

**GUILD DYNAMICS IN
SEVENTEENTH-
CENTURY ISTANBUL:
Fluidity and Leverage**

EUNJEONG YI

BRILL

GUILD DYNAMICS IN SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY ISTANBUL

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BY

EUNJEONG YI



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TO MY PARENTS

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PREFACE

This work is based on my doctoral dissertation, “The Istanbul Guilds in the Seventeenth Century: Leverage in Changing Times” (Harvard, 2000). Some 10 years have passed since I first saw a set of colorful miniatures depicting the procession of Istanbul guilds in an Ottoman history survey class. I was interested in guilds immediately, but as I went on to read the secondary literature on Ottoman guilds I found that works painting “big pictures” of the guilds generally portrayed them in a rather bleak tone. They tended to judge that Ottoman guilds in general, and the Istanbul guilds in particular, were tradition-bound and/or closely controlled by the government. The gap between the vivid miniatures and the monotonous “big pictures” posed me a daunting question: were the guilds of Istanbul such ineffective, inert, weak entities?

This book is the modest result of my pursuit of that question. Since it is a general (overambitious?) study that tries to accommodate all guilds mentioned in court records, *divan* documents, chronicles and so forth of the early to mid-seventeenth century, the arguments may come across as being too broad. However, I find comfort in the thought that at least I discovered some patterns of behavior applying to many guilds that in fact shared a common mode and arena of action; I also believe that my findings seriously modify conventional wisdom on the guilds.

I must thank many people without whose help this book would not have been possible. First and foremost, I would like to thank Professor Cemal Kafadar, who was my insightful advisor during my period of graduate study at Harvard. I greatly enjoyed being his student and cannot express enough gratitude for all he has taught me. I also thank Professors Roger Owen and Edward Keenan, who as members of my dissertation committee made valuable comments on my rough drafts. After I graduated, I further benefited from comments made by prominent scholars such as Suraiya Faroqhi, Halil İnalçık, Engin Akarlı, Donald Quataert, Şevket Pamuk and Molly Greene. I feel the deepest gratitude towards all of them. Additionally, I greatly benefited from discussions held during both the Labor

History Workshop held at New York University (March, 2001) and a double panel from the 2001 MESA conference entitled “‘Guilds’ in the Ottoman Empire.” While I learned so much from my mentors mentioned above, any mistakes that remain in this book are mine alone.

I spent an enjoyable and productive time in the archives of Istanbul thanks to the kind assistance of the archival staff. I thank the present and former personnel of the Müftülük archives, especially Abdülaziz Bayındır, Ömer Özkan and İsmail Kurt, all of whom helped me read difficult documents and gave me useful information. I will never forget the hospitable atmosphere of the small reading room on the second floor. I would also like to thank members of the staff of the Başbakanlık archives, who were also very kind, and Professor Halil Sahillioğlu, who generously answered my questions. The director of the Süleymaniye Library, Nevzat Kaya, and his staff were always willing to help me in acquiring the microfilms of documents and literary sources. In addition, Ülkü Altındağ of the Topkapı Palace archives allowed me to read precious documents and even lent me her private books. I am also indebted to the personnel of Istanbul University libraries and the Atatürk Kitaplığı (The Municipal Library of Istanbul) for their kindness. With regard to the reading of documents, I am indebted to Mr. Yücel Demirel, who tutored me, to Professors Şinasi Tekin and Cemal Kafadar, and to my friend Himmet Taşkömür.

I sincerely thank my knowledgeable and good-humored copy editor, Jason J. Nash, who has not only proficiently made my clumsy sentences flow, but has also helped me think and write more clearly. Additionally, this book was made possible by the many institutions that aided me financially. The Korea Foundation for Advanced Studies generously funded my graduate study for five years, which is an example of rare generosity in this age. The American Research Institute in Turkey (ARIT)’s dissertation research fellowship provided partial support for my archival research and accommodated me in its hostel (1996–1997). The travel grant of the History Department of Harvard University in 1998 and the post-doctoral research grant of ARIT also enabled me to undertake further crucial research.

Last but not least, I heartily thank my loving family. I am grateful to my husband for his unwavering support and wisdom that have helped me through difficult times. My parents have always believed

in me and have been the source of my greatest support, especially in assisting me with many of my child-rearing responsibilities. I also thank my wonderful parents-in-law for understanding and appreciating my work. Lastly, I feel extremely lucky to have a healthy and happy four-year-old daughter who has blossomed despite her mother's busy working schedule.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AK	Atatürk Kitaplığı
AŞ	‘Atıf Şikâyet Defteri
<i>EI</i> ¹	Encyclopedia of Islam, first edition
<i>EI</i> ²	Encyclopedia of Islam, second edition
EK	Eyüb Kadılığı
GK	Galata Kadılığı
<i>İA</i> ¹	İslam Ansiklopedisi (Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı)
<i>İA</i> ²	İslam Ansiklopedisi (Diyanet Vakfı)
IBK	İstanbul Bab Kadılığı
<i>İFM</i>	İstanbul Üniversitesi İktisat Fakültesi Mecmuası
<i>İJMES</i>	International Journal of Middle East Studies
İK	İstanbul Kadılığı
<i>İstA</i> ¹	İstanbul Ansiklopedisi (by Reşat Ekrem Koçu)
<i>İstA</i> ²	İstanbul Ansiklopedisi (Tarih Vakfı)
<i>JESHO</i>	Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient
KK	Kamil Kepeci
MC	Muallim Cevdet
MD	Mühimme Defteri
MM	Maliyeden Müdevver
<i>TSAB</i>	Turkish Studies Association Bulletin
TTK	Türk Tarih Kurumu
WVGÖ	Verband der Wissenschaftlichen Gesellschaften Österreichs

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A NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION

I follow the *IJMES* system of transliteration for Ottoman Turkish and Arabic words, with slight modifications (I added h for ح and s for س). When I cite words from published or secondary sources, I adhere to the system of the source. Words commonly used in English are rendered in their most common and simple forms (e.g., *waqf* instead of *vakıf*, and *sharia* instead of *sharī‘a*). I italicize all foreign words, except longer passages (i.e., longer than a full line) in quotation marks. Official titles are italicized except when used with a person’s name, and place names and other proper nouns are not italicized or fully transliterated. Additionally, there are inevitable inconsistencies in the transliteration due to citations from various sources.

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A NOTE ON TRANSLATION

The translation of trade names is very difficult, especially because the Istanbul guilds were divided into extremely specialized groups, and because Turkish, Arabic and Persian synonyms were all applied. Therefore, the translation is at times very descriptive and cumbersome, although I have tried to avoid unnecessary complications. Most of the time, the trade names are hyphenated (e.g., brocade-maker) except for those that are established single words (e.g., shoemaker).

INTRODUCTION

Terminology

In undertaking a study of seventeenth-century Istanbul guilds, I should first clarify what I mean by “guilds” in the context of Ottoman history. It is undoubtedly dangerous to borrow terms from European history because they are loaded with various unintended cultural, social and mental constructs shaped in another historical context.¹ The definition of a “guild,” even in European historiography, can be very imprecise since it can designate disparate organizations emanating from an already wide range of time and space.² It is indeed problematic to use this ill-defined term in non-European historiographies without redefining it in the context of particular histories, although this happens all too frequently. Middle Eastern historiography has been no exception in this regard. One might say that research on Ottoman craft organizations “suffered for a long time from the lack of a clear definition of the term ‘guild.’”³ In addition, the term might give a false impression (e.g., of having a fully formed institutional structure), whereas this was not always the case in Ottoman history. The implied comparison with European guilds may lead some to consider that Middle Eastern trade organizations are similar but incomplete versions of European guilds, rather than understanding them in their own historical context.

¹ Antony Black, “Decolonization of Concepts,” *Journal of Early Modern History* 1–1 (1997) 55–69. This article shows many examples of “exported” European concepts that are used in Middle Eastern historiography in misleading ways.

² While there were a wide variety of entities that were called guilds in Europe, the most typical were city-wide merchant guilds and specialized craft guilds, and the former usually participated in the administration of the city. In addition, European craftsmen moved from city to city rather frequently. For general information on European guilds, see Steven Epstein, “Guilds and Métiers,” in *Dictionary of the Middle Ages* (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1985), Sylvia Thrupp, “The Gilds,” *Cambridge Economic History of Europe* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1963) 230–80, Antony Black, *Guilds and Civil Society in European Political Thought* (London: Methuen, 1984) chapters 1, 2 and 4, and Stephen Epstein, *Wage Labor and Guilds in Medieval Europe* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1991).

³ Gabriel Baer, “The Structure of Turkish Guilds and Its Significance for Ottoman Social History,” *Fellah and Townsman in the Middle East: Studies in Social History* (London: Frank Cass and Company, 1982) 193.

To address these problems, one may choose one of the following options: a. to use neutral descriptive terms such as “craft organizations” or “trade organizations,” b. to use indigenous terms such as *tāʿife* or *eṣnāf* that are used in primary sources,⁴ or c. to continue to use the term “guild” while clarifying what is meant. It is rather cumbersome to use descriptive terms repetitively, and the indigenous terms are often even more imprecise than the term in question, “guild.” Namely, *tāʿife* or *eṣnāf* could loosely designate a much wider range of social categories beyond that of organized trade groups. Therefore, it would be misleading to translate such terms from sources automatically as “guilds,”⁵ although they often include craft and service groups that I would like to designate as such.

I decided to use this problematic term “guild” with some clarification. I use it in the general sense, divorced from the European historical context, meaning an organized urban craft/service group that usually had an internal hierarchy and official leadership. I use the term mainly for the sake of convenience and because there is no better term for now. At the same time, the use of the term has gained so considerable a currency in the field of Ottoman history that it has become a standard term describing trade organizations. Behind the use of the term in Ottoman history is a tacit acceptance among scholars that, aside from legal specifics, Ottoman trade organizations had important commonalities with their European counterparts. Roughly speaking, they were both monopolistic associations established for the production or sale of certain commodities and were constituted by individual masters who agreed to follow their internal rules.⁶ So, although the word “guild” may not be the perfectly neutral universal term for pre-industrial trade organizations, one may try to use it in that sense alone.

⁴ Engin Akarlı expressed concerns about the careless use of the term “guild” and prefers to use *eṣnāf*. Presentation at the conference “Law and Its Application in the Ottoman Empire: A Workshop” (Harvard University, April 1998).

⁵ For example, we often hear that Evliya Çelebi enumerated that more than a thousand guilds existed in Istanbul in 1638, but this is the result of the simplistic translation of *eṣnāf* as guilds.

⁶ The European guilds, as well the Middle Eastern, have been considered negatively in terms of economic efficiency (that is, traditional, restrictive and opposed to the growth of a free market economy), although this view is being challenged of late. See Charles R. Hickson and Earl A. Thompson, “A New Theory of Guilds and European Economic Development,” *Explorations in Economic History* 28 (1991) 127–68. See also S.R. Epstein, “Craft Guilds, Apprenticeship, and Technological Change in Preindustrial Europe,” *Journal of Economic History* 48: 3–4 (1988) 684–713.

The mainstay of what I call guilds consists of artisans and service workers that operated in the civilian economy of Istanbul, as opposed to the palace artisans or artisans in the military sector. Furthermore, I will use the phrase “guild system” to neutrally designate a realm that consisted of various guilds in Istanbul that interacted with and learned from one another on all kinds of issues. The phrase “guild system” by no means indicates a state-imposed system as is often the connotation in Ottoman history.⁷ Admittedly, the government and its various branches exercised great power over the guilds by setting prices, collecting taxes and securing provisions for the state and armed forces. Although demands from the state and armed forces probably even facilitated the formation of some guilds, the government’s will was not the sole determining factor in the guild system as I see it. I would prefer to see the guild system as an arena made up mainly of guilds that came into being, split into regional groups, learned from one another, institutionally evolved, became outdated or adapted to new situations. Even if the government set parameters for the guild system, internal dynamics were at least as important as state control.

Undoubtedly, there were unorganized marginal tradesmen, but they lie mostly beyond the scope of this book. Merchants who traded over wide areas are not included because they functioned under a different set of conditions, although they may have had some relations to the craft sector.⁸ Craft and service associations were mostly stationary, and mainly covered the needs of their immediate local market. Such trade organizations dealt in the commodities that were directly connected to the daily survival of urban people—foodstuff, clothes, shoes, water, fuels, and so on. These groups functioned as collective bodies and were seen as such by the state. Although they did not participate in the administration of the city in a formal way, the “guilds” had unmistakable importance in urban society.

⁷ Donald Quataert doubts if the “guild-system” in the usual sense ever existed in reality. See his “Labor History and the Ottoman Empire, c. 1700–1922,” *International Labor and Working-Class History* 60 (2001) 101.

⁸ Suraiya Faruqi, “Merchant Networks and Ottoman Craft Production (16–17th Centuries),” *The Proceedings of International Conference on Urbanism in Islam*, 5 vols. (Tokyo: Middle Eastern Culture Center, 1989) 1: 85–132.

Historiography and Questions

In the historiography of the Ottoman guilds, the Istanbul guilds have always occupied a special place, just as Istanbul has received special treatment in Ottoman studies. Generalizations about Ottoman guilds have been based on specific impressions of Istanbul guilds.⁹ We tend to feel as if we know more about Istanbul guilds than those of other cities in the Ottoman Empire because of Evliya Çelebi's famous travel account¹⁰ and Osman Nuri's¹¹ and Ahmed Refik's¹² collections of sources that concerned many Istanbul guilds. However, we do not yet in fact have substantial knowledge about the guilds of Istanbul, since there has been little in-depth analysis, let alone a detailed description of them. This would seem to contradict complaints about the trend to overemphasize the center and major cities in the field of Ottoman history.¹³

The liveliest contemporary portraits of Istanbul guilds are found in the books of festivals (*sûrnâmeler*) and in the travelogues describing guild processions, which were part of grand imperial festivals along with the shows of entertainers and mock battles. For example, well over a hundred groups—most of them professional guilds—paraded at a festival celebrating the circumcision of a prince in 1582.¹⁴ Each guild exerted itself to stage a spectacular and entertaining show, and

⁹ Gabriel Baer's articles are typical examples. See footnote 28.

¹⁰ Evliya Çelebi, *Seyâhatnâme*, 10 vols. (Istanbul: İkdâm Matbaası, 1314/1896–97–1938), *Evliya Çelebi Seyâhatnâmesi*, vol. 1, *Istanbul*, ed. Orhan Şaik Gökyay (Istanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 1996), *Narrative of Travels in Europe, Asia, and Africa in the Seventeenth Century by Evliya Efendi*, ed. and trans. Joseph von Hammer (London: Parbury, Allen and Co., 1834).

¹¹ Osman Nuri (Ergin), *Mecelle-i Umur-ı Belediye*, 5 vols. (Istanbul, 1914–1922). They are newly published in nine volumes (Istanbul: İstanbul Büyükşehir Belediyesi, 1995). Unless otherwise indicated, page numbers are given according to the old version.

¹² Ahmed Refik (Altınay) *Istanbul Hayatı*, 4 vols. (Istanbul: Enderun Kitabevi, 1988, first published 1333/1914–15).

¹³ As a recent example, Beshara Doumani expressed concern about the continuing trend of emphasizing major cities and nations during the thematic conversation “Whither the Social and Cultural History of the Middle East?” at the MESA Annual Meeting, 1999.

¹⁴ Mehmet Arslan, *Türk Edebiyatında Manzum Surnameler* (Ankara: Atatürk Kültür Merkezi, 1999) 229. The procession of guilds in the tradition of Ottoman festivals was first established in 1582, although they had occasionally participated in imperial festivals earlier in the sixteenth century. See Derin Terzioğlu, “The Imperial Circumcision Festival of 1582,” *Muqarnas* 12 (1995) 90. For a transcription of a *sûrnâme* about the 1582 festival, see Gisela Procházka-Eisl, *Das Sûrnâme-i Hümâyûn* (Istanbul: Isis, 1995).

there was a strong element of competition among the guilds that participated. As they marched, guildsmen in their best clothes displayed their wares and products, and even small-scale workshops on carriages with actual craftsmen exhibiting the everyday processes of their work were featured in the festivities. A colorful banner with a guild's name preceded each group of marchers. When a group of guildsmen arrived under the pavilion of the sultan, they paid homage, prayed for him, and presented a product of their trade or some other artifacts of precious metal. The sultan received such gifts favorably, and in return gave rewards or granted the wishes of the guild.¹⁵

In contrast to the liveliness and centrality that the guilds displayed in festivals, the modern literature about them has painted an altogether different picture. First, this topic has drawn little attention, despite the importance of the guild system in urban Ottoman society. Although there are books and articles focusing on the subject of guilds published before the 1980s, most of them do not address the subject in its own right. They tend to view the guilds in the light of one limited aspect in their relationship to a "more central" theme, be it religious mysticism, the administrative concerns of the government, or staunch traditionalism.

The fact that there are very few scholarly works devoted solely to the study of Middle Eastern guilds reflects a general lack of past interest in the subject. One may start from Max Weber, who considered non-European guilds unimportant on the grounds that they did not constitute an urban community as a corporate body and therefore were not conducive to the formation of "civil society."¹⁶ Extending the Weberian view of the Middle East is the literature of "the Islamic city."¹⁷ Its basic tenet was that the Islamic city did not have municipal

¹⁵ Arslan, 218–232. Metin And, *Osmanlı Şenliklerinde Türk Sanatları* (Ankara: Kültür ve Turizm Bakanlığı, 1982) 227–248. Sometimes, other social groups such as *medrese* students (*sūh̄tegān*) or dervishes mixed into the guild processions, and were similarly treated by the authorities. While the state exhibited its power and grandeur at the festivals, guilds and other social groups could convey their messages to the authorities in public. For example, coffee sellers and *medrese* students were each granted their wishes in 1582. See Terzioğlu, 87.

¹⁶ Max Weber, *The City*, trans. and ed. Don Martindale and Gertrud Neuwirth (New York: The Free Press, 1958) 80–99.

¹⁷ See Janet Abu-Lughod, "The Islamic City—Historic Myth, Islamic Essence, and Contemporary Relevance," *IJMES* 19 (1987) 155–176. This is a critical article on how the idea of the "Islamic city" was originally constructed by Western Orientalists drawing upon a small sample of North African cities and upon one another's authorities. The "chain of transmission (*isnād*)" included William Marçais,

institutions such as a city council or guilds at the level of medieval Europe. This discourse legalistically focused on the *sharia*, which recognized individuals rather than corporate bodies, and concluded that Islamic cities lacked corporations.¹⁸ Moreover, it characterized Islamic political life as having a monarchic tendency: strong and intrusive central government and weak social groups subjugated by the ruler. This in turn supposedly hampered the development of institutional autonomy.¹⁹ It seems to imply, therefore, that the Islamic city did not have the potential to achieve what European cities had attained. Against the background of the stagnant and occasionally violent “Islamic city,” Middle Eastern craft and service associations were seen as being devoid of corporate qualities, or they were branded as inferior versions of their European archetypes. Since Europe was the measure of all other cultures, and the Middle Eastern city compared so negatively with that standard, Middle Eastern guilds were not an attractive topic to study for social scientists or social historians until the beginning of the 1980s.²⁰

Instead, a salient trend since the 1920s has been to look at Middle Eastern guilds from the viewpoint of religion and mysticism. This trend started with Louis Massignon, who viewed the craft guilds as by-products of the anti-Sunni Qarmati movement that aimed to overthrow the Abbasid Caliphate.²¹ According to him, the guilds were Qarmati fraternities as well as professional organizations. Even after

Robert Brunschvig and Gustave von Grunebaum. For an articulation of this viewpoint, see S.M. Stern, “The Constitution of the Islamic City,” in A.H. Hourani and S.M. Stern eds., *The Islamic City* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1970).

¹⁸ However, according to Baber Johansen, *Contingency in Islamic Law: Legal and Ethical Norms in the Muslim Fiqh* (Leiden: Brill, 1999) 77–106, 359, there are cases in which Islamic jurisprudence recognized groups: for example, Islamic jurists have discussed the definition of the “all embracing town” and the collective responsibility of artisanal associations for blood money (*āqila*). Indeed, it would be too extreme to state that there was no corporation as a reality or concept in the Islamic world.

¹⁹ Stern, 34.

²⁰ Here, one should mention Sabri Ülgener, whose view on the guilds and pre-capitalist economy uniquely blends Weberian sociology and an appreciation of non-economic “medieval” values. Although he categorically states that Ottoman society and guilds were closed upon themselves and completely traditionalistic, he also attributes to the traditional mindset positive qualities such as patience and perfectionism. See his *İktisadi Çözülmenin Ahlak ve Zihniyet Dünyası* (Istanbul: Der Yayınları, 1981).

²¹ Qarmatism was a part of Ismā‘ilism, which gained a following in the late ninth century (W. Madelung, “Qarmaṭī” *EF*). For Massignon’s theory, see his “Sinf” *EF* and “La ‘Futuwwa’ ou ‘pacte d’honneur artisanal’ entre les travailleurs musulman au Moyen Age,” *La Nouvelle Clio* 4 (1952) 171–98. Also, see Bernard Lewis, “The Islamic Guilds,” *Economic History Review* 8 (1937) 20–37.

centuries, the guilds continued to associate themselves with mystical sufi orders and *futuwwa* (*fütüvvet* in Turkish) organizations,²² which were independent and therefore suspect in the eyes of state authorities. This theory has two problems: first, there is no clear evidence that Qarmatism and the trade organizations were interrelated; second, it views the “Islamic guild” as a monolithic entity that varied little over vast stretches of time and space. Massignon’s thesis is now largely discredited, and some scholars in the early 1970s severely criticized his loose application of the term “guild.”²³

However, Massignon’s thesis at least provoked ongoing interest in the religious aspect of Middle Eastern trade organizations. For example, Franz Taeschner also studied craft organizations as creators of semi-religious bonds.²⁴ He produced solid studies on *futuwwa* and *ahî*²⁵ organizations, and their religio-moral codes and symbolic rituals expressed in the *fütüvetnâmes*. This led him tangentially to the study of Ottoman guilds.²⁶ *Ahî* organizations flourished in the vacuum of strong political power in post-Mongol Anatolia, but dwindled after their peak in the fourteenth century as Ottoman centralization proceeded.

²² *Futuwwa* literally means the qualities of the “young man,” and the term designates various movements—or their religio-moral codes—in the urban communities of the Muslim East. One may view it as a men’s club that aimed at upholding manly virtues, such as “generosity” and “hospitality.” Such movements drew urban men of lower-class background (mostly tradesmen) who did not have the support networks of local notables. (Marshall G.S. Hodgson, *The Venture of Islam*, 3 vols (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977 c. 1974) 2: 125–131. In the political anarchy when the Abbasid Caliphate had weakened or when the Mongols had disrupted the existing political system, *futuwwa* groups gained power in many cities. Hammer-Purgstall saw it as a form of chivalry, and *futuwwa* is often associated with sufism and/or professional organizations (Cahen and Taeschner, “Futuwwa,” *EI*²).

²³ Stern, 36–47, Claude Cahen, “Y a-t-il eu des corporations professionnelles dans le monde musulman classique?: Quelques notes et réflexions,” in A.H. Hourani and S.M. Stern eds. *The Islamic City* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1970) 52–56, Gabriel Baer “The Organization of Labour,” *Handbuch der Orientalistik Abteilung 1*, Band 6, Abschnitt 6, Teil 1. (1977) 30.

²⁴ However, Taeschner did not accept the hypothesis that the Qarmati movement created guilds (Lewis, 26).

²⁵ *Ahî* means the Anatolian version of *futuwwa* developed in the late Seljuk period and after, and also those who participated in such urban brotherhoods (Taeschner, “Akhî” *EF*) By *ahîsm* I mean the religio-moral principles cherished by the *ahîs* and the observation of such principles.

²⁶ Taeschner wrote a few significant works on *futuwwa* and *ahî* literature, including *Zünfte und Bruderschaften im Islam: Texte zur Geschichte der Futuwwa* (Zürich and München: Artemis Verlag, 1979) and *Gülschehris Mesnevi auf Achî Eran, den Heiligen von Kürschehr und Patron der Türkischen Zünfte* (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1955). In the former, he mentions H. Thorning, *Beiträge zur Kenntnis des Islamischen Vereinswesens auf Grund von Bast Madad et-Taufiq* (*Türkische Bibliothek* 16, Berlin, 1913) as an important precursor.

According to Taeschner, *ahîsm* continued throughout the Ottoman centuries in urban guilds generally in connection with sufi lodges and particularly through subscribing to the authority of an *ahî baba*, the successor (or his local delegate) of Ahi Evren, the patron saint of tanners. Although many guilds may well have been involved in semi-religious communal activities, it is rather dangerous to make the umbrella generalization that all trades were covered by *ahîsm*. Abdalbaki Gölpınarlı, another scholar who concentrated on the *fütüvvetnâmes*, regards the guilds as *ahî* organizations as well.²⁷ Even nowadays, some scholars seem to identify Ottoman guilds completely with *ahîsm* (at least up to the seventeenth century), instead of observing the guild organizations critically in and of themselves.²⁸ Because this approach mainly uses the *futuwwa* manuals, which are prescriptive rather than descriptive, it tends to give an idealized portrait of Ottoman guilds. While the interest in *ahîsm* in the context of guild organizations is perfectly legitimate, one has to be aware that the structure and activities of guilds cannot be comprehensively explained by a communal religion.

Other scholars such as Robert Mantran²⁹ and Gabriel Baer³⁰ viewed Ottoman guilds mainly from administrative, economic and sociological points of view. It is thanks to their contributions that guilds became a subject of study independent from the religious aspect, and they

²⁷ Abdalbaki Gölpınarlı, "İslam ve Türk İlerinde Fütüvvet Teşkilatı ve Kaynakları," *İFM* 11:1-4 (1949-50) [the whole volume], "Burgazi ve «Fütüvvet-Nâme» si," *İFM* 15 (1953-4) 76-153, "Fütüvvet-Nâme-i Şeyh Seyyid Huseyn ibni Gaybî," *İFM* 17 (1955-56) 73-125, "«Fütüvvet-Nâme-i Sultânî» ve Fütüvvet Hakkında Bâzı Notlar," *ibid.* 127-55.

²⁸ For example, see Neşet Çağatay, *Bir Türk Kurumu Olan Ahilik* (Ankara: TTK, 1997, first published in 1989), Yusuf Ekinci, *Ahilik ve Meslek Eğitimi* (Istanbul: Millî Eğitim Bakanlığı, 1989), Adnan Gülerman and Sevda Taştakil, *Ahi Teşkilatının Türk Toplumunun Sosyal ve Ekonomik Yapısı üzerindeki Etkileri* (Ankara: Feryal Matbaası, 1993). Ahmet Kal'a traces the origin of this notion back to Osman Nuri's *Mecelle*. See his *İstanbul Esnaf Birlikleri ve Nizamları* (Istanbul: İstanbul Büyükşehir Belediyesi İstanbul Araştırma Merkezi, 1998) 61-65.

²⁹ Robert Mantran, *Istanbul dans la seconde moitié de XVII^e siècle* (Paris: Librairie Adrien Maisonneuve, 1962).

³⁰ Gabriel Baer, "The Administrative, Economic, and Social Functions of Turkish Guilds," *IJMES* 1 (1970), and "Monopolies and Restrictive Practices of Turkish Guilds," *JESHO* 13 (1970). His major articles about the "Turkish" guilds were reprinted in Gabriel Baer, *Fellah and Townsman in the Middle East: Studies in Social History* (London: Frank Cass and Company, 1982), part three: "The Turkish Guilds" 147-222. His work on the Egyptian guilds is much more original and less schematic. See his *Egyptian Guilds in Modern Times* (Jerusalem: The Israel Oriental Society, 1964).

played important roles in shaping major impressions about Istanbul's guilds. Overall, the conventional wisdom about Ottoman (and therefore Istanbul) guilds has been either that the state authorities rigidly controlled them or that they were staunchly conservative organizations averse to change. However, at present there are few scholars who completely subscribe to these theories. Such images of the guilds were well suited to the presumptions about non-Western societies, such as in the above-mentioned literature of the "Islamic city" and the notion of "Oriental despotism."³¹ More particularly, they corresponded to the paradigm of "Ottoman decline" in Ottoman historiography, which saw no positive social or political developments occurring in the Ottoman Empire from the late sixteenth century onward.

Mantran's book is an impressive survey of social and economic life in Istanbul in the second half of the seventeenth century, and it treats guilds as an integral part of the whole social organism. Baer's articles also played a pioneering role in exploring the social and economic, as opposed to the religious and mystical, aspects of Ottoman guilds. Since the publication of these works, there have been few comprehensive studies examining Istanbul guilds, thus showing their place as classics in the historiography of Istanbul guilds. Although Mantran's and Baer's focuses, arguments and details differ, they share some common assumptions about the nature of Istanbul's guilds and their relationship with the government.

Let us first summarize Mantran's view of the Istanbul guilds. According to him, the administration had enormous power over the city's economic life. "The central government allocated practically all power in the city of Istanbul."³² The practice of price-fixing and market supervision through authorities such as the *kadi* and *muhtesib* were evidence enough for him to characterize the government authorities as *dirigiste*, authoritarian and interventionist. He even says that the "Turkish" type of guilds was complementary to the administration put in place by the sultan, which gradually conquered the Byzantine type of guilds. Moreover, he assumed that the government was responsible

³¹ Karl A. Wittfogel, *Oriental Despotism* (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1978, c. 1957) 117–18. The particular theory of Wittfogel based on the hypothesis of "hydraulic society" may not have been itself predominant, but it is in the longstanding context of seeing non-Western societies as being governed by despotic rulers.

³² Mantran, *Istanbul*, 287–288.

for the division of the guilds³³ and much of the issuance/distribution of *gedik*.³⁴

While Mantran portrays state control of the guilds as very strict, he does not overlook a few of their autonomous features and rights. Based on first-hand research from archival materials, he points out that guilds were able to elect their own headmen and restrict the number of shops in each trade, and that they could appeal to the authorities should government functionaries abuse their administrative power. Therefore, the headmen took on an ambiguous role in which they were representatives of the guilds while at the same time being answerable to the authorities. On the other hand, although he admires the “grand liberty” given to the guilds to appeal and the government’s “impartial judgment” respecting legitimate claims,³⁵ Mantran does not place much importance on this “rapport” *per se*, other than that the government was able to deflect the discontent of the guilds and make them more obedient. In other words, the guilds’ autonomous rights that existed were “allowed” by the government since they would in turn facilitate state control.

According to Mantran, another element that made guilds obedient to government authorities was the religious control of society. He focuses on the fact that many of the sultan’s orders were supported by the religio-juridical statements of the grand *mufti* of Istanbul (*seyhülislām*). As the state authorities were backed up by the religious authorities, the guilds had religious leaders (e.g., *seyh* and *duaci*) as well. This religious leadership within the guilds—although in the seventeenth century it was decreasing in terms of influence—allegedly made the guilds less prone to turbulence.³⁶ As long as they were able to treasure their religious customs and traditions and maintain an internal social hierarchy and solidarity the guilds were content to “vegetate.” After all, according to Mantran, Islam was a religion that prohibited “inno-

³³ Mantran, *Istanbul*, 354–357. Mantran mentions the minute division of guilds according to their specialties along with a comment that the government may not have wanted to further divide the guilds so as to be able to deal with only a limited number of responsible guild headmen to coordinate.

³⁴ Mantran, *Istanbul*, 368ff. *Gedik* may have various meanings depending on the context, but in the most general sense regarding artisans and service workers it means a right to engage in trade within a guild. The issuance of *gediks* by the government authorities is not confirmed for the seventeenth century, although there are cases dating from later centuries. See Chapter III for a detailed discussion.

³⁵ Mantran, *Istanbul*, 377–378.

³⁶ Mantran, *Istanbul*, 288.

vation,” and only non-Muslim minorities and foreigners could usher in change.³⁷

As a whole, Mantran’s view of the late-seventeenth-century Istanbul guild system is one of harmonious control: the government was able to intervene in guild matters, but allowed some commercial freedom; the guilds were able to appeal to the authorities, but were generally obedient and useful for administrative purposes. The government and the guilds supported each other in a stable and conservative economic and social structure.³⁸ According to this picture, although the guilds were given some legal rights, guildsmen were not vigorous actors but were more akin to passive preservers of tradition.³⁹

Whereas Mantran’s book is about the economic and social life of Istanbul in the second half of the seventeenth century,⁴⁰ Gabriel Baer’s articles theoretically cover all “Turkish” guilds of the Ottoman Empire from the sixteenth to the nineteenth century. However, it is clear from his sources⁴¹ that he focused mainly on the guilds of Istanbul and assumed that they must have been the norm for Ottoman guilds in general.

In Baer’s view, the central state was the most important actor in the guild system, and the guilds were merely an administrative link between the state and the population of the towns. Guilds by themselves, therefore, supposedly only had minimal power or autonomy. Although Baer recognizes the communal aspect of the guilds’ internal life, such as the arbitration of internal conflicts, yearly excursions, mutual aid funds and the occasional expulsion of troublemakers,

³⁷ Mantran, *Istanbul*, 329.

³⁸ Mantran seems to blame the guilds more than the government for conservatism. André Raymond’s monumental work on the merchants and craftsmen in Cairo (*Artisan et Commerçants au Caire au XVIII^e Siècle* [Damas: Institut Français de Damas, 1973] 206–229) features a comparable view that the stagnation in economy and technology was partly due to the limits of the guild structure. Mantran’s overview of the Istanbul guilds is similar to and may have been influenced by the notion of the Islamic guilds in Gibb and Bowen, *Islamic Society and the West* (1950) vol. 1, pt. 1, 276–281.

³⁹ Mantran underestimates these appeals on the grounds that they were mainly aimed at protecting already given privileges (*Istanbul*, 329). He maintains that the defense of rights were essentially individual rather than collective, except in cases where the sultan had granted privileges to a guild.

⁴⁰ However, we may note here that Mantran also draws freely from Osman Nuri’s *Mecelle* that rarely makes differentiation between time periods regarding the guild system of Istanbul.

⁴¹ His main sources are the aforementioned Osman Nuri’s and Ahmet Refik’s collections of documents and Evliya Çelebi’s travel account.

he emphasizes the fact that most guild activities, such as the punishment of a member, were brought before the authorities.⁴² He did not think of the possibility that guilds might have voluntarily brought some of their cases to the *kadi* simply for the purpose of notarization and formalization.

According to Baer, the government adopted many restrictive measures in order to control urban crafts, such as limiting the number of guild members, prohibiting “wild” (extra-guild) business, and arranging job specialization and spatial concentration. Guild monopolies were important since it was the basis upon which the government could enforce its decisions on issues such as fixed prices.⁴³ The government aimed to control the guilds in an easier fashion through spatial concentration, and to keep them harmoniously in business through job specialization. The headmen of the guilds, who were more like “government agents” than guild representatives, were in charge of controlling the establishment of new shops⁴⁴ and had to guarantee honest behavior on the part of guild members.⁴⁵ Almost all aspects of guild activities were under government supervision.

In short, Baer’s representation of the Istanbul guilds is one of subjugation under the rigid and unilateral control of the government, as opposed to Mantran’s picture of harmonious control. Other elements such as religious and ethnic divisions in the society and in the guild system assisted government control, but the most important factor was the government’s will and ability to control and intervene. That the government was willing and able to tightly control guild affairs is assumed by Baer without critical examination.⁴⁶

In comparing and analyzing the two most comprehensive works on the Istanbul guilds, one may focus on the differences and say that while Mantran views the guilds as relatively autonomous organizations, Baer regards them as rigidly controlled by the government.⁴⁷ However,

⁴² Baer, “Functions,” 43.

⁴³ Baer, “Functions,” 39.

⁴⁴ Baer, “Monopolies,” 147.

⁴⁵ Baer, “Monopolies,” 148.

⁴⁶ To be fair to Gabriel Baer, one should note a short article entitled “Ottoman Guilds—A Reassessment,” *VIII. Türk Tarih Kongresi: Kongreye Sunulan Bildiriler* (1976) 2: 95–101. He modified some of his extreme statements after his student Haim Gerber wrote a dissertation on Bursa that had a different view of the guilds, as we shall see below. Ultimately, however, he did not yield his position that “the principal functions of the guilds in these [i.e., Ottoman] towns were to serve the government as an administrative link.”

⁴⁷ Faroqhi, “Crisis and Change, 1590–1699,” in *An Economic and Social History of*

there are unmistakable commonalities between the two: both scholars regard state control as strong and authoritarian and the guilds as either weak (Baer) or obedient (Mantran) social groups under the government; neither of them makes sufficient chronological differentiation, which suggests that they view the potential for change in Istanbul's guilds as minimal. Additionally, both seem to imply that religious belief or divisions facilitated government control.

The image of the Istanbul guilds shaped by Baer and Mantran has rarely been challenged, although more and more people have become dissatisfied with their notions. Baer's articles especially have become widely used as general references on the Ottoman guilds; for non-guild specialists and social scientists dealing with Ottoman history, Baer was an undisputed authority.⁴⁸

Many historians studying the Ottoman guilds in the 1980s and 1990s, however, were not satisfied with the aforesaid images and came to focus on autonomous features of the guilds. Studies on the guilds of Bursa, Ankara, Aleppo, Damascus and Cairo portray more autonomously functioning provincial guild systems than previously expected.⁴⁹ Important articles about the Istanbul guilds were also published from the 1980s on.⁵⁰ Halil İnalçık studied a case from the eighteenth century in which a new guild headman needed to be approved by

the Ottoman Empire, ed. İnalçık and Quataert (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994) 586.

⁴⁸ See for example, Şerif. A. Mardin, "Ideology and Religion in the Turkish Revolution," *IJMES* 2 (1971) 204, and İlkey Sunar and Binnaz Toprak, "Islam in Politics: The Case of Turkey," *Government and Opposition* 18 (1983) 423.

⁴⁹ See Haim Gerber, *Economy and Society in an Ottoman city: Bursa, 1600–1700* (Jerusalem: Hebrew University, 1988), Özer Ergenç, "Osmanlı Şehirlerindeki Yönetim Kurumlarının Niteliği Üzerinde Bazı Düşünceler," in Osman Okyar and Halil İnalçık eds., *Türkiye'nin Sosyal ve Ekonomik Tarihi, 1071–1920* (Ankara, 1980) 1265–74. Abdülkarim Rafeq, "Craft Organization, Work Ethics, and the Strains of Change in Ottoman Syria," *The Journal of the American Oriental Society* 111–113 (1991) 495–511, Pascale Ghazaleh, "The Guilds: Between Tradition and Modernity," in *The State and Its Servants: Administration in Egypt from Ottoman Times to the Present*, ed. Nelly Hanna (Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press, 1995) 60–74, same author, *Masters of the Trade: Crafts and Craftspeople in Cairo, 1750–1850* (Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press, 1999) and Suraiya Faroqhi, "Ottoman Guilds in the Late Eighteenth Century: The Bursa Case," *Making a Living in the Ottoman Lands: 1480 to 1820* (Istanbul, The Isis Press, 1995) 93–112. See also Amnon Cohen, *The Guilds of Ottoman Jerusalem* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 2001).

⁵⁰ There are also some valuable factual studies on individual guilds, such as boatmen and saddle makers. See Cengiz Orhonlu, "İstanbul'da Kayıkçılık ve Kayık İşletmeciliği," *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Şehircilik ve Ulaşım üzerine Araştırmaları* (İzmir: 1984), and Nejdet Ertuğ, "Osmanlı Ulaşım Sisteminde Kayıkçılık" Ph.D. thesis, (Istanbul, 1999). See also Çağatay Uluçay, "İstanbul Saraçhanesi ve Saraçlarına Dair Bir Araştırma" *Tarih Dergisi* 3:5–6 (1951–52) from an earlier period.

guild members before taking office, even in a guild where the *kethüdâ*-ship was handed down from father to son.⁵¹ Mübahat Kütükoğlu's article shows in an encyclopedic manner how various affairs were handled in the guild system without government help.⁵² Engin Akarlı's articles demonstrate how the Istanbul guilds in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries could use the central justice system and their existing institution of *gedik* to protect themselves from challenges such as demands for higher rent by *waqf* administrators.⁵³ His recent paper deals with the various disputes guilds were involved in and effectively demonstrates the relative freedom pre-Tanzimat guilds attained by relying on consensus, tradition and recourse to the court system.⁵⁴ For the nineteenth century and beyond, Donald Quataert shows the resilience of some guilds, even in the age of industrialization.⁵⁵ Some new doctoral dissertations are also noteworthy. Cengiz Kırılı's work reveals the networking among guildsmen and janissaries through coffeehouses in nineteenth-century Istanbul,⁵⁶ while John Chalcraft sees expressions of semi-autonomy and the politics of notables in the relationship between the guilds and the government.⁵⁷ It is now appropriate to use the insights gathered from these recent works to comprehensively rethink conventional wisdom on Ottoman guilds.

Because historiography has focused on the issue of government control and guild autonomy, I naturally started out asking the same questions: "How autonomous were the Istanbul guilds vis-à-vis the

⁵¹ İnalçık, "The Appointment Procedure of a Guild Warden (*kethüdâ*)," *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes* 76 (1986) 138–139.

⁵² Mübahat Kütükoğlu, "Osmanlı Esnafında Oto-Kontrol Müessesesi," *Ahilik ve Esnaf* (Istanbul: Yaylıcak Matbaası, 1986) 55–85.

⁵³ See his "Gedik: Implements, Mastership, Shop Usufruct and Monopoly among Istanbul Artisans, 1750–1850," *Wissenschaftskolleg-Jahrbuch* (1985–86) 225–31 and "The Uses of Law among Istanbul Artisans and Tradesmen: The Story of Gedik as Implements, Mastership, Shop Usufruct and Monopoly, 1750–1850," *International Symposium on Legalism and Political Legitimation in the Ottoman Empire and in the Early Turkish Republic: ca. 1500 to 1940* (Ruhr: Universität Bochum, 1988) 1–37.

⁵⁴ "Law and Order in the Marketplace: Istanbul Artisans and Shopkeepers, 1730–1840" (unpublished conference paper, 1998).

⁵⁵ Donald Quataert, *Ottoman Manufacturing in the Age of the Industrial Revolution* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993) and his "Ottoman Workers and the State, 1826–1914," in *Workers and Working Classes in the Middle East*, ed. Zachary Lockman (Albany: SUNY Press, 1994) 21–40.

⁵⁶ Cengiz Kırılı, "The Struggle over Space: Coffeehouses of Ottoman Istanbul, 1780–1845," Ph.D. dissertation, Binghamton University, State University of New York (2000).

⁵⁷ John Chalcraft, "The Striking Cabbies and Other Stories: Crafts and Guilds in Egypt, 1863–1914," Ph.D. dissertation, New York University, 2001.

state?” or “Given that autonomous features of the Istanbul guilds are recognized even in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries when the government attempted to impose stricter control, what would the guilds in previous centuries have been like?”

By examining the case of Istanbul, I intended to address the characteristics of guild autonomy at the minimum level under the most rigid government control. As my research proceeded I came to realize that formulating questions around the binary opposition of state and society, that is, government control versus guild autonomy, was of limited usefulness. First, autonomy is a slippery concept that is difficult to measure, especially when it was exercised in rather informal ways—for example, influencing the *kadi*'s decisions by saying “such and such is the tradition in our trade and we therefore need to uphold it.” Second, the boundary between the state and guilds blurred all too many times, as in the cases of government-appointed guild headmen who still had to represent their guilds' interests in the court. Guilds voluntarily registered their business arrangements in *kadi* court records (*sicill*), which indicates that they confirmed their autonomous decisions by using a legal branch of the government. The reality was thus much more complex than could be described in terms of mutually inversely proportional “control” and “autonomy.”

In this vein, my main question changed to one about this complex existence and the leverage exercised by seventeenth-century Istanbul guilds. What were the guilds capable of doing within the framework of their rules, traditions and obligations *vis-à-vis* the government? This becomes an important question in view of previous scholarship through the 1970s, which characterized the guilds as incapable and backward by nature. I intend to examine what kind of leverage the guilds had in terms of making changes within their organizations and of negotiating with government authorities. In so doing, the newly developing approaches as embodied in the publications of the last two decades have provided me with useful points of departure. The setting of seventeenth-century Istanbul provides particularly fertile ground, because it witnessed many institutional changes and economic and political troubles within and without the guild system, which stimulated the guilds to take active measures beyond their usual practices. By focusing on Istanbul, one gets the extra benefit of being able to examine the very basis of conventional wisdom.

I had to leave out many guild-related issues from this book. There is little information available concerning such crucial issues as the

first emergence of the guilds, their production technology, or the apprenticeship procedure. It is also very difficult to get precise information on the guilds' *sufi/futuwwa* connections. In addition, groups of artisans and service workers in the government sector are beyond the scope of this book, although the boundaries between them and their civilian counterparts may blur.

Sources and Methodology

The main sources for this study are *sicills* from the early to mid-seventeenth-century *kadi* courts in the Istanbul area. The court registers are full of lively transactions from a wide variety of people, Muslim and non-Muslim, who used the *kadi* court, and they also include copies of administrative orders from the central government. Therefore, *sicills* are very useful for the social and economic history of those who rarely surfaced in chronicles and other government documents. Studies based on court registers have taken off over the past couple of decades, although some scholars in Turkey had used them earlier.⁵⁸ Given that the guildsmen themselves did not leave behind their own records, the court records are the best source for first-hand accounts of guild affairs as they include contracts and conflicts that arose from daily life in the guilds. Each entry related to a guild gives a “snapshot” profile of the guild, listing the leaders and prominent members who came to court. In fact, many of the aforementioned new studies on Ottoman guilds since the 1980s are based on court records. Although the “snapshots” in and of themselves do not provide uninterrupted

⁵⁸ For the scope of the contents and lists of *sicills* available in the archives see Ahmet Akgündüz et al. *Şer'îye Sicilleri*, 2 vols. (Istanbul, Türk Dünyası Araştırmaları, 1988). For the numerous studies based on *sicill*, see Islamic Legal Studies Program, Harvard Law School, “A Preliminary Bibliography of Studies Based on Ottoman Court Registers,” unpublished typescript prepared for a conference, 1998. The *kadi* court records have gained popularity among western scholars since Ronald Jennings wrote a dissertation about those of Kayseri (“The Judicial Registers (*Şer'i Mahkeme Sicilleri*) of Kayseri (1590–1630) as a Source for Ottoman History,” Ph.D. Thesis, University of California, Los Angeles, 1972). For an introduction to the court records of Istanbul, see Yvonne J. Seng, “The *Şer'îye Sicilleri* of Istanbul Müftülüğü as a Source for the Study of Everyday Life,” *TSAB* 15–2 (1991) 307–325. Recently, Brinkley Messick, an anthropologist, used *sicills* in combination with his fieldwork in Yemen, where *kadi* court procedure is still alive, shedding new light on the legal process behind the court records. See his *The Caligraphic State* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1993).

or comprehensive information about the guilds, they are still very useful for us to know what the guilds were like to the extent that they were represented in the court system.⁵⁹

The records from the central court of Istanbul, and the court of Galata in particular, contain many cases involving guildsmen. This thesis thus draws on the oldest 10 registers (covering 1612–1620 and 1660–1662) from the Istanbul court and Galata court registers, numbers 73 (1650–1652) and 80 (1656–1657). The long hiatus between 1620 and 1660 is unfortunate, but this happily lends itself to a comparison between the two periods covered by the Istanbul *sicills*. Although I freely cite government documents and literary sources dating from the second half of the seventeenth century, my work basically covers the period between the second decade of the century and the 1660s.

To supplement the court records, I have also drawn on some *divān* documents (*Mühimme defteri* and *Şikâyet defteri*)⁶⁰ from the Başbakanlık Archives in Istanbul. These are important sources because the Istanbul guilds had easy access to the sultanic authority when filing petitions: the palace and its attendant bureaucracy were located nearby, and the ideology of sultanic justice was receptive to their claims. *Kanunnâmes* (Ottoman law codes) are used to understand the government position. What is not covered by documentary sources I have reconstructed from literary sources, such as chronicles and travelogues. Evliya Çelebi's idiosyncratic and often exaggerated descriptions of the city, the guilds and the political situation are quite valuable for this purpose.

In analyzing these sources, I look at craft and service guilds in general rather than one particular sector or guild. While I am aware of the danger of such a general approach, this method provides some benefits when used with careful differentiation according to particular issues. First, it makes it possible to see if there were recognizable behavioral patterns common to various guilds. Second, by examining a large number of guilds over a relatively short period of history, one gets a view of what was happening simultaneously in different parts

⁵⁹ The judicial and notarial services provided by the *kadi* court were not for free. According to 'Abdurrahman Paşa, "Osmanlı Kanunnâmeleri" (1676) *Millî Tettebbü' Mecmuası* 3, getting a certificate (*hüccet*) or filing a petition (*'arz*) cost 25 *akçe*, having a decision registered in the *sicill* 8 *akçe*, and the signature of a *kadi* 10 *akçe*.

⁶⁰ These are registers that include government orders resulting from the proceedings at the *divān* (a council of ministers that functioned both as the cabinet and the highest court).

of the guild system. In this way, it becomes easier to draw connections between the guilds and larger societal trends. A study that concentrated on only one guild would end up considering it over a few centuries because the available source material might not be adequate to make an in-depth observation of the guild in question within a relatively short time frame. While my study addresses multiple guilds and the guild system in general, I try not to overlook qualitative analysis. I endeavor to examine significant details, such as the concepts the guildsmen used to describe their leaders and the rhetoric they employed to make their cases stronger in the courts.

This work begins with a description of the geographical and historical situation in seventeenth-century Istanbul, as it is important to understand how the guilds were affected by and interacted with the tumultuous currents and events of the time. Chapter II examines the organization and operation of the guilds on three different levels: that of individual guilds, of guild members and of inter-guild relationships. Chapter III critically rethinks the so-called “traditionalism” within the guilds and considers whether they could initiate institutional changes or adapt their existing system in response to the demands of the time. Finally, Chapter IV deals with the guilds’ leverage in their relations with government authorities in the context of their complex mutual interests.

CHAPTER ONE

THE SETTING: SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY ISTANBUL

To understand the guilds in seventeenth-century Istanbul it is important to know their geographical and historical context. Studies of Ottoman guilds have tended to overlook their connections to the wider political, economic and social trends of the time, as if the guilds existed in isolation from the rest of society.¹ However, even if the connection between the guilds and their geographical and historical background is not always clear, the particulars of seventeenth-century Istanbul provided the framework within which the guilds functioned.

Istanbul is one of the most written about cities in world history. It was a favorite of travelers and observers throughout the Byzantine and Ottoman periods, and has remained so in modern times.² However, to understand the backdrop of the activities of guildsmen, we need to look at the topography, commercial and cultural geography, and historical events of the time.

Istanbul is located in a strategic position both politically and commercially. Perched upon the shores of the Bosphorus and the Marmara Sea, its land connection lies to the west. Therefore, once the western front, where the famous Theodosian walls stood, was secured, it was very hard for enemies to attack, let alone conquer, the city. The impressive defensive position of the city was one of the reasons why the final stage of the Byzantine Empire lasted as long as it did. In addition, with its deep and secure ports on the Golden Horn and its long coastline, the city was ideally suited for seaborne trade. It welcomed a constant flow of foodstuffs, textiles and luxury goods brought by boats. It was well connected to the Black Sea and the Mediterranean Sea, while remaining protected by the two straits—the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles—at either end of the Marmara Sea. However, the existence of these straits made the area vulnerable

¹ See the section on historiography in the Introduction.

² For a good collection of seventeenth-century European travelogues on Istanbul see the bibliography in Mantran, *Istanbul*, 667–76.

to embargoes, which indeed materialized in the form of Venetian blockades during the mid-seventeenth century.³

By the beginning of the seventeenth century, Istanbul had already been the capital of the empire for a century and a half. Byzantine Constantinople, destroyed during the conquest of 1453, had been quickly transformed into the Ottoman capital with two large palaces and numerous mosque complexes, military barracks, markets and caravansarays under the patronage of Mehmed the Conqueror and his immediate successors. The building boom lulled in the seventeenth century due to financial difficulties, and only two major mosque complexes were added: Sultan Ahmed's Mosque in At Meydanı⁴ (1609) and Yeni Cami in Eminönü (1663) completed by Turhan Sultan, the mother of Mehmed IV,⁵ who herself had come to power in the aftermath of the guild uprising in 1651.

Now that all the territories around Istanbul belonged to the Ottomans, the natural growth of the metropolis was no longer confined within its walls.⁶ Ottoman Istanbul was closely connected to its three major suburbs—Galata to the north of the Golden Horn, Eyüb to the west of the land walls, and Üsküdar to the east across the Bosphorus—collectively called *bilād-i selāse* (the three towns), and together they made up the main body of greater Istanbul. The three towns, when narrowly defined, were little more than small town centers, but they incorporated many suburban villages under their jurisdiction. Administrative directives were often simultaneously addressed to the *kadis* of Istanbul and *bilād-i selāse*, and the *kadis* would gather at the grand vizier's Wednesday *divān* to discuss current issues of interest in the area.⁷

Of the four towns, Istanbul was the center of administration, politics and all urban functions. It accommodated the palaces, the central bureaucracy and the main body of the central army. The largest markets in the metropolitan area, wholesale centers and numerous

³ There were three almost back-to-back Venetian embargos of the Dardanelles during the Cretan War: May 1648 to May 1649, March 1650 to May 1654, and June 1656 to September 1657. İsmail Hami Danişmend, *İzahlı Osmanlı Kronolojisi* 5 vols. (Istanbul: Türkiye Basımevi, 1950) 3: 422–23.

⁴ This is where the Byzantine Hippodrome was located.

⁵ The construction of Yeni Cami started in 1597 but was postponed because of a lack of funds.

⁶ The size of the walled city was about 23 square kilometers (9 square miles).

⁷ Reşat Ekrem Koçu, "Bilād-i selāse" *İstA*¹. The *kadi* of Istanbul had seniority over those of the other three towns only in matters such as confirming fixed official prices (*narh*); otherwise, the *kadis* were independent.

shops were situated in the middle of the city. In addition, luxury industries flourished thanks to the patronage of the palace and state dignitaries. The central religious establishment and the most prestigious schools (*medreseler*) were in Istanbul. The city possessed a diverse population and was a central point for the minorities as well as for the Muslims, given the existence of the Greek and Armenian patriarchates⁸ (in Fener and Kumkapı, respectively) within its walls. It was also a place of religious controversy, rumor and political unrest, for reasons to be discussed later in this chapter.

The other three towns each had their own individual flavor. Galata, a former Genoese colony, was annexed after the conquest of Constantinople. As this district was never taken by force, it remained physically intact and the population before the conquest by and large stayed there.⁹ This town naturally attracted non-Muslim immigrants from the provinces¹⁰ and European merchants because of the existing population's composition.¹¹ Galata's close vicinity to the harbors on the Golden Horn was conducive to international trade, and there were several markets as well as a *bedestan*¹² built by Mehmed the Conqueror.¹³ In addition, the nearby military factories, the Imperial Dockyard (Tersane) in Kasımpaşa¹⁴ and the Gunnery (Tophane) in Tophane, which became a place name for the area, were local centers of craftsmanship. Eyüb, which was connected to Istanbul by land, included many gardens, pastures and fisheries¹⁵ and was a center for animal by-product industries such as slaughterhouses, tanneries

⁸ The Armenian Patriarchate in Istanbul was not yet the head of all Armenians in the Ottoman Empire, but its authority was on the rise throughout the seventeenth century. Kevork Bardakjian, "The Rise of the Armenian Patriarchate of Constantinople," in *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire: The Function of a Plural Society*, ed. Benjamin Braude and Bernard Lewis (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1982) 1: 89–100.

⁹ İnalcık, "Ottoman Galata," *Varia Turcica XIII: Première Rencontre Internationale sur l'Empire Ottoman et la Turquie Moderne*, ed. Edhem Eldem (Istanbul: Isis, 1991) 39–47.

¹⁰ Eremya Çelebi, *Istanbul Tarihi*, trans. Hrand Andreasyan (Istanbul: Eren, 1988) 38. Eremya Çelebi relates that the bodies of many Armenian men lay in Galata cemeteries away from their families with their heads "looking east."

¹¹ See Mantran, *Istanbul*, 76–78.

¹² This word comes from the Arabic word "bazzaz" (cloth merchant) and Persian place suffix "-s(i)tan". It specifically designates a sturdy building where luxury goods were stored and sold (İnalcık, "Istanbul," *ET*²), but also figuratively means a covered bazaar that grows out of a central building.

¹³ Evliya Çelebi, Hammer's translation, vol. 1, part 2, 52, Gökyay edition, 184.

¹⁴ For an overview of the dockyard in the seventeenth century, see İdris Bostan, *Osmanlı Bahriye Teşkilâtı: XVII. Yüzyılda Tersâne-i Âmire* (Ankara: TTK, 1992).

¹⁵ Mantran, *Istanbul*, 67–68.

and candle-making factories. The market of Eyüb featured cobblers, milkmen and toy-makers.¹⁶ There were also many mansions belonging to the *ulema* and other dignitaries, and many mosques and schools (*medreseler*), for it was a Muslim spiritual center, the home of the shrine of Ebu Eyüb el-Ansari. Üsküdar, located across the Bosphorus from Istanbul, was an important transit point for international (both Armenian and European) commerce, but it does not seem to have played an important role in the local economy of the Istanbul area since it had no large marketplaces.¹⁷ It was a well-developed urban area, however, with *grandees'* residences and mosque complexes, and from here all military campaigns to the east were launched.

Although Istanbul was a great commercial center blessed with magnificent ports, its commerce consisted primarily of imports and few exports,¹⁸ with its economy geared to consumption and not export-oriented production. The palace, bureaucrats and huge population combined had the greatest purchasing power in the empire, and the government encouraged the flow of commodities into the city, but not out of it. The provisioning of Istanbul was a huge task, and the rest of the empire was made a hinterland.¹⁹ In the same context, most trades and crafts in Istanbul catered to the daily needs of the inhabitants, such as supplying foodstuffs, clothes, shoes, leather products, candles and fuel and ensuring the transportation of goods. The economic life of the capital largely consisted of the production of goods and services that were in turn consumed mostly within the greater Istanbul area.

Commercial activities were centered on the large markets of Istanbul and Galata. In Istanbul the main commercial zones were located around the Covered Bazaar in the center of the walled city, and

¹⁶ Evliya Çelebi, Hammer's translation, vol. 1, part 2, 33, Gökyay edition, 169.

¹⁷ Mantran, *Istanbul*, 81–82. His statement that there was no market or any established guilds seems to be rather extreme. It may have originated from Evliya's comment that Üsküdar did not have a *bedestan* or any market appropriated by a single guild. The artisans of Üsküdar were all mixed together in terms of location according to Evliya (Evliya Çelebi, trans. Hammer, vol. 1, part 2, 82, ed. Gökyay, 204), but this does not preclude the existence of guilds there.

¹⁸ Mantran, *Istanbul*, 90–91.

¹⁹ See Mantran, "Centralisation administrative et financière: problèmes du ravitaillement d'Istanbul aux xvii^e et xviii^e siècles," in *Istanbul à la jonction des cultures Balkaniques, Méditerranéennes, Slaves, et Orientales, aux xvi^e–xix^e siècles* (Bucharest, 1977) 61–62. Edhem Eldem et al. *The Ottoman City between East and West: Aleppo, Izmir and Istanbul* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1999) 162–63.

along the shores of the Golden Horn, where the ports, customs, and wholesale markets existed.²⁰ These two areas had been commercially developed on a large scale under imperial patronage since the time of Mehmed the Conqueror, which is evident from the *waqf* documents of his Aya Sofya foundation.²¹ According to a recent study, this arrangement of the commercial districts closely resembled that of Byzantine Constantinople, and it was a natural result of the same government policy of provisioning the city through seaborne transportation: receiving imports at the ports along the Golden Horn and relaying them to the interior areas of the city.²² The Covered Bazaar started with a sturdy building (*bedestan*) for the sale and safe storage of luxury goods, but soon new craft shops—including shoemakers, slipper-makers, cap-makers, felt-makers, jewelers and money-changers²³—were added to the original structure. Eventually, before the end of Mehmed the Conqueror's reign, an entirely new building sheltered more than a thousand shops under the same roof.²⁴ Not only were shops incorporated into the Covered Bazaar, but other shops and markets were also established nearby.²⁵ The great bazaar was located at the crossroads of highways coming from the various gates, ports and major squares of the city. According to Mantran, the Covered Bazaar was connected to three main commercial streets: one leading to Eminönü (customs at the port area) via Mahmud Paşa, another leading to Edirnekapı (a gate on the land wall) via Şehzadebaşı, and a third leading to Topkapı and Yedikule on the land walls via the quarter of Aksaray.²⁶ The port area along the Golden Horn admitted all sorts of imported goods; it was much more bustling than

²⁰ Mantran, *Istanbul*, 38.

²¹ İnalçık, "Istanbul," 227–29.

²² Çiğdem Kafesçioglu, "The Ottoman Capital in the Making: The Reconstruction of Constantinople in the Fifteenth Century," Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1996. Chapter 2. The Ottoman government, in addition to keeping the same centers of business as the Byzantines did, utilized the remaining Byzantine buildings to promote commerce.

²³ İnalçık, "Istanbul," 227 (citing from the Aya Sofya *waqf* register of 894/1489).

²⁴ İnalçık, "The Hub of the City: the Bedestan of Istanbul," *International Journal of Turkish Studies* 1–1 (1979–80) 5–6. The *waqf* document of Aya Sofya included 124 shops in the Bedestan and 72 around it, whereas that of 1489 had 126 inside the Bedestan and 782 outside.

²⁵ Such as Mahmud Paşa Market to the east and Sultan Pazar[ı] at the Fatih mosque complex. (İnalçık, "Istanbul," 227–229.) For the many *hans* and caravansarays see Evliya Çelebi, Hammer's translation, vol. 1, part 1, 176–177, Gökyay edition, 134.

²⁶ Mantran, *Istanbul*, 38.

the Land Customs (Karagümrük) of Istanbul.²⁷ After passing through customs' controls, foodstuffs were sold in the Fruit and Vegetable Market (Yemiş İskeleyi) and in the Flour Exchange (Un Kapanı) further west up the Golden Horn. For retailers, the proximity of wholesale markets must have been a great attraction: bakers, pastry-makers, and sweets-makers, for example, crowded the area near Un Kapanı.²⁸ The aforementioned Sultan Ahmed and Yeni Cami complexes, which included many shops, were built near this port area. In addition, on the Galata side of the Golden Horn running from Karaköy to Kasım Paşa another bustling commercial area was located.²⁹

Although more concentrated in the commercial centers, shops of various trades could also be found in other districts of the city. That shops were well dispersed throughout Istanbul along the major highways is evident from the 15 different itineraries of the market tax collectors (*kol oğlanları*) who visited each and every shop in all Istanbul districts in the late seventeenth century to collect amounts due.³⁰ Indeed, some food-related trades (bakers, grocers and butchers) had to be located in all residential quarters.

While shops were dispersed all over intramural Istanbul, those plying the same trade often clustered together on the same street. Many contemporary Istanbul street names are derived from trade names, and this would seem to be an indication of the historical concentration of trades in their respective centers. Prominent examples are the slaughterhouses, tanneries and candle factories in the Yedikule and Edirnekapı area, Sarraçhane (a saddler's market) in Şehzadebaşı and Simkeşhane (a silver wire factory) in Beyazıt.³¹ Such concentrations of shops belonging to certain trades have been observed in other Ottoman cities.³² This phenomenon has sometimes been seen as evi-

²⁷ Selma Özkoçak, "Two Urban Districts in Early Modern Istanbul: Edirnekapı and Yedikule," forthcoming in *Urban History*, Cambridge University Press, May 2003, p. 5, n. 23.

²⁸ According to Eremya Çelebi (16–17), there were around 110 bakeries around Un Kapanı, although Hezarfen Hüseyin mentions only 72 regular bakeries and 12 special bakeries in intramural Istanbul. See his *Telhîsü'l-beyân*, ed. Sevim İlgürel (Ankara: TTK, 1998) 248.

²⁹ Mantran, *Istanbul*, 38.

³⁰ See Atatürk Kitaplığı, Muallim Cevdet collection B. 2, folios 1–16, and Bab-ı Defteri 25386, p. 2ff. Kamil Kepeci 2056, pp. 1–6.

³¹ İnalçık, "Istanbul," 226. He also mentions dye-works, fulling mills and oil presses as spatially concentrated near the related craft centers. Also, see Baer "Monopolies," 153–155 for more examples.

³² Gibb and Bowen, 279, 283. Baer, *Egyptian Guilds*, 28.

dence of the state's attempt to control the guilds by concentrating each of them in one area.³³ While it is indeed true that the state often provided buildings and other infrastructure for specific trades and that the resident tradesmen of such facilities often claimed monopoly rights over certain raw materials and commodities, it would have been impossible to confine a trade to its original location alone while the city's population, and thus demand, grew over the years. Over time, new regional subgroups formed outside *intra muros* Istanbul. Additionally, among the many cases of guilds' appeals to the Istanbul *kadi*, relatively few mention the location of the relevant guild in relation to a specific market or quarter. Most cases refer to the guild's location as generic "Istanbul" or as scattered among a few quarters, instead of one specific area in the city, which would seem to indicate that spatial concentration was not a binding principle (see Appendix F).³⁴

There is little precise information about the position guilds occupied in this urban economy, although scholars do agree that they constituted a mainstay of economic life in the cities.³⁵ From the late sixteenth century on, at any one time, there were at least one hundred discernible groups of artisans and service workers in Istanbul. Whereas Evliya Çelebi enumerated several hundred guilds, there are more realistic accounts. *İhtisāb* law codes tend to list only 70–80 guilds, which were the most important for provisioning and policing purposes (see Appendix A). The guilds that participated in the festive parade in 1582 numbered well over a hundred (see Appendix B). In addition, Hezarfen Hüseyin (1669) enumerates 139 guilds that allegedly operated 32,150 shops in Istanbul (see Appendix C).³⁶ During my research in the Istanbul court records, I came across more than a hundred trade names (see Appendix D). The number of Istanbul guilds does not seem to have been fixed in any way, and different observers counted them in a variety of ways.³⁷ However, whatever the source,

³³ Baer, "Monopolies," 153–155. Ira Lapidus, *Muslim Cities in the Later Middle Ages* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967) 100.

³⁴ On the other hand, Raymond (*Artisans et Commerçants*, 519) regards the divisions of guilds according to location not as natural growth in the guild system but as a result of government intervention. He reasons that the more regional groups there were, the easier it was for the government to control and administer them through direct contact. However, there is no evidence suggesting that the government divided a trade into regional guilds for the sake of administration.

³⁵ İnalcık, *The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age 1300–1600* (New Rochelle, New York: Orpheus Publishing, 1989 c. 1973) 151.

³⁶ *Telhîs*, 53–54.

³⁷ A comparable discrepancy existed in terms of the descriptions of existing guilds

it is clear that tradesmen inside and outside the guild system occupied a large chunk of the urban population. Although Istanbul was different from Bursa in size and nature, and the inheritance registers Haim Gerber uses may not be an unbiased sample, his statistics regarding the seventeenth-century population of Bursa provide a useful guideline: artisans and service workers made up 18 to 24 percent of the population, and taken together with merchants they accounted for 43 percent of the estates recorded in the court registers.³⁸

In terms of population, Istanbul was one of the largest cities in early modern Europe. Its population must have increased significantly in the sixteenth century, since there was a huge demographic push throughout the Mediterranean region in this period.³⁹ Not much is known about the seventeenth-century population other than that there were repeated edicts aimed at returning recent immigrants to the city back to the provinces. It is difficult to get even approximate population statistics before the nineteenth century, and the numbers reported by travelers are usually impressionistically exaggerated. Even the calculations of modern scholars, based on tax registers, have produced unlikely results, because they made unwarranted assumptions about the average size of a household or the ratio between Muslim and non-Muslim residents in the city.⁴⁰ More recently, the consensus in academia has been that the population of early modern Istanbul could not have reached half a million, given the nature of social infrastructures, such as buildings and water supplies, at that time. Multi-story buildings were rare, and Istanbul had many gardens and open spaces before the nineteenth century. Contemporary scholars estimate that the population of early modern Istanbul was no more

in eighteenth- to nineteenth-century Cairo. Pascale Ghazaleh, "Organizing Labor: Professional Classifications in Late 18th-/early 19th-Century Cairo," unpublished paper presented at the annual meeting of the Middle East Studies Association of North America, 2002.

³⁸ Gerber, *Bursa*, 24, Tables 2–9. One may suspect that the proportion of tradesmen was higher, since there were many cases in which the profession of the deceased was unknown. He notes that 30 to 40 percent were poor people (who had an estate of less than 20,000 *akçe*) whose occupations were not mentioned. This category must have included marginally employed tradesmen.

³⁹ Fernand Braudel, *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II* (New York: Harper and Row, 1972) 402–418. Also see Michael A. Cook, *Population Pressure in Rural Anatolia, 1450–1600* (London: Oxford University Press, 1972) Chapter II and 58–66.

⁴⁰ İnalçık, "Istanbul" 243–244. Those with implausibly large population estimates are, for example, Mantran, *Istanbul*, 45–47 (later cited in Braudel, *Mediterranean*, 347), A.H. Lybyer, "Constantinople as Capital of the Ottoman Empire," *Annual Report of the American Historical Association* (1916) 377.

than 300,000, considering the physical and hygienic limits of an early modern city⁴¹ and the amount of grain that mid-seventeenth century Istanbulites consumed (approximately 250 tons a day).⁴² Ultimately, however, the estimation of the seventeenth-century population of Istanbul remains mere speculation.

A population of nearly 300,000 was enough to create difficulties for both the government and urban society. Supplying the city's population with food was one of the central government's most important and difficult tasks: the butchers, for example, were at times forced to sell at prices set below profit levels for the sake of political stability.⁴³ The crowded wooden houses of the city were vulnerable to fire,⁴⁴ and the dense population and humid climate led to the outbreak of epidemics.⁴⁵ Several such urban disasters occurred in the seventeenth century, and at times shops and markets sustained huge damage. It is known that before the beginning of the twentieth century urban populations in Europe could not sustain themselves without immigration from the countryside.⁴⁶ One might assume that this was also the case in Istanbul in the seventeenth century, although the social custom of frequent bathing may have helped to reduce the death toll from epidemics.⁴⁷

⁴¹ Both Edhem Eldem and İlber Ortaylı pointed this out in *İstanbul'un Dört Çağı: Panelleri* (Istanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 1996) 47, 52.

⁴² This statistic of Istanbul's grain consumption comes from İnalçık's "İstanbul'un İaşesi" in *İstanbul Şehremaneti Mecmuası*, based on which Zafer Toprak made a population estimate. Toprak conjectures that the population of Istanbul at the beginning of the seventeenth century was around 250,000. See his "Tarihsel Nüfusbilim Açısından İstanbul'un Nüfusu ve Toplumsal Topografyası," *Dünya ve Bugünüyle Toplum ve Ekonomi* 3 (1992) 117–19. According to Hezarfen Hüseyin (*Telhîs*, 248), the residents of Istanbul consumed 12,000 keyl (about 300 tons, 1 keyl = 20 vukiyye = 25.659 kilograms) of wheat daily.

⁴³ Faroqhi, *Towns and Townsmen*, 228–233. The government tried to recruit butchers among the rich in core Ottoman lands. Being appointed as a butcher in Istanbul was often used as a form of punishment for usury.

⁴⁴ Mantran, *Istanbul*, 36. According to him, there were at least 22 major fires in the greater Istanbul area, among which those in 1633 and 1660 damaged wide areas of the city including several major commercial and residential quarters.

⁴⁵ Mantran, *Istanbul*, 22. İnalçık, "İstanbul," *EF* 243.

⁴⁶ Roger Mols, *Introduction à la démographie historique des villes d'Europe du XVI^e au XVIII^e Siècle* (Gembloux: J. Duculot, 1954–56) 2: 313ff. and 366–368, as cited in Nikolai Todorov, *The Balkan City: 1400–1900* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1983) 69. See also Jared Diamond, *Guns, Germs, and Steel* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1999) 205.

⁴⁷ M. de Thevenot, *The Travels of Monsieur de Thevenot into the Levant* (London: H. Clark, 1686) 37. He observes that the "Turks" [i.e., the Ottoman Muslims] were generally healthier than Europeans partly because of frequent bathing, moderate eating and abstinence from wine.

In the end, it is very difficult to know exactly how much the size of the population changed in the seventeenth century. It was a period when the government had stopped keeping tax registers that reflected the precise number of taxpaying subjects; the new tax registers for *‘avāriż* (irregular) taxes recorded the number of artificial households as tax units, which could include a varying number of real households, depending on their level of economic wealth. There are records of imperial orders seeking to send recent immigrants back to their home provinces, which indicates that the government noticed and disapproved of the inflow of immigrants. Even if the urban population was not self-sustaining, migrants from the countryside were not welcome in the eyes of the authorities. They viewed the new immigrants, who often had few economic resources, with concern since migration meant a reduction of provincial tax revenues and very likely a worsening of living conditions and an increase in criminal activity. The advent of immigrants had already created provisioning problems in the reign of Süleyman the Magnificent (r. 1520–66);⁴⁸ at the beginning of the seventeenth century, the wave of newcomers intensified as people fled the disorder of the Celali rebellions (1596–1609) and looked for protection within a walled city.⁴⁹ Istanbul probably continued to grow in terms of population partly due to immigration, since there is architectural evidence of the city’s growth in this period. About 40 percent of the population of greater Istanbul may have lived in suburbs outside the walls; residential areas developed around the Bosphorus, Golden Horn and Üsküdar, while mosques, schools and grandees’ mansions were constructed in Eyüb.⁵⁰

In addition to cultural geography and demography, the historical conjuncture of the seventeenth century must also be considered. Indeed, in many places around the world the seventeenth century

⁴⁸ Ahmet Refik, *Onuncu*, 83–89.

⁴⁹ The term “Celali” generally refers to the provincial (especially Anatolian) rebellions in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. It was a popular term coined after the revolt in 925/1519 of Şeyh Celal that swept through Amasya, Turhal and Tokat. This term was mainly applied to provincial rebellions between 1580 and 1620 in official documents. (William J. Griswold, *The Great Anatolian Revolts?* [Berlin: Klaus Schwarz, 1983] 245, n. 41). This period is marked by exceptional disturbances in the provinces because of the unemployment of the former landholding cavalry and the excess population in the countryside who sought advancement via (para)military careers or downright banditry. See Mustafa Akdağ, *Büyük Celâli Karışıklıkların Başlaması* (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Basımevi, 1963).

⁵⁰ Doğan Kuban, “İstanbul’un Tarihi Yapısı,” *Mimarlık* 5 (1970) 35–36 as cited in Zafer Toprak, “Nüfus—Fetihten 1950’ye,” *İstA*².

was a troubled period,⁵¹ and the Ottoman Empire was no exception. Ottoman history unfolded in a whirlwind of change, and Istanbul was always at the center of the storm. Most classical Ottoman institutions, i.e., the Imperial Household, the bureaucracy, the fiscal system and the military, were undergoing a strenuous process of restructuring. Many of the changes that became manifest in this period had their roots in the last phase of the Classical Age (ca. 1453–1550), particularly in the time of Süleyman the Magnificent. However, the pace of transformation began to accelerate visibly at the end of the sixteenth and the beginning of the seventeenth century. The changes during this period stood in dramatic contrast to the classical Ottoman ways of running the state during its perceived “Golden Age.” Contemporary Ottomans and modern scholars alike have tended to view these changes simply as signs of “Ottoman decline.”⁵² This perception is unfortunate, especially because it has prevented generations of scholars from taking these transformations seriously enough to study them, although a new generation of scholars is of late viewing them in a different light.⁵³ According to Linda Darling, for example, the seventeenth century in Ottoman history “is coming to be seen as a critical period of transition between a centralized ‘feudal’ polity and a more decentralized, more commercialized, and less autocratic regime.”⁵⁴

Many of the rules governing the Imperial Household changed, particularly in the reign of Ahmed I (r. 1603–17). The dominant pattern of succession until that time—princes-cum-provincial governors fighting among themselves until a winner triumphantly reached

⁵¹ For a discussion of the various aspects of the seventeenth-century crisis in Europe, see Trevor Aston, ed. *Crisis in Europe: 1560–1660* (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books, 1967), especially E.J. Hobsbawm, “The Crisis of the Seventeenth Century,” which had started the whole debate in Nos. 5 and 6 of *Past and Present* (1954), and H.R. Trevor-Roper, “The General Crisis of the Seventeenth Century,” 59–95. For a more globally oriented approach, see Geoffrey Parker and Lesley M. Smith, eds. *The General Crisis of the Seventeenth Century* (London: Routledge, 1997, c. 1978).

⁵² For a comprehensive discussion of the Declinist perceptions in the seventeenth century and thereafter, see Kafadar, “The Question of Ottoman Decline,” *Harvard Middle Eastern and Islamic Review* 4: 1–2 (1997–98) 30–75.

⁵³ See, for example, Rifaat Abou-El-Haj, *Formation of the Modern State: The Ottoman Empire, Sixteenth to Eighteenth Centuries* (Albany: State University of New York [hereafter SUNY] Press, 1991), Karen Barkey, *Bandits and Bureaucrats: the Ottoman Route to State Centralization* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994), and Linda Darling, *Revenue-Raising and Legitimacy* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1996).

⁵⁴ Darling, “Ottoman Politics through British Eyes: Paul Rycaut’s *The Present State of the Ottoman Empire*,” *Journal of World History* 5–1 (1994) 79.

Istanbul and all the others were executed—was abandoned in Ahmed I's Law Code.⁵⁵ When Ahmed I ascended to the throne, unlike his predecessors he spared his baby brother Mustafa from being put to death. When Ahmed died, the throne was given to Mustafa, bypassing Ahmed's eldest son Osman (later Osman II). It was a huge departure from the law of fratricide in effect since the days of Mehmed II. The practice of sending young princes to the provinces to have them gain experience in small-scale government was also abandoned. Now the princes and their mothers were kept in Topkapı Palace in Istanbul, and even after one of them succeeded to the throne, the others could expect to live on in the same place.

For these reasons, the succession struggle also had to take on a different form. Whereas previously princes had fought against one another's armies in the provinces, now they and their supporters were herded together in the palace, and all succession struggles took place within the confines of Istanbul.⁵⁶ What was new about a succession struggle in this post-classical era was that it did not end once a prince was enthroned. The sultan could be replaced by his brother, if he and his inner circle lost the confidence of the Ottoman body politic.⁵⁷ The sultanate was no longer inviolable. The change of sultans became a vehicle in a power game that involved various groups of statesmen, *ulema*, soldiers and women of the harem aligned in factions. Therefore, the new system of succession was more conducive than the old one to political unrest and uncertainty in Istanbul.⁵⁸

⁵⁵ Rhoads Murphey, "The Historical Setting," in Robert Dankoff, *The Intimate Life of an Ottoman Statesman Melek Ahmed Pasha (1588–1662)* (Albany: SUNY Press, 1991) 33–34.

⁵⁶ Murphey, "The Historical Setting," 34.

⁵⁷ I am not implying that the Ottoman body politic was democratically structured. That said, there still exists the need for systematic studies on the political process of deposing a sultan and enthroning another. It seems to have, if indirectly, involved wider aspects of the public than were formerly assumed. For example, the sultan's popularity or lack thereof in broader society may very well have been considered by his deponents. Such political processes may not be simplistically attributed to the whim of the janissary troops or *ulema*.

⁵⁸ The transition from one succession principle to another was not a smooth process. Osman II and Murad IV still had some of their brothers executed to make sure that their throne was not endangered, while sparing the very young who would not threaten their power but might help preserve the dynastic line. The confined life in the palace and the anxiety of not knowing when their elder brother, the sultan, would want to have them killed must have taken their toll on some of the princes. While it is by no means justifiable to blame all the misfortunes of the empire on the weak or even "mad" personalities of individual sultans, it is by no means surprising that there were a few sultans who were psychologically unstable

At the same time, the role of the sultan in the administration of the empire became more impersonal and symbolic. The role of the grand vizier and the network of people surrounding the sultan became more important, overshadowing the imperial *divān*. The meeting days of the imperial *divān*,⁵⁹ which had been six days a week under Mehmed II, decreased to four or five days a week by the mid-sixteenth century. In the early to middle part of the seventeenth century they were fixed at four days a week, but in the 1660s under Mehmed IV (“the Hunter”) the meeting days fell to just two days a week. The grand vizier assumed more authority to make important decisions, and his *divān* was separately institutionalized in the building of Paşa Kapısı directly across from the palace when Derviş Mehmed was the grand vizier (ca. 1654).⁶⁰ In addition, the imperial women, especially the queen mothers,⁶¹ and the palace officials who had physical proximity to the sultan⁶² became prominent in behind-the-scenes political deals. This is not to say, however, that the sultans could not actively take charge of state affairs. If they wanted and were able to, sultans like Osman II—although his reform efforts in the military sector brought him to an unfortunate end—and Murad IV vigorously took part in the administration of the empire and personally led military campaigns.

Ideologically and symbolically, the sultan was still the center of politics and justice, even if he did not personally need to take an interest in the day-to-day running of the state. As the ultimate authority in

or detached from state affairs. For example, Ibrahim I (“the Mad”), who had seen his older brothers murdered, was literally scared to death suspecting that he was also to be killed when he was taken out of his quarters for the enthronement ceremony (*Tārīḫ-i Na‘īma*, 6 vols. [Istanbul, 1864–66] 3: 450–51).

⁵⁹ The imperial *divān* was also presided over by the grand vizier, though it was theoretically under the surveillance of the sultan.

⁶⁰ Uzunçarşılı, *Merkez ve Bahriye Teşkilatı* (Ankara: TTK, 1988 c. 1948) 1–7, 242–250. One of the grand viziers in this period, Derviş Mehmed Paşa (1653–54), was a very wealthy man who had made his fortune in commerce. He advocated the involvement of statesmen in entrepreneurship eloquently, and his personal wealth may have helped him weather the political instability of the time. See Metin Kunt, “Derviş Mehmed Paşa, Vezir and Entrepreneur: A Study in Ottoman Political-Economic Theory and Practice,” *Turcica* 9 (1977) 200, 210–14.

⁶¹ Leslie Peirce, *The Imperial Harem: Women and Sovereignty in the Ottoman Empire* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993) 57–112.

⁶² Metin Kunt, “The Köprülü Years,” Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University, 1971, Part 1, Chapter 1. Kunt observes that even the power of the grand vizier was limited by palace officials who exercised undue influence based on their proximity to the sultan.

the empire, he was supposed to live up to certain standards of morality and protocol, with the extravagance of Ibrahim I and the hunting-frenzy of Mehmed IV proving very unpopular with the public.⁶³

As the number of soldiers dramatically increased in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries (see Chapter III), it was no easy task for the Ottoman government to maintain the quality as well as the quantity of the army. It was a time of “Military Revolution” in Europe, when the nature and organization of armies were noticeably changing. In Europe, the ratio between cavalry and infantry gradually shifted in favor of the latter, and the size of armies grew larger to carry out siege warfare, aided by new developments in logistics.⁶⁴ The Ottomans, sharing a European front with the Habsburgs, were forced to follow new trends in military technology and organization to fight against European armies. The landholding *sipahi* cavalry, for example, had become strategically obsolete and was gradually phased out.⁶⁵ The army of the period needed more infantrymen, not because they were individually valued but because they were expendable in war. While the regular janissary infantry troops increased greatly, temporary mercenaries (called *sekban* or *sanca*) recruited from the peasantry were being used in greater numbers.⁶⁶ These supplementary forces, unemployed in times of peace, became a destabilizing force ready for use by local leaders against the central government, as in the Celali rebellions. Despite the costly military transformation, it was very difficult for the Ottoman army to repeat its victories of

⁶³ İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Tarihi*, 9 vols. (Ankara: TTK, 1995 c. 1951) III/1: 223–39, 490–93.

⁶⁴ Geoffrey Parker, “‘Military Revolution’ 1560–1660—A Myth?,” *Journal of Modern History*, 48–2 (1976) 204–209. One should remember that this “Military Revolution” did not happen in a short time but over an extended period of a few centuries. Actually, the Ottoman Empire in the middle of the fifteenth century was militarily quite advanced, with one of the earliest standing armies, and their feat of capturing the city of Constantinople (1453) despite its formidable walls caused a sensation among European military circles.

⁶⁵ Griswold, *The Great Anatolian Revolts?* 11–21. The ineffectiveness of the *sipahi* cavalry became obvious in the course of the war against the Habsburgs in the 1590s. The government tried to get rid of the cavalry using any excuse, the most famous example of which is found in the “register of the deserters” (1005/1596) made by Cağalazade Sinan Paşa, which suddenly outlawed tens of thousands of cavalymen who had temporarily retreated from the front during a battle. The outlawed cavalymen had to make their living from banditry, and joined the Celali rebels in the provinces.

⁶⁶ İnalçık, “Military and Fiscal Transformation in the Ottoman Empire, 1600–1700,” *Archivum Ottomanicum* 6 (1980) 288–297.

the past. The government found the increasing military expenditure more difficult to absorb when it reached the limits of its territorial expansion. The series of protracted wars the Ottomans had been fighting since the end of the sixteenth century produced little booty to add to the treasury, but military spending continued to rise steadily.⁶⁷ The resulting deficits in turn caused coin debasements and arrears in the payment of soldiers' salaries. In these conditions, it was hard to expect complete obedience from the soldiers. In fact, mutinies were not limited to the Ottoman Empire. Other countries in early modern Europe also suffered similar deficits incurred by increasing military spending and occasional mutinies driven by discontent over unpaid salaries, although some—especially Holland—soon mastered ways to tap into the enormous commercial wealth of their societies so as to deal with the situation early on.⁶⁸

The Ottoman Empire, however, was not as fortunate in finding sufficient economic resources within its society to finance a huge army. The daily lives of Ottoman soldiers deteriorated, and the disillusioned soldiery became a social as well as military problem. Not only did the army occasionally have to endure lack of payment, but troops were often assigned to the front during increasingly deadlocked battles. Given the Ottoman tradition of launching all campaigns from Istanbul, this involved a long, weary journey from home into great danger with almost no reward. The increased and concentrated population of soldiers in Istanbul was wary of leaving for the front, and some refused to go. Their salaries, even when paid completely, had decreased significantly because of the many coin debasements and ensuing inflation. Many took to business in the city to support themselves, and the professionalism and fighting power of the army began to be compromised. In addition, some also engaged in violent and even criminal activities. Even so, the government did not have sufficient power to discipline the unruly elements among the soldiery, especially the janissaries. The janissaries had occasionally interfered in politics during the Classical Age. Now, their discontent made the soldiers

⁶⁷ Military spending was the largest component of total government expenditure, of which at least 70 percent was spent on wages for the troops (Caroline Finkel, *The Administration of Warfare: The Ottoman Military Campaigns in Hungary, 1593–1606* [Wien: VWGÖ, 1988] 67). The wages occupied 44 to 69 percent of all government spending during the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries (Ahmet Tabakoğlu, *Türk İktisat Tarihi* [Istanbul: Dergâh Yayınları, 2000, c. 1986] p. 191, table 4).

⁶⁸ Parker, 209–213.

more prone to revolt, sometimes because of their own grievances and sometimes at the instigation of a court faction.⁶⁹ Indeed, the soldiers were a crucial force to be used in succession and other power struggles. There were at least six major army revolts in Istanbul in the seventeenth century (1622, 1632, 1648, 1655, 1656 and 1687), and in three of them (1622, 1648 and 1687) the sultan was deposed—in two of these three (1622 and 1648) the sultan was also assassinated, and there were numerous executions and dismissals of high-ranking bureaucrats. The frequency of armed revolts in Istanbul and the fear of them may well have been a factor in the preference of the sultan to live in Edirne in the second half of the seventeenth century.⁷⁰

These army revolts were more than temporary disturbances in Istanbul politics. The janissary corps, now a social group as well as a military formation, often accommodated the poor populace of the city, composed mostly of half-employed lumpen tradesmen who recently migrated to Istanbul without any economic or social networks to fall back on. The latter increased in the walled cities like Istanbul in the aftermath of the Celali rebellions. Whenever the janissaries revolted, the rabble joined them. Both the janissaries and the displaced urban poor remained rebellious and available to any palace faction that wished to stage a coup. In this vein, it is not surprising that the culture of rebellion spilled over into other sectors of society that were not normally prone to revolt. For instance, in 1656 unspecified groups of Istanbulites (*halk*, *‘umūmen kıl ve şehir halkı*) held a demonstration demanding the return of Mehmed IV from Üsküdar and an immediate counteroffensive against the Venetians upon hearing the news of the Venetian occupation of the islands of Bozcaada (Tenedos) and Limni (Lemnos) near the Dardanelles.⁷¹ Even the established men of the marketplace, who usually preferred stability to political

⁶⁹ For the analysis of seventeenth-century janissary rebellions and their relationship with the lumpen tradesmen I owe much to Professor Cemal Kafadar's "Yeniçeri-Esnaf Relations," M.A. Thesis, McGill University, (1981) especially Chapter 5, "The Revolts."

⁷⁰ For example, Mehmed IV spent more time in Edirne than in Istanbul, having new buildings built and old ones repaired in the Edirne palace (Rifat Osman, *Edirne Sarayı* [Ankara: TTK, 1989] 31). The sultan's preference for living in Edirne became so salient that the anxiety of the people in Istanbul reached boiling point in 1703 following the rumor that Edirne was going to be declared the new capital city.

⁷¹ *Tārīh-i Gilmāni*, facsimile in Buğra Atsız, *Das Osmanische Reich um die Mitte des 17. Jahrhunderts: Nach den chroniken des Vecihi (1637–60) und des Mehmed Halifa (1633–60)* (München: Tufarik, 1977) 71b–72a. The occupied islands were important transit points for the provisioning of Istanbul, and this incident led to the most severe of Venetian blockades.

action, spontaneously took to the streets in 1651 and 1687, and their demands were granted. Revolts perhaps became a normalized mode of communication between the state and society during this highly unstable period of the sultanate: the voices of ordinary people and their demands on the government came to have some weight.

Coupled with political and military problems were the growing economic difficulties faced by the empire. The most salient was the massive inflation between the 1580s and the mid-seventeenth century. Historians are still grappling with the causes of the Ottoman “Price Revolution”: some emphasize monetary factors such as the influx of American silver, while others focus on “real” factors such as an increasing population and the ensuing growth of aggregate demand.⁷² The monetarist view counting on the increased volume of silver is now being criticized, even as an explanation of the “Price Revolution” in Europe.⁷³ It seems that the impact of the influx of silver has been overestimated. Although it elevated price levels in the Ottoman Empire to new highs, the silver quickly moved to areas further east toward where the empire was running a negative trade balance. Additionally, since there were already debased coins circulating in the Ottoman economy, good foreign silver coins were hoarded rather than circulated.⁷⁴ As a consequence, the Ottoman economy still lacked

⁷² Ö.L. Barkan, “The Price Revolution of the Sixteenth Century: A Turning Point in the Economic History of the Near East,” trans. Justin McCarthy, *IJMES* 6 (1975) 16. Inflation was at its peak between 1585 and 1606, during which prices nominally tripled and rose up 60 percent in real value. Haim Gerber presents a revisionist view countering Barkan’s view that the “Price Revolution” had a huge impact on the Ottoman economy. His thesis has a point in that inflation did not have such a negative effect as Barkan attributes to it, considering the difference between real and nominal prices. He argues that inflation may have actually been the result of the natural demands of an increasing population and growing commercial activities (“The Monetary System of the Ottoman Empire” *JESHO* 25–3 (1982) 316–317). On the other hand, Gerber’s notion discounts the psychological effects on the people who had been used to stable fixed prices for about a hundred years, and does not account for the fact that inflation was calculated based on the rise of the officially fixed (nominal) prices, which must have been set artificially low compared to market prices. See Kafadar, “Prelude to Ottoman Decline Consciousness: Monetary Turbulence at the End of the Sixteenth Century and the Intellectual Response,” unpublished paper, whose shortened version is published as “Les troubles monétaires de la fin du xvi^e siècle et la prise de conscience ottomane du déclin,” *Annales: Économies, Société, Civilisations*, 46–2 (1991) 387–389.

⁷³ Şevket Pamuk, *A Monetary History of the Ottoman Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000) Chapter 7, 112–130. According to him, silver inflow to Europe continued even when prices were falling in the seventeenth century.

⁷⁴ Mustafa Akdağ, *Türkiye’nin İktisadî ve İçtimai Tarihi*, 2 vols. (Ankara: TTK Basımevi, 1971) 2 (1453–1559): 332–339.

specie even after the influx of American silver; the silver was responsible for the initiation of an inflationary cycle rather than for sustaining it.⁷⁵ Another perhaps more important factor behind inflation was the recurrent coin debasements of the government, since the state resorted to currency depreciation in order to manage the deficits caused by its huge military expenditure. The debasements were on such a massive scale that by the late seventeenth century the basic Ottoman currency of the silver *akçe*, at that time of minimal worth, was mainly used as a unit of account rather than as a means of payment.⁷⁶ Frequent depreciation and the mixed circulation of old and new *akçe* in the market must have confused the situation, but the debasements per se do not seem to have led to the total devastation of the Ottoman economy, as was once assumed by Barkan, by making Ottoman raw materials cheaper for European merchants. Such an eventuality is particularly unlikely for the Istanbul trades, the majority of which were geared to the production of daily necessities. However, one should also remember that the guildsmen were on the losing side in the ongoing currency devaluation, since they were, in principle, supposed to sell their commodities at prices fixed in terms of the debased *akçe*.⁷⁷ Although the officially fixed prices (*narh*) rose over time, the real value of the *akçe* decreased more rapidly.

Furthermore, because of its financial squeeze, the government collected more taxes, mostly as cash, in coins containing a good portion of precious metal. Taxes formerly collected only in emergencies became regularized. As noted previously, a substantial portion of the landholding cavalry was displaced from the land and was replaced by tax-farming contractors, so much so that tax farming became the dominant mode of tax collection in the empire.⁷⁸ Adding to the com-

⁷⁵ Kafadar, "Les Trouble Monétaires," 388.

⁷⁶ Şevket Pamuk, "Money in the Ottoman Empire," in İnalçık and Quataert eds. *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire*, 964.

⁷⁷ Mantran, "Politique, économie et monnaie dans l'empire Ottoman au XVII^{ème} siècle," *Türkiye'nin Sosyal ve Ekonomik Tarihi* (Ankara, 1980) 125. It was the lower class, petty merchants and craftsmen, and the salaried soldiers who were the victims of coin debasements. Prices rose mildly but constantly between 1630 and 1680, while the government received various taxes with sound coins. We do not know, however, what kinds of coins were used in what proportions for actual transactions.

⁷⁸ Tax farming has generally been associated with negative images of corruption and an oppressed peasantry. It has not been long since tax farming as a system became an object of scholarly analysis. For major scholarly works on the subject, see Yavuz Cezar, *Osmanlı Maliyesinde bunalım ve Değişim Dönemi: XVIII. Yüzyıldan Tanzimat'a Mali Tarihi* (Istanbul: Alan Yayıncılık, 1986) and Mehmet Genç, "Osmanlı

mercializing trend already present in the sixteenth century, the state's increased tax demands may well have forced ordinary Ottoman townsfolk to engage in extra business activities, as they needed more money in order to buy at premiums the "good coins" with which the state demanded its taxes be paid.⁷⁹ As the economy became more commercialized,⁸⁰ the increasing lack of Ottoman currency was met by European coins, even debased or counterfeit ones.⁸¹ All in all, the life of regular tradesmen must have been difficult, if not unsustainable, because their income was in the debased *akçe* yet they had to pay their taxes in good (foreign) coins. As a result, an urban disaster like a fire, epidemic or naval blockade could easily tip their lives over the edge into poverty.

Amid these political and economic hardships, Istanbul society was also experiencing the growth of a fervent religious movement called "Kadızedeli" after the puritanic preacher Kadızedeh Mehmed (d. 1635). We might call it an ultra-orthodox or "fundamentalist" movement, since the upholders of its tenets posited that the ills of society could be cured by abolishing all "innovations" and going back, at least in theory, to the simple and righteous way of life of the Prophet Muhammad and his followers. They objected to all kinds of novelties ranging from drinking coffee, smoking tobacco, and sufi practices of *zikr* (loud or quiet remembrance of God's names), to singing and dancing. These looked like mostly unimportant matters to Kâtip Çelebi, the Ottoman polymath of the seventeenth century, but they were taken seriously by those who were involved in the debates.⁸² The main enemies of the Kadızedeli sympathizers were the sufi brotherhoods, which were deemed to be the source of many unorthodox practices, and there were frequent mob fights between the

Maliyesinde Malikane Sistemi," in Osman Okyar and Ünal Nalantoğlu eds., *Türkiye İktisat Semineri* (Ankara, 1975). A new way to understand tax farming is to compare it to the modern practice of privatizing government-run companies and institutions, as Ariel Salzmann does in "An Ancien Régime Revisited: 'Privatization' and Political Economy in the Eighteenth-Century Ottoman Empire," *Politics and Society* 21–4 (1993) 393–423.

⁷⁹ Faroqhi, "Counterfeiting in Ankara," *TSAB* 15–2 (1991) 284.

⁸⁰ Molly Greene, *A Shared World: Christians and Muslims in the Early Modern Mediterranean* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000) 7.

⁸¹ Pamuk, "Money in the Ottoman Empire," 964–965.

⁸² For the many debates about social customs of the day, see Kâtip Çelebi, *Mizan ü'l-Hakk*, translated by G.L. Lewis, *The Balance of Truth* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1957).

Kadıızadelis and the supporters of the sufi orders.⁸³ Although the active phase of the movement ended toward the end of the seventeenth century, in the long run it may have had a lasting effect on the Ottoman legal system.⁸⁴

This movement was popularized by some preachers (*vāʿizan*) who worked at a number of prestigious mosques (e.g., the Aya Sofya and Fatih mosques), and it gained a following among poor, illiterate commoners as well as grandees in officialdom. While at times influencing policy making at the state level, as in the case of the ban on coffee-houses and taverns under Murad IV (1633) and Mehmed IV (1662), the movement's ideas also appealed to the ordinary people of the capital city, since the preachers maintained that the Koranic injunction of "enjoining good and forbidding evil (*emr bi'l-ma'rūf ve nahy ʿanü'l-münker*)" was the duty of all righteous Muslims and not only of those representing governmental authority.⁸⁵ According to the Kadıızadelis, a faithful Muslim was entitled to criticize all unorthodox or "wrong" practices and even prohibit them physically. Aside from the ultra-conservative leaning of the Kadıızadelis, this must have been an empowering message at least for some of the Muslim populace in Istanbul.⁸⁶ Although it is difficult to know how precisely the Kadıızadeli movement influenced the tradesmen in Istanbul, the heated debates between the Kadıızadelis and their sufi opponents must have drawn various tradesmen to either camp.⁸⁷ The general upheaval created by the debates and fights presumably challenged the public to create

⁸³ Zilfi, *The Politics of Piety: The Ottoman Ulema in the Postclassical Age (1600–1800)* (Minneapolis: Bibliotheca Islamica, 1988) 140–143.

⁸⁴ There was a growing tendency since the seventeenth century of regarding the secular dynastic law (*kanun*) as less important than the *shariʿa*, at least among legal circles Uriel Heyd, *Studies in Old Ottoman Criminal Law*, ed. V.L. Menage (London: Oxford University Press, 1973) 154–55. Çavuşoğlu, "The Kadıızadeli Movement: An Attempt of Şeriʿat-Minded Reform in the Ottoman Empire," Ph.D. Dissertation, Princeton University, 1990, "Conclusion."

⁸⁵ Zilfi, 137.

⁸⁶ Çavuşoğlu's dissertation on the Kadıızadeli movement comments that it is very hard to pinpoint the social background of the lower echelon of the Kadıızadeli followers. We cannot draw a direct connection between the movement and the social strata of tradesmen.

⁸⁷ Naʿīma (6: 233) indicates that there were some tradesmen among the Kadıızadeli zealots. Also, for the sufi affiliation of tradesmen, see Kafadar, "Self and Others: The Diary of a Dervish in Seventeenth-Century Istanbul and First-Person Narratives in Ottoman Literature," *Studia Islamica* 69 (1989) 142–43. At least a Ḥalveti sufi şeyh tells us in his diary that he socialized with many tradesmen during informal gatherings of his brotherhood.

and hold opinions regarding contemporary religious and social practices.

Since Ottoman military fortunes vis-à-vis Europe were changing for the worse, and Kadızadeli purists were at times very close to the sultan and high-ranking bureaucrats, it is not so surprising that the famous religious tolerance of the Ottomans was to some extent compromised. There were more and more incidents of calling the non-Muslims *kefere* instead of *dhimmī* in official documents and literary works.⁸⁸ Under the inspiration of Vani Mehmed (d. 1685), a serious Kadızadeli advisor to Sultan Mehmed IV and Grand Vizier Fazıl Ahmed Paşa, the production and consumption of wine were banned even for non-Muslims, and mass conversion to Islam was encouraged.⁸⁹ It is difficult to know whether such trends in government policy deepened religious rifts, but given the scope of the Kadızadeli movement, it is rather likely. Nevertheless, one should also remember that Muslims and non-Muslims went on working together in business partnerships during this period; antagonism between religious communities did not necessarily overrule the prospect of pursuing mutual interests.

Overall, it is too simple to think of seventeenth-century Istanbul as a theater featuring all kinds of turmoils, disasters and hardships. Surely, seventeenth-century Istanbulites had a “Golden Age” behind them, either the Ottoman Classical Age or the Prophet Muhammad’s time, to look back on and sigh over, but that is not to say that the events of the seventeenth century represented meaningless deterioration. Rather, the Ottoman state and Ottoman society were groping for solutions to these crises. Political calm continued for a while after Murad IV took control with his iron fist (1632–39). By the time of the Köprülü grand viziers (ca. 1656–1683), it looked as if the immediate threat of political instability caused by rebellions in the capital and the provinces, disastrous wars, and extreme budget deficits was largely taken care of. However, the state was merely managing the problems at hand rather than finding fundamental solutions to them.⁹⁰

⁸⁸ IK 3: 88a/707, IK 5: 17b/120, BOA İbnülemin Maliye 381, Hezarfen Hüseyin, *Telhis* chapter 11, 248 and so on.

⁸⁹ Zilfi, 151.

⁹⁰ Köprülü Mehmed Paşa seems so different from his predecessors in that he was successful while most others suffered dismissal and in some cases execution after a short period in office. Nevertheless, he actually maintained the same policy line as a number of his precursors, especially Tarhunçu Ahmed Paşa, in increasing tax revenues and asking the sultan for the right to use unchecked power (Metin Kunt, “The Köprülü Years,” Part 1, Chapter 2).

It was not only the state sector that was searching for new ways to adapt to difficult situations. As the Kadızadeli movement demonstrates, ordinary people were aware of the society's problems and did not shy away from participating in large-scale movements. Not only at the level of a public movement, but also at the level of social groups and individuals, such as guilds and guildsmen, there were strenuous efforts made to find ways to weather the challenges of the time, such as heavy taxes and the encroachment of outsiders into the trades. Some guilds began to use new institutional devices to meet such challenges and fortify their structures. In addition, the aforementioned 1651 revolt of the guilds was forceful enough to trigger a political realignment at the highest level.

Through all these structural changes and consolidations, guilds and guildsmen were not a disconnected or isolated segment of society. They were a part of the picture, although they were not always visible. All the changes mentioned above were directly or indirectly affecting the guilds. The guildsmen also observed political events, like the dethronement of a sultan, with keen eyes, although it is very difficult to know in any detail what they thought about the events around them based on the few remarks preserved in the chronicles (Chapter IV). What is clear is that the importance of the guilds was on the rise both for guild members and for the state in the face of new realities.

CHAPTER TWO

THE ORGANIZATION AND OPERATION OF GUILDS

a. *The Guild as a Collective Body: Membership, Leadership and Guild Activities*

Guilds incorporated large numbers of artisans and service workers in Ottoman Istanbul, although they admittedly did not account for the entire working population.¹ How were guilds organized in seventeenth-century Istanbul, and how did they operate? Although it is impossible to know the full range of individual guild structures given the huge diversity of the guilds and their particular characteristics, there are some discernible general commonalities in their organization and operation. This chapter will construct a picture of the guild system that contradicts the conventional images of state-controlled Istanbul guilds. Guilds were in fact able to make independent decisions regarding their business affairs, and the regulations that governed them were relatively fluid and maneuverable.

The guilds in the seventeenth-century Ottoman capital do not seem to have been clearly defined organizations, although the guildsmen of that time probably had a clearer understanding of the principles governing each respective guild than we do now. In addition to the lack of detailed descriptions of the guilds, the records of guild activities in court registers rarely give us a clear understanding of the boundaries of these organizations. For example, we do not precisely know the guildsmen's definition of membership in a guild, the rights and duties of a member, nor the exact procedure by which an outsider could become a member. Besides, even when we have some information about certain guilds, there is no guarantee that this information is true of all Istanbul guilds, since they had different interests and apparently varied in organization.

¹ Donald Quataert, "Labor History and the Ottoman Empire, c. 1700–1922," 96, points out that Ottoman historians, depending on the state archives, have ignored non-guild workers who had little to do with the state.

Even the various existing lists of guilds are not consistent. The idiosyncratic account by Evliya Çelebi provides us with around five hundred trade names,² while other authorities quote numbers ranging from 70 to 140 (see Appendices). The contents of the more realistic lists fluctuate greatly, and even when they list the same trades they may arrange such trades differently (e.g., listing a group independently or together with others). It would seem that the boundaries of guilds were not firmly set, especially in the eyes of non-guild observers and even state authorities.

The terms conventionally applied to the guilds also reflect the amorphousness of guild organization. They include *tā'ife*, which simply means a group of any kind, *hırfet* or *şan'at*, which means a trade or craft, and *eşnāf* (whose original meaning is classes/kinds), which refers to artisans and menial workers in general who often doubled as shopkeepers. Of these terms, the one most commonly used to designate a guild is *tā'ife*, meaning any kind of real or imaginary group. The term was applied to any ethno-religious, professional or general social group, regardless of its degree of organization. Its application was so broad that one even comes across such examples as “women in general” (*nisvān tā'ifesi*)³ or the social stratum of “officers” (*ağā tā'ifesi*).⁴ This imprecision in the use of *tā'ife* has attracted the attention of many scholars.⁵ On the other hand, *hırfet*, the second-most used term, clearly designates a commercial trade and was never applied to other types of organizations. One may assume, however, that from an insider's point of view *tā'ife* had multiple usages to designate generic, guild-like or government groupings, none of which were confusing once a context was given. The word *tā'ife* itself, however, does not signify the qualities of a given group. Therefore, we are at a loss to know any of the characteristics of a given guild until we see how it

² Evliya, ed. Gökyay, *Evliya Çelebi Seyahatnamesi*, 1: 368–371. Yücel Dağlı's index provides about 550 entries under the heading of “esnaf,” although one may consider some to be overlaps.

³ IK 7: 31a.

⁴ ‘Abdurrahman Paşa's “Kanunnāme,” (1087/1676–77) *Milli Tettebu' Mecmuası* 3: 544.

⁵ Baer, *Egyptian Guilds in Modern Times* (Jerusalem: Israel Oriental Society, 1964) 17, Gerber, *Bursa*, 34, Goffman “Ottoman *millet*s in the early 17th century,” *New Perspectives on Turkey* 11 (1994) 135–158, and Raymond, “The Role of the Communities (*Tawā'if*) in the Administration of Cairo in the Ottoman Period,” in *The State and Its Servants: Administration in Egypt from Ottoman Times to the Present*, ed. Nelly Hanna (Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press, 1995) 32–43.

acted and was constituted. We cannot even be sure when a *tā'ife* is mentioned in a seventeenth-century document that it was organized like a guild unless it acted as a group under the leadership of certain guild officials.⁶

Even among occupational *tā'ifes* there must have been structural differences corresponding to the nature of the occupation. For example, some special social and occupational groups were under closer government surveillance than others because the authorities viewed them with suspicion.⁷ Therefore, brokers and slave dealers seem to have been rather tightly knit communities due to the government's demand that the members guarantee one another's good behavior. Meanwhile, groups of social outcasts, such as beggars and pickpockets,⁸ or those who did not have a fixed station, such as peddlers (*koltukçular*), may not have had a regular guild structure⁹ even when they were called *tā'ifes*, particularly because they were almost never seen in court claiming their rights. In this study, the *tā'ifes* discussed will be limited to those consisting of artisans or workers having a tangible organization—sometimes a structure as simple as a group of craftsmen acting collectively in court. Even with this limitation, we can identify a set of diverse groups comprising all kinds of urban crafts and services.

How, then, should we approach the diversity and ambiguousness of seventeenth-century Istanbul guilds? Can we identify meaningful patterns in their structure and behavior, despite a lack of formal

⁶ It may be dangerous to assume that a *tā'ife* with no mention of guild officials was not an organized group at all, since even then a crafts/service group could launch legal action together. Without guild officials, such a group must certainly have been less organized than those with guild officials, but it could have been in the process of establishing a stricter organization: members of such groups could later choose to have guild officials (GK 73: 123a, biscuit-makers, GK 80: 38a, 93b, bottle-makers).

⁷ There were some guilds that the government authorities must have been interested in closely controlling so that it could take the initiative in organizing trades under state supervision. For example, brokers (*dellallar*) and slave dealers (*esirciler*) seem to have been mistrusted by the government so much that the individuals in these trades were registered in the *defter* of fixed prices. Kütükoğlu, *Osmanlılarda Narh Müessesesi ve 1640 Tarihli Narh Defteri* (Istanbul: Enderun Kitabevi 1983) 255, 287.

⁸ Although the state attempted to control those suspicious groups more strictly by appointing officials, the relationship between the membership and leadership must have been very different. See Evliya, ed. Gökyay, 223, Hammer's translation vol. 1, pt. 2, p. 109.

⁹ "Regular" guild structure in a broad sense should encompass some minor variations in leadership structure, degree of internal control, etc.

definitions? It is indeed dangerous to generalize about the guild structure of the seventeenth century based on a limited number of cases, but the listings of guild members as litigants in the court records would suggest that many guilds shared similar organizational features, such as officials with the same titles, elders (*ihtiyārlar*),¹⁰ and regular members without titles. In addition, although we do not know many details about their structure, we do have sources that provide details on dynamics within the guilds. What is striking is that completely unrelated guilds showed similar patterns of behavior, as we will see later in this chapter. From this body of information about diverse guilds, it is justifiable to try to come to some understanding as to the general qualities of guilds.

Information about membership and leadership is particularly important in understanding the nature and constitution of the guilds in this period. In what ways did people enter and leave guilds? How homogeneous were guild members? What matters could the guilds autonomously make decisions about and how were these decisions made? How were guild-leaders selected or appointed? How much interaction was there between leaders and members? What did members expect from their leaders? These are questions that shall be dealt with in the following sections, although some of them can be only partially answered.

i. *Fluid Boundaries of Membership*

What was guild membership like in the context of seventeenth-century Istanbul? This is a difficult question to answer given that guildsmen themselves did not leave their own documents behind and that government sources are vague about the delineation of guild membership. Seventeenth-century documents frequently refer to an artisan only as being “affiliated with such and such a group” (. . . *tāʾifesinden*), which may or may not have been a real organization with internal hierarchy, and they do not always give a member’s rank in the group, all of which makes it difficult to fully understand the dynamics of guild membership. Some court cases, however, shed light, if only in

¹⁰ It is very difficult to observe the precise functions of the elders, since in most cases they are mentioned only cursorily as part of the guild delegation along with the guild leaders in court records. However, it is likely that they were selected from among the most powerful masters in a guild who had a say in deciding guild affairs.

passing, on how membership was acquired and relinquished, and the kind of rights and duties guild membership entailed.

Above all, guilds seem to have controlled membership matters themselves, and the authorities were content to let guilds oversee their own membership in the early to mid-seventeenth century. The government registered and kept an eye only on the members of trades that might engage in criminal practices. It required guarantors (*kefîl*)¹¹ for the members of such trades, presumably to prevent them from doing any harm to society,¹² but not for others. The government's insistence that all guildsmen should have guarantors (*kefîl*) and that those who lacked guarantors should be expelled from the city seems to have started much later, in the eighteenth century, when population pressures were more severely felt.¹³ The government, therefore, seems to have been unwilling to intervene overly in guild membership issues, while guildsmen saw them as vital to their own interests. Naturally, individual guilds shaped and established regulations regarding membership.

Most scholarship on the Ottoman guilds has concentrated on the issues of monopoly and regulation. It has emphasized the strict control of guild membership by the guild or by the authorities in the centuries after the conquest of Constantinople. Such an approach has been salient since Osman Nuri,¹⁴ and scholars of later generations

¹¹ The sources concerning government-required mutual guarantee (*kefalet*) among the guildsmen do not specify what the guarantee was about. Legally, a guarantor could be either responsible for paying the amount owed by the person for whom he stood surety or for finding and presenting the latter in person (Bilmen, *Hukukî İslamiyye ve İstilahatî Fikhiyye Kamusu*, 247–48, 251–52). I surmise that for guilds of dubious repute, the guarantee may have been of the latter type.

¹² On the case of slave dealers, some of whom illegally sold freeborn Muslims, see MD 88: 20/48. See also footnote 7 above.

¹³ AK, MC, B.10: 26a (1176/1763) includes the register of guildsmen of the Galata and Kasımpaşa areas, which contained 41 guilds and a total of 5,156 masters, senior and regular apprentices. Of those, 497 people who had been working without guarantors were expelled to their place of origin by the imperial order. This measure seems to have been intended to control immigration from the countryside. For another example, see C. Orhonlu, "Kayıkcılık ve kayık işletmeciliği" *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Şehircik ve Ulaşım üzerine Araştırmaları*, (İzmir, 1984) 87–88. Also, Münir Aktepe (*Patrona İsyanı* 24–25) gives examples of the voluntary adoption of *kefalet* in the early eighteenth century within guilds such as the *kafesçiler* (cage-makers/wooden lattice workers) and *örücüler* (menders/darners).

¹⁴ Osman Nuri, *Mecelle*, 644–651. He asserts that guild monopoly prior to the *Tanzimat* reforms was based on two elements: one was the *gedik*; the other was a guild's control of its specialized commodity by preventing the intrusion of outsiders opening shops wherever they liked.

have followed his understandings.¹⁵ The tendency to place restrictions on becoming a member of a guild and on opening a new shop was an important aspect of the guild system, and the guilds had good reason to do so when there was outside competition. We may not assume, however, that such restrictions applied to all guilds across all periods. It is important to evaluate these restrictions in their historical context. Scholars have only recently begun to consider restrictions on guild membership within specific time frames, and Engin Akarlı's articles on the development of *gedik* (mastership/shop usufruct) and the reinforcement of guild monopolies in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries provide good examples.¹⁶ Guild membership in the seventeenth century, however, has not yet been made a separate issue. There has been a dominant assumption that guild membership was intensely controlled in the seventeenth century that appears to have been based on just a few contemporary instances and evidence taken largely from later centuries.

The huge diversity in size and varying characteristics of the Istanbul guilds may have resulted in dissimilar membership structures. A cursory glance at Evliya Çelebi's account of various guilds in 1638 discourages us from expecting that each and every craft or service trade in Istanbul would have had a homogeneous structure. The groups Evliya describes—his exact term is *eşnâf*, although not all the *eşnâfs* he lists may count as guilds¹⁷—range from only a few people to several thousand, depending on the trade. Although we should discount his numbers to some extent, given his tendency toward hyperbole, Evliya's account clearly indicates the disparate sizes of the different guilds. For example, whereas there were major guilds of considerable size, such as bakers ("10,000 people with 999 shops"), tanners ("3,000 men with 700 shops"), and saddle-makers ("5,000 men with 1,084 shops"), there existed also very small groupings such as sellers of

¹⁵ For a prominent example, see Gabriel Baer, "Monopolies," 148, n. 6.

¹⁶ See Akarlı's articles, "Gedik: Implements, Mastership, Shop Usufruct and Monopoly among Istanbul Artisans, 1750–1850," *Wissenschaftskolleg-Jahrbuch*, 1985–86 and "The Uses of Law among Istanbul Artisans and Tradesmen: The Story of Gedik as Implements, Mastership, Shop Usufruct and Monopoly, 1750–1850," *International Symposium on Legalism and Political Legitimation in the Ottoman Empire and in the Early Turkish Republic: ca. 1500 to 1940* (Ruhr: Universität Bochum, 1988) 1–37.

¹⁷ Evliya Çelebi may not have meant "guilds" by *eşnâf*, since he enumerates more than 1,100 groups including all kinds of social categories. *Eşnâf* in this context may have only meant groups or kinds, as the original meaning of the Arabic word indicates. Osman Nuri, *Mecelle*, 476–478.

leather pieces (*pařacılar*: “15 men with 10 shops”), and oven-builders (“10 men” [with no mention of the number of shops]).¹⁸ Such diversity in size seems to suggest that even among the craft and service guilds, aside from the officials, scholars and marginal social groups that he also included, there may have been different degrees of organization. One might assume that the larger guilds, especially those in charge of food provisioning, which would have had over a hundred shops dispersed throughout the Istanbul area, would have had to be divided into regional divisions headed by *böliükbaşı*s (chief of a division)¹⁹ and therefore would have been less cohesive as a group.

In addition, other unique features of each guild, for example, the level of required skill, the degree of independence from state authority and the degree of geographical concentration, must also have affected membership structure. Large provisioning guilds such as bakers and butchers received the heaviest government control. The tanners’ guild, with its reputation for independence and its strong attachment to the cult of its sufi patron saint Ahi Evren, is likely to have had inter-city networks through the dervish lodges of the cult²⁰ and, at least according to Evliya Çelebi, accepted criminals pursued by state authorities into their sphere to protect and discipline them with hard work, eventually incorporating them as members.²¹ Some service trades that did not require complicated skills or substantial investment, such as the water-carriers and porters, might well have been particularly alert to the encroachment of outsiders and stringent about taking outsiders as new members (see Chapter III). We may also assume that guilds with a high degree of cohesion and geographical concentration must have found it easier to control their membership.²²

¹⁸ Evliya Çelebi even mentions a trade that comprised only one person (screw-wise maker = *buma işkenceci*, Evliya, ed. Orhan Şaik Gökyay, 300). Although Baer translates it as torture-instrument maker (Baer, “Administrative,” 32), this is not likely. Obviously, this one person could not form a guild by himself; it could have been a subspecialization within the trade of carpentry. Additionally, the numbers Evliya gives are often exaggerated. For example, he estimates the number of boatmen as 7,000 in the mid-seventeenth century, but a more realistic figure that Cengiz Orhonlu gives based on the study of a government register of 1751 (Kamil Kepeci n. 7438, p. 15) is only 1,274 boatmen. (Orhonlu, “İstanbul’da Kayıkçılık,” 85.)

¹⁹ IK10: 74a. (The grocers’ guild, for example, had division chiefs besides the *bazarbaşı*, who headed the whole guild.)

²⁰ Taeschner, “Akhī Ewrān,” *ET*².

²¹ Evliya Çelebi, ed. Gökyay, 283.

²² Faroqhi, “Urban Space as Disputed Grounds: Territorial Aspects to Artisan Conflict in Sixteenth- to Eighteenth-Century Istanbul” 277, in her *Stories of Ottoman Men and Women* (Istanbul, Eren, 2002).

Although the diversity of the guilds may have led to different conceptions of membership and varying policies, they seem to have shared some common ground. Almost all guilds had a tiered membership structure. One can easily trace the distinctive appearances of “masters” (*usta*, Turkish form of the Persian word *ustād*, meaning master/teacher) back to the sixteenth century, if not earlier, which definitely indicates that there were lower rank(s) in a guild. Scholars of Ottoman guilds have often presumed that most guilds had a three-tiered structure comprising masters (*usta*), senior apprentices (*kalfa*, Turkish form of the Arabic word *khalīfā*, originally meaning deputy/successor) and regular apprentices (*çırak* = *şagird*), regardless of the period.²³ However, we should avoid making generalizations about the structures in the early period up to the seventeenth century. What is clear for this period is only that there was a general differentiation between masters and apprentices.²⁴ Suraiya Faroqhi has expressed doubt as to the existence of *kalfa* before the eighteenth century, pointing out that at that time the word was rarely used.²⁵ Indeed, the rank of *kalfa* was rarely mentioned in the seventeenth century, and then, for example, only among the ranks of government scribes²⁶ and in some guilds in Bursa.²⁷ The documents that I examined did not refer to *kalfa* as a guild rank. In addition, the much better documented case of the court workshops reveals that palace artisans were only either masters or apprentices (*şagird* = *çırak*).²⁸ In addition, among the few documents that touch upon apprenticeship, there is a case in which

²³ For example, Osman Nuri’s description of artisans of Şiroz (Serres) in the nineteenth century, (*Mecelle*, I: 690–716) is frequently used to make an umbrella case for Ottoman guilds in general.

²⁴ According to Ömer Lüfti Barkan, *Süleymaniye Camii ve İmareti İnşaatı (1550–1557)* 2 vols. (Ankara: TTK, 1979), the construction trades in the mid-sixteenth century had only masters and apprentices (1: 185–329, 2: 173–189). The palace artisans in the seventeenth century were divided only into masters and apprentices. See the salary (*mevacib*) register in Topkapı archives, D 2993 (1033/1623–24), D 1072 (1037/1627–28), and D 3410 (1060/1650).

²⁵ Faroqhi, “Between Conflict and Accommodation: Guildsmen in Bursa and Istanbul during the 18th Century” (unpublished manuscript, 1997) 14–15.

²⁶ For example, Katip Çelebi, who was a well-known man of letters in the mid-seventeenth century, was also known as “Hacı Halife” for his scribal rank.

²⁷ Gerber, *Bursa*, 41–42. Haim Gerber found some cases in which *kalfa* was mentioned by guildsmen, but it was in the sense of a mere “wage-earner” and not a fully established rank in a guild.

²⁸ The palace artisans in the seventeenth century were divided only into masters and apprentices. See the salary (*mevacib*) register in Topkapı archives, D 2993 (1033/1623–24), D 1072 (1037/1627–28), and D 3410 (1060/1650).

a gunstock-maker's (*kundakçı*) apprentice (*şagird*) was approved to open an independent shop after working for a master (1072/1661–62), which shows that this guild did not have the rank of *kalfa*.²⁹ In fact, even Osman Nuri does not say that one was promoted to a mastership only from the rank of *kalfa*, and the term he uses for the promotion ceremony is *çırak çıkarma*.³⁰ Therefore, even if there were some *kalfas* in some guilds, the rank does not seem to have been very widespread. Of course, the absence of a senior apprenticeship does not necessarily indicate that all apprentices were equal under their masters; there may well have been a line of seniority among the apprentices working in the same shop.³¹

As we have only very few documents from this period that even cursorily mention apprenticeship, it is difficult to know in detail how apprenticeship differed from guild to guild. This lack of information may be because guildsmen did not have to address apprenticeship in court except when there was a problem, which may have happened rarely because of the obviously lop-sided power relations between masters and apprentices. When the above-mentioned gunstock-maker became independent, he sued his former master for having exacted more money than the latter was entitled to, but such cases were rarely recorded. Among the few documents that do mention this issue, in a case regarding hard biscuit-makers, one problem they wanted their newly selected *kethüdâ* to settle was that of the appropriation of other masters' apprentices. The masters collectively made an agreement not to take another's apprentices (. . . *bir-birimizin şagirdini âharnın yanına almayıp* . . .).³² This shows that skilled apprentices were obviously an important human resource, and the masters resented losing those they had trained.

Wage labor in the guild is even more rarely mentioned in court records. We have no information on how important wage laborers were in each guild or why they were needed. In addition, the relationship between the apprentices and wage laborers—if the latter

²⁹ IK 10: 36b.

³⁰ Nuri, *Mecelle*, 582.

³¹ Some of the palace artisans (*simiği* and *fodlacı*, certain kinds of bakers), however, seem to have formed a clear hierarchy (*meratip silsilesi*) among the subordinates under a master (Ahmed Refik, *Onuncu*, 7–8). By the same token, we may suppose that masters within a guild had different degrees of power and authority, depending on their economic resources, expertise and age. Some masters who counted as elders were deemed more important.

³² GK 73: 123a.

existed in the guild in question—is yet another question without an obvious answer. There are only a couple of examples in the seventeenth-century court registers that I have examined. One of them involves Armenian coal dealers. An Armenian called Bogos, the son of Kirkor in the coal dealers' guild, sued two others of the same guild who were also Armenians. The reason for the lawsuit was that the latter failed to pay the former 35 *riyal guruş* (a large Spanish silver coin, 1 *riyal guruş* = about 88 *akçe* in 1659)³³ for his year's work. Bogos claimed that he had a contract by which he “rented himself out” (*kafamı icār*) to the two for this amount. When the defendants denied his claim, the arbitrators intervened and helped the two parties settle the suit for 11 *riyal guruş*. This case provides little information about guild structure or about whether those involved were contracted in a master-apprentice relationship. However, Bogos does seem to have been employed at a higher level than an apprentice, given that he was initially promised 35 *riyal guruş*, which was more than a token amount likely to be given to an apprentice.³⁴ In another case, a non-Muslim shoemaker, Yani, hired a Muslim, one ibn ‘Abdullah, on a contract basis promising he would give the latter 4,000 *akçe* a year, which was also more than a token amount for the period.³⁵ These cases are too random for us to get a general idea as to the extent of wage labor within the guilds. The situation may well have varied greatly from guild to guild.

It seems that only the masters counted as full-fledged guild members with membership rights and duties. They were the heads of individual business units within a guild, and apprentices were apparently affiliated with the guild mainly through their masters. Mastership/full membership evidently entailed various obligations, such as paying a due share of taxes, following rules set by internal agreements, government directives or a combination of both (for example, fixed prices and production standards), and participating in all other collective

³³ Şevket Pamuk, “Money in the Ottoman Empire, 1326–1914,” in *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire*, ed. İnalcık and Quataert (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994) 964. The exchange rate between the *riyal guruş* and *akçe* fluctuated greatly in the seventeenth century.

³⁴ IK 9: 28a. We do not have any indication about the level of remuneration that guild apprentices received. It is likely, however, that they did not receive anything or were paid merely a token amount given the nature of their work as on-the-job training. As in the case of aforementioned gunstock-makers, the master could even demand money from the apprentice.

³⁵ IK 7: 17b.

economic and communal activities. In return for fulfilling these duties, members had rights to certain benefits provided by the guild, such as the wholesale purchase of raw materials. Above all, guild membership gave legitimacy to those in the relevant trade in the eyes of both the guild and the state. Members could and often did complain about the intrusion of outsiders, and succeeded in having illicit businesses banned,³⁶ at least officially, although this may not have ensured their monopoly in reality. Inside a craft guild, a master would have had the right to procure his due share (*hişşe*) of any raw material supply that the guild had acquired, as is known from a case involving a *paçacı* (cook of sheep feet).³⁷ Within a service guild, presumably, every master had the right to a certain amount of service opportunities. The foregoing is not stipulated by a legally prescriptive document prepared by the guild, but is corroborated repeatedly through the operations of guilds in disputes that were played out in the courts. Such rights and duties can be considered in terms of give-and-take since, for example, the aforementioned *paçacı*'s grounds for demanding his share of sheep feet was that he had paid taxes along with other guild members.

I have argued above that masters were full members with certain rights and duties. How then did one become a master, a person who ran a shop in affiliation with a guild? The standard way to become an independent artisan with a shop was to be approved by guild authorities after completing an apprenticeship under a master. If stringently applied, this rule would have ensured the total control of the guilds over the selection and admission of new members. Clearly, guilds seem to have considered this path the legitimate way of entry, on the grounds that anyone who worked in a trade should be sufficiently trained, for a long enough period, under a qualified master. Therefore, *hām-dest* (unskilled) and *na-ehl* (unqualified) were terms guildsmen could use to reprove intruders.³⁸ The early seventeenth-century disorder in the countryside caused by the Celali rebellions must have increased the number of those seeking jobs in urban

³⁶ IK 3: 56a/473 (tinsmiths), IK 5: 75a (water-carriers without mounts), IK 6: 2b/10 (fruit-sellers), 25b (chicken-sellers), AŞ 1: 88/419 (grocers, vegetable-sellers, and shopkeepers), IK 9: 190b (sherbet-makers), IK 10: 154b (sellers of imported mirrors).

³⁷ IK 9: 70a.

³⁸ AŞ 2: 17/66, dated 1062/1651–1652 (as cited in Kütükoğlu, “Oto-Kontrol,” 62). The *mühürger* (seal-makers) guild described intruders who opened businesses without serving a master or being approved by the guild authorities with these words.

trades (see Chapter III). Obviously, the guilds did not want this outside competition. When a certain Ömer, who was not connected to the sherbet-makers' guild, opened a sherbet shop, the sherbet-makers' guild appealed to the court claiming that no one without permission from the guild authorities could open a shop. The guild even claimed that it had an imperial order to the effect that a person who had not undertaken an apprenticeship with a master could not open a shop (1071/1660–61).³⁹

A large percentage of apprentices must have been the sons of masters. Most probably, masters' sons were not considered outsiders to the guild to begin with. Even before the gradual consolidation of membership through *gedik* (the right to shop usufruct), which normally guaranteed a son's inheritance of his father's mastership, the common forms of *waqf* shop leases gave the sons of a dead tenant the right to continue the lease.⁴⁰ In these cases, if the son had come of age and been trained in the trade in question, it was natural for him to inherit the mastership and continue his father's business in the same shop. Indeed, vocational inheritance seems to have been very common.

Although apprenticeship and approval by the guild authorities were the normal preconditions for full membership, we might question whether there were other ways of joining a guild. Alternatively, were there ways to practice a certain trade without joining a guild while indirectly benefiting from it? The greatest difficulty in addressing these questions is the ambiguity of an individual's formal membership status in court documents. It is doubtful that the court confirmed the identity of the appellants beyond recording who and what they said they were. Nonetheless, with some degree of caution, I would like to assume that "being affiliated with such and such an artisan group (. . . *ṭā'ifesinde*)" meant that a person was a member of a guild, and not just that he practiced the trade, especially when other documents confirm that such a guild existed and had clearly recognizable guild officials.

In the early decades of the seventeenth century, most guilds apparently did not attempt to impose strict regulations on people coming into their trade or leaving it, particularly if the matter was handled through guildsmen or established shop owners. Shop sale and rental documents corroborate this. Shops changed hands freely and with

³⁹ IK 9: 190b.

⁴⁰ Sitki, *Gedikler* (Istanbul 1325/1909–10) 5–6.

little signs of involvement on the part of guild authorities. It may have been that guildsmen were upset only when an outsider opened a business in their trade having no connection to the existing shops and networks, thereby disrupting the established order. Even then, some guilds were rather tolerant toward intruders. For example, when outsiders started setting up saddle stores, the saddle-makers' guild in Üsküdar's sole demand was that the government tax them as well.⁴¹

Therefore, outsiders could sometimes enter the domains of guilds without disrupting the existing order. First, one could sublet the shop, the commodities and the tools of the trade from a guildsman. Nothing is specified about the qualifications required to do so, although we cannot eliminate the possibility that the guild screened the sublessee's qualifications without recording the fact. We have examples of sublets from perfumers' (*attār*), brass founders' (*dökmeçi*), and bakers' (*ḥabbāz*) guilds.⁴² In these documents, whereas the lessors are mentioned as members of a *ṭā'ife*, the tenants are not thus described. It seems that a non-guild member could take up a trade by sublet from a guildsman.

A second possibility was by renting or purchasing a shop from the owner or the *waqf*-administrator. Many shops were predesignated for a particular trade,⁴³ and the way shops changed hands through landlords at least partly explains why: when a guildsman could no longer pay the rent on his shop, and therefore went out of business, the owner or administrator of the shop—either a private property or a charitable endowment—could buy the existing commodities and instruments from the insolvent guildsman and simply provide a new tenant with a fully equipped shop. For example, in one case a non-Muslim master dyer named Dimo rented a shop privately owned by a certain Mustafa Subaşı. When the contract ended and Dimo could

⁴¹ AŞ 2: 221/853. Also see IK 3: 56a/473 (tinsmiths) and IK 6: 2b/10 (fruit-sellers). This is very similar to what Gerber observes with respect to seventeenth-century Bursa guilds. Namely, some guilds were relaxed about newcomers as long as they performed their duties in the guild. On the other hand, some guilds showed exclusive tendencies early on; the saddle-makers of Saraçhane wanted to have non-members' shops closed as early as 1015/1606–7. (Çagatay Uluçay, "İstanbul Saraçhanesi ve Saraçları," *Tarih Dergisi* III: 5–6 [1951–52] 151–54) It seems that the older the history of one's guild was and the more prestigious the *waqf* one's guild was located in, the more likely one would be to lay claim to a monopoly.

⁴² IK 1: 15a/88 (perfumers), IK 7: 34b (brass founders), IK 8: 16a (bakers).

⁴³ For example, a woman in the early 1610s complained that her ex-husband sold a "kebab-maker's shop" she inherited from her father (IK 1: 10a/58). For a similar designation of a shop for a certain trade, see IK 3: 70b/588, which is about a grocer's shop owned by a woman.

not pay the rent completely, he sold the goods in the shop to Mustafa, and Mustafa, in turn, canceled Dimo's remaining debt.⁴⁴ The new tenant could also be a member of the same guild, but the landlord would have been able to rent out his shop to a non-guild member if he wanted to. When a Muslim woman, Safiye Hatun, rented out her grocery shop, there was no indication that her non-Muslim tenant was a guild member.⁴⁵ We only rarely come across examples in which a guild headman was involved in the transfer of a shop.⁴⁶ Guilds and guild officials were not usually mentioned in the transaction documents for shops and commodities; this shows that these transactions were deemed to be a matter between the concerned individuals and were not primarily a guild matter.

Third, it seems that one could take up a trade by becoming a business partner (*şerik*) of a guild member. At times guildsmen could have a business partner from outside their guild, whether the relevant guild liked it or not. In such cases, the outside partner might indirectly benefit from the privilege of being affiliated with a guild. There is some evidence that guildsmen could form partnerships with outsiders. However, it is unclear whether the partnerships concerned the very trades they were supposed to engage in as guild members or were some unrelated business ventures. I will discuss this route to membership further in a later section on individual guildsmen's business transactions.

Aside from guild membership, we should not neglect the involvement of investors, although they were not considered proper members of craft/service *tâ'ifés*. There are a number of examples of landlords and state dignitaries who invested in shops. Often they owned the real estate where the business was taking place, or they might be

⁴⁴ IK 4: 22a/145,146. In contrast, there was a case in which the trade of a shop was not at first designated, but was later made into a butcher's shop by the tenant. As a *beğ*, the latter was of a military background, and he probably set up the shop without any connection to the butchers' guild. (IK 2: 6b/58)

⁴⁵ IK 3: 70b/588. Women in my sources are mainly described as shop owners, investors or inheritors of shop leases but generally not as active guild members, although exceptionally there were women who were slave-dealers recorded in a price register (see Kütükoğlu, *Osmanlılarda Narh Müessesesi ve 1640 Tarihli Narh Defteri*, 256–257). Female involvement in production must have happened mostly outside the guild setting, such as in private homes. See Suraiya Faroqhi, "The Fieldglass and the Magnifying Lens: Studies of Ottoman Crafts and Craftsmen" *Making a Living in the Ottoman Lands 1480 to 1820* (Istanbul: Isis, 1995) 88 for the example of female silk-dyers.

⁴⁶ IK 10: 47b. This is from the bakers' guild.

deeply involved in subletting *waqf* properties and sometimes the distribution of raw materials.⁴⁷ A certain Muharrem Ağa and Öküz Reis rented a bakery and then sublet it to two Greeks who were members of the bakers' guild.⁴⁸ In addition, the aforementioned Safiye Hatun, who let her grocer's shop for 7,000 *akçe* per year, also lent 20,000 *akçe* to her non-Muslim tenant.⁴⁹ We have only limited information about the investors' influence on guilds, but we can safely say that non-guild investors, such as military officers and wealthy women, do not seem to have caused any visible friction within the guild structure. This could be another element that might indirectly influence a guild's control of its membership.

The court records indicate that leaving a trade was not a difficult process. Let us go back to the two non-Muslim members of the bakers' guild who sublet a bakery from Muharrem Ağa and Öküz Reis. One of them, Anastas, simply decided to leave for another town, ending the business partnership and settling all mutual debts with his partner. From then on, the remaining partner was to keep the same business and pay the shop-rent on his own. Interestingly, Anastas did not have anything to settle with the guild when he left.⁵⁰ It seems that the bakers' guild did not interfere with the exact human composition of a member shop, especially when there was some continuity in its personnel. This is interesting since this particular guild was known to be quite intrusive. It seems that guild membership was taken more casually in leaving a trade than in entering one.

Based on the foregoing information, it can be safely asserted that the boundary of guild membership was not clearly defined and that there existed a gray area between the realms of guild and non-guild. This may well have meant that it was not difficult for an outsider to penetrate the Istanbul guilds, at least in the early seventeenth century. We can demonstrate the relative ease of penetration by showing the presence of newly arrived "foreign" elements in guilds. There are many cases of Anatolian and Rumelian immigrant members in

⁴⁷ AŞ 2: 74/301. A *kapıcı başı* rented many *başhanes* (restaurants serving sheep's heads) from a state-owned *waqf* in Galata, and secured his share (*hişşe*) of sheep heads from slaughterhouses. Given that he could not have run the several *başhanes* he rented, he must have sublet them to the *başçıs* of Galata.

⁴⁸ IK 5: 90a.

⁴⁹ IK 3: 70b/588.

⁵⁰ IK 5: 90a.

different guilds,⁵¹ and we also see many more janissary elements in the 1660s than in the 1610s.⁵² Given such encroachment, we may have to rethink the idea of “guild monopoly”—at least in the context of the early seventeenth century. Even if there was a principle of guild monopoly, it could not be thoroughly applied if membership was not strictly delineated or limited. Furthermore, the government did not give absolute support for the monopoly claims made by the guilds, contrary to what has been assumed. Occasionally, it sided with “poor” artisans who petitioned against established guilds in their trades.⁵³

However, the boundary of a guild did not always remain ambiguous and porous throughout the seventeenth century: first, certain guilds may have developed a clear concept of a boundary between their own groups and outsiders; after all there was talk of “expulsion” from a guild as a possible punishment for those violating guild rules.⁵⁴ Although I have not seen actual cases of expulsion from Istanbul, there are reported cases from other towns.⁵⁵ Expulsion is an important indicator not only of clear boundaries—at least to the members of the guild in question—but also of the guild’s determination to keep troublemakers out, even though it could not or did not prevent all newcomers from entering a trade. Second, *gedik* (literally, a “slot”) is mentioned for several guilds over the middle decades of the seventeenth century, which seems to indicate that there were at least some efforts to make the guild boundaries less permeable.⁵⁶ Although the exact meaning of *gedik* in this period is not clearly

⁵¹ For example, see IK 9: 53a. An Armenian immigrant who had come from Anatolia and become a member of the bakers’ guild entrusted his land back home to another Armenian. There are many cases in which Istanbul tradesmen were involved in the transfer of real estate in the provinces, which seems to indicate that they were recent immigrants who still kept ties with their places of origin. See also IK 7: 25b, IK 8: 26a and 41b, IK 9: 85b, 110b, 211a and 273a, and IK 10: 113a etc.

⁵² See Chapter III for details.

⁵³ MD 81: 189/421 (1017/1608). The government permitted “poor tailors” from outside to do business on the condition that they did not cause harm to the existing tailors’ guild.

⁵⁴ There is only one example where the possibility of expulsion was discussed. It concerned the tanners’ guild (IK 9: 145b).

⁵⁵ Haim Gerber gives three examples of expulsions out of guilds in his *Bursa*, 57.

⁵⁶ Those guilds that had *gedik* in the mid-seventeenth century include water-carriers (*saka*), brokers of the Inner *Bedestan*, *zelehor* (Evlıya Çelebi’s term, of which we do not now know the meaning now) porters (*hammāl*) stationed near Un Kapanı, makers of the metal tips of shoes (*na’lçacı*), and glass-makers (*camcı*). Water-carriers especially seem to have established the institution of *gedik* early on, the earliest evidence coming from 1630 (MD 85: 226/518, as cited in Mantran, *Istanbul*).

explained in the documents, it generally seems to have limited the number of practitioners in a given guild (see Chapter III). While the practice of *gedik*, even when it was widespread and formalized after the mid-eighteenth century, could not completely prevent outsiders from encroaching on the guilds, it must have made casual encroachment much more difficult.

ii. *Egalitarianism, Wealth and Social Mobility*

We tend to regard Ottoman guilds as egalitarian, communalistic organizations that suppressed internal competition and the profit motive while subscribing to *futuwwa* ideals, or the ascetic sufi teachings of the Melamis.⁵⁷ As a corollary, relations between craftsmen and merchants (i.e., the interregional merchants as opposed to local vendors) seemed generally to be hostile due to the merchants' disregard of the norms of the local market. Complaints about merchants who hoarded raw materials or otherwise intruded on the specialty of tradesmen were common among guilds. Guildsmen called such "immoral" behavior of merchants *maṭrabāzlık*, which would seem to indicate a judgment that the merchants' (*maṭrabāz*) way of doing business was inherently evil.⁵⁸

Admittedly, most guilds had a limited supply basis and a localized market, and they therefore needed to distribute the minimal amounts of profit among themselves. It made sense for them to show hostility toward merchants who brought disorder to their markets. It was even more resented if one of the guild members acted like a merchant in defiance of guild rules. However, this may be only one aspect of the guilds' relations with merchants, and such hostility may not have meant that guilds were absolutely egalitarian or imbued with a purely ascetic spirit. After all, guildsmen could not avoid contact with merchants.

The extent to which guilds were egalitarian is very difficult to measure. It is indeed likely that there was a dominant egalitarian culture within those guilds that observed communal ceremonies. Presumably,

⁵⁷ Halil İnalçık, "Capital Formation in the Ottoman Empire," *Journal of Economic History* 29: 1-2 (1969), 103-104.

⁵⁸ İK 6: 2b/10 (fruit-sellers against shopkeepers [*bazarcılar*] who opened shops dealing in fruit illicitly), 11a (joint petition by the guilds of ironworkers [*demirciler*], cauldron-makers [*kazgancılar*], tinsmiths [*kalaycılar*] and so on against coal hoarders). Both groups called the accused *matrabaz*.

some guilds were more egalitarian than others, given that some took particular care to distribute raw materials equitably among the members.⁵⁹ Nonetheless, the egalitarian mentality may not directly translate into economic homogeneity among guildsmen. Mehmed Genç attests, regarding the eighteenth century, that “the differentiation between the poorest and the richest artisan in the same activity hardly exceeded 1:4 or 1:7.”⁶⁰ Even if we acknowledge some egalitarian tendencies, we may need to consider the possibility that there was substantial differentiation within a guild,⁶¹ not to mention between different trades.⁶² After all, some guild members might have access to familial or other resources they could invest in their trades, and in the normal course of business some fared better than others. For the early to mid-seventeenth century, the lack of a substantial amount of inheritance cases concerning artisans makes it difficult to accurately assess the situation. However, even the few available inheritance documents provide a variegated picture of tradesmen’s estates.⁶³

Another way to deal with this issue may be to analyze shop sales or lease documents, although the size and rent of a shop do not directly reflect the wealth of the concerned artisan due to other factors such as debt relations. It is also clear that the amount of rent could vary greatly even in one trade, as the leases of grocers’ shops indicate. In one case, the rent was only a 300 *akçe* down payment plus 25 *akçe* monthly rent, whereas in another the tenant was sup-

⁵⁹ Coal dealers (*kömiircüler*, IK 5: 28b/190) and cooks of sheep feet (*paçacılar*, IK 10: 52a) claimed that they were supposed to have their raw materials distributed “equitably (*alā’s-sevīye*).” However, it is unclear whether it literally meant that each member would get the same amount of raw materials or only that the distribution should be fair. Cohen suggests that “equality” among the guild members could be modified according to the ranks of individual guildsmen (Cohen, 165).

⁶⁰ Mehmed Genç, “Ottoman Industry in the Eighteenth Century: General Framework, Characteristics and Main Trends,” in *Manufacturing in the Ottoman Empire and Turkey, 1500–1950*, ed. Donald Quataert (Albany: SUNY Press, 1994) 67.

⁶¹ Pascale Ghazaleh, *Masters of the Trades*, 76–86. Guild *shaykhs* in Cairo tended to be far wealthier than regular members of the same trade.

⁶² For example, we can easily imagine that an average goldsmith would have been much more affluent than an average cobbler.

⁶³ See Said Öztürk, *Askeri Kassama Ait Onyedinci Asır İstanbul Tereke Defterleri* (Istanbul: Osmanlı Araştırmaları Vakfı, 1995) 438–493. Some examples of tradesmen’s estates and their net value in *akçe* include a court butcher (59,702), a saddle-maker (11,223), a court saddle-maker (12,138), a miller (8,333), a nail-maker (19,161), a *helva*-maker (204,174), a cauldron-maker (1,713), a court water-carrier (3,215), a fisherman (10,413), another fisherman (800), a slave-dealer (50,700), a physician of the sultan (24,400), a brocade-maker (135,905), a painter (11,500), a wood-seller (71,864), the *kethüdā* of tent-makers (181,900), a cap-maker (51,238), another cap-maker (1,366,060), and a blacksmith (13,757).

posed to pay 7,000 *akçe* a year.⁶⁴ We can also provide some confirmation that the size of the businesses in the bakers' guild varied. For example, in one case a bakery that was transferred under the supervision of the bakers' guild and an agent of the *kadi* had a total value of 69,930 *akçe*, including its inventory of wheat, flour, horses, firewood and certain equipment;⁶⁵ in another, a member of the bakers' guild bought 280,050 *akçe* worth of flour (1,867 *keyl* = approximately 46 tons) in only one transaction, although he did so on credit.⁶⁶ Both cases happened in the same year (1072/1661–62), so the value of the currency used in the transactions must have been similar. Therefore, we may safely estimate that there were businesses of varying sizes within the bakers' guild, each probably catering to different kinds of demands for bread.⁶⁷

An egalitarian mentality would dissuade a guildsman from making more profit at the expense of his fellow guildsmen. Being "too rich" was immoral if the only way to become "too rich" was to get involved in merchant-like "profiteering," which was frowned upon by other guildsmen.⁶⁸ If so, this may also indicate that wealth accumulated without engaging in profiteering, any definition of which is bound to be subjective in the first place, was viewed to be legitimate in the eyes of a guild. Even the official price-fixing system described in the *Narh Defterleri* (Registers of Fixed Prices) approved the application of higher prices (with up to 40 percent profit margins) on goods produced with superior craftsmanship by extraordinarily skilled masters.⁶⁹

Ottoman guilds have been characterized as having strong roots in the *futuwwa* ideal. *Futuwwa* is a religio-moral code of Islamic tradesmen that had been politically powerful in the Middle Periods of

⁶⁴ IK 3: 47a/397, 70b/588.

⁶⁵ IK 10: 47b.

⁶⁶ IK 9: 154b. The price of flour in this case (150 *akçe* per *keyl*) seems to be substantially higher than normal fixed prices—even the special flour from Aydınçık cost no more than 100 to 120 per *keyl* only five years earlier in 1656 (GK 80: 92a)—all of which may indicate the baker produced high quality bread on a large scale with a special kind of flour. For more details about this case, see the section on individual guildsmen.

⁶⁷ One of the two bakeries might have been a *hâş firm* (bakery of special high-quality bread).

⁶⁸ Halil İnalçık, "Capital Formation," 103–104. "If a guildsman became too rich, his fellows would expel him from the guild and treat him as a 'merchant.' (. . .) for where the purchasers were limited, if one man increased his share another must be left in want."

⁶⁹ Mübahat Kütükoğlu, *Osmanlılarda Narh Müessesesi ve 1640 Tarihli Narh Defteri*, 58.

Islamic history⁷⁰ (between the tenth and fifteenth century approximately) in places where no strong central authorities existed. In urban environments of the Middle East, the word was also used to refer to groups/movements of urban dwellers following the *futuwwa* norms. The word *futuwwa* literally means “young manhood,” and therefore it was a befitting name for men’s clubs that upheld manly virtues.⁷¹ Such groups in Turkish Anatolia were frequently called *ahis*.⁷² Groups like these upheld virtues such as kindness, generosity, honesty and piety, and denounced vices such as avarice, violence and worldly pleasures, all the while placing emphasis on communal values and activities. As centralized political power grew stronger in the Ottoman Empire, *futuwwa/ahi* groups lost their political influence, but certain elements of their code survived mostly in the form of moral exhortations addressed to urban artisans and service workers. Not only before and during the Ottoman Classical Age (ca. 1450–1600), but even thereafter, such *futuwwa* values were repeatedly asserted in *fütüvvetnâmes* (*futuwwa* manuals).

Although we know about communal meetings and ceremonies that promoted the guildsmen’s spirit of fair dealings and obedience to the authorities,⁷³ we do not yet know exactly how the *futuwwa* ideology and the guilds’ economic and social practices were connected. First, we do not know the number of guilds that subscribed completely to *futuwwa* ideals. After all, some of the major guilds may not have done so, since they were described in a *futuwwa* manual as being disqualified from the path of *futuwwa*.⁷⁴ In addition, although some medieval *futuwwa* associations allegedly included non-Muslims and slaves (Hodgson, 2:127), *futuwwa*, with its firmly Islamic symbolism and rituals, may have had difficulty incorporating non-Muslim or

⁷⁰ This periodization is according to Marshall Hodgson, *The Venture of Islam*, 3 vols. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974) 2: 3–4.

⁷¹ Hodgson gives a vivid and interesting account of various *futuwwa* movements in the Middle Periods, namely that of young men of lower class who did not have patronage from local notables (2: 125–131). In addition, on Caliph al-Nasir’s (r. 1180–1225) efforts to incorporate sufi-leaning *futuwwa* associations into his court see 281–286.

⁷² About the mythical and early history of *futuwwa* movements, see Cahen and Taeschner, “Futuwwa” in *EI*².

⁷³ Osman Nuri, *Mecelle* (new), 519–539.

⁷⁴ D.A. Breebaart, “Miscellanea: The Fütüvvet-Nâme-i Kebîr, A Manual on Turkish Guilds,” *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient* 15 (1972) 208. Those groups excluded from the *futuwwa* included butchers (*kaşşâblar*), weavers (*çul-lâhlar*), brokers (*tellâllar*), bath attendants (*tellâklar*), surgeons (*cerrâhlar*), hunters (*avcılar*), and polytheists (*müşrikler*).

religiously mixed guilds.⁷⁵ In addition, even if members of a guild sincerely believed in the principle of *futuwwa*, which may well have been the case, they may not have been necessarily intolerant of economic inequality in a guild, especially if the rich members were supposed to contribute more for a common purpose.

In the table below we review an example of economic differentiation within a guild with a case of the guild *waqf* of the cauldron-makers' (*kazgancular*).⁷⁶ So far, this is the only seventeenth-century endowment deed of a guild *waqf* found in Istanbul. It shows a relatively large difference (at least compared to Genç's scale) among the amounts of donations made by 18 individual members.⁷⁷

Table 1. The Donation Amounts to the
Guild *Waqf* of the Cauldron-Makers

<i>Name</i>	<i>Donation amount (akçe)</i>
El-Hac Resul b. Murad	4,800
Hasan b. 'Abdullah	11,200
Hüseyin b. 'Abdullah	4,800
El-Hac 'Ali b. 'Abdullah	7,200
Mehmed b. 'Abdullah	3,200
İbrahim b. 'Abdullah	2,000
Mustafa b. 'Abdullah	1,200
Mehmed b. Hüseyin	4,800
Mehmed b. Murad	3,200
Kara Mehmed b. 'Abdullah	1,200
Yahya b. Hüseyin	2,000
El-Hac Mehmed b. 'Abdullah	3,200
Mustafa b. Osman	1,200
(another) Mustafa b. 'Abdullah	1,200
'Abdurrahman b. 'Abdullah	1,200
Mahmud b. 'Abdullah	1,200
Hasan b. Kurt	2,000
Hasan b. 'Abdullah	1,200

⁷⁵ It may have been possible for other religious communities to imitate such moral codes within their own religions.

⁷⁶ These cauldron-makers were originally from Trebizond, and many of them may have been recent converts given that the patronym of "ibn 'Abdullah" was quite common among them. Conventionally, a convert was given the patronym of ibn 'Abdullah.

⁷⁷ IBK 122: 25b-26a.

The average donation is 3,156 *akçe*. Of the 18 listed, 10 submitted 2,000 or less. Therefore, the large donations by Hasan b. ‘Abdullah (11,200) and El-Hac ‘Ali b. ‘Abdullah (7,200) are several times more than what some of the others gave individually. The most likely reason behind such variance is the difference in the scale of businesses owned by individual members, assuming that the members were equally generous. Based on this, I would surmise that a master could be several times as rich as his less well-off colleagues, and still count as a legitimately wealthy member of the guild. These relatively well-to-do members may well have commanded great power and authority in the organization, given their large donations to the guild charity. On the other hand, those wealthy members may have been expected to donate more than others did. In addition, the list given above may have included only the larger donors, since the listed donations only add up to 56,800 *akçe*, whereas the amount collected was 76,000. There may well have been some unlisted poorer members who donated lesser amounts.

In addition, were the guildsmen always averse to merchants, or were they even always separate from merchants? Of course, there was a division between tradesmen in the local marketplace and long-distance luxury traders, the former being under the *hisba* (the government’s control over market transactions) and the latter not. One may not draw such a clear line, however, between artisans and merchants; both are very loosely defined concepts. The Ottoman term *eşnâf*, which roughly meant tradesmen, included all kinds of craftsmen, service workers and small-scale vendors. They were sometimes placed in the loose category of *ehl-i suk* (men of the marketplace), which conceptually comprised both petty tradesmen and luxury merchants. Whatever the caliber of the intercontinental traders, they still had to have some shops in the *bedestan* of Istanbul along with other trades. In addition, it is rather plausible that groups representing rich merchants were organized somewhat similarly to the ordinary artisan guilds. The physical closeness of the shops must have led to some form of interaction between the merchants and artisans, since at times the market became a unit of taxation, for example, shortly before the 1651 rebellion of tradesmen. It is, however, doubtful that the guildsmen in general were hostile to legitimate luxury merchants. The Melâmi sufi order’s influence, whose extent is beyond our knowledge, may have made some guildsmen turn away from worldly fame and pleasure, but it is doubtful that all guildsmen categorically antagonized all merchants. Evliya describes the merchants (*hacegîyân*) of the New

Bedestan saying that they had boundless wealth, but at the same time they were honest people.⁷⁸ Of course, one may not suppose that he represented all tradesmen's viewpoints, particularly since he was the son of a wealthy goldsmith. The concept of loathsome merchants was probably limited to those who drove up raw material prices through hoarding. While *matrabaz* and *bazırgan* acquired the connotation of a profiteer,⁷⁹ such negative imagery may not have categorically been applied to all merchants.

No matter how much artisans hated the profiteering practices of some merchants, they had to rely on merchants for their supply of raw materials, and therefore had to work with them. In addition, merchants, being usually wealthier than the average artisan, seem to have been a handy source of credit for the latter. For example, bakers often owed money to the sea captains who brought in wheat, since they could not pay for an entire consignment at once.⁸⁰ Although general hatred toward profiteers existed, at least some tradesmen did not have an aversion to obtaining further profits by cooperating with the so-called profiteers, especially with those who also had political power. In 1061/1651, while many artisans suffered from supply shortages and high raw material prices, others prospered under the protection of janissaries-turned-investors. It was a time when the power of janissary officers was at its peak. The high-ranking officers, indirectly through their agents, were deeply involved in the supply of meat and other daily necessities, and they had invested in bakeries, groceries and other businesses. The market inspector (*ih̄tisāb ağası*) and his assistants could not touch the shops under their protection.⁸¹ Under these circumstances, guild authorities may not have been able to have the masters of such shops punished due to their fear of the janissary officers.

Not only was there economic diversity among tradesmen, but there was also some upward social mobility out of that category. The observed blurring of the line between the rulers and the ruled was commonly deplored among seventeenth-century intellectuals.⁸² Some individuals from *eşnāf* (tradesmen) backgrounds—who were of course

⁷⁸ Evliya, ed. Gökyay, 295.

⁷⁹ İnalçık, "Capital Formation," 103–105.

⁸⁰ IK 5: 113b and IK 6: 25b.

⁸¹ Na'ima, 5: 99 and 137.

⁸² Koçi Bey, *Koçi Bey Risâlesi*, ed. Yılmaz Kurt (Ankara: Ecdâd, 1994) 50–51 (Ottoman) 57 (transliteration), Yaşar Yücel, ed., *Kitâb-i Müstetâb* (Ankara: Ankara University Press, 1974) 3.

part of the subject people—moved up into the *‘askerī* (ruling class). There were, for instance, marriages between distinguished viziers and people of the marketplace. The widow of a (wholesale) fruit-seller (*yemişçi*) and a major customer of hers, Güzelce Mahmud Paşa, were married by the *hoca* (teacher; mentor) of the sultan, Mustafa Efendi.⁸³ The bride-money (*mehr*) involved was a staggering amount of 400,000 *altın* (1 *altın* = about 120 *akçe* in 1610s).⁸⁴ According to Karaçelebizade ‘Abdülaziz, who related this anecdote, this was not the first marriage between viziers and prominent people of the bazaar.⁸⁵ In addition, some high-ranking religious and secular officials (both *ulema* and viziers) bore nicknames indicating *esnāf* backgrounds. Although some of those might have been names coming from military duties in their former career or from an acquired guild connection, it is impossible for all of them to have been in such positions.

Traditionally, becoming a religious official such as a *kadi* or a *mufti* was a path of social mobility open to all Muslim subjects. A prominent example in the seventeenth century is Debbağzade Mehmed Efendi (d. 1702), a son of the *şeyh* of the tanners’ guild in Yedikule, who became *şeyhülislām* (the Grand Mufti of Istanbul) twice in the late seventeenth century.⁸⁶ In his study of Şeyhî’s biographical dictionary of seventeenth-century *ulema*, Ali Uğur shows that among the 735 entries he analyzed, there were 17 from commercial backgrounds.⁸⁷ This makes only slightly more than 2 percent of the whole, but the commercial backgrounds did not just include wealthy trades such as goldsmiths and merchants. The fathers of those *ulema* included a knife-maker, a shoemaker and a barber. Öküz Mehmed Paşa, who served Ahmed I as his grand vizier, was the son of a blacksmith exercising his trade near the land customs post of Istanbul.⁸⁸ That

⁸³ He had taught Ahmed I (r. 1603–17) since the latter was a prince. Mehmed Süreyya, *Sicill-i Osmani*, 4 vols. (Istanbul: Matba‘a-i ‘Âmire, 1890–93) 4: 382.

⁸⁴ Barkan, “XVI. Asrın İkinci Yarısında Türkiye’de Fiyat Hareketleri,” *Bellelen* 34/136 (1970) 576.

⁸⁵ Karaçelebizade ‘Abdülaziz, *Ravzatü’l-Ebrār* (Cairo, 1238/1832) 499.

⁸⁶ “Debbağzade Mehmed Efendi,” *İA²*. It is a question to ponder whether the *şeyh* of the tanners’ guild was also a practicing tanner or was a full-time religious leader.

⁸⁷ Ali Uğur, *The Ottoman Ulema in the Mid-Seventeenth Century* (Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 1986), Introduction. He analyzes only part (about a half) of Şeyhî’s biographical dictionary, and conjectures that these people probably made their way into the religious bureaucracy by bribery. However, while there was the [a stong] tendency for *ulema* positions to be filled mostly by prominent *ulema* families, we may not simply assume that outsiders could get in through bribery alone.

⁸⁸ Osmanzade Ahmed Tayyib, *Hadîkât ü’l Vüzerā* (Freiburg, 1961) 61–62.

the sons of artisans could make their way into the realm of officialdom suggests that at least some artisans had enough wealth to spare their sons from the drudgery of working in their shops. Once they could forgo their sons' labor, education in the *medrese* (or palace school) did not cost a great deal for the parents. Although many Istanbul guildsmen in the seventeenth century struggled to make ends meet due to the presence of heavy taxes, fixed prices and repeated currency devaluations in the first half of the century, at least the better-off among them must have been able to have their sons educated and thus follow different careers.

Moreover, in the seventeenth century, there were other options of mobility that were considered to be illegitimate by the state authorities. These included joining the military corps, particularly the janissaries, and joining the group of *seyyids* (descendants of the Prophet Muhammad).⁸⁹ The intermingling of tradesmen with janissaries was an especially salient phenomenon in post-classical-era Istanbul (see Chapter III), although it is very difficult to imagine the proportion of tradesmen-turned-janissaries to janissaries-turned-tradesmen.

Even though many guilds and guildsmen may have had some egalitarian and communalistic attitudes, it did not preclude the unequal distribution of wealth in a guild or the pursuit of profit by some guildsmen. Nor did the cohesion in a guild make the sons of guildsmen look inward or avoid social mobility. The "egalitarianism" of the guildsmen in this period must have been either tolerant of the actions of wealthier members, or else it could not control the behavior of individual members.

iii. *Ethno-Religious Composition of the Guilds*

The ethnic and religious composition of guild membership has always been an object of scholarly interest, since it is a good indicator of

⁸⁹ Ö.L. Barkan ("Tereke Defterleri" *Belgeler* 3: 5–6 (1966) 8) gives very interesting statistics on the tax exemptions of ordinary Muslims in seventeenth-century Yenişehir (a town in Thessaly). Out of 756 Muslim households there, 499 were exempt from *avāriż* and other "irregular" taxes on various pretexts: 216 of them for being janissaries, 55 for being *seyyids*, 71 for being *imams*, 37 for being *müezzins* (those who perform the call to prayer from the mosque), 16 for being *ḥaṭībs* (preachers), 26 for being cavalrymen, 12 for being *kadis*, seven for being *şeyhs*, and 11 for being *müderreses* (teachers). See Hülya Canbakal, "'Ayntab at the End of the Seventeenth Century" Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1999, Chapter 3. However, it is hard to say what exemptions existed in Istanbul.

whether there were daily communications and interactions across the religious and ethnic divide. From the enumeration of guilds in Evliya Çelebi's account, in which some guilds were distinctly noted as being composed of non-Muslims, Gabriel Baer once assumed in a frequently cited article that any guild without an indication of religious or ethnic affiliation was a Muslim guild, basing his assertion on the grounds that non-Muslim guilds were so indicated by Evliya.⁹⁰ To be fair, one should also note that Baer later admitted that his hypothesis might have been wrong after Haim Gerber's study of the Bursa guilds was released.⁹¹ As it stands, the presumption behind this hypothesis was that people of different faiths did not mix, let alone form a guild. This may have been a subconscious legacy of a previous generation's tendency of viewing guilds primarily as part of a religious movement and of regarding Middle Eastern societies as vertically organized groups combined mainly by state action.

Later generations of scholars, however, found that in many Ottoman cities some guilds were religiously mixed.⁹² We now know that Muslims, Christians and Jews in many parts of the Ottoman Empire worked together, even in the same guilds; the next task is to understand on what scale and in what manner the business interactions between different religious and ethnic communities were conducted. What was the ratio of religiously mixed guilds to religiously homogeneous guilds? Additionally, if some trades had separate groups of artisans divided along religious or ethnic lines, what was their relationship? Could a trade be totally monopolized by one ethnicity or religious group when it was not one of the trades defined in advance by religious doctrines or social biases, such as in the cases of Jewish butchers and Gypsy dancers?

The names and titles of guild members—most likely guild elders—present in court when their pleas were recorded provide some indication of the ethno-religious composition of guilds. *Kadi* court records many times enumerate the guild members who came to the court to register a contract or to file a lawsuit against some other individual or group. Obviously, this sample is limited by the fact that not every

⁹⁰ Baer, "Monopolies," 156–59.

⁹¹ Baer, G. "Ottoman Guilds: A Reassessment," VIII. *Türk Tarih Kongresi: Kongreye Sunulan Bildiriler II* (1976) 95–101.

⁹² Gerber, *Bursa*, 58, Rafeq, "Political Power and Social Networks: Popular Coexistence and State Oppression in Ottoman Syria," in *Islamic Urbanism in Human History*, ed. Sato Tsugitaka (London and New York: Kegan Paul International, 1997) 23–27, Akarlı "Law and Order in the Marketplace," 9–18.

single guild member came to court. Moreover, those present in court probably were not recorded down to the last person. The records usually list some names and titles (the number ranges from only a few to more than 20) and then say “and so on (*ve sâ'irler*).”

Allowing that the lists of guild members in individual court cases are not comprehensive, they can still give us a basic picture when we examine them together with other data. There were approximately 50 guilds whose members' names are given in the Istanbul *kadi* registers volumes 1 to 10,⁹³ out of which we can get a rough idea of religious affiliation and ethnicity in the way the names are spelled and patronyms attached. That is, one can distinguish a non-Muslim from a Muslim since the former is given *veled-i* whereas the latter is given *ibn* before his patronym. In addition, for Armenians who sometimes had the same names as Muslims, as in the case of “Murat,” his name would be spelled with a “tā (ط)” rather than “del (د)” on top of the *veled-i*.⁹⁴ Greeks were mostly simply called *dhimmī* (non-Muslim)—the court records somehow almost never designate a person or a group as “Rūm”—whereas Armenians and Jews were distinguished by their ethnicity. Perhaps in the context of Istanbul, the term *dhimmī* had the connotation of “Greek” since Greeks were the largest minority group in the city.

Out of about 50 guilds whose delegations are described in the *kadi* registers (See Appendix F), 34 had only Muslim names,⁹⁵ five had only *dhimmīs*,⁹⁶ three had only Jews,⁹⁷ and two had only Armenians.⁹⁸

⁹³ I deliberately have used only Istanbul court records here since adding the cases from the Galata court registers would have tilted the statistics towards an overrepresentation of Greeks and Armenians. On the other hand, I admit that the numbers from Istanbul may slightly over-represent the position of Muslims.

⁹⁴ For further discussion of the distinction between Muslims and groups of non-Muslims made by the court, see Najwa al-Qattan, “*Dhimmīs* in the Muslim Court: Legal Autonomy and Religious Discrimination,” *IJMES* 31 (1999) 429–444. Such differentiation, however, did not apparently lead to discrimination in adjudication.

⁹⁵ Grocers, lathe-operators, fruit-sellers, shoemakers, pedestrian water-carriers, tin-smiths, potters, cow butchers, silk manufacturers, shoetip-makers, snow/ice-sellers, sherbet-makers, horse-cart drivers, porters, shopkeepers of Bezzazistan-i Cedid, linen-weavers, barbers, bakers, pickle-makers, barley-dealers, a group of merchants near Bezzazistan, knife-makers, smallware-dealers, tanners, felt-makers, rice-dealers, straw mat-sellers, launderers, starch-makers, cooks of sheep feet, oil-makers, kebab-makers and cooks, trough makers and quilted turban-makers.

⁹⁶ The shopkeepers of El-Hac Muhieddin Mahallesi, fishermen, sellers of brick-dust for mortar, simit-flour-makers and bottlemakers.

⁹⁷ “Jewish” silk manufacturers, “Jewish” bead-makers, and “Jewish” smallware-dealers.

⁹⁸ Locksmiths and nail-makers.

There were three non-Muslim guilds whose *kethiidās* were Muslim,⁹⁹ and five guilds definitely consisting of both Muslims and non-Muslims.¹⁰⁰ Taken at face value, this seems to indicate that more than 65 percent of the sample guilds were made up of Muslims only. However, one should remember the imperfect nature of these records.¹⁰¹ Clearly, some of the major guilds for which only some Muslim members were indicated in the abovementioned court cases actually had non-Muslims within their ranks.¹⁰² We know for certain from court records concerning individual artisans described as guild members that such major guilds as the grocers, the butchers and the bakers also had non-Muslim members. It is equally possible that a non-Muslim religious subgroup was represented, and in that case it is a moot question whether to view it as a separate guild.

It is also surprising that not many mixed guilds were represented in this sample. How normative was the mixed guild? We are in no position to exhaustively answer this question. In fact, one might ask whether the frequency of mixed guilds is so important. While there were not many mixed guilds according to court records, religiously mixed partnerships of individual artisans were quite common (see Chapter II; section on partnership). Perhaps we should also remember that it must have been easier to form an organization with one's coreligionists, if only because of the shared social and religious customs. Cengiz Kırılı has shown that masters often recruited from those who belonged to their own social group through established connections.¹⁰³ At a minimum, it would have been easier, for example, to coordinate with other members if all guild members took the same day off.¹⁰⁴ Therefore, it is not at all strange that there was a tendency toward religious subdivisions within a trade, whether within one guild under the same leaders or in separate guilds with separate leaders. Whether

⁹⁹ Soup cooks, coal-dealers and candle-makers.

¹⁰⁰ Jewelers, round cake-makers, perfumers, gunlock-sellers, and *boza*-makers.

¹⁰¹ In 1838, approximately 50 percent of guilds were religiously mixed. See Donald Quataert, "Ottoman Workers and the State, 1826–1914," in *Workers and Working Classes in the Middle East*, ed. Zachary Lockman (Albany: SUNY Press, 1994) 25.

¹⁰² For example, the round-cake makers once sent a mixed delegation (IK 4: 49b/348) in 1028/1618–19, but sent another that was apparently all Muslim (IK 10:12b) in 1071/1660–61.

¹⁰³ Cengiz Kırılı, "The Struggle over Space: Coffeehouses of Ottoman Istanbul, 1780–1845," Ph.D. dissertation, Binghamton University, State University of New York (2000) 67–135.

¹⁰⁴ For example, a group of Christian shopkeepers agreed that they would do no business on Sundays (IK 1: 33b/224).

craftsmen of different religions/denominations remained together in a guild or not depended on the choices of the groups concerned.

More important than the way a guild was constituted is the way religious subdivisions in a single guild or separate ethno-religious guilds within a trade interacted with one another. When a trade was divided into religiously defined guilds, it did not necessarily mean that they were hostile to each other. Thus for instance, the Muslim *hurdacı* (smallware-dealers) guild backed up the claim of the Jewish *hurdacı* guild on its monopoly over European-made glass products, testifying in the latter's favor when bottle-makers intruded into their trade.¹⁰⁵ On the other hand, the presence of two religious groups within a single guild did not mean they were always on amicable terms. For example, there were both Muslims and non-Muslims (*dhimmī*: probably Greek) in the *takyeci* (cap-makers) guild who had a serious quarrel over whether their new headman should come from one group or the other.¹⁰⁶

By the same token, we cannot simply assume that non-Muslim guilds headed by Muslim headmen were evidence of government efforts to control non-Muslims. It is certainly possible that the government appointed some Muslim headmen for that purpose. However, another possibility is that the non-Muslim guilds themselves may have invited Muslim headmen, expecting that such a move would strengthen their position in dealing with the state authorities.¹⁰⁷ In fact, Arslan Beşe, the *kethüdā* of the otherwise all-*dhimmī* (probably Greek) candle-makers in the 1660s, might have been just such an example. After all, he was a *beşe*, a low-ranking military man the likes of whom the government seldom appointed to be guild headmen. Most of the appointment documents from the early seventeenth century show that the *kethüdās* appointed by the government were mostly from the central cavalry troops and some of them were *ağa*(officer)s (see the following section).¹⁰⁸ Arslan Beşe appeared in court with the *dhimmī* candle-makers many times and spoke on their

¹⁰⁵ IK 10: 96b.

¹⁰⁶ Ahmet Refik, *Onbirinci*, 55.

¹⁰⁷ Akarlı, "Law and Order in the Marketplace," 15–16. The Jewish butchers chose a Muslim to represent them.

¹⁰⁸ On the other hand, janissaries began to make their way into positions that had been monopolized by the central cavalry after the chaos of 1648–56. Additionally, if the *kethüdā*-ship was a tax-farm, the position was at least theoretically open to anybody who could afford to buy it.

behalf, which may well have been just what the latter wanted.¹⁰⁹

Thus, how guilds and ethno-religious communities overlapped is a complex problem. Apparently, in the seventeenth century many guilds were religiously homogeneous, some had more than one religious group within them, and still others had a non-Muslim membership headed by Muslim *kethüdās*. Was this an indication of increasingly rigid boundaries between religious communities? While it is not inconceivable given the social atmosphere of the Kadızadeli movement, one should keep in mind that partnerships between Muslims and non-Muslims on the level of individual tradesmen continued to be common. Moreover, there was even a case in which groups of Muslim and non-Muslim guilds selected a non-Muslim who was the headman of one of the guilds to be their deputy (*wakil*) in an expected lawsuit over their unpaid wages against the state authorities (see Section II–c). In conclusion, it is necessary to address the issue of guilds and potential ethno-religious divisions not only by using statistics, but also by examining forms of interaction between the religious groups.

iv. *Guild Leadership—Titles, Appointments and Expectations*

The leaders of guilds had various titles;¹¹⁰ however, the most common among them were *kethüdā* and *yığıtbaşı*. Most guilds that came to court had these two officials, although some guilds possessed only one of them. In the majority of cases in which a guild had both, the *kethüdā* was considered the superior leader and the *yığıtbaşı* his assistant. It

¹⁰⁹ IK 9: 12b, 13a, 23b, 120a, 170b and 254a. On one occasion the same guild—the names of the leaders who came to court were the same—came to the court without Arslan Beşe (IK 10: 69b).

¹¹⁰ A common type of guild headman's title was "... *başı*" as in *sakabaşı*. What is unclear to us is whether such "... *başı*" meant *kethüdā*, and we have to be cautious since these two terms may have meant different things from case to case. Evliya Çelebi tends to call the head of a guild "... *başı*" as opposed to *kethüdā*, but the court records normally designate guild heads as *kethüdās*. In addition, it is noteworthy that the head of the grocers' guild was called *bazarbaşı* (IK 3: 25b/220), who was called the same in seventeenth century Bursa according to Haim Gerber. Eremya Çelebi relates that the *etmekçibaşı* was almost always selected from among Armenian bakers because there were so many of them (*Istanbul Tarihi*, 165). Given that Eremya Çelebi also mentions the *kethüdā* of the bakers and we have examples of Muslim *kethüdās* of the bakers' guild, a guild could have both a *kethüdā* and a "... *başı*." In that case, it is an intriguing question how the two guild officials related to each other. According to Rafeq ("Craft Organization" 497), the title "... *başı*" in Syrian towns indicated a government official rather than a leader selected within the guild. It is unclear whether this applied to Istanbul, and if so, to what extent.

is unclear how exactly these two major guild officials related to each other. *Kethüdās* and *yiğitbaşıs* led the guilds together, and their roles do not appear to have been differentiated, at least in the period that concerns this study.¹¹¹ However, as mentioned before, there were guilds such as the hard biscuit-makers (*peksimatçılar*) and bottle-makers (*şişeciler*) in Galata that did not have *kethüdās* or any other leaders with official titles until the middle of the seventeenth century. Indeed, the offices of *kethüdā* and *yiğitbaşı* may have been relatively novel in this period. Mantran conjectures that the *kethüdā* became the veritable leader of a guild in the sixteenth to seventeenth century.¹¹² The *sūmāme* of ‘Āli describing the guild parade during the 1582 circumcision festival mentions only the masters and apprentices present, but not the office holders.¹¹³ Although some guilds at that time clearly had *kethüdās* and/or *yiğitbaşıs*,¹¹⁴ it is unclear how widespread they were in the late sixteenth century. For example, apparently the tanners of both Kasımpaşa and Yedikule did not have a *kethüdā* as late as 1580.¹¹⁵ Although there was a standardizing tendency toward having both officials in a guild—some guilds came to the court saying “we want a *kethüdā*/*yiğitbaşı* just like other guilds have”—the leadership structure of the Istanbul guilds was not necessarily uniform, even in the early seventeenth century (see Appendix F).

At this point it may be of value to explore the genealogy and usage of these titles. *Kethüdā*, originally an ancient Persian word meaning “master of the house” or “head of the family,” eventually came to acquire other meanings such as a husband, chief of a tribe, or the headman of a village.¹¹⁶ The term appears to have been used

¹¹¹ Engin Akarlı finds that the *yiğitbaşıs* in the eighteenth century played important roles in their guilds, especially when the members felt the need to have government-appointed *kethüdās* dismissed. Indeed, it is likely that the role of the second officer became more important in terms of making internal agreements and ensuring autonomy when the *kethüdā* was appointed from outside. For example, the coal dealers’ guild, which was all Armenian except for the Muslim *kethüdā*, had their *yiğitbaşı* supervise the distribution of raw materials (IK 5: 28b/190). In many other seventeenth-century guilds where the *kethüdā* was government appointed, however, the role of the *yiğitbaşı* remains unclear.

¹¹² Mantran, *Istanbul*, 373.

¹¹³ Terzioğlu, 90–91.

¹¹⁴ Ahmet Refik, *Onuncu*, 120–122, 127–130, 135–136.

¹¹⁵ Faroqhi, “Urban Space as Disputed Grounds: Territorial Aspects to Artisan Conflict in Sixteenth to Eighteenth-Century Istanbul,” *Stories of Ottoman Men and Women* (Istanbul: Eren, 2001) 222.

¹¹⁶ The following discussion of the usage of the word *kethüdā* is based on the article “Kethhudā” in *ET²*, by Cengiz Orhonlu and Gabriel Baer.

for a long time through the Seljuk and Ilkhanid eras, eventually acquiring various meanings. As early as the Seljuk period there were *kethüdās* who officiated as village representatives.¹¹⁷ In Ottoman officialdom, the title was generally used to mean a deputy official to a high-ranking bureaucrat. It is not known how the title came to designate a guild leader, let alone whether or how the use of this title for guild leaders was related to its other uses. However, it is possible to compare guild *kethüdā*-ships to those documented for other organizations. In many respects, a comparative study of the *kethüdā*-ships of various social groups such as guilds, ethno-religious communities largely coinciding with residence quarters and military units is greatly needed. The *kethüdās* of these social groups, according to İnalçık, had one commonality and this was to represent their groups vis-à-vis the state and ensure them a considerable degree of autonomy.¹¹⁸

Yiğitbaşı is also a very interesting title, given its literal meaning of the head (*baş*) of a group of young men (*yiğitler*), which seems to imply a legacy from the *futuwwa/ahî* tradition that upheld ideal virtues of young manhood. Nonetheless, while the title itself indicates a *futuwwa* element, the existence of a *yiğitbaşı* may not necessarily indicate that the guild in question subscribed to the *futuwwa* ideology based in sufi culture, since *yiğitbaşı* had become a common title found in most Istanbul guilds, including those that were non-Muslim.

In addition to *kethüdā* and *yiğitbaşı*, some guilds had religious leaders, such as the *ahî babas* in the tanners' guilds¹¹⁹ and the *şeyhs* in various other guilds (e.g., barbers, water-carriers without mounts, metal shoetip-makers and launderers).¹²⁰ However, we do not come

¹¹⁷ Ann K.S. Lambton, *Landlord and Peasants in Persia* (London: Oxford University Press, 1953) 175.

¹¹⁸ İnalçık, "Comments on 'Sultanism': Max Weber's Typification of the Ottoman Polity," *Princeton Papers in Near Eastern Studies* 1 (1992) 62–63. "In Ottoman society virtually every group, from the guilds to the janissary corps, was organized around the *kethüdā*-ship."

¹¹⁹ The tanners' tradition of having an *ahî baba* goes back to their legendary thirteenth-century patron saint Ahi Evren. Ahi Evren has a tomb sanctuary in Kırşehir, which was a place of pilgrimage. Taeschner asserts that the *şeyh* of the sanctuary, who had the title of *ahî baba*, wielded great influence over the tanners and related guilds in the Anatolian and European provinces of the empire (F. Taeschner, "Akhi Evran" in *ET*²). Also, the *ahî babas* of the branches in each town claimed that they had the exclusive right to perform the "girdling (initiation) ceremony for apprentices of all guilds," although it is unlikely that other guilds yielded to their unilateral claims. See İlhan Şahin, "Ahi Evran" in *IA*².

¹²⁰ IK 3: 39b/338, IK 5: 72b, 75a, IK 9: 8a, 189a, IK 10: 146b. Additionally, Evliya Çelebi claims that there were 105 guild *şeyhs* in Istanbul (As cited in Nuri, *Mecelle*, I: 561).

across many religious officials in the guilds mentioned in seventeenth-century court records, which may have been due, as Mantran sees it, to the diminution of the importance of their roles.¹²¹ Since these officials existed side by side with the usual *kethüdā* and *yığıtbaşı*, their roles may have been more related to the non-business aspects of guild life. On the other hand, when the tanners' guild of Yedikule brought the tanners of Eyüb to the court, the Eyüb tanners were listed as having only an *aḫi baba* and elders, without a *kethüdā* or *yığıtbaşı*.¹²² Therefore, in the absence of standard guild officials, an authority figure whose functions were primarily religious and moral could represent the group in business affairs as well.¹²³ Presumably, the *şeyh*s in the barbers' guild played a role in their communal activities, given that its members called themselves "all of us brothers (*cumlemiz iḫvān*)" in a religious, fraternity-like manner.¹²⁴

Guild officials other than those mentioned above—such as a *naḫīb* (literally, a "leader"),¹²⁵ *duacı* ("prayer"),¹²⁶ and *çavuş* (normally "sergeant"), which occur in both Evliya Çelebi and Osman Nuri—are very rarely referred to in seventeenth-century documentary sources.¹²⁷ We do not know whether they commonly existed in seven-

¹²¹ Mantran, *Istanbul*, 364. He argues that in the seventeenth century the religious aspect yielded to the administrative and practical functions of the guild, and therefore the influence of the religious officials decreased, although they were still needed for ceremonial purposes. His reference is Hüseyin Hüsam ed-Din, as cited in Nuri, *Mecelle*, I: 561.

¹²² IK 10: 113b–114a. Additionally, those who were recorded as elders of the Eyüb tanners were described as having peculiar jobs—needle-maker/seller, coffee-dealer and *tırşe*-maker—on top of being tanners. On the other hand, Yedikule tanners (the oldest group of Istanbul tanners) seem to have had a more standard organization; they had an *aḫi baba* as well as a *kethüda* and *yığıtbaşı*, listed in that order. It is difficult to speculate who among them had more authority or power based on the order of listing, since in another case the *kethüdā* and *yığıtbaşı* were listed before the *aḫi baba* (IK 10: 104b).

¹²³ However, tanners were considered the most independent and exceptional of all. See Evliya Çelebi, ed. Gökyay, 283–84.

¹²⁴ IK 9: 8a.

¹²⁵ A *naḫīb* presided over the initiation ceremony of an apprentice described by Evliya Çelebi. He was mentioned together with a *şeyh*, a *duacı* and a *kethüdā*. (Gökyay edition, 213–214.) Evliya also says that there were 300 *naḫīb*s in Istanbul guilds (*Esnāf-ı naḫıban-i ehl-i ḫıref*, *Mecelle* I: 562).

¹²⁶ A *duacı* is mentioned among the launderers appealing for a change of *kethüdā*, but we do not get any further information from this document. (IK 10: 12b) This is the only instance where we find a *duacı* in my sources apart from Evliya Çelebi's account. Osman Nuri also relates that there was a *duacı* in the barbers' guild until the nineteenth century and he played an important role in the initiation/promotion ceremonies (*Mecelle*, I: 563).

¹²⁷ Osman Nuri, *Mecelle*, I: 561–563. The only example I have is a case in which

teenth-century guilds or what their exact functions were in the context of guild organization. Although Evliya tells that us large numbers of *seyh̄s*, *naķ̄ı̄bs*, *duacıs* and *çavuşes* existed, we get the impression that their numbers were on the decrease and that their duties were unclear. One exception might be the administrator of the guild *waqf*, who seems to have been chosen from among the elders.¹²⁸ Such a paucity of sources mentioning guild officials other than *kethüdās*, *yığıtbaşıs* and *seyh̄s* may reflect a standardizing trend whose causes are unknown. One may surmise that it happened through the guilds' interaction with the state, and also due to mutual imitation between the guilds.

How did the guild leaders come to office? There were basically two ways: internal selection and external appointment by the government.¹²⁹ The government appointment of *kethüdās* for crafts and service guilds happened frequently in Istanbul, whereas it was a rare occurrence in provincial towns over the same period.¹³⁰ The ratio between guild-elected and government appointed leaders is difficult to determine, since not all appointments were recorded. We may safely say, however, that both occurred quite commonly. The gov-

the *çavuş* of (*miri*) *kalafatçular* (caulkers working for the government, probably at the Imperial Dockyard [Tersane-i Âmire].) who was working as a deputy (*vekıl*) of Ali Ağa who was also a *miri kalafatçı* (GK 80, 14b). This case does not reveal anything about the duties of the *çavuş*. Additionally, having a *çavuş* may have been exceptional, since the structure of state-hired artisan groups may well have been different from that of regular guilds. There is a good chance the *miri kalafatçı* were not civilian but *askeri* (military/ruling class), in which case the title *çavuş* could be a military rank rather than a guild office. Evliya Çelebi relates that the goldsmiths had *çavuşes* among them, but their function is unclear. They delivered the invitations to excursions for provincial goldsmiths, but this cannot count as an everyday function (Gökyay edition, 272). Evliya also claims that there were 415 guild *çavuşes* (*eşnâf-ı çavuşân-ı ehl-i şanâyi*).

¹²⁸ IK 5: 47b/331, IBK 122: 25b–26a. Additionally, *kethüdās* often doubled as guild *waqf* administrators. IK 9: 89b and 199b.

¹²⁹ There is a peculiar exception that does not belong to either category. The silk dealers, seeing that the group of silk brokers was in disarray, designated a Jewish broker to become the new *kethüdā* and received the approval of the court. It is probable that a powerful guild could occasionally intervene in the selection of the *kethüdā* for a subordinate one, although it is unknown how common such a practice was.

¹³⁰ Although the head of an important foodstuff guild in a high-ranking administrative city could be appointed from above, as in the case of the *kethüdā* of the bakers' guild in Edirne (MD 81: 193/430), it seems to have been much less common in provincial cities than in Istanbul. Haim Gerber reports no such case from the court records of Bursa throughout the seventeenth century, even though his sources may have some gaps. Given Bursa's closeness to the political center, this could be an indicator that government authorities rarely intervened in the selection of provincial guild headmen (Gerber, *Bursa*, 40).

ernment-appointed officials were mostly *kethüdās*,¹³¹ but not all *kethüdās* were appointed from above.

What were the guilds to which *kethüdās* were appointed? From the 1610s we have records of the appointment of *kethüdās* for guilds representing bakers,¹³² cow-butchers,¹³³ regular (sheep) butchers, candle-makers,¹³⁴ water-carriers,¹³⁵ cooks,¹³⁶ coffee sellers¹³⁷ and ox-cart drivers (*öküz arabacılar*) from the 1610s. Many of these were among the larger groups that contributed significantly to the provisioning of the city. Appointees to these guilds were selected mostly from the military segments of the sultanic household (*kapıkulu*), especially the central cavalry. The government must have wanted to supervise the larger guilds more closely to ensure their payment of taxes and conscientious business practices. On the other hand, it was also a way of giving a salary/pension to (mainly retired) military officers at a time of financial difficulties for the state. Some retired military officers gave up their pensions to the treasury (*Beytülmal*) and were later appointed as *kethüdās*. The assumption here was that the government-appointed *kethüdās* would derive their income from the guild.¹³⁸ In addition, sometimes the guild *kethüdā*-ship was sold outright as a tax-farm, as in the case of the fishermen's, cow-butchers' and *boza* (a drink of

¹³¹ The only exception concerns the *yığıtbaşı* of the bakers' guild, who was appointed from among the *kapıkulu sipahileri*. IK 5: 142 (1029/1619–20).

¹³² IK 5: 19b/134. The *kethüdā*-ship of the bakers was given to a retiree (*emekdar*) from the 9th division (*bölük*) of the *kapıkulu sipahileri* (1029/1619–20). In addition, almost at the same time, the *yığıtbaşı* also was appointed from above. This is not strange given the heavy control intended by the government for the bakers' guild.

¹³³ IK 5: 19b/138. (1029/1619–20) A certain Ahmed among the *mülazıms* (lieutenants or candidates) of the 13th division of the *silahdars* wanted to give up the *kethüdā*-ship of the cow-butchers, but he was reappointed against his will. Why did he want to give up the *kethüdā*-ship? Could it be related to the fact that the butchers' business entailed greater risks because of the artificially maintained low price (Faroqhi, *Towns and Townsmen*, 228–233) which in turn might have made the job of the *kethüdā* less lucrative? This was also the guild that had rejected its tax-farmer-cum-*kethüdā* only two years earlier, saying that having their *kethüdā* appointed from above was against their tradition (IK 3: 86a/700).

¹³⁴ IK 3: 1a/6. The *kethüdā*-ship was given to a retiree of an unspecified kind (1027/1618).

¹³⁵ IK 5: 19b/139. A retiree from the 158th division of the *silahdars* was appointed as the *kethüdā* of the water-carriers (1029/1619–20).

¹³⁶ IK 5: 19b/135. The *kethüdā*-ship was given to a *mülazım* from the 106th division of the *silahdars* (1029/1619–20).

¹³⁷ IK 5: 19b/137. The *kethüdā*-ship was given to a *mülazım* from the 58th division of *kapıkulu sipahileri* (1029/1619–20).

¹³⁸ Mehmet Genç, "Osmanlı Esnafı ve Devletle İlişkileri," *Ahilik ve Esnaf* (Istanbul: Yaylıcak Matbaası, 1986) 120–21.

fermented millet)-makers' guilds.¹³⁹ With the state budget being tight at the beginning of the seventeenth century, the government did not hesitate to change such tax-farmer-cum-*kethüdās* in the middle of their contractual term once a more desirable candidate presented himself. The abovementioned cases show that a *kethüdā* of the fishermen's guild was dismissed only a few days after he had been appointed, and that an aspiring tax-farmer began interfering in the *boza*-makers' guild even while the incumbent was still recognized by the government. In the latter case, the state would have granted the tax-farm to the new applicant if only he had agreed to pay the amount the incumbent tax-farmer owed to the treasury and provided a guarantor.

Did these appointed officials remain alien to the guilds? It could easily have been the case for tax-farmer *kethüdās*, especially when the government changed them frequently in its endless search for increased revenues. In one case, Ahmed Beğ, the *kethüdā* of the barley-sellers' (*arpacı*) guild, who was probably a government appointee, seems to have shown very little interest in guild matters; he let his deputy collect special military taxes for campaigns and did not even come to court when the guildsmen and the deputy had the collected amount registered.¹⁴⁰ It was therefore possible for a government-appointed *kethüdā* to be detached from the internal business of a guild. Nevertheless, not all of the outsider-turned-*kethüdās* remained aloof of major guild activities. Even when matters were already decided by guild elders, a *kethüdā* was supposed to represent and speak for his guild, and indeed, there are many cases in which alien *kethüdās* led "their" guildsmen in court on all kinds of issues.¹⁴¹

Appointment by the government, however, did not give the *kethüdā* unquestioned power over a particular guild. To be able to function effectively, the *kethüdā* had to secure cooperation from his fellow guildsmen. In one extreme case, a *kethüdā* who acquired his position in the cow-butchers' guild after paying 10,000 *akçe* to the treasury—

¹³⁹ IK 3: 16b/139 (fishermen), 86a/700 (cow-butchers), and 92a/721 (*boza*-makers).

¹⁴⁰ IK 9: 104b (1071/1660–61). We do not have the appointment document of this Ahmed Beğ, but the fact that he was called "Beğ" while no elders of the mentioned guild bore a military title suggests that he was an appointed *kethüdā*.

¹⁴¹ For example, Mehmed Ağa of the bakers' guild was a very active *kethüdā*, who intervened in the transfer of shops and even testified about a baker's debt. He was most probably a government-appointed *kethüdā*, since he was referred to as *fahṛ ü'l-a'şyān* (an epithet for high ranking officers) and the bakers' guild had had external appointments before (IK 10: 47b).

this was a tax-farm—could not start his term of office because the guild's members had made an agreement among themselves to reject him on the grounds that this was not the way they had selected their *kethüdā* in the past. Frustrated, he wanted the return of the money he had paid to the treasury, with the guildsmen bearing witness that he could not truly become the *kethüdā* of their guild.¹⁴² Likewise, guildsmen could reject their government-appointed *kethüdās* after a period of time had passed, based on their performance. The ox-cart drivers' guild, for example, was able to replace their appointed *kethüdā*, although the new one was also selected by the government.¹⁴³

In addition, those guilds that autonomously selected their own leaders from among their ranks give us even more vivid and detailed accounts of *kethüdā* selection. Guilds such as the tanners (*debbāğlar*), barbers (*berberler*), rice-dealers (*pirinççiler*), starch-makers (*nişasteciler*), water-carriers without mounts (*piyade sakalar*), launderers (*çameşuyar*), quilted turban-makers (*kavukçular*), felt-makers (*keçeciler*), *simit*-flour-makers (*simit un işleyenler*), and linen-weavers (*kettancılar*) internally selected and dismissed their *kethüdās*. The dismissal, resignation or death of a *kethüdā* led to the selection of a new one.

Guildsmen's accounts of why they selected and dismissed *kethüdās* reveal a great deal about what a *kethüdā* was supposed to do and what the virtues and vices of *kethüdās* were in their eyes. Why did a guild need a *kethüdā*? What did the guild headmen's services comprise? According to the Jewish bead-makers (*boncukçular*), they needed a new *kethüdā* when the former one died in order to be able to equitably distribute raw materials among themselves.¹⁴⁴ The hard biscuit-makers successfully established the position of *kethüdā* in their guild because they thought it would help improve their internal affairs, which at the time were in a state of "disorder (*ihtilāl*)."¹⁴⁵ Some *kethüdās* were deeply involved in the management of guild funds, and were held accountable for their actions; the *kethüdā* of the felt-makers' guild, for example, was dismissed for his mismanagement of such a

¹⁴² IK 3: 86a/700 (1027/1617–18). However, soon the guild had to face another government-appointee, as a certain Ahmed was appointed to the same position in 1029/1619–20.

¹⁴³ IK 1: 36a/239.

¹⁴⁴ IK 10: 71a.

¹⁴⁵ GK 73: 123a. The members wanted to restore order by ensuring the fair (*ala's-seviye*) assignment of expenditure (*harç*) and banning the masters from stealing the apprentices of others. They agreed to pay to the *kethüdā*-elect 10 *guruş* per bakery annually.

fund.¹⁴⁶ In addition, *kethüüdās*, especially those appointed by the government, had to collect a number of taxes from their guilds. Given that the hard biscuit-makers wanted their own *kethüüdā* partly to handle some new taxation issues, it seems that the internally selected *kethüüdās* also administered tax collection. In addition, the *kethüüdā* provided an authority figure to whom one could entrust one's private money, although a bootmaker discovered his *kethüüdā* was not so trustworthy after all.¹⁴⁷ In general, internally selected *kethüüdās* seem to have actively engaged in and coordinated all kinds of intra-guild activities.

Nonetheless, one cannot draw too clear a line between internally selected and externally appointed *kethüüdās*, because, as we have seen, at least some appointed *kethüüdās* were very much involved in intra-guild affairs. Due to the paucity of appointment documents, we often cannot determine how the *kethüüdā* of a certain guild was selected. Most court cases that mention guild *kethüüdās* do not give any clue indicating whether he was internally selected or externally appointed. *Kethüüdās* in most cases, nonetheless, seem to have performed the same basic functions, such as representing the guild in court, managing internal affairs and collecting taxes.

Regardless of how a *kethüüdā* came to power, he may have had to acquire a diploma (*berāt*) to officially hold office. The *kethüüdā* of the water-carriers without mounts (*piyade sakalar*) received a *berāt* from the government, and apparently he had been internally selected and was already a member of the guild.¹⁴⁸ It is unclear how many guild *kethüüdās* in the seventeenth century acquired a *berāt*, given that there are very few documents remaining from this period, although this procedure seems to have become standard in later centuries. In all likelihood, the government gave a *berāt* only to the *kethüüdās* of major guilds seen as important in controlling the provisioning of the city.

What were the merits and demerits of *kethüüdās* as described by the guildsmen themselves? When guildsmen came to court to change their *kethüüdā*, they usually claimed that they had made an agreement to support a candidate as their new *kethüüdā* and described the can-

¹⁴⁶ IK 9: 199b.

¹⁴⁷ IK 4: 36a/252.

¹⁴⁸ There was only one that I have seen among the 12 court record registers. It was a *berāt* given to the *kethüüdā* of water-carriers without mounts (IK 3: 95b/735). The new *kethüüdā* may have been from the same family as the previous one, as both had the patronym of "Alioğlu."

didate's desirable qualities.¹⁴⁹ Occasionally, the selection of a new *kethüdā* followed the dismissal of an incumbent who had lost the confidence of his guildsmen. As mentioned above, there were at times concrete reasons for removing a *kethüdā*, such as his mismanagement of the guild *waqf*. In most cases, however, the virtues and vices of a *kethüdā* were described in terms of abstract qualities and abilities. For example, a headman was not supposed to be lazy (*tekâsül*) or negligent (*müsâmahası olmak*) in his service. The simit-flour-makers and the launderers dismissed their *kethüdās* primarily for those reasons.¹⁵⁰ Greediness was another detestable quality, as it ran counter to the principle of fairness. Being "greedy" (*tamâkâr*) as well as "incompetent in his service" (*hîdmetine iktidârî olmayup*), the *kethüdā* of the linen-weavers lost his position.¹⁵¹ The rice-dealers (*pirinççiler*) replaced the incumbent *kethüdā* with their *yiğitbaşı* because the *kethüdā* had become too old to provide the services required of him and had resigned (*. . . pîr ve ihtiyâr olup eda-yi hîdmete bir vechile kudreti olmayup taşdîr îmeğîn yeri hâlî olmağla*).¹⁵² Thus, the ability to carry out the duties of the headman was an important concern.

In contrast, the qualities of the newly selected headmen that guildsmen described in their presentations in court were the direct opposite of the abovementioned characteristics. The linen-weavers described their candidate as knowledgeable about the services required, pious (*dîndar*) and upright (*mustakîm*).¹⁵³ The launderers highlighted another desirable quality; they said their candidate was an "elderly and mature (*pîr ve ihtiyâr*) man" of the guild and was thus suitable for the task.¹⁵⁴ This indicates that although guildsmen may not have wanted to have a *kethüdā* so old he could not handle the duties required of him, they did consider seniority a positive attribute as long as the person proved able. The quilted turban-makers provide a very rare and interesting

¹⁴⁹ The autonomous pre-selection of community leaders with later approval in court was clearly not limited to the guilds. For example, the representatives of a neighborhood mosque in Galata came to the court saying that they wanted so-and-so as their new *imam* (GK 80: 79a).

¹⁵⁰ IK 9: 270b, IK 10: 12b.

¹⁵¹ IK 8: 27b.

¹⁵² IK 9: 249a.

¹⁵³ IK 8: 27b. It is noteworthy that "piety" is paired with "uprightness," as if religious piety was considered a guarantee of honesty. On the other hand, those *kethüdās* dismissed for moral failures did not get criticized for being impious.

¹⁵⁴ IK 10: 12b.

case. They liked their *kethüdā* who had been working for them for eight years so much that they decided to have him alone and no one else. Whereas his predecessors had been “incapable and treacherous (*kādir olmayup . . . hıyāneti zuhūr itmişdir.*)” he was very thoughtful in taking care of issues arising in the guild, and superbly fulfilled his responsibilities. Everybody was pleased with and thankful for his words and deeds. After the guildsmen had made the aforesaid decision, the candidate was reappointed and he agreed to continue as their *kethüdā*.¹⁵⁵ It is also possible, however, that the members of the guild may have had to declare that they wanted only the incumbent *kethüdā* in order to fend off other claimants, such as former *kethüdās*.¹⁵⁶ From the foregoing, it is clear that *kethüdās* were supposed to be capable in performing their role and that moral authority and seniority were also desired qualities.

Although many guilds selected *kethüdās* by consensus, challengers who wanted the position themselves at times appeared, not to mention that guildsmen could become discontented with their *kethüdās* after a while. Ex-*kethüdās* especially could create problems by refusing to accept the authority of the incumbent. For example, an ex-*kethüdā* of the barbers’ guild continued meddling in guild affairs, claiming without foundation that he had become the *kethüdā* again (*kendi hālinde olmayup ben kethüdā oldum diyü*). The *şeyh* and elders of the guild appealed in favor of the incumbent *kethüdā* saying that he had been upright (*mustakim*) and circumspect (*perhizkâr*) in his service, while the former had been dismissed for being dour and argumentative (*her hālinde . . . müte’ellim ve müteşekki olduđu ecilden*).¹⁵⁷ In another case, the tanners accused one of their own of aspiring to become a *kethüdā*; however, his colleagues did not approve of him, since he was introducing a “dubious” production practice into the guild.¹⁵⁸ There may have been some perquisites attached to *kethüdā*-ship that made the office attractive, as we saw in the case of the hard biscuit-makers’ guild mentioned earlier.

In both the hard biscuit-makers’ and quilted turban-makers’ guilds,

¹⁵⁵ IK 10: 134b. . . *kethüdā* *nasb olundukda ol dahi kabul ve hıdmet-i lāzımesin edāya ta’ahhüd . . .*

¹⁵⁶ Osman Nuri, *Mecelle*, I: 574 presents a similar case from the mid-1660s where a guild stood by its *yigübaşı* against the intervention of a former one.

¹⁵⁷ IK 9: 8a. Interestingly enough, the *şeyh* and *yigübaşı* of the guild were also challenged by their predecessors in separate court cases recorded on the same page.

¹⁵⁸ IK 10: 108b.

the *kethüdā* officially agreed (*ta'ahhüd*) in court to undertake his duties upon appointment.¹⁵⁹ Although in other cases this phase of the appointment procedure is not recorded, we may suppose that a *kethüdā*'s promise to perform all necessary services was a standard practice. This promise is not so different from what the newly appointed deputy of the widow of a candle-maker said in court: he accepted the deputyship and agreed to fulfill his duties.¹⁶⁰ *Kethüdā*-ship does not seem to have been very different from other types of commonly practiced deputyship contracts, at least in that the two parties agreed on the bestowal of certain powers and obligations on the appointee. The taking of an oath was probably a legal formula to render the adoption of an office valid. The *kethüdā*'s promise, in return for the investment of administrative power by guild members, constituted a contract between himself and guild members. That is, if the *kethüdā* did not do his job properly, the guildsmen had the right to dismiss him, as the above examples clearly illustrate. Whether internally selected or government-appointed (although it is unclear whether appointees also had to take an oath), a guild leader had to live up to certain standards in order to remain in office.

v. *Day-to-Day Guild Activities*

What were the major collective activities that occurred in the guilds during the first half of the seventeenth century? First, they laid down rules for their business activities, such as the regulation of raw materials, production and sales. Collective deals to purchase and distribute raw materials were the most important of these functions.¹⁶¹ It seems that guildsmen could, or at least were expected to, secure designated kinds of raw materials at specified places at fixed rates. In addition, this collective purchasing was often an occasion for the payment of tax if the raw material was coming from outside the city, because a customs tax was charged at the pier (*resm-i kağan*). The oil-makers' guild provides a good example. According to their

¹⁵⁹ For similar examples of a *kethüdā*'s promise like this see GK 73: 123a (hard biscuit-makers), IK 8: 27b (linen-weavers), and IK 10: 23b (starch-makers).

¹⁶⁰ IK 9: 210b.

¹⁶¹ Guildsmen made agreements for collective purchasing (straw-mat makers [*hasırçılar*] IK 9: 262b), or equitable (*ala e's-seviye kımseye ziyāde ve noķşān vürilmemek*) distribution (coal-dealers [*kömürçüler*], IK 5: 28b/190 and the cooks of sheep feet [*paçacılar*], IK 10: 52a).

testimony, they were supposed to buy sesame and linseed at the pier near the Ayazma Gate. First, the *bazarbaşı* (the head of the grocers' guild) would take over the goods, and after paying tax, the oil-makers would distribute them among themselves under the supervision of the *kethüdā*, *yığıtbaşı* and elders (*ihtiyārlar*). The guild members were thus upset when two of their number secretly bought those commodities at another pier, paying more than the fixed price but no taxes.¹⁶²

For many other guilds as well, procuring enough raw materials and ensuring their equitable distribution were major concerns. When a member of the Yedikule tanners' guild secretly bought a quantity of goatskins (448 sheets) from a slaughterhouse in the Eminönü quarter instead of following the norm of collective purchasing, the guild took him to court on the grounds that he had violated an intra-guild agreement and had thus created disorder. The offender, in turn, acknowledged his misbehavior and agreed that he deserved to be expelled from the guild if he committed the same violation again.¹⁶³

In addition, guilds established rules regarding the maintenance of production standards, methods and sales routes, although examples of these activities are relatively rare. For example, the *çörekçi* (round cake-makers) guild maintained that their *çöreks* had to be of a certain weight.¹⁶⁴ In another case, the tanners brought a member who had engaged in an irregular practice to the court's attention.¹⁶⁵ In neither case, however, did the guildsmen specify what were the exact rules of normal practice. In addition, the candle-makers designated which candle-maker should supply candles to which grocer at the level of individual shops and made guild-wide agreements about such arrangements.¹⁶⁶

Although as a group a guild would have wanted to maintain existing arrangements, this does not necessarily mean that such understandings never changed. When the supply of certain raw materials or commodities was lacking or unstable, the guilds had to come up with new ways of acquiring them. For example, when raw silk brokers did not provide regular supplies, silk manufacturers (*kazzāzlar*)

¹⁶² IK 10: 74a.

¹⁶³ IK 9: 145b.

¹⁶⁴ Standard weight was an important element of official price fixing, since the sellers could attempt to reduce the weight when the price was made low.

¹⁶⁵ IK 10: 12b and 108b–109a. For details, see the section on individual members' violation of guild rules.

¹⁶⁶ IK 9: 12b, 120a, and 254a.

agreed to license a Jewish merchant to bring them raw silk.¹⁶⁷ In another instance, the *kethüdā* and elders of the *bedestan* agreed not to buy silk textile coming from Bursa when it did not meet standard requirements.¹⁶⁸ Obviously, some rearrangement and shifting could occur even within the established practice of collective purchasing.

Second, the guilds collected a number of taxes levied on their members internally. Istanbul guilds in the seventeenth century, contrary to Gabriel Baer's notion that the "Turkish" guilds, unlike guilds in cities in other parts of the empire, did not have tax-collecting functions,¹⁶⁹ actually did collect taxes internally. It has long been assumed that most taxes imposed on Istanbul guilds were collected by government officials such as the *ih̄tisāb ağası* and his agents (*kol oğlanları*).¹⁷⁰ However, Istanbul court records from the seventeenth century show many cases to the contrary. Guildsmen came to court to fix tax distribution arrangements between related guilds.¹⁷¹ As mentioned before, some guild *kethüdā*-ships were sold as tax-farms, which proves that certain kinds of taxes were collected by *kethüdās*. Not only the government-appointed *kethüdās* but also internally selected *kethüdās* were involved in tax administration. It seems that the guild's function of tax-collection without the intervention of government officials has been implicitly considered a standard of guild autonomy, in spite of the fact that explicit statements to that effect have not been found.¹⁷² This has been implied in the contrast drawn between the Istanbul guilds and those of other (e.g., Egyptian) cities, where the latter were supposed to have had the function of assessing, distributing and collecting taxes while the former did not implement any of them.¹⁷³ When guilds, instead of government officials,

¹⁶⁷ IK 3: 96a/736.

¹⁶⁸ IK 7: 33b.

¹⁶⁹ Baer, "Functions" 35–36. Baer acknowledges some exceptions, such as the collection of *imdadīye* in nineteenth-century Istanbul. Haim Gerber's study on seventeenth-century Bursa shows the fiscal functions of the guilds as well (*Bursa*, 45–48).

¹⁷⁰ Mantran, *Istanbul*, 310–323, and Baer, "Functions," 35. For taxes imposed on guilds, Mantran lists only those taxes collected by government officials. Baer argues that one of the main differences between "Turkish"—i.e., Istanbul—guilds and Egyptian guilds was that the former did not have fiscal functions such as tax collection.

¹⁷¹ Conflicts over tax payment typically developed around arrangements in which assistant guilds were supposed to contribute to the main guilds' tax payment. See Section iii of this chapter.

¹⁷² For example, Rafeq, "Craft Organization," 505. ("The *ṭā'ifa*, as an autonomous body, had important economic and fiscal functions.")

¹⁷³ Baer, *Egyptian guilds*, 88–93, and "Functions," 35.

were in charge of collecting their own taxes, they could have more flexibility in distributing taxes inside a guild and among related guilds. In this regard, Istanbul guilds show an ambivalent situation. On the one hand, the guilds administered and distributed some of their taxes internally, but on the other hand, it was done in some guilds through tax-farmers (who doubled as *kethüdās*) who could have squeezed the guildsmen for more revenue.¹⁷⁴

The court records do not provide detailed information about tax-farms in the guild setting. Occasionally they record lump sums paid in advance to the treasury (*beytūlmāl*), e.g., 6,000 *akçe* for the fishermen's guild and 10,000 *akçe* for the cow-butchers in 1027/1618–19,¹⁷⁵ which most probably means that the tax-farmer-cum-*kethüdā* had to discuss tax distribution with the guild members concerned. Often, taxes collected within the guilds were simply mentioned as taxes in general (*rusūm* or *tekâlif*). Nonetheless, we may assume that guilds usually collected “irregular” taxes such as army tax (*ordu akçesi*) and shovel tax (*kürek ve kazma akçesi*),¹⁷⁶ given that the regular *ihtisāb* taxes were collected by government officials. For example, the *kethüdā* of the barley-dealers' (*arpacı*) guild was collecting the military tax through his deputy in the early 1660s,¹⁷⁷ and many major guilds and assistant guilds were negotiating to divide such taxes among themselves. Such irregular taxes had become a matter of routine some time in the first half of the seventeenth century, which is not surprising given the ongoing

¹⁷⁴ This situation is somewhat similar to what is described in Faroqhi, “Ottoman Guilds in the Late Eighteenth Century: The Bursa Case” in *Making a Living in the Ottoman Lands: 1480–1820* (Istanbul: Isis, 1995) 100.

¹⁷⁵ There are two interesting tax-farm cases from the fishermen's guild (IK 3: 16b/139) and cow-butchers' guild (IK 3: 86a/700). The fishermen's *kethüdā* was dismissed after only 11 days, replaced by a higher bidder. Interestingly, he had to tell the state that he was no longer in the position when the treasury wanted the promised amount from him. The cow-butchers' *kethüdā* could not even begin working as a *kethüdā* because the guild rejected him. He also had to prove that he had not been able to take over the *kethüdā*-ship lest he should pay the formerly agreed sum of taxes. These cases seem to indicate either that the state managed tax-farms sloppily, or that it tried to garner all the money it could even from a replaced tax-farmer unless he could prove that he had been dismissed.

¹⁷⁶ See Chapter IV for a more detailed discussion on irregular taxes. We can assume that they were in nature irregular, because they were collected in years when there were imperial campaigns (*sefer-i hümayün*). Perhaps the “shovel” tax was intended to meet the expenses of military engineering, such as trench digging and fortress sapping (Uzunçarşılı, *Kapıkulu Ocakları*, II, 107, 132). Equally, there is a possibility that *avârız* was also collected from guilds (e.g., *piyade sakalar*, IK 3: 95b/735).

¹⁷⁷ IK 9: 104b.

warfare, changing military technology and fiscal drain of the period.¹⁷⁸

Although we do not know exactly how heavy those “irregular” taxes were nor exactly when they were regularized, together with the already existing *ih̄tisāb* taxes, they must at least occasionally have been heavy enough to induce the creation of special funds in some guilds to help in the payment of such taxes. The hook-makers’ guild, for example, had a cash *waqf* for *ordu m̄ih̄immatı* (tax for military requisites) by the late 1610s, according to a brief note in a document recording a change of *waqf* manager.¹⁷⁹ In the 1640s, the cauldron-makers, who were originally from the Trebizond area, created a large guild *waqf* (see section ii).¹⁸⁰ The members of the guild contributed varying amounts of money, which added up to 76,000 “good and new” *akçe*. Making an agreement on the conditions and purposes of the *waqf*, they stipulated that the cash fund was to be loaned out at interest, and that the income from the interest was to be spent on military requisites (*ordu m̄ih̄immatı*) and expenses to pay for government levies in kind (honey, oil, soap, etc.). Each year, the account of the *waqf* was to be examined by the *keth̄üdā*, *yığ̄ıtbaşı* and others. We can see other cases of guild *waqfs* for which specific purposes were not mentioned, but we may imagine that tax-payment was a primary concern.¹⁸¹ Of course, it was not the only concern, and the records show that guild *waqfs* were used for communal meals and feeding the poor in the guild (*taḫ-i ta‘m ile Sarraçhane fukarāsi i‘ām oluna*), as in the case of the saddle-makers.¹⁸²

In addition, the activities of the guilds also included communal and semi-religious ceremonies and periodic excursions to the suburbs. Guilds were likely to have occasional communal banquets (*z̄iyāfet*). For example, the water-carriers without mounts (*arka sakalanı*)¹⁸³ claimed

¹⁷⁸ For an overview of the taxes levied on the guilds in the seventeenth century, see Chapter IV.

¹⁷⁹ IK 5: 47b/331. This document does not give any more information on the size of the *waqf* or how the fund was raised.

¹⁸⁰ IBK 122: 25b–26a. When the cauldron-makers moved to Istanbul is unclear.

¹⁸¹ IK 9: 199b. For example, the felt-makers’ (*keçeci*) guild had a cash *waqf* for “various needs.”

¹⁸² IK 9: 89b. In this case, the *waqf* was created by just one person who bequeathed one third of his property, 20,000 *akçe*, and was administered by the successive *keth̄üdās* of Sarraçhane.

¹⁸³ I translate both *piyade sakalanı* and *arka sakalanı* (literally, water-carriers using their backs) as “water-carriers without mounts,” since they seem to mean the same group. These two are never listed side-by-side.

in court that it had been their tradition for the newly selected *yığıtbaşı* to hold a banquet for members.¹⁸⁴ Perhaps when a new leader was elected, it was an important juncture to confirm their solidarity around the new leadership and reinforce the members' sense of belonging to the guild.

Evliya Çelebi gives a precious first-hand account of a guild excursion and an initiation ceremony in the goldsmiths' (*kuyumcu*) guild.¹⁸⁵ He claims that he was the son of the *kuyumcubaşı* (head of the goldsmiths) and therefore had the opportunity to participate in their excursions to Kağıthane, a favorite riverside area along a tributary of the Golden Horn, and to be properly initiated as an apprentice in the guild. Being an insider, he has a tendency to glorify and idealize the ceremonies of his trade, but his account has unique value as it is the only insiders' view that has survived. He says the excursion to Kağıthane was held every 20 years with the state's financial support and Sultan Süleyman the Magnificent's specially endowed (as a *waqf*) kitchen utensils.¹⁸⁶ Goldsmiths from all over the Ottoman Empire gathered in Kağıthane, and the feast continued for 20 days. Even the incumbent sultan, grand vizier and *şeyhülislām* came to this gathering (!), and "no other trade had such a great excursion." His description may not be believable down to the last detail, but at least the endowed kitchenware rings true, given similar examples from later centuries.¹⁸⁷

Evliya's account of the guild initiation ceremony is much less ostentatious than that of the excursion. He explains how the sufi-like ceremony of initiation proceeds, presided over by the *naķīb*. The *naķīb* ceremonially greets the gathered people, and the latter reply. He then gives the novice a hide, which is a substitute for a carpet, indicating that the boy is now qualified to take his place among them. The *naķīb* and another person take the novice on either side to deliver him to his master. The master ties his belt around the novice's waist, ties some other objects to the girdle, and also gives him a

¹⁸⁴ IK 3: 39b/338. Interestingly, when the water-carriers without mounts accused their new *yığıtbaşı* of not holding a banquet upon his appointment, the *yığıtbaşı* said he would give a banquet only if he was reimbursed the money he had paid for the communal spending of the guild before. The members decided to forgo the banquet.

¹⁸⁵ *Kuyumcu* could also mean a jeweler.

¹⁸⁶ According to Evliya, the sultan was also trained as a goldsmith. Evliya, ed. Gökyay, 272.

¹⁸⁷ For example, IBK 218: 82a–b (1173/1759–60) shows a case of a *waqf* among glass-makers, which included large dishes, pots, decanters and ladles.

stick. He goes on to give the boy a number of moral and philosophical injunctions, and then, as part of the ceremony, slaps him on the right ear. The novice, in turn, kisses the hand of everybody present and respectfully exits. Each step of this ceremony is accompanied by religious blessings and incantations. Undoubtedly, this type of ceremony would have deepened the relationship between master and apprentice, and given it a more than occupational meaning. On the other hand, it does not seem likely that the guild doubled as a sufi order. Apparently, there were outside guests at the ceremony, given that Evliya relates that the novice kissed the hands of the guests from other “orders” (*tavīkler*) as well as those of his own superiors. Most probably, a guild could turn to a larger sufi lodge for the initiation of its novices. The non-Muslim goldsmiths—in addition to Muslims, there were Greeks, Armenians and Jews according to Evliya—may or may not have attended this ceremony, which had an obvious Muslim flavor.

As is the case with the religious officials of the guilds, it is difficult to assess either the significance of these communal/religious activities in the lives of the guildsmen or the range of their effects, especially because they are seldom mentioned in official records. What one can confirm is that there were *waqfs* for communal expenses, as in the case of abovementioned saddle-makers. Although it is the only case I have thus seen among seventeenth-century Istanbul guilds, there were similar ones in other places and times.¹⁸⁸

vi. *Decision-Making in the Guilds*

There are a couple of recurring themes in the decision-making of guildsmen with regard to various types of guild activities, such as tradition and consensus (*ittifāk*). Guildsmen often referred to either of these when making decisions both large and small. Out of 93 court record entries that contain guildsmen’s collective pleas, 50 refer to their customary practices, 32 to agreements, and 19 to both. While the reference to tradition has a strong element of legitimizing rhetoric, the use of agreement may shed new light on the actual working of the guilds.

¹⁸⁸ Faroqhi, “The Bursa Case,” 104–105. She observes that there were some guild *waqfs* of relatively small sums of cash designated for communal meals (*ta’amiye*) in eighteenth-century Bursa.

Guildsmen made agreements (*ittifāk*) on issues as diverse as raw material distribution, guild-headman selection,¹⁸⁹ setting production standards, founding a guild *waqf*, and even allocating specific sales routes for each member. What, then, does the prevalence of these agreements reveal about seventeenth-century Istanbul guilds?

One may consider agreement a part of guild autonomy as Haim Gerber, who studied the court records of seventeenth-century Bursa extensively, does.¹⁹⁰ This is in the sense that at least the internal affairs of the guild system were determined by agreements among the immediately concerned parties, that is, between the members of a guild or among two or more related guilds. The method of agreement played an important role in creating and/or preserving guild regulations, which were often referred to as traditions. He also points out that the *kadi* did not usually check the previous records to verify the claims of the guilds and that the interpretation of guild regulations was in the hands of the guild itself.

While this seems mostly true for seventeenth-century Istanbul guilds, the only trouble in calling the near self-determination of the guilds “autonomy” is that what they enjoyed was not complete autonomy. Many times, especially when there were disputes, the final decision for a guild matter had to be made by the government.¹⁹¹ One may say that the degree of so-called guild autonomy could not go beyond the extent to which internal agreements were made. Moreover, the government intervened in the affairs of large provisioning guilds in Istanbul and appointed their officials, although these officials were held accountable to guild members.¹⁹²

The practice of consultation and agreement may not necessarily be regarded as democratic or harmonious. As we know from the examples of violations of guild rules (that were often sanctioned by

¹⁸⁹ Ergenç, “Osmanlı Şehirlerindeki Yönetim Kurumları,” 1273–74 also provides cases in which the leaders of guilds were selected “unanimously” (*cumlesinin re’yi ile, ittifâkların üzere*) from Bursa and Ankara court registers of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

¹⁹⁰ Gerber, *Bursa*, 42–45.

¹⁹¹ For a legalist critique of Gerber, see Timur Kuran, “Islamic Influences on the Ottoman Guilds,” in Kemal Çiçek et al. eds. *The Great Ottoman Turkish Civilizations*, 2: 50–53. “As long as an outside power could remove any particular freedom at will, the guilds would not be genuinely autonomous.”

¹⁹² See also John Chalcraft’s objection to Gerber in that the latter’s concept of guild autonomy is based on rigid dichotomy between the state and society. See his “Striking Cabbies of Cairo and Other Stories,” 14–15.

agreements), an agreement did not always guarantee harmony, and malcontents occasionally arose. One cannot assume, therefore, that the internal regulations governing guilds always operated against a harmonious background. In fact, a closer look at the documents reporting guild agreements ironically reveals that they were often made immediately after the existing order had been threatened by members or outsiders, to the effect that those involved would restore previous practices.¹⁹³ Guildsmen often brought the offender to the court to have him swear that he would follow the agreement. Agreements, and the regulations based upon them, needed occasional reconfirmation to maintain their effect.

In addition, we also need to consider how the guilds reached these agreements. A guild agreement may not have needed much formality,¹⁹⁴ since it must have been often among people who knew one another very well. The fact that agreement was the key factor in determining various kinds of guild affairs does not necessarily mean that all guild members had an equal voice, given the hierarchical composition of the guilds. For example, one can justifiably imagine that the elders (*ihtiyārlar*) had more of a say in decision-making than the regular masters,¹⁹⁵ not to mention the apprentices. It might be wise to remember İnalcık's warning against overestimating the Ottoman tradition of consultation: consultation (*meşveret*) with people of lower standing existed, but it was the people in the top ranks who reserved the right to make decisions.¹⁹⁶ Minority opinions may not have been asked for or carefully heeded, and there were violators of rules who were not happy with the existing agreements. Therefore, we should be aware of the potential shortcomings of agreements, which might not have represented all segments within a guild. Presumably, the standard practice was to downplay conflicts and legitimize previously made decisions through "consensus."

¹⁹³ İK 9: 145b. For example, the tanners reconfirmed their agreement on collective purchasing when there was a violation of that rule. For similar examples, see the coal dealers (*kömürçüler*, İK 5: 28b/190) and straw-mat sellers (*hasırçılar*, İK 9: 262b).

¹⁹⁴ Here we may be reminded of David Hume's idea about the natural development of agreement or convention out of a general sense of common interest, which does not need any formal promise. See his *A Treatise of Human Nature* (London: J.M. Dent and Sons, 1966, first published 1738).

¹⁹⁵ It may not be a simple coincidence that the word *ihtiyār* also means free-agency/free will.

¹⁹⁶ İnalcık, "Decision-Making in the Ottoman State," in *Decision-Making and Change in the Ottoman Empire*, ed. Caesar E. Farah (Missouri: Thomas Jefferson University Press, 1993) 9–18. He gives examples of guilds and emergency hearings at the *divān* court.

That said, we may still want to delve further into the meaning of such a large number of agreements within the guild setting. Despite all the limits the format of “agreement” may have had, it necessarily gave guilds a contractual character. Remember, for example, the tanner who violated a guild agreement concerning raw-material purchase and swore that he would never do it again, lest he face expulsion from the guild. In general, the essence of being part of a guild was to consent to follow the agreements as rules. We tend to view guilds as organizations embodying regulation and monopoly, imposed either from within or by the state. This notion, however, neglects the important process of agreement, or contract in a loose sense of the word, which preceded rule-bound activities. Given the fluid boundaries of guild membership in the early seventeenth century, the power to set rules within a trade through agreements among a core group of people and to have all those involved follow them was a key feature of guild activity.

b. *Individual Guild Members and the Guild*

How much power did a guild have over its individual members? Did individual guildsmen have some degree of freedom to carry out business independent of the guild? In addition, when a member thought the guild had treated him unfairly, how capable was he of protesting? These questions are difficult to answer with any precision, and we must also assume that there were differences from guild to guild. Nonetheless, the many transactions of individual guildsmen recorded in court documents indicate that they possessed some level of latitude.

We tend to understand a guild as a group, so much so that we may unconsciously assume that its members always acted collectively. Though a collective dimension of guild activities certainly existed, one should remember that each shop in a seventeenth-century Istanbul guild was a separate business. Moreover, as we have seen, the shops were not always homogeneous in terms of size, which indicates that the scale of economic activities in which they were involved could vary. It was up to individual members to form capital for their business and make ends meet.

The freedom exercised by individual guildsmen is hard to measure; we can only speculate on the basis of scanty documentation. In addition, the leeway guild members had seems to have varied from issue

to issue. For example, violations of fixed prices or production standards were considered serious, and government and guild authorities reacted strongly against them.¹⁹⁷ On the other hand, individuals apparently enjoyed some flexibility in matters of raw-material purchase and partnership formation, though whether this was intended by the guilds or not is uncertain.

i. *Purchase of Raw Materials*

Although we sometimes come across records that corroborate the commonly accepted notion of guild control over the collective¹⁹⁸ purchasing of raw materials, we do not know to what degree guild authorities could control raw material distribution. It is not even clear whether all guilds tried to control raw material purchases by their members. When purchasing raw materials collectively, guilds seem to have cared more about securing enough material in competition with other similar groups and having members buy from the same source rather than about supervising each and every transaction.¹⁹⁹

Documents referring to purchases of raw materials by individual guildsmen rarely mention guild control. In every case, the transacting party is a single individual or a few people in partnership on each side, and there is no trace of guild intervention. One may wonder whether this lack of mention was because the guilds were so involved in their members' transactions that mentioning such information was considered redundant. While this may have been true of some guilds, the mere existence of guild oversight cannot mean that individual transactions were necessarily limited. Once the parameters were set by the guild, individual members seem to have had some leeway.

One Armenian baker (*etmekçi*) who had purchased wheat from a flour-seller (*uncu*), for example, could not pay for the wheat and was therefore warned by the court to repay his debt to the flour-seller.

¹⁹⁷ IK 3: 89b/712. A bakery that belonged to the "Kapı Ağası Vakfı" was closed by government authorities as it had produced white bread that did not meet the weight requirement.

¹⁹⁸ Here I use the word "collective" in the sense that many individual members of a guild gathered in one place and made their purchases, and not that they bought as one group. There is a possibility that a guild bought a massive amount together and then distributed it among guild members, but it is uncertain if this was a common practice.

¹⁹⁹ For examples where the tanners and candle-makers of Yedikule tried to procure their raw materials in opposition to their competitors, see Mühimme Defteri 93: 27/157 and 38/207 and AŞ 3: 56-57/185 and 57/186.

In this document, there is no mention of supervision by either of the relevant guilds. Given the dispersion of bakeries throughout the city, and the huge size of the two guilds that were in charge of basic provisions of the seventeenth-century metropolis, it must have been very difficult to coordinate all members to buy and sell flour simultaneously in a designated place. Both the flour-seller and the baker referred to the amount of the purchased wheat in an interesting way. They called it “the wheat whose amount is known to us” (*beynimizde miḳdārı maʿlum buḡday*), which apparently indicates that the core transaction primarily involved the two of them alone.²⁰⁰

In another case, a butcher named Yorgi hired Yani of the same guild as his *ḳmādār*²⁰¹ to purchase meat. Securing raw materials through an agent may not have been rare among guildsmen.²⁰² The details of the purchase are not given, but after all the calculations, Yorgi claimed that Yani had to give him back 4,500 *akçe*, whereas Yani denied the claim and said that the amount due was only 1,100 *akçe*. Unable to present evidence or witnesses, Yani took an oath in the name of God “who sent down the Bible to Jesus”²⁰³ that the court accepted. What is noteworthy is that no authorities or other members of the butchers’ guild were called to the court as witnesses on either side. If the guild had heavily monitored individual procurements, the amount of the purchase and the price of the meat must have been known to other people, if not also the original sum of money that Yorgi gave to Yani.²⁰⁴

Meanwhile, a case from the cauldron-makers’ (*kazgancı*) guild shows a rather different picture. In this case, Bostan, a janissary cauldron-maker, sued his partner Konstantin for failing to give him half of

²⁰⁰ IK 9: 102a.

²⁰¹ This term is not found in dictionaries of Ottoman Turkish, but from the word *ḳmā* (the plural form of the Arabic word *ḳunye* (*ḳunya*) meaning profit or acquisition), we may speculate on its meaning. It might have meant a person in charge of money, namely a treasurer for a *şirket*, or someone who shares profit given the usual meaning of the Persian “-dār” suffix, which implies sharing. Interestingly, this word was often used in cases related to the butchers (IK 8: 25b, 35a and IK 9: 68a).

²⁰² There is a document in which a yogurt-seller sued his hireling who had brought him yogurt and milk from a village but failed to return him his horse (IK 8: 42b).

²⁰³ This was the set formula for the Christians to say when they took an oath in court. Such different arrangements of oath-taking for non-Muslims in the eighteenth and nineteenth century Damascene court are observed in Najwa al-Qattan, “*Dhimmīs* in the Muslim Court: Legal Autonomy and Religious Discrimination,” *IJMES* 31 (1999) 438.

²⁰⁴ IK 9: 68a.

the profits from the sale of their commonly owned copper while he was away. We do not know from the document why the cauldron-maker did not use the copper, instead selling it for a 20,000 *akçe* profit. When Konstantin denied Bostan's claim, the *kethüidā* and another member of the guild testified in Bostan's favor. The guild authorities of the cauldron-makers knew not only how much profit Konstantin made from this particular transaction, but even the size of the original partnership's capital.²⁰⁵ Of course, it is possible that the guild authorities were only accidental witnesses, but even then, this example suggests the existence of closer ties between guild leaders and regular members in a smaller guild. Theoretically speaking, it seems that smaller guilds could exercise more control over their individual members. In this case, however, the guild apparently did not object to their members reselling raw materials for profit, and intervened in the lawsuit only when they were summoned as *'udūl* (competent and disinterested witnesses), which indicates that the arrangement over how to dispose of acquired raw materials concerned primarily the partners.

On the whole, based on these cases of raw material purchases, we may assume that guilds left the particulars of such transactions up to the individual guildsmen. Although the guilds were sometimes in charge of the fair distribution of raw materials (as in the case of the cooks of sheep feet [*paşacılar*]), individual tradesmen probably negotiated rather freely if the guilds—especially the larger ones—could not completely control each transaction.

Sometimes, even fixed prices may have been compromised in the course of a transaction. Going back to the two examples of flour prices mentioned before, it seems to have been possible for a baker to buy flour for much more than the fixed price, whatever the reason may have been. A flour-seller, Uzun Kosta, had sold to a baker, Mehmed Çelebi, 1,867 *keyl* (about 46 tons) of flour for 280,050 *akçe* (i.e., 150 *akçe* per *keyl*).²⁰⁶ In another case in the same year (1072/1661–62), when the *kadi*'s agent, experts (*ehl-i vukūf*) and disinterested (*bi-garez*) Muslims estimated the value of the flour stored in a shop, the price was only 45 *akçe* per *keyl*. Their supposedly sound estimate (*tahmin-i sahih*) must have been in harmony with fixed prices.²⁰⁷ In

²⁰⁵ IK 9: 61b.

²⁰⁶ IK 9: 154b (8th of Şafer, early October).

²⁰⁷ IK 10: 47b (16th of Ramazan, early May).

such a situation, how can we reconcile the difference of price between the two cases? One possibility is that they involved different types of flour. The officially fixed prices varied to some extent between flour types. In addition, one has to consider the seasonal difference, since the price of grain would gradually rise throughout the year after the harvest in summer.²⁰⁸ In this case, 150 *akçe/keyl* was registered in October, and 45 *akçe/keyl* in May, which is in defiance of the natural yearly price trend. Therefore, it is rather difficult to understand why the fixed price of one type of flour was more than three times higher than that of another, if the officially set prices were not violated. In the register of fixed prices from 1640, for example, the prices of various types of flour varied between 50 and 80 *akçe* per *keyl*.²⁰⁹ It is probable that at times there were gaps between the officially approved prices and the prices applied in reality.²¹⁰ Therefore, perhaps even the principle of fixed prices was not absolutely binding and it depended on negotiations between sellers and buyers. It remains a subject of conjecture whether such a variety of prices happened under the supervision of the guild or mainly through dodging its control. As it stands, the fact that the former case made into the *kadi* register indicates either that the price of flour at 150 *akçe* per *keyl* was still within the gamut of allowable flexibility, or that the *kadi* court did not heed the implications of the litigation's details.

Just as the individual guildsmen in these cases seem to have had some *de facto* leeway in procuring and disposing of raw materials, they could also appeal to the court when they thought the distribution process unfair. The cooks of sheep feet (*paşacılar*) provide a good example. The authorities of this guild were more directly involved in raw-material procurement and distribution than seems evident in the previous cases of bakers and butchers. That is, their *kethüdā* was in charge of acquiring the heads and feet of sheep and cows, and then distributing the due share of each shop (*tevzi* olun-

²⁰⁸ That is, when grain prices are not externally controlled and the harvest was more or less steady. For an analysis of the fluctuation of wheat prices based on the data of monthly price changes in Pisa (1633–1682), see *Karl Gunnar Persson, Grain Markets in Europe: 1500–1900* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) 67, 118.

²⁰⁹ Kütükoğlu, *1640 Tarihli Narh Defteri*, 92. Even the special flour of Aydıncık cost no more than 100 to 120 per *keyl* in May 1657, when the Venetian embargo was not yet lifted (GK 80: 92a).

²¹⁰ Kafadar, “State Supervision over the Marketplace: Thoughts on Ottoman Market Codes in the Light of the Book of the Eparch” (unpublished paper presented at Princeton, 1994) 20.

dukda kârhane şâhiblerine hisse virilmek).²¹¹ It is not certain whether such controlled distribution of raw materials applied to other guilds. In 1071/1660–61, a Mehmed Beşe of the guild sued the *kethüdâ* claiming that he had not received his due share, even though he had been running a shop in the trade for some time and had paid the taxes imposed on the guild along with other members.²¹² Within a year, more than nine members of the same guild who were not guild officials came to court to notarize their agreement in the presence of their new *kethüdâ* that the heads and feet of sheep and cows should be distributed equally, without giving any more or any less to anybody (*‘ala’s-seviye, kimesneye noķşân ve ziyâde virilmemek için biz ittifâk eyledük*).²¹³ The fact that ordinary guild members were mentioned at the top of the document as plaintiffs implies that the agreement was made on their initiative. Thus, to acquire what they needed, regular members could also rely on existing regulations or push for a new agreement.

ii. *Business Partnerships (şirket)*

Another indication of the freedom enjoyed by individual members is the frequent and unrestricted formation of business partnerships (*şirket*) among them. Such an arrangement is very commonly seen in seventeenth-century documents. We have six cases from the period between 1612 and 1620, 20 from the 1660s, and one from two Galata court registers of the 1650s. Although the number of documents may not look impressive, we have to take into consideration that partnership matters were commonly contracted orally, and that tradesmen generally came to court only when problems arose. Guildsmen used partnerships extensively to maintain the financing and running of their shops. Given the long history and legitimacy invested in this institution, guildsmen must have made full use of it since it could help them finance the operations of a shop by gathering more capital. Additionally, the use of partnerships may have alleviated the presumed bottleneck at the stage of promotion to being masters who ran their own shops.

²¹¹ The expression *kârhane şâhibleri* in the text is rather confusing. Literally, *şâhib* means an owner, but in this case, “a responsible master” seems more appropriate, because the legal owners of the shops may not have engaged in running the business.

²¹² IK 9: 70a.

²¹³ IK 10: 52a.

The institution of business partnership in the Middle East had been established in the *sharia* law since the seventh and eighth centuries, and it had a longer history than any organization of crafts or service guilds, if we discount the legendary accounts of the mystical origin of “guilds” going back to the Prophet Muhammad and the rightly guided Caliph ‘Ali.²¹⁴ According to a recent monograph, the Middle Eastern types of partnerships may have inspired the *commenda* and other partnerships in Europe during the Middle Ages that later developed into the more complex business enterprises of capitalism. In the Middle East itself, however, business partnership evolved more cumulatively than dramatically.²¹⁵

Partnership (*şirket*) in Ottoman times, as in the classical period of Islam, was based on contracts in which two or more individuals agreed to contribute either capital, labor or credit to form a business with a view to sharing the profit thus made.²¹⁶ A contract of *şirket* simply consisted of an offer and its acceptance.²¹⁷ Such a contract did not require any documentation to be valid. Any individuals could engage in partnership contracts with others as they wished, and partners could end contracts when they wanted.²¹⁸

The legal categories of partnership are minutely and technically enumerated in Islamic jurisprudence (*fiqh*), though there are some differences in explaining the categories depending on the school of law, a subject that is beyond the scope of this study. Of the many types of *şirkets*, the most relevant to the guildsmen’s partnership are *muḍāraba* and various subcategories of *şirket-i ‘aḳd*.²¹⁹ *Muḍāraba* is a partnership in which there is a strict job-division between the investor

²¹⁴ Evliya, ed. Gökyay, 212.

²¹⁵ Çizakça, *Comparative Evolution of Business Partnerships: The Islamic World and Europe, with Specific Reference to the Ottoman Archives* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1996). On earlier history of Middle Eastern partnerships and relation to *commenda*, see Abraham L. Udovitch, *Partnership and Profit in Medieval Islam* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970).

²¹⁶ According to Çizakça, business partnership seems to have been more flexibly applied in Ottoman times than in the classical period of Islam, as a *muḍāraba* contract shows principal other than cash, which had not been allowed in the early Islamic age (IK 25: 261 of 1179/1765, as cited in Çizakça, *Partnership*, 72–73).

²¹⁷ Bilmen, *Hukukî İslamiyye ve İstilahatı Fikhiyye Kamusu*, 7: 79–80.

²¹⁸ We can see a casual breakup of a *şirket* in a case where one partner of a bakery simply wanted to move to another town, as shown earlier in this chapter. In addition, a *şirket* was to break up when one partner died and therefore the terms of the contract had to change, although they could make a new contract.

²¹⁹ About the definition and description of *şirket-i ‘aḳd* and *muḍāraba*, see Bilmen 7: 57–62, 79–81, 101–102, İbrahim ibn Muhammad Halabi, *Mülteḳā ü'l-abḩur*, trans. Mevkufatı (Istanbul: Dāru't-Tibaatī'l-‘Āmire, 1290/1873) 360–364, and Çizakça, *Partnership*, Chapter 1, 3–9.

and the manager of the concerned business; one party simply provides capital, and the other works in order to maximize the profits from the business. This relationship involves an element of limited liability, since the agent is not held responsible for the loss of the capital, and the investor bears no responsibility beyond losing his principal in case of further loss.²²⁰ Therefore, this type of *şirket* was frequently used in risky intercontinental trade, although it was also used for crafts and services.²²¹

Şirket-i 'aḳd (contractual partnership) comprises various partnerships in which partners contributed similar things in either even or uneven proportions. It had three basic categories: capital (*şirket-i māl*), labor (*şirket-i 'amel*),²²² and borrowing (*vücūh*). As is apparent from their names, each designates a partnership in which partners put their capital together, work together, or borrow together relying on their reputation. These categories could also be easily combined: partners might, for example, combine their capital and labor, or credit and labor.

Each type of *şirket-i 'aḳd* is subdivided into *mufāwada* (unlimited investment partnership) and *'inan* (limited investment partnership).²²³ The former requires that the partners be equal in every aspect, such as their religious affiliation, gender, amount of capital investment, and final share of profit. In addition, partners in this type of contract are able to represent each other in business transactions, and have to stand surety for each other, which necessitates that this partnership be only between people who trust each other completely. In contrast, *'inan* is more flexible and allows for disparity between partners—they can be from different religious groups, invest different amounts of money in the business, or get different levels of return from any profit made. One partner could stand surety for another, but this was not mandatory. The terms in this type of contract depended on how the concerned parties arranged them.

²²⁰ Çizakça, *Partnership*, 4–7.

²²¹ None of the documents I have examined thus far have indicated a given partnership as *muḍāraba*, but at least one of them concerning smallware vendors clearly resembles *muḍāraba* (IK 8: 18a), and there is a great probability that outside investors were in *muḍāraba* partnerships with the masters of guilds. Çizakça (*Partnership*, 72) gives an eighteenth-century (1765) example of *muḍāraba* in which a merchant invested in a shoemaker's shop.

²²² *Şirket-i 'amel* is also called *şirket-i teḳabbül* or *şirket-i şanāyi'*. The only case of this type of *şirket* (IK 3: 59b/502) among the *sicills* that I have consulted is in shoemaking (*pabuççılık*).

²²³ These translated terms come from Udovitch's book.

How, then, did the guildsmen of seventeenth-century Istanbul use this institution? Even from the modest number of documents available, we can see that it was adopted by various occupational groups, including bakers, butchers, grocers, candle-makers, tanners, flour-sellers, wool-makers, smallware-sellers, cauldron-makers, sheep-sellers, and tavernkeepers, although bakers and butchers were the groups most often registered as being involved in *şirket*. Therefore, we may safely judge that partnership was quite common among the guildsmen. Most of the partnership cases involved two people, but *şirkets* of three to four people were not rare, even though *şirkets* of a much bigger size appeared only occasionally.²²⁴ In addition, the duration of partnerships among guildsmen is mostly unknown, but from one account where the contract lasted at least 12 years between non-Muslim bakers, we can infer that *şirkets* could last for relatively long periods.²²⁵ Therefore, it would seem that partnerships could expand in terms of size and duration.

An interesting feature of the *şirkets* formed by artisans is that they often crossed religious boundaries. There are two examples from the 1610s²²⁶ and five examples from the 1660s,²²⁷ which make over one fourth of all the *şirket* cases examined. This indicates that a substantial percentage of artisans did not appear to care about their partners' religions as long as the partnership was profitable. The *‘inan* partnership between a Muslim and a non-Muslim was completely lawful according to Hanafi jurisprudence in the first place.²²⁸ So, not only were some guilds interreligiously organized, but their members actively mixed together and formed partnerships. When artisans did not care about having someone whose religion was different from theirs as their business partners, they cared even less about the religious affiliation of those whom they traded with, as there are many records of interreligious transactions. In addition, these originally “Islamic” types of business partnerships were also commonly utilized

²²⁴ GK 73: 66a (involving nine Muslim tanners), IK 2: 25b/212 (six *dhimmi* butchers).

²²⁵ IK 9: 211a.

²²⁶ IK 3: 73b/612 (butchers) and IK 5: 111b (bakers).

²²⁷ IK 9: 15a (butchers), 61b (cauldron-makers), 211a (bakers), 235b (butchers), IK 10: 148a (butchers).

²²⁸ Udovitch, 126. On the other hand, such a partnership was supposed to be frowned upon (*makrūh*), and the Muslim partner was supposed to supervise the joint venture.

among religious minority groups, especially by the Greek Orthodox and Armenians.²²⁹

From the documents, however, it is difficult to determine the type of a given *şirket*, because most cases do not mention the category to which it belonged. Furthermore, most of the documents give no details of the partnership arrangement, but simply record briefly who owed his partner such-and-such an amount of money, or that partners so-and-so bought a certain amount of a commodity together. Such things could happen with almost any of the abovementioned partnership types, except that the latter was unlikely to happen in *mudāraba*, since investors in *mudāraba* partnerships, in principle, would not directly meddle with any business activity. Therefore, we are left with very few details from which to reconstruct the *şirkets* used by artisans and service workers.

Despite the small pool of partnership-related cases and the scant descriptions available, we can make a few observations. There are some discernible patterns among the *şirkets* formed by artisans. One example is a partnership in which every partner actively participates in all activities to a more or less equal degree in the partnership; another is one where one party mainly provides capital and facilities while the other party runs the business. One might roughly call the first “equal” and the second “unequal” types of *şirkets*.²³⁰ The former can be either *mufāwada* or *‘inan*, depending on the arrangement, and the latter either *mudāraba* or *‘inan*. I suspect that *‘inan*, with its flexibility, was the most common type of *şirket* among guildsmen, because *mufāwada* forbids partnership between Muslims and non-Muslims, despite the fact that such partnerships abounded in the seventeenth century, and *mudāraba* in principle separates the investor from the running of the business, which senior guildsmen may have disliked. Whatever the case, both the “equal” and the “unequal” types seem to have been commonplace among tradesmen, although for the reasons mentioned above we cannot always determine the type of *şirket*.

²²⁹ Çizakça, 79. Additionally, the use of partnerships among non-Muslims as defined in Islamic jurisprudence was very common even as early as the ninth and tenth centuries. It is important to remember, however, that partnerships had existed before the advent of Islam, and non-Muslims in the Middle East must have been used to such institutions (Udovitch, 8).

²³⁰ I apply these terms only loosely and intuitively, and there is no clear boundary between them.

One example of a *şirket* in which the partners had “equal” standing is that of two butcher partners who lost 2,400 *akçe* of their partnership capital of 19,000 *akçe* and bore the loss equally, 1,200 *akçe* each (IK 10: 148a). This seems to indicate that they had invested the same amount of money. In another case, two tavernkeepers, Yorgi and Petro, in a *vücut* partnership borrowed money—Yorgi borrowed 1,400 and Petro 2,600 *akçe*—together from a third person, and there is no further indication that they played different roles in the partnership. Upon Petro’s repayment of his share of the debt, Yorgi declared that from then on he did not have anything to do with Petro and the partnership, which implies that their partnership was limited to borrowing money together.²³¹ In addition, there is another case of a partnership between two Armenian brothers in the bakers’ guild. Although the court document records little other than that one brother owed money to the other after the end of the *şirket*, we may assume that as brothers they had equal standing in the partnership. They probably inherited the shop usufruct and shared it.²³²

An example of an “unequal” partnership is one in which an established master forms a partnership with someone working under him. In such a partnership, the junior partner seems to have handled everyday business, although this may not mean that the senior partner was totally detached from the business. When a baker sued his former shop assistant (*tezgâhdâr*), who was also his partner, for an allegedly unpaid sum of money, it turned out that the assistant did not owe as much money as the baker claimed, since the baker had ordered him to give part of the sum to a certain captain Ahmed.²³³ In this case, the junior partner was apparently in charge of the money coming in and going out of the shop.

In addition, there is a case of a partnership in smallware sales (*hurdacılık*) that strongly resembles a *muđaraba* in that one partner invested 40,000 *akçe* and the other ran the business commanding four deliverers. Although we cannot be sure that they were members of the *hurdacı* guild—the two partners were still residents of Aydıncık (a province on the Marmara Sea coast)—as they were not mentioned as guild members, we can only presume that they did business in Istanbul from the fact that their debt litigation was reg-

²³¹ IK 8: 26a.

²³² IK 9: 53a.

²³³ IK 10: 144b.

istered in Istanbul. It is still noteworthy, however, that a *muḍāraba* type of partnership was used in a service trade.²³⁴

At the same time, real-life partnerships were more complicated than those described in *fiqh* literature because of the involvement of people who were not a part of the original partnership.²³⁵ For example, agents (*wakil*) and *ḵmādārs*, whose exact function is still unknown, were marginally attached to some partnerships. In the aforementioned case of the cauldron-makers' partnership, it was Bostan Beşe's agent who informed him that his partner Konstantin had made a profit from selling copper while he was away, a transaction that later led to his lawsuit.²³⁶ Additionally, the partners of a butcher shop, Ali Beşe, Foti and Kosta, sued their *ḵmādār*, another Kosta, complaining that he had misused and consumed their profits entrusted to his care from the year before, worth some 11,000 *akçe*.²³⁷ These agents and *ḵmādārs* are not identified as a part of the *şirket*, but they played crucial roles in the working of partnerships.

The guild must have recognized *şirkets* as a perfectly normal everyday institution, as long as the activities of individual *şirkets* remained within one trade specialization represented by a guild and did not go against its rules. This is certain since when there were disputes involving partners who were members of a guild, the authorities of the relevant guild were sometimes present in court as witnesses. There are examples of this from the cauldron-makers' and bakers' guilds.²³⁸

At times, however, some *şirkets* went beyond the boundaries of a guild. While we do not know how guildsmen's *şirkets* with outsiders were viewed by guild authorities, we do know that they were not seen as problematic in *kadi* courts. A court case tells us that a janissary²³⁹ and a candle-maker—presumably a guild member—were in a partnership that was not about making and selling candles but about buying and selling firewood.²⁴⁰ In another case, a certain Osman, whose occupation is not indicated, and Receb, a sailor,

²³⁴ IK 8: 18a.

²³⁵ *Mültekā*, 363.

²³⁶ IK 9: 61b.

²³⁷ IK 9: 15a. It is not mentioned whether this *ḵmādār* participated in the partnership. We may note that especially janissaries in butchery used *ḵmādārs* (IK 8: 25b and IK 8: 35a).

²³⁸ IK 9: 61b and IK 9: 211a.

²³⁹ He was only indicated as a janissary, and therefore was not an official member of any guild.

²⁴⁰ IK 10: 38b.

formed a partnership in a grocery business, which ended in Osman's being indebted to Receb.²⁴¹ If Osman was a member of the grocers' guild, he had consequently brought an outsider into his trade. If Osman was not a member of the guild, then he and his partner were encroaching on the guild's domain. The court found no fault in recording these as legitimate cases. Furthermore, the famous legal reference book of the Ottoman times, *Mültekā ü'l-abhur*, seems to recognize *şirkets* between people of different trades as being permissible. Describing *şirket-i sanāi'*, which is another name for *şirket-i 'amel*, the text says the *şirket*, for instance, can exist between two tailors or between a tailor and a dyer working together.²⁴² Given the unquestionable authority of the *Mültekā*, the legitimacy of such *şirkets* was at least legally sound. As in these examples, guildsmen did not seem to have faced legal obstacles to forming partnerships with outsiders.

Nevertheless, we should not overlook the potential for conflict between established guilds and those *şirkets* that went beyond the boundary of one guild.²⁴³ It is easily imaginable that a business partnership between a grocer or a baker and a sailor defied the official supply system of raw materials. Guild authorities would have on good grounds feared disruptions from such partnerships.

iii. *Violation of Guild Rules*

How serious were the punishments when guild members defied the existing internal rules? What these violators faced was mainly a court warning and being forced to reconfirm their commitment to follow the rules from then on. Records of expulsion are so rare that the registers I examined did not list any, in contrast to cases identified from Bursa *sicills* during the same period.²⁴⁴ Expulsion must have been a last resort reserved for repeat offenders. However, it must have been a known possibility given that a delinquent tanner swore that he would accept expulsion from the guild should he violate guild rules again.²⁴⁵ In addition, the *kadi* court's attitude is interesting in that it acted as it would have in any other civil case. *Kadis* warned

²⁴¹ IK 8: 17/3.

²⁴² *Mültekā ü'l-abhur*, 363.

²⁴³ For example, a declaration of the Plovdiv *abacı* (weavers of coarse wool textile) guild laid down their rules including a stipulation that a master should form a partnership only with another master in the same guild (Todorov, *The Balkan City*, 224).

²⁴⁴ Gerber, *Bursa*, 57. He mentions three expulsion cases.

²⁴⁵ IK 9: 145b.

violators of guild rules much like those who violated private contracts, for example, debtors who did not repay their debts. The court never summoned such violators on its own initiative, but instead dealt with them only when the guilds turned them in.²⁴⁶ This indicates that the violation of guild regulations was an intra-guild matter. It is likely that the only exceptions to this attitude of the court may have been for those who violated the fixed prices for goods and services, as this was a matter that involved not only the guilds but the government as well.

Among the selected *sharia* court registers and *divān* registers, there are only a few cases of individual members who went against guild rules and were reported to the court by their fellow guildsmen.²⁴⁷ Certainly, the repeated violation of rules would have provoked guild authorities to take legal action. For example, a few *çörek* (round cake)-makers were accused of violating the production standards of the guild. They allegedly consistently made *çörek*s below the standard and went against the “opinion” of guild authorities and elders, based on the testimony of more than 10 people including the *kethüdā* and *yiğitbaşı* (. . . *da’ima nākış işlediklerinden gayri re’yimize muhalefet idüp . . .*). On top of their violation of production standards, it is interesting that they were also accused of not conforming to the opinions of their superiors. Clearly, a member was supposed to be obedient to guild authorities.²⁴⁸

A guild would use the court to discipline unruly or independent-minded members who would more openly challenge guild rules or guild authorities. The accused individuals seem to have been rather powerful in their guilds, and the guilds were forced to resort to the court to rein them in. A *na’lçacı* (shoetip-maker) was accused in the *divān* court of having worked every day in a shop held in common by the guild (*cumlesinin icaresinde olan na’lçacı dükkān*) without letting others take their turn, as what he did was against custom. Everyone in the guild was supposed to work there one day in turn, although it is unclear how often.²⁴⁹ That the guild had a commonly held shop

²⁴⁶ Such a policy of the *kadi* court is also confirmed in Kayseri court records coming from a similar period. Jennings, “The Judicial Registers of Kayseri (1590–1630) as a Source for Ottoman History,” Ph.D. dissertation, UCLA (1972) 119.

²⁴⁷ IK 9: 145b (tanners), IK10: 12b (*çörek*-makers), 74a (oil-makers), 109a (tanners), and AŞ 2: 118/460 (shoetip-makers).

²⁴⁸ IK 10: 12b.

²⁴⁹ For whatever reason, the shoetip-makers were inclined to such a practice. Another group in Galata had 12 elders who took turns in working at a spot in the Yağkapamı (See Chapter III).

and that every member worked there one day once in a while seems rather peculiar to us. One possibility is that the shop somehow became vacant and the guildsmen did not want to lose it while there was not a suitable master to take over the shop. Probably, in order to avoid this outcome, they maintained their presence in the shop together. If the members of a given guild wanted to ensure equal opportunity for all those involved, the taking of turns would have been a good solution. It seems likely that the violator must have been a rather powerful (but disliked?) person in the guild, given that the other members had to resort to going to the *divān* court and get a document (*hüccet*) to stop him.²⁵⁰

Once, even the tanners of Yedikule who, according to Evliya Çelebi, were so independent that they would not hand over to the authorities criminals who sought refuge in their community,²⁵¹ went to court to warn a person who had instituted a dubious practice. The *aḥi baba* and the *kethüdā* of the guild, together with some other members, sued a certain El-Hac Mehmed on the grounds that he had built a room (*oda*) with a furnace in his workshop (*kârḥane*), gathered people who “suited his temperament (*havāsına tābî*”) and taught them “trickeries (*hiyal*).” What is unusual is that the guild members did not bring the person in question to the court, as if to do so was a difficult task. The guild elders asked the court to send someone to examine his workshop and warn him to store only tannery instruments in his shop and not to bring in any outsiders, since the elders regarded him as not minding his own business (*kendi ḥālinde olmamağla*). When El-Hac Mehmed was interrogated at his workshop, he agreed that he would not store any non-tannery implements or bring in any outsiders, which ended the case. However, more than 16 of his neighbors, who may well have included tanners or related tradesmen—one of them was named Aḥizade—supported him, saying that he was a good person and he was doing his job (. . . *şuleḥādan olup kendi ḥālindedir*). Their testimony indicates that El-Hac Mehmed was involved in something that the guild authorities considered unacceptable for a tannery, but it was something his neighbors viewed as part of his job. He might have been introducing a new tanning method that his competitors considered “trickery.” In addition, this El-Hac Mehmed was probably an influential person in his own right, even if he did

²⁵⁰ AŞ 2: 118/460.

²⁵¹ Evliya Çelebi, ed. Gökyay, 283, Hammer’s translation, vol. 1, pt. 2, 206.

not get along with the guild authorities, given that he was accused of coveting the *kethüüdā*-ship of the guild, although he denied such claims.²⁵²

If one focuses on guild regulations and the *kadi*'s support for them, one could well think that guild regulations were intrusive, prohibitive and intolerant to any variance from standard and customary practices. On the other hand, the paucity and lightness of punitive actions by guilds recorded in the registers should be considered. Among the several cases found in 12 *defters* of court records, none of them goes beyond having the *kadi* warn the culprit. As Haim Gerber concludes, taking the violator to the *kadi* itself may have been considered a form of punishment. This situation may indicate that internal persuasion and a warning in concert worked rather effectively and that guilds could not afford to detect or meddle in all the violations their members were committing. Most likely, there was some unofficial leeway from which individual artisans could benefit.

Although guild membership made an artisan subject to the rules of the guild to which he belonged, such regulation did not completely determine the trajectory of his business activities. He still had to make many decisions in terms of financing, forming partnerships (or not), securing raw materials, and even to what extent he should follow the guidelines and customs within the guild and the state-induced fixed prices.

c. *Inter-guild Relationships*

The seventeenth-century metropolis of Istanbul possessed numerous guilds, and Evliya Çelebi, the most frequently cited source for an overview of the whole guild system of Istanbul, himself lists several hundred.²⁵³ How then did the multitude of seventeenth-century Istanbul guilds interact?

Although it is difficult to know the whole gamut of possible interactions among the guilds, we can focus on a few salient issues. First is the problem of "assistant" (*yamak*) guilds. Some guilds were attached

²⁵² IK 10: 108b–109a.

²⁵³ According to Mantran's count, Evliya lists 1,107 guilds (*Istanbul*, 353). However, we have to discount the number to some extent because many of the listed groups are not appropriate to be considered craft or service guilds.

to related guilds that were larger and more important, and the former were supposed to contribute to the latter's payment of tax. Court records, government documents and Evliya Çelebi corroborate this arrangement. While it is clear that the practice existed in other Ottoman towns,²⁵⁴ we still need to explore in what way *yamak* arrangements worked.

The way Evliya Çelebi describes a main guild and related assistant guilds gives us an impression that such arrangements were fixed and inflexible. This is partly the result of the setting of his account, which was a quasi-military parade of guilds supposedly performed in front of the sultan and state dignitaries shortly prior to Murad IV's Baghdad campaign. Such an account may well have partially reflected reality, but whether the day-to-day relations between a main guild and an assistant guild were as clearly designated and fixed as on a ceremonial occasion is questionable.²⁵⁵

For example, whether a guild was a *yamak* to another guild was not always clearly settled. In one case, the *hurdafuluş* (smallware-dealers) guilds protested against the *na'lçacı* (shoetip-makers) guild's claim that it was the latter's *yamak* and therefore had to help pay the shovel tax (*kürek ve kazma akçesi*). The smallware dealers argued that they had been independently paying their tax worth 30,000 *akçe* annually when a campaign was on. Although they allegedly had imperial orders (*emr-i şerif*) to the effect that no outsider should interfere with their payment of that particular tax, the *na'lçacı* guild apparently did not consider the matter indisputable. The fact that this case was entered into the central *divân* register (*Mühimme Defteri*) and that the government gave imperial orders repeatedly a few times tells us that this problem arose all too often.²⁵⁶

In addition, even when two or more guilds were definitely related as major and assistant guilds, there were concrete issues to resolve. In 1071/1661, the bakers' guild took the *çörek* (round cake)- and *börek* (flaky pastry)-makers to the court, saying that their assistant guilds, namely the *çörek*-makers, *börek*-makers, *francela* (fine white bread) makers, *simit* (ring-shaped bread)-makers and so on, had helped them

²⁵⁴ Baer, *Egyptian Guilds*, 41, and Gerber, *Bursa*, 45–47.

²⁵⁵ Even Evliya himself tells us that the shagreen (= *sağır*, raw hide with a rough surface) makers were in a dispute with the tanners' guild to which they had been a *yamak* and participated in the procession as a *yamak* of the sword-makers (*kılıççılar*) Gökyay edition, 266.

²⁵⁶ MD 88: 129/337.

pay military taxes, but this arrangement had ended in disorder.²⁵⁷ Therefore, the bakers and their *yamaks* agreed on a new arrangement in which the *yamaks* were supposed to share one *kethüdā* and one *yığılbaşı*, to pay two items of army taxes (*sayf* [summer] *ordıyya* and *koyun* [sheep] *ordıyya*), which amounted respectively to 16,500 and 33,000 *akçe*, and to be directed (*mudahele*) by the bakers in paying other taxes. In another example, locksmiths and their assistant guild the nail-makers registered the amount of shovel tax the latter should contribute each year. In this case, there was no conflict, but they wanted to register the same amount that had been traditionally paid and was going to be paid in the future (400 *akçe*).²⁵⁸ Their wish to clarify the amount to be paid must have arisen from their awareness that such issues were not beyond dispute.

As we saw to be the case in the handling of intra-guild issues, we may well suppose that such related guilds may not have had an equal voice in determining tax payment arrangements. Major guilds in general had more power in the decision-making process than their *yamaks*. Additionally, there may have been a difference of power between *yamaks*. For example, in the abovementioned case of the bakers and their *yamaks*, although the agreement was confirmed by the representatives of both the bakers and the *çörek*- and *börek*-makers, the representatives of other affected *yamaks* were not even present in court. This might indicate that the others were unhappy about the agreement, but somehow did not have the power to object to the decision. However, it is important to note that guilds wanted to solve their problems in the form of agreements, even if such decision-making processes were lopsided.

Another issue that similar types of guilds had to negotiate over and settle was that of monopoly and specialization. Previous scholarship has assumed that the division of trades into narrowly specialized guilds was a result of state intervention and the state's will to control.²⁵⁹ It is still too early to estimate the role of the government in

²⁵⁷ IK 9: 52b. Here, the grouping of these assistant guilds is not clear from the expressions used in the document. Apparently, the *çörekçi* and *börekçi* guilds had a common *yığılbaşı* from before, and therefore we may assume that they were within one group at that time. The aforementioned case of the *çörekçi* guild apparently suggests that it was a separate guild a year after (IK 10: 12b), but it is also possible that the court carelessly called the guild of both *börekçis* and *çörekçis* only as the latter.

²⁵⁸ IK 10: 14b.

²⁵⁹ Mantran, *Istanbul*, 356–57, Baer, “Functions,” 33.

the guilds' development of narrow specializations. However, it seems more likely that guilds themselves evolved such minute divisions, especially when we consider the disputes and agreements over specialized goods. The only clear state action in response to this matter was to warn intruders when a guild claimed and proved it traditionally specialized in certain goods that recently had been intruded upon by outsiders. It is difficult to imagine that the state intentionally and artificially divided artisans into narrowly specialized groups, although the government's tendency to support claims of monopoly made by guilds may have encouraged a tendency toward specialization. In fact, the monopoly over certain goods, especially of those that were not the main product of any guild, was disputed, and compromises were reached. When the Jewish smallware-sellers' guild (*hurdafuluruş*) of Mahmud Paşa Market (*sūk*) sued the bottle-makers of Galata for intrusion into their realm of selling mirrors, eyeglasses (*gözlük*), hard baskets (*sepet*), etc. imported from abroad, they claimed that such goods were their long-time specialty.²⁶⁰ The bottle-makers admitted that they imported and dealt in such goods, but denied that those commodities were peculiar (*maḥşūş*) to the Jewish smallware-dealers alone. Only when the Muslim smallware-dealers of Uzunçarşı testified that those goods were particular to their Jewish colleagues was the case closed. The testimony of these Muslim practitioners indicates that they had acknowledged and respected the Jewish guild's claim of specialty by not handling the abovementioned commodities. This reveals that no one exactly knew the whole range of each guild's specialization, except for a very small circle of related guilds that may well have determined the rules among themselves. Obviously, not knowing the particular arrangements, the court required the testimony of a concerned guild or other "knowledgeable" persons. External violators of such arrangements may have been unaware of their existence and challenged such claims of monopoly.

We find an actual example of an agreement regarding specialization in a case brought by the *boza* (fermented drink made of millet)-

²⁶⁰ IK 10: 96b. The exact term used in this document that I translated "abroad" is *dar ü'l-ḥarb*, "domain of war," which means territories that are ruled by non-Muslims. Probably the bottle-makers imported the goods from Europe, especially from Venice. The Murano glassware coming from Venice was very popular among the Ottomans, and local glass-makers centered in Istanbul successfully emulated it. See Fuat Bayramoğlu, *Turkish Glass Art and Beykoz-Ware*, trans. Leyla M. Kermenli (Istanbul: Istanbul Matbaası, 1976) 38–42.

makers' guild and the cooks' and kebab-makers' guild. They said in court that liver (*ciğer*) kebab had long been the *boza*-makers' specialty,²⁶¹ whereas meatballs (*köfte*) and meat (*et*) kebabs had been that of the cooks (*aşçılar*) and kebab-makers. That being the existing arrangement, both guilds intruded on the other's realm by cooking each other's specialties. They eventually reached an agreement that they should stick to their original practices and they would cook the other's specialty only when a customer brought in uncooked meat and asked them to cook it. Here we can see that the arrangements were minutely divisive, but at the same time left some room for flexibility depending on customer desires. It also seems that the guildsmen of similar specialties could easily encroach into one another's domain, simply because the skills required were not all that different. No matter how many intrusions there were at the individual level, however, the leaders of the relevant guilds agreed to respect the original specialties of each other probably because they wanted to have the sole right to their respective products.²⁶² In a similar case, two groups of shoemakers respectively agreed to sell different types and sizes of shoes.²⁶³

While there were disputes and compromises between related or rival guilds, some guilds, in fact, acted together when they had a common problem. For example, in one case, grocers, vegetable-sellers, and "shopkeepers" (*bazarcular*) of the Galata markets got together and petitioned the government to prohibit three peddlers (*koltukçular*) from selling goods in which they specialized—such as soap, fruits, raisins, eggplants, pumpkins and the like—on the pavement in front of grocery shops.²⁶⁴ Additionally, the ironworkers' (*demirci*), cauldron-makers' (*kazgancı*), tinsmiths' (*kalaycı*) and other related guilds jointly asked for and received an imperial order that forbade profiteers

²⁶¹ It is unclear how the *boza*-makers got involved in the kebab business. However, this shows that a guild could expand its specialty to something that did not have primary relevance to its initial designation. Remember, the bottle-makers tried unsuccessfully to deal in imported mirrors and so on although they were blocked by the smallware-dealers.

²⁶² IK 10: 93a and 94b.

²⁶³ IK 3: 35a/298. The two groups of shoemakers agreed, in addition to other respective specialties, that one of them should sell *nārenci* (orange-colored shoes) for customers up to 10 years old (*on yaşına varınca*), and the other should sell those for customers older than 10 (*on yaşından yukarı*). At first glance, the wording in the text seems to refer to the shoes, but the word *yaş* in Turkish normally applies to persons. Therefore, it should mean the size for a 10-year-old child.

²⁶⁴ AŞ 1: 88/419.

(*matrabazlar*) from selling coal at excessively high prices.²⁶⁵ In another instance, various regional groups of ironworkers (*demirciler*), locksmiths (*çilingirler*), nail-makers (*ekserciler*) and related guilds chose the *kethüdā* of the nail-makers' guild (who happened to be a non-Muslim, probably Greek) to represent them in their future lawsuit against government officials who had not paid them their wages for making and delivering large nails intended for the construction of a fortress.²⁶⁶

In such joint petitions, the *kethüdās* and/or *yığıtbaşıs* of the concerned guilds cooperatively presented their cases to the *divān* or *kadi* court. One can easily imagine that guild officials and elders discussed common problems with one another. Indeed, such inter-guild communication must have been easy and even commonplace, given that some interrelated guilds were physically located close to one another. For example, the Yedikule area, located outside the Istanbul city walls, was a long-established center of animal by-product guilds such as the tanners, butchers and candle-makers.²⁶⁷ The Sarraçhane (saddle-makers' workshop) was intended from its inception during the reign of Mehmed the Conqueror to be a center of army-related crafts.²⁶⁸ In addition, the fact that interrelated guilds had to cooperate in areas, such as the distribution of raw materials, the specialization of products/commodities, and tax-paying arrangements, made inter-guild dialogue all the more necessary. This kind of interaction between guilds must have been the basis for common action, legal or otherwise (such as mass petitions or, on rare occasions, rebellions).

d. Conclusion

In this chapter we have observed the organization and activities of guilds on three different levels: the unit of a single guild, individual guildsmen, and inter-guild relationships. In each case, the guilds in

²⁶⁵ IK 6: 11a. Another guild that joined their petition reads as *davulcu* (drum-makers), and perhaps they were the makers of metal drums.

²⁶⁶ IK 7: 9b–10a.

²⁶⁷ MD 93: 27/157 and 38/207.

²⁶⁸ At least iron and copper smiths, which were important military crafts, existed in the Sarraçhane area. Doğan Kuban, *Istanbul: An Urban History* (Istanbul: The Economic and Social History Foundation of Turkey, 1996) 226. Additionally, for the connection of the Sarraçhane to the many guilds that supplied inputs for saddle-making, see S. Faroqi, "Urban Space as Disputed Grounds: Territorial Aspects to Artisan Conflict in Sixteenth- to Eighteenth-Century Istanbul" (unpublished conference paper, 1997).

seventeenth-century Istanbul showed greater fluidity and flexibility than we have previously thought.

Although the sources do not provide copious details about a precise guild membership structure of this period, it is clear that the guilds had tiered memberships of masters and apprentices. Outsiders could easily enter guilds by making connections to the guild masters or the landlords of guild shops. The government, although it usually supported guild privileges, did not always respect claims of monopoly. "Monopoly" in the seventeenth-century situation could not be more than wishful thinking on the part of the guild.

As for membership homogeneity, we cannot assume that the egalitarian *futuwwa* mentality, which the guildsmen may or may not have possessed, so dominated the guilds that they tried to prevent individual members from becoming too rich or that guildsmen maintained their distance from merchants in general. There was a measure of economic differentiation between the tradesmen in a guild as well as among those in different trades, but we have no indication that such disparities in wealth caused any discord in a guild or between disparate guilds. The ethnic and religious makeup of the guilds differed considerably from guild to guild; while there were apparently many mono-religious guilds, the presence of mixed guilds or mixed partnerships between individuals was not at all exceptional.

Guild officials seem to have been undergoing a process of standardization in the seventeenth century, resulting in the twin offices of *kethüüdā* and *yig'itbaşı* in almost every guild. The mention of religious and other officials is limited to a few eccentric guilds, such as the tanners, barbers and launderers. A guild's leadership was required to respond to the interests and demands of its members, whether or not that leadership was internally selected. Even the *kethüüdās* appointed by the government as tax-farmers could be ousted by the collective agreement of guild members. The same principle was applicable to the *yig'itbaşı* and all other guild officials.

Just as in the selection and dismissal of the guild leaders, guildsmen made and justified many of their decisions by internal agreement. They made such agreements on matters ranging from raw-material distribution within a guild to inter-guild arrangements regarding specialization. Of course, the mechanism of "agreement" in the guild system is likely to have been biased in favor of powerful individuals and guilds, but still it seems to have had genuine importance given the frequency with which it was used. In fact, agreement was so central to making any important decision concerning the guilds that

we may consider a guild a contractual bond in which all were supposed to obey a set of arrangements that were created through consensus. This form of agreement in decision-making probably underlined the obligation of all guild members to follow certain rules, although such rules were occasionally violated and had to be agreed upon anew from time to time.

It is easy to forget that individual masters under the umbrella of the guild had individual businesses that differed from one another. We tend to regard individual guildsmen as almost uniform, undistinguishable shopkeepers closely monitored by guild authorities, but that may not be the case at all. Guildsmen seem to have had substantial leeway in their individual transactions, probably in violation of guild rules at times. Additionally, tradesmen engaged in partnerships freely, apparently without any direct intervention by the guilds that they were in, and they were able to take partners from outside the guild or engage in incidental businesses that were irrelevant to their original trades.

Inter-guild relationships were also a vivid arena in which different guilds negotiated and vied for more beneficial tax-distribution or job-division arrangements. Related guilds appealed together to the court against common enemies such as merchants who drove up the price of raw materials or government officials who were late in paying their wages. Previous scholarship has not separately focused on these levels of joint guild activities, because guilds have been considered mainly in the context of the state-guild relationship and not in terms of their own interconnectedness.

Istanbul guilds in the seventeenth century were on every level more flexible and dynamic than was formerly assumed. Individual guildsmen, guild organizations and interrelated groups of guilds were all able to determine their own affairs within certain boundaries. That is, the government intervened in issues such as price-fixing and tax collection, and intra- and inter-guild rules had to be observed. On the whole, however, the guild system was not so rigid as to deny room for the guildsmen to maneuver and negotiate. Just as there were traditions and rules, there were also agreements, disputes and compromises. As an overview of the guild organization and activities, this chapter leaves us with the impression that seventeenth-century Istanbul guilds were rather loosely organized and fluid enough to allow internal changes in various directions. From here, we can go on to examine the changes that the guild system underwent.

CHAPTER THREE

GUILDS, “TRADITIONALISM” AND CHANGE

a. *How “Conservative” Were the Guilds?—Rhetoric and Reality*

By and large, we hold the impression that Ottoman guilds stuck to their customary practices and as a result underwent few major changes over time. This impression comes from both the primary sources and secondary literature concerning guild matters. One can commonly come across groups of artisans and service workers who wanted to resolve various problems by going back to their old practices in many *sharia* court cases and petitions to the sultan. There were even a few set clichés the guilds used on such occasions, which a researcher gets fairly accustomed to after reading several documents, such as “. . . as it used to be done before” (*yapılageldüğü üzere*), “since long ago” (*kadimden beri*), “while . . . has not been customary” (*mu’tād değil iken*), and so on. Therefore, it is rather easy for a scholar to rush to the conclusion that Ottoman guilds were vegetating within the boundaries of tradition while enjoying government-ensured protection until they were finally rendered powerless with the advent of European industrial commodities.¹ This understanding of the Ottoman guilds, moreover, matches well with the notion of the long decline in the second half of Ottoman history, or the modernist view that holds that all pre-industrial Middle Eastern societies were tradition-bound.

While we need to analyze what is behind the traditionalist rhetoric that guildsmen commonly used, we must also seriously consider the likelihood that many of them might have regarded tradition as a positive thing and tried to maintain it for as long as possible. Being small producers who were easily affected by even very small changes in their intricately woven market connections that were based on narrow specialization, relatively fixed purchase routes or price regulation, many of them must have felt safer when they could keep

¹ See Mantran, *Istanbul*, 299, 329, Raymond, *Artisans et Commerçants*, xvii, 215, 227 among others.

their established rights intact. Guildsmen understandably disliked disruptions in their stable business patterns, whether caused by illegitimate intruders or government functionaries.

Moreover, as in any society that has experienced a long period of success and prosperity, the citizens of the Ottoman capital generally seem to have viewed the concept of “tradition” in a positive light. It is true that almost all pre-modern societies used traditionalist rhetoric, but the Ottomans, who had witnessed the dazzling ascent of the Ottoman state and the stability it created, had even more reason to do so. While ordinary people such as tradesmen may not have had a profound sense of Ottoman history, they did want the convenience and order that the observance of tradition ensured. Tradition, given its frequent mention, must have meant for both the government and its subjects a method or practice that had demonstrated its success and efficiency in dealing with various affairs. This notion therefore implied that in order to maintain or restore former levels of prosperity certain “traditional” practices or methods should be revived.² It is no wonder that many of the sixteenth- and seventeenth-century reform treatises generally looked with nostalgia on classical Ottoman institutions, although exactly what was meant by tradition could differ greatly, depending on the purpose of those who discussed it.³

The goal sought by resorting to tradition was not simply to restore the past, but to redress the pressing problems of the present. After all, as Hodgson says, no traditional society can survive by simply and blindly following its customary practices because it constantly faces new challenges and crises that tradition does not provide direct answers for.⁴ Indeed, the combination of “flexibility in substance and formal adherence to the precedent” may best characterize the traditionalism of so-called traditional societies.⁵

² Fleischer, “Royal Authority,” p. 200. Among Ottoman intellectuals, Kâtip Çelebi in the mid-seventeenth century and Na’îma in the eighteenth century thought that the “decline” of the empire as they perceived it could be reversed by restoring the classical institutions of the earlier and more glorious period.

³ See Kafadar, “The Myth of the Golden Age: Ottoman Historical Consciousness in the Post-Süleymanic Era,” in İnalcık and Kafadar eds., *Süleyman the Second and His Time* (Istanbul: Isis, 1993) 42–43. Even among the proponents of tradition-minded reforms, there were at least two different groups: one of which was Ottoman *kanun*-oriented, and the other that wanted to go back to the principles of the Prophet Muhammad (*selefism*).

⁴ Hodgson, 3: 181–82.

⁵ Eric Hobsbawm and Terrence Ranger, eds. *Invention of Tradition* (Cambridge University Press, 1983) 2.

Even allowing for the possibility that Istanbul artisans and service workers may well have had some degree of serious attachment to tradition and customary practices, one should, in order to analyze elements of this "traditionalism," search beyond the surface of the conservative rhetoric that guildsmen used. Well over half of the court appeals and petitions to the central administration filed by groups of artisans and service workers base their arguments on customary arrangements.⁶ Some guilds implied that their traditions were more authentic because of their long history, as in cases where various guilds claimed that their customs could be traced back to the time of Mehmed the Conqueror.⁷ Drawing on tradition in dealing with government authorities was a well-established habit among the guildsmen. What then constituted the tradition they referred to, and what does their reference to it indicate?

In answering this abstract question, one may start with what was considered the converse of "tradition". In opposition to the concept of "tradition" was "novelty (*bid'at*),"⁸ and the latter word is usually used in negative contexts, such as novelties that contravened the religious law (*sharia*). Therefore, in some contexts the word *bid'at* can be translated even as "illegality."⁹ Although Kâtip Çelebi theorizes in his *Mîzân ü'l-Hakık* that there are both good and bad novelties,¹⁰ the mainstream understanding of "novelty" as a concept carried a negative connotation, that of "disorder (*ihtilâl*)" as opposed to orderliness. Likewise, "tradition (*âdet*)" nearly always had a positive connotation.¹¹

⁶ For example, out of 93 *sharia* court record entries containing guildsmen's collective pleas, as many as 50 refer to their customary practices.

⁷ See the examples of the straw-mat sellers (IK 9: 262b) and Yedikule tanners (Ahmed Refik, *Onbirinci*, 30–31). Those old guilds that had existed since the time of Mehmed the Conqueror and/or located in *waqf* buildings provided by him typically laid claim to monopoly over relevant raw materials. It is also likely that the association with Mehmed II furnished them with unquestionable legitimacy.

⁸ I do not translate *bid'at* as "innovation" because of its decidedly positive connotation in modern English.

⁹ Linda Darling, *Revenue-Raising and Legitimacy* (Leiden: Brill, 1996) 297.

¹⁰ Kâtip Çelebi, *Mîzân ü'l-Hakık* (Istanbul: 1280/1863) 74–76, *The Balance of Truth*, trans. G.L. Lewis, London: Allen and Unwin (1957) 89–91. Similarly, a famous seventeenth-century jurist, Khayr al-Din Ramlî, mentions both positive and negative innovations (Haim Gerber, *Islamic Law and Culture: 1600–1840* [Leiden: Brill, 1999] 97–104).

¹¹ There is an interesting case in a *kanunnâme*, which mentions that there was a harmful tradition in the markets of Edirne, but the content of the tradition is unclear from the text. "Edirne İhtisab Kanunnamesi," Ahmed Akgündüz, ed. *Osmanlı Kanunnâmeleri ve Hukûkî Tahlilleri*. 9 vols. (Istanbul: FEY Vakfı, 1990–) 2: 395. "Ve dahi içlerinde bir 'âdet var imiş ki, ana 'helke (= *heleke*)' derler imiş, andan bu halka

This, nevertheless, should not mean that the Ottomans viewed everything old as positive and everything new as negative, as this was a matter of definition and nuance. Usually, for something to be called *bid'at*, it had to be both new and against the law or social custom. By the same token, just because something had happened repeatedly in the past did not mean it had simply become a “tradition” as only old customs deemed beneficial were considered to be traditions.

It is noteworthy that in the official documents, crafts and service guilds rarely talk about tradition as a lump sum of what had been done before or what had been traditionally valued; they mostly specify concrete practices that were either for or against their age-old customs. This may well have been because the guilds’ petitions addressed the specific issues concerning them at a particular moment.¹² Their habitual references to customs when addressing the authorities focused on day-to-day decision-making about practical matters.

Guilds addressed various internal and external issues drawing on their “traditions.” Frequently, they used traditionalist arguments in dealing with disputes over the manner and route of raw material distribution,¹³ outsiders’ encroachment on their trades,¹⁴ and other peculiar business arrangements in their respective guilds, such as the shoetip-makers taking turns to work in a shop¹⁵ or the candle-makers designating who among them should supply candles to which grocer.¹⁶ As far as intra-guild affairs were concerned, traditionalist rhetoric was the most effective weapon for the petitioning guildsmen (unless their opponents succeeded in appealing to the sympathy of the authorities).

hayli zarar görünür imiş, muhtesib anı gözleye, etdirmeye.” *Helke* in Greek means a copper bucket or a cauldron (Tietze, “Griechische Lehnwörter im anatolischen Türkisch,” *Oriens* 8 [1955] 244). On the other hand, Nicoara Beldiceanu translated *helke* as “loss (*‘perte’* in French)” (*Recherche sur la ville Ottomane au XV^e siècle: étude et actes* [Paris: Librairie d’Amérique et d’Orient, 1973] 264).

¹² Guildsmen occasionally referred to tradition in a generic way. The case of the hard biscuit-makers in Galata (GK 73: 123a, dated 1061/1650–51) who wanted to introduce a *kethüdü*-ship into their guild provides a rare example in which guildsmen mentioned tradition in general. In their agreement regarding the new installation of a *kethüdü*, they required him to handle business generally according to customary practices (*mu’tād üzere*).

¹³ IK 9: 145b (tanners), 262b (straw-mat sellers), IK 7: 33b (silk dealers in the *bedestan*).

¹⁴ IK 9: 121a (Morocco leather dealers), 190b (sherbet-makers), IK 9: 113b–114a and IK 10: 104b (tanners), GK 80: 52a (caulkers and carpenters against “seamsters” *hıyyāt*).

¹⁵ GK 73: 104b and 109a, AŞ 2: 118/460.

¹⁶ IK 9: 12b, 13a, 23b, 120a, 254a.

Guilds used the same set of arguments in conflicts and negotiations over the distribution of tax burdens between related guilds. Regional branches in one trade or related guilds drew on tradition when conducting their quarrels and compromises over the distribution of the tax burden they were supposed to pay in common. Both the main guild in Istanbul and the branch/assistant guild could resort to customary practices to make their cases. For example, the *kethüüdâ* of the *helva* (a type of sweets)-makers accused the *helva*-makers of Galata and Kasımpaşa of not paying taxes together with them, even though the latter had done so before.¹⁷ Likewise, the Galata branch of the hook-makers (*kullabçılar*) rebutted the claims of the Istanbul hook-makers, who wanted the former to pay resin (*sakız*) tax together with the main guild, saying that they had been paying taxes separately in Galata since days of old up to now (*kadımden bu ana gelince*).¹⁸ To prevent future disputes like these, the locksmiths and their assistant guild of nail-makers confirmed the latter's level of contribution to the former for shovel tax (*kürek ve kazma akçesi*).¹⁹

Tradition-based arguments were also used against unsolicited interventions from the government. The barrel-makers of Istanbul and Galata directly disputed a new tax item (*tokmak akçesi* = mallet tax) imposed on them on the grounds that they "had not paid tax under the name of 'tokmak akçesi' since days of old up to then." They maintained that government functionaries were interfering in customary practices (*kadımden olgelmişe muhalif*) by introducing a *tokmak akçesi* that had been imposed elsewhere but not in Istanbul.²⁰ Probably, this tax was not created by the sultan authority nor listed in the tax registers, since the central government canceled it without hesitation. The government willingly recognized such tradition-based refusals to pay taxes even at the expense of its own functionaries' tax collection potential, although presumably the new tax could have helped relieve the tight budgetary constraints of the period to some extent as well as benefit various functionaries personally.²¹

¹⁷ GK 73: 134b (1061/1650–51).

¹⁸ GK 73: 39a (1061/1650–51).

¹⁹ IK 10: 14b.

²⁰ GK 73: 134b.

²¹ Darling, *Revenue-Raising*, Chapter IX, 281–306. As she suggests, such willingness on the part of the government to listen to the pleas of the common people at the expense of extra revenue may reflect its concern for legitimacy and fairness.

In particular, guilds at times boldly rejected officials appointed to their guilds by the government, saying that it was not their custom to receive a government-appointed official. A good example is the case of the cow butchers, who forestalled their government-appointed *kethüdā* from taking up office after he had purchased his position as a tax-farm.²² In addition, when the grocers came to the *kadi* court and complained about the newly created position of “inspector (*nāzır*),” the position may well have been a form of government intervention. According to them, a certain Receb Çelebi “somehow” (*bir tarıkle*) became an inspector of the grocers’ guild, even though there had not been any inspector in the guild “since long before.” It is hard to think of any other way through which Receb Çelebi could become an inspector if not through government connections. Following the guild’s claim that there had been no such position before, and that its creation had divided the guild into two quarreling sides, causing disorder, the *kadi* court ordered Receb to cease his involvement with the guild.²³ Even decisions made by the government could be reversed by guildsmen’s resistance based on tradition if the former lacked confirmation by higher—such as sultanic—authorities.

Like the guilds, individual artisans and service workers could rely on earlier practices in their appeals to the authorities. This was true not just for cases in which the tradition of a whole guild was concerned. The practices of individuals that had earlier been considered unproblematic could also be considered legitimate and in conformity with the existing order. Individual bakers of special white bread strenuously asserted that they had been producing it for some time when they sought an official permit from the government.²⁴ In addition, even after the candle-makers’ guild registered an agreement to the effect that none of their members should buy animal fat from the butchers of the Janissary Square (Yeniçeri Meydanı), one of its members still complained that what “used to be” his share of animal fat from the Janissary Square butchers and other slaughterhouses had disappeared following the advent of the new peddling practitioners.²⁵

Although many individuals who employed traditionalist logic suc-

²² IK 3: 86a/700. However, within two years they had a government-appointed *kethüdā*.

²³ IK 3: 25b/220.

²⁴ GK 73: 127a (1061/1650–51).

²⁵ IK 9: 170b and 184b (1072/1661–62) “peddling (*koltuk*)” and “newly introduced (*hādīs*).” The court simply recorded his claim, and what happened after is unknown.

ceeded in having their cases heard, the guilds must have had some extra advantage because their leaders had the authority to state what was and was not "tradition." The court trusted guild leaders' statements about their guild's customs unless someone directly challenged them. In many ways, guild leaders had unchecked authority regarding the internal traditions of their organizations. They were also called upon to act as third-party witnesses when a matter that did not directly concern their own but other related guilds was in dispute. Such near dominance in using traditionalist rhetoric naturally opened the door to guilds' employing and manipulating so-called traditions. Moreover, as they defined and reinterpreted traditions, guild officials also had the practical authority to judge whether their trades were in order or disorder. In their appeals the guilds typically maintained that all forms of disorder resulted (*kulli ihtilala ba'is olmuşdur*) from the violation of age-old tradition.²⁶ They implied, by saying so, that guild traditions were an antidote for disorder, which was probably a most appealing argument for seventeenth-century Ottoman authorities. From the foregoing, it seems that the guildsmen's primary concern was to secure and protect their interests rather than to maintain traditions for their own sake. Often, they allude to tradition in support of what they want, referring to concrete arrangements rather than abstract concepts. Although occasionally reinforced by government-issued documents, the effectiveness of references to customary practices is striking, given that the government almost always approved claims based on tradition. The importance of tradition for the guilds may have been more a result of its utility than its intrinsic value, as far as we can confirm from various court cases.

Here one may ask, "Was it perhaps the government itself that was the traditional party since it was the one approving most of its subjects' claims based on customs?" Some scholars would think that this was the case.²⁷ It is true that the government used and was receptive to traditionalist rhetoric, but it might also have been only practical in reality. The Ottoman state did not want any form of social disturbance, and therefore had to respect social customs. However, given the drastic reform efforts of the second half of the

²⁶ IK 9: 145b. The tanners also reinforced their "tradition" by using documents issued by the kadis (. . . hüceci-i müte'addidede mestür oldığı üzere . . .).

²⁷ Mehmed Genç, "Ottoman Industry in the Eighteenth Century," in *Manufacturing in the Ottoman Empire and Turkey, 1500–1950*, ed. Donald Quataert (Albany: SUNY Press, 1994) 59.

Ottoman period, the state must not have been as inherently traditional as many would have. Although the Ottoman *kanun* (law code) was supposedly based on tradition, the Ottomans all too often found it difficult to agree on what “tradition” itself encompassed.²⁸

The implication of the presence of a large number of legal actions won by using tradition-based arguments is that there were numerous violations of tradition-based rules. As cases about raw material distribution show, often the violators of customary rules were within the guilds themselves. In some instances such “violators” did not yield easily, but disputed and questioned the allegedly established tradition. The violators simply denied the alleged tradition rather than give what their version of it was. Although the guild authorities could usually prove their cases against the “violators,” such disputations are important because they show that “tradition” within a guild was by no means absolute or unchallengeable. For example, when the officials of the oil-makers’ (*şrugancı*) guild accused two of their members of violating the customary purchase route, the accused members claimed that what the guild authorities described as their old custom was not actually their custom at all. The case was not resolved until the head of the grocers’ guild was summoned to testify that the testimony of the oil-maker elders was true.²⁹ The violators here either had a different understanding than that of the authorities regarding what their purchasing customs were, or were defying the tradition knowingly and purposefully. Either way, tradition was not a monolithic entity.

The incompleteness and malleability of what was defined as tradition become clearer when we consider why there were repeated records of agreements outlining the same tradition: it was because serious infringements of such traditions were a constant possibility. The snow/ice dealers (*karıclar*) and sherbet-makers (*şerbetçiler*) made agreements in 1029/1619–20 and 1072/1662 to the effect that the former should not sell to groups (e.g., *koltukçular* = itinerant peddlers) other than the latter, that the snow dealers were responsible for the cost of transportation, that the sherbet-makers should not delay the payment of the snow/ice price, and that the price of snow/ice should be “such and such” an amount per load (*yük*). Basically, there is no

²⁸ Baki Tezcan, “The ‘Kanunname of Mehmed II’: A Different Perspective,” *The Great Ottoman Civilization* (Ankara, 2000) 3: 657–665.

²⁹ IK 10: 74a.

difference between the two agreements originating from the two different periods 50 years apart except for the price agreed upon. Both documents claim that the agreements were based on their traditional practices.³⁰ The recurrence of the same agreements may well indicate that "tradition" did not remain robust without some degree of reinforcement.

Additionally, "tradition" could be manipulated to serve a particular group's interests, and guilds sometimes used tradition in a very selective manner. Namely, not all of what had been done before was considered a valid guild custom. Guild members regarded only those parts of tradition that were beneficial to them as their "tradition," as is shown clearly in the following government order of the period concerning the cap-makers':

Order (*hüküm*) to the *Kadi* of Istanbul:

A group of Muslim cap-makers located near the Grand Bazaar (*Bezzazistan*) came to the imperial court and filed a petition saying, "Since there were few Muslims and many non-Muslims (*kefere tã'ifesi*) in our guild before, the *kethüdäs* have been selected from among the non-Muslims. As the Muslim members in our guild increased and became many, they did not accept being ordered about by a non-Muslim *kethüdä* considering the honor of Islam. Therefore, we have acquired a *fetwa* from the *seyhülislām* and an imperial edict to the effect that a Muslim member be appointed *kethüdä* and the non-Muslims be banned from the *kethüdä*-ship. When a Yusuf among the [Muslim] members was appointed *kethüdä*, and he was given a document [*hüccet*] from the *sharia* court, (. . .) the non-Muslims did not agree to this but had a non-Muslim *kethüdä* appointed over themselves, saying, 'We also have an Imperial order and *sharia* court documents in our hands that are different from yours.'" Reporting that they now have two *kethüdäs* in one guild, which is against what had been their customary practice (*kadimden olıgelene muhalif*), they requested an imperial order to the effect that they should have only one *kethüdä* and he should be from among the Muslims, as stated in the *fetwa* and the court document. (. . .)³¹

After consulting the old documents (*hidmet defterleri*), the *divān* court acknowledged the tradition of having only one *kethüdä*, and granted their wish that there should be one Muslim *kethüdä* for the whole guild. What is noteworthy here is that the Muslim cap-makers regarded only one part of their custom concerning *kethüdä*-ship as legitimate.

³⁰ IK 5: 40a/272, IK 10: 72a. From 56 *akçe* (1029/1619–20) to 128 *akçe* (1072/1662).

³¹ MD 92: 23/109. Ahmet Refik, *Onbirinci*, 55.

Namely, they referred to the fact that there used to be only one *kethüddā* at a time as their tradition, but not that the only *kethüddā* used to be a non-Muslim. Although there were *fetvas* and court documents involved in this case, the focus of the dispute was on the difference of opinion between the two groups over what the legitimate tradition was. In fact, there seem to have been conflicting orders and documents given to each side, although the final decision by the *divān* court was in favor of the Muslim members. The authorities seem to have simply approved what the appealing party on each occasion requested until the court was forced to decide the issue.

Since “tradition” was a very useful way of making one’s claims accepted, guilds featured it whenever they could as a way of securing legitimacy in their dealings with the authorities. The widespread use of “custom” as a rationale for their actions is therefore not surprising, as official documents sometimes revealed even distortions or loose interpretations of existing practices.³² Haim Gerber, who observed such uses of customs in seventeenth-century Bursa court records, notes that having the customs of a guild approved by the authorities was an important way of insuring guild autonomy.³³ Even though they fell short of having complete autonomy, the guilds had tremendous leverage in dealing with government authorities when relying upon their own traditions. Furthermore, depending on the context in which the guilds drew on “tradition,” the relevance reached even beyond guild autonomy, touching on inter-guild issues and on a guild’s relationship with its members.

Having said so much about guildsmen’s use of tradition, this is not to insinuate that guildsmen had a cynical, exploitive attitude toward their traditions. The oral traditions of guildsmen must have been rather malleable, naturally leading to different versions and interpretations. Therefore, even if there were some guildsmen who deliberately made false claims and knowingly distorted their traditions, most would have truthfully believed that their version of a certain tradition was valid even when it had been actually invented not so long before.³⁴

³² AŞ 2: 50/205. The *başçı* (cooks of sheep heads) guild of Istanbul claimed that a shop in Tophane was a novelty, while the shop turned out to have been a *başçı* store “since long ago.” Thereafter, the Istanbul *başçıs* were obliged to share the supply of sheepheads with the ones in Galata, Tophane and Beşiktaş.

³³ Gerber, *Bursa*, 42–45. He also shows a case of silk dyers in which they went as far as forging a tradition in order to advance their interests.

³⁴ Edward Shils, *Tradition* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981) 263–267

The general tendency to draw on tradition did not prevent guilds from introducing new practices without referring to what had been done before.³⁵ When guildsmen tried to introduce changes, they could not argue that the new institution or practice was based on their tradition. Instead, they ascribed the need for change to new circumstances, such as heavier taxation and internal disorder. Cases in point include the hard biscuit-makers of Galata and the shopkeepers in the Arab Bazaar, who decided respectively that they needed a *kethüüdā*-ship for their guilds; they probably observed that other guilds were headed by *kethüüdās*.³⁶ Additionally, the court summoners (*muḥẓırlar*) of Istanbul decided to limit member numbers to eliminate disorder and confusion caused probably by outside intruders; although it may be disputable whether this group could be compared to crafts- or service-guilds, its structure appears to have been similar.³⁷

When change was needed, what exactly could the guildsmen do? In other words, what mechanisms could guilds use to introduce change? The most salient way was to make an agreement between the members regarding certain issues, and thereby make it binding. Agreement was universally used, even if it is not always explicitly mentioned, for any kind of important decision in a guild, either to preserve certain customs or introduce new practices. Given that guilds

gives a theoretical explanation as to how a tradition diverges. "Individuals [often unconsciously] warp the prevailing combination into a form more congenial to themselves" and "most of the adherents of a tradition have a blurred apprehension of the tradition which they affirm."

³⁵ As contemporary anthropologists acknowledge, retaining traditional institutions, beliefs and values does not preclude the advent of major change. See for an example of modern India, Milton Singer, *When a Great Tradition Modernizes: An Anthropological Approach to Indian Civilization* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1972) 245–249, 298–366.

³⁶ GK 73: 123a. and GK 80: 2a. Additionally, the case of bottle-makers in GK 80: 38a seems to indicate they wanted to firmly institute *kethüüdā*-ship, which had existed before occasionally. They stated that they needed a *kethüüdā* for intermittent tax collection and other business as if their need of a *kethüüdā* was not an established fact from before. However, their candidate Marko, as it turns out later in the document, had been the *kethüüdā* of the guild previously (They had a *kethüüdā* and a *yigütbaşı* in 1650–51 (GK 73: 46b), and the *kethüüdā* at that time was the same Marko). Marko was approved and appointed by the *sharia* court, but there was internal disagreement as to whether the guild needed a *kethüüdā* (GK 80: 93b).

³⁷ IK 7: 42b. The court summoners had a *kethüüdā* as leader, and there were six divisions under him. They limited the number of members in each division claiming that there were an unknown number of "people of selfish desire" (*ehl-i garéz*, intruders?) among their ranks. They also had some people banned from working as summoners.

generally showed deep respect for traditional practices, it seems that they needed new agreements to reverse what had been done before or to introduce something new into their guilds. Many cases where guildsmen made significant alterations directly or indirectly mention agreements that resulted in such changes.

Nevertheless, not all changes in the guild system were brought about through internal agreements between guildsmen. Sometimes, disputes led to organizational restructuring, as in the example of the shagreen (= *sağrı*, raw hide with a rough surface)-makers who switched from having the tanners as their superior guild to the sword-makers (*kalaççı/seyyaf*) after conflicting with the former.³⁸ Additionally, there were changes that were beyond the control of artisans and service workers, such as government policies imposing new taxes on the guilds, or the constant intrusion of the military and of new immigrants from the countryside into the guilds. These by themselves were simply given factors that guildsmen could not reverse, but their efforts to respond to such adverse trends must have given them momentum for other changes. The introduction of the *kethüdā*-ship in some guilds as a response to the new imposition of irregular taxes is a case in point.

It is fair to say that the Istanbul guilds in the seventeenth century were not favorably disposed toward change for its own sake. One rarely comes across cases where guildsmen tried to set up explicitly new institutions or transform work practices within their guilds; on the contrary, there is a sheer abundance of references to tradition and customary practices. However, it is not proper to conclude without further investigation that the Istanbul guilds were simply conservative in nature. In a society where tradition-based rhetoric was generally accepted, one may not have wanted to advertise whatever change or innovation had been made. We know of little technological innovation happening inside the Istanbul guilds; the closest that I found was the case of a tanner who started a “dubious” practice that other tanners saw as “trickery” and prevented him from repeating.³⁹ However, we should not hastily conclude that there was no technological development. As in some medieval European guilds, there might have been technological progress⁴⁰ made in the guild

³⁸ Evliya Çelebi, ed. Gökyay, 266.

³⁹ IK 10: 108b.

⁴⁰ It is difficult even to speculate on technological developments within the guilds because the available sources do not generally reveal technological details. However, one may at least point out that Ottoman glass-makers (centered in Istanbul) before the end of the seventeenth century were quite successful at imitating European glass-

setting that the artisans did not publicize.⁴¹ There was nothing for the guildsmen to gain by spreading the word about a new technological advance when there were many potential outside competitors, including marginal military men and poor immigrants from the countryside. If there were indeed some technological developments approved within the guilds, presumably they could be used homogeneously to help elevate the technological level of their members.

Guildsmen amply used and manipulated tradition to suit their interests, while probably respecting and believing in the value of tradition. However, the importance of tradition to guildsmen did not necessarily make them averse to change. We do not know directly about guildsmen's attitudes toward changes—for example, how readily they initiated or accepted changes in their organizations—since we know only a very small part of what was going on at that time. On the other hand, some important new features of the guild system became visible over the course of the turbulent history of the early seventeenth century, which seems to showcase the flexible and adaptive aspects of the guilds. As the environment of the Istanbul guild system and its elements were changing, guilds had to adapt to new situations. In this process, tradition was not necessarily a liability but an asset for the guilds to draw on. The following section will examine these broader changes in the guild system of seventeenth-century Istanbul, namely the formation of new guilds, new types of guild members and new institutional devices.

b. *New Developments in the Guild System*

i. *New Guilds*

Did the seventeenth-century guild system have room for new guilds? Although established guilds may not have been happy about the

ware such as the Murano glass from Venice. In the early nineteenth century, there was the important development of colored and gilt glassware (*Beykoz işleri*) in Beykoz on the Asian side of Istanbul (Fuad Bayramoğlu, 38–42). See also Donald Quataert, *Ottoman Manufacturing in the Age of Industrial Revolution* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993) 109–110 for an example of a technological breakthrough in silk cloth finishing.

⁴¹ S.R. Epstein, "Guilds, Apprenticeship, and Technological Change in Pre-industrial Europe," *Journal of Economic History* 48: 3–4 (1998) 693–705. Medieval European guilds did not publicize their technological breakthroughs since there was no motivation to do so; patent rights did not yet exist.

emergence of new guilds if there was a potential conflict of interest, and sometimes did try to ban their perceived rivals, there is no indication that the government or the guilds necessarily blocked the formation of new organizations. Although conventional scholarship on the Ottoman guilds never denied the possibility of new guilds emerging, it failed to highlight the existence of newly formed guilds at various intervals. The question as to whether new guilds appeared over time remained an untreated issue, while the common image of the unchanging guild system continued.

To determine whether a guild (*tāʿīfe*) was newly created or not, however, is not an easy task. The documents my research covered did not reveal a single case detailing the beginning of a new guild or the government's official recognition of a guild that had existed hitherto unofficially.⁴² However, we may conjecture from circumstantial evidence, such as the lists of trades in government registers, that new guilds were forming. There were always more trades than there were guilds, and some of the former made their way into the sphere of the latter. The formation of guilds would have not happened at a single moment but would have occurred over a long period of time that comprised at least two phases: first, the actual formation of the physical organization; second, the official recognition of the organization by the authorities. Recognition itself did not involve a charter, though it did entail official recognition of leadership positions via a diploma (*berāt*) and the detailing of certain privileges in return for service to the government. Official recognition does not appear to have been crucial in the formation of a new guild. Lack of recognition did not prevent an artisan group from doing business or acting collectively in court, although it may have been at a disadvantage in relation to an established guild. To make matters more ambiguous, even if a group of artisans formed a new organization, had their leader officially recognized and the tax burden settled, it is difficult to know the precise boundaries of the guild, given the existence of various regional branches in one trade and the possible rearrangement of relationships among them.⁴³ The ambi-

⁴² On the other hand, Gibb and Bowen (*Islamic Society and the West*, 291) mention that the tobacco dealers' guild was newly recognized in 1725, although it had unofficially existed for many years already.

⁴³ MD 81: 178/394 (1017/1608–1609). The candle-makers' guild of Edirnekapi and Yedikule made a complaint against groups of candle-makers in Galata, Üsküdar and Hasköy saying that their *kethüdā* used to be the *kethüdā* of all candle-makers, including the aforementioned groups, but the others had become more independent of late.

guity of words such as *tā'ife* and *hırfet* does not help make the picture any clearer. Even the ethno-religious subgroups in one guild were sometimes called *tā'ife*, as in the case of the cap-makers mentioned in the previous section.⁴⁴

In addition to all this, there is the further question of whether new trades were being created alongside new groups of guilds within existing trades. The start of a new trade is never clearly articulated, but we can detect some guilds that specialized in hitherto unheard of commodities based on an examination of the lists of guilds at various times in and around the seventeenth century. Although we may not be absolutely certain whether these guilds represented the creation of new trades, because their specialties could have existed before as commodities, there are examples of completely new items such as coffee⁴⁵ and tobacco⁴⁶ that soon instigated the formation of separate dealer groups and, eventually, of guilds. There is also no indication that new trades or guilds faced any obstruction whatsoever, especially if they did not pose a threat to the interests of the existing guild system.

There are good reasons to surmise that new craft and service guilds were forming throughout the seventeenth century. First, the population of Istanbul was growing rapidly due to the influx of people fleeing the early seventeenth-century Celali rebellions and ensuing disorder in the countryside. Secondly, the demand for everyday commodities must have increased too rapidly for the size and geographic concentration of the established guilds to meet appropriately, although the guilds may not have wanted to share their privileges with groups sprouting outside their original boundaries.⁴⁷ Lastly, immigrants from the countryside and various military elements looking for employment in the marketplace sometimes formed new groups themselves as well as penetrated the established guilds.

⁴⁴ Ahmet Refik, *Ombirinci*, 55.

⁴⁵ Ralph Hattox, *Coffee and Coffeehouses* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1988, c1985) 28. Coffee reached Istanbul in the mid-sixteenth century.

⁴⁶ V.G. Kiernan, *Tobacco: A History* (London: Hutchinson Radius, 1991) 21. The Spaniards brought tobacco to the Old World only in the mid-sixteenth century. It reached the Ottoman Empire in 1601 (*Tārīh-i Peçevi* as cited in Bernard Lewis, *Muslim Discovery of Europe* [New York: W.W. Norton, 1982] 196). Tobacco dealers, however, do not appear in the court records that I covered, probably because of the tobacco bans in effect.

⁴⁷ For example, the saddle-makers in Saraçhane tried to ban other saddle-makers. Uluçay, "İstanbul Saraçhanesi," 151-54.

Examining the *ih̄tisāb* law codes and price registers (*narh defterleri*) of the period gives us the impression that there were new guilds emerging and existing guilds disappearing. These were compiled for the purpose of price and other regulations and presumably reflect the understanding of the composition of the Istanbul guilds by the government. Since the formats of the law codes are quite regular, they are very useful for observing the overall increase in the number of Istanbul guilds. There were more than 30 guilds mentioned in 1501, about 74 under Süleyman the Magnificent (r. 1520–1566) and about 76 under Ahmed I (r. 1603–1617) (see Appendix A). Among the last two, while the numbers of entries are very close to one another, the guilds included in the former did not always get included in the latter. It is interesting to note that in the price register of 1525, only bakers and butchers were listed as guilds with prices of bread and meat items under them while all the other items given official prices were listed only as commodity items without any reference to the guilds responsible for their preparation.⁴⁸ The format of the 1525 register seems to imply the fact that the bakers and butchers were more organized than other groups at that time, probably because of state pressure to ensure the provisioning of the city. Additionally, in comparing the official price lists of 1600 and 1640,⁴⁹ an interesting difference between the listed guilds (i.e., those listed as groups of people rather than commodities) can be discerned from the two registers. About half of the “guilds” listed in the 1640 register are not found among those of 1600, and not all of those listed in 1600 were present in 1640, while the number of listed guilds increased over time. This discrepancy, however, may not mean that formerly existing trades totally disappeared and completely new ones mushroomed, since the produced items tended to make their way into the price registers even when the relevant guild did not. Rather, it shows that the organization of guilds in the eyes of public authorities differed between 1600 and 1640, and that may very well be a result of the malleability and unclear boundaries of the guilds (see Appendix A).

In connection with this, a list given in the registers concerning the taxes imposed on artisans and service workers in the late sev-

⁴⁸ Sahilliođlu, “Osmanlılarda Narh Müessesesi ve 1525 Yılı Sonunda İstanbul’da Fiyatlar,” *Belgelerle Türk Tarihi Dergisi* 1–2 (1967) 56.

⁴⁹ Here I counted only those that were recorded as groups and not those that were indicated by their commodities alone. These price registers do not list guilds that supplied food as groups, which distorts the picture greatly.

enteenth century is of particular interest (see Appendix E). The list includes 62 trade groups (*hırfet*), and the title of the list reads: "[These are] novelties created recently and were abolished with the imperial edict" (*Soñradan iħdās olunup bā fermān-i ʿālī refʿ olunan bidʿatlardır ki*). Taken at face value, this suggests that there were some new guilds created but soon abolished because they were unwelcome "novelties" (*bidʿat*). However, in the context of the *iħtisāb* tax registers, it seems to indicate only that these were guilds from which *iħtisāb* officials had been improperly collecting dues, against the prescription of the *iħtisāb* tax register.⁵⁰ Therefore, the 62 guilds were not newly created per se. The guilds were neither illegal novelties, nor were they abolished by the government. What was abolished during this time was the practice of groundlessly collecting *iħtisāb* taxes and unlawful dues from them. What this list provides for our purposes is evidence of a mixed set of variegated guilds that existed by 1682. They share no clear characteristics except for the fact that *iħtisāb* officials had been collecting dues illicitly from them.

The list seems to be rather unorganized, mixing various categories: some trades seem to have been fairly well established by the early seventeenth century or even before (e.g., chicken-sellers, cooks, pastry-makers, cauldron-makers, broadcloth-makers, shoemakers), often appearing in official documents such as the *kanunnāmes* or *kadi* court records, while some others are obscure. Most of the listings refer to single trades, though some include two related trades as one group. Additionally, the list sometimes mentions the trades by how the craftsmen/servicemen were called, and occasionally by the commodities they traded. While a few of those listed seem to have been a rather broad definition of the trade, most of them were divided according to their specialty, regional basis and religious affiliation. This, indeed, is a typical example of the guild lists one would come across in a price register or tax register of the seventeenth century. Probably, it reflects the different degrees of organization among groups of artisans and service workers.

Although we do not know exactly why the listed groups were exempt from *iħtisāb* taxes, as they may well have been subject to other urban taxes, we may assume that these listed groups fall into

⁵⁰ AK, MC, B. 2: 19a–b, KK 2056: pp. 17–18. Bab-ı Defteri 25386: pp. 16–17. "Bu zikr olunan altmış iki nevʿ ehl-i hırfet üzerlerine defter-i ʿatıķ de bir akçe kayıd olunmamış iken iħtisāb ağası olanlar iħdās eyledükleri bidʿatlar . . ."

two categories. The already established guilds whose existence is confirmed in the early seventeenth century or before must have been exempt from the *ih̄tisāb* taxes through specific arrangements with government authorities, and this must be the reason for them not having been registered in the previous *ih̄tisāb* register. On the other hand, there are a few relatively new guilds in the list that may not have existed when the previous register was compiled. For example, some of the listed groups were not mentioned in the description of a guild parade (1048/1638) in the travelogue of Evliya Çelebi. The sheer volume of his account makes one doubt the possibility of him omitting any guild known at that time.⁵¹ So, if some guilds were not found in Evliya's account but were noted in later records, this seems to indicate that such guilds were of recent emergence or had gained recognition over the intervening period. Several of the 62 groups⁵² registered in the *ih̄tisāb defteri* (1092/1681–2) were apparently not known to Evliya Çelebi. Based on these data, it becomes apparent that there were new guilds being added to the guild system on an ongoing basis. As to the new additions to the existing guilds, the government does not seem to have been in principle opposed.

The basic attitude of the government was not against the formation of new craft/service groups in Istanbul. The government might take a negative attitude toward the new groups because of petitions from the established guilds against them, but it did not seem to have been intrinsically opposed to the creation of new artisan groups. For example, in 1017/1608, a group of poor tailors who had come from outside the city (*etrafından geliip*) petitioned the sultan, claiming that the established (*oturak*) guild of tailors wanted to have them banned even though they did not intrude into the realm of the guild. The government ordered the *kadi* of Istanbul to investigate the case, question the *kethüdā* of the Grand Bazaar (*Bezzazistan*) and other experts, and prevent the guild from obstructing the poor tailors' business if indeed they did no harm to the established tailors.⁵³ Thus, the gov-

⁵¹ There is naturally a possibility that some guilds did not participate in the procession. However, Evliya's account of the guilds clearly aimed at giving a comprehensive list of the existing guilds in Istanbul. Probably, he enumerated all the guilds he knew about by using the opportunity of describing the parade.

⁵² Such as *lahmacuncuyan*, *şerriyyeciyan*, *Mekki sabuncuyan*, *kavurılmış kestane ve fındıkçıyan*, *balıkçıyan-i kalıç*, *balıkçıyan-i kalkan*, and *limoncuyan*. This indicates the formation of new specialties that were not mentioned in Evliya's time (1638).

⁵³ MD 81: 189/421.

ernment was not in principle averse to the creation of new artisan groups as long as they did not pose a threat to the established market order. It was usually the established guilds whose immediate interests required that they prevent the formation of new guilds by petitioning the government to ban such groups. A passage in the *kanunnāme* dating from Ahmed I's time (r. 1603–17) further corroborates the permissive position of the government. In the section about "craftsmen and their penalties," after listing more than 70 groups of artisans and servicemen and specific regulations regarding them, it states, "God the Blessed and Exalted created all the others that are not listed here. It is ordered that the *muhtesib* (= *ihtisāb ağası*) should supervise all of them as well" (emphasis mine).⁵⁴ It would seem that the government cared little about the guilds other than those that were so important to the daily life of the city as to be listed in price registers or law codes. The expression that "God created all of them" indicates that the government basically approved the existence of all other guilds or business groups, and this therefore implies, indirectly, the authorities' openness toward new guilds.

Not only did the government accept new guilds, but some royal *waqfs* also established a basis for creating guilds. For example, the *waqf* of *Valide Sultan* (queen mother) Nur Banu in Üsküdar, which was created in the late sixteenth century, included a tannery that accommodated a new group of tanners.⁵⁵ This new group of tanners came into conflict with existing tanner groups in Yedikule and Kasımpaşa over raw material supplies. Although the authorities handed down a judgment in favor of one side each time there was a conflict, in the long run they do not seem to have totally sided with one or completely outcast another⁵⁶ (see Chapter IV for examples of conflicting petitions filed by different groups of tanners).

Government control over the guilds in the eighteenth century and after seems to have been much more rigid than that of the seventeenth century. Policies regarding the guilds included binding guild members with mutual surety (*kefalet*) and expelling those who came

⁵⁴ Akgündüz, ed. *Osmanlı Kanunnameleri*, 9: 533. "Fi'l-cümle bu zıkr olandan gayri Hakk tebâreke ve te'âlâ yaratmıştır, mecmû'un muhtesib görüp gözetmesine hükm-i şerîf vârid olmuştur."

⁵⁵ Ahmed Refik, *Onuncu*, 115. Murad III's edict in 1575 designates some sources of raw hides in and around Istanbul for the Üsküdar tannery.

⁵⁶ AŞ 3: 56–57/185 and 57/186.

from the provinces recently. This must be related to the uncontrollable increase in the population of Istanbul due to the influx from the countryside over the century.⁵⁷ However, even the intensified state control of later centuries may not indicate that the state opposed the emergence of new guilds from existing ones or from the Istanbul population. As can be seen, during the early to middle part of the seventeenth century the government was not at all opposed to the creation of new guilds, and this stance must have provided the chance for new groups to become established.

The majority of the new guilds, as far as can be observed, were mostly regional offshoots of an existing trade, religiously divided subgroups, and extremely specialized groups dealing in certain commodities. One may think on this basis that even if there were new guilds forming, they were not truly innovative, but it is too early to draw such a conclusion. Clearly, there is much left unsaid in the sources about the new guilds in the seventeenth century. We should not think that the names of new guilds defined their business activities precisely. It is unlikely that most of the new guilds did only what their names indicated: selling spinach, selling lemons, or fishing for swordfish, for example. They must have handled other commodities as well, as in the case of the *boza*-makers, who also specialized in liver kebabs.⁵⁸ In addition, completely new specializations, such as coffee and tobacco, appeared. The only important observation we can make at this point is that there was room for new guilds to emerge, if only the resistance of the established guilds could be forestalled.

ii. *New Members*

In the first half of the seventeenth century, new elements could be found in the guilds: military personnel, such as janissaries, and immigrants from the countryside. The exact scale of this influx of outsiders is beyond our knowledge, but the sheer quantity of documents that mentioned the military element or immigrants shows it was a widespread phenomenon affecting the established guild order.

Istanbul court records had a long hiatus between the 1610s and 1660s, and the military presence in the guilds grew strikingly during this period. While we see people with military titles (most com-

⁵⁷ Aktepe, *Patrona İsyani*, 24–30.

⁵⁸ See Chapter II, section c.

monly, *beşe* and *beğ*) only occasionally associated with the guilds in documents from the 1610s,⁵⁹ many of the group appeals by guildsmen in the 1660s included the names of military personnel among those who appealed. In addition, by mid-century, many people with military titles in individual lawsuit cases were mentioned as being members of guilds (. . . *ṭāʿifēsinden*). As far as we can confirm from the documents, 18 out of the 37 guilds that appealed collectively in court in the 1660s had military members. From the multitude of such guilds, we can roughly fathom the widespread nature of janissary⁶⁰ infiltration into the guilds.

That there were guild members who had military titles could indicate either of the following: (a) that some janissaries entered the guilds and functioned as guild members; or (b) that some craftsmen joined the janissary corps but still depended on their guild status for their livelihood (see aforementioned *Koçi Bey Risalesi*, 50–51). In reality, both (a) and (b) happened, and there were reasons for the two sides to seek affiliation with the other.⁶¹ Indeed, while the janissaries needed extra income to make ends meet, craftsmen/service workers in the guilds would have appreciated the protection and tax-exemption that a connection with the military could give them. It is difficult to know which direction of movement was more voluminous because it is almost impossible to know the provenance of a tradesman with a military title. Despite this, it is assumed here that a substantial number of guildsmen with such titles originated from the military sector. The janissaries, despite their military success in the course of Ottoman territorial expansion, were in deep distress by the late sixteenth century. Changes in warfare and technology demanded more and more of them in times of war, but to maintain such large

⁵⁹ There are five examples out of 27 groups from the early seventeenth century (1612–19): lathe-operators (*çukrukçular*, IK 3: 25b/221), two shoemaker (*ḥaffāf*) groups respectively in an arcade in Karaman-i Kebir and in another near the mosque of Sultan Ahmed I (both mentioned in IK 3: 35a/298), snow/ice dealers (*karcılar*, IK 5: 40a/272) and horse-cart drivers (*at arabacılar*, IK 5: 52b/370).

⁶⁰ From here on, unless otherwise specified, I will use "janissaries" as an umbrella term representing all the military elements that penetrated into the guilds since they were the best-known of the urban military sector and were seen to be particularly connected to crafts/service guilds.

⁶¹ Kafadar, "Yeniçeri-Esnaf Relations," 80–81, 101. A similar two-way movement between the soldiers and tradesmen in Cairo starting as early as in the late sixteenth century (ca. 1577) is observed by André Raymond in "Soldiers in Trade: The Case of Ottoman Cairo," *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 18–1 (1991).

numbers of soldiers on a salary basis during peacetime was a great burden on the state's finances. Therefore, short of financial resources in the aftermath of the long and draining wars of the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries against the Habsburgs (1593–1606), Safavid Iran (1603–1639), and the Celali revolts in the countryside (1596–1609), the government resorted to coin debasement and occasional layoffs to manage the bloated janissary population. Although janissaries sometimes resisted these measures by staging revolts, which all too often endangered the lives of government dignitaries, their economic situation did not improve. Such rebellions only reinforced the status of the high-ranking janissary officers as political power brokers. Overall, the livelihood of a rank-and-file janissary was by no means stable in the first half of the seventeenth century.⁶²

The increase in the number of janissaries aside from other military units and the rate of coin debasement from the late sixteenth century to the early seventeenth century show dramatic fluctuations. The size of the janissary corps remained stable in the fifteenth century at around 10,000 to 12,000. Their numbers started to grow during the reign of Süleyman the Magnificent, reaching 13,357 in 1560. Upon the enthronement of Murad III (1574) the janissaries were 13,599 strong, and in 1595 the number almost doubled to more than 26,000. Three years later there were 35,000, and at the end of the Celali revolts in the countryside (1609) the figure stood at 37,627. In addition, the rebellion of Abaza Mehmed Paşa under the rallying cry of avenging the death of Osman II, who had been slain by janissaries in 1622, forced many janissaries to flee from the outer provinces of Anatolia, which further intensified the concentration of troops in Istanbul.⁶³ The number given in Koçi Bey's reform treatise dedicated to Murad IV (r. 1623–40) is as large as 46,113.⁶⁴ This number was drastically slashed to 17,000 in the early years of Ibrahim the Mad (r. 1640–48), but soon crept up again for the Cretan campaigns. During the war against Venice in 1653, their

⁶² According to Ömer Lütfi Barkan, the real value of the average salary of janissaries paid in silver *aķe* plunged from 34.38 *altın* of 1581–2 to 20.73 (or 11.05 when the market rate was applied) in 1669–70, and that of *sipahis* went down from 99.21 *altın* to 41.14 (21.93 with the market rate) over the same period. ("The Price Revolution of the Sixteenth Century: A Turning Point in the Economic History of the Near East," *IJMES* 6 (1975) 19.)

⁶³ *Tārīḫ-i Peçevi* (Istanbul, 1281–83/1864–66) 2: 391.

⁶⁴ Yılmaz Kurt, ed. *Koçi Bey Risalesi* (Ankara: Ecdad, 1994) 44 (Ottoman), 52 (translation).

numbers reached a new high of 55,000, and after the suppression of Kara Murad Paşa's janissary rebellion (1655), there were more than 80,000. However, the government was able to cut down their number again to 39,078 in 1663—though if retirees were included their actual size bloats to 54,000.⁶⁵

However, these figures are not an exact representation of janissary expansion. These numbers are mostly based on the payroll registers, so the irregular affiliates (e.g., *mülazımlar* and *taslakçılar*) who did not receive a regular salary were not counted, although their numbers were on the rise as well.⁶⁶ Additionally, since the janissary units were greatly interested in maximizing their incomes to the fullest extent possible, the number of men they recorded in the register tended to be exaggerated. Allegedly, even the janissary *ağa* (*yenîçeri ağası*) did not know how many janissary soldiers there were at any given time, because the register of each barracks (*ocak*) was incorrect, and the real numbers were kept secret even from senior officers.⁶⁷ It is beyond doubt, however, that the janissaries greatly increased in number, while the real wages they received from the state fell. Stationed in major Ottoman cities, the janissaries became an increasingly ineffective battle formation, swelled as their ranks were by non-combatants. The state began to view them as troublemakers rather than as loyal servants of the sultan, as the rumors about Osman II (1618–22)'s aborted plan to replace them with a new army demonstrate—although this situation ended in his deposition and murder.

Inflation caused by coin debasement constituted another factor that further antagonized the janissaries. The janissaries earned a fixed cash salary that was bound to subject them to economic harm in times of inflation. Coin debasement continued throughout the early seventeenth century, and there was mild but constant inflation between

⁶⁵ Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Devleti Teşkilâtından Kapıkulu Ocakları I: Acemi Ocağı ve Yeniçeri Ocağı* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1988) 611–16.

⁶⁶ Some of the new affiliates must have come from the trades. In his reform treatise Koçi Bey (*Koçi Bey Risalesi*, 57) enumerates the new elements that adulterated the janissary troops, including *katırcılar* (muleteers), *deveciler* (camel-drivers), *hammallar* (porters) and *ağdacılar* (thick-syrup makers). *Acemi oğlanları* (janissary novices) filed a petition (ca. 1649) saying that grocers and porters were becoming janissaries in return for bribes while the janissary novices did not get the chance to be promoted to regular janissary positions (Na'ima, 4: 418).

⁶⁷ See Uzunçarşılı, *Kapıkulu Ocakları*, 619–20, whose source is d'Ohsson's eighteenth-century account.

1630 and 1680.⁶⁸ According to Barkan, the exchange value of 1 *altın* (gold coin) was between 120 and 130 *akçe* from 1611 to 1618, but subsequently became 180 (1626–29), 200 (1640–41/1630–32), 220 (1642–44/1632–35), 240 (1646–48/1636–38) and 250 *akçe* (1638–40).⁶⁹

Therefore, with such constantly deteriorating prospects to earn a livelihood, janissaries naturally had to find work outside the barracks. Those who joined up as candidates (*mülazımlar*) were often in an especially difficult position as they had to earn their living somewhere else until they became official soldiers receiving a regular salary.⁷⁰ For them, the easiest solution at hand was to pick up a trade and work in the marketplace, since some forms of business did not require a high level of skills or large amounts of capital to engage in. Some of the janissaries were even trained in workshops under the surveillance of the janissary *ağa* and had some craft skills that may have facilitated their intrusion into the wider marketplace.⁷¹ Others might have bullied tradesmen into forming partnerships and sharing profits, as their Cairene counterparts often did.⁷² In addition, some janissaries illicitly engaged in commerce, such as importing firewood from outside Istanbul, by exploiting their military connections and networks.⁷³

The janissaries' occasional involvement in the marketplace was not a new phenomenon in the seventeenth century: there are imperial edicts to the effect that janissaries should not engage in commerce and other civilian trades dating from the late sixteenth century. In 1584, an order was issued decreeing that janissaries and other military elements such as the *acemi oğlanları* (janissary novices), *cebeciler* (armorers) and *topçular* (artillerymen) should not interfere with what was the job of the people of the marketplace: keeping shops and engaging in commerce. Their commercial activities were all the more problematic because they often violated the established norms of the market, especially regarding fixed prices and supply arrangements. The words of the edict expressed strong disapproval of such inter-

⁶⁸ Mantran, "Politique, économie et monnaie dans l'empire Ottoman au XVII^{ème} siècle," 125.

⁶⁹ Barkan, "XVI. Asrın İkinci Yarısında Türkiye'de Fiyat Hareketleri," *Belleten* 34/136, (1970) 576–77.

⁷⁰ Uzunçarşılı, *Kapıkulu Ocakları*, 1: 620.

⁷¹ Uzunçarşılı, *Kapıkulu Ocakları*, 1: 400–402.

⁷² Raymond, "Soldiers in Trade," 18.

⁷³ As early as 1575 there was a case in which *acemi oğlanları* imported firewood into Istanbul while not respecting the price ceiling. Ahmed Refik, *Onuncu*, 113–14.

ference and in principle banned it, but in the end the punishment of violators was entrusted to the officers of the military corps, which was of dubious efficacy considering that the officers themselves did not shy away from exploiting commercial opportunities.⁷⁴ Another edict declared three years later (1587) had a different tone. It was issued in response to a complaint from some craftsmen that military elements in the marketplace were less than cooperative when there were state demands for services. The military, although engaging in commercial activities, still claimed tax privileges and threatened other craftsmen with acts of violence. The government's reaction to this was not that the military should go back to their original duties as soldiers, but that they should comply with the norms and traditions of the craftsmen.⁷⁵ It is possible that by this stage the authorities realized that it was unrealistic to ban the urban military's economic activities altogether. On the other hand, janissaries and other military elements in the late sixteenth century seem to have remained consciously distant from the guild system, since they claimed military privileges and refused to share the same humble duties as the men of the marketplace.

In the seventeenth century, however, as the janissaries and the guilds increasingly intermingled with each other, such distinctions in the marketplace were no longer apparent. Being an outside element, the janissaries may have had difficulties in assimilating into the guilds at first,⁷⁶ but after a while janissaries in the marketplace became an irreversible *fait accompli* (although there were occasional complaints about individual janissary guildsmen causing disorder). They had, in a sense, become a normalized part of everyday guild life. Some janissaries kept on engaging in illicit businesses outside the realm of the regular guilds, using their own networks and connections, and a number of high-ranking officers actively sponsored such enterprises.⁷⁷

⁷⁴ Ahmed Refik, *Onuncu*, 130–131.

⁷⁵ Ahmed Refik, *Onuncu*, 134–135. Interestingly, the organization that appealed to the *divân* was a very mixed group of artisans, including lamp-makers (*çırakçılar*), metal workers (*dökmeçiler*), smallware-sellers (*hurdacılar*), bronze (*tac*) workers, brass (*pirinç*) workers, and copper (*bakır*) workers which had one *kethüdâ* and one *yiğitbaşı*.

⁷⁶ It must have been easier for janissaries to associate with poor artisans and service workers outside the guild system because there was little barrier regarding membership and duties to fulfill. See Kafadar, "Yeniçeri-Esnaf Relations," Chapter IV, 81–85.

⁷⁷ See Barkan, "Tereke Defteri," *Belgeler* 3:5–6 (1966) Chapter VI, "Askeri Sınıf Mensuplarının Ticaret ve Sanâyi ile İlgileri," which provides ample examples of janissaries in business who lived in Edirne.

Many individual janissaries in trades, however, do not seem to have felt the need to form groups completely separate from the regular guilds. On the contrary, they needed to be a part of the guilds if they wanted stable and legitimate jobs. The guilds, for their part, did not anymore categorically accuse the janissaries of being a group disrupting order in the marketplace.

Although at times the intrusions of the military sector offended some guilds, complaints from guilds between 1612 and 1619 were mostly about specific violations of their rules on the qualifications for opening shops, and not about the kind of people who were intruding into their trade. For example, although the chicken-sellers complained about a certain Mehmed Beşe (the title indicates his military status) opening a chicken store without the knowledge of the guild,⁷⁸ and the water-carriers without mounts (*arka saka*) accused Ramazan Çavuş and Mustafa Ağa of having their slaves commercially deliver water,⁷⁹ the reason for the complaints was not that they were members of the military but that they were intruding without permission. In addition, a few guilds listed military members—aside from guild leaders with military titles, who most likely had been appointed by the government—when they were appealing in court, which indicates that guilds were willing to accept military-turned-new-members as long as they obeyed the customs and regulations of the guilds. By this period, some of the military elements in the guilds seem to have begun identifying their own interests with those of the guild they were in, and were as active as other, regular guildsmen in the guilds' petitions and appeals to the authorities. The guilds that revealed their military members when appealing in the *kadi* court between 1612 and 1619 are the lathe-operators (*çıkırkçular*),⁸⁰ the shoemakers/sellers of Istanbul and the arcade in Karaman-i Kebir,⁸¹ the snow/ice-dealers,⁸² and the horse-cart drivers.⁸³ What is interesting is that there

⁷⁸ IK 6: 25b.

⁷⁹ IK 5: 75a. *Çavuş* and *Ağa* also identify these individuals as military people.

⁸⁰ IK 3: 25b/221 (1027/1617–18) one *beşe* and two *beğs* including the *kethüdā* out of six named petitioners.

⁸¹ IK 3: 35a/298 (1027/1617–18) including one *beğ* out of three named members of Istanbul shoemakers and three *beğs* and one *çavuş* out of seven named members of shoemakers in Karaman-i Kebir arcades.

⁸² IK 5: 40a/272 (1029/1619–20) two *beğs* including the *kethüdā* among five members.

⁸³ IK 5: 52b/370 (1029/1619–20) four *beğs* including the *kethüdā* among seven members.

were more *beğs* than rank-and-file *beşes* among the mentioned guild members. In fact, there was only one *beşe* listed, aside from the aforementioned Mehmed Beşe who unsuccessfully attempted to open a chicken store and therefore may not count as a true guildsman.

When comparing the 1610s and 1660s, we can see that janissary-guild intermingling had expanded greatly over the 50-year period. By the middle of the century, among the 37 guilds that appealed as groups found in Istanbul court registers numbers 7 to 10, in which the names and titles of the members are indicated, 18 had military elements.⁸⁴ Moreover, when we count individuals with both military titles and guild affiliations who came to court for various personal and business reasons, the number of guilds with military members increases further.⁸⁵ Since the court records rarely enumerate all the members who came to court, they only partially reveal the intermingling of janissaries and tradesmen. Most of the military members had the title of *beşe*, whereas occasionally *beğ* or *çorbacı*⁸⁶ is also found. Since *beşe* was the lowest rank among the regular janissaries, this seems to indicate a diffusion of ordinary janissaries into an increasingly broad range of guilds.⁸⁷ Meanwhile, it is unlikely that the janissaries renounced their military network altogether. There are some guilds that showed exceptionally high proportions of military elements, such as the cooks of sheep feet (*paşacılar*: four *beşes* and two *beğs* out of 10 members), cooks/kebab-sellers (*aşçılar/kebabçılar*: three *beşes* and one *beğ* out of six) and *boza* (fermented millet drink)-makers (five *beşes* out of eight), but even in such cases, there were civilian

⁸⁴ The 1660s-guilds with military elements listed as their members in their appeals to the *kadi* are as follows: gunlock (*tabanca kilit*)-makers, linen-weavers (*kettancılar*), bakers (*ekmekçiler*), knife-makers (*bıçakçılar*), smallware-sellers (*hurdeciler*), sherbet-makers (*şerbetçiler*), felt-makers (*keşeciler*), rice-dealers (*princçiler*), round cake-makers (*görekçiler*), launderers (*çameşnylar*), starch-makers (*nişasteciler*), cooks of sheep feet (*paşacılar*), oil-makers (*şrugancılar*), kebab-makers and cooks (*kebabçılar/aşçılar*), sellers of fermented millet drink (*bozacılar*), tanners (*debbagılar*) shoetip-makers (*na'lıacılar*), and quilted turban-makers (*kavukçular*).

⁸⁵ There were individual janissary members among glass-makers (IK 9: 51a), butchers (IK 8: 31a, IK 9: 166a), boatmen (*peremeciler*, GK 73: 125b), coal-dealers (*kömürcüler*, IK 9: 192b), flour-sellers (*uncular*, IK 9: 206a), grocers (*bakkallar*, IK 9: 217b), transporters (*navluncular*, IK9: 105a), timber-merchants (*keresteciler*, IK 10: 71a), and gunstock-makers (*kundakçılar*, IK 10: 36b).

⁸⁶ IK 9: 145b. The tanners were a motley group that included a *çorbacı*, *seyyids* and *beşes*.

⁸⁷ One should also consider movement in the opposite direction. Namely, the abundance of *beşes* in various guilds may partially indicate a tradesmen's acquisition of the lowest military rank.

members along with janissaries. These examples from the 1660s and the horse-cart drivers, who had a high proportion of military elements in the 1610s but do not have follow-up records from the 1660s, were mainly service guilds that did not require greatly refined skills. It must have been easier for military elements to engage in some of the service trades, and they were able to enter approximately half of the guilds in the sample of court records used in this study.

Furthermore, the janissaries did not remain a superficially annexed part of the guild system; their penetration was much more successful and organic. To be mentioned by name in court appeal cases indicates that they were not just regular members, but distinguished members of the guilds such as elders (*ih̄tiyār̄lar*) or powerful masters (*ustalar*). The delegations of some guilds clearly included military members who were their elders.⁸⁸ The janissaries became an organic part of many guilds, and by the middle of the seventeenth century this was an irreversible fact of Istanbul life.

The existence of janissaries in the guilds, however, was a very complex phenomenon. Whereas individuals with military titles were accepted as regular members in most guilds, it is unclear whether they were a welcome addition. It is also difficult to resolve whether the janissary elements in the guilds retained an active connection to the military sector proper, although some seem to have been closely related to high-ranking officers.⁸⁹ One thing certain is that the janissaries in the marketplace cannot be seen as a united group. There were factions among the janissaries along unit and barracks' lines, and they seem to have engaged in large-scale enterprises using their networks and privileges,⁹⁰ while as mentioned above there were individual janissaries who sought work inside or outside the guild system.

In many ways, the presence of janissary members in the guilds does not follow a uniform pattern. In cases where janissary members were guild elders or officers, or claimed their right to a share of raw materials,⁹¹ they do not appear different from civilian mem-

⁸⁸ IK 8: 27b (*kettancılar*: linen weavers), IK 9: 125b (*hurdeciler*: smallware-dealers), and IK 9: 249 a (*pirinççiler*: This could mean either rice-sellers or brass workers). If some of these guild elders were originally guildsmen who later acquired military titles, it would also indicate the importance of military connections for the guilds.

⁸⁹ AŞ 2: 74/301. (Some restaurants serving sheep heads were owned by the *kapucu başı* at the palace).

⁹⁰ Barkan, "Price Revolution," 23–24.

⁹¹ IK 9: 70a.

bers of the same guilds. In such cases, they advocated the "age-old" traditions and regulations of the guilds, on which they based their arguments. However, other janissaries in the guilds were unruly, disobedient and even violent. The master gunstock-maker (*kundakçı*) who was sued because he had wanted to charge more money than he was entitled to from his apprentice was himself a *beşe*.⁹² So was the shoetip-maker who opened his shop against his guild's rule about *gedik*.⁹³ A *navluncu* (transporter) *beşe* bought a large amount of wheat from the manager of a farm illicitly without the knowledge of the farm owner.⁹⁴ Additionally, one of the three *çörek*-makers who violated the production standard was a *beşe*. This last example is a case in point because there was another *beşe* among the elders who accused him.⁹⁵ Namely, military elements in the same guilds did not necessarily cooperate. Sometimes they committed not only business malpractice but also engaged in violence. For example, in one assault case a janissary-cum-craftsman injured somebody in the marketplace, although the victim was not a member of his own guild.⁹⁶

In general, janissaries in the seventeenth century were considered to be of dubious moral repute. Some of them did not mind having close business relationships with tavernkeepers,⁹⁷ and others committed felonies such as robbery⁹⁸ and capturing and selling Muslim women as slaves.⁹⁹ The porters' guild complained that the military confiscated their horses, an important means of their livelihood, for military messenger work.¹⁰⁰ There are also a handful of assault cases involving janissaries who were not identified as guildsmen.¹⁰¹ With this kind of behavior, the general impression of janissaries could not

⁹² IK 10: 36b.

⁹³ IK 9: 189a (*na'lçacılar*/shoetip-makers). Without *gedik*, the shop did not involve a right to practice the trade under the supervision of guild authorities.

⁹⁴ IK 9: 105a.

⁹⁵ IK 10: 12b.

⁹⁶ GK 80: 82a. A candle-maker *beşe* injured a *bazarıcı* at Yağ Kapanı. In a comparable case, a glass-maker *beşe*'s slave attacked a Jew (IK 9: 51a).

⁹⁷ A janissary *efendi* (scribe) rented his premise out to a tavernkeeper (IK 9: 2a). An Ali *Beşe* sued a tavernkeeper who had not repaid a debt to him (GK 80: 70a).

⁹⁸ IK 8: 31a. An Ahmed *Beşe* robbed a non-Muslim butcher.

⁹⁹ IK 10: 4b. A Muslim mother said in court that a janissary *serdar* (commander) sold her daughter to a slave merchant in Üsküdar.

¹⁰⁰ IK 5: 71b. This type of commandeering, however, may not be taken as an arbitrary wrongdoing, since the water-carriers' horses were supposed to be taken by the military in emergency. The military officers could easily stretch this practice to other guilds in contravention of what was specified in the registers.

¹⁰¹ IK 8: 26a, GK 80: 87b.

have been positive among the regular guildsmen. One may assume that there was a subtle tension between the guilds and unruly janissaries because of the latter's disruption of order in the marketplace, even though some janissaries became well-assimilated regular members of the guilds.

Given the nature of the janissaries' access to physical force and their need of extra income, their disruptive actions and intrusions into the marketplace are not surprising. At the same time, in the background there was the continued concentration of power in the hands of high janissary and other military officers throughout the seventeenth century, except for brief breaks under the austere policies of Murad IV and the Köprülü grand viziers.¹⁰² Following the end of the fratricidal succession pattern of the Ottoman sultanate, which was dominant until the end of the sixteenth century, the military forces garrisoned in Istanbul came to have the power to depose the incumbent sultan and substitute another from among the remaining princes. Therefore, although divided into factions such as janissaries versus *sipahi*, and old barracks versus new barracks within the janissary corps, the military consistently held sway over the sultan's household and the central administration, particularly when there were no acts of great leadership on the part of the sultan or the civil bureaucracy. The political power of the military, furthermore, made the officers able to encroach into other sectors of the state administration. For example, in extreme cases they could even influence state financing by meddling in the appointment of high-ranking bureaucrats such as the grand vizier and central finance officials.¹⁰³ With power that extended much further than what they were supposed to have, the military officers had extensive, if not unified, sway over the marketplace. Some of the military were appointed as the leaders of guilds, and others (e.g., the *ihtisab* cadre and *Istanbul ağası*) were in charge of supervising the market and collecting taxes. In addition, they could engage in private business on a large scale while squeezing the regular guilds, as three janissary commanders did shortly prior to the 1651 rebellion (see Chapter IV, section d).

¹⁰² Faroqhi, "Crisis and Change," in İnalcık et al. eds. *Economic and Social History*, 414–15, and 418.

¹⁰³ Na'ima, 5: 18–19, 98. Janissary officers expressed discontent when Siyavuş Paşa became grand vizier in 1650 without consulting them (5: 104). They were even suspected of having embezzled the salaries of the soldiers (5: 60–61).

Exactly how the power of the officers was related to the disruptive behavior of the rank-and-file is unclear, but there are at least two possible connections: first, there were of course those who were directly associated with high-ranking officers and benefited from their protection when engaging in illicit business; second, the occasional embezzlement of soldiers' salaries by high-ranking officers must have left at least some of them discontent and therefore more prone to criminal activities. The infiltration of military elements into the guilds may also have been assisted by the guild leaders who had been selected from the military.¹⁰⁴ Much of this remains speculation, but that there was a connection between officers and the rank-and-file is certain, however sour it could turn occasionally.¹⁰⁵

Guildsmen in Istanbul had to live with janissary oppression and intrusion as a given fact and had accepted some individual janissaries as their colleagues, but sometimes their patience ran out, as the rebellion of 1651 demonstrates. Although the forced exchange of debased coins in the marketplace and the imposition of numerous taxes sanctioned by the then grand vizier Melek Ahmed Paşa directly triggered the rebellion, the rage of the guildsmen was mainly directed at the janissary officers, who were suspected of causing many anomalies such as profiteering from foodstuffs and other daily necessities.¹⁰⁶

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Fresh immigrants from Anatolia and the Balkans coming to Istanbul were also entering trades. It is difficult to gauge the exact scale of the population influx in the seventeenth century, or the resulting increase of Istanbul's populace. However, it is certain that the population continued to rise during the first half of the seventeenth century, especially through rural immigration. Such population inflows were already noticed in the second half of the sixteenth century when imperial edicts were issued to the effect that recent immigrants who had come to Istanbul within five years or who did not have a guarantor should go back to their home villages.¹⁰⁷ The authorities' concern at that time was that the home villages' tax revenues had

¹⁰⁴ About the government-appointed guild officials, see Chapter II, section a-iv.

¹⁰⁵ Sometimes the rank-and-file revolted against the oppressive officers (Kafadar, "Yeniçeri-Esnaf Relations," Chapter V).

¹⁰⁶ Na'ima, 5: 96-97.

¹⁰⁷ Ahmed Refik, *Onuncu* 139-140 (yr. 1567) and 145-146 (1579).

decreased sharply because many taxpayers had left their land, and newcomers in general were apt to increase the social evils of the city. Although population pressure was not as urgently felt in Istanbul as it would be in the eighteenth century,¹⁰⁸ the government had to begin controlling the number of people coming to live in Istanbul.

However, making registers of new immigrants and sending back those who had been newly settled did not work effectively due to the huge inflow of people as a result of warfare on the frontiers of the empire, the Celali rebellions and the ensuing rural unrest in the early seventeenth century.¹⁰⁹ Istanbul and other walled cities attracted people for their security and presumably better job opportunities.¹¹⁰ *Kıtab-i Müstetab*, an anonymous reform treatise composed under Osman II (r. 1618–22), deplores the dispersion of the taxpaying provincial subjects (*reāyā*) as follows: “These days most of the *reāyā* [left their places.] Some of them went to Persia, some to the land of the Tatar Khan, and some to the frontier provinces of Rumelia. *Some others went to Istanbul, Edirne, Bursa, and other great cities and became porters (hammāllar), craftsmen (ehl-i şanāyi’), and large-scale farmers (ekābir çiftçiler) [around the city]*” (emphasis mine).¹¹¹ Even the ideal style of living allegedly changed in the seventeenth century from that of a provincial *sıphahi* (cavalryman) to that of an urban gentleman.¹¹² Many Anatolian non-Muslims, for example, settled in Galata and along the Bosphorus, increasing the urbanization of these areas in the seventeenth century.¹¹³ There was a further imperial order seeking to reg-

¹⁰⁸ For the population pressure in the early eighteenth century, see Münir Aktepe, “XVIII. Asrın İlk Yarısında İstanbul’un Nüfus Mes’elesine Dair Bazı Vesikalar,” *Tarih Dergisi* vol. 9 no. 13 (1958) 11–18. The authorities then feared further population growth in Istanbul so much so that they even restricted the entrance of merchants into the city.

¹⁰⁹ Aktepe, “İstanbul’un Nüfus,” 1.

¹¹⁰ Faroqhi, *Towns and Townsman*, 272–75.

¹¹¹ *Kıtab-i Müstetab*, ed. Yaşar Yücel (Ankara: Ankara University Press, 1974) 20.

¹¹² Rhoads Murphey, “Communal Living in Ottoman Istanbul: Searching for the Foundations of an Urban Tradition,” *Journal of Urban History* 16–2 (1990) 116. He says, “A perception of the city as a place of comfort, sophistication, culture and opportunity, and an ideal place of residence in particular for middle- and upper-class gentlemen with rural land holdings and sources of income began to take shape in the seventeenth century.”

¹¹³ Zafer Toprak, “Nüfus,” *İstA*². Particularly the Armenian communities in Istanbul seem to have been overwhelmed by the newcomers from Anatolia. Some Armenians who had earlier settled down in Istanbul appealed to the authorities against the new immigrants’ interference with the established Armenian institutions such as community and church leadership (IK 5: 99b, “Mahfil-i kazada Celäliden perâkende ve perişan olup soñradan gelüp mahrüse-i merkûmede sâkin olan Ermeni

ister newcomers settled in Istanbul, Üsküdar, Galata and so on in 1071/1661, probably for the purpose of sending such newcomers back to their places of origin.¹¹⁴

The continuous growth of the immigrant population in Istanbul naturally affected the guilds: some of the newcomers pursued business opportunities outside the guild system while others seem to have achieved guild membership. There were complaints by established guilds regarding people who came from outside as groups or individuals and who encroached on their specialties, as we have seen in the section on new guilds. On the other hand, there were individuals who were mentioned as being part of the existing guilds (. . . *tā'ifesinden*) but had come from the countryside in their own generation (see Table 2). Since place of origin is not usually mentioned in group appeal cases we do not know the extent of their advancement within the guilds, but one salient example is the multitude of Anatolian Armenian bakers in the bakers' guild who seem to have bonded closely.¹¹⁵ Joining a guild must have been easy when a guild member helped an immigrant to do so. Given the existence of long-distance labor migration within the empire in pre-industrial times, this practice may have been customary and therefore nothing new in some guilds where regional ties were an important organizing principle.¹¹⁶ However, the influx of immigrants in this period must have put a strain on some existing guilds. It seems that for the immigrants, the service trades (e.g., that of porters) became relatively easier targets, since they did not require very refined skills or large amounts of capital to enter.

tā'ifesinden . . . nām Ermeniler . . . aramızda sâkin olmağla cema'at başlıklarımıza ve papaslarımıza ve kethüdâlarımıza ve kiliselerimize . . . karışmak isteyüp dağl itmekle . . .”).

¹¹⁴ KK 72, p. 414. This document is not preserved well and there are places impossible to decode, but it is clear that the government was worried about the influx from Anatolia, and took a firm stand in getting a precise register (“Do not let them make an excuse saying ‘we have been here from long before.’”).

¹¹⁵ Eremya Çelebi relates that there were many Armenian bakers, and this might have given opportunities to the Armenian immigrants in the guild (*Istanbul Tarihi*, 17).

¹¹⁶ For examples of early nineteenth-century immigrants to Istanbul who found jobs in various trades, see Cengiz Kırılı, “The Struggle over Space: Coffeehouses of Ottoman Istanbul, 1780–1845,” Ph.D. dissertation, Binghamton University, State University of New York (2000) 77–111. See also Christopher Clay, “Labor Migration and Economic Conditions in Nineteenth-Century Anatolia,” *Middle Eastern Studies* 34–4 (1998) 7–9.

Table 2. Guildsmen who came from or owned real estate in the provinces¹¹⁷

defter	Number	year	origin/real estate	trade	ethnicity
IK 1	8b/50	1612	أيدونات [Aydwnat] near Paramyta, Rumelia	butcher	dhimmī
IK 3	59b/502	1618	Çorum, Anatolia	shoemaker	Muslim
IK 5	102a	1620	Silistre, Rumelia	porter	Muslim
IK 7	25b	1659	Van, Anatolia	perfumer	Armenian
IK 8	26a	1660	Eğin (in Harput), Anatolia	baker	Armenian
IK 8	41b	1660	Divrigi (in Sivas), Anatolia	porter	Armenian
IK 9	59b	1661	وکیبر [Wkbr], Rumelia	<i>boza</i> -maker	dhimmī
IK 9	85b	1661	برمدی [Brmdy], Rumelia	chicken-seller	dhimmī
IK 9	110b	1661	Malatya, Anatolia	shopkeeper	Muslim
IK 9	211a	1661	Eğin, Anatolia	baker	dhimmī
IK 9	273a	1662	Eğin, Anatolia	baker	dhimmī
IK 10	113a	1662	Eğin, Anatolia	porter	Armenian
GK 73	56a	1651	Eğin, Anatolia	grocer	Armenian
GK 80	73a	1657	Eğin, Anatolia	baker	Armenian

Guilds' reactions to these intrusions by outsiders, whether janissaries or immigrants, were not always hostile. A guild could either accept the intruders as regular members and make them pay their share of the tax burden, or try to ban the businesses that were set up without its knowledge or approval. A guild might first try to transfer part of its tax load to the intruders, and if that did not work move on to appeal to the authorities to ban them altogether. When the tin-smiths accused a group of gypsies of practicing their *métier*, going around residence quarters, their point was that the gypsies did not work in stores and therefore were hard to track down for tax collection purposes.¹¹⁸ The fruit-sellers also complained about unauthor-

¹¹⁷ The court records of Eyüb from this period mention some artisans who had come from Rumelia. For example, see EK 53 (1058/1648–49): 6a 2. (a baker), 44b (a furrier [*kürkçü*] or a boatman [*kürekçi*]), EK 57 (1061–62/1650–52): 39a (a butcher), 47a (a hard biscuit-maker).

¹¹⁸ IK 3: 56a/473.

ized shops set up by people who had never served fruit-seller masters, let alone paid taxes.¹¹⁹ These seem to indicate that at least some of the established guilds recognized the newcomers as long as they also paid tax, although the former might have been only justifying their request by decrying the latter.

Prohibiting encroachment was not easy when the "intruders" appealed to the authorities with persuasive arguments, even though guilds had all the legitimation necessary to stop such intrusions. A group of "poor tailors from outside" argued that they did not do any damage to the business of the tailors in the Covered Bazaar when the latter wanted the former banned from business,¹²⁰ and a shoetip-maker (*na'lçacı*) claimed that he was expert (*māhir*) enough to keep his business when the guild of the *na'lçacı* wanted his shop closed.¹²¹ In addition, when a chickpea-roaster (*leblebici*) started his business without having a relationship to the established chickpea-roasters, the latter tried to close down the former's shop on the pretext that there was a government order (*emr*) to the effect that there should be no more than 16 chickpea-roaster shops in Istanbul. However, when the former petitioned the central *divān*, the grand vizier Mehmed Paşa sided with him, asking what harm would result from having another *leblebici* shop (1028/1618–19).¹²² The government, at least in the 1610s, seems to have been rather receptive to such claims as it listened to the petitioners, although in principle it maintained its opposition to outsiders and stayed on the side of taxpaying guildsmen and their traditions. The authorities' attitude to this "intrusion" issue does not seem to have been consistent. Overall, the porous boundaries of guild membership, which seemingly required the payment of taxes only, and the government's relaxed attitude about new elements' joining the guilds¹²³ made infiltration relatively easy.

Meanwhile, however, the guilds could not allow the intrusion of outside practitioners to flourish as it threatened their vested interests and livelihood. Although there seems to have been room to

¹¹⁹ IK 6: 2b/10.

¹²⁰ MD 81: 189/421.

¹²¹ IK 4: 36a/251.

¹²² IK 4: 8a/54. The fixed number of shops designated by the order (*emr*) is likely to be the result of the guild's request, since the government did not actually try to police the situation.

¹²³ This is in striking contrast with the eighteenth-century stance of the government towards intruders into guilds. See AK, MC, B.10: 26a (1176/1763) as discussed in Chapter II, section 1.

accommodate new members in the guilds of the early seventeenth century, an excessive influx of outsiders sometimes led to tighter controls over membership by guilds. This may have had an impact on the definition of membership inside the guilds, and could have been related to the later institution of *gedik*.

New members or new types of members individually entering the guilds may not themselves have transformed the structure of the guild system; however, changes in the composition of the guilds may have had a deep impact on their social orientation. For example, they created a symbiotic relationship between the guildsmen and the janissaries. In addition, the immigrants and janissaries brought new connections and subgroups into the guild system. The sheer number of infiltrators may also have stimulated some guilds to enhance their defenses and strengthen their control over membership.

iii. *New Institutional Devices*

Although new trades and individuals were inevitably entering the guild system over time and did constitute an external force for change, they only indicate the open-ended nature of the guild system. Whether or not the guilds were capable of innovating and adapting to new situations largely depended on whether they could make/adopt new internal institutions according to the needs of the time. Though reflected in only a few documents, institutional changes seem to have been fashioned in some guilds in the early to mid-seventeenth century. These were indeed new, even if the sources sometimes make them appear as ancient as the guilds themselves.

The Appearance of Gedik

Gedik in the Ottoman guild system has been considered the core institution of so-called guild monopoly and government control. *Gedik*, which originally designated a “fissure” or a “slot,” acquired various meanings such as “privilege,” “tools of a trade,” “right of shop usufruct,” and “right to practice a trade,” depending on the context. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, to engage in trade one usually had to obtain a corresponding *gedik*. In that sense, the *gedik* of later centuries can be roughly translated as a “certificate”¹²⁴

¹²⁴ Donald Quataert, “The Age of Reforms,” in *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire*, ed. Inalcik and Quataert, 895–98.

or "license"¹²⁵ to practice a trade, which often involved complex relationships with other members of the guild, merchants, *waqfs* and the government. There were a limited number of *gediks* for each guild. One person or a few people in common could possess a single *gedik*, and this *gedik* could be transferred, sold or inherited. The issuance of *gedik* documents was partly in the hands of the government or *waqfs* in the nineteenth century.¹²⁶ By identifying a certain number of shops/masters as legitimate practitioners, *gedik* could favor established masters in a monopolistic fashion.

In most works, *gedik* tends to be treated as a monolithic institution. *Gedik* is first mentioned in a few scattered cases found in the seventeenth century. It would seem that *gedik* started in this period,¹²⁷ although its spread gained momentum only in the mid-eighteenth century.¹²⁸ Scholars have tended to hastily generalize that there was a uniform *gedik* system with more or less the same qualities for all guilds in the seventeenth century and after.¹²⁹ Additionally, this *gedik* system has been often regarded as representing a combination of governmental

¹²⁵ Indeed, the workings of the "gedik system" may have been quite similar to those of today's liquor licenses or taxi medallions. The number of licenses is determined by consultation between the trade association and municipal authorities, and shifts in public demand are also factored in.

¹²⁶ Not only the government, but also the *waqfs* that let shops, and the guild authorities as well, issued *gediks* to guild masters (Sitki, *Gedikler*, 22–25).

¹²⁷ M. Belin, *La Propriété Foncière en Pays Musulman et Spécialement en Turquie* (Paris: Imprimerie Imperiale, 1862) 153–54. As cited in Gibb and Bowen, vol. 1, pt. 1, 282. The historian "Cevdet Efendi" [a.k.a. Cevdet Paşa] told the author that *gedik* was a relatively new institution which appeared some 150 to 200 years earlier, and its general application was a more recent phenomenon. Since their conversation took place in the mid-nineteenth century, Cevdet must have thought that *gedik* came into existence between the middle and the end of the seventeenth century.

¹²⁸ Meninski's late seventeenth-century multi-language dictionary *Lexicon Arabico-Persico-Turcicum* (Vienna, 1780–1802) does not provide any trade-related meaning for *gedik* (كدوك), although it gives the meaning of a "salaried military position."

¹²⁹ Mantran, *Istanbul*, 369, Baer, "Monopolies," 160–161. Mantran simply shows that *gedik* existed among water-carriers in 1630 and seems to assume that *gedik* existed in the same form and scale then as in later centuries. Ahmet Kal'a made a similar assumption with the example of *gedik* in the glass-makers' guild from 1070/1659 in his "Gediklerin Doğuşu ve Gedikli Esnaf," *Türk Dünyası Araştırmaları* 16 (1982) 185. Ahmet Akgündüz, on the other hand, finds the origin of *gedik* in the usufruct (*sükna*) of *waqf* shops, tracing it back to the legal treatise of the famous *şeyhülislâm* Ebusuud Efendi in the sixteenth century. Although shop usufruct had a connection to the institution of *gedik*, this explanation contradicts the fact that many of the early *gediks* are found in service guilds that did not require shops. See his "Osmanlı Hukukunda Gedik Hakkının Menşe'i ve Gedik Hakkıyla İlgili Ebusuud'un Bir Risalesi" *Türk Dünyası Araştırmaları* 46 (1987) 149–62.

control over the guilds and a system of guaranteed monopoly in return for the acceptance by the guilds of a certain level of control.¹³⁰

In fact, however, *gedik* developed historically through a confusingly complex process involving various agents who strove to promote their respective interests. Let us review the outlines of what we know. There are a few cases of *gedik* found in seventeenth-century sources, although they have not attracted scholarly attention in their own right. Mehmed Sıtkı mentions that “monopoly” (*inhisar*) [and therefore *gedik* as well] appeared around 1140/1727–28, but he fails to provide concrete details of the practice of *gedik*, the guilds that adopted *gedik*, or the social circumstances of the time.¹³¹ It is possible that he observed the sudden appearance of *gedik* in a number of guilds of that period.¹³² *Gedik* seems to have spread gradually in the early eighteenth century. One may regard the *gedik* of this period as a customary practice in the guilds rather than as a rigid or uniform institution.

Engin Akarlı, working on the practice of *gedik* ca. 1750–1840, paints a very complex and multi-faceted picture that is cursorily described below. He emphasizes *gedik*'s nature as an “instrument,” and explains that the custom of transferring tenure/seniority through the registered tools of a trade was well established in the first half of the eighteenth century. According to him, the practice of *gedik* acquired other important functions and spread to most guilds from the middle of the century. *Gediks* (registered tools fully owned by a master) began to be used as security for loans that merchants supplied to artisans. Merchants

¹³⁰ Baer, “Monopolies,” 159–165. According to him, monopoly was a basic condition for the “guild system” to work as “a link between the government and the urban population,” (145) and “most of the restrictions (. . .) were controlled by a particular and remarkable institution, the *gedik* system (159).” For a more balanced view, see Ahmet Kal’a, “Gediklerin Doğuşu ve Gedikli Esnaf,” 186–187.

¹³¹ Sıtkı, *Gedikler*, 19. Osman Nuri’s *Mecelle* (new), 2: 636 mentions that there are some cases of *gedik* dating from before. One must exercise caution as Sıtkı and Nuri tend to identify *gedik* directly with monopoly, despite *gedik*'s multiple functions.

¹³² Münir Aktepe describes the influx of migrants into Istanbul in the early eighteenth century and gives two cases (of *kafesçiler* [birdcage-makers] and *örücüiler* [darners]) in 1726 where guildsmen tried to prevent further intrusion by outsiders by way of being one another’s guarantors (*kefîl*) and requiring guarantors from any future practitioners (Aktepe, *Patrona İsyâm*, 24–25). These guilds at that time did not speak about *gedik* per se, even though they began to practice something very similar to *gedik* in content—in that they virtually limited membership to the existing members who had known one another and could become guarantors (*kefiller*) for one another (Ahmet Kal’a regards *kefalet* as a precursor of *gedik*. See his *İstanbul Esnaf Birlikleri ve Nizamları*, 113–122). Such trends would seem to suggest that serious levels of encroachment provoked some guilds to take measures to protect their interests.

petitioned the *divān* requesting that members of a guild stand surety for one another and not change their shop locations without the knowledge of the Istanbul court. Guild masters, for their part, tended to want the collective right to decide who should acquire a vacant *gedik*, claiming that if a *gedik* were transferred outside the guild it would inevitably result in low quality goods that would harm their reputation. Therefore, they willingly took collective financial responsibility (by standing surety for one another) toward merchants and the state on the condition that they obtained control over the transfer of the *gediks* of their trade. The state benefited from this as well, securing a collective guarantee for tax payment, although it did not take an active role in making such deals. In addition, masters used *gedik* to protect themselves from rent hikes and eviction, claiming that their *gediks* gave them perpetual tenure in *waqf* premises. Another aspect of *gedik* was that especially after the customs of a guild were written down by the government in the form of a *nizam* (charter), and *gediks* were formally endorsed in it, guild masters considered *gedik* to be a guarantee of their monopoly. Therefore, *gedik* ultimately helped in strengthening guild monopolies. From the above we can say that *gedik* developed on multiple fronts in the midst of an interplay between guild masters, merchants, *waqf* administrators and central authorities.¹³³

Given the intricate conjunctural evolution of *gedik* in later centuries, we cannot conveniently assume that the attributes of the nineteenth-century practice were the same as those in the seventeenth century. Needless to say, *gediks* in the seventeenth century should be understood based on references from the same period, although the scarcity of such sources makes it impossible to explore if these *gediks* were related to various social forces like *waqfs* and merchants.¹³⁴ Since there are few examples of *gedik*, we may explore the details of those found at some length.

The seventeenth-century Istanbul guilds noted as having *gedik* are as follows: water-carriers (regular¹³⁵ and those without mounts), shoetip-makers, glass-makers, the butchers of Et Meydanı (The Janissary

¹³³ For an authoritative overview of the complex development of *gedik* in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, see Engin Akarlı's forthcoming paper, "A Means to Multiple Claims for Istanbul Artisans and Traders, 1750–1840" (to appear in R. Alain Pattage and Martha Mundy, eds. *Legal Culture, Property and Persona*, forthcoming).

¹³⁴ Although I focus on the issue of membership control in discussing the seventeenth-century practice of *gedik*, we cannot eliminate the possibility that seventeenth-century *gedik* was also partly related to *waqfs* or other social forces.

¹³⁵ The regular water-carriers used horses for delivery.

Square),¹³⁶ porters under Un Kapanı Emını (supervisor of the Flour Exchange),¹³⁷ coffee-grinders,¹³⁸ brokers of the Covered Bazaar,¹³⁹ and the night guards of the same bazaar and Istanbul, although one may hesitate to include the last group among artisans and service workers because they may well have been closely related to the police force.¹⁴⁰ Among the abovementioned groups, only the cases of the water-carriers¹⁴¹ and shoetip-makers¹⁴² are found in seventeenth-century court records. The glass-makers' case is found in a later document that referred back to the seventeenth century,¹⁴³ and all the others are found in Evliya Çelebi's travel account. The fact that there are only a few cases found among the myriads of documents and numerous entries of guilds listed in Evliya Çelebi's travel account suggests that the practice of *gedik* was not widespread at that point.

As sources from the period do not provide a definition, one begins to wonder how *gedik* was understood minus all the historical accumulations of meanings and relationships in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. One should caution against assuming that it was one uniform institution, particularly at this incipient stage. One has to imagine that the practice of *gedik* differed from guild to guild since, for example, the *gediks* of a geographically fixed artisan group and those of mobile service workers would naturally involve different arrangements. In the end, *gediks* were managed differently by various guilds even in the nineteenth century, when *gedik* had become a regular feature of virtually all guilds.¹⁴⁴

One salient feature of *gedik* in this period gleaned from the more informative cases is the limitation and control of membership in one trade. Even without *gedik*, the concept of putting a limit on the num-

¹³⁶ Evliya, ed. Gökyay, 244, trans. Hammer, vol. 1, pt. 2, 144.

¹³⁷ The mentioned porters have *zelehor* as their epithet, but it is unclear what it meant. *Canberdi* is similarly unclear in terms of its meanings and origin. Evliya, ed. Gökyay, 255, trans. Hammer, vol. 1, pt. 2, 162.

¹³⁸ Evliya, ed. Gökyay, 256, trans. Hammer, vol. 1, pt. 2, 162.

¹³⁹ Evliya, ed. Gökyay, 294, trans. Hammer, vol. 1, pt. 2, 222.

¹⁴⁰ Evliya, ed. Gökyay, 293, trans. Hammer, vol. 1, pt. 2, 221.

¹⁴¹ Both regular water-carriers (MD 85: 227/518, dated 1040/1630) and water-carriers without mounts (IK 8: 20a, 1071/1660–61).

¹⁴² IK 9: 189a.

¹⁴³ İstanbul Ahkâm Defteri 3: 354/1282, (1168/1755) published in *İstanbul Esnaf Tarihi*, ed. Ahmed Kal'a (İstanbul: İstanbul Araştırma Merkezi, 1997) 1: 98–99.

¹⁴⁴ Sıtkı, 31–40. While some government branches controlled *gediks* of certain guilds (coffee dealers, tobacco dealers, etc.), some other guilds (e.g., *dulbend*/cotton muslin weavers) managed their *gediks* alone. There were also many cases in between.

ber of legitimate practitioners in a guild (or an unorganized trade) was a rather common concept. Established artisans would prefer this practice since that would give them the excuse to have outside competitors banned, and the government sometimes issued orders to have shops other than a set number in a trade closed (either urged by the relevant guilds or according to the *muhtesib*'s report).¹⁴⁵ Such government intervention in fixing the number of shops may not have worked effectively, given an example of repeated orders to have newly opened florist shops closed. In 1595, the government ordered the shutting down of all florist shops other than the five that had existed from before, but in 1609 it ordered the closure of all shops except for the 13 it specified.¹⁴⁶ Suddenly, one sees eight more old (*kadim*) shops added to the five shops in existence 14 years before. One should remember that it would have been impractical for the government to properly monitor the number of shops in civilian trades, except in cases where the supply of materials was needed for government/military use. It is more likely that members of the established guilds voluntarily took the initiative in freezing the number of their members and shops, thereby making it more difficult for outsiders to intrude. In most cases, the government probably acted against the new shops primarily at the request of the established guilds.¹⁴⁷

With the advent of *gedik*, which would often involve the control of instruments of trade, fixed locations or something tangible that was a necessary part of engaging in business, a limitation on the number of practitioners would have had a stronger effect. In describing the butchers of Et Meydanı,¹⁴⁸ who were in charge of the meat supply for the janissaries, Evliya Çelebi says that every one of them (80 people in 20 shops, perhaps he meant every shop) had a *tomruk* (a large stone, or the trunk of a kind of tree. Probably it was a chopping block the butchers used), which was [his] *gedik*, thus showing

¹⁴⁵ See Refik, *Onuncu*, 108 (various textile producers), 115–116 (*seraser* [a kind of brocade]-makers), *Onbirinci*, 47 (silk textile-producers).

¹⁴⁶ Refik, *Onbirinci*, 18–19 (transcription of MD 73: 112/257) and MD 78: 516/1337 (1018/1609). The then *muhtesib* suggested that the florist shops other than the five that had existed from before should be closed, and the government accepted that.

¹⁴⁷ For example, see IK 4: 8a/54. The chickpea roasters tried to ban an outsider on the pretext that there could only be 16 chickpea roasters, basing their argument on a government order (*emr-i şerif*).

¹⁴⁸ It must be Et Meydanı where the janissaries were stationed, rather than At Meydanı as it is rendered in Evliya, trans. Hammer, pt. 2, 144, and Evliya, ed. Gökyay, 244.

that *gedik* also meant the tools of a trade.^{149, 150} When one of the *tomruks* became vacant, it was transferred through the janissary *ağâ's* permission. This seems to indicate that the number of these butchers was fixed through a measure of control over their tools of trade, and recruitment was made only when a slot became vacant. Similarly, the regular water-carriers recruited only when one of them died, and they were supposed to transfer a vacant *gedik* only to a qualified person.¹⁵¹ Evliya also mentions the case of the *zelehor* (?) porters, who recruited from among the *canberdi* (?) porters from “outside” when one of their *gedik* holders died.¹⁵²

Although they did not specify that they wanted to have only a set number of shops, *gedik* in the case of the shoetip-makers had a function of curbing the creation of new shops that had not been approved by the guild. When a Mustafa Beşe of the shoetip-makers' guild handed over his “shop with a shoetip-makers' *gedik*” (*na'ıçacı gedîgi olan dükkanını*) to “another [person]” (*âhar*) and opened a new shoetip-making business in a recently built *bedestan* in Mercan Market, the guild wanted Mustafa Beşe to move back to a shop that had a *gedik*. From the rendering of the sentences in the document, it is not clear whether the person who acquired the shop was another guild member or not.¹⁵³ The shoetip-makers were worried about having a newly opened (*ihdâs olan*) shop, even if it was opened by one of their own, in addition to the old (*kadîmî*) one that had *gedik*, and in their opinion the new shop created disorder. Assuming that shops with *gediks* were limited in number and had designated locations, warning him to go back to such a shop—whether his old shop or another shop with *gedik*—must have had the effect of limiting the number of practitioners by *gedik*.¹⁵⁴

¹⁴⁹ It is easily imaginable that the tools necessary for practicing a trade came to symbolize the license.

¹⁵⁰ It is interesting that Joseph von Hammer translated *gedik* as “fief.” Perhaps he thought of it as something inviolable and inheritable. See his *Narrative of Travels in Europe, Asia and Africa*, vol. 1, pt. 2, 144, 162.

¹⁵¹ Kütükoğlu, *Narh Defteri*, 249–50. Here they were called water-carriers with horses (*at sakalari*).

¹⁵² Evliya, ed. Gökyay, 255.

¹⁵³ IK 9: 189a (1072/1661–62).

¹⁵⁴ Documents concerning inheritance indicate that water-carriers' *gediks* each had a designated fountain. (MD 85: 227/518, IK 8: 20a). Even before they clearly referred to *gediks*, they may well have been assigned to fountains of known locations, as the description of a register of water-carriers without mounts in 1027/1618 (IK 5: 75a). The designation of fixed locations in this case also would have strengthened the limitation on the number of practitioners.

These examples do not necessarily indicate that the number of *gediks* and the legitimate members in a given guild could not increase over time. There are examples from the nineteenth century that show changes in the number of *gediks* over the long term.¹⁵⁵ However, in principle, the guilds seem to have tried to fix the number of *gediks* at a level deemed appropriate.

Here we may make a little detour into the etymology of the word *gedik*. Besides its usual meanings, *gedik* in Old Turkish also means "scarcity" (*eksik*, *noķşan*) or "need" (*iķtiyāc*), and in the verbal form, *gedilmek*, *gediklenmek*, or *gedik açılmak*, it means "for a need to arise quickly."¹⁵⁶ If we factor this second meaning into the concept of *gedik* in an organization, whether artisanal, bureaucratic or military, we may speculate that *gedik* meant not just a given number of job openings, but also implied that the designated figure was the necessary and not the accidental amount in the eyes of those who controlled their numbers.

Assuming that the core concept of *gedik* was to limit the number of legitimate practitioners in a trade (and confirm it by controlling the instruments of trade or by limiting the number of shops at designated locations), why was it necessary in the few guilds mentioned above? Water-carriers, both regular and those without mounts, provide interesting clues about the formation and nature of seventeenth-century *gedik*. They seem to have adopted *gedik* the earliest, with the oldest record of *gedik* found up to now belonging to the regular water-carriers (1630).¹⁵⁷ Encroachment by outsiders was especially severe for the water-carriers. There were many intruders including slaves/servants (*kullar*), Arabs, Armenians and porters.¹⁵⁸ Indeed, water carrying was an easy business for anyone to engage in because it required little start-up capital and few learned skills. The water-carriers without mounts complained in 1027/1618 that a certain Ramazan Çavuş and Mustafa Ağa of the Demirkapı and 'Ulvanoglu quarters had illicitly hired many people to engage in a water-delivery business, even though their names were not recorded in the *defter* of water-carriers without mounts, and neither was there a record of the quarter

¹⁵⁵ Sıtkı, 32. *Gediks* of the tobacco-sellers increased from 47 to 94, and the cooks of tripe soup (*iķkembeciler*) returned some of *gediks* to their *waaf* landlords when business was slow.

¹⁵⁶ *Tarama Sözlüğü*, (Ankara: Türk Dil Kurumu, 1967) 3: 1622.

¹⁵⁷ MD 85: 227/518.

¹⁵⁸ IK 5: 72b, 75a.

they lived in or the location of their designated fountains.¹⁵⁹ To be registered in this *defter* was an important criterion for legitimate practitioners, since the *defter* became the basis of sharing the burden of services for the government, such as firefighting. This *defter's* original purpose was to organize firefighting activities and therefore the authorities might well have been involved in its creation and maintenance to a certain extent. However, the water-carriers without mounts used it for their own purpose, in order to reinforce their existing right to block outsiders. As a result of a previous petition, they had acquired an imperial order to the effect that no one but those registered in the *defter* should engage in their trade, and they used it against the two intruders who had started a large-scale water delivery business.¹⁶⁰ The *defter* functioned as a register of mastership and business locations, which may suggest a step toward the practice of *gedik*.¹⁶¹

The aforementioned case seems even more relevant to *gedik* when we consider that the water-carriers were among the earliest confirmed as having *gediks* in their guilds in the seventeenth century. As early as 1630, the regular water-carriers (as opposed to those without mounts) had already been implementing *gedik* as part of their custom. This is by far the earliest reference among the records discovered to *gedik* by name in the context of craft and service guilds. There is no mention of *gedik* whatsoever in the *narh defteri* of 1600,¹⁶² and I

¹⁵⁹ IK 5: 75a. It is also interesting to note that the two officers who started a water delivery business also sued the water-carriers without mounts, claiming that the fountains they drew water from traditionally belonged to the people of their quarter and not to the water-carriers (IK 5: 72b). Both sides had obtained supporting sultanic orders (*emr-i şerif*). Which side eventually won the case is unclear since both succeeded in having the other party warned by the *kadi* in separate entries (We do not know which happened first because neither of the two entries give a date). If the two officers' claims were right, the water-carriers unjustly expanded their territory forbidding ordinary people from drawing water from fountains, just as in Osman Nuri's negative portrayal of the water-carriers, *Mecelle* (new) 2: 648.

¹⁶⁰ IK 5: 75a. There is another example from the *muhzırlar* (court summoners), who registered in the court that they would limit the number of their members apparently in order to exclude intruders. Although they may not be considered a regular guild in the marketplace, it is an example other guilds could have learned from (IK 7: 42b).

¹⁶¹ The registration of all mastership and tools and their transfer was an important feature of *gedik* that was widely applied to the guilds of later centuries. See Akarlı, "Use of Law among Istanbul Artisans and Tradesmen" 2, n. 6. According to him, master artisans' and shopkeepers' registration of tools and equipment, which were called *gedik*, with their *kethüdās* emerged as a general practice in the eighteenth century, and this was remembered under Mahmud II in 1814 as a recent development. Sitki (*Gedikler*, 22) also mentions the registration of transfers of *gedik* by the *kethüdās*.

¹⁶² We should acknowledge, however, the formats of the two *narh* registers (1600 and 1640) differed greatly. The 1600 register was simpler and less descriptive.

have not come across any mention of *gedik* among cases from *defters* 1 to 6 of the Istanbul court (1612–1619). In the *narh defteri* of 1640, the water-carriers were the only guild mentioned as having *gediks*, with an organization of 240 members among whom every 16 had one *bölükbaşı* (division chief).¹⁶³ In addition, the water-carriers without mounts, who had decided to control membership by using a *defter* in the late 1610s, definitely had *gediks* in 1071/1661–62, which is relatively early.¹⁶⁴ It is reasonable to surmise that such a register of members constituted a step toward *gedik*. The water-carriers without mounts used this register to parry off the otherwise uncontrollable encroachment of outsiders, such as immigrants and military elements, and for that *gedik* must have been a very useful tool.¹⁶⁵

The threat posed by outsiders would have applied to other guilds of the time as well. Numerous guilds appealed to the court saying that intruders had caused all kinds of disorder in the relevant trade and had damaged their daily business (*kâr u kesbimize zarar*). This complaint sounds cliché, and the guilds may well have exaggerated their losses, but one must not overlook the fact that they directed their accusations at outsiders. The competitive pressure posed by outsiders differed from guild to guild, and the service trades that did not require significant preparation to start up business, such as water delivery, must have felt the pressure most sorely. It is no coincidence that there were a few service guilds (such as water-carriers, porters, night guards and brokers)¹⁶⁶ among those who already had *gediks* in the seventeenth century. It is unclear how shoetip-makers and glass-makers came to have *gedik* by mid-century, but one may again suspect outside competition given that as early as in 1028/1618–19 the shoetip-makers unsuccessfully tried to ban an outsider.¹⁶⁷

Another possible origin of *gedik* in the guilds, which must have been compatible with the guilds' anxiety over outsiders' intrusion, was by their imitation of organizations in the government sector. Assuming that a main purpose of *gedik* was to limit the number of players in a certain field, the similarity between *gediks* in the guild settings and those in other sectors is striking. In fact, the term *gedik*

¹⁶³ Kütükoğlu, *Narh Defteri*, 249–50.

¹⁶⁴ IK 8: 20a.

¹⁶⁵ Zija Shkodra, "Les esnaf ou corporations dans la vie urbaine Balkanique des XVII^e–XVIII^e siècles," *Studia Albanica* 12–2 (1975) 69.

¹⁶⁶ Of course, brokerage required some knowledge of the commodities that were handled, but I suppose it may not have required rigid training for many years.

¹⁶⁷ IK 4: 36a/251.

was first used in the military and government sector before the guilds began to use it.¹⁶⁸ Of course, what was meant by *gedik* in the government and military sectors and in the guilds had distinct connotations and applied to different contexts, but the basic feature of limiting the number of people of a certain rank and service remained the same. Given the similarity of the basic concept, one may speculate that some guilds were simply fashioned after government/military groups that had *gedik*. That some of the earliest guilds employing *gedik* were connected to the government (e.g., porters under Un Kapani Emini, coffee grinders affiliated with the government [*mīrīdī*]¹⁶⁹) or the janissaries (e.g., the butchers of Et Meydanı) makes this supposition more plausible. Additionally, the water-carriers' guilds were very closely connected to the public concerns of the government, which placed so much import on basic commodities, hygiene and firefighting, even if the guild itself was not technically within the government sector. One might also imagine that as janissary encroachment into the trades intensified, and janissaries sometimes even dominated a trade, the military elements may have introduced organizing principles familiar to them. Even then, one should not forget that for masters of a civilian guild to adopt a new institutional device on their own initiative they would need to have a good reason for doing so, just as the water-carriers without mounts did.

If indeed the *gediks* in the government sector inspired those in private guild organizations, is it also possible that the government was involved in the spread of *gedik* among the guilds? At this point, we have no documentation outlining the exact process of the formation of *gedik* that would tell us whether the guilds proactively adopted *gedik* or the government encouraged it. Given the involvement of the government in the *gediks* of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, as described in Sitki's *Gedikler*,¹⁷⁰ and especially the heavy interven-

¹⁶⁸ For example, see *Kitāb-i Müstetāb*, 4, for the *gediks* of the *topçu* and *cebeci* troops. 'Abdurrahman Paşa of the late seventeenth century also mentions the *gediks* of *müteferrika* (an elite group in the palace), *çavuşlar* (sergeants), *divān kâtibleri* and *defter-i hakani kâtibleri* (types of scribes). See his *Kanunnâme*, 543.

¹⁶⁹ I believe this *mīrīdī* meant that the coffee grinding facilities were state-owned and the state profited from them, although Evliya does not explain in what sense he used the word.

¹⁷⁰ Especially the *gediks* of coffee dealers, tobacco dealers, taverns and sherbet-sellers were bound to government offices, and in such cases the latter issued the *gedik* documents. This is probably understandable from the fiscal point of view, since these presumably profitable commodities must have drawn many people who hoped

tion under Mahmud II that left a lasting impression, one may wonder whether the state played a role in introducing and/or managing *gediks* in the seventeenth century.

In appeal cases concerning *gedik*, the guilds seem to have regarded it primarily as part of their customary regulations and maintained *gediks* according to their traditions, over which they were not necessarily unanimous.¹⁷¹ This indicates that *gedik* was controlled by the guilds rather than by the government. Even if the membership registers were in the hands of government authorities, however, the decision to control membership by relying on the register was made by the guild in the abovementioned water-carriers' case. In the seventeenth century at least, government intervention in the issuance and management of *gedik* is not apparent. Therefore, one may assume that the government's control of *gediks* was minimal and often at the level of merely approving guilds' decisions in this period.

Whatever its provenance, *gedik* had a function of tightening control over membership by tying it to a physical object (or an abstract notion of a right, in the case of the porters, for example). In later periods, in the course of protecting existing businesses, *gedik* came to reinforce monopolistic claims, to privilege established masters and their families to the exclusion of apprentices without connections, and later on to facilitate stable shop usufruct that undermined the rights of *waqfs*. Thus, one might view the entire development of *gedik* as conservative, restrictive and protective of established interests, or even conclude that it actually hindered further changes in the guild system. This, however, would be an unfair judgment, especially for the seventeenth century. Detailed descriptions of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century *gediks* reveal that they had flexible aspects.¹⁷² Just as with other paraphernalia of the guild system, *gedik* was not a monolithic institution but a practice that evolved according to circumstantial needs and reflected social relations. *Gedik*s survived even after the official abolition of monopolies and were compatible with the spread

to make money (Sitki, 23–25). Additionally, in the nineteenth century, *gediks* became subject to taxation since they were much easier to handle than profit taxes (Süleyman Sudi, *Osmanlı Vergi Düzeni (Defter-i Muktesid)* ed. Mehmed Ali Ünal (Isparta, 1996) 68, 107, 111.

¹⁷¹ IK 9: 189a (shoetip-makers) and MD 85: 227/518 (regular water-carriers).

¹⁷² See Sitki, *Gedikler*, 30–32. The number of *gediks* rose and fell according to booms and lulls in a trade. A *gedik* could be transferred to an outsider, although guild masters tried to prevent this from happening. Occasionally, the *gediks* of a guild could be transferred to another guild.

of some manufacturing in the industrial age.¹⁷³ Likewise, in *gediks* of the seventeenth century, one may instead see the ability of guilds to protect themselves in response to outsiders' challenges, to strengthen their organization by reinforcing membership control, and to adopt a new institutional device originating from a different setting.

Guild Waqfs and Kethüdā-ship

Added to intrusions into the guilds by outsiders such as janissaries and rural immigrants were the taxes imposed on the guilds. Tax was definitely on the rise in the early to mid-seventeenth century due to a series of long and costly conflicts that drained the state treasury. Even if the tax rates rose just in line with inflation, the irregular dues imposed to pay for military campaigns must have been levied more frequently on tradesmen (see Chapter IV for details). Even if the burden were no heavier than before, the irregularity itself—some taxes were collected as military needs arose—must have been stressful and required accommodation.

Guild *waqfs* for wartime dues must have been a natural response to such emergency tax payments.¹⁷⁴ Unfortunately, only one of the three examples from this period spells out when the *waqf* was founded (cauldron-makers' *vakfiye*: 1053/1643–44),¹⁷⁵ and it is impossible to tell when such *waqfs* became popular or how widespread they were. The other two are not *vakfiyes* but simple entries in court records in which the *waqf* administrators were changed and the characteristics of the *waqfs* were only briefly noted.¹⁷⁶ Neither of them mentions their respective date of foundation. The former is only mentioned as a “cash fund of the hook-makers for military needs” (*kullabacı hürfetin ordu-yı hümayyün muhimmât[ı] için vakfolanun nukûd*). The latter is described as a “33,500 *aķçe* cash fund of the felt-makers, donated by some benevolent founders for military requisites” (*keçeci tâ'ifesinin ordu-yı*

¹⁷³ Donald Quataert, “The Age of Reforms, 1812–1914” in *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire*, ed. İnalcık and Quataert, 895–898. For example, manufacturers of a new, embroidered textile acquired *gediks* in 1840s. The government prohibited the creation of new *gediks* only in 1861.

¹⁷⁴ It has been noted that there was a development of *waqfs* for the collective payment of *avâriż* (*avâriż vakfi*) founded by the residents of certain quarters in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries (*avâriż vakfi*). See Faroqhi, “The Bursa Case,” 234, and Ergenç, “Osmanlı Şehirlerindeki Yönetim Kurumları,” 1271.

¹⁷⁵ IBK 122: 25b–26a.

¹⁷⁶ IK 5: 47b/331 (hook-makers [*kullabacılar*], 1027/1618) and IK 9: 143a (felt-makers [*keçeciler*], 1072/1661–62).

hümâyünları için ba'z eşhâb-i hayrâtn vakf eyledükleri otuz üç bin beşyüz akçe). It seems that capital pooling for guild *waqfs* was common since the cauldron-makers also arranged their own *waqf* in the same way (See Table 1 in Chapter II, section a–ii.)

The cauldron-makers seem to have made careful and detailed plans to cope with a variety of situations. The terms of the cash *waqf* founded by the cauldron-makers are as follows:

The interest income (*bākī kalan ribh*) should be used for the military requisites (*ordu muhimmāti*) of the members of the cauldron-makers who have come from Trebizond and settled in Istanbul in years when military campaigns were ordered through imperial edicts. Additionally, in the years when the sultanate demands honey, oil, resin, soap, salt and other things for the use of the state from tradesmen in general (*'umūmen ehl-i hıref*), [this fund] should be used for the delivery of whatever is assigned to our guild. Every year, the earned interest should remain secure in the hands of the *waqf* administrator until the next year so that it can be added to the capital of the *waqf* at the beginning of the next year and be loaned on interest if one of the aforementioned occasions of spending does not occur. If the interest income does not suffice the taxes in a given year, the amounts added to the capital in previous years may be used for tax payments. The account of the *waqf* administration should be reviewed by the *kethüdā*, *yığıtbaşı* and other people each year. If somehow [literally, 'by God's command'] the income cannot be spent for the designated uses, the collected interest should be used for poor Muslims.¹⁷⁷

We do not know exactly when such guild *waqfs* for emergency military taxes started, or when they became popular among the guilds. Records of guild *waqfs* from before the eighteenth century are quite rare,¹⁷⁸ and it is likely that they were at a nascent stage in the early part of the seventeenth century as irregular taxes such as *'awāriż* became regularized (see Chapter IV). Wartime dues that were unpredictable depending on developments at the front would have also necessitated

¹⁷⁷ IBK 122: 25b. It is also interesting that the masters tried to make the *waqf* void after its terms had been set. Somehow, the masters became convinced that cash *waqfs* were against the legal opinion of the Hanafi school of law, and attempted tenaciously to get their donated money back from the *waqf* administrator. (Among the Ottoman Hanafis, there were different opinions, but the government always favored cash *waqfs* for practical reasons. See Jon E. Mandaville, "Usurious Piety: The Cash Waqf Controversy in the Ottoman Empire," *IJMES* 10 (1979) 289–308.) The administrator, in turn, took the case to the court and received the court's approval and order that the *waqf* was "sound (*ṣahih*)" and "necessary (*lāzım*)."

¹⁷⁸ Faroqhi, "Between Conflict and Accommodation: Guildsmen in Bursa and Istanbul during the Eighteenth Century" (unpublished manuscript).

emergency funds within the guilds. Since the guilds were keenly attentive to what other guilds were doing, the introduction of a guild *waqf* for taxes in a few would have influenced many other guilds.

Another institutional change occurring in some guilds was the establishment of standard positions for officials. Guilds that did not have their own set of recognized officials, such as *kethüdās* or *yığıtbaşıs*, appealed to the court to establish such offices, and their requests were generally approved. *Kethüdās* and *yığıtbaşıs* may not have existed for long at the beginning of the seventeenth century (see Chapter II, section a–iv). By mid-century, most guilds came to have both a *kethüdā* and a *yığıtbaşı*, but there were some that established such offices only then. Interestingly, the three cases in which guilds founded *kethüdā*-ships all come from mid-century Galata: the hard biscuit-makers in 1061/1651,¹⁷⁹ the shopkeepers of the Arab Suḡ in 1067/1657,¹⁸⁰ and the bottle-makers in 1067/1657.¹⁸¹ This perhaps reflects a tendency toward organization and formalization among the formerly regional branches of the Istanbul guilds. This is more likely given the example of the candle-makers in the Edirnekapı/Yedikule area, who complained that their *kethüdā* used to be the *kethüdā* of all the candle-makers in the Istanbul area and that he once supervised all raw material distribution, whereas now various regional groups had acquired their own *kethüdās* and separately secured raw materials.¹⁸²

These guilds must have observed others operating through the mediation of *kethüdās* and decided to establish their own. That guilds were learning from one another is shown in a case that comes from a slightly earlier period. The horse-cart drivers, who already had a *kethüdā*, said that they wanted to have a *yığıtbaşı*, as many other guilds had already acquired one.¹⁸³

Appealing for the approval of the new *kethüdā*-ship by the *kadi*, guildsmen said they needed a *kethüdā* to deal with taxes that were occasionally (*ahyānan*) imposed on them and to deal with other business affairs,¹⁸⁴ or to end disorder (e.g., stealing one another's apprentices) within their trade.¹⁸⁵

¹⁷⁹ GK 73: 123a.

¹⁸⁰ GK 80: 2a.

¹⁸¹ GK 80: 38a.

¹⁸² MD 81: 178/394 (1017/1608–09).

¹⁸³ IK 5: 52b/370 (1029/1619–20).

¹⁸⁴ GK 80: 2a (shopkeepers of Arab Suḡ), 38a (bottle-makers).

¹⁸⁵ GK 73: 123a. The hard biscuit-makers employed traditionalist rhetoric asking the new *kethüdā* to conduct their affairs “in terms of what had been done before (*mu’tād üzere*).”

Guild *waqfs* also addressed the challenge of heavy taxation while creatively using a traditional social institution. Thus, it seems that these new uses of familiar devices were responses to the trends of the time and were well grounded in social tradition. Although we do not know the full scale of the spread of guild *waqfs* and the changes in the official leadership structure at this time, it is important to note that conscious alterations of the guild structure, on the initiative of guild members, were both possible and actually happened.¹⁸⁶

The next question is about the nature of these changes. None of the new developments—*gedik*, guild *waqfs* or the spread of *kethüdā*-ship into more guilds—were unfamiliar to the guild system or to the wider society. The term and concept of *gedik* had existed in the government and the military, *waqf* had been a common social institution for all kinds of public purposes, and *kethüdā*-ship had already existed in a number of guilds in the sixteenth century, if not before. In other words, changes in the seventeenth-century guild structure were solidly based in familiar social customs. This, nonetheless, does not necessarily make such changes any less important or valuable for study. It is only natural that guilds tried to survive under adverse conditions with whatever resources they had at hand, and the consequent changes were the results of the institutional innovation of guildsmen within the bounds of their knowledge.

c. Conclusion

The frequent recourse of guildsmen to tradition in their petitions to government authorities does not necessarily indicate that they were inflexible in following their customs. On a general level, tradition was viewed in a positive light as it represented order and legitimacy, and artisans and craftsmen may well have had sincere respect for their traditions. On a more concrete level, however, tradition in its specifics was malleable and maneuverable, as customary practices regarding specific issues in a given trade were usually not clearly defined or written down. Guildsmen often used tradition-based arguments to achieve concrete and immediate benefits. Since the government

¹⁸⁶ For a study of institutional consolidation of the guild in the eighteenth century, see Suraiya Faroqhi, "Ottoman Guilds in the Late Eighteenth Century: The Bursa Case," *Making a Living in the Ottoman Lands: 1480 to 1820* (Istanbul: The Isis Press, 1995) 93–112.

usually gave legitimacy to those groups and individuals that adhered to customary practices, everyone wanted “tradition” on his side. Some guildsmen even distorted their version of what had been going on before. Nevertheless, it is possible that different interpretations coexisted without intentional distortions due to the inexact and unpublicized way tradition was remembered. Therefore, customary rules within a guild or old arrangements between related guilds must have required occasional clarification. The specifics of tradition had to be reconfirmed or modified when there were disputes and/or misunderstandings. In addition, whenever a new situation arose and customary practices could no longer continue, members of a guild or related guilds could make fresh arrangements through agreement. This type of mild “traditionalism” would not have prevented change from occurring.

The early seventeenth-century Ottoman Empire was beset by cataclysmic upheaval, and the guild system of Istanbul in the same period underwent significant readjustments. As the population of the capital city grew and spread into the suburbs, new guilds were created. Some of them were regional branches of existing trades and others developed around new commodities. There is no sign that either the government or the established guilds actively forestalled the creation of new guilds. At the same time, an increasing number of disillusioned and impoverished janissaries and rural immigrants sought jobs in the trades of Istanbul. These new elements partly infiltrated the existing guilds and partly remained unabsorbed. Already in the early seventeenth century, the water-carriers without mounts, who were frequently encroached upon, took steps to prevent further intrusion. Such efforts on the part of the guilds to control their membership more strictly may have resulted in the adoption of *gedik* by a few guilds. Additionally, heavy and irregular taxation resulted in the creation of guild *waqfs* for the purpose of meeting military tax requirements. In the same context, some regional guilds that did not have their own *kethüdās* had the position established in order to handle new problems more actively. Given that new guilds and trades emerged, new social elements infiltrated, and guilds learned from one another and institutionally evolved, it would not be too farfetched to liken the guild system to a rather open and evolving eco-system.

The guilds were not inherently conservative or against practical changes. Although they employed traditionalist rhetoric whenever possible, and probably believed in a tradition-based order, they did

accept changing situations and adopt new institutions. In response to the external challenges of this period, such as the influx of outsiders and increased state demands, individual guilds made impressive efforts to effectively address them with creative variations on existing institutional themes.

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CHAPTER FOUR

THE GOVERNMENT-GUILD RELATIONSHIP—THE NEGOTIATING POWER OF THE GUILDSMEN VIS-À-VIS THE STATE

a. *Government Stance toward Istanbul Guilds and Guildsmen*

To understand the way in which the government and Istanbul guildsmen interacted, one must first comprehend what the state's economic and political goals were and how it perceived the guilds' characteristics and potential, because these form the basis of the government's policies toward the guilds. The decisions of Ottoman administrators, both senior and junior, on guild affairs were closely tied to the government's policy goals and its perceptions of the guilds. To begin with, we will examine the Ottoman sultanic law codes (*kanunnāmes*) and the literary works of the ruling elite of the period.

The Ottoman government, like other pre-modern governments, did not have a concept of "economy" that was independent of politics, governance and ethics.¹ The most important economic goals of the Ottoman state were: first, to procure enough revenue to maintain the bureaucracy and the army; and second, to provide subjects of the state—especially the residents of the capital city Istanbul—with sufficient materials to live on at affordable prices. In so doing, the government went as far as fixing consumer prices and discouraging exports. Mehmet Genç discerned these principles and dubbed them "fiscalism" and "provisionism," terms that have gained considerable currency.² These were, if not as "immutable" as he argues, indeed salient and persistent principles of the Ottoman state. From today's

¹ See Kafadar, "When Coins Turned into Drops of Dew and Bankers Became Robbers of Shadows: The Boundaries of Ottoman Economic Imagination at the End of the Sixteenth Century." Ph.D. dissertation, Institute of Islamic Studies, McGill University, Montreal, 1986, "Conclusion."

² Mehmet Genç, "Ottoman Industry in the Eighteenth Century," 59. He mentions "traditionalism" as another principle of the state's management of the economy that was "immutable." Although the government used traditionalist rhetoric often, it may be necessary to examine its rationale and contexts before we label it as unconditional "traditionalism."

point of view, such economic policies may seem helplessly short-sighted and limited. In the face of the fiscal hardship caused by increased military spending from the late sixteenth century on, the state took a different path from that of mercantilism. It did encourage the increase of agricultural production³ for tax purposes, but mostly did not directly involve itself in entrepreneurship. Instead, the Ottoman state took a path that was less risky and promised a surer acquisition of revenue, one of the broad application of tax-farming in place of *timar* (fief)s,⁴ and the control of urban producers.

The Ottoman state had practical reasons to follow these principles. Namely, the Ottoman ruling elites thought of the economy in political and moral terms, as did the political elites of many other pre-modern countries, and these principles were congruent with their political purposes. In the pressing military situations of the seventeenth century, securing revenue to fund campaigns was an imperative. In addition, provisioning the capital city with cheap and ample supplies was important for political stability, since the capital had a population containing unruly soldiers and poor rural immigrants.

The concept of a “just ruler” was also crucial in the legitimation of the Ottoman sultans and the dynasty in that it required the state to tend to “public affairs (*maşāliḥ-i ‘amma*),”⁵ such as those concerning the marketplace, in a way that would benefit the larger public and ensure “fair” earnings. For example, the state deemed fairness of prices as important, and it allowed artisans, in principle, to take only 10 percent (and occasionally 20 percent) profit margins on top of their production costs.⁶ Although the sultan was styled as a pro-

³ İnalçık, “Rice cultivation and the Çeltükçi Re’aya System,” *Turcica* 14 (1982) 69–141. This gives an example of the direct management of agriculture by the state, which was deemed to be non-existent in Max Weber’s framework of sultanism.

⁴ The change from the *timar* system to tax-farming was a logical step in light of the fiscalism of the time when the state needed cash revenue on an unprecedented scale, although it has often been regarded as a symptom of decentralization and decline. For a reexamination of tax-farms, see Salzmänn, “An Ancien Régime Revisited,” 398–400.

⁵ In his “Law and Order in the Marketplace: Istanbul Artisans and Shopkeepers, 1730–1840” (conference paper given at Harvard University, April 1998), Engin Akarlı has pointed out the public relevance of the marketplace in Ottoman legal thinking. The basic principles of the *sharia* could be compromised for the sake of the public good, as in the case of price fixing.

⁶ The Ottoman *kanunnâmes* invariably give these rates. The *ih̄tisâb kanunnâme* of Istanbul (1501) in Ö.L. Barkan, “Bazı Büyük Şehirde Eşya ve Yiyecek Fiyatlarının Tesbit ve Teftişi Hususlarını Tanzim Eden Kanunlar,” *Tarih Vesikaları* I–5 (1942) 340, Ahmet Akgündüz, ed. *Osmanlı Kanunnameleri*, 9: 533, Abdullah Uysal, ed., *Zanaatlar Kanunu (Kanun-nâme-i Ehl-i Hiref)*, (Ankara: Kültür ve Turizm Bakanlığı,

tector of Islam, Islamic religious identity was not enough to legitimize his worldly power.⁷ The Ottoman sultan and his dynasty had to prove their capability, or at least willingness, to maintain law and order in the realm and thereby guarantee the provision of justice and ensure the well being of their subjects.

In trying to achieve the economic and political goals of the government, the guilds loomed large. They were the producers and/or sellers of daily necessities and they also constituted a large segment of urban taxpayers. Therefore, the government had to guarantee that the guilds provided quality products at reasonable prices, while ensuring that they paid all relevant taxes upon demand. Supervising the guilds and guildsmen was significant for the government not just to attain its economic goals, but also to maintain proper public order in the marketplace and in broader urban society. Thus, we see the government's attempts at imposing control in the prescriptions of Ottoman law codes (*kanunnāmes*) regarding guilds and the market. These law codes are the most important sources that describe the government's intention of controlling the guilds.

There are a few *kanunnāmes* that contain regulations related to the marketplace, such as those of Bayezit II (r. 1481–1512),⁸ Süleyman the Magnificent (r. 1520–66), Ahmet I (r. 1603–17), an anonymous one from the mid-seventeenth century,⁹ Hezarfen Hüseyin (d. 1676)'s *Tellh̄is üil-Beyān*,¹⁰ and the *kanunnāme* recorded by 'Abdurrahman Paşa in 1087/1676–77. There are a number of salient points that arise from these *kanunnāmes*. The supervision of the marketplace that these *kanunnāmes* dealt with was called collectively *ihtisāb*, and this supervision was entrusted to the *muhtesib*, or market inspector.

1982) 95. In extreme cases, however, such as when a person had brought sheep into the city but had not been able to sell them for a long time, the *muhtesib* was allowed to approve a 40 percent profit margin (*Zanaatlar Kanunu*, 95).

⁷ Cornell Fleischer, "Royal Authority, Dynastic Cyclism and 'Ibn Khaldunism' in Sixteenth- and Seventeenth-Century Ottoman Letters," *Journal of Asian and African Studies* XVIII, 3–4 (1983) 58. There were other Muslim monarchs (e.g., the Safavid *shahs*, and Mamluk sultans until the beginning of the sixteenth century) who could claim the same kind of legitimacy.

⁸ Under his reign, three separate *kanunnāmes* respectively for Istanbul, Bursa and Edirne were codified (1501–2).

⁹ Abdullah Uysal, ed., *Zanaatlar Kanunu (Kanun-nāme-i Ehl-i Hıref)* (Ankara: Kültür ve Turizm Bakanlığı, 1982).

¹⁰ This book explains the *kanun* of his time, although it is not itself a *kanunnāme*. Hezarfen Hüseyin does not consider all the individual or local *kanunnāmes*, some of which deal with market taxes, but focuses on the central organization of the state. In so doing, he describes *narh* and the state of some Istanbul guilds in a chapter.

These law codes are full of instructions regarding what the guilds were supposed to do and were forbidden from doing in terms of production and sales, what amounts of taxes¹¹ were to be collected on what types of goods, and what the *ih̄tisāb* officials were to supervise. The *kanunnāmes* often give detailed production standards and fixed prices (either in money or weight terms),¹² as well as the punishments to be meted out for their violation. While giving some general instructions such as against using incorrect units of measurement, bearing false witness and cheating customers, they also provide meticulous details about the misdeeds likely to be committed by particular kinds of guildsmen and prohibited such activities even to the extent of issuing regulations on matters that seem trifling. For example, vinegar- and yogurt-makers were not supposed to mix water into their products;¹³ pickle-makers (*turşucular*) were not supposed to mix rotten pickles with good ones; cream-makers (*kaymakçılar*) were not supposed to mix starch with cream; and knife-makers were forbidden to sell western-style (*frenġi*) knives as if they were Damascene (*dimişki*).¹⁴ The *kanunnāmes* also obliged *ih̄tisāb* officials to see to it that the men of the marketplace (that is, the Muslims among them) obeyed religious practices, such as fasting during the month of Ramazan and performing daily prayers. Some regulations were about differentiating Muslims from non-Muslims.¹⁵ The final part of such *ih̄tisāb* codes usually orders the *ih̄tisāb* officials even to restrict the alms-begging activities of beggars and mendicants, although this is not so bizarre given they must have been an integral part of public spaces, including the markets.

The contents of the *kanunnāmes* reveal much about the government's general viewpoint on the guilds and how to control them. The controls and punishments, if not the tax collection, stipulated

¹¹ Sales tax (*bac-i bazar*) and scale tax (*resm-i kaġan*).

¹² *Kanunnāmes* were intended to be long-lasting price registers (*narġ defterleri*). Kütükoġlu, *Narġ Defteri*, 25.

¹³ Barkan, "Bazı Büyük Şehirde Eşya ve Yiyecek Fiyatlarının Tesbit ve Teftişi Hususlarını Tanzim Eden Kanunlar," *Tarih Vesikaları* I-5 (1942) 338. This is a translation of the *ih̄tisāb kanunnāme* for Istanbul made in 1501.

¹⁴ Ahmet Akgündüz, ed., *Osmanlı Kanunnāmeleri*, 9: 530. Also, needle-sellers (*iġneciler*) were forbidden to sell their needles saying that they were "Dimişki (Damascene)," which indicates that the word was reserved for high quality metal goods.

¹⁵ Such as dress code (non-Muslims could not dress like Muslims) and the mandatory use of different sets of instruments in barber shops and baths (e.g., Akgündüz, ed. *Osmanlı Kanunnāmeleri*, 9: 532–533). However, given that the office of *muġtesib* became a tax-farm concerned with tax collecting more than anything else, the aspect of religious supervision among his duties may well have waned.

in the *kanunnāmes* are based on a moral discourse with a slight religious tint. In this discourse, what mattered was not economic efficiency or profitability, but morality and justice. The *kanunnāmes* saw the tradesmen as subjects requiring close monitoring and restriction from a moralist position. This aspect is clear from the way the *kanunnāmes* convey their injunctions.

The *kanunnāmes* often strike a note of suspicion concerning the morals of craftsmen and service workers.¹⁶ Sometimes explicitly and sometimes implicitly, they indicate that the guildsmen would and did cause disorder in the marketplace by, for example, arbitrarily raising prices if the government did not strictly apply price ceilings.¹⁷ The fact that *ih̄tisāb* officials supervised lowly social groups such as beggars and lepers as well as regular guilds might (or might not) indicate that, in the eyes of the authorities, guildsmen were clearly far from being the most respectable of social groups.¹⁸ Indeed, artisans and service workers were not the most trusted elements of Ottoman society. Even though they formed a legitimate part of the society comprised of elements that complemented one another in a “circle of justice” (*dā’ire-i ‘adliye*),¹⁹ the tradesmen apparently were

¹⁶ My impression from the *kanunnāmes* is that the state understood artisans and service workers as individuals rather than as groups when it came to control and supervision. They never (at least up to the early seventeenth century) mention any possibility of control through the guilds, and not even the formal existence of guilds. They refer to amorphous “bakers” instead of to a “bakers’ guild.” Even if the word *tā’ife* is used, that does not necessarily indicate the existence of an organized body.

¹⁷ ‘Abdurrahman Paşa, “Kanunnāme,” *Millî Tettebû’ Mecmuası* III, 505, and Hezarfen Hüseyin, *Telh̄is ü’l-Beyân*, ed. Sevim İlgürel (Ankara: TTK, 1998) beginning of Chapter 11. “Narh,” 298. The *kanunnāme* of Süleyman the Magnificent also states that the purpose of the chapter on *ih̄tisāb* was to supervise the market because the tradesmen of Istanbul had been arbitrarily charging whatever prices they wanted (Akgündüz, ed. *Osmanlı Kanunnameleri*, vol. 4, 323).

¹⁸ Surely it is possible that the government charged the *muhtesib* with supervising all the guilds and the beggars on the streets together simply because they shared the same public spaces regardless of their social esteem.

¹⁹ Fleischer, “Royal Authority” 200–202. “Circle of justice” was a political theory that various social and political elements including the sultanic authority, justice, military and the subjects such as farmers, merchants and artisans were mutually dependent upon. One element could not dispense with another according to this idea. Similar thoughts about justice existed as early as in Sassanian Persia. See Lambton, “Justice in the Medieval Persian Theory of Kingship” *Studia Islamica* 17, (1962) 96–97. Such ideas reemerged in post-Mongolian political philosophy, as in Nasir al-Din Tusi (d. 1274)’s *Ahlāq-i Nāsiri*. The Ottoman intellectuals of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries (for example, Kınalızade ‘Ali Efendi, Mustafā ‘Ali, and Na’ima) enthusiastically accepted the scheme, and to them, justice as the counterbalance to sultanic authority was of utmost importance.

considered only mediocre in comparison to others. Osman Nuri talks at some length about the negative social stereotype attributed to guildsmen.²⁰ Mehmed Halife, in his *Tārīḫ-i Gilmāni*, imputes the devastating fire and ensuing famine of 1660 to the immorality of Istanbulites and the corresponding scourge of God. He criticizes tradesmen for bringing about the calamity by using all kinds of trickery in their business, not caring for the poor, and indulging in treachery and bribery.²¹ Although there is no direct evidence that these negative images of tradesmen affected the state's position vis-à-vis the guilds, the tone of mistrust in the *kanunnāmes* seems to be consistent with the negative stereotypes found in other sources.

Secondly, the degree of intended control expressed in the law codes was different depending on the type of guild. While many of the regulations were specific and even meticulous, the amount of such specific regulations directed at different guilds varied greatly. While they laid out a very detailed set of regulations regarding basic foodstuff suppliers such as bakers and butchers,²² other groups that might have been considered marginal (e.g., thread-makers and shoetip-makers) were not given such detailed regulations. The number of regulations applied to individual guilds was therefore disparate. Some guilds were mentioned in only one line that stated they were also under the supervision of *iḥtisāb* officials and they should produce goods of high quality.²³ When comparing these stock phrases to the detailed regulations affecting bakers and butchers, it becomes clear that the government's control over the guilds was never intended to

²⁰ The word "*herif*," which means a person working in a trade, had negative connotations such as "common (*ādi*)," "tactless (*nādān*)" and "vulgar (*lehce*)." These stereotypes allegedly even go back to the time of the Abbasids(!) (See *Mecelle*, I: 511–12). Nuri's statement is not at all time-specific, and it is unclear how such negative images evolved. One should also differentiate various trades that could not have had the same social standing. At least some trades were susceptible to social prejudices for known and unknown reasons at any given time. Those related to money-changing, blood, death, filth, baths or entertainment were usually mistrusted or despised. See, for example, Brunschvig, "Metiers vils en Islam," *Etude d'islamologie* (Paris, 1976) 149.

²¹ Mehmed Halife, *Tārīḫ-i Gilmāni*, ed. by Kamil Su (Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı, 1999) 94–100.

²² The stricter control of such basic guilds is also corroborated by the *kadi* court records. For example, there was an order to the effect that the assistants (*nā'ibler*) of the *kadi* in various districts of Istanbul should not adjudicate in proceedings involving bakers or cooks but refer the cases to the central court of Istanbul (IK 10: 154b).

²³ For example, cream and cheese dealers, linen-sellers and cotton-sellers (Akgündüz, ed. *Osmanlı Kanunnameleri*, 9: 527, 532).

be uniform. The following is the stipulation as to how the bakers should be controlled in Ahmed I's *kanunnāme*.

[Addressing the *muhtesib*]

Supervise the bakers' bread, cornbread (*kirde*) of the cornbread bakers, and *çörek*s (round cakes) of *çörek*-bakers so that they are not half-baked, black or sour. If the products weigh less [than the standard weight], the *kadi* should censure the baker and take 1 *akçe* of fine per each missing dirham (= about 3 grams). Their sieves should be dense and good. If there are half-baked, sour, black or burnt [loaves], punish the bakers soundly. In addition, their experts (*ehl-i hibresi*) [who have a say in deciding guild affairs and price setting] should not be selected from among themselves, but the consumers ("*yiyici ta'yfesinden*"—literally, those who eat). *Çörek*s and bread should be made by halves (*nisf işlene*). Have them mix 7 *vukiyye* (= 400 dirham = 1.282945 kg) of oil into 1 *müdd* (= 20 *kile* = 513.160 kg) of flour, and produce [bread] very cleanly. Let them bake oil-less *çörek* and cornbread for fixed prices. Have them produce cleanly, and bread should always be found without being short in supply.²⁴

The uneven degrees of regulations given to various guilds mentioned in the *kanunnāmes* summarily show us the inevitable incompleteness of government control. The number of *ih̄tisāb* officials and police, many of whom were abusive and poorly disciplined, may not have been adequate to ensure the close but fair control of every single trade in the market. Often, their powers of inspection could not even touch guildsmen who were connected with senior dignitaries. Therefore, the government must have practically concentrated its capacity of supervision on some key guilds and left the others on a loose rein. After all, as mentioned in Chapter III, the final sections of the *ih̄tisāb kanunnāmes* tend to admit that they did not cover all the existing guilds, but still claim that those who were not covered were nonetheless under the control of *ih̄tisāb* officials. One may suspect that government authorities did not even know the full gamut of the existing guilds, and acknowledged their legitimacy without even knowing who and what they were.²⁵ In such a situation, one can easily doubt that the authorities had control over the unmentioned guilds in any way. The number of guilds covered by the *kanunnāmes* increased as time passed, but the foodstuff and daily necessity guilds remained the most heavily

²⁴ Akgündüz, ed. *Osmanlı Kanunnameleri*, 9: 525.

²⁵ Akgündüz, ed. *Osmanlı Kanunnameleri*, 9: 533.

represented, since they were the groups important to control from the government's point of view.²⁶

In this context, the nature and strength of the government's supervision of the guilds is called into question. Doubtless, the government tried to maintain firm control over key provisioning trades to ensure stability and peace in the capital city, but beyond that one might question the seriousness of the government's intentions, given the scanty regulations prescribed for some groups. In addition, the government alone must have found it difficult to make regulations without the help of the guilds. We may surmise that the rules detailing production standards in the *kanunnāmes* were set out in consultation with experts inside the guilds, just as the government consulted guild experts when fixing prices (*narh*). In addition, because the regulations stipulated in the *kanunnāmes* were incomplete and could not cover the entire gamut of production and sales activities the guilds engaged in, they had to be complemented by individual edicts and by the internal rules of each trade.

We also need to consider the complexity of the government's view of the guilds. The guilds were simultaneously objects of suspicion and handy sources of revenue. At the same time, they comprised a large chunk of Istanbul's population that the state needed to appease or even rely upon in occasional emergencies.

As pointed out before, there was great anxiety on the government's part that the guildsmen would engage in business with a selfish motivation, thus driving price levels up. This government concern must have been grounded in observed reality, since it was expressed repeatedly by the *kanunnāmes*, and guildsmen may well have paid respect to *narh* only in the presence of *ih̄tisāb* officials. It was perhaps on the assumption that the men of the marketplace were making illicit profits more than what they were legally entitled to that the government sometimes used them as a handy source of emergency revenue. There are at least two examples of this in the mid-seventeenth century, although these examples may not count as normal fiscal events carefully planned by the finance department. The first is under Sultan Ibrahim (r. 1640–48), who blatantly confiscated qual-

²⁶ Guilds that produced food, textiles or shoes account for about half of all those mentioned in both the *ih̄tisāb kanunnāme* of 1501 (slightly more than 30) and that of Ahmed I (approximately 76).

ity goods from shops in the Istanbul markets.²⁷ In 1651, when the janissary officers' power was at its apogee, the government once again collected a multitude of irregular taxes from the marketplace, including payments not due until the year after, and this act angered the guildsmen to the point of rebellion (see section d).

Nonetheless, the authorities could not always resort to such hard-line policies. Although the state thought the tradesmen deceitful, it could not afford to squeeze them infinitely. As Ottoman subjects whose grievances the sultan had to take care of, guildsmen had the right to appeal to the *divân* court of the sultan, who was expected to uphold justice.²⁸ Although emergency situations such as wars did suspend normal consideration of subjects' concerns, at least in theory, the sultan could not allow his officials to act unjustly toward his subjects, much less inflict excessive burdens on them himself.

Guildsmen not only had the right to be heard as Ottoman subjects, but they also formed a large societal group in Istanbul that had political potential. Guildsmen, depending on circumstances, could become either rebels against or supporters of the faction in power at a specific moment. Since any political event in the capital city could have serious repercussions, the state had to be careful not to alienate the guilds. The guild processions featured in the grand imperial festivals for a circumcision or wedding in the imperial family are examples of the efforts of the state to incorporate the guilds on the symbolic and ideological level. The spectacle of guild parades always ended with guildsmen paying homage to the sultan and exchanging gifts with him.²⁹

Therefore, despite its declared mistrust of the guilds and intention to control them, the government in reality focused its surveillance on those that handled daily necessities. The authorities showed a

²⁷ Na'ima, 4: 287–91 (1058/1648).

²⁸ Uriel Heyd, *Studies in Old Ottoman Criminal Law*, ed. V.L. Menage (London: Oxford University Press, 1973) 227–228.

²⁹ For example, the circumcision festival under Murad III (1582) was held on an unprecedentedly large scale to distract the discontent of the people at a time of political and economic crises (inflation was picking up, the war with Persia went on intermittently, and the assassination of Mehmed Sokollu Paşa had recently shaken the political elite). Derin Terzioğlu, "The Circumcision Festival of 1582: An Interpretation," *Muqamas* 12 (1995) 85. For an overview of the literature describing such imperial festivals, see Mehmet Arslan, *Türk Edebiyatında Manzum Surnameleler* (Ankara: Atatürk Kültür Merkezi, 1999).

more relaxed attitude in dealing with guilds that were less important in terms of provisioning. Absolute control was not necessary as long as the government could maintain a rapport with the guilds.³⁰ State officials and the court, besides ensuring that guilds abided by the rules and paid taxes, were also consumers who needed the unhindered functioning of the guilds to maintain their own levels of comfort. In addition, the government had to maintain good public relations with the guilds by upholding the ideology of justice and by publicly displaying mutual goodwill during occasional imperial ceremonies. However stiff the stipulations in the *kanunnāmes* sounded, the government could not simply command or rule over the guilds at will.

b. *Government Involvement in the Guild System*

The Ottoman government was extensively involved in the economic system of Istanbul within which the guilds operated, although it did not interfere with intra- or inter-guild matters that the guilds themselves could arrange. Government involvement had a tremendous effect on the conditions of the guilds and made up a large part of the guild system. The state was greatly interested in ensuring that the guilds were able to carry on business, pay taxes, perform services for various government branches, provide city dwellers with inexpensive daily necessities, and engage in fair economic activities.³¹ Thus, the authorities intervened in different aspects of guild activities through various channels of the state apparatus, though such interventions never amounted to absolute control of the guilds.³² I will explain some of the major aspects of state intervention in the following sections, although they are by no means the only arenas of government activity affecting the guilds: i. providing physical infrastructure and sufficient raw materials; ii. market supervision and price fixing; and iii. collection of regular and irregular taxes.

³⁰ Here, one may be reminded of Mantran's argument that such rapport helped the government direct the guilds more easily. See his *Istanbul*, 357, 378.

³¹ Mehmet Genç, "Osmanlı Esnafı ve Devletle İlişkileri," *Ahilik ve Esnaf* (Istanbul: Yaylacık Matbaası, 1986) 122–123. Since the government knew very well that guildsmen were allowed only small profit margins, it had to protect and privilege them in other ways.

³² Şevket Pamuk, *A Monetary History of the Ottoman Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000) 72–74 raises doubts about the extent to which the Ottoman government could intervene in the economy. Certainly there was a gap between the government's aspirations and reality.

i. *Infrastructure and Provisioning*

Ever since Mehmed the Conqueror captured Istanbul and began a program of rebuilding and repopulating the city, feeding and providing for the people of the new capital, as well as for the palace and military personnel, became an important issue. The government required that wholesale merchants bring in sufficient supplies of grain, sheep and other daily necessities, and that artisans and service workers as small producers and vendors sell their finished products at affordable prices. The construction of mosque complexes commissioned by the sultans, imperial family and senior bureaucrats over the space of a couple of centuries not only met the need for religious worship and learning, but it also satisfied the demand for business premises, since most of the *waqf* complexes had arcades of stores and workshops either in the same location or in another district of the city. In the seventeenth century, the building boom of the previous century had stalled, but some new complexes were built such as Ahmed I's in At Meydanı (The Byzantine Hippodrome) and Yeni Cami (including the Spice Bazaar)³³ in the sea customs area (Eminönü) of Istanbul. Most Ottoman guildsmen did not own their workshops but instead rented space from either charitable foundations—of which mosque complexes counted as the grandest examples—or from private owners of real estate. The revenue collected from shops under royal *waqfs* went into the personal treasury of the sultan (*iç hazineleri*), which was also a part of the state's finances. Therefore, the state and many of the guildsmen were indirectly involved in a landlord-tenant relationship through the medium of royal *waqfs*.³⁴ The state not only provided shops, markets and factories to tradesmen, but also wholesale distribution centers (*kapanlar*) and piers. As early as the reign of Mehmed II, the sultan ordered the building of a council house for tradesmen (*Ehl-i hıref Divānhanesi*) near Un Kapanı so that tradesmen and *ih̄tisāb* officials could consult with one another.³⁵ In many ways, the government provided much of the environment and basic infrastructure within which businesses operated.

³³ Also known as Mısır Çarşısı, one of the largest markets in Istanbul.

³⁴ This relationship put the government in a difficult position when there were disputes between the royal *waqfs* and guilds. The government under Selim III had to accept the guildsmen's pleas that they pay customary rents and be protected from eviction, in view of the principle of "public benefit." See Akarlı, "The Uses of Law," 13–15.

³⁵ Nuri, *Mecelle* (new), 2: 765, 843, 3: 1527.

Not only did the state provide the necessary infrastructure, but it also took pains to secure sufficient quantities of goods, especially foodstuffs, for the city. Of course, this was very important for the food-producing guildsmen in terms of acquiring raw materials for their trades, and for the common populace of the city in terms of their survival, but it was also intended to ensure the upkeep of the palace and the military. The most important two items were wheat/flour and meat. The provisionist policy for Istanbul was promoted even to the degree of distorting the economy of the rest of the empire.

As for grain, the authorities were actively involved in its transportation, storage and distribution. The government commissioned ships to bring in grain and flour, spending huge sums of money to do so, and required customs dues only once in order not to drive prices up. Officials punished sea captains severely for delays or deviations in delivery, and the bakers' guild pressured the government to secure the grain it needed on time.³⁶ In addition, the state provided the city with many silos along the Golden Horn that could accommodate the huge supplies coming from the provinces and made sure that the grain was processed and distributed adequately to the bakers at the Flour Exchange (Un Kapanı).³⁷ In the 1501 *kanunnāme*, the bakers were asked to procure in advance a sufficient amount of wheat/flour to ensure at least a month's consumption, and if possible two months.³⁸

In meat provisioning as well, the government tried to secure enough sheep to satisfy the city's demand. It devised a complex system of sheep-delivery to the capital and controlled slaughtering in the sixteenth century.³⁹ Even the prices of meat in provincial towns were marked

³⁶ For a detailed description of the process of grain transportation to Istanbul and government supervision over it, see Salih Aynural, *İstanbul Değirmenleri ve fırınları: Zahire Ticareti (1740–1840)* (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı, 2001) 5–51.

³⁷ İnalçık, *Economic and Social History*, 181–2. Also, see Rhoads Murphey, "Provisioning Istanbul: The State and Subsistence in the Early Modern Middle East," *Food and Foodways* 2 (1988) 221–238.

³⁸ Barkan, "Bazı Büyük Şehirlerde Eşya ve Yiyecek Fiyatlarının Tesbit ve Teftişi Hususlarını Tanzim Eden Kanunlar," *Tarih Vesikaları* I–5 (1942) 336.

³⁹ Antony Greenwood, "Istanbul's Meat Provisioning: A Study of *Celepkeşan* System," Ph.D. Dissertation, the University of Chicago, 1988, "Introduction." According to him, the system of sheep driving was a new concept in that it incorporated provisioning measures into the category of *'avāriż*. The sheep drivers were exempt from other irregular taxation in return for their sheep-driving to Istanbul. See also Bistra Cvetkova, "Les *celep* et leur rôle dans la vie économique des Balkans à l'époque Ottomane (XV^e–XVIII^e s.)," in *Studies in the Economic History of the Middle East from the Rise of Islam to the Present Day*, ed. Michael A. Cook (London: Oxford University Press, 1970) 172–92.

lower in order to provide extra motivation for registered sheep drivers (*celepler*) to bring their flocks of sheep to Istanbul and not sell them off on the way. The *celepkeşan* system began malfunctioning in the face of the economic crisis at the end of the sixteenth century because of the extraordinary burden it placed on the sheep deliverers. However, the government kept relying on sheep drivers to procure sufficient numbers of sheep, while trying to minimize any independent trade in sheep.⁴⁰ Once the sheep arrived in the capital, the butchers first supplied the palace and barracks with meat⁴¹ and then sold the rest to the populace.⁴² The butchery trade in Istanbul was not very lucrative in the seventeenth century because butchers were compelled to sell meat to the janissaries at rates below the official prices.⁴³

Beyond its supplies of staple foods, Istanbul was privileged in terms of the procurement of all kinds of other foodstuffs and necessities, ranging from fruits and nuts to olive oil and soap.⁴⁴ The government took its function of creating and maintaining an urban environment suitable for people to live and do business in seriously, even though it might have been a by-product of palace-centered thinking. Although Istanbul was privileged at the expense of other regions, its example clearly shows how the government made things possible for civilian businesses, even as it controlled and squeezed them.

ii. *Market Supervision and Price Fixing*

In the context of the economic order envisaged by the Ottoman government, it was very important to ensure that the goods and services provided to the people were plentiful, inexpensive and of good quality. In so doing, the state had to devise institutions that would enforce its will over the market. There were various cooperative branches of the government involved in controlling the functions of the guild system, some of which concentrated on the marketplace more than others did.

Even a high-ranking bureaucrat such as the grand vizier was involved in the affairs of the Istanbul marketplace, and his involvement

⁴⁰ Cvetkova, 188.

⁴¹ The seventeenth-century janissary butchers were subsidized (probably by *żarar-i kaşşabiyye* tax [= a general customs due of 1 percent]) to sell at low prices. Evliya, ed. Gökyay, 244.

⁴² MD 81: 200/448.

⁴³ Greenwood, 213–216.

⁴⁴ See Daniel Goffman, *Izmir and the Levantine World, 1550–1650* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1990) 72.

summarily suggests the centrality of Istanbul to the empire. The imperial bureaucracy was not completely separate from that of Istanbul's, since the city was indeed the abode of the sultanate (*Dār ü'l-Saltanat*). The *mufti* of Istanbul was the head of the *ulema* for the whole empire. Likewise, the grand vizier was personally in charge of the city's administration, which was transferred to his lieutenant vizier (*kaymakam paşa*) when he was physically outside the city. The grand vizier controlled a police force consisting of various military elements with which to keep the urban population in order.⁴⁵ Evliya Çelebi relates that the grand vizier patrolled the markets every Wednesday, dropping by the Tradesmen's Council House (*Ehl-i hîref Divânhanesi*) at the Flour Exchange, the Pavilion (*Çardak*) at Fruit Pier (*Yemiş İskelesi*), the Vegetable Market Council House (*Sebzehane Divânhanesi*), and the Butchery (*Sallahane*) in Eminönü to hold hearings (*divân*).⁴⁶ During this routine procession he was accompanied by the *kadi* of Istanbul and the *muhtesib*, among other officials.⁴⁷ Such market patrols headed by the grand vizier, however, had probably become less frequent in the seventeenth century. According to 'Abdurrahman Paşa's *kanunnâme* (1676), the grand vizier was expected to lead the market patrol (*kol dolaşmak* or *gezmek*) only "occasionally (*ahyānan*)."⁴⁸ However, even the sultan went out to the markets in disguise when there were severe shortages.⁴⁹

Since the grand vizier was busy with all kinds of state affairs, much of the administration of the city was left to the *kadi*. Although the *kadi*'s original duty was the application of *sharia* over individuals,⁵⁰ an Ottoman *kadis*' jurisdiction extended far beyond. He was responsible for the implementation of the *kanun* (laws legislated by the sultanic authority) as well as the *sharia*, and this sometimes required adjusting the latter. In addition, various administrative directives and

⁴⁵ Janissaries, cavalrymen (*sipahi*), *cebecis*, *topçus*, *bostancis*, *tüfengcis* and *mataracis*, and so on according to Evliya's description. Hammer's translation, vol. 1, pt. 1, 52, Gökyay edition, 47–48.

⁴⁶ Evliya, ed. Gökyay, 47–48. Evliya says the purpose of the hearings were to fix official prices, but it is not likely that prices were reset every week.

⁴⁷ Küttükoğlu, *Narh Defteri* (19–20), gives a detailed description with a diagram of the grand vizier's procession into the markets.

⁴⁸ 'Abdurrahman Paşa *Kanunnamesi*, 499. The *kaymakam* also took over many duties of the grand vizier regarding the administration of the city (Necdet Sakaoglu, "Vezirazam," *İstA*², 7: 384–386).

⁴⁹ İnalcık, *Economic and Social History*, 179.

⁵⁰ *Kadi* courts were originally designed to deal with lawsuits between individuals and were aimed at protecting individual rights (Heyd, 208–09, based on Mawardi).

the responses to all petitions from common people were sent to the *kadi* for him to carry out. In this way, as Mantran has pointed out, the *kadi* played a crucial role in the rapport between the state and the people. He was also involved in the process of securing foodstuffs and raw materials and fixing prices.⁵¹ In performing his primary duty as a judge, he adjudicated many disputes among guilds and guildsmen, arbitrated between quarreling parties through *muşlihūn* (mediators),⁵² and notarized contracts and agreements. The *kadi* delegated his authority to assistant *kadis* (sg. *nā'ib*/pl. *navwāb*) in various districts of Istanbul. The *nā'ibs* handled relatively unimportant matters independently, while they transferred important cases to the central *kadi* court.⁵³ Galata, Eyüb and Üsküdar each had its own *kadi*, and the four *kadis* of Greater Istanbul cooperated to administer the metropolis. The *kadi* of Istanbul had preeminence in price-fixing for the whole area, but the three other *kadis* were by-and-large independent within their own jurisdictions.⁵⁴

The duty of actually supervising daily market activities, however, was in the hands of the *muhtesib*, also known as the *ihtisāb ağası*. The weekly patrol by the grand vizier, as regular as it was, could not sufficiently cover the whole city; his route was limited to the vicinity of Un Kaparı and Eminönü, the food distribution centers near the piers of the Golden Horn, thus epitomizing the importance of foodstuff provisioning in the economic administration of Istanbul. While the grand vizier's involvement in the market was probably on a ritual and symbolic level only, the *muhtesib* and his men were in charge of policing the marketplace on a daily basis. The *muhtesib* was technically a subordinate of the *kadi*. He was expected to report all serious violations of market regulations that were punishable by execution to the *kadi*, although *ihtisāb* officials were capable of punishing minor violators on the spot.⁵⁵ There were four *muhtesibs* respectively

⁵¹ The *kadi* was held responsible for the failure in adequately supplying the city with raw materials. Karaçelebizade 'Abdülaziz almost got executed by Murad IV after a shortage of plain oil (1044/1633). He was considered culpable because the supply shortage allegedly related to his mismanagement of *narh* (Na'ima, vol. 3, 1266–67).

⁵² Heyd, 247.

⁵³ Since most of the *kadis* of Istanbul in the seventeenth century held the office only for a year or so (Rakim Ziyaoğlu, *İstanbul Kadıları, Şehreminleri, Belediye Re'isleri ve Partiler Tarihi: 1453–1971* [Istanbul: İsmail Akgün Matbaası, 1971] 56–58) perhaps the assistant *kadis* played an important role in ensuring the consistency of the administrative and legal procedures.

⁵⁴ Reşat Ekrem Koçu, "Bilād-i selāse," *İstA*¹.

⁵⁵ Heyd, 232.

under the *kadis* of Istanbul, Galata, Eyüb and Üsküdar in the greater Istanbul area.⁵⁶ According to Evliya Çelebi, the men of the Istanbul *muhtesib*, who were called *kol oğlanları*, numbered 300 (in 1638).⁵⁷ These *ihtisab* officials saw to it that tradesmen observed the fixed prices, did not cheat their customers and paid *ihtisab* taxes. The *kanunnāmes* stipulate that they should watch over religious observance in the marketplace, but we do not know how actively they did so.⁵⁸

The institution of *muhtesib* goes back a long way to the classical age of Islam, and its purpose was “enjoining good and forbidding evil (*emr bi'l-ma'arif ve nahy 'anü'l-münker*)” in the marketplace. Before Ottoman times, the duty of the *muhtesib* was centered around the supervision and exhortation of religious morality in the market; it did not have the strong administrative/punitive power of its Ottoman counterpart. The administrative purpose expressed itself much more clearly in the office of *muhtesib* in the Ottoman period, involving price setting and summary punishments on sight. Although price setting practices had been approved in cases of dearth in Islamic traditions, despite some objection to it based on a *hadith* going back to Prophet Muhammad, it was not usually associated with the office of *muhtesib* before Ottoman times.⁵⁹

The office of the *muhtesib* became a tax-farm early on. The exact time is not known, but this was certainly the case by the middle of the seventeenth century.⁶⁰ Therefore, by definition, anybody of either a military or civilian background⁶¹ who had enough money to be

⁵⁶ Osman Nuri, *Mecelle* (new), 1: 317.

⁵⁷ Evliya, ed. Gökyay, 260. Cf. Mantran in “Hisba,” *ET*² says there were 56 *kol oğlanları*. The leaders of *kol oğlanları* were called entitled “*terazu-başı*,” meaning the head of the scales. This title may have stemmed from their examining the measures of the shopkeepers.

⁵⁸ *Ihtisab* duties relevant to religious observances may well have been marginal, since the *ihtisab kanunnāmes* for Bursa and Edirne compiled under Bayezid II did not refer to them.

⁵⁹ Kafadar, “State Supervision over the Marketplace: Thoughts on Ottoman Market Codes in the Light of the Book of the Eparch” (unpublished conference paper). The price setting practices may have had to do with those of the Byzantines, although this is not to say that the *muhtesib* was a direct successor of the Byzantine tradition. Also, see “Hisba,” *ET*².

⁶⁰ Beldiceanu, *Recherché sur la ville Ottomane au XV^e siècle: Etude et Actes* (Paris, Librairie d’Amerique et d’Orient, 1973) 78–79. In the fifteenth century, some *muhtesibs* benefited from *timars*, although their offices were partly tax-farms. By the seventeenth century, the office of *muhtesib* had become a full tax-farm (Mantran, Istanbul, 143–46). For an example, see Topkapı archives, E. 7002/82 (Sometime between 1650 and 55). An *ihtisab ağa*-ship was described as a *mukata'a* (tax source to farm out).

⁶¹ Akgündüz, ed. *Osmanlı Kanunnameleri*, 9: 525. This *kanunnāme* has a stipulation

the highest bidder could acquire the position, which was auctioned every year. However, I am inclined to think that the position was more appropriate for an ex-military officer,⁶² who would be at ease with commanding his assistants (*kol ođlanları*), some of whom had janissary backgrounds.⁶³ Given Evliya Çelebi's account, in which the *kol ođlanları* were likened to executioners, they must have been feared greatly by tradesmen. Indeed their "oppression," particularly that of the janissaries, reached such a degree that the *ih̄tisāb* tax register had to be rearranged in the late seventeenth century.⁶⁴ The *muhtesib*'s daily inspection rounds not only entailed his assistants but also the regular police forces of *subaşı*s (originally, army commanders) and *asesbaşı*s (also called *pāsban*). Consequently, there was a strong potential for the military connection to take root in the *ih̄tisāb* cadre.

The most notable elements of *ih̄tisāb* control were price-fixing and enforcing fixed prices (*narh*), although they also included controlling product quality⁶⁵ and collecting *ih̄tisāb* dues. The *ih̄tisāb* cadre, in principle, was expected to allow no goods to be sold without *narh* and to inspect every trade.⁶⁶ Fixed prices were always the maximum prices allowed, or price ceilings, reflecting the Ottoman administrative concern with keeping price levels low. The *muhtesib* was in charge of the process of price-fixing, and he had the fixed prices reported to and registered by the *kadi*. In particular, the *muhtesib* was supposed to set the prices of meat and bread with extreme care (*nihāyet derecede diđkat idüp*)—he had to consult various groups of people before actually setting the prices, including notables, poor people and experts

regarding the process of punishing the *muhtesib* when he had acted unjustly. The law code provides what was to be done should he be from a trade background or he was from the sultan's household (*kapıkulu*). Although this *kanunnāme* did not particularly address Istanbul, it shows that in principle anyone could become a *muhtesib*.

⁶² Yaşar Yücel, ed., *Kıtab-ı Mesālihi'l-Muslīmān ve Menāfi'i'l-Mü'minīn* (Ankara: Ankara University Press, 1981) 69–71. This anonymous treatise describes an ideal *muhtesib* as a person from an *altı bölük* (central cavalry) or *muteferrika* (elite group at the court) background who also is learned (*ehl-i 'ilm*). The author is thought to be from the *ulema* and he poignantly criticizes the injustice done by the *muhtesib*, but he still does not demand that a non-military man be appointed to the office.

⁶³ Necdet Sakaođlu, "İhtisāb" in *İstA*² vol. 4, 143–144. He mentions without further specification that the *ih̄tisāb* assistants were made up of selected soldiers from the 56th battalion (*orta*) of janissaries and tradesmen who knew the traditions of the market.

⁶⁴ The *ih̄tisāb* register of 1092/1681 (AK, MC, B.2) was compiled in order to prohibit the *ih̄tisāb* cadre from collecting illicit dues not registered in the defter.

⁶⁵ For examples of regulations on quality control, see section a) of this chapter.

⁶⁶ Akgündüz, ed. *Osmanlı Kanunnameleri*, 9: 525.

who were well versed in the bakery and butchery businesses.⁶⁷ This indicates that it was more important to keep the prices of staples such as bread and meat low in comparison to other commodities. Perhaps the *muhtesib* took less care in determining the official prices of other goods, although he was expected to consult experts involved with the trade in each case. After defining production cost, a 10 percent profit margin was usually added (20 percent for particularly skilled crafts) when setting the fixed prices.⁶⁸ The consultations must have formed a built-in negotiation process in determining *narh*.

In reality, however, the above-mentioned rules of price-fixing did not always apply. The price of some commodities could be set by agreements between related guilds without government supervision. As mentioned before, the snow/ice dealers and sherbet makers consulted one another about the price of supplying ice.⁶⁹ Additionally, the *çömlekçi* (potters) guild and their suppliers could apparently determine the prices of goods, since they registered the agreed-upon price of cups (*bardaklar*) after consultation.⁷⁰ Moreover, as the 1640 *narh* register shows, the authorities even approved that extraordinary products made by renowned masters commanded higher profit margins than did the normal products of the same trades.⁷¹

It is difficult to know how firm the *ihtisab* control of the marketplace was and how faithfully tradesmen respected and observed the fixed prices. Although *ihtisab* officials made daily inspection tours of Istanbul shop by shop to collect daily dues (*yevmiye-i dekakin*), if not

⁶⁷ Akgündüz, ed. *Osmanlı Kanunnameleri*, 9: 524. “Ahvâl-i İhtisab.”

⁶⁸ Kafadar, “When Coins Turned into Drops of Dew,” 130. The institution of *narh* was, therefore, based on the concept of “fair gain,” which was never fully elaborated. The fixed prices were supposed to protect not only “poor consumers” but also the treasury.

⁶⁹ IK 5: 40a/272, IK 10: 72a.

⁷⁰ IK 3: 62b/522 (1027/1618). Those who brought cups from Dimetoka for the potters wanted to raise the prices saying that they were not in common demand; the potters and their suppliers reset prices of two kinds of cups, respectively at 2.5 and 2 *akçe*. Various kinds of Dimetoka cups, according to the price registers of 1640, were worth between 1 and 2 *akçe*, although it is unclear if they were exactly the same kind.

⁷¹ Kütükoğlu, *Narh Defteri*, 58. She lists 35 masters of 17 guilds that were allowed special prices. The 17 guilds were: the shoemakers (*ayakkabıcılar*), coppersmiths (*bakarcılar*), seal-makers (*mühürçüler*), clock-makers (*saatçılar*), bow-makers (*yaycılar*), pillow-makers (*yasdıkçılar*), pen-case makers (*devatçılar*), bridle-makers (*genciler*), tinsmiths (*kalaycılar*), pen-knife makers (*kalemtraşçılar*), soft candy makers (*ma'cuncular*), bookbinders (*mücellidler*), brass workers (*pirinç esyacılar*), makers of reading desks (*rahleciler*), makers of prayer rug (*seccadeciler*) and makers of janissary hats (*yünlükçüler*).

for other reasons, it must have been impossible to have the tradesmen carry out every transaction according to *narh*. In fact, a joke about *narh* in a sixteenth-century collection claimed that salespeople quoted the fixed prices only when *ih̄tisāb* officials were around and otherwise sold their goods at higher prices.⁷² While this joke may well have had much truth to it, the Istanbul guildsmen may not have supported total freedom pricing their goods if it meant “disorderly” competition and an inequitable distribution of profit. Equally, the guildsmen were keen on having the prices of their raw materials remain stable. There are actually cases of petitions from guilds requesting that the government end the disorder in pricing the goods they bought.⁷³ Established guilds did not like the disorder caused by competition among their members, and price-fixing was a useful way to curb internal competition. The observance of *narh* was a criterion of moral legitimacy. Guildsmen tended to present themselves to the authorities as conscientious tradesmen selling goods in line with *narh* and paying due taxes, and there was a general moral repugnance of those who sold above *narh*, not to mention profiteers. There were guildsmen who accused other members of violating the fixed prices.⁷⁴ Therefore, even if many guildsmen may have deviated from the fixed prices in a small-scale fashion daily, they still thought *narh* was a useful guideline for their guilds and for the system as a whole. The fixed prices, after all, reflected the guilds’ estimate of their own costs, and they may well have had some room to maneuver in their report of costs. If they did not like the fixed prices they could, at least in principle, appeal to the *kadi* or take the case to the *divān* court.⁷⁵

Despite the consultations inherent in the process of price-fixing, the fixed maximum prices could be a heavy burden for tradesmen, especially during the tumultuous monetary history of the seventeenth-century Ottoman Empire (see Chapter I). When prices rose suddenly, the state was forced to devalue the currency to cover war expenditure, which was expanding rapidly due to changing military technology

⁷² Lāmi‘ī, as cited in Kafadar, “State Supervision over the Marketplace,” 20, n. 48.

⁷³ For example, a group of chicken-sellers asked the government to end the disorder regarding the price of chickens that were coming into Istanbul (MD 85: 247/574).

⁷⁴ IK 10: 12b (*çörek*-makers).

⁷⁵ Sahillioğlu, “Osmanlılarda Narh Müessesesi ve 1525 Yılı Sonunda İstanbul’da Fiyatları,” *Belgelerle Türk Tarihi*, 1–1, 38. The bakers of Sarajevo appealed to the *kadi* of their city complaining about the *muhtesib* ignoring the production cost in determining the official prices and they received an imperial order in their favor.

and management. As provincial rebellions became chronic, the government had to resort more often to devaluation to fill the budget deficit, since the revenue from the provinces was spent on suppressing revolts and the transfer of revenue to the center fell sharply. Although there were a few currency reforms (*taşhîh-i sikke*, in 1600, 1618, 1624 and 1640)⁷⁶ to bolster the value of the silver *akçe* in the early seventeenth century, its value fluctuated greatly and on the whole remained on a downward trend. The situation worsened so much that the *akçe* fell into disuse in favor of foreign coins and became merely a unit of account.⁷⁷

For guildsmen this must have been a disadvantage, because their prices were fixed in terms of *akçe*. It seems that the government hoped that the tradesmen and the military would shoulder the side effects of devaluation, putting up with a reduction in their real profits and wages. The authorities made price registers (*narh/es'ar defterleri*) to lower nominal prices whenever they raised the value of silver coins,⁷⁸ whereas they do not seem to have raised prices when devaluing the currency. The value of the *akçe* decreased more than 50 percent over the 40 years between 1600 (1 *altın* = 120 *akçe*) and 1640 (1 *altın* = 250 *akçe*),⁷⁹ but the difference in the listed nominal prices in the two price registers reflect only slight increases over a 40-year interval.⁸⁰ The government seems to have waited until the tradesmen complained about their inability to make profits at the current prices before acting. In some extreme cases, the government may actually have abandoned the principle of negotiation in the process of price fixing in order to keep price levels artificially low. At the height of the Venetian blockade and grain shortage in Ramazan (June–July) 1657, shortly before the Venetians were driven away from the Dardanelles, the official prices were about twice as high as those of 1651 (March and November).⁸¹ Probably even that level of

⁷⁶ Pamuk, "Money," 962.

⁷⁷ Pamuk, "Money," 961–964.

⁷⁸ Mübahat Kütükoğlu, "1009 (1600) Tarihli Narh Defterine Göre İstanbul'da Çeşitli Eşya ve Hizmet Fıatları," *İstanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi Tarih Enstitüsü Dergisi* 9 (1978) 9–13.

⁷⁹ Barkan, "Fiyat Hareketleri," *Belleten* 34/136 (1970) 576–77.

⁸⁰ For example, the official price of bread changed from 200 to 150 *dirhem* per *akçe* (a 33 percent increase in price), and that of meat rose from 8 to 9 *akçe* per *vukıyye* (25 percent). Amazingly enough, prices of some commodities actually went down (Kütükoğlu, *Narh Defteri*, 48–49).

⁸¹ GK 73: 131b, 132a, 136b, 137a, GK 80: 92a.

price increase was the result of government efforts to keep inflation as low as possible.⁸² The blockade, according to Na'ima's account, ratcheted up prices in Istanbul as supplies from the Mediterranean regions were held up in the Dardanelles.⁸³ In such dire conditions, it must have been very difficult for guildsmen to maintain *narh*.⁸⁴

Once the official prices were set, the government seems to have been rather inflexible about the observance of *narh*, at least on the surface. Guildsmen rarely filed petitions asking for changes in fixed prices. Was it because they were mostly content with the official prices of their goods? It is a possibility since prices were fixed in consultation with guild elders, but they could not have been satisfied all the time. In contrast, one finds many repeated government orders to the effect that official prices should be strictly applied, starting with the *kanun-nāmes*. The authorities probably viewed *narh* as enforceable, particularly because prices were fixed through negotiations with the guilds, which had formally agreed to them. It must have been difficult for the tradesmen to resume price negotiations on their own initiative at any time other than during the annual negotiations.⁸⁵ If they were to petition against the prevailing fixed prices, they had to have a good reason for their objection, for example, that the *muhtesib* had not heeded their opinions during the consultation process in the first place.⁸⁶

Therefore, when business situations were unprofitable and the government was adamant about keeping price levels low, it was easier for guildsmen to violate *narh* on a small scale by avoiding the market

⁸² Only a year or so earlier (1655–56) Süleyman Paşa had debased the *akçe* from 70 *akçe* per *esedi guruş* to 110 *akçe* (*Tārīḫ-i Gilmāni*, in Atsız, 57a). Since these devalued coins resulted in a mutiny, it is unclear whether the debased coins were circulated or not. If they did, they would certainly have added to inflationary pressure.

⁸³ Na'ima, 6: 214. He gives only one concrete example, that the price of rice rose up to 150 *akçe* per *kile* (bushel), which used to be about 40 *akçe* in 1640 (Kütükoğlu, *Narh Defteri*). It is unclear whether the price he gave was an official price or not.

⁸⁴ GK 80: 94a (11 Şa'ban 1067/May 25, 1657). There are two documents on this page about price control during the blockade. First, the *kadi* of Galata was urged to take stricter measures using the police forces (*zabitler*) in ensuring the application of official prices. The other is a petition to the sultan of self-defined "poor people (*fukara*)" complaining about butchers who did not sell according to the fixed prices. Additionally, a *bazarbaşı* (head of a market) was appointed to a market in Galata to stop tradesmen from violating price ceilings (GK 80: 91a: 5 Şevval, 1067/July 17, 1657).

⁸⁵ Prices were set before Ramazan, a time of fasting and feasting. Depending on the commodity, different prices were fixed seasonally within a year (Kütükoğlu, *Narh Defteri*, 9–10).

⁸⁶ Sahillioğlu, "Osmanlılarda Narh Müessesesi," 38.

inspector's surveillance than to have the authorities change the official prices. Moreover, they could also try to find a more profitable ways of doing business within the system. There are many petitions to the sultan for licenses to bake special white bread (*hāş ekmek*),⁸⁷ which was sometimes considered an exception to the price control on regular bread and was probably more profitable.⁸⁸ This is perhaps why many military officers invested in white-bread bakeries. In addition, sometimes men of the marketplace bribed the *muhtesib* to relax his supervision.⁸⁹ After all, *narh* was a difficult framework to work within during periods such as the early seventeenth century, when the currency was unstable, and tradesmen had to find ways to survive on meager profit margins.

iii. Collection of Regular and Irregular Taxes

The taxes imposed on the urban marketplace fell into two categories: regular and irregular. The *ih̄tisāb* cadre was in charge of the collection of some of the regular taxes, whereas guild officials participated in the collection of irregular ones. The process of collecting irregular taxes from guilds is not yet fully understood, but it is clear (as we have seen in Chapter II) that there were cases in which *kethüdān* collected such taxes, and that related guilds could adjust their respective share of the tax load imposed upon them.

Given the constant military expeditions and financial disruptions that the state was going through in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, it is not surprising that Ottoman taxpayers had to shoulder a greater burden than before. The state's revenue remained

⁸⁷ The *hāş ekmek* (*nan-i hāş*) symbolized a higher rank in both quality and name compared to other types of bread. Tülay Artan, "Aspects of the Ottoman Elite's Food Consumption: Looking for 'Staples,' 'Luxuries,' and 'Delicacies' in a Changing Century" in *Consumption Studies and the History of the Ottoman Empire, 1550–1922: An Introduction*, ed. Donald Quataert (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2000) 131.

⁸⁸ IK 3: 89b/712, 95a/732, GK 73: 126b, 131b, 132a, 133b, 136a, 136b. GK 80: 89a 1. The first two documents show a case in which a baker successfully argued that his bakery for special bread had the right to bake bread below the standard weight for regular bread.

⁸⁹ According to Uriel Heyd, the *muhtesib* had a proclivity to take routinized fines in return for overlooking violations (234). The *ih̄tisāb kanunnāme* for Bursa (1502) relates that there had been such incidents in that city (Barkan, "Kanunlar" II, *Tarih Vesikaları* 2–7 (1942) 18). The existence of illicit dues, called "*müsāmaḥa* (negligence)," among those illegally created by the *ih̄tisāb* cadre seems to be suggestive of the routine overlooking of violations (AK, MC, B.2, 1b).

below its expenditure for most of the early to mid-seventeenth century, when there was constant warfare going on either at home or abroad. Without knowing exactly how much was collected through tax-farmers—because the amount of money they handed over to the center does not necessarily represent the whole amount they collected—it is hard even to conjecture how much overall taxes increased or who in what region bore a greater burden. Linda Darling’s recent study of tax administration by the finance department of the central government reveals that the state tried to distribute taxes fairly upon its subjects and the rates of tax increases in *cizye* (poll tax on non-Muslims) and *‘avāriż* were not necessarily higher than the rate of inflation.⁹⁰ On the other hand, given that the irregular taxes became completely normalized by the 1620s, it seems that there was at least an elevation in the levels of taxation, even if they were still bearable. By the mid-seventeenth century, *‘avāriż*, the category of irregular taxes,⁹¹ became an annualized tax source listed under the “fixed revenue (*muḳarret*)” section of a budget chart.⁹² At times, the tax burdens of the tradesmen were unbearable, given that the tax officials tended to collect additional dues and that the government found it convenient to raise emergency revenues from the Istanbul guilds (see Section d).

Guildsmen were traditionally subject to various market dues and customs on a regular basis, and they were expected to render special services to the palace, the army or the dockyard.⁹³ Regular taxes were applied differently from one trade to another. Among the regular taxes guildsmen had to pay were the *bac-i bazar* (market sales tax), *resm-i kaḫan* (scale tax), *damga resmi* (stamp tax), *yevmiye-i dekakin* (daily shop tax), and *bitirme* (“wholesale” tax).

⁹⁰ Darling, *Revenue-Raising and Legitimacy*, 117–118.

⁹¹ *‘Avāriż* seems to have had two meanings: 1. A category of irregular emergency taxes, including levies in kind and service. It was called collectively *‘avāriż-i divāniye ve tekālif-i ‘orfiyye*. 2. More specifically, it designated the cash replacement of irregular taxes (*‘avāriż akḫesi*). When *‘avāriż* is mentioned with other items of irregular dues, it is probably used in the second meaning. For an overview of the evolution of *‘avāriż*, see Barkan, “*Avarız*,” *İA*¹.

⁹² Barkan, “1070–1071 (1660–1661) Tarihli Osmanlı Bütçesi ve Bir Mukayese” *İFM* 17 (1955–56) 329.

⁹³ Faroqhi, “Labor Recruitment” in Quataert, *Manufacturing in the Ottoman Empire* 19 and 42. According to her, Ottoman artisans performed forced labor for at least part of their lives, since the state often demanded their services without pay or with only minimal pay. Wartime mobilization was the heaviest of all.

Bac-i bazar (shortened as *bac*) has a very long history going back to the foundation of the Ottoman Empire itself.⁹⁴ According to the *kanunnāmes* of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, *bac* was supposed to be collected in the market only, and on the portion of goods sold, not on inventories. The government collected *bac* from the sale of commodities including grain, metals, textiles, leather goods, pottery and slaves. The rate was set based on the amount of goods sold; for example, 1 *akçe* per load (*yük*) of dark soap.

The scale tax (*resm-i kapan*) was collected at the time of weighing, and was primarily relevant to goods coming from outside the city that were weighed at the ports for sale in the city. It and *bac* were the two tax items mentioned in the *kanunnāmes*. The rates of scale tax are also stipulated differently for each commodity,⁹⁵ but the tax was less widely applied. The scale tax rates are recorded for fewer commodities than are *bac* rates in the *kanunnāmes*.⁹⁶ This, however, is not to say that only the listed commodities were subject to the scale tax, since some key items that are not listed, such as flour and grain at the Flour Exchange (Un Kapanı), were indeed weighed and taxed at the wholesale distribution centers (*kapan*).⁹⁷

There were also *damga* (stamp) taxes for the stamps on certain textiles and metal goods that constituted an official guarantee of certain standards. Quality control was the main purpose of this tax, and its collection right was farmed out.⁹⁸ The *ih̄tisāb ağası* did not collect this tax himself, but was called upon to coerce those who refused to pay it.⁹⁹ It is unclear whether the *ih̄tisāb* cadre had immediate control over the three types of taxes mentioned above, since they are not registered in *ih̄tisāb* registers.¹⁰⁰

⁹⁴ Aşıkpaşazade relates a legend about Osman I at the end of the thirteenth century, that he did not feel entitled to charge sales taxes (*bac*) from the urban markets. *Aşıkpaşazade Tārīhi* (Istanbul: Matba‘a-yı ‘Āmire, 1332/1913–14) 19–20.

⁹⁵ Akgündüz, ed. *Osmanlı Kanunnameleri*, 9: 521 and 523. There is a stipulation that anything weighed at the *kapan* is to be taxed 2 *akçe* per scale, one from the seller and one from the buyer. Perhaps this was the general rule for those goods not listed for the scale tax.

⁹⁶ Akgündüz, ed. *Osmanlı Kanunnameleri*, 9: 521. A hodge-podge list of a little more than 10 items is given (metals, sugar, soap, liquor, etc.).

⁹⁷ “Kapanlar,” *İstA*², 4: 430–431. *Kapan* has a double meaning: “a large scale” and “a wholesale distribution center.”

⁹⁸ Darling (*Revenue-Raising*, 142) gives an example of a *damga*-tax collection right that was farmed out.

⁹⁹ Kazıcı, *Osmanlılarda İhtisab Müessesesi* (Istanbul: Öz Dizgi Matbaası, 1987) 171.

¹⁰⁰ Although there are three versions, they are almost identical in terms of contents. See AK, MC, B.2 (1092/1681–2), Kâmil Kepeci 5026 (1096/1684–85) and Bab-ı Defteri 25386 (1096/1684–85).

The *ih̄tisāb* registers of the 1680s list the taxes *ih̄tisāb* officials collected along with details of numbers.¹⁰¹ First, the shop taxes were collected daily from 3,170 registered shops within the walls of Istanbul. These shops were divided into 15 tax quarters (*kol*): Tahtakale, Eksik, Taraklı, Ayasofya, Tavukpazarı, Kazasker, Langa, Yedikule, Karaman, Edirnekapı, Balat, Un Kapanı, Rah-i Cedīd, Aksaray, and Cibali. Under the entry of each shop the daily due amount (usually under 5 *akçe*) is recorded.¹⁰² The total of the daily dues was 8087 *akçe*, which amounts to more than 2 million *akçe* annually.¹⁰³ This figure formed a considerable portion of *ih̄tisāb* revenue (2,710,300 *akçe* in total).

The yearly *bitirme* (“wholesale”) tax was levied mostly on dietary supplements, such as dairy products, processed meat and desserts. It was also applied to some non-food items such as candles, coal and fodder. What is interesting is that the *bitirme* was imposed on guilds as a lump sum,¹⁰⁴ differently from other taxes based on individual transactions and business premises. *Bitirme* seems to have been collected once or twice a year, and if twice, it was on Ruz-i Hızr in spring and Ruz-i Kasım in fall, and the amount varied roughly between

¹⁰¹ The taxes that constituted *ih̄tisāb* revenue in these registers are: *yevmiye-i dekakin* (shop taxes), *resm-i sefāin* (boat tax), *bitirme* (“finalization”), and some tax farms. Boat taxes were levied on boats landing at the piers of Istanbul, and the rates were different depending on the kind of commodities on board and also on the size of the boat. The yearly total of the boat tax was 280,000 *akçe*. The *bitirme* started at the latest in 1020/1611–12 (Kazıcı, 186. Based on MM 18134). It is unclear why this tax was called *bitirme*.

¹⁰² Hezarfen Hüseyin (*Telh̄is ü'l-Beyān*, 254) reports in 1675 that the daily dues from the shops ranged between 1 and 20 *akçe*, which were much higher than those of 1682. For example, the Jewish butchers were supposed to pay 20 *akçe* in 1675, whereas they had to pay only 4 in 1682. Such disparity may have been the result of the new *ih̄tisāb* register of 1682 that manifestly aimed at abolishing illegal dues. Perhaps it reduced the regular tax amounts such as daily shop taxes as well.

¹⁰³ 8,087 times 354 (days of a year) is 2,862,978, but apparently the *yevmiye* tax was not collected every single day of the year since the yearly total of *yevmiye* calculated by subtracting the sum of other items (539,500) from the total *ih̄tisāb* revenue (2,710,300) is only 2,170,800 *akçe* (Bab-ı Defteri 25386, pp. 1–16).

Yevmiye-i dekakin	8,087 (daily).
Rusumat-i sefîneha:	280,000 (yearly)
Bitirme:	102,100 (yearly)
Mukata‘a-i penir:	25,000
Mukata‘a-i h̄ariciye	100,000
Mukata‘a-i iskele-i Üsküdar	18,000
Mukata‘a-i arşuncılık (measurer of length?)	14,400
Grand total:	2,710,300 (yearly)

¹⁰⁴ Although sometimes it is stipulated how the lump amount was to be made (e.g. 3 *akçe* for each cow from the cow drivers (*celep keşan-i bakar*) to make 22,000 *akçe* of *bitirme*), in most cases the 32 entries do not indicate exactly how to collect the tax.

500 and 20,000 *akçe*. In all, the *bitirme* tax from various guilds totaled some 102,100 *akçe*.¹⁰⁵

In addition, there were emergency taxes related to wars, which naturally remained unpredictable even after the regularization of *‘avāriż*. It is well known that the guilds had to provide the army with tradesmen who would serve them on the battlefield. Ottoman troops almost always set out from Istanbul, and naturally it was the guildsmen of Istanbul who had to shoulder the heaviest burden in serving them, although those from Bursa, Edirne and some other cities also did so.¹⁰⁶ Not only were guildsmen expected to accompany campaigns to remote places such as Poland or Iraq, but also the remaining members of their guild had to provide for the *orducu* tradesmen during their war service and also for the livelihood of their families back in Istanbul.¹⁰⁷ According to a study of guildsmen who were supposed to accompany an Iranian campaign in 1730, the burdens placed on the 28 guilds (*ordu akçesi*) were slightly over 3 million *akçe*, which was more than the value of the entire *ih̄tisāb* revenue from Istanbul in 1681. Although this example comes from the early eighteenth century, and the amount imposed was somewhat more than usual, it gives us an idea regarding the high end of the possible range of *ordu akçesi* (see Table 3).

Table 3. Levies for *ordu eṣnāfi* (*ordu akçesi*) in 1730

(Based on Münir Aktepe, “Ahmed III. Devrinde Şark Seferine İştirāk Edecek Ordu Esnafi Hakkında Vesikalar,” *Tarih Dergisi* 7–10 (1954) 18–19).¹⁰⁸

Guild	Amount	Guild	Amount
Bakers	174,000	Butchers	432,000
Candle-makers	55,000	Grocers	1,440,000
Cooks of sheep feet	72,000	Saddle-makers	40,000
Shoemakers	129,600	Perfumers/	84,000

¹⁰⁵ This amount is slightly higher than the total amount of the listed *bitirme* tax (100,430).

¹⁰⁶ Uzunçarşılı, *Kapukulu Ocakları*, 1: 369. n. 1.

¹⁰⁷ For the early development of the institution of *orducu esnafi* see Gilles Veinstein, “Du marché urbain au marché du camp: l’institution Ottomane des orducus,” in Abdejelil Temimi ed. *Mélanges Professeur Robert Mantran* (Zaghouan, 1988) 299–330.

¹⁰⁸ When the guildsmen came to know that the *ordu* tax they had paid with difficulty was not spent on the war—the plan for the Iranian campaign was canceled—and they could not get their money back because it had been appropriated by dignitaries, it angered them to the point of rebellion (the Patrona Halil rebellion of 1730).

Table 3 (*cont.*)

Guild	Amount	Guild	Amount
Cloth merchants	48,000	Herbalists (<i>attār</i>)	
Cotton-fluffers	40,000	Cooks	160,000
		Silk manufacturers	24,000
Seamsters	42,000	Hook-makers	24,000
Bow-makers	9,600	Sword-makers	16,000
Arrow-makers	9,600	Barbers	36,000
Blacksmiths (<i>naʿlband</i>)	48,000	Animal hair	36,000
		processors	
Packsaddle-makers	18,000	Shoetip-makers	34,800
Tin workers	9,600	Secondhand dealers	32,000
Tent-makers	—	Broadcloth-makers	40,000
Cauldron-makers	18,000	Trouser-makers	36,600
Ironmongers	18,000	Barley-dealers	60,000
(<i>demirciyan</i>)			

Not only were these large sums shouldered by a small number of guilds,¹⁰⁹ they were also unpredictable and in some cases had to be quickly collected after the decision to go to war was announced. Therefore, those guilds that were required to pay *ordu akçesi* solicited their related or assistant guilds to contribute, and indeed they were helped greatly. However, to squeeze such large sums out of the guilds quickly must have been difficult. Given the incessant warfare in the early to mid-seventeenth century, the burden shouldered by the guilds for military recruits must have been considerable.

Numerous other minor taxes were also enforceable on the people of Istanbul, and the nature of some of these is little understood. It is usually from exemption documents that we learn the names of various minor taxes. Some guilds could gain exemptions from minor and “irregular” taxes in return for serving the government sector.¹¹⁰ The employment of guildsmen or use of their services in the palace and government factories was very common, and the guildsmen were either paid somewhat under the market rate or not paid at all.¹¹¹ These

¹⁰⁹ However, some of the guilds, especially the grocers, were able to divert some of the amounts to their assistant guilds (*yamaklar*).

¹¹⁰ For example, fishermen (IK 5: 24b/168) and gardeners (GK 80: 91a) did so.

¹¹¹ Faroqhi, “Labor Recruitment and Control in the Ottoman Empire (Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries)” in *Manufacturing in the Ottoman Empire and Turkey, 1500–1950*, ed. Donald Quataert (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994) 13–57.

services included various activities such as building mosque complexes, working at the Imperial Dockyard, or simply providing needed materials to the palace and branches of the government. Based on such exemptions granted in return for special services, one may assume that various categories of *‘avāriż* were mutually exclusive, and one form of service guaranteed exemption from others.¹¹² Although in the documents there is a sense that such arrangements were fair and accepted in principle, one may wonder whether they were strictly applied in real-life situations given that guildsmen took care to list in their exemption documents all the taxes they were supposed to be exempt from. Apparently, the guildsmen were very careful to list all the dues that someone in a tax-collecting position might want to gather from them “by mistake.” These listed taxes were of a wide variety, and differed depending on which guild and what period they concerned. What is clear, however, is only that guildsmen, just as other Istanbulites, were subject to an amazing variety of minor dues unless they were protected by an exemption document. For example, in 1619 the taxes that the fishermen listed they were exempt from included *‘avāriż*, *ispence* (for non-Muslims only), *kaşşabiyye*, *kazma ve kürek* (shovel tax), *lağımçı* (miner) tax, *ipek* (silk), *boya* (paint), *otluk* (fodder) tax and the tax to support *devşirme* boys.¹¹³ In the middle of the century, the taxes listed for a tavernkeeper were slightly different, although some of the same taxes featured again: *‘avāriż*, *ispence*, *ordu*, shovel tax, *tulum* (skin bag) tax, *kazgan* (cauldron) tax, *feryade* (an extraordinary war tax), *maşdariyye* (a type of excise/customs),¹¹⁴ *kuyu* (well) tax, *fuçu* (barrel) tax, *hamr ve ‘arak* (wine) tax, *Hamr Emîni bitirmesi* (another wine related tax), and dues (probably illicitly) levied by the *subaşı*, *asesbaşı*, *yasakçı*, and so forth.¹¹⁵ Many of these taxes are almost unknown in terms of their purpose and content, and we may only guess from their names what they were. However, at least some of them seem to have been used for supporting and providing for the army.

What exacerbated the situation for the guildsmen of Istanbul was tax and police officials abusing their authority. In 1618, there was an

¹¹² Darling, 88.

¹¹³ IK 5: 24b/168, *Sürüle gelen devşirme oğlanların besleme akçeleri*.

¹¹⁴ According to Ibnülemin Maliye 381, it was a brokerage tax in the late seventeenth century.

¹¹⁵ GK 80: 89b (a tavernkeeper). Also, see GK 80: 90b and MD 88: 66/167 for similar tax exemption documents issued to non-Muslim civilians whose occupations were not specified, although there is a good chance that they were tradesmen as well. The last mentioned document also noted dues collected by the *muhtesib* and *acemi oğlanları*.

order to the *kadis* of Istanbul and its surroundings to the effect that the *muhtesib* and other police officers should not collect the same taxes twice from those who had already paid and kept receipts.¹¹⁶ It should be remembered that the *ih̄tisāb* register of 1682 was put together anew because the oppressive tax collection prior to that time drove the men of marketplace to petition the central government about the *ih̄tisāb* officers' wrongdoings.¹¹⁷ The *ih̄tisāb* officers, *muhtesib* and *kol ođlanları* not only arbitrarily established new dues¹¹⁸ for their own benefit, but they also collected taxes from guilds that were not registered as being responsible for *ih̄tisāb* tax payment. It is possible that such distortions in tax collection were related to the growing power of the janissaries and their connections in the capital city, as the new register stipulated in one place that *hasekis* among the janissaries¹¹⁹ should not serve as *kol ođlanları* for more than six months, and after six months they should exchange their position with someone else.¹²⁰

Overall, nothing is definitively known about how heavy the tax burden was for the average tradesmen in Istanbul; one has to extrapolate this burden from the attitude of the government and the actions of the guilds. Given that the government mostly tried to keep taxation at a reasonable level throughout the empire,¹²¹ and that no petition from Istanbul guildsmen complaining about tax assessment fell within the scope of my research, it seems that they were not overly dissatisfied with the amounts of officially imposed taxes. The government would have wanted to be careful not to offend the residents of the capital city, with all its political weight. Guildsmen's recorded discontent and worries were mainly related to abuses by tax officials or to their disrespect of tax exemptions.¹²²

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¹¹⁶ IK 3: 87b/706.

¹¹⁷ Atatürk Kitaplığı, MC, B.2. 1b. "... bid'at men' ve def' olunmak ricāsıyla 'arz-ı hāl olundukda mahmiyye-i mezburede vāki' cemr' dekākın ve sār' rusumāt-i ih̄tisābiyye müceddeden tahrir ve defter olunup . . ."

¹¹⁸ Such as 'ıydiyye, mecidiyye, ramažāniyye, haftalık, aylık, müsāmaħa, hāmlik, etc. (AK, MC, B.2 1b).

¹¹⁹ Uzunçarşılı, *Kapıkulu Ocakları*, 1: 204–05. The commanders of the 14th, 49th, 66th and 67th battalions (*ortalar*) of the janissary corps were called *haseki*.

¹²⁰ AK, MC, B.2. 19b.

¹²¹ Darling (*Revenue-Raising*, Chapter 3, 83–100), contrary to the common notion of arbitrary and ineffective tax administration of the seventeenth century, the finance bureau in this period tried to locate the tax sources and estimate them reasonably.

¹²² On the other hand, guildsmen may have strategically avoided offending senior officials by putting the blame on low-level tax collectors. The abuses of state servants were a common theme in the official discourse when confronted by taxpayers.

To sum up section b), the government created the infrastructure, helped guilds secure raw materials, regulated the market, and collected taxes from the guilds. There is no doubt that these activities affected the guilds comprehensively on various levels. However, it would be a mistake to interpret the government's influence as one of total command over the guilds. Although the authorities established many rules regulating the guilds and issued many orders to that effect, the guilds also played a crucial role in making such rules and orders work. When an administrative order was issued, it could become all too easily mired in the course of its implementation among the guilds.

For example, an imperial order to the effect that the shoemakers of other localities should fill the arcade of the Sultan Ahmed *waqf* took a long time to be carried out as it seems that the shoemakers did not want to leave their old shops. In 1618, the administrator of the *waqf* reported to the sultan (Osman II) that some shops were still vacant; the matter was resolved only after consultation among the experts of the trade. The head of the palace boot-makers (*hāṣṣa çizmeciler*) agreed to move in with his group, but only on the condition that they would get the monopoly right over certain types of shoes.¹²³ Two years later, the *waqf* still needed tenants from among the shoemakers, which indicates that the former arrangement had not succeeded. Once again, the government ordered that some shoemakers from other markets in Istanbul transfer to Ahmed I's *waqf*. This order had to be carried out in the form of agreements between the *kethüdā* of the arcade and individual shoemakers from various markets. Even then, guild masters mostly sent their junior partners (e.g., sons).¹²⁴ It was difficult to force guildsmen to do what they did not want to do, and the details of implementing an imperial order had to be worked out within the guild system.

c. *Petitions and Appeals by Guilds and Guildsmen*

From the description of the restrictive measures in the *kanunnāmes*, one might easily get the impression that the guilds were passive organizations on the receiving end of government control. However, guilds

¹²³ IK 3: 92b/722.

¹²⁴ IK 6: 49a–b.

were not necessarily powerless before the state. Guilds could independently determine their internal matters and had a say in the fixing of official prices. Even in cases where there was a conflict of interest between the state and the guilds, as in taxation and the administration of royal *waqfs*, it was not always easy for the state to force the guilds to follow its policies. Guildsmen could be very tenacious in making claims or avoiding government orders, and government officials themselves were often inconsistent.

Beginning in the seventeenth century, there are more records of petitions that contain complaints from common people of the empire.¹²⁵ It is hard to prove that there were fewer such petitions before that time, but the fact that from the mid-seventeenth century onward a separate register for complaints was initiated indicates that their number had grown such that they required separate handling independent of the *Mühimme Defterleri*, the oldest and most comprehensive of *divān* registers.¹²⁶ All Ottoman subjects, whether man or woman, Muslim or non-Muslim, had the right to file a petition with the sultan's authority and have their grievances redressed. There are many petitions in which we observe guildsmen addressing the grievances they had.¹²⁷ Petitions contain by far the most articulate responses by guildsmen to government measures. Thus, an examination of the guilds' petitions, the rhetoric they adopted, and the way guildsmen used the central *divān* court show that the guilds made strenuous efforts to secure their privileges.

There were basically two kinds of petitions: direct petitions from ordinary subjects (*arż-ı hāl*) and petitions by state officials (*arż*).¹²⁸ The latter type of petition was often filed by the *kadi* on behalf of the people under his jurisdiction. Although minor disputes between guilds or between a guild and low-ranking officials under the *kadi*'s

¹²⁵ Darling, *Revenue-Raising*, 281–82.

¹²⁶ Hans Georg Majer, ed., *Das Osmanische Registerbuch der Beschwerden von Jahre 1675* (Vienna: Verlag der Österreichische Akademie des Wissenschaften, 1984) "Einleitung," 17–20.

¹²⁷ Faroqhi, Suraiya. "Political Initiative 'from the Bottom Up' in the Sixteenth- and Seventeenth-Century Ottoman Empire: Some Evidence for Their Existence" in *Osmanische Studien zur Wirtschafts- und sozialgeschichte: In Memoriam Váncó Boskov*, ed. Hans Georg Majer (Wiesbaden: O. Harrassowitz, 1986), reprinted in *Coping with the State: Political Conflict and Crime in the Ottoman Empire, 1550–1720* (Istanbul: The Isis Press, 1995) 6–10.

¹²⁸ İnalçık, "Şikâyet Hakkı: 'Arż-ı Hāl ve 'Arż-ı Mahzar'lar," *Osmanlı Araştırmaları (Journal of Ottoman Studies)* 7–8 (1988) 35.

authority could be resolved in the *kadi* court, recurring conflicts and grievances caused by tax collectors had to go to the central *divān* court. That is, while the *kadi* court functioned on a day-to-day level, the *divān* was the court of last resort.¹²⁹

The guildsmen of Istanbul had easy access to the central *divān* court. The *divān* court—either the imperial *divān* at the palace or at the grand vizier's—always took the hearing of the people's grievances as one of its primary goals, although it was also the highest court in the empire and doubled as a cabinet, where all kinds of state affairs were discussed. Therefore, any subject of the sultan, however poor, was permitted to file a petition (*arż-ı hāl*) to have their grievances redressed. Petitions were received both at the court and on the road as dignitaries moved from one place to another, even on the way to military campaigns.¹³⁰ For the guilds of Istanbul, particularly, it must have been easy to file such a petition, not only because the central *divān* was physically close, but also because there was no local *divān* court aside from it. There was no separate governor for the town of Istanbul, but the grand vizier was personally in charge of the capital city. Arguably, whatever grievance there may have been among the people of Istanbul to be presented at the *divān*, it was already of central importance because of Istanbul's weight in the empire.

Consequently, the guilds and individual guildsmen frequented the central *divān* over various matters, large and small, and their requests were almost always granted. Among the petitions to the *divān* court my research covered, very few were rejected.¹³¹ Why were the petitioners—not just the guildsmen—so successful? One of the core reasons was the ideology of justice that bolstered the legitimacy of the sultanic authority; that is, the sultan's power was justified by protecting his people from any oppression or injustice on the basis of his secular laws (*kanun*). The sultan was thought to be directly responsible for peace and order in society.¹³² In the seventeenth century,

¹²⁹ It is difficult, though, to say that every case presented to the *divān* court was more important than those presented to the *kadi* courts because virtually anybody could take a case either to the *kadi* court or the *divān*.

¹³⁰ İnalçık, "Şikâyet Hakkı," 33.

¹³¹ Indeed the central *divān* rejected some petitions, although very rarely. Darling (*Revenue-Raising*, 281) mentions that only two to three cases out of 625 in the *defter* KK 2576 were turned down.

¹³² Tursun Beg, eds. Halil İnalçık and Rhoads Murphey, *History of Mehmed the Conqueror* (Minneapolis: Bibliotheca Islamica, 1978) 21. However, sultanic justice had a tint of personal grace rather than that of an impersonally binding legal system. İnalçık, "Adâletnâmeler," 49.

the Ottoman sultans were becoming increasingly detached from the daily governance of the state, but the idea of sultanic justice still applied to the grand vizier's *divān* since the sultan delegated his authority to the grand vizier. Therefore, to ensure that a just image of sultanic authority was presented to the general public through the petitioners, the central *divān* had by necessity to appear receptive. The petitioners, in turn, did their best to meet the expectations and ideas of the authorities in describing their situation. Once a petition was received, although the matter was investigated, the ensuing order tended to be influenced by suggestions made by the petitioners.

A few common themes recur in the guildsmen's petitions. Sometimes they were about the issue of excessive or illegal taxation, which was also connected to oppression by government officials. Then there were petitions for special permissions (such as tax exemptions or the right to open a special bread bakery and to apply special prices), and those arising from inter-guild disputes over a raw material monopoly or the sharing of tax burdens. While disputes between guilds or guild members cast the government simply as an umpire, those involving guilds and state functionaries created more delicate situations. Namely, in these cases, such as tax disputes, the fiscal and political interests of the government were in potential conflict.¹³³

Most salient among the issues in petitions to the government were tax matters. Guildsmen's petitions regarding taxes are by no means surprising given that many of the petitions from Ottoman subjects to the central *divān* even before the seventeenth century complained about heavy and illegal taxes.¹³⁴ They may not represent a clear majority of petitions since many inter- and intra-guild matters were presented before the *divān* court. However, the former takes on more importance than the latter as petitions, because they involved government authorities more directly. After all, securing a sufficient supply of revenue was a pressing concern of the state, perhaps to the same degree as making ends meet with a 10 percent profit margin while paying various *ih̄tisāb* and irregular taxes was to the guildsmen.

Although it is very difficult to accurately assess the way taxation changed in the seventeenth century, the impression is that taxation was on the increase. Even if protests against the imposition of illegitimate taxes were nothing new, seventeenth-century guilds' petitions

¹³³ Darling, *Revenue-Raising*, Chapters VIII and IX.

¹³⁴ Inalcık, "Şikâyet Hakkı," 37 and Faroqi, "Political Activity among Ottoman Tax-payers and the Problem of Sultanic Legitimation (1570-1650)," *JESHO* 35 (1992) 7-13.

seem to have acquired a new intensity, particularly when seen from the viewpoint of the fiscal history of the time. The state had a chronic budget deficit that must have been aggravated by the decline of provincial revenues. Taxation at the center may well have become heavier to make up for losses in the provinces. As previously mentioned, irregular taxes became regularized and the army tax (*ordu akçesi*) burden on the tradesmen could be at times quite high. In addition to all these, tax collection in Istanbul was often in the hands of military officers, who sometimes abused their power to extract more than was designated. We must look at the abundance of tax disputes among related guilds in this context.

It is no wonder that guildsmen disputed the taxes that were imposed upon them, as the non-Muslim oil-makers argued against *maşdariyye* in 1685.¹³⁵ *Maşdariyye* was also called *dellaliyye* (brokerage tax), and the latter existed already in the fifteenth century.¹³⁶ The administrator of customs (*gümrük emini*) was in charge of the collection of the tax, and the tax rate was specified in a revenue register (*ma'den defteri*). It was stated on a general level that no one but Muslims could do business without paying *maşdariyye*, and that the dealers in oil had to pay 1.5 *akçe* for every 100 *akçe* [worth of oil they sold].¹³⁷ However, this did not mean that there was no room for negotiation. Namely, there was no stipulation about the small-scale vendors of oil who sold 1 or 2 *vukiyye* (1 *vukiyye* [*okka*] = about 1.28 kg) at a time. Based on this, the self-defined poor oil-makers (non-Muslim) of Istanbul, Galata and Üsküdar petitioned the central *divân* arguing that the collection of *maşdariyye* taxes from them was not only against the previous practice but also against the records in the register (*hılâf-i defter*) since they had been selling oil only on a small scale. The central authorities received the petition favorably and specified in the margin of the register (*der kenâr olunup*) that *maşdariyye* should not be taken from the poor. Soon after this, the *gümrük emini* disputed the decision saying that there had been an imperial order to the effect that the non-Muslim oil-makers should pay *maşdariyye* without resistance. Unfortunately, it is not clear from the existing documents how the issue was resolved. There was, however, a remarkable rapport between

¹³⁵ Başbakanlık arşivi: İbnülemin Maliye 381.

¹³⁶ Nicoara Beldiceanu, *La Ville Ottomane*, 81–84.

¹³⁷ The tax seems to have been collected at the scale, such as that of the *kaşans* (wholesale distribution centers).

the government and the guilds, and the stipulations in the *defters* could be made more flexible, although tax-collecting officials would protest such modifications.

What guildsmen were more comfortable in doing was relying on tax privileges granted by the government in return for certain services to the palaces, government workshops, or other branches of the state sector since in such cases they at least had a legal document proving their tax-exemption rights (*mu'afnāme*). In other words, some guilds and individuals, guildsmen or not, were exempted from the irregular taxes (*tekālif-i 'öfyfye*) collected by executive officials (*ehl-i 'örf*) in return for special services, often related to their trades.¹³⁸ For example, when groups of Üsküdar guilds, such as the grocers, barley-dealers (*arpacılar*) and blacksmiths (*na'lbendler*), complained that they were being charged irregular taxes for military campaigns, they brought up the edict of Mehmed the Conqueror that granted them tax exemption rights in return for services to the army in the first three stations, allegedly saying, "Do not interfere with them even when a general call to arms (*nefir-i 'ām*) is in effect."¹³⁹ In 1029/1618–19, the fishermen's guild filed a petition arguing that the tax collectors did not respect the exemption they had acquired in return for their services to the Imperial Dockyard and for delivering (*edā etmek*) their boats to the "Bahkhane (Fishery)" every year. They listed nine items of tax they were supposedly exempt from, and apparently that was not all.¹⁴⁰ Their enumeration of tax items conveys to us a sense of urgency and the immediate possibility of the tax collectors' intrusion. Additionally, when the guilds of vegetable, fruit and flower dealers who provided the palaces and imperial gardens with their produce lost their tax exemption document in the great fire of Istanbul in 1043/1633–34, they immediately asked for a new copy of the exemption document and made it doubly secure by acquiring another document corroborating the first from the *kadi*, because they feared that the demands of tax officials would be hard to resist if they did not have proper documentation.¹⁴¹

¹³⁸ Other than the examples given here, there is also a case of bear trainers who received tax-exemption rights in return for service for the palace (IK 10: 155a).

¹³⁹ MD 81: 95/435. There is a similar case with guildsmen in a village under Üsküdar in the same *defters*, 221/501.

¹⁴⁰ IK 5: 24b/168 (1029/1619–20).

¹⁴¹ GK 80: 91a. Additionally, even if the guildsmen had proper documentation, some tax collectors could still violate it. For example, the *ih̄tisāb* cadre and other tax

Even when a guild did not have an official exemption document, they—and perhaps the government as well—might have had an understanding that services provided to government branches implied an exemption from other taxes.¹⁴² For example, when the guild of barrel-makers (*vanlıci*) won their case against the tax collectors and succeeded in rejecting the *tokmak akçesi* (mallet tax) on the grounds that it was a novelty in the Istanbul area, while in the provinces the mallet tax had been collected, the barrel-makers shrewdly pointed out in their petition before making their main argument that they had been faithfully paying *cizye* and had offered barrels to the Imperial Dockyard upon request, although they did not mention any exemption document.¹⁴³

Not only groups of professional trades, but also individual tradesmen petitioned the *divān* court for tax exemptions. There are some petitions by individuals, some of whom are identified as guildsmen who wanted *müsellem* status (originally, tax-exemption in return for military service) in return for performing various services for the state. These petitions are mostly about exemption from irregular taxes, and one may surmise that the irregular taxes imposed on the guildsmen and other urbanites were mainly on the same items, since the petitions from the same *sicill* register of the Galata court list several common items of taxes regardless of whether the tax-exempt person in question was indicated as a tradesman or not.¹⁴⁴ Once again, as in the case of group deals, we do not know exactly how such individual tax deals were initiated, especially because the existing documents are petitions filed by those who wanted to inherit or transfer such exemption rights. One may only surmise that deals of this type were mediated by dignitaries (e.g., administrators of large

collectors were warned by the government because some of them had collected the same tax twice—even when the taxpayers had receipts (*tezkereler*). See IK 3: 87b/706.

¹⁴² Darling (*Revenue-Raising*, 88 and 263) assumes that the various levies subsumed under the name *‘avāriż* were considered mutually exclusive. However, this principle may not have always applied considering that there were abusive tax collectors.

¹⁴³ GK 73: 134b. The “mallet tax” is not mentioned anywhere else in the contemporary documents and might have been a tax item peculiar to the trade of barrel making.

¹⁴⁴ I suspect that some of the individual petitioners may well have been guildsmen who did not identify themselves to be so. The tavern-keeper mentioned in the text was not clearly identified as one in some other documents, and there is another case that seems to be about a tavern-keeper, *boza*-seller or a boatman. The person would have been liable for the *kürekçi* (oarsman) levy had it not been for the tax-exemption (MD 88: 66/167).

waqfs, *bostancıbaşı*s, and so on) who had better access to the *divân* and with whom the concerned individuals had connections, as such persons often filed the petitions for the inheritance or transfer of the exemption rights.¹⁴⁵

The case of a tavernkeeper (*meyhaneci*) who wanted to continue his deceased father's tax exemption is an amazing example of the effort expended to avoid the burdens of irregular taxes. Tavernkeepers were, as one can imagine, associated with the lowest moral elements, at least in the state's eyes, and therefore suffered more from the heavy demands of the government than other trades did. Taverns had also been banned altogether at several points in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries,¹⁴⁶ and they were the objects of occasional surprise inspections and suppression under Osman II¹⁴⁷ and Murad IV.¹⁴⁸ Tavernkeepers, together with *boza* (fermented drink made from millet)-makers, had to provide oarsmen for the navy's galleys upon demand, particularly when there were naval campaigns such as the Cretan War against Venice (1645–69).¹⁴⁹ Given that galley labor was also used as a form of punishment for criminals, tavernkeepers indeed were being punished for engaging in a dubious trade. Despite this, a certain tavernkeeper (Istani?) filed a petition (*arz*) through the *waqf* administrator of Orta Cami, the official mosque of the janissary barracks. His father had been granted tax exemption, including that of *cizye*, because he was injured when he was mobilized as a builder (*dulger*) on Murad IV's Revan (Yerevan) campaign (1635). After he died, his son (Istani?) requested tax exemption in return for offering 60 *vukiyye* (168 pounds, 1 *vukiyye* (*okka*) = 400 *dîrhem* = 2.8 pounds) of olive oil to Orta Cami every year. The son was first given an edict (*fermân-i 'âli*) to the effect that he was exempt from taxes, but he came back and demanded a new *berât* (diploma) as other tax exempt non-Muslims were given, which shows that he was careful enough to procure multiple documents to back up his claim. After he was granted the license, he came yet again back to the central *divân* complaining that the *voyvoda* of Galata ignored his *berât* and charged him 440 *akçe*. It is not mentioned how the petition was

¹⁴⁵ GK 80: 89b–90b. There is another tax exemption document concerning a jeweler (*kuyumcu*).

¹⁴⁶ Refik, *Onuncu*, 141 (975/1567).

¹⁴⁷ "Tuğî Tarihi," ed. Midhat Sertoğlu, *Belleten*, 11–43 (1947) 502.

¹⁴⁸ Na'ima, 3: 224.

¹⁴⁹ GK 80: 92b, 93a.

received, but in the next entry in the Galata court register, the *kadi* of Galata warned the *voyvoda* and ordered him to return the money he had collected.¹⁵⁰ In all likelihood, the *divān* had received the petition favorably and asked the *kadi* to investigate the case. Although the petitioner was a tavernkeeper who was held in low regard from a religio-moral point of view, the central government and the *kadi* apparently did not discriminate against him in the legal process.

As we have seen above, the guilds and individual guildsmen worked very hard to alleviate their tax loads, especially because it was the tax collectors who often violated the rules. What is remarkable is that the central government was as receptive to tax-related petitions as to those concerning intra- and inter-guild affairs. This could have been partly because the government was aware of the rapaciousness of some tax officials and was genuinely concerned about the fairness of tax administration. On the other hand, the state could not afford to lose the confidence of the guilds in order to gain more revenue in the short run. Even though the government does not generally seem to have punished oppressive tax officials harshly, securing legitimacy through sultanic justice remained a major concern in times of disorder.¹⁵¹

As for the manner of the petitions, guildsmen generally made very strong pleas in their petitions, be it about the price of white bread or about oppression by government officials. Not only did they present to the court all available documentation in support of their cases, they also used rhetoric and arguments that appealed to the authorities. Although the petitions and rulings were never a matter of rhetoric only, and evidence to back up one's argument had to be found in documents and registers, it is very interesting to see the expressions tradesmen used to describe their grievous situations.¹⁵²

¹⁵⁰ All these documents, which number five, are listed in one page, GK 80: 89b.

¹⁵¹ According to Darling (*Revenue-Raising*, 294), the Ottoman state understood its dependency on the taxpayers as usually explained by the "circle of justice (*dā'ire-i 'adliye*)" in the Ottoman period. Justice being defined partly in terms of restraint in taxation, the government had reasons to listen to the tax-related petitions in order not to let the "circle"—the whole fabric of state and society—break in times of crisis.

¹⁵² What the guildsmen said in the *kadi* or *divān* court may well have been shortened and paraphrased by the scribes, but the fact that there is a good deal of colloquialism seems to reflect the original testimony to a certain extent. See Yvonne Seng, "The Şer'iye Sicilleri of Istanbul Müftülüğü as a Source for the Study of Everyday Life," *İSAB* 15-2 (1991) 307-25. Oral testimony and immediate accessibility were valued over written documents in the traditional Muslim justice system. For a modern example of such a mechanism in Yemen, see Brinkley Messick, *The Calligraphic State* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1993)

before the authorities and what some commonly used phrases implied.

The most common were petitions asking for the approval of something or the abolition of something else on the basis of earlier practices. More claims were based on tradition than on the law, if they did not draw on both. As Chapter III showed, tradition was a useful instrument of argument for the guilds and was shaped and reshaped by intra- and inter-guild agreements. Respect for tradition was one of the key elements in state-guild relations as well. Tradition had a quality of not-yet-formalized law in the minds of the Ottomans, and ultimately, the legitimation of sultanic law in Islamic jurisprudence was ensured through the acknowledgment of it in the venue of “custom.” Tradition was an important guide to what was permissible in those relations, regardless of the issue: whether it was large-scale tax imposition, the tax exemption of one person or the application of a special price to some bakeries. Namely, what had been practiced before unhindered was deemed permissible and perhaps beneficial, or not harmful at least. Probably, it was in this context that Ahmed I’s *kanunnâme* stated that “if prices were fixed according to the way they were done before, nobody involved was at fault.”¹⁵³ Additionally, compared to claiming that something was against the law (*kanun*), guildsmen bore a lower burden of proof in saying that something was against tradition.

Tradition was an arena that both guildsmen and state officials could manipulate for their own respective interests.¹⁵⁴ For example, guilds and tax collectors could very well have different opinions about what was and was not tradition. Namely, they could respectively refer to customs from different periods. Such differences of opinion between guilds and officials over what was the proper tradition were manifested in the aforementioned imposition of the *maşdariyye* tax on the oil-makers’ guild.¹⁵⁵ In another case, some non-Muslim bakers

Chapter 9, “Judicial Presence.” On the other hand, Gilles Veinstein, “L’oralité dans les documents d’archives ottomans: paroles rapportée ou imaginée?” *Revue du Monde Musulman et de la Méditerranée* 75–76 (1995) 133–142 points out that there are too many bureaucratic and formulaic expressions and structures, which suggests heavy editing and summarizing by the scribes. He regards testimonies rendered in the form of direct speech mainly as a means to make them look authentic.

¹⁵³ Akgündüz, ed., *Osmanlı Kanunnameleri*, 9: 524.

¹⁵⁴ İnalçık, “Adâletnâmeler,” 52. Tax officials sometimes collected taxes such as those that had been collected from before the Ottoman conquest, in the name of tradition, without any grounds in the *kanun*.

¹⁵⁵ İbnülemin, *Maliye* 381.

appealed to the *kadi* court saying that *ihtisāb* officials were collecting fines from those who had violated the fixed weight standard for bread, while previously they had not collected fines but had simply recorded the names of the violators. Interestingly, the bakers also said that *ihtisāb* officials had collected fines for “so many years” (*bunca seneden beri*),¹⁵⁶ which seems to indicate that if only in terms of past practice, *ihtisāb* officials’ collecting and not collecting fines could both qualify as “tradition.” From the *ihtisāb* officials’ viewpoint, although not mentioned in the document, it could have been that the collection of fines was not only in harmony with tradition but also backed by the *kanunnāme*, which allows general fine collection from the violators of fixed prices.¹⁵⁷ It is interesting that those who appealed had indeed violated the fixed prices and yet still had the courage to appeal to the *kadi*. The *kadi* of Galata warned the officials not to collect fines from the bakers in the future, while also admonishing the bakers not to violate the official prices.

In addition, guildsmen occasionally resorted to Islamic rhetoric that underlined religious mores, although they used it much less frequently than they used traditionalist arguments. Clearly, it was almost exclusively Muslim guildsmen who utilized religious rhetoric. Since the Ottoman state definitively claimed to be the protector of Islam and gave privileges to Muslims, such invocations of Muslim identity could only help.

However, what exactly was intended by resorting to “Muslim” identity? Was this manifested Muslim-ness necessarily in opposition to non-Muslim-ness, and did it lean toward the favoring of Muslims over non-Muslims? There might have been an element of religious division and discrimination, given observations of growing non-Muslim identities and relatively more frequent uses of the word *kefere* (heathens, a derogatory word indicating non-Muslims) instead of the more neutral *dhimmī* for non-Muslims in this period.¹⁵⁸ Let us also not forget that there was a reassertion of purist Islamic views (e.g., the

¹⁵⁶ GK 80: 75b.

¹⁵⁷ Akgündüz, ed., *Osmanlı Kanunnameleri*, 9: 525. It is curious why the *ihtisāb* officials did not appeal. They had probably collected too much in fines for them to be legitimate.

¹⁵⁸ IK 3: 88a/707, IK 5: 17b/120, Ibnülemin, Maliye 381. Additionally, the *kanunnāmes* repeatedly use the word *kefere*, and maybe this was partly for the purpose of making a clear difference between Muslims and non-Muslims, for example, just as in the stipulation of separate dress codes for Muslims and non-Muslims.

Kadızedeli movement) in the seventeenth century. Indeed, there is the case of the cap-makers (*takyeciler*), whose Muslim members wanted to select their *kethüdā* only from among the Muslims although they had had non-Muslim *kethüdās* earlier. The Muslim members also prevented the non-Muslims from having a non-Muslim *kethüdā* of their own.¹⁵⁹ Here, the Muslims brought forth their Muslim identity in order to prevail over the non-Muslims. However, things are not that simple in other cases in which Islamic rhetoric was adopted. For example, when the fruit-sellers (*yemişçiler*) accused a number of practitioners who had not worked under a master and yet opened shops without letting the guild authorities know, they said: “Those people bought goods from the Muslims and did not pay the price to the Muslims (*Musliminin meṭā’ların alıp . . . müslümanlardan aldıkları meṭā’in akçelerin vermeyüp . . .*).”¹⁶⁰ While the word “Muslim” may indicate literally the believers of the Islamic faith, it also implies those morally upright and pious subjects who were worthy of protection by the sultanic authority. In this sense, “Muslim” could acquire the meaning of “public,”¹⁶¹ since after all the Ottoman state was imagined as a community of the faithful (*ummah*), despite the variegated nature of the Ottoman population. A *kadi* of Istanbul, in a ruling that warned a janissary to refrain from encroaching upon the chicken trade in line with the concerned guild’s request, said that he made the decision in order to “straighten the affairs of Muslims (*naẓm-i umūr-i muslimin için*).”¹⁶² As with traditionalist expressions, the Islamic rhetoric among the guildsmen clearly had its counterpart on the government side and was a response to the government’s ideology and expectations.

Although the rhetoric of Islam apparently seems to have been part of the dominant discourse of the day, it did not prevent the non-Muslim guildsmen of the city from appealing to state/religious authorities. The Galata court records show that many non-Muslims appealed and petitioned for privileges (for example, when seeking permission to set up special bakeries or to gain tax exemption) and redresses

¹⁵⁹ Refik, *Onbirinci*, 55.

¹⁶⁰ IK 6: 2b/10. Fruit-sellers had emphasized their being Muslims before in IK 3: 29b/252 as well.

¹⁶¹ The word “Muslim” is often used in the sense of “public” in many Ottoman government documents and chronicles. Very rarely, there are examples where Muslims and non-Muslims are both mentioned as the components of the subject people, as in Hezarfen Hüseyin’s introduction of the chapter about *narh* (*Telhîs ü’l-Beyân*, 248).

¹⁶² IK 6: 25b.

of their grievances. Even the non-Muslim bakers who had violated *narh* did not feel inhibited from appealing to the *kadi* against the abuse of the *ihtisāb* officials, as mentioned above (GK 80: 75b). Then do the many cases of *dhimmīs*' appeals and petitions tell us that they suffered more than the Muslims? It is hard to determine, beyond that they had to pay a poll-tax (*cizye*), which the Muslims did not. On the other hand, the multitude of petitions may indicate their belief that they could expect equal justice from the government. It appears that the non-Muslims were rather well integrated into the apparently "Islamic" public system.¹⁶³ In an unusual case, a non-Muslim *na'lıçacı* (shoetip-maker), who accused the guild of shoetip-makers (whose leaders were Muslims) of not letting him into their guild despite his proficiency, presented to the court a *fetva* (legal opinion) from the *şeyhülislām* (the pinnacle of Ottoman *ulema*) in his favor.¹⁶⁴ Of course, Muslims must have used *fetvas* more often than non-Muslims did, but the tables could be turned in the so-called "Islamic" system.

Rhetoric and arguments aside, there were some other behavioral strategies for petitions. First, it was useful for the guildsmen to be tenacious in repeating petitions and appeals. Although very receptive toward petitions, in the end the government authorities had to take sides when there was a dispute between competing groups of artisans in the same trade. Usually, as long as any evidence could be provided, the authorities' reaction was to accept the account of the petitioners and warn the accused party. However, since the government was not always consistent, it could reverse its decision afterwards. There were cases in which two government documents owned by two different groups were in conflict with one another.¹⁶⁵ The authorities were also so well aware of such possibilities that they sometimes said in imperial orders "grant [what the petitioners want] if there has not been any order to the contrary."¹⁶⁶ It paid off to repeat petitions to the *divān*, even if you were rejected once, since the government did not necessarily have a set opinion on intra-trade issues and might express newly found sympathy.

The foremost example of such persistence is that of a group of tanners located in the suburbs of Istanbul in Yedikule. They con-

¹⁶³ Najwa al-Qattan, 438–39.

¹⁶⁴ IK 4: 36a/251.

¹⁶⁵ For example, see the case of Muslim and non-Muslim cap-makers (*takyeci*) cited in Chapter III (MD 92: 23/109, Ahmet Refik, *Onbirinci*, 55.).

¹⁶⁶ MD 93: 27/153, 38/207.

tinued actively petitioning the courts against the presence of outside intruders in their business because they were feeling pressure from their competitors in other parts of the greater Istanbul area.¹⁶⁷ The Yedikule tanners' petitions were well received as long as their rivals were outside intruders without the support of a semi-government institution, such as an imperial *waqf*, since they were under the aegis of the Aya Sofya Endowment (*waqf*) established by Mehmed the Conqueror, enjoying a supposed monopoly on the raw hides of animals slaughtered in Istanbul. However, when Murad III's mother Nur Banu Sultan established her *waqf* complex, including a tannery in Üsküdar, the *waqf* endowment deed designated several butcheries in and around Istanbul to supply the Üsküdar tannery, and Murad III's edict confirmed the *waqf* endowment deed's injunctions in 1575.¹⁶⁸ After this, the conflict between these two tanner groups over raw materials intensified, with both sides citing their *waqf* documents and both receiving support from their respective *waqf* administrators, who were concerned about the rental income from their tenants and were therefore interested in keeping the businesses of their tenants alive and well. In 1016/1607–8, the *divān* heard the Üsküdar tanners' petition and recognized their rights over the Yedikule tanners.¹⁶⁹ This decision was repeated in 1040/1630–31¹⁷⁰ and in 1064/1653–54,¹⁷¹ but again, in 1070/1659–60, upon the petition of the Yedikule tanners, who asked whose *waqf* deed was to be followed, the Yedikule group's privileges were recognized over those of Üsküdar.¹⁷² It seems that the matter was settled at least in principle since there was another edict that again privileged Yedikule in the late eighteenth century (1196/1781–82).¹⁷³ In many ways, the Yedikule tanners displayed amazing persistence, claiming their rights under Mehmed II's endowment for centuries, and after more than 50 or so years, reclaiming their privileges over the Üsküdar tanners.

Guilds or individual artisans often took care to secure support from as many government authorities as possible. In order to achieve

¹⁶⁷ Faroqhi, "Urban Space as Disputed Grounds: Territorial Aspects to Artisan Conflict in Sixteenth- to Eighteenth-Century Istanbul," *Stories of Ottoman Men and Women* (Istanbul: Eren, 2002) 221–225.

¹⁶⁸ Refik, *Onuncu*, 115.

¹⁶⁹ Refik, *Onbirinci*, 30–31.

¹⁷⁰ Yedikule side's petition, MD 85: 215/491.

¹⁷¹ AŞ 3: 56–57/185. Üsküdar tanners' petition.

¹⁷² MD 93: 43/223.

¹⁷³ Refik, *Onikinci*, 230–32.

this they tried to acquire multiple sets of documentation: a *ferman* (edict) and *berāt* (diploma) from the *divān*, a *temessuk* (title-deed) from the *kadi*, and sometimes a *fetva* (legal opinion) from the *seyhülislām* to give added support to their case in court. The aforementioned tavernkeeper provides a good example of such efforts.¹⁷⁴ Should guildsmen lose their documentation (for example, in a fire), they made sure to acquire the same documents from multiple authorities once again.¹⁷⁵ They could also, however, turn to a different authority if they found they had a problem with another one.¹⁷⁶

In filing petitions, guilds often sought the assistance of dignitaries who were related to them through *waqf* or tax arrangements and had the latter petition on their behalf. The administrators of *waqfs* and directors of government branches had interests in making the businesses of related guildsmen prosper reasonably since otherwise it would be difficult to collect rents from their tenants or get specially arranged services. This is why the *waqf* administrators were deeply involved in the abovementioned dispute cases between the tanners of Yedikule and Üsküdar.

When a guild appealed to the court, many if not all of its members, rather than the guild leaders alone, were present as the case was pleaded. At times, court records give the names of more than 10 or even 20 guildsmen, and indicate that those were not all who came to court. The largest delegation found among my documents was that of the quilted turban makers, consisting of more than 23 people. Sometimes, the delegations present in court were described as being a “great multitude” (*cemm-i gâfir*).¹⁷⁷ The large size of a delegation probably helped in emphasizing the importance of the case.

When more than one guild united to address a common problem, the government may have been more obliged to listen to them. There are some cases of joint appeals and petitions that convey a sense that

¹⁷⁴ GK 80: 89b.

¹⁷⁵ GK 80: 91a, as mentioned before.

¹⁷⁶ For example, getting a *fetva* from the *mufti* seems to indicate an effort to influence or even reverse a *kadi*'s decision, although the documents I used do not clearly indicate a previous decision was overturned. A *dhimmī* shoetip-maker sued the guild of the same trade that had tried to ban his business despite his proficiency, presenting a *fetva* from the *seyhülislām* in his favor, and won the case. Since it was common for a guild to ban outside practitioners with a *kadi*'s warning, there may well have been a previous decision in favor of the guild (IK 4: 36a/251).

¹⁷⁷ IK 3: 7b/58, *hallaç* (cotton or wool fluffers), Refik, *Onuncu*, 121–122 (tanners), 132–133 (linen weavers).

the injustice done to them was more serious.¹⁷⁸ Up to now, there is no evidence of overarching organizations above regular guilds in Istanbul such as the *meclis* (council) of guilds as in the provincial city of Şiroz (Serres),¹⁷⁹ other than that there was a head of shopkeepers in each bazaar (e.g., the *kethüdās* of *bedestans*). Guildsmen were more than capable of organizing themselves if need be. One example of this phenomenon was when the various Muslim and non-Muslim guilds that had provided large nails used for a building within the Boğaz Hisarı delegated their representation to one of their *kethüdās*—who was a *dhimmī*—and made him their deputy (*wakil*) to deal with government agents in lawsuits and to obtain their unpaid wages.¹⁸⁰

These behavioral patterns in negotiating with the government were not peculiar to guilds and guildsmen alone, but could be used by any Ottoman subject. On the other hand, guilds had an advantage in the sense that they could use their business networks and present their cases in a more organized way. Their strategies, combined or separately, worked very well when applied to lawsuits or petitions over intra- or inter-guild matters in which the state remained a third party, and sometimes those involving conflicts with minor government officials who collected taxes or fines from them.¹⁸¹

In other words, organization was an important factor that helped guildsmen in their dealings with the government, both within one guild and across related guilds. Those with established organizations, as in any negotiation process, had an advantage in terms of bargaining power. It is not that the state was more sympathetic to more organized groups—the government was actually quite sympathetic on occasion to unorganized groups of poor artisans.¹⁸² However, it

¹⁷⁸ See AŞ 1: 88/419, IK 6: 11a, IK 7: 9b–10a. These are examples cited in Chapter II, section c. In addition, it is worth remembering that there was a category of joint petitions (*‘arż-ı mahżar*) among those filed by Ottoman subjects. An *‘arż-ı mahżar* was usually filed in a situation of grave injustice by people of various social groups in a city. See İnalçık, “Şikâyet Hakkı,” 41.

¹⁷⁹ Nuri, *Mecelle*, 697.

¹⁸⁰ IK 7: 9b–10a. The *kethüdā* of the nail-makers (*ekserciler*) was approved as their representative by the head (*baş*) of the ironmongers at Tersane (Muslim), *kethüdā* of the ironmongers in Tavukpazarı (Muslim), head (*baş*) of the ironmongers in Üsküdar (Muslim), *kethüdā* of the *keylciler* (measurers of grain, etc.) near Un Kaparı (Muslim), *kethüdā* of the *katârcılar* (camel drivers) near Odun Kapısı (Muslim), head of the Istanbul ironmongers (non-Muslim), head of the Galata ironmongers (non-Muslim), and another non-Muslim *kethüdā* whose guild’s name is illegible.

¹⁸¹ IK 3: 87b/706, GK 80: 75b, BOA İbnülemin tasnifi, Maliye 381,

¹⁸² MD 81: 189/421 (tailors “from outside”), IK 3: 90b/715 (candle-makers). ‘Poor’ was a favorite epithet for the petitioners.

was more likely that the legitimacy of the more organized and established groups would be recognized in terms of raw material distribution and sales, since they were considered the trade experts who could tell others what the tradition was. The records of artisans establishing guild official positions, such as *kethüdās* and *yığıtbaşıs*, in the seventeenth century indicate their need to become more organized in relation to the government, whether dealing with tax officials or filing petitions to the court.

As shown above, although within the boundary of petitions and appeals, guildsmen actively mobilized all their resources and utilized every known method to achieve their goals. They secured legal documents formerly issued to their advantage, mobilized help from dignitaries they had connections to, tried to influence the courts with *fetwas* from *muftis* (preferably from the *şeyhülislām*), used traditionalist and Islamist rhetoric picturing themselves as unjustly victimized law-abiding subjects, while tenaciously filing petitions and encroaching on rival groups' territory over decades and getting organized when necessary. Guilds usually sent large delegations to the court and sometimes joined forces with one another. Literally, they used the Ottoman court system to its fullest extent. After all, petitioning was the best option for the Istanbul guildsmen to take especially when the government was so receptive to petitions, since tax-dodging or outright revolt would normally cause more suffering.¹⁸³

Although guilds were more often than not successful in having their problems redressed through petitions, the events of the time did not always run as they saw fit. Ultimately it was the government, however receptive it was, that had the right to formally approve or disapprove guild affairs, and guilds could not always ensure that the government made the decisions they wanted. In other words, although the common people such as guildsmen had a great deal of initiative, this still fell short of autonomy.¹⁸⁴ When they could not force the government to remedy their problems through the usual channels, they either had to put up with worsening situations, or had to take an unusual route to address the government—although the unusual was perhaps no more than an extension of the usual.

¹⁸³ Darling, 298. Tax-dodging generally caused more severe tax burdens. GK 80: 90b, 93a (tavernkeepers' examples).

¹⁸⁴ Darling, 298.

d. *Uprising as an Extended Form of Negotiation:
The Case of the 1651 Rebellion*¹⁸⁵

On the second day of Ramazan 1061 (Saturday, August 19, 1651),¹⁸⁶ the guildsmen of Istanbul took to the streets on a massive scale, leaving their shops and markets closed. They filled the outer court of the sultan's palace and surrounding areas and insisted that they would not disperse until excessive taxes were canceled and the responsible bureaucrats punished. Although their action did not last for more than two days, this incident constituted the first rebellion in Istanbul led by guildsmen that drew the keen attention of contemporaries and became a precedent for the participation of guildsmen in later rebellions.

Seventeenth-century revolts by guildsmen (1651 and 1688), however, have not attracted much scholarly attention. There may be two reasons for this general lack of interest in this topic. First, on the assumption that the government exercised firm control over the guilds and that guilds had only economic but not political concerns, these revolts would look like exceptions simply provoked by economic hardship. One may point out, as Robert Mantran did, that guildsmen were generally quiescent except for two occasions in the tumultuous history of seventeenth-century Istanbul.¹⁸⁷ Second, guild revolts may have been regarded as less politically important because they did not result in the same scale of massive violence as military

¹⁸⁵ One may raise a question whether the word "rebellion" is preferable to "demonstration," given the low degree of violence. However, it seems that the event was seen as a rebellion by the Ottoman chroniclers such as Kâtip Çelebi (*Fezleke-i Kâtip Çelebi* [Istanbul: Cerîde-i Havâdiş Matbaası, 1869–71] 373) and Na'îma (5: 97) given that they used the word "*hurûc*" (disobedience, rebellion) to describe it. Perhaps in Ottoman taxonomy "demonstration" and "rebellion" were not deemed to be so different in that they were both disruptions of normal social and political order. In addition, Paul Rychart (*The History of the Turkish Empire, from the Year 1623 to the Year 1677* [London, 1687] 84s) also observed the incident as a "rebellion" by the "people" of Istanbul.

¹⁸⁶ *Tārîḫ-i Gilmâni*, ed. Kamil Su, 37, Vienna manuscript in Atsız, *Das Osmanische Reich im 17. Jahrhundert* (Munich: Rudolf Trofenik, 1977) 29a–b, and Vecihi (Leiden manuscript, facsimile in Atsız) 51a. According to Evliya Çelebi, *The Intimate Life of an Ottoman Statesman, Melek Ahmed Pasha (1588–1662)* ed. and trans. Robert Dankoff (New York: State University of New York Press, 1991) 79, Kâtip Çelebi, *Fezleke-i Kâtip Çelebi*, 374, and 'Abdi Paşa (*Vekayî'name* Süleymaniye Library, M. Hafid Efendi 250) 16a, it happened on the 4th of Ramazan.

¹⁸⁷ Robert Mantran, *Istanbul dans la seconde moitié de XVII^e siècle*, 249ff., 359–360.

ones did. These assumptions, however, turn out to be questionable in the following study of the 1651 rebellion.

This protest is important in a few respects. It provides good test material for probing the mode of communications and negotiations between the state and the guilds in an emergency situation and for comparing it with their communications in more normal situations. This incident also showed the political potential of the guilds, although guilds are usually regarded as only relevant in the economic and social arenas. Additionally, the way the revolt broke out and unfolded shows that the networking and communication among guildsmen went well beyond the usual business connections among related guilds—about which we actually know very little beyond Evliya Çelebi's somewhat artificially systematized lists of major and assistant guilds.

Although this seems to be the first major revolt of the Istanbul artisans and service people,¹⁸⁸ guilds or their precursors of various types in Byzantine and Middle Eastern cities had at times been involved in political life. As early as in the late Abbasid caliphate, the caliph considered the artisans and merchants as his potential allies against the unruly military elites who had stronger forces than the caliph himself.¹⁸⁹ In thirteenth- and fourteenth-century Anatolia, guild-like fraternities of urban dwellers almost took over the local administration of towns.¹⁹⁰ In addition, in Byzantine Constantinople, guilds were both vociferous and rebellious at times.¹⁹¹ Although we may not necessarily assume direct connections between these urban organizations and seventeenth-century Istanbul guilds, given their similar position in their respective societies, it is no wonder that seventeenth-century guilds had a similar political potential.¹⁹² Not only in the distant past and in different configurations of artisans, but

¹⁸⁸ Some Istanbul tradesmen may have rebelled along with soldiers before 1651. See Kafadar, "Yeniçeri-Esnaf Relations" Chapter V for a comprehensive treatment of the janissary-*esnâf* relationship in many rebellions. My approach to the 1651 revolt benefited greatly from his thesis.

¹⁸⁹ Rhoads Murphey, "Sinf," in *Encyclopedia of the Middle Ages*.

¹⁹⁰ Taeschner, "Ankara," *ET*². Murphey, "Sinf."

¹⁹¹ For the political activities of the Byzantine guilds, consult Speros Vryonis, "Byzantine Demokratia and Eleventh-Century Guilds," *Dumbarton Oaks Papers* 17 (1963) 289–314.

¹⁹² For examples of provincial guilds' protests, see the Bosnian revolt (1681) described in İsmail Eren, "Bir Yugoslav Tarihi: Hamdiya Kreşevlakoviç ve Eseri," *İFM* 17 (1956) 365 and the crisis in Mosul (1719) in Dina Rizk Khoury, *State and Provincial Society in Ottoman Empire: Mosul 1540–1834* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997) 1–2.

also in the reign of Süleyman the Magnificent, the shoemakers of Istanbul allegedly rallied behind the sultan to confront a threat from the janissary corps.¹⁹³ It is also possible that some tradesmen participated in military revolts before 1651, since nonmilitary elements reportedly mixed with the rebels as early as the rebellion that deposed Osman II (1622).¹⁹⁴ Therefore, one may conclude that the 1651 rebellion was not totally unthinkable in the collective consciousness of the guildsmen, although in terms of its scale and demands it was clearly a new phenomenon.

First, let us reconstruct what happened based on some chronicles and Evliya Çelebi's description of the event. Accounts written by authors of the time include Mehmed Halife's *Tārīḥ-i Gilmāni* (written between 1660 and 1665),¹⁹⁵ Kâtip Çelebi's (d. 1657) *Fezleke-i Tārīḥ*,¹⁹⁶ Vecihi's (d. 1071/1660–61) *Tārīḥ*,¹⁹⁷ 'Abdi Paşa 'Abdurrahman's (d. 1692) *Veḳāyi'nāme*,¹⁹⁸ and Evliya's vivid description as a first-hand observer of the rebellion—he was among the retinue of the then grand vizier Melek Ahmed Paşa. Most chronicles only briefly mention this rebellion, describing it within two to three pages. The most detailed accounts are those of Evliya Çelebi and Na'îma, and therefore I have inevitably relied on these accounts. However, one should take caution: Evliya's account is uniquely partisan in favor of his patron Melek Ahmed Paşa; while Na'îma writes from the officially sanctioned viewpoint of the eighteenth century as the *vak'anavis* (state-appointed writer of an official chronicle) of the time.¹⁹⁹ On the whole,

¹⁹³ Evliya, ed. Gökyay, 285–286. Hammer's translation, 209. The following account is not confirmed by any official document. Armed shoemakers (*pabuççılar*) numbering 40,000 to 50,000 [*sic*] ran to the support of Sultan Süleyman the Magnificent when he did not even officially call for their help but merely threatened the janissaries that he would have the shoemakers crush them. Süleyman was pleasantly surprised at this rally for him and granted the shoemakers all their wishes, including obtaining recruits from the *devşirme* boys as in their discontinued tradition, an increase in their profit margin, and the right to punish criminals among themselves without resorting to the *kadi*. This is an interesting and unique example of a demonstration of force by a guild. If this account is correct, the shoemakers may have been already known for their military and political potential given that the sultan specifically indicated that he could use their forces and they had traditionally been recruited from *devşirme* boys.

¹⁹⁴ "Tuği Tarihi," 493, as cited in Kafadar, "Yeniçeri-Esnaf Relations."

¹⁹⁵ Atsız, *Das Osmanische Reich*, cxxiii.

¹⁹⁶ Istanbul: Ceride-i Havadis Matbaası, 1286–1287.

¹⁹⁷ Atsız, *Das Osmanische Reich*, cxv.

¹⁹⁸ Süleymaniye Library, M. Hafid Efendi 250.

¹⁹⁹ On the other hand, Na'îma benefited from many seventeenth-century chronicles, including the now lost *Şâmil ve Kâmil* by Şârih ül-Menarzade. Probably Na'îma obtained details of the revolt that were not recorded in other chronicles from this

in fact, the sources are largely consistent and complementary to one another in terms of factual information.

The revolt of 1651 was apparently triggered by the excessive demand of levies from the marketplace imposed by the government. It occurred in the middle of the Cretan War (1645–69), and the treasury had suffered greatly because of the extravagance of the former Sultan Ibrahim (“the Mad,” r. 1640–48). While the state had reasons to raise revenue aggressively, the chronicles impute the extraordinary taxation preceding the rebellion to the janissary officers in power. This was a time when the power of the janissary officers was at its peak, only three years after their crucial participation in the dethronement of Ibrahim in 1648. The establishment of the new regime developed around the child Sultan Mehmed IV, his grandmother Kösem Sultan, and a group of high-ranking bureaucrats and *ulema* who took power after removing Ibrahim from the throne. The new governing coalition does not seem to have had a clear vision of where it was going nor the ability to secure stability. It was dominated by the janissary officers, who now did not even have the *kapıkulu sipahi* forces as their counterbalance since the *sipahis* had recently lost their political power when they revolted unsuccessfully to avenge the death of the former Sultan Ibrahim. The janissary officers, now thinking that they were the only kingmakers, dipped their fingers into all kinds of government affairs.²⁰⁰

Although they were prominent power brokers, the janissary officers could not completely dominate the political arena. Political factions in this period included various elements connected by disparate forces, and this is clear even from the scanty information that the chronicles provide. In 1651, the core of the ruling faction comprised the janissary officers and Kösem Sultan, Mehmed IV’s grandmother. They were connected to some famous *ulema*, such as the *Şeyhülislām* Karaçelebizade ‘Abdülaziz, and installed their men in key government positions, such as the office of the *defterdar* (finance minister).

one. Babinger, *Osmanlı Tarih Yazarları ve Eserleri*, trans. Coşkun Üçok (Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı, 1982) 209–210.

²⁰⁰ One may wonder how exactly the janissary corps could wield so much unchecked power even though they could play the role of kingmaker. In addition, the janissary officers’ policy of seemingly unlimited exploitation described in the chronicles seems to be quite irrational. It could be a reflection of the social bias against the janissaries in this period. Janissary officers probably did not always pursue that policy line, and if they did the reasons behind it are unclear.

The grand vizier Melek Ahmed did not belong to the core group, although he maintained an amicable relationship with it. By the same token, the opposition faction consisted of various elements: the queen mother Turhan allied with Harem officials such as the *kızlar ağası*. Since they were close to the sultan, they could quickly mobilize support from the *ulema* and bureaucrats in a critical situation. The tax-weary guildsmen and sympathetic *seyyids* (descendants of the Prophet Muhammad) must have strengthened and legitimized this faction against the other, as we shall see later.

There seem to have been many extraordinary taxes levied on Istanbul guilds in the years leading up to Ramazan 1061/1651. Because of war in Crete and skirmishes in the Black Sea region, and as more and more provincial revenues were retained by the provinces and not transferred to the center in the seventeenth century,²⁰¹ the guilds in the capital were becoming more important as a handy source of revenue. Many chroniclers, with the exception of Evliya Çelebi, attribute most of the burdens borne by the guildsmen to the greed of the janissary officers. According to the chronicles, while the treasury was running short of funds to distribute salaries to the soldiery, the high-ranking janissary officers filled their own pockets by embezzlement and by issuing debased coins when paying salaries.²⁰² This was possible because they had their men positioned in the treasury department beginning with the *defterdar* (a finance minister) himself. Moreover, they allegedly brought many commodities from outside of Istanbul and forcibly sold them to the people of the marketplace at excessively high prices, in itself a form of taxation. The guild delegations at the imperial *divân* argued that they had already paid 14 taxes, including *‘avārîz*, in that year up to Ramazan, and had to buy copper, hazelnuts, salt, soap, resin, fustian, Diyarbakır cotton cloth, alum, morocco leather, and so on brought in through the connections of janissary officers and imposed by the government at three times “normal” prices.²⁰³ In addition, the treasury was running so serious a

²⁰¹ Şevket Pamuk, *A Monetary History of the Ottoman Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) 138–9.

²⁰² For example, according to Kâtip Çelebi’s *Fezleke* (374), the janissary officers calculated that they could get 300 *kese* (purse) of *guruş* out of the debasement of 1,000 *kese* of *guruş*, which was a significant profit.

²⁰³ Na‘îma, 5: 99. Unfortunately, Na‘îma did not list the other 13 items of taxes. Also, see Dankoff, 78 and *Seyâhatnâme* 3: 279. One may wonder why the janissary officers used the cumbersome method of hard sell; there is nothing known about the details of such operations.

deficit that it collected taxes for the coming years in advance. Even then, the state could not pay all the salaries of government officials.²⁰⁴

The instance of taxation that finally exceeded the guildsmen's limits of tolerance started with a request for army supplies and salaries for soldiers from the Azak (Azov) fortress, where the discontent of the military had reached mutinous levels. While supplies were ordered to be transferred from the nearby town of Kefe (Caffa, Kaffa), the central government had to provide the soldiers' salaries. The plan of the janissary officers in collusion with finance officials on that occasion was to bring in 120 *yük* (a *yük* was 100,000 *akçe*) of defective coins to Istanbul, forcibly trade them for gold with the men of the marketplace,²⁰⁵ and then have the gold changed into *riyal guruş* (spanish silver coins) by Jewish money-changers so as to pay the overdue salaries for soldiers.²⁰⁶ Since the *akçe* to be given to the guildsmen in return for gold was of low value and the exchange rate to be applied was unreasonably low—118 debased *akçe* was to be given in exchange for 1 *altın* (gold coin), whereas the normal exchange rate was 160 good *akçe* for 1 *altın*²⁰⁷—the tax-weary tradesmen reached their limits of tolerance. Although guildsmen usually did not like confronting the government directly, except on rare occasions, this became one of those rare occasions.

When the debased coins were delivered to the *kethüdā* of the Covered Bazaar to be distributed to the guilds, none of the guild leaders who gathered around him accepted the deal. Instead, the usually pro-establishment guild leaders—although they complained to the authorities frequently, they seem to have considered the government basically on their side—decided to reject this coercive exchange. A delegation of guild elders went to the grand vizier Melek Ahmed Paşa to file collective petitions (*‘arz -ı hāl*) on this matter repeatedly, but to no avail.²⁰⁸ It is only Evliya Çelebi's unique account that relates the

²⁰⁴ Na‘īma, 5: 60 and 70. There is also a document in the Topkapı archives (E 5223/20) that contains an order to the *kadis* of Istanbul and the three metropolitan districts to the effect that they should collect the 1062 portion (*mahsūb*) of the *lağım* (mine) tax right away in the month of Şa‘ban 1061, which was shortly before the rebellion. A government order urging tax collection at that point must have worsened the grievances felt by the guildsmen.

²⁰⁵ ‘Abdi Paşa, 16a, also Katip Çelebi, *Fezleke*, 374.

²⁰⁶ Na‘īma, 5: 98. According to Evliya Çelebi, the original plan agreed upon at the grand vizier's *divān* was distorted by the finance department officials in a way that burdened the guildsmen more (Dankoff, 78 and *Seyāhatnāme* 3: 278–79).

²⁰⁷ ‘Abdi Paşa, 16a.

²⁰⁸ Kâtip Çelebi, *Fezleke*, 374.

involvement of *seyyids* (and *ulema*) in the delegation. The authorities were usually generous in accepting guild requests, but the fiscal difficulties squeezing the treasury must have been a factor that made the grand vizier more inflexible than usual. The grand vizier's decision in normal petition cases was the ultimate word on the matter, at least momentarily. Behind his choice to rebuff the guildsmen's pleas must have been a belief that they would not resist government orders if it meant risking their lives or livelihood.²⁰⁹ In all likelihood, this perception formed the basis of the government's and the janissary officers' excessive taxation in the first place. Although the grand vizier, being unable to resist the janissary officers, felt compelled to reject the guilds' petition,²¹⁰ his own impolite treatment of the guild elders and of the *seyyids*²¹¹ who joined them pleading for "justice for the Muslims" only aggravated the situation. The *seyyids* had great moral and political clout, and the grand vizier's impatience toward the delegation including the *seyyids* immediately hurt his public image.

Upon their rejection by the grand vizier, the guilds decided to turn to another kind of authority, namely, that of the *şeyhülislâm*. When they went to the *şeyhülislâm*, the tradesmen closed their shops and markets to follow their guild officials and elders.²¹² The act of

²⁰⁹ Kudde Kethüdâ's advice to the grand vizier that the *eşnâf* would disperse soon if they had to risk their lives or part from their wives (Dankoff, 83).

²¹⁰ 'Abdi Paşa, 16a.

²¹¹ The *seyyids* must have had a lot of moral authority in public relations, being as they were the Prophet's descendants. Guilds also turned to the official head of the *seyyids*, namely the *nakîbüleşrâf*, as well as the *şeyhülislâm* (Dankoff, 79 and *Seyâhatnâme* 3: 280). The *nakîbüleşrâf*, considered as one of the guild *nakîbs* (see Osman Nuri, Mecelle [new] 1: 538–539) in the Ottoman context may have been involved in the affairs of crafts as in the Safavid system described by Mahdi Keyvani. See his *Artisans and Guild Life in the Later Safavid Period: A Chapter in the Economic and Social History of Iran* (Berlin: K. Schwarz, 1982) 67–68. According to Hülya Canbakal's recent Ph.D. dissertation, "Ayntab at the End of the Seventeenth Century," (Harvard University, 1999) the number of *seyyids* was on the increase in the seventeenth century. Becoming a *seyyid*, like becoming a janissary, was a way for a *reaya* to join the *askeri* class. In 'Ayntab, janissaries frequently attacked *seyyids*, although it did not amount to factional strife. The relations between the janissaries and *seyyids* in Istanbul in the seventeenth century are totally unknown, much less in terms of their involvement in trades. However, it is beyond dispute that some Istanbul guilds included some *seyyids* as their members, for example, the starch-makers (*nışasteciler*, IK 10: 23a) and tanners (*debbâğlar*, IK 10: 104b and 145b).

²¹² Kâtip Çelebi, *Fezleke* (374) says that *yığıtbaşıs* and elders led the crowd to the grand *mufîh*, (*şeyhülislâm*). This seems to indicate that the normal cadre of guilds led them to the mass uprising of the guilds, although some of the government-appointed *kethüdâs* may not have wanted to participate.

closing the markets must have been a signal that the guilds were determined not to engage in their normal activities until their urgent concerns were addressed. For the government it was a foreboding of unrest, and it would usually prefer to have the markets open. However, now that the shops were closed, the guild delegation was joined by a huge mass of tradesmen.²¹³ The rioters were crudely armed with cudgels, clubs, and fire-pokers, while some of them even had muskets, showing their resolve to make their voices heard.²¹⁴

Unfortunately, none of the chronicles provides detailed information as to which guilds participated and which guilds did not. To be more precise, it is not even clear from accounts contained in the chronicles that all the participants were organized guildsmen. The rebels were called *ehl-i sūk* (men of the marketplace), *ehl-i hıref* (tradesmen), or even *ahali-i şehir* (people of the city). However, given that the revolt was provoked by the imposition of an extraordinary tax on the markets of Istanbul, the shopkeepers and craftsmen who were directly affected should be regarded as forming the main body of the rebels. It is likely that organized and unorganized artisans both participated assuming the latter too were being subjected to excessive taxation. Those who were not organized, but had shops in the markets, had to pay taxes imposed on the markets as lump sums.²¹⁵ As guild leaders themselves resisted the levies they were supposed to collect and led the guildsmen to file petitions and eventually to revolt, it seems that many guilds participated collectively. Although it is unclear exactly what elements formed the participants of the uprising, Evliya pointed out that the uprising started with the *ahıs* of Sarraçhane (Saddlers' Market) who raised their banners and drums. Additionally, since we clearly see the *kethüüdā* of Sarraçhane among the delegation of the tradesmen, the people of Sarraçhane may have formed the core of the rebels. Plus, we may assume that the shopkeepers in and around the Covered Bazaar also participated, since the discontent

²¹³ Na'ima, 5: 100. The crowd reached almost 150,000 according to Evliya Çelebi, who tends to exaggerate numbers (*Seyāhatnāme* 3: 280, Evliya, ed. Kahraman and Dağlı, 164). Dankoff's translation (79) mentions the number as 50,000.

²¹⁴ Although the tradesmen were not heavily armed and did not nearly compare with the janissary corps in terms of the violence they could inflict, they at least almost killed a government official who insulted them (Dankoff, 86–87 and *Seyāhatnāme* 3: 283–86).

²¹⁵ Arab Suğ shopkeepers and bottle-makers of Galata, wanting to establish a *kethüüdā*-ship, said they needed it to handle taxes imposed on the market (GK 80: 2a, 38a).

with the levy and a series of petitions started from there. Clearly, the protest was broadly based, given that a high bureaucrat pejoratively described them as a pack of “jackals, grocers, hoarders, saddlers, silk mercers, linen drapers, camel drivers and porters,” even if he may not have exactly known which guilds were participating.²¹⁶

The *şeyhülislām* Karaçelebizade ‘Abdülaziz seems to have been surprised by the guildsmen’s mass protest. Despite Evliya’s accusation that he plotted against Melek Ahmed Paşa, the *şeyhülislām*’s role in the downfall of the grand vizier seems to have been only inadvertent.²¹⁷ In fact, the *mufti*, who may well have owed his office to the janissary officers,²¹⁸ tried to appease the angry crowd with his promise to send a letter of intercession (*şefâatnâme*) to the grand vizier in their favor and almost succeeded in making them disperse. At this point, some of the experienced guild leaders, sensing that the problem would not be solved so easily, physically obliged the *şeyhülislām* to mount a horse, join them in the front row of the march to the sultan’s palace, and present their petition. This clearly added more weight to their case, since the *mufti*’s voice carried serious political clout in an unclear political situation. The sultan was still the ultimate guarantor of justice in the empire both in the way he was presented and in the tradesmen’s perceptions. The men of the marketplace must have been used to sultanic statements upbraiding the injustice of his officials in the form of an *‘adâletnâme* (a sultan’s edict that prohibits the abuse of power by the bureaucrats against his subjects), since they were usually posted in busy market areas for public viewing.²¹⁹ Although they took an uncompromising stance on their demands, the guildsmen who took part in the 1651 revolt seem to have ultimately believed in sultanic authority and the system, or saying so was their best bet to make their request heard. (“We have no remaining faith in the sultan’s

²¹⁶ Dankoff, 82–83.

²¹⁷ Dankoff, 79–82. Evliya claims that Siyavuş Paşa (the person who became the next grand vizier), Ebu Said and ‘Abdülaziz (the then *şeyhülislām*) instigated the insurrection. According to Evliya, once the *şeyhülislām* was on the side of the rebels, the grand vizier showed signs of compromise, suggesting that they should pay only part (70,000 piasters = *guruş*) of the originally imposed amount of taxes. The guildsmen nearly agreed to his terms, but the compromise collapsed following their demand to punish the janissary officers.

²¹⁸ Na‘îma, 5: 62.

²¹⁹ İnalçık, “Adâletnâmeler,” 88. Anyone could get a copy of an *‘adâletnâme* upon request (967/1559–60) and all markets and all public places were supposed to exhibit *‘adâletnâmes* (1044/1634–35).

ministers. Let us talk to him directly.”)²²⁰ Without the power to interfere directly in state affairs, such as sultanic succession, it was perhaps realistic for the guilds to rely on the authorities within the established system, however unsatisfactory they may have been.

When the procession of the protestors, with the *şeyhülislām* on horseback, reached the palace and filled the first court, Sultan Mehmed IV's disapproving reaction to the *mufti* was, “Why did you not disperse the crowd but bring them here?” The situation must have looked like another crisis for the child sultan who had been enthroned in the aftermath of a rebellion only three years before. Such a massive disturbance had to be quickly prevented. The sultan promptly promised in writing (*hatt-ı hümayün*) to cancel all the new taxes and levies (*tekâlif-i muhdaşa*)²²¹ and return to the levels of taxation in Süleyman the Magnificent's time about a century earlier, however unrealistic it was given the deficits the treasury was running.²²² However, the tradesmen were not satisfied with the achievement of their immediate economic goal, but went on to demand the removal of Melek Ahmed Paşa from his office and the execution of the top-ranking janissary officers whom they held responsible for the excessive taxation.²²³ The sultan easily agreed to dismiss the grand vizier, but the removal of the janissary officers was another task entirely, given the unruliness of the military forces. The *şeyhülislām* ‘Abdülaziz Efendi and the new grand vizier Siyavuş Paşa managed to save the sultan from this embarrassing moment by persuading the crowd to go home and continue to petition early next morning, for it was already close to sunset. In this manner, the authorities seem to have tried to diffuse the tension by postponing any meeting with the crowds of tradesmen. All government authorities seem to have con-

²²⁰ Kâtip Çelebi, *Fezleke*, 374.

²²¹ ‘Abdi Paşa, 16a.

²²² Vecihi, 51a. The repealing of taxes were also recorded in Solakzade, ed. Vahid Çabuk, (based on Topkapı Palace Library, III. Ahmed no. 3078) 2: 602.

²²³ There are different accounts regarding exactly how many executions the tradesmen requested, but all of them commonly mention the three major janissary officers: Kara Çavuş, the janissary *ağa*, Bektaş Ağa, and Çelebi Ağa, the *kul kethüdâsı*. Evliya Çelebi's account lists the most, allegedly 150 government officials including the grandmother of the sultan, but it is likely that he exaggerated the number again (Dankoff, 81 and *Seyâhatnâme* 3: 281). If the rebel tradesmen did ask for the execution of Kösem Sultan—no other source confirms it—it is intriguing that the markets were voluntarily closed by tradesmen in her mourning for three days (Dankoff, 89 and *Seyâhatnâme* 3: 288). Probably, the opinions about Kösem Sultan were not unified in the markets.

sidered the tradesmen a nuisance who had to be dealt with quickly. Once the crowd caught the *şeyhülislām* or the sultan, the authorities had to act as supposed upholders of sultanic law and order, if only to maintain good public relations and disperse the angry crowd.

The next morning, however, no one could return to the square in front of the palace because janissary soldiers under the accused officers blocked all the roads leading there. The soldiers forceably opened the shops again against the will of the shopkeepers, which resulted in the opening and closing of the shops and markets several times on that day.²²⁴ The janissary officers were all the more outraged because many tradesmen of military origin, such as janissaries and *solaks* who they had considered to be on their side, had also participated in the protest.²²⁵ Thus, the first uprising of the Istanbul tradesmen was quelled rather abruptly, since their physical force was no match for that of the janissaries.

Nevertheless, after the suppression of the uprising, its aftermath took an unexpected turn. The grand vizier's office went to Siyavuş Paşa, who was known to be less than cooperative with the janissary commanders. The first candidate considered for the grand viziership had been the janissary *ağa* (*yeniçeri ağası*), the supreme commander of the janissary corps and a key figure in the janissary faction in power, supported by the grandmother of the sultan, Kösem Sultan. He was also one of the officers the tradesmen wanted to have executed. Yet at this opportunity he did not respond to the call of the sultan, thinking that the invitation could be a trap since it came without the actual seal of the grand vizier.²²⁶ Only then was the office given to Siyavuş Paşa. The janissary faction nervously started contemplating measures to secure their future. They came to the conclusion that some Harem officials²²⁷ in connection with the queen mother Turhan were responsible for Siyavuş Paşa's appointment, and demanded the grand vizier banish the officials to Egypt. This, however, caused a rapid counteroffensive from the rival faction. On the 16th of Ramazan, the Inner Palace servants under the leadership of the *kızlar ağası*

²²⁴ Vecihi, 51b.

²²⁵ Na'ima, 5: 105–106.

²²⁶ Kâtip Çelebi, *Fezleke*, 374–75.

²²⁷ Uzunçarşılı, *Saray Teşkilâtı*, 172–183. The Harem officials were headed by the *kızlar ağası*, and their political standing rose tremendously since the early seventeenth century when succession struggles and coups started to evolve around the palace.

assassinated Kösem Sultan and the *bostancıbaşı* (chief gardener),²²⁸ alleging that the sultan's grandmother and the janissary officers were conspiring together to depose the sultan for a younger prince who had a more docile mother than Turhan on the throne. For the sultan's mother and the inner circle of the palace with Mehmed IV on their side, this allegation, whether true or false, became the official position of the government. The opposition may also have been encouraged by the unpopularity of the officers among the men of the marketplace to take such a drastic action.

At this point, the palace and the janissary officers began to compete for supporters among the dignitaries of the state respectively at the palace and at Orta Cami, where the janissary headquarters were located. The officers gathered a considerable number of dignitaries including the *şeyhülislām* 'Abdülaziz Efendi and other leading *ulema*, but ultimate legitimacy lay with the sultan. The palace circle took out the banner of the Prophet Muhammad (*sancağ-ı şerīf*), which had been used only for military campaigns against other countries,²²⁹ and used it to issue a general call to arms for "any able-bodied Muslims" to rise up against the disloyal janissary officers. This was the first such use of the banner in internal Ottoman politics. Upon receipt of this news, many soldiers in Istanbul²³⁰ and residents of the city "including the sick and women" (i.e., not to mention the tradesmen who had revolted) came under the banner to fight the janissary officers' forces.²³¹ The surprised "*ağas*" were soon deserted by their supporters, given provincial positions, and finally killed while traveling to their new posts. To the guildsmen who had demanded the execution of leading janissary officers, this turn of events must have been most empowering and vindicating.

Even if we do not consider the aftermath of the guildsmen's revolt, its outbreak and development by themselves provide a number of interesting features worth analyzing. In truth, this was a short-lived period of tumult that was easily put down by coercion, but it showed

²²⁸ He was the head of a troop that guarded the palace and other private gardens of the emperor. He was also in charge of the waterways and boatmen around Istanbul.

²²⁹ Uzunçarşılı, *Saray Teşkilatı*, 248–60. It is not clear how the banner was acquired, let alone whether it was really the banner of the Prophet. The Ottoman army started using it for campaigns beginning 1003/1595.

²³⁰ Janissaries affiliated with a different faction (*Eski Odalı*) rather than the key officers came under the banner without hesitation. *Tārīḫ-i Gilmāni*, Kamil Su edition, 39 and Vienna manuscript, 36b–37a.

²³¹ Paul Rycaut, *History of the Present State of the Ottoman Empire* (London, 1682) 39–40.

the political potential of guilds in new ways that were not apparent before. Although the rebellion was suppressed early on, the guildsmen's requests to have excessive taxes repealed, the grand vizier removed from his office and the janissary officers executed were all accomplished. What, then, does this rebellion tell us about the guildsmen's outlook and behavior when faced with crises?

First of all, although this incident is called a rebellion and surely went beyond the boundaries of normalcy, the course of events was an extension of normal petitioning procedures. The revolt, although it possibly had been brewing, does not seem to have been planned in any way. It was, rather, a simple escalation of a frustrating process of petition and negotiation. The guildsmen seem to have skipped the *kadi* court, but that is because tax disputes with the government were beyond the reach of the *kadis*. Other than that, they employed the tactics they usually did in petitions on everyday issues. They "repeatedly" presented their case to the grand vizier, who in the end lost his temper at the delegation of the guilds.²³² When they could not persuade the grand vizier, they turned to other authorities such as that of *şeyhülislām*—and probably to the *naķībūleşrāf* in charge of the descendants of the Prophet Muhammad if we believe Evliya Çelebi—and finally took the matter to the sultan, who was ultimately responsible for the rule of the state, despite his usual aloofness. Guildsmen, especially the experienced (*kārdān*) leaders, knew what to do next when they were turned down or politely avoided at each step. As they normally would, they appealed to different authorities until their demands were accepted. Although the protest was somewhat more complicated by public agitation and incidents of violence, its format remained that of a joint petition.

In addition, the normal guild hierarchy, that of the *kethüdā*, *yigītbaşı* and elders, led the tradesmen to the grand vizier, *şeyhülislām* and the sultan. With a crowd of more than 10,000 filling the palace court and the square outside, it was of course an unprecedented occasion. However, given the guildsmen's usual manner of going to court in groups of 10 to 20 people and possibly more (e.g., *cemm-i gafīr*), this again does not seem to be so far removed from their usual practice. Namely, when guilds appealed as groups, it involved many, if not all, of the concerned people rather than only the leaders of the concerned groups. It was not uncommon for related guilds to join

²³² Kâtip Çelebi, *Fezleke*, 374.

together to have their grievances redressed, as examples of joint petitions in Chapter II indicated. In addition, when filing petitions guildsmen had occasionally mobilized help from dignitaries they were related to through *waqf* leases or tax-replacing special arrangements. Likewise, guildsmen included *seyyids*, whose voice would have much more weight than their own, in their delegation.

Such similarities between the guilds' usual negotiating activities and their behavior at the time of the revolt remind us of Guilain Denoeux's thesis that an urban network may either prevent unrest or encourage it, depending on the particular circumstances. He argues that urban networks curb instability to an extent by providing a social safety net and alleviating poor people's discontent with the government, but beyond the point where the government's policies start to threaten the patrons' interests urban networks may actually encourage turmoil.²³³ We usually view guilds in terms of their cooperation with the government and their useful role in administration. However, the guilds could also organize large-scale protests, employing strategies similar to those they would use in normal petitions.

While the patterns of their normal legal actions could very well tie into actions of protest, however, the revolt was a transformative event for guildsmen because their hidden political capabilities were suddenly made clear to themselves as well as to the government authorities and other segments of society. Namely, with all the continuities, there were definitely new features in this event that made it a "rebellion."

Above all, what is noteworthy is that guildsmen moved on to making a political demand from an economic one, and did not waver from it even after their original petition for having the new tax repealed was approved. That they demanded the dismissal of the grand vizier and execution of some key figures in the ruling coalition, such as three leading janissary officers, demonstrates that guildsmen thought the origins of their unacceptable economic situation to be political. In addition, that they directed their anger at the janissary officers rather than the grand vizier who personally mistreated them shows that guildsmen were convinced—correctly or not—as to who were the responsible actors.

²³³ Guilain Denoeux, *Urban Unrest in the Middle East: A Comparative Study of Informal Networks in Egypt, Iran and Lebanon* (Albany: SUNY Press, 1993) 48–49. Denoeux's analysis incorporates informal networks such as patron-client relationships that have a broader scope than organizational structures such as guilds.

Given that their political opinion already formed before the rebellion, one cannot assume that guildsmen's daily lives were devoid of politics. While this is a little known aspect of their lives, they must have observed with keen eyes the tumultuous political developments in the first half of the seventeenth century. Though it remains questionable whether guildsmen could acquire correct and detailed information about current political events, they were by no means isolated from the rest of society. Military rebellions by janissaries and/or *sipahis* in Istanbul had become rather common,²³⁴ and this may have given a message to the people of the city that rebellion was a possible way of communicating with the state. The Sarraçhane *kethüdâ's* rude words spoken to the *şeyhülislâm* ("You [plural] rose up to kill Sultan Ibrahim when you wanted furs [used for the outer garment of high bureaucrats, i.e., figuratively, "high offices"], and now what can we not do in our situation?")²³⁵ betrays that they had observed he was a main player in the coup three years before in which Sultan Ibrahim was killed.²³⁶ Here it is implied that their revolt was more legitimate than the previous coup since the latter was mainly for the personal advancement of a small coterie of dignitaries. Some chronicles also indicate that the rebels took heart from the uprising of Abaza Hasan, who had been deposed from his *voyvoda*-ship by the janissary officers earlier in the same year.²³⁷ If guildsmen followed developments in the political arena closely enough and were influenced by them, it is not surprising that they told the sultan, who initially refused to execute the three janissary officers, "With the negligence of the sultanate, [the janissary officers] put their hands into affairs that had no relation to their 'duty of scale' (*derazu vazıfesi*—perhaps this refers to the duty of the *ih̄tisāb* cadre).²³⁸ [Because of that] the Ottoman dynasty has fallen and it is burning in the hearth (*ocak*—which also has the meaning of a military corps)."²³⁹ The tone of what they said was remarkably different from the discourse they employed in normal circumstances.

²³⁴ Cemal Kafadar, MA Thesis, "Yeniçeri-Esnaf Relations: Solidarity and Conflict," Chapter V. The Revolts, 86–119.

²³⁵ Na'ima, 5: 99–100.

²³⁶ Na'ima, 5: 99–100.

²³⁷ Vecihi 50b–51a, and for the reasons why Abaza Hasan protested, see Şeyhî Mehmed Efendi, *Vekayü'l Fudalâ*, in *Şakaik-ı Nu'maniye ve Zeyilleri*, ed. Abdülkadir Özcan, 5 vols. (Istanbul, Çağrı Yayınları, 1989) 3: 586.

²³⁸ Some janissaries were in charge of market supervision under the *ih̄tisāb ağası*, and some of the *ih̄tisāb* cadre were called *derazu başı* (AK, MC B.2, p. 17).

²³⁹ Vecihi, 51a.

Here, it is necessary to mention Vecihi's unique interpretation of the revolt as a basically political revolt rather than being one provoked by excessive taxes. He relates that the "people of the city" (*ahali-i şehir*) hated the rule of the janissary officers so much that they had been waiting for an opportunity to revolt. The new tax gave them the excuse they were looking for.²⁴⁰ Although this is one possibility, it does not seem very plausible because the guildsmen did not demand the punishment of the three officers in their first petitions to the grand vizier; the normally pro-establishment guild leaders would not have made rebellion their first choice even with keen political awareness. However, Vecihi's judgment may well have reflected public opinion in the market and the city as a whole.

As they were talking politics in the course of the uprising, the guildsmen used Islamic rhetoric rather heavily and did not employ any of the traditionalist logic used so commonly in their normal petitions, as far as the source materials tell us. It is likely that the rebels knew that an argument based on tradition would be irrelevant in such an emergency, although the sultan's statement that taxes would be reduced to the level in Süleyman the Magnificent's time was an attempt to appeal to the usual logic of tradition shared by the state authorities and guilds.²⁴¹ The guildsmen described themselves as righteous but unjustly oppressed Muslims in their petitions ("Are we not Muslims? What is the injustice to us?"), and this reflects the sense of urgency and importance of their protest. In a way, the act of including seyyids and the *ulema*, or the *şeyhülislām* if only by force, in their delegation could be a way of stating the importance of their cause by employing "Islamic" human symbols. Guildsmen used religious rhetoric not only to emphasize the significance of their case but also to address the wider society. Guildsmen started addressing the "*Ummah* (community) of Muhammad" to gain supporters within and outside the market. According to Na'īma, criers and the like (*tellawariler*) called out "Community of Muhammad, What is the injustice done to us? (. . .) Close your shops!" This seems to indicate that they were calling all Muslims, but primarily other guildsmen. Although Islamic rhetoric could possibly limit its audience only to Muslims, in this case it may not necessarily have alienated non-Muslim trades-

²⁴⁰ Vecihi, 50b–51a.

²⁴¹ Perhaps implied here is the idea of the Ottoman Golden Age as a reference point.

men, since those whom the protesters would portray as heathens were the “unjust” janissary officers.²⁴² Islamic rhetoric, if not all-encompassing, was simply the most widely and prestigiously accepted discourse of justice and politics in Ottoman society and was considered so by state authorities. In fact, Islamic rhetoric seems to have been nothing other than the normal language of the authorities, given that the grand vizier, *şeyhülislām* and the sultan addressed the protesters as Muslims or servants of God (*‘ibadullah*). Guildsmen only counter-utilized the elites’ political language.²⁴³

Together with effective religious rhetoric, the organization of the protest must have been greatly assisted by the presence of guild and market structures, and the networks involved. Since consultations on everyday matters were implemented inside a guild and between related guilds, the usual networks must have functioned to create a consensus to stage the protest, only on a much larger scale. The shopkeepers unanimously closed their shops and markets, and this shows that the networks between guilds and markets, that is, the scope of communications among them, was broader than the boundary of their immediate business contacts. In connecting one group to another, the leaders of guilds and markets probably played a crucial role.

Obviously, guildsmen’s networks extended beyond the boundary of the guild system. Military elements in the markets, who by that time had grown substantially, could owe loyalty to either the guilds or the officers. However, the military elements joined the protestors much to the bewilderment and anger of the three janissary officers. There were *ulema* and *seyyids*, although we do not know how many, who joined or supported the guild delegation. This type of wide-scale mobilization may well have been helped by business ties: court records from the middle of the seventeenth century show that about half of the guilds for which records are available had members with

²⁴² The people of the marketplace nailed a Frankish hat on the door of Bektaş Ağa for his unjust imposition of taxes a few months before the revolt. This is simply a moral reprimand from the Muslim public. Na‘īma also relates that Bektaş Ağa privileged *dhimmī* grocers at the expense of the people (*halk*) who had to buy goods from them at high prices, but there is no reason to believe that those who thrived under his protection were mostly non-Muslim. This seems to be a sensationalized and biased description of his commercial activities (Na‘īma, 5: 137).

²⁴³ For a later example of guildsmen using the language of the state authorities for their own interests, see Donald Quataert, “Ottoman Workers and the State, 1826–1914” in *Workers and Working Classes in the Middle East*, ed. Zachary Lockman, 21–22.

military titles²⁴⁴ and that there were guilds, although not as many, that included *seyyids*.²⁴⁵ The tanners, who had *seyyids* among their ranks, may well have had good connections to *seyyids* and *ulema* owing to their *ahī* association and clout. In addition, even without the practical relations, the guildsmen's plea would have found sympathy from the *seyyids* and *ulema*, not only for their Islamic rhetoric but probably through connections in their daily religious life involving mosques, sufi gatherings and schools.²⁴⁶ As the Kadızadeli movement had many followers among the men of the marketplace,²⁴⁷ some *ulema* were bound to have sympathy toward guildsmen.

In the context of using "Islam" for appealing to the public, the government's use of the banner of the Prophet Muhammad for the general call to arms against the janissary officers had a special meaning to the guildsmen who had rebelled. Although they had addressed the wider society with a great deal of success in the revolt and had used their own symbolic banners in different occasions,²⁴⁸ the *sancağ-ı şerīf* showed the guildsmen the prime example of using a political symbol. Their political demand that had been rejected was grandiosely resurrected by the new ruling faction in the form of a holy cause under the banner of the Prophet. The rebels must have felt that they had played a major role in bringing down the janissary officers. To guildsmen, this banner must have epitomized their final victory and the approval of their involvement in political activities. Guildsmen identified their revolt with the banner in their collective memory, and they felt they had the right to demand from the government that it raise the banner in extreme situations, as they did in 1688. In the 1688 uprising, guildsmen appropriated the use of the holy banner of Muhammad as the symbol of their rally. This time, the guildsmen rebelled against the pillage of the marketplace by the *kapıkulu* corps, who had taken

²⁴⁴ From Istanbul court records *defters* 7–10 from the early 1660s, 18 out of 37 guilds that came to court had members with military titles.

²⁴⁵ For example, the starch-makers (*nişasteci*, IK 10: 23a) and tanners (*debbağ*, IK 10: 104b and 145b).

²⁴⁶ Denoëux, 62–67, provides examples of coalitions between tradesmen and men of religion, from eighteenth-century Egypt and nineteenth-century Iran.

²⁴⁷ Na'ima, 6: 233.

²⁴⁸ Guildsmen used their banners in processions organized for festivals. Also, Evliya Çelebi relates that the *ahīs* (tanners?) of Sarraçhane first took out their banners and drums and cried "Let the people of Muhammad rally beneath the standard." While tanners had a reputation for being independent, it is also possible that Evliya projected what happened later to the earlier part of the rebellion (Dankoff, 79; Kahraman and Dağlı, 164, and *Seyāhatnāme*, 3: 280).

power through a revolt a few months earlier. A napkin-maker (*yağlıkçı*) whose shop was vandalized made a makeshift banner by tying a white cloth to a stick and called on the other artisans to rebel, upon which many people gathered and marched to the palace.²⁴⁹ Among them there was a rumor that the holy banner was raised, and later the rebels demanded from the palace the raising of the holy banner, which the palace granted after some hesitation.²⁵⁰ On this occasion, guildsmen were definitely referring to what had happened in 1651. Tradesmen were quick to appropriate the symbol of justice in the hands of the government for their own purposes.

As their political potential was expressed clearly through the experience of rebellion, guildsmen must have acquired some political self-confidence. They succeeded in achieving their goals by means of a rebellion, even if they did not originally intend to revolt. After this initial success, staging revolts and participating in political actions would have appeared to be more realistic options than they did before. At some critical junctures after 1651, they did not hesitate to take to the streets without even bothering to petition first. In 1688, although many of the state authorities were themselves in danger and did not have much power because of the general anarchy in the aftermath of a military rebellion, it is still noteworthy that guildsmen did not even attempt to petition or turn to a dignitary, but took to the streets immediately. They joined other elements such as the soldiers and the *ulema* in 1703²⁵¹ and 1730. In the beginning of the Patrona Halil rebellion (1730), the core group of the rebels went to markets to agitate and recruit from potential sympathizers even before they went to the janissary barracks, which attests to the guildsmen's political inclination at that time. It is not possible to indiscriminately refer to them all simply as homogeneous tradesmen, since there were various elements with different proclivities. The relatively more established members of the guilds did not want prolonged social disorder as they were afraid for their own safety and did not want

²⁴⁹ *Tārīh-i Rāşid* 2: 29. *Zübde-i Vekayiât* (Ankara: TTK, 1995) 280.

²⁵⁰ İsâzade, *İsâ-zâde Tārīhi*, ed. Ziya Yılmaz (Istanbul: İstanbul Fetih Cemiyeti, 1996) 209, Sarı Mehmet Paşa, *Zübde-i Vekayiât*, ed. Adülkadir Özcan (Ankara: TTK, 1995) 280, *Silâhdâr Tārīhi*, ed. Mustafa Nihat Özön (Ankara: AKBA Kitabevi, 1947) 120–125 and *Tārīh-i Rāşid* (Istanbul: Matba'â-i 'Âmire, 1865) 29–30 relate that both the request and rumor happened in the course of the revolt.

²⁵¹ See Riffat Abou-el-Haj, *The 1703 Rebellion and the Structure of Ottoman Politics* (Istanbul: Nederlands Historisch-Archaeologisch Instituut te Istanbul, 1984) 34.

to lose their property.²⁵² On the other hand, “lumpen artisans” were naturally more prone to rebel, and this is shown as early as the rebellion in which Osman II was dethroned in 1622.²⁵³ However, both guild members and marginally employed artisans shared a consciousness of the effect of their mass protest. Although the hardships of urban small producers in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Istanbul may have been a more important factor in driving the tradesmen onto the streets, the consciousness of what they could politically achieve must have greatly facilitated it. The experience of the 1651 rebellion made them realize that revolt was a present and feasible option when petitions and appeals did not work. Moreover, they found a way to legitimize the revolt in the eyes of the wider public and sultanic authorities through the spontaneous use of a symbolic banner and their request of the holy banner, although this strategy could not always guarantee success.²⁵⁴

The 1651 revolt cannot be explained away as a sudden break from guildsmen’s normally non-political pattern of behavior. Their potential as a political force was deeply rooted partly in their accumulated experience of negotiating with the government in the form of petitions and appeals and partly in their ability to form political opinions based on their observations of political events and to make connections to people within and outside of the markets in their daily lives. Therefore, the seeming discrepancy between the usual image of obedient, state-controlled guilds and the all-out rebellions by the same groups did not really exist. Government control, administrative rapport and

²⁵² For a later example, one may count established guilds’ switch of support from the rebels to the sultan over the period of a year in the aftermath of the Patrona Halil rebellion (R. Olson, “The Esnaf and the Patrona Halil Rebellion,” 341). Namely, the guilds at first sided with the rebels against the misrule and extravagance of the government and brought down the government of Ahmed III, but they could not stand the disorder after the rebellion for long and finally gave their support to the new sultan.

²⁵³ Kafadar, “Yeniçeri-Esnaf Relations,” Chapter V. From the first quarter of the seventeenth century onwards, the firm association of janissaries and lumpen artisans was a noteworthy phenomenon in janissary-led revolts, whereas the members of established guilds participated in revolts very selectively.

²⁵⁴ For another example of the use of a banner, although this time the rebels were not in any way indicated as tradesmen, it is worthwhile recalling the hunger-provoked popular rebellion of 1740, which started with a green banner under which the ringleaders of the revolt gathered crowd appealing to all “Muslims.” See Olson, “Jews, Janissaries, Esnaf,” *JESHO* 20–2 (1977) 194, 203, as quoted from Everard Fawkener’s 1740 report.

rebellions did not exist in isolation but were on a continuous spectrum of the government-guild relationship. Guilds could and did use the same types of strategies in both normal petitions and rebellions, and the transition from the former to the latter was only a few steps away. They expressed their discontent with the incumbent political coalition and demanded the punishment of the key figures whom they held responsible for their economic grievances. They switched from the usual traditionalist rhetoric to Islamic rhetoric, probably in order to emphasize the importance and urgency of the issues at hand. The gathering of a rebellious crowd of over 10,000 people, although unprecedented, was made possible through the networks inside the arena of the guilds and beyond. Once the transition happened, however, rebellion was not a remote possibility anymore.

In conclusion, we may specify three points in the guilds' relationship with the government: 1) The normal patterns of petitioning behavior among the guildsmen were compatible with staging a rebellion. While the tradesmen were looking for redress within the given system of justice, they inadvertently arrived at the alternative of rebellion. 2) Despite the fact that guilds were useful organizations for the administrative purposes of the government, once the government's demands went beyond certain limits, the guilds, their leaders and their business and non-business networks could also turn into a vehicle of protest. 3) Tradesmen had always possessed a potential relevance to the political arena, and this became clearer after the 1651 rebellion, although they were not primarily political beings.

e. *Conclusion*

Despite the leverage and negotiating power of seventeenth-century Istanbul guilds, the government played an important role in the guild system and was a virtual part of it. The government's role was crucial in the building of infrastructure, provisioning, mediating, price-fixing, high-level policy making and market supervision, which nevertheless did not amount to absolute state control of the guilds. There was more rapport in the communication between the guilds and the government in which the final decision lay with the government authorities, although the government could not afford to press the guilds indefinitely.

The government-guild relationship was a complex one involving various levels of subgroups that had conflicting interests in both guild and government realms, i.e., large major guilds, assistant guilds, marginal or unorganized artisans and service people on the one hand, policemen (*subaşı*s and *asesbaşı*s), tax-farmers, *ihtisāb* officials, *kadis* and their assistants, the grand vizier and high bureaucrats, and ultimately the sultan on the other. One may not simply regard these as the guilds on one side and the government on the other, because there may well have been conflicts on each side, for example between related guilds and government branches. One clear area of tension was between the tax-collectors, who had to make ends meet on the personal and state level, and the sultanic authority, which symbolized justice and benevolence to the subject people. Furthermore, one may not assume that the government always utilized the same consistent policy toward the guilds, because there are clear examples of incoherence. Since the government tended to listen to the pleas of petitioners and side with them, sometimes it favored the established guilds and sometimes the marginal artisans.

For the government, the guilds were useful for the purposes of taxation and provisioning. Nevertheless, beyond their usefulness in terms of administration there were other considerations that the government made in regard to the guilds. In general, the government did not trust the business ethics of tradesmen, although some guilds may have cherished the moral ideals of *futuwwa*, and this justified government surveillance. On the other hand, tradesmen had political potential either in favor of or against the government, and therefore the government had to win and keep the guilds' support in their day-to-day interactions. Probably, the government gradually moved toward the conclusion that it could benefit more from siding with the established guilds than with marginal artisans in its dispute arbitrations, as the elements of unstable and crime-prone "lumpen artisans" grew with immigration from the countryside.

We do not have an overt account of what the tradesmen thought of the government and what they wanted from it, but clearly we can extract some of their expectations from what they said in court and from the time of the revolt. In addition to providing the basic conditions of business—infrastructure, raw materials, etc.—they wanted the government to maintain law and order and to negotiate fairly between disputing guilds or between a guild and government officials. The tradesmen either believed in the ideology of sultanic justice, or

used it to further their interests, playing aggressively within the rules set by the government. This made most of their claims in a legitimate and undeniable fashion. The guilds remained mostly nonviolent, despite increasing taxation, but the rebellion of 1651 showed that they would not tolerate levies beyond certain levels.

The government-guild relationship during this period was naturally complementary, although the government by definition was in command. Guilds were expected to do business their own way within the parameters that the government set and pay their taxes. The government was supposed to maintain order and justice in the marketplaces of Istanbul and keep taxes at reasonable levels. Such mutual expectations were not always met in real life, but they remained vital standards.

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CONCLUSION

Although the importance of the Ottoman guilds as a social category and an urban institution is beyond doubt, they have not attracted the attention they deserve. In the past, Ottoman guilds in general and the Istanbul guilds in particular have been considered historical entities with limited economic and political potential. Historians have tended to view the guild system as a major obstacle to the development of a capitalist economy,¹ and have rarely attempted to probe below the surface to determine the actual nature of the guilds. As paradigms based on modernism are now largely in question, the historical view of the Ottoman guilds must also acknowledge their capabilities and relevance, which have hitherto either been neglected or ignored.

In contrast to their negative stereotypes, the Istanbul guilds in the seventeenth century possessed important capabilities. First, they had general latitude in handling guild affairs. Agreements within a guild and among related guilds constituted an important means of determining issues, ranging from tax distribution to trade specialization, within the guild system. Second, the guilds were not blindly conservative but were able to introduce new institutions and thus change their organizational structure. Third, the Istanbul guilds maintained considerable practical power in their negotiations with the government on matters that concerned them, however strict government control may have appeared.

Istanbul guilds in the early seventeenth century appear to have been rather open-ended in their organization. Membership was not so rigidly controlled, given the free sale and sublet of shops and the seemingly unrestricted practices of partnership. This is also evidenced by the infiltration of outsiders such as soldiers and immigrants into the guilds. New guilds were created through the subdivision of an older guild structure or through the introduction of a new trade. The relationship between major guilds and assistant guilds was not totally fixed, as there were occasional readjustments. The situation was similar for the regional branches of one trade: they could agree

¹ Edhem Eldem critiques the historiography of guilds in the recently published Eldem et al. *The Ottoman City*, 160–61.

or disagree over commodity specialization, raw material distribution and their respective shares of the tax load. On the whole, as in other Ottoman towns, the internal operation of the guild system seems to have been mostly left to case-by-case arrangements made by the concerned guilds within the parameters of “provisionism” set by government authorities. Therefore, this system operated not with uniform orderliness, but with recurring disputes and compromises among various levels of concerned parties, such as markets, guilds, individual guildsmen, outsiders and government functionaries.

It is within this context of fluidity that we have to consider the role of “traditionalism” and change in the guilds. “Tradition” was an important asset for guilds as it legitimized guildsmen’s claims in petitions to the government or in disputes with other artisans. As guild leaders were in a position to determine what were the customary practices in a given trade, tradition was even more useful in the hands of established guilds. Although guildsmen probably retained sincere respect for their traditions, this did not prevent them from subtly manipulating the contents of a tradition or taking unprecedented measures when necessary. Given the malleability of oral traditions, it was possible that people in a trade regarded different versions of a tradition to be true. In addition, guildsmen would not have thought their respect for tradition was incompatible with the introduction of necessary changes into their organizations. They often relied on internal agreements to endorse new rules in their guilds. In fact, there were many changes in the guild system in the seventeenth century, initiated from inside and outside, such as new guilds being formed, existing guilds splitting or merging, outsiders encroaching on a large scale, and new institutional devices being adopted. One might even think of the whole guild system as an open-ended and evolving “eco-system,” to use a crude metaphor.

The general fluidity in the organization and operation of the guilds and the guild system also sheds light on the nature of the much talked-about government intervention. Namely, such fluidity in the guild system indicates that the government could not supervise every aspect of the Istanbul guilds, although the administrative will and capacity to control were at the highest level in the empire. The main points of government control of the guilds were to ensure provisioning and taxation, and to keep order in the marketplace. The state also functioned as an arbitrator and made authoritative decisions for disputing parties. However, it did not matter to the gov-

ernment how many guilds there were, how many practitioners a guild included, or whether guilds had monopolies over the commodities they produced.

In truth, the government could take advantage of the guilds to ensure social and economic control. It appointed officers to some important guilds, consulted guild elders to fix prices, and occasionally used the guilds as a handy source of revenue. At the same time, guilds' leverage in their relations with the government was by no means negligible, although it usually operated in low-profile ways such as via petitions and appeals. Government authorities were generally very receptive to the pleas of the guilds and of individual guildsmen because they had to uphold the ideology of sultanic justice to maintain the confidence of their subjects, especially the residents of Istanbul, a major part of whom were tradesmen. As political and financial crises deepened by mid-century, the Istanbul guilds became an important and immediate source of revenue and were occasionally subjected to excessive taxation. However, the government was obliged to accept their collective and individual petitions about tax-related grievances. The 1651 rebellion of the guildsmen erupted when the balance between taxation and redress tipped against them, and it summarily showed the political potential of the guilds. Guildsmen expressed their views about those in the government responsible for excessive taxation, but did not actually turn their hostility on the sultanic authority itself. Their demands and protests ultimately remained a mass petition, despite some acts of violence. At the same time, however, the experience of this rebellion made guilds more ready to rise up in response to economic/political oppression. For the state, the guilds became a potential ally as well as an occasional source of disturbance.

In the long run, the Istanbul guilds in the early to mid-seventeenth century were becoming more structurally organized and were growing more politically relevant as a result of their reactions to the difficult challenges of the time. The influx of soldiers and immigrants into the trades may have stimulated some guilds to strengthen their control over membership. Additionally, heavy taxes encouraged them to set up tax-relief funds and become more organized under the leadership of guild headmen for the purpose of better negotiating tax distribution. Such structural fortification may have heightened the guilds' value as a vehicle of control in the eyes of the government, because in the eighteenth century we observe further government intervention, such as the requirement that guild members be

one another's guarantors; those tradesmen who did not obtain a guarantor could be expelled from Istanbul to curb population growth in the city. Guildsmen would have probably welcomed this measure since they were always worried about outside competition. Hence, the state's control of society through the guilds did not necessarily indicate that the guilds were completely subdued, because they could gain privileges in return. Guilds always could and did use the legal establishment fully to protect their own interests, and on rare occasions fiercely showed their disapproval of government measures in the form of rebellion, which could even result in a political realignment within the palace. Therefore, one may observe that while the government exercised overarching control over the guilds, the latter also exercised ongoing leverage in the guild system and beyond.

Although this book attempted to touch on various issues related to the Istanbul guilds in the seventeenth century, it by no means reflected the whole complexity of guild organizations. Admittedly, there are still many things we do not know about them. For example, this study could not investigate the religious activities of the guilds and their relations to sufi orders, although this issue is important in understanding their social life. What it does demonstrate is that the guilds were very much connected to the larger social and political trends of the period and also to other segments of society. Past studies have tended to overlook the fact that the Ottoman guilds were not simply confined to their narrow occupational horizons. If we observe them in wider social contexts, the guilds could be the focus of new interesting studies.

It is interesting to compare the institution and operation of the guilds and other small social groups. Halil İnalçık has alluded to the importance of internally elected leadership, which bore the title of "*kethüdā*" in various segments of Ottoman society, from the guilds to the janissary corps.² According to him, all *kethüdās* represented the interests of their groups to the outside world and were held accountable by the groups they represented. If he is right, the leadership structure of the guilds had a lot in common with those of other types of social groups. In addition, the general process of internally selecting a *kethüdā* could be applied to other kinds of leaders, as exemplified in a case in which a mosque congregation pre-selected their *imam*-to-be and

² İnalçık, "Comments on Sultanism," 62–63.

came to the court to have their choice registered in a similar fashion to when guildsmen selected their leader.³ There have already been some suggestive articles focusing on the similarities among guilds, ethno-religious groups and residence quarters,⁴ and small social groups are also receiving more attention than they had previously.⁵

In addition, guilds may be compared to other groups in the government sector. Groups that fall under the category of government also seem to have had comparable organizational structures: the scribes who were divided into regular scribes and apprentices,⁶ and the Imperial Harem, which comprised ranks such as apprentices (*şagird*), *gedik*-holders, and masters (*usta*).⁷ Such a wide application of a master-apprentice system may not be so peculiar, considering that in Venice even some government officials were organized into “guilds.”⁸ Although these government branches were under different forces and had different goals, it would be enlightening if we could observe changes in government organizations over time and compare such changes with those in the guilds. The Istanbul guilds in particular, due to their close physical proximity to the ruling sector, might have learned some organizing principles from it.

Additionally, the trade guilds might also be important in understanding the sense of self-identity among Ottoman subjects. There is no doubt that religion was a primary marker in understanding a person or a group in Ottoman society, but it was not the only marker. The occupational divide must also have been important in the daily lives of those who worked in the trades, just as we in modern times draw our identity partly from what we do. Given that the court records describe a person by religion, residence, occupation or all three, occupation was an officially recognized element of identity.

³ GK 80: 79a.

⁴ For example, see Raymond, “The Role of the Communities (*Tawa’if*) in the Administration of Cairo in the Ottoman Period,” in Nelly Hanna ed. *The State and Its Servants: Administration in Egypt from Ottoman Times to the Present* (Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press, 1995) 32–43.

⁵ For example, a conference at the Orient Institut in Istanbul entitled “Small-Scale Regions in the Ottoman Empire” (1996) included some presentations on urban social groups and the methodology to study them.

⁶ According to Linda Darling, there were guild-like ranks among the scribes whose composition fluctuated in the early seventeenth century. See her “Ottoman Salary Registers as a Source for Economic and Social History,” *TSAB* 14–1 (1990) 13–33.

⁷ Inalcık, *The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age, 1300–1600*, 86.

⁸ Richard MacKinney, *Tradesmen and Traders: The World of Guilds in Venice and Europe, c. 1250–1650* (London: Croom Helm, 1987) 10–11.

A good example of guild members' self-identification and attachment to the guild may be their efforts to defend the honor of their guild against an insult posed by an outsider.⁹

In the light of such wide social implications, the Ottoman guilds seem a promising subject for further research if we can only look beyond the usual boundaries and stereotypes. Guilds were not limited and passive entities closed in upon themselves, as they have often been described; they were, in fact, closely connected to various parts of the state and society, and were influenced by them, just as they could exert influence. Therefore, the study of guilds may provide important clues for rethinking the systemic configuration (e.g., state-society relations) in Ottoman history.

⁹ IK 3: 25b/221 (*çıkırkçılar*/lathe-operators).

APPENDICES

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APPENDICES^{1 2}

APPENDIX A: LISTS OF TRADES IN LAW CODES
(*KANUNNĀMELER*) AND PRICE REGISTERS
(*NARĦ DEFTERLERİ*)

1. Kanunnāme of 1501³

<i>Debbağ[lar]</i>	tanners
<i>Ĥaffaflar</i>	shoemakers
<i>Sağrncular</i>	shagreen-makers
<i>Sarraclar</i>	saddlemakers
<i>Etmekciler</i>	bakers
<i>Aşclar</i>	cooks
<i>Başclar</i>	cooks of sheep heads
<i>Bakçallar</i>	grocers
<i>‘Attarlar</i>	perfumers/herbalists
<i>Bezzâzlar</i>	cloth-sellers
<i>Takyacılar</i>	cap-makers
<i>Ĥayyatlar</i>	seamsters
<i>Neccâr[lar]</i>	carpenters
<i>Bennâ[lar]</i>	builders
<i>Çuğacılar</i>	broadcloth-makers
<i>Kuyuncular</i>	goldsmiths/jewelers
<i>Mutablar</i>	animal hair-processors
<i>Nâlbendler</i>	blacksmiths
<i>Boyacılar</i>	dyers
<i>Kazancılar</i>	cauldron-makers
<i>Bıçakçılar</i>	knife-makers
<i>Ĥallaclar</i>	cotton-fluffers
<i>Gazzazlar</i>	silk manufacturers

¹ In addition to the lists provided here, one must also consult the list under the heading of *eşnâf* in the index prepared by Yücel Dağlı in Evliya Çelebi, *Evliya Çelebi Seyâhatnâmesi* I. Kitap, *Istanbul*, ed. Orhan Şaik Gökyay (Istanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 1996).

² The transcription/transliteration of trade names are inconsistent because I generally follow the transliteration given in each cited work, while adding some diacritics for clarity.

³ Ömer Lütfi Barkan, “Bazı Büyük Şehirlerde Eşya ve Yiyecek Fiyatlarının Tesbit ve Teftişi Hususlarını Tanzim Eden Kanunlar,” *Tarih Vesikaları* I-5 (1942) 326–340. In addition to the list above, there is an earlier list that includes *celebkeşler* (sheep-drivers), *büryanclar* (roasters), and *börekçiler* (pastry-makers).

<i>Halaykıcılar</i>	slave dealers
<i>Hamamcılar</i>	bathkeepers
<i>Mumhane</i>	candle factory
<i>Kalaycılar</i>	tinsmiths
<i>Değirmenciler</i>	millers
<i>Dellallar</i>	brokers
<i>Bazarcılar</i>	shopkeepers
<i>Hamnal</i>	porters
<i>Tarakçılar</i>	comb-makers

2. Kanunnâme under Süleyman the Magnificent (r. 1520–1566)⁴

<i>Etmekçiler</i>	bakers
<i>Kırdeciler</i>	corn bread-makers
<i>Çöreçiler</i>	round cake-makers
<i>Kaşşâblar</i>	butchers
<i>Aşçular</i>	cooks
<i>Başçılar</i>	cooks of sheep heads
<i>İşkembeciler</i>	cooks of tripe-soup
<i>Pençekeşçiler</i>	cooks of animal organs
<i>Börekçiler</i>	pastry-makers
<i>Bakçallar</i>	grocers
<i>Yoğurtçular</i>	yogurt-makers
<i>Kaymakçılar</i>	cream-makers
<i>Peymirciler</i>	cheese-makers
<i>Sirkeçiler</i>	vinegar-makers
<i>Turşucular</i>	pickle-makers
<i>Hevacılar</i>	confectioners
<i>Şerbetçiler</i>	sherbet-makers
<i>Hoşafçılar</i>	fruit juice-makers
<i>Derziler</i>	tailors
<i>Çukacılar</i>	broadcloth-makers
<i>İplikçiler</i>	thread-makers
<i>Gönlekçiler</i>	shirt-makers
<i>Kazzâzlar</i>	silk manufacturers
<i>Dellallar</i>	brokers
<i>Halâyıcıkçılar</i>	slave dealers
<i>Kemhacılar</i>	brocade-makers
<i>Valeçiler</i>	silk gauze-makers
<i>Takyeciler</i>	cap-makers
<i>Atlascular</i>	satin-makers
<i>Börümcekciler</i>	crepe-makers
<i>Mücevvezeciler</i>	plaited turban-makers

⁴ Ahmet Akgündüz, *Osmanlı Kanunnameleri*, 4: 321–329.

<i>‘Arakıyyeciler</i>	soft felt cap-makers
<i>Ĥaffâflar</i>	makers of (cheap) shoes
<i>Başmakçular</i>	shoemakers
<i>Babuçular</i>	shoemakers/cobblers ⁵
<i>Çizmeciler</i>	boot-makers
<i>Mücellidler</i>	bookbinders
<i>Şahhâflar</i>	booksellers
<i>Eskiciler</i>	secondhand dealers
<i>Gön Tacirler</i>	sellers of coarse leather
<i>Bulgariyeciler</i>	shagreen (sağrı)-makers
<i>Serrâclar</i>	saddlemakers
<i>Keşeciler</i>	felt-makers
<i>Mutaflar</i>	animal hair-processors
<i>Hallâclar</i>	cotton-fluffers
<i>Demircüler</i>	ironmongers
<i>Kazancılar</i>	cauldron-makers
<i>Kalaycılar</i>	tinsmiths
<i>Bıçakçılar</i>	knife-makers
<i>Kıncular</i>	sheath-makers
<i>İğneciler</i>	needle-makers
<i>Na’lbendler</i>	blacksmiths
<i>Na’lçeciler</i>	shoetip-makers
<i>Kılıççılar</i>	sword-makers
<i>Kuyuncular</i>	goldsmiths/jewelers
<i>Bennâlar</i>	builders
<i>Neccârlar</i>	carpenters
<i>Kiremidçiler</i>	rooftile-makers
<i>Kerpiççiler</i>	adobe-makers
<i>Çakıcılar</i>	makers of pocket knives
<i>Çanakçılar</i>	makers of earthenware pots
<i>Şabuncular</i>	soap-makers
<i>Mumcular</i>	candle-makers
<i>Oduncular</i>	firewood sellers
<i>‘Attârlar</i>	perfumers/herbalists
<i>Bezazlar</i>	cloth-sellers
<i>Boyacılar</i>	dyers
<i>Ĥammâmcılar</i>	bathkeepers
<i>Berberler</i>	barbers
<i>Tabibler</i>	physicians
<i>Cerrâhlar</i>	surgeons
<i>Değirmenciler</i>	millers
<i>Cüllâh</i>	weavers

⁵ *Başmaklar* particularly means shoes with heels, while *babuclar* means shoes without heels worn with *mestler* (inner boots).

3. Kanunnâme of Ahmed I (r. 1603–17)⁶

<i>Etmekçiler</i>	bakers
<i>Kırdeciler</i>	corn bread-makers
<i>Çörekçiler</i>	round cake-makers
<i>Kaşşâblar</i>	butchers
<i>Aşçular</i>	cooks
<i>Başçular</i>	cooks of sheep heads
<i>İşkembeciler</i>	cooks of tripe-soup
<i>Pençekeşçiler</i>	cooks of animal organs
<i>Börekçiler</i>	pastry-makers
<i>Lokma işleyenler</i>	fried dough-makers
<i>Bakçallar</i>	grocers
<i>Yoğurdçular</i>	yogurt-makers
<i>Turşucular</i>	pickle-makers
<i>Kaymakçular</i>	cream-makers
<i>Peynirciler</i>	cheese-makers
<i>Helvacılar</i>	confectioners
<i>Şerbetçiler</i>	sherbet-makers
<i>Terziler</i>	tailors
<i>Çukacılar</i>	broadcloth-makers
<i>Abacılar</i>	makers of coarse woolen colth
<i>İplikçiler</i>	thread-makers
<i>Gömlek satanlar</i>	shirt-sellers
<i>Gazzâzlar</i>	silk manufacturer
<i>Dellâllar</i>	brokers
<i>At canbazlar</i>	horse dealers
<i>Halayucukçular</i>	slave dealers
<i>Takyeciler</i>	cap-makers
<i>‘Arağıyyeciler</i>	soft felt cap-makers
<i>Haftâflar</i>	shoemakers
<i>Kemhâcılar</i>	brocade-makers
<i>Vâleciler</i>	silk gauze-makers
<i>Taftacılar</i>	taffeta-makers
<i>Atlasçular</i>	satin-makers
<i>Mestçiler⁷</i>	makers of inner boots
<i>Bürümcekciler</i>	crepe-makers
<i>Hurdacılar</i>	smallware-dealers
<i>‘Arağinciler</i>	linen cap-makers
<i>Eskiciler</i>	secondhand dealers
<i>Gön tâcirleri</i>	sellers of coarse leather
<i>Debbâğlar</i>	tanners
<i>Sağrıncular</i>	shagreen-makers

⁶ Ahmet Akgündüz, *Osmanlı Kanunnameleri*, 9: 525–533.

⁷ Akgündüz reads it as *müzkebciler*.

<i>Serrâclar</i>	saddlemakers
<i>Keşeciler</i>	felt-makers
<i>Müytâflar</i>	animal hair-processors
<i>Demirciler</i>	ironmongers
<i>Kazancılar</i>	cauldron-makers
<i>Bıçakçılar</i>	knife-makers
<i>Kıncular</i>	sheath-makers
<i>İğneciler</i>	needle-makers
<i>Na'lbendler</i>	blacksmiths
<i>Na'leşciler</i>	shoetip-makers
<i>Mismârcular</i>	nail-makers
<i>Kuyuncular</i>	goldsmiths/jewelers
<i>Simkeşler</i>	gold or silver wire-drawer
<i>Bennâlar</i>	builders
<i>Nacarlar</i>	carpenters
<i>Kiremidçiler</i>	roof-tile-makers
<i>Kerpiççiler</i>	adobe-makers
<i>Çömlekçiler</i>	earthenpot-makers
<i>Ağaççılar</i>	timber-sellers
<i>Tahtacılar</i>	board-sawyers
<i>‘Alef-furuşçular</i>	fodder-sellers
<i>Hamallar</i>	porters
<i>Kömürçüler</i>	coal-dealers
<i>‘Attâr[lar]</i>	perfumers/herbalists
<i>Zerdûzlar</i>	embroiderers
<i>Ma‘cuncular</i>	taffy-makers
<i>Boyacılar</i>	dyers
<i>Hamâmçular</i>	bathkeepers
<i>Tarakçılar</i>	comb-makers
<i>Berberler</i>	barbers
<i>Tabîbler</i>	physicians
<i>Cerrâhlar</i>	surgeons
<i>Değirmenciler</i>	millers
<i>Ketâncular</i>	linen[flax]-weavers
<i>Pambukçular</i>	sellers of raw cotton

4. *Price Register of 1009/1600*⁸ (alphabetically rearranged)

<i>Abacılar</i>	makers of coarse woolen garments
<i>Alacacılar</i>	makers of a motley cotton textile
<i>Arabacılar</i>	cart-drivers

⁸ Mübahat Kütükoğlu, “1009 (1600) Tarihli Narh defterine Göre İstanbul’da Çeşitli Eşya ve Hizmet Fiatları,” *İstanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi Tarih Enstitüsü Dergisi* 9 (1978) 1–83. In the above and following price registers, food-related guilds

<i>Arakıyyciler</i>	felt-cap makers
<i>Aşçılar</i>	cooks
<i>Attarlar</i>	perfumers/herbalists
<i>Ayyakkabıcılar</i>	shoemakers
<i>Ayyakkabıcılar (Saray için)</i>	shoemakers for the palace
<i>Bakırcular (kalaycılar)</i>	coppersmiths and tinsmiths
<i>Bakkal</i>	grocers
<i>Başçılar</i>	cooks of sheep heads
<i>Bogasiciler</i>	makers of twilled cotton
<i>Boyacılar (Boya satıcılar)</i>	dye-sellers
<i>Boyacılar (Kumaş boyacılar)</i>	textile-dyers
<i>Bezçiler</i>	cloth-sellers
<i>Çadırcılar</i>	tent-makers
<i>Çilingirler</i>	locksmiths
<i>Çiniciler</i>	tile-makers
<i>Çömlekçiler</i>	potters
<i>Çukacılar</i>	broadcloth-makers
<i>Değirmen taşçıları</i>	masons of grinding stones (mills)
<i>Dülbendciler</i>	muslin-sellers
<i>Futacılar</i>	apron-makers
<i>Hammamcılar</i>	bathkeepers
<i>Hammallar</i>	porters
<i>Hasırcılar</i>	straw-mat makers
<i>Helvacılar</i>	confectioners
<i>İğneciler</i>	needle-makers
<i>İpek ve ipekli kumaş satıcıları</i>	sellers of raw silk and silk textiles
<i>İplikçiler</i>	thread-makers
<i>Kaşıkcılar</i>	spoon-makers
<i>Kâğıtçılar</i>	paper-makers
<i>Kavukçular</i>	quilted-turban makers
<i>Kebeciler</i>	makers of very thick felt
<i>Keçeciler</i>	felt-makers
<i>Kepkeççiler</i>	makers of pins/small nails
<i>Koğancılar</i>	beehive-keepers
<i>Kumaşçılar</i>	wholesale textile dealers
<i>Kütucular</i>	box-makers
<i>Kürkçüler</i>	furriers
<i>Nalbandlar</i>	blacksmiths
<i>Nahncılar</i>	clog-makers
<i>Oduncular</i>	firewood-sellers
<i>Pamukçular</i>	cotton-sellers
<i>Peremeciler</i>	boatmen

are not listed as guilds but only the commodities they dealt in are listed in the register. Here, I cite only the ones listed as groups of tradesmen. It is a moot question as to what one should count as a guild here.

<i>Sağrıcular</i>	shagreen-makers
<i>Sandıkçılar</i>	chest-makers
<i>Sarıkcılar</i>	turban-makers
<i>Sarraclar</i>	saddlemakers
<i>Semerciler</i>	packsaddle-makers
<i>Sepetçiler</i>	basket-makers
<i>Sof ve muhayyerciler</i>	dealers of wool and watermarked textiles
<i>Şamdancıyan</i>	makers of candlesticks
<i>Şişeciler</i>	bottle-makers
<i>Tekneciler</i>	trough-makers
<i>Terziler</i>	tailors
<i>Ütücüler</i>	ironers
<i>Yaycılar</i>	bow-makers
<i>Yemişçiler</i>	fruit-sellers
<i>Yorgancılar</i>	blanket-makers

5. *Price Register of 1050/1640⁹ (alphabetically rearranged)*

* <i>Aba-furuşan</i>	sellers of coarse woolen garments
* <i>Alaca</i>	motley cotton textiles
* <i>Arabacıyan</i>	cart-drivers
* <i>Arakiyye</i>	felt-caps
* <i>Attârân</i>	perfumers/herbalists
* <i>Bakarcıyân (kalay)</i>	coppersmiths and tinsmiths
<i>Berberân</i>	barbers
<i>Bezzâzân</i>	cloth merchants
* <i>Bogasıcıyân</i>	makers of twilled cotton
<i>Börkcüyân</i>	makers of janissaries' felt caps
<i>Canabâz</i>	acrobats
* <i>Çadrcıyân</i>	tent-makers
<i>Çıkrıkçıyân</i>	lathe-operators
* <i>Çömlekiyân</i>	potters
* <i>Çorab-furûşân</i>	sock-sellers
* <i>Çuka-furûşân</i>	broadcloth-sellers
<i>Debbağân</i>	tanners
<i>Dellalân</i>	brokers
<i>Destâr-furûşân</i>	handkerchief-sellers
<i>Dimi-furûşân</i>	fustian-sellers
<i>Doğramacıyân</i>	carpenters
<i>Dörpücüyân</i>	users of files [tool], (to smooth a surface)
<i>Esircıyân</i>	slave-dealers

⁹ Mübahat Kütükoğlu, *1640 Tarihli Narh Defteri*. I included commodity items only when the guild that produced them were mentioned in the register of 1600. The items with asterisks are also found in 1600.

<i>Eskiciler</i>	second-hand dealers
<i>Fağfırcuyân</i>	porcelain-makers
<i>Gemiciyân</i>	sailors
<i>Haffafân</i>	shoemakers
<i>Hallacân</i>	cotton-fluffers
<i>Hammâlân</i>	porters (various groups)
<i>Hargele Miyancıları</i>	brokers of pack animals
* <i>Hasır-furûşân</i>	straw-mat sellers
<i>Hayyatân</i>	seamsters
* <i>İğneciyân</i>	needle-makers
* <i>İplikçiyân</i>	thread-makers
<i>Kafesdarân</i>	birdcage-makers
* <i>Kağıdcuyân</i>	paper-makers
<i>Kalem-furûşân</i>	pen-sellers
<i>Kalıçe-furûşân</i>	rug-sellers
<i>Kalkancıyân</i>	shield-makers
<i>Kamçıyân</i>	whip-makers
<i>Kapamacıyân</i>	dealers in ready-made clothing
* <i>Kavukçuyân</i>	quilted-turban makers
<i>Kazzâzân</i>	silk manufacturer
* <i>Kebe-furûşân</i>	sellers of very thick felt
* <i>Keçe</i> (3 kinds)	felt
* <i>Keman-furûşân</i>	bow-sellers
<i>Kenarıyân</i>	edge-decorators (of pottery)
* <i>Kepkepciyân</i>	makers of pins/small nails
<i>Kılıççı</i>	sword-makers
<i>Koğa(=kova)cıyân</i>	bucket-makers
<i>Kürk-furûşân</i>	fur merchants
* <i>Kürkçüyân</i>	furriers
* <i>Kutucuyân</i>	box-makers
<i>Misk-furûşân</i>	musk-sellers
<i>Mücellidân</i>	bookbinders
<i>Mühr-kenân</i>	seal-makers
<i>Muşamma-furûşân</i>	wax-cloth sellers
<i>Muytabân</i>	animal hair processors
* <i>Na'ibandân</i>	blacksmiths
<i>Na'ıacıyân</i>	shoe-tip makers
<i>Peremeciyân</i>	boatmen
<i>Sâ'atçıyân</i>	clockmakers
<i>Sakkayân</i>	water-carriers
* <i>Sarıcıyân</i>	turban-makers
* <i>Sarracân</i>	saddlemakers
* <i>Semerciyân</i>	packsaddle-makers
* <i>Sepetçiyân</i>	basket-makers
<i>Sırmakışân</i>	makers of gold/silver threads
* <i>Sof-furûşân</i>	wool-sellers
<i>Sorguçuyân</i>	makers of head ornaments

<i>Süpürge-furûşân</i>	broom-sellers
* <i>Şişeciyân</i>	bottle-makers
<i>Tesbih-furûşân</i>	sellers of prayer beads
<i>Tir-furûşân</i>	arrow-sellers
<i>Tüfengciyân</i>	gunsmiths
* <i>Ütüciyân</i>	ironers
<i>Varak-keşân</i>	gold-beater
<i>Vezne-furûşân</i>	scale-sellers
<i>Yağlıkçıyân</i>	napkin-makers
<i>Yapukcuyân</i>	makers of horse blankets (put under the saddle)
* <i>Yorgan-furûşân</i>	blanket-sellers
<i>Zergerân</i>	goldsmiths
<i>Zıhgir-furûşân</i>	sellers of archers' thumb stalls

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APPENDIX B: LISTS OF TRADES BASED ON
 DESCRIPTIONS OF THE GUILD PROCESSION IN 1582
 (Kept in original order, since these are the descriptions
 of a procession)

List of trades in Mustafa Āli's Sūrnāme¹

<i>Ebu Eyyubi Ensari Halkı</i>	people of the town of Eyüb
<i>Takyacılar</i>	cap-makers
<i>Bezzazistan Ahalisi</i>	people of Bedestan
<i>Bit Pazarı Halkı</i>	people of the Flea Market
<i>Sahhâflar</i>	booksellers
<i>Mücellid ve Nakkâşlar</i>	bookbinders and painters
<i>İstanbul Huffâzı</i>	reciters of Qur'an in Istanbul
<i>Pâytahtın E'imme ve Hutabâsı</i>	<i>imams</i> and preachers of the capital city
<i>Mevlânâ-yı Rûmî Dervişleri</i>	dervishes following Mevlana Celaeddin Rûmî
<i>Sûhtegân</i>	<i>medrese</i> students
<i>Abdâlân-ı Rûm</i>	dervishes of Rumelia
<i>Akdeniz ve Karadeniz Mellâhları</i>	sailors of the Mediterranean and the Black Sea
<i>Ser-terâşân</i>	barbers
<i>Tig-gerân</i>	sword-makers
<i>Kârd-gerân</i>	knife-makers
<i>Mikrâz-gerân</i>	makers of scissors
<i>İğneciler, Çilingirler, Demirciler</i>	needle-makers, locksmiths, ironmongers
<i>Gözlükçüler</i>	makers of eyeglasses
<i>Aynacılar</i>	mirror-makers
<i>Attârlar</i>	perfumers/herbalists
<i>Câme-şûylar</i>	launderers
<i>Sabun-fürûşân</i>	soap-sellers
<i>Hayyâtîn</i>	tailors
<i>Kazzâzlar</i>	silk manufacturers
<i>Hallâçlar</i>	cotton-fluffers
<i>Edirne ve Bursa Basmacıları</i>	textile-printers of Edirne and Bursa
<i>Kürkçüler</i>	furriers

¹ Mehmet Arslan, *Manzum Sumaneler*, 220–228. There are 58 groups listed, including six definitely non-guild ones. This is the shortest list of the groups that participated in the procession. In contrast, there are expanded lists from other sources, such as the next one, that list more than a hundred guilds.

<i>Serâser-bâflar</i>	brocade-weavers
<i>Yahudi ve Hristiyan Çuhacılar</i>	Jewish and Christian broadcloth-makers
<i>Sebbâgîn</i>	dyers
<i>Sarıçular</i>	turban-makers
<i>Kâlîçe-fürûşlar</i>	rug-sellers
<i>Mûy-tâblar</i>	animal hair processors
<i>Semerciler</i>	packsaddle-makers
<i>Âsiyâbân</i>	millers
<i>Sepetçiler</i>	basket-makers
<i>Kalaycılar ve Kazancılar</i>	tinsmiths and cauldron-makers
<i>Nalburular</i>	hardware dealers
<i>Mumcular</i>	candle-makers
<i>Mûze-dûz ve Mûze-fürûşlar</i>	boot-makers and sellers
<i>Nalbantlar</i>	blacksmith
<i>Nahn Yapan ve Satanlar</i>	clog-makers and sellers
<i>Kemân-keşler</i>	bowmen/archers
<i>Yaycılar</i>	bow-makers
<i>Talimhâne İşçileri</i>	workers of the parade ground
<i>Kahveciler</i>	coffee sellers
<i>Meyhaneciler</i>	tavern keepers
<i>Bozahâne Erleri</i>	<i>boza</i> (a millet drink)-house workers
<i>Kasaplar</i>	butchers
<i>Debbâğlar</i>	tanners
<i>Esirciler</i>	slave merchants
<i>At Canbazları</i>	acrobats on horseback
<i>Arka Hammalları ve At Hammalları</i>	porters (pedestrians and with horses)
<i>Basmacılar</i>	textile-printers
<i>Hayme-dûzân</i>	tent-makers
<i>Žer-gerân</i>	goldsmiths
<i>Şişeciler</i>	bottle-makers
<i>Bûriyâ-bâflar</i>	straw-weavers

List of 148 Trades According to an Anonymous Sûrnâme²

<i>Takyeciyân</i>	cap-makers
<i>Hayyâtân</i>	tailors
<i>Sakâyân</i>	water carriers
<i>Tabbâhân</i>	cooks

² Joseph Hammer-Purgstall, *Histoire de l'empire Ottoman*, 18 vols. (Paris: Bellizard, Barthès, Dufour et Lowell, 1837) 7:163, no. 6, 402–405, cited in Osman Nuri, *Mecelle* (new) 2: 578–579. Hammer says his source was an anonymous description attached to the chronicle of Osman Paşa's Caucasus campaign. There are groups mentioned more than once, and also merchants from other cities. One should note that this list was intended to be a description of the festive parade rather than an exhaustive list of Istanbul guilds.

<i>Çizmeciyan</i>	boot-makers
<i>Mestciyan</i>	makers of leather socks
<i>Serbâzân ve cambâzân</i>	acrobats
<i>Penbeciyan</i>	cotton beaters
<i>Âbgînekârân</i>	glass-makers
<i>Sîmkeşân</i>	silver thread drawers
<i>Halvâniyan</i>	confectioners
<i>Tasbâzân</i>	bowl-jugglers
<i>Bahâr fîrûşân</i>	spice-sellers
<i>Meyveciyan</i>	fruit-sellers
<i>Hatîbân</i>	preachers
<i>Îmâmân</i>	prayer leaders
<i>Gazzâzân</i>	silk manufacturers
<i>Sarrâcân</i>	saddle-makers
<i>Cilâhân</i>	weavers
<i>Îpekyân</i>	raw silk dealers
<i>Ezhâr fîrûşân</i>	florists
<i>Riştékârân</i>	thread-maker
<i>Peştêmâlbâzân</i>	bathtowel-makers
<i>Bezzâzzistân-ı atîk esnafî</i>	shopkeepers of Old Bedestan
<i>Müytâbân</i>	animal hair-processors
<i>Buryabâzân</i>	straw-weavers
<i>Galata esnafî</i>	tradesmen of Galata
<i>Kilitciyan</i>	locksmiths
<i>Mühürçiyan</i>	seal-makers
<i>Yorgancıyan</i>	blanket-makers
<i>Şâne fîrûşân</i>	comb-sellers
<i>Âyîne sâzân</i>	mirror-sellers
<i>Türkârân</i>	arrow-makers
<i>Ef'î girân</i>	snake charmers
<i>Çini fîrûşân</i>	tile-sellers
<i>Buhûrkârân</i>	incense-makers
<i>Boyacıyan</i>	dyers
<i>Nîzekârân</i>	spear-makers
<i>Kaftancıyan</i>	kaftan-makers
<i>Çakşırçıyan</i>	trouser-makers
<i>Semerciyan</i>	packsaddle-makers
<i>Sandıkkârân</i>	chest-makers
<i>Sâ'atçıyan</i>	clockmakers
<i>Şem'dânkârân</i>	candlestick-makers
<i>Sayyâdân-ı Mâhî</i>	fishermen
<i>Kürekçiyan</i>	oarsmen
<i>İlikçiyan</i>	buttonhole-makers
<i>Kalafatçıyan</i>	caulkers
<i>Kemânkârân</i>	bow-makers
<i>Ketan fîrûşân</i>	hemp/flax-sellers
<i>Ekmekçiyan</i>	bakers

<i>Bisterciyân</i>	mattress-makers
<i>Dellâlân</i>	brokers
<i>Şem'kârân</i>	candle-makers
<i>Şeker fîrûşân</i>	sugar-sellers
<i>Attârân</i>	perfumers/herbalists
<i>Mısır Çarşısı³ esnafı</i>	shopkeepers of the "Egyptian" Market
<i>İğneciyan</i>	needle-makers
<i>Keçeciyan</i>	felt-makers
<i>Meyve fîrûşân</i>	fruit-sellers
<i>Destmâl fîrûşân</i>	napkin-sellers
<i>Aba fîrûşân</i>	sellers of coarse woolen garments
<i>Bennâyân</i>	builders
<i>Debbâğân</i>	tanners
<i>Bıçakçıyan</i>	knife-makers
<i>Rikâbkârân</i>	stirrup-makers
<i>Gâşiye düzân</i>	(dust) cover-makers
<i>Hayme düzân</i>	tent-makers
<i>Boğasıyan</i>	makers of <i>boğası</i> (twilled cotton)
<i>Na'lbendân</i>	blacksmiths
<i>Süpürgeciyan</i>	broom-sellers
<i>Bezzâzzistân-ı cedîd esnafı</i>	shopkeepers of New Bedestan
<i>Bozacyân</i>	<i>boza</i> -makers
<i>Destâr-kârân</i>	turban-makers
<i>Dellâkân</i>	bath attendants
<i>Keşti girân</i>	wrestlers
<i>Hokkabâzân</i>	cup-jugglers
<i>Katırcıyan</i>	Muleteers
<i>Nalçacıyan</i>	shoetip-makers
<i>Kellebüşkârân</i>	headscarf-makers
<i>Arakçîn düzân</i>	skullcap-makers
<i>Kavukçuyân</i>	quilted turban-makers
<i>Kutucıyan</i>	box-makers
<i>Sabun miski kârân</i>	musk soap-makers
<i>Çiftçiyân</i>	farmers
<i>Haddâdân</i>	blacksmiths
<i>Basmacıyan</i>	textile-printers
<i>Garbâlkârân</i>	sieve/screen-makers
<i>Şerbetçiyân</i>	sherbet-sellers
<i>Bît Pâzâryân</i>	shopkeepers of the Flee Market
<i>Yelpâzekârân</i>	fan-makers
<i>Sahtiyân fîrûşân</i>	Morocco leather-sellers
<i>Paşmak bâzân</i>	shoe/slipper-makers

³ This may not refer to the Mısır Çarşısı as we know it today, since the latter, as part of the Yeni Cami complex, entered into construction only in 1597. See "Yeni Cami Külliyesi," *IstA*².

<i>Âhen-i köhne fîrûşân</i>	scrap iron-sellers
<i>Câmeşûyân</i>	launderers
<i>Gazgancyân</i>	cauldron-makers
<i>Delev fîrûşân</i>	bucket-sellers
<i>Nâtrân</i>	bath inspectors
<i>Tabbahân</i>	Cooks
<i>Muhtesibân</i>	men of the <i>muhtesib</i>
<i>Sebze fîrûşân</i>	vegetable-sellers
<i>Kirtaskârân</i>	stationer
<i>Kundakkârân</i>	gunstock-makers
<i>Pâlûdcyân</i>	jelly-makers
<i>Kassâbân</i>	butchers
<i>Zırhkârân</i>	bowstring-makers
<i>Kebkebirân</i>	nail/pin-makers
<i>Mikrâskârân</i>	makers of scissors
<i>Ligâmkârân</i>	bridle-makers
<i>Kilidkârân</i>	locksmiths
<i>Rismânkârân</i>	cord-makers (?)
<i>Canbâzân-ı resen</i>	tightrope-walkers
<i>Tâsbâzân</i>	bowl-jugglers
<i>Rakkâsân</i>	dancers
<i>Dest-i çub bâzân</i>	tumblers
<i>Tişekârân</i>	dealers in second-hand clothes
<i>Devatkârân</i>	pencase-makers
<i>Murg bâzân</i>	bird-sellers
<i>Hammâmyân</i>	bath owners
<i>Sarıncyân</i>	turban-makers
<i>Sağurcyân</i>	shagreen-makers
<i>Ganem celebân</i>	sheep-drivers
<i>Turşıcıyân</i>	pickle-makers
<i>Basmacıyân halkârî</i>	⁴ printers of caftan material
<i>Nakl fîrûşân</i>	candy-makers
<i>Tut fîrûşân</i>	berry-sellers
<i>Müezzinân</i>	those who perform the call to prayer
<i>Miyân-bend kârân</i>	belt-makers
<i>Kebabçıyân</i>	kebab-makers
<i>Kemha bâzân</i>	silk-weavers
<i>Kerpiç kârân</i>	mortar-makers
<i>Serguc kârân</i>	makers of head ornaments
<i>Arabacıyân</i>	cart drivers
<i>Hammâlân</i>	porters
<i>Mâkiyân fîrûşân</i>	chicken-sellers
<i>Kahve fîrûşân</i>	coffee-sellers
<i>Sepedkârân</i>	basket-makers

⁴ “ballkarî” in Hammer.

<i>Hakkâkân</i>	seal-engravers
<i>Kireçciyân</i>	lime-burners
<i>Hurâsânciyân</i>	sellers of brickdust for mortar
<i>Sarrâfân</i>	money changers
<i>Dibekkârân</i>	potters
<i>Mürekkebciyân</i>	ink/inkpot-makers
<i>Na'lin kârân</i>	makers of sole plates for shoes [or clog-makers?]
<i>Kalem kârân</i>	pen-makers
<i>Bahar fîrûşân-ı Mısır</i>	spice-sellers of Egypt
<i>Bâzergânân-ı Bursa</i>	Bursa merchants
<i>Bâzergânân-ı Arabiyân</i>	Arab merchants

APPENDIX C: TRADES THAT HAD SHOPS IN THE 1670s
(*TELHİSÜ'L-BEYÂN*, ed. Sevim İlgürel, 53–54,
rearranged alphabetically)

<i>‘Abacılar</i>	makers of coarse woolen garments
<i>Afyoncular</i>	opium-sellers
<i>‘Arağçuncular</i>	makers of linen cap worn under a turban
<i>Arpacılar</i>	barley-dealers
<i>‘Aşâplar</i>	sellers of herbs
<i>‘Aттârlar</i>	perfumers/herbalists
<i>Bakırcılar</i>	coppersmiths
<i>Bakğallar</i>	grocers
<i>Balmumcular</i>	beeswax-sellers
<i>Barutcular</i>	gunpowder-makers
<i>Başçılar</i>	cooks of sheep heads
<i>Başmacular</i>	textile-printers
<i>Berberler</i>	barbers
<i>Bezirciler</i>	linseed oil-makers
<i>Bezazlar</i>	cloth merchants
<i>Bıçakcular</i>	knife-makers
<i>Boğasıcular</i>	twilled cotton-makers
<i>Börekçiler</i>	pastry-makers
<i>Boyacılar</i>	dyers
<i>Bozacular</i>	<i>boza</i> -makers
<i>Burgucular</i>	peg/screw-makers
<i>Camcılar</i>	glass-makers
<i>Cerrahlar</i>	surgeons
<i>Cevâhirciler</i>	jewelers
<i>Cillâhan</i>	weavers
<i>Çadırcılar</i>	tent-makers
<i>Çakşırcılar</i>	trouser-makers
<i>Çamaşırcılar</i>	launderers
<i>Çıkrıkçılar</i>	lathe (spinning wheel)-operators
<i>Çiçekçiler</i>	florists
<i>Çiniciler</i>	tile-makers
<i>Çizmeciler</i>	boot-makers
<i>Çukacılar</i>	broadcloth-makers
<i>Debbağlar</i>	tanners
<i>Demirciler</i>	ironmongers
<i>Derziler</i>	tailors
<i>Desterciler</i>	saw-makers
<i>Dökmeciler</i>	founders
<i>Düğmeciler</i>	button-makers

<i>Eğeciler</i>	file (tool)-makers/users
<i>Ekmekçiler</i>	bakers
<i>Eskacılar</i>	second-hand dealers
<i>Eyerciler</i>	saddle-makers
<i>Gâliye Misciler</i>	dealers in perfume
<i>Gazzazlar</i>	silk manufacturers
<i>Gırbalçılar</i>	sieve/screen-makers
<i>Hallâçlar</i>	cotton-fluffers
<i>Hasırcılar</i>	straw-mat weavers
<i>Helvacılar</i>	confectioners
<i>Hınnacı</i>	henna-sellers
<i>İşneciler</i>	needle-makers
<i>İpekçiler</i>	(raw) silk-dealers
<i>İplikçiler</i>	thread-makers
<i>İşçiler</i> [probably <i>Aşçılar</i>]	cooks
<i>Kadıfeciler</i>	velvet-makers
<i>Kaftancılar</i>	caftan-makers
<i>Kâğıdıcılar</i>	paper-makers
<i>Kahve döğenler</i>	coffee-grinders
<i>Kahve-kûblar</i>	coffee-pounders
<i>Kalaycılar</i>	tinsmiths
<i>Kalemtraşcular</i>	makers of penknives
<i>Kalıçeciler</i>	rug-sellers
<i>Kantarcılar</i>	scalemasters
<i>Kaşıkçılar</i>	spoon-makers
<i>Kaşşâblar</i>	butchers
<i>Kavukçılar</i>	quilted turban-makers
<i>Kazgancılar</i>	cauldron-makers
<i>Kebabcılar</i>	kebab-makers
<i>Keçeciler</i>	felt-makers
<i>Keresteciler</i>	wood sellers
<i>Keserciler</i>	adze-makers/users
<i>Ketenciler</i>	linen-weavers
<i>Kılığkârlar</i>	sword-makers
<i>Koğacılar</i>	bucket-makers
<i>Kömürcüler</i>	coal-dealers
<i>Kurşuncular</i>	lead-casters
<i>Kutucular</i>	box-makers
<i>Kuyumcular</i>	goldsmiths/jewelers
<i>Kürekçiler</i>	oarsmen
<i>Ma'cuncular</i>	taffy-makers
<i>Mişâr[mişâr]cılar</i>	makers of, or workers with, saw
<i>Miskçiler</i>	musk-dealers
<i>Mücellidler</i>	bookbinders
<i>Mühürçüler</i>	seal-makers
<i>Mürekebbeciler</i>	ink-makers

<i>Mutağcılar</i>	animal hair-processors
<i>Na'lbandler</i>	blacksmiths
<i>Na'lburcular</i>	hardware dealers
<i>Na'lıncılar</i>	clog-makers
<i>Nakkaşlar</i>	painters
<i>Okçular</i>	arrow-makers
<i>Otlukcular</i>	fodder sellers
<i>Ödcüler</i>	timber dealers
<i>Pabuç dikiçileri</i>	cobblers
<i>Paçacılar</i>	cooks of sheep feet
<i>Pareçiler</i>	sweetmeat-makers
<i>Pastırmacılar</i>	makers of pressed meat
<i>Peştemalcılar</i>	bathtowel-makers
<i>Sâ'atçılar</i>	clock-makers
<i>Sabuncular</i>	soap-sellers
<i>Şağar[sağrı]cılar</i>	shagreen-makers
<i>Şahhaflar</i>	booksellers
<i>Sahtiyancılar</i>	Morocco leather-makers
<i>Şandalcılar</i>	boatmen
<i>Şandukçılar</i>	chest-makers
<i>Saraçlar</i>	saddlemakers
<i>Şarıkçılar</i>	turban-makers
<i>Şarısakçılar</i>	garlic-sellers
<i>Sebzeciler</i>	vegetable-sellers
<i>Semerciler</i>	packsaddle-makers
<i>Sepetçiler</i>	basket-makers
<i>Serâserciler</i>	brocade-makers
<i>Şımakeşler</i>	makers of gold/silver threads
<i>Simidciler</i>	bakers of ring-shaped bread
<i>Şerbetçiler</i>	sherbet-sellers
<i>Sirkeçiler</i>	vinegar-makers
<i>Sorguçular</i>	makers of head ornaments
<i>Şıngancılar</i>	oil-makers
<i>Şişeciler</i>	bottle-makers
<i>Tabibler</i>	physicians
<i>Takyeciler</i>	cap-makers
<i>Tarakçılar</i>	comb-sellers
<i>Taşçılar</i>	stonemason
<i>Tavukcular</i>	chicken-sellers (listed twice)
<i>Telciler</i>	wire-makers
<i>Tığramacılar</i>	carpenters/wood-carvers
<i>Turşucular</i>	pickle-makers
<i>Tüfekçiler</i>	gunsmiths
<i>Vezneciler</i>	scale-makers
<i>Yağ-mumcular</i>	candle-makers
<i>Yağlıkçılar</i>	napkin-makers

<i>Yaycılar</i>	bow-makers
<i>Yemişçiler</i>	fruit-sellers
<i>Yoğurtçular</i>	yogurt-makers
<i>Yorgancılar</i>	blanket-makers
<i>Zerkûblar</i>	gold-beaters
<i>Zerre[zure]ciler</i>	dealers of millet/Indian corn (نوره)
<i>Zihgirciler</i>	makers of archers' thumb stalls

APPENDIX D: LIST OF TRADES FOUND IN COURT RECORDS
(IK 1–10, GK 73, 80)

<i>‘Abacılar</i>	makers of coarse woolen garments
<i>‘Arabacılar</i>	cart-drivers
<i>‘Arakıyeciler</i>	felt-cap makers
<i>Arka (piyade) sakalar</i>	pedestrian water-carriers
<i>Arpacılar</i>	barley-dealers
<i>Aşçılar</i>	cooks
<i>At ‘arabacılar</i>	horse cart-drivers
<i>‘Attarlar</i>	perfumers/herbalists
<i>Bağcılar</i>	gardeners
<i>Bakçallar</i>	grocers
<i>Balcılar</i>	honey-sellers
<i>Bahçular</i>	fishermen
<i>Başçılar</i>	cooks of sheep heads
<i>Başmacılar</i>	textile-printers
<i>Bazarcılar</i>	shopkeepers
<i>Berberler</i>	barbers
<i>Bıçakçılar</i>	knife-makers
<i>Börekçiler</i>	pastry-makers
<i>Boyacılar</i>	dyers
<i>Bozacılar</i>	<i>boza</i> -sellers
<i>Buzcular</i>	ice-sellers
<i>Camcılar</i>	glass-makers
<i>Canabazlar</i>	acrobats
<i>Çadırcılar</i>	tent-makers
<i>Çameşuylar</i>	launderers
<i>Çıkrıkçılar</i>	lathe (spinning wheel)-operators
<i>Çiçekçiler/şüküfeciler</i>	florists
<i>Çilingirler</i>	locksmiths
<i>Çizmeciler</i>	boot-makers
<i>Çorbacılar</i>	soup-cooks
<i>Çömlekçiler</i>	potters
<i>Çörekçiler</i>	round cake-makers
<i>Çukacılar</i>	broadcloth-makers
<i>Davulcular</i>	drum-makers
<i>Debbağlar</i>	tanners
<i>Demirciler</i>	ironmongers
<i>Deveciler</i>	camel-drivers
<i>Dökmeciler</i>	metal-founders
<i>Ekmekçiler (habbazlar)</i>	bakers
<i>Ekserciler</i>	nail-makers

<i>Esirciler</i>	slave-dealers
<i>Fincancılar</i>	coffee-cup makers
<i>Gemiciler (mellâhlar)</i>	sailors
<i>Ĥaffâftlar</i>	shoemakers
<i>Hallâcılar</i>	cotton-fluffers
<i>Hammâllar</i>	porters
<i>Hammâm(cılar)</i>	bathkeepers
<i>Hasırcılar</i>	straw mat-weavers
<i>Ĥayyâtlar</i>	seamsters
<i>Helvacılar</i>	confectioners
<i>Ĥurasancılar</i>	sellers of brickdust for mortars
<i>Ĥurdacılar (Ĥurdafuruşlar)</i>	smallware-dealers
<i>İşkembeciler</i>	cooks of tripe-soup
<i>Ĥahveciler</i>	coffee-sellers
<i>Ĥalaycılar</i>	tinsmiths
<i>Ĥalafatçılar</i>	caulkers
<i>Ĥalkancılar</i>	shield-makers
<i>Ĥarcılar</i>	snow/ice-dealers
<i>Ĥaşşâblar</i>	butchers
<i>Ĥaşıķçılar</i>	spoon-makers
<i>Ĥavukçular</i>	quilted turban-makers
<i>Ĥayıkçılar</i>	boatmen
<i>Ĥazgancılar</i>	cauldron-makers
<i>Ĥazzâzlar</i>	silk manufacturers
<i>Ĥebabçılar</i>	kebab-makers
<i>Ĥebeciler</i>	makers of very thick felt
<i>Ĥeçeciler</i>	felt-makers
<i>ĤemĤa(cı)lar</i>	brocade-makers
<i>Ĥeresteciler</i>	wood-dealers
<i>Ĥettancılar</i>	flax-/hemp-dealers
<i>Ĥoltukçular</i>	peddlers
<i>Ĥömürçüiler</i>	coal-dealers
<i>Ĥundaķçılar</i>	gunstock-makers
<i>Ĥuyumcular</i>	goldsmiths/jewelers
<i>Ĥürķçüiler</i>	furriers
<i>Leblebiciler</i>	chickpea-roasters
<i>Marangozlar</i>	carpenters
<i>Ma'cuncular</i>	taffy-makers
<i>MeyĤaneciler</i>	tavernkeepers
<i>Mumcular</i>	candle-makers
<i>Na'lçacılar</i>	shoetip-makers
<i>Nawluncular</i>	transporters
<i>Pabuççular</i>	shoemakers
<i>Paçacılar</i>	cooks of sheep feet
<i>Palamutçular</i>	fishermen of <i>palamut</i> (a kind of fish)
<i>Peksimatçular</i>	hard biscuit-makers
<i>Peremeciler</i>	boatmen

<i>Peştemelciler</i>	bathtowel-makers
<i>Pirinççiler</i>	rice-dealer; or brass-workers
<i>Sâ'atçılar</i>	clockmakers
<i>Şabbâğlar</i>	dyers
<i>Sandıkçılar</i>	chest-makers
<i>Sarraçlar</i>	saddlemakers
<i>Sayyâğlar</i>	gold/silversmiths
<i>Semerciler</i>	packsaddle-makers
<i>Şerbetçiler</i>	sherbet-makers
<i>Simit un işleyenler</i>	<i>simit</i> -flour-makers
<i>Simitçiler</i>	baker of ring-shaped breads
<i>Sütçüler</i>	milk-sellers
<i>Şıruğancılar</i>	oil-makers
<i>Şişeciler</i>	bottle-makers
<i>Takiyeciler</i>	cap-makers
<i>Taşçılar</i>	masons
<i>Ȧavacılar</i>	pan-makers
<i>Ȧavukçular</i>	chicken-sellers
<i>Tellâklar</i>	bath attendants
<i>Tırşeciler</i>	parchment-makers
<i>Turşuçular</i>	pickle-makers
<i>Uncular</i>	flour-sellers
<i>Yemişçiler</i>	fruit-sellers
<i>Yoğurtçular</i>	yogurt-sellers

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APPENDIX E: THE 62 GUILDS (*HİRFET*) NOT SUBJECT TO
İHTİSÂB TAXES IN 1092/1681–82¹

<i>halka simitciyan</i>	ring-shaped bread-bakers
<i>leblebiciyan</i>	roasted chickpea-sellers
<i>kassaban-i yahud</i>	Jewish butchers
<i>‘attāran-i yahud</i>	Jewish druggists
<i>hammālan-i Topkapısı</i>	porters of Topkapı
<i>hammālan-i Odun Kapısı</i>	porters of Odun Kapısı
<i>hamlık bazarcıyan</i>	dealers of unripe fruits and vegetables?
<i>aşçıyan ve yahnicıyan</i>	cooks and stew-makers
<i>dükiciyan</i>	cobblers/seamsters
<i>çukacıyan</i>	broadcloth-weavers
<i>hallācan</i>	dressers/cleaners of cotton wool
<i>ısfanakçıyan</i>	spinach-sellers
<i>turfanda kiraz</i>	early cherries
<i>parmak üzümü</i>	“finger” grapes?
<i>avenk üzümü</i>	string grapes?
<i>turfanda üzümü</i>	early grapes
<i>kavun karpuz</i>	melons and watermelons
<i>aşlıkçıyan-ı buğday</i>	wheat-foodstuff dealers
<i>‘arab gevreği</i>	Arabian crispies?
<i>tavukçıyan</i>	chicken-sellers
<i>yoğurtçıyan-i Kanlıca</i>	yogurt-sellers of Kanlıca
<i>yoğurtçıyan-i Top Kapısı</i>	yogurt-sellers of Topkapı
<i>kazgancıyan</i>	cauldron-makers
<i>kebeciyan-i İmroz</i>	felt-makers of İmroz
<i>sirkeciyan</i>	vinegar-makers
<i>kaşarcıyan-i yahud</i>	Jewish <i>kaşar</i> cheese- makers
<i>postalçıyan ve çizmecıyan</i>	makers of heavy army shoes and boots
<i>limoncıyan</i>	lemon-sellers
<i>ipekçıyan-i yahud</i>	Jewish silk-dealers
<i>ipekçıyan-i Rum</i>	Greek silk-dealers
<i>lahmacuncıyan</i>	makers of pancakes with ground meat
<i>değirmenha-i üzüm</i>	grape mills
<i>değirmenha-i dakik</i>	flour mills
<i>süpürgeciyan</i>	broom-makers
<i>paçacıyan</i>	cooks of sheep feet

¹ The list is found in three almost identical *ihtisāb* registers (AK, MC, B. 2: 19a–b, KK 2056: pp. 17–18. Bab-ı Defteri 25386: pp. 16–17). The title of the list reads: “[These are] novelties created recently and were abolished with the imperial edict” (“*Soñradan ihdās olunup bā fermān-i ‘āli ref’ olunan bid‘atlardır ki*”).

<i>bitürme-i besâtin</i>	garden vegetable wholesalers
<i>simit uncuyan</i>	makers of flour for <i>simits</i>
<i>İstanbul'a odun getiren gemiciyan</i>	boatmen who brought firewood to Istanbul
<i>çörekeciyan</i>	makers of sweet pastry
<i>kelepoşçıyan</i>	headscarf-makers
<i>çardak altında üzüm ve incir satan izmirciyan</i>	sellors of grapes and figs [who imported their produces from Izmir?] under pavilions
<i>Tahtakale bakkallar</i>	grocers of Tahtakale
<i>bastırmacıyan-i yerlü</i>	local makers of pressed meat
<i>bezirciyan</i>	linseed-oil makers
<i>püdecıyan-i çakal</i> [?]	flat-bread bakers
<i>gazzâzân-i yahud</i>	Jewish silk manufacturers ²
<i>şerbetçiyan-i muslim ve dhimmî</i>	Muslim, Christian and Jewish sherbet-makers
<i>kasılcıyan</i>	dealers of grain cut green for fodder
<i>haffâfan</i>	shoemakers
<i>şerriyeciyan</i>	makers of thin short noodles
<i>balıkçıyan-i kalkan</i>	turbot fishermen
<i>balıkçıyan-i kılıç</i>	swordfish fishermen
<i>Mekki sabuncular</i>	Mekkan soap dealers
<i>bozağ-i yahud</i> ³	Jewish [kosher] veal?
<i>sa'lebciyan</i>	sellors of a hot drink made of <i>salep</i> powder
<i>kuzu sarması</i>	lamb wraps?
<i>yoğurtçıyan-i Kasımpaşa</i>	yogurt-sellers of Kasımpaşa
<i>bal mumciyan</i>	beeswax candle makers
<i>kavurulmuş kestane ve fındıkçıyan</i>	roasted chestnut- and hazelnut-sellers
<i>perakende sabuncıyan</i>	soap retailers
<i>turp-i Galata</i>	radish of Galata
<i>çeşni</i>	tasters?

² It is unclear in what ways they were different from the above-mentioned *ipekçıyan-i yahud* (Jewish silk-dealers).

³ Ziya Kazıcı reads it as *bozağçıyan*, whatever it may mean. (“*Buzak*” means calf, and therefore perhaps veal as well.) *Osmanlılarda İhtisab Müessesesi* (Istanbul: Kültür Basım Yayın Birliği, 1987) 150.

APPENDIX F: DATABASE: GUILDS FOUND IN GROUP APPEALS (IK 1–10 AND GK 73, 80)¹

ket = *kethüda*, yiğit = yiğitbaşı ket beşe = a *kethüda* who was also a *beşe*, ket beğ = a *kethüda* who was also a *beğ*.

m = Muslim, z = *dhimmi*, e = Armenian, j = Jewish

I = Istanbul, G = Galata

1. = first entry on a page, s. = last entry on a page, s2. = second last entry

defter	folio/ document	year (A.H.)	trade	location	religion	number	military element	contents	recourse to tradition	use of agreement	leaders
IK 1	33b/224	1021/1612–13	shopkeepers (dekâkin ashabi)	El-Hac Muhieddin Mahallesi	z	5	none	Agreed not to do business on Sundays.	yes	clear	unclear
IK 3	25b/220	1027/1618	grocers (bakkal)	Istanbul	m	16 +	none	Protested against someone becoming an inspector over them.	yes	tacit (after conflict)	bazarbaşı, yiğitbaşı, bölükbaşı
IK 3	25b/221	1027	lathe-operators (çıkırkçı)	Istanbul	m	6+	1 beşe, 1 beğ, ket beğ	Complained about an insult to their group.	no	unclear	kethüda, yiğitbaşı
IK 3	29b/252	1027	fruit-sellers (yemişçi)	Istanbul and vicinities	m	14+	none	Agreed that they should buy fruit under the supervision of their leaders.	yes	clear	bazarbaşı, kethüda (not present)

¹ For the database, I simplified transliteration, eliminating special fonts such as ħ and ģ.

Appendix F (*cont.*)

defter	folio/ document	year (A.H.)	trade	location	religion	number	military element	contents	recourse to tradition	use of agreement	leaders
IK 3	35a/298	1027	shoe-makers (haffaf)	Istanbul (Arasta-i Cedîd)	m	3+	1 beğ	Agreed to specialize in certain types and sizes of shoes (avoiding conflict with the next group).	yes	yes	kethüda
IK 3	35a/298	1027	shoe-makers	Karaman-i Kebir Karyesi	m	7+	3 beğs, 1 cavuş	Agreed to specialize in certain types and sizes of shoes (avoiding conflict with the previous group).	yes	yes	kethüda
IK 3	39b/338	1027	pedestrian water-carriers (arka saka)	Istanbul	m	21+	none	Sued their yiğitbaşı for not holding a banquet after he took office.	yes	n/a	şeyh and yiğitbaşı
IK 3	55a/469	1027	soup cooks (çorbacı)	unclear	z ket (m)	5+	none	Dismissed a government- appointed kethüda for his poor performance.	no	tacit	kethüda
IK 3	56a/473	1027	tinsmiths (kalaycı)	Istanbul	m	8+	none	Sued Gypsy intruders.	yes	unclear, tacit	kethüda, yiğitbaşı

IK 3	62b/522	1027	potters (çömlekçi)	Istanbul	m	4+	none	Agreed on the prices of cups with the suppliers whom they were buying from.	no	clear	kethüda, yiğitbaşı	
IK 3	86a/700	1027	cow butchers	unclear	m	n/a	none	Rejected an appointed kethüda.	yes	clear	kethüda, ihtiyars	
IK 3	89a/710	1027	shoemakers (kavaf)	near the Bezzazistan, Karaman-i Kebir Arasta	unclear ket (m)	n/a	unclear	Sued the shoemakers of Cami-i Cedid for violating their previous agreement.	yes,	clear	kethüda	
IK 3	96a/736	1027	silk manufacturers (kazzaz)	Istanbul	m	n/a	yiğit and ket only	ket beğ (new)	Suggested and had a kethüda appointed to the raw silk brokers (dellal) who were in disarray.	no	clear	kethüda, yiğitbaşı
IK 3	96a/736	1027	silk manufacturers (kazzaz)	Istanbul	j	unclear	none	Cooperated with their Muslim colleagues in having a kethüda appointed to the brokers.	no	clear	kethüda,	
IK 4	8a/54	1028/1618–19	chickpea-roasters (leblebici)	Istanbul	unclear	unclear	names not mentioned	An outsider (Muslim) succeeded in getting a government order	clear (on the part of the intruder)	n/a	unclear	

Appendix F (*cont.*)

defter	folio/ document	year (A.H.)	trade	location	religion	number	military element	contents	recourse to tradition	use of agreement	leaders
								allowing him to sell roast chick- peas, despite the objection of the guild.			
IK 4	32b/226	1028	jewelers (kuyumcu)	Aya Sofya, Gedikpaşa Çarşı, etc.	m (3) z (11)	14+	none	Sued a former yiğitbaşı (z) creating problems.	no	tacit	yiğitbaşı
IK 4	36a/251	1028	shoetip-makers (nalçacı)	Istanbul (El-Hac Ishak Mahallesi)	m	4	none	A dhimmi (outsider) successfully persuaded the government to order the guild to allow him to make shoe-tips. He acquired a fetva as well	no	n/a	kethüda, yiğitbaşı
IK 4	49b/348	1028	Round cake-makers (çörekçi)	Istanbul	z (ket) m (2)	3	None	Sued the cooks who wanted round cake- makers to contribute part of their military tax	yes	n/a	kethüda, ihtiyars

IK 4	51b/362	1028	perfumers (attar)	Yemiş İskelesi	m (2) j (4)	6	none	Brought two Jewish members who had bought some tin secretly.	yes	tacit	yiğitbaşı (muslim)
IK 5	24b/168	1029/1619–20	fishermen (balıkçı), dalyan (fish trap)ci, and igrîb (fish net)ci	Balat and Fener	z	unclear	none	Demanded tax (tekalif-i örfiyye) exemption as specified in muafname. (incl. avariz tax listings.) Seemingly granted.	yes	tacit	unclear
IK 5	28b/190	1029?	coal(kömür) dealers	Istanbul	z[e?] (7) ket (m)	8	none	Reproached some members' procuring the commodity secretly.	yes	very clear	yiğitbaşı
IK 5	40a/272	1029?	snow/ice-sellers (karcı)	Istanbul	m	5	a beğ, + ket beğ	Agreed on snow/ice supply and price.	yes	clear	kethüda
IK 5	40a/272	1029?	sherbet makers (şerbetçi)	Istanbul	m	8	ket beğ	Same as above.	no	tacit	kethüda, yiğitbaşı
IK 5	52b/370	1029	horse-cart drivers (at arabacılar)	Istanbul	m	7	3 beğs + ket beğ	Wanted to establish the office of yiğitbaşı just as other guilds had theirs.	no	tacit (cumlenin iltimas . . .)	kethüda, plus yiğitbaşı newly instated.
IK 5	71b s.	1029	porters (hammal)	Istanbul (Balat and other gates)	m	5+	none	Appealed against the commandeering of their horses.	no	tacit	kethüda

Appendix F (*cont.*)

defter	folio/ document	year (A.H.)	trade	location	religion	number	military element	contents	recourse to tradition	use of agreement	leaders
IK 5	75a 1.	1029?	pedestrian water-carriers (arka saka)	Istanbul, Demir Kapı	m	4	none	Appealed against intrusions by many kinds of outsiders.	indirectly (we have been doing business for over 20 years)	tacit	şeyh (Dervish Ali) and yığıtbaşı
IK 6	2b/10	1029	fruit-sellers (yemişçi)	Istanbul	m	10+	none	Appealed against intrusion by outsiders, wanting court's support.	yes	clear	bazarbaşı, yığıtbaşı ihtiyars
IK 6	25b s.	1029	chicken-sellers (tavukçu)	Istanbul	m	n/a, yığıt and ket only	unclear	Sued a beşe who violated the rules of <i>gedik</i> .	yes	tacit	yığıtbaşı, kethüda
IK 7	5a–5b/31	1070/ 1659–60	gunlock (tabanca kilit) sellers	Kilithamı in Istanbul	m (11) z (4)	15	3 beşes, 1 beğ	Confirmed their rule of not buying outside of the designated purchase route.	yes	clear	kethüda
IK 7	9b s.– 10a 1.	1070?	iron-workers (demirci), nail- makers, etc. (multiple guilds)	Tersane, Tavuk- pazarı, Üsküdar, Istanbul, Galata	unclear, but leaders include m and z	only guild leaders are mentioned	n/a	Selected a deputy to sue government officials who had not paid their wages.	n/a	clear	demircibaşı, kethüdas

IK 7	33b 2.	1070	Bezzazistan-i Cedid	Istanbul	m	6+	none but ket ağa	Decided not to buy from their former supplier because the textiles did not meet the standard length.	yes	clear	kethüda, ihtiyars
IK 8	27b 2.	1071/1660–61	linen-weavers (kettancı)	Istanbul	m	14+	1 beşe (ihtiyar)	Changed their kethüda.	no	tacit	kethüda, bölükbaşı, ihtiyars
IK 9	8a 2.	1071	barbers (berber)	Istanbul	m	6+	none	Supported the incumbent şeyh against a challenger.	no	tacit	kethüda, yiğitbaşı, şeyh, ihtiyars
IK 9	8a 3.	1071	barbers (berber)	Istanbul	m	12+	none	Supported the incumbent yiğitbaşı against a challenger.	no	tacit	kethüda, yiğitbaşı, şeyh, ihtiyars
IK 9	8a 4.	1071	barbers (berber)	Istanbul	m	15+	none	Supported the incumbent kethüda against a challenger.	no	tacit	kethüda, yiğitbaşı, şeyh, ihtiyars
IK 9	12b s.	1071	candle-makers (mumcu)	Istanbul	z, ket (m)	5+	only the kethüda	Designated a candle-maker to supply candles to a grocer.	yes	clear	kethüda, yiğitbaşı
IK 9	13a s2.	1071	candle-makers (mumcu)	Istanbul	z, ket (m)	3+	only the kethüda	Designated a candle-maker to supply candles to a grocer.	yes	clear	kethüda, yiğitbaşı

Appendix F (*cont.*)

defter	folio/ document	year (A.H.)	trade	location	religion	number	military element	contents	recourse to tradition	use of agreement	leaders
IK 9	23b 2. & 3.	1071	candle-makers (mumcu)	Istanbul	z ket (m)	5+	ket beşe	Designated a candle-maker to supply candles to a grocer.	yes	clear	kethüda, yiğitbaşı
IK 9	64a 5.	1071	pickle-makers (turşucu)	Istanbul	m	4+	none	Appealed against intrusion by havyar (caviar?)ci. This ended in an agreement to share tax burden.	indirectly	clear	yiğitbaşı
IK 9	104b s.	1071	barley-dealers (arpacı)	Istanbul (Arpa İskelesi and Un Kapani)	m	7+	none but ket beğ	Had their tax payment confirmed.	no	no	appointed kethüda, his tax agent, ihtiyars
IK 9	120a 2.	1072/ 1661–62	candle-makers	Istanbul	z ket (m)	6+	ket beğ (could be beşe)	Designated a candle-maker to supply candles to a grocer.	yes	clear	kethüda, yiğitbaşı, ihtiyars
IK 9	121a 1.	1072	merchants (tacirler)	near Bezzazistan	m	10+	none but intruder bazargans (2 beşes)	Tried to keep their traditional monopoly right on morocco leather business from “bazarganlar.”	yes	no	kethüda, yiğitbaşı, ihtiyars

IK 9	125b 2.	1072	knife-makers (bıçakçı)	Uzunçarşı	m	5+	1 beğ	Sued smallware-dealers (hurdacı) for not respecting their privilege in purchasing Venetian knives.	yes	no	kethüda
IK 9	125b 2.	1072	smallware-dealers (hurdacı)	Sultan Bayezit in Istanbul	m	5	2 beşes (ihtiyar)	They were the accused.	n/a	n/a	ihtiyars
IK 9	143a 2.	1072	felt-makers (keçeci)	Istanbul	unclear	unclear	unclear	Changed a waqf-administrator for their fund for the payment of military taxes.	no	tacit	kethüda
IK 9	145b s.	1072	Tanners (debbağ)	Yedikule	Muslims	18+	2 beşes	Sued a member who violated a rule about raw-material purchase.	yes	clear	kethüda, yiğitbaşı, ahî baba, ihtiyars
IK 9	147a 1.	1071	sellers of brickdust for mortar (hurasancı)	Istanbul and vicinities	z	unclear	n/a	Petitioned against the commandeering or their horses by the Istanbul ağası.	n/a	n/a	unclear
IK 9	170b 2.	1072	candle-makers	Kumkapı, Balıkpazarı Ayazma- kapı, Balat, Otağçı	z, ket (m)	7	ket beşe	Regular members swore in front of the guild officials that they would	no	clear	kethüda, yiğitbaşı, ihtiyars

Appendix F (*cont.*)

defter	folio/ document	year (A.H.)	trade	location	religion	number	military element	contents	recourse to tradition	use of agreement	leaders
IK 9	189a s.	1072	shoetip-makers (nalçacı)	Istanbul	m	6+	2 beşes plus one accused	not buy from the janissary butchers again. Sued a beşe who opened a shop that was without <i>gedik</i> .	yes	tacit	şeyh, yiğitbaşı, ihtiyars
IK 9	190b s.	1071	sherbet-makers (şerbetçi)	Istanbul	m	14+	1 beğ	Appealed against intruders.	yes	tacit	kethüda, yiğitbaşı, ihtiyars
IK 9	199b 2.	1072	felt-makers (keçeci)	Istanbul	m	6+	1 beşe	Changed their kethüda.	no	tacit,	kethüda
IK 9	249a 1.	1072	rice-dealers (pirinççi)	Istanbul	m	6+	3 beşes (ihtiyar)	Selected a new kethüda. He in return swore that he would fulfill his duties.	no	tacit	kethüda, yiğitbaşı, ihtiyars
IK 9	249a 2.	1072	rice-dealers (pirinççi)	Istanbul	m	8+	3 beşes (ihtiyar)	Selected a new yiğitbaşı. He swore to fulfill his duty.	no	tacit	kethüda, yiğitbaşı, ihtiyars
IK 9	254a s.	1072	candle-makers	Istanbul	z, ket (m)	4+	ket beşe	Decided sales routes.	no	clear	kethüda, ihtiyars
IK 9	262b s2.	1071	straw mat- sellers (hasırcı)	Istanbul	m	13+	none	Confirmed their rule of buying	yes	clear	kethüda, yiğitbaşı

IK 9 270b 3.	1072	simit-flour-makers (simit un işleyen)	Istanbul and Balat	z	12 (Istanbul) 5+ (Balat)	none	raw materials under the supervision of guild leaders.	Changed their position and to have the ceremony (merasim).	no	tacit	kethüda
IK 10 12b 2.	1071	round-cake makers (çörekçi)	Istanbul	m	10+	2 beşes	Sued members who did not comply with their production standard.	no, but their judgment	tacit	kethüda, yığitbaşı	
IK 10 12b s.	1072	laundryers (çameşuy)	Istanbul,	m	12+	1 beşe	Changed their kethüda.	no, but their judgment	tacit	kethüda	
IK 10 14b s.	1072	locksmiths (çilingir)	Istanbul	ket (e)	1	unclear	Agreed on the amount of tax contribution from their yamak nail-makers.	yes	tacit	kethüda	
IK 10 14b s.	1072	nail-makers (ekserci)	Istanbul	e	4+	none	Agreed on the amount of tax contribution to their main guild locksmiths.	yes	tacit	yığitbaşı	

Appendix F (*cont.*)

defter	folio/ document	year (A.H.)	trade	location	religion	number	military element	contents	recourse to tradition	use of agreement	leaders
IK 10	23a3.	1072	starch-makers (nişasteci)	Istanbul	Muslims	4+	1 beşe	Changed their kethüda.	no	tacit	kethüda,
IK 10	27b2.	1072	candle-makers (mumcu)	Istanbul,	z	15+	none	Appointed one member to acquire raw materials.	yes	tacit	kethüda
IK 10	52a s2.	1072	cooks of sheep feet (paçacı)	Istanbul	m	10	4 beşes, 1 beğ, ket beğ	Decided to ensure fair and equitable distribution of raw materials.	no	clear	kethüda
IK 10	69b 1.	1072	candle-makers (mumcu)	Yedikule, Balat, etc	z,	4+	none	Arranged animal fat distribution: the four groups would get fat from slaughter- houses respec- tively 5, 5, 5, and 15 days of a month	no	clear	yığıtbaşı
IK 10	71a 1.	1072	bead-makers (boncukcu)	Mahmud Paşa Çarşısı	Jewish	8	none	Selected a kethüda.	no	tacit	kethüda
IK 10	72a 1.	1072	sherbet-makers (şerbetçi)	Istanbul	m	7+	2 beşes, ket beşe	Agreed with snow suppliers	yes	well- implied	kethüda, yığıtbaşı

IK 10 72a 1.	1072	snow-sellers (karıcı)	Istanbul	m	4	none	(price fixing and supply monopoly). Agreed with sherbet makers, (price fixing and supply monopoly).	yes	well-implicit	karcıbaşı
IK 10 74a 3.	1071	grocers (bakkal)	Istanbul	m	3+	unclear	Bearing witness in the following oil makers' case.	yes	n/a	bazarbaşı bölükbaşı
IK 10 74a 3.	1071	oil-makers (şirugancı)	Istanbul, Galata, Eyüb, Üsküdar, Kasimpaşa	m	10+	1 beşe, 1 beğ	Sued members who violated the agreement on raw material distribution.	yes	tacit	kethüda, yiğitbaşı, ihtiyars
IK 10 93a 3.	1072	kebab-makers and cooks (kebabçı/aşçı)	Istanbul	m	6+	3 beşes, 1 beğ	Mutually agreed with the boza makers not to intrude upon each other's specialty.	yes	clear	kethüda, yiğitbaşı, ihtiyars
IK 10 94b 1.	1072	boza-makers (bozacı)	Istanbul	m (5) z (3)	8+	5 beşes, incl. ket beşe	Mutually agreed with the kebab-makers/cooks not to intrude upon each other's specialty.	yes	clear	kethüda, yiğitbaşı, ihtiyars
IK 10 96b 1.	1072	bottle-makers (şişeci)	Galata	z	2+	none	They were accused of encroaching upon small-ware dealers' specialties.	no	n/a	kethüda

Appendix F (*cont.*)

defter	folio/ document	year (A.H.)	trade	location	religion	number	military element	contents	recourse to tradition	use of agreement	leaders
IK 10	96b 1.	1072	smallware- dealers (hurdafruş)	Istanbul, Uzunçarşı	m	8+	1 beğ	Testified that their Jewish colleagues were right.	yes	tacit	unclear
IK 10	96b 1.	1072	smallware- dealers (hurdafruş)	Istanbul, Mahmud Paşa Suku	j	7+	none	Accused bottle makers of intrusion upon their specialized goods.	yes	tacit	kethüda, yiğitbaşı, ihtiyars
IK 10	99b s.2	1072	trough-makers (tekneci)	Istanbul	m	7+	none	Appealed against intrusion by koltukcu (peddlers).	yes	tacit	şeyh, kethüda, yiğitbaşı, ihtiyars
IK 10	104b 4.	1072	tanners (debbağ)	omitted	m (3 of whom seyyids)	12+	none	Sued a parch- ment maker for bypassing the tanners.	yes	tacit	kethüda, yiğitbaşı, ahi baba, ihtiyars
IK 10	108b s.	1072	tanners (debbağ)	Istanbul	m (3 of whom seyyids)	10+	2 beşes (usta)	Reproached a member for his ambition to become a kethüda.	no	incomplete	ahi baba, kethüda
IK 10	109a	1072	tanners (debbağ)	Istanbul, Yedikule	m (2 of whom seyyids)	5	none	Suing a member who engaged in a dubious practice.	no, but indirectly	tacit,	ahi baba, kethüda

IK 10	113b s.- 114a 1.	1072	tanners (debbâğ)	Yedikule (same people as “Istanbul” guild)	m (one seyyid and one çorbacı)	7+	1 beşe, 1 çor- baci	Appealed against Eyüb tanners’ buying black cow hides.	yes	tacit	ahi baba, kethüda, yiğitbaşı, ihtiyars
IK 10	113b s.- 114a 1.	1072	tanners (debbâğ)	Eyüb	m (motley: iğneci, kahveci, tırşeci)	4+	none	Acknowledged Yedikule tanners’ claim.	yes	tacit	ahi baba, ihtiyars
IK 10	134b 2.	1071	quilted turban- makers (kavukçu)	Istanbul	m	23+	2 beğs, 1 beşe	Decided to stick with the incumbent kethüda whom they liked.	no	well-implicit	kethüda
IK 10	146b s.	1072	launderers (çameşuy)	Istanbul,	m	7	1 beşe (yiğitbaşı, new)	A beşe was selected to be yiğitbaşı.	no	tacit	şeyh, yiğitbaşı
GK 73	39b s2.	1061/ 1650–51	hook-makers (kullabcı)	Istanbul, Galata	m	2 (I) 7(G)	none	Those in Istanbul unsuc- cessfully sued those in Galata for not sharing tax burden.	yes	tacit	yiğitbaşı, ihtiyars (I)
GK 73	46b s2.	1061	bottle-makers (şişeci)	Galata	z,	12+	none	Complained about some members’ practices.	no	very clear	kethüda, yiğitbaşı, yazıcı (?)
GK 73	104b 2.	1061	shoetip-makers (nalçacı)	Galata	m	ket (m) 12+ (ihtiyar)	unclear	Appointed an elder to practice once	yes	very clear	kethüda, ihtiyars

Appendix F (*cont.*)

defter	folio/ document	year (A.H.)	trade	location	religion	number	military element	contents	recourse to tradition	use of agreement	leaders
GK 73	109a 1.	1061	shoetip-makers (nalçacı)	Galata	m	ket (m) 12+ (ihtiyar)	unclear	in 12 days in an arcade inside Yağka- panı Gate. Appointed another elder for the same practice, when there was a vacancy.	yes	very clear	kethüda, ihtiyars
GK 73	123a s.	1061	hard biscuit- makers (peksimatçı)	Galata	z	15	none	Wanted to establish the position of kethüda.	yes for internal practices, no for kethüda- ship	clear	kethüda, from then on
GK 73	134b 1.	1061	small barrel- makers (varılcı)	Istanbul and Galata	z	8+	none	Petitioned against illegally collected tokmak (mallet) akçesi.	yes	tacit	title not mentioned
GK 73	134b 2.	1061	confectioners (helvacı)	Istanbul, Galata, Tophane, Kasimpaşa	unclear ket (m)	unclear	unclear	Those in Istanbul sued those in Galata for not sharing tax burden.	yes	tacit	kethüda

GK 73 135b 4.	1061 ca.	boza-makers (bozacı)	Galata	unclear	unclear	unclear	Petitioned not to let meyhaneciler increase bozacı's share of kürekçi levy.	yes (and also referring to ferman)	tacit	unclear
GK 73 135b 4.	1061 ca.	tavern-keepers (meyhaneci)	unclear (perhaps Galata)	z	unclear	unclear	They were accused of increasing bozacı's share of kürekçi levy arbitrarily.	n/a	tacit	unclear
GK 73 135b 5.	1061	tavern-keepers (meyhaneci)	Beşiktaş, Ortaköy, Arnavutköy	z	unclear	unclear	They had been reluctant in giving kurekci levy together with those in Galata. The government would punish them with a heavier imposition.	yes.	tacit	unclear
GK 80 2a 2.	1067/1656–57	shopkeepers (dekâkin ahalisi)	in Arab Suk in Galata	m	8	3 beşes, 1 beğ	Selected a kethüda for the first time.	no	tacit	kethüda, from then on
GK 80 38a 2.	1067	bottle-makers (şişeci)	Galata	z	7	none	Wanted to have a kethüda, for practical purposes (unclear whether kethüda-ship had been firmly established).	no	tacit	kethüda, from then on

Appendix F (*cont.*)

defter	folio/ document	year (A.H.)	trade	location	religion	number	military element	contents	recourse to tradition	use of agreement	leaders
GK 80	52a 2	1067	caulkers (kalafatçı) carpenters (marangoz)	unclear	m	9 (caulkers) + 2 (car- penters)	2 beğs, 1 odabaşı, 2 beşes (caul- kers), 1 beşe (carpenter)	Appealed against intrusion by hayyat (seamsters) in their sandal wood and boatmaking business.	yes	tacit	re'is
GK 80	52a 2.	1067	seamsters (hayyat)	unclear	m (4) z (1)	5	none	They were sued by caulkers and carpenters.	n/a	n/a	unclear
GK 80	52a 3.	1067	shoetip-makers (nalçacı)	Galata	m	5+	3 beşes	Changed their kethüda.	no	clear	kethüda
GK 80	75b 2.	1067	bakers (etmekci)	Galata	z	15 (all w/o titles)	none	Complained about the ihtisab ağası fining them.	yes, indirectly	tacit,	unclear
GK 80	91a 2.	1067	shopkeepers (bazarıcı) vege- table-sellers (sebzeci) florists (şüküfeci)	Istanbul	unclear	unclear	unclear	Claimed tax exemption.	yes	n/a	unclear
GK 80	93b 1.	1067	bottle-makers (şişeci) govern- ment order to them	Galata	z	unclear	none	Some members did not want to have a kethüda, but the govern-	yes	no	kethüda

IK 7	42b 1.	1070	court summoners (muhzır) (non-guild)	Istanbul	m	12	none	ment sided with the kethüda and his supporters. Limited the number of members.	no	tacit	kethüda, bölükbaşı, kaimakam, duacı
IK 7	42b 3.	1070	court summoners (muhzır) (non-guild)	Istanbul	m	13	none	Same, and expelled some troublemakers.	no	clear	kethüda, bölükbaşı, kaimakam

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3 (1063–65/1652–55)
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