


Cambridge Studies in Islamic Civilization

Economic life in Ottoman Jerusalem

Amnon Cohen



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
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
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Note on transcription

In most cases Ottoman administrative terms as well as place names have been transcribed in their Arabic form. Although their pronunciation may have been largely influenced by the Turkish language used predominantly by the local administration, we have followed the written form as it appears in the main source of this work: the Arabic local court records. Nevertheless, there are a few instances of administrative terms that were originally Turkish; in these cases we did not use the Arabicized version but rather the authentic Turkish form (in modern spelling). Words or names that have already become part of English usage (e.g. kadi) have been used in their accepted form.



Ottoman Jerusalem, showing distribution of soap-factories in the sixteenth century

Introduction

Every town is and wants to be a world apart [. . .] all or nearly all of them between the fifteenth and eighteenth centuries had ramparts.

Where there is a town, there will be a division of labour.

(F. Braudel, *Civilization and Capitalism 15th–18th Century*
(New York, 1979), Vol. 1, *The Structures of Everyday Life*, pp. 491, 479.)

Jerusalem became part of the Ottoman empire, as did most of the Arabic-speaking provinces, during the last months of 1516. These major political developments came in the wake of a military campaign that put an end to three centuries of Mamluk rule in Syria, Palestine and Egypt. Covering an area that had never been regarded as militarily threatening or economically attractive, neither Damascus nor Cairo were originally considered by the Ottomans as important objectives. Jerusalem, much smaller in size and of minimal administrative consequence, was even less significant – its religious history notwithstanding.

Once these cities were incorporated into the Ottoman body politic, the rulers' initial lack of interest became irrelevant. They were the masters and acted accordingly. The first years of rule in the newly acquired territories must have been uneasy for both governor and subjects. The death of Sultan Selim and the succession of his son, Suleiman, in 1520, did not alleviate the situation. The governor of Syria, a former Mamluk officer who had crossed the lines and joined the Ottoman camp at the crucial stage of their takeover, took advantage of what seemed to him, prematurely, to be the demise of the new rulers. He rebelled against the state and its newly established sultan in the hope that this time too, he was betting on the right horse. To his surprise, the central government overcame him easily, but from the administration's perspective the episode must have complicated matters even further; it would now take longer to impose Ottoman rule definitively. The first Ottoman land and population census (*tahrîr*) was not carried out until 1525–6, and it took the Jerusalem kadi another five years to establish a functioning court system. The earliest court records (*sijill*), still messy in form,

but increasingly important and from the outset very reliable are dated 1530/1.

The administrative structures devised in the second decade of Ottoman rule, became fully operative in the course of the 1530s. The second census held in Jerusalem in 1538–9 proved to be more comprehensive and reliable. There was an increase of private building activity in the various neighborhoods, and the government initiated preparations for a major construction project. For many years the walls surrounding the city were too dilapidated to provide any significant protection, but the Mamluk authorities did nothing to repair them. The Ottoman administration knew that providing elementary safety to life and property would have an immediate effect on the flagging economy and dwindling demography of Jerusalem and would also enhance the new rulers' prestige within the Muslim community. They therefore undertook the renovation of the walls. Istanbul and Damascus initiated the plans for the project, allocated part of the budget and sent technical and administrative experts. The local population of Jerusalem, as well as that of all other districts of Palestine, contributed their share of taxes to defray the cost of building materials and skilled labor. The commemorative inscriptions over the main gates of "the walls of Suleiman" specify that the actual building took place between the years 1538–41, but one may safely surmise that a project of such magnitude took longer; the preparatory work started earlier and the final touches were added later than is stated on the formal inscription.

The district governor whose official seat was in Jerusalem was entrusted with the keys to all the newly installed gates although they were actually deposited with his deputy, the *subaşı*. Keeping these keys was not just a symbolic act; the *subaşı* had to ascertain that the gates to Jerusalem were locked from sunset to daybreak in order to prevent unwarranted intrusion from the outside. Nevertheless, attempts were made to surmount the hurdle these walls presented. Less than three years after the official completion of the ramparts project, while conducting a search in a cave in the Eastern village of Buqay^c al-Da'n, the district governor found an authentic replica of a key to the gate closest to the Temple Mount area. Members of the blacksmiths' guild were summoned to court in a futile attempt to find the accomplice. Other steps must have been taken to prevent the recurrence of such an episode as the *sijill* archives make no further references to events of this kind. Other techniques, however, were tried: ten years later, a woman living in one of the larger neighborhoods (Bâb Hittâ) was kidnapped late at night, without anyone noticing it, and was smuggled out of town by means of ropes thrown over the walls. Apparently the walls did not seal the town off completely from the surrounding world, but even the afore-mentioned attempts indicate a new reality: the importance of security in Jerusalem, day and night, was recognized.¹

Once security had been achieved for the local population the Ottomans

addressed themselves to satisfying another basic requirement: water supply. Throughout its recorded history, from biblical times onward, Jerusalem has suffered from lack of an adequate supply of water. Various systems have been devised to overcome this lack (see below, pp. 72-4), one of which was the construction of an aqueduct to bring water to Jerusalem from the springs of Irtas (some ten miles to the south). This extensive structure which dates back to Roman times (and unfortunately is overlooked by Braudel in the list of "few aqueducts" he drew)² was considerably damaged in the course of the centuries and was hardly improved by the Mamluks. The Ottomans had the run-down sections repaired and the entire system became operative once more, but in addition very special attention was given to its final outlets in the city. Jerusalem's various conduits and water-pipes were repaired, and new ones were installed where necessary. A comprehensive system of fountains was constructed (probably incorporating some that had existed before) to enable the public to enjoy the fresh water.

One impressive fountainhead was built just outside the walls, at the lower section of "the pool of the Sultan Suleiman", a large, open-air pool dug at the south-western corner of town. Situated outside the city walls, it was intended to provide water for caravans of pilgrims and visitors coming to the city and also served as a reservoir enabling a steady supply of water to the entire system within the walls. Most of the fountains, however, were built within the walls for the convenience of the local population: five were dispersed around the Temple Mount (two to its north, three to its west), three were within its precincts; two additional outlets were located at the most important public baths (one to its north, another to its west).³ The construction of this water system was carried out by the same high official who had been entrusted with the repair of the walls. By the middle of 1541 he could report to a meeting on the Temple Mount attended by top state officials (as well as the kadis of the various religious schools of Jerusalem) that the main stage of the project had just been completed and a steady supply of water was already reaching all outlets. The report goes on to point out that both the initiative and the funding of the project were provided by the Sultan Suleiman.

Although the driving force behind this project was the desire to satisfy the urban-secular needs of the population, the context as well as the vocabulary used to describe it are basically religious: the sultan is referred to as "the greatest *'imām*" and the entire scheme was declared a religious endowment bearing the sultan's name. A number of modifications and improvements undoubtedly had to be added later in the century, but as of this relatively early date the system could be formally declared operative. The supply of running water to all the inhabitants of Jerusalem was proclaimed a major service with which the Ottoman authorities undertook to unremittably provide the local population "night and day, forever and ever."⁴



The two major projects described so far were carried out almost con-

currently and both were motivated by the desire to ensure the material well-being of Jerusalem's population. The new rulers, however, were also concerned about the spiritual dimension and emphasized the religious importance of Jerusalem, the need to preserve it and provide its Muslim majority with improved conditions for religious observance. The walls were rebuilt not only to promote the image of the Ottoman sultan as an omnipotent ruler and a religious leader (*'imām*), but also as a precaution against threats to Jerusalem from the Christian powers. Venice was at war with the Ottomans on the European front, and the building of the walls was actually linked to reports of movements of Venetian naval units in the Eastern Mediterranean. Not knowing the precise aims of the alleged maneuvers, the Ottoman authorities feared that they might be directed toward the seizure of Jaffa, to be followed by an attack on Jerusalem. The distance between Jaffa and Jerusalem made such a plan politically astute and militarily feasible on the part of the Venetian army. The Crusaders, whose rule was still remembered in the Holy Land, had in fact, realized both of these political and military objectives. Surrounding Jerusalem with strong walls was also a means to defend the Muslims and their Holy Shrines from the covetous eyes of the Christians. The case of Jerusalem, thus supports Braudel's argument that "the Osmanli Empire [. . .] had ramparted towns only on its threatened frontiers – In Hungary facing Europe, in Armenia facing Persia";⁵ Jerusalem's ramparts faced Venice on the maritime frontier.

Similarly, the supply of water also had a religious aspect. Ablution prior to each of the five daily prayers is an integral part of the ritual, hence all water conduits converged within or just outside of the main entrances to the Temple Mount. The religious inferences mentioned above aptly pertain to the specific context of water-supply. These were only preliminary steps: plans to improve the condition as well as the shape of the Temple Mount were of much wider scope. The impressive domes of its mosques were stripped of their old coating and during the second half of the century were covered with new lead tiles. Regulations were issued forbidding Jews and Christians to enter the site and those violating the prohibition were prosecuted and punished. The combination of intensive construction activities and a growing number of believers attending services on the Temple Mount led to reports that hygienic conditions there were rapidly deteriorating. Thereupon, in the early 1550s explicit orders were issued to clear the entire esplanade of weeds, building materials and other debris that had accumulated there. To avoid similar neglect in the future, as well as to forestall immoral behavior resulting from the mingling of men and women "on Fridays, religious feast-days and other noble [holy] days," special arrangements were made. Istanbul appointed an officer with a daily salary to be permanently stationed on the Temple Mount to enforce law and order.⁶

Reliable security arrangements, regular water supply and facilities for

conducting religious rituals in an appropriate atmosphere and setting – all of these were important Ottoman contributions towards the improvement of life in Jerusalem. Another aspect of daily life the authorities had to come to grips with was of no less importance: the local economy. Jerusalem was quite far from the traditional trade route between Cairo and Damascus, the *via maris*. Nor could it play an important role in the activities of the annual *hajj* caravans – whether they were religious or commercial – since it was equally distant from the Egyptian route to Mecca and the Syrian one. The popu-



1. Three views of the Temple Mount area.

lation of Jerusalem was relatively too small to attract either the commercial traffic following the Mediterranean shores or the pilgrimage caravans to deviate from their regular routes. If we add the poor state of the commercial facilities in the town after the long years of Mamluk neglect to the drawbacks enumerated above, the overall picture that emerges is an underdeveloped, sluggish economy that has little in common with urban life as we conceive it.

Improvement of this state of affairs could be achieved in two ways: industry and commerce. The Ottomans did not indulge in entrepreneurial industrial initiative, although industrial developments took place under their rule, as will be described in these pages. Their main concern was with the creation of commercial opportunities that might compensate the town for its lack of natural resources. Administrative regulations stipulated that spices brought to Jerusalem should be sold in the spice-dealers' market, and they were exempt from all taxes. This general provision, that in the first half of the century was already an integral part of the *kanunname* of Jerusalem, was applied not only to spices imported from the Far East, but also to many other items brought from provinces closer by. Onions and garlic, for example, usually imported from Egypt, or raisins (*zabīb*) "brought from Syria" were not liable to any tax although a small fee was paid for raisins "because their arrival in Jerusalem was very rare."⁷ Such across-the-board exemption was very unusual for the Ottoman authorities and can only be explained as an attempt to encourage trade either with the town itself or with Jerusalem as a station on the way to more remote places. The local functionaries, the *muhtasibs*, were not at all pleased with these exemptions as their income suffered because of them. The Jerusalem court proceedings report numerous cases of attempts by officials to circumvent the regulations and impose unauthorized taxes on these commodities. Time and again between 1538 and 1563 the kadi intervened in order to stop such violations and redress the damages thus caused to the trade in spices and related import items.⁸

Indicative as the above description may be of the guidelines of economic policy, it teaches us little about the actual execution of this policy, and even less about its results. We can glean these from an analysis of the changes that took place in the spice-dealers' market (*sūq al-ʿaṭṭārīn*) itself. In January 1565 it was undergoing massive renovations involving repairs of the old shops as well as the construction of so many new ones that they justified special reference. The new section merited a name of its own, and even at this stage, when it was simply an appendage of the old market it was called "the new spice-dealers' market"; in other words, it was regarded as distinctly separate from the old one.⁹ From the sources at our disposal today, it is hard to determine whether this initiative was inspired by governmental authorities or was prompted by private local entrepreneurs. Whatever the case may be, the development that took place in the spice market clearly indicates significant acceleration of the economic activity conducted there.

The spice market was by no means an exceptional case. One of the most important commercial centers of Jerusalem was the cotton-weavers' market (*khān*, sometimes *sūq al-qaṭṭānīn*). This was an impressive partly-roofed structure more than two stories high with depots on the ground floor and a variety of shops on the upper level. Unlike most other markets of Jerusalem on the same premises it had a large courtyard where merchants could tether their pack-animals and even leave them overnight. Dating back to Mamluk rule in Palestine and constituting part of the Dome of the Rock endowment, during the fifteenth century the entire complex was neglected by both temporal and religious authorities. The Ottoman occupation found parts of it very run-down, neglected and virtually deserted. As early as 1544, that is just after the major projects of the walls and water supply were completed, public interest began to focus on this market and probably on others as well. Its shops were first cleared of the refuse that had accumulated through the years and new doors and gates were installed. With the carpenters came the painters, and finally the locksmiths. Further repairs and improvements in the cotton-weavers' *khān* were introduced in later years, and maintenance activities were reported in and around the complex. Between 1564 and 1566, for example, the number of shops attached to both sides of the entrance to the market grew from 28 to 32,¹⁰ which is an indication that the increased volume of trade one would have expected to result from the large-scale development projects indeed materialized. More conclusive proof is provided by the very substantial (fourfold) increase in rent paid annually by merchants who traded there. Moreover, the superintendents of the Dome of the Rock endowment, fully aware of the financial benefits that might accrue from this source, approached Istanbul with a request to raise their share of income from the low level at which it had been fixed many years before. Their request was granted because "the shops of the [above]-mentioned *khān* acquired fame after the [Ottoman] occupation."¹¹

The vegetable market (*sūq al-khuḍār*) was not as important for international trade as the spice-dealers' market, nor was it involved in local industry as were the cotton-weavers. It catered primarily, perhaps exclusively, to the needs of the local population but nevertheless underwent a development process similar to that of the other two. In this case the source of the initiative is very clear: a group of local merchants belonging to all three religious denominations, approached the Jerusalem kadi. All they wanted was a permit to clean and rebuild the dilapidated market and they explicitly undertook to finance the project. Once permission was granted they refurbished the market so completely that it was later referred to as "the new market." It is not surprising that its forty shops were then rented for 9 consecutive years instead of 2 or 3 as had been customary: both lessor and lessee knew that they could expect a high enough income from the shops to cover the long-term undertaking and still leave a sufficient margin of profit.¹²

Developments in these markets, different as they were in details, share at least one common denominator: they are a clear indication of an upsurge of economic activity in Jerusalem under the Ottomans. This pattern of repairs and reconstruction, culminating in the addition of a totally new section was not limited to only these three markets. The jewelers, for example, had always leased space in other markets (e.g. the wickerwork market, *sūq al-qushshāsh*) but in the late fifties were asked by the authorities to bring their leases to an end, and concentrate all their professional activity in one place: the newly established jewelers' market.¹³ At the end of 1548 it was announced that "goods imported to the town of Jerusalem will be sold only in the Sultan's market (*sūq al-sultān*).” Although this formulation might have implied an almost unlimited variety of items, later references indicated that in effect it only applied to foodstuffs. A decree issued 35 years later used more precise phraseology: "honey, onions, cheese, cooking butter etc." were specifically itemized. Complaints were lodged with the authorities to the effect that this regulation was not being observed, whereupon strict orders were issued, including warnings to potential offenders.¹⁴ As part of the overall economic development, Jerusalem's markets became increasingly specialized during the second half of the sixteenth century. This was when the Ottoman economic policies introduced around 1550 – after the security, water and religious needs of the population had been attended to – began to bear fruit.

The various aspects described so far add up to a multi-faceted policy that the newly established Ottoman administration made concerted efforts to implement. Considerations of international as well as domestic prestige were highly important to the new rulers, but they were also aware of the practical advantage to be gained from improving conditions in these recently acquired territories. This should not be construed as an attempt to belittle another dimension that inspired many of these reforms: the government was indeed interested in the welfare of the local population.

In retrospect, the residents of Jerusalem stood to gain more than anyone else from the various projects undertaken. The demographic growth of the town is an important additional indication of the success of many of these enterprises: it is most unlikely that the population would have expanded had the authorities not evinced a vital interest in the well-being of their subjects. Official orders sent to Jerusalem occasionally referred to such an interest, but one might tend to dismiss these statements as routine lip-service paid by the rulers to their underlings.

However this does not seem to be borne out either by the general developments outlined above or by the picture of vital economic activity that emerges from the material discussed in this book. Moreover, the government also manifested concern for the lower strata of local society. In the traditional Muslim state such concern was always linked to the religious institutions of the *waqf* charitable endowments – which proliferated in

Jerusalem during the early years of Ottoman rule. The most famous of them – the endowment founded in 1552 by Roxelana, Sultan Suleiman's beloved wife¹⁵ made exemplary arrangements for the establishment and maintenance of a free kitchen for poor people and students in Jerusalem. In the course of the century it became one of the major institutions of the town; it functioned regularly and provided many local families with two nourishing hot meals a day. The poor as well as the more fortunate Jerusalemites ("the many who fed on bread" and "the few who ate meat," to use Braudel's formulation)¹⁶ could rightly regard the Ottoman rule as auspicious.

To this point we have used broad generalized terms such as "population" and "local society" in our discussion of development projects introduced by the Ottomans. For a better understanding and more meaningful evaluation of the changes that took place under their rule, however, they must be viewed at much closer range and from more specific perspectives. Focusing (as we did above) on the ruling institution and its administrative endeavors – even on its achievements, important as they may have been – provides us with only one dimension, usually the organizational one, of the total picture. In a separate volume we have discussed an additional dimension, attempting to shed light on the numerically small but nonetheless important Jewish minority group in Jerusalem's population. Some work has been done and more research is now in progress, on the way of life of the Christian minorities in Ottoman Jerusalem. But the most important and largest social element in the town was the Muslim community which represented more than four-fifths of the entire population and was a microcosm of similar – and much larger – towns throughout the Empire.

Therefore, to acquire a clearer and more authentic perspective on life in Jerusalem under Ottoman rule, we must turn to the *sijill* volumes in the archives of the Muslim court which kept daily records of all cases referred to it for adjudication. Such a court existed in Jerusalem, as it did in every other administrative center of the empire. The kadi, the Muslim judge, not only heard cases and passed judgment, but recorded and publicized decrees and orders emanating from Istanbul and in its capacity as notary public kept complete records of permits and licenses issued, as well as of appointments to various official posts. Each new *sijill* entry tempts the researcher to investigate a hitherto unexplored facet of daily life, to follow the fortunes or misfortunes of a person whose name seems familiar from some earlier innuendo, or whose family affairs we have learned about from previous entries. Obviously, however, it was necessary to select from this vast, minutely documented record of human activities, a limited number of fields of such vital importance to everyday life that the picture of how Muslims lived under Ottoman rule would begin to emerge.

We have chosen to concentrate on three major aspects of production and consumption that had important implications for Jerusalem's industry and commerce in the sixteenth century. In deciding to discuss the activities

involved in the production and distribution of meat, olive oil (and soap), and bread, we deal with the town's most active economic sectors, those that produced commodities consumed by the overwhelming majority of the residents. We also address more general economic problems such as inflation, attempts at price control, professional specialization and guild interrelationships, the local population's patterns of supply and demand and how they affected economic life in general as well as the specific fields we chose for detailed analysis.

In some cases these and related questions could not be fully answered for lack of sufficient data. After the painstaking process of collecting, sorting, sifting, analyzing and then reconstructing the myriad minute details from the court annals, we have been able to reach some conclusions that help illuminate a hitherto obscure side of Ottoman life: its economic functioning. We have tried to apply Braudel's yardstick of "concrete observation" – for which the *sijill* archives are the best possible source material – to acquire as detailed and rich a picture as possible of what he has termed the "complexity and heterogeneity of rural life."¹⁷

True, we have dealt with only one town, Jerusalem. But the conclusions drawn and parameters outlined apply to other urban centers of the Arabic-speaking provinces as well as to the Ottoman empire as a whole. It is our hope that the following pages will contribute to a more profound acquaintance with the Ottoman society and economy. And we will feel amply rewarded if our readers will visualize the factual and descriptive material offered here as pertaining not only to "society" and "economy" but rather to "real people and how they lived."

CHAPTER 1

Butchers and meat consumption

[. . .] "Swine is good Saxon [. . .] but how call you the sow when she is flayed, and drawn and quartered, and hung up by the heels like a traitor?" "Pork", answered the swine-herd, "I am very glad every fool knows that too", said Wamba, "and pork, I think, is good Norman-French, and so when the brute lives [. . .] she goes by her Saxon name; but becomes a Norman and is called pork, when she is carried to the Castle-hall to feast among the nobles" [. . .] "there is old Alderman Ox continues to hold his Saxon epithet, while he is under the charge of serfs [. . .] but becomes Beef, a fiery French gallant, when he arrives before the worshipful jaws that are destined to consume him. Mynheer Calf, too, becomes Monsieur de Veau in the like manner he is Saxon when he requires tenance, and takes a Norman name, when he becomes a matter of enjoyment. *Ivanhoe*, Sir Walter Scott, Chapter 1.

1. The *muhtasib* and the butcher

The office of *ḥisba*, although not mentioned in the Koran or in any of the other canonical texts of Islam, is one of the oldest institutions of the Islamic state. Opinions may vary as to whether the *muhtasib* which was entrusted with it was actually a revised version of an earlier Greek institution or an authentic Arab term that emerged in the new socio-political reality of the ʿAbbasid empire. Nevertheless, the concept and the term, as well as the major functions that the *muhtasib* fulfilled became the third pillar of the classical Islamic state and society (the other two being the kadi and the *ṣāhib al-shurṭa*), and they survived until modern times. The main duties of the *muhtasib* in the koranic spirit of promoting good and forbidding evil (*sūra* 3, verse 100) were inspection of market activities in the widest sense of the word: patrons, clients, merchandise, and their multi-faceted inter-relations. To qualify for such a complex and responsible position, the *muhtasib* "had to be known for his moral integrity and his competence in matters concerning the law; he was therefore usually a *ḥakīm*."¹ In the late Middle Ages Muslim jurists who had a close (sometimes even personal) knowledge of the role filled by the *muhtasib* referred to it as a "religious duty" (*khidma dīniyya*). Hence it was to be delegated only to one of the "most prominent

Muslims and most eminent righteous people.”² In pre-Ottoman times, however, there were some cases, as noted by Claude Cahen, in which merchants were also commissioned to perform the duties of *muhtasib*. Uriel Heyd, referring to the sixteenth-century Ottoman empire, goes a step further from the classical concept. Drawing upon the experience of Bursa, where a *çavuş* of the Palace served as a *muhtasib* towards the end of the century, he concludes: “Though he too held a ‘religious office’ he was usually not, unlike many *muhtasibs* in earlier periods, a member of the ‘ulema class.”³ Were this statement to apply not only to Bursa but to other places as well, and were it confirmed by additional evidence, the Ottoman state, at least from this standpoint would seem to represent a fairly new stage in Muslim history, divorced from previously accepted administrative and social tenets. The story told by the Jerusalem *sijill* volumes tends to corroborate, and even systematize the new character that the *hisba* assumed in this Arabic-speaking province (and probably others as well).

Few of those mentioned as *muhtasibs* in sixteenth-century Jerusalem were members of the ‘*ulamā*’ class, nor did they bear titles indicating religious upbringing and duties. References to professional activity, scattered biographical facts as well as other informative details drawn from the proceedings of the local court all invariably lead to the same conclusion: the appointees were usually local merchants or well-to-do professionals. Moreover, the lucrative, influential position of *muhtasib* was often attained by people who were already highly esteemed in their particular guild. A case in point is the appointment to this job of a non-‘*ālim*, the head of the butchers’ guild in Jerusalem, Tāj al-Dīn al-Sukkarī.

Quite often the *hisba* of Jerusalem was entrusted to two people concurrently. Our sources do not provide us with any indication as to why: the reasons might have been administrative expediency, an attempt to supervise economic activity more closely by dividing responsibility for the various markets in the city, or it might have been sheer greed on the part of the provincial authorities who thus sought to gain higher returns from those who leased them the position. In early May, 1531, the local *hisba* was farmed out to Tāj al-Dīn al-Sukkarī and al-Nāṣirī Muḥammad ibn al-Aqra^c. They were also given the title of “the eldest of the merchants” (*shaykh al-tujjār*) for two markets: that “of the merchants” (*sūq al-tujjār*) and that of the spice-dealers (*sūq al-‘attārīn*).⁴ Al-Sukkarī had already been referred to as a *muhtasib* some four months before.⁵ It was a casual reference, probably because by then he had already been associated with the position for some time. Since there are no *sijill* volumes available antedating A.H. 927/1530, however, there is no way to verify this. Later that year, on October 18, 1531, there is another reference to Tāj al-Dīn al-Sukkarī as a *muhtasib*, this time in conjunction with another person.⁶ Exactly one *hijrī* year after the first joint appointment, Ramaḍān 938 (mid-April, 1532), al-Sukkarī’s appointment was cancelled and he was replaced by someone else. Still, less than half a

year elapsed before he was once again entrusted with “the position of the *ḥisba*.”⁷ In later years the same pattern repeats itself, al-Sukkarī often being mentioned as a *muḥtasib* (e.g. mid-July, 1534, mid-November, 1534, end-April, 1536; mid-July, 1551–early March, 1552).⁸ Intermittently, he was vested with closely related administrative duties, for example: “public-crier (*dallāl*) for the goods brought into Jerusalem” in August, 1534 or a month later as the person in charge of *bayt al-māl*.⁹

None of the above-mentioned entries imply, let alone explicitly state that Tāj al-Dīn al-Sukkarī laid claim to any religious title of *ʿālim* or other. His mercantile activity is quite clearly indicated by the aforementioned title of *shaykh al-tujār*. More specifically, he was not just a merchant: he dealt first and foremost in meat. From the very early volumes of the *sijill* and for many consecutive years he emerges as a member of the guild of butchers, which he even headed on several occasions. In other words, Tāj al-Dīn al-Sukkarī was a butcher before he became a *muḥtasib*, and he persisted in this professional line of activity for many years thereafter. A few conclusions of a more general nature are pertinent here. First, Heyd’s suggestion, mentioned above, is applicable not only to Anatolian Bursa, but also to Jerusalem. The position of the *muḥtasib* was no longer regarded as a “religious duty,” but rather had a strictly economic, secular character. Those who performed the function were merchants and other professional people who occasionally held the title of *al-muʿallim*, i.e. “the expert” in their particular field.¹⁰ Butchers, or members of their extended family, were very high on this list.

In addition to our earlier references to Tāj al-Dīn al-Sukkarī’s professional activity before and after he became a *muḥtasib*, it should be noted here that he did not give up his original occupation as a butcher even while serving as a *muḥtasib* during the first half of the century. In other words, no basic change occurred in his regular activity later on, when he was replaced by the authorities. In 1531, then again in 1532 he concurrently paid for the lease of both the *ḥisba* and the *laḥḥāma* in Jerusalem.¹¹ Abu al-Yāsir ibn Rajab al-Qinyāṭ, whose name is often mentioned during the second half of the century as a *muḥtasib*, had previously been a butcher.¹² In the late fifties, then in the late sixties and early seventies, another butcher, Shihāb al-Dīn ibn Mīrān intermittently served as a *muḥtasib*; other members of his family too belonged to the butchers’ guild.¹³

From these and similar examples, the following conclusion may be drawn: During many decades of the sixteenth century members of the butchers’ guild of Jerusalem, more often than members of any other profession, were commissioned by the local authorities to hold the highly responsible office of the *ḥisba*. To a certain extent this interrelationship may have emanated from purely functional considerations. On the one hand, there had to be sufficient funds at one’s disposal to pay for the lease of the lucrative *ḥisba*, and butchers apparently had money. On the other hand, the *muḥtasib* was responsible for the regular, systematic collection (among other tolls) of the

"butchers seal tax" (*resm-i damga-i kassabin*),¹⁴ known in Jerusalem also as "the butchers' toll" (*bāj al-laḥḥāma*). Butchers, naturally, were better qualified than anyone else to levy such a tax. This is more than just a reasonable guess based on the terminology of the *tahrīr* registers; it can be independently established by evidence drawn from the *sijill*. In August 1534, when two new *muḥtasibs* were appointed in Jerusalem, they were entrusted with both *wazīfat al-ḥisba wa'l-damga*. About a month earlier, the former *muḥtasib* concluded a deal with another butcher, according to which "both of them will be partners in the performance of the butcher's profession, as well as in the [collection of the] *damga*." The dual, or rather triple connection seems to be very clearly established here.¹⁵ As the name of this toll indicates, it was collected in the slaughterhouse and a seal (*damga*) was affixed as an official guarantee of the reliable origin and quality of the meat. Some *muḥtasibs* tried to take advantage of this situation and levy a much higher toll than that prescribed by the *kanun* regulations or by established custom. When the butchers complained to the kadi he supported them and formally prohibited such unlawful procedure.¹⁶ In 1568 a *muḥtasib* (Sharaf al-Dīn ibn ʿAṭīyya, see below) tried to collect not only higher rates, but a double *damga*: he levied it on the butchers as usual, but insisted that the slaughterers too pay him an equal sum. When the head of the Jewish community brought this practice to the attention of the kadi, it was immediately and categorically forbidden. Yet another stratagem used by a *muḥtasib* was an attempt to collect this toll for sheep and cattle imported to Jerusalem as well as for the meat after slaughtering. The importers (*jallāba*, locally referred to also as *sūqa* or *sawaqa*) were obliged to comply, as were the butchers.¹⁷ It is pertinent to note here, by way of presenting a more variegated and balanced picture, that many a butcher found ways of evading such burdensome procedures by simply slaughtering their animals outside the slaughterhouse (either at home or at some public location), which was equally wrong and met with the disapproval of the local authorities.

Apart from the functional, built-in relationship that existed between the *muḥtasib* and the butchers, there were also certain less formal links between the two institutions. Since the *muḥtasib* was in charge of control of all prices (as well as the inspection of weights and measures), the variety of meats sold in Jerusalem markets (see below) was an important element in his daily routine. This made butchers highly eligible for the job. The intimate acquaintance with the butchers' *modus operandi* as well as the close relationship that evolved as the *muḥtasib* by definition had to check the way in which the butchers performed their duty, offered the former many opportunities and temptations, that were apparently hard to resist. The petition discussed below, presented to the kadi of Jerusalem on December 15, 1568, throws further light on the real problems and difficulties that emerged from this close relationship. Three members of the local butchers' guild came to the court and submitted a formal complaint against the behavior of Sharaf

al-Dīn ibn ʿAṭīyya, the *muḥtasib*. Due to the gravity of the situation and the wider implications of the case, the officer in charge of the law-enforcing agency who was regarded as the personal representative of the governor – i.e. the *subaşı* – was also present throughout the hearing. The way the *muḥtasib* fulfilled his duties, the butchers claimed, was very detrimental to their own cause. In defiance of well-established regulations and patterns of economic and administrative activity, for some time he had been personally dealing in meat: buying and selling sheep, having them slaughtered and even selling the meat to the general public. Quite understandingly, they found this to be not only wrong, but also unfair competition and a threat to their main source of income. The kadi stated that he regarded such behavior as contrary to the Ottoman *kanun* regulations, as well as to earlier specific orders of the Sultan. He therefore called for the *muḥtasib* and emphatically warned him against further conduct of this sort.

On December 15, 1568 the *muḥtasib* was summoned once again, this time by the *subaşı* who showed the court meat allegedly slaughtered and sold by the *muḥtasib*, despite all earlier warnings. The *muḥtasib* denied these allegations, whereupon several butchers testified that he had indeed acted as claimed by the *subaşı* in flagrant violation of the code of economic and administrative behavior.¹⁸ The profits accruing from such action were apparently quite high, and we encounter similar cases on different dates, the roles being played by different actors. Towards the end of March, 1582, several butchers came to the kadi of Jerusalem and presented him with a petition against the *muḥtasib*, ʿAlā al-Dīn ibn al-Jāmūsh. They accused him not only of slaughtering and selling meat in the open market – and thus unfairly competing with them – but also of forcing them to buy a given percentage of it at exorbitant prices. The kadi summoned the defendant and had a Sultanic decree issued in August, 1567 (i.e. over a year before the petition presented in December, 1568 to the aforementioned case, which is proof that there had been earlier occurrences of an identical kind). This *firman* emphatically forbade the *muḥtasib* to engage in unauthorized interference in the affairs of the butchers of Jerusalem or to oppress them by forcing them to purchase meat at prices and under conditions set by him.¹⁹ In other words, unlawful acts of this kind occurred in Jerusalem throughout the sixteenth century. Actually, they should be viewed in a wider perspective: similar behavior was noted in other parts of Palestine at the time on the part of the *muḥtasibs* who imported various commodities (particularly wheat) to the town and forced the local merchants to buy at exorbitant prices.²⁰ This was undoubtedly done whenever potential profits were so high that they counterbalanced the warnings of the authorities or the protests of the local merchants. Meat was unlike other commodities in that the *muḥtasib* not only imported and sold it to the members of the butchers' guild, but he also had the sheep slaughtered and sold directly to the consumers. Meat sold in this way promised a higher income than could be

expected from other products. This also indicates another aspect of the interrelation between the *muhtasib* and the butcher: even when he was not a *bona fide* butcher, the *muhtasib* was very deeply involved in the guild's commercial activity.

So far we have focused on the butchers' relative importance and the effect they had on the man who was entrusted with the *hisba*. Let us now change our vantage-point and look at this relationship from the opposite angle, i.e.: how important was the institution to the butchers and what benefits accrued to the guild as a result of its close ties with the *muhtasib*? The most significant conclusion to be drawn is that the social and economic importance of the butchers in Jerusalem was much greater than might have been assumed from the mere fact that they were in charge of providing the town and its people with meat. In the final analysis the butchers were no different from a broad stratum of artisans and professional people entrusted with supplying services and foodstuffs to the population. In this sense their function was considered similar to that of any grocer, baker or spice-dealer; like them, the butchers enjoyed certain occupational advantages and suffered from certain disadvantages. Their most conspicuous advantage was that both the Ottoman authorities and the local population – in Jerusalem as in all other urban centres of the Empire – regarded the supply of meat as a high-priority item. Many of the *kanunname* collections contain detailed entries regulating the professional activity of the butchers, such as the one dealing with the *ihtisab* of Istanbul (*kanunname-i ihtisab-i Istanbul al-mahrusa*), dating from the early sixteenth century. Its two opening chapters are exclusively devoted to matters concerning the butchers and the supply of meat. Only then does it focus on bread and other essential provisions for the capital of the Ottoman empire.²¹ There is no doubt that among the various merchants and craftsmen of Jerusalem the butchers occupied a very important position. Perusal of the many volumes of the *sijill* court proceedings confirms this; they are referred to more frequently than any others of their peer group, and the religious, economic and administrative authorities seem to be involved with their affairs to a larger extent than they are with any other guild. A technical detail indicative of their great consequence emerges from a document of early May, 1531: unlike most other regular entries of the *sijill* this one (wherein the butchers undertook to provide their city with a constant supply of meat) is signed and attested to not by ordinary witnesses, but by both the Ḥanafī and the Shafī'ī kadīs of Jerusalem.²²

On the other hand, the butcher dealt in meat, an occupation that involved some unpleasant aspects: his hands and clothing were always stained with blood, while the odors emanating from his shops were much more offensive to human nostrils than those emitted by the spice-dealer's or greengrocer's. With all due respect to the economic importance of the butcher, he was part of a line of craftsmen (tanner, processor of hides, *adamīs* who separated and collected the fats, saddle and harness-maker, shoemaker) who looked and

smelled unclean because of their regular dealings with various parts of animals. They were also viewed by the public with varying degrees of repugnance. The tanners, for example, were removed to the Kedron Valley outside the walls of the town not only because they needed a place to spread their hides, but because of the stench the hides exuded while being processed. The relatively low value of property in close proximity to the slaughterhouse may explain, at least partially, the concentration of many Jewish houses in that part of Jerusalem. Even in later years, with more advanced living conditions, such areas were unattractive; how much worse it must have been in the sixteenth century when sanitary arrangements in a Middle Eastern town like Jerusalem – which had a very limited supply of water – left much to be desired.²³ In Arabic as well as in other languages, the term “butcher” had a negative connotation evoked by constant occupation with blood and slaughtering. Even metaphorically speaking, the term had pejorative connotations, always associated with blood and killing. In eighteenth-century Egypt, when a certain Aḥmad who would later become the most prominent governor in Palestine became notorious for his cruelty he was branded with the term *al-jazzār* which was the Egyptian colloquial equivalent of butcher.

On balance the very fact that during the sixteenth century several butchers reached the high post of *muḥtasib* had to do not only with the very nature of their profession but with their personal qualities; it also had, however, a cumulative effect on their social and economic status. After all, the *muḥtasib* was one of the highest functionaries in town (along with the *sancakbeyi*, the *kadi*, the commander of the citadel-*dizdar* and the *subaşı*). In the city’s daily routine the *muḥtasib* was of no lesser consequence than the *subaşı* or the *dizdar*, since his line of activity – finances, commerce etc. – concerned the residents more often and to a greater extent. The more often they saw this position occupied by the head of the butchers’ guild, the higher their esteem for the latter became. The intensive involvement of the *muḥtasib* in the local economy must have brought him not insignificant wealth even when he acted strictly within the confines of his official authority; this in turn also had a positive bearing on the image of the guild in the public eye. Both wealth and image were further enhanced when some of the butchers were entrusted anew with the *ḥisba*. One of these was Tāj al-Dīn al-Sukkarī who, when relieved of the office of *muḥtasib*, as mentioned before, was put in charge of *bayt al-māl* which indicates again his continuing social relevance, his administrative calibre and of course his economic resourcefulness.

The colourful career of Tāj al-Dīn al-Sukkarī offers some useful insights as to the economic and social importance of the butcher/*muḥtasib*. In mid-1535 in Jerusalem he sold a black slave he had owned; this indicates a degree of affluence as well as a certain social standing. In September, 1530, he married the daughter of a silversmith and undertook to pay bride-money at the unusually high rate of 17,500 *qıř’a ḥalabiyya*. Apart from this revealing

sum, there is another dimension to the match: he married into a family with high socio-economic prestige. Not only did the father-in-law deal in precious metals (which involved more than average sums of money), but he was also a *sayyid*, i.e. a descendant of the family of the Prophet Muhammad. These were the most venerated families in local society, and the silversmith must have agreed to marry his daughter to a butcher only after due consideration. In mid-June, 1536, he took another wife, the daughter of 'Izz al-Dīn al-Dīrī, the Ḥanafī kadi of Jerusalem, and the same record refers to his "other wives." If we bear in mind that by then he had divorced the silversmith's daughter, we may conclude that he had at least three, and probably even four wives (since the specific term for "wife" used in our Arabic text means a minimum of three). From this text we may also conclude that his solid economic position was not his least important asset. From a social standpoint he has upgraded himself even further: this time he has married the Ḥanafī kadi's daughter. Daughter of the highest religious dignitary in town, she belonged to Jerusalem's upper class. Even if the bride had hidden defects which we know nothing about, her father would surely not have given her hand in marriage had the social gap been too wide. Still, both parties were fully aware of a substantial social difference. Towards the end of August, 1536, al-Sukkārī did not just swear to divorce her "if he spent one of her nights with [any of] his [other] wives." He also had to undertake to pay her *nafaqa* money at the rate of 6 silver *'uthmānī* coins "throughout her entire period of marriage [with him]." This "adequate support money" guaranteed by a husband is quite usual in Muslim society, and on the face of it should not convey anything extraordinary (except for its relatively high rate). One very exceptional element however was involved, for which we have not found any parallel in all *sijill* volumes we consulted: *nafaqa* is usually granted in the case of divorce, when the husband undertakes to give his estranged wife financial support. Only in our case she was promised *nafaqa* money on a regular basis without any reference to an impending divorce. Tāj al-Dīn acted thus to please his wife by endowing her with a generous and steady income. This, coupled with the earlier reference, indicates a good and solid economic situation, as well as an impressive degree of self-confidence. Such behavior was also appropriate for a person who regarded himself lucky to have married the *mawlā*'s daughter and felt obliged to please his father-in-law to whom he always deferred most humbly.²⁴

2. The butchers' guild

The butchers' guild was a cooperative organization of all those formally and officially authorized to slaughter and sell meat in Jerusalem. They were called *qaṣṣāb* (less frequently also *laḥḥām*, and on one exceptional occasion the Egyptian term *jazzār* was used). To qualify as a butcher and to be

accepted into the guild one was not only supposed to have a degree of professional skill and a desire to become a member; formal authorization had to be granted as well.

As was the case with other guilds both in Jerusalem and elsewhere, the butchers were not all of equal status. A list compiled at the end of October, 1574, drew a clear distinction between the lower rank of ordinary butchers (*al-qaṣṣābīn*) and those who rose to be "master butchers" (*al-muʿallimīn al-laḥḥāmīn*). The difference between the two categories is obvious not only from the terminology, but also because the latter were regarded as the highest echelon of the guild and they were the ones who were asked to sponsor and formally underwrite the ordinary butchers *vis-à-vis* the *subaṣī* and the court.²⁵ In practice, there seems to have been no difference between the two categories; both engaged in slaughtering and in selling meat. There was, however, a lower category known as "vendors" (*bayyāʿīn*) who, as the name implies, dealt exclusively in selling. At the beginning of the sixteenth century, when the overall number of butchers was relatively small, the pattern of relations between butchers and "vendors" was strictly maintained: each butcher had two or three "vendors" who were supposed to sell only his meat. The arrangements were worked out by the guild members themselves and confirmed by the kadi. This professional division of labor and services though less precisely maintained, persisted in later years: some of the butchers, very likely the more active ones, still had their own "vendors."²⁶ Their number however, was decreasing while the number of butchers was increasing. This as well as other evidence indicates that each "vendor" distributed meat that belonged to more than one butcher.

There are two more categories in the butchers' guild: the *sallākh* and the *dhabbāḥ*. The former was probably an apprentice or slaughterer who had not yet attained the full title of *qaṣṣāb*. Literally *sallākh* meant "he who pulls off the skin of a [slaughtered] animal," or "he who works in the slaughterhouse" (*maslakh*). But in actuality this title had a far wider meaning. Regarded as an intermediate professional, the *sallākh* was positioned somewhere between the *dhabbāḥ* and the *qaṣṣāb*. He was in charge of the slaughtering (although he did not perform the act itself) and handled the animal afterwards (skinning, carving the different parts, dressing etc.). Unlike the butcher, he could not buy or import sheep, and he was not supposed to slaughter on his own account but always for a fully qualified butcher.²⁷ The lowest rank in the guild was that of the slaughterer (*dhabbāḥ*) who was nothing more than the butcher's technical assistant.²⁸

All the above titles were conferred by the head of the guild, but the two highest ones had to be confirmed by the kadi as well. This was done in one of two ways: either by issuing lists of names of all guild members authorized to use the relevant title after the kadi had received personal and financial guarantees of their future conduct or a personal appointment was made and immediately publicized (the formula used was "*istaqarra fī'l-qīṣāba*" or

"*fi'l-lahāma*" or "*fi ħirfat al-lahāma*"). The moment a man was officially declared a butcher he became a full-fledged member of the guild ("he became one person like every person among them in terms of [paying] fines [buying the] number [of animals] and slaughtering [them]"). Sometimes a new member would be entitled to only "half a share" ("he became half a person," *niṣf riḡāl*), which meant that he did not enjoy all the rights of full members, and would be held responsible for only part of the obligations attendant on their status.²⁹

The right to enjoy the formal status of butcher entailed certain obligations, the most burdensome having been the regular payment of a pre-determined amount of money. Tāj al-Dīn al-Sukkarī, for example, had to remit a daily payment to the local authorities for the right to slaughter and sell meat, in addition to another daily payment for the *ḥisba*. Half a year before, in April, 1532, the guild undertook to pay 1200 *‘uthmānī* silver coins to the *sancakbeyi* in return for the right to buy sheep and slaughter them in Jerusalem, "as usual."³⁰ Another obligation was to sell only meat of reasonably good quality and correct weight at the official price set by the kadi. The meat was supposed to be sold at the butcher's shop, each kind or grade separately. Special care had to be taken to avoid mixing the meat of sheep and goats, since the one could easily be mistaken for the other, while their respective prices differed substantially. The butcher would usually slaughter his own sheep, but he was forbidden to do so at home or in any other unauthorized location. The only place they could, and indeed should have used for this purpose was the city slaughterhouse, and the meat of anyone who broke this rule was confiscated (*girift*).³¹ This last obligation, very much like the other ones, was not an arbitrary stipulation, but had intrinsic logic: on the one hand it introduced an element of quality control, ruling out the possibility of passing off bad meat as if it had been privately slaughtered. On the other hand, by supervising the quantities slaughtered every week the local authorities could regulate meat prices. The butchers not only had to abide by the rules governing the actual slaughtering: after it each of them was supposed to collect all unsalable parts of the animal (*asqāt*) and dispose of them outside the town walls. The meat to be marketed was divided among them either according to quotas pre-set by the guild, or in accordance with guidelines laid down by the kadi (see below).

Another obligation they all took upon themselves was never to leave town unless specifically authorized to do so by the governor. Failure to comply with this obligation automatically meant that the wife of the party concerned would divorce him. Moreover, since supplying meat was predominantly a collective duty to be performed by the guild as a whole, in the interest of the public at large, the colleagues of the missing butcher were expected to step in and provide his quota.³² In this context the final question is: how meaningful were all these obligations in actual daily life? Many instances described in the *sijill* show clearly that the *sancakbeyi*, the kadi and the *muḥtasib*

closely observed these regulations, and any malpractice they detected was immediately and severely punished. They were most particular about the control of weights. The *muhtasib* made frequent routine calls on butchers, checking all their weights and taking samples of the quantities they sold to their customers. If he discovered discrepancies, meaning, of course, unlawful profiteering, the offender was brought to court, tried, and penalized. Tampering with weights and demanding exorbitant prices of course occurred with other commodities as well as meat (for example: bread), and were prosecuted and punished in these cases too. Another offence, however, was occasionally tracked down during the regular inspection tours of the butchers: the sale of "inedible meat," also described as "producing a bad smell," whereupon the guilty party was summoned to appear before the kadi who in turn would mete out severe punishment.³³

The guild was headed by "the head of the butchers" (*ra'is al-qasṣābīn*, whose position was referred to as *riyāsa*). As in other guilds, the "head" was in charge of all internal relations among members, attended to the performance of their professional duties, and was expected to prevent non-members from slaughtering or selling meat without explicit permission. He was also personally involved both in fixing the meat prices and their formal announcement by the kadi sitting in court. He had an additional duty, however, over and above that of heads of other guilds (e.g. silversmiths): he was not only in permanent control of the professional standards of the members of the guild and the services they provided to the public; supplying the town with meat was also within his sphere of responsibility. This might appear self-evident because, after all, to whom else could the local population turn in search of meat? But the butchers' role in supplying meat was not an exclusively technical or passive one. Whenever a shortage threatened, the governor and other administrative functionaries would turn to the head of the guild, put the burden of blame on him and insist that he should have taken the necessary precautions to prevent the scarcity.

It was the kadi who formally (and probably also ceremoniously) nominated the butcher, and then specified his duties: he should make it his business "to be responsible for [lit.: 'reason for'] the import [*jalab*] of meat to Jerusalem [both] in the summer and in the winter," to sell it at the price stipulated by the kadi "and to prevent all other butchers [from changing the price], and to provide the inhabitants of the city and those [pilgrims] coming to visit it with as much meat as they need, both in summertime and in the winter, and to designate on his own responsibility whoever he may choose as a butcher." The candidate then had to formally express his full and unmitigated consent to all the duties imposed upon him, but the only one to which he specifically had to refer concerned providing the city with meat.³⁴ The stressing of summer and winter should not be viewed simply as a stylistic form. It stemmed from the reality of life in Jerusalem: it was much simpler (and cheaper) to supply sheep during the summer, whereas weather con-

ditions created numerous difficulties and obstructions to this traffic during the winter. Some butchers took advantage of the varying circumstances and interpreted their duty as binding upon them only during the hot season ("they practice slaughtering in summertime and neglect slaughtering in wintertime").³⁵ This, however, was not the rule and they were all warned to refrain from such behavior. To sum up, the head of the guild had three major roles, in descending order of importance: First, to see to it that the city despite all obstacles receives a regular supply of meat all year round. Second, to guide and supervise his colleagues so that they carry out the kadi's instructions and do not over-charge their customers. Third, to appoint new members to the guild and promote those who qualify for higher rank (e.g. *mu'allim*, "master"). The latter function was executed at a public ceremony (prevalent in other places and other guilds as well) called *shadd al-thawba*, i.e. "the binding of the garment." The name derived from the ceremonial climax of the ritual when the head of the guild would tie a girdle which had several knots on it around the candidate's waist. The candidate would undo some of the knots and then tie them again.³⁶

Providing animals for local consumption in the major urban centers was usually the concern of private *entrepreneurs* called *jallābiyya* in Arabic or *celep keşan* in Turkish. For many years this pattern was valid in most parts of the empire, and although "fonctionnaires de l'administration ottomane" were also involved, theirs was not a permanent, ongoing link. Various individuals associated with local and inter-regional trade were bound by the state to supply a given number of sheep to the army camps in times of war and to the urban population in peaceful days.³⁷ Along with members of other guilds, butchers too were occasionally appointed as *jelep keşan*, but on purely individual grounds. The butchers' guild, however, was a corporate body formally integrated with the administrative set-up, and as such it became involved in the entire process collectively – and in a functional manner. It was through this channel that the supply of meat became much more closely linked with, and actually a part of the state establishment.

H. Inalcık's definition of "the guild structure [that] was an attempt to satisfy the law of supply and demand in the face of certain difficulties" is borne out by the detailed information with which the *sijill* provides us. Its application to our case, however, calls for a certain modification. The statement that: "Guild representatives bought raw materials in the market at a fixed wholesale price and distributed them to the masters"³⁸ was only partially true in our context. The butchers themselves were supposed to seek and find sources of supply outside the city markets, either in the neighboring rural areas or further away. Held responsible by the authorities for the regular provision of meat, the head of the guild could not shift the onus of responsibility to the private *entrepreneurs* mentioned above, or to anyone else. When meat supply became meager in Jerusalem, there was an immediate reaction not only on the part of the general public, but among

high officials and military personnel. The meat market's best and most regular customers, they brought pressure to bear on the local authorities and levelled formal accusations of neglect against the butchers and the head of their guild. The latter did not object to the allegation or attempt to deny responsibility. They merely claimed financial reasons, i.e.: the lack of sufficient liquid funds.³⁹ As for the townspeople, they too considered that the major reason for the insufficient number of animals brought into Jerusalem for slaughtering was the "lack of a head" to the butchers' guild.

The following episode may serve as an illustration of the role of the head of the guild in the city's economic life, and the way others viewed it. On June 14, 1546, the governor of Jerusalem, Sinān Pasha, received a delegation of prominent people: several high-ranking "feudal" officers (*sipāhi*) of the district, headed by their commander, the *alaybeyi*; the head of the infantry units stationed in the citadel, the *çeri başı*; some rich merchants and several religious functionaries. They came to complain about the dire scarcity of meat in Jerusalem which, they claimed, had hit everyone in town – big and small, rich and poor, permanent inhabitants and visiting pilgrims. The delegation thought the main cause of the trouble was that the guild functioned poorly due to lack of a leading personality at its summit. After listening to their arguments the *sancakbeyi* decided to act: he turned to one of the dignitaries of town, a certain *khawāja* (a title of a rich person, usually a merchant) Ḥasan ibn Muḥammad ibn Zurayq, alias Ḥasūna, and appointed him head of the guild. In order to make the job more attractive to this newly invested *shaykh*, the governor ordered some of the old, experienced butchers to collect various tolls he was entitled to in his new capacity and pass them on to him. Moreover, the governor himself undertook – and this was a most unusual step on his part – to see to it that Ḥasan actually received these and any other remittances due him from the guild. As for Ḥasan, there and then he announced that the appointment was made with his full agreement and free participation. Moreover, after the audience with the governor he immediately proceeded to the court and received the confirmation of the kadi. Eleven signatures of various prominent personalities are affixed to this detailed description (which is exceptional both in the number of signatories and in terms of their social and economic caliber). Then there is a rider, dated January 12, 1554: an illustrious decree issued by the sultan and addressed to the kadi of Jerusalem declaring the above decision null and void. Thereupon the kadi summoned Ḥasan to appear before him, and notified him that his appointment was cancelled.⁴⁰

The cancellation took place some eight years after the actual appointment, but hindsight reveals a few facts that at a much earlier date might have caused some doubt as to the appointment's validity. About two months after the above session the same Ḥanafī kadi was still dealing with the issue, insisting that members of Ḥasūna's family, as well as others, formally promise the governor to personally monitor his activities as head of the guild, and see to

it that he does not leave town. To make the guarantees even firmer, these people had to produce names of additional reliable members of the community who in turn underwrote the above obligation. To top it all, Ḥasūna himself took an oath in court to that effect, confirming that if he broke the condition of permanent presence in Jerusalem his wife would immediately and automatically be declared divorced.⁴¹ Two weeks later, new developments took place. Ḥasūna sold a flock of more than 200 sheep (rather a large one in local terms) to a *sipahi* living in Jerusalem who in turn re-sold it to Tāj al-Dīn al-Sukkarī. On the very same day the *sancakbeyi* consented to relieve Ḥasūna of office and he replaced him with an experienced head of the butchers' guild, the same Tāj al-Dīn.⁴² More than mere coincidence seems to have occurred here; the events were apparently interrelated. An interesting finding that emerges is that the head of the guild must have had ample funds at his disposal, to enable him to accumulate enough animals with which to regulate the supply of meat and maintain the fixed prices. Upon being replaced, Ḥasūna was to hand over not only the title and responsibilities, but also the means necessary for proper performance of the duties entailed.⁴³

In any event, further difficulties lay ahead. In the summer of 1553, on the eve of the month of Ramaḍān, a group of local people complained about the irregular and inadequate supply of meat and requested that a head be nominated to the guild of butchers in order to redress the situation. The kadi (by now both the old kadi and the governor had been replaced) looked into the matter carefully and his inquiry shed what at that point seemed to be new light on the episode of mid-1546. The same Ḥasan ibn Zurayq testified that "he is not a butcher and never before had acquired any knowledge about this trade" because he had always been a rich merchant (*min al-dawlatliyya*).⁴⁴ This notwithstanding, Sinān Pasha had forced him to undertake this position by resorting to various threats, and so did several *sancakbeyis* who were in Jerusalem in later years. Ḥasūna finally referred his case to the Sublime Porte and obtained a *firman* instructing that he be immediately relieved of this office. What reasonable explanation can there possibly be for this turn-about? His affluence may have been instrumental in convincing official Ottoman circles to have the *firman* issued, but it must have been that very affluence that brought about the earlier decision to try and force him to undertake the job. The kadi, however, did not take his testimony at face value and tried to confirm it by collecting corroborative evidence from different sources, among them "the eldest of the merchants" (*shaykh al-tujjār*) as well as Shaykh Aḥmad al-Dajjānī, a Sufi leader and a most venerable dignitary in Jerusalem.⁴⁵ They not only confirmed his version, but described it in more colourful and impressive terms. Sinān Pasha, the governor of Jerusalem in mid-1546, beat Ḥasūna with his own hands, then threatened to kill him if he did not agree to become head of the butchers, leaving him no option but to acquiesce and declare publicly that he did so of his own free choice although actually he acted out of "fear for his life as well

as for his belongings." Further reports transmitted by the kadi to Istanbul also spoke of Ḥasūna as having been incarcerated in the local prison for several days, which indicates not only to what lengths the governor was willing to go, but also that his subject was not always obedient. Be that as it may, the rest of the story is clear: Ḥasūna became head of the guild, and only at a later stage was the appointment invalidated. He must have been exposed to similar experiences in years following, and in order to ward off pressures brought to bear upon him in mid-January, 1554 the kadi of Jerusalem ruled that "nobody should be forced to become a butcher against his own judgment." Moreover, the aforementioned *khawāja* Ḥasan should not fill this position any more, and will "not be required as of now to perform butchery."⁴⁶

The entire episode sheds light on various aspects of public life in Jerusalem in the sixteenth century: involvement of members of Jerusalem's military establishment (including those stationed in the citadel) who were following non-military urban pursuits; the imprecise and liberal recurrence of terms like "out of his own free choice" in the *sijill* proceedings; the interrelations between the local community in the province and the central government of Istanbul, as well as the kadi's important role in the chain of command and flow of information between those two remote poles. Our interest in this chapter focusses on the part played by the head of the butchers' guild within the wider context of the supply of meat to Jerusalem. From these descriptions the head of the guild emerges as having charge of the system in a threefold capacity: he represents the other members of the guild professionally, speaks for the provincial authorities administratively, and oversees a most vital consumer interest of the local population. Therefore, although the guild could have functioned without a formal head for a given period of time, it was of paramount importance to fill the opening for the sake of both governor and subjects. How, then, can one account for the appointment of a person who later proved to be unqualified for the job?

Two reasons can be suggested. First, since he was an affluent merchant he could be very useful in providing the town with meat regularly all year round, and particularly on the eve of the holy month of Ramaḍān, when he was first nominated. This sounds plausible and may have more than a hypothetical element of truth in it. Recently Suraiya Faroqhi has convincingly shown how "provincial wealthy men" were forcibly appointed to the position of butcher in Istanbul, were sent there as "virtual prisoners," and the performance of their new role "was employed as a semi-acknowledged punishment for usury."⁴⁷ We have no evidence at all to indicate similar intentions or comparable circumstances in our case; after all this was a local inhabitant, not one who had been exiled, nor had his reputation been tarnished before. But the similarity with the "butcher as a scapegoat" syndrome, to use Faroqhi's terminology, is striking in the most important element common to both cases: the wealth at the disposal of the prospective

candidate. Some of the instances taken from the Istanbul side of the equation show a remarkably high level of affluence, far surpassing that of Ḥasūna. Still, he was a well-to-do merchant, to say the least. Since he did not move elsewhere in his new capacity, but remained in the town of Jerusalem, one cannot possibly speak of a transfer of wealth as was the case in Istanbul. But by forcing him to become a butcher, and head-butcher for that matter, the local authorities may have intended to tie up a large part of his fortune in the town (instead of having the money used to export goods), thus forcibly ensuring a dependable source of funds to provide Jerusalem with meat. Second, although Ḥasan had apparently never been a butcher before, other members of his family had been. The sons of Aḥmad Zurayq were famous butchers in Jerusalem as of the early years of Ottoman rule (probably also in Mamluk times). When the governor selected Ḥasan for this position his decision was not altogether arbitrary: mistaken identification due to the similarity of name may have accounted for the initial nomination. But reaffirmation of the appointment in the following years indicates either the erroneous appraisal of the entire family as monolithic in nature (see below) or else a belief that his brothers and cousins, who professed the same occupation, would be the best guarantee of adequate performance of his duties, even if he lacked the necessary qualifications.

Another conclusion to be drawn from this incident is that the *sancakbeyi* was not only involved in the appointment of the head of the guild, but showed constant interest in and concern for the way he fulfilled his responsibilities. Several butchers had to pledge before the governor or his representative that they would oversee his permanent sojourn in town. Whenever any complaints concerning his behavior or his functioning came to light, the head of the guild was asked to explain, justify, revise and occasionally redress. In November, 1545, for example, meat supply was so low that Tāj al-Dīn al-Sukkarī was sent for and instructed to report the reasons. He explained to the governor's representative that in his capacity as head of the butchers' guild he has authorized all inhabitants of Jerusalem to slaughter in the slaughterhouse, presumably by way of trying to cope with the growing demand on the eve of the month of Ramaḍān. His version notwithstanding, he was severely punished, then ordered to see to it that a sufficient quantity of sheep be brought into the city.⁴⁸

At this point it is in place to turn away from the head of the guild and address ourselves to the butchers themselves. The formal, and rather obvious questions of who could be a butcher is easily answered along the lines drawn before, i.e.: he who was officially appointed butcher by the head of the guild. Let us try however, to establish some rather more substantive dimensions: how many butchers were there, and what were their family affiliations? At the outset we should point out that there were some people in Jerusalem who slaughtered and sold meat although they bore none of the formal titles associated with the butchering. In local parlance they were also

referred to as “butchers,” but they dealt in meat outside the well-defined area of the walled town. The reason for that seems clear: The constant demand for meat kept its price reasonably high, leaving the butchers a substantial marginal profit. Those who functioned officially were liable to various charges and tolls levied by the local governor. The others might have lowered prices to attract potential customers, but even without this, they could enjoy higher profits as they paid virtually none of the fixed duties. Naturally therefore, when it was suggested that they become official members of the guild they paid no attention. On June 12, 1547 the head of the guild complained that several people “practice butchery without his permission. He requested to summon them to court and offered that they adhere to the guild of the butchers. If they consent to do it they will be registered as such [in the law-court proceedings] and if they do not they will be prevented from practicing butchery.”⁴⁹ It was reported that two such unauthorized butchers (al-ḥajj Aḥmad al-Jazzār and ‘Abd al-Qādir ibn Salāḥ) were brought to court, but they turned down the offer of membership in the guild and consequently were formally advised that they should refrain from slaughtering or selling meat. Four days later another person (‘Abd al-Razzāq ibn ‘Ubayd) was brought by the head of the guild who accused him of illicit slaughtering of animals outside the slaughterhouse. He admitted his guilt, was indicted and punished.⁵⁰

Although the regulations explicitly prohibited only slaughtering, in practice sales were also banned, as the climate of Jerusalem and sanitary conditions in the town at that time made it impossible to store meat for more than a few days. Moreover, one who was not an authorized butcher could not participate in the earlier stage of the process, i.e. the purchase and import of animals. In other words: although the licensing of butchers was primarily pegged to the act of slaughtering, this was used as a convenient point of leverage and control; the technicalities of the bloody business, after all, could be perfectly mastered without any official acknowledgement. The real reason for the licensing was to secure both quality and price of meat. The price could have been affected by demand as well as by supply: the volume and frequency of meat purchases were equally important in this respect, as were the slaughtering of animals and the unauthorized sale of their meat. This was the logic of the kadi’s exhortation when he publicly announced the names of the newly appointed butchers (the term used was: *istaqarra fī’l qiṣāba*, i.e. “sought and found a permanent place as a butcher”): “he warned all others besides the above-mentioned butchers [. . .] to refrain from slaughtering and avoid any involvement in the purchase of sheep.”⁵¹ In one case at least this prohibition was further elaborated to include even importing sheep to Jerusalem. Anyone found guilty of breaking any of these rules was liable to most severe punishment – *siyāsa* – as severe as that inflicted upon butchers found responsible for a meat shortage in Jerusalem.⁵²

Neither the number of authorized butchers nor their identity were constant. Since permission to deal with meat was granted by the head of the guild, obviously different heads acknowledged different people and they did not regard themselves as automatically bound by decisions of their predecessors. Then too, there must have been butchers who decided at one point or another to cease functioning as such, while at the same time additions were made to the list. These new names were sometimes newly admitted butchers who after long apprenticeship had reached a sufficiently high professional level or, as pointed out before, people who were induced to cross the line and become respectable members of the guild after having functioned illegally for some time. The *sijill* registers provide us with many instances of the brisk turnover of guild members, some being officially validated as butchers, others after a given period of membership declaring that they voluntarily relinquished their trade as well as their title. The importance of the entire subject for Jerusalem's economic life and activity led to the regular issuance of lists of qualified and fully authorized butchers. Important as these lists may have been to the general public, they should be regarded only as depicting the situation on a given date; since the mechanism for updating left a great deal to be desired, they fairly soon became somewhat obsolete. The lists were not announced at a particular time of the year, and can be found on different months, usually once or twice a year. The greater relative importance of meat during the month of fasting during the day was the reason for the announcement of many lists during, or just before Ramaḍān; and fewer lists were publicized in later months (usually at the end of the Hijri year or the beginning of the following one). Lists are not available for every year, but in many cases we checked there was a high degree of coincidence between them and the names of butchers that appear in the *sijill* archives. The following conclusions, therefore, were primarily drawn from these lists, with the addition of some corrective information gleaned from scattered references in the *sijill* proceedings.

Before going into further detail, an observation is in place concerning the guild's nature, public- and self-image. Neither the "established" butchers nor those who practiced their profession informally looked upon their occupation in the negative light reflected by their colleagues in Istanbul. Termed "scapegoats" by Faroqhi in her recent work, those people were appointed butchers as a form of punishment and hardly profited from the trade: "A butcher's shop in Istanbul was so unlikely to make a profit," and "the uncertainties of their trade often placed them in a financially precarious position." Naturally they tried to shirk their responsibility and the central authorities had to resort to a variety of stratagems to keep them functioning.⁵³ This was not the case in Jerusalem: Butchering was quite a lucrative occupation there, even when the provincial government put difficulties in the way of those engaging in it. Entire families maintained an interest and involvement in it for generations; individuals requested the right to become guild members

and were willing to pay regular sums of money for the privilege. All of this leads to one conclusion: unlike Istanbul, where butchers apparently incurred heavy financial losses, Jerusalem's butchers made handsome profits and had no reason to regret their occupation or neglect their responsibilities – in short they were alert and active in performance of their duty, thereby serving their own, as well as the public's interests.

During the first years of Ottoman rule in Palestine the number of butchers in Jerusalem was five to six (for a total population of about 9000). In the thirties and forties, although new names appear, the overall figure remained the same. As of the middle of the century a steady increase is apparent, the average number of butchers being ten per year (for a total population of about 15,000). Later years indicate further growth: a list of 16 butchers was made public in 972/1564–5, and an even longer one, 19 butchers in all (one of them Jewish, another Christian) was recorded some seven years before (965/1557–8). As the sixteenth century unfolded the occupation was increasingly attractive. This could be attributed in part to the improved performance of the guild and in part to the tighter control of unauthorized slaughtering introduced by the kadi and the *muhtasib*. But the major reason for the increase in the number of butchers in Jerusalem was the growing demand for their services, i.e. the town's meat consumption rose. This was the result of two trends that emerged locally: a demographic upsurge and an improved economy; they were interrelated and most conspicuous in the late fifties and early sixties of the sixteenth century. Later years witnessed the opposite situation, with an economic standstill followed by a decline, and a persistent tendency toward a decrease in population that persisted until the end of the century. The high mark previously reached in the number of members of the butchers' guild did not repeat itself, but even in its self-imposed reduced size the guild maintained an average of at least ten butchers a year (e.g. in 991/1583–4). In this respect too, they followed the demographic pattern of the town.⁵⁴

When we turn from statistical stereotypes to human beings, an element of continuity emerges. In the course of many years numerous names recur in either identical or very similar forms. Others disappear from the records for a few years, then re-emerge (e.g. °Awn ibn Khūsīhā in 1564–5, 1574–5, 1577–8 and again in 1583). In a third pattern, also very common, the thread of continuity can be followed among various members of the same family. Establishing family relations in the context of a traditional Muslim society (as well as among the Jewish and Christian subjects of the Sultan) is a very difficult task: family names were seldom used. There are some ways, however, of determining these relationships beyond doubt. In some cases a surname is used (al-Sukkarī, al-Duhayna, al-Qinyāt); in others, there is explicit reference to family connections ("his son", "his uncle", "his brother"). Even when none of these aids exist, links can be established by comparison and cross-references of the names in their traditional form (a

person, his father and his grandfather). Although there are several hundreds of names of butchers in Jerusalem during the sixteenth century, one is on very solid ground in speaking of about twenty families (some of which, unknown to us, may have been linked to one another) that had several members who concurrently or successively plied this trade. Among them, these twenty families cover most butchers we know of, and all of these who reached a high degree of expertise and professional acclaim. Most conspicuous among them were al-Sukkarī, al-Duhayna, ibn Mīrān, ibn Zurayq. In other words, membership in the butchers' guild and in the profession, was limited to a very small number of families who tended to keep their professional knowhow to themselves; they preferred to train their own progeny rather than share their knowledge with outsiders. In each family a certain member would reach a high degree of proficiency (and wealth) and be acknowledged by everyone else as the expert master-butcher of the family; but there were others, too, who served as his assistants or his business associates. Sometimes two or three members of the same family became independent butchers, which conveyed a distorted image of the guild as comprising mainly brothers and cousins (e.g. al-Duhayna in the early thirties or sons of Abu'l-Faṭḥ ibn Da'ūd in the early eighties).⁵⁵

Some of the families that dealt extensively and traditionally in meat, were nevertheless involved in other occupations. We have described above how a mistaken public image may have brought about the appointment of an al-Sukkarī as a head of the guild although he was actually a merchant and not a butcher. There are examples of members of other families (e.g. al-Duhayna) who engaged in trades unrelated to meat and its supply. To the modern reader this is not surprising, and seems almost self-evident, even when the reference is to a traditional and monolithic society. The modern student of late medieval Muslim reality, however, finds it difficult to grasp another aspect of that society's occupational structure. Accustomed as we are to our contemporary concept of professional specialization, the use of the noun "butcher" conveys to us an image of someone whose main, perhaps exclusive business is dealing with meat. But butchers in sixteenth-century Jerusalem, we should caution, did not regard this as their sole vocation. In 1553 two Jerusalemites sent a petition to the Sublime Porte complaining that the *muḥtasib* of their town had them registered as butchers, thus obliging them (like all other members of the guild) to personally see to it that Jerusalem be provided with sufficient meat. They did not object to the allegation that they occasionally engaged in this line of activity (*qaṣṣābliq*), but they were not primarily butchers; more often than not they earned a living by engaging in other occupations. Their argument was accepted by the Sublime Porte and they were thereupon exempted from all the duties other butchers had to fulfil.⁵⁶ There was nothing particularly bizarre about butchers engaging in other lines of business, nor was this deemed reprehensible by the central administration. This particular facet of the local occu-

pational stratification implies a less compartmentalized setting than we would have otherwise assumed from the clear and rigid structure conveyed by the guild system. After all, a person who was active in a variety of fields must have either belonged to more than one guild or, at the very least, have moved freely in several professional circles. This did not imply value judgment as to any of those professions, but rather a more relaxed and flexible approach to changing economic circumstances and to potential options. The central government, however, was not always as liberal with regard to attempts to shun the responsibilities and burdens implied by membership in the butchers' guild: some thirty years after the Jerusalemites successfully petitioned the Sublime Porte the kadi of Bursa was given the right to force back to their former jobs all those butchers who had turned to other trades.⁵⁷

The combination of trades engaged in simultaneously took several different forms. Some were by-products of the butcher's main line: trading in hides or buying other merchandise (for example: bitumen from the Dead Sea) from the Bedouin tribes who usually supplied them with sheep.⁵⁸ Other occupations were a far cry from the butchers' most natural concerns. In 1566 Aḥmad ibn al-ḥaj Muḥammad, of the al-Duhayna family was a religious functionary in charge of laying the straw mats and lighting the oil-lamps (*farrāsha wa-sha'āla*) in Al-Aqṣā mosque.⁵⁹ Another member of the family, al-ḥajj Muḥibb al-Dīn Aḥmad al-Sukkarī, the brother of the head of the butchers' guild, served as a *mu'adhdhin* in the Al-Aqṣā mosque in the years 1555–7.⁶⁰ Tāj al-Dīn al-Sukkarī himself, a butcher and head of the guild for many years, did not regard this as his one and only calling, and was very deeply involved in a variety of other activities. In 1542 he took a thirty-year lease on two dilapidated buildings in the pottery market (*al-fakhr*), close to Bāb al-ʿAmūd, and received a permit from the kadi to rebuild them. Three years later he bought nine *qinṭār* of soap and as collateral pledged his flour-mill with its four horses, as well as his share in the soap-factory in Bāb al-ʿAmūd that he owned together with Ḥasūna ibn Zurayq.⁶¹ In mid-1547 he was registered as one of the millers (*ṭaḥḥānīn*) of Jerusalem, as was Mūsā ibn al-Duhayna.⁶² In 1553 Tāj al-Dīn deposited a substantial quantity of soap for export to Cairo with his partner Ḥasūna, and about a year later he purchased a large quantity of Egyptian cloth of varied colours.⁶³ In November, 1555, he owed an impressive amount of money as part of a commercial deal in which he had acquired some 400 *raṭl* of soap.⁶⁴ In January, 1557, he was owed a sum of money for a consignment of soap he had sold to the brother of another butcher, and later that year he sold both meat and soap to the *mutawallī* of the Khasseki Sultan *waqf*.⁶⁵ From these, as well as from many other episodes, it becomes quite clear that Tāj al-Dīn al-Sukkarī, one of the most prominent butchers of his time, had both the means and the energy to engage in additional trades, maintain active business contacts with Egypt, and even produce soap for export. His business association with

Ḥasan ibn Zurayq, alias Ḥasūna, may have been yet another reason for the governor of Jerusalem to assume that Ḥasūna too was a butcher, and therefore qualified to be appointed head of the guild. Be that as it may, the combination of meat business, soap production and international commerce not only extends the meaning of his economic activity, but also adds an additional dimension to the social status of this individual who, let us not forget, was first and foremost known as a butcher.

To carry out all the transactions described above (and the many others reported in the *sijill*), Tāj al-Dīn needed substantial funds. The combined result of all these enterprises probably increased his resources. His involvement in importing cattle and sheep to Jerusalem in his capacity as head of the butchers' guild also implied certain financial assets, and the profits he made on these enriched him further. The same applies to his office as a *muḥtasib*, and to another salaried position he filled for several years: chief butcher of the free soup-kitchen (*imaret*) of the Khasseki Sultan endowment.⁶⁶ But the best indication of his solid economic status should be sought in another direction: the assets he accumulated over and above his liquid earnings. In early January, 1532, he acquired an Abyssinian (*ḥabashī*) slave for 2460 dirham. He had a long-term lease on the flour mill, owned the animals that worked there and was part owner of the soap-factory, all of which enhanced his economic reputation. In early January, 1531, he rented a house in the neighborhood of Bāb al-ʿAmūd. Some twenty years later, as a result of his diversified economic activities he accumulated further assets: instead of the old rented house he now lived in a spacious home of his own in the neighborhood of Awlād Quṭayba, near the Dayr al-Sultān monastery. In the early fifties he improved his residence by adding a number of what we would now call industrial projects: he applied for and was granted the kadi's permission to establish a flour-mill, an oven for baking bread and a press for extracting sesame oil (*sayraj*) in the basement of the building.⁶⁷

Tāj al-Dīn's social position rested primarily on his economic status. Not only was he appointed several times to head the guild of butchers and be the *muḥtasib* of Jerusalem. He was also nominated to a number of other positions in the local municipal administration. On August 2, 1534, he was appointed chief public-crier in charge of declaring all goods imported to the markets and actively involved in their sales to the local merchants (*dallāla*). The relative importance of this job can be inferred from the high income he anticipated when he undertook it: Tāj al-Dīn pledged a monthly payment of 3500 *ʿuthmānī* for the lease of it, about 35% higher than the *muḥtasib* paid to lease his position. About a month later he was put in charge of *bayt al-māl*, i.e.: the collection of all revenues accruing to the state treasury from the properties of missing and absent persons (*khārīj al-daftar wa-māl al-ghiyāb wa'l-maḥlūl*), a position he held for several years consecutively.⁶⁸ In the late thirties he leased the revenues of a number of villages in Palestine (e.g. Lydda where he was granted not only the right to collect the various *mīrī*

taxes, but also the *jizya* poll-tax paid by its Christian population).⁶⁹ In early January, 1554, official circles in Jerusalem were making preliminary arrangements for what seemed to be an imminent visit of the Sultan. Although no known source refers to it, there is no doubt that the Sultan who had spent the winter of that year in Aleppo, was considering paying a visit to the town where the previous year his beloved wife had founded an impressive endowment in her name.⁷⁰ In the course of the preparations Tāj al-Dīn pledged “to bring sheep to Jerusalem prior to the arrival of the illustrious Sultan [. . .] in ten days,” and to import wherever additional quantity would be needed to provide fully for the military units accompanying him.⁷¹ The visit came to naught, but the role assigned to Tāj al-Dīn indicates his reliability in the eyes of the government as well as his administrative importance in the province. A person so closely involved in the economy and administration of his town not only in his professional capacity as a butcher, but also as tax farmer, merchant, *entrepreneur* – surely enjoyed an important status in the eyes of his townspeople. No wonder, therefore, that the highly respected Ḥanafī kadi agreed to give him his daughter in marriage. When Tāj al-Dīn gave his own daughter in marriage in 1553 she received 70 gold coins as bride-money, a much higher sum than was usually given then in Jerusalem.⁷²

The story of Tāj al-Dīn al-Sukkārī’s economic rise and social and administrative advancement – can be fairly easily traced, thanks to the information available about him in the *sijill*. But even at the height of his career he was always regarded and referred to, as a butcher. In the sixties and very early seventies his son ‘Alā’ al-Dīn took over from him and proceeded along the same line. But although Tāj al-Dīn may have reached higher peaks than others, his case was by no means exceptional. Members of other families of butchers attained substantial affluence and prominence within the social setting of Jerusalem. The al-Duhayna family was deeply involved in the soap business, some of its members acquired substantial assets in Jerusalem (houses, orchards), and in a few instances even left behind considerable legacies for their kin.⁷³ When the kadi summoned prominent people to his court in June 1591, in the course of his investigation into the behavior of a certain Jerusalemite, he questioned not only the *shaykh al-ḥaram* of the Temple Mount and the head of the merchants (*shaykh al-tujjār*), but also *khawāja* Muḥammad ibn al-Duhayna. In 1598 another son of the al-Duhayna family was appointed head of the town’s merchants.⁷⁴ The Zurayq family acquired fame along with their wealth (the “Ḥasūna soap factory” became very well known both for its product and as an exporter to Egypt). On February 21, 1566, the governor of Damascus sent an order to Jerusalem based on an earlier *firman* issued in Istanbul. He instructed the kadi of Jerusalem to convene his court at the dome of the chain (*qubbat al-silsila*) on the Temple Mount. Moreover, a meeting called for such a central location meant broad exposure and indicated that the inquiry into

the kadi's behavior was important enough to merit high priority. The authorities in Istanbul had received from Muḥammad ibn Zurayq, alias Ḥasūna a detailed list of misdeeds allegedly perpetrated by the kadi.⁷⁵ This was no private vendetta, but rather a petition submitted on behalf of some of the Sultan's subjects against a high-ranking official. The very choice of ibn Zurayq to go to Istanbul to register the complaint and the initial order attained to have it properly and promptly investigated, indicate Ḥasūna's high social status.

Until now our discussion has focused on each family of butchers separately. It should be pointed out, however, that a careful perusal of the *sijill* discloses a dense network of close relationships among them. The marriages recorded most frequently in the *sijill* are between offspring of two families belonging to the butchers' guild, thereby increasing the group's cohesion and enhancing the economic and social importance of its more distinguished members. The daughter of the butcher Maḥmūd al-Miṣrī married a butcher, ʿAlī ibn Bzūz. The mother of the merchants ʿAbd al-Qādir and ʿAbd al-Raḥmān, sons of Muḥammad ibn Zurayq, was the daughter of *al-muʿallim* Muḥammad al-Duhayna, while another daughter of her family married another son of the Zurayqs (in the late eighties). In 1578 reference was made to the very substantial inheritance bequeathed by the mother of Ghirs al-Dīn ibn Ḥasan ibn Zurayq, whose maiden-name was al-Duhayna. A few decades before, in 1541 and again in 1546, the butcher ʿAlī ibn Ḥasan al-Duhayna is mentioned as the maternal uncle of Ḥasan ibn Zurayq. In other words: the links between the al-Duhayna and ibn Zurayq families already existed early in the century, and were further strengthened by intermarriage in later years.⁷⁶ There was, however, another pattern: that of butchers marrying outside their occupational group. We mentioned above the marriage of ibn al-Sukkari to the daughter of the Ḥanafī kadi. The wife of another butcher, Ibrāhīm ibn Abi al-Faṭḥ was the daughter of one of the most famous merchants (*aʿyān al-sāda al-tujjār*) in town (in 1583).⁷⁷ Another woman, whose name and whose father's name indicate Turkish extraction (Fāṭima Khātūn bint Qara Göz) was married to Yūnis the butcher. Ibrahim's marriage was essentially of social importance for him since it placed him in a higher social group than that of his own peers. Yūnis' marriage also had an economic dimension: on the eve of his wife's death she made an endowment of 50 gold coins, and after her death the inventory of her belongings included unusually expensive items (e.g. large rugs), indicating a high standard of living.⁷⁸

As a socio-economic group in Jerusalem the butchers kept their distinctive characteristics and closed guild structure, but they were far from being isolated or segregated from other categories. We have just shown again how even the most sacred bond, that of marriage, although most expedient and helpful in securing the impregnability of the family and its belongings, was far from being inaccessible to others, and was actually used to link them to

loftier and more promising circles. Where they lived and where they worked expressed the same duality. Whenever we can establish butchers' residences from the court proceedings – which can be most reliably confirmed by *tahrīr* data concerning the two most prominent families of the guild – it emerges that they usually preferred to live in close proximity to one another. They seem to have chosen two adjacent residential neighborhoods, al-Sharaf and al-Rīsha, located in the south-eastern part of the town, both of them bordering the al-Maslakh quarter, the permanent location of the slaughterhouse.⁷⁹ As for their shops, these were not concentrated in one area of Jerusalem, which had no “meat market.” Butchers' shops were probably located in the main market (*sūq al-sultān*) side by side with those providing other essential foodstuffs (e.g. the butcher *al-mu'allim* ʿAlī ibn Abī Jāmūs had his shop at the *suq al-ṭabbakhīn* in khatt Da'ūd, while another butcher's shop was situated in the new spice-dealers' market *sūq al-ʿaṭṭārīn*).⁸⁰ From this standpoint, there was no difference between Jerusalem and Ottoman Cairo.⁸¹

The butchers' trade, however, was not restricted to town limits, and had an additional dimension. References we have made above to the involvement of certain butchers in the soap trade imply that their economic activity extended beyond the bounds of Jerusalem. The export of soap to Egypt and import of Egyptian cloth to Palestine indicated an inter-province dimension. Another aspect of a more general nature was built into the guild structure: the import of sheep from Syria and from distant Anatolia. Since this was part of the butchers' obligation *vis-à-vis* the local consumers, the governor of Jerusalem permitted them to leave town for long periods of time in search of funds. Just as the export of soap to Egypt entailed the import from there of goods such as cloth, coffee, indigo etc., so the import of meat to Jerusalem was associated with export. Butchers who bought sheep and camels from the Bedouins, sold the nomads the commodities that the town could offer them: cloth, firearms, and various goods not necessarily manufactured in Jerusalem, but brought there from other districts and provinces. Sometimes these commercial contacts were maintained and expanded without the blessing of the local governor, occasionally even in disregard of his specific prohibition, and this resulted in severe punishment for all concerned. The import of meat, on the other hand, was usually carried out with the explicit approval and active support of the Ottoman authorities. The governors even went one step further, and seem to have encouraged the butchers to comply with a pattern of export as part of the two-way commercial traffic they engaged in. The official order authorized the butchers “to go to the different districts, be they the eastern provinces or any other areas in order to bring [*jalb*, Turkish: *celep*] sheep, [sheep]-fat (*samn*) and other [commodities] according to their customs, and in order to take [there] cloth, ambergris (ʿ*anbar*) and other items you used to take, except for arms and weapons.”⁸² This *firman* reveals a new aspect of the butchers' activities: they carried out a lively export business from Jerusalem to Syria and Anatolia. This flow of

merchandise, that balanced the import of meat, consisted mostly of goods that were not produced in Palestine but passed through it. Some of the cloth came to Jerusalem from Egypt; ambergris (used mostly as a perfume and spice for coffee) was also imported to Palestine, and the same applies to weapons brought by European vessels to the Syrian and Palestinian ports. Thus the role of the butchers in the import of sheep to Jerusalem (and probably to other parts of Palestine as well) assumes much more significance: although initially and primarily it was intended to provide the townspeople with meat, it should also be viewed as a crucial link in the inter-provincial and international trade of Palestine as a whole.

3. Regulation of meat prices

a. Categories and grades

Several kinds of meat were sold in Jerusalem: beef, water-buffalo, camel, sheep and goat, the last two being the most popular. Mutton (*al-laḥm al-dānī*, *al-kharūf*, or less frequently, *al-kharūf al-dānī*) was always 10–20% more expensive than goat meat (*al-māʿiz*). The difference in price was not set by the suppliers, but rather by the demand: Jerusalemites – like everyone else in Palestine and the Ottoman empire – preferred mutton as it was fatter, more tender and tastier. The difference in size and shape of the animals' joints as well as that of the fibres and tissues of the meat eliminated *a priori* any possibility of mistaking cattle for sheep. Between mutton and goat meat however, there was a possibility of error, or even worse: customers could be deliberately misled.⁸³ The difference in price that prevailed throughout the century between the two was sufficient incentive for some butchers to offer goat-meat as mutton, thereby increasing their profit substantially – though unlawfully. The *muḥtasib*, aware of potential breaches of the local code of commercial regulations, warned all butchers and, in the event of such a case coming to his attention, he would bring the wrong-doer to court for trial and punishment.

The difference in price of mutton and goat derived from their basically different qualities. But within each category there were several grades of meat, hence three different prices were set for each: the highest price bought prime quality fillet (*majrūm*, devoid of bones or other non-pure-meat substance); the second grade was called “fat,” or “good”; the lowest quality was termed *mughayyar*, i.e. “that was made different” in quality, or *mā dūnahu*, i.e. “less than it.” The fillet does not appear regularly in the price lists (see below) for either sheep or goat meat. There were years (e.g. 1551, 1552, 1562 and from 1564 to the end of the century, with only three exceptions) when it was not mentioned at all and no price was quoted for it, which leads to one conclusion: there was no demand for this expensive cut. The two grades, the medium and lower quality, were always offered to the public and

recorded on the price lists. As for all the other brands of meat, for which demand was generally lower, only the two lower grades are mentioned: the more expensive one was "fat", "good" or "with few bones" (*khafīf al-ʿazm*); the lower quality was referred to as "less than it" (*mā dūnahu*). The difference in price for the two grades of all five kinds of meat was usually 10–20%, with the exception of cows where the difference could be as great as 50%.

As of 1560 new terminology is introduced to differentiate the quality of sheep and goats: the "good" meat was referred to as *turkumānī*, whereas the inferior quality was termed *balqāwī* or *baladī*. Unlike the adjectives used before, which denoted certain qualities inherent in the meat itself, these new terms were derived from the region in which the flocks originated. The meaning of the first was "Turcomans", i.e. sheep that came from north-eastern Syria and Anatolia, in the Diyarbakir, Adana and related sheep-breeding areas; they drew their name from the Turcoman tribes that raised them and perhaps even brought them to Palestine.⁸⁴ Although they had to be driven a very long distance, the meat of these sheep and goats was regarded as of the highest quality. The second term is an adjective derived from the noun *al-balqā'*, which should not be translated literally, but should be construed as designating the region to the east of the Jordan river, usually the central area between *wādī al-Zarqā'* and *wādī al-Mujīb*.⁸⁵ This, too, was an area mostly populated by bedouins who sent their sheep to the Jerusalem markets. The third term, *baladī*, means "local," and as such (probably for additional, more substantive reasons) this meat was regarded as the lowest quality, hence it was in least demand. The difference of 10–20% was maintained among these three sub-categories.

Occasionally one finds another term on the price lists: *liyya*. This designates the fat, tail-like, lower part of the sheep's back which has no bones and therefore is equivalent to the *majrūm* fillet of sheep. Its price was often very similar to that of the fillet, but there were also deviations in both directions: sometimes the *liyya* was more expensive (in 1559 and in 1563 by 10%), and sometimes less (in 1547 and 1570 by 7% and just under 10%, respectively). The high price of this cut implies that only well-to-do customers could afford to buy it. During the last quarter of the century it is not registered at all, which indicates lack of interest by the general public as a result, no doubt, of deteriorating economic conditions.

Those who could not afford to buy the more expensive mutton or goat-meat had to be content with inferior camel- (*jamal*) and water-buffalo-meat (*jāmūsī*), or beef (*baqarī*), none of which were abundant in Palestine at the time. Somewhat exceptional was the camel, which could be obtained in relatively larger quantities in Jerusalem: one might have expected camel-meat to be abundant in Jerusalem which was on the edge of the desert where the Bedouin tribes raised camels. But the great demand for these animals for portage, as work-animals, and as a source for milk and wool limited slaughtering to those camels that could not satisfy these demands anymore.

In spite of its limited supply, the price of camel-meat remained 30–40% lower than mutton, which can only be explained by low demand. The water-buffalo which the nomad tribes bred in swamp-areas in northern Palestine, as well as in the shallow water of rivers that flow into the Mediterranean, was also available only in relatively small numbers (no resemblance to Egypt in this context) – but nevertheless demand was limited and its price was as low as that of camels. As for beef, this was always the lowest in price – even though virtually no cattle were raised in Palestine. On occasion its price matched that of the water-buffalo, but usually it was even less expensive, and was sold at half the price of mutton (second quality beef, with a lower fat content, was an additional 15% cheaper).

We have referred above to beef, camel-, and water-buffalo-meat as being inferior to that of sheep and goat, but it should be pointed out that this is a highly subjective assumption. There is nothing objectively or inherently “inferior” about beef, for example; in other societies it was highly regarded and much more expensive than mutton. The value of meat is not determined by impartial considerations or objective premises, but by the taste of potential customers. It is a well-established fact that mutton was very highly regarded in the Middle East before as well as after the region was incorporated into the Ottoman empire, although one should not carry this argument *ad absurdum*.⁸⁶ This preference – which remained quite constant throughout the sixteenth century – implies entirely different gastronomic concepts than those held in Europe. Pork, for example, traditionally regarded by Islam as impure, was never sold, let alone displayed, in butchers’ shops in Jerusalem. Wine too was forbidden to Muslims, but its sale to non-Muslims was tolerated by the authorities in Jerusalem,⁸⁷ whereas no attempt was made to please the Christians by enabling them to acquire pork for their own use. One may generalize with a large degree of certainty that no pigs were raised in Ottoman Palestine during the sixteenth century; hence it was impossible to buy pork in Jerusalem. The animal elicited strong feelings of repugnance, and when one Muslim wanted to insult another he branded him publicly as “pork eater” – an unforgivable insult, for which he was brought to court.⁸⁸ On the other hand beef, so popular in Europe, was looked down upon in the Ottoman empire, and even the prime cuts were regarded as less desirable than the poorest quality goat-meat. The large variety of meat available leads to the conclusion that it was not a luxury item, although only the affluent bought the more expensive cuts. Lower social groups purchased the less expensive cuts, thus satisfying their needs in consonance with the means at their disposal.⁸⁹

b. The mechanism of price-fixing

The Ḥanafī kadi of Jerusalem – like his colleagues in other urban centers of the Ottoman empire – regularly publicized lists of prices fixed by the

muhtasib for foodstuffs and other commodities. These prices (*narkh* was the technical term used, but very often the Arabic *tas'ir* – price-fixing – or *as'ar* – prices – was used) were set according to local supply and demand. Hence they both reflected and influenced the economic trends with respect to a specific commodity in a given geographical area. But price-fixing should not be considered only a routine activity on the part of local officials. Although both the kadi and the *muhtasib* were high-ranking functionaries, they had to coordinate their moves with the highest administrative and political authority.

True, Sarı Mehmed Pasha who in the eighteenth century wrote *The book of counsel for Vesirs and governors* based on his rich experience in the empire's financial affairs, mentions no formal, long-established apparatus, even during the heyday of the empire for coordinating the work of various authorities. He did, however, point out the importance of establishing such coordination: "let not the matter of establishing market prices be passed over with the mere entrusting of it to judges and inspectors of weights and measures"; this should be done with the active involvement of "the ruler [. . .] the city judge cannot carry it out" all by himself.⁹⁰ The author depicts the lack of such coordination as one of the many signs of decline, a situation that could be remedied by returning to the "classical" pattern the entire state apparatus had followed in the empire's golden days.

During the first half of the sixteenth century the regime was certainly still flourishing, yet no formal system of coordination existed in Jerusalem, and the fixing of prices was left to the kadi. Nevertheless, the *subaşı*, the personal representative of the governor, was extensively involved in many cases dealing with financial matters (including prices) and even in the purchase and import of sheep from the distant eastern provinces.⁹¹ He frequently made use of his law-enforcement powers to deal with recidivists (guilty of faulty weights, exorbitant prices) and sometimes in matters of great importance the governor himself intervened (e.g. the supply of meat to the town). These instances confirm the kadi's close links with the *muhtasib* on the one hand, and with the urban and provincial administrative authorities on the other. The governor did not assume as much responsibility as Sarı Mehmed would have wished, but he definitely did not leave everything to the exclusive discretion of the kadi.

All prices were read out at court in the presence of the *muhtasib*, *shaykh al-tujjār* (occasionally), merchants and the public at large. When special attention was given to meat prices, or when these were separately announced, the head of the guild and some of the butchers were also present. On occasion, the personal representative of the governor and high-ranking military personnel also attended these sessions. The prices were probably announced publicly at some other place as well. The usual phrase was "the news was circulated in town,"⁹² but despite the almost casual tone of the original statement in Arabic, this would seem to have been done deliber-

ately and in systematic fashion at the most suitable location, i.e. the marketplace. Thereafter the prices were registered in the court's records (*sijill*) not only as part of the routine procedure accorded any statement of importance, but as a document for future reference, to be consulted by members of the public and binding on the merchants until it was replaced by an updated list. A few dozen items, mostly foodstuffs, appeared on these lists and as they were important in daily life, the demand for them was widespread and stable. The prices, quoted in monetary terms per weight unit (usually *qıf'a ḫalabiyya* per *raṭl*), were made public several times a year.

The different kinds of meat were very often included in lengthy lists. But independently of these, which usually covered a whole page in the registers, there were also shorter ones, containing one or two lines only. These were items, the price of which needed more frequent rectification than others. Such for example was the case of wheat and barley, olive-oil, and also meat. Meat prices can be found on the general lists, but much more often they were quoted separately. The high frequency with which the price of meat as compared to other items is dealt with in the *sijill*, is a further reminder of its relative importance in Jerusalem. This, incidentally, is further attested to by Pakalın, in the course of his discussion of the Grand Vezir's involvement in the control of prices in Istanbul: when he wanted to clarify the actual price of a certain commodity, he would direct his inquiries to the kadi or the *muhtasib*. But when a problem arise with regard to the butchers (for example: when they had an insufficient quantity of meat in their shops) he would demand a detailed report from the commanding officer of the Janissaries who was more important politically and more potent administratively.⁹³

The public announcement of the price-list made it officially binding, and thereafter the kadi could lawfully apply the sanctions at his disposal against any transgressor. Although he was the functionary responsible in the eyes of the public, everything he did in this field – setting the price, controlling its enforcement, penalizing violators – was in close cooperation with the *muhtasib*. The latter was, in fact, the best informed person in the realm of prices and commerce, but nevertheless, he did not advise the kadi on these matters without first consulting prominent businessmen – and even some potential customers – in the market.

Neither the initiative for price-fixing nor its timing emanated from the capital, nor did Damascus coordinate prices for the entire province, although in other parts of the empire such centralized coordination did exist. The kadis of the major towns in the Balkan provinces and the provinces of Anatolia were regularly instructed from Istanbul as to the quantities of sheep to be slaughtered and prices to be charged in their respective localities. This was part of a comprehensive mechanism designed to ensure the constant supply of meat to Istanbul, hence the regulation of supply in neighboring or even less close areas would have had a direct and immediate

effect on it.⁹⁴ Syria and Palestine, including Jerusalem, were apparently considered so remote from Istanbul that their demand for meat was not important enough to make their inclusion in the price-fixing arrangements of the empire's "central core" meaningful. Thus unlike Salonica or Skopje, for example, meat prices in Jerusalem were not coordinated with or even influenced by any overall external considerations.

Although ordinarily prices were decided upon in Jerusalem for Jerusalem and by the Jerusalem authorities, occasionally they were determined by initiatives of the customers themselves. In early April 1570, for example, several Jerusalemites appeared at court and in the presence of the *muhtasib* complained to the kadi "on the subject of meat." The price fixed at an earlier date could no longer be enforced as circumstances had changed, so they requested the kadi to set a lower one. "Our master [*mawlānā*] [the Ḥanafī kadi] efendi instructed that the price [of meat] be fixed based upon the request of the [above] mentioned [inhabitants] as well as the *muhtasib* [...] that meat will not be sold at any price higher than that."⁹⁵ The request, emanating from the consumers themselves and buttressed by the professional expertise represented by the *muhtasib*, was indeed instrumental in updating the price of meat. Although this was not the only case of its kind, the procedure followed was not normal. Usually the kadi both took the initiative and set the prices, after consulting with the head of the guild, who upon being appointed was told that: "The price [of meat] will be fixed for him every year in the four seasons, each season and its [respective] price, according to the exalted Ottoman *kanun* regulations."⁹⁶ Six years later, when Tāj al-Dīn al-Sukkarī, was once again appointed head of the guild, we found a similar formulation: "the price of meat will be fixed for him three times every year, once every four months, according to the old [established] custom (*ʿāda*)."⁹⁷

These two versions appear almost identical, both in concept and style, but there is a significant difference between them: while the former points out that the price of meat would be fixed, as usual, four times a year, the latter says this would be done, also as usual, three times a year. What, then, was the "usual" procedure? How often were prices actually set? The answer might be sought in the time that elapsed between the two statements. On the face of it there seems to be a gradual development: the first citation is taken from the text of an appointment, dated 1546, when the kadi seems to have been abiding by the rule that prices were fixed every three months, whereas the second one, dated 1552, reflects a new rule requiring that this be done once every four months. Unfortunately, however, this approach indicating a gradual process cannot be satisfactorily applied here: about three months before the earlier appointment, in June 1546, the *sijill* describes in detail the appointment of another head of the guild. With respect to pricing, instructions are as follows: "the price of meat will be [fixed] three times every year, and he will register its price every four months in accordance with the old

[established] custom (*āda*) and based upon truth and justice.”⁹⁸ The scribe, as a matter of fact, originally wrote “four times,” then crossed it out and wrote “three” above, which rules out any doubt about his intention and the actual state of affairs. What clearly emerges from this text is that prices were listed three times a year – both before and after September, 1546. In other words, no zigzag line passed through these separate pieces of evidence: all three versions, written on three different dates, refer to the same “old custom” or *kanun* regulation based on that custom. The difficulty remains, however, since we still have two different versions. The discrepancy may well stem from the easy confusion of three and four: three times a year means every four months, and *vice versa*. The fact that a year divides naturally into four seasons does not make resolution of the problem any easier: were the meat prices in Jerusalem to be set three times a year or four?

Turning to the praxis of the court, we may be able to explain the discrepancy by use of an inductive yardstick: as noted above, meat prices were fixed as part of the regular, formal establishment and publication of price lists for food (and certain other commodities, notably small coins). In the *sijill* registers of sixteenth-century Jerusalem (contrary to Mantran’s findings for Istanbul) these lists are usually recorded three times a year.⁹⁹ There were, however, a few cases when they were registered four times a year (e.g. 969/1561–2, in the months of Šafar, Rabīʿ al-Awwal, Shaʿbān and Dhūʿl-Qaʿda), and others when the lists appeared only twice (e.g. 955/1548–9 in Rajab and Ramaḍān). Publication was not during any particular month or at regular intervals of time (sometimes they were made public every month or two, other times 4–5 months would elapse). Meat was a special case in point, since questions of its supply and demand were much more crucial than for all other commodities listed; the customers (townspeople and even more so, members of the military and administrative establishment) were much more vociferous as far as meat supply went. On the other hand its sensitivity to changes that occurred along the supply routes and in the weather (Palestinian weather making meat storage even for a short duration quite impossible during at least six months of the year) caused much more rapid fluctuation in prices.

In other words, whether it was three or even four times that the head of the butchers’ guild was supposed to have received new prices, the kadi actually issued them much more frequently. In the year 952/1545–6, for example, meat-prices were fixed four times: Rabīʿ al-Thānī, Jumādāl-Ākhira, Shaʿbān, Shawwāl. The following year, 953/1546–7, this was done in Muḥarram, Rabīʿ al-Thānī and Shaʿbān. The year after, 954/1547–8, it was carried out in Muḥarram, Šafar, Rabīʿ al-Thānī, Rajab, Dhūʿl-Hijja.

Thus in three consecutive years chosen at random the prices of meat were fixed during different months and at varying intervals. Moreover in Muḥarram 953 prices were changed five times, in Muḥarram 954 twice, four times in Šafar 954, and twice again in its last month. Thus in one year meat

prices were actually set seven times, in another year ten. It should be pointed out that a careful scrutiny of the text and of developments in Jerusalem during the relevant years discloses no special characteristics or events other than the routine attempt to balance supply and demand that might justify such fluctuations. One further comment with respect to the above-mentioned examples is almost self-evident: unless otherwise stated, each price remained valid until the next list was made public. On very rare occasions (most of them involving the intention of the authorities to avoid raising prices during Ramaḍān) the period of validity was determined in advance: at the end of 1538, for example, the price of meat was set "for the period of two months as of the beginning of Jumādāl-'Ūlā."¹⁰⁰

An attempt to draw more general conclusions from the many cases in the sixteenth century elicits the following pattern: there were seldom only one or two listings per year, but rather at least 3–4, and in most years meat prices were fixed much more frequently. In certain years new meat prices were proclaimed almost monthly (e.g. 965/1557–8), and as far as the months of the Hijri year are concerned it is hard to discern any regularity. Through the years meat prices were set during any and every month, although more often in Muḥarram, Šafar, Rabī' al-Thānī, Jumādāl-'Ākhira. Ša'bān and Shawwāl. During the month of Ramaḍān itself fewer prices were fixed than usual since, as we have noted, they were often set during preceding months. From the 1570s onwards (i.e. under the Sultans who followed Suleiman the Magnificent, d. 1566) the frequency is reduced to only once or twice a year, and in several of the last 15 years of the sixteenth century meat prices are not mentioned at all.

The paucity of information on this topic in the *sijill* volumes dating from the end of the sixteenth century, highlighted against the almost excessive flow of detail for the earlier decades, should be viewed in a wider context that well deserves elaboration. This would require a separate framework, but a few remarks are in place here. Some of the initial causes of the decline of the Ottoman empire were rooted in the days of Suleiman the Magnificent, but it was after his death that the process gathered momentum. In Palestine the last thirty years of the sixteenth century witnessed increasing indications of gradual stagnation in various spheres, inevitably leading to a decline. The rising demographic curve and the economic upsurge typical of the first two thirds of the century were reversed. The concern provincial and local governors had shown for the welfare of the population of Palestine was now undergoing a change for the worse, due to the steady downgrading of those officials (as was the case in other parts of the empire). The various administrative systems in Palestine were functioning on a much lower key: the population and taxation surveys (*tahrīr*) that had been conducted regularly and quite efficiently during most of the century became increasingly careless in its final decades and then ceased altogether. Logically one would expect similar changes in the price-fixing and price-control apparatus – and that is

precisely what emerges from the *sijill* registers of the 1580s and 1590s. It might of course be suggested that the missing information was included in texts that never reached us. After all, the *sijill* series of Jerusalem – its wide range and impressive volume notwithstanding – is far from perfect, and some of the documents may have been lost in the course of years (the registers were not bound until modern times). But that is precisely the point: the very fact that until the early 1580s all these price lists were meticulously reported and registered and then almost totally disappeared from most of the volumes pertaining to the last two decades are a convincing additional illustration of the deterioration in Jerusalem's administrative and financial systems. Prices were still being fixed even in those years (and later), but with growing irregularity, indicating the worsening standards of effective administration. In these last years of the sixteenth century where some pricing of meat (and other foodstuffs as well) can still be traced, it was fixed neither three nor four times, but at best, once a year only.

Returning to the norm that prevailed for most of the century, it is still necessary to account for the setting of meat prices four times each year, and quite often even more frequently. The orders of the Sultan and "established custom" called for the updating of prices several times a year. The demand for meat, although it gradually climbed as a result of population-growth, could not (and in fact did not) reflect any abrupt changes over the years. Any significant changes resulted largely from shifts that occurred in the supply system which was prone to vary and was of a more flexible nature. Just as limited meat supply brought about an immediate threat of shortage which in turn caused an upsurge in price, so a sudden increase of supply made the old price obsolete and called for change. Only part of the local demand for meat in Jerusalem could be satisfied by sources located in nearby villages. In order adequately to supply Jerusalem with meat, large quantities of sheep and goats had to be brought in from other districts of Palestine, as well as from Syria and Anatolia to the north. Flocks traversing such long distances were exposed to innumerable hardships of heavenly or human origin. Since Jerusalem could not stock sufficiently large quantities, shortages could occasionally occur and even if temporary, were bitterly felt. This called for a quick updating of prices by the kadi and at such times the regular mechanism of three or four times a year proved inadequate. Changes in meat prices took place, therefore, whenever there was an imbalance between supply and demand. The provincial authorities thus created an incentive for the butchers to import more meat in times of scarcity, and on the other hand they looked after the interests of the local population by forcing prices down whenever higher prices were no longer justified as meat was plentiful.¹⁰¹

c. Prices

A systematic and careful perusal of the *sijill* volumes enabled us to establish a long list of prices of the various kinds of meat throughout the sixteenth

century. This was not a simple matter: we have noted the total lack of data for several years towards the end of the century, and the few meat prices available for certain other years. This applies to all kinds of meat, but even earlier in the century the listings are far from complete. Whereas the listing for mutton and goat-meat is practically complete, this cannot be said for the most expensive cuts (fillet of all kinds) and the cheaper meat (beef, camel and water-buffalo). We have no data for these for many years. This difficulty in itself is indicative of one aspect of the patterns of meat consumption: as we have said above, the highest quality meat was in relatively low demand, hence it was less important to register the changes in its price than the changes that occurred in mutton and goat meat (of both regular and low quality). Camel-meat, and to a lesser degree beef and water-buffalo-meat, were also of a somewhat limited appeal: they fared rather well when compared to the sales of all fillets, but in no way could they compete with the steady, widespread demand for mutton and goat. In other words, if we take meat consumption as an indicator of affluence, we may safely conclude that in Jerusalem the middle class of moderate means was much larger than either the upper, wealthy strata, or lower poor class.

The attempt to put together as complete a series of prices as possible posed certain technical problems. Sometimes entries are missing as a result of defects in the *sijill* volumes (parts of pages missing entirely or ruined by damp). In other cases the holes are not so much in the actual paper but in the information transcribed by the clerk: he may have copied the various categories, but failed to record all or some of the numerical values. Another problem, well known to students of Ottoman diplomatics, is that of the script itself, very seldom are the prices quoted in regular, Arabic numerals, or in whole words – they are usually recorded in *siyakat*, the difficulties of which do not have to be repeated here. Messy handwriting and careless mistakes, in themselves quite often a source of difficulties for the proper reading and full understanding of a text, in most cases can be handled satisfactorily by comparing the same scribe's characteristic lines and forms of copying or by applying (with great caution) an element of imagination to the missing link in the context of the questionable phrase or sentence. None of these strategies can be usefully applied to numerical lists. Moreover, even the few existing *siyakat* writing manuals are of limited use in our case because of special, personal (or perhaps provincial?) traits that some of the scribes developed in their own *siyakat*. The only way to overcome these difficulties is by the tedious, old-fashioned method of reading extensively and thoroughly, paying careful attention to the minute details of each handwritten item. In addition, one can hope and pray that he will be so fortunate as to come across one of these rare cases when the scribe generously provides two texts – both *siyakat* and regular numerals. But patience and luck were not always enough. Consequently there were cases in which we could not decipher the signs used for prices and had to forgo some of the information, although theoretically it was available.

All these difficulties notwithstanding, as shown in appendix 1, we have been able to draw up a long, detailed series of meat prices in Jerusalem in the sixteenth century. The first conclusion, readily reached from comparing these figures, is that prices were not constant, but underwent many changes in the course of the century. This applies to all varieties of meat, although the cheaper ones changed less frequently, even remaining stationary for many months. This, too, was an outcome of the relatively limited or flexible demand for the less expensive meat.

When did prices change and why? It would appear from this series, that the reasons are to be sought in both supply and demand. The months of Ramaḍān, when daytime fasting encouraged a higher rate of consumption of meat (and sweets) during the night, figures very high in this context. In anticipation of Ramaḍān the fixing of meat prices became much more important for the public than usual; sufficient quantities for the whole month had to be secured and potential consumers had to be protected from possible abuse on the part of the butchers and meat vendors. This is a reasonable hypothesis, and may also be deduced from the listings of experimental prices we have established, but in addition, there are specific references to this effect: the *sijill* very clearly states that the butchers of Jerusalem (along with the millers and the bakers) formally undertook "to provide the town with the best commodities as of today [i.e. mid-Ramaḍān] and up to the third day of the month of Shawwāl" which is the end of ʿĪd al-Fiṭr, the festivities concluding the month of fasting.¹⁰² Preparations to meet the increased demand for meat during Ramaḍān engendered a great hustle and bustle some time in advance, hence a price rise was clearly apparent in Shaʿbān, the preceding month. As far as we are concerned it is immaterial whether the rise was a result of an actual increase in demand on the part of the merchants, or of rising expectations among the potential buyers; it may have been a combination of the two. In many years this trend, however, can be easily traced, for example: 944/1537–8, 945/1538, 953/1546, 962/1555, 965/1558 etc. The text did not mention any time limit for the prices set on these dates, but reasons for that become obvious from a specific reference dating early Shaʿbān, 941 (mid-February, 1535). A rider to the prices set specifically points out that they will be valid to the end of the month of Ramaḍān, at which time they will drop.¹⁰³ This was not a hypothetical assertion, and if the prices during Shaʿbān are compared with those of the month of Shawwāl, i.e. before and immediately after Ramaḍān, a clear downward trend is apparent (e.g. in the years 944/1538, 945/1539, 947/1541, 966/1559, 975/1568, 978/1571, 979/1571–2). There were also a few cases where prices dropped even prior to the termination of Ramaḍān, and since there is no evidence of a previous exorbitant (and prohibitive) increase in meat-prices, this was probably the result of an exaggerated build-up of stock by over-optimistic merchants. Subsequently they had to adjust their prices in order to dispose of their merchandise in a market that had shown itself to be grimly disappointing (for example: in 937/1541).

Another religious holiday distinguished for its exceptionally high meat consumption (particularly mutton) was ʿĪd al-Aḏḥā. On this occasion, which took place at the end of the Hijri year (10 Dhū'l-Hijja), it was customary for every family to slaughter an animal and distribute its meat to all members of the family and needy neighbours. Rising expectations among potential consumers and speculative merchants thus brought about another set of "seasonal" price increases. Compared with the month of Ramaḏān and the holiday that followed it, ʿĪd al-Aḏḥā caused only a relatively brief change in consumer patterns, hence it is sometimes rather difficult to ascertain its immediate effect. Still, significant increases in official prices can be traced toward the end of many Hijri years (e.g. in 968/1561 mutton prices rose from 14 to 15, then to 17½ ḥalabiyya per raṭl between Shawwāl, Dhū'l-Qa'da and Dhū'l-Hijja, respectively). Most revealing in this context was the year 954/1548 when all meat prices went up between the beginning of Dhū'l-Hijja and the 13th of that month, then during the following month, Muḥarram 955/1548, all the prices plummeted, 10% at first and then another 15%.

So far we have addressed ourselves to the mechanism of and reasons for fluctuation in demand, but changes in prices also occurred as a result of certain fluctuations in supply. As we have already pointed out, these were often brought about by the human element, as well as the financial. In such cases the governor of Jerusalem intervened in order to overcome the difficulties and secure the supply. Natural obstacles and severe weather conditions were equally instrumental in affecting supply, but we have never encountered any attempt by the local or provincial authorities to relate directly to these – apart, of course, from the price-adjustment mechanism described above. Jerusalem is located in a hilly area substantially higher than most other parts of Palestine, hence its weather conditions are much harsher than those prevailing in the area. The flocks of sheep and cattle purchased from the grazing grounds of nomad tribes in the Syrian desert, in north-eastern Syria or southern Anatolia¹⁰⁴ were transported along the roads to other major cities of the empire as well as Jerusalem. This was a complex and hazardous enterprise and it became much more problematic with the heavy rains and deep snow of winter. The Ottoman administration was fully aware of these factors and their effect on food – above all on the supply of meat to frostbitten regions. Although no precautions were taken to forestall these difficulties (e.g. by mandatory stocking of large flocks well in advance), these problems were not ignored and the solution sought was a financial one. Specific entries were introduced into the *Kanunname-i Ihtisabs* of both Istanbul and Edirne dealing with the situations arising from changing climatic conditions: they stipulated that higher prices were to be charged for meat during the winter (although the semantic expression was: smaller weight for the same monetary unit) to compensate the merchants for their extra toil and expenses.¹⁰⁵ The *Kanunname* of Jerusalem, on the other hand, did not refer to any adjustments in price due to climate, since winter in Jerusalem was

much milder than that in either Istanbul or Edirne. There were, however, reports indicating the harmful effects that winter had on the supply of meat to Jerusalem. This was expressed, for example, by the *mutawalli* in charge of the Khasseki Sultan endowment: "the soup-kitchen of the above endowment suffered from an acute shortage of meat during the winter."¹⁰⁶

The best way to measure the effect of winter on meat prices in Jerusalem is by comparing the relevant entries in the price lists. A close perusal reveals that an upsurge of meat prices during the winter is a very common phenomenon, with the chart rising sharply occasionally. This was true for many years, for example: October, 1537–February, 1538; September–November, 1538; October–December, 1545; September, 1549–February, 1550; November, 1557–January 1558; September–November, 1561; October–December, 1573. When winter was over, meat prices showed a clear tendency to fall: November, 1532–April, 1533; November, 1533–May, 1534; January–April, 1539; February–March, 1541; March–June, 1542; March–April, 1546; March–April, 1558; March–April, 1567; December, 1571–March, 1572; December, 1573–April, 1574; February–April, 1577. At the end of May, 1545, when the price of meat dropped, the head of the butchers formally pledged that the new, relatively low price would remain valid throughout the summer.¹⁰⁷ One should add, however, that although widespread and almost regular, this pattern was not always followed and there were several cases when spring or summer witnessed a price rise or a drop in prices occurred during autumn and winter. These cases, very few in the course of the whole century, should be attributed to the interplay of factors other than the weather (e.g. security conditions along the roads).

Meat prices were quoted – as were the prices of other commodities – in *qif'a ḥalabiyya*, a silver coin occasionally referred to as *dirham*. The former was an official term, sometimes given in one of its two shorter versions (*qif'a* or *ḥalabiyya*), whereas the term *dirham* had no formal status and was used in the same sense as in early traditional Islamic coinage. The unit of weight was always the *ratl*.¹⁰⁸ During the second half of the century a new term appears in the *sijill*, the Turkish *para*, but most prices are still quoted in *qif'a ḥalabiyya*. Towards the end of sultan Suleiman's rule *para* recurs more frequently, and as of late 1566 (which roughly coincides with the advent of Selim II) the old terminology has almost disappeared. During the last third of the sixteenth century meat prices were quoted in *para* only (with the exception of very few, marginal references). This was not simply a change in terminology, but an illustration of the broader process whereby the Arabic speaking provinces were becoming fully integrated into the Ottoman administrative system. The *dirham*, or the *qif'a ḥalabiyya* were Arabic terms used in Ottoman Jerusalem with the full support of the authorities during the first decades of the new administration, although the official language was Turkish. Thus the bureaucratic routine was adapted to the established habits of the local population.¹⁰⁹ By the same token old Mamluk gold coins (*dīnār*,

ashrafī, *ghawrī* etc.) were still very much in use in the sixteenth century although they had been struck by the sultanate the Ottomans had vanquished and replaced. Both Selim I and Suleiman the Magnificent issued new silver and gold coins, which in the Arabic-speaking provinces were first used along with the old Mamluk coins, then gradually replaced them. The *para* was one of these, as indicated by its Turkish name. After fifty years of Ottoman rule there were still some remnants of old Mamluk times in various fields, including the financial one. Although no decision was ever taken to suppress the use of the old terms and coins, they gradually became obsolete and their relevance in daily life became marginal. The increasing references to *para*, therefore, was a clear sign of the Ottomanization of Palestine's economy, a process that took place simultaneously among its neighbors as well.¹¹⁰

The *dirham*, or the *qiṭʿa ḥalabiyya* was also referred to – from the very early years of Ottoman rule – as *ʿuthmānī*, an Arabic adjective meaning “Ottoman.” In the course of later decades the local population learned to differentiate among various “Ottomans” (*Selīmī*, *Suleimānī* or *Murādī*) as it had done with regard to the coins bearing the names of the various Mamluk rulers. In the meantime they resorted to *ʿuthmānī* as a term of a general nature, also used for a coin of higher denomination, the *akçe*. Among other things, this may have stemmed from the difficulty caused by the consonant “ḡ” which does not exist at all in Arabic. Twenty years after the Ottoman occupation, however, the term *ʿuthmānī* was no longer used to designate any coin other than the *akçe*.¹¹¹

The official rate of exchange for one *para*, also valid and used in Palestine at the time,¹¹² was 2 *akçe* (2 *ʿuthmānī*). From the middle of the century onwards – and possibly before that – each *ʿuthmānī* was the equivalent of $2\frac{1}{2}$ *qiṭʿa ḥalabiyya*.¹¹³ One *para*, therefore, equalled 5 *ḥalabiyya*. The same rate of exchange (1 *para* = 2 *ʿuthmānī*) remained in force to the end of the century, although the actual devaluation undergone by the *akçe* when its size was trimmed and its silver contents reduced, brought about attempts to change it. The proceedings of a case heard by the kadi of Jerusalem in November, 1589, indicate an actual devaluation of 50%: “the old *ʿuthmānī* [coin] was worth [as far as its silver alloy was concerned] one and a half *ʿuthmānī* [of its reduced size and silver contents as today].”¹¹⁴ The owners of vineyards in the Jerusalem area who were liable to taxation quoted in *para* were fully aware of the actual as well as formal devaluation and tried to gain thereby. They did not wish to continue paying their taxes according to the old rate of 1 *para* (*qiṭʿa mashriqīyya*) to 2 *ʿuthmānī*, but rather $1\frac{1}{3}$ *ʿuthmānī* per *para* (probably claiming that since the rate of exchange between the new and old *akçe* is a difference of $\frac{2}{3}$, they are entitled to pay accordingly, regardless of whether they use old coins or new). The kadi looked into the matter then ruled that this should not be permitted, since “the rate of exchange [*al-muʿāmala*] in the province of the Arabs [*mamlakat al-ʿArab*] is

2 *‘uthmānī* per each *qif’a* and it is forbidden to levy any sum exceeding this rate, and he ordered that they continue according to the style followed in the past and collect 2 *‘uthmānī* for every coin of one *qif’a*.”¹¹⁵ The kadi adhered inflexibly to the formally established exchange rate between *para* and *‘uthmānī*, and would not adjust it to the changing market conditions, but this approach could not prevail for very long. At the end of 1590 there were specific references concerning the need to amend the situation: a decree issued the preceding year by the sultan had established new exchange rates for both gold and silver coins. The districts of Jerusalem and Nablus did not obey this firman and under various pretensions continued to trade according to the old rate. When the new *para* coins arrived in Jerusalem the kadi ruled that the new rate be applied: 2 new *para* = 3 old *para*. In the last decade of the century this new rate of exchange was not only binding, but also actually enforced, and the kadi of Jerusalem calculated his accounts on the basis of 1 *para* = 3 *‘uthmānī*.¹¹⁶ Conservative of mind and upbringing, being in charge of the legal system which was equally (perhaps even more) conservative in nature, the kadi found it difficult to adjust to the deteriorating financial situation. When he finally succumbed and consented to formalize the already existing arrangements, the sixteenth century was practically over. But until its very last decade whenever meat prices were quoted in *paras*, it was still according to the old rate of exchange (1 *para* = 2 *‘uthmānī*). In other words: the real devaluation of Ottoman money had hardly any direct effect on the prices of meat.¹¹⁷

What conclusions can be drawn from the comparison of meat prices in the years when they were calculated in *qif’a ḥalabiyya* and in those when calculations were in *paras*? First, in the late fifties and early sixties, when both denominations were used concurrently, 1 *para* was equivalent to 4–5 *ḥalabiyya*. In February, 1558, for example, when a *raṭl* of mutton was sold at 20 *ḥalabiyya* and goat-meat was sold at 4½ *para*, the rate of exchange was 1:4. In January, 1562, when goat-meat was sold at 18 *ḥalabiyya* and mutton at 4 *para*, the latter (always higher than goat meat) should have been worth at least 20 *ḥalabiyya*, i.e. 1:5. Similarly, in April, 1568, when goat meat was quoted at 14 *ḥalabiyya* and mutton was 3 *para*, the rate was still 1:5. The same emerges with respect to prices of April, 1570. From then on meat prices are quoted only in *paras*, but until the late 1580s the Jerusalem kadi refused, as described above, to modify the formal rate of exchange between the coins. All of these figures lead to one very clear conclusion: while during the first half of the century mutton fluctuated between 12 and 15 *ḥalabiyya* per *raṭl*, and goat-meat was somewhat cheaper, the picture changed drastically during the second half: mutton sold at a 30% higher price (15–22 *ḥalabiyya*), and the same was true for goat-meat.

Meat prices in Jerusalem rose very substantially towards the late eighties, even in comparison with any previous peak. In 1587–9 all meat doubled in price, and the final years of the century show a return to the higher average

price level of the early eighties. One might tend to ascribe the very steep price increases of the late eighties to the formal devaluation of the *akçe* in 1584.¹¹⁸ But this explanation is less than satisfactory in view of the developments of the following years, when prices, though still high, returned to their earlier level. To what, then, can these developments be attributed? Part of the explanation of the price increase must have been related to the real devaluation of the *akçe*, even though the kadi of Jerusalem tried to ignore it. The gradual replacement of the *qıř'a ħalabiyya* by the *para* also appears to be a partial attempt to compensate for the falling value of the *akçe*. But the deep inflationary trends of the Ottoman economy had a negative effect on the *para* coins, too; hence the need to compensate for their decreased value by augmenting prices. Other reasons should be sought in broader spheres of administration: the steadily declining standard of services provided for the local population, the deterioration of security conditions throughout Syria and Palestine, also contributed to the increase in the price of meat. Irregular supply of meat to Jerusalem was one aspect of the general decline, but whereas in earlier years on such occasions the local and provincial authorities had intervened to regulate the supply through the butchers' guild, towards the end of the century these corrective mechanisms proved to be faulty and no longer operated in a way conducive to price control and adjustment. The late eighties should be viewed in this light, although the price increases were exceptionally great. The reasons for this specific upsurge lay in the administrative-political rather than economic context.

Jerusalem in the mid-eighties was ruled by a governor called 'Abd al-Raĥmān Khudāwirdī, alias Abū Sayfayn. The high-handed policies of this ruler "of the two swords" left very deep scars in Jerusalem. He apparently used his "two swords" very often not only against villagers and their belongings in the vicinity of Jerusalem, but equally against various elements of the urban population (including, for example, the local kadi or the *subaşı* of the town). One immediate outcome of his unmitigated cruelty towards the local people was a disruption of many services, among them the supply of various commodities. Meat supply was also affected, hence the exorbitant prices; they were somewhat reduced in the following decade – to the partial relief of the inhabitants. While 'Abd al-Raĥmān's rule lasted, however, there was no doubt as to its negative effect on the local economic system. In May, 1588 a long list of very detailed complaints was brought to the kadi by the Muslim inhabitants of Jerusalem, charging the governor and his cohorts with perpetrating grave acts of persecution against them. The *sijill* is very clear about this: "he [the governor] had given his people power over the merchants [*al-jallāba*] who import goods [to town and] to the market; they used to rob everything that had been imported, then confiscate their camels, and as a result import of goods [*jalb*] to Jerusalem stopped altogether."¹¹⁹ Although, as we have pointed out, meat (and other) prices dropped after he was no longer in office, they were still much higher at the turn of the century than

before, thus indicating the economic difficulties that prevailed in the system as a whole.

It is pertinent at this point to compare meat prices in Jerusalem with those in other areas of the empire. On the whole there do not seem to have been major differences in the general level, though some not insignificant ones can be noted. Throughout the sixteenth century in the capital of the empire several attempts were made to keep meat prices down by administrative means. The figure of 6 *akçe* per 1.28 kg. quoted by Faroqhi for 1592¹²⁰ should be projected against the 5 *para* (= 10 *akçe*) decreed in Jerusalem in the early 1590s for a *raṭl* – which equalled approximately 2½ kg. In other words meat in Istanbul was slightly more expensive than in Jerusalem as a result of the higher demand as well as administrative regulations in force there. To ensure the capital's supply the central government not only tried to keep the price attractively high; it also fixed lower prices for Istanbul's neighboring areas: 2–3 *akçe* for 1.28 kg. This seems to have been true for more distant provinces as well; in Syria and Palestine the price of meat was much higher than in the Balkans (3 to 4 times as high), but still lower than in Istanbul. True, we found no trace of regular empire-wide price-fixing that directly affected Jerusalem, but this does not prove that such a mechanism did not exist in other parts of the empire, particularly at the core – Istanbul and its vicinity. Although partly, at least, Jerusalem's supply came from sources that potentially could also provide Istanbul, there does not seem to have been any correlation of prices between the two, let alone any arbitrary regulations to that effect. Syria and Palestine seem to have been – at least with respect to meat supply and prices – an autonomous sub-unit that regulated its economy according to its own local needs. As it transpired, however, the final outcome largely coincided with the central administration's overall considerations in this respect, thus serving the general aims of securing Istanbul's supply without actually harming Jerusalem.

So far we have been examining kinds of meat and their respective prices as if these were an isolated phenomenon. For a fuller understanding of what meat prices actually amounted to, we should now turn to an attempt to evaluate their economic, as against their statistical dimension. At the end of 954/early 1548, a mason earned about 4 *akçe* a day in Jerusalem, while an expert builder (*mu'allim bannā'*) earned three times as much. With these 12 *akçe* the latter could buy about 2 *raṭls* of mutton (the cost of which amounted then to 15 *ḥalabiyya*, i.e. 6 *akçe* per *raṭl*). It would cost an ordinary mason more than a day and a half of labor. Seven years later, in 962/1555 (which, incidentally, was the first year when meat-prices were quoted in *paras*) a mason earned ¼ *para* (i.e. about ½ *akçe*), and an expert builder 3 *para* (6 *akçe*) per day. In other words: the latter daily earned the equivalent of one *raṭl* of mutton whereas the former had to work for 12 days for the same amount of meat.¹²¹ In the course of 7 years the purchasing power (in terms of meat-prices) of an expert builder's daily work was reduced by 50%,

while that of a mason dropped even more. Those were years when the population of Jerusalem increased very substantially, which meant a certain increase not only in the demand for their services but also in the supply of the various categories of builders. The decreasing value of their wages (and there is no reason to regard the building industry as an exceptional sector) meant that meat actually became more expensive although no change may have occurred in nominal terms. Moreover, even when meat prices did not increase (whether nominally or in terms of real money), they were still relatively high. In 957/1550 the kadi of Jerusalem ruled that a certain widow and her three children be granted 3 'uthmānī a day, i.e. $7\frac{1}{2}$ *qiṭ'a ḥalabiyya*.¹²² With this they could buy just about $\frac{1}{2}$ a *taṭl* of mutton (i.e. $1\frac{1}{2}$ 'uqiyyas per person per day). Had they bought the less expensive beef they could, naturally, have gotten about twice as much. But the above-mentioned sum was not only for meat or even for food in general; it was calculated in such a way that it would cover all their basic expenses: food, clothing, accommodation, public bath etc. For the amount of money they had at their disposal they could not, of course, afford to buy meat every day. Meat was indeed expensive, and many Jerusalemites could not afford to buy it very often during the year.

Later years show a certain improvement of the equation between meat-prices and wages. In 1578 an expert builder earned 6 *para* a day while a mason earned 1 *para*. At the end of 1582 the former earned the same amount while those working for him earned $1\frac{1}{2}$ –3 *para* daily.¹²³ These sums do not differ substantially from the wages earned in 1548 for the same work, and as we pointed out earlier, the price of meat did not undergo any major changes during those years either. The gap created between the decreasing purchasing power of the money of account and the relatively steady prices of meat was again almost completely bridged, and once again a balance was struck between prices and wages. Unfortunately, political and administrative conditions in the second half of the 1580s caused the situation to deteriorate again: meat prices went sky-high, hence its purchase became even more problematic than in past years. All of these examples confirm our earlier contention that rather limited quantities of meat were purchased in Jerusalem during the sixteenth century.

The same conclusion can be reached from a very different angle – that of the quantity of animals allocated to each butcher as his daily slaughtering-quota.

The establishment of fixed quotas of animals for slaughtering constituted part of the meat-control mechanism in Jerusalem. While supply was regarded as part of the butchers' responsibilities, pricing was an administrative prerogative of both the kadi and the *muḥtasib*. The quota was not, however, arbitrarily decided upon; the formal resolution was based on the hypothetical point of equilibrium between supply and demand. The Ottoman authorities had very limited means with which to influence the

demand side of the equation. They could, however, greatly influence supply by pre-arranging and regulating the slaughtering. One way to do this was by strictly forbidding slaughtering of a "private" nature, which we have discussed above, and authorizing it only in the slaughterhouse. This was not just a general obligation, but every butcher personally had to pledge to conform to it, as well as declare publicly in court that "if he slaughtered sheep at his house in Jerusalem where he presently resides, himself or his representative or by his approval or by an order emanating from him, and if he should not slaughter in the sultan's market in accordance with the noble firman, then his wife will be [immediately] divorced [. . .] [this declaration was made] after he [the kadi] had warned him as well as the rest of the butchers that they may not slaughter anywhere except at the sultan's market."¹²⁴ In other cases butchers pledged themselves to pay a fine to the *sancakbeyi* if they failed to fulfil this obligation.¹²⁵ This was one way of regulating supply. Another one was by allocating the quantity and kind of animals, particularly sheep and goats, that each butcher could slaughter. At the beginning of the century there was an attempt to distribute slaughtering equally among the butchers and they had to take a solemn oath to that effect in court. The local authorities for their part undertook to provide an equal number of animals to all butchers who for various reasons did not have a sufficient number at their disposal. Moreover, in order to make sure that the distribution would be equitable, the butchers themselves undertook not to "inflate" their lists by adding names of their relatives thereto, unless this was approved by all members of the guild.¹²⁶ Economic reality, however, proved to be stronger than any administrative regulations. The more affluent among the butchers found ways and means to purchase more animals than the less fortunate ones, equality proved less and less attainable, and finally around the middle of the century, the entire experiment was given up thereby formalizing the socio-economic reality of inequality within the guild.

From then on we have only a few examples, but they are most instructive. In 1551 four butchers came to the *muhtasib* and undertook to conduct all their slaughtering in the "slaughterhouse of the sultan" (*maslakh al-sultān*, which took its name from the market place – *sūq al-sultān* – near where it was located).¹²⁷ Moreover, they pledged to slaughter specific quantities every day: Aḥmad ibn Zurayq 5 goats and 1 sheep, Maḥmūd ibn al-Duhayna 3 goats and 1 sheep, *al-mu'allim* Suwaydān 30 different animals (the figures for the fourth are not given). Multiplying these figures by six days a week we reach about 1000 animals per month for these few butchers alone.¹²⁸ Another list dated five years later provides us with more detailed information as to the number of sheep and goats each of 12 butchers (one Jew and one Christian among them) were entitled to slaughter every day. Most of them were permitted to slaughter 5–6 animals a day, except for Tāj al-Dīn al-Sukkārī who was allowed 30. On the whole the guild could and was supposed to slaughter

75 animals daily which meant about 400 a week (the Jewish member, and possibly his Christian colleague too, could slaughter only twice a week). This brings the monthly figure to the higher total of 1600 animals.¹²⁹ These figures did not include cattle; although its consumption was not particularly high, beef supply involved the same price setting and control of slaughtering and quantities. The exact total of animals slaughtered in Jerusalem is hard, perhaps impossible to calculate, but we can reach a fairly close estimate based on the above information, as well as other indications we have. The difference between the monthly figure for 1551, and the much higher one for 1556 does not indicate a meaningful contrast: we know that in 1551 there were a few more butchers in Jerusalem who must also have had permission to slaughter, hence the total figure of animals actually slaughtered must have been much higher than 1000 per month. We are thus led to the same conclusion: the monthly quota of animals was approximately 2000. This was four times as high as the figure cited for Jerusalem in the spring of 1535 when the population was much smaller, and the total for slaughtering was calculated at approximately 500.¹³⁰ Proportionally speaking, the rate of increase of meat-consumption surpassed the demographic growth, which indicates a certain improvement in the overall standard of life.

In addition to the animals brought to Jerusalem from nearby villages (Abū Dīs, al-Ṭūr, Siṣr etc.), from the neighboring Bedouin tribes (e.g. the Taʿāmiura) or from other nomads (Kurds, Turcomans), there was a third source, a local one, i.e. the governor and his entourage.¹³¹ The transactions usually involved several dozen sheep and goats bought by the flock, and somewhat fewer cattle, water-buffalo or camels. We seldom come across references to purchases entailing hundreds of sheep and goats, but the butchers ordinarily kept a permanent reserve of several hundred (rarely as much as a thousand) in and around Jerusalem to guarantee the supply. These reserves were crucially important in enabling them to overcome periods of scarcity due to weather conditions, transportation difficulties or anything else that restricted or altogether stopped the flow from the main source – that of “the Eastern provinces” (*al-bilād al-sharqiyya*).¹³² This was a means of regulating supply throughout the year and warding off radical price-changes. We have seen before that although prices rose and fell during the century, the fluctuations remained within the relatively limited range of 10–20% from one year to another, one season to another, and even from the beginning to the end of the century. The way the guild dealt with supplies and the precautions the butchers took to ensure that they would always have a flexible supply stocked nearby is the most reasonable explanation for the rather small fluctuation in prices.

We would like to end this chapter by elaborating somewhat on one important aspect touched on above: the relatively small quantities of meat consumed in Jerusalem. Taking the figure of just under 2000 animals per month as a basis for comparison, we reach an annual average of about

24,000. This figure is highly instructive from two points of view: first, when compared with meat consumption in Istanbul which in the following century (1674) imported 4 million sheep, 3 million lambs and $\frac{1}{4}$ million cows. In the middle of the sixteenth century, the population of Jerusalem was approximately 15,000, i.e. 2% of that of the capital in 1674, which means that Jerusalem required much less meat. By Istanbul's standards, Jerusalem should have consumed about 150,000 rather than 24,000 animals annually. Even allowing for the fact that the official establishment in Istanbul was far larger than that of Jerusalem and probably consumed more meat than other socio-economic groups (that of the capital amounted to $\frac{1}{30}$ of the entire population, according to Mantran),¹³³ Jerusalem's meat consumption was lower than that of Istanbul by a ratio of 1:3 or even 1:4. Secondly bearing in mind that the population of Jerusalem at its peak was 2500–3000 families the 12,000 to 18,000 sheep and goats that were slaughtered annually mean an average of 4–6 animals per family per year. Although this is not an insignificant figure, it is not an impressive one either.

Meat was regarded as a basic element of the Jerusalemite's daily diet. When a divorced woman received alimony or orphans were allotted money from an inheritance, the kadi used a set formula: he granted them a daily sum "to pay for meat, oil and bread."¹³⁴ In other words, these were not considered luxuries, but essentials that every human being was entitled to. In reality, however, whereas everyone may have had bread and some oil or fat for daily consumption, this was not the case as far as meat was concerned. Unlike grain or oil, meat could not be stored and used over an extended period. When a sheep was slaughtered its meat had to be consumed within a short time. Private slaughtering therefore would usually be limited to high holidays or very special occasions, while the purchase of meat at the butcher's shop was generally kept at very limited quantities because of both storage problems and expense.

Finally, it is interesting to examine the meat consumption of Jerusalem in the light of data available for other towns. For comparison, we will use the higher figure of 24,000 sheep consumed annually in Jerusalem to account for some private as well as unauthorised public slaughtering. Multiplied by 20 kg. which is the average weight of a sheep, then divided by 16,000 (the approximate population around 1560) the figure finally reached is 30. In other words: annual meat consumption in Jerusalem was 30 kg. (or 80 grams per day) per person. Surprisingly, this figure is quite similar to that noted elsewhere. The average consumption in Rome some 45 years later was 38.3 kg., i.e. about 30% higher. Rome's consumption is referred to as the "normal situation" for Italy; then it keeps falling until two hundred years later it is down to 21.2 kg. The figure calculated for several French towns (e.g. Dijon, Toulouse etc.) throughout the 19th century fluctuates between 40 and 77 kg. per person.¹³⁵ True, when meat consumption in these European cities dropped, it was compensated for by increased purchases of

fish – which was not the case in Jerusalem. Jerusalemites, therefore, did not get as much protein as did the Romans, and had only a fraction of that consumed by the inhabitants of Istanbul. From this standpoint, as well as from that of the relative quantities at their disposal, they were no doubt worse off. But on the whole, in the reality of their day, the low level of meat consumption was not particularly exceptional. Unfortunately, we have no figures for meat consumption in any urban center in the Ottoman empire, outside of Istanbul. From the perspective of Jerusalem it was Istanbul rather than Rome that counted. Although objectively speaking the average figure reached above of approximately 80 grams per person per day could be considered low but reasonable, the only relevant consideration for the local inhabitants was what they knew of Istanbul – and that one led to an undoubtedly clear and negative conclusion: they had less meat than they wanted or thought they were entitled to.

Conclusion

Butchering in Jerusalem emerges from the foregoing pages as an institution of dual character: an occupation that is functionally limited and performed in a given locale on the one hand, and on the other one more extensive administrative and social, as well as international dimensions. First and foremost the butchers were supposed to provide the town with meat all year round; at the same time, however, they played a much more important role – that of the *muhtasib*. For many years throughout the century, more butchers than members of any other trade or profession filled this position, which was of central importance in the economic and administrative life of the town and its inhabitants. The combination of the two occupations implied greater profits and higher social status for the butchers than one otherwise have assumed. Wives and daughters of butchers received much more substantial bride-money than was usually the case, and they had long lists of possessions to bequeath, many of which were of considerable value. These advantages resulted from professional activity which, although closely supervised and regulated by the provincial authorities, nevertheless yielded the butchers high profits. There was a butcher in Jerusalem in 1582 who could afford to hire the services of a colleague to take charge of the daily running of his shop: “he would sell meat [for] him and weigh it for him every day.”¹³⁶ It does not sound like a job needing much training or special qualifications. The man was hired for 6 months (which indicates the expectation of quite some stability) and was promised a daily salary of 6 *para* (specifically referred to as new, *murādī* coins not yet devalued as were the old ones). This would have been the equivalent of the daily wages of an expert builder (*mu^callim bannā’*), who was rarely hired on a long-term basis, and did work of a more demanding nature. The relative generosity of the above butcher

can best be attributed to the high returns he expected on his capital and for his professional services.

Professionally speaking, the butchers were referred to as a corporate body: members of the guild who were supposed to obey all instructions issued by the authorities with regard to maximum prices, organized slaughtering, meat-supply quotas etc. They were conceived of as a *ṭā'ifa*, strange as this might seem to the modern mind: religious minorities too were expected to pay their dues and perform all other obligations collectively; this also held true for the rural communities that paid taxes and fines as a unit even though certain individuals were held directly responsible.¹³⁷ Clear as the guild structure appears in the reality of sixteenth-century Jerusalem, another element enters the picture often enough to shed a somewhat different light on it. A given family, sometimes even a given person, pursued more than one career. Although many butchers were born into families of long-standing reputation in the field, at different stages of their lives some of them had been very active in other professions concurrently (e.g. soap production). There are no indications as to how, if at all, they resolved their problems of double, sometimes triple, loyalty. But since professional activity involved membership in more than one guild, cutting across lines this way must have slightly blunted the distinction between one guild and the next.

Turning from the general to the personal, this meant, *inter alia*, that although butchers preferred to marry within butchers' families, they did not necessarily do so. Economic advance as well as social mobility (both horizontal and vertical in the course of time) must have been among the major considerations in such unions, and were certainly among their most conspicuous results. A woman of the Duhayna family, which was known for many generations as deeply involved in the meat trade, married into the Zurayq family, known for its soap business. When the woman died in 1578 she left an inheritance worth about 15,000 *paras*; a year before an even higher figure – 17,500 *paras* – was quoted as the inheritance left by another member of the family.¹³⁸ These and other cases of inter-marriage confirm the high socio-economic standards reached by some members of these families who accumulated their capital through commercial activities and further consolidated it by arranging good marriages. They did not, however, cease to be regarded as members of their original profession even when – as a result of marital bonds – they became related to most venerable '*ulamā*' families, or other dignitaries of the town.

In addition to the socio-economic mobility of the butchers and to the administrative function they often fulfilled, there was an international aspect to the profession that merits consideration. Like members of any other guild, the butchers probably preferred to keep to themselves, living in the same neighborhood or at least in close proximity. But some of them, at least, were deeply involved in inter-provincial commerce which greatly

expanded their horizons. Some butchers had business contacts in Jerusalem's soap industry which brought their merchandise (and members of the family if not themselves) to distant provincial centers such as Cairo or Damascus. But their own guild, also, with its built-in mechanism that made the butchers responsible for the supply of meat to the local market made travelling incumbent upon some, if not all of them. In their quest for sheep they travelled not only through Palestine, but also went as far as Syria and further. To finance their purchases they were authorized to export commodities from Palestine for which there was a demand. These commercial activities no doubt added to their profits and improved their socio-economic status, but it also gave their guild an added dimension, much broader than the parochial nature of their daily routine would lead one to expect.

The normal activity of the butchers generated diverse and intensive contacts between them and the various local authorities. The *muhtasib*'s involvement in the performance of their duties was similar to his involvement in the town's other economic sectors. The butchers were in rather closer contact with the local kadi as the price of meat was adjusted much more frequently than that of other commodities, but this was not basically different from the kadi's relations with other guilds. It was the involvement of the governor and his deputy that added altogether different dimensions to the butchers' guild. Time and again one finds descriptions of court sessions attended by the governor or convened at his request, dealing with matters concerning the butchers. This was not a personal whim of certain governors; it cut across all years and basically stemmed from the relative importance the governor attributed to the meat-supply as a factor in the well-being of the local population. Although the quantities of meat consumed in Jerusalem were proportionally much lower than the average consumption in Istanbul, it apparently was a very important commodity for the entire population, and at this stage of Ottoman history local and provincial governors were still very anxious to see to it that this interest on the part of their inhabitants was properly served.

Concern of the provincial governors for adequate meat supplies was not specific to Jerusalem or even to all of Palestine; it held good for other parts of the Ottoman empire as well. The entire mechanism of adjustment of meat-prices was managed by the local authorities, with minimal intervention by the provincial authorities of Damascus. The central government in Istanbul took no initiative and never interfered directly. The Sublime Porte was responsible for the well-being of all the subjects of the Sultan in a vague, indirect way. More specific steps were taken when petitions or complaints reached "the threshold of felicity," i.e. the relevant part of Ottoman central bureaucracy, which often dealt with them by issuing a *firmān* ordering investigation, fact-finding, and if need be redress. But the interest the central authorities benevolently showed in offering the common folk fair and just treatment (righteous by religious standards) should not distort the picture.

Unlike Mantran's contention in one of his earlier works on Istanbul, the Ottomans did not have "un contrôle extrêmement strict" over the economic situation in Jerusalem; in fact they hardly had any direct control at all – either of the guilds or the prices, which are among the alleged elements of control mentioned by Mantran.¹³⁹ In Istanbul and perhaps elsewhere in Anatolia, they may have had, in fact they very likely did have such control, but not in Jerusalem. One cannot, therefore, accept Mantran's statement that "toutes les grandes villes de l'empire y étaient soumises" – Jerusalem was a town, though much smaller than Bursa or Edirne. even if the central government wanted to interfere by setting maximum prices and supervising the quality of services rendered and merchandise supplied, it never did so to any significant extent in sixteenth-century Jerusalem.

In this respect as well as others, the sixteenth century proved to be the period during which Palestine was gradually incorporated into the empire and its various systems. Even after this had been fully accomplished, however, the economic system was still managed with an element of administrative autonomy. The butchers' guild and the entire field of meat-supply to Jerusalem indicate that even in the heyday of what is commonly regarded as a highly centralized administration, the central authorities left a wide range of discretion to the periphery. In the highly sensitive economic field, local governors and other state agencies could – and indeed did – carry out their responsibilities in an independent manner, with no intervention from above. Prices were regulated and supply ensured by the local apparatus only – provided that this was within the overall framework and according to the general parameter established in Istanbul. The overwhelming concern was for the smooth functioning of the system and enhancement of the well-being of the Sultan's subjects. From this standpoint, Jerusalem's situation, although otherwise unique, was no different than that of Istanbul.

CHAPTER 2

Soap production and olive oil

And the sons of Hārūn, may god bless him, used to come to the rock [in Jerusalem] and used to call it “the temple,” and a fountain of olive-oil poured down on them from heaven.
(Al-Wāsiṭī, *Faḍā'il Bayt al-Maqdis*)

Braudel's distinction between “meat eaters” and “bread eaters” may be applied, although in somewhat attenuated form, to the realities of Ottoman Jerusalem. There was, however, a third element of equal importance in the daily diet of those days. This was, as may have been surmised from earlier textual references (see above, p. 56) as well as from acquaintance with Middle Eastern cuisine – olive-oil. In the economy of sixteenth-century Jerusalem, however, it also served as raw material for the production of soap, and in this chapter we shall elaborate on both uses of this commodity.

Soap-factories

When the Ottomans conquered Palestine the production of soap in Jerusalem was already a well established economic institution. Evidence from Mamluk times and even earlier indicates that olive oil extracted in the rural hinterland (particularly in the villages north of Jerusalem – *bilād Banī Zayd* – and *jabal Nablus*) was regularly brought into town. The local population used some of it; the rest served as raw material for soap, most of which was produced in Jerusalem itself.¹

In light of the general economic decline in Palestine during the late Mamluk period it would be reasonable to assume that soap production in Jerusalem was disrupted, as were other economic sectors. It did not, however, come to a halt even with the change in the ruling elite and provincial administration. The earliest records available in the court archives, dating from the late 1520s, clearly indicate that several soap-factories (*maṣbana*, pl. *maṣābin*) were operative. One of them that was a part of the *waqf* of Ibn Abī Sharīf, is reported to actually have been producing soap in the late fifteenth century. Hence these two separate periods, so unlike one another adminis-

tratively and otherwise are linked by a direct and almost uninterrupted chain of economic activity.²

From the standpoint of this line of economic activity, then, the first century of Ottoman rule in Jerusalem should be seen as a continuation – although under much better circumstances. The major elements of the soap-making process were not new: the factories themselves had been there before – all they needed to be maintained and even improved was sufficient motivation on behalf of the *entrepreneurs*, and appropriate support on the part of the local authorities. Normally, overall economic conditions were also important. The extent to which the existing *maşbanas* were actually renewed and improved will be carefully scrutinized in the following pages. Even if the results of the scrutiny are positive, a related question will have to be addressed: did the Ottomans undertake new economic initiatives? or did they merely maintain, perhaps slightly improve the *status quo*? Specifically, were any new soap-factories built in Jerusalem in the course of the sixteenth century?

The decline of the late Mamluk period did some irreparable damage to the then-existing soap-production. Some of the factories were actually in a shambles and the Ottomans either did not or could not remedy the situation. There was one old building with a soap-factory in its basement, known as *qanāṭir Khuḍayr* – the name of a certain part of Jerusalem – that was in ruins. Although the whole property was referred to as totally useless, it was the object of several transactions during 1535. One buyer, an expert builder, may have intended to use his professional know-how to improve his newly acquired real-estate; then it was purchased by another member of the Ottoman establishment, a *sipahi* of the military elite. Not only were relatively low sums paid, but the price kept falling, and by the end of the year it had diminished to a bare fraction of the property's market value. This was an example of a soap-factory that fell into disrepair and was never rebuilt nor does it appear to have been used for any other purpose in later years.³

Other factories were apparently in relatively better shape; all they needed was a substantial investment by the owners or the leaseholders in the repair of both the building and its equipment, after which normal production could be resumed.⁴ Repairs, however, were not carried out as a single, one-time episode. The constant series of repairs conducted almost uninterruptedly in all the *maşbanas* was one of the best indications of the pace of production in Jerusalem. Apparently the most prevalent damage was to the cauldrons themselves; more precisely, the copper coating of the cauldrons had to be replaced frequently as it was impaired by the extreme heat to which it was exposed. Copper had to be imported and was regarded as an expensive metal; the frequency with which it was renewed in most cauldrons attests to an impressive rate of productivity. It also required a financial investment that was no doubt motivated by the belief that such money was well spent and would bring handsome returns.

During the first half of the century at least twelve soap-factories were operating steadily in Jerusalem. There was no formal registry of even partial listing of these institutions from which one might draw general conclusions. Information about such factories, as well as about most other aspects of economic life, has to be gleaned from meager, often insignificant details mentioned in daily law-suits (or accompanying evidence) brought before the kadi. In Jerusalem most soap-factories were known by name, so there was hardly any need to describe their exact location. Moreover, the same factory was sometimes referred to by two different names which can be very misleading for the historian. When it was impossible to reach a positive identification we preferred to subsume new evidence within that pertaining to an already known *maşbana*. The overall number of soap-factories during the first fifty years of Ottoman rule might have been as high as fifteen or so. Most of them were located in two areas: the south-western part (the Jewish quarter, the Zion quarter better known as al-Rīsha) and the northern part (Bāb al-ʿAmud and its vicinity), both inside the walled city. In other words, they were concentrated in the city's extremities, far from the more densely populated environs of the Temple Mount. It may be assumed that these locations were not chosen at random: both the beginning and the end of the soap-producing process would have gained considerable advantage from the proximity to the gates and from the open spaces available near the walls. All raw materials used in the factories were imported in bulk from neighboring, sometimes distant areas so that the closer the *maşbanas* were to the gate, the better it was for their owners. The large quantity of refuse (*jift*) that was left at the end of the process, could not easily be disposed of in densely populated neighborhoods and made the empty areas near the walls absolutely essential.


The systematic operation, and the proper maintenance as well as the occasional repair of the existing factories was true for the entire century. It indicated a positive Ottoman policy and dynamic economic reality that prevailed in Jerusalem. At least three additional factories were built in the forties, sixties and eighties by local *entrepreneurs*, thus confirming the general impression made by the description of the performance of the other fifteen: there was increasing interest and growing profitability in soap production.

Applying the yardsticks described above we reached the figure of eighteen soap-factories operating in Jerusalem during the sixteenth century. We shall now describe and analyze the main developments that these factories underwent in the course of the century.

1. One of the most productive soap-factories was known by several names, the most popular being *maşbanat ibn mīrān* or *al-mīrāniyya* although it was also confusingly called *maşbanat ibn shakhātīr*. This was probably the factory previously known as *abū ghānim*. The name most commonly used for it derived from the family of Abu'l Luṭf b. Mīrān, rich merchants (*min al-sāda*

alatujjār, khawāja, kh-wājikī) who gradually increased their share of ownership in this *maṣbana*. Originally it had been established as an endowment (*waqf*) some forty years prior to the Ottoman arrival (881/1476–7) by a soap-producer (*ṣabbān*) Ibrāhīm Ibn al-A^craj, also known as Ibn Shakhātīr – the source of one of the other names by which it was known. Since the terms of the endowment referred only to the building, there was nothing to exclude legal ownership by various parties of its equipment – hence the growing share of members of the Abū Ghānim b. Mīrān family. Toward the end of 1559 it underwent a series of thorough repairs made necessary by serious damage incurred by an earthquake; it then resumed production at a steady pace. The factory remained in the hands of the above-mentioned families, and even some members who became involved in totally different vocations maintained connections with it. Early in 1564, for example, Burhān al-Dīn b. Jamā^ca al-Kinānī, a famous Hanafī Muftī of the territory described somewhat ambiguously as “the Arab lands” (*bi’l-bilād al-‘Arabiyya*) bought a share for a substantial sum of money from his aunt, a daughter of Ibn Abu’l Luṭf b. Mīrān. Some shares of the *maṣbana*, probably regarded as a promising investment, were purchased in later years by prominent outsiders: in 1565 to a certain Ibn Ḥāmid, referred to as a dignitary (*min a’yān al-quds*) bought part of it; another part was purchased by a prosperous silversmith (*khawāja Ibrāhīm al-Ṣā’igh*) in 1575 and a similar transaction took place in 1582.

Two factors could account for the relative importance of this soap-factory: its capacity and its location. The usual set-up in similar institutions in Jerusalem included two copper cauldrons, a few basins (*hawḍ*) for holding the fresh soap and a cistern for collecting rainwater. The higher level of production in this factory is indicated not only by the two cisterns for rainwater or the fact that it had two entrances which indicate greater volume, but also by the impressive number of pits (*bīr*) – sixteen – for the storage of olive oil. As for location, this *maṣbana* was close to al-‘Amūd Gate behind *sūq al-fakhr* (to the south of which lay *khān al-ghawānima*) which was known to be related to soap rather than clay pottery as its name might seem to indicate. In the late Mamulk period this area was already regarded as the major concentration of soap-factories: “*sūq al-fakhr* drew its name from Fakhr al-Dīn, the owner of *al-madrasa al-Fakhriyya*, and in it the *maṣbanas* in which soap is produced.”⁵ It became increasingly associated with olive oil which for obvious reasons was sold there; then finally towards the end of 1574 its name was changed and it was referred to as “*sūq al-fakhr*, now known as *sūq al-zayt*” (the [olive]-oil market). Given the inherent conservatism of any administrative system, including the Ottoman, this new term must have capped a protracted economic development that culminated in changing patterns of trade, consumption and production in Jerusalem. Olive oil had always been bought and sold in the town’s markets, but the substantial increase in the demand for it as raw material for soap-production



2. The remains of an Ottoman soap-factory in Jerusalem, operated until the late nineteenth century by the al-Quṭayna family.

is clearly illustrated by the change in name of the market-place. Both the oil and the soap produced from it became much more important from the middle of the century on.⁶

2. Another soap-factory was located in the same *sūq al-fakhr* area that in later years was called “the [olive]-oil market.” It was referred to as *al-sharwīniyya*, *maṣbanat abū sharwīn*, or simply “the biggest one” (*al-kubrā*). The latter appellation must have derived from its size (one of its pits, termed “the mother,” had a capacity of at least 20 *qintār* of oil), whereas the former name was that of the rich merchant (*khawāja* Abū'l-Naṣr b. Sharwīn) who operated the factory as early as the mid thirties if not before. Some twenty years later (1559) it was run by another member of the family who bore the impressive title “the most prominent merchant” (*ʿayn al-sāda al-tujjār*) of Jerusalem. Six years later a third member, described as “a prominent rich merchant” (*min aʿyān al-sāda al-khawājikiyya*) was monitoring the factory’s income in his capacity as the administrator (*nāzir*) of the endowment bearing the name. In the year 1600 another member of the same family performed the same function. This endowment was established in 1522, i.e. during the very first years of Ottoman rule by one Burhān al-Dīn Abū'l-Naṣr ibn Sharwīn (who probably owned and operated it during the late Mamluk period) as a family endowment, the proceeds of which were to accrue to his descendants. Although it had no formal or direct link to any official institution, the soap-factory was very often (perhaps due to its size) used for storing oil that belonged to the endowments of the Temple Mount in Jerusalem, the Cave of the Patriarchs in Hebron, and even to members of the military establishment. Various members of Ibn Sharwīn family were concurrently involved in the ongoing functioning of the soap factory and benefitted from its income. In 1564, when excessive use of its facilities brought about a degree of deterioration, the family had to sacrifice some of its income for structural improvements and renovation of equipment (the term used is *ʿimāra*, “building”) – an investment that was undoubtedly soon compensated for by increased productivity. A final note emerging from the annals of this soap-factory involved most illuminating family ties between the competitors who operated the Mīrāniyya and the Sharwīniyya *maṣbanas*. A sale concluded at the end of 1565 reveals that the daughter of one of the Ibn Mīrāns was married to one of the Ibn Sharwīns who was most active in the running of his family’s soap-factory located in the same neighborhood as her family’s factory. Although in this specific case it was her share in her family’s place that was sold, there is no doubt that the prospering soap business, lucrative and attractive though it may have been to newcomers, was kept close within the family circles of those who had been in this field for generations.⁷

3. *Al-Manṣūriyya* was located in the south-western part of Jerusalem in the section occasionally referred to by the old terms “Zion quarter,” “the inner Zion quarter” (*ḥārat ṣahyūn al-juwwāniyya*), and occasionally by the

more recent name “the Jewish” or “al-Rīsha” quarter. Only once was a more specific geographical description offered: Dayr al-Zaytūna (just north of Zion gate) lay south-west of it. Originally, that is in Mamluk times, it was not one enterprise but two separate ones that suffered serious deterioration. The newly introduced Ottoman administration, by way of improving its *modus operandi*, had the two factories merged as early as 1530 (“now the two are mixed and have become one soap-factory”). This policy, designed to increase its functional capacity, was maintained throughout the century. Like the cases described above, the factory remained a charitable endowment, that status dating back to the late Mamluk period when two different members of Ibn Abī Sharīf family established it. The proceeds of this endowment, although originally designated for remittance to the various members of the family in their capacities as managers or supervisors, were actually spent on introducing various improvements.

In the late twenties the Ḥanbali religious authority was asked to give an official opinion as to the advisability of spending the income in that way. “As long as there is a need” it may and should be spent thus, was the legal answer, and it was immediately implemented. In the forties, then in 1551 and again in 1556 and 1559 and several times during the early sixties, the factory was repaired time and again and new structural elements were added. The detailed and frequent financial reports submitted by the parties involved in these repairs indicate that the enterprise was very successful. Each year it was leased for a higher sum and the amount of money allocated for repairs was very substantial indeed. Prosperous merchants rented parts of the factory for extended periods. Some of their names had a familiar ring: in 1546 Ḥasūna b. Zurayq had at least one pit there bearing his name, and at the same time a member of the Duḥayna family owned about 20% of it; Muḥammad b. Ḥasūna b. Zurayq and another rich merchant rented it in 1563 and 1564.⁸ The members of the Zurayq family, familiar to us from earlier descriptions, will reappear separately in connection with these activities in the field of soap-production.

4. *Al-Jābirīyya* soap-factory was very close to *Al-Manṣūriyya* and almost indistinguishable from it. It too was part of the endowment of Burhān al-Dīn b. Abī-Sharīf, located in al-Rīsha (formerly: “inner Zion”) quarter, more specifically in the small market (*suwayqa*) of the Jewish neighborhood. During the sixteenth century it underwent developments similar to those of the neighboring plant. In poor state at the very beginning of Ottoman rule, it was taken care of by the *waqf* supervisors and eventually became very active in its field. There were further improvements in later years and substantial sums were spent on reconstruction; storage pits were added, new equipment was installed and subsequently kept in good repair. At least some of its leaseholders were prominent merchants from different families (al-Duḥayna – at a certain stage even one of its members, who headed the butchers’ guild; Ibn Sammūm, Ibn al-Mujāhid alias Ibn al-Jāmūs, Ibn

‘Usayla, and descendants of *shaykh* Ibn Abi Sharīf). Since parts of this soap-factory, above all its equipment, were privately owned (*mulk*) by various families, it was coveted, frequently becoming the object of commercial transactions; it could also be turned into an endowment – and in 1579 this was actually done by a merchant called Ibn al-Duhayna.⁹

5. *Al-Maslakh* (“the slaughterhouse”) soap-factory derived its name, quite obviously, from its proximity to the slaughterhouse. It was located just north of al-Manṣūriyya, and was usually referred to as the Jewish quarter’s factory. The last three *maṣbanas* described (3–4–5) were not only physically near to one another; members of the same families held parts of them either in combined ownership or as a lease. The most important of these families were the Ibn Sammūms, but some shares were also owned by the Ibn Zurayqs, and Ibn Duhayna – although throughout the century these owners were usually referred to as “prosperous merchants.” In about 1550 twenty-five percent of this factory belonged to a former well-to-do kadi, then to his daughters. In 1553 it was sold to Ḥasan b. Muḥammad Ibn Zurayq alias Ḥasūna for the impressive sum of 200 *sulṭānī* gold coins. This high price notwithstanding (almost three times the amount paid that year in a transaction of similar magnitude in Ramle),¹⁰ the legal representatives of the heirs to the above-mentioned kadi regarded this deal as unsatisfactory and sued Ḥasūna for infringement. Some twenty years later, however, no such accusations were levelled at the Ibn Zurayqs who uninterruptedly collected their income from renting this *maṣbana* and the soap it produced.¹¹

6. Another soap-factory, *al-Jāmūsiyya*, was also located in the Jewish quarter. It derived its name from its owner, *khawājā* Shihāb al-Dīn Aḥmad b. *khawājā* Badr al-Dīn b. al-Jāmūs, although part of it (the building, not the equipment) belonged to the Abū Sharīf endowment. From the few references made to it in our registers, this *maṣbana* seems to have been somewhat less active than those described above. This can also be concluded from the fact that at various stages (1549, 1551, 1565) it functioned at only half its original capacity. This must have been the major reason for the relatively low rent (just over 1 ‘*uthmānī* per day) paid by a merchant otherwise unknown in the soap business (‘Alā’ al-Dīn b. Arghūn) in the middle of the century. There is no indication in later years¹² of greater interest expressed through higher rent.

7. The most prominent merchant of Jerusalem in mid-1545 (‘*ayn al-sāda al-tujjār* also called ‘*umdat al-tujjār*), *khawājā* Shams al-Dīn b. Sammūm, owned another soap factory called *al-Nāṣiriyya*. Some forty years later his four sons, all also referred to as merchants, still owned the same place. Throughout those years soap was produced and stored there on behalf of a variety of individuals, among them the head of the Janissary unit stationed in the Citadel, the former *alaybeyi* of Lajjūn and deputy governor (*mutasallim*) of Jerusalem. The exact nature of this *maṣbana* has been questioned: once or twice there are confusing references which seem to indicate

that it was part of the Abū Sharīf endowment and it is identified with *al-Manṣūriyya*. But close perusal of the documents confirms that despite the resemblance in the names the two were distinctly different.¹³

8. A section of Jerusalem not mentioned so far was *‘aqabat* (“the steep road”) *al-Zāhiriyya*, leading to *bāb al-ghawānima*, the north-western entrance to the Temple Mount. Near the top of it (*ra’s*), quite close to the olive-oil market, was a soap-factory called *al-Jad‘ashiyya*, or *mawlānā al-efendi*. The latter name was referred to its owner, Aḥmad b. Naṣṣuḥ, who served as a kadi in Jerusalem and during the 1540s took a personal interest in having the factory cleaned up and the building repaired, thus substantially increasing the capacity of the soap-factory. In the early fifties it was rented out to a soldier in the Citadel who invested further in its improvement; then it was purchased by another kadi, Ḥamza, who died in the mid fifties but not before his name became associated with this *maṣbana*. His heirs let it to a rich merchant (Shams al-Dīn b. Sharaf al-Dīn b. kadi al-Salt) who invested more than three times its annual rent of 30 gold coins on improvements, as a result of which the factory’s productive capacity more than doubled. Ten years later, in the mid sixties, it was rented to the same person for 200 gold coins annually – a clear indication of its increased value. Strictly speaking, this was a direct outcome of the various development schemes but this success should also be viewed in the wider context of the growing demand for real-estate in Jerusalem in the late fifties and early sixties – when demographic pressure in the town reached its highest peak.¹⁴

9. South of the olive-oil market, in the narrow street (*zuqāq*) Abū Shāma there was a smaller and somewhat less important soap-factory. It was part of an endowment established in the mid forties by *shaykh* Shihāb al-Dīn b. Zayn al-Dīn ‘Abd al-Raḥīm who had amassed considerable property. This particular *maṣbana*, rented by another member of the Ibn kadi al-Salt family of merchants, did not increase its value over the years: as late as 1579 it still had just one cauldron and was rented for the relatively low sum of 22½ gold coins annually.¹⁵

10. ‘Abd al-Raḥīm’s endowment included another soap-factory (added in 1551), rather large in size and located just south of the Bāb al-‘Āmūd gate. To its west was the neighborhood mosque, to its east a mill and an oil-press was located nearby which provided it with its basic raw material.¹⁶

11. Another *maṣbana* in the Bāb al-‘Āmūd quarter was referred to as *al-Darghūtiyya*, or *al-Dūrghuniyya*, or *al-Sūghunji*. There is hardly any information about it and it was apparently of limited importance; around the middle of the century its leaseholder paid only 200 *ḥalabiyya* silver coins per year.¹⁷

12. Then there was another *maṣbana* about which we know almost nothing except its name – *al-maghmūsiyya* – and the fact that in 1541 part of it was the object of a real-estate transaction between two major soap-producers, Ibn Mirān and Ibn Sharwīn.¹⁸

13. At a certain point in time Ṭurghūd ağa, an officer with the “feudal” cavalry (*za‘īm*) was put in charge (*mutawallī*) of the Khasseki Sultan endowment, simultaneously becoming responsible for soap-factory number 8. This dual capacity involved him deeply in everything connected with olive oil (a major staple collected as the proceeds of the particular villages that were part of the endowment, as well as an important element in the daily menu provided for the general public by that free soup-kitchen, often referred to as *imaret-i amire*). Toward the end of his career he set up an endowment of his own, which included a soap-factory bearing his name. Occasionally referred to as al-Ṭurghūdiyya it appears in our registers some time after his death in 1564. The Shāfi‘i kadi authorized the superintendent (*mutawallī*) of the newly established endowment, who was also in active service, being commanding officer of the Citadel garrison, to use an old dilapidated building for soap-production. The original text does not, however, use the term *inshā’* as one would expect, but rather *ta‘mīr*, indicating that the initial steps had been taken some time before. Nevertheless, during this year and the next as well, intensive excavation and construction activity went on around what was referred to as “the new” *maşbana*. Located in ‘*aqabat al-Zāhiriyya*, very near the factory described in No. 8 above, one wonders if the two were not actually one. Moreover, a casual remark about the building activity in the *maşbana* of Ṭurghūd beyi indicates that it had been known before by the name of ‘Ali Çelebi, the son-in-law of the late Ḥamza *effendi*. If that is so, then *maşbanas* 8 and 13 are identical. A few months later Ṭurghūd ağa’s endowment is described as consisting of two soap-factories¹⁹ – which gives us the final clue and offers a reasonable solution to the puzzle: al-Ṭurghūdiyya, which had its origins in al-Jad‘ashiyya, developed as a separate entity and became a new shop. Located close to the old one for all practical purposes it was regarded as an extension of it, and although the “old” and the “new” *maşbana* were distinguishable, the latter absorbed the former (probably incorporating it). No wonder, therefore, that although in 1565 the two were still regarded as separate, during the last third of the century al-Jad‘ashiyya (or *mawlānā efendi Ḥamza*) is not referred to again.²⁰

Al-Ṭurghūdiyya was one of the most active establishments in the field, and its pits were regularly used to store the oil of Khasseki Sultan endowment as well as that of both the Jerusalem and the Hebron (*al-ḥaramayn al-sharifayn*) endowments. It was apparently highly coveted by the major soap producers who tried to outbid one another for its lease. In 1575 and then in 1585 part of its equipment went out of commission and had to be repaired. Throughout the years there was a special link between this *maşbana* and the military commanders of the citadel who time after time were put in charge of its routine functioning.²¹

14. East of the olive-oil market, in ‘*aqabat al-sitt* street, a new soap-factory appeared in 1578. It was part of an endowment recently established by the


late Jār Allāh *efendi*. It contained two cauldrons and all other necessary equipment, and was rented for 60 gold coins per year. The lessees were a variegated group: religious functionaries (a Shāfiʿī kadi, the *ʾimām* – prayer leader – of the al-Aqṣā mosque), military personnel and merchants – either individually or in mixed groups. From the outset substantial sums of money were invested in repairs and improvements in both structure and equipment. These investments were necessary to achieve high standards of production and they also generated an impressive rise in income. In 999, the *hijrī* year equivalent to 1590–1 the overall income was 1280 *qīṭʿa*, the following year it dropped to 730; then in 1592–3 it rose as high as 4500 *qīṭʿa*.²²

15. Another soap-factory that became very active as of the late fifties was *al-Bayrāmiyya*. It was located in Bāb al-ʿAmud quarter, which had several such plants as well as oil-presses. This was not an altogether new *maṣbana*: it had operated during the very first years of Ottoman rule under the name of *al-khawājā* Zāhid, a merchant who must have owned it in Mamluk times. Twenty-five per cent of it was sold in 1514 for the very low price of 525 *dirham*. In 1542 when it was partially disintegrating, it was bought by al-Sukkarī who undertook its repair. In 1546 it was being run as a relatively low-key operation by a partnership in which Tāj al-Dīn b. Aḥmad al-Sukkarī held 50%. Toward the end of that year these Sukkarī’s 50% plus an adjacent enclosure (*ḥawsh*) was purchased by a *sipāhi* officer, Bayrām Jāwīsh for 100 *qubruṣī* gold coins. This was only one of a long list of properties Bayrām Jāwīsh amassed in Jerusalem and its vicinity as well as in Gaza. He included it all in a very impressive endowment he set up in the course of the 1540s and early 1550s. The income that would accrue from his part of the soap-factory was earmarked for welfare in Jerusalem, particularly on a hospice (*ribāʿī*) for the poor that he built in *wād al-ṭawāḥīn* street. Once the factory had been made into an endowment, money was invested in its repair and possibly in enlarging it, as a result of which both its productivity and its value increased. In 1560 Bayrām himself rented the same 50% for an annual 30 *sulṭānī* gold coins. After his death the *maṣbana* was neglected by his heirs and by 1563 its rent had dropped to approximately 18 *sulṭānī* per year. Then a series of repairs carried out during the years 1564, 1567, and 1570 raised its rental value by 20%. Moreover, the leaseholders were actually paying much more: in 1571, for example, an additional 45 gold coins – i.e. 200% more – was spent on repairs.

This soap-factory remained a partnership with the other 50% divided equally between the descendants of a Hebronite kadi and members of the Ibn Zurayq-Ḥasūna family. When Bayram Jāwīsh’s daughter married the *alay beyi* of Jerusalem the factory’s economic “pull” increased. The marriage cemented bonds with the district’s “feudal” elements – men who headed many of the surrounding villages that were the source of supply of olive oil. In 1582 all the partners leased it to the chief builder (*mīmar baṣī*) of Jerusalem who undertook to pay an annual rent of 30 gold coins for four

consecutive years and to spend the entire 120, plus an additional 20 gold coins, on development. Such willingness on the part of shrewd businessmen to spend much higher amounts than the agreed upon annual rent is the best indication of the soundness and increasing value of this economic enterprise. The various partners were so anxious to develop the venture that in 1573 they took over an adjoining courtyard with a small mosque and turned it into a storage area and dumping ground.²³

16. We have mentioned the Ibn Zurayq family several times in this chapter, as well as earlier in this book. In connection with soap-production two of them were apparently minor partners in the *al-Bayramiyya* soap-factory. Another one owned a small part of the *al-maslakh* factory. Others appear in our registers time and again as well-to-do merchants in Jerusalem who handled consignments of olive-oil and soap. But their most interesting, and perhaps most important role in the local economy was that of *entrepreneurs*. A detailed legal document issued by the Ḥanafī kadi of Jerusalem on June 14, 1544, tells the story of how they built a totally new *maṣbana*. Two Ibn Zurayq brothers authorized a third brother, Badr al-Dīn Ḥasan, alias Ḥasūna, to dispose freely of a plot of land they owned in common in the Banī ʿAlam quarter. It was located in the middle of a much larger tract of land that belonged to the family. It also bordered to the south on “the Jewish synagogue.” Ḥasan was specifically permitted by his brothers (and this in turn was confirmed by the local kadi) to build a new *maṣbana* on this land (*ʿan yuʿammira wa-yunshiʿa*). The entire enterprise must have been considered of great public importance since the relevant document was not issued only by one kadi (the Mālikī in this case); it was formally confirmed and sanctioned by his Ḥanafī and Shafīʿī counterparts. So Ḥasan set to work, spending about 60,000 silver *qīṭʿa* on plans, excavation, building materials, fees and other expenses. Finally the project was ready and production started at once. The factory was improved and enlarged in later years and was therefore referred to as “the big *maṣbana*,” that of al-Sharaf or al-Ḥayādira quarter. Although situated in the Jewish quarter this was not mentioned in its name, probably by way of distinguishing it from the *maṣbana* that was already there (see above, p. 68). Throughout the century “the big *maṣbana*” belonged to the Ibn Zurayqs who constantly enlarged it, as attested to by a decree sent in 1595 from Istanbul to Jerusalem. It forbade them to continue using a water-cistern they had unlawfully monopolized for their soap-factory, ordering them to return it immediately to the public bathhouse (an al-Aqṣā endowment) to which it actually belonged. This was essentially a mini-water-system that collected the run-off rainwater from the surrounding roofs into one central storage well – absolutely essential for the public bath and useful for the private soap-factory. There is no indication as to whether the decree was finally implemented and the bathhouse rendered operative again. But as this case dragged on for some 40 years with the various local kadis issuing explicit orders – it can be taken as a good sign of



3. The minaret of the al-ʿUmarī mosque in the Jewish quarter of Jerusalem.

the tenacity of the Ibn Zurayqs, as well as of the growing needs and increasing demand for the products of the “Ḥasūna *maşbana*.”²⁴

17. The soaring demand for soap – and undoubtedly the profits reaped by its producers – brought about the construction of yet another soap-factory. Two brothers, both merchants, sons of the Jerusalem merchant known as Ibn ‘Usayla, bought a lot in the Jewish quarter opposite the slaughterhouse; the remains of two dilapidated buildings could still be discerned on the site. In mid 1565 they received a written building permit from the Ḥanafi kadi and it was reconfirmed the next year. Construction extended over three consecutive years (mid 1566 to the end of 1569), and involved the digging of 10 oil-storage pits and 2 water-cisterns, the erection of an elongated stone building supported by a series of new vaults, the installation of a cauldron and preparatory work for a second one. The overall expenditure amounted to 710 *sultānī* gold coins. Construction of this sizeable building on a relatively small plot of land ruined parts of the narrow roads (just under 6 feet wide) adjacent to it. The developers therefore undertook not merely to restore the roads, but to widen them and thereby adapt them to serve an industrial enterprise.²⁵

18. The soap boom did not subside until the end of the century. In mid 1588 an official document issued by the local kadi attested to the construction of yet another soap-factory in Bāb al-‘Amūd quarter. The same pattern seems to have repeated itself: an old, neglected “water-melon caravan-saray” (*khān al-biṭṭīkh*) had been allowed to fall into disrepair. A religious functionary (the *‘imām* of the Dome of the Rock) purchased the plot and had a new soap-factory constructed there. Eleven years later, when the *‘imām* sold half his share (25% of the entire enterprise) he received 500 *sultānī* gold coins, a figure conspicuously higher than any price quoted before in similar details – further proof of the inflated value of soap-producing facilities.²⁶

Olive oil

Olive oil was the most important ingredient in the process of soap-production. In its pure form it also constituted a major component of the daily diet of the various social and ethnic groups that made up Ottoman society. It served another function as well, being used for illumination both in private houses and public institutions.

Due to the Mediterranean climate and soil composition, altitude etc., the olive became one of the most common trees of Palestine’s landscape. The mountainous hinterland of Jerusalem, conceived broadly as including the entire area stretching northward to Nablus and Jinīn, and southward to Hebron and its immediate vicinity, had been rich in olive plantations for centuries. As a matter of fact the local population drew a clear distinction between old trees, *rūmānī* (“Roman”), that had been bearing for well over

a thousand years, and the *islāmī* ("Muslim"), i.e. those that had been producing olives for only a few hundred years. The difference was not just historical: there was a meaningful disparity in terms of yield, the more recent trees giving less fruit. This botanical fact received administrative confirmation in that by formal decree of the Ottoman *kanunname* for Jerusalem: the tax collected for "Romans" was higher per tree than that levied for "Muslims."²⁷

Though the olives themselves were of some culinary importance, this had very limited economic relevance. Taxes – assessed and collected in kind – were not calculated in accordance with weight or volume of fruit yielded, but rather in terms of the quantity of their by-product – oil. Usually pressed in the villages, although sometimes in Jerusalem itself, olive oil was either collected by parties entitled to it (*sipahi* "feudal lords," tax collectors, superintendents of religious endowments) or sold to merchants. It was not like other commodities that were simply bought and sold; olive oil was apparently in such great demand that merchants bought it in the villages (either personally or through commercial and local agents) well in advance.

The common pattern was for town people of adequate means to negotiate with village heads (*ra'īs*, p. *ru'asā'*) and strike a deal. The villagers undertook to provide an agreed-upon quantity of oil and deliver it in town to the very home of the buyers (be they ordinary merchants, military personnel, religious functionaries, or high-ranking administrative agents). When the merchandise was available the purchasers paid in full and it was supplied to the customer almost immediately. Such deals were apparently quite common and did not involve any particular formalities, hence there are hardly any references to them in the court proceedings – except, of course, in cases where something went wrong.

Another kind of transaction was recorded very frequently in our registers – those were "future" deals. The villagers did not sell the actual merchandise, but "rights" to it: merchants (and others) who wanted to ensure that they got all the oil they needed, were willing to pay for it several months in advance, before the olives even ripened, let alone were pressed to extract the oil. The villagers (usually their elders and heads) served as go-betweens, collected a down-payment in cash (called *ra'smāl*, "capital") and undertook to provide the goods within a specified period: a few months, even a year. In other words the anticipated yield was virtually mortgaged not only when the budding olives were already visible and the potential crop could be assessed, but even during or at the end of the previous season. These transactions took place before there was any sign of the next year's fruit or any way of knowing how the season might turn out. This kind of economic interaction would seem to have introduced an element of stability into the village economy as it enabled the peasants to invest funds in other crops or enterprises (olive trees hardly needed any cash investment). From the perspective of Jerusalem this commercial pattern is the best possible indication of the

town's growing demand for olive oil. The small number of complaints or reports of legal cases in which villagers were sued for not complying with the agreed conditions means that upon maturity the merchandise was promptly delivered. The villagers honored their promises as they wanted the rest of the money due them; at the same time, private consumers and factory owners in town could rely upon a steady supply of oil for their own purposes.

Although olive oil could be preserved for a long time without losing its taste or nutritive value, potential customers in Jerusalem were more interested in the freshly pressed oil from the current yield. No other item on the long list of foodstuffs grown and consumed in Palestine (except barley, which underwent a procedure similar to oil) was so minutely checked and meticulously reported. The maturing of the olives and extraction of new oil was carefully recorded and the importance of this procedure was such that vague testimony was unacceptable. Conclusive proof as well as eye-witness testimony had to be brought to the local court: in the presence of a special delegate of the *sancakbeyi*, usually his *subaşı*, dependable peasants (*ʿāyān*) from olive-growing villages presented themselves to the Ḥanafī judge and personally attested to the ripening of the new crop. They gave a very precise and detailed deposition: representatives of more than one village – sometimes from as many as seven villages from various parts of the district²⁸ had to cite exactly the same date. The list of villages participating in this ritual was not fixed: every year other names were mentioned, and very often eye-witnesses were accompanied by a rather vaguely defined “elder” of their region (*shaykh bilād Banī Zayd*). Most of the peasants came from villages in the district of Jerusalem that were north and north-west of the town. Occasionally villagers from the district of Nablus (Salfīt, Mardā) also appeared and were regarded as equally reliable sources. No evidence is quoted of eye-witnesses from any southern villages in the Jerusalem district although there were olive-groves there too. This may have been related to climatic reasons: the cooler areas were most suitable for olive-growing, and larger consignments of oil came to Jerusalem from the villages to the north. The dates reported fluctuated, but on the whole ranged from the middle of August to the end of September; sometimes the very same date is cited for two different years (e.g. August 19 for both 1560 and 1574).

“The ripening of the olives” (*istiwāʾ al-zaytūn*) in the district of Jerusalem was not merely reported by the people concerned. They had to present the court with tangible proof in the form of a quantity of “new oil” such as they had just described in the following terms: it had been recently pressed, brought into town, sold there as well as in the villages and consumed by the public (*ʿuntufīʿa bihi*, *ʿakalū minhu*). A variety of vessels in which a significant quantity (two *raʿl* on one occasion) of this oil was actually brought into the court is mentioned in the records: *muḥallabat fukhkhār*, *ʿakka*, *hashshat fukhkhār*, *zibdiyyet fukhkhār*. After being given to the kadi the oil had to be checked by the members of the court and confirmed by the official court wit-

nesses; finally the kadi himself officially endorsed it. In later years the head of the merchants (*bazar başı*), as well as oil-merchants (*zayyât*) and other experts (usually the person in charge of the oil scales, *qabbân al-zayt*) confirmed the facts in court. From that moment on the "new oil" referred to in all the deals became marketable in Jerusalem and could be delivered to customers. Shortly afterwards the price was set and became binding for all future oil transactions.²⁹

Practically everyone in Jerusalem bought relatively small quantities of oil (a few *raṭls* in some cases, several dozen in others). Some of it was stored at home (Jerusalem houses had a basement or den for this purpose) and was used throughout the year as a basic component of the daily cuisine. Larger consignments (a few *qintârs* of 100 *raṭl* each) were usually purchased by more affluent people, many of whom well in advance secured an adequate supply of better quality oil for the right price. Although not delicate by nature, olive trees yielded quantities that varied from year to year. Usually a good harvest was followed by a poorer one and unexpected weather conditions (e.g. a heat-wave while the flowers were budding or strong winds that could shake off the young, still-weak fruit) could wreak havoc with the yield. The advanced purchases of oil therefore were more important to safeguard an uninterrupted supply of this vital commodity than to defend the consumer against unexpected price-hikes. If the supply was abundant, the additional quantities were purchased in town.

Camels usually transported the oil into town, each one carrying a load of four vessels (*ẓarf*). The merchants who specialized in this field (*jallābī al-zayt*) were not allowed to sell oil wherever they chose. Unlike most foodstuffs brought into town which had to be weighed in the *wakāla* caravan-sarai and sold in the central market (*sūq al-sultān*), olive oil had to be unloaded, weighed and sold in a special location – *khān al-zayt*. Smaller consignment, or those sold in advance in the villages, were delivered according to prearranged conditions, i.e. to the very house of their buyers. All the rest – by far the largest quantity – was sold at the olive-oil market, where it was available to everyone (*yubāʿ li'l-khāṣṣ wa'l-ʿāmm*).³⁰ A special scale-beam (*qabbān*) was installed there, and incoming consignments were first weighed then either sold directly or kept in the special storage areas in the *khān*. Both the *khān* and the scale were part of the endowment of the hospital named after Saladin (*al-bimāristān al-ṣalāhi*), hence all their income was earmarked for upkeep of the hospital. In practice this meant that the person who leased the *khān* and scale was entitled to collect a fee levied on each camel-load of three *dirham ḥalabi* ($\frac{2}{3}$ for the weighing, the rest for the *khān*). In the very early sixties 33% was added to the fee without authorization, but subsequently was explicitly prohibited when the merchants complained.

Although conducting business in the olive-oil market was a well established routine, there were merchants who occasionally avoided it. By doing so they deprived the endowment of some of its income, the local authorities

of their price-control mechanism, and the religious court of its administrative relevance. These merchants sold under less formal conditions either in their homes, by the *raṭl*, or in the soap-factories where the oil was later stored. Storing oil in the pits of a soap-factory was very common, but weighing it there was frowned upon and unauthorized. Explicit orders were sent to Jerusalem therefore warning against such action and in certain cases the people involved were even brought to justice. The recurrence of such warnings in different years and repeated announcements about the matter by the town criers clearly indicates that the violations were not just a few unrelated episodes but represented a lucrative technique that many resorted to despite established custom and the specific prohibition. In 1549, 1556, 1558, 1559, 1560 and in 1583 (when a Jew was accused of having imported oil in this fashion from the northern district of Nablus), repeated attempts were made to put an end to this unauthorized commercial pattern, from which one may



4. The *Sūq al-Sulṭān* (Sultan's market), a typical *khān* in Jerusalem.

assume that it had acquired serious dimensions. But neither warnings, reprimands nor actual punishment (fines or even flogging, *taʿzīr*) stopped the practice. Substantial profits seem to have accrued from this activity, which amounted to smuggling oil into town particularly during years when burgeoning demand exceeded supply.

Other indications confirm this: in an attempt to keep the merchants from circumventing the oil-scale, the fees they had to pay for the use of these facilities were substantially reduced: as of 1564 the *qabbānī* would collect only 1 *dirham* per camel-load from his customers (he was compensated by a fee of 2 *ʿuthmānī* a day from the endowment). This, however, did not seem to make the job less attractive: in 1564 it was leased for 26 gold coins per year, in 1574 an annual 40 *sulṭānī* gold coins were paid for the lease, the following year it was leased for 45, whereas in 1589 new leaseholders were paying 180 per year. At the end of the century though, this tendency seems to have been reversed: the income of the *khān* and the olive-oil scale was leased out for 80 gold coins, less than half of the 1589 figure, but still much higher than the sums levied during the first half of the century.³¹

The rising cost of the lease of the olive-oil scale in Jerusalem during the second half of the century coincided with the increasing activity of the soap-factories there. Both phenomena resulted from, and then caused, a growing demand for olive oil in the town. Demographic developments described elsewhere in this work had a share in bringing about this trend; economic developments too contributed to pushing the curve of oil-consumption up further. More people simply bought more oil and soap; improved living conditions meant, among other things, consuming more of these commodities. But the quantity of oil purchased in the sixteenth century was not only related to its triple role as foodstuff, raw material and fuel. Oil served as a means of tax-collection and was also used for short- and intermediate-term investments.

Agricultural produce was the major source of taxation in early Ottoman Palestine and the rate levied was calculated as a given percentage of the annual yield. This was true for income due to the treasury (either local or imperial), as well as for sums collected for religious endowments. The abundance of olive trees in Palestine (and in other parts of the Ottoman empire as well) put them into a category by themselves, although all other trees were taxed simply as "trees" ("vineyards" were in a separate category). Taxes were levied in kind, but from the very first years of Ottoman rule olives as such were never collected. When they ripened they were picked, pressed, their oil extracted – and a certain percentage of the oil was then delivered to the tax collectors. The following formulation occurs very often in our registers: the *sancakbeyi* (or his deputy, or a *sipahi* "feudal" officer, or the superintendent of a given endowment) was entitled to a certain quantity of olive oil from the peasants of a given village. This was collected "in return for the share (*qasm*, *muqāsama*) [tax] of the yield of olives of the

above-mentioned village [. . .] for the year [. . .].” Moreover, a close study of tax collection in practice as it emerges from the court proceedings reveals that olive oil plays a much greater role in the system than one might have surmised.

In view of the variety of agricultural produce taxed “in kind” one may wonder about the practical aspects: How was the “taxing” actually done and where could all the produce be stored? With respect to Jerusalem – and there is no reason to consider it as any different from other provinces – it can now be determined that olive oil served as a means of payment for other items as well. It had, in fact, many advantages over other foodstuffs: it was relatively easy to transport and store, was almost immune to damage inflicted by natural causes and also maintained a steady value over an extended period of time. One seldom comes across references to taxing sheep, or beehives or vineyards “in kind” – although these were widespread agricultural branches in the villages around Jerusalem. More often, but much less frequently than might be expected (assuming that practice coincided with theory), grains (barley and wheat, sometimes lentils) were collected. Taxes were generally paid in olive oil or in gold coins. The relatively large quantities of oil brought to Jerusalem by the district’s villagers are also explained by the annual *mīrī* tax they had to pay. The superintendents of the endowment of the holy shrines in Jerusalem and Hebron (*al-ḥaramayn* or *al-waqfayn al-sharīfayn*) took an active hand in this matter. When the olive season approached, a special emissary (referred to as “the clerk of the oil due to the two endowments”) was sent to the villages to look after the interests of the endowments and ensure that the appropriate quantities and quality of oil would be provided. Since nothing was taken for granted, least of all the supply of precious olive oil, this “clerk” was held responsible for the villagers’ fulfilment of their duties and liabilities. If he did not fulfil his function properly, it meant that someone else obtained the lion’s share of that year’s yield and the endowment did not get the olive oil it was entitled to. This was regarded as a very serious offense and he was punished accordingly: he was sentenced to flogging (*taʿzīr*) and immediately received 39 blows (“whips,” *sawt*) in public.

Other high-ranking functionaries were also deeply involved in olive oil commerce, many of them military personnel: Janissaries stationed in the Citadel, their commanding officers, including even the commander-in-chief of the Citadel (*dizdar*), *sipahi* officers residing in Jerusalem. Religious dignitaries (*ʿulamāʾ*) serving in various official capacities were also very often involved in this trade on their own account. The governor of Jerusalem himself (through the services of someone delegated for this purpose) also sold olive oil that was either levied as part of his appanage or simply purchased for him. All of these – and, naturally, transactions engaged in by merchants for whom this was bread and butter – involved substantial quantities of oil. Part of it must have been stored in private houses in

earthenware jugs (*jarra*) of five and ten *raṭls* each kept in special containers or cisterns (*ṣihrij*).³² Another part was stored in the soap-factories³³ which usually contained an average of ten deep pits, each pit with a capacity of a few dozen *qinṭārs* (each approximately 300 kg.). In other words tens of tons made their way to Jerusalem every month during the season, but a large percentage was stored away for later use.³⁴

From the economic standpoint, the storage of oil was regarded as an investment. This was true for individuals, and much more so in the case of institutions. A large proportion of the income of a major endowment like that of the two sanctuaries of Jerusalem and Hebron (*al-ḥaramayn al-sharīfayn*) was collected and preserved, as stated above, in the form of oil. Whenever money was needed to provide for any of the institutions maintained by this endowment (e.g. to purchase foodstuffs for the free soup-kitchens of the Cave of the Patriarchs in Hebron) oil was taken out of the soap-factory pits and auctioned to the highest bidder.³⁵ The most profitable exploitation of this oil, however, as well as the best way to stockpile it for a long time without fear that it might spoil, was to keep it in the more durable state of soap.


Soap production

Soap was made primarily though not exclusively of olive oil. Its preparation (the usual verb used was "cooking," *ṭabkh*) involved the addition of alkali (*qali* in Arabic, *kaliye taṣ* i.e. "stones of alkali" in Turkish). This was usually provided by the bedouin tribes through intermediary merchants (*jallāba*), who prepared bulk consignments of certain desert bushes burnt to ashes by the suppliers themselves. (The French merchants who exported these in later years to be used in the soap industry in France called them "*cendres*," i.e. ashes). Scattered references in our registers indicate that some alkali was sent in Egyptian boats from Rosetta to Jaffa, but getting the supply from the bedouins was the usual pattern. Sometimes the soap-merchants themselves went to the desert to find the suppliers, and sometimes they sent their representatives. This innocuous item was apparently regarded as of considerable mercantile value, hence the attempts of some governors to levy a 10% tax on it. When in 1566 the soap-makers guild (*sabuncı taifesi*) complained about this to Istanbul the unauthorized tax was abolished.³⁶

A substantial quantity of oil, usually 17 *qinṭārs* (about 5000 kg.) was cooked in a cauldron (in most cases copper) for several days, sometimes for a week or two. As the cooking proceeded, alkali ashes and smaller quantities of lime (*shīd*) were added. When ready, the soap was left to cool, after which it was cut into cakes (slate (*lawḥa*) was the original term used) according to a given shape and size and left to dry. This meant that the newly manufactured soap, still soft and bearing the green color of olive oil (hence called

“green soap”) was spread to dry in a special section of the factory. Since this was a long process and involved great quantities, this special section (*mafrash*) was covered with layers of soap piled into huge round hollow cones built up row on row in latticework fashion. This was done in order to both facilitate the flow of air and make the best possible use of the limited space available (the technical term used was *shabk* or *tashbīk*, i.e. interweaving, making a “net-like” form). The soap might remain there for many months, until it was sold and shipped out.

The entire soap-production process from the very beginning until the final cakes were cut was carried out by special experts, “soap-makers” (*ṣānīʿ al-ṣābūn*, *maṣābīnī*, *ṣabbān*). Their services were hired by the *entrepreneurs* who had rented the factory (or a cauldron in it) and provided the raw materials. The professional qualifications of the experts had to be checked and confirmed by the head of their guild, *shaykh al-muʿallimīn fī ṭabkh al-ṣābūn*, who was nominated by the kadi.³⁷ This nomination was made at the request of the members of the guild. In the middle of 1564, for example, twelve members – all soap-makers, none of them even related to the families who leased or owned the factories – came to the Ḥanafī kadi with a specific request “that master [*al-muʿallim*] Khalīl ibn Muṣṭafā be their *shaykh* in the practice and preparation of soap manufacturing in Jerusalem. They will not object to any of his instructions, be they major or minor [matters] concerning this occupation [*ṣināʿa*]; they will obey him and act according to his orders.” Thereupon the kadi agreed and made the requested appointment. A decade later the man was still in charge of the guild, looking after the interests of its members as well as constantly checking the standard of their work. Some twenty-five years later, when a conflict broke out among some members of the guild as to the professional proficiency of their head, the kadi had to intervene and reconfirm the same person as the guild’s *shaykh*. As this case was being heard it also emerged that although these professional experts, the *maṣābīnīs*, were hired to work in the factory by its leaseholders, there was another functionary – “the director” of the soap-factory – who acted as middleman between the *maṣābīnīs* and the leaseholders.³⁸ The experts were not considered permanently employed in any specific factory, though in practice they probably were associated with one place for an extended period. The “director,” on the other hand, was permanently employed and acted as plant superintendent (*amīn*, *mutakallim*). Employed by the leaseholders or owners he was in full charge of the factory’s activities. Its keys were in his possession, he regularly inspected the state of its equipment, saw to its proper functioning and to the safekeeping of its contents. The high demand for oil, and the value of the soap made these factories lucrative targets for burglars. Installing heavy doors and locks were not sufficient deterrents; in some cases the walls themselves were broken through and merchandise stolen. The night-watch (*ʿasas*) whose task it was to protect these places seemed helpless, so the only way to prevent such misfortunes



5. The old Ottoman technique of drying soap-cakes (*tashbik*), still in use in a Nablus soap-factory.

was for the superintendent to sleep inside the soap-factory. So this too became one of his duties.³⁹

All these steps were taken for the purpose of providing the best possible production conditions. Although every Jerusalemite was a potential customer, people who did not own olive-oil consignments did not order soap to be made for them and sold on a retail basis directly from the factory. The soap was produced for the owners themselves or, more usually, by lessees who had rented the place for a given time, either for a shorter or longer period. Very often a person who availed himself of an oil consignment would decide to have it made into soap. He himself may not have been a merchant or a soap-producer (e.g. the local kadi or just an ordinary *‘ālim*, a Janissary soldier, a *sipahi* “feudal” officer),⁴⁰ so he would rent a cauldron for 3–4 weeks (or longer, if he had the means) to have one “dish” (*ṭabkha*) or more cooked on his account. The usual rate for such a lease was four to five *sultānī* gold coins, but towards the end of the century growing demand occasionally pushed the price up to six, and even seven. These sums were paid either to the holders and directors of the endowment to which the factory or its building belonged, or to the owners of the equipment installed in the building.⁴¹ This money could also be regarded as a sub-lease, granted by the person who had rented the facility on an annual basis and was usually considered the actual holder of the soap-factory. In many cases he renewed the lease for several years consecutively. Although the owners or lessees of the factories were usually involved in large transactions, they occasionally participated in smaller deals involving the purchase of olive-oil and production of soap.

In most cases the owners or lessees can be identified throughout the century. They were, for all practical purposes, the soap-producers of Jerusalem. Some of the family names have already appeared in this chapter: Ibn Zurayq, Ibn Jāmūs (originally from Ramle), Ibn Mirān, Ibn Sharwīn, Ibn Sammūm, Ibn al-Duhayna, Ibn Abi Sharīf. Others were equally important as long-term leaseholders: Ibn kadi al-Salt, Ibn kātīb al-zayt, al-‘Usayli or al-‘Asalī, Ibn al-‘Anbūsi, Ibn Shuqrūq.⁴² At one point (1584) a list of about fifty names is given for soap-producers, including one identified as a Janissary, three as kadis. All the rest – and this was true for most producers any other year as well – had two things in common: in our immediate context they were designated as soap-producers, but in a wider sense they were referred to as “merchants” (*tājir*), and bore the corroborative title of *khawāja* (sometimes *khōja*). Their involvement in soap-production was never their exclusive occupation; mercantile activity in other fields either anteceded or followed it. Their titles, the amount of money they invested in this business, and in a few cases even the properties they bequeathed indicate that they were people of substantial means. The average annual rate they paid for their lease, in most cases ranged from fifty to sixty gold coins but it could run as high as two hundred.⁴³ Since they could not – and probably never intended to – be the only users of the *maṣbana* facilities, as described

above, they routinely sub-let them to various bidders for short periods thus being partially compensated for their initial investment. It is hard to tell whether this occupation was their major one, and its relative importance may have changed in the course of years – either for the same person or his heirs. One common denominator, however, emerges clearly: the two different lines were never completely separated; these people did not stop being merchants upon becoming *entrepreneurs*, they merely diversified their activity.

The production of soap was a channel in which prosperous merchants could invest their money, increase their property and expand their trade. But now they traded in soap. In other words although they specialized in olive oil and soap (and were referred to as “those who buy oil and prepare soap”), the modern concept of division of functions did not apply in their case; the industrial *entrepreneur* and merchant – sometimes even called by the dual title “a soap-maker merchant” (*min al-tujjār al-ṣabbāna*) – actually converged in one person whose dual loyalty did not prevent him from being equally interested in promoting the two different activities. This peculiar aspect of their enterprise explains why they were not formally included in the soap-makers guild: although deeply involved in this field they were still regarded as part of the merchants’ guild (*ṭā’ifa*) headed by a *ra’īs al-tujjār*. Thus they were simply “merchants who prepare soap” (*al-tujjār al-ladhīna yaṭbakhūna al-ṣābūn*).⁴⁴

Before we proceed any further with our description and analysis of the process of soap-production in Jerusalem, two points related to other centers of production in Palestine – Ramle and Nablus – should be made. Although Jerusalem’s merchants were very deeply involved in this industry in their own town, they did not limit their activity only to it. Since their merchandise came from villages all over the district and even beyond its boundaries, they occasionally traveled there to inspect potential “hunting grounds,” and thus became aware of other business possibilities. In one case, for example, in mid-1535 a merchant from Jerusalem bought a dilapidated soap-factory from a local merchant in the town of Ramle. A week later he established an endowment for his family and in court had to fight the other party’s attempt to wrest it from him on false pretenses. This was, no doubt, a way for the Jerusalemite to increase the production capacity at his disposal, and it also put him in a better position to purchase oil from adjacent villages. In a wider context, this also increased the economic importance of Jerusalem *vis-à-vis* other towns in Palestine.⁴⁵

This statement may seem questionable in light of what we think we know about the importance of Nablus in the field of soap-production. It was indeed a major part of the Nablus economy for many years, and is described as such, for example by Ibn Battuta in the fourteenth century.⁴⁶ It did not, however, compete in any way with Jerusalem until the late Ottoman period, when Nablus soap became the best in Palestine. During the late Mamluk

period Jerusalem (and to some extent Ramle) consumed a substantial part of the Nabulsi oil. "For many years before that" – i.e. the year 1485 – "olive oil used to arrive from *jabal* Nablus and be sold in Jerusalem and Ramle."⁴⁷ The same was true for the sixteenth century, and for a few more years as well, when Jerusalem maintained its primacy as the major producer of soap in Palestine, perhaps even in greater Syria.

The soap industry in Jerusalem was highly beneficial for the town's economy. Its development in the course of the sixteenth century meant more jobs, more intensive activity and higher income for the various families (at least 80 identified positively, and 20 more likely) involved in the various stages of production. Alongside the obvious advantages it brought to the town some damaging side effects. The most serious was ecological: as early as 1555, when soap production was just picking up, the quantities of waste left over after completion of the production process naturally increased. The *entrepreneurs* could not dispose of it outside their *maşbanas* since these were located, as we have pointed out, in residential areas. The "soap-factories' dirt" (*turābn al-maṣābin*) which early on, i.e. in 1544, had constituted no problem was now being dumped in increasing quantities on both sides of the city walls. These growing piles of refuse became a health hazard to the local inhabitants and also endangered the walls. A formal complaint was eventually filed by a local merchant whose land was being thus misused and the kadi intervened. He prohibited the practice not so much on grounds of public interest but rather because it involved trespassing on private property. Although there is no further information as to whether and how this specific case was solved, the wider aspects of the problem were not satisfactorily addressed. A case reported in the early seventies confirms beyond any doubt that the vicinity of the city walls was still regarded as a dump for soap-waste and fear was expressed that this might cause serious damage to the walls. We can only wonder whether the kadi's repeated threats were more effective this time.⁴⁸

Soap trade

The merchants fulfilled a dual role in soap-production. On the one hand, as described above, they provided the industry with funds and served as its main driving force. On the other hand, once the soap was ready for distribution they did more than just provide the local population with it; they sold it outside of Jerusalem, in other parts of Palestine and in more remote markets. It was sold in the rural areas around Jerusalem that had previously provided the town with olive oil and was also sent to Jericho, Nablus, Kafr Kanna in the Galilee and Gaza.⁴⁹ The population of Gaza was second in size only to that of Jerusalem so that town was a major consumer in its own right. Its principal involvement though, was in another aspect of the soap trade: it was a link in the long chain that brought the soap to Egypt. This upgraded

the activities of the soap-making merchants as those amongst them who became involved in this stage were exporting soap and became part of a busy inter-provincial trade which included importing goods to Palestine. They engaged in even more far-reaching trade as their soap was bought in a province as remote as the Yemen, where in 1565 the governor of Mawza^c imported a large consignment of it (along with some other items).⁵⁰ Its fame had spread much further than the Yemen and Jerusalem soap was in demand in various parts of the empire.

In view of the broad spectrum of Jerusalem merchants who dealt in soap one would naturally assume that not all of them were involved in exporting to Egypt. Only the more prosperous among them could afford the extra investment in cost of transport or to tie down part of their capital in a venture which was always protracted and sometimes hazardous. The merchants who became actually involved in international transactions did not constitute a separate category; the names that recur in this context are identical in most cases with those who had earlier purchased oil, had soap manufactured from it and then sold it to the highest bidder. (A certain merchant who had arrived in Jerusalem from elsewhere, took a wife and engaged in soap-production in the town, was referred to as exporting soap to Egypt "like the other merchants of Jerusalem.")⁵¹ In most cases these merchants did not go to Cairo themselves, but commissioned a close relative (a son, a brother) or some other authorized person to represent them.⁵²

They sent the merchandise either by sea or over land. The bulky nature of the product made sea transport most appropriate and it was shipped from either Jaffa or Gaza in the relatively small vessels that commuted between Egypt and the main ports of the Syrian coast. The overland passage – much simpler and more often used – was the caravan route that linked the two provinces. It is not hard to trace the exact itinerary followed. The merchandise was transported by camel from Jerusalem to Gaza where it was unloaded and stored (usually in *al-khān al-Mālī*). This was the shortest lap of the journey and the safest; no security precautions were called for. Once they left Gaza these small caravans were exposed to the hardships involved in traveling through the Sinai desert, and above all the danger of attack by nomadic bedouin tribes. Preparations had to be made before the travelers left the town: adequate supplies were accumulated, they waited until their small numbers were augmented either by other local caravans or arrivals from out of town, and they sought the services of some kind of security force (*rifq*). At certain points along the road a special tax (*khafar*) was levied: in Gaza itself, "to the bedouins" (*al-ʿarab*, elsewhere identified as *al-sawālīma*), in Qatiyya, and in Šālīhiyya. In this context two more check-posts were mentioned – ʾIsdūd and Khān Yūnus. All these locations between Gaza and Cairo were part of the historical Cairo–Damascus trade route known as the "sea road" (*via maris*).

A very detailed list compiled in Jerusalem in 1547 enables one to arrive at

some conclusions as to the special financial burdens such a commercial route involved, as well as its relative importance. A large soap consignment weighing more than 10 tons was calculated at 42,000 *qit'a ḥalabiyya*. About 20% of this sum – which actually represented 25% of the original cost – consisted of various expenses incurred on the road to Cairo. About one third of the 20% (2680 out of 8740) was paid for renting the camels to carry the consignment from Gaza to Cairo (compared to a mere 82 *ḥalabiyya* paid for transportation between Jerusalem and Gaza). The various taxes paid en route amounted to another 25% of the 8740 and the rest went to defray sundry expenses at both ends of the journey. In other words, although the overland route increased the price of soap in Cairo very substantially, demand was so great that the higher price was not a deterrent. Moreover, although the overland route cost more than twice the maritime alternative, it was regarded as the most reliable and was thus more frequently taken.⁵³

Special road-taxes (*khafar* or simply *bāj*) were mandatory, and were charged against each and every camel-load (*ḥiml*) of soap. To avoid it, during the first half of the century merchants would have their caravans skirt this main highway, by then renamed “the Sultan’s road” (*al-ḍarb al-sultānī*). Taking alternative routes saved a substantial sum of money on each journey. The kadi of Jerusalem therefore issued an order confirming once again the mandatory nature of the road tax for all merchants commuting between Cairo and Gaza and their obligation to abide by the specific Ottoman *kanun* enforcing it. Since this income belonged to the Imperial treasury (*khāss*), failure to pay it would be regarded as a serious offense, punishable by a fine of 100%.⁵⁴ Be that as it may, the local economy contributed directly to the state which derived immediate benefit from it: since the tax was perceived as a percentage of the overall volume sent, the growing soap export to Egypt meant increased returns.

The local economy, however, also looked for ways of enjoying this wind-fall and levied another tax – this time intended for the upkeep of the endowments of Jerusalem and Hebron. “The tax on soap-loads” (*rasm aḥmāl al-ṣābūn*) had to be paid at the gates of Jerusalem, (thereby circumventing evasions) at the rate of 16 *‘uthmānī* per camel-load. The proceeds accruing therefrom were then to be distributed between the Temple Mount endowment and that of the Cave of the Patriarchs in Hebron at a ratio of one and two thirds. Unlike the taxes collected along the road to Egypt which were levied during the early stages of Ottoman rule (they were couched in general terms that could include all merchandise traversing the road in both directions), this later tax was specifically for soap. The *sijill* refers to it as first mentioned in the Imperial Registers (*al-daftar al-khāqānī*) in 967 (1559–60), although it actually appears there some six years earlier.⁵⁵ In any event, as of the mid fifties, when the soap industry was gathering momentum, the new tax was introduced as a direct contribution to the local economy of the towns

that produced soap. Collection of this tax continued uninterruptedly until the end of the century.

Naturally enough there were attempts to dodge payment even of this relatively straightforward tax. In mid-1560 several cases were reported in which soap was sent to Egypt by sea, its owners claiming that maritime export was exempt from taxation. This was proved incorrect, hence the merchant was forced to pay.⁵⁶ Ways seem to have been found to cheat the endowments of Jerusalem and Hebron out of a meaningful share of these proceeds, hence other stratagems were tried. The head of the porters' guild was ordered to report any soap loaded by members of his guild to the authorities. During the 1580s, the tax was leased out to the Jewish tax collector in Cairo, Dā'ūd, in the hope that since all soap was funneled to the same destination, it would be easiest to track it down there. But here, again, reality proved more complex than theory, and various arrangements worked out between Dā'ūd and the soap merchants again worked to the disadvantage of the endowments' administration.⁵⁷ The search for ways and means to ensure effective collection of this tax continued to the very end of the century, and is a further indication of how lucrative the soap trade was. This was also confirmed by other signs, the most instructive of which was the willingness of those who held the lease to collect these taxes to increase their annual payments – no doubt because they anticipated a rise in income. From an annual sum of 150 gold coins in the years 1579–83 their payment rose to 200 in 1588/9, i.e. an increase of 33%.⁵⁸

In view of the widespread tax evasion, using tax income as a precise yardstick to measure the volume of soap export to Egypt would be misleading. The proceeds of the lease, however, can be taken as a reasonable indication of the level of export although in actuality it was doubtless higher. The standard for measuring a camel-load (*himl*) was not a precise one as it varied from town to town. In Jerusalem it was approximately 140 *raṭl*.⁵⁹ Multiplying this by 2.6 kg. gives about 400 kg. per *himl* (which was the average load at the time).⁶⁰ The 150 *sulṭānī* gold coins paid for the annual lease was the equivalent of 6000 silver aspers. If we divide them by 8 (16 *'uthmanīs* = 8 *para*) we reach an estimated minimum of 750 soap-loads, or 300 tons. An increase of 33%, as mentioned above, means 400 tons per year, and one reference even puts the figure for 1589 at about 700 tons.⁶¹

The increasing demand for soap and the growing profitability of its export seems to have encouraged wider circles – including the *mufī* of Jerusalem in 1594 – to indulge in this line of activity. Moreover, at certain stages or on certain dates the soap-factories in Jerusalem were producing at maximum capacity, and simply could not increase their production any more without raising their cost substantially. The only alternative left was to rely upon factories outside Jerusalem to back them up. There were, indeed, *maṣbanas* in other parts of Palestine: in Nablus, Ramle and Lydda. But whereas in

earlier years merchants from Nablus and Ramle sold oil to Jerusalem or bought its soap, in later years some of the factories in those towns were mobilized to support Jerusalem's production. They not only produced soap ordered by Jerusalemite merchants, but were also geared to increasing the soap-export to Egypt. The *mufti* for example sent olive oil to a soap-factory in Lydda where soap was produced and then sent to Egypt.⁶² The increasing flow of soap to Egypt may also somehow have been linked to the fluctuations in the transportation fees: the rate of 25% which had been established during the earlier part of the century did not change in 1556, but then they dropped to 15–20%: each camel-load, that usually sold in Cairo at 20–30 *sultānī* gold coins, was charged a lump-sum of 5 gold coins. Interestingly enough, the cost of soap consignments sent by sea remained at basically the same level: the overall sum for maritime transportation to Egypt, including shipment by boat up the Nile to Cairo plus various fees to the local *muḥtasib* and other parties, amounted to just under 20% for a medium-sized consignment of 7 tons sent in 1594.⁶³

Upon arriving in Cairo the soap was stored in the “soap caravansaray” (*wakālat al-ṣābūn*), also called the caravansaray of Qayṣūn, then gradually sold to local customers. This *wakāla*, identified by A. Raymond south of bāb al-Naṣr, was naturally located in the northern part of the city, i.e. at the end of the main road from Palestine, and it was there that Palestinians lived during the Ottoman period.⁶⁴ In other words, other items may also have been exported from Palestine to Egypt, but the most common and important item was Jerusalem (and much later Nabulsi) soap. Egyptian involvement with this soap was not only at the receiving end. The reputation (and perhaps also the price of the product) encouraged some Egyptians to commission soap to be produced in Jerusalem on their account. Such details were usually concluded when they came to Jerusalem as pilgrims (Jewish people on their holidays,⁶⁵ Muslims on *ziyāra* to their holy shrines) or ordinary visitors. They either purchased olive oil outright or placed an order for the coming season. When the soap was ready, it had to be sent to them in Cairo.

There was also a third way in which Cairo's economy was involved in the soap trade: in return for the money made for the sale of the soap (which was stored in the local *ḥāṣils*, where it could remain until a price was offered) the merchants from Palestine could purchase goods available in Egypt. The Jerusalem merchants who occasionally personally escorted their soap to Cairo were of course interested in being paid in gold coins (although sometimes they collected their price in Egyptian *nīṣṣ*). But in various years throughout the century it is clear from the registers that a substantial part of their income returned to Palestine in kind – that is through importing Egyptian goods. They imported quite a variety of items (e.g. rice, indigo, coffee, spices, Nubian slaves), but the most popular was cloth. Cloth could be sold in Jerusalem at a profit, thereby furthering the lucrative nature of soap trade with Egypt.⁶⁶

The high regard in which Jerusalem soap was held not only in Ottoman circles, but also by Christian “outsiders” is best illustrated by an unusual report filed with the kadi of Jerusalem toward the end of the century. Some time in 1591 a boat loaded with soap was intercepted near Cyprus, which was probably its destination. This was a consignment belonging to the “Jerusalemite masters” (*al-sāda al-maqādīsa*). Twenty or so merchants had eschewed the usual pattern of engaging in individual transactions and had combined their efforts, no doubt in an attempt to promote their merchandise in a new market, and possibly also to cut their expenses. Christian pirates (*ʿifranj*) seized the boat and its cargo, took them to Crete and sold the soap in the market there. Ordinarily, this would have been the end of such an episode. But when the pirates discovered who the owners of this soap were “they regarded it as a serious matter.” They sent word to Jerusalem informing the merchants that if they sent an envoy he would be given the exact sum of money the pirates had collected for the sale of the soap.

Apart from the insight this episode gives as to the workings of the soap trade (and, incidentally, to a surprising aspect of Muslim–Christian relations in the Mediterranean at that time) an important conclusion can be drawn therefrom: the soap-merchants of Jerusalem – as well as the Christian pirates – were anxious to keep a dialogue going, and of course were interested in financial compensation. This implies a wider scope of relations, or more simply – that Jerusalem soap was so famous and sought after that several years after the event (as reported in 1595) both parties deemed it useful to reopen negotiations on this matter. This could not have happened had there not been ongoing export of Jerusalem soap to some ports of the Christian world – even if only the closest ones – which in itself can be viewed as another very meaningful achievement.⁶⁷

Prices

Olive oil and soap were permanent items on the price-lists regularly announced by the kadi. The oil was one of the basic ingredients in the local population’s daily diet; soap was relatively more important than one might think in view of the limited quantities of water Jerusalem’s people had at their disposal. These products, however, were not as vital as meat, so their prices were seldom fixed and announced separately, but were adjusted along with the prices of a variety of other commodities. Such adjustments were made throughout the entire century, at an average rate of three–four times a year, practically every year. The price, quoted in *dirham ḥalabi* per *ʿuqiyya* (= $\frac{1}{12}$ of a *raṭl*), and occasionally also per *raṭl*, during the first half of the century gradually changed its format in the second half when the larger weight unit of *raṭl* was used more often; after the 1570s the price was quoted in *paras*. These changes were probably brought about by developing commercial patterns: as consumption of these commodities increased, the

most common and practical unit of weight – even for private small-scale buyers – became the *raṭl*. The rising price for both oil and soap (to some extent due to inflationary processes) forced the authorities to adjust the value of money of account. The smaller piece, the *dirham* or *qiṭʿa ḥalabiyya* were not discontinued but were gradually replaced by the *para* coins, each of which was worth 5 *dirhams*.

There were two categories of oil and three of soap. Oil was designated as “good” (*ṭayyib*) or second quality (*mā dūnahu*, *muʿakkar*, . *al-khull* literally: “lower than it,” “opaque” and “sour,” respectively). The best soap was “good” or “dry” (*yābis*, *qādiḥ*), second best “green” or “waxed” (*akḥḍar*, *mushammaʿ*) and lowest quality was “spread out [to dry]” (*al-mafrūsh*, *min al-mafrash*). During the first half of the century only two categories of soap were advertised and sold; the third category emerged only about 1550 after which it never disappeared. The growing demand and increased production were responsible for the introduction of the third category – the freshly produced soap, still spread out to dry (on that part of the factory assigned for this specific stage of production, *al-mafrash*), and purchased “half baked” as it were, before it had even reached the secondary quality of “green” soap. In its “dry” form soap was easiest to store and transport and of course much more economical to use – hence its higher price.

On the whole the price of olive oil was either lower than that of soap or equal to it. In some cases, however, it was set at a higher level, mostly in the fifteen thirties and forties – that is, when soap consumption was still relatively low. During the second half of the century olive oil was somewhat cheaper than first quality soap, costing the same as the second grade “green.” The most meaningful comparison, though, was not between the different items but rather within each particular series and in connection with each item separately throughout the entire period. If we consider olive oil, it becomes clear that price fluctuation was an ongoing phenomenon, although there was a certain pattern to the fluctuation: in most cases a year of relatively low prices is followed by one of higher prices. This might not come as a surprise to one who is acquainted with the reality of olive growing. A bountiful year, as we have noted above, is almost routinely followed by a lean year which immediately affects the price. But even within a given year the price does not remain stable, in most cases rising after midsummer (August–September and later) probably in anticipation of the new yield.

Yet, the statistical data we accumulated indicates that there were years when the demand pushed the price of oil even higher in springtime (1536, 1541) whereas there were a few years – very few – when hardly any change took place at all (e.g. 1544–5, when the price grew to an exorbitant level and remained there). One outstanding change interrupted the normal pattern of fluctuations: as of the mid sixties the price rose steadily, and during the 1580s it reached very high levels. The reader may recall that the same tendency was apparent in meat prices. During the eighties the Jerusalem population

was experiencing hard times under a difficult ruler, and the local economy suffered greatly. An improvement set in during the last decade of the century and prices dropped considerably, but they were still high. This is attributable in part to the severe inflation, but the growing demand for oil served also as an important contributing element.

Soap prices were affected, naturally, by fluctuation in the price of oil, but there was only limited correlation. Throughout most years of the first half of the century the price of dry soap remained almost stable at $2\frac{1}{4}$ – $2\frac{1}{2}$ *qiṭʿa ḥalabiyya* per *ʿuqiyya*. Then it started climbing in the early fifties and although there were exceptional years, remained three to four times higher until the early eighties – a clear indication of greater demand generated by local demographic pressure, improved economic conditions and increasing sales abroad.

Some of those years coincided with the rule of Abu Sayfayn, but this was not true for 1590, for example, when soap was more expensive than at any other time in the entire century – 20 *para* per *raṭl*. The scanty information we have for the last decade of the century indicates a certain drop, but then in 1599 it became high again. In other words, the demand for soap – both in Palestine and abroad – not only increased gradually during the second half of the century, but soared as the century drew to a close.

The growing demand for soap had a direct effect on the price of oil. In earlier years only inferior quality oil was used for soap-making: in 1538, for example, when a *raṭl* of first-quality oil for private consumption sold for 15 *qiṭʿa*, oil “for soap making” sold for $11\frac{1}{2}$ per *raṭl*, i.e. 25% cheaper, which indicates its inferior quality. In 1541 it cost almost 30% less. Forty years later, however, there was hardly any difference between “good oil for food” sold at 5 *para* per *raṭl* and “oil for soap-production” that sold at 4 *para* and 4 *qiṭʿa*. The reason for this should be sought not so much in the more refined taste of customers as in the equalization of the demands: oil for soap-production was still lower in quality, but producers were willing to pay a higher price for it as it brought them handsome profits.

Another development that occurred as the demand for soap (and oil) increased was a differentiation of the price when bought “from the *jallāb*” (the merchant) or “from the market.” The latter was always higher – by 10–25% in the late fifties and by about 5% in the eighties and nineties. This difference might have been due to the quantities sold (retail as against wholesale transactions) or to the wider choice displayed at the market as contrasted with a more limited selection (and perhaps lower quality) the smaller merchant could offer his customers.

The official prices of both oil and soap – just like any other commodity – were mandatory. In the case of meat, where supply was limited and prices therefore adhered to the official ruling, oil and soap transactions in practice, presented a much more variegated picture. We were able to compare the official price to those actually quoted in more than four hundred different

commercial deals concluded in Jerusalem. Generally speaking, there was a high degree of conformity, and the official prices seem to have been strictly followed. But the updating mechanism in these cases was far less efficient – and also less important – than in connection with meat. After all, both oil and soap could easily be stored for a long time – and more often than not actually were. Concerning olive oil therefore, the same oil could be priced differently on different dates. A distinction was drawn between the terms used for the official price, *sīr*, and the actual one, *thaman* or *qīma* (“value”). Not all of the substantial quantities of oil collected from the various villages for the major Jerusalem endowments were consumed by their beneficiaries and trustees; the surplus was often put up for public sale. For three consecutive days the crier would then announce the available quantity as well as the price being asked and he would be willing to sell it to the highest bidder. If “no one expressed an interest or wanted it for a higher price” it would be sold for the official one; if no one was ready to pay even that, “it was left as is until a buyer will be found.”⁶⁸

Public institutions may have tried to sell for a higher price, but private owners were willing to sell for less. This was true for various years throughout the century, although the difference in price was only marginal. In the earlier part of the century there were quite a number of cases in which oil was sold for some fifty percent less than its official price – no doubt because of weak demand. As of the mid forties, a significant increase occurs in its prices. Although this trend abated somewhat in the following years, the overall level remained quite a bit higher than before. This is even more apparent when we compare the prices of soap. They too increased, on occasion succeeding the official price by a margin of thirty, forty and sometimes even fifty percent. These changes again probably resulted from increasing demand, the steeper upswing of the soap chart indicating that it was growth in soap consumption that pushed olive oil up rather than the opposite.

Some of the rise, however, may have been related to a monetary problem that had emerged some time before. One should bear in mind that during the second quarter of the century newly struck Ottoman silver coins had just been circulated in Palestine. They did not replace the old ones which remained valid for many years to come; since their names were quite similar, but their exchange rate drastically different, for a given period at least some of the increase in price may have stemmed from the prevailing confusion. The most popular silver *qif'a ḥalabiyya* was customarily worth half a silver *dirham* *‘uthmānī*. The new *dirham* *‘uthmānī*, also called “new Suleymani coins” (*qif'a jadīda suleymāniyya*) were fixed at an exchange rate of 1:2 compared with the old one.⁶⁹ In other words a new *dirham* was now worth at least 4 *ḥalabiyya*, and as of 1546 it is clear from our records that the new rate was 1:5.⁷⁰ The ratio between gold and silver did not change: a *sultānī* gold coin was still worth 40 silver coins, *fiḍḍa*,⁷¹ but these forty might have

been either the new coins, or the equivalent of 80, if calculated in the old *‘uthmānī* coins.⁷² At the final stage, the new term *para* was introduced as the equivalent of the “new *suleymānī* (or *‘uthmānī*) silver *qiṭ’a*.” Forty silver *paras* equaled 1 *sultānī* gold coin, each of the former equalling 5 *ḥalabiyya* coins. Although one occasionally comes across *para* even in the very early 1550s, it came into widespread use later on and during the sixties gradually replaced the various *qiṭ’as*; by the last quarter of the century it was in almost exclusive use. Toward the end of the century other coins were introduced, called *shāhī*, “imperial,” each worth 5 *para*,⁷³ but this (probably a smaller gold coin) did not have any effect on the nomenclature of the smaller silver coins. By that time the *para* had pride of place, with *ḥalabiyya* seldom mentioned, and then only as one fifth of the *para*. To return to our original point of departure: during the late forties and early fifties, when the rising demand for soap coincided with the introduction of new coins there was some confusion that might partially account for the unsystematic – and sometimes contradictory – use of the term *qiṭ’a* or *‘uthmānī*, and may to a certain extent explain the abrupt price-rise.

Finally, we must compare the prices that were actually charged for olive oil and soap. A close examination of the situation in almost any given year reveals that in both the smaller units of *raṭl* and the larger quantity of *qinṭār* (= 100 *raṭls*), soap sold for a much higher price than oil. Of course the soap-production process involved payment to the factory owner and workers as well as additional expenses for fuel (firewood, *ḥaṭab*), lime and alkali. But these were much cheaper than oil and actually added substantially to the weight of the final product.⁷⁴ The difference in price however, was still considerable, as is clearly borne out by the following examples: a *qinṭār* of oil sold for 6⅔ gold coins in 955/1548, while a *qinṭār* of soap sold for 11 gold coins; in 961/1554–5 a *qinṭār* of oil sold for 14 gold coins, and soap for 20; in 972/1565 the difference was 16 to 20; in 973/1566, 17 to 28; in 977/1569–70, 12 as compared with 20 and even 25; in 998/1580, 12½ and 20; in 955/1587, 26 and 47½; in 988/1590, 14 and 18; in 1003/1594–5, 15 and 20. In other words these statistics (and scores of others) lead to a very simple conclusion: buying oil and having soap made from it was a very sensible thing to do, since it involved highly lucrative profits.

This was a very lucrative business indeed even as early as 1535: a large consignment of olive oil purchased at the price of 10 *dirham* per *raṭl* was stored for some time in *al-Manṣūriyya* soap-factory, then made into soap. The overall expenses (input of various ingredients, rent for the equipment used, fees for the workers) were calculated by the producers at an average of 60% of the initial oil price – which brings the final sum to 16 *dirham* per *raṭl*. A *raṭl* of soap was officially set that specific month at 24, i.e. – an immediate handsome profit of 50%.⁷⁵ We have already examined two cases where the records give us rare insight into the breakdown of the price of soap in accordance with the various elements that went into its manufacture. In the light

of the ample evidence as to the price of oil as compared with that of soap in most of the years of the sixteenth century an overall, self-evident conclusion emerges: production of soap was extremely worth while for those who had the funds to invest in it. No wonder, therefore, that many merchants, particularly those who were most prosperous, chose to add soap-production to their enterprises. Nor is it surprising that in spite of the difficulties involved in exporting to Egypt and more remote places, these merchants were ready and willing to undertake the risk. The high profit these ventures entailed accounts for the interest in the field, the building and repair of soap-factories and the impressive activity of the Jerusalemites in the industry.

Concluding remarks

Supply of foodstuffs and raw materials to Istanbul, the capital, by the various administrative units of the Ottoman empire, was a major consideration in the economic configuration of the entire body politic. Olive oil was one of the foodstuffs that was in high demand and reached Istanbul not only from nearby markets, but also from provinces as distant as those of North Africa, from where it was shipped by sea.⁷⁶ Palestine (and for that matter the entire eastern basin of the Mediterranean), although abundantly endowed with olive-groves and much closer to Istanbul than North Africa, contributed no olive oil at all. The reason seems quite simple: there was simply no surplus as the soap-industry permanently consumed it all. While Palestine benefited directly from Jerusalem's active soap-making industry, the capital was obliged to expend greater efforts in bringing oil from much more remote Mediterranean areas.

Viewed from a more general perspective, this entire economic sector reveals another aspect which deserves special note. It is well-known that traditional Islamic society was based on commercial mercantile activity. In his excellent book on the Arab towns André Raymond confirmed this for the Ottoman period as well. He refers to "the supremacy of commercial activities over productive activities," and shows convincingly that this traditional concept was carried over to Ottoman Arab towns and reinforced there.⁷⁷ Our own research on Ottoman Jerusalem on the whole confirms this contention, but it also suggests a certain qualification. While the basic distinction between merchants and artisans prevailed in Jerusalem also, the dividing line was not entirely clear-cut. Merchants probably did not personally engage in manual work, but were very closely related to it. They invested money, time and energy in soap-production, and were actually and systematically involved in the entire process. The term *entrepreneurs* that we used in reference to the economic side of their role should not be misconstrued. They were not tycoons who invested money in various kinds of businesses but had nothing to do with the operation they were financially

involved in. These merchants were also artisans in a broader sense of the term: they constantly participated in the actual process of production. In the interest of better results they found themselves merchants turned into artisans but their major perspective remained that of trade and profit-making.

CHAPTER 3

Flour and bread

[. . .] the Lord had visited his people in giving them bread.

[. . .] and they came to Bethlehem in the beginning of barley harvest.

And she went and came and gleaned in the field after the reapers.

(Ruth 1, 6; 1, 22; 11, 3.)

Division of labor: millers and bakers

Important as meat and olive oil were in the daily diet of Jerusalemites, for the majority of the population bread was the most essential staple. The demand for meat was curbed to some extent by its relatively high price. Olive oil was cheaper, easier to procure and store and, as we have seen, was very widely used. Bread, however, was the major source of calories and other nutritional elements for all social strata. Due to its lower price, in its various forms it tops the list of foodstuffs consumed in sixteenth-century Jerusalem; it was readily available and production and supply were quite dependable. To encourage the town's merchants to engage in the economic activities involved in bread-making and in order to keep the price down, grains imported for bread were tax-exempt. The *kanunname* of Jerusalem which set the rates for the various taxes to be levied on goods imported to the town specifically stated: "from wheat nothing shall be levied."¹ Although barley was not mentioned, one may assume that by the same logic, it too was tax-free.

The crucial importance of bread is also apparent from the opposite end of the economic spectrum, i.e. that of the consumer. The best proof of the high value attributed to bread can be derived from mandatory rulings by which a judge obliged a given individual to provide a dependent with his basic needs. When, for example, the permanent financial support of an old disabled father was imposed on his son in addition to a certain amount of money, he was responsible for supplying 3 measures (*mudd*) of wheat every month. The detailed list of *nafaqa* a certain person had to pay his estranged wife starts off with "one *mudd* of wheat he also had to have ground [for her]" each

month.² These – and many other examples – were local expressions of the validity of F. Braudel's statement³ (originally made in the context of medieval European society, but equally applicable to Jerusalem) that bread was "the least expensive foodstuff in relation to its calorific content." The combination of low price and high calories, plus the not insignificant element of the availability in Palestine of wheat and barley made bread the basic daily staple for the poor as well as the rich.

Supplying fresh bread was neither a gastronomical whim nor a matter of highly refined taste, it was a necessity: no yeast was used to produce the very thin popular local bread (*kimāj*). After just a few hours it dried out and became very difficult to eat, as well as tasteless. Urban society could not bake bread at home several times a day as did the nomads and peasants; space and other necessary conditions for this were lacking in town. Therefore it was professionally produced in bakeries that were expected to provide Jerusalem with freshly baked bread at least twice a day (morning and evening), and sometimes even more often.⁴ The variety of terms used indicates that Jerusalem consumed several types of bread (*khubz*) in addition to the ordinary *kimāj*: *Simīd*, *Sammūn*, *Tannūrī*, *Māwī*, *Ṭabbūnī*. The differences between them were in shape, weight and quality, but some may have been baked with leavening.

The operation called for a well-defined division of labor among the various links in the chain of bread production, and for clearly drawn regulation concerning the *modus operandi* of each of the different guilds involved. The two final links, i.e. the millers (*ṭahḥān*) and the bakers (*khabbāz*, *farrān*)⁵ were the most important ones. Unlike our modern system, when the overall responsibility of supplying a town with fresh bread daily would lie almost exclusively with the bakers, sixteenth-century millers were equally responsible. Bakers today draw upon their own stock of flour for their daily production, and whenever stores run low they have them replenished. Although urban life in Jerusalem offered a variety of storage areas where flour could be kept for a long time without being exposed to humidity or consumption by rats, old patterns of nomad life still prevailed. This was not sheer conservatism, but rather a matter of taste and custom. Freshly ground flour had to be used for baking of bread, hence the millers were expected to provide the bakers with it daily. This meant that the miller not the baker, was the focal point of the entire process, and his economic and social importance was established accordingly.

The major occupation of the *muḥtasib* of Jerusalem was the administration of economic activity in the town; in a manner similar to that described in our chapter on the butchers, he controlled the professional performance of members of the millers' and bakers' guilds. It was his job to inspect the weight and price of the bread to ensure that they conformed with official regulations, but he also controlled the quality of the flour, the quantities supplied and the mill's sanitary conditions.⁶ These were all aspects

of his overall responsibility which was: the systematic and orderly supply of flour to Jerusalem. His involvement was not merely theoretical: "if the supply of flour to the town were interrupted" he would be personally punished.⁷

To avoid problems in this connection, he delegated his responsibility to the millers. As early as 1534 a court session was held in which five millers undertook "to provide the town of Jerusalem with various types of bread [. . .] according to the existing custom" and to that end they pledged "their responsibility, their trust and their money."⁸ In later years this responsibility was delegated formally: their guild as a whole became answerable for supplying the town with flour. An elaborate and precisely worded plan was drawn up stipulating the volume and destination of the flour to be provided by each miller. In other words each baker knew precisely where his flour would come from and which miller was designated to supply him on a permanent daily basis with his specific quota.

In earlier days, as may be concluded from the case in the mid 1530s cited above, apparently only the first half of this scenario, i.e. the part pertaining to the millers, was precisely followed. No bakers' names are mentioned; whereas the millers, specifically named, were expected to provide the flour to "their *qimāṭ* (?)." ⁹ A decade later, when the governor of Jerusalem issued regulations for providing bread to his court he had the millers undertake to provide him with flour – but made no reference at all to the bakers who



6. Mill-stones of the Ottoman period found in the al-Qūṭayna family house in Jerusalem.

would actually produce the bread.¹⁰ As of the mid fifties we find detailed lists that establish by name not only the volume of flour to be ground every day by every single miller, but also the bakers paired with each one and the quantity with which they would be supplied.

There was no fixed ratio between bakers and millers: sometimes one or two bakers, more often four to five, were matched with a given miller. The bakers, however, were always pegged to the millers, and not the other way around: "the arrangement of the bakers as subordinate to the millers" was repeated in careful detail during the entire second half of the century.¹¹ This "arrangement" was worked out by the *muhtasib* with the active participation of the head of the millers' guild (and very likely the head of the bakers' guild as well).¹²

Guild activities

The head of the guild was appointed by the kadi, following the recommendation of the members themselves. The head of the bakers' guild was simply referred to as: "their head and representative"; that of the millers was expected to exercise his authority with a two-fold aim in mind: "to examine and decide in their affairs and those of the Muslims".¹³ Although couched in very general terms, his first duty seems reasonably straightforward; whereas "those [affairs] of the Muslims" require clarification. Obviously he should have been expected to attend to the affairs of his guild, but one would hardly expect him to be involved with the general "[economic] affairs of the Muslims" which was the concern of the *muhtasib*. The head of the millers' guild was exclusively in charge of the supply of flour – no other economic "affair" – to the entire town, not only to its Muslims. But Jerusalem's society was predominantly Muslim, hence the phrase referring to the affairs of the Muslims was simply an expression of the Islamic concept of relations between the ruler and his subjects: the rights of the Muslims took precedence over those of the minorities who were regarded as "protected" at best. Whatever privileges or benefits they received were granted gratuitously – never as a manifestation of an inherent or self-evident right. Moreover, although there are occasional references to a Christian or Jewish miller as members of the guild¹⁴ in lean years, the authorities were very strict with regard to providing these minority groups with bread: it was never to be done in a way that might adversely affect the Muslims whose needs had to be met first: in 1588 the Catholic priest who represented his community to the local authorities was formally warned to refrain from buying wheat "until the Jerusalemite Muslims' requirements were fully met."¹⁵

It was incumbent upon the millers to provide the bakers with flour so that they in turn could fulfil their responsibility and provide the town with bread. The head of the millers was formally in charge of supplying the flour and was given a deputy to assist him in the performance of his duties. The kadi did

not, however, regard this as a sufficiently binding arrangement: every miller had to pledge that he would never discontinue the operation of his mill, and he also formally cautioned both the millers' and the bakers' guilds that if there was any "obstruction and no bread was found in the market until the sunset prayer [*maghrib*]" on any given day, they would be punished accordingly.¹⁶ This was not an idle threat; whenever there was a significant bread shortage the guild members were duly punished. In 1556, for example, a year in which there were no reports of natural disasters such as drought, flood etc., that could have reduced the supply of grain, bread gradually disappeared from the Jerusalem markets. Upon inspection the *muhtasib* discovered that the millers rather than the bakers were causing a scarcity. Dissatisfied with the prices set some time before, they preferred to hoard their wheat and barley until they could get a better price. They ceased grinding, thereby cutting off the bakers' supply of flour. When this was reported to the kadi and confirmed by his inspectors he ruled that although technically the bakers were not performing their economic function within the community, it was the millers who should be held responsible for the grave disruption of a vital service. Six major members of the millers' guild (including their head), were accordingly brought before the kadi and duly punished.¹⁷

The guilds, although referred to in general terms, were well-defined entities. From the episode just reported it becomes clear that the membership did not consist of an anonymous group of millers; the identity of each miller was well known to the authorities, and the same held true for the bakers. Both lists were updated regularly by the kadi. The detailed lists of millers and bakers that appear by name in the *sijill* permit us to reconstruct some of the main features of their guilds. Although very closely linked to one another functionally there was little overlapping among the members of the two guilds. There were no more than a handful of exceptional cases in which a miller operated a bakery (*furn*) in addition to his mill, and was therefore either personally or through a close relative (brother or father) responsible for providing a predetermined quantity of bread daily.

The latter example raises another question, that of economic mobility: we have no indication of a miller's family downgraded to become bakers; there is, however, at least one clear case of social and economic mobility in the opposite direction. A certain Maḥmūd ibn Muḥammad al-Kurdi who in 1558 was only a baker, ten years later served in the dual capacity of both miller and baker (incidentally, he was expected to provide the largest quota of bread – 70 *raṭl* daily). Nine years later he was again only involved in baking, but his son became a master (*mu'allim*) miller, and for some time was even appointed head of the millers' guild.¹⁸ Judging by their surnames, there were cases of mobility between this profession and others: Muḥammad al-Sha'ār, a miller in the late eighties, had been upgraded from his earlier occupation of supplying barley (*sha'ir*); for Abu'l-Naṣr ibn al-Jundī being a

member of the millers' guild in 1542, may have indicated a decline from his father's position as a *solider* (*jundī*) but he stayed in the profession for many years and some 15 years later had become a master miller;¹⁹ two sons of a tailor (*khayyāt*) chose to become millers in 1570, and some twenty years later a third person, who may or may not have been their relative, but was definitely a former tailor became an important member of the millers' guild.²⁰ There seems to have been a certain attraction (very likely an economic one) which membership in the millers' guild held out not only to lower links in the chain of bread-production, but to some outsiders as well. This accounts for the slow changes apparent in the lists available for different years, but does not blur the tendency characteristic of the guild: most of the families that provided its membership remained constant.

Although the professional division of the various guilds was very clearly drawn, and membership in each guild involved specialized knowhow and training, there were a few cases in which wealthy people became involved in more than one specialized field. Around the middle of the century a list of eight millers was drawn up, each of whom owed the governor 180 *mudd* of wheat. Two of the names on the list, Taj al-Dīn al-Sukkārī and *mu'allim* Mūsā ibn al-Duhayna, specifically referred to as *ṭahḥān*, were among the butchers whom we discussed earlier in this work. It is very unlikely that they were equally knowledgeable and proficient in each of these professions. The inevitable conclusion is that since they had accumulated a sufficient amount of capital they were in a position to consider milling and baking (as well as soap making) lucrative enough to warrant investing their money in expectation of a substantial profit. But this did not turn these butchers into bakers or millers: they probably hired and adequately remunerated professionals who belonged to the millers' and bakers' guilds.²¹

Various indications in our sources point to the fact that the bakers were not only dependent upon the millers for their living, but were also relatively lower on the social ladder. Two Hebronite bakers appeared as witnesses in a case brought before the Jerusalem kadi in 1574. Not only did the kadi find them uninformed on matters concerning the religious school (*madhhab*) they subscribed to, but they were totally ignorant about Islam in general. Moreover, their social behavior left a very negative impression when reported in court: "they walked barefoot, they urinated in public roads and they washed without a loincloth."²² Of course, they may have been somewhat extreme examples, but they were, nevertheless, members of their guild; although the men were found unfit to serve as reliable witnesses in court, their standards of behavior did not disqualify them as bakers.

The bakers' status seems to have been considered socially (and economically) lower, and actually their occupation was less complicated and demanding in terms of professional knowledge. Millers were always referred to by their full names preceded in most cases by the title "master" (*al-mu'allim*); bakers were usually mentioned by first name only, nor did we

even once come across a “master-baker.” A fair number of the bakers were relatively new in Jerusalem and still used their place of origin as a surname; there was even an occasional manumitted slave (*‘atīq*) among them. These are all indications of a lower class. The numbers involved were also quite disparate: the millers’ guild consisted of approximately ten members, occasionally (e.g. in 1576) going up to 13; that of the bakers was much larger, including 20 to 30 members.²³

Since much more detailed information is available about the millers’ guild than the bakers’, a few more general conclusions may be derived from it.²⁴ In the early part of the century there were still some millers who belonged to families known for their activities in other economic fields (e.g. Ibn Zurayq, Ibn al-Sukkari), but after 1550 they do not appear in this context any more. Other families were much more permanently represented in the millers’ guild: as early as 1534 we come across references to various members of the Ibn al-Shuqruq family who were actively involved in this guild, and more than forty years later, in 1576, they were still among its prominent figures.²⁵ Other families that were conspicuously present and active among the millers were the Ibn al-Luyya, Ibn Abi Maksūra, Abu’l Jawd, Ibn ‘Aṭiyya. Occasionally several members of the same family can be identified as active millers working concurrently or in chronological proximity. There were also cases in which the descendants of two separate families would intermarry (e.g. the miller Abu’l-Naṣr Ibn al-Jundī, who married the daughter of another miller, the famous Ibn al-Shuqruq in 1541, and paid a dowry of 40 gold coins which was much higher than the average).²⁶

The generous dowry indicated a degree of affluence, but was not necessarily indicative of social or even administrative importance. The millers held a relatively unimportant position in Jerusalem’s overall socio-economic structure. Unlike the butchers, they did not send members of their guild to fill major administrative or economic positions such as that of the *muḥtasib*. A miller never served as a “chief merchant” (*bazar başı*) in the market place. Moreover, they were not even regarded as “prominent merchants” (*a’yān al-sūq* who helped the *muḥtasib* to administer various commercial matters, particularly in connection with the regular fixing of food prices).

As stated, each miller was supposed to provide several bakers with given quantities of flour. His daily quota was determined by the head of the guild, and may have been affected to some extent by the capacity of his mill. The quotas allocated to the same miller, however, were often changed after relatively few consecutive years, which indicated that they were fixed in accordance with other considerations – probably financial ones. But there was never an attempt to reach even ostensible parity in this respect among the various members of the guild. In the year 1555/6, for example, the major millers were supposed to grind and provide the following daily quotas: 20, 40, 50, 70, 75, 80, 95 and 100 *raṭl* of flour. Three years later there were eleven millers whose respective assignments fluctuated between 25 and 75 *raṭl* a

day, whereas in 1576 the individual quotas were somewhat lower, ranging from 15 to 65 each.²⁷

These allocations were then split into smaller units by the bakers, usually 10–20 *raṭl* each, sometimes less (5–7½ *raṭl*). Such small quantities of flour could hardly provide a family with a decent living, so most bakers had to draw upon more than one miller. A baker could thus obtain some thirty or forty *raṭl* per day, and in exceptional cases even as much as 60. Although the record of bread produced and sold in Jerusalem is not always complete, certain cumulative figures may be deduced for the town as a whole. In the mid-fifties, for which we have the best and most detailed statistics, the quantity ranges from 550 to 650 *raṭl* per day.²⁸ Incomplete lists for the late seventies and eighties indicate half as large a supply, although one of these entries tells of supplying two bakers with “as much as they need.” More detailed and fuller information for 1576 also indicates a certain decrease, just below 500 *raṭl*.²⁹ Prior to the mid fifties, however, the incomplete data for 1534 adds up to 160 *raṭl* only.³⁰ This helps us to form a picture of the overall trend of bread-consumption in the sixteenth century. During the first decades of Ottoman rule, when Jerusalem was still sparsely populated and some of its bakeries (as well as other public facilities) were still in ruins, more bread was baked at home and the overall commercial demand was low. In the forties and fifties, as the population of the town increased, living conditions and business activity improved; this had an immediate effect on the demand from the guild network for bread. When a population decline set in during the seventies and eighties, demand for bread diminished. The bakers could be promised as much flour as they wanted, but on the whole were able to sell only small quantities in town.

Bread production was a chain consisting of more than the two links, millers and bakers, described so far. One additional link was comprised of bakers who specialized in particularly thin and unleavened bread (*kimjāniyya*, those who produced *kmāḥ*). As is indicated by their name they were regarded as a special type of baker; although in a document dated 1581, they were referred to as a separate category (*tā'ifa*) – an identical term used to describe the bakers and millers – the difference was not entirely clear-cut: Thirteen years earlier two *kimjānī* were referred to as part of the bakers' guild, whereas the same people whose names were mentioned separately in 1581 were listed with the regular bakers both in 1556 and in 1575. Although we cannot rule out the possibility that a specialized category evolved over the years, it seems rather more likely that this was a sub-group within the bakers' guild.³¹

Earlier stages: measuring, sieving, pricing

At the other end of the spectrum, at the inception of the production process, matters are more clearly delineated.

The measuring (*kayl*) of wheat and barley “and other grains” (*hubūbāt*)

was the earliest and crucial stage in the bread-making process. It was carried out in a special location, "the vacant lot of the grains" (*ʿarṣat al-ghilāl*), to which the merchants brought their camel-loads. This "lot" had a triple function, each of which we shall discuss below: it was the site on which grains were officially measured, their prices were fixed and controlled and fees were levied as allocations for public services. It must have been quite spacious to accommodate all the pack-animals as well as a few essential buildings ("shops," *bā'ika* pl. *bawā'ik*). The animals were stabled in one and there were three others in which the grain sales took place.³² The entire "lot" (*ʿarṣa*) was referred to as part of the "Sultan's market" (*sūq al-sultān*), the main market in Jerusalem, where all imported goods were sold.³³ From the above description one realizes that the "lot" must have been a paved open space, probably a continuation of the covered bazaar. Whenever the floor required new paving it was immediately attended to by the town authorities.³⁴

The millers were provided with barley by the *ʿallāfīn* who had a guild of their own headed by a specially nominated *naqīb*. Although the term *ʿallāf* meant literally a person who was in charge of selling provender, it was clearly applied in Ottoman Jerusalem only to the sale of barley. As a sideline these people must have also dealt in fodder, as indicated by their name; they were, after all, responsible for having the barley sieved and separated from the chaff before it could be sold.³⁵

The *ʿallāf* guild seems to have had considerable social status at the time: its members were not only charged with supplying barley to the pilgrims who came to Jerusalem, but were also responsible for providing it to the governor and his closest retinue ("the dignitaries of the state"). Only members in good standing of this guild were entitled to buy and stock barley for later sale to people who belonged to any of those groups. Members of the guild were in close contact with the most conspicuous administrative figures; this may have been either the cause or the result of their high social and even economic status.³⁶

The *ʿallāfs* were assisted by professional sievers (*mugharbil*, *nakhkhāl*), just as the bakers relied on the kneaders (*ʿajjān*) to carry out the more rudimentary part of their role.³⁷ Although references to the *ʿallāf* guild were always in the context of barley, as no equivalent guild was involved in the winnowing of wheat, it may be assumed that it was included within the terms of reference of the *ʿallāfs*. This may also be inferred from one reference to millers and *ʿallāfs* who did not measure the grains they were handling correctly: no distinction was drawn between wheat and barley, and the terms as used there applied to both.³⁸

The various merchants had no choice but to come to the "lot" to have their grain measured and sold; no large-scale transactions were permitted elsewhere and no weighing or measuring was regarded official unless conducted at the "lot." Like the mandatory slaughtering in the *maslakh* referred

to in our chapter on the butchers and meat, measuring the grains in the *‘arṣa* was meant among other things, to facilitate control of prices and to guarantee the town’s regular grain supply.

The mechanism of price regulation was very similar to that discussed in earlier chapters and every “measurer” (*kayyāl*) who operated in the “lot” was obliged to charge the fixed price. Two to three official measurers usually operated, headed by a master (*mu‘allim*); “the scribe of the grains” (*kātib al-ghilāl*) recorded their activities.

A significant quantity of the wheat and barley sold in Jerusalem came there as part of the *mīrī* taxes due from the peasants in the countryside.³⁹ Some of it was collected in the villages, while some peasants brought the grain into Jerusalem directly to the “lot,” where it was measured and recorded so that its value could be checked against the tax lists; thereafter it was sold to bidders. The measurers should have operated only in the “lot,” so that the price they charged could always be checked.⁴⁰ Attempts were made, however, to avoid this control and sell the produce to customers outside, e.g. the Christian monasteries. This was not only a breach of state regulations – as specified in a decree sent from Istanbul in 1542⁴¹ – but also contained an element of unfair competition. The Muslim customers (millers, bakers and non-professional buyers) complained to the authorities, requesting that urgent steps be taken to stop such outside sales.⁴² To avoid any doubt as to what they might be doing, the measurers were obliged to pledge that they would be permanently present at the “lot” during the day.⁴³ The millers, for their part, had to formally undertake to do all their buying there as well as to carry out all transactions through the good offices of the measurer.

All these regulations were motivated by the desire to control the level of prices in conformity with the rates set by the *muhtasib*. Unlike meat or olive oil, where the weights and measures were standard (e.g. *raṭl*) and therefore could be used by anybody, “measurers” of grains had at their disposal a single specific dry measure located in the “lot” that bore an official seal as proof of its authenticity.⁴⁴ In 1572 a group of Jerusalemites complained that a dishonest measurer had taken advantage of them; he had replaced the official measure (*kayl*) with a smaller one, thus unlawfully raising the price and actually stealing their money. Upon inspection their charge was validated and action was taken to avoid similar dishonesty in the future: the official measure of one *mudd* of wheat equivalent to $7\frac{1}{2}$ *raṭls* was reconfirmed, and the measure was stamped by the kadi so that no further tampering might occur. It was then publicly announced that this was the only official measure to be used in Jerusalem, and all others were thereupon declared null and void. No further complaints of this nature were reported in our sources, which may indicate that because this was a highly sensitive issue the regulation was closely observed both by the public and by the market inspection apparatus.⁴⁵

Tampering with the official measure, although ethically wrong, could have been quite advantageous to those responsible for it since they collected the amounts due per units-of-volume measured. Each camel-load of grains paid 4 *‘uthmānī* coins whereas smaller loads (*bahīm*, “beast” referring to both donkey- or mule-load) paid half of that. As we have said, a “load” designated specific volume and weight, hence the importance of an agreed unit size.⁴⁶ The fees thus collected constituted one source of the annual income for the upkeep of the “two sanctuaries” (*ḥaramayn sharīfayn*) of Jerusalem and Hebron which were leased for an annual lump sum. The entire enterprise was directed and managed by the chief kadi. As early as August 1546, a few years after the walls of Jerusalem were completed and provided the town’s merchants and their goods with security, much larger quantities of grains were brought into town. The taxes to be levied at the “lot of the grains” had to be adjusted accordingly and the regulations then set by the kadi and enforced were observed throughout the rest of the century.⁴⁷

The “measuring tax” (*rasm al-kiyāla*) was not an innovation; similar dues were collected from grains imported to Jerusalem during the Mamluk period and were also allocated for the upkeep of the Dome of the Rock endowment. In the early Ottoman days the rate set was 1 *‘uthmānī* per camel-load and ½ *‘uthmānī* per donkey- and mule-load. The operators of the “grain lot” took advantage of the increased traffic into Jerusalem and considerably raised the amounts collected from the importers (*al-jallābīn li’l-ghilāl*). The importers lodged complaints with the kadi who summoned the measurers and elicited their support for new rates. They were higher than the old official rates, but substantially lower than the unauthorized ones had been. It is therefore not surprising that under those circumstances the new rates were readily accepted by the importers.⁴⁸ The annual rent for use of the “lot” (which actually amounted to the right to collect the “measuring tax”), unlike the measuring tax, changed according to the fluctuating expectations of the lessees. In 957/1550 the “lot” was leased for 6200, and in 963/1555–6, for 13,000 *‘uthmānī*; five years later it was rented for 15,000 *‘uthmānī* (500 of which were paid for the special gown, *khil’a*, the measurers had to wear); in 981/1573–4 it was 150 gold *sulṭānīs*; in 983/1575–6 three millers competed for the lease, and it went to the highest bidder for 125 *sulṭānī* gold coins (which indicated rather lower expectations); in the following year somebody else leased it for 177 gold coins; towards the end of the century, in 1003/1594–5, it was leased for 200 gold coins of the *sulṭānī* denomination.⁴⁹

Grain importers

The *jallāba* importers referred to above were yet another link in the economic chain described so far. Literally these were “the people who fetched” various kinds of goods not otherwise available and brought them into Jerusalem (thus they were occasionally referred to by their full name,

al-jallāba li'l-baḏā'ī, “the fetchers of goods”). It has often been erroneously assumed that they dealt only in meat but the fact is that wheat and barley also appeared regularly on their shopping-lists. Two kinds of merchants seem to have performed this economic role: first there were specialized grain merchants who either bought grain from peasants who came into town or went to the outlying villages and bought it there. They were sometimes referred to as *ḥaddārs* and at one point, at least, many of them were Jewish.⁵⁰ But the *jallāba* could also import grain to Jerusalem as part of more variegated transactions. Wheat and barley were particularly attractive import items not only because of the permanent demand and reliable consumers' market but because their importers enjoyed the special privilege we mentioned above: unlike all other goods brought into town, these two items were specifically exempted from the special *ghafar* tax, and all other dues levied on commodities arriving in Jerusalem.⁵¹ The exemption was probably enacted by the Ottoman authorities from the earliest days of their rule in Palestine in order to encourage population growth and economic activity in Jerusalem. When 'Abd al-Raḥmān, the high-handed governor of Jerusalem tyrannized its population in the late eighties, he could not alter these regulations; his only recourse was to have his people rob “the *jallāba li'l-baḏā'ī* and the *sūqa*” of their camels and merchandise, thereby stopping the import of all goods, including grains, to Jerusalem.⁵²

The *sūqa* (*sawaqa*?) was another guild, but the exact nature of its activity remains rather vague. The above quote indicates that its members were very closely related to (although not identical with) the *jallāba*. *Sūqa* may have been a local term for the latter, but were that so, it would have been unnecessary to mention them side by side. One possible distinction could have been that while the *jallāba* were in charge of bringing the goods into town from distant places, the *sūqa* were in charge of the local outlets. This hypothesis may be confirmed by a description of the routine activity of the latter, dated winter 1596.⁵³ Ten members of the *sūqa* guild came to the court and requested the kadi to sanction their earlier decision to submit the name of one of their number as a candidate for the influential position of “head of the market” (*bazar baṣī*). They undertook to abide by all his decisions, while the nominee himself expressed his willingness upon one condition: that he become the exclusive supplier of kitchen provisions to the district governor and the members of his retinue. If any of those dignitaries might wish to purchase something directly from any other *sūqa* merchant their request would of course be immediately fulfilled by the individual approached, but the “head of the market” would personally attend to the bill and the whole matter should eventually be adjusted as if it were his transaction rather than that of the actual seller. These conditions were accepted and the nominee of the *sūqa* guild members was duly appointed as “head of the market.” The *sūqa* emerge here as merchants operating in the local marketplace (hence their name, derived from *sūq*, “market”), who provide the town and its

inhabitants – be they of high or low social rank – with foodstuffs of all varieties, including grains. Rice, another major source of carbohydrates as well as of proteins, was in demand in Palestine but was not grown there (it was usually imported from Egypt). Its sale in Jerusalem was also the responsibility of the *sūqa*, not at all on a voluntary basis. Supplying rice was mandatory and if any member of the *sūqa*'s guild was negligent in fulfilling this duty he was fined by the governor.⁵⁴

An interesting insight concerning their links with the millers and bakers can be gained from the fact that the very first name on list of *sūqa* was that of ḥājj ʿAbd al-Qādir ibn Mūsā *al-khayyāt* who had been an active miller some twenty years earlier.⁵⁵ He may or may not have given up his previous occupation altogether, but he seems to have accumulated sufficient funds to have enabled him to function as an important merchant. This was not the only such example: in 1590 another individual whose family (Ibn Firkāh) had been involved in the milling business for many years was among a group of merchants who suggested a candidate for the vacant position of “head of the market” whose duties would be, among others: “not to discriminate among the *sūqa* in the buying of goods, and the taking of the goods from them to the governor.”⁵⁶

To sum up: grains were imported to Jerusalem by the *jallāba* who had them weighed in *ʿarṣat al-ghilāl*. From there they were sold either directly to the millers or to the *sūqa*, the merchants in the town's marketplace. The latter stocked grains (and other foodstuffs) to be sold to local customers with baking and grinding facilities of their own (usually administrative dignitaries or local institutions such as the soup-kitchen of the Khasseki Sultan).

The highly specialized nature of the Jerusalem markets – coordinated as they were with the various professional guilds – concentrated all mercantile activity involving wheat and barley at “the lot of the grains” which was essentially an open marketplace. Here the *jallāba* and other wholesale merchants, as well as many peasants, would offer their goods to millers, local grain dealers, and a variety of individual buyers. The operation as a whole fell within the jurisdiction of the *muhtasib*, but in actual practice it was conducted by measurers who leased the lot, usually for one year, renewable upon request, with the lessee undertaking a new financial obligation.

“The ripening of the barley”

Since all grain transactions were supposed to be carried out there and the measurers (often closely related to the families of the most important millers, e.g. Ibn Abi ʿAṭiyya) 2–4 in most cases were obligated to be present at all times, they were regarded as the most knowledgeable about everything involving this field. Their testimony in court therefore was a crucially important part of the process of determining the “ripening of the barley” (*istiwāʾ al-shaʿīr*). Although wheat flour tasted better and was more nourish-

ing, its price – always twice as high as that of barley – had a restrictive effect on the demand for it. Barley bread although “less nourishing than wheat or rye bread” was very widely consumed in eighteenth-century France and Poland, while wheat, regarded as “luxury cereal” was reserved for sales for export or for rare celebrations.⁵⁷ The special and systematic official interest in the ripening of the barley (there was no equivalent procedure for wheat or any other grain) indicates that the same was true to a very large extent with regard to sixteenth-century Jerusalem. Barley was much more popular with Jerusalemites than wheat, and, like olive oil, was included in the daily diet of the entire population. Hence the ripening of barley and of olives was the systematic annual concern of the court (attestation to the maturity of these products only was one of the few items considered important enough to merit entry in the *sijill* under a special title indicating its contents).

Proof that the olives were ripe had to be brought from villages that were quite far north of Jerusalem, whereas evidence that the barley had ripened came from the nearby countryside. All the villages mentioned in this context were either around Jerusalem within a five miles perimeter (ʿĀzariyya, Abu Dīs, Bethlehem, Silwān, al-Jīb, ʿAnnāta, ʿĪsāwiyya, Bayt Saḥūr al Wād, al-Ṭūr) or stretched eastward toward the Jordan (Dayr Bani ʿUbayd, Jericho and Nuwayʿima). In other words these villages were closely linked to the local Jerusalem economy, and the formal announcement that their barley had just ripened was therefore of great importance both for the villagers and for the consumer market in Jerusalem. To indicate the exceptional importance of this matter, a special session held in court by the Ḥanafī kadi of Jerusalem issued a more or less standard statement to the effect that consignments of the “new barley” entering town “were to be sold in *ʿarṣat al-ghilāl* and made available to the people”. Unlike the regular sessions of the court, this session was always attended not only by the parties directly concerned, but also by a personal representative of the district governor (usually his lieutenant, the *ketkḥudā*, occasionally the *subaşı* or his representative – a *sipahi*, the standard-bearer (*sancakdār*) and on several occasions of the Shafiʿī kadi as well. The chief measurer also was always present, accompanied by some of his colleagues. The court regarded the latter as expert witnesses who came to report on the quality of barley that had arrived at their “lot.”

The most important part of the session, however, was the screening of the factual evidence presented to the court. Since the measurers might be suspected of biased judgment because of their close involvement in grain transactions, more objective, disinterested testimony was sought. This came from two sources: first, eye-witnesses in the shape of peasants either from the villages mentioned above or from other places, who could attest that they had seen the ripe barley in at least one of the aforementioned places (in one exceptional case such a report was filed by two soldiers stationed at Jerusalem’s citadel who had visited Jericho and witnessed the condition of

the fields). Since the barley was found to have just ripened, they testified, reaping had started in the respective villages and the first consignments of barley had already begun to arrive in town. Second, in order to support their claim and buttress their evidence, they brought samples of the new yield into court. A variety of receptacles was used: a container (*inā'*, *'ubūwa*), a basket (*quffa*), a nosebag (*mikhhlāh*), a sack (*kīs*, *shiwāl*, *firda*), but the contents were always identical. The measurer confirmed the authenticity of the samples, the court inspected all the evidence presented and then gave its consent, approving of both the harvest and sale of the yield in town. There was only one case when apparently some doubts arose and the kadi insisted on actually visiting the fields and threshing-floors of al-^cĀzariyya before he granted his approval.

This entire procedure was not just a matter of getting the kadi's approval of pre-established facts determined by members of the community. For several reasons any other procedure would have been less effective. The harvesting was not supposed to begin before the barley had reached full size and maturity and was of a quality that would justify the price charged for it, the said price having been decided upon earlier by the same kadi. But since barley was also one of the crops taxed at a rate proportionate to the yield, premature reaping might have been harmful to the interests of the farmers, of the urban population at large, and certainly of the state treasury. On the other hand the harvest could not be postponed until actually authorized by the kadi as that might have exposed the peasants to damages incurred by either natural or man-made causes. Since a substantial part of the yield was remitted to the authorities as part of the *mīrī* income it could not be touched without the specific permission of the responsible tax-official – and if he happened to arrive on the spot late the villagers sustained considerable losses; they virtually pleaded with the kadi, at such times, to personally authorize the harvest. A case reported extensively in a *sijill* dated 1588⁵⁸ shows the kadi's reluctance to step into the shoes of the tax collector and rule that harvesting might be begun. Only recurrent, insistent pleas of the peasants convinced him to accede to their request. This incident sheds light on the other hitherto unseen side of the equation; the kadi did not merely confirm facts unilaterally established by the villagers; they suggested the timetable for reaping each year's new yield but it had to be confirmed by the authorized official who was in charge of tax-collection. The official apparatus endorsed the peasants' recommendation not so much because of concern for the vital interests of the citizenry, but rather as a way of safeguarding its own primary interest: the full collection of its share of taxation. Once the tax-collector's consent was given, the harvest started and when consignments of the barley arrived in town they became the concern of the public rather than of the tax-mechanism. It was at this stage that the kadi intervened and declared – *ipso facto*, as it were – that the year's yield had

reached maturity. Thereafter it could be sold, bought and consumed by the townspeople in accordance with the newly set prices.

As might be expected, when the yield brought by one village was endorsed and confirmed, permission to harvest applied to the entire Jerusalem district – the barley in all the villages was formally declared ripe and ready for reaping. On special occasions allowances were made and permission was granted early: in 1561, for example, when Jericho's crop was severely damaged by hordes of locusts coming in waves from the East, throughout the district reaping was permitted almost a month ahead of the actual ripening in order to save at least part of the yield. Reaping time in normal years, however, was fairly regular: the many examples at our disposal converge at one chronological point indicating that throughout the 16th century the barley harvest took place between the middle of March and the middle of April.⁵⁹

Mills and ovens

ʿArṣat al-ghilāl played an important if secondary role in the long chain of bread production in Jerusalem; although its actual dimensions are unknown to us, the “lot” seems to have covered a substantial area inside the city walls. The two establishments in which the actual production occurred: the mills (*ṭāhūna*, *ṭāhūn*)⁶⁰ and the baking-ovens (*furn*) were much smaller but scattered throughout the town. We counted at least twelve of each unit, and their territorial distribution leads to the conclusion that, for the sake of convenience, they were located in every section of town: freshly ground flour was readily accessible to the bakers and the local inhabitants had easy access to freshly baked bread. Unlike most commodities, bread had to be brought home by the female (or the young) members of the household once or twice every day, the shorter the distance they had to cover to fetch it, the more secure they were. This pertained particularly to the minority communities who always felt (and often actually were) more vulnerable than the Muslim majority. Members of the minority groups were even more insistent about having grinding facilities as well as an oven close by: some of the Christian congregations operated ovens within the precincts of their monasteries (e.g. Dayr al-ʿAmūd reported in 1562 to have been functioning there for many years). “The Jewish neighborhood” had at least one bake-oven in the first half of the century; in 1583 the Jews requested the kadi to issue a construction permit for another one in a house close to “their market.” The permit was granted.⁶¹ All in all, a “quarter” was not just a theoretical urban sub-division; it constituted an almost self-sufficient entity in which local inhabitants knew one another intimately, elected the heads of the neighborhood or ethnic community, worshipped God in a near-by house-of-prayer⁶² – and were also provided with vital local services such as the supply of bread.

Building new mills and ovens, or re-activating old ones that had been derelict and unused for many years, was an outstanding characteristic of the first century of Ottoman rule in Jerusalem. As early as 1534 a dilapidated oven in the Bāb Ḥiṭṭa quarter was leased for twenty years with a special provision authorizing its reconstruction. Twelve years later another long-term lease was concluded, this time in the village of Tūr Zayta, just outside of the walled city, with the declared intention of installing a windmill there (windmills, incidentally, were not unusual in Jerusalem at the time).⁶³ Another mill was thoroughly repaired in 1548–9 in Bāb al-ʿAmud, and eight years later (1556–7) yet another old structure was rented to be made into a new mill. In 1560 an old building near Bāb al-ʿAmud gate was torn down to allow for the construction of a new bakery. Then in 1565 a store was turned into a new mill and all necessary equipment was installed there.⁶⁴ Most of this building activity took place during the first fifty years of Ottoman rule in Jerusalem, although there was occasional new construction even later (e.g. 1589, a flour mill in Bāb al-ʿAmud).⁶⁵ Maintenance and repairs continued in later years as well. Our records indicate quite clearly however, that the construction activity that coincided with the demographic and economic upsurge in Jerusalem gradually subsided and almost came to a halt during the last third of the century which in general could be characterized as years of standstill followed by decline.

Converting old deserted buildings into active mills and bakeries provided a vital service to the public although it was not initiated by the government but undertaken by individuals who regarded this as a promising investment. Quite a few of these assets belonged to prominent townfolk: in the mid-forties the *mawlā* of Jerusalem owned a bakery and a mill which he let to one of the town's chief builders. In the early seventies the district governor owned a mill, while the commanding officer of the citadel operated both a nearby mill and adjacent bakery.⁶⁶ Naturally, these people did not personally operate the plants; the actual job was performed on their behalf by professionals. We should, however, point out that in the early part of the century, when the millers' guild had not yet fully developed, there were a few cases of flour mills being rented by non-professional people. The most conspicuous of them was the case of Tāj al-Dīn al-Sukkarī who during 1538 rented a mill for a year; he also leased the "lot of the grains" at the same time, in addition to his various activities in other fields, as discussed elsewhere in this work.⁶⁷

Coping with inflation

In the last quarter of the century Jerusalem's economic scene was pervaded by an atmosphere of increasing stagnation and decline. Some of it coincided with and could be attributed to the difficult years of the mid eighties when a harsh governor severely oppressed the local population, thereby adding his

share to the deterioration of living conditions as well as the overall economic situation in the town. But the policies of a rapacious ruler, and even the subsequent reaction to his years in office, by definition only lasted for a relatively limited period. Deeper economic reasons should be sought to explain the plight of the local population. In the early nineties the process of economic decline, although somewhat mitigated, was still going on. One of the major reasons for the economic crisis was the devaluation of the Ottoman coinage.⁶⁸ An insight into the mechanism that linked the immediate economic scene in Palestine to the overall financial crisis in the empire can be gained from a close look at the performance of some of the members of the millers' and bakers' guilds.

Towards the end of 1585 Jerusalem was suffering very heavily from what Barkan called "the century's economic illness":⁶⁹ the inflation that undermined the economy of the Ottoman empire as a whole. "Most of the commercial transactions in Jerusalem were carried out in *shāhī* coins, and most of these [were] false [and] mixed with copper." These coins were so debased that they could hardly be used as legal tender. They eventually went out of circulation altogether in the markets of Syria and Palestine, "import of goods to Jerusalem came to a halt, the supply of daily bread diminished and merchants closed their shops in the market." This constituted an imminent threat to the town's economic fabric, so the kadi summoned the major merchants, including the "head of the market" and the "eldest of the merchants" (*shaykh al-tujjār*) and announced that since Jerusalem was part of the province of Damascus, the provincial exchange rates should be enforced there. "The exchange rate of a gold *dīnār* in Damascus was then 15 *sultānī*, each *qurūsh* was 9 *shāhī*,⁷⁰ and the latter was exchanged by the people for Mar'ash silver *qīṭ'a* at the rate of 4 *para* for each *shāhī*, and 4½ in commercial transactions." Reports had reached the kadi to the effect that the ratio in Jerusalem was not 1:4 or 1:4½, but rather 1:5 which meant that his decision to adjust the rate to that used in Damascus, was a *de facto* devaluation of 10%.⁷¹ This may have alleviated some of the economic strain on commercial circles, but as the authorities soon discovered, did not put a stop to the general inflationary process. Bread-production, so vital to the town's daily functioning, served once again as an acid test indicating trends affecting all sectors of society.

Ordinarily, of course, bread was sold to the consumers, but it was also distributed free to less fortunate people who could not afford to buy it. The soup-kitchen of Khasseki Sultan in Jerusalem and that of the Cave of the Patriarchs in Hebron distributed free meals with bread twice a day. Although this charity was a pious deed to be accepted gratefully by its recipients certain patterns evolved over the years indicating that it should not be – and indeed was not – taken for granted. The poor people who turned to one of these institutions expected the food to be of a certain quality and quantity. In 1569, for example, there were complaints about the weight

of bread distributed at the Khasseki Sultan soup-kitchen: it no longer weighed the customary 90 *dirham* per loaf. When interrogated the bakers explained that they were not being negligent in the performance of their duties but that bread baked in the morning out of the standard 105 *dirham* of dough weighs 90 *dirham* when fresh and only 85 as it dries out later in the afternoon.⁷² At a later date complaints of another type came to the kadi's attention and had to be checked. Toward the end of October 1596 rather well-founded rumors reached the Jerusalem kadi (who was formally in charge of the court of Hebron as well) to the effect that the bread distributed in Hebron was very inadequate. Investigation revealed that both the millers and the bakers were deliberately neglecting their duty. When asked for an explanation of their behavior they made no attempt to deny the facts and told the court that their action was a result of the changes that had occurred in the value of silver coins: in the past they had been paid in Egyptian coins (*qiṭ'a Masriyya*), but ever since the change in the exchange rates the difference between Egyptian and Damascene coins (*qiṭ'a Shāmiyya*) made payments in Damascus coin worthless. The kadi was anxious to motivate them to improve production and immediately ordered that all payments to them be made in Egyptian coins.⁷³

Understanding the meaning of their grievance seems to be somewhat difficult: *qiṭ'a*, after all, was the same Ottoman coin whether struck or used in Damascus, Cairo or any other Ottoman center, for that matter. But apparently the millers and bakers were suffering a significant loss from the disparity in the actual value of the coin; otherwise it is unlikely that they would have disrupted their daily routine to such an extent. Another *sijill*⁷⁴ dated almost two years later indicated similar problems in the Jerusalem soup-kitchen as well, and provides us with information that sheds more light on the background and meaning of the financial pressures. Originally there was no difference between "Egyptian" and "Syrian" coins: the exchange rate of both was 2 *'uthmānī* (i.e. 2 *akçe*) from the early years of the century on. A decree issued in Istanbul in August 1595, less than a year before the crisis in Hebron's bread supply, adjusted the exchange rate of the silver *para* (and consequently of the golden *sulṭānī* that was worth 40 *para*).⁷⁵ This was, no doubt, an attempt on the part of the recently inaugurated Sultan, Mahmud III, to stop the seemingly uncontrollable inflationary process the empire as a whole was undergoing. The *firman* indicates quite clearly that the new coins were introduced in the Eastern provinces, and the "new Syrian" exchange rate was definitely an "Eastern" one. A "Syrian" *qiṭ'a* (the Arabic term for the Turkish *para*) was redefined as worth 2 *akçe* (i.e. 2 *'uthmānī*) whereas an "Egyptian" *qiṭ'a* would be the equivalent of 2 Syrian or 4 *akçe*. Since the official deed of the Khasseki Sultan endowment (issued in the mid sixteenth century) stipulated its regular stipends (*'ulūfa*) in *akçe*, the new exchange rate dealt the beneficiaries of this endowment a severe financial blow. Their stipend was paid in either Syrian or Egyptian *para*

coins calculated at the new rate, hence they received only half the real value of their former payments. In other words, they were given the same number of *akçe* as before, in accordance with the endowment regulations, but after devaluation these *akçe*s could buy only half as many *qif'a*s. The only way to compensate them, the Sultanic decree stipulated, was to keep paying them in Egyptian *qif'a* (or *para*) according to the old rate, i.e. double their stipend in *para* coins.

This raised the related issue of how a *sulṭānī* gold coin should be calculated. From a strictly arithmetical perspective the answer seemed self-evident: since it equalled 40 *para*, its exchange rate should have been 160 *akçe*. However, in the remote provinces of Rumeli and Anadolu (Wilāyat al-Rūm) – even when real gold coins were used (which were considered of higher value than *sulṭānī* calculated in Egyptian *qif'a*)⁷⁶ they were reportedly computed at a lower rate of 120 *akçe*. In Jerusalem also some of the “siewers” (*mugharbil*) and bakers (referred to as providers of “heavy services”) were receiving their stipends from the above endowment according to the new, i.e. the lower rate. When this report reached the kadi he ruled that whenever these people were to be paid on the basis of a *sulṭānī* coin, it should be calculated at the rate of no more than 120 *akçe*. In other words they would receive an intermediate rate: neither 80 *akçe* per *sulṭānī*, the rate that prevailed before the devaluation, nor the new rate of 160, but an in-between 120. This meant a substantial gain as compared with the old rate at which these professionals had been paid, although it was less than they were entitled to according to the newly devalued *akçe*. The compromise relieved the bakers and their associates of the burden placed upon them by the new exchange rates for the *para* and *akçe* (Arabic: *qif'a* and *‘uthmānī*), although in a wider context it amounted to a subsidy provided by the Empire to endowment beneficiaries (and perhaps others as well) thereby reducing the anti-inflationary effect of the devaluation.

The direct outcome of the devaluation in the mid eighties was a substantial rise in the price of gold, as a result of which “the prices of food [. . .] soared [. . .] and those [living] on fixed income suffered.”⁷⁷ The latter category included, among others, beneficiaries of religious endowments, no doubt a meaningful element within the Jerusalem population. To alleviate their financial difficulties somewhat and appease growing popular unrest, compromises were sought. But these – like the issue of new coins a short while later, i.e. in 1589/90 “restoring financial stability” – could not possibly solve the basic problems. The main causes of the inflationary process remained potent: the international flow of precious metals, changes in trade patterns, high levels of military expenditure and growing demographic pressures. Another general reason that clearly emerges from our records should be added to all of these as summed up by Barkan: unsystematic implementation of the newly decreed exchange rates which although intended to improve the financial situation of various sectors within the

population, actually undermined the advantages that might have been gained by unilateral enforcement of the new monetary regulations. No wonder, therefore, that the devaluation of the mid eighties had to be buttressed by another one in the course of less than half a decade. Unlike the reasons pointed out by Barkan which were primarily the result of external conditions as well as uncontrollable demographic pressures – this one was a direct outcome of a weakened administration, undecided as to the best way of achieving its aims and carrying out the desirable policies it itself had proclaimed. In the final analysis these attempts to placate the local population further aggravated the inflationary process and resulted in more harm than good for all parties involved.

Conclusion

This work has focused primarily on the town of Jerusalem and its local economy, with occasional references to contacts it maintained with other regions. Livestock was imported from the northern and north-eastern provinces, soap was exported to Egypt; rice, cloth, coffee and indigo were among the commodities imported from Egypt or sent from more remote provinces (Jedda) *via* Cairo. It was in the context of its relations with Egypt that we touched upon some of Jerusalem's links to other parts of Palestine: Jaffa served as the port of Jerusalem not only for European and other pilgrims, but for maritime traffic between Jerusalem and Cairo as well. Gaza was an important stopover for caravans taking the land route between the two cities.

The way from both Jaffa and Gaza to Jerusalem was over the single main road that wound up through the Judaeen mountains all the way to the city gates. Passengers traveling uphill had to slow down and thus became relatively easy prey for bedouin and other robbers. The Ottoman authorities did not provide systematic military protection for the occasional caravans that followed this route and the only alternative was to deputize surrogate units. The Jerusalem court summoned the heads of two villages situated at critical points along the steepest part of the road (Qaryat al-^ʿInab and Sarīs) and officially entrusted them with the task of ensuring the safety of human and commercial traffic to Jerusalem. Should a robbery occur between "the steep incline of al-Qaṣṭal and the way-station [literally: sitting room, *ʿiwān*] located in the road," stipulated a Sultanīc order sent to Jerusalem, the heads of the villages were responsible for the return of the goods (or their full value) to their owners, and for bringing the perpetrators of such deeds to justice. In return for their services they were entitled to collect a tax (*khafar*) from all pilgrims (Christian or Jewish) as well as from any load of merchandise "except for the loads of grain imported to Jerusalem since these are not liable to any toll at either of the two check-points."¹

Thus Jerusalemites became more aware of an aspect of the inter-provincial scene involving security conditions that prevailed along the road leading from the Mediterranean coast to the city; simultaneously their

horizons expanded to include elements of the international scene. In 1573 when the superintendent of a free soup-kitchen in Jerusalem reported that he could no longer provide free meals because of the scarcity of rice in both Jerusalem and Ramle, he gave as the reason: "no one is importing it from Egypt to Jerusalem because of fear of the enemy and the pirates at sea."² He was surely referring to deteriorating maritime conditions, an outcome of the major defeat suffered by the Ottomans in the naval battle of Lepanto about a year and a half before. This indicates a general knowledge of and interest in international matters – land-oriented though Jerusalem generally was.

Should one attempt to draw conclusions from these and similar references as to the nature of the relations between Jerusalem and other parts of Palestine? This question should be addressed in two separate contexts: relations between the town and its immediate hinterland and those it maintained with other parts of Palestine. The first context can be relatively simply discussed: since it was the major urban center of the district bearing its name, Jerusalem served as the seat of the *sancakbeyi*. Hebron, the other town in the same district, and the 220 villages spread throughout the 30-mile-long and 10-mile-wide mountainous area, all depended on it. In return they supplied Jerusalem with most of its agricultural needs and purchased a wide variety of items either manufactured in the town or acquired there through barter. They also paid their taxes in Jerusalem and visited the Temple Mount mosques on holidays and other important occasions.

In addition to the urban and rural population inhabiting the Jerusalem district there was a third demographic element: the bedouin tribes that roamed the wilder parts of the Judaeian desert. Although these desert areas too were under the jurisdiction of the *sancak* administrative division, they were usually left to follow their traditional way of life which meant camel-raising, tribal self-sufficiency and occasional raids on ambulatory targets (trade caravans) as well as stationary ones (villages). Since Jerusalem had been surrounded with walls the bedouin could no longer harass its inhabitants, although periodic attempts were made to overcome even this obstacle (e.g. by using ropes to climb the walls at night).³ Yet theirs was not the entirely isolated society one might tend to believe. The proliferation of firearms among them during the sixteenth century indicates some contact with outsiders, and in the context of their periodic raids there are decrees from Istanbul that even refer to cooperation between inhabitants of Hebron and rebellious tribes.⁴

Contacts between the bedouins and the townspeople however, were not limited to hostile activities. The Jerusalemite *timar* holder, accused by many of his peers in mid-1590 for having maintained a regular relationship with the "rebellious bedouins," was specifically charged with providing them with arms, participating in their fatal attack on the governor of Jerusalem and systematically purchasing their spoils.⁵ The last accusation is very meaningful: Jerusalem served as an important link in the chain of bedouin-urban

economic relations and was a vital outlet for their merchandise. This commerce could not be handled by small merchants – it had to be undertaken by someone who had the necessary access to the tribes as well as the funds available for substantial transactions. Twenty-five years earlier another important personality, not an Ottoman officer but an affluent Jerusalem merchant was incriminated for similar offenses. This was Khalīl b. Ḥasan b. Muḥamad Zurayq, also known as Ibn Ḥasūna, a member of one of the leading families in Jerusalem's economy, as may be recalled from earlier references in this work. In June 1566 he was brought to court for having conducted extensive business deals with the bedouins: "he sold them cloth, arrows and other merchandise; he bought sheep, camels and various articles from them that had been looted from the Muslims, e.g. the late Ḥasan, who was district governor of al-Karak and others." The latest charge was that he had gone out to meet these bedouins and had bought a consignment of camels which he then brought to Jerusalem and sold. He did not deny the charges, admitted having done everything in "the Eastern sub-district" (*al-nāḥiya al-sharqiyya*), and was thereupon convicted and punished.⁶

These deeds were unlawful, so much so that even an affluent merchant was convicted and penalized for them. But they nevertheless indicate a pattern of interdependence between the urban and desert economies. The same merchant was not, as one might have assumed, deterred by the punishment he received but continued to develop intensive economic relations with the bedouins. Eighteen years later, in 1584, he is reported to have sent an emissary to them with money to pay for a large consignment of alkali for Jerusalem's soap industry.⁷

The central administrative and economic role that the town played for the peasants and the bedouins living in the Jerusalem district was more meaningful than that played by other towns in Palestine (e.g. Safed or Nablus), although in essence it was similar. They too were each the seat of a district governor who provided administrative services and tried to maintain law and order in the area under his jurisdiction. Jerusalem, however, was not just the largest of the towns and the most active in interprovincial trade; it was also the most revered town in Palestine. This added an aura of respectability to it and to otherwise routine events that took place there; it also entailed the maintenance of special relations between Jerusalem and the rest of Palestine despite the fact that other parts of the country had no formal obligations to it and no official connections with its governors. Since under the Ottomans Palestine was not conceived as a defined administrative unit and formally speaking the district of Jerusalem was no more or less important than the districts of Nablus or Gaza – the only actual linkage among these *sancaks* was their mutual dependence upon Damascus.

Nevertheless, as we have shown in the introduction to this work, the Ottomans paid special attention to the religious nature of Jerusalem. The

source of most of the income for the pious endowments established in Jerusalem – the older ones dedicated to the Temple-mount shrines, the more recently established Khasseki Sultan, as well as other less important *waqfs* – was the agricultural produce of many Palestinian villages. Even a cursory look at the regular annual contributions to these endowments demonstrates this very clearly: many villages in the central coastal area of Yahūdiyya, Bayt Dajan and Lydda contributed to the Khasseki Sultan, while others in the Galilee (including Acre) sent part of their income to the mosques of the Temple Mount endowment. Shafa'amr west of Haifa, Al-Zib north of Acre, or Tulkarm and neighboring villages west of Nablus – are all place-names gleaned from a long list of remote Palestinian rural areas that regularly contributed toward the upkeep of endowments in Jerusalem.⁸ These were not the only links of their kind: occasionally a “feudal” lord would be entrusted, with some villages in other parts of Palestine as part of his “fief,” although he himself lived in Jerusalem (e.g. the villages of Qalqīlya and Kafr Šābā in the district of Nablus).⁹ But whereas such arrangements were valid for only a limited period and therefore transitory in essence, the contacts between the *waqf* villages and Jerusalem were of a much more permanent nature. In the broader country-wide perspective this meant upgrading Jerusalem and turning it into a focal point with respect to economy and religion. In sixteenth-century life these were the two major concerns of most human beings, hence the centrality of Jerusalem at that time not only for its residents, but for the vast majority of the population of Palestine.

It is in place here to turn our attention from the relations between Jerusalem and the rest of Palestine to another aspect of sixteenth-century reality, i.e. the pattern of relations within the town itself and among its inhabitants. The three sectors described in this work are far from exhausting the list of economic activities. Other types of merchants and other groups of artisans also played an important part in the Jerusalem economy. Most of their activity was conducted in the markets described in our introduction, markets that remained operative not only throughout the sixteenth century, but for many years to come as well. In 1582, for example, at least seven different markets were functioning: *sūq al-tujjār*, *sūq al-ʿaṭṭārīn*, *sūq al-khuḍar waʾl-bāshūra*, *al-sūq al-kabīr*, *sūq al-sammānīn*, *ūq al-thawriyya*, *sūq al-ṣuyyāgh*.¹⁰ Some of these names (e.g. spice-dealers – the second market, jewelers – the last one) indicate guilds that have already been referred to either in the course of this book or in an earlier work.¹¹ The names of other markets (the first one, “the merchants” the fourth “the big one”) indicate that they sold a variety of items. Foodstuffs of a similar or related nature to those dealt with in the foregoing chapters were handled by the same merchants in a manner reminiscent of the routines described above. The public-criers, for example, were heard in 1566 announcing that “no merchant in the town of Jerusalem should receive any merchandise

whatsoever unless previously recorded as brought into one of the markets and also weighed [therein].”¹² Rice, although imported from Egypt and therefore relatively expensive, could serve as a substitute for wheat and barley. Its dealers, therefore, not only had to abide by the price set for it, but also had to provide the public with preassigned daily quotas.¹³ Sesame oil, substantially cheaper than olive oil, was regularly pressed in specially assigned *maʿṣaras* by members of a particular guild of *maʿāṣirīs*. Towards the end of the century, when the price of olive oil kept rising, the authorities instructed the guild to promote the production and sale of sesame oil, thereby increasing its consumption in town. The merchants, however, were reminded that the old regulations were still binding: sesame should be purchased collectively by all the guild members in the special lot (*ʿarṣa*) earmarked for this trade; once extracted, the oil should be sold either at the press itself or in the various markets.¹⁴

The three sectors discussed in this work were not, however, merely samples chosen to illustrate economic processes and their social dimensions. We chose them because of the vast quantity of evidence and information about them in the daily proceedings of the Jerusalem court. The occasional references in our sources to other professions did not provide us with sufficient information to reconstruct their activity in detail, although the patterns that emerged were very similar to those elaborated above. The wealth of material we encountered on meat, oil and soap and bread, led us to conclude that more than any others, these were the basic economic sectors that fulfilled the elementary needs of the local population and were of concern to most people in Jerusalem. Although basically separate, the three sectors were closely linked by a common denominator: each supplied an item vitally essential for all the inhabitants of the town. Thus, for example, we find the prices of these commodities updated more often than those of others, and enforcement was also more systematic. In the month of Ramaḍān, when the entire Muslim community fasts by day and eats at night, making food-supply relatively more important than at any other time of the year, special attention was paid to both bread and meat. As early as 1531, for example, not only was a combined price list of meat and bread issued, but “the millers, the bakers and the butchers undertook to provide the town with the most excellent goods” during the entire month of fasting.¹⁵ The other months of the year convey a somewhat less vivid picture, but the parameters remained unchanged.

Although each of these economic sectors was discussed separately, certain aspects common to all can be discerned and summarized in a broader context. Taken as a whole, Jerusalem in the 16th century can be viewed from three different perspectives: that of administration, urban planning and economic function. Administratively, the ruling elite and its military adjuncts could be clearly distinguished from the majority of the local population. Physically, the various markets and other locations where pro-

fessional activity was conducted were distinctly separate from one another. Functionally, too, there was a conspicuous differentiation: that of the various guilds.

This compartmentalization served as an adequate framework for a highly active, prosperous economy and contemporary sources provide us with many indications confirming this. Jerusalem's impressive demographic growth throughout the first fifty years of Ottoman rule (which coincided with similar trends in other parts of Palestine) meant a steady increase in the value of real estate as well as widespread reconstruction of dilapidated buildings to make them habitable. Building activity was not limited to private lodgings: flour-mills, bakeries, oil-presses and soap-factories – although owned privately or held as endowments of local families – were intended to provide economic services essential for practically everybody in Jerusalem. The reconstruction of a variety of marketplaces as well as the establishment of public services for the poor (e.g. the free kitchen of Khasseki Sultan) added more public facilities. There were other, related phenomena of a less spectacular nature although equally important from an overall economic perspective: increase in consumption of the basic commodities discussed above – meat, grains, olive oil and soap. Jerusalem was the best illustration that the “continuous fall of grain prices” in fifteenth-century Syria, the general trend of decline of the soap industry described by Ashtor and termed as suffering “disastrous effects”¹⁶ came to a halt in sixteenth-century Palestine and developments were in just the opposite direction. Other sectors constituting important elements of the local economy witnessed similar developments although they are less frequently referred to in our sources. Examples are the production of jewelry and religious artefacts for local and pilgrim consumption; the processing of animal hides for use both in private households and commercial enterprises (shoes and sandals, saddles, water skins etc.); increased consumption of popular spices sold by the *‘aṭṭārs*, and the introduction of coffee in the recently established coffee-shops – looked down upon and even resented by more devout members of the community – but towards the end of the century they had become an integral part of society. These and many other developments all pointed in one direction – that of a dynamic, well defined and organized economy.

The extent to which the Jerusalem economy was indeed well defined and organized is a question that deserves more fine tuning in the light of our research, although it might seem self-evident: the very existence and orderly functioning of the various guilds, their built-in hierarchy, the *muḥtasib* and “head of the merchants” who inspected and coordinated the guilds, the pricing system – all of these appear, on the surface, as convincing evidence of efficient organization. The lines however, were not as sharply drawn as one might assume. In the relations between ruler and subject, economic development projects were not always initiated by the former. Not infrequently the merchants themselves approached the authorities – mostly in

Jerusalem, but sometimes elsewhere as well and at higher echelons – requesting or suggesting economic initiatives. True, the overall official approach to such projects was positive and conducive to their implementation, but this does not detract from the crucial importance of initiative emanating from the people rather than being imposed from above by the Sultan's officials.

By the same token, the geographic distribution of shops and markets referred to above was less well-defined than might appear. The recurring attempts of the authorities to have all members of a given guild or profession carry out their respective occupation within the precincts of a given market indicate that not all parties concerned complied with the directives. Some guild-members preferred to work at home, or sell their products there – to avoid the strict price and quality control exercised by the authorities. Wholesale meat was supposed to be purchased in the slaughterhouse, oil in *khān al-zayt*, grains in “the lot of the grains.” But we have come across many cases in which these regulations were ignored, and the respective items were sold elsewhere. Moreover, even within the markets which had names indicating an element of professional differentiation, the actual picture was not one of strict segregation: a butcher's shop functioned in the spice-dealers' market, whereas a baker permanently sold his merchandise in a market with neighbors who all dealt in oil and soap. The nature of commercial activity conducted in the various markets seems to have been far from rigid, and the same shop might have been owned over the years by different people who dealt in different commodities.

The guild system too, was less well-defined than one might have supposed. Although the underlying hypothesis and basic conception implied systematic professional organization, the guild was not just an economic structure. The guild system played an important role in the administrative apparatus of Jerusalem. Guild-members were expected to provide the townspeople with a plethora of vital services, hence they were not supposed to leave town even for short periods of time; whenever a guild-member – whether physician or butcher – wished to leave, he had to apply for a permit, and occasionally had to supply a replacement. This economic/administrative duality however was understandable in the centralized Ottoman state, that regarded itself as permanently responsible for both spheres. It was within the guilds themselves that a measure of distortion was perceptible. Although every guild was clearly defined both in form and in the nature of its activity, the *sijill* contains ample evidence that there were people who owed allegiance to more than one guild. We have seen that certain individuals, members of one guild (e.g. butchers), were also deeply involved in the affairs of another (e.g. soap-makers). This held true for even more diverse fields: merchants, whose economic role was quite clear, later became involved in soap-making, and although they did not have to roll up their sleeves and engage in the actual production, they were far from being just

silent partners. The “economic rivalry” referred to by Professor Inalcık,¹⁷ as existing between merchants and guildsmen could not possibly have been applicable to those cases in which merchants themselves became guild-members. Nor could it apply to the opposite cases: when butchers were sent to remote places to purchase sheep they acted as full-fledged merchants engaging in widespread export as well as import. Merchants, indeed, became “capitalists,” but so did some of the craftsmen, and the two concepts were not mutually exclusive at all. The phrase “merchants who prepare soap” cited above¹⁸ is most revealing in this respect. The boundaries separating these two categories in Jerusalem – and probably in other parts of the empire – were less clearly defined than we tend to conclude from the texts of Muslim jurists. The vague differentiation was furthered by cases, also referred to above, of intermarriages between families of active guild members and those of religious functionaries.

The reality of Jerusalem projects the “merchants” – both individually and as a group – as the class more involved than any other in the reconstruction of the town’s markets. They were also the prime benefactors from the economic boom that Jerusalem experienced in those years.¹⁹ Merchants, however, did not limit their public activity to the combination of trade and industry. Their public profile can be correctly perceived only after the addition of a third dimension, that of their economic and social leadership in town. When the local population found that the ‘*awāriḍ*’ taxes imposed on them were arbitrary and unjust, they turned to the merchants for help. In mid-1545, for example, the formal head of the merchants, the “chief” merchant (*shaykh al-sāda al-tujjār*), as well as a few other prominent ones (Ibn Sammūm, Ibn Mīrān), sent a special messenger to Istanbul to request on behalf of all Jerusalemites, “Muslims as well as Jews and Christians [*ahl al-dhimma*]” that the taxes be withdrawn. He was given a substantial sum of money to cover expenses on his way and he was expected to try to get an official *firman* canceling these ‘*awāriḍ*’ altogether.²⁰ Contemporary sources do not offer us any clue as to the argument that might have been used, nor are we informed of the outcome of this mission. One thing, however, is clear: in sixteenth-century Jerusalem (and perhaps in other urban centers as well) the merchants played a leading role. They could not compete with the *ashrāf* in terms of noble descent, nor could they claim the religious prestige of the ‘*ulamā*’, or the physical power of the military establishment. But in terms of economic and social activity within their own society (and outside of it), they set the pace and were at the helm, as entrepreneurs and developers, and even as local leaders. For students of Muslim history this may not seem so surprising; after all, this was not basically different from the situation in classical Islamic days. In this respect, too, the Ottoman empire emerges as a continuation of a long historical chain that had not changed either conceptually or pragmatically since the emergence of Islam.

Jerusalem, essentially only a provincial town, encapsulated all these

aspects within the framework of a highly centralized state. And this brings us to another modification of a seemingly clear-cut pattern: even during Suleiman's days, the highest peak of the golden age of the empire, the "classical" pattern of state administration was only partially implemented. Within the overall parameters of the Sultan's policies, Jerusalem conducted its economic and social life with very limited interference from the central authorities. This may have impeded implementation of some reforms and could not have pleased their initiators. It did, however, provide the provinces – or at least those moderately remote geographically like Jerusalem – with enough flexibility to enable the various local *cadres* to apply their own yardsticks to their specific circumstances. Useful as this appeared to have been in the short run for the empire as a whole, this growing laxity in the following centuries contributed to the further weakening of the empire and its inevitable demise. But that is another story.

Note on abbreviations

The first three appendices have been compiled from the scattered references to commodities prices in the *sijill* volumes. The prices are stated in *qif'a ḥalabiyya* (also: *dirham ḥalabī*) or in *para* coins, abbreviated as h. or p., respectively. We also followed the procedure of the *sijill* in quoting prices per *raṭl*, the unit of weight most commonly used at the time. Oil and soap, however, were also quoted in the smaller unit of '*uqiyya* ($\frac{1}{12}$ of a *raṭl*). their prices, whenever available, were thus presented in appendix 2 either to the left of the slash or to its right, signifying '*uqiyya* or *raṭl*, respectively. In the few cases where the *sijill* stated the price for '*uqiyya* as well as for *raṭl* we presented the relevant figures on both sides of the line.

The names of the months of the Islamic year are here presented in abbreviated forms:

Muḥarram – M	Rajab – B
Ṣafar – S	Sha ^c bān – Shab
Rabī ^c al-Awwal – RI	Ramaḍān – Ram
Rabī ^c al-Thānī – RII	Shawwāl – Shaw
Jumādā'l-'Ūlā – JI	Dhū'l-Qa ^c da – DQ
Jumādā'l-'Akhira – JII	Dhū'l-Hijja – DH

Note on weights, measures and monetary values

The study of economic life, even that of a small part of a vast empire, should draw upon rich statistical data. This is one more aspect in which the *sijill* archives emerge as most informative and reliable. Once the technical problems of deciphering cryptic *siyaqat* symbols have been overcome, the *sijill* volumes offer substantial (and substantive) information on a variety of topics.

However, the student of Ottoman economic history finds himself faced with a series of difficulties which make the proper use and adequate evaluation of this information almost as questionable as the actual reading and understanding of the texts.

The lack of a fully acknowledged and agreed upon unit – be it of weight, measure or monetary value – throughout the empire and in the course of evolving years, is foremost among these difficulties. Students of European history may have encountered problems of a similar nature, but the state of the art in Islamic history, and more particularly in Ottoman history, makes such problems very hard to overcome.

The few existing manuals in our field are useful, indeed, but they also indicate the extent of our ignorance. H. Sauvaire's classic series of articles published in the *Journal Asiatique*¹ more than a century ago was mainly based on oriental sources and focused mostly on earlier Islamic periods. More than seventy years elapsed until W. Hinz published his concise and highly important *Islamische Masse und Gewichte*² which added new dimensions to our knowledge in this field. E. Ashtor's article, recently published in the *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*³ furnished us

1 H. Sauvaire, "Matériaux pour servir à l'histoire de la numismatique et de la métrologie musulmanes," in *Journal Asiatique* VII sér., T. XIV (1879), pp. 455–533; T. XV (1880), pp. 228–77, 421–78; T. XVIII (1881), pp. 499–516; T. XIX (1882), pp. 23–77, 97–163, 281–327; VIII sér., T. III (1884), pp. 368–445.

2 W. Hinz, *Islamische Masse und Gewichte* (Leiden, 1955).

3 E. Ashtor, "Levantine weights and standard parcels: a contribution to the metrology of the later Middle Ages," in *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, vol. XLV, part 3 (1982), pp. 471–88.

with new material from European archives, although, unfortunately, he stopped at the end of the Mamluk state. Professor H. Inalcık's short note in *Turcica*⁴ on measures of capacity and land measures (with a bibliography of recent works in this field) as well as his more detailed article there on Ottoman metrology fill an important *lacuna*. They also serve as a reminder of the importance of a concerted scholarly effort to be undertaken in order to bridge the gaps in our understanding of Ottoman economic and administrative realities.

The basic unit of weight in Palestine was the *raṭl*, divided into 12 'uqiyyas. For larger consignments the term *qinṭār* (= 100 *raṭls*) was used. There were other measures used at the time, e.g. *mudd* = 7½ *raṭls* of wheat, or *ḥiml*, a camel-load which in Jerusalem weighed approximately 140 *raṭls*. All of these, and some others, were related to one unit – the *raṭl*, which raises the question of its modern equivalent. The “bewildering” diversity of *raṭls* (to use Ashtor's term) in the different towns of Egypt, Syria and Palestine is not made any easier by his updating of Hinz's information as to the *qinṭār* of Ramle: 273 rather than 232 kg. A *raṭl*, therefore, had no fixed or permanent weight even in Palestine around the year 1500, and it seems to have been the equivalent of a little less than 3 kg.

Monetary units present us with an even more complicated problem. During the first decades of Ottoman rule although new coins had already been introduced (Egyptian, Damascene and Aleppine *qiṭ'a*, the most popular of them all), *dirham* and *dīnār*, the old terms for silver and gold coins were still in use. In the course of the second half of the sixteenth century these Arabic terms were replaced by the Turkish *para* and *akçe* (= ½ *para*, also known as 'uthmānī). The latter, however, underwent a devaluation and in 1589, for example, an “old” 'uthmānī in terms of its silver alloy was worth one and a half “new” 'uthmānī. The *sulṭānī* gold coin that had originally been worth 40 *paras* was fluctuating towards the end of the sixteenth century between 120 and 160 *akçes*.

All of these were the outcome of inflationary pressures that were building inside the Ottoman economic system. The authorities, in Istanbul as well as in the provinces, were trying to curb the inflation, but the unstable exchange rate of gold and silver brought about serious difficulties to the daily life and economic activity of the local population. Some of the attempts to cope with these problems by the local and provincial administration were discussed in this work. It is our hope that they may generate more research on other parts of the Ottoman empire and serve as a contribution to a better understanding of its economy and society.

4 H. Inalcık, “Rice cultivation and the *çeltücker-re'âyâ* system in the Ottoman empire,” appendix III, in *Turcica*, T. xiv (1982), pp. 119–25; “Introduction to Ottoman metrology” in *Turcica*, T. xv (1983), pp. 311–48.

APPENDIX 1

Meat prices in Jerusalem (per *raṭl*)

(stated in *qif'a ḥalabiyya* = h. or *para* = p.)

Date	Sheep	Goat	Water buffalo	Cattle	Camel
2 Hija 936/28.7.1530		12h.	11h.	10h.	
1 R II 937/22.11.1530		14h.	13h.	11h.	10h.
20 J II 937/8.2.1531			12h. (fat)	10h. (fat)	
			10h. (lower quality)	8h. (l.q.)	
			(henceforward l.q.)		
19 Ram. 937/6.5.1531		12h.	11h.	10h.	
14 Shaw 937/31.5.1531	14h. (fillet)	11h.	10h.		
6 R I 938/18.10.1531		12h.			
18 J I 938/28.12.1531		15h.	13h.	10h.	10h.
2 R II 939/1.11.1532		12h.	11h.	10h.	10h.
20 R II 939/19.11.1532		15h.	11h.	10h.	10h.
20 Ram 939/15.4.1533		11h.	10h.	8h. (?)	
19 R II 940/7.11.1533		13h.	11h.	10h.	
15 Hija 940/18.5.1534		12h.	11h.	8h.	8h.
21 M 941/2.8.1534		12h.	11h.	7h.	7h.
3 R II 941/12.10.1534	16h. (fillet)	13h.	12h.	10h.	
25 J I 941/2.12.1534		15h.	14h. (fat)		
			10h. (l.q.)		
13 Shab 941/17.2.1535		13h.	12h.		
26 Shaw 941/25.4.1535		10h.			
28 Shaw 941/27.4.1535		13h.	12h.	10h.	8h.
25 Hija 941/27.6.1535		13h.	12h.		
6 R II 942/4.10.1535		13h.	11h.	10h.	10h.
9 Raj 942/3.1.1536		14h.	13h.		
M 943/June 1536		13h.	11h.	6h.	
4 Raj 943/17.12.1536		15h.	13h.	10h.	7h.
25 Shab 943/6.2.1537		14h.	12h.	7h.	7h.
2 Ram 943/12.2.1537		13h.	11h.		

Date	Sheep	Goat	Water buffalo	Cattle	Camel
10 Ram 943/20.2.1537		12h.	11h.	7h.	
12 Q 943/22.4.1537	17h. (<i>liyya</i>)	13h.	11h.	7h.	
14 J I 944/20.10.1537	17h. (<i>liyya</i>)	15h.	13h.	7h.	
	17h. (fillet)				
end J I 944/30.10.1537		14h.	12h.		
15 Ram 944/16.2.1538		15h.	11h.	7h.	
25 Ram 944/26.2.1538		13h.	11h.	7h.	
18 Shaw 944/21.3.1538		12h.	10h.	7h.	
7 R II 945/2.9.1538	16h. (fillet)	12h.	10h.		
23 R II 945/18.9.1538		13h.	11h.	8h.	
4 Raj 945/26.11.1538			10h.		
10 Shab 945/1.1.1539		15h.	14h.		
11 Shaw 945/2.3.1539		12h.	11h.		
2 Hijja 945/21.4.1539		11h.	10h.		
24 Shab 947/24.12.1540		16h.			
19 Shaw 947/16.2.1541		15h.			
4 Q 947/2.3.1541		14h.			
10 Q 947/8.3.1541		13h.			
8 J II 948/29.9.1542		12h.			
1m 948/27.4.1541		12h.	7h.	5h. (l.q.)	7h.
27 Q 948/14.3.1542		15h.		7h.	
14 Hijja 948/31.3.1542		13h.			
8 R I 949/22.6.1542		12h.			
2 J I 949/14.8.1542	16h. (fillet)	12h.	15h. (fillet)		
17 J II 949/28.9.1542		13h.	11h.		
end M 950/end April 1543	15h. (fillet)	12h.	10h.	5h.	4h. (l.q.)
2 S 950/7.5.1543		11h.	10h.	3h.	2½h. (l.q.)
6 S 950/11.5.1543		11h.	11h. (balqāwī) 10h. (jabali)	5h.	4h. (l.q.)
			11h.		
29 R I 950/2.7.1543				6h.	5h. (l.q.)
17 Raj 951/4.10.1544			10h.		
18 Shab 951/4.11.1544				7h.	6h. (l.q.)
14 Shaw 951/29.12.1544	11h.				
21 Hijja 951/5.3.1545		13h.	12h.		8h. (l.q.)
17 R I 952/29.5.1545		11h.	9h.		
11 R II 952/22.6.1545	15h. (<i>liyya</i>)	12h.	10h.		
9 J II 952/18.8.1545			14h. (fat) 12h. (l.q.)		

6 Shab 952/13.10.1545		13h.		12h.		10h.		
7 Shaw 952/12.12.1545		15h.		14h.(fat)				
				10h.(l.q.)				
3 M 953/6.3.1546	17½h.(fillet)	14h.	16h.(fillet)	13h.				
	12h.(l.q.)			10h.(l.q.)				
5 M 953/8.3.1546	16h.(fillet)	14h.(fat)	15h.(fillet)	13h.(fat)				
	12h.(l.q.)			10h.(l.q.)				
17 M 953/20.3.1546	15h.(fillet)	12h.	14h.(fillet)	11h.			7h.(fat)	
							4h.(l.q.)	
23 M 953/26.3.1546					10h.(fat)		10h.(fat)	
					7½h.(l.q.)		7½h.(l.q.)	
29 M 953/1.4.1546	13h.(fillet)	11h.	12h.(fillet)	9h.				
	13h.(liyya)							
19 S 953/21.4.1546		12h.		10h.			6h.	4h.(l.q.)
27 R II 953/27.6.1546		13h.		12h.				
3 Shab 953/29.9.1546		14h.(fat)		13h.(fat)				
6 M 954/26.2.1547		14h.		13h.				
7 M 954/27.2.1547		13h.		12h.				
5 S 954/27.3.1547	14h.(fillet)	12h.	12h.(fillet)	11h.	9h.	7h.(l.q.)	7h.	6h.(l.q.)
7 S 954/29.3.1547		13h.		12h.			8h.	
23 S 954/14.4.1547	12h.(fillet)	10h.	11h.(fillet)	9h.	8h.	7h.(l.q.)	6h.(fat)	
	12h.(liyya)						5h.(l.q.)	
24 S 954/15.4.1547	15h.(fillet)	12h.	14h.(fillet)	11h.	8h.	7h.(l.q.)	7h.(fat)	
	14h.(liyya)						6h.(l.q.)	
7 R II 954/27.5.1547	15h.(fillet)	12h.	14h.(fillet)	11h.				
20 Raj 954/5.9.1547		13h.		12h.	11h.(l.q.)			
		12h.(l.q.)						
6 Hijja 954/17.1.1548		15h.		14h.				
23 Hijja 954/3.2.1548	20h.(fillet)	17h.(fat)	17h.(fillet)	15h.(fat)				
	20h.(liyya)							
3 M 955/13.2.1548	18h.(fillet)	15h.	17h.(fillet)	14h.(fat)				
	20h.(liyya)							
Awā'il M 955/11-20.2.1548	16h.(liyya)	13h.(fat)	14h.(fillet)	12h.(fat)	8h.	6h.(l.q.)	7h.(fat)	
							5h.(l.q.)	
6 R II 955/15.5.1548			14h.(fillet)	11h.(fat)				
				10h.(l.q.)				
9 Raj 955/14.8.1548								7h.(fat)
								5h.(l.q.)
16 Raj 955/21.8.1548	16h.(fillet)	13h.	15h.(fillet)	12h.(fat)		8h.(fat)	7h.(fat)	
	18h.(liyya)			10h.(l.q.)		6h.(l.q.)	5h.(l.q.)	
9 Shab 955/13.9.1548	15h.(fillet)	13h.(fat)	14h.(fillet)	12h.(fat)				
	18h.(liyya)	12h.(l.q.)		10h.(l.q.)				

Date	Sheep	Goat	Water buffalo	Cattle	Camel
7 Shaw 955/9.11.1548		15h.(fat)	13h.	9h.(fat) 7h.(l.q.)	9h.(fat)
17 S 956/17.3.1549		15h. 12h.(l.q.)	12h. 10h.(l.q.)	7h. 5h.(l.q.)	
2 R I 956/31.3.1549		13h.	11h.(fat)		
27 J I 956/23.6.1549	14½h.(fillet)	13h.(fat) 10h.(l.q.)	13h.(fillet) 12h.(fat) 10h.(l.q.)	7h.(fat)	
3 Raj 956/28.7.1549					8h.
13 Raj 956/7.8.1549	15h.(fillet)	13h.	13h.(fillet) 11h.	7h.	
8 Ram 956/30.9.1549			10h.		
7 S 957/25.2.1550		15h.	13h.		
16 S 957/6.3.1550		13h.	12h.		
13 R I 957/1.4.1550	15h.(fillet)	12h.	14h.(fillet) 11h. 10h.(l.q.) 10h.(fat) 8h.(l.q.)	7h.(fat) 5h.(l.q.) 7h.(fat) 5h.(l.q.)	
27 R I 957/15.4.1550					
17 Hijja 957/27.12.1550	18h.(fillet) 18h.(liyya)	15h.	15h.(fillet) 12h.	10h. 8h.(l.q.)	
19 M 958/27.1.1550		15h.			
10 S 958/17.2.1551		14h.	12h.(fat)		
4 R I 959/29.2.1552		13h.(fat)			
8 R I 959/4.3.1552		12h.	11h.		
end J I 959/24.5.1552		12h.	11h.	8h.	6h.
4 R I 960/18.2.1553		13h.	12h.		
2 R II 960/18.3.1553		12h.	11h.	8h.	7h.(l.q.) 6h. 5h.(l.q.)
Awakhir Raj 960/3-12.7.1553	15h.(fillet) 18h.(liyya)	12h.	14h.(fillet) 11h.	6h.(fat) 4h.(l.q.)	8h.
1 Q 960/9.10.1553		15h.(fat) 12h.(l.q.)	14h.(fat) 10h.(l.q.)	10h.(fat) 8h.(l.q.)	
end Q 960/7.11.1553		13h.(fat) 12h.(l.q.)	11h.(fat) 10h.(l.q.)	12h.(fat) 10h.(fat)	
10 Ram 961/9.8.1554		14h.(fat)	12h.(fat)	9h.(fat) 5h.(l.q.)	
3 J I 962/26.3.1555		12h.	10h.		
13 J II 962/5.5.1555		12h.(fat)	11h.		
14 Shab 962/4.7.1555		15h.(fat) 13h.(l.q.)	13h.(fat) 10h.(l.q.)		
26 M 963/11.12.1555		13h.	12h.		

14 S 963/29.12.1555		4p.(fat)		3p.(fat)	
11 R II 963/23.2.1556		15h.		14h.	
18 R II 963/1.3.1556		3½p.		3p.	
Awākhir R II 963/4-12.3.1556		3p.		14h.(fat)	
1 J I 963/13.3.1556	3½p.(liyya)	13h.	12h.(l.q.)	12h.(fat)	
				11h.(l.q.)	
9 J I 963/21.3.1556	15h.(liyya)	12h.		11h.	6h.
					5h.(l.q.)
25 J II 963/6.5.1556	15h.(fillet)				
1 Raj 963/11.5.1556					8h.(fat)
23 Raj 963/2.6.1556					6h.(fat)
1 Ram 963/9.7.1556		14h.		13h.	
14 R I 964/15.1.1557		3½p.		3p.(fat)	
Awāsiṭ R I 964/12-21.1.1557		15h.		13h.	
Awākhir R I 964/21-30.1.1557		13h.	12h.(l.q.)	12h.(fat)	
				11h.(l.q.)	
8 R II 964/8.2.1557		12h.	11h.(l.q.)	11h.	
				10h.(l.q.)	
28 J I 964/29.3.1557		3p.		14h.	
19 J II 964/19.4.1557					7½h.(fat)
					6h.(l.q.)
Awā'il Raj 964/30.4-8.5.1557	16h.(fillet)	15h.		15h.	10h.
					7½h.(fat)
22 Shab 964/20.6.1557		15h.		14h.	6h.(l.q.)
				12h.(l.q.)	8h.
3 Ram 964/30.6.1557		16h.		14h.	8h.(fat)
					6h.(l.q.)
21 Hija 964/15.10.1557		4p.		3½p.(fat)	2p.(fat)
				3p.(l.q.)	1½p.(l.q.)
9 M 965/1.11.1557					12h.(fat)
5 S 965/27.11.1557		20h.(fat)		17½h.(fat)	
		17½h.(l.q.)		15h.(l.q.)	
12 R I 965/2.1.1558		22½h.		17½h.(fat)	10h.
		20h.(l.q.)		15h.(l.q.)	7h.
		20h.		4½p.	6h.(l.q.)
14 R II 965/3.2.1558		17½h.		15h.	
25 R II 965/14.2.1558		15h.		13h.	
3 J I 965/21.2.1558		15h.		14h.	
3 J II 965/23.3.1558		13h.		12h.	10h.
8 Raj 965/26.4.1558		14h.		10h.	7h.
24 Raj 965/12.5.1558				10h.	8h.
				8h.(l.q.)	7h.(l.q.)

Date	Sheep	Goat	Water buffalo	Cattle	Camel
22 Shab 965/9.6.1558					10h.
29 Shab 965/16.6.1558		16h.			
20 Ram 965/6.7.1558	21h.(fillet)	17½h.	18h.(fillet)	15h.	10h.
3 S 966/15.11.1558			12h.(fat)	9h.	
22 RI 966/2.1.1559		13h.		8h.(l.q.)	
22 RII 966/1.2.1559			12h.(fat)		
1 JII 966/11.3.1559	18h.(fillet)	15h.	16h.(fillet)	14h.(fat)	10h.
27 JII 966/6.4.1559	20h.(fillet)	17h.	18h.(fillet)	15h.	
5 Raj 966/13.4.1559	20h.(fillet)	17h.	18h.(fillet)	15h.	
17 Raj 966/25.4.1559		16h.		12h.	
5 Shab 966/13.5.1559	20h.(fillet)	16h.(fat)	18h.(fillet)	14h.(fat)	8h.(fat)
11 Shaw 966/17.7.1559		15h.(l.q.)		13h.(l.q.)	6h.(l.q.)
13 Q 966/17.8.1559	18h.(fillet)	15h.	16h.(fillet)	13h.	
21 Q 966/25.8.1559	20h.(liyya)	16h.(fat)	14h.(fat)	8h.	
9 M 967/11.10.1559	18h.(fillet)	15h.(l.q.)	16h.(fillet)	13h.(l.q.)	6h.(l.q.)
	20h.(liyya)	16h.(fat)		14h.(fat)	
		15h.(l.q.)		13h.(l.q.)	
		4p.		3½p.	
				2½p.(l.q.)	
Awa'il S 967/2-10.11.1559			12½h.		
19 RII 967/18.1.1560		13½h.(fat)			
26 JI 967/23.2.1560		17½h.			
3 Raj 967/30.3.1560		13h.			
10 Raj 967/9.4.1560		15h.		10h.	
2 Hijja 967/24.8.1560		17½h.			
17 JI 968/3.2.1561		17½h.			
13 JII 968/1.3.1561		15h.			
15 JII 968/3.3.1561		13h.		8h.(fat)	
16 Ram 968/31.5.1561		14h.		6h.(l.q.)	
3 Shaw 968/17.6.1561	18h.(fillet)	14h.	15h.(fillet)	12h.(fat)	
	18h.(liyya)		13h.	8h.	
16 Q 968/29.7.1561	20h.(fillet)	15h.	18h.(fillet)	10h.(l.q.)	8½h.
	20h.(liyya)			5h.(l.q.)	5h.(l.q.)
end Hijja 968/10.9.1561		17½h.(fat)		10h.	10h.
		14h.(l.q.)		8h.(l.q.)	10h.(fat)
				10h.(fat)	6h.(l.q.)

3 S 969/13.10.1561	20h. (liyya)	17½h. 14h. (l.q.)	16h. (fat) 10h. (l.q.)	10h. (fat) 6h. (l.q.)
16 RI 969/24.11.1561		17½h. 14h. (l.q.)	16h. 10h. (l.q.)	10h. (fat) 6h. (l.q.)
17 RI 969/25.11.1561		20h.	18h.	
28 RII 969/5.1.1562		4p. 15h. (l.q.)	18h. 13h. (l.q.)	10h.
15 JI 969/21.1.1562		17½h.	15h.	10h.
28 JI 969/3.2.1562	20h. (liyya)	16h. 13h. (l.q.)	14h. 11h. (l.q.)	
3 JII 969/8.2.1562		15h.	14h.	8h. (fat)
1 Hijja 969/2.8.1562		17h.	15h.	10h.
4 M 970/3.9.1562		4p.	3½p.	
4 RII 970/1.12.1562		4½p.	4p.	
17 shab 970/11.4.1563	18h. (fillet) 20h. (liyya)	15h.	15h. (fillet) 13h.	10h. 8h. (l.q.)
8 Shaw 970/31.5.1563	18h. (fillet) 20h. (liyya)	15h.	15h. (fillet) 13h.	7½h. 5h. (l.q.) 8h.
3 Hijja 970/24.7.1563		16h.	15h.	
9 S 971/28.9.1563		17h.	15h. 10h. (l.q.)	
RII 971/11-12.1563				2½p.
21 RII 971/8.12.1563		4p.	3½p. (fat)	
22 JII 971/6.2.1564		15h. (fat)	13h. (fat) 12h. (l.q.)	8h.
25 M 972/2.9.1564		17½h.	15h. (fat)	10h. (fat) 8h. (l.q.)
13 S 973/9.9.1565				2p. + 1h.
23 S 973/19.9.1565		3½p.	3p.	
15 Ram 973/15.4.1566		15h.	14h.	10h.
11 Shaw 973/1.5.1566		16h.	15h.	12½h. 9h.
15 JI 974/28.11.1566		16h.	15h.	10h.
14 JII 974/27.12.1566		4½p.	4p. (fat) 3½p. (l.q.)	9h.
18 Shab 974/28.2.1567		15h. 14h. (l.q.)	13h.	13h.
13 Ram 974/24.3.1567		4p.	3½p. (fat)	
2 Shaw 974/12.4.1567		3½p.	3p.	½p. 2p. (fat) 1½p. (l.q.)
7 Q 974/16.5.1567	5p. (liyya)	3½p.	3p.	2½p. 2p. (fat) 8h. (l.q.)
13 Hijja 974/21.6.1567	30h. (liyya)	18h.	16h.	10h. 8h. (l.q.)

Date	Sheep	Goat	Water buffalo	Cattle	Camel
17 II 975/19.11.1567	6p. (liyya)	4½p.	4p.		
19 Shab 975/18.2.1568		4p.			
15 Shaw 975/13.4.1568		3p.	14h.	2p. (fat) 1½p. (l.q.)	
12 Q 975/9.5.1568		6p.			
1 RI 976/24.8.1568		4p.			
9 II 976/30.10.1568		4p.	3½p.	2p.	
11 Shaw 976/29.3.1569		3½p.	2p. + 2h.	2p.	
4 Q 976/20.4.1569			3p.		
6 RII 977/18.9.1569		4p.	3½p.	2p.	
				1½p. (l.q.)	
5 III 977/15.11.1569		4p.	3½p.		
28 Shaw 977/5.4.1570		3½p.	3p.	8h. (fat) 6h. (l.q.)	
14 Q 977/20.4.1570	3½p. (liyya)	3p.	13h.	8h. (fat) 6h. (l.q.)	
28 Q 977/4.5.1570	4½p. (fillet) 4p. (liyya)	3½p. (fillet)	3p.	1p. + 3h. (fat) 6h. (l.q.)	
6 S 978/10.7.1570		2½p.			
27 Shaw 979/14.3.1572		3½p.	3p.	2p.	2p. + 2h. (fat)
				1½p. (l.q.)	
Awā'il M 980/14-23.5.1572		3½p.	3p.	2p.	
5 R I 980/16.7.1572		3½p.	3p.	8h.	
				5h. (l.q.)	
13 Raj 980/19.11.1572		4½p.	4p. (fat)		
12 Q 980/16.3.1573		4½p.	4p.		
23 Hijja 980/26.4.1573		3½p.	3p.		
14 J II 981/11.10.1573		4p.	3½p.		
28 Shab 981/23.12.1573		5p.	4p.		
13 Q 981/6.3.1574		4p.	3p.		
19 Q 981/12.3.1574	4p. (liyya)	3½p.	3p.	2p. (fat)	
1 M 982/23.4.1574	4p. (liyya)	3p.	2½p.	2p. (fat) 1½p. (l.q.)	
Awāsīt S 982/1-9.6.1574	5p. (fillet)				
6 Shab 982/21.11.1574		5p.	4p.		
5 J II 983/11.9.1575		4p. + 2h.	3½p.		
7 Shaw 983/9.1.1576		4p.	3½p.	2p. (fat)	
10 RII 984/7.7.1576		3½p.	3p. (fat)		

22 JII 984/16.9.1576		4p.		3p.			
end Q 984/18.2.1577		4p.					
26 M 985/15.4.1577		3½p.		3p.	2½p.	2p.(fat)	
						1½p.(l.q.)	
22 RII 985/9.7.1577		4p.		3p.			
27 Raj 985/10.10.1577	6p.(liyya)	5p.		4p.	3p.	2½p.(fat)	
						2p.(l.q.)	
19 M 986/28.3.1578	4p.+2h.(fillet)	4p.	4p.(fillet)	3p.	2p.		2p.
	5p.(liyya)				1p.+3h.(l.q.)		1p.+3h.(l.q.)
17 M 987/16.3.1579		3½p.		3p.		2p.	
1 S 990/25.2.1582		4p.		3½p.		2p.(fat)	
26 RI 990/20.4.1582		5p.		4p.			
18 JII 991/9.7.1583		4½p.		4p.		12h.(fat)	
						11h.(l.q.)	
13 S 995/23.1.1587		8p.		8p.			
4 Shaw 996/27.8.1588		8p.		7p.			
Awā'il JI 977/19-28.3.1589		10p.		7p.		4p.	
26 JI 997/13.4.1589		8p.					
Awā'il Shab 997/16-24.6.1589		8p.		7p.		4p.	
5 M 1003/20.9.1594		5p.		4½p.			
17 Shab 1008/24.11.1599		4½p.		4p.			

APPENDIX 2

Olive oil and soap prices in Jerusalem

(States in *qif'a ḥalabiyya* = h, or in *para* = p.)

Date	Olive oil	Soap		
		Dry per 'uqiyya/raṭl	Wet 'uqiyya/raṭl	Spread for drying 'uqiyya/raṭl
S 937/Oct 1530	1½h./	1h./		
Jl 937/Dec 1530	/ 16h.	1h./	/ 10h.	
Shaw 937/May 1531		/ 17h.	/ 16h.	
Jl 938/Jan 1532	1h./ 12h.			
Ram 938/Apr 1532	/ 30h.	/ 17½h.	/ 17h.	
Shab 939/Mar 1533	2¼h./	2¼h./	2h./	
Shaw 939/May 1533	2¼h./	2¼h./	2h./	
Rll 940/Nov 1533	4h./			
M 941/Jul 1534	1¼h./ 1h./ (lower quality, henceforward l.q.)		/ 16h.	
Rll 941/Oct 1534	1½h./ 1¼h./ (l.q.)			
Jll 941/Dec 1534	2¼h./	2h./		
Ram 941/Mar 1535		1½h./	1¼h./	
Rll 942/Oct 1535	/ 12h.			
Jll 942/Dec. 1535	/ 12h.	/ 16h.		
Ram 942/Mar 1536	/ 15h.	/ 21h.	/ 16h.	
M 943/Jun 1536	1¼h./ 1h./ (l.q.)	2½h./	1½h./	
S 943/Jul 1536	1½h./	2¼h./	1½h./	

Date	Olive oil	Soap		
Date	per 'uqiyya/ raṭl	Dry per 'uqiyya/ raṭl	Wet 'uqiyya/ raṭl	Spread for drying 'uqiyya/ raṭl
Shab 943/Jan 1537				
	/ 16h.			
DH 943/May 1537				
	/ 18h.	/ 24h.		
	/ 15h. (l.q.)			
RII 944/Oct 1537		2h./		
B 944/Dec 1537				
	/ 15h.	/ 20h.		
DH 944/May 1538				
	1½h./			
Shaw 944/Mar 1538				
	1 qinṭār = 580 'uthmānī (l.q., "for soap making")			
RI 945/Aug 1538				
	1½h./	2h./	1½h./	
RII 945/Sep 1538				
	2h./	2½h./	2h./	
Shab 945/Jan 1539				
	2h./	2½h./	1½h./	
Shaw 945/Mar 1539				
		2½h./	2h./	
Ram 947/Jan 1541				
	1 qinṭār = 1100h. (l.q., "for the soap factories")			
DH 947/Apr 1541				
	1½h./		1½h./ 16h.	
M 948/May 1541				
	1½h./		/ 20h.	
			/ 16h. (l.q.)	
RII 948/Aug 1541				
	1½h./		/ 12h.	
Ram 949/Dec 1542				
	1½h./	/ 24h.	/ 20h.	
DQ 949/Feb 1543				
	1½h./ 16h.			
RI 950/Jun 1543				
	1½h./	/ 14h.	/ 10h.	
B 951/Oct 1544				
	3h./ 36h.	2½h./ 30h.	2h./ 24h.	
	2½h./ 30h. (l.q.)			
DH 951/Feb 1545				
	3h./	/ 30h.	/ 24h.	
M 952/Mar 1545				
	3h./	2½h./ 30h.	2h./ 24h.	
RII 952/Jun 1545				
	3h./ 36h.	2½h./ 30h.	2½h./ 27h.	
Shab 952/Oct 1545				
		2½h./		
Ram 952/Nov 1545				
	/ 21h.	2½h./	2h./	
Shaw 952/Dec 1545				
		2h./ 24h.		
DQ 952/Jan 1546				
	/ 20h.	/ 27½h.	/ 24h.	
S 953/Apr 1546				
	/ 19h.	2½h./	2h./	
	/ 16h. (l.q.)			

Date	Olive oil	Soap		
Date	per 'uqiyya/raṭl	Dry per 'uqiyya/raṭl	Wet 'uqiyya/raṭl	Spread for drying 'uqiyya/raṭl
Shab 953/Oct 1546	/ 20h.	2½h./	1½h./	
Shaw 953/Dec 1546	2¼h./ 2h./ (l.q.)	2½h./	2¼h./	
DH 953/Feb 1547	2h./ 1¾h./ (l.q.)	2½h./	2h./	
RII 954/Jun 1547	2h./ 1¾h./ (l.q.)	2½h./	2¼h./	
JII 954/Aug 1547	2h./ 1½h./ (l.q.)	2½h./	2¼h./	
Shab 954/Oct 1547	1¾h./ 1½h./ (l.q.)	2½h./	2h./	
Ram 954/Nov 1547	/ 18h. / 15h. (l.q.)	/ 25h.	/ 24h.	/ 17½h.
RI 955/Apr 1548	/ 18h. / 15h. (l.q.)	/ 27h.	/ 24h.	/ 18h.
B 955/Aug 1548	/ 18h. / 15h. (l.q.)	/ 24h.	/ 20h.	/ 18h.
Ram 955/Oct 1548	1½h./ 1¾h./ (l.q.)	2¼h./	/ 20h.	1½h./
M 956/Feb 1549	/ 24h.	/ 27h.	/ 24h.	/ 18h.
S 956/Mar 1549	/ 20h. / 15h. (l.q.)	/ 25h.	/ 20h.	/ 17½h.
B 956/Aug 1549	/ 21h. / 18h. (l.q.)	/ 22½h.	/ 20h.	
JI 957/May 1550	1½h./	/ 24h.	1½h./ 18h.	
JI 958/May 1551	2½h./ 2h./ (l.q.)	2½h./	2h./	1½h./
JI 958/Jun 1551	/ 21h. / 20h. (l.q.)	/ 26h.	/ 22h.	/ 21h.
Ram 958/Sep 1551	/ 6para	/ 7p. + 1h.	/ 6p.	
DQ 958/Nov 1551	/ 24h.	/ 25h.	/ 20h.	/ 18h.
B 960/Jul 1553	/ 24h. / 21h. (l.q.)	/ 30h.	/ 27½h.	/ 24h.
B 961/Jun 1554		3h./ 36h.		
Shaw 961/Sep 1554	2½h./			
JII 962/Apr 1555	3h./ 2½h./	3¼h./	2h./	

Date	Olive oil	Soap		
		Dry per 'uqiyya/raṭl	Wet 'uqiyya/raṭl	Spread for drying 'uqiyya/raṭl
DQ 962/Oct 1555	3h./ 2½h./ (l.q.)		2h./	
DQ 963/Sep 1556	/ 30h. / 25h. (l.q.)	/ 42h.		
M 964/Nov 1556	/ 6p.	/ 7½p.		
S 964/Dec 1556		/ 6p. / 40h.		
RI 964/Jan 1557	/ 24h. / 22h. (l.q.)	/ 30h.	/ 27h.	/ 24h.
RII 964/Feb 1557	/ 27h. / 24h. (l.q.)	/ 30h.	/ 30h.	/ 24h.
JII 964/Apr 1557	/ 21h.		/ 22½h.	
B 964/May 1557	/ 18h. ("oil for soap")	/ 30h. / 36h.	/ 24h. / 27h. ("from the <i>jallāb</i> ") ("from the market")	/ 20h. / 22h.
Shab 964/Jun 1557	2½h./ 27h. / 18h. (l.q.) ("from the <i>jallāb</i> ") / 21h. (l.q.) ("from the market")	/ 30h. / 38h.	/ 24h. / 27h. ("from the <i>jallāb</i> ") ("from the market")	/ 20h. / 22h.
JI 965/Mar 1558	2h./	2½h./	2h./	/ 4p.
B 965/May 1558	/ 24h. / 20h. (l.q.)	/ 30h.	/ 24h.	/ 20h.
DQ 965/Aug 1558	/ 27h. / 24h. (l.q.)	/ 27h.	/ 24h.	/ 20h.
RII 966/Jan 1559	/ 24h. / 21h. (l.q.)	/ 24h.	/ 21h.	/ 19h.
JII 966/Mar 1559	/ 24h. / 20h. (l.q.)	/ 27½h.	/ 24h.	/ 21h.
DQ 966/Aug 1559	/ 5½p. / 4p. + 4h. (l.q.)	/ 30h.	/ 27½h.	/ 24h.
Ram 973/Apr 1566	/ 7p. / 6½p. (l.q.)			
Shab 974/Feb 1567	/ 40h.	3h./ 35h.		
DQ 974/May 1567	/ 12p.	3h./ 7p. + 1h.		
DH 974/Jun 1567	/ 13p.	1p./ 40h. (1½ 'uqiyya)		
S 975/Aug 1567	/ 8p.	3h./		

Date	Olive oil	Soap		
Date	per 'uqiyya/raṭl	Dry per 'uqiyya/raṭl	Wet 'uqiyya/raṭl	Spread for drying 'uqiyya/raṭl
RI 976/Sep 1568				
JII 977/Nov 1569	/ 4p. + 4h.	/ 6p.	/ 5p.	
JI 978/Oct 1570	/ 6p.	/ 7p.	/ 6p.	
M 979/Jun 1571		/ 7p.	/ 6p.	/ 5p.
B 979/Dec 1571	/ 6½p.	/ 7p.	/ 6p.	/ 5p.
RI 980/Jul 1572	3h./ 7p. + 1h.	/ 8p.	/ 7p.	/ 6p.
	/ 8p. + 2h.	1p./ 8p. (1½ 'uqiyya)	/ 7p. + 1h.	/ 6p.
JII 980/Sep 1572				
Shaw 983/Jan 1576	2½h./	/ 8p.	/ 7p.	
Ram 984/Dec 1576	/ 5p. + 2h.	/ 7p. + 1h.	/ 6p.	/ 5p.
	/ 6p.	/ 6p.	/ 5½p.	/ 5p.
	/ 5½p. (l.q.)			
RII 985/Jun 1577	/ 6p.	/ 7p. + 1h.	/ 6p.	/ 5p.
	/ 5p.			
DQ 985/Jan 1578				
	7p. + 1h.	/ 7p. + 1h.	/ 6p.	/ 5p.
M 988/Mar 1580	/ 7p. + 1h.	/ 8p.		/ 6p.
RII 989/May 1581	/ 5p. ("for food")			
	/ 4p. + 4h. ("for soap")			
S 990/Mar 1582	/ 8p.	/ 7½p.		/ 6p.
DQ 990/Dec 1582	1 <i>quīṣṭār</i> = 13 <i>sulṭānī</i> gold coins ("for soap")			
R II 991/May 1583		/ 9p. + 1h.	/ 8p.	/ 7p.
		/ 10p.	("from the merchants")	
			("from the market")	
JII 991/Jul 1583		/ 10p.	/ 9p.	/ 8p.
		/ 10½p.	/ 9½p.	/ 8½p.
			("from the market")	
B 992/Jul 1584				
JII 993/May 1585	4h./			
	/ 12p.	/ 15p.	/ 12p.	
S 995/Jan 1587			/ 13p.	/ 10p.
Shaw 996/Sep 1588	/ 13p.	/ 14p.	/ 12p.	
Shab 997/Jul 1589	/ 16p.	/ 16p.	/ 14p.	
998/1590		/ 19p.	/ 17p.	/ 14p.
			("from the market")	

Date	Olive oil per 'uqiyya/ raṭl	Soap		
		Dry per 'uqiyya/ raṭl	Wet 'uqiyya/ raṭl	Spread for drying 'uqiyya/ raṭl
Jl 998/Mar 1590	1 qinṭār = 12½ suṭṭānī			
M 1003/Sep 1594	/ 7½p.			
Ram 1005/May 1597	/ 10p.			
Rl 1006/Oct 1597	/ 9p.		/ 10p. / 10½p. ("from the market")	
DH 1006/Jul 1598			/ 14p.	/ 13p.
Ram 1007/Apr 1599		/ 17p.		

Flour and bread prices in Jerusalem
(per *raṭl* in *dirham ḥalabī* = h. or *para* = p.)

[illegible]

DQ 943/Apr 1537		5h.		3½h.		3h.		4h.		5h.	
DH 943/May 1537		4½h.		3½h.		3½h.		4h.	4½h.		
M 944/June 1537	4½h.					3h.					
S 944/Jul 1537		4h				3h.		4h.	4h.		
S 944/Jul 1537						2¼h.		3½h.	3¼h.		
JII 944/Nov 1537		4h.				2½h.		3½h.			
Shab 944/Jan 1538	2½h.	3½h.				2½h.					
DQ 944/March 1538		4½h.				3h.		4h.		4½h.	
DH 944/May 1538		4½h.									/10h.
M 945/Jun 1538		5h.				3½h.		4½h.		5h.	
RI 945/Aug 1538	5½h.	5½h.		4½h.				5½h.		5½h.	
RII 945/Sep 1538				4h.						7h.	
Shab 945/Jan 1539											10h./12h.
Shaw 945/Mar 1539				6h.	5h.			6½h.		6h.	
DH 945/May 1539		5½h.				3½h.		5h.		6h.	
	("from the market")	6h.									
	("from the miller")	7h.				4½h.					
DH 945/May 1539		5h.						4½h.		5h.	
S 947/Jun 1540	7h.	7h.		4h.		3½h.		5½h.		7h.	
S 947/Jun 1540	4h.	5h.				3h.		4h.	5h.		
JII 947/Sep 1540						3½h.					
JII 947/Oct 1540		4½h.				3h.		4½h.	4½h.		
DH 947/Apr 1541	18h.			4h.		2½h.					
M 948/May 1541						3h.					
S 948/Jun 1541		4½h.									
B 948/Nov 1541		4½h.				3½h.		4h.		4h.	
Shaw 948/Feb 1542		4½h.			2½h.	3h.		4h.		4½h.	
	("from the mill")										
	4¾h.										
	("from the market")										
DQ 948/March 1542					2½h.	3h.		3½h.	4h.	4h.	
M 949/May 1542		4h.						3½h.		4h.	
										(½h. each <i>kmāḥ</i>)	
RI 949/July 1542		7h.									
JII 949/Sep 1542		4h.									
Ram 949/Dec 1542		4h.			2½h.	3h.		3½h.		4h.	
Shaw 949/Jan 1543		3½h.	3h.			2½h.		3½h.		3½h.	
B 951/Oct 1544	12h.	12h.		7h.						12h.	12h./15h.
Shab 951/Nov 1544		10h.				7h.					11h.

Date	Flour		Bread							Ka'k ('Bagels') Dry/Soft
	Ṭahīn	Šimūd	Sammār	Šimīd	Kishkār	Māwī	Ṭabbūnī	Tannūrī	Kmāj	
RI 952/May 1545		roh. (local) 9h. (Egyptian)			8h.					
RI 953/May 1546	7½h.	7½h.				4h.	6h.		7h.	
RI 953/Jun 1546	6h.	6h.		4h.		3½h.			6h.	
JI 953/Jul 1546		5h.	4½h.			3h.	4½h.		5h.	
B 953/Sep 1546		4h.				2½h.	3½h.		4h.	
Shab 953/Oct 1546		4h.					3½h.		4h.	
Shaw 953/Dec 1546		3½h.				2½h.	3h.		3½h.	
DH 953/Feb 1547		3h.				2h.	3h.		3h.	
JI 954/Aug 1547						2½h.	3h.			
JI 954/Aug 1547									3½h. (6 kmāj per raṭl)	
B 954/Sep 1547		3½h.								
Ram 954/Nov 1547		3½h.		3¼h.		2½h.	3½h.		3½h.	
DQ 954/Jan 1548		3h.				2¼h.			3h.	
RI 955/Apr 1548	3h.								3h.	
RI 955/Apr 1548		3½h.							3¾h.	
B 955/Aug 1548	3½h.	3½h.				2½h.	3½h.		3h.	
Ram 955/Oct 1548		3½h.							3½h.	
Shaw 955/Nov 1548		3h.					3h.			
DH 955/Jan 1549	3½h.	3½h.								
M 956/Feb 1549		3¾h.	3½h.			2½h.	3½h.		3½h.	
S 956/Mar 1549		3½h.							4h.	
S 956/Mar 1549		3h.		3h.		2½h.	3h.		3¾h.	
Shab 956/Sep 1549	3½h.	3½h.								
S 957/Feb 1550	5h.	5h.	5h.			4h.			5h.	
RI 958/Mar 1551		6h.	6h.			4h.				
JI 958/May 1551		5h.				4h.	5h.			
JI 958/May 1551		4½h.								
B 958/Jul 1551		5h.	5h.			3½h.	5h.	4½h.	5h.	
DQ 958/Nov 1551			5h.			3½h.	4h.		6h.	
JI 959/May 1552		5h.	5h.			3½h.	4h.	4½h.	5h.	
B 959/Jul 1552		5h.	4½h.	3½h.		3h.	4h.		5h.	
Shab 960/Aug 1553		5½h.								
M 961/Dec 1553		6h.								
JI 961/Apr 1554		6½h.								

B 961/Jun 1554		6h.		4h.		4h.	6h.	5h.	
DH 961/Nov 1554		7h.		7½h.		7½h.		7h.	
JII 962/Apr 1555		7h.							
B 962/Jun 1555		6h.							
Ram 962/Aug 1555		7½h.							
DH 962/Nov 1555		7h.	7½h.			7½h.		7h.	
Shab 963/Jun 1556		6h.				5½h.		6h.	
Shaw 963/Aug 1556		1p.	1p.	4h.					
Shaw 963/Aug 1556		6h.							
RI 964/Jan 1557		6h.	4h.	4h.				6h.	
RII 964/Feb 1557		5½h.	4h.	4½h.	3½h.	5h.		5½h.	10h./15h.
B 964/May 1557		5h.	4½h.			4½h.		5h.	
Shab 964/Jun 1557		5½h.			3½h.			5½h.	/15h.
S 965/Nov 1557		6h.				4h.		6h.	
RI 965/Jan 1558		6h.	5h.			4h.		6h.	9h./12h.
JI 965/Mar 1558			1p.			4h.	5h.	6h.	2p./13h.
JII 965/Apr 1558		6h.	5½h.					6h.	
B 965/May 1558		6½h.	5½h.			5½h.	6h.	6½h.	12h./13h.
Shab 965/Jun 1558		5h.						6½h.	
Shaw 965/Aug 1558		5h.	3½h.		3h.	5½h.	4½h.	5h.	
								(kmāj al-yahuđ)	
M 966/Oct 1558		4h.	4h.						
S 966/Nov 1558	4½h.	4h.					4h.	4½h.	
RII 966/Jun 1559		4h.							
JII 966/Mar 1559		4h.			3h.	3¾h.		4h.	
Shab 966/May 1559		4½h.							
Ram 966/Jun 1559		5h.				5h.			
Ram 966/Jun 1559		6h.				6h.		5h.	
Shaw 966/Jul 1559					6h.	7½h.			
DQ 966/Aug 1559		7½h.	7h.	5h.		7h.			
M 967/Oct 1559	2p.	2p.							
RI 967/Dec 1559						10h.			
RII 968/Jun 1561		12½h.							
Shab 968/Apr 1561		12h.							
Shaw 968/Jun 1561		8h.	7h.	6½h.	5h.			8h.	
S 969/Oct 1561		8h.						8h.	/15h.
RI 969/Nov 1561	8h.	8h.	8h.	7h.	5h.	7h.		8h.	12h./15h.
Shab 969/Apr 1562	9h.	11h.	10h.		6h.	6½h.		11h.	
Ram 969/May 1562		8h.		7½h.				8h.	
DQ 969/Jul 1562		8h.				5h.		8h.	
S 970/Oct 1562		9h.				8h.	9h.		

Date	Flour		Bread							Ka'k ('Bagels') Dry/Soft
	Ṭaḥīn	Šimūd	Sammūr	Šimīd	Kishkār	Māwī	Ṭabbūnī	Tannūrt	Kmāj	
RII 970/Dec 1562		10½h. ("white pure")								
JI 970/Jan 1563	12½h.					7½h.				
JII 970/Feb 1563	15h.					9h.	10h.			
Shab 970/Apr 1563		14h.				7½h.	9h.		14h.	
Ram 970/May 1563		12h.				6h.			10h.	
Ram 970/May 1563		9h.					6h.		7h.	
Shaw 970/Jun 1563		6h.							5½h.	
DQ 970/Jul 1563		5h.					5h.		5½h.	
B 971/Feb 1564					3½h.	4h.	4½h.		5½h.	
S 972/Sep 1564		7½h.				5h.	6h.		7h.	
972/1564		9h.	9h.				7½h.		8½h.	
S 973/Sep 1565		9h.				5h.	7½h.		8h.	3p./
Ram 973/Apr 1566		2p.								
DH 974/Jun 1567		2p.					12h.		2p.	
S 975/Aug 1567		10h.				6h.			2p.	
JI 975/Nov 1567		8h.				5½h.	8h.		8h.	
Shaw 975/Apr 1568						5½h.	6½h.			
RI 976/Sep 1568		1p.				3½h.	4½h.		1p.	
JII 977/Nov 1569							4½h.			
JI 978/Oct 1570		7h.	7h.		4½h.	5h.	6h.		7h.	
Shaw 978/Mar 1571			2p.			6½h.	8h.		9h.	
M 979/Jun 1571		2p.				6½h.	1½p.		2p.	
B 979/Dec 1571		16h.		2p.			2p. + 2h.			
M 980/May 1572		2p.								
S 980/Jun 1572		9h.								
RI 980/Jul 1572		8h.	8½h.			5h.	7h.		8½h.	
JI 980/Sep 1572		7h.	7h.			4h.	6h.		7h.	
B 980/Nov 1572		7½h.								
S 981/Jun 1573		2p. + 2h.				7h.	2p.		12h.	
B 981/Nov 1573		3p. + 1h.								
RII 981/Aug 1573		2p. + 4h.				9h.	12h.			
Ram 981/Jan 1574		4p.								
RI 982/Jul 1574							7½h.			
Shaw 982/Jan 1575		8½h.				1p.	7h.		8½h.	
RII 983/Jul 1575		1p. + 1h.				4h.	1p.		6h.	

Shaw 983/Jan 1576		1p. + 1h.	4½h.		4h.	1p.	1p. + 1h.	
RI 984/Jun 1576		1p.				4h.	1p.	/12h.
Ram 984/Dec 1576		5h.	1p.			4h.	1p.	
RII 985/Jun 1577		1p.				4h.		
M 986/Mar 1578		1p. + 1h.	1p. + 1h.		½p. + 1½h.	1p.	1p. + 1h.	
JI 989/Jun 1581		13h.			7½h.	9h.	13h.	
M 990/Feb 1582		4p.			13h.		14h.	
S 990/Mar 1582		18h.					18h.	
RI 990/Apr 1582		13h.			6½h.		13h.	
DH 990/Jun 1583		18h.			2p.		18h.	
S 991/Mar 1583		4p.			12h.	14h.	18h.	
B 992/Jul 1584		19½h.			2p.		19h.	
994/1586		13h.			8h.	9h.		
JI 995/Apr 1587			2p.		8½h.	12h.	14h.	
JII 995/May 1587			2p.		8½h.	12h.	14h.	
JI 997/Apr 1589		4½p. ("local")			3p.	4p.	5p.	
		4p. ("imported")						
Shaw 997/Aug 1589		18h.			16h.	16h.	18h.	
DQ 997/Sep 1589	5½p.	6p.			16½h.		6p.	
1002/1594		1p. + 1h.						
M 1003/Sep 1594						1p. + 4h.	2p.	
Ram 1004/May 1596		2p.		1p.		1½p.	2p.	
Ram 1005/May 1597					1½p.	8½h.	2p.	
JII 1006/Jun 1598	2p. + 2h.				1½p.	2p.	2p. + 2h.	
M 1007/Aug 1598		4½p.					4½p.	

A soap-factory in Jerusalem

The flourishing soap-making industry in sixteenth-century Jerusalem underwent a gradual decline until, during the late Ottoman period, it ground to a halt. Unlike Nablus, where Ottoman soap-factories are still operational today, hardly any remnants of *maşbanas* can be identified in present-day Jerusalem.

Any extant vestiges should naturally be sought in the quarter known as the Khan al-Zayt (olive oil marketplace) south of Damascus gate. Shaykh As'ad al-'Imām, an authority on local history and a scholar in his own right, was kind enough to help us locate the only remains of a *maşbana* still to be found in Jerusalem. House Number 37 in Khān al-Zayt belongs to the al-Qūṭayna family, known in the nineteenth century for their intensive involvement in the production of oil as well as soap. Part of the building is used as their residence; the rest is derelict but extremely impressive from our standpoint.

The second storey is a huge hall, 29×16.40 meters. It had at least 20 stone pillars supporting the arches on which the roof rested. (Cf: *sijill*, vol. 77, pp. 340–1, describing another soap-factory in Jerusalem introduced in the late sixteenth century into an old building, where the roof rests on 24 pillars and 30 arches.) The pillars are 145×125 cm. each, rising at the highest point of the arch to 3.30 meters. In most cases the distance between pillars is 4.50 meters, although one row is structured in such a way that the pillars are 5.40–5.70 meters from one another. In the middle of the eastern wall two chimneys are easily identifiable, extending 80×83 cc. alongside the center pillar, indicating the existence of two ovens in the basement. A flight of stairs leads to the lower level, part of which is rented as storage space to a few shop-keepers, and part of which is impenetrable. Beneath the floor of the lower storey were the two ovens as well as seven deep pits for oil storage, now all blocked. The overall height of the pillars from this level to the roof is approximately 8 meters.

The entire massive building is pre-Ottoman and the masonry as well as the architectural features indicate an old Crusader structure. It was subsequently altered (perhaps in the Ottoman period, perhaps earlier) and ovens, chimneys and pits were installed, for the purpose of adapting it to function as a soap-factory. It may be considered a typical example of the *maşbanas* described in this work.

Notes

Introduction

- 1 Jerusalem Muslim court archives (henceforth: *sijill*), vol. 15, p. 524; vol. 16, p. 206; vol. 26, p. 67; vol. 67, p. 450; vol. 69, p. 302.
- 2 F. Braudel, *Civilization and Capitalism 15th–18th century, the Structure of Everyday Life* (New York, 1981), vol. 1, p. 228.
- 3 For more details see my “Local trade, international trade and government involvement in Jerusalem during the early Ottoman period,” in *Asian and African Studies* (Jerusalem, 1978), vol. 12, No. 1, p. 6 n. 4.
- 4 *Sijill*, vol. 4, p. 303. From this perspective the Jerusalemites were much better off than the inhabitants of London for whom “running water” actually meant “distributed regularly three times a week” (Braudel, *Civilization and Capitalism*, vol. 1, p. 229).
- 5 Braudel, *op. cit.*, p. 491. For a more detailed description see my “Ottoman involvement in Europe: its relevance for 16th century Palestine,” in the *Proceedings of the Seventh Symposium of CIEPO* held in Pecs, Hungary, 7–11.9.1986 (forthcoming).
- 6 *Sijill*, vol. 32, pp. 171–2. For further examples of Ottoman interest in and attendance to Muslim sanctuaries and religious life in Jerusalem see U. Heyd, *Ottoman documents on Palestine 1552–1615* (Oxford, 1960, pp. 151–62).
- 7 R. Mantran and J. Sauvaget, *Règlements fiscaux ottomans, les provinces Syriennes* (Beyrouth, 1951), p. 38; Ö. L. Barkan, *XV ve XVI ncı Asırlarda Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Zırai Ekonominin Hukuki ve Mali Esasları* (İstanbul, 1943) vol. 1, *Kanunlar*, p. 218; A. Cohen and B. Lewis, *Population and Revenue in the towns of Palestine in the Sixteenth Century* (Princeton, 1978), pp. 52, 55, 141; *Sijill*, vol. 14, p. 303.
- 8 See, for example: *Sijill*, vol. 42, p. 94; vol. 44, p. 354.
- 9 *Sijill*, vol. 46, p. 143.
- 10 *Sijill*, vol. 17, p. 204; vol. 44, p. 176. vol. 45, p. 355; vol. 48, p. 404.
- 11 *Sijill*, vol. 47, p. 188.
- 12 *Sijill*, vol. 44, pp. 382, 424, 448, 462. See also my “On the Realities of the Millet System” in B. Braude and B. Lewis (eds.), *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire* (New York, 1982), vol. II, p. 11.
- 13 A. Cohen, *Jewish Life under Islam* (Cambridge, Mass., 1984), pp. 164–5.
- 14 *Sijill*, vol. 21, p. 408; vol. 64, p. 40.
- 15 See Heyd, *Ottoman Documents*, pp. 143–4.
- 16 F. Braudel, *Civilization and Capitalism*, vol. 1, p. 106.
- 17 Braudel, *op. cit.*, p. 25.

Ch. I. Butchers and meat consumption

- 1 For the origins of the term and the development of the institution see: *Ḥisba in Encyclopaedia of Islam* (new edition, henceforth: *EP*).
- 2 W. Behrnauer, "Mémoire sur les institutions de police chez les Arabes, les Persans et les Turcs," in *Journal Asiatique*, 1860, pp. 136–8.
- 3 U. Heyd (V. L. Ménage, ed.), *Studies in Old Ottoman Criminal Law* (Oxford, 1973), p. 232.
- 4 *Sijill* of the Shariʿa court of Jerusalem, vol. 1, p. 255 (henceforth all references to this series will be shortened as follows: vol. [. . .], p. [. . .]). On the *sijill* archives as a source for the history of Palestine see my *Jewish Life under Islam* (Cambridge, Mass., 1984), pp. x–xii; see also my *Ottoman Documents on the Jewish Community of Jerusalem in the 16th Century* (Jerusalem, 1976), pp. 9–13; Kāmil Jamīl al-ʿAsālī, *Wathāʾiq Maqdisiyya Taʾrikhiyya* (Amman, 1983), Vol. 1; Muḥammad Asʿad al-ʾImām al-Ḥusayni, *Al-Manhal al-Ṣāfi fiʾl-waqf wa-Aḥkāmihī* (Jerusalem, 1982).
- 5 Vol. 1, p. 185.
- 6 Vol. 1, p. 455. The original formulation is: *ʾishtaraka fi* [. . .] *al-ḥisba*. R. Mantran's statement in *EP* ("*Ḥisba* in Ottoman Empire"): "The term *ḥisba* does not occur in the registers and documents of the Ottoman administration" should, therefore, be corrected. This – and many similar references in the *sijill* – call for a revision of Mantran's opening sentence on *ḥisba* in the Ottoman empire.
- 7 Vol. 2, pp. 87, 218.
- 8 Vol. 4, pp. 213, 423; vol. 6, p. 434; vol. 25, pp. 85, 287. His somewhat unusual title in the latter source is *nāẓir al-ḥisba al-sharīfa*.
- 9 Vol. 4, pp. 249, 309.
- 10 Vol. 43, p. 139.
- 11 Vol. 1, p. 455; vol. 2, p. 218.
- 12 See, for example, vol. 27, p. 499; vol. 28, p. 445; vol. 30, p. 63.
- 13 Vol. 36, p. 208; vol. 53, p. 143. Functional promotion and social mobility of Jerusalemite butchers never reached, however, the impressive heights reported from Naples, Italy, where "our former butcher no longer practises his trade except through his assistants since becoming a duke" (F. Braudel, *Structures of Everyday Life*, vol. 1, p. 533).
- 14 A. Cohen and B. Lewis, *Population and Revenue in the Towns of Palestine in the Sixteenth Century* (Princeton, 1978), pp. 46–9, 60, 101. In the *tahrīr* registers a shorter version of this term is used, simply *waṣṣābīn* ("butchers") or *qaṣṣābiyya* ("butchery"), and it is always levied in conjunction with the *iḥtisāb* taxes. Another term which does not occur in the *tahrīr* registers, and was probably used locally was *bāj al-laḥḥāma* (vol. 6, p. 684).
- 15 Vol. 4, pp. 215, 248.
- 16 Vol. 37, p. 249. The kadi confirmed on that occasion that they were not supposed to pay one *dirham* *ʿuthmānī* per every animal slaughtered, as he insisted, but rather one *qifʿa* per four animals.
- 17 Vol. 51, p. 485; vol. 61, p. 73.
- 18 Vol. 51, p. 435.
- 19 Vol. 61, p. 66.
- 20 U. Heyd, *Ottoman Documents on Palestine 1552–1615* (Oxford, 1960), pp. 82–3, 133.
- 21 Ö. L. Barkan, "Kanunname-i ihtisab-i İstanbul-el-Mahrusa," in *Tarih Vesikaları* (February, 1942), No. 5, pp. 329–30. For a French translation see: R. Mantran, "La police des marchés de Stamboul au debut du XVIème siècle" in *Les Cahiers de Tunisie* (Tunis, 1956) No. 14, pp. 218–20. For a few examples of entries on meat and butchers in various *kanunname* regulations see: Ö. L. Barkan, *XV ve XVI ıncı Asırlarda Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Zirai Ekonominin Hukuki ve Mali Esasları, Kanunlar* (İstanbul, 1945), pp. 38#17, 85#27, 100#38, 138#35, 218#10, 312#29, 330#25, 394#24, 400#22.

- 22 Vol. 1, p. 268.
- 23 For Cairo see: A. Raymond, *Artisans et commerçants au Caire au XVIIIe siècle* (Damas, 1973), T.I., p. 312.
- 24 Vol. 1, p. 56; vol. 2, p. 61; vol. 5, pp. 39, 356; vol. 6, pp. 113, 116. For a similar case in which the head of the butchers' guild in Cairo gave his daughter in marriage to Shaykh Ḥasan al-Kafrāwī who served as a teacher and a *mufīṭ* in al-Azhar see: Raymond, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 423.
- 25 Vol. 56, p. 239.
- 26 For a list of butchers and their respective vendors at the beginning of the century see vol. 1, p. 15. For an example of the somewhat modified, though basically similar arrangement at a much later date see an entry dating early 1565 (vol. 46, p. 177) which states: "the butcher *al-mu'allim* Ibrāhīm ibn Abi al-Faṭh ibn Da'ūd" and "his vendor 'Abd al-Razzāq."
- 27 For a few examples see vol. 20, p. 438. The concept of different levels of specialization of guild members emerges clearly from the following pledge made by a butcher in court when he undertook *annahu lā yadhbaḥu walā yaslakhu walā yaf' alu šinā' at al-laḥāma* (vol. 44, p. 505). For a similar text see also vol. 59, p. 297.
- 28 For a list of 14 *dhabbāḥs* see vol. 43, p. 325. In a court session also attended by the *muḥtasib* they all undertook to refrain from any slaughtering unless specifically authorized by the butcher.
- 29 For lists of butchers see, for example, vol. 46, p. 177; vol. 56, p. 239; vol. 57, p. 285.
- 30 Vol. 2, pp. 82, 218.
- 31 Vol. 33, p. 464.
- 32 Vol. 1, p. 15; vol. 4, pp. 350, 482; vol. 31, p. 435.
- 33 For example: vol. 23, p. 599.
- 34 Vol. 27, p. 370. See also vol. 18, p. 328. A hypothesis which is usually taken for granted or implied is explicitly spelled out on this occasion: the butchers were expected to provide, first and foremost, the governor and his entourage with meat on a regular basis ("they [. . .] should supply the town with meat during [both] summer and winter without any neglect, and they should do it as of the beginning of the month of Rajab this year [of 1531] to the *diwān* of our lord [. . .] [the governor of Jerusalem] 'Uways bey," vol. 1, p. 214). For an indication as to the quantities furnished to the governor see vol. 2, p. 179.
- 35 Vol. 27, p. 29. For another example of the effect of severe weather conditions on the supply of meat to Istanbul, see *Tarih vesikaları*, No. 5, pp. 329–30.
- 36 For a detailed description of this ceremony see G. Baer, *Egyptian Guilds in Modern Times* (Jerusalem, 1964), pp. 9, 55–9. The term *thawba* which is not mentioned by Baer or any of his sources must have been a local term used in Jerusalem (and probably in other parts of Syria and Palestine also). Since this appointment was looked upon as having been granted by the entire guild, not only by its head, the latter's role was regarded as performed "on their behalf." For a similar ceremony held by the butchers of Istanbul in the sixteenth century see: G. Baer, "The structure of Turkish guilds and its significance for Ottoman social history," in *Proceedings of the Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities* (Jerusalem, 1971, in Hebrew) Vol. IV, No. 12, p. 189. For a detailed account of the guild system in Bursa with occasional references to the butchers there see H. Gerber, "Guilds in Seventeenth-Century Anatolian Bursa," in *Asian and African Studies* (Jerusalem, 1976), vol. 11, pp. 64–82.
- 37 B. Cvetkova, "Les *celep* et leur rôle dans la vie économique des Balkans à l'époque ottomane," in M. Cook, *Studies in the Economic History of the Middle East* (London, 1970), pp. 172–92. B. A. Cvetkova, "Les registres des *celepkeşan* en tant que sources pour l'histoire de la Bulgarie et des pays balkaniques" in *Hungaro-Turcica Studies in Honour of Julius Ne'meth* (Budapest, 1976), pp. 325–35. We do not share S. Faroghi's view that the butchers were "involuntary business partners" (p. 228): no indication of any element of partnership could be found in our sources.

- 38 H. Inalcık, *The Ottoman Empire: the Classical Age 1300–1600*, p. 156.
- 39 Vol. 27, p. 390.
- 40 Vol. 18, p. 128.
- 41 Vol. 18, pp. 256, 279.
- 42 Vol. 18, pp. 327, 328.
- 43 In this respect the head of the butchers was not exceptional at all: providing guild members with raw materials was one of their common tasks in various parts of the empire (G. Baer, "The organization of labour," in B. Spuler (ed.), *Handbuch der Orientalistik*, Abteilung, 1, Band 6, Teil 1 (Leiden, 1977, p. 39.
- 44 Vol. 27, pp. 29, 187. For another case where an affluent person is regarded as fully qualified to become a butcher: see A. Refik, *On altıncı asırda İstanbul hayatı (1553–1591)* (Istanbul, 1935), p. 94.
- 45 On Aḥmad al-Dajjānī see Heyd, *Ottoman Documents*, pp. 149, 178 and my article "The expulsion of the Franciscan monks from Mount Zion," in *Turcica*, Tome xviii (Paris, 1986), pp. 156–7.
- 46 Vol. 27, pp. 187, 299.
- 47 S. Faroqhi, *Towns and Townsmen of Ottoman Anatolia* (Cambridge, 1984), pp. 228–33.
- 48 Vol. 17, p. 297; vol. 21, p. 219. The tolerant and understanding approach that we encountered at the beginning of the century did not recur at any later date. It was then that Tāj al-Dīn al-Sukkārī pledged that their guild would provide Jerusalem with meat "as long as they are acting in their capacity as butchers, and as long as they have sheep at their disposal" (vol. 1, p. 268). Thereafter they were expected to provide the town with sheep as an integral part of their professional responsibilities.
- 49 Vol. 19, p. 134.
- 50 Vol. 19, p. 145.
- 51 Vol. 53, p. 143.
- 52 Vol. 44, p. 505. On the term *siyāsa* and its administrative meaning see my *Jewish Life under Islam* (Cambridge, Mass., 1984), p. 152, n. 18. For a specific reference to the application of *siyāsa* punishment to the butchers see vol. 15, p. 450: "if there is no meat in town the *siyāsa* [punishment] will be applied to them in accordance with the *kanun*."
- 53 Faroqhi, pp. 232–9.
- 54 For long and detailed lists of butchers see, for example: vol. 36, p. 149; vol. 43, pp. 139, 325; vol. 46, p. 177; vol. 48, p. 77; vol. 56, p. 239; vol. 57, pp. 129, 285; vol. 59, p. 297; vol. 61, p. 33; vol. 62, p. 52. For a discussion of the major demographic trends in Jerusalem see Cohen and Lewis, *Population*, pp. 21, 92–4.
- 55 Vol. 1, p. 495 (ʿAlī, his sons Muḥammad and Maḥmūd, his brother Aḥmad); vol. 4, p. 614 (Muḥammad, ʿAlī and Aḥmad); vol. 6, p. 79 (ʿAlī, Muḥammad and another Muḥammad) – all of these are members of the Duḥayna family. Vol. 59, p. 297 (Yaḥyā, Ibrāhīm); vol. 61, p. 33 (Wahība); vol. 61, p. 368 (Ibrāhīm) – all of these members of the family of Abu'l-Faṭḥ ibn Da'ūd. In eighteenth-century Cairo one could also find certain families heading the butchers' guild or holding influential positions in it for many years consecutively (Raymond, *Artisans*, vol. II, p. 554).
- 56 Vol. 32, p. 151. For a similar case of vague demarcation of the bounds of a guild in Bursa see: H. Gerber, "Guilds in Seventeenth-Century Anatolian Bursa," in *Asian and African Studies*, p. 64.
- 57 Faroqhi, pp. 239–40.
- 58 For the former see, for example, vol. 62, p. 169; for the latter see vol. 62, pp. 88, 137.
- 59 Vol. 49, p. 161.
- 60 Vol. 30, p. 310; vol. 33, p. 264.
- 61 Vol. 14, pp. 676–7; vol. 17, p. 215.
- 62 Vol. 19, p. 228.
- 63 Vol. 27, p. 203; vol. 28, p. 286.

- 64 Vol. 31, p. 235.
- 65 Vol. 33, pp. 143, 150.
- 66 About the purchase of a herd of water-buffalo by his son, ʿAlā al-Dīn, acting for his father who served at that time as the butcher of Khasseki Sultan endowment see vol. 31, p. 136. When the latter died his son replaced him in this position (vol. 33, p. 326).
- 67 Vol. 1, p. 185; vol. 2, p. 43; col. 25, pp. 215, 502. For further changes that these pieces of property underwent in 1558 see vol. 36, p. 179. On a similar case of a Cairene butcher who managed to accumulate a substantial amount of property (both movable and immovable) in the eighteenth century see Raymond, *Artisans*, vol. II, p. 396.
- 68 Vol. 4, pp. 249, 309; vol. 6, p. 434. On *bayt al-Māl* see Cohen and Lewis, *Population*, pp. 73–4. On *khārīj al-daftar* see A. Cohen, *Palestine in the 18th Century – Patterns of Government and Administration* (Jerusalem, 1973), p. 211.
- 69 Vol. 6, p. 274.
- 70 J. de Hammer, *Histoire de l'empire Ottoman* (Paris, 1826) t. VI, p. 61. For further details on this endowment see Heyd, *Ottoman Documents*, p. 143 and n. 1. For developments undergone by this endowment in later years see O. Peri, "The *waqf* as an instrument to increase and consolidate political power: the case of Khasseki Sultan *waqf* in late 18th century Ottoman Jerusalem," in *Asian and African Studies* vol. 17 (Haifa, 1983), pp. 47–62.
- 71 Vol. 27, pp. 294, 297.
- 72 Vol. 28, p. 71.
- 73 Vol. 33, pp. 270–1; vol. 36, pp. 121–2; vol. 43, pp. 355, 387; vol. 61, pp. 339–40.
- 74 Vol. 72, p. 352; vol. 78, p. 332.
- 75 Vol. 49, pp. 126–9. On the deep involvement of this family in the soap trade see, for example, vol. 58, p. 415 and vol. 62, p. 269.
- 76 Vol. 23, p. 63; vol. 66, p. 354; vol. 67, p. 161; vol. 58, pp. 153–4, 413; vol. 13, p. 251; vol. 17, p. 465.
- 77 Vol. 62, p. 144.
- 78 Vol. 22, pp. 438, 442; vol. 40, p. 145.
- 79 See a town-sketch of Jerusalem and its various neighborhoods in Cohen and Lewis, *Population*, p. 80. For instances of members of the Duhayna and Zurayq families registered as living in the above-mentioned neighborhoods in the course of the population survey (*tahrīr*) of November, 1538, see vol. 10, pp. 218–19; for further evidence to that effect pertaining to the families of Duhayna and al-ḥājī ʿAlī al-qasṣāb in the survey of 1543 see vol. 16, pp. 542–3.
- 80 Vol. 20, p. 83; vol. 46, p. 143.
- 81 Raymond, *Artisans*, vol. I, p. 316.
- 82 Vol. 12, p. 351; vol. 49, p. 65. For the butchers' involvement in the import of sheep in other parts of the empire see M. M. Alexandrescu-Dersca, "Quelques données sur le revêtement de constantinople au 16e siècle," in *Actes du premier congrès international des études Balkaniques et sud-européennes* (Sofia, 1969), vol. 3, pp. 669–70.
- 83 Inaccurate terminology used in this context may have further complicated the issue: although two different Arabic nouns were used to designate sheep and goats, the collective noun for small cattle (*ghanam*) was also used as a common noun for both. By adding a qualifying adjective a "white one," i.e. a sheep (*ghanam bayād*, or simply *bayād*) could be differentiated from a "black one" or "goat" (*sawād*, or *ghanam māʿiz*) (vol. 20, p. 437).
- 84 See: Mantran in *Cahiers de Tunisie*, p. 219, n. 3; Faroqhi, pp. 225–6; Refik, pp. 79–80.
- 85 "Al-Balkā" in *EP*.
- 86 R. Mantran, *Istanbul dans la seconde moitié du XVII^e siècle* (Paris, 1962), p. 197. Our evidence does not, however, substantiate his other contention, that "Turkish cuisine" did not regularly consume beef unless it was first processed into sausages.
- 87 Compare: F. Braudel, *The Structures of Everyday Life, Civilization and Capitalism 15th–18th Century* (New York, 1979) vol. I, p. 190.

- 88 Vol. 43, p. 110. The full phrase was: *yā mājūsī yā 'ākil lahm al-khinzīr*.
- 89 See my *Ottoman Documents*, pp. 198–9. For a totally different variety of meats consumed in Rome some two hundred years later, and for the larger diversification of the respective prices there see: J. Revel, “Les privilèges d’une capitale: l’approvisionnement de Rome à l’époque moderne,” in *Annales*, vol. 30 (1975), p. 569.
- 90 W. L. Wright, *Ottoman Statecraft* (Princeton, 1935), p. 77 (English translation), p. 21 (Turkish text).
- 91 For example: vol. 16, p. 535; vol. 23, p. 434.
- 92 *Wa-'ushī'a dhālika fi'l-madīna* (vol. 1, p. 296).
- 93 M. Z. Pakalın, *Osmanlı Tarih Deyimleri ve Terimleri Sözlüğü* (Istanbul, 1951) vol. II, p. 655. These price lists included locally produced foodstuffs, imported goods (e.g. iron, steel), imported foodstuffs (e.g. meat) etc. Since quite a variety of these was dealt with by the local merchants it calls for a modification of Inalcık’s distinction between craftsmen, who were subject to the *hisba* regulations, and the merchants who were not. At least one aspect of the merchant’s activity, pricing, was subject to *hisba* regulations (H. Inalcık, “The foundations of the Ottoman economico-social system in the cities,” in N. Todorov (ed.), *La Ville Balkanique 15e–19e siècles* (Sofia, 1970), pp. 18, 23.
- 94 Faroqhi, pp. 221–2.
- 95 Vol. 53, p. 212.
- 96 Vol. 18, p. 328 where the deposition of the head of the guild of the butchers is cited.
- 97 Vol. 27, p. 370 dated the end of December, 1552.
- 98 Vol. 18, p. 128.
- 99 The above description is diametrically opposed to Mantran’s following contention (in his *Istanbul*, p. 327): “Cette fixation du prix maximum n’avait certes pas lieu chaque semaine, ni même probablement très fréquemment. La réglementation établie pour ces prix était valable pour une durée aussi longue que possible, c’est-à-dire tant que ne se produisaient pas des modifications essentielles soit dans le domaine politique, soit dans le domaine économique.” Mantran goes on to specify that these are the advent to power of a new Sultan, serious difficulties of supply, very severe weather conditions or a devaluation of the Ottoman money. Thus he concludes that “Ainsi, il n’existe pas de périodicité de publication des règlements concernant le *narh*.” On this matter Pakalın’s version is much more reliable, though somewhat ambiguous: “the kadis [. . .] arranged and promulgated [the price lists] occasionally” – see his *Osmanlı Tarih*, vol. 2, p. 657.
- 100 Vol. 10, p. 7.
- 101 For a clear case of the kadi ordering the price reduced as a result of a complaint and an explicit request to that effect submitted by the local inhabitants see: vol. 52, p. 212.
- 102 Vol. 1, p. 264.
- 103 Vol. 4, p. 582.
- 104 On “Turcoman” sheep which originated from Diyarbekir and sent to Istanbul see Mantran, in *Cahiers de Tunisie*, p. 219, n. 3.
- 105 *Tarih vesikaları*, vol. 5, pp. 329–30, and vol. 9, p. 168.
- 106 Vol. 29, p. 107.
- 107 Vol. 16, p. 535.
- 108 See “Dirham” in *EP*.
- 109 For the alternating use of *ḥalabiyya* and *dirham* see: vol. 18, p. 39; vol. 25, p. 224.
- 110 For another example taken from another administrative context see Cohen and Lewis, *Population*, pp. 38–40.
- 111 In later years one finds a similar use of the term even in Istanbul (Mantran, *Istanbul*, p. 239).
- 112 For example: vol. 28, p. 59 where 1800 *‘uthmānī dirhams* equal 22½ gold *qubruşīs*, i.e. 1 *qubruşī* = 80 *‘uthmānī*. Each gold coin was 40 *paras* worth. See also vol. 54, p. 569 where the same rate of 1 *para* = 2 *‘uthmānī* some twenty years later might be easily established.
- 113 For example: vol. 37, pp. 95, 252, 533 (the latter sets 3 *sikka* gold coins at 600 *ḥalabiyya*,

- i.e. 1 gold coin = 40 *para* = 200 *ḥalabiyya*, hence 1 *para* = 5 *ḥalabiyya*). See also: vol. 49, p. 551: 160 *para* = 800 *ḥalabiyya*.
- 114 The reference here must be to the actual value of the smaller, old *akçe* coins as compared to their full-size initial worth when first struck. Otherwise one might suspect that the scribe erred and should have written: “the new ‘*uthmānī*’ is worth 1½ old ‘*uthmānī*’” which would correspond roughly to the formal devaluation of 1584.
- 115 Vol. 69, p. 310.
- 116 Vol. 71, pp. 63, 64, 103; vol. 78, p. 400.
- 117 This is corroborated by Mantran’s findings on Istanbul in the seventeenth century, when the depreciation of the silver coins took a further dip and still “la courbe d’augmentation et de diminution [des prix] ne suit pas la courbe de la dévaluation de l’aspre, ce qui tendrait à montrer que le prix des denrées n’a pas été directement influencé par la fluctuation de la monnaie.”
- 118 See “*Akçe*” in *EP*; Mantran, *Istanbul*, p. 239.
- 119 Vol. 67, p. 215. The merchants, called *jallāba*, imported various goods to Jerusalem, unlike the misconception that they (referred to as *jelep kešan* in Turkish) limited themselves to providing meat only (see, for example, vol. 5, pp. 329–30).
- 120 Faroqhi, p. 222.
- 121 Vol. 20, p. 164; vol. 21, p. 245; vol. 30, p. 49.
- 122 Vol. 24, p. 336.
- 123 Vol. 54, pp. 153–4; vol. 61, p. 378.
- 124 Vol. 55, p. 232.
- 125 Vol. 1, p. 15; vol. 25, p. 385.
- 126 Vol. 1, p. 15 (‘*innahum yatasāwū fī’l dhabīḥa wa-man lā qudra lahu ‘alā’l musāwāt takfīhī’l madīna*’); vol. 1, p. 214 (‘*wa-tawāfaqu bi-ajma’ihim an yatasāwū fī ḥirfat al-laḥāma [. . .] ‘alā’l sawīyya*’).
- 127 On *maslakh* see Cohen and Lewis, *Population*, pp. 80, 84. Because of its proximity to the quarter where Jewish people resided it was also called “the slaughterhouse of the Jewish quarter” (*maslakh ḥārat al-yahūd*) (vol. 1, p. 15). In my *Jewish Life under Islam* (p. 148) I suggested an explanation which now seems erroneous, and should be rectified in the light of the version I suggest here. On the location of the slaughterhouse on the outskirts of Cairo, very much like the situation in Jerusalem see Raymond, *Artisans*, vol. 1, p. 312. Cairo had 6 slaughterhouses, while Jerusalem had just one. But if we compare the size of the population in Cairo (Raymond, *op. cit.*, p. 204) with that of Jerusalem the inevitable conclusion is that relatively speaking, it did not need more.
- 128 Vol. 35, p. 385.
- 129 Vol. 31, p. 452. For further examples see: vol. 31, p. 404; vol. 33, p. 6.
- 130 Vol. 4, p. 614 speaks of 15 sheep and goats a day “for the Muslims” only.
- 131 Vol. 28, pp. 245, 438; vol. 40, pp. 144, 218.
- 132 Vol. 45, p. 69; vol. 46, p. 20; vol. 40, p. 218.
- 133 Mantran, *Istanbul*, p. 196. Compare the case of seventeenth century Rome; although it had a smaller population than Naples, its consumption of meat and wine was much higher (J. Revel, in *Annales*, p. 572).
- 134 See, for example, vol. 40, p. 41.
- 135 B. Bennassar and J. Goy, “Contribution à l’histoire de la consommation alimentaire du XIV^e au XIX^e siècle,” in *Annales*, vol. 30 (1975), pp. 413–15; M. Aymard, “Pour l’histoire de l’alimentation: quelques remarques de méthode,” *ibid.*, pp. 431–2; J. Revel, “Les privilèges d’une capitale: l’approvisionnement de Rome à l’époque moderne,” *ibid.*, p. 563.
- 136 Vol. 61, p. 76.
- 137 The villagers of Jifna gave the following testimony in 1575: *matā waqa’a gharāma ‘alā nafs min ahālī al-qaria al-mazbūra yatasāwū fīhā* (vol. 56, p. 539).
- 138 Vol. 58, p. 413; vol. 57, p. 461.

139 Mantran, *Cahiers de Tunisie*, p. 215.

Ch. 2. Soap production and olive oil

- 1 Mujir al-Din al-Ḥanbali, *Al-'uns al-jalil bi-ta'rikh al-Quds wa'l-khalil* (Amman, 1973), vol. 2, p. 356.
- 2 Vol. 1, p. 10. For a detailed biography of Ibrahīm b. Muḥammad b. Abi Sharīf (d. 923/1517) see: Najm al-Dīn al-Ghazzi, *Al-kawākib al-zāhira bi-a' yān al-mī'a al-āshira* (Beyrut, 1979), vol. 1, pp. 102–5; the specific relevant lines are on page 104: “[. . .] and he had a soap factory in Jerusalem where he made soap, and he made his living from it.”
- 3 Vol. 5, pp. 171, 243. The prices dropped from 850 to 550, then to 150 *dirhams*. For another example see vol. 5, pp. 78–9.
- 4 Vol. 1, p. 10.
- 5 Mujir al-Din, vol. 2, p. 54.
- 6 Vol. 2, pp. 247–8; vol. 5, p. 106; vol. 16, p. 221; vol. 18, pp. 111, 587–8; vol. 19, p. 286; vol. 21, pp. 444, 487; vol. 22, p. 214; vol. 25, p. 329; vol. 28, p. 389; vol. 31, p. 383; vol. 33, p. 395; vol. 36, p. 188; vol. 39, p. 69; vol. 40, p. 143; vol. 43, pp. 63, 550; vol. 48, pp. 236, 259, 363, 415, 424; vol. 49, pp. 4, 7, 179; vol. 56, pp. 411, 536, 593; vol. 58, pp. 419, 447; vol. 61, p. 431; vol. 66, p. 501; vol. 69, p. 30; vol. 72, p. 76; vol. 76, p. 5.
- 7 Vol. 6, p. 585; vol. 14, p. 93; vol. 23, p. 173; vol. 36, pp. 361, 371; vol. 44, p. 305; vol. 46, pp. 42–4; vol. 48, pp. 170, 363; vol. 51, pp. 302, 308; vol. 53, p. 150; vol. 54, p. 347; vol. 56, p. 112; vol. 57, pp. 4, 231; vol. 59, p. 192; vol. 61, p. 467; vol. 64, p. 370; vol. 66, pp. 87, 142; vol. 80, p. 353.
- 8 Vol. 1, p. 10; vol. 2, p. 279; vol. 4, pp. 61, 219, 232, 461; vol. 7, pp. 26, 81; vol. 13, p. 400; vol. 17, p. 51; vol. 18, pp. 172, 348, 476, 480, 510; vol. 20, p. 161; vol. 27, p. 94; vol. 33, pp. 112, 183; vol. 36, pp. 205, 328, 329; vol. 39, p. 100; vol. 49, pp. 31, 168; vol. 51, p. 65.
- 9 Vol. 4, pp. 61, 219, 232, 526; vol. 13, pp. 498, 527; vol. 20, p. 542; vol. 24, p. 342; vol. 27, p. 473; vol. 35, p. 36; vol. 36, pp. 328, 341; vol. 37, p. 554; vol. 40, p. 351; vol. 43, pp. 312, 351; vol. 55, p. 558; vol. 56, p. 404; vol. 58, p. 309.
- 10 Compare: vol. 27, pp. 81 and 173.
- 11 Vol. 27, pp. 171, 173; vol. 31, p. 41; vol. 33, p. 183; vol. 35, pp. 196, 202; vol. 36, pp. 21, 215; vol. 37, p. 554; vol. 40, p. 351; vol. 43, pp. 312, 355, 396–7; vol. 49, p. 168; vol. 53, p. 427; vol. 56, p. 120; vol. 58, pp. 309, 415; vol. 59, pp. 182, 364, 506; vol. 61, p. 38.
- 12 Vol. 20, pp. 151, 587; vol. 22, p. 490; vol. 23, p. 138; vol. 25, p. 263; vol. 31, p. 5; vol. 39, p. 206; vol. 40, p. 293; vol. 46, p. 160.
- 13 Vol. 17, p. 24; vol. 21, p. 125; vol. 25, p. 381; vol. 37, pp. 135, 554; vol. 39, p. 99; vol. 40, p. 351; vol. 45, p. 112; vol. 49, p. 413; vol. 58, p. 100; vol. 59, p. 364; vol. 62, p. 46.
- 14 Vol. 4, p. 541; vol. 16, p. 214; vol. 17, p. 86; vol. 18, p. 4; vol. 19, p. 435; vol. 24, p. 290; vol. 25, pp. 263, 350; vol. 27, p. 205; vol. 30, p. 202; vol. 31, pp. 25, 269, 573; vol. 35, p. 174; vol. 39, p. 243; vol. 40, p. 140; vol. 45, p. 286; vol. 46, pp. 51, 99; vol. 48, pp. 187, 402, 481; vol. 49, p. 533.
- 15 Vol. 24, p. 451; vol. 31, pp. 301–2; vol. 36, p. 318; vol. 55, p. 311; vol. 58, p. 519.
- 16 Vol. 24, pp. 453–4; vol. 31, pp. 301–2.
- 17 Vol. 18, p. 476; vol. 66, pp. 64, 397.
- 18 Vol. 13, p. 618.
- 19 Vol. 48, p. 320; vol. 49, p. 119.
- 20 A certain clause in the *waqfiyya* of Turghūd Beyi stipulated that a new cauldron should be installed in the soap-factory of *Efendi* Ḥamza, as well as six additional cisterns for oil storage be dug there. When this was carried out in the course of 1564 the workers came upon a burial cave which had a sarcophagus and a “Roman cross” which was found inadequate for oil, so it was turned into a water-storage cistern (vol. 46, p. 51).
- 21 Vol. 46, pp. 3, 249; vol. 48, pp. 402, 406; vol. 49, pp. 87, 125; vol. 51, pp. 222, 226, 534;

- vol. 55, p. 588; vol. 56, pp. 230, 274, 329; vol. 57, p. 200; vol. 58, pp. 32, 239, 398, 400, 418; vol. 59, p. 576; vol. 61, p. 10; vol. 64, p. 213; vol. 66, p. 342; vol. 69, pp. 59, 351.
- 22 Vol. 6, p. 370; vol. 14, pp. 600, 607; vol. 58, pp. 162, 347, 430, 447; vol. 61, pp. 296, 513; vol. 64, p. 223; vol. 69, pp. 93, 393, 470; vol. 76, p. 261; vol. 83, p. 487.
- 23 Vol. 17, p. 215; vol. 18, p. 415; vol. 40, p. 34; vol. 48, p. 454; vol. 49, p. 587; vol. 51, p. 477; vol. 53, pp. 439, 443, 522, 600; vol. 54, p. 554; vol. 55, p. 487; vol. 56, pp. 648–50; vol. 58, p. 425; vol. 61, p. 420.
- 24 Vol. 28, p. 201; vol. 31, p. 277; vol. 33, p. 301; vol. 40, p. 342; vol. 51, p. 498; vol. 55, p. 492; vol. 56, pp. 120, 469; vol. 58, p. 416; vol. 64, p. 467; vol. 76, pp. 513–14.
- 25 Vol. 48, p. 444; vol. 53, pp. 68–9; vol. 58, p. 500; vol. 66, p. 9.
- 26 Vol. 69, p. 131* (note: due to erroneous pagination this is the second such page, when 165 was followed by 126 *passim*.); vol. 80, pp. 1, 116.
- 27 Barkan, *Kanunlar*, p. 217.
- 28 Villages mentioned: Kobar, Safā, °Aṭṭāra, Deyr Ghassana, Mazāri°, Tibna, Bayt Illū, Qarāwa Banī Zayd, Ra's Abi Zaytūn, Bayt Rīmā, Bayt Ghawr, Bayt °Anān.
- 29 Vol. 36, p. 292; vol. 39, p. 531; vol. 49, p. 577; vol. 53, p. 10; vol. 56, pp. 197, 427; vol. 58, pp. 10, 512; vol. 59, p. 538; vol. 64, p. 115; vol. 69, p. 261; vol. 72, p. 132; vol. 76, p. 261.
- 30 Vol. 16, p. 145.
- 31 Vol. 21, p. 402; vol. 33, p. 290; vol. 37, p. 538; vol. 40, p. 140; vol. 43, p. 83; vol. 46, pp. 28, 53, 89, 258; vol. 56, p. 466; vol. 57, pp. 139, 236; vol. 58, pp. 288, 291; vol. 59, p. 251; vol. 61, p. 440; vol. 62, p. 261; vol. 66, p. 336; vol. 69, p. 336; vol. 76, p. 26.
- 32 A very clear distinctive line was drawn when private houses were described in a transaction involving real estate, between “water” and “oil” cisterns (e.g. *arba'a šahārīj mu'adda li-jam'i mā' l-'ashtiya wa-likhazn al-zayt*, vol. 21, p. 156). For the different sizes of jars see vol. 24, p. 552; vol. 36, p. 361.
- 33 A special case was the Temple Mount where oil could be – and actually was – stored in some of its many wells, pits and subterranean reservoirs. The oil stored there was used both for lighting the various public institutions located there, and as a long-term investment.
- 34 Vol. 2, pp. 137–8; vol. 4, pp. 461–2; vol. 8, p. 188; vol. 17, pp. 158, 166, 173, 213, 216, 273, 418, 534, 569; vol. 19, p. 408; vol. 21, p. 616; vol. 23, p. 173; vol. 25, p. 114; vol. 33, pp. 156, 191; vol. 36, p. 79; vol. 37, p. 319; vol. 43, p. 9; vol. 48, pp. 42, 469; vol. 49, p. 597; vol. 55, p. 588; vol. 62, p. 261.
- 35 Vol. 61, p. 467.
- 36 Vol. 49, pp. 22, 65, 121, 679; vol. 61, pp. 158, 274; vol. 80, p. 158. The involvement of some of these merchants with the bedouin tribes led them to conduct large-scale commercial business with them even when the bedouins were in open revolt against the Ottoman authorities. Khalīl b. Zurayq, for example, was convicted and punished in 1565 for such an offense. For a detailed description of alkali ashes see: E. Ashtor and G. Cevidalli, “Levantine Alkali Ashes and European Industries,” in *Journal of European Economic History*, vol. 12, No. 3 (1983), pp. 475–522.
- 37 Vol. 39, p. 174; vol. 40, p. 202; vol. 45, p. 255. For the various stages see: vol. 4, p. 522.
- 38 Vol. 45, pp. 249, 255; vol. 54, p. 288; vol. 69, p. 93. 'Inna al-šunnā° 'innama huwwa li'l-tujjār lā li'l-mutakallim °alā al-mašbana).
- 39 Vol. 31, p. 383; vol. 49, p. 413; vol. 51, p. 308; vol. 55, p. 558; vol. 57, p. 304; vol. 62, p. 46. Although in most cases people in charge of soap-factories (and all the others involved in this field) were Muslim, there are some exceptions, in which cases Christians were also participants and even held responsible positions like *mutakallim* (vol. 12, pp. 394, 496; vol. 18, p. 233).
- 40 For example: vol. 58, pp. 162, 430.
- 41 For such a combination, not unusual, of *waqf* and *mulk* see: vol. 40, p. 293; vol. 46, p. 40.
- 42 Vol. 1, pp. 10, 282; vol. 4, pp. 78, 106, 113, 219, 232, 461; vol. 6, p. 94; vol. 13, p. 400;

- vol. 14, p. 90; vol. 18, p. 478; vol. 21, p. 125; vol. 31, p. 41; vol. 33, pp. 112, 395; vol. 35, p. 74; vol. 36, p. 371; vol. 37, p. 172; vol. 39, p. 243; vol. 40, p. 329; vol. 43, pp. 312, 351, 355, 396, 397, 550; vol. 44, p. 305; vol. 46, pp. 42–3; vol. 48, pp. 236, 454; vol. 49, p. 31; vol. 51, pp. 65, 222, 226; vol. 53, pp. 300, 439; vol. 54, p. 252; vol. 55, pp. 311, 610; vol. 56, pp. 230, 269, 274; vol. 61, p. 10; vol. 66, p. 142, 354.
- 43 Vol. 46, p. 99; vol. 58, p. 32. This, and other examples cited below, confirm H. Inalcık's general description: "The merchant remained free to accumulate [. . .] as much capital as he could, and to seek always to increase this capital; and the types of activity in which he could engage were neither prescribed nor limited" (H. Inalcık, "The foundation of the Ottoman economico-social system in the cities," in N. Todorov (ed.), *La Ville Balkanique* (Sofia, 1970), p. 18.
- 44 For a full list of names of "those who buy olive-oil and prepare soap" see vol. 64, p. 202. The same terms indicating this dual character are repeated elsewhere in our registers, e.g. vol. 16, p. 202; vol. 46, p. 81; vol. 48, p. 469; vol. 80, p. 158. It may be noted that this combination of merchants who were also soap-producers was not in itself a novelty. In late Mamluk Jerusalem, we are told by Muḥīr al-Dīn, olive oil was sold to "the merchants who produce soap in Jerusalem and Ramle" (*Al-'uns al-jalīl*, vol. 2, p. 356).
- 45 Vol. 8, pp. 270–2. An interesting side-show emerges from this case: the claim that a Hanbalī kadi drafted a document proved false was denied, *inter alia*, because "the Ottoman state [. . .] were the governors at that time [1518] and the Hanbalī kadi was not the judge in Jerusalem."
- 46 Iḥsān al-Nimr, *Ta'rikh jabal Nablus wa'l-Balqā'* (Nablus, 1961) vol. 2, pp. 288–93.
- 47 Muḥīr al-Dīn, vol. 2, p. 356.
- 48 Vol. 16, p. 214; vol. 30, p. 302; *Jewish Life*, pp. 194–5.
- 49 Vol. 7, p. 470; vol. 22, p. 138; vol. 49, p. 423; vol. 64, p. 220.
- 50 Vol. 48, p. 469; vol. 49, pp. 2–3; vol. 76, p. 488.
- 51 Vol. 58, p. 433.
- 52 Vol. 10, p. 23; vol. 20, pp. 446, 476; vol. 22, p. 356; vol. 23, p. 185; vol. 24, pp. 123, 179; vol. 25, p. 230; vol. 33, p. 357; vol. 40, p. 204; vol. 46, p. 102; vol. 48, p. 32; vol. 51, p. 655; vol. 54, p. 485; vol. 58, pp. 155, 166, 415; vol. 59, pp. 182, 192, 199; vol. 76, p. 488.
- 53 Vol. 19, p. 286; vol. 28, p. 221; vol. 33, p. 357. This information may be taken as qualifying H. Inalcık's description of camel transport and its economic feasibility in his "Arab camel drivers in Western Anatolia in the 15th century," in *Revue d'histoire maghrébine*, Nos. 31–2 (Tunis, Decembre, 1983), pp. 266–7 and n. 49.
- 54 Vol. 21, p. 567; vol. 28, p. 442.
- 55 Vol. 59, p. 334. Cohen and Lewis, p. 96.
- 56 Vol. 39, p. 420.
- 57 Vol. 62, p. 53; vol. 69, p. 77.
- 58 Vol. 58, p. 355; vol. 59, p. 334; vol. 69, p. 193.
- 59 See, for example, vol. 58, p. 348; Volney, although in later years, puts a camel's load at 750 lbs. (*Voyage en Egypte et en Syrie*, p. 382). It consisted of two equally distributed sacks hanging on each side of the animal. Half a *ḥiml* was called *firda* ("one part of a pair") and it weighed approximately 70 *raṭls*. A *ḥiml* of Gaza was somewhat smaller and it amounted to 133⅓ *raṭl* (vol. 31, p. 451; vol. 35, pp. 259–60). A *ḥiml* of Egypt weighed about 600 *raṭl*, six *qinṭār* of Cairo (*bi-wazn al-Qāhira*) or one *qinṭār* of Jerusalem was the equivalent of 5½ *qinṭārs* of Cairo. (Vol. 20, p. 476; vol. 35, p. 218; vol. 54, p. 413; vol. 33, p. 493.) On the complexity of this problem see: E. Ashtor, "Levantine weights and standard parcels: a contribution to the metrology of the later Middle Ages," in *BSOAS*, vol. XLV, 1982, pp. 471–9.
- 60 Braudel, *Civilization and Capitalism*, vol. 1, p. 343.
- 61 Vol. 69, p. 75. The average 750 camel-loads per year for the earlier years tallies with the

- figure reached from calculating the expected export in the fifties when this tax was first levied – 691 *himls* (Cohen and Lewis, pp. 55, 96).
- 62 Vol. 76, p. 146. The same year another Jerusalem *ʿālim* bought himself a share in a soap-factory in Lydda to ensure the use of these facilities in an uninterrupted manner (vol. 76, p. 415).
- 63 Vol. 35, p. 167; vol. 58, p. 348; vol. 76, p. 402.
- 64 A. Raymond, *Grandes villes arabes à l'époque ottomane* (Paris, 1985), pp. 320, 336. It was equally referred to in our registers at *wakālat* Qaysun at bāb al-nasr (vol. 64, p. 110). See also: A. Raymond, *The Great Arab Cities in the 16th–18th centuries an Introduction* (New York, 1984) p. 44; *Artisan et commerçants*, t. 1 (1973) pp. 337–8.
- 65 For details see my *Jewish Life under Islam* (Cambridge, Mass., 1984), pp. 192–5.
- 66 Vol. 16, p. 485; vol. 23, p. 185; vol. 25, p. 74; vol. 27, p. 421; vol. 51, p. 46; vol. 55, pp. 343, 495; vol. 58, p. 145; vol. 59, p. 257; vol. 61, p. 230; vol. 64, p. 110; vol. 66, p. 580; vol. 69, pp. 147, 487. The latter describes a somewhat complex deal providing Jerusalem with substantial quantities of coffee beans, as well as indigo from Jedda via Cairo in 1590.
- 67 Vol. 76, p. 488. One should bear in mind that this episode was highly exceptional; usually these pirates plagued the eastern Mediterranean and presented a real danger to the maritime trade. In 1573, for example, the supply of rice to Palestine was cut off completely “because there was no one to import it from Egypt to Jerusalem for fear from the enemy and the pirates who were [active] at sea” (vol. 55, p. 495).
- 68 Vol. 33, pp. 156, 161, 183, 191.
- 69 Vol. 16, p. 399.
- 70 Vol. 18, p. 195.
- 71 Vol. 30, p. 208.
- 72 Vol. 27, p. 223.
- 73 Vol. 62, p. 267.
- 74 In one case we are told that 10 *qinṭār* of oil produced 14.4 *qinṭār* of soap – i.e. 40% increase (vol. 66, p. 354).
- 75 Vol. 4, pp. 461–2.
- 76 Faroqhi, *Towns and Townsmen*, p. 84.
- 77 A. Raymond, *Grandes villes arabes à l'époque ottomane* (Paris, 1985), pp. 88–9.

Ch. 3. Flour and bread

- 1 Barkan, *XV et XVI unci asırlarda Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Ziraî Ekonominin Hukukî ve Mali Esasları*, vol. 1, *Kanunlar*, p. 218; vol. 58, p. 380.
- 2 Vol. 2, pp. 378, 396.
- 3 F. Braudel, *Civilization and Capitalism, 15th–18th Century*, vol. 1 (New York, 1981) p. 133.
- 4 See, for example, vol. 56, p. 424 where a baker formally undertakes to bake in the morning and evening.
- 5 For the use of the same term in Jerusalem and Damascus under the Mamluks see: D. P. Little, *A catalogue of the Islamic Documents from al-Haram aṣ-Ṣarîf in Jerusalem* (Beirut, 1984), pp. 127, 144, 202, 293.
- 6 Vol. 25, p. 225; vol. 30, p. 272; vol. 43, p. 282.
- 7 Vol. 14, p. 227.
- 8 Vol. 4, p. 264.
- 9 Vol. 4, p. 264; vol. 16, p. 56; *wa-kull man lahu qimāṭ yukaffihî fî kull yawm wa-matâ tabayyana ʿalâ aḥad min aṭ-ṭaḥḥânin annahu ʿaṭṭala qimāṭahu yakunu mustaḥiqqan liʿt-taʿdib*.
- 10 Vol. 14, p. 759.

- 11 Vol. 30, p. 253; vol. 31, pp. 77, 248; vol. 34, pp. 335, 343; vol. 36, pp. 148–9; vol. 44, pp. 26, 222; vol. 48, p. 479; vol. 49, pp. 368, 592; vol. 54, p. 87; vol. 56, p. 424; vol. 57, p. 85; vol. 69, p. 169.
- 12 Vol. 34, p. 335. The latter was not mentioned, but the detailed information on the various members of his guild must have emanated from him.
- 13 Vol. 49, p. 597; vol. 31, p. 248.
- 14 For example: Mināḥīm the Jew in 1541 or Mūsā the Christian in 1589 (vol. 13, p. 465; vol. 69, p. 232, respectively).
- 15 Vol. 67, p. 405.
- 16 Vol. 54, p. 87; vol. 57, pp. 85, 265. The latter provides us with an additional insight into the reality of economic life: the kadi of Jerusalem cautioned the millers that they should provide the bakers with a sufficient quantity of flour, whereas the latter were equally cautioned against any relapse in the provision of bread to “the pilgrims” (*zuwwār*). The timing was early April, 1577, i.e. just before the spring pilgrimage of Jews and Christians to Jerusalem.
- 17 Vol. 31, p. 379.
- 18 Vol. 34, p. 335; vol. 49, p. 592; vol. 57, p. 85; vol. 55, p. 461.
- 19 The growing involvement of soldiers in various sectors of economic activity is a well-established fact, and an important negative contribution to the deterioration of the entire Ottoman military and administrative system. We know of no serious research into the actual role they played in the local economics of the various provinces. Far from a situation where “their commerce [. . .] was always based on encroachment on other businesses” as Ö. L. Barkan interpreted their behavior (in his article “The price revolution of the sixteenth century: a turning point in the economic history of the Near East,” in *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, vol. vi (1975), p. 24). There is yet another possible approach to their role in local affairs: they may have become integrated in the local economy, thus adding certain badly needed funds for further investments, perhaps even talents and stamina to the existing guild structure. In Jerusalem, in any case, we came across cases like the above-mentioned, or those Janissaries who became expert (*‘usta*) tailors, one of whom was even elected by the guild members as their professional head (vol. 59, p. 317) – which call for a distinction between their negative military performance and their possible positive contribution to the economy of Jerusalem (as well as other provincial urban centers).
- 20 Vol. 69, p. 232; vol. 14, p. 759; vol. 54, p. 87.
- 21 Vol. 19, p. 228.
- 22 Vol. 57, p. 7.
- 23 In sixteenth-century Ḥamāt in Northern Syria the number of millers oscillated between 8 and 14, whereas the bakers’ guild consisted of 13 members (‘Abd al-Wadūd Muḥammad Yūsuf “Tawā’if al-ḥiraf wa’s-sinā’at fi Ḥamāt fi’l-qarn as-sādis ‘ashar” in *Al-Ḥawliyyāt al-‘Āthāriyya as-Sūriyya* (Damascus, 1969), vol. 19, pp. 88–9.
- 24 For detailed lists of names see: vol. 30, p. 253; vol. 31, pp. 77, 145, 248, 379; vol. 34, pp. 335, 343; vol. 36, pp. 148–9; vol. 44, pp. 26, 222; vol. 48, p. 479; vol. 49, pp. 368, 592; vol. 54, p. 87; vol. 56, p. 424; vol. 57, p. 85; vol. 67, pp. 233, 294, 392; vol. 69, pp. 169, 232.
- 25 Vol. 4, p. 264; vol. 57, p. 85.
- 26 Vol. 13, p. 380.
- 27 Vol. 31, p. 77; vol. 34, p. 335; vol. 57, p. 85, respectively.
- 28 Vol. 31, pp. 77, 248; vol. 34, pp. 335, 343; vol. 36, pp. 148–9.
- 29 Vol. 56, p. 424; vol. 57, p. 85; vol. 69, p. 169.
- 30 Vol. 4, pp. 241, 264.
- 31 Vol. 59, p. 543; vol. 49, p. 592; vol. 56, p. 424; vol. 3, p. 77, respectively.
- 32 Vol. 33, p. 25. In Cairo, too, the term *‘arṣa* was used for a very similar institution

- (A. Raymond, *Artisans et commerçants*, vol. I, p. 308). This “lot” in Jerusalem may have been identical with “the wheat market” of Mamluk times (cf. Little, *Catalogue*, p. 295).
- 33 Vol. 21, p. 418.
- 34 Vol. 69, p. 298.
- 35 Vol. 6, p. 420; vol. 27, p. 245; vol. 33, p. 20; vol. 57, p. 266. In Ḥamāt, however, the authentic nature of the guild remained intact (ʿAbd al-Wadūd in *Ḥawliyyāt*, vol. 19, p. 91).
- 36 Vol. 72, p. 197.
- 37 Vol. 6, p. 530.
- 38 Vol. 33, p. 91.
- 39 See, for example, vol. 55, p. 143.
- 40 Vol. 17, p. 372.
- 41 Vol. 14, p. 691.
- 42 Vol. 61, p. 277.
- 43 Vol. 43, p. 241.
- 44 *Kayl al-Sultan al-makhtūm* (vol. 14, p. 691).
- 45 Vol. 55, p. 102. A *Kayl* of alkali, however, was 6 *raʿl* (vol. 33, p. 3). The entire problem of measures of capacity in the Ottoman Empire seems to have been even more complicated than that of weights: according to Mantran (in *Cahiers de Tunisie* (p. 220) 1 *mudd* of wheat equals usually 7 *kīle*, or 6 Salonica *kīle*. In Istanbul, however, he calculated 1 *mudd* of grains at 20 *kīle*, i.e. approximately 500 kg (*ibid.*, n. 6). The basis for his calculations is that 1 *kīle* equals 18–20 *okka*, i.e. 25 kg. But even if we read *ʿuqiyya* for *okka* the Jerusalem *kīle* would be about 50% larger than what Mantran termed as the “usual” *kīle*, and that of Istanbul would seem to be fourfold more voluminous.
- 46 Vol. 40, p. 2; vol. 56, p. 343.
- 47 Vol. 40, p. 2.
- 48 Vol. 18, pp. 215, 262.
- 49 Vol. 23, p. 56; vol. 33, p. 32; vol. 40, p. 2; vol. 56, pp. 105, 343, 555; vol. 76, p. 227.
- 50 See my *Jewish Life under Islam*, pp. 189–90. In volume 48, p. 196 nine different Jewish names are cited.
- 51 Vol. 12, p. 149.
- 52 Vol. 67, p. 215.
- 53 Vol. 78, p. 41.
- 54 Vol. 10, p. 543. For further details on rice supply to Jerusalem see: vol. 49, p. 379. See also A. Raymond, *Artisans et commerçants*, vol. II, pp. 381–2.
- 55 In 1575 then in 1580 members of this family were active millers (vol. 56, p. 424; vol. 59, p. 319).
- 56 Vol. 72, p. 378.
- 57 Braudel, *Civilization and Capitalism*, vol. I, pp. 110, 125, 134.
- 58 Vol. 67, pp. 215, 244.
- 59 Vol. 24, p. 425; vol. 33, p. 326; vol. 34, p. 252; vol. 35, p. 152; vol. 36, pp. 108–9; vol. 40, p. 284; vol. 43, pp. 237, 306; vol. 49, p. 400; vol. 51, pp. 184, 593; vol. 53, p. 274; vol. 54, pp. 114, 547; vol. 55, p. 402; vol. 56, pp. 80, 553; vol. 57, p. 280; vol. 58, p. 339; vol. 59, pp. 165, 337; vol. 61, p. 522; vol. 66, pp. 176, 461; vol. 69, p. 130; vol. 77, p. 309.
- 60 For a brief history of this institution see: K. Shihāda, “Taʾrikh aʾl-ṭāhūn ka-muʾassasa ʾiqṭisādiyya,” in *Al-Ḥawliyyāt al-ʾĀthāriyya as-sūriyya* (Damascus, 1973) vol. 23, pp. 241–73; vol. 24, pp. 109–22.
- 61 Vol. 43, p. 48; vol. 62, p. 260.
- 62 For a fuller discussion of the role of the quarters see: Cohen and Lewis, *Population*, pp. 34–41.
- 63 Vol. 27, p. 88. In Cairo, however, mills were operated “uniquement [. . .] par la force animal” (Raymond, *Artisans*, vol. I, p. 313, n. 2).

- 64 Vol. 4, p. 241; vol. 18, p. 326; vol. 23, p. 155; vol. 33, p. 102; vol. 39, p. 250; vol. 48, p. 276.
 65 Vol. 69, p. 166.
 66 Vol. 16, p. 520; vol. 57, p. 131; vol. 51, p. 686; vol. 33, pp. 359, 368. This building activity was very similar to the “activités de constructions remarquable” which took place in Damascus during the very same years. Pascual points out that up to the middle of the century this was undertaken in most cases by the “notables” of Damascus, whereas later this was usually the initiative of the local governors (J.-P. Pascual, *Damas à la fin du XVI^e siècle* (Damascus, 1983), pp. 16–17.
 67 Vol. 8, pp. 189, 350.
 68 For many technical details as well as a wider perspective of this entire process see: Barkan, “Price revolution” in *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, vol. vi (1975), pp. 12–16.
 69 Barkan, “Price revolution,” in *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, vol. vi (1975), p. 26.
 70 For a somewhat unsatisfactory short review of these and other coins used in Damascus during the sixteenth century see J.-P. Pascual, *Damas à la fin du XVI^e siècle* (Damascus, 1983), vol. 1, p. 121.
 71 Vol. 64, p. 534; vol. 66, p. 54.
 72 Vol. 51, p. 584. According to M. Z. Pakalın (*Osmanlı Tarih Deimleri ve Terimleri Sözlüğü* (Istanbul, 1951), pp. 453–4) one *dirham* weighed ca. 3.15 grams, which puts one loaf of soup-kitchen bread at the somewhat surprising weight of 283 grams.
 73 Vol. 78, p. 507.
 74 Vol. 79, p. 35.
 75 The original exchange rate was laid at 1 *para* = 2 ‘*uthmānī* as may easily be gathered, for example from the *kannunname* of Damascus: *kirkar para ki seksen ‘Osmani olur* (Barkan, *Kanunlar*, p. 226).
 76 Vol. 79, p. 129.
 77 Barkan, “Price revolution,” in *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, vol. vi (1975), pp. 12–13.

Conclusion

- 1 Vol. 58, p. 380.
- 2 Vol. 55, p. 495.
- 3 Vol. 33, p. 46.
- 4 Heyd, *Documents*, pp. 84–5.
- 5 Vol. 69, p. 486. The *sancakbeyi* killed was the notorious Khudawirdi bey, alias Abu Sayfayn. An earlier reference (scribbled on the binding of vol. 66 upper left side) put the date of his (first?) arrival in Jerusalem at February 18, 1587. Recurring references in volume 67 to the cruelty of the governor ‘Abd al-Rahman (e.g. p. 215) seems to indicate that this was the same person, but more research still has to be conducted on these years.
- 6 Vol. 49, p. 65.
- 7 Vol. 64, p. 121.
- 8 Vol. 33, pp. 224, 503; vol. 39, pp. 361–2; vol. 51, pp. 619, 621; vol. 59, p. 281.
- 9 For the administrative position of the various villages mentioned in these pages see W. D. Hütteroth and K. Abdulfattah, *Historical Geography of Palestine, Transjordan and Southern Syria in the late 16th century* (Erlangen, 1977), pp. 140, 154–5, 192.
- 10 Vol. 61, p. 206. Four different guards were appointed to secure the shops and their contents from any potential threat. The shopkeepers had to pay a monthly sum for the daily protection (*hirāsa*) as well as for that of the night watches (*‘asas*), and in order to increase security conditions at night were also obliged to maintain a certain illumination system in these markets. On the third in the above mentioned list see also vol. 75, p. 445.

- 11 See, for example, my *Jewish Life*, pp. 162–75.
- 12 Vol. 49, p. 65.
- 13 During the month of Ramaḍān 974/1567 (vol. 49, p. 379) six different merchants were to sell 105 *mudd* at the price of 5 *para* per unit, the entire quantity divided between them at the following quotas: 25, 30, 25, 10, 10, 5.
- 14 In 1594, for example, sesame oil sold for 5 *para* per *raṭl* while olive oil oscillated between 10–7½ *para* (vol. 76, p. 24). See also vol. 59, p. 369; vol. 66, p. 320; vol. 76, pp. 21, 24, 335. The head of the guild in 1586 was *al-ḥajj* Abu'l-Nasr b. *Muhibb al-Dīn al-Sukkari*.
- 15 Vol. 1, p. 264.
- 16 E. Ashtor, "The development of prices in the medieval Near East," in B. Spuler (ed.), *Handbuch der Orientalistik*, 6 Band, 1 Teil (Leiden/Köln, 1977), pp. 102–3; E. Ashtor, "The economic decline of the Middle East during the late Middle Ages – an outline," in *Asian and African Studies*, vol. 15, No. 3 (1981), pp. 277–8.
- 17 H. Inalcık, "The foundations of the Ottoman economico-social system in cities," in N. Todorov (ed.), *La ville Balkanique XV^e–XIX^e siècles* (Sofia, 1970), pp. 18, 23.
- 18 See above, p. 85.
- 19 For a detailed and most impressive list of immovable properties in and around Jerusalem, owned by two merchants, sons of Muḥammad Samūm, see vol. 33, pp. 164–9.
- 20 Vol. 17, pp. 23–4. For *ʿawāriḍ* see *EP* (by H. Bowen).

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