In a lucidly argued revisionist interpretation of society in Ottoman Egypt in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Jane Hathaway challenges the traditional view that Egypt's military elite constituted a revival of the institutions of the Mamluk sultanate. The author contends that the basic framework within which Egypt's elite operated was the household, a conglomerate of patron–client ties that took various forms and included many different recruits. In this respect, she argues, Egypt's elite represented a provincial variation on an empire-wide, household-based political culture.

The study focuses on the Qazdağlı household. Originally a largely Anatolian contingent within Egypt's Janissary regiment, the Qazdağlıs dominated Egypt by the late eighteenth century. Using Turkish and Arabic archival and narrative sources, Jane Hathaway sheds light on the manner in which the Qazdağlıs exploited the Janissary rank hierarchy, while forming strategic alliances through marriage, commercial partnerships, and the patronage of palace eunuchs.

This provocative study will have a major impact on the understanding of Egyptian and Ottoman history, and will be essential reading for scholars in the field, and for anyone interested in pre-modern history.

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The politics of households in Ottoman Egypt

The rise of the Qazdağlıs

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To Meg Hathaway

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Note on transliteration

When dealing with both Arabic and Ottoman Turkish, one often feels bound to choose between the two in matters of transliteration. I have tried instead to strike a compromise. The names and titles of all of Egypt's grandees and of all Ottoman officials, as well as the titles of books in Ottoman Turkish, are rendered according to a transliteration system for Ottoman Turkish. Egyptian place names, Arabic book titles, and the names of Arab authors are rendered according to a system for Arabic. Where institutions are concerned, I have tried to choose the forms that are least alienating to readers in the field. Ottoman offices, such as that of *Kızlar Ağası* or *Ḫazinedar-i Şehriyarî*, are rendered in Turkish transliteration. Institutions whose names derive from Arabic and that are usually encountered in Arabic transliteration in the secondary literature (e.g., *waqf*, *Awqāf al-Ḥaramayn*) retain their Arabic transliterations, as do local offices (e.g., *sarrāj*, *qā'im maqām*). *Mamlūk* occurs so often in the text that after its first occurrence, I have not thought it necessary to highlight and vocalize it. Terms that have found their way into English dictionaries, such as "reaya" and "ulema," retain the spelling found there.

The transliteration system used for both Arabic and Ottoman Turkish is that employed by the *International Journal of Middle East Studies*. However, I have chosen to omit diacritical markings, except for indications of the letter *'ayn*, in proper names and in Turkish common nouns not derived from Arabic.

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Preface

When first undertaking this project, I profited from the advice and encouragement of L. Carl Brown, Mark Cohen, Michael Cook, Halil Inalcik, Norman Itzkowitz, Bernard Lewis, A. L. Udovitch, and, above all, Cemal Kafadar, whose insights continue to inspire me. I am also grateful to Abraham Marcus, who guided my earliest research on pre-1798 Egypt. My colleagues in the Ottoman Egyptian subfield have been extraordinarily generous and supportive. I must single out Daniel Crecelius, Peter Holt, and André Raymond; though I may question some of the conclusions of their scholarship, I know very well that my own would not have been possible without theirs. Other colleagues who have offered advice both on the content of my research and on the process of preparing a book for publication include Philip Brown, Richard Bulliet, Stephen Dale, Carter Findley, Ulrich Haarmann, Victoria Holbrook, Eve Levin, Amy Singer, Ehud Toledano, and two anonymous readers for Cambridge University Press. Ron McLean of Ohio State's Graphics Services department prepared the maps while the University Libraries' Rare Books and Manuscripts collection supplied the cover photographs. Asım Karaömerlioğlu provided invaluable assistance with the index. Marigold Acland and her assistant Emma Mayes at Cambridge University Press have offered cheerful and expert guidance at every turn in the publication process.

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Finally, I offer sincere thanks to Beshir and Stella, and to my mother, Meg Hathaway, who instilled in me the love of learning and made becoming an academic seem not only possible but desirable. There are, in addition, many others who have helped me in ways of which they, and perhaps I, were unaware.

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Abbreviations

AI	*Annales Islamologiques*
BSOAS	*Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*
EI[1], *EI*[2]	*Encyclopaedia of Islam*, first and second editions
IJMES	*International Journal of Middle East Studies*
JAOS	*Journal of the American Oriental Society*
JESHO	*Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient*
MIDEO	*Mélanges de l'Institut Dominicain des Études Orientales*
SI	*Studia Islamica*
WZKM	*Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes*



Fig. 1 The Qazdağlı genealogy



Fig. 2 The Jalfi genealogy

Introduction

This is the story of the rise of the Qazdağlı household. To the extent that this household is familiar to readers outside the tiny circle of scholars of pre-nineteenth-century Ottoman Egypt, it is known chiefly as the group headed by the famous ʿAli Bey, the former military slave (*mamlūk*) who in the late 1760s dared to assert Egypt's autonomy in defiance of the Ottoman sultan. Alternatively, the household attracts notice as the party of predominantly Georgian mamluks whom Bonaparte found holding sway in Egypt at the time of his invasion in 1798. The prevalence of a regime of military slaves from the Caucasus region naturally evokes the Mamluk sultanate, which ruled Egypt before the Ottoman conquest in 1517. Thus it seems almost automatic, even to experts on the subject, to depict the regime over which the Qazdağlıs presided as a reversion to the usages of the Mamluk sultanate.

Yet the Qazdağlı household was founded by a Janissary officer toward the middle of the seventeenth century. Thus, what is missing from the foregoing appraisal of the household is an appreciation of the context within which the household emerged and developed in the century preceding ʿAli Bey's hegemony. This context is, in the first place, an Ottoman context, for the character of the Ottoman Empire's administration and Egypt's place within it underwent telling changes during the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. The Qazdağlıs, furthermore, participated in a provincial Ottoman military culture whose transformations prepared the ground for the Georgian preponderance of the late eighteenth century.

I attempt here to provide a sense of this context by analyzing the Qazdağlıs' evolution within the framework of Ottoman decentralization and the emergence of an empire-wide military and administrative culture based on households. Both the redirection of the empire's priorities and the composition and functions of households provide critical keys to understanding the course that the Qazdağlı bloc followed. But in order to place the Qazdağlıs squarely within this context, we must first place Egypt in the context of the Ottoman Empire during these critical centuries.

I

The household and its place in Ottoman Egypt's history

CHAPTER I

Egypt's place in the Ottoman Empire

In the summer of 1516, it was evident to most observers of the Ottoman imperial palace of Topkapı in Istanbul, if not to most residents of the city at large, that Sultan Selim I (1512–20) was preparing a decisive military expedition against one of his two chief Asian antagonists. Early in the season, the sultan's campaign tent had been pitched at Üsküdar, on the eastern shore of the Bosphorus; by July, he had reached the camp of his general Sinan Pasha in the eastern Anatolian town of Malatya. Up to this point, however, which rival Selim intended to attack remained open to question. The militantly Shi'ite Safavid empire, which had swept across Iran early in the sixteenth century, posed a sharp political and ideological challenge to the Ottoman Empire. Only two years earlier, in fact, Selim had dealt the Safavids a bruising defeat at Chaldiran in northwestern Iran. It was to pursue the campaign against the Safavids that Sinan Pasha had marched to Malatya. To the south, however, the Mamluk sultans, who ruled Egypt, Syria, the Hijaz, and southeastern Anatolia, had become a major irritant to Selim. Although they, like the Ottomans, were Sunni Muslims, they refused to support the Ottoman effort against the Safavids. They were also a poor buffer against the Portuguese presence in the Red Sea and Indian Ocean. Diplomatic relations between the Ottomans and Mamluks had deteriorated in recent months. Two Ottoman ambassadors to the Mamluk court at Cairo had been humiliated and abused.

Arguably, then, Sultan Selim had a *casus belli* against both the Safavids and the Mamluks. When he had joined the army at Malatya, however, instead of continuing east toward Iran, he turned south, through the Cilician Gates and into Syria. It was now obvious that Selim intended to attack the Mamluks. The swift course of the Ottoman victory is well known. Selim's forces met the army of the Mamluk sultan Qansuh al-Ghuri at the plain of Marj Dabiq, just south of what is today Syria's border with Turkey. Al-Ghuri is said to have suffered a fatal apoplectic fit on the battlefield; his body was never recovered. Legend has it that spirits, or *jinn*, carried it off.

Continuing south, Selim captured Damascus in September 1516, and entered Egypt at the beginning of 1517. In an hour-long battle outside Cairo,

the Ottoman army routed the forces of al-Ghuri's successor, Tumanbay, and entered the capital, thus putting an end to the Mamluk sultanate.[1]

Only six months after marching from Malatya, then, Selim had added thousands of square kilometers to the Ottoman Empire. Formerly a Balkan–Anatolian domain with a predominantly Christian population, the empire now encompassed the heartland of Islam, including Islam's holy places. The Ottomans had also become an overwhelming presence in the eastern Mediterranean and the Red Sea. These new acquisitions gave the empire new opportunities, coupled with new responsibilities. Egypt became, as it were, the linchpin of the empire's new territories. In the first century-and-a-half of Ottoman rule over Egypt, the province served as a strategic rallying point for expeditions against the Portuguese and for conquests in the Red Sea and the eastern Mediterranean. The conquest of Yemen in 1538 was launched from Egypt, while the long, torturous struggle to take Crete from the Venetians required thousands of troops from Egypt. The Ottoman governors of Egypt during these years were predominantly military men who had come up through the Janissaries and often governed smaller provinces. Following the conquest of Yemen, in fact, Egypt appears to have enjoyed a political symbiosis with Yemen. An Ottoman governor of Egypt could often expect a subsequent posting to Yemen; meanwhile, land tenure and provincial administration in Yemen were virtually identical to those in Egypt.[2]

From a somewhat more mundane standpoint, Egypt also served the empire as a rich source of provisions. The province paid an annual tribute, known as *irsālīye-i ḫazīne*, to Istanbul; this tribute exceeded the revenues received from any other province.[3] Egypt also supplied manpower for imperial campaigns, not only those in Crete and Yemen, but expeditions against Austria and Iran, as well. Egypt's legendary grain harvests provided food for the Ottoman armies and for the populations of other Ottoman provinces in times of scarcity. Through Egypt, furthermore, the Ottomans gained access to the trade in black African slaves through the Sudan.

On defeating the Mamluks, the Ottoman Empire won control of the Holy Cities of Mecca and Medina, and assumed the obligations of the cities' custodian. The Ottoman governors of the province of Damascus (Shām) and

[1] On the Ottoman conquest of Egypt and its effects, see Muhammad b. Ahmad b. Iyas, *An Account of the Ottoman Conquest of Egypt in the Year A.H. 922 (A.D. 1516)*, trans. W. H. Salmon (London, 1921); Muhammad b. Ahmad b. Iyas, *Journal d'un bourgeois du Caire*, trans. Gaston Wiet, 2 vols. (Paris, 1955); Jean-Louis Bacqué-Grammont, *Les Ottomans, les Safavides et leurs voisins* (Istanbul, 1987), pp. 18–99, 206–7; P. M. Holt, *Egypt and the Fertile Crescent, 1516–1922: A Political History* (Ithaca and London, 1966), pp. 3–45; G. W. F. Stripling, *The Ottoman Turks and the Arabs, 1511–1574*, Illinois Studies in the Social Sciences, vol. XXVI, no. 4 (Urbana, IL, 1942).

[2] Shams al-Din ʿAbd al-Samad al-Mawzaʿi, *Dukhūl al-ʿuthmāniyyīn al-awwal ila al-Yaman*, ed. ʿAbdallah Muhammad al-Habashi (Beirut, 1986), pp. 86ff.

[3] On the tribute, see Stanford J. Shaw, *The Financial and Administrative Organization and Development of Ottoman Egypt, 1517–1798* (Princeton, 1962), pp. 283ff.

Egypt were each responsible for equipping an annual pilgrimage caravan. The Egyptian caravan carried grains and money for the poor of the Holy Cities, along with the *maḥmil*, the symbolic litter transported each year to Mecca, and a new *kiswa*, an embroidered covering for the Ka'ba, Islam's most sacred shrine.

At the end of the seventeenth century, Egypt's place in the Ottoman Empire altered significantly. No longer was it the staging area for critical military engagements in the Red Sea and the eastern Mediterranean. The Portuguese had ceased to pose a threat to Ottoman domination of the Red Sea by the beginning of the century, when Portugal's imperial might was dwindling. Candia, the Venetian capital in Crete, was at long last taken in 1669, and although Egyptian troops still performed mopping-up operations and garrison duty on the island,[4] the days of urgent engagement had passed. Meanwhile, the overthrow of Ottoman rule in Yemen by the Zaydi Shi'ite imams in 1636 put an end to the symbiosis between Yemen and Egypt. To the west, the abortive Ottoman siege of Vienna in 1683 resulted in a massive demobilization of forces on the European front and concurrently reduced the role that Egyptian forces played in European campaigns. Henceforward, Egypt's importance to the Ottoman Empire would hinge on the province's ability to deliver revenue and grains, and to provide for the Holy Cities. Correspondingly, the Ottoman governors of Egypt shifted from veteran warriors to bureaucrats and palace cronies. Within Egypt's ruling society itself, these duties would become central concerns and bones of contention.

Egypt's incorporation into the Ottoman Empire occasioned significant demographic changes within the province. The population of Egypt, as we now know, increased under Ottoman rule, until the natural disasters and political turmoil of the late eighteenth century began to reverse the trend. Although Cairo was reduced from an imperial to a provincial capital, it nevertheless registered impressive gains in numbers of inhabitants and territorial extent. At the time of the Ottoman conquest, Cairo contained some 150,000 souls; by 1800, it was a city of 250,000.[5] The city expanded far to the west during these nearly 300 years, as political and commercial elites moved out of the densely populated hub centered in the old Fatimid city. In the countryside, regional market towns such as Damanhur and Minyat Zifta attained or recaptured commercial importance. Upper Egypt came to be better integrated into the provincial economy as grains from more and more southern villages were requisitioned for the growing number of imperial pious foundations (*awqāf*, s. *waqf*) supporting Mecca and Medina.

The Ottoman takeover of Egypt brought a massive and varied influx of people into the province, even as the Ottomans removed large numbers of

[4] See, for example, Istanbul, Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi, Mühimme Defteri 99, no. 75 (1101/1689).

[5] André Raymond, "La population du Caire et de l'Egypte à l'époque ottomane et sous Muhammad 'Ali," in *Mémorial Ömer Lutfi Barkan* (Paris, 1980).

Egyptian artisans and ulema (Muslim scholars) to Istanbul.[6] Large numbers of Ottoman troops remained in Egypt after the conquest to garrison the new province. These troops were a motley crew of Anatolian Turks; Balkan youths recruited through the *devşirme*, the classical Ottoman method of collecting non-Muslim boys from conquered territories; and various Turkic and Kurdish tribal levies. Meanwhile, Turkophone bureaucrats of various ethnic origins arrived in Cairo to join holdovers from the Mamluk bureaucracy, and the Ottoman governors transported their own sizable entourages to Cairo. As Egypt's role within the empire began to change in the seventeenth century, many other sorts of Ottoman subjects sought their fortunes, or at least their livelihoods, in the province. Anatolian mercenaries seeking more dependable livelihoods than could be had in their native lands enrolled in the Egyptian garrison forces as a means of securing regular salaries while plying various petty trades on the side. Victims of political upheavals in Istanbul and Anatolia sought refuge in Egypt. In the mid-seventeenth century, furthermore, eunuchs of the imperial harem began routinely to be exiled to Egypt, where they amassed wealth and attracted large followings.

Egypt's military echelons following the Ottoman conquest were obviously greatly changed from the military elite of the Mamluk sultanate. Nonetheless, they were not completely transformed. Selim I incorporated those members of the Mamluk forces who professed loyalty to the Ottomans into the administrations of Egypt and Syria. Before he returned to Istanbul, moreover, he pardoned a number of defeated Mamluks and allowed them to remain in Egypt. Selim's strategy in pursuing this policy appears to have been to balance the often rebellious Ottoman soldiery against the repentant Mamluks.

Likewise, the administration that Selim and his successor, Süleyman I (1520–66), imposed on Egypt combined effective elements of the Mamluk administration with innovations sufficient to ensure Ottoman control. Under the late Mamluk sultanate, Egypt's cultivable land was divided into twenty-four *qīrāṭ*s, which the Mamluk sultan, emirs, and soldiery received as *iqṭā'*s, or assignments of usufruct; distribution varied with changes in the financial administration.[7] These assignments supported the Mamluk cavalry, which was commanded by the emirs. The emirs, along with the sultan himself, were typically the manumitted slaves, or mamluks, of the sultan's predecessor. They were ranked according to the number of horsemen their *iqṭā'*s could support: hence emirs of ten, forty, one hundred. The rank-and-file horsemen (*ajnād*, s.

[6] Ibn Iyas, *Journal d'un bourgeois du Caire*, vol. I, pp. 79ff.; Gaston Wiet, "Personnes déplacées," *Revue des Etudes Islamiques* 27 (1959), 9–21.

[7] On the Mamluk land regime, see Hasanayn Rabie, "The Size and Value of the *Iqṭā'* in Egypt, 564–741/1169–1341," in Michael Cook (ed.), *Studies in the Economic History of the Middle East: From the Rise of Islam to the Present Day*, (Oxford, 1970); A. N. Poliak, "Some Notes on the Feudal System of the Mamluks," *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* (1937), 97ff. On Mamluk slave society, see David Ayalon, *L'esclavage du mamelouk* (Jerusalem, 1951); and his "Studies on the Structure of the Mamluk Army," parts 1–3, *BSOAS* 15 (1953), 203–28, 448–76, and 16 (1954), 57–90.

jundī) were the mamluks of the emirs and the ruling sultan, who commanded them. Functionally, then, the Mamluk *iqṭāʿ* resembled the *timar* system in force in most of the Ottoman Empire's European provinces and in Anatolia before 1517; both systems in turn drew inspiration from the earlier Seljuk *iqṭāʿ*.[8]

On conquering Egypt, the Ottomans retained the Mamluk division of the land into thirteen subprovinces comprising twenty-four *qīrāṭs*. They discarded the Mamluk term *ʿamal* for a subprovince in favor of the Ottoman terms *vilāyet* and *nāḥiye*; the enormous subprovince of Jirja in Upper Egypt was termed an *iqlīm*. The *Kanunname*, or law code, promulgated by the grand vizier Ibrahim Pasha in 1525 refers to the governors of these subprovinces by the title *kāshif*, a term applied to subprovincial governors during the Bahri Mamluk era (1250–1388).[9] Despite these retentions, however, the Ottomans made no attempt to preserve the *iqṭāʿ* system or to impose the very similar *timar* system. Instead, Selim I confiscated all *iqṭāʿ*s and replaced their holders with imperially appointed salaried administrators known as *emin*s, who were to collect all land taxes. By the early seventeenth century, the post of *emin* had given way to the tax farm, or *iltizām*. Military grandees and high-ranking ulema received the right to collect the taxes of specific administrative units in return for advance payments to the governor's treasury. In this way, the revenues of all administrative units, from villages to entire subprovinces, came to be farmed by salaried officials. Meanwhile, a mélange of Ottoman and Mamluk titles came to apply to these tax farmers, or *mültezim*s. By the late seventeenth century, the subprovincial *iltizām*s were often called *sancak*s in practice, much like the subdistricts of Anatolia and Rumelia under the *timar* system, while their holders were called variously *sancak*, *sancak beyi*, bey, and emir. It should be stressed, however, that these beys of the middle centuries of Ottoman rule in Egypt, despite the traditional Mamluk and Ottoman titles they bore, were not throwbacks to the old Mamluk or, indeed, to the classical Ottoman land regime. They constituted a new Ottoman-era beylicate[10] of tax farmers.

In short, the administration of Ottoman Egypt was neither a continuation

[8] On the Seljuk *iqṭāʿ*, see, for example, Claude Cahen, "L'évolution de l'*iqṭāʿ* du IXe au XIIIe siècle," in Claude Cahen, *Les peuples musulmans dans l'histoire médiévale* (Damascus, 1977). On the Ottoman *timar* system, see, for example, Halil Inalcik, *The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age, 1300–1600*, trans. Norman Itzkowitz and Colin Imber (London, 1973), pp. 104–18.

[9] Heinz Halm, *Ägypten nach den mamlukischen Lehensregistern*, 2 vols. (Wiesbaden, 1979), vol. I, pp. 60ff. The thirteen subprovinces were Minufiyya, Qalyub, Gharbiyya, Mansura, Sharqiyya, Buhayra, Giza, Fayyum, Atfih, 'Ushmunayn, Manfalut, al-Bahnasa, and Jirja. On Ottoman adaptation of the Mamluk system, see "Mısır Kanunnâmesi" in Ömer Lutfi Barkan, *XVve XVIıncı asırlarda Osmanlı imparatorluğunda ziraî ekonominin hukukî ve malî esasları*, İstanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakultesi Yayınlarından No. 256 (Istanbul, 1943), vol. I, chapter 105; Shaw, *Financial and Administrative Organization*, pp. 28ff., 60–2; P. M. Holt, "The Beylicate in Ottoman Egypt during the Seventeenth Century," *BSOAS* 24 (1961).

[10] "Beylicate" results from the addition of a Latinate suffix to the Turkish *beylik*, denoting the post of bey. It is commonly used in secondary scholarship on Ottoman Egypt.



Map 1 The major regions of Egypt, showing the subprovinces

of the late Mamluk system nor a new imposition of the classical Ottoman system. Instead, it represented a new administrative strategy that bore a number of features of both the Mamluk and traditional Ottoman regimes. This system attempted to accommodate both Ottoman soldiers and former Mamluks. Mamluks were incorporated into the six regiments that initially garrisoned Egypt;[11] one of these six was a special cavalry corps, the Çerakise (Circassians), formed from Mamluk followers of the collaborationist Mamluk emir Hayr Bey, who was named first Ottoman governor of Egypt. The governors of the thirteen subprovinces were expected to hold the rank of *sancak beyi*, much like their counterparts in the empire's central lands. As in the central lands, there seems to have been some expectation that regimental commanders, or aghas, would be promoted to this rank.

This Ottoman–Mamluk administrative hybrid, perhaps inevitably, did not run according to the plan of the 1525 *Kanunname*. The subprovincial and district governorships came to be regarded as the equivalent of Mamluk emirates, although the salary, rather than the land grant, was the reward of achieving the rank of *sancak beyi*. Former Mamluk emirs and new recruits from the Caucasus and sundry other locales joined the ranks of the *sancak beyi*s so that by the latter half of the sixteenth century, a new group of beys had emerged as a stratum apart from the regimental soldiery. It was no doubt to curb the influence of this group that the Ottoman government introduced a seventh regiment of soldiery in 1554. This new regiment, the Müteferrika, was filled directly from the imperial palace with the cream of the empire's military elite and their offspring. Shortly after this corps' creation, an imperial order excluded all regiments but the Müteferrika and Çavuşan from promotion to *sancak beyi*.[12] Coming on the heels of a 1553 land reform aimed at curbing the alienation of land revenues as personal pious foundations, or *waqf*s, by local grandees,[13] these actions reflect a desire for stronger central control over Egypt. The central government, from all appearances, sought to Ottomanize the beylicate and to construct an institutional link between the beylicate and the Ottoman soldiery. However, the beys of Müteferrika and Çavuş origin eventually began to cultivate local roots and to recruit clients of their own; this perhaps explains the appearance in the chronicles by the early seventeenth century of beys of a variety of origins: Caucasian slaves, Bosnian recruits, Anatolians, even native Egyptians. This ethnic mélange could only have contributed to friction within the province as the "Ottoman" beys of Müteferrika and Çavuş origin and their clients vied with these other elements for positions and the revenues that went with them.

Such friction may lie behind the rise of two factions within Egypt's military

[11] These were the Çavuşan, Gönüllüyan, Tüfenkciyan, Çerakise, Janissaries (Mustahfizan), and 'Azeban.

[12] Mühimme Defteri 6, no. 487 (972/1564); 29, no. 9 (984/1576).

[13] Stanford J. Shaw, "The Land Law of Ottoman Egypt (960/1553): A Contribution to the Study of Landholding in the Early Years of Ottoman Rule in Egypt," *Der Islam* 38 (1962), 106–37.

elite early in the seventeenth century: the Faqārī (from "Dhū'l-Faqār") and the Qāsimī (from "Qāsim"). They affiliated with two ancient bedouin factions, respectively, the Nisf Sa'd and Nisf Harām. In the course of the seventeenth century, the rivalry between these two factions permeated Egyptian society, extending beyond the military ranks to encompass bedouin and artisans.

The origins of these factions remain obscure. They were not typical Mamluk factions of the sort that had pitted the followers of a new Mamluk sultan against those of his predecessor. Origin myths recounted by at least three Arabophone chroniclers link the advent of the factions to the Ottoman conquest of Egypt, and this mythos may have some basis in fact.[14] Circumstantial evidence suggests that the Faqaris took their name from the emblem of the caliph 'Ali b. Abi Talib's sword Dhu'l-Faqar, which was prominently displayed on many Ottoman battle flags, particularly those of the Janissaries.[15] This theory squares with the origin myths' assertion that the Faqaris, in contrast to the Qasimis, sided with the Ottomans. The source of the Qasimis' appellation is more obscure; the group may have had connections to the Qasimi dynasty that ruled Yemen after the Ottoman defeat in 1636. By the end of the seventeenth century, in any case, the historical origins of the two factions had been forgotten, and only myths and trappings remained. Thus, when the chronicler 'Abd al-Rahman al-Jabarti reports, "The way one faction [*farīq*] was distinguished from the other was that when they rode in processions, the Faqaris' flag was white, and their lances had a knob, while the Qasimis' flag was red, and their lances had a disk,"[16] there is reason to believe that this was one of the only means left of distinguishing between the two groups.

Despite the *Kanunname*'s intentions, the soldiery's link to the beylicate had been severed by the end of the sixteenth century. Under the late Mamluks, the line from slave horseman to manumitted emir had been, for the most part, direct and clear cut. In the Ottoman Empire's central lands, as well, a well-defined promotional line existed from regimental officer to *sancak beyi*. These dependable connections had ceased to exist in Egypt, however; the beylicate by the late sixteenth century had few direct connections to the regiments, while the beys were of somewhat superior status to any of the regimental officers.[17] This gap between beys and officers engendered intense struggles over influence and revenues between the two groups.

[14] For example, Ahmad Çelebi b. 'Abd al-Ghani, *Awḍaḥ al-ishārāt fī man tawalla Miṣr al-Qāhira min al-wuzarā' wa al-bāshāt*, ed. A. A. 'Abd al-Rahim (Cairo, 1978), pp. 283–4; 'Abd al-Rahman b. Hasan al-Jabarti, *'Ajā'ib al-athār fī al-tarājim wa al-akhbār*, 7 vols. (Cairo, 1958–67), vol. I, pp. 67–71; Ahmad Katkhuda 'Azaban al-Damurdashi, *Al-durra al-muṣāna fī akhbār al-kināna*, British Museum, MS Or. 1073–4, pp. 2–5.

[15] Zdzislaw Zygulski, Jr., *Ottoman Art in the Service of the Empire* (New York, 1992), pp. 45–51, 69ff.; Fevzi Kurtoğlu, *Türk Bayrağı ve Ay Yıldız* (Ankara, 1938), pp. 74–7; Riza Nour, "L'histoire du croissant," *Revue de Turcologie* 1 (1933), 117/346.

[16] Al-Jabarti, *'Ajā'ib*, vol. I, p. 71.

[17] There was one exception during the late sixteenth century, when the newly established Müteferrika corps monopolized entry into the beylicate. See chapter 3, p. 42.

The prevalence of the tax farm, or *iltizām*, by the seventeenth century only compounded the friction between soldiery and beylicate. *Iltizām* deprived Egypt of the logical rank distinctions between soldiery and beys that had prevailed under the Mamluk *iqṭāʿ* system or that might have prevailed under the Ottoman *timar* system. Under the Mamluk system, a manumitted slave rose to the rank of cavalry commander and received an *iqṭāʿ* grant to support the cavalry he commanded. Under the "classical" Ottoman system, a *sancak beyi* by definition held a collection of *timar*s known as a *sancak*. A Janissary, being an infantryman, could not hold a cavalry-supporting assignment of usufruct but received a salary, in cash and provisions, from the imperial treasury. With the introduction of *iltizām*, however, the beys joined the soldiery as salaried functionaries. As their salaries grew increasingly uncertain beginning late in the sixteenth century, the Janissaries and the rest of the Ottoman soldiery had every incentive to enter the game of *iltizām*-acquisition. The tax farm granted by sultanic fiat gave beys and soldiers two common objects of competition: not only the grant of revenue itself but also the imperial favor that allowed one to hold it undisturbed. The gap between beys and soldiery was, in short, a defining feature of Ottoman Egypt's military society that came into being because the Ottomans refused to allow Egypt to cling to late Mamluk usages or, on the other hand, to adopt classical Ottoman usages.

Pressure on the soldiery increased toward the end of the seventeenth century, when a wave of Anatolian soldiers, both imperial troops and mercenaries, flooded the province. The end of the long war on Crete in 1669 and the disengagement following the failed Ottoman siege of Vienna in 1683 led to a massive demobilization of troops from the imperial capital, or *kapıkulları*, who proceeded to disperse throughout the empire. Unrest in Anatolia, itself in part related to the demobilization, fed the flood. As early as the 1660s, chronicles of Egypt report a group of rowdy Anatolian soldiers running amok in Cairo.[18] In Egypt, demobilized troops, many of whom had become mercenaries, were joined by organized contingents of Ottoman soldiery dispatched to the province on specific missions. As a consequence of this influx, the soldiery, and in particular the officers of the Janissary and ʿAzeban corps, acquired a weight in Egypt's military society that they had not previously enjoyed. They began to challenge the beys for available revenues and in so doing could not avoid joining the competition for *iltizām*s. The *iltizām*s themselves grew more desirable at the end of the seventeenth century, when the Ottoman Empire adopted life-tenure hereditary tax farms, known as *mālikāne*s. The one category of tax farms the regimental officers could not attain, however, was the subprovincial governorships, which were still allotted to *sancak beyi*s on a yearly basis. Nonetheless, by striking roots in Egypt and acquiring other lucrative tax farms, as well as undertaking commercial enterprises, regimental officers were able to compete with beys for wealth and status.

[18] See chapter 4, n. 42.

A hallmark of the soldiery's newfound prominence is that during these years, the highest-ranking regimental officers, the aghas, were not infrequently promoted to the beylicate. This sort of promotion was often a *de facto* punishment designed to remove the officer from his base of power in the regiment.[19] However, it could also give the officer access to a large subprovincial tax farm and to such potentially lucrative positions as treasurer and pilgrimage commander. The powerful Gönüllüyan commander Hasan Agha Bilifya, for a notable example, made certain of his followers aghas, and certain of those aghas beys, in pursuit of just such a strategy.

But not all those enrolled in the regiments were *bona fide* soldiers. It was not only possible but desirable for a citizen of any description to have himself or even herself placed on the rolls of one of the regiments. In this way, the citizen became, as it were, an honorary soldier and drew his regiment's monthly stipend while enjoying the military's tax-exempt status. The soldiers, for their part, sought entry into the crafts as a means of supplementing their unreliable government stipends. The regiment that practiced this abuse of privilege most widely was the Janissary regiment. Janissaries frequently forced a Cairene artisan to accept the regiment's "protection" (*ḥimāyet*), thus gaining a lucrative and fairly dependable source of income for themselves while taking the artisan onto the regiment's payroll. By the eighteenth century, some 14,000 residents of Cairo, or between 5 and 6 percent of the city's population, were inscribed on the rolls of the Ottoman regiments.[20] We may be sure that only a fraction of these were actual combatants.

In short, the Ottoman Empire's shift from a military conquest state to a bureaucratic, revenue-collecting state in the course of the seventeenth century was characterized by the localization of the empire's servants in the provinces. In Egypt, the Ottoman soldiery evolved from participants in imperial conquests and special provincial expeditions to entrenched local interest groups. The late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, in fact, comprise a phase in Ottoman Egypt's history when the soldiery, and particularly the regimental officers, wielded unprecedented influence. For a substantial part of this time, Egypt was controlled by a troika headed by the commander of the Gönüllüyan regiment, Hasan Agha Bilifya, an intriguing character whose acquaintance we shall make presently. His two partners were his son-in-law, Ismail Bey, and his protégé, the Janissary officer Mustafa Kâhya al-Qazdağlı. These three figures headed the Faqari faction, one of the two factions that had divided Egypt's military, artisanal, and tribal populations since at least the early seventeenth century.

[19] Hence Hasan Agha Bilifya was made a bey until he was able to work his way back into the regiments. See chapter 4, n. 52.

[20] Daniel Crecelius, *The Roots of Modern Egypt: A Study of the Regimes of 'Ali Bey al-Kabir and Muhammad Bey Abu al-Dhahab, 1760–1775* (Minneapolis and Chicago, 1981), p. 21, citing Layla 'Abd al-Latif Ahmad, "Al-iḍāra fī Miṣr fī al-'aṣr al-'uthmānī," Ph.D. dissertation, 'Ayn Shams University (1975), p. 168.

It was Mustafa Kâhya al-Qazdağlı, the client of Hasan Agha Bilifya, who founded the household that would control Egypt a century later. Yet by the late eighteenth century, the Qazdağlı group was barely recognizable as Mustafa Kâhya's household. Its upper ranks consisted of a group of beys of almost exclusively Georgian slave origin. Meanwhile, the Faqari and Qasimi factions had dwindled into obsolescence. As for the regiments, they had lost much of their institutional significance, degenerating into sources of income for clients of the beys. Certain high officers of the Janissary corps, however, remained critical to the maintenance of order in Cairo.

From all appearances, then, a transformation occurred within Egypt's military echelons during the second half of the seventeenth and the first half of the eighteenth centuries. Yet while the beylical preponderance of the late eighteenth century has been widely remarked, the circumstances preceding and engendering it have remained largely untreated. Indeed, what we might call the middle period of Ottoman rule in Egypt, roughly the century 1650–1750, remains a relatively unexplored backwater of the Ottoman Egyptian subfield. The late eighteenth-century beylical hegemony, rather than being compared with the regimental hegemony that immediately preceded it, is typically likened to the conditions prevailing at the end of the Mamluk sultanate, just before the Ottoman conquest. Thus, the Georgian beylicate is regarded as a revival or, in some cases, a continuation of the usages of the Mamluk emirate. Correspondingly, the work of the small group of scholars who have devoted serious attention to the structure of Ottoman Egypt's military elite has been marked by an urge to link Ottoman to Mamluk Egypt via the beylicate. This is accompanied by a tendency to refer to the late eighteenth century as the culmination of the beylicate's evolution.

For a single example of this readiness to analyze Ottoman Egypt's military society in terms of the Mamluk society that preceded it, we might turn to the work of P. M. Holt, whose pioneering research in predominantly Arabic sources laid the foundation for the modern study of Ottoman Egypt's military elite. In a seminal article on the seventeenth-century Egyptian beylicate, Holt portrays the Müteferrika corps, which was introduced to Egypt in 1554, as a descendant of the Khassakiyya corps of the Mamluk sultanate. The Khassakiyya had consisted of the Mamluk sultan's personal mamluks; from its ranks new emirs were chosen.[21] In this respect, the Müteferrika corps bore a superficial resemblance to the Khassakiyya inasmuch as it served as the Ottoman governor's bodyguard and was for a number of years part of the exclusive pool of candidates for the beylicate. Yet this regiment took its name from the Ottoman Müteferrika corps in the imperial capital. Like the imperial Müteferrika, it was filled exclusively from the palace and thus represented the Ottoman courtier elite in Egypt. Furthermore, as we have seen, it was introduced to Egypt as part of an attempt to Ottomanize the province's

[21] Holt, "Beylicate," 223.

administration. To depict this regiment as a throwback to the Mamluk sultanate belies its true purpose in Ottoman Egyptian military society.

This study seeks to examine this middle period from roughly 1650 through 1750 in the belief that the causes of the various transformations within Egypt's military echelon can be found in the Ottoman and provincial context in which they occurred. I have sketched above the manner in which the prominence of the soldiery during the late seventeenth century grew out of fundamental changes in the Ottoman Empire's character and their provincial concomitants. By the same token, I intend to examine the structure of Egypt's military society during this critical period in order to expose the roots of the beylical hegemony of the late eighteenth century. This period is worthy of study in its own right, as well. A close analysis of the structures through which the military echelon operated, the interaction among its various ranks, and the workings of strategic alliances within the framework of the two omnipresent factions will shed light on the nature of Egypt's military society and its place in Egyptian and Ottoman society at large.

I have chosen to focus my study on the household founded in the late seventeenth century by Mustafa Kâhya al-Qazdağlı. The Qazdağlı household was not simply one of a number of military groupings that underwent the transformation from regimental to beylical supremacy during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Rather, this household was at the forefront of this transformation and often propelled it. The story of the changes that brought Egypt within a century from an officer-led troika to a Georgian mamluk beylicate is to a large extent the story of the rise and evolution of the Qazdağlı household.

CHAPTER 2

The household

Defining the household

At its inception in the latter half of the seventeenth century, the Qazdağlı household was one of many military households operating in Ottoman Cairo. The military household was arguably the basic unit of Egyptian military society as it developed under Ottoman rule. It is therefore essential to define this phenomenon before proceeding to examine the rise of the Qazdağlıs. The military household was not exclusively a kinship group, although it could and usually did include members of the household founder's family. Primarily, however, it comprised the household head and those who enjoyed his patronage, whether or not these were related to him. A group of households could ally with one another to form a faction. The Faqari and Qasimi factions, which dominated Egypt during the seventeenth and part of the eighteenth centuries, were each a collection of allied households.

The secondary studies of Ottoman Egypt that have been published over the past thirty-five years customarily define these military households as Mamluk households and describe the society to which they belonged as a Mamluk or neo-Mamluk society. This is not to suggest that the military administration of Ottoman Egypt was an unaltered continuation of the Mamluk regime under Ottoman rule. Historians acknowledge the administrative changes outlined in the preceding chapter, as well as the influx of a diverse group of military personnel, both mamluk and non-mamluk, into Egypt. Yet the method of recruiting and training a military entourage, these historians hold, survived from the Mamluk sultanate; slaves and mercenaries alike were recruited into and trained within the households of enterprising grandees, which were inspired by the households of the sultanate. Hence, the Mamluk household is regarded as a fundamental characteristic of Ottoman Egypt's military establishment.

Notwithstanding, the connotations of the term "Mamluk household" have rarely been examined in the secondary literature. While this literature explores the activities of various so-called Mamluk households, it rarely questions the validity of the term itself. The work of P. M. Holt, Michael Winter, and Stanford Shaw refers rather vaguely to Mamluk households as if the term's

implications should be understood. Daniel Crecelius has undertaken to outline the composition of the "Mamluk *bayt*" while André Raymond has pinpointed the locations of the residences of Cairo's leading grandees. Gabriel Piterberg has come closest to placing the household in an Ottoman context by stressing the importance of household membership in Turko-Mongol military societies generally; he contends, however, that the recruitment of slaves lent Egypt's Mamluk households a special cast.[1] David Ayalon has attempted to delineate the practices of the Ottoman-era military household, as he did for the households of the Mamluk sultanate; he has found, in fact, that the usages of the Ottoman-era household differed significantly from those of the medieval Mamluk household.[2] Nonetheless, he insists that the altered household of the Ottoman era remained a Mamluk phenomenon; indeed, his approach to Ottoman Egypt's military society is colored by his conviction that it was Mamluk in all its elements. Generally, then, the assumption of these historians has been that Ottoman Egypt's military households were inherently Mamluk, that even if they no longer consisted entirely of slave recruits, they still drew their inspiration from the households of the Mamluk sultanate.

A reassessment of this terminology and the assumptions that underlie it can, I believe, bring to light an approach to Ottoman Egypt's military society that more faithfully reflects its complexity. Such a reassessment must center on the problematic concept of the reappearance of the Mamluk household in Ottoman Egypt. There were certainly households of the type described above in Ottoman Egypt, but we cannot prove that they took their inspiration directly or exclusively from comparable structures in the Mamluk sultanate. On the other hand, households were a key feature of Ottoman society at large in the years following the reign of Sultan Süleyman I (1520–66). The prototype of the Ottoman elite household was, naturally, the household of the sultan himself, which reached its full development during Süleyman's reign.[3] The imperial household headquartered at Topkapı Palace combined the trappings of the elite domestic household – kitchens, gardens, privy chambers, women's quarters guarded by eunuchs – with the attributes of a military household: training schools for palace pages and guards, and of course the

[1] See, for example, Holt, "Beylicate," 218, 225; Holt, *Egypt and the Fertile Crescent*, pp. 73, 85, 90–2; Michael Winter, "Turks, Arabs, and Mamluks in the Army of Ottoman Egypt," *WZKM* 72 (1980), 99–100; Shaw, *Financial and Administrative Organization*, pp. 37, 63, 194; Crecelius, *Roots of Modern Egypt*, pp. 30–1; André Raymond, "Essai de géographie des quartiers de résidence aristocratique au Caire au XVIIIe siècle," *JESHO* 6 (1963), 58–103; Gabriel Piterberg, "The Formation of an Ottoman Egyptian Elite in the Eighteenth Century," *IJMES* 22 (1990), 280.

[2] David Ayalon, "Studies in al-Jabarti I: Notes on the Transformation of Mamluk Society in Egypt under the Ottomans," part 2, *JESHO* 3 (1960), 290–9. Ayalon's most significant finding is that the "open house" (*bayt maftūḥ*) of the Ottoman era had no parallel in the Mamluk sultanate (p. 297).

[3] Leslie P. Peirce, *The Imperial Harem: Women and Sovereignty in the Ottoman Empire* (New York and Oxford, 1993); Gülru Necipoğlu-Kafadar, *Architecture, Ceremonial, and Power: The Topkapı Palace in the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries* (New York, 1991).

pages and the various detachments of valets and bodyguards themselves. Many of these detachments of household soldiery, such as the Baltacıs (axemen) and Bostancıs (gardeners), themselves played dual domestic and military roles.[4]

While it was unquestionably the preeminent household in Istanbul and in the empire at large, the imperial household faced rivalry, or at least a diffusion of its own power, on both fronts from lesser households. Competition came from the households of viziers and provincial governors, many of whom had begun their own careers in the imperial palace,[5] and from groups of soldiers that coalesced in the barracks of the imperial Janissaries in the capital. The formation of gangs within the Janissary barracks complicated the tradition by which the Janissaries of Istanbul were considered an extension of the sultan's household. Household, and specifically kitchen, terminology defined the Janissaries' ranks and functions: the corps was known as an *ocak* ("hearth"), as was the case in Egypt, while *çorbacı* and *aşçıbaşı* (soup-maker and head cook, respectively) were officer ranks. The Janissaries signaled a rebellion by overturning their soup kettles, indicating that they rejected the sultan's food and thus their place in his household.[6] Particularly after the sixteenth century, when imperial power became dispersed among an ever-widening network of interest groups in the palace and capital, this tension among competing loci of power increased.

The same sort of tension existed in the Ottoman provinces, where the governors' households imitated the sultan's palace on a smaller scale. But any governor's household was itself liable to face competition from the households of local elites. Egypt's local elite consisted primarily of the beys and regimental officers. Localized Ottoman officials, such as longtime administrators or exiled palace eunuchs, could also join this elite. A grandee typically built up an entourage of slaves, domestic servants, wives and concubines, bodyguards, and assorted clients who collected at his place of residence. The governor's entourage coalesced in Cairo's citadel, while the entourages of beys and officers typically gathered in the palatial houses that many of them owned in various neighborhoods of the city. Elite residences tended to concentrate in certain areas of the city. The emirs of the late Mamluk sultanate had preferred to establish their houses in and just south of the original Fatimid city of al-Qahira, and near the pond known as Birkat al-Fil in southwestern Cairo. The Ottoman-era grandees followed suit, though giving increasing preference to Birkat al-Fil, until the late eighteenth century, when the hub of elite residence

[4] İ. H. Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Devletinin Saray Teşkilatı* (Ankara, 1945), especially pp. 432–39, 465–87; Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Devleti Teşkilatından Kapukulu Ocakları*, 2 vols. (Ankara, 1943–4), vol. I, pp. 60, 65, 137–8, 478; vol. II, p. 198; *EI*^{2}, s.v. "Bostandji," by İ. H. Uzunçarşılı; *EI*^{2}, s.v. "Adjami Oghlan," by Harold Bowen.

[5] Metin Kunt, *The Sultan's Servants: The Transformation of Ottoman Provincial Government, 1550–1650* (New York, 1983); Rifaat A. Abou-el-Hajj, "The Ottoman Vezir and Paşa Households, 1683–1703: A Preliminary Report," *JAOS* 94 (1974), 438–47.

[6] Uzunçarşılı, *Kapukulu Ocakları*, vol. I, pp. 167–71, 234–7, 254–9.

shifted northwestward to Birkat al-Azbakiyya.[7] Chronicles of the period typically refer to such a residence-based conglomerate as *bayt*.[8] Such a structure is what most historians have in mind when they speak of the Mamluk household, taking into account that not all the members of a grandee's entourage need be slaves.

Yet groups of clients could also form within the barracks where the Ottoman troops were garrisoned, much as they did in the Janissary barracks in Istanbul. In this process, an officer cultivated clients among the soldiery in the subdivision of the corps that he led. Histories of Ottoman Egypt give ample evidence of such groups, typically led by lower officers who did not have the money or status to build lavish houses outside the barracks. The seventeenth and eighteenth centuries saw the rise of two particularly aggressive Janissary bosses, Küçük Mehmed and Ifranj Ahmed. Both held the rank of *başodabaşı*, or chief commander of a barracks (*oda*), the smallest subdivision of the Janissary corps.[9] The hierarchical structure and routine of barracks life no doubt facilitated their attempts to attract clients among those under their command. Such followings within a regiment are usually called *ṭaraf*, *ṭā'ifa*, or *jamā'a* in the chronicles, although these terms can denote a number of other sorts of social and military groups, as well.[10] They do not easily fit the rubric of the Mamluk household. Yet the chronicles suggest that such gangs were contiguous with residence-based households, for once a regimental officer had attained a high enough rank and income, he would normally leave the barracks and purchase, confiscate, or build a house in one of Cairo's neighborhoods. Here, he would build up a domestic-cum-military household of his own.[11]

In all, then, three types of household coexisted on the local scene: the households of the governor and other Ottoman administrators and former admin-

[7] Raymond, "Essai de géographie"; André Raymond, "Les Quartiers de résidence de l'élite de l'époque mamelouke à l'époque ottomane (XIV–XVIIIe siècles)," paper delivered at the conference "The Mamluks in Egyptian Politics and Society," Bad Homburg, Germany, December 1994.

[8] Ahmad Çelebi and al-Jabarti refer to the large household of 'Osman Çavuş al-Qazdağlı in this manner. See Ahmad Çelebi, *Awḍaḥ*, p. 608; al-Jabarti, *'Ajā'ib*, vol. II, p. 12.

[9] On Küçük Mehmed, see, for example, al-Damurdashi, *Durra*, pp. 14, 26; Ahmad Çelebi, *Awḍaḥ*, pp. 190ff.; al-Jabarti, *'Ajā'ib*, vol. I, pp. 130ff.; P. M. Holt, "The Career of Küchük Muhammad (1676–94)," *BSOAS* 26 (1963), 269–87. On Ifranj Ahmed, see 'Abdülkerim b. 'Abdurrahman, *Tārīḫ-i Mıṣır*, Istanbul, Süleymaniye Library, MS Hekimoğlu Ali Paşa 705, fos. 128r-146v; Ahmad Çelebi, *Awḍaḥ*, pp. 229ff.; al-Jabarti, *'Ajā'ib*, vol. I, pp. 107ff.; André Raymond, "Une 'Revolution' au Caire sous les Mamelouks: La Crise de 1123/1711," *AI* 1 (1966), 95–120.

[10] For example, the entourages of the early Qazdağlı leaders Mustafa Kâhya and Hasan Çavuş are called variously *ṭaraf* and *ṭā'ifa*. See al-Jabarti, *'Ajā'ib*, vol. I, pp. 107, 238; 'Abdülkerim, *Tārīḫ-i Mıṣır*, fo. 135v. Interestingly, similar groupings were noted in the former Soviet army in eastern Germany. See "Bad Blood in Germany: The Soviet Army Can't Leave Soon Enough," *Newsweek*, November 12, 1990, p. 42.

[11] On 'Osman Çavuş al-Qazdağlı's house, see al-Jabarti, *'Ajā'ib*, vol. II, p. 48; Doris Behrens-Abouseif, *Azbakiyya and Its Environs: From Azbak to Ismail, 1476–1879* (Cairo, 1985), pp. 55–62; Raymond, "Essai de géographie," 74.

istrators; the households of local grandees; and groups within the barracks. These were all, however, interconnected: Ottoman functionaries who formed households on the spot became local grandees, as did barracks strongmen who left the barracks and formed sophisticated households. In the latter case, the household could serve as an instrument of social mobility within the military cadre, or at the least as an affirmation of having attained an influential status. In the former case, it served as a meeting ground for imperial and local interests by providing an opportunity for imperial functionaries to exercise local influence and to co-opt local luminaries.

In short, the household was neither a rigidly defined nor a static entity. Many different types and sizes of household existed in a variety of settings. Moreover, households were continuously evolving, expanding through marriages and mergers or breaking up as a result of rivalries among members. Households evolved to serve the needs of a highly competitive society that frequently received new members from far-flung places. For the newly arrived Anatolian soldier or Caucasian mamluk, the household was a means of acculturation, socialization, and education. It afforded a degree of financial security, for the household member could rely on his patron to smooth his path through the ranks of the regiments, or to provide him with a tax farm or entry into a craft or commercial venture. For the household head, the household was an efficient means of exploiting sources of wealth by allotting tax farms and offices to his followers. The wealth, prestige, and military might of a household enabled its members to exert pressure on the Ottoman governor and various other officials, as well as on merchants and artisans with whom they found it profitable to affiliate. In the long run, the household preserved its founder's interests. The most senior or most trusted of the household head's followers typically assumed leadership of the household on the death of his patron, thus ensuring continued household control over critical sources of wealth. While households might compete for offices and control of sources of revenue, they could also form mutually profitable alliances. A relatively small household with limited resources could ally itself with a larger, wealthier household for its own protection. Nor was the household a structure that only the high-ranking elite could exploit. Even lower officers could form followings within their barracks or perhaps within simple homes. These smaller households could amass wealth and enter the ranks of the elite through strategic alliances and exploitation of revenues.

The term *tābi*ᶜ

Thus it appears that the term "Mamluk household" confuses the reality of Ottoman Egypt's military society because it excludes the barracks groups and ignores precedents for and parallels to the Egyptian household in other parts of the Ottoman Empire. Moreover, the chroniclers of and the participants in this society did not, to judge from their own writings, employ this term them-

selves. In the chronicles of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, a mamluk denotes simply a military slave. Furthermore, the word mamluk and the various terms for "household," such as *bayt*, *ṭaraf*, and *ṭā'ifa*, are never combined.

The terminology that these sources do employ seems instead to acknowledge that a household commonly contained non-mamluks in addition to mamluks. The historian ʿAbd al-Rahman al-Jabarti frequently uses the phrase *atbāʿ wa mamālīk* ("followers and mamluks") to refer to a grandee's entourage.[12] Arguing from al-Jabarti's usage, Gabriel Piterberg has asserted that the singular of *atbāʿ*, *tābiʿ*, must designate a non-mamluk; David Ayalon, in contrast, has argued that it is simply a synonym for mamluk.[13] I would argue that the term has no bearing on slave status but denotes a follower who may or may not be a mamluk. This meaning is implicit in the manner in which al-Jabarti uses *tābiʿ*. He describes the lineage of the famous late eighteenth-century grandee Bulut Kapan ʿAli Bey, who rebelled against the Ottoman sultan in 1768, in the following terms: *al-amīr al-kabīr ʿAlī Bak . . . wa huwa mamlūk Ibrāhīm Katkhudā tābiʿ Sulaymān Jāwīsh tābiʿ Muṣṭafa Katkhudā* ("the great emir ʿAli Bey, and he was the mamluk of Ibrahim Kâhya, [who was] the *tābiʿ* of Süleyman Çavuş, [who was] the *tābiʿ* of Mustafa Kâhya").[14] The historical record leaves no doubt that ʿAli Bey was the mamluk of Ibrahim Kâhya al-Qazdağlı; however, the status of Ibrahim Kâhya and his patron Süleyman Kâhya is far less certain. It seems likely, under the circumstances, that al-Jabarti cautiously uses *tābiʿ* when he is unsure of a person's mamluk status.

Use of *tābiʿ* in other Arabic and Turkish narratives of the Ottoman era tends to support this interpretation. The seventeenth-century Turkish traveler Evliya Çelebi refers a number of times to *tevābiʿ ve havadarlar* ("followers and companions"). Meanwhile, a seventeenth-century account of the Ottoman occupation of Yemen from 1538 through 1636 speaks of *atbāʿ wa alzām* ("followers and adherents").[15] Both writers emphasize these followers' membership in a common entourage rather than their mamluk or non-mamluk status.

Notwithstanding, *tābiʿ* was not simply a term of convenience for military figures who may or may not have been mamluks. Rather, the term seems to lie at the heart of the configuration of military society in Ottoman Egypt. Nowhere is this more apparent than in a type of document that was critical to the operations of Egypt's soldiery, namely, the salary registers that the Ottoman administration drew up at the time of military campaigns.[16] In these

[12] See, for example, al-Jabarti, *ʿAjā'ib*, vol. II, p. 90. (The plural is usually *atbāʿ* but occasionally *tawābiʿ*.)

[13] Piterberg, "Formation of an Ottoman Egyptian Elite," 279; Ayalon, "Studies in al-Jabarti," part 2, 278–83.

[14] Quoted by Ayalon, "Studies in al-Jabarti," part 2, 279.

[15] Evliya Çelebi, *Evliya Çelebi Seyahatnamesi*, ed. Ahmed Cevdet, 10 vols. (Istanbul, 1888–1938), vol. VII, p. 722; al-Mawzaʿi, *Dukhūl al-ʿuthmāniyyīn*, p. 71.

[16] I have examined two such registers in detail: Istanbul, Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi, Maliyeden Müdevver 4787 (1086–8) and 7069 (1150). For a more detailed discussion of their contents, see chapter 3, pp. 37–46.

registers, no specific indication of slave or free-born status occurs; the word *mamlūk* is absent, as is the Turkish word *kul* or any other term for a slave. On the other hand, the word *tābiʿ* is applied both to soldiers whose slave status is apparent from the fact that they are given the generic patronymic *ibn ʿAbdullah*, and to those whose fathers are specified. The Ottoman administrators, it appears, identified these soldiers not by their slave status but by the persons whom they followed.

To judge by the frequency with which *tābiʿ* appears in these salary registers, the number of soldiers who belonged to households grew substantially in all seven regiments between the late seventeenth century and the mid-eighteenth century. Of 2,000 soldiers listed in a 1675–7 salary register, 751 are labeled *tābiʿ*; of 3,000 in a 1737–8 register, 1568 are so labeled. In these sixty years, the proportion increased by some 15 percent. Furthermore, the number of household members and the size of households appear to be greatest within the Janissary and ʿAzeban corps.

Clearly, the sort of follower designated by *tābiʿ* is a military client who is engaged in a patron–client relationship, or *intisāb*, with a senior personage. The patrons who appear in the pay lists and in the chronicles comprise a broad range of higher and lower officers, beys, imperial officials, bureaucrats, descendants of the Prophet (*ashrāf*), and others. *Tābiʿ* must have applied to a variety of *intisāb* arrangements. Nonetheless, military clientage of this type appears to have been somewhat more intense than the sort of *intisāb* encountered between a court poet and his imperial patron, for example, or among commercial partners. A client identified with his patron to the extent of adopting his sobriquet (*laqab*) and bearing his grudges into succeeding generations. Thus it is safe to say that while a *tābiʿ* was certainly a client, he was not *merely* a client.

Additional light may be shed on the implications of *tābiʿ* for military clientage by the more customary use of the term in both Turkish and Arabic sources. *Tābiʿ* is typically a geographical term used to identify the parts or dependencies of a certain region. An imperial order of 1733, for example, refers to the village of Bilifya in the Upper Egyptian subprovince of al-Bahnasa as *vilāyet-i Bahnasavīye'ye tābiʿ . . . ḳarye-i Bilifyā*.[17] This would translate literally to "the village of Bilifya following the subprovince of al-Bahnasa." The implication is that Bilifya is a dependency of al-Bahnasa and, as such, belongs to a group of villages included in al-Bahnasa subprovince. We might by analogy take *tābiʿ* in the context of military clientage to mean a soldier who is a dependant of an officer, bey, or official and who belongs to the group of soldiers whom this person patronizes. In other words, the *tābiʿ* is a member of his patron's entourage, or household. In fact, as Rifaat Abou-el-Hajj's work has shown, the word does not belong to mamluk terminology at all but simply denotes any member of any household, whether or not he or she

[17] Istanbul, Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi, *Mühimme-i Mısır*, vol. V, no. 18, dated 1146 (1733).

is a slave.[18] In stressing membership, *tābiʿ* also differs in connotation from the Turkish *çırak*, a term denoting an apprentice or protégé who is promoted by a grandee or official without necessarily belonging to his entourage. Indeed, the reliance of both official documents and local chroniclers on *tābiʿ* as a generic term for members of the entourages of grandees, regardless of slave status, gives the impression that clientage overshadowed slave status in defining a person's position in Egyptian military society by the late seventeenth century.

The household as a key to Ottoman history

The concept of the household, allowing for a wide range of variation, from relatively informal barracks coalitions to highly articulated residence-based conglomerates, provides a more flexible and representative framework within which to place Ottoman Egypt's military society than the conventional notion of a neo-Mamluk military regime. Focusing on the household as a unit of social organization in its own right, rather than as an inherently Mamluk phenomenon, also allows us to accommodate the decidedly disparate elements who participated in household-building: soldiers and beys, Caucasian slaves and free-born Anatolian Muslims, women, merchants and artisans, ulema and *ashrāf*. Emphasizing the household also enables us to include Egypt in the pattern followed by the Ottoman Empire as a whole during the period after Süleyman I's death. A hallmark of the diffusion of imperial power was the efflorescence of households removed from the political center, notably those of provincial governors and of high palace officials. Such households were the prototypes for the households of local notables (*aʿyān*) that came to dominate provincial society during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.[19] Egypt's prospective *aʿyān* consisted in part of military grandees. These grandees had numerous examples of the residence-based elite household before them in the households of the high Ottoman functionaries dispatched to administer the province. Foremost, of course, was the Ottoman governor's household, but a number of other imperial figures established households, as well: for example, the chief judge (*qāḍī ʿaskar*); the head of the descendants of the Prophet (*naqīb al-ashrāf*);[20] and above all, the exiled Chief Black Eunuchs of the imperial harem.[21] The habit of patronage through the household created common ground between imperial officials, both on the spot and in Istanbul, and local grandees. Ambitious local figures sought favor with the imperial center by joining the households of imperial functionaries in Cairo; imperial figures in

[18] Abou-el-Hajj, "Vezir and Paşa Households," 441.

[19] Kunt, *The Sultan's Servants*, especially chapter 5 and conclusion. See also Abou-el-Hajj, "Vezir and Paşa Households," 446, n. 37.

[20] The *naqīb al-ashrāf* was appointed from Istanbul until the eighteenth century, when the Bakri family, a prominent Cairene clan of descendants of the Prophet, came to monopolize the post.

[21] See Jane Hathaway, "The Role of the Kızlar Ağası in Seventeenth–Eighteenth Century Ottoman Egypt," *SI* 75 (1992), 141–58.

turn injected their clients into the households of local grandees. In this respect, the household served as a nexus between center and province.

Correspondingly, the formation of households as bastions of local power was typical of an empire whose central authority was fragmented. When Ottoman officials and troops struck roots in the provinces to which they had been posted, they not infrequently found that their loyalty to their own interests on the spot rivaled their loyalty to the sultan. When these figures amassed entourages, property, and wealth in the provinces – in short, when they formed households – they became, in effect, localized notables. "Localized," as I use it here, is intended to have a very loose meaning. When an Ottoman functionary became localized in Egypt, he did not necessarily begin speaking fluent Arabic and considering Egypt, as opposed to the imperial capital or another province, his homeland. All he need do was establish his base of operations in Egypt. A large and diverse group of people achieved this sort of localization in Egypt, among them Ottoman officials, soldiers and mercenaries who set up shop in Cairo's bazaars, and new mamluk recruits. We have reason to believe that a great number founded or joined households of some description.

Acknowledging that building viable households, rather than striving for mamluk exclusivity, was the chief motive driving Egypt's grandees in turn provides an opportunity to address considerations of household-building that were arguably more fundamental than the acquisition of mamluks. No household could survive without a relatively stable source of revenue, for example. Historians have noted that beys typically drew the bulk of their revenues from rural tax farms while regimental officers relied on urban tax farms, such as that of the customs, until the early eighteenth century, when officers began to encroach on rural tax farms.[22] Yet the household economic strategies that lay behind these choices have not been considered. The Qazdağlı household amassed a portion of its wealth from the trade in coffee from the Yemeni port of Mocha through the Holy Cities to Egypt. Early in the household's development, Qazdağlı leadership and alliances seem to have depended in part on the control of revenues from and the formation of partnerships in this trade. A decline in Yemeni coffee prices toward the middle of the eighteenth century, owing to an influx of less expensive beans from French possessions in the Caribbean, in turn seems to have contributed to the Qazdağlıs' decision to penetrate the beylicate.[23]

Similarly, the household supplies the context for basic features of elite life that have not received close scrutiny, notably elite marriages and elite residences. Marriages that linked two households or that absorbed otherwise rootless clients were a key strategy of any household head, for they not only increased the household's membership but also forged political alliances and gave the household access to new sources of wealth. It was primarily through

[22] See, for example, Shaw, *Financial and Administrative Organization*, pp. 28–36, 102–33; André Raymond, *Artisans et commerçants au Caire au XVIIIe siècle*, 2 vols. (Damascus, 1973–4), vol. II, pp. 612–57, 710–26, 772–5. [23] See chapter 7, pp. 134–7.

marriage, furthermore, that a household head's wives, concubines, sisters, and daughters exercised influence and contributed to the household's fortunes.[24]

Perhaps the most visible feature of a household was the house or other building that served it as a place of assembly and a bastion of political power. High-ranking regimental officers, beys, and Ottoman officials typically established their entourages, including wives and concubines, in palatial residences. Often, the houses of allied grandees clustered in particular elite neighborhoods; by the mid-eighteenth century, for example, the southern shore of Birkat al-Azbakiyya in western Cairo was dominated by the houses of the Qazdağlıs and their allies.[25] By the late eighteenth century, the houses of the leading Qazdağlı grandees had displaced the governor's council, or *divan*, in the citadel as loci of political power.[26] In time of political turmoil, however, the house could serve as a fortress where the household head could face down or hide from his enemies, or stash his wealth should he have to flee.[27]

Far more difficult to define are the smaller, less wealthy households of lower officers or officials that coalesced in the barracks of Cairo's citadel or in relatively small homes. One can speculate that they were somewhat more loosely organized than the great houses, above all since many soldiers had shops and even homes in or near Cairo's bazaars[28] and would therefore not tend to group regularly in a central location unless mustered for a military expedition or to receive their salaries. Most likely the headquarters of a lower officer's household was the barracks room, or *oda*, where the barracks commander acted as boss of his subordinates. By the eighteenth century, barracks commanders, or *odabaşıs*, were among the most numerous household heads among the Janissaries and 'Azeban.[29] Wives and daughters could have been included in these households only very tangentially as their main arenas of activity would have been the houses of their respective husbands or fathers.

The bases of households in common property, commercial partnerships, and marriage alliances have remained virtually unexplored with reference to Ottoman Egypt.[30] Yet such questions were fundamental to household formation. They provide a critical aid to our understanding of household-building strategies and of household self-definition. These considerations broaden the scope of the household beyond large compounds filled with mamluks and can yield a more inclusive, and therefore more faithful, reconstruction of

[24] See chapter 6 and Jane Hathaway, "Marriage Alliances among the Military Households of Ottoman Egypt," *AI* 29 (1995), 133–49.

[25] Raymond, "Essai de géographie," 73ff.; Behrens-Abouseif, *Azbakiyya and Its Environs*, pp. 49ff. [26] See, for example, al-Jabarti, *'Ajā'ib*, vol. IV, pp. 256–7.

[27] Hathaway, "Marriage Alliances," 18ff.

[28] André Raymond, "Soldiers in Trade: The Case of Ottoman Cairo," *British Society for Middle East Studies Bulletin* 18 (1991), 21ff. [29] See chapter 3, pp. 41–2.

[30] For a study of the phenomenon in medieval Europe, see Carol Lansing, *The Florentine Magnates: Lineage and Faction in a Medieval Commune* (Princeton, 1991), especially chapters 2–5. In "Soldiers in Trade," cited above, André Raymond has made an intriguing study of the wealth of low-ranking officers, based on inheritance registers.

Ottoman Egypt's military households. Attention to such issues gives us a key to the barracks conglomerates that, while easily overlooked by mainstream institutional history, were essential to the evolution of Egypt's military society. These lesser households were the building blocks of that society; in such barracks groups the Qazdağlı group, which controlled Egypt for most of the eighteenth century until the French invasion of 1798, had its beginnings.

To give due weight to such varied household-building strategies and thereby to gain some understanding of the link between barracks conglomerates and palatial residences, we must adopt a more inclusive definition of the military household that does not adhere strictly to the model of the Mamluk sultanate but assesses the military entourage as an instrument of cultural assimilation and social mobility. By addressing these functions in a wide range of households, from loose barracks gangs to residential conglomerates, we can transcend the limitations and assumptions of Mamluk terminology and achieve a more nuanced view of the military society that is ordinarily labeled Mamluk. At the same time, we can restore Egypt's military society to its Ottoman context by recasting it as a regional variation on a household-based elite culture that existed throughout the Ottoman Empire and that integrated the imperial center with its provinces.

This is what I hope to accomplish in the present study. The household, taking into account its diverse forms and functions, is the framework I intend to apply to Ottoman Egypt's military society. The following chapters use the process of the evolution and disintegration of households as a lens through which to view changes within that society from the mid-seventeenth century to the mid-eighteenth century, when Egypt's military society shifted from one dominated by regimental officers to one controlled almost exclusively by mamluk beys. This inclusive process is fully realized in the Qazdağlı household, which itself underwent a transition from an officer-led barracks gang to a full-fledged elite household headed by and consisting of manumitted mamluks.

A note on sources

A disconcerting feature of Ottoman Egyptian historiography is its disproportionate reliance on sources from the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Foremost among these is the multi-volume chronicle of ʿAbd al-Rahman al-Jabarti, *ʿAjāʾib al-athār fī al-tarājim wa al-akhbār*, composed early in the nineteenth century. It is perhaps natural that scholars such as Daniel Crecelius and Gabriel Piterberg, whose concern is explaining the circumstances of the late eighteenth century, should rely primarily on sources from that period. Yet even David Ayalon bases his study of "neo-Mamluk" institutions entirely on the chronicle of al-Jabarti, while Michael Winter clinches assertions based on earlier works with examples from al-Jabarti.

Piterberg, in addition, makes use of the highly inaccurate narrative of al-Jabarti's contemporary, the poet Ismail al-Khashshab.[31]

Al-Jabarti's chronicle has the advantages of being clearly and eloquently written and of having been published in several editions. For the events following Ibrahim Kâhya al-Qazdağlı's ascendancy, moreover, al-Jabarti's chronicle is reliable; it is also virtually the only serious indigenous Arabic narrative source available for this period. It is now acknowledged that al-Jabarti borrowed much of his earlier material from Ahmad Çelebi and other chroniclers.[32] What is not so frequently taken into account is that by the time al-Jabarti wrote, the events of the early eighteenth century, to say nothing of even earlier events, had already been mythologized. That is to say, the stories of the great Faqari and Qasimi beys and officers, before the advent of the Qazdağlı hegemony, had become part of vaguely remembered popular lore. Al-Jabarti cuts through the embroidery more successfully than al-Khashshab, whose narrative gives us an inkling of the extent to which the realities of earlier years had been distorted. When al-Khashshab describes the origins of the Qazdağlı household, for instance, it is clear that he is entirely unaware of the household's founder, Mustafa Kâhya; the earliest leaders he recognizes are Süleyman Kâhya and his so-called mamluk Ibrahim Kâhya. He seems, furthermore, to be unfamiliar with the rank hierarchy of the regiments; he never mentions any rank below that of kâhya, despite the fact that most household leaders amassed their power at lower ranks. Generally speaking, al-Khashshab tends to use the term mamluk as a sort of catch-all for Egypt's military grandees and freely applies it to grandees of earlier eras who may not have been mamluks in the literal sense.[33] The net effect is to imbue the late eighteenth-century ascendancy of a beylicate of mamluk origin with a historical resonance that it may not have had and to give the impression that mamluks were more common in seventeenth- and early eighteenth-century Egyptian military society than they may, in fact, have been.

The character of this middle period of Ottoman rule in Egypt is, naturally, reproduced most faithfully in sources composed during that era. The range of

[31] Ismail al-Khashshab, *Tadhkira li-ahl al-baṣā'ir wa al-abṣār ma' wajh al-ikhtiṣār*, Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, MS Arabe 1858.

[32] P. M. Holt, "Ottoman Egypt (1517–1798): An Account of Arabic Historical Sources," in P. M. Holt (ed.), *Political and Social Change in Modern Egypt* (London, 1968); Daniel Crecelius, "Ahmad Shalabi ibn 'Abd al-Ghani and Ahmad Katkhuda 'Azaban al-Damurdashi: Two Sources for al-Jabarti's *'Ajā'ib al-athār fī al-tarājim wa al-akhbār*," in Daniel Crecelius (ed.), *Eighteenth Century Egypt: The Arabic Manuscript Sources* (Claremont, CA, 1990). Al-Jabarti also borrowed extensively from the Damurdashi set of chronicles, discussed below.

[33] Though aware of al-Khashshab's inaccuracies, Gabriel Piterberg accepts his verdict that Ibrahim Kâhya al-Qazdağlı was a mamluk (see Piterberg, "Formation of an Ottoman Egyptian Elite," 281 and n. 32). This impression of Ibrahim Kâhya resonates in the account of the French traveler Volney, who portrays Ibrahim Kâhya (whom he never calls Qazdağlı) as coming out of nowhere and effecting a "revolution" that "returned" the Mamluks to power. Volney seems to imply that Ibrahim was himself a mamluk. See Volney (Constantine-François Chasseboeuf), *Travels through Syria and Egypt in the Years 1783, 1784, and 1785*, trans. from the French, 2 vols. (London, 1805), vol. I, pp. 90, 104–5, 152.

chronicles from that period that are available to the historian of Ottoman Egypt has of late received fresh attention.[34] Generally speaking, these chronicles come from the pens of two different schools of historians. The more pervasive is the bureaucratic school, which produced narratives that are tightly keyed to the calendar and the succession of rulers and that exhibit great concern for the orderly sequence of events.[35] In addition to al-Jabarti's *ʿAjāʾib*, four of the chronicles that I have employed in this study belong to this school. All four were composed early in the eighteenth century and are therefore relatively close to the events with which this study is concerned. Two of the four are in Arabic: an anonymous work entitled *Akhbār al-nuwwāb*... and Ahmad Çelebi's *Awḍaḥ al-ishārāt*. Two more are in Ottoman Turkish: ʿAbdülkerim b. ʿAbdurrahman's *Tārīḫ-i Mıṣır* and Mehmed b. Yusuf al-Hallaq's *Tārīḫ-i Mıṣır-ı Ḳāhire*.[36]

The second category of narrative has been described by al-Jabarti himself as being written by "common soldiers." Its foremost representative is the set of Arabic chronicles known collectively as the Damurdashi group, consisting of three histories composed early in the eighteenth century. All three are connected to the kâhya of the ʿAzeban regiment; hence the "soldier" epithet.[37] The epithet is misleading, however, for these works are themselves sophisticated narratives that display a highly-developed bureaucratic consciousness of their own. It is, however, the bureaucratic consciousness of the regiments, as opposed to that of the chancery or the financial administration. Hence the authors are attuned to military ritual and to the minutiae of military procedure (battles included). I use the latest and most complete of the three chronicles, *Al-durra al-muṣāna fī-akhbār al-kināna*, ostensibly by Ahmad al-Damurdashi.[38]

[34] The authoritative historiographical treatments remain Holt, "Ottoman Egypt"; P. M. Holt, "Al-Jabarti's Introduction to the History of Ottoman Egypt," *BSOAS* 25 (1962), 38–51; Stanford J. Shaw, "Turkish Source-Materials for Egyptian History," in P. M. Holt (ed.), *Political and Social Change in Modern Egypt* (London, 1968). A new collection of historiographical articles has been compiled by Crecelius in *Eighteenth Century Egypt*.

[35] For a full discussion of this genre, see Jane Hathaway, "Sultans, Pashas, *Taqwīms*, and *Mühimmes*: A Reconsideration of Chronicle-Writing in Eighteenth-Century Ottoman Egypt," in Crecelius (ed.), *Eighteenth Century Egypt*.

[36] Anonymous, *Akhbār al-nuwwāb min dawlat Āl ʿUthmān min ḥīn istawla ʿalayhā al-sulṭān Salīm Khān* (to 1126/1714), Istanbul, Topkapı Palace Library, MS Hazine 1623; Ahmad Çelebi b. ʿAbd al-Ghani, *Awḍaḥ al-ishārāt fī man tawalla Miṣr al-Qāhira min al-wuzarāʾ wa al-bāshāt* (to 1150/1737), ed. A. A. ʿAbd al-Rahim (Cairo, 1978); ʿAbdülkerim b. ʿAbdurrahman, *Tārīḫ-i Mıṣır* (to 1128/1716), Istanbul, Süleymaniye Library, MS Hekimoğlu Ali Paşa 705; Mehmed b. Yusuf al-Hallaq, *Tārīḫ-i Mıṣır-ı Ḳāhire* (to 1127/1715), Istanbul University Library, T.Y. 628.

[37] Al-Jabarti is quoted in Holt, "Al-Jabarti's Introduction," 39. The three chronicles in question are Mustafa b. Ibrahim al-Maddah al-Qinali, *Majmūʿ laṭīf yashtamil ʿala waqāʾiʿ Miṣr al-Qāhira* (to 1739); Anonymous, *Kitāb [majmūʿ] al-durra al-munṣāna fī waqāʾiʿ al-kināna* (to 1754–5); and Ahmad al-Damurdashi, *Al-durra al-muṣāna fī akhbār al-kināna* (to 1169/1755–6). For a full description of these chronicles, see Holt, "Ottoman Egypt"; and Holt, "The Career of Küchük Muhammad," 269–87. A version of al-Qinali under the title *Taʾrīkh waqāʾiʿ Miṣr al-Qāhira, Kināna ismuhu taʿala fī arḍihi* exists in Cairo's Dar al-Kutub Manuscripts Division, Microfilm No. 27970.

[38] This is the name of one of the *kâhyas* of the ʿAzeban corps at the time when the chronicle was composed. Whether the *kâhya* himself or one of his affiliates actually wrote the chronicle is unclear. Al-Qinali claims to be the follower (*tābiʿ*) of "the late Hasan Agha ʿAzeban Damurdash."

A useful foil to these local chronicles is the imperial histories composed by official court historians (s. *vak'anüvis*). A number of these are paraphrased in the multivolume history of the Ottoman Empire compiled by the Austrian Orientalist Josef von Hammer-Purgstall.[39] While by no means as specific as the chroniclers on the spot, the court historians can often shed light on local circumstances by putting them in their imperial context. In the process, they can expose legends and tall tales employed by the provincial historians. Much the same purpose is often served by the descriptions of visitors from Istanbul to Egypt, whether in official or unofficial capacities. Such are those sections dealing with Egypt in the travelogue of the well-known seventeenth-century traveler Evliya Çelebi and the history of the eighteenth-century scholar Şemdanizade Fındıklılı Süleyman Efendi.[40] The same broad perspective is provided by the accounts of European travelers to Egypt. Of these, perhaps the most valuable for this period is the description of the British theologian Richard Pococke, who was present in Egypt as Ibrahim Kâhya al-Qazdağlı was achieving paramount power and was, in fact, the guest of Ibrahim's archrival, 'Osman Bey Zülfikar.[41] Pococke's description of Egypt's military cadres is careful and precise, and catches those cadres just before the transformation from regimental to beylical preponderance. In that respect, his work may be used to temper the misconceptions of a late eighteenth-century observer such as the French traveler Volney.

Beyond the narrative sources lies the fathomless realm of archival documents. For this study, I have tried to exploit documents that have a bearing on Egypt's connection with the imperial capital so as to come by a better understanding of Ottoman Egypt's institutions and of the imperial context in which the local events so meticulously detailed in the chronicles took place. The bulk of my archival sources are *mühimme* registers, which record orders from the sultan to the governors and other officials of the Ottoman provinces. These registers are housed in the Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi in Istanbul. Where

[39] Josef von Hammer-Purgstall, *Geschichte des osmanischen Reiches*, 10 vols. (Pest, 1827–35). A French translation in eighteen volumes also exists under the title *Histoire de l'empire ottoman* (Paris, 1835–43). The *vak'anüvis*es whom von Hammer consults for our period are Mehmed Raşid, whose work covers 1660–1721; Küçükçelebizade, a.k.a. Ismail 'Asım (1722–8); Mehmed Subhi (1730–43); Süleyman 'Izzi (1744–51); and Ahmed Vasıf (1752–74). On these historians, see Franz Babinger, *Die Geschichtsschreiber der Osmanen und ihre Werke* (Leipzig, 1927), pp. 268–70, 293–4, 298–9, 287–8, 335–7. Von Hammer is perceptive enough to make use of provincial Turkish chronicles such as that of al-Hallaq (whom he calls *Sohnes Jusufs*) when these offer a fuller account of events.

[40] Evliya Çelebi, *Seyahatnamesi*, vol. X; Şemdanizade Fındıklılı Süleyman Efendi, *Şemdanizade Fındıklılı Süleyman Efendi Ta'rihi*, ed. M. Münir Aktepe, 4 vols in 3 (Istanbul, 1976). One should also, no doubt, mention Mustafa 'Ali, *Mustafa 'Ali's Description of Cairo of 1599*, ed. and trans. Andreas Tietze (Vienna, 1975). Although composed before the period under study, this work sheds much light on Ottoman Egypt's institutions.

[41] Richard Pococke, *A Description of the East and Some Other Countries*, 2 vols. (London, 1743); and an abridgement, with additions, entitled *Travels of Richard Pococke, L.L.D., F.R.S., through Egypt, Interspersed with Marks and Observations by Captain Norden* (Philadelphia, 1803).

Egypt is concerned, the typical order is addressed to the governor or to the governor along with key beylical officials (usually the pilgrimage commander and the treasurer) and military officers. In exceptional cases, an influential grandee is singled out. For the eighteenth century, a collection of registers pertaining solely to Egypt exists under the title *Mühimme-i Mısır*. To investigate events preceding the eighteenth century, however, one has no choice but to peruse the general Mühimme Defterleri.[42] This effort, however, has its own rewards. For example, much information is to be found in these registers about conditions during the late seventeenth century in the region of western Anatolia where the early Qazdağlı leaders originated.

The Chief Black Eunuch, whose influence on Egypt's military households is the subject of chapter 8, opens an entirely new archival front. Most of my material pertaining to this intriguing figure comes from the archives of the Topkapı Palace. These archives contain a vast potpourri of documents relating to the Chief Black Eunuch and other Palace eunuchs: estate inventories, endowment deeds, imperial directives, records of revenues and expenditures, even the occasional copy of an Arabic court transcript from Cairo's religious courts. The archives also yield a number of documents relating to Egypt's grandees.

The Başbakanlık Arşivi offers a more statistical sort of source in the form of financial registers. These fall into a variety of categories: for example, land tenure, salaries, and revenues and expenditures for various foundations. I have exploited two sorts of documents from the Archives' Maliyeden Müdevver collection. The first is a *muqāṭaʿa defteri*, detailing the revenues expected from village tax farms (s. *muqāṭaʿa*) all over Egypt during the early 1720s. As well as being useful from a purely financial standpoint, such a register has great topographical importance since the topographical "narratives" of the late Mamluk era were a lost art in Ottoman Egypt. But this register is of especial interest for this study because it gives the names and titles of the individual tax farmers and thus reveals the extent to which regimental officers had encroached on rural tax farms by the 1720s.

Finally, the Maliyeden Müdevver collection contains extensive military salary registers covering all seven of Egypt's regiments. These registers offer a unique source for the composition of the regiments and, within the regiments, of military entourages. I have examined two of these registers in detail: one falling near the beginning of our period, the other toward the end.

[42] For a discussion of the *mühimme*, see Shaw, "Turkish Source Materials;" Stanford J. Shaw, "The Ottoman Archives as a Source for Egyptian History," *JAOS* 83 (1963), 447–52; Türkiye Cümhüriyeti Başbakanlık Devlet Arşivi Genel Müdürlüğü, *Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi Rehberi* (Ankara, 1992); Atilla Çetin, *Başbakanlık Arşivi Kilavuzu* (Istanbul, 1979); Midhat Sertoğlu, *Muhteva Bakımından Başvekâlet Arşivi* (Ankara, 1955).

CHAPTER 3

Transformations in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Egyptian military society

The final step in setting the stage for the emergence of the Qazdağlı household is an assessment of the general trends in Egypt's military society during the period in which the household came to prominence. We have established that the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries were an era during which regimental officers attained unprecedented influence in Egyptian society. Indeed, the pendulum of household leadership, and therefore of influence, seems to have swung back and forth between beys and officers throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Although the two groups were nominally connected through the possibility of an agha being promoted to bey, as he might have been in the imperial capital, this promotional line was never firmly established except as a means of removing influential officers from their bases of power. In actual fact, a certain tension existed between the two groups, quite apart from questions of factional loyalties. Each group had access to different sources of revenue: the beys to tax farms in the countryside, including the lucrative subprovincial governorships, the officers to urban tax farms such as the customs of the Red Sea and Mediterranean ports. Naturally, then, each group eyed the accumulation of wealth by the other with suspicion.

Shifting household heads: from beys to regimental officers

The Ottoman government's introduction of the Müteferrika regiment to Egypt in the latter half of the sixteenth century appears to have brought the beylicate to a peak of power and influence, as localized Müteferrika officers ascended to the rank of bey and began to recruit their own followers from within their former regiment.[1] In chronicles of Ottoman Egypt composed in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, specific beys begin to appear toward the end of the sixteenth century. These are presumably for the most part localized Müteferrika and Çavuşan who had come to Egypt from the imperial palace. Nonetheless, it seems likely that they, like the former Mamluk emirs

[1] This trend is attested by the 1675–7 salary register, Maliyeden Müdevver 4787. See also table 3.1.

who had been allowed to remain in Egypt, purchased slaves from the Caucasus to add to their households. By the 1630s, Evliya Çelebi reports that there are many Circassians in Egypt.[2]

All Egypt's military grandees competed for the *riʾāsa*, a phenomenon whose precise meaning has been the subject of some speculation. As depicted by P. M. Holt, the *riʾāsa* seems a nebulous form of powerfulness. The leading bey or officer assumed the *riʾāsa*, as indicated in the chronicles by the phrase *intaha ʿalayhi al-riʾāsa* (literally, "the *riʾāsa* ended on him").[3] As the balance of power in Egypt shifted from the beylicate to the regiments and back again, the holders of the *riʾāsa* changed accordingly. Thus, early in the seventeenth century, a group of soldiers held the *riʾāsa* while by the middle of the following century, the Janissary officer Ibrahim Kâhya al-Qazdağlı shared it with the ʿAzeban officer Ridvan Kâhya al-Jalfi.[4] Late in the eighteenth century, the *riʾāsa* would become the prerogative of the leading Qazdağlı bey. Notwithstanding, scrutiny of the chronicles suggests that the *riʾāsa* was no abstraction but a collective "headship" that comprised specific high-ranking offices, with the revenues accruing to them. These offices appear to have been the commands of the seven regiments plus the key beylical posts of pilgrimage commander, *defterdar* (treasurer), and eventually *shaykh al-balad*, or headman of Cairo. The reason that individuals, duos, and trios are variously credited with holding the *riʾāsa* is probably that the chief figures in the *riʾāsa* varied according to the wealth and importance of the offices it comprised. Thus the connotation of *intaha ʿalayhi al-riʾāsa* is perhaps not that the person in question is the sole holder of the *riʾāsa* but that he is the wealthiest and most powerful holder: the *riʾāsa* literally culminates, or ends, in him.

By the end of the sixteenth century, beys appear to be taking an increasingly prominent role in Egypt's administration and, concomitantly, amassing considerable wealth. At roughly the same time, chronicles begin to report soldiery revolts after decades of apparent calm.[5] These revolts were no doubt themselves a partial consequence of the beys' growing influence; as the beys promoted the interests of their own followers in the Müteferrika and Çavuşan regiments, opportunities for less well-connected soldiers dwindled. Most deeply affected were the three cavalry regiments, the Gönüllüyan, Tüfenkciyan, and Çerakise. Although these regiments were often called *sipahi* regiments after the timariot forces of the central provinces, they did not hold cavalry-supporting assignments of usufruct but relied on monthly salaries that were lower than those of any of the other regiments. As tax farming grew more

[2] Evliya Çelebi, *Seyahatnamesi*, vol. VII, p. 723.

[3] See, for example, al-Jabarti, *ʿAjāʾib*, vol. I, p. 234.

[4] Holt, *Egypt and the Fertile Crescent*, pp. 90, 93. Al-Damurdashi at one point (*Durra*, p. 185) distinguishes between the *riʾāsa* of the Janissaries and that of the ʿAzeban. On Ibrahim and Ridvan, see al-Damurdashi, *Durra*, p. 560.

[5] See, for example, Shams al-Din Muhammad b. Abi al-Surur al-Bakri al-Siddiqi, *Al-rawḍa al-zahiyya fī wulāt Miṣr wa al-Qāhira*, Cairo, Dar al-Kutub Manuscripts Division, Microfilm No. 1640, unpaginated, on Üveys Pasha's tenure; Holt, "Beylicate," 216–18.

prevalent, the treasury's ability to disburse salaries on time diminished; the soldiers of the cavalry regiments suffered accordingly. Matters came to a head in 1609, when rebellious troops from the *sipahi* regiments renounced their loyalty to the Ottoman Empire and named their own sultan. The Ottoman governor brutally crushed the rebellion with the cooperation of the beys, who thereby augmented their influence.[6]

In the years following the *sipahi* rebellion, Egypt's beys demonstrated a newfound power summarily to depose any governor who threatened their interests. It is at this point that the two factions, the Faqaris and Qasimis, make their first appearance in provincial chronicles. An ethnic component to this new factionalism has been suggested,[7] and indeed, one explanation for it may be friction between the beys who had come from the imperial palace and those who traced their line of clientage back to the collaborationist Mamluk emirs. Although ethnic divisions were far from clear cut, the former group would have been more likely to contain ethnic Turks and Balkan recruits, the latter group to contain Caucasians.[8] The former group, from all appearances, corresponded to the Faqari faction, the latter to the Qasimi.

Indeed, a certain Circassian ethnic pride manifests itself among elements of the Qasimi faction during the early decades of the seventeenth century. The Qasimi chieftain Ridvan Bey Abu al-Shawarib named two of his sons Özbek and Khushqadam, names evoking the Mamluk sultanate,[9] and was arguably the Ridvan Bey al-Kabir who commissioned a work tracing his descent through the Mamluk sultan Barquq (1382–99) to the Arab clan of Quraysh, from which the Prophet Muhammad came. The purpose of this work seems to have been to demonstrate that the Qasimis were appropriate choices for commander of the pilgrimage by virtue of their devotion to the Holy Cities.[10]

The Ottoman government attempted to control the two factions by dividing the rural governorships and key administrative positions evenly between them, maintaining in theory a Faqari pilgrimage commander and a Qasimi *defterdar*. In actual fact, particular sultans and grand viziers favored one faction or the other according to their own interests; meanwhile, each faction strove mightily to fill both positions. Command of the pilgrimage was partic-

[6] Ibn Abi al-Surur, *Al-rawḍa al-zahiyya*, on the tenure of Mehmed Pasha "Kul Kıran;" Holt, "Beylicate," 218.

[7] Michael Winter, "'Ali Efendi's 'Anatolian Campaign Book': A Defence of the Egyptian Army in the Seventeenth Century," *Turcica* 15 (1983), 267–309.

[8] Metin Kunt has pointed out the ethnic tension between "westerners" from the Balkans and Anatolia, and "easterners" from the Caucasus and Kurdistan. See his "Ethnic–Regional (*Cins*) Solidarity in the Seventeenth-Century Ottoman Establishment," *IJMES* 5 (1974), 233–9.

[9] Carl Petry, *Twilight of Majesty: The Reigns of the Mamluk Sultans al-Ashraf Qaytbay and Qansuh al-Ghawri in Egypt* (Seattle and London, 1993), pp. 19–24, 47, 94–101.

[10] Anonymous, *Nisba sharīfa wa risāla munīfa tashtamal 'ala dhikr nasab al-Jarākisa min Quraysh*, Princeton University Library, Garrett Manuscript Collection, MS 186H. P. M. Holt comes to a different conclusion in "The Exalted Lineage of Ridwan Bey: Some Observations on a Seventeenth-Century Mamluk Genealogy," *BSOAS* 22 (1959), 224–7. Holt examined manuscripts in the John Rylands Library, Manchester, England, and the British Museum.

ularly desirable since it gave access to the trade of the Hijaz and Yemen, and to the India trade, as well, since the Arabian peninsula was a way station between the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean. After two Circassian beys of the Qasimi faction usurped both positions during the 1640s, the court shifted its support to the Faqaris, setting the stage for the rise of the remarkable Faqari chieftain Ridvan Bey. Ridvan held the post of pilgrimage commander for some twenty-five years, despite the efforts of Sultan Murad IV to remove him from office.[11] During these years, he established the Faqari faction as a formidable power. To counter him, the Ottomans appear to have injected Bosnian soldiers from the capital into the Qasimi faction. Turkish chronicles refer to Ahmed Bey Bushnaq ("Bosniak"), his brother Sha'ban, and his nephew Ibrahim Bey Abu Shanab as Yeni Kapılı. This epithet most likely refers to the Yeni Kapı quarter on the Marmara coast of Istanbul, near where the palace of the sultan's mother stood.[12] Ridvan Bey's death in 1656 gave Ahmed Bey Bushnaq the opportunity to consolidate the Qasimis' power. Growing friction between the two factions erupted in a series of bloody battles throughout the Egyptian countryside during 1660 that culminated in a Qasimi massacre of defeated Faqaris. Notwithstanding, the Ottoman court had grown alarmed by the beys' excesses and made haste to do away with the victorious Ahmed Bey Bushnaq.[13]

The decimation of the beys in 1660 and the Ottoman government's attempt to curb the influence of the remainder in the aftermath of the debacle left a vacuum in Egypt's military elite that the regimental officers were prepared to fill. Apart from the beylicate's disarray, a number of developments enabled the officers to move to the forefront of the provincial elite. The influx of troops from the capital and demobilized mercenaries during these years added to the soldiery's numerical strength. A substantial proportion of them, to judge from the salary registers, were joining the households of officers, as well (see table 3.1).

For their part, the officers were expanding their sources of revenue. Their control of Egypt's customs became extraordinarily lucrative during the seventeenth century with the introduction of coffee from Yemen and the resulting traffic in coffee beans across the Red Sea. Many officers formed partnerships with the overseas merchants (*tujjār*) from a number of countries who handled trade in coffee and spices. The burgeoning coffee trade made it desirable for officers to acquire the tax farms of the Egyptian villages that produced the grain that accompanied the pilgrimage caravan to the Hijaz; although the grain was intended for the poor of the Holy Cities, a portion of it was traded

[11] See, for example, al-Hallaq, *Tārīḫ-i Mıṣır-ı Ḳāhire*, fos. 143v–153v; Ahmad Çelebi, *Awḍaḥ*, pp. 147–8. On Ridvan Bey's role in the 1630 restoration of the Ka'ba, see Suraiya Faroqhi, *Pilgrims and Sultans: The Hajj under the Ottomans* (London and New York, 1994), pp. 11, 115–19.

[12] Al-Hallaq, *Tārīḫ-i Mıṣır-ı Ḳāhire*, fos. 156r, 162v, 226r, 226v. *Yeni Kapılı* can also refer to Bab al-Jadid in Cairo's citadel; see al-Hallaq, *Tārīḫ-i Mıṣır-ı Ḳāhire*, fos. 159v, 320v; 'Abdülkerim, *Tārīḫ-i Mıṣır*, fo. 68v. However, none of the Arabic chronicles ever uses Bab al-Jadid as a *nisba*.

[13] Al-Hallaq, *Tārīḫ-i Mıṣır-ı Ḳāhire*, fos. 183v-185r; Ahmad Çelebi, *Awḍaḥ*, pp. 58–9.

in the Hijaz for coffee.[14] Officers already held village tax farms to a limited extent in the opening decades of the seventeenth century. Toward the end of the century, the introduction of the life-tenure tax farm, or *mālikāne*,[15] encouraged increasing numbers of officers to join the ranks of village tax farmers. Villages were relatively secure sources of revenue; village tax farms were the bases of many households' wealth.

Officers also benefited from the fact that the Ottoman court considered them more trustworthy and manageable than the beys. The duties and tenure of an officer were far more clearly defined and circumscribed than those of a bey. In the latter half of the seventeenth century, consequently, officers were assigned an increasing number of privileged duties. Many of these had to do with the supervision of Ottoman pious foundations, or *awqāf* (s. *waqf*). It seems to have been customary for the Ottoman governor of Egypt to name the agha of the Janissary corps supervisor, or *nāẓir*, of the *waqf* of any mosque he might commission in the province.[16] Of far more consequence were the huge imperial *awqāf* established to service the Holy Cities. These four *awqāf*, known as *Awqāf al-Ḥaramayn*,[17] drew revenues from throughout the Ottoman Empire and were overseen by the Chief Black Eunuch of the imperial harem. However, a large number of Egyptian villages were endowed to the *Awqāf* and supplied the grain that was transported to the Holy Cities at the time of the pilgrimage. For that reason, supervisors on the spot, usually called *mütevellis*, were chosen from among Egypt's military elite. Although there seems to have been no stipulation as to the supervisors' ranks, beys dominated the posts until late in the seventeenth century. At that point, however, an imperial order transferred supervision to specific officers of the Janissary and 'Azeban corps. Control of these positions gave the officers every incentive to acquire the tax farms of individual villages endowed to the *Awqāf al-Ḥaramayn*.[18]

The seventeenth century also witnessed a shift in the balance of power among the seven regiments. While the three cavalry corps remained the lowliest of the regiments, the relative wealth and influence of the other four regiments changed. As the military elite grew more localized and direct injections of imperial personnel into the province waned, the Müteferrika corps, once the cream of the regiments and the channel of sultanic influence, dwindled in numbers and importance. By the end of the seventeenth century, its once-exclusive ranks were open to the clients of officers from other regiments (see table 3.1). Many of the privileged positions it had controlled, such as the *horde*, the right to tax public spectacles such as celebratory processions,[19] had been

[14] On this point, see Pococke, *A Description of the East*, vol. I, p. 204; and Michel Tuchscherer, "Le Pèlerinage de l'émir Sulaymân Ġâwiš al-Qazduglî, sirdâr de la caravane de la Mekke en 1739," *AI* 24 (1988), 175.

[15] Shaw, *Financial and Administrative Organization*, pp. 30, 39; see also *EI*², s.v. "Mālikāne," by Irène Beldiceanu-Steinherr.

[16] See chapter 8, n. 40.

[17] Uzunçarsılı, *Osmanlı Devletinin Saray Teşkilatı*, pp. 173ff.

[18] See chapter 8, pp. 148–50.

[19] See Shaw, *Financial and Administrative Organization*, pp. 121, 194.

usurped by the Janissary and ʿAzeban corps, which now emerged as Egypt's premier corps. Always the largest regiment, the Janissaries now took the Müteferrika's place as the wealthiest and most influential regiment. The corps benefited from the fact that it was not attached to the governor's council, or *divan*, as the Müteferrika and Çavuşan were, but had a separate power base in its barracks in Cairo's citadel. The Janissaries also enjoyed a network of influence throughout the commercial sections of Cairo, where they took many artisans and merchants under their "protection." Their connections with the populace complemented their role in policing Cairo and maintaining public order. In the marketplaces, the Janissary agha by the eighteenth century had assumed most of the functions of the market regulator, or *muḥtasib*, such as overseeing weights and measures, public morals, and the conduct of religious minorities.[20] The practice of sending Janissary contingents to guard the pilgrimage caravan, as well as heavy Janissary participation in foreign campaigns, gave the corps commercial connections outside Egypt that no other regiment enjoyed. Egypt's customs and the coffee trade were controlled almost entirely by Janissaries.

The only regiment that could in any sense challenge the influence of the Janissaries by the end of the seventeenth century was the ʿAzeban corps, which by that time had displaced the Müteferrika as Egypt's second-largest regiment. Like the Janissaries, the ʿAzabs enjoyed a power base in the citadel, separate from the governor's *divan*. They also controlled the supervision of one major imperial *waqf* and numerous village tax farms, as well as privileged sources of revenue, in particular the *horde*. At the beginning of the eighteenth century, a prolonged and bitter power struggle erupted between the Janissaries and the ʿAzeban, from which the Janissaries emerged more formidable than ever.

Household formation within the regiments

Household formation appears to have been a natural concomitant of the growing size and activity of the regiments. A comparison of two salary registers from the latter part of the seventeenth century and the early part of the eighteenth century shows growing numbers of soldiers to have been clients of officers and other prominent figures, while lower-ranking officers were increasingly amassing entourages of their own. Before we uncover the evidence that these pay lists offer, however, a word concerning the structure and hierarchy of the regiments is in order.

Each of Egypt's seven regiments had a distinctive character and performed a distinct role in provincial administration. Two regiments, the Müteferrika and Çavuşan, were combined cavalry and infantry regiments attached to the Ottoman governor's council, or *divan*. The Müteferrika were initially the more

[20] Raymond, *Artisans et commerçants*, vol. II, pp. 606–10.

prestigious regiment. They consisted originally of the governor's personal mamluks; vacancies in their ranks were to be filled directly from the imperial palace. They were also quite a large regiment, second in size only to the Janissaries. The Çavuşan were a much smaller and more modest corps, originally formed from defeated Mamluks who declared loyalty to the Ottoman sultan; vacancies in this corps were open to members of the three cavalry regiments. These cavalry regiments, Gönüllüyan (Volunteers), Tüfenkciyan (Riflemen), and Çerakise (Circassians), were the smallest and most poorly paid of the seven regiments. They were assigned such disagreeable chores as delivering messages, collecting subprovincial taxes, and keeping order in the countryside. Their ranks contained a mixture of volunteers and clients of officers of other regiments; the Çerakise corps, however, appears to have been distinguished by a high percentage of sons of beys and officers in its ranks.[21]

The two infantry regiments, Janissaries (Mustahfizan) and ʿAzeban, were associated with Cairo's citadel; their respective barracks and rallying points were located at the Janissary Gate and the ʿAzab Gate, each well removed from the section of the citadel where the governor held his *divan*. The Janissaries were by far the largest of Egypt's regiments, numbering several thousand by the end of the eighteenth century. Their numbers were periodically augmented by new contingents, numbering anywhere from a few hundred to two thousand, dispatched from Istanbul. Egypt's Janissaries performed a complex array of services: they were responsible for maintaining order in Cairo and guarding the city's marketplaces and ports. In addition, they ensured the security of the pilgrimage caravan en route to and from the Holy Cities. They were also on call for military expeditions within Egypt and comprised the bulk of the governor's contribution to imperial campaigns. The ʿAzeban served principally as frontier fortress guards, as they did in the Ottoman Empire at large. ʿAzab garrisons could be found at Alexandria, Damietta (Dumyāṭ), Rosetta (al-Rashīd), Khan Yunus, el-Arish, Lake Burullus, Bani Suways, and other strategic sites, as well as outside the gates of Fatimid Cairo.[22]

A regiment was termed *ocak* (literally, "hearth") or occasionally *bölük*. Each *ocak*, with the possible exception of the Müteferrika and Çavuşan,[23] comprised several divisions, which were rather confusingly called *bölük*s, as well; each *bölük* in turn comprised several barracks companies, or *oda*s. The highest officer and nominal commander of the *ocak* was the agha. Real power, however, often rested with his lieutenant, or *kâhya* (*kethüda*). The lowest *ocak-*

[21] Thus, in the 1737–8 salary register (Maliyeden Müdevver 7069), a substantial number of soldiers are listed in this fashion: "Mehmed/Ahmed Bey/veledi." On the nature and duties of the regiments, see "Mısır Kanunnâmesi," in Barkan, *Osmanlı imparatorluğunda*; Shaw, *Financial and Administrative Organization*, pp. 189ff.

[22] For a complete list, see Shaw, *Financial and Administrative Organization*, p. 211. Thus, soldiers cited in the salary registers as *der Iskanderiye*, *der Burullus*, etc., may well be members, current or former, of ʿAzeban garrisons at these locales.

[23] In the salary registers, the members of these regiments are listed alphabetically by first name; no regimental subdivisions are evident.

wide rank in most corps seems to have been that of *çavuş*. These *ocak* commanders formed the upper echelon of officers (*iḫtiyariye*), those who wore the wide-sleeved, open-fronted gown known in both Turkish and Arabic sources as the *dolama* and modified in western sources to "dolman."[24] Each *bölük* was headed by a *bölükbaşı*, or *ser bölük*, each *oda* by an *odabaşı*, or *ser oda*. Troops of the rank of *odabaşı* and below wore not the *dolama* but a form of loose trousers known by the Persian word *shalvar*, corrupted in Arabic to *shirwāl*.[25] *Çorbacı* (literally, "soupmaker") was a nebulous rank that among the imperial Janissaries was a divisional (*orta*) officer superior to the *odabaşı*. In Egypt, the *çorbacı* was relatively more important in the ʿAzeban corps, the *odabaşı* and *çavuş* in the Janissary corps.

When the regiments were summoned to participate in imperial campaigns, the scribes of the Ottoman administration drew up a master roll containing the names and salaries of all members of all seven regiments joining the expedition. This type of roll is known in Ottoman Turkish as *mevācib defteri* (register of salaries) or *esāmi defteri* (register of names) and consists of lists of soldiers from all seven of the Egyptian regiments, with their salaries. An entry in such a register might contain nothing more than the soldier's name and salary; however, several more pieces of information were not infrequently added: the name of the soldier's father and/or his patron, his place of origin, perhaps even his craft.

These pay lists are by no means a precise and reliable statistical source. The amount of information they provide for each soldier is inconsistent. The soldiers whose names appear in the list are, furthermore, only the official combatant force, which typically comprised roughly a tenth to a quarter of the total population of each *ocak*.[26] This does not mean, however, that these were the men who actually went into battle; the practice of sending proxies on campaign was widespread.[27] The entries can be regarded only as men who were inscribed on the regimental payrolls. Even so, the scribes who compiled the registers often copied from earlier lists, adding new information as obtained from the corps commanders. A number of entries are figures well known from other sources who could not possibly have been alive or active when the lists were prepared.

Problems of interpretation grow even more complex where statistical matters are concerned. Geographical origins, for example, are not given for the majority of soldiers. If we discover a small concentration of Anatolians, should we regard it as indicative of a broader trend? I would hazard the guess that we should, but one can never be certain. By the same token, one cannot

[24] According to Michel Tuchscherer, the *dolama* (which he renders "dolma") was worn over a kaftan. See "Pèlerinage," 184. (He is, admittedly, speaking of a garment intended for bedouin chiefs.)

[25] See al-Damurdashi, *Durra*, p. 16.

[26] This is going by the *ocak* statistics supplied by Crecelius in *Roots of Modern Egypt*, p. 21. The higher proportions are to be found among the Janissaries and ʿAzeban.

[27] This practice is explained in Shaw, *Financial and Administrative Organization*, pp. 209–10.

Table 3.1 *Household formation within the regiments, according to Maliyeden Müdevver 4787 (1675–7) and 7069 (1737–8)*

Regiment	Müteferrika		Çavuşan		Gönüllüyan		Tüfenkciyan	
Date of register	1675–7	1737–8	1675–7	1737–8	1675–7	1737–8	1675–7	1737–8
Total number of soldiers in register	359	216	129	216	129	213	109	186
Number in households (labeled *tābi'*)	188	110	58	104	43	95	41	94
Ranks of household heads/total number of clients per rank								
beys	22/30	4/6	4/5	1/2	1/2	2/4	2/2	2/3
*kāshif*s	1/3	0/0	0/0	2/5	2/2	0/0	3/3	0/0
aghas	41/87	23/76	10/12	13/36	10/13	7/9	8/9	10/13
*kâhya*s	7/8	1/1	4/5	2/2	1/1	2/2	2/2	0/0
*çavuş*es	10/12	1/2	17/24	12/28	4/4	2/2	0/0	2/2
*çorbacı*s	1/1	0/0	0/0	1/1	0/0	2/2	0/0	7/9
*bölükbaşı*s	0/0	0/0	1/1	0/0	10/15	13/33	16/21	12/27
*odabaşı*s	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0
imperial officials	13/21	1/1	3/5	1/1	0/0	2/2	3/3	0/0
ulema, bureaucrats, *ashrāf*	11/13	3/7	2/3	3/5	1/1	5/9	0/0	5/11
other	26/36	12/18	7/7	22/25	5/5	20/34	3/3	17/25
mamluks	218	62	68	73	62	88	63	80
non-mamluks	125	112	52	96	60	87	46	89
Anatolians	4	3	0	9	0	3	0	11
Affiliated with other regiments								
household heads	27	8	18	1	0	2	3	1
clients	57	5	17	2	18	2	11	1

be entirely sure that trends drawn from these nominal combatant forces apply to the regiments at large. In short, the salary registers yield an impression of general trends among the soldiery rather than conclusive statistics.

The first of the two registers in question is a *mevācib defteri* dated 1086–8/1675–7 and listing 2,000 soldiers for a campaign that is unspecified in the register but that coincides with the 1678 Ottoman expedition against the Polish fortress of Kameniecz. The second register is an *esāmi defteri* dated 1150/1737–8 and listing 3,000 soldiers for a campaign against Austria, presumably the campaign that resulted in the Ottoman recapture of Belgrade.[28] A comparison of the two shows an increasing number of soldiers, both mamluks and free-born Muslims, participating in households, to judge from the numbers designated *tābi'*. By 1737, household membership appears to be

[28] Istanbul, Prime Ministry Archives, Maliyeden Müdevver 4787 (1086–8) and 7069 (1150). I am grateful to Professor Colin Heywood for identifying the earlier campaign.

Table 3.1 *Household formation within the regiments, according to Maliyeden Müdevver 4787 (1675–7) and 7069 (1737–8)*

Regiment	Çerakise		Janissaries		'Azeban	
Date of register	1675–7	1737–8	1675–7	1737–8	1675–7	1737–8
Total number of soldiers in register	88	168	847	1263	259	847
Number in households (labeled *tābi'*)	43	73	302	736	76	356
Ranks of household heads/total number of clients per rank						
beys	2/2	3/4	15/31	11/13	5/9	11/13
*kāshif*s	4/4	0/0	4/5	0/0	0/0	1/2
aghas	5/6	7/10	22/54	10/22	14/17	8/25
*kâhya*s	3/3	2/2	12/31	26/136	6/6	21/68
*çavuş*es	5/6	3/3	14/35	49/198	8/9	24/60
*çorbacı*s	0/0	1/1	0/0	6/6	0/0	19/31
*bölükbaşı*s	14/17	20/29	23/70	23/47	5/8	5/7
*odabaşı*s	0/0	0/0	0/0	24/126	5/5	32/66
imperial officials	1/1	0/0	3/7	3/3	3/3	0/0
ulema, bureaucrats, *ashrāf*	1/1	1/2	8/12	17/30	6/6	20/45
other	4/4	13/20	34/60	72/145	12/16	35/36
mamluks	59	87	443	467	113	210
non-mamluks	33	65	370	541	134	386
Anatolians	0	1	36	67	12	59
Affiliated with other regiments						
household heads	4	6	9	33	3	33
clients	9	1	7	50	7	29

most common within the Janissary corps. The change in the heads of households is instructive. Fewer soldiers are clients of imperial officials, such as members of the royal family, grand viziers, and Chief Black Eunuchs. This tendency is to be expected, given the decentralization of provincial administration in the empire generally and the growing localization of Egypt's military elite. Significant changes are also noticeable in the ranks of those officers who head households, particularly within the infantry regiments. In the seventeenth century, aghas are well represented among household heads in all regiments, and *bölükbaşı*s in all but the two *divan* regiments. The 1737–8 register, however, reflects a transformation in household configuration within the two infantry *ocak*s. Household leadership is now dominated by *kâhya*s, *çavuş*es, and *odabaşı*s, as well as *çorbacı*s among the 'Azeban. These figures confirm the impression that narrative sources give of the growing influence of these officers during the years between the two pay registers. The early Qazdağlı leaders

of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries were Janissary *kâhya*s and *çavuş*es; this same period saw the rise of two assertive Janissary *odabaşı*s, Küçük Mehmed and Ifranj Ahmed. In the ʿAzeban corps, meanwhile, the *çorbacı* Ibrahim al-Sabunci founded a household that dominated that regiment for most of the 1710s and 1720s.[29]

But these findings could also suggest that households headed by lower officers were a natural consequence of the growth of the Janissary and ʿAzeban corps. In an enormous regiment of several thousand, the most manageable unit of organization was the smallest one, namely, the barracks, or *oda*. An *odabaşı* or a *çorbacı* would find a ready pool of followers among the men under his command. This barracks following could serve as the core of the more grandiose household he would amass as he rose through the ranks to *çavuş*, then *kâhya*, and moved his entourage into a proper residence of his own.

Evidence from the three cavalry regiments – Gönüllüyan, Tüfenkciyan, and Çerakise – strengthens the impression that households formed within the regiments. While household participation among these regiments is relatively low in the 1670s, it has increased to some 50 percent by 1737. In these smaller regiments, subdivisions as small as the *oda* do not appear to have existed; most household heads in both pay registers are aghas or *bölükbaşı*s. At the same time, however, virtually none of the members of these regiments has a patron or client outside his regiment, such as an officer of another corps or an imperial official. Instead, the cavalry regiments seem to be turning in on themselves during the eighteenth century. In the case of the cavalry regiments, and to some extent that of the infantry regiments, as well, household formation could represent not just opportunism on the part of ambitious officers but a response to the vagaries of decentralization, above all the uncertainty of regular salary disbursements. While officers saw households as opportunities for fiscal aggrandizement, soldiers turned to their officers for sustenance.

Beys are conspicuously underrepresented among the household heads in all regiments with the exception of the 1675–7 Müteferrika corps. This exception is not surprising, given that former Müteferrika officers dominated the beylicate in the decades following the regiment's introduction and presumably groomed their successors within the regiment's ranks. The overall scarcity of beylical household heads in the pay lists could indicate either that the beys kept their followers off the lists of combatants or that they drew their followers from outside the regiments, most likely by purchasing mamluks. At the same time, the lack of beylical clients reflects a fundamental gap between the beylicate and the regiments. In the chronicles, a mamluk or other client is typically promoted to the beylicate from the rank of agha, or commander of a regiment. We might infer that mamluks of beys received the ranks and salaries of aghas while they completed their training for the beylicate, and that beys did not cultivate large numbers of clients among the regimental rank and file. By

[29] Al-Damurdashi, *Durra*, pp. 145, 185, 189–91, 199, 212–13, 232.

Table 3.2. *Anatolian and Aegean places of origin among the Janissaries listed in Maliyeden Müdevver 4787 (1675–7) and 7069 (1737–8)*

Town, region, or affiliation	Number of soldiers so labeled	
	1675–7	1737–8
Aksaray	1	1
Alaca Hisar	1	0
Alanya	1	2
Antalya	1	1
Arabkir	0	1
ʿAyntab (Gaziantep)	0	4
Chios	1	1
Çorum	0	1
Derbend	0	1
Diyarbakır	3	6
Edirne	3	6
Ereğli	0	3
Erzurum	4	8
Gelibolu	0	1
Harput	0	1
Isparta	1	1
Istanbul	1	5
Izmid	0	1
Izmir	0	1
Kara Hisar	1	1
Karaman	0	1
Kastamonu	0	1
Kayseri	6	2
Kazdağı	2	1
Kuşadası	0	1
Laz	0	1
Malatya	0	6
Maraş (Kahramanmaraş)	0	1
Mersin	1	0
Midilli (Lesbos)	2	1
Niğde	0	1
ʿOsmancık	1	0
Pazarcık	0	1
Rumi (western Anatolia/eastern Balkans)	1	0
Teke	1	1
Tokat	1	1
Türkmen	1	0
Üsküdar	1	0

the same token, the beylicate was ordinarily inaccessible to officers below the rank of agha, whose line of promotion typically ended in the rank of *kâhya*. These lower officers, in contrast, drew heavily on the rank and file of the regiments in building their households. Until the 1720s, then, the sub-agha officers appear to have faced a traditional, if not an institutional, block to their entry into the beylicate.

This gap between the aghas and the other ranks of the regiments to which

Table 3.3. *Non-Anatolian places of origin among the Janissaries listed in Maliyeden Müdevver 4787 (1675–7) and 7069 (1737–8)*

Town, region, or affiliation	Number of soldiers so labeled	
	1675–7	1737–8
Abkhazia	1	4
Akkerman	0	1
Albania	3	3
Algeria[30]	1	1
Armenia	3	0
Aydos	0	1
Baghdad[31]	9	1
Belgrade	2	0
Bosnia	9	7
Circassia	5	8
Cyprus (?)	0	1
Damascus	1	0
Frank	1	0
Georgia	9	17
Hijaz	0	1
Hungary	1	0
Iskodra (?)	0	1
Jewish (?)	0	1
Kurd	0	6
Mosul	1	0
Nablus (?)	0	1
Sidon	0	1
Silistre (?)	0	1
Tarabulus (?) (Tripoli)	0	1
Temeşvar	0	2
Üsküp (Skopje, Macedonia)	4	0
unidentified	0	3

they ostensibly belonged may have contributed to the efflorescence of *kâhya*s by the late seventeenth century. By this time, *kâhya*s had come to dominate the Janissary, ʿAzeban, and Çavuşan corps. The leader of the Qazdağlı household for the first several decades of its existence was a *çavuş* or *kâhya* of the Janissary corps. Although the Janissary agha remained critical to the maintenance of public order, his political authority was subordinate to that of *çavuş* and *kâhya*. During the second half of the eighteenth century, the post of Janissary agha, as well as that of *wālī*, or chief of police, was the preserve of clients of Qazdağlı grandees.

As to the ethnic composition of the clients in these pay registers, the most striking development is an influx of both free-born Anatolians and Caucasian mamluks, above all Georgians. More generally, a shift from western to eastern

[30] Soldiers from Algeria could well be Anatolian since most of Algeria's garrison was recruited from Anatolia. [31] Soldiers from Baghdad could well be Georgian mamluks.



Map 2 The Caucasus and the Black Sea region

populations becomes noticeable as soldiers from eastern Anatolia and the Caucasus displace those from western Anatolia and the Balkans. This trend, no doubt, has much to do with the changing military priorities of the Ottoman Empire in the early eighteenth century. Following the Ottoman defeat at Vienna and the concomitant loss of much of Hungary, Ottoman engagements against the Hapsburg Empire grew less numerous. The empire's attention now shifted to the rival Safavid empire in Iran and to the ever-more-threatening Russian empire. Hence campaign routes ran through eastern Anatolia and adjacent regions, and therefore recruits and captives of war tended to be of eastern origin.

Much of the Caucasian contingent, however, consisted of Georgian mamluks purchased by Egypt's military grandees. Their presence almost certainly results from the changing status of the Christian kingdom of Georgia in the eighteenth century. The eastern portion of the Georgian kingdom was under the suzerainty of Safavid Iran, which during the seventeenth century employed Georgian mamluks on a large scale. After the disintegration of the Safavid empire in 1722, Ottoman officials and provincial grandees seized the opportunity to purchase unprecedented quantities of Georgian mamluks.[32]

The late eighteenth-century beylicate

The prominence of regimental, and specifically Janissary, officers continued until the mid-eighteenth century, by which time a series of economic changes had weakened the officers' position. The introduction of the hereditary tax farm, or *mālikāne*, in the late seventeenth century had made rural tax farms an ever more secure source of revenue; consequently, Janissary officers intensified their efforts to obtain them. Furthermore, rural tax farms had become an attractive alternative to investment in the increasingly precarious commerce in Yemeni coffee. Early in the eighteenth century, coffee from France's Caribbean possessions entered the Mediterranean and began to undercut the Yemeni product. Although of lower quality than Mocha coffee, the Caribbean coffee was less expensive. Caribbean and Yemeni blends soon became the beverage of choice among Egyptians of middling means. As a result, Yemeni coffee prices plummeted,[33] and Janissary officers who had made their fortunes in the coffee trade turned increasingly to rural tax farms. In this arena, however, they were at a permanent disadvantage to the beys, for only those with the rank of bey could hold the most lucrative tax farms, the subprovincial governorships. Even officers who held village tax farms found their interests subordinated to those of the beys who administered the subprovinces within which their villages lay.[34] By the middle of the eighteenth century, the beylicate had regained its dominance over the regimental officer echelon.

From this point until Napoleon Bonaparte's troops occupied the province

[32] See chapter 5, pp. 101–2. [33] Raymond, *Artisans et commerçants*, vol. I, pp. 156ff.
[34] Pococke, *A Description of the East*, vol. I, p. 164.

in 1798, Egypt's military society was dominated by beys of Caucasian, and above all Georgian, mamluk origin who belonged to the greater Qazdağlı household. These beys had, in addition, attained a good measure of *de facto* autonomy from the Ottoman central government. Ottoman governors no longer exercised any real authority over the province but were summarily banished to the countryside, where they waited out their terms. The well-known Bulut Kapan ʿAli Bey brought this Qazdağlı beylical hegemony to its peak by killing or exiling all his rivals from competing households. In 1768, he went so far as to assert his independence from the Ottoman sultan, minting coins and having the Friday public sermon (*khutba*) read in his name. Scholars often regard the regimes of ʿAli Bey and his successors as a revival of the usages of the Mamluk sultanate, for during these years, Egypt's leading bey and his mamluks controlled the province, monopolizing key appointments and the revenues accruing to them. ʿAli Bey, in short, introduced a neo-Mamluk beylicate.[35]

This scheme of a late eighteenth-century neo-Mamluk beylicate is consistent with the manner in which historians have viewed the relationship between Egypt's regiments and the eighteenth-century beylicate. Because the regiments were introduced by the Ottomans, they are perceived as the natural domain of traditional Ottoman recruits: Anatolian and Balkan mercenaries and, initially, products of the *devşirme*, the traditional Ottoman practice of gathering boys from conquered Balkan territory. The beylicate, in contrast, is regarded as the successor to the emirate of the Mamluk sultanate. P. M. Holt seems to have originated this view. In a seminal article, Holt asserts that the post of *sancak beyi* in Ottoman Egypt was in fact a continuation of the Mamluk office of *amīr miʾa*, which denoted an officer who held an *iqṭāʿ* that supported one hundred (*miʾa* in Arabic) horsemen. While acknowledging the changes wrought by the transformation of the land tenure system and the absorption of new elements into Egypt's military echelons, Holt bases his contention on parallel Mamluk- and Ottoman-era offices and institutions. Thus he draws analogies between the Müteferrika regiment and the Khassakiyya, who served as bodyguards to the Ottoman governor and the Mamluk sultan, respectively; the Ottoman and Mamluk pilgrimage commanders (*amīr al-ḥājj*); the Ottoman *defterdar* (treasurer) and the Mamluk *khazindār kabīr*; the Ottoman *qāʾim maqām*, who stood in for a deposed governor, and the Mamluk *nāʾib al-ghayba*.[36]

Against these analogies, one might point out that all these Ottoman-era titles and offices, except for that of *amīr al-ḥājj*, existed in Istanbul and might well have derived from contemporary imperial usages rather than from those of the defunct Mamluk sultanate. Nonetheless, these Ottoman usages were no doubt readily adapted to Egypt because of preexisting Mamluk parallels. Such

[35] See, for example, Crecelius, *Roots of Modern Egypt*, pp. 28ff.; Kenneth M. Cuno, *The Pasha's Peasants: Land, Society, and Economy in Lower Egypt, 1740–1858* (Cambridge, 1992), pp. 27ff.

[36] Holt, "Beylicate," 223.

considerations lead to the broader point of a general similarity among the military and administrative institutions of late medieval and early modern Turco-Iranian Muslim empires, including those of the Mamluks, Ottomans, Seljuks, Safavids, and Mughals. This general similarity could provide a more subtle and convincing explanation for the parallels in Mamluk and Ottoman administration in Egypt than the notion of indiscriminate Ottoman borrowing from the Mamluk sultanate.

Holt's belief that the Ottoman-era beylicate represented a sustained, or at least revived, Mamluk institution is shared in large part by his scholarly contemporaries and successors. Even Stanford Shaw, who is concerned primarily with fiscal matters, continually mentions a "Mamluk hierarchy" that he eventually describes as a "parallel institution" to the Ottoman administration.[37] Daniel Crecelius refers to the "revived mamluk beylicate of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries," which he describes as an autonomous system.[38] Kenneth Cuno regards Bulut Kapan ʿAli Bey as the founder of a "neo-Mamluk" society and therefore the precursor to the autocratic Muhammad ʿAli Pasha, who ruled Egypt in the early nineteenth century.[39]

In other recent studies, ethnicity and slave status figure more prominently in the definition of "Mamluk." Hence Michael Winter suggests a frequent, although not absolute, correlation among slave status, Caucasian ethnicity, and the rank of bey.[40] Gabriel Piterberg concedes that non-slave elements, primarily Anatolians, entered the beylicate until well into the seventeenth century but posits what he terms a "closed elite" of mamluk beys by the late eighteenth century.[41] The thrust of both authors' arguments is a gap between free-born recruits from the Ottoman Empire's central lands and Caucasian mamluks. This gap parallels the gap between the beylicate and the regiments inasmuch as mamluks came to dominate the beylicate and the highest officer ranks, while free-born Muslims were relegated to the rank and file of the regiments or served as auxiliary troops. Winter asserts that this division existed as early as the early seventeenth century, citing the distinction that the grandees and the Ottoman authorities drew between *Rūm oğlanı*, or free-born recruits from the Ottoman central lands, and *Mısırlıs* ("Egyptians"), whom he takes to connote the elite of beys and officers whose ranks, as time went on, included more and more mamluks.[42] Winter's interpretation is not entirely accurate, to judge from the use of *Mısırlı* and related terms by the Ottoman authorities in imperial orders. Until the eighteenth century, the sultan appears to have used *Mısır kullarım* ("my Egyptian servants") to refer to Egypt's military establishment in its entirety, making no distinction between mamluks and free-born Muslims, officers and enlisted men. By the same token, *Mısır ʿaskerleri*

[37] Shaw, *Financial and Administrative Organization*, pp. 33, 37, 186.
[38] Crecelius, *Roots of Modern Egypt*, pp. 22–3.
[39] Cuno, *The Pasha's Peasants*, pp. 27ff.
[40] Winter, "Turks, Arabs, and Mamluks," 106.
[41] Piterberg, "Formation of an Ottoman Egyptian Elite," 281–2.
[42] Winter, "'Ali Efendi's 'Anatolian Campaign Book'," 272ff.

("Egypt's soldiers") seems to have connoted the entire provincial fighting force, regardless of rank and status. Both terms subsumed mamluks and *Rūm oğlanı*. The most prominent grandees, such as the pilgrimage commander and *defterdar*, were addressed separately. In the latter half of the eighteenth century, imperial orders begin to use the Arabic term *Miṣriyyūn* ("Egyptians") to refer to the military elite, acknowledging the growing autonomy of the province's military contingent.[43]

In general, most historians posit a steady weakening of the regiments at the hands of the beylicate that manifests itself in a tightening barrier between slaves and free-born Muslims.[44] They do not suggest that Ottoman Egypt retained or recaptured in unadulterated form the slave ethos of the later Mamluk sultanate, whereby manumitted Circassian slaves were preferred for all high-ranking positions while non-Circassians and non-mamluks, including the sons of the emirs, were often excluded from military society.[45] Ottoman Egypt's highly complex military contingent included mamluks and non-mamluks of a variety of ethnicities. Nonetheless, these scholars tend to portray the dominance of Georgian beys at the end of the eighteenth century as a deliberate attempt to replicate the priorities of the Mamluk sultanate.

The implication of such depictions of a Mamluk revival in Ottoman Egypt is that the legacy of the Mamluk sultanate resided in the Ottoman-era beylicate. This notion therefore contributes to a conceptual dichotomy between the beylicate, on the one hand, and the regiments, on the other, which were initially exponents of Ottoman authority in Egypt. If the beylicate represents a continuation or revival of the Mamluk regime, as Holt suggests, then the beys must be responsible for sustaining or resuscitating the tradition of the military household on the model of the Mamluk sultanate. Hence, the so-called Mamluk household in Ottoman Egypt is naturally linked to the beylicate. When historians observe households forming within the regiments and mamluks being appended to the regimental payrolls, they conclude that this is part and parcel of the regiments' degeneration and the beylicate's concomitant ascendance late in the eighteenth century. According to this scheme, the household, assumed to be inherently Mamluk, is a structure fundamentally alien to the regiments; it undercuts their own internal structures – *oda* (barracks), *bölük* (division) – by infiltrating them from outside. Thus, the degradation of the regiments, the preponderance of the beylicate, and the formation of households are interrelated features of the evolution of Egypt's military society during the eighteenth century and are, furthermore, correlated with the

[43] For example, *Mühimme-i Mısır*, vol. I, no. 64 (1121/1709); vol. VII, nos. 214 (mid-Receb 1168/1755) and 229 (late Ramazan 1168/1755).

[44] Thus Crecelius uses "mamluk beylicate" and "mamluk state" virtually interchangeably to refer to an autonomous political entity (*Roots of Modern Egypt*, pp. 28, 29). See also Winter, "Turks, Arabs, and Mamluks," 100; Piterberg, "Formation of an Ottoman Egyptian Elite," 281.

[45] Thus, for example, black slaves were held in contempt. See, for example, David Ayalon, "The Circassians in the Mamluk Kingdom," *JAOS* 49 (1949), 135–47; David Ayalon, *Gunpowder and Firearms in the Mamluk Kingdom: A Challenge to Medieval Society* (London, 1956).

fact that growing numbers of mamluks were entering and rising to the top of that society in the latter half of the eighteenth century. In short, the combined Mamluk and beylical preponderance appears to be the culmination of the evolution of Egypt's military elite. Indeed, Daniel Crecelius and Gabriel Piterberg write with the intention of explaining this preponderance. Michael Winter, although starting from a much earlier period, finds the greatest justification for his assertion that the Mamluk beys came to be an Arabized elite cherished by the Egyptian public in al-Jabarti's vituperative comments on the Ottoman forces who arrived in Egypt in 1801 to help rout the French.[46]

This preoccupation with the late eighteenth-century beylicate in the context of the beylicate's purported link to the Mamluk emirate gives the ascendancy of the beylicate a teleological cast, as if, no matter how Egypt's military elite might adapt to Ottoman realities, it somehow could not avoid slipping *back* into Mamlukdom. In general, to insist that the Ottoman-era beylicate is a throwback to the Mamluk emirate bespeaks a willingness to construe the principal features of Egyptian military society as quintessentially Mamluk, ignoring possible Ottoman models for the same institutions. The historian must downplay fundamental changes in the land regime on which the Mamluk emirate had been based, in the mix of people admitted to the beylicate, and in the titles, if not the functions, of the chief beylical operatives. That is to say, the historian must maintain that these changes did not alter the fundamentally Mamluk character of the beylicate. I would venture that the Mamluk sultanate has exerted a certain fascination over the Ottoman Egyptian subfield, so that most major institutions of Ottoman Egypt's military society are regarded as modified Mamluk institutions.

Yet the case of ʿAli Bey, the purported founder of the neo-Mamluk beylicate toward the end of the eighteenth century, points up the shortcomings of this scheme of parallel mamluk, household, and beylical hegemony. ʿAli Bey was not the culmination of a long line of beylical hegemons but rather the mamluk of the ambitious Janissary *kâhya* Ibrahim al-Qazdağlı. Ibrahim Kâhya and other *kâhya*s of his generation began raising their clients to the beylicate as early as the 1720s, no doubt with the aim of acquiring Egypt's largest and most lucrative rural tax farms, namely, the subprovincial governorships.[47] Thus the transformation to beylical leadership within the Qazdağlı household was arguably the work of the generation preceding ʿAli Bey, the enterprising Janissary officers who steered their clients toward the beylicate. As such, this transformation subverts the scheme by which the beylicate subsumed the regiments, for in the Qazdağlıs' case, a household that had evolved within and come to dominate the Janissary regiment infiltrated and came to

[46] Winter, "Turks, Arabs, and Mamluks," 121–2. Given that this army included the future Muhammad ʿAli Pasha, whom al-Jabarti detested, the quotation could well be heavily biased.

[47] Ahmad Çelebi (*Awḍaḥ*, p. 514) records what is to my knowledge the first instance of a regimental officer raising a client to the beylicate in 1727, when the Janissary kâhya Hüseyin al-Dimyati made his client Mustafa Agha al-Wali *sancak beyi* of Jirja and Minya in Upper Egypt.

dominate the beylicate. In fact, the case of the Qazdağlı household combines with the examples of *odabaşı* bosses and the evidence of the salary registers to suggest that households could form entirely within the regiments and that, in that case, their formation followed the regimental hierarchy. While the salary registers abound with the mamluks of officers, furthermore, there is no reason to believe that these mamluks, simply by virtue of being mamluks, subverted the structure of the regiments.

Moreover, the Qazdağlı beylicate of the late eighteenth century can be regarded as the outcome of shrewd household decision-making. The Qazdağlıs did not simply join the movement from urban to rural tax farms and, correspondingly, from regimental to beylical households. The household's distinctive achievement was its ability to win control of both the regimental officer echelon and the beylicate. In so doing, the Qazdağlı household was able to retain its traditional sources of revenue while adding the more promising sources available to the beylicate. Through control of such critical posts as Janissary agha and *wālī*, furthermore, the Qazdağlıs were able to keep their collective finger on the pulse of Cairo's markets while retaining the upper hand in maintenance of public order and mediation of public protests. In the latter years of the eighteenth century, Janissary officers became a substratum within a Qazdağlı conglomerate dominated by beys.

Since the Qazdağlı takeover of the beylicate was launched from the Janissary regiment, it must therefore be viewed in the context of the household's earlier evolution within the Janissary corps. From this standpoint, it becomes evident that Qazdağlı domination of the beylicate would not have been possible had the household not previously come to control the Janissary corps. The two chapters that follow attempt to elucidate the Qazdağlı household's evolution within the Janissary corps and its penetration of the beylicate. In this context, Qazdağlı co-optation of the beylicate is a matter of household evolution and, as such, not a radical departure from the household's previous history. Yet this assertion implies that the late eighteenth-century beylicate did not result from a revival of the practices of the Mamluk sultanate but was the natural outcome of the evolution of the Qazdağlı and other regimental households.

CHAPTER 4

The emergence and partnership of the Qazdağlı and Jalfi households

As the Qazdağlı household took shape within the Janissary regiment, its development was paralleled and shadowed by that of the Jalfi household, which appeared several decades later than the Qazdağlıs but came to dominate the ʿAzeban regiment at roughly the same time that the Qazdağlıs were consolidating their hold over the Janissary corps. After years of flirting with both the Qazdağlıs and their chief rivals within the Faqari bloc, the house of Zülfikar Bey, the Jalfis forged a long-lasting alliance of subordination with the Qazdağlıs that would nurture the Qazdağlı enterprise and shape the Qazdağlı style of rule through the middle of the eighteenth century. For the historian, the Jalfi household is a useful study in contrast to the Qazdağlı group and, perhaps, an example of the role the Qazdağlıs themselves might have taken had circumstances been different: a far smaller, far less complex household that proved a reliable second fiddle. To understand the workings of the early Qazdağlı household, we must come to a complementary understanding of the workings of the early Jalfis.

Jalfi origins

The name Jalfi first appears in the registers of imperial orders known as *mühimmes* in 1715.[1] Three salient features distinguish this household and perhaps determine, in large measure, its behavior in Egyptian military society. First of all, the Jalfis appear to have been a relatively small and uncomplicated household, comprising only one major line of affiliation. They were therefore untroubled by competing branches. Second, they did not belong to either of the two great factions, Faqari or Qasimi, although they did exhibit sympathies for certain Faqari subgroups, notably the Qazdağlıs and the household of Zülfikar Bey. This lack of factional allegiance no doubt contributed to the Jalfis' third distinguishing characteristic, the mediating role that key Jalfi leaders played both between and within the two factions. In short, the Jalfis impress one as the ideal ally or adjunct – which, indeed, is a role they came to play repeatedly, ultimately in support of the Qazdağlıs.

[1] *Mühimme-i Mısır*, vol. I, nos. 409, 411, 412 (all 1127/1715), on Shahin Odabaşı.

The Jalfi household's origins are obscure and have been heavily mythologized. Two versions of the myth can be found in two Arabic chronicles composed in the early nineteenth century. Al-Jabarti, in his obituary of ʿAli Kâhya al-Jalfi, asserts that ʿAli acquired the epithet Jalfi

> because Mehmed Agha, the mamluk of Beshir Agha al-Kızlar [and] the master [*ustādh*] of Hasan Kâhya [al-Jalfi, master of ʿAli] had among his followers [*tawābiʿ*] a man called Mansur al-Zataharcı al-Sinjalfi, from an Egyptian village called Sinjalf. He was wealthy and had a daughter named Khadija, to whom Mehmed Agha married his mamluk Hasan Kâhya, and she was known as al-Sitt al-Jalfiyya.[2]

Beshir Agha al-Kızlar must be one of the five Ottoman Chief Black Eunuchs who bore the name Beshir, most probably the first, al-Hajj Beshir, who held office from 1717–46. Hasan Kâhya al-Jalfi's connection to al-Hajj Beshir Agha has greater implications for the function of the Chief Black Eunuch in Egypt, as we shall see in chapter 8, than it does for the Jalfis themselves. More significant for the Jalfis is Hasan Kâhya's marriage to the daughter of Mansur al-Zataharcı. The epithet Zatāharcı is mystifying. The Turkish *cı* suffix connotes a profession; otherwise, the word seems to be a mistranscription. The proper appellation could be *zāhireci*, a lower rank in the imperial Janissary corps. Al-Jabarti's story, in any case, implies that Hasan Kâhya, by virtue of his marriage to Mansur's daughter, was the first Jalfi proper.

The poet Ismail al-Khashshab, in his far inferior chronicle composed at the request of the French, offers a different version of the Jalfi foundation myth. An oil salesman (*maʿaṣarāni*) sells sesame oil to a soldier (*jundī*), then accompanies the soldier to his home and performs a service for him. Thirty days later, the *jundī* dies, and the oil-seller buys his house. After returning for a time to his town (*balad*) of Sinjalf, he returns to Cairo and begins buying mamluks, whom he enrolls in the regiments and provides with tax farms. One of these mamluks is Süleyman Kâhya al-Jalfi, who al-Khashshab seems to think is the greatest of all Jalfi leaders and the master of Ridvan Kâhya al-Jalfi, who held sway over Egypt in partnership with Ibrahim Kâhya al-Qazdağlı toward the middle of the eighteenth century.[3]

Al-Khashshab's account concurs with al-Jabarti's in the pivotal role played by the village of Sinjalf in the Nile Delta subprovince of Minufiyya. The name Jalfi could well derive from this village since Ottoman officials – and indeed al-Khashshab himself – seem to have treated the Coptic village-name prefix *sin* or *sand* as a separate, perhaps detachable, word.[4] In fact, the village may commonly have been called Jalf or Galf, although there was also a Galf in the

[2] Al-Jabarti, *ʿAjāʾib*, vol. II, p. 52.

[3] Al-Khashshab, *Tadhkira li-ahl al-baṣāʾir*, fo. 10. Süleyman Kâhya was actually the client of ʿAli Kâhya and the *khūshdāsh* (fellow client or mamluk) of Ridvan Kâhya.

[4] Thus the village of Sandabast in Gharbiyya is rendered variously in archival sources as Sand Batt, Sanda Bast, and simply Bast. See, for example, Topkapı Palace Archives, D 2520/1 (1159/1746), 3(1167/1753–4); D 7662 (1163/1750); *Mühimme-i Mısır*, vol. V, nos. 44 and 93 (1146/1733–4). Al-Khashshab renders Sinjalf as two words: Sin Jalf.

Upper Egyptian subprovince of al-Bahnasa. If the Jalfis follow the pattern of other households and individuals named for Egyptian villages, then their sobriquet indicates control of the tax farm of Sinjalf. Presumably the household acquired this tax farm from either Mansur al-Zataharcı or the oil merchant, who may be one and the same. If his name is in truth *zāhireci*, then Mansur may be a typical specimen of a Janissary officer who acquired a rural tax farm while also engaging in small-scale commerce. The centrality of a merchant to the household's foundation, meanwhile, puts the Jalfis in the ranks of the merchant and other non-military, or reaya, households that joined the elite early in the eighteenth century, such as the Sharaybis, Fallahs ("peasants"), and Manavs ("fruiterers").[5]

Al-Jabarti's origin story seems more reliable than al-Khashshab's with regard to the original Jalfi. Archival sources, as well as one other chronicle, indicate that Hasan Kâhya was the first to bear the epithet Jalfi. An imperial order of 1715 cites a *Jalfī'nin Şahin Odabaşı* ("Jalfi's Shahin Odabaşı") as one of seven rebels who fled Egypt in the wake of the 1711 civil war. Three orders farther along, he is called *Jalfī'ye tābiʿ Şahin Odabaşı* ("Shahin Odabaşı the follower of Jalfi").[6] Al-Damurdashi identifies this Shahin as an *odabaşı* who had been made a *thālith* ("third": a lower officer) "during the lifetime of Kâhya al-Jalfi."[7] This *kâhya* can only be Hasan, who is the only Jalfi to have appeared in al-Damurdashi's chronicle by that point and who by that point is recently deceased. "Jalfi" of the *mühimme* must therefore refer specifically to Hasan Kâhya. The fact that the imperial orders never call "Jalfi" by his first name and title is extraordinary since identifying adjectival forms, or *nisba*s, of place-names are the exception, rather than the rule, in the *mühimme*. Hasan must be well-known to the imperial palace – as he presumably would have been had he enjoyed strong ties to the Chief Black Eunuch.

Notwithstanding, Hasan Kâhya is rather an obscure figure. He is perhaps best known for expanding and refurbishing the Husayniyya *mashhad*, a thirteenth-century mosque and sanctuary outside Cairo's Bab al-Futuh where the head of Husayn, martyred son of the caliph ʿAli, is supposedly buried.[8] Politically, however, his most significant legacy would appear to be the Jalfi tradition of mediating factional disputes. In 1712, Hasan Kâhya intervened in a struggle between the Qasimi chieftain Ismail Bey b. ʿIvaz and Zülfikar Agha (later Bey), a client of the Bilifya group, over the village of Qiman al-ʿArus in al-Bahnasa, which was endowed to the *Awqāf al-Ḥaramayn*. Hasan arranged a compromise whereby Zülfikar would enjoy half of the village's revenues

[5] On the Sharaybis, see n. 102 below. The founding father of the Fallah household, al-Hajj Salih, was an orphaned Egyptian peasant who amassed wealth and influence after joining the household of ʿAli Kâhya al-Jalfi. On the rise of the Fallahs, see al-Jabarti, *ʿAjāʾib*, vol. II, pp. 89–90. The Manavs are well represented in the 1737–8 pay list. They appear with the Fallahs as opponents of Bulut Kapan ʿAli Bey in 1183/1770; see al-Jabarti, *ʿAjāʾib*, vol. II, p. 335.

[6] *Mühimme-i Mısır*, vol. I, nos. 409, 412. [7] Al-Damurdashi, *Durra*, p. 213.

[8] Al-Jabarti, *ʿAjāʾib*, vol. I, p. 281; Ahmad Çelebi, *Awḍaḥ*, p. 251; al Hallaq, *Tārīḫ-i Mışır-i Ḳāhire*, fo. 304r (where he is not called Jalfi).

while Hasan Kâhya lived.[9] The terms of this settlement attest to the immense authority and esteem that Hasan Kâhya must have enjoyed.

Al-Jabarti has Hasan being promoted from ʿAzeban *çorbacı* to *kâhya* in 1123/1711, only a year before his death.[10] It seems likely, then, that he built his household while still a *çorbacı*. Of that household we know little. Aside from Shahin Odabaşı, who disappears from history after fleeing Egypt, Hasan's only known followers are the obscure Ibrahim Çorbacı, and ʿAli Çorbacı (later Kâhya). Of these, the latter is far more significant to the evolution of the Jalfi household.

While Hasan Kâhya appears to have been a mamluk,[11] we cannot be sure of the status of ʿAli Kâhya, who is labeled simply Hasan Kâhya's *tābiʿ*.[12] Regardless of his own status, ʿAli Kâhya appears to have cultivated an entourage of free-born Anatolian *sarrāj*es. A *sarrāj*, literally a "saddler," appears in most cases to have been an Anatolian or a Balkan mercenary hired as a bodyguard and liable for occasional irregular military service; in earlier centuries, *sarrāj*es performed the duties of nightwatchmen.[13] All of ʿAli Kâhya's followers listed in the 1737–8 salary register come from towns in Anatolia.[14] Al-Damurdashi, furthermore, claims that ʿAli Kâhya refused to add the mercenary Laz Ibrahim to his household because he already had a sufficient number of *sarrāj*es.[15] It seems likely that the Jalfi household included a relatively small leadership of manumitted mamluks who depended upon a large clientele of Anatolian *sarrāj*es. In the early decades of the eighteenth century, as the ʿAzeban vied for position with the Janissaries and built ever larger households, *sarrāj*es must have appealed to the highest officers as a relatively economical and plentiful source of manpower.

While still a *çorbacı*, ʿAli al-Jalfi served his patron Hasan Kâhya as *ḫazinedar*, or treasurer. In this capacity, he seems to have had some sort of fiscal authority over the disputed village of Qiman al-ʿArus and to have taken a hand in the settlement between Zülfikar and Ismail Bey b. ʿIvaz; it is ʿAli whom Zülfikar credits with saving his livelihood.[16] ʿAli's mediation served to bind the Jalfis to the household of Zülfikar Bey, which was emerging as a leader of the Faqari bloc. Once he had become *shaykh al-balad*, or "headman," of Cairo, Zülfikar Bey repaid his debt to the Jalfis by making ʿAli

[9] Al-Damurdashi, *Durra*, pp. 172, 176, 231–2. See also al-Jabarti, *ʿAjāʾib*, vol. II, p. 52. Zülfikar was the treasurer (*ḫazinedar*) of ʿÖmer Agha Bilifya, a client of Hasan Agha Bilifya's client ʿAli Agha.

[10] Al-Jabarti, *ʿAjāʾib*, vol. I, p. 282.

[11] Al-Jabarti (*ʿAjāʾib*, vol. II, p. 52) and al-Damurdashi (*Durra*, p. 232) both refer to him as such.

[12] Al-Jabarti, *ʿAjāʾib*, vol. II, p. 52; al-Damurdashi, *Durra*, p. 232.

[13] *Sarrāj*es numbered among the Ottoman troops besieging the fortress of Azov in the mid-seventeenth century; see Evliya Çelebi, *Narrative of Travels in Europe, Asia, and Africa*, trans. Joseph von Hammer-Purgstall, 2 vols. (London, 1834), vol. II, p. 194. The fourteenth-century Moroccan traveler Ibn Battuta implies that they patrolled the streets of Delhi at night; see ʿAbdallah Muhammad b. Ibrahim b. Battuta, *Riḥla Ibn Baṭṭūṭa* (Beirut, 1964), p. 480.

[14] Specifically, one each from ʿAyntab (Gaziantep), Bursa, Isparta, and Istanbul.

[15] Al-Damurdashi, *Durra*, p. 452.

[16] Al-Jabarti, *ʿAjāʾib*, vol. II, p. 52; al-Damurdashi, *Durra*, p. 363.

Çorbacı and Ibrahim Çorbacı, another client of Hasan al-Jalfi, successive acting *kâhya*s (s. *kâhya al-waqt*) of the ʿAzeban corps in 1141/1728–9 and 1142/1729–30. These promotions thwarted the ambitions of Yusuf Kâhya al-Birkawi, the head of a Faqari subfaction that contended with the Jalfis for leadership among the ʿAzeban.[17] While cementing his ties to Zülfikar's household, therefore, ʿAli Kâhya al-Jalfi antagonized the Birkawis, who turned against him.

During ʿAli Kâhya al-Jalfi's tenure as ʿAzeban *kâhya al-waqt*, the first alliance between a Jalfi and a Qazdağlı leader emerges. This early alliance, however, contrasts with the pattern of later Qazdağlı–Jalfi alliances, for it took the form of a mutual alliance with Zülfikar Bey's client ʿOsman Bey. Such an alliance would have been unthinkable for later Qazdağlı leaders, who were, in the main, implacable foes of ʿOsman Bey. In the late 1730s, the Janissary *kâhya* ʿAbdullah al-Qazdağlı alienated the rest of the Qazdağlı household by making common cause with ʿOsman Bey Zülfikar, who was then pilgrimage commander. By 1737–8, ʿAbdullah Kâhya, ʿOsman Bey Zülfikar, ʿAli Kâhya al-Jalfi, and the *defterdar* Ibrahim Bey Qatamish dominated the *riʾāsa*, the collective "headships" of the seven regiments, together with the posts of pilgrimage commander and *defterdar*. ʿAbdullah Kâhya perhaps took this maverick action in order to gain leverage against the growing power of the Qazdağlı chieftain Ibrahim Odabaşı (later Çavuş, then Kâhya), who was emerging as ʿOsman Bey Zülfikar's chief rival.

Yet the Jalfis maintained an aura of neutrality despite their alliance with ʿAbdullah Kâhya, on the one hand, and ʿOsman Bey Zülfikar, on the other. Following the example of the Qiman al-ʿArus settlement, ʿAli Kâhya interceded in a quarrel between ʿOsman Bey Zülfikar and Ibrahim Odabaşı al-Qazdağlı over the village of Tahta in Asyut subprovince in Upper Egypt.[18] A follower of ʿOsman Bey, ʿAli Kashif, was appointed governor (*ḥākim*) of the district in 1738, whereupon he swept into Tahta and killed the *shaykh al-balad*, in this case a title taken by the bedouin village headman. The shaykh's son appealed to Ibrahim Odabaşı, who offered to lease the district from ʿOsman Bey and appoint a *kāshif* from his own household. ʿOsman Bey, however, categorically rejected this bald attempt to buy him out. Ultimately, ʿAli Kâhya al-Jalfi arranged a compromise whereby ʿOsman Bey replaced ʿAli Kashif with another *kāshif* from his household and recognized the deposed *shaykh al-balad*'s son as his father's successor. In this way, control of Tahta remained in ʿOsman Bey's household while Ibrahim Odabaşı's candidate became village headman.

Indeed, the Jalfis' neutrality and mediation efforts seem to have hampered

[17] The household's epithet came from the tax farm of Birkat al-Fil. See al-Damurdashi, *Durra*, p. 276.

[18] In al-Damurdashi, *Durra*, p. 440, the village's name is spelled Taḥṭā. According to Halm, *Ägypten*, vol. I, p. 98, it was most commonly spelled Ṭahṭā. The full story is recounted in al-Damurdashi, *Durra*, pp. 440–4.

the Ottoman government's ability to manipulate the grandees who dominated Egypt's revenues through the *ri'āsa*. A common tactic of the central government during these years was to eliminate all *ri'āsa*-holders in order to recover their revenues. During the 1730s, ʿOsman Bey Zülfikar was a source of particular irritation to Istanbul. In addition to failing to remit what remained of his late master's estate, he had neglected to send grain to the Holy Cities and to remit Egypt's annual tribute to Istanbul.[19] Mustafa Pasha, governor of Egypt at the time of the Tahta dispute, hatched a plot against ʿOsman Bey and the other *ri'āsa*-holders but was foiled by ʿAli Kâhya's compromise.[20] His successor, Süleyman Pasha al-ʿAzm, resurrected the plan and succeeded in killing ʿAli Kâhya through the instruments of ʿAli's old Birkawi rivals.

The circumstances of ʿAli Kâhya al-Jalfi's murder have much to do with the character of his household, which was composed largely of Anatolian *sarrāj*es. In fact, the incident reveals much about how *sarrāj*es gained entry into households. ʿAli Kâhya's actual killer was one Laz Ibrahim, presumably a native of the northeastern region of Anatolia known as Lazistan, whom al-Damurdashi describes as a *sarrāj* of the governor of Jirja. Having killed a soldier (*jundī*) in Jirja, Ibrahim fled to Cairo and begged ʿAli Kâhya to take him into his service "like Abu Manākhir Fidda Yusuf, when he killed . . . a *jundī* of the Damāyita[21] . . . and you made him an ʿAzab."[22] ʿAli Kâhya refused on the grounds that he had enough *sarrāj*es. The disgruntled Laz Ibrahim turned to ʿAli Kâhya's rival, the ʿAzab officer Ahmed Kâhya al-Birkawi, client of the late Yusuf Kâhya al-Birkawi, who with the governor's approval incited Laz Ibrahim to assassinate ʿAli Kâhya al-Jalfi. One would conclude from this example that *sarrāj*es were freebooters who, while they may have been affiliated with one or another regiment, formed their own patronage ties with influential officers and beys. In the ʿAzeban corps, where they seem to have been most numerous, they were evidently admitted at the rank of *çavuş*.[23]

*Sarrāj*es offered ʿAli Kâhya, as well as the rival Birkawis, an attractive alternative to mamluks since they were easier to come by and incurred no purchase price. Nonetheless, the bonds that they forged with their patrons were evidently no less strong than those between master and slave. The examples of

[19] *Mühimme-i Mısır*, vol. IV, nos. 404, 405, 434, 435, 476 (all 1144/1731–2), and 507 (1145/1732–3). [20] Al-Damurdashi, *Durra*, p. 444.

[21] This refers to the Dimyati household, a Faqari ally that rose to prominence early in the eighteenth century. Their epithet came from their control of the customs at Damietta.

[22] Al-Damurdashi, *Durra*, p. 453.

[23] The only two men labeled *sarrāj* in the 1737 pay list belong to the ʿAzeban corps. Furthermore, when the maverick *odabaşı* Küçük Mehmed was removed from the Janissary corps and made an ʿAzab *çavuş*, he served as the ʿAzeban *kâhya*'s *sarrāj*; see ʿAbdülkerim, *Tārīḫ-i Mışır*, fo. 97v. In *A Description of the East*, vol. I, p. 169, Pococke notes that if ʿAzabs "go through those other offices of Seraches and Chouses, they never are advanced to be Caias." P. M. Holt sets forth an elaborate process whereby *sarrāj*es were enrolled in all the regiments by their patrons at the rank of çavuş; see *EI*², s.v. "Miṣr," by Holt.

sarrājes to be found in the chronicles are of servants willing to defend their masters to the death and even to kill for them.[24]

Despite the prevalence in ʿAli Kâhya al-Jalfi's household of Anatolian *sarrājes* enrolled in the ʿAzeban corps, a certain distance appears to have existed between these ʿAzab enlisted men and ʿAli Kâhya's two most prominent followers, Süleyman and Ridvan Çorbacıs. Indeed, these two officers may have been mamluks, much like household founder Hasan Kâhya. In 1739, the Jalfis had an opportunity to take control of the ʿAzeban corps when ʿOsman Bey Zülfikar wrested control of the regiment from Ahmed Kâhya al-Birkawi. ʿOsman Bey's plan was to make Süleyman Çorbacı ʿAzeban *kâhya al-waqt* while promoting Ridvan Çorbacı to the beylicate. But the ʿAzab rank and file (*nafar wa wājib raʿāya*)[25] insisted: "If you make Ridvan Çorbacı a *sancak*, we will kill him." ʿOsman Bey chose instead to make Ridvan *kâhya al-waqt* while promising Süleyman that he could succeed him.[26] Clearly, Ridvan Çorbacı al-Jalfi hardly rode a wave of popular support into the post of *kâhya al-waqt* but was grudgingly accepted by a belligerent rank and file who would just as soon have seen him dead. The enlisted men's disenchantment could have had a number of causes. They may have favored the Birkawi group while, perhaps, considering Ridvan too much the creature of ʿOsman Bey Zülfikar. Beyond this, their ire may have reflected the historical friction between higher regimental officers, on the one hand, and the lower officers and rank and file, on the other. Highly intriguing is the implication that the beylicate provided no protection from the wrath of the enlisted men. In the course of the eighteenth century, the beylicate would eclipse the authority of the regiments. At this point, however, the beylicate seems still to have lacked overriding authority, much as it had in the seventeenth century, when powerful regimental officers were promoted to the beylicate in order to remove them from their bases of power.

Süleyman Kâhya al-Jalfi had subordinated himself to Ridvan as a result of this contretemps. In so doing, he observed a Jalfi tradition which we might call that of the weaker comrade. When a Jalfi leader had two prominent clients, one seemed content to be effaced by the other. Thus while Ibrahim Kâhya al-Jalfi succeeded his comrade ʿAli as ʿAzab *kâhya al-waqt* in 1729–30, ʿAli remained dominant. Among ʿAli Kâhya's clients, Süleyman Kâhya similarly succeeded Ridvan Kâhya as *kâhya al-waqt* yet never challenged Ridvan's preeminence.[27] This apparent concern for preserving a clear line of succession

[24] The two most prominent examples in al-Damurdashi's chronicle are the *sarrājes* of Çerkes Mehmed Bey and his archrival Zülfikar Bey: al-Sayfi and al-Shatwi ("Summery" and "Wintry"), respectively. These fanciful names may, of course, be apocryphal. Ahmad Çelebi spells al-Sayfi's name with a *sīn* so that it becomes the much more frequently encountered Arabic *nisba* of "sword."

[25] *Nafar* (*nefer* in Turkish) typically refers to a soldier, while *wājib raʿāya* most likely denotes members of the population at large who joined the regiments, whether voluntarily or by compulsion. [26] Al-Damurdashi, *Durra*, pp. 467–8.

[27] Süleyman Kâhya's career ended when he was exiled to the Hijaz for his complicity in the counterattack following the *vakʿat-i shūr-angīz* (to be discussed below). See Ahmad Çelebi, *Awḍaḥ*, pp. 623–4. In al-Damurdashi's account (*Durra*, pp. 420–5), Ibrahim Kâhya al-Jalfi, the *khūshdāsh* of ʿAli Kâhya, is exiled.

saved the Jalfi household from the struggles for dominance that upset most other households, including the Qazdağlıs.

As the new head of the Jalfi household, Ridvan Kâhya attempted to continue a second Jalfi tradition, namely that of mediation between the house of Zülfikar and its rivals. By the 1740s, however, the struggle between ʿOsman Bey Zülfikar and Ibrahim al-Qazdağlı, now a Janissary *çavuş*, had become so intense that it was impossible for the Jalfis to maintain any semblance of neutrality. In a quarrel in 1743 over the district of Farshut in the Upper Egyptian subprovince of Jirja, Ridvan Kâhya, who owed his very post to ʿOsman Bey Zülfikar, cast his lot with the Qazdağlıs.

The Farshut dispute unfolds in similar fashion to the earlier confrontation over Tahta. Farshut was controlled by Shaykh Humam, the chief of the Hawwara bedouin, who were a potent force in Upper Egypt. When the Hawwara shaykh of Farshut was killed, Shaykh Humam paid the *ḫulvān*, or fee for acceding to a deceased person's tax farm, to Ibrahim Çavuş al-Qazdağlı, who intended to supply Farshut with a *kāshif* from his own entourage. The governor of Jirja, none other than the ʿAli Kashif who had earlier coveted Tahta, protested to ʿOsman Bey, who forbade Ibrahim Çavuş to send a *kāshif*. As if on cue, Ridvan Kâhya al-Jalfi interceded. His manner of interceding can only have been rather intimidating, however; he rode to ʿOsman Bey's house with 100 mercenary troops (*levends*). "As for the *sancak*," al-Damurdashi continues, "he had in his hand a palmetto fan, with which he struck Ridvan Kâhya, knocking off his *kavuk* [headgear]".[28] This insult led Ibrahim Çavuş to attack ʿOsman Bey directly, driving him out of Egypt. ʿOsman Bey's humiliation of Ridvan may have been intended to convey the bey's outrage at Ridvan's betrayal. Unlike his predecessors ʿAli and Hasan Kâhyas, who had maintained a sort of non-committal loyalty to the house of Zülfikar, Ridvan had compromised himself by taking Ibrahim Çavuş al-Qazdağlı's part. Ridvan was by now too closely attached to Ibrahim Çavuş to evoke any personal loyalty within the Zülfikar camp.

What is surprising, though, is that despite their alliances, first to the house of Zülfikar, then to the Qazdağlıs, the Jalfis were routinely expected to mediate. This role may, in fact, have resulted from the nature of these alliances, in which the Jalfis were always adjuncts or subordinates. Was the household founded as a pool of nonaligned agents and intermediaries, never intended to dominate Egypt? Jalfi dominance of the ʿAzeban corps indicates that the household desired leadership and was able to sustain it once it was attained. Their attempts to recruit members do not appear to have lagged behind those of any other leading household; we recall ʿAli Kâhya's plentiful supply of *sarrājes*. It seems more likely that the Jalfis, unable to encroach on either the beylicate or the Janissary corps, found a niche for themselves in control of the ʿAzeban

[28] Al-Damurdashi, *Durra*, pp. 494–5. Earlier, the troops are referred to as *nafar wa sarrājūn*. In any case, some sort of mercenaries seem to be intended, again indicating that the Jalfis continued to draw manpower from non-mamluks. On *ḫulvān*, see Shaw, *Financial and Administrative Organization*, p. 35; and Crecelius, *Roots of Modern Egypt*, p. 28.

corps and in adjunct relationships with the households that did dominate these more prominent institutions. These alliances, however, carried their own risks. The Jalfis could not prevent the rivalries among the households with whom they allied themselves from overwhelming their quasi-neutrality; hence Ridvan Kâhya's rejection by ʿOsman Bey Zülfikar once he had taken the part of Ibrahim Çavuş al-Qazdağlı.

In this society, furthermore, an alliance always created the possibility of a future rivalry: on the death of Ibrahim Çavuş (by then Kâhya) al-Qazdağlı eleven years after the Farshut dispute, Ridvan's household fell to the jealous ʿAbdurrahman Kâhya al-Qazdağlı. From then on, the Jalfis existed as a minor subsidiary of the Qazdağlı conglomerate. Even so, their mediating role continued. During the duumvirate of the Qazdağlı leaders Ibrahim and Murad Beys at the end of the eighteenth century, one Mehmed Kâhya Arnavud al-Jalfi, the retainer of Ibrahim Bey, mediated a standoff between one of Murad Bey's mamluks and a mob of irate commoners.[29]

Qazdağlı origins

The Jalfis' senior partners, the Qazdağlıs, seem to date back several decades before their junior allies. Two soldiers labeled *Qāẓṭāġī* can be found among the 1675 Janissary corps.[30] By 1737, however, *Qāẓṭāġī*s had come to form the largest single grouping within the Janissary corps: in the later pay list, fifty-four Janissaries, or 4.3 percent, are labeled *Qāẓṭāġī*, *tābiʿ-i Qāẓṭāġī*, or *tābiʿ-i [Fulān] Qāẓṭāġī*.[31] These *Qāẓṭāġī*s can only be representatives of the household that Arabic sources habitually call Qazdughli or Qazdoghli, which originated in the Janissary corps some time in the early to mid-seventeenth century and came to dominate Egypt completely by the middle of the eighteenth century. In Arabic narrative sources, the name is usually rendered قازدغلي. The Turkish orthography of the pay registers (قازطاغی) and of al-Hallaq's and ʿAbdülkerim's chronicles (قازطاغلی) makes it clear, however, that the name is an adjectival form, or *nisba*, of the Kazdağı, or Mount Ida, in western Anatolia.[32] The name should therefore properly be rendered and pronounced Kazdağlı or Qazdağlı. Whether it was actually pronounced this way in eighteenth-century Egypt we cannot know. Likewise, how the name was transmogrified into Qazdughli is debatable. It is certainly likely that the soft (*yumuşak*) "g" was pronounced as a hard "g" by many of the Anatolian mercenaries themselves; this pronunciation was characteristic of eastern Anatolia, from where quite a number of mercenaries came. The orthographic

[29] This was the protest of the Husayniyya butchers against Hüseyin Bey Çıfıt; see al-Jabarti, *ʿAjāʾib*, vol. III, pp. 316–17. [30] Maliyeden Müdevver 4787.

[31] Maliyeden Müdevver 7069, which also lists one Qāẓṭāġī among the Çavuşan and two among the ʿAzeban.

[32] There is at least one other Kazdağı: near the town of Uşak, east of Izmir; see *Türk Ansiklopedisi*, s.v. "Uşak," by R. İzbırak. Mount Ida, however, is by far the best known and most frequently encountered in atlases and geographical dictionaries.

difference would lead one to suspect that the Turkish name was at some point erroneously rendered by an Arabophone scribe unfamiliar with either Turkish phonetics or the geographical referent. Similar mutations occur frequently in the Arabic chronicles of the period; in fact, the Turkish word *dağ* ("mountain") is sometimes spelled with a *dal* even in Ottoman writings. On the other hand, the vowel change – from *hamza* (long "a") to *ḍamma* (short "u") – probably resulted from simple mispronunciation, perhaps owing to some species of Anatolian accent, on the one hand, or to the Cairene accent, on the other. It was probably assumed in later years that the name derived in part from the Turkish *oğlu* ("son of") and was thus of a piece with other *ughli* names drawn from that root, such as Lazughli, "son of the Laz."

In his biography of the founder of the Qazdağlı household, Mustafa Kâhya, al-Jabarti asserts that he was *rūmī al-jins* ("*rūmī* by ethnicity"). *Rūm* and *rūmī* during this period typically refer to the territories of the Ottoman Empire that were formerly ruled by the Byzantines: namely, the Balkans and western Anatolia, with a particular emphasis on the imperial capital.[33] There is therefore no reason to doubt that Mustafa Kâhya al-Qazdağlı was so named because he himself came from the region of the Kazdağı. The Kazdağı itself belongs to a range of mountains running along the shore of the Gulf of Edremit, an arm of the Aegean Sea. Unlike the Uludağ range near Bursa, these mountains are not lush and green but craggy, albeit heavily wooded. The upper section of the Kazdağı itself consists of sharp, denuded rock, ending in a broken summit.[34] Between the mountains and the sea is a coastal plain planted with olive trees. The nearest large town is Edremit, then and now a major center of olive oil production.[35]

The Kazdağı has historically played an important role in the regional timber industry. The nomadic Turcoman tribesmen known as *yürüks* who settled in the region in the fifteenth century took up woodcutting and espoused ʿAlevism, a brand of mystical Islam that, while not doctrinally Shiʿite, reveres ʿAli; their descendants are known as *tahtacıs*.[36] Whether Egypt's Qazdağlı household had its origins among these tribesmen cannot be determined. It appears, however, that timber from the Kazdağı reached Egypt during the Ottoman period.[37] Furthermore, the Ottomans routinely recruited

[33] Thus, for example, al-Damurdashi (*Durra*, p. 199) refers to the Ottoman government as *al-dawlat al-rūmiyya*.

[34] See J. M. Cook, *The Troad: An Archaeological and Topographical Study* (Oxford, 1973), pp. 3, 304. This description draws on my own observations of the Kazdağı region, as well.

[35] The town appears as such in eighteenth-century orders, for example, *Mühimme-i Mısır*, vol. II, no. 182 (1129/1717), which is addressed to "the representatives of Edremit and the Kazdağı."

[36] Pococke, *A Description of the East*, vol. II, pp. 108, 120; *Türk Ansiklopedisi*, s.v. "Tahtacılar," by E. R. Fiğlalı.

[37] In describing the removal of two enormous sixteenth-century Ottoman cannons from Suez to Anatolia, Ahmad Çelebi (*Awḍaḥ*, p. 296) notes that they were moved via a contraption consisting of Qazdağlı firs (*shawāḥi Qazdughli*) on wheels. The masculine, rather than feminine, singular adjective in this expression seems inappropriate unless the chronicler is employing an unadorned Turkish *nisba*.

troops for imperial campaigns from among other tribal groups, notably the Kurds and Turcomans of eastern Anatolia. Late in the seventeenth century, western Anatolia – in particular the districts of Biga and Karesi, northeast of the Kazdağı – became in turn a prime source of imperial soldiery.[38] Certainly, the harsh uncertainties of a nomadic life in the Kazdağı range would have made the sultan's service all the more attractive to the mountaineers.

The salary registers indicate a tiny trickle of Qazdağlıs within a steady stream of Anatolians to Egypt by the mid-1670s, followed, it would seem, by a relative flood. Meanwhile, evidence exists of instability, and therefore of motive for migration, in the Karesi and Edremit regions late in the seventeenth century. Several orders speak of rebellious troops wreaking havoc in the area in the 1670s and 1680s.[39] These were most likely soldiers demobilized after Mehmed IV's European campaigns, particularly the 1683 debacle at Vienna. Unable to find gainful employment in Anatolia, many sought opportunity in Egypt and other Arab provinces.

A very thin line separated imperial soldiery from freebooting mercenaries since any economic crisis of this sort could transform one into the other. But during these same decades, Egypt received an influx of imperial soldiery, mobilized and dispatched to address specific problems within the province. Some of these detachments resulted from the reforming efforts of the Köprülü family of grand viziers. In a particularly striking move in 1670, the grand vizier Köprülü Fazıl Ahmed Pasha ordered 2,000 troops to accompany his lieutenant (*kâhya*) Kara Ibrahim Pasha to Egypt to overhaul the province's finances.[40] Confirming this general trend, André Raymond has discovered a body of imperial troops (*kapıkulu*) in the inheritance registers of Cairo's *sharī'a* court archives between 1672 and 1726. Many of these soldiers came from Anatolia although not, it appears, from the Kazdağı.[41] Narrative histories indicate that imperial troops were beginning to disrupt Cairene society as early as the 1660s. Hence several chroniclers recount the antics during the 1660s of a quintet of rowdy soldiers from the imperial court who are known in Arabic as the *zurub*, an Arabicized plural of the Turkish *zorba*, "rebel."[42]

[38] For lists of Kurdish and Turcoman tribesmen, see Mühimme Defteri 99, no. 186 (early Rebi' II 1101/1690). Orders for troops from the Biga–Karesi region can be found in Maliyeden Müdevver 4414 (1070/1659–60) and 4465 (1084/1673–4). Recruitment from the Kazdağı region may have begun much earlier. The historian Ibrahim Peçevi mentions one Salih Pasha, a vizier of Süleyman I (1520–66), who began as a Kazdağlı *levend* (mercenary) and eventually became governor of Algeria; see *Tārīḫ-i Peçevi*, 2 vols. in 1 (Istanbul, 1865–7), vol. I, p. 40. I am indebted to Leslie Peirce for this reference.

[39] Mühimme Defteri 96, no. 26 (early Cumaze I 1089/1678); 98, no. 126 (mid-Safer 1100/1689).

[40] Al-Hallaq, *Tārīḫ-i Mıṣır-ı Ḳāhire*, fos. 204v-205r; *Akhbār al-nuwwāb*, fo. 34r; Ahmad Çelebi, *Awḍaḥ*, p. 171.

[41] Raymond, "Soldiers in Trade," 4. Raymond's Anatolians come primarily from 'Ayntab (Gaziantep), Malatya, and Harput.

[42] *Akhbār al-nuwwāb*, fos. 29v ff.; al-Hallaq, *Tārīḫ-i Mıṣır-ı Ḳāhire*, fos. 139–44; 'Abdülkerim, *Tārīḫ-i Mıṣır*, fos. 80v–84v; Ahmad Çelebi, *Awḍaḥ*, p. 162. *Akhbār al-nuwwāb* refers to them as zurub and Ahmad Çelebi as ẓurub. Al-Hallaq, however, uses no epithet while 'Abdülkerim refers to the group as the *sürbe* (flock of birds).

Correspondingly, the 1675 pay list reveals Anatolian places of origin for 4 to 5 percent of the Janissaries and ʿAzeban (see table 3.2). At least some of these must be imperial troops.

For his part, Mustafa Kâhya al-Qazdağlı may have ridden the cusp between imperial soldier and opportunistic mercenary. He was already established in Egypt by the 1650s, to judge from an order of 1753, which cites one "Kazdağlı Mustafa of Egypt's *odabaşıs*" as a trustee of the Basyatiyya Madrasa in Mecca one hundred *hijrī* years before.[43] In 1655, Mustafa al-Qazdağlı would have been about forty years old; we can conjecture that he had arrived in Egypt at least several years before. It is possible that Mustafa held the rank of *odabaşı* in the imperial Janissary corps before coming to Egypt, and that he was one of a number of imperial Janissaries of that rank who settled in Egypt and formed a coherent body of "Egypt's *odabaşıs*." One "Mustafa [b.] Mehmed/Qāzṭāġī" does appear in the 1675 pay register, and given the fact that out-of-date information was often retained in such lists, he could conceivably be identical with the household founder. He is one of only two Janissaries designated "Qāzṭāġī" in the list; the other, ʿAli [b.] Mehmed, could be his brother.

Al-Jabarti informs us that on Mustafa's arrival in Egypt, he became the *sarrāj* of the Gönüllüyan commander Hasan Agha Bilifya. Whether the rank of *odabaşı* in Egypt's Janissary regiment went along with the post of *sarrāj* is unknown; in the ʿAzeban corps, as we have seen, the post is more commonly connected with the higher rank of *çavuş*. It is likewise impossible to determine whether Hasan Agha recruited Mustafa or whether Mustafa volunteered to join Hasan Agha's household. A *sarrāj*, as we observed above, appears to have been a mercenary who was propelled into free agency, often after committing a crime.[44] Although there is no evidence that Mustafa al-Qazdağlı committed a crime, he would have entered Hasan Agha's household of his own accord had he followed this general pattern. On the other hand, the case of Tunisia offers evidence that regimental officers recruited Anatolian soldiers for their entourages.[45] In that case, Mustafa al-Qazdağlı may not have had to beg for Hasan Agha's patronage in the manner of Laz Ibrahim or Abu Manākhir Fidda Yusuf, but may have been courted. Whether such recruitment would have occurred before or after Mustafa's arrival in Egypt is likewise debatable. It seems clear, in any case, that regimental officers exploited the seventeenth-century influx of Anatolians, whether current or former imperial soldiers or independent mercenaries, as a ready pool of household members. The post of *sarrāj*, whatever its links to the imperial regiments, was a common route of induction into Egypt's military society. In this sense, Mustafa Kâhya al-

[43] *Mühimme-i Mısır*, vol. VII, no. 82 (mid-Ṣaʿban 1166/1753).

[44] In addition to Laz Ibrahim and Abu Manākhir Fidda Yusuf, we have the example of Çerkes Mehmed Bey's *sarrāj* al-Sayfi, an Armenian who fought at Belgrade in 1718 and was taken back to Cairo by the ʿAzab strongman Yusuf Çorbacı al-Birkawi. He fled to Çerkes Mehmed after committing a crime for which Yusuf Çorbacı wished to punish him (Ahmad Çelebi, *Awḍaḥ*, pp. 426–7).

[45] L. Carl Brown, *The Tunisia of Ahmed Bey, 1837–1855* (Princeton, 1974), p. 54.

Qazdağlı was typical of Anatolian newcomers to Egypt's military households.

To judge from the pay registers, Mustafa Kâhya al-Qazdağlı may have recruited *sarrājes*, Anatolian or otherwise, to his own household. The 1737 pay register labels fourteen non-mamluk soldiers *tābiʿ-i Qāzṭāġī*, "follower of the Qazdağlı." While this expression could refer to the follower of any Qazdağlı leader, or even to anyone from the Kazdağı, Mustafa Kâhya is implicated since several chronicles refer to him simply as "al-Qazdağlı."[46] Overall, the 1737 register gives the impression that the backbone of the Qazdağlı household for the first several decades of its existence consisted of free-born Muslims:

Table 4.1. *Mamluks and non-mamluks in the Qazdağlı household*

Household Head	Mamluks	Non-Mamluks	Unidentifiable
Qāzṭāġī	4	14	7
ʿOsman Kâhya	1	2	1
Süleyman Kâhya			1
ʿAbdurrahman Baş Çavuş	1		1
ʿAli Baş Çavuş		1	
Süleyman Çavuş			2
Hasan Çavuş		2	
Hüseyin Çavuş		2	1
ʿOsman Çavuş		1	1
Süleyman Çavuş	1	4	1
Yusuf Çavuş			1
ʿAbdurrahman Ser Oda	1		1
Ahmed Ser Oda			1
ʿOsman	1[47]		

In short, the appearance of the Qazdağlı household owed much to the flow of free-born Muslims, many of them Anatolians, into Egypt's household network during the seventeenth century. The natural tendency of the regiments to coalesce in households also played a role in the household's emergence. At the same time, Mustafa Kâhya's large following is an early sign of the *kâhya* ascendancy in Janissary household leadership that would eclipse the "natural" leadership of lower officers. All these phenomena were symptomatic of the overall prominence of the regimental soldiery in the late seventeenth century.

[46] For example, al-Damurdashi, *Durra*, pp. 78, 162; al-Jabarti, *ʿAjāʾib*, vol. I, p. 112. In addition, al-Jabarti (*ʿAjāʾib*, vol. I, p. 234) refers to Mustafa as "the great Qazdağlı" (*al-Qazdughli al-kabīr*) and "the grandfather of the Qazdağliyya" (*jad al-Qazdughliyya*). It seems unlikely, furthermore, that *tābiʿ-i* could be a geographical referent, as it is in other contexts, denoting simply someone from the Kazdağı. The *atbāʿ-i Qāzṭāġī* of the pay lists include a Bosnian; a Baghdadi, who could be a Georgian mamluk; and five Anatolians from a variety of districts, including a Laz.

[47] Two of the household heads are probably listed at least twice. ʿOsman Çavuş is most likely the future ʿOsman Kâhya and may be identical to "ʿOsman." ʿAbdurrahman Ser Oda is probably the future ʿAbdurrahman Baş Çavuş.

The triumvirate of Hasan Agha Bilifya, Ismail Bey the defterdar, and Mustafa Kâhya al-Qazdağlı

The household of Mustafa Kâhya al-Qazdağlı's patron, Hasan Agha Bilifya, was the most graphic manifestation of regimental officer power during the closing years of the seventeenth century. According to al-Jabarti, Hasan Agha "continued to promote" his *sarrāj* "until he attained [the post of] kâhya of the Mustahfizan."[48] During his tenure as Janissary *kâhya*, Mustafa al-Qazdağlı formed the third leg of a triumvirate headed by Hasan Agha and his son-in-law, the Faqari *defterdar* Ismail Bey. Under the Ottoman governors Ismail Pasha (1694–7) and Kara Mehmed Pasha (1699–1704), this triumvirate, for all practical purposes, ran Egypt. Al-Damurdashi, in fact, refers to Ismail Pasha's tenure as *dawlat Ismāʿīl Bāshā wa Ḥasan Āghā Bilifyā* ("the regime of Ismail Pasha and Hasan Agha Bilifya").[49] As we shall see, the pragmatically determined structure of Hasan Agha's household may have served as a model for his Qazdağlı ally.

Hasan Agha Bilifya himself is a rather enigmatic figure. Al-Jabarti notes that he was *rūmī* but does not mention when he came to Egypt. The first date al-Jabarti provides in his biography of Hasan Agha is 1085/1674–5, when Hasan became ʿAzeban agha.[50] A deed of endowment (*waqfiyya*) of 1675, however, bears his signature as former Çavuşan *kâhya*.[51] In 1087/1676–7, according to al-Hallaq, he was raised to the beylicate.[52] This sort of dubious promotion was in the seventeenth century a convenient method of removing inordinately influential regimental officers from their arenas of power. Hasan Agha was evidently able to escape the beylicate in short order; al-Jabarti has him being appointed Müteferrika Başı in 1089/1678, then Gönüllüyan agha in 1093/1682. The congeries of regimental offices that Hasan Agha held almost surely brands him as a product of the imperial palace since at the time, the aghas of the regiments and all Müteferrika officers were dispatched from Istanbul.[53] As we have seen, furthermore, both the Müteferrika and the Çavuşan were close to the governor of Egypt.

Yet Hasan Agha was also the *tābiʿ* of one Mehmed Çavuş Qiyala,[54] who evidently farmed the taxes of Shubra Qiyala in Gharbiyya subprovince, a village endowed to the imperial foundations for the Holy Cities (*Awqāf al-Ḥaramayn*). Hasan Agha himself acquired the tax farm of Bilifya, an *Awqāf* village in al-Bahnasa, and seems to have constructed a bailiwick from a cluster

[48] Al-Jabarti, *ʿAjāʾib*, vol. I, p. 234. [49] Al-Damurdashi, *Durra*, p. 52.
[50] Al-Jabarti, *ʿAjāʾib*, vol. I, p. 234.
[51] Hamza ʿAbd al-ʿAziz Badr and Daniel Crecelius, "The *Waqf*s of Shahin Ahmad Agha," *AI* 26 (1992), 86.
[52] Al-Hallaq, *Tārīḫ-i Mıṣır-ı Ḳāhire*, fo. 213. Al-Jabarti (*ʿAjāʾib*, vol. I, p. 234) does not include this information. [53] Shaw, *Financial and Administrative Organization*, p. 193.
[54] The 1958 edition of al-Jabarti's chronicle has *fiyāla*, undoubtedly either a misprint or a mistranscription of the manuscript.

of *Awqāf* villages in the vicinity.[55] This sort of sustained authority over *Awqāf* villages indicates strong ties to the Chief Black Eunuch of the Ottoman imperial harem (Kızlar Ağası or Darüssaade Ağası), who supervised the *Awqāf* from Istanbul. The Bilifya–Qiyala line may well have gone back to one or another Chief Black Eunuch or his agents, who sought to ensure an orderly flow of *Awqāf* revenues by installing their clients in *Awqāf*-related tax farms. The Chief Black Eunuch's long-term patronage may have entailed channeling his agents and their clients into key administrative posts. Mehmed Çavuş Qiyala and Hasan Agha Bilifya may both in turn have pursued this strategy, either recruiting clients from the imperial center or co-opting them once they came to Egypt, then placing them in positions that would enable them to form their own power bases. This may explain why Hasan Agha channeled Mustafa al-Qazdağlı into the Janissary corps rather than taking him into one of the regiments that Hasan Agha himself had commanded.

The triumvirate that Hasan Agha Bilifya formed with Mustafa Kâhya al-Qazdağlı and Ismail Bey the *defterdar* grew out of a muted conflict between the Bilifya household and the Faqari chieftain Ibrahim Bey b. Zülfikar, the son of Ismail Bey's *khūshdāsh* (mamluk of the same master) Zülfikar Bey, who attempted to realize a scheme of Faqari aggrandizement. This conflict does much to illustrate the nature of the Bilifya household and the tension between rank loyalties and factional loyalties at a time when the composition of Egyptian military society was in flux.

Ibrahim Bey b. Zülfikar was appointed pilgrimage commander in 1691, replacing the powerful Qasimi chieftain Ibrahim Bey Abu Shanab; Hasan Agha's son-in-law Ismail Bey, meanwhile, retained the post of *defterdar*. By allowing Faqaris to hold both posts, the Ottoman government broke with its normal practice of dividing the positions between a Faqari and a Qasimi. In pursuit of Faqari supremacy, Ibn Zülfikar attempted to manipulate the Janissary corps, which until then had been controlled by Qasimis. He eliminated three Qasimi officers,[56] thus clearing the way for the return to the Janissary corps of the ambitious lower officer Küçük Mehmed Başodabaşı. Always antagonistic to the interests of the higher officers, Küçük Mehmed had been expelled from the regiment in 1680 and again in 1686.[57]

Küçük Mehmed's cooperation with Ibn Zülfikar at first seems a bit bewildering. The *başodabaşı* is portrayed in al-Jabarti's chronicle and in secondary studies as a populist hero who defended the common soldiery and the populace at large against the abuses of the grandees, both officers and beys.[58] Yet

[55] See chapter 8, pp. 156–60.

[56] The Janissary kâhya Halil was assassinated while the *baş iḫtiyar* (head of the higher officers) Receb Kâhya and the chief scribe (*kâtib-i kebîr*) Selim Efendi were raised to the beylicate. Selim Efendi was eventually executed. See al-Damurdashi, *Durra*, pp. 12–13; al-Jabarti, *ʿAjāʾib*, vol. I, p. 230.

[57] On Küçük Mehmed's career, see al-Jabarti, *ʿAjāʾib*, vol. I, pp. 242–5; Holt, "The Career of Kūchūk Muhammad," 269–87.

[58] See, for example, al-Jabarti, *ʿAjāʾib*, vol. I, pp. 238, 241; Holt, "The Career of Kūchūk Muhammad," 285–7.

he appears to have had a personal stake in the downfall of one of the Qasimi officers, the chief scribe (*kâtib-i kebîr*) Selim Efendi. An order of 1696 reveals that the *başodabaşı* owed Selim 3,000 gold pieces (*şerifî altun*) and was also in debt to two other Janissary officers and two customs officials.[59] Yet notwithstanding Küçük Mehmed's personal grudge against Selim Efendi, Selim may have been exactly the sort of extortionate higher officer whom Küçük Mehmed is praised for opposing. Indeed, al-Damurdashi has Mustafa Kâhya al-Qazdağlı, Küçük Mehmed's eventual archfoe, arranging Selim Efendi's expulsion from the Janissaries by accusing him of withholding money from the soldiers' salaries.[60]

At first blush, the Bilifya group seems to acquiesce in Ibn Zülfikar's and Küçük Mehmed's machinations. Ismail Bey and Hasan Agha stood to profit financially from Ibn Zülfikar's program of Faqari supremacy. Shortly after being named pilgrimage commander in 1691, Ibn Zülfikar engineered the transfer of local supervision of the *Awqāf al-Ḥaramayn* from Janissary and ʿAzeban officers to beys – and almost exclusively Faqari beys, at that.[61] These positions had been assigned to the regimental officers only in 1670, as part of the reforms of Kara Ibrahim Pasha. The timing of the beylical takeover makes one suspect that it was arranged by Ibn Zülfikar in an attempt to weaken the higher regimental officers. Such a strategy would have complemented his eliminating the Qasimi officers and championing Küçük Mehmed. Meanwhile, the Faqari stranglehold on the offices of pilgrimage commander and *defterdar*, unbroken for most of the 1690s, helped to ensure Faqari control of *Awqāf* revenues once *Awqāf* supervision was attached to beylical posts. Ismail Bey, the longtime *defterdar*, would naturally have benefited from this monopoly, but so too would Hasan Agha, whose al-Bahnasa tax farm was endowed to the *Awqāf al-Ḥaramayn*. Both al-Damurdashi and al-Jabarti, in fact, have Hasan Agha conspiring with Ibrahim Bey b. Zülfikar and the governor. To quote al-Jabarti, Ibn Zülfikar "played a trick with the assistance of Hasan Agha Bilifya and incited the governor of Egypt at that time to make Receb Kâhya Mustahfizan and Selim Efendi beys (*sanājiq*)."[62] Hasan Agha seems even to have had some partiality toward Küçük Mehmed; when the *başodabaşı* was expelled from the Janissary corps in 1686, Hasan Agha had made him a *çorbacı* in the Gönüllüyan.[63]

[59] Mühimme Defteri 108, no. 1315 (beginning Ramazan 1107). The document notes specifically that Küçük Mehmed had 3,000 *şerifî altun* of Selim's money in his possession. Had Selim died heirless, this debt would probably have gone uncollected. Indeed, his assassins seem to have assumed that he had no heirs until some claimants petitioned the imperial army, thus occasioning the order. Al-Jabarti (*ʿAjāʾib*, vol. I, p. 233) asserts that Selim had no heirs.

[60] Al-Damurdashi, *Durra*, p. 14.

[61] Specifically, the Deşişet ül-Kübra to Ibrahim Bey b. Zülfikar in place of the Janissary agha, the Muhammediye to Murad Bey the *defterdar* in place of the Janissary *kâhya*, the Muradiye to Ismail Bey in place of the Janissary *baş çavuş*, and the Ḥassekiye to ʿAbdullah Bey in place of the ʿAzab *kâhya*. Of these, Murad Bey was the sole Qasimi. See Ahmad Çelebi, *Awḍaḥ*, p. 178; al-Hallaq, *Tārīḫ-i Mışır-ı Ḳāhire*, fo. 226r. Ismail Bey replaced Murad Bey as *defterdar* eight months later.

[62] Al-Jabarti, *ʿAjāʾib*, vol. I, p. 231; see also al-Damurdashi, *Durra*, p. 12.

[63] Al-Jabarti, *ʿAjāʾib*, vol. I, p. 242.

Mustafa al-Qazdağlı, the Janissary *kâhya*, lost the opportunity to supervise one of the *Awqāf al-Ḥaramayn* as a result of Ibrahim Bey b. Zülfikar's scheme, despite his complicity in the removal of the Qasimi officers from the Janissary corps. The officers' elimination, however, precipitated a higher officer–lower officer struggle between Mustafa Kâhya and Küçük Mehmed. Mustafa Kâhya, for the moment, lost; Küçük Mehmed exiled him to the Hijaz. Only in 1694 did Hasan Agha Bilifya succeed in persuading Ibrahim Bey b. Zülfikar to allow Mustafa Kâhya to return to Cairo. On his return, the disgruntled Mustafa ordered "a *sekban* [mercenary] whom he had in the district of Talkha" to assassinate Küçük Mehmed.[64]

Ibrahim Bey b. Zülfikar's flirtation with power ended not long afterward, when, in collusion with the governor, he attempted to kill his predecessor as pilgrimage commander, the Qasimi leader Ibrahim Bey Abu Shanab. There are several versions of the story in which Abu Shanab, fearing just such a plot, hides out in his harem, only to discover that a new governor has been appointed and that he has been named *qā'im maqām*, or interim governor.[65] As for Ibrahim Bey b. Zülfikar, he died shortly thereafter, in the plague of 1696.

In the wake of Ibrahim Bey b. Zülfikar's death, the Bilifya group did not choose to pursue his ruthlessly pro-Faqari program. On the contrary, a rivalry seems to have festered between Ibn Zülfikar's remaining clients and the Bilifya allies. Thus Hasan Agha Bilifya, Ismail Bey, and Mustafa Kâhya collectively deposed Ismail Pasha (1694–7) for supporting Eyüp Bey, a freedman of Ibn Zülfikar, against one of Ismail Bey's allies.[66] Al-Damurdashi, meanwhile, stresses the care with which Hasan Agha maintained a working relationship with the Qasimis, in particular Ibrahim Bey Abu Shanab. Hasan Agha, for instance, asked Abu Shanab to participate in Ismail Pasha's deposition. After Hasan Agha's death in 1704, his son-in-law Ismail Bey appears to have shared power with Abu Shanab.[67] Hasan Agha, along with Abu Shanab, appears committed to the balancing act between Faqaris and Qasimis that the Ottoman government itself pursued. This commitment seems to have been common among the household leaders of the late seventeenth century. Ibrahim Bey b. Zülfikar's scheme of Faqari supremacy, however, threatened this balance of power.

But by supporting Küçük Mehmed, a *başodabaşı*, Ibn Zülfikar also sought to curb the power of the higher officers, or *iḫtiyariye*, of whom Hasan Agha was the foremost representative. Ibn Zülfikar recognized a threat to the beyli-

[64] Al-Jabarti, *'Ajā'ib*, vol. I, p. 237. Talkha is a village on the Damietta branch of the Nile, in Sharqiyya subprovince. Accounts vary as to the identity of Küçük Mehmed's killer. Ahmad Çelebi (*Awḍaḥ*, p. 190) says merely that whoever killed Küçük Mehmed was not worth the price of a slipper on his foot.

[65] Ahmad Çelebi, *Awḍaḥ*, pp. 194–7; al-Hallaq, *Tārīḫ-i Mışır-ı Ḳāhire*, fo. 220r; 'Abdülkerim, *Tārīḫ-i Mışır*, fo. 99v; al-Damurdashi, *Durra*, p. 30 (not the identical story).

[66] Ahmad Çelebi, *Awḍaḥ*, pp. 201–2.

[67] Al-Damurdashi, *Durra*, p. 52; al-Jabarti, *'Ajā'ib*, vol. I, p. 237.

cate in the regimental officers' ascendancy. By the late seventeenth century, the officers were encroaching on the tax farms (*iltizāms*) of Egyptian villages,[68] a process that can only have been facilitated by the officers' monopoly on local supervision of the *Awqāf al-Ḥaramayn*. When Ottoman officials attempted to extract revenues from the countryside, they often went directly to these *iḥtiyariye*, sometimes empowering them as agents, or *vekils*. By acquiring strategic village tax farms, these officers came to control the flow of grain from the Upper Egyptian villages that produced it. Not only was this grain important as revenue (paid in kind); during the pilgrimage, it was transported to the Hijaz, where it was distributed to the poor of the Holy Cities and exchanged for coffee.[69] The immense fiscal and commercial importance of the Upper Egyptian villages cannot have been lost on Ibn Zülfikar when he attempted to outmaneuver the *iḥtiyariye*; neither was it lost on Hasan Agha, who was, after all, the officer/tax farmer par excellence.

One could say, then, that the point at which Hasan Agha and Ibn Zülfikar parted company was the point at which factional loyalty – in this case, to the Faqaris – was subsumed by loyalties of rank: loyalties to beys vs. loyalty to officers. Indeed, the tension between factional and rank loyalties seems to have fueled elite politics late in the seventeenth century. The peculiar genius of the Bilifya household, however, was that it did not allow either loyalty to overwhelm it. On the one hand, Hasan Agha insisted on the preservation of the two-faction system, presumably in the interest of order. On the other hand, Hasan Agha's household strategically combined officers and beys, many of whom were themselves former officers, and allowed all of them to join the game of tax-farm acquisition. Ismail Bey the *defterdar* is a case in point. An agha before marrying Hasan Agha's daughter, he acted the part of an officer/tax farmer. Along with two Janissary *kâhyas*, he served as agent (*vekil*) of the governor Hasan Pasha in extracting revenues from villages in Fayyum and Gharbiyya. He performed the same function for the chief assistant of the *ruznameci*, the keeper of the treasury's day-book, in two Jirja villages.[70]

The rivalry between the Bilifya household and that of Ibrahim Bey b. Zülfikar, then, was between two fundamentally different kinds of household. Ibn Zülfikar's household followed a design of factional and, from all appearances, beylical supremacy. The Bilifya group, in contrast, was committed to the traditional factional balance of power. Although its wealth and influence were rooted in the phenomenon of the officer/tax farmer, it did not hesitate to integrate beys into the household in the name of pragmatism. Decades later, the Qazdağlı household would adopt a variant of this pragmatic household-building strategy.

[68] See Maliyeden Müdevver 1350, a *muqāṭa'a defteri* of 1134–5/1721–3. We can assume, I believe, that these conditions indicate encroachment in the late seventeenth century.

[69] This is explained by Pococke, *A Description of the East*, vol. I, p. 204; and by Tuchscherer, "Pèlerinage," 175.

[70] Mühimme Defteri 111, no. 1002 (early Zilkade 1111/1700); 112, no. 996 (mid-Muharrem 1114/1702) and 115, no. 1454 (mid-Rebi' I 1119/1707).

Mustafa Kâhya al-Qazdağlı must certainly have been one of the foremost Bilifya officer/tax farmers although his *sekban* in Talkha, whom he allegedly urged to assassinate Küçük Mehmed, is our only evidence that he had rural holdings. Mustafa Kâhya is by far the most shadowy member of the Bilifya triumvirate. He is always present at such signal events as the deposition of Ismail Pasha, yet the extent of his powers is never clearly defined. The chronicles give the impression that Hasan Agha and Ismail Bey dominated the trio; when Kara Mehmed Pasha (1699–1704) "occupied himself with his amusements," he left the tasks of collecting revenues and paying salaries to Ismail Bey the *defterdar* and Hasan Agha Bilifya, but not specifically to Mustafa Kâhya.[71] Yet ʿAbdülkerim refers to Ismail Bey and Mustafa Kâhya as the heads of the Faqaris,[72] and clearly the imperial palace was aware of Mustafa's prominence. A formulaic order of 1110/1699, calling on all of Egypt's notables to perform the duties imposed upon them by the sultan, singles out "the Gönüllüyan agha Hasan" and "Mustafa of the *iḫtiyar* of the Mustahfizan regiment" (as *defterdar*, Ismail Bey is addressed as a matter of course).[73] This sort of usage is highly unusual in such an order; those singled out are persons in whom the central government recognizes the power to carry out its orders.

Mustafa Kâhya was no doubt regarded as such a figure of authority because of the power he wielded in the Janissary corps. We know that he amassed at least 600 followers within the corps; al-Jabarti reports that 600 "followers of Mustafa Kâhya al-Qazdağlı" defected to the ʿAzeban corps at the start of the 1711 civil war.[74] Once Küçük Mehmed had been eliminated, furthermore, Mustafa Kâhya and his party (*ṭarafuhu*) ruled the regiment with an iron hand, killing, exiling, and driving out their opponents.[75] One member of this party, Mustafa Çorbacı b. al-Husri, augmented the Janissaries' fiscal power by removing the mint from the governor's *divan*, relocating it inside the citadel's Janissary Gate, and assuming the post of director of the mint (*amīn Dār al-Ḍarb*).[76] This strategy would have enabled the Janissaries to check the debasement of the Egyptian *para*, or silver coin, and thus to curb the devaluation of their salaries.[77] By the time of its founder's death in 1704, then, the Qazdağlı household was a bastion of numerical and economic strength within the Janissary regiment.

Later Qazdağlı leaders

Still, whether a single, unified Qazdağlı household under Mustafa Kâhya's tutelage existed during the mid- to late seventeenth century is debatable. If

[71] Al-Damurdashi, *Durra*, p. 101. [72] ʿAbdülkerim, *Tārīḫ-i Mıṣır*, fo. 112r.
[73] Mühimme Defteri 111, no. 12 (mid-Zilkade 1110).
[74] Al-Jabarti, *ʿAjā'ib*, vol. I, p. 107. The clearest account I have seen of the events of the civil war is that of ʿAbdülkerim, *Tārīḫ-i Mıṣır*, fos. 128r–146v.
[75] Al-Jabarti, *ʿAjā'ib*, vol. I, p. 238.
[76] Al-Damurdashi, *Durra*, p. 75. See also Mühimme Defteri 111, no. 14 (mid-Zilkade 1110/June 1699), which registers the palace's dissatisfaction with this move.
[77] This rationale was suggested to me by Şevket Pamuk.

Mustafa were one of a large Anatolian *kapıkulu* influx, then he presumably represented only one of a large number of soldiers from the region of the Kazdağı in western Anatolia. It is at least conceivable that several groups of Qazdağlı immigrants coexisted within Egypt's soldiery toward the end of the seventeenth century but that Mustafa Kâhya distinguished himself from the pack and succeeded in organizing the household that eventually came to dominate Egypt. Correspondingly, each of these groupings could have incorporated other Anatolian, and even non-Anatolian, elements. Those *atbā'-i Qāẓṭāġī* for whom places of origin are given in the 1737 pay register include five Anatolians from a variety of districts, including Lazistan; and in addition a Bosnian and a Baghdadi. The last, in all likelihood, belonged formerly to the armies of the autonomous governors of Baghdad, and is thus perhaps a Georgian mamluk.

Certainly, the early Qazdağlıs, as depicted primarily in the pages of al-Damurdashi, lack the cohesiveness of the later household and may, in fact, belong to two or more disparate groups. The figure of Nasif Kâhya, one of eight opponents of the *başodabaşı* Ifranj Ahmed, whose expulsion from the Janissary corps triggered the 1711 civil war, is particularly enigmatic. Al-Damurdashi and al-Jabarti typically refer to him as Nasif Kâhya al-Qazdughli; al-Jabarti even claims that he is Mustafa Kâhya's nephew.[78] Yet in al-Hallaq's chronicle and in the *mühimme*, this personage is called Nasuh Kâhya with no *nisba* at all. In chronicles and imperial orders alike, Nasif is never explicitly linked to the larger Qazdağlı household but appears only in conjunction with two other ringleaders of the rebellion, Niğdeli Hasan Kâhya and Kör ("Blind") 'Abdullah Çavuş. Nasif's connection to an officer from the central Anatolian town of Niğde suggests a certain Anatolian solidarity among the rebels; at least three of the Eight, in fact, can be identified as Anatolians.[79] It is possible that Nasif was an immigrant from the Kazdağı or from another region of Anatolia who did not join Mustafa al-Qazdağlı's household or who at least diverged in some fashion from the core of the household's membership. Although no other Qazdağlı grandee is associated with Nasif's and friends' rebellion, the fact that 600 members of Mustafa Kâhya's household eventually followed the rebels into the 'Azeban corps points toward some bond between the rebels and the main Qazdağlı household. This bond may have been at least partially ethnic but may also have derived from a

[78] Al-Jabarti, *'Ajā'ib*, vol. I, p. 276. If this is so, then Nasif could be the son of the 'Ali [b.] Mehmed who appears with Mustafa [b.] Mehmed in the 1675 pay list.

[79] In Ahmad Çelebi's account (*Awḍaḥ*, p. 224), these three appear as Niğdeli Hasan Kâhya, 'Ayntablı Hasan Odabaşı, and Ahmed Çorbacı the *tābi'* of Bekir Efendi. (Bekir Efendi's household, as represented in the 1737 pay register, consisted entirely of Anatolians.) The remaining four of the Eight were Kör 'Abdullah Çavuş, Kara Ismail Kâhya, Şerif Mustafa Kâhya, and Ibrahim Odabaşı. Al-Damurdashi's list (*Durra*, p. 135) differs slightly, including 'Ayntablı Mehmed Odabaşı and Ibrahim Gedik Odabaşı, and replacing Bekir Efendi's *tābi'* Ahmed Çorbacı with Gedik Mehmed Çavuş. In the Arabic chronicles, Niğdeli Hasan's epithet is rendered نجدلي, which has been transliterated as Najdali. The Turkish rendition, however, is نكده لي.

common stake in the high officers' privileges and in the *odabaşı–çavuş–kâhya* line of promotion that Ifranj Ahmed sought to disrupt. This line of promotion was to play a decisive role in the Qazdağlis' later evolution.

Hasan Çavuş

The central Qazdağlı group headed by Mustafa Kâhya itself divided into two identifiable branches following his death in 1704: one headed by his client Hasan Çavuş, another headed by his client Süleyman Çavuş. Süleyman Çavuş seems to have followed the tradition observed among the Jalfis of the weaker, or subordinate, comrade. Although he was the patron of Ibrahim Çavuş, who would later steer the Qazdağlı household to unprecedented heights, Süleyman himself remained an obscure figure, completely overshadowed by Hasan Çavuş. Hasan was undoubtedly the older and more experienced officer; al-Jabarti has him promoting Süleyman from *çorbacı* to *odabaşı* in 1128 or 1129/1716.[80]

As for Hasan Çavuş, we know almost as little about him as we do about Mustafa Kâhya. *Sharī'a* court records examined by André Raymond refer to Hasan as Mustafa's mamluk. However, he is never referred to as such by any of the early eighteenth-century chroniclers, perhaps because they were not certain whether he was a mamluk or not.[81]

On the death of Mustafa Kâhya in 1704, according to al-Damurdashi, Hasan assumed the *dolama*, the gown signifying that one had attained the rank of çavuş.[82] He had become *baş çavuş* by 1711 and *kâhya* by 1714. Clearly, Hasan was unable simply to take over the Janissary corps from Mustafa Kâhya but was obliged to rise through the ranks; the line of promotion he followed, however, was the familiar *odabaşı–çavuş–kâhya* track favored by the dominant *kâhya* stratum. Hasan seems to have died shortly after becoming *kâhya*, to judge from al-Jabarti's comment that in 1128/1716, the followers (*atbā'*) of Hasan Çavuş shared in the headship, or *ri'āsa*, of the 'Azeban corps,[83] presumably as representative of the Qazdağlı Janissaries who had defected to the 'Azeban corps in protest against Ifranj Ahmed Odabaşı.

Hasan Çavuş's most significant action was, in fact, joining this defection to the 'Azeban in Muharrem 1122/March 1710. His role in the defection can be gleaned with some difficulty from the chronicles. *Akhbār al-nuwwāb*, 'Abdülkerim, Ahmad Çelebi, and al-Jabarti all give variations on the theme that 600 followers of the late Mustafa Kâhya, *followed* by fifteen Janissary officers, defected to the 'Azeban corps after agreeing that they could not counte-

[80] Al-Jabarti, *'Ajā'ib*, vol. I, p. 295.

[81] See, for example, 'Abdülkerim, *Tārīḫ-i Mışır*, fos. 135r, 152v.

[82] Al-Damurdashi, *Durra*, p. 120. Al-Damurdashi's wording, however, gives the impression that Hasan was already a *çavuş* when he took the *dolama*.

[83] Al-Jabarti, *'Ajā'ib*, vol. I, p. 143. The date of Hasan Kâhya's death is confirmed by André Raymond's research in the *sharī'a* court archives.

nance Ifranj Ahmed as *başodabaşı*.[84] Such an account distinguishes between the disaffected Qazdağlıs and the disaffected Janissary officers, and could be taken to mean either that the enlisted men within the Qazdağlı household acted without the consent of their officers, or that the household at this juncture did not include a significant number of officers. Al-Jabarti, however, shortly afterward refers to three *kâhya*s and ten *çorbacıs among* the defecting troops, implying that the Qazdağlıs were already well-represented within the officer ranks in 1710. *Akhbār al-nuwwāb* and al-Jabarti at length explain that Hasan Çavuş, his *khūshdāsh* Süleyman Çorbacı, and the latter's client Ibrahim Çorbacı, on returning from the pilgrimage in Safer 1122/April 1710, joined the exodus.[85] Later, an 'Azeban force assembled to counter Ifranj Ahmed's forces included those Janissaries who had joined the 'Azeban, "such as the emir Hasan, the former baş çavuş; the emir Hasan Çavuş *tābi'* al-Qazdağlı; the emir Hasan Çelebi Kâhya; and the group [*jamā'a*] of Mehmed Çavuş Gedik."[86]

The Qazdağlı exodus to the 'Azeban corps brings to light several general features of the household at this stage of its development. Foremost is the Qazdağlıs' continuing implacable opposition to radical *odabaşı* households such as those of Küçük Mehmed and Ifranj Ahmed. By 1710, moreover, the household possessed sufficient numbers to make the Janissary corps suffer if Qazdağlı interests were threatened. In countering this latest upstart *odabaşı*, however, the Qazdağlıs appeared willing to put the interests of higher officers before the interests of their own household. Hence they exhibited solidarity with the renegade Eight, who seem to have been for the most part disgruntled officers, perhaps adherents of the *odabaşı–çavuş–kâhya* promotional line that Ifranj Ahmed had violated. Hasan Çavuş's willingness to align himself with the Gedik group in this defection underscores the Qazdağlıs' commitment to the general principle of high officer privilege. The *kâhya*s who dominated the Janissary corps at this juncture came from the Gedik household, a group favored by the Qasimi chieftain Ismail Bey b. 'Ivaz; thus the Gediks were, if anything, potential rivals to the Qazdağlıs. Moreover, there was no prior tie of loyalty binding the two households. But preservation of the *kâhya*s' domination of the Janissary corps and of the *odabaşı*-to-*kâhya* promotional line was critical to the Qazdağlıs' own ascendancy within the regiment. Therefore Hasan Çavuş chose to take the side of his fellow high officers, rivals though they might be.

[84] 'Abdülkerim, *Tārīḫ-i Mışır*, fo. 127v; *Akhbār al-nuwwāb*, fo. 70r; Ahmad Çelebi, *Awḍaḥ*, p. 229; al-Jabarti, *'Ajā'ib*, vol. I, p. 107. The author of *Akhbār al-nuwwāb* refers in the first instance to "followers of the late Mustafa Kâhya al-Qazdughli"; later, he mentions "nearly 600 *nafar* who agreed with [the Eight]." Al-Jabarti does likewise although he does not give the number 600, preferring to limit himself to "many troops [*anfār*]"; he also cites fifteen officers *in addition to* the group (*ṭā'ifa*) of Mustafa Kâhya. Ahmad Çelebi gives the number of officers (*a'yān al-Yanijshariyya* [sic]) as twenty.

[85] *Akhbār al-nuwwāb*, fo. 70v; al-Jabarti, *'Ajā'ib*, vol. I, p. 108.

[86] Al-Jabarti, *'Ajā'ib*, vol. I, p. 112. *Akhbār al-nuwwāb* (fo. 75r) has only two Hasans: Hasan Çavuş al-Qazdağlı and Hasan Çelebi "who became kâhya." The latter may be Hasan Çavuş's son, who died in the plague of 1148/1735–6 (al-Jabarti, *'Ajā'ib*, vol. II, p. 48).

Finally, the circumstances of Hasan Çavuş al-Qazdağlı's defection to the ʿAzeban corps point up the heightened importance of Janissary officers in the pilgrimage caravan. Hasan Çavuş al-Qazdağlı could not join the defection at its inception because he, along with Süleyman and Ibrahim Çorbacıs, was away on the pilgrimage. Hasan served as *serdar al-qiṭār*, commanding the pilgrimage train; Süleyman as *serdar al-ṣurra*, commanding the force that met the pilgrims on their return to Egypt; and Ibrahim as *serdar Jiddawī*, overseeing the caravan when it halted at the Red Sea port of Jidda. The Janissary role in the pilgrimage had been enhanced early in the eighteenth century as declining security on the pilgrimage route made bedouin attacks more frequent. The *serdar al-qiṭār* became particularly prominent during these years and began to rival the *amīr al-ḥājj* for influence.[87] Hasan Çavuş and his two colleagues started a tradition of Qazdağlı involvement in the pilgrimage that enabled the household to build on the ties to the Hijaz that Mustafa Kâhya had forged during his service there. Good Hijazi connections were of the utmost importance in the Red Sea coffee trade, which the Janissary corps in general and the Qazdağlıs in particular came to dominate in the eighteenth century.[88]

In some respects, then, the career of Hasan Çavuş al-Qazdağlı represents a regression from the near-dictatorial sway that Hasan's patron Mustafa Kâhya had held over the Janissary corps. Yet although the Qazdağlıs were for the moment content to play a subordinate role to the Gedik officers, they retained an active commitment to the supremacy within the corps of *kâhya*s and to the line of promotion that culminated in the rank of *kâhya*. Mustafa Kâhya had come to dominate the Janissary corps through this line of promotion, and it was through this line that the Qazdağlıs would regain control of the regiment. Meanwhile, the Qazdağlı household under Hasan Çavuş acquired a hold over the conduct of the pilgrimage caravan. Their dominance seems to have been personal, rather than institutional, since the three principal pilgrimage posts were filled by Qazdağlıs at a time when the household did not yet control the top posts in the Janissary corps. Qazdağlı links to the pilgrimage and to the coffee trade would anchor the household when it eventually moved to take over the regiment. The years of Hasan Çavuş's stewardship were, in sum, years of preparation for the assumption of preponderant power in the Janissary corps.

ʿOsman Çavuş

Following Hasan Kâhya's death around 1716, his client ʿOsman Çavuş assumed control of the Qazdağlı household. Like Hasan Çavuş, ʿOsman is

[87] The culmination of this rivalry would be the confrontation between Ibrahim Çavuş al-Qazdağlı, *serdar al-qiṭār*, and ʿOsman Bey Zülfikar, *amīr al-ḥājj*, in 1738. They refused even to ride out together. See al-Damurdashi, *Durra*, p. 435.

[88] Raymond, *Artisans et commerçants*, vol. II, pp. 707ff.; Tuchscherer, "Pèlerinage," 175, 181. Raymond explains that the Janissary officers placed the overseas coffee merchants under protection (*ḥimāyet*).

identified in *sharī'a* court documents as the mamluk of his patron; chronicles and the *mühimme*, however, do not make this specification. Under 'Osman Çavuş's tutelage, the Qazdağlı household defined itself as the preeminent Janissary household and followed the general trend among the Janissaries of rivaling the beylicate for control of lucrative rural tax farms. 'Osman Çavuş achieved such authority through a shifting series of opportunistic alliances.

'Osman Çavuş's ascendancy took place in the context of the obsolescence of the Faqari and Qasimi factions, which had dominated Egypt's military cadres for nearly a century. With the deaths of the Qasimi chieftains 'Ivaz Bey in 1711 and Ibrahim Bey Abu Shanab in 1718, the Qasimi faction divided against itself. 'Ivaz's son, the young firebrand Ismail Bey, embarked on a long rivalry with Abu Shanab's mamluk Çerkes Mehmed Bey. Meanwhile, both beys tried to gain leverage against the Faqari successor household of Zülfikar Bey, a client of the Bilifya household. Alarmed at this threat to the traditional balance of power, the Ottoman chancery abruptly issued a spate of orders demanding that key offices be divided between the Faqaris and Qasimis.[89] Amidst this turmoil, the growing power of the regimental officers pressed against the beylical stratum that had heretofore dominated the two factions. A tax-farm register (*muqāṭa'a defteri*) of 1134–5/1721–3[90] attests that military officers were acquiring the tax farms of rural villages in numbers sufficient to challenge the beys' and *kāshif*s' domination of the countryside. 'Osman Çavuş al-Qazdağlı was in the vanguard of this regimental challenge.

The conflict between Çerkes Mehmed Bey and Zülfikar Bey in the late 1720s gave 'Osman Çavuş the opportunity to assert himself as an independent power. In February 1726, 'Osman joined a force of 1,500 men from all seven of Egypt's regiments who marched against Çerkes Mehmed in support of Zülfikar Bey.[91] Ostensibly, this conflict was a classic confrontation between the Faqari faction under Zülfikar Bey and the Qasimi remnant under Çerkes Mehmed. Yet 'Osman Çavuş undermined the factional antagonism of the two beys by making conciliatory gestures toward Çerkes Mehmed's party. Shortly after the battle, in which Çerkes Mehmed was put to rout, 'Osman Çavuş prevented the execution of a number of Çerkes Mehmed's supporters. The relatives whom Çerkes Mehmed had brought from "the realm of unbelief (*diyār al-kufr*)" – presumably his Circassian homeland[92] – and who were stranded in Cairo when he fled were rusticated to their holdings in the Egyptian countryside; meanwhile, three Janissary officers allied with Çerkes were merely placed under house arrest.[93] 'Osman Çavuş's machinations enraged Zülfikar Bey, who accused 'Osman Çavuş of betraying his Faqari allegiance and pressured

[89] *Mühimme-i Mısır*, vol. III, nos. 583, 584, 585, 596 (all 1138/1725–6). These appear to be the first mentions in central government orders of the two factions.
[90] Maliyeden Müdevver 1350. [91] Ahmad Çelebi, *Awḍaḥ*, p. 473.
[92] Ahmad Çelebi, *Awḍaḥ*, p. 482.
[93] Ahmed Çelebi, *Awḍaḥ*, p. 478. The three were Ahmed Agha Lahluba, Receb Kâhya, and Mehmed Çavuş the *tābi'* of 'Ali Kâhya al-Daudli.

him into exiling the officers to the Hijaz.[94] But these overtures to the Çerkesites paid off handsomely for the Qazdağlı household, for one of Çerkes' key Janissary supporters, Mehmed Çavuş al-Daudli, was obliged to install 'Osman Çavuş as agent (*vekil*) over the Daudli lands. In this case, 'Osman Çavuş had chosen regimental loyalties over factional loyalties and profited from the choice.[95] 'Osman Çavuş's patronage of the Daudlis, in fact, indicates a willingness to subvert the beylical leadership of the Faqari faction by co-opting Janissary households, whether Faqari or Qasimi, that served his interests. Thus, he asserted himself against Zülfikar Bey by expanding his hegemony over the Janissary corps.

In 1729, 'Osman Çavuş came to hold sway over the Janissary corps.[96] Though still a *çavuş*, he manipulated the post of *kâhya*, promoting and deposing candidates as pragmatism dictated. Promoted to *kâhya* himself the following year, 'Osman lashed out savagely at those Janissary households that would not be co-opted; he annihilated the Gedik household and killed two prominent members of the up-and-coming Şerifian group.[97] Ensconced in power, he ruled the regiment through fear, beating, then exiling those whom he deemed unworthy.[98]

Like his patron Hasan Çavuş, 'Osman Çavuş laid the foundations of his power while holding the rank of *çavuş*. He seems, however, to have parlayed that rank into a seat of greater authority than it had been in Hasan's day. While still a *çavuş*, 'Osman achieved a hold over the regiment unequaled since the days of Mustafa Kâhya. 'Osman also shared in the *ri'āsa* at this rank, a feat unusual for a *çavuş*.[99] Unlike Hasan Çavuş, furthermore, he was not obliged to align himself with potential rivals, such as the Gediks, but simply eliminated them.

'Osman Çavuş maintained and reinforced the connection with the pilgrimage caravan established by the previous generation of Qazdağlıs. As early as 1724, he was named *serdar* of Jidda, the officer who met the pilgrims from Egypt when they arrived in that port. In this capacity, he is praised by Ahmad Çelebi for feeding the caravan escort, as well as the poor of Mecca, in the face

[94] Ahmad Çelebi, *Awḍaḥ*, pp. 548–9. In a gripping scene, Zülfikar Bey asks 'Osman Çavuş if he is not a Faqari, then if he is not a Qazdağlı.

[95] According to Ahmad Çelebi (*Awḍaḥ*, p. 577), Zülfikar Bey settled for exiling, rather than executing, Mehmed Çavuş out of fear of 'Osman Çavuş's power. In 1732, with Zülfikar Bey safely dead, 'Osman Çavuş brought Mehmed Çavuş back from the Hijaz and reinstated him in the Janissary corps.

[96] Ahmad Çelebi (*Awḍaḥ*, p. 550) dates 'Osman Çavuş's assumption of power over the Janissary corps to Ramazan 1141/May 1729.

[97] Al-Damurdashi, *Durra*, pp. 220, 223, 362. The two Şerifians killed were Şerif Mustafa Kâhya, who had been one of the eight Janissaries who defected to the 'Azeban in 1711 (see above, n. 79), and his son Şerif Ahmed Çavuş.

[98] Ahmad Çelebi, *Awḍaḥ*, p. 570. Four people died under the beatings, but according to Ahmad Çelebi, they all deserved their fates. Ahmad Çelebi's laudatory tone could indicate popular approval of 'Osman Çavuş.

[99] In 1728, 'Osman dominated the *ri'āsa* with Zülfikar Bey, Yusuf Kâhya al-Birkawi of the 'Azeban, and Halil Efendi of the Çerakise (al-Damurdashi, *Durra*, p. 375).

of ruinous scarcity.[100] Under ʿOsman Çavuş, the Qazdağlı role in the pilgrimage was much more blatantly linked to the Red Sea coffee trade. ʿOsman's estate inventory, found among the records of Cairo's religious court, includes a stock of coffee in Jidda and holdings in several Red Sea ships.[101] In exploiting the coffee trade, ʿOsman Çavuş cultivated a tie with the Sharaybi clan of coffee and spice merchants, who by the early eighteenth century monopolized the post of *shah bandar* (literally, "lord of the port"), the head of the overseas merchants (*tujjār*). As Ahmad Çelebi reports, ʿOsman felt so great a loyalty to the *shah bandar* Qasim Çelebi al-Sharaybi that on the latter's death, ʿOsman walked behind his funeral cortège from al-Azhar to the tomb.[102]

It was most likely ʿOsman Çavuş's domination of the Janissary corps and the coffee trade, rather than the rank of *kâhya* alone, that allowed him to confiscate the estates of those Janissaries and overseas merchants who died heirless during the plague of January 1736. Al-Jabarti gives the impression that these inheritances formed the basis of ʿOsman's fortune.[103] This claim seems a bit exaggerated, for the plague occurred quite late in ʿOsman's life and career. Nonetheless, it can only have augmented his wealth. For several years already, the post of *kâhya*, along with astute commercial activity, had enabled ʿOsman to build an impressive household. Listings of ʿOsman Kâhya's followers in archival sources seem to underrepresent the size of his household. The 1737–8 pay register lists only six followers, including only one identifiable mamluk.[104] ʿOsman's estate inventory, meanwhile, lists three *kāshif*s, one former *kâhya*, one *çavuş*, three *odabaşı*s, one *çorbacı*, and one Palace eunuch.[105] The total strength of his household was much greater than indicated in either of these lists, however; the 1736 plague, Ahmad Çelebi informs us, carried off fifty-four members of ʿOsman Kâhya's household.[106] Ahmad Çelebi uses the word *bayt* to describe ʿOsman's group, implying that his entourage constituted a coherent "family," with a full complement of women, children, and servants, rather than simply a mass of partisans within the regiment.

[100] Ahmad Çelebi, *Awḍaḥ*, p. 432.

[101] Tuchscherer, "Pèlerinage," 158. The *mühimme* confirms that many Red Sea ships used to transport coffee were under Janissary protection (*ḥimāyet*).

[102] Ahmad Çelebi, *Awḍaḥ*, p. 589. The branch of the Sharaybi clan founded by al-Hajj Mehmed Dede dominated the post of *shah bandar*. The leader of another branch, Yusuf, a partisan of Ismail Bey b. ʿIvaz, became a *kāshif*, then a bey. Yusuf Bey joined Zülfikar Bey's expedition against Çerkes Mehmed Bey while Qasim Çelebi led the spice merchants in financing the expedition. See al-Damurdashi, *Durra*, pp. 295–6, 307, 371, 380; Ahmad Çelebi, *Awḍaḥ*, p. 155. On al-Hajj Mehmed, see al-Jabarti, *ʿAjā'ib*, vol. I, pp. 219ff.

[103] Al-Jabarti, *ʿAjā'ib*, vol. II, p. 48. See also al-Damurdashi, *Durra*, pp. 411–12, and Tuchscherer, "Pèlerinage," 159. ʿOsman's fellow *ri'āsa*-holders Mehmed Bey Qatamish, Yusuf Kâhya al-Birkawi, and Halil Efendi of the Çerakise meanwhile confiscated the estates of heirless "*sancak*s and aghas," ʿAzabs and guild-members, and *sipahi*s, respectively.

[104] This total comes from combining the followers of "ʿOsman Kâhya Qāẓṭāġī" and those of "ʿOsman Çavuş Qāẓṭāġī".

[105] Tuchscherer, "Pèlerinage," 157, n. 10. One Halil and one Mustafa the *ḫazinedar* (treasurer) are also listed.

[106] Ahmad Çelebi, *Awḍaḥ*, p. 608. Al-Jabarti (*ʿAjā'ib*, vol. II, p. 12) gives the figure 120.

This household no doubt had its headquarters in ʿOsman Kâhya's residence (*menzil*) in the posh western suburb of Azbakiyya rather than in the barracks within the citadel's Janissary Gate. Such a house at the very center of elite residence was one of the most important hallmarks of the power of a grandee. ʿOsman Kâhya's is, moreover, the first identifiable Qazdağlı house of which we have any evidence. While building or purchasing such a house seems to have been within the means of a *çavuş*, the rank of *kâhya* included the emoluments necessary to commission the grandiose public works known as *maʾāthir*, or "feats." ʿOsman's *maʾāthir* were considerable: he commissioned a mosque near Azbakiyya, in conjunction with a Qurʾān school over a fountain (*sabīl-kuttāb*), a bath, and irrigation works; and a sufi lodge (*zāwiya*) for the blind near al-Azhar, as well as numerous improvements to al-Azhar's dormitories, known as *riwāqs*.[107] The superintendent, or *nāẓir*, of the *waqf*s by which these structures were maintained was ʿOsman's *çırak* (protégé or apprentice) Süleyman Çavuş, who was also ʿOsman's *çuhadar* (footman), *vekil* (agent), and heir. In the last capacity, Süleyman took charge of the Qazdağlı wealth on ʿOsman Kâhya's assassination in 1736.

Under ʿOsman Çavuş, then, the Qazdağlı group took shape as a well-articulated household. Indeed, the first reference to the Qazdağlıs as a coherent group occurs in al-Jabarti's account of the conflict between Zülfikar Bey and Çerkes Mehmed Bey, when Zülfikar asks ʿOsman Çavuş if he is not a Faqari, then if he is not a Qazdağlı. ʿOsman regained the Qazdağlı hegemony over the Janissary regiment that his predecessor Mustafa Kâhya had achieved. Yet ʿOsman's accomplishments went considerably beyond those of Mustafa Kâhya. ʿOsman Çavuş made the Qazdağlı household a completely independent locus of power, despite his constant jockeying with Zülfikar Bey. The household was no longer an adjunct, however influential, of a more powerful Faqari conglomerate such as the Bilifya group. The Bilifyas, in fact, while retaining both their unique combination of regimental officers and beys and their alliance with the Qazdağlıs, had lost pride of place. Henceforward, they took the role of supporters, if not adjuncts, of the Qazdağlı household.

The Qazdağlı household under ʿOsman Çavuş, for its part, appeared ready to follow the Bilifya example by attempting a foray into the ranks of the minor subprovincial governors. The fact that ʿOsman's entourage, as recorded in his estate inventory, includes three *kāshif*s is critical for the future of the household, for it indicates a new willingness to move beyond the Janissary corps in the quest for revenues and influence, even while keeping a firm grip on the regiment. This would be the pattern that the successful branch of the Qazdağlıs

[107] On his house, see Behrens-Abouseif, *Azbakiyya and Its Environs*, pp. 55ff.; on the other structures, see al-Jabarti, *ʿAjāʾib*, vol. II, p. 48; al-Damurdashi, *Durra*, p. 411; Tuchscherer, "Pèlerinage," 158; Bayard Dodge, *Al-Azhar: A Millennium of Muslim Learning*, memorial ed. (Washington, DC, 1974). The *riwāq*s (literally, "porches") were the dormitories or colleges into which al-Azhar was divided. They were typically organized according to students' ethnicities or places of origin.

would follow for the next two decades: while the Janissary corps would remain the base of the household's power, the household would begin to encroach on the post of *kāshif* and, ultimately, that of bey.

Süleyman Çavuş

ʿOsman Kâhya was killed in a massacre staged at the home of the *defterdar* in 1736, an event that in the *mühimme* goes by the understated name *vakʿat-i shūr-angīz*, or "tumultuous incident." The massacre appears to have been a typical scheme by the Ottoman governor to eliminate the joint holders of the *riʾāsa* and seize their revenues.[108] The attackers attempted to assassinate thirteen grandees who constituted the leadership of the beylicate and all seven regiments; of these, only three survived in rather suspicious circumstances.[109]

Süleyman Çavuş "was at his patron's side at the time of his murder in the *defterdar*'s house; he suffered a great shock, grew weak, and contracted 'illness of the trachea'" – a respiratory disease that eventually killed him.[110] He received an imperial order (*ferman*) entitling him to inherit ʿOsman's land revenues, a portion of which he was to divide among ʿOsman's other *çırak*s and heirs. He ignored this proviso, however, cutting off ʿAbdurrahman Çavuş al-Qazdağlı, the son of ʿOsman's late patron Hasan Kâhya whom ʿOsman had apparently taken under his wing. Süleyman allowed ʿAbdurrahman to keep only a surplus (*fāʾiẓ*) from ʿOsman's landed revenues totaling four purses. Finding no support in the Janissary corps, ʿAbdurrahman sought refuge in the ʿAzeban regiment and was admitted by ʿAli Kâhya al-Jalfi, who had taken over that regiment following the assassination of Yusuf Kâhya al-Birkawi in the *vakʿat-i shūr-angīz*.[111] In this fashion, ʿAbdurrahman became the first Qazdağlı since ʿAbdullah Kâhya to ally with the Jalfis, who, indeed, seem to have become natural allies of disenfranchised Qazdağlıs.

Süleyman Çavuş al-Qazdağlı had, from all appearances, begun to build up a household before ʿOsman Kâhya's assassination and before he himself was promoted from *çavuş* to *kâhya* in 1739. The 1737–8 pay register lists seven followers of Süleyman Çavuş: one mamluk, four non-mamluks, and two clients

[108] *Mühimme-i Mısır*, vol. V, nos. 347–9, 352, 367 (all 1148/1736); 385, 400 (both 1149/1736–7); 428 (1150/1737–8). Al-Jabarti claims (*ʿAjāʾib*, vol. II, p. 57) that the attack was aimed primarily at the pro-Zülfikar Qatamish group, who dominated the *riʾāsa* and were in default on the fee (*ḥulvān*) for farming the taxes of the villages they controlled. Yet the fact that the *vakʿat* obliterated the leadership not only of the beylicate, but of most of the regiments as well, indicates that the governor had targeted the entire *riʾāsa*.

[109] The ten killed in the *vakʿat-i shūr-angīz* were Mehmed Bey Qatamish (*defterdar*), ʿAli Bey Qatamish (*amīr al-ḥājj*), Salih Bey Qatamish, ʿOsman Kâhya al-Qazdağlı, his ally Ahmed Kâhya al-Harputlu, Yusuf Kâhya al-Birkawi of the ʿAzeban, Halil Efendi of the Çerakise, the Gönüllüyan agha, and Salih and Hamza Çorbacıs of the Tüfenkciyan. ʿOsman Bey Zülfikar survived the attack, along with the kâhya of the Çavuşan and the Müteferrika Başı.

[110] Al-Jabarti, *ʿAjāʾib*, vol. II, p. 57. The term al-Jabarti uses for the disease is *marad al-qaṣaba*.

[111] Al-Damurdashi, *Durra*, pp. 426–7. Similar *fermans* were granted to Ibrahim Bey Qatamish and one "çavuş al-Harputlu." See also al-Jabarti, *ʿAjāʾib*, vol. II, p. 57.

who cannot be identified as one or the other.[112] Even given such small numbers, Süleyman's reliance on non-mamluks is striking. One of these non-mamluks is even a central Anatolian descendant of the Prophet by the name of Şerif Süleyman Karamanlı. Since he was appointed *kâhya* only months before his death, Süleyman lacked the funds to indulge in massive building projects. He did, however, construct a palace at Bulaq to supplement his personal residence in the old Jewish quarter near Bab Zuwayla.[113] His choice of residence is itself intriguing when one considers that he might simply have occupied 'Osman Kâhya's mansion at Azbakiyya. The commercial hub near Bab Zuwayla had been the site of Hasan Agha Bilifya's residence.[114] By choosing to reside there, Süleyman al-Qazdağlı situated himself in a bustling commercial district where textiles, flax, and coffee were unloaded and stored. His proximity to these operations was no doubt critical to his duties as 'Osman Kâhya's agent, or *vekil*, during the latter's lifetime. As 'Osman's *vekil*, Süleyman would have overseen his patron's commercial operations, including the all-important coffee trade, and the provisioning of the pilgrimage caravan.

Following the by-now-established Qazdağlı pattern, Süleyman, now a *kâhya*, was appointed *serdar qiṭār al-ḥajj* in 1739. In this capacity, he was responsible for a massive distribution of money and goods between Cairo and Mecca. His estate inventory suggests that he went heavily into debt to finance the pilgrimage; debts to the *sharīf* of Mecca, to other regimental officers, and to other Qazdağlıs are listed, as are debts to textile merchants for the robes he intended to distribute to various bedouin chieftains along the pilgrimage route.[115] The inventory attests, furthermore, that Süleyman had indeed maintained 'Osman Kâhya's commercial ties to the Hijaz and interest in the Red Sea coffee trade. Among Süleyman's holdings, the register lists fifteen Nile boats, which he used to ship goods to Suez, and a half share in a Red Sea ship which no doubt served to transport grain to the Hijaz to exchange for coffee.[116] His own agents, positioned all along the pilgrimage route, were to provision the caravan's relay stations and presumably, following the general practice of commercial *vekils*, to oversee Süleyman's commercial transactions during the pilgrimage. However, Süleyman's illness foiled this grandiose venture; he succumbed to it while encamped at Birkat al-Hajj, waiting to take the road.

Given Süleyman Kâhya's residence and the intensity of his commercial activities, it appears that he was actually closer to the daily commodities transactions on which the Qazdağlı household relied than his patron; thus it is likely that he had a large hand in amassing 'Osman Kâhya's fortune. After 'Osman's

[112] There is also one follower of a Süleyman Kâhya Qāzṭāğī, but since Süleyman Çavuş was promoted to *kâhya* only in 1739, this cannot be he. More likely, this Süleyman Kâhya is the *khūshdāsh* of Hasan Kâhya al-Qazdağlı and the patron of Ibrahim Kâhya.

[113] Tuchscherer, "Pèlerinage," 161–2. [114] Ahmad Çelebi, *Awḍah*, p. 372.

[115] Tuchscherer, "Pèlerinage," 162, 172ff. Tuchscherer notes that Süleyman also inherited some debts from 'Osman Kâhya.

[116] Tuchscherer, "Pèlerinage," 172ff. One assumes, furthermore, that Süleyman's debts must have included debts to grain merchants for the cereals that he distributed and sold in the Hijaz.

murder, Süleyman carried on his patron's thinly veiled rivalry with the household of Zülfikar Bey, now headed by Zülfikar's mamluk 'Osman Bey, who monopolized the post of pilgrimage commander. The rivalry was becoming steadily more blatant and, indeed, petty. Al-Damurdashi notes that the procession in which Süleyman Kâhya set out on the pilgrimage in 1739 was calculated to surpass that of the pilgrimage commander in splendor, thus symbolically challenging 'Osman Bey's authority to lead the pilgrimage.[117]

ᶜAbdullah Kâhya

'Osman Kâhya's unexpected murder threw the Qazdağlı household into some confusion; this confusion was all the more dangerous since under 'Osman's tutelage, the household had acquired unprecedented wealth and influence. Süleyman Kâhya bore some responsibility for this wealth and influence and evidently regarded himself as the paramount member of the household, if one may judge by his usurpation of 'Osman's estate. Süleyman's refusal to share household leadership is perhaps what led others of 'Osman Kâhya's clients to seek alliances with Süleyman's ostensible enemies, above all the household of Zülfikar Bey.

Perhaps the most graphic example of the splitting of the Qazdağlı ranks in the wake of 'Osman Kâhya's death is the case of 'Abdullah Kâhya. It is not certain that 'Abdullah Kâhya was a follower of 'Osman Kâhya; he is not specified as such in either chronicles or archival documents. Evidence exists, however, to place him at least tentatively within 'Osman Kâhya's circle. Al-Damurdashi has 'Osman Kâhya promoting 'Abdullah from *çavuş* to Janissary *kâhya al-waqt* in 1148/1736,[118] not long before 'Osman's assassination. Although no 'Abdullah Kâhya appears in the 1737–8 pay register, furthermore, one of the manumitted mamluks listed in 'Osman Kâhya's estate inventory is an 'Abdullah Kâhya.[119]

We first encountered 'Abdullah Kâhya al-Qazdağlı in the late 1730s, when, as *kâhya al-waqt* of the Janissary corps, he aligned himself with 'Osman Bey Zülfikar and 'Ali Kâhya al-Jalfi. This sort of behavior would seem to have put him at odds both with his ostensible patron, 'Osman Kâhya, and with Ibrahim Çavuş, the up-and-coming leader of the other major branch of the Qazdağlı group. 'Abdullah's case attests to the dislocations that beset the Faqari faction in the years after 1730, pitting the Qazdağlıs against the house of Zülfikar. Beyond this, however, his case illustrates how 'Osman Kâhya's death upset the Qazdağlı pecking order. The abrupt loss of such a forceful leader left something of a power vacuum that encouraged both Ibrahim Çavuş and 'Osman's chosen successor, Süleyman Kâhya, to attempt to monopolize household leadership. Caught between Süleyman Kâhya and Ibrahim Çavuş, 'Abdullah

[117] Al-Damurdashi, *Durra*, p. 436.
[118] Al-Damurdashi, *Durra*, p. 404.
[119] Tuchscherer, "Pèlerinage," 157.

Kâhya sought to define himself against both headmen by turning to their rival, ʿOsman Bey Zülfikar.

Circumstantial evidence suggests that ʿAbdullah Kâhya's attempt at self-definition may even have included a power play at the expense of ʿOsman Kâhya. ʿOsman's assassination in the *vakʿat-i shūr-angīz* gave ʿAbdullah Kâhya the *riʾāsa*, along with ʿOsman Bey Zülfikar, ʿAli Kâhya al-Jalfi, and Ibrahim Bey Qatamish. Even more suspiciously, ʿAbdullah Kâhya and ʿAli Kâhya al-Jalfi, for unexplained reasons, refused to attend the fateful gathering at the *defterdar*'s house. Against this backdrop, ʿOsman Bey Zülfikar's miraculous escape from the massacre seems almost contrived.[120] However, the *vakʿat-i shūr-angīz* resulted from a complex tangle of motives on the part of the Faqari successor households and the Qasimi remnant.[121] It is therefore risky to suggest that ʿAbdullah Kâhya al-Qazdağlı, ʿAli Kâhya al-Jalfi, and ʿOsman Bey Zülfikar simply conspired with the governor, Mustafa Pasha, to eliminate the *riʾāsa*-holders and thereby to procure their wealth. Indeed, as we have seen, the governor would later attempt a less dramatic attack on these new participants in the *riʾāsa*.

If ʿAbdullah Kâhya's relationship with ʿOsman Kâhya al-Qazdağlı were ambivalent, his relationship with Ibrahim Çavuş al-Qazdağlı, who emerged as household leader following the death of Süleyman Kâhya, was unequivocally antagonistic, if only because ʿAbdullah was firmly allied with Ibrahim's nemesis, ʿOsman Bey Zülfikar. In the land-tenure disputes examined above, ʿAbdullah Kâhya stood staunchly by ʿOsman Bey. In the decisive confrontation over Farshut in Jirja, however, ʿAbdullah seems to have taken at least a stab at peace-making; al-Damurdashi has him physically coming between ʿOsman Bey and Ibrahim Çavuş.[122] When his effort failed, ʿAbdullah Kâhya remained loyal to ʿOsman Bey, warning him that Ibrahim Çavuş intended to ambush him. This helped prompt ʿOsman's flight to Istanbul, where he strove to ingratiate himself with the central government.

Before leaving Egypt, however, ʿOsman Bey took the remarkable step of advising ʿAbdullah Kâhya to turn himself over to Ibrahim Çavuş's camp on

[120] It also seems faintly suspect that aside from ʿOsman Bey, the only two *riʾāsa*-holders to survive the attack were the two closest to the governor's *divan*: the Müteferrika Başı and the Çavuşan kâhya.

[121] The *defterdar* in whose house the massacre occurred was the Faqari grandee Mehmed Bey Ismail, the son of Ismail Bey, the son-in-law of Hasan Agha Bilifya; Mehmed Bey, in addition to representing the Bilifya "old guard," had the support of the Chief Black Eunuch al-Hajj Beshir Agha (see chapter 8, pp. 158–60). A group of Qasimi plotters was also complicit: Süleyman Bey al-Farrash, a mamluk of the ʿIvazi Mehmed Bey al-Jazzar; the former pilgrimage commander Ridvan Bey; ʿIvaz Bey's son-in-law Salih Kashif; and ʿOsman Kashif. The last two carried out some of the killings. Ahmed Kâhya al-Birkawi, follower of the slain ʿAzeban *kâhya* Yusuf al-Birkawi, was accused of purposely lagging behind his patron so as not to join him in the trap. As we have seen, he later masterminded the assassination of ʿAli Kâhya al-Jalfi. See al-Damurdashi, *Durra*, pp. 407, 413, 415, 418; Ahmad Çelebi, *Awḍaḥ*, p. 619.

[122] Al-Damurdashi, *Durra*, p. 494. The wording, *dakhala baynihim*, suggests that ʿAbdullah Kâhya was trying to keep the two from attacking each other; this was not a formal mediation effort.

the grounds that "you are [both] Qazdağlıs; you should not cut yourselves off from each other."[123] ʿOsman Bey seems to have recognized a Qazdağlı solidarity that Ibrahim Çavuş himself did not acknowledge. To Ibrahim, as to the Ottoman government, ʿAbdullah Kâhya was as much a rebel as ʿOsman Bey.[124] Although Ibrahim received ʿAbdullah hospitably, he soon procured an imperial order to exile him to Damietta. ʿAbdullah fled into the province of Damascus (Shām) but died at Jaffa.[125] The imperial treasury confiscated his wealth.

The confrontation between ʿAbdullah Kâhya and Ibrahim Çavuş represents a crisis within the greater Qazdağlı household. This crisis can be read in two ways: as a protracted working out of the post-ʿOsman Kâhya succession, or, more broadly, as the final showdown in the struggle for succession to the Faqari faction. In either case, the house of Zülfikar played its familiar role as foil to the Qazdağlıs. In the years following the final defeat of the Qasimi faction and the assassination of ʿOsman Kâhya al-Qazdağlı, however, the Qazdağlıs had reached a point beyond which a tense working relationship with the household of Zülfikar was no longer possible. A grandee was either for ʿOsman Bey Zülfikar or against him, and in choosing sides, the Qazdağlıs split. Remarkable throughout their struggles for and against ʿOsman Bey Zülfikar, though, is the persistent perception of Qazdağlı cohesion, as if the household *should* by rights form a single group. This ostensible solidarity may owe much to the institutional coherence of the Janissary regiment within which the household had evolved.[126] Yet this solidarity did not, in the final analysis, keep either ʿAbdullah Kâhya or Ibrahim Çavuş from turning against the rival branch of the household. In defeating ʿAbdullah Kâhya and ʿOsman Bey Zülfikar, Ibrahim Çavuş and his branch won control of the household and settled the question of Faqari succession.

Mehmed Kâhya al-Tawil

Arguably more typical of ʿOsman Kâhya al-Qazdağlı's followers is Mehmed Kâhya al-Tawil ("the tall"), who appears sporadically, along with certain of his followers, in the later pages of al-Damurdashi's chronicle. He apparently founded a Qazdağlı sub-household whose members all bore the epithet *ṭawīl*. Admittedly, his identification as a follower of ʿOsman Kâhya is even more tenuous than that of ʿAbdullah Kâhya. Al-Damurdashi points out that Mehmed Kâhya's client ʿAli Odabaşı donned the *dolama* and became a *çavuş* before ʿOsman Kâhya's death, as if dating the fortunes of Mehmed Kâhya's

[123] Al-Damurdashi, *Durra*, p. 506.

[124] On the Ottoman government's view of ʿOsman Bey, see chapter 5, pp. 89–90.

[125] Al-Damurdashi, *Durra*, p. 516, is vague on just who fled to Shām; al-Jabarti, *ʿAjā'ib*, vol. II, p. 75, has ʿAbdullah dying in Shām. *Mühimme-i Mısır*, vol. VI, no. 168 (1157/1744) confirms that he died in Jaffa and has ʿOsman Bey's *tābiʿ* Hüseyin being exiled to Damietta.

[126] Holt makes much the same argument in *Egypt and the Fertile Crescent*, p. 91.

own household by those of his patron. After ʿOsman Kâhya's death, Mehmed Kâhya lived opposite Ibrahim Çavuş al-Qazdağlı, in the former house of Şerif Mustafa Kâhya, one of the eight Janissary opponents of Ifranj Ahmed whose expulsion from the regiment had triggered the 1711 civil war. At the behest of Ibrahim Çavuş al-Qazdağlı, Mehmed Kâhya had his group assassinate the Qasimi ʿOsman Kashif, who had carried out some of the killings in the 1736 *vakʿat-i shūr-angīz*.[127] This was almost certainly a revenge killing for ʿOsman Kâhya.

The next we hear of Mehmed Kâhya al-Tawil is his death, which occurred shortly after he had served a year (1151–2/1738–9) as *kâhya al-waqt* of the Janissaries. In a rather bizarre scene, the Birkawi assassins of ʿAli Kâhya al-Jalfi were killed inside Mehmed al-Tawil's house by a mob who broke in while Mehmed was being buried. Mehmed's follower ʿAli, now a *çavuş*, had allowed the assassins inside when they claimed to be under the protection (*fī ʿirḍ*) of the dead man. The account implies that the two assassins took over the house, locking ʿAli Çavuş out.[128]

ʿAli Çavuş, now himself called al-Tawil, resurfaces among the forces that Ibrahim Çavuş al-Qazdağlı assembled against ʿOsman Bey Zülfikar in 1744.[129] He never reappears in al-Damurdashi's chronicle. A Hasan al-Tawil can be found resettling the sons of Ridvan Kâhya al-Jalfi following the latter's defeat at the hands of ʿAbdurrahman Kâhya al-Qazdağlı.[130] Like others of Ibrahim Çavuş's adherents, the Tawil group joined ʿAbdurrahman when he turned on Ridvan after Ibrahim's death. The Tawil group's seemingly seamless transition from followers of ʿOsman Kâhya to followers of Ibrahim Çavuş contrasts starkly with ʿAbdullah Kâhya's profound ambivalence. Perhaps this sort of behavior was more typical of the less prominent members of the Qazdağlı household. For every maverick dispossessed heir, there was perhaps an overriding number of household members who supported the headman of the moment and thus sustained the household's cohesion.

ʿAbdurrahman Çavuş

ʿOsman Kâhya's death left ʿAbdurrahman Çavuş, the son of Hasan Kâhya, in an uncomfortable limbo, deprived of his inheritance yet too young and too poorly connected to assert independent authority. When Süleyman Kâhya died, ʿAbdurrahman Çavuş replaced him as *serdar qiṭār al-ḥajj* and at long last inherited the fortune of ʿOsman Kâhya. The scene of his succession, as drawn by al-Damurdashi, is rather gripping. ʿAbdurrahman's stepfather, Süleyman

[127] Al-Damurdashi, *Durra*, p. 432; see also p. 416. In Ahmad Çelebi's chronicle, Yusuf Kashif of Giza, who killed ʿOsman Kâhya al-Qazdağlı, is later called ʿOsman Kashif (*Awḍaḥ*, p. 620). See also n. 121, above.

[128] Al-Damurdashi, *Durra*, pp. 466, 469–70. The scene is rendered all the more confusing by al-Damurdashi's apparent confusion of Mehmed Kâhya's and ʿAli Kâhya al-Jalfi's houses.

[129] Al-Damurdashi, *Durra*, pp. 496, 497, 503.

[130] Al-Damurdashi, *Durra*, p. 581.

Agha the *kâhya* of the Çavuşan corps, entered Süleyman Kâhya's tent and found him on the point of death.

When his spirit had left his body, Süleyman Agha rose and took the register [of Süleyman Kâhya's possessions] from the executor and put the keys in a trunk. Then he took the keys to the trunks, boxes, cases, and baskets, and informed ʿOsman Bey Zülfikar, who sent for the heir, ʿAbdurrahman Çavuş, and bestowed on him the *kaftan* of the *serdar qiṭār* [*al-ḥajj*]. Süleyman Agha gave him the keys, and he went to the tent [filled] with his effects and necessities.

These necessities included a large amount of ground coffee and Sitt Shuykyar, the white concubine who had previously been handed down from ʿOsman Kâhya to Süleyman Çavuş.[131]

ʿAbdurrahman al-Qazdağlı did not become *kâhya al-waqt* of the Janissary corps until 1161/1748. For the next several years, he waited in the wings, so to speak, while Ibrahim Çavuş al-Qazdağlı held power. During this period, he served as *serdar qiṭār al-ḥajj* on several occasions and commenced the astonishing building projects that still dot Cairo. His bid for power belongs to the years after Ibrahim Çavuş's death and thus lies beyond the scope of this study. It is worth noting, however, that ʿAbdurrahman Çavuş, like ʿAbdullah Kâhya, asserted himself by forgoing the pattern of alliances that ʿOsman and Süleyman Kâhyas had established. Under ʿOsman and Süleyman, the Qazdağlı household had persisted as a Faqari successor that was not above the occasional nod to the Qasimi remnant by way of pursuing its ever-more-blatant rivalry with the staunchly Faqari household of Zülfikar Bey. ʿAbdurrahman Çavuş, however, cultivated ties not only to the Qasimi remnant but also to the household of Zülfikar. He owed his inheritance to an agreement between ʿOsman Bey Zülfikar and his own stepfather, the Qasimi Süleyman Agha.[132] Süleyman Agha, for his part, seems to have cultivated ʿOsman Bey's allies ʿAbdullah Kâhya and ʿAli Kâhya al-Jalfi, to whom al-Damurdashi refers as his companions (*aṣḥāb*) at the time of Süleyman al-Qazdağlı's death. ʿAli Kâhya al-Jalfi had earlier, we will recall, offered ʿAbdurrahman refuge when ʿAbdurrahman was obliged to leave the Janissary corps. This set of alliances in all likelihood constituted ʿAbdurrahman's attempt to gain leverage against Süleyman Kâhya al-Qazdağlı, who had, after all, usurped his inheritance. These alliances centering on ʿOsman Bey Zülfikar existed as a permanent alternative to the main branch of the Qazdağlı household; they could accommodate members of the Qazdağlı household who were estranged from the household's leaders. Yet in ʿAbdurrahman's case, as in ʿAbdullah Kâhya's, these alternative alliances illustrate the fate of the Faqari faction following the

[131] Al-Damurdashi, *Durra*, p. 437; al-Jabarti, *ʿAjā'ib*, vol. III, pp. 130ff. See also Hathaway, "Marriage Alliances," 145.

[132] Süleyman Agha was a mamluk of the Qasimi Mustafa Bey al-Qird and a *khūshdāsh* of Salih Bey al-Qasimi, who would become an archenemy of Bulut Kapan ʿAli Bey in the late eighteenth century. In 1180/1766, ʿAli Bey exiled the aged Süleyman to the Delta along with all the other *khūshdāshes* of Salih Bey. See al-Jabarti, *ʿAjā'ib*, vol. II, pp. 201–2.

downfall of its last major Qasimi adversary, Çerkes Mehmed Bey, in 1730. The faction degenerated into two struggling blocs that coalesced from the successors of the Bilifya subfaction: the Qazdağlıs and the household of Zülfikar. If a grandee bore a grudge against the leader of one bloc, he had little choice but to join the other bloc. Ironically, these two post-Faqari blocs had all but taken the place of the two obsolete factions.

Conclusion

The existence of so many rival tangents within the Qazdağlı household points up the far greater complexity of the Qazdağlı conglomerate in comparison to the Jalfis. The Jalfis were a relatively simple household who seemed virtually designed to act as adjuncts and mediators rather than as movers and shakers. This quality made them ideal partners for any household that sought to fight its way to the top in the era of factional obsolescence that began in the 1730s. Hence Jalfi headmen became partners first of Zülfikar's group, then of the Qazdağlıs. The partnership of Ridvan Kâhya al-Jalfi and Ibrahim Kâhya al-Qazdağlı, to whom Ridvan was decidedly subordinate, represented the height of Jalfi wealth and influence. Following the death of Ibrahim Kâhya and Ridvan Kâhya's rout by ʿAbdurrahman Kâhya al-Qazdağlı, the Jalfis were relegated to the status of retainers to the Qazdağlıs.

Although the Qazdağlı household was much larger and more complex than the Jalfi household, what is remarkable about its first half-century of evolution is that the household was steadily dominated by one line, namely, that extending from founder Mustafa Kâhya through his client Hasan Kâhya to the latter's client ʿOsman Kâhya. The assassination of the forceful ʿOsman Kâhya, coupled with the degeneration of the factional context within which the household had grown up, left the household's leadership open to the alternative branch headed by Ibrahim Kâhya. Like the Jalfis, the Qazdağlıs used the other remnants of the Faqari faction, particularly the house of Zülfikar, as foils. Notable, in fact, is the manner in which both the Qazdağlı and Jalfi households, headquartered in the regiments, played themselves off against the bey-dominated Faqari successor households. The old tension between *sancak* and *ocak* did not disappear with the disintegration of the traditional factions.

Apart from the factional question, the evolution of the Qazdağlıs and Jalfis illustrates the importance to these two regimental households of control of the highest officer ranks and of the preservation of an orderly line of promotion through these ranks. In the case of the ʿAzeban corps, this line ran from *çorbacı* to *kâhya*, in the case of the Janissaries, from *odâbaşı* through *çavuş* to *kâhya*. While the rank of *kâhya* seems to have been the key to control of both regiments, it was arguably more critical to ascendancy within the ʿAzeban corps. With the possible exception of founding father Mustafa Kâhya, the early Qazdağlı headmen laid the foundations of their entourages, wealth, and influence while holding the rank of *çavuş*. One might go so far as to assert that

preponderant wealth and power were prerequisites for the rank of *kâhya* and that the post itself was merely the icing on the cake of power. Ibrahim Kâhya al-Qazdağlı, we are told, held the post of *kâhya al-waqt* for only three months. Still, some combination of revenues and prestige enabled *kâhya*s to undertake extensive building projects which *çavuş*es seem seldom to have attempted. It is probably no coincidence that no *ma'āthir* are mentioned for Ibrahim al-Qazdağlı until after he had risen to become a *kâhya*.[133]

It stands to reason, then, that in order to monopolize the rank of *kâhya*, the Qazdağlıs would first have had to dominate the rank of *çavuş*. To judge from the pay registers, they had accomplished this task by the 1730s, although they by no means excluded other elements from the rank of *çavuş*.[134] While consolidating their control of that rank, they strove to keep leadership of the Janissary corps out of the hands of upstart lower officers. The last serious threat from below had come from Kara Mustafa Çavuş, who was neutralized by 'Osman Çavuş in 1729.[135] The Qazdağlıs thus kept the line of promotion from *odabaşı* to *çavuş* to *kâhya* open to their own clients. These apparently entered the corps at the rank of *odabaşı* or below. On being promoted to *çavuş*, they assumed the *dolama* and were free to leave the barracks and form their own households. At this point, the group of followers within the barracks could become a household in the literal sense: it could be headquartered in a residence. Hence the importance to the *çavuş* of building, purchasing, or confiscating a large residence in a prominent location, often close to the homes of his patron or allies. The Qazdağlı household reached this stage under 'Osman Çavuş, whose house at Azbakiyya became the nerve center of Cairo's military power.

The Qazdağlıs' and Jalfis' adherence to this line of promotion attests to the hold of the regimental structure over the two households. The pattern of evolution displayed by the two households never amounted to a question of the rank of *kâhya* replacing lower ranks as a locus of power. Both households retained the institutional integrity of their respective regiments to the extent that except in extraordinary cases, one still had to serve one's time as a *çavuş* or *çorbacı* before becoming a *kâhya*. The Qazdağlıs succeeded in making the post of Janissary *çavuş* more powerful than it had ever been, then exploited the post of *kâhya* at a time when that rank had itself attained unprecedented power. In this fashion, they set the stage for their own penetration of the beylicate. It was only this leap beyond the regiment that subverted the authority of the regimental hierarchy within the household. While the rank of *kâhya* could not supplant that of *çavuş* as a locus of power, the late Qazdağlı beylicate could – and did – supplant the rank of *kâhya*, to which it owed its influence.

[133] Al-Damurdashi, *Durra*, p. 566; al-Jabarti, *'Ajā'ib*, vol. II, p. 91. Most building during his regime was undertaken by his partner Ridvan Kâhya al-Jalfi.

[134] One Niğdeli Hasan Çavuş, for example, was allied with the Qazdağlıs. In the 1737–8 pay register, Niğdeli Hasan Çavuş had more followers than any single Qazdağlı leader aside from "Qāẓṭāğī". This Hasan Çavuş is not to be confused with Niğdeli Hasan Kâhya, a ringleader of the Eight in the 1711 civil war (see above, n. 79).

[135] Ahmad Çelebi, *Awḍaḥ*, p. 356.

CHAPTER 5

The ascendancy of Ibrahim Kâhya al-Qazdağlı and the emergence of the Qazdağlı beylicate

Ibrahim Kâhya's background

Ibrahim Kâhya al-Qazdağlı came from what we might call the secondary branch of the Qazdağlı line started by Mustafa Kâhya. He was the *tābiʿ* of Mustafa Kâhya's rather obscure follower Süleyman Çavuş, who seemed content to subordinate himself to his older and more enterprising *khūshdāsh* Hasan Kâhya. Ibrahim's ethnicity cannot be determined with any certainty. The *mühimme* repeatedly refers to him by the *nisba* Kazdağlı, implying that he, like Mustafa Kâhya, came from western Anatolia. Yet the *mühimme* applies the epithet Kazdağlı to earlier household heads, such as Hasan and ʿOsman Kâhyas, whom the records of Cairo's *sharīʿa* courts indicate to have been mamluks.[1] If Ibrahim were a mamluk, he would have followed a pattern within the developing Qazdağlı household of leadership by manumitted mamluks. Like the previous generation of Qazdağlıs, furthermore, Ibrahim's generation evidently adhered to the "weaker comrade" tradition to which Ibrahim's patron Süleyman Çavuş himself had fallen victim. Thus, Ibrahim emerged as *primus inter pares* among Süleyman Çavuş's clients, the rest of whom barely warrant mention in the chronicles.[2]

Ibrahim Kâhya followed established Qazdağlı practice in using the pilgrimage as a channel of influence. We recall that at the time of the massive Qazdağlı defection to the ʿAzeban corps in 1710, Hasan Çavuş al-Qazdağlı was busy serving as *serdar qiṭār al-ḥajj* while his lesser *khūshdāsh* Süleyman held the post of *serdar al-ṣurra* and one Ibrahim Çorbacı that of *serdar Jiddawī*. If this Ibrahim were Süleyman's client, the future Ibrahim Kâhya, then he took a leading role in the pilgrimage quite early in his career. He was not promoted to *çavuş* until 1148/1735 and, while holding that rank, became *serdar qiṭār al-ḥajj* in 1151/1738.

In the course of protecting the pilgrimage caravan, Ibrahim Çavuş ran afoul

[1] *Mühimme-i Mısır*, vol. VI, nos. 418, 419, 426, 427 (all 1160/1747) and 591, 592 (both 1161/1748).

[2] The only one who is mentioned, in fact, is one Hasan Kâhya "Bıyıklı" or "Abu Shanab" (i.e., moustachioed), who appears fleetingly in al-Damurdashi (*Durra*, pp. 409, 431). The 1737–8 pay register also lists one Yusuf as the sole follower of a Süleyman Kâhya al-Qazdağlı.

of the pilgrimage commander, ʿOsman Bey Zülfikar.[3] As noted in connection with the Jalfi household, the antagonism between the two grandees culminated in their confrontation over the village of Farshut in Jirja subprovince in 1743, when Ibrahim Çavuş forced ʿOsman Bey to flee Egypt for Istanbul. This episode was a prelude to Ibrahim Çavuş's ouster of the governor Mehmed Ragıb Pasha in 1748, which later commentators have interpreted as an act of rebellion on Ibrahim's part.[4] Yet a reassessment of the power plays among the governor and the Faqari successor households following ʿOsman Bey's flight reveals that the "rebel" label was as transitory as the political alliances that occasioned its use. Such a re-examination demonstrates, furthermore, that Ibrahim Çavuş attempted to avoid being branded a rebel.

Ibrahim Çavuş's "insurrection" reconsidered

ʿOsman Bey Zülfikar fled Egypt after Ibrahim Çavuş al-Qazdağlı replaced the *kāshif* of Farshut, who belonged to ʿOsman Bey's entourage, with a *kāshif* of his own. Yet Ibrahim Çavuş had evidently secured the support of the Ottoman governor and the sultan for his action; by vehemently opposing Ibrahim Çavuş's *kāshif*, therefore, ʿOsman Bey was repudiating the wishes of the imperial government. The imperial orders dispatched to Cairo at this time make it clear that the palace regarded ʿOsman Bey, not Ibrahim Çavuş, as a rebel. The orders brand ʿOsman a rebel (*şaki*) and traitor (*ḫā'in*) and express great interest in collecting the acquisition fee, or *ḥulvān*, that ʿOsman was required to pay for the many villages whose taxes he farmed.[5] One of these was the village of Faraskur in the Delta subprovince of Buhayra, which had been set aside for the cultivation of rice destined for the imperial court; among ʿOsman Bey's many transgressions was withholding the court's rice and other provisions.[6] Despite the government's efforts to divide supervision of the pious foundations for the Holy Cities (*Awqāf al-Ḥaramayn*), furthermore, ʿOsman Bey had somehow come to be superintendent of three: the Muradiye, Ḫassekiye, and Valide Sultan *waqf*s. The orders in the *mühimme* demand that ʿOsman Bey remit to the imperial treasury the taxes levied on villages endowed to these *waqf*s.[7] ʿOsman Bey's property, the orders declared, was to be confiscated and

[3] Al-Jabarti, *ʿAjā'ib*, vol. II, p. 90. According to al-Jabarti, ʿOsman Bey felt a personal aversion to Ibrahim Çavuş.

[4] The French traveler Volney, for example, speaks of an "insurrection" (*Travels*, vol. I, p. 155). Al-Jabarti (*ʿAjā'ib*, vol. II, p. 361) speaks of Ibrahim Kâhya's "independence" (*istiqlāl*), which could conceivably mean nothing more than that Ibrahim's leadership was unchallenged.

[5] *Mühimme-i Mısır*, vol. VI, nos. 88, 89 (both 1157/1744–5), 255 (1158/1745–6). *Ḫā'in* seems a harsher accusation than *şaki*; it had been applied to Çerkes Mehmed Bey, who was regarded as a renegade. *Şaki* seems to have applied to anyone who disobeyed a sultanic order. On *ḥulvān*, see Shaw, *Financial and Administrative Organization*, p. 35.

[6] *Mühimme-i Mısır*, vol. VI, no. 89 (which has Faraskur in Tahta), 298 (1159/1746). On Faraskur, see Shaw, *Financial and Administrative Organization*, p. 15.

[7] *Mühimme-i Mısır*, vol. VI, nos. 15, 16, 127, 141 (all 1157/1744–5), 200–3 (all 1158/1745–6). On supervision of the *Awqāf al-Ḥaramayn*, see chapter 8.

sold. If the bey were caught trying to reenter Egypt, he was to be seized and executed.[8] He was, in short, to be given no quarter.

Yet once ʿOsman Bey had arrived in the imperial capital, he underwent a slow, subtle transformation in the eyes of the palace. An order from the time of his arrival notes indignantly that he had come to Istanbul without an imperial rescript (*ferman*) commanding his presence. Yet the bulk of this decree is taken up with a narrative recounting the plundering of ʿOsman Bey's house in Cairo by his victorious opponents; the account resembles a chronicle. Incredibly, ʿOsman's name, when it appears in the order, is followed by the Arabic honorific formula *dāma ʿizzuhu* ("may his glory endure"). These are hardly words one would apply to a traitor, and indeed, the document reads as if ʿOsman Bey himself were dictating to the scribe.[9] This may have been close to the truth, for the order must have been prepared in response to ʿOsman Bey's complaint about his ill treatment. The order's source for details of the situation in Egypt is thus ʿOsman's complaint itself.

Clearly, ʿOsman Bey, on his arrival in the capital, lost no time petitioning the court for redress of his grievances. His efforts quickly bore fruit, for his rehabilitation, as documented by the *mühimme*, proceeded in earnest. The court granted him permission to remain in Istanbul even though his holdings in Egypt were still to be seized and sold. In an order issued almost immediately thereafter, the Egyptian grandees were warned not to interfere with the salaries (*ʿulufe*, *cerāye*) of ʿOsman Bey's family or with the family *waqf* he had founded to provide for them. Not long afterward, his family was brought to Istanbul.[10] By 1159/1746, ʿOsman Bey had been appointed *sancak beyi* of Edirne, with the promise that his money and property in Egypt would be restored to him.[11] ʿOsman Bey and his supporters were exerting a great deal of pressure at court. They also employed more tangible means of persuasion: the order officially pardoning ʿOsman Bey shows that he had paid a "pardon tax" (*bedel-i ʿafv*) of 200 Egyptian purses in order to obtain the government's favor.[12]

Even from his self-imposed exile, ʿOsman Bey Zülfikar attempted to use the new governor and future grand vizier Ragıb Mehmed Pasha (1744–8) to effect a Zülfikarite restoration in Egypt. To accomplish this, however, ʿOsman Bey had to eliminate not only Ibrahim Çavuş al-Qazdağlı but also the other remaining Faqari successor household: the Qatamish group. This was a house-

[8] *Mühimme-i Mısır*, vol. VI, nos. 88, 93, 94, 113, 114, 140 (all 1157/1744–5).

[9] *Mühimme-i Mısır*, vol. VI, no. 126 (1157/1744). This concurs with al-Damurdashi's account (*Durra*, p. 516) of ʿOsman's telling Sultan Mahmud I how his opponents had plundered the equivalent of his *ḫulvān* from his house and lands (*bilād*). According to al-Damurdashi, Mahmud wrote a *ḫaṭṭ-ı şerīf* demanding this amount and sent it to Egypt with the famous diplomat Yirmi Sekiz Çelebi.

[10] *Mühimme-i Mısır*, vol. VI, nos. 140, 143, 144, 147, 166 (all 1157/1744–5).

[11] *Mühimme-i Mısır*, vol. VI, no. 327. Vol. VI, no. 373 (1161/1748) contains the first confirmation that he has been pardoned.

[12] *Mühimme-i Mısır*, vol. VII, no. 327 (mid-Cumaze II 1159/1746).

hold that had been founded by Mehmed Bey Qatamish, the Georgian mamluk of the Faqari chieftain Qaytas Bey, who had been executed in the chain of events set off by the 1711 civil war. Mehmed Bey Qatamish himself had been slain in the 1736 *vak'at-i shūr-angīz*. On 'Osman Bey's departure, the Qatāmisha regained the premier posts of the *ri'āsa*, which they had dominated before 1736. Ibrahim Bey Qatamish, a protégé of the late Mehmed Bey, replaced 'Osman Bey Zülfikar as *shaykh al-balad*, or headman of Cairo, while his *khūshdāsh* Halil Bey became pilgrimage commander. Meanwhile, 'Ali Bey of the Dimyati household, which farmed the customs of the port of Damietta, filled the post of *defterdar*.[13]

This new generation of Qatāmisha lost no time in running afoul of Ragıb Mehmed Pasha and of the central Ottoman government. Halil Bey Qatamish was a particularly rapacious pilgrimage commander. The black African slaves whom he purchased in preference to Caucasian mamluks or Anatolian *sarrāj*es routinely robbed the pilgrims, prompting a complaint to the governor on behalf of the Maghribi pilgrims by the outraged sultan of Morocco, Mawlay 'Abdallah. Al-Jabarti quotes Mawlay 'Abdallah's letter and Ragıb Pasha's reply, in which he brands Halil Bey a rebel (*şakî*) and vows to kill him along with "three of his companions".[14]

The death in 1746 of the powerful Chief Black Eunuch al-Hajj Beshir Agha (1717–46) gave Ragıb Pasha the opportunity to attack the Qatāmisha and the other participants in the *ri'āsa*. The ancient eunuch's demise set off an intense effort on the part of the central treasury to reclaim his wealth, which was spread all over the empire. Grain and surplus revenues (*fā'iz*) from the Egyptian villages endowed to the *Awqāf al-Ḥaramayn*, of which Beshir Agha had been superintendent,[15] were in the possession (*zimmet*) of *shaykh al-balad* Ibrahim Bey Qatamish, *defterdar* 'Ali Bey Dimyati, and 'Ömer Bey Qatamish, the son of a mamluk of Mehmed Bey Qatamish. On being asked by Beshir Agha's agent (*vekil*) to relinquish his grain, Ibrahim Bey Qatamish is said to have retorted, "The sultan can eat shit!" Nonetheless, he was willing to lease a village tax farm to the agent in return for a deposit on the grain.[16] Ibrahim Bey's obstinance evidently precipitated an imperial decree (*ḥaṭṭ-ı şerîf*) secretly

[13] Al-Damurdashi, *Durra*, pp. 523, 527, 532. *Mühimme-i Mısır*, vol. VI, no. 426 (1160/1747), refers to Ibrahim Bey Qatamish as *shaykh al-balad*.

[14] Al-Jabarti, *'Ajā'ib*, vol. II, pp. 60–1. The quoted reply is dated 16 Muharrem 1161/1748, by which time Halil Bey had already been killed. By al-Damurdashi's account (*Durra*, p. 525), Halil Bey served as *amīr al-ḥājj* in 1159–60/1746–7. Although the letters seem authentic, I suspect they should be taken with a grain of salt as al-Jabarti on occasion overinterprets his subjects' motives. The *mühimme* is curiously silent on Halil Bey's outrages.

[15] On the Chief Black Eunuch's role as superintendent (*nāẓir*) of the *Awqāf*, see chapter 8.

[16] Al-Damurdashi, *Durra*, pp. 528–31; al-Jabarti, *'Ajā'ib*, vol. II, p. 18. Two *ferman*s dated early Ramazan 1160/1147 (Topkapı Palace Archives E 5215/27 and 28) reveal that the *wakīl Dār al-Sa'āda* cited in al-Damurdashi's text was Beshir Agha's agent 'Osman Agha. The latter *ferman* bears his stamp on the reverse, with the date 1161/1748. In a *waqf* account of 1166–7/1753–4, 'Osman Agha is listed as *mültezim* of Daljamun in Minufiyya subprovince, which may therefore be the village in question. See also *Mühimme-i Mısır*, vol. VI, pp. 318, 319, 341, 342 (all 1159/1746) on reclamation of al-Hajj Beshir's revenues and possessions.

authorizing Ragıb Pasha to assassinate all the Qatāmisha, along with ʿAli Bey Dimyati, and to banish the remaining Dimyatis.

The hand of the exiled ʿOsman Bey Zülfikar, however, is evident in this imperial order. The assassinations were to be carried out by his followers, who were being kept in the house of Hüseyin Bey al-Khashshab, a protégé of ʿOsman's master Zülfikar Bey and, incidentally, a great favorite of Ragıb Pasha.[17] Ibrahim Çavuş al-Qazdağlı's designs on the *riʾāsa*, however, stood in the way of the Zülfikarite restoration. Therefore Hüseyin Bey al-Khashshab and Ragıb Pasha hatched a plot to kill Ibrahim Çavuş and his ally Ridvan Kâhya al-Jalfi. Once again, ʿOsman Bey Zülfikar lurked behind the scenes. The killing fell to a number of his mamluks who were hiding in Cairo and who were to set a trap for Ibrahim and Ridvan at al-Khashshab's house. Following the successful completion of their task, they would bring ʿOsman Bey back to Cairo. Learning of the plan, Ibrahim Çavuş confronted Ragıb Pasha and demanded a *ferman* to execute al-Khashshab. The beleaguered governor refused to order the execution of "a man who carried out the order of our lord the sultan, a follower of God and his Prophet." Ibrahim Çavuş promptly deposed him and chased al-Khashshab out of Cairo.[18]

Ibrahim Çavuş's rout of Hüseyin Bey al-Khashshab and Ragıb Pasha would have constituted an act of rebellion had the imperial government staunchly supported ʿOsman Bey Zülfikar. Yet what is remarkable about imperial policy toward ʿOsman Bey, as reflected in the *mühimme*, is its very lack of consistency. Indeed, the struggle among the Faqari successor households seems to have been duplicated in the imperial capital. The orders in the *mühimme* apply the label *şaki* ("rebel," "outlaw") to the opponents of whichever group carried the greatest weight at court. In Ramazan 1159/September 1746, just as ʿOsman Bey Zülfikar's rehabilitation was nearing completion, two orders appeared labeling both Ibrahim Çavuş al-Qazdağlı and Ridvan Kâhya al-Jalfi *şaki*. The charges reflect ʿOsman Bey's long-standing rivalry with Ibrahim Çavuş over the conduct of the pilgrimage: Ibrahim, the orders claim, had failed to deliver grain to the Holy Cities and to protect pilgrims and Egyptian villagers alike from bedouin attack. The orders seem, furthermore, to target Ibrahim's control of the Janissary regiment, through which the Qazdağlıs maintained their monopoly of the post of *serdar qiṭār al-ḥajj*. Ibrahim and his allies (*havadarlar*) are to be punished, and the proper order of the regiment is to be maintained.[19] When we recall that the *serdar qiṭār al-ḥajj*'s office depended on this official's ability to protect the pilgrimage caravan from bedouin attack, ʿOsman Bey's motives

[17] Al-Damurdashi, *Durra*, pp. 531–5; al-Jabarti, *ʿAjāʾib*, vol. II, nos. 19–20. Al-Jabarti takes his story from al-Damurdashi. On Hüseyin Bey al-Khashshab's career, see al-Damurdashi, *Durra*, pp. 344–6, 405, 459–65. [18] Al-Damurdashi, *Durra*, pp. 538–44.

[19] *Mühimme-i Mısır*, vol. VI, no. 282 (early Ramazan 1159): "*ocağımızın devām ve sebāt ve niẓāmlarımızın mustaḳarr olmasını.*" Vol. VI, no. 283 is a copy of 282 giving only the actual order to punish.

become more comprehensible. If 'Osman Bey could draw attention to his own ability to conduct a safe pilgrimage by attacking Ibrahim's incompetence, then he laid the ground for his restoration to power. Not coincidentally, an order just preceding these accusations against Ibrahim Çavuş calls 'Osman Bey *shaykh al-balad* for the first time since his flight.[20]

Still, it is unlikely that 'Osman Bey's pardon constituted an imperial endorsement of his attempt at restoration. Following established practice, the sultan may have assigned 'Osman Bey to Edirne in order to allay his efforts to return to Cairo. Not one of the most lucrative or prestigious governorships, the *sancak beyliği* of Edirne perhaps served the purpose of rewarding the persistent bey while getting him out of the capital.

Nor does the Zülfikarite restoration seem to have benefited from the proscription of the Qatāmisha that followed 'Osman Bey Zülfikar's pardon, despite the efforts of Ragıb Pasha and Hüseyin Bey al-Khashshab to turn these circumstances to Zülfikarite advantage. Instead, the imperial government seems to have regarded Ibrahim Çavuş al-Qazdağlı and his allies as the logical successors to the Qatāmisha in the *ri'āsa*. While the slain and exiled Qatāmisha are labeled *şaki* in a cluster of orders from 1747, Ibrahim Çavuş al-Qazdağlı and Ridvan Kâhya al-Jalfi are singled out as two of Egypt's leaders in much the same way that Hasan Agha Bilifya and Mustafa Kâhya al-Qazdağlı had been late in the seventeenth century.[21] Never again is either of them called *şaki*.

As for the Qatāmisha, they undergo a less spectacular version of the transformation achieved by 'Osman Bey Zülfikar. The above-mentioned series of orders from 1747 aim, as one would expect, at retrieving the unpaid fees, unremitted revenues, and possessions of the Qatāmisha, as well as those of 'Ali Bey al-Dimyati, and at auctioning off their tax farms.[22] In 1163/1750, however, two members of the Qatamish group who had fled to the Hijaz were pardoned and allowed to reside in Mecca although they were forbidden to return to Egypt.[23] Mecca may have served the same purpose for the Qatāmisha that Edirne did for 'Osman Bey Zülfikar.

The central government's benign attitude toward Ibrahim Çavuş appears in its virtual non-response to his ouster of Ragıb Pasha. The order appointing Ahmed Pasha, governor of the *sancak* of İç İl on the southern Anatolian coast, to replace Ragıb mildly terms the circumstances in which Ragıb was deposed another *vak'at-i shūr-angīz* and makes no mention of Ibrahim Çavuş.[24] On the contrary, Hüseyin Bey al-Khashshab and his followers are labeled rebels

[20] *Mühimme-i Mısır*, vol. VI, no. 279 (1159).
[21] For example, *Mühimme-i Mısır*, vol. VI, no. 418 (1160).
[22] *Mühimme-i Mısır*, vol. VI, nos. 416, 418, 419, 426, 427 (all 1160/1747).
[23] *Mühimme-i Mısır*, vol. VI, no. 583.
[24] *Mühimme-i Mısır*, vol. VI, no. 507 (1161/1748). 'Ali Pasha, the governor of Rhodes, was initially to have been appointed, but because he had to travel too great a distance, the post was given to Ahmed Pasha.

(*eşkiyā'*). In a by-now-familiar pattern, a flurry of orders demands the sale of their tax farms and the seizure of their houses.[25] This is, in fact, the pattern the central government typically followed in handling usurpatious *ri'āsa*-holders: proscription and zealous efforts to reclaim their ill-gotten wealth followed by varying degrees of leniency. In the final anaylsis, then, the imperial government regarded 'Osman Bey Zülfikar, the Qatāmisha, and al-Khashshab as no more nor less than corrupt *ri'āsa*-holders. The government certainly did not recognize any compelling need for 'Osman Bey and his allies to return to power in Cairo.

The bond between Ragıb Mehmed Pasha and Hüseyin Bey al-Khashshab is somewhat harder to fathom. Perhaps Ragıb felt grateful toward al-Khashshab and the remnants of 'Osman Bey Zülfikar's following for helping to dispatch the Qatāmisha; this is perhaps what Ragıb means when, in al-Damurdashi's account, he credits al-Khashshab with executing the sultan's order. But al-Damurdashi may exaggerate the extent of Ragıb's favoritism, for Ragıb was not rebuked or otherwise overtly punished for siding with al-Khashshab. Instead, he was appointed *nişancı*, the official who affixed the sultan's ornate signature (*tughra*) to imperial documents, then transferred to the sensitive post of tax collector (*muhassıl*) of the western Anatolian district of Aydın (ironically located near the foot of the Kazdağı). Posting to a small provincial district such as Aydın may have indicated some loss of favor, yet it may have resulted only partially from Ragıb's conduct in Egypt. Ragıb Pasha was, in any case, not unhappy to leave Cairo. "Weariness has come from governing the Mother of the World," he lamented in a poem. "It is enough, this ill-treatment by Cairo. Let us make haste to Rum."[26] His deposition cannot be considered a cataclysmic defeat, for he had weathered four years in Cairo, more than most governors.

No doubt many elements came to bear on the decline, recovery, and frustration of the Zülfikarites' fortunes and the concurrent ascendancy of Ibrahim Çavuş al-Qazdağlı. Foremost was the imperial government's standard treatment of local grandees who attempted to exploit the *ri'āsa* for their personal gain. But other factors surely played a part. If 'Osman Bey Zülfikar's follower

[25] *Mühimme-i Mısır*, vol. VI, nos. 493, 501, 502 (all 1161/1748); 573 (1162/1749); 648, 649 (1163/1750). No. 649 identifies Hüseyin Bey as *one of* the "Qatamişlu"s; however, I believe this to be an erroneous reiteration of the previous order, which speaks of "the killed and fled of the Qatamişlu, and also those who fled later: Ḫaşab Hüseyin Bey and Abaza Mehmed Bey." In addition to Abaza Mehmed Bey, the former *defterdar*, al-Khashshab's fellow rebels were granary supervisor 'Osman Bey, Sharqiyya governor Halil Bey, and former Müteferrika Başı 'Osman Bey.

[26] The poem is quoted by Ahmed Resmî Efendi in his *Ḫalîfet ül-ru'asâ'*, Istanbul, Süleymaniye Library, MS Halet Efendi 597/1, fo. 60v; see also Norman Itzkowitz, "Mehmet Raghip Pasha: The Making of an Ottoman Grand Vizier," Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University (1958), p. 127. On Ragıb's career after Egypt, see the same work, pp. 130 ff. The *muhassıl* of Aydın had been critical for the keeping of order in that troubled district during the early eighteenth century. See, for example, Mühimme Defteri 112, nos. 58, 541, 791 (all 1113/1701); nos. 853, 854, 877, 1014, 1315 (all 1114/1702).

al-Khashshab found an ally in Ragıb Pasha, it seems likely that 'Osman Bey himself found an ally at the imperial court; nothing else could explain the speed and thoroughness of his rehabilitation. But similarly, the speed with which his aspirations and those of his followers were thwarted anew suggests a power struggle in the imperial capital. The death of al-Hajj Beshir Agha, who habitually supported Faqari successors for the *ri'āsa*, perhaps dealt as heavy a blow to the Zülfikarites as it did to the Qatāmisha. A telling point in this regard is that the defeated Hüseyin Bey al-Khashshab fled not to Istanbul but to Upper Egypt, then to the Hijaz. He may have sensed that Istanbul had ceased to offer haven to defeated partisans of 'Osman Bey Zülfikar. This same depletion of court support for the Zülfikarites may have played a part in 'Osman Bey's own removal to Edirne. For his part, Ibrahim Çavuş al-Qazdağlı no doubt benefited from the sojourn in Cairo during the early 1750s of the future Chief Black Eunuch Ebukoff Ahmed Agha (1755–8), who was to become Ragıb Pasha's nemesis.[27]

In the final analysis, then, the ascendancy of Ibrahim Çavuş al-Qazdağlı resulted not from a daring rebellion but from his seeming ability to pose as the sole loyal servant to the sultan amidst a crew of self-serving opportunists. He remained prudent even while holding the *ri'āsa*; unlike his immediate predecessors, he did not withhold Egypt's tribute, the *irsāliye-i ḫazīne*, from Istanbul.[28] This canniness sustained him in power until his death while allowing him to amass enormous amounts of revenues from sources other than the *irsāliye*. Chief among these sources were, of course, the enormous rural tax farms controlled by beys.

Ibrahim Çavuş's alliance with Ridvan Kâhya al-Jalfi and penetration of the beylicate

The proscription of the house of Zülfikar and the Qatamish group, along with that of the Dimyatis, left a sizable gap in the ranks of the beys. This gap was filled to a large extent by the clients of Ibrahim Çavuş al-Qazdağlı and Ridvan Kâhya al-Jalfi. But why did Ibrahim and Ridvan choose, in this instance, to promote their own clients to the beylicate rather than relying on strategic alliances with predominantly beylical households, as their households had in the past? A few such beylical households remained with whom the Qazdağlıs had alliances of long standing, notably the much-reduced Bilifyas and the Fallahs, a household founded by a man of peasant (*fallāḥ*) origin.[29] These households continued in the Qazdağlı camp during Ibrahim's and Ridvan's duumvirate (1748–54), albeit in decidedly subordinate positions. On several

[27] Ebukoff Ahmed lived in Egypt before becoming palace treasurer (*Ḫazinedar-i Şehriyarî*) in 1754. See chapter 8, p. 163. On Ragıb's rivalry with the Chief Black Eunuch, see Itzkowitz, "Mehmet Raghip Pasha," pp. 142ff.

[28] Shaw, *Financial and Administrative Organization*, p. 7.

[29] On this latter household, see al-Jabarti, *'Ajā'ib*, vol. II, pp. 89–90.

occasions, for example, the key beylical post of pilgrimage commander was awarded to a member of the Bilifya household.[30] Notwithstanding, the *mühimme* gives the impression that by 1748 the Qazdağlıs were the only group left whom the central government considered capable of handling Egypt's affairs. Ibrahim Çavuş's willingness to challenge the most powerful beylical households directly suggests that he considered himself in the same light and had, in fact, outgrown strategic alliances.

Ibrahim Çavuş's partnership with Ridvan Kâhya al-Jalfi, in particular, was not a strategic alliance on the model of earlier Qazdağlı alliances of convenience with potential rivals such as the Gediks, Zülfikarites, and Qatāmisha. Instead, it evolved from the Jalfis' traditional role as mediators among and subordinates to more powerful households. Ridvan Kâhya, as we have seen, broke the Jalfis' historical attachment to the house of Zülfikar by siding with Ibrahim Çavuş against 'Osman Bey Zülfikar in the Farshut dispute of 1743. By the time Ragıb Pasha assumed the governorship, Ibrahim Çavuş and Ridvan Kâhya were considered a pair. When they came to dominate the *ri'āsa* in 1748, they reached an agreement whereby "[of] everything that entered Ibrahim Kâhya's hand of spices or extortion [*balṣ*], he gave one-third to Ridvan Kâhya."[31] The two officers' agreement, then, resembled the commercial partnership known as a commenda or *muḍāraba*, with Ibrahim in the role of the active partner who carried out commercial transactions and Ridvan as the passive partner who invested money but little else.[32] Ridvan may well have financed most ventures; in fact, the financial wherewithal that the rank of *kâhya* gave him no doubt made him all the more attractive to Ibrahim. The building projects that a *kâhya* could afford to fund lent legitimacy to the duumvirate and allowed it to make a permanent mark through the large-scale charitable projects known as *ma'āthir*.

Over and above the business end of the partnership, the duumvirate of Ibrahim Çavuş and Ridvan Kâhya seems to have operated according to a carefully contrived division of power. When the two began promoting their followers to the beylicate, for example, they took pains to promote the same number of clients at the same time. Essential to the duumvirate, then, was a balance of power between the households of the duumvirs. This principle of equal division was retained by those pairs of late eighteenth-century Qazdağlı beys who attempted to administer Egypt jointly.[33]

As for the followers whom Ibrahim Çavuş and Ridvan Kâhya raised to the

[30] For example, Ibrahim Bey Bilifya, a mamluk of Hasan Agha Bilifya's mamluk Mustafa Bey Bilifya. See al-Damurdashi, *Durra*, p. 508.

[31] Al-Damurdashi, *Durra*, p. 560.

[32] On the *muḍāraba*, see A. L. Udovitch, *Partnership and Profit in Medieval Islam* (Princeton, 1970), chapter 6; and S. D. Goitein, *A Mediterranean Society: The Jewish Communities of the Arab World as Portrayed in the Documents of the Cairo Geniza*, 5 vols. (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1967, 1971, 1978, 1983, 1988), vol. I, pp. 171ff.

[33] Namely, Ibrahim and Murad Beys (1783–6, 1791–8), and Ismail Bey and Hasan Bey al-Jiddawī (1786–91).

beylicate, they were in the first instance aghas of various regiments. At the time of his confrontation with 'Osman Bey Zülfikar over Farshut in Jirja, Ibrahim Çavuş supported the claim of pilgrimage commander Halil Bey Qatamish to the Jirja governorship. On Halil Bey's execution, however, Ibrahim Çavuş promoted his own client 'Osman al-Qasir,[34] agha of the Müteferrika corps, to the beylicate and installed him at Jirja. At the same time, adhering to the division of power, Ridvan Kâhya raised his client Ismail Agha of the 'Azeban to the beylicate and gave him the governorship of the Delta subprovince of Minufiyya.[35] In making these appointments, Ibrahim and Ridvan revived the late seventeenth-century pattern of promotion from agha to bey. This promotional track seems to have been a concomitant of the regimental officers' preponderance within the military elite; it had been a hallmark, for instance, of the Bilifya heyday. Furthermore, the first protégé of a *kâhya* to be promoted to bey, Mustafa, the client of Hüseyin Kâhya al-Dimyati, had been an agha. The *kâhyas*' subordination of the rank of agha enabled them to use this rank as a conduit to the beylicate.

Still, these aghas did not follow the usual path of promotion within the regiments. As a general rule, no *çavuş* who was promoted to *kâhya* rose thence to agha, thence to bey.[36] In extraordinary cases, soldiers at the rank of *çorbacı* and below, as well as men who did not belong to the regiments, could be made aghas by special fiat.[37] But in general, two distinct promotional tracks can be discerned within the regiments by the mid-eighteenth century: the *çavuş*-to-*kâhya* track, which led to control of the regiment; and the agha-to-bey track, which led to control of subprovincial governorships. The post of Janissary agha, as we have seen, had become a special case; by the late eighteenth century, furthermore, Janissary aghas not infrequently alternated between this post and that of *subaşı* or *wālī*, who joined the Janissary agha in policing Cairo.

Eschewing the alliances of convenience with post-Faqari beylical households that had been a key component of previous Qazdağlı strategy, Ibrahim Çavuş catapulted the Qazdağlı household itself into the beylicate. Direct control of key beylical posts, in particular that of pilgrimage commander, was no doubt high among his concerns. The Qazdağlı officers' increasingly testy

[34] The name is spelled قصير, corresponding to the Arabic word for "short." However, the epithet could also refer to the port of Qusayr in southern Egypt, indicating that 'Osman held the tax farm of the port. Qusayr was of relatively minor commercial importance, except for a brief efflorescence late in the eighteenth century; see Daniel Crecelius, "Some Remarks on the Importance of Qusayr in the Late Eighteenth Century," paper delivered at the Middle East Studies Association conference, Baltimore, 1987. There is no mention, however, of 'Osman's holding such a tax farm.

[35] Al-Damurdashi, *Durra*, p. 514.

[36] One of the rare exceptions was Ridvan Çavuş al-Qazdağlı, an apparent associate of 'Abdurrahman Kâhya al-Qazdağlı, who was made a bey in 1161/1748, while 'Abdurrahman was on pilgrimage. See al-Damurdashi, *Durra*, pp. 538, 544.

[37] Ahmad Çelebi (*Awḍaḥ*, p. 354) tells of the son of the 'Azeban *kâhya* Yusuf, who, angered by his father's promotion of his mamluk over his son, defected to the Janissaries and was ultimately appointed 'Azeban agha when the Qasimi chieftain Ismail Bey b. 'Ivaz appealed to the governor.

relations with long-time pilgrimage commander 'Osman Bey Zülfikar had demonstrated that the fortunes of the Janissary *serdar qiṭār al-ḥajj* could be held hostage by an antagonistic pilgrimage commander. To make matters worse, the Qazdağlıs' commercial interests were threatened by the imperial government's desire to strengthen the pilgrimage commander at the expense of the coffee merchants with whom the Qazdağlıs were intimately connected. Two orders of 1162/1749 obliged merchants plying the pilgrimage route to pay a tax on each sack (*ferde*) of coffee to the pilgrimage commander to guard them against bedouin attacks. These orders sought to reduce treasury expenditures for the pilgrimage and to keep the merchants from pocketing imperial outlays.[38] By controlling the pilgrimage command along with the coffee trade, Ibrahim Çavuş could mitigate imperial interference in any exchanges that took place between the merchants and the pilgrimage commander.

Related to control of the coffee trade and the pilgrimage command was control of the Upper Egyptian villages that produced the grain that was transported to the Holy Cities and, in some cases, traded for coffee. Ibrahim Çavuş, we will recall, was already hard at work acquiring rural tax farms for himself and his party in the days when he was still locked in rivalry with 'Osman Bey Zülfikar. Even then, the largest rural tax farms, the subprovincial governorships, were on his mind, and above all that of the massive subprovince of Jirja, the largest governorship of all and the veritable breadbasket of Egypt. Ibrahim's encroachment on Jirja, of course, triggered 'Osman Bey's flight to Istanbul. As we have seen, Ibrahim Çavuş wasted little time asserting direct authority over Egypt's breadbasket by promoting his client 'Osman Agha al-Qasir to the beylicate and making him governor of Jirja.

Indeed, concern for control of grain supplies and the pilgrimage command seems to have dictated all three of the promotions to the beylicate that Ibrahim Çavuş made during his lifetime. In addition to 'Osman Agha al-Qasir, Ibrahim Çavuş promoted 'Ali Kashif al-Qird (ultimately known as al-Ghazzawi) and Hüseyin Agha Kishkish[39]. 'Ali Bey al-Qird was already pilgrimage commander in 1162/1749 while Kishkish, after spending a year as governor (*kāshif*) of Mansura, became director (*emin*) of the central granary in Cairo. Ultimately, he would lead the pilgrimage four times, striking terror into the hearts of bedouin raiders.[40]

[38] *Mühimme-i Mısır*, vol. VI, nos. 531, 532 (both 1162). The orders claim that the merchants acquired 100 Egyptian purses a year from the pilgrimage outlays.

[39] *Qird* means "monkey" or "ape" in Arabic. Hüseyin Bey's epithet is rendered Kīsh Kīsh in a list of late eighteenth-century Egyptian beys in the Topkapı archives (E 1648/2 [1773]). The vocalization given by M. Münir Aktepe in his transcription of Şemdanizade Fındıklılı Süleyman Efendi's history, however, is Keşkeş. *Kiş* is the Persian word for a pinion feather, *keş* the Turkish word for curdled milk. Either can also mean "check" in the game of chess.

[40] Al-Jabarti, *'Ajā'ib*, vol. II, p. 305. Kishkish was ultimately murdered by the party of Bulut Kapan 'Ali Bey. 'Ali Bey al-Ghazzawi was exiled to Gaza (hence his epithet) after plotting to assassinate 'Abdurrahman Kâhya al-Qazdağlı. See Holt, *Egypt and the Fertile Crescent*, pp. 93–5.

In filling the beylicate with their clients, Ibrahim Çavuş and Ridvan Kâhya proved themselves the most successful, though hardly the only, regimental officers to infiltrate the beylicate. Clearly, these officers had determined that the future of Egypt's military leadership lay in the beylicate. For the nature of the beylicate itself had changed over the past century. No longer was promotion to bey a punishment for overly ambitious regimental officers; instead, it had become a highly desirable route to preeminent power. Shortly after Ibrahim Kâhya's death in 1754, his clients Hüseyin Kashif al-Sabunci and Küçük ʿAli Agha (the future Bulut Kapan ʿAli Bey) asked Ridvan Kâhya al-Jalfi to make them beys. To maintain Qazdağlı–Jalfi parity, Ridvan was obliged to promote two of his own followers, as well, and settled on Mehmed and ʿAli Kashifs. The fact that three of these four were already *kāshifs*, or minor subprovincial governors, indicates that preponderant power in Egypt had shifted from the regiments' largely urban base to the control of rural administration exercised by the beys in conjunction with the *kāshifs*.[41]

Perhaps in recognition of this power shift, Ibrahim Kâhya al-Qazdağlı did not trouble to groom a member of his household to succeed him as Janissary *kâhya*. Instead, he allowed ʿAbdurrahman Kâhya, son of the early eighteenth-century Qazdağlı headman Hasan Kâhya, to assume leadership of the household and of the Janissary regiment. ʿAbdurrahman Kâhya's case is instructive in itself, for it illustrates the less-than-glorious end to which the principal branch of the Qazdağlı household had come. When it proscribed the Qatāmisha and the Dimyatis, the imperial government had suspected ʿAbdurrahman Kâhya, then still a *çavuş*, of conspiring with the proscribed parties and of fleeing with them to the Hijaz. Although no evidence exists of any particular sympathy between ʿAbdurrahman and either group, al-Damurdashi does have ʿAbdurrahman performing the pilgrimage in 1161/1748 in the company of the exiled Şerif ʿAli Çavuş al-Dimyati, who died in the Hijaz. ʿAbdurrahman was eventually pardoned and restricted to the Hijaz on the same terms as the Qatāmisha; on the petition of "the higher officers [*iḫtiyariye*] of the seven regiments," however, he was allowed to return to "his place of origin" (*vaṭan-ı aslî*),[42] Egypt. The prime mover behind this intervention seems to have been Ibrahim Kâhya al-Qazdağlı himself, who in 1162/1749 had the geriatric pilgrimage commander ʿÖmer Bey al-Ihtiyar bring ʿAbdurrahman back to Cairo.[43]

While Ibrahim Kâhya lived, ʿAbdurrahman Kâhya remained virtually inactive politically. On Ibrahim's death, however, he abruptly took charge of

[41] Correspondingly, Ibrahim's protégés, or *çıraks*, in 1754 had numbered five beys (*sancaks*) and only two *çavuşes*. See al-Damurdashi, *Durra*, p. 572.

[42] *Vaṭan-ı aslî* is so defined in Kunt, "Ethnic–Regional (*Cins*) Solidarity," 135.

[43] *Mühimme-i Mısır*, vol. VI, nos. 483, 434 (both 1160/1747, citing ʿAbdurrahman as *şakî*), no. 587 (1163/1750, pardoning him); al-Damurdashi, *Durra*, pp. 538, 553.

Ibrahim's followers and used them to rout the unfortunate Ridvan Kâhya al-Jalfi. The Qazdağlı forces chased their erstwhile ally into Upper Egypt, where he died a slow, painful death from a gunshot wound to the shin.[44] Following Ridvan's ignominious demise, ʿAbdurrahman Kâhya continued to raise Ibrahim Kâhya's clients to the beylicate. ʿAbdurrahman appears never to have built a full-fledged household of his own. This seems rather an odd circumstance, considering that he had inherited the wealth of several influential officers and amassed considerable wealth through his own commercial transactions. Secondary studies have typically asserted that ʿAbdurrahman made a calculated decision to withdraw from politics, preferring instead to devote himself to building and similar good works.[45] Such an argument, however, fails to explain why ʿAbdurrahman would drum Ridvan al-Jalfi out of power so ruthlessly if he harbored no political ambitions. It is, of course, likely that ʿAbdurrahman, with no power base of his own, was manipulated by the followers of the late Ibrahim Kâhya al-Qazdağlı. These Qazdağlı clients had every reason to destroy the balance of power that Ibrahim and Ridvan had observed, for in so doing, they would relieve themselves of the obligation to share the beylical posts and the revenues that went with them with Ridvan al-Jalfi's followers. In those circumstances, however, one would have expected ʿAbdurrahman to try to build up his own following in order to avoid becoming a pawn of Ibrahim Kâhya's clients. A possible explanation for his inaction is that he made an agreement with Ibrahim Kâhya in return for his repatriation to Egypt: that, perhaps, he would not amass a military following or challenge Ibrahim's and Ridvan's duumvirate during Ibrahim's lifetime. Although there is no hard evidence for such a non-aggression pact, such an agreement would do much to explain ʿAbdurrahman's behavior. It also follows the tradition, perfected by the Qazdağlıs and Jalfis, of the subordinate or adjunct comrade. While Ibrahim Kâhya may not have sought a partnership with ʿAbdurrahman Kâhya, he may have managed to co-opt and thereby to neutralize him.

Even within the Janissary corps, ʿAbdurrahman Kâhya proved unable to assert undiluted authority. He held sway over the regiment from 1162/1749 until Ibrahim Kâhya's freedman Bulut Kapan ʿAli Bey exiled him to the Hijaz in 1178/1765. Yet in marked contrast to Ibrahim Kâhya and his other Qazdağlı predecessors, ʿAbdurrahman was never able to parlay control of the regiment into impregnable political power although he was spectacularly adept at parlaying it into personal riches and impressive buildings. Even during the years following Ibrahim Kâhya's death, ʿAbdurrahman apparently failed to amass a body of clients whom he could have guided through the Janissary ranks. The regiment's higher echelons were filled until quite late in the eighteenth century by followers of Ibrahim Kâhya; these were succeeded either by their own

[44] Al-Jabarti, *ʿAjāʾib*, vol. II, p. 110.

[45] For example, Holt, *Egypt and the Fertile Crescent*, p. 93; Crecelius, *Roots of Modern Egypt*, pp. 38, 46.

clients or by clients of Ibrahim's beylical protégés. In this fashion the late Ibrahim Kâhya's household checked ʿAbdurrahman Kâhya in the very seat of his power.

Meanwhile, the Janissary corps had come to be completely overshadowed by the beylicate, now dominated by Ibrahim Kâhya's most ambitious clients. ʿAbdurrahman was, in fact, the last Janissary *kâhya* even to flirt with decisive political power. Wealthy and influential *kâhya*s still appear in the chronicles and in archival documents, for example, Mehmed Kâhya Abaza, a mamluk of Mehmed Çorbacı al-Sabunci, whom we shall meet presently. He was promoted to *kâhya* by Bulut Kapan ʿAli Bey's freedman Mehmed Bey Abu al-Dhahab and, on attaining this rank, bought many mamluks and became very influential.[46] But his career only illustrates how the influence that had enabled the *kâhya*s to penetrate the beylicate had been turned on its head by the very Janissary household that had brought the rank of *kâhya* to the height of its power. Instead of playing kingmakers to the beys, the highest Janissary officers now served at the beys' pleasure. Remarkably, this transformation had been accomplished by Ibrahim Kâhya's household within a generation of Ibrahim's death.

Georgians and Abkhazians

We have speculated that the early Qazdağlı household, following the death of its founder, Mustafa Kâhya, comprised a leadership of largely Caucasian mamluk origin and a rank and file of substantially Anatolian origin. Nonetheless, it is impossible to be sure of the ethnicity of any particular leader or to identify any ethnic bloc within the household at large. Beginning with the household of Ibrahim Kâhya, however, the Qazdağlı household comes to be dominated by Georgian and Abkhazian mamluks. The most prominent of these are undoubtedly Ibrahim Kâhya's mamluk Bulut Kapan ʿAli Bey, later known as ʿAli Bey al-Kabir; ʿAli Bey's mamluk Mehmed Bey Abu al-Dhahab; and Abu al-Dhahab's mamluks Ibrahim and Murad Beys, all of whom were either Georgian or Abkhazian. They were part of a growing number of Georgians who were prominent in Egypt and in the Ottoman Empire at large after the collapse of the Safavid empire in Iran in 1722. The Safavids had employed Georgian mamluks on a large scale during the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries; the empire's demise freed up a source of eastern Georgian slaves for the Safavids' Ottoman neighbors. (Western Georgia had been an Ottoman sphere of influence and an important source of slaves since the late fifteenth century.) In 1724, furthermore, the Ottoman Empire and Russia signed a treaty giving the Ottomans suzerainty over all of Georgia, which they retained until 1735.[47] The Ottoman court took aggressive advan-

[46] Al-Jabarti, *ʿAjāʾib*, vol. III, p. 292. Following Mehmed Çorbacı's execution, Abaza Mehmed served in the household of Hüseyin Bey al-Sabunci.

[47] David M. Lang, *The Last Years of the Georgian Monarchy, 1658–1832* (New York, 1957), pp. 11–22, 57–8, 69, 74, 105, 114–15, 139–42. Lang notes (p. 105) that the slave trade with western

tage of this new supply of manpower, as did the Ottoman provincial elites. The autonomous governors of Baghdad, for a particularly notable example, cultivated an entourage of Georgian mamluks that ultimately came to rule the province.[48] Egypt's grandees may well have been inspired by the Baghdadi example. Military commanders from Egypt were regularly exposed to the Baghdadi Georgians since Egyptian contingents to the Iranian battlefront typically mustered in Baghdad; the governor of Baghdad was often chief field commander of these expeditions.[49] As we shall see, circumstantial evidence suggests that Egypt's grandees may have acquired Georgian mamluks from Iraq. The military salary registers reflect these varied influences: Georgia, a key source of manpower even in the 1670s, had become the single most important source of foreign soldiery in Egypt by the 1730s (see table 3.3).

The first major Egyptian household to be established by a Georgian or Abkhazian appears to have been the Qatamish household. The founder, Mehmed Bey Qatamish, was the Georgian or Abkhazian mamluk of the Faqari chieftain Qaytas Bey, a Kurd. According to al-Damurdashi, the Hawwara bedouin of Upper Egypt gave Mehmed Bey the epithet Qatamish after a sweets-seller (*helvacı*) in Cairo.[50] It is possible, however, that Mehmed Bey's epithet had a Georgian or Abkhazian source. Evliya Çelebi describes an Abkhazian tribe in the western Caucasus known as Kamish ("reed" in Turkish), and remarks: "Among these people of Kamish the children of the Abaza are sent from [?] Constantinople and Cairo."[51] The name could also conceivably derive from the western Georgian capital of Kutaisi, which the Ottomans rendered Kutā'is.

Abkhazian, or Abaza, soldiers had likewise become more numerous in Egypt. As if to corroborate the testimony of the pay lists, an Abaza beylical household came to prominence around the time of Ibrahim Kâhya's ascendancy. Although the Abazas were initially allied with Hüseyin Bey al-Khashshab and ʿOsman Bey Zülfikar, one household member, Hamza Bey Abaza, defected from the household of his patron Mehmed Bey Abaza to Ibrahim Kâhya's household.[52] Like the Circassians, the Georgians and Abkhazians were valued for their equestrian skills and prowess in warfare.[53]

This newfound concentration of Georgians and Abkhazians need not, however, point to a desire for Caucasian hegemony among Egypt's grandees

Georgia also intensified early in the eighteenth century. See also W. E. D. Allen, *A History of the Georgian People* (London, 1932; reissued New York 1971), pp. 192, 282–3, 286–7.

[48] Holt, *Egypt and the Fertile Crescent*, p. 146.

[49] Al-Damurdashi, *Durra*, pp. 55–6.

[50] Al-Damurdashi, *Durra*, p. 128.

[51] Evliya Çelebi, *Narrative of Travels*, vol. II, pp. 55–6. Orders of the early eighteenth century cite the group as *Qatamişlu taifesi*. Al-Jabarti (*ʿAjāʾib*, vol. II, pp. 49–50) contends that Mehmed Bey Qatamish was Georgian.

[52] This Hamza Bey was the mamluk of former *defterdar* Mehmed Bey Abaza, who fled Egypt with Hüseyin Bey al-Khashshab. Later, Mehmed Bey tried to sneak back into Cairo but was caught and executed.

[53] Several Georgian and Abkhazian grandees are cited for their skill in the equestrian and other martial exercises known as *furūsiyya*: for example, Hüseyin Bey Kishkish (see al-Jabarti, *ʿAjāʾib*, vol. II, p. 305).

in the mid-eighteenth century. The manner in which Ibrahim Kâhya al-Qazdağlı built up his household argues against any such calculated ethnic imperative. If we examine the clients whom Ibrahim Kâhya raised to the beylicate during his lifetime, as well as those who were promoted just after their patron's death, we find an array of defectors and hand-me-downs from other households. ʿAli Bey al-Qird, later known as al-Ghazzawi, and his brothers had been mamluks of the Chief Black Eunuch in Istanbul, while Hüseyin Bey al-Sabunci had served as treasurer (*ḫazinedar*) to Mehmed Çorbacı al-Sabunci of the ʿAzeban corps. Hamza Bey Abaza, meanwhile, defected to Ibrahim Kâhya's household from the household of Mehmed Bey Abaza. Most of these beys were Georgian or Abkhazian; however, they were acquired not solely because of their ethnicity but to reinforce Ibrahim Kâhya's and his heirs' control of the pilgrimage route to Mecca and Medina and of the tax farms of the grain-rich districts of Upper Egypt. All these beys, like those of Ibrahim's clients mentioned previously, served at various times as protectors of the pilgrimage caravan and as governors of grain-producing villages and subprovinces.[54]

So far from a program of ethnic consolidation, then, control of Upper Egypt and the pilgrimage route, as well as strong ties to the Ottoman court, seem to have been Ibrahim Kâhya's chief strategies in building a household. Nonetheless, by the time of his death, his household did contain a fair number of Abkhazians and Georgians. Toward the end of his life, when he enjoyed the influence and income of a Janissary *kâhya*, Ibrahim was no doubt able to pick and choose his mamluks, rather than recruiting disaffected and discarded members of other households. He may well have chosen to stock his household with Georgians and Abkhazians. Ridvan Kâhya may have pursued a similar strategy of amassing Georgians and Abkhazians if rather tenuous circumstantial evidence can support such a conclusion. Following their rout by ʿAbdurrahman Kâhya al-Qazdağlı and the death of their patron, the followers of Ridvan Kâhya al-Jalfi fled to Baghdad. There, we are told, they settled (*istawṭana*).[55] Baghdad was at the time under the control of autonomous Georgian mamluk governors who had been recruited by the governor Hasan Pasha and his son Ahmed.[56] One suspects that Ridvan's followers chose this highly unusual exile because they were also Georgians; they may even have come to Cairo from Baghdad.

Certainly there has been much speculation on the true ethnicity of Bulut Kapan ʿAli Bey, who begins his career modestly enough in the pages of al-

[54] On al-Qird, see al-Jabarti, *ʿAjā'ib*, vol. III, p. 158; on al-Sabunci, al-Damurdashi, *Durra*, pp. 491, 546, 549–52, and al-Jabarti, *ʿAjā'ib*, vol. II, pp. 116–18; on Hamza Bey and the Abaza household generally, al-Damurdashi, *Durra*, pp. 533, 542–4, 559.

[55] Al-Jabarti, *ʿAjā'ib*, vol. II, p. 110. Al-Damurdashi (*Durra*, pp. 581–2) has Ridvan's "*sancak*s and *sarrājūn*" turning initially to Ridvan's *khūshdāsh* Süleyman Kahya al-Jalfi, the ʿAzeban *amīn al-baḥrayn* ("administrator of the two seas," a post connected to port customs), who had taken refuge with the *kâhya* of the Çavuşan.

[56] Holt, *Egypt and the Fertile Crescent*, p. 146.

Damurdashi's chronicle as Küçük 'Ali Agha, a mamluk of Ibrahim Kâhya who was raised to the beylicate by Ridvan Kâhya al-Jalfi following his master's death.[57] Accounts of 'Ali Bey's origins seem to agree only that he began life as a Christian. The French traveler known as Volney asserts that 'Ali Bey was Abkhazian and ridicules his countryman C. E. Savary's contention, drawn from 'Ali Bey's authorized biographer, S. K. Lusignan, that 'Ali was the son of a Greek Orthodox priest.[58] Volney's opinion is shared by the eighteenth-century Ottoman scholar Şemdanizade Fındıklılı Süleyman Efendi. Fındıklılı, who accompanied the governor Rakım Pasha to Egypt in 1768 and spent a number of months there, goes on to claim that 'Ali Bey sought Abkhazian supremacy in Egypt. On hearing of Ottoman defeats by Russia, 'Ali Bey is supposed to have exclaimed: "There cannot be a more favorable time for Abkhazian assumption of power [*tasallut*] than this!"[59] His scheme was to negotiate an alliance with Russia, then encroaching on the Caucasus, that would ensure him a continuous supply of Abkhazian mamluks.[60]

Whatever the validity of these accounts, the fact that Abkhazian conspiracy theories were circulating by the time of 'Ali Bey's ascendancy indicates that the Qazdağlı household had added a sizable share of Georgian and/or Abkhazian members to its ranks during and following the tenure of Ibrahim Kâhya. Ottoman officials such as Fındıklılı Süleyman Efendi tended to respond to this ethnic concentration by evoking the stereotype of the untrustworthy, ignorant Georgian or Abkhazian, harking back to rebellious Abkhazian governors of the seventeenth century.[61]

If ethnic conglomerates emerged under Ibrahim Kâhya's successors, I would contend that they arose spontaneously, in the manner of earlier ethnic concentrations. It is, after all, natural for members of a common ethno-linguistic group to coalesce in a foreign setting. Thus, just as Anatolian soldiers banded together in the mid-seventeenth century, and just as Çerkes Mehmed Bey sought to bring his Circassian relatives to Egypt early in the eighteenth century, so some form of Georgian or Abkhazian solidarity may have emerged late in the eighteenth century.

Such natural tendencies were compounded by the pragmatic concerns of household-builders for a readily available pool of clients who could be forged into a viable household. The influx of imperial troops, or *kapıkulları*, in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries naturally resulted in an increase in Anatolian representation among the military households. This

[57] Al-Damurdashi, *Durra*, p. 467.

[58] Volney, *Travels*, vol. I, pp. 107–9 and note. Daniel Crecelius reveals Savary's debt to Lusignan and appraises all three authors' accounts in *Roots of Modern Egypt*, pp. 40–1, n. 5.

[59] Fındıklılı, *Ta'rīhi*, vol. III, p. 99.

[60] *Ibid.* A purported alliance between 'Ali Bey and Russia is the subject of several of the famous letters exchanged between Voltaire and Catherine the Great. See W. F. Reddaway (ed.), *Documents of Catherine the Great: The Correspondence with Voltaire and the Instruction of 1767 in the English Text of 1768*, reissue (New York, 1971), pp. 96, 143, 326.

[61] Kunt, "Ethnic–Regional (*Cins*) Solidarity," 233–9.

Anatolian influx was complemented, although not eclipsed, by a Georgian influx after 1724. Hence even in the early decades of the eighteenth century, the pay registers indicate primarily Georgian households within the Gönüllüyan regiment. Late in the eighteenth century, meanwhile, Ibrahim Bey, the Georgian freedman of Mehmed Bey Abu al-Dhahab, used his own cozy relations with Russia to amass an entourage of not Georgian but Russian mamluks.[62]

Such ethnic concentrations, whether spontaneous or planned, occurred in a military society that was marked by its heterogeneity. Even the early Qazdağlı grouping was, from all appearances, an ethnic hodgepodge, mingling Turks with Lazes, Bosnians, and Georgians. Both pay registers and chronicles document military personnel of a bewildering array of ethnic origins, from Armenian to Sudanese. Ethnic solidarity surely played a critical role in Egyptian military society during the middle centuries of Ottoman rule; however, we can hardly speak of calculated ethnic exclusivity in a military society whose ranks were open to Turks and Caucasians, Jewish converts and black Africans.[63] This diversity cannot be separated from the diversity of recruitment methods that Ottoman officials and provincial grandees employed in building their households. The congeries of ethnicities was part and parcel of a system that accommodated slaves, converts, and free-born Muslims from a wide range of backgrounds.

Nonetheless, we can observe greater use of mamluks to fill the highest offices, both beylical and regimental, in the years following Ibrahim Kâhya's ascendancy. Ibrahim Kâhya launched a tradition of Janissary households whose mamluks dominated the posts of Janissary agha and chief of police (*wālī* or *subaşı*) until well into the 1780s. Ibrahim's mamluk ʿAbdurrahman Agha, for example, was Janissary agha from 1758 until 1770, when he was replaced by his own mamluk Selim, who was at the time the *wālī*. Selim held the post of Janissary agha intermittently until 1786. He was replaced as *wālī* by Musa Agha, another mamluk of ʿAbdurrahman Agha.[64] The offices of Janissary agha and *wālī* were critical to the civic control of Cairo; the households that monopolized them amounted to a Janissary substratum through which Ibrahim Kâhya and the later Qazdağlıs controlled the Janissary regiment.

If we regard the purchase and promotion of mamluks as a strategy for household-building rather than an ethos, then we can reconcile the increasing prominence of mamluks in Egyptian military society after the middle of the eighteenth century with the pragmatic realities of that diverse society. Already

[62] Daniel Crecelius, "Russia's Relations with the Mamluk Beys of Egypt in the Eighteenth Century," paper delivered at the Middle East Studies Association conference, Boston, 1986, pp. 10–11. Ibrahim and Murad Beys came much closer to an alliance with Russia than ʿAli Bey had done. Their dangerous flirtation triggered the Ottoman naval invasion of Egypt in 1786.

[63] See Holt, "Beylicate," 225; Ayalon, "Studies in al-Jabarti," 316ff.

[64] Al-Jabarti, *ʿAjāʾib*, vol. III, pp. 192–4. ʿAbdurrahman Agha was out of office during part of 1766, when ʿAli Bey was exiled from Cairo.

in control of the Janissary corps, Ibrahim Kâhya came to hold sway over the entire province owing to a vacuum in the beylicate that he had helped to create. To maintain this power and to ensure the flow of revenues that went with it, he faced the challenge of controlling Egypt's rural administration, dominated by *kāshif*s and *sancak beyi*s, while keeping a tight rein on the Janissary officers who policed Cairo's civil life. The quickest and surest way to fill urban and rural, regimental and beylical posts with reliable men was to purchase mamluks from the most convenient source: the Caucasian region, and above all Georgia and Abkhazia. But purchasing mamluks in response to the problem of household-building was by no means revolutionary. Ibrahim Kâhya's revolution consisted in using this strategy to achieve simultaneous control of both the soldiery and the beylicate.

II
Qazdağlı household-building strategies

CHAPTER 6

Marriage alliances and the role of women in the household

Beginning at least with the tenure of 'Osman Kâhya, the Qazdağlı household became a full-fledged *bayt*, that is, a self-sustaining household-cum-family. It included not only the household head and at least a portion of his male clients but all the women associated with the household head: daughters, female servants, nurses, and, above all, wives and concubines. These wives and concubines were not mere accessories but were critical components of the household's membership who contributed to its evolution.

It was primarily through marriage and concubinage that women achieved their leverage in Egypt's military society. Marriage to an influential grandee gave a woman access to his wealth, of which she might stand to inherit a part, particularly if the grandee had no male heirs. By the same token, marriage to the female relative or widow of an important grandee gave an aspiring bey or officer access to her dowry and her independent wealth. But in conjunction with the material wealth it conferred, such a marriage afforded the wife of an influential grandee or the husband of a well-connected woman an enhanced political and social status. Thus, an elite marriage of this type was as much an alliance or partnership as the strategic alignments and power-sharing arrangements common among male grandees. Marriage and concubinage were the elite woman's entry into the political culture of Egypt's military elite.

We have little evidence, however, that a complex, highly articulated gendered politics evolved in Egypt on the order of the "sultanate of women," that era of intense harem influence in imperial palace politics that spanned much of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Rather, within particular households, individual wives and concubines appear to have served as sources of authority and legitimacy. The Qazdağlı household poses no exception to this rule. Therefore any discussion of marriage as a component of Qazdağlı household-building strategy must be couched in the context of marriage patterns among Egypt's elite society as a whole.

Women in Egypt's elite society appear to have acquired authority and legitimacy by fulfilling three principal roles. The wife or concubine might, first of all, cement an alliance between two households. Second, she might anchor the household, contributing to its identity and acting as a sort of family matriarch.

Finally, she might guard the household's wealth, either by protecting it from usurpers or by herself forming part of the household's heritable property.

Cementing an alliance

If a prominent household head had a daughter, it was not uncommon for him to marry her to his most prominent client: often the eldest of his clients, or the one of longest standing. In this fashion the client became the son-in-law of the household head and acquired a kinship tie to the household. The practice is comparable to the inter-dynastic marriages common among European royal households of the period, but it bears even greater resemblance to the Ottoman sultan's practice of marrying a princess to a prominent vizier. Throughout the Ottoman era, we encounter numerous grand viziers, admirals, and other lofty officials who bear the epithet *damad*, signifying that they are sons-in-law of the sultan. Indeed, several imperial sons-in-law served as governors of Egypt. No doubt the most prominent was Damad Hasan Pasha, son-in-law of Mehmed IV (1648–87) and brother-in-law of Ahmed III (1703–30), who held the governorship from 1688 to 1690 and again from 1707 to 1709, serving in between (1703–4) as grand vizier.[1] Particularly during the seventeenth century, we encounter the occasional Egyptian grandee married to the daughter of an imperial official on the spot: for example, Yusuf Bey Sihr al-Naqib – or Nakib Damadı Yusuf Bey, in the Turkish chronicles – the son-in-law of the head of the descendants of the Prophet (*naqīb al-ashrāf*), who until the eighteenth century was appointed from Istanbul.[2]

This sort of marriage, then, could link a local household to an elite household in Istanbul, such as that of the *naqīb al-ashrāf*, or even to the sultan's household. More commonly, however, it served to connect two local households or to bind an otherwise rootless client – a mamluk, a mercenary, a soldier without family – firmly to the household of his patron. Examples of the client/son-in-law abound in Egypt during both the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The powerful Hasan Agha Bilifya was closely allied with his son-in-law, the longtime *defterdar* Ismail Bey, with whom he virtually ran Egypt for most of the 1690s, in conjunction with Mustafa Kâhya al-Qazdağlı. Hasan Agha appears to have promoted Ismail from agha to bey once Ismail had married Hasan's daughter. The marriage would not only have established

[1] See Edouard de Zambaur, *Manuel de généalogie et de chronologie pour l'histoire de l'islam* (Hanover, 1927), pp. 164, 167. Hasan Pasha's wife used her influence with her brother to have Hasan Pasha recalled to Istanbul after his second term; see al-Damurdashi, *Durra*, pp. 133–4. The single most famous example of this sort of marriage is perhaps the marriage of Mihrimah Sultan, daughter of Süleyman I (1520–66), to Rüstem Pasha, who five years after his marriage became grand vizier. See Peirce, *The Imperial Harem*, pp. 72, 76–7.

[2] Al-Hallaq, *Tārīḫ-i Mıṣır-ı Ḳāhire*, fos. 204v-205r; *Akhbār al-nuwwāb*, fo. 34r; Ahmad Çelebi, *Awḍaḥ*, p. 171. In the late eighteenth century, the Bakri family, a prominent Cairene clan of *ashrāf*, came to monopolize the post.

a strong bond of loyalty between Ismail and Hasan Agha but would also have initiated a tie between the Bilifya household and the household of Ismail's original patron, Hasan Bey al-Faqari. These two households were the pillars of the Faqari bloc. Hence the marriage contributed to factional cohesion, as well.

Factional cohesion was an outmoded concern by the mid-eighteenth century, when the Faqari and Qasimi factions had been displaced by a motley crew of successor households to whom the old bipolar balance of power meant little. The most successful of these successor households, that of the Qazdağlıs, split the Faqari bloc entirely, ultimately aligning with the smaller and decidedly subordinate Jalfi household against the household of Zülfikar Bey. This alliance, of course, culminated in the duumvirate of Ibrahim Kâhya al-Qazdağlı and Ridvan Kâhya al-Jalfi, who held sway over Egypt from 1748 through 1754. On Ibrahim Kâhya's death, however, his own successors brutally routed Ridvan; thenceforward the greater Qazdağlı household reigned unchallenged until Bonaparte invaded Egypt in 1798.

But the Qazdağlıs were left to absorb the Jalfi remnant, and here, the strategic marriage could serve their purposes. Ridvan Kâhya al-Jalfi's daughter married a brother of one of Ibrahim Kâhya al-Qazdağlı's clients, who had migrated from Istanbul specifically to join Ibrahim's household. This marriage is particularly intriguing because the bride had been married previously to one of Ridvan al-Jalfi's own mamluks (see fig. 3). The groom, however, had failed to consummate the marriage. On Ridvan's death, he had fled to Baghdad and sent for his wife, but she had refused to join him. At her insistence, the marriage was annulled by a *fatwa*, or legal opinion, of the Maliki rite of Sunni Islam.[3] Evidently, the daughter of the defeated Ridvan wielded enough influence not only to repudiate the match her late father had arranged for her but to seem an asset to the Qazdağlıs as they consolidated their power.

The Jalfi–Qazdağlı marriage was not an alliance between equals but served rather to reconcile the remnant of the defeated household with its partner-turned-vanquisher. It seemed designed, indeed, to settle the disaffected Jalfi orphan, to say nothing of her newly arrived bridegroom. Particularly in the era of Qazdağlı preponderance, the marriage alliance most commonly served to integrate an unconnected client, whether male or female, into a household and to ensure his or her loyalty and obligation. Perhaps the best-known eighteenth-century example of this practice is the latter-day Qazdağlı grandee Bulut Kapan ʿAli Bey's habit of arranging marriages between prominent male and female members of his household. In 1760, he married his *khūshdāsh* Ismail Bey to the daughter of their late patron Ibrahim Kâhya; in 1766, ʿAli's

[3] Al-Jabarti, *ʿAjāʾib*, vol. III, p. 158. Al-Jabarti reports that the new bridegroom and his brothers were manumitted mamluks of "Bashīr Āghā Qizlār," i.e., the Chief Black Eunuch. The eunuch in question may be Moralı Beshir Agha, who held office from 1746 to 1752, succeeding the long-lived al-Hajj Beshir. It is conceivable that the brothers fled Istanbul in the aftermath of Moralı Beshir's execution.



Fig. 3 Partial genealogy of the Faqari faction

own sister wed his newly manumitted mamluk Mehmed Bey Abu al-Dhahab.[4]

The family matriarch

A strategic marriage of the type just examined could contribute to a household's political stature. Ismail Bey's marriage to the daughter of Hasan Agha Bilifya, for example, cemented a formidable Faqari front by binding the Bilifya household to that of Hasan Bey al-Faqari. Yet that marriage does not appear to have been essential to the development or survival of either household. Nowhere, furthermore, is there evidence that the Bilifya daughter lent legitimacy in any fashion to one household or the other. Examples do exist, however, of wives who fulfilled precisely this function: taking the role of veritable family matriarchs, they gave their households an aura of continuity.

The Jalfi household, in the years before its subordination to the Qazdağlıs, seems to have regarded the wife of the household's founder as such a matriarch. If al-Jabarti is to be believed, the Jalfi household owed its very name to the wife of Hasan Kâhya, the household's founder. The daughter of Mansur al-Zataharcı, who farmed the taxes of Sinjalf village in the Delta subprovince of Minufiyya, was known as al-Sitt al-Jalfiyya.[5] Following his marriage to her, Hasan Kâhya himself adopted the surname (*laqab*) al-Jalfi and, in fact, is sometimes mentioned in chronicles and official documents alike by this surname alone, as if his first name were superfluous.[6] The effect of this marriage, then, was presumably to give Hasan Kâhya access to the tax farm of Sinjalf through the current tax farmer's daughter. Since the village name became the sobriquet for the entire household, one suspects that the tax farm must have formed the nucleus of the household's wealth, much as the tax farm of the village of Bilifya in the Upper Egyptian subprovince of al-Bahnasa did for the household of that name. Thus, al-Sitt al-Jalfiyya became a cornerstone of the Jalfi household by providing a basic source of its wealth.

Al-Sitt al-Jalfiyya does not, however, fade completely from history once she is safely married to Hasan Kâhya. On the contrary, she seems to have remained a household matriarch of sorts for some years after her husband's death. In an intriguing episode from the Damurdashi chronicle, the arm of the mercenary Laz Ibrahim, killed in retaliation for assassinating ʿAli Kâhya al-Jalfi, is presented to al-Sitt al-Jalfiyya in return for *bakhshīsh*. In like fashion, Laz Ibrahim's head had been presented to ʿAli Kâhya's client, Ridvan Kâhya al-Jalfi.[7] ʿAli Kâhya had himself been the client of al-Sitt al-Jalfiyya's husband, Hasan Kâhya, and it is likely that she married him on

[4] On Ismail Bey, see al-Jabarti, *ʿAjā'ib*, vol. II, p. 196; and Crecelius, *Roots of Modern Egypt*, p. 45. On Abu al-Dhahab, see Crecelius, *Roots of Modern Egypt*, pp. 49–50, and the sources cited in n. 22.

[5] Al-Jabarti, *ʿAjā'ib*, vol. II, p. 52.

[6] Al-Damurdashi, *Durra*, p. 213; *Mühimme-i Mısır*, vol. I, nos. 409, 410, 412 (1127/1715).

[7] Al-Damurdashi, *Durra*, p. 470.

Hasan Kâhya's death. It appears, then, that both Ridvan and al-Sitt al-Jalfiyya had put a price on the assassin's head (or arm, as the case may have been). One might well ask whether it were normal for the wife of a slain man to join his client in exacting vengeance. In this instance, indeed, Ridvan Kâhya and al-Sitt al-Jalfiyya seem to preside over the revenge killing as joint heads of the Jalfi household.

It is difficult, however, to gauge al-Sitt al-Jalfiyya's precise function in the Jalfi household because she is only sparsely mentioned in the chronicles. This is a feature common to women in general, whether they are family matriarchs or not. Somewhat better represented, in any case, is the wife of another prominent grandee, the Qasimi chieftain Ibrahim Bey Abu Shanab. (For the sake of convenience, I shall refer to her as Mrs. Shanab.) The chroniclers do not reveal Mrs. Shanab's origins or how and why Ibrahim Bey came to marry her. Like al-Sitt al-Jalfiyya, however, Mrs. Shanab appears as a formidable presence within her household after her husband's death, almost as if she had in some respects taken his place as symbolic head of the household. On a few occasions, the chronicler Ahmad Çelebi refers to her as *al-mar'āh* ("the woman" in Arabic), which is no doubt intended to be taken in the sense of "the lady," a sobriquet implying respect for her stature.[8] When the body of her son, Mehmed Bey Shanab, who had died in hiding in 1726, was discovered by his Faqari opponents, it was given to her for burial. On this occasion, the Ottoman governor tells Mrs. Shanab: "Better you had given birth to a stone than to him," and reproaches the corpse: "You are the cause of the destruction of your father's house."[9] His remarks could imply that he holds Mrs. Shanab responsible for producing a son who undid all the work of her illustrious husband. On the other hand, there is a sense of commiseration with Mrs. Shanab, whose son has betrayed both his parents. The governor soon had the Shanab house razed, thereby demonstrating that despite Mrs. Shanab's prestige and although she was not liable for her son's misdeeds, the household could not be sustained by a widow who was not married to one of her late husband's clients and who had no living son.

In general, the Arabic chronicles give the impression that the older generation of household leaders – the generation of Ibrahim Bey Abu Shanab, Hasan Kâhya al-Jalfi, and Hasan Agha Bilifya – were less bellicose and more politically astute than their successors. The wives of these elder statesmen seem to share the respect accorded their husbands. But they also derived prestige from being the mothers of the younger generation of grandees who were heirs to the leadership of their fathers' households; in this sense, they were literally household matriarchs. Although Mrs. Shanab's immense prestige owed much to her husband, the "grand old man" Ibrahim Bey Abu Shanab, she also drew stature from being the mother of Abu Shanab's son and heir to his household, Mehmed Bey Shanab. It must therefore have been an immense disappointment

[8] Ahmad Çelebi, *Awḍaḥ*, p. 480. [9] Al-Damurdashi, *Durra*, pp. 326–7.



Fig. 4 Partial genealogy of the Qasimi faction

to her to see her son destroy the alliances and squander the wealth that his father had carefully nurtured.

This is not to say, however, that the status of Mrs. Shanab and other elite women rested entirely on that of the men with whom they were connected. The wife of a grandee lived in the thick of political intrigue and was likely to be a skilled political operator herself. As first ladies and matriarchs, furthermore, women attained political influence that did not disappear with the deaths of their husbands, patrons, or sons. In decorous widowhood, they assumed a sort of elder stateswoman or dowager status from which the households and factions to which they belonged derived prestige. The chroniclers leave no doubt that Mrs. Shanab, al-Sitt al-Jalfiyya, and other prominent widows of their generation were just such political adepts.

Wives and household wealth

Wives as guardians of household property

The breakdown of traditional factional allegiances during the succeeding generation gave elite women greater opportunity to display their political acumen. In the early 1700s, the Faqari and Qasimi factions splintered into fractious successor groups. While the Faqari faction weathered a muted internal rivalry between the Qazdağlı household and that of Zülfikar Bey, the Qasimis split completely asunder as a result of the competing ambitions of the successors of Ibrahim Bey Abu Shanab and those of his *khūshdāsh* 'Ivaz Bey. Abu Shanab's mamluk Çerkes Mehmed Bey became the mortal enemy of 'Ivaz Bey's son Ismail Bey, going so far as to join the Faqari remnant's schemes against Ismail Bey's party.

In a highly charged atmosphere in which today's ally could easily become tomorrow's deadly foe, women found themselves intruding in the political arena more visibly than they ever had before. Perhaps the most striking example of such a politically active woman is the sister of the wealthy and immensely popular Ismail Bey b. 'Ivaz, who was, naturally, a highly desirable match for any of her brother's adherents. She was known as Hanım bint 'Ivaz; *hanım*, the Turkish equivalent of "Miss" or "Lady," is unquestionably a title of respect. Owing to the deadly infighting among Egypt's grandees, Hanım was married, then widowed by a succession of prominent 'Ivazis. Significantly, the Arabic chronicles give her second and third husbands the sobriquet *zawj Hanım* ("husband of Hanım"), indicating the prestige accruing from marrying this woman, who as the years passed must have been acquiring the hallowed status of 'Ivazi first lady, if not matriarch.

Hanım bint 'Ivaz was no mere figurehead, however, but played a critical part in keeping the 'Ivazis' wealth out of the clutches of their opponents. When a governor antagonistic to her brother arrived in Egypt in 1720 and began plotting to kill him, Hanım wasted no time in dividing up and redistributing all Ibn 'Ivaz Bey's property, as well as that of his murdered followers, so that the

governor could not lay hands on it.[10] She took the same course of action when each of her three husbands was assassinated. Recounting the third occasion, the chronicler al-Damurdashi tellingly calls her "the household head [*al-qahramāna*] bint 'Ivaz Bey Hanım."[11]

The issue of the wealth of one of Hanım's murdered husbands allows us to observe an intriguing instance of gender solidarity that transcended the Shanabi–'Ivazi antagonism. Al-Damurdashi recounts how in 1724, the assassins of Hanım's first husband, her brother's ally 'Abdullah Bey, tried to trick the unwitting Hanım into giving them the gold and furs that 'Abdullah had deposited with her as a security (*amāna*) by sending her a forged writ (*tadhkira*). This message purported to be from 'Abdullah Bey, informing his wife that he was alive but in hiding and needed these items. Mrs. Shanab joined the concubine of the late governor 'Ali Pasha (1706–7, 1717–20) in informing Hanım of her husband's fate and advising her to foil the assassins by demanding to see her husband.[12] The three women should by all rights have been enemies, for while 'Ali Pasha had been sympathetic to Ismail Bey b. 'Ivaz, Mrs. Shanab was the widow of Çerkes Mehmed Bey's patron. Their cooperation suggests that the Shanabi–'Ivazi alliance that had anchored the Qasimi faction in years past had not disintegrated among the leading Qasimi women as it had among the faction's male grandees. This circumstance no doubt had much to do with ties of long standing among the women concerned; Mrs. Shanab, for instance, may have nurtured a strong maternal affection for the daughter of her husband's slain *khūshdāsh*.[13] And yet there is something unmistakably female about this alliance, for the younger generation of male Shanabis and 'Ivazis showed no such reverence for the ties that had bound their fathers and patrons. Mrs. Shanab's son was nearly as venomous a foe of Ismail Bey b. 'Ivaz as was Çerkes Mehmed Bey. The entire incident suggests that wives, concubines, and daughters could play a more enduring role than men in preserving the identity of a political faction. Qasimi loyalties survived among these three women long after they had fallen victim to the ambitions of male members of the faction. Even more striking, the women were willing to indulge these atavistic loyalties even when they threatened the political designs of the subfactions to which their male relatives belonged.

Nor was this extraordinary feminine alliance a mere fluke. It resurfaces some years later, in 1731, when the same three women appear to support a plot by three male 'Ivazis, including Hanım's husband of the moment,[14] to kill the

[10] Al-Damurdashi, *Durra*, p. 251. [11] Al-Damurdashi, *Durra*, p. 423; see also pp. 282–3, 434.

[12] Al-Damurdashi, *Durra*, pp. 282–4.

[13] The assassination of 'Ivaz Bey in 1711 is a famous episode in the history of Ottoman Egypt's grandees. See al-Damurdashi, *Durra*, pp. 154–6; Ahmad Çelebi, *Awḍaḥ*, p. 230; al-Jabarti, *'Ajā'ib*, vol. I, pp. 119–22; 'Abdülkerim, *Tārīḫ-i Mıṣır*, fos. 128r–146v.

[14] Her husband was Yusuf Bey *zawj Hanım*, who, after he had taken in one of Çerkes Mehmed Bey's allies, was called Yusuf Bey al-Khā'in, "the traitor"; see al-Damurdashi, *Durra*, p. 321. The other two conspirators were Yusuf Bey al-Sharaybi and the former Janissary agha Süleyman Abu Difiyya.

Faqari chieftain Zülfikar Bey, who had assassinated Ismail Bey b. 'Ivaz in 1724. Yet the plot was not a simple case of 'Ivazi revenge; it had originated with a disgruntled Faqari, Halil Agha Qatamish, who was personally jealous of Zülfikar's large household.[15] Enmities and alliances had grown increasingly unpredictable with the disintegration of the two traditional factions. Once again, then, the women's alliance was a last bastion of Qasimi solidarity in the face of unraveling factional bonds. In supporting Zülfikar's assassination, moreover, the women carried on the interests of the men to whom they owed their places in the Qasimi bloc long after these men were dead: 'Ivaz Bey had been killed in 1711, his son in 1724, the governor 'Ali Pasha in 1720; Ibrahim Bey Abu Shanab, meanwhile, had died in the plague of 1718.[16]

Zülfikar Bey, for his part, regarded the women as a genuine threat and requested an order from the governor to exile them to Anatolia. To this plan, 'Osman Kâhya al-Qazdağlı allegedly responded: "You idiot [*Yā qillat 'aqlak*]! They will say at the Porte that the Ghuzz of Egypt were afraid of three women and exiled them to Anatolia!" 'Osman Kâhya instead courageously placed the women under house arrest.[17] In the end, Halil Agha succeeded in killing Zülfikar Bey in spite of the three women's detention; the bey's murder set off a nostalgic wave of Faqari–Qasimi antagonism that ended in the virtual annihilation of the Qasimi remnant.

The Faqari reaction to the women's alliance reveals that the women's enemies, at least, regarded them as serious political actors and as anchors of the Qasimi bloc. The women did not act at the pleasure of whatever chieftains happened to head the sundered remnants of the Qasimi faction but, on the contrary, defied the rift within the faction by retaining the old Shanabi–'Ivazi partnership; the male Qasimis weakened themselves and ultimately met disaster by not following the women's example.

Hanım bint 'Ivaz is only the most spectacular of a series of grandees' wives who stashed away their husbands' property. In the two invasions that occurred toward the end of the eighteenth century, the invading powers dealt forcefully with women who clung to their husbands' wealth, thereby admitting that they regarded these women as potential threats. In 1786, an Ottoman naval force under the command of the admiral, or Kapudan Pasha, Cezayırlı Hasan landed at Alexandria with the aim of ousting the late Qazdağlı duumvirs Ibrahim Bey and Murad Bey, whom the Porte suspected of collaborating with the Russian empire.[18] Cezayırlı Hasan Pasha went so far as to imprison the two wives of the momentarily defeated *shaykh al-balad*, or head of Cairo, Ibrahim Bey, until they relinquished Ibrahim's fortune.[19] Following Bonaparte's inva-

[15] Al-Damurdashi, *Durra*, p. 377.

[16] See n. 13 above; al-Damurdashi, *Durra*, pp. 225, 256, 264; al-Jabarti, *'Ajā'ib*, vol. I, pp. 276, 146–7, 301–2.

[17] Al-Damurdashi, *Durra*, p. 378. The word Ghuzz, commonly used for Egypt's military population, derives from Oghuz, the Turkic confederation within which the Ottomans originated.

[18] Crecelius, "Russia's Relations with the Mamluk Beys of Egypt in the Eighteenth Century."

[19] Al-Jabarti, *'Ajā'ib*, vol. III, p. 344.

sion of Egypt in 1798, the French occupying force treated Sitt Nafisa, wife of Ibrahim Bey's former fellow strongman Murad Bey, as a veritable proxy for her husband, who had fled to Upper Egypt. She attained this stature because Murad Bey, following the familiar pattern, had left part of his property with her as a security (*amāna*) when he fled.[20]

The extraordinary alliance of the three Qasimi women and the treatment of the wives of the duumvirs point up a general feature of the role that the wives of grandees played: when grandees' operations were disrupted – when they were killed or forced to flee Cairo – their wives became islands of stability who maintained their husbands' status in their absence. What this meant, first and foremost, was that wives protected their households' wealth against all usurpers, including the Ottoman government. A fleeing grandee commonly left his wealth in the hands of his wife (or sister, in Ismail Bey b. 'Ivaz's case) as a security (*amāna*); thus the wife became, in effect, her husband's agent. This responsibility could carry with it considerable political power but could also leave the wife subject to the antagonisms that had been directed against her husband. In such circumstances, however, her gender stood her in good stead; women's attachment to the home, as well as the habit of treating wives and daughters with a modicum of respect, made a wife harder to attack. Men's reluctance to take women completely seriously as political actors – and therefore as serious threats – also worked to a wife's advantage; witness the ridicule heaped on Zülfikar Bey when he attempted to exile the three formidable Qasimi women.

Wives as heritable property

It may seem paradoxical that a wife could play a crucial political role while at the same time depending on some attachment to a man for her social and political identity. If Mrs. Shanab were really a serious actor on the Cairene political scene, for example, why could the household to which she belonged not survive after the death of her son? Attention must be paid to the fashion in which this dependence itself contributed to a woman's ability to assume a political function. This seeming paradox lies at the heart of the marriage alliance; it informs above all the practice whereby a wife was passed from a deceased husband to his client. Indeed, the successive marriages of Hanım bint 'Ivaz are extraordinary only because of the immense prestige she enjoyed and the frequency with which her husbands died. In general terms, her predicament was not uncommon. When a grandee died, one of his clients typically married his widow or chief concubine. This practice was part of the process of inheriting and taking over the house of the patron; the client who married the widow was typically his patron's heir, and the widow was, in effect, part of his inheritance. Thus, following Zülfikar Bey's murder, his mamluk 'Ali

[20] Al-Jabarti, *Journal d'un notable du Caire durant l'expédition française, 1798–1801*, trans. Joseph Cuoq (Paris, 1979), pp. 41–2, 56; see also p. 123 and nn. 30–1 below.

Bey transferred all Zülfikar's followers to a new house and married Zülfikar's widow.[21] While we can regard such a custom as demeaning to women and, indeed, a sign of their objectification, we can also view it as a verification of the importance of the marriage alliance to the continuity of the household.

The experiences of two women from the Qazdağlı household suggest, however, that the "heritable wife" was a complex phenomenon circumscribed by strict rules of succession. One concubine, Sitt Shuykyar, seems to have been handed down from generation to generation of Qazdağlı leaders; this perhaps explains the Persian sobriquet *shuykyar*, which denotes a woman who has had a husband. Originally purchased by ʿOsman Kâhya al-Qazdağlı, she passed to the latter's client and heir, Süleyman Kâhya, after ʿOsman's assassination in 1736. Following the death of Süleyman Kâhya three years later, however, Sitt Shuykyar did not fall immediately to the lot of the heir presumptive, ʿAbdurrahman Kâhya, along with Süleyman's material wealth. Instead, she married Ibrahim Kâhya.[22] Why this discrepancy? Although he inherited Süleyman's wealth, ʿAbdurrahman did not assume leadership of the Qazdağlı household; that honor fell to Ibrahim, who belonged to another line of patrons and clients within the Qazdağlı bloc and had inherited the wealth of that line. It appears, then, that the widow of the household head was not treated entirely as heritable property but was available only to the succeeding head of the household. Indeed, on becoming Qazdağlı headman after Ibrahim Kâhya's death, ʿAbdurrahman at last married Sitt Shuykyar. Thus, the "heritable wife" phenomenon, at first blush a degrading custom, actually seems to have dovetailed with the "family matriarch" phenomenon; the man who assumed household leadership became the consort of the household's first lady.

Yet the fortunes of ʿAbdurrahman Kâhya's mother, Emine Hatun, suggest that even this rule did not apply in all cases. On the death of ʿAbdurrahman's father, Hasan Kâhya, in 1716, Emine married Hasan's mamluk and successor as household head, ʿOsman Kâhya. This was part of the familiar process whereby a client inherited his patron's widow along with the rest of his wealth. Emine's son ʿAbdurrahman must have been quite young at this time, certainly not beyond his early teens. It is quite possible that ʿOsman Kâhya took the role of a surrogate father to ʿAbdurrahman or was, at least, the greatest male influence on him during his youth. Although ʿOsman inherited his patron's wealth, he bequeathed a portion of his own estate to ʿAbdurrahman, as it were saving Hasan Kâhya's fortune for ʿAbdurrahman while adding liberally to it through his own enterprises. He could not have known that after his own death in 1736, his client Süleyman Kâhya would appropriate the entire amount. Süleyman Kâhya did not, however, marry the twice-widowed Emine Hatun. Instead, she appears to have spent the next three years single. By this time, of course, her son ʿAbdurrahman would have grown to manhood, and having an adult son

[21] Al-Damurdashi, *Durra*, p. 384. The house was that of the exiled Chief Black Eunuch Yusuf Agha (1671–87) at Suwayqat ʿUsfur. [22] Al-Damurdashi, *Durra*, pp. 437, 566.

may have spared his mother the typical widow's fate. Likewise, Mrs. Shanab's son, Mehmed Bey Shanab, may account for Mrs. Shanab's unmarried status after the death of Ibrahim Bey Abu Shanab – though advanced age may have been a contributing factor.[23] Al-Damurdashi offers further evidence, however, that only a fully grown son could influence his mother's fate in this fashion. Commenting on the death of the 'Ivazi Yusuf Bey al-Jazzar, the chronicler notes that because Yusuf Bey's son "lacked his first beard [*khālī al-'idhār*]," the bey's mamluk received his tax farm, took his wife, and took charge of his house.[24]

Eldest sons and elder brothers may have had the prerogative of marrying their mothers and sisters off, as well as guarding their single status. Shortly before his assassination, Ismail Bey b. 'Ivaz promoted the *kâhya* of the Çavuşan corps to bey, apparently in the expectation that he would marry the highly desirable Hanım.[25] Some fifteen years later, just as the Qazdağlı concubine Sitt Shuykyar was passing from Süleyman Kâhya's hands into those of Ibrahim Kâhya, al-Damurdashi and al-Jabarti report the marriage of 'Abdurrahman Kâhya's mother Emine Hatun to then-Çavuşan *kâhya* Süleyman Agha.[26] One would suspect that 'Abdurrahman had much to do with his mother's marrying Süleyman Agha, who was a firm ally of 'Abdurrahman and was instrumental in securing the Qazdağlı inheritance for him. Emine Hatun herself, however, may well have taken some part in arranging the marriage out of concern for her son's welfare.

His mother's remarriage no doubt came at a decisive moment for 'Abdurrahman: he had finally come into his inheritance after seeing it waylaid for years by two family clients – although to be sure, the inheritance had been substantially increased by the enterprising 'Osman Kâhya. Yet he still did not head the household and, in fact, needed to keep his wealth and his political identity from being overwhelmed by the man who did, Ibrahim Kâhya. For these reasons, no doubt, he cultivated a tie with Süleyman Agha, who took it upon himself to enter the dying Süleyman Kâhya's tent and make certain that no one else attempted to lay claim to his wealth. In this instance, then, Emine Hatun was the instrument of a marriage alliance that proved of economic and political benefit to her fatherless son. Her remarriage contained elements of all three types of marriage bond: in the role of heritable wife and family matriarch, she cemented a critical alliance for 'Abdurrahman.

The heritable wife was not always an instrument, however, but could take an overt role in shaping the political fortunes of her household. Successive marriages to prominent grandees schooled a woman in the fine art of political intrigue. The redoubtable Hanım bint 'Ivaz, for example, had by the time of her third marriage become an accomplished political operator. She is defi-

[23] According to al-Jabarti (*'Ajā'ib*, vol. I, p. 276), Ibrahim Bey Abu Shanab was ninety-two at the time of his death in 1718. About his wife's age we have no information.

[24] Al-Damurdashi, *Durra*, p. 263. [25] Al-Damurdashi, *Durra*, p. 239.

[26] Al-Damurdashi, *Durra*, p. 437; al-Jabarti, *'Ajā'ib*, vol. III, p. 130.

nitely not to be regarded as the helpless victim of inscrutable fate; finding herself with a new husband, she brought her own ambitions to bear on his political career. When Hanım's third husband, Salih Agha, found an opportunity to govern the Nile Delta subprovince of al-Mansura, al-Damurdashi has her telling him, "Become a *ṣanjāq* [*beyi*], and I will take it upon myself to protect you from all the boasting (*iftikhār*)"[27] – meaning the boasting of the Faqaris, and particularly Mehmed Bey Qatamish, who was bent on destroying the last of the Qasimis. Salih, in collusion with the Ottoman governor, ultimately joined in the assassination of the Faqari leaders in the infamous 1736 *vak'at-i shūr-angīz*. One is certainly justified in suspecting that Hanım took a Lady Macbeth-like part in the scheme.

One of the more remarkable examples of a widow's independent action is that of the concubine of 'Ali Pasha, who governed Egypt from 1706 to 1707 and again from 1717 to 1720. His concubine, we recall, had joined Hanım bint 'Ivaz and Mrs. Shanab in their earlier attempt to foil the designs of the Faqaris and their allies. When 'Ali Pasha was executed by sultanic order in 1720, his concubine chose to remain in Cairo, defying his son's wishes to take her back to Istanbul.[28] She refused, in effect, to become heritable. We do not know whether she married or from where she drew support following the departure of her late master's family. Al-Damurdashi always refers to her simply as "'Ali Pasha's concubine [*maḥḍiyya*]," leading one to suspect that she did not, in fact, marry. We know that 'Ali Pasha had supported Ismail Bey b. 'Ivaz – this, in fact, was probably the reason for his execution – and that his concubine sympathized with the Qasimi remnant; otherwise, we know little of what niche she managed to occupy. She does not appear to have attached herself to another household, unless perhaps she were sheltered by Mrs. Shanab. In any event, her seeming isolation and lack of male protection did little to prevent her from undertaking political activity.

'Ali Pasha's concubine should probably be regarded as an exception to the rule of heritability. The fact that her heritability would have required a physical relocation perhaps contributed to her ability to remain independent. It seems to have been the norm, however, that heritability accompanied political activity rather than precluding it. Even the last great widow of pre-nineteenth-century Egypt, Sitt Nafisa, owed her political influence to her heritability. Like Hanım bint 'Ivaz, she was repeatedly widowed and remarried. Her first husband was the famous Bulut Kapan 'Ali Bey; on his assassination in 1773, she married Murad Bey, the mamluk of 'Ali Bey's mamluk Mehmed Bey Abu al-Dhahab.[29] It is as Murad Bey's wife that she is best known, for in that capacity, she acted as broker for the interests of the grandees who had fled to Upper Egypt in the wake of the French invasion. A number of incidents reported by al-Jabarti reveal that the French recognized her as Murad's representative in

[27] Al-Damurdashi, *Durra*, p. 414. [28] Al-Damurdashi, *Durra*, p. 256.

[29] Murad's first wife was the widow of Salih Bey, a remnant of the Qasimi faction and enemy of Bulut Kapan 'Ali Bey. See Murad's obituary in al-Jabarti, *Journal*, p. 327.

Cairo. When the French confiscated the house of a prominent blind shaykh of al-Azhar university who had forcefully protested against the French occupation, he complained from hiding to Sitt Nafisa, who relayed his complaint to Murad Bey in Upper Egypt.[30] After making peace with Murad and giving him the emirate of Upper Egypt, the French paid Sitt Nafisa a monthly pension of 100,000 *paras*, or Egyptian silver coins; this amount was raised to 140,000 after Murad's death in 1801. Yet following Murad's death, Sitt Nafisa was handed off to one of his mamluks; the French acquiesced in this time-honored ritual.[31] Still, we may see in this eventuality an affirmation of Sitt Nafisa's influence. To assume leadership of Murad's household without marrying his remarkable widow would have been unthinkable; Sitt Nafisa was a necessary component of the leading grandee's power.

Generally speaking, the heritable wife's value, like that of a cherished family heirloom, appreciated with age: marriages to politically prominent personages increased her political acumen; this acumen, in turn, made her an asset to her deceased husband's clients. This equation assumed that the wife of a grandee was, in some sense or other, a political actor. Though in some respects a commodity, she was not passive or voiceless. The role of heritable wife and that of matriarch or first lady were by no means mutually contradictory; many women found themselves playing both roles.

Conclusion

In the capacity of wife or concubine, or in some cases sister or daughter, an elite woman of Ottoman Egypt was able to contribute significantly to the stability, aggrandizement, and preservation of the household to which she belonged. Marriage, in this context, was a household activity, much like purchasing slaves or recruiting mercenaries. Indeed, the household was the indispensable arena of the elite woman's activity, as it was of the elite man's activity. It was arguably even more critical to a woman's operations, for a woman was less likely than a man to leave the house for an extended period. To be sure, women were not *confined* to their houses but enjoyed some degree of mobility within Cairo's elite neighborhoods. It seems to have been fairly common for women to visit each other in their homes, as Mrs. Shanab and 'Ali Pasha's concubine visited Hanım bint 'Ivaz, and to use these visits as occasions for political maneuvering. At times of political crisis, nevertheless, the man of the house was apt to flee his residence while his wife and concubines stayed behind. In this sense, they were truly anchors of the household. The women of the house and the section of the residence over which they presided – commonly known as the harem – were a locus of relative stability within the household.

[30] Al-Jabarti, *Journal*, p. 238. Murad sent a *kāshif* from his household to intercede with the French, and the house was returned.

[31] Al-Jabarti, *Journal*, pp. 308, 315, 350.

In more general terms, the harem represented relative stability in the midst of a turbulent, changing society. Here the usurping strongman might at least hesitate to tread; here his vanquished foe would stash his wealth in the hope of better days to come. And here he might actually hide to escape the wrath of his victorious enemy. The women of the household were thus not mere accessories to a household's power, prestige, and longevity but were vital elements of them.

This function of women grew more pronounced as central control of Egypt weakened in the course of the eighteenth century. As the Faqari and Qasimi factions became obsolete, the women of the households that had comprised these factions preserved some semblance of traditional loyalties while at the same time safeguarding household wealth in the face of ever-shifting alliances. The preponderance of the Qazdağlı household in the latter half of the eighteenth century offered some hope of stability although, to be sure, the Qazdağlıs vied among themselves for dominance while asserting relative autonomy from the central government. As individual grandees amassed more and more wealth and power, their wives took on the status of headwomen to their husbands' headmen. And when their husbands were challenged, whether by rival grandees or by outside forces, these women took responsibility for preserving the wealth and integrity of enormous households.

In a society in which political power was centered in households, marriage was a natural form of political merger or alliance. The elite wife was not only the mother of her husband's heirs and successors but also his ally, partner, and agent, especially in time of crisis. Thus, while the wife partook of her husband's political and economic stature, she could also contribute to it, often substantially. Indeed, a veteran of one or more marriages brought considerable political experience, and typically considerable wealth, to a new match. A marriage was arranged in the expectation that the wife could bestow or derive some political benefit from it; a woman's marriage bond was the foundation upon which she built her political activity. In short, female political empowerment was not an unexpected dividend of the elite marriage but a key feature of it. Arguably, then, women such as Emine Hatun, Sitt Shuykyar, and Sitt Nafisa were as important to the Qazdağlı household's efflorescence as their more famous male counterparts.

CHAPTER 7

Property and commercial partnerships

Building a household entailed not only acquiring clients and forging alliances, by marriage or otherwise, but also amassing enough wealth to sustain these clients, along with wives and children, and to leave a legacy that they could inherit. Hence a prime concern of any astute grandee was securing a steady source of revenue. This revenue could derive from tax-collection rights in both city and countryside, from property rentals, or from investment in trade. Complementing and reinforcing this tangible wealth was the household's symbolic wealth: monuments to a household's stature in the form of *ma'āthir* – the charitable works, such as mosques and fountains, that a household head commissioned – or, more fundamentally, the mansion or palace where the household assembled to hatch its schemes of aggrandizement. Such structures proclaimed the household's existence and contributed to its members' sense of identity and cohesion.

The house

Perhaps the most visible and essential component of a household's wealth was the house that it used as a headquarters. Indeed, the very ability to purchase or commission the construction of a palatial residence reflected a certain degree of wealth, status, and independence on the part of the household head. Household heads of relatively low status, such as low-ranking regimental officers, tended to use their barracks in Cairo's citadel as a headquarters while perhaps maintaining modest family residences in various neighborhoods. A Janissary officer typically acquired a substantial residence only after attaining the rank of *çavuş* and an ʿAzab officer only after attaining the rank of *çorbacı*; a grandee who did not belong to a regiment, meanwhile, was typically promoted to bey before he acquired such a house.[1] One suspects, therefore, that the salary and perquisites of a lower rank did not suffice to purchase or build a house. Often, the house was attached to a particular rank inasmuch as if the household head died, one of his clients would assume his rank and, with it, his

[1] On these points, see chapter 2, p. 26; chapter 4, pp. 77–8; and Raymond, "Soldiers in Trade," 19–20, 27–8.

house. This procedure was part of the process of succeeding one's patron as head of his household.

A house that could serve as headquarters for a household was typically a sizable affair, containing ample quarters for the household head and his retainers and aides. A reception hall was essential, for here the household head received guests and consulted with his allies and with members of the Ottoman administration. In the houses of Egypt's most influential grandees, these receptions took the form of occasional councils for which the house was opened to the general public; a house of this stature was therefore known as an "open house" (*bayt maftūḥ* in Arabic), an institution that had not existed before the Ottoman conquest of Egypt.[2] Such councils paralleled the Ottoman governor's *divan* in the citadel. By the late eighteenth century, they had begun to displace the governor's *divan* as loci of political power. Correspondingly, the house of the *shaykh al-balad*, the bey who by the mid-eighteenth century was recognized as the chief grandee of Cairo, displaced the citadel as Cairo's political nerve center.[3]

The *shaykh al-balad*'s wives, concubines, and daughters, or indeed those of any prominent household head, contributed to this power configuration. Although the women and their respective suites of servants resided in the harem quarter of the house, this part of the house was itself a base of power. In fact, it could be the locus of a parallel female household, headed by the household head's wife or wives, that was integral to the household's overall authority. Thus, al-Jabarti refers to the female members of Murad Bey's household as the *atbāʿ* of the remarkable Sitt Nafisa, wife first of Bulut Kapan ʿAli Bey, then of Murad.[4] By the middle of the eighteenth century, it was apparently not uncommon for the women of a wealthy household to reside in a separate house. Al-Damurdashi notes that the long-time *ruznameci*, or keeper of the treasury day-book, ʿAbdullah Efendi, had a "harem house" for the women of his household.[5] Among the later Qazdağlıs, the notion of the harem house appears to have evolved into a separate residence for each of the leading female members of a household. Al-Jabarti reports that when Ibrahim Kâhya al-Qazdağlı's daughter married Ahmed Agha al-Barudi, the couple moved into Ibrahim Kâhya's "famous house outside Bab al-Saʿada and Bab al-Kharq," west of Bab Zuwayla.[6] Later, the historian recounts a visit he made with the poet Ismail al-Khashshab to the home of Umm Marzuq Bey, wife of Ibrahim Bey al-Kabir, in the ʿAbdin quarter, south of Azbakiyya.[7] Here, Ibrahim's son Marzuq Bey was raised, much as the Ottoman sultan's sons had once been raised in the Old Palace (Saray-ı ʿAtik), some distance from the imperial palace of Topkapı.[8]

[2] Ayalon, "Studies in al-Jabarti," part 2, 293–7.

[3] Thus, in 1795, Ibrahim Bey al-Kabir held a *divan* at his home in Azbakiyya, attended by Cairo's religious and military leadership, to proclaim an agreement ending a popular protest. See al-Jabarti, *ʿAjāʾib*, vol. IV, pp. 255–7.

[4] Al-Jabarti, *ʿAjāʾib*, vol. IV, p. 305.

[5] Al-Damurdashi, *Durra*, p. 218.

[6] Al-Jabarti, *ʿAjāʾib*, vol. III, p. 111.

[7] Al-Jabarti, *ʿAjāʾib*, vol. III, p. 281.

[8] On this point, see Peirce, *The Imperial Harem*, pp. 119–25. Wives and sons of the reigning sultan resided in Topkapı Palace beginning in the reign of Süleyman I.

The location of a house was arguably as important a consideration as its size and amenities. The house of Qazdağlı forefather Hasan Agha Bilifya stood just outside Bab Zuwayla, the southern gate of the original Fatimid city of al-Qahira.[9] This was a site where many craftsmen, including localized Ottoman soldiers,[10] had their shops, and a frequent scene of urban protest. It was also within easy range of al-Azhar university and Khan al-Khalili, Cairo's principal market, where many imperial soldiers who had taken up crafts had houses and shops.[11] A bit farther north were several major *wakālas*, or commodities warehouses, including the coffee and flax *wakālas* founded in the late seventeenth century by the Chief Black Eunuch ʿAbbas Agha.[12] In addition, the *wālī* (*subaşı* in Turkish), Cairo's chief of police, chosen from among the Janissary officers, was stationed outside Bab Zuwayla with his men.[13] Thus the spot was well situated both to participate in and to police the activities of Cairo's most commercially vibrant sector. It was not routine for regimental officers to reside in this neighborhood during the seventeenth century, when Hasan Agha would presumably have occupied his house. Influential grandees of that time, as well as exiled palace eunuchs, concentrated around Birkat al-Fil in southern Cairo.[14] Hasan Agha no doubt saw both commercial and political advantage in placing his house there.

During the eighteenth century, the hub of elite residence moved steadily westward, and the Qazdağlı houses followed suit. ʿOsman Kâhya al-Qazdağlı appears to have been the first Qazdağlı leader to build a house on the shores of Birkat al-Azbakiyya, setting a precedent to be followed by almost all of his successors. Azbakiyya by the latter half of the eighteenth century had, in fact, become something of a Qazdağlı lake, surrounded by the houses of the Qazdağlı grandees and their allies.[15] Perhaps the most famous Qazdağlı compound at Azbakiyya is the sprawling palace of Mehmed Bey al-Alfi, a mamluk of Murad Bey who was active at the end of the eighteenth century. The palace, as is well known, became Bonaparte's headquarters during the French occupation of Egypt.[16]

A noteworthy exception to this Qazdağlı residential preference was the house of Süleyman Kâhya al-Çuhadar, the short-lived successor to ʿOsman Kâhya, which stood in the old Jewish quarter in the heart of al-Qahira, northwest of Bab Zuwayla. But since Süleyman appears to have spent the bulk of his career as commercial agent to his patron, ʿOsman Kâhya,[17] the location of his house makes sense. It is probably not unlikely that most household heads

[9] Ahmad Çelebi, *Awḍaḥ*, p. 146. [10] Raymond, "Soldiers in Trade," 27.
[11] Raymond, "Soldiers in Trade," 21.
[12] Jane Hathaway, "The Wealth and Influence of an Exiled Ottoman Eunuch in Egypt: TheWaqf Inventory of ʿAbbas Agha," *JESHO* 37 (1994), 303, n. 45, and 307.
[13] Raymond, "Essai de géographie," 65–73; Raymond, "Soldiers in Trade," 27.
[14] Raymond, "Essai de géographie," 65ff.
[15] For example, Raymond, "Essai de géographie," 73ff.
[16] Raymond, "Essai de géographie," 78ff.; Behrens-Abouseif, *Azbakiyya and Its Environs*, p. 72.
[17] On this point, see chapter 4, p. 80.


N
Birkat al-Ratli
Bulaq
Northern Cemetery
Birkat al-Azbakiyya
Bab al-Nasir
Bab al-Futuh
Gamaliyya
al-Azhar
Al-Khalij
Bab Zuwayla
Qasabat Ridwan
Birkat al-Fil
Citadel
Qanatir al-Siba
Qara Maydan
Muqattam
The Nile
Rawda
Al-Khalij
Imam Shafi'i
Fustat
Southern Cemetery
Giza

Map 3 Cairo

stationed commercial agents in such centers of commercial activity even if they did not reside there themselves. The fact that they established their own houses at some remove from these quarters reflects not a lack of commercial involvement but, in all probability, a desire for distance and security from the merchants and artisans most likely to engage in protest.[18] A mob of protestors willing to march from Bab Zuwayla to a grandee's house in Azbakiyya to make its demands must be a committed mob; by the time it reached its destination, furthermore, its passions might well have cooled.[19]

It seems to have been fairly rare for a grandee to construct a large residential-cum-religious complex around his personal residence. Although many leading grandees' houses were palatial in scope and open, to varying degrees, to the public, they were primarily living quarters for the grandee and his clients, children, wives, concubines, and servants. An exception to this rule was the complex of 'Osman Kâhya al-Qazdağlı at Azbakiyya, which included, in addition to 'Osman Kâhya's own residence, a mosque; a *sabīl-kuttāb*, or Qur'ān school over a fountain; a bath; a waterwheel; living quarters for mosque functionaries and tenants; and shops.[20] 'Osman Kâhya was the first Qazdağlı leader to establish the household as a power to be reckoned with, no longer in the shadow of the Gedik or Bilifya household, in addition to being the first Qazdağlı to reside at Azbakiyya. His charitable and educational compound may therefore have served to establish the Qazdağlı household as the leading presence at Azbakiyya, meanwhile winning him support among the neighborhood residents who benefited from the services that the compound offered. The mosque and school could also have contributed to the religious education of 'Osman's clients, particularly mamluks imported from the "realm of unbelief."[21]

While the house was unquestionably a political headquarters, it could serve as a military headquarters, as well. As the chief symbol of a household's power, it was an obvious target of the household head's enemies, including the Ottoman governor. During the protracted series of disturbances that followed the 1711 civil war, the rival Faqari and Qasimi factions fought for control of various grandees' houses in the same way that armies in the field might battle for a strategic hill. Al-Damurdashi describes how the allies of the Faqari chieftain Eyüp Bey, seeking to outrun the governor and his Qasimi allies, made use of a basement tunnel connecting Eyüp's house to that of his ally 'Ömer Agha Bilifya.[22] A house could likewise be transformed into a fortress, with cannon on the roof and gun nests at the windows. When the household head was defeated, his house became the war trophy of his enemies. Standard procedure

[18] Raymond's depiction of the late eighteenth-century grandees as alienated from the "native" mercantile population seems exaggerated; see "Soldiers in Trade," 34.

[19] On the typical course of popular protest in Cairo, see Gabriel Baer, "Popular Revolt in Ottoman Cairo," *Der Islam* 54 (1977), 213–42; Raymond, *Artisans et commerçants*, vol. II, p. 432.

[20] Behrens-Abouseif, *Azbakiyya and Its Environs*, pp. 55–8, 114–16.

[21] *Diyār al-kufr* is used to refer to Circassia in Ahmad Çelebi, *Awḍaḥ*, p. 482.

[22] Al-Damurdashi, *Durra*, p. 168.

called for the victor to plunder and raze or burn the house of the vanquished.[23] By the same token, a grandee who ran afoul of the central Ottoman government could expect his house to be destroyed by the troops of the governor. At the climax of this same set of disturbances, the governor's forces carried out an order to execute the Faqari chieftain Qaytas Bey; afterward, they sealed his house and chopped down the 500-year-old mulberry tree that grew in his garden, under which the unfortunate Qaytas had held his *divan*.[24]

In addition to being a center of power, the household compound contained a great deal of material wealth in the form of furnishings, carpets, dishes, and jewelry, in addition to horses and other stabled animals. Al-Damurdashi's description of the contents of the assassinated Ismail Bey b. 'Ivaz's house includes "Indian cloth, ambergris, pearls, china and porcelain dishes, money and provisions, harnesses and chain mail."[25] Yet the household head was not so naïve as to concentrate all his material wealth in his residential compound. Grandees and other notables, such as leading ulema, frequently resorted to "small houses" (s. *dār ṣaghīra*), generally located in poorer neighborhoods such as Husayniyya, outside Bab al-Futuh, where they stashed a portion of their valuables.[26] A harem or harem house could serve a similar purpose. The mob that sacked the house where 'Abdullah Efendi the *ruznameci* lived left his harem house untouched after neighborhood residents intervened, claiming it had already been plundered.[27] In this instance, the neighbors were almost certainly protecting the harem house, aware of what it contained. Later in al-Damurdashi's chronicle, Hasan Kâhya al-Razzaz, the patron of Ridvan Kâhya al-Jalfi, declares that he keeps his money in his harem, trusting no one.[28] Since, by Muslim law, property belonging to the household head's wife remained in her possession and since household women were less vulnerable to attack than men, as pointed out in the preceding chapter, the harem made a sensible vault for household valuables.

Tax farms

Although the house was a piece of property that served as an anchor for the household, as well as a powerful symbol of the household's wealth and prestige, it did not itself generate income. Households tended to secure their incomes from control of key sources of revenue and from commercial activities. As tax farming proliferated during the seventeenth century, tax farms became profitable investments for many households. Tax farms

[23] For example, al-Damurdashi, *Durra*, pp. 499, 533–4.

[24] Ahmad Çelebi, *Awḍaḥ*, pp. 271, 282. For an analysis of the chronicles' recounting of this incident, see Hathaway, "Sultans, Pashas, *Taqwīm*s, and *Mühimmes*," 66.

[25] Al-Damurdashi, *Durra*, p. 251. The inventory is suspiciously similar to that of 'Osman Bey Zülfikar's house on p. 499.

[26] Raymond, "Essai de géographie," 83–4. For examples, see Ahmad Çelebi, *Awḍaḥ*, p. 587 (Hasan Agha Bilifya); al-Jabarti, *'Aja'ib*, vol. IV, p. 85 (Shaykh Hasan al-Kafrawi).

[27] Al-Damurdashi, *Durra*, p. 218. [28] Al-Damurdashi, *Durra*, p. 456.

encompassed not only the taxes levied in villages and rural districts but also the fees from such urban operations as port customs and tolls. During the seventeenth century, regimental officers tended to hold urban tax farms while beys tended to hold rural farms, above all those of the subprovincial governorships. By the eighteenth century, however, officers had joined the ranks of rural tax farmers, a development that inevitably led them to covet the farms of the subprovinces and ultimately to penetrate the beylicate.[29]

The most attractive rural tax farms were those of grain-producing villages attached to the imperial *waqf*s of the Holy Cities (*Awqāf al-Ḥaramayn*) since the tax farmer could collect the *fāʾiẓ*, or surplus revenue, left after the village had remitted its obligation to Mecca and Medina. From all appearances, grandees frequently attempted to acquire clusters of *Awqāf* villages in a particular region, thus achieving genuine regional authority.[30] The example of the Bilifya household suggests that such tax farms, treated as heritable property, could form the basis of substantial household wealth. Household founder Hasan Agha Bilifya was the longtime tax farmer of Bilifya, an *Awqāf* village in the Upper Egyptian subprovince of al-Bahnasa. We do not know whether Hasan Agha himself sought to augment Bilifya with other tax farms in the region; given his fiscal acumen, it is not an unlikely prospect. What is certain is that Hasan's mamluk Mustafa Bey Bilifya received the tax farm of Bilifya on Hasan's death in 1704 and expanded the Bilifya household's authority in the region. An imperial order of 1733 grants him administrative autonomy (*serbestiyet*) over a cluster of *Awqāf* villages in al-Bahnasa.[31] This Upper Egyptian preserve gave the Bilifya household not only a secure source of income but also a provincial redoubt to which they might flee in time of crisis. When Bonaparte invaded Egypt in 1798, the Bilifya household's Qazdağlı successors may have made use of this getaway. Murad Bey attempted to wait out the French in the village of al-Fashn, part of the old Bilifya sphere of influence.[32]

Grandees and, indeed, entire households were commonly called by the names of the tax farms upon which their wealth was based, underlining the centrality of the tax farm as a source of household income. In addition to the Bilifya household, the chronicles offer the examples of the Jalfi household, ostensibly named after the village of Sinjalf in Minufiyya subprovince, and ʿAbdurrahman Bey Dalja, who farmed the taxes of Dalja village in ʿUshmunayn subprovince.[33] Governors of the Upper Egyptian super-province of Jirja frequently bore the appellation "Jirja;" the most notorious of these

[29] Maliyeden Müdevver 1350 (1134–5/1721–3); Pococke, *A Description of the East*, vol. I, p. 164.

[30] The British theologian Richard Pococke notes that the village of Mallawi in ʿUshmunayn subprovince "is at the head of nine villages, which compose a small principality belonging to Mecca, and is subject to the Emir Hadge" (*Travels of Richard Pococke*, p. 60).

[31] *Mühimme-i Mısır*, vol. V, no. 18 (1146/1733–4). See also chapter 8, n. 58.

[32] Al-Jabarti, *Journal*, p. 238.

[33] Al-Damurdashi, *Durra*, p. 293. See also Hathaway, "The Role of the Kızlar Ağası," 156–7.

Jirja governors was perhaps Mehmed Bey Jirja, who rebelled against the Ottoman governor in 1659.[34]

Commercial activities

Even households that drew the core of their wealth from tax farms might also invest heavily in commercial activities, either in addition to or in conjunction with tax farming. Often the proceeds of a commercial venture allowed the household head to begin acquiring tax farms, as well as to build a lavish house, purchase mamluks, and hire mercenaries, bodyguards, and servants. Early in the eighteenth century, a number of households came to the fore whose founders had started out in particular trades, then combined the wealth they had amassed with strategic alliances to propel themselves up the ladder of influence. Often only the name of the profession remained to bear witness to the household's origins. The founder of the Sabunci household, which dominated the ʿAzeban regiment during the 1710s and 1720s, must at one time have made soap (*ṣabūn* in Turkish and Arabic), while the Manav clan, which appears sporadically in pay registers and chronicles during the same period, presumably began as fruiterers (*manav* in Turkish). Better documented are the origins of the Fallah ("peasant") household, whose namesake, al-Hajj Salih al-Fallah, was an orphaned Egyptian peasant who amassed wealth and influence after joining the household of ʿAli Kâhya al-Jalfi. His descendants assured their fortunes by attaching themselves to the Qazdağlıs.[35]

A trade that was essential to a household's foundation and sustenance would inevitably affect the household's composition and behavior. New recruits to the household might be trained in the trade or chosen according to their ability to enhance the household's commercial performance. Ibrahim Kâhya al-Qazdağlı chose clients who could win him control of the pilgrimage route and access to the tax farms of Upper Egyptian grain villages, thus ensuring his domination of the coffee trade and facilitating his penetration of the beylicate.[36] Members of the Sharaybi household likewise joined in manipulating the overseas trade in coffee and spices. Yet by the same token, commercial rivalries could divide a household or pit one household against another. A desire for uncontested control of port customs and coffee revenues must have contributed to ʿOsman Kâhya al-Qazdağlı's decision to eliminate the Gedik and Şerifian households from the Janissary corps.[37] Following ʿOsman Kâhya's death, his client Süleyman Kâhya's usurpation of his estate effectively kept ʿAbdurrahman Kâhya out of the coffee trade.[38]

A grandee's wives or concubines could play a critical role in building and sustaining commercial partnerships and investments. For a wife was not only

[34] See, for example, al-Hallaq, *Tārīḫ-i Mıṣır-ı Ḳāhire*, fos. 169r ff.
[35] On the Sabuncis, see chapter 3, n. 29; on the Manavs and Fallahs, see chapter 4, n. 5.
[36] See chapter 5, pp. 98, 103. [37] See chapter 4, pp. 76–7.
[38] See chapter 4, pp. 79–80.

a political partner, as noted previously, but a business partner, as well. In safeguarding the household's wealth when the household head was forced to flee, she herself resembled the passive partner in a commenda or *muḍāraba*;[39] the fact that a grandee might stash his wealth in the harem of his house, or even in a separate harem house, makes the analogy especially appropriate. The wife could take a more active role in commercial ventures, as well. Al-Jabarti describes how the wife of the late eighteenth-century rector of al-Azhar university, ʿAbdallah al-Sharqawi, shrewdly invested in shops, baths, and real estate to complement the shaykh's own eager acquisition of tax farms.[40] This sort of conjugal entrepreneurship was perhaps characteristic of new members of the elite, such as up-and-coming ulema, who frequently secured their place in this higher social stratum by marrying daughters of prominent merchants or military grandees. The *sharīʿa*'s stipulation that a wife retained possession of any property she might acquire encouraged the wives of grandees to make investments that contributed to the household's wealth. The central government could confiscate the estate of a grandee who rebelled against the sultan, but it could not touch tax farms, commercial properties, and luxury goods that technically belonged to the grandee's wife.

It was characteristic for a commercially active grandee to endow commercial structures, not necessarily in the same neighborhood as his residence. Janissary and beylical households participated in a wide array of commercial activities and frequented the structures associated with them, notably the complexes of warehouse, bourse, and lodging known as *wakāla*s, and central markets, or *qayṣariyya*s.[41] Before the late eighteenth century, however, we do not find these households endowing such commercial structures on anything like the scale of Ottoman officials, including governors and exiled Chief Black Eunuchs.[42] The great exception to this rule is the market area known as Qasabat Ridwan, founded in the seventeenth century by the longtime pilgrimage commander Ridvan Bey al-Faqari. The *qaṣaba* lies just to the south of the commercial nexus of al-Qahira, whereas Ridvan Bey's residence stood at Birkat al-Fil, at the time the center of elite residence. A number of local grandees and Ottoman officials endowed *wakāla*s near the Nile ports where commodities such as flax and coffee were unloaded. In the seventeenth century, for example, the exiled eunuch ʿAbbas Agha endowed a coffee *wakāla* at Gamaliyya, a northern neighborhood of Cairo, and a flax *wakāla* at

[39] See chapter 5, n. 32.

[40] Cited in Raymond, *Artisans et commerçants*, vol. II, pp. 427–8.

[41] Although *wakāla* and *qayṣariyya* could be used interchangeably for a warehouse, *qayṣariyya* could also connote a market for the sale of luxury goods, roughly synonymous with the Turkish *bedesṭan*. For a discussion of the terminology, see Raymond, *Artisans et commerçants*, vol. I, pp. 254–63.

[42] For example, ʿAbbas Agha's flax and coffee *wakāla*s and the *wakāla*/coffeehouse in Rosetta endowed by Hafiz Ahmed Pasha (1591–5). On these structures, see n. 43 below; Ahmad Çelebi, *Awḍaḥ*, p. 123; Muhammad ʿAbd al-Muʿti al-Ishaqi, *Kitāb akhbār al-uwal fī man taṣarrafa fī Miṣr min arbāb al-duwal* (Cairo, 1887), p. 163.

Bulaq.[43] A century later, Bulut Kapan ʿAli Bey renovated a *qayṣariyya* at Bulaq that had been endowed by the sixteenth-century governor Sinan Pasha; after ʿAli Bey's death, his rights to the *qayṣariyya* were acquired by his own mamluk Mehmed Bey Abu al-Dhahab.[44] Such establishments contributed directly to commercial operations that enriched the household. Thus, their purpose differed from that of charitable foundations, such as mosques and fountains, which were designed to win support by serving the community. By the late eighteenth century, however, the latter-day Qazdağlı household had largely displaced imperial functionaries as loci of authority and siphoned off enough revenue from the imperial treasury to endow both commercial and charitable structures that matched anything the central authority could commission.[45]

The Qazdağlı household and the Red Sea coffee trade

Certain commercial enterprises were natural adjuncts of tax-farming. The trade in Yemeni coffee stands out in this regard. Coffee was grown in the region of Mocha in southern Yemen, where it may have been introduced from Ethiopia sometime during the fifteenth century.[46] From Yemen, Red Sea ships carried the coffee northward to the Hijaz. Here, Egyptian coffee merchants entered the operation, trading coffee for Egyptian grain, primarily from the Upper Egyptian villages endowed to the imperial pious foundations that serviced Mecca and Medina (*Awqāf al-Ḥaramayn*), during the annual pilgrimage.[47] Grandees seeking to profit from the coffee traffic therefore sought to acquire the tax farms of Upper Egyptian grain villages, as well as to control the pilgrimage route.

The Qazdağlı household was extraordinarily successful at securing just these sorts of control. Acquiring control of the pilgrimage route was a Qazdağlı strategy of long standing. Beginning early in the eighteenth century, the household monopolized the Janissary post of *serdar qiṭār al-ḥajj*, or commander of the pilgrimage caravan, as well as several affiliated Janissary posts. At the same time, the Qazdağlıs, adopting the tactic of the Bilifyas and of other Janissary officers, began to acquire the tax farms of grain-producing villages, above all those attached to the *waqf*s of the Holy Cities.[48] This agenda dictated the household's choice of clients and would ultimately propel it into the beylicate.

[43] On ʿAbbas Agha's structures, see Hathaway, "The Wealth and Influence of an Exiled Ottoman Eunuch in Egypt," 303, 307.

[44] Daniel Crecelius, "The *Waqf* of Muhammad Bey Abū al-Dhahab in Historical Perspective," *IJMES* 23 (1991), 59–60.

[45] Thus, Mehmed Bey Abu al-Dhahab used the rents from ʿAli Bey's *qayṣariyya* to fund his *madrasa*. See Crecelius, "The *Waqf* of Muhammad Bey," 60.

[46] Ralph S. Hattox, *Coffee and Coffeehouses: The Origins of a Social Beverage in the Medieval Near East* (Seattle and London, 1985), pp. 11ff., 73–7.

[47] See chapter 3, n. 14. [48] See chapter 4, pp. 76–9, and chapter 5, pp. 97–8.

A household that depended on the coffee trade could not, however, be content with controlling the pilgrimage route and key Upper Egyptian tax farms, but must also bring its influence to bear on the shipment of coffee from Yemen across the Red Sea to Egypt. Well before the Qazdağlıs came to prominence, Janissary officers had sought the tax farms of the customs at the Red Sea and Nile ports through which Yemeni coffee must pass. Some households even used control of the Mediterranean customs at Alexandria, Rosetta, and Damietta to profit from European imports and exports of coffee and other goods. Thus the French consul lamented the death in 1720 of the Janissary officer Gedik Mehmed Kâhya, who as customs director allowed French merchants to export coffee from Egypt without paying ruinous taxes.[49]

Likewise, the ships that transported coffee and grain across the Red Sea were often owned by Janissary officers. Frequently, these were Indian ships that the officers purchased; Egypt itself does not appear to have had a shipbuilding industry during the Ottoman era, until Murad Bey launched a Nile boat-building scheme late in the eighteenth century.[50] A Janissary officer might own a ship in partnership with another officer or an overseas merchant; in that case, the portion of the ship that he owned was heritable. Süleyman Kâhya al-Qazdağlı's estate inventory notes that he owned half of a "Red Sea ship," possibly built in India; the ship is one of Süleyman Kâhya's numerous investments in the coffee trade.[51] Presumably, the half-share in the ship passed to ʿAbdurrahman Kâhya, along with the rest of Süleyman's possessions, when Süleyman fell ill and died as he was about to begin the pilgrimage in 1739.[52]

Coffee itself appears to have formed a part of the Qazdağlı household's heritable wealth. Thus, ʿAbdurrahman Kâhya inherited the "ground coffee beans" that Süleyman Kâhya had in his tent during his encampment at Birkat al-Hajj. Süleyman had no doubt intended to trade these beans in the course of the pilgrimage, perhaps selling them in locales that lay along the outgoing route. The Qazdağlıs may have regarded a load of coffee beans much as medieval Egyptian merchants had regarded a pound of raw silk: as a commodity that was useful to have at hand since it could easily be converted into ready cash.[53]

It appears, in fact, that the coffee trade determined the structure of the Qazdağlı household's early leadership and the sorts of alliances it formed. From its inception late in the seventeenth century through the mid-eighteenth century, household leadership rested with the Janissary officers, always of the rank of *kâhya* or *çavuş*, who held the post of *serdar qiṭār al-ḥajj*. This post was

[49] Quoted in Raymond, *Artisans et commerçants*, vol. I, p. 177.

[50] On Indian ships and Indian trade to the Hijaz, see, for example, *Mühimme-i Mısır*, vol. IV, no. 495 (1144/1731); vol. VI, no. 26 (1158/1745); Faroqhi, *Pilgrims and Sultans*, pp. 163, 165–6. On Murad Bey's project, see al-Jabarti, *ʿAjāʾib*, vol. III, p. 298.

[51] See Tuchscherer, "Pèlerinage," 162, 172.

[52] On ʿAbdurrahman's inheritance, see al-Damurdashi, *Durra*, p. 437.

[53] For this use of silk, see Goitein, *A Mediterranean Society*, vol. I, pp. 222, 454.

an attractive complement to Janissary control of the customs at the Nile and Red Sea ports and Janissary ownership of the ships that transported coffee through the Red Sea. This combination of prerogatives enabled the Qazdağlıs and their Janissary allies to control almost completely the transshipment of coffee from Yemen and the Hijaz to Egypt. Through repeated contact with the Hijaz, furthermore, the Qazdağlıs cultivated clients and invested in properties there that could shelter them in time of crisis, much like the Bilifya holdings in Upper Egypt.[54]

The influence of Janissary officers both within the Qazdağlı household and in Egypt at large culminated in the duumvirate of Ibrahim Kâhya al-Qazdağlı and the ʿAzeban *kâhya* Ridvan al-Jalfi, who jointly controlled Egypt from 1748 until 1754. This duumvirate was rooted in a partnership in the coffee trade. Al-Damurdashi recalls that Ibrahim Kâhya gave a third of whatever "entered his hand" to Ridvan Kâhya. The chronicler at length explains that what came into Ibrahim's hand was six *şerifs*, or imperial gold pieces, from each load of coffee beans that entered the spice customs (*duwān al-bahār*), which the Qazdağlıs controlled.[55] Ibrahim's and Ridvan's arrangement resembles the form of commercial partnership known as a *muḍāraba* or commenda, in which the "passive" partner puts up the capital and receives two-thirds of the profits while the "active" partner sells the merchandise and receives one-third of the profits.[56] While Ridvan was clearly the "passive" partner in this scheme, we have no indication that he put up capital for a specific enterprise, as in the classic commenda. Rather, Ridvan appears to have had more money to invest generally; hence his extensive building projects and cultivation of what amounted to a salon culture.[57] Following Ibrahim's death in 1754, Ridvan appealed to the new Qazdağlı headman, the long-suffering ʿAbdurrahman Kâhya, to continue the partnership. On the advice of Ibrahim's mamluks, ʿAbdurrahman flatly refused and, in their company, routed Ridvan from Cairo.[58] ʿAbdurrahman's action signaled that the partnership was no longer necessary to Qazdağlı influence; the household had achieved its preponderance and outgrown strategic alliances of the sort it had cultivated with the Jalfis.

The Jalfi alliance was not the only coffee-related connection that the Qazdağlıs engineered while consolidating their influence during the early decades of the eighteenth century. They took some pains to attach themselves to the powerful Sharaybi clan of coffee and spice merchants. ʿOsman Kâhya al-Qazdağlı, under whom the Qazdağlıs emerged as a formidably powerful

[54] This may partially explain why the Hijaz was such a popular place of exile during the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. Mustafa Kâhya, the founder of the Qazdağlı household, and ʿAbdurrahman Kâhya were both exiled there. By the late eighteenth century, however, grandees were as likely to seek refuge in Upper Egypt.

[55] Al-Damurdashi, *Durra*, pp. 560, 577.

[56] See chapter 5, n. 32.

[57] On these, see al-Damurdashi, *Durra*, pp. 560–1; al-Jabarti, *ʿAjāʾib*, vol. II, pp. 92ff.

[58] Al-Damurdashi, *Durra*, pp. 577–81.

household during the 1730s, was especially close to Qasim Çelebi al-Sharaybi, the *shah bandar*, or chief of Cairo's overseas merchants. On Qasim's death in 1734, 'Osman Kâhya walked behind his bier from the Sharaybi mansion all the way to the cemetery at Qarafa.[59] Of more practical significance, the Sharaybi compound at Azbakiyya stood next door to 'Osman Kâhya's own residential complex. The Sharaybis' cooperation benefited the Qazdağlıs not only in the coffee trade but also in conflicts with other aspiring grandees. For a notable example, the Sharaybis led the coffee and spice merchants in financing an expedition against Çerkes Mehmed Bey in 1729.[60]

Until the death of Ibrahim Kâhya, the Qazdağlıs were, in effect, a coffee household. We would therefore naturally expect the household to have suffered from the drop in world coffee prices during the 1730s, when French merchants introduced lower-quality coffee from France's Caribbean colonies into the Mediterranean and Red Sea trades, thus undercutting demand for the Yemeni product.[61] It was during these years that the Qazdağlı household began to encroach in earnest on the tax farms of Egyptian grain villages. Coffee wealth, of course, enabled the Qazdağlıs to purchase these tax farms at auction; in turn, control of these tax farms facilitated the grain-for-coffee trade in the Hijaz. And yet these tax farms were a hedge against falling coffee prices, as well, since revenues from the farms did not depend directly on the coffee trade. As the coffee trade grew less profitable, the Qazdağlıs seem to have concentrated more of their energies on acquiring lucrative tax farms. Control of the subprovincial governorships, holding the rank of bey or *kāshif*, would naturally have become a higher priority. Thus, falling coffee prices and the growing uncertainties of the Red Sea coffee trade may have contributed to the Qazdağlı household's penetration of the beylicate in the latter half of the eighteenth century.

In the course of its development, the Qazdağlı household proved itself adept at securing sources of revenue that would ensure its continuity. It began as one of several Janissary households that drew their wealth from the Red Sea coffee trade. Ultimately, Qazdağlı domination of the Janissary regiment, combined with the household's control of the pilgrimage route, gave the Qazdağlıs a virtual monopoly on the coffee trade. The partnership in coffee tariffs between Ibrahim Kâhya al-Qazdağlı and Ridvan Kâhya al-Jalfi would not have been possible without such a monopoly. The Qazdağlıs reinforced their hold on coffee proceeds by acquiring the tax farms of villages, above all those endowed to the *Awqāf al-Ḥaramayn*, that produced grain, which could be exchanged for coffee during the pilgrimage. These tax farms in turn gave the Qazdağlı household a foundation for its entry into the beylicate. Throughout its development, the household forged alliances with other households, such as the

[59] Ahmad Çelebi, *Awḍaḥ*, p. 589. See also chapter 4, n. 102. On the wealth of coffee merchants generally, see Faroqhi, *Pilgrims and Sultans*, p. 170.

[60] See chapter 4, n. 102.

[61] Raymond, *Artisans et commerçants*, vol. I, pp. 156ff. See also chapter 3, n. 33.

Bilifyas and Sharaybis, that could contribute to its success in these ventures. In a society in which the household was typically the engine of large-scale economic activity, playing the role of trading company, holding company, and landlord, the successful household made investments and entered partnerships that would give it the flexibility to adapt to changing economic circumstances. The Qazdağlı household seems to have had a peculiar genius for just such strategic planning.

CHAPTER 8

The Qazdağlıs and the Chief Black Eunuch

The household, as we have seen, encompassed a network of alliances that could link men and women in a wide variety of activities and in far-flung locales. The Qazdağlıs used a variety of commercial and conjugal alliances to cement their authority within Egypt and the Hijaz. It was imperative, however, for them to extend their household alliances beyond their immediate vicinity in order to cultivate ties with the various powers at the imperial center: those who were in a position to appoint a friendly governor to Egypt or, on the other hand, to order the seizure of the Qazdağlıs' estates. In building these bonds, the Qazdağlıs and their imperial allies exploited the household as a channel of exchange between Egypt and the imperial center. For it was principally by affiliating with local households or co-opting local grandees into their own households that imperial functionaries exerted influence in the provinces.

Of all imperial appointees who carried weight on the local scene, one stands out for exploiting the household in this fashion. This is the Chief Black Eunuch of the Ottoman imperial harem, known as *Kızlar Ağası* or *Darüssaade Ağası*. The use of eunuchs in imperial inner sancta dates to remote antiquity; the Persian, Roman, and Chinese empires all practiced the custom. The Ottomans had begun to employ harem eunuchs in the early days of their empire. Ottoman harem eunuchs included black Africans imported from the eastern regions of sub-Saharan Africa and whites imported primarily from the Caucasus. The chief eunuch of the imperial harem, who oversaw the hierarchy of eunuchs who served the hierarchy of imperial mothers and concubines, was initially white. Late in the sixteenth century, however, black eunuchs achieved priority in this post for reasons that are not completely clear. The availability and relative ease of acquisition of African slaves, as compared to Caucasian slaves, was no doubt a factor. In addition, Africans were more resistant to disease, owing to the dense germ pool in sub-Saharan Africa, and therefore more likely than Caucasians to survive castration.[1] By the early seventeenth century, in any case, the chief harem eunuch was always black. A chief white eunuch remained in the palace as guardian of the threshold of the

[1] On these points, see Norman Penzer, *The Harem* (London, 1936; repr. 1965), pp. 161–7.

sultan's audience chamber (*Babüssaade Ağası*); however, he ranked below the Chief Black Eunuch in influence.

The Chief Black Eunuch's influence was at its peak throughout the Ottoman Empire during the period of this study. The Eunuch had begun to take a large part in the operation of the empire toward the end of the sixteenth century, when the Ottoman princes began to spend their formative years sequestered in the women's quarters (*ḥarīm*, or harem) of the palace, emerging only when called to the throne. With the advent of this custom, which came to be known as the *kafes*, or "cage," system, the current and future sultans' mothers acquired formidable influence. So, too, did the eunuchs who guarded the harem, for they acted as liaisons between the harem women and the sultan and his retinue, and oversaw the harem budget. In short, the harem became the focus of imperial power. As harem politics flourished, the power of the Chief Black Eunuch waxed until by the mid-seventeenth century, he rivaled the grand vizier for *de facto* control of imperial policy.[2]

Meanwhile, the Chief Black Eunuch's connections with Egypt during this period were considerable. Indeed, the Eunuch's career, from beginning to end, was intertwined with the province. Harem eunuchs were generally presented to the sultan by the Ottoman governor of Egypt, who selected them from the slave caravans that arrived annually from Sennar and Darfur in what is now Sudan.[3] Those few palace eunuchs who attained the post of Chief Eunuch entered a lifelong preoccupation with Egypt. For the Eunuch was the superintendent (*nāẓir* or *mütevelli*)[4] of the *Awqāf al-Ḥaramayn*, the imperial pious foundations established to service the Holy Cities of Mecca and Medina. There appear to have been four major *waqf*s: the Deşişet ül-Kübra and Ḥaramayn, which were initially established under the Mamluk sultanate and included the Ḫassekiye *waqf*; the Deşişet-ül Sugra, or Muradiye, founded by Murad III (1574–95); and the Muhammediye, founded by Mehmed IV (1648–87).[5] Since these *waqf*s derived a substantial portion of their revenues from Egyptian villages, they became the main channel for the acting Chief Black Eunuch's influence in Egypt.

As if to cap this Egyptian connection, the typical Chief Black Eunuch was

[2] Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Devletinin Saray Teşkilatı*, pp. 173–9.

[3] P. S. Girard, *Description de l'Egypte*, vol. XVII: *Mémoire sur l'agriculture, l'industrie, et le commerce de l'Egypte*, 2nd ed. (Paris, 1824), pp. 278–96; H. A. R. Gibb and Harold Bowen, *Islamic Society and the West: A Study of the Impact of Western Civilization on Moslem Culture in the Middle East*, 1 vol. in 2 parts (London, 1950–7), part 1, *Islamic Society in the Eighteenth Century*, p. 305, n. 3.

[4] Despite Stanford Shaw's rigorous terminological breakdown in *Financial and Administrative Organization*, pp. 41–5, the titles seem to have been fairly fluid.

[5] Shaw, *Financial and Administrative Organization*, pp. 269–70. Shaw also includes a *waqf* founded by Ahmed II (1691–5) which, however, is never mentioned in the chronicles' or *mühimme*'s accounts of the *Awqāf al-Ḥaramayn*. İ. H. Uzunçarşılı, *Mekke-i Mükerreme Emirleri* (Ankara, 1972), p. 15, lists only the Mamluk Ḫassekiye-i 'Atik and Deşişet ül-Kubra; the Deşişet ül-Sugra or Muhammediye; and the Ḥaramayn. See also Faroqhi, *Pilgrims and Sultans*, pp. 80, 90.

exiled to Egypt on being removed from office. The practice began in 1645, when Sünbül Agha sailed to Egypt after five years as Chief Black Eunuch. (En route, alas, he was captured by pirates of the Knights of Saint John of Malta and martyred.)[6] Over the next century and a half, seventeen of thirty-eight Chief Black Eunuchs, as well as numerous lower-ranking eunuchs, were banished to Egypt. This form of exile was, of course, a peculiarly Ottoman institution: a not quite honorable demotion designed not to ruin the victim but to keep him in reserve at a far remove from the center of power. It was, moreover, a salaried exile: the eunuch received a stipend through the Keşide, a corps of imperial appointees attached to the Ottoman governor's council, or *divan*.[7] Like other exiled officials, he could strike roots in his new home, endowing *waqf*s, acquiring property, perhaps even buying slaves.

In short, the Chief Black Eunuch's career was divided into two phases: his term in office in Istanbul, when he upheld imperial interests, and his term of exile in Egypt, when he served his personal interests. Yet a neat bifurcation cannot be made between these two phases. Obviously, the acting Chief Black Eunuch realized that he might well end his days in Egypt and could be expected to feather his Egyptian nest from Istanbul. From the late seventeenth century onward, moreover, the Chief Black Eunuch's Egyptian exile occasionally became a prelude to his appointment as *Shaykh al-Ḥaram al-Nabawī*, or guardian of the Prophet's tomb in Medina – a post that held a whole new set of imperial duties, including, in the case of at least one exiled Eunuch, supervision of another large imperial *waqf*. It would be more accurate to describe the Chief Black Eunuch's connection with Egypt as a sustained personal interest in the province amid the vicissitudes of an imperial career. The Eunuch was, in any case, the one imperial official whose career regularly, if not inevitably, included a stint in Egypt.

The range of the Chief Black Eunuch's personal interests in Egypt

How extensive were the Chief Black Eunuch's interests within Egypt? An inventory that has survived in the Topkapı Palace archives of the personal, as opposed to imperial, *waqf* holdings in Egypt of one Chief Black Eunuch, 'Abbas (1667–71), indicates that these interests were remarkably broad and deep.[8] Compiled after 'Abbas' death, the inventory falls into two main parts:

[6] Mehmet Süreyya, *Sicill-i 'Osmani*, 4 vols. in 3 (Istanbul, A.H. 1308), vol. III, p. 113. All basic biographical information on the eunuchs comes from this source.

[7] According to Shaw, the mandate of the Keşide was to "care for Ottoman officers serving the Sultan in Egypt" (*Financial and Administrative Organization*, p. 202). However, the corps' functions seem to have been more complex. The imperial harem eunuchs within the Keşide appear to have been capable of mustering as a fighting force. Thus, the Chief Black Eunuchs appear as a corps alongside the beys, aghas, and ümerā'-i Çerakise in the 1659 expedition against Mehmed Bey al-Faqari, and later follow the beys on horseback in a procession accompanying the *maḥmil* (al-Hallaq, *Tārīḫ-i Mıṣır-ı Ḳāhire*, fos. 169r, 170v).

[8] Topkapı D 7657 (undated). For a detailed analysis of this document, see Hathaway, "The Wealth and Influence of an Exiled Ottoman Eunuch in Egypt."

a list of twenty-seven books, followed by a long list of real-estate holdings. The real-estate portion of the inventory reveals 'Abbas Agha's formidable commercial power. The sheer diversity and extent of rural and urban properties are remarkable. In the Egyptian countryside, 'Abbas' holdings encompassed seven towns in three different subprovinces.[9] Most striking is the concentration of commercial properties in the district of Zifta, northeast of Cairo on the Nile. There, 'Abbas could claim a *qayṣariyya*, or covered market[10]; a *wakāla*, or warehouse-cum-caravanserai; a complex of coffeehouse (*kahveḫane*), "coffee-pounding place" (*kahve döğecek maḥall*), and four shops; and two storage rooms (*qā'ah*),[11] over one of which stood a *mekteb*, or school. In Cairo, meanwhile, the *waqf* incorporated a motley assortment of lands, shops, and houses, including 'Abbas' personal residence in the then-fashionable elite quarter overlooking the pond of Birkat al-Fil in southern Cairo. But surpassing all these in commercial importance were three *wakāla*s: one in Gamaliyya, one outside Bab al-Futuh, and, most notably, a "large *wakāla*" at the port of Bulaq, most likely for the storage of and trade in flax.[12]

Above and beyond these individual items, the inventory makes 'Abbas out to be a patron of Egypt's regional linen industry, a key enterprise since antiquity. In the village of Shubra Basyun in Gharbiyya, the inventory lists four "places for wetting flax" (*keten ıslatacak maḥall*) – such wetting being an integral part of linen-making.[13] Cairo's Gamaliyya quarter was home to three *raṭāba*s, probably fulling mills,[14] and a dyeing house (*boyaḫane*). Associated with these were ten shops, a room over a shop, and a "ruined place" (*ḫarābe maḥall*).

Perhaps the most intriguing feature of this document, however, is the light it sheds on 'Abbas' intellectual leanings. A predilection for medicine is indicated. The property list includes four copper pots (*nüḥḥās*) for eight physicians (*ṭıbbçı*) in Zifta; meanwhile, two of 'Abbas' twenty-seven books are medical works. Even the street in which his residence is situated is called "Medicine Street" (*Ṭıbb Sokağı*).

The topics of 'Abbas Agha's remaining books hint at their owner's linguistic abilities and eclectic tastes. The bulk of the library[15] consisted of religious

[9] Minyat Ja'far and Shubra Basyun in Gharbiyya; Zifta and Mit Ghamr in Sharqiyya; and Kharab Fazara, Bahada, and Minyat 'Asim in Qalyub. These sites are identified in Halm, *Ägypten*; and Carl Petry, *The Civilian Elite of Cairo in the Later Middle Ages* (Princeton, 1981).

[10] *Qaysariyya* is spelled with a *sīn*, a practice common in Egypt, to judge from the Cairo Geniza. See Goitein, *A Mediterranean Society*, vol. I, p. 194.

[11] This usage is discussed by Goitein, *A Mediterranean Society*, vol. I, p. 187.

[12] This identification is a bit problematic since Bulaq's flax *wakāla* was endowed by Hafiz Ahmed Pasha (1591–5) to support a well on the pilgrimage route. See Ahmad Çelebi, *Awḍaḥ*, p. 123.

[13] Goitein, *A Mediterranean Society*, vol. I, p. 105; Girard, *Mémoire*, pp. 99ff.

[14] Goitein's notecards on microfilm (Princeton University) note the appearance of the word *raṭba* in a Geniza document to describe a fulled gown (*[thawb] maqṣūra raṭba*).

[15] Mühimme Defteri 110, no. 947 (early Cumaze II 1109/1698) confirms that these books were part of a library (*kitabḫane*). This document also reveals that the former governor of Egypt, Ismail Pasha (1694–7), had illegally sold some of the *waqf* property.

texts: Qur'ān, Prophetic traditions (*ḥadīth*), and collections of largely Hanafi legal opinions (*fatwas*) and exegesis in both Arabic and Turkish. Yet added to these were three histories, including the *Tevārīḫ-i Āl-i ʿOsmān*, the fifteenth-century compilation of early Ottoman history, and a collection of Persian poetry by the fifteenth-century Herati poet Jamiʿ. Most of these religious and literary works belong to the curriculum of the Ottoman courtier's education.[16] Yet the standard palace curriculum cannot account for four works that hint at mystical leanings: *Kīmiyya-i saʿāde*, probably that of the eleventh-century theologian al-Ghazali; *Ṭabaqāt al-awliyā'*, a compendium of sufi saints' biographies by the tenth-century mystic Farid al-Din ʿAttar; the same author's *Manṭiq al-Ṭayr* (Parliament of the Birds); and a collection of sufi devotions known as *Qirā'āt al-awrād*. In this regard, it seems quite noteworthy that the *waqf* property includes a sufi lodge, or *zāwiya*, outside Bab al-Futuh, the northern gate of old Fatimid Cairo. This would place the *zāwiya* in the Husayniyya quarter, which was a center of sufi activity.[17]

Channels of influence: *vekil*s and mamluks

The unacknowledged presences in ʿAbbas Agha's *waqf* inventory are the personnel who must have run the linen works, overseen the villages, perhaps even cared for the books. If the Chief Black Eunuch held such commercial and cultural power, in office or out, through whom did he exercise it? Did he employ followers who accompanied him from Istanbul, or did he operate through local intermediaries? The question expands to become one of the extent of the Chief Black Eunuch's involvement in local society. If, as ʿAbbas Agha's *waqf* register indicates, the Eunuch were commercially and even culturally entrenched in Egypt, to what degree was he politically entrenched, as well?

Certainly, the figures most frequently encountered in connection with the Chief Black Eunuch's interests in Egypt are his agents, or *vekil*s (*wakīl*s in Arabic). Their functions seem roughly to coincide with the well-documented activities of commercial *vekil*s: a *vekil* is entrusted with a sum of money and assigned a specific task, although not necessarily a financial one. In a certain sense, the *vekil* resembles the active, itinerant partner in the commercial partnership known as a *muḍāraba* or commenda.[18] The Chief Black Eunuch seems

[16] See, for example, Barnette Miller, *The Palace School of Muhammad the Conqueror* (New York, 1951), pp. 94ff.; Paul Rycaut, *The Present State of the Ottoman Empire* (London, 1668; repr. New York, 1971), p. 32.

[17] Husayniyya and environs were the center above all for various offshoots of the Ḫalveti sufi order, notably the Gülşeni and Demirdaşi orders, highly influential in the early Ottoman period. In the eighteenth century, the Husayni *mashhad* was the ritual center of the Bayyumiyya order, which was dominated by Husayniyya's butchers. See Ernst Bannerth, "La Khalwatiyya en Egypte: Quelques aspects de la vie d'un confrerie," *MIDEO* 8 (1964–6), 1–74; B. G. Martin, "A Short History of the Khalwati Order of Dervishes," in Nikki R. Keddie (ed.), *Scholars, Saints, and Sufis* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London, 1972).

[18] On this form of partnership, see Udovitch, *Partnership and Profit in Medieval Islam*, chapter 6; and Goitein, *A Mediterranean Society*, vol. I, pp. 171ff. See also chapter 5, n. 32.

to have employed *vekils* for the most part while physically absent from Egypt. Thus al-Hajj Beshir Agha, en route from Medina to Istanbul in 1717 to take up the mantle of Chief Black Eunuch, left a *vekil* in Cairo. "He stayed in Egypt for two months," writes Ahmad Çelebi, "then went to the Imperial Threshold after setting up ʿAbdullah al-Fahl as his *vekil* to build the fountain and the school opposite Qantarat Sunqur."[19] It is impossible to tell whether ʿAbdullah al-Fahl belonged to al-Hajj Beshir's retinue or whether he were a local figure whom Beshir indeed "set up". Various others of Beshir's *vekils* appear in the *Mühimme-i Mısır* during Beshir's lengthy term of office (1717–46). These are all styled "Agha" – Mehmed Agha, ʿOsman Agha, etc. – leaving one unsure of their identities. They could be other harem eunuchs or, alternatively, members of Egypt's military corps. ʿAbdullah al-Fahl, at any rate, was almost certainly not a eunuch but a mamluk; the epithet *faḥl* connotes an uncastrated male.

A limited body of evidence exists linking the *vekils* of the Chief Black Eunuch and other harem eunuchs to Egypt's military cadres, particularly in the seventeenth century. Al-Hallaq, for example, describes ʿUveys Bey, a former member of the palace corps of axemen (Baltacıs) who came to Egypt with the exiled eunuch Nezir Agha around 1665. Nezir entrusted ʿUveys with 10,000 gold Venetian ducats so that, although al-Hallaq does not apply the title *vekil* to him, ʿUveys served as a *de facto* financial representative.[20] He was later given the post of *silahdar ağası*, or weapons-bearer, and ultimately raised to the beylicate. Here, we see two interlocking phenomena at work: a member of a harem eunuch's retinue joins the local military elite, and the practice of exiling harem eunuchs to Egypt spawns a direct injection of palace personnel into Egyptian military society. This case is evidently representative of a broader trend. The military salary register of 1675–7 designates a number of men as followers of the Chief Black Eunuch (*tābiʿ-i Ağa-yı Darüssaade*). Admittedly, these are very few in relation to the total number of troops: some fifteen out of 2,000. But more interesting is the fact that a majority of these followers of the Eunuch belong to the Müteferrika regiment, which was filled directly from the imperial palace until the mid-seventeenth century and which was the principal pool for beys during the late sixteenth century.[21] Furthermore, the Müteferrika corps included adherents of other imperial appointees, notably the grand vizier and the head of the descendants of the Prophet (*naqīb al-ashrāf*), who until the eighteenth century was appointed from Istanbul.[22]

The logical extension of these *vekils* contracted on the spot and clusters of followers within the military corps would seem to be a full-fledged household that the Chief Black Eunuch could exploit once he arrived in Egypt. Yet only one exiled Chief Black Eunuch, Yusuf Agha (1671–87), can unequivocally be said to have headed a household, and even so, we can identify only two of his

[19] Ahmad Çelebi, *Awḍaḥ*, p. 290. [20] Al-Hallaq, *Tārīḫ-i Mışır-ı Ḳāhire*, fo. 185.
[21] See chapter 3, pp. 40–2. In contrast, the 1737–8 salary register lists only two followers of the Chief Black Eunuch. [22] See chapter 3, pp. 40–2.

followers. The first of these, one Ahmed Bey, seems to be identical with the Qasimi governor of Minufiyya subprovince. He appears briefly and sporadically in the chronicles, where his most noteworthy achievement is leading a force to protect Rhodes in 1695.[23]

Far more visible is Mustafa Bey Kızlar, so surnamed because he was Yusuf Agha's protégé, or *çırak*. His origins are obscure. The first reliable reference to him appears in al-Hallaq's chronicle: when Hasan Pasha arrived in Egypt in 1687, Mustafa Bey was *qā'im maqām*, the beylical stand-in for a deposed governor.[24] The date of this episode is too close to the date of Yusuf Agha's exile to make it plausible that Mustafa accompanied Yusuf Agha to Egypt. He was probably injected into the Egyptian military elite from Istanbul or, alternatively, acquired in Egypt well before Yusuf Agha arrived there.

Unlike Ahmed Bey, Mustafa Bey aligned himself with the Faqari bloc and, in fact, seems to have nurtured ties of loyalty to the Bilifya group.[25] His known career extends for some fifty years, in the course of which he served twice as *qā'im maqām*, once as governor of Jirja, and once as *defterdar*. Mustafa Bey died around 1730, one assumes at a relatively advanced age. Of his own followers he seems to have left few, if any. Al-Damurdashi makes fleeting reference to a mamluk of Mustafa Bey residing in Yusuf Agha's old house in the quarter of Suwayqat 'Usfur in southern Cairo. This house had once belonged to Yusuf Agha's own patron, the Chief Black Eunuch Taş Yatur 'Ali Agha, who was exiled to Cairo in 1648. This mamluk, however, had been reduced to such poverty that he was forced to contract a *de facto* sale of the house by means of the ninety-year lease known as the *ḥikr*.[26] If Mustafa Bey had a household, then, it was a small and poor one – in keeping, one would suspect, with his patron's household.

It is difficult to determine just why Yusuf Agha was unable to build a solidly successful household. His case can be interpreted in both a positive and a negative light. The negative interpretation would hold that both local and imperial forces militated against the Chief Black Eunuch building an independent household in Egypt. By the late seventeenth century, the Faqari–Qasimi scheme had become a dense socio-political tangle that overwhelmed those injected into it from outside. The difficulty of holding one's own in such a milieu was no doubt compounded in the case of the Chief Black Eunuch, who was by his very nature a marginal type not easily absorbed by a military society in which ethnic and gender distinctions mattered a great deal. In this regard, it is perhaps remarkable that Ahmed and Mustafa Beys achieved the high ranks they did.

[23] Al-Hallaq, *Tārīḫ-i Mıṣır-ı Ḳāhire*, fo. 230v; Ahmad Çelebi, *Awḍaḥ*, p. 192; al-Damurdashi, *Durra*, pp. 17–19; al-Jabarti, *'Ajā'ib*, vol. I, p. 77.

[24] Al-Hallaq, *Tārīḫ-i Mıṣır-ı Ḳāhire*, fo. 219v.

[25] Al-Damurdashi describes an incident in which Hasan Agha Bilifya and his son-in-law Ismail Bey interceded for Mustafa Bey with the governor Hüseyin Pasha and obtained the governorship of Jirja for Mustafa (*Durra*, pp. 58–9).

[26] Al-Damurdashi, *Durra*, p. 322. See also al-Hallaq, *Tārīḫ-i Mıṣır-ı Ḳāhire*, fo. 219v. On the *ḥikr*, see Badr and Crecelius, "The *Waqf*s of Shahin Ahmad Agha," 92, n. 73.

At the same time, Istanbul seems to have tried to prevent a single Chief Black Eunuch gaining a permanent foothold in Egypt's military elite. Thus in 1675, when Süleyman Agha (1651–2) headed a delegation of soldiers petitioning the sultan to depose the governor, he was denounced for interfering in military matters and banished to the Aegean island of Lemnos.[27] The same motives may have lain behind Yusuf Agha's posting to Medina as *Shaykh al-Ḥaram al-Nabawī* in 1691, four years after he landed in Egypt. This return to imperial service may have constituted yet another form of salaried exile even though Yusuf Agha apparently lost no property or privileges in the process.[28]

An alternative interpretation, however, would suggest that Yusuf Agha never contemplated an independent household but that he intended Mustafa Bey to serve as permanent representative of the Chief Black Eunuch in Egypt even while participating fully in Egyptian military society. This explanation gains plausibility from evidence that Mustafa Bey served as *vekil* both to Yusuf Agha and to al-Hajj Beshir Agha while the latter was still Chief Black Eunuch[29] and would be further strengthened if Mustafa Bey Kızlar were identical with a Mustafa Bey cited in the *mühimme* as the treasurer (*ḫazinedar*) of the Chief Black Eunuch Nezir Agha (1692–4).[30]

The one Chief Black Eunuch who is alleged to lie behind the formation of a self-sustaining household is al-Hajj Beshir Agha (1717–46), the longest-lived and arguably the most powerful Chief Black Eunuch in Ottoman history. Al-Hajj Beshir was exiled to Egypt before his career as Chief Black Eunuch began. In 1713, while holding the post of palace treasurer (*Ḫazinedar-i Şehriyarî*), he was removed to Cyprus with the deposed Chief Black Eunuch Uzun Süleyman Agha (1704–13), then transferred briefly to Egypt before being posted to Medina as *Shaykh al-Ḥaram al-Nabawī*. He was recalled to the imperial palace in 1717. As we have seen, he stopped in Cairo on his way back and left a *vekil* building a fountain there.

If al-Jabarti is to be believed, of course, al-Hajj Beshir at some point left behind more than a fountain. The chronicler, we recall, credits Beshir's mamluk Mehmed Agha with founding the Jalfi household by marrying his own client Hasan Kâhya to the daughter of Mansur al-Zataharcı al-Sinjalfi (see chapter 4, pp. 53–4). This Mehmed Agha may be al-Hajj Beshir's *vekil* al-Hajj Mehmed Agha, who appears in several imperial orders of the 1730s con-

[27] Al-Hallaq, *Tārīḫ-i Mıṣır-ı Ḳāhire*, fo. 213r.

[28] In contrast, when he was deposed as Chief Black Eunuch, his property, including his house at Suwayqat 'Usfur, was confiscated. When he arrived in Cairo as an exile, his *vekil* Ahmed Agha retrieved the house from the governor. See al-Hallaq, *Tārīḫ-i Mıṣır-ı Ḳāhire*, fos. 220r and 222; *Akhbār al-nuwwāb*, fo. 40r; Ahmad Çelebi, *Awḍaḥ*, pp. 181–2.

[29] Mühimme Defteri 99, no. 491 (mid-Receb 1101/1690) refers to Mustafa Bey as Yusuf Agha's *vekil*. As al-Hajj Beshir Agha's *vekil*, Mustafa Bey was named *mutaṣarrıf*, or administrator, of the Qasimi 'Abdurrahman Bey Dalja's lands in Egypt after the latter had fled to Istanbul and sought al-Hajj Beshir Agha's intercession. See al-Damurdashi, *Durra*, p. 293; *Mühimme-i Mısır*, vol. IV, no. 8 (1139/1726–7); Hathaway, "The Role of the Kızlar Ağası," 149.

[30] *Mühimme-i Mısır*, vol. I, nos. 447 (1128/1716), 471 (1129/1717).

cerned with his death and the disposal of his estate.[31] The orders do not, however, link Mehmed Agha to the village of Sinjalf in Minufiyya subprovince. Little would seem to predispose an acting Chief Black Eunuch to place a *vekil* in this village, for it was evidently not one of the villages whose revenues went to the *Awqāf al-Ḥaramayn*. But then again, Mehmed Agha may simply have been looking after his personal interests, much like ʿAbbas Agha, in acquiring followers in that village. Thus the *vekil* could be more than just a channel of influence for the Chief Black Eunuch; he could exploit connections on the spot for his own benefit.

Changes in the administration of the *Awqāf al-Ḥaramayn* and their effects on the military households

With al-Hajj Beshir Agha, we come to the question of the Chief Black Eunuch's influence while in office: in particular, the power he wielded through his supervision of the *Awqāf al-Ḥaramayn*. The *Awqāf* clearly formed a key institutional link between imperial and local interests. Yet even in matters of *Awqāf* administration, the meeting of imperial and local was not limited to institutional arrangements but was colored by considerations of personal affiliations. Here, too, the clientage relationship and the household played major roles in the exchange between center and province.

The four imperial *Awqāf* created a network of endowed villages throughout Egypt. Several posthumous accounts of the *fāʾiẓ*, or surplus revenue, that Beshir Agha drew from these villages give an impression of how the *Awqāf* permeated the Egyptian countryside. A total of thirty-one villages are named in these registers. Of these, I have been able positively to identify twenty-one and tentatively to identify two more. The accounts note the subprovinces in which these villages lie, revealing that the villages are widely scattered throughout nine of Egypt's thirteen subprovinces.[32] With so many sources of revenue and regional authority at stake, the competition for *Awqāf* supervisory posts, as well as for the tax farms of endowed villages, was understandably fierce. Thus, during the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, when beys and military officers were competing for rural revenues in general, we should not be surprised to find the administration of the *Awqāf al-Ḥaramayn* in flux. The changes, however, were not instigated entirely by local interests but consituted part of the continuing dialogue between center and province. The Chief Black Eunuch was frequently one of the key participants in this dialogue, both as a

[31] *Mühimme-i Mısır*, vol. IV, no. 514 (1145/1732–3); vol. V, nos. 44, 56 (1146/1733–4). Oddly, vol. V, no. 56 refers to Mehmed as *vekil ḫaric*, the supplier of provisions to the imperial pantry. Perhaps the scribe copying this particular order confused Mehmed Agha with Mehmed Bey Qatamish, cited as former *vekil ḫaric* in vol. V, no. 11.

[32] Of the Delta villages, seven are in Gharbiyya, one in Mansura, two in Qalyub, three in Minufiyya, one in Sharqiyya, and one (possibly two) in Buhayra; of the Upper Egyptian villages, four are in al-Bahnasa, one (possibly two) in Giza, and one in Fayyum. Topkapı D2520/1–3.

local and as an imperial figure. In two decades of flux between 1670 and 1691, this dialogue changed considerably.

The reforms of Kara Ibrahim Pasha, 1670

In 1670, local administration of the *Awqāf al-Ḥaramayn* underwent a fundamental change at the hands of the governor Kara Ibrahim Pasha, who had arrived with 2,000 imperial troops to reform Egypt's finances. Kara Ibrahim reassigned the local supervision of the Deşişet ül-Kübra, Ḥaramayn, and Ḥassekiye *waqf*s from beys to the Janissary agha, Janissary *baş çavuş*, and ʿAzeban *kâhya*, respectively.[33] Before examining the details and motives of this transformation, however, we should consider the framework within which such a change was effected. In the Ottoman Empire, a network of personal rivalries and alliances shadowed the imperial institutional structure. Furthermore, both institutional and personal machinations took place within three interlocking spheres: the imperial sphere, encompassing the chancery, domain of the grand vizier, and the palace, domain of the sultan, his mother (*Valide Sultan*), and the Chief Black Eunuch; the sphere of the beys and military officers, who were the main repositories of local influence; and the sphere of the factions and households to which these grandees belonged. If we cast the transformation of the *Awqāf* administration in terms of these spheres, the motives underlying it may become more comprehensible.

The governor of Egypt originated in the imperial sphere and was one of a host of mediators between that sphere and the other two. During the latter half of Sultan Mehmed IV's reign (1648–87), when the grand viziers of the Köprülü family carried out sweeping administrative and financial reforms, the governor was most likely to belong to the coterie of the grand vizier. Kara Ibrahim Pasha was the personal lieutenant (*kâhya*) of the grand vizier Köprülü Fazıl Ahmed Pasha.[34] The change that he wrought in the administration of the *Awqāf al-Ḥaramayn* was designed, like many of the Köprülü reforms, to ensure greater control by the imperial government over provincial revenues. In practice, this meant increasing the grand vizier's influence at the expense of the Chief Black Eunuch and those local figures attached to him. In this sense, the reform was at once imperial and local.

Such a consideration makes the presentation of the *Awqāf* reform in the chronicles more comprehensible. In the texts of al-Hallaq, *Akhbār al-nuwwāb*, and Ahmad Çelebi, Kara Ibrahim audits the *Awqāf* accounts just after those of the current *qā'im maqām*, or stand-in for a deposed governor, Ken'an Bey and the former *qā'im maqām* Yusuf Bey Sihr al-Naqib.[35] Finding the accounts

[33] Al-Hallaq, *Tārīḫ-i Mışır-ı Ḳāhire*, fos. 204v–205r; *Akhbār al-nuwwāb*, fo. 34r; Ahmad Çelebi, *Awḍaḥ*, p. 171. This slate of officers foreshadows the later prominence of the Janissary *baş çavuş* and the ʿAzeban *kâhya*.

[34] Al-Hallaq, *Tārīḫ-i Mışır-ı Ḳāhire*, fo. 203v.

[35] *Sihr al-naqīb*, or *Nakib damadı*, refers to the son-in-law of the *naqīb al-ashrāf*, the chief of the descendants of the Prophet.

of the two beys corrupt, he dispatches the beys to Istanbul, where they are imprisoned. The fall in the fortunes of Ken'an Bey, in particular, is highly significant. Having come to Egypt in the entourage of the governor Şehsüvaroğlu Mehmed Pasha in 1067/1656, Ken'an became the *vekil* of the deposed Chief Black Eunuch Musli Agha (1662–7), the predecessor of 'Abbas Agha.[36] It seems possible, in fact, that Ken'an and Yusuf Beys were themselves the local supervisors of the *Awqāf al-Ḥaramayn*, although it is difficult to tell from the chroniclers' accounts. On the other hand, both enjoyed close ties to the palace-affiliated governors who preceded Kara Ibrahim. Yusuf was named *qā'im maqām* by Bostancı Ibrahim Pasha (1078–9/1667–8) while Ken'an, the protégé of Şehsüvaroğlu Mehmed Pasha, was named *qā'im maqām* by Karakash 'Ali Pasha (1079–80/1668–9).[37] Through his reforms, then, Kara Ibrahim Pasha sought to counter this palatial conglomerate of Chief Black Eunuchs, governors connected to the palace,[38] and local clients of both eunuchs and governors who also belonged to the military elite.

Kara Ibrahim's choices for replacements in the *Awqāf* administration were regimental officers who, during the seventeenth century, often came out of the palace but who were also closely connected to the governor's council, or *divan*. The Janissary *baş çavuş* regularly assisted at the *divan*.[39] The Janissary agha, meanwhile, was still appointed from Istanbul. Furthermore, a tradition seems to have begun of naming the Janissary agha supervisor of the *waqf*s established by individual governors.[40] (The status of the 'Azeban *kâhya*, later so important for his local connections, is more difficult to ascertain.) These officers were, in short, influential local personages who had originated in the imperial center but whose power did not yet extend far beyond, or rival, that of the governor's *divan*. If the Köprülü grand vizier could appoint his allies to the governorship, and these governors could in turn fill the supervisory posts of the *Awqāf al-Ḥaramayn* with officers linked to their *divan*s, then the grand vizier attained a lock on the *Awqāf* revenues and a check on the power of the Chief Black Eunuch and his clients. The reform had the additional benefit of dis-

[36] Al-Hallaq, *Tārīḫ-i Mıṣır-ı Ḳāhire*, fo. 179v, refers to Mehmed Pasha's man (*adam*) Ken'an Efendi. Ken'an is cited as Musli Agha's *vekil* in a property case from the Cairo *sharī'a* court records (Topkapı E 7900, 1080/1669–70), which reveals that Ken'an took over Musli's freehold property (*mülk*) on the latter's death.

[37] Karakash 'Ali Pasha named Ken'an *qā'im maqām* on his deathbed (al-Hallaq, *Tārīḫ-i Mıṣır-ı Ḳāhire*, fo. 203v; *Akhbār al-nuwwāb*, fo. 33r; Ahmad Çelebi, *Awḍaḥ*, p. 169). It also seems significant that Karakash 'Ali was buried near Ken'an's mentor, Şehsüvaroğlu Mehmed Pasha.

[38] While Karakash 'Ali was a vizier and therefore may have been aligned with the chancery, Bostancı Ibrahim belonged to the palace corps of "gardeners" (Bostancıs), one of the military groups closest to the sultan. See *EI*[2], s.v. "Bostandji," by İ.H. Uzunçarsılı.

[39] Pococke, *A Description of the East*, vol. I, pp. 166–7.

[40] In al-Hallaq, *Tārīḫ-i Mıṣır-ı Ḳāhire*, fo. 159v, the Janissary agha Ibrahim points out that he came from the sultan's palace. The Janissary agha was appointed supervisor of the *waqf*s of the tomb complex of 'Uqba b. 'Amr, restored by Ebu Nur Mehmed Pasha (1063–6/1653–6); and of a sufi lodge (*tekke*) near Qadam al-Nabi, east of Old Cairo, built by Melek Ibrahim Pasha (1071–4/1661–4). See al-Hallaq, *Tārīḫ-i Mıṣır-ı Ḳāhire*, fos. 157v, 189v; *Akhbār al-nuwwāb*, fo. 26v.

persing and bureaucratizing the supervisory posts. In the first place, the regimental officers' posts were far better defined, in terms of both function and duration, than the post of bey. By dividing *Awqāf* supervision among a set number of officials, furthermore, Kara Ibrahim Pasha prevented a single notable from aggrandizing himself by monopolizing all the supervisory offices.

Kara Ibrahim Pasha's reform seems barely to take into account the third of our three spheres: that of the local households. The factions to which Ken'an and Yusuf Beys belonged are not mentioned in the chronicles although there is some reason to believe that they at least nurtured sympathies for the Qasimi faction. In this instance, however, a constellation of imperial entourages – those of the grand vizier, the Chief Black Eunuch, and the governor of Egypt – took precedence over the local network of households and factions. This, as later developments in *Awqāf* supervision were to attest, was highly unusual.

The Valide Sultan *waqf*, 1678

The new order seems to have held for about a decade. Then the new Valide Sultan *waqf* gave the Egyptian pilgrimage commander the chance to supervise a major imperial *waqf* once more. Founded by Rabi'a Gülnüş Emetullah, the wife of Mehmed IV, in 1678, the *waqf* supported a hospital and soup kitchen in Mecca. It drew much of its revenue from four carefully chosen Egyptian villages, as well as from the port of Bulaq.[41] A series of *waqf* accounts running from 1682 through 1713 repeatedly cites the *amīr al-ḥājj* as *nāẓir*, or supervisor, of the *waqf*. The deposed Chief Black Eunuch Yusuf Agha (1671–87) is also given the title *nāẓir* in several of these documents after 1108/1696. Since Yusuf Agha held the post of *Shaykh al-Ḥaram al-Nabawī*, or chief guardian of the Prophet's tomb in Medina, after 1691, one is tempted to conclude that Gülnüş Emetullah named the *Shaykh al-Ḥaram* empire-wide *nāẓir* of the *waqf* while the *amīr al-ḥājj* served as *nāẓir* "on the spot," a post equivalent to *mütevelli*. However, the documents never refer to Yusuf Agha and a particular *amīr al-ḥājj* as *nāẓir* simultaneously. On the contrary, the documents give the distinct impression that Yusuf's terms as *nāẓir* alternated with those of the local grandees, unusual though such an arrangement may have been.[42]

[41] Al-Hallaq, *Tārīḫ-i Mıṣır-ı Ḳāhire*, fo. 215r; 'Abdülkerim, *Tārīḫ-i Mıṣır*, fo. 96. The villages were Mallawi and its dependencies (in al-Hallaq and 'Abdülkerim, *tévābi'*) in 'Ushmunayn; and Birma, Tataya, and al-Ja'fariyya in Gharbiyya. See also the series of accounts under Topkapı E 33. The *waqf* is briefly mentioned by *Akhbār al-nuwwāb* (fo. 37v) and Ahmad Çelebi (*Awḍaḥ*, p. 176), who call it the Ḫassekiye *waqf* because Gülnüş Emetullah was the *ḫasseki* (favorite concubine) of the reigning sultan.

[42] See, for example, Topkapı E 33/16, paragraph 3, line 1; and paragraph 5, line 1. Yusuf is cited as *nāẓir* in 1108–10/1696–8 (Topkapı E 33/31) and in 1113/1701–2 (E 33/22), and as former *nāẓir* in 1111/1699 (E 33/19). In the cases of other imperial *waqf*s, the Chief Black Eunuch held the post of *nāẓir* while in office in Istanbul. Local grandees served as local *nāẓir*s, or *mütevellis*; the terms are sometimes used interchangeably. On the *Shaykh al-Ḥaram*'s duties, see Faroqhi, *Pilgrims and Sultans*, pp. 153–4.

It is challenging to discern where Yusuf Agha personally and the Chief Black Eunuch institutionally stood in relation to this new *waqf*. The *waqf* was founded when Yusuf Agha still held the office of Chief Black Eunuch. He may therefore have had some say as to which pilgrimage commander was named *nāẓir*. The pilgrimage commanders who held the post before 1710 constituted a solid stream of Faqaris: Zülfikar Bey, Ibrahim Bey b. Zülfikar, Eyüp Bey, Qaytas Bey.[43] Except for Eyüp Bey, furthermore, all belonged to the line of Zülfikar Bey (d. 1102/1690–1): Ibrahim Bey was his son; Qaytas Bey was Ibrahim's mamluk.[44] Given Yusuf Agha's link to the Faqaris through Mustafa Bey Kızlar, this glut of Faqari *nāẓir*s seems more than merely coincidental. One possible explanation for the phenomenon could be, on the one hand, that as the Köprülü era waned, the sultan's mother and the Chief Black Eunuch used their renewed influence to promote the interests of the Egyptian faction whom they favored. On the other hand, the Köprülüs could have succeeded in weakening the Chief Black Eunuch to the extent that the sultan's mother was obliged to turn to local grandees to supervise her *waqf*. The exiled Yusuf Agha, in this context, becomes the rival of the Faqari beys for the supervision of the *waqf*.

The reality, in all likelihood, lies somewhere in between these two alternatives. All evidence points to Yusuf Agha's formidable influence within Egypt and within the Faqari faction. Meanwhile, the fact that he was able to obtain a pardon and win appointment as *Shaykh al-Ḥaram* in 1102/1690–1 and later, while holding this post, to acquire the supervision of the Valide *waqf* attests to his continuing pull inside the imperial palace. In general, nothing suggests that Yusuf Agha was dealing from anything other than a position of strength after 1691. He is cited as *nāẓir* even when the reforming Köprülü relative Amcazade Hüseyin Pasha (1698–1702) held the grand vizierate.[45] The pilgrimage commanders during his two tenures as *nāẓir* were the Faqaris Eyüp Bey and Qaytas Bey. Eyüp Bey succeeded Yusuf as *nāẓir* in 1115–16/1703–4 while in 1111/1699–1700, Yusuf's own mamluk Ahmed Bey Minufiyya became pilgrimage commander. Yusuf Agha seems, in short, to have used his personal links to the string of Faqari pilgrimage commanders to put his hand in the *waqf* revenues. His work was, naturally, made easier when a sympathetic sultan or grand vizier was in power.

Whatever the details of Yusuf Agha's machinations may have been, one gets the strong impression that such control as he exercised over the Valide *waqf*

[43] Zülfikar: Topkapı E 33/9 (dated 1093/1682 but covering expenditures for 1091/1680), E 33/14 (1094/1683); Ibrahim: E 33/19 (cited as former *nāẓir* in 1111/1699–1700); Eyüp: E 33/23 (former *nāẓir* 1116/1704–5); Qaytas: E 33/23 (current *nāẓir* 1116), E 33/24 (1116). In an 1116 addendum to E 33/22 (1113/1701–2), Eyüp has taken possession of Yusuf Agha's *fāʾiẓ*, or surplus revenue, as of 1115–16. Presumably, he was *nāẓir* during that year. Zülfikar Bey is not to be confused with the eighteenth-century patron of ʿOsman Bey Zülfikar. The stream of Faqaris is broken only by the Qasimi Ismail Bey b. ʿIvaz in 1123/1711 (E 33/31).

[44] Eyüp Bey was the *tābiʿ* of Derviş Bey.

[45] Yusuf is first cited as *nāẓir* under Mustafa II's first grand vizier, Elmas Mehmed Pasha (1695–8).

resulted from personal and not institutional power. No later *Shaykh al-Ḥaram* is cited as *nāẓir* of the Valide *waqf*, despite the fact that a number of later Chief Black Eunuchs followed Yusuf in serving as *Shaykh al-Ḥaram* after being deposed. It may be safe to assert that Yusuf Agha was the last truly influential Chief Black Eunuch in exile.

Yusuf Agha's case makes it clear that the practice of exiling Chief Black Eunuchs to Egypt could strengthen local households and, correspondingly, weaken the grand vizier's authority over the distribution of *waqf* revenues. The Valide Sultan *waqf* gave the Faqari faction, and in particular the household of Zülfikar Bey, the opportunity to shore up their local influence even as they cultivated ties with the exiled Yusuf Agha. At times, however, Yusuf Agha competed with these Faqari grandees for supervision of the *waqf*. When an imperial official, exiled or not, cast his lot in with a powerful local household or faction, he ran the risk of seeing his influence overwhelmed. Certainly such a threat existed toward the end of the seventeenth century in the person of Ibrahim Bey b. Zülfikar, who parlayed the opportunity presented by the Valide *waqf* into a Faqari monopoly on *waqf* supervision.

Clearly, the question of the administration of the Valide *waqf* intertwined the imperial and local spheres in a way that the *waqf* reform of 1670 had not. The earlier reform had been initiated by the governor at the behest of the grand vizier. The Valide *waqf* similarly originated within the imperial sphere, but its administration in practice depended far more graphically on influence-peddling between the imperial and local spheres. Where the exiled Chief Black Eunuch Yusuf Agha was involved, *waqf* administration operated at the nexus of the imperial and local spheres. The factional sphere had, meanwhile, entered the picture since the Valide *waqf* in broad terms and Yusuf Agha in particular promoted the Faqari bloc. So far as the general issue of imperial *waqf* administration is concerned, we notice a tendency for the imperial sphere to enmesh the local sphere in its designs. This trend goes hand in hand with a tendency toward less purely institutional, more personal changes within the *waqf* administration. These two tendencies culminated in, if they did not engender, the bold stroke of Ibrahim Bey b. Zülfikar, through whose efforts the local sphere subverted the imperial sphere.

Ibrahim Bey b. Zülfikar and renewed beylical supervision of the *Awqāf al-Ḥaramayn*, 1691

Only twenty-one years after local supervision of the *Awqāf al-Ḥaramayn* had been invested in three regimental officers, it returned to the beylicate. The chroniclers' depiction of the change gives the impression that this was no institutional transfer of power but a matter of individual beys taking over the supervisory posts by imperial decree. The imperial order authorizing the change appears to have specified four individuals as the new supervisors. According to its terms, the pilgrimage commander Ibrahim Bey b. Zülfikar

replaced the Janissary agha as supervisor of the Deşişet ül-Kübra, the *defterdar* Murad Bey replaced the Janissary *kâhya* at the Muhammediye, Ismail Bey replaced the Janissary *baş çavuş* at the Ḥaramayn, and ʿAbdullah Bey replaced the ʿAzeban *kâhya* at the Ḥassekiye. The order effecting Kara Ibrahim Pasha's reforms, in contrast, had referred to "whoever is agha of the Mustahfizan, whoever is *baş çavuş* of the Mustahfizan," and so on.[46]

The new change dovetails neatly with Ibrahim Bey b. Zülfikar's appointment as pilgrimage commander in 1691 and his scheme for self-aggrandizement. This scheme had two principal aims: domination of the Janissary corps by neutralizing the corps' higher officers and, more generally, Faqari hegemony over Egypt's institutions. To realize the first aim, Ibn Zülfikar eliminated three prominent Janissary officers who belonged to the Qasimi faction and, bypassing the higher officer cadre entirely, championed the maverick *başodabaşı* Küçük Mehmed.[47] Ibn Zülfikar's rivalry with the higher regimental officers makes it seem plausible that he engineered the beylical takeover of *Awqāf* supervision in order to weaken the officers.

We should not, however, neglect the factional element to Ibn Zülfikar's strategy. The Janissary officers whom he eliminated were, after all, Qasimis, and his objective was to ensure Faqari domination of the regiment. Three of the four beys who assumed *Awqāf* supervisory posts were, furthermore, Faqaris. The exception was Murad Bey, the Qasimi *defterdar*. Only eight months after the transformation, however, Murad Bey was deposed in favor of the powerful Faqari Ismail Bey. Murad's deposition may or may not have had any effect on his control of the Muhammediye revenues since, as observed above, the transfer of *Awqāf* supervision does not appear to have been an institutional change. That is to say, Ismail Bey need not have taken over supervision of the Muhammediye just because he had been appointed *defterdar*.

This consideration makes it seem somewhat likely that Ibn Zülfikar was somewhat more concerned with ranks than he was with factions. Although eager to ensure Faqari supremacy, he was arguably even more determined to circumvent the regimental officers, who were at the peak of their power late in the seventeenth century. Ibn Zülfikar would, one might argue, make common cause with a Qasimi bey before he would ally himself with a Faqari officer. His rivalry with the most powerful of the Faqari officers, Hasan Agha Bilifya (see chapter 4, pp. 66–9), adds weight to this notion.

Yet it seems oddly coincidental that the accounts of the Valide Sultan *waqf* never mention a Qasimi pilgrimage commander as *nāẓir* before Ismail Bey b. ʿIvaz in 1123/1711. There were, to be sure, only two Qasimi pilgrimage com-

[46] Al-Hallaq, *Tārīḫ-i Mıṣır-ı Ḳāhire*, fo. 226v; *Akhbār al-nuwwāb*, fo. 42v; Ahmad Çelebi, *Awḍaḥ*, p. 187; al-Jabarti, *ʿAjā'ib*, vol. I, p. 75. The change took place in Rebiʿ II 1103/December 1691. It is unclear whether the Janissary *kâhya* had been given the supervision of the Muhammediye *waqf* in 1670 or sometime thereafter.

[47] Al-Damurdashi, *Durra*, pp. 12–13; al-Jabarti, *ʿAjā'ib*, vol. I, p. 230; al-Hallaq, *Tārīḫ-i Mıṣır-ı Ḳāhire*, fos. 225 ff.; *Akhbār al-nuwwāb*, fos. 38v ff.; Ahmad Çelebi, *Awḍaḥ*, p. 182; ʿAbdülkerim, *Tārīḫ-i Mıṣır*, fos. 98r ff.

manders during the years between the *waqf*'s founding and Ismail Bey's ascendancy: Ibrahim Bey Abu Shanab in 1099–1100/1688 and Ahmed Bey Minufiyya, the follower of Yusuf Agha, in 1111/1699. Abu Shanab was powerful enough for his absence from the *waqf* accounts to be conspicuous. We know, furthermore, that Ibrahim Bey b. Zülfikar considered Abu Shanab a threat to his power, for he attempted to assassinate him (see chapter 4, p. 68). Nonetheless, the general character of a pious endowment makes it unlikely that supervision of the Valide *waqf* was open to competition from all quarters each year. It must surely have been assigned to whoever held the pilgrimage command, despite the apparent aberration of Yusuf Agha's two tenures.[48] Faqari dominance of the pilgrimage command enabled that faction to dominate the Valide *waqf*.

Ibrahim Bey b. Zülfikar's program, as played out through control of *waqf* supervision, was one of beylical supremacy, particularly Faqari beylical supremacy. The Valide *waqf* provided a test case for this supremacy. The control exercised by Faqari pilgrimage commanders over the Valide *waqf* may well have encouraged Ibn Zülfikar to make his move on the *Awqāf al-Ḥaramayn*.

A more cryptic question is whether Ibn Zülfikar's hegemonic designs on the *Awqāf al-Ḥaramayn* owed anything to Yusuf Agha. The transfer of the supervisory posts to beylical control occurred within months of Yusuf Agha's pardon and appointment as *Shaykh al-Ḥaram*. Given the circumstances, it seems logical to conclude that Yusuf Agha's position vis-à-vis the imperial *waqf*s was bound up in some fashion with the preponderance of the beys of Ibn Zülfikar's party in the supervisory positions, as it was in the case of the Valide *waqf*. It would be foolish to claim, however, that Yusuf Agha was responsible for the success of Ibn Zülfikar's party or vice versa. A more plausible conclusion is that at certain times, it suited the purposes of one party to use the other.

Like the other changes in *Awqāf* supervision, Ibrahim Bey b. Zülfikar's assault on the *Awqāf al-Ḥaramayn* can be assessed in terms of the interplay of imperial and local interests. In this instance, the transformation in *waqf* supervision originated in the local sphere. The imperial sphere acquiesced inasmuch as the palace issued rescripts affirming the changes that Ibrahim Bey had set in motion. In short, the imperial role in this transformation in *Awqāf* supervision seems to have been largely reactive.

Such a description aptly characterizes an imperial order of 1110/1699 which calls for supervision of the *Awqāf al-Ḥaramayn* to be restored to the officers of the Janissary and ʿAzeban corps, "as it was in the beginning" (*kemma fī ül-evvel*).[49] The sultan who issued the order in response to a petition by the

[48] *Mühimme-i Mısır*, vol. III, no. 222 (1720s), gives this impression. However, vol. IV, no. 26, cites Ibrahim Efendi Kâhya as the *nāẓir* of the Valide *waqf* for 1135–6/1723–4 although, since he was based in Jidda, he may have been only a *nāẓir* "on the spot."

[49] Topkapı E 5211/22 (mid-Zilkade 1110/June 1699). The *kâhyas al-waqt* of both regiments are given prominence.

aggrieved regimental officers was Mustafa II, whose grand vizier at the time was Amcazade Hüseyin Köprülü. Thus the timing of the edict conforms to an attempt to resuscitate the Köprülü reforms.[50] Yet the order was, from all appearances, ignored; beys continued to dominate *Awqāf* supervision. This imperial ineffectiveness points up the contrast between Ibn Zülfikar's revolution and the two earlier major transformations in *waqf* supervision. In this case, no reforming governor codified the distribution of supervisory posts; no ambitious imperial relative founded a new *waqf*. In short, no imperial force acted to confirm any local group in power. Instead, a local force took the initiative, forcing the imperial sector to acknowledge his power. Yet Ibn Zülfikar's aggrandizement was not completely one-sided. The creation of the Valide *waqf* and the consistent support of the Valide and of the exiled Chief Black Eunuch for Faqari grandees had created a climate that favored Ibn Zülfikar's ascendancy. By empowering certain local forces, these imperial forces enabled them to assert themselves.

What, then, of the factional element that seems always to pervade the local sphere? Changes in *waqf* administration from 1678 onward clearly favored the Faqaris inasmuch as members of that faction dominated the positions to which *waqf* supervision was reserved. Yusuf Agha, despite having at least one Qasimi follower, shored up the Faqari bloc. Ibn Zülfikar's agenda, meanwhile, was decidedly pro-Faqari although he also followed a program of subordinating high-ranking regimental officers to beys. In pursuing this program, moreover, he did not hesitate to alienate rival groups within the Faqari bloc, most notably the household of Hasan Agha Bilifya. Nonetheless, the virtually complete lack of Qasimis in *Awqāf* supervision between 1678 and 1711 indicates that the opposing faction was being squeezed out of *waqf* administration. There can be no question that the changes in *waqf* administration wrought by the creation of the Valide *waqf* and the ambitions of Ibn Zülfikar benefited the Faqaris.

The beylical hegemony promoted by Ibn Zülfikar Bey was, meanwhile, just as successful in the long run as his scheme of Faqari supremacy. The example of the eighteenth-century Faqari grandee 'Osman Bey Zülfikar (no relation to Ibrahim Bey b. Zülfikar) shows that the pilgrimage commander was capable of not only retaining but extending his hold over imperial *waqf* supervision. As illustrated in chapter 5, 'Osman Bey contrived to control not only the supervision of the Deşişet ül-Kübra *waqf* but also those of the Muradiye, Ḫassekiye, and Valide Sultan *waqf*s. This, too, was with the tacit consent of the imperial sphere, which moved only belatedly to restrict him.

[50] On Hüseyin Köprülü's reforms, see Lewis V. Thomas, *A Study of Naima*, ed. Norman Itzkowitz (New York, 1972), pp. 66–82.

The household of Hasan Agha Bilifya and the *Awqāf al-Ḥaramayn*

The career of Ibn Zülfikar's chief rival within the Faqari bloc, the powerful Gönüllüyan commander Hasan Agha Bilifya, calls into question the importance of control of *Awqāf* supervision to local influence or to influence within the imperial sphere. Hasan Agha's example offers an alternative route to power and influence. Neither a bey nor the *nāẓir* of an imperial *waqf*, Hasan Agha amassed revenues and regional authority by acquiring the tax farms of a cluster of Upper Egyptian villages endowed to the *Awqāf al-Ḥaramayn*. Although he himself normally resided in Cairo, as did the pilgrimage commander, he deployed his followers and agents in such a way as to maintain direct control over his power base in the Upper Egyptian subprovince of al-Bahnasa. This gave him a purely regional authority that Ibn Zülfikar lacked.[51] He did not seem to covet either the high-profile beylical posts or the key *waqf* supervisory positions. However, he did place his followers and allies in positions to attain these offices for themselves.[52]

Which, then, was the more profitable course: to control the major supervisory posts or to control the tax farms of strategic *Awqāf* villages? Hasan Agha Bilifya's camp took the latter course and ultimately survived Ibn Zülfikar's camp, which took the former. Still, there can be no question that Hasan Agha's group desired the supervisory posts. The 1699 imperial order demanding that the posts be restored to the regimental officers was, lest we forget, precipitated by a petition from the Janissary and ʿAzeban officers, one of whom was Hasan Agha's protégé Mustafa Kâhya al-Qazdağlı. Later, of course, the Bilifya subfaction headed by Zülfikar Bey would monopolize the post of pilgrimage commander to even greater effect than Ibrahim Bey b. (the earlier) Zülfikar had done.

One could argue, then, that the course pursued by Hasan Agha's group resulted from a simple case of sour grapes. Unable to attain the major supervisory posts, the Bilifya group acquired a solid core of tax farms, particularly those of villages endowed to the *Awqāf al-Ḥaramayn*. Such rural tax farms were a high priority among the regimental officers in general, as a register of tax farms (*muqāṭaʿa defteri*) of 1721–3 attests.[53] These villages supplied the grain that was transported to the poor of the Holy Cities at the time of the pilgrimage. Without control of the grain villages, control of the supervisory posts meant little. Hence the villages were also coveted by such once-and-future pilgrimage commanders as the rival Qasimis Ismail Bey b. ʿIvaz and Çerkes Mehmed Bey during the late 1720s.[54]

[51] Control of this region undoubtedly meant influence with the area's bedouin. This is perhaps why Hasan Agha is occasionally called "shaykh Nisf Saʿd," referring to the bedouin faction aligned with the Faqaris. See, for example, al-Damurdashi, *Durra*, p. 12.

[52] Hasan Agha's son-in-law, Ismail Bey, who held the post of *defterdar* for many years, is the most obvious example. Ismail's alliance with Hasan preceded his rise to power, for Hasan promoted him from agha to bey.

[53] Maliyeden Müdevver 1350 (1134–5).

[54] See Hathaway, "The Role of the Kızlar Ağası," 154–7.

By controlling strategic *Awqāf* villages, Hasan Agha and his faction in effect circumvented the power of the supervisors of the *Awqāf al-Ḥaramayn*. Apart from their control of *Awqāf* villages, the Bilifya group enjoyed the classic perquisites of the officer/tax farmer, namely, revenues from customs, the coffee trade, and protection (*ḥimāyet*) rackets among Cairo's artisans and merchants.[55] This congeries of revenues gave the group a measure of economic and political power that the pilgrimage commanders could not, for the moment, challenge.

Nonetheless, Hasan Agha was not an officer who was radically opposed to beys. He took no part in the wars of rank in which Ibrahim Bey b. Zülfikar seemed eager to indulge. Instead, he cannily combined officers and beys within his household in order to take maximum advantage of available revenues. Hence he forged an alliance with Ismail Bey the *defterdar*, whom he himself had promoted from agha to bey, while cultivating Mustafa Kâhya al-Qazdağlı. His link to Ismail Bey gave him a connection to the *Awqāf al-Ḥaramayn* since in the reorganization of 1691, Ismail Bey had taken charge of the Ḥaramayn *waqf*. Had the 1699 petition succeeded in restoring the Janissary and ʿAzeban officers to these posts, however, Hasan Agha would still have enjoyed an influential connection, since a Janissary *kâhya* was his protégé. Hasan Agha clearly surpassed Ibrahim Bey b. Zülfikar at contingency planning. His household was prepared to take advantage of *Awqāf al-Ḥaramayn* revenues should the opportunity present itself. At the same time, the household amassed alternative sources of revenue, many of them related to the *Awqāf*, that sustained their power in the absence of such opportunity.

The household of Hasan Agha Bilifya and the Chief Black Eunuch

In acquiring his strategic tax farms, did Hasan Agha Bilifya benefit from imperial links of the sort that Ibrahim Bey b. Zülfikar seems to have enjoyed? True, he flourished under two friendly governors during the 1690s, Ismail and Kara Mehmed Pashas, who allowed Hasan Agha, Ismail Bey the *defterdar*, and Mustafa Kâhya al-Qazdağlı effectively to run the province. One suspects, however, that over and above this, Hasan Agha Bilifya enjoyed impressive ties to the imperial palace throughout his life. The various regimental commands that he held mark him as a product of the imperial palace. His patron, Mehmed Çavuş Qiyala, was, moreover, evidently the sometime tax farmer of Shubra Qiyala, an *Awqāf al-Ḥaramayn* village in Gharbiyya subprovince.[56] Insofar as those who farmed the taxes of villages endowed to the *Awqāf al-Ḥaramayn* had the acquiescence, if not the blessing, of the Chief Black Eunuch, Hasan Agha Bilifya would seem to have enjoyed a link of some standing to that official.

[55] For a description of the practice of *ḥimāyet*, see Raymond, *Artisans et commerçants*, vol. II, pp. 688–92; Raymond, "Soldiers in Trade," 18, 23. On the Janissaries' role in the customs, see Raymond, *Artisans et commerçants*, vol. II, pp. 618–28.

[56] See chapter 4, p. 65.

Hasan Agha would have had to sustain his career through several Chief Black Eunuchs and to weather the vicissitudes that the Eunuchs' shifting factional preferences might entail. As the preceding section pointed out, the Chief Black Eunuch Yusuf Agha ostensibly presided over the ascendancy of Hasan Agha's rival Ibrahim Bey b. Zülfikar. Yet Yusuf Agha also competed for supervision of the Valide *waqf* with members of Ibn Zülfikar's party. On the other hand, Yusuf's own Faqari follower, Mustafa Bey Kızlar, allied himself with the Bilifya group. Thus in the closing years of the seventeenth century, when Yusuf Agha wielded influence in Cairo, Hasan Agha Bilifya learned to prepare for any eventuality.

The Bilifya household's ties to the Chief Black Eunuch seem to have become more reliable after Hasan Agha's death, in particular during the lengthy tenure of al-Hajj Beshir Agha (1717–46). While Hasan Agha seems to have exercised *de facto* authority in the vicinity of Bilifya, his mamluk Mustafa Bey Bilifya[57] received official sanction to administer freely all Bahnasa villages attached to the various Ḥaramayn *waqf*s. An imperial order of 1733 consigns all *Awqāf* villages in the region to Mustafa Bey as *serbestiyet*, a grant of complete administrative autonomy though not of outright ownership.[58] Nine villages near Bilifya are enumerated. Of these, I have identified six. Plotted on a map, they form a coherent Bilifya bailiwick in al-Bahnasa. The physical reality of this sphere of influence confirms that *Awqāf*-related tax farms were not simply sources of revenue but could be used as a route to territorial aggrandizement.[59] In this way, a connection to the Chief Black Eunuch could translate into genuine regional power.

The Damurdashi chronicle gives us a titillating hint of a more direct link between the Bilifya group and al-Hajj Beshir Agha. Al-Damurdashi envisions the scene in which the imperial government (*al-dawla*) chooses Mehmed Bey Qatamish for pilgrimage commander in response to a bedouin attack on the Egyptian pilgrimage caravan in 1733. "And the Aghāt Dār al-Sa'āda said, 'And for the defterdarship, the son of sayyīdi, Mehmed Bey Ismail.'"[60] This Mehmed Bey was the son of Ismail Bey the *defterdar*, the son-in-law of Hasan Agha Bilifya. One can only speculate as to what is intended by *sayyīdi*, but elsewhere in the Damurdashi chronicle and in medieval Mamluk usage, *sayyīd* has the connotation of "master."[61] It would be chronologically possible for Ismail Bey to be al-Hajj Beshir's master, although Hasan Agha Bilifya would

[57] He was promoted from agha of the Çerakise corps to bey in 1710. See al-Damurdashi, *Durra*, p. 135.

[58] *Mühimme-i Mısır*, vol. V, no. 18 (1146/1733–4). This act of favoritism may or may not have had something to do with Mustafa Bey's being *ḫazine serdarı*, the officer who delivered the Egyptian revenues to Istanbul each year.

[59] Richard Pococke, writing in the early 1740s, describes a similar cluster of villages centered on Mallawi in 'Ushmunayn subprovince. See chapter 7, n. 30.

[60] Al-Damurdashi, *Durra*, p. 407.

[61] On this point, see Ayalon, *L'esclavage du mamelouk*, pp. 25ff; Ayalon, "Studies in al-Jabarti," 275–6. According to Ayalon, *sayyīd* was a rare usage under the Mamluk sultanate but became much more common under the Ottomans.



Map 4 The *Awqāf al-Ḥaramayn* villages in al-Bahnasa controlled by the Bilifya group. Not shown: Ihwa and al-Fashn, farther north

make a more plausible candidate. In any case, what is perhaps more significant than the hinted master–slave relationship is the fact that a local chronicler such as al-Damurdashi perceives the Chief Black Eunuch's personal interference in Egyptian affairs and his affinity for certain local factions – in this case, the Bilifya group.

The notion that control of *Awqāf*-related tax farms translated into regional authority receives further corroboration from a posthumous account, dated 1159/1746–7, of the surplus revenue (*fā'iẓ*) accruing to al-Hajj Beshir Agha from a number of *Awqāf al-Ḥaramayn* villages in Egypt. Three of these villages are consigned to the tax farms of various local grandees: Sha'sha' in Minufiyya subprovince to the 'Azeban *kâhya* Ridvan al-Jalfi, Bashbish in Gharbiyya to the Janissary *çavuş* 'Abdurrahman al-Qazdağlı, and Kila al-Bab in Gharbiyya to former pilgrimage commander 'Ömer Bey Qatamish.[62] The terminology employed is *der 'uhde-i Fulān* (literally, "entrusted to [name]"), which means simply that the village in question belongs to the tax farm of the person in question. The *der 'uhdecis* listed in this account all belong to the Faqari faction in the aftermath of 'Osman Bey Zülfikar's ouster; they comprise the Qazdağlı headmen and their Jalfi and Qatamish allies. If we assume that these *der 'uhdecis* enjoyed the support of al-Hajj Beshir Agha, then this account bears witness to the regional displacement of the house of Zülfikar by the Qazdağlıs and their allies with at least the tacit consent of the Chief Black Eunuch.

Palace eunuchs in Egyptian households

This question of tacit consent is germane to the changing character of the interplay between imperial and local spheres in the course of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. During the late seventeenth century, the Chief Black Eunuch Yusuf Agha took the initiative in amassing followers in Egypt and building a local power base. It seems logical to assume that the powerful al-Hajj Beshir Agha followed the same tack of aggressively recruiting followers on the spot, the Jalfi household ostensibly being the most durable legacy of his efforts. Nonetheless, the suggestion that Beshir Agha was the client of Ismail Bey the *defterdar* calls this pattern of activity into question. If an exiled Chief Black Eunuch could recruit local manpower to his own household and co-opt local grandees, could he likewise be recruited or co-opted himself? Given that the initiative for changes in the administration of the *Awqāf al-Ḥaramayn* had passed from the imperial to the local sphere by the early eighteenth century, one would expect local grandees to become more assertive in their dealings with palace eunuchs, whether exiled or in office.

These considerations may help to explain the appearance of a palace eunuch in the estate inventory of 'Osman Kâhya al-Qazdağlı, the grandee who made

[62] Topkapı D 2520/1 (1159).

the Qazdağlı household a formidable local power. ʿOsman Kâhya's estate inventory, preserved in Cairo's *sharīʿa* court archives, includes a list of his followers (*tawābiʿ*). The ninth of these is one Beshir Aghāt Dār al-Saʿāda.[63] The term *aghāt Dār al-Saʿāda* refers specifically to eunuchs of the imperial harem in Istanbul and is frequently used to refer to the Chief Black Eunuch. The appearance of a harem eunuch in this register seems quite surprising since, from what we have seen, a local grandee was far more likely to number among a eunuch's followers. Could this Beshir Agha, furthermore, be one of the five Beshir Aghas who served as Chief Black Eunuch during the eighteenth century? It would seem that of these five, only two could possibly have belonged to ʿOsman Kahya's household: al-Hajj Beshir (1717–46) and Beshir III (1752–5).

Al-Hajj Beshir resided in Cairo only briefly: in between his banishment to Cyprus and his posting to Medina as *Shaykh al-Ḥaram al-Nabawī*, and en route back to Istanbul to begin his tenure as Chief Black Eunuch. Nonetheless, he must certainly have forged strong ties with Egypt, perhaps nurturing them during his four years (1713–17) in Medina. Al-Jabarti credits al-Hajj Beshir with founding the Jalfi household, and al-Damurdashi hints that he belonged to the household of Ismail Bey the *defterdar*. But Ismail Bey had been dead for several years[64] by the time al-Hajj Beshir arrived in the vicinity of Egypt, albeit his household continued to thrive. The household of ʿOsman Kâhya al-Qazdağlı, meanwhile, did not begin to come into its own until the 1720s, by which time al-Hajj Beshir Agha was ensconced in Istanbul.

The second Beshir Agha, Moralı Beshir (1746–52), enjoyed the dubious distinction of being executed without ever having seen Egypt.[65] His successor, whom for convenience I call Beshir III, became Chief Black Eunuch in 1165/1752 and was deposed and exiled to Egypt in 1168/1755. By that time, ʿOsman Kâhya al-Qazdağlı had been dead for nearly twenty years. It would seem, then, that neither Beshir III nor al-Hajj Beshir makes a satisfactory candidate for ʿOsman Kâhya's eunuch follower.

If, however, either of these Beshir Aghas entered a household in Egypt *before* joining the corps of eunuchs in the imperial palace, then the scheme becomes more plausible. Eunuchs were traditionally presented to the Ottoman sultan by the governor of Egypt, who purchased them from Cairo's slave markets after they had been shipped across the Sahara from Sennar and Darfur and castrated by Coptic specialists in Upper Egypt.[66] The governor chose his own household eunuchs from the same caravan shipments from which palace eunuchs were drawn, and a given imperial harem eunuch might well have done a stint in the governor's household

[63] Tuchscherer, "Pèlerinage," 157, n. 10.
[64] According to al-Jabarti (*ʿAjāʾib*, vol. I, pp. 233–4), he died in 1119/1707.
[65] For an account of the circumstances behind his execution, see Ahmed Resmî Efendi, *Ḫamîlet ül-Küberâ*, Istanbul, Süleymaniye Library, MS Esad Efendi 2258/I, fos. 11r ff.
[66] See above, n. 3.

before moving on to the palace. Egypt's grandees surely selected their household eunuchs from this pool, as well. As they encroached on the governor's functions, the grandees no doubt presented eunuchs from their own households to the palace.

If we accept the notion that Beshir Agha III joined the household of 'Osman Kâhya al-Qazdağlı in between his enslavement and his introduction to the imperial palace, then the dating seems creditable. When Beshir III became Chief Black Eunuch in 1752, he was probably at least sixty years of age. The office normally capped off a lengthy career as a palace eunuch; most Chief Black Eunuchs assumed the post late in life, held it for one to five years and died soon after being deposed. Since most eunuchs were castrated shortly before or at puberty, we can calculate that Beshir III's initial enslavement occurred forty to fifty years before his appointment as Chief Black Eunuch. Thus he would have joined 'Osman Kâhya's household some time after 1702 and before his initial palace appointment some time before 1720.[67] 'Osman Kahya was at the peak of his career in the 1720s and early 1730s and was presumably building up an entourage before the death of his patron, Hasan Kâhya, in 1716. Thus, it seems at least chronologically possible that he added Beshir Agha III to his household during those years.

If Beshir III is indeed the imperial harem eunuch whose name appears in 'Osman Kâhya's inheritance register, then this affiliation no doubt gave him a foundation on which to build when he returned to Cairo on his deposition in 1755. Such a connection may explain the record in the *Description de l'Egypte*, prepared by the French occupational force, of a house at Azbakiyya belonging to a Beshir Agha. By André Raymond's reckoning, the house was constructed some time between 1755 and the French occupation in 1798.[68]

This house at Azbakiyya becomes particularly intriguing when we recall Yusuf Agha's house at Suwayqat 'Usfur, which Yusuf inherited from his patron, Taş Yatur 'Ali Agha, and passed along to his own mamluks. This house seems to have been a virtual headquarters for the exiled Chief Black Eunuch and his agents and followers. Beshir Agha's house at Azbakiyya may similarly have served as a new seat for exiled eunuchs, in keeping with the shift in the center of elite residence, and hence of political power, westward to Azbakiyya. Moreover, Azbakiyya was a friendly location for such a headquarters. Beshir Agha's house was in close proximity to that of his ostensible master, 'Osman Kâhya al-Qazdağlı, and to that of 'Osman's allies, the influential Sharaybi merchants. The house was, moreover, surrounded by the residences of the most important Qazdağlı grandees of the late eighteenth century, most notably those of Ibrahim Bey, Murad Bey, and Ismail Bey, who con-

[67] The *Sicill-i 'Osmani* is of little help in determining when Beshir III arrived in the palace since it seldom gives the dates at which the Chief Black Eunuchs began their palace careers or even the dates at which they attained their first significant ranks.

[68] Raymond, "Essai de géographie," 73 ff.; Behrens-Abouseif, *Azbakiyya and Its Environs*, pp. 72–3.

trolled Cairo during the 1780s and 1790s. This configuration of elite residences in effect transformed Azbakiyya into a late Qazdağlı lake.

All these considerations help to clarify the relations between Ibrahim Kâhya al-Qazdağlı and the Chief Black Eunuchs. Ibrahim Kâhya rose to power on the ashes of al-Hajj Beshir Agha inasmuch as the ancient eunuch's death precipitated the downfall of the Qatamish group and the momentary proscription of ʿAbdurrahman Kâhya al-Qazdağlı. Circumstantial evidence would suggest that Ibrahim Kâhya's ascendancy can have been possible only with the cooperation of al-Hajj Beshir Agha's successors, Moralı Beshir Agha (1746–52), Beshir Agha III (1752–5), and above all Ebukoff Ahmed Agha (1755–8), the archrival of the governor Ragıb Mehmed Pasha. Ebukoff Ahmed had, in fact, resided in Cairo before becoming palace treasurer (*Ḫazinedar-i Şehriyarî*) in 1754; he would therefore have been present when Ibrahim Kâhya was at the height of his power. Several imperial orders concerned with the recovery of Ebukoff Ahmed's estate after his death reveal that he was to some extent financially dependent on Ibrahim Kâhya.[69] Thus any preference he may have given Ibrahim was in the nature of a returned favor.

The examples of Ibrahim Kâhya, ʿOsman Kâhya, and Ismail Bey the *defterdar* suggest that the Qazdağlı and Bilifya households made a point of cultivating palace eunuchs. Such cultivation evidently meant more than currying favor with the acting Chief Black Eunuch in the hopes of acquiring the tax farms of villages endowed to the *Awqāf al-Ḥaramayn*. It meant taking young eunuchs into one's household and later offering them to the sultan's palace in the expectation that one's patronage would not be forgotten. (Thus al-Hajj Beshir Agha evidently remembered Ismail Bey's patronage.) It could also mean forging alliances with the *vekil*s or protégés of acting or exiled Chief Black Eunuchs, as the Bilifya group did with Mustafa Bey Kızlar and as the Qazdağlıs did with the Jalfis.

The expectation of the Qazdağlıs and of the Bilifyas before them, then, was that patronage of a young eunuch could one day ripen into clientage to the Chief Black Eunuch. Such opportunistic attitudes brought harem eunuchs into the households and into the political culture of Egypt's military elite. These eunuchs provided an enduring link between local households and the imperial palace at a time when the favor of the Chief Black Eunuch could propel an aspiring grandee into the highest and most lucrative local offices. In any confrontation with the governor or the grand vizier, furthermore, the Chief Black Eunuch could prove a formidable ally. Between 1678 and 1754, with few exceptions,[70] the party favored by the Eunuch dominated Egypt's key beylical and regimental offices.

[69] *Mühimme-i Mısır*, vol. VII, nos. 405, 411, 442, 450, 455 (all 1171/1758).

[70] Exceptions occurred mainly during the 1720s, when the Qasimi archrivals Ismail Bey b. ʿIvaz and Çerkes Mehmed Bey enjoyed a heyday. Nonetheless, there is some evidence that al-Hajj Beshir Agha extended some form of favor to Ibn ʿIvaz. See Ahmad Çelebi, *Awḍaḥ*, p. 344.

We should not lose sight of the fact that the instrument of all these power exchanges between center and province was the household. A eunuch attained power not because he was a eunuch but because he belonged to a particular household. Membership of an influential household in Cairo, whether that of the governor or that of a grandee, could serve as an entry to the imperial palace. Membership of the sultan's household, in turn, gave the Chief Black Eunuch access to the reins of imperial authority. Both during and after his term in office, the Chief Black Eunuch patronized Egyptian households and attempted to construct his own so as to acquire a channel of influence in the land of his exile. It would no doubt be erroneous to assert that one's eunuchhood had no effect on one's ability to function in Egyptian military society. Eunuchs did not become beys or regimental officers; moreover, eunuchs evidently faced some form of ingrained barrier to building large and enduring households. Yet in general, the household seemed to sweep most status considerations before it. It was the framework within which vital patron–client networks were constructed between the imperial and local spheres as well as within the local sphere.

CHAPTER 9

Conclusions

The Qazdağlıs and Ottoman household politics

This study of the Qazdağlıs' ascendancy has followed the household from its evident beginnings as a knot of soldiers in one of the Ottoman regiments to its apogee as Egypt's wealthiest and most influential elite conglomerate. The Qazdağlı household's interests at different stages of its evolution linked regiment, beylicate, and imperial authority. Attaching himself to the entourage of an established grandee who was well connected to the imperial center and enjoyed the patronage of the Chief Black Eunuch, household founder Mustafa Kâhya built up his own following, consisting of both mamluks and free-born Anatolians, within the Janissary regiment. His successors, particularly 'Osman Çavuş al-Qazdağlı, led the household to complete dominance of the Janissary corps even as they began to seek outside the regiment for followers. As we have seen, moreover, evidence indicates that 'Osman Çavuş maintained the Qazdağlıs' link to the Chief Black Eunuch. Finally, under Ibrahim Kâhya, the Qazdağlı household breached the beylicate. Even at this juncture, there is circumstantial evidence to suggest a continuing Qazdağlı connection to the Chief Black Eunuch. In this fashion, the Qazdağlı household cultivated regimental, beylical, and imperial connections; to its success in doing so, it may be argued, it owed its longevity.

The Qazdağlı example demonstrates how the rough and tumble of Ottoman Egypt's politics were played out through households, especially during the years attending and following the demise of the Faqari and Qasimi factions. In the days of Mustafa Kâhya al-Qazdağlı and Hasan Agha Bilifya, factional and, to some extent, rank loyalties tempered the rivalries of individual households somewhat. Thus Hasan Agha and his son-in-law Ismail Bey did little to counter the machinations of their fellow Faqari Ibrahim Bey b. Zülfikar. By the early decades of the eighteenth century, these factional ties were straining, so that 'Osman Çavuş al-Qazdağlı, for example, undercut Faqari solidarity by taking the part of the Qasimi allies of Çerkes Mehmed Bey. Ibrahim Kâhya al-Qazdağlı and his archrival 'Osman Bey Zülfikar later competed to piece together the shreds of the Faqari faction. Although the two major factions

were composed of households, rivalries among these households could, ironically, subvert the factions and thus contribute to their obsolescence.

Particularly in the years of the traditional factions' desuetude, the household not only served as the vehicle of local politics but provided the framework within which the imperial government dealt with its largest province. The story of the Qazdağlıs' ascendancy has pointed up the Ottoman governor's repeated strategy of attempting to assassinate the holders of the *ri'āsa* so as to punish them for failing to remit their revenues, on the one hand, and to confiscate their property for the imperial treasury, on the other. Since, in the days of factional obsolescence, the *ri'āsa*-holders were generally concentrated within a single household, this meant in effect targeting that particular household. 'Osman Çavuş al-Qazdağlı fell victim to one such scheme, most of whose victims belonged to the Qatamish household, which at the time dominated the *ri'āsa*. Less than a decade later, Ibrahim Kâhya al-Qazdağlı played on the government's concern with the revenues retained by the *ri'āsa*-holding allies of 'Osman Bey Zülfikar to secure *de facto* control of Egypt for himself. So far from fomenting a "revolution" against the central government, Ibrahim posed as the sultan's loyal, revenue-remitting servant. The government's displeasure with the Zülfikar household redounded to the credit of the Qazdağlı household.

These examples of imperial manipulation of the *ri'āsa*, furthermore, point up two features of the Ottoman central government's approach to its largest province once Egypt had ceased to be a major base for Ottoman territorial expansion. First is the government's intense revenue consciousness. Imperial documents give the impression that the central government's overriding concern in administering Egypt during these years was extracting the revenue that was legally its due, whether this meant the tribute dispatched annually to Istanbul or the moneys and grain supplied to the Holy Cities. The grandee and, in turn, the household who followed the sultan's orders in fulfilling these duties won imperial favor and gained the ear and the patronage of influential functionaries at court and on the spot in Egypt. Thus the issue of revenue remittance laid the ground for the ceaseless competition among households for sultanic favor.

Particularly striking in this regard, however, is the sultan's apparent fickleness in labeling revenue-hoarding "rebels." Documents from the sultan's own chancery reveal how 'Osman Bey Zülfikar, in an extraordinary turn of events, managed to rehabilitate himself with the court. Perhaps, then, the imperial approach to deadbeats was akin to the imperial approach to deposed Chief Black Eunuchs: to keep them in reserve – assuming they survived any assassination attempts – lest they become useful later. Indeed, once the Faqari and Qasimi factions had withered away, the central government had little choice but to adopt such a strategy; no longer able to divide key offices comfortably between the two factions, it was obliged to patronize alternative households in order to retain leverage in the province.

In some cases, a degree of leverage could be achieved through integrating Egyptian grandees into the households of imperial functionaries, both in Istanbul and on the spot in Egypt. Egyptian grandees could, for their part, incorporate Ottoman officials into their own households. The Chief Black Eunuch stands out for playing a leading role in both processes. Acting and exiled Eunuchs could cultivate clients within established local households or, alternatively, could found local households of their own – although with the possible exception of the Jalfi household, the latter scheme does not seem to have met with great success. Meanwhile, Egyptian grandees could take prospective palace eunuchs into their households with the expectation of future leverage in the palace. In this fashion, the household could act as an extension of the patron–client tie by providing a bridge between the imperial and provincial capitals. All sorts of central and provincial personnel might participate in such an enterprise: governors, *qāḍīs*, and bureaucrats, as well as sundry military personnel. Still, the Chief Black Eunuch's exploitation of this connection should be stressed above all. This study, I am convinced, has uncovered only the bare outlines of the Eunuch's influence within Egypt. Both acting and exiled Chief Black Eunuchs seem critical to the functioning of the province. In this regard, the household could serve as a key to the Chief Black Eunuch's *modus operandi* not only in Egypt but in the Ottoman Empire at large.

The Qazdağlı household and Ottoman elite culture

If we consider the household not as a purely Mamluk institution but as a flexible vehicle for the accumulation of manpower and revenues, then clearly it can extend far beyond Egypt's military ranks to encompass Egyptian and, indeed, Ottoman elite society at large. The household was, in fact, the fundamental assimilative structure of Ottoman elite society. A parallel can be drawn between the households of Egyptian grandees and Ottoman elite households, including that of the Ottoman governor and even that of the sultan; likewise, the household can be regarded as an arena of common interest between Ottoman officials and Egyptian elites.

As applied to Egypt's military echelons, the household can transcend the historiographical tension between beylicate and soldiery, mamluk and freeborn, by including all these elements in a common organizational strategy. For the military household in its various incarnations, from barracks gang to fully developed residential complex, was precisely that: a strategy designed to enable a group with common interests to succeed in the never-ending competition for revenues, influence, and imperial favor. Perhaps the most striking feature of the Qazdağlı household is that it did indeed come to encompass all these elements and, in so doing, proved itself the most durable of Egypt's households in the years following the demise of the Faqari and Qasimi factions. Thus Ibrahim Kâhya's decision to begin raising clients to the beylicate

enabled his household to secure control of the most lucrative rural tax farms. At the same time, his strategy of purchasing Georgian mamluks provided his household with a ready pool of candidates for the beylicate and for key beylical offices.

Although the Qazdağlı household metamorphosed into a predominantly Georgian beylical household within little more than a generation, we should not regard Ibrahim Kâhya's "experiment" as a radical departure from the household's previous practices. The Qazdağlı household never consisted exclusively of free-born Anatolians but from its earliest days contained an admixture of mamluks of various origins. Ibrahim Kâhya's encroachment on the beylicate, moreover, had been foreshadowed by the household-building activities of his predecessor ʿOsman Çavuş, whose entourage included three *kāshif*s. Generally speaking, of course, the move toward ever-larger rural tax farms was already visible among the officer ranks as a whole in the early decades of the eighteenth century.

In the final analysis, the Qazdağlı household bridged the gap between beys and regimental officers by taking control of both the Janissary corps and the beylicate. In this scheme, to be sure, the Qazdağlıs may have drawn inspiration from the example of the allied Bilifya household, which included both officers and beys among its numbers. Lingering frictions between beys and officers, epitomized in the confrontation between Bulut Kapan ʿAli Bey and ʿAbdurrahman Kâhya al-Qazdağlı during the 1760s, were subsumed by the ultimate subordination of the Janissary corps to the beylicate. However, the "substratum" of Janissary officers that thereby came to exist within the Qazdağlı household apparently enjoyed a respected status until the end of the eighteenth century. Until the last decade or so of the century, they typically came from the household of Ibrahim Kâhya al-Qazdağlı himself rather than from the households of the late Qazdağlı beys. These officers also played an almost formulaic mediating role in intra-household crises and in social upheavals. In this sense, their function resembled that performed on numerous occasions by members of the Jalfi household. This consideration suggests that the substratum – or, on the other hand, the subordinate household or partner – was a familiar phenomenon in Egyptian military society and fulfilled a well-defined role as adjunct or mediator. For that reason, we should perhaps not be overly surprised that the relationship between Ibrahim Kâhya al-Qazdağlı and Ridvan Kâhya al-Jalfi resembled a formal unequal partnership. Subordination of this sort was not necessarily a matter of accepting humiliating inferiority but, on the contrary, could have advantages. It left Ridvan Kâhya al-Jalfi and ʿAbdurrahman Kâhya al-Qazdağlı, for instance, free to patronize the arts and build impressive monuments. In the long run, the relationship between beylicate and soldiery was more complex than simple dominance and submission. Under the late Qazdağlıs, the soldiery was incorporated into a pattern that the household had earlier perfected in its partnership with the Jalfis. In such fashion was the tension between *sancak* and *ocak* overcome.

In the course of breaching the beylicate, the Qazdağlı household, and by extension Egypt's military society at large, transformed itself into a body dominated by Georgian mamluks. This transformation raises a number of historiographical questions. With the importation of large numbers of Georgians and other Caucasians, Egypt's military society ceased, in large measure, to be a mixed society whose households combined free-born Muslims of predominantly Anatolian origin with mamluks of various origins, and approached the sort of mamluk society that Ottoman Baghdad had cultivated. The extent to which the Baghdadi version of the Georgian mamluk strategy resembled its Egyptian counterpart, as well as the extent to which Georgian mamluks were employed in other Ottoman provinces and in the capital, bears further investigation. More broadly, the composition of Egypt's military society and the methods of recruitment it employed bear comparison to the elites of a number of the Ottoman Empire's other Arab provinces: not only Baghdad but also Damascus, Tunisia, and Algeria.[1]

If we are to compare military societies and therefore, presumably, military households, in a variety of locales, we must establish a clear definition of the military or elite household throughout the Ottoman Empire. While the Ottoman imperial household has received a great deal of scholarly interest, relatively little work exists on elite households in the Ottoman provinces. So far as Egypt specifically is concerned, much work exists on the military indoctrination of the Mamluk sultanate; where the elite households of the Ottoman era are concerned, however, only David Ayalon has uncovered some practices of the residence-based compounds of the highest beys and officers. The smaller, less visible households – the barracks followings, as well as the households of lesser government functionaries – remain woefully underrepresented. In short, the barracks life of Ottoman Egypt, to say nothing of other Ottoman provinces, has been largely neglected yet could tell us much not only about the operations of Ottoman provincial elites but also about the political culture of that society.

In the very broadest terms, of course, the household has global applications. Patron–client and kinship groupings, both for political solidarity and for economic activity, were by no means exclusive to the Ottoman Empire but existed and exist in a vast array of societies. The fact that such groupings have been observed in medieval Florence and among the former Soviet army in eastern Germany[2] suggests that the household, as defined here, may be symptomatic of a society at a certain stage of its development – or, alternatively, of its disintegration. For the Ottoman Empire, until the development of centralizing

[1] Baghdad and Algeria, however, make particularly interesting examples since they represent the two extremes between which Egypt operated: a society dominated by Georgian mamluks and one dominated by Anatolian Janissaries. Both, however, were quasi-autonomous frontier provinces arguably not subject to the same degree of central coercion as Egypt. Eighteenth-century Tunisia presents a mixed military society much closer to that of Egypt during the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. See, for example, Brown, *Ahmad Bey*, chapter 2.

[2] See chapter 2, nn. 10 and 30.

state institutions in the modern sense, household politics was a system that proved effective for the better part of three hundred years.

A key goal of this study has been to lay to rest the unexamined use of the term "Mamluk household." Still, given the prevalence of Georgian mamluks within Egypt's military elite in the years following Ibrahim Kâhya's ascendancy, it seems reasonable to ask whether a mamluk ethos did not evolve. The existence of a pervasive mamluk culture could explain why al-Jabarti refers to most late eighteenth-century grandees as mamluks while Ismail al-Khashshab applies the term to all grandees without chronological distinction. Ahmed Pasha al-Cezzar, meanwhile, claims that Egypt's grandees by the late eighteenth century were not only exclusively mamluk but almost exclusively Georgian.[3] In effect, then, "grandee," or "emir," had become virtually synonymous with "manumitted Georgian mamluk." Under this new Georgian mamluk preponderance, so different from the mixed military society that preceded it, it is conceivable that a sort of mamluk mythos did come to prevail. This mythos may even have harked back to the Mamluk sultanate. In this sense, we might speak of a Mamluk revival, although to assert that the Mamluks thereby "regained" control of Egypt seems anachronistic. Rather, the mamluk culture of late eighteenth-century Egypt may have had more the character of a calculated, if genuinely felt, nostalgia that could serve political purposes. In that sense, it may have resembled the Seljuk genealogy claimed by the Afrasiyab dynasty of seventeenth-century Ottoman Basra, or the Byzantine court rituals adopted by the Phanariot Greeks whom the Ottomans appointed governors, or *hospodar*s, of Moldavia and Wallachia in the eighteenth century.[4]

The questions of elite culture and self-perception seem to hover very near the surface of any investigation of the transformation of Ottoman Egypt's military society. These are not only historical but historiographical questions since they invoke the changing military terminology and, in some cases, distortions of history that are encountered from time to time in the later Egyptian chronicles. The issue of changes in military vocabulary, in conjunction with changes in perceptions of the military elite, under the late Qazdağlı order is a formidably difficult subject to broach but one that would shed much light on just what barriers stood between the realities of late eighteenth-century Egypt and those that had preceded and produced them. Such a study would also uncover new truths about historical writing in eighteenth-century Egypt, which is now beginning to be reexamined.

[3] Piterberg, "Formation of an Ottoman Egyptian Elite," 282 and n. 41, quoting Ahmed Pasha (Cezzar), *Ottoman Egypt in the Eighteenth Century: The Nizâmnâme-i Mısır of Cezzar Ahmed Pasha*, ed. and trans. Stanford J. Shaw (Cambridge, MA, 1962). Oddly, Piterberg uses this quotation to make the point of mamluk exclusivity while giving short shrift to this extraordinary ethnic exclusivity.

[4] On the Afrasiyabs, see Holt, *Egypt and the Fertile Crescent*, p. 134; on the Phanariots, see William H. McNeill, *Europe's Steppe Frontier, 1500–1800* (Chicago and London, 1964), pp. 107–10, 140–1, 173–6. I am currently at work on a study of this political use of nostalgia.

The historiographical problem of the late eighteenth century

As we have seen, a certain barrier does seem to exist between the Egyptian historians of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries and the events that occurred a century or so before they wrote, to say nothing of the historians contemporary with those events. This gap is more than the usual loss of empathy that comes of writing from a few decades' remove but rather constitutes a genuine gap in memory and understanding. Al-Jabarti, a circumspect and self-conscious historian, makes some effort to bridge this gap by devoting attention to, and borrowing liberally from, the work of chroniclers of a bygone era. The same, however, cannot be said for a writer such as Ismail al-Khashshab. While al-Khashshab is valuable as a key to Egypt's collective popular memory, it is clear from his chronicle that the collective memory he represents is one from which the era of mixed or exclusively Anatolian regimental households that followed prescribed lines of promotion has vanished. When a European traveler such as Volney attempts to exploit this collective memory in summarizing the history of the earlier era, he absorbs these inaccuracies. The same pitfalls await the modern historian who attempts to extrapolate the circumstances of the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries from those of the late eighteenth century, but with a subtle difference. If a historian is predisposed to regard Ottoman Egypt's institutions as Mamluk – whether by virtue of his training in the history of the Mamluk sultanate, his preoccupation with the late eighteenth century, or his Egyptocentrism – the late sources can only confirm his preconceptions. In this instance, both the historian and his sources contribute to an anachronistic interpretation of the earlier era.

This difficulty can be addressed by using the sources, both narrative and non-narrative, of that era. Yet here, a subtler interpretive danger exists in the extent to which our reading of earlier Ottoman-era sources is informed by the outlook of later sources or, for that matter, of Mamluk sources. This danger is especially sharp in writing the history of Ottoman Egypt since the earlier Ottoman sources, almost without exception, have come to light a good deal later than the late Ottoman or Mamluk ones and are less likely to be published.[5] If we turn to Ahmad Çelebi after reading al-Jabarti, for instance, we cannot be certain that the variety of ranks and titles that appear in the pages of the earlier chronicle – *kâhya*, *sarrāj*, *çırak*, *tābiʿ*, mamluk – carry the same connotations in the later one.

The danger in relying on late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century sources, then, lies in believing that the late eighteenth-century conditions they depict mirror earlier conditions or represent the culmination of a lengthy historical trend. In short, the practice of extrapolating from the late eighteenth

[5] This problem is, however, being remedied by the efforts of A. A. ʿAbd al-Rahim, Daniel Crecelius, and ʿAbd al-Wahhab Bakr in publishing chronicles from the earlier period.

and early nineteenth centuries to the early eighteenth and the late seventeenth centuries can create distortions in our perceptions of earlier realities. These distortions are compounded by a historiographical attitude that sometimes appears among historians of the pre-modern Middle East generally. This attitude treats a chronicle as a compendium of facts rather than as a text employing a specific narrative strategy in order to address a specific audience. Hence a common method of exploiting a chronicle is to pile up incident upon incident from its pages in order to illustrate a given point.[6] The net effect of this approach is a historical leveling, so that an event of 1650 can be likened to another of 1720 and a third of 1780 with little regard for historical development. Such a use of historical narratives imparts a homogeneous character to the entire period of Ottoman rule in Egypt before the nineteenth century. What results is a noncontextual approach both to historical events and to the texts in which they are depicted. Nor is the threat of such an approach restricted to the use of narrative sources; it poses an even greater risk when non-narrative sources are used since archival documents seldom contain any sort of narrative context at all.

This noncontextual approach encourages the historian to treat the nearly three centuries between Selim I's conquest and Bonaparte's invasion as a phase during which little or no genuine institutional development occurred within Ottoman Egypt's military society, and therefore to assert that while Ottoman troops disrupted that society to a certain extent, they did not change its inherently Mamluk character. Thus when mamluk beys achieve preponderance at the end of the eighteenth century, it is natural to regard them as throwbacks to the long-defunct Mamluk sultanate. This perception is made all the easier by the fact that when serious scholarly work on the history of Ottoman Egypt began, by far the best-known narrative sources were, so to speak, bookends to the period: on the one hand, the chronicle of the late Mamluk historian Ibn Iyas; on the other, that of al-Jabarti. When the two best-known chronicles of Ottoman Egypt provide the greatest amount of detail on the late Mamluk sultanate, on the one hand, and the late eighteenth century, on the other, the similarities between the two periods can be overplayed at the expense of what came between.

As more and more narrative, as well as archival, sources for the "middle period" of Ottoman rule in Egypt come to light or receive fresh scrutiny, we historians would do well to develop a mode of critical thinking unbiased by recourse to the late Ottoman or late Mamluk period. This does not mean abandoning the historical sources of those periods since these sources can serve as useful glosses on their successors and antecedents. Al-Jabarti's chronicle in particular, so clearly and elegantly written, can often clarify the obfuscations of earlier chronicles. But the usages of these earlier and later sources

[6] This is precisely Ayalon's method in "Studies in al-Jabarti." A not-so-blatant use of the same tactic can be observed in Winter, "Turks, Arabs, and Mamluks," 117ff.

should not be adopted wholesale. The challenge to historians is to be constantly aware that we are writing about a dynamic society in which institutions and usages did change, whether by design or through gradual evolution.

If anything, the Qazdağlı household exemplifies this truth. For the shift within Egypt's elite society from regimental dominance in the late seventeenth century to beylical dominance in the late eighteenth century coincided with the Qazdağlı household's evolution from a strictly Janissary household to a beylical one. In this sense, the Qazdağlıs are more than an example of the evolution of the household in Ottoman Egyptian military society; they are its epitome.

Glossary

agha – the highest officer in an Ottoman regiment, although greater authority was often held by the *kâhya*; also, a title given to eunuchs of the Ottoman imperial palace

amīr al-ḥājj – the commander of the annual pilgrimage caravan to Mecca and Medina, usually a bey

ashrāf (s. *sharīf*) – descendants of the Prophet Muhammad

Awqāf al-Ḥaramayn – the imperial pious foundations (*awqāf*, s. *waqf*) established to provide for the Holy Cities (Ḥaramayn) of Mecca and Medina

ʿAzeban – an infantry regiment of Ottoman soldiery in Egypt, second in size to the Janissaries by the eighteenth century; typically guarded the gates of Cairo and manned various frontier fortresses

başodabaşı – the chief of the commanders of the smallest subdivisions of a regiment, known as *oda*s (rooms)

bayt – the name commonly given to a full-fledged household headquartered in an imposing place of residence

bey (also *sancak beyi*) – one of the group of grandees who governed Egypt's major subprovinces or held such positions as *amīr al-ḥājj* and *defterdar*

Birkat al-Azbakiyya – a pond in western Cairo, named after the Mamluk emir Azbak (Özbek), who began to develop the surrounding neighborhood in the fifteenth century; became the hub of elite residence in Cairo during the latter half of the eighteenth century

Birkat al-Fil – a pond in southern Cairo, so named because it resembles an elephant's head in shape; the hub of elite residence in Cairo during the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries

bölük – a subdivision of an Ottoman regiment in Cairo, larger than an *oda*; also, a name for the entire regiment

bölükbaşı – the commander of a *bölük*

çavuş – one of the higher officers of an Ottoman regiment in Egypt, ostensibly third in command, below the agha and *kâhya*

Çavuşan – a combined infantry and cavalry regiment of Ottoman soldiery in Egypt, attached to the governor's *divan*; typically delivered messages and collected taxes from Egypt's subprovinces

Çerakise (literally, "Circassians") – a cavalry, or *sipahi*, regiment of soldiery in Egypt, the smallest and most poorly paid of the seven regiments. By the seventeenth century, the regiment was not exclusively Circassian, but it did seem to enroll the sons of beys and officers.

Chief Black Eunuch (*Kızlar Ağası* or *Darüssaade Ağası*) – the eunuch who oversaw the harem of the imperial palace and wielded enormous influence in the Ottoman Empire at large, typically a slave from eastern Africa who was exiled to Egypt on being deposed

çırak – the protégé of an official or grandee, who was promoted to high office by this official or grandee although not necessarily a member of the official's household

çorbacı (literally, "soupmaker") – apparently a middle-ranking officer of a regiment, evidently most important in the ʿAzeban corps; also, an honorary title given to grandees who had not climbed through the normal regimental hierarchy

defterdar – the chief treasurer of Egypt, usually a bey

devşirme – the classical Ottoman system of gathering non-Muslim boys, typically from Balkan territory, for training as palace pages and Janissaries

divan (Arabic, *dīwān*) – the administrative council held by the Ottoman governor of Egypt three times a week in Cairo's citadel and attended by the highest regimental officers, the highest beylical officials, and the highest-ranking ulema

dolama (English, "dolman") – the long-sleeved, open-fronted robe worn by regimental officers of the rank of *çavuş* and above, as well as by beys

emin (Arabic, *amīn*) – a salaried imperial official appointed from Istanbul to collect taxes in Egypt's subprovinces during the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, ultimately displaced by tax farming; also, a village administrator

emir (Arabic, *amīr*) – a broad title for Egyptian grandees, whether beys or high-ranking regimental officers

fāʾiẓ – surplus revenue from a *waqf*, typically appropriated by the *nāẓir*

Fallah – an eighteenth-century Egyptian household whose founder was of peasant (*fallāḥ*) origin; allied with the Qazdağlı household

Faqaris – one of two factions that pervaded Egyptian society from roughly 1640 to 1730, probably named for the caliph ʿAli b. Abi Talib's sword Dhū'l-Faqār. The Qazdağlı household originated within this faction.

Gönüllüyan (literally, "volunteers") – a cavalry regiment of Ottoman soldiery in Egypt, commanded during the mid- to late seventeenth century by Hasan Agha Bilifya

ḥākim – a title given to the governor of a large Egyptian subprovince, particularly Jirja

Ḫazinedar-i Şehriyarî – the eunuch who supervised the palace treasury; often a stepping-stone to the office of Chief Black Eunuch

ḥimāyet (Arabic, *ḥimāya*) – a Janissary "protection" racket whereby the regi-

ment co-opted a Cairene artisan by placing him on the Janissary payroll and using his business as a source of income

ḥulvān (Arabic, *ḥulwān*) – the fee paid to the governor's treasury for rights to a tax farm

iḫtiyariye (Arabic, *ikhtiyāriyya*) – the "elders," or commanding officers, of an Ottoman regiment in Egypt, including the aghas, *kâhyas*, and *çavuşes*

iltizām – a tax farm: the right to collect the taxes of a rural district or of an urban enterprise, such as port customs. The tax farmer purchased this right at auction based on the amount of revenue he expected to collect; he kept any revenues above this amount.

intisāb – a patron–client relationship

iqlīm ("clime") – a term applied to the large Upper Egyptian subprovince of Jirja, as opposed to *nāḥiye* or *vilāyet*, which were variously applied to all other subprovinces

iqṭāʿ – the right to the usufruct of a piece of land, from which the holder of that land must raise cavalry for the imperial armies, similar to the *timar* of the Ottoman central lands. The *iqṭāʿ* system was employed in Egypt under the late Mamluk sultanate but was abolished after the Ottoman conquest.

irsālīye-i ḫazīne – the tribute sent annually from the Ottoman governor of Egypt to the imperial treasury, accompanied by a bey

jamāʿa (Turkish, *cemaat*) – a small household based within a regimental barracks and usually headed by a lower-ranking officer, roughly equivalent to *ṭāʾifa* and *ṭaraf*; in the Ottoman capital, a regimental subdivision

Janissaries (in Egypt, *Mustahfizan*) – an infantry regiment of Ottoman soldiery in Egypt, the largest and, by the mid-seventeenth century, the wealthiest and most influential regiment; in the central Ottoman lands, the imperial infantry

jundī – a member of the regimental rank-and-file, typically assumed to be a cavalryman since the term was applied to the cavalry of the Mamluk sultanate

kâhya (*kethüda*, *katkhudā*) – a regimental officer, ostensibly second in command to the agha but typically holding real authority; also, the lieutenant of an Ottoman official

kâhya al-waqt – the "acting *kâhya*" of a regiment, a year-long, rotating position

Kanunname – any body of sultanic law, meant to supplement the religious law, or *sharīʿa*; in Egypt, the administrative law promulgated in 1525 by the grand vizier Ibrahim Pasha

kapıkulları (literally, "slaves of the gate") – troops, typically Janissaries, sent to the provinces from the imperial capital

kāshif – a term applied to the governor of a district or subprovince under the Bahri Mamluk sultanate (1250–1388), and resurrected for minor subprovincial governors in Ottoman Egypt

Kazdağı – Mount Ida in western Anatolia, near the Gulf of Edremit, namesake of the Qazdağlı household. There is another Kazdağı near Uşak in

western Anatolia; however, it seems most likely that the Qazdağlı household takes it name from Mount Ida.

khūshdāsh – a mamluk of the same master as another mamluk. The term seems also to have applied to non-mamluk clients of the same patron. The *khūshdāsh* bond was an extremely strong, brotherly tie.

ma'āthir – the public buildings and other public works, such as mosques and fountains, that a grandee or official left behind at his death

mālikāne – the life-tenure, hereditary tax farm, introduced throughout the Ottoman Empire c. 1700

mamluk – a military slave, often from the Caucasus region, trained in a household and ultimately manumitted

Manav – an eighteenth-century household in Egypt whose founder was evidently a fruiterer (*manav* in Turkish)

muḍāraba – a commercial partnership in which the "passive" partner invested the bulk of the capital and received two-thirds of all profits while the "active" partner handled all transactions and received one-third of all profits; similar to a commenda

mühimme – collective name for registers containing copies of sultanic orders to various provincial governors and other officials

mültezim (Arabic, *multazim*) – the holder of a tax farm (*iltizām*)

Müteferrika – an infantry regiment in Ottoman Egypt, created in 1554 and initially filled from the imperial palace; until the mid-seventeenth century, the wealthiest and most influential regiment in Egypt

nāḥiye – in Egypt, a name applied, along with *vilāyet*, to a subprovince; in the rest of the Ottoman Empire, a district smaller than a subprovince

naqīb al-ashrāf – the head of the descendants of the Prophet in Egypt, appointed from Istanbul until the mid-eighteenth century, when Cairo's Bakri family began to monopolize the post

nāẓir – the superintendent of a *waqf*

ocak (literally, "hearth") – name applied to a regiment of Ottoman soldiery in Egypt

oda (literally, "room") – the smallest subdivision of a regiment

odabaşı – the commander of an *oda* within a regiment

para – the Ottoman Egyptian silver currency, as distinct from the imperial silver currency, the *akçe*

qā'im maqām (Turkish, *kaymakam*) – the deputy, or stand-in, for a deposed or absent governor or other official

qaṣaba – a central commercial district or street; literally, a town

Qasimis – one of two factions that pervaded Egyptian society from roughly 1640 to 1730, decimated by the Faqaris in 1730

qayṣariyya – a covered or uncovered market for the sale of luxury goods, especially textiles; can be synonymous with *wakāla*

qīrāṭ ("carat") – a land measurement, twenty-four *qīrāṭ*s signifying the total of a given parcel of land

reaya (Arabic, *raʿāya*) – the tax-paying peasantry in Egypt and in the Ottoman Empire as a whole

riʾāsa – the collective "headship" of the seven Ottoman regiments in Egypt, plus the beylical posts of *amīr al-ḥājj*, *defterdar*, and, by the late eighteenth century, *shaykh al-balad*. The *riāʾsa* was dominated by one or more of these officials at various periods

ruznameci – the Ottoman official who kept the day book (*ruzname*) of financial transactions

sabīl-kuttāb (Ottoman Turkish, *sebil-mekteb*) – a Qurʾān school (*kuttāb* or *mekteb*) over a fountain, the public work most frequently endowed in Egypt by Chief Black Eunuchs

sancak – in the Ottoman Empire generally, a subprovincial governorship; in Egypt, also, the governor of the subprovince

sancak beyi – the governor of a subprovince

sarrāj (literally, "saddler") – a mercenary hired to serve as valet and bodyguard to a grandee or official

serdar qiṭār al-ḥajj – the Janissary officer who accompanied and guarded the annual pilgrimage caravan

Sharaybis – an eighteenth-century Egyptian household whose leaders were wealthy coffee and spice merchants allied with the Qazdağlıs

shaykh al-balad – "headman of Cairo," an office held by Egypt's most influential bey beginning in the mid-eighteenth century; also, the bedouin headman of an Egyptian village

shirwāl (Persian, *shalvar*) – a type of knee-length trousers worn by rank-and-file soldiers and regimental officers below the rank of *çavuş*

subaşı – the Ottoman Turkish term for the Janissary officer who acted as Cairo's chief of police. Cf. *wālī*.

tābiʿ (literally, "follower") – a client, whether mamluk or non-mamluk, of a household head

ṭāʾifa – a small household based within a regimental barracks and usually headed by a lower-ranking officer, roughly equivalent to *jamāʿa* and *ṭaraf*; also used for many other kinds of groups, such as religious sects and craft guilds

ṭaraf (literally, "side") – a small household based within a regimental barracks and usually headed by a lower-ranking officer, roughly equivalent to *jamāʿa* and *ṭāʾifa*

timar – the right to the usufruct of a piece of land, from which the holder of that land must raise cavalry for the imperial armies; similar to the *iqṭāʿ* of the Mamluk sultanate

Tüfenkciyan (literally, "riflemen") – a cavalry regiment of Ottoman soldiery in Ottoman Egypt

ulema (Arabic, *ʿulamāʾ*) – scholars of Islamic theology and jurisprudence, including all religious officials and teachers

vekil (Arabic, *wakīl*) – an agent, usually a commercial or legal agent, who handled the affairs of an absent official or grandee

vilāyet (Arabic, *wilāya*) – an Ottoman administrative term for a province or, in Egypt's case, a subprovince

vizier (Ottoman Turkish, *vezir*; Arabic, *wazīr*) – an Ottoman government minister with the rank of pasha, including the governor of Egypt

wakāla – a commercial structure containing storage space for merchants' goods as well as lodging and office space for the merchants; served as a bourse and commodities exchange. See also *qayṣariyya*.

wālī (Ottoman Turkish, *vali*) – the Arabic term for the Janissary officer who acted as Cairo's chief of police (cf. *subaşı*); also, a term for the Ottoman governor of Egypt

waqf (Turkish, *vakıf*) – a pious foundation endowed in perpetuity to support a religious or charitable institution; can be established for the public good (*khayrī*) or for the benefit of the founder's family (*ahlī*)

zāwiya – a sufi lodge, usually a non-state-sponsored lodge

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