


THE OTTOMAN EMIRATE

(1300-1389)



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THE OTTOMAN EMIRATE
(1300-1389)

Edited by: Elizabeth Zachariadou



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FOREWORD

The transformation of a small emirate, situated on the south-eastern border of the Byzantine state, into the powerful Ottoman empire, which succeeded that of Byzantium and exerted a powerful impact on the Western Christian world for several centuries, constitutes a phenomenon with a variety of aspects. The theories of the great historians M. F. Köprülü and P. Wittek, both put forward in the 1930s, have recently been challenged. On the other hand, recent findings and subsequent studies have provoked further discussions with new arguments and provided additional explanations. The role of the dervishes in the formation of the Ottoman emirate has been stressed. Coins have been found which shed new light on the humble beginnings of the fourteenth-century Turkish emirs. Texts relating to religion and the holy war have been discovered. Cadasters or land censuses have clarified early institutions. Thus a re-examination of the history of the emirate which was to develop into an empire became a desideratum.

The University of Crete was the first in Greece to initiate organised Turkish studies by creating two teaching posts in Turcology in 1984. The Institute for Mediterranean Studies, also situated in Crete, took a further step by organising postgraduate studies in Turkish history, language and palaeography in 1987. An international symposium focusing on the birth of the Ottoman empire appeared to be another step in the development of Turkish studies in Greece.

The Symposium, organised by the Institute for Mediterranean Studies, took place in Rethymnon during the Halcyon Days of 1991 on the 11th, 12th and 13th of January.

The papers contained in the present volume were presented at that Symposium. Those of Prof. Irène Beldiceanu-Steinherr and of Prof. Jacques Lefort dealt with Bithynia, the cradle of the Ottoman empire, and its inhabitants. Prof. Halil Inalcik analysed the activities of Osman, the founder of the Ottoman state, while Dr Colin Imber examined problems related to the first three Ottoman sultans. Prof. Aldo Gallotta reconsidered the myth of the Oğuz origin of the Ottoman state and Dr Metin Kunt discussed the Islamic hinterland of the early Ottomans.

Comparisons between the Ottoman emirate and other Turkish petty dynasties undoubtedly contribute to an understanding of the situation in

fourteenth-century Anatolia, and three papers were devoted to them; more specifically Prof. Tuncer Baykara dealt with the city of Denizli, Dr Feridum Emecen with the emirate of Sarukhan and the editor of this volume with that of Karasi. Dr Konstantin Zhukov threw light on Sarukhanid and Karasid coins. Finally, Dr James Reid examined a variety of problems relating to Mongol rule.

The papers of Prof. Mehmed Ipşirli and Dr Michel Balivet focused on cultural and scholarly life, and those of Prof. Irène Mélikoff and of Prof. Ahmet Yaşar Ocak on religious life and the activities of the dervishes. Prof. Speros Vryonis enlarged on the cultural and religious aspect by examining the socio-cultural structure of fourteenth-century Konya.

*Christian activity directed against early Ottoman expansion was another topic. Prof. Nikos Oikonomides drew attention to an early Serbo-Byzantine alliance, Prof. Anthony Luttrell reviewed Latin responses and Dr Janos Hovary discussed the attitude of Hungary, which was destined to become the main opponent of the Turks in the Balkans. Prof. Vassilis Demetriades dealt with the “*vexata questio*” of the institution of the *devşirme*. Dr Steve Reinert gave a detailed account of sources relating to the 1380s and their chronological problems. One paper, that of Prof. György Hazai, was devoted to the Osmanlı language.*

As this was the first international symposium on Turkish Studies to be held in Greece, we are first of all grateful to our colleagues who so warmly responded to our invitation and participated in the sessions of the Symposium.

We would also like to express our profound gratitude to Mr Ioannis Kefaloyiannis, the then Minister of Tourism, and to Mr Robert Taylor, the then Director of the British Council, for helping us with the travel expenses of the participants; also to the Mayor of Rethymnon, Mr Dimitris Archontakis, for his hospitality to our colleagues, and to the then Vice-President of the University of Crete, Prof. Nicholas Faraklas, for his encouraging presence and help. Above all we wish to express our gratitude to the then Minister of Cultural Affairs, Professor Anna Psarouda-Benaki, for the substantial financial support provided for the organisation of the Symposium and particularly for the publication of the present volume. We would like to express our sincere thanks to Mrs Alcestis Souloyianni, Director of the «Cultural Action Department» of the same Ministry, for her lively and personal interest in our activities and for attending the sessions. Finally, we thank the then Ambassador of the Republic of Turkey Mr G. Aktan, and the then Consul General Mrs G. Dalyanoğlu, for honouring the work of the Symposium by attending all the sessions so assiduously.

ABBREVIATIONS

PERIODICALS

<i>AcOrHung:</i>	<i>Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae</i>
<i>Annali I.U.O.:</i>	<i>Annali dell'Istituto Universitario Orientale di Napoli</i>
<i>AnStu:</i>	<i>Anatolian Studies</i>
<i>AP:</i>	<i>Ἀρχαῖον Πόντου</i>
<i>ArOtt:</i>	<i>Archivum Ottomanicum</i>
<i>ArSlPhil:</i>	<i>Archiv für Slavische Philologie</i>
<i>Atti SLSP:</i>	<i>Atti della Società Ligure di Storia Patria</i>
<i>AÜDTCFD:</i>	<i>Ankara Üniversitesi Dil ve Tarih-Cografya Fakültesi Dergisi</i>
<i>Bell:</i>	<i>Belleteri, Türk Tarih Kurumu</i>
<i>BMGSt:</i>	<i>Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies</i>
<i>BNJ:</i>	<i>Byzantinisch-Neugriechische Jahrbücher</i>
<i>BSI:</i>	<i>Byzantinoslavica</i>
<i>BSOAS:</i>	<i>Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies</i>
<i>ByzFor:</i>	<i>Byzantinische Forschungen</i>
<i>BZ:</i>	<i>Byzantinische Zeitschrift</i>
<i>DOP:</i>	<i>Dumbarton Oaks Papers</i>
<i>IFM:</i>	<i>Istanbul Üniversitesi İktisat Fakültesi Mecmuası</i>
<i>IJMES:</i>	<i>International Journal of Middle East Studies</i>
<i>IJTS:</i>	<i>International Journal of Turkish Studies</i>
<i>JAOS:</i>	<i>Journal of the American Oriental Society</i>
<i>JESHO:</i>	<i>Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient</i>
<i>JRAS:</i>	<i>Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland</i>
<i>JTS:</i>	<i>Journal of Turkish Studies</i>
<i>MHR:</i>	<i>Mediterranean Historical Review</i>
<i>MT:</i>	<i>Materialia Turcica</i>
<i>OCP:</i>	<i>Orientalia Christiana Periodica</i>
<i>OLZ:</i>	<i>Orientalistische Literaturzeitung</i>
<i>OsmAr:</i>	<i>Osmanlı Araştırmaları</i>
<i>REB:</i>	<i>Revue des Études Byzantines</i>
<i>REI:</i>	<i>Revue des Études Islamiques</i>
<i>ROL:</i>	<i>Revue de l'Orient Latin</i>
<i>RSO:</i>	<i>Rivista degli Studi Orientali</i>
<i>SAD:</i>	<i>Selçuklu Araştırmaları Dergisi</i>
<i>SF:</i>	<i>Südost-Forschungen</i>
<i>StuIsl:</i>	<i>Studia Islamica</i>
<i>StuMe:</i>	<i>Studi Mediaevali</i>
<i>StuVe:</i>	<i>Studi Veneziani</i>
<i>TAD:</i>	<i>Ankara Üniversitesi Dil ve Tarih-Cografya Fakültesi Tarih Araştırmaları Dergisi</i>

CULTURE OUVERTE ET ÉCHANGES INTER-RELIGIEUX DANS LES VILLES OTTOMANES DU XIV^e SIÈCLE

Michel BALIVET

Le XIV^e siècle, on le sait, voit la transformation d'un petit *beylik* turc semi-nomade, l'émirat ottoman, en un puissant état balkanique et anatolien. Cette expansion très rapide se fait en partie au détriment de Byzance qui, non seulement est expulsée d'Asie-Mineure mais qui se transforme en une enclave, de plus en plus exigüe, au cœur des possessions turques. Dans ces conditions, les relations turco-byzantines furent, avant tout, placées sous le signe de l'affrontement politique, et c'est sous cet angle qu'elles sont, à juste titre, le plus souvent étudiées.

Cela ne doit pas faire oublier cependant, qu'une fois la conquête militaire ottomane accomplie, la cohabitation entre les conquérants et leurs nouveaux sujets non-musulmans, fut une réalité que les deux groupes en présence durent vivre et gérer au mieux, au risque de rendre toute existence quotidienne comme toute organisation étatique impossible. Il y eut donc nécessairement entre Turcs et Grecs du XIV^e siècle, dans le cadre de l'émirat ottoman, des contacts autres que conflictuels, et en particulier dans l'ordre intellectuel et religieux que nous allons brièvement évoquer. Dans ce domaine, il faut confronter sources ottomanes et témoignages grecs comme le font, de plus en plus, en d'autres secteurs de recherche, Turcologues et Byzantinistes. Je pense, entre autres, à l'article, suggestif pour ce propos comparatiste, d'Elizabeth Zachariadou sur la campagne de Bâyezîd 1er contre le Kadi Burhâneddîn où l'auteur utilise en synopsis sources musulmanes et byzantines.¹ Nous allons donc examiner deux exemples d'échanges théologiques et culturels, bien connus par eux-mêmes, mais rarement replacés dans le contexte turco-islamique précis où ils ont eu lieu.

Premier cas: Grégoire Palamas, archevêque de Thessalonique, captif des ottomans, séjourne en Bithynie en 1354. Dans sa correspondance, il raconte les débats théologiques qu'il eut, à plusieurs reprises, avec des personnalités turques, politiques et religieuses, soit à l'initiative des musulmans, soit à la sienne propre.

1. Manuel II Palaeologos on the strife between Bâyezîd I and Kâdi Burhân al-Dîn Ahmad, *BSOAS*, 43 (1980) 471-481. Perspective comparatiste turco-byzantine également dans les recueils d'articles suivants: *Continuity and change in late byzantine and early ottoman society*, edd. A. BRYER-H. LOWRY, (Birmingham-Washington 1986); et *ByzFor*, 16 (1990).

Or le ton qui domine ces échanges, semble empreint de modération et d'esprit conciliateur. A deux exceptions près, les *gâzî* en campagne qui le traitent assez rudement à Lampsaque/ Lapseki, et les Juifs islamisés de la cour d'Orhân dont nous allons reparler, les interlocuteurs turcs de Palamas, l'émir lui-même, son petit-fils, les notables de la cour, *imâm* et gens de la rue, se montrent ouverts et toujours prêts à discuter des mérites comparés de l'islam et du christianisme.²

Deuxième cas: Gémiste Pléthon, le philosophe bien connu, "déserte sa patrie", selon l'expression d'un contemporain, à une époque de sa jeunesse qui doit se situer vers 1380, pour aller faire ses études dans la capitale ottomane, sous la direction d'un Juif qui avait une position très en vue à la cour du sultan, puis il revient enseigner à Byzance.³

Plusieurs questions peuvent être posées à propos de ces deux expériences. Dans le cas de Palamas, peut-on vraiment croire que le prélat prisonnier ait eu un accueil aussi favorable de la part de ses interlocuteurs turcs, ou bien l'évêque, mortifié par son expérience de captivité, tente-il de présenter à son avantage des faits humiliants, ainsi que l'en accusent ses adversaires? En ce qui concerne Pléthon, est-il pensable qu'un jeune étudiant grec du XIV^e siècle, ait préféré quitter la prestigieuse ville universitaire que restait Byzance, pour aller se former dans un centre réputé barbare et ennemi, et, qui-plus-est, sous la direction d'un Juif helléniste, ou est-ce là une information malveillante forgée par les nombreux ennemis du philosophe pour nuire à sa réputation? Seule, une analyse de la vie intellectuelle et religieuse dans l'émirat ottoman du XIV^e telle qu'on peut l'appréhender à la lumière des sources turques, peut corroborer nos deux témoignages byzantins, ou, au contraire, leur apporter un démenti flagrant.

Si l'on en croit les sources musulmanes, le jeune émirat ottoman se fait remarquer au XIV^e siècle, non seulement par sa vigueur politico-militaire, mais également par son dynamisme intellectuel et religieux: Ahmed Taşköprüzâde, dans son ouvrage prosopographique consacré aux premiers savants ottomans, enregistre la rapide augmentation des lettrés ottomans au XIV^e siècle: il consacre une demi-douzaine de rubriques au règne d'Osmân, une dizaine pour le règne d'Orhân et plus d'une trentaine pour l'époque de Bâyezîd 1^{er}.⁴ Abdürrahmân al-

2. Edition critique ANNA PHILIPPIDIS-BRAAT, La captivité de Grégoire Palamas chez les Turcs: dossier et commentaire, *TM*, 7 (1979) 135sqq.

3. GENNADE SCHOLARIOS, *Oeuvres complètes*, éd. L. PETIT, (Paris 1930sqq.) v. IV, p. 162: "Tu ne connaissais pas Zoroastre auparavant, reproche l'auteur à Pléthon. C'est Elisée, un Juif (...), qui te l'a fait connaître. Fuyant la patrie pour recevoir son bel enseignement, tu vécus à la table de cet homme très influent à la cour des barbares". Et ailleurs; v. IV, p. 152: "Par cet homme, Juif en apparence, mais en réalité helléniste, que non seulement il (Pléthon) fréquenta longtemps comme son maître, mais qu'il servit au besoin et qui lui donna sa subsistance, car il était parmi les personnages les plus puissants à la cour des barbares, par cet homme donc il acheva de devenir tel (qu'il fut)"; cf. aussi F. MASAI, *Pléthon et le Platonisme de Mistra*, (Paris 1956) p. 55-59.

4. *Es-Şekâ'ikun-nu'mânîye fî 'ulemâ'i d-devleti-l-'osmânîye*, éd. A. S. FURAT, (Istanbul 1985).

Bistamî qualifie Nicée/Iznik, où Palamas eut les contacts les plus fructueux avec des musulmans, de “nid de savants”.⁵ C’est à Nicée/Iznik qu’est fondée la première *medrese* ottomane, *Orhân Gâzî medresesi*, jouxtant la célèbre église du concile, Sainte-Sophie devenue *Cuma Mescidi*. A la tête de cette institution se succèdent une lignée de savants de renom comme le premier *müderris*, Dâvûd de Kayseri puis Taceddîn Kürdî, en poste au moment du passage de Palamas.⁶ A Bursa, première capitale ottomane, enseignent de fortes personnalités comme Mollâ Fenârî, *müderris* de la *Manastır Medresesi* sous Murâd 1^{er}.⁷

Or, Dâvûd comme Fenârî, sont très influencés par les idées du grand soufi espagnol Muhyîddîn Ibn Arabî dont l’influence sur l’islam anatolien fut déterminante. Ibn Arabî avait longuement séjourné à la cour seldjoukide au début du XIII^e siècle et son œuvre énorme fut commentée par ses disciples anatoliens, de Sadreddîn de Konya à Dâvûd et à Fenârî qui en imprègnèrent leur enseignement. Il s’agit d’un islam mystique, très ouvert, favorable aux contacts avec les non-musulmans, dans lequel la personnalité de “Jésus Fils de Marie” (Isâ Ibn Meryem), joue un rôle important, et l’*imâm* avec qui Palamas discute à Iznik appartient manifestement à ce courant de pensée.⁸

Mais l’islam des *ulemâ* et des savants n’est pas le seul qui modèle les attitudes conciliantes: il y a aussi la religion populaire et peu formaliste des derviches errants, des *bâbâ* turcomans et de cette population issue des mariages turco-chrétiens que les sources byzantines appellent “mixobarbare” et qui mélange volontiers son double patrimoine culturel. Les Byzantins vénèrent à l’occasion tel ou tel thaumaturge turc: Abdâl Murâd est connu en milieu grec pour ses miracles, et les habitants de Bursa, à l’époque où la ville est encore byzantine, lui envoient de la nourriture. Emîr Sultân, depuis Bursa va rendre visite à un anachorète grec dans l’Olympe de Bithynie (*Keşiş Dağ*), attiré par sa réputation de sainteté.⁹ Dans la région de l’Olympe aussi, vit le populaire Geyikli bâbâ, habitant dans une église, buvant du vin et accomplissant avec son épée des exploits proches de ceux de Saint-Georges, ensemble de caractères qui devaient le faire voir d’un bon œil par les chrétiens locaux.¹⁰

Un peu plus tard, les mêmes habitants de Bursa, alors que la ville est devenue

5. A. A. ADIVAR, *Osmanlı Türklerinde ilim*, (Istanbul 1970) p. 12.

6. *Kitâb-i Cihan-nümâ*, v. I, p. 163.

7. *Şekâ'ik*, p. 12sqq.

8. Dâvûd est un des commentateurs appréciés d’Ibn Arabî, cf. CLAUDE ADDAS, *Ibn 'Arabî ou la quête du Soufre rouge*, (Paris 1989) p. 100, 276, 340. La famille de Fenârî se rattachait à la lignée spirituelle du principal disciple anatolien d’Ibn Arabî, Sadreddîn de Konya, *EI*² “Fenârî-zâde” (J.R. Walsh).

9. Dès la fin du XI^e siècle, Anne Comnène parle de “μυξοβαρβαροι ελληνιζοντες”, *Alexiade*, III, p. 205. Sur Abdâl Murâd et les Byzantins, OCAK, *La révolte*, p. 127. Sur Emîr Sultân et le moine olympien, SENÂÎ EFENDI, *Menakıb-ı Emir Sultan*, (Istanbul 1290) p. 60-63.

10. OCAK, *La révolte*, p. 119-120.

capitale de l'émirat ottoman, prennent le parti d'un prédicateur populaire (*vâiz*) qui affirme que Jésus est aussi élevé en dignité que Muhammad, au grand scandale d'un voyageur arabe de passage. A Ankara, à la fin du siècle, Manuel II Paléologue dit de son interprète en langue turque, que, bien qu'il fût musulman, il restait très attaché à la religion de ses ancêtres chrétiens.¹¹ On ne doit pas perdre de vue non plus que Palamas, de son côté, appartient à une école de pensée relativement modérée dans ses jugements envers l'islam. Depuis Maxime le Confesseur pour qui le Saint-Esprit était à l'œuvre chez tout homme qu'il soit barbare ou nomade, jusqu'à Mathieu Blastarès qui affirme qu'il y a dans l'islam une ombre de grâce, il a toujours existé, à Byzance, des penseurs qui reconnaissaient certaines qualités à la religion musulmane, en particulier son rigoureux monothéisme, et Palamas fait partie de ce courant.¹²

Dès lors, on comprend mieux le ton serein qui domine le débat de Nicée, entre l'évêque de Thessalonique et l'*imâm* turc, et la volonté mutuelle de trouver un terrain d'entente. L'atmosphère qui règne dans l'émirat ottoman au milieu du XIV^e siècle telle que nous la décrivent les sources turques, est donc tout-à-fait propice aux échanges conciliants entre musulmans et chrétiens et confirme la peinture brossée par Palamas. Des passages comme la conclusion de la discussion théologique de Nicée, telle que nous la rapporte l'évêque, à la fin de sa lettre, prennent tout leur relief: "*Je leur dis avec un léger sourire: – si nous étions tombés d'accord sur le plan des formulations, nous appartiendrions à la même religion. L'un des Turcs dit alors: – le temps viendra où nous serons d'accord entre nous. Et moi, j'en convins et je souhaitai que ce temps arrivât vite.*"¹³

Le désir de concorde interconfessionnelle ne peut être plus clairement exprimé dans la bouche d'un prélat byzantin. On pense, côté musulman, aux affirmations universalistes d'Ibn Arabî ou de Rûmî dont l'influence est si forte dans l'émirat ottoman du XIV^e siècle: "*Mon cœur, écrit le soufi espagnol, est capable de toutes les formes: il est le temple des idoles, le cloître du moine chrétien, les tables de la loi mosaïque, le coran des fidèles; ma religion est la religion de l'Amour*".¹⁴ Et Rûmî de son côté affirme: "*Si les chemins sont différents, le but est unique: pour certains le chemin de la Ka'ba passe par Byzance, pour d'autres par la Perse ou la Chine, pour d'autres du côté de l'Inde ou du Yémen (...). Le but*

11. Sur le *vâiz* de Bursa, Lâtîfî de Kastamonu, *Tezkire*, Istanbul 1314, p. 56. Sur l'interprète de Manuel II, E. TRAPP, *Manuel II Palaiologos, Dialoge mit einem "Perser"*, (Vienne 1966) p. 79.

12. Pour Maxime le Confesseur, le Saint-Esprit est présent "*chez les barbares et les nomades*", AD. THALASS., XV, P.G., v. 90, col. 297. MATHIEU BLASTARÈS discerne "*τὸ φῶς τῆς χάριτος*" chez les "Agarènes", *Syntagma*, II 3, P.G., v. 144, col. 1108. Palamas reconnaît chez les musulmans une foi monothéiste "*digne d'Abraham*", *Défense des saints hésychastes*, éd. G. MEYENDORFF, (Louvain 1973), v. II, p. 392-394.

13. PHILIPPIDIS, *op. cit.*, p. 160.

14. *Tarjumân al-Ashwâq*, éd. NICHOLSON, *Translation Fund. New Series*, XX, (Londres 1911) p. 67.

n'appartient ni à l'infidélité ni à la foi (...), et ceux qui se disaient l'un l'autre chemin faisant: – tu as tort et tu es impie, oublient leur querelle une fois arrivés, car leur but était unique".¹⁵

En ce qui concerne le séjour de Pléthon dans la capitale ottomane auprès d'un savant juif, rien dans les sources musulmanes ne rend cet événement impossible. Les hommes de science d'origine juive, sont fréquemment présents dans les cours musulmanes, que ce soit en tant que médecins, traducteurs, astronomes ou philosophes. Les émirs turcs continuent cette tradition: Ibn Battûta s'étonne de la place d'honneur et de marques de respect réservées au médecin juif de l'émir d'Aydın; l'émir Orhân s'entoure de savants juifs devenus musulmans qu'il considère comme des gens avisés et experts en exégèse et en théologie; il oppose ces gens-là à Grégoire Palamas dans une controverse islamo-chrétienne. Il n'y a donc rien de vraiment étonnant à ce que Pléthon soit venu étudier auprès d'un Juif ottoman, les cas de recours à des savants juifs par des intellectuels chrétiens étant, d'autre part, une pratique que le Moyen-Age n'ignore pas.¹⁶ De plus, la philosophie est tenue en grande estime dans les *medrese* turques du temps: Eflâtûn/Platon est pour beaucoup, selon le mot d'Attar, "*le Maître universel qui enseigne l'Alchimie illuminatrice*".¹⁷ Cemaleddîn Aksarayî, le maître de Fenârî, appelait "*meşşâiyûn*", péripatéticiens, les plus jeunes de ses élèves, car il leur dispensait son enseignement en se promenant, et il désignait comme "*revâkiyyûn*", stoïciens, ses disciples plus avancés, car il leur donnait des cours sous l'un des porches de la *medrese*.¹⁸

Il ne faut pas oublier non plus que Pléthon, s'intéressant aux doctrines zoroastriennes, peut avoir été en contact avec les milieux soufis influencés par les théories de Suhrawardî. Henri Corbin établit un rapport étroit entre le système pléthonien et celui du grand mystique iranien du XII^e siècle. Si tel était le cas, quand, sinon pendant son séjour ottoman, le philosophe grec aurait-il pu s'informer sur les théories "orientales" (*ishrâqî*) des platoniciens de Perse, quand on sait en outre la forte influence de la pensée persane chez les Ottomans? L'expérience de Pléthon en territoire turc, montre donc, d'une part le dynamisme attractif de la vie intellectuelle et de l'enseignement dans l'état ottoman dès le XIV^e siècle, et, d'autre part, le cosmopolitisme de la cour des sultans où se côtoient sans heurt, intellectuels musulmans, juifs et chrétiens.¹⁹

15. Dans son *Fîhi-mâ-fîhi, Le Livre du Dedans*, éd. EVA DE VITRAY-MEYEROVITCH, (Paris 1976) p. 134-135.

16. Sur le médecin juif de l'émir d'Aydın, IBN BATTUTA, *Voyages*, v. II, p. 305-306. Sur les savants juifs d'Orhân, M. BALIVET, Byzantins judaïsants et juifs islamisés, *Byzantion*, 52 (1982) 24-59. Le recours à des savants juifs en chrétienté médiévale, se rencontre un peu partout de Byzance à la Sicile et à l'Italie des Humanistes, voir COLETTE SIRAT, *La philosophie juive au Moyen-Age*, (Paris 1983) p. 56, 255, 304, 306, 318, 363 etc.; F. SECRET, *Les Kabbalistes chrétiens de la Renaissance*, (Milan 1985) p. 108, 115.

17. ATTAR, *Le Livre Divin (Elahi-Nameh)*, (Paris 1961) p. 402-404.

18. *Şekâ'ik*, p. 17-19.

19. Sur les ressemblances doctrinales entre Suhrawardî et Pléthon, H. CORBIN, *En Islam iranien*, (Paris 1971) v. II, p. 11, 31-34, 47.

Le système d'échange et de brassage inter-culturel qui se met en place dans le premier État ottoman, se renforcera par la suite et sera une des composantes très importantes de l'empire des sultans turcs pendant toute son histoire et jusqu'au début même de notre siècle. Je n'en veux pour preuve en conclusion, que les deux petits textes suivants. Le premier est un poème turc en l'honneur de Mevlânâ Djelâleddin Rûmî :

*“Ben sende yitirdim tenimi canımı, ey Şah!
Buldum yine her zerrem içinde seni billah
Şelâlei esrarını dök ruhuma, ey mah!
Ağlat beni, inlet beni, ta haşre kadar yak.”*

*“En toi je me suis perdu corps et âme, ô Roi!
Je t'ai retrouvé en chacun de mes atomes, de par Dieu
Inonde mon esprit de ta mystérieuse cascade, ô lune!
fais-moi pleurer, fais-moi gémir, jusqu'au Jugement
Dernier, brûle-moi.”*

L'auteur de ce poème est un avocat grec de ce siècle, Adamantios Ketseoglou, affilié, à Istanbul, à l'ordre *mevlevî* sous le nom de *Yaman Dede*.²⁰

Le second texte est un poème en grec, dédié à la Crète :

*“Μά κρητικιά μου λειμονιά και ποῦ θά σέ φυτέψω;
Νά σέ φυτέψω στήν καρδιά ἴσω και σέ κερδέψω.
Μ'ἄ πᾶς στή Κρήτη κρητικιά βάστα μου ἴνα μαχαίρι
Νά τό φορῶ στή μέση μου χειμῶνα καλοκαίρι
μ'ἄ πᾶς στή Κρήτη κρητικιά, χαιρέτα μου τήν Κρήτη.”*

*“Ma citronette crétoise où pourrais-je te planter?
Je te planterai dans mon cœur dans l'espoir de te gagner.
Si tu vas dans la Crète des Crétois apporte-moi un couteau
pour que je l'ai à la ceinture l'hiver comme l'été
Si tu vas dans la Crète des Crétois, salue-la pour moi.”*

Ce poème est chanté parmi les Turcs d'origine crétoise de Söke, dans la province d'Aydın.²¹

20. V. MIRMIROGLOU, *Οί Δεσβίσσαι*, (Athènes 1940) p. 393.

21. K. ÖZBAYRI et E. ZAKHOS-PAPAZAKHARIOU, Documents de tradition orale des Turcs d'origine crétoise, *Turcica*, 8 (1976) 82.

LA POPULATION NON-MUSULMANE DE BITHYNIE (DEUXIÈME MOITIÉ DU XIV^e s. - PREMIÈRE MOITIÉ DU XV^e s.)

Irène BELDICEANU-STEINHERR

Cette étude essayera de projeter quelque lumière sur la répartition géographique de la population non musulmane de la Bithynie, sur les couches sociales et les modalités d'imposition. Nous tenterons de déterminer si des institutions byzantines ont survécu à la conquête turque et si l'on peut tirer des conclusions portant sur l'appartenance ethnique de la population à partir des anthroponymes. Soulignons toutefois qu'il ne s'agit ici que d'une première approche. La documentation concernant les époques les plus reculées est rare et le dépouillement des sources datant de la fin du XV^e et du début du XVI^e siècle représente un travail de longue haleine qui doit être mené avec doigté. Nous avons décidé de tenter l'expérience avec le matériel dont nous disposions, même si les résultats devront être affinés par la suite.

I. Les sources

Les sources les plus anciennes à notre portée sont des actes de legs pieux: celui d'Orkhan en faveur de sa zavîyé sise à Brousse,¹ celui de Murad 1^{er} en faveur de son *imaret* de la même ville² et enfin celui de Bayezid 1^{er} en faveur de celui de son père.³ Nous nous sommes servi également d'un registre de legs pieux couvrant une partie de la Bithynie et datant du règne de Mehmed II. Il contient les comptes de l'année 859 (22 déc. 1454 -10 déc. 1455) et nous est parvenu en deux fragments.⁴ A cela s'ajoute le recensement des domaines et

1. HÜSEYİN HÜSAM ED-DİN, Orkhan beyin vaqfiyesi (Acte de legs pieux d'Orkhan bey), *TOEM*, fasc. 94 (nouvelle série 17) (1926-27) 284-301; analyse dans BELDICEANU-STEINHERR, *Recherches*, p. 127-130. L'acte date du 19-28 avril 1360.

2. M.T. GÖKBILGIN, Murad I. tesisleri ve Bursa imareti vakfiyesi, *TürkMec*, 10 (1951-1953) 217-234; analyse dans BELDICEANU-STEINHERR, *Recherches*, p. 213-218.

3. GÖKBILGIN, *op. cit.*, fac-similé.

4. Le premier fragment est conservé aux Archives de la Présidence du Conseil à

timars du règne de Bayezid II concernant la même région, daté d'*evasit safer* 892 (6-15 févr. 1487).⁵

Les articles du regretté professeur Ö.L. Barkan et surtout le livre qu'il a préparé avec E. Meriçli sur la province que les Ottomans ont appelée Khüdavendigâr⁶ nous ont été d'un grand secours. Ce dernier ouvrage permet d'étudier les changements intervenus entre la fin du XV^e et la deuxième moitié du XVI^e siècle, car il s'appuie essentiellement sur trois recensements, datant respectivement de 1487, 1521 et 1573.

Un mot enfin pour justifier notre utilisation de registres plus ou moins tardifs par rapport à l'époque qui nous intéresse. La documentation relative à la deuxième moitié du XIV^e siècle se réduit malheureusement à peu de choses. Grégoire Palamas nous apprend qu'il avait été hébergé par ses coreligionnaires, mais sans rien nous révéler de leur mode de vie. Les registres de legs pieux présentent l'avantage de figer jusqu'à un certain degré la situation, puisque les clauses fixées par le fondateur étaient sensées garder leur validité jusqu'à la fin des temps. Les registres consacrés aux domaines et aux timars ont cependant aussi leur utilité, car les recenseurs se réfèrent toujours aux recensements antérieurs et notent les changements successifs. Lorsqu'une population, venue d'ailleurs, s'installe dans un village, ils mentionnent son origine.

L'utilisation des registres de la Bithynie est cependant difficile, la documentation étant lacunaire. D'une part ces registres nous sont parvenus en mauvais état. Par des recoupements avec ceux de l'époque de Soliman le Magnifique on a la certitude que le registre de Mehmed II, mentionné plus haut, a été amputé de nombreux feuillets. La même constatation est valable pour le registre de Bayezid II. Il contient en effet un tiers seulement des quartiers de Brousse.

D'autre part, la difficulté de se faire une idée précise sur la Bithynie à l'époque ottomane tient aussi à la relation entre contribuable et bénéficiaire de l'impôt, problème qui demande de plus amples explications. Lorsqu'on compare l'Anatolie centrale avec la Bithynie, on constate une différence fondamentale. En Anatolie centrale, les bénéficiaires des revenus fiscaux – disons un legs pieux et un timariote – se partageaient l'assiette fiscale selon des lois bien établies. Le legs pieux recevait la dîme; le timariote, les droits coutumiers. En Bithynie chaque bénéficiaire touchait les impôts des villageois qui lui étaient assignés. Si une

Istanbul dans le fonds Maliyeden Müdevver defterleri sous le no 16016 (cité dorénavant **MM 16016**), le deuxième se trouve aussi à Istanbul à la bibliothèque "Atatürk Kitaplığı" dans le fonds Muallim Cevdet sous le no 0 117/1 (cité dorénavant **MM 0 117/1**). Autrefois ce fonds était entreposé à la bibliothèque de la municipalité de Beyazit.

5. Istanbul, Archives de la Présidence du Conseil, fonds Tapu ve Tahrir defterleri, no 23 (cité dorénavant **TT 23**).

6. Ö. L. BARKAN, XV ve XVI ncı asırlarda osmanlı imparatorluğunda toprak işçiliğinin organizasyonu şekilleri, *IFM*, I (1939-40) 29-74, 198-245, 327-447. BARKAN-MERİÇLİ.

partie d'un village versait les impôts à un timariote et l'autre partie à un legs pieux, les premiers contribuables seront inscrits dans le registre de timar et les autres dans le registre de legs pieux.⁷ En ce qui concerne la Bithynie, on n'est donc jamais sûr de posséder les données complètes sur un village. Dans ces conditions procéder à des estimations est souvent aléatoire, qu'il s'agisse de la production ou de la densité de la population d'un village.

A ce propos nous nous sommes demandé pour la première fois si nous n'avons pas affaire en Bithynie à un héritage byzantin. L'Anatolie centrale a subi pendant plus de deux siècles l'influence de l'administration seldjoukide puis mongole, tandis que la Bithynie a été occupée par les Ottomans directement sur les Byzantins. Le même phénomène s'observe aussi à Trébizonde.

II. La répartition géographique des non-musulmans

Du point de vue géographique notre recherche est limitée par la nature des sources dont nous disposons, à savoir essentiellement les registres fort incomplets cités plus haut. La région que nous explorons ne correspond par conséquent qu'à une partie de la Bithynie. Elle comprend Brousse et les circonscriptions administratives d'Inegöl, Söğüd, Yenichehir, Domanitch, Kirmidj,⁸ Yarhisar, Ermeni Ili, Gürle, Qaragöz (devenu Aqhisar), Izniq, Yalaq Ova. Ne sont pas compris Nicomédie au nord-est, la ville faisant partie de la province de Qodja Eli, et toute la région située à l'ouest de Brousse.⁹ Une exception: Ulubad et Kirmasti (aujourd'hui Kemalpaşa) et cela grâce aux données fragmentaires du registre de legs pieux de 1454-55 (MC 0 117/1).

Nous avons relevé 43 agglomérations, dont 12 ne sont pas localisables. Si on dépouille le livre de Barkan et Meriçli sur la province de Khüdavendigâr, il faudra ajouter 6 villages pour la circonscription administrative de Brousse, 3 pour celle d'Inegöl, 1 pour celle de Yarhisar et 13 pour celle de Yenichehir.

Lorsqu'on regarde les textes de plus près, on constate qu'il s'agit de données provenant de registres tardifs. Une partie des non-musulmans est constituée de déportés, d'esclaves achetés pour faire fructifier la terre ou de personnes ayant émigré des legs pieux voisins. En ce qui concerne Köprübachı par exemple, les chrétiens viennent de Depedjiq appartenant au legs pieux d'Orkhan.¹⁰ Quant à

7. "Les noms des raïas se trouvent dans le registre de legs pieux": registre de timars d'*evail muharrem* 928 (1-10 déc. 1521), Archives de la Présidence du Conseil, fonds Tapu ve Tahrir defterleri no 111, p. 386. "Les autres revenus d'Edinçik reviennent au legs pieux de Bayezid II; ils sont inscrits dans le registre de legs pieux": registre cité, p. 435.

8. C'est la lecture proposée par BARKAN-MERIÇLI, liste no 143, p. 125.

9. Le TT 23 n'est malheureusement pas complet. Nous n'avons pas pu exploiter deux fragments conservés dans les mêmes archives sous les nos 44 et 1050; voir BARKAN-MERIÇLI, introduction, p. 66.

10. BARKAN-MERIÇLI, p. 102.

Khalifelü, aujourd'hui Maskara Hasan, il accueille un chrétien de Filadar, village appartenant au même legs pieux.¹¹

III. La population

Avant de passer à l'étude des non-musulmans, une constatation s'impose. La majorité vivaient soit sur les domaines du sultan, soit sur les legs pieux fondés par les premiers souverains ottomans. Sur 43 localités trois seulement étaient allouées à des timariotes. Chose plus curieuse encore, lorsque le sultan se partageait les villageois avec un timariote, ce dernier ne disposait que des impôts versés par les musulmans comme par exemple à Despina, Söğüd et Topraq Öyüğü. Malheureusement il n'est pas toujours aisé de déterminer qui est musulman et qui est chrétien comme nous le montrerons plus bas.

Nous diviserons la population en citadins et en villageois. Cette différenciation est artificielle –si on fait exception de Brousse–, car aussi bien les uns que les autres labouraient la terre et cultivaient la vigne. La ville ottomane se distinguait surtout par l'existence d'un marché et d'un minimum de manufactures, telles que savonnerie, teinturerie, fabrique de bougies et de *boza*, boisson préparée à partir de céréales fermentées. A cela s'ajoutaient parfois une boutique vendant des têtes de moutons et une buvette.

1. La ville

Les informations que nous avons pu glaner sur les villes de Bithynie sont rares en raison de la documentation lacunaire. Seule Brousse échappe en partie à la règle.

D'une façon générale on peut affirmer que le nombre des non-musulmans est restreint dans les villes et qu'il va en décroissant jusqu'à la fin du XVI^e siècle. Les autochtones avaient déserté en grande partie les agglomérations urbaines avant la conquête et ceux qui sont restés les quittent ou se convertissent peu à peu à l'islam. Si l'on regarde les tableaux dressés par Barkan et Meriçli, on constate qu'en 1573 il ne reste plus de non-musulmans dans les villes telles que Inegöl, Söğüd, Yarhisar et Aqhisar.

Brousse constitue une fois de plus une exception. Mais les communautés chrétiennes qu'on y trouve en 1487 ont été au moins en partie colonisées par les sultans eux-mêmes. Près de Muradiye vivaient des chrétiens, dont les aïeux avaient été déportés de Philadelphie (Alachehir)¹² très probablement par Bayezid 1^{er} après la conquête. En 1521 la ville comprend le quartier des Simaviyan.¹³ Il

11. BARKAN-MERIÇLI, p. 49.

12. TT 23, p. 17.

13. BARKAN-MERIÇLI, p. 8.

s'agit de toute évidence de personnes déportées de la ville de Simav en Anatolie.

Sur les 152¹⁴ quartiers que comptait Brousse en 1521, le registre de 1487 n'en contient que 45 (dont un incomplet). En regard de 2218 foyers musulmans on compte 78 foyers chrétiens répartis sur 4 quartiers. A cela s'ajoutent 2 foyers juifs (un père et son fils); malheureusement il est impossible de savoir s'il s'agit là d'une famille établie de longue date.

Le quartier qui abritait autrefois un monastère byzantin et où sont enterrés Osman et Orkhan, ne compte aucun chrétien en 1487.¹⁵ Le métropolite de l'époque, Sévastos, habite parmi les déportés de Philadelphie. Dans le quartier du marché aux poissons, les chrétiens sont également des nouveaux venus, puisqu'ils sont qualifiés de *zimmi-i müteferriq* (protégés de l'État dispersés) appartenant au legs pieux de Murad 1^{er}, Bayezid 1^{er} et d'un membre de la famille de Germiyan.¹⁶

Les habitants de Qoz Tchechme ne semblent pas non plus être tous des descendants des Byzantins à juger d'après leurs noms. Certains portent en effet des noms turcs ou persans.¹⁷ Il reste les éleveurs de chevaux au service de l'État du quartier d'Ala ed-Din qui, à une exception près, portent tous des noms tirés du calendrier grec-orthodoxe.¹⁸ Ce sont peut-être les seuls dont l'arbre généalogique remonte aux habitants d'avant la conquête.

En ce qui concerne la ville de Söğüd, le registre **TT 23** nous réserve une surprise. Considérée comme le berceau de l'État ottoman, une bonne partie de ses habitants étaient pourtant chrétiens. Deux legs pieux, deux timariotes et le sultan se partageaient les contribuables.¹⁹ D'après Barkan, il y avait en 1487 huit chrétiens et cinq musulmans, mais en 1521 les données sont tellement imprécises que Barkan n'a pas osé se prononcer sur la religion des 20 contribuables.²⁰ La raison réside dans le fait que de nombreux chrétiens portaient à l'époque des noms turcs, persans voire arabes à côté de noms grecs et bibliques. Nous reviendrons sur le problème des anthroponymes qui ne permettent pas toujours de départager les diverses communautés religieuses. En 1573 en tout cas, on ne compte plus de chrétiens à Söğüd d'après Barkan.

14. Qurchunlu, Qaplıdja et Temürqapı étaient à l'époque de Mehmed II des villages indépendants: **MC 0 117/1**, fol. 3 r^o, 18 v^o, 20 r^o.

15. **TT 23**, p. 22. Jusqu'en 1573 les Ottomans disaient *mahalle-i Manastır der qal'e*; cf. BARKAN-MERİÇLİ, p. 6, no 113.

16. **TT 23**, p. 29.

17. **TT 23**, p. 19: Qosta veled-i Todoros, Mikhal veled-i Mikhal, Qaloyan veled-i Qaloyan, Arslan veled-i Ilyas, Qaloyan veled-i Pulad, Doma veled-i Qaraman, Yakhchi veled-i Ilyas, Yorgi veled-i Yani (ou Bali?), Todoros veled-i Arslan, Arslan veled-i Qosta, Niqola veled-i...

18. **TT 23**, p. 29: Yani veled-i Martinos, Dimitri..., Kriyatas veled-i Yorgi, Todoros veled-i..., Dimos veled-i Yorgi, bive Mariya.

19. Cf. liste annexe. Les mécréants de Söğüd payaient 4 *mudd* de blé aux timariotes Seferchah et Mustafa: **TT 23**, p. 64.

20. BARKAN-MERİÇLİ, p. 288.

Pour ce qui est de la ville de Nicée, le registre du règne de Mehmed II mentionne sept chrétiens portant des noms grecs, lesquels font partie du legs pieux en faveur de la mosquée d'Orkhan sise à Nicée très probablement. Le registre fait état aussi d'un notable mécréant, sans donner son nom. Les vigneronns qui exploitaient son vignoble payaient au legs pieux de Yaqut pacha 350 aspres. Malheureusement nous n'avons pas d'autres informations sur la ville.

Enfin, grâce au legs pieux de Lala Chahin, on connaît la composition de la ville de Kirmasti. Aux deux quartiers musulmans se joignait un quartier chrétien composé de 19 vigneronns dont la plupart portait des noms de l'Église byzantine. A cela s'ajoute un Tatar chrétien, un Hongrois, une veuve et un bouvier.

Étant donné que le TT 23 ne représente qu'une partie du recensement de 1487 (manquent les circonscriptions d'Izniq, Ada, Yalaq Ova, Gürle, Kite, Ulubad, Toyhisar, Aydıncıq), on ne dispose pas d'autres informations sur les villes bithyniennes.

2. La campagne

Les non-musulmans habitant la campagne peuvent être classés dans les catégories suivantes: vigneronns, éleveurs de bovins, pêcheurs et paysans cultivant la terre. Il ne s'agit pas de refaire ici le travail réalisé par le Prof. Ö. L. Barkan dans les années quarante qui, s'il reste toujours valable, se place dans un cadre plus général, puisqu'il concerne aussi bien les musulmans que les non-musulmans et inclut aussi la Roumélie. Nous nous proposons seulement de puiser à la documentation dont nous disposons les informations qui se réfèrent aux débuts de l'État ottoman et qui permettent de dégager des institutions remontant à l'époque byzantine.

a. Les vigneronns

En ce qui concerne les vigneronns, nous avons relevé 12 villages où l'on pratiquait la culture de la vigne.²¹ Cela va de 2 vigneronns à Söğüd jusqu'à 191 à Mudanya. Pour Mudanya et Qurchunlu situés sur la côte méridionale de la mer de Marmara, il faut parler de monoculture. L'ensemble des vigneronns payait au legs pieux de Murad 1^{er} une somme forfaitaire de respectivement 15000 et 12000 aspres. Quant aux droits que percevait autrefois l'empereur byzantin,²² ils étaient alloués à deux timariotes.

Dans les autres villages chaque vigneron payait une redevance en espèces

21. Bigados, Tchepni, Ereğli, Hamza beg (au nord d'Inegöl), Khatun köy (près d'Inegöl), Kirmasti, Kufi (région de Söğüd), Mudanya, Qurchunlu, Söğüd, Temürqapı (près de Bursa), Yüregir (près de Gürle).

22. Le recenseur emploie le mot *bid'at* (innovation illicite du point de vue religieux): TT 23, p. 43.

dont le montant variait d'un individu à l'autre, et pour laquelle le recenseur ne donne aucune justification. En déduire que nous avons affaire à une main d'œuvre servile est hasardeux. Il faut plutôt penser à une tradition byzantine.

Le vin de Trigleia, village situé à quelques km à l'ouest de Mudanya, était très apprécié à l'époque où nous nous plaçons. On le mentionne dans des documents notariés des Archives de Gênes datant du 25 mars et du 22 mai 1332.²³ En 1352, les Génois offrent à Orkhan comme cadeau entre autres 44 *metrete* de vin de Trigleia.²⁴ Cette localité, comme Gemlik (l'ancien Kios) et Seki (en byzantin Sykè ou Sygè, aujourd'hui Sığı) faisait, à l'époque de Bayezid 1^{er}, partie de son legs pieux. Mais nous n'avons pas d'autres données sur ces villages.²⁵ En ce qui concerne Qurchunlu, légué par Bayezid 1^{er} à la fondation pieuse de son père, l'acte précise qu'il l'a acheté à la communauté villageoise chrétienne de l'endroit.²⁶ Nous ne savons pas ce que recouvre cette expression, mais il est bon de rappeler que la région de Qurchunlu abritait le monastère d'Elegmoi.²⁷ Il est probable que les villages qui se consacraient entièrement à la viticulture sous les règnes des premiers sultans, auront appartenu à l'époque byzantine aux domaines de l'empereur ou aux monastères.²⁸

b. *Les éleveurs de bovins*

Nous avons dénombré cinq villages où l'on élevait des bovidés: Mekedje, Qazıqlı, Qoyun Hisar, Serme et Şusiğırlıq. Les quatre derniers faisaient partie des domaines de l'État. On percevait des bouviers une somme fixe par vache laitière et un certain nombre d'impôts, à savoir la capitation, un droit versé à l'occasion de la fête de Pâques et la contre-valeur d'un service non précisé. Étant donné que le recenseur n'inscrit souvent que le total de l'assiette fiscale, la capitation incluse, on ne peut pas connaître le montant de chaque impôt.

Il nous semble que ces villages chrétiens sont également un héritage de l'époque préottomane pour les raisons suivantes. Comme à l'époque byzantine, le recenseur note soigneusement le nombre d'animaux dont les bouviers prenaient soin, en distinguant entre les vaches laitières, les veaux, les taureaux et les taurillons. Or ceci est contraire aux pratiques du fisc ottoman. Il va de soi que les villageois musulmans de Bithynie élevaient aussi des bovins, ne serait ce que pour disposer de boeufs de labour, mais les registres n'en font jamais mention.

23. M. BALARD, Péra au XIV^e siècle, Documents notariés des Archives de Gênes, *Les Italiens à Byzance*, (Paris 1987) p. 25, doc. no 35 et 37.

24. M. BALARD, A propos de la bataille du Bosphore, *TM*, 4 (1970) 457.

25. *TT* 23, p. 51.

26. GÖKBILGIN, *op. cit.*, fac-similé.

27. R. JANIN, *Les églises et les monastères des grands centres byzantins*, (Paris 1975) p. 144-148.

28. A Seki (Sykè ou Sigè) et à Tirilye (Trigleia) étaient implantés des monastères byzantins: JANIN, *op.cit.*, p. 183-184, 185-187.

Étant donné que les Ottomans maintenaient les impôts versés avant la conquête, le droit payé à l'occasion de Pâques est une preuve de plus que nous avons affaire à des élevages remontant à l'époque byzantine.

Avec le temps, les éleveurs de bovidés passent à l'islam comme le révèle tel passage d'un registre de 1521.²⁹ Nous nous demandons si le village de Susıǵırlıq était encore chrétien en 1487 (TT 23 p. 103), car seules deux personnes ont chacune un père portant un nom grec-orthodoxe. Le registre précise en outre qu'on y faisait paître autrefois des chevaux et que désormais les contribuables seront soumis au *kesim*, c'est-à-dire au versement d'une somme forfaitaire. Ces remarques témoignent d'un profond changement survenu avant le recensement de 1487. Barkan considère le village comme étant entièrement chrétien,³⁰ mais cela nous entraînerait à conclure que le derviche Bektach, l'un des contribuables, était lui aussi chrétien!

c. Les pêcheurs

Un mot sur les pêcheurs. Dans la région de Yenichehir se trouvait une pêcherie desservie par sept personnes. Elles versaient à l'État 2743 aspres pour la pêcherie et 700 aspres pour la buvette. A cela s'ajoutait la capitation jumelée pour une somme forfaitaire de 238 aspres, dont on ne précise pas la nature.³¹

d. Les paysans

Parmi les paysans non musulmans les registres distinguent entre *azadegan* (les affranchis), *kharadjgüzar* (ceux imposés à la capitation), *ortaqtchı* (laboureurs associés), *kesimdjı* (paysans imposés à une somme forfaitaire) et *ellidji* pour lesquels on n'a pas encore trouvé une définition satisfaisante.

Nous ne nous attarderons pas sur les affranchis, car il s'agit de prisonniers de guerre ou d'esclaves, étrangers à la région, colonisés dans les villages bithyniens pour faire fructifier la terre. Ils étaient classés comme les laboureurs musulmans en détenteurs de tenure (*tchift*) ou de demi-tenure (*nim tchift*) en *bennak* et célibataires (*müdjerred*).³² La même remarque est valable pour les *kharadjgüzar*, qui versaient, en plus de la dîme et du droit de tenure, la capitation.³³

Quant à l'*ortaqtchı*, il s'agit d'un paysan démuné –musulman ou chrétien–

29. Dans la circonscription administrative d'Aydındjıq, tous les bouviers mécréants se convertissent à l'islam: *Registre détaillé de la province de Khüдавendigар*, Archives de la Présidence du Conseil, fonds Tapu ve Tahrir defterleri no 111, p. 436.

30. BARKAN-MERIÇLI, p. 124, no 119.

31. TT 23, p. 61.

32. Sur 81 contribuables Tchardaq comptait 30 affranchis TT 23, p. 205.

33. Sarudja Birgoz TT 23, p. 35. Étant donné que les non-musulmans versaient la capitation au legs pieux de Murad 1^{er}, elle n'est pas inscrite dans le TT 23 qui recense seulement les domaines du sultan et les timars.

qui recevait du propriétaire de la terre les bœufs de labour, les instruments aratoires et la semence et qui partageait avec lui la récolte. Comme il existe suffisamment d'études sur le sujet,³⁴ nous passerons aux *kesimdji*.

D'après la documentation la plus ancienne, les recensements de 1454/55 et de 1487, le *kesimdji* est un paysan –musulman ou chrétien–³⁵ qui s'engage à faire fructifier une terre restée vacante contre le versement d'une somme forfaitaire. Cette vacance pouvait venir du fait qu'un détenteur ne voulait pas la labourer lui-même,³⁶ mais la plupart du temps elle est due à la mort ou à la dispersion de paysans qui travaillaient sur des terres dont ils n'étaient pas propriétaires, tels que les domaines de l'État. Dans le **TT 23**, les *kesimdji* remplacent surtout les *ellidji* dispersés ou décédés. Malheureusement le registre n'inscrit que la somme globale des impôts dus en espèces par les villageois, ce qui empêche toute évaluation.³⁷ Dans le cas de Berde, le recenseur inscrit l'impôt global sous le titre "*'an djizye-i maqtu'a*" (capitation forfaitaire).³⁸

En ce qui concerne les *ellidji*, il n'est pas aisé de se faire une idée exacte de leur rôle.³⁹ Nous avons essayé dans un premier temps de considérer le mot *ellidji* comme l'étymologie populaire d'un mot byzantin, mais il nous a fallu y renoncer. Le vocable est composé de *elli* qui signifie cinquante et du suffixe *dji* qui sert à former des mots de métier. Contentons nous d'énumérer les traits qui sont communs à cette catégorie de paysans en nous limitant aux sources les plus anciennes.

– Il y a des terres d'*ellidji*, même s'il n'y a plus d'*ellidji* qui les labourent. Les recenseurs sont donc conscients qu'ils s'agit de terres qui avaient une vocation particulière.

– Les terres qui continuent à être exploitées par les *ellidji* appartiennent soit aux legs pieux d'Orhan et de Mūrād 1^{er}, soit aux domaines du sultan. En revanche, celles qui sont abandonnées par les *ellidji* se trouvent souvent aux mains d'un timariote.

34. BARKAN, XV ve XVI inci asırlarda osmanlı imparatorluğunda toprak işçiliğinin organizasyonu şekilleri, *IFM*, I (1939-40) p. 29-74; IRÈNE BELDICEANU-STEINHERR, Les laboureurs associés en Anatolie (XV^e-XVI^e siècles), *Contributions à l'histoire économique et sociale de l'empire ottoman, Collection Turcica*, no III, (Louvain 1984) p. 93-104.

35. *Kesimdji* chrétiens dans le **TT 23**: Qarasılı (p. 59), Topraq Öyüğü (p. 59), Menteche (p. 59), Balıqlagu (p. 61), Qara Kilise (Sarudja veled-i Abdullah paye la djizye, p. 62), Altun Boga (p. 63), Bedre ('an djizye-i maqtu'a, p. 102) Achağa Diyedinler (p. 103), Bey Söğüdü (p. 119), Despina (p. 203).

36. Hadjdji Ahmed fils d'Ibri et Ahmed fils d'*imam* ont la jouissance d'une terre, mais elle est travaillée par Yunus: **MC 0 117/1** fol. 36 r^o (legs pieux en faveur de la medrese d'Orkhan bey à Izniq).

37. Le village Qarasılı est composé d'*ellidji* et de *kesimdji* dont l'un est imposé aussi à la capitation. Le recenseur réunit le revenu sous le titre "capitation, droits versés par les *ellidji* et les *kesimdji*": **TT 23**, p. 59.

38. **TT 23**, p. 102.

39. BARKAN, *op.cit.*, p. 233.

– Les *ellidji* sont une catégorie de paysans en voie de disparition.⁴⁰ Ils sont remplacés par les *kesimdji*, paysans payant une somme forfaitaire. Il s’agit par conséquent d’une institution ancienne que les Ottomans n’ont pas conservée longtemps.

– Dans notre source la plus ancienne, le **MC 0 117/1** (1454-55), les *ellidji* sont chrétiens et portent la plupart du temps des noms tirés du calendrier grec-orthodoxe comme à Qavaq (fol. 16 r^o), Bladyanos (fol. 16 v^o) et Armud (fol. 17 v^o). A Kufi on trouve aux côtés d’un Dimitri un Yakhchi (34 r^o). Dans le **TT 23** (1487), sont inscrites des communautés formées par des *ellidji*, à savoir Despina (p. 203) et Tchardaq (p. 203-204). Les contribuables sont chrétiens mais portent des noms mixtes.

– En 1454-55 on inscrit la paire de bœuf dont disposait le laboureur. Il ne s’agit pas de surface puisque le recenseur spécifie à un moment donné: *bir tchiftlik yeri vardır, kendünün iki tchift[i] yürür* (il a une tenure où marchent deux paires de bœuf lui appartenant).⁴¹ En 1487 en revanche, il n’y a aucune annotation de ce genre. On signale toutefois les célibataires à l’aide de la lettre “*mim*”.

– En ce qui concerne les impôts, on note l’impôt sur les céréales perçu en nature et un impôt en espèces (*naqdiye*) sur les potagers, la toile de lin et le coton. A cela s’ajoute la contre-valeur en argent d’un service (*hizmet*) non spécifié.⁴² On n’inscrit pas la capitation. Elle figure seulement dans les cas où la communauté villageoise était formée de plusieurs catégories de paysans.

Si l’on met ces données en parallèle avec un texte tiré du code coutumier de Mehmed II, on peut en déduire que nous avons affaire à des paysans au service d’une institution militaire. Au début de l’État ottoman, le cavalier (*müsellem*) percevait, en effet, d’un certain nombre de raïas qui lui étaient assignés, mais qui n’allaient pas eux-mêmes à la guerre, cinquante aspres en tout. Le nombre des personnes pouvait varier entre quarante et cinquante. Plus tard Mehmed II soumit

40. Mentions dans le **TT 23**: *Kestel-ellidjiler qırılmıç* (p. 39); *Achağı Diyedınler -ellidjiler munqarız olmuç* (p. 103); *Anakhora -müteferriq olmuç* (p. 203).

41. **MC 0 117/1**, fol. 60 v^o.

42. *Naqdiye 'an öchr-i bostan ve kirpas ve penbe ve hizmet* (versement en espèces représentant la dîme sur les potagers, la toile de lin, le coton et le service): **TT 23**, p. 203 (village Despina). *Her ellidjiden mal-i kirpas on bech aqtche deyü qayd olmuç der defter-i köhne* (il est inscrit dans le registre ancien qu’on perçoit de chaque *ellidji* quinze aspres à titre d’impôt sur la toile de lin). Sous le total: *'an djizye ve resm-i ellidjiyan ve kesimdjiyan* (capitation et droit perçu des *ellidji* et des *kesimdji*): **TT 23**, p. 59 (village de Menteche). *Mezkur kafır [sic!] ütcher archun bez verürler imich, chimdi bez aqtchesi on becher aqtche verür [sic!] demich Kirmasti deyü qayd olmuç der defter-i köhne* (les mécréants susdit donnaient trois coudées de toile de lin; à présent ils verseront quinze aspres a dit [le recenseur] Kirmasti. Ceci est inscrit dans le registre ancien): **TT 23**, p. 115 (village Topraq Öyüğü). L’emploi tantôt du singulier, tantôt du pluriel provient du fait qu’il ne restait en 1487 qu’un contribuable. Kirmasti est le nom du recenseur. D’après les comparaisons que nous avons effectuées entre le registre de legs pieux de 1454-55 et des registres plus tardifs, nous sommes arrivées à la conclusion qu’il a effectué le recensement de 1454-55.

le système à une réforme profonde. On créa des foyers comprenant quinze personnes au maximum dont chacun devait servir à tour de rôle.⁴³ L'institution des *ellidji* devint donc caduque. Quoi qu'il en soit, il ne faut pas déduire du mot *ellidji* que chaque individu versait à l'État cinquante aspres, parce que ce taux est beaucoup trop élevé pour l'époque.

IV. *Les anthroponymes des non-musulmans*

Nous avons mentionné à mainte reprise qu'il était parfois très difficile de distinguer les chrétiens des musulmans dans les registres lorsque le recenseur n'ajoute aucun qualificatif tel que *gebr*, *kafir*, *zimmi* ou *kharadjgüzar*, expressions qui désignent les mécréants. Les non-musulmans en Bithynie portent en effet très souvent des noms turcs, parfois persans et même arabes. Dans le registre datant de 1454-55, le recenseur mentionne quatre laboureurs, Qaraman, Murad, Chahin et son frère Ilyas. S'il n'avait pas ajouté le mot *gebr*, nous aurions classé ces contribuables parmi les musulmans. Parfois les noms sont panachés. Le père porte un nom chrétien et le fils un nom turc, mais le contraire aussi est fréquent. Voici les noms de quelques contribuables du village de Tchardaq.⁴⁴ La localité, située près d'Aghisar, est mentionnée par le chroniqueur Achırpachazade comme étant habitée par des mécréants à l'époque de Mehmed 1^{er} (1413-1421).⁴⁵ Mavrudi, fils d'Aqtche a un frère nommé Süleyman. Yorgi est fils de Seltchuq, Yani fils de Qaragöz, Kiryaqos fils de Mahmud et Diranos fils d'Aqtche. En revanche Qaradja est fils de Qostandin, Timurtach fils de Qaradja et Yusuf fils de Qara Kafir (le mécréant noir). Dans le village habitent aussi deux musulmans qui sont signalés comme tels. A Beg Söğüdü nous rencontrons la même difficulté. Vasil est fils de Süleyman, Seydi fils de Ali, Yakhchi fils d'Anastos, Dimitri fils de Buraq et Qara Vasil est viticulteur. Un seul est signalé comme *kharadjgüzar* et il porte un nom turc, Qaradja fils de Yakhchi. En ce qui concerne le nom de Seydi, nous avons la preuve qu'il pouvait être porté aussi par un chrétien, puisqu'à Serme Seydi fils de Halladj est qualifié de *kharadjgüzar*. De plus, le recenseur précise que la liste comprend les noms des bouviers *zimmi* qui s'occupent des buffles de l'État (TT 23, p. 40). Encore un exemple curieux, la ville de Makedje. En réalité il y a deux villes,⁴⁶ la musulmane et la chrétienne. Dans cette dernière les noms sont mixtes. A côté du prêtre, d'un Mikhal, d'un Yani et d'un Yorgi on trouve un Hamza, un

43. N. BELDICEANU, *Code de lois coutumières de Mehmed II*, (Wiesbaden 1967) fol. 38 v^o-39 r^o.

44. TT 23, p. 203-204.

45. AŞIKPAŞAZADE (Giese), p. 77.

46. M. Jacques Lefort dans son exposé présenté dans le même cadre, a montré à l'aide de diapositives que la ville moderne était adossée à la colline, tandis que la ville ancienne était située dans la plaine. Signalons à cette occasion que nous avons dépouillé ensemble l'ouvrage

Qaradja, un Turud, un Ibrahim et un Süleyman. Plus curieux encore sont les noms d'Abdal et Avdal pour des chrétiens, puisque ce terme désigne une catégorie de derviches.⁴⁷ Signalons enfin les villages de Yüregir et de Tchepni qui portent le nom de tribus turques. Dans le premier, tous les villageois sont chrétiens et portent des noms tirés du calendrier grec-orthodoxe,⁴⁸ dans le second les villageois sont divisés en musulmans et en chrétiens, mais ces derniers portent des noms turcs.⁴⁹

Tous ces exemples montrent que la Bithynie a connu un afflux d'éléments étrangers. Sous les premiers sultans, des prisonniers de guerres et des esclaves furent établis sur les domaines et les legs pieux. Ils s'intégrèrent peu à peu à la communauté villageoise. Ce phénomène est amplement connu et a fait l'objet de plusieurs études. On sait également que les Byzantins ont christianisé des communautés turques venues soit par le nord de la mer Noire soit des parties de l'Asie Mineure dépendant de l'État seldjoukide. Il ne faut cependant jamais perdre de vue que le passage au christianisme était à Byzance soumis à des règles très strictes et exigeait, entre autres, l'abandon du nom "barbare". A cette catégorie appartiennent probablement les habitants du village de Tchepni dont les noms sont tirés du calendrier grec. Quant aux autres, il ne peut s'agir ni de populations autochtones grecques, ni de musulmans convertis. A en juger d'après les anthroponymes, nous avons affaire à une population turco-tatare (même si d'autres éléments ne sont pas à exclure), chrétienne de père en fils, mais dont le christianisme, voire parfois la religion, reste à définir.

V. Conclusion

La population non musulmane n'est pas très dense en Bithynie sous les premiers sultans ottomans et elle tend à diminuer jusqu'à la fin du XVI^e siècle. Le processus est plus rapide dans les villes qu'à la campagne. Les mécréants vivent essentiellement sur les legs pieux des premiers sultans et sur les domaines. Pour cette raison, on peut avancer que ces terres ont appartenu aussi à l'époque byzantine aux domaines soit de l'empereur, soit des monastères ou encore de grandes familles. Cette hypothèse est renforcée par le fait que certains impôts faisaient partie de l'héritage byzantin. Le pourcentage de la population d'origine byzantine est cependant faible. Les Ottomans ont ramené de leur nouvelles conquêtes en Europe des prisonniers de guerre pour mettre en valeur leurs terres.

de BARKAN-MERIÇLI durant l'hiver 1989/90, selon un certain nombre de critères. Ces travaux préliminaires nous ont facilité la réalisation de la carte qui repose cependant seulement sur les données des registres cités.

47. MC 0 117/1, fol. 30 r^o et v^o.

48. TT 0 117/1, fol. 34 v^o.

49. TT 0 117/1, fol. 43 r^o.

Les registres gardent aussi la trace d'un afflux de populations turques remontant à l'époque byzantine: la frontière était restée perméable en dépit des efforts des empereurs. Certaines furent byzantinisées, seul le nom de la tribu témoignant de leur origine. Les registres révèlent enfin des communautés villageoises, où, dans une même famille, les noms turcs, parfois arabes ou persans, côtoient les noms tirés du calendrier des saints chrétiens. Pour le moment, nous ignorons quel hasard les a amenées dans ces régions et quelle était au juste leur foi. C'était là un pan de l'histoire de l'Asie Mineure qui était resté jusqu'à présent dans l'ombre.

RÉPARTITION DE LA POPULATION NON MUSULMANE EN BITHYNIE¹

n°	LOCALITÉ	LOCALISATION	COORDONNÉES	COTE	PAGE	CATÉGORIE	INSCRITS	NON MUSULM.
1	Altun Boga			TT 23	63	domaine	7	7
2	Armud	Armud	B-6/26	MC 0117	17v°	legs pieux	13	5
3	Ayas Köy	Ayaspaşa	O-U/217	MC 0117	58v°	legs pieux	9	3
4	Balıqlıgu			TT 23	61	domaine	7	6
	»			TT 23	76	timar	6	2
5	Bedre	Bedir	O-Ü/30	TT 23	102	domaine	* 24 ²	24 ?
6	Bigados			MC 0117	15v°	legs pieux	16	16
7	Bladyanos	Biladivunus	B-S/26	MC 0117	16v°	legs pieux	17	16
8	Brusa	Bursa	B-T/26	TT 23	4	domaine	2296	78
9	Despine	Tesbene/Fevziye	K-R/35	TT 23	203	domaine	17	16
	»			TT 23	200	timar	13	
10	Diyedinler (Achağı)	Devdinler	O-Ü/30	TT 23	56	timar	3 ³	?
	»	»		TT 23	103	domaine	* 5	5 ?
11	Eregli	Ereğli	K-O/31	MC 0117	38r°	legs pieux	41	41
12	Hamza Beg	Hamzabey	O-U/30	MC 0117	37r°	legs pieux	11	5
13	Iznıq	Iznik	K-R/32	MC 0117	37v°	legs pieux	7	7 ⁴
14	Kerdeli			MC 0117	52r°	legs pieux	9	1 ⁵
15	Kestel	Kestel	B-U/27	TT 23	39	timar	19	4 ?
16	Khatun Köy			MC 0117	26v°	legs pieux	18	17
17	Kirmaştı	Kernalpaşa	O-Ü/21	MC 0117	49r°	legs pieux	23	23
18	Kufı			MC 0117	34r°	legs pieux	16	15
19	Mekedje	Mekeci	K-R/37	MC 0117	30r°	legs pieux	37	29
20	Menteche	Menteşe	K-S/30	TT 23	59	domaine	* 18	18 ?
21	Mudanya	Mudanya	B-S/25	MC 0117	1v°	legs pieux	191	191
22	Oadimi	Kadimi	O-U/29	MM 16016	18	legs pieux	20	1
23	Oara Kilise	Karakilise	K-S/31	TT 23	62	domaine	* 1	1 ⁶ ?
24	Oansılı	Karasil	K-T/31	TT 23	59	domaine	* 15	15 ?
25	Qavaq/Qotchi			MC 0117	16r°	legs pieux	16	14
26	Qazıglı	Kazikh	B-S/27	TT 23	45	domaine	17	17
27	Qovun Hisar	Koyunhisar	K-S/30	TT 23	61	domaine	* 7	7 ?
28	Qurchunlu	Kuşunlu	B-S/26	MC 0117	3r°	legs pieux	72	72
29	Sarudja Birgoz	Burgaz	B-S/25	TT 23	35	timar	20	18
30	Seme	Seme	B-T/28	TT 23	40	domaine	26	26
31	Söğüt	Söğüt	E-Ü/36	MM 16016	14	legs pieux	3	3
	»	»	»	MM 16016	17	legs pieux	3	3
	Söğüt (Begsöğütü)	»	»	TT 23	64	timar	2	
	»	»	»	TT 23	119	domaine	* 13	13 ?
32	Su Sığırliq			TT 23	103	domaine	12	5
33	Sülemieh	Söylemiş	K-T/31	TT 23	62	domaine	* 4	4 ?
34	Tchardaq	Cardak	K-R/35	TT 23	203-5	domaine	81	76
35	Tehepni			MC 0117	34v°	legs pieux	14	9
36	Temür Qapu	Demirkapı	quartier Bursa	MC 0117	20r°	legs pieux	14	9
37	Topraq Övüğü	Toprakocak	K-S/30	TT 23	59	domaine	* 6	6 ?
	»	»	»	TT 23	115	timar	1	1 ?
38	Yala			TT 23	62	domaine	* 6	6 ?
39	Yalanda	Yilanda	K-Ö/37	MC 0117	28v°	legs pieux	25	1 ⁷

40	Yenidje Köy	Yeniceköy	O-Y/227	MC 0117	50v ^o	legs pieux	11	9	
41	Yüregir			MC 0117	43v ^o	legs pieux	23	15	
42	Zenberekçhi			TT 23	41	timar	5	1	
43	Zindandju	Zindancik	quartier Inegöl	MM 16016	11	legs pieux	24	3	

Notes de la liste

1. La liste contient les noms des localités habitées en partie ou dans leur totalité par des non-musulmans. Étant donné que le recenseur du **TT 23** n'inscrit que le montant global des impôts, capitation (*djizye*) comprise, et qu'il fait rarement la distinction entre musulmans et non-musulmans, même si une localité était habitée par les deux communautés, il n'a pas été toujours possible de déterminer le nombre exact des non-musulmans. Pour cette raison nous avons fait suivre les cas qui prêtent à discussion d'un point d'interrogation. La colonne des coordonnées se réfère à la carte de Turquie à l'échelle de 1/200 000 publiée par la direction générale de cartographie, 2^e éd., Ankara, 1951. Nous avons utilisé les feuillets Bursa (**B**), Eskişehir (**E**), Kocaeli (**K**) et Orhaneli (**O**).
2. L'astérisque placé devant le nombre d'inscrits indique que la communauté s'acquittait de la capitation.
3. Les trois personnes figurent aussi dans la rubrique des domaines du sultan. Faut-il interpréter cette double inscription comme une bévue du recenseur?
4. Les sept chrétiens ne représentent qu'une fraction de la population de Nicée.
5. Il s'agit d'une veuve.
6. Ce village pose un problème, car l'unique contribuable enregistré s'appelle Sarudja fils d'Abdullah qui ne peut être qu'un converti en raison de son nom. D'autre part, la capitation s'élève à 154 aspres, ce qui représente un montant trop important pour un simple paysan. La capitation inscrite au profit du domaine du sultan provient peut-être de paysans chrétiens qui versaient les autres impôts à un timariote et qui étaient pour cette raison inscrits ailleurs.
7. Sur vingt-six contribuables seule une veuve est chrétienne.

SOME THOUGHTS ON THE ORIGINS OF THE *DEVŞİRME*

Vassilis DEMETRIADES

The subject I am going to speak about is not a new or unknown one to anybody here. The problem of the origins of the *devşirme* has occupied the historians of the Ottoman Empire ever since the time of the first Ottoman historiographers. To me it seems that it has already been extensively and sufficiently investigated,¹ and nothing different could be said, at least until new evidence comes to light, confirming or refuting previous arguments.

I hope that my offering on this subject is sufficient to support a new approach to this topic. It comes from a source very remote from the time of the *devşirme*'s origins. However, the document under investigation could be of some interest; at least it could prompt some thoughts on questions already posed in previous articles² and perhaps could lead to a re-evaluation of some other sources.

I am speaking about a firman of 1707 registered in the *sicil* no. 16, p. 26-28, of the *kadi* of Thessaloniki, kept in the Historical Archive of Macedonia, Thessaloniki. It is an order for a special *tahrir* of those who belonged to the *ocak*

1. J.A.B. PALMER, The Origin of the Janissaries, *Bulletin of the John Rylands Library*, 35/2 (1952-53) 448-481; A. VAKALOPOULOS, Προβλήματα της Ιστορίας του Παιδομαζώματος, *Hellenica*, 13 (1954) 274-293; P. WITTEK, Devşirme and Şari'a, *BSOAS*, 17 (1955) 271-278; V.L. MENAGE, Sidelights on the devşirme from Idris and Sa'duddin, *BSOAS*, 18 (1956) 181-183; S. VRYONIS Jr., Isidore Glabas and the Turkish Devşirme, *Speculum*, 31 (1956) 433-443; V.L. MENAGE, "Devşirme", *EI*²; BASILIKE D. PAPOULIA, Ursprung und Wesen der 'Knablese' im osmanischen Reich, *Südosteuropäische Arbeiten*, 59 (Munich 1963); A. MATKOVSKI, Prilog Pitanju Devşirme, *Prilozi Orientalnu Filologiju*, 14-15 (1964-1965) 273-309; S. VRYONIS Jr., Seljuk Gulams and Ottoman Devşirmes, *Der Islam*, 41 (1965) 224-252; V.L. MENAGE, Some Notes on the Devşirme, *BSOAS*, 29 (1966) 64-78; I. BELDICEANU-STEINHERR, En marge, p. 21-47; C. CAHEN, Notes sur l'esclavage musulman et le devşirme ottoman à propos de travaux récents, *JESHO*, 13 (1970) 211-218; V.L. MENAGE, rev., *BSOAS*, 40 (1977) 155-160; IRINA E. PETROSIAN, The Mabda-i Kanuni-i Yeniçeri Ocağı Tarihi on the System of Devşirme, *Between the Danube and the Caucasus*, ed. G. KARA, (Budapest 1987) p. 217-227.

2. See MENAGE, "Devşirme", *EI*², on the re-introduction of the *devşirme* by Murad II; CAHEN, Notes sur l'esclavage, p. 215, on the situation in the marches before they became real provinces of the Ottoman state.

of the *korucıyan*,³ who took care of the meadows in the area and were obliged to rear horses and camels for the Turkish army. According to the *süret* of the *Defterhane*, which was annexed to the firman, the inhabitants of six villages in the area of Thessaloniki (Arablu, Tekyelü, Bınarca, Yeni Köy, Kavalar, Ankara) and three of Drama (Kırlü, Arablu, Boyalık)⁴ were obliged to do this service “from ancient days” (*kadimü’l-eyyamdan*), as written in the “old defter” (*defter-i ‘atik*). In exchange, they were exempted from certain taxes: the *ispence*, the ‘*avariz-i divaniyye*, the *nuzul*, the *celeb-i tahrir*, the *pencik oğlanı* and other *akçelü ve akçesiz tekâlif-i ‘örfiye ve saka*.⁵ The number of the *korucıyan* in each village, all of them Christians, was limited and the office hereditary, but people from other villages wishing to enjoy the same exemptions were moving and

3. *Korucu*, according to J. W. REDHOUSE, *A Turkish and English Lexicon*, (Constantinople 1890) p. 1486, is “a guard, keeper of a piece or tract of meadow or forest land”. At the beginning of the 17th century it was “the designation of those janissaries, who were discharged from active service in the army corps on account of their old age, completion of their years of service or invalidity. They did not participate in military expeditions, only performed guard duty in the janissary barracks when the janissaries were sent on military expeditions” (PETROSIAN, *op. cit.*, p. 217). The term in the firman is applied to *reaya* without any connection with the janissary corps.

4. V. DEMETRIADES, Φορολογικές κατηγορίες τών χωριών τής Θεσσαλονίκης κατά τήν Τουρκοκρατία, *Makedonika*, 20 (1980) 420-422. In 1771 the villages of the *korucıyan* in the area of Thessaloniki were named Yuncılar, Hanlu-Arablu, Bınarca, Bostanlı-Arablu, Tekyelü, Yeni Köy and Davud-Balı.

5. The text runs as follows: “*Kaza-i Selanik nahiyeleri kura çayrları kadimü ’l-eyyamdan beri biçüp ve tasıyup be-her sene hu tarafına / hizmet ide geldükleri defter-i ‘atikde mestur ve mukayyed bulunmağın defter-i cedide kayd olundu. Ve zikr olunan / gılmanan-i küreciyan ve küreciyan tayfesi ocağı mezburde olan hassa davarların kadimü ’l-eyyamdan / berü görüp ve gözëdüp ağıl ve sa’ırelerin yapup ve asitane-i sa’adete tor getiri lazım / geldikde yedekçilerin harc-ı rahların kendü yanlarından virüp ve otlak ve samanların alvirüp hizmet / eylemelerile hizmetleri mukabelesinde ispence ve ‘avariz-i divaniyyeden ve nuzul ve celeb-i tahrir olunmaktan / ve pencik oğlanı ve sa’ir akçelü ve akçesiz tekâlif-i ‘örfiye ve sakadan / mu’af ve müselleml olup kendüleri fevt oldukda / evladları yerlerine hizmet idüp / bila varis fevt olanların beytü ’l-malların / istabl-i ‘amire tarafından ocağı mezburi kurı ağası / kabz ide geldüğü defter-i ‘atikde mestur olmağın defter-i / cedide dahi kayd olundu Ber defter-i korucıyan Der kenar Fi 16 Rebiyü l-evvel sene 1119 Vaslı”.* Sicil no. 16, p. 27-28.

The *gazis* were exempted from several taxes, like ‘*öşr*, ‘*avariz-i divaniyye*, *rusum-ı ‘örfiyye* and others (BELDICEANU-STEINHERR, *En marge*, p. 27). The *korucıyan*, being part of their organization, enjoyed the same privileges.

Mentioning both *ispence* and *pencik oğlanı* at the same document is another indication that those two levies were different from each other and not the same. Compare also WITTEK, *Devshirme and Şhârî’a*, p. 272-273. It is also an indication that *ispence* was already demanded from the *reaya*, when the exemptions were granted to the *korucıyan*. The *timar* system was already in force, existing as an institution from the time of Osman, the founder of the Ottoman state. See N. BELDICEANU, *Le timar dans l’État ottoman (début XIV^e-début XVI^e siècle)*, (Wiesbaden 1980) p. 26.

settling in them. The *tahrir* was to be obtained in order to forbid that.⁶

All the exempted villages belonged to the vast *vakıf* of Gazi Evrenos Bey and his descendants.⁷ Those in the area of Thessaloniki were located west of the town, close to the mouths of the rivers Axios (Vardar) and Galikos. Furthermore, each year those villages paid instead of various taxes only a fixed, lump sum of money (*maktu'*) to the *vakıf* and nothing else.⁸ The three villages of the camel-drivers (*kullukçıyan-ı sıtran*) in the *kaza* of Drama belonged to the *ocak* of Thessaloniki.⁹

I would like to draw your attention to the name of the forced levy of Christian children as it was still applied in the document, three centuries after the institution began. The name for the children collected by the *devşirme* was "*pecnik oğlanı*" at least until 898/1493, according to a "*pecnik nişanı*" published by Uzunçarşılı in his "*Kapukulu Ocakları*".¹⁰ In documents already of the middle 16th century the term was "*'acemi oğlanları*" (in documents dating from 1565, 1568, 1571, 1578 and published by Uzunçarşılı and Alexandar Matkovski).¹¹ In the 17th century the name usually given to the institution was "*oğlan cem'i*" (1607/8), or "*yenicerilik için oğlan alınmak*" (1622, 1638/9) and "*devşirme*" (1638, 1646/7). The term "*pecnik oğlanı*" for the future janissaries was used only at the beginning of the institution, being later replaced by different terms, perhaps since the abolition of the collection of the real *pecnik* in the first decades of the 16th century.¹²

6. A translation in Greek of the firman has been published in *Ίστορικά Ἀρχεῖα Μακεδονίας*, Α', Ἀρχεῖον Θεσσαλονίκης (1965-1912), ed. I. VASDRAVELLES, (Thessaloniki 1952) p. 73-75. Because of several mistakes in this translation I considered useful to give a new translation of the text concerning the *korucıyan* in DEMETRIADES, Φορολογικές κατηγορίες, p. 420-422.

7. For Gazi Evrenos and his descendants see I. MELIKOFF, "Ewrenos" and "Ewrenos oghulları", *Et*², 2, p. 720-721; I. H. UZUNÇARŞILI, "Evrenos", *IA*, 4, p. 414-418; BELDICEANU-STEINHERR, *Recherches*, p. 228-236; V. DEMETRIADES, The tomb of Ghazi Evrenos Bey at Yenitsa and its inscription, *BSOAS*, 32/2 (1976) 328-332; IDEM, *Ἡ Κεντρικὴ καὶ Δυτικὴ Μακεδονία κατὰ τὸν Ἑβλιγιὰ Τσελεμπή*, (Thessaloniki 1973) p. 22-24, 216-219. For the *vakıf* of Gazi Evrenos see V. DEMETRIADES, Problems of land-owning and population in the area of Gazi Evrenos Bey's *Wakf*, *Balkan Studies*, 22/1 (1981) 43-57. For the bibliography on the families of the great *uç-beyis* see BELDICEANU-STEINHERR, *En marge*, p. 29, n. 1.

The problem of the exemption from the *devşirme* of the inhabitants of *vakıf*-estates is discussed by PAPOULIA, *Ursprung und Wesen der "Knabenlese"*, p. 54-55, and MENAGE, *Some Notes on the Devşirme*, p. 71-72. We can see that only a few inhabitants of certain villages in the Gazi Evrenos *vakıf* enjoyed immunity.

8. DEMETRIADES, Φορολογικές κατηγορίες, p. 410.

9. DEMETRIADES, Φορολογικές κατηγορίες, p. 421.

10. I. H. UZUNÇARŞILI, *Osmanlı Devleti Teşkilâtından Kapukulu Ocakları*, (Ankara 1943) I, p. 86-88.

11. MATKOVSKI, *Prilog Pitanju Devşirme*; p. 288-291.

12. The institution of the *pecnik*, one fifth of the prisoners of war taken for the sultan or as a monetary tax, has already been fully investigated. See bibliography in note 1, espe-

We should therefore assume that the firman drawn up was based on the “*defter-i ‘atik*”, probably a copy of older, similar *defters*, leading to the original order, by which the *koruçiyan* of the villages were given exemption from the levies. When did this happen?

I think that in order to establish the possible date of the beginning of the exemption we should examine the conditions under which the villages in the area came under Turkish domination. As we have already seen, the villages of the *koruçiyan*, together with about 35 other villages, belonged to the vast *vakıf* of Gazi Evrenos Bey and his descendants.¹³ This *vakıf* was one of the oldest and most extensive in the European part of the Ottoman empire. According to the unpublished *defters* with the properties of the *vakıf*, which are kept in the Historical Archive of Macedonia in Thessaloniki, parts of it existed in the areas of Gümülcine (today Komotini), in Western Thrace, Zihna and Serres in Eastern Macedonia, and Yeni Şehir (today Larissa) and Volos in Thessaly. However, the main part of the *vakıf* extended over the large plain west of Thessaloniki, as far as the lake of Yenice- i Vardar, which has been drained in recent years.

The role of Evrenos Bey and his family in the occupation of Thrace, Macedonia and other parts of Greece is well known. Gazi Evrenos had been present in Rumili since Orkhan sent his son Süleyman to support John Cantacuzenus against John V Palaeologus.¹⁴ His forces constituted the spearhead of the Turkish extension in the “left arm” of Rumili. Acting most of the times somewhat independently of the army of the Ottoman bey, Gazi Evrenos occupied Ypsala, Gümülcine, Zihna and Serres, being a real “*mâlik al-ghuzât wa ‘l-mujâhidîn*”, as his tomb-stone records.¹⁵ Any place which submitted to the *gazis* soon after its occupation was handed over to the main Ottoman army and the irregular forces either of Gazi Evrenos or of the other great *uç-beyleri*, like Turahan, Mihâl-oğlu and Malkoç-oğlu, were engaged with expeditions to new frontier areas.

We know that Turkish forces appeared before the ramparts of Thessaloniki in the spring of 1372, soon after the defeat of the Serbian army on the battlefield of Çirmen.¹⁶ Most probably they were raiders (*akıncı*), followers of Evrenos

cially MENAGE, Some Notes on the Devşirme, p. 72-75, and BELDICEANU-STEINHERR, En marge, *passim*. The *pencik*, which was inaugurated after Murad I made Adrianople his capital in 1377, was abolished during the time of Selim I and was replaced by a tax of 20 *akçe* per prisoner of war; see BELDICEANU-STEINHERR, En marge, p. 37, 40.

13. For the number of the villages and the *çiftlik*s belonging to the *vakıf* in various periods see DEMETRIADES, Problems of land-owning, *passim*.

14. MELIKOFF, “Ewrenos”, *EJ*², 2, p. 720.

15. DEMETRIADES, The tomb of Ghazi Evrenos Bey, p. 332.

16. A. VAKALOPOULOS, *Ιστορία τῆς Μακεδονίας, 1354-1833*, (Thessaloniki 1969), p. 29. C. IMBER, *The Ottoman Empire, 1300-1481*, (Istanbul 1990) p. 31. Cydones wrote in a letter of his: “For I have heard that the barbarian leader and his army stand before the gates together with the booty they have dragged along, and that the citizens who look

Bey. During the next few years several castles and towns of Macedonia surrendered to the same irregular troops. The events of the Ottoman conquest of Macedonia are not clear at all. Several dates are given for the occupation of each town; most of them are concentrated in the periods around 1372-1373¹⁷ and 1385-1386. It seems very probable that several towns surrendered to Gazi Evrenos first, a fact preserved by many local traditions, and they were occupied more or less permanently by the combined forces of Murat I and his *beylerbeyi* Kara Timurtaş Paşa and Evrenos Bey during the middle years of the next decade.¹⁸ The town of Thessaloniki had already found itself in such a difficult situation, that in 1375 John V Palaeologus, feeling unable to defend it, promised to hand over this and another, unspecified, town to the Pope; the two cities were to be defended by the Hospitallers.¹⁹

We must place the settlement of Gazi Evrenos in the town of Yenice-i Vardar before or during the years 1383-1387. Most probably there existed there a town or a castle of unknown name.²⁰ Its new name, *Yenice*, was given by Gazi Evrenos, who gave it to other settlements as well, in every place he used as his base for a shorter or longer period of time: in the area of Xanthi the name was applied to a new town, distinguished as Yenice-i Karasu. In Gümülcine, in Serres and much later in Thessaloniki,²¹ the same name was given to *mahalles* belonging either to his *vakıf* or in which a number of his warriors had settled. Yenice-i Vardar became the main centre of the Evrenos family, where the tombs of Gazi Evrenos himself and his descendants were located together with several mosques, *imarets*, *hammams* and other buildings of the same character.

The area extending from the town of Yenice to the surroundings of Thessaloniki formed the *vakıf*, which was founded around 1386.²² The villages in it paid all the taxes, including the *cizye*, to the *vakıf*. It can be said that the area of the *vakıf* constituted a distinguished part of the Ottoman state, always receiving special treatment. Even in 1826, when all the *vakıfs* of the empire were placed

who look down at them from the walls do nothing but weep" (DENNIS, *The Reign of Manuel II*, p. 55). It is not clear who exactly was the "barbarian leader" and his army who attacked Thessaloniki either on 10 April (DENNIS, *The Reign of Manuel II*, p. 55) or 11 April (IMBER, *op. cit.*, 31) 1372. This was not the first time for the Turks to be seen under the walls of Thessaloniki. For the Turks who were cooperating with the Catalan Company in Western Thrace and Macedonia in 1306-1309 threatening to conquer Thessaloniki, see N. OIKONOMIDES' paper in this volume.

17. According to reports reaching the Pope in Avignon in June 1373, the Turks "had practically surrounded Constantinople, Thessalonica and certain other territories" (DENNIS, *The Reign of Manuel II*, p. 34).

18. DEMETRIADES, *Η Κεντρική και Δυτική Μακεδονία*, p. 17-28.

19. A. LUTTRELL, Gregory XI and the Turks 1370-1378, *OCP*, 46 (1980) 408.

20. DEMETRIADES, *Η Κεντρική και Δυτική Μακεδονία*, p. 23.

21. V. DEMETRIADES, *Τοπογραφία της Θεσσαλονίκης κατά την εποχή της Τουρκοκρατίας 1430-1912*, (Thessaloniki 1983) p. 27, 83, 141.

22. MELIKOFF, "Ewrenos" and "Ewrenos oghulları", *EI*², 2, p. 720.

under the directorship of the Ministry for the *vakıfs*, that of Gazi Evrenos was excluded. When the *timar* system was applied in Central Macedonia, probably in the time of Bayezid I, the *vakıf* remained intact. We must assume that its villages had been occupied by or surrendered to the forces of Gazi Evrenos, which had made Yenice their centre, and not to the main Ottoman army. The occupation must have taken place at the same time or soon after Gazi Evrenos settled in Yenice, while his irregular troops were blockading the town of Thessaloniki, which surrendered then, thanks mainly to their efforts. The main Ottoman forces were present when the siege began, soon after the conquest of Serres, and the battle of Chortaitou²³ and when the town capitulated,²⁴ but the long, close blockade of the town could be carried out only by the efforts of the *gazıs* headed by Gazi Evrenos; for this purpose their base and supply centres must have been situated not far from the city.

The villages of the *korucıyan*, situated at the eastern borders of the *vakıf* area and closer to the town of Thessaloniki, had probably surrendered to Gazi Evrenos under certain conditions, the duty of breeding horses and camels for his *gazıs* with the exemption from paying *pencik oğlanı* among them.²⁵ That must have happened before Bayezid I applied the levy of the children on the town (for the first time in 1395)²⁶ and of course on the villages around the town, where it was already in force.²⁷ According to a *tahrir defteri* of the *vilayet* of Thessaloniki and Avret-Hisar, written before 1445, Bayezid had bestowed a village as a *vakıf* on the *imam* of the mosque in the citadel (*kule*) of Thessaloniki.²⁸ We do not know if he applied the *timar* system in the area at the same time, but this is very probable. The connection also of the camel-breeders in the remote *kaza* of Drama with the *ocak* of the *korucıyan* of Thessaloniki, all of them part of the Gazi Evrenos *vakıf*, is probably due to the very early date of the organisation of this special auxiliary force.

Apart from the evidence discussed in previous articles, more evidence, concerning the application of the *devşirme*, derives from a letter of Coluccio di

23. DENNIS, *The Reign of Manuel II*, p. 75-76; cf. also *Actes de Docheiariou*, ed. N. OIKONOMIDÈS, Archives de l' Athos, XIII, (Paris 1984) p. 259.

24. DENNIS, *The Reign of Manuel II*, p. 87. Dennis noticed that Chalkokondylas "makes no mention of a siege but rather gives the impression that the mere approach of Khairaddin's army sufficed to bring about the surrender of the city". Hayreddin Paşa, beylerbeyi of Rumili at that time, was absent during the siege (DENNIS, *The Reign of Manuel II*, p. 127-128).

25. This makes the exemption of the *korucıyan* villages from the taxes mentioned one of the earliest ones.

26. VRYONIS, Isidore Glabas, p. 438.

27. For the policy of direct control over the vassal countries and the unification of various parts of the Ottoman state by Bayezid I, see H. INALCIK, Ottoman methods of conquest, *Stulsl*, 2 (1954) 104-105.

28. DEMETRIADES, Φορολογικές κατηγορίες, p. 396.

Salutati of the year 1397; he wrote that the Turks “*decem vel duodecim annorum pueros ad militiam rapiunt*”.²⁹ There is no doubt that the *devşirme* was in force before the end of the 14th century.

If my suggestions are correct, then we must accept that the application of the *devşirme*, still called by its earlier name, i.e. *pencik oğlanı*, took place in Central Macedonia during the years 1383-1387, or even earlier, when the *gazi* forces of Evrenos Bey occupied the area of his later *vakıf*. The exemption from the *ispence* and the *pencik oğlanı* to villages belonging to the *vakıf* by the Ottoman administration in a later time seems to me very improbable. Such an action would mean an intrusion into the rights of self-government of the *vakıf*, rights which were kept intact until the end of its existence in the 20th century. An act of this type would mean exemption from taxes which the *vakıf* collected for itself, in return for services to the state. That the horses and camels destined for the *gazis* would become the property of the state later, when the *gazi* forces ceased to function as before, seems quite obvious.

If we accept that the *devşirme* was enforced as early as 1383-87 in the area of Central Macedonia by Gazi Evrenos Bey and his followers,³⁰ we must assume that they did not confine themselves to applying the “tribute of children” only to the comparatively small area around Thessaloniki, but extended the levy of children to a much wider area. Balkan countries belonged then to Byzantine, Serbian and Bulgarian lords, who had accepted Ottoman suzerainty and were vassals of the Ottoman bey since 1371,³¹ after the battle of Çirmen. The fact that according to the *şari'a* those countries were part of the *dar al-ahd* did not mean much to the *gazis* and their lords, who were acting quite independently of the forces of the Ottoman government,³² at that time influenced greatly by the *ulema*, persons opposed to the *gazi* traditions and perhaps despised by those wild warriors.

When those areas were absorbed by the Ottoman state during the time of Bayezid I, as happened with Thessaloniki in 1394-5, or after the reunification of the Ottoman state following the Interregnum, the Ottoman administration continued an institution, which had already been in force for several decades. This is what Bartholomaeus de Jano implies in his *Epistola de Crudelitate*

29. *Epistolario di Coluccio di Salutati*, ed. F. NOVATI, *Fonti per la Storia d'Italia* publicate dall'Istituto Storico Italiano. *Epistolari secoli XIV-XV*, v. III, (Roma 1891-1911) p. 208-211; my colleague E. Zachariadou has drawn my attention to it.

30. We should bear in mind that about ten years earlier Evrenos Bey was personally charged by Murad I with the collection of the *pencik* in his area (BELDICEANU-STEINHERR, *En marge*, p. 39).

31. The Bulgarian princes were vassals of Murad I since 1371, the Serbian princes in Macedonia and Serbia since 1372, the Byzantine Emperor since 1373, and the local lords of Albania since 1375 (INALCIK, *Ottoman methods of conquest*, p. 104).

32. For the relative independence of the *uç-beyis* in military affairs during the time of the first Ottoman beys and their importance see INALCIK, *Ottoman methods of conquest*, p. 121; also BELDICEANU-STEINHERR, *En marge*, p. 30-32.

Turcarum in 1438 when he writes that Murad II “*decimam puerorum partem de Christianis, quod prius numquam fecerat, nuper accepit*”.³³ When Fr. Georgius de Hungaria writes in his *Tractatus de moribus, condicionibus et nequicia Turcorum* that during his captivity between the years 1438 and 1458 “*the children were levied from Christians who were free of dues to other lords and rendered services to the Sultan himself*”,³⁴ we should conclude that those “*other lords, who were already levying the pencik from their tenants*” could not be other than the *uç-beyis*, who also inhabited “*omnem terram sui dominii*”. It seems that the Ottoman Sultan merely imitated the *uç-beyis*, collecting children for his own service from areas which did not constitute part of the personal domain of the *gazi*-lords, like the *vakıf* of Gazi Evrenos.

That also explains, I think, the contradiction of the *devşirme* with the *şhari'a*: most probably, the Ottoman state did not introduce the *devşirme*, but it continued to levy a tax already in force, exactly as other previous taxes continued to be demanded from the inhabitants of the conquered countries, “*justified by custom and necessity*”, as Palmer and Wittek have accepted.³⁵

It seems that the *devşirme*, deriving originally from the *pencik*, “*the collection of the fifth part of prisoners from the dar al-harb due to the sultan*”,³⁶ which was applied by the *uç-beyis*' forces,³⁷ spread to the *dar al-ahd* as the collection of children by the same persons for their own purposes,³⁸ to be continued by the

33. Quoted by PALMER, *The Origin of the Janissaries*, p. 464.

34. “*Sed et per omnem terram sui dominii adhuc multi sunt de grecis antiquis et aliis nationibus qui castella et oppida plurima inhabitant et ab omnibus statutis et oneribus aliorum dominorum liberi et exempti ipsius regis serviciis intendunt et ad eius curiam pertinent.*” (PALMER, *The Origin of the Janissaries*, p. 466).

35. PALMER, *The Origin of the Janissaries*, p. 466. WITTEK, *Devşirme and Şhari'a*, p. 275.

36. MENAGE, “*Devşirme*”, *EI*².

37. It is very significant that the two oldest preserved *kanun*s for the collection of the *pencik*, or better the *pençüyek*, the first one being undated and the second one of 898/1493, both attribute the collection of the fifth of the prisoners to the *uç-beyileri* (UZUNÇARŞILI, *Kapukulu Ocakları*, p. 86-89). The Venetian notary in Candia, Francesco Avonal, writes in his report to Venice dated 3 March 1403 that Hemanuel Calogeniti, a Greek from Ainos, had been in the middle November of the previous year “*in partibus Thessalonicensibus, et vidit gentes Turchorum qui revertebantur de partibus Ungariae ad quas iverant pro depredando, a quibus Turchis audivit iste qualiter LXVI m Turchorum iverant ad partes Ungarie pro depredando, et derobaverant multas et innumeras gentes et cum depredatione praedicta redierunt ad partes Vlachie superpositas Turcho, et ibi voluit capitaneus exercitus accipere pendameriam, scilicet de quibuslibet quinque captivis unum secundum morem suum*” (G. T. DENNIS, *Three reports from Crete on the Situation in Romania, 1401-1402*, *StuVe*, 12 (1970), 246-247). The *akıncıs* (*gentes Turchorum*) from the area of Thessaloniki were describing their raid into Hungary and how their leader (*capitaneus exercitus*) wanted, while they were still in Wallachia, to levy the *pencik* (*pentameriam*), according to his custom (*secundum morem suum*). For the terms *devşirme*, *pencik* and

Ottoman state officially, after the *dar al-ahd* countries were incorporated into the *dar al-Islam* of the Ottoman empire.

Nevertheless, permit me to conclude my paper with the same words with which Claude Cahen finishes his article on the *devşirme*: “*Allahu a‘lam*” (God knows best).

pendameria see E. ZACHARIADOU, Janissaries, *ODB*, v. II, p. 1301.

38. The existence of great numbers of slaves or manumitted slaves in the armies of the *uç-beyis*, and especially of the family of Gazi Evrenos, is well attested: INALCIK, Ottoman methods of conquest, p. 121. BELDICEANU-STEINHERR, En marge, p. 29-30).

OTTOMAN POLICY OF CONQUEST OF THE TURCOMAN PRINCIPALITIES OF WESTERN ANATOLIA WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO SARUKHAN BEYLIGI

Feridun M. EMECEN

It is known that the policy of conquest by the Ottomans depended upon *ghaza* or *cihad*. The *ghaza* against non-Muslim territories, known as *Dârülküfr/Dârülharb*, was the main target not only for the Ottoman principality but also the other Turcoman emirates in the frontier/uç. The attractive prospect of the *ganimet*, i.e., booty taken during *ghaza*, brought a vitality to these conquests. There is no doubt that this *ghaza* policy was the continuation of the *Alperen* tradition and it was a natural result of the Islamic concept of conquest of *feth*. *Ghaza* was supported by Islamic principles and developed within Islamic concepts. The Ottoman principality adopted and practised Islamic principles of *ghaza* against the *Dârülküfr*. Moreover, it is also known that the Ottoman principality tried to control and annex the Turcoman emirates bordering its territory. But since a conflict between two *ghazis* was forbidden by the *Kur'an*, it was necessary to prepare legitimate grounds for the conquest of the neighbouring Turcoman emirates. How was this handled by the Ottomans? Did they have any misgivings about warring with the Turcoman emirates? In this paper, the Ottoman policy of conquest towards the Turcoman emirates of western Anatolia in general, and the phases of the annexation of the Sarukhan principality in particular, will be examined in the light of newly studied sources.

Muslim jurists divided territories into *Dârülharb* and *DârüIslâm*, in the context of events and political conditions, for these terms do not occur in the *Kur'an* or the *Hadis*.¹ In this context, *Dârülharb* (Abode of War) is a country under non-Muslim rule whereas *DârüIslâm* (Abode of Islam) is a country under Muslim rule. In Muslim jurisprudence, international relations were organised according to the *Dârülharb* and *DârüIslâm* dichotomy; *ghaza/cihad* and peace terms were also explained in this context. In Islamic law, with regard to Muslim states there was no question of international law except for the case of rebellion (*bagy*). Perhaps for this reason, Islamic law attributed less importance to interna-

1. AHMED ÖZEL, *İslam Hukukunda Ülke Kavramı: Dârüİslam-Dârülharb*, (Istanbul 1988) p. 80; A. ABEL, "Dâr al-Harb", *EI*², s.v.

tional relations between the independent Muslim states. For the Islamic conception was that Muslim states shared the same objective, had the same law, and that relations among themselves were internal matters. This internal question manifested itself in the case of rebellion. A country in rebellion was classified by Muslim jurists as being in the *Dârûlbagy* and was seen as being in contrast with the *Dârûladl* (the country of peace or justice).² In reality, how did the *Dârûlbagy* concept emerge? This concept originated in interpretations of the *Kur'an*, although it is not directly mentioned in its verses. The decree concerning obeying the legitimate head of state and not rebelling against him can be found in the following verse "ordering to obey God, the messenger and those charged with authority among you" (*Nisa* 4/59). Another verse, similar in meaning says that "If two parties among the believers fall into quarrel, make you peace between them, but if one of them transgresses beyond bounds against the other, then fight you against the one that transgresses until it complies with the command of *Allah*, but if it complies, then make peace between them with justice and be fair" (*Hucurât*, 49/9).

Obviously, the *Dârûlbagy* concept was very important for preparing the legal ground for struggle between the Muslim states. This Islamic concept manifested itself in viewing the struggles among the Turcoman emirates as an impediment to the goal of carrying on *ghaza* against infidel states. To begin with, this claim was also put forward very simply by the Ottomans and it was shaped by the old Oğuz and Turkish suzerainty traditions. Within this framework, we can examine the Ottoman policy of conquest towards neighbouring emirates.

Although the earliest Ottoman chronicles are rather late and have deficiencies, through comparative study of these sources it is possible to reach certain conclusions. The chronicles present Ottoman ideology and, of course, the Ottoman point of view. However, one should always be conscious of the fact that these sources were influenced by their own times. The Ottoman emirate, like the other Turcoman emirates of western Anatolia, was very familiar with the ideology of *ghaza*. During the years of its foundation, when the Ottomans were active on the Byzantine frontier, maritime principalities gained booty from the sea, while other emirates remained in the inner part of Anatolia. The field of *ghaza* for the emirates of Menteşe, Aydın, Sarukhan and Karası was the Aegean islands and the shores of Rumelia. But this was a limited and difficult activity. The Ottomans, on the other hand, through their geographical location, were very well-placed for making *ghaza*, and their reputation rapidly spread among the other Turcoman emirates.³ The Ottomans, through their reputation and able use

2. ÖZEL, *op. cit.*, p. 28, 135-136; M. HAMMIDULLAH, *İslamın Hukuk İlmîne Yardımları*, (Istanbul 1962) p. 72.

3. F. KÖPRÜLÜ, *Osmanlı Devleti'nin Kuruluşu*, (Ankara 1988) p. 107; H. İNALCIK, "Türkler", *IA*, XII/2, p. 286-293; cf. also ENVERİ, *Düstûrnâme*, ed. M. HALİL, (Istanbul 1928) p. 88.

of propaganda, followed a policy of using the sources of manpower of the other emirates and thus strengthened their *ghaza* activities.

In Ahmedî's work, which is considered the first Ottoman source that contains words in support of Ottoman ideology, their reputation in *ghaza* and their contributions in spreading justice were highlighted.⁴ In *Behçetü't-tevârih*, Şükrullah very clearly explains that owing to his reputation in *ghaza*, many fighters from the neighbouring regions had joined Osman Gazi's forces.⁵ Crossing over into Rumelia and the acquisition of new territories there, particularly increased their authority and made the Ottomans more and more powerful in the region. The Ottomans followed a policy of protection against the pressures of the Germiyans and with effective propaganda had succeeded in promoting their notion of justice. After that they annexed the territories of Karası, which were in the path of their conquests, one by one. According to Ottoman sources, in this conquest, intervention in the struggle between the sons of the beg of Karası, extending their protection to Karası, leaving certain lands to them as *mülks* or *timars* and accepting Karası notables into the Ottoman military system played an important role.⁶ The Ottomans, after the accession of Murad I, accelerated the policy of directly controlling the emirates, making them subject states. They managed to annex part of the lands of Germiyan through marriage ties and the territories of Hamid through purchase.⁷ The latter fact clearly shows how rich the Ottoman treasury was. The main source of its wealth was booty. In fact, during the marriage feast of Bayezid I, display of valuable and rich wedding presents by one of the Ottoman *Uç beg* made good propaganda and demonstrated Ottoman economic power.⁸ As indicated above, the purchase of land from other principalities also showed their economic strength.

The continuous development of the Ottoman principality as a centralized state, the establishment of a regular army and the spread of its reputation for *ghaza* caused anxiety to the Turcoman emirates and from time to time forced them to come together against the Ottomans. The claim of legitimacy given in the early Ottoman sources, such as Şükrullah, Aşıkpaşazâde, Neşrî, for the recapture of Ankara by Murad I is a typical example. While Murad I was going to fight against infidels in Rumelia, word was sent out among the other principalities that they should take advantage of the situation and prepare to attack Bursa. Upon learning this, Murad I consulted with the *ulema* and asked them against whom they should fight first. The *ulema* pointed out that fighting against the infidels was *farz-ı kifâye*, but to remove tyranny from the Muslims was *farz-ı ayn*. Ac-

4. AHMEDİ, *İskendernâme*, facsimile, ed. I. ÜNVER, (Ankara 1983) 65b-66a.

5. ŞÜKRULLAH, *Behçetü't-tevârih*: ATŞIZ, *Osmanlı tarihleri*, p. 53.

6. AŞIKPAŞAZADE (Atşız), p. 120-122; *Kitâb-i Cihan-nümâ* (Taeschner), v. I, p. 46-47.

7. VARLIK, *Germiyan*, p. 65; AŞIKPAŞAZADE (Atşız), p. 129; for the monetary crisis in Anatolia see, *Kitâb-i Cihan-nümâ* (Taeschner), v. I, p. 55, 57.

8. AŞIKPAŞAZADE (Atşız), p. 130; *Kitâb-i Cihan-nümâ* (Taeschner), v. I, p. 56.

ording to the chroniclers, Murad I being a just and pious person preferred the second way.⁹

This attitude was most probably a good example of how the Ottomans made legitimate their policies of sovereignty towards the emirates. This was the application of the *Dârûlbagy* concept by one Islamic state to another. Similarly, it may be suggested that with the same idea and consideration the Turcoman principalities united among themselves to attack the Ottomans. However, since we are mostly dependent on the Ottoman sources, we do not have enough of an idea of the views of the other side.¹⁰ But it is possible to say that the policy of *ghaza* of the Ottomans gave them priority and superiority in their claims against the other emirates' claims. In fact, Murad's words to the envoy of Karaman, saying that to make obstacles while he was busy day and night with holy war against the infidels was rebellion and malice "*mâni*'-i *gazâya gazâ, gazâ-yı ekberdir*"¹¹ are a good example of Ottoman ideology and attitude. The legitimacy of Murad's operations in making the Turcoman emirates into vassal states were explained by Ottoman historians, such as Aşıkpaşazâde and Neşrî, on these grounds. As Prof. Inalcık has pointed out, to make states into vassals was the first step in establishing Ottoman rule and it was a general characteristic of the Ottoman method of conquest.¹²

The interpretations by the early Ottoman historians were rewritten in a more sophisticated way by their successors. Kemalpaşazâde especially being also a *Sheykhulislâm*, formulated this point in an excellent way, and some later historians such as Hoca Saadeddin, Alî and Müneccimbaşı, most probably being influenced by Kemalpaşazâde, made the same interpretations. Kemalpaşazâde said that, properly speaking, these states should be removed, that removing malice from among Muslim states was the first duty of Muslims, and that since these emirates were rebellious they must be suppressed.¹³ Alî pointed out that these emirates were robbers who drew the sword against the *ghazis*.¹⁴

After making these general observations on the basic principles of Ottoman rule over the Turcoman emirates, we can now particularly examine the phases of the conquest of Sarukhan.

The Sarukhanoğulları was one of the Turcoman emirates founded in the western frontier of Anatolia and derived its name from its founder. The identity of Sarukhan Bey, who siezed Manisa and founded the principality, is obscure. It

9. *Kitâb-i Cihan-nümâ* (Taeschner), v. I, p. 52.

10. See AZİZ B. ERDEŞİR ESTERABADI, *Bezm ü Rezm*, transl. M. ÖZTÜRK, (Ankara 1990) p. 353-355; ŞİKARI, *Karamanoğulları Tarihi*, ed. M. KOMAN (Konya 1946) p. 141, 160, 163.

11. *Kitâb-i Cihan-nümâ* (Taeschner), v. I, p. 59-60.

12. H. INALCIK, Ottoman Methods of Conquest, *StuIsl*, 2 (1954) 103-129.

13. KEMALPAŞAZADE, *Tevârih-i Al-i Osman*, ed. Ş. TURAN, I. defter, (Ankara 1970) p. 25-27.

14. ALİ, *Fusûlü Hallü Akd ve Usûlü Harc u Nakd*, Süleymaniye-Esad Efendi Ktp. nr. 2389, 55b-56b.

15. BA, *Tahrir Defteri*, nr. 398, p. 159.

is certain that his father's name was Alpağı.¹⁵ From present-day research it is clear that the story of the origin of Sarukhan Bey comes from Ibn Bîbî who lists him among the Harezm *emirs*.¹⁶ However, Ibn Bîbî does not provide any evidence for this information. Consequently these stories of his origins remain only suppositions. Similarly, the early relations between the Sarukhanids and Ottomans are also obscure. But it can be said with certainty that the Sarukhanids allied with the Aydınoğulları against the Ottomans. It is also known that they made an agreement with the Empress Anna against Cantacuzenus who was in league with the Ottomans. In fact, it has been stated that Ilyas, who replaced his father Sarukhan Bey, sent a force of 6,000 troops to the aid of the Empress.¹⁷

This information gives the impression that relations between the Ottomans and Sarukhanogulları were not very close or friendly. The reason probably was that they were not direct neighbours, since there were some other principalities between them. Consequently, the Sarukhanids acted more freely and felt themselves more secure from Ottoman attack. However, the Ottoman emirate's gradual annexation of the Karası Beyliği brought the Sarukhan Beyliği, which economically depended on maritime activities against the Christians, into direct proximity with the Ottomans. Two reasons, first, the common border between the two principalities, and secondly, the decrease in sea faring activities and the diminution in economic resources after the Latin occupation of Izmir (Smyrna), meant that the Sarukhan Beyliği had to become friendly with the Ottomans and even during the reign of Murad I had to accept Ottoman superiority and sovereignty. Outwardly there was a friendship between the two *Beyliks*, but in reality, like the other Turcoman principalities, Sarukhan Beyliği became a compulsory vassal of the Ottomans. The Sarukhanogulları, like the other emirates, could not stand up to Ottoman demands. Ottoman influence was especially felt at the time of the Kosova war (1389).¹⁸ The forces of the Sarukhan Beyliği participated in the war alongside the Ottomans. This constituted the first and the most important phase of the transition period of the Sarukhan Beyliği to Ottoman sovereignty. Although in this phase there was no direct domination, there was the recognition of suzerainty.

On the other hand, during the period when Ottoman influence became manifest, there was disorder in the internal affairs of the Sarukhan Beyliği. The struggle between Ishak's sons, Orkhan and Hızırşah, shook the principality and finally Hızırşah having removed his brother, dominated Manisa. The Sarukhanogulları played a role in instigating the events that forced Bayezid I to

16. IBN BIBI, *El-evâmirü'l-Alâiyye fi'l-umuri'l-Alâiyye*, fac. ed. A. ERZI, (Ankara 1956) p. 430; see also F.M. EMECEN, *XVI. Asırda Manisa Kazası*, (Ankara 1989) p. 17, note 20.

17. G. OSTROGORSKY, *Bizans Devleti Tarihi*, transl. F. Işıltan, (Ankara 1981) p. 479.

18. *Kitâb-i Cihan-nümâ* (Taeschner), v. I, p. 79.

undertake an Anatolian campaign. Although it is not clear whether Orkhan or Hızırşah participated in these events, it can be said that Orkhan, who lost the struggle against his brother, joined the alliance against the Ottomans. Because Hızırşah met Bayezid I on the outskirts of Manisa without any opposition and submitted to him, Bayezid let him keep part of his territory.¹⁹ Later Orkhan too had to obey the Ottomans, but the Ottoman administration, remembering his earlier hostile attitude, showed no tolerance of him, and with some other *begs* he was sent in exile to Bursa or Iznik. Moreover, we can assume that it was Orkhan who joined Timur.²⁰ Thus these events constituted the second phase of Ottoman rule, and in this phase, instead of occupying the whole land of Sarukhan Beyliği, the Ottomans followed a special policy of annexing some territory and leaving the rest in the hands of the Sarukhan *begs*. The next target was that in the long run the land that was left to Hızırşah as a free estate would be gradually taken under direct Ottoman control. But Timur's invasion occurred during this period and for a while the Sarukhan *begs* re-established their rule over Manisa. Although during the reign of Çelebi Mehmed, Manisa was taken under Ottoman rule, the struggle lasted until the reign of Murad II. In the latter's time, some notables of Sarukhan were exiled to Rumelia and thus the process of domination was completed.²¹

As a result, according to the earliest Ottoman sources, the Ottoman Beyliği was very keen to prepare legitimate grounds for the policy against the Anatolian emirates, including the Sarukhan Beyliği. It should be remembered, however, that most of these sources were written in the fifteenth century and in the context of the political conditions of that time: this later evaluation of events resulted in a simpler interpretation. Later historians narrated these ideas within the more sophisticated Islamic concepts of their time. Moreover, it can be said that the Ottomans applied more or less the same methods of conquest to the Turcoman emirates as they did in Rumelia.

19. *Kitâb-i Cihan-nümâ* (Taeschner), v. I, p. 85.

20. ENVERİ, *Düstûrnâme*, ed. M. HALİL, p. 88; Ç. ULUÇAY, "Saruhanoğulları", *IA*, X, p. 241; M. HALİL, *Medhal*, p. 83.

21. *Suret-i Defter-i Sancak-ı Arvanid*, ed. H. INALCIK, (Ankara 1954).

IL “MITO OGUZO” E LE ORIGINI DELLO STATO OTTOMANO: UNA RICONSIDERAZIONE

Aldo GALLOTTA

1.0 È noto che sulle origini dello stato ottomano le fonti turche presentano un insieme di notizie credibili e notizie fantastiche che si equivalgono, essendo entrambe fuse in un racconto tradizionale che, a un dato momento, accreditato da storici aulici, quali Sa'd ed-Dīn ed altri, prese un carattere si può dire ufficiale.

Questo racconto prende le mosse dalle origini “oguze” della casa regnante. Che lo stato ottomano fosse in definitiva una lontana conseguenza della immigrazione in Asia Minore, al tempo dei Selgiuchidi, negli ultimi decenni dell'undicesimo secolo, di grandi masse turche di stirpe oguzza viventi in origine nelle steppe della zona del Caspio è una realtà storica. Al tempo di 'Osmān, però, ossia due secoli dopo, il termine “oguzo” era ormai da tempo obliato come denominazione etnica. Rifarsi allora agli oguzi significava affermare una idea nazionale la quale affondava le proprie radici nel passato, ma era legata alla leggenda piuttosto che alla storia, in altre parole era un mito. L'importanza storica del “mito oguzo” risiede nel fatto che gli Ottomani vi trovarono un blasone di nobiltà e uno strumento di supremazia politica. D'altra parte questo mito è un segno del permanere di una coscienza turca nella dinastia regnante attraverso i secoli.

Il tema, ampiamente dibattuto tra gli studiosi delle origini dello stato ottomano, tra i quali si ricordano in primo luogo M. Fuad Köprülü e P. Wittek, ha visto in questi ultimi anni un aumento di interesse da parte di ricercatori di diversa origine e formazione. Mentre taluni, quali B. Flemming, si sono soffermati ad esaminare le implicazioni politiche del “tema oguzo” rilevandone il carattere familiare a tutti gli stati turcomanni più o meno coevi del XV secolo,¹ la gran parte degli studiosi ha esaminato la questione in particolare in correlazione con la ben nota teoria formulata da P. Wittek circa le origini e il carattere dello stato turco anatolico, secondo cui questa compagine statale può ben definirsi “stato-gāzi”.² Tra costoro si distinguono C. Heywood, il quale ritiene storicamente e

1. BARBARA FLEMMING, *Political Genealogies in the Sixteenth Century, OsmAr*, 7-8 (1988) 123-137.

2. La teoria wittekiana, esposta in diversi lavori, è ben riassunta in: WITTEK, *Rise*.

metodologicamente improprio il modo seguito per la formulazione della teoria da parte di Wittek;³ R. P. Lindner, che evidenzia il carattere nomadico prevalente dello stato;⁴ C. Imber, il quale rifiuta in particolare il carattere “ideologico” della tesi wittekiana, invitando, d'altra parte, a considerare attentamente l'attendibilità delle notizie riferite dalle fonti turche;⁵ e R.C. Jennings, che sottopone a severa critica il carattere “gāzī” dello stato ottomano sulla base dei dati presi in considerazione da Wittek stesso.⁶

Non v'è dubbio che gran parte delle critiche mosse al Wittek siano fondate, anche in considerazione degli indubbi progressi che ha fatto la scienza storica in questi cinquanta anni e più trascorsi dal tempo in cui lo studioso austriaco formulò in modo organico le sue idee.⁷ Una riconsiderazione delle idee che ancora oggi sono alla base di molti studi storiografici che le accettano acriticamente, è di fatto una necessità e forse una urgenza. Bisogna, nel fare ciò, tenere sempre presente che gran parte dei progressi conseguiti o che si conseguiranno sono stati resi possibili grazie alla serietà degli studi allora fatti e alle metodologie applicate. Più che partecipare alla discussione sulle questioni sopra accennate ritengo necessario in primo luogo riconsiderare opportunamente la questione del carattere “oguzo” dello Stato ottomano, ripercorrendo l'itinerario dell'affermazione del “mito oguzo” e valutando di volta in volta quanto può essere sintomo di verità storica, e quanto invece può essere interpretato quale mistificazione o alterazione di fatti, in connessione con avvenimenti particolari.

2.1 La prima testimonianza del “mito oguzo” presso gli Ottomani risale abbastanza addietro e precisamente alla prima fonte turca, l'*İskender-nâme* di Aḥmedī (m. 1413), ove è detto che Er Toğrıl, il padre di 'Osmān, e due altri personaggi che gli furono vicini, Gündüz Alp e Gök Alp, erano “oguzi”.⁸ Va però considerato che questa testimonianza è posteriore al regno di Murād I (1362-1389), quando gli ottomani, attraversato il Qizil Irmağ, vennero a contatto con paesi abitati da masse di nomadi turcomanni, tra i quali le tradizioni etniche oguze si erano ben conservate. È pertanto pensabile che la coscienza oguzza degli ottomani sia nata, o si sia affermata, proprio in quelle circostanze.⁹

3. C. HEYWOOD, Wittek and the Austrian Tradition, *JRAS*, 1988/1, 7-25; IDEM, Boundless Dreams of the Levant, Paul Wittek, the George-Kreis and the Writing of Ottoman History, *JRAS*, 1989/1, 32-50.

4. R.P. LINDNER, *Nomads and Ottomans in Medieval Anatolia*, (Bloomington 1983).

5. C. IMBER, Paul Wittek's, De la défaite d'Ankara à la prise de Constantinople, *OsmAr*, 5 (1986) 65-81; IDEM, The Ottoman Dynastic Myth, *Turcica*, 19 (1987) 7-27.

6. R.C. JENNINGS, Some Thoughts on the Gazi-Thesis, *WZKM*, 76 (1986) 151-161.

7. Ved. sopra, nota n. 2.

8. *Dâstân ve Tevârîh-i Âl-i Osman*, in: ATSIZ, *Osmanlı Tarihleri*, p. 7-8.

9. Sul momento storico considerato ved. H. INALCIK, *The Ottoman Empire. The Classical Age 1300-1600*, (London 1973) p. 9-16; A. BOMBACI, *La Turchia dall'epoca preottomana al XV secolo*, in: A. BOMBACI-STANFORD J. SHAW, *L'Impero ottomano*, (Torino 1981) p. 248. e segg.

Il mito oguzo trionfa al tempo di Murād II (1420-1451), nella storia di Yazıġioġlı 'Alī, la quale, oltre a intitolarsi *Ta'rīh-i Āl-i Selġuq* "Storia della Casa Selgiuchide", figura anche con il titolo di *Oġuz-nāme* "Libro di Oguz". In effetti essa è una compilazione basata rispettivamente su una traduzione della storia persiana di Rašīduddīn per la parte concernente le origini turche e mongole e particolarmente gli oguzi e le loro tribù, di Ravandī per i Selgiuchidi di Persia e di Mesopotamia, di Ibn Bībī (in epitome) per i Selgiuchidi di Turchia e ancora di Rašīduddīn per la parte che giunge fino a comprendere il regno dell'Ilhān Gazan. All'autore appartengono aggiunte alla traduzione di Ibn Bībī e cenni sugli eventi più vicini al suo tempo. Le aggiunte alla traduzione del *muhtasar* del *El-evāmīr ul-'alā'iyye* di Ibn Bībī sono intese a esaltare la parte rappresentata dalla tradizione oguzo nelle istituzioni dei Selgiuchidi di Turchia e così sono palesemente le notizie riferite agli Ottomani. La famiglia ottomana sarebbe appartenuta alla tribù dei Qayī, una delle ventiquattro originarie tribù oguze, discendente da Qayī, primo dei quattro figli di Gün Hān, a sua volta primo dei sei figli dell'eroe eponimo Oguz.¹⁰ 'Osmān sarebbe stato eletto "hān" dai *beg* delle tribù oguze sospinte verso i confini bizantini dalla pressione dei Mongoli, in riconoscimento del primato dei Qayī fra tutte le tribù oguze; l'elezione sarebbe avvenuta nel corso di una assemblea (*quriltay*) secondo la consuetudine turca (*töre*), allora ancora rispettata; i capi si sarebbero inchinati tre volte innanzi a 'Osmān e gli avrebbero offerto una coppa di latte (*qimran*).¹¹

Una diversa versione dell'origine oguzo degli Ottomani è indicata nello stesso torno di tempo dallo storico Sükrüllāh (m. 1489), esponente del filone storiografico di Aġmedī, inviato nel 1449 da Murād II quale ambasciatore presso Ġihān Šāġ, sovrano dei turcomanni Qaraqoyunlu, regnante a Tabriz. Ġihān Šāġ asserì di essere parente del sultano ottomano e fece comparire un cantastorie (ta'rīh-hvān) il quale esibì un libro in caratteri mongoli,¹² da cui risultava che

10. Ed. M. T. HOUTSMA, *Recueil des textes relatifs à l'histoire des Seldjucides*, III. *Histoire des Seldjucides d'Asie Mineure d'après Ibn Bibi. Texte turc*, (Leiden 1902) p. 204-205.

11. Cf. P. WITTEK, *Deux chapitres de l'histoire des Turcs de Roum, Byzantion*, 9 (1936) 309 nota 4 (ristampato in: *La formation de l'Empire ottoman*, ed. V. C. MENAGE, London 1982). Di questi usi oguzi parla ancora Yazıġioġlı, *op. cit.*, p. 10. Cf. E. ROSSI, *Il "Kitab-i Dede Qorqu"*. *Racconti epico-cavallereschi dei Turchi Oguz tradotti e annotati con "facsimile" del ms. Vat. Turco 102*, (Città del Vaticano 1952) p. 19.

Il motivo della coppa regale è molto diffuso nella antica iconografia turca, tanto da essere utilizzato correntemente quale tema letterario, collegato con la mitica coppa di Gem. Cf. A. BOMBACI, *La letteratura turca*, (Firenze-Milano 1969) p. 329.

12. Evidentemente si tratta di caratteri uigurici, come concordano tutti gli studiosi. Ved. per esempio J. E. WOODS, *The Aqquyunlu. Clan, Confederation, Empire. A Study in 15th/9th Century Turko-Iranian Politics*, (Minneapolis & Chicago 1976) p. 190.

Dopo Tamerlano si ebbe tra i turchi musulmani una ripresa dell'alfabeto uiguro. La testimonianza più evidente in Anatolia è rappresentata dai *yarlıg* di Maometto II, su cui ved. R. R. ARAT, *Un yarlıg de Mehmed II, le Conquérant*, *Annali I.U.O.*, N. S. I (1940) 25-68.

mentre Ğihān Šāh discendeva da Deniz Alp, figlio sestogenito di Oguz, Murād II discendeva da Gök Alp figlio quartogenito. In conformità con questa tradizione Šükrüllāh ricostruisce un albero genealogico che collega 'Osmān a Oguz attraverso Gök Hān.¹³ Siffatta genealogia contraddiceva l'appartenenza degli Ottomani ai Qayī, presunta da Yazıĝioĝlı, in quanto il padre di Qayī era Gün Hān e non Gök Hān.

Una genealogia che risale a Qayī e a Gün Hān appare invece in Bayatī, un turco originario dell'Azerbayĝan, il quale, intorno al 1481, scrisse un *Oĝuz-nāme* degli Ottomani. Egli non soltanto fornisce i nomi degli immaginari antenati di 'Osmān, ma altrettanto immaginarie biografie di ciascuno di essi, inserendoli nel corso della storia musulmana.¹⁴

Le due versioni genealogiche che fanno capo rispettivamente a Gök Hān e a Gün Hān si trovano giustapposte in Nešrī, il quale non prende partito né per l'una né per l'altra.¹⁵

P. Wittek considera più antica la versione che collega gli Ottomani a Gök Hān, identificando questo con Gök Alp menzionato da Aĥmedī.¹⁶ L'appartenenza ai Qayī attribuita agli Ottomani è secondo lui una falsificazione. Il fatto che il capostipite di questa tribù fosse il primogenito del primogenito di Oguz sarebbe di per se sospetto. Se il rango di Qayī fosse attestato soltanto più tardi, quando gli Ottomani erano già in auge, si potrebbe accettare che essi erano oguzi del ramo dei Qayī, in quanto la preminenza attribuita al loro capostipite si spiegherebbe come una invenzione a *posteriori*, introdotta per adattare la tradizione all'eccezionale fortuna politica dei discendenti di 'Osmān. Senonché la tribù dei Qayī appare al primo posto già nell'undicesimo secolo, nella lista di Maĥmūd di Qašĝar, se si tien conto che ivi essi figurano preceduti soltanto dai Qiniq evidentemente in omaggio alla casa selgiuchide allora regnante, la quale apparteneva appunto ai Qiniq;¹⁷ in effetti nell'elenco di Rašīduddīn, compilato due secoli dopo, quando la stella dei Selgiuchidi era tramontata, i Qayī appaiono senz'altro al primo posto.¹⁸

Il ragionamento di Wittek non fa una grinza. Se però si tiene conto che

13. *Behçet üt-tevârîh*, in ATŞIZ, *Osmanlı Tarihleri*, p. 51; Cf. KÖPRÜLÜ, *İlk Mutasavvıflar*, p. 212.

14. *Câm-i Cem-Âyin*, ed. F. KİRZİOĝLU in ATŞIZ, *Osmanlı Tarihleri*, p. 380-400.

15. *Kitâb-i Cihan-nümâ* (Taeschner), v. I, p. 2-8.

16. *Kitâb-i Cihan-nümâ* (Taeschner), v. I, p. 9 e segg.

17. *Dîvânü 'l-lugati 't-türk*, ed. KILISLI RIF'AT, v. I, p. 56-58; ed. B. ATALAY, v. I, p. 55-59. Cf. T. BANGUOĝLU, *Oĝuzlar ve Oĝuzeli üzerine, Türk Dili Araştırmaları Yıllığı Belleten*, 1959, p. 21 e F. SÜMER, *Oĝuzlar* (Türkmenler). *Tarihleri-Boy teşkilatı - Destanları*, (Istanbul 1980, III ed.), p. 206 e segg. e annesse tabelle.

18. *Ğamī'u 't-tevârîh*, trad. K. JAHN, *Die Geschichte der Oĝuzen des Rašīd ad-Dīn*, (Wien 1969) p. 63-68; trad. A. Z. V. TOĝAN, *Oĝuz Destanı, Reşideddin Oĝuznāmesi, Tercüme ve tahlili*, (Istanbul 1972) p. 49 e segg. Cf. E. ROSSI, *op. cit.*, p. 16-17 e F. SÜMER, *op. cit.*, p. 206 e segg.

esistono elementi per ritenere che i Qayī furono se non addirittura la tribù oguza che maggiormente contribuì al primo popolamento turco dell'Asia Minore, almeno una delle più diffuse,¹⁹ la possibilità che il clan di 'Osmān appartenesse ai Qayī appare ammissibile. L'albero genealogico, con i due rami alternanti facenti rispettivamente capo a Gök Hān e a Gün Hān è palesemente una creazione fantastica, mentre la tradizione dell'appartenenza etnica ai Qayī poteva essere una realtà.

Comunque, il "mito oguzo", anche se non ne è il risultato, come vorrebbe Wittek (esso figura infatti già prima in Aḥmedī), è verosimilmente connesso a un movimento "romantico" che al tempo di Murād II mise in onore le antichità turche con la finalità politica di favorire l'impianto della dominazione ottomana sulle tribù turcomanne dell'Anatolia. La discendenza da Qayī, vera o presunta che fosse la loro appartenenza alla tribù che prende il nome da questo leggendario nipote di Oguz, contribuiva ad affermare il loro prestigio. Fu certo allora che fu messa in circolazione la profezia attribuita ad un famoso personaggio oguzo, Dede Qorqud, secondo la quale il potere sarebbe un giorno pervenuto nelle mani dei discendenti di Qayī. Questa profezia è menzionata da Yazīğ'ioğlī²⁰ e figura nel prologo del *Kitāb-i Dede Qorqud*.²¹ L'origine Qayī ebbe il crisma ufficiale: il *tamğa* di questa tribù appare infatti su monete di Murād II, era ancora in uso nel sedicesimo secolo per marcare i cavalli appartenenti alle scuderie del sultano e si osserva su arnesi militari ottomani.²² Non solo, ma la genealogia facente capo a Qayī ebbe il sopravvento nella storiografia aulica.²³

D'altra parte non v'è dubbio che l'interesse degli Ottomani nella genealogia oguza sia anche da vedere nella prospettiva della disfatta del 1402 e nei tentativi perpetrati per la sopravvivenza dello stato, tra i quali importante era per gli Ottomani mostrarsi non tanto superiori quanto perlomeno eguali ai Ḥān timuridi dell'Est e non solo per evitare il vassallaggio timuride, ma anche e soprattutto per dichiarare la propria superiorità sui beilliccati anatolici.²⁴

2.2 È il caso di fare qualche esemplificazione secondo le fonti. In Qaramanī Mehmed Paşa Qayīq Alp, antenato di 'Osmān, discendente da Oguz, al tempo della conquista di Bağdād da parte dei Mongoli (1258), viveva in Armenia, a Ahlat, con

19. Ved. KÖPRÜLÜ, *Les Origines*, p. 83 e segg.; F. SÜMER, *op. cit.*, p. 211-221; M. F. KÖPRÜLÜ, Kay Kabilesi hakkında yeni notlar, *Bell*, II/31 (1944); F. DEMİRTAŞ, Osmanlı devrinde Anadolu'da Kayılar, *Bell*, XII/47, p. 575-615.

20. Cf. WOODS, *op. cit.*, p. 299.

21. *Dede Korkut Kitabı*, ed. M. ERGIN, (Ankara 1958-1963) p. 15; ed. O. S. GÖKYAY, v. I, p. 1; v. II, p. 2; ed. E. ROSSI, p. 96. Cf. WOODS, *loc. cit.*

22. Cf. P. WITTEK, De la défaite d'Ankara à la prise de Constantinople, *REI*, 12 (1938), 27-28 nota 1 e WITTEK, *Rise*, p. 11.

23. Ved. ad es. la genealogia riportata da HOCA SA 'DEDDIN, *Tâğ et-tevarîh*, v. I, (Istanbul 1279) p. 15, e da IBN-I KEMAL, *Tevarîh-i Al-i Osman*, I. Defter, ed. Ş. TURAN, (Ankara 1970) p. 44 (osmanlı şeceresi), 112-113.

24. Ved. ad es. H. INALCIK, The Rise of the Ottoman Historiography, *HME*, p. 160.

armenti di cammelli e greggi di ovini, e da lì, insieme con i Selgiuchidi in rotta, venne a stabilirsi sul monte Qarağa, poi si trasferì altrove. Da lui discesero, di padre in figlio, Sarquq Alp, Gök Alp, Gündüz Alp e infine Er Toğrıl.²⁵

Nelle cronache è ingigantita la figura di Süleymān Šāh, appena nominato da Šükrüllāh e ignorato da Qaramanī Mehmed Paša, ed è evidente la tendenza a staccare le vicende dei futuri Ottomani da quelle dei Selgiuchidi, senza alcun rispetto per la realtà storica. Secondo le cronache anonime e Oruğ, Süleymān Šāh, della stirpe di Oguz, era un capo di nomadi, re di Mahan, nella Persia, da dove sarebbe fuggito a seguito dell'invasione dei Mongoli. Il suo arrivo in Asia Minore appare indipendente da quello dei Selgiuchidi che sarebbe avvenuto sotto il sultano 'Alā'uddīn, il quale, lasciata la Persia dopo la conquista di Bağdād da parte dei Mongoli, sarebbe divenuto re del "paese di Rūm".²⁶

Secondo 'Āšīq-paša-zāde invece Süleymān Šāh fu inviato contro gli infedeli, alla testa di cinquantamila nomadi turcomanni e tatars, dai Persiani (i Grandi Selgiuchidi?), i quali, avendo vinto gli Arabi con l'aiuto dei nomadi turchi, se ne volevano sbarazzare. I Selgiuchidi sarebbero venuti in Anatolia molto tempo dopo di lui, sotto 'Alā'uddīn.²⁷ Le cronache concordano poi nel raccontare che Süleymān Šāh dopo aver guerreggiato per qualche tempo trionfando sugli infedeli, mentre si dirigeva da Aleppo verso il Turkestan, perì incidentalmente, annegato nell'Eufrate, presso il castello di Ğa'bar.²⁸ Secondo 'Āšīq-paša-zāde, un gruppo degli uomini di Süleymān, i Döger, rimase a Ğa'bar e vi si trovava ancora ai suoi tempi; gli altri si sparpagliarono, costituendo i turcomanni di Siria e i turcomanni tatars di Anatolia pure dei suoi tempi; solo una piccola parte rimase con i tre figli del condottiero, Sunqur Tegin, Gün Toğdī e Er Toğrıl.²⁹

Nešrī cerca di conciliare i due filoni e di metterli d'accordo con la storia. Egli da una parte parla dell'insediamento a Ahlat in Armenia di un gruppo di oguzi discendenti da Gök Hān al tempo di Maḥmūd di Gazna (m. 1030) e della loro permanenza sotto la pressione dei Mongoli di Süleymān Šāh dalla Persia in Anatolia ove regnava 'Alā'uddīn (Kay Qubād I), tacendo del grossolano anacronismo delle precedenti fonti circa la venuta dei Selgiuchidi in Turchia dopo l'avvento dei

25. *Tevârih es-Selâtin el-osmaniye*, ed. I.H. KONYALI in ATŞIZ, *Osmanlı Tarihleri*, p. 343. Gök Alp e Gündüz Alp sono evidentemente i due personaggi che abbiamo visto in Aḥmedi.

26. GIESE, *Chroniken*, v. II, p. 9-11. ORUC (Babinger), p. 5-6. Secondo Oruc l'avvenimento si verificò nel 626/1228-29. In realtà, come è noto, i Selgiuchidi vennero in Asia Minore circa un secolo e mezzo prima di 'Alā'uddīn Kay Qubād I, che regnò dal 1220 al 1236, e Bağdād cadde nel 1258. In effetti lo 'Alā'uddīn Kay Qubād di cui parlano sempre le cronache turche è una versione "mitizzata" del vero sultano selgiuchide, come ha indicato C. IMBER, *art. cit.*, p. 13-14.

27. AŞIKPAŞAZADE (Atsız), p. 92-93; AŞIKPAŞAZADE (Giese), p. 5-7.

28. AŞIKPAŞAZADE (Giese), p. 11.

29. Ed. ATŞIZ, p. 93. Sui Döger ved. F. SÜMER, *Dögerlere dâir, TürkMec*, 10 (1953), p. 139-158.

Mongoli. Riferisce quindi così come 'Āšīq-paša-zāde le vicende dell'illustre antenato degli Ottomani, Süleymān Šāh.³⁰

Gibbons per primo contestò la realtà storica di Süleymān Šāh, accettata tacitamente da Hammer e, in genere, da quanti scrissero dopo di lui. Egli trova inverosimile che nessuna traccia sia rimasta nelle fonti storiche di un signore di Mahan (che egli identifica con la pianura fra Dinavar e Nahavand) così chiamato, condottiero di cinquantamila uomini.³¹ Un'ipotesi convincente (affacciata già da Jorga) è stata avanzata da P. Wittek. Süleymān Šāh non è altro che una controfigura di Sulaymān figlio di Qutlumiš, il fondatore, nell'undicesimo secolo, del regno selgiuchide di Anatolia.³² In effetti costui, come il presunto avo di 'Osmān, fu in Siria e vinse presso Aleppo una battaglia, subito dopo la quale però, non però annegato; annegato però invece il figlio Qılıç Arslan nel fiume Habur, il cui nome, nella grafia araba, non si discosta troppo da Ğa'bar. Un indiretto appoggio riceve l'ipotesi di Wittek dalle parole di 'Āšīq-paša-zāde, dalle quali Süleymān Šāh risulta non tanto l'antenato degli Ottomani quanto il condottiero di tutti i Turchi dell'Asia Minore. Wittek spiega anche il riferimento a Mahan, da situare nella regione di Marv, nel Khorasan. È da qui che prese le mosse Abū Muslim, il generale che contribuì in maniera decisiva alla vittoria degli Abbasidi sugli Umayyadi e che divenne il protagonista di un romanzo popolare assai diffuso in Anatolia.³³ Le cronache affermano che Süleymān Šāh era della stessa stirpe di Abū Muslim, inserendolo così in un ciclo leggendario ben noto ai loro lettori o ascoltatori. Insomma, sottraendo ai Selgiuchidi la figura di Süleymān, si attribuiva agli Ottomani il merito della conquista dell'Asia Minore, ed un primato rispetto ai Selgiuchidi, il cui regno colà veniva fatto anacronisticamente iniziare con Kay Qubād I. L'ignoranza del pubblico cui le cronache erano destinate rese possibile una tale falsificazione di cui finì per farsi in parte garante anche uno storico serio come Nešrī.³⁴

Dalle contrastanti e confuse versioni delle fonti ottomane³⁵ risulta chiaro che finché non acquistò autorità il racconto di Nešrī con la figura di Süleymān Šāh in primo piano, non esistette una tradizione comunemente recepita sul loro passato, sicché ebbero campo libero svariate e strampalate versioni, specialmente in autori stranieri.³⁶

30. *Kitāb-i Cihan-nümā*, p. 20-21.

31. H. A. GIBBONS, *The Foundation of the Ottoman Empire*, (London 1968, ristampa) p. 263 e segg.

32. *Op. cit.*, p. 13.

33. *Ibidem*, p. 12. Ved. I. MELIKOFF, *Abu Muslim, le "porte-hache" du Khorassan dans la tradition épique turco-iranienne*, (Paris 1962).

34. GIESE, *Chroniken*, v. I, p. 10; *Kitāb-i Cihan-nümā* (Taeschner), *loc. cit.*

35. Oltre a quelle già riferite altre se ne trovano che non mette conto citare qui; tra l'altro Enveri (su cui ved. MELIKOFF, *Destan*, p. 29) e Sarīğa Kemal (su cui ved. R. ANHEGGER, *Sarıca Kemal ve Selâtin-nâmesi*, *TD*, I/1-2, 72-94), nella seconda metà del XV secolo, cercarono di stabilire rapporti di parentela fra gli Ottomani e i Selgiuchidi.

36. Ad esempio il famoso storico arabo magrebino Ibn Ḥaldun (m. 1406) (*Kitāb*

2.3 Anche attorno a Er Toğrıl, il padre di ‘Osmān, certamente un personaggio storicamente esistito, si intrecciò la leggenda intesa a glorificarne la figura. Aḥmedī fa cominciare la carriera di Er Toğrıl con la partecipazione sua e di altri “gāzī” oguzi suoi compagni alla campagna intrapresa dal sultano ‘Alā’uddīn contro gli infedeli nella zona di Sultān Yūki (ossia Eskişehir). Ecco in traduzione il breve scarno testo (sconosciuto a Hammer, Zinkeisen e Jorga) che rappresenta il preludio della formazione dello stato ottomano:

*Colà Er Doğrıl guerreggiò assai, senz’altro divenne famoso al mondo.
L’esercito portò la devastazione in terre senza fine, si impossessò di ricco bottino, calpestò la sede della miscredenza. Il sovrano (‘Alā’uddīn) rimase in quella zona alquanto tempo, affinché gli infedeli fossero distrutti.
Allora aveva concluso pace con i tatarì (mongoli); quando costoro seppero che egli si era rivolto contro gli infedeli, profittando dell’occasione, presero a devastare il paese. Rotti i patti, ripresero l’ostilità.
Il sultano rimase molto scosso da questa notizia; fu per lui necessario tornare.*

al-‘Ibār, V, Bulaq 1868, p. 163) fa discendere ‘Osmānğūq (così egli chiama ‘Osmān, con il vezzeggiativo turco *-cuq*) da un Amir Ğuq, seguace del selgiuchide Sulaymān figlio di Qutlumīš; seri storici d’Egitto e di Siria, quali Maqrizi (m. 1422) (*Kitāb as-suluk li-ma’rifat duwal al-mulūk*, ed. M. MUSTAFA ZIADA, II (Il Cairo 1971) p. 186, 259), Ibn Tağribirdi (m. 1469) (W. POPPER, *Extracts from Abū’l-Mahāsīn ibn Tağhri Birdī’s chronicle entitled Hawādith ad-duhur fi madā’l-ayyam wa’sh-shuhūr*, (Berkeley - Los Angeles 1930-1952) p. 18, 24, ecc.), Ibn Hağar (m. 1449) (*Inbā’al-ğumr bi-abnā al-‘umr*, su cui ved. F. TAESCHNER, Beiträge zur frühosmanischen Epigraphik und Archäologie, *Der Islam*, 20 (1932) 114-115; ŞEVKIYE INALCIK, *Ibn Hacer’de Osmanlı’lara dair haberler*, *AÜDTCFD*, (1948) 189-195, 349-358, 517-529) fanno discendere gli Ottomani da ‘Osmān, arabo del Hiğaz venuto a Qonya in tempo di carestia, nel 650/1252-1253; a lui sarebbero succeduti Sulayman, che avrebbe conquistato Brussa (!), ‘Osmān, Ardam ‘Ali (forse corruzione di Er Toğrıl), Orhan. ŞARAFUDDİN YAZDI, il biografo di Tamerlano, asserisce che era notorio che gli Ottomani discendevano da un “marinaio turcomanno” (*Zafer-nāme*, II (Calcutta 1888) p. 187; trad. francese di PETIT DE LA CROIX, *Histoire de Timur Bec*, III (Paris 1722) p. 259-263). In Occidente si diffuse la versione di ‘Osmān figlio di un pastore chiamato Zich (nome derivato evidentemente dal suffisso di ‘Osmancuq/Osmancıq), che, alla corte del sultano selgiuchide ‘Alā’uddīn, vinse in duello un cavaliere bizantino ritenuto invincibile ed ebbe in premio la città di “Ottomanzich” ossia Osmancık, a sud di Sinope, città che nulla ha a che vedere con ‘Osmān anche se essa è messa con lui in relazione da Evliyā Çelebi, del XVII secolo, che ne fa il luogo di nascita (ved. *IA*, s. v. “Osmancık”). L’italiano GIAMBATTISTA ANGIOLELLO, che fu al seguito del conquistatore, definisce Zich: villano, arator et zappator di terra; cf. *Historia turchesca 1300-1514*, ed. I. URSU, (Bucarest 1910) p. 4.

Egli affidò quella zona a Er Doğrül affinché per anni e mesi scacciasse i miscredenti.

Essendogli state concesse tante conquiste, 'Alā'uddīn ritornò verso Qonya. Allora molti uomini si unirono a Er Doğrül: erano faccende che si regolavano con la saggezza.

Egli acquistò coraggio con l'adesione dei nuovi venuti, dedicò la vita al servizio di Dio.

Avanzò, raggiunse la contrada di Söğüt e conquistò quella zona con la spada.

Non passò molto che questo mondo gli volse le spalle. Er Doğrül lasciò il mondo con rimpianto!³⁷

Con la presenza di Er Toğrül nella zona di Sultanyüki (Sultanönü) mettiamo saldamente piede nella storia.³⁸ Fuori della realtà storica siamo invece per quanto concerne il riferimento a 'Alā'uddīn (Kay Qubād I) (1220-1236). Non risulta che questo sultano, di cui conosciamo abbastanza bene i movimenti, abbia mai condotto spedizioni contro l'impero greco di Nicea (1204-1261), con il quale anzi sembra essere stato in buoni rapporti. Egli inoltre non ebbe mai a combattere contro i Mongoli; fantastica pertanto è la vittoria sui Mongoli attribuita a 'Alā'uddīn, il quale come trofeo avrebbe fatto cucire un parasole con le pelli dei testicoli dei nemici caduti.³⁹ Parimenti fantastico è il racconto di un generoso intervento di Er Toğrül, alla testa di una piccola schiera, in favore dello stesso 'Alā'uddīn che stava per essere sopraffatto dai Mongoli. Questa leggenda si trova in Bayatī, che pone il combattimento presso Sivas, con il motivo del macabro parasole;⁴⁰ in Neşrī, che dice di averlo ascoltato dal dotto Mevlānā Ayās in base a una notizia risalente a un palafreniere di Orḡān,⁴¹ e infine in una lettera certamente apocrifia di Bāyezīd I a Tamerlano.⁴²

37. AḤMEDĪ, p. 8 (vv. 75-94).

38. Ricordiamo che Sultanyüki è l'antico nome di Eskişehir, la città sorta nei pressi della distrutta Dorileo, ai confini della Frigia con la parte della Bitinia ove per l'appunto si formò lo stato ottomano e si attuò la sua prima espansione. Sultanyüki è testimoniato tra gli altri dallo scrittore arabo AL ḤARAWĪ del dodicesimo secolo, *Kitāb az-ziyārat*, (Šam 1953) p. 58 e da AḤMEDĪ, *loc. cit.*

39. ŠÜKRÜLLĀH, p. 52; QARAMANĪ MEḤMED PAŞA, p. 344. Le *Cronache anonime* parlano del mongolo Baču Ḥān (GIESE, *Chroniken*, p. 12), che potrebbe essere il generale Bayğu, ma questi venne in Anatolia dopo la morte di Kay Qubād, o un altro personaggio di età posteriore. Ved. su Bayğu CAHEN, *Turquie Pré-ottomane*, p. 241-244 e O. TURAN, *Selcuklular zamanında Türkiye*, (Istanbul 1971) *passim*.

40. BAYATĪ, p. 394.

41. *Kitāb-i Cihan-nümā* (Taeschner), p. 22.

42. Cfr. GIBBONS, *op. cit.*, p. 267, nota 4. La corrispondenza tra Bāyezīd e Tamerlano è riferita anche da IBN 'ARABŞAH (m. 1450), *'Ağā'ib al-maqdūr fī nawā'ib Timur*, (II Cairo 1285) p. 126-142.

Niente di più facile che abbia operato la tendenza, caratteristica di tradizioni vaghe, a riallacciarsi a personaggi famosi, quale fu Kay Qubād I, il più celebre dei sultani selgiuchidi di Turchia.

Rimane incerto se Er Toğrıl si trovasse nella zona di Dorileo-Eski Şehir, così come tanti altri turcomanni, prima ancora dell'avvento dei Mongoli in Asia Minore, ovvero se egli sia venuto nell'Anatolia occidentale nella seconda metà del tredicesimo secolo convogliato nello spostamento di masse di turcomanni in questa direzione, sotto la pressione dei Mongoli. La seconda ipotesi sarebbe suffragata dalla versione leggendaria che pone la venuta degli antenati degli Ottomani in Asia Minore posteriormente alla presa di Bağdād da parte dei Mongoli, nel 1258, e dalla notizia di una prima dimora di Er Toğrıl sul monte Qarağa.⁴³ Questo monte, tra i tanti dello stesso nome, potrebbe identificarsi con quello situato a circa cento chilometri a sud-ovest di Ankara, se lo si pone in relazione con un presunto viaggio di Er Toğrıl con il figlio 'Osmān,⁴⁴ o dei suoi due figli, 'Osmān e Sarīyatī, a Engüri (Ankara).⁴⁵ Nessun appiglio con la realtà storica hanno le notizie del soggiorno degli antenati degli Ottomani nella zona di Ahlat, in Armenia⁴⁶ e di Er Toğrıl, insieme con i figli Sonqur e Gün Toğdı, dopo la morte del padre Süleymān Şāh, a Pasin (Pasinler, a est di Erzurum) e in una conca vicina detta Sürmeli Çuqur. Da qui i due fratelli si sarebbero separati da Er Toğrıl e sarebbero ritornati nel Turkestan.⁴⁷

Sul terreno della realtà storica ritorniamo con l'insediamento di Er Toğrıl a nord di Eski Şehir, entro i margini della Bitinia, avendo per sede estiva il monte Domanič (Domanič Dağ)⁴⁸ e come sede invernale la cittadina di Sögüt.⁴⁹ Questi luoghi gli sarebbero stati assegnati dal sultano 'Alā'uddīn al quale Er Toğrıl avrebbe inviato il figlio Sarīyatī (detto anche Savği "l'ambasciatore") con la richiesta di una sede ove stabilirsi.⁵⁰ Naturalmente anche in questo caso l'intervento di 'Alā'uddīn ha carattere leggentario, tanto più che appare difficile che i Turchi abbiano messo piede in Bitinia nella prima metà del tredicesimo secolo, mentre quella regione era costituita in forte stato con capitale a Nicea, a meno di cento chilometri a nord di Sögüt. Non si può escludere, è vero, già allora una infiltrazione turca, ma è più verosimile che essa sia avvenuta in un'epoca posteriore al 1261, quando il sovrano di Nicea, Michele VIII Paleologo, annientato l'impero latino d'Oriente, ricostituì l'impero bizantino con capitale a Constantinopoli e i suoi interessi si spostarono dall'Asia all'Europa.

Alla leggenda di Er Toğrıl appartengono fantastiche imprese navali, a lui

43. ŞÜKRÜLLAH, p. 51.

44. AŞIKPAŞAZADE (Giese), p. 93.

45. ORUC (Babinger), p. 6-7.

46. ŞÜKRÜLLAH, *loc. cit.* Cf. H. INALCIK, *art. cit.*, p. 160-161.

47. GIESE, *Chroniken*, p. 11-12; AŞIKPAŞAZADE, e ORUC, *loc. cit.*

48. GIESE, *Chroniken* e AŞIKPAŞAZADE, *loc. cit.*

49. AĦMEDĪ e AŞIKPAŞAZADE, *loc. cit.*

50. La notizia figura in tutte le fonti citate.

attribuite dallo storico arabo 'Aynī (m. 1451) e dal greco Calcocondila, del tempo di Maometto II,⁵¹ o la vittoria che, secondo Idrīs Bitlisī, storico ottomano del XVI secolo che scrisse in persiano, Er Toğrīl, alla testa di quattrocentoquaranta cavalieri, avrebbe inflitto presso Brussa, accorrendo dal monte Qarağa, a un esercito bizantino condotto dall' imperatore in persona e costretto a imbarcarsi per Gallipoli. Di questo esercito avrebbero fatto parte i tatarı Aqtau che furono effettivamente al servizio dei Bizantini, provenendo dell'Orda d'Oro, ma in un'epoca più tarda.⁵²

Meno attendibile è quel che dice 'Āšīq-paša-zāde, ossia che Er Toğrīl condusse una esistenza pacifica, in inverno a Sögüt, in estate sui pascoli alpini, proteggendo i vicini greci contro 'Alī Šīr, potente signore del vicino emirato dei Ghermiyani, spalleggiato dal "tataro Cavdar", vale a dire i Çavdar, un residuo della popolazione di stirpe mongola, venuta nella seconda metà del tredicesimo secolo in Anatolia occidentale, ove ebbe una base fortificata nelle rovine del grande tempio romano di Aezeni, oggi Çodar Hisar (=Çavdar Hisar).⁵³

A ricordo, non sappiamo quanto autentico, della residenza di Er Toğrīl a Sögüt, esiste colà ancora oggi un edificio, nella sua attuale struttura non più antico di un secolo, ospitante una tomba a lui attribuita, ma sprovvista di epigrafe.⁵⁴

3.1 Che il nucleo attorno al quale si costituì lo stato ottomano fosse formato da pastori turcomanni semi-nomadi è riconosciuto in definitiva da tutti gli studiosi, eccetto Wittek, e può considerarsi bene accertato. A prescindere da quello che abbiamo chiamato il "mito oguzo", è significativa la presentazione degli ottomani quali pastori seminomadi che si riscontra nelle fonti e che è rimasta tradizionale per tutta la durata dell'impero ottomano. A parte il fatto che le cronache, tranne pochi casi di nomi islamici, attribuiscono nomi turchi ai parenti e compagni di 'Osmān (Gündüz, Turgut, Ayqut, Saltīq, ecc.), esse concordano nel parlare di sedi invernali e di sedi estive alpine in luoghi fissi, offrendoci quindi un tipico quadro di "piccolo nomadismo". 'Āšīq-paša-zāde parla non solo degli spostamenti stagionali di 'Osmān, ma anche di tipici prodotti dell'economia nomade da lui

51. 'AYNĪ, *'Iqd al-ğumān fī ta'rīh ahl az-zamān*, ed. in turco a cura di A. ABIDIN, Aynī'nin İkdul Cūman fī tarih Ehli 'z-zaman adlı tarihinden Osmanlılara ait verilen malūmatın tenkiydi, *Tarih Semineri Dergisi*, 3 (1938) 109-215; CHALCOCONDYLAS, *Historia*, ed. BEKKER (Bonn 1843). Vi è forse confusione con possibili spedizioni di un omonimo figlio di Bāyezid I che fu governatore di un distretto marino, su cui ved. AŞIKPAŞAZADE (Giese), p. 59, 66-67.

52. Ved. A. DECEI, *Etablissement des Aktāv de la Horde d'Or dans l'Empire ottoman au temps de Yıldırım Bayezid* in: *Symbolae in honorem Z.V. Togan*, (Istanbul 1955) p. 77-92.

53. AŞIKPAŞAZADE (Atsız), p. 93. Cfr. WITTEK, *Rise*, p. 11-12 e KÖPRÜLÜ, *op. cit.*, p. 53. Sui Cavdar ved. F. SÜMER, *Anadolu'da Moğollar*, *SAD*, 1 (1969), 118.

54. Ved. F. TAESCHNER, *Anatolische Forschungen*, *ZDMG*, 82 (1928) 93-94.

offerti in dono quali formaggi, pecore, tappeti, ecc. e narra che le donne di 'Osmān non erano disposte a recarsi a Bileğik per partecipare alle feste nuziali del signore del luogo, perchè la città era "stretta" per loro, abituate agli "ampi spazi".⁵⁵ Altrove è descritto il nipote di 'Osmān che in prima persona si occupa degli affari tribali, badando al *göç*.⁵⁶

Si potrebbe pensare che questo sia un quadro di genere ispirato al motivo delle origini oгуze, e forse in parte lo è; così come è da tenere presente la possibilità di una coloritura tendenziosa da parte di 'Āšīq-paşa-zāde, ben noto per la sua avversione all'emergente potere della classe dei burocrati e alla prevalenza che andavano assumendo i rinnegati.⁵⁷ Ma sulle abitudini nomadi degli Ottomani vi sono testimonianze non sospette relative al tempo di Orḡān. Il viaggiatore arabo Ibn Battuta ci informa che il sovrano ottomano dimorava in una tenda e non in un palazzo e che le sue mogli, contrariamente alla norma vigente nell'ambiente cittadino, comparivano agli estranei non velate.⁵⁸ Agli ideali nomadi sono altresì da ricondurre la proverbiale povertà di 'Osmān, la sua incapacità e noncuranza di leggere e la struttura statale che si rifaceva direttamente agli ideali propri di una società nomade, apparentemente di tipo patriarcale.⁵⁹

Il problema comunque non è tanto quello del carattere nomade o meno del nucleo primigenio, quanto della parte da questo rappresentata nella formazione dello stato ottomano. Secondo il Köprülü, peraltro sostenitore dell'importanza dell'elemento turco, questo nucleo si sarebbe dissolto proprio con la nascita dello stato.⁶⁰

Appare invece evidente, almeno dai dati delle fonti che i quadri dirigenti del nuovo stato furono costituiti, come del resto non poteva essere diversamente, dalla aristocrazia nomade, con alla testa la famiglia regnante. Particolare importanza ha il termine *alp* che accompagna il nome di vari compagni di 'Osmān (Turgut Alp, Hasan Alp, Ayqut Alp, Qonur Alp, Saltıq Alp)⁶¹ e che ci riporta non tanto alla tradizione mitica oгуza, quanto a una associazione a sfondo militare cavalleresco esistente allora in Anatolia da riferire, a quanto sembra, proprio all'ambiente nomade.⁶² A differenza dei *gāzī* che nella grande massa combattevano a piedi, gli *alp* montavano a cavallo

55. AŞIKPAŞAZADE (Atsız) p. 94, 98-99, 101-102.

56. Cf. LINDNER, *op. cit.*, p. 32, nota 167.

57. Ved. A. BOMBACI, *La letteratura turca*, (Firenze - Milano 1969) p. 349-350.

58. IBN BATTUTA, *Voyages*, v. II, p. 314-325.

59. Ved. in proposito quanto riferiscono le fonti citate.

60. *Op. cit.*, p. 105-106 e IDEM, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunun etnik menşei meselesi*, *FoII*, VII/28 (1943) p. 219-303.

61. Stranamente, fuori delle genealogie e di Alp Gündüz in ORUC (Babinger), il termine *alp* non è mai associato né a 'Osmān né ai membri della sua famiglia.

62. Ved., tra gli altri, KÖPRÜLÜ, *op. cit.*, *passim*; A. CAFEROĞLU, *Dedem Korkut Hikâyelerinin Antroponim Yapısı, Türk Dili Araştırmaları Yıllığı Belleten*, 1959, p. 63-67 e LINDNER, *op. cit.*, p. 24-25.

e occupavano verosimilmente un posto preminente nella cavalleria ottomana. Questa cavalleria era allora certamente formata da nomadi e fu essa la principale artefice delle conquiste ottomane, con le sue incursioni e con il suo impiego tattico nelle battaglie. Altra funzione dei nomadi, come è noto, fu il popolamento dei paesi conquistati, presupposto alla loro turchizzazione, avvenuto è da ritenere in circostanze analoghe a quelle che condussero alla turchizzazione dell'Anatolia in epoca selgiuchide.⁶³ La distribuzione di terre e di case ai suoi commilitoni da parte di 'Osmān, la fondazione di nuove città, quale indubbiamente fu Yenişehir, sono testimonianze che 'Āšīq-paša-zāde ci fornisce a questo proposito.

Infine rimane incerto quanto l'espansione ottomana sia espressione dell'istinto aggressivo del nomade e quanto invece dell'ideologia islamica della guerra santa. Ossia in poche parole quando e in che misura il nomade si mutò in *gāzī*.

3.2 L'ideologia della guerra santa fu senza dubbio il contributo principale dell'Islam alla formazione dello stato ottomano. Essa però non insorse a seguito di una conversione, come vorrebbe Gibbons.⁶⁴

Che i turcomanni vissuti ai confini con Bisanzio professassero la religione musulmana, sia pure alla superficie, è un fatto storicamente fuori discussione, sia per quelli venuti con la prima ondata oguza, sia per quelli rifuggenti dalla dominazione mongola. Nessun appiglio può offrire il nome di 'Osmān, islamico a differenza di quello del padre Er Toğrīl, essendo tra i nomadi in uso indifferentemente nomi turchi e nomi islamici. Sono le circostanze storiche e non la conversione che spiegano l'improvviso successo di 'Osmān. Wittek ha ragione nel sottolineare l'importanza della denominazione *gāzī* attribuita con enfasi agli Ottomani da Aḥmedī e ricorrente poi nelle fonti e nella singolare titolatura di Orḥān in una epigrafe:

*Sultano, figlio del sultano dei gāzī, gāzī figlio di gāzī... Orḥān figlio di 'Osmān.*⁶⁵

Il fatto è che in questi casi il termine *gāzī* non si riferisce necessariamente a una particolare associazione ben nota quale componente della società islamica,⁶⁶ ma ha un valore generico per designare quanti, nomadi e non

63. Ved. CAHEN, *Turquie Pré-ottomane*, p. 101 e segg.

64. *Op. cit.*

65. Brusa'da en eski kitabe, *TOEM* 29, (1912) 318-320. Cf. KÖPRÜLÜ, *op. cit.*, p. 101 e segg.; WITTEK, *op. cit.*, p. 124-15; LINDNER, *op. cit.*, p. 3, 7, 35; C. IMBER, *art. cit.*, *OsmAr*, 5, p. 70.

66. Su cui ved. WITTEK, *op. cit.*, *passim*.

67. Non per niente AHMEDİ (p. 8) definisce Er Toğrīl e i suoi contemporaneamente "gazi" e "oguzi". Cfr. T. KORTANTAMER, *Leben und Weltbild des altosmanischen Dichters*

nomadi, si dedicavano alla guerra santa.⁶⁷ Gli Ottomani, in quanto viventi alle frontiere con gli infedeli nemici del mondo musulmano, si sentivano investiti dell'obbligo religioso e della missione morale di combattere gli infedeli e di allargare i confini dell'Islam e in questo obbligo e missione il nuovo stato trovò la sua ragione di vita, traendone prestigio ed anche vantaggi materiali, cose entrambe che spiegano l'affluire sotto le sue bandiere di musulmani di altre regioni.

È stato già ampiamente rilevato come alla frontiera i due mondi di civiltà e religione diversa non si scontravano sempre frontalmente, ma anche si incontravano, e le due parti non vanno considerate come irriducibili avversari.⁶⁸ Turchi passavano al servizio dei Bizantini e Bizantini al servizio dei Turchi. Numerose schiere di Turchi sostennero la causa di Alessio Philanthropinos ribellatosi a Andronico II e debellato nel 1296 e milizie turche provenienti dall'Asia Minore fecero parte dell'esercito di Alessio II operante in Europa; non pochi *akritai*, scontenti dei Paleologi, entrarono nelle file turche.⁶⁹ Diserzioni, prigionie, matrimoni facilitavano inoltre i contatti, sì che a entrambe le parti erano familiari i rispettivi costumi e genere di vita. Giustamente osserva Wittek che l'assunzione di poteri politici da parte dei *gāzī*, da intendere comunque in senso generico, li trovò già esperti delle condizioni del territorio da dominare.⁷⁰ D'altra parte l'idea della guerra santa non escludeva la possibilità di tregue e di intese, in altre parole di un normale gioco politico. Questo concetto era reso dal termine *mūdārā* che troviamo in 'Āšīq-paša-zāde e poi infinite volte nelle storie ottomane e che può genericamente rendersi con "dissimulazione", significando in pratica "finta amicizia".⁷¹ I buoni rapporti che il cronista ottomano afferma esistessero, finché non si addivenne alla rottura, ma per perfidia dell'altra parte, fra 'Osmān e il signore di Bileğik, non hanno probabilmente alcuna realtà storica, ma sono significativi di una concezione imperante sin dagli inizi della storia ottomana. Dietro la facciata della guerra santa se ne presentava un'altra, materata di tolleranza, nei rapporti fra vincitori e vinti. 'Āšīq-paša-zāde nel presentare la condotta di 'Osmān a questo proposito non dà alcuna garanzia di fedeltà storica ed ovviamente riflette una visione propria della categoria dei dervisci cui egli apparteneva; tuttavia offre eloquente testimonianza di una tradizionale politica lungimirante, tanto che 'Osmān al fratello Gündüz, che gli proponeva scorrerie devastatrici, obiettò che in tal modo si sarebbero prosciugate le fonti della prosperità del paese; in occasione di un'incursione non prese prigionieri per accattivarsi l'animo della popolazione; infine in

Ahmedi, (Freiburg 1973) p. 236. Così nelle *Cronache* costoro sono menzionati quali "gāzi" e "alp".

68. Ved. a tal riguardo WITTEK, *op. cit.*, cap. II.

69. Ved. VRYONIS, *Decline*, p. 136-137.

70. *Op. cit.*, p. 33 e segg.

71. Oltre alle fonti citate ved. anche LINDNER, *op. cit.*, p. 24.

generale con il suo comportamento benevolo e giusto si acquistò la fiducia dei cristiani, i quali, trovando il suo regime preferibile a quello bizantino, restavano a popolare i paesi da lui conquistati o addirittura vi affluivano da paesi vicini.⁷²

3.4 Altri ideali che non erano quelli della guerra santa animavano un'organizzazione musulmana assai diffusa in Anatolia a quei tempi, l'organizzazione degli *ahī*, anche se all'occorrenza i suoi membri prendevano parte ad operazioni militari. Non si può escludere che questa organizzazione avesse già al tempo di 'Osmān messo radici nella società ottomana, ma è poco probabile che vi avesse assunto una funzione di guida, come vorrebbe Giese.⁷³ Questo studioso avanza in proposito l'idea che Edebali, suocero di 'Osmān, fosse un *ahī*. La cosa avrebbe importanza, perchè alla figura dello *šeyḥ* Edebali è assegnata nelle cronache una posizione eminente. Egli in qualche modo ha il compito di sacralizzare il regno di 'Osmān. Er Toḡrīl (o lo stesso 'Osmān) sogna infatti che una luna sorge dal seno dello sceicco e si immerge nel suo e quindi dal suo ombelico spunta un albero che crescendo a dismisura ombreggia tutta la terra. Lo sceicco gli spiega che la luna rappresenta la propria figlia Māl Ḥatun,⁷⁴ la quale sposerà 'Osmān e che l'albero rappresenta il dominio del mondo destinato ai discendenti degli sposi. A parte questo racconto leggendario e le contraddizioni del racconto stesso, Edebali sembra fosse effettivamente un personaggio storico, poiché si conserva il ricordo di suoi discendenti ed egli figura come suocero di 'Osmān in documenti purtroppo non pubblicati.⁷⁵ Non vi sono però sufficienti elementi per farne un *ahī*. Giese si basa sul ritratto che ne dà 'Āšīq-paša-zāde:

*...era chiamato derviscio, ma l'essere derviscio era un suo fatto intimo (bāṭininde), aveva molti beni e ricchezze e beni e bestiame, teneva lampada e stendardo, la sua casa era sempre abitata da ospiti.*⁷⁶

Ma quanto di questo ritratto può far pensare a un *ahī* (l'ospitalità) è un evidente ampliamento di 'Āšīq-paša-zāde di quanto dicono gli altri cronisti.⁷⁷

72. Ved. AŞIKPAŞAZADE (Atsız), p. 94 e segg. Cfr. LINDNER, *op. cit.*, p. 5.

73. Das Problem der Entstehung des osmanischen Reiches, *Zeitschrift für Semitistik*, II/2 (1924) 246-271. Ved. anche J.H. KRAMERS, Wer war Osman?, *Acta Orientalia*, 6 (1927) 242-254. Cf. P. WITTEK, Deux chapitres, *op. cit.*, p. 313-314 e F. TAESCHNER, War Murad I. Grosmeister oder Mitglied des Achibundes?, *Oriens*, 6 (1953) 23-31.

74. Māl Ḥatun è Rabi'a in ORUC (Babinger), p. 9, e Malḥun in AŞIKPAŞAZADE (Atsız), p. 95.

75. Pare che Māl Ḥatun non fosse figlia di Edebali. Ved. *IA*, s.v. "Osman I", p. 443.

76. Ed. ATSIŞ, p. 95.

77. ORUC, *loc. cit.*: era ricco; GIESE, *Chroniken* p. 12: era un derviscio credente, aveva molte ricchezze e beni.

Rimane solo il fatto che due *aḥī*, Aḥī Šemseddīn e Aḥī Ḥasan, figurano in 'Āšīq-paša-zāde rispettivamente come fratello e nipote di Edebalı e ambedue avrebbero partecipato all'assedio di Bursa.⁷⁸

Non vi è dubbio che le strutture politiche del nuovo stato erano di marca musulmana, anche se ben poco di preciso si può dire su di esse. In primo luogo rimane incerta la posizione dello stesso capo dello stato, 'Osmān. Nelle fonti nessun titolo si accompagna al suo nome. Dall'atto del 1324 apprendiamo che egli era insignito dell'epiteto Fahr ud-Dīn.⁷⁹ Non è possibile dire se questo epiteto fu da lui stesso assunto o gli fu conferito. Può ritenersi certo che 'Osmān non godesse della piena sovranità non avendo lo stato ottomano la piena indipendenza dalla sovranità mongola nemmeno sotto il figlio di lui, Orḡān. Che vi sia stata una investitura da parte del selgiuchide 'Alā'uddīn III con l'invio di insegne di potere (*tuġ*, bandiera, tamburo), come vogliono le fonti ottomane, non è da escludere.⁸⁰ Sebbene privato dai Mongoli di ogni potere effettivo, questo sultano aveva ancora un'autorità formale, come risulta da iscrizioni recanti il suo nome quale sovrano regnante.⁸¹

Secondo le cronache 'Osmān in un secondo tempo avrebbe fatto tenere in suo nome la preghiera del venerdì da Dursun Faqīh a Qaraġa Ḥiṣār.⁸² Secondo 'Āšīq-paša-zāde 'Osmān nel far questo avrebbe apertamente rinnegato l'autorità selgiuchide, vantando il suo diritto di conquista, la sua discendenza da Gök Alp e la priorità di Süleymān Šāh rispetto ai Selgiuchidi in Anatolia.⁸³ Una prova sicura di una affermazione giuridica di sovranità, sia pure non incompatibile con una supremazia mongola, potrebbe essere rappresentata dal ritrovamento di una moneta d'argento nel Arkeoloji Müzesi di Istanbul che è stata letta al suo nome e a lui attribuita da I. Artuk.⁸⁴

4.1 Comunque sia, si deve a 'Osmān il merito di aver trasformato i minuscoli possedimenti paterni nello stato da lui detto "ottomano", profittando della situazione quanto mai favorevole esistente nelle province bizantine di confine. Quale sua data di nascita, per quanto possano valere le indicazioni cronologiche delle fonti, compare l'anno 1258 o 1259 e come luogo Söğüt. La successione al padre Er Toġrıl, di cui è incerta la data di morte, avvenne, secondo le cronache, senza contrasti.⁸⁵ Secondo Nešrī invece lo zio Dundar (un terzo fratello di Er

78. Ed. ATŞIZ, p. 115. Cfr. GIESE, *art. cit.*, p. 237.

79. Ved. I. H. UZUNÇARSILI, Gazi Orhan Bey Vakfivesi, *Bell*, V/11 (1941) 277-288.

80. Ma ved. la discussione in proposito in BELDICEANU-STEINHERR, *Recherches*, p. 64-74.

81. Ved. H. EDHEM, Al-i Germiyan Kitabeleri, *TOEM*, 2 (1910) 113.

82. GIESE, *Chroniken*, p. 12.

83. AŞIKPAŞAZADE (Atşız), p. 103-104.

84. I. ARTUK, Osmanlı Beyliğinin Kurucusu Osman Gazi'ye ait Sikke, *Türkiye'nin Sosyal ve Ekonomik Tarihi (1071-1920). Birinci Uluslararası Türkiye'nin Sosyal ve Ekonomik Tarihi Kongresi Tebliğleri*, (Ankara 1980) p. 27-33.

85. GIESE *Chroniken*, p. 12.

Toğrîl sconosciuto alle altre fonti) si sarebbe fatto avanti, ma poi si sarebbe ritirato in considerazione della popolarità del nipote.⁸⁶ La notizia non è inverosimile, dal momento che non esistevano norme precise sulla successione al potere nelle formazioni politiche musulmane, e gli Ottomani non costituivano certo una eccezione a questo proposito. Le discussioni che si sono fatte un tempo se vigesse presso di loro la primogenitura o il seniorato non hanno motivo di essere.

Come è noto, l'espansione si attuò in tre direzioni: verso sud, ai danni di altri signori musulmani, e, a ventaglio, verso nord-est e verso nord-ovest, in territorio bizantino, secondo ogni probabilità proprio in quest'ordine anche nel tempo.

Circa le conquiste verso sud non disponiamo di altre notizie che quelle assai vaghe e malcerte fornite dalle fonti ottomane, le quali suggeriscono la cronologia sopra prospettata, in quanto le collocano agli inizi del regno di 'Osmān. Esse appaiono peraltro il presupposto strategico per l'avanzata in Bitinia, dando a 'Osmān la possibilità di svolgere la sua azione con le spalle protette. Mete sarebbero stati tre posti di notevole importanza strategica: Inönü, Qarağa Hişār, Eski Şehir.

Dell'acquisto di Inönü da parte di 'Osmān non esiste alcuna esplicita menzione nelle fonti. Neşrî dice solamente che il signore di Inönü era amico di 'Osmān, mentre quello di Eski Şehir gli era rivale in amore, tanto che per mettergli le mani addosso attaccò Inönü; 'Osmān si salvò con la fuga, addivenendo poi a uno scontro per lui vittorioso.⁸⁷ Comunque, per chi avesse avuto come base Sögüt, il possesso di Inönü era un presupposto per la conquista di Qarağa Hişār e di Eski Şehir. Infatti da Inönü si risaliva il corso dell'antico Bathys e si imboccava la valle del Thymbris (l'odierno Porsuk Çay), affluente dell'alto corso del Sangario, ove erano situate a monte Qarağa Hişār e a valle Eski Şehir.

Qarağa Hişār oggi rappresentata da una fortezza in rovina, di costruzione bizantina o selgiuchide, sbarrava la strada verso Sögüt a un attacco da parte dei Ghermiyani e dei Çavdar loro alleati, contro i quali, secondo 'Āşîq-paşa-zāde, Er Toğrîl aveva battagliato e che rappresentavano la più grave minaccia, dal lato musulmano, per l'esistenza dello stato di 'Osmān.⁸⁸

Potrebbe anche darsi che Qarağa Hişār fosse stata già presa da Er Toğrîl, ma è più probabile che il suo acquisto sia avvenuto ad opera di 'Osmān. Nelle fonti esistono due versioni, l'una, nel primo senso, di Şükrüllāh e Qaramanî Meḥmed Paşa,⁸⁹ l'altra nel secondo senso di 'Āşîq-paşa-zāde.⁹⁰ Neşrî, che si trovò innanzi le due versioni, pensò di conciliarle supponendo che la fortezza fu presa una

86. *Kitâb-i Cihan-nümâ* (Taeschner), p. 25. Cfr. *IA*, s.v. "Osman I".

87. *Ibidem*.

88. Ved. *IA*, s.v. "Osman I".

89. Ved. *ATSIZ*, *Osmanlı Tarihleri*, p. 52 e 344.

90. *Ibidem*, p. 94.

91. *Kitâb-i Cihan-nümâ* (Taeschner), p. 22, 26.

prima volta da Er Toğrıl, poi andò perduta, quindi fu riconquistata da ‘Osmān :⁹¹ opinione accolta da Hammer. In realtà a quanto sembra, si tratta dello stesso avvenimento narrato in due versioni che coincidono nel particolare dell’intervento di ‘Alā’uddīn. I primi due autori, laddove Aḥmedī parla della zona di Sulṭānyūki,⁹² dicono, senza nominare questa località, che Er Toğrıl fu lasciato dal sultano, ritiratosi per combattere i Mongoli, con il compito di conquistare Qarağa Ḥiṣār. ‘Āṣīq-paša-zāde abbonda in particolari: ‘Osmān nemico del signore bizantino di Aynegöl, si accingeva a attaccare la città di notte con settanta uomini. Avvertito in tempo, sventò un agguato tesogli dal nemico, lo vinse e quindi incendiò la vicina fortezza di Qolağa; i signori greci si rivolsero allora per aiuto al castellano di Qarağa Ḥiṣār, che si scontrò con ‘Osmān in un combattimento di incerto esito su un passo del monte Domaniç; ‘Alā’uddīn intervenne in favore di ‘Osmān con un esercito ed insieme investirono la piazzaforte; il sultano però si allontanò per muovere contro il tataro Bayinğar che aveva preso Eregli, lo vinse a Biga e si fece preparare il noto macabro parasole.⁹³ È evidente che il cronista fonde un racconto legato nella tradizione a Er Toğrıl con un episodio, vero o fantastico, relativo all’attività di ‘Osmān in Bitinia. Se si considera sospetta la sostituzione di Qarağa Ḥiṣār a Sultanyūki, per essere una innovazione di Şükrüllāh, seguito da Qaramanī Meḥmed Paša, rispetto al più antico Aḥmedī, e d’altra parte che Bayinğar è il nome di un generale mongolo inviato in Anatolia nel 1297, in un’epoca cioè in cui è da ritenere governasse ‘Osmān, è da preferire la versione di ‘Āṣīq-paša-zāde che indica quest’ultimo quale protagonista. Rimangono tuttavia senza riscontro storico la presa di Eregli (Eraclia di Licaonia?) da parte di Bayinğar (il Baçu Ḥān delle cronache?) ed inoltre è una assurdità che il sultano fantoccio ‘Alā’uddīn Kay Qubād III (1297-1302) (non può infatti trattarsi che di lui) abbia vinto i Mongoli a Biga, in Misia.

Tutte le fonti concordano nel dire che Qarağa Ḥiṣār fu presa agli infedeli. L’acquisto di questo centro, le cui chiese sarebbero state trasformate in moschee e le case assegnate ai vincitori, avrebbe enormemente contribuito ad accrescere la popolarità e il seguito di ‘Osmān. Gente dell’emirato dei Ghermiyan e di altri luoghi vi si sarebbe stabilita. ‘Osmān l’avrebbe assunto come sua sede e ivi si sarebbe arrogata dignità sovrana.

Completamente all’oscuro siamo circa i particolari dell’acquisto di Eski Şehir, che potrebbe anche essere stato anteriore a quello di Qarağa Ḥiṣār. Soltanto Neşrī contiene l’accento già riferito all’inimicizia del suo signore contro ‘Osmān e un laconico annuncio della conquista.⁹⁴

Non sappiamo nulla, in questa prima fase del regno di ‘Osmān e anche nella successiva, circa i suoi rapporti con i vicini emirati musulmani, eccetto quanto ‘Āṣīq-paša-zāde ci dice dell’inimicizia con i Ghermiyan, potenti vicini in Frigia.

92. Ed. ATŞIZ, p. 8.

93. *Loc. cit.*

94. *Loc. cit.*

Non è escluso che la spedizione narrata da 'Ašîq-paša-zāde, compiuta da 'Osmān contro Göynük, nella regione a destra del basso corso del Sangario, fosse ai danni di 'Ömer Beg, un emiro musulmano che operava in quella regione contro i bizantini, con il quale forse più tardi lo stesso 'Osmān strinse legami di parentela. In questa spedizione un certo Samsa Çavuş, della zona di Mudurnu (Modrone), nella stessa regione, un personaggio che a giudicare dal titolo "çavuş", era stato al servizio dei Selgiuchidi, collaborò con gli Ottomani.⁹⁵

Quel che sappiamo sugli antefatti della espansione ottomana in territorio bizantino è l'inimicizia di 'Osmān con il signore di Aynegöl e l'amicizia invece con quello di Bileğük. Secondo Neşrî, 'Osmān avrebbe intrapreso, su richiesta di quest'ultimo, una spedizione contro il vicino Köpri Hîşâr e l'avrebbe conquistato per conto dell'alleato. Nei festeggiamenti questi si sarebbe fatto baciare la mano dai guerrieri di 'Osmān che indignato avrebbe voluto punirlo. Lo zio Dundar avrebbe tentato di dissuaderlo, facendo presente che già erano sufficienti nemici i Ghermiyan e gli altri signori greci, ma il nipote infuriato lo avrebbe ucciso con un colpo di freccia.⁹⁶

Per quel che concerne l'espansione in Bitinia le fonti ottomane non forniscono molti particolari: di queste Aḥmedî e il filone più antico che fa capo a lui si limitano a un nudo elenco dei luoghi conquistati: Bileğük, Aynegöl, Köpri Hîşâr, Yeni Şehir, Yar Hîşâr. Le cronache più che altro abbondano di particolari fantastici. Nessun contributo notevole è fornito da Neşrî o dagli storici a lui posteriori.

Le fonti bizantine indicano che nel 1282 il processo di espansione degli ottomani in Bitinia non era avviato, o era ancora agli inizi, fosse o meno ancora vivo Er Toğrîl. Non parlano infatti di loro, come sarebbe stato da attendersi se essi avessero rappresentato una parte notevole, nel riferire che in quell'anno Michele VIII intraprese un'azione militare contro i Turchi della regione a destra del basso Sangario i quali molestavano la Mesotinia, ossia la parte della Bitinia attigua a Constantinopoli e si spinse sino a Bursa e Lopadio per rafforzare i confini contro i Turchi della Misia.⁹⁷

È certo perciò che gli Ottomani entrano propriamente nella storia con la battaglia di Bafeo del 27 luglio 1302.

95. Ved. *IA*, *op. cit.*

96. *Kitâb-i Cihan-nümâ* (Taeschner), p. 28.

97. Cf. BOMBACI, *L'impero ottomano*, p. 194.

LA PLACE DU XIV^e SIÈCLE DANS L'ÉVOLUTION DE LA LANGUE TURQUE

György HAZAI

Le siècle qui est le sujet de notre symposium est une période qui prépare de grands changements. Dans l'Anatolie qui se trouve en plein état de dissolution politique, une force de consolidation apparaît, qui jusqu'à la fin du siècle peut enregistrer des succès remarquables. Elle tire et multiplie ses forces du "front de l'Ouest", dans les luttes menées dans les Balkans et contre Byzance. Après une brève régression au début du siècle suivant, elle peut s'attaquer à la reconstruction de l'unité politique de l'Anatolie. Mais quelle est la place de ce siècle dans le développement de la langue turque? Que nous disent à ce propos les monuments linguistiques de cette époque?

En ce qui concerne le XIV^e siècle, il y a pas mal de monuments linguistiques à la disposition des chercheurs. Il est vrai qu'ils nous viennent souvent de la plume des copistes des étapes suivantes, ce qui signifie qu'il faut toujours mettre un point d'interrogation sur la valeur de ces données. Tout de même, ils forment une documentation assez riche pour pouvoir faire un tableau solide de la première période du développement de la langue écrite turque-oghousse en Anatolie.¹

La place occupée par cette époque dans l'évolution de l'histoire de la langue turque de Turquie et des langues turques a toujours été un sujet d'actualité pour les turcologues. Ce n'est pas un hasard que la plupart des éditions et des analyses des monuments linguistiques se soit attachée à cette période.²

Dans la littérature turcologique, la langue de cette époque était appelée

1. Cf. M. MANSUROĞLU, *Das Altosmanische*, *Philologiae Turcicae Fundamenta*, Tomus primus, Aquis Mattiacis ([Wiesbaden] 1959) p. 161-182; GY. HAZAI, *Kurze Einführung in das Studium der türkischen Sprache*, (Budapest - Wiesbaden 1978) p. 26-30; M. ADAMOVIĆ, *Konjugationsgeschichte der türkischen Sprache*, (Leiden 1985) p. 8-26; V.G. GUZEV, *Untersuchungen zur Turksprache Kleinasiens vom 13. bis zum 16. Jahrhundert*, *Handbuch der türkischen Sprachwissenschaft*, Teil I. GY. HAZAI, ed., (Budapest - Wiesbaden 1990) p. 35-62.

2. La bibliographie des monuments linguistiques édités v. dans les ouvrages mentionnés.

longtemps “vieille-osmanlie”.³ Par ce terme on a voulu exprimer qu’entre la période saldjouque et la période ottomane suivante on ne peut pas constater une différence qui nierait la continuité historique de la langue oghouze en Anatolie. Plus tard, tout de même, “l’ancien turc anatolien” est devenu le nom accepté pour la langue de l’époque. Sans doute était-ce plutôt le résultat du désir de trouver le terme qui corresponde correctement aux réalités historiques. Car il était évident qu’il était anachronique de nommer “osmanlie” cette langue, dont les monuments représentatifs étaient nés dans les sphères culturelles indépendantes des Ottomans.

Les chercheurs de l’ancien turc anatolien du XIV^e siècle ont examiné les monuments linguistiques sous deux aspects. D’une part en les comparant à ceux de l’époque suivante, où l’on pouvait constater une continuité organique. D’autre part en faisant également des incursions en direction de l’époque précédente, afin de chercher une réponse à certaines questions importantes. On peut les résumer comme suit: comment peut on expliquer la présence des éléments “turcs-orientaux” dans les monuments linguistiques de l’époque, dont la langue à cause de cette spécificité, a été souvent caractérisée par le nom “olğa-bolğa dili”? Cela nous amène à poser la deuxième question: est-ce que l’on pourrait considérer ces traits comme des traces de la tradition d’une langue écrite des Turcs-Oghouzes déjà née à l’époque précédente? Autrement dit: est-ce que ce sont les ouvrages anatoliens du XIV^e siècle qui doivent être considérés comme les premiers témoignages de l’écriture des Oghouzes?⁴ Après une discussion des chercheurs sur ce sujet on voit certaines choses plus clairement. Mais en même temps il est évident que la recherche n’a pas encore dit son dernier mot.

En ce qui concerne les éléments “turcs orientaux” des monuments linguistiques, l’on est arrivé déjà à un certain consensus. Les chercheurs n’essayent plus de lier cette couche spécifique à une source dialectale anatolienne. Ils acceptent plutôt le fait que ces éléments aient pénétré dans la langue grâce à l’influence de la tradition littéraire et des relations spirituelles permanentes avec la région turque orientale. Le fait qu’au cours du développement de la langue turque anatolienne ces éléments aient été rapidement absorbés ou éliminés, soutient nettement cette explication. En même temps, il est évident que seules l’édition et l’analyse systématique de tous les monuments sur une base numérique nous présentera un tableau exact de ces phénomènes.

A propos de l’autre problème la discussion va sûrement continuer, car la découverte d’un monument linguistique, qui pourrait nous éclairer plus nettement sur le développement de la langue à cette époque est tout à fait improbable. Mais pour le linguiste, l’examen des problèmes liés à la période de l’apparition des monuments linguistiques et celui des problèmes liés aux époques suivantes sont

3. H. VÉMBÉRY, *Das Altosmanische*, (Leiden 1901); A. ZAJACZKOWSKI, *Études sur la langue vieille osmanlie*, [1-2] (Kraków 1934-1937); M. MANSUROĞLU, *op. cit.* etc.

4. A ce propos v. HAZAI, *Kurze Einführung*, p. 39-48.

de même importance. Il s'agit ici du problème de l'étude de l'évolution suivie par la langue depuis la parution de ses premiers monuments jusqu'à nos jours, en déterminant la place de la première phase dans cette évolution. Dans ce contexte les questions sont à formuler comme suit: quels sont les changements qui attestent la structure de la langue à travers les siècles? Quelles différences peut-on constater entre l'idiome central et les dialectes? Quel est l'arrière-fonds chronologique de ce développement? Autrement dit: comment peut-on diviser en époques l'histoire de la langue, cette fois-ci en se limitant exclusivement au domaine de la structure linguistique? En même temps quelle voie d'évolution peut-on observer dans les dialectes? Dans quelle mesure suivent-ils les changements de l'idiome central ou gardent-ils des traits archaïques?⁵

Essayons d'esquisser une réponse à ces questions, en partant toujours du principe que le XIV^e siècle, sujet de notre symposium, doit se trouver au centre de notre intérêt. La comparaison de l'ancien turc anatolien avec le turc de Turquie de nos jours, prouve que du point de vue de la structure il y a très peu de changements: dans le système phonologique les changements *ğ:y o et n:n, m*, dans le système morphologique l'accomplissement spectaculaire de l'harmonie labiale et illabiale des voyelles, qui dans le cas des suffixes donne, au lieu des types de suffixe à deux variantes, des types de suffixe à quatre variantes; dans le système de la morphologie la disparition de certaines catégories (*isar, ıci, gil* etc.) et en même temps l'apparition des nouvelles formes (présent *ıyor* et futur *acak*), certains changements dans le contexte sémantique des catégories morphologiques. Notre attention est concentrée exclusivement sur la structure de la langue, c'est pourquoi nous ne touchons pas les problèmes de l'immense transformation du lexique de la langue à travers les siècles.

Le XIV^e siècle, dont la langue est caractérisée par l'état ancien des phénomènes, forme le point de départ du développement, montré plus haut. Du point de vue de leur caractère, les monuments linguistiques du XIV^e siècle présentent une continuité que l'on retrouve dans l'époque suivante, où ils sont de plus en plus liés à la cour ottomane, qui s'est établie à partir de 1453, à Istanbul. En même temps, ils attestent d'une certaine homogénéité, dont il est difficile de dire si elle est le reflet de la réalité ou la conséquence de l'écriture arabe qui cache les phénomènes. En tout cas il est clair que dans le tableau c'est plutôt l'unité qui domine que les différences. En même temps il est clair qu'en examinant toutes les données des monuments linguistiques avec une méthode numérique, on pourra mettre à jour l'arrière fonds territorial pour certains phénomènes uniquement. Même grâce à l'application de cette méthode on ne peut pas espérer un tableau clair des dialectes de cette époque.⁶

5. A ce sujet v. HAZAI, *op. cit.*, p. 48-60.

6. Pour l'application de la méthode numérique v. GY. HAZAI, *Das Osmanisch-Türkische im XVII. Jahrhundert. Untersuchungen an den Transkriptionstexten von Jakob Nagy de Harsány*, (Budapest - The Hague - Paris 1973).

Il ne faut pas oublier que ces monuments linguistiques reflètent la période de la stabilisation de la langue écrite et sa transformation en langue littéraire. Dans cette période c'est l'effort vers l'homogénéité qui s'impose comme le plus important facteur du développement.

Il est vrai que le linguiste qui analyse les monuments linguistiques des siècles suivants, se trouve dans la même situation. Les monuments linguistiques précieux de la langue turque, qui sont écrits en écritures étrangères reflètent aussi pour la plupart l'histoire de l'idiome central, c'est à dire, la langue d'Istanbul. Bien sûr il y a des exceptions qui confirment la règle. Mais le canal de cette information représente un part très faible dans la documentation linguistique. En fait on pourra présenter une histoire des dialectes turcs presque exclusivement par l'étude comparative soigneuse des dialectes contemporains de la langue turque.

Dans l'esquisse de l'histoire des dialectes turcs, l'histoire du domaine linguistique qui est l'espace de vie des différentes variantes territoriales de la langue, et qui se trouve en changements permanents à travers les siècles, doit avoir une place extraordinaire. Les recherches, jusqu'à nos jours, n'ont pas accordé à cette question toute l'attention qu'elle mériterait. On a accepté la constatation de Tadeusz Kowalski, publiée dans les années trente dans sa récapitulation dialectologique, qui sans doute était correcte à son époque, que l'on ne sait presque rien sur l'histoire du territoire linguistique.⁷

La situation est bien différente aujourd'hui. Il est bien connu que les recherches historiques ont fait de grands progrès au cours des décennies précédentes. Des sources importantes sur l'histoire de la population de l'Empire Ottoman ont été découvertes, éditées et examinées. On sait plus de choses au sujet des migrations, des processus interéthniques, de l'influence et de l'effet des guerres, des catastrophes naturelles etc. sur le cens de la population. Je me permets ici de mentionner qu'à notre symposium la plupart des conférences a touché ces problèmes, et *nolens volens* a contribué avec ses données à l'histoire de la population, et ainsi également à la formation du territoire linguistique. A l'avenir le linguiste qui examinera l'histoire des dialectes devra obligatoirement prêter attention à cette documentation bien enrichie, mais malheureusement pas assez systématisée. C'est sans doute un domaine où le linguiste et l'historien doivent travailler ensemble.

En ce qui concerne l'arrière fonds chronologique des événements de l'histoire de la langue, tout d'abord il faut souligner un postulat méthodologique important. Il découle de ce que nous avons dit, et s'applique aux relations de l'idiome central et des dialectes et à l'état des sources à ce propos. Dans l'état actuel des choses le linguiste ne peut envisager que la description de l'histoire de l'idiome central, en essayant ainsi de répondre aux questions qui sont liées à la chronologie de son évolution. Mais dans ce contexte on doit attribuer une attention particulière à l'homogénéité des sources.

7. T. KOWALSKI, "Osmanisch-türkische Dialekte", *EI*, v. IV, p. 991-1010.

Selon les renseignements de nos sources pour les changements dans la structure de l'idiome central, lié à Istanbul, on peut constater la chronologie suivante. La simplification de l'inventaire morphologique se déroule dans la plus ancienne phase du développement. La même époque montre dans le secteur de la phonologie et de la morphologie l'état ancien, c'est à dire le point de départ du développement. L'apparition des traits de l'étape suivante, bien entendu avec un rôle marginal peut être observée à la dernière phase de cette époque.

L'élargissement des changements dans la structure phonologique et morphologique forme une phase indépendante dans l'histoire de la langue. Parallèlement à cette évolution, les deux catégories morphologiques nouvelles trouvent aussi leurs places dans la langue et se stabilisent: ce sont le présent *iyor* et le futur *acak*. L'accomplissement de tous ces changements signifie la fin de cette époque et le commencement d'une autre qui continue même de nos jours.

Selon la terminologie traditionnelle, la première époque, dont les caractéristiques sont mentionnées dans les plus anciens documents linguistiques, et qui dure jusqu'à la fin du XV^e siècle, est nommée "vieille-osmanlie". La période suivante qui comprend les XVI^e, XVII^e et XVIII^e siècles a reçu le nom de moyen-osmanlie. L'époque du nouvel-osmanli commence au début du XIX^e siècle.⁸ Il est bien compréhensible que l'utilisation de ces termes est un compromis qui s'explique pour des raisons techniques: l'application des termes "ancien turc anatolien" ou "le turc de Turquie" pour la division de l'histoire de la langue par époque serait liée à des difficultés, et même à certaines contradictions historiques.

Après avoir présenté ce bref tableau de l'évolution de la langue et de sa chronologie je voudrais souligner à nouveau que ce modèle ne caractérise que l'idiome central dans le réseau des variantes territoriales de la langue turque qui est devenu le prédécesseur de la langue commune contemporaine, y compris aussi les dialectes, qui, comme nous allons le voir, ont suivi ce développement. Le modèle ne caractérise que cette zone territoriale de la langue. Le reste du territoire linguistique historique de la langue turque, formée par la conquête Ottomane, présente un tableau complètement différent. Le développement des dialectes turcs était bien loin d'être simultané à celui de la zone centrale. Ils ont préservé des traits archaïques, caractéristiques des étapes anciennes de l'évolution de la langue, qui formaient souvent le point de départ d'un développement abérrant.⁹

La liaison organique de l'idiome central avec un certain territoire ne s'observe qu'en Roumélie de l'Est et dans le Nord-Ouest de l'Anatolie. Les dialectes des autres secteurs de l'Anatolie présentent la préservation des traces

8. A ce propos v. HAZAI, *Kurze Einführung*, p. 60-66. Pour une autre théorie concernant les époques de l'histoire de la langue turque de Turquie v. ADAMOVIĆ, *op. cit.*, 309-334.

9. Cf. GY. HAZAI, *Zu einigen balkanischen Momenten bei der Herausbildung der türkischen Literatursprache*, *Studies in Honour of Julius Németh*, (Budapest 1976) p. 341-345.

archaïques en proportion de l'éloignement d'Istanbul. Les traits archaïques les plus marquants sautent aux yeux en Anatolie de l'Est et en Roumélie de l'Ouest (en Bulgarie occidentale et en Macédoine ex-Yougoslave), reflétant fidèlement un phénomène bien connu dans l'évolution des langues, à savoir que les zones marginales du territoire linguistique représentent toujours un ancien stade de l'évolution linguistique.

Tout est la conséquence évidente de l'évolution territoriale du pouvoir ottoman et des facteurs économiques et culturels qui en ont résulté. Le fait historique que la réalisation de la nouvelle unité politique de l'Anatolie est devenu liée à un centre occidental, plus exactement à une force militaire et politique, qui dans la formation de ses plans et de ses actions a accordé une préférence à l'orientation vers l'Ouest, notamment vers les Balkans, et Istanbul a déterminé la future direction de l'évolution territoriale de la langue turque. Le grand aiguillage des changements qui ont initié et déterminé le développement de la langue turque est lié à la période de la naissance du pouvoir ottoman, et ainsi au siècle dont l'histoire est le sujet de notre symposium.

THE LEGEND OF OSMAN GAZI

Colin IMBER

All modern accounts of the foundation of the Ottoman Empire and the reign of Osman I still rely very largely on the earliest Ottoman sources: the *Anonymous Chronicles* and the *Histories* of Oruç and Aşıkpaşazade. The various recensions of Oruç and of the *Anonymous Chronicles* are very similar to one another and obviously derive from an original text, no longer extant, dating from 1422 or very shortly afterwards. Aşıkpaşazade's *History*, including his account of the reign of Osman I, is much longer and more detailed, but still makes use of the same material as is found in the Anonymous/Oruç texts. The modern tendency has been to accept all this material as being in essence, if not in detail, true. Modern historians still, for example, accept Aşıkpaşazade's stories of Osman's "companion" Köse Mihal, his "general" Turgut Alp, and his "son" Alaeddin Pasha, as historically accurate. The plain fact is, however, that almost none of the material in these texts is even remotely historical, and that to discover this, one usually has to look no further than the texts themselves. The figure of Köse Mihal, best developed in Aşıkpaşazade's *History*, provides a good example.

This character's first appearance in Ottoman literature is in the earliest recension of Oruç's *History*, dating probably from 1467. This is the story of how the Prophet appeared to Mihal –not yet Köse Mihal– in a dream and directed him to join Osman.¹ This motif of conversion in a dream is a topos of popular Islamic literature,² and as such does not inspire confidence in Oruç's tale as an accurate historical record. The passage is also an interpolation unskillfully inserted into the redactor's base-text. The question then is why did the redactor –evidently Oruç himself– choose to add this passage to his narrative. The answer is fairly obvious. A comparison between the Anonymous texts and the Oruç texts shows that the former have a number of tales set in Anatolia (such as the infidel-chopping dervish who captured Yalova single-handed),³ which are absent from the latter.

1. This passage is discussed in V.L. MÉNAGE, On the recensions of Oruç's "History of the Ottomans", *BSOAS*, 30 (1967) 314-322.

2. For a discussion of another legend where this motif appears, see P. WITTEK, The taking of Aydos Castle, a ghazi legend transformed, in: G. MAKDISI (ed.), *Arabic and Islamic Studies in Honour of Hamilton A.R. Gibb*, (1965) p. 662-672.

3. GIESE, *Chroniken*, v. I, p. 11.

This is not surprising since Oruç himself was a Rumelian, a native of Edirne. Now a leading Rumelian family in Oruç's time, and leaders of the Rumelian *akıncı*s were the Mihaloğulları. It is not surprising therefore that Oruç should wish to give this family a leading role in history, and so invented a family-ancestor as a companion for Osman, the ancestor of the Ottoman Sultans. Oruç makes the Prophet tell Mihal in his dream that he will carry "the standard of Islam as far as Hungary." This is simply a reference to the role, in Oruç's time, of the Mihaloğulları as *akıncı* commanders, leading raids usually against the Hungarians.

However, Oruç's text is crude, and it remained to Aşıkpaşazade to present Mihal –by now Köse Mihal– as a convincing character.⁴ Aşıkpaşazade adopts Oruç's story of Mihal's conversion, but displaces it in the narrative. It is only after the fall of Bilecik, long after he had become Osman's companion, that Köse Mihal converts to Islam after the Prophet had appeared to him in a dream. Up to this point he remains a Christian. Now the reason he remains a Christian is because Aşıkpaşazade –a master story-teller– requires Osman to have a Christian companion to act as an intermediary between himself and his Christian adversaries. Before the appearance of Köse Mihal in the story, Aşıkpaşazade creates the figure of a *martolos* to fulfill the same role,⁵ *martolos* being a Rumelian term for a Christian in Turkish service, which would have been familiar to Aşıkpaşazade's Rumelian audience. In fact, to explain the presence of Köse Mihal in Aşıkpaşazade's *History*, one need look no further than the structure of the narrative. However, there is no doubt that to Aşıkpaşazade's listeners, Köse Mihal would have appeared a convincing figure. His *History* must have taken shape when he was in Rumelia, largely, one may assume, as entertainment for his *akıncı* companions, and they must often have witnessed Christian lords who, like Köse Mihal, fought alongside Muslims and eventually accepted Islam.

A further development in the Köse Mihal stories is that Aşıkpaşazade makes him lord of Harmankaya, near Bursa. This is easily explicable, since an early sixteenth-century cadastral register of the district shows that a member of the Mihaloğlu family, Mihaloğlu Ali (*d.* c1500) had in fact purchased Harmankaya as a freeholding.⁶ The register does not give the date of the purchase. However, Mihaloğlu Ali was a younger contemporary of Aşıkpaşazade and it seems more than likely that they knew each other personally. Thus, in making Ali's fictitious "ancestor" lord of Harmankaya, Aşıkpaşazade was merely celebrating a friend's new acquisition.

Aşıkpaşazade's stories of Osman's supposed "son" Alaeddin Pasha, the imaginary founder of the *yaya* infantry,⁷ are also fictitious. Again, this is quite

4. AŞIKPAŞAZADE (Ali), *passim*.

5. AŞIKPAŞAZADE (Ali), p. 5.

6. BARKAN-MERİÇLİ, nos 540, 556.

7. AŞIKPAŞAZADE (Ali), p. 37-40.

apparent from a casual glance at the texts. This “son” appears first in Oruç and the *Anonymous Chronicles*,⁸ and must therefore have figured in the non-extant chronicle of 1422/3 from which these texts evidently derive. These chronicles, however, name the “son” not as Alaeddin Pasha, but as Ali Pasha, and tell two stories about him. The first of these is that he renounced the rulership in favour of his brother Orhan, and the second is that he advised his brother to dress his troops in red hats (*börk*), while dressing his own slaves in white ones. Most of the Anonymous/Oruç texts conclude with a remark that “levying *yayas* in Anatolia dates from Orhan’s time”, implying that the troops in white hats were *yayas*. Modern historians have tended to accept this tale as a genuine historical episode, which it clearly is not.

Two features of the chronicle texts show that the Ali Pasha story is an interpolation, evidently by the redactor of 1422/3. In the first place it is blindingly obvious that the tale relates not to the origin of the *yayas*, but to the origins of the *azabs* and the Janissaries who, in the fifteenth century, wore respectively red and white hats. Furthermore, the description in the texts of the troops in white as “slaves attached to” Orhan makes it obvious that the reference is to the Janissaries. The *yayas* were not slaves, whereas the Janissaries were. If further proof is needed, the Anonymous Chronicle text published by Ertaylan concludes the description of the troops in white hats with the (incomplete) phrase “became Janissaries”. The same text attributes the origins of the *yayas* not to Orhan but to Yıldırım Bayezid.⁹ The reason why most redactors have suppressed any reference to the Janissaries and instead identified the troops with *yayas*, is because later in the text they have inserted a story attributing the foundation of the Janissaries and their white hats to Murad I, hence the need to alter the earlier story which attributes their foundation to Ali Pasha. The second indication that this passage is an interpolation occurs earlier in the texts, in an episode where Osman distributes lands to his son Orhan and to his other relatives and followers. Ali Pasha was not a beneficiary of Osman’s largesse, obviously because his name did not appear in the base text, from which the redactor of 1422/3 compiled his chronicle. However, because this redactor later inserted a story about Ali Pasha, he had to explain why he received no lands, and so added the explanatory sentence: “Now Osman had another son whom he called Ali Pasha. He did not let him leave his side”.¹⁰ This “explanation” appears in all subsequent texts.

A clue to the source of the Ali Pasha stories comes not from a Turkish source, but from the Egyptian chronicle of Ibn Hajar al-Askalani (*d.* 1449). Under the heading of *Necrologies* for the year 796, Ibn Hajar has inserted, as an anachronistic death notice for Murad I, a list of Ottoman rulers, together with a few brief sentences on the origins of the Ottomans and on the virtues of each

8. GIESE, *Chroniken*, p. 14; ORUC (Babinger), p. 15-16.

9. I.H. ERTAYLAN, *Tevarih-i Al-i Osman*, (Istanbul 1946) p. 22-23.

10. ORUC (Babinger), p. 12; GIESE, *Chroniken*, p. 7.

ruler.¹¹ It is clear that Ibn Hajar has inserted this passage as a block with no major emendations, since in its genealogy and chronology it is at variance with his other genealogical and chronological entries relating to the Ottomans. Furthermore, since most of the material in it reflects themes familiar from the “canonical” Turkish chronicles, one may assume that it is in essence an Arabic abridgement of a Turkish chronicle composed after the death of Murad I in 1389 and probably before 1400. In one respect, however, it departs from the familiar tradition, and this is in the succession of Ottoman rulers. Instead of giving the succession as *Osman - Orhan - Murad*, it inserts an extra Sultan to give *Osman - Ardan Ali - Adrahan* (for “*Orhan*”) - *Murad*. In other words, an Ottoman tradition parallel to the one largely preserved in the Anonymous/Oruç texts, places a Sultan called (Ardan) Ali between Osman and Orhan.

This (Ardan) Ali must be the same as Ali Pasha and explains the interpolation in the text of 1422/3. The redactor clearly had two sources, one giving the succession as *Osman - Orhan*, and the other giving it as *Osman - (Ardan) Ali - Orhan*. He clearly accepted the *Osman - Orhan* succession as historically accurate, but instead of eliminating the figure of (Ardan) Ali/Ali Pasha from his story, he harmonised the discrepancy between his sources by changing Ali from Orhan’s father to Orhan’s brother. It is clear that this second source also contained a story attributing to Ali the foundation of the *azabs* and the Janissaries, since the redactor has clumsily adapted this to his base-text by changing Janissaries to *yayas*. In short, the redactor created Orhan’s “brother” Ali Pasha by a process of textual emendation. His motives in doing so were, however, as much ideological as literary. In changing Ali Pasha from Orhan’s father to Orhan’s brother, he had to assume that when Orhan succeeded, Ali Pasha had voluntarily renounced his claim to the rulership. Having made this assumption, and having stated that Ali Pasha “became a dervish”, the redactor concludes the tale with the words: “In those days Padishahs and lords took counsel with one another... and did not kill one another.” In other words, the redactor is using his newly created story as an exemplary one, to attack the Ottoman practice of royal fratricide. This is scarcely surprising, since he was evidently at work on his text in 1422/3. Not only would a writer at this date have experienced the fratricides of the Ottoman civil war between 1402 and 1413, but he would have been composing his text in the midst of a new civil war which ended with the hanging of Murad II’s uncle “Düzme” Mustafa in February, 1422 and the strangling of his brother “Küçük” Mustafa in January, 1423. The Ali Pasha story is, in fact, an expression of disgust at contemporary events.

Aşıkpaşazade also uses the Ali Pasha story, with many embellishments (such as the topos of the empty Treasury) and a significant change. The change

11. IBN HAJAR AL-'ASKALANI (ed. HASAN HABASHI), *Inba' al-ghumr bi-anba' al-'umr*, (Cairo 1969-72) v. 1, p. 484; Ş. INALCIK, Ibn Hacer'de Osmanlılar'a dair haberler, *AÜDTCED*, 6 (1948) 524.

is in the name of Orhan's "brother" which, in Aşıkpaşazade, is no longer Ali Pasha, but Alaeddin Pasha. He concludes the story with an account of the origin of the term *enük yaya*, used for a class of infantryman. The source of the change from Ali to Alaeddin Pasha is easy to identify. The *Memoirs* of Constantine Mihailović who served the Sultan, probably as a Janissary between the 1450s and 1463, contain a brief *History* of the Ottoman dynasty. This "history" lists a Sultan called Alaeddin, between Osman and Orhan. Mihailović attributes to this Sultan the foundation of an infantry corps called *yeni kehaye*, whom he dressed in white hats.¹² This tradition –half-remembered in Mihailović's version– was obviously also familiar to Aşıkpaşazade who, under its influence, changed the Ali Pasha of the Anonymous/Oruç to Alaeddin Pasha. Furthermore, the term *yeni kehaye* in Mihailović was clearly a misunderstanding of the term *enük yaya*¹³ and explains the somewhat inconsequential appearance of this term in Aşıkpaşazade's text.

In sum, therefore, the figure of Alaeddin Pasha arose from several apocryphal traditions of the early Sultans. Like Köse Mihal, he is entirely fictitious. So too are the other companions and followers of Osman Gazi.

The early Ottoman chronicles are typical of much pseudohistory in that they derive personal names from place names, and weave biographies around the characters thus created. This process is most evident in the passage, common to all the chronicles, where Osman distributes land to his followers. To the names of Hasan Alp and Turgut Alp, the texts add the comment: "The name of these *gazis* is still remembered nowadays" with some, including Aşıkpaşazade, adding that the villages in question are called Turgudeli.¹⁴ The late fifteenth – and early sixteenth – century cadastral registers of the Bursa sanjak confirm that "Hasan" and "Turgut" were indeed common elements in the toponyms of the region. However, "Hasan" is too common an element in Turkish place-names in general to link it to a person. *Turgut* and *Turgudeli* derive demonstrably from a pre-Ottoman name. The form in which this name appears in Ptolemy (2nd century) is *Dagouta*,¹⁵ but more to the point is a reference in Constantine Porphyrogenitus (*d.* 959) to a people or district near Mt. Olympus called *Dagotthenoi*.¹⁶ This name is obviously what underlies *Turgudeli* which Turkish speakers, by a process of folk-etymology, understood to mean "Turgud's land". The next step in the process was the emergence of Turgut Alp as the conqueror of this district. Similar folk-etymologies created the figures of Akça Koca, the conqueror of Kocaeli; of Kara Mürsel, the conqueror of the town of that name; and of Konur Alp, the conqueror

12. CONSTANTINE MIHAILOVIĆ, *Memoirs of a Janissary*, ed. and trans. B. STOLZ - S. SOUCEK, (Ann Arbor 1975) p. 34-35.

13. Cf. MÉNAGE, *BSOAS*, 40 (1971) 159.

14. ORUC (Babinger), p. 12; AŞIKPAŞAZADE (Ali) p. 20-21.

15. *Geography*, Book 5, Chapter 4, para. 14.

16. CONSTANTINE PORPHYROGENITUS, *De Thematibus*, ed. NIEBUHR, (Bonn 1811), v. III, p. 25.

of Konurpa. *Konur*, like *Turgut* and *Hasan*, is a common element in the toponyms of the region, and may possibly preserve the name of the former Byzantine ecclesiastical province, *Honorias*. Thus Hasan Alp, Turgut Alp, Konur Alp, Akça Koca and Kara Mürsel are not historical figures but the creations of folk-etymology.

Folk-etymology was also responsible for creating some of the "historical" events of Osman's reign. This is most evident in Aşıkpaşazade who, for example, uses the place-name Taşakyazusu ("testicle-plain") to create a tale of how the Seljuk Sultan Alaeddin defeated and castrated a Tatar army.¹⁷ The village name İteşeni ("scratched up by dogs") inspired him to tell the story of the ignominious burial of an infidel who had killed Osman's brother.¹⁸ Aşıkpaşazade must also have known the story which appears in all the recensions (made between 1513 and 1538) of Spandounis' *History* of the Ottomans. This tale, evidently a reflection of a genuine Turkish tradition, makes Dinboz the first town which the Ottomans conquered. Spandounis explains that the name in Turkish means "change of Faith" (*din bozmak*), and that the town's fall was therefore an omen of future Turkish conquests.¹⁹ Here too folk-etymology has created the story of a battle. Aşıkpaşazade, however, has re-worked the Dinboz tradition and merged it with the story of another battle which appears in the Anonymous/Oruç. In these texts, Osman fights a battle near Koyunhisar, in which his brother (or in other recensions, nephew) Gündüz, is killed. Gündüz, these texts relate, lies buried at a place called "Turk's grave". Once again a popular etymology of a toponym has associated a place—evidently a local shrine—with the grave of an Ottoman prince and created a battle scene in order to explain why the supposed prince should be buried in such an unlikely spot. The story appears in Aşıkpaşazade, but the site of the battle has been displaced from Koyunhisar to nearby Dinboz.²⁰ He probably made this change in order to accommodate the tradition, preserved by Spandounis, of a battle at Dinboz. At whatever location, however, the battle derives from popular etymology rather than history.

This small sampling of the personalities and events of Osman Gazi's reign is enough to demonstrate that, as historical records, the early Ottoman chronicles are without value. However obvious this may be, it has not prevented historians in the twentieth century from using them as a basis for theories of Ottoman origins. The main contestants are the "nomad" theory and the "gazi" theory. The first theory, in essence, accepts the story in the Turkish chronicles that Osman was the leader of a tribe. The second theory rejects this view and maintains that Osman was the leader of a *gazi* corporation", and that these "gazi" origins of the

17. AŞIKPAŞAZADE (Ali), p. 9.

18. AŞIKPAŞAZADE (Ali), p. 8.

19. For the passage in the 1513 recension, see CHRISTIANE VILLAIN-GANDOSSI, *La Méditerranée aux XII^e-XVI^e siècles*, (London 1983), III, p. 158-160; for the emended passage in the 1538 recension, see SATHAS, *Documents*, v. IX, p. 138-139.

20. ORUC (Babinger), p. 13; AŞIKPAŞAZADE (Ali), p. 21.

state determined the course of Ottoman history. Another theory attempts to reconcile the two, by explaining how Osman and his followers made the transition from nomad to *gazi*. To these theories, one may add two more traditional stories of Ottoman origins which occur in "authentic" sources. The first appears in Mihailović's *Memoirs* and in the Italian *Historia Turchesca* of 1514,²¹ both of which probably reflect traditions current among the *kapıkulu* troops, among whom Mihailović and the informants for the *Historia* served. This tradition makes Osman not a nomad but a peasant. The second appears first in Ibn Hajar who says of the Ottomans: "It is said that they are descended from the Arabs of the Hijaz," and in Enveri's *Düsturname* of c1465. Enveri in effect glosses Ibn Hajar's rather bald statement by telling a long story which makes the male ancestor of the dynasty a Companion of the Prophet and hence an Arab of the Hijaz.²²

Since the most elementary textual analysis shows that almost all the "facts" about Osman Gazi and his followers are actually fiction, it would be unwise to accept unreservedly any theory of Ottoman origins. A more fruitful approach would be to identify each separate tradition concerning the origins of the Ottoman Empire and to establish why and, if possible, when and where it arose.

The tradition which makes Osman the leader of a nomadic tribe must, as Wittek convincingly showed, have arisen in conjunction with the fictional Ottoman genealogy which makes the dynasty descend in the senior line from Oğuz Khan. This first appears c1425 in the work of Yazıncızade Ali who derived his Oğuz materials from the Persian of Rashid al-Din. Different versions of the genealogy emerged during the fifteenth century, but all make Osman, by virtue of descent, the leader of all the Oğuz.²³ Since the epics of Oğuz Khan and his descendants present their heroes as leaders of tribes, it follows that Osman too must be a tribal chief. Hence the "nomadic" materials in the Ottoman chronicles.

The theory of Osman as a leader of *gazis* is the formulation of Paul Wittek and dates from the 1930s. Wittek did not, strictly speaking, find the proof for his theory in the Anonymous/Oruç or in Aşıkpaşazade. These do, it is true, portray Osman as a *gazi* but this picture, as Wittek noticed, is at odds with their depiction of him as a tribesman. Wittek's proof-text was the earlier *History of the Ottoman Kings* by Ahmedi (c1400), which opens with a passage on the merits of *gaza* and presents each Ottoman ruler as a *gazi*. The problem with this proof is that Ahmedi was a moralist rather than a historian and, in particular, that his *History* contains a line which, if anything, undermines the "gazi theory". This reads: "Those servants of religion flowed (*aktılar*) against the infidels / So they gave *gaza* the name *akın*."²⁴ In other words, the terms which Ahmedi heard in daily use were not *gaza* / *gazi*, but *akın* / *akıncı*, and it is the moralist Ahmedi himself who is providing them with a religious gloss by giving them in their Arabic form.

21. DONADO DA LEZZE, *Historia Turchesca*, ed. I. URSU, (Bucharest 1910) p. 1-10.

22. ENVERI, *Düsturname*, ed. M.H. YINANÇ, (Istanbul 1928) p. 73-74.

23. C. IMBER, *The Ottoman Dynastic Myth, Turcica*, 19 (1987) 16-20.

24. AHMEDİ, *Iskendername*, ed. ISMAIL ÜNVER, (Ankara 1983) p. 66a.

Essentially, the Arabic *gazi*, as it appears in early Ottoman texts is simply a calque on the Turkish *akıncı*. In the early Ottoman chronicles, the terms are often in fact interchangeable, and this provides a clue to the source of the “*gazi*” element in these works. It is clear from his own autobiographical details that Aşıkpaşazade served as an *akıncı* in Rumelia between c1430 and c1450, and that much of his chronicle must have taken shape as an entertainment for his warrior companions. Similarly, the chronicle of Oruç is a Rumelian text, and it is more than likely that some of the stories in it, including the conversion of Mihal, also circulated among the Rumelian *akıncıs*. Hence the picture of Osman as a *gazi* / *akıncı* in the chronicle texts, does not reflect a historical reality about Osman: it reflects the milieu in which the tales about him formed.

The tradition which presents Osman and his father as peasants survives today only in Mihailović²⁵ and the *Historia Turchesca*. It was evidently more widespread in the fifteenth century, since a fragment of the tale remains embedded in the 1467 Oruç. A seemingly inconsequential sentence in this text reads (with a slight emendation): “When Osman was small, (his father) Ertuğrul made him plough.”²⁶ Later in the narrative, Ertuğrul and his sons, presented as tribesmen, go to the summer pasture. Now pastoral tribesmen do not plough, and the intrusive sentence is evidently a relic of the tradition which makes Ertuğrul and his son Osman peasants. To harmonise it with the rest of the text, the redactor has added the phrase: “When Osman was small”, indicating that when he was older and went to the summer pasture, he no longer had to plough. The “peasant tradition” in Mihailović has produced a story about how Osman captured a fortress by smuggling in weapons hidden in sacks of grain. Aşıkpaşazade obviously knew the same story, but made an important modification. In his version, Osman captured the fortified town of Bilecik by bringing in warriors and weapons hidden in the felt wrappings of the oxen which habitually carried his goods into Bilecik for safe-keeping, while he went to the summer-pasture.²⁷ Here too there is an obvious adaptation from the “peasant” to the “nomad” tradition. The origin of the “peasant-tradition” is not obvious. Since it appears in Mihailović and the *Historia Turchesca*, it was probably current among the *kapıkulu* troops, many of whom would originally have been *devşirme* lads. Most of these would have had a peasant background, and perhaps wished to portray the dynasty which they served in the light of their own experience of rising from the peasantry to the Sultan’s service.

The story which makes the Ottomans descend from “the Arabs of the Hijaz” or from a Companion of the Prophet, clearly served to legitimise the Ottoman dynasty by linking it directly to the Prophet. This tradition did not, it seems, survive Enveri.

25. CONSTANTINE MIHAILOVIĆ, *op. cit.*, p. 30-33.

26. ORUC (Babinger), p. 6.

27. AŞIKPAŞAZADE (Ali), p. 15-16.

Clearly none of the theories of Ottoman origins, ancient or modern, is tenable. Equally, almost all the traditional tales of Osman Gazi are fictitious. The best thing that a modern historian can do is to admit frankly that the earliest history of the Ottomans is a black hole. Any attempt to fill this hole will result simply in the creation of more fables.



OŞMĀN GHĀZĪ'S SIEGE OF NICAEA AND THE BATTLE OF BAPHEUS

Halil INALCIK

During the period 1075-1086 Nicaea became the capital city of the Seldjukid ruler Süleymānshāh I, founder of the Seldjukid Sultanate of Anatolia.¹ Lost to the Byzantines as a result of the siege by the crusaders from the West in 1097, its re-conquest remained a constant concern for the Seldjukids. Seldjukid rule was restored in Nicaea in 1105, but the city was lost again in ca. 1147 to the Byzantines.

The dry Eskişehir plain where the Turcomans were pushed back now became a frontier between Byzantines and Seldjukids. Pastoral Turcomans needed the hilly country with good mountain pasturelands beyond the borderline and quite often penetrated with their herds into Byzantine territory. Against them Emperor Manuel I Comnenus (1143-1180) built or reinforced fortresses on the border, including Karaca-Hisar on a mound just three kilometres from Eskişehir. However,

1. O. TURAN, *IA* (1967), s.v. "Süleyman-Şah I"; VRYONIS, *Decline*, p. 96-142; CAHEN, *Turquie Pré-ottomane*, p. 13-15; ALI SEVİM, *Anadolu Fatihî Kutalmışoğlu Süleymānşāh*, (Ankara TTK 1990); Süleymānşāh I conquered Nicaea in 1075 and made it the capital city of the Seldjukid Sultanate in Anatolia. The Emperor Alexios Komnenos recognized his possession of Nicaea with the treaty of Dragos-Creek (near Maltepe) in 1081. Upon Süleymānşāh's death in June 1086 (see ALI SEVİM, *op. cit.*, p. 37-39) the Seldjukid Sultan Melikşāh sent his general Porsuk, and then Bozan to take possession of the city. Abu'l Kasim, lieutenant of Süleymānşāh at Iznik, approached the emperor to be able to resist the Seldjukid emirs until he was put to death by Bozan in 1087. It is to be noted that Abu'l Kasim is credited with having conquered Nicomedia (Izmit) before he died. TURAN, *op. cit.*, p. 217-218, asserts that the state Süleymānşāh founded gave rise among the Turcomans in this part of Anatolia to a tradition of the "frontier state of the ghazis". The claim in the early Ottoman traditions that Süleymānşāh was the ancestor of 'Oşmān Ghāzī may be taken as evidence of such an enduring tradition over centuries. However ENVERİ, *Düsturname*, ed. M. H. YINANÇ, (Istanbul 1928) p. 6-8, 78, correcting the error on the basis of better sources, recognises Süleymānşāh as the son of Kutalmış and gives a different genealogy for 'Oşmān's ancestors. What is important here is that the re-conquest of Nicaea and revival of the Turkish-Muslim state of Iznik must have become the ultimate ambition among the Turcomans settled in this area. On the Seldjukid presence in Nicaea in general, see VRYONIS, *Decline*, p. 31-36, 52-58, 112-116, 146-155.

the crushing Seldjukid victory at Myriokephalon in 1176 totally changed the conditions on this frontier, encouraging the westward expansion of the Turcomans; for the Sultan's first condition for peace was the demolition of the recently built fortresses in the region.

Apparently the Seldjukids, in particular their frontier *ghāzīs*, never gave up the idea of the re-conquest of Nicaea for Islam. For Muslims, a land once made part of the *Dār al-Islām* is considered always an Islamic territory and its loss was believed to be only temporary. At any rate, after Süleymānshāh the Seldjukids seem to have always regarded Nicaea a city just at the border of their territory. In fact, when Ghiyās al-Dīn Mes'ūd II (1283-ca. 1301 and 1303-1308) had the Seldjukid Sultanate in Anatolia, bestowed upon him by the Mongol Khan, his territory was supposed to encompass all the lands "up to the border of Nicaea".²

Also, about 1261, when the Turcoman clans dependent on Sultan 'Izz al-Dīn Keykāvūs migrated to join him in Byzantium, "they went down to Iznik pretending that they were going to their own winter pastures, and in a short period of time from there many Turkish nomadic families (Türkevi) passed over to Europe".³ As will be seen below, 'Osmān Ghāzī's strategy leads us to believe that his ultimate goal was to re-conquer Nicaea. In effect, comparative examination of the Byzantine and Ottoman sources show that the battle of Bapheus itself was an episode which resulted from 'Osmān's attempt to capture Nicaea.

As a contemporary observer, Pachymeres is, in general, our most reliable source for 'Osmān's activities, in particular for the battle of Bapheus.⁴ In the introduction to his history, Pachymeres makes it clear that his account is based either on his own observations or the statements of those who were eye-witnesses of the events. Nevertheless, Pachymeres should be used critically, with comparison of his information with Ottoman traditions. For example, Pachymeres, as well as modern authors following him, seem to be mistaken in representing 'Osmān as active in lower Sangarius (Sakarya) prior to 1300. Confusion seems to originate from the fact that Pachymeres in his story, leaving 'Osmān aside for a moment, goes back to an earlier period when the Paphlagonian Çobanid emirs were involved in the activities in the area.⁵ In the Ottoman traditions it was Akça-Koca who

2. YAZIDJIZĀDE ALI, *Tarīkh-i Āl-i Selçuk*, Topkapı Palace Library, Revan Köşkü K. no 130, 517; on this source see A.S. ERZI, *IA*, s.v. "Ibn Bibi".

3. YAZIDJIZĀDE, *op. cit.*, p. 462-464.

4. George Pachymeres' account on 'Osmān Ghāzī's activities has been examined by various specialists including G. CARO, *Zur Chronologie der drei letzten Bücher des Pachymeres*, *BZ*, 6 (1897) 116ff.; ARNAKIS, p. 91ff., in particular note 153; F. TINNEFELD, *Pachymeres und Philes als Zeugen für ein frühes Unternehmen gegen die Osmanen*, *BZ*, 64 (1971) 46-54; E. A. ZACHARIADOU, *Pachymeres on the "Amourioi" of Kastamonu*, *BMGS*, 3 (1977) 57-70; Prof. Zachariadou most kindly clarified for me several points in the Greek text. I am also indebted to Timothy O. Baldwin for his translation for me of the whole section on 'Osmān into English.

5. ZACHARIADOU, *op. cit.*, argues that the digression dates back to the events of the

was active in the lower Sangarius area around Düz-Bazarı (Ada-Pazarı, today) down to Orkhan's time. Akça-Koca was an ally, and then a vassal, of 'Osmān Beg.

In fact, Pachymeres, going back to earlier times, describes the situation in Bithynia prior to the major confrontation at Bapheus in 1301. He tries first to explain how the defence of the region was weakened as a result of the inappropriate measures taken by the usurper Emperor Michael VIII Palaeologus in the 1260s. Greeks living in the district of Nicaea, Pachymeres tells us, rose up against the usurper, and harsh treatment of the rebels totally alienated the population in the region from him. When the Emperor abolished the tax exemptions of the native soldiers in the fortresses they did not hesitate, Pachymeres adds, to join the Turks. "Some of them even served them as guides", a fact confirmed by the Ottoman sources. The Greek historian denounces the governor of Nicaea for acting towards the population "as a bandit rather than a soldier". The monks living in the monasteries in the area were severely persecuted as heretics.⁶

And then, narrating co-Emperor Michael's campaign in western Anatolia in 1302, Pachymeres starts to tell us how 'Osmān became a pressing threat to the provinces close to Constantinople, Nicaea in particular. Summarising first in a digression the events preceding 'Osmān's raids "on the Sangarius river" he then tells us how 'Osmān crossed over the mountain (obviously the *Avdan* range in the Ottoman sources) and began to forage and pillage the land of "Halizones" on the coastal plain, on the peninsula of Nicomedia / Izmit.

Pachymeres gives details of the state of the blockade to which Nicaea was subjected following the Ottoman invasion of the surrounding areas. Its communication with Constantinople, he says, was cut off except through the road from Kios (Cius, Turkish *Gemilik* or *Gemlik*).⁷ Travellers stayed at Kios and crossed the land in the night to reach the lake and enter the city at the only gate which was left open. All the other gates, Pachymeres continues, were closed because the enemy forces had surrounded the city on all other sides. We shall return to this point of detail when we discuss the authenticity of the Ottoman tradition.

years 1290-1293, when Çobanid Ali, the chief of the Turcoman ghāzīs in the lower Sangarios, made peace with Byzantium and gave up raiding into the Byzantine territory. Then 'Osmān assumed the leadership of the ghāzīs and vigorously continued the raids, which resulted in the siege of Nicaea. The passage is discussed by H. İNALCIK, *CHI*, v. I, p. 267, and Y. YÜCEL, *Çoban-Oğulları Beyliği, Anadolu Beylikleri hakkında Araştırmalar* I, 2. ed. 1991; p. 33-51; it is a Seldjukid source, *Musamarat al-Akhbar* by AKSARAYI, ed. O. TURAN, (Ankara 1944), which threw light upon Pachymeres' account.

6. LAIOU, *Andronicus II*, p. 86-93; on the conditions of life of the Greeks on the frontier zone and the attitude toward the Ottomans early Ottoman traditions contain information confirming the Greek sources; on Ottoman conciliatory policy, *istimālet*, see H. İNALCIK, *Ottoman Methods of Conquest, Stulsl*, 2 (1954) 103-129.

7. Already Abu'l Kasim had built, obviously with the co-operation of the indigenous Greek craftsmen, a fleet at Kios/Gemlik around 1086; see Anna Comnena, apud VRYONIS, *Decline*, p. 481.

Like the Ottoman tradition, Pachymeres too, describes the battle of Bapheus as resulting from 'Oṣmān's blockade of Nicaea.

Here are the main points in Pachymeres' account of the events leading to the battle of Bapheus.

1. On the 27th of July Atman ('Oṣmān) appeared suddenly in the vicinity of Bapheus, a place near Nicomedia, together with his followers, numbering many thousands.

2. Pachymeres then tells us how the raiders of 'Oṣmān attacked Mouzalon at *Telemaia* prior to the battle of Bapheus. The success encouraged him to cross the mountain passes and come to raid the "Halizones".

Comment: This first success apparently was a surprise attack of a vanguard of "about one hundred men". Arnakis believes that it happened one year before the battle of Bapheus,⁸ which is plausible (see *infra*, Chronology).

3. Other Turcomans from near the *Meander* river joined 'Oṣmān's troops when he decided to confront the Byzantine army. Many Turcoman allies, he says, joined him in this campaign.

Comment: Who were these allies?

It is not plausible that Turcomans from such a distant region as the Meander came to join 'Oṣmān. Ottoman tradition (see *infra*), however, states that when 'Oṣmān learned that the Emperor was preparing an army against him, he asked for aid from the Sultan of Konya, who sent orders to the Turcomans of Sahibin-Karahisar (Afyon Karahisar) for his support. In fact, Karahisar was the principal Seldjukid frontier centre in this section, under the direct dependence of the Sultan.⁹ Turcomans of Aydın and Mentеше advancing on the Meander valley were better known in Constantinople at this time, while Karahisar had become a back country in the wake of the conquests by the Turcomans over the Byzantines in western Anatolia in the period 1290-1304. This may be another confusion in Pachymeres' account.

General Situation in the years 1298-1301

Ottoman chronicles¹⁰ make sufficiently clear that at this point 'Oṣmān had not yet become a leader among the chiefs in the area, each of whom acted independently. Prior to the battle of Bapheus, during the raid against Göynük-Taraklı on the main road from Kastamonu to Nicaea, 'Oṣmān had to rely on the co-operation of the local Turcoman and Greek lords in the area between the

8. ARNAKIS, p. 129-131.

9. On the powerful Seldjukid emir Sāhib Fakhr al Dīn 'Alī and his sons, who with their stronghold Kara-Hisar had a dominant position in western frontier lands, see AKSARAYI, *op. cit.*, index Fakhr al Dīn, in particular p. 145-153.

10. For these chronicles see H. INALCIK, *The Rise of Ottoman Historiography*, HME, p. 152-167; for a detailed examination of the early traditions on 'Oṣmān, see the second part of this paper.

Sakarya and Göynük rivers. Köse Mihal, one of these lords, appears to have been not his vassal but his ally at this time. Apparently, now 'Oşmân's allies in the area joined him to confront the major Byzantine reaction threatening all of them. Pachymeres adds that at this particular time Emîr 'Alî, son of the Çobanid Emîr Yavlak Arslan, seeing the general onslaught against the Byzantines, resumed his offensive policy against them in the lower Sakarya valley in the Adapazarı area. This explains Pachymeres' digression on the Çobanids of Kastamonu. No connection, however, between 'Oşmân and 'Alî is alluded to. 'Alî's action, Pachymeres notes, had no significant consequence. 'Oşmân emerged as the leader confronting the imperial army. In any case, while 'Oşmân moved to Yalak-Ova against Mouzalon with his troops, the Byzantine frontiers from the lower Sakarya river all the way down to the river ports at Geyve and Lefke, which controlled the roads from the east to Nicaea, were under attack.

In general, the Turcoman frontier lords intensified their raids into the Byzantine territories at times when they felt secure from a Mongol threat in their rear.

The years 1298-1301 were particularly favourable for the Turcomans to assume their hostile activities against Byzantium all over the western frontiers.¹¹ In 1298, in Anatolia, the Mongol general Sülemiş had risen up against the Khan, while Bayıncar, or Bayancar, the new commander-in chief of the Mongol regiments in Anatolia, put 'Alâ al-Dîn Keykubâd III on the Seldjukid throne in Konya.¹² In the winter of 1299, Sülemiş killed Bayancar. This important event is referred to in the early Ottoman traditions. In the years 1299-1300, Mongol troops under Emîr Kutlushâh and Emîr Çoban were kept busy quelling the Sülemiş rebellion. Sülemiş was popular among the frontier Turcomans. When

11. On the decisive events in western Anatolia during this period, see WITTEK, *Mentesche*, p. 15-24; ZACHARIADOU, *op. cit.*, p. 57-70; LAIOU, *Andronicus II*, p. 85-126.

12. See AŞIKPAŞAZADE (Atsız), p. 97; according to Ottoman traditions, Bayancar's arrival coincided with the siege of Karaca-Hisar and the date given is 687 A.H., which began on February 6, 1288; details of this episode are well known from the Seldjukid and Ilkhanid sources: see Z. V. TOGAN, *Umumi Türk Tarihine Giriş*, 2. ed., (Istanbul 1970) p. 243, 328-331, 468, 488; Bayancar's arrival in Anatolia as governor general actually occurred toward the end of the year 1298. By 1299 Sülemiş, supported by the anti-Ilkhanid Turcomans, took the entire central and western lands of the Seldjukid Sultanate under his control (TOGAN, *op. cit.*, p. 330). According to TOGAN, *op. cit.* p. 331, 'Oşmân must have been involved in this struggle on the side of Sülemiş, who was captured and executed in Tabriz in 1301. In brief, Sülemiş' rebellion coincides with 'Oşmân's activities against Nicaea; thus, in the years 1298-1301, the Mongol *khans* lost control over the Turcomans in the western frontier zone. The Byzantines believed that the Turcomans were effectively under the *khan's* control and could be checked by him in their anti-Byzantine raids; hence, the marriage arrangement of a Byzantine princess, Maria, the sister of Andronicus II, to Ghazan Khan (died 1304); "Maryam" was married to Ghazan's successor Öldjeytû in 1306; see B. SPULER, *Die Mongolen in Iran*, (Berlin 1968) p. 107.

he was eliminated, Mongol forces who had been under him moved to the west and took refuge in the Eskişehir – Bithynia area, becoming neighbours to ‘Osmān. All these events have a confused reflection in the Ottoman popular chronicles. However, it must be pointed out that Sülemish’ scene of activity was in the distant area of Amasya-Tokat where the Turcomans became his main supporters.

Our principal contemporary source on the Ilkhanids of Iran, Rashīd al-Dīn, observes that “Sülemish gained the support of the Mongol troops in the province of Danismend (the Tokat-Amasya region) and took control of the Udj, or frontier areas, granting the symbols of begship, the flag and military band, to many lords (in the Danismend province)”. Z.V. Togan¹³ has speculated that the Ottoman tradition about Sultan ‘Alā’al-Dīn granting the symbols of begship to ‘Osmān may actually be related to Sülemish. In any event, it is a fact that in the period 1299-1301, the Turcomans on the western frontiers rose up in a general offensive against the Byzantine territories from the lower Sakarya valley down to Ephesus.¹⁴

Evidently, ‘Osmān profited from the massive advance of the Turcomans in western Anatolia in the years 1299-1301, which prevented the Byzantines from maintaining their position against ‘Osmān in Bithynia. ‘Osmān’s move against Nicaea must be considered within this general picture.

Now let us turn to the Ottoman traditions on the events prior to the battle of Bapheus. Since the original text for the early traditions compiled by Yakhshi Fakīh, son of Ishak Fakīh, the imam of Orkhan Ghāzī, is lost we have to reconstruct them by comparing various Ottoman sources which have made use of this source. The most complete among them on the events we are concerned with here is the anonymous Tawārikh-i Āl-i ‘Osmān.¹⁵

The early Ottoman traditions on the battle of Koyun-Hisar (Bapheus)

I. The passage on the siege of Nicaea and the battle of Bapheus in the anonymous Tawārikh-i Āl-i ‘Osmān

The Anonymous account is the most detailed version available in the Ottoman traditions dealing with the siege of Nicaea. We have followed basically the critical text established by F. Giese.¹⁶ Other copies, not utilised by him, namely those of Izzet Koyunoğlu, Ayasofya and Beshīr Çelebi do not contain

13. TOGAN, *op. cit.*, p. 331.

14. WITTEK, *Mentesche*, p. 15-23.

15. GIESE, *Chroniken*, v. I. The following manuscripts have also been utilised: the Izzet Koyunoğlu MS, Milli Kütüphane, Ankara Microfilm Archive no A. 1465, 10-16; the Ayasofya MS, no A. 233, fol. 6-10; Türk Tarih Kurumu MS, no. A 1701, 8-17; Beşir Çelebi, *Tevārih-i Āl-i Osman*, ed. I.H. ERTAYLAN, (Istanbul 1946) p. 11-18. ORUC (Babinger) in his chronicle, generally following the anonymous chronicles, skips over the siege of Nicaea.

16. GIESE, *Chroniken*, v. I, p. 7-9.

important variants concerning the above events. Giese's text and the Koyunoğlu MS retain the stories of the Tekvur's daughter and of the dervish, while other copies lack one or both of these stories.

Among the later versions of the same tradition, Lûtfi Pasha, writing his history of the Ottoman House on the basis of an anonymous chronicle, provided the most detailed version.¹⁷ He omits, however, the legend of the daughter of the Tekfur but retains the story of the dervish.

"Another son was born to 'Osmân. He gave to him the name of 'Alî Pasha. He stayed with his father while Orkhan Ghâzî was active in conquering lands. He captured Köprü-Hisar by assault and let his ghâzîs pillage it. Then, he came and lay siege to Iznik. In those days Iznik was a city extremely well fortified, of good repute and populous. It was surrounded on its four sides by swamps, so no force could approach it. In addition, it had a very large population. It is related that from each of its four gates one thousand men mounted on piebald horses could ride out at a moment's notice. You may estimate, by comparison, how many men mounted on one-coloured horses there were and how populous the city was. But in those days ghâzîs were well trained and each of them was like a dragon and did not turn his back even if attacked by a thousand infidels. They had an unshaken faith in God and God granted them his favour. So, blessed in their faith, they came and pillaged the land around Iznik. When each time the infidels came out to attack, the ghâzîs, with God's favour, defeated and drove them back into the city. But, in the end, the ghâzîs saw that this city could not be taken by assault because it was protected by water on all four sides, and by no means would it be possible to approach it [so that they changed their tactics]. They went and built a watchtower (*havâle*) on the slope of the hill on the side of Yenişehir and garrisoned it with troops.

"A strong man, reputed for his valour in those days, known as Tâz 'Alî, was stationed there with forty men under his command to watch and intercept the city's traffic with the outside world. At the present time that small fort is called Tâz-'Alî-Hişârî. There is a high rock above the fort at the foot of which a spring gave forth cool water. This spring now also bears the name of Tâz-'Alî-Pınarı.

"Thereafter, the infidels, being thus closely controlled, remained confined to their city because the ghâzîs with their raiding did not let them leave the city gates. No one from the outside was able to enter Iznik. Besieged in the city, the infidels, finally were able one day to dispatch a man to the Tekvur of Istanbul to report their condition, saying:

'The Turk has attacked and overwhelmed us and cut off contact with the outside world; we cannot do anything to change the situation. If you can help us, do so as soon as possible, otherwise we are not in a position to resist. They will [take the city and] enslave our sons and daughters. If you do not help us, we shall perish from starvation'.

17. LUTFI PASHA, *Tarihi*, ed. 'ĀLĪ, (Istanbul 1341) p. 23-25.

"[They asked help from him] since in those days Iznik was under the rule of the Tekvur of Istanbul. When the Tekvur learned of the situation, he prepared a number of ships filled with soldiers and sent them out to drive away the ghāzīs from the district of Iznik. The troops in the ships, put under the command of a trusted man of the Tekvur, were supposed to land on the coast at Yalak-Ovası and thence go over to Iznik to make a surprise attack on the ghāzīs. While they made this plan among themselves, a spy, working for the ghāzīs, came among the enemy troops and learned where they were coming to land. At the risk of his life the spy hastened to come and inform the ghāzīs.

"Thereafter the ghāzīs came to Yalak-ova and hid themselves in an ambush, waiting on the beach where the infidels were supposed to land. For their part, the infidels sailing in their ships arrived and started to land in the night on the beach at Yalak-Ovası and to scatter around the land. While each of them was busy in guiding out his horse and assembling his weapons, the ghāzīs, shouting the name of Allāh and entrusting themselves to Him, made a surprise attack by dashing their horses headlong into the infidel ranks. By putting many to the sword, they stirred up such panic among the enemy troops and created such a massacre that only God knows the number who died. The rest rushed into the sea and drowned. Only those who were fortunate enough were able to return to the ships. In short, the greater part of the infidels perished and only a small number of them were able to save their lives. Once they were in the ships, they thought of nothing but to get away. They arrived in Istanbul and told the Tekvur what had happened. Hearing the news, the Tekvur became very sad and moaned. But what else could he do except sit in patience, feeling completely helpless?

"When the news of the Tekvur's failure reached the infidels in Iznik, they lamented and mourned. Finally, they discussed the situation among themselves and reached a decision. They agreed that those who had chosen to flee had run away already; now, for those who stayed, there was no alternative but to surrender and submit. They did so and surrendered the city-fortress to the ghāzīs. By gaining the city, the ghāzīs gathered in much booty.

"After they had conquered Iznik, the ghāzīs turned in the direction of Yalak-Ovası. At that time, this area was defended by strong forts in the mountains at locations difficult to reach, and there were also countless prosperous settlements around. On the hills all the way to Iznikmid (Nicomedia) there was not a single tree, but many forts, prosperous towns and villages. The forests, they say, later covered these hills when the area became uninhabited [after the attacks of the ghāzīs]. This is related by those who lived in those days and it is true. They state that there were several reasons for the well-being of the area. One of them was that the area was hilly and rugged [difficult to penetrate]. Another was that many people who ran away out of fear of ghāzīs came and settled in this area. One other reason was that the Tekvur of Istanbul had a beautiful daughter..."

Here, Greek and Turkish folk stories, obviously picked up in our popular histories, have entered into the historical narrative. Here is told the legend of how the princess was afflicted by leprosy and recovered in the Yalak-Ovası

thermal springs. Thus, the Tekvur was moved to build bath houses on the site. Also added is the legend concerning a dervish with a wooden sword who performed miracles and caused the Greeks of this area to convert to Islam. Immediately following the legends comes the coalition among the tekvurs of Bursa, Adranos, Batanos, Kestel and Kite, who united against 'Oşmān and confronted him at Dimboz. Then, the story of the siege of Bursa with the construction of the two *havāle* forts for the blockading of the city follows.

II. *Neshrī's version*

Neshrī's history, completed somewhere between 1486 and 1493, is the earliest compilation to elaborate the original tradition in the interests of dynastic claims.¹⁸ The following translation of Neshrī follows the critical text established by Unat and Köymen, comparing the Menzel Codex published by Franz Taeschner.¹⁹

The independence of 'Oşmān Ghāzī and Sultan 'Alā' al-Dīn's sending of a sword of honour to him.

Following his conquests of Bilecik, Yar-Hisar, Inegöl and Yenişehir with all their dependencies, 'Oşmān Ghāzī, showing zeal [for further ghazā], proceeded to make a raid against Iznik. He came and cut off the roads coming to the city so that all supplies from outside stopped. Since famine broke out and the population became greatly distressed, they secretly sent a courier across the lake to ask for help from Istanbul. [An army] was about to be sent from Istanbul. Thereupon 'Oşmān addressed the ghāzīs saying "now a rather large army is coming from Istanbul. If we leave this place [and retreat], the infidels around us will become as bold as lions and attack us; we must find a way to repulse them". The ghāzīs responded saying: "Since our forces are small in number, we must seek aid from Sultan 'Alā' al-Dīn", and so they immediately sent a courier to Konya and reported their recent conquests and what was happening. The Sultan, hearing all this, was extremely content and decided that a drum and flag be bestowed [upon 'Oşmān], and ordered that several thousand men from Sahibin-Kara-Hisarī (Afyon Kara-Hisarī) go to their aid. But before the courier returned, the infidel troops coming from Istanbul started crossing over the pass at Dil. The infidels, believing that the Turks had run away, encamped without taking precautions. 'Oşmān meanwhile captured a man from the fortress of Yalak-Hisarī and being informed of the infidels' carelessness, suddenly fell in the darkness of the night upon those who already had come over the strait and put them to the sword. Those who ran away were drowned in the sea. Those who had not proceeded over the strait returned to Istanbul. The ghāzīs took much booty. 'Oşmān then did not concern himself

18. On Neshrī's history, see MÉNAGE, *Neshrī*, and cf. INALCIK, *The Rise*, p. 152-167.

19. *Kitāb-i Cihan-nümā* (Taeschner), v. I, p. 32.

further with Iznik, and sending the good news of the victory to his people and with the intention of reaching his capital, he set out. His mother and other relatives came out to meet him at one or two days' distance. By coincidence, on the same afternoon, the drum, flag, diploma and robe of honour arrived [from the Seldjukid Sultan]”.

III. Ahmedī's version

The earliest reference to the siege of Iznik comes from the poet Ahmedī writing in his *Iskendernāme* the section dealing with the Ottomans around the year 1410.²⁰

Here is the full translation of his verses on the events leading to the siege of Iznik:

“That champion (‘Oṣmān) conquered Bilecük, Inegöl and Köprü-Hisar and never stopped; sending out troops in every direction, he took many lands in a short time. Burning and destroying the infidels' land, he laid siege to Bursa and Iznik”.

Ahmedī provides clear testimony that the source used by the Anonymous chronicles, Aşıkpaşazāde and Neşrī is a common one prior to their histories, most plausibly Yakhshi Fakīh's lost *Menāqibnāme* written ca. 1405.²¹ In Ahmedī, the sequence of ‘Oṣmān's conquests prior to his blockades of Iznik and Bursa is strongly reminiscent of the later compilations (Yenişehir and Yar-Hisar are omitted by our poet Ahmedī, but the conquest of Köprü-Hisar, preceding the blockades, is added). ‘Oṣmān's blockades, not the capture, of Iznik and Bursa follow these conquests mentioned in Ahmedī and in the later compilations. Obviously, Ahmedī, writing a short epic, skipped over the details. In essence, the main events are told *in the same sequence*. Ahmedī also shows that the Anonymous chronicler's account of the Ottoman conquest of Nicaea at this date is a distortion of the original source.

IV. Compilations made upon Sultan Bayezid II's order: *the Histories of Idrīs-i Bidlisī and Kemāl Pasha-zāde*

Idrīs, writing between 1502 and 1506, and Kemāl Pasha-zāde, at about the same time, represent later compilations made for the Sultan Bayezid II, using

20. A critical text of this section of *Iskendernāme* is now available: KEMAL SILAY, *Ahmedī's Ottoman History*, MA thesis, Department of Uralic and Altaic Studies, Indiana University 1990.

21. On Yakhshi Fakīh's *Menāqibnāme* now see, V. L. MÉNAGE, The Menaqib of Yakhshi Faqih, *BSOAS*, 26 (1963) 50-54; in fact, this addition to the Yakhshi Fakīh's original history belongs to Aşıkpaşazāde, who tried to show that Shayh Ede-Bali of the *Wafāiyya* order was the spiritual mentor of the Ottoman Dynasty; Aşıkpaşazāde himself was of the same *ṭarīqa* as his ancestors Ashik Pasha and Elvan Çelebi, see H. INALCIK, How to read Ashik Pasha-zāde's History of the Ottoman House (forthcoming in V.L. MÉNAGE, *Festschrift*).

chiefly copies of the Anonymous chronicles, which obviously differ from our copies and Neshrî.

In Idrîs' arrangement, the sequence of events is as follows: 'Osmân married his eldest son Orkhan to Nilüfer, to whom he granted the province of Kara-Hisar, otherwise known as Sultan-Önü; he granted Eskişehir to his own brother, Gündüz Alp, and the fortress of In-Önü and Yund-Hisar to Aygud Alp, the province and fortress of Yar-Hisar to Hasan Alp, that of Inegöl to Turgut Alp, and finally he bestowed the entire revenue of the province of Bilecük on Shaykh Ede-Bali. Then, 'Osmân chose Yenişehir as his capital city. His younger son, 'Alâ' al-Dîn Pasa, remained in Bilecük beside his mother. He himself stayed most of the time in Yenişehir. Then "in the year 701, which is the third year from his accession to the sultanate", he marched to conquer Köprü-Hisar.

After the fall of Köprü-Hisar, the fortress of Marmara near Köprü-Hisar and Dimboz surrendered. 'Osmân then returned to his capital city and planned to conquer Iznik.

"Osmân Bey considered its conquest one of the most important undertakings and without warning he marched toward that land". 'Osmân met with strong resistance, but his men overran and laid waste the countryside outside the fortress, pillaging and killing as they moved. Before leaving the place, they built in the vicinity of Iznik a strong watchtower and placed a garrison of a hundred men there, who kept provisions from reaching this large populous city. "The tower built by 'Osmân became known as Targay-Hisarı²² after one of his brave and trusted men. The ruins of this tower are still visible".

Idrîs finds the rationale for this great plan in 'Osmân's belief in his mission revealed in an extraordinary dream 'Osmân experienced while sleeping in Shaykh Ede-Bali's convent: "the divine promise will become in the end a reality through such exploits for Islam".

Kemâl Pasha-zâde²³ puts the battle of Yalak-Ovası before the conquest of Köprü-Hisar and the siege of Iznik, and "'Osmân's succession to the sultanate of the Seldjuks" after the battle. While Kemâl Pasha-zâde evidently follows Neshrî ("the messenger via the Lake" in both) in the description of the events preceding the battle and of the battle itself, he diverges from him on "'Osmân's succession to the sultanate" and follows Ruhî or the Bodleian anonymous chronicle.²⁴

The story of the battle is missing in Aşıkpaşazâde. He merely makes a very brief reference to the raid and siege of Iznik and the blockade.²⁵

22. A close examination of his text shows that he misread *Taz Ali* as *Targay*. The correct form is "Diraz Ali", which is shortened to "Taz Ali" in the chronicles; see below.

23. *Tevârih-i âl-i Osman*, II. Defter, ed. Ş. TURAN, (Ankara TTK 1983) p. 130-146.

24. On Ruhî and the Bodleian MS, see MÉNAGE, *Neshrî*, p. 12-14, 26.

25. AŞIKPAŞAZADE (Atsız), p. 105: *Iznig'ün vilayetine segirttiler. Şehrün kapusını yapdurdılar. Bir nice gün ceng etdiler. Dört yanı vilayet dapdılar. Kal'a üzerine er kodılar. Dapan vilâyeti timar erlerine verdiler; kendiler gene Yenişehir'e çıktılar.*

I. Siege of Nicaea

In the following, versions of the original tradition of Yakhshi Fakīh as found in later compilations will be compared and discussed.

1. *A son was born to 'Osmān; he named him 'Ālā' al-Dīn and kept him at his side*

The Anonymous chronicler and Aşikpaşazāde appear to be the most faithful to the original text.

In fact, this statement is designed to tell us that the elder son, Orkhan, was given the command of the raids. Orkhan was the elder son of 'Osmān Beg. It was a Turco-Mongol steppe tradition to keep the youngest son at the hearth and to send the eldest to the most advanced frontier for raids.²⁶ This custom survived with all of the Turcoman emirates and continued with the Ottomans for a long time. Being in command of the frontier forces gave to the eldest son a greater chance of succeeding his father as ruler.

2. *'Osmān completed the conquest of Bilecük, Yar-Hisar, Inegöl and Yenişehir, and then he began to make raids into the province of Iznik*

Neshrī here elaborates on his source, telling us first of 'Osmān's four earlier conquests and his later major feat of the siege of Iznik and adds that this led to his rise to the status of an "independent" *beg* (ruler), whereas in the original tradition (cf. the Anonymous Chronicles) it was actually Orkhan who made the raid and captured Köprü-Hisar.

It is interesting to note that the same four places, Bilecük, Yar-Hisar, Inegöl and Yenişehir in the same order are to be found in the *Takvīms* which are Neshrī's source. One particular *Takvīm*, dated ca. 1446, presents the conquest of Bilecük (or Bilecük) with the other three forts as a turning point in 'Osmān's career.²⁷

In fact, these conquests in the years 699-702 of Hijra appear to have constituted part of his plan to capture the two most important cities in Bithynia, Iznik and Bursa. Then, he moved his headquarters to Yenişehir, which lay between the two cities. There he settled his ghāzīs and made it a new *udj*, leading into the Bursa plain in the west and that of Nicaea in the north. The latter city was only about 25 km. from Yenişehir. 'Osmān's ghāzīs in the new *udj*, the tradition says, "wanted to continue the raids all the time." Before he attacked Nicaea, 'Osmān organised raids in the valley of the Göynük river and the Sakarya valley to take control of the main highway coming through Göynük-Taraklı-Lefke or Mekece

26. See H. INALCIK, Ottoman Succession and its Relation to the Turkish Concept of Sovereignty, *The Middle East and the Balkans under the Ottoman Empire*, (Bloomington 1993).

27. *Tarihî Takvimler*, ed. O. TURAN, (Ankara 1954) p. 16, 52.

to Iznik from the east. The Göynük-Taraklı highway to Lefke in the south or Geyve to the north remains still today the main throughfare from the inner Anatolian plateau to Iznik and Izmit.

3. *The raid against Iznik*

In the Anonymous chronicles, Orkhan alone is responsible for the raid. It should be remembered that the original tradition comes from Yakhshi Fakīh, son of Orkhan's imam.

4. *The conquest of Köprü-Hisar*

The Anonymous chronicler: Orkhan conquered Köprü-Hisar by force and plundered it. Aşıkpaşazāde: Orkhan and 'Oşmān together conquered Köprü-Hisar and plundered it.

Neshrī here omits the conquest of Köprü-Hisar. In a previous chapter he says (*Kitāb-i Cihan-nümā* (Taeschner, p. 34; *Kitāb-i Cihan-nümā*, p. 92) 'Oşmān had aided the *Tekvur* of Bilecük in his capture of Köprü-Hisar. Perhaps Neshrī thought that when 'Oşmān conquered Bilecük, Köprü-Hisar, too, came into 'Oşmān's possession among the lands conquered. However, the original source must assert that Köprü-Hisar was conquered later in the context of the raids against Iznik.

Between Yenişehir and Iznik rose the Avdan mountain range and the passes over it were defended by the Kızıl-Hisar and Köprü-Hisar fortresses. The Ottoman surveys, or *tahrīr defteris* of Hüdāvendigār²⁸ supply interesting details on them.

The passage concerning Köprü-Hisar in the survey of 1571 says: "Since the mountain pass called Dirāz-'Alī, situated on the public road coming from Iznik to the village named Köprü-Hisar, is frightful, dangerous and uninhabited"; a report has been formerly sent to the Porte asking it to station guards there. "The aforesaid pass", the record continues, "is one *menzil*, or a day's march, away from Iznik on the way to Köprü-Hisar, and it is extremely difficult to guard it if the guards are placed in the middle of the pass". It is proposed that half of the guards, thirty men, should be stationed in the Kızıl-Hisar fort in the middle of the pass to watch the road coming from the direction of Iznik and the other half of the guards at Çamlıca to watch the road coming from Köprü-Hisar. The area was covered with forests. In 1571, sixty *yaya* militia were appointed guards with exemption from ordinary and customary taxes.

It is of crucial importance for us to note that this document confirms the fact that the place-names and topography given in the narrative traditions such as the Anonymous chronicles cannot be inventions or contrived legends, but well-informed authentic sources. No contrived story could give such precise topographical details.

The note from the surveys establishes the fact that in order to descend to the

28. BARKAN-MERİÇLİ, p. 219-220, no 366, and p. 274, no 378/2.

plain of Nicaea, ‘Oṣmān’s forces had first to gain control of the Dirāz-‘Alī mountain pass. Also known as Tiraz-‘Alī or Trāz ‘Alī, a hero in our narrative sources, this man is obviously a historical figure who left his name in various place-names along the strategic road from Yenişehir to Iznik. The same survey (p. 225, no. 378/4) tells us that a winter pasture, or *kışlak*, in the Kara-dere village on the Avdan mountain is called Uzun-oghlu (son of the tall one), most probably the son of our *Dirāz* (tall, in Persian) ‘Alī. The name of *Avdan* is found among Turcomans as that of a nomadic clan.

Later on, in the fifteenth century, the *ketkhudā* of Ishak Pasha built a dervish convent at Köprü-Hisar to give shelter to travellers and he made a *wakf* of his freehold village called ‘Isā-Virānı in the Inegöl district. According to a record in the same survey book (no 378/1), there was another mountain pass called *Katranlu-Derbendi* between the sea landing (*iskele*) of Samanlu and Yenişehir, frequented by merchants. The villagers from Çardak, Sarti-oğlu, Makri, Dimboz, and Menteşe were appointed guards at this pass. While Dirāz-‘Alī Derbendi led ‘Oṣmān to the plain of Iznik, the Dimboz-Koyun-Hisar mountain pass led ‘Oṣmān into the Bursa plain. Following the battle of Bapheus, a major confrontation would take place at this pass between ‘Oṣmān and a coalition of the tekvurs of the Bursa plain, namely, those of Bursa, Adranos, Batanos, Kestel and Kite and the victory would open up to ‘Oṣmān the entire plain of Bursa.

5. The surrender of the “district of Marmara”

Aşıkpaşazāde refers to it while in the Anonymous chronicles and *Neshrī* is missing. The “Marmara vilāyeti” is the area between Yenişehir and Bursa just before the strategic pass of Dimboz, leading to the Bursa plain. There is a swamp called Marmaracık-gölü there today. The Greeks of this area surrendered to ‘Oṣmān to avoid the ghāzī attacks. As the Ottoman tradition puts it “they came and submitted, and ‘Oṣmān Ghāzī left everyone on his land (*yerlü yerinde*)”. This piece of information is omitted in the Anonymous chronicles and *Neshrī*, perhaps because they believed it was not important. Among late compilers, Kemāl Pashazāde (I, 143-144) and Idrīs (p. 66) mention the surrender of the population of Marmara. Idrīs provides further details referring to a “fortress of Marmara” and its surrender when its inhabitants saw the fate of Köprü-Hisar. In any case, ‘Oṣmān must have deemed it necessary to make a raid into the Marmara district, obviously to safeguard his capital of Yenişehir before he set out for the siege of Iznik.

6. The siege of Iznik, the construction of a watchtower (*havāle*) to intercept the city’s traffic with the outside world. The ghāzīs made raids and subdued the countryside around the fortress of Iznik

The Anonymous chronicles, Aşıkpaşazāde and *Neshrī* all have this information. While Aşıkpaşazāde and *Neshrī* are laconic on the siege of Iznik and the subsequent raids in the plain, the Anonymous author gives details coupled

with folk stories of Greek and Turkish origin about the ancient city of Iznik and the conversion to Islam of the population in the area. However, in essence, the three sources, using evidently the same source, agree with each other. The Anonymous chronicles and Aşıkpaşazāde make clear that 'Osman's forces laid siege to the city and fighting lasted quite some time. Our three chronicles agree that by setting up a blockade and organizing raids in the country-side, the ghāzīs subdued the entire population outside the city walls.

The details which the Anonymous chronicles supply are interesting. Firstly, Iznik is described as a populous and strongly-garrisoned city, which was not true in that period. As a result of the recovery of Constantinople from the Latins in 1261 and the subsequent increasing Turcoman raids, some of Nicaea's inhabitants had already left for Nicomedia or Constantinople, and Michael VIII Palaeologus reportedly neglected its defence. Ibn Baṭṭūṭa's eyewitness report (1332?) of the city as a ruined one belongs to a period when the Ottomans had taken control of the city (March 1331) and had permitted the inhabitants to leave. The Anonymous author's exaggerated statement evidently must be a reminiscence of the situation under the Lascarids.

In any case, 'Oşmān's failure at the siege needed explanation in the Ottoman account. Emphasis is also put on how the city's defence was enhanced by the surrounding waters and swamps.

In the first part of the tradition, the Anonymous chronicles admit that the city could not be taken by storm (*Gördüler kim ceng ile alınmaz*) so that 'Oşmān built the Tāz-'Alī or rather Drāz-'Alī, fort to keep the place under siege. But in the paragraph concerning the aftermath of the victory over the emperor's troops at Yalak-Ovası (Bapheus), the same author claims that the Nicaeans surrendered the city to the Ottomans. The author of the Anonymous chronicle might have thought that the logical outcome of the victory should be the fall of the city, so that he changed the original source at this point. In any case, Aşıkpaşazāde and Neshrī, following the original text literally, state that 'Oşmān's men gave up the fight against the fortress of Nicaea and concerned themselves with subjecting the population in the open country around the fortress.

The story about the erection of the *havāle*, or the fort for the blockade, is related only in the Anonymous chronicles. Aşıkpaşazāde does not mention it; Neshrī refers to the blockade without mentioning the fort. Later compilers, Idrīs (p. 67) and Kemāl Pasha-zāde (p. 145), obviously following the Anonymous Chronicles, mention it. Still following the Anonymous Chronicles, which appear to have reproduced the original source in a most detailed fashion, we find that under Tāz 'Alī the men in the fort numbered one hundred, but in some copies of this it is changed to forty, a sacred figure. The watchtower intercepted the traffic to the city coming from the outside so that famine resulted. The Anonymous Chronicles assert that this situation lasted for quite some time (*bir nice zaman*). Thus, the date of the actual siege perhaps should be placed one or two years before the battle of Bapheus, between 1299-1301. The main cause leading to the battle of Yalak-Ovası is attributed, in the original tradition, to the fact that Iznik,

under blockade, distressed by famine, finally succeeded in sending a messenger to the Emperor in Istanbul, stating that if the relief forces did not arrive in time, they would have no choice but surrender.

Neshrī adds that the messenger was sent *over the lake* (compare Pachymeres). In order to explain why the people of Iznik asked for help from Istanbul, the Anonymous Chronicles add that “at that time the Tekvur of Istanbul ruled over Iznik, too.”

II. The Battle of Bapheus

Now the question remains to determine whether or not the Ottoman account of the battle of Yalak-Ovası and Pachymeres’ account of the battle of Bapheus refer to the same event. Let us review comparatively the main points in the two sources.

1. *The circumstances and causes leading to the battle*

According to Pachymeres, ‘Osmān’s threat to the land of “Halizones” made the Emperor decide to send an army under Heteriarch Mouzalon. As we have seen earlier, Pachymeres stops at this point and goes back to earlier events connected with ‘Osmān. He then tells us how “a group of ‘Osmān’s men numbering one hundred made a surprise attack on Mouzalon and almost captured him.” This emboldened ‘Osmān, Pachymeres adds, to cross the “Siphones Mountains” and to descend on the “land of Halizones”.

The Ottoman account of the battle does not speak of this vanguard activity but concentrates on the battle on the Yalak-Ovası on the shore. However, both Pachymeres and the Ottoman chronicles refer to ‘Osmān’s earlier activities around Nicaea, the latter source giving full details about the siege of the city and the urgent appeal of the besieged to the Emperor. It becomes clear that the Emperor sent Mouzalon to relieve Nicaea from the blockade. The “Land of Halizones” is obviously the Ottoman Yalak-Ovası, the flat coastal plain between Yalova and Kara-Mürsel (infra).

Pachymeres clearly says that ‘Osmān sent his vanguard before he set out to pass through the valley leading to the coast (on the valley and the highway, infra). In the valley there is a fort called today Çoban-Kale (Shepherd’s Fort), (see photo I), a few kilometres from the coast, controlling the highway Dil-Hersek-Iznik.

‘Osmān sent the vanguard to make sure that the garrison in the fort, apparently reinforced by Mouzalon’s men, would be neutralised, to open his way to the plain on the Gulf of Izmit. The surprise attack by his vanguard must have taken place near the fort surrounded by hills. In fact, Pachymeres talks about the hills where ‘Osmān’s men, at first repelled by Mouzalon’s soldiery, retreated and then made a successful counterattack. This success made ‘Osmān decide to pass through the valley to reach Yalak-Ovası on the coast.

Çoban-Kale is situated between the village of Karadere and that of *Ayazma* where there is a Greek *hagiasma*. Local people say that the fort was built by the Genoese. Çoban-Kale is in ruins today; shepherds come there with their herds to

rest, hence its name of Çoban-Kale. Koyun-Hisarı, as referred to in the Ottoman tradition in this connection, must have been our Çoban-Kale (infra).

It is suggested that the skirmish must have occurred one year prior to the battle of Bapheus.²⁹ If this is correct, Mouzalon must have been at the fort prior to his coming back with a sizeable army to confront 'Oşmān's invasion the following year. In fact, subsequent to the vanguard's success, 'Oşmān's mustering of a large army by calling on his allies, to which Pachymeres refers, would have taken some time.

In any case, these are the principal antecedents and causes which appear to have led to the major confrontation on the plain of Yalak-Ovası in 1301 (for the date, infra). On the whole, both the Byzantine and Ottoman accounts agree and complement each other on the background of the battle of Bapheus.

2. The location of the battlefield

Pachymeres tells us that 'Oşmān, crossing the mountain pass with "allies and partners for his raids", entered the "land of Halizones". He adds that Bapheus is in "the area around the wonderful city of Nicomedia," and Byzantine troops, when defeated, "swarmed ignobly into the nearby city of Nicomedia". The Ottoman tradition identifies the battlefield as Yalak-Ovası or Yalak-plain on the sea coast. Thus, both of our sources agree that the battle took place on the coastal plain on the southern shores of the Gulf of Izmit (Nicomedia) in a place where the highway coming from Nicaea reached the coastal plain.

During Byzantine times the imperial "Military Road", passing through Dakibyza (Gebze), reached Aigialoi "where they crossed the narrow entrance of the Gulf of Astakos to Kibotos and continued their journey by land to Nicaea."³⁰ The ferry from Aigialoi to Kibotos was in use under the Byzantines as well as under the Ottomans. Aigialoi must be *Dil* (the tongue or promontory) of the Ottomans and Kibotos, Hersek town (see photo 2). During Ottoman times, this main highway between Istanbul and Asia Minor was known as the Baghdad Caddesi, along which passed caravans and armies (see photos 3 and 4). At Hersek town, under Bāyezid II, Grand Vizier Hersek Ahmed Pasha built a *wakf* complex with a caravanserai, mosque, fountains and other facilities for the convenience of travellers before they started their long journey through the Yalakdere valley and Nicaea into Asia Minor. About twenty five km. to the west of Hersek town lies Helenopolis (in the vulgar pronunciation, Elenopolis), or the Turkish Yalova. Yalak-Hisar mentioned in the Ottoman tradition must be Helenopolis. The Turkish name of Yalova must derive from Yalak-Ova(sı).

29. ARNAKIS, p. 129-131.

30. RAMSAY, *Asia Minor*, p. 200-201; cf. EVLIYA ÇELEBİ, *Seyahatname*, v. II, p. 60-61; F. TAESCHNER, *Das anatolische Wegenetz nach Osmanischen Quellen*, (Leipzig 1924) v. I, p. 66-67, 99-100.

Further west between Helenopolis and the promontory Poseidion (Bozburun) lies Pylai, which was also used as a landing place by the Byzantine emperors on their way to Asia Minor. The city of Pylai was still an important commercial centre in the thirteenth century. In order to protect the city, Manuel I Comnenus (1143-1180) built the fortress of Pylai and forts.³¹ Our Çoban-Kale or Koyun-Hisarı in the valley leading to the coastal plain must have been one of these newly built or repaired forts.

When Orkhan resumed his father's plans of expansion on the Yalak-Ova coast following the conquest of Nicaea (1331) the fortresses of Yalak-Ova (Yalova) and Koyun-Hisar in the area put up resistance until Nicomedia surrendered (1337).

According to the Ottoman tradition, by 1337, the fortresses of Yalak-Ova and Koyun-Hisarı formed the appanage of a Byzantine princess. The fortresses are described exactly as follows: "the fortress in the valley (deredeği) in Yalak-Ova belonged to an infidel by the name of Yalknya (or Balknya), and on the hill there was another fort which they call Koyun-Hisarı at the present time". Yalak-Ova was the name given to the area between Yalova and Hersek or Kara-Mürsel. Ottoman tradition adds that Koyun-Hisarı was put under the command of Kaloyan, brother of the "master" (*sāhib*) of Yalak-Ova, Yalknya.

Joseph von Hammer correctly identifies Bapheus with Koyun-Hisarı³² but confuses it with another Koyun-Hisarı near Dimboz where 'Osmān confronted the coalition of the *tekvurs* of the Bursa plain. Just before the battle of Bapheus, 'Osmān had captured a man from Yalak-Hisarı and learned from him that his ambush at Yalak-Ova was not known to the enemy.

The Koyun-Hisarı village in the Kite Kadiship had its *karye* (village) status in the XIVth century and is then mentioned in the later survey registers as a simple *mezra'a*, or an abandoned village. Apparently, it was a gathering point for the flocks, the tax revenue of which was levied by the Koyun-emīni. In this period, the *yürüks*, mostly Akça-Koyunlu, are mentioned in the area.

3. *The Armies and the Battle*

Let us first attempt to analyse Pachymeres' account of the battle.

Mouzalou's army consisted of the Byzantine soldiery, the Alan mercenaries and the local militia, altogether about two thousand men. But this army lacked unity because, Pachymeres tells us, just before the battle, the money and horses belonging to the militia were given to the Alan mercenaries, which made the former jealous and reluctant to co-operate.

31. H. GLYKATZI-AHRWEILER, Les forteresses construites en Asie Mineure face à l'invasion seldjoudique, *Akten des XI. Internationalen Byzantinisten Kongresses*, edd. F. DÖLGER – H.G. BECK, (Munich 1958) p. 186-189; VRYONIS, *Decline*, p. 121.

32. J. von HAMMER, *Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches*, (Pest 1835) v. I, p. 67, 85.

As regards 'Oşmān's troops, they, Pachymeres says, greatly outnumbered the Greeks, because he attracted allies, and even individuals from Paphlagonia, who, for booty, joined him enthusiastically. Pachymeres tells us they included foot-soldiers as well as horsemen.

Because of the non-cooperation, Pachymeres asserts, of the local militia and of the troops' carelessness, the Greek army's attack collapsed and they began to run away. Many fell, but most fled. They swarmed into the nearby city of Nicomedia. At this critical point, the Alans courageously counter-attacked giving the great mass of infantry the chance to retreat. Encircling the Ottoman troops, the Alans attacked soldiers on foot and wounded the horses of the cavalry by sending salvos of arrows crosswise. Thus, Pachymeres adds, in order to secure the retreat of the Greeks, the Alans sacrificed themselves and fell one after another.

In brief, in his attempt to explain the Greek failure, Pachymeres underlines the superiority of 'Oşmān's troops in number, the non-co-operation of the local militia on the battle field and the lack of discipline among the Byzantine soldiery. The Alan mercenaries, coming from the northern Black Sea area where they had served under Emir Nogay (d. 1299 or 1300) and trained in the Turco-Mongol steppe tactics, proved that they were a match for the Turcoman fighters. The victory of Bapheus signalled the impending uninterrupted Ottoman successes against the Byzantine or the Balkan states in the decades which followed. The explanation of it is that in addition to their superiority in tactics, the Ottoman rulers received from Anatolia innumerable ghāzīs or professional Turcoman ghāzīs hastened to fight under the Ottoman flag simply for the expected booty, while the Byzantine and Balkan rulers had to enroll and maintain professional soldiery including *Tourkopouloi* by paying huge sums from their depleted treasuries. The advantageous position of the Turcoman begs was obvious and from the beginning Byzantium was doomed to lose its desperate struggle. Andronicus II's dismantling of the expensive and inefficient Byzantine navy in 1284 made perfect sense because what was then desperately needed was these mercenary troops in order to stop the Turcoman onslaught in Anatolia.

In 1354, in his speech of abdication, John VI Cantacuzenus confessed the invincibility of the Turkish soldiery. Believing in the professional military superiority of the Turcoman, he himself stuck throughout his career to his alliance with Umur Ghāzī of Aydın and then Orkhan, since they brought to his aid Turcoman troops against his rivals, while his enemies in Constantinople failed to attract this decisive element to their own side.³³

Ottoman chronicles give a different version of the course of the combat. According to this source, the Emperor sent a relief army by sea to Nicaea, which arrived at Yalak-Ovası and began to land in order to make a surprise attack on 'Oşmān's troops. But informed through a Greek spy of the enemy's plan, 'Oşmān lay in ambush. Neshrī's version included the interesting detail that the Byzantine

33. H. INALCIK, *The Rise of the Turcoman Maritime Principalities in Anatolia, Byzantium and the Crusades*, *ByzFor*, 9 (1985) 179-217.

army began to pass from 'Dil'³⁴ to Yalak-Ovası during the night. The Ottoman forces made a surprise attack as the Byzantine troops began to take their horses out of the ships, and scattered around; taken by surprise, many Byzantines were massacred and many of those who attempted to reach their ships were drowned. Those who were able to escape to the ships sailed back to Constantinople.

In this story what is definite is that 'Osmān fought against an army "sent by the Tekvur of Istanbul"; so there is no doubt that both sources speak of the same event. But how does one explain or combine the divergent descriptions of the battle in the Byzantine and Ottoman accounts?

Pachymeres contains no details on how the army under Mouzalon arrived at Bapheus/Yalak-Ovası, whether directly by sea or by the land route Gebze-Dil-Bapheus. In this entire account there is no reference to ships. However, according to him, prior to the confrontation, Mouzalon had been long enough in the area to organise his troops (taking the horses of the local militia and giving them to the Alan mercenaries, etc.)

For the purposes of a surprise attack, the Emperor must have sent the main troops by sea rather than by the long land route. But, even if the land route was used, the troops had to pass over the narrow sea passage from Aigialoi (Dil) to Kibotos (Hersek) by ship, as Neshrī's version confirms. An Ottoman surprise attack near Kibotos is in order in either case. Alternatively, the Byzantine troops from Constantinople arrived partly by land and partly by sea. As for the course of the battle, the only theory capable of reconciling the two divergent reports is that each deals with a different stage of the confrontation. Apparently, first the Ottomans attacked the Byzantine soldiery as they arrived by ship from Constantinople, and when the Byzantine local militia took in panic the route to Nicomedia, the Byzantine regular troops rushed under the cover of the Alans back to their ships waiting on the shore. The Ottoman tradition possibly preferred to concentrate on this dramatic flight of the main Byzantine soldiery to the ships and made it the main theme of the battle.


4. *The Date of the Battle of Bapheus*

Since Muralt's 'Essai', Byzantinists have debated the date of the battle. Most of them agree on 27 July 1301, and thus have rejected the date 27 June 1302 accepted by Muralt.³⁵

Pachymeres mentions 'Osmān and the battle of Bapheus in the context of the retreat of the Co-Emperor Michael IX from Magnesia to Kyzikos and finally to Pegai (Kara-Biga on the Marmara shore) in the year 1302. On the other hand, the Catalan expedition to western Anatolia, which took place in 1303-

34. The rivers from the Iznik-Hersek valley in the south and the Dil-Ovası valley from the north of the Izmit bay made tongue-like deltas on both sides, narrowing the sea passage at this point; both deltas are called 'Dil'; the southern Dil is also called 'Hersek-Dili'.

35. E. de MURALT, *Essai de chronographie byzantine*, v. I-II (St. Petersburg 1855-1871). Cf. HASLUCK, Bithynica, *Annual of the British School at Athens*, 13 (1906-1907), 285-308.



1. The fort of Çoban-Kale / Koyun.



2. The Dil on the south coast of the Ismit Bay, also called Hersek Dili.



3. *The highway through the valley Iznik-Dil.*



4. The Ottoman bridge on the route Iznik-Dil.

1304, is related in Pachymeres to the account of 'Oşmân's attack.

In discussing, on the basis of the contemporary sources Pachymeres and Philes, Andronikos II's military and diplomatic activities in the period 1296-1299, F. Tinnefeld suggests that in 1298 the Emperor sent a military expedition against "the barbarians in Bithynia" (referred to by Philes).³⁶ The Byzantine failure in this expedition marked the beginning of the successful expansion of the Ottomans in the region. Lastly, P. Schreiner discusses the dates 1301 and 1302, comparing Pachymeres with the notices in the Byzantine short chronicles.³⁷ He suggests that the year 1304 may also be considered for the battle of Bapheus, since in that particular year our sources speak of a general assault of the Turks in western Anatolia and of the flight en masse of the Greek population towards fortified places, including Constantinople.

As for the Ottoman tradition on the date of the Yalak-Ovası battle, this is placed immediately before the battle of Dimboz against the Tekvurs' coalition in the Bursa region in the Hegira year of 702, which started on 26 August 1302. So, the battle of Bapheus must have taken place in the previous year, in the summer of 1301.

To conclude, with the siege of Nicaea and his victory over the Emperor's relief army, 'Oşmân won incomparable fame and charisma among the frontier Turcomans and leaders, securing for himself and his offspring an enduring legitimation for primacy and sovereignty. Neshrî and other compilers of around 1500 were right in associating his beg ship or "independence" with the event. The contemporary Byzantine historian Pachymeres describes 'Oşmân after his victory as one of the most energetic Turcoman emirs threatening Byzantium.

The compilations arranged at Bâyezîd II's request by Idrîs and Kemâl Pasha-zâde after his accession to the throne attributed 'Oşmân's rise to sultanate or to empire as the successor to "the Seljukid Sultan of Konya" or "the Ẓayşer (Caesar) of Constantinople" to his victory over the Byzantine Emperor's army. Thus, at a time when Mehmed the Conqueror's claim to universal empire had become a dynastic assertion to primacy among the states to the East and to the West, the Ottomans used 'Oşmân's victory at Bapheus as the dynasty's legitimation to imperial sovereignty as early as the time of the dynasty's founder.

The elaborate formula and apparatus added by the later compilers to the original candid story of the humble origin of the dynasty should not be an excuse for the historian to dismiss both the early folk traditions and the later elite elaborations. Such later additions as the divine revelation of imperial power through the dream, and its interpretation by a shaman-like holy man, or the Seljukid sultan's recognition of the exalted lineage of 'Oşmân are, in fact, extremely interesting and meaningful for the historian. Also it is equally misleading to dismiss altogether as pure myth and legend the early Ottoman traditions because of these later elaborations.

36. TINNEFELD, *supra*, n. 4, p. 51.

37. SCHREINER, *Kleinchroniken*, v. III, p. 217-219.

For legitimation to the empire, some of the compilers do not find even the Seljukid Sultan's recognition of 'Osmān as his successor strong enough and had recourse to the right of the sword, or victory, as a sign of divine *ta'yīd* (support) and consider him '*mu'ayyad min 'indillāh*' 'sovereign by God's support'.



Bithynia in the Period 1300-1350.

TABLEAU DE LA BITHYNIE AU XIII^e SIÈCLE

Jacques LEFORT

La disparition presque complète des documents d'archive byzantins relatifs à la Bithynie fait que l'état du pays à la veille de la conquête ottomane n'est pas facile à connaître. Toutefois, aux silences des sources byzantines peuvent jusqu'à un certain point suppléer la prospection archéologique et certaines sources ottomanes du XV^e siècle.¹

Je me bornerai à tenter d'établir les deux points suivants: 1. La Bithynie était au XIII^e siècle constituée d'un dense réseau de villages. 2. A ce réseau était superposé un réseau, lui aussi très dense, de villes et de fortifications.

La région étudiée au séminaire de l'École Pratique des Hautes Etudes, et sur le terrain depuis l'automne de 1987,² ne correspond qu'approximativement à la Bithynie. Elle ne comprend pas le Nord du golfe de Nicomédie; elle est limitée à l'Est par la vallée du Sangarios, au Sud par l'Olympe (Uludağ), et elle s'étend à l'Ouest jusqu'à Cyzique. Par ailleurs, nous n'avons encore que rapidement visité la région située à l'Ouest de Bursa.

Je commencerai par rappeler brièvement le peu qu'on sait par les chroniqueurs byzantins sur la situation des campagnes et sur la défense du pays au XIII^e siècle.

Le pays et sa défense

A. *Richesse de la Bithynie.* La fertilité de la région a été célébrée à toute époque. La Bithynie est riche en eau. C'est aujourd'hui la banlieue maraîchère d'Istanbul, comme ce fut le jardin de Constantinople. Tout au plus peut-on introduire à cette image deux correctifs. D'une part, le fond de certaines dépressions aujourd'hui artificiellement asséchées n'était pas drainé, en tout cas pas à la même échelle, à l'époque byzantine et ne pouvait pas être mis en culture:

1. Seuf indication contraire (en cas d'édition plus récente), les chroniqueurs byzantins sont implicitement cités dans le corpus de Bonn.

2. Cf. B. GEYER, J. LEFORT, F. PLANET, *Prospection dans la région de Bursa 1990, IX. Araştırma sonuçları toplantısı 1991*, Ankara, p. 109-118.

ces étendues, lorsqu'elles n'étaient pas marécageuses, étaient livrées à la pâture, certaines d'entre elles pour les chevaux de l'armée, d'autres pour les troupeaux des paysans ou des grands propriétaires. D'autre part, les terrasses alluviales sur lesquelles s'effectue l'agriculture contemporaine n'étaient sans doute pas aussi développées au XIII^e siècle qu'elles le sont aujourd'hui: c'est ce que suggère l'enquête géographique que Bernard Geyer a menée. Par ailleurs, la Bithynie est aussi un pays riche en forêts: il suffit ici d'évoquer la végétation luxuriante des versants de l'Uludağ. Les arbres, de l'olivier au châtaigner selon l'altitude et l'exposition, viennent bien, de même que la vigne.³

Ajoutons que la Bithynie est admirablement située: sur la mer, face à Constantinople, au pied du plateau anatolien. Il y a là des données constantes, des potentialités économiques qui valaient au Moyen Age autant qu'aujourd'hui. Le *xénodocheion* de Pylai voyait défiler les animaux de boucherie ou de trait destinés à la capitale;⁴ Constantin VII célébrait les laitues de l'Olympe;⁵ il semble qu'à cette époque les armées impériales aient été pourvues de vin et d'huile provenant de la région de Nicée;⁶ plus tard, Pegolotti mentionne le vin de Triglia.⁷ A mille traits, on devine une activité commerciale et donc un développement urbain qui, plus qu'ailleurs, ont peut-être été permanents.⁸

La prospérité de l'Asie Mineure byzantine, à la fin du XIII^e siècle, est soulignée par Pachymère: en 1301, les mercenaires Alains y découvrent "des régions qui regorgeaient de toute sorte de biens".⁹ Le même auteur évoque aussi, pour le milieu du XIII^e siècle, l'aisance et, indirectement, le nombre, des paysans "riches en terre et en troupeaux" qui habitaient les montagnes à l'Est du Sangarios.¹⁰ A propos de la politique agraire des empereurs de Nicée, Skoutariôtès et Pachymère évoquent tous deux une oeuvre de colonisation et de mise en valeur des domaines impériaux, sur lesquels on avait fondé des villages;¹¹ d'après le peu que disent les sources, il semble que cette expansion ait été le fait du pays tout entier.¹² On exportait des céréales de Nicée vers le sultanat de Rum¹³ et le

3. Voir, sur la région étudiée, C.L. STOTZ, *The Bursa Region of Turkey*, *The Geographical Review*, 1939, p. 81-100, et des indications dans W.-D. HÜTTEROTH, *Türkei*, (Darmstadt 1982).

4. J. DARROUZÈS, *Epistoliers byzantins du X^e siècle*, (Paris 1960) p. 209.

5. *Ibidem*, p. 327, 328, 329.

6. *Constantine Porphyrogenitus three Treatises on Imperial Military Expeditions*, éd. J. HALDON, CFHB, (Vienne 1990) p. 132.

7. F.B. PEGOLOTTI, *La pratica della mercatura*, éd. A. EVANS, (Cambridge Mass, 1936, réimp. New York 1970) p. 24.

8. Cf. M.F. HENDY, *Studies in the Byzantine Monetary Economy, c. 300-1450*, (Cambridge 1985) p. 49.

9. PACHYMERES (1835), p. 309.

10. PACHYMERES (1984), v. I, p. 33.

11. ACROPOLITA, p. 285-286. PACHYMERES (1984), v. I, p. 99.

12. Cf. ANGOLD, p. 102-104.

13. GREGORAS, v. I, p. 42-43; ANGOLD, p. 116.

trésor de l'État, qui provenait en partie des revenus de l'agriculture, était important.¹⁴ Ces faits suggèrent à la fois abondance d'hommes et prospérité – une prospérité qui semble d'ailleurs avoir été générale en Asie Mineure au milieu du XIII^e siècle.¹⁵

Si, grâce au cartulaire de Lembos, on peut entrer dans plus de détails sur l'organisation du monde rural pour la région de Smyrne, comme l'ont fait Hélène Ahrweiler et Michael Angold,¹⁶ on ne peut qu'en rester, pour la Bithynie, à cette image très générale. Il en est de même pour la défense du pays.

B. *L'organisation de la défense.* La Bithynie est dans l'ensemble restée byzantine durant tout le XIII^e siècle. A l'Ouest et au Sud-Ouest, après le traité de Nymphaeon, en 1214, la région située à l'Est de Lopadion relève de l'empire de Nicée.¹⁷ Au Nord, seule la région de Nicomédie est latine jusqu'en 1240.¹⁸ A l'Est, la frontière avec les Turcs, portée en Paphlagonie sous l'empire de Nicée,¹⁹ s'établit sur le Sangarios vers 1280.

On a, surtout par Pachymère, quelques indications sur l'organisation militaire de la région. Il existait en Bithynie une armée thématique qui tenait garnison dans les villes et dans les forteresses.²⁰ Dans la crainte d'une arrivée des Mongols, Jean III avait fait constituer des dépôts de blé et d'armes et armer les paysans.²¹ Les plus notables ou les plus valeureux d'entre eux se voyaient attribuer des pronoïai.²² Il y avait en particulier en Bithynie des corps de troupes d'origine provinciale, parfois enrôlés dans l'armée mobile, notamment, sous Michel VIII, un corps d'archers efficaces,²³ recrutés parmi des villageois (*chôritai*) qui s'adonnaient à l'agriculture et habitaient la frontière près de Nicée.²⁴ On devine donc une solide armée ou du moins une milice, bien organisée, de paysans-soldats.

Par ailleurs, on sait que les soldats de l'armée mobile jouissaient de pronoïai dans la région.²⁵ Les pronoïaires y sont mentionnés par Pachymère, à propos d'événements qui se passent en 1303.²⁶ Certains d'entre eux étaient des mercenaires, qui, on le sait, formaient une partie importante de l'armée.

14. PACHYMERES (1984), v. I, p. 96-97.

15. CAHEN, *Turquie Pré-ottomane*, p. 116-121.

16. AHRWEILER, *Smyrne*; ANGOLD, p. 121-143.

17. ACROPOLITA, p. 28.

18. ANGOLD, p. 244-245 et n. 10.

19. Cf. PACHYMERES (1984), v. I, p. 29.

20. Cf. ANGOLD, p. 193-194.

21. PACHYMERES (1984), v. I, p. 187.

22. *Ibidem*, p. 29.

23. *Ibidem*, p. 173.

24. *Ibidem*, p. 259-267.

25. ANGOLD, p. 192.

26. PACHYMERES (1835), p. 389.

Cette organisation militaire fut détruite en peu d'années. Pachymère attribue l'invasion ottomane à trois facteurs: 1) Tout d'abord, la pression exercée par les Mongols à partir des années 1250: pour leur échapper, les Turcs occupèrent les montagnes de Paphlagonie jusque là byzantines.²⁷ 2) Ensuite, dans les années 1260, la politique militaire de Michel VIII: l'empereur décida de verser l'armée thématique dans l'armée de campagne, chaque soldat, privé de son lot de terre, recevant dès lors une solde dont le montant était, nous laisse-t-on entendre, inférieur au revenu de l'exploitation qu'il avait auparavant. En raison de ce changement, les soldats défendirent la frontière avec moins de détermination, alors que les Turcs multipliaient les incursions. De plus, les soldes furent versées irrégulièrement, et diminuées. Il en résulta que les soldats furent tués, passèrent à l'ennemi ou émigrèrent. Pendant ce temps, les Turcs occupèrent les points fortifiés, et de là faisaient des incursions.²⁸ 3) Enfin, la dernière raison avancée par Pachymère est un cataclysme survenu en 1302, sur lequel nous reviendrons.

Les grandes étapes de la conquête se déduisent, dans l'Histoire de Pachymère, de l'analyse précédente. Dans les années 1260, la Paphlagonie fut soumise à de fortes impositions; les paysans, affaiblis, passèrent aux Turcs qui s'en servirent comme guides et alliés, ou émigrèrent;²⁹ c'est alors que se produisit la perte de cette province située à l'Est du Sangarios. Ensuite, vers 1280, des soldats d'Asie Mineure ayant été enrôlés dans l'armée d'Occident (usant d'une géographie archaïsante, Pachymère parle d'un corps de soldats paphlagon, d'Halizones ou Mésothyrites, de Phrygiens et de Mysiens), les Turcs s'enhardirent et, à cette date, la frontière se fixa sur le Sangarios.³⁰ Le pays ne fut pas pour autant laissé à l'abandon, car cette frontière fut d'abord défendue. En 1280, Michel VIII inspecta la région du Sangarios;³¹ en 1281, il décida de la faire fortifier; il munit les deux rives du fleuve de nombreuses forteresses, restaurant celles qui avaient souffert du temps, en élevant d'autres (on sait que Théodore Métochite attribue ces constructions à Andronic II: les tours étaient si rapprochées qu'on aurait dit, écrit-il, les remparts d'une ville³²) et fit approvisionner les soldats des forteresses.³³ En 1282, l'empereur parcourut à nouveau la région du Sangarios, la renforça de son mieux puis se rendit à Lopadion, pour fortifier également la frontière dans la région d'Achyraous (Balikésir, hors de la région étudiée, au Sud-Ouest).³⁴ Enfin, en 1302, selon Pachymère nourri des *Météores* d'Aristote, le Sangarios, à la suite de fortes pluies, changea de cours pour quelques mois, dans les environs d'Adapazarı, ce qui facilita les raids turcs; sur ce point précis, –la cause

27. PACHYMERES (1984), v. I, p. 33; ANGOLD, p. 101.

28. PACHYMERES (1984), v. I, p. 33-35.

29. *Ibidem*, p. 291-293.

30. PACHYMERES (1984), v. II, p. 403-407.

31. *Ibidem*, p. 622.

32. I. SEVČENKO, *Études sur la polémique entre Théodore Métochite et Nicéphore Choumnos*, (Bruxelles 1962) p. 138 et n. 6.

33. PACHYMERES (1984), v. II, p. 633-637.

34. *Ibidem*, p. 657.

«météorologique» de la conquête ottomane– il est peut-être difficile de suivre Pachymère. Quoi qu'il en soit, les Byzantins abandonnèrent alors les forteresses au delà du Sangarios. Osman passa à l'Ouest du fleuve et battit les armées impériales près de Nicomédie, à Bapheus.³⁵

Pachymère insiste à plusieurs reprises sur l'exode qui se produisit alors. Il note que beaucoup de Byzantins s'enfuirent;³⁶ il mentionne une foule importante de réfugiés passant de Pylopythia à Prinkipo;³⁷ "toute la Mésothynie émigra", écrit-il;³⁸ il note encore que les gens "de l'intérieur" gagnaient Constnatinople.³⁹ "Tout avait été détruit en peu de mois"⁴⁰ et la Bithynie était ravagée.⁴¹ Comprendons que l'élite sociale s'enfuit, ainsi qu'un certain nombre de paysans. Il est sans doute difficile de croire à un exode massif, et nous verrons qu'une partie de la paysannerie est bien restée sur place. Mais le système défensif se trouva totalement désorganisé; dès le début du XIV^e siècle, les Byzantins ne contrôlaient plus en Bithynie que certaines places fortes, en particulier côtières, et les armées turques tinrent définitivement la campagne. En 1305, tout le territoire qui entoure Nicée et Pythia et qui va jusqu'à la mer était, selon Pachymère, détenu par Osman.⁴²

Le caractère brusque, inexorable, de ces événements invite à enquêter de plus près sur l'état de la Bithynie au XIII^e siècle, à examiner si les notations générales que j'ai relevées sur l'état des campagnes et sur la défense du pays peuvent être ou non confirmées de quelque façon. Que peut-on savoir sur l'occupation du sol, sur le réseau des villages et des fortifications en Bithynie au XIII^e siècle?

Le réseau des villages

A. *Les sources byzantines.* Nous ne connaissons par les sources byzantines qu'une vingtaine de noms de villages bithyniens. Aucun d'entre eux n'est certainement localisable. Nous connaissons aussi une dizaine de noms de domaines, *proasteia* ou métoques: leur identification est encore plus problématique. L'absence de documents et le changement de la toponymie, surtout dans les campagnes, rendent impossible une étude comme celle que les archives de l'Athos permettent en Macédoine. Tout au plus peut-on dire, d'après les vies de saints du IX^e siècle et les correspondances d'évêques au X^e, que la distinction entre villages de petits propriétaires et grands domaines est ancienne en Bithynie;

35. PACHYMERES (1835), p. 327-332.

36. *Ibidem*, p. 319.

37. *Ibidem*, p. 324-325.

38. *Ibidem*, p. 327.

39. *Ibidem*, p. 335.

40. *Ibidem*, p. 336-337.

41. *Ibidem*, p. 388-390.

42. *Ibidem*, p. 642.

d'après l'ensemble de la documentation écrite d'époque byzantine, on devine que la structure agraire de la région ne différait pas, aux siècles suivants, de celle de régions mieux connues à ce point de vue: à d'anciens (et gros?) villages s'opposaient des hameaux (moins peuplés?) de locataires établis sur les domaines. Mais on ne peut pas dire plus – et nous sommes ici proches de la banalité.

B. *La prospection.* La prospection systématique de certaines vallées, comme celle que nous avons entreprise en 1989 au Nord-Ouest de Nicée, suggère que dans bien des cas les villages actuels correspondent à d'anciens habitats romains, paléochrétiens puis byzantins. L'abondance des vestiges romains (par exemple des contrepoids de moulins à huile, réutilisés en pierres à bulgur) et paléochrétiens (des fragments architecturaux provenant d'églises) semblent attester une occupation du sol très dense, y compris sur les versants, aux premiers siècles de notre ère. La relative rareté des vestiges proprement byzantins (IX^e-XIII^e siècles) dans les villages ne signifie pas que les Byzantins aient été moins nombreux que les Romains, mais doit plutôt s'expliquer par le fait que leurs techniques de construction, faisant généreusement appel aux remplois, ont laissé moins de trace. La seule chose claire jusqu'ici, et elle n'est pas surprenante, c'est que seul le sommet des versants a été occupé pour la première fois au XIX^e siècle. On a l'espoir que des études relevant autant de la paléogéographie que de l'archéologie permettront de préciser l'histoire du peuplement rural au Moyen Age.

C. *Les registres ottomans.* Les registres ottomans du XV^e et du XVI^e siècles⁴³ apportent quelque lumière sur l'état des campagnes byzantines au XIII^e siècle. Ces registres fournissent, pour la première fois dans l'histoire, une image précise du peuplement des campagnes en Bithynie.

Une étude toponymique et topographique sur les villages mentionnés (sauf exception, les *mezra's* – ou hameaux – n'ont pas été pris en considération), dans les kaza de Bursa, Inegöl, Yarhisar, Ermenipazarı, Yenişehir, Geyve et Akhisar suggère un certain nombre de faits. Dans ces sept kazas, presque cinq cents villages sont enregistrés, mais sur un siècle (de 1487 à 1573); ce nombre excède donc un peu le nombre des villages existant à un moment donné, certains d'entre eux étant apparus, d'autres ayant disparu, au cours de cette époque. Par ailleurs, l'objet et la composition des registres font qu'il n'est pas sûr que nous connaissions tous les villages d'un kaza. En tenant compte de ces remarques, on peut noter que le nombre des villages connus aux XV^e-XVI^e siècles est, dans cette région, comparable à celui des villages actuels, tels qu'ils apparaissent sur la carte turque au 1/200.000 des années 1930. Pour cette raison, il semble possible, voire probable, que nous connaissions par ces documents la plupart des villages de la région aux XV^e-XVI^e siècles. La moitié des villages mentionnés dans les registres peut être

43. Tels que je les connais à travers la publication de BARKAN-MERİÇLİ. Je remercie Irène Beldiceanu d'avoir accepté de travailler avec moi sur cet ouvrage; son aide était indispensable; mais les erreurs d'interprétation n'engagent que moi.

localisée, parce qu'ils n'ont pas changé de nom jusqu'au XIX^e siècle (certains toponymes ne se trouvent que sur les cartes ottomanes ou sur celles de Kiepert). Cette proportion est suffisante pour que l'on puisse penser que la répartition des villages localisés est représentative de l'ensemble, d'autant que les toponymes disparus semblent souvent être ceux d'habitats précaires, situés sur les versants.

Parmi les informations données par ces registres, figure le fait que certains d'entre eux sont habités partiellement, parfois majoritairement, par des chrétiens. Il est certes possible que ces chrétiens soient arrivés dans ces villages après la conquête ottomane: tel registre mentionne, dans tel village, la présence de chrétiens déportés.⁴⁴ Mais le cas ne semble pas général. Le maintien d'un certain nombre de paysans grecs après la conquête semble plus probable. En effet, la persistance de plus de cinquante noms de villages qui ne sont pas turcs, dont la plupart sont visiblement grecs, ne s'expliquerait pas dans une région qui aurait été totalement désertée. Il est probable que ces toponymes sont anciens, et qu'ils témoignent d'une certaine continuité du peuplement. Celle-ci est particulièrement claire dans la quinzaine de villages qui ont à la fois un nom grec et une population chrétienne. Par ailleurs, la présence de chrétiens dans un village dont le nom est turc –une quarantaine de cas– ne signifie pas nécessairement qu'il s'agisse de chrétiens arrivés après la conquête: d'autres explications sont possibles. Si l'on peut parler d'une continuité du peuplement après le début du XIV^e siècle (parce que les villages sont en partie peuplés de chrétiens au XV^e siècle, ou parce que les toponymes qui les désignent ne sont pas turcs), il faut aussitôt ajouter que cette continuité n'est perceptible, après deux siècles, que dans un village sur cinq. Sans doute convient-il de tenir compte des conversions à l'islam, qui ont pu gommer l'origine grecque d'une partie de la population: mais, si les registres ottomans permettent de nuancer les affirmations de Pachymère, ils ne le contredisent pas: à la fin du XV^e siècle, et peut-être depuis le XIV^e, le pays était devenu largement turc.

Une étude détaillée, par kaza, apporte d'autres informations. Dans le kaza de Bursa, comme dans l'ensemble de la région, il semble que l'on connaisse la plupart des villages du XV^e siècle. Un village sur cinq est alors en partie chrétien et les toponymes grecs sont assez nombreux. On note cependant le peuplement totalement turc du pied de l'Olympe. Dans ce milieu géographiquement privilégié, il existait évidemment des villages de piémont à l'époque byzantine: à l'Ouest de Bursa Misi⁴⁵ au moins, d'après le nom, et il en allait vraisemblablement de même à l'Est, qui a été occupé avant la fin du XV^e siècle par des membres de la tribu des Kızık. A cet endroit, les Turcs ont remplacé des Grecs, assez vivement, ou assez massivement, pour qu'aucun toponyme pré-turc ni aucune famille chrétienne ne subsistent. Dans le kaza d'Inegöl aussi, les toponymes qui ne sont pas turcs et la présence de chrétiens suggèrent le maintien d'une partie de la population grecque

44. BARKAN-MERIÇLI, p. 221, no 369 (Aravud, kaza d'Yenişehir), p. 473, no 726 (Köpri-Başı, kaza d'Akhisar).

45. *Ibidem*, no 45, p. 32.

après la conquête. Dans la plaine, les chrétiens sont présents dans un village sur trois, alors que dans la montagne on ne les trouve que dans un village sur huit: si on ne peut pas dire que la plaine est grecque, il est clair que la montagne est alors turque; on verra que ce fait se vérifie ailleurs. Cette répartition peut s'expliquer, au XV^e siècle, par des genres de vie différents, mais elle renvoie sans doute aussi à une histoire du peuplement. Par ailleurs, dans les montagnes, plusieurs toponymes qui ne sont pas turcs (par exemple Bedre⁴⁶) suggèrent une certaine occupation des versants avant l'époque ottomane; or une occupation byzantine sur les versants serait elle-même l'indice d'une population dense dans la plaine au XIII^e siècle. Le kaza de Yarhisar est une zone montagneuse. La toponymie non turque n'y est pas absente (Kesahor⁴⁷ et Perama⁴⁸ ne sont pas localisés), ce qui suggère, comme à Inegöl, une occupation des versants au XIII^e siècle. Au XV^e siècle, les chrétiens ne sont restés que dans un village, vers 500 m. d'altitude, Kara-Omca.⁴⁹ Dans l'ensemble, comme à Inegöl, la montagne est devenue turque. Le kaza d'Ermenipazari (il était peu habité et peu de toponymes y sont localisables) est aussi un pays de montagne; on constate qu'aucun toponyme n'y est grec, et on n'y trouve que six feux chrétiens, au XVI^e siècle.⁵⁰ Le kaza d'Yenişehir correspond en revanche à un bassin. L'empreinte byzantine y reste forte, d'après les toponymes localisés, Makri,⁵¹ Misanoz,⁵² Dimbos,⁵³ Ayazma,⁵⁴ Karakilise,⁵⁵ et ceux qui ne le sont pas, Kostendil,⁵⁶ Despina,⁵⁷ Lagoz,⁵⁸ sans compter d'autres noms de villages qui paraissent peu turcs. La présence des chrétiens est importante dans la plaine, puisqu'on les trouve dans deux villages sur trois: c'est la plus forte proportion de chrétiens qu'on rencontre dans la région. Mais sur le versant, comme c'est le cas ailleurs, la plupart des villages sont musulmans. Le kaza de Geyve formait la rive droite de la plaine du Moyen Sangarios. La comparaison avec le réseau des villages dans les années 1930 suggère que nous connaissons tous les villages de la plaine aux XV^e-XVI^e siècles. Le versant était déjà très occupé au XV^e siècle. On ne trouve dans le kaza aucun toponyme dont on puisse affirmer qu'il n'est pas turc, sauf Geyve, qui doit être Kabeia byzantin (cf. plus bas), et on n'y trouve non plus aucun chrétien au XV^e ni au XVI^e siècle. C'est la première plaine sans chrétiens que l'on rencontre et on peut noter qu'elle est sur la rive droite

46. *Ibidem*, no 118, p. 82.

47. *Ibidem*, no 230-2, p. 143.

48. *Ibidem*, no 232, p. 146.

49. *Ibidem*, no 231, p. 145.

50. *Ibidem*, à Karaca Kaya, no 254/2, p. 166.

51. *Ibidem*, no 313, p. 202.

52. *Ibidem*, no 330, p. 211.

53. *Ibidem*, no 419, p. 252.

54. *Ibidem*, no 403-7, p. 243.

55. *Ibidem*, no 325, p. 208.

56. *Ibidem*, no 378/6, p. 225.

57. *Ibidem*, no 379-5, p. 225.

58. *Ibidem*, no 405, p. 244.

du Sangarios: or, à Akyazı non plus, rive droite du Sangarios plus au Nord, il n'y a aucun chrétien. Il en allait différemment rive gauche du fleuve. Le kaza d'Akhisar compte en effet trois villages comportant des chrétiens, tous dans la plaine, et d'assez nombreux toponymes grecs ou peu turcs, comme Despina,⁵⁹ Bednos Virani,⁶⁰ dont certains ne sont pas localisés: Anahor,⁶¹ Mide⁶² par exemple. Les toponymes apparemment pré-turcs ne sont pas absents en montagne, ce qui suggère ici aussi une occupation byzantine du versant, donc une pression démographique relativement forte au XIII^e siècle.

Cette présentation schématique de certaines des données contenues dans les registres ottomans permet deux conclusions provisoires: 1) La répartition inégale des chrétiens et des musulmans, qui doit grossièrement correspondre à celle des Grecs et des Turcs, selon les kazas, et entre les plaines et les versants, semble renvoyer à une histoire du peuplement, voire même à l'histoire de la conquête: la différence de peuplement entre la rive droite et la rive gauche du Sangarios est en tout cas à noter, si l'on se souvient que le fleuve a été une frontière. 2) L'existence d'une toponymie non turque, par hypothèse byzantine, sur les versants, suggère que l'occupation du sol était assez dense dans les plaines au XIII^e siècle. Quel que soit le nom des villages au XV^e siècle, il est pour cette raison vraisemblable que la plupart d'entre eux existaient au XIII^e. L'information est faible, et elle n'est pas établie avec certitude: mais la disparition des archives byzantines invite à la prendre en compte et à tenter de la vérifier.

Le réseau des villes

L'espace bithynien était structuré par un réseau de villes et de places fortes dont les garnisons assuraient la sécurité des communications et, dans une certaine mesure, celle des villages avoisinants. On trouvera sur la carte, p. 117, l'indication des sites fortifiés au XIII^e siècle connus de nous. Comme pour les villages, trois types de sources en permettent l'étude: les textes byzantins, certaines sources ottomanes et la prospection.

A. *Les sources byzantines.* Les remparts d'un certain nombre de villes ont été entretenus constamment depuis l'Antiquité, par exemple ceux de Nicée, étudiés par Schneider-Karnapp,⁶³ puis par Foss-Winfield,⁶⁴ d'Apollônias, de Brousse ou de Nicomédie.⁶⁵

59. *Ibidem*, no 707, p. 461.

60. *Ibidem*, no 759, p. 493-494.

61. *Ibidem*, no 708, p. 461-462.

62. *Ibidem*, no 719, p. 469-470.

63. A. M. SCHNEIDER et W. KARNAPP, *Die Stadtmauer von Iznik*, (Berlin 1938).

64. Cl. FOSS et D. WINFIELD, *Byzantine fortifications, An Introduction*, (Pretoria 1986).

65. Cf., sur les villes dont la continuité est attestée, W. BRANDES, *Die Städte Kleinasiens im 7. und 8. Jahrhundert*, (Berlin 1989) p. 124-131.

Zone frontière depuis l'invasion selcuk, ou du moins dont l'importance pour la défense de Constantinople s'est accrue, la Bithynie a été mise en défense sous les Comnènes. On connaît, par les chroniqueurs, la date à laquelle certaines forteresses ont été édifiées ou restaurées. On sait ainsi qu'Alexis I^{er} a fortifié Kibôtos,⁶⁶ que l'on peut localiser dans les environs d'Ersek (Hélénoupolis), et Sidéra,⁶⁷ situé sans doute près du lac de Sapanca. Jean II a fortifié Achyraous⁶⁸ et Lopadion.⁶⁹ Manuel Comnène a (re)construit une place forte à Malagina⁷⁰ sur le Sangarios, à Pithèkas⁷¹ et à Pylai.⁷² Contre les Nicéens, les Latins ont fortifié Charax⁷³ (aujourd'hui Hereke), Kibôtos,⁷⁴ Cyzique dont les murs étaient presque en ruine.⁷⁵ On sait aussi que, contre les Turcs, les empereurs de Nicée ont réparé les remparts de Nicée, en y (re)construisant l'avant-mur,⁷⁶ et qu'ils ont restauré les murailles de Brousse.⁷⁷ Mais dans la plupart des cas, on peut seulement affirmer qu'un site était fortifié au XII^e ou XIII^e siècle, et même parfois on doit se contenter de le déduire.

Contrairement à ce qu'il en est pour les villages, la bibliographie consacrée à l'identification des villes antiques ou byzantines est considérable. Dans une région où la toponymie a largement changé, la recherche doit souvent mettre en oeuvre la totalité des informations conservées, du monnayage romain aux registres ottomans, pour aboutir parfois à une simple hypothèse.⁷⁸ Là encore, l'absence d'archives byzantines est un obstacle. Je mentionnerai rapidement quelques uns des problèmes de localisation qui se posent à propos des sources byzantines.

Un certain nombre d'évêchés, encore énumérés dans une notice du XII^e siècle⁷⁹ ne sont pas localisés. Ces évêchés ont certainement correspondu à des

66. *The Ecclesiastical History of Orderic Vitalis*, éd. M. CHIBNALL, (Oxford 1968) p. 202: Cheuetot.

67. *Alexiade*, v. II, p. 206.

68. CHONIATA, p. 33: Ochyrai.

69. KINNAMOS, p. 38.

70. *Ibidem*, p. 36; CHONIATA, p. 52.

71. KINNAMOS, p. 38. On a identifié Pithèkas à Bözöyük; cf. ZACHARIADOU, *Ἱστορία καὶ θρύλοι τῶν παλαιῶν σουλτάνων, 1300-1400*, (Athènes 1991), p. 82, n. 129.

72. *Ibidem*, p. 63, 194.

73. VILLEHARDOUIN, *La conquête de Constantinople*, éd. E. FARAL, (Paris 1939) v. II, § 460, 481: Caracas.

74. *Ibidem*, § 460: le Chivetot.

75. *Ibidem*, § 454: Equise.

76. Cf. FOSS-WINFIELD, *op. cit.* ci-dessus, n. 64, p. 82.

77. Cf. ANGOLD, p. 99.

78. A défaut de donner ici une bibliographie, rappelons que les questions de méthode sont magistralement traitées dans ROBERT, *Villes*; on y trouve plusieurs développements importants sur notre région.

79. J. DARROUZÈS, *Notitiae episcopatum ecclesiae constanopolitanae*, (Paris 1981) no. XIII; cf. p. 136.

villes, à des sites fortifiés, mais il n'est pas sûr que les sièges mentionnés aient tous existé à l'époque, ni que tous aient été situés dans la région étudiée: si les sources invitent à localiser Basilinoupolis dans la région d'Orhangazi,⁸⁰ on ne sait rien sur Eristè, Linoè, Maximianai; notons que Noumérika est encore attesté au XII^e siècle.⁸¹ Césarée (peut-être au Nord de Bursa⁸²) n'est plus mentionnée au XI^e siècle comme évêché, mais c'est toujours un *polisma* dans Nicétas Choniate.⁸³ Signalons enfin que l'existence d'un évêché est parfois le seul indice de la fortification d'un site: ainsi pour Apamée (Mudanya), ou pour Prainétos (Karamürsel).

Chez les historiens et chroniqueurs. – Anne Comnène cite plusieurs fortifications qui ne sont pas localisées: outre Sidèra déjà mentionné, Kyr Georges près de Nicée à l'Ouest, sur la rive Nord du lac⁸⁴ et Arménokastron,⁸⁵ qu'il est tentant, malgré une difficulté due à l'ordre dans lequel certaines places-fortes sont énumérées, d'identifier à Ermenipazarı, aujourd'hui Pazaryeri.⁸⁶ – Acropolite mentionne un certain nombre de places-fortes toutes situées dans la région de Manyas: Bernéniakon, Charioros, Lentiana et Poimanènon;⁸⁷ Poimanènon a été identifié par Hasluck à Eski Manyas,⁸⁸ mais Louis Robert a émis des objections⁸⁹ et le problème est à reprendre pour l'ensemble de ces sites. Acropolite cite également un fort, Kéramidas, dans les montagnes de Cyzique.⁹⁰ – Pachymère, à propos de l'invasion ottomane en Bithynie au début du XIV^e siècle, donne le nom de plusieurs agglomérations situées dans la région de Nicée, dont la plupart semblent fortifiées; je cite le passage: "la célèbre Nicée était fermée, et coupée des agréments environnants, elle était aussi gênée par la pénurie. C'était tantôt Bélokômis, tantôt Angélokômis, Anagourdys, Platanéa, Mélangeia et tous les alentours qui, vidés de leurs habitants, attiraient les lamentations de ceux qui savaient. Kroulla et Katoikia souffraient ces maux en pire. En effet, la route d'Hérakleion et de Néakômis vers Nicée était fermée..."⁹¹ A tort ou à raison, Bélokômè a été identifiée à Bilecik et Angélokômè à Inegöl.⁹² Mélangeia est Malagina,⁹³ près du Sangarios; ce site, important dans l'histoire militaire byzantine,

80. RAMSAY, *Asia Minor*, p. 179.

81. V. LAURENT, *Le corpus des sceaux de l'empire byzantin*, V, I, (Paris 1963) p. 285-286.

82. Cf. ROBERT, *Villes*, p. 190 et n. 1. On pourrait songer à localiser Césarée sur le site de Péladarion (cf. ci-dessous).

83. CHONIATA, p. 603.

84. *Alexiade*, v, II, p. 74.

85. *Ibidem*, v, III, p. 198.

86. WITTEK, *Toponymie*, p. 36 et n. 8.

87. ACROPOLITA, p. 36.

88. F. W. HASLUCK, *Cyzicus*, (Cambridge 1910) p. 119 s.

89. ROBERT, *Villes*, p. 198 n. 3.

90. ACROPOLITA, p. 47.

91. PACHYMERES (1835), v, II, p. 412-413.

92. B. KANDÈS, *Η Πρωσσα* (Athènes 1883), p. 71; RAMSAY, *Asia Minor*, p. 207.

93. Cf. FOSS, p. 164.

est peut-être localisé.⁹⁴ Kroulla a été identifié par Tomaschek à Gürle,⁹⁵ qui est probablement le Corleh d'Ibn Battûta, étape entre Brousse et Nicée⁹⁶ et Katoikia à Kite.⁹⁷ Hérakeion est aujourd'hui Ereğli sur le Golfe d'Izmit⁹⁸ et Néakômè est à chercher dans la région de Pylai-Hélénopolis.⁹⁹ Pachymère mentionne aussi Kouboukleia, "phrourion dans la Mysie de l'Olympe",¹⁰⁰ dont le site est semble-t-il connu,¹⁰¹ Trikokkia, qui n'est pas localisé,¹⁰² et un autre *phrourion*¹⁰³ que Cyril Mango a identifié à juste titre à Péladarion (Filadar, village abandonné près de l'actuel Gündoğdu).¹⁰⁴ – Le *polychnion* de Philokrènè, cité par Grégoras et Cantacuzène à propos de la bataille de Pélékanon en 1329,¹⁰⁵ était situé dans la région de Dakibyza (carte ottomane: Filingir). – Au total, sur plus de quarante sites fortifiés ou vraisemblablement fortifiés au XIII^e siècle d'après les sources byzantines, moins de la moitié peuvent être localisés.

B. *Aşıkpaşazâde*. La chronique ottomane d'Aşıkpaşazâde,¹⁰⁶ écrite à la fin du XV^e siècle par quelqu'un qui connaissait bien la Bithynie et qui avait eu accès à des sources aujourd'hui disparues, mentionne, en faisant le récit de la conquête par Osman et Orhan, un certain nombre de places fortes tenues par des *tekur* chrétiens, gouverneurs ou seigneurs byzantins, et prises par les Ottomans. Malgré le caractère un peu naïf du récit, nous sommes portés à accorder une grande valeur à ce texte, car, là où la vérification est archéologiquement

94. Cf. en dernier lieu FOSS. L'auteur identifie Malagina (ou Métabolè à Malagina) au site fortifié près de Paşalar dont nous parlons plus loin.

95. TOMASCHEK, p. 10.

96. IBN BATTUTA, *Voyages*, II, p. 180.

97. Cf. ZACHARIADOU, *op. cit.* p. 85.

98. Cf. TOMASCHEK, p. 10.

99. ATTALIAE, p. 144.

100. PACHYMERES (1835), p. 580.

101. Kouboukleia semble être l'actuel Körükle à l'Ouest de Bursa (cf. A. MESETIDES et B. DELEGIANNES, *Mikrasiatika Chronika*, 3 (1940) 430 et B. DELEGIANNES, *Mikrasiatika Chronika*, 6 (1955) 211: mention de la forteresse). KANDÈS *op. cit.* p. 71, identifie Kouboukleia à un mystérieux Δοῦβλουτζε, mais, sur la carte qu'il publie, Koboukleia est bien à l'emplacement de Körükle. Près de Körükle, nous avons trouvé les traces de ce qui pourrait être une enceinte et quelques tessons de céramique byzantine.

102. PACHYMERES (1984), v. I, p. 267 et v. II, p. 638 L'identification de Trikokkia à Koçhisar, au Sud-Est de Nicée, dans l'*EI*², 5 (1983) p. 248, par. H. DE GROOT, repose apparemment sur l'affirmation de KANDÈS, p. 71.

103. PACHYMERES (1835), p. 596.


104. C. MANGO, The monastery of St. Abercius at Kursunlu (Elegmi) in Bithynia, *DOP* 22 (1968) 176; cf. aussi *ibidem*, p. 169, n. 2. Nous avons visité les vestiges de la fortification en août 1992; la céramique date des époques romaine, byzantine et ottomane.

105. GREGORAS, v. I, p. 434, 435; CANTACUZENUS, v. I, p. 360, 361.

106. Je connais le texte par des traductions: celle, en allemand, publiée par KREUTEL, et, pour les 59 premiers chapitres, celle, en grec, de ZACHARIADOU, *op. cit.*, p. 123-213.



*A. Lopadion,
l'enceinte byzantine.*



*B. Apollônias,
porte de la ville.*




C. Kite, mur byzantin.



D. Kestel, tour et mur de l'enceinte.

*E. Kuleler, une des deux
tours du château.*



F. Akhisar, le mur d'enceinte.





G. Eskihişar, le mur d'enceinte.



H. Söğütlü, les remparts.

possible, nous avons constaté que les sites mentionnés par l'auteur ont effectivement été fortifiés et occupés par les Byzantins au XIII^e siècle. Si l'on admet que cette vérification est probante, on est tenté de tenir pour vraisemblable que l'ensemble des sites fortifiés cités dans la chronique comme ayant été détenus par des chrétiens correspond à des sites fortifiés byzantins. L'auteur mentionne dans la région considérée une quarantaine de sites fortifiés chrétiens, dont une trentaine sont identifiés. Nous avons visité vingt quatre d'entre eux. Les vestiges trouvés sur place permettent de dire que seize au moins étaient occupés au XIII^e siècle – ce qui fonde notre confiance dans cette source. Au total, aux agglomérations fortifiées ou fortifications localisées qui sont connues par les sources byzantines, Aşikpaşazâde permet d'ajouter presque une vingtaine de sites.

Les fortifications chrétiennes que la Chronique mentionne dans la région sont les suivantes; je les énumère d'Ouest en Est: Kirmasti (§ 35),¹⁰⁷ aujourd'hui Mustapha Kemal Paşa. – Ulubat (§ 17), aujourd'hui Uluabad, est Lopadion byzantin, dont les fortifications sont en partie conservées (pl. A). – Apolyont (§ 35) aujourd'hui Apolyontköy, est Apollônias: l'enceinte subsiste (pl. B). – Biloyoz (§ 35) n'est pas identifié; d'après le contexte, la place-forte pourrait être dans la région d'Apolyont-Uluabad. – Kite (§ 17) se nomme Ürünlü depuis 1960; les ruines du château sont à 50 m. au Sud-Est du village (pl. C); on trouve au sol de la céramique byzantine des XIII^e-XIV^e siècles et de la céramique ottomane. – Adranos (§ 17) est Adrianoi byzantin, qui n'est connu que par des listes d'évêchés, aujourd'hui Orhaneli; à 2,5 km à l'Ouest d'Orhaneli, on trouve les ruines imposantes de l'Adrianoi romain et paléochrétien; à 2 km au Nord, une colline fortifiée correspond vraisemblablement au site byzantin de la ville. L'espace fortifié fait 100 m. sur 70; deux tours sont bien conservées avec un type de parement connu ailleurs, dans la région et en Macédoine, vers le XIII^e siècle; on trouve au sol des tessons byzantins et quelques dalles de marbre qui pourraient provenir d'une église. – Dans la région de Bursa (§ 18) d'après le contexte, se trouverait Bidnos (§ 17), qui n'est pas identifié.¹⁰⁸ – Gemlik (§ 23), Kios byzantin, est mentionné allusivement par Aşikpaşazâde, comme port; d'importants vestiges de la citadelle sont conservés. – Kestel (§ 17): le nom n'a pas changé et l'enceinte subsiste (pl. D). – Au Nord du Golfe d'Izmit, Geğibüze (§ 30), château et village, aujourd'hui Gebze, est le Dakibyza byzantin. – Hereke (§ 80) – le nom n'a lui non plus pas changé – s'appelait, nous l'avons noté, Charax à l'époque byzantine. – Au Sud de la région, Aynegöl (§ 3), aujourd'hui Inegöl: nous n'y avons pas vu de vestiges médiévaux. – Kolaca (§ 5) est, dans Aşikpaşazâde, un petit château dans les environs d'Inegöl. Il existe aujourd'hui, à 4 km à l'Est d'Inegöl, un village dit Kulaca; mais nous n'y avons trouvé aucune trace de fortification. – Plus au Sud, Ikizce (§ 5), près du défilé de Domaniç, n'est pas localisé. – Koyunhisarı (§ 17),

107. Je donne la première occurrence, en renvoyant aux chapitres (§) de la Chronique.

108. Cf. ZACHARIADOU, *op. cit.*, p. 85, n. 141.

dans le bassin d'Yenişehir: près du village actuel Koyunhisar, aujourd'hui nommé Hamidiye, il y avait une agglomération byzantine, d'après l'abondante céramique du XIII^e siècle, mais on n'y devine pas de fortification. – Yarhisar (§ 12), aujourd'hui le village Yarhisar (à distinguer de la ville contemporaine homonyme, située plus à l'Est); quelques restes des remparts subsistent: un mur et les traces d'un autre mur, au sommet d'un éperon rocheux; la céramique au sol date des XIII^e-XVI^e siècles. – Köprühisar (§ 16) – le nom n'a pas changé – est, d'après divers vestiges, un site paléochrétien et peut-être byzantin; nous n'y avons trouvé aucune trace de fortification. – Çavuşköyü (§ 20), "petit château près de Lefke à l'entrée de la vallée de la rivière de Yenişehir" conquis, puis donné par Osman à Samsa Çavuş selon Aşıkpaşazâde, doit être identifié au site dit Kuleler; c'est une forteresse érigée sur un ensellement dominant le Kocasu; deux tours sont conservées (pl. E) et peut-être des traces de murs; la céramique trouvée au sol est du XIII^e siècle. – Peut-être dans la région d'Izmit (Iznikmid, § 25) d'après le contexte, ou plus à l'Ouest si la localisation donnée dans la chronique, "près de Yalakovası" se rapporte à la vallée du Yalakdere, un Koyunhisarı, différent du précédent, est mentionné au § 30: dans la seconde hypothèse, il pourrait s'agir du Çoban Kale dont il est question ci-dessous.¹⁰⁹ – Au Sud d'Izmit, Mekece (§ 20) est déjà mentionné par Ibn Battûta comme étape entre Nicée et Geyve-Kabaia;¹¹⁰ à 1 km du village actuel du même nom, qui est sur une colline,¹¹¹ on trouve, dans la plaine, les restes d'une enceinte de 52 m. au moins sur 12; la céramique au sol est byzantine et ottomane. – Lefke (§ 20) est Leukai byzantin, aujourd'hui Osmaneli; aucune trace de fortification n'est visible. – Çadırılı (§ 20) serait peut-être, d'après le contexte, dans la région de Lefke. – Leblebihisar (§ 20), peut-être également dans la région de Lefke, n'a pas été identifié. – Bilecik (§ 2): il semble que des vestiges y soient conservés. – A l'Ouest de Pamukova-Akhisar, près du hameau Paşalar, les restes imposants d'une puissante agglomération fortifiée peuvent être identifiés au Akhisar d'Aşıkpaşazâde (§ 20). Sur un piton de calcaire blanc, s'élève une vaste enceinte de plus de 100 m. de long; le mur est hellénistique, romain, paléochrétien et byzantin; dans une tour, une salle à coupole sur pendentifs évoque celle qu'on trouve dans la tour Gonatas à Iznik; trois citernes sont visibles, et une poterne, d'époque byzantine, est conservée (pl. F); les tessons sont hellénistiques, romains, byzantins (XIII^e-XIV^e siècles) et, pour très peu, ottomans. Sur un ensellement, on devine une ville basse, non fortifiée. Nous avons donc affaire à une ville byzantine occupée au XIII^e siècle.¹¹² – Près d'Adapazarı se trouve Beşköprü, qui est le pont de Justinien: de petites forteresses y sont mentionnées par Aşıkpaşazâde (§ 22), là où le Sangarios se jette dans

109. Je dois cette suggestion à M. H. Inalcik.

110. IBN BATTUTA, *Voyages*, II, p. 182: Makedja.

111. Sur un des pitons de cette colline, des vestiges peut-être anciens subsistent.

112. Voir aussi la description du site pas FOSS, p. 170-171; comme nous l'avons noté (n. 94), Cl. Foss identifie ce site à Métabolè-Malagina.

“l’Ayângölü” (le lac de Sapanca ?). S. Şahin a publié les photos d’une fortification située près du pont de Justinien;¹¹³ il pourrait s’agir d’un des forts édifiés par Michel VIII, dont il a été question plus haut. – Geyve (§ 20) a été identifié à Kabaia byzantin par Wittek.¹¹⁴ Notons qu’au Nord de Geyve une colline semble avoir été fortifiée; on y trouve des traces de murs, mais pas de céramique caractéristique. – Au Sud de Geyve sans doute, Ap suyu (§ 22), ou peut-être Ap sopiya, près du Sangarios, est probablement identique à Ap sufi dans la région de Gölpaazarı, mentionné par le registre TT23 de 1487.¹¹⁵ – Karaçepüş, “puissant château dans la vallée du Sangarios” (§ 20) était peut-être, d’après le contexte, non loin de Lefke.¹¹⁶ – Karatekin (§ 22) pourrait être dans la même région que Karaçepüş. Ces deux places étaient considérées comme utiles pour attaquer Nicée. – Harmankaya (§ 9), dont le seigneur chrétien était Köse Mihal, doit être, d’après le contexte, entre Tarakcı et Eskişehir. On trouve aujourd’hui, près du village d’Harmanköy, au pied de l’imposante montagne dite Harmankaya, des vestiges qui pourraient être ceux d’une enceinte.¹¹⁷ – Plus à l’Est, Aşıkpaşazâde mentionne Tarakçı Yenicesi (§ 10; aujourd’hui Taraklı) qui est déjà cité par Ibn Battûta comme étape entre Mekece et Göynük,¹¹⁸ et, hors de la région étudiée, Akyazı (§ 22) et Goynük (§ 10; le nom n’a pas changé). Enfin, Gökalanoz (§ 10; ou Körfelinos), pourrait être situé dans la région de Taraklı-Göynük d’après le contexte.¹¹⁹

C. La prospection. En visitant la région, guidés souvent par les voyageurs, dont l’étude a été menée par Jean-Pierre Grémois, nous avons rencontré d’autres fortifications que celles qu’on a pu identifier dans les sources byzantines ou dans Aşıkpaşazâde; ces fortifications, comme d’autres que nous avons retrouvées et qui ont déjà été mentionnées, ont été étudiées plus particulièrement par Christophe Giros pour l’architecture et par Véronique François pour la céramique. J’en mentionnerai dix (en les énumérant d’Ouest en Est), dont il est vraisemblable qu’elles étaient occupées au XII^e ou au XIII^e siècle. – Sur la rive Nord du lac d’Apollonias, à Eski Karağaç, nous avons observé les vestiges d’une fortification

113. S. ŞAHIN, Adapazarı/Beşköprü mevkiindeki antik Köprü ve çevre tarihi coğrafyasında yarattığı sorunlu durum, *VII. kazı, araştırma ve arkeometri sempozyumu*, (Ankara 1986) p. 179. Nous n’avons pas vu ces fortifications.

114. WITTEK, *Toponymie*, p. 36 et n. 9.

115. Je dois ces informations à Irène Beldiceanu.

116. D’après la carte 1 de KREUTEL, p. 334, serait près de Beşköprü, rive droite du Sangarios. FOSS, p. 172 n. 47, songe à un rapprochement avec le Çoban Kale, rive gauche du Sangarios, dont nous parlons plus loin. Le Kara Çepis de BARKAN-MERİÇLİ (no 141, p. 91), dans le kaza d’Inegöl, semble être un autre site.

117. La localisation proposée pour Harmankaya par KREUTEL (Index, p. 312) est erronée.

118. IBN BATTUTA, *Voyages*, II, p. 184: Ienidja.

119. Cf. ZACHARIADOU, *op. cit.*, p. 141 et n. 69.

byzantine (tour d'angle). – Burcun est une butte aplanie sur la route Sölöz-Yenişehir; le mur est visible à certains endroits; l'enceinte mesurait 50 x 30 m; on trouve au sol de la céramique byzantine tardive. – Çoban Kale, dans la vallée du Yalakdere: autour d'une colline fortifiée à mi pente, six tours subsistent; la céramique va de la seconde moitié du XIII^e siècle à la fin du XIV^e. – Eski Hisar pourrait être Nikètiata mentionné par Cantacuzène.¹²⁰ C'est une vaste enceinte byzantine, dont l'étude archéologique sera publiée par Clive Foss; la porte est conservée; au centre se trouve un grand bâtiment rectangulaire à trois niveaux; le mur d'enceinte est pourvu de tours dont deux au moins sont voutées (pl. G). – A Kaynarca à l'Est de Nicée, nous avons trouvé les vestiges d'une enceinte (?) et de la céramique du XIII^e siècle. – A Karadin, plus à l'Est, les vestiges d'autres murs (100 m. de long; céramique préhistorique, romaine et byzantine). – Deux fortification dans le défilé du Sangarios ont été repérées: l'une dite Saray près de Şerifiye, l'autre dite Çoban Kale. – Büyük Kale, également rive gauche du Sangarios plus au Nord, près de Beşköprü, est une vaste enceinte dans la plaine, percée d'une porte. – Söğütlü, au Nord d'Adapazarı, toujours rive gauche du Sangarios, est un château byzantin du même type que le précédent, mais beaucoup plus important, ceint de tours carrées, percé de trois portes étroites (pl. H); la céramique n'est pas datable. Ce château pourrait faire partie, comme plusieurs des sites déjà mentionnés, des fortifications édifiées par Michel VIII pour défendre la frontière du Sangarios.¹²¹


Au total, plus de 45 sites fortifiés, ou vraisemblablement fortifiés, sont actuellement localisés. Ils figurent sur la carte ci-contre. D'autres fortifications restent bien sûr à découvrir ou à localiser. La carte donne cependant une première image de la défense du pays au XIII^e siècle.

Selon l'état de la documentation, il n'est pas toujours possible de savoir si un site fortifié correspond à une ville ou à un simple château-fort. Mais, si l'on admet que l'on devait trouver, sur les routes, une agglomération fortifiée tous les 25 ou 30 km, et si l'on tient compte de l'ensemble des informations, il paraît vraisemblable que l'on connaisse, par leur nom byzantin ou par le nom qu'elles ont prises en turc, la plupart des villes byzantines de la région. Ce réseau était complété par un réseau de châteaux, dont un petit nombre seulement a jusqu'ici été repéré.

Partout, on trouve des remparts dont la céramique au moins atteste l'occupation au XIII^e siècle. Dans l'état de nos recherches, nous ne pouvons que confirmer ce que Pachymère écrit ou suggère: la Bithynie semble avoir été, dans le siècle qui a précédé la conquête ottomane, une région prospère, bien peuplée et bien défendue.

120. CANTACUZENUS, v. I, p. 360.

121. Pour d'autres sites fortifiés dans la même région, voir FOSS, p. 175-176.



Sites fortifiés ou vraisemblablement fortifiés au XIII^e siècle en Bithynie.

LATIN RESPONSES TO OTTOMAN EXPANSION BEFORE 1389*

Anthony LUTTRELL

In their many references to the Turks before 1389 the Latins seldom wrote specifically of the Ottomans as a separate power, though they sometimes mentioned or alluded to their leaders Osman, Orkhan or Murad, or to their forces. The Latins of the East must have always been aware that there were different groupings among the Turks, and after about 1354 the Christians in the Balkans were usually facing the Ottomans or their companions. The Latins in the West had for centuries been accustomed to the idea of the Turks in general and their opinions of them were often most disparaging;¹ on the other hand, there was a long-standing view of the Turks as *Teucri* or Trojans who were somehow related to the Franks, a notion repeated by the crusading propagandist Philippe de Mézières in 1389.² There were few if any Latin missionaries active among the Anatolian Turks during the fourteenth century,³ but the Latins knew the Turks as mercenaries and allies, in thirteenth-century Greece for example; as enemies, pirates and raiders, especially along the coasts of Asia Minor, to whom some Westerners paid tribute; as infidels who appeared, often vaguely, in Western written sources

* This paper is limited to a consideration of Latin responses in the period down to 1389; it attempts no general survey of Turkish, Greek or Latin affairs and omits consideration of Serbian, Hungarian and other Balkan responses. The author is most grateful to Elizabeth Zachariadou for extensive help, particularly with Byzantine references, to Stephen Reinert, especially for information contained in his article in this volume, and to Kate Fleet, for observations on the Genoese sources.

1. Eg. A. ATIYA, *The Crusade in the Later Middle Ages*, (London 1938) p. 108 *et passim*.

2. PHILIPPE DE MÉZIÈRES, *Le Songe du Vieil Pelerin*, ed. G. COOPLAND, 2 v. (Cambridge 1969), v. II, p. 427; cf., very generally, S. RUNCIMAN, *Teucri and Turci, Medieval and Middle Eastern Studies in Honour of Aziz Suryal Atiya*, ed. S. HANNA, (Leiden 1972).

3. Cf. J. RICHARD, *La Papauté et les Missions d'Orient au Moyen Âge (XII^e-XV^e siècles)*, (Rome 1977). The general absence of Latin conversion activity in fourteenth-century Anatolia may have resulted from the lack of any strong central ruler around whom to concentrate missionary work and from the strength of Muslim fervour in Anatolia.

and against whom a crusade might be launched, as in 1344 at Smyrna; and as merchants with whom the Latins had commercial dealings. Turks could send peace envoys to the pope at Avignon, pay tribute to the Hospitallers of Rhodes, or make arrangements and truces which might, on occasion, establish peace on land accompanied by war at sea.⁴ Most Turkish fleets were markedly inferior to those of the Latins;⁵ the latter's great advantage lay in the galleys which protected their long-distance trade and their Aegean island bases, but they were weak on land except where they occupied defensible coastal positions.

As long as the Ottomans had little or no access to the sea and no competent fleet to use upon it there were only limited contacts with the Latins. A description of the East written apparently by a French author in about 1308 mentioned, without naming the victor or the site of the battle, the great victory won in 1302 by Osman, the first Ottoman ruler, over the Greeks near Bapheus; it referred to the widespread devastation which the *Turci* in general had inflicted on the inhabitants of Asia Minor.⁶ The Catalans and their companions, who originally went to oppose the Turks in the Anatolian lands facing Constantinople and who eventually fought both against and alongside various Turkish forces between 1303 and 1307, wintered on the Cyzicus peninsula on the Asiatic coast of the Sea of Marmora in 1303/4 and skirmished with certain Turks at Gallipoli.⁷ The Catalans probably knew a number of Turks, some of them former allies, who belonged to, or were later absorbed into, the evolving Ottoman grouping. The Genoese at Pera above all, and to a lesser extent other Latins at Constantinople, were evidently aware that the Turks were advancing in Bithynia and in some cases they had contacts with them. In 1311 two Genoese galleys were sent by the Greek emperor to ferry back to Anatolia a group of Turks who had sacked Gallipoli after leaving the Catalans in Thessaly, but instead the Genoese killed many of them and took them away to Italy.⁸ Later, in 1323, ten Genoese galleys were captured by the Emir of Sinope and some of those taken remained prisoners

4. On Latin-Turkish truces, A. LUTTRELL, *The Hospitallers of Rhodes confront the Turks: 1306-1421*, *Christians, Jews and Other Worlds: Patterns of Conflict and Accommodation*, ed. P. GALLAGHER, (Lanham 1988) p. 91, 97, 105.

5. E. ZACHARIADOU, *Holy War in the Aegean during the Fourteenth Century*, *MHR*, 4 (1989) 214-217.

6. *Anonymi Descriptio Europae Orientalis*, ed. O. GÓRKA, (Cracow 1916) p. 7.

7. RAMON MUNTANER, *Crònica*, in *Els quatre grans cròniques*, ed. F. SOLDEVILA, (Barcelona 1971), caps. 203-209; PACHYMERES (1835), v. II, p. 398-399; cf. LAIOU, *Andronicus II*, p. 134-183; D. JACOBY, *Catalans, Turcs et Vénétiens en Roumanie (1305-1332): un Nouveau Témoignage de Marino Sanudo Torsello*, *StuMe*, ser. 3, 15 (1974) 230-234; and A. FAILLER, *Chronologie et Composition dans l'Histoire de Georges Pachymères (livres VII-XIII)*, *REB*, 48 (1990) 55-57.

8. MUNTANER, cap. 241; GREGORAS, v. I, p. 253-254. LAIOU, *Andronicus II*, p. 166, 232-233, and JACOBY, p. 233-234, document another group of Turks who left the Catalans and were ferried to Anatolia by ten Genoese ships in 1312/1313.

in Turkish hands for many years.⁹ There must also have been commercial relations. Describing conditions before about 1340, Francesco Balducci Pegolotti mentioned an inferior sort of alum known as *ghiaghillo* or *giachile* which came from a place four days' journey inland but could be had at Tirilye on the coast directly north of Bursa.¹⁰ Latin merchants in the East probably sent rather reliable reports to their home towns, yet some Western chroniclers provided curiously inaccurate news of the Turks, as in the case of the Florentine Giovanni Villani.¹¹

The conquest of Byzantium from the Greeks was long a dominant ambition of many Latins, such as Pope Benedict XI in 1304 and Clement V thereafter, who used the danger to Constantinople from the Turks to justify proposals for attacks on the Greeks. Only in March 1325 did Venice, apparently for the first time, envisage a coalition against those Turks who were raiding the Latin islands or attacking Westerners in alliance with the Catalans of Athens, though these were not Ottomans but the Turks of the Anatolian coastal emirates in an area where there were strong Venetian interests.¹² The Eastern question slowly became a Turkish one. Crusading theorists who knew the region, such as Guillaume Adam writing in 1313 and Burcard in about 1332, spoke in terms of Latin armies on their way to Syria crossing the Bosphorus or the Dardanelles and attacking the Turks. Such an expedition would undoubtedly have met Ottoman resistance, but Constantinople and Jerusalem were the real objectives;¹³ these writers did not explicitly distinguish the Ottomans as a separate power, though Guillaume Adam wrote of those "Turks who are near Constantinople".¹⁴ The Ottoman leader Orkhan had at least thirty ships by the 1330's, and by about 1346 he was absorbing the Emirate of Karasi with its fleet and its access to the Dardanelles.¹⁵ The Genoese of Pera seem to have been in touch with Orkhan in 1337 and to have favoured his plans to attack Constantinople.¹⁶ In 1339 the Byzantine emperor Andronikos III sent a mission to Pope Benedict XII which spoke of retaking towns which had fallen to the Turks and of reviving old proposals for an ecclesiastical council to settle religious differences between Greeks and Latins.¹⁷ The papacy was being made aware that a specifically Ottoman threat was increasing.

9. References in LAIOU, *Andronicus II*, p. 301; BALARD, *Romanie*, p. 67.

10. FRANCESCO BALDUCCI PEGOLOTTI, *La Pratica della Mercatura*, ed. A. EVANS, (Cambridge Mass. 1936) p. 43, 293, 369.

11. On Giovanni Villani's "fantasies", LEMERLE, *Aydin*, p. 189 n. 3, 192 n. 2, 4.

12. E. ZACHARIADOU, The Catalans of Athens and the Beginnings of Turkish Expansion in the Aegean Area, *StuMe*, ser. 3, 21 (1989) 821-838; IDEM, *Trade and Crusade*, p. 7 n. 21, 15 *et passim*.

13. Both in *Recueil des Historiens des Croisades: Documents Arméniens*, v. II, (Paris 1906), discussed in ATIYA, p. 65-67, 95-110.

14. *Recueil*, v. II, p. 539-542.

15. ZACHARIADOU, *Trade and Crusade*, p. 64.

16. GREGORAS, v. I, p. 539.

17. K. SETTON, The Byzantine Background to the Italian Renaissance, *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society*, 100 (1956) 42-43.

During the 1340's there was civil war within Byzantium in which John VI Kantakouzenos allied with Orkhan and in 1346 even gave the Ottoman ruler his daughter in marriage. In 1345 that emperor, evidently worried about Western reactions to such dealings, vaguely explained the military necessity of resisting the Turkish threat to two Franciscans sent to him from Pera.¹⁸ Three years later an embassy from Kantakouzenos was in Avignon again proposing a council and declaring his willingness to join in an attack on the Turks of Aydin around Smyrna, even though he was in fact allied to them; Kantakouzenos perhaps hoped to improve his position against all Turks, including Orkhan.¹⁹ There may have been individual Latins who fought alongside the emperor's Ottoman allies, for on 15 May 1347, in recognition of certain unspecified services, Kantakouzenos authorized Guillaume Poujoize and Jean Braidy, both citizens of Metz, to add the imperial eagle to their arms.²⁰ Meanwhile, there was no official papal response to the Greek initiative. The Latins had captured the castle by the sea at Smyrna from the Turks of Aydin in 1344 but they held it with increasing difficulty in the face of an overwhelming economic crisis, the great plague, civil strife in Byzantium and, from 1351, open war between Venice and Genoa.

A major conflict between the Christian powers at Constantinople naturally led to Ottoman involvement. The Venetian fleet spent some time on the Ottoman coast in 1351 but the Venetians had in some way annoyed Orkhan.²¹ By early November Orkhan's envoys were negotiating with the Genoese at Pera and, as the Florentine chronicler Matteo Villani was somewhat inaccurately aware, nine light Turkish vessels or *parascarmi* and 1000 archers stationed both at Pera and afloat fought alongside the Genoese in the great battle with the Venetian-Catalan-Byzantine fleet in the Bosphorus on 13 February 1352; the Turks' expenses were recorded at Pera sixteen days after the battle. Turkish informers provided much information to the Genoese who in turn sent embassies and gifts to the Ottomans. The latter supplied the Genoese with provisions, and thirty Genoese galleys sailed to Ottoman territories in Anatolia to load flour. At some point after the battle envoys from Pera concluded a formal treaty with Orkhan, apparently the first between a Western power and the Ottomans, and in the early spring the Genoese fleet took shelter in Ottoman ports. Genoa's enemies sent representatives who tried without success to get Orkhan to abandon the Genoese.²² Later in 1352 the

18. CANTACUZENUS, v. II, p. 502-504.

19. LEMERLE, *Aydin*, p. 224-226; K. SETTON, *The Papacy and the Levant: 1204-1571*, v. I, (Philadelphia 1976) p. 213-215.

20. J. SCHNEIDER, Un Gentilhomme de Ville: Sire Nicole Louve, Citain de Metz (1387-1462), *La Noblesse au Moyen Âge: XI^e-XV^e siècles*, ed. P. CONTAMINE, (Paris 1976) p. 183 n. 2. Professor Schneider kindly provided a photocopy of the text, in French, of the otherwise unknown imperial bull he cites.

21. According to CANTACUZENUS, v. III, p. 228.

22. Important new materials in M. BALARD, À propos de la Bataille du Bosphore: L'Expédition génoise de Paganino Doria à Constantinople, *TM*, 4 (1970) 443-450 et

Genoese ferried Turkish forces to Europe and in October the Turks defeated the Serbs at Pythion south of Edirne.²³

At this time Kantakouzenos' forces included both Catalan troops and various Turks who served him side by side.²⁴ In May 1352 Kantakouzenos was compelled to make an alliance with the Genoese by which he accepted the Genoese treaty with Orkhan,²⁵ but in 1354 the Ottomans occupied Gallipoli and established a more permanent presence in Europe. On 20 September 1355 Orkhan wrote from Nicaea to Genoa repeating a demand made in 1352 or 1353 requesting tax exemptions at Pera for two burgesses of Pera, Filippo Demerode and Bonifacio da Sauro who had negotiated the 1352 treaty and were by 1355 in the sultan's service. The authorities at Genoa acceded in a fulsome reply in Italian made on 21 March 1356 which referred to Orkhan as their brother and as the father of the Genoese of Pera, recalling his great assistance to them in 1352; this exemption was confirmed at Genoa on 20 November 1358 when reference was made to the *concordium* Orkhan had made with the Genoese after the battle of 1352.²⁶ In December 1358 Orkhan instructed his son Suleiman not to interfere with Genoese shipping passing Gallipoli and to act in conformity with the Genoese treaty, presumably that of 1352.²⁷

passim; see also H. INALCIK, *The Ottoman Turks and the Crusades: 1329-1451, A History of the Crusades*, ed. K. SETTON, v. VI, (Madison 1989) p. 230-231, where Balard's materials are not used; BALARD, p. 444, places the treaty after the battle. MATTEO VILLANI, v. I, p. 200, stated that the Turks sent sixty armed ships to aid the Genoese. N. IORGA, *Latins et Grecs d'Orient et l'Établissement des Turcs en Europe*, *BZ*, 15 (1906) 211, followed by INALCIK, p. 231, refers to the 1000 archers, part of them on Genoese ships, and Orkhan's interview with the Genoese leader Paganino Doria at Chalcedon, but his sources do not support these inferences. E. ZACHARIADOU, *S'enrichir en Asie Mineure au XIV^e Siècle*, in: *Hommes et Richesses dans l'Empire byzantin*, v. II: *VIII^e-XV^e Siècle*, ed. V. KRAVARI et al., (Paris 1991) p. 222-223, citing GREGORAS, v. III, p. 91, refers to a Genoese embassy sent late in 1351 to Orkhan to seek his alliance and to promise annual tribute, and notes that after February 1352 the Genoese recruited Turkish troops in Bithynia with the permission of Orkhan for which the Genoese had to pay him. According to INALCIK, p. 231, Orkhan himself took part in the battle; he cites later texts in L. BELGRANO, *Prima Serie di Documenti riguardanti la Colonia di Pera*, *Atti SLSP*, 13 (1877-1884) 127, 129. IORGA, *Latins et Grecs*, p. 211, also claims that it was the Ottomans who attacked Korone and Methone in 1352, but his source, the text in: S. LJUBIĆ, *Monumenta Spectantia Historiam Slavorum Meridionalium*, v. III-IV, (Zagreb 1872-1874), v. III, p. 240, did not indicate any Ottoman participation.

23. INALCIK, p. 231-232; a letter of autumn 1352 in: CYDONÈS, *Correspondance*, v. I, p. 85-86, also mentioned a Turkish defeat of the Serbs.

24. A. LUTTRELL, *Latin Greece, the Hospitallers and the Crusades: 1291-1440*, (London 1982), IX, p. 274.

25. Text in *Liber Iurium Reipublicae Genuensis*, ed. H. RICOTTI, v. II, (Turin 1867) p. 601-606.

26. Texts in BELGRANO, p. 125-129.

27. BELDICEANU-STEINHERR, *Recherches*, p. 125-126.

The Latins reacted sluggishly to the Ottomans' occupation of Gallipoli in March 1354 and to their invasion of Thrace, though by August the Venetian *bailo* at Constantinople was sending his government a general warning of the dangers posed by the Turkish advances.²⁸ In 1355 John V Palaeologos secured control of Constantinople. A Latin through his mother, Anna of Savoy, he endlessly deluded himself with hopes of Western military aid to be gained by religious concessions. In 1356 Pope Innocent VI reactivated the Latin league against Aydin, and he instructed the Genoese and the Cypriots to assist John V against the Ottomans if he were to accept an ecclesiastical union.²⁹ In the following year Innocent sent Pierre Thomas as his legate to Constantinople to prepare such a union and to initiate military action. The legate's biographer, Philippe de Mézières, later wrote rather vaguely of the Genoese and other Latins being encouraged against the Turks in the maintenance of a holy war.³⁰ In 1358 John V made a peace treaty with Orkhan³¹ but when Pierre Thomas returned to Constantinople in 1359 he pressed for religious changes on the part of the Greeks and he also led perhaps the first Latin military assault on the Ottomans, in which a force of Hospitallers, Venetians, Genoese, English and Greeks captured and burned Lampsakos, an Ottoman port on the coast opposite Gallipoli; the *Turci* counter-attacked noisily, *ululantes et vociferantes*, and the Christians retreated with some difficulty.³²

Almost immediately Pierre Thomas left Constantinople, where he had apparently concentrated on doctrinal matters, and Western resources and activities were subsequently directed towards Cyprus and Jerusalem, with Latin attacks against the Turks along the southern coasts of Anatolia and the major crusade which sacked Alexandria in 1365. This allowed the Ottomans to continue their advances, as some Westerners were aware; Matteo Villani, for example, reported as of about 1361 that from their base at Gallipoli the Turks had used their shipping to attack Constantinople and had taken the town of Dimotica while the emperor quarrelled with Orkhan.³³ In 1362 the Venetians did propose a specifically anti-Ottoman league in which a total of eight Genoese and Venetian galleys would patrol the waters from Gallipoli to the Black Sea in order to cut off the Turks

28. Text in LJUBIĆ, v. III, p. 265-267.

29. ZACHARIADOU, *Trade and Crusade*, p. 64-65.

30. ...*laetantes animabantur contra Turcos ad sustinendum bella Dei in pace ecclesiae: The Life of Saint Peter Thomas by Philippe de Mézières*, ed. J. SMET, (Rome 1954) p. 80. Those Turks defeated at sea off Megara circa 1359 are not identifiable: SETTON, *The Papacy and the Levant*, v. I, p. 459 n. 116.

31. ZACHARIADOU, *Trade and Crusade*, p. 65.

32. Text in SMET, p. 85-86. ZACHARIADOU, *Trade and Crusade*, p. 65-66, notes that the Byzantine sources ignore this episode. The Turkish tradition seems to confirm the Latin account, and may also reflect a possible Latin attack on Saros Bay to the north of the Gallipoli peninsula at the same time: INALCIK, p. 237-238. Whether the Genoese involved were from Pera, which had a truce with Orkhan, is uncertain.

33. MATTEO VILLANI, v. II, p. 340-373.

from Europe.³⁴ It was in 1364 that the Greek scholar-politician Demetrios Kydones complained that the Latins did nothing, that the Turks were laughing about them and that Constantinople would fall.³⁵ Kydones was soon proved wrong. In 1366 John V's cousin Amedeo of Savoy, who had originally intended to crusade in the southern Cypriot sphere, went instead to recapture Gallipoli; in 1367 he also took two Ottoman fortresses on the European coast of the Sea of Marmora. Amedeo's success was well recognized in the West, notably in the great fresco done at Santa Maria Novella in Florence in about 1368 which apparently included his portrait.³⁶ He persuaded John V to travel to Rome to submit in person to the pope, but even that produced no further material support for Byzantium. The Venetians had refused to join Amedeo, whose expedition threatened their commercial relations with the Turks; in fact in April 1365 they were hoping to secure a trading counter from Orkhan's successor Murad whom they had heard to be favourably disposed towards them.³⁷ In 1368 an embassy leaving Venice for Constantinople knew that Murad wished to discuss the setting up of a Venetian counter at Skutari opposite Constantinople, and it had, optimistically, been empowered to make an arrangement by which Murad would pay to fortify the place and Venetian merchants would enjoy tax exemptions there and in other Ottoman ports.³⁸

In 1371 the Turks won a major victory over the Serbs at Černomen, putting the whole Balkans, and in the long term even Hungary and Italy, under threat. King Lewis of Hungary, while proclaiming his anti-Ottoman crusading zeal, exploited the situation to advance Hungarian expansion at the expense of the Bulgars and his other Christian neighbours, and it was only gradually that Ottomans and Hungarians moved towards a direct military conflict.³⁹ This confrontation was confused by hostilities between Hungary and Venice. When in 1373 the Hungarians sent troops to help Padua in its war with the Venetians, the latter sought Ottoman assistance and by June some 5000 Turkish foot archers sent by Murad from the Hungarian frontier were serving around Padua in north-east Italy. They were by no means invincible, and in fact the Paduan chronicler noted that in flight they dropped their weapons and "ran strongly like the devil".

34. F. THIRIET, *Una Proposta di Lega antiturca tra Venezia, Genova e Bisanzio nel 1362*, *Archivio Storico Italiano*, 113 (1955) 321, 324. The Turks invited into Catalan Thebes in 1363 were apparently not Ottomans: SETTON, *The Papacy and the Levant*, v. I, p. 458-459.

35. *Ibid.*, 259.

36. *Ibid.*, 285-307; cf. A. LUTTRELL, *A Hospitaller in a Florentine Fresco: 1366/8*, *Burlington Magazine*, 114 (1972).

37. THIRIET, *Sénat*, v. I, p. 109.

38. Text in LJUBIĆ, v. IV, p. 92-93.

39. INALCIK, p. 239-248; SETTON, *The Papacy and the Levant*, v. I, p. 286-291; N. HOUSLEY, *King Louis the Great of Hungary and the Crusades: 1342-1382*, *Slavonic and East European Review*, 62 (1984) 201-208.

However, they caused considerable damage, and their arms and scimitars, their long hats and their exceptional archery skills made an impression on the local Italians.⁴⁰

After 1371 the West was unable to ignore the Ottoman threat but despite much talk and many negotiations it would not send effective aid. In 1372 there had been a project, said by the pope to be “for the exaltation of the Christian faith and the honour of the Roman Church”, to send an expedition to Durazzo and the *regnum Albanie* under Enguerand de Coucy, and in 1376 the French and Navarrese companies raised by Louis of Evreux did occupy Durazzo.⁴¹ The Venetians were negotiating with Murad in 1376 and despatched an embassy to secure his alliance against the Genoese in 1377.⁴² A major war had broken out in 1376 between Venice and Genoa in the course of which all parties allied or negotiated with different groups of Turks. In April 1377 the Genoese sent an envoy to Murad carrying presents worth 1400 florins.⁴³ This situation was further complicated by parallel struggles within the families of both the emperor and the sultan. John V retook Constantinople with Ottoman help in 1379 and in 1381 the Genoese made peace with Venice and with Murad, but it was too late; in 1376 Pope Gregory XI had left Avignon for Rome where he died in 1378 and there followed the dual election resulting in a papal schism which virtually excluded any coordinated Latin action in the East for nearly twenty years.⁴⁴

The leadership of the Latin response devolved above all on the papacy, and Gregory XI had explicitly accepted the primacy among Levantine problems of the Ottoman threat. In 1375 he wrote to Queen Giovanna of Naples: “Opposing the Turks can not only be considered a work of faith, but it is a better contribution towards the defence of the Principality of Achaea and the Kingdom of Naples; it is easier and more important to help those in danger, lest they perish, than to attempt at present the recovery of the holy land which has been occupied for so long”.⁴⁵ Gregory made extensive diplomatic efforts and wrote numerous letters in his attempts to organize resistance, but divergent Latin interests always disrupted his coalitions. An anti-Ottoman congress summoned to Thebes in 1372 never met; Venetians and Genoese took opposing sides at Constantinople where by 1376 intervention was virtually impossible; Lewis of Hungary preferred to attack the Bulgars; there were distracting problems in Cilician Armenia, Cyprus, Smyrna and Latin Greece. Behind these difficulties lay an overwhelming economic and

40. *Istoria Padovana*, RIS, v. XVII, (Milan 1730) 176-184; INALCIK, p. 243, wrongly places these operations in Dalmatia.

41. A. LUTTRELL, *Appunti sulle Compagnie navarresi in Grecia: 1376-1404*, *Rivista di Studi Bizantini e Slavi*, 3 (1983) 115-116.

42. ZACHARIADOU, *Trade and Crusade*, p. 74 n. 328.

43. BALARD, *Romanie*, v. I, p. 89.

44. DENNIS, *The Reign of Manuel II*, p. 26-51.

45. As translated in N. HOUSLEY, *The Avignon Papacy and the Crusades: 1305-1378*, (Oxford 1986) p. 117.

demographic crisis, aggravated by endemic warfare and plague, in the West. The Latins never focussed firmly on the Turkish problem. In particular, the papacy gave precedence to its Italian wars and the return of the curia to Rome. Thus Gregory XI spent an annual average of at least 194,000 florins, and probably much more, in Italy, while for the struggle in the East he allocated a mere 3000 florins per annum to be extracted from the Cypriot clergy. Latin responses to the Turkish threat involved extensive diplomatic correspondence but were supported by minimal resources; as a result they achieved little.⁴⁶

Unable to persuade the secular powers into concerted or even unilateral action, Gregory XI made sustained efforts to mount an anti-Turkish *passagium* at no expense to the papacy by turning to the Hospitallers of Rhodes, an arm of the Roman Church over which he exercised a direct jurisdiction. Rhodes and Smyrna, which the Hospital defended, were not in the path of the Ottoman advance until immediately after 1389, though fifty Hospitallers had participated in the attack on Lampsakos in 1359.⁴⁷ There was a policy or party, both at Avignon and on Rhodes, which favoured the transfer of the Hospital, wholly or in part, to mainland Greece where its territorial and economic base would have been greatly enlarged and where it could have been seen to be standing more directly between Western Europe and Turkish – and increasingly Ottoman – menaces. In 1356 there had been a scheme to establish the Hospital in the Morea, possibly at Corinth. During the 1380's the Master of Rhodes was seeking to acquire various dynastic claims to the Principality of the Morea, and between 1397 and 1404 the Hospitallers defended Corinth and the Despotate of the Morea against the Ottomans.⁴⁸ Gregory's response to the Turkish advances into Europe fell within this long-term programme of using the Hospital against the Ottomans in mainland Greece.

In 1373 Gregory XI launched a great inquest into the Hospital's Western resources and summoned an assembly of Hospitallers to Avignon. He had also to consider a precise destination for his *passagium*. In 1374 he consulted the Venetians who replied that there were many suitable objectives "in the parts of Constantinople or *Romania*." Gregory sent two theologians and two Hospitallers to Constantinople and they returned in the autumn of 1375 with an offer from John V to hand over Thessaloniki and another city, presumably Gallipoli, to be garrisoned by the Hospital if the pope would send an expedition to free "the part of Greece" from the Turks. Gregory formally summoned the Hospitallers' *passagium* in December 1375, and in 1376 the Master of Rhodes wrote of an expedition to the Duchy of Athens. Meanwhile events at Constantinople were making intervention there impractical. Instead in 1377 the Hospitallers arranged a five-year lease on the Principality of Achaëa, which they then occupied, and

46. LUTTRELL *Latin Greece*, XV *passim*. P. THIBAUD, Pope Gregory XI (1370-1378) and the Crusade, *Canadian Journal of History*, 20 (1985), is not satisfactory.

47. SMET, p. 85.

48. LUTTRELL, *The Hospitallers of Rhodes*, p. 98-101.

another lease on the town of Vonitza in the Gulf of Arta. In 1378 a pathetically small group of Hospitallers was ambushed and defeated near Arta by its Christian Albanian ruler, Ghin Boua Spata.⁴⁹ The real objective of this expedition was never stated, but there may well have been Ottoman raids in the area.⁵⁰ Years later, after 1420, the Cretan Emmanuele Piloti claimed that with five galleys the Hospitallers could have forced both the Egyptian Mamluks and the Turks off the seas and have compelled them to pay tribute, and could even have prevented the Ottomans from establishing themselves in Europe, but Piloti did not make it clear what period he had in mind; in any case, he must have known that the Hospital could not normally maintain more than one or two galleys.⁵¹

The Ottomans' advances continued and so did Venetian negotiations with them. In November 1381 an envoy to Murad was to ask him to prevent his subjects from attacking Venetian lands. The Venetians exchanged envoys with Murad in 1384, thanking him for his favours, refusing to attack Pera, seeking the release of prisoners taken by the Turks on Negroponte, and inquiring about customs concessions on grain and alum, and about the trading counter they hoped to set up in Ottoman territory. In July 1385 the Venetian Rector of Ptelion, who had connections with Murad, was to visit the sultan privately to sound out his intentions towards Venice. The Venetians concluded a treaty with Murad in or soon after 1385, but in 1387 and 1388 relations became strained. In 1387 Venetian embassies travelled to protest against Ottoman attacks on Negroponte and on Korone and Methone in the Morea, but Murad and his vizier Ali Pasha demanded armed help and tribute from the Venetians while failing to return captives they had taken. A new envoy was sent in 1388 to explain that the Venetians would not send troops to fight for Murad. The latter was supporting Theodore, the Greek Despot of the Morea, who was obstructing Venetian attempts to secure control of Argos and Nauplia in the Morea. The Venetians tried to placate Murad diplomatically, but they also considered the creation of an anti-Ottoman coalition to defend the Morea and resist Murad's advances into the Balkans.⁵² Turkish expansion was compelling the Venetians to modify

49. LUTTRELL, *Latin Greece*, XII, p. 279-283, 286-292; XV, p. 406-414.

50. The Turks have not yet been documented in Epiros before 1380: D. NICOL, *The Despotate of Epiros: 1267-1479*, (Cambridge 1984) p. 150-153; E. ZACHARIADOU, *Marginalia on the History of Epirus and Albania (1380-1418)*, *WZKM*, 78 (1988) 199.

51. *Traité d'Emmanuel Piloti sur le Passage en Terre Sainte: 1420*, ed. P.-H. DOPP, (Louvain - Paris 1958) p. 217.

52. THIRET, *Sénat*, v. I, p. 150-151, 162-165, 170, 177-179; K. SETTON, *The Catalans and Florentines in Greece: 1380-1462, A History of the Crusades*, v. III, (Madison 1975) p. 245-247; S. REINERT, in this volume, p. 181-182, 184-190, 195-199, 200-202. On the lost 1385 treaty, ZACHARIADOU, *Trade and Crusade*, p. 74 n. 328. In 1382 certain Turks supported the Venetian governor of Tenedos, Znacchi Mudazzo, when he refused to hand over Tenedos as agreed in 1381: SETTON, *The Papacy and the Levant*, v. I, p. 323-325. These

their policy of avoiding the costly occupation, administration and defence of extensive island and mainland sites; they took over Corfu in 1386, and in 1387 their captains on Corfu made a local agreement, quite probably involving the payment of tribute, with the Turks.⁵³ Venetian policy remained as ambiguous as ever, and from 1386 to 1389 the senate was envisaging intervention to save Avlona and above all Durazzo from conquest by the Ottomans.⁵⁴

The Roman pope Urban VI, having abandoned the Hospitallers in Epiros in 1378, did little for the East thereafter, though he sent an envoy to Thessaloniki and Constantinople after 1383, and in 1388 he gave orders for two galleys, which never materialized, to fight the Turks.⁵⁵ The Ottomans attacked the Catalans of the Duchy of Athens in 1385, and in 1387 they took Thessaloniki; Nerio Acciaiuoli, Lord of Corinth, was accused of causing the Turks to launch attacks against the Venetians in 1388.⁵⁶ The Genoese at Constantinople had concluded a peace with Murad in 1381 and in 1382 John V made a treaty with the Genoese which included an agreement that neither party would fight the sultan.⁵⁷ On 8 June 1387 two representatives of Genoa, not of Pera, went to the *cassale* of *Mallaina*, possibly Malagina near Bursa, and in the courtyard of Murad's residence there they and the sultan ratified treaties made with Orkhan, possibly including that of 1352, and with Murad, possibly including that of 1381; Bartolomeo de Lamgascho, burgess of Pera, translated the text from Greek into Latin. It was agreed that monies taken from Giovanni Demelode by the collectors of the *commerchium* and the *centsaria* or brokerage dues with respect to goods of Murad which had been bought and sold in Pera should, with the exception of the tax of 8 carats per 100 hyperpers paid for the *centsaria*, be restored; that Murad's Turkish subjects should pay no *commerchium* on goods imported or exported at Pera but should pay the brokerage tax of 8 carats per 100 hyperpers; that the Genoese were to be free to trade in Ottoman domains without molestation, paying only the normal *commerchium* as agreed of old; that Genoese ships could load victuals in Ottoman ports, paying the same reduced taxes as the Muslims, Greeks, Venetians and others; that both sides would return escaped slaves or pay for them; and that the Genoese would enforce this agreement on those of Pera.⁵⁸ Subsequently, in

seem not to have been Ottomans but Turks from Phocaea: B. KREKIĆ, *Dubrovnik (Raguse) et le Levant au Moyen Age*, (Paris - The Hague 1961) p. 42-43, 222-223.

53. ZACHARIADOU, *Marginalia*, p. 201-202.

54. Texts in G. VALENTINI, *Acta Albaniae Veneta saeculorum XIV et XV*, I part 2, (Palermo 1968) p. 59-60, 63-67, 70-72, 75-83, 85-89; cf. A. DUCCELLIER, *La Façade maritime de l'Albanie au Moyen Age: Durazzo et Valona du XI^e au XV^e Siècle*, (Thessaloniki 1981) p. 492-503.

55. DENNIS, *The Reign of Manuel II*, p. 132-150; LUTTRELL, *Latin Greece*, XIV, p. 580-581, 584 n. 11.

56. SETTON, *The Papacy and the Levant*, v. I, p. 239, 247 n. 70.

57. DENNIS, *The Reign of Manuel II*, p. 43-44, 50-51.

58. Text in BELGRANO, p. 146-149; cf. BELDICEANU-STEINHERR, *Recherches*, p. 241-243.

1390, 1391 and 1392, Ottoman representatives were well received in Pera.⁵⁹

The succession of apparent changes or fluctuations in policy, of leagues against the Ottomans alternating or combining with truces and commercial arrangements, was not the result of mere vacillation, but was rather a long-term habit of applying short-term solutions to immediate problems as situations and personalities changed in both East and West, as decisions were taken on the spot in the Levant or imposed at long-distance from Avignon, Genoa, Venice and elsewhere. Too often the decisive considerations were commercial; there was only a limited underlying determination to oppose the Turks because they were infidels. Following their treaty of June 1387 with Murad, the Genoese launched proposals advanced some time before June 1388 for a Christian alliance to include Venice, Byzantium and the Hospitallers of Rhodes.⁶⁰ In October and November 1388 the Genoese again proposed the creation of a naval league including Crete, Naxos, Chios, and Rhodes to oppose Murad – *Moratus Bey et eius secta* – and other Turks, and this was agreed later in that year; it was possibly a defensive arrangement designed to resist an anticipated Ottoman attack.⁶¹ Yet in the next year, after the battle at Kosovo in which Murad was killed, an envoy from Pera went to the new sultan, Murad's son Bayezid, and on 26 October 1389 the existing Ottoman treaties were renewed at Pera.⁶² For Froissart, writing perhaps a decade later, it was the Genoese who defended Pera and Constantinople and who prevented the Turks reaching Naples and Rome,⁶³ yet Genoese policy was really just as ambiguous as that of Venice.

In the margin of major political developments there were other Latin contacts with the Ottomans. Particularly close to the Turks was the Genoese family of Gattilusio which from 1355 held Lesbos and was connected by marriage to the imperial Palaeologi. Francesco Gattilusio supported John V against the Ottomans⁶⁴ and took part in the reconquest of Gallipoli in 1366,⁶⁵ but his son, the second Francesco, was more cautious. He joined the anti-Ottoman league of 1388 but somewhat later, in 1396, he failed to go, as obliged, to the aid of Pera against the Turks.⁶⁶ In 1396 and 1397 he arranged with Bayezid for the ransom of the Latins captured at Nikopolis,⁶⁷ but the French mistrusted him as the sultan's

On Malagina, see REINERT, in this volume, p. 179, and n. 31, and C. FOSS. Eliano di Camilla had gone from Pera to treat with Murad in 1386: BALARD, *Romanie*, v. I, p. 92-93.

59. Texts in BELGRANO, p. 151-154, 160-167, 169-172.

60. The Venetians replied to the Genoese proposals on 8 June 1388: THIRIET, *Sénat*, v. I, p. 178.

61. Text in L. BELGRANO, *Secunda Serie di Documenti riguardanti la Colonia di Pera*, *Atti SLSP*, 13 (1877-1884) 953-956; cf. REINERT, in this volume, p. 199-200.

62. BALARD, *Romanie*, v. I, p. 97.

63. JEAN FROISSART, *Oeuvres*, ed. KERVYN DE LETTENHOVE, 25 v., (Brussels 1870-1877) v. XI, p. 229-231.

64. G. DENNIS, *Byzantium and the Franks: 1350-1420*, (London 1982) I, p. 9-10.

65. SETTON, *The Papacy and the Levant*, v. I, p. 299.

66. Text in BELGRANO, p. 965-967.

67. SETTON, *The Papacy and the Levant*, v. I, p. 359-364.

“friend”; indeed in 1399 he warned the Ottomans of an imminent Latin attack.⁶⁸

Distant Latins came into contact with the Ottomans for a variety of reasons. Thus English contingents fought at Lampsakos in 1359 and at Gallipoli in 1366.⁶⁹ John Lord Mowbray was killed fighting the “Turks” and was buried at Pera in 1368, while two of Richard II’s household knights, Sir William Neville and Sir John Clanvowe who were friends of the poet Geoffrey Chaucer, both died during 1391 in Pera where they may have been on a royal mission concerned with aid for Constantinople.⁷⁰ In February or March 1388 the future French Marshal, Jean de Boucicault, and his companion Renault de Roze sent from Constantinople to Murad, who was then near Gallipoli, for safe conducts, which were readily granted. Murad received them with a great feast and they stayed with him for three months and offered to fight for him against any Muslim enemy; none was available. The sultan, whom they must have regarded as in some sense a chivalric companion, thanked them and provided them with an escort to the Hungarian frontier.⁷¹ The chronicler Jean Froissart said that Boucicault and four companions made this visit to “the very valiant” Murad as part of a journey which also involved a pilgrimage to Jerusalem.⁷² Before 1389 pilgrims did not normally come into contact with the Ottomans, and the travel or espionage literature of men such as Johan Schiltberger, Bertrand de la Broquière and Ghilbert de Lannoy all came after 1400.⁷³ The Ottomans evidently employed some Latins and a few must have learnt some Turkish, as had Jacques de Helley, a French knight who had been in Murad’s service before 1389 and who was able to speak at least a little Turkish during the great battle at Nikopolis in 1396.⁷⁴

The French chroniclers failed to present coherently the information which reached them from the East. In 1384 the young Charles VI of France was told that Murad had dreamed that a false god named Apollo offered him a gold crown in the presence of thirteen prostrate Western princes.⁷⁵ In June 1384 the exotic Leo

68. DENNIS, *Byzantium and the Franks*, I, p. 17, 18 n. 41.

69. A. LUTTRELL, *English Levantine Crusaders: 1363-1367*, *Renaissance Studies*, 2 (1988).

70. S. DÜLL – A. LUTTRELL – M. KEEN, *Faithful unto Death: the Tomb Slab of Sir William Neville and Sir John Clanvowe, Constantinople 1391*, *Antiquaries Journal*, 71 (forthcoming).

71. *Le Livre des Fais du bon Messire Jehan le Maingre, dit Bouciquaut*, ed. D. LALANDE, (Geneva 1985) p. 61-62. Murad’s presence near Gallipoli in the second quarter of 1388 is quite possible: REINERT in this volume, p. 182-184. On Renault de Roze, see J. DELAVILLE LE ROULX, *La France en Orient au XIV^e siècle*, v. I, (Paris 1886) p. 162-163.

72. FROISSART, v. XII, p. 39; v. XIV, p. 381.

73. Cf. R. SCHWOEBEL, *The Shadow of the Crescent: the Renaissance Image of the Turk (1453-1517)*, (Nieukoop 1967).

74. FROISSART, v. XV, p. 319-320; cf. J. RICHARD, *An Account of the Battle of Hattin referring to Frankish Mercenaries in Oriental Muslim States*, *Speculum*, 27 (1952).

75. *Chronique du Religieux de Saint-Denys*, ed. M. BELLAGUET, 6 v., (Paris 1839-1852) v. I, p. 318-320.

VI, the exiled King of Cilician Armenia, arrived in Paris and addressed the royal council on Eastern affairs. He then went in the following year to London where he urged peace with the French and an Eastern crusade, after which the English king sent ambassadors to negotiate in France.⁷⁶ Froissart, who was presumably writing somewhat later and perhaps even after the disaster at Nikopolis in 1396, put into Leo's mouth a speech to the French king and court which was extraordinarily garbled but perhaps reflected the mental picture of Turkish affairs held by even a knowledgeable Westerner in about 1389 or a little later. Froissart was deeply confused, in a way that Leo VI could never possibly have been, between *Turcs* and *Tartres*; between the Ottoman sultan, the Sultan of Babylon or Cairo, and the Mongol ruler Timur or one of his lieutenants, called the *takon*, *takem* or *cakem* – presumably the *Hakem* – of *Tartarie*; between Serbia and “Hungary”; and between the Greek emperor and the titular Latin Emperor of Constantinople. Froissart even thought that it was the Turks who had murdered King Pierre of Cyprus in 1369.

Leo VI reportedly spoke to the French court of Amadeo of Savoy taking Gallipoli from the “Tartars” in 1366. According to Leo, Murad reconquered Gallipoli by force; his officials, or those of the *takon*, were already established within Constantinople; and the Turks derided the Latins who were divided by their allegiance to rival popes. In a confusing speech from Leo, Murad was said to be a valiant and noble man who loved the French language and wished to see France. That sultan demanded submission but left in peace his vassals, who included the Turkish lords of Satalia, Ephesus and Miletus whom Leo's speech mentioned repeatedly. He had an army of 100,000 and a bodyguard of 10,000; he always lived in camp and his ninety-year-old father accompanied him everywhere. Murad wanted to conquer all “Hungary” and reach Rome where he hoped to be crowned by the rulers of Tartary, Baghdad and Cairo, but he was ambushed and defeated by the brave *Lazara*, presumably the Serbian ruler Lazar, who refused to submit. Leo's speech, made in 1384 well before the battle of Kosovo at which Murad and Lazar were both killed in 1389, broke off before that point and strangely Froissart never mentioned that battle.⁷⁷ Lazar did apparently impose some sort of check on Murad at Pločnik in 1386 and he won a notable victory against an Ottoman force at Bileća in Bosnia during August 1388.⁷⁸

Froissart recounted how Boucicault returned from “Greece and Turkey” with news of the sultan's plans to attack “Hungary”, upon which the French king and his people desired to go to defend “Hungary” and Constantinople and also to recover Cilician Armenia.⁷⁹ In reality, Boucicault returned from Jerusalem by

76. N. IORGA, *Philippe de Mézières (1327-1405) et la Croisade du XIV^e Siècle*, (Paris 1896) p. 463-465.

77. FROISSART, v. XI, p. 229-249; Leo's “speech” deserves detailed analysis.

78. REINERT, in this volume, p. 176-178, 193-194; cf. INALCIK, p. 247. The confused Western accounts of Balkan affairs deserve detailed examination in the light of Reinert's clarifications of events.

way of Rhodes and Venice after the battle at Kosovo and was in Burgundy by October 1389.⁸⁰ Froissart described Murad as *l'Amorath-Baquin* which may have meant "Emir Beg"; Bayezid he called *Baasach dit Amorath-Baquin*.⁸¹ The chronicler of Saint Denys reported more plausibly that French nobles returning from Jerusalem brought news of a "Hungarian" defeat by Murad, presumably referring to that of the Serbs at Kosovo. Murad, who was called *Lamorath-Baxim* and was said to be a *subditus* of the Emperor of Persia, was described as having spies in the West to inform him of the intentions of Western governments and as wanting to visit France when he had finished with "Austria". The Sultan was reported as desiring to meet the French king, who was said to wish to engage him in personal armed combat. Murad was held to treat his opponents humanely and to allow them to choose to become tributaries rather than be sent into exile; with a safe conduct one could travel safely in his lands.⁸²

In close touch with Leo VI was Philippe de Mézières, the companion and biographer of the papal legate Pierre Thomas, a former Chancellor of Cyprus, the counsellor of Charles V of France and tutor to his son Charles VI, and a passionate devotee of the cause of Jerusalem. Writing in 1397, Mézières referred to Murad's comparatively minor origins, his military and diplomatic prowess and his subjugation of much of Byzantium and the Balkans, and he noted that the Turks had met very stiff resistance and had suffered heavy losses at Kosovo in 1389.⁸³ Mézières' crusading propaganda included the old notion that one path to the recovery of Jerusalem lay through Anatolia, an idea which survived throughout the fourteenth century and was partly inspired by the reading of chronicles concerning Godefroi de Bouillon and the First Crusade.⁸⁴ In his lengthy *Songe du vieil Pelerin*, which was completed between June and October 1389, Mézières wrote that Murad and the Turks had conquered the empires of Constantinople and Bulgaria, the kingdom of Serbia and other lands, and that it was to be feared that in ten years Murad or his successor would be in Southern Italy and Germany; none could be found to resist them for long. In a passage at the end of his work, evidently written after Kosovo, Mézières mentioned that Murad and one of his sons had been killed in a Christian victory in *Albanie*. Here too he proposed a Jerusalem crusade passing through Constantinople and suppressing the Turks en route.⁸⁵

79. FROISSART, v. XIV, p. 386-387.

80. *Livre des Fais*, p. 64.

81. FROISSART, v. XIV, p. 235; v. XVI, p. 217.

82. *Religieux de Saint-Denys*, v. I, p. 708-710; confused Western reactions to Kosovo are studied in T. EMMERT, *Serbian Golgotha: Kosovo, 1389*, (New York 1990) p. 48-60. It was not possible to consult the contributions to *Kosovo: Legacy of a Medieval Battle*, ed. W. VUCINICH - T. EMMERT, (Minneapolis 1991).

83. Text in FROISSART, v. XVI, p. 510-511.

84. J. WILLIAMSON, *Philippe de Mézières et l'Influence du Cycle de la Croisade au 14e Siècle* [unpublished typescript kindly provided by the author].

85. PHILIPPE DE MÉZÈRES, v. I. p. 253; v. II, p. 434, 501, 531; cf. EMMERT, p. 49-51, 176-177.

In the West the crusade had long provided an excuse for lay rulers to seek ecclesiastical taxation.⁸⁶ The Ottoman danger was also a useful diplomatic card which was being employed in the 1380's as a cover or justification for negotiations primarily designed to secure an Anglo-French peace or the termination of the papal schism, and it was indeed true that these were obstacles to crusading action.⁸⁷ Yet the Latins confused their strategic priorities. A crusade of 1390 went to Mahdia in Tunisia. The disaster which befell the Serbs at Kosovo in June 1389 produced initial misunderstandings and even rejoicings. According to the monk of Saint Denys, who was clearly confused and who misplaced the information under the year 1395, Venetian envoys reached Paris in July and reported Murad's death and a Christian victory without mentioning that the Serbian leader Lazar had been killed; the chronicler confused Lazar with the King of Hungary and described Murad's son and successor Bayezid as his *nepos*. He also reported that on hearing the first news from Kosovo the French king and his uncles actually went to give thanks at Nôtre Dame.⁸⁸ A contemporary Florentine chronicler also retailed much rumour and fanciful detail about the battle, claiming that some Genoese and other Christians had fought for the Turks there.⁸⁹

For a long time there was little sign that the Latins regarded the Ottomans as a special kind of Turk. By 1389 they did appreciate the seriousness of the Ottoman threat but they were too occupied with Western problems and commercial considerations, too divided among themselves, too apt to treat the crusade as a means of taxation and too hostile to the Greeks to take strong and united action. That came in 1396 with the crusade which was crushed at Nikopolis but which may none the less have saved Constantinople for nearly sixty years.⁹⁰ In 1402 the Ottomans were in their turn badly beaten near Ankara where the Sultan Bayezid was captured by Timur, but even then the Latins failed to attack the Ottoman survivors. Venetian and Genoese shipping ferried the fleeing Turks to safety in Europe, and in 1403 the Christian powers made a treaty with Bayezid's son Suleiman against Timur.⁹¹ After many decades of compromise and ambiguity, the Latins had come to see the Ottomans as an essential component of the Levantine establishment whose disappearance they could scarcely envisage; they were as much concerned to preserve as to reshape or destroy the Ottoman regime.

86. LUTTRELL, *Latin Greece*, XIV, p. 582-583, XVI, p. 133-134; HOUSLEY, *The Avignon Papacy*, p. 162-198 *et passim*.

87. J. PALMER, *England, France and Christendom: 1377-99*, (London 1972) p. 180-192.

88. *Religieux du Saint-Denys*, v. II, p. 386-390; possible interpretations of these confusions are discussed in EMMERT, p. 51-54, 177-179.

89. *Cronica Volgare di Anonimo Fiorentino*, ed. E. BELLONDI, in *RIS*, ns. v. XXVII part 2, (Città di Castello 1917) p. 77-79; cf. EMMERT, p. 54-57, 179-184.

90. Cf. LUTTRELL, *The Hospitallers of Rhodes*, p. 97-98.

91. ALEXANDRESCU-DERSCA, *Timur*, p. 83-85, 105-107.

L' ORIGINE SOCIALE DES PREMIERS OTTOMANS

Irène MÉLIKOFF

Durant l'époque des Seldjoucides de Rum, et plus particulièrement au XIII^e siècle, la vie dans les cités était florissante. La population urbaine parlait le persan et la culture persane prédominait. La religion officielle était l'Islam sunnite dont les fondements étaient enseignés à la *Medrese*. En Anatolie, les *Medrese* étaient célèbres. Elles influençaient la vie culturelle des centres urbains. Le commerce et l'artisanat étaient en grande partie aux mains des Chrétiens et des Juifs. Le gouvernement Seldjoucide était tolérant et large d'esprit, aussi Musulmans et Non-Musulmans coexistaient-ils en bonne entente. La vie spirituelle était très développée. Ainsi, Muhyi'd-din Arabî (1164-1241) qui vint plusieurs fois en Asie Mineure, y répandit sa philosophie du *Vahdet-i Vudjûd* qui peut être défini comme un Panthéisme mystique. Les Sultans Seldjoucides qui étaient des gens cultivés, protégeaient le développement de la mystique et de l'érudition. D'autre part, la forte personnalité de Mevlâna Djelaleddin Rûmi influença la vie spirituelle et philosophique des centres urbains.¹

Mais la situation était toute autre dans les campagnes où affluaient les tribus turkmènes, nomades pour la plupart, dont l'émigration se fit sur plusieurs siècles: à partir de la fin du XI^e jusqu'au XIV^e siècle. La période cruciale fut le XIII^e siècle qui connut les émigrations dues à l'invasion mongole. Cette invasion fut la cause de l'exode massif des tribus Oghuz venues d'Asie Centrale et du Khorassan, vers l'Anatolie. Après la défaite du Kharezmchah, les Kharezmiens cherchèrent, eux aussi, refuge dans l'Empire Seldjoucide de Rum. Le Sultan Alâeddin Keykubâd I (1220-1237) enrôla une partie dans son armée et dispersa les autres en Anatolie Centrale. Cependant, sous le règne de Ghiyaseddin Keykhusrev II (1237-1246), les relations entre le Sultan et les Kharezmiens se détériorèrent et ceux-ci devinrent une cause de désordre, se transformant souvent en pillards. Ils vinrent grossir les rangs des Baba'îs, lors de la révolte qui ébranla l'Empire dans les années 1239-1240.²

L'émigration massive des tribus turkmènes donna naissance à des difficultés

1. Voir CAHEN, *Turquie Pré-ottomane*, p. 148 sq. (les Villes); p. 162 sq. (les Non-Musulmans); p. 208 sq. (la vie culturelle et religieuse).

2. Voir KÖPRÜLÜ, *Les Origines*, p. 58-59; OCAK, *La révolte*, p. 44-45.

matérielles et sociales. Les tribus avaient souvent de la peine à trouver des alpages et des hivernages pour leurs troupeaux. Ainsi, par exemple, en 1263, certaines tribus vinrent demander à l'Empereur byzantin Michel VIII Paléologue, des terrains d'alpage et d'hivernage. Elles seront envoyées en Dobroudja.³ Les Turkmènes de la campagne très souvent encore nomades, ne s'entendaient pas avec la population islamisée et iranisée des centres urbains. Les habitants des villes voyaient d'un mauvais oeil les Turkmènes incultes et ne parlant que le turc. Ils les appelaient *Etrâk-i bî idrâk*, "Turks dépourvus d'intelligence". Comme les Turkmènes professaient une foi hétérodoxe et non-conformiste, ils disaient: *Etrâk'in dini zayıf*, "la foi des Turks est faible".

En effet, les Turkmènes continuaient à professer les croyances de leurs ancêtres; même convertis à l'Islam, ils n'en demeuraient pas moins attachés à leurs anciennes traditions et à leurs coutûmes ancestrales. Les tribus turkmènes étaient loin d'être toutes converties à l'Islam. L'islamisation de l'Anatolie se fera sur plusieurs siècles. Les Turcs se sont convertis, au cours de leur histoire, à la plupart des religions du globe. En plus du Chamanisme originel –et qui est toujours vivant en Asie Centrale et en Sibérie–, il y a eu des Manichéens, des Bouddhistes, des Chrétiens Nestoriens, sans parler des Khazars de religion mosaïque, des Gagauzes orthodoxes, des Comans catholiques, etc. Le Manichéisme était déjà éteint, lors de leur migration vers l'Anatolie, mais il n'en était pas de même du Bouddhisme. Nous savons que certaines grandes familles de l'époque seldjocide, comme par exemple les Ertena, qui étaient des Uygghurs, étaient bouddhistes.⁴ Il y avait aussi des Nestoriens: on en trouve un témoignage dans le Geste de Melik Danichmend.⁵ Mais parmi les tribus turkmènes, c'était encore le Chamanisme qui prédominait, même sous le couvert de l'Islam. Les chefs de tribu étaient souvent aussi des chefs religieux et le Baba islamisé était encore très proche du Chaman, à la fois prêtre-sorcier et guérisseur. Ainsi, par exemple, il a été montré que Baba Ilyas, le chef de la révolte des Baba'îs, était un Chaman islamisé, ayant pouvoir de miracle et également guérisseur. Aussi ses partisans refusèrent-ils de croire à sa mort. Il est l'exemple du chef du tribu qui était aussi chef religieux, avec un pouvoir spirituel et temporel.⁶ Parmi les autres chefs religieux qui furent aussi chefs de tribu, on peut citer Sari Saltuk qui conduisit, en 1263, un groupe de tribus turkmènes –peut-être appartenant à la

3. Voir WITTEK, Yazıjıoghlu, p. 639-668; A. DECEI, Le Problème de la Colonisation des Turcs Seldjocides dans la Dobroggea au XIII^e siècle, *TAD*, 6/10-11 (1968) 85-111.

4. Voir KÖPRÜLÜ, *Les Origines*, p. 96-100; F. SÜMER, Anadolu'da Moğollar, *SAD*, 1 (1969).

5. Le rapprochement entre *Nestor*, un des ennemis de Melik Danishmend, et les Nestoriens, m'a complètement échappé, lorsque je rédigeais mon ouvrage sur *La Geste de Melik Dânişmend*, Paris 1960; et pourtant, j'avais trouvé, dans le *Battâlnâme*, un "Nestor, le Mécréant pratiquant une religion secrète": voir *La Geste de Melik Dânişmend*, v. I, p. 169.

6. Voir OCAK, *La révolte*, p. 57.

grande tribu des Tchepni— en Dobroudja.⁷ Comme Baba Ilyas, il incarne le derviche guerrier.

Sous le couvert de l'islam, les Babas continuaient à participer à leurs anciennes cérémonies: dans les assemblées, conformément aux traditions des Turcs anciens, femmes et hommes se cotoyaient, il était fait usage de boissons alcoolisées et également de haschisch. Cela se passait ainsi pendant les réunions d'Ahmed Yesevi, à Yesi, au XII^e siècle; les *Ulema* de l'époque en furent scandalisés et envoyèrent des *Müfettis*, investigateurs, mais ceux-ci furent éconduits sans ménagement.⁸ La même chose se passait lors des réunions de Baba Ilyas, comme en témoigne son *Menâkibnâme*, composé par son arrière petit-fils, Elvan Çelebi.⁹ Quant à l'usage de boissons alcoolisées, les premières chroniques ottomanes nous apprennent que Orhan Ghazi entretenait de très bonnes relations avec Geyikli Baba, un Baba hétérodoxe qui avait participé, avec ses derviches, à la conquête de Brousse, et qu'il lui faisait envoyer du vin, parce que: "le Baba a l'habitude de boire".¹⁰ Ceci illustre de façon éloquente l'esprit de tolérance et l'attitude non-conformiste des premiers sultans ottomans, plus proches des Babas turkmènes que de la *Medrese* de leurs descendants.

Nous avons déjà mentionné Sari Saltuk Baba (ou Dede). Un des disciples de Sari Saltuk fut Barak Baba. Nous trouvons son nom dans les sources historiques, en particulier dans le *Tarih-i Oldjaytu Sultan Muhammed Hudâbende*. Malgré différentes traditions légendaires qui lui donnent des origines princières, Barak Baba aurait peut-être été originaire de Tokat. D'après Cahit Öztelli,¹¹ Barak serait le nom donné à une espèce de chien de chasse à poils longs; mais ce fut aussi le nom d'une tribu turkmène. Barak Baba portait un couvre-chef orné de cornes; ses vêtements étaient ornés de clochettes et d'astragales. Lorsqu'il faisait le *Sema'*, "danse extatique", cela produisait un tintamarre qui faisait peur aux enfants. On raconte que lorsque Barak Baba vint à Damas, on lacha contre lui une autruche sauvage; le Baba sauta sur le dos de l'oiseau et lui fit faire le tour de la place. Barak Baba ne respectait pas les tabous alimentaires de la religion, il consommait du haschisch et récitait des vers improvisés dans un état d'extase. Cette description rappelle celle des *kam-ozan* des anciens Turcs. Barak Baba fut peut-être un Kalenderî; c'était un ordre de derviches errants et mendiants, s'adonnant à la danse extatique et à l'usage du haschisch. En 1307, il fut mis à mort au Ghilan; il fut jeté tout vivant dans un chaudron. On dit qu'il avait alors quarante ans.¹²

7. Voir ci-dessus, note 3. Pour les Çepni, voir OCAK, *La révolte*, p. 67; et aussi K. YÜCE, *Saltuk-Nâme'de Tarihi, Dinî ve Efsanevî Unsurları*, (Ankara 1987) p. 86-88.

8. Voir KÖPRÜLÜ, *Ilk Mutasavvıflar*, p. 27; F. KÖPRÜLÜ, *Influence du Chamanisme Turco-Mongol sur les Ordres Mystiques Musulmans*, (Istanbul 1929).

9. Voir A. OCAK, *Bektaşî Menâkibnâmelerinde İslam Öncesi İnanç Motifleri*, (Istanbul 1983) p. 125-137; ELVAN ÇELEBİ, p. 22-23 (ff. 15, a-b).

10. Cf. OCAK, *La révolte*, p. 118-121.

11. Cf. C. ÖZTELLİ, *Yunus Emre, bütün şiirleri*, (Istanbul 1971) p. XIX-XXIII.

12. Sur Barak Baba, voir KÖPRÜLÜ, *Influence du Chamanisme*; OCAK, *La révolte*, p.

En parlant des chefs religieux du XIII^e siècle, on ne saurait passer sous silence le plus célèbre d'entre eux: Hadji Bektach-i Veli. Nous aurons l'occasion de revenir sur ce sujet. Il faut cependant préciser que Hadji Bektach ne fut au départ qu'un des nombreux Babas anatoliens. Il n'eut pas tout d'abord de place prépondérante; ce n'est que plus tard qu'il gagna sa célébrité. Si Hadji Bektach est devenu le saint populaire par excellence, il le doit à ses relations avec les premiers Ottomans et parce que Orhan Ghazi en a fait le patron des Janissaires. C'est à cause de cela que le Bektachisme est devenu par la suite le plus célèbre des ordres populaires turcs.

Puisque nous parlons de Bektachisme, je voudrais souligner un fait important: en parlant des groupements religieux populaires, j'ai utilisé le terme "hétérodoxe". Or, je tiens à préciser qu'au XIII^e siècle, et également au XIV^e, hétérodoxie ne signifie pas "Chiisme". Dans aucune source ancienne, nous ne trouvons mentionné, dans les campagnes anatoliennes, de Chiisme, surtout pas de Chiisme extrémiste. Je citerai comme preuve la généalogie de Baba Ilyas dont le fils aîné, appelé Ömer Pacha, fut pendu pendant la révolte.¹³ Le premier des quatre *halife* de Baba Ilyas, s'appelait Cheykh Osman. Il fut chargé par son maître de propager l'Islam en pays de Rum. Il échappa au massacre et termina sa vie à Kirchehir. C'est lui qui fut le maître du poète Achik Pacha, le père d'Elvan Çelebi et l'arrière grand-père d'Achikpachazade.¹⁴ Or, les noms *Ömer* et *Osman* sont impossibles chez les Chiites qui pratiquent le *teberrâ*, malédictions sur les trois premiers Califes. Force nous est de constater que Baba Ilyas n'était pas Chiite, pas plus que son disciple, Hadji Bektach-i Veli. Le Chiisme s'est infiltré dans le Bektachisme petit à petit. Dans les centres urbains, il était certainement connu, venant d'Irak et de Syrie, mais il ne représentait pas de danger important. La polémique Sunnisme-Chiisme n'entrera dans sa phase aigüe qu'avec la propagande safavide.

Le peuple turc a toujours eu de la vénération pour la Famille du Prophète et les martyrs de Kerbelâ. Mais ce n'est pas à proprement parler une preuve de Chiisme et la présence de forteresses ismaïliennes en Syrie n'était pas suffisante pour influencer la masse des tribus nomades ou semi-nomades, encore attachées à leur passé et en général illettrées. Ainsi, Ghazi Osman lui-même, d'après le témoignage de Nechri, ne savait ni lire, ni écrire. D'après cet historien, lorsque le derviche Turgud demanda à Ghazi Osman une récompense pour lui avoir interprété le rêve prémonitoire de Cheykh Ede Bali concernant la lignée d'Osman, ce dernier lui répondit: "Ben yazu yazmak bilmezem", "Je ne sais ni lire, ni écrire", et il lui donna en gage de sa promesse son épée et son gobelet. On retrouve le même récit chez l'historien Achikpachazade.¹⁵

105-110; YÜCE, *Saltuk-Nâme'de*, p. 161-163.

13. Voir ELVAN ÇELEBI, p. LVI-LVII.

14. ELVAN ÇELEBI, p. XXXIII, XLII, LIX, LXVI, LXVIII, LXXII, LXXXVI, LXXXVII.

15. Voir *Kitâb-i Cihan-nümâ*, v. I, p. 83. On trouve le même récit chez AŞIKPAŞAZADE (Ali), p. 4-7; AŞIKPAŞAZADE (Atsız), p. 95-96.

Au XIII^e et même au XIV^e siècle, le terme "hétérodoxe" ne signifie pas autre chose que la présence de substrats venus du Chamanisme ou des autres religions professées par les Turks. On trouve, par exemple, la croyance à la réincarnation, voir à la métempsychose. On trouve également la croyance au Kök-Tengri, au dieu-ciel, des anciens Turks: Baba Ilyas qui monte, après sa mort, vers le Kök-Tengri, monté sur son magnifique cheval gris, en est un exemple.¹⁶ Plus tard, Kök-Tengri sera indentifié à Ali, devenu à son tour une divinité solaire.

Différents courants venus aux cours des siècles s'intégrer aux croyances des tribus turkmènes encore superficiellement islamisées, contribueront à donner un aspect de Chiisme extrémiste à ces croyances.

1) L'intégration des Akhis aux derviches, au cours du XIV^e siècle. Nous savons que la corporation des Akhis était très proche des derviches auxquels elle a donné leurs rites d'initiation: se ceindre d'une ceinture, boire une coupe, recevoir une arme symbolique, etc. Les Akhis étaient de tendance chiite: cela ressort des *Futuvvetnâme* que nous avons en notre possession.¹⁷ Leur patron était Selman-i Farsî qui, chez les Chiites, vient immédiatement après Ali en importance.¹⁸

2) L'influence du Khurufisme prêché par Fazlullah d'Astarabâd, qui fut exécuté en Azerbaïdjan, en 1396. Ses disciples, en premier lieu Nesimî, émigrèrent en Anatolie et en Roumélie et y apportèrent les idées anthropomorphiques de leur maître. Les Khurufis s'intégreront dans le Bektachisme. Leurs idées sont toujours vivantes dans les milieux bektachis, comme en témoigne le célèbre poème de Hilmî Dede Baba (m. 1907):

Tuttum aynayı yüzüme / Ali göründü gözüme

"J'ai tenu un miroir devant mon visage / Ali est apparu à mes yeux." Ali représente la manifestation par excellence de la Divinité.

3) Mais l'influence décisive fut causée par la propagande safavide dans la deuxième moitié du XV^e siècle et au tournant du XVI^e siècle.

*

Les Ottomans faisaient partie des tribus turkmènes. D'après ce que nous apprennent les sources historiques,¹⁹ leur ancêtre, Süleyman Chah, émigra en Anatolie, fuyant l'invasion mongole, après la prise de Balkh par Genghis Khan. C'était un chef turkmène nomade (*yörük, etrâk*), appartenant à la tribu des Kayi,

16. Voir ELVAN ÇELEBI, p. LI; OCAK, *La révolte*, p. 57-58, 63.

17. Voir IA, s.v. "Fütüvvet". On ne peut pas énumérer ici la très riche bibliographie sur la *Futuvvet*: voir les différents articles de Claude Cahen, Jean Deny, Abdülbâki Gölpınarlı, Franz Taeschner. Voir aussi L. MASSIGNON, *La "Futuwwa" ou "Pacte d'honneur artisanal entre les travailleurs musulmans au Moyen Age"*, *Opera Minora*, v. I, (Beirut 1963) p. 396-417.

18. Voir L. MASSIGNON, *Salman Pâk et les prémices spirituelles de l'Islam Iranien*, *Opera Minora*, v. I, p. 443-483.

19. Principalement Aşıkpaşazâde, Neşrî, Oruc.

une des tribus Oghuz. Il avait quatre fils. Deux d'entre eux, Ertoğrul et Tündar, nomadisaient, à la tête d'une tribu de quatre cent tentes, dans la région de Söğüt qui devint le lieu de résidence d'Ertoğrul. Ce dernier avait trois fils: Gündüz, Sarubali et Osman. Seul Osman a un nom musulman, c'est pourquoi on s'est posé des questions sur l'origine de son nom qui apparaît sous la forme "Atman" dans les sources grecques. Les premiers Ottomans, surtout Osman et Orhan, apparaissent comme de simples chefs de tribu, encore proches des Turkmènes nomades, à la fois par leur mode de vie et par leurs pratiques religieuses. Plus tard, après la consolidation de la puissance ottomane, lorsque l'Islamisme sera devenu le principal fondement de la dynastie, la *Medrese* règlera toute la vie religieuse, mais les premiers sultans ottomans continuaient à s'appuyer sur les Babas qui leur assuraient le soutien de la population turkmène.

Les témoignages des chroniqueurs ottomans, et en particulier Achikpachazade, nous montrent les liens étroits qui existaient entre les premiers sultans ottomans et les derviches hétérodoxes issus du mouvement Baba'î et qui étaient appelés, au XIV^e siècle, *Abdal*.

Achikpachazade mentionne l'importance de quatre groupes sociaux: *Gaziyan-i Rum*, *Ahiyan-i Rum*, *Abdalan-i Rum* et *Bacıyan-i Rum*. Ils représentent la structure sociale de cette première période de l'Empire: la classe guerrière (*Gaziyan-i Rum*), la classe artisanale (*Ahiyan-i Rum*), la classe religieuse populaire (*Abdalan-i Rum*), et enfin les femmes (*Bacıyan-i Rum*) qui jouaient un rôle important. D'après Achikpachazade, l'Ordre des Bektachis eut pour fondateur, non pas Hadji Bektach lui-même qui fut un saint contemplatif (*meczub budala aziz*), mais son épouse spirituelle, *Kadıncık Ana*, et le disciple de celle-ci, Abdal Musa.²⁰

Achikpachazade donne une longue liste des derviches qui vécurent au temps de Ghazi Osman, Orhan et Murad I. Il en rattache une grande partie à son aïeul, Baba İlyas-i Horasâni. Parmi ces derviches, il y en a un qui est devenu célèbre et dont l'auréole a été si forte qu'elle a éclipsé tous les autres: il s'agit justement de Hadji Bektach à qui remonte le plus célèbre des ordres religieux populaires de l'Empire Ottoman: celui des Bektachis.

Au cours des XIV^e, XV^e et XVI^e siècles, les Bektachis ont intégré et assimilé tous les éléments hétérodoxes issus des milieux turkmènes. Ils ont assimilé la corporation des Akhis, les Khurufis, mais surtout les *Abdal* et tous les mouvements religieux populaires qui avaient formé le mouvement Baba'î: Yesevî, Haydarî, Kalenderî, Vafa'î.²¹

Pourquoi ce rôle prépondérant pris par Hadji Bektach qui ne fut au départ qu'un parmi les innombrables Baba de l'époque?

Ce caractère au départ secondaire de celui qui est considéré comme le saint

20. Cf. AŞIKPAŞAZADE (Ali), p. 199-206; AŞIKPAŞAZADE (Atsız), p. 234-239.

21. Ces hypothèses ont été émises pour la première fois par F. Köprülü: voir, entre autres, KÖPRÜLÜ, *Les Origines*, p. 100-123. Voir, en dernier lieu, OCAK, *La révolte*, p. 131-134.

populaire turc par excellence, me frappa lors de mon séjour au Deli Oğman, en Bulgarie. Dans cette région, il existe un groupe important – officiellement cent mille personnes – de turcophones pratiquant un Islam hétérodoxe, le même qu'on trouve en Anatolie. Ce groupe est appelé "Kızılbach". Parmi eux, il y a un sous-groupe appelé "Bektachi". Ces derniers se réclament de Hadji Bektach, tandis que les premiers ont pour saint principal Demir Baba qui aurait été un disciple de Cheykh Bedreddin. Ce dernier est particulièrement vénéré et le jour anniversaire de sa mort on exécute une danse rituelle appelée: *Şeyh Bedreddin Sema'i*. Les habitants de cette région reprochent à Hadji Bektach son rattachement aux Janissaires qui ont laissé chez eux un très pénible souvenir. C'est pour cette raison que Hadji Bektach n'est pas très aimé parmi eux. J'ai compris, après ce voyage, que le phénomène qui porte le nom de Bektachisme, pouvait exister en dehors de Hadji Bektach et qu'en fait son nom était venu s'ajouter à un phénomène déjà existant. Son rôle prépondérant doit être rattaché à ses relations étroites avec les Ottomans qui en firent le patron des Janissaires. En favorisant Hadji Bektach qui appartenait au même milieu social qu'eux-mêmes, les premiers Ottomans ont sans doute cherché à canaliser les différents groupes hétérodoxes et à les ramener sous leur contrôle. Cette hypothèse est renforcée lorsqu'on visite le sanctuaire de Seyyid Battal, près d'Eskichehir. Ce sanctuaire, bâti, par les Ottomans sur un ancien site byzantin, autour du tombeau présumé du célèbre héros épique, contient des bâtiments dont une vaste et belle cuisine, érigés par Selim I qui fut l'ennemi de tous les hétérodoxes.

Les relations étroites existant entre les premiers Ottomans, les Akhis et les *Abdalan-i Rum*, sont attestées dans les anciennes chroniques: celles de Achikpachazade, Nechri, Orudj, les Chroniques anonymes. A cette liste, vient maintenant à s'ajouter un texte de première importance, car il est plus ancien que les autres: *Menâkibü'l-Kudsiyye fî Menâsibi'l-Unsiyye*, recueil hagiographique concernant Baba Ilyas-i Horasâni, écrit par son arrière petit-fils, Elvan Çelebi, dans la première moitié du XIV^e siècle.²² Le chroniqueur du XV^e siècle, Achikpachazade, fut l'arrière petit-neveu d'Elvan Çelebi, petit-fils de son frère Selmân. Le *Menâkibnâme* de Baba Ilyas confirme ce que nous savions déjà par les témoignages d'Eflâki et de Achikpachazade, c.à d. que Hadji Bektach avait été un disciple de Baba Ilyas.²³ Mais il nous apprend aussi quelque chose de nouveau; parmi les disciples de Baba Ilyas, se trouvait Cheykh Ede Bali, qui sera le beau-père de Ghazi Osman et son conseiller juridique. Cette source nous apprend les relations étroites qui existaient entre Hadji Bektach et Cheykh Ede Bali. Ce dernier faisait aussi partie de la corporation des Akhis. Son frère Chemseddin et son neveu Huseyin étaient également des Akhis.²⁴

D'après le *Menâkibnâme*, ni Hadji Bektach, ni Cheykh Ede Bali ne prirent

22. Edité par ISMAIL E. ERÜNSAL – A. YAŞAR OCAK, (Istanbul 1984).

23. Cf. EFLAKI (Huart), v. I, p. 296-297. Voir aussi note 20.

24. Cf. OCAK, *La révolte*, p. 83-84; ELVAN ÇELEBI, p. 169, vers 1994-1995.

part à la révolte des Baba'îs. C'est ce qui leur permit d'échapper au massacre final. D'après Achikpachazade, le frère de Hadji Bektach, Mentech, avait rejoint Baba Ilyas à Sivas et fut mis à mort –ou tué sur le champ de bataille–, probablement en même temps que son maître. Mais Hadji Bektach était resté dans les régions de Kirchehir et Kayseri et n'avait pas pris part aux opérations.

L'appartenance de Cheykh Ede Bali au milieu Baba'î et ses rapports avec Hadji Bektach, sont des éléments importants pour l'étude des relations entre les premiers Ottomans et l'Ordre des Bektachis. C'est à leur protection qu'est due l'importance prise, à partir du XIV^e siècle, par Hadji Bektach, surtout lorsque son nom fut lié au corps nouvellement formé des Janissaires dont il devint le patron.

C'est grâce à la bienveillance des Ottomans que l'Ordre des Bektachi dut sa place prépondérante dans l'Empire et qu'il put s'imposer comme l'ordre mystique populaire par excellence. A cette époque, les doctrines des Bektachis n'étaient pas encore contaminées par les hérésies chiites extrémistes, comme elles le seront plus tard, lorsque le Khurufisme s'intégrera au Bektachisme, et surtout après la propagande des premiers Safavides. Ces idées extrémistes n'apparaissent ni dans le *Vilâyetnâme* de Hadji Bektach, ni chez les premiers poètes bektachis, tels Abdal Musa ou Kaygusuz Abdal. Aucune source ancienne ne les mentionne. Eflâki²⁵ nous apprend que Hadji Bektach était un bon musulman, bien que pratiquant un Islam peu conformiste, ne suivant pas à la lettre la loi du Prophète et ne faisant pas ses cinq prières rituelles. Mais la même chose était vraie pour les différents Babas de l'époque. Ahmed Yesevi qui a gardé une réputation de sainteté, tenait des réunions où femmes et hommes se cotoyaient et au cours desquelles des boissons alcoolisées étaient consommées.

Si l'on examine toutes les sources citées, on remarque que Hadji Bektach ne fut pas au départ un personnage de premier plan. Il fut un des nombreux Baba turkmènes qui avaient été liés au mouvement des Baba'îs. Eflâki et Achikpachazade ne lui donnent qu'une place secondaire. Il est de même significatif que Yunus Emre que le *Vilâyetnâme* cite parmi les disciples de Hadji Bektach, ne mentionne pas son nom dans ses poèmes, alors qu'il parle de Taptuk Emre, de Barak Baba, de Geyikli Baba et de Sari Saltuk. Néanmoins, son nom a servi à fonder l'ordre populaire le plus important de l'Empire Ottoman. L'explication de ce succès peut être trouvée chez l'historien Orudj qui implique une relation entre le frère du Sultan Orhan, Ali Pacha, et l'Ordre des Bektachis. D'après Orudj, Ali Pacha renonça à toute fonction gouvernementale pour rejoindre les rangs des *Meşâyih* et pour mener une vie de derviche. Il conseilla à son frère de mettre sous la protection de Hadji Bektach le corps d'armée des Janissaires qui venait d'être constitué. Il lui dit: "*Ey Kardeş! Bütün askerın kızıl börk giysinler. Sen ak börk giy. Sana ait kullar da ak börk giysinler. Bu da âlemde nişan olsun. Orhan Gazi bu sözü kabul edip adam gönderdi. Amasya'da Horasanlı Haci*

25. Cf. EFLAKI (Huart), v. I, p. 296-297; v. II, p. 20-21.

Bektaş'tan izin alıp ak börk getirtti."²⁶ La présence de Hadji Bektach doit naturellement être mise en doute, puisqu'il est mort probablement à la fin du XIII^e siècle (en 1271, d'après la tradition), mais il est néanmoins certain que le corps des Janissaires fut rattaché à l'Ordre des Bektachis.

Il y a un autre point qui attire l'attention dans le récit d'Orudj: c'est la mention d'*Amasya*, alors que le centre des Bektachis se trouvait à Soludja Karaöyük, près de Kirchehir. Amasya fut le centre de l'activité de Baba Ilyas. C'est à *Çat*, près d'Amasya que se trouvait son *zaviye* et c'est à Amasya que le Cheykh fut mis à mort.²⁷ Le souvenir des rapports entre Hadji Bektach et Baba Ilyas semble avoir été encore vivant au temps où écrivait Orudj.

On connaît l'intérêt porté par les premiers sultans ottomans au sanctuaire du saint: le *Vilâyetnâme*²⁸ raconte que son *türbe* "mausolée" fut construit par Murad I qui était très lié à la mémoire de Hadji Bektach à cause de ses relations avec son aïeul Osman Ghazi. Murad I aurait fait construire le mausolée par un architecte nommé Yanko Madyan.²⁹ Les premiers sultans n'ont pas cessé de témoigner leur intérêt à ce mausolée: Murad II aurait fait fondre six cent pièces d'or pour faire couler l'étendard (*alem*) qui ornait le mausolée; Bayezid II rendit visite au sanctuaire et, d'après le *Vilâyetnâme*, il fit recouvrir de plomb le toit. Ces donations s'arrêtent après le règne de Bayezid II.³⁰

Les relations qui existaient entre Cheykh Ede Bali qui joua un rôle de premier plan dans la vie d'Osman Ghazi, et Hadji Bektach, telles quelles ressortent du *Menâkibnâme* de Baba Ilyas-i Horasâni, sont très importantes pour l'histoire des premiers Bektachis. Elles confirment le témoignage d'Orudj qui implique des liens entre Ali Pacha, le frère d'Orhan, et les Bektachis. Certains auteurs ont même supposé, d'après le témoignage d'Orudj, qu'Ali Pacha aurait pu être Bektachi.³¹ C'est d'ailleurs ce qui vient à l'esprit en lisant le passage d'Orudj.

Le regretté Louis Massignon, par une intuition géniale qui le caractérisait, avait pressenti que Ghazi Osman pouvait devoir son nom à un "saint bektachi", de même que Bayezid. Malheureusement cette hypothèse n'a jamais été prouvée.

Néanmoins, la mention de Cheykh Ede Bali aux côtés de Hadji Bektach et le témoignage des anciennes chroniques ottomanes, nous permettent de voir dans les premiers Bektachis un instrument chargé de ranger sous la bannière gouvernementale, grâce à une initiative venue des sultans ottomans, les masses

26. Cf. ORUC (Atsız), p. 34.

27. Cf. ELVAN ÇELEBI, p. XXI, XXVII, XXVIII, XLV-LII, LVIII, LXVI-LXVII, LXVIII.

28. Cf. *Manakib-i Hacı Bektaş-ı Velî "Vilâyet-Nâme"*, éd. ABDÛLBÂKI GÖLPINARLI, (Istanbul 1958) p. 91-92.

29. *Ibid.*, p. 91-92.

30. Voir SURAIYA FAROQHI, *Der Bektaschi-Orden in Anatolien, von späten fünfzehnten Jahrhundert bis 1826*, (Vienne 1981) p. 119-I.

31. Cf. J. K. BIRGE, *The Bektashi Order of Dervishes*, (London-Hartford 1937) p. 46-50.

populaires professant un Islam encore mal assimilé et proche des anciennes croyances des tribus turkmènes. Au service des sultans ottomans, les Bektachis firent, dans un premier temps, figure de derviches colonisateurs, éducateurs et propagateurs de la religion islamique et de la culture turque, comme le fut, en son temps, Ahmed Yesevi, et comme le fut, dans les Balkans, Sari Saktuk Dede.

Mais victimes de ce rôle de colonisateurs et d'éducateurs, et sous l'influence d'hérésies étrangères et des populations chrétiennes avec lesquelles ils seront continuellement en contact, surtout dans les régions balkaniques où ils furent très nombreux, les Bektachis devinrent, au cours des siècles, un ordre ouvertement hétérodoxe, mais aussi libéral, supra-confessionnel, non-conformiste et même parfois révolutionnaire.

**LES MILIEUX SOUFIS DANS LES TERRITOIRES
DU BEYLICAT OTTOMAN ET LE PROBLEME
DES 'ABDALAN-I RUM' (1300-1389)**

Ahmet Yaşar OCAK

a. Introduction

Le rôle des ordres mystiques dans la fondation du beylicat ottoman, fut, aux yeux des chercheurs, depuis Joseph von Hammer, l'un des sujets les plus intéressants et les plus fascinants de l'histoire ottomane. Mais ce fut surtout le regretté Fuat Köprülü, dont nous commémorons cette année le vingt cinquième anniversaire de la mort, qui l'a étudié à fond, notamment dans ses quatre ouvrages capitaux cités, par ordre chronologique, *Türk Edebiyatında İlk Mutasavvıflar*,¹ "Anadolu'da İslâmiyet",² l'article "Abdal",³ et *Les Origines de l'Empire Ottoman*.⁴

Des savants et des chercheurs postérieurs, tels que les regrettés Abdülbaki Gölpınarlı et Ö. Lûtfi Barkan, puis Halil İnalcık, Irène Mélikoff et quelques autres, y ont apporté des contributions riches et intéressantes.⁵ Mais pourtant, il nous semble que le sujet comprend encore certains aspects devant être éclaircis et certains problèmes devant être résolus.

Dans notre présent exposé, nous allons essayer, à notre tour, de faire certains analyses et interprétations. Mais avant d'aborder le sujet, il nous paraît nécessaire de réexaminer les sources et de réviser l'état actuel des nos recherches et de nos connaissances.

1. KÖPRÜLÜ, *İlk Mutasavvıflar*.

2. M.F. KÖPRÜLÜ, Anadolu'da İslâmiyet, *Dârülfünûm Edebiyat Fakültesi Mecmuası*, 4-6 (1338-1340//1922-1924).

3. IDEM, Abdal, *Türk Halk Edebiyatı Ansiklopedisi*, 1^{er} fascicule, (Istanbul 1935).

4. KÖPRÜLÜ, *Les Origines*.

5. Cf., par ex., A. GÖLPINARLI, *Yunus Emre ve Tasavvuf*, (Istanbul 1961); Ö. L. BARKAN, İstîlâ devirlerinin kolonizatör Türk dervişleri ve zaviyeler, *VD*, II (1942), 279-353; H. İNALCIK, *The Ottoman Empire, The Classical Age: 1300-1600*, (London 1973) p. 186-202; IRÈNE MÉLIKOFF, Un ordre de deviches colonisateurs: Les Bektachis, *Mémorial Ömer Lûtfi Barkan*, (Paris 1980) p. 149-157.

b. Sources et état actuel de nos recherches et de nos connaissances

Il convient de diviser en quatre catégories les sources connues jusqu'à présent:

1. Les chroniques ottomans qui, elles aussi, peuvent être divisées en deux parties: une première comprenant les chroniques rédigées vers la fin du XIV^e siècle, telles les *Tevarih-i 'Al-i-'Osman* d' Oruç Beg⁶ et de 'Aşikpaşazade,⁷ et le *Kitâb-i Cihannümâ* de Mehmed Neşri⁸ et une deuxième comprenant des chroniques rédigées durant les siècles postérieurs telles les *Tavarih-i 'Al-i-'Osman* de Kemalpaşazade,⁹ le *Tâcu't-Tevarih* de Hoca Sa'du'd-Din,¹⁰ le *Kunhu'l-Ahbar* de Gelibolulu Mustafa 'Ali¹¹ et *el-Aylemu'z-Zahir* de Mustafa Cenabi.¹²

2. Les sources biographiques rédigées aux XV^e, XVI^e et XVII^e siècles, telles la *Terceme-i Nefeḥātu'l-Uns* de Lami'i Çelebi,¹³ les *Şakayiku'n-Nu'maniyye* de Taşköprüzade Ahmed,¹⁴ le *Güldeste-i Riyaz-i 'Irfan* de Bursalı Belig¹⁵ et la *Ravza-i Evliya* de Baldirzade Mehmed,¹⁶ et enfin, avec une certaine réserve les parties biographiques du célèbre *Seyahatname* d'Evliya Çelebi.¹⁷

3. Les ouvrages hagiographiques, ou autrement dit, les *Menakibname* bektachis, relativement peu utilisés et analysés à cette fin, ont été rédigés en partie, dans la deuxième moitié du XVI^e siècle et en partie dans la première moitié du XVI^e siècle. Étant tous issus de la tradition des *Abdalan-i Rum* qui avaient des relations étroites avec les autorités gouvernementales à l' époque de la fondation de l'état ottoman, ils nous seront très utiles dans nos analyses et nos interprétations.¹⁸

4. Enfin les documents d'archives, ou plutôt les registres ottomans dont la

6. ORUC (Babinger).

7. AŞIKPAŞAZADE (Ali).

8. *Kitâb-i Cihan-nümâ* (Taeschner).

9. IBN KEMÂL (Kemâlpaşazâde), *Tevâriḥ-i Âl-i 'Oşmân*, éd. ŞERAFETTİN TURAN, v. I, (Ankara 1970).

10. HOCA SA'DU'D-DİN, *Tâcu't-Tevâriḥ*, v. I-II, (Istanbul 1279, 1280).

11. MUSTAFA 'ÂLİ (Gelibolulu), *Kunhu'l-Aḥbâr*, v. V, (Istanbul 1285).

12. MUSTAFA CENÂBÎ, *el-'Aylemu'z-Zâḥir*, Bibl. Süleymaniye (Ayasofya), no 3033.

13. LÂMÎ'Î ÇELEBÎ, *Terceme-i Nefeḥātu'l-Uns*, (Istanbul 1270).

14. Pour la traduction turque, voir MECDÎ EFENDÎ, *Terceme-i Şakâyik*, (Istanbul 1269).

15. İSMÂ'İL BELİĞ, *Güldeste-i Riyâz-ı 'İrfân*, (Bursa 1302).

16. BALDIRZÂDE MEḤMED, *Ravza-i Evliyâ*, Bibl. Süleymaniye (Hacı Mahmud), no 4560.

17. EVLIYÂ ÇELEBÎ, *Evliyâ Çelebî Seyâhatnâmesi*, v. 1-6, (Istanbul 1314-1318); v. 7-8, (Istanbul 1928); v. 9-10, (Istanbul 1938).

18. Pour une brève présentation de ces ouvrages hagiographiques dits *Bektaşî menakib-nameleri*, voir A.Y. OCAK, *Bektaşî Menâkibnâmelerinde İslâm Öncesi İnanç Motifleri*, (Istanbul 1983) p. 1-17; pour une analyse de ces *menâkib* du point de vue du problème des *Abdalan-i Rum*, voir IDEM, *Kalenderîler ve Bektaşîlik, Doğumunun 100 yıldönümünde*

plus grande partie ne remonte pas au delà du XVI^e siècle.

Jusqu'à présent, tous les chercheurs ont basé leurs recherches sur les matériaux que nous venons de citer brièvement. Ces quatre groupes de sources, ont en commun leurs informations sur les *Akhis* et les *Abdalan-i Rum*, ou autrement dit, les *Rum Abdallari*, qui constituent le milieu soufi par excellence, dans les territoires du beylicat ottoman durant le XIV^e siècle.

En ce qui concerne les recherches en la matière, il faut citer en premier lieu, celles de Fuad Köprülü qui aborda pour la première fois le sujet, et insista dans ses quatre ouvrages déjà mentionnés, sur l'identité mystique des *Abdalan-i Rum*, sur leurs relations avec les begs ottomans, et sur l'ambiance religieuse dans les territoires du beylicat; il a également étudié le rôle des *Abdalan-i Rum* dans les premières conquêtes ottomanes. Et il a souligné pour la première fois, le rapport entre le mouvement baba'i et les *Abdalan-i Rum*¹⁹ ce qui, à notre point de vue, est particulièrement important.

Suivant la voie frayée par Fuad Köprülü, le regretté Ö. Lûtfi Barkan a publié en 1942, son article magistral, intitulé *Kolonizatör Türk Dervişleri*²⁰ qui se basait non seulement sur les chroniques classiques, mais aussi sur les documents tirés des registres ottomans, non utilisés par Fuad Köprülü, éclairant ainsi le rôle des *Akhis* et des *Abdalan-i Rum* dans la formation du beylicat ottoman. A notre avis, le seul défaut des travaux de ces deux grands savants, est de ne pas avoir comparé leurs données avec celles des *menakibname* écrits selon la tradition des *Abdalan-i Rum* autrement dit les recueils hagiographiques, appelés aujourd'hui *menakibname bektachis*.²¹

Dans les années 1950-1960, ce fut le regretté Abdülbaki Gölpınarlı qui, dans le cadre de ses recherches sur le Bektachisme et sur Yunus Emre, se pencha sérieusement sur la question des *Abdalan-i Rum*, ainsi que sur leurs rapports avec le mouvement baba'i, et avec les Bektachis.²² Contrairement à ce que disait son maître Fuad Köprülü, selon Gölpınarlı, les *Abdalan-i Rum* formaient un ordre mystique indépendant des autres groupes de derviches, tels les Yesevis, les Kalenderis et les Hayderis.²³ Mais en fin de compte, les opinions des deux savants se rejoignaient en disant que les *Abdalan-i Rum* étaient, à l'origine, les premiers Bektachis. Il en ressort donc que ce furent les Bektachis qui ont joué un rôle

Atatürk'e Armağan, éd. par Faculté des Lettres de l'Univ. d'Istanbul, (Istanbul 1981) p. 297-308.

19. Cf. KÖPRÜLÜ, *Ilk Mutasavvıflar*, p. 291, n. 4; IDEM, *Osmanlı Devletinin Kuruluşu* (édition turque des *Origines de l'Empire Ottoman*), (Ankara 1959) p. 101 (on a utilisé, dans cette présente étude, cette édition turque).

20. Cf. *supra* note 5.

21. En réalité, on les appelle à tort *menakibname bektachis*, car nous les connaissons par l'intermédiaire de la tradition bektachie. Mais à l'époque où ils ont été rédigés, l'ordre bektachi n'était pas encore organisé.

22. Cf., par ex., GÖLPINARLI, *Yunus Emre ve Tasavvuf*, p. 17-50.

23. Cf. *op. cit.*, *ibid.*

considérable dans la formation du beylicat ottoman.

C'est à ce stade que nous devons parler d'un autre savant qui s'est consacrée, durant des longues années à l'étude du Bektachisme. Il s'agit du Professeur Irène Mélikoff dont certains articles étudient le rôle des Bektachis dans la formation de l'état ottoman.²⁴ Elle s'est montrée convaincue que les premiers *begs* étaient servis des premiers Bektachis, c'est-à-dire des *Abdalan-i Rum* comme d'un instrument gouvernemental, chargé de ranger les masses populaires sous la bannière d'un Sunnisme libéral et tolérant.²⁵

Il nous semble que la question bektachie a aussi une place dans les recherches du Professeur Irène Beldiceanu bien qu'elle s'intéresse plutôt aux problèmes socio-économiques de la période classique de l'histoire ottomane.²⁶ Il faut aussi mentionner le Professeur Speros Vryonis Jr. qui, tout en poursuivant ses recherches sur l'histoire de l'islamisation de l'Anatolie, s'est intéressé au processus de l'influence réciproque des cultures islamo-chrétiennes aux XIII^e et XIV^e siècles, dans les milieux hétérodoxes.²⁷ Quant au Professeur Halil Inalcik dont les recherches magistrales recouvrent toute l'époque classique de l'histoire ottomane, plus particulièrement dans le secteur politique et socio-économique, il s'intéresse, ces dernières années, aux problèmes de l'histoire religieuse de la période classique, notamment aux *Abdalan-i Rum*.²⁸

Après ce court exposé sur l'état actuel de nos recherches et des nos connaissances, nous pouvons aborder l'étude de notre sujet.

c. Milieux soufis dans les territoires ottomans

Avant de parler des milieux soufis sur les territoires du beylicat ottoman à l'époque dont nous nous occupons, il faut jeter un coup d'oeil sur les ordres mystiques qui existaient dans l'Anatolie seldjoukide dès le début du XIII^e siècle car une bonne compréhension des milieux soufis dans le beylicat ottoman dépend d'une bonne connaissance des ordres mystiques de cette époque.

Aujourd'hui, grâce aux recherches savantes de Fuad Köprülü et d'Abdülbaki Gölpınarlı, nous connaissons déjà beaucoup de choses sur les ordres mystiques or sur les écoles soufis de l'époque en question. Nous savons qu'à la veille de l'invasion mongole, dans la première moitié du XIII^e siècle, il y avait eu, en Anatolie, plusieurs immigrations de derviches venus de Transoxiane, du Harezmi,

24. Cf., par ex., l'article cité dans la note 5 (Un ordre de derviches colonisateurs: les Bektachis).

25. *Op. cit.*, p. 156-157.

26. Depuis quelques années, elle fait des recherches sur la question des *Abdal* en s'appuyant sur les registres ottomans de la région de Bursa.

27. Cf., par ex., VRYONIS, *Decline*, p. 351-402.

28. Cf., par ex., Sultan and dervish: An analysis of the Otman Baba Menakibnâmesi, *Saints and Sainthood in Islam* (An international conference, Berkeley, April 3-5 1987) (sous presse).

du Khorassan, de l'Azarbaycan et de l'Erran, et même de l'Iran et de la Syrie. Ils représentaient différentes tendances mystiques dont les chefs et les partisans appartenaient à des différentes couches sociales et culturelles.²⁹ Ils se rattachaient principalement, dans les milieux cultivés aux trois écoles ou traditions, représentées par Muhyi'd-Din-i 'Arabi (1241), par Şihabu'd-Din Ebu Hafs 'Ömer es-Sühreverdi (1232), et par Necmu'd-Din-i Kubra (1221).³⁰ Les grandes villes de l'Anatolie seldjoukide, telles Konya, Kayseri, Tokat, Sivas, Amasya, abritaient les *zaviyas* de ces groupes soufis.

Il y avait aussi des ordres mystiques populaires provenant des mêmes régions que les ordres citadins. Ils étaient teintés d'hétérodoxie et imprégnés de substrats mystiques pré-islamiques; ils s'implantaient en général dans les milieux ruraux et nomades, rarement dans les milieux urbains. C' était la Vefaiyya, la Hayderiyya et la Yeseviyya.³¹

D'autre part, la deuxième moitié du XIII^e siècle, c'est-à-dire l'époque de l'hégémonie mongole, vit de nouvelles infiltrations d'ordres mystiques en Anatolie, surtout celles des Rifa'is dits Ahmedis,³² et des créations d'ordres nouveaux, tels la Mevleviyya dit Celaliyya.³³ A l'époque de la fondation du beylicat ottoman la Mevleviyya, la Rifa'iyya et la Halvetiyya eurent une influence considérable dans les villes anatoliennes,³⁴ au détriment de la Sühreverdiyya et de la Kubreviyya qui étaient déjà assimilées par la Mevleviyya.

Mais il ne faut pas oublier que les *Akhis* existaient toujours à cette époque, dans toutes les villes et dans tous les villages anatoliens. Les corporations des *Akhis* n'étaient pas de simples corporations de métiers, mais des parfaites organisations mystiques.³⁵ Ainsi se présentaient les milieux soufis de l'Anatolie seldjoukide qui se sont directement transplantés dans l'Anatolie des beylicats turcomans.

Quant aux groupes soufis qui existaient au XIV^e siècle dans les territoires ottomans, il serait intéressant de remarquer qu'ils ne présentaient certainement pas une telle variété. Les résultats des recherches effectuées jusqu'aujourd'hui, n'ont prouvé que la présence des *Akhis* et des *Abdalan-i Rum* dans le beylicat ottoman, durant l'époque en question. En étudiant les sources que nous venons de repartir en quatre catégories, on ne trouvera aucun témoignage concernant les ordres

29. A ce sujet, voir par ex. KÖPRÜLÜ, *Ilk Mutasavvıflar*, p. 164-166. IDEM, *Türk Edebiyatı Tarihi*, (İstanbul 1926) p. 284; IDEM, *Anadolu'da İslâmiyet*, p. 296-297; IDEM, *Kuruluş*, p. 94-102.

30. Cf. KÖPRÜLÜ, *Ilk Mutasavvıflar*, p. 171-74; IDEM, *Anadolu'da İslâmiyet*, p. 294-295.

31. Cf. KÖPRÜLÜ, *Kuruluş*, p. 98-99; voir aussi, OCAK, *La révolte*, p. 28-35.

32. AHMED EFLÂKI, *Manâkib al-Arifin*, éd. TAHSIN YAZICI, (Ankara 1961) v. II, p. 716, 915; IBN BATTUTA, *Voyages*, v. II, p. 292, 293, 310.

33. A ce propos, voir ABDÛLBAKI GÖLPINARLI, *Mevlânâ'dan Sonra Mevlevilik*, (İstanbul 1953) p. 244-266; VRYONIS, *Decline*, p. 381 sq.

34. Cf., par ex., KÖPRÜLÜ, *Kuruluş*, p. 95.

35. Cf. *op. cit.*, p. 92.

mystiques tels que la Mevleviyya, la Rifa'iyya, la Halvetiyya etc., alors que dans les territoires des autres beylicats, les Karamanoğulları, les Germiyanogulları, les Aydinogulları, les Menteşeoğulları, nous constatons la présence des ordres mentionnés. Un témoin contemporain, le célèbre voyageur maghrébin Ibn Battuta, mentionne, dans ses voyages en Anatolie, des cheiks et des *zaviyas* mevlevies et rifa'is, ainsi que la présence des *Akhis*.³⁶ D'ailleurs, grâce aux sources mevlevies, nous connaissons l'expansion de la Mevleviyya dans les territoires des beylicats de l'Anatolie de l'Ouest. Selon les *Menakibu'l-'Arifin* d'Ahmed Eflaki, Ulu'Arif Çelebi, le petit-fils de Mevlana Celalu'd-Din, qui était le cheik des Mevlevis de l'époque, entretenait de bonnes relations avec les *beg* de différents beylicats turcomans, comme par exemple, Mes'ud Beg des Menteşeoğulları; Şuca-u'd-Din Inanç Beg, Ilyas Beg et Mehmed Beg des Aydinogulları, Alişiroğlu Yakub Beg des Germiyanogulları, et enfin Mehmed Beg des Eşrefoğulları.³⁷ Toujours d'après Eflaki, il organisait, pendant ses voyages dans ces différents beylicats, des séances de *zikr* et de *sema'* grâce auxquelles il avait gagné plusieurs disciples et fonder des *zaviyas*.³⁸ Mais il est curieux de constater qu'il n'avait jamais mis les pieds dans les territoires du beylicat ottoman.

Une question vient à l'esprit: Pourquoi ces ordres mystiques ne venaient-ils pas s'établir dans le beylicat ottoman? Ce beylicat avait-il quelques particularités qui ne leur convenaient pas? A notre avis, la réponse à cette question doit être cherchée d'une part dans la situation géopolitique du beylicat ottoman en tant qu'un beylicat frontalier (*uc beğliği*), d'autre part, dans la qualité socio-culturelle de sa population.

Cela signifie qu'en tant que beylicat frontalier, le beylicat ottoman, comme l'ont montré Fuad Köprülü et Halil Inalcik, était strictement attaché à l'idéologie de *gaza* et de *cihad*, et faisait souvent la guerre contre Byzance. Il avait donc besoin de combattants qui soient toujours sur le pied de guerre, car ce petit beylicat, entouré à l'Est et au Sud par d'autres beylicats turcomans, ne pouvait s'agrandir que vers l'Ouest, c'est-à-dire, vers Byzance.

C'est probablement pour cette raison que les territoires ottomans n'étaient pas un terrain favorable à la prolifération d'ordres mystiques, tels la Mevleviyya, la Rifa'iyya etc., qui préféreraient la vie tranquille dans les *zaviyas* où ils pouvaient s'adonner aux cérémonies du *zikr* et du *sema'*, au lieu de combattre contre les troupes byzantines, alors que pour les *Akhis* et pour les *Abdalan-i Rum*, qui étaient à la fois mystiques et *gazi* combattant avec leurs sabres en bois,³⁹ les territoires ottomans constituaient un terrain qui convenait à leur idéal.

Le deuxième facteur que nous croyons être aussi important que le premier, est la qualité socio-culturelle de la population qui se composait en grande majorité

36. IBN BATTUTA, *Voyages*, v. II, p. 292, 293, 310.

37. EFLAKI, v. II, p. 851, 864, 948-949; WITTEK, *Mentesche*, p. 60-64; voir aussi, GÖLPINARLI, *Mevlevîlik*, p. 73-75.

38 Cf. *op. cit.*, *loc. cit.*

39. A ce sujet, voir WITTEK, *Mentesche*, p. 116, note 2.

de tribus turcomanes nomades ou semi-nomades. Se rattachant évidemment à un Islam populaire, imbreigné de substrats hétérodoxes non encore marqué par le caché de la *medrese*, ces tribus étaient sans doute plus ouvertes à l'esprit mystique des *Akhis* et des *Abdalan-i Rum* qu'à celui des Mevlevi ou des Rifa'-is, façonné par un enseignement plus savant et plus subtil.

Ici, il convient d'ajouter un troisième facteur dû à l'effet de l'hégémonie mongole, vers la fin du XIII^e siècle. Si l'on étudie le processus de l'installation de l'hégémonie mongole en Anatolie vers les années 1250, on remarquera que les *Akhis* et les *baba* turcomans, alias les *Abdalan-i Rum* du XIV^e siècle, furent, dès le début, deux obstacles sérieux pour les envahisseurs mongoles. C'est pour cela que les autorités gouvernementales ont exercé une surveillance stricte et intolérante à l'égard des *Akhis* et des *baba* turcomans qui ont été contraints d'émigrer, pour échapper à l'oppression mongole, vers les territoires des beylicats frontaliers.

Et ces *baba* turcomans dont la majorité était, d'après les sources, issue du milieu *baba'i*, appartenaient aux différents ordres mystiques populaires, tels la Hayderiyya, la Yeseviyya et particulièrement la Vefa'iyya, qui se rassemblaient tous, au XIV^e siècle, sous le nom d' *Abdalan-i Rum* ou *Rum Abdalları*, dénomination utilisée notamment par eux mêmes.⁴⁰

d. *Abdalan-i Rum* ou *Rum Abdalları* ou les disciples de *Baba Ilyas* et de *Haci Bektas*

On sait que le terme *Abdalan-i Rum*, ou, dans les sources postérieures, *Rum Abdalları*, fut utilisé pour la première fois par Aşıkpaşazade,⁴¹ célèbre historien ottoman descendant de la famille de Baba Ilyas-i Khorassani, chef de la révolte des Baba'is auxquels se rattachaient les *Abdalan-i Rum*.⁴² Mais en réalité, ce fut Elvan Çelebi, poète mystique du XIV^e siècle, grand oncle paternel de Aşıkpaşazade, qui désigna les disciples de son grand-père sous le nom d'*abdal* dans son ouvrage mi-biographique mi-hagiographique *Menakibu'l-Kudsiyye fi Menasibi'l-Unsiyye*.⁴³ Ainsi renforcent-ils ou plutôt consacrent-ils l'appartenance des *Abdalan-i Rum* au mouvement *baba'i*.

Ce fut Fuad Köprülü qui repencha pour la première fois sur l'analyse de ce terme, autrement dit, sur la question des *Abdalan-i Rum*, dans ses différents travaux consacrés à l'histoire de l'islamisation de l'Anatolie. Il en a conclu que les *Abdalan-i Rum* se composaient de derviches kalenderis, yesevis et hayderis –il ne mentionne pas les vefa'is– qui étaient tous issus du milieu *baba'i*. Il n'a pourtant, jamais entrepris une analyse détaillée de ces groupes de derviches. Abdülbaki Gölpınarlı ne l'a pas fait non plus.

40. Cf., par ex., KÜÇÜK ABDAL, *Velāyetnāme-i Otmān Baba*, Bibl. Adnan Ötügen, no 643, *passim*.

41. AŞIKPAŞAZADE (Ali), p. 200.

42. Cf. *op. cit.*, p. 1.

43. Voir ELVAN ÇELEBI, p. 166.

Quant aux chercheurs postérieurs, ils ont souvent utilisé ce terme sans faire allusion à leur identité mystique, ni à leur appartenance à tel ou tel ordre. Ainsi, la question des *Abdalan-i Rum* reste encore jusqu'à présent un problème qui n'a pas été résolu et qui revêt un caractère important à l'époque à laquelle le beylicat ottoman s'était formé.

S'il veut étudier ce problème, le chercheur se trouvera confronté aux questions suivantes:

1) De quels groups de derviches se composaient les *Abdalan-i Rum*? Y avait-il prédominance de tel ou tel groupe parmi eux?

2) Quels sont les personnages intermédiaires grâce auxquels les *Abdalan-i Rum* furent reliés au milieu baba'i pendant la formation du beylicat ottoman? A quel groupe de derviches appartenaient-ils?

3) Y a-t-il vraiment un rapport entre les *Abdalan-i Rum* et les Bektachis? Etaient-ils vraiment les premiers Bektachis? A quoi est dû ce rapport?

4) Quel est le mystère de Şeyh Edebalı? Quelle est plutôt la vraie identité de ce personnage mystérieux qui joue le rôle d'homme-clé dans les relations des *Akhis* et des *Abdalan-i Rum* avec le gouvernement central ottoman de l'époque?

5) Comment se fait-il que les *beg* ottomans, apparemment attachés au culte sunnite, ont eu des relations très proches avec les *Abdalan-i Rum* issus du milieu baba'i qui avaient certainement une idéologie religieuse hétérodoxe?

A notre avis, pour répondre à ces questions, il faut étudier et analyser très attentivement les textes concernés qui figurent dans les sources. Si on le fait, on remarquera que ces textes nous livrent uniquement des renseignements assez décousus concernant huit personnages, qui ont tous vécu au XIV^e siècle. Ce sont:

1. Şeyh Edebalı

2. Kumral Abdal (ou Dede)

de l'époque de Osman Beg

3. Geyikli Baba

4. Abdal Musa

5. Abdal Murad

6. Abdal Mehmed

7. Dođlu Baba

de l'époque d'Orhan Beg

8. Postinpus Baba

de l'époque de Murad Beg

Exception faite de Şeyh Edebalı dont l'identité nous parait discutable, les autres font certainement partie des *Abdalan-i Rum*.

Il nous semble que, dans ce problème des *Abdalan-i Rum* ou dans celui du milieu soufi qui a joué un rôle de première importance dans la formation du beylicat ottoman, Şeyh Edebalı avec son disciple Kumral Abdal, Geyikli Baba et Abdal Musa, ont eu une place exceptionnelle; parce qu'ils sont les seuls personnages dont nous avons la possibilité de connaître les chaînes initiatiques grâce auxquelles nous pouvons identifier leurs ordres mystiques. Parmi ces

personnages, Şeyh Edebali jouit d'une importance particulière. C'est parce qu'il est l'homme-clé dans les relations des premiers *beg* ottomans, avec les *Akhis* et avec les *Abdalan-i Rum*.

Jusqu'à cette dernière décennie, Şeyh Edebali, le beau-père de Osman Beg, était connu par les chercheurs comme étant un grand chef *Akhi*, entouré d'une communauté d'*akhis*.⁴⁴ Mais depuis les années 1980, les travaux destinés à l'analyse d'une nouvelle source, jusque là mal connue, –il s'agit des *Menakibu'l-Kudsiyye* d'Elvan Çelebi, déjà cités– ont remis en question la personnalité et l'identité mystique de ce personnage mystérieux, mort à 120 ans. Cet ouvrage, bouleversant nos connaissances classiques sur la révolte des Baba'is, place Şeyh Edebali en plein milieu baba'i. Il cite son nom comme étant l'un des successeurs de Baba Ilyas, à côté d'un autre successeur, le célèbre, Hacı Bektaş-i Veli.⁴⁵

*Hacı Bektaş şol sebebden hiç
Göze almadi tac-i sultani
Edebali ve bundagi huddam
Gördiler Hacı'dan bu seyrani*

Ces vers très intéressants nous révèlent en même temps l'appartenance de Şeyh Edebali, en tant que successeur de Baba Ilyas, à l'Ordre Vefa'i, ordre mystique fondé au XI^e siècle en Iraq, par Tacu'l-'Arifin Seyyid Ebu'l-Vefa Bağdadi (1107).⁴⁶ De plus, le témoignage d'Elvan Çelebi, basé sur les traditions orales de la famille de Baba Ilyas, n'est pas seul. Nous avons un autre texte qui renforce l'appartenance de Şeyh Edebali à la Vefa'iyya. Il s'agit de la traduction turque, faite au XVI^e siècle, des *Menakib-i Tacu'l-Arifin Seyyid Ebu'l-Vefa* (l'original porte le titre suivant: *Tezkiretu'l-Muttakin ve Tabsiratu'l-Muktedin*),⁴⁷ rédigés au XIV^e siècle par un certain Şihabu'd-Din el-Vasiti. Voici le texte:

Bilgil ki Osman gazi tabe serahu Hazretleri'nin kavmi içinde Hazret-i Tacu'l-'Arifin Seyyid Ebu'l-Vefa kuddise sirruhu hulefasından bir 'aziz var idi. Şeyhu's-şuyuh Menba'u yenabi-i'l-fütuh Cami 'u'l-kelimat Havi'l-keramat... Hazret-i Şeyh Edebali dirlerd...

44. A propos de Şeyh Edebali, voir *Kitâb-i Cihan-nümâ* (Taeschner), v. I, p. 25-26; ORUC (Babinger), p. 8; AŞIKPAŞAZADE (Ali), p. 6; *Tevârîh-i Âl-i 'Oşmân* (Anonyme), Bibl. de l'Université d'Istanbul, manusc. turcs no 2438, f. 29b.; MECDİ, *Terceme-i Şakâyık*, p. 20; *Terceme-i Menâkıb-i Seyyid Ebi'l-Vefâ*, Bibl. Süleymaniye (Murad Buhari), no 257, f. 1a. En ce qui concerne la biographie donnée par *Terceme-i Şakâyık* à propos de Şeyh Edebali, nous sommes personnellement convaincus qu'elle est largement falsifiée, suivant l'idéologie religieuse de l'Empire ottoman de l'époque.

45. Cf. ELVAN ÇELEBI, p. 169.

46. Pour ce personnage très important –jusqu'à aujourd'hui mal connu et négligé– qui a une place très importante dans la formation du soufisme populaire turc du XIII^e et XIV^e siècles en Anatolie, voir OCAK, *La révolte*, p. 53-56.

47. Cf. *Terceme-i Menâkıb-i Seyyid Ebi'l-Vefâ*, p. 1.

Si nous croyons à l'authenticité de ces deux textes, il nous faudra accepter le résultat suivant: Şeyh Edebali est un cheik vefa'i issu du milieu baba'i.

En ce qui concerne l'identité *akhi* de Şeyh Edebali, tous les chercheurs, dont Fuad Köprülü, I. Hakki Uzunçarşılı, Ö. Lûtfi Barkan et leurs successeurs, se basant sur les témoignages des premières chroniques, ont admis cette identité.⁴⁸ Par exemple, selon le *Cihannüma* de Mehmed Neşri, Şeyh Edebali avait un frère nommé *Akhi Şemsu'd-Din* qui avait, lui aussi, un fils nommé *Akhi Hüseyin*.⁴⁹

Edebali didikleri 'azizin bir karındaşı var idi. Adına Ahi Şemsu'd-Din dirler idi. Anın dahi oğlu Akhi Hüseyin...

En s'appuyant probablement sur le *Cihannüma* Kemalpaşazade donne les mêmes renseignements dans ses *Tevarih-i Al-i Osman*.⁵⁰

Ces deux textes que nous venons de citer, posent évidemment le problème de l'identité ou de l'appartenance mystique de Şeyh Edebali. Une question paraît se poser: Est-ce qu'il était vraiment un cheik vefa'i issu du milieu baba'i, ou bien était-il un chef *akhi*? Ou était-il tous les deux à la fois? Vu que les textes des deux *menakib* sont formels, pourrions-nous admettre le fait que Şeyh Edebali faisait partie du milieu baba'i en tant qu'un cheik vefa'i? Du reste, si l'on analyse attentivement le texte de Mehmed Neşri, nous remarquons que le titre *akhi*, utilisé pour le frère et pour le neveu de Şeyh Edebali, ne s'applique pas à lui-même. S'il était vraiment un *akhi*, il faudrait que ses disciples Kumral Abdal (ou Kumral Dede) et Derviş Torud, eux aussi soient mentionnés dans les sources sous le nom d'*akhi*. Au contraire, ils sont cités avec des titres propres aux *Abdalan-i Rum*,⁵¹ qui ne sont absolument pas des appellations utilisés par les *Akhis*.

Personnellement, nous avons, pour le moment, tendance à penser que Şeyh Edebali devait être à la fois *Akhi* et cheik vefa'i. S'il avait vraiment cette double identité mystique, on peut supposer que c'est par l'intermédiaire de ce personnage important que les *Akhis* et les *Abdalan-i Rum* ont rendu service, en un certain sens, à 'Osman Beg, fondateur de l'Etat ottoman.

En ce qui concerne le fait qu'il était un cheik vefa'i, il n'est pas le seul représentant de cette identité mystique: nous avons un autre personnage contemporain qui avait la même identité que lui. Il s'agit du célèbre Geyikli Baba, venu avec ses disciples, à l'époque d'Orhan Beg, dans la région d'Inegöl, qui se présentait à ce *beg* ottoman tout comme Şeyh Edebali: "*Baba İlyas müridiyim Seyyid Ebu'l-Vefa tarikindenim*".⁵² Il eut, dans la région d'Inegöl et de

48. Voir par ex. İ. H. UZUNÇARŞILI, *Osmanlı Tarihi*, (Ankara 1972, 3^e éd.) v. I, p. 530, 560; BARKAN, *Kolonizatör Türk Dervişleri*, p. 288.

49. *Kitâb-i Cihan-nümâ* (Taeschner), v. I, p. 26; *Tevârîh-i Âl-i 'Oşman* (Anonyme), f. 29b; *Terceme-i Saķâyık*, p. 20.

50. Voir IBN KEMAL, v. I, p. 183, 189.

51. *Op. cit.*, p. 89-91, 94-95.

52. Cf., par ex., AŞIKPAŞAZADE (Ali), p. 46; LÂMÎ'İ ÇELEBÎ, p. 690; *Kitâb-i Cihan-nümâ* (Taeschner), v. I, p. 47, et les autres sources qui parlent de Geyikli Baba.

Bursa, de nombreux disciples qui sont cités dans les registres ottomans et dans les sources hagiographiques du XVI^e siècle sous le nom de *Geyiklü Baba Cema'ati* ou *Cema'at-i Geyiklü*.⁵³ A l'époque, il participait avec ses disciples, aux *gaza* et par cette occasion, il avait su se faire des disciples même parmi les dignitaires et les *gazi* ottomans, tels que Turgut Alp, vieux général de Osman Beg, dont l'histoire est racontée en détail dans les sources.⁵⁴

Quant au troisième personnage-clé, qui n'est autre que Abdal Musa dont l'analyse biographique nous permettra d'identifier l'origine du Bektachisme et sa liaison avec les *Abdalan-i Rum*, il est le seul personnage parmi eux dont l'origine nous est connue et sa légende hagiographique nous est parvenue.⁵⁵ Venu dans les territoires du beylicat ottoman à l'époque d'Orhan Beg, tout comme Geyikli Baba, lui et ses disciples, d'après les sources, ont participé aux différentes *gaza* contre les troupes byzantines.⁵⁶

Apparemment, il était originaire de Sulucakaraöyük, c'est-à-dire de la *zaviya* de Haci Bektaş-i Veli; il était le disciple de Hatun Ana.⁵⁷ Cela veut donc dire qu'il était attaché au culte de Haci Bektaş et qu'il en fut le porteur dans le beylicat ottoman. Autrement dit, il est le seul pionnier, historiquement connu, des vrais Bektachis du XIV^e siècle. C'est donc grâce à lui et à ses disciples que le culte de Haci Bektaş, à notre avis l'élément créateur le plus important du Bektachisme, a trouvé l'occasion de s'implanter et de se propager parmi les *Abdalan-i Rum*. C'est grâce à lui et à ses disciples que le culte de Haci Bektaş a pu survivre à côté du culte de Baba Ilyas, représenté par Şeyh Edebali et par Geyikli Baba, dans les territoires ottomans.

C'est justement dès cette époque qu'a commencé le processus de la formation du Bektachisme, dans une seule branche des *Abdalan-i Rum*, attachée au culte de Haci Bektaş qui a assimilé, au fur et à mesure, celui de Baba Ilyas, dans des conditions que nous ignorons encore complètement. Mais ce qui est curieux, c'est que cette branche ne s'appelait pas encore, à notre connaissance, "*Bektaşî*"; puisque l'un des textes où ce terme de *Bektaşî* a été utilisé pour la première fois, est celui de Aşıkpaşazade.⁵⁸ A notre avis, il est très probable que Abdal Musa et ses disciples aussi se soient dits Vefa'i, tout comme Şeyh Edebali et Geyikli Baba, étant donné que Haci Bektaş lui-même était un cheik vefa'i, en tant que

53. Cf. BARKAN, *Kolonizatör Türk Dervişleri*, p. 290; CEVDET TÜRKAY, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Aşiretler, Oymaklar ve Cemâatlar*, (Istanbul 1979) p. 373-374.

54. Cf., par ex., AŞIKPAŞAZADE (Ali), p. 46; LÂMÎ'İ ÇELEBÎ, *loc. cit.*; *Tevârîh-i Âl-i 'Oşmân* (Anonyme), f. 42b; İBN KEMÂL, v. II, p. 91.

55. Voir *Velâyetnâme-i Abdal Mūsā*, Bibl. privée de Bedri Noyan. Pour un^e édition non scientifique, voir *Abdal Musa Sultan ve Velâyet-nâmesi*, éd. ADIL ALI ATALAY, (Istanbul 1990, 2^e éd.).

56. Cf. par ex. un document d'archives édité par HILMI ZIYA (Ülken) dans son article intitulé *Anadolu'da dinî rûhiyat müşahedeleri: Geyikli Baba, Mihrab Mecmuası*, 13-14 (1340) p. 447.

57. AŞIKPAŞAZADE (Ali), p. 205.

58. Cf. *op. cit.*, *loc. cit.*

halife de Baba Ilyas, le grand Cheik Vefa'i du XIII^e siècle, en Anatolie.⁵⁹

Il ressort de tout ce que nous venons de dire jusqu'ici, qu'il y avait très probablement, au XIV^e siècle, deux cultes qui dominaient parmi les derviches Vefa'is venus dans les territoires du beylicat ottoman, en tant que représentant des *Abdalan-i Rum*.

Une autre question vient à l'esprit: N'y avait-il pas, à l'époque, d'autres groupes d'*Abdalan-i Rum* attachés aux autres ordres mystiques ou aux autres cultes? Par exemple, où se trouvaient les Yesevis, les Hayderis et les Kalenderis qui, selon les hypothèses de Fuad Köprülü, faisaient certainement partie des *Abdalan-i Rum*? A vrai dire, contrairement aux témoignages cités ci-dessus, prouvant l'existence de cheiks vefa'is dans les territoires ottomans à cette époque, on n'a rencontré jusqu'à présent aucun texte qui fasse allusion à l'existence des Yesevis et des Hayderis, si ce n'est des textes très courts à propos d'un certain Abdal Murad, Abdal Mehmed et Dođlu Baba, ayant vécu tous à l'époque d'Orhan Beg, et d'un certain Postinpus Baba de l'époque de Murad Beg.

Si l'on étudie de près ces textes, on verra que ces personnages, sont tous originaires de l'extérieur de l'Anatolie: soit de la Transoxiane, du *Khorassan* ou de l'Azerbaycan. Malgré le manque de renseignement précis quant à leur appartenance mystique, leurs surnoms et leurs accoutrements nous donnent l'impression qu'ils devaient être des Cheiks Yesevis ou Hayderis tous très proches les uns des autres du point de vue de l'identité mystique et de l'accoutrement extérieur. Du reste, nous avons quelques textes inclus dans le *Vilayetname* de Haci Bektaş-i Veli, rédigé dans le dernier quart du XV^e siècle, qui attestent l'existence de traditions yesevis et hayderis parmi certains groupes des *Abdalan-i Rum*.⁶⁰

Nous arrivons maintenant à un autre point essentiel de notre exposé: c'est le rapport qui nous paraît indéniable, de tous ces milieux mystiques qui font partie des *Abdalan-i Rum*, avec le mouvement kalenderi en Anatolie. Nous sommes personnellement convaincus que tous les problèmes et toutes les questions que nous venons de soulever tour à tour, c'est-à-dire, une grande majorité des mouvements socio-religieux, tels que la révolte des Baba'is, l'identité mystique des Vefa'is, des Hayderis et même des Yesevis, *alias* les *Abdalan-i Rum*, et enfin le processus de la formation du Bektachisme, dépendent directement de ce mouvement Kalenderi qui s'étend pendant une longue période allant du début du XIII^e jusqu'à la fin du XVI^e siècle en Anatolie. D'après les résultats des recherches que nous avons menées jusqu'à présent sur les *menakibname* dits bektachis, mais en réalité rédigés selon la tradition des *Abdalan-i Rum*, nous pouvons dire que les Vefa'is, y compris Haci Bektaş lui-même, les Hayderis et les

59. OCAK, *La révolte*, p. 53-56.

60. Voir *Manāḳib-i Hūnkār Haci Bektaş-ı Velî (Vilâyetnâme)*, éd. A. GÖLPINARLI, (Istanbul 1958) p. 9-13.

Yesevis présentait un caractère fortement influencé par le mouvement kalenderi. Autrement dit, ce grand mouvement soufi, né vers la fin du XI^e siècle en Asie Centrale et plus particulièrement en Iran, réorganisé au début du XIII^e siècle au Moyen Orient par Cemalu'd-Din-i Savi (1232-33),⁶¹ couvrait à l'époque, comme un parasol, tous ces groupes soufis mentionnés. Les données fournies par les *menakibname*, concernant les cheiks et les derviches rattachés à ces milieux soufis, renforcent notre hypothèse.⁶²

Cependant, il y a une chose que nous devons préciser, c'est que nous n'entendons pas, dans ce contexte, par le terme de "mouvement kalenderi", uniquement l'Ordre kalenderi qui existait sous ce nom depuis le XIII^e siècle, en Iran, en Asie Centrale et en Anatolie. Cet ordre mystique, n'est mentionné dans les sources ottomanes que vers le XVI^e siècle.⁶³

Ce mouvement kalenderi, très important du point de vue de toute l'histoire religieuse de l'Anatolie jusqu'à la fin du XVI^e siècle, n'a pas fait jusqu'à présent l'objet d'une étude quelconque détaillée, exception faite de certains passages importants de Fuad Köprülü et d'Abdülbaki Gölpınarlı, figurant dans leurs différents travaux. En ce qui concerne les études de Tahsin Yazıcı, elles couvrent plutôt l'époque classique de l'histoire de l'ordre kalenderi. Aujourd'hui, nous avons besoin d'une monographie détaillée sur l'histoire de ce mouvement en Anatolie, pour mieux comprendre les mouvements socio-religieux et les ordres mystiques hétérodoxes à l'époque seldjoukido-ottomane.

Quant à la dernière question de notre exposé qui est, à notre avis, très importante dans le cadre du problème des *Abdalan-i Rum*, c'est celle de l'adaptation de leur idéologie religieuse hétérodoxe, à celle du beylicat ottoman. N'oublions pas que cette idéologie a constitué, dans les années 1240, l'idéologie des Baba'is qui se sont révoltés contre le gouvernement seldjoukide d'Anatolie. Et à peu près 60 ans après cet événement, qui a dangereusement secoué l'état seldjoukide, cette idéologie a contribué à la naissance d'un autre état, l'état ottoman, un état sunnite par excellence.

Maintenant nous pouvons poser notre question: Comment et dans quelles conditions s'est réalisé cet événement? Nous pensons que la réponse à cette question se trouve dans l'analyse de ces deux idéologies religieuses qui se sont rencontrées dans un terrain où elles avaient besoin l'une de l'autre.

61. Sur Cemalu'd-Din-i Savi voir par ex. *Manâqib-i Camâl al-Dîn-i Sâvî*, éd. TAHSIN YAZICI, (Ankara 1972); TAHSIN YAZICI, *Kalenderler'e dair yeni bir eser, Necati Lûgal Armağanı*, (Ankara 1968) p. 785-797; IDEM, *Kalandariyya, EI²*.

62. Sur les données des *menakibname* dits bektachis, voir notre article cité dans la note 18.

63. Cf., par ex., *Geschichte Şultan Süleymân Kânûnîs von 1520 bis 1557 oder, CELÂLZÂDE MUŞTAFÂ, Tabakâtu'l-Memâlik ve Derecâr'ul-Mesâlik*, éd. PETRA KAPPERT, (Wiesbaden 1981) f. 348b; FAĞIRI, *Risâle-i Ta'rifât*, Bibl. de l'Univ. d'Istanbul, manusc. turcs, no 3051, f. 13b; NIŞÂNCI MEHMET PAŞA, *Târîh-i Nişâncî*, (Istanbul 1290) p. 237 sq. et les autres chroniques ottomanes de l'époque.

Il ne faut pas oublier, pour bien comprendre les conditions d'adaptation de ces deux idéologies, que d'une part l'Islam hétérodoxe des *Abdalan-i Rum* n'était pas à l'époque imprégné d'un Chiisme militant, comme il le fut au XVI^e siècle; d'autre part, l'Islam sunnite des *beg* ottomans n'était pas l'Islam dur et intolérant du XVI^e siècle. A cette époque, c'est-à-dire au XIV^e siècle, l'idéologie religieuse du beylicat ottoman reposait tout naturellement, en tant qu'un beylicat turcoman frontalier, sur une conception d'un Islam très simple, populaire, pas encore dominé par l'Islam dogmatique des *medrese*. Cette idéologie, comme l'ont déjà montré les recherches du Professeur Mélikoff, avait un caractère tolérant et souple qui convenait évidemment à la mentalité religieuse des *Abdalan-i Rum*.⁶⁴ Cette esprit de tolérance est particulièrement caractéristique de l'époque des premiers *beg* ottomans. Nous avons une preuve historique qui peut nous en donner une idée plus précise. Il s'agit d'un fait qui eut lieu entre Orhan Beg et Geyikli Baba et qui figure dans un document d'archives, déjà publié en 1924, par le regretté H. Ziya Ülken. D'après ce document, Orhan Beg aurait envoyé du vin et du *raki* à Geyikli Baba en recompense de ses contributions à la conquête de Kızılkilise, car Geyikli Baba et ses disciples étaient buveurs du vin.⁶⁵

En voici le texte:

Merhum Orhan Padişah, Baba mey-hordur deyü iki yük araki ve iki yük şarab gönderüb Baba dahi yanındaki Baba Sultan ile...

Cette attitude d'Orhan Beg qui n'aurait jamais été tolérée ni chez les sultans ni chez les *ulema* du XV^e et XVI^e siècles, est tout à fait compréhensible pour nous, si l'on connaît l'ambiance socio-culturelle et socio-religieuse d'un beylicat turcoman frontalier de l'époque. Du reste, nous avons des témoignages contemporains relatant des événements pareils qui se passaient également dans les autres beylicats turcomans d'Anatolie.

Nous avons essayé d'exposer la situation des milieux soufis dans les territoires ottomans à l'époque de la formation du Beylicat. En conclusion, nous pouvons dire que nous sommes personnellement convaincus que nous avons encore besoin de recherches et analyses plus approfondies, plus détaillées, pour mieux comprendre l'ambiance mystico-religieuse à l'époque où le beylicat ottoman a vu le jour.

64. Cf. MÉLIKOFF, Les Bektachis, p. 156-157.

65. Cf. le document d'archives cité par H. ZIYA (voir *supra* note 56).

THE TURKS IN EUROPE (1305-13) AND THE SERBS IN ASIA MINOR (1313)

Nicolas OIKONOMIDES

Modern historians have often deplored the fact that the Balkan Christians were unable to set aside their differences during the 14th century and create a common front that would have halted the Turkish onslaught. Moreover, the bitter struggle for supremacy in the Balkans at the time of Stephen Dushan, which coincided with a catastrophic Byzantine civil war, did not leave much scope for turning against the Turks.

Yet, already before the irresistible rise of the Ottomans, some emirates of Asia Minor, especially those of Menteshe and of Aydin, had wrought havoc all over the Aegean with naval raids. But it was even earlier, at the time of the Catalan company, that the European parts of the empire had their first taste of what was to come from the Turks. And for once, there was an effort not only to push these new invaders away from Europe but also to strike a blow at their bases in Asia Minor.

There had been previous attempts to push back the Turks. The emperor Andronikos II first tried Alan mercenaries against them, but without success. Then came the Catalans, who conducted very successful operations in Asia Minor during the summer of 1304. But immediately after their departure, the Turks captured Ephesos (October 1304). What is more, in the spring 1305, the Company broke with the Byzantines and embarked upon the great adventure that would lead to the capture of Athens six years later.

It was during the Catalan adventure that the Turks eventually crossed to Europe. The Byzantine historian Nikephoros Gregoras says that the Catalans, who were at Kallipolis, first invited 500 of them as allies from the opposite side (of the Dardanelles), i. e. from Asia Minor, and that many more volunteered their services.¹ In fact this second group also arrived in 1305. They did not ask for any money; all they wanted was to keep the booty that they would gain, giving only one fifth to the Catalans;² eight hundred horse and two thousand foot joined

1. GREGORAS, v. I, p. 228-229: διαπρεσβεύονται περί συμμαχίας πρὸς τοὺς ἀντιπέραις οἰκοῦντας τῶν Τούρκων καὶ λαμβάνουσι τότε μὲν πεντακοσίους ὄπλιτας... μετ' οὐ πολὺ δὲ καὶ ἑτέρους οὐκ ὀλίγους αὐτομόλους ἰόντας.

2. This is an interesting arrangement, apparently in accordance with the law of Islam,

the Company under this agreement.³ According to another Byzantine historian, George Pachymeres, they originally came from the clan of the Aydinoglu and were accompanied by many Greeks from Asia Minor.⁴ Later, after the battle of Apros (1307), they were joined by a corps of Christianised Tourkopouloi who had deserted the emperor. It is not impossible – but it cannot be demonstrated either – that some Ottomans had joined forces with them.⁵

These Turkish contingents stayed with the Company for quite some time and impressed Muntaner with their valour, loyalty and obedience, as well as with their efficiency in conducting looting expeditions in neighbouring – and not so neighbouring – regions. They also impressed the Greeks with their destructive raids, and with their desire to make permanent conquests so far away from home.

which stipulated that one fifth of the spoils of war should go to Allah, that is the State. Cf. MAJID KHADDURI, *War and Peace in the Law of Islam*, (Baltimore and London 1955) p. 120 ff. In this first phase, the Turks were simple auxiliaries and consequently they had to recognise that the Company was the “State” that employed them. But this practice was applied by other powers in the region: the very Christian Byzantine emperor also required one fifth of the booty gained by his soldiers; see PSEUDO-KODINOS, *Traité des offices*, ed. J. VERPEAUX, (Paris 1966) p. 251.

3. MUNTANER, *Crònica*, ch. 228, p. 75-77 = *The Chronicle of Muntaner*, transl. by LADY GOODENOUGH, II, (London 1921) p. 542-544. – Pachymeres calls the Turks “allies” (σύμμαχου), Gregoras “mercenary allies” (μισθοφορικὴν συμμαχίαν), but I think that Muntaner, who was an eyewitness, describes the agreement more accurately. According to PACHYMERES (1835), v. II, p. 572, there was an initial agreement giving the Turks half the booty, but the Catalans cheated and gave them only one third of it.

4. PACHYMERES (1835), v. II, p. 585: τῶν περὶ Ἀσίην Περωσῶν... ἐμῆξάντων καὶ Ῥωμαίων ἐξ Ἀνατολῆς... This is a noteworthy piece of information. The permanent conquest of Western Asia Minor by the Turks was then very recent: Ephesus had fallen not even one year before the events that we describe here (October 1304); and the fall of its hinterland could not by any means antedate the operations of Alexios Philanthropenos (1293-1295). The collaboration of the conquered populations with the Turks in operations directed against the Byzantine empire is significant in showing that an anti-Constantinopolitan ideology prevailed then in Asia Minor, an ideology which certainly facilitated the Turkish conquest and which, combined with a certain greed for booty, motivated the participation of Christians in overseas looting operations.

5. A persistent note of the Greek Short Chronicles places the first crossing of the Turks in the West (or in Europe, or in the “world”) in the year 6815 (= 1306/7); in some of them it is even mentioned that this was done by a son of Osman, named Süleyman, who remained as a governor for 21 years. See SCHREINER, *Kleinchroniken*, v. I, p. 451, 459, 461, 471, 493, 551, 571 and cf. v. II, p. 221-222. It is possible that we have here a confusion due to the fact that in 1307 the Turks advanced for the first time into western Thrace and Macedonia; and a confusion with events that followed the year 1347 (6855), when a Süleyman, son of sultan Orhan, eventually crossed to Europe as a supporter of Kantakouzenos and settled permanently on European soil waiting for the opportunity to conquer a strong point (which was to come with the capture of Tzympe and Kallipolis in 1352 and 1354).

Moreover, the Greek texts that we are going to examine in what follows, represent them as people attached to the principles of the Islamic religion and particularly motivated by the ideology of the *djihad*. This ideology, and the economic desire for booty, appear to be the main motives attracting the Turks to the service of any chieftain who conducted operations, mainly looting raids, against the infidel.

Thomas Magistros (the monk Theodoulos) describes how in 1308-1309 the Turks, then with the Catalans in Central Macedonia, sent ambassadors repeatedly with demands that the city (Thessalonica?) be delivered to them forthwith and that its inhabitants become their subjects; otherwise, they threatened to conquer the city and destroy it down to the foundations, to massacre the inhabitants, in particular those who resisted them, to take thousands of slaves, to loot everything, to destroy all agricultural production, to destroy all churches and houses, ports and graves, porticos and amphitheatres, among other frightful things.⁶ I believe that the rhetoric of Thomas Magistros accurately describes the Turkish proposals. According to a tenet of Islamic Law, the Turks, before launching their attack on the city, proposed surrender to the inhabitants and status as *zimmi* in return for security in their "blood and property". As these inhabitants were Christians, there could be no question of demanding their conversion to Islam.⁷ If this invitation, which had normally to be repeated three times, was ignored, then the Muslim army was allowed to show no mercy to the enemy: according to the usual Turkish tactics, this attack would start with the destruction of the countryside and the isolation of the city; then, when the city was taken, the conquerors would feel free to kill whoever they wanted, to seize all that they would find, to carry off the entire population into slavery, to destroy all buildings that they deemed necessary for destruction. It is clear that the Turks, although auxiliaries of the Catalans, were planning their own conquests, to be made in the name of Islam, and that in the process they obeyed the precepts of Islamic Law while fulfilling their obligation as Muslims to conduct the *djihad*. This was in 1308-1309.

Eventually the Turks parted company with the Catalans. According to Gregoras, this would have happened before the company crossed into Thessaly (1309); according to Muntaner⁸ and, most importantly, to Marino Sanudo, who was

6. Letter of Thomas Magistros to the monk Joseph concerning the attack of the Italians (= Catalans) and of the Persians (= Turks), in *PG*, v. 145, c. 444-445: (the Turks) κήρυκας τινας ἡμῖν ἐκπέμπουσιν ὁσημέραι... δεινότατα πάντων αἰτουῦντας· κἄν μὴ τὰ βουλευόμενα πέρας ὡς τάχιστα σχῆ (τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ἐκόντας ὄντας παραδεδοκῆναι σφίσι τὴν πόλιν καὶ μετὰ τῶν ὑποτεταγμένων φέρεσθαι), ἀτόπους τινὰς ἀπειλοῦσαι πορθήσεις καὶ κατασκαφὰς γῆς, καὶ πόλεως ἀναστάσεις ἐκ βάρθρων, καὶ τῶν ἐνοικούντων ὄλεθρον, καὶ δάκρυα καὶ σφαγὰς καὶ αἷμα καὶ φόνον, καὶ αἰχμαλώτους μυρίους, καὶ τραύματα τῶν ἀνθισταμένων, καὶ ἀπολωλότας ὑπὲρ τὸ πλῆθος, καὶ ἀγωγὴν σκυλευμάτων, καὶ καρπῶν ἀπάντων φθοράν, καὶ νεῶν καὶ οἰκῶν, καὶ λιμένων καὶ τάφων, καὶ στοῶν καὶ θεάτρων· καὶ πάνθ' ὁμοῦ τὰ φρικώδη.

7. KHADDURI, *War and Peace*, p. 96.

8. MUNTANER, *Crònica*, ch. 241, p. 109 = *The Chronicle*, p. 578. Muntaner describes

then serving at Negroponte, the parting of the ways took place after the victory of the Catalans over the duke of Athens on 15 March 1311. Jacoby has convincingly shown that this last date is the correct one.⁹ The testimony of another contemporary, Thomas Magistros, leads to the same conclusion. He describes how, after this victory, the Turks refused all lands and took only the movable part of the booty, especially all pieces of armour and all horses – which, taking into consideration the extent of the Frankish defeat of 1311, must have added up to objects of considerable value.¹⁰

It seems that new business was then opening up. According to an obscure passage of Thomas Magistros, the Serbian kral Stephen Milutin was making preparations against Byzantium and for that reason he wanted to take the unemployed Turks into his service. The Byzantine general Chandrenos, who had successfully pushed the Company and its Turkish allies towards Thessaly and Southern Greece, opposed this arrangement as much as he could and with successful stratagems managed “to kill many enemies and to put to flight the others, with insignificant losses on his part”.¹¹

The subsequent fate of the Turks is known from Gregoras.¹² The Tourkopouloi deserters, 1,000 horse and 500 foot strong, under the command of Melik, submitted to the Serbian kral, gave up their armament and became farmers, with the promise to serve as reservists when asked to do so. It seems that this arrangement did not proceed smoothly, since Serbian sources inform us that in order to subdue them, Milutin had to crush them in battle and then disperse them inside his state.¹³

how the Turks refused to stay in Attica although they had been promised lands by the victorious Company. Had they accepted that offer, however, they would have had to submit to a Christian state.

9. D. JACOBY, *Catalans, Turcs et Vénitiens en Roumanie (1305-1332): un Nouveau Témoignage de Marino Sanudo Torsello*, *StuMe*, ser. iii, 15/1 (1974) 230-234.

10. *PG*, v. 145, c. 364: Οἱ μὲν ἐκ Σικελίας ὀρμώμενοι τὰς πόλεις ἐλόντες ... ἵπποι δὲ καὶ δπλα καὶ πᾶσά τις πρὸς μάχην παρασκευὴ Πέρσαις ἦν. GREGORAS, v. I, p. 248-249, also insists on the friendly sharing of the “movable” booty between Catalans and Turks when they parted company (αἰχμαλώτους... λάφυρα).

11. *PG*, v. 145, c. 364: Τοῦ δὲ Τριβαλλῶν ἄρχοντος τὰ πρὸς Ῥωμαίους ἠθετηκότος, (Milutin was the son-in-law of the Byzantine emperor, but at that time he was still involved in the anti-Byzantine alliance led by Charles de Valois) καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τοὺς μὲν Πέρσαις ὑποποιήσασθαι (the edition has *περὶ ὑποκίσασθαι* which makes no sense; it should be corrected into *ὑποποιήσασθαι* or *παραποιήσασθαι*) πειρωμένους, τῶν δ' ἡμετέρων ἦκιστ' ἐόντων (ἐπὶ γὰρ ἡμῶν ἐπειράτο), δπλων ἐδέησε καὶ χειρῶν... Χανδρηνός, τοῦτο μὲν στρατηγικαῖς ἐπινοίαις, τοῦτο δὲ χειρῶν εὐψυχία καὶ τόλμη... τῶν μὲν οἰκείων μηδὲν ἀποβεβληκώς, τῶν δὲ πολεμίων τοὺς μὲν πλείους διειργασμένους, τραυματίας δὲ καὶ φυγάδας τοὺς λοιποὺς εἰργασμένους.

12. GREGORAS, v. I, p. 254-258.

13. See for example the Life of Stephen Milutin by Danilo: a victory of the kral over the “Persians and the Agarenes”: ARHIEPIKOP DANILO, *Životi kraljeva i arhiepiskopa Srpskih*, ed. N. RADOJČIĆ, (Beograd 1935) p. 107-110. Cf. DÖLGER, *Regesten*, v. IV, no

The rest, 1,300 horse and 800 foot, under the command of Halil (Halil Edje in the Turkish sources¹⁴) struck a deal with the Byzantines: they promised to leave them in peace if the Byzantines allowed them to cross the passes of Christoupolis (Kavalla) and provided them with the ships necessary to carry them, together with their booty, to Asia Minor. But when they arrived at Kallipolis, the Byzantine military changed their mind and a confrontation ensued. The Turks occupied a fortress and used it as their base, brought in some reinforcements from Asia Minor, and won a major victory over a Byzantine army led by emperor Michael IX, capturing many distinguished prisoners as well as the emperor's tent with even his crown. This must have occurred in late summer 1311.

From then on, for a period that lasted not quite two years, the Turks laid waste the whole of Thrace, to the point that the Byzantines, shut inside the fortified cities, were no longer able to cultivate or sow their fields.¹⁵ The situation was becoming desperate for the Byzantine government, the more so now that the Turks were entrenched on European soil, their number constantly increased by the addition of volunteers attracted by booty as well as by desire to participate in the holy war. This is how the recruitment of the Turks is described by the Byzantine emperor in a chrysobull of 1313: "Numerous were their compatriots who came to join them again and again, the ones being added to the others, and larger numbers came to be added to the numerous ones that were already there, and their power increased much; and this was bad, because our forces were not yet organised to face them. They could not be contained by any means..."¹⁶

Moreover, the Turks were known to be efficient and highly motivated soldiers, in their desire for material as well as for spiritual gains. Thomas Magistros describes them as being particularly ferocious warriors, who took pleasure in killing; he dwells on their unlimited greed and on their readiness to die in order to protect not only their own possessions but also (and especially) to grab someone else's goods. "In truth they find that it is very dishonourable for them not to die in war, not to have the frenzy of war operated over their bodies¹⁷; this is something that

2344 (a Byzantine embassy of congratulation for this event is dated towards the end of 1312). Danilo was then hegoumenos of the Chilandar monastery and wrote Milutin's Life before he became Archbishop of Serbia (14 September 1324), most probably in the early 1320s: G. L. MCDANIEL, *The Lives of the Serbian Kings and Archbishops by Danilo II: Textual History and Criticism*, unpublished doctoral dissertation submitted at the University of Washington in 1980, p. 136-137. Cf. also *infra*.

14. WITTEK, Yazıcioglu, p. 662-3.

15. GREGORAS, v. I, p. 262: ὡς μήτε ἀροτριᾶν, μήτε σπείρειν τῶν πόλεων ἐξιόντας δύνασθαι Ῥωμαίους ἐφ' ὅλοις ἔτεσι παρὰ βραχὺ δυσεῖ. This phrase, taken literally, would mean that the Turks started their raids after the harvest of the fields (July), but before their sowing for the year to come (autumn).

16. Actes de Chilandar I. Actes grecs, ed. L. PETIT, in *VV*, 17 (1911), Priloženie 1, no 26, l. 22-27 = DÖLGER, *Regesten*, no 2348.

17. The phrase is obscure. It seems to refer to specific rites reserved to those who fall

they often say to each other as an insult.”¹⁸ This is an obvious reference to the ideology of the *djihad* and to the individual desire to obtain a martyr’s death while fighting the infidel.

They also impressed the Byzantines with their customs and rituals. When, in the spring of 1313, one raiding party had been intercepted by the Byzantine army, the Turks used the wagons transporting the booty to create a “fortified camp” in the well known manner of the nomads. In Gregoras’ description it is added that afterwards the Turks threw dust on their heads, raised their hands to heaven (in prayer, presumably) and then took up their weapons to fight.¹⁹ These rituals may reflect a Shiite mentality²⁰ of constant mourning.²¹

All this happened at a time when the anti-Byzantine alliance of Charles of Valois had fallen apart. The Byzantine emperor asked for military assistance from his son-in-law, the kral Stephen Milutin, with whom relations had ostensibly been restored in the meantime, and who had already subdued the Turks who took refuge in his state. A Serbian cavalry corps, 2,000 strong, came to support the Byzantines, who had already won a first victory over the Turks and had forced them to retreat to their fortified refuge on the Kallipolis peninsula. Byzantine and Genoese ships completed the blockade by cutting off communication by sea. Thus the Turks, after some unsuccessful attempts to break free, decided to surrender to the Genoese in the hope that they would not be as harsh to them, since they had not suffered at their hands. But in the night, many by mistake fell into the hands of the Byzantines, who slaughtered them and took all their posses-

in war as martyrs. But this is not a regular Muslim practice, at least as far as I have managed to find in KHADDURI, *War and peace*, p. 62: the martyrs of the *djihad* must be buried where they fell without being brought to a mosque in order to be washed. One may wonder whether this is not a reminiscence of customs of Central Asia, where frenzied ceremonies, including horse races, banquets, dances, etc., were performed at funerals: see J.-P. ROUX, *La mort chez les peuples altaïques anciens et médiévaux*, (Paris 1963) p. 166, 168.

18. *PG*, v. 145, c. 441: καὶ τοῦτοις ὡς ἀληθῶς εἰς αἰσχιστον πίπτει τὸ μὴ πολέμῳ τεθνάναι, μηδὲ τὰ κείνου βακχεῖα τοῖς σώμασι τελεσθῆναι· καὶ τις ἤδη τοῦτο πολλάκις ἐτέρῳ εἰς ὄνειδος προὔτεινεν.

19. GREGORAS, v. I, p. 266: πρῶτα μὲν τὰς ἀμάξας κατὰ κύκλον στήσαντες... ἔπειτα κόνιν χεῖρα μὲν κατὰ κεφαλῆς καὶ χεῖρας πρὸς οὐρανὸν ἀνατείναντες ἀνελάβοντο τὰ ὄπλα.

20. Is it noteworthy that in the year 1313 (AH 713) the Islamic month of Moharrem started on the 28th of April. The first decade of Moharrem is the period of remembrance par excellence for the Shiites. – Be that as it may, it has already been remarked that the Aydinoglus were Shiite: ZACHARIADOU, *Trade and Crusade*, p. 206, note 774.

21. The gesture of throwing dust on one’s head may also be seen as expression of celebration, or at least as a gesture performed before addressing God. This can be seen from a passage of the Memoirs of John Kantakouzenos: Umur Aydinoglu unexpectedly learned from an embassy that his dear friend John Kantakouzenos, whom he thought dead, was alive and well; immediately, “he threw dust on his head and expressed many thanks to God for these news” (κόνιν μὲν κατεχέατο τῆς κεφαλῆς καὶ Θεῷ πολλὰς ὠμολόγει χάριτας τῆς ἀγγελίας): see CANTACUZENUS, v. II, p. 384.

sions. Only some of the Turks who went to the Genoese galleys survived: the Genoese executed only those carrying many valuables (because they wanted to hide the existence of these valuables, which could be claimed by the Byzantines); the others they sold as slaves for their own profit.

This was a major victory and the court poet, Manuel Philes, wrote a poem addressed "to the emperor, when the barbarians were destroyed by our men in Aigos Potamoi and in Syke."²² Aigos Potamoi, to-day's Cimaliköy on the Kallipolis peninsula,²³ seems to have been the place of the Turkish defeat and massacre. Syke undoubtedly refers to Galata, opposite to Constantinople, where the Genoese would have delivered their prisoners to the emperor and where a second massacre seems to have taken place. Philes describes how Thrace was filled with the corpses of these barbarians who "came from the west", how this would be a lesson to the other barbarians, and how the emperor attributed this success to the help of the Virgin.²⁴

The poem of Philes concludes with a prayer to the Virgin on behalf of the emperor, in which he mentions a "successful attack in the ocean" conducted with the help of the Christians in order to sweep away any nation that foolishly ignores the Son of the Virgin.²⁵ This seems to be a reference to a naval expedition that was then in preparation.

And indeed a naval expedition there was. It is not mentioned by Nikephoros Gregoras, and his silence has caused historians to dismiss the information from other sources as exaggeration.²⁶ But these sources, Serbian, Greek and Turkish, are very reliable:

1. *Serbian sources*, i.e. (a) The biography of the Serbian Kral Stephen Milutin by Archbishop Danilo, to which we referred already,²⁷ and (b) the preface of a chrysobull of Milutin granting to the monastery of Chilandar on Mount Athos the village of Uljare.²⁸ This document has been considered by some specialists to be a forgery produced after the battle of Kossovo (1389). Both sources have been compared and analysed by I. Dujčev.²⁹

22. MANUELIS PHILAE, *Carmina*, ed. E. MILLER, v. I, (Paris 1855) p. 220-225: εἰς τὸν βασιλέα, ὅτε οἱ ἐν Αἰγὸς Ποταμοῖς καὶ ἐν τῇ Συκῇ βάρβαροι παρὰ τῶν ἡμετέρων ἀπώλοντο.

23. PAULI-WISSOWA, *Real-Encyklopaedie* 1, 1894, 977.

24. This information completely agrees with Nikephoros Gregoras, who describes how Andronikos II, in his despair, had concluded that only divine help would allow him to get rid of these enemies.

25. MANUELIS PHILAE, v. I, p. 225: ἕως μετ' αὐτῶν ὑπὸ σοὶ τῶν φιλάτων, εἰς ὠκεανὸν εὐτυχῶς ἐπιδράμη· ὡς ἂν δι' αὐτοῦ πᾶν κατακλύσης γένος, ὃ τὸν σὸν ἠθέτησεν ἀφρόνως τόκον.

26. LAIOU, *Andronicus II*, p. 232-233.

27. Life of Stephen Milutin by Danilo: fighting the Turks in Asia Minor under the command of Novak Grebostrek: DANILO, *supra* note 13, p. 110-112.

28. Text easily available in Actes de Chilandar 2. Actes Slaves, ed. B. KORABLEV, *VV*, 19 (1915) Priloženie 1, no 18, esp. p. 432 ff.

29. I. DUJČEV, *La conquête turque et la prise de Constantinople dans la littérature*

2. *Greek sources*, i.e. two prefaces to chrysobulls of the emperor Andronikos II Palaiologos. (a) The first was issued in October 1313: to show his gratitude to the Serbian kral who had helped him against the Turks (the story is detailed in the preface), the emperor accedes to his request and gives the village of Koutzi in the Strymon to the Serbian monastery of Chilandar.³⁰ (b) The second chrysobull was issued in July 1317: for the same reasons (and with a similar preface) the emperor confirms all possessions of the monastery of Chilandar.³¹

3. *Turkish source*. The poet Enveri, who glorified the feats of Umur pasha of Aydin, speaks at the beginning of his epos of how Mehmed Aydinoglu, the founder of the dynasty, came to western Asia Minor as a lieutenant of Sasa beg, and how he conquered on his behalf the cities of Ayasoluq (Ephesos) and Keles (Kaloe). He then mentions an attack of the joint forces of Alans (Byzantine mercenaries whom we have already met), Greeks and Serbs, who came from the sea and who were finally repelled by the Aydinoglu and their army. At this moment there was also a quarrel between the Aydinoglu and Sasa, who sided with the Christians and was killed.³² These events are placed between the arrival of the Aydinoglu in the region (1304, fall of Ephesos) and the distribution of the emirate by Mehmed Aydinoglu to his sons (1320's).³³

According to these sources the events may be reconstructed as follows.

After Halil Edje and his men were annihilated, a second Serbian elite cavalry contingent arrived in Herakleia (Eregli), under the command of the nobleman Novak Grebostrek. That this was a second contingent is clearly stated in Serbian and in Greek sources (σύμμαχος αὐθις ἑτέρα δύναμις οὐκ ἀγεννής). As there was no longer any enemy in Thrace, an expedition against the country of the Turks was organised, obviously the country whence the troops of Halil Edje mainly came, the land of Aydin. What happened there cannot be determined, since both sides, the Serbs and the Turks, claimed victory. The Byzantine emperor alone does not speak of any military triumph, probably because the results of this expedition fell short of his expectations.

That the expeditionary force won a battle against the Turks and looted their territory, as the Serbian sources claim, seems probable. The pressure on the Turks must have been strong enough to convince one of them, Sasa, to side with the Christians, in spite of the fact that he was a true believer in Islam, as Enveri stresses. But the expedition soon lost steam and finally left the land of Aydin without making any permanent gains – a fact that entitled the Aydinoglu to claim victory for their side.

slave contemporaine, *BSI*, 16 (1955) 318-326 (with complete bibliography and indication of other Serbian sources).

30. Actes de Chilandar I, no 26 = DÖLGER, *Regesten*, no 2348.

31. Actes de Chilandar I, no 32 = DÖLGER, *Regesten*, no 2390.

32. On the poorly known personality of Sasa see ZACHARIADOU, *Trade and Crusade*, p. 107-108.

33. MÉLIKOFF, *Destan*, p. 47-48; cf. LEMERLE, *Aydin*, p. 25 ff.

The chronology of these events is not open to doubt. The Turkish defeat started "almost two years after 1311" and was completed before October 1313 (the first Byzantine chrysobull). Moreover, two independent and very reliable Serbian sources, a manuscript colophon and an inscription from Nagoričino, state clearly that 1312/13 was the year in which the Serbian kral was victorious over the Turks.³⁴ Gregoras states that Halil's defeat occurred the year before the deposition of patriarch Niphon (11 April 1314),³⁵ that is in 1313. And a Greek Short Chronicle places [the destruction] of Halil in the year 1312/13.³⁶

An improvised overseas expedition? This is, I believe, precisely what happened. The Serbian cavalry was feudal in character, which meant that they had a contractual obligation towards their kral to serve him abroad for a limited number of days each year, after which the lord would have to pay them a salary if he wanted to keep them on campaign any further. The first Serbian contingent arrived in time to participate in the siege and annihilation of Halil Edje and his men, and to share in the spoils taken from them. But the second contingent, which obviously was dispatched in order to replace the first one (presumably neither the Serbian kral, nor the Byzantine emperor were willing to pay salaries³⁷) arrived after all was over. As this was a fresh army that joined the already mobilised Byzantines, with ships ready and available from the previous operation, an expedition may have been improvised against the territory of the enemies, the Turks of Aydin, whose morale could not but be shaken by the news of Halil Edje's disaster. This could simply have been a punitive attack, aimed, among other things, at booty. Or it could have been an attempt to test the Turkish defences in Western Asia Minor, which, as the Catalan expedition had shown in 1304, were not all that impregnable.

And so the operation was launched, made up of the Serbs, the Greeks and the Alan mercenaries. At first came success – looting and divisions among the Turks. But the resistance of the latter did not collapse; on the contrary it seems to have stiffened on the part of the Aydinöglü. Time passed, and the Serbians had to return home; for their part, the Byzantines obviously did not feel that they were in a position to hold by themselves the bridgehead that the allied army had created. So they all left, without any permanent results. This temporary, essentially piratical, character of the operation may explain why it is not even mentioned by the historian Nikephoros Gregoras.

There were, however, permanent results on the Turkish side. The competition between the Aydinöglü and Sasa, which may well have started before 1312-13³⁸

34. Cf. DUJČEV, *loc. cit.*

35. GREGORAS, v. I, p. 269.

36. SCHREINER, *Kleinchroniken*, v. I, p. 194, cf. v. II, p. 224-225.

37. The Byzantine treasury was then in dire straits; see GREGORAS, v. I, p. 263.

38. An inscription of the *Ulu Djami* of Birgi declares that the city was conquered by Mehmed Aydinöglü in 1307 (it is not said whether he was then acting on his own or as the lieutenant of Sasa) and that he constructed the mosque in the year 712 H (May 1312-May

was then exacerbated.³⁹ But the Christians abandoned their ally, Sasa, who ended up being killed as a traitor to the cause of Islam, probably in late 1313 or some time later. Henceforth, the Aydinoglu would reign unopposed. Curiously enough, this Byzantino-Serbian expedition resulted in reinforcing the position of the very enemy against whom it was directed.

1313); consequently in this last date he certainly acted as an independent lord. See P. WITTEK, *Inscriptions from Southwestern Anatolia*, *Art Studies*, 1931, p. 198-199.

39. See MÉLIKOFF, *Destan*, p. 47-48: Enveri stresses that Sasa sided with the Christians because he was "plein d'envie".

**FROM NIŠ TO KOSOVO POLJE.
REFLECTIONS ON MURĀD I'S FINAL YEARS***

Stephen W. REINERT

Those competent to judge generally claim that the Ottomans indeed defeated the combined Serbian and Bosnian forces on June 15, 1389, at the first battle of Kosovo Polje. It was not, however, a perfect victory. The Ottomans suffered considerable losses, and their leader, sultan Murād I, was killed in the context of the battle. The latter development was decisive in preventing the Ottomans from regrouping and continuing their advance, since the expectation of anti-Ottoman reactions in Anatolia forced the new sultan, Yıldırım Bāyazīd, to withdraw from the udj and return to Edirne. Throughout the ensuing three years he was occupied in Anatolia, preserving and expanding upon his father's hegemonist legacy. Meanwhile, in Serbia, Murād's key antagonists soon accepted vassalage – the surviving Lazarevići by mid- 1390, and Vuk Branković by late November 1392. Thus, by the time Bāyazīd turned his attention back to Rumili late in 1392, the military victory of June 15, 1389 had reached the logical, perhaps inevitable political conclusion that Murād had intended.¹

Such is the current *consensio opinionum* on the “meaning of Kosovo”, i.e., as an episode in Balkan history. Historians still disagree, however, on the sequence and character of the events which led to that battle – specifically, the developments between Murād I's initial encounters with knez Lazar in 1386, and the sultan's fateful journey to Kosovo Polje in the spring of 1389.² To a large

* I thank George Dennis, Bariša Krekić, Anthony Luttrell, and especially Elizabeth Zachariadou for the help and advice they so generously gave while I was researching and writing this paper. The results, whatever their worth, I dedicate to the memory of Laskarina Bouras. She thoroughly enjoyed the puzzles of texts, monuments and objects. More importantly, she succeeded, better than most, in finding the right answers.

1. For a recent assessment, with references to earlier interpretations, see T. EMMERT, *The Battle of Kosovo: Early Reports of Victory and Defeat*, in: *Kosovo, Legacy of a Medieval Battle*, ed. W. VUCINICH and T. EMMERT, (Minneapolis 1991) p. 19-40, esp. p. 34-35.

2. See, for example, the discrepancies in the most reputable accounts of the past decade: A. BOMBACI, in: A. BOMBACI and S. SHAW, *L'Impero ottomano*, (Turin 1981) p. 260; R. MIHALJČIĆ, *Kosovska Bitka, Istorija srpskog naroda*, v. 2, *Doba borbi za očuvanje*

degree, these disagreements reflect how scholars have variously accepted, rejected or modified Neshrī's account of events – arguably the most significant narrative on this interval, and one substantially unparalleled in the anterior or contemporary Turkish and Greek histories. The net effect, of course, is lingering confusion over a major problem in Balkan and Ottoman history, namely the causality of Kosovo, as well as Murād's itinerary and concerns in his final years.

In this paper, I propose to examine afresh the evidence on these themes, using Neshrī's account as the focal point. I shall approach the task in four steps. First I shall summarize the key episodes in Neshrī's narrative, focusing in particular on his view of the interconnectedness of events – the chain of cause and effect – between Murād and knez Lazar's initial encounter at Niš, and their mutual demise at the first battle of Kosovo Polje. Next I shall review the evidence for Murād's itinerary and concerns during this interval on the basis of salient external (and hence primarily non-Ottoman) sources. Thereafter, I shall compare the latter with the former, assessing the overall integrity of Neshrī's account. In conclusion, I shall set forth what hopefully may be regarded as a plausible chronology of events between the conquest of Niš and the first battle of Kosovo Polje.

I. Neshrī's conception of events

I shall not, at this juncture, provide a complete synopsis of Neshrī's narrative from Murād's conquest of Niš to his death at Kosovo Polje. My intent, rather, is to underscore those episodes which the author considered significant, as well as interconnected, in this closing phase of the sultan's life. Reduced to their bare

obnovu države (1371-1537), ed. J. KALIĆ et al., (Beograd 1982) p. 42-44, and further in IDEM, *Lazar Hrebeljanović. Istorija, Kult, Predanje*, (Beograd 1984) p. 115-117; J. FINE, *The Late Medieval Balkans, A Critical Survey from the Late Twelfth Century to the Ottoman Conquest*, (Ann Arbor 1987) p. 407-408; C. MATANOV, in: C. MATANOV and R. MIKHNEVA, *Ot Galipoli do Lepanto. Balkanite, Evropa i Osmanskoto Našestvie (1354-1571)*, (Sofia 1988) p. 79-81; H. INALCIK, *The Ottoman Turks and the Crusades, 1329-1451*, in: gen. ed. K. SETTON, *A History of the Crusades*, v. 7, ed. H. HAZARD and N. ZACOUR, *The Impact of the Crusades on Europe*, (Madison 1989) p. 246-247; T. EMMERT, *Serbian Golgotha. Kosovo 1389*, (New York 1990) p. 39-40; C. IMBER, *The Ottoman Empire, 1300-1481*, (Istanbul 1990) p. 27-28 and 35-36; and S. ČIRKOVIĆ, *Serbia on the Eve of the Battle of Kosovo*, in: W. VUCINICH and T. EMMERT, *Kosovo, Legacy of a Medieval Battle*, p. 10-14. Since my objective here is not to analyze the historiography of the problem (an intriguing task in itself), I shall not enumerate the discrepancies in these accounts, or those which precede. In any event, I consider it more important to return to the primary sources, variously examining and reconsidering what they have to tell us.

3. The versions of Neshrī I cite are the edition of F. UNAT and M. KÖYMEN (Ankara 1949), and J. LEUNCLAVIUS, *Historiae musulmanae turcorum de monumentis ipsorum exscriptae, libri xviii*, (Frankfurt 1591), henceforth LEUNCLAVIUS. I have limited my

essence, and ignoring extraneous themes, these may be summarized as follows:³

1. *The Conquest of Niš*. In 787 A.H., Murād concluded his Serbian operations by subjecting Niš, at which point knez Lazar agreed to provide an annual contingent of troops, along with tribute in silver. Then, after conquering several Thracian castles, the sultan returned to Edirne, where he learned of Karamañoğlu Alaeddin Beg's attacks on Ottoman territory. Leaving his vizier Djandarlı Hayreddin in Rumili, Murād returned to Bursa, where he wintered.⁴

2. *The Campaign in Karaman*. In the spring of 788 A.H., Murād campaigned in Karaman, but without Hayreddin, who recently had died. After imposing his will on Alaeddin, Murād returned to Bursa. Moreover he did not return to Rumili until the following late winter or early spring.⁵

3. *The Treachery of Lazar, Tvrtko, and Djuradj*. In the Balkans, meanwhile, a sequence of developments unfolded which ultimately would compel Murād to confront the Slavic princes yet again. First of all, when the Serbs who had fought with Murād in Karaman returned home, their commander urged Lazar to break his ties with the Ottomans. Impressed by these urgings, Lazar indeed renounced his vassalage and thereupon formed an alliance with Tvrtko of Bosnia. Subsequently, Neshrī implies, the "*tekvur-i İskenderiyye*" journeyed to Murād, offering to secure Bosnia for the Ottomans if the sultan would send a commander and troops. This "lord of Scutari" may confidently be identified as Djuradj II Stracimirović Balšić. Trusting Djuradj, Murād dispatched "Lala Shahin" to Bosnia with a small force. The latter could not have been Murād's tutor, the first beylerbeyi of Rumili, since the latter died prior to the Karamanian campaign. Presumably he was a regional commander – according to İnalçık, possibly the *subaşı* of Leskovac, whose actual name was "Kavala" or "Kefalia" Shahin.⁶ In any event, when Shahin arrived in Bosnia, he was ambushed by a force of 30,000 – the scheming, Neshrī indicates, of Djuradj, Tvrtko and Lazar. Against Shahin's advice, the Ottomans fought a battle, suffering terrible losses. Shahin, however, managed to escape and presumably conveyed the bad news to Murād. Although Neshrī clearly

to these because Leunclavius, and later the Vienna manuscript (on which the Unat-Köymen edition is based), were the means by which western scholars knew Neshrī well into the present century.

4. *Kitâb-i Cihan-nümâ*, v. I, p. 211.11/214.11; LEUNCLAVIUS, p. 239.43-244.55. In recounting Lazar's itinerary and activities from Niš to Edirne, Neshrī has returned to the appropriate point in 'Ăşıqpaşazâde, chapters 54 and 55, which he now incorporates: AŞIKPAŞAZADE (Giese), p. 55-56. These conquests, however, are incidental to the sequence leading to Kosovo and hence may be ignored.

5. *Kitâb-i Cihan-nümâ*, v. I, p. 214.12/234.8; LEUNCLAVIUS, p. 244.55-258.40.

6. H. İNALCIK, *El*², s.v. "Arnawutluk", where he identifies Shahin as "Kefalia Shāhin (in Turkish chronicles Kavala Shāhin, later Shihāb al-Dīn Shāhin Pasha), an *udj-beği* and probably *subaşı* of Liaskovik..." On Shahin's activities earlier in the 1380s, and later in 1394 (by which time he controlled Scutari), see E. ZACHARIADOU, Marginalia on the History of Epirus and Albania (1380-1418), *WZKM*, 78 (1988) 200, 206.

envisions the three Slavic princes as collectively responsible for Shahin's entrapment, he does not specify whether they jointly conspired before Djuradj visited Murād, or if Lazar and Tvrtko merely assisted Djuradj once he had managed to lure an Ottoman force to Bosnia.⁷

4. *Murād's Mobilization for Vengeance, and the Bulgarian Revolt.* Apprised of Lazar, Tvrtko and Djuradj's treachery, Murād resolved to mount a retaliatory campaign, striking first at knez Lazar. General preparations were ordered, but it soon became evident that two vassal princes were refusing their summons, namely "Sosmanoz" (i.e., Šišman, the Bulgarian tsar) and "Dobrudja-oglı" (evidently Ivanko, the son of Dobrotitsa). Murād now resolved to confront the Bulgarian princes before proceeding to Serbia, and hence he directed the army to Bulgaria, under the command of 'Alī Paşa, Hayreddin's son and successor as vizier. The sultan himself proceeded to Edirne, but at some point thereafter he returned to Anatolia.⁸

5. *The Bulgarian Campaign.* Neshrī delineates the Bulgarian campaign as a three-phase operation. Sometime in winter, the year being unspecified, 'Alī Paşa quickly secured the fortresses north of the Kamčiya River, while Šišman stayed put at Tŭrnovo. It would seem, moreover, that Neshrī supposed that Pirot passed from Bulgarian to Serbian control approximately at this time. He does not, however, clarify the circumstances of this cession. The second stage began the ensuing spring, when Murād himself crossed with supplementary forces and settled in Yanbolu. Neshrī intimates that this occurred in early spring, since he claims that when Murād sailed to Gelibolu the weather was cold, and the previous

7. *Kitâb-i Cihan-nümâ*, v. I, 234.9/240.3; LEUNCLAVIUS, p. 259.8-264.14. N.b. that after recounting Shahin's defeat, Neshrī unequivocally states that "*İskenderiyye tekvuru, mel'un Laz'ile ve Bosna ile muvaza'a idüb gelmiş imiş. İttifâk idüb, Müslimanlara bu işi kıldılar*" (in Unat-Köymen's transcription). This sentence appears in identical form in the Codex Menzel (an earlier draft), as well as the Paris manuscript (a later recension). For these passages, see *Kitâb-i Cihan-nümâ* (Taeschner), v. I, facsimile p. 65 and v. II, facsimile p. 102. In Leunclavius version of this sentence, it is specified that Djuradj had conspired with Tvrtko and Lazar before invoking Shahin: "*Et huius quidem stragis auctor unus fuit arcis Alexandrinae regulus, qui cum Zirfae Despota Lazaro, & cum Teggiure Bozinacorum secreto consentiens, astute rem omnem composuerat; communicatisque prius cum duobus hisce consiliis, sub fraudulentæ simulationis praetextu, quasi Turcorum rebus maxime studeret*" (p. 264.5-14). The additional phrases are probably to be attributed to Leunclavius, rather than the Codex Hanivaldanus.

In my summary *supra*, I have ignored three intriguing events which Neshrī situates in this time frame (i.e., the interval between the Karamanian campaign and the mobilization to avenge Shahin's defeat), while Murād was in Yenishehir – i.e., the purported marriages between daughters of John V, and Ya'qūb and Bāyazīd; the circumcision of Bāyazīd's third son; and Yazıdjioghlu's embassy to Egypt. These marriages, if indeed they occurred, have thus far not been documented; cf. A. LUTRELL, John V's Daughters: A Palaiologan Puzzle, *DOP*, 40 (1986) 103 and n. 3. Likewise Yazıdjioghlu's mission, so far as I know, has not been independently attested.

8. *Kitâb-i Cihan-nümâ*, p. 240.3/242.12; LEUNCLAVIUS, p. 264.14-266.40.

few days contrary winds had been blowing. In any event, after Murād arrived at Yanbolu Šišman made his first submission, promising to surrender Silistra. The last stage of the campaign commenced when the tsar failed to deliver Silistra. The highlight of the renewed military action was the siege of Nikopol, where Šišman withdrew. This phase ended when the tsar submitted a second time, and Murād mercifully reinstated him as a vassal.⁹

6. *The March to Kosovo*. Between the Bulgarian campaign and the movement to Kosovo, Neshrī posits very little time. Towards the end of the action at Nikopol, he reports, Murād moved to nearby Tavshanlu, where, still in springtime, he met with 'Alī Pasha and planned the Serbian campaign. Thereafter 'Alī Pasha proceeded to Filibe, where, within a couple of months, the forces from Rumili and Anadolu were assembled. In warm summer weather, they began the journey west to Serbia. We may ignore, here, Neshrī's rather extended treatment of the developments at Kosovo. Pertinent, however, is his dating of these events to 791 A.H., and his conviction that Murād's assassin – Miloš Kobila (Miloš Obilić) – acted with knez Lazar's prior knowledge, and hence sanction.¹⁰

Such, then, is Neshrī's version of the events leading to the first battle of Kosovo Polje. The material from Murād's conquest of Niš, through his return to Bursa, depends on 'Ashikpashazāde. The subsequent episodes, from the Karamanian campaign through the battle of Kosovo, derive from an additional source which appears to be well-informed, at least in some sections. This text has thus far not been identified. Scholars have established, however, that the parallel but abridged narrative in the anonymous Oxford chronicle depends on a filiated source.¹¹

Before assessing the character of Neshrī's account, let us note that it contains three exact dates. First of all, the capture of Niš and Lazar's submission is generally located in 787 A.H., i.e., sometime between February 12, 1385 and February 1, 1386. Secondly, Murād's campaign to Karaman is situated in spring 788, i.e., in the spring of 1386 (since 787 A.H. began February 2, 1386 and ended January 21, 1387). Finally, the events at Kosovo are dated to 791, i.e., the spring of 1389 (since 791 A.H. began December 31, 1388 and ended December 19, 1389). Obviously, then, Neshrī posits Lazar's defection, the latter's alliance with Tvrtko, and the conspiracy leading to Shahin's entrapment somewhere between the end of the Karamanian campaign (evidently late spring or summer 1386), and the commencement of the Bulgarian campaign (by extrapolation, late 1388 or early 1389).

9. *Kitāb-i Cihan-nümâ*, p. 242.13/256.8; LEUNCLAVIUS, p. 266.41-276.49.

10. *Kitāb-i Cihan-nümâ*, p. 256.9/306.6; LEUNCLAVIUS, p. 276.49-301.44.

11. The fundamental treatment of Neshrī is still V. MÉNAGE's *Neshrī's History of the Ottomans, The Sources and Development of the Text*, (London 1964). See in particular p. 13-14, and the concordance for Neshrī's chapters 14-57 on p. 61.

II. *The exiguous evidence*

Faced with any historiographic text, the critical reader inquires whether its key assertions are correct and searches elsewhere for corroboration, contradiction, or simply amplification. Accordingly, in the following section I shall review the evidence which has thus far emerged from sources other than *Neshrī* regarding Murād's itinerary and concerns from 1386-1389. This data may be grouped under five chronological rubrics, as follows:

1386, Spring or summer?

As one might expect, Serbian sources convey some information, albeit fragmentary, about Murād's initial encounters with knez Lazar. The pertinent sources are various types of chronicles, all of which either record or transmit supposedly contemporary notices for the years of interest to us, namely 6894 (i.e., September 1, 1385 – August 31, 1386) or 6895 (i.e., September 1, 1386 – August 31, 1387). Beyond this there is a Greek chronicle, completed in 1624, which focuses on the Turkish conquests in Serbia and very likely depends on an earlier Serbian annal.

The entries in the Serbian chronicles suggest that Murād experienced a mixture of victory and if not defeat, then frustration, in his initial clash with knez Lazar. The data on the first theme are coherent, with six manuscripts unequivocally recording that Murād conquered Niš in 6894.¹² Unfortunately neither the month nor even the season is specified, and hence it is unclear whether Niš fell to the Ottomans sometime in fall through early winter 1385, or sometime in winter through summer 1386.¹³ It is reasonably certain, however, that the Turks invaded Bosnia for the first time in late October 1386, occasioning panic as far as Ragusa.¹⁴ Might one infer, therefore, that this raid was a more or less immediate consequence of the fall of Niš, which thus should be dated to spring or (more plausibly) summer 1386? The conjecture is not implausible, in my view, since Niš and Ragusa were connected by a major route which could be traversed within a fortnight or so.¹⁵

12. L. STOJANOVIĆ, *Stari srpski rodoslovi i letopisi*, (Beograd-Sremski Karlovci 1927) p. 215, no 591, fourth and fifth entries; *ibid.*, no 592, second entry.

13. Here one cannot resolve the problem simply by harmonizing the Christian and Islamic dates, and then placing the fall of Niš somewhere within the overlapping months (i.e., from September 1385 through January 1386). *Neshrī*'s date, after all, may very well be inaccurate by one year.

14. So far as I can tell, C. JIREČEK was the first to demonstrate this from Ragusan evidence, in his *Geschichte der Serben*, v. II, part 1, (Gotha 1918) p. 118, and cf. note 2.

15. C. JIREČEK, *Die Handelsstrassen und Bergwerke von Serbien und Bosnien während des Mittelalters. Historisch-geographische Studien*, (Prague 1879) p. 74-78. According to S. ČIRKOVIĆ, this incursion may even have been invoked by Djuradj II Stracimirović Balšić, the lord of Zeta, to damage his antagonist kralj Tvrtko (cf. *Istorija srednjovekovne Bosanske države*, (Beograd 1964) p. 158.

The entries intimating Murād's defeat or frustration refer to an encounter at Pločnik, a site southwest of Niš, between Kuršumlija and Prokuplje, and just west of the Toplica River. Reduced to their essence, the relevant chronicle entries convey three versions of an encounter at Pločnik:

Version 1: "Murād and Lazar fled from Pločnik on the Toplica"¹⁶

Version 2: "Murād went out to Pločnik"¹⁷

Version 3: (a) "Murād went out against Lazar, and he was turned back from Pločnik", or: (b) "Murād fled from (or before) Lazar at Pločnik."¹⁸

In addition, one chronicle conveys a version combining actions at Pločnik and Niš, as follows:

Version 4: "Murād went out to Pločnik and occupied the city of Niš".¹⁹

The oldest chronicle relaying the first version dates the event to 6894, but several later ones place it variously in 6893 or 6895.²⁰ All chronicles conveying the second version date the event to 6894.²¹ The chronicle with form (a) of the third version locates the event in 6894, while chronicles relaying form (b) date it predominantly to 6895, and in two instances to 6894.²² The chronicle conveying

16. STOJANOVIĆ, *Stari srpski rodoslovi i letopisi*, p. 113, no 191, left column (*Vü lëto 6894. Sije lëto pobeže Mouratī i knezī Lazarī s Pločnika is Toplice*); *ibid.*, p. 113, no 191, right column (*Vī lëto 6895. Sie lëto pobeže Amouratī i svetyi knezī s Pločnika*); *ibid.*, p. 215, no 591, sixth entry ([*Sije lëto*] *pobeže [carī] Amouratī i [svetyi] knezī Lazarī ot Pločnika is Toplice*, entered in the Sečenik ms. under 6895, and in the Sofia ms. under 6893).

17. *Ibid.*, p. 117, no 221 (*I vī to lëto isxodi carī Mouratī na Pločnikī*); *ibid.*, p. 215, no 591, first entry (*Isxodi carī Mouratī na Pločnikī*).

18. *Ibid.*, p. 215, no 591, second entry (*Isxodi Mouratī carī na kneza, i vrati se opetī ot Pločnika*); *ibid.*, seventh entry (6895. *Pobēže carī Mouratī ot (ispredī) kneza Lazara ot Pločnika is Toplice*).

19. *Ibid.*, p. 287, no 1099 (*Anno 6894 [1386] exit Murath ad Plotchnik et occupat Nissam urbem*).

20. V. sup. note 16 for citations. Entries no 191, left and right columns, p. 113, derive from the oldest annals, which Stojanović respectively designates "Zametak II" and "Zametak III". The final entry in "Zametak II" dates to 1404, while "Zametak III" terminates in 1432. In Stojanović's view these annals are filiated (the author of "Zametak III" having employed a source similar to "Zametak II"), and the dates given in the earlier "Zametak II" are more accurate (*ibid.*, p. LXXXVI-LXXXVII). Stojanović's no 591, sixth entry, p. 215 (conveying the aberrant dates of 6893 and 6895) reflects two mss. from the second half of the fifteenth century (*ibid.*, p. LVI, on the Sečenik chronicle, and p. XLII-XLIII, on the ms. Stojanović calls "Sofiski prvi").

21. V. sup. note 17 for citations. Stojanović's no 221, on p. 117, is from an annal he designates "Zametak VI". The section in which this entry appears was compiled in or after 1453 (cf. *ibid.*, p. LXXXVI). The chronicles reflected in Stojanović's no 591, on p. 215, again derive from the "younger chronicles" composed after 1459 (here cf. *ibid.*, p. XLI-XLIV, regarding the Kiev, Studenica, and Sarandaporski mss. underlying this entry).

22. V. sup. note 18 for citations. All the pertinent mss. again derive from the group of post-1459, or "younger", chronicles. On these, see again *ibid.*, p. XLI-XLIV, and further p. XLV-LVI.

the conflated fourth version, finally, dates the events to 6894.²³

To conclude our survey of the material in the Serbian chronicles, let us consider the entry in the Greek version of an earlier Serbian chronicle. For the year 6894, the author indicates that Murād crossed into Serbia, confronted knez Lazar, but “was unable to do anything [against] him.”²⁴ Clearly this version has no exact counterpart in the Serbian entries we have surveyed. Presumably, however, it alludes in a very generalized way to the encounter at Pločnik – which, as we have seen, the oldest pertinent Serbian annal likewise dates to 6894. Whatever the case, the value of the entry is marginal, since it is unclear whether the author translated the Serbian *verbatim*, or clumsily summarized his understanding of what happened, omitting specifics of locale.

Such, then, is the evidence of the Serbian chronicles. In assessing its worth, two categories of questions arise, the first of which concerns the sense of the entries. What, according to the chroniclers, actually transpired between Murād and Lazar at Pločnik? Did this encounter, whatever its nature, precede or follow the Ottoman conquest of Niš? In the latter case, did it occur still in 6894 (i.e., before August 31, 1386), or rather 6895 (i.e., sometime between September 1, 1386 and August 31, 1387)? Beyond such elementary questions, one may legitimately ask if these Serbian sources are generally reliable. Stated otherwise, is there any reason to prefer their data to that conveyed in *Neshrī*?

Let us consider first the matter of content. Clearly we may accept that the entries collectively posit a military encounter between Murād and Lazar in the vicinity of Pločnik, i.e., along the main route which ran southwest from Niš and continued eventually to Ragusa. Four versions – namely 2, 3(a), 4, and probably the Greek text – imply that Murād initiated the attack, “going forth” from some unspecified place towards the locale of the encounter, i.e., Pločnik. Two versions specify what happened in that encounter, but in somewhat contradictory terms. Version 1, it would seem, implies that the Serbs and Ottomans either confronted one another and then withdrew, or mutually retired from an action once commenced. Version 2, conversely, clearly asserts that Lazar expelled Murād’s forces from the vicinity of Pločnik – blocking, in that episode, further Ottoman progress across the southernmost east-west route in the Lazarevići domain. To prefer one version over the other is arbitrary. Taken together, however, they suggest that on at least one occasion Lazar was able to deter the Ottomans from penetrating beyond Pločnik, though the encounter probably did not entail a pitched battle. In other words, it would appear that Murād was stymied, but not overwhelmingly defeated. Whatever the case, the encounter could not have been a major reversal

23. V. sup. note 19 for citation. This entry is again from a later chronicle, which survives only in a Latin translation (cf. *ibid.*, v. I, p. LVI-LVII). Its value is questionable.

24. SCHREINER, *Kleinchroniken*, v. I, p. 561, no 6 and v. II, p. 331-332 (ἔτους 6894 ἔδίαβην αὐτὸς ὁ σουλτάν Μουράτης <εἰς τήν> Σερβίαν, εἰς τὸν κνέζην Λάζαριν, καὶ οὐδὲν ἠμπόρεσεν νὰ τὸν ποιήσῃν τίποτες).

for the Ottomans, since raiding parties were advancing to the hinterlands of Ragusa (plausibly along the main route astride which Pločnik was situated) in autumn 1386.

As for the chronology, I am inclined to accept the date given in the oldest Serbian short chronicle, echoed in several later Serbian chronicles and the Greek version, namely 6894. Accordingly, the action at Pločnik must have occurred in close proximity to the events at Niš, and thus should be dated somewhere in the spring through late summer of 1386. It is impossible, however, to ascertain whether this incident preceded or followed Murād's conquest of Niš. Conceivably Murād's initial target in this region would have been Niš, given its location on the Belgrade-Constantinople highway, and the fact that the Ottomans already controlled Sofia. Thus, the action at Pločnik would reflect Murād's subsequent efforts to conquer the castles west of Niš, and hence the route proceeding to the Adriatic. This is, however, speculative. The most we may deduce from these entries is that Murād's maneuvers in Serbia in spring/summer 1386 resulted in the conquest of Niš, and a rebuff near Pločnik, sometime before or after the action at Niš.²⁵

The only outstanding problem, now, is whether the fall of Niš persuaded knez Lazar to accept vassalage, as Neshrī alleges. Obviously the Serbian chronicles do not affirm that this was the case, as presumably they might well have had it been so. It would seem, moreover, that if knez Lazar were able to stymie Murād at Pločnik, he would not have submitted at this particular point. The foregoing are

25. F. BABINGER's cursory reading of the Serbian texts, misleading to so many, should simply be ignored (*Beiträge zur Frühgeschichte der Türkenherrschaft in Rumelien (14.-15. Jahrhundert)*, (Brunn-München-Wien 1944) p. 77, esp. note 43. For a more careful assessment, with which I fully concur, see R. MIHALJČIĆ, *Lazar Hrebeljanović*, p. 115. ČIRKOVIĆ (Serbia on the Eve of the Battle of Kosovo, p. 14), has recently expressed a rather skeptical view of the worth of these entries: "[The brief] notes from the Serbian chronicles are contradictory, thus preventing us from understanding what actually happened during this Turkish intrusion which occurred sometime between September 1385 and August 1386. What is hidden behind such statements as 'Murad and Prince Lazar escaped,' or 'Tsar Murad escaped at Pločnik', or 'and he came back from Pločnik'?... There are no grounds for any conclusion about a major battle or victory for one side or the other. Therefore, it is difficult to connect this struggle with Murad's motives for the campaign which would lead to the Battle of Kosovo." Čirković's cautious approach contrasts sharply not only with earlier historians, who saw in Pločnik a resounding victory for the Serbs and Bosnians, e.g., most influentially, H. GIBBONS, *The Foundation of the Ottoman Empire*, (Oxford 1916) p. 169, but also contemporary scholars who similarly depict this encounter as a Serbian triumph (e.g., BOMBACI, *L'Impero ottomano*, p. 260). Let us note, nonetheless, that Čirković has implicitly arrived at two conclusions regarding the chronicle evidence. In terms of chronology, he obviously accepts those entries which date the episode to 6894 (i.e., 1385/1386) and not 6895 (i.e., 1386/1387). Moreover, he seems to concede that some sort of encounter occurred at Pločnik between Lazar and Murād, though not on the scale of a major battle.

not, to be sure, definitive arguments. Yet they are plausible – assuming we regard the chronicle entries as basically credible.

Let us turn, then, to the general quality of this evidence, beginning with the question of sources. It is, let us admit, by and large impossible to identify the sources on which these particular entries ultimately depend. Of only one chronicle may it be conjectured that its author was a contemporary of Lazar and Murād, and hence that he created his entries pertaining to Pločnik, as opposed to reproducing what he found in anterior records.²⁶ The authors of the other chronicles were writing for the most part after 1459.²⁷ According to Stojanović, they derived their material for the interval from Stefan Dušan's death (i.e., 1355) to the frontiers of living memory from notices or annotations in the older chronicles, or lists of important events.²⁸ Since the latter represent contemporaneous recordings, or a collection of such, the chroniclers who employed this material presumably transmitted a body of credible data. That would depend, however, on whether the original recordings were indeed accurate, and likewise whether the subsequent chroniclers who incorporated them did so faithfully, without conscious or unconscious distortions. At this point we have reached an impasse, since little evidence has thus far emerged to clarify either issue. Why, then, accept the data and implications conveyed by these entries?

Certain historians, let us admit, have instinctively preferred the Serbian chronicles from a blanket distrust of their Ottoman counterparts.²⁹ As previously mentioned, however, Neshrī's account of events from Niš through Kosovo evidently relies on an anterior source which may be of considerable value, and hence more cogent reasons must be advanced should one opt to reject its various elements. In my opinion, two arguments might be offered for preferring the data in the Serbian chronicles regarding the events of 6894. First, it is likely – even in the absence of concrete proof – that whoever composed the original notices did so rather soon after the events, relying on local informants who knew at least the general outcome of knez Lazar's encounter with Murād in 6894. In recording what transpired, moreover, the author(s) apparently intended simply to summarize what had happened, and not to sculpt a particular image of either Lazar or Murād. We cannot, on the other hand, characterize Neshrī's source for these years with much specificity. His narrative diverges, to be sure, from that of the other chroniclers,

26. I.e., STOJANOVIĆ's "Zametak II", on which v. sup. note 20.

27. For STOJANOVIĆ's description of these chronicles, v. sup. note 22.

28. STOJANOVIĆ's, *Stati srpski rodoslovi i letopisi*, p. LXXXIV-LXXXVI.

29. Cf. SCHREINER's dismissive remarks: "Die serbischen Quellen bringen im Gegensatz zu den phantasievoll ausgeschmückten osmanischen keine Einzelheiten, erwähnen jedoch, wenigstens für die Schlacht, ein exaktes Datum, und zwar überwiegend das Weltjahr 6894..." (*Kleinchroniken*, v. II, p. 331-332). These lines seem to confirm what H. ÍNALCÍK wrote a few years before, referring to Byzantinists: "... [they] generally assume that these [Ottoman] sources are mere fairy-tale narrations, unreliable in every way", *ArOtt*, 3 (1971) 274.

and its wealth of detail (particularly vis-à-vis ‘Alī Paṣḥa’s Bulgarian campaign) is striking. To suppose, however, that it depends on an “eye-witness” report is entirely conjectural. Furthermore, we cannot establish how Neshrī addressed this source in composing his work – more significantly, how he might have altered its various elements in delineating Murād as a heroic martyr. Needless to say, neither of these reservations is sufficiently compelling to warrant our wholesale rejection of Neshrī’s account. Faced, however, with contrary evidence of plausible worth, they allow us to question certain aspects of his conception of events.

All in all, the Serbian chronicles appear to be valuable for clarifying the date of the conquest of Niš, and for intimating, with their allusions to Pločnik, that knez Lazar survived his initial encounter with the Ottomans with his sovereignty intact. If this was indeed so, then Lazar’s subsequent antagonism with Murād cannot be envisioned as the treachery of a rebellious vassal, but rather the knez’s continuing attempt to preserve his autonomy.

1387, Spring (and also summer?)

The first independent reference to Murād’s whereabouts following his operations at Niš and Pločnik appears, so far as I can determine, in a treaty the sultan concluded with the Genoese on June 8, 1387. The Latin text of the document survives, and it specifies that the agreement was concluded “*in Turchia, in quodam cassale dicto Mallaina, in cortillio domus habitationis personaliter prefacti Domini* [i.e., Murād].”³⁰ “Mallaina” obviously should be identified with “Malagina”, a Byzantine mustering site in the vicinity of Bursa.³¹ The treaty does not clarify why Murād was here, rather than Bursa or Edirne. However, one inevitably wonders if Murād was either gathering his forces, or en route to an engagement, i.e., his clash with Alaeddin Beg.

These questions, to repeat, cannot be answered from the text of the treaty. Furthermore, no non-Ottoman sources have thus far surfaced which corroborate that Murād campaigned in Karaman the spring or summer following his conquest of Niš. If, however, we accept Neshrī’s basic ordering of events (and thus far there are no reasons for summarily rejecting it), we may plausibly date the campaign to this very spring or summer, 1387. As Uzunçarşılı and others have argued, the Karamanian campaign must have occurred then since (a) Neshrī indicates that Hayreddin died a short time *before* the campaign commenced, and

30. L. BELGRANO, Prima serie di documenti riguardanti la colonia di Pera, *Atti SLSP*, 13 (1877-1884) 149.

31. See C. FOSS, Malagina, *ODB*, v. 2, cols. 1247a-b, with further literature; E. ZACHARIADOU, *Ιστορία και Θρύλοι τῶν παλαιῶν σουλτάνων (1300-1400)*, (Athens 1991) p. 82-84. Foss situates Malagina in the vicinity of Pamukova, whereas Zachariadou associates it with Yenishehir (following J. Sölch, with supplemental evidence).

(b) Hayreddin's tombstone inscription reveals that he died in Serres in 789 A.H. (i.e., January 22, 1387-January 10, 1388).³² Dennis, moreover, has narrowed the date of Hayreddin's death to the interval between sometime in April 1387 (when he presided at the surrender of Thessaloniki) and May 15 (by which time his second son, Ibrāhīm, was functioning in his stead at Serres).³³ It follows, therefore, that if Neshrī's placement of the Karamanian campaign relative to Hayreddin's death is correct, the enterprise must have unfolded in spring and/or summer 1387.

1387, Late summer/autumn – 1388, June?

Judging from a handful of Byzantine, Venetian and French sources, Murād seems not to have personally engaged in any major campaigns from late summer 1387 through approximately June 1388, but remained variously in Anatolia and southern Thrace. Unfortunately, however, these same sources reveal only fragments of his itinerary and agenda. At some point in late summer or autumn 1387, the sultan evidently returned to Bursa, where (precisely as Neshrī tells us) he plausibly spent the winter. By late February or March, however, Murād had crossed to Thrace, to the vicinity of Gallipoli, where he was still to be found sometime in June, 1388. His activities during this interval included negotiations with the Palaiologoi and the Venetians, and a fascinating encounter with the colorful Jean II le Meingre Boucicaut. Let us briefly consider each in turn.

A cluster of Byzantine texts reveals that sometime in late summer or autumn 1387, Murād received Manuel Palaiologos at Bursa. Since the autumn or winter of 1382 Manuel had ruled Thessaloniki more or less autonomously, defying his father John V's policy of accommodation with Murād. This led, inevitably, to a protracted and rather hopeless struggle with the Ottomans, who blockaded the city for four years. Ultimately, in March or early April 1387, the citizens of Thessaloniki opted to surrender to Hayreddin Paṣha. A few days before the surrender, Manuel left Thessaloniki and sought refuge with his cousin, Francesco II Gattilusio, on Lesbos. He was still there at the height of summer, perhaps at the very time Murād was campaigning in Karaman, but sometime thereafter he proceeded to Tenedos. Manuel's political status was now quite tenuous, since he was reconciled neither with his father, an Ottoman vassal, nor the sultan himself. Towards the end of the summer, it would seem, Murād initiated tentatives to secure Manuel's submission. These exploratory parleys must have occupied

32. For the evidence on Hayreddin's death, see *Kitāb-i Cihan-nümâ*, p. 220. 4-6; F. TAESCHNER – P. WITTEK, *Die Vezirfamilie der Ğandarlyzāde (14.-15. Jhdt.) und ihre Denkmäler. Der Islam*, 18 (1920) 84, where the inscription and the Esphigmenou document are discussed. For datings of Murād's Karamanian campaign to 1387, see I. UZUNÇARŞILI, *Osmanlı Tarihi*, v. I, *Kuruluştan İstanbul'un fethine kadar*, (Ankara 1947) p. 134, and p. 136, n. 1; BELDICEANU-STEINHERR, *Recherches*, p. 219.

33. DENNIS, *The Reign of Manuel II*, p. 155, especially note 11.

several weeks at least, and may well have been paralleled by exchanges with John V. Ultimately, perhaps in September, Manuel opted to journey to Bursa and arrange terms of accommodation. The meeting was harmonious, and Murād may even have granted Manuel suzerainty of Christoupolis. Moreover, he seems to have mediated Manuel's return to Constantinople, and a measure of reconciliation with John V. Nonetheless, the elder emperor insisted that Manuel subsequently withdraw to Lemnos, where he in fact remained until the late summer or fall of 1389.³⁴

Throughout the closing months of 1387, at least two Venetian embassies arrived at Murād's court, protesting the repercussions of an Ottoman raid in the Morea. Sometime in September, Theodore Palaiologos, despot of Mistra and Manuel's younger brother, implored Evrenoz, the *udj begi* of Macedonia and Thessaly, to ravage the estates of his refractory magnates, hoping thereby to strengthen his own rule. Obviously, since the exact date of Manuel's meeting with Murād is unknown, it is unclear whether Theodore's entreaty preceded, overlapped, or postdated that encounter.³⁵ In any event, the Ottomans did not confine themselves to Theodore's *archontes* but harried the Venetians at Methoni and Koroni, as well as Negroponte. By late September, dispatches had arrived from these outposts informing Venice that the Turks' raid had caused extensive damages, and that the invaders had made off with prisoners, livestock and other spoils.³⁶ This development was troubling, since throughout the 1380s Venice's relations with Murād had been very good.³⁷ On October 3, the senate commissioned an ambassador, Daniel Corner, to proceed to Murād and negotiate the liberation of captives, restoration of stolen properties, and an agreement to restrain

34. Manuel's movements from Thessaloniki to Lemnos have been carefully examined by DENNIS, *op. cit.*, p. 155-58, and BARKER, *Manuel II*, p. 59-65. SCHREINER, *Kleinchroniken*, v. II, p. 332-333, subsequently, would prefer to date Hayreddin's capture of Thessaloniki more generally to March-May 1387.

The evidence for Manuel's meeting with Murād includes six of Kydonēs' letters (nos. 352, 354, 355, 363, 365, 370), in: CYDONĒS, *Correspondance*, v. II and Laonikos Chalkokondyles' retrospective, ed. E. DARKÓ, *Laonici Chalcocandylae historiarum demonstrationes*, v. I, (Budapest 1922) p. 42.19-44.4 and 48.20-22, where it is specified that Manuel met Murād in Bursa. For DENNIS' treatment of this material, see *op. cit.*, p. 158; for BARKER's version, see *op. cit.*, p. 61-64, and note 179 on p. 65 for a possible dating of Manuel's return to Constantinople (i.e., following his meeting with Murād) as September 17, 1387.

35. On the date of Evrenoz Beg's raid, see most recently SCHREINER, *Kleinchroniken*, v. II, p. 335. On the background and events, still fundamental is K. SETTON, *The Catalans and Florentines in Greece, 1380-1462*, in: gen. ed. K. SETTON, *A History of the Crusades*, v. III, ed. H. HAZARD, *The Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries*, (Madison 1975) p. 245-246.

36. SETTON, *op. cit.*, p. 245, note 66 (for an important excerpt of the September 28, 1387 Venetian senate deliberation record).

37. ZACHARIADOU, *Marginalia*, p. 201-202.

further attacks on Venetian possessions.³⁸ Corner did embark on his mission, arriving in the east plausibly late in 1387, where he encountered both Murād and 'Alī Paṣha. Unfortunately, it is unclear if this meeting took place in Bursa, or elsewhere.

Murād's initial reply to Corner's message seemed to be conciliatory, since he commanded that the castellans of Koroni and Methoni dispatch an envoy to identify the captives, following which they would be freed. Moreover, at some point during Corner's visit Murād concluded that the ambassador had promised him auxiliary aid, at the republic's expense. The sultan probably also raised the possibility of Venice rendering tribute, implicitly to assure the security of her holdings in the Morea. Such, then, were the concrete results of Corner's meeting (or meetings) with Murād and 'Alī Paṣha. Subsequently Corner returned to Venice, at the very latest by July 24, 1388, but more likely months before. He arrived with letters from Murād, which recounted the sultan's decisions, and indicated that he was pleased with the dogs Corner had brought as gifts – in particular a large-headed one. Implicitly Murād wanted others of that sort, and was hoping the republic would comply. Corner also brought letters from 'Alī Paṣha, which conveyed the Ottoman perception that Corner had promised *gratis* auxiliary aid.

The aftermath of Corner's embassy was disappointing, indeed troubling, for the authorities in Venice. First of all, the castellans of Koroni and Methoni were not successful in recovering the captives. They indeed dispatched an envoy, as Murād had enjoined, but this *nuntio* was inexplicably rebuffed by 'Alī Paṣha *ex parte Morati*. News of this episode, which may well have transpired before the end of 1387, was duly dispatched to Venice, probably arriving in advance of Corner. Thereafter, when Corner himself returned, with his news and official letters, the senators were appalled to learn that the sultan and the vizier were angling for a tributary alliance. These tensions, accumulating from late 1387 through the first half of 1388, would eventually induce Venice to send yet another embassy to Murād in late July, 1388. By the early months of that year, however, it was sufficiently clear that Murād was not greatly concerned about placating Venice, and perhaps even hoped that Evrenoz's show of force the previous autumn might induce her to consider a tributary pact.³⁹

Possibly a few months or so after Corner's embassy, the French adventurers, Boucicaut and Renault de Roze, initiated their rather fascinating contacts with

38. THIRIET, *Sénat*, v. I, no 736, p. 177-179.

39. The complex of events pertaining to Corner's mission and its aftermath is evident from the Venetian senate deliberation record of July 24, 1388. The fullest edition of this is still that of N. IORGA, *Veneția in Marea neagră, Analele Academiei Române, Memoriile Secțiunii istorice*, II, 36 (1913-14), p. 1096-1098, no VIII. A few sections are more fully edited by J. VALENTINI, *Acta Albaniae Veneta saeculorum XIV et XV*, Part I, v. 2, (Milan 1968) p. 77-79, no 368.

Murād.⁴⁰ According to Boucicaut's biographer, the two lords set out for the east (i.e., the Holy Land) after Boucicaut left the service of Louis II, duke of Bourbon. They took the sea route from Venice to Constantinople, where they remained all the following Lent. Judging from internal evidence, the year of this undertaking was 1388; moreover, in that year (Latin) Easter fell on March 29.⁴¹ During their sojourn in Constantinople, the lords dispatched a message to "Amorat" (Murād), who at that time was *en Grece pres de Galipoli*, requesting a grant of safe conduct. Murād not only readily complied but invited them to his court, proffering a fine and enjoyable feast and the possibility of military service *en cas que il feroit guerre a aucuns Sarrasins*. *Sarrasin*, let us note, is a term the author uses to designate "Arabs" or "Turks" interchangeably. Its concomitant sense, therefore, is "Muslim". The French lords accepted Murād's offers and remained with him for approximately three months. Thereafter Boucicaut and Renault took their leave, since the sultan had not, in point of fact, waged war with any Muslim adversaries and implicitly had no immediate plans to do so. Murād now arranged for the lords to proceed safely through Ottoman Rumili, via Greece and the "kingdom of Bosnia and Bulgaria", until they reached the frontier.⁴²

This account of Boucicaut's efforts to reach the Holy Land in 1388 is of course rather laconic, and its underlying source is unclear. Presumably, however, it reflects the report of someone in Boucicaut's circle who was familiar with his journeys to the east.⁴³ Pertinent here are its assertions, seemingly accurate, regarding Murād's whereabouts and concerns in the spring of 1388. Judging from this text, the sultan was in Thrace, near Gallipoli, when Boucicaut and Renault initially contacted him sometime in February or March 1388. Throughout the following April, May and a portion of June the lords were in Murād's retinue, but it is unclear whether the locale was again the environs of Gallipoli, or some other place. Implicitly, however, Boucicaut and Renault did not travel an enormous distance from Constantinople to find the sultan (no lengthy journey is recorded). Wherever Murād received and maintained these lords, however, he clearly did so anticipating their utility as military auxiliaries should conflicts with non-Christian enemies arise. Regrettably Boucicaut's biographer does not clarify the nature of Murād's military concerns at this time. We can, however, make some plausible speculations.

40. I would like to thank Dr. Anthony Luttrell for having kindly alerted me to this episode, during our conference in Rethymnon.

41. Cf. D. LALANDE's reckoning in his edition, *Le livre des fais du bon messire Jehan le Maingre, dit Bouciquaut, mareshcal de France et gouverneur de Jennes*, (Geneva 1985) note on p. 61.

42. BOUCICAUT, p. 61.4-62.27. For other instances of the biographer's use of "Sarrasin", see p. 40.14; 95.27, 31, 40, 42; 96.45, 56, 58; 97.96; 98.140.

43. On the biographer and his sources, see LALANDE's introductory remarks, *op. cit.*, p. xxi-xxvi.

According to Neshrī, let us recall, Murād dispatched ‘Alī Pasha to Bulgaria to punish the Bulgarian princes early in 1388. Murād himself did not accompany the troops at this stage. Rather, he crossed to Edirne, where he remained for some time. In the spring (i.e., of 1388), however, Murād did lead supplementary contingents to Bulgaria, which he obtained from Anatolia. Throughout the ensuing weeks of the campaign, moreover, he remained *in situ* at Yanbolu.

Unfortunately, none of the exiguous evidence for the interval under discussion *specifically* corroborates Neshrī’s version of Murād’s agenda at this time. Nonetheless, two facts have emerged from the dossier which possibly provide clues. As we have seen, late in 1387, ‘Alī Pasha was apparently quite anxious to secure a promise of *gratis* military aid from Venice. Was the vizier planning the Bulgarian campaign then – perhaps angling for Venetian assistance in transferring troops from Anatolia to Rumili? Whatever the case, it seems likely that ‘Alī Pasha and Murād were at least contemplating some military action late in 1387.

Boucicaut’s biographer provides the second salient fact, i.e., that Murād was near Gallipoli effectively throughout the first half of 1388, anxious to recruit mercenaries. This evidence may well intersect with Neshrī. It is possible, in other words, that Murād’s documented presence in Thrace reflects what Neshrī alleges about the opening of the Bulgarian campaign – viz. that Murād dispatched ‘Alī Pasha north, implicitly in late winter or early spring, while he himself remained, for some unspecified period, in Edirne. This being the case, the sultan’s concern about his security vis-à-vis “les Sarrasins” is quite understandable. Doubtless he feared that the Karamanoğulları would exploit this classically vulnerable moment to recover what they had lost the previous summer. Here one might object that if the foregoing were true – that the Bulgarian campaign was unfolding throughout the first half of 1388 – it is unlikely that Boucicaut and Renault would have returned to Hungary in June via “the kingdom of Bosnia and Bulgaria”, or that Boucicaut’s biographer would not have mentioned the dangerous circumstances to which they were exposed. Conversely, it is entirely possible that the travellers followed the major arteries, well to the west of the war zone.

If this interpretation of the evidence is correct, then Boucicaut and Renault de Roye sojourned with Murād *before* the second phase of the Bulgarian campaign, when Murād himself, after returning to Anatolia, led reinforcements to Bulgaria and moved his headquarters to Yanbolu. Since the Frenchmen left the sultan’s service in June, it follows that this phase of the campaign must have commenced sometime thereafter.

The chronology implies, finally, that tsar Šišman must have renounced his ties with Murād sometime between the latter’s departure from Serbia (ca. autumn or early winter 1386) and the end of 1387. Moreover, he likely did not revolt in the context of parallel anti-Ottoman currents in Serbia and Bosnia, but acted independently, for reasons which remain unclear. Here one cannot help but wonder if Šišman defied Murād toward the summer of 1387, when the sultan was preparing to attack Karaman. That, after all, would have been a perfect occasion to rebel, since the outcome of Murād’s clash with Alaeddin beg remained to be seen. The

simplest and most effective form of defiance, moreover, would have been to refuse to provide troops for that campaign. It is impossible, of course, to know if Šišman actually provoked Murād in this way. If he did, however, this might well explain why Murād dispatched 'Alī Paşa to Bulgaria so soon after the Karamanian campaign, i.e., early in 1388, in a season when cold, snow, and lack of provisions could certainly have hampered operations.

1388, ca. June-December

No evidence has thus far emerged to clarify Murād's itinerary or agenda throughout the final seven months of 1388. Pertinent to our inquiry, however, are developments in Venice, Bosnia and the Morea which variously hint at Murād's diplomatic and military activities at this time, and elucidate the background to his Serbian campaign in the spring of 1389.

Venetian Concerns in the Summer of 1388

Three Venetian Senate deliberation records indicate that friction between the republic and Murād was mounting throughout the summer of 1388. The first two, dated July 23 and 24, again pertain to the aftermath of Evrenoz Beg's raid in September 1387. The August 26 record again reveals the senators responding to Ottoman military provocations, the precise nature of which is unclear.

When they convened on July 24, the senators identified Nerio Acciaiuoli as the agent ultimately responsible for past and present difficulties. A letter was drafted accusing him of having provoked the past year's assault, and of currently cultivating the Turks who were situated in a position to sweep down and attack Venetian possessions. This letter was dispatched to the baiulo in Negroponte, with instructions that he convey it to Nerio and enjoin him to oppose the Turks, as he had previously sworn to do.⁴⁴

The following day, the Senate reviewed its various attempts to obtain redress for the damages inflicted by Evrenoz Beg's men at Methoni, Koroni and Negroponte. Clearly the senators were distressed that the key issues were unresolved, and that Murād and his vizier were pressuring Venice to enter a tributary alliance – in effect, to accept Ottoman-style vassalage for the possessions in Romania. Consequently, they resolved that day to dispatch a new envoy to reiterate Venice's concerns and clarify its stance vis-à-vis military aid and tribute. The Senate now placed its hopes on Ludovico Dandolo, a resident of their commune in Constantinople who reputedly got along well with Murād. In essence, Dandolo was commissioned to placate Murād with amicable greetings (indicating that more fine

44. IORGA, *op. cit.*, p. 1095, enumerated as no VII, and more fully in SETTON, *op. cit.*, p. 247, n. 70.

dogs would be sent); to register Venice's surprise and concern that no captives had been freed, despite Murād's earlier agreement; to clarify that Daniel Corner had no authorization or competence to promise Venetian military aid; and to argue that Murād and 'Alī Paṣha's curious presumption stemmed from some misunderstanding – an error in translation. Moreover, Dandolo was expected to persuade Murād, amicably of course, to halt the raids of the *desensores* (akıncılar?) on Koroni and Methoni, and, should the topic arise, to desist from the notion that Venice would provide him with tribute. Only one further item in this *commissio* need concern us, namely the instruction that Dandolo should seek an audience with 'Alī Paṣha, "if he shall be in those parts," deciphering from him Murād's intentions and attitude towards Venice, and likewise determining if the sultan had ordered his vizier to commence any military preparations.⁴⁵

Unfortunately, the results of Dandolo's embassy are unrecorded. Whatever transpired, however, the anxieties the Venetians felt in late July 1388 intensified considerably – in fact, remarkably – throughout the following month. In its meeting on August 26, the Senate addressed itself to the numerous reports it had received concerning "the hostile and unfavorable disposition of Murād, and the [military] movements he has made on land and sea." Consequently, it ordered that defensive measures be taken at Koroni, Methoni, and Negroponte, and that three galleys proceed from Alexandria to the Gulf *pro conforto fidelium nostrorum illarum partium*. Moreover, it devised a remarkable plan for negotiating a league of Christian powers to prevent the Turks from invading southern Greece. Here the Senate envisioned nothing less than a complete reshuffling of the existing pattern of alliances, an ambition which indicates the degree of anxiety which Murād's latest maneuvers – whatever their nature – had evoked in Venice. The stimulus to their discussion, it would seem, was a recent letter from their bailo in Constantinople revealing that Theodore "appeared to be well-disposed" to dispensing with the Turks and allying with the local Christian powers. Thus they proposed, now, to induce Theodore Palaiologos to abandon his ties with the Turks and forge a defensive alliance with Venice, the Duchy of Athens, and the Navarrese.⁴⁶

The bailo who wrote this letter was surely Piero Grimani, who served from 1376 to 1389.⁴⁷ It is unclear when Grimani dispatched his letter to the authorities in Venice, but a plausible *terminus post quem* is mid to late July, 1388. Likewise we can only speculate concerning Grimani's source of information, but it would seem that he was reporting what he had learned from

45. V. sup., note 38 for editions of the text. Pertinent here is VALENTINI, *op. cit.*, p. 77-79, where the Senate's *commissio* to Dandolo is edited in full.

46. V. infra, note 49 for the key passages of this deliberation record.

47. According to V. GRUMEL, *La chronologie*, (Paris 1958) p. 404, Grimani served as bailo between 1386 and 1389, succeeding Andrea Gradenigo and preceding Giovanni Miani. C. Maltezou, however, argues that Gradenigo merely served as ambassador to Constantinople in 1375, and otherwise the office of bailo was vacant in 1372-1376. Pierro Grimani (Petrus Grimani) was then elected sometime after March 12, 1376, and evidently

Theodore himself, or those close to him. When, where, and how Grimani made contact with Theodore is unclear. There is no reason to suppose, however, that Theodore was sojourning in Constantinople when the bailo composed his letter. More likely Grimani acquired his information through some communication or envoy. After all, for years he and Theodore had been on friendly terms, and very plausibly they would have maintained contact with one another.⁴⁸ We may conjecture, therefore, that an exchange between Grimani and Theodore took place in late spring or early summer, at which time Grimani broached the possibility of a defensive league. In his reply, Theodore expressed a tentative or non-committal interest, on the basis of which the bailo reported back to Venice that Theodore “appeared to be well-disposed” to closing ranks with the local Christian powers. It seems improbable that Theodore seriously considered breaking his liaison with the Turks at this time. On the other hand, if he supposed that Murād’s current military agenda *potentially* threatened him, the despot may well have wished to leave all options open.

In its discussion on August 26, the Senate now proposed to induce Theodore to break with the Turks and align with the local Christian powers of Romania. It resolved that the bailo (i.e., Grimani) should confer with Theodore and persuade him “with benevolent words to disband [his] Turks, and procure the union and alliance of all these localities with our dominion” (*procurandum quod omnes illi loci uniantur et coniungantur cum nostra*). At the same time, they enjoined their castellans at Koroni and Methoni to send envoys to the despot, proposing that the local powers ally with Venice, but pretending as if they were acting entirely on their own initiative. Finally, the Senate directed the same castellans to test the waters with Nerio Acciaiuoli, the Navarrese, and anyone else who might be sympathetic to such an alliance, but to allege that Theodore was the *fons et origo* of the enterprise. Once the castellans had carried out these charges, they were to write without delay, assessing the viability of the proposed league and its potential effectiveness for repulsing an invasion.⁴⁹

The strategy embodied in these directives is generally clear. At this stage the senators deemed it unwise to approach Theodore, Nerio and the Navarrese with official proposals. If the Venetian government attempted to organize the league, its would-be allies would immediately suspect the republic’s motives. The senators

held office in 1389, when Giovanni Miani began his tenure: *Ὁ θεσμός τοῦ ἐν Κωνσταντινουπόλει Βενετοῦ βαίλου (1268-1453)*, (Athens 1970) p. 116-118, and table on p. 127.

48. In 1379, Grimani played a leading role in effecting the restoration of John V and Manuel, in gratitude for which Theodore offered him, in 1384, the fortress of Monemvasia (cf. DENNIS, *The Reign of Manuel II*, p. 117-118, esp. note 45 for the text of the Venetian Senate deliberation of March 29, 1384 attesting to Theodore’s offer). MALTEZOU, *op. cit.*, p. 46-47, additionally clarifies why Grimani, as bailo, had to petition the senate for permission to accept this gift.

49. Since this text is so crucial to my dating of the Bulgarian campaign, I quote here LOENERTZ’ s edition (omitting his notes) in CYDONÈS, *Correspondance*, v. II, p. 439-440

therefore hoped to achieve their objective by persuading Theodore not only to dissolve his pact with the Turks, but to play the leading role in bringing about the desired coalition. Hence the subterfuges they enjoined upon the castellans of Methoni and Koroni, and their charge to Grimani. They calculated, obviously, that if Theodore converted and took the organizing initiative, he would inevitably convince Nerio and the Navarrese to follow suit, and no one would fear that the league would be dominated by Venice, for Venetian ends.

The deliberation record does not specify, however, where the Senate expected its agents to commence their tentative maneuverings with Theodore. According to Loenertz, the Senate's directive to their bailo in Constantinople indicates Theodore's whereabouts in the late summer or autumn of 1388. In his view, this implies that the Venetians presumed on August 26, 1388 that Theodore was either in Constantinople (and, we might add, was expected to remain there for some time), or that his arrival in the near future was anticipated. Thus the Senate selected the bailo in Constantinople to parley with Theodore, and not the bailo of Negroponte, of the castellans at Methoni and Koroni whom it would have commissioned had Theodore been in the

(=Document no 8 in Appendix D): *Cum de multis partibus per multas manus literarum rectorum nostrorum et aliorum habeantur noua uera de mala et iniqua dispositione Morati et apparatu quem facit in terra et in mari, et ideo necesse sit prouidere et subito de locis nostris Coroni, Mothoni, Nigropontis et aliorum locorum nostrorum, et, sicut pridie lectum fuit in isto consilio, baiulus noster Constantinopolis fuerit in colloquio cum chier Teodoro, dispoti Amoree, inducendo ipsum uerbis beniuolis ad dimittendum Turcos et ad procurandum quod omnes isti loci uniantur et coniungantur cum nostra dominatione, ad que idem dominus dispoti, ut scribit idem baiulus noster, uidetur esse bene dispositus, uadit pars quod committatur castellanis nostris Coroni et Mothoni quod mittant quendam nuntium sufficientem ad dictum dominum dispoti, faciendo sibi inter cetera exponi qualiter dominatio nostra per literas nostri baiuli Constantinopolis sensit de optima dispositione sua qua esset de dimittendo uiam Turchorum et de adherendo se nobis et de procurando ligam et unionem omnium illorum locorum cum dominatione nostra, que optima dispositio sua ualde placuit nobis, et quod ideo dicti castellani – semper ostendendo quod moueantur a se ipsis – uellent scire modum qui uideretur tenendus dicto domino dispoti de faciendo hanc ligam pro salute omnium dictorum locorum et pro maiori informatione mittatur eis copia puncti litere nostri baiuli suprascripti facientis mentionem de predictis et si uidebitur dictis castellanis prefatum dominum dispoti esse ita dispositum prout oretenus dixit nostro baiulo antedicto, tunc dicti castellani per illum modum qui uidebitur eis et dicto domino dispoti faciant hoc notum domino Rainerio de Azaiolis domino Corinthi, Nauarensibus et aliis qui uiderentur apti ad hanc ligam, inuestigando intentionem ipsorum, et si uellent attendere ad hanc ligam, sciendo a predictis in casu quo attenderent ad hanc ligam omnes modos, uias et conditiones qui et que sibi uiderentur ad faciendam dictam ligam, trahendo a dicto domino dispoti, domino Rainerio, Nauarensibus et aliis quicquid poterunt, et semper ostendendo quod hec omnia habuerunt principium a dicto domino dispoti et habita responsione, et quicquid poterunt trahere a predictis, scribant nobis sine mora omnia que habuerunt, et etiam, si uidebitur eis, castellanis nostris, quod per talem ligam possit obstari Turchis et prohiberi aduentus eorum ad partes illas.*

Morea.⁵⁰ This interpretation, however, is open to question.

The fact that the Senate chose Grimani to negotiate with Theodore does not necessarily mean they presumed Theodore was in Constantinople, or expected him shortly to arrive. The senators may very well have selected Grimani, in particular, because he was familiar with the matters at hand and because of his friendly rapport with the despot. When they formulated their instructions on August 26, they obviously had no way of knowing if, in point of fact, Theodore would be in Constantinople a month or so later, when their missive hopefully would arrive. Most likely they simply expected that Grimani, on receipt of his mandate, would proceed immediately and talk with Theodore, wherever he happened to be – Constantinople, the Morea, or elsewhere. Furthermore, the senators' directive to the castellans at Methoni and Koroni provides a clue to Theodore's whereabouts in the autumn of 1388. Contrary to Loenertz, the Senate *did* commission these castellans to contact Theodore, evidently through envoys, with the limited competence to propose the idea of a league, and assess the despot's inclinations. Apparently they would not, like Grimani, take up the more sensitive issue of Theodore's Turkish auxiliaries. More importantly, though, the full set of tasks expected of them – simultaneously dispatching envoys to Theodore, Nerio and Pedro de San Superano; gathering information; and returning a report *sine mora* to Venice – suggests that the senators operated on the assumption that Theodore, like the other princes, was in residence and could be contacted quickly by the local castellans.

It would seem, therefore, that the Senate envisioned the following series of maneuvers following the dispatch of its August 26th decisions. First, the castellans of Methoni and Koroni, who would naturally be the first to receive their instructions, would approach Theodore and present him with their allegedly spontaneous idea for a league. Likewise they would send envoys to Nerio and the Navarrese, insinuating Theodore's authorship of the plan, and exploring their particular reactions. Subsequently the results would be communicated to Venice. Meanwhile, Piero Grimani would have received his directives, and would now commence his effort to coopt Theodore as an ally, journeying to Mystra if necessary.

If the Senate's instructions were speedily delivered, according to plan, they presumably reached their destinations in early to mid September, 1388. Unfortunately, the Venetian documents do not indicate that this in fact occurred, and hence that Theodore was courted by the castellans and the bailo as the Senate intended. And whatever transpired, there is no reason to suppose that the league the senators envisioned ever materialized. At this juncture, we are faced with

50. R. J. LOENERTZ, *Pour l'histoire du Péloponèse au XIVe siècle (1382-1404)*, *Études Byzantines*, 1 (1943 [published 1944]) p. 169. In the republication of this article, Loenertz made no significant changes on this point (i.e., in ed. R.-J. LOENERTZ and P. SCHREINER, *Byzantina et Franco-Graeca*, [Roma 1970] p. 238).

two questions. What had Murād done by August 26, 1388 to provoke such profound anxieties in Venice, and why did the Senate's scheme to ensure the security of the Morea evaporate so quickly?

Unfortunately, there is no clear answer to the first question. It might be argued that the fears registered on August 26 reflect reactions to the second phase of Murād's Bulgarian campaign – i.e., when the sultan led an auxiliary army across the Dardanelles, and took up headquarters at Yanbolu. Such movements, involving naval and land operations, feasibly could have caused Venetian observers in Romania to relay the alarming communiqués to which the minutes allude. Such reports may not have conveyed sound information on Murād's objectives, but exaggerated fears that the Morea and Negroponte were potential campaign targets. On the other hand, the sultan's actions in northeastern Bulgaria may *not* have profoundly concerned the Venetians, at home or in Romania. Their animating interest clearly was the safety of their possessions in the Morea, and the recent, festering tensions with Murād. In other words, the issues and reports considered at the August 26 deliberation could have been, respectively, identical with and similar to those examined on July 23-24. Which interpretation is preferable? To exclude the first scenario as utterly impossible would be arbitrary; still, the second explanation is probably more likely. After all, if the senators were indeed disturbed by Ottoman expansionism in northeastern Bulgaria, one would expect that the deliberation record would have included some identifiable reference to Murād's latest campaign in this region.⁵¹

Let us consider, now, why this Venetian defense league, planned in late August 1388, failed to materialize. It is likely, first of all, that Theodore's communication to Piero Grimani – the one indicating that he might be willing to participate in such an alliance – was purely exploratory. The subsequent negotiations, if such there were, may have convinced the despot that he really had little to gain from closing ranks with Venice. As Loenertz succinctly observed, referring to the August 26 deliberation, “Venise... espérait amener le despote à congédier ses auxiliaires turcs. Mais elle n'offrait rien en échange.”⁵² In addition, twenty days before the Senate met on August 26 an event occurred in the Morea which, it would seem, precluded the possibility of Theodore joining an alliance against the Turks. Before examining this and its repercussions, however, let us consider a crisis of major import which unfolded in Bosnia, likewise in the month of August 1388.

51. My conclusions, here, are heavily influenced by Bariša Krekić and Elizabeth Zachariadou, whom I thank for having shared with me their views on this matter.

52. LOENERTZ, *op. cit.* (i.e., the first edition), p. 170.

The Crisis in Bosnia in Late August 1388

According to Neshrī, let us recall, the pivotal episode leading to the events of Kosovo was a conspiracy among the lords of Bosnia, Serbia and Īskenderiyye which culminated in “Lala Shahin’s” disastrous defeat somewhere in Bosnia. Fortunately a few Ragusan sources, narrative and documentary, shed at least some light on the realities of this episode.

Let us begin with an anonymous Ragusan chronicle, composed no earlier than the mid-fifteenth century, which conveys an echo of the battle Neshrī describes. The relevant passage, which amounts to only a few lines, is the earliest exiguous source explicitly describing such a battle and its outcome:⁵³

1388. On August 27 the Turks were smashed at Bilecia in Bosnia by the Bosnians, under Voevoda Vuchovich, who had 1700 lances. And the Voevod of the Turks was Scan [or Sciajn] Bascia, with twenty thousand lances. And few Turks made it back alive to their country.

The author alleges, then, that a battle such as the one Neshrī describes actually took place, on August 27, 1388, and that the adversaries were Bosnians commanded by [Vlatko] Vuković, and Turks led by a certain Shahin Pasha. The date, as we shall see, is corroborated by contemporary Ragusan documents. Vlatko Vuković may be identified as one of kralj Tvrtko’s generals, who, the chronicler tells us, later fought at the battle of Kosovo Polje.⁵⁴ Otherwise, his version of the outcome of the battle corroborates Neshrī, but without revealing what led Shahin Pasha to Bosnia, or whether Vlatko’s forces reflected a coalition among Tvrtko, Lazar and Djuradj. The author seems to envision the episode, however, simply as a clash between the Bosnians and the Turks.

A handful of Ragusan consiliar records provides a bit more clarity on the sequence of events, as well as Tvrtko and Djuradj II’s roles in the episode. They indicate, first of all, that by August 9, at the latest, Bosnians and Ragusans were anticipating a Turkish attack on their territory. In fact, by then Tvrtko had offered to send troops to Ragusa to augment its defenses. The Senate deferred action until the following day, when it appointed envoys to proceed to Djuradj and kralj Tvrtko. Tvrtko would be informed that Ragusa would accept a thousand soldiers to strengthen the defenses of Ston. The records state that Djuradj would likewise be contacted “on the matter of the Turks”, but unfortunately they do not specify precisely what the Ragusans wanted him to do.⁵⁵ In forming any hypothesis, it is

53. Ed. S. NODILO, *Annales Ragusini anonymi item Nicolai de Ragnina*, Monumenta Spectantia Historiam Slavorum Meridionalium, v. XIV, Scriptorum I, (Zagreb 1883) p. 48.

54. See EMMERT, *Serbian Golgotha, Kosovo, 1389*, p. 101, for a translation of the relevant passage.

55. Ed. M. DINIĆ, *Odluke veća Dubrovačke republike*, v. II, (Beograd 1964) p. 437-438, and note in particular: *Die VIII augusti. Rogatorum ball. XXVI. Pp. de eundo ad*

essential to note that the Ragusan records also reveal that Djuradj and Tvrtko were currently not on friendly terms, and that for many years the former had suffered from the latter's expansionism.⁵⁶ It should also be recognized that Neshrī's identification of Djuradj as Murād's vassal is credible.⁵⁷ With these considerations in mind, we might suppose the Ragusan elders hoped to convince Djuradj to intervene with Shahin, persuading him not to attack. Likewise they probably wished to assure him that their dealings with Tvrtko were a matter of self-defense and not an endorsement of the kralj's designs on Balšići lands.

Judging from these same documents, less than a week after these embassies forces under Shahin had either approached or penetrated the hinterland of Ragusa. Tvrtko, likewise, was evidently making more general preparations to confront the expected assault. On August 16, the Ragusan senate voted to allow all persons fleeing from the Turks to take refuge at Ston.⁵⁸ Four days later it elected "Georgius de Bossa" (Zore Bogšić) as their envoy *ad Sayn caput Turchorum*, presumably to persuade him to leave Ragusa in peace.⁵⁹ The outcome of this mission is unknown. By August 23, an envoy from Djuradj had arrived with instructions to negotiate, on the issue of the Turks, with a view to the "welfare and benefit" of Ragusa. The sense of this is again obscure. We may certainly conclude that Djuradj had resolved to cooperate to ensure Ragusan security, and possibly he either had or was about to parley with Shahin on Ragusa's behalf. He may even have advised the Ragusans to offer tribute to the Ottomans. In any event, according to Ćirković the clash between Shahin and his adversaries may have taken place within the next day or two, i.e., somewhat earlier than the Ragusan chronicler reports, since on

Consilium Maius pro facto Turchorum. Cp. XX. (p. 437); Die IX augusti MIII CLXXXVIII. Rogatorum ball. XXIII. Pp. de mittendo unum nuncium popullarem d. Georgio de Balsa pro facto Turchorum. Cp. XXIII. Pp. de mittendo domnum Marinum ad dictum d. Georgium. Cp. XXIII. (p. 437); Pp. de recipiendo in Stagno et Puncta mille homines armigeros illorum regis Bossine. . . Cp. XVII. (p. 438); p. de expediendo ambaxiatam ituram ad regem Bossine, Cp. XVIII (p. 438).

56. For a convenient summary of Tvrtko's relations with the Balšići to this point, see FINE, *The Late Medieval Balkans*, p. 392-393, and 396. Unfortunately Fine does not refer to the primary sources, for which see V. ĆOROVIĆ, *Kralj Tvrtko I Kotromanić*, (Beograd-Zemun 1925), p. 62-64, 70-76.

57. Scholars have generally supposed that Djuradj accepted vassalage soon after his accession, which came about after his uncle, Balša Balšić, was defeated and killed in a battle with the Turks in 1385. Presumably, then, these circumstances compelled him to submit. Cf. I. BOŽIĆ, *Zeta između Turaka i Mlečana*, in ed. M. DJUROVIĆ et al., *Istorija Crne Gore*, v. II, part 2, (Titograd 1970) p. 49-52, and again FINE, *op. cit.*, p. 391.

58. DINIĆ, *op. cit.*, p. 439 (*Die XVI Augusti. Rogatorum Ball. XXI. Pp. de dimittendo intrare in Stagno omnes gentes fugientes a Turchis...*).

59. *Ibid.*, p. 440 (*Die XX augusti. Rogatorum ball. XVIII. Pp. de mittendo unum nuncium ad Sayn caput Turchorum... Electus in ambaxiatorem ad Turchos. Georgius de Bossa Re.*). JIREČEK, *Geschichte der Serben*, p. 118, identified "Georgius de Bossa" as Bogšić.

August 26 the Ragusans resolved to liberate “Albanian” captives they had taken.⁶⁰ Whatever the case, the Senate was *still* urgently concerned on August 26 – the very day the Venetian Senate met, deliberating developments in Romania – since it resolved to inform king Sigismund of Hungary of recent developments, and to implore his advice for a “remedy” to the Turks.⁶¹

Lamentably the Ragusan documents make no further mention of Shahin, and hence our knowledge of his clash with the Bosnians depends primarily on the aforementioned anonymous chronicler, who dates the event to August 27. It is possible, but by no means certain, that news of the Ottoman defeat circulated to Constantinople, stimulating Demetrios Kydones to write a rather bittersweet letter to Manuel Palaiologos, who was still on Lemnos.⁶² Otherwise, there is pertinent evidence from the Ragusan conciliar records concerning the *aftermath* of the battle. On September 5, the Senate arranged to dispatch envoys to Tvrtko and Djurdj, this time for the express purpose of effecting “harmony and friendship” between the two. Tentatives towards this end were still being pursued, at Tvrtko’s initiative, in November 1388 and March 1389. The upshot of these negotiations is unknown.⁶³ Their occurrence, however, underscores the fact that prior to the battle of Bileća, and for some time thereafter, the relationship between Tvrtko and Djurdj was hardly amicable.

We may conclude from the Ragusan evidence that the Bosnians defeated Shahin at Bileća just before or on August 27, 1388, and that Tvrtko and Djurdj were not friends and allies when this occurred. This latter fact, moreover, by and large discredits Neshri’s view of the basic character of the episode. According to him, let us recall, Shahin’s expedition was evoked when Tvrtko, Lazar, and Djurdj formed an anti-Ottoman conspiracy or solidarity – a move, in the case of Djurdj and Lazar, equivalent to rebellion. Judging from the Ragusan documents, however, it is highly unlikely that such a scenario was possible. Tvrtko and Djurdj, first of all, were so antagonistic to one another that it is difficult to imagine them organizing a coalition and conspiracy to damage Murād. No additional material has thus far surfaced to clarify knez Lazar’s activities in 1388, particularly the summer. Still, it likewise seems implausible that he was

60. DINIĆ, *op. cit.*, p. 441 (*Die XXVI augusti. Rogatorum ball. XVI. Pp. de faciendo libere relaxari omnes Albanenses fugientes captos per nostros Raguseos. Cp. XIII.*). For ĆIRKOVIĆ’S interpretation, see his *Istorija srednjovekovne Bosanske države*, p. 158.

61. DINIĆ, *op. cit.*, p. 441 (*Dicto die [i.e. XXVI augusti]. Rogatorum ball. XVIII. Pp. de scribendo de nov[is] Turchorum prefato d. nostro [i.e., regi Hungarie] et consilium super remedio contra ipsos, iuxta id quod petit et secundum quod super hoc scriptum est per officiales. Cp. XV.*”).

62. See in particular S. ĆIRKOVIĆ, Dimitrije Kidon o Kosovskom Boju, ZR, 12 (1970) 213-19, and my article “A Byzantine Source on the Battles of Bileća (?) and Kosovo Polje. Kydones’ Letters 396 and 398 Reconsidered,” forthcoming in *Studies in Honor of V. Ménage*, ed. C. HEYWOOD, C. IMBER and C. FINKEL.

63. ĆOROVIĆ, *Kralj Tvrtko I Kotromanić*, p. 77-79.

involved in this episode, since his relations with Tvrtko at this point in time may not have been as cordial as scholars traditionally have supposed.⁶⁴ There is, in summary, no convincing evidence that Tvrtko, Djuradj and Lazar conspired (in any combination) to ambush the Ottomans in the summer of 1388.

Why, then, did Shahin invade Bosnia in August, 1388? Several recent historians have argued that Djuradj indeed induced the Ottomans to invade Bosnia, in the framework of his vassalage to Murād, and for the express purpose of injuring if not eliminating his rival, kralj Tvrtko. Thereafter, it is implied, Tvrtko became apprised of Djuradj's maneuverings, organized his defenses, and successfully confronted Shahin once he arrived in Bosnia. His scheme to ruin Tvrtko having backfired, Djuradj then reconsidered his position and entered peace negotiations. Those who favor this reconstruction obviously accept two key elements from Neshri's account, namely that as of 1388 Djuradj was an Ottoman vassal, and that he indeed promised to deliver Bosnia to Murād, contingent on appropriate Ottoman help. They seem to suppose, however, that Neshri's view of Djuradj's motives constitutes an inversion of reality – the metamorphosis of a scheming but nonetheless loyal vassal into a treacherous conspirator.⁶⁵ This interpretation strikes me as quite plausible. Indeed, Djuradj's maneuverings vis-à-vis Tvrtko appear fundamentally similar to those of Theodore Palaiologos against his *archontes*. Both needed the Turks as leverage against local enemies, and the Turks, for their part, readily exploited such opportunities as a "method of conquest".⁶⁶

Let us conclude by emphasizing what is significant in this episode. Whatever stimulated Shahin's campaign, there is no doubt that Tvrtko's troops humiliated the Ottomans at Bileća in late summer 1388. We may confidently suppose, moreover, that this experience turned Murād's attention, once again, to the northwestern udj. Curiously, however, he did not organize any reprisals in 1388, despite the fact that he must have learned of Shahin's defeat certainly by mid-September. Had the forces assembled for the Bulgarian campaign already been dispersed? Was it deemed inadvisable to invade Serbia at this particular time, so close to the onset of autumn? Whatever the case, we may concur with Jireček that it was apparently the fiasco at Bileća – i.e., and not the earlier skirmish at Pločnik – which provoked Murād to return to Serbia in spring 1389, doubtless with the intent of continuing to Bosnia.⁶⁷

64. ČIRKOVIĆ, Serbia on the Eve of the Battle of Kosovo, p. 12-14.

65. JIREČEK hinted at this interpretation in his abbreviated and rather arbitrary summary of Neshri (whom he knew through Leunclavius) in his *Geschichte der Serben*, p. 118-119, including note 1 on p. 119. For a more explicit "exegetis", see ČIRKOVIĆ, *Istorija srednjovekovne Bosanske države*, p. 158, and BOŽIĆ, *Zeta izmedju Turaka i Mlečana*, p. 52-53.

66. See most recently ZACHARIADOU, *Marginalia*, p. 196.

67. After describing the events at Bileća, Jireček states "Dieses Missgeschick bewog Murad zu einem grossen Feldzug gegen Serbian und Bosnien". (*Geschichte der Serben*, v. II, p. 119).

The Crisis in the Morea, August-December 1388

When Shahin and his troops met their fate at Bileća, the Venetians, let us recall, were frenetically planning a defensive league among the Christian powers of the Morea, including of course Theodore Palaiologos, whose ties with Evrenos Beg were suspiciously close. As indicated, moreover, this alliance seems not to have materialized. More likely than not, the development which precluded such – and which entangled Murād more deeply in Morean affairs – was the death of Piero Corner, lord of Argos and Nauplio.

Piero Corner had acquired his position in the Argolid because of his marriage to Marie d'Enghien, a scion of the Brienne family, and heiress to Argos and Nauplio.⁶⁸ It is now known that Piero died on August 6, 1388, leaving behind a widow who was less than twenty-five years old, and who had no son on whose behalf she could rule. Consequently, a crisis of leadership ensued, arousing the predatory ambition of neighboring princes, in particular Theodore and his father-in-law, Nerio Acciaiuoli, duke of Athens.⁶⁹ Nerio's goal, it would seem, was to detach the Argolid from Venetian influence, and at all costs to prevent the republic from acquiring direct control of its chief cities. His strategy was not, however, to dispatch his own troops to conquer Argos and Nauplio, but to support the ambitions of Theodore, his son-in-law, to annex them to the despotate.

There is no reason to presume, as have some, that Theodore immediately occupied Argos and Nauplio following Piero's death.⁷⁰ Rather, it would seem that he commenced his attack on these cities sometime in December, occupying them by the end of the month or early in 1389. Throughout the previous four months, Theodore apparently engaged in military and diplomatic preparations to enable, as well as justify, his projected takeover of these cities. Conversely, the Corner as well as the Venetians in the Argolid pressured the hapless Marie to sell her legacy to Venice, and thereby assure an adequate defense against Theodore, Nerio, or the Turks. Let us first consider Theodore's activities, the evidence for which derives from an inscription commissioned by the despot, and placed above the door of the church of the Panaghia at Parori.⁷¹

68. A. LUTTRELL, *The Latins of Argos and Nauplia: 1311-1394, Papers of the British School at Rome*, v. 34 = n.s. v. 21 (1966) 42.

69. The date of Corner's death, unknown to Luttrell and his predecessors, and first noted by Schreiner, appears in the anonymous *Chronicle of Argos and Nauplio*. For the passage, see SCHREINER, *Kleinchroniken*, v. I, p. 232, entry no 23, i.e., 1388/6896 (Ind. 11) Aug. 6.

70. E. g. SETTON, *The Catalans and Florentines in Greece*, p. 247. Luttrell, however, is more cautious, stating that Theodore, late in 1388, "attacked Argos and Nauplia" (*The Latins of Argos and Nauplia*, p. 47).

71. The definitive edition is by R.J. LOENERTZ, *Res Gestae Theodori Ioann. F. Palaeologi, Titulus metricus A.D. 1389, Epetēris Hetaireias Byzantinōn Spoudōn*, 25 (1955) 207-210. For a description of this inscription, see LOENERTZ's supplemental (bracketed) remarks in the 1970 reprint of *Pour l'histoire du Péloponèse au XIVe siècle*, in note 1 on p. 228.

Fourteen lines of this inscription summarize events from the aftermath of Evrenoz Beg's incursion to Theodore's conquest of Argos. They may be translated as follows:⁷²

Then, seeing that the Agarenes had taken possession of virtually the entire land and disregarding toil, trouble and danger, [Theodore], in his good judgment, went about everywhere, so that we might have a hope of deliverance, and no longer see captivity. Then, having conversed pleasantly with the emir, and having found there an unexpectedly favorable reception, he received [from him] authority over the Peloponnese. When he returned, he conquered the lordship of Argos, that is the entire [territory] which [those] tyrants were ruling, and was led before us a trophy-bearing victor, the Latins having been quite humiliated, or rather, thoroughly damaged.

Let us examine the content of this segment, and then consider its bearing on Theodore's maneuverings between the death of Corner, i.e., August 6, 1388, and his conquest of Argos, i.e., late December 1388 or early 1389.

This portion of the inscription delineates a sequence of five events in Theodore's life, none of which are elaborated in any detail. It alleges, first of all, that Theodore resolved to journey to Murād's presence sometime after Evrenoz Beg's intervention, his objective being to ensure the safety of his subjects and avert direct Ottoman conquest. The text does not specify the exact circumstances which induced Theodore to take this step, but suggests that he made his decision on the basis of general considerations, namely his understanding of the extent of the Turkish conquests and the threat this consequently posed. Secondly, the inscription indicates that Theodore left the Morea to meet Murād, but does not record the precise locale of their meeting. The sultan is designated merely by his title – ὁ ἀμηρᾶς (the emir). The third event to which the inscription alludes is Theodore's meeting with Murād. Here it is affirmed that the despot was well-received, and that his conversations with the sultan were cordial. Otherwise, the text insinuates that their discussion focused substantively on Theodore's political status, and that ultimately Murād accorded him ἐξουσία (authority) over the Peloponnese. Thereafter, it is alleged, Theodore returned to the Morea. The fifth and final event recorded in the inscription is Theodore's conquest of the "lordship of Argos", qualified to mean the entire territory held by the masters of Argos. The

72. LOENERTZ, *Res Gestae Theodori*, p. 209-210, lines 70-83: Ἐπειτα, εἰδὼς Ἄγαρηνοὺς τὴν κτίσιν / ἄπασαν ὡς ἀντικρὺς ἐν χερσὶν ἔχειν, / μόχθου κόπου τε, κινδύνου παραβλέψας, / γνώμη ἀγαθῆ εἰς ὑψήλιον τρέχει, / ὡς ἂν ἔχοιμεν ἐλπίδα σωτηρίας / καὶ μηκέτι ἴδοιμεν αἰχμαλωσίαν. / Εἶτα ἀμηρᾶ ὠμιληκῶς ἠδέως, / ἀναδοχὴν εὖνοιαν εὖρηκῶς ξένην / ἐξουσίαν ἔλαβε Πελοποννήσου, / χειρῶσας ἑλλῶν δεσποτείαν τοῦ Ἄργου / πᾶσάν τε φημι ἦν δυνάσται ἐκράτουν, / ἀχθεῖς πρὸς ἡμᾶς νικητὴς τροπαιοῦχος, / τῶν Λατίνων πάντῳ γε κατησχυμένων / ἢ μᾶλλον εἰπεῖν ζημιωθέντων ἄγαν.

latter are characterized as Latins, but their names are not mentioned. Otherwise, the text intimates that Theodore attacked them in response to previous acts which merited their “humiliation” and “damage”. Hence, what he did was morally justifiable, and a legitimate expression of the “authority” he now held in the Peloponnese, implicitly as the emir’s subordinate.

Loenertz, in 1944, was the first to explicate the events to which this passage alludes. In his view, the “emir” whom Theodore visited was of course Murād, and he conjectured their encounter presumably took place either in Edirne or Bursa. Theodore proceeded there in order to submit to Murād formally, thereby attaining continuous military aid from the Ottomans. In so doing, the despot “rendered homage” to Murād, and the sultan “formally invested [Theodore] with the despotate, which he henceforth governed in his name.” Thereafter Theodore returned to the Morea, and, with the backing of Murād and Nerio Acciaiuoli, commenced his struggle with Venice for the possession of Argos.⁷³ Loenertz conjectured, moreover, that the Venetian Senate deliberation of August 26 provided a clue to the chronology of these events. As previously discussed, he supposed that the senators’ commission to the bailo in Constantinople indicated that Theodore was either in the capital in August 1388, or expected shortly to appear. Then, correlating Theodore’s alleged sojourn in Constantinople with his journey to Murād’s court, he surmised that the despot stopped in the capital, either before or after his interview with Murād, to consult with his father, John V.⁷⁴

Loenertz’s interpretation while fundamentally sound, may be modified in three respects. First of all, the clarification of Piero Corner’s death date allows us to specify, or at least to attempt to specify, Theodore’s reasons for visiting Murād at this particular time. By mid-August, the despot certainly realized that Venice might intervene either to protect Marie d’Enghien’s legacy in the Argolid, or annex it directly. Like Nerio Acciaiuoli in Athens, Theodore naturally feared and opposed any expansion of Venetian power in the Morea. More to the point, he clearly aspired to subject the Argolid to the despotate. Thus, when he journeyed to Murād sometime after Corner’s death, he plausibly did so to obtain sanction and

73. “Vainqueur de ses propres sujets grâce à l’aide d’un chef turc, le despote Théodore résolut de faire sa soumission à l’émir Mourad afin de s’assurer le bénéfice permanent de l’assistance ottomane... en cette année 1388 Théodore... s’en alla auprès de l’émir Mourad Ier pour lui prêter hommage. Il fut bien accueilli, et l’émir l’investit formellement du despotat, qu’il gouvernerait désormais en son nom. Cet honneur singulier était expressément rappelé sur le marbre de Parori! Le Paléologue rentra ensuite chez lui et, fort de sa nouvelle condition de vassal turc, escomptant la protection de Mourad et l’aide de son beau-père le duc florentin d’Athènes que l’alliance turque ne rebutait pas..., il se lança dans le célèbre conflit avec Venise à propos d’Argos”: Pour l’histoire du Péloponèse au XIV^e siècle, first edition, p. 169; no significant changes in the 1970 reprint.

74. “Peut-être alla-t-il d’abord à Constantinople pour se concerter avec son père l’empereur, ainsi qu’il semble l’avoir fait dans toutes les occasions mémorables de son règne. Toutefois le passage de l’inscription qui pourrait avoir ce sens est ambigu... En tout cas le voyage de Théodore à Constantinople, avant ou après son entrevue avec Mourad,

support for his anticipated moves in the Argolid, and inevitable conflict with Venice.

On the other hand, Theodore probably did *not* approach Murād late in 1388 as an autonomous ruler. It seems more likely, in other words, that the despot had already submitted to the Ottomans the previous year, i.e., in late summer or autumn 1387, when he secured Evrenoz Beg's assistance.⁷⁵ Assuming this was the case, it follows that when Theodore came to Murād in 1388 it was not to negotiate terms of submission, i.e., to construct the vassal-lord relationship, as Loenertz evidently supposed. Rather, he arrived as an established tributary, seeking now a specific grant of authority to annex the d'Enghien legacy and administer it, in continuing subordination to Murād.

The date of Theodore's visit with Murād, finally, should not be calculated with reference to the August 26 Venetian senate deliberation, but rather the evidence of the Parori Inscription itself. As discussed above, the Senate's instruction to "our bailo in Constantinople" does not necessarily prove that Theodore was in the capital in August 1388, or that he was expected to arrive sometime (plausibly) in September. The Parori Inscription, on the other hand, indicates very clearly that Theodore made his trip to Murād's court shortly before his attack on Argos. That event, as we shall see, can be situated on the basis of documentary evidence in mid-December 1388. Presumably, then, Theodore journeyed to Edirne or Bursa sometime in late autumn 1388 (October or November?). Prior to that, we may suppose, he was watching the situation in Nauplio, and coordinating plans with Acciaiuoli.

While Theodore was plotting his moves, and cementing his liaison with Murād, Marie d'Enghien, the Corner, and the Venetians of the Argolid were likewise searching for an ally. The Corner resolved that Marie should sell her

est fort probable" (*Ibid.*, p. 169, again with no subsequent changes). The passage in the inscription which Loenertz found ambiguous was the fifteenth line of column three, which G. MILLET edited as *γνώμη ἀγαθῆ εἰς ὑφήλιον τρέχει* (Les inscriptions byzantines de Mistra, *Bulletin de Correspondance Hellénique*, 23 [1899] p. 152). Loenertz translated this to mean "... guidé par son jugement éclairé il se rendit auprès du [chef] universel", claiming that *ὑφήλιος* designates "la terre entière, l'universel". Clarifying further he wrote: "Ici c'est un adjectif pris substantivement, l'universel, l'oecuménique. Quel est ce personnage oecuménique? Sûrement pas le patriarche, mais le souverain, soit l'empereur byzantin, basileus titulaire de l'*οἰκουμένη*, soit plutôt le maître effectif, l'émir turc" (*op. cit.*, p. 161, and note 3). In 1944, therefore, Loenertz was uncertain whether *ὑφήλιος* referred to the emperor John V, or the emir Murād I. When he published his edition of the inscription in 1955, he no longer regarded the term as ambiguous and now explicated it straightforwardly as follows: "*ὑφήλιον*: universalis (*scil.* dominus) est Turcorum princeps, καθολικὸς αὐθέντης..." (Res Gestae Theodori, p. 209, note to line 73). More plausibly the phrase *εἰς ὑφήλιον τρέχει* simply means that he "went about everywhere", i.e., "searched high and low" or "searched everywhere under the sun".

75. Cf. J. CHRYSOSTOMIDES, *Manuel II Palaeologus, Funeral Oration on His Brother Theodore*, CFHB (Thessalonica 1985) p. 18, with evidence in note 13.

properties to Venice, and pressured her relentlessly to make the transaction. Their sentiment was shared by the Venetians of Argos and Nauplio, who feared that Nerio would attempt to conquer their cities. The details of these maneuverings throughout the autumn of 1388 are unknown. However, early in December 1388, if not before, Marie journeyed to Venice to discuss the sale of her legacy. At the same time, it would seem, a group of local Venetian nobles and citizens commissioned Giovanni Gradonigo to convey to the republic their letters and arguments supporting that action. In its meeting on December 12, the Senate heard Gradonigo's appeal, voted in favor of the purchase, and negotiated with Marie an instrument of purchase.⁷⁶

It would appear that Marie's negotiations with the Venetians stimulated Theodore to commence military action against Argos and Nauplio. Unfortunately, the documents pertaining to the deliberation and transactions of December 12 do not reveal whether he had taken the offensive by that date. By the time the Senate met on December 22, however, news had arrived that Argos was under siege. We may assume, moreover, that Theodore was also attempting to secure Nauplio.⁷⁷ These actions initiated a conflict between the despot and the Venetians which would last for over five years, and which the sultans – first Murād, and then Bāyazīd – would observe with keen interest.

The Genoese Inspired anti-Turkish League, November-December 1388

Throughout November and December of 1388, the Genoese of Pera, the Hospitallers of Rhodes, King James of Cyprus, the Mahona of Chios, and Francesco II Gattilusio, lord of Lesbos, formed among themselves a *ligam, unionem, confederacionem, fraternitatem et societatem* in order to confront not only the Ottomans, but *omnes et singulos turcos infideles*.⁷⁸ This was essentially a defensive alliance, the precise mechanics of which need not concern us here. The timing of this alliance, however, is of considerable interest. Why, in the late autumn of 1388, did these Aegean and East Mediterranean lords consider it imperative to form a league against the Turks, i.e., the Ottomans as well as the other Anatolian begs?

The instrument signed by James of Cyprus on November 2, 1388, contains an extremely fascinating line which feasibly clarifies the league's genesis. This indicates that the society was directed especially against *illum Turcum filium*

76. See LUTTRELL, *The Latins of Argos and Nauplia*, p. 47-48, for the terms of the contract.

77. SCHREINER, *Kleinchroniken*, v. I, p. 233, entry no 27, i.e., 1388 Dec.-1389 Jan. /6897 (Ind. 12): καὶ πρὸ τοῦ λαβεῖν τὸ Ἄργος ἐπολέμησε μὲ τοὺς Ἄναπλιώτας τοῦ δῶσαι αὐτοῦ τὸ Ναύπλιον.

78. L. BELGRANO, *Seconda serie di documenti riguardanti la colonia di Pera, Atti SLSP*, Appendices to v. 13 (1888) 956 (from the Hospitallers' pact). For a summary of the document, see G. HILL, *A History of Cyprus*, v. II, *The Frankish Period, 1192-1432*, (Cambridge 1948) p. 439-40.

*iniquitatis et nequicie, ac sancte Crucis nimicum, Moratus Bey et eius sectam, cristianum genus sic graviter invadere conantes.*⁷⁹ Intriguing, here, is the allusion to a major Ottoman assault against *cristianum genus*. Is this simply a generalization, or does it refer to a specific act of aggression? Unfortunately, the agreements sworn by the other parties provide no clarification. Murād's recent Bulgarian campaign (winter/spring-summer, 1388) certainly qualifies as such an attack, but would this have stimulated these particular Mediterranean powers to forge an anti-Turkish alliance? It seems improbable, but again we should not summarily dismiss its possibility. After all, one of the contracting parties, Genoa, did have commercial interests on the Bulgarian littoral. Alternatively, the formation of the league, at this point in time, might simply be viewed as the continuation of an earlier agenda, now attaining success.⁸⁰

1389, ca. January - June

Our knowledge of Murād's movements from early 1389 to the eve of his fateful Serbian campaign is virtually nill. Nonetheless there is some independent testimony regarding his diplomatic and military agenda in Rumili during these months. This pertains, unfortunately, only to Venice and the Palaiologoi, and extremely little has thus far emerged to clarify the immediate background to the Kosovo campaign. In any event, let us consider the meager information we have, proceeding, as before, region by region.

The Continuing Crisis in the Morea

As is evident again from the Venetian records, Murād continued throughout his final months to support Theodore Palaiologos' designs on the d'Enghien legacy. Prior to the battle of Kosovo, the despot's struggle with the Venetians had evolved through two phases.

Between mid-December 1388 and early April 1389, the bone of contention was *both* Argos and Nauplio. In their December 22 meeting, the Venetian senators anticipated that military aid could not be delivered to the Argolid before mid-April 1389. Therefore, they exhorted Albano Contarini, the commander at Argos, to resist Theodore as best he could until spring. At the same time letters were sent to Theodore and Nerio, demanding that the aggression on Argos cease. These

79. *Ibid.*, p. 954.

80. Judging from Thiriet's summary of the Venetian Senate deliberation of June 8, 1388, the Genoese had already proposed a "league" to Venice in the spring of 1388 (*Sénat*, v. I, no 739, p. 178). It would seem, however, that at that time the Genoese were seeking to establish a more general *modus operandi* vis-à-vis the Turks, rather than a specifically military alliance. That the Venetians did not participate in the alliances concluded late in 1388 is hardly surprising, since, as we have seen, the republic was delicately attempting to secure Argos and Nauplio without antagonizing Murād.

measures, however, were quite ineffectual. In fact, it is likely that Theodore had occupied Argos and Nauplio by the time the Senate's missives reached their destinations. When the Senate met on February 18, 1389, its chief task was devising a strategy to secure its recently purchased territories from Theodore. On January 26, the senators had agreed to appoint Perazzo Malipiero as provisor (governor) of Argos and Nauplio. They now commissioned him to proceed to Koroni and determine whether the despot might be persuaded, through negotiation and other pressures, to surrender the cities.⁸¹ The Venetians did acquire Nauplio on April 2, although it remains unclear precisely how.⁸² Thereafter Malipiero established his headquarters in Nauplio, and absorbed himself in negotiations to obtain Argos.

Malipiero's efforts to secure Argos bore no fruit during the final months of Murād's reign. Having lost Nauplio, Theodore was inflexibly resolved to keep Argos. Moreover, he continued to have Murād's support, and plotted his moves in consultation with him, as is evident from the Venetian senate deliberation of May 31, 1389. In the course of that meeting, the senators vituperated over a letter which Theodore had sent, announcing that he could not parley about Argos until Murād answered a recent inquiry of his. Unfortunately, the deliberation record does not indicate the nature of this inquiry, and nothing of Theodore's communications with Murād has thus far come to light. Nonetheless, the allusion at least clarifies that a close liaison had formed between the despot and the sultan as a result of this crisis. Indeed, the Venetians probably refrained from launching direct military action to secure Argos because they feared provoking Murād. Consequently, on May 31, they simply enjoined Malipiero to renew negotiations with Theodore and Nerio, this time in the company of Nicholas Zeno, captain of the Gulf.⁸³ Their efforts were again futile. A fortnight later, when Murād died at Kosovo Polje, Theodore still held Argos, and would continue to do so down to 1394.

From the Ottoman perspective, the results of Murād's contacts with Theodore from late 1388 through spring 1389 were twofold. The despotate of Mystra was securely absorbed, like the territories ruled by John V and John VII, within the *dār al-ahd*. Murād acquired thereby an additional source of tribute, and a corridor for expanding his political and military influence in the southern Aegean. Secondly,

81. The Senate instructed Malipiero to consider the usefulness of negotiating with Nerio, and also to request assistance and support from Bishop Paolo Foscari of Patras (a Venetian citizen), and Pedro de San Superan. On this sequence, see SETTON, *The Catalans and Florentines in Greece*, p. 248.

82. The date of the transfer was established again by Schreiner, from the chronicle of Argos and Nauplio (*Kleinchroniken*, v. I, p. 232, entry no 24, i.e., 1389/6897 [Ind. 12]). The notice merely records that on this date "... ἐπαράλαβεν ἡ ἐκλαμπροτάτη αὐθεντία τὸ Ναύπλιον [καὶ τὴν] περιοχὴν αὐτοῦ". As Schreiner himself remarks, "Es gibt sich aus den Quellen nicht, ob Nauplion friedlich an Venedig zurückgegeben oder ob es zurückerobert wurde".

83. SETTON, *The Catalans and Florentines in Greece*, p. 248.

by aiding Theodore in his struggle to obtain the d'Enghien legacy, Murād commenced an Ottoman-Venetian rivalry for dominance in the Morea which was to have a very long history. He did so, however, in a tentative way, refusing to allow Theodore's ambitions to entangle the Ottomans in a full-scale war with the republic.

Murād and the Tensions between John VII and John V

The exact chronology is again unclear, but plausibly sometime in the opening months of 1389 John VII Palaiologos began searching for allies to assist him in overthrowing his grandfather, John V. In past decades Murād had shown himself keenly sensitive to the rivalries and power struggles among the Palaiologoi, which he had repeatedly exploited to his advantage. It is possible, albeit difficult to prove, that he presently endorsed John VII's ambitions.

The latter's motives are not difficult to surmise. Now in his late teens, John VII earnestly hoped that he would succeed his grandfather as emperor in Constantinople. Moreover, his claims were not insignificant.⁸⁴ He and his supporters must have been startled, however, when his uncle Manuel left Thessaloniki and subsequently effected a reconciliation with Murād and John V, in autumn 1387. As indicated above, the elder emperor nonetheless insisted that Manuel withdraw to Lemnos, in some measure to allay John VII's concerns that his prospects for the succession were now dashed. Likewise he pointedly refrained from acknowledging Manuel as his heir apparent.⁸⁵ The evidence indicates,

84. John VII's claims probably originated in 1377, when his own father, Andronikos IV, very likely crowned him co-emperor (cf. BARKER, *Manuel II*, p. 29, and esp. note 70; p. 74-75, and note 200). Moreover, in treaties concluded in 1381 and 1382 Andronikos' status as John V's successor was officially recognized, obviously to the exclusion of Manuel II; on the treaties, see in particular DENNIS, *The Reign of Manuel II*, p. 44-51, BARKER, *Manuel II*, p. 41-42, and K. SETTON, *The Papacy and the Levant [1204-1571]*, v. I, *The Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries*, (Philadelphia 1976) p. 322-323; on Manuel's return to Thessaloniki in 1382, see DENNIS, *op. cit.*, p. 49-51 and 59-60. It was in consequence of this that Manuel proceeded to Thessaloniki and commenced his independent-minded reign over that city (BARKER, *Manuel II*, p. 68-69). John VII, at that juncture, doubtless expected that Andronikos IV would succeed John V, and that he would eventually succeed *his* father. This scenario did not, in point of fact, materialize. First of all, Andronikos IV unexpectedly died in 1385. This meant that the succession was once again an open question, the chief contenders being John VII and his uncle Manuel, John V's eldest surviving son. In the months following Andronikos IV's death, the Genoese of Pera had repeatedly demonstrated their support for John VII, and likewise their disdain for John V; cf. DENNIS, *The Reign of Manuel II*, p. 158-59; BARKER, *Manuel II*, p. 63-66; LOENERTZ, *L'exil de Manuel II Paléologue à Lemnos, 1387-1389*, *OCP*, 38 (1972) esp. p. 118-119. It would seem however, that John VII was too young to capitalize on this support, since in 1385/1386 he was only fifteen or sixteen. Perhaps more importantly, Manuel posed little threat, since he was fully occupied with the defense of Thessaloniki through March or early April, 1387.

85. DENNIS, *The Reign of Manuel II*, p. 158-59; BARKER, *Manuel II*, p. 63-66; LOENERTZ, *L'exil de Manuel II*, esp. p. 118-119.

however, that John V's arrangements were insufficient to calm his grandson's fears.

Genoese documents discovered by Michel Balard establish that in May 1389 John VII was in Genoa, where he was recognized as emperor and received a loan of 250 pounds. They also indicate that the young man remained in Genoa possibly as late as January 1390, and then sailed to the east. Unfortunately, it is unclear from these records precisely why John VII was in Genoa.⁸⁶ His subsequent behavior, however, may well provide a clue. In April, 1390 John VII launched his coup against John V and besieged Constantinople with Genoese and Turkish aid. On the night of April 13/14 he succeeded in entering the city, which he ruled for a mere three months.⁸⁷ One might deduce, then, that John VII journeyed west to secure Genoese authorization and support for his struggle with John V.

Those who have studied the problem generally suppose this to have been so, and I see no reason to dispute their conclusion.⁸⁸ Missing from their assessments, however, are two considerations. Why did John VII embark on his plot at this particular moment, presumably late in 1388 or early in 1389? And did Murād himself encourage John VII to secure Genoese aid, intending eventually to withdraw support from John V? The first question is virtually impenetrable. One wonders, nonetheless, if John VII felt in some way threatened not only by Manuel's return, but by Theodore's recent alliance with Murād. In other words, did he fear that his uncle might now serve as Manuel's ally and advocate at the Porte? This is of course speculative, but the intensity of Theodore's devotion to his brother Manuel is indisputable.⁸⁹

In approaching the second question, let us recall that John VII was unquestionably an Ottoman vassal, and he probably would not have embarked on a journey to Italy, whatever the reason, without having consulted the sultan. Presumably, then, John VII must have communicated with Murād at some prior to sailing west. It is likewise difficult to imagine that John VII would have concealed his designs vis-à-vis the Genoese and John V – knowing, as he assuredly did, that his chances of successfully launching a coup against his grandfather were negligible without Ottoman support, or at least acquiescence. These considerations do not, of course, inevitably lead to the conclusion that Murād sanctioned John VII's aspirations and sent him west with his blessings. Still, one cannot help but wonder if that was the case. Was Murād dissatisfied with John V at this point, perhaps fearing that his obeisant stance might sooner or later change, now that Manuel had appeared on the scene? Did the sultan hope to obtain a further measure of influence in Constantinople with John VII on the throne? Had

86. BALARD, *Romanie*, v. I, p. 94, and esp. note 320.

87. BARKER, *Manuel II*, p. 71-78; also important is E. ZACHARIADOU's John VII (alias Andronicus) Palaeologus, *DOP*, 31 (1977) 339-342.

88. BARKER, *Manuel II*, p. 69-70 with full discussion of historiography thus far in note

188. Of significance since is BALARD, *Romanie*, p. 94-95.

89. Cf. CHRYSOSTOMIDES, *Manuel II Palaeologus*, p. 28.

the recent tensions with Venice induced him to consider even closer relations with Genoa, to the extent of supporting their preferred emperor? Again it is impossible to know from the evidence at hand. Let us simply recall that when John VII returned to the east, early in 1390, at which time Murād was dead, the young man assuredly met with Bāyazīd, or at least secured his intervention, to obtain the Turkish troops he used in attacking Constantinople. The new sultan may well have granted his permission, so quickly and agreeably, merely out of opportunism. Then again, he might have effected a plan entertained by his father.

In conclusion, we may at least entertain the possibility that, in the closing months of his life, Murād was again playing the game which by now he had mastered – exploiting the incessant rivalries within the Palaiologan clan to Ottoman advantage.

The Aftermath of Bileća in Bosnia, Zeta and Serbia

For generations students of Serbian history have diligently scrutinized the available sources for clues to the movements and concerns of the Slavic princes throughout the six months preceding the battle of Kosovo.⁹⁰ Despite their impressive labors, the interval between the battle of Bileća and Murād's campaign to Serbia remains disappointingly obscure, on the Slavic as well as Ottoman sides. Has anything, then, emerged which might affect our assessment of Neshrī's version of events?

As we have seen, Ragusan consiliar records reveal Tvrtko and Djuradj maneuvering towards peace in September and November 1388, and again in March 1389, but conversely do not clarify whether these negotiations resulted in a treaty. In any event, we need not suppose that Djuradj simultaneously rejected his ties with Murād, or that Murād viewed him as an enemy. This cannot be proven but merely inferred, since Djuradj seems not to have fought with knez Lazar and his allies at Kosovo.⁹¹ Whatever the case, Tvrtko must certainly have welcomed this easing of hostilities, since it freed him to establish his authority over the Dalmatian cities he had acquired in 1387. Indeed, this seems to have been his main political and military priority through the spring of 1389.⁹² Otherwise, nothing more of Tvrtko or Djuradj's activities, in this particular time frame, has been established which is germane to our theme.

Knez Lazar's activities during the six or seven months preceding Kosovo Polje are even more obscure. On the basis of two of Sigismund's charters, scholars have traditionally assumed that Lazar's overriding concern in spring 1389 must

90. For a fine summation of what is known, with references to earlier literature, see again ĆIRKOVIĆ, *Serbia on the Eve of the Battle of Kosovo*, p. 1-17.

91. Cf. BOŽIĆ, *Zeta između Turaka i Mlečana*, p. 53-54.

92. ĆOROVIĆ, *Kralj Tvrtko I Kotromanić*, p. 79-80.

have been his relations with Hungary. Indeed, it would seem that in March Lazar learned that Sigismund was preparing to invade his realm, ostensibly in retaliation for his previous attacks on Hungarian possessions. Thereafter warfare was supposedly averted through the mediation of Nikola Gorjanski the Younger, Lazar's son-in-law and a staunch supporter of Sigismund, who conveyed the knez's acknowledgement of Hungarian suzerainty. This submission may have affected or complicated Lazar's relations with Tvrtko, an enemy of Sigismund, but it remains unclear precisely how.⁹³ Aside from this crisis, nothing is known of Lazar's agenda at this time.

What do these few, disparate fragments reveal about relations between the Slavs and the Ottomans in the months preceding Kosovo? Obviously, very little. Particularly disappointing is the fact that no record of contacts between Murād and the aforementioned princes has survived. Likewise we can hardly surmise from the evidence whether the Slavic lords forged a significant "anti-Ottoman coalition" in consequence of Shahin's defeat and the predictable Ottoman revanche. Admittedly, there is no proof that discussions in this direction were not pursued, and well in advance of the news that Murād was intending to invade Serbia. Given the little we know about Tvrtko and Lazar's agendas, however, it is distinctly possible that this was not the case. The great lords, in other words, may very well have pursued their individual ambitions, with little thought for collective defense, until they were apprised that an invasion was forthcoming.

Let us return, now, to the *casus belli*, and how Murād and Lazar variously justified or characterized their confrontation. As previously noted, Jireček and others have supposed, in the absence of more revealing evidence, that Murād returned to Serbia to avenge Shahin's defeat, and otherwise resume expansionary confrontation. The conjecture is reasonable, but it still remains to explain why Murād's initial target apparently was knez Lazar and not kralj Tvrtko – whose general, after all, decimated Shahin's forces at Bileća. One can, of course, dismiss the issue by appealing to elementary geographic and tactical considerations. To proceed to Bosnia, Murād would have to confront the remaining Serbian princes, with whom, in any case, Tvrtko predictably would ally in a time of dire threat. But we may further imagine that Murād may very well have *presumed* that Lazar was closely allied with Tvrtko, and that his troops had fought with Vlatko Vuković against Shahin Pasha, as Neshri confidently believed. After all, Ottoman intelligence on the alignments of Slavic princes may have been limited, and it would have been natural and indeed prudent for Murād to have *suspected* that Lazar and Tvrtko were allied, even if that were not the case. It would seem therefore, that Murād marched to Kosovo intending to punish all parties he deemed responsible for the fiasco at Bileća, and likewise to advance the *udj* even

93. ĆIRKOVIĆ, *Serbia on the Eve of the Battle of Kosovo*, p. 13, with references to the documents.

further to the north and west. Conversely, Tvrtko and Lazar must have viewed the Ottomans simply as invaders to be repulsed, yet again.

III. Summary assessments

The foregoing, it is hoped, represents a reasonably complete inventory of Murād's itinerary and concerns ca. 1386-1389 based on salient themes in *Neshrī*, and key exiguous sources. As is evident, the points of correspondance between the former and the latter are few, a fact which underscores how little the historian knew about Murād's relations with the Italians and the Palaiologoi. Nonetheless, the directly ancillary evidence allows us to criticize the basic architecture and credibility of *Neshrī*'s narrative at three points.

Neshrī's underlying premise, first of all, is that knez Lazar, in the aftermath of the Karamanian campaign, not only broke with the sultan but joined Tvrtko and Djuradj in an effort to badly damage the Turks. Since it is unlikely, however, that Lazar ever functioned as Murād's vassal, the action *Neshrī* posits to commence this drama (i.e., Lazar's decision to renounce his ties with Murād, after Serbian warriors returned from the Karamanian campaign) must be regarded as fictitious. As we have seen, moreover, it is questionable whether Lazar, Tvrtko and Djuradj formed any significant "anti-Ottoman entente" in the years preceding the battle of Bileća, or indeed afterward. This being the case, that encounter cannot be viewed as the fruit of a three-way conspiracy, and likewise as the critical turning point where Murād realized that Djuradj and Lazar had betrayed him. Rather, as argued above, the battle probably came about because Djuradj maneuvered, quite straightforwardly vis-à-vis Murād, to pit the Turks against Tvrtko. Thus only the Bosnians returned victorious from Bileća, whereas Djuradj must have been embarrassed, if not politically and militarily damaged, by *Shahin*'s defeat. As for Murād's reaction to the crisis, it is probable that he *supposed* that Lazar and Tvrtko had allied to defeat *Shahin*, but it is unclear whether he likewise considered Djuradj culpable. In short, he very likely viewed the battle as a symptom of danger at the *udji*, and not as evidence of yet another vassal rebellion.

The second major difficulty with *Neshrī*'s account is his assumption that tsar Šišman and Ivanko defied Murād *following* (and implicitly in reaction to) *Shahin*'s defeat, thus compelling Murād to postpone *revanche* and deal first with them. In contrast, the documentary evidence suggests that the full course of Murād's final Bulgarian campaign extended from early 1388 through late summer or even early fall of that year. It follows, then, that the Bulgarian princes must have renounced their ties with Murād probably in 1387, certainly not in the wake of Bileća, and that Šišman either had made his second submission, or would soon do so, when *Shahin* fought the Bosnians in late August, 1388. This means, in other words, that *Shahin*'s antagonist (i.e., Tvrtko) and the Bulgarian princes (i.e., Šišman and Ivanko) probably did not influence one another's posture towards

Murād, as Neshrī intimates. We may add, here, that those who would still exploit Neshrī to construct an organized, south-Slavic “coalition against the Turks” in 1387 or 1388 should examine the exiguous evidence more carefully.⁹⁴

The final problem with Neshrī’s version is his sense of the chronology and character of Murād’s expedition to Kosovo. The last phase of the Bulgarian operations, and the opening of the Serbian campaign, could not have been closely consecutive, as the historian posits. Instead, approximately eight or nine months elapsed between Šišman’s second submission and Murād’s clash with knez Lazar. More problematic, however, is Neshrī’s vision of this campaign as an enterprise to punish a rebellious and scheming vassal, hence paralleling Murād’s prior operations in Bulgaria. Alternatively, if we accept that in spring 1389 Lazar was subject only to king Sigismund, we may conjecture that Murād viewed his campaign as a return engagement with a still unyielding enemy. Moreover, he doubtless considered this necessary because he *assumed* that knez Lazar had aided Tvrtko in defeating Shahin the previous summer, even though this probably was not the case.

One wonders at this juncture why Neshrī constructed his narrative in this fashion. What, in other words, was his underlying intent, and how did this influence or shape his composition? The question, in my opinion, is ultimately impossible to answer.⁹⁵ Otherwise we may simply observe that this construction of Murād’s final years as a circle of betrayals, beginning and culminating with knez Lazar, must have impressed its Ottoman audience as a moving and aesthetically satisfying story. It sets the stage, moreover, for an equally absorbing idealization of Bāyazīd, the impetuous thunderbolt, as the agent of righteous revenge. Conversely, for the modern reader, cognizant of the external sources, it conveys a conception of events which requires considerable modification.

94. Perhaps the most egregious example in recent scholarship is STANFORD SHAW’s account of these years in his *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*, v. 1, *Empire of the Gazis: The Rise and Decline of the Ottoman Empire, 1280-1808*, (Cambridge 1976) p. 20. In essence Shaw duplicates Uzunçarşılı’s narrative (for the passage, v. supra in note 32), which in turn depends heavily on the hopelessly confused *mélange* in GIBBONS’ *The Foundation of the Ottoman Empire*, p. 169-70.

95. It is tempting, of course, to regard this text as a martyrology in which historical fact is secondary to idealization. After all, Neshrī evidently contemplated Murād’s final years from the perspective of the end, the horrible violence perpetrated at Kosovo. For him, this clearly represents the slaughter of a virtually perfect ruler – one who punctiliously observed the requirements of the faith, and who magnanimously trusted all who had promised him loyalty, including the *kāfirs*. Looking backward from this spectacle, surveying the years immediately preceding Kosovo, Neshrī envisions Murād as having been repeatedly betrayed by the treacherous unbeliever, his exact opposite. He identifies Lazar as the arch-adversary, the accursed one who began the vassal revolts when he united with Tvrtko to “thrust the sword in the Turk”, and who accomplished his design at Kosovo when, so it appears, he connived with Miloš Kobila to murder Murād (*Kitāb-i Cihan-nümâ*, 236.7). Equally malign was the tekfur of İskendiriyye. Aided and abetted by Tvrtko and Lazar, he directly exploited

IV. Proposed chronology, 1386-1389

It remains to summarize my investigations and reflections more systematically. In what follows, therefore, I have arranged all pertinent events in as precise a chronological order as possible. Certain judgements are of course tentative, and these I have enclosed in parentheses.

1386, SPRING THROUGH DECEMBER

(spring or summer?) (probably after the fall of Niš)	Murād conquers Niš. Murād is stymied by knez Lazar in an engagement at Pločnik.
(sometime in the spring or summer?)	While Murād is in Serbia, Alaeddin Beg of Karaman attacks Ottoman territory.
before October 23	Turkish forces reach the lower Neretva Valley, causing panic in Ragusa.
(late fall or winter?)	Murād returns to Edirne, and then Bursa, where he winters.

the sultan's trust when he came to him in the guise of loyalty, all the while hoping to annihilate an Ottoman army. Contemplating the Bulgarian princes, Neshrī sees in them an opportunistic sort of perfidy, but conversely is deeply moved by Murād's compassion in forgiving and reinstating tsar Šišman not once, but twice. He seems to imply, moreover, that Murād would have done the same for Lazar had he humbly submitted, instead of sanctioning Miloš Kobila's scheme to cross the enemy line, feign defection, and then murder the sultan. All in all, Murād emerges from Neshrī's pen as a blameless victim, exhibiting in his martyrdom the full measure of his nobility. He dies, in short, as the perfect gāzi saint.

Faced with such an image, one naturally wonders if Neshrī's conclusions merely reflect *a priori* convictions, of the predictable sort. Did he assume, in other words, that since Murād was murdered by one of Lazar's commanders, it necessarily followed that Lazar had sanctioned the deed? And did he consider it self-evident that Lazar was a rebellious vassal, of the same ilk as Šišman; that he, Tvrtko and Djuradj had plotted to annihilate Shahin; and therefore that *they* were the ones who inspired the Bulgarian revolts? In this case Neshrī's narrative is truly a kind of fiction in which historical realities are discarded or reinterpreted in an agenda of idealization. Alternatively, was the author's judgment about the circumstances of Murād's death, and everything which led up to it, the result of a more critical reflection on the evidence at hand? There are those, of course, who would dismiss these questions as excessive. After all, a writer whose self-acknowledged task was to extol the *al-i 'Osmān* would "naturally" massage the evidence to portray Murād precisely as people believed him to be, an utterly innocent, glorious martyr. On the other hand, since it is quite unclear how Neshrī addressed his underlying source, it is imprudent to pronounce on his intent. His objective, in other words, may simply have been to transmit what he found in a source he honestly deemed credible, and not to contrive or construct *à son gout*.

THE YEAR 1387

March or early April before May 15	Thessaloniki surrenders to Hayreddin Pašha, and Manuel Palaiologos proceeds to Lesbos. Hayreddin Pašha dies and is succeeded as grand vizier by his son, 'Alī Pašha.
June 8 (probably during the summer)	Murād concludes a treaty with the Genoese at Malagina. Murād invades Karaman and reduces Ala-eddin to submission.
height of summer (late summer or early fall?) (early September?)	Manuel Palaiologos is still on Lesbos. Murād returns to Bursa, following the campaign in Karaman. Theodore Palaiologos invokes Evrenoz Beg, who harries the despot's <i>archontes</i> as well as the Venetians at Methoni, Koroni, and Negroponte.
late September (September, or somewhat later?)	News of Evrenoz's raid arrives in Venice. Manuel Palaiologos, having earlier relocated to Tenedos, journeys to Bursa and makes his submission to Murād. After returning to Constantinople, he then sails to Lemnos, where he remains until late summer or fall 1389.
October 3 (late 1387?) (sometime in 1387?)	The Venetian Senate meets and selects Daniel Corner to proceed and meet with Murād. Daniel Corner meets with Murād. Thereafter the castellans of Methoni and Koroni send a nuncio to Murād to identify Venetian captives, but are rebuffed by 'Alī Pašha. Ivan Šišman renounces his ties with the Ottomans.

THE YEAR 1388

(sometime early in the year)	Murād dispatches 'Alī Pašha to northeastern Bulgaria, commencing the first phase of his struggle with Ivan Šišman. Murād also crosses to Rumili, but remains primarily in lower Thrace.
(sometime in first quarter of the year?)	Corner returns to Venice with letters from Murād and 'Alī Pašha.
February or March?	Boucicaut and Renault de Roye contact Murād, who is near Gallipoli, asking for a grant of safe-conduct.
April through (early?) June	Boucicaut and Renault de Roye reside with Murād, evidently in the vicinity of Gallipoli. Thereafter they return to Europe, via "Greece, Bulgaria and Bosnia."

(late spring?)	Pietro Grimani, in Constantinople, learns that Theodore Palaiologos might be amenable to joining an anti-Ottoman alliance, and communicates such to the Senate in Venice.
(late June or July?)	Murād leads major reinforcements to Bulgaria, commencing the final phases of the conflict with Ivan Šišman.
(perhaps while Murād was in Bulgaria, or earlier?) July 24	Djuradj II Stracimirović Balšić asks Murād for troops to strike at Tvrtko of Bosnia. The Venetian Senate reviews the situation in the Morea, choosing Lodovico Dandolo to conduct a new embassy to Murād .
August 6	Pietro Corner, the lord of Argos and Nauplio dies. Nerio Acciaiuoli now supports Theodore Palaiologos' ambition to secure the d'Engchien legacy, in competition with Venice.
August 9	The <i>udj-begi</i> <u>Shahin</u> is present in Bosnia with forces. The Ragusans, expecting an attack, soon dispatch envoys to Tvrtko and Djuradj.
August 26	Reviewing reports of Murād's recent hostile movements, the Venetian Senate drafts plans for an anti-Turkish league to include Theodore Palaiologos.
August 27	Vlatko Vuković decimates <u>Shahin's</u> forces in a battle at Bileća.
September	Tvrtko is maneuvering with the Ragusans to secure peace with Djuradj.
(October or November?)	Theodore Palaiologos proceeds to Murād's court (at Edirne?), makes his submission and obtains Murād's sanction to secure the d'Engchien legacy.
November	Tvrtko is again maneuvering with the Ragusans to secure peace with Djuradj.
November-December	The Genoese inspired anti-Turkish league is formed, but without Venice's participation.
(early December, or earlier?)	Marie d'Engchien, Pietro Corner's widow, proceeds to Venice to negotiate the sale of her property.
December 12	The Venetian Senate formalizes its purchase of Argos and Nauplio from Marie.
December 22	By this meeting of the Venetian Senate, Theodore Palaiologos has commenced his attacks on Argos and Nauplio.

THE YEAR 1389

(early in the year?)	John VII Palaiologos probably meets with Murād, discussing his plans to journey to Genoa.
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- January 26 The Venetian Senate meets, appointing Malipiero its provisor in Nauplio.
- March The Ragusans are again negotiating for a peace between Tvrtko and Djuradj.
(in March?) To forestall king Sigismund's plans to invade Serbia, knez Lazar dispatches Nikola Gorjanski to affirm Lazar's vassalage to Sigismund.
- April 2 The Venetians acquire control of Nauplio.
(in April or May?) Theodore Palaiologos has communicated with Murād about the situation in the Morea, and is awaiting a reply.
- May John VII is in Genoa, where he receives imperial acclamations and loans.
(sometime in May?) Murād mobilizes for his campaign to Serbia and Bosnia, determined *inter alia* to avenge Shahin's defeat.
- May 31 The Venetian Senate discusses Theodore's refusal to negotiate over Argos, as he awaits a reply from Murād. Malipiero is instructed to renew negotiations with Theodore and Nerio.
- June 15 The armies of Murād and knez Lazar clash at Kosovo Polje, in which context Murād is murdered by Miloš Obilić, and Lazar is captured and executed.

**THE MUSLIM FAMILY IN 13th-14th CENTURY
ANATOLIA AS REFLECTED IN THE WRITINGS
OF THE MAWLAWI DERVISH EFLAKI**

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The subject of this short paper is derived from a larger, on going research project which has as its title "The Universe of the Mawlawi Dervish Eflaki and Muslim Society in 13th-14th Century Asia Minor". It is well known that the early Ottoman principality, as well as the numerous beyliks of the late thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, arose from the dismembered Rum Seljuk sultanate and that their societies drew heavily on the social life and institutions of the Rum Seljuks.¹ Despite changes and evolutions the cultural and social continuities of Rum Seljuk society are well known and undeniable. In many ways the single richest source for our knowledge of the society and culture of Asia Minor at this time is the hagiographical text, known as the *Menakib al-Arifin*, describing the lives and activities of the saints and khalifas of the Mawlawi *tariqat*, which was written by the Mawlawi dervish Eflaki.² Born sometime between 1286-91 and deceased in

1. For the background consult the following works: The fundamental work on the history of the Rum Seljuks remains O.TURAN, *Selçuklular zamanında Türkiye*, (Istanbul 1971). Unfortunately the work of C. CAHEN, *Pre-Ottoman Turkey. A General Survey of the Material and Spiritual Culture and History c1071-1330*, (London 1968), is deficient. The recent French version-translation, *La Turquie Pré-ottomane*, (Paris-Istanbul 1988) has the deficiencies of the English version. In this latter Cahen has merely added only a few references to works which have appeared in the intervening 20 years, and has not incorporated the critical scholarship and data generated since 1968, nor has he remedied the shortcomings of the earlier volume. See also VRYONIS, *Decline*.

2. For an earlier, but still very useful, evaluation of the Muslim sources for Seljuk history and society, M.F. KÖPRÜLÜ, Anadolu Selçukluları tarihinin yerli kaynakları, *Bell*, 7 (1934) 379-522. For a detailed analysis of Eflaki, A. TANERİ, *Türkiye Selçukluları kültür hayatı (Menakibu'l-arifin'in değerlendirilmesi)*, (Konya 1977). For the edition of the Persian text of Eflaki, T. YAZICI, *Şams al-Din Ahmed al-Aflaki al-'Arifi, Manakib al-Arifin*, second edition (Ankara 1976-80, I-II), hereafter EFLAKI-YAZICI. Still useful is the French translation of Cl. Huart: EFLAKI (Huart) (despite the reservations of Köprülü). On Rumi and the Mawlawi dervish order: A. SCHIMMEL, *The Triumphal Sun. A study of the Works of Jalaloddin Rumi*, (Albany 1983); W.C. CHITTICK, *The Sufi Path of Love. The Spiritual Teachings of Rumi*, (Albany 1983); A. GÖLPINARLI, *Mevlana Celaleddin Hayatı, felsefesi*,

1360 in Konya, his work begins with vague recollections of Balkh prior to the invasions of Djingiz Khan in the early thirteenth century and comes down to 1353. This latter date is just one year prior to the Ottoman seizure of Gallipoli, the first strategic foothold of the Ottomans in European Byzantium.

Though Eflaki's work is hagiographical through and through, it is also an important and very interesting cultural document. Scholars have long been aware of this but have used it peripherally, preferring the important chronicles, waqfnames, and rich inscriptional materials,³ the first in Persian, and the latter two bodies of sources in Arabic. The chronicles of Ibn Bibi and Karim al-Din Aksarayi are of great significance for the political activities and institutions of the Rum Seljuks; the waqfnames give us details as to the establishment and economic functions of select and restricted numbers of pious foundations. The inscriptions have enabled scholars to date buildings and individuals. For the larger picture of socio-cultural organization and life, however, the text of Eflaki is more important than any of these sources.

Eflaki presents the reader with an entire universe, his own and that of the Mawlawis, with the radial axes of its systems, its many constituent elements, and finally its dynamics. Eflaki's vision of his social world includes a not inconsiderable body of features and details that deal with the Muslim family. Because the genealogy of the Mawlawi khalifas is of great concern to him, our author pauses to speak of the birth of children, the age of puberty, marriage arrangements and alliances, legal concubines, divorce, the position of women, love, affection, hate and jealousy. Indeed Eflaki terminates his very long book with a short section entitled "Names of children and successors of our great master Baha al-Din Balkhi."⁴

In one of his characteristic tales the author begins by informing us that the high officials of the city of Ladiq had become disciples of Amir Arif and yet the son of the city's *nazir* had abstained from the Mawlawi circle. After some prodding by the disciples of Amir Arif the young man announced that if Amir Arif could insure him the birth of a son he would, in exchange, become a disciple of the Mawlawis. On a cold winter day Amir Arif had left the *zawiya* and made his way to the hammam of Khadje Omar in the falling snow. He passed by the door of the hammam at the moment when the son of the *nazir* encountered him as the young man was about to enter the bath house. Amir Arif placed a bouquet of roses in his hands and said to him:

"Blessed be the arrival of a son!"⁵

The young man, pleasantly surprised and with the thought of a son in his

eserleri, eserlerinden seçmeler, (Istanbul 1959); IDEM, *Mevlanadan sonra Mevlevilik*, corrected edition (Istanbul 1983).

3. KÖPRÜLÜ, *op. cit.*, *passim*.

4. EFLAKI-YAZICI, p. 994-1000.

5. EFLAKI-YAZICI, p. 939.

mind, entered the hammam where he gently bathed himself and then left to return to his house. Aroused by the effects of the bath, by the felicitations from Amir Arif, and with the fragrant roses in hand, he, understandably, found his young wife exceedingly beautiful and proceeded to ply her with the games of love. The same instant she became pregnant. The son of the *nazir* joyously acquired his new son, the loving wife retained the bouquet of roses for years thereafter, giving away the roses petal by petal as medical cures for the ill, and the Mawlawi dervishes acquired a new disciple.⁶

The story is simple, direct, and of course miraculous. Yet the details surrounding this young family which had been unable to have a son are realistic: The erotic effects of the warm bath, the suggestion of the fragrant roses in the cold snow, and the belief in miraculous intervention combined to produce a natural and loving conjugal union which resulted in the desired fruit and which overcame the vexing problem of sterility.

More tragic than sterility was the problem of infant mortality, if the family history of Rumi's son Sultan Walad and his wife Fatima Khatun is in any way typical. Eflaki relates that though Sultan Walad and his wife Fatima Khatun had had many children, 15 to 16 in fact, 12 to 13 of these had died in infancy, their deaths having taken place variously at six to twelve months. He was, understandably, very saddened by these tragedies and his wife resorted, in desperation, to all sorts of remedies and, we are told, subjected her body to violent movements in order to detach an ovum. Rumi, her father-in-law, restrained these attempts, and, instead she avoided the eating of heavy food, performed animal sacrifices, and distributed alms to the poor so that she finally gave birth to Amir Arif in 670 (1272).⁷ The nature and extent which infant mortality could attain are tragically apparent in this particular history. Its immediate effects are equally apparent: sadness, apprehension, resort to measures which would shock modern medicine. What is not reflected in the story is the effect of repeated births and child mortality on the physical and psychological health of the mother, as well as their effects on the potential size of the family.⁸

In continuing the story of the birth of Sultan Walad's son Amir Arif, Eflaki tells his reader that the proud father Rumi was ecstatic. Entering the room of birth the overjoyed Rumi showered gold dinars on the head of the mother Fatima Khatun. He next picked up the tiny infant, wrapped him in his own blessed shirt, put his grandson in one of the shirt sleeves and wrapped a batch of gold coins (intended for the child) in another corner of the shirt. Satisfied, he turned his baby grandson over to the women. He it was, also, that chose the infant's name, picking the name Feridoun (after the name of his paternal grand-father). After having chosen a specifically Persian name of his grandchild, he then added an Arab name

6. EFLAKI-YAZICI, p. 939.

7. EFLAKI-YAZICI, p. 825.

8. EFLAKI-YAZICI, p. 995.

as well, Amir Arif.⁹ In order to flesh out the cultural implications of the two names Eflaki relates that Rumi in gazing down on the beloved infant recognized the light of the seven saints: Baha al-Din Walad, Sayyid Burhan al-Din, Shams al-Din Tabrizi, Shayh Ala al-Din (Zarkub), Çelebi Hosam al-Din, Djalal al-Din Rumi, and Sultan Walad. Characteristically the grand-father composed Persian poetry to celebrate and to glorify the birth of the new Feridoun.

“He is of the face of Chosroes!”¹⁰

A woman made a cradle with a veil for little Amir Arif, and he is reported to have first uttered the Arabic word for God, Allah, at the age of six months. One month later a huge tumor developed on his neck and for seven days and nights he could not suck milk at his mother’s breast. The doctors proved unable to cope with the massive constriction of the throat with the result that Sultan Walad took his little son to the terrace of Rumi’s *madrassa* where the son placed the infant at Rumi’s feet. Rumi had a pen and inkholder brought and he then proceeded to inscribe fourteen lines of writing over the child’s bulging throat and neck. According to Eflaki the tumor disappeared instantly and little Feridoun clamoured for his mother’s breast. The mother, in gratitude, sacrificed and distributed alms, whereas the relieved grand-father, naturally, organized a *sema* and performed his mystical dance.¹¹

It is of interest to recount the morbid nature of Amir Arif’s games and preoccupations as a child, concerned as he was with the bones and graves of the dead.¹² Eflaki closes this section by telling his reader how long Amir Arif lived: 49 years, adding, “his life was governed by the number seven”.¹³

The institution of the wet nurse in the family of the Mawlawi khalifas emerges twice. In the case of Baha al-Din Walad’s family Eflaki relates the name of the wet nurse, Nasb Khatun. She is described as wise and as a legal scholar. At the time that he departed Balkh for Baghdad, Rumi was but five years of age and his older brother Çelebi Ala al-Din Mahmud was seven, and so Baha al-Din took the wet nurse with him.¹⁴ In the second instance, at a later time and in Konya, the wet nurse of Sultan Walad is referred to by the Greek words *Kira manna*, and she is said to have had mystical visions and to have served as a domestic in the household of Rumi.¹⁵

We do not hear much, from Eflaki, on the period of childhood leading up to the attainment of puberty. It is with puberty of the boy and girl that they became eligible for marriage and so Eflaki reintroduces elements concerning the age of puberty of children in the family. There are very occasional references to male

9. Rumi had named his son after his own father, EFLAKI-YAZICI, p. 786.

10. EFLAKI-YAZICI, p. 825-7.

11. EFLAKI-YAZICI, p. 836.

12. EFLAKI-YAZICI, p. 834-5.

13. EFLAKI-YAZICI, p. 836.

14. EFLAKI-YAZICI, p. 10.

15. EFLAKI-YAZICI, p. 821.

circumcision, though the ages of the boys are not always given. But on the occasion of a sumptuous circumcision ceremony in the fortress of Kara Hisar the two little boys that were to undergo the painful ceremony were aged seven and eight years respectively. Aside from reporting their ages, of considerable interest in ascertaining at what age the circumcision ceremony was executed, Rumi observed, with considerable apprehension, that as the mother of the two boys was not present, the children would be fearful and unhappy.¹⁶

The specific age of puberty is nowhere stated in an explicit manner, but puberty, or *morahiq* is obviously attained in the early teens and Rumi was himself married at the age of eighteen, if Eflaki's reckoning is reliable.¹⁷ On the other hand Rumi affianced his son Sultan Walad to Fatima Khatun upon the former's attainment of the state of *morahiq* (and therefore considerably earlier than the 18 years of Rumi),¹⁸ and Sultan Walad's mother had herself been very young when affianced to Rumi.

In those cases where Eflaki gives details, marriages were arranged by the family: Baha al-Din Walad, Rumi's father, was forced to marry a princess of Khurasan;¹⁹ Rumi's father arranged his marriage to Gawhar Khatun in Laranda in 1226;²⁰ Rumi selected Fatima Khatun as wife for his son Sultan Walad.²¹ However an incident from the life of Amir Arif indicates that marriage and the parental decisions were not always to be taken for granted. Amir Arif, the son of Sultan Walad, was prone to a life of celibacy and therefore for some time resisted his father's pressure to marry. Sultan Walad, explained to him that marriage was an important institution as it provided a man with a house and an extended household society. Obviously a house and the extended domestic society of extended family, retainers, and slaves constituted an important base of social power and an assurance of present and future security. The social force of such arguments appealed little to the young man, as he was absorbed with asceticism, the company of the *yan* and the mystical society of Konya more generally. One autumn evening as Amir Arif rode his horse through the lovely gardens of Konya, he came to the neighborhood Fahr an-Nisa. The grapes in the vineyards were ripe and the intoxicating aroma of the sweet grape syrup that the workers were preparing hung heavily in the warm air. At that moment two small children suddenly presented Amir Arif with two bouquets of roses and just as suddenly disappeared. On the following day Sultan Walad explained to his son that this was an imperative sign that he should marry. Thus it was that he married Dawlat Khatun, daughter of the Emir Qaisar of Tebriz.²²

16. EFLAKI-YAZICI, p. 342-3.

17. EFLAKI-YAZICI, p. 26.

18. EFLAKI-YAZICI, p. 719.

19. EFLAKI-YAZICI, p. 9-10.

20. EFLAKI-YAZICI, p. 26.

21. EFLAKI-YAZICI, p. 719.

22. EFLAKI-YAZICI, p. 841-2. For Konya at this time: T. BAYKARA, *Türkiye*

Though the details are incomplete, Eflaki's stories reveal a family and marriage system that was polygamic and which not only tolerated but in some cases actually promoted concubinage. Rumi himself seems to have had two wives: Gawhar Khatun, the daughter of Khadje Sharaf al-Din Lala; and Melek Khatun, or as she was more commonly known, Kira Khatun.²³ His son Sultan Walad had three ladies in his harem: His wife Fatima Khatun, and the concubines Nusret (Khatun) and Sunbulu (Khatun).²⁴ The short genealogical and chronological table at the end of Eflaki's work does not note any further polygamy in the extended family history. We cannot, however, know if this note is complete. Of these wives one, Kirai Bozorg (the Great Lady), wife of Baha al-Din Walad and mother of Rumi, is said to have had a previous marriage to a rich and powerful man from Samarqand. With the latter's death she married Baha al-Din.²⁵

A principle necessity for the wedding of the young girl was the trousseau and possessions that she would bring with her. Rumi had taken into his harem Fatima and Hadiyya, the two daughters of Salah al-Din Zarkub. The latter, when he dissolved his goldsmith shop to become a dervish and follower of Rumi, had given away all his wealth. Correspondingly, he was not in a situation to outfit his two daughters with their trousseaus in their marriages to Sultan Walad and to the calligrapher Nizham al-Din respectively.

Rumi used his connections to gain entry to the wealth of the sultan's *saray* by contacting Usta Khatun, the teacher of the sultan's daughters. On her return to the palace Usta Khatun placed a basket around her neck and went about the saray crying out "Something for God!" Gurdji Khatun, the sultan's wife, went into her own treasury, chose two or three pieces of material and five pieces of every type of garment. The other women gave 20 pairs of diamond earrings, 20 precious rings, tall caps, necklaces, bracelets studded with precious stones. There were tents, beautiful carpets from Georgia, Shiraz and Aksaray; wooden and copper plates, cauldrons, copper and porcelain bowls, mortars, candle holders, and a complete set of kitchen utensils. Usta Khatun then loaded the gifts on mules from the royal stables, brought them to the *madrassa* of Rumi and the latter divided the goods into two trousseaus: one for Hadiyye Khatun and the other for Fatima Khatun. Both girls were thus able to proceed to the marriage ceremony with their respective grooms.²⁶

Not a great deal is said about the customs attendant upon marriage ceremonies. On the occasion of her marriage to Sultan Walad, Fatima Khatun fasted and had mystical visions which she related to Gurdji Khatun and to the

Selçukluları devrinde Konya, (Ankara 1985); M. ÖNDER, *Mevlana şehri Konya*, (Ankara 1971).

23. EFLAKI-YAZICI, p. 994-5.

24. EFLAKI-YAZICI, p. 995.

25. EFLAKI-YAZICI, p. 681.

26. EFLAKI-YAZICI, p. 724-5.

daughter of the Parvane. She was conducted to the house of her husband and Rumi composed ghazals on the occasion of the wedding. Rumi also wrote a letter of advice to his son exhorting him to respect his wife. "She is to be faithful to you", he continues, "to cause you no trouble, and you are not to think of infidelities or to fall into a state of boredom".²⁷ We also hear of the throwing of golden dinars before the bride and groom,²⁸ and of the giving of sugared almonds at the wedding. When Rumi attended the wedding of a friend someone shouted,

"there is no sugar on the almond".

Rumi replied,

"there is sugar, but it is with the almond".²⁹

punning on the word for almond and the female vagina, which are one and the same in Persian.

The question of divorce appears but rarely and in a somewhat obscured fashion. Gurdji Khatun, the wife of the Parvane, persuaded her husband to swear an oath that he would grant her whatever she desired. When he complied, she then asked him for a divorce. In two other instances wives managed to persuade their husbands to swear by the formula of the three divorces that they would comply with the wishes of the wife, and upon the husbands' agreements the wives then asked for divorce. Though the texts are not absolutely clear they indicate: (1) That it was more difficult for women to obtain a divorce, since it is implied that it was the right of the man and not of the woman; (2) Nevertheless women on occasion desired divorces and manipulated their husbands in order to secure the divorce. By and large, however, divorce is absent from the long text of Eflaki.³⁰

From the reading of Eflaki the authority of the male patriarch of the household is fairly obvious. He is responsible for the marriage arrangement and choice of spouses of his children; he must provide the financial resources for the trousseaus of the women in his harem. It is he who chooses the name of the children, or so it would seem. Divorce, polygamy, and concubinage are male prerogatives.

What was the condition of the female sex in the family of Muslim Konya? To begin with the house was divided into **بيرون** and the **اندرون** (or the harem), the latter being reserved for the women, and the former for the men.³¹ It was in the *enderun* that Fatima and Hudiyye passed much of their childhood up until their marriage. As for the manner of life of these women a contemporary, Hadji Mobarraq Haidari, gave a succinct description of it. It involved, of course, the wearing of the veil **چادر** and of sitting behind the door, and of working the

27. EFLAKI-YAZICI, p. 719-20.

28. EFLAKI-YAZICI, p. 448.

29. EFLAKI-YAZICI, p. 449.

30. EFLAKI-YAZICI, p. 432.

31. EFLAKI-YAZICI, p. 820-1. When Mahmud Beg occupied Konya he violated the sanctity of Sultan Walad's harem for which, according to Eflaki, he and his family perished.

32. EFLAKI-YAZICI, p. 467-8.

spinning wheel.³² Rumi remarks that all honest women who have the honor of visiting him come veiled *نیم روی*.³³ On the other hand there are substantial indications that some women moved rather far afield and outside of the house. Amir Arif's mother is with him in Tokat.³⁴ Every Thursday night the wives of the prominent men of Konya gathered at the home of the wife of the sultan's *na'ib* Amin al-Din Mikail where Rumi would hold a special meeting for them. Seated about him they would throw rose petals on him and asperse him with rose water as he would reveal his mystical thoughts and admonish them morally. A number of young female slaves was in attendance whose function it was to play the flutes and drums, reciting at the same time the *Mathnawi*. At that point Rumi would begin his gyrating dance and the *sema* would be in full session. As the women were drawn ever more deeply into the ecstatic state they began to fill the blessed shoes of Rumi with their gold jewelry in hopes that Rumi would vouchsafe them some special favor. As he was also in an ecstatic state he took no notice of them and upon the completion of the morning prayer he would depart.³⁵ These women, of a high social station, had access to the innermost secrets of Rumi's *sema*, but it was a matter of separate (from the males) and not quite equal.

It would seem that by the time of Amir Arif the spread of the Mawlawi order throughout much of Anatolia had resulted in the spread of the *sema* among women as well as among men. Thus a certain Koch-Liqa was the lieutenant of Amir Arif in the city of Toqat where the great ladies of the region were her disciples.³⁶

The grouping of the women of the various, more socially prominent households also made it possible for them to attend, en masse, other events. The case of the visit of the Rifa'i dervishes to Konya allows us to make the transition from women's participation in social events outside the harem to the internal conflicts between husband and wife and the implementation of patriarchal authority within the family.

The arrival of the Rifa'i dervishes in Konya created a great stir as their performance combined the marvellous with the fraudulent. They were hosted in the *madrassa* of Qaratay where the Konyiotes hung about open mouthed and speechless before the daring feats of the visitors. News of all this quickly spread to the harems of the proper Konyiote families and soon the women were restlessly striving to find a way to go to the Qaratay *Madrassa*. They finally came to Kira Khatun, Rumi's second wife, and asked whether they might not go all together. At the time of departure of the ladies for the *madrassa* Rumi was away visiting the mosque in Meram. On his return he found the house empty and fell into a frightful rage that his wife should have gone out of the house without his permission. On her return the unfortunate wife incurred the fierce wrath of her spouse and fell

33. EFLAKI-YAZICI, p. 719.

34. EFLAKI-YAZICI, p. 790.

35. EFLAKI-YAZICI, p. 490-1.

36. EFLAKI-YAZICI, p. 928.

seriously ill. She was possessed by an instant trembling and coldness of the body, neither of which the local physicians were able to cure. She even appealed to the gentle Zarkub to intercede with the irate Rumi, but this too proved to be of no avail. Henceforth, even in mid-July, she wore a fur coat (a *bortani*) with a silk macrame as well. In her room she always kept a mangal with heated embers, and in full light of day a lighted candle. Thereafter she never left her room except at night when she went to the bath. The destruction of the once felicitous conjugal relation is due to Rumi's jealousy and the absolute patriarchal power which fed it. He was jealous of his wife's departure on an innocent visit for which she had never previously consulted the lord of the house. He was also, undoubtedly, jealous that this serious breach of his patriarchal power should have been occasioned by a group of sensationalist dervishes whom he undoubtedly considered as inferiors and competitors.³⁷

A much shorter version of a similar story is related of Shams al-Din Tabrizi and his wife Kimiya Khatun. He was very attached to her and yet an innocent promenade in the gardens was enough to destroy the relationship. One day, while Tabrizi was out of the house, the grandmother of Sultan Walad took Kimiya Khatun, along with other ladies, for a walk in her garden. When Tabrizi returned to his house, his wife was missing, and so he became greatly angered. On her return the unsuspecting woman was afflicted with a stiff neck, we are not told how she incurred it, and three days later she died.³⁸ The strong suspicion is that her husband strung her heavily. Again we see the jealousy of patriarchal authority, ever present in the household of many Muslim Konyiotes, and accompanying it we see the severe isolation of the fairer sex.

The conflict of the sons with this patriarchal authority is also evident, though it is not quite so strident. When Rumi had in effect exiled his wife Kira Khatun from his affections to a dreadful and shadowy life in the isolation of the harem, Sultan Walad and Hosam al-Din continued to render her honor and to consider her as a mother, though in fact she was not their biological mother.³⁹ Sultan Walad, in his own times, had a bad relationship with his son Amir Arif and the two refused to speak to one another. But in this instance the father gave in and prepared a large banquet in honor of his son in order to heal the rift. It was no doubt easier for favored sons to thwart or at least to blunt the razor-like jealousy of patriarchal authority. The future belonged to them and it was they who would continue and vouchsafe the immortality of the fathers.⁴⁰

This negative side of relations between man and woman within the Muslim family structure is symbolized at the very highest level of Muslim society by the notorious quarrel between the imperious Gurdji Khatun and her husband the

37. EFLAKI-YAZICI, p. 716-8.

38. EFLAKI-YAZICI, p. 641-2.

39. EFLAKI-YAZICI, p. 718.

40. EFLAKI-YAZICI, p. 955.

Pervane. In this case, however, it would seem that the aggressor was the wife rather than the husband.⁴¹

If Eflaki reproduces scenes of family quarrels, arbitrary authority, and occasional cruelty, he also gives us vignettes of tender devotion and love. At one point Sultan Walad lay in bed, seriously ill, and was preparing to meet his maker. He called his attentive wife Fatima Khatun to his bed-side informing her that he was about to die. She tried to bolster his faltering spirits by telling him that her death would proceed his. When he continued to insist on the imminence of his death she informed him that not only would she die first. In addition, she told him, "You will marry two more women; one will give you a son, and the other will bear you two more."⁴²

Fatima, who had suffered 16 childbirths and the death in infancy of 13 of her children, remained the loving, patient, and selfless companion that she had been throughout her difficult marital life.

The family closeness which she manifested under such rigors was absolutely evident when she and her younger sister Hadiyye were growing to puberty in Rumi's harem. She was already so endearing that Rumi himself took the efforts to teach her to read and write. He not only received the two sisters unveiled in his presence, he took the initiative to provide them with truly royal trousseaus.⁴³

The intensity of parental-filial attachment between Rumi and Sultan Walad was such that it later gave rise to the legend that in the boy's infancy he was so attached to his father that he would cry piteously whenever Rumi would leave him to attend the prayers. Thus Rumi abandoned the prayers so as to be in constant attendance on the dependent infant. A miracle resulted, according to Eflaki, and milk began to pour from the nipples of Rumi and it was he who gave the infant Sultan Walad milk.⁴⁴ Miracles aside, the boy was constantly at the side of the father in the mosque and *madrassa* and their age difference having been small, they were mistaken for brothers.⁴⁵

The tenderness and love which Rumi felt for the son and his young bride Fatima Khatun are graciously reflected in the letter of instructions which he wrote the young couple on the occasion of their wedding, and in the epithalamial poetry he composed and dedicated to them during the marriage celebrations.⁴⁶

It remains to say something of love and devotion by the grown child for the aging mother. In a short but poignant description of Latife Khatun, the mother of the goldsmith Zarkub, Eflaki's descriptive powers are at their very best, for they are moving but swift. As they placed the aged Latife, wrapped in her shroud, in the grave, the mournful son stood loyally and sadly close by Rumi, who was always in

41. EFLAKI-YAZICI, p. 432.

42. EFLAKI-YAZICI, p. 817-8.

43. EFLAKI-YAZICI, p. 726-7.

44. EFLAKI-YAZICI, p. 785.

45. EFLAKI-YAZICI, p. 785-6.

46. EFLAKI-YAZICI, p. 732.

a hurry to be off to some other event scheduled for his busy social life, beckoned his friend abruptly:

“Let us go.”

Zarkub bowed to his master, but replied:

“She has many claims on me. I wish to deliver her from punishment, from the terrors of the tomb, from the fear which the angels Monkar and Nakir bring. I ask of you that in the terrifying situation of the tomb she be not deprived of the company of the houris (of paradise).”⁴⁷

The devotion of the grown son to the soul and the memory of the aged mother have been immortalized in this brief scene that Eflaki has brought to us of the Muslims’ family in thirteenth century Konya, of its loves and hates, of its dignity, and attachments when death smashes the bonds of both love and hate, but not of remembrance. Indeed remembrance is one of the bonding forces in Eflaki’s universe, but I shall speak of this at another time and place.

47. EFLAKI-YAZICI, p. 718-9.

THE EMIRATE OF KARASI AND THAT OF THE OTTOMANS: TWO RIVAL STATES

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The emirates of Karasi¹ and of Osman enjoyed similar opportunities to expand through the conquest of Byzantine territory and thus to become important powers. The emirate of Karasi had a long frontier with Byzantium which stretched from the region of Kyzikos on the southwest coast of the Propontis to the Gulf of Edremit; therefore controlled the Asiatic coast of the Dardanelles. At the time when the Karasi Turks were establishing themselves on the Dardanelles and were able to launch their first raids into Thrace, the Ottomans were still fighting the Byzantines in the interior of Bithynia and could only occasionally reach the coast. According to Wittek's well-known theory, the *raison d'être* of the Ottoman state was the holy war against the infidel.² This same *raison d'être* may also have led the emirate of Karasi to increase its strength by attracting warriors from other Muslim countries to wage a continuous war against the Christians which might have secured Karasi such wealth and prestige that it became an empire. Instead, the Turks of Karasi were the first to be subjugated by the Ottomans and their territory, while retaining its name, became one of the earliest Ottoman sandjaks.

According to the Byzantine historian Gregoras, the Turkish emirs formed a coalition and divided the coastal territories of Asia Minor among themselves shortly before 1303-1304, as a result of which the emir Kalamis and his son Karasi began to rule over the region of ancient Troy.³ This information is inaccurate. It derives from the early part of Gregoras' work which includes events before his own time. It is unlikely that there was any such coalition of the emirs, as reported only by Gregoras, since that would have contradicted the known history of Asia Minor at that time. Other sources describe the various Turkish emirs as often fighting one another while also striving to establish their own states

1. I.H. UZUNÇARŞILI, *IA*, s.v. "Karasi-oğulları"; C. CAHEN, *EI*², s.v. "Karasi"; J. MORDMANN, Über das türkische Fürstengeschlecht der Karasi in Mysien, *Sitzungsberichte der Königlich Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Phil. - Hist. Classe*, (Berlin 1911) p. 2-7.

2. WITTEK, *Rise*.

3. GREGORAS, v. I, p. 214.

through the conquest of Byzantine territory. In the region of Ephesos the emir Sasa disappeared under pressure from the Aydınoğlu family, while the early Turkish chronicles repeatedly mention the enmity between Osman, the founder of the Ottoman dynasty, and his neighbour Germiyanoğlu.⁴

Furthermore, as Cahen remarks, the name of Karasi is absent from the account of Muntaner, whose chronicle of the Catalan expedition in Asia Minor is largely confirmed by the history of his Byzantine contemporary Pachymeres, whose work is one of the main sources for early fourteenth century Anatolian history. Both authors agree that in about 1300 the Turks reached the coast opposite Constantinople through raids which were carried out not by an organized army but by small irregular groups. After pillaging and taking captives the Turks would retreat without any permanent occupation of the conquered territory. These Turkish advances forced the Byzantine emperor Andronikos II to invite into Byzantium the mercenaries of the Catalan Company who spent the winter of 1303-1304 in the peninsula of Artake; this region was well protected on its landward side by a wall built, from one sea to another, to protect it against the Turkish threat. These Turks were nomads who occasionally penetrated into Byzantine lands and Muntaner describes how the Catalans encountered them encamped in the countryside with their women and children and how they slaughtered and captured them. According to Muntaner, the Catalans met organized Turkish armies when they marched more to the South; they encountered those of the emir Sasa, who later captured Ephesos, and of the emir of Aydin, the founder of the well-known emirate. Furthermore Pachymeres' narrative shows that the two towns which were later included in the emirate of Karasi, that is Achyraous or Balikesir and Pergamos, were still under Byzantine rule in 1303-1304.⁵

We can, therefore, reject Gregoras' remarks which imply that the Karasi emirate was in existence before the arrival of the Catalans, and we can conclude that the foundation of this emirate was an after effect of the Catalan campaign in Asia Minor. When the Catalans evacuated Asia Minor the country was left in chaos. The Turks profited from this situation and began to blockade or assault the towns some of which, Ephesos in particular, surrendered.⁶ The Byzantines were unable to resist the Turks, since their troops had been despatched to fight the Catalans in Thrace and Macedonia. Even Byzantine writers of those years such as Pachymeres were so absorbed by the destructive military activities of the Catalan Company in Europe that they failed to mention events in Asia Minor, which was lost to the Turks at that time.

4. LEMERLE, *Aydin*, p. 18-26; E.A. ZACHARIADOU, *Ἱστορία καὶ Θρύλοι τῶν Παλαιῶν Σουλτάνων, 1300-1400*, (Athens 1991) p. 68-69.

5. MUNTANER, *Crònica*, p. 24-34; PACHYMERES (1835), p. 388, 390-391, 393, 411-412, 423. On the chronology of these events, see, A. FAILLER, *Chronologie et composition dans l'histoire de Georges Pachymèrès*, *REB*, 48 (1990) 44-85.

6. LAIOU, *Andronicus II*, p. 341-343.

On the other hand, the two Turkish leaders mentioned by Gregoras, Kalames and his son Karasi, are known through other sources which permit the genealogy of the dynasty which ruled over the emirate of Karasi to be established. A funeral monument found in Tokat bears an inscription of 1415 in which the ancestors of Kutlu Melek and of her son Mustafa çelebi are listed.⁷ They start with the legendary Turkish hero Melik Danışmend who was succeeded by Bagdi beğ or, according to another reading, Yagdi beğ; he was the father of Kalem beğ, who was the father of Karasi khan, who was the father of Yakhshi khan, who was the father of Beğlerbeğ, who was the father of Mustafa beğ, this last being the father of Kutlu Melek. His remote ancestor, Melik Danışmend, was a mythical figure but most of the other members of the family are mentioned by contemporary sources or on coins struck by them;⁸ it is, therefore, certain that Kutlu Melek descended from the petty dynasty of Karasi and knew her genealogy well.

We can also identify the real founder of this dynasty as the grandfather of Karasi beğ who, according to the inscription, was called Bagdi or Yagdi. Pachymeres' passage reporting the invasion of western Asia Minor by the Turks in about 1302 enumerates several turbulent emirs. Together with Aydin, Osman, Alishir, Mentеше and others, he mentions a certain Pagdinis.⁹ The Bagdi beğ of the inscription can safely be identified as the Pagdinis of Pachymeres; the other reading, Yagdi, may be ignored. This places the emergence of the Karasi family in the very early years of the fourteenth century when most of the Turkish dynasties of that period began to gain ground in the frontier zones between the Byzantine and the old Seldjuk lands. Bagdi beğ was apparently one of the chieftains of these advanced outposts, an *udj beği* who was active near the territory in which the emirate of Karasi was founded shortly afterwards. A few years elapsed between the emergence of the family and its establishment in the territory known by the name of Karasi, which probably took place in the days of Karasi beğ. Pachymeres reports that the Catalans expelled certain Turks from the fortress of Germe situated to the east of Pergamos.¹⁰ These could well have been those Turks who in the following years founded the emirate of Karasi. In the vicinity of Germe there were two towns which were both bishoprics, Kalamos and Akarasos or Akrasos.¹¹ It is tempting to connect their names with Kalem and Karasi. Karasi

7. ISMAIL HAKKI [UZUNÇARŞILI], *Kitabeler*, (Istanbul 1927) p. 43-44; B. KARAMAGRALI, *Figürlü Mezar Taşları*, *SAD*, 2 (1970) 85-86.

8. I. ARTUK, *Karesi-oğulları adına basılmış olan iki sikke*, *TD*, 33 (1980/81) 283-290.

9. PACHYMERES (1835), p. 389; on this passage see, WITTEK, *Mentesche*, p. 23. Wittek tentatively proposes that behind Pagdines one could recognize the name Beha eddin. However no Turkish emir with that name is known at that time. Moreover, Beha eddin is an Arabic name while most of the emirs had Turkish names. Wittek also attempts to identify a Lamises mentioned by Pachymeres in the same passage with the Kalames mentioned by Gregoras; but that remains a hypothesis.

10. PACHYMERES (1835), p. 425.

11. RAMSAY, *Asia Minor*, p. 125-126, 129; on the toponyms, cf. L. ZGUSTA, *Kleinasiatische Ortsnamen*, (Heidelberg 1984) p. 54, 213. J. DARROUZES, *Notitia*

is not a Turkish name¹² while the Turkish emirs were often named after the region which they ruled; Izmir-oğlu is an obvious example. If this conjecture is correct, one can follow the advance of the conquest: from the hills of the region of Kalamos¹³ the emirs of Karasi first came down to Pergamos¹⁴ and from there to the coast of the Propontis which they conquered after 1330. Until the 1320s the peninsula of Artake and the region of Trigleia were still under Byzantine rule. The metropolis of Kyzikos was in good condition and was one of the very few Anatolian ecclesiastical sees able to contribute an annual subsidy to the Patriarchate of Constantinople.¹⁵ In 1328 the Byzantine emperor Andronikos III crossed from Constantinople to Kyzikos to visit the church of Artake and also to meet Karasi's son Demir khan, who was harrassing the towns of that region with his troops. The emperor moved to the town of Pegai (Biga), where he met Demir and concluded a treaty with him.¹⁶ Four years later the Moroccan traveller Ibn Battuta visited Karasi and he too met Demir. At that time Karasi beğ was no longer alive and his two sons, Yakhshi and Demir, ruled over two separate principalities, the former in Pergamos and the latter in Balikesir.¹⁷ This arrangement followed a practice applied in most of the contemporary Turkish emirates which were ruled by a senior lord or *ulu beğ* while the territory was divided into provinces governed by younger brothers or sons.¹⁸ Probably the senior lord was Demir, who in this capacity concluded the treaty with the Byzantine emperor and who was established in the most important town of the emirate. Both brothers, however, bore the old Turkic title khan which was higher than *beğ*, the latter then being the usual title in other emirates. As Ibn Battuta remarked, khan meant sultan in their language. If we take the inscription of Tokat at face value, Karasi was the first to

Episcopatum Ecclesiae Constantinopolitanae, Géographie ecclesiastique de l'empire byzantin, v. I, (Paris 1981) p. 208, 220, 235, 253, 276, 298, 313, 316.

12. The hypothesis that Karasi derives from Kara-Isa has been strongly rejected by UZUNÇARŞILI, *IA*, s.v. "Karasi-oğulları". However, Kalem could be a Turkish name: a "tatas" of the Byzantine court was called Theodoros Kalampakis, that is Kalem-beğ (πάμισ), a Christianised Turk who took the name Theodore; see ACROPOLITA, p. 139.

13. See the description of the region by ACROPOLITA, p. 185.

14. Pergamos was taken by the Turks shortly after the evacuation of Anatolia by the Catalans: H. GELZER, Pergamon unter Byzantiner und Osmanen, *Abhandlungen der Königlich Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Phil. - Hist. Abh., Anhang II*, (Berlin 1903) p. 90-91.

15. VRYONIS, *Decline*, p. 299.

16. ZACHARIADOU, *Trade and Crusade*, p. 16. The name of this Turkish lord was then pronounced Demir (not Timur), as written by the Byzantines; see MORAVSČIK, *Byzantinoturcica*, v. II, p. 297, 304-305. According to Kantakouzenos, Demir was the son of Yakhshi; but that is inaccurate.

17. IBN BATTUTA, v. II, p. 448-449.

18. ZACHARIADOU, *Trade and Crusade*, p. 108-109; UZUNÇARŞILI and CAHEN, *supra* note 1, imply that the emirate broke up after Karasi-beğ's death but nothing confirms their guessing.

take the title of *khan*, and his successors used both titles, *khan* and *beğ*, alternately.¹⁹ Ibn Battuta found Pergamos in ruins while Balıkesir was a fine and populous city with pleasant bazaars, but he was disappointed with Demir *khan* whom he qualified as a worthless person while he found the population of Balıkesir as worthless as its leader.

The two brothers, *Yakhshi khan* who was established in Pergamos, and Demir *khan* at Balıkesir, are also mentioned in the work of the Egyptian scholar al-Umari who, although giving information for approximately the same years, describes them in altogether different terms as possessing important fleets and being devoted to the holy war which they conducted against the Byzantines continuously and successfully. By this time they had probably imposed their rule upon the regions of the Propontis since al-Umari describes *Yakhshi* as Lord of Marmara.²⁰ Military operations against the Byzantines were transferred to Europe. Kantakouzenos reports that in the early 1330's the Turks, carrying horses on their vessels, twice crossed the Dardanelles and raided Thrace, advancing as far inland as Kissos/*Keshan*.²¹ Although he does not describe them as Karasi Turks, they presumably came from that emirate since that was their point of departure. Karasi was in fact a vigorous and prestigious Muslim power, firmly established on the coast opposite the European territories of Byzantium to which it constituted a powerful threat at a time when the Ottomans were only occasionally able to raid the coasts of Bithynia. One text, the *Hikayet-i Gazi*, which was very probably composed in the emirate of Karasi at that time, reveals the spirit prevailing there. Its author tried to explain the meaning of the holy war waged by the Muslims against the infidels and the rules of that war.²² However, *Yakhshi's* important fleet, together with fleets belonging to other Turkish emirs, was destroyed by the crusading galleys of the Latins near Edremit in 1334, and that victory, which caused great enthusiasm among the Christians, temporarily halted Turkish expansion in the Aegean.²³

According to the early Turkish chronicles, the emirate of Karasi was taken

19. V. BARTHOLD, *El*, s.v. "beg". I note, however, that only in the second edition of the inscription by KARAMAGRALI, *supra* note 7, is Karasi's name followed by the title *khan*. P. WITTEK, Notes sur la tughra ottomane, *Byzantion*, 20 (1950) 279-282, while examining the introduction of this title in the tughra, suggested that the first Ottoman Sultan who took it was Murad I. The early Ottoman chronicles usually mention the sultan with the title *khan*.

20. F. TAESCHNER, *Al-Umari's Bericht über Anatolien in seinem Werke Masalik al-amsar fi mamalik al-amsar*, (Leipzig 1929) p. 22, 43.

21. CANTACUSENUS, v. I, p. 435-436.

22. Ş. TEKİN, XIV üncü yüzyıla ait bir *ilm-i hâl*: Risaletü'l-Islam, *WZKM*, 76 (1986) 279-292; IDEM, XIV. yüzyılda yazılmış gazilik tarikasi "gâzılığın yolları" adlı bir eski Anadolu türkçesi metni ve Gazâ/Cihâd kavramları hakkında, *JTS*, 13 (1989) 139-163.

23. ZACHARIADOU, *Trade and Crusade*, p. 29-33; cf. N.J. HOUSLEY, Angevin Naples and the Defence of the Latin East: Robert the Wise and the Naval League of 1334, *Byzantion*, 51 (1981) 548.

by the Ottomans in the following year. More precisely, the chronicler *Ashikpashazade* narrates a story which most probably derives from an older text, that of *Yakhshi Fakih*.²⁴ According to this story, the beğ of Karasi, named *Adjlan*, died. One of his sons called *Dursun* was already in the service of the Ottoman lord *Orkhan* while another son had stayed with his father. *Dursun* incited *Orkhan* to annex his brother's territory, which consisted of the region of *Balikesir*, *Edremit* and *Bergama*. *Orkhan* carried out this annexation but *Dursun* was killed during the military operations; his brother was taken captive by the Ottomans. These events took place in the year 735, that is 1334-1335.²⁵ The family may well have been divided by this time and *Dursun*, one of its members who was established in the region of the *Propontis*, could well have joined the Ottomans. There is no doubt that there was a pro-Ottoman party in *Karasi* and that two early Ottoman heroes, *Hadji-Ilbeği* and *Evrenos*, originated there.

However, *Ashikpashazade's* date must be rejected on the basis of other sources for the history of *Karasi*. Following the naval defeat of 1334, that emirate rapidly recovered and resumed its raids. *Gregoras* reports that the Turks continuously crossed the *Dardanelles* to pillage *Thrace*. In 1337 the Turks of *Karasi* set off with vessels carrying horses for a large-scale raid, but they were repulsed by the Byzantines and forced to conclude a treaty with them.²⁶ In the summer of that year the Ottomans under *Orkhan* also launched a raid on *Thrace*. By that time the Ottomans held part of the coast of the *Propontis* and their light vessels sailed from *Trigleia*. However, the Ottoman troops consisted only of foot soldiers, who were defeated and pursued by the Byzantines.²⁷ *Orkhan* then resumed his military operations on land and captured the port of *Nikomedeia*. Shortly after the death of *Andronikos III* in 1341 *Yakhshi*, who was followed by his neighbour the emir of *Sarukhan*, organized two raids on *Thrace*, during which he was defeated and wounded. He was again obliged to conclude a treaty with the Byzantines.²⁸ During the civil war within Byzantium, which erupted shortly afterwards, the emirate of *Karasi* maintained its prosperity.

Ashikpashazade reports that *Karasi's* son, who had been taken prisoner, died of plague two years after the conquest of his emirate: *iki yıl diri oldu; ahir yumrucak çıkardı; Allah rahmetine vardı*.²⁹ He probably died during the *Black Death* of 1348 in which case the emirate came to an end in 1345-1346, a significant moment for Turkish expansion in Europe.

Since 1341 the Byzantine empire had been devastated by the civil war between *John VI Kantakouzenos* and the legitimate heir to the throne, the young

24. V.L. MENAGE, *The Menaqib of Yakhshi Fakih*, *BSOAS*, 26 (1963) 50-54.

25. AŞIKPAŞAZADE (Giese), p. 41-42.

26. GREGORAS, v. I, p. 535-538.

27. GREGORAS, v. I, p. 539; CANTACUSENUS, v. I, p. 505.

28. CANTACUSENUS, v. II, p. 65-70. The treaties of *Karasi* with the Byzantines concluded in 1337 and 1341 have been omitted by DÖLGER, *Regesten*, v. IV, V.

29. I am very indebted to Prof. V.L. Ménage who helped me understand this point.

John V Palaiologos. The Turks profited from this situation, and their power increased considerably because both parties appealed to them for military aid. Turks from several emirates were deeply involved in this civil war as mercenaries or as allies. Kantakouzenos allied himself first with Umur paşha Aydınoğlu and later with the Ottoman Orkhan. Less is known about the close relations of the Karasi Turks with John Batatzes, a character who reflected the decadence of Byzantium. His puzzling personality and his activities are described by two contemporary authors, Kantakouzenos and Gregoras.³⁰ Batatzes was of humble origin and had become extremely wealthy by conducting several land censuses at the command of the Byzantine government. His relatives possessed huge estates in Thrace, including the fortresses of Polyboton and of Tiristasis (Sarköy); he fortified the latter at his own expense. Furthermore Batatzes' family had strong family connections, his son being married to the Patriarch's daughter while his daughter was married to the son of Apokaukos, the strong man behind John V Palaiologos.

At the beginning of the civil war Batatzes supported John V Palaiologos but later, in 1344-1345, he went over to the other side. Kantakouzenos reports in his Memoirs that while he himself was in Thrace, Batatzes surrendered his fortresses to him, abandoning Palaiologos. At this very time an emir called Süleyman came from Asia Minor to visit Kantakouzenos and to offer him horses, presents and numerous soldiers. In another passage Kantakouzenos reports that this Süleyman was the son of Karasi,³¹ and the events which followed show clearly that his visit, which took place at the same time as Batatzes' adherence to Kantakouzenos, was not a simple coincidence but resulted from close relations between the two men. This alliance was very useful to Kantakouzenos since Batatzes, who was experienced in warfare, had excellent relations with the Turkish emirs and knew the Turkish language very well. Established in Sarköy, he fought successfully against armies despatched by John V Palaiologos and organized raids against territories administered by the Palaiologan supporters. Furthermore in spring 1345 Süleyman Karasioğlu joined Kantakouzenos' ally Umur Aydınoğlu and crossed over to Thrace to fight against Palaiologos.³²

At about the same time Kantakouzenos concluded his alliance with the Ottoman Sultan Orkhan, whereupon Palaiologos attempted to counterbalance the situation by sending an embassy to Süleyman Karasioğlu to ask for military aid; but this failed.³³ In fact, shortly afterwards Süleyman married Batatzes' daughter. This marriage gave Batatzes' family connections an extra dimension and initiated a new pattern in Byzantine politics, for less than a year later

30. GREGORAS, v. II, p. 741-743; CANTACUSENUS, v. II, p. 552-556. On Batatzes cf. the *PLP*, in which, however, the information is not accurate.

31. CANTACUSENUS, v. II, p. 475-476, 507.

32. MÉLIKOFF, *Destan*, p. 123; LEMERLE, *Aydin*, p. 217, hesitates to accept the information given by the Turkish text, which, however, is fairly clear.

33. CANTACUSENUS, v. II, p. 507.

Kantakouzenos married his own daughter to Sultan Orkhan.

In the autumn of 1345 Batatzes changed his mind yet again. He sent a message to Palaiologos that he intended to revert to his side, abandoning Kantakouzenos. Batatzes also promised to find a strong Turkish force to fight against Kantakouzenos; this he could arrange through his son-in-law, Süleyman the emir of Karasi. The subsequent events were reported by Gregoras and Kantakouzenos. Kantakouzenos' detailed narrative concernig Batatzes' defection includes his own dramatic reaction. He was clearly shaken by the event and, although he knew that Batatzes had abandoned him and that an army from Karasi was ready to cross to Thrace, he sent a high official to persuade Batatzes to remain on his side. Batatzes refused to receive this ambassador, made no attempt to hide his rapprochement with Palaiologos and, in a most confusing and evasive way, promised to send messages later to ask that he be pardoned. Kantakouzenos, although realizing that Batatzes wanted to win time until the arrival of the Turkish army, sent another high official who was again to offer a pardon to Batatzes for his betrayal. This ambassador was unable to accomplish his mission because he arrived while a Turkish army was landing at Sarköy; he returned immediately with this bad news. Several towns in Thrace controlled by Batatzes' relatives revolted against Kantakouzenos who was forced to make serious preparations for war immediately.

Two subsequent embassies sent by Kantakouzenos as well as his repeated offer to pardon Batatzes show that after the latter's defection the situation had become desperate. Not only the events themselves but also the style of his account reveal that he went through hours of deep anxiety. The continuation of his narrative includes a miraculous touch. While discussing matters with his ambassador he fell half asleep and had a dream in which two very handsome young men covered him with a purple cloth bearing a large golden cross and a golden inscription "Jesus Christ Victor". He woke up and recounted his dream which was taken as a good omen. Later he learned that exactly at the moment he had this vision, Batatzes had been assassinated by his Turkish soldiers.³⁴ Kantakouzenos apparently related his dream in his Memoirs in order to suggest that this crucial danger was avoided only because he was protected by Christ.

Kantakouzenos claimed that the reason why the Turks killed Batatzes was that he had betrayed them because, when inviting them to Thrace, he had not told them that they would have to fight Kantakouzenos. The Turks reached Thrace and were happy to see the numerous animals roving in the fertile countryside which they were ready to pillage. Nevertheless, as soon as they learned that they were in a territory which had revolted against Kantakouzenos they were no longer tempted by the booty and, after killing Batatzes, they returned home. Between the lines of Kantakouzenos' narrative his pride and satisfaction may be discerned,

34. CANTACUSENUS, v. II, p. 555. On Kantakouzenos' history cf. A.P. KAZHDAN, *L'histoire de Cantacuzène en tant qu' oeuvre littéraire, Byzantion*, 50 (1980) 279-335.

while his description of Thrace contradicts other passages of his work in which he cynically states that the country was completely ruined by the civil war and had been deserted. Gregoras, who writes that the Turks killed Batatzes because he had invited them to a country where there was nothing to pillage or even to eat, seems much more reliable even though the real reason for the killing of Batatzes was a different one. Batatzes' end came in the winter of 1345-1346, that is two years before the Black Death, when, according to *Ashikpashazade* the emirate of Karasi apparently came to an end.

Behind the clash between Kantakouzenos and Batatzes may be discerned a conflict between two Turkish states, that of the Ottomans and that of Karasi. Kantakouzenos and Gregoras do not comment on this, perhaps because they were not aware of its full significance. This conflict was inevitable and had its roots in past rivalries between the Karasi and the Ottoman emirates. Both states directed their raids against the same territories in a period when booty constituted the basis of the economic life of the Turkish warriors, especially as it included captives to be sold as slaves. The slave trade flourished in Turkish Asia Minor during the fourteenth century. Raids on territories already pillaged by other Turks certainly yielded less profit in prisoners and booty. According to an old Oriental custom, the emirs received one fifth of the booty. The revenues of the various emirs were also increased by the taxes collected from the territories they invaded and, in return, they discontinued their attacks.³⁵ There was certainly antagonism over who would first undertake a raid and who would first collect taxes. If there were plans for a permanent expansion, that would exacerbate this antagonism since Thrace was the obvious outlet for both emirates.

From the spring of 1345 the Ottomans were active in Europe as allies of Kantakouzenos and their rivalry with Karasi increased. The Ottomans were becoming richer by pillaging Byzantine property and by seizing captives; they exacted tribute from those Christian inhabitants under Kantakouzenos' protection.³⁶ They became acquainted with the topography of the country and they devastated it in preparation for the final conquest which began less than ten years later with the conquest of Tzympe and then of Kallipolis. The intervention of the Karasi Turks, who appeared on the scene with Süleyman, in support of the side opposing Kantakouzenos shook the position of the Ottomans and endangered their plans concerning Thrace and perhaps even the whole Balkans.

Soldiers of the pro-Ottoman party which existed in Karasi apparently killed Batatzes in Thrace. On the other hand, it is fairly certain that the army which Kantakouzenos prepared in order to fight Batatzes largely consisted of Ottoman Turks who could have killed Batatzes as well. Anyhow, the confrontation between

35. E.A. ZACHARIADOU, *S'enrichir en Asie Mineure au XIVème Siècle, Hommes et richesses dans l'Empire byzantin*, edd. V. KRAVARI – J. LEFORT – C. MORRISSON, (Paris 1991) v. II, p. 215-224.

36. See the eloquent passage in MÉLIKOFF, *Destan*, p. 99, which describes the joint collection of the taxes by Kantakouzenos and Umur.

the Ottomans and the Karasi Turks in Europe almost certainly led sultan Orkhan to take the decision to conquer the emirate of Karasi, which thus disappeared after a life of less than half a century. Most probably the defeated son of Karasi, whose name is not mentioned by the early Ottoman chronicler Ashikpashazade, was Süleyman, the son-in law of Batatzes.³⁷ The reason why Ashikpashazade gives incorrect dates for these events is that all Turkish chronicles, that of Ashikpashazade included, remain silent about the alliance between Orkhan and John Kantakouzenos and as a result the narrative of affairs in the 1340s is highly confused. The reason for this silence was obviously that while Ottoman expansion in Thrace, the first step in the conquest of the Balkans, had begun with the alliance with Kantakouzenos, the Ottoman historians needed to show that the conquest of Christian lands was an exclusively Ottoman achievement.³⁸

According to the inscription at Tokat, the founder of the Karasi dynasty was Melik Danışmend, a legendary hero belonging to the glorified dynasty of the Danışmend Turks,³⁹ who had fought the warriors of the first crusade and who had been enemies of the Seldjuk dynasty of Konya. The Danışmend dynasty disappeared completely shortly after 1200 and it was impossible to connect it with the Karasi family. Therefore the Tokat inscription reported a family myth intended to glorify its past by establishing an affiliation with an old Turkish dynasty of Anatolia. This family myth also expressed the rivalry between the Karasi dynasty and the Ottomans whose dynasty claimed an affiliation with the Seldjucs of Konya. This Ottoman dynastic myth was intended to demonstrate that the house of Osman was somehow the legitimate successor of the old sultans of Rum. The Karasi Turks, who probably had great aspirations, claimed a semi-legendary origin in Melik Danışmend who had disputed Seldjuk supremacy.

Despite the earlier rivalry, the sailors of Karasi, who excelled in naval warfare, offered their services to the Ottomans immediately after the annexation of their emirate. Their country had a long naval tradition. It included the town of Pegai where ferocious sailors, or perhaps more accurately pirates, from Monembasia had settled on the invitation of the Byzantine emperor Michael VIII Palaiologos.⁴⁰ The early Ottoman chronicles obscure the fact that it was the Karasi Turks who paved the way for the conquest of Thrace, and they attribute the whole plan to Süleyman pasha, the son of Orkhan. However, they describe in detail how the experienced seamen of the peninsula of Artake constructed light vessels for the young pasha and how they instructed him to sail to the opposite

37. Ashikpashazade perhaps omitted the name because at that time another Süleyman, the son of Orkhan and great hero of the crossing to the Balkans, was active.


38. ZACHARIADOU, *Ιστορία και Θρύλοι*, p. 47-57. There is an additional element of confusion in Ashikpashazade's narrative because within the same context he reports the conquest of Lopadion by the Ottomans. Lopadion surrendered to the Ottomans in 1327: SCHREINER, *Kleinchroniken*, v. I, p. 8, v. II, p. 232-233.

39. IRENE MELIKOFF, *EI*², s.v. "Danışmendids".

40. HELENE AHRWEILER, *Byzance et la Mer*, (Paris 1966) p. 354-360.

coast in order to begin the great conquest.⁴¹ Some of these sailors had the title of *edje*⁴² which was frequently used in Karasi and which survived as a place name, *Edje Ova*, in the peninsula of Kallipolis. The use of this title and the use of the title *khan* by the Karasi lords seem to be peculiarities intended to distinguish this emirate from the others.

I can now propose the following genealogical tree in which those who were senior lords are indicated by an asterisk:



Karasi beğ probably died shortly before 1328 when his son and successor Demir khan concluded the treaty with Andronikos III. His son Djüdje is apparently known through a grave stone at the cemetery of Deveciler in Bursa.⁴³ Demir khan had a short reign and was succeeded by his brother Yakhshi; coins struck in his name show that he was a senior lord in the emirate;⁴⁴ he disappeared shortly after 1341. His son Beğlerbeğ was also a senior lord, as indicated by a coin struck in his name which has survived.⁴⁵ Doubts have been expressed whether Beğlerbeğ

41. AŞIKPAŞAZADE (Giese), p. 44-45; cf. H. INALCIK, The Closing of the Black Sea, *AP*, 35 (1979) 78-79; H.J. KISSLING, Zum islamischen Heiligenwesen auf dem Balkan, vorab im thrakischen Raum, *Zeitschrift für Balkanologie*, 1 (1962) 52-54; cf. finally H. INALCIK, "Arab" Camel Drivers in Western Anatolia in the Fifteenth Century, *Revue d'Histoire Maghrebine*, 10₃₁₋₃₂ (1983) 256-258.

42. On *edje*, equivalent of *kodja*, see M.Z. PAKALIN, *Osmanlı Tarih Deyimleri ve Terimleri*, (Istanbul 1946) s.v. "Ece", and cf. *Tarama Sözlüğü*, Türk Tarih Kurumu, (Istanbul 1943) s.v. "Ece", with a quotation from the XIIIth-XIVth centuries. Xemelic, mentioned by MUNTANER, *Crònaca*, v. II, p. 76, is certainly *Edje-Melik*.

43. UZUNÇARŞILI, *IA*, s.v. "Karasi".

44. ARTUK, *Karesi-oğulları adına basılmış olan iki sikke*, p. 283.

45. ARTUK, *Karesi-oğulları adına basılmış olan iki sikke*, p. 284.

was a name and it was taken as a title. However its appearance on a coin followed by the title of *çelebi*, which was commonly used in the emirates, makes it clear that it was really a name, similar to some other Anatolian names which sound like titles such as Il-Gazi or Ilbeği or Beyler.⁴⁶ Beğlerbeğ *çelebi* apparently had a brother Yakub whose name is known from a manuscript.⁴⁷

46. A certain Beyler *çelebi* is connected with the *ulu djami* of Osmanđjuk: F. İLTER, Osmanlı ılasım ađında ırnak kenarı bir yerleşme: *Osmançık, Bell*, 52 (1989) 558-559.

47. TEKİN, XIV üncü yüzyıla ait bir *ilm-i hâl*, p. 284, 288-289.

**OTTOMAN, KARASID, AND SARUKHANID COINAGES
AND THE PROBLEM OF CURRENCY COMMUNITY IN
TURKISH WESTERN ANATOLIA
(’40s – ’80s OF THE 14th CENTURY)**

Konstantin ZHUKOV

The collection of coins issued by the Muslim dynasties of Anatolian Beyliks possessed by the Hermitage Museum in Leningrad remains one of the richest in the world. The total number of coins in it is now estimated at approximately one hundred and fifty.¹ A part of them was described in the “Inventory-Catalogue” published by A. Markov in 1896.² While an important contribution for its time, this catalogue is now totally inadequate. The purpose of my paper is to correct some errors in attribution which can be found in the catalogue and to analyse the currency of the Ottoman, Karasid, and Sarukhanid dynasties both in terms of typology and metrology.

Ten years ago, such a typological analysis was carried out by Philip N. Remler, who showed a close relationship between the Ottoman, Isfendiyarid, and Eretnid coinages. He arrived at the conclusion that this relationship indicates the existence of “a sort of currency community based on a common origin and close commercial ties”.³

It should be noted that the main features of the style of the coins concerned are a distinctive rendition of the *shahāda* and geometrical fields in various forms both on the obverse and the reverse.

By analysing the style of the silver coins of these three Beyliks, Ph. Remler has shown clearly the derivation of their coinages from that of the Ilkhanids. In his opinion, “this derivation is of two types: in the first, a style usually from

1. I should like to thank Mrs Marina Severova of the Numismatic Department of the Hermitage Museum for allowing me to use the collection of these coins as well as for the help she has given me.

2. A. MARKOV, *Inventarnii katalog musulmanskih monet Imperatorskogo Ermitazha*, (St. Petersburg 1896). There are also five additions to this catalogue: *Dobavleniie*, v. I-V.

3. PH.N. REMLER, Ottoman, Isfendiyarid, and Eretnid coinage: a currency community in fourteenth century Anatolia, *American Numismatic Society, Museum Notes*, 25 (1980) p. 167.

further east – was consciously imitated in a coin of another Beylik; in the second, a group of styles, usually Ilkhanid, formed a pool from which Beylik types were drawn and redrawn over a period of generations”,⁴ that is, after political independence had been achieved by the Beyliks. He also points out that the former indicates the strength of trade links in the area (in the first place the east-west silk trade) and the latter shows the continued prestige and legitimacy of the Mongol empire in Iran as well as the fact that the Mongol currency practice was also adopted by the Beyliks.⁵

It is worth stressing that the comparison of types also helps to determine a sequence as well as approximate dates of the Beylik coinages. For instance, while compiling a catalogue of Sultan Orkhan’s coins, Remler suggests that the coins of Orkhan Type V may date back to the 1340s and possibly to the 1350s.⁶ Orkhan Type V consists of two variants. One variant has a hexafoil obverse and a hexafoil reverse, while another has a hexagon reverse and an octafoil obverse.⁷

An *akche* of the same type is kept in the Hermitage collection. In A. Markov’s catalogue it was erroneously attributed to Ishak Sarukhanoghlu.⁸

Obv. Within octafoil, in
circle surrounded by dots
lā ilāha illā Allāh
Muhammad
rasūl Allāh

Rev. Within hexagon, in
circle surrounded by dots
al-sultān al-a’-dal
Urkhā[n] [bin] ‘Uthmān
[khallada] [A]llāh mulkahu

No mint, no date. Diameter 17 mm, l. 02g, pierced. Plate I.

I think that it is possible to define the date proposed by Remler for the coins of Orkhan Type V more precisely. I shall try to do it by using the published coins of the Karasid dynasty. To begin with, I should like to draw attention to a silver coin published in the eighth volume of the “Catalogue of Oriental Coins in the British Museum” under number 64, with erroneous attribution to a certain Ishak Pasha.⁹

4. *Ibid.*, p. 168-169.

5. *Ibid.*, p. 169, 186, 188.

6. *Ibid.*, p. 185.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 184-185.

8. *Dobavleniie*, v. II, p. 899, no 0. In my preliminary study, A silver coin of the Karasid dynasty in the collection of the Hermitage Museum, *Pismennii Pamiatniki i Problemi Istorii Kulturi Narodov Vostoka*, v. I, (Moscow 1990) p. 35-38, this coin was incorrectly attributed to Beylerbeyi Karasioghlu. Reading of the reverse legend presents some difficulties because most of the words are written inaccurately and incompletely. For example, خان is written without ن, while the word بن is omitted. It should be noted, however, that these are characteristic features of Orkhan’s coins of this type; see, S. LANE-POOLE, *Catalogue of Oriental Coins in the British Museum*, v. 8: *The Coins of the Turks*, (London 1883) p. 43, note .

9. LANE-POOLE, *op. cit.*, p. 36, no 64, plate II.

The type of this akche is just the same as of the silver coin of Orkhan described earlier. However, there is a difference in the reverse legend, namely, instead of the inscription Orkhan bin Osman, the coin bears the rendition of the name Beylerbeyi.

We know that Beylerbeyi Çelebi Karasioghlu was a son of Yakhshi Karasioghlu. The latter ruled over the Beylik in Bergama.¹⁰ Two Karasid coins have been recently published by İbrahim Artuk. One of them was a silver coin of Yakhshi and the other a copper coin (*manghir*) of Beylerbeyi Çelebi. The *manghir* is similar to anonymous copper coins of the Sarukhanid dynasty and it has an octafoil field both on the obverse and on the reverse.¹¹ Being a copper coin, its style can be used in a typological analysis only as additional evidence. But it is worth stressing that this style coincides completely with that of the silver coins issued by Eretna in 1342-1343 (according to Remler's classification – Eretna Type I).¹² Thus, the coins minted by Beylerbeyi Çelebi fit perfectly the Typology Chart proposed by Remler and we may assume that the coins of Beylerbeyi as well as the akches of Orkhan Type V (second variant) were issued around 1344.

It should be noted that the last mention of his father Yakhshi Karasioghlu in the sources dates back to the summer of 1341. At the beginning of 1345 it was Sulayman Karasioghlu who reigned over the Emirate.¹³ In other words, we may speculate that the famous Adjlan Karasioghlu referred to in the Ottoman chronicles and Beylerbeyi Çelebi could be one and the same person, his rule lasting from the second half of 1341 to the end of 1344. However, it seems more probable that Beylerbeyi might be a *lakab* of Sulayman Karasioghlu, in which case Adjlan would be a nickname of Yakhshi Karasioghlu.

Thus, we have two possible ways of solving genealogical problems of the Karasid dynasty and one may hope that by discovering new sources, possibly numismatic evidence, the question will be settled.

The second coin of the Hermitage collection which I should like to call attention to is interesting in several respects. In A. Markov's catalogue it was erroneously attributed to Ishak Çelebi Sarukhanoghlu,¹⁴ but in fact it is an akche of his son Orkhan Sarukhanoghlu.¹⁵

10. See *infra*, note 13.

11. İ. ARTUK, Karesi-oğulları adına basılmış olan iki sikke, *TD*, 33 (1980/1981) 284, plate I, II.

12. REMLER, *op. cit.*, p. 172-173, 188.

13. K.A. ZHUKOV, *Egeikiie Emirati v. XIV-XV vv*, (Moscow 1988) p. 45-46.

14. *Dobavleniie*, v. IV, p. 1043, no 00.

15. See K.A. ZHUKOV – M.B. SEVEROVA, Dve serebrianiie turetskiie moneti XIV v. (akche İbrahima Menteshoğlu i akche Orhana Saruhanoğlu) iz Kollektcii Gosudarstvennogo Ermitazha (in press). An abstract was published in the proceedings of the conference: Novoie v sovetskoi numizmatike i numizmaticheskom muzeievedenii (October 14-16, 1987), (Leningrad 1987) p. 17-18.

Obv. Within circle,
in tughra
Urkhān bin Ishāk

Rev. In circle,
surrounded by dots
Khulida mulkuhu
/ date in ciphers /

No mint, year 780/1378-1379. Diameter 13mm, l. 10g. Plate II.

This is a rare coin. We know only three other specimens. One of them was published by İsmail Galib in his catalogue with both the erroneous attribution (to Karaman bin İshak) and the incorrect date (the Hijra year of 880).¹⁶ Since the coin is obliterated and the date is not evident in the photograph, I have not been able to determine whether it was a misprint or a common error (▲ instead of ▼) which was made in preparing the die. Two other specimens of the same type were published (with correct attribution) by the late Cüneyt Ölçer in his catalogue of the Karamanid coins under numbers 119 and 120.¹⁷ In the photograph of the no 119, one can see only two ciphers (•▲); while in the photograph of the no 120 the date is evident completely (•▲▼). Taking into account the date inscribed on our coin, we may conclude that the dates of the specimens published by Ölçer should be read inversely, that is (▼▲•).

The *tughra*, or monogram of the emir's name is one of the peculiar features of the style of the Sarukhanid coins. It is interesting to note that akches with the similar simple form of tughra were struck in 776/1374-1375 by Orkhan's father Ishak Sarukhanoghlu.¹⁸

The last report concerning the activities of Ishak Sarukhanoghlu is the dated inscription on the wall of Mevlevi-khane built by his order in Manisa.¹⁹ Both the inscription and Orkhan's silver coin described above bear the date 780. Therefore, one may conclude that in that year Ishak was succeeded by Orkhan.

Orkhan Sarukhanoghlu had been deposed by his brother Khizir before 791/1389. The first reign of Khizir ended with the capture of western Anatolian Beyliks by Sultan Bayezid I (1389-1402) in 1390. The second period of the Sarukhanid ascendancy over the Emirate began with Timur's invasion of Anatolia. Timur, after his victory at Ankara (July 28, 1402), reinstated Orkhan in the Beylik of Sarukhan.²⁰ In the summer of 1404 the power struggle between Orkhan and his brother Khizir was renewed. The latter won once again. However, he was dethroned and murdered by the Ottoman Mehmed Çelebi in the spring of the

16. İ. GALİB, *Takvim-i Meskûkât-ı Selçukiye*, (Kostantinya 1309) p. 116, no 172, plate V.

17. C. ÖLÇER, *Karaman Oğulları Beyliği Madeni Paraları*, (İstanbul 1982) p. 106-107, no 119-120, plate II.

18. LANE-POOLE, *op. cit.*, p. 31, no 58; İ. ARTUK – C. ARTUK, *İstanbul Arkeoloji Müzeleri Teşhirdeki İslâmî Sikkeler Kataloğu*, (İstanbul 1971) v. I, p. 433-434, no 1319.

19. M. ÇAGATAY ULUÇAY, *JA*, s.v. "Saruhanoğulları".

20. Orkhan's copper coins bearing the date 806/1403-1404 are known to exist (see İ. ARTUK – C. ARTUK, *op. cit.*, v. I, p. 434, no 1321).

next year.²¹ The extant akches of Khizir are undated,²² but considering the extremely short duration of his second reign, it is possible to place them as far back as the period of his first accession, that is, in the pre-Ottoman period.

By drawing a metrological comparison between the silver coins issued by Orkhan and Khizir Sarukhanoghlu, on the one hand, and the akches of Sultan Murad I, on the other, we may conclude that their regular weights are equal. There are four types of the akches issued by Murad I. Their regular weights are the following: Murad I Type I-1.10g (emission: 290 akches out of 100 dirhams of silver); Murad I Type II and Murad I Type IV-1.15g (emission: 278 akches out of 100 dirhams).²³ The weight standard of Murad I Type III has not been established yet.²⁴

The real weight of the Orkhan's akche described above is 1.10g.²⁵ Khizir's silver coins have weight standards of 1.10g and 1.15g.²⁶

I should add that my calculations should be regarded as preliminary ones, because they are based on the real weights of a few coins, not of a series. Nevertheless, in the light of these data, the finds of the coins of Murad I at Sardis, that is in the territory of the former Beylik of Sarukhan, are of considerable importance. For instance, a *manghir* of Murad I was discovered during the excavations at Sardis, lying side by side with two *manghirs* of Ishak Sarukhanoghlu. Apart from this small hoard, there were also several isolated finds of both akches and *manghirs* struck by Murad I.²⁷

It was the practice to call in the coins of predecessors when a new sultan came

21. K.A. ZHUKOV, *op. cit.*, p. 61-62.

22. See *infra*, note 25.

23. İ. ARTUK – C. ARTUK, *op. cit.*, v. II, (İstanbul 1974) p. 456-457, no 1379-1381. These types have variants of the weight standard of 1.20g (see N. PERE, *Osmanlılarda Madeni Paralar*, (İstanbul 1968) p. 51, plate 2; and also two specimens of the Hermitage collection with the real weights of 1.17g each: State Hermitage, inventory numbers 9.085 and 9.086). It is worth stressing that the real weight of the akche struck by Ishak Sarukhanoghlu in 776 is also 1.20g (see İ. ARTUK – C. ARTUK, *op. cit.*, v. I, p. 433-434, no 1319).

24. Concerning the coins of Murad Type III see, İ. ARTUK, I. Murad sikkelerine genel bir bakış, 761-792 (1359-1389), *Bell*, 46, 184(1982) 791-793, 783. However, the attribution of the coins of that type to Murad I still remains uncertain; cf. *Greek, Roman, and Islamic coins from Sardis*, edd. T.V. BATTREY, ANN JOHNSTON, K.M. MACKENZIE, M.L. BATES, Archaeological Exploration of Sardis, Monographs, 7 (Cambridge, Mass. 1981) p. 238, no 29-31, plate IX.

25. Since the specimen published by İ. GALİB (see *supra*, p. 240) is obliterated, its real weight is only 0.90g. The weight of one specimen published by C. ÖLÇER (no 120) is 1.03g, but the weight of another one (no 119) is also 1.10g (see *supra*, p. 240).

26. İ. ARTUK – C. ARTUK, *op. cit.*, v. I, p. 433-434, no 1320; A. TEVHİD, *Müze-i Humayun'un Meskûkât-ı Kadime-i İslâmîye Kataloğu*, Kısım IV, (Kostantinya 1321) p. 385, no 791-792.

27. *Greek, Roman, and Islamic Coins from Sardis*, p. 229, 237.

to power or after a neighbouring Beylik was captured. Therefore, one would suppose that the coins of Murad I had already circulated in the Beylik of Sarukhan before the Ottoman conquest of 1390.

My preliminary observations lead to the following conclusions: firstly, there was a unity of types of the coinages issued by Sultan Orkhan and the Karasid dynasty in the middle of the forties; and secondly, there was a currency community in the Ottoman Emirate and the Beylik of Sarukhan as early as the seventies and eighties of the XIVth century. These facts show the strong economic links within a considerable part of western Anatolia before the Ottoman conquest of 1390. Thus, we may identify two periods in the formation of a currency community within the territory of those three Beyliks. In the first period, the Karasid coinage was assimilated to the Ottoman one in design, while in the second period, the currency of the Sarukhanid dynasty was equalised with the Ottoman coinage in weight series.

Plate I



Obv.



Rev.

Plate II



Obv.



Rev.