

FRONTIERS OF
OTTOMAN STUDIES
VOLUME I

EDITED BY COLIN IMBER
& KEIKO KIYOTAKI

Library of Ottoman Studies
5

I.B. TAURIS

Frontiers of Ottoman Studies

Frontiers of Ottoman Studies:
State, Province, and the West

Volume I

Edited by

Colin Imber and Keiko Kiyotaki

I.B. Tauris

London • New York

Published in 2005 by I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd
6 Salem Road, London W2 4BU
175 Fifth Avenue, New York NY 10010
www.ibtauris.com

In the United States of America and in Canada distributed by
St Martin's Press, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York NY 10010

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Volume 1.
ISBN: 1 85043 631 2
EAN: 978 1 85043 631 7

Volume 2.
ISBN: 1 85043 664 9
EAN: 978 1 85043 664 5

A full CIP record for this book is available from the British Library
A full CIP record for this book is available from the Library of Congress

Library of Congress catalog card: available

Printed and bound in Great Britain by TJ International Ltd, Padstow, Cornwall
Camera-ready copy edited and supplied by Keiko Kiyotaki

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Preface

These volumes contain a selection of the papers presented at the 15th Symposium of the Comité International d'Études Pré-Ottomanes et Ottomanes (CIEPO-15), held in London from 8 July to 12 July, 2002. Keiko Kiyotaki arranged the chapters in the volumes under thematic headings which reflect the sessions of the conference. Colin Imber was the overall editor of volume 1, dealing with the political, social and economic history of the Ottoman Empire. Keiko Kiyotaki edited the statistical material in the volume. Volume 2 covers literary and cultural topics. To maintain the thematic integrity, the editors had regrettably to exclude some articles that were intrinsically very interesting. We were also unable to consider contributions in languages other than English. The editors respected the authors' own systems of transliteration. Tables and illustrations were standardised in form only. Endnotes remain unaltered except in the style of citation. The authors were individually responsible for obtaining permission to use copyright materials. Views and opinions in the text are those of the individual authors.

Colin Imber and Keiko Kiyotaki

Introduction

Colin Imber

More than a quarter of a century ago a scholar described Ottoman history as ‘Clio’s poor relation’. That was certainly true then, and in terms of the status of Ottoman history, at least in the history departments of European and American universities, it remains true today. Furthermore, the study of Ottoman history since the collapse of the Empire after 1918 has suffered from more than neglect, and has had to endure more than its fair share of stresses and strains. Despite pockets of enlightenment, most western historians have, until fairly recently, been content to think of the Ottoman Empire, if they thought of it at all, in terms of ‘the Turkish menace’ or as ‘the sick man of Europe’. Western thinking about Ottoman government and institutions often did not progress beyond a vague concept of—in the words of a British administrator in Mandate Palestine—‘the blasting rule of the Turks’. In the twenty-five or so countries that today occupy the former territory of the Ottoman Empire there is a greater awareness of Ottoman history and consciousness of an Ottoman legacy. However, more often than not Ottoman history in these countries has been co-opted by nationalist governments and, outside Turkey at least, presented in school and university curricula in terms of ‘the Turkish yoke’ that for centuries stifled the culture and development of the occupied nations. In Turkey, on the other hand, the nationalist agenda has been to present a one-dimensional view of the Empire as a great and uniquely Turkish achievement, and to seek the origins of its institutions in a vaguely defined Turkish past, somewhere in Central Asia.

These ways of thinking have left a legacy of clichés and misconceptions that even today present a minefield through which serious students and researchers must pick their way carefully. It is, however, easy to exaggerate the obstacles that face historians of the Ottoman Empire. Next to the nationalist and other politically and ideologically motivated dross, there are seams of gold, and as more historians enter the field the quantity and quality of published material has increased. Studies continue to appear which add not only to the sum of our knowledge of the Ottoman Empire but also

to our understanding of how it worked, allowing us to see beyond the old clichés and to correct hoary misconceptions. As an example, Keiko Kiyotaki's article in this collection directly challenges a frequently stated opinion that the practice of tax farming in the Ottoman Empire was necessarily a symptom of weak and inefficient government and a source of corruption. Through a case study of Iraq in 1831 she demonstrates that in some respects tax farming was beneficial. It not only gave the farmer an interest in stimulating the economic activities that provided him with an income and the government with revenue; it also had the effect of giving the tax-farmers, often powerful local notables, a vested interest in upholding the Ottoman system.

Such re-assessments are possible only through a careful study of the sources, and in this respect Ottomanists are more fortunate than historians working in other areas of the Islamic world. As the articles in this collection show, Ottoman source material is abundant, and in particular the millions of documents preserved in the Prime Ministry Archive (*Başbakanlık Arşivi*) in Istanbul. Although this is the repository for records of the central government, and presents a view of the Empire as seen from Istanbul, its records are indispensable for the study of the Ottoman provinces, an area of research that is coming increasingly to the fore and which forms a theme of this volume. The Ottoman Empire, as one historian wisely remarked, 'floated on a sea of paper': Ottoman administrators had a passion for lists and inventories which today provide much of the raw material for provincial history. Above all, from the early years of the Empire's existence, the government maintained registers of taxable resources throughout the sultan's realms, and it is these documents in particular that provide information about the provinces. Their focus is obviously narrow, but as tax records, they give a picture of settlement patterns, economic activities, and the distribution of tax revenues, and they provide a broad picture of populations and how they fluctuated over the years. It is by the careful study of tax registers that Mehdi İlhan is able to plot the changes in population, city boundaries and districts in the Anatolian city of Çankırı and Tomoki Okawara is able to correct the hitherto accepted picture of Damascus as a city that underwent little change in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. These articles demonstrate how the apparently arid pages of Ottoman tax registers can provide the foundation for urban and provincial history. At the same time, historians are beginning to test the evidence of the registers against archaeological, seismic and other evidence on the ground. Tom Sinclair's study of the town of Adilcevaz on the eastern frontier of the Ottoman Empire exemplifies this new trend. At a different level, John Curry's study of the Anatolian 'saint' Ömer al-

Fu'adi of Kastamonu serves as a reminder of the cultural and religious particularism of towns and districts outside the capital.

A growing interest in the different communities within the Empire parallels the research into its various regions and again, by emphasising Ottoman pluralism, serves to show that the advent of Ottoman rule did not, as nationalists once assumed, simply obliterate or drive underground non-Muslim and non-Turkish cultures. The Ottoman Jewish community in particular enjoyed a less chequered history than did the Jews in many regions of western and eastern Europe. In this volume Shaul Regev shows how Jewish scholarship continued to flourish in the Ottoman Empire, while Orly Meron's picture of Jewish entrepreneurship in Salonica reminds us of the international importance of the large Jewish population of that city between the fifteenth and early twentieth centuries. The multinational character of the Ottoman Empire was something that it shared with its dynastic rivals, the Habsburg and Romanov Empires, and which proved, as many have pointed out, to be a fatal weakness in its final decades. The principle of dynastic rule was not something that could survive the growth of nationalist ideologies in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. When intellectuals in the Empire began to identify their own communities as forming political nations and above all, perhaps, when the post-1908 Young Turk government began to promulgate Turkish nationalism as an official doctrine, the old imperial structure, perhaps best understood as a coalition of interests and semi-autonomous communities allied to the ruling dynasty, was bound to collapse. The papers by Caesar Farah and Yaron Harel, by referring to the beginnings of Arab nationalism and Zionism in the early twentieth century, connect with this theme.

The increasing amount of research on the Ottoman Empire below the level of the central government and the ruling élite has not displaced work on the central themes of imperial history. In this volume Rhoads Murphey's article on Mustafa Safi's early seventeenth century *Annals of Ahmed I*—a work which, like many other important Ottoman histories, survives only in manuscript—is a reminder of the importance of Ottoman literary chronicles, not only in providing a narrative framework for the Empire's history, but equally for understanding how the dynasty sought to legitimise its rule and how Ottoman subjects viewed the sultans. It is primarily through semi-official chronicles such as Safi's that we catch a glimpse of the image that the sultans presented, or tried to present to the outside world. Yavuz Cezar does not concentrate on the person of the sultan or specifically on his government, but rather on a group of men without whom the government could not have functioned. In most years from the last quarter of the sixteenth century the Ottoman treasury ran a deficit and, in the eighteenth and nineteenth

centuries, before the establishment of a banking system, turned to the great financiers of Istanbul for credit. These men and their businesses are the subjects of Yavuz Cezar's study. The development of banking in the nineteenth century was one of a series of centrally inspired reforms which collectively can be seen as an effort by the reformers to create a 'state' in the modern understanding of the term, with permanent institutions and an increasingly wide range of government functions. The reform of the judiciary which, in one of its aspects, forms the subject of Jun Akiba's paper, was another expression of these changes.

All the papers in this volume demonstrate how progress in Ottoman studies still depends on a close reading of primary source material. Jane Hathaway's paper, for example, by focussing on the meaning of a deceptively simple phrase, *evlâd-i 'arab* (literally 'sons of the Arabs'), in the context of Ottoman Egypt, reminds us how historical interpretation can often depend on our understanding—or misunderstanding—of small details in the texts, sometimes even single words. It is often the apparently inconsequential detail that leads to important discoveries and opens up new fields of research. In this collection, by enquiring into the sense of the term 'household' in Ottoman fiscal documents, Nenad Moačanin raises broader questions about social and family structures in the Ottoman Balkans. The fact that the interpretation of historical documents still often hinges on the precise definition of words is an indication that the serious study of Ottoman history is still at a very early stage in comparison with the historiography of western Europe. This means, however that, with so much to discover and so much material at the historian's disposal, it has become one of the most exciting fields for historical research even if, in terms of prestige and profile, it still remains 'Clio's poor relation'.

POLITICS AND ISLAM

Mustafa Safi's Version of the Kingly Virtues as Presented
in His *Zübdet'ül Tevarih*, or Annals of Sultan Ahmed,
1012-1023 A.H./1603-1614 A.D.

Rhoads Murphey

Volume two of Safi's history is outwardly 'factual' and uses the annalistic format to cloak its interpretive bent. Conversely, volume one of the *Zübdet* is self-avowedly focused not on the 'major' events of Sultan Ahmed's reign, but on the meaning, significance and interpretation of seemingly commonplace 'minor' events connected with the daily routine of the sultan and his entourage. It is his (i.e. the sultan's) movements, actions and gestes that make up the narrative core of the volume, while he (the historian) Safi places these impromptu 'moments' and 'glimpses' of the royal personage in their appropriate interpretive context. It is a highly personal account, often based on Safi's own privileged access to direct observation of the sultan in private non-rehearsed moments closed to all except intimate members of the sultan's household staff, or the even more limited numbers of potential observers chosen to accompany him during his hunting excursions.

The tale revolves exclusively around the sultan and is told by way of anecdotes (*menkıbe*) which exemplify his possession of the qualities of the ideal king as defined in medieval theoretical political tracts like Ghazali's early twelfth-century *Nasihat al-Muluk* and the well-known late eleventh century *Siyasetname* of Nizam al-Mulk. In many ways this first volume of Safi's history fits better with that tradition than with any pre-existing form of Ottoman historical or political writing. The *Risale* of Ayn Ali written in 1018/1609 for the same sultan is far more a practical guide to the mechanics of good administration than a theoretical treatise on kingly virtues.

The starting point of the work is an account of Ahmed's accession and coronation in 1012/1603 which is distinct from the rest of the volume and fits more with the annalistic or factual format of volume two. This takes up the first 14 folios of the volume and clearly identifies the sultan as the main subject and point of reference for the rest of the work. By far the longest part of the volume covering 112 out of 192 folios of the Berlin manuscript is devoted to the *menakib* of Sultan Ahmed. Here the author illustrates the acts and describes the exceptional qualities and attributes of the youthful sultan which, according to one of Safi's favourite and oft-repeated expressions, have: '*never before been seen or heard of in a sovereign occupying the Ottoman throne*'. By this Safi expects the audience to understand in particular the sultans Mehmed Fatih and Süleyman Kanunî. At the end of the *menakib* section the work is interrupted with a long digression dedicated to brief sketches of the events (of the 'major' sort dealt with mostly in volume two) of the reigns of Ahmed's thirteen predecessors on the Ottoman throne beginning with Osman Gazi. Although the digression is of substantial length (62 folios), only one of the reigns, that of Ahmed's father Mehmed III, is covered in any detail.

Safi's digression is justified, in fact necessitated, by a comment at the beginning of the volume which indicates that as he was writing the preface to his history, the Ottoman dynasty had reached the 321st lunar year of its existence, corresponding to the year 1020 *hicri* or 1611 A.D.¹ Accordingly, all of Ottoman history up to the accession of Ahmed I in 1012/1603 forms the natural and inevitable yardstick against which to compare Ahmed's performance during his first eight years on the throne. Its purpose however is not to provide a detailed history of the dynasty (it is too brief for that), but rather to provide a point of reference for the assessment of Ahmed's reign.

Before turning our attention to a few of the themes treated by Safi in the *menakib* pages of Volume One, it will perhaps be useful to take a brief look at the overall scope and purpose of the work. The first point to be made is that the work is long. The two volumes comprise roughly 650 folios or 1300 pages of text, but cover only an eleven year span of Ottoman history from December 1603/Receb 1012 to the end of 1614/Zilkade 1023. This is fairly prolix even by the most tolerant of standards. The second point is that, contrary to popular belief, Safi's work is not really a chronicle as traditionally defined and it certainly cannot be considered a continuation (*teyîd*) to Hoca Saadeddin's 'Crown of Histories' as claimed by Babinger.² Both the 'Crown' and Mustafa Ali's 'Essence of Knowledge' (*Kunh al-abbar*) are truly retrospective accounts of the dynasty up to their own times, whereas Safi's 'Quintessence' (*Zübde*), apart from the 62 folio digression in Volume One (ZT I, folios 127-

89), focuses on the author's own times and covers only the initial years, not even the whole reign, of one sultan. The case for Ali rather than Safi as the continuator and completer of the 'Crown' is much stronger on two grounds. In the first place, Ali's admiration for Saadeddin, though complicated by debts of obligation through patronage, was seemingly sincere³ which suggests a personal motive for his attempt to emulate the achievements of his close contemporary and fellow historian. Perhaps more to the point, secondly Ali's work actually does continue the 'Crown', whereas the 'Quintessence' picks up the thread with an 83 year gap in coverage between the death of Selim I in 1520/926 and the commencement of Ahmed's reign in 1603/1012.

In the portion of his work devoted to the menakib of the young sultan Ahmed, Safi is exploring with his intended audience, composed principally of the sultan and his top government advisers what, at this stage of the dynasty's development in the 321st lunar or 313th solar year of its existence, they would consider the abiding values for which the regime should be known and remembered. In his view, the possession by the currently reigning Ottoman sultan of the high moral traits, intellectual abilities and physical attributes ascribed to the figure of the ideal ruler in the standard cannon on Islamic statecraft deserved celebration not only because these high virtues were personified by the current Ottoman ruler, but because they typified the Ottoman regime itself.

Safi divides his text in 112 folios or eleven score pages of text allocated in the crimped *taliq* script of the Berlin manuscript to nine distinct categories.⁴ Of these, the first six are devoted to character traits or moral virtues, the seventh to the sultan's public building activities and charitable donations to serve as the proof and demonstration of his possession of the kingly virtues of generosity (*kerem, saba*) and piety, and sections eight and nine to his physical strengths and competence to rule. These sections are of varying length and importance, but neither the number of anecdotes provided nor the overall length of any of the sections provides a reliable indication of the importance assigned to it by the author. For example, despite its relative brevity, the paramount importance of section one on sultanic justice (*adalet*) covering only six folios of text is indicated by the pre-positioning of this section at the beginning of the account. The emphasis in terms of length and extent of coverage is placed on sections six (on sultanic generosity) and seven (on construction of mosques and *imarets*) which together cover 32 out of 112 folios or about three tenths of the total.

It may plausibly be argued that Safi's choice of emphasis was dictated at least in part by his desire to refute the controversial views put forward by Mustafa Ali in his treatise composed in 1581/989

and addressed to Murad III. Ali's list in the *Nushat al-Selatin* of eighteen *lazime* or requirements for the ideal ruler contained two controversial and contentious items, both of which seem to call into question basic commitments with which the Ottoman regime had long been associated. In *lazime* nine Ali expressed the view that rather than authorizing expenditure of the funds belonging to the *beyt'ül mal* to support charitable giving, sultans should rely exclusively on the gains from their own conquests (*mal-i ganimet*),⁵ and in a similar vein in *lazime* thirteen Ali expressed the view that imperial bounty and gifts to individuals in all forms ought to be confined to what he called 'reasonable' limits.⁶ Safi takes precisely the opposite view that there can be no such thing as excess of virtue, and that the perception as well as the reality of sultanic generosity formed a basic source of the state's well-being and a principal cause of the dynasty's preservation. To demonstrate his points, Safi provides examples, a small sampling of which we will present in the remainder of our paper.

General Overview and Contents of Folios 15 to 127 of Volume One of the Zübdet

[note: folio references are to the Berlin Ms., Or. Oct. 1044]

Section I (Sultanic justice), ff. 15-22

[note: anecdotes in this section are chosen to show an ideal balance between *hilm* and *gazab* or clemency and severity]

Section II (Sultanic probity and honesty), ff. 23-4

Section III (Sultanic piety)

(a) episode detailing Ahmed's smashing of the chiming clock presented by the 'infidels' to Sultan Mehmed III as a diplomatic gift (ff. 24-5)

(b) account of Ahmed's diligence in the performance of the five daily prayers (ff. 25-31)

(c) account of Ahmed's financing of the construction of mosques and *meschids* (ff. 31-8)

Section IV (Sultanic reason and intelligence (*akl*)) [ff. 38-56]

Section V (Sultanic modesty and humility), ff. 57-66

[note: this section is intended to balance against the excesses proudly acknowledged in sections 3(c), 6 and 7].

Section VI (Sultanic generosity and magnanimity), ff. 67-79

Section VII (Sultan Ahmed's charitable building programme). ff. 79-92

Section VIII (Sultanic bodily vigour and skills in horsemanship and the hunt), ff. 92-114

Section IX (Sultanic valour and bravery (*şecaat*) including an account of the ruler's omnipresence and omnipotence), ff. 114-27.

Section I: Sultanic Justice

The dominant theme of the first section on sultanic justice is that true justice must be tempered with mercy and in it the sultan is portrayed as successfully treading a finely defined line between undue severity and unjustified clemency. The anecdotes show him avoiding excessive punishment for minor crimes that posed no real threat to social order on the one hand, while unflinchingly meting out the severest penalties to the sowers of political discord and causers of social unrest. This theme is paralleled in the hunt section where Safi portrays the sultan allowing a fatally trapped boar to escape in the wild as demonstration of his *merhamet* and *mukerremet* (Section VIII, folio 112a). Balancing this act of clemency, he is shown in another anecdote eliminating a wild boar caught roaming in the vicinity of Fenerbahçe because its behaviour threatened the residents while also inflicting damage on their crops (Section VIII, folio 113b). Likewise, in one of the first anecdotes in Section One, the sultan is shown in a forgiving mode when he insists that a strict interpretation of the *şer'i hadd* penalties disallowed regarding theft as a capital crime. Thus, he demands that a horse thief be punished with *zıccr* (forced labour in the galleys) rather than *katl* (summary execution), despite the fact that the thief has upset vital state priorities, delaying transport of supplies destined for the eastern front in the critical year following Kuyucu Murad's assumption of the Grand Vizierate in 1015/1606 [Section I, folio 18a]. On the other hand, when the inhabitants of Gebze complained of a disturbance of the peace caused by the presence of an outlaw (*şakî*) in their midst, the sultan immediately dispatched the *bostancı başı* to bring him to justice at the court in Üsküdar where he was tried and executed in consideration for the public good (Section I, folio 19a-b). A similar anecdote relates how during his excursion to Edirne in 1014/1605 the sultan himself presided over the public execution of a *şakî* named Ayneci Hasan as a warning to other fomenters of public disorder (*ibret l'il nas*) [Section I, folios 21a-22a].

The sultan's severity in the prosecution of justice is balanced throughout this section by the author's insistence on the need for scrupulous avoidance of any exceeding of the *şer'i* limits for punishment of crimes. For example, in the above-mentioned case of Ayneci Hasan, the author is at pains to point out that before the order of execution was carried out, every care had been taken to ensure that the case was properly investigated and the evidence

supporting the imposition of the extreme penalty was juridically sound (Section I, folio 19a: ‘*hadd-i şer‘den tecaviüzden ibtiraz-i tam edip ...*’).

The theme of the rule of law and sultanic justice, though clearly viewed by the author as an essential foundation supporting the well-being and stability of the state, is not treated very fully in this section. This is partly because allusions and direct references to sultanic justice are plentiful in other parts of the work, making a proliferation of examples in the first and most directly relevant section superfluous. Thus, the importance of direct access to sultanic justice is alluded to in an aside in the section on the hunt (Section VII, folio 102a) where Safi refers to unwelcome interference by the court chamberlains (*hacibs*) during periods when the sultan made his residence in the capital Istanbul. This he contrasts to the relative openness and accessibility of the sultan and his closer listening to the petitions of his subjects during his tours through the countryside. The author’s claims about the usefulness of the royal hunt from this perspective are made much more explicit in a passage in volume two which covers the sultanic excursion to Edirne in late 1021-early 1022/winter 1613 (ZT II, folios 227b-228a). Here he deflects potential criticism of the sultan for his seeming preoccupation with trivial pursuits like the hunt by stating that these occasions actually served a three-fold function. On this particular occasion Safi prefaced his description with an explicit claim that by participating in the hunt Sultan Ahmed was merely carrying out God’s will and designs. In making such claims Safi was seemingly influenced by Fakhr al-Din Razi’s notion of divine guidance and assistance extended to the rulers of Islamic states by way of *irşad-i ghaybi*.⁷ Safi’s message is that God works his will in mysterious ways whose subtle logic is beyond man’s reason and capacity to judge.

The second function of the hunt was to strike fear into the hearts of the state’s enemies caused by the appearance of the sultan near the frontiers of his realm which, by past experience, had always foretold the imminent commencement of a military campaign. The third purpose of the hunt was to serve as an occasion for the sultan’s acquiring of direct knowledge about the state of his realms by hearing the views of his subjects presented in their own words rather than through the medium of a vizier’s *telhis* or the interference of any other intermediary.⁸ The multiple functions of the hunt are explored elsewhere in Safi’s work too (in both volumes one and two) where the distribution of rewards and sharing out of the captured game at the conclusion of the hunt offer manifold occasions for the display of sultanic generosity (see below, Section VI).

Section II: Probity and Scrupulous Honesty

The length of this section, completed in a mere two folios, serves as no indication of the importance attached to it in Safi's philosophical scheme. Here we are presented a tale showing the sultan's abhorrence for 'ill-gotten' gains demonstrated by his insistence on the return to its 'rightful' owners of the considerable sum of 300,000 *akçes*. This legacy had been claimed by a preliminary judgement as the property of the beyt'ül mal because the legatees had been absent (*gâib*) at the time of the testator's death and could not be quickly identified or tracked down. When the legal heirs eventually materialised the sultan, ignoring the agreement on the part of the absent legatees to forego a part of their inheritance, and overriding the sustained objections of his chief treasury officer, the *defterdar*, decided to return the whole sum to its rightful owners. This short section of the menakib is both thematically important as a demonstration that the sultan's rule was indeed 'just', as claimed in the immediately preceding section, and that he is a pious and God-fearing ruler as the author will set about to demonstrate in the following section. Funds acquired illegitimately could bring no credit to the sultan even if expended for the purpose of erecting monuments to God's greater glory.

A single anecdote has equal force to a dozen if it is based on supportable claims. The relaters or conveyers of the anecdotes are thus important to Safi as a source of authentication and verification of the claims he puts forward in the menakib. In the case concerning the disputed legacy, Safi's informant was a high-ranking figure close to the sultan, the *damad* Mustafa Pasha who at the time of writing had recently stepped down as the Grand Vizier's *kaim-makam* and whose own reputation for probity and honesty was beyond reproach. According to the *Sicill-i Osmani* Mustafa Pasha had served first as chief equerry, then deputy Grand Vizier between 1016/1607 and 1018/1609 and died in 1019/1610.⁹ This implies that Safi had already been collecting material for his anecdotes for several years before his own elevation as the sultan's private spiritual adviser (*imam-i sultani*) in Ramazan 1017/December 1608 and the official commissioning of his history (ZT II, folio 140a-b). Safi suggests that the sultan's principled position in this decision was that protection of the financial rights of orphans and survivors (*mal-i yetim*) took precedence over all other concerns. Although he shared with his *defterdar* this-worldly concerns such as the meeting the pressing demand to pay the quarterly wage instalments of the Janissaries, his main responsibility and accountability as sultan was to God in the afterlife. Thus, financial concerns arising out of his position as head of state ruling over a world empire in the present were if not trivial

then transitory matters which had to take second place to his abiding concern to maintain his own reputation for honesty and fair play.

Section III: Piety and Building Projects

We skip over these details bearing a thematic connection to later sections on sultanic generosity (Section VI) and charity (Section VII) in order to save space for analysis of some of the more original aspects of Safi's coverage of sultanic gestures in other sections.

Section IV: Sultanic Intelligence

In this section of the work Safi begins to develop the idea that the sultan (at present the still untried, but in his fundamental character 'impressive' teenage monarch Ahmed) possessed superior, semi-miraculous powers of intellect, observation and intuition. The notion that sultans possessed a God-given ability to see through external appearances and make sound decisions based on assessment of the fundamentals is expressed in the idea of *kariba* or sudden inspiration of the mind. This idea that sultans possessed exceptional insight is certainly not original to Safi, but Safi cleverly develops this theme in relation to a sultan whose early reign seemed to be filled more with disappointments than successes in encounters on both land and sea. One recent exception, albeit not one that led to any permanent strategic gains for the Ottomans, was the strange and unexpected successes of the Ottoman galleys against a small fleet of heavily armed Maltese galleons led by Commander Fressinet in the waters off Cyprus in the summer of 1018/1610. This strange reversal of fortunes for the 'infidels' serves as an opportunity for Safi to reflect on Ahmed's military prowess in comparison with his predecessors.

Safi favourably compares the record of the currently reigning sultan and his *kapudan* Halil Pasha with the record of achievement for a single encounter achieved by Sultan Süleyman and his celebrated admiral Barbarossa. In actual fact, the Ottoman capture of the Black Gehennam or 'Red' Galleon and several other impressive enemy ships in 1610/1019 is confirmed in a number of contemporary Western accounts.¹⁰ But, putting aside the dubious rhetorical gains from Safi's undisguised eulogy and in the end rather unconvincing hyperbole, it can be seen that the author had a more serious purpose in mind in his suggestion that it was through the influence exerted by the sultan through remote control and telepathic communication that Halil Pasha was led to the right place at the right time to achieve this success. Safi seems to imply here that the sultan had gained *sabib-kiran* status by proxy through his admiral by exerting the force of his superior intellect in absentia. By the

traditional logic, the ‘Lord of the Conjunction’ achieves success as a conqueror partly because of superior tactics and martial abilities but equally because he enjoys divine guidance and support (*al-mü’eyyed min ‘ind Allah*). Thus Safi, far from regarding Halil Pasha’s ‘lucky strike’ against the Maltese Commander Fressinet as a random event, sees in it a sign of divine favour and a portent of the sultan’s future success. These views are made explicit in a brief though revealing passage where Safi offers his comments on the events and unequivocally attributes Ottoman success to the sultan’s insight:

Akl-i sahib ve ayar, ve zihni müstakim al edvarı vasıtasıyla hakikat-i hal’a ittıla, ve nefis al emr’e işraf ve istitla sebebi iledir.
(ZT I, folio 50b)

Section V: Sultanic Humility (Modesty)

The next section of the Ahmedian menakib is devoted to developing the theme of the sultan’s humility as demonstrated by his lack of concern with physical comfort and luxury and his disinterest in the outward trappings of his imperial office. Here we see the first indications of Safi’s view that the ideal ruler should model his personal behaviour not on usual human practice and average human morality, but rather by the highest moral standards set by the *sunna* of the Prophet and the example of the *hülefa-i Rashidun* who succeeded him. Sultan Süleyman is again referred to as rival candidate for pre-eminence in this kingly virtue because in his later life he turned his back on the finery and pomp of sultanic office even though his achievements as ruler and his status as world conqueror had made him the object of all the world’s admiration and envy. In a telling passage Safi states:

Sultan Süleyman ... evahir-i ömrllerinde libas kısmından sof ve kutn ile kâni, ve harir kısmından külliyyet ile rafî oldukları şayidir
(ZT I, folio 60b).

This emphasis on the sin of *kibr* or pride and the importance of the sultan’s setting an example to his subjects by his own modest habits and self-denying inclinations had a particular resonance for Ottoman audiences for two reasons. The first was that frugality in the sultan was in a way expected so that his vast expenditures for *bayrat* and his monumental building projects could properly be understood as a sign of his piety and charitable concern as opposed to the alternative, and always possible, interpretation that it was a wasteful display of imperial power unjustified in the current climate of general economic hardship and financial strain. The theme of imperial profligacy (*israf*)

had already been developed by Mustafa Ali, and Safi, in his double role as adviser to the sultan and eulogizing chronicler of his reign, would have been remiss in his duties if he had not raised and dealt effectively with this issue on his own account.

The second reason for the emphasizing of *kibr* (pride) was that it was precisely this fault which was being ascribed by defenders of the regime to the most determined challengers of sultanic authority, namely the Celalis who, despite Kuyucu Murad's recent successes in the field, were at the time of writing still far from having been dealt a decisive knockout blow. In Safi's view, the only way to achieve success against them was for the sultan (and his closest advisers) to occupy the moral high ground and to studiously avoid all taint and suspicion of corruption and greed. This was a tall order for the young sultan to fill, but Safi's insistence on it and his developing of the theme of the good vizier (i.e. Öküz Mehmed Pasha) and the bad vizier (i.e. Nasuh Pasha) in volume two is revealing of Ottoman governing principles and priorities which were, at least in some government circles, still operative.

As evidence of the sultan's humility and distaste for unnecessary display, the author provides the example of his incognito attendance at prayer services held at Aya Sofya on *Arefe Günü* in March 1610/Zilhicce 1018 when instead of sitting apart in his usual isolated vantage point in the imperial loggia, he took up his place among the other members of the congregation and sat humbly and simply like all the other prayers on a straw mat on the floor (ZT I, folio 66a). The theme of the sultan mingling with his subjects and his frequent adoption of disguise (*tebdil-i suret*) in order to carry out impromptu inspections and inform himself of their views, is taken up repeatedly elsewhere in the *menakib*, particularly in the closing part of the *minicorpus* in section nine.

Section VI: Generosity/Magnanimity

The association of the virtuous and just ruler with acts of spontaneous (and ideally disproportionate or excessive) acts of kindness and generosity is a well-worn theme in the medieval Islamic literature on statecraft. Sultanic largesse was not just an ideal to be striven for, but an indispensable part of the exercise of power and authority. No sultan could hope to establish his authority upon his accession to the throne without a generous distribution of sultanic largesse to his household troops and Safi is quick to note the sultan's exemplary performance of this obligatory act of 'expected' generosity in other parts of his history. What he means to document in this section of the *menakib* portion of his work is the ways in which

Sultan Ahmed excelled in the performance of unexpected or extraordinary acts of generosity.

The menakib tradition is by its very nature devoted to a recording of exceptional acts of bravery, kindness, saintliness and other exemplary, even superhuman, qualities of the protagonist or hero figure on which the tale-teller chooses to dwell. Therefore this vying for recognition of superior virtue—based on one of the root meanings of the verb ‘*nkb*’ in the active participial form—is at the heart of Safi’s undertaking in this part of the work. Munificence, magnanimity and bounty are qualities admirable in their own right, but for a sultan with responsibility for the care of his subjects, especially the poor and vulnerable members of society (widows, orphans etc.) they are essential prerequisites for effective rule. By definition, the height of generosity is to reward someone who is by his actions or character undeserving of reward. Safi gives several examples of this quality in Ahmed whose acts of gratuitous generosity he likens to the attitude of the noble Abd Allah ibn Umar ibn al-Khattab (d. 73/693), renowned for his manumitting of slaves as a reward for their professions of faith and intention to convert to the true Islamic belief, despite the fact that he had been reliably informed that their statements of conversion were insincere. By rewarding them beyond their deserts he (like his later emulator sultan Ahmed) stood to lose very little except material possessions (slaves or cash), whereas the example of spontaneous generosity had the potential for leading the unbelievers to consider a sincere conversion (ZT I, folio 68b for the comparison to Abd Allah ibn Umar).

The first tale in Section Six relates the sultan’s practice of *saçma* or showering of coins on onlookers who awaited the royal procession and passage. Safi dwells in particular on this ritual as performed when the sultan was on one of his frequent excursions to the countryside outside the capital. On one occasion, Ahmed is portrayed as having rewarded a *zimmi* who had lined up twice at separate halting places of the royal procession to receive double his allotment of royal grace and largesse; the second time professing an acceptance of Islam. The sultan, although he knew the claim to be bogus, was incapable of restraining his natural impulse for all-encompassing bounty which was part of his innate character. To reward only the deserving or just would be a sign of meanness on his part, a gesture to be avoided while distributing imperial largesse since, in a sense, ‘overdoing it’ was the very nature of the symbolism of the occasion.

A second anecdote relates a boat trip taken between Üsküdar and Eminönü during which the sultan travelling incognito engages his *zimmi* boatman in conversation and in a light-hearted exchange invites him to convert. Although the *zimmi* declines the invitation, at

the end of the trip before leaving the boat the sultan leaves several gold pieces on the bench as an offering in place of the few akçes fare that would normally be expected. The boatman immediately understands that the passenger was not just a wealthy person but one with nobility of spirit possibly, even probably, the sultan himself and immediately he regrets his earlier decision, not out of mercenary motives but out of admiration for his former passenger's gesture of spontaneous generosity. The ritual distribution of gifts and rewards by the sultan form a consistent theme of sultanic superfluity repeated throughout the work. Section Six itself contains a number of examples showing the extremes and excesses achieved by Ahmed in his demonstrations of royal generosity. For example at the conclusion of a particularly successful hunting expedition, in addition to the usual richly brocaded robes of honour (*bîlat*) he rewarded his falconers by filling the falcon's hood (*üsküf*) with gold coins (ZT I, folio 74a). Likewise, in the ceremonies held to celebrate the ground breaking and later foundation laying phases of the construction of the magnificent imperial mosque bearing his name, in addition to organizing feasts for state dignitaries and guests of honour, he also made sure to include in his banqueting plans all the construction workers occupied at the site (ZT I, folio 75a). Food distributions and feasting were the ideal metaphor for his paternalistic and caring rule and the placement of this section on generosity here at the heart of the menakib pages is by no means accidental. These allusions to sultanic bounty make the perfect introduction and bridge to the next section (Section VII following immediately on its heels on folio 79) which gives an extensive account of the sultan's building programme devoted to charitable purposes.

Section VII: Building Works

The detailed section covering 13 folios (26 pages) on the various building projects sponsored by Sultan Ahmed has a completely different character from the rest of the menakib division of Safi's work and can therefore be skipped over with relative brevity. It is worth noting however that in similar fashion to Section One where the two sides of sultanic justice were exemplified and demonstrated, so too in Section Seven there is a conscious attempt to provide a balance of coverage between high profile and large-scale projects like the Sultan Ahmed Mosque and the repairs to the Kaaba in Mecca on the one hand, and more prosaic, but for the residents of the affected neighbourhoods perhaps even more praiseworthy, efforts by the sultan to improve their living conditions on the other. One such project was the fountain erected in the Tophane district whose water supply came from a relatively distant source at the imperial gardens

of Karabali located near Taşlık at the present-day site of the Swiss Hotel overlooking the Bosphorus. This project was prompted by the suffering caused by the water shortages experienced during the drought of 1020/1611 to which the sultan responded with practical measures designed to alleviate his people's hardships (ZT I, folio 91b).

In another part of his history devoted to an account of the sultan's residence at the palace of İstavroz on the Asian shore of the Bosphorus in the summer of 1022/1613 (ZT II, folios 294b-295a), the author records the sultan's preoccupation with the acquiring of merit (*saḡab*) due from his financing and completion of beneficial projects like the construction of fountains. Ahmed insistently regarded projects undertaken for the public good to be his own imperial prerogative and was unwilling to share it even with members of his own palace staff and even when they offered to sponsor and pay for the projects themselves. In denying permission to one of his own officers belonging to the Hass Oda staff to realise plans for the construction of a new fountain, Ahmed delivered an impassioned speech simulated by Safi as follows:

Hayır. Bu hayr'da kimsenin müşareketi, ve ol amel-i kesir al-ecr'de gayrın müşayaatı maktebul-i hümayunum yoktur. Bu bab'da sana ecr-i delalet kâfi.

Section VIII: The Royal Hunt

This section of the *menakib* holds a particular interest since it adds a physical dimension to the account of the semi-miraculous mental powers ascribed to the figure of the ruler in Section Four on sultanic intelligence. One of its most consistent and persistent themes is the sultan's ability—derived from good horsemanship, physical stamina (*küvvet-i bazı*), patience in adversity and disregard for his own personal comfort—to achieve unexpected (even miraculous) feats of rapid movement and mobilization. The writer was of course not unaware of the fact that Ahmed, due to his tender age at the time of his accession, was effectively the first sultan ever to have assumed office without the usual period of on-the-job training as governor of an Anatolian province. His remarks are thus to be interpreted in part as an argument and assertion that Ahmed's preoccupation with the hunt fulfilled the equivalent training role. At the same time, he wants it clearly understood that, although Ahmed had not yet personally led any campaigns, he had all the requisite abilities to do so in the fullness of time.

The endurance theme and the omnipresence and speed themes developed in this section are thus all to be understood within this

context of fitness to rule from the standpoint of his competence to lead military campaigns. The hunt, treating themes like the tracking and trapping of prey, was in fact a perfect metaphor for fighting with human opponents and the significance of Safi's allusions to birds of prey swooping down on their unsuspecting quarry is all too transparent in its reference to the empire's enemies in its two-front war in the Hungarian and Iranian borderlands. His assertion that the sultan's seemingly trivial pursuits masked a far more serious occupation with mastering the arts of war was not just credible according to traditional custom and belief, but also welcome news to his readers. In effect Safi—using rather crude techniques of augury and divination from signs and portents signalled by the flight pattern of birds conforming to the conventions of the traditional pseudo-science of ornithomancy or *iyafa*—was indicating that he saw indications of the ruler's future potential as a *gazi* sultan cast in the traditional mould. In this longish, but by virtue of its thematic content introductory, twelve-folio section of the work Safi lays the groundwork for the linked concluding section of the Ahmadian menakibs in Section Nine where he focuses again, this time providing more concrete examples, on the theme of sultanic presence and omnipresence. In the final section, the connections between the sultan's ability to appear with the speed of a hawk and strike unexpectedly are developed more fully as are the obvious implications of this ability both for the empire's internal residents (obedient subjects and rebellious Celali's alike) and its external foes.

Section IX: Sultanic Valour and Bravery (*Şecaat*)

Coverage of this important topic will be divided (as is conceptually appropriate to Safi's view of the subject) into its three main constituent parts:

- A. Speed (*çabuk-suvarî*)
- B. Surprise Appearances (*tebdil-i suret*)
- C. Sight and Glimpse (*didar, dide*)

IX/A—The Sultan's Speed (on Horseback)

The physical capabilities of monarchs were linked by the time-honoured conventions of the *adab al-muluk* literature with their mental capacity. The young prince's training was explicitly founded on the principle: mens sana in corpore sano. Safi's claims about the semi-magical or miraculous mental powers of the sultan developed in Section Four of the menakib are balanced in this section with tales of the sultan's extraordinary physical powers, focusing in particular

on speed and Ahmed's exceptional ability—natural in a youth of sixteen years, but elevated to a level of seemingly supernatural capacity in Safi's account—to cover large tracts of land on horseback, seemingly tirelessly. Of the several *menkıbes* which focus on this topic, perhaps the most interesting and significant is the one in which Safi teases out a deeper or hidden significance from the fact that the sultan, travelling light, was able to make two short back-to-back journeys to and from Edirne at an early point in his reign in 1014/1605. He acknowledges that the reason for the sultan's speedy and sudden return to Istanbul after only a week's stay in Edirne was dictated by the military crisis in Anatolia which required his urgent presence to deal with a Celali threat against the former Ottoman imperial capital Bursa, but the rapid reaction itself Safi takes as a portent of great things to come in the future and a warning to the enemies of the state, both internal and external, that the sultan, ever vigilant, is never far away.

The restlessness of the sultan and his desire to be always on the move is here subtly transformed by Safi from a weakness into a hidden strength with a single (or a few rather artfully conceived) strokes of the pen. The sultan is praised in the Edirne anecdote for his dexterity on horseback (*sebkebarlık*) and swiftness in riding (*çabuk-süvari*). By demonstrating his ability to reach Edirne, known by all to be a six-stage journey, in a mere three going and four coming back (the comment comes in relation to the return journey on folio 120b) the sultan has proven his manliness and courage (*şecaat*) to the satisfaction of all. Not content with this somewhat dubious contention about the exceptional nature of the feat, the author then goes on to compare this 'rare' event with Sultan Süleyman's speed record in his covering the whole distance to Hungary with his heavily laden baggage trains in a mere twenty five days:

*Sultan Süleyman Budin kalesine ki menzil-i selatin ile iki aylık yoldur,
yigirmibeş günde geldiği gibi, padişah-i asr...
(ZT I, fol. 121b).*

By drawing such parallels and placing Ahmed in the category of the thunderbolt sultans among his ancestors with their fabled ability to strike with lightning speed and devastating effect the author's clear implication is that the empire's current adversaries had better be on their guard. Both the author and his audience were of course keenly aware of the fact that the Ottomans had signed a peace treaty with Habsburgs in 1606/1015, with concessions over the status of Hungary, and that as he was putting the finishing touches on volume one of his history a treaty with the Safavids (signed in October 1612/Ramazan 1021) was imminent. This however, or so Safi,

strongly hinted, should not be considered the end of the matter in either case.

In another tale, this time conveyed to the author by Cerrahzade Mevlana Mehmed Efendi who had spent a period of captivity in the hands of the Safavids, it is reported that rumours of the sultan's rapid movements were circulating at Shah Abbas' court giving rise to speculation and fear of Ottoman intentions on the eastern front of the empire. Addressing the shah in a bit of dialogue skilfully simulated by Safi, the *alim* issues the following words of warning to his captors:

Sultan al haremeyn ve'l hafikeyn hazretleri (i.e. Sultan Ahmed) bir muteharrik neşet [dir]. İki gün bir yerde karar etmemek mükteza-yi tab-i hümayunları, bir an hali oturmamak ıktiza-yi hatir-i ilham-makrunlarıdır. İnme ve binmede usanmaz, ve hareket-i anife ile gelme ve gitmeden mande olmaz, bir zât-i merdane sıfatdır.
(ZT I: 122b-123a).

He then goes on to state:

Murad-i şerifi olan mahal'a zaman-i yesir'de vusala kudreti ba irade-i Allah kati zabirdir.'

Having established the sultan's exceptional power, physical stamina and youthful energy that allow him to appear where and when he wants, Safi's next task is to demonstrate how these sudden appearances are used to good effect in the internal administration of his empire.

IX/B—The Sultan's Surprise Appearances

The periodic appearance of the sultan among his subjects both impromptu and planned is regarded by long-standing custom and time-honoured tradition among writers of *adab al-muluk* manuals as an essential part of good government. These traditions held that the movement and circulation of the ruler was a particularly effective instrument for the execution of justice and prevention of oppression and dereliction of duty by his officers when the sultan's inspection visits were carried out surreptitiously. The practice of *tebdil-i suret* or appearances of the sovereign disguised in the everyday costume of his subjects, was, according to Safi's account, much favoured by Ahmed. At all events he seems not to have enjoyed much the rigid formality and confinement of life in the palace, and his frequent excursions, whether for the purpose of inspection or for pleasure, are amply documented. Safi is inclined to regard them as

opportunities for hearing the petitions and complaints of his subjects and taking swift action to right wrongs as soon as he learned of them. He formulates this view in his introduction to Section Nine of the *menakib*:

Gab Sipahi tarzında ve gab Rumeli dilaverleri tarzında devr edip, bazı mahal-i zihama ve nice mecami-yi pür-izdihama iktiham etmişler ve bu takrifle nice ahvala şu'ur, ve nice kazaya ve umura vukuf-i mevfur tabsil etmekle, icra-yi abkam-i fadl, ve imza-yi seyf-i adl ile intikâm eylemişler'
(ZT I, folio 115b).

Some of Safi's anecdotes are seemingly based on actual events and in some cases these, in addition to being verified by ascription to a named informant, are also dated. One such case is the *incognito* inspection by the sultan of the Grand Vizier Kuyucu Murad's camp at Üsküdar in May 1610/Safer 1019 before his departure for the eastern front. When he attempts to enter the commander's tent in the guise of a *sipahi* the sultan is denied admission after being told by the guards that their master is not to be disturbed during his afternoon siesta (*kaylule*). The sultan leaves as his calling card a single arrow which the vizier upon waking up from his nap of negligence (*kbwab-i gafflet*) immediately recognizes as a warning from the sultan to improve his vigilance. In his narration of the anecdote, Safi suggests three possible interpretations of the symbolic meaning of the sultan's leaving of the lone arrow as offered by three different observers. The first gives the view that it is the sultan's way of indicating to the vizier that he should be 'straight as an arrow' in the execution of his duties and eschew all forms of corruption and injustice. The second opines that the sultan has chosen this way of issuing a threat to his vizier that he faces the risk of dismissal or, if circumstances justify it, even a shot through the heart by way of execution. Finally a third commentator offers his view that the arrow's barb is aimed not at the vizier, but rather issued to him as equipment to remind him that his objective is the Iranian front where the arrow can be used to better purpose aimed against the Safavid enemy. In effect the third message is both a warning and an encouragement telling the vizier to tarry no longer on the outskirts of Istanbul and proceed immediately to the front. (ZT I, folio 116b): Later Safi reports these interpretations being discussed and debated in the city and asks the sultan to explain his real intentions. Concerning the final two alternatives he offers the following remark:

İkisinin dahi mutalaası rast, ve kelamının her birisi düürüst-i bi-kem u kastdır
(ZT I, folio 118b)

The sultan's behind-the-scenes vigilance and knowledge gained by means of *tebdil-i suret* is contrasted in the sleeping vizier anecdote with the vizier's negligence and deficiency of intellect, based on the logic that you can't understand what you don't know and the vizier, the captain of the Ottoman ship of state, has just been caught asleep at the wheel. Several other anecdotes in this section focus on the sultan's successes in intelligence gathering and one claims that during the royal excursion to Bursa in Receb 1014/November 1605 he even infiltrated the camp of the rebels outside the city to eavesdrop on their plot making (ZT I, fol. 126a: '... *bariç-i belde'de sipah zorbalalarının çadırları içine girdiler ve, köşe-be-köşe seyr ile, ol taife'nin evzânı gördüler*'). The take-home message being conveyed throughout this section is that not only is the sultan omnipresent but, as a result of his wide circulation (often in disguise) throughout his realm, he is also omniscient.

IX/C—*The Beneficial Effects of the Glimpse or Sight of the Royal Presence*

Interspersed among the anecdotes in Section Nine of the menakib, whose principal focus revolves around accounts of the sultan's riding skills and his surprise visits on both lazy viziers and other wrongdoers, Safi gives strategic placement to an account of the beneficial effects of the sultan's appearance, arrival and residence (however brief) in his second capital Edirne. One such visit occurred towards the beginning of his reign in the autumn of 1605/1014. According to Safi's account, the townsfolk of Edirne expressed extreme joy and jubilation at his arrival since no royal visit had been paid to their city since the time of Selim II who spent a prolonged period of residence there in the winter of 1567-8/975 (ZT I, folio 119b: '*Sultan Selim Han-i Sani'den berü padişah yüzün görmek, ve cemal-i ba-kemalî müşabedesi ile murada ermek müyesser olmamağla...*'). Safi then goes on to philosophise and reflect on the life-enhancing qualities and restorative properties with which the royal presence was imbued. He describes how the mere sight, even at a distance, of the imperial aura allowed average mortals to imbibe and absorb some of the sultan's strength and charisma to the betterment of their own lives. The notion of the curative effects of the royal touch in the Western concept of sacral kingship has been studied in detail in a classic work by Marc Bloch published more than forty years ago,¹¹ but to my knowledge the subject of the healing power of the sight of the sovereign and the importance of proximity to his line of sight (*nazar-i iltifat*) in oriental ideas of sacral kingship has as yet been little studied and certainly merits closer attention. On this theme allow me to quote once more directly from the from the horse's mouth:

Didar-i şaban-i Al-i Osman tişne-yi dillerin ab-i hayata ve devran-i hicret-menzilleri ru-yi canana olan iştiyakı gibi cümleten meştak, ve tecelli-i cend-i devlet ve ikbala pür-eşvak olmuşlar idi
(ZT I, folio 119b).

[Their thirsting hearts were panting to be slaked by the fountain of life by the sight of the kings belonging to the House of Osman and they jointly longed for reunion with the unsatisfied yearning of parted lovers awaiting the return of the beloved and all were filled with desire for the beatific royal apparition which harbingers good fortune and prosperity].

The references to the healing properties of the sight of the royal presence and the intermingling of subjects and sovereigns in Section Nine brings a close to the menakib section of Safi's work, while at the same time providing the context and justification for his brief excursion into the retrospective history where he recounts the deeds of valour accomplished by Ahmed's ancestors and thirteen predecessors on the Ottoman throne. This account is not just brief (it runs to only 62 folios out of the combined total of roughly 650 in the two volume work), but also composed in such a way as to avoid distracting the reader's attention too much from the *kuvvat-i kalb* (strength of character) and *şecaat* (boldness) of his main subject, Ahmed.

Conclusion

Safi's history is a long, complex and multi-dimensional work. In Volume One, the sultan is the author's exclusive focus. The only other people who intrude themselves into his account are palace informants and conveyors of tales or, very occasionally and exceptionally, co-actors like Kapudan Halil Pasha who is mentioned only as an incidental instrument as part of Safi's account of the sultan's own very considerable part in the navy's successes in the summer of 1610/1019. The sultan's daily routine and his transfers of location (*nakl-i mekan, tebdil-i mekan*) are the subject of prolonged and detailed coverage as are his movements in pursuit of quarry during the hunt. Throughout the work, but particularly in Volume One, the author sometimes deliberately ignores seemingly important ('major') events, while giving long and detailed attention to signs and portents and the deeper significance of seemingly trivial ('minor') events. Of course his priorities were dictated in part by his role and responsibilities in the sphere of news management and spin and the necessity for mounting a spirited defence of the monarchy as an institution on the one hand while offering an explanation for the

apparent failings of the monarch as a person on the other, but it goes deeper than that. Defence of reputation (i.e. the sultan's in Volume One) and reputation enhancement (e.g. the justification offered for Öküz Mehmed Pasha's promotion to the Grand Vizierate and the lambasting of his rival Nasuh Pasha in Volume Two) represent only one dimension of the *Zübdet*, and only one of the levels on which it can meaningfully be read.

Safi's interests are not global history, retrospective history or even the political and diplomatic history of his own time. Instead he offers a highly introspective account of the person of the sultan and focuses on the underlying meaning rather than the superficial appearance of events affecting the dynasty. Safi's account of sultanic personality is quite unusual. Unlike the *şehname* and writers of accounts of individual campaigns whose more narrowly defined job as panegyrists it was to catalogue a limited range of achievement confined mostly to the military sphere, Safi's vision of history offers us a well-rounded account of a man 'in full'. As such it is a great rarity in the Ottoman historical corpus offering us a fascinating alternative, more contemplative even subversive, reading of Ottoman history to that more typically served up in the *sturm und drang* single-dimensional versions.

Notes

¹ See the *Zübdet ü'l Tevarih*, Staatsbibliothek, Berlin, MS Or. Oct. 1044, [henceforth ZT] Volume I, folio 2b.

² cf. Babinger, *Geschichtsschreiber*, 146.

³ Fleischer, *Bureaucrat and Intellectual*, 127.

⁴ See below, *General Overview*.

⁵ Tietze, *Counsel for Sultans*, Pt. I, 146.

⁶ Tietze, *op. cit.*, 152: 'Bahşiş u ata, ve inam u saba'da galat kılmayalar. Bu makule edvar ısraf u utlaf idijü aşikâr'.

⁷ See Lambton, *State and Government in Medieval Islam*, 133.

⁸ ZT I, folio 228a: 'reaya ve beraya ki paytaht-i Konstantiniyede arz-i ahval onlara nisbetle kemal snubet ve işkal üzeredir, bu Dar al-Nasr Edirne'ye gelip, her gün taşaları teşrif etmek ile, men-i hacib ve derban, ve zecr-i bevvab-i bi-aman olmayıp ..., arz-i hal-i pür-melal etmelerini tesbil ve tesyirdir'

⁹ *Sicill-i Osmani* Vol. 4, 383.

¹⁰ See in particular, Grimston, *Continuation*, 1298 and Hammer, *Geschichte*, Volume 4, 439-40.

¹¹ cf. the English translation by J. Anderson entitled *The Royal Touch*.

İfta and *Kaza*: The *İlmiye* State and Modernism in Turkey, 1820-1960

Kemal H. Karpat

Introduction

Islam in today's secular republican Turkey reflects a remarkable institutional continuity along with a number of modernist changes in its organization and thinking. Resulting not only from the incorporation of secular western features into the system but also from an evolution in thinking within the Islamic system itself, these changes have allowed Turkey's Islam to coexist with a self-proclaimed secular state supposedly not involved in religious issues.

Actually from the beginning of the age of reforms, the state took an active role in directing (or misdirecting) the course of religious life and using the faith for its own interests. In fact, during that time, the state, that is the cadre of decision-makers who control the regime and its ideology, engaged in shaping the Islamic institutions and the *ilmiye* in a way not seen in the pre-reform period.

Today, organizationally speaking, the *Diyânet İşleri Başkanlığı* (est. 3 March 1924) can be considered the counterpart of the old *Meşihat* or şeyhülislamate. The *Diyânet* is bound to the Prime Minister's office but acts largely as an independent body in issuing its views on a number of religious matters. It is, at the same time, a national Turkish institution interested in salvaging the Ottoman material legacy and even in establishing schools in the former Ottoman territories in the Balkans. Its long time head, Mehmet Nuri Yılmaz with his white turban, poise and erudition, appeared much more like an old chief *muftî* than a modern bureaucrat, although he controlled his own 88,000-strong bureaucracy of *imams* and *hatîps*.

Working closely with the *Diyânet* in various capacities, but not part of it, are the professors who teach in the approximately fifteen divinity schools located in some of the major state universities controlled by the government through YÖK, the Council of Higher Education. These faculties, significantly named *İlahiyat* (spiritual, heavenly) instead of *diniyat* (religious), are modelled after the similar bodies that were part of the *Darül-fünun*, the Istanbul University,

established in 1870. The first Divinity School was established under the leadership of Tahsin Efendi, a Paris-educated former *medrese* teacher who had repudiated religious dogmatism in favour of progress through science and education.

The elections of 2 November 2002, brought to power the Justice and Development Party and resulted in the appointment of Mehmet Aydın, the much respected head of the Divinity School of Ege University in Izmir, as state minister in charge of the Diyanet. Aydın reportedly advocated that the head of the Diyanet be elected by the faculty of the divinity schools and members of the religious bureaucracy and intelligentsia. Today's İlahiyat teachers—one could call them *müderrises*—are exceptionally well-educated, modernist and Kemalist, but also good Muslims. Their job it is to study Islam, *tefsir* and *hadis* being among their key subjects.

Some of the old medreses closed by the Republican government in 1924 gradually reopened after 1952 as *imam hatip* schools. Other closed medreses merely had relocated to private quarters in a move initiated by the Republican People's Party, the very architect of secularism, in the late 1940s. These rearrangements of religious education were concluded during the Premiership of M. Şemseddin Günaltay (1883-1961), who is also credited for enacting the law establishing the basis of multi-party democracy in Turkey. The initial purpose of the new medreses was to provide trained (and controlled) imams and hatips to perform religious services and prevent self-proclaimed 'hocas' and populist preachers from filling the 'secularist' spiritual vacuum with obscurantism and anti-Kemalist propaganda.¹

In 2000 there were over a thousand co-educational imam hatip schools, but the number decreased substantially after the government decided that the imam hatip schools must accept only graduates who had completed the eight-year *orta* (mid-level) education in regular state schools. In addition, the graduates of the imam hatip schools now may enroll in only a limited choice of university faculties. A resulting decrease of interest in imam hatip schools suggests that the previous popularity of those schools was due to their having offered possibilities for lay professional training in addition to Islamic teaching.

The similarity between the Ottoman and current situations applies to the tarikats as well as to the ilmiye. Throughout the Ottoman era many members of the ilmiye belonged to various sufi tarikats and a variety of nineteenth century sufi tarikats still exist, although most of the Ottoman Bektāşi, Halveti, Kadiri and other orders have disappeared or have been reduced to shadows of their former selves. Today, the popular religious orders are largely Nakşbendi, divided into groups such as Nurcu, Süleymancı, Fetullacı, etc., and most of them espouse the teachings of Şeyh Halid (d. 1827). At the same

time, they combine a modernist, Turkish national stand on most contemporary issues with a high degree of Islamic orthodoxy.

On the other hand, there no longer is an official *ilmiye*. Instead, the *kadı* courts of the old judiciary system have been replaced by lay civil courts and lay judges trained in law schools in a secularization of the judiciary that began in the Tanzimat period but ironically intensified during the reign of Sultan Abdülhamid, the most islamist Ottoman ruler of the nineteenth century.

Now the greatest difference between the old and new Islam in Turkey is that religion no longer is the principal subject governing public life because the overwhelming part of the population considers itself Muslim without being islamist. Beginning in the nineteenth century and throughout the Republic, the *ilmiye* lost its *kaza* (judiciary) function. It preserved the *ifta*, that is, opinion rendering, when it did not pertain to Islamic legality of government actions and related issues. Rather, the *ifta*'s new role was to explain, justify and legitimize in an Islamic way social and political change. True, many medieval Islamic writings offer a variety of arguments defending changes in the rules and regulations governing society, but making such arguments was not the primary task of the *ilmiye*. In the late Ottoman state and today's Turkey, by contrast, the *ilmiye*'s primary function shifted towards reconciling change with Islam and adapting society to contemporary life.

A quick glance at the enormous outpouring of so-called 'Islamic' books, journals, and newspapers (*Zaman*, *Akit*, *Yeni Şafak* etc.) in Turkey indicates that they remain preoccupied with modernization, that is, with the Republic and the compatibility between its reforms and Islam. The opinions and arguments range from liberal and humanistic to conservative and dogmatic, but the central topics continue to be change and modernity and their suitability to Islam. To the objection that because this modernity came from the Christian West, any innovation or *bida* is a violation of Islam, the answer is that science and civilization are based on reason or *akl* and utility. The old argument that the West took its science from Islam is rarely heard.

Underneath all the debates about the place of Islam in Turkish society and contemporary civilization lies the desire to preserve the society's spiritual and moral integrity. Because religion serves as a vehicle for that purpose, in today's Turkey, identity is viewed in national terms, and is inseparable from religious identity, despite the ethnic connotation of the former. Thus the boundary of Islam has expanded to include national identity, although one also can argue that the two always were inseparable from each other. In any case, the Diyanet and the leaders of the divinity faculties—that is, the modern Kemalist *şeyhülislam* and the müderrises—are the source of a

modern, reasoned ifta to reconcile Islam and modernity within a cultural-historical framework.

The Historical Background

The tension between a static system of beliefs and a changing social and political environment was felt in the early days of Ottoman history. Although the state had to intervene as an umpire and occasionally side with one party or another, it generally kept a healthy distance from both. I fully agree with R.C. Repp's view that behind the creation of the original *müftülük* back in the fifteenth century 'was the desire to create within the state a distinctly religious figure, free from the taint of secular government... [he quotes Kramer] and represent, so to speak the religious conscience of the people'.²

In 1924 the state made the Diyanet the official spokesman and interpreter of Islam in order to reassure the common citizens that their creed is safe and they can become modern and worldly yet remain Muslim. Consequently, 81 percent of the people interviewed in a survey conducted by Binnaz Toprak opposed the abolition of the Diyanet. While few people show any real interest in what the Diyanet does, it is perceived as being the second party in a dialogue between faith and state that has been going on for centuries. Those who told interviewers they wanted to abolish the Diyanet probably were the radical Kemalists and islamists who form a mere ten percent of the population. In a similarly paradoxical way, the army was criticized for a variety of reasons by a vast percentage of respondents but supported by 86 percent of them as the most trusted institution in Turkey and the only institution capable of holding the state-faith dialogue on an even keel.

The relationship between Islam and modernity in Turkey has always been decided, controlled and conditioned by a state pursuing the one basic goal of its own survival. In the nineteenth century the state's relations with its subjects underwent a fundamental change as the state sought to base itself on a nation rather than to act as the arbiter and balancer among various communities and social groups. The policy for building a nation, known as Ottomanism, forced the state to emphasize certain religious and political ties in order to build allegiance to the state and assure social cohesion. As it emerged, the nation, in turn, represented a new form of political and social organization that called for the state to undertake even more drastic changes in government as well as in all other areas of social and cultural activity.

The political-social changes undertaken by the state would be called *ıslahat* or reform and could be summarized in one word,

modernization. It was in this context that the *ilmiye's* role was redefined in order to reconcile Islam with social change, and religion ceased to be the preserve of various communal leaders in order to become the government's primary implement of modernization. In the past Islam and the *ilmiye* had provided legitimization for the state's actions; now the task of the *ilmiye* was to argue that because Islam was compatible with modernization, the sultan-caliph's Islamic credentials as a ruler were not impaired even as he reformed society and its institutions.

The involvement of Islam and the *ilmiye* in the process of change began after Mahmud II had disposed of the *ayans* and Janissaries and suffered a severe defeat in the war with Russia in 1828/9. The opinions on their exact role in the process, however, are sharply conflicting. Niyazi Berkes saw the *ilmiye* as totally opposed to change while Uriel Heyd and David Kushner have provided convincing evidence that many members of the *ilmiye* actually became members of various reform councils.³ Yet one fact is certain, the *ilmiye* who had reigned supreme in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries,⁴ using contrived religious arguments to thwart rational explanations for the deterioration of Ottoman state power, rapidly lost their influence in society to the rising bureaucrats and lay intellectuals and the modern schools.

The creation of the *Evkaf Nezareti* in 1820 brought administration of all the *vakıfs* under state control and by allowing the government to use their revenues for its own purposes, dealt a grave economic blow to the medreses, the educational backbone of the *ilmiye*. During the same régime of Sultan Mahmud II, however, the sultan appointed imams and hatips to military units to provide religious services for the recruits. In the end, a good part of the *ilmiye* opposed Mahmud's reforms and were exiled, but the *şeyhülislam* and his entourage gave the sultan full backing and eventually Mahmud made the *şeyhülislam* a member of the ministerial cabinet. The selective incorporation of the *ilmiye* into the state service had begun.

In a recent study, Seyfettin Erşahin of the Divinity Faculty of Ankara has shown how Mahmud delegated Yasincizade Abdulwahhab, the *şeyhülislam* in 1821-2 and 1828 to 1833, to use Islamic sources to provide a theory of total obedience to the sultan and the necessity of reform.⁵ Citing twenty-five *hadises*, Abdulwahhab argued that a civilized human society was based on solidarity and cooperation and that when '*şer ve fesad*' (evil and corruption) undermined the social order, then the *ahkâm* could be set aside to restore *umran* (civilization). In such a situation it was incumbent on the ruler to issue some general principles enforceable in this world. According to Abdulwahhab as well as Hoca Ishak and

Esad Efendi, two other *ulema* who published works on this issue the '*icab-ı maslahat*' (force of circumstances) permitted the Muslims to adopt a new policy and attitude. Abdulwahhab described how the Prophet himself had taken certain decisions that deviated from the norm, before employing great effort to demonstrate that Mahmud possessed all the attributes required of Islamic rulers. He was Zill Allah (the Shadow of God) and every subject needed to obey him.

With a variety of Islamic references, Abdulwahhab portrayed Mahmud as a 'renewer' who was dedicated to the continuity of the Muslim community and its faith. Consequently, practically all the reforms undertaken by Mahmud, including the introduction of newspapers, publication of books, etc., were in accordance with Islam. So, too, was the required change of clothing (from which the *ilmiye* were exempt) as all that insured good appearance avoided *israf* (squandering). In fact, however, during the Tanzimat period and Abdulhamid's reign such reforms as the rise of a modern school system, the rapid growth of a bureaucracy-intelligentsia, a decline in the number of medreses, lack of vakıf revenues and the establishment of a state or *nizami* court system under judges trained in the law schools all further marginalized and fragmented the *ilmiye*.

Although the upper layer of the *ilmiye* headed by the *şeyhülislam* cooperated with the government and submitted to the sultan-caliph's wishes, many lesser *ulema*, notably in the towns and cities of Anatolia drifted away from the centre, economically, ideologically and socially. At the same time, they legitimized their actions as a protest of the true believers against a state which itself had drifted away from Islam. The upper crust of the *ilmiye* already associated with the government continued to discuss the islamization of the reform and received generous government salaries while the mid-level mollahs, usually unranked and deprived of government support, tended to associate themselves with the community and its aspiring new leaders, the *eşraf*.

A variety of factors increased the mid-level mollahs' association with the neo-sufi popular orders, notably the Nakşbendi. For instance, there was the influx of Caucasian followers of Şeyh Şamil who further popularized the Halidiya and there also was a degree of regionalization—or 'turkification'—of Islam, as Butrus Abu-Manneh has claimed.⁶ But most of all, the religious leaders in the countryside believed that the so-called reforms were not rejuvenating society, but were only increasing the state's power. They were not against renewal and change; they wanted them to conform to the material needs of society and to Islam. Evidently they wanted a series of reasoned arguments showing that change was compatible with their faith. Instead, Mahmud's *ilmiye* was justifying reforms that strengthened the state, not the society. The old theoretical concept

of *din ü devlet*—the communion of state and faith—had disintegrated with the division among its advocates, the *ilmiye*.

In the Tanzimat period a new brand of religious leaders rose from the relatively unranked ulema in the countryside. Their rise reflected at least two new forces that were transforming Ottoman society and producing a more natural, widely accepted synthesis between Islam and modernity. First, economically, this countryside ulema was relatively independent of the government and supported by *eşraf*, the new middle-class leaders whose position and income were rooted in the community, not the government. Fundamental to both the emergence of the *eşraf* and the mental outlook shared by the countryside ulema was a new economic order created by wider trade opportunities and intensified relations with Europe.

Second, as David Commins has shown in his work on Islamic reform in Syria,⁷ the countryside élites also took advantage of new opportunities to invest in land. Originally meant to consolidate state control of the state lands, the Land Code of 1858 ended up privatizing them. This process later was intensified during Abdulhamid II's reign, by amendments to the Land Code of 1877-97 that left practically no difference between *mülk* and *miri* landholders. A relative increase in agricultural production ensued, for the amount of the *ısr* tax collected was three times greater in 1900 than at mid-century, and there was some resulting capital accumulation in the hands of the rising agrarian middle class.⁸ Donations from local landlords assured the survival of the *ilmiye* and *vaiẓan* in the countryside and supported local *medreses* and *mektebs*. Consequently a number of medreses and mektebs continued to function under the direction of the same müderris or of their descendants, although the government now ignored all but the most well-known local and provincial medreses. While the local medreses and traditional schools often sought leadership and suggestions from the larger centres, including the *şeyhülislamate*, in reality they were becoming more likely to follow the views of the local community and their local sponsors.

The involvement of the mid-level, independent-minded ulema in commercial activities and crafts, while they devotedly studied Islam on their own, is a fact needing closer research. I became alerted to this phenomenon many years ago when I found a group of merchants in Istanbul who originally came from Elaziğ; more than half of them claimed to have learned their trade from their fathers and grandfathers, who were members of the local *ilmiye*.⁹ Ziyaüddin Gümüşhanevi, founder of the major Halidiyya branch in Turkey, was the son of a merchant from Gümüşhane in northeastern Turkey and originally made his living by crafting purses; and Ahmed Hamdi Akseki, about whom there will be further discussion, sustained

himself economically by carving and selling seals (*mühür*) while studying in the medrese of Karamanlı Süleyman Efendi in the town of Ödemiş in the Aegean region.

Free of economic dependence on the government, while deeply knowledgeable about Islam and aware of the conditions in their own communities, the second-rank *ilmiye* developed a far more realistic understanding of social reform than did the bureaucrats who considered themselves agents of modernization. My own view is that the ulema in the countryside defined reforms in the strictly utilitarian terms of economic improvement, governmental efficiency and honest administration, all coexisting with an orthodox yet worldly Islam. They thus freely criticized the established government for both its maladministration and its contrived Islamic arguments.

The ulema in general, but especially its mid-level ranks, deeply resented the otherwise little-noticed granting of 'equality' to Christians through the *Islahat Fermanı* of 1856, part of the Paris treaty of the same year.¹⁰ The edict was issued against the advice of a council of ulema that had debated the question in detail for two weeks in November 1849, when it was introduced by the sultan at the insistence of the British ambassador, Stratford Canning. Looking at the issue strictly from the viewpoint of the *seriat*, the council had stated that Christian testimony could not be accepted in criminal cases but Christians could be consulted. Furthermore, the *cizye* should be retained and not changed to *bedelat-ı askeriye* (tax in lieu of military service) though in this case, the final decision was to be left to the government. The council also had stated that Christians could not be placed in a position to command Muslims but could be conscripted into service units of the army.¹¹ At the same time, the council had recommended increased economic benefits for Christians. The Rescript of 1856, however, accepted all the provisions the council had rejected, provoking a constantly deepening rift between the state and the economically independent countryside ulema, which no longer equated the state's own interest and views with that of its constituency.

Actually the council had supported considerable change in the Christians' status quo. If the question had not been imposed on it by the zealously Protestant Ambassador Canning, the ulema's reaction might have been even more positive. Nevertheless, Cevdet Pasha, the learned alim and historian as well as Minister of Vakıfs and spokesman for the state, criticized the *ilmiye* for insisting that there could not be an alliance between *Darul-Islam* and *Darul-Harb*. On the contrary, he pointed to the Crimean War as having created such an alliance, which ultimately necessitated the broadening of Christians' rights.¹²

The Crimean War was a turning point in the Ottoman opening to Christian Europe. Even some of the ulema in India argued that England was now part of the Darul-Islam because the Caliph had become England's ally to defeat Russia, the sultan's worst enemy. After the Paris treaty, however, the mistrust and animosity towards France and England revived as the two powers tried to exploit the 'equality' granted Christians. To increase their own influence in the Ottoman state, they used the upper-class Christians as agents in their commercial and judicial dealings with the Ottoman government. The Muslim reaction took the form of nationalism, creating further opposition to the Tanzimat reforms, to the Ottoman government itself, and to the upper *ilmiye* which sanctioned the reforms. The *vaizan* (preachers) used their exceptional influence among the lower classes to mobilize effective resistance against the Rescript of 1856 and Europe, too.

The coming of Abdulhamid II brought momentous changes in the government's relations with the *ilmiye* and in the entire issue of reform. Unlike every previous sultan (possibly excepting Abdulaziz in his last years), Abdulhamid emphasized his role as Caliph of all Muslims rather than his position as the Ottomans' sultan. He fused the Ottoman ruler's titles into one by placing the Caliphate on the first plane and using it to strengthen the central government's authority. Abdulhamid also used Islam to strengthen the political unity of his Muslim subjects who became the overwhelming majority after the loss of the Balkans in 1878. He, therefore, sought to gain the confidence of the restive Arabs and to integrate millions of Muslim refugees from the Balkans and Caucasus into the Anatolian society. The international facet of this policy, generally known as pan-Islamism, was a political tactic that used the threat of *Jihad* in order to thwart French, Russian and British ambitions in the Ottoman Empire.

Although the sultan became the *de facto* political head of Islam, religious decisions were ostensibly left to the *şeyhülislam*. Abdulhamid espoused the old dictum that the *padişah-caliph* had the right of *tazîr* (censuring, reproof) and not of *ifta* (opinion). Abdulhamid considered himself the executive of the *şariat*, not its interpreter, and this formula suited most of the *ilmiye* and the body public. Thus the *şeyhülislam* apparently regained his old position as the uppermost source of *ifta* , but that right was left to the *şeyhülislam* only provided he became the sultan's clerk, for the caliph's view prevailed.

The *ilmiye* seemed to believe that a strong government dedicated formally to Islam was the best guarantee of its own position and mission. It seems that the sultan had reached a consensus with the upper *ilmiye* that he was the head of the government and the

şeyhülislam was the head of the ilmiye and the voice of Islam. Abdulhamid was closely assisted by one of the most learned alims, Uryanizade Ahmed Esad Efendi (1813-89). After serving as *kazasker* of Rumili and Anatolia and a member of the Ayan Council, Esad Efendi served as şeyhülislam from 1878 to 1889. He was a strong believer in absolute sultanic authority over the government and the sultan's non-involvement in religious affairs. His successor, Cemaleddin Efendi (1848-1919), known as 'Abdulhamid's şeyhülislam', believed that the old unity of *din ü devlet* had been restored.¹³ In reality, after outwardly assuming all the credentials of a bona fide ruler-caliph, the sultan engaged in a series of far-reaching social, educational, and economic reforms that greatly exceeded those of the Tanzimat.

Abdulhamid received a powerful rational Islamic backing for his reforms from Cevdet Pasha, who had been Minister of Vakıfs and Justice. A convinced monarchist but also a social relativist and a follower of Ibn Khaldun, who had translated the *Muqaddimah*, Cevdet had consistently defended the view that '*Zamanın tagayyuru abkamin tebeddülünü meşru kılar*' (changed conditions legitimize the change of laws). He consequently criticized the ulema for their opposition to reforms—including the Edict of 1856—and cited Koranic verses and *hadises* to support his views.¹⁴ Cevdet favoured neither resistance to change nor blind imitation of the West. He believed reform consisted of social and cultural revival achieved by infusing traditional institutions with western science and technology.¹⁵ Cevdet's extraordinary contribution to Islamic modernism and the maintenance of Ottoman legacy, however, still awaits a competent full-length study.¹⁶

Another defender of Abdulhamid was the journalist and novelist Ahmet Midhat Efendi, who advocated among other things, the rights of women and made many aspects of European life and history known in Turkey.¹⁷ He was a social and cultural liberal but a political conservative and a supporter of Abdulhamid's absolutism. Thanks to defenders such as Ahmet Midhat, Abdulhamid established his credentials as an islamist ruler free of the European political and cultural tutelage that seemed to taint the Tanzimatists.

Under Abdulhamid, railways, the press, finances, the economy, communications, agriculture—practically every sector of Ottoman society—underwent considerable renovation without opposition or even criticism. Abdulhamid's borrowings from the West far exceeded those of the Tanzimat but were described as having an Arabic-Islamic origin. By claiming, for instance, that many western sciences, including algebra and chemistry were discovered by Arabs, the sultan was politically courting the Arabs and, at the same time, clothing the secular aspects of contemporary civilization in

respectable Muslim garb. He thus upheld human society's worldly aspects, which had been condemned in the past as *maddiyyun* and *tabiyyun* or materialism.

Abdulhamid's greatest achievement was the creation of a three-tiered educational system originally designed in 1869. The religious mektebs were converted into modern schools while the existing professional schools were reformed and new ones were added to them. The purpose was to use education as the means to acquire the strength of Europe and to refashion the internal society. Although the process of teaching was moved from the mosque to the school, many members of the ulema, such as the illustrious Esad and Ali Haydar Efendis, were put in charge of carrying out the educational reforms. The curricula of the schools, notably at the upper two levels (*ruşdiye* and *idadi*), now consisted mainly of secular subjects, but courses on Islam were introduced after 1890 to counteract the influence of the missionary and foreign schools. There was much that was new in the schools (maps, buildings, teaching methods) and also much continuity, producing in the end a new Ottoman Islamic identity.¹⁸

Abdulhamid made a special effort to court the notables and the ulema in the countryside as well as many sufi orders. He often consulted with the head of the Halidiyya-Ziyayya, and when Ziauddin Gümüshanevi died, the sultan ordered him entombed at the entrance of Süleyman the Magnificent's *türbe* (grave-mausoleum). By contrast, the sultan practically preempted the real power of the official *ilmiye* and the *şeyhülislamate* by making them the government's agents in control of the preachers or *vaizan*. In addition, he ordered that the 'imams, hatips and other employees of religion' be examined and certified before being allowed to practice.¹⁹

Because the *şeyhülislam* still retained the formal authority to sanction the sultan's dethronement Abdulhamid kept the *meşihat* under close supervision, possibly having heard that some of the officials had ties to his critics. In 1891 the Council of Ministers ranked the branches of the bureaucracy as *askeriye*, *mülkiye* and *kalemiye* (military, administrative, secretarial), significantly omitting the *ilmiye*. Probably prodded by the sultan, the council met again one week later and included the *ilmiye* in the classification and ranking of the bureaucracy but left the *şeyhülislam* out of the *ilmiye*. Actually the 'new' ranking conformed to the old one, except that the old title *kazasker* (chief *kadı*) was changed to *sadr-ı Rumeli-Anadolu payesi*.²⁰

The opposition to Abdulhamid was directed against his absolutism, not his reforms. It rose not only from the students educated in modern schools but also from the ulema in the countryside. The former invoked the lay principles of freedom

embodied in the Constitution of 1876, which the sultan had suspended; the latter criticized the sultan because, in the words of Musa Kazım (1858-1919), şeyhülislam from 1910 to 1918 in the Young Turk era, the 'khalifa was elevated to the rank of deity'. A large number of ulema originating in the countryside such as Mehmed Esad of Erbil, Şevki Celaleddin, and many Bektaşis and Kadiris as well as the leading Arab Islamic thinkers Rashid Rida and Abdulhamid al-Zahrawi charged that Abdulhamid's absolutism had converted the caliphate into a tool of oppression. Consequently, both westernists and islamists regarded the Young Turks' revolution of 1908 as a liberating movement directed against Abdulhamid's absolutism and not against his widespread reforms.

In truth, the Young Turk revolution was a middle-class social revolution against the imperial system and its entrenched bureaucracy, including the old *ilmiye*. It was also a populist revolution on behalf of the *millet* (nation), and it was a revolution of the countryside against an overly centralized state. As is well known, the revolution originated in Macedonia and was carried out by a combination of military leaders and local notables, but it was preceded by a series of uprisings in Anatolian cities led mainly by local merchants and craftsmen.

The revolution uprooted the *ilmiye* entrenched around the throne and brought to power the countryside religious cadres. The şeyhülislam, who remained a member of the ministerial cabinet until 1916, lost his independence. Despite the collapse of the old *ilmiye*, Islam remained central in the political life of the new leaders and continued to play a major role in community life. The Young Turks remained fully aware of the Ottoman caliph's prestige in the Muslim world even though their call to *cihad* at the beginning of the First World War resulted from German insistence rather than the Young Turks' belief in its effectiveness.

From 1908 on, the term *ilmiye* was replaced by the ideological term *islamcı*, or islamists, to distinguish the group from two other major ones, the westernists and the Turkists. Westernism, despite its ultimate victory in the Republic, was espoused by a relatively small group while Turkism long had been embraced by all parties involved in the debate. Turkism posed the biggest and most divisive challenge to the islamists because it superseded the question of modernism, which, as Ziya Gökalp showed in his famous article 'Üç Cereyan' (Three Currents), had been accepted by all intellectuals.²¹

The islamists in the Young Turk era, like most political actors of the time, had provincial origins. A fairly large number of them appear to have studied in their local medreses, but many, especially the younger ones had attended only the modern schools.

When the islamists are classified into groups, the first group is the one associated with the Young Turks and known as the governmental islamists. The main uniting point of this modernist, statist wing of the islamists was its opposition to absolutism and Abdulhamid. It was best represented by Musa Kazım who advocated importing only knowledge, science and technology from the West.²² Said Halim Pasha (1863-1921), who eventually became Prime Minister, also advocated caution in borrowing from the West. He was, however, a modernist islamist and increasingly is being viewed as the voice of the moderate democratic Islam of his time.²³

On the other side of the islamist spectrum stood the conservative monarchists. Allied with the country notables, they were the pillars of the opposition *Abrar* and *Hurriyet ve İtilaf* parties. Probably the best representative of this group was Mustafa Sabri (1869-1954), born in Tokat and educated in a medrese. He established the review *Beyanul-Hak* (Declaration of Rights) in September 1908 and in its first issue thanked the Young Turks and the army for ending Abdulhamid's absolutism.

Disturbed by the demise of the old *ilmiye* and the government's 'secularization' policy, Sabri founded the *Cemiyet-i İlmîyye-i İslamiye* (Society of Islamic Ulema), which became a bitter opponent of the Union and Progress, and he was also among the founders of the *İtilaf* party. He fled the country after the coup of 1913 but returned in 1918 following the Ottoman defeat in World War I to serve twice as *şeyhülislam* in the Damat Ferit governments. He also endorsed the Sèvres Treaty of 1920 and was critical of the Kemalist resistance movement. In 1922 Sabri fled Turkey again, never to return, even after an amnesty pardoned the so-called 150, mainly religious opponents of Atatürk.²⁴

The radical militant wing of islamism was represented by the *İttihad-i Muhammedi* (Muslim Union) and its head Vahdedi. Publisher of the paper *Volkan*, Vahdedi instigated the reaction of March 1909. The basic contention of this group was that the state must be Islamic and enforce the *şeriat* in transactions and in punishment of criminal acts.²⁵

The group known as the Turkist-Islamists—moderate secular nationalists—included many prominent personalities, among them Ziya Gökalp and a number of literary figures, as well as émigrés from Russia such as Ahmet Agayev (Ağaoğlu).²⁶ These committed modernists were nationalists who wanted material progress and considered Islam a cultural or moral substratum of society rather than a guiding legal system.

From the viewpoint of this paper, however, the most important group of islamists in the Young Turks era was associated with the review *Sirat-ı Mustakim* (Straight Path), which later took the name

Sebilul-Reşad (Path of Righteousness). It included the largest number of moderate, modernist islamists, many of whom were from the countryside and had been educated in both the traditional and modern schools or solely in the modern ones.

The longevity of the review indicates that it had a substantial number of readers. Many of them probably did not regard themselves as islamists, but simply as Muslims. The review saw Islam as the faith of a social body or a community, and it looked upon the state as a regulatory agency that should not intervene, either positively or negatively, in religious affairs. As long as the government left the community free to practise its faith the review did not question its other acts on religious grounds.

Although the *Sebilul-Reşad* never formulated a well-defined doctrine, its prevailing view was that the government could take measures to strengthen society and in this way, benefit the faith. For the same reason, a fairly large number of educated Muslims acquiesced to Abdulhamid's development policies while only a handful supported his absolutism.

Writers for the review did not reject the West or condemn the westernists. On the contrary, they regarded the West as having updated and perfected science and technology, which presumably were of Islamic origin. They believed that renewal was both material and spiritual and it could be achieved by being open to science and the world yet remaining bound to Islam. They regarded the constitutional regime as being in accord with the şeriat, for they did not see the state charged with the duty to enforce the şeriat, but only to let the community conduct its religious life through its own representatives and institutions. To the utter dismay of radical islamists, after 1922 especially, some accepted that the state and society were Turkish. In other words, they accepted the living reality of a national state. Other islamists, by contrast, denied both the Parliament's and the sultan's legislative powers; as late as 1909 some of them even had demanded a return to the *fıkħ*.

The *Sebilul-Reşad* took an Ottomanist, as opposed to a Turkist, stand. The term 'Ottoman', however, had national rather than Islamic connotation. At first, prominent writers, including Ahmed Naim and Süleyman Nazif, regarded Ottomanism as close to Islam and bitterly criticized Turkism. Later, the followers of *Sebilul-Reşad* changed their thinking as a result of their debates with the Turkists, who, as Berkes aptly put it, 'turned the discussion [of] the secularization of the state into the secularization of religion.'²⁷

In sum, the group of islamists writing for the *Sebilul-Reşad* gradually accepted both the primacy of the community-nation and that entity's right to follow its faith while rejuvenating itself with science and technology. Whether all this contains the seeds of

secularization is open to debate. The more important point is that a powerful Islamic continuity, extending from the Ottoman Empire into Republican Turkey, was achieved through a collaboration between the moderate national islamists of the *Sebilul-Reşad* and the Republican government. Although it must be emphasized that these islamist collaborators did not speak on behalf of all the islamists and represented just one layer of Islamic thinking in Turkey, they enjoyed the advantage of having state power behind them. Through the state's power and its control of the educational system the Islam of the moderate modernist wing of the *Sebilul-Reşad* became the faith of most of the country's inhabitants.

The first to achieve a consensus between the continuity of Islam and the Kemalist regime was Ahmet Hamdi Akseki (1887-1951). Born in the village of Güzelce in the Akseki area, he studied in the local mekteb and then in the medrese of Karamanlı Süleyman Efendi in Ödemiş. After Akseki came to Istanbul in 1905 and received his *icazet* (diploma) from Bayındırlı Muhammed Şükrü Efendi, he enrolled in the Istanbul Darül-fünun and graduated in 1918, with a specialization in philosophy and kelam—theology. Meanwhile, from 1908 on, he had been one of the most active writers for the *Sebilul-Reşad* and had taught in various schools. Having participated in the War of Liberation, Akseki was charged with reforming the teaching programmes of the medreses, which were abolished in 1924. The following year, he was tried (and acquitted) for membership of the *Tarikat-ı Salahiye* (Path of Salvation) Society.

In 1939 Akseki became vice-director of the Diyanet Office, serving under Şerafettin Yaltkaya (1887-1949), another very important modernist islamist. Actually from 1939 until his death, the Diyanet was under the direction of Akseki who was instrumental in shaping its current philosophy. He knew Arabic, Persian and English and wrote numerous books, including *İslam Dini* (Muslim Faith), which reportedly sold an unprecedented total of 1.5 million copies. He also wrote the *Askere Din Dersleri* (Religious Teaching for Soldiers) of 1925, which went through several editions. Clearly, Akseki played a crucial role in shaping the structure and philosophy of the *Diyanet* and the government's policy towards Islam in Turkey.

Also instrumental in changing the Republican government's rigid secularism towards an accommodation with Islam was M. Şemseddin Günaltay. He was born in Kemaliye in the province of Erzincan, the son of a local müderris, İbrahim Efendi. He studied in the İdadi, then went to the teachers' college and finally to the University of Lausanne, where he studied physics. Upon his return, he wrote for the *Sebilul-Reşad* while teaching the history of religions at Istanbul University. In 1913 he published the *İslam Mecmuası* and joined the Islamist-Türkist group. In the next year he became the dean of

Istanbul University's Divinity School. Beginning in 1923 he was elected to the National Assembly on the slate of the ruling Republican People's Party, and from 15 January 1949 to 22 May 1950 Günaltay served as Prime Minister. In that period the teaching of Islam was liberalized, and a variety of other measures were taken to harmonize the government's policy with the belief system and Islamic practices of society. For example, the original imam hatip schools were established as part of this policy of reaching a consensus with Islam.

Other islamists, such as İsmail Hakkı İzmirli (1868-1946) and Mehmet Ali Aynı (1868-1945) wrote for the *Sırat-ı Mustakım* and *Sebilul-Reşad* and played critical roles in creating today's official Islam in Turkey. The examples of Akseki and Günaltay, however, amply illustrate how a drastically changed form of Ottoman Islam continued in modern Turkey and how a new national, semi-secularized ilmiye emerged. As in Ottoman times, there are still large groups of islamists, including many popular sufi orders, outside the Diyanet's jurisdiction, but relations between the representatives of the official Islam and non-official Islam are reportedly good. That is to say the Ottoman policy of mutual tolerance among various appointed and self-declared representatives of Islam continues as well.

Notes

¹ There is a rising demand to revise the negative image of the old medrese. Yaşar Sankaya, 'Osmanlı Medreselerinin Gerilemesi Meselesi: Eleştirel bir Değerlendirme Denemesi', *İslam Araştırmaları Dergisi* 3 (1999), 23-40.

² R.C. Repp, *The Mufti of Istanbul: A Study in the Development of the Ottoman Learned Hierarchy* (London, 1986), 300.

³ Uriel Heyd, 'The Ottoman Ulema and Westernization in the Time of Selim III and Mahmud II', *Studies in Islamic History and Civilization*, ed. Uriel Heyd (Jerusalem, 1961), 63-96 and David Kushner, 'The Place of the Ulema in the Ottoman Empire During the Age of Reform (1839-1918)', *Turcica* 19 (1987): 51-74. *İlmiye Salnamesi*, a voluminous work of about 750 pages, deserves special mention. It was undertaken by the İstanbul şeyhülislamate in order to rehabilitate the prestige of the ilmiye, tarnished since the Young Turk revolution and its 'secularist' policies. Prepared under the direction of Mustafa Hayrı Efendi, şeyhülislam and Minister of Justice, it consists of three parts, including numerous relevant fetvas covering the entire structure of the time as well as biographies of some 124 ulema who lived in the earlier periods. It is a source of primary importance for any study of education (it has a section on the medreses) and social groups in the Ottoman times. An edition in the Latin alphabet was published in 1998.

- ⁴ Madeline C. Zilfi, 'Elite Circulation in the Ottoman Empire: Great Mollas of the Eighteenth Century', *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient* 26:3 (1983), 361.
- ⁵ Seyfettin Erşahin, 'The Ottoman Ulema and the Reforms of Mahmud II', *Hamdard Islamicus* 22:2 (1999), 19-40.
- ⁶ Butrus Abu-Manneh, 'Şhaykh Ahmad Ziya'uddin El-Gümüşhanevi and Ziya-i-Khalidi Suborder', *Shi'a, Sects and Sufism*, ed. F. de Jong (Utrecht, 1992), 104-17.
- ⁷ David Dean Commins, *Islamic Reform: Politics and Social Change in Late Ottoman Syria* (New York, 1990).
- ⁸ See Kemal H. Karpat, *The Politicization of Islam: Reconstructing Identity, State, Faith and Community* (New York, 2001), Ch. 4 on 'The New Middle Classes and the Nakşbandia', 89-116.
- ⁹ Similarly, Qasim al-Halaf (1806-67) of Damascus left his trade as a barber, studied to become an alim and served as preacher and imam. His position and status were inherited by his son and his grandson, Jemaluddin (d. 1914), whose own descendants returned to lay professions. The Qasimis not only compiled a dictionary of Damascus crafts and occupations, but also denounced millers, bakers, grain suppliers, tax farmers and rich men for their greed and adulterated foods. David Commins, 'Social Criticism and Reformist Ulema of Damascus', *Studia Islamica* 78 (1993), 169-80.
- ¹⁰ Roderic Davison, *Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 1856-1876* (Princeton, 1963) and 'Turkish Attitudes Concerning Christian-Muslim Equality in the Nineteenth Century', *American Historical Review* 59:4 (1954), 844-64.
- ¹¹ The minutes are in Başvekalet Arşivi (B.A.), Yıldız Collection sec. 18, folder 39. See also Karpat, 76-7.
- ¹² Karpat, 74.
- ¹³ After serving for a short period as şeyhülislam under the Young Turks, Cemaleddin went to Egypt and criticized them bitterly. See his memoirs, *Siyasi Hatıralarım* (Istanbul, 1920 & 1990). The best source on şeyhülislams is the voluminous *İlmîye Salnamesi* (Istanbul, 1916).
- ¹⁴ Karpat, 104-6.
- ¹⁵ Niyazi Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey* (Montreal, 1964), 70, 74.
- ¹⁶ Cemil Meriç, *Cevdet Paşa'nın Toplum ve Devlet Görüşü* (Istanbul, 1992) is a mere beginning.
- ¹⁷ Karpat, 157-8.
- ¹⁸ Benjamin C. Fortna, *Imperial Classroom: Islam, the State, and Education in the Late Ottoman Empire* (New York, 2002), 110, 138.
- ¹⁹ The by-laws '*tevcib-i cihat nişannamesi*' concerning the certification of the vaizan and related correspondence are in B.A., Sadaret, Mabeyn-i Humayun, Yıldız, Sadaret Resmi Mevzuatı, No. 41/34.
- ²⁰ For the two ranking lists of 5 and 12 July 1891 see B.A., Sadaret, Yıldız Resmi Maruzatı No. 55/46.
- ²¹ *Türk Yurdu* 3 (1913); Taha Parla, *The Social and Political Thought of Ziya Gökalp, 1876-1924* (Leiden, 1985).
- ²² Musa Kazım, *Devr-i İstibdat Ahvali ve Musebbileri* (Istanbul, 1911); Berkes, 259.
- ²³ Sait Halım (Pasha) *Bubranlarımız* (Istanbul, 1911).
- ²⁴ Mustafa Sabri remained a bitter enemy of Atatürk. See his *Hilafet ve Kemalizm* (Istanbul, 1991) republished by Sadık Albayrak. Abdullah Dürriyade, the şeyhülislam who issued the fetva denouncing the Kemalists as outlaws, had been Sabri's deputy. Probably personal ambition, rather than loyalty to ideology, shaped Sabri's career. He had been elected deputy from Tokat and wanted to become *Sadrâzam* – Premier.

²⁵ Berkes, 341.

²⁶ Ahmet Aġaoġlu deserves a more detailed study than accorded here. For a recent publication, see Fahri Sakal, *Aġaoġlu Ahmed Bey* (Ankara, 1999).

²⁷ Berkes, 377.

From *Kadı* to *Naib*: Reorganization of the Ottoman Sharia Judiciary in the Tanzimat Period

Jun Akiba

Historians dealing with the sharia courts in the late Ottoman Empire have long been aware of the fact that it was always the *naib*, not the *kadı* (qadi), who presided over the court.¹ ‘*Naib*’ literally means a deputy *kadı*. Why then was the sharia judge in the late Ottoman period generally called *naib*? This paper focuses on the process of the shift in the title of judges during the Tanzimat period: from that of *kadı* to *naib*. But it was not merely the title that changed. This shift was in fact a replacement of one system by a new one and represents an extensive reorganization of the sharia judiciary under the Tanzimat. So far the development of the *naib*ship system has not been examined. Research on the nineteenth-century Ottoman *ulema*² usually paid little attention to the institutional aspect and studies on the Tanzimat reforms have had little interest in what happened to the ‘traditional’ sharia courts. It is true that the Ottoman sharia courts in the nineteenth century were overshadowed by the enactment of a series of secular legal codes and the formation of a new secular court system, which eventually reduced the scope of the sharia jurisdiction more or less to matters concerning personal status and *waqf*. However, the Ottoman judicial reforms comprised from the beginning the reorganization of the institution of the sharia court and judiciary, which profoundly affected the whole hierarchy of the *ulema*, as well as the daily practice of local sharia courts. Recent studies using the sharia court registers are more concerned with how individuals managed to use the court and how the court dispensed justice, thus turning to the examination of the way the court records reconstructed the ‘reality’. This trend necessitates more careful attention to the institutional background against which the court records were produced. The diversity of court practice over time and space is also brought into focus in this context.³ Changes during the nineteenth century are no doubt especially significant in the history of the Ottoman sharia court. The purpose of this paper is to illustrate the reorganization of the sharia judiciary in the Tanzimat period and also to examine the underlying logic of the reforms.

Naibs in the Pre-Tanzimat Period

The main characteristic of the Ottoman sharia judiciary was the integration of the kadıs' offices into the Empire's ruling institutions and its hierarchical organization. This organization was established during the mid-sixteenth century, and developed through the following centuries. As a precondition for understanding the reforms, the situation of the Ottoman sharia judiciary in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries must be understood, since naibs were already prevalent by that period.⁴

There were two types of the kadıship: *mansıb* and *mevleviyet*. Most of the offices of the kadı (sing., *kaza*, which also meant the district under kadı's jurisdiction) were in the former category. Mansıbs were divided into three according to geographic area (Rumeli, Anadolu and Mısır⁵) with each line organized into a hierarchical order. These career lines were collectively called 'the hierarchy of kadıship' (*tarik-i kaza*). Kadıs of the mansıbs in Rumeli were appointed by the *Kazasker* of Rumeli and those in Anadolu and Mısır by the *Kazasker* of Anadolu.

Mevleviyet, which meant the office of the *molla* (senior judge), was a kadıship of the Empire's main cities. Cities such as Edirne, Bursa, Damascus or Jerusalem were included in this category.⁶ These offices were given only to those ascending from the career line of the professorship (*müdürlük*) in Istanbul. Above the mevleviyets came the kadıships of Mecca and Medina, the kadıship of Istanbul, the offices of two *Kazaskers*, and finally the office of *Şeyhülislam*. This hierarchy beginning from the professorships to the *Şeyhülislam* at the top, was called 'the hierarchy of professorship' (*tarik-i tedris*). It was the *Şeyhülislam* who had the authority to appoint the mollas.

The two hierarchies, of kadıship and professorship, constituted the two pillars of the *ilmiye* hierarchy. The actual operation of the system was, however, not so simple. The kadıs often delegated their duties to deputies and they themselves did not actually serve as judges. This phenomenon could be explained through the existence of two factors: the fee-collection system and the increase in the number of candidates for kadıships.

Judges were not salaried. They earned their income from court fees collected in return for their legal, notarial and administrative services. The post of judgeship could bring in large profits so long as the judge tried to collect as much fees as possible during his tenure. The authority of the kadı to collect fees facilitated the transfer of this right to another person, just as in tax farming.

The lucrateness of kadıships attracted many ulema to this profession, which eventually led to the over-abundance of candidates. In fact, an elaborate and strict hierarchy of judgeship was

originally developed to control the number of candidates and impose order on the distribution of the right to collect fees. The short tenure ranging from one to two years was a device to prevent one person from monopolizing the office, and to provide as many candidates as possible with equal opportunities.⁷ But excessive competition led to abuses such as bribery and favouritism on the one hand, and led to the domination of several prominent ulema families of the higher offices of the *ilmiye* hierarchy, on the other. Since vested interests of members of the *ilmiye* hierarchy could not be easily infringed, even unqualified ulema would retain their offices. This situation necessitated the delegation of their duties to deputy judges.

Especially serious were the problems in the hierarchy of kadiship. The foremost among them was overpopulation. It was said that there were 5,000 to 6,000 members belonging to the hierarchy of kadiship during the reign of Selim III,⁸ despite the number of kadiship posts in the whole Empire being around one thousand at most. According to a firman of Selim III, many 'incompetent' (*na-ehl*) individuals infiltrated into the hierarchy through favouritism, personal connections and bribery, or by taking the place of dead kadis.⁹ It was also said that many personal followers or servants of certain high-ranking ulema had acquired the membership of the hierarchy through their favour,¹⁰ certainly not all of whom were qualified. Many of them sent naibs to their places of duty.

The inflation in the number of judges resulted in other consequences. Candidates had to wait a long time before they were appointed. While on the waiting list, they were allowed to serve as a naib at the sharia court, a measure to enable them to make a living. The hierarchy of professorship was also oversized and many stayed for a long period in the offices of the lower professorships. The naibship was a remunerative occupation for lower-ranking professors who were seeking an additional income.¹¹ In consequence, we can find many naibs holding the title of *kadı* or *müderriis*.

Some of the characteristics of the Ottoman sharia judiciary explained above were most obvious in the practice of *arpalık*, which was a nominal judgeship given as a stipend to the holders of honorary ranks.¹² In principle, judges of the *mevleviyet* posts (*mollas*) as well as kadis of Mecca, Medina and Istanbul assumed their original duties. However, due to the inflation in the number of applicants at every level of professorship and *mevleviyet*, honorary ranks (sing., *paye-i mücerred*) of the *mevleviyets* and other higher judge posts were created for candidates. To provide the holders of honorary ranks with income, they were granted judgeships as *arpalıklar*. The holders of these judgeships would farm out their duties to naibs so that they could receive their income from court fees

collected by the naibs. In the same manner, judgeships known as *maışet* were given to high-ranking professors to supplement their incomes.

Another type of naib was found in *nahiyes* or sub-districts under the kazas. The judges of kazas sent their naibs to the nahiyes under their jurisdiction. In fact, the problem of naibs in the sixteenth century concerned this type of naibs.¹³ But later, larger kazas such as provincial centres absorbed neighbouring smaller kazas relegating them to nahiye status, so that judges of the larger kazas would appoint naibs to the adjacent kazas, which allowed them to transfer the income of these smaller kazas to themselves. This kind of annexation was more widespread in the provinces farther from the centre. For example, Nablus, itself a large town and administratively a sancak (region or sub-province), was a nahiye of Jerusalem in the *ilmiye* terminology, that is, the kadı (*molla*) of Jerusalem appointed his naib to Nablus.¹⁴

Overall, the influx of the number of candidates, the existence of unqualified kadı title-holders, the assignment of arpalıks and the integration of smaller kazas into the larger ones all contributed to the proliferation of naib appointments, which entailed two main problems: First, since naibs were appointed by kadıs themselves (or arpalık holders), the centre could not check the qualifications of naibs. Second, since naibs had to pay the kadıs, they usually tried to collect as much as possible in fees and thus they tended to abuse their office.

Selim III issued several firmans to prohibit kadıs from delegating their duties to naibs.¹⁵ But since the decrees allowed sick and aged kadıs to appoint naibs, they seemed to have little effect. Later Mahmud II was more concerned about the issue of court fees and the appointment of proper naibs.¹⁶ The *İlmiye Penal Code* enacted in 1838 dealt mainly with the naib problem.¹⁷ It tried to determine the qualifications of naibs, and officially approved the delegation of judgeship to naibs regardless of kadıs' condition.

The Early-Tanzimat Period

Immediately after the promulgation of the *Gülhane Rescript* in November 1839, the reorganization of the sharia judiciary was undertaken as part of the Tanzimat reforms in the provincial administration and the tax system. Just as the initial reform projects of the Tanzimat resulted in failure in the first two years, the attempt to pay salaries to naibs was also unsuccessful mainly because of the financial crisis.¹⁸

But it did not mean a total reversion to the pre-Tanzimat practice. The most important result of the judiciary reforms during these years

was the separation of naibs from kadıs. Naibs were no longer dependent on kadıs in the sense that they did not need to pay monthly to kadıs, who would now receive pensions from the state¹⁹ and that naibs would not be appointed by kadıs. It became a principle that the appointment of naibs should be administered by the Şeyhülislam.²⁰

In actual practice, the nomination of naibs was determined by informal personal relationships and by one's position in the patrimonial ilmiye hierarchy. Reputation among the elite ulema circles in Istanbul was a main criterion of appointment. *'Ma'lumi'l-ehliye'* ('whose competence is known') or *'ehliyeti ve haysiyeti nümayan'* ('whose competence and dignity is evident') was a common phrase used by the Şeyhülislam.²¹ Holding a rank of the ilmiye itself meant that he was known and competent. On the contrary, the phrase *'mechulü'l-abval'* ('whose quality is unknown') was usually associated with incompetence and abuse.²² On the other hand, especially for naib posts in the remote provinces for which applicants usually did not appear in the capital, personal relationships with the provincial governors or reputation among the provincial notables was important. The İlmiye Penal Code of 1838 had laid down the examination requirement for those applicants whose quality was unknown.²³ Several archival documents indicate the implementation of this rule, although it is not clear whether it was applied regularly.²⁴ It seems that the examination was only one of the criteria for the nomination of judges.

Altogether, a regular system of naib appointment did not exist. The Şeyhülislam Ârif Hikmet Beyefendi (1846-54) seemed frustrated at the lack of information about the naibs when it became obvious that the corruption of naibs concerning court fees continued to be a serious problem. On one occasion when the unlawful charge of court fees by a naib again came to light in 1848, the Şeyhülislam proposed that naibs with unknown competence should find sureties (*küfela*) on their appointment.²⁵ He openly admitted that the unknown naibs infiltrated into the judiciary and he attributed all the troubles to them. Presumably they were without rank, that is, outside the ilmiye hierarchy and most probably coming from the provinces to the capital seeking posts. However, Ârif Hikmet Beyefendi's proposal about the surety never materialized.

The Reforms of 1855

An Order of 1855

The next Şeyhülislam Meşrebzade Mehmed Arif Efendi (1854-8), a leading member of the reformist ulema, launched a series of reforms

in the sharia judiciary. In April 1855 an order was issued concerning the conduct and fees of kadıs and naibs,²⁶ which mentioned the question of excessive fee collection in the preamble and pointed to two reasons for the problem. First, the order acknowledged that most of the corrupt judges were judges of nahıyes whose posts were farmed out (*iltizam*) by the judges of larger kazas. They purportedly committed unlawful acts in order to collect the sum they owed. The second reason was that since some of the naibs were appointed directly by the holders of mansıb and maişet, these ‘unknown’ naibs were apt to charge illegal fees. Here again, being unknown is associated with injustice.

As regards the first point, the order stipulated that the judge of a kaza should not farm out the judgeship of a nahıye at a fixed price but should appoint by way of ‘trust’ (*emanet*), leaving to the naib one fourth, one third or a half of the net amount of the court revenue. As for the second problem, the order prescribed that the appointment letters should be given to naibs not by the original holders of mansıb or maişet, but by the Kazaskers of Rumeli and Anadolu. By this measure, naibs were to be formally appointed by Kazaskers and thus nominal title-holders were officially excluded from the appointment procedure. Its implementation can be seen in appointment letters recorded in the sharia court registers. Appointment letters after 1855 were written in the name of the Kazasker, whereas previously they were usually sent by the original title-holders.²⁷

The Regulations for Naibship of 1855

A more serious step towards the reorganization of the sharia judiciary was taken by the regulations for naibship²⁸ which passed the new reform organ *Meclis-i Tanzimat* in April 1855 together with the regulations for kadıship.²⁹

The main point of the regulations for naibship of 1855 was the introduction of the five-grade system to the naibship. In this system, judges as well as judicial posts were arranged into five categories and the judge would be appointed (in principle) only to the post corresponding to his grade (*sınıf*) (art. 1). The posts of judges were classified according to the importance and scale of each kaza (art. 4). Edirne, Selanik, and İzmir, for example, became first grade kazas. For the categorization of the judges, rank, reputation and the results of examination constituted the main criteria. High-ranking judges would be given the first grade automatically. Along with judges of lower ranks in the hierarchy of professorship (*mevali-i devriye* and *müderrisin*), judges who had higher ranks in the hierarchy of kadıship and whose qualifications were well known would be granted the

second grade. Those who held the ranks of *mevleviyet* or *müderris* but having no experience of actual service could attain the third grade after passing the examination (art. 2). Judges without ranks were obliged to take examinations to acquire the *naibship* grades (art. 11). Article 11 of the regulations applied a strict selection criterion to those *naibs* of an unknown quality. Whereas *naibs* holding *ilmiye* ranks were treated favourably, the regulations were severe to *naibs* without ranks. Even if they had certificates (*tezkiyeleler*) for judgeships, these documents were deemed suspicious. *Naibs* who had already taken an examination and thus got certificates should take the examination again to get the *naibship* grades. To conduct examinations and arrange the appointment of judges, the Committee for Selection of Sharia Judges (*Meclis-i İntihab-ı Hükkâmü's-Şer'*) was created in the Şeyhülislam's Office.

While experienced judges might possibly be weeded out through strict examinations, a new way for recruiting judges was intended to be a formal apprenticeship in the courts in Istanbul, which the Şeyhülislam's Office could keep under its control. According to article 12, a new candidate should do his apprenticeship in one of the courts in Istanbul serving as a court scribe until getting the certificate to be admitted in the examination. But this project soon turned out to be unrealistic because of a shortage of the scribal posts. Then a school for training judges called *Mu'allimhane-i Nüvvab* was created in Istanbul in August 1855.³⁰ Graduates of this school would be granted the third to fifth grades of *naibship* upon graduation. Thus the Şeyhülislam, while applying a strict selection criterion to experienced judges, adopted a new recruitment policy based on a merit system in which judges were to be trained in the professional school administered by his office. Whereas judges with *ilmiye* ranks continued to be treated favourably, the introduction of the grade system nonetheless laid the foundation for a rational appointment system based on grade and not on rank. In other words, the élite *ulema*, confronted with challenges from the outside, aimed to defend the privileged status of their organization by redefining the membership.

The creation of the grade system was highly significant, because it was a new order different from the existent *ilmiye* hierarchy and special to the *naibship*, promoting it to an official and independent institution. This arrangement was in a sense an official declaration of the replacement of *kadiship* by *naibship*. The regulations for *naibship* of 1855 allowed original holders of *mansıbs* in the hierarchy of *kadiship* to actually serve in their own *kazas*, but only on conditions stipulated in the 6th article of the regulations, the inclusion of which suggests that the actual services by *kadis* themselves were unusual. Exceptionally, ten *mevleviyet* posts (Cairo,

Damascus, Jerusalem, Aleppo, Kurdistan [Van], Trabzon, Crete, Baghdad, Tripoli of Libya, Beirut) besides the kadiships of Istanbul, Mecca and Medina were reserved for the original title-holders (mollas or kads).³¹ To all the other judge posts including several *mevleviyet* posts (Edirne, Bursa, etc.), naibs were appointed in principle.

Nominal Kadiship

One may wonder why the Ottomans did not try to restore the kadiship to its original function. This is mainly because the state was not willing to infringe the vested interests of the kadı title-holders. Restructuring of the kadışip would have necessitated the dismissal of many ulema who depended on the revenue accruing from their titles. The Ottoman bureaucracy preferred to leave the kadı system untouched and instead built a new institution of naibship.

The kadışip survived, but it eventually became a nominal institution, composed of title-holders receiving monthly stipends. The 1855 regulations of mansibs in the hierarchy of kadiship³² only articulated the appointment procedures in detail but were not concerned with the duties of appointees. Registers in the Meşihat Archives of the Istanbul Mufti's Office reveal that later in the 1870s only those who had little or no other income could hold the nominal kadı titles to receive their stipend. For example, a *hizmetkâr* (servant) Selim Efendi was entitled to the Harput kazası (nominal kadiship of Harput),³³ while a certain es-Seyyid Mustafa Salim Efendi was deprived of his title of 'kadı' because he was a clerk in a government office (*tarik-i kalemiyede müstabdem*).³⁴ Most probably their own occupations had nothing to do with judgeship.

Bereketzade İsmail Hakkı, a medrese student in the 1860s attests that it was medrese students who were the main beneficiaries of the nominal kadışip. In a sense, the kadışip became a kind of fellowship for medrese students.

This was a nominal hierarchy of kadışip, in which nominal *kazas* were assigned to those who entered the career (*tarik*) once in every one or two years by seniority and by fortune as far as I remembered. The first assigned *kazı* [would bring in] a twelve-month [stipend], and the *kazas* assigned next and much later [would bring in] stipends continuing for eighteen months. At the beginning of the career, stipends were very little but as one attained seniority the amount of stipend rose higher and higher.... As is evident from my remarks here, the kadiship of the *tarik* [-i *kazı*] was in itself not such a significant thing. Students, however, deemed it very important because they

would enter an intelligence competition (*zekaâ yarışı*) in the examinations and thus it increased their eagerness rather than hampered [their] study...³⁵

We can find in the personnel records of the late Ottoman ulema examples of naibs who entered the hierarchy of kadışip in their student years. As Bereketzade İsmail Hakkı said, the amount of the first stipend was as small as 29 or 30 *guruş*. It usually ended up with 100 to 200 *guruş*.³⁶ The highest amount seen in the records was 480 *guruş*,³⁷ but it was exceptional. The value of these stipends was very low if we compare with the salaries of fifth-grade naibs after the provincial reform (about 500 to 1500 *guruş*).

With restricted membership and the small amount of stipends, the hierarchy of kadışip lost its importance. In the end, when the old regime was dissolved in 1908, the new government pursuing a rational system should have seen no value in the existence of this nominal kadı system. In March 1909, the hierarchy of kadışip was officially abolished and kadıs disappeared both nominally and virtually.³⁸

Limited Centralization

As mentioned above, the reorganization of naibship in 1855 established the grade system and centralized the appointment procedure. The reformed personnel administration was visible in two registers of naibs, of Rumeli and Anadolu, found in the Meşihat Archives.³⁹ These registers covering the period from 1855 to the early 1870s, list names and appointment dates of naibs under the heading of each kaza. Kazas are arranged in alphabetical order after the five-grade classification. From these registers we can see not only the achievements of the reforms but also their limitations. The registers do not contain records of significant numbers of kazas belonging to the Arab and Southeast Anatolian provinces. Not only tiny kazas, but some administrative centres of sancaks such as Nablus, Sulaimaniya or Mardin are also absent. This under-representation means that these kazas remained outside the control of the Şeyhülislam's Office. Naibs of these kazas were appointed by the judges of central kazas to which they were attached as nahiyes.

In fact this situation had practical reasons, since the Şeyhülislam's Office often had a great difficulty in finding judges for the posts of smaller kazas in the remote regions. In the naib registers, notes such as 'as there is no naib of the grade who would go [to the post]' (*sınıfta gider naib bulunmadığından*) appear repeatedly. In such cases a naib 'outside the grade' (*sınıfta gayri dahil*) would be appointed. In other cases, judges were selected from among the ulema originating or

living in the kaza in question (*yerli, ol tarafta sakin*), even though there was a customary rule of avoiding the appointment of locals.⁴⁰ There were also cases where provincial governors or local administrative councils requested the appointment of their candidates by official letters. Since these kazas were not expected to yield sufficient revenues to make up for the travel and living expenses, and because of a basic principle of appointment on application, few naibs would wish to go to such places. For example, in Palu (near Harput) Hüseyin Hamid Efendi, a former naib of Palu, returned to the post in January 1854 at the request of the local administrator and the local council. After serving in Palu for more than four years, he was dismissed on the ground that he was a local and had stayed in office longer than the prescribed period (two years). But as there was no applicant holding the grade, an Ali Rıza Efendi, again from the local inhabitants and without the naibship grade was appointed in May 1858. Then in November of the same year, a complaint was brought against Ali Rıza, and the local administrator and the local council again requested the appointment of Hüseyin Hamdi, who was living there. But this time, before the appointment letter for Hüseyin Hamdi arrived in Palu an applicant with the naibship grade appeared in Istanbul and eventually he became the naib of Palu.⁴¹

The Şeyhülislam was aware of these circumstances. In July 1855 in his report to the Grand Vizier,⁴² using a familiar cliché he lamented that these provincially nominated judges were ‘unknown’ and therefore incompetent. Then he proposed the application of an examination in each provincial centre to nominate the judges for nahiyes or smaller kazas in each province. Examination in the provinces was implemented at least in some places.⁴³

Provincial Reform and the Establishment of Naibship

Integration of the Judicial System into the Provincial System

As the judicial system was an essential part of the provincial administration, it was the provincial reforms beginning in 1864 that brought more fundamental changes to the sharia judiciary. Whereas the reforms in 1855 were carried out on the initiative of the Şeyhülislam’s Office, these series of reforms were initiated by the Sublime Porte.

The provincial reforms were first undertaken in the Tuna province (with the capital in Rusçuk [Ruse]) in 1864 under the governorship of the famous Midhat Pasha. In the following years the new administrative system was extended to most of the provinces in the Empire.⁴⁴ The Provincial Reform Law⁴⁵ was intended to lay a centralized and uniform administrative system over the Empire,

reorganizing provincial units into three hierarchical levels: *vilayet* (province), *sancak/liva* (region) and *kaza* (district). Accordingly, each of the administrative units would have one sharia court with a sharia judge appointed by the centre. Naibs nominated by the Şeyhülislam would preside over the kaza and sancak courts. (In actual practice, they were nominated by the Committee for Selection of Sharia Judges and appointed in the name of the Kazasker of Rumeli or Anadolu). To the centre of each vilayet, the inspector of judges (*müfettiş-i hükkâm*) would be nominated by the Şeyhülislam and appointed by the Sultan. The inspector of judges would check the decisions of the sharia courts in the vilayet, supervise the conduct of naibs under his jurisdiction and at the same time hear cases at the sharia court of the provincial centre in his capacity as the sharia judge.⁴⁶ Thus the law integrated the judicial institution into the provincial administration system. Before, the hierarchy of the sharia judiciary had not corresponded to that of local administration. For an extreme example, the naib of Muş in the province of Erzurum, had been appointed by the molla of Kurdistan, that is the judge of Van, which was the centre of another province.⁴⁷ By the implementation of the Provincial Reform Law this kind of inconsistency disappeared and judges of all the kazas in the Empire began to be officially appointed directly from Istanbul, although certainly not all the naibs were sent from Istanbul but still nominated in the provincial centres to be approved by the Şeyhülislam's Office.⁴⁸

Another important innovation the provincial reform introduced to the sharia judiciary was the salary system.⁴⁹ Salaries were assigned to the judges of kaza level and above, according to the grade of the judicial post. The introduction of the salary system enabled the government to get hold of the court revenues and it expected that this would prevent corruption in the collection of fees.

Creation of the Nizamiye Court System

The scope of the provincial reform encompassed a much wider design, which actually transformed the Ottoman judicial system fundamentally. The organization of secular courts called *mahakim-i nizamiye* was created to hear cases according to state law, apart from the existing sharia courts.⁵⁰ In this new order, sharia judges assumed a new duty: the office of the chief judge of the secular court. The inspector of judges would serve as the chief judge of the high court (*divan-ı temyiz*) in the provincial centre and the provincial criminal court (*meclis-i cinayet*). The naibs of sancaks and kazas would also serve as the chief judges of the new secular courts (*meclis-i temyiz* and *meclis-i de'avi* respectively).

The establishment of the nizamiye court system was an important part of provincial reform. The official statement⁵¹ published on the occasion of the promulgation of the Provincial Reform Law, stated that the confusion in the local administrative councils had been caused by the fact that administrative, civil and criminal cases were all discussed in the same place. It was to avoid this confusion, the statement follows, that the administrative and judicial functions of the local councils should be separated. To this end, the judicial function became independent of the duties of the local councils and was taken over by these new courts. This new court was to consist of one chief judge and a certain number of members elected from among the local population both muslim and non-muslim.

As mentioned above, the chief judge of the new court was the judge of the sharia court. But this arrangement is conceivable when one considers that the secular court was developed from the local council, in which the sharia judge had been performing judicial services as its *ex officio* member. Therefore the existence of a sharia-cum-secular judge was not a mere expedient in the transitional period but a natural form extended from long experience in the local council.⁵²

Establishment of the Naib System

The provincial reforms beginning in 1864 underwent several modifications. In the judicial sphere, first in June 1869, due to the overload of the inspector of judges, another naib called *merkez naibi* was appointed to the provincial centre to serve as the judge of the sharia court and the chief judge of the higher court of the central sancak.⁵³ As usual in Ottoman reform attempts, financial problem restricted the achievement of the judicial reorganization project. Salaries were cut at least twice between 1866 and 1872.⁵⁴

In November 1871, to reduce the financial burden, the offices of the inspector of judges and the merkez naibi in the provincial centre were abolished and replaced by the single office of the naib called *merkez-i liva naibi* (later renamed *vilayet merkez naibi*).⁵⁵ At this stage, a universal system of naibship was finally established. This meant that to every sharia court in each vilayet, sancak and kaza a naib would be appointed by the Şeyhülislam's Office.⁵⁶ Only five judicial offices were exceptions: three kadiships in Istanbul (Istanbul, Galata and Eyüp), two kadiships of the holy cities of Mecca and Medina, and the kadship of Cairo.

As seen above, the system of naibship was a by-product of the provincial reform. The reform established a centralized judicial organization, in which one sharia court and one secular court were set up in each administrative unit in parallel, and one judge was

appointed by the centre to preside over both of the courts. The Sublime Porte at first seems to have intended to be involved in the appointment of all the judges.⁵⁷ But in consequence, after the abolition of the office of the inspector of judges, the authority to appoint all the judges at the kaza level and above was concentrated in the Şeyhülislam's Office.⁵⁸

Now the Şeyhülislam's Office would administer the appointment of naibs according to grade. One effect of this can be seen in the case of *mevleviyet*. As a result of the establishment of the naib system, all the *mevleviyet* posts except Galata, Eyüp and Cairo ceased to be actual judge posts. Since the *mevleviyet* posts were integrated in the *ilmiye* hierarchy, *kadıs* (mollas) had been appointed to these offices according to seniority in the hierarchy for a term of one year. But after the extension of the naib system to these posts (Damascus, Jerusalem and others mentioned above), appointments began to be made not according to rank, but to grade, which was unique to, and the basis of, the naibship.

Conclusion

The Ottoman efforts to cope with the disorganization of the sharia judiciary resulted in the transition from *kadıship* to naibship in 1871. The establishment of the naib system achieved the Şeyhülislam's direct administration over the whole sharia judiciary. Under the new system, the naib became the judge of both the sharia and the new secular courts. But during the following decades the naib's position as the judge of the secular court would face continuing challenges from the Ministry of Justice.⁵⁹ The new law for the *nizamiye* court system of 1879 divided the courts at the *vilayet* and *sancak* levels into civil and criminal sections and in consequence the Ministry of Justice began to appoint judges of the criminal courts directly. The law also introduced the new procedure of recruitment and appointment of *nizamiye* court judges. While it was never fully realized, the law provided that an official from the Ministry of Justice should be present at the Committee for Selection of the Sharia Judges to check the naibs' qualifications for serving at the *nizamiye* courts.⁶⁰ In spite of these pressures, the naibs' double role continued until the end of the Empire.⁶¹

The reorganization of the sharia judiciary also brought about a change in the character of the naibs. In the preceding period, naibs had always run the risk of failure in recouping their expenses with court fees. Because of this, holding the office of naib involved a certain degree of speculation. At the same time, their appointment had been highly dependent upon personal connections. But after the salary and grade systems were introduced to the naibship as a result

of the reforms, naibs began to resemble modern civil officials. A new identity as a professional group gradually grew among the naibs, and this probably prepared the ground for the revival of their title in 1913: back from naib to kadi.⁶²

Notes

I am indebted to Halil İbrahim Erbay, Yücel Terzibaşoğlu and Iris Agmon for reading the earlier version of this paper. I also thank all the participants at the session of the 15th CIEPO symposium, July 2002, for their helpful comments and suggestions. This Research was partially supported by a Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research from the Japanese Ministry of Education. Support for my research in Turkey from 1998 to 2000 was provided by the Heiwa Nakajima Foundation.

¹ See, e.g., *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, new ed. (hereafter cited as *EP*), s.v. 'Mahkama, 2. The Ottoman Era,' by H. İnalcık and C. V. Findley, 6:6.

² In fact not many studies have been done on the Ottoman ulema during the Tanzimat period. See for example, David Kushner, 'The Place of the Ulema in the Ottoman Empire During the Age of Reform (1839-1918),' *Turcica* 29 (1987), 51-74; Richard L. Chambers, 'The Ottoman Ulema and the Tanzimat,' in *Scholars, Saints and Sufis: Muslim Religious Institutions in the Middle East since 1500*, ed. Nikki R. Keddie (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1972), 33-46.

³ I am thinking here of the works of Iris Agmon, Beshara Doumani, Boğaç A. Ergene, Leslie Peirce and Najwa Al-Qattan, to name only a few. Especially relevant here is Iris Agmon's study on the family and the court in late Ottoman Haifa and Jaffa, in which she examines the implementation of the judicial reforms in the provinces. See Iris Agmon, 'Text, Court, and Family in Late-Nineteenth-Century Palestine,' in *Family History in the Middle East: Household, Property, and Gender*, ed. Beshara Doumani (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2003), 201-28; idem, 'Social Biography of a Late Ottoman *Shari'a* Judge,' *New Perspectives on Turkey*, Spring 2004 (forthcoming).

⁴ For the general description of the Ottoman ilmiye hierarchy, see İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Devletinin İlmiye Teşkilâtı* (Ankara: TTK, 1965); *EP*, s.v. 'İlmiye,' by U. Heyd and E. Kuran, 3: 1152-1154; Madeline C. Zilfi, 'Elite Circulation in the Ottoman Empire: Great Mollas of the Eighteenth Century,' *Journal of Economic and Social History of the Orient* 26 (1983), 318-64. Especially for the classical Ottoman sharia judiciary, see also İlber Ortaylı, *Hukuk ve İdare Adamı Olarak Osmanlı Devletinde Kadı* (Ankara: Turhan, 1994); Feda Şamil Arık, 'Osmanlılar'da Kadılık Müessesesi,' *OTAM* 8 (1997), 1-72.

⁵ Since Egypt achieved *de facto* independence from the Ottoman Empire in the 19th century, judges in Egypt are outside the scope of this article. For the sharia judiciary in Ottoman Egypt, see Galal H. El-Nahal, *The Judicial Administration of Ottoman Egypt in the Seventeenth Century* (Minneapolis and Chicago: Bibliotheca Islamica, 1979), 12-17; Nelly Hanna, 'The Administration of Courts in Ottoman Cairo,' in *The State and its Servants: Administration in Egypt from Ottoman Times to the Present*, ed. Nelly Hanna (Cairo: The American Univ. of Cairo Press, 1995), 44-59; A. Chris Eccel, *Egypt, Islam, and Social Change: Al-Azhar in Conflict and Accommodation* (Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 1984), 20-3, 78-93.

⁶ There was another branch of mevleviyet called *devriye mevleviyetleri*, which included the kadships of Bosna, Baghdad, Diyarbakır and others. In principle, only those who came through the posts of (titular) professorships in Bursa and Edirne were

appointed to these offices and they would not be promoted to the main mevleviyet posts.

⁷ It also had an object to prevent judges from getting rooted in local societies. See Halil İnalçık, 'Rûz-nâm-çe Registers of the *Kadıasker* of Rumeli as Preserved in the Istanbul Müftü-lük Archives,' *Turcica* 20 (1988), 264; idem, 'Centralization and Decentralization in Ottoman Administration', in *Studies in Eighteenth Century Islamic History*, ed. Thomas Naff and Roger Owen (Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois Univ. Press, 1977), 30.

⁸ Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi (hereafter cited as BOA), HH (Hatt-ı Hümayun) 3708, copy of firman, evahir Şaban 1207/Apr. 1793.

⁹ Ibid. copy of firman, evahir Şevval 1209/May 1795; Cevdet Adliye 4271, report of *Kazaskers*, 11 Rebiülahir 1213/22 Sept. 1798. Cf. Uzunçarşılı, 255-9.

¹⁰ [Tatarcık Abdullah], 'Sultan Selim-i Salis Devrinde Nizam-ı Devlet hakkında Mütala'at,' pt. 1, *Tarih-i Osmani Encümeni Mecmu'ası* 7, no. 41 (1332), 274; Ahmed Lütfü, *Tarih-i Lütfî*, 8 vols. (Istanbul: Matba'a-i Âmire, 1290-1328), 1:194-5.

¹¹ Madeline C. Zilfi, 'Diary of a Müderris: A New Source for Ottoman Biography,' *Journal of Turkish Studies* 1 (1977), 170.

¹² For arpalık, see İbnülemin Mahmud Kemal, 'Arpalık,' *Türk Tarih Encümeni Mecmu'ası* 16, no. 17 (94) (1926), 276-83; Uzunçarşılı, 118-21; Zilfi, 'Elite Circulation,' 353-4; idem, *The Politics of Piety: The Ottoman Ulama in the Postclassical Age (1600-1800)* (Minneapolis: Bibliotheca Islamica, 1988), 66-70.

¹³ Halil İnalçık, 'Adâletnâmeler,' *Belgeler* 2, no. 3-4 (1965), 76-77; Gilles Veinstein, 'Sur les *nâ'ib* ottomans (XVème-XVIème siècles),' *Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam* 25 (2001), 247-67.

¹⁴ Beshara Doumani, *Rediscovering Palestine: Merchants and Peasants in Jabal Nablus, 1700-1900* (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1995), 249-50.

¹⁵ BOA, Cevdet Adliye 717, copy of firman, evahir Ramazan 1203/June 1789; HH 3708, copy of firman, evasıt Receb 1213/Dec. 1798; Cevdet Adliye 6366, draft of firman, evahir Safer 1217/June 1802. See also Uzunçarşılı, 255-60.

¹⁶ For example, BOA, Cevdet Adliye 1712, 13 reports of judges on receipt of the firman (Vidin, Tirmova, Rusçuk etc.), Ramazan-Şevval 1239/May-June 1824; *Takvim-i Vekayi* (hereafter cited as TV) 76 (13 Ramazan 1249/24 Jan. 1834), 1; 93 (23 Şaban 1250/25 Dec. 1834), 1-2.

¹⁷ 'Tarih-i İlmi'ye dair Ceza Kanunnamesi,' reprinted in Musa Çadırcı, 'Tanzimat'ın İlanı Sıralarında Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Kadılık Kurumu ve 1838 Tarihli 'Tarih-i İlmiyye'ye Dâir Ceza Kânunname'si,' *Tarih Araştırmaları Dergisi* 14, no. 25 (1981-82), 139-61.

¹⁸ Halil İnalçık, 'Tanzimat'ın Uygulanması ve Sosyal Tepkileri,' *Belleten* 28, no. 112 (1964), 639.

¹⁹ BOA, İrade Dahiliye 285, 1 Zilhicce 1255/5 Feb. 1840; İrade Dahiliye 440, 14 Muharrem 1256/18 March 1840.

²⁰ BOA, MAD (Maliye'den Müdevver Defterler) 9061, 22, circular of the Ministry of Finance, 3 Şaban 1257/19 Sept. 1841; İnalçık, 'Tanzimat'ın Uygulanması,' 686.

²¹ See, e.g., BOA, A.MKT (Sadaret Mektubi Kalemî) 82/14, Şeyhülislam to Grand Vizier, 5 Cümadelahir 1263/20 May 1847; A.MKT 116/41, Şeyhülislam to Grand Vizier, Feb.-March 1848; A.MKT 143/6, Şeyhülislam to Grand Vizier, 5 Ramazan 1264/6 Aug. 1848.

²² The preface of the İlmiye Penal Code of 1838 openly stated that most of naibs were of an unknown quality (*mecbulii'l-abval*) and that their unsuitable deeds (*uygunsuz harekâti*) were evident. Çadırcı, 'Kadılık Kurumu,' 148.

²³ Ibid. 150-1.

²⁴ For example, a former naib of Behište (near Bitola) İsmail Efendi petitioned for the appointment complaining that he was still out of office although he had taken

an examination in Istanbul and acquired the certificate. BOA, A.MKT.NZD (Sadaret Mektubî Kalemi Nezaret ve Devair) 7/15, Grand Vizier to Şeyhülislam, 28 Cümadelahir 1266/5 May 1850. See for other documents referring to the naibship examinations, e.g., A.MKT 131/121, 29 Cümadelahir 1264/2 June 1848; A.MKT 159/49, 26 Zilhicce 1264/24 Nov. 1848; A.MKT.NZD 8/26, 21 Receb 1266/2 June 1850; A.MKT.NZD 12/92, 13 Şevval 1266/22 Aug. 1850. The grading as stipulated in the law (Çadırcı, 'Kadılık Kurumu,' 151-2) was not mentioned in the sources.

²⁵ BOA, A.MKT 116/41, Şeyhülislam to Grand Vizier, Feb.-March 1848.

²⁶ 'Kuzat ve Nüvvabın Suret-i Hareket ve Rüsumatına Da'ir ba-İrade-i Seniyye Karargir Olan Usulü Şamil Tenbihat,' *TV* 521 (18 Receb 1271/6 Apr. 1855), 2-4.

²⁷ For example, the sender of the appointment letter to the naib of Varna dated 1 Ramazan 1268 (19 June 1852) was the holder of the *mansib* of Varna, while another letter dated 1 Rebiülevvel 1272 (12 Nov. 1855) was given by the *Kazasker* of Rumeli. Istanbul Muftı's Office, Sharia Court Record Archives (İstanbul Müftülüğü Şer'î Siciller Arşivi), Bilâd-ı Metrûke Defterleri, Varna sharia court registers, 13/5, fol. 1b; 13/6, fol. 52b.

²⁸ 'Nüvvab Hakkında Nizamname,' 17 Receb 1271/5 Apr. 1855, *Düstur*, 1st ser., 4 vols. and 4 suppl. (Istanbul: Matba'a-i Âmire, 1289-1302) (hereafter cited as *Düstur*¹), 1:321-324, *TV* 522 (5 Şaban 1271/22 Apr. 1855), 4.

²⁹ 'Tevcihat-ı Menasib-ı Kaza Nizamnamesi,' 17 Receb 1271, *Düstur*¹, 1:315-20, *TV* 522 (5 Şaban 1271), 2-4.

³⁰ For details, see Jun Akiba, 'A New School for Qadis: Education of the Sharia Judges in the Late Ottoman Empire,' *Turica* 65 (forthcoming).

³¹ Istanbul Muftı's Office, Meşihat Archives (İstanbul Müftülüğü Meşihat Arşivi, hereafter cited as IMMA), Register belonging to the Meşihat Archives but located in the Sharia Court Record Archives (hereafter cited as D/I), 143, Register of naibs (Anadolu), fols. 92b-93b. I am indebted to Bilgin Aydın and İlhami Yurdakul, who showed me the draft of the Meşihat Archives' catalogue they were preparing and gave me many helpful suggestions about the sources. My special thanks are also due to Ömer Özkan, Abdullah Coşkun, Murat Al and Hüsnü Atam among the staff of the archives.

³² 'Tevcihat-ı Menasib-ı Kaza Nizamnamesi,' see n.29 above.

³³ IMMA, Register no.1999, Register of Committee for Selection, fol. 27a, #7/229, 22 Receb 1290/15 Sept. 1873.

³⁴ *Ibid.* fol. 6a, #16/1, 24 Muharrem 1290/23 March 1873. These measures were in conformity with article 24 of the regulations for kadship.

³⁵ Bereketzade İsmail Hakkı, *Yâd-ı Mâzî* (Istanbul: Sebülür-Reşad Kütübhanesi, Tevsî-i Tiba'at Matbaası, 1332), 30-1.

³⁶ See, e.g., IMMA, Sicill-i Ahval Dosyaları, #1892 (Zileli Osman Hayri), #2573 (Libhocalı Abdülhalim), #2687 (Elbistanlı Abdurrahman Nafız). See also Sadık Albayrak, *Son Devir Osmanlı Uleması*, 2nd ed., 5 vols. (Istanbul: İstanbul Büyükşehir Belediyesi, 1996), 1:101 (Abdurrahman Nafız Efendi, Elbistanlı), 1:168 (Ahmet Efendi, Tirebolulu).

³⁷ IMMA, Sicill-i Ahval Dosyaları, #2538 (İbradılı İsmail Hakkı).

³⁸ IMMA, Sicill-i Ahval Dosyaları, #3755 (Ardanoçlu Süleyman Sami), curriculum vitae. I wish to thank Halil İbrahim Erbay for drawing my attention to this record.

³⁹ IMMA, D/I 143, Register of naibs (Anadolu), D/I 144, Register of naibs (Rumeli).

⁴⁰ *EP*, s.v. 'Mahkama, 2,' 6:4. Yücel Özkaya, *XVIII. Yüzyılda Osmanlı Kurumları ve Osmanlı Toplum Yaşantısı* (Ankara: Kültür ve Turizm Bakanlığı, 1985), 211.

⁴¹ IMMA, D/I 143, fol. 50b.

⁴² BOA, İrade Dahiliye 21189, Şeyhülislam to Grand Vizier, 19 Şevval 1271/4 July

1855.

⁴³ For example a naib of Erzurum, appointed in December 1856, abolished the practice of farming out the nahiye naibships according to the order of 1855 mentioned above, and then applied the examination to nominate the nahiye judges. As this arrangement worked well, the naibships of the sancaks of Bayezid and Çıldır were also integrated under the jurisdiction of the Erzurum judge. Before, no one in the capital applied to the judgeships of these sancaks, since they were too far and yielded little revenues. Because of this, blank appointment letters (*açık mürasele*) had been sent to these places and judges had been selected locally (*yerlîsünden mahallince tensib*). BOA, A.MKT.NZD 219/46, report of special agent to Erzurum, 22 Cümadelahir 1273/18 Feb. 1857; Şeyhülislam to Grand Vizier, 9 Şaban 1273/4 Apr. 1857. Cf. IMMA, D/I 143, fols. 8b, 50a, 53b.

⁴⁴ For the provincial reforms, see İlber Ortaylı, *Tanzimattan Sonra Mahalli İdareler (1840-1878)* (Ankara: Türkiye ve Orta Doğu Amme İdaresi Enstitüsü, 1974), 42-104; Carter V. Findley, 'The Evolution of the System of Provincial Administration as Viewed from the Center,' in *Palestine in the Late Ottoman Period: Political, Social and Economic Transformation*, ed. David Kushner (Jerusalem: Yad Izhak Ben-Zvi, Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1986), 3-29; Stanford J. Shaw, 'Local Administration in the Tanzimat,' in *150. Yılında Tanzimat*, ed. Hakkı Dursun Yıldız (Ankara: TTK, 1992), 33-49.

⁴⁵ The Provincial Reform Law was first promulgated in 1864 and then modified in 1867 for general application. 'Tuna Vilayeti Namıyla Bu Kere Teşkil Olunan... Nizamnamedir,' 7 Cümadelahir 1281/7 Nov. 1864, *Düstur* (Istanbul: Matba'a-i Âmire, 1282), 517-536, *TV 773* (7 Cümadelahir 1281), 2-5; 'Vilayet Nizamnamesi,' [1867], *Düstur*¹, 1: 608-24

⁴⁶ At first the offices of müfettiş-i hükkâm and the judge of the provincial capital were separate. But because of the financial problem (see below), after November 1866 these offices were given to a single person and an assistant judge (*bab naibi*) was appointed to help him. BOA, İrade Meclis-i Mahsus 1348, 19 Receb 1283/27 Nov. 1866.

⁴⁷ *Salname-i Devlet*, 12 (1274): 75; 21 (1283): 76.

⁴⁸ In the registers of naibs cited above, appointments of judges after the provincial reforms are recorded in separate pages. IMMA, D/I 143, fols. 80a-90b; D/I 144, fols. 47b-75a. We can find, for example, the names of the naibs appointed to kazas in the Suriye province (including the Jerusalem sancak) during several years following the application of the provincial reforms (D/I 144, fols. 62b-66a). Most of those kazas do not appear in the original section of the register.

⁴⁹ In the Tuna province, naibs of sancaks would be given a monthly salary of 6000 guruş, while naibs of the first, second, third, fourth and fifth grade kazas would be given 4000, 3000, 2500, 2000 and 1500 guruş respectively. BOA, MAD 13635, 2, #5, Ministry of Finance to Şeyhülislam, 22 Cümadelahir 1281/22 Nov. 1864; IMMA, D/I 144, fol. 50b. For the implementation in the Tuna and other provinces, see BOA, MAD 13635, 13547, 13419, Registers of reports from Ministry of Finance to Şeyhülislam, 1864-8.

⁵⁰ See *EP*, s.v. 'Mahkama, 2,' 6:7-11; Sedat Bingöl, 'Nizamiye Mahkemelerinin Kuruluşu ve İşleyişi, 1840-1876' (doctoral thesis, Akdeniz Üniversitesi, 1998).

⁵¹ 'Beyanname,' *TV 773* (7 Cümadelahir 1281), 1-2, *Düstur* (Istanbul, 1282), 516.

⁵² For the local council during the Tanzimat period, see Ortaylı, *Mahalli İdareler*, 13-29; Stanford J. Shaw, 'The Origins of Representative Government in the Ottoman Empire: An Introduction to the Provincial Councils, 1839-1876,' in idem, *Studies in Ottoman and Turkish history: Life with the Ottomans* (Istanbul: Isis Press, 2000), 183-231, first published in *Near Eastern Round Table, 1967-68*, ed. R. Bayly Winder (New York: New York Univ. Press, 1969), 53-142; Musa Çadırcı, 'Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Eyalet ve Sancaklarda Meclislerin Oluşturulması (1840-1864),' in

Yusuf Hikmet Bayur'a Armağan (Ankara: TTK, 1985), 257-77; Doumani, 172-8, 241-3.

⁵³ BOA, İrade Dahiliye 41397, 9 Rebiülevvel 1286/19 June 1869; Ayniyat Defteri, Meşihat 1076, p. 88, 15 Rebiülevvel 1286/14 Haziran 1285/26 June 1869. Before the appointment of the *merkez naibi*, an assistant judge (*bab naibi*) was serving under the direction of the inspector of judges.

⁵⁴ BOA, İrade Meclis-i Mahsus 1317, 18 Rebiülahir 1283/29 Aug. 1866; BOA, MAD 13419, pp. 2-3, #11, Ministry of Finance to the Şeyhülislam's Office, 21 Muharrem 1284/25 May 1867; MAD 9431, Register of financial instructions to Edirne, 22 #78, 28 Mart 1288/9 Apr. 1872; MAD 9433, Register of financial instructions to Selânik, pp. 26-27, #43, 27 Temmuz 1285/8 Aug. 1869; 84-93, #317, 14 Rebiülahir 1289/20 June 1872.

⁵⁵ BOA, İrade Dahiliye 44621, 8 Ramazan 1288/20 Nov. 1871; MAD 9431, 23, #82, 22 Mart 1288/3 Apr. 1871; MAD 9433, 70, #240.

⁵⁶ Its implementation can be seen in the Ottoman state and provincial yearbooks (*salname*). Since the functions of the naib were almost equal to those of the kadı, the naib was popularly known as kadı. An Ottoman dictionary of Şemseddin Sami gives 'a kadı in general (*ale'ül-lak kadı*)' for the third meaning of a naib. Şemseddin Sami, *Kamus-ı Türkî*, 2 vols. (Istanbul: İkdâm Matba'ası, 1317-18; repr. Istanbul: Enderun Kitabevi, 1989), 2:1453.

⁵⁷ In the first provincial reform law of the Tuna province, all the judges were designed to be nominated by the Şeyhülislam and appointed by the Sultan. As the Sultan's order would be issued in the form of irade, this process required the Sublime Porte's approval. But the later law in 1867 stipulated that only the inspector of judges should be appointed by the Sultan. 'Tuna Vilayeti Namıyla Bu Kere Teşkil Olunan ... Nizamnamedir,' art. 16, 39, 54; 'Vilayet Nizamnamesi,' art. 16, 37, 50. See n.45 above.

⁵⁸ The new system was confirmed by the regulations for sharia judges of 1873. 'Hükkâm-ı Şer'iyye Nizamnamesi,' 13 Muharrem 1290/12 March 1873, *Düstur*, 2:721-5.

⁵⁹ For details see Akiba, 'New School for Qadis,' forthcoming.

⁶⁰ 'Mahakim-i Nizamiyenin Teşkilât Kanun-ı Muvakkatıdır,' 27 Cümadelahir 1296/5 Haziran 1295/17 June 1879, *Düstur*, 4:245-260, esp. art. 1, 43-53 and an additional article.

⁶¹ See the Ottoman state and provincial yearbooks and also *EP*, s.v. 'Mahkama, 2,' 6:9; Kushner, 'Place of the Ulema,' 61-2.

⁶² 'Hükkâm-ı Şer' ve Me'murin-i Şer'iyye hakkında Kanun-ı Muvakkat,' 19 Cümadelula 1331/26 Apr. 1913, *Düstur*, 2nd ser., 12 vols. (Istanbul: Matba'a-i Osmaniye, 1329-1927), 5: 352-61, art. 3.

ECONOMY AND TAXATION

The Role of the *Sarrafs* in Ottoman Finance and Economy in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries

Yavuz Cezar

It is well known that ‘bankers’ called *sarrafs* occupied an important place in the Ottoman economy, and so deserve a special attention.

In the years between the 1750s and the 1850s the role of the *sarrafs* changed and became very important in the financial system of the Ottoman empire in comparison with the previous centuries, playing a crucial role solving the new problems caused by the monetization of the economy¹. In the second half of the nineteenth century, however, their role and importance diminished and real banks took their place in the Ottoman financial system.²

The aim of this short article is to focus on their role in the Ottoman financial system, but first it is necessary to give some information about their identities, jobs and status as professional money-dealers.

Sarraf is a word still used in Turkish, today meaning a person who practises the job of exchanging precious coins; in other words a *sarraf* is a person who trades gold or silver coins. In today’s banking and monetary system, the activities and as a result the effects of the *sarrafs* on money trade are naturally limited, but in a traditional economic system, like that of the Ottoman empire, based on precious metal standard and without banks, they played an important role in monetary and financial history.

Before the eighteenth century *sarraf* meant much the same as it does today: money-changer or goldsmith, but, during the eighteenth century the definition of a *sarraf* began to change. From that century

the sarrafs were no longer the ordinary goldsmiths of a traditional society, but rather they became important agents of the official establishment. The question therefore is why and how the role of the sarrafs changed in the Ottoman economy, and what was their new importance in the Ottoman financial system?

Ottoman sarrafs cannot be classified as a single category. When we talk about the 'ordinary sarrafs', these should be classified as artisans. In Ottoman documents they are called artisans: *sarrafi esnafı*. They had a separate guild and they practised their trade according to the rules of that guild. To open a shop and to practise the job without the permission of the guild was forbidden. Each sarraf had to be a member of the guild and get a *gedik* or a permit. As a result the number of sarrafs and shops were limited. Without special permission, entry to the profession was possible only in a case of death. When this happened, the free *gedik* was sold to whoever who paid the maximum amount of licence fee,³ but in practice, in many cases, under a secret gentlemanly agreement, the son of the ex-sarraf received his father's *gedik*.⁴ At the head of the guild as a director, was a senior called *sarraflar kethudası* or sometimes *sarraflar kabıyası*. As in the other guilds, the sarraf's guild also had a supervisor called *yığıtbaşı* and a kind of board called *ibtiyalar beyeti*.⁵

According to a document dated 1714 the number of the sarrafs registered in the guild's records was 40, and besides these, the artisans called *gümüşçü* (silver artisans) were also registered. So the total number of the members of the guild was 50.⁶ In another document dated 1761 the total number of sarraf and *gümüşçü* of Istanbul is seen as 137 (only 72 of them were sarrafs). The same document also shows that all of them are *zımme* which means that they were non-Muslims.⁷

Another document dated 1 October 1763 shows that in that year a new regulation was put into effect for both sarrafs and *gümüşçü*. The analysis of the text of this new regulation allows us to learn many details about the sarrafs. The number of the sarrafs registered in the guild's record is 73; there are also 13 *gümüşçü*s as members of the guild.⁸

In fact, the sarrafs defined as artisans are not directly the subject of this article. This category of sarrafs dealt mainly with the exchange of real coins and had close relations with the imperial mint. Research on them would lead us to research the monetary history of the Ottoman empire rather than the financial history, whereas our goal here is to focus our attention on the financial system of the empire.

The sarrafs who had close relations with the Imperial Central Treasury (*Hazine-i Amire*), more than or instead of the Imperial Mint (*Darbhane-i Amire*), formed another category of sarrafs. They were called *hazine sarrafi* and defined as *bazırgan sarraf* in Ottoman

documents. As a social group they were classified in *tüccar taifesi* (merchants). The sarrafs in this category possessed bigger capital sums than those in the first group and, as a result, were richer and more influential in Ottoman society. Besides practising money-changing they were also involved in activities such as lending, trade and acting as the guarantor of tax-farming operations. The merchant sarrafs, other than their shops (*dükkan*) situated in the city's shopping centre (mostly in Kapalıçarşı/covered bazaar), had another room or office in different *bans* (caravanserais serving as commercial centres) of the city.⁹

These sarrafs kept a ledger in their office called *sarrafa defteri*, where they had to register all transactions which they were involved in. In any case of disagreement or controversy, especially in cases such as the death of the sarraf himself or his client/customer, these books were consulted by government officials or judges in order to clarify the situation and resolve any problem¹⁰.

Since sarrafs in this category are classified *bazırğan* or *tüccar* (merchant), it seems that they were not dependent directly on the rules of the guild. This group of sarrafs, as members of the private sector, practised their business freely and safely under the rules of the Ottoman commercial and financial law. The most important document for them in their business was the official or special agreement signed mutually with the state or the client. In case of dispute this document was taken as a base to solve the problem.

It is clear then that for the sarrafs of the second category the terms 'merchant-banker' or 'merchant-financier' fit better than the term 'goldsmith'.

Sarrafs of all kinds were most numerous in Istanbul. Alongside the registered sarrafs, there were other money-changers who practised the business illegally with whom officers of the sarraf guild and the government were always at loggerheads in an attempt to keep the money market in their control. However, not all sarrafs were established in the capital: local sarrafs also carried on their business in different cities of the empire, especially in the big centres. The total number of sarrafs in the empire would seem to be around 200. The number of sarrafs listed in all kinds of documents for a given period easily amount to that number.

A number of interesting points also arise from a scrutiny of their names and surnames. Appendix 1, prepared from the original Ottoman archival documents, contains the names or surnames of more than 200 sarrafs.¹¹ However before drawing any conclusions from the list, I wish to draw your attention to the problems that arise from the nature of Arabic letters used in Ottoman documents. Sometimes the same name is written with different spellings and furthermore, Ottoman handwriting does not allow us read proper

names easily. Preparing such a name list is for this reason somewhat hazardous, since, it is possible for two or sometimes three different types of writing to be used for the same person. How therefore can we know whether or not it refers to another sarraf? In preparing such a list we should be conscious that such duplications are inevitable and that we have to make the necessary reduction for similar names. When we scan our name list, some interesting points emerge:

1. There are only four Muslim names, from which we can conclude that the ratio of Muslim sarrafs was very low. 98% are non-Muslims.

2. Among the non-Muslim names it seems that Jewish and Armenian names are in majority, while the Greek or Orthodox names are few. The reason for this must firstly be the date of the documents used in the list. In a different list based on documents of the previous centuries the situation could be different. We know that wars and revolts in the Balkans, and especially Greek independence, decreased the number of the Orthodox sarrafs in the Ottoman Empire. In the time of Mahmud II the sarraf of the imperial mint was an Armenian called Kazaz Artin. He was one of the favourites of the sultan.

In a Turco-Muslim society, the high ratio of non-Muslim sarrafs was not seen as an oddity either by the government or by the people¹². My research has turned up very few examples of popular complaint that the sarrafs are non-Muslims. In examples from the years 1194/1780, 1239/1823 and 1265/1848, we find the people of only a few cities such as Damascus (Şam), Sayda and Jerusalem (Kudüs) complaining that the sarrafs of their cities were Jews or Christians, while they would prefer Muslims¹³.

3. It is not always possible to determine the ethnic origin of a sarraf from his name alone. However another surname, an explanation or a qualification sometimes accompanies the name itself (for example, *Yahud tıfjesinden Şapçı Bobor sarraf, zımmi Rafael*). This supplementary information is helpful but is not enough to prepare long lists on the basis of ethnicity, since names are mostly chosen according to religion and not according to ethnicity.

Before the nineteenth century, the Ottoman government did not intervene in religious or sectarian affairs, with the result that reciprocal confidence was established between the government and minorities. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, however, this situation changed, when Catholic propaganda became widespread in the Ottoman Empire. This affected Christian sarrafs, especially the Armenians some of whom converted to Catholicism¹⁴. This new situation created new political problems, and was something which the Ottoman government could not accept with tolerance. Anyone

preaching the Catholic faith suffered serious punishment and some Catholic sarrafs were condemned to death, although their punishment was later changed to exile¹⁵.

It was unusual in traditional Ottoman law, to execute a sarraf and, we must emphasise that, in demanding such a severe punishment, members of the same ethnic community played a major role. The Catholic movement had divided Ottoman Armenians. The most powerful members of each religious group within the same ethnic community were sarrafs and a fierce competition began between the partisans of the big sarraf families in order to keep their safe position in society and especially their relations with the government. We may therefore conclude that, during these events, each group intrigued with the Ottoman government, claiming that the other group should be severely punished.

4. From the name list, and with the help of some other documents, we can see that the profession of sarraf was traditional in some Jewish and Armenian families. In our list we can find sarrafs with the same family names, such as Tingiroğlu, Gelgeloğlu, Düzoğlu. A family could remain in the profession for as long as a century.

The first Ottoman bank did not open until 1863.¹⁶ This was late not only in comparison with western economies but late too for the conditions of Ottoman economy itself. Banks in the Ottoman Empire should, in my view, have opened a century earlier, because the state financial system and the economy in general had needed them since the second half of the eighteenth century. The vacuum was filled by other official institutions and by sarrafs, making the period between 1750 and 1850 the golden age for the sarrafs of the Ottoman Empire. In that period their importance in the economy and in the financial system reached its peak.

Although sarrafs had always been important in the Ottoman economy, their importance increased greatly in the eighteenth century when they started to play a very big role in economic life. The question is what happened at that period and why did they become so important?

The eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were an age of transformation for the Ottoman Empire. One development of the period that was especially relevant was the levy of some new taxes in cash, resulting in the increase of money in circulation. However, the traditional Ottoman financial institution was not yet ready for the bill of exchange, to transfer sums of money from one place to another, and so, while on the one hand they started to reform the financial institution,¹⁷ on the other hand they tried to find fast and practical solutions for these new problems. Because of their experience in financial operations the sarrafs seemed to Ottoman rulers to be

useful for exchange transactions and so began to play big role in both Ottoman society and in state finance. In the same period, besides their involvement in official financial operations, the sarrafs engaged in private transactions; indeed at that period almost every wealthy ottoman had his own sarraf. Sometimes, a statesman's official sarraf acted for him privately. The main job of a big sarraf was to lend money or to play the role of guarantor in financial and commercial operations in the Ottoman economy. They in fact acted as ordinary merchant-bankers in any kind of economy, and their goal was no doubt to sell money at the highest price and take the maximum profit.

In Ottoman society, therefore, the death of a sarraf was not an ordinary event since it involved other people. The same was true of the death of an important person. In these cases, the examination of the sarraf's records to determine who were creditors or debtors was a crucial matter. The *tereke defterleri* (estate registers) tell us much about the lending operations of the sarrafs and indicate that borrowing from them was a very common practice¹⁸.

A 20-page defter written in *siyakat* and preserved in the Ottoman Archives in Istanbul provides an example¹⁹. In it are registered the debts of 435 persons who died between 1230-49/1814-33. The total amount of the debt is 22,856,224 *guruş*, giving an annual average of over than one million *guruş*. Before going into the details, we should note how high and impressive these numbers are.

The 435 persons are from all social categories and their debts are to different places or persons such as other ordinary people, artisans, merchants, sarrafs, officials, the central treasury and other institutions of state. The amount each person's debt naturally differs. Some are indeed modest.

If however, we ignore the small debts and focus our attention on the large ones the results are interesting. Among the 435 people who died we find 45 with debts of over 100,000 *guruş*. Of these, if we eliminate the ones who were not indebted to a sarraf their number drops to 16. The remaining 29 are indebted to a sarraf. Many of the other 435 persons were also indebted to a sarraf, but the total amounts are under the limit of 100,000 *guruş*.

Appendix 2 lists these 29 persons.²⁰ The first column shows their rank in the original document, the second column their names and surnames. The third column gives the total amount of each person's debt, the fourth the name of the sarraf concerned, and the last one the amount of debt to the sarraf. What can we deduce from that table? Here are some results:

1. For each person, in the total amount of his debt the share of his sarraf occupies the first rank. The percentage of the share of the sarraf is in general over 90%.

2. Among the names, bureaucrats or officials form a majority. Only 3 names belongs to non-Muslims.
3. For some persons, the total amount is very striking, sometimes over a million.

The results are very impressive. The large sums involved suggests that these persons were ultra rich when they were alive, otherwise they could not have had such a high credits. This conclusion is not however, entirely valid, because their debts to a sarraf did not necessarily result directly from their private or personal relations. It is very likely that, these very high amounts of debt relate indirectly to their official duties, because, in similar examples from other sources we see that the sums owed by Ottoman officials to the sarrafs are indeed very high. For example, in the time of Mahmud II, the total amount owed by six Ottoman officials to a Jewish sarraf called Şapçı Bohor was over 8.5 million guruş. More than 5.5 million guruş of that amount belonged to one official, the governor of Aleppo (Halep), Serezli Yusuf Pasha.²¹

The question then arises of why these officials, on their way to eternal life left such large debts? The answer is complex and what follows is a summary.

From the second half of the eighteenth century the Ottoman financial system began to be centralised. At the same time, the use of money as the method of exchange in the economy increased. The Ottoman financial organisation was not yet ready with its own resources to collect and manage the new taxes. At the same time, after the financial reforms of Selim III, the management of *mukataas* and also *timars* seized by the central treasury (*İrad-ı Cedid Hazinesi'nce zabt olunan mukataat ve timarat*) brought new problems. The government therefore tried to solve some of the problems by introducing other actors on to the stage. Especially in tax-farming operations, local governors assumed heavy duties and responsibilities. To carry out these operations a supposedly skilful assistant called *kapu kethüdası* was appointed to each one to help them in financial matters. However only some of these assistants were really capable and the others asked the help of the sarrafs in financial operations. At the same time, local governors themselves also preferred the assistance of the sarraf to that of their kapu kethüdası. Thus, a new trio of *vizier*, kapu kethüdası and sarraf begun to play an important role in the Ottoman financial system.²² Furthermore, it seems that the central government preferred to approach the sarrafs directly instead of the local governors. This is because, in many cases, the claims of the central treasury could be paid in advance by the sarrafs. In brief therefore, a combination of the needs of the central treasury and the incapacity of the *kapu kethüdası*s and viziers resulted in the extraordinary rise of sarrafs in

the Ottoman empire.²³ The members of this profession automatically took their place in the financial system to fill the vacancy.

To sum up, the most important and confidential information and operations of the state were entrusted to the sarrafs. At the same time, many persons in Ottoman society and especially the high bureaucrats in their private or personal relations always asked the help of sarrafs. In this period of time, there was no discrimination on the basis of religion.

It seems clear that by the beginning of the nineteenth century the time had come for the Ottoman empire to found a central bank in Istanbul and to let entrepreneurs found private banks in the provinces with their own capital. The sarrafs, as private/individual bankers benefited from the absence of institutional banks and in that period they made large profits and became the richest group in the Ottoman society.

Appendix 1

A Selection of *Sarrafs'* Names Randomly Selected
from Various Archival Sources

Name of the Sarraf	Source	Date
ABDURRAHMAN (Birecik gümr.)	CM 21003	Ş 1120
ABDÜLBAKİ	CM 10 107	2 L 1176
ABRAHAM	CM 12 993	1220
ACI DAVID	CM 29 407	12 C 1215
AGOP	CM 2 175	3 C 1254
AGOP	CM 15 195	17 M 1220
AGOP	Cev.Darb. 255	23 C 1181
AGOP (Erzurum)	Cdarb. 446	7 Za 1212
AGOP (son of Mihail)	CM 23 557	15 Ra 1198
AGOPYAN	CM 15 459	27 M 1262
ALYON BAZİRGAN	CM 9 428	10 C 1265
APOSTOL PAPA	HH 5815C	1218
ARAM ve BOGOZ (Barsra gümr.)	CM 16 801	12 S 1191
ARSLANOĞLU MANOK	CM 21 249	Ş 1267
ARTİN	CM 15 941	CA 1237
ARTİN	HH 11 657; HH 11 551	1204-1205
ARTİN	CM 13 657	11 M 1256
ARTİN	Dah.İra. 1 161	4 N 1256
ARTİN	CM 1 858	21 Z 1229
ARTİN (Mısır sarrafı)	HH 16 049	1205
ARTİN (Mısır sarrafı)	CM 28 894	19 z 1204
ARZAN	HH 24 510	1225
ASTOR	CM 22 069	C 1215
AVADİS	CM 22 641	6 C 1204
AVANES	Cev.Darb. 255	23 C 1181
AVANİS	Cev.Darb.208	15 Za 1176
AVANNES	Meclis-i Vâlâ 522	2 Za 1257
AVANS (Filibeli İloğlu karatik)	CM 396	15 CA 1258
AVRAM	Dah.İr. 3161	C 1258
BAĞDAR (Goncegüloğlu)	CM 15 002	5 Ra 1232
BAĞDASAR	Dah.İra.3924	5 Ş 1259
BAĞDASAR	Melis-i Vâlâ 608	23 M 1258
BALTACI BAZİRGAN	CM 9 428 and 13 560	10 C 1265/ 12 S 1261
BEDROS	CM 22 485	no date
BEDROS	CM 26 79	1 S 1205
BEDROS	HH 9 950	1205

Appendix 1 *cont.*

BEDROS (Darbhane sarrafı)	CM 30 604	26 Ş 1200
BEDROS (Serakı)	Cdarb. 167	no date
BEDROSUN ANTON	Tarih-i Lütfi	1242
BOGOS	CM 121	19 S 1234
BOĞOS	Meclis-i Vâlâ 618	3 S 1258
BUHUR	CM 2 320	7 R 1231
CANİK (Sarrafı kethüdası)	CM 16 748	12 S 1255
CANİK BAZİRGAN	CM 2 560	5 M 1261
CANİK veled-i SİMON	CM 2 085; CM 2 084	13 B 1239
CEZAYİRLİOĞLU MIGİRDİÇ	CM 18 302	R 1254
CEZAYİRLİOĞLU MIGİRDİÇ	CD 5 623	9 C 1259
CEZAYİRLİOĞLU MIGİRDİÇ	CM 1 413	25 Ra 1269
DANİYEL	CM 12 862	1258
DAVİD	CM 12 795	1232
DAVİDOĞLU EVSEK	CM 20 332	L 1259
DAVUDOĞLU BEDROS	Tarih-i Lütfi	1242
DEMİR	CD 3 490	Ra 1260
DİMİTRAKİ (Morah)	CM 2 085	13 B 1239
DİMİTRİ	CM 12 799	1237
DİMİTRİ (Sakızlı)	CM 26 041	25 M 1203
DÜZOĞLU	CDARB. 671	19 M 1235
DÜZOĞLU	CDARB. 672	29 C 1235
EBRENİ (Sultan's sarraf in Paris)	CM 24 171	Ş 1281
EMREZE	CD 5 646	8 Za 1237
ETRİBAS	AliEmiri 218	1230
GASPAR	Cev.Darb.418	25 Za 1258
GELGELOĞLU	MAD 5 990,P 85	1259
GELGELOĞLU	CM 10535	19 R 1261
GELGELOĞLU	CD 1486	Ra 1260
GELGELOĞLU	CM 12 776	R 1263
GELGELOĞLU ARTİN	CM 20 144	28 Za 1252
GELGELOĞLU ARTİN	CM 25 734	3 Z 1266
GELGELOĞLU ONİK	Meclis-i Vâlâ 516	24 L 1257
GONCEGÜLOĞLU BAĞDASAR	Dah.İra. 1 064	7 Ş 1256
GÜLGÜLOĞLU ARTİN	CM 1 685	9 Ş 1260
GÜLGÜLOĞLU BOĞOS	HH 16 350	1236
GÜLLABİOĞLU	Belleten 151, s.412	1221
GÜZELİOĞLU ARTİN	Meclis-i Vâlâ İr. 1 029	28 Za 1259
GÜZELOĞLU ARTİN	Tezakir, I, p 73	
HAMİYUS	CD 7 699	C 1161
HANİM	CM 19 944	14 R 1255
HARLAMBO(Kıbrıs sandık sar.)	CM 21 122	11M1266
HARON	CM 6 789	19 L 1198

Appendix 1 *cont.*

HASFİL (Bağdadlı)	CM 2 084	12 B 1239
HASKİYELİ	HH 24 510	1225
HAYIM	CD 4 469	21 Ca 1197
HAYİM	Meclis-i Vâlâ 710	13 R 1258
HAYİM	CM 21 429	Z 1246
HAZAR	CM 1 577	After TANZİMAT
HOCA AGOP	CM 15 120	27 R 1237
HOCA AVANS	CD 1 348	17 B 1222
HOCA HARKAL	CM 2 484	NO DATE
HOCA MAKSUT (bazirgan)	CM 192	17 B 1246
HOCA MİKAIL	CM 15 794	5 Z 1259
HOCA MİKAIL	CM 13 560	12 S 1261
HOCA OHANNES	Cevdet Adliye 4 802	1266
HOCA OSEB	CM 24 253	R 1241
HOCA OSEP	CD 639	23 Ra 1239
HOCADUR/HACADUR	CM 16 225	22 Ra 1232
HOCE KEVORK	Dah.İra.3849	22 C1259
HÜDAVERDİĞLU	CM 12 580	5 Ş 1232
HÜDAVERDİĞLU NEZARET	CM 31 312	R 1239
HÜDAVERDİOĞLU ABRAHAM	CM 12 787	5 C 1258
HÜDAVERDİOĞLU MANNİK	CM 26 846	S 1255
İSPİRDAKİ (Mısır sarrafı)	HH 16 035	
İSTEFAN	Cev.Darb. 259	4 Z 1173
İSTEFAN	HH 15 430	1204
İSTEFAN (Edirne)	CM 10 820	13 R 1215
İSTEPANOĞLU BEDROS	CM 12 218	28 Ş 1246
KALEF	CM 22 532	4 S 1221
KALICIOĞLU VİÇİN	Tarih-i Lütfi	1242
KARABET (Sarrafılar kethüdası)	CM 4 622	27 S 1229
KARABET(Sarrafılar kethüdası)	CM 11 078	19 1234
KARAKAŞ	CM 31 228	Ş 1192
KASABAR	CM 25 047	N 1230
KASPAR	CD 1 348	17 B 1222
KAZAZ ARTİN	Tarih-i Lütfi	1242
KILCIOĞLU ANDON	CM 14 722	7 R 1234
KILCIOĞLU ANTON	MAD 9 722, 372	27 C 1210
KILCIOĞLU KİRKOR	CM 1 508	1246
KİRKOR	CM 1461	1260
KİRKOR	Meclis-i Vâlâ 370	4 Ca 1257
KİRKOR	Cev.Darb. 255	23 C 1181
KİRKOR İSTEFAN	Cev.Darb. 384	9 Ra 1217
KİRKOR(Köloğlu/Güloğlu)	CM 14 698	No date
KOKAS	CM 17 077	N 1268
KOKAS	Meclis-i Vâlâ 646	28 S 1258
KONORTA	CM 12 365	5 M 1220

Appendix 1 *cont.*

LAMBO	CM 18 009	21 Za 1231
LOHMANOĞLU	CM 22 248	3 N 1233
MANİK	CM 19 822	23 Z 1227
MANİK	CM 12 365 and 12 410	5 M 1220/4 S 1224
MANİK HÜDAVERDİOĞLU	CM 2 320	7 R 1231
MARDİROS	CM 9 456	3 C 1265
MARDİROS(Sarraflar kethüdası)	CM 15 192	12 S 1220
MARKAR	CM 9 456	3 C 1265
MARKAROĞLU BOĞOZ	CD 2 627	R 1236
MARKOS	Cevdet Adliye 6 358	4 Ra 1183
MEHMED	CM 10 107	2 L 1176
MENDİS	Cev.Darb. 255	23 C 1181
MIGİRDİÇ	CM 11 639	3 L 1222
MIGİRDİÇ	CM 10557	7 ZA 1250
MIGİRDİÇ	Meclis-i Vâlâ İr. 965	21 Ca 1259
MIGİRDİÇ	CM 25 056	21 Ra 1269
MIGİRDİÇ	Meclis-i Vâlâ 559	Za 1257
MİHAİL	CM 23 557	15 Ra 1198
MİKAİL	CM 1 383	1253
MİNAS	Cev.Darb.208	15 Za 1176
MİNAS	CM 31 330	C 1192
MİNAS (sarraflar kethüdası)	CM 23 921	3 B 1208
MİNOS (sarraflar kethüdası)	CM 10575	9Z 1210
MİSAK	CM 2 919	11 M 1264
MİSAK (Bazirgan)	CM 26 006	1267
MİSAK (Bazirgan)	CM 9 420	1267
MURAD	CM 1 784	24 S 1233
MURAD	CM 14 042	12 N 1231
MURADOĞLU RAFAEL	CM 2 522	17 M1216
MUSA	CM 21 915	20 Za 1256
MUSA ŞAPÇI	CM 30 368	15 R 1220
NAZRET (HÜDAVERDİOĞLU)	CM 21 236	9 R 1234
NESİM	CM 31 030	21 Ş 1247
NESİMACI	CM 22 539	1144
NURİ EFENDİ (gümrükte)	CM 10 830	17 L 1255
OHAN	CM 10 979 and 13 462	4 ZA 1244/25 M 1246
OHAN	CM 23 733	1204
OHANNES	CM 13 816	4 M 1251
OHANNES	CM 21 915	20 Za 1256
OHANNES (Tanferoğlu ² /Tingiroğlu)	Maclis-I Vâlâ 707	10 R 1258
OHANNES (Balıkanlı)	CM 24 913	19 Ca 1258
OSBEK	CM 23 009	R 1215

Appendix 1 *cont.*

OSEB	Tarih-i Lütfi	1242
OVANS	CM 10557	7 ZA 1250
OVANS	CM 3 538	8 B 1233
OVSEB (Pekmezoğlu)	CM 16 235	22 S 1267
PASKAL	CM 11 371	M 1236
PENKANLI AVANNES	Meclis-i Vâlâ 202	24 L 1256
PETRAKÎ ZİMMÎ	CM 24 910	20 S 1192
RAFAEL	CM 19 213	Ş 1261
RAFAEL	CM 19 213	Ş 1261
SAĞAM	CM 31 740	M 1223
SAKAOĞLU MARDİROS	Dah.İra. 3560	6 M 1259
SAKAOĞLU MARDİROS	CM 13 138 and 13 210	15 N 1246/1207
SASKAL	CM 21 984	18 B 1228
SAVİDOĞLU OSEB	CM 18 294	C 1227
SERGİS	CM 12 745	4 R 1251
SERGİZ	CM 12 544	Za 1250
SERGİZ	CM 11 369	6 N 1230
SİMON	CM 2 305	Za 1213
SİMYON	Cev.Darb.208	15 Za 1176
ŞALCI MUSA	CM 22 447	B 1201
ŞAMANTO	CD 824 and CM 13 244	no date/1208
ŞAMANTO	CD 824	No date
ŞAPÇI BOHOR	MAD 8250	1242-1249
ŞAPÇI BOHOR	Tarih-i Lütfi	1242
ŞAPÇI BOHOR	HH 16 352	1235
TINGİROĞLU AGOP	CM 20 164	R 1217
TINGİROĞLU AGOP	CM 19 538	Ş 1205
TINGİROĞLU AGOP	CM 16 226 and 20 764	6 M 1232/29 Z 1228
TINGİROĞLU AGOP	Tarih-i Lütfi	1242
TINGİROĞLU ARTİN	CD 1253	B 1253
TINGİROĞLU ARTİN	CM 1 097	B 1253
TINGİROĞLU KİRKOR	Tarih-i Lütfi	1242
TINGİROĞLU SİMON	CM 20 348	B 1263
TINGİROĞLU SİMON	CM 13 841	8 L 1208
YABIK	CD 5 776	L 1229
YAZICI KİRKOR	Cev.Darb.261	15 Za 1235
YENİŞEHİRLİ SABETAY	CM 12 705	7 B 1237
YORGAKÎ (Kıbrıs tercümanı)	CM 16 468	14 B 1226
YORGAKÎ (Semurkaş)	CM 13 761	16 Za 1208
YORGİ	CM 16 642	15 R 1232

Appendix 2

The Share of the *Sarrafs'* Credits in the
Total Debt of Some Persons

I	II	III	IV	V	
Between 1230-1246					
4	Kuşadası muhafızı Ağa	İlyas	166 460	Ovannes	166 460
14	Şam valisi elhac Ali Pasha		922 209	Patrik(?)	579 236
17	Zihne ayarı elhac Ali Ağa		841 245	Gelgeloğlu Boğos	837 945
21	Vezir Mehmed Selim Pasha		288 717	Boğos	226 396,5
49	Berkofçalı Yusuf Pasha		116 985	Artin	113 929,5
61	Hüseyin Pasha, Köstence muhafızı		237 835,5	Matris/Patris(?) Varkasan	109 894,5 18 821
113	Yenişehir mutasarrıfı İsmail Pasha		262 773	Markar	165 000
115	Hasan Pasha		1 103 330,5	Miğiroğlu Agop Miran	840 000 80 578,5
119	Reşid Pasha		727 860,5	Patrik(?)	616 125
122	Salih Pasha		199 426,5	Maksur	182 926,5
125	Şam valisi Salih Pasha		1 050 939	Tingiroğlu Kirkor	1 020 000
126	Maraşlı Ali Pasha		376 810	Ohan	
141	Ahmed Ağa, Darbhane Nazırı		479 306,5	A sarraf (no name)	24 000
144	Tırhala valisi Boşnak Süleyman Pasha		237 067	Tinginoğlu Oseb	236 567
146	Tepdelenli Ali Pasha, Veli Pasha, Muhtar Pasha		792 948,5	Kirkor	309 500
151	Süleyman ağa, Menlik ayarı		147 000	Hocador	140 000
197	Motafını zimmi		105 759	Hatem yahudi	42 000
202	Mihal/Mican(?) zimmi		2 254 682,5	Matros Çıfıt yehud Şapçı Bohor Patrik(?)	214 571 800 000 1 161 220 78 833
223	Maraşlı Ali Pasha valde sultan kethüdası		244 182	Tingiroğlu Agop	160 183,5
226	...? zimmi		108 743	Bohor	45 000
266	Süleyman Pasha, Şam valisi		301 718	Şapçı Bohor	135 000
271	Lütfullah Pasha		377 333	Ağop ve Artin(?)	365 308
281	Ahmed Pasha, sadr-ı sabık		128 696,5	Manok	72 627,5

I	II	III	IV	V
Between 1247-1249				
II/16	Halil Efendi	317,753	Sarraflar...?	317,753
II/18	Hafız Ali Pasha	342,523	...?oğlu Ağoş ve diğlerleri	342,523
II/21	Hafız Ali Pasha	170,481	Ohan ve diğlerleri	170,481
II/56	Ahmed Ağa	308,522.5	Gelgeođlu Artın ve diğlerleri	308,522.5

Notes

¹ For the monetization of the Ottoman economy and financial system see Yavuz Cezar, '18 ve 19. Yüzyıllarda Osmanlı Taşrasında Oluşan Yeni Malî Sektörün Mahiyet ve Büyüklüğü üzerine', *Dünü ve Bugünüyle Toplum ve Ekonomi*, sayı 9, Nisan 1996, 89-143. Yavuz Cezar, 'Comments on the Financial History of the Ottoman Provinces in the eighteenth century: A Macro Analysis', in *Essays on Ottoman Civilization* (Prague, 1998), 85-92

² For a general view of Ottoman financial history, see: *Osmanlıdan Günümüze Türk Finans Tarihi* (İstanbul Menkul Kıymetler Borsası Yayını, İstanbul, 1999). For the bankers of the late Ottoman period see Haydar Kazgan, *Galata Bankerleri*, İstanbul 1991 (published by Türk Ekonomi Bankası); İonna Pepelasis Minoglu, 'Ethnic Minority Groups in International Banking: Greek Diaspora banker of Constantinople and Ottoman State Finances, 1840-81', *Financial History Review* 9 (2002), 125-46.

³ BOAD (Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşiv Dairesi=Ottoman Archives Administration), Cevdet Darbhâne, no 321, 5 Ş 1216/11 December 1801.

⁴ BOAD, Cevdet Maliye, no 2 176, 13 Ra 1195 /9 Mars 1781; Cevdet Dahiliye, no 4 469, 21 Ca 1197/24 April 1783; Cevdet Maliye, no 23 557 (15 Ra 1198/7 February 1784); Cevdet Darbhâne, no 328, N 1216/1801; Cevdet Maliye, no 3 384, 11 Ca 1218/29 August 1803.

⁵ BOAD, Cevdet Maliye, no 10 575, no 15 192, no 4 622, no 11 078, no 16 748, no 2 560, no 15 147

⁶ BOAD, MAD, no 1 763, 186-8, 205-6.

⁷ Ahmet Refik, *Onikinci Asr-ı Hicrîde İstanbul Hayatı*, 193 see the document no 234

⁸ BOAD, Cevdet Darbhâne, no 193

⁹ BOAD, Cevdet Maliye, no 23 557, no 16 068, no 10 648, no 2 522, no 19 973, no 14 944, no 24 913, no 17 077, no 28 894; Cevdet Darbhâne, no 255; MAD, no 9 722, p 185; MAD, no 9 730, p 46; MAD, no 8 151, vrk 7-8 (in that defter dated 1835-6 the addresses of their offices and the names of 75 sarraflar are listed). For the hans and shopping centres of Ottoman İstanbul see Mustafa Cezar, *Typical Commercial Buildings of the Ottoman Classical Period and the Ottoman Construction System*, (Türkiye İş Bankası, İstanbul, 1983) (A revised editon in Turkish was published by Mimar Sinan Üniversitesi in 1985: *Tipik Yapılarıyla Osmanlı Şehirciliğinde Çarşı ve Klasik Dönem İmar Sistemi*). Ceyhan Güran, *Türk Hanlarının Gelişimi ve İstanbul Hanları Mimarisi* (Vakıflar Genel Müdürlüğü yayını, İstanbul, 1977).

¹⁰ BOAD, Cevdet Darbhâne, no 453, 21 N 1220/13 December 1805; MAD, no 9 722, passim.

¹¹ I must underline that this list is not exhaustive. *Sarrafs'* names are randomly selected from various sources.

¹² For example among the 27 clients of a non-Muslim *sarrafs* Kılıcıoğlu Artin the majority were Muslim and only the 10 of them were Armenian. BOAD, Cevdet Maliye, no 1508, 1246.

¹³ BOAD, Cevdet Maliye, no 27 328, 16 139 and 6 658

¹⁴ Ahmed Refik, *12. Asr-ı Hicride İstanbul Hayatı*, 21-2, 35, 160-3

¹⁵ Lütfi Tarihi, I, 272-4, 276; II, 188; III, 163-4.

¹⁶ Edhem Eldem, *Osmanlı Bankası Tarihi*, İstanbul 1999 (published by Tarih Vakfı)

¹⁷ Y.Cezar, 'Osmanlı Geleneksel Mali Örgütünde Çözülme Yılları: Tanzimat Öncesinde Bâb-ı Defteri', *Dünü ve Bugünüyle Toplum ve Ekonomi*, 7 (İstanbul, 1994).

¹⁸ In the Ottoman Archives among many others especially the following *defter* is rich in examples of this kind: MAD, no 9 722

¹⁹ BOAD, Cevdet Maliye, no 17 129

²⁰ See appendix 2

²¹ *Tarih-i Lütfi*, I, 245-6.

²² Yavuz Cezar, *Osmanlı Maliyesinde Bunalım ve Değişim Dönemi*, 242

²³ A document kept in BOAD (Hatt-ı Hümayun, no 12 968, date: 1211) shows dramatically how the *viziers* and their *kethüdas* were financially weak in their relations with the *sarrafs*.

The Poll-Tax and Population in the Ottoman Balkans

Nenad Moačanin

Authors dealing with various aspects of Ottoman taxation usually state that the poll-tax was levied on a household basis (per *hane*) until the reform of 1691.¹ Some say ‘predominantly’, while others occasionally mention the per head basis as if it were generally applied without engaging in discussion over the striking contradiction with the opposite statement. It is accepted that before the difficulties in the late sixteenth century the rates oscillated between 40 and 70 *akçes*, sometimes less, sometimes more, with occasional ‘exceptions’ (Albania, Anatolia). In addition, the fact that the rate (probably per head) of 30 *akçes* in general seems to be the only available overall estimation for decades in the sixteenth century, seems not to have provoked any raised eyebrows thus far.² It seems that a need for the revision of such generalizations, and of the ‘per hane’ article of faith in particular, has become urgent. Indeed, there is enough evidence in favour of the *personal* nature of the poll-tax for most of the sixteenth century, at least for the large areas of the Empire including Bosnia, Serbia and even northwest Bulgaria. We read in the Mühimme 7, entry nr. 448 (1567):

Order to the governor of Temeşvar: The collectors of the *haraç* have found that many *reaya* in Semendire, Alaca Hisar, İzvornik and Vidin are missing. When questions were raised, it was reported that when the *vilayet* of Temeşvar was surveyed, its *haraç* was put on houses (*hane başına*) and, because of that they (i.e. the *reaya*) have moved and gone over there. Now it is forbidden for the *reaya* from the Empire to go there to the detriment of the *haraç*. [I have commanded...] Let the *reaya* who go over there be charged with the head-tax (*baş haracı*), not with the house-tax (*hane haracı*).

The underlying idea is that to the south of Sava and Danube the *haraç* was collected from all adult males. Nr. 449 is still more explicit:

Order to the *timar defterdari* of Temeşvar, the surveyor of the vilayet, Muharrem Çelebi: Since Gyula was conquered, the reaya of Semendire, Izvornik and Alaca Hisar hid themselves and went across the Danube to Temeşvar. Some might well have left because of lawlessness, yet the real cause is that in those provinces the poll-tax (*cizye*) and the land-tax (*ispence*) are incumbent on heads, while in the vilayet of Temeşvar they depend on households, and are paid (only) once, no matter how many unbelievers are dwelling in one house.

Again, entry nr. 519 emphasizes the wish of the reaya in Semendire to settle in Temeşvar, Segedin, Sirem and Pojega because there the unbelievers pay only one *filori* even when there are ten of them in one household.³

Some passages in the *kanunnames* for Semendire, Izvornik, and Hersek, as well as the Kuripečić travelogue (Bosnia), when examined in the light of the decrees we have quoted above, point clearly to the same principle, that is, to taxation per head. Since the first mention comes from a kanunname for Herzegovina written in 1530, it is quite possible that the change had occurred about that year or a bit earlier. So in some areas the shift toward introducing the 'more canonical' *cizye* had actually happened.⁴

Closer examination of data for 1489-91 offered by Todorov and Velkov reveals that in most north-western districts, including Albania, high rates are nearly absent.⁵ In a few places the rate was around 50 akçes, 40-6 was more common (Bosnia and north-eastern Herzegovina), and often the rate was low or very low (36 for Vidin, 30 for Alaca Hisar, 28 for Albanian districts and 16 for Smederevo/Semendire.) Clearly the amount of the tax reflected adjustments of the principles of Ottoman taxation to local circumstances (meaning to the productivity and financial capacity of local people rather than to the 'old custom'.) We may suppose that the main reason for predominantly low rates was the fact that in these places the nuclear household was only a part of a traditional collective of two and more families. It is also possible that a single such household had insufficient arable land or, in the case of pastoralists, had only a secondary interest in cultivating the land. The whole area corresponds well to the predominant Balkan family pattern of the early modern age.⁶ Since this Balkan family pattern presupposes complex, multiple family collectives, the actual rate for a hypothetical nuclear family may well have been 10 or 5 akçes or less! On a *per capita* basis for all the working members of a collective, it might have amounted to next to nothing.

Let us stop here and anticipate a little. Although the survey from 1489-91 uses the word *cizye*, it is obvious that at the same time those

moneys represented simply a *tribute*. Anyway, the jurists had a very appropriate term for it, which I here reintroduce as a historian's *terminus technicus*: *harac-ı muvazzaf* ('the obligatory haraç') as distinct from the *harac-ı mukaseme*. Since the character of the tax had not been strictly defined, personal taste might be the reason for the frequent interchange of the terms haraç and cizye in the same document. Hopefully I can demonstrate how during the period down to the reform of 1691 there was a long series of shifts from the *harac-ı muvazzaf* of the fifteenth century to a tax closer in nature to the canonical *cizye* in the sixteenth century, and then back again in the seventeenth century!

Whereas the rate of the per household haraç for the European part of the Ottoman 'core area' (50-60 akçes) must have been more than enough to match the average number of adult males in most nuclear households,⁷ by contrast in the north-west with its complex multiple hanes this was not so before 1530. In the north-west, although the state did not really want *filoricis* and *çiftlikçis* to take control of arable land, in the early phases it was hardly possible to stop them. In Bosnia in the sixteenth century there were hundreds of *çiftlikes* on land abandoned and devastated by war yielding only a lump sum. Apart from large groups of sheep- and cattle-breeders that paid only one filori, a significant number of Vlachs in Serbia, Herzegovina and Dalmatia joined the remnants of the older sedentary population in performing some limited agricultural activities. Most of the population had to serve the government at least occasionally as auxiliaries. It seems that when a Vlach household, regardless of its size, ceased to be a simple filori-payer, it nevertheless continued to pay almost the same amount as before, with the only difference that part of it was in kind. Thus the 83 akçes collected from *filoricis* became a 16-akçe haraç + 25 to 50 akçes of *ispence* + minor taxes in kind and cash after they became 'ordinary' reayas. Despite this, they tried to escape as soon as the opportunity arose. The only explanation for this must be that the new régime did not respect a traditional large collectivity of, say, 9, 11, or 15 persons each, but instead counted only nuclear families. Perhaps the new tax burden was not very heavy, yet subjectively it was still two-or three times more than what had prevailed before. The case is most obvious in Serbia, where both Vlach groups constituted the majority of the population. In Herzegovina in 1477 the rate of the haraç was apparently higher, 45 akçes, but no *ispence* is mentioned in the early sources.⁸ We can therefore imagine that it is included, together with a poll-tax at a low rate, into the tribute as a kind of the *harac-ı muvazzaf*. In Bosnia the remaining older agricultural population living in complex collectives had been put under the pressure of paying both the haraç (40-50 akçes) and the *ispence* (25-50 akçes)

plus the tithes.⁹ This circumstance must have been one of the main motives for conversion to Islam, probably the main one.

After the Empire had pushed its frontiers far to the north, all the Christian population along with the majority of the Vlachs, became burdened with the triple poll-tax (in Herzegovina, 30-25-20 akçes) most of them at the lowest rate. For the Vlachs this was a hard blow, and for old Bosnians a further stimulus for finding radical solutions. In some areas Islamization progressed more quickly, while many chose other ways. Some tried—successfully—to present several *baştines* as single units, while others simply hid behind a Muslim *tapu* holder, either a relative, or a buyer from outside. That is why the Bosnian *tabrirs* are even less reliable for demographic research than the poll-tax records. Curiously enough, it was more advantageous to convert in the Balkans, where the per household *resm-i çift*, also a kind of harac-ı muvazzaf, was only 22 akçes, than it was to convert in Anatolia with its much higher rates (36 to 53 akçes). Could the latter rates possibly reflect a merging of former Christian head and land tax? There is an explanatory note in a copy of the general kanunname from the beginning of the Süleymanic era referring to the vilayet of Rum which may support such a speculation.¹⁰

As for the the Vlachs, they started long distance migrations. Waves of migrants left the central Adriatic hinterland around 1535 heading for parts of the Middle Danube region, not fully under anyone's control. Some of them had returned by the early 1560s following the reestablishment of the status of filoricis which took place around 1540.¹¹ But in Semendire/Smederevo this did not happen, and there the attrition continued well into the seventeenth century.

Having outlined the essentials of developments in the north-west, we may use the information as a tool for a better understanding of what was happening in Rumelia to the south. I had only limited access to relevant sources, but I would like to point out that there are no clear and unambiguous statements on this subject in the more recent literature. One can read (sometimes in the same work) about a general rate of 30, 50, or 50-60 akçes (for some places 75 akçes), allegedly levied sometimes on individuals and sometimes on hanes. Allowance is made for the existence of the three-class per head *cizye*, but this is confined to an insignificant number of 'exceptional' cases, such as town-dwellers and other privileged groups.

Here I propose to test a hypothesis. Let us first ask whether the haraç in 1490 and later in 1530 or 1550 could possibly have consisted of more parts than simply the *zimme*'s canonical obligation, however vaguely conceived that may be? In 1530 the haraç for Herzegovina was a sum (56 akçes) which was probably a compound

of the poll-tax (i.e. *cizye*) plus the ispençe. In Montenegro/Karadağ, which had the status of sultanīc *hass*, the *resm-i filori* in 1523 was a compound made up of a 33 akçe poll-tax, a 20 akçe ispençe and 2 akçes for the collector (again practically the same amount).¹² We may also hypothesize that in Herzegovina in 1477 the average of 46 akçes was a compound of 19 akçe (the same *cizye* as in Serbia?) plus a 25 akçe ispençe plus 2 akçes for the collector's fee. Occasionally it seems that the sheep-tax (*koyun bakka*, *adet-i ađnam*) was included. In the 1489/91 record the *resm-i filori* occasionally appears. This means that this tax was also a kind of *harac-ı muvazzaf*, comprising equivalents for the poll-tax, ispençe and agricultural taxes. The Vlachs were in no way different from the ordinary *reaya* as payers of the *harac-ı muvazzaf*, but they did not pay the *harac-ı mukaseme*. Therefore, it is safe to assume that around 1490, at least in some places, rates higher than the expected 40, 50, or 60 akçes can be explained by the presence of imperial or governor's estates (*hass*), where ispençe and/or sheep-tax was added on top of the poll-tax.

We may therefore speculate that the period up to 1530 could rightly be called the epoch of the *harac-ı muvazzaf*, a tax which does not depend in the first place on the productivity of the land. Bearing this in mind, we may guess that the contradiction between two important reports from the fifteenth century, that of Promontorio de Campis and Konstantin Mihajlović, can be explained away by supposing that the first source speaks of a *haraç* (poll tax) which includes an ispençe of 70 akçes, while the second report intends only the poll-tax.

We may also ask whether per head taxation was levied in the area of the Balkan collective family in the same way as it was levied per household throughout most of Ottoman Europe. The key question is whether or not the per head *haraç* was an obligation on every healthy male over 15? In the aforementioned decrees the affected provinces are designated as belonging to the 'inland' (*'iç ilinden firar etmeyeler'*). The *haraç* in those provinces was not the *hane haracı* (household tax), which prevailed in Hungary, but the *baş haracı* (poll tax), which was characteristic of the *iç il*. Consequently, if there existed a *hane haracı* further south, then the *reaya* would flee south as well, to Thrace, Thessaly etc. I think that the riddle is resolved if we accept that the so-called *baş haracı* for most of Rumelia have meant practically the same thing as the *hane haracı*. But here *hane* does not stand for any kind of household. Because of the clear predominance of nuclear households, only a biological family of 5 or so would have been the basic taxation unit. Larger units were, *faute de mieux*, treated as exceptions, and when possible disregarded. Conversely, the imposition of the per head poll-tax in the north-west was aimed at the large (and sometimes very large) Balkan collective

family households. Many kanunnames are silent or seemingly ambiguous in this matter, probably because such a principle seemed self-evident to Ottoman bureaucrats. The widespread practice of registering unmarried sons speaks in favour of their having counted such persons as subject not just to the ispençe but also liable to the poll-tax, without any lowering of the rate.

Let us here propose an unorthodox approach to the core area cizye rate of 55-60 akçe. How can an 'overall' rate of 30 akçe be reconciled with that? Is it not likely that the authorities were worrying about leaving a significant number of older male adolescents, just about to separate from their father's household, untaxed? The kanunname for Herzegovina of 1530 says that the rates of 30, 25 and 20 akçe are paid by the ordinary *haragüzar*. When the ispençe is added, it makes some 50 akçe. It seems likely that where a rate of 56 akçe is given, there was in many areas of Rumelia a tacit burdening of *possibly more than one person*.

When a purely personal tax, such as the ispençe, is concerned, legal stipulations are more expressive. Here may lie the cause for apparent inconsistencies in the literature. To conclude, we may say that haraç was collected first on both a per head basis (a hair-splitter would say 'close-to-per head') and also on a purely formal household basis, but in the latter case only in frontier areas, either with large units, or close to the border with all the insecurity that entailed. After 1530 the per head basis became universal except for pure pastoralists (Vlachs and others), and on land conquered in Hungary. Since in the overwhelming majority of cases, tax-liable adult males corresponded to the number of heads of nuclear households, the 'per hane' principle, which owed more to scribal convenience than to the complex reality, made its way into scholarship. Thus the poll-tax was not, or not very much at odds with the sacred law regarding the size of taxation units. The only big difference was the real rate of the haraç, meaning a burden distributed per capita.

The most striking feature of the seventeenth-century cizye records (the bureaucracy used the word haraç less frequently) is the comparatively low number of taxation units in comparison with the old *tapu tabriirs*. From this some have concluded that there was a dramatic diminution of the Balkan Christian population, due to biological, climatic or other natural factors, or to socio-political phenomena, such as Islamization. Others have warned against hasty conclusions, drawing attention to changes of status (for example, new *vakıf* villages). Thus the proportions of the 'demographic catastrophe' may have diminished, yet considerable losses in general are still believed to have actually happened.¹³

I have made extensive use source materials for Slavonia and Srijem/Sirem and, to certain extent, for Bosnia. Although the

findings may not be mechanically applicable to the rest of Ottoman Europe, I believe that the emerging patterns of a new approach to taxation by Ottoman authorities in those northerly places must have had much in common with what was happening farther south. One great advantage of this material is that Ottoman documents can be examined in the light of non-Ottoman sources, not just travellers' reports, but also for instance the Habsburg surveys made for taxation purposes around 1700. The second survey from 1702 is generally richer in information than the first from 1698. Among other questions, the peasants were asked what, when and how they paid taxes to their masters before the Habsburg conquest. After revision, and, I hope, by refining the argumentation offered in the main text of my book on Ottoman Slavonia (see endnote 18 below), the result of the investigation can be summarized as follows:

Before c 1590, the indigenous inhabitants of Slavonia were mostly still obliged to pay one gold coin per hane. Newcomers from the 'Vlach' South, who were more numerous than the older population, were charged with 383, later with 394 akçe per hane (or rather per taxable unit!) Since they were expected to be living in complex households, they were accordingly burdened with two gold coins. Three *mufassals* and several *icmals* exist for the newcomers, with slight variations in numbers. Here and there names of older inhabitants appear among the new. The destination of their *cizye* was the provincial treasury in Kanizsa. No record devoted solely to the older settlers has been found as yet. The survival of this first group is manifest only in the Habsburg survey. The total of hanes for Požega in the existing Ottoman records is around 4,500, while the Venetian spy report from 1625 gives nearly twice as large a figure.¹⁴ The Hofkammer record then reports that four gold coins were requested from those who possessed a plough, or who had a 'full-sized farm' (*sessio integra*). We may therefore conclude that in contrast to the sixteenth century records, a more realistic, flexible hane had been established, a kind of *tevzi hane* indeed! The reaya were stimulated to mutual help and joint work in order to come to terms with a new kind of taxation (this is confirmed by the poem of a local poet in 1773, who mentions exactly this cooperative way of land cultivation).¹⁵ Thus only some 60% of the actual households may have entered Ottoman records, while the personal names in the *mufassals* (from the thirties) probably represent the very numerous newcomers. This development has much in common with the assessment of the *avarız* (a kind of extraordinary tax, now in cash.) The rates of the *cizye* were close to those canonically prescribed, and, what is more, in this particular matter no complaints about over-taxation were expected.

It is perhaps worth applying the same approach to Rumelia as a whole. We can, for a start, agree that many categories of the former taxable population, such as unmarried sons and widows (and, it seems, those with little or no land) do not appear in the poll-tax records of the seventeenth century. It used to be thought that the *cizye* did not keep pace with the rate of inflation, and that the total tax burden had considerably increased.¹⁶ Now it seems that this belief should be partly corrected. True, the value of the *akçe* became relatively stable at about 120 or 150 *akçes* per gold coin, but that was for relatively short periods and only at the strictly official level. The most usual exchange rate was 200-50 *akçes* for a ducat. The *reaya* had to pay more, but that was on the account of the collector's fee. The half-legal extraordinary taxes collected on behalf of the provincial authorities (*tekalif-i şakka*), plus increased and often unpunished plain extortions were a very heavy burden.

In any case to enregister fewer units but with more *people* per unit would be a very rational procedure. Therefore the extreme 'losses' of *hanes* may be explained satisfactorily, especially in cases when no Islamization, no expansion of pious endowments, and no migrations or natural disasters are indicated.¹⁷

In brief, in many areas of Ottoman Europe (if not everywhere) in the seventeenth century the method of assessing and collecting the *cizye* was 'avariz-ized', but that fact becomes visible only in judicial records or in certain sources of a specific nature, like the Hofkammer surveys and some other rare reports.¹⁸ It is very probable that the new system was not mechanically applied: in regions where the poll-tax unit was paying, for example, 150 *akçes*, the basis for collection was still one nuclear household. If we allow for the *maaş* and *gulamiye*,¹⁹ we can propose that the threshold between zones of predominantly one nuclear household and zones of predominantly more than one nuclear household lay somewhere around 200-50 *akçes* collected per unit, with a margin of some 100 *akçes*. Let us speculate a little. A unit paying 400 *akçes* may represent a complex family in the western Balkans, while in the eastern and southern regions it may consist of one 300 *akçe* payer plus one who can afford only 100, plus another one who is short of cash altogether, but lives and works with the first two on the same *çiftlik/baştine*, the title-deed being in the hands of the wealthiest taxpayer. Some prosperous heads of households really were able to pay a yearly rate of 350 *akçes* or more, and even the *avarız* on top of that, while at the same time it could be difficult for several very poor families to produce a sum of 150 *akçes* among themselves. By taking these inequalities into account, the apparent population decrease of one third or so can be substantially reduced, if not nullified, and, at

the same time, the danger of multiplying grand totals mechanically by three or so is avoided.

A source from 1687 (sancak of Sirem) speaks:

Der-i devlet mekine 'arz-i dayi-i kemine budur ki: Girgurofça kazası re'ayasından olan Radinçe karyesi ve İsteyanofça karyesi ahalişi meclis-i şer'e gelüb dediler ki haliya kazamız İrig kazası mülhakatından olmağın cizyemiz Budun cizyesi defterinde olub ve be-her karye ikişer cizye hanesi olub ve İrig kasabasında tevzi' ü taksim olunub lakin ziyade za'ıf ve perakende ve perişan olmalarından naşi olmikdar haneyi edaya iktidarları olmayub Radinçe karyesi bir hane ve İsteyanofça karyesi buçuk hane olmak (...).²⁰

Thus these reayas wanted to pay their cizye as one, namely as a half-household (*buçuk hane*)! Both settlements had previously amounted to just two hanes, but that was now too much for them. The document states that 'the inhabitants of the two villages' (meaning in practice some elders representing the whole population), have come to the court so there is no possibility that this entry stands for 'half a person'. In the late sixties of the sixteenth century there were 34 houses in the two villages. A decrease of 98% is not credible. Furthermore, the expression *tevzi' ve taksim* (by the *kadi* of Irig) used to describe the assessment of the poll-tax points clearly to a procedure similar to the collection of the *avarız* (collected mostly per units of more than one nuclear household.) The fact that this was happening in a peripheral area harassed by war has no great significance, because the 'normal' wish would have been to pay a lump sum (*maktul*), and not to form an 'exotic' half a hane. As we can see from the example for İlaça in the Hofkammer record,²¹ there the collectors took twenty forints as a single 'household or head tax'—i.e., a *haraç* - from five houses which together were able to pay the prescribed amount of 20 forints (ten ducats). Per household it was four forints, which approximately equalled the rate of 373 akçe. But since the size of the average sixteenth century hane was already 7.5 persons, and since now the trend was probably upwards, we can say that individually adult male peasants were paying about one ducat each. This means that around 1680 there were probably ten heads of complex households as *tapu*-holders, which is to say 'two *haraçes*' in each village totalling the full amount of cizye, but with the possible presence of a certain number of other less fortunate inhabitants. War caused the number of local poll-tax units in Radinci to sink to five or four, together constituting one hane, and in Stejanovci to three or two, constituting a half hane. This happened as the result of impoverishment and the loss of some inhabitants (*'zayıf ve perakende*

ve perişan olmalarından). Indeed, the yield from the seventeenth century unit of five four-forint holdings approximately equals ten sixteenth century 'simple' units paying one filori (two forints) each. Therefore two 'Sirem cizye hanes' in 1687 may stand for 20 nuclear families. To this an unknown number of tenants may be added. The *ilam* says that the size of both villages was the same before the war, just as it was in the late sixteenth century. It is therefore not impossible that one sank from 17 complex households (making 34 in the *tahrir*) to probably 10, and then to five on one full-sized *baştine*, while the other, more drastically, sank from 17 to ten to two and one half.²²

Michael Ursinus has found that in the district of Bitola/Manastir there were some 3,000 hanes of poll-tax payers in 1683, while in 1690 the number of adult males (now expressed in *evrak*) was about 5,000. The author thinks that the difference of some 2,000 could be explained if it represented the co-resident unmarried sons of the first group, but the earlier and smaller number reappears again in 1711, 1720/1, 1723/4 and 1737/8, also under the heading 'cizye evraks'(!). The larger number (which is obtained by separating the Manastir part from the group of several *kazas*) also reappears in the same period. Both the first and the second (larger) group show an upward tendency, so that the apparent 'surplus' persists. Ursinus is inclined to interpret this fact as a consequence of the possible earlier practice of registering only better off persons. Consequently, the extra two thousand 'persons' (or at least some of them) could be legitimately imagined as households of the less fortunate.²³

Down to the beginnings of the demographical transition at the end of the eighteenth century, mortality was the most unstable variable, with a decisive influence on the dynamics of population growth. To the contrary, natality was rather stable staying at a level of about 40 per thousand. Before the nineteenth century neither natality nor mortality fell below 30 per thousand, a marker considered to be the divide between the first and second phase of demographic transition. When the level of mortality was less than the rate of natality, there was population growth, and in the opposite case there was a decline in population. Therefore we can posit that in the seventeenth century the natality rate was stable at about 40 per thousand, while mortality was unstable, though not falling below the lower limit of 30 per thousand.

If the supposed decrease of the Balkan population from 8 millions to 5 millions ever really occurred, it could be explained only by rising mortality. Deliberate diminishing of the family size by marrying later is a specific Western phenomenon, and has never played a prominent role east of the St.Petersburg-Trieste line.²⁴ This line divides Austria in two parts, leaving the nearest Rumelian district at a

distance of some 700 kilometres. For a sharp decrease of population size over three generations (1580-1650), we would need an average age for the first-time mother of 23.3 years), which would require an uninterrupted period of high-mortality to trigger it. Then the average of births might fall from 4 to 3.5 children, of whom only half are supposed to reach the age of 18, which would in turn eventually produce the eight to five million decrease.

In the heart of the Balkans there was no war in the seventeenth century. Plagues were usual, but not more violent or more widespread than in other epochs. What is left is famine, probably connected with factors such as the side-effects of wars fought elsewhere, rising prices, and diseases caused by malnutrition. Yet such phenomena were prominent only in some periods, not continuously. For the period under examination, it can be accepted only for the first two decades, and perhaps again in the 1620s. For the rest of the period, conditions were not that bad. Thus in the first years of the seventeenth century the total population might have sunk to 7 millions or slightly less, provided mortality had caused the birthrate to fall to 3.5 per thousand. Then in the next generation the response to that deficit could have been in theory simply to maintain a new level of 4 births per nuclear family. A new drop might produce the loss of another million, the trend finally stopping at six millions. Thus, in the worst case we have a loss of 25%. On the other hand, the birthrate after each decline could well be more than four, making up for all losses, re-establishing and then maintaining the initial size of the population; or both the 'four' and 'more than four' births scenarios could change places, producing at the end a loss of some 10-15%. According to what we stated earlier, case number two seems the most likely, with some possibility left for case three. In fact disturbances that led to a spread of famine attested by the sources, a factor that provoked higher mortality, occurred during the long Cretan war of 1645-69. Yet it was in the second half of the seventeenth century that a number of the *cizye* records seem to show some recovery!

Then the average of births might fall from slightly over 4 (stagnation) to 3.6 children, of whom only half are supposed to reach the age of 18, the number of the survivors being further reduced by some 2-3%, for various reasons (only one child, no chance to marry, entering a monastery). This eventually produce the eight to five million decrease. Let us demonstrate more closely the effect of hypothetical birth rates (only linear progression, disregarding the unknown ups and downs): at a number of births of 8 per nuclear family after the peak in 1580 (eight millions) we should have 15.2 millions in 1603, 28.9 in 1626 and the incredible 54.8 in 1650. At the rate of 4.22, there would be stagnation (eight millions). The

supposed catastrophe appears only at 3.6 (6.8 – 5.78 – 5). And, at 2, the number of souls is halved after each interval: 3.8 – 1.8 – 0.9.

In conclusion I would suggest that we need very much more thorough investigation into seventeenth century marriage practices, and into mortality and birth-rates in various regions of the Balkans. In some cases perhaps exploring graveyards would help more than struggling with the puzzling *cizye* and *avarız hane* figures. At the present it seems to me that the overall decrease in the seventeenth century Balkan population—if any—could only have been moderate.

Notes

¹ I do not intend to compile a (long) list of authors who have discussed our topic in the last half a century. There are some articles where all important contributions are mentioned and commented on at length. For example, Machiel Kiel, 'Remarks on the administration of the poll tax (*cizye*) in the Ottoman Balkans and value of poll tax registers (*cizye defterleri*) for demographic research', (*Etudes Balkaniques*, 4, Sofia 1990, 71). Here and in his other writings on issues of *cizye* and *avarız*, the author cites a good deal of relevant literature. Other very important contributions are two recent articles by Oktay Özel: 'Population changes in Ottoman Anatolia during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries: the 'demographic crisis' reconsidered' (forthcoming in *IJMES*), and 'Osmanlı Demografi Tarihi Açısından Avarız ve Cizye Defterleri', in Evgeni Radushev (ed.), *Balkan Identities* (forthcoming, but see his nearly identical article in Halil İnalçık and Şevket Pamuk (ed.), *Osmanlı Devleti'nde Bilgi ve İstatistik*, Ankara: DİE Yayını, 2001).

² Halil İnalçık and Donald Quataert ed., *The Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire 1300-1914* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1994), 70.

³ 7 Numaralı mühimme defteri no. 7 (ed. Murat Şener et al.), Ankara, 1997.

⁴ Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi, İstanbul, TT 167 for Herzegovina from 1530, *kanunname*. Branislav Đurđev et al., *Kanuni i kanun-name za Bosanski, Hercegovacki, Zvornički, Kliški, Crnogorski i Skadarski sandžak*, Sarajevo 1957, 100. Dušanka Bojanić, *Turski zakonski propisi iz XV i XVI veka za smederensku, krševačku i vidinsku oblast*, Beograd, 1974, 47. Srećko M. Džaja and Jozo Džambo (ed.), *Benedikt Kuripešić, Itinerarium der Gesandtschaft König Ferdinand I. von Ungarn nach Konstantinopel 1530*, Bochum 1983.

⁵ Nikolaj Todorov and Asparuh Velkov, *Situation démographique de la Péninsule balkanique (fin du XV^e—début du XVI^e s.)*, Sofia 1988.

⁶ Karl Kaser, *Familie und Verwandtschaft auf dem Balkan. Analyse einer untergehenden Kultur*, Wien-Köln-Weimar, 1994.

⁷ The sum could perhaps consist of a 25 or 30 akçe tax for the head of the household, plus the same amount for land. This was the case in Bosnia.

⁸ In 1477 it was not a part of sipahi's revenue. Cf. Ahmed Aličić, *Poimenični popis sandžaka vilajeta Hercegovina*, Sarajevo 1985 (passim). On the sultanik and the governor's hasses it was levied together with the *cizye* (see TT 167).

⁹ Kuripešić, *Itinerarium*, 22 speaks of the taxes to the 'Turk' before and in 1530 ('von ired erpawten gründen kein andern zyns dann jaerlich einen ungerischen gulden das ist fünfftzig Asper von einem haus zu gebenn schuldig gewest... 'Zum andern nimpt er jaerlich von allen personen jung und alt einen sondern zins ye dreyszig oder viertzig Aspern von einer person').

- ¹⁰ Hamid Hadžibegić, *Kanun-nama sultana Sulejmana Zakonodavca*, Glasnik Zemaljskog muzeja u Sarajevu, nova serija IV-V, Sarajevo 1950, 338, footnote 177.
- ¹¹ Orijentalni Institut Sarajevu, manuscript of Abdulah Polimac, signature 1/2 129-2 from the year 972 (1564/65).
- ¹² Đurđev et al., idem. 156-7.
- ¹³ Kiel, 'Remarks', 91. Also Özel, *Population changes*, with an extensive presentation and discussion in historiography on controversies about 'population pressure', 'pull' factors and the like.
- ¹⁴ Rački, Franjo, *Prilozi za geografsko-statistički opis bosanskoga pašalika*, Starine XIV, Zagreb 1882, 179.
- ¹⁵ Tomo Matić, *Djela Matije Antuna Reškovića*, Stari pisci hrvatski XXIII, Zagreb, 1916, 126, 50.
- ¹⁶ Linda Darling, *The Ottoman Finance Department and the Assessment and Collection of the cizye and avarız Taxes 1560-1660* (Ph. D. Diss., University of Chicago, 1990), 149. I think Darling is right when she says that cizye was *not* increased save for the amount of the collector's fee.
- ¹⁷ Moreover, the purchase of cizye defters became a widespread abuse for a long while, and the 'ilizam-like' practice may also contributed to the emergence of a new system of registration.
- ¹⁸ Tadija Smičiklas, *Dvjestogodišnjica oslobođenja Slavonije*, Zagreb, 1891. Ive Mažuran, *Popis naselja i stanovništva u Slavoniji iz 1698. godine*, Osijek, 1988.
- ¹⁹ Darling, idem, 202. She argues that the the collector's fees constitute most of the increase in the rate of the poll-tax, because the rise in the amount of the cizye did not exceed the rate of inflation by very much. This may be correct, but does not alter the fact that the tax burden has become twofold, threefold or even heavier.
- ²⁰ Aleksandar Fotić, 'Dva priloga iz istorije Srema 1687. godine', *Zbornik za orijentalne studije* 1, Beograd 1992, 139-46.
- ²¹ Mažuran, *Popis*, 54.
- ²² Nenad Moacanin, *Slavonija i Srijem u razdoblju osmanske vladavine*, Slavonski Brod 2001, 33.
- ²³ Michael Ursinus, 'Mutafçı Ahmed, und seinesgleichen: zur Bedeutung des deruhdecilik in Manastir im 18. Jahrhundert' in *Studia in honorem Professoris Verae Mutafčieva*, Sofia, 2001, 360-2.
- ²⁴ In this respect the only data from a non-Ottoman source about the seventeenth century I could find is a missionary report about Balkan Catholics from 1647. In Albanian Catholic villages in Kosovo girls were supposed to marry at any age between 15 and 23 years. Jačov, idem., 152-3.

The Practice of Tax Farming in the Province of Baghdad in the 1830s

Keiko Kiyotaki

Tax farming was the major method of tax collection by the provincial government in Baghdad, applying to most taxes on economic activities and agricultural production. Basically, a private tax collector paid the government a deposit in advance, and was then responsible for collecting and paying the tax of his farm. He retained the difference between his share of revenue and the promised amount of tax to the government as a profit. The tax farm was, in principle, sold to the highest bidder at public auction, but it was frequently assigned to private individuals or officials without competitive auction. The terms of the contract, such as the length of tax-farming period, the amount of levy in advance, and the method of payment differed from time to time, depending on the tax administration and policies of the local regime. The government in Baghdad, for example, employed a system of lifetime tax farming as a major method until the collapse of the quasi-independent military regime in 1831. The new government under the Ottoman governor, Ali Riza Pasha, tightened the conditions of the contract on renewing or in transfer of new farms. It eventually changed the basic scheme of taxation from lifetime contracts to a shorter period of from one to three years, under direct supervision of the imperial treasury in Istanbul. Although the government modified tax administration in the decade after the collapse of the local military regime, it did not bring to an end the application of tax farming itself. The system of tax farming never ceased to operate, and kept its influence on provincial administration throughout the nineteenth century. The purpose of this paper is to describe the local practice of tax farming in Baghdad, in relation to its administrative, social, and economic roles. This may clarify the effect of the Ottoman tax system and the character of fiscal administration in the region.

The tax-farming procedures used in this region help to understand how tax-farming practice generated tax revenues for the government. Ottoman tax administration has attracted wide attention from scholars interested in the political, social and

economic consequences of taxation by an administratively weak government. Those who consider tax farming a necessary evil of weak government focus on the unequal distribution of tax resources due to over-collection by the tax farmer. An important contribution of this weak government hypothesis was to highlight the transformation of urban society and the political regionalism that developed as a result of the system of the lifetime tax farm prevailing during the eighteenth century.¹ Systematic analysis of tax farming in respect to public finance and administration was not given serious consideration, except in the works of Yavuz Cezar and Mehmet Genç that I shall discuss shortly.² In the traditional conception, tax farming was often misrepresented as an inefficient method of taxation and interpreted as a cause of failure in Ottoman tax administration. The social and political logic that emphasised unequal distribution of revenue resources is a one-dimensional approach from the perspective of provincial history. There were, more often than not, economic rationales that explained why the government of Baghdad employed tax farming for revenue collection and fiscal administration. The suggestion that tax-farming practice gave an exploitative advantage to the tax farmer is not consistent with historical evidence concerning the province of Baghdad from the 1830s onwards.

This paper maintains that the local practice of tax farming was not always inefficient, and had positive effects on the public finance of the Baghdad government. Abundant primary sources show the depth of the contemporary government's interests in tax farming as a method of public finance and rural administration. One of the most important sources in this period is the survey of tax farms in 1247/1831. It was carried out by the local office of finance (*bay-muhasebe*) in the treasury after the collapse of the quasi-independent military regime in Baghdad.³ It is a best-case survey of the socio-geographic distribution of the tax farms. The records were inclusive of the details of the contract, the size of the farm, the location, and the year of purchase. Although the survey records do not allow a comprehensive analysis of tax farming, they are sufficient to allow an overview of contemporary taxation, showing both the advantages of tax farming and its flaws. Based on the survey, this paper explains how tax farming operated as an economic institution and played a role in stabilising the tax and fiscal administration for the government in the province of Baghdad.

Local Practice of Tax Farming in Baghdad

Although the local history of the province of Baghdad during our period is not well known, the survey indicates that in the system of

local administration there was continuity with earlier Ottoman practice. With regards to taxation, the Ottomans traditionally raised revenue through two types of tax farm: one was a limited term of contract, usually one to three years and the other was a contract for the tax farmer's lifetime. Tax farming with a limited-term contract originated in the fifteenth century, while the lifetime tax-farming contract became the predominant method of taxation in the eighteenth. A prominent characteristic of tax farming contracts found in the records was that the year of contract initiation dated from well before the survey, often from before the farmer's lifetime. Such old farms were termed as 'lifetime tax farms (*malikâne*)', but their holders were apparently heirs to the previous holders, or received the contract by transfer, either by sale, gift, or reward.

A characteristic of the lifetime tax-farming system is its combined role of tax collecting and bond finance for the government. The new system began during the period of the Ottoman-Habsburg War of 1683-99, when the government instituted the new system for the purpose of raising ready cash for financing extraordinary wartime expenditures. Different from the usual contract of the tax farm for a time-limited period, according to Genç the tax farmer had to pay into the treasury a larger deposit, determined by auction. The price was usually settled between at two to eight times the annual profits of the farm, a figure that the treasury determined by subtracting the tax amount from the estimated annual revenue of the farm. The tax amount was fixed in the contract, and paid into the treasury by the farmer yearly or in instalments for the farmer's lifetime.⁴ In those cases when the amount of the tax was fixed at lower than the estimated annual profit, the system clearly illustrates the use of tax farming as government finance by selling bonds, or more specifically, selling an annuity contract to the tax farmer. The initial payment was a government debt that the creditor or the tax farmer was entitled to recover from the profit of tax farms. The tax farmer would receive the interest payment as the profit throughout his lifetime. This principle was particularly applicable when the government divided the tax-collecting right in the farm into shares, and sold them to private individuals at auction. This method allowed wide subscription to the shares with smaller amounts of initial payment than for the lifetime tax farm from the subscriber. The purchaser of the share received the annuity from the profit of the farm for his lifetime according to the portion of the share.

Local custom might differ from the general practice of the lifetime tax farm that Genç studied. As he suggested, the whole process was performed locally, under nominal authorisation of the central government. According to contemporary documents prepared in Baghdad, the prospective purchaser of the farm submitted an

application to the governor's office (*divan*) for initiating the tax-farming contract. Based on his application, the local treasury prepared an official memorandum on the terms of contract. The memorandum was sent to the central authority applying for the Sultan's authorisation to finalise the contract. But the local treasury often did not follow the formal procedure. Based on the memorandum, the governor of Baghdad issued an authorisation (*divan-ı tezkiye*) of the contract. The farmer made a partnership contract with his agent (*kefil*) registered with the Islamic court upon payment of a deposit as requested by the contract. The procedure was official, but in many cases, deficient. The letter of authorisation was not precise in prescribing the details of contract, and caused many confusing disputes with the local treasury after the collapse of the local quasi-independent regime in 1831.⁵ Indeed, both the problems and virtues of the traditional method of tax farming are observed in the official correspondence between the provincial and central governments at the time of the governmental change in the 1830s.

The grass-roots practice of tax farming at the time of Ali Rıza Pasha's takeover in 1831 was problematic for two reasons: one was the often deficient procedure of the contract and the other arose from the wide application of tax farming in this region. The problem of the confused procedure of local tax farming, indeed, turned out to be serious when the new government confiscated the tax farms of the military officials, administrators, and notables, who had supported the previous government. The treasurer, Arif Efendi was entrusted to perform an auction sale of their properties, and in cases of tax farms, to transfer them to another tax farmer. As a result of lack of experience in local tax administration, he transferred the tax farm to the relatives of the governor and his retainers, high officials, and notables in Baghdad without the required payment or issue of authorisation. Because of the maladministration of tax farming, the treasurer himself was discharged and replaced by a financial official from the imperial treasury in Istanbul in 1837. The rights of the tax farmer illegally transferred were cancelled, auctioned again, and properly recorded by the new treasurer in official account books under the titles of *malikâne kalemi* and *başmuhasebe kalemi*. The details of the auction sales were reported to the imperial treasury in Istanbul, and the letter of authorisation was issued after their receipt of the report and required payment (*resm-ı kasr-ı yedi* and *harac-ı aklam*).⁶ However, the tax farm was still often granted to those who bribed the governor, treasurer, and the members of the administrative council. The amount of the tax itself was discounted, without the required payments in advance, which resulted in a drain on the tax revenues due to the Baghdad treasury.

Another problem arose when the government of Ali Riza Pasha was instructed to cancel the lifetime tax farms, and auction the new contracts. In reality, as shown in a voluminous correspondence with the central authority, the government was hardly able to perform the renewal of the contracts, or where necessary, the auction sale under new conditions, as a result of lack of experienced tax officials. The new system of tax farming required by the central authority shows substantial modification from the old one. In the local practice, as was often the case in the sale of lifetime tax farms, the government sold the tax farm to the person who offered the highest deposit. The annual amount of the tax was fixed in the contract. In the new system, the government auctioned off the tax due from the tax farmer based on the tax revenues in the previous years, instead of the payment of a deposit based on the estimated profit of the tax farm. The amount of deposit decreased as a consequence, and the tax increased rapidly year by year after the reform. Public auctions took place at the administrative council, which had been set up in Baghdad under the supervision of the Baghdad governor, instead of at the local treasury where the auction of the lifetime tax farms had taken place. As military commander-in-chief of the *Irak ve Arabistan* Army, Ali Riza Pasha, could not supervise fiscal and tax administration. It was not until the penetration of Tanzimat principles in the 1850s that the government could carry out the new system of tax farming in the province with less confusion in the procedure.⁷

The new regime in Baghdad after 1831, on the other hand, benefited from taking over the prevailing system of tax farming, without encountering many political and administrative difficulties arising from the breakdown of the existing local regime. The economic significance of tax farming may provide reasons for the new government's willingness to preserve the traditional taxation method. Tax revenues were achieved with a minimum cost of tax collection, because the administrative costs were borne by the tax farmer. The government could, moreover, transfer the risk of decrease in tax revenues to the tax farmer, by receiving the payment in advance at a fixed amount. The payment in advance served as domestic borrowing by the government from the tax farmer, at the cost of reduced opportunities for increasing tax revenues in the future. Given the lack of employment and business opportunities for many people, the tax farming system became the largest employer and yielded money at various stages of tax collection. The tax farmers who won the periodical auctions had good relations with the peasant cultivators in the fields. Historical evidence and an illustrative analysis of the survey records in Baghdad may help us to

understand the advantages of tax farming and the extent of its impact on the local economy and society.

Distribution of Tax Farms in Baghdad

The survey of tax farms in 1831 was recorded in two registers belonging to the başmuhasebe kalemî in Baghdad. One was the record of tax farms called *mukataa* in the fiscal year of 1247/1831-2. It was a duplicate copy of the survey record made locally in Baghdad and sent to the central authority. It listed tax farms which were transferred by sale (*ihale*), assigned (*der-uhde*), or put under direct collection (*emanet*), including the name of the tax farmer and the amount of tax in cash and in kind. The total number of farms in this record was 73, whose unit of taxation was large compared to farms in the entry list in another register. There were several farms for which nobody bid for the purchase and which were put under direct supervision of the government as *emanet*. The rest of the farms were located in the cities of Baghdad and Basra, and in agricultural areas along rivers, canals, and mountain streams. The tax farms in the cities were established on various taxable items such as customs duties, boat bridges over the Tigris River, the poll tax charged on non-Muslim residents, transit duties, bakery, sugar factories, dues on the issue of domestic passports, and stamp duties. The tax collected by the tax farmer was paid into the provincial treasury in cash. The tax farmers of such profit-bearing tax farms were, more or less, closely associated with the governor Ali Rıza Pasha, as his retinue, as administrative or military officials, or as local notables in Baghdad. In addition to the tax farms in the city, there were numerous tax farms called *mukataa-ı miriye* (or *mukataa*), in agricultural areas. (See Table 1) These were largely located in the basins of the three major rivers in the province, the Diyala, the Tigris, and the Euphrates, along major canals fed from the rivers, in towns and villages, or in areas near perennial marshes. They were within a day trip from the city of Baghdad, or nearby major towns in which the government established the district administration. Compared to the tax farms in the urban area, the unit of the tax farm in agricultural areas was not uniform, and conditions were complicated due to the entrenched interests of the tax farmer. Much difficulty originated in the taken-for-granted privilege of the tax farmer established over the land and produce through the long history of the tax-farming practice in the province.

Another register was described as the record of rivers and villages inside tax farms (*mukataa*) which were assigned to persons and which were incorporated into tax farms. They were registered with the land registry office (*defterhane*) in Baghdad. It was in fact an entry

list of tax farms called *maktua*, which were located outside the larger tax farms, or formed parts of the larger tax farm. They were mostly smaller units of tax farming, such as villages or portions of villages, rain-fed fields, irrigated fields along streams, canals, springs, wells, and marshes. In many places the tax farmer received only a portion of a canal or stream, or a part of agricultural fields. In addition to the location of the farm, the record includes the details of the contract such as the name of the farmer, the date of transfer, the amount of tax, the grant of tax-exempt privilege, if any, and the other conditions of transfer in each farm. The farmers under the contract were of various origins and included military men (*asker*), government officials (*kalemîye*), notables (*ayan*), men of religion (*ulema*), dervishes (*derîş*), and tribesmen (*aşîret*). The military men mentioned in the document were *beg*, *çavus*, *ağa*, and *paşa*. The officials of the government were designated *efendi*, *katib-i hazîne*, *katib*, *emin*, *mir-i cemaat*, *muhasebeci*, and *halife*. Titles of employees of religious institutions were *müderris*, *imam*, *hatib*, *müfti*, and *mulla*. The notables were recognised by the name of *haci*, *zade*, *karisi*, *batun*, *sayyid*, and *varid*. Those who had no distinguishing epithets were *reaya* (Ottoman subjects), but in consideration of their wealth, which was large enough to purchase the tax-farming right, they may be classified as notables. Members of mystic orders are designated *şeyh* and *derîş* in the record. Besides them, this category includes entries on the *tekkes* of the Nakşbendî and Bektaşî orders, to which the government assigned the tax farms. Tribes are listed under the name of the tribal sheikh, and can be distinguished by the size of tax farm and its location.

A summary of the records of the survey in the second register is shown in Tables 2 to 6. The tables indicate farms held under a system of share-holding. In the record, there are a large number of farms in which shareholders were entitled to partake in the right of tax collection. The shareholders are recognised by their title according to the classification above, but in the following tables, they are entered as share-holding (*hîsse*) to make clear the type of farm.⁸ Analysis of the record according to the location of the farm and the social and political status of the tax farmer recognised in the survey record helps identify characteristic features of tax farming in this region.

There were 456 tax farms entered in the survey record, which were inclusive of five *timar* holdings. Two of five timars were merged into the tax farm in the Zengibad district; two turned into the farms with share-holding; and one was farmed out to the military official for tax collection. The total area of tax farming was not recorded but the area assigned for taxation was known. The area of a farm was small, mostly one or two *feddan* (a local unit of

measurement equivalent to *dönüm* [approximately 0.25 hectare]), not more than five to eight feddan. Table 2 shows that a large number of farms, 171 farms, were situated in the Hilla region on the Middle Euphrates River. Another 198 farms were located on the Diyala River basin, or in Mahrut, Khorasan, Khanaqin, and Khalis. 34 farms were farmed out in the mountain area in Mandali and Jisan, and 53 farms were in Dujail in the north-west of Baghdad along the right bank of the Tigris River. The notables entered into contracts for more than one-third of the tax farms, many of which were located in the irrigated areas on the basin of the Middle Euphrates River. The rest of the farms were distributed equally among six different categories of tax farm. The farm was either held under a single name or by two to four different names jointly. In the case of the joint holding, the farmers were mostly from among the notables. For example, the notables jointly held 45 farms out of the total number of 60 joint farms. The holders of the rest of the farms were military officials (11 farms), men of religion (2 farms) and mystic orders (2 farms). A few farms of the notables had the names of ulema jointly, but in this region there was no farm held by a combination of military men and notables.

It is not evident from the record whether the tax farmer was an official tax collector formally authorised by the government, or a tax-collecting agent of the larger farm, mukataa. Documents of petition (*arzhal*), the deed of authorisation (*divan-ı tezkire*), or the deed issued by the Islamic court (*ilam*) give a clue to the status of the tax farm listed in the record. For example, the petition of the tax farmer (*der-uhdeci*) claiming the farm along the canal of Abu Jedid in Mahrut shows that the farmer (*ayan*) purchased the tax-collecting right from the government, not from the tax farmer of the larger tax farm in the secondary market. He entered into the contract for his lifetime, paying the initial payment and fees requested by the government. The tax assigned to him was paid to the tax-collecting official of Mahrut in which his farm was located.⁹ This is an obvious case of a legitimate holding of a tax farm authorised by the government. The survey record includes numbers of farms in which the right of tax collection was obscure. In the case of the farms located along the irrigated canals, for example, the government partitioned part of the large tax farm (*mukataa*), and granted the tax-collecting right of the separated farms to different farmers. Their taxes were paid to the tax farmer of the large tax farm. The farmers were functionally the taxmen of the tax farmer of the large farm, but apparently, they entered into the tax-farming contract with the government. According to a document dated after the survey, the government terminated an assignment of a farm separate from the large tax farm to a dervish lodge (*tekke*), or its members (*derviş*). Instead, it paid

monthly stipends from the local treasury in compensation.¹⁰ This incident indicates that the government perhaps remained a party to the tax-farming contract and retained the power of authorisation in any transfer of the farm.

The year of purchase of many farms dates back to well before the tax farmer's lifetime. The oldest year of transfer in the record was 1639, referring to a farm located in Hilla. The year of purchase in the record varied from 1639 to the year of survey, mostly between 100 to 10 years before the survey. The contract for the farm could be renewable by way of inheritance or by sale, or purchased by the same family for generations. Otherwise, the farms were merged into the larger units, *mukataas*. For example, 60 farms in the eighteenth century, 5 farms after the nineteenth century, and 36 farms in unknown years are listed in the record as *mablul*; that is, they were merged into larger tax farms in the district.¹¹ Many of them were located in irrigated areas along the canals in Hilla, Khalis, and Khorasan, which were largely farmed by the notables. (See Table 3)

After deduction of all merged farms from the list, the total number of farms is 355, of which 147 were located on the Diyala River basin, 125 on the Euphrates River basin, 51 farms on the Tigris River basin, and 32 in mountain areas along the Ottoman-Persian border. (See Table 4) They were subject to tax payment, but in reality only two-fifths of the farmers paid taxes into the treasury, while nearly three-fifths received the privilege of tax exemption and the other tax benefits (*muaf*). The tax was in cash, grain, or both, depending on the location of the farm. Generally speaking, the tax on rain-fed fields in villages and their vicinity, lands irrigated by streams, springs and branch canals, whose productivity could be estimated, was paid in kind. The tax on highly productive farms was paid in cash. The farms of high tax value were located in Khalis, where nearly a half of the farms in the villages were charged the payment of the tax in cash, *zolota kuruş*. (Polish silver coins). The farmer paid the tax to the tax-collecting official (*emin*) in the district, the tax farmer (*mültezim*) of the large tax farm who often served as the district administrator as well, or paid directly into the local office of administration (*divan*). There were a few farmers who divided the tax into two portions and paid to the tax collector and the administration office respectively. There were several other farmers who paid the tax in cash to the treasury in Baghdad directly.

Military officials played the role of tax collectors more often than of beneficiaries of taxation. Notables were major tax payers according to the list, for they might have purchased the right in a tax farm without the privilege of tax exemption. Besides military men and notables, the farms subject to share-holding were also tax paying. (See Table 5) The share-holders were notables, women, or

government officials who were granted the share as salaries (*halife-i mukabele*). Women held three shares, and the rest belonged to officials or notables. The year of transfer of shares differed by share even within the same farm. The share-holder's lands were cultivated fields near the city of Baghdad in which production was stable and less risky. Irrigated land was less regarded for the sale of share, except for farms of high productivity along the major canals.

The farms with tax benefits were scattered throughout the agricultural area in the province. (See Table 6) The tax farmers obtained the privilege of tax exemption by putting down a larger initial payment on purchase, or as a grant that the government paid as a premium for service or as a privilege, reward, or stipend. Indeed, one of purposes of the survey of 1831 was to screen out the farms which had been exempted from taxation by the previous military regime. Looking into the record, the number of tax-exempt farms was large, about three-fifths of the total. In the Dujail district, in particular, all except six farms raked off state money, with the excuse of tax privilege. Above the sub-heading in the record of the Dujail mukataa, we can find a note stating that all privileges were void. Another important piece of evidence is provided by the recipients of the privilege. Almost all tribal sheikhs, many of the ulema and dervishes were among the recipients of such tax privileges, alongside military men and government officials.¹² It is not clear from the contemporary documents on what conditions the government allocated tribal lands as tax farms without the obligation of tax payment. Entries in the register concerning several tribal farms tie up the grant of the tax farm with an acknowledgement of the tribal sheikh upon his selection to the tribal sheikhsip. In the same way, public facilities such as *menzilhanes*, mosques, and their employees had the use of tax revenues for stipends, salaries, or as operating costs of their facilities and institutes.

The Political and Economic Implications of Tax Farming

The local government in Baghdad arranged and implemented an elaborate scheme of taxation based on the Ottoman system of tax farming. The survey record shows that there was a predominance of small tax farms in different locations throughout urban and agricultural areas. The number of tax farmers was large, and their social backgrounds were very various. A number of factors might have produced this pattern. Social and geographic features such as the distance from government offices, complicated farming practice, imperfect markets for agricultural produce, weak political will in exercising supervision over the actual process of revenue collection might all have affected the contract of tax farming. In particular,

Ottoman historians have suggested that politically weak government was one of the most influential factors in the evolution of this unique pattern. My study of the record, however, shows that this was not the case. The monopolistic control of tax farming by powerful lifetime tax farmers—an important political effect of weak governmental control—was not always existent. In contrast, there were numerous farms where the local government exercised active control over farming, for example in assigning tax farms as a substitute for salary payments, special rewards, stipends, and subsidies. Some farmers purchased the tax-exempt privilege by paying a large deposit, which could usefully meet the government's demand for debt finance. The farmers who revived land for cultivation received the tax-collection right on the land. Workers in public facilities, government employees, or military men, even religious establishments had the right to tax farms as salaries, stipends, or to pay operational costs. The transfer of the right on the less competitive auction market did not undermine the government's ability to monitor the execution of tax farming. It was not always true that tax farming had been an inefficient system of taxation, and a disadvantage to the Ottoman central authority. In this respect, the hypothesis of weak government does not explain many important aspects of the local practice of tax farming in the province of Baghdad.

Furthermore, the record demonstrates the political role of tax farming as a means of provincial administration. An important example of this was the government's use of tax farming as a measure of tribal administration. The tribesmen in the province claimed large areas of agricultural land as their tribal domain (called *dıra*), and engaged in agricultural production for tribal use and income. Their lands were mainly located in agricultural areas along the major rivers and canals in the central and southern regions of the province, and yielded large quantities of agricultural produce. Administrative incorporation of the tribesmen into the government system was a key to the economic and political stability of any regime in Baghdad. The list of a number of tribal sheikhs in the Hilla district on the Middle Euphrates River portrays a benign acceptance of governmental authority by the tribal sheikhs as a result of the political use of tax farming. As recorded in the register, the tribal sheikh was appointed as tax farmer of his tribal land, contingent on being acknowledged as the tribal sheikh by the government. Most tax farms awarded to the sheikh were exempt from the actual payment of the tax in return for his service to the government. The area of tax farms was large, with low turnover and re-sale of the farms. Another use of tax farming as a political tool was the grant of tax farms to military commanders and officials who were Ottomans, or recruited

locally from among the tribal chiefs in the area. The tax farms of the military men were scattered in all districts, in particular, in the tribal areas on the basin of the Middle Euphrates River and in Khanaqin near the Ottoman and Persian borders. Most of their holdings were tax exempt, so that they could supplement the cost of military campaigns and provide an incentive for their military service.

In conclusion, the survey record of 1831 gives a hint of the enduring problems of tax farming as well as its functional benefits that social and political historians have previously underestimated. A few serious problems arose in the early period of the new Ottoman regime under Ali Riza Pasha in Baghdad. These were mainly related to legal disputes over the agreement of the tax farmer with the previous quasi-independent military regime, and to the provisions of new regulations on the method of transfer. On the other hand, the economic and political advantages of tax farming made its continuation worthwhile. The local practice was administratively serviceable at a time of governmental change when inexperienced administrators had little information on agricultural sites and native farming practices. Operated by the local government, tax farming provided an opportunity for new government officials to gain access to agricultural production. In the process of centralisation, the government withheld the transfer of lifetime tax farms, and moreover, tried to exercise tight political control over the abuse of tax farmers by implementing periodical auctions of the tax-farming right. The assignment of tax revenues for collection could economise on scarce administrative resources and provide a police force for the central authority. Another merit of tax farming was its function as an economic institution. The tax farmer was expected to encourage profitable activities on the farm, supervise agricultural production, improve the maintenance of natural resources such as irrigation canals, drainage, and the recruitment of peasant workers. The tax farmers were also often actively involved in agricultural practice as seed owners or supervisors of farm management. Because of their active role in local administration and production, the Ottoman government in Baghdad aptly incorporated tax farming, despite its shortcomings, into the centralised system of administration in the Tanzimat period.

Table 1. Tax Farms (*Mukataas*) in Agricultural Areas

River Basin	Tax Farm	Farmer	Tax (kuruş)	Wheat (tagar)	Barley (tagar)	Grain (tagar)
Diyala	Khorasan	Notable	60,000	100	600	
	Mahrut	Ulema (Hatib)	40,000	80	370	
	Shehriban	Ulema (Hatib)	60,000			
	Khalis	Military (Ağa)	160,000	200	1,100	
	Alibad, Humeyr	Official (Katib)	25,000			
Tigris	Tikrit (zabitlik)	Military (Beğ)	25,000			
Euphrates	Abu Ghraib	Notable		400	400	200
	Musaib	Notable	200,000	300	300	
	Iskandariya	Tribe (Şeyh)		150	130	
	Mahawil	Notable		600	300	100
	Radwaniya	Tribe (Şeyh)		200	200	
	Mahmudiya	Tribe (Şeyh)		50	50	
	Nil, Kandiya	Notable	150,000			
	Basiya	Notable		60	40	
	Huriya	Notable		120		
	Hilla	Notable	560,000	2,100	2,100	556
	Nahr Shah	Notable		800	250	150
Zengibad	Hindiya	Notable	1,000,000			
	Shifate	Notable	30,000			
Mandali	Kıfr	Military (Ağa)	60,000			
	Mandali	Notable	450,000			
	Kazaniya	Military (Ağa)	140,000	150		
	Badr, Jisan	Notable	16,000			

Sources: Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi (BA), Bâb-ı Defteri Başmuhasebe Kalemi (D. BŞM.), Bağdat Hazinesi, 16748, 1247 A.H.

Table 2. Tax Farms in Total

	Military (Asker)	Official (Kalemiye)	Notable (Ayan)	Religion (Ulema)	Mystic (Derviş)	Tribe (Aşiret)	Share (Hisse)	Unknown	Total
Khanaqin	17	9	21	6	3	1	6	3	66
Mahrut	2	1	7	1				3	14
Khorasan	4	2	13	2	1	1	11	14	48
Khalis	12	8	22	3	2	1	10	12	70
Hilla	16	7	68	14	6	44	10	6	171
Dujail	1	2	29	3	2	10	1		48
Tigris	3	1	1						5
Mandali	4		13	9	4	2	2		34
Total	59	30	174	38	18	59	40	38	456

Sources: BA, D. BŞM. BGH, 16749, 1247 A.H.

Table 3. Tax Farms (Merged)

	Military (Asker)	Official (Kalemiye)	Notable (Ayan)	Religion (Ulema)	Mystic (Derviş)	Tribe (Aşiret)	Share (Hisse)	Unknown	Total
Khanaqin	3							3	6
Mahrut		1	1					3	5
Khorasan			5					13	18
Khalis	4		5			1		12	22
Hilla	2		30	2	1	5		6	47
Dujail			1						1
Tigris		1							1
Mandali			2						2
Total	9	2	44	2	1	6		37	101

Sources: BA, D. BŞM., Bağdat Hazinesi, 16749.

Table 4. Tax Farms under Contract

	Military (Asker)	Official (Kalemiye)	Notable (Ayan)	Religion (Ulema)	Mystic (Derviş)	Tribe (Aşiret)	Share (Hisse)	Unknown	Total
Khanaqin	14	9	21	6	3	1	6		60
Mahrut	2		6	1					9
Khorasan	4	2	8	2	1	1	11	1	30
Khalis	8	8	17	3	2		10		48
Hilla	14	7	38	12	5	39	10		125
Dujail	1	2	28	3	2	10	1		47
Tigris	3		1						4
Mandali	4		11	9	4	2	2		32
Total	50	28	130	36	17	53	40	1	355

Sources: BA, D. BŞM., Bağdat Hazinesi, 16749.

Table 5. Tax Farms (Tax Paid)

	Military (Asker)	Official (Kalemiye)	Notable (Ayan)	Religion (Ulema)	Mystic (Derviş)	Tribe (Aşiret)	Share (Hisse)	Unknown	Total
Khanaqin	6	3	13	1	1		5		29
Mahrut	2		1						3
Khorasan	2	2	5			1	6		16
Khalis	8	4	12		1		7		32
Hilla	13	4	20	5		3	5		50
Dujail			5	1					6
Tigris	2		1						3
Mandali	2		5				1		8
Total	35	13	62	7	2	4	24		147

Sources: BA, D. BŞM., Bağdat Hazinesi, 16749.

Table 6. Tax Farms with Tax Benefits

	Military (Asker)	Official (Kalemiye)	Notable (Ayan)	Religion (Ulema)	Mystic (Derviş)	Tribe (Aşiret)	Share (Hisse)	Unknown	Total
Khanaqin	8	6	8	5	2	1	1		31
Mahrut			5	1					6
Khorasan	2		3	2	1		5	1	14
Khalis		4	5	3	1		2		16
Hilla	1	3	18	7	5	36	5		75
Dujail	1	2	23	2	2	10	1		41
Tigris	1								1
Mandali	2		6	9	4	2	1		24
Total	15	15	68	29	15	49	15	1	208

Sources: BA, D. BŞM, Bağdat Hazinesi, 16749.

Notes

I am grateful to Yavuz Cezar, Roger Feldman, and particularly, Colin Imber for reading this paper.

¹ Suraiya Faroqhi, 'Crisis and Change' in Halil İnalçık (ed.), *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire*, 2 vols. (Cambridge, 1994), ii, 537-8; Ariel Salzman, 'Ancien Regime Revisited: 'Privatization' and Political Economy in the Eighteenth-Century Ottoman Empire' *Politics and Society*, 21/4 (1993), 393-423; Margaret L. Meriwether, 'Urban Notables and Rural Resources in Aleppo, 1770-1830' *International Journal of Turkish Studies*, 4/1 (1987), 55-73.

² Yavuz Cezar, *Osmanlı Maliyesinde Bunalım ve Değişim Dönemi* (İstanbul, 1986), 169-74, 242; Mehmet Genç, 'Osmanlı Maliyesinde Malikane Sistemi', in Ünal Nalbantoğlu and Osman Okyar (eds.), *Türkiye İktisat Semineri* (Ankara, 1975), 231-96.

³ Turkey, Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi (BA), Bâb-ı Defteri Başmuhasebe Kalemi, Bağdat Hazinesi, 16748, 1247 A.H. and 16749, 1247 A.H.

⁴ Faroqhi, 'Crisis and Change', 537-8; Genç, 'Malikane Sistemi', 236-42.

⁵ BA, Muallim Cevdet Tasnifi (CT) Maliye 9618, 28 Zilkade 1252; BA, CT Maliye 19794, 12 Rebiyülâhir 1250; BA. Irâde (I), Mesâil-i Mühimme 2044, 19 Receb 1262; Dahiliye 2133.

⁶ The National Archives of the UK (TNA): Public Record Office (PRO). FO 195/113, No.26, 16 April 1832; No.56, 27 July 1832; No.65, 29 July 1833; No.67, 5 September 1833; BA. I, Dahiliye 2133, 21 Receb 1257; J .B. Rousseau, *Description du Pachalik de Bagdad* (Paris, 1809), 25-8.

⁷ BA, I. Meclis-i Vâlâ 5488, 20 Zilkade 1266; BA, CT Maliye 19034, 20 Rebiyülevvel 1228; İnalçık, *An Economic and Social History*, i, 64-6; Abdul Rahim and

Yuzo Nagata, 'The Iltizam System in Egypt and Turkey', *Journal of Asian and African Studies*, 14 (1977), 179-83; Ahmet Tabakoğlu, *Gerileme Dönemine GİRerken Osmanlı Maliyesi* (Istanbul, 1985), 122-35.

⁸ BA, CT Maliye 1622, 24 Cemaziyelevvel 1250; Cezar, *Değişim Dönemi*, 79, 242; Mehmet Genç, 'Esham', *İslam Ansiklopedisi*, XI, 376-80.

⁹ BA. I, Mesâil-i Mihimme 2037, 17 Cemaziyelevvel 1260; Dahiliye 2932, 12 Rebiyülevvel 1258; BA. I, Mesâil-i Mühimme 2038, 4 Cemaziyelâhir 1260; TNA: PRO. FO 195/113, No.14, 1835.

¹⁰ BA, CT Maliye 9258, 17 Cemaziyelevvel 1250; CT Evkaf 27168, 11 Cemaziyelevvel 1250; CT Evkaf 1185, 27 Cemaziyelâhir 1260.

¹¹ BA, CT Maliye 18883, 14 Safer 1244.

¹² BA, CT Maliye 18883, 9258; CT Evkaf 27168.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF OTTOMAN TOWNS

The City of Adilcevaz in the Late Middle
Ages and the Early Ottoman Period

Tom Sinclair

The subject of this paper is the city of Adilcevaz, whose remains lie on a tall rock and adjacent parts of the plain on the north-west shore of Lake Van. The paper is concerned with the settlement which those remains now represent, both as the settlement was in the late Middle Ages after the demise of the Il-Khanid empire, and in the early Ottoman occupation up to A.D. 1600. By 'settlement' we mean a series of buildings, including defensive walls, standing on certain parts of the terrain, a population, and the relation between buildings and population. Some attention has already been given to the question of the nature of Adilcevaz as a settlement in the sixteenth century.¹ However the account in question has more to do with the buildings and certain characteristics of the population as revealed by the sixteenth century Ottoman documents, than with the position of those buildings on the site and the position of the population in relation to those buildings. Moreover an examination of the evidence, of whatever sort, pertaining merely to the sixteenth century is insufficient. The state of the city in the first century or so of Ottoman rule is impossible to understand without an estimate of the equivalent in the late Middle Ages.

Site

The city's site lies on the present shore (the shoreline has retreated owing to a rise in the level of the lake) on a plain at the mouth of a broad valley. The valley, only about 5 km. long, has a flat floor more than a kilometre in width, and this broadens at the approach to the lake. The valley's floor, irrigated by a river, is at present covered with orchards and gardens, among which houses are interspersed. The nature of the outlying groups of houses to the north-west (away from the lake) of the citadel on its rock cannot have been much different in the late Middle Ages and the early Ottoman period from what it is now: a kind of farming suburb.²

The city's medieval walled area stood on the isolated rock, which now descends into the lake on the one side and is precipitous on the opposite side (facing inland). The citadel, in the strict military sense of the word, occupies the very top of the rock: a narrow spine only about 80 m. long. The citadel takes the form of a thin box of walls defended by a few towers on either side.³

The walls descend from either end of the tiny citadel, diverging from one another at first, and enclosing an apron of steeply-sloping ground. As we shall argue below, in the late Middle Ages the walled enclosure on the front face of the rock certainly contained a civilian population and may have accommodated military personnel too. One indication is the mosque, of late medieval construction, within the enclosure. At present the walls are cut off by the lake—they descend straight into it—providing further indications of a rise in the level of the lake.⁴ We know, moreover, from Evliya Çelebi's mid-seventeenth century description that a wall ran along the base of the front apron of the citadel rock, protecting it from attack on the side of the lake.⁵ A further locus of population, at any rate in the eleventh century A.D., was an island in the lake somewhere in front of the rock. (The evidence for the former existence of this island and for its submerging by the lake's rising waters is presented below.)

To the east of the citadel rock, near the shore, is the sixteenth-century mosque known as the Zal Paşa Camii.⁶ This was probably built soon after 963/1556, the date of a *tabrir defter* in which other mosques and a medrese are mentioned and in which one would therefore expect a mention of this mosque too: the same year, moreover, is the date when Zal Pasha's work on the new Ottoman citadel at Ahlat commenced.⁷ The mosque, however, is now completely isolated. We shall argue that population and houses moved, in the late Middle Ages and possibly during the early years of Ottoman rule, from the island to the walled enclosure and to some extent to the land around the mosque; there was probably also a transfer of population from the island to the flat and fertile land west

of the rock. In the sixteenth century, we shall argue, population shifted again, this time from the walled enclosure on the front face of the rock to the easterly suburb around the Zal Paşa mosque and to the other suburb west of the rock. In a final series of moves in the 19th century people abandoned the easterly suburb round the Zal Paşa mosque, the westerly suburb and the walled area on the rock. Essentially the population moved to the present site of the town or else dispersed to villages.

The Late Middle Ages

The Il-Khanid period in this region lasts until around 751/1350.⁸ During the Il-Khanid period, at least until c. 736/1335, the region's dominant cities were Ahlat, a day's walk from Adilcevaz on the lake's west shore, and Erciş, several days' walk to the east and towards the lake's north-easterly finger. Ahlat was an Il-Khanid provincial capital with a pronounced Muslim element in its population, whereas Erciş was very much a Christian centre.⁹

In the period from the end of the Il-Khanid empire to the beginning of the Ottoman occupation, it is convenient to take only the period of Kara Koyunlu control over the region, which lasts from some time in the 1360s to 1468.¹⁰ Information on Adilcevaz is lacking for the Ak Koyunlu and Safavid occupations, which are not long enough to provide a coherent picture by themselves anyway. The Kara Koyunlu directly administered a band of territory comprising the north shore of the lake, including Adilcevaz and Erciş, and other plains to north and east (Malazgirt, Bargiri/Muradiye etc.).¹¹ During the period of Kara Koyunlu control, Ahlat, on an open site and with a tiny and somewhat vulnerable walled area, was fast emptying and the population transferring to the much better protected city of Bitlis, a day's walk away from the lake's south-west corner down a narrow valley.¹² Moreover Ahlat was not directly controlled by the Kara Koyunlu: it was in the hands of the Bitlis princes, admittedly themselves vassals of the Kara Koyunlu.¹³ Erciş, too, declined, despite its reputation as a favoured city of the Kara Koyunlu, especially under the blows of successive invasions and counter-attacks by the Kara Koyunlu. The reconstruction work undertaken by the Kara Koyunlu could not compensate for the openness and exposure of the site. The small citadel lay on an artificial mound in a plain; the walled area, if there was one, seems to have been limited in extent.¹⁴ Further south the territory, including the key city of Van, was controlled by the local Kurdish principalities.

If the region contained a city which suited the Kara Koyunlu as an administrative centre, it was Adilcevaz. The city lay within the band

of territory north and north-east of the lake which was directly administered by the Kara Koyunlu. Its rock, with walled area and citadel, made it highly secure.¹⁵ Kara Koyunlu administration was in fact based here rather than at Erciş. There seems to have been a governorship, based at Adilcevaz, of the whole district of the north shore and the Malazgirt plain.¹⁶ The city population itself had a secular leader, apparently something not far different from a mayor, as well as a bishop.¹⁷

What, then, did Adilcevaz amount to as a city in the Kara Koyunlu period?

During one of the Turkish raids on Asia Minor in the mid-eleventh century A.D., the city was attacked by Tughrul Beg. From a description of the attack it becomes clear that the main body of the city lay on the island. The walled area on the front face of the rock was merely a citadel, into which the population withdrew.¹⁸

But from the description of a Kara Koyunlu attack on the city in the early fifteenth century it emerges that the walled area on the rock is no longer merely the citadel but, precisely, the walled area of the city—its heart.¹⁹ There is some evidence, independent of this, that the walls enclosing the whole area were well maintained. An inscription of Jahan Shah, Kara Koyunlu sultan from 1438 to 1467, has been found in the walls, which proves at least Kara Koyunlu interest in the city.²⁰ The mosque inside the walls would most credibly date from the Kara Koyunlu period.

If the city's walled area was that on the front face of the citadel rock, where were the suburbs? No island is mentioned in the early fifteenth century. This does not by itself mean that there was no island. However the process of transfer from the island to the walled enclosure on the rock, to the land east of the rock around the present Zal Paşa Camii and, perhaps, to the west of the citadel rock may have started and may even have finished. By the mid-seventeenth century the descriptions of Evliya Çelebi and Katib Çelebi make it more than likely that the island had disappeared by then.²¹ When the move from the island took place depends on an unknown: the point or points at which a rise in the lake's level took place sufficient to submerge the island or at least waterlog it and so make it uninhabitable.

Summing up, the settlement of the late Middle Ages must have been of some size: not only do we have evidence of the existence of an institution resembling that of a mayor, which would suggest a substantial body of population, but the city was the centre of an extensive administrative district and presented, in the circumstances of the time, many advantages over the neighbouring city sites: the easily defensible apron of land, fortified by walls, and the citadel, admittedly tiny, but difficult or impossible of approach, because

surrounded, along different stretches, either by cliffs or by steep slopes. The city, therefore, consisted of the walled enclosure on the rock and the small citadel above, together, probably, with a developing suburb to the east and perhaps one to the west too.

The Ottoman Period: 1534 to 1600

From 1534 onwards Adilcevaz was a sanjak capital in the huge *eyalet* of Amid, whose capital was the city then of that name, now Diyarbakır, in the upper Tigris basin to the south-west.²² Until that date the Kurdish principalities of Bitlis, Hakkari and Hizan all belonged to the same *vilayet* [sic], though only on a nominal basis.²³ From the date of its capture by the Ottomans the significance of the sanjak of Adilcevaz was precisely that it was not a Kurdish principality; it was, moreover, the easternmost city and sanjak on the lake's north shore permanently in Ottoman hands: Erciş and Van were held by the Safavid empire. In these circumstances one might have expected greater Ottoman investment in the city; and this would probably have taken place if the Ottoman empire had not progressively tightened its hold on the region, conquering the eastern cities (Erciş, Van) and grafting the sanjak system on to the hereditary Kurdish principalities.

However the Ottoman and Safavid empires' territorial holdings within the region did change; so did the régime under which the Kurdish principalities co-operated with the Ottoman authorities; and the city and sanjak of Adilcevaz lost much of their significance within the Ottoman defensive and administrative arrangements for the region.²⁴ The princes of Bitlis, which in the period to 1535 represented the front line of territory administered by states or other entities loyal to the Ottoman empire, were thrown out, precisely, in 1535, and the principality converted into a sanjak of more standard style.²⁵ (In 1578 the prince, son of that expelled in 1535, was invited back, and was reinstated as sanjak bey of Bitlis and Muş, though with many of the rights and privileges of a hereditary prince; in effect he regained his principality, though under a somewhat different status.)²⁶ In 1548 Van was captured and turned into the centre of an *eyalet* effectively encompassing the Van region and, after 1578, the land descending towards Lake Urmia.²⁷ Besides Bitlis, the other Kurdish principalities were given a similar status; they retained much of their former status, both under the Ottomans and before, but the Ottoman empire imposed certain duties such as the raising of troops.²⁸ After bitter fighting between 1548 and 1553 Erciş was finally captured.²⁹ An immense effort was put into fortifying the city,³⁰ and it became the first line of defence against an enemy

approaching from the east along the track from Khoy. Adilcevaz therefore lost its former front-line position.

Given the city's reduced importance within the Van region, what, in terms of built form and of population, did Adilcevaz amount to in the sixteenth century?

The description by Evliya Çelebi, though relating to a date half a century later than our period, is much the best we have of the city's physical layout in the Ottoman period, and his description should be borne in mind in the attempt to interpret the evidence we have which strictly pertains to the sixteenth century. According to Evliya there was an *iç kale*, with mosque, arms stores, grain stores, *defterdarhane* etc., and below the *iç kale* another *kale*. The lakeside walls of the latter are specifically mentioned by Evliya—these were later submerged, as we said above. He mentions many cannon, some of which pointed towards the harbour: the latter, judging by the evenly shelving shore to the west, probably lay to the east, not far from the Zal Paşa Camii. In the lower *kale* Evliya mentions 300 *bağsız bahçesiz* houses (houses without orchards or gardens): the houses were apparently so closely jammed together that, in contrast to those in the suburbs, certainly the northerly and westerly, there was no room for gardens. Evliya also mentions a *han* or caravansaray.³¹

Evliya's *iç kale* may be the tiny citadel atop the rock, though it would be hard to find space for a mosque there, and my own inspection of the ruined buildings inside the citadel's walls did not reveal a mosque. More likely, perhaps, his *iç kale* was delimited by a cross-wall on the citadel rock's front face, running between each arm of the defensive walls. The mosque in question would then be the late medieval one within the walls. Below the cross-wall were Evliya's 300 civilian houses.

Evliya is describing a situation 100 years after the mid-sixteenth century, the period to which most of our direct evidence pertains, and about 50 years after the end of the sixteenth century. However, for the sixteenth century we have little direct evidence as regards the layout of the walls. The model with which Evliya presents us is useful in interpreting the evidence we do possess.

A tahrir defter of 963/1556 tells us that in that year there were 25 Christian households *der nefsi şehiri Adilcevaz* and 283 Christian households in the *şehiri Adilcevaz*.³² Normally the phrase 'der nefsi şehiri ...' or 'der nefsi ...' means 'in the town of ...' (i.e. 'in... itself'). But here the *nefs* is contrasted with the *şehir*; the latter means what *nefs* normally means in the documents, i.e. the town as a whole, except that part of the town is distinguished as the *nefs*. Probably the population of the *nefs* is the civilian population of the

walled area on the front face of the citadel rock. It is unclear if in the mid- or late sixteenth century there was a cross-wall.

Concerning the Muslim population the defter makes no equivalent distinction; the phrase 'nefs-i Adilcevaz' is used for the whole Muslim population of 283 households.³³ This does not mean that no Muslims lived in the walled area on the rock; it means merely that the document fails to make the relevant distinction in their case. This is because before the Ottoman conquest the Christians of the walled area had been assigned as *bass* to the *kadı* and two of his brothers.³⁴

Besides the nefs (in this case the walled area on the rock) the document of 1556 mentions a Great Mosque with a substantial *vakıf*.³⁵ Evliya does not mention a Great Mosque, but does mention the Zal Paşa Camii, and the Zal Paşa Camii that we have now may well be a completely new construction (modelled on the Üç Şerefeli Camii at Edirne) on the same site.³⁶ Zal Pasha started the building of the Ottoman citadel at Ahlat (by then part of the sanjak of Adilcevaz) in the same year, 963/1555-6, finishing it in 965/1557-8.³⁷ The construction of the present Zal Paşa Camii at Adilcevaz could well fall sometime after the date of the defter.

The defter also mentions the *vakıf* of the Hatuniye Medresesi, the position of which cannot be located now: the identification, proposed by some, with the late medieval mosque in the walled area on the rock is most unlikely, since that building contains no spaces or other features, such as cells for students or for the *müderris*, characteristic of medreses.³⁸ Although the defter of 1556 does not divide the town into *mahalles*, by the time of Evliya Çelebi's visit there were eight: a mixture of *mescits* and churches served them.³⁹ In the defter reference is made to a Cihanşah Mescidi (not necessarily founded by the Kara Koyunlu sultan; reputation attracts attribution) and a Hızır Mescidi, which must mean in practice that two Muslim mahalles existed.⁴⁰ Given the size of the Christian population there must have been several churches.

So far the existence of the Zal Paşa Camii, whose position we know, and of the two mescits and the Christian element of the population, which must have worshipped in churches, has been established. Where, apart from the walled enclosure on the rock, did the population live? Certainly some lived to the east, on the ground where the Zal Pasha Camii stands, inland from the harbour. But Evliya indicates the existence of housing to the west of the rock, where he mentions palaces, *re'aya evleri* and *bağ evleri* (houses of the subject, tax-paying population, and houses with orchards). This should not be taken to mean that there were no orchards or gardens at all to the east of the rock, and in fact Evliya does mention gardens with pools and *şadırvans* in that area.⁴¹ Likewise 're'aya evleri' is an odd phrase, considering that the civilian population, both Muslim

and Christian, was *re'aya* in any case. But Evliya may be implying simply that the market area was to the east near the Zal Paşa Camii. We should not take his words too literally and suppose him to be implying that there were no *re'aya* to the east of the rock. He merely finds the absence of any market to the west an appropriate reason for mentioning the existence of *re'aya* in that district. The true impression to be gained from Evliya's short description is that the housing on the rock's west side was more scattered and interspersed with orchards and other greenery—the irrigation was better—whereas the housing to the east was more close-packed and less relieved by greenery. There must also have been houses to the north of the rock, among orchards, as there are now. It is hard to make any judgements as to the relative concentrations of Christians and Muslims in the town: probably their mahalles lay on both sides of the rock without any noticeable preponderance of one or the other element in either area.

Finally let us pass to the problem of total numbers. Evliya says there were in all 1,100 houses outside and 300 within the walled area, whereas the *defter* implies exactly 500 in all, of whom 25 are explicitly identified as being *der nefs-i şehir*.⁴² As we saw above, the phrase describes the Christian population of the walled area on the rock; however it does not preclude the presence of Muslims within that area.

The difference between Evliya's and the *defter*'s totals may arise in part from exaggeration by Evliya's informants. But it is possible that the town genuinely grew in the century which separates the one source from the other. The rapid expansion of the silk trade between Europe and Iran along the line between Tabriz and Aleppo in the second half of the sixteenth century and, in particular, in the first two decades of the seventeenth, might well have added to the demand for services to travellers in the town and so brought in more population.⁴³ The *han* mentioned by Evliya in the walled area seems not to have existed in the mid-sixteenth century.

Whatever the truth about the total number of inhabitants in Evliya's time, if we apply his proportions (300 inside, 1,100 outside) to the *defter*'s total, we can say that in the mid-sixteenth century the number of houses inside the walled area was perhaps about 107, which implies 82 Muslim households in addition to the 25 Christian ones the *defter* explicitly mentions.

As a coda to the above, let us explain the reason why the shore wall of the enclosure on the rock has disappeared and why population has left both that enclosure and the districts east and west of the rock. These are due to a subsequent rise or rises in the lake's level. The principal episode during which the lake's waters rose was probably that of 1838-41, which caused the population of Erciş to

abandon the old site for the present one and submerged the shore wall of the Ottoman citadel at Ahlat. Another rise of the lake's level took place in the two decades or so leading up to 1898, and the effects of that were compounded by an earthquake which shook the town of Adilcevaz shortly before 1890. As a result of these last two events the population finally abandoned the former suburbs east of the rock, around the Zal Pasha Camii, and west of the rock, as well as the walled enclosure on the rock itself.⁴⁴

Summary


Let us summarise the contentions of this paper as follows. In the late Middle Ages the city had a substantial population overall, owing to the defensibility of the site and to its administrative function. The walled enclosure on the rock was the city's kernel, and very likely the tiny citadel at the very top of the rock was in existence. Previously the walled enclosure on the front face of the rock had been merely the citadel, while the main body of population lived on the island. By the late Middle Ages the island had either been submerged or had at any rate been so affected by the rising waters of the lake that the population had abandoned it, either wholly or else substantially. Probably there were suburbs to east and west of the rock.

In the sixteenth century the town was of less importance, because despite a brief period as a front-line outpost this role was taken over in the mid-century by other cities further east, particularly Erciş. Nevertheless Adilcevaz was a sanjak capital.

In a citadel at the top of the rock was housed much of the apparatus of civilian and military administration, though it is not clear whether the citadel in question was the tiny, narrow one at the very top of the rock or a larger one defined and cut off by a cross-wall further down. The authorities had probably driven out of the whole walled area a number of civilian households. The result was that only a small number (perhaps of the order of seventy) of households remained in the walled enclosure on the rock. The bulk of the population had again moved, this time out of the walled area on the rock rather than into it. The main concentrations of housing and population were to east and west of the rock. To the east, near the present Zal Paşa Camii and above the harbour, there was a limited market area, and around this the housing was more compact than on the west side. To the west the housing was less dense and was to a greater extent scattered among orchards and gardens. To the north the housing must have been equally thinly spread among orchards. The total civilian population in the mid-sixteenth century

was 500 houses, which implies a total of 2,500 to 3,000 inhabitants. However the boom in the Aleppo silk trade may well have led to an increase in the population of Adilcevaz during the second half of the sixteenth century, and the increase no doubt continued in the early seventeenth century. The total of 1,400 households implied by Evliya may have been, at the time, only a slight exaggeration, if an exaggeration at all.

In respect both of the late Middle Ages and of the early Ottoman period it would be wrong to think of a compact city primarily depending on urban functions, those of industry and trade. Primarily Adilcevaz was a farming city, in which the houses lay either among gardens and orchards or else not far from them and from fields where other elements of the population's livelihood were earned.⁴⁵



Notes

- ¹ O.Kılıç, XVI. Yüzyılda Adilceviz ve Ahlat (1534-1605) (Ankara, 1999), 85-106.
- ² On the plain and orchards etc. to the north of the citadel rock, T.A.Sinclair, *Eastern Turkey: An Architectural and Archaeological Survey*, 4 vols. (London, 1987-90), I.275.
- ³ *Ibid.* I.275.
- ⁴ *Ibid.* I.275. On the walls and mosque, *ibid.* I. 275-6.
- ⁵ See n.21 below.
- ⁶ Sinclair, *Eastern Turkey* I.276; G.Goodwin, *A History of Ottoman Architecture* (Lon-don, 1971, repr. 1987), 308.
- ⁷ Below, nn. 35-7.
- ⁸ *The Cambridge History of Iran*, 7 vols. (Cambridge, 1969-91), V.415-16. The last known Il-Khanid coin minted at Ahlat dates to 746/1346 (American Numismatic Society Collection, New York—hereinafter ‘ANS’—, 1922.216.344 (Arm.)). But this is because the Bitlis princes then took the city, rather than because all Il-Khanid claims to the region had been withdrawn. The Bitlis princes were in possession of it by 750/1349 (Cahen, ‘Diyar Bakr (14 c.)’, 78, cf. 89; but even at this stage they may have been vassals of the Il-Khan. A coin of Anushiravan (ANS 1992.26.351) was minted at Vostan in the same year, 750/1349.
- ⁹ On Ahlat, F.Sümer, *Selçuklular Devrinde Doğu Anadolu’da Türk Beylikleri* (Ankara, 1990), Ch.III, sects. 8, 9. On the extensive Muslim cemetery at Ahlat, B.Kara-mağaralı, *Ahlat Mezartaşları* (Ankara, 1972). On Muslim ‘alims, astronomers etc., at Ahlat in the period, R.Tekin, *Ahlat Tarihi* (Istanbul, 2000), 172-3; O. Turan, *Doğu Anadolu Türk Devletleri Tarihi* (Istanbul, 1973), 121; Fadl Allāh Rashīd al-Dīn, *Jāmi’ al-Tavārikh*, eds. A.A.Romaskevičā, A.A.Khetegurova, A.A.Ali-Zade. 3rd vol. tr. A.A.Arendsa, 3 vols. (Baku, 1957-80), 67. On Erciş, A. Mat’evosyan, *ŽG dari hiša-takaranner* (Erevan, 1984), 600-1, 666-7, 685 for three different churches; D.Kra-wulsky, *Irān das Reich der İlhāne: eine topographisch-historische Studie* (Wiesbaden, 1978: TAVO B/17), 419 for the rebuilding of the walls in the early fourteenth century; Collection of Forschungstelle für Islamische Numismatik, Tübingen University (hereinafter ‘Tübingen’), ANS and M.A.Seifeddini, *Monetnoe Delo i Deneznoe Obraš-čenie v Azerbaidžane, XII-XIV vv.*, 2 vols. (Baku 1981) for the coins. On the manu-scripts produced in the city and district in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries, A.Taylor, ‘Armenian Illumination under Georgian, Turkish and Mongol Rule. The Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries’ in T.F.Mathews & R.S.Wieck (eds.), *Treasures in Heaven: Armenian Illustrated Manuscripts* (New York, 1994), 84-103, 94-7; P.Soucek, ‘Armenian and Islamic Manuscript Painting: A Visual Dialogue’, in T.F.Mathews & R.S.Wieck (eds.), *Treasures in Heaven: Armenian Art, Religion and Society* (New York, 1998), 113-31, pp.116, 123-4.
- ¹⁰ For an indication of events in the region during the Kara Koyunlu period, A.Abdulkadiroğlu et al. (eds), *Van Kütüğü* (Van 1992: Yüzüncü Yıl Üniversitesi Yayın no. 8), 93-117. Kara Koyunlu control of the region was partial to begin with. The Bitlis dynasty was very probably subject to the Kara Koyunlu when it helped them at the siege of Mosul in 770/1369: F.Sümer, *Kara Koyunlular*, vol. I. (Ankara, 1967), 42. However the Hakkari dynasty (south-east of the lake) appears from the coin evidence to have recognised only the Jalayirids, a Mongol successor dynasty, until the Kara Koyunlu subjugated them in 1406 or soon after. See ANS 1921.999.113 (Arm.); A.A.Markov, ‘Katalog’ Dželairidskix’ Monet’ (St. Petersburg, 1897: *Sobranie vostočnyx’ monet’ Imperatorskovsago Ermitaža*), 23, no. 100; 27, no.123; 38, no.167; Tübingen HB9 E4-E6, F1, F2. On the subjugation, T’ovma Mecobeci, *Patmut’iwn Lank-T’amuray ew yajordac’ iwroc’*, ed. K.Şahnazarian

‘Thomas of Metsop, ed. Shahnazarean’ below), Paris 1860, 70. On the flight of the last Kara Koyunlu sultan, Hasan Ali, to Hamadan (meaning the abandonment of Azerbaijan and the Van region to the Ak Koyunlu), Cambridge History of Iran VI, 115-17, 173-4.

¹¹ See n.16 below.

¹² The production of coins was cut dramatically in the early 740s/1340s, after which only ten coins are known (see ANS; Tübingen; Seyfeddini, *Monetnoe Delo*). The sequence of remarkable gravestones in the Muslim cemetery comes to an end in the mid-730s/1330s: after this, only a few are known (Karamağaralı, *Ahlat Mezartaşları*, esp. 238-54). In 1471 an Italian ambassador to the Ak Koyunlu court, Barbaro, reported only 1000 houses (*Travels to Tana and Persia*, by Barbaro and Contarini, tr. W.Thomas & E.Roy [second part of book, with separate pagination, is *A Narrative of Italian Travels in Persia in the 15th and 16th Centuries*, tr. & ed. C.Grey] (London 1873), 85). On the site of Ahlat, H.F.B.Lynch, *Armenia. Travels and Studies*, 2 vols. (London 1901, repr. Beirut 1965, New York 1990), I.284-92; İ.Kafesoğlu, ‘Ahlat ve Çevresinde 1945’de Yapılan Tarihi ve Arkeoloji Teknik Seyahatı Raporu’, *Tarih Dergisi* 1 (1949), 171-2. On the growth of Bitlis, (a) extensive coin evidence of a mint which started activity in the early fourteenth century and became particularly active in the fifteenth; (b) Muslim monuments were erected here beginning only in the fifteenth century (M.O.Ank, *Bitlis Yapılarında Selçuklu Rönensansı* (Ankara, 1971), 17-19, 27-8, 35-6, 64, 65-6; (c) gravestones are known beginning only in the fourteenth century (K.Pektaş, *Bitlis Tarihi Mezarlıkları ve Mezartaşları* (Ankara 2001: T.C. Kültür Bakanlığı Yayınları, 2610), 21-3, 25-8, 32-3; (d) a number of Armenian monasteries were founded here in the early and mid-fifteenth century L.S.Xaçikyan, *XV dari hayeren jerageri hisatakaranner vol. I* (Erevan 1955), no. 69a, 63-4, no. 168, 165; H.Oskian, *Vaspurakan-Vani vank’erē*, vol. III (Vienna, 1947), 914. On the site, Sinclair, *Eastern Turkey* I.297.

¹³ C.Cahen, ‘Contribution à l’histoire du Diyar Bakr au XVe siècle’, *Journal Asiatique* 69 (1955), 65-100 (summary of Arabic manuscript on history of Ayyubid dynasty of Hisn Kayfa), 78, cf. 89.

¹⁴ The production of coins drops off dramatically in the mid-fourteenth century after the reign of Sulayman (last coin 744/1343-4): see principally Tübingen and Seyfeddini, *Monetnoe Delo*. Attacks on the city: Thomas of Metsop, ed. Shahnazarean (n.10 above), 47, 49, 88-9 (cf., for the date, 85-6, and Sümer, *Kara Koyunlular* 130); V.A.Hakobyan (ed.), *Manr Zamanakrgut’yunner, XIII-XVIII DD.* [Minor Chronicles of the 13th to 18th c.], 2 vols. (Erevan 1951, 1956), I.143 (Anon. Chron.). Reconstruction: Thomas of Metsop, ed. Shahnazarean, 49, 58-9; *Minor Chronicles*, ed. Hakobyan, I.143 (Anon. Chron.); Sümer, *Kara Koyunlular*, 112. On the site, Lynch, *Armenia* II.27-9.

¹⁵ It was even used as a prison: see Sümer, *Kara Koyunlular*, 79.

¹⁶ The governorship. (a) In Timur’s campaign of 1387, Sahand, the ‘işxan’ (‘prince’) of the city of Adilcevaz, was given the district of Erciş too (Thomas of Metsop, ed. Shahnazarean, 29). The account as a whole suggests Sahand was responsible for the district as well as the city of Adilcevaz. (b) In 1467, Mahmud the mihmandar was Jahan Shah’s vālī in Adilcevaz (presumably the whole district): see Abū Bakr Tihirānī, *Kitāb-i Diyārbakriyya*, haz. N.Lugal & F.Sümer. 2 vols. (Ankara 1962), II.461. (c) In the short reign of Hasan Ali, the last Kara Koyunlu sultan (n.12 above), a vilāyat of ‘Adiljavāz and Avnik is known (*Kitab-i Diyārbakriyya* II.461). This would include the Malazgirt plain. For Malazgirt under Kara Koyunlu administration, *Minor Chronicles*, ed. Hakobyan, I.143 (Anon. Chron.). The examples cited in the next footnote, particularly the first, are likely also to be governors of the district of Adilcevaz.

¹⁷ In the late fifteenth century a Yovhannēs was made jefnawor of the city and hramanat ('man in authority') of the district (Thomas of Metsop, 112-3). Examples of Muslim governors of the city who may also have been responsible for the district are known: 'Salt'ın [Salāh al-Dīn], 'tēr k'alakin', 'k'alak'apet', 'city-head', in 1495 (Thomas of Metsop, 112): however Thomas of Metsop's information here may in reality relate to the previously known Sahand of a century earlier: see previous footnote.

It is perhaps surprising, given the importance of the town, that it did not become a more productive mint. From the Kara Koyunlu period it seems only two coins are known: Tübingen HE7 B2 (cf. S.Album, 'A hoard of silver coins from the time of Iskandar Qara Qoyunlu', Numismatic Chronicle 16 (1976), 109-57, p.139, no. 26), a silver coin of the rebel Aspan (on whom *ibid.* 139-40), and Tübingen HE 7C2 (cf. Album, 'Lake Van hoard', 144, no. 46), a tanka of Iskender. Minting had started under the late Il-Khans: Tübingen GF1 D2, GF9 B6 (Uljaytu); GH4 D1, GH8 C4, GH4 D2 (Abu Said). For a brief period of minting in the early sixteenth century, before the final Ottoman annexation but during a brief period of nominal subjection to the Ottoman empire, below n.22.

¹⁸ Aristakes of Lastivert, Patmut'wn Aristakeay vardapeti Lastiverte'woy, Venice 1909, 84-5. For the events described, see R.Grousset, *Histoire de l'Arménie des origines à 1071* (Paris, 1949, repr. 1973), 600 and for the date, 596. Cf. also H.Hübschmann, *Die altarmenischen Ortsnamen* (Strasbourg, 1904, repr. Amsterdam 1969), 328 n.3, quoting a different edition of Aristakes.

¹⁹ Thomas of Metsop 89; cf. T.Sinclair, 'Two Problems Concerning the Van Region: Arakel of Tabriz on the Earthquakes of 1646 and the Evidence for the Rise in the Level of the Lake', in E.Zachariadou (ed.), *Natural Disasters in the Ottoman Empire* (Rethymnon, 1999), 212-13.

²⁰ Kafesoğlu, 'Ahlat ve Çevresi' 186. Note that after Timur's ravaging of the city and district in 1387, repairs were carried out on the buildings affected (Thomas of Metsop 30).

²¹ Evliya Çelebi, *Seyahatname*, cild I-VI, ed. A.Cevdet, Istanbul H. 1314-18, IV.142-4; Katib Çelebi, *Cihānnuma*, translation in Chéréf-ouddine, Prince de Bidlis ..., *Chéréfname ou Fastes de la Nation Kurde*, trans. F.B.Charmoy, 2 vols. (St. Petersburg 1869-75), 166. Katib Çelebi says that the town is on the summit of a hill, which, however ill-informed, means he conceives of the city as centred on the rock. He then, however, states that the town is in the middle of the lake. The latter cannot mean that Katib Çelebi supposes the city lies on an island; since he has just pointed out its position on the rock, his remarks must be a way of saying that the rock juts out into the lake. See Sinclair, 'Two Problems' 213. There is some evidence for a submerged island off Adilcevaz. A sonar survey carried out in the 1970s revealed humps in the lake's bed: E.T.Degens & F.Kurtman (eds.), *The Geology of Lake Van*, Ankara 1978 (Maden Tetkik ve Arama Enstitüsü Yayınlarından, 169), 13-14, 136.

²² On the final conquest by the Ottomans, *Târih-i Peçevî*, 2 vols. (Istanbul, 1281/1864-65), 176; M.Tayyib Gökbilgin, 'Arz ve raporlarına göre İbrahim Paşa'nın İrakeyn seferindeki ilk tadbirleri ve fütûhatı', *Belleten* XXX/82 (1957), 449-82, p.454; cf. Kılıç, *Adilcevaz ve Ahlat* 9. But Adilcevaz may have fallen temporarily into Safavid hands again, as it seems to have been recaptured in 955/1548: *Sharafnâme*, ed. V.Véliaminoff-Zerkov, 2 vols. (St. Petersburg 1860), 1862, II.199. On Adil-cevaz as a sanjak in the province of Amid, A. Akgündüz, *Osmanlı Kanunnâmeleri ve Hukukî Tahlilleri*. V. *Kitap, Kanunî Sultan Süleyman Devri Kanunnâmeleri*. II. Kısım, *Kanunî Devri Eyâlet Kanunnâmeleri* (Istanbul, 1992), 437.

That coins were minted in 924/1518 and 926/1520 in the names respectively of Selim I and Süleyman I (N.Kabaklarlı, 'Mangır'. Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Bakır Para-ları/Copper Coins of [the] Ottoman Empire, 1299-1808 (Istanbul, 1998), 245, 277) evidently means that an unknown local ruler temporarily acknowledged the Ot-toman sultans at the time.

²³ The document of 933/1527, Topkapı D.5246, most conveniently quoted in I.M.Kunt, *The Sultan's Servants. The Transformation of Ottoman Provincial Government, 1550-1650* (New York, 1983), 108 & fig.6 (cf. 103), shows Bitlis, Hakkari and Hizan as Ottoman vassals. On the Mahmudi, who never permanently joined the Ottoman fold until 1554, J.J.Reid, 'Mahmudi Order and Clan, 1500-1606', *Lekoln* (Berlin) 7 (2000), 29-52, pp.32-6. On the initial declaration of allegiance by the three princes, Hoca Sadettin Efendi, *Tacüt-Tevarih*, 5 vols., ed. İ.Parmaksızoğlu (Ankara, 1992), IV.245-7, 248-9, and M.Van Bruinessen & H.Boeschoten, *Evliya Çelebi in Diyarbekir. The relevant section of the Seyahatname*. Edited with translation, commentary and introduction (Leiden etc., 1988), 14-15 and n.4 on 15.

²⁴ On the sanjak beys of Adilcevaz in the sixteenth century, Kılıç, *Adilcevaz ve Ahlat*, 47-56. On the janissaries and other personnel stationed there, *ibid.* 56-9, 63-6, 67-79.

²⁵ *Sharafnama* I.437-44, 354. Cf., among other evidence for the treatment of the sanjak, Başbakanlık Arşivi, *Tahrir Defter* ("TD" below) nos. 189 and 208 (both early icmal defters), and no. 413 (a mufassal defter, probably but not certainly compiled a few years after the first two). Eventually the sanjak was split into two, those of Bitlis and Muş.

²⁶ *Sharafnama* I.454-5. On the status, *ibid.* I.455-6; Başbakanlık Arşivi, *Mühimme Defteri* ("MD" below) 32, no. 506, p. 276; no. 543, p.297.

²⁷ On the capture of Van, Peçevi 273-4: Solak Zâde *Tarihi*, 2 vols. (Istanbul 1296/1879), II.210; *Sharafnama* II.199; cf. F.Sümer, *Safevî Devletinin Kuruluşu ve Gelişmesinde Anadolu Türklerinin Rolü* (Şah İsmail ile Halefleri ve Anadolu Türkler) (Ankara 1992), 66. On the province, Van Kütüğü 106-7. The border was fixed by the treaty of Amasya in 1555 (J. De Hammer, *Histoire de l'empire ottoman depuis son origine jusqu'à nos jours*, tr. J.-J.Hellert, 2nd ed. (Istanbul, 1996), VI.39-40). On its expansion in this sector in 1578 (Khoy, Salmas etc.), B.Kütükoğlu, *Osmanlı-İran Siyâsî Münasebetleri (1578-1612)* (Istanbul, 1993), 43-4.

²⁸ On the status of the princes as hükümete, Ayn-ı Ali Efendi, *Kavânin-i Âli Osman der Hülâsa-i Mezânin-i Defter-i Divân* (Istanbul 1280/1863-64, repr. Istanbul 1979), 29; discussed Kılıç, *Van* 135-42; however the present author's research shows that the picture as presented by these two authors needs much qualification. On the Mahmudi's behaviour in the second half of the sixteenth century, Reid, 'Mahmudi Order and Clan' 35-8, 42-8. On the Hakkari's behaviour, N.Sevgen, *Doğu ve Güney-Doğu Anadolu'da Türk Beylikleri* (Ankara, 1982), 142-8.

²⁹ See in particular Peçevi 296-7; A Chronicle of the Early Safawîs, being the *Ahsanu't-Tawârikh* of Hasan-i Rumlu, vol. I (Persian Text), ed. C.N.Seddon (Baroda, 1931), 367-70; *Sharafnama* II.205; cf. Sümer, *Safevi devletinin kuruluşu* 66, 67.

³⁰ MD 6, no. 1029, of 972/1564-5.

³¹ Kılıç, *Adilcevaz ve Ahlat* 87, quoting the Topkapı MS fol. 242 r. Note that the walls were eventually repaired in 982/1574-5 (MD 24, no. 910, p.332); the difference with Erciş was the speed, urgency and great concentration of workmen with which that city's defences were repaired. A grain store is referred to in 968/1560-61: MD 3, no. 1557, p.674. The enclosure probably accommodated

more than 300 houses: its terrain lacked the springs which would have made gardens possible.

³² TD 297, 7-11.

³³ TD 297, 5-7.

³⁴ TD 297, 7. But, after the Ottoman conquest, on the death of one of the brothers, his share—nine of the households—was assigned to the Ottoman sultan.

³⁵ TD 297, 68; Kılıç (*Adilcevaz ve Ahlat* 88-96) quotes also the *Kuyûd-i Kadîme* (in the *Tapu Kadastro Genel Müdürlüğü Arşivi*, Ankara) 202, f. 520, of 1571.

³⁶ *Evliya, Topkapı MS*, fol. 242 r, apud Kılıç 96 and n.13. On the imitation, Goodwin, *History of Ottoman Architecture* 308. The text of the defter runs ‘câmi’-i şerîf-i nefs-i ‘Âdi’l-Cevâz’. It does not look as though the same distinction as before (‘nefs-i şehir-i ‘Âdi’l-Cevâz’ versus ‘şehir-i ‘Âdi’l-Cevâz’) underlies the phrase ‘nefs-i ‘Âdi’l-Cevâz’. The latter seems to refer here to the built-up area, considered as an administrative unit.

³⁷ On the start of the construction work, MD 2, no. 18, p.164 and the other documents quoted by Kılıç, 108-10. On the end date, *Evliya*, Istanbul ed. IV.137-8, and *Topkapı MS* fol. 240 r, quoted Kılıç 108 n. 14.

³⁸ TD 297, 68-9; *Kuyûd-i Kadîme* 202, fol. 52 r, apud Kılıç 96-8. Identification with mosque on rock: Kafesoğlu, ‘*Ahlat ve Çevresi*’ 187, quoted at least without disagreement by Kılıç, 96, n.15. The text of the defter again runs ‘medrese-i Hâtuniye der nefs-i ‘Âdi’l-Cevâz’: on the phrase ‘nefs-i ‘Âdi’l-Cevâz’ as referring to the whole built-up area, n. 37 above. Excavation should clear up the problem, which would apply to many aspects of construction history in the town. Note, however, that a medrese called the *Hatuniye Medresesi* was functioning in the first decade of the twentieth century: see *Van Kütüğü* 204. Since the walled enclosure on the rock and the two suburbs on the coast to east and west had already been abandoned by this stage (see below), the *Hatuniye Medresesi* may well have been in the northerly suburb. Alternatively the information which suggests that the whole site was abandoned shortly before 1890 (that of de A.P. De Cholet, *Voyage en Turquie d’Asie, Kurdistan et Mésopotamie* (Paris, 1892), 216), may be somewhat mistaken: a presence was after all maintained on the citadel rock, and the late medieval mosque functioned, in the early twentieth century at least, as a medrese, known at this stage as the *Hatuniye Medresesi*. But the mosque could not have been built as a medrese, nor would the *Hatuniye Camii* of the sixteenth-century defter have been located in the walled enclosure’s late medieval mosque.

³⁹ *Evliya*, *Topkapı MS* fol. 242 r, apud Kılıç, *Adilcevaz ve Ahlat* 88 and n.8. But TD 297, 69, does mention a *Kilise Mahallesi*: so the town had very likely been divided into mahalles.

⁴⁰ *Cihanşah Mescidi*: TD 297, 69; *Kuyûd-i Kadîme* 202, fol. 53 o, apud Kılıç, *Adilcevaz ve Ahlat* 102. *Hızır Mescidi*: *Kuyûd-i Kadîme* 202, fol. 53 o, apud Kılıç 102-3.

⁴¹ *Evliya*, *Topkapı MS* fol. 242 r (see previous note). Cf. the mention of orchards in TD 297, 68; *Kuyûd-i Kadîme* 202 fol. 52 o & r (previous note).

⁴² Nn. 31 & 32 above.

⁴³ On the increase in the volume of silk exports, E.Herzig, ‘The volume of Iranian raw silk ex-ports in the Safavid Period’, *Iranian Studies* 25 (1992), 64, 65, 69. On the first two decades of the seventeenth century, R.Davis, ‘English Imports from the Middle East, 1580-1780’, in M.A.Cook (ed.), *Studies in the Economic History of the Middle East* (London, 1979), 193-206. On the 16th-century trade in general, R.P.Matthee, *The Politics of Trade in Safavid Iran. Silk for Silver, 1600-1730*, (Cambridge, 1999), 19-26, and on both centuries, H. İnalcık & D.Quataert (eds.), *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, 1800-1914* (Cambridge, 1994), 243-4, 338-40, 343-4, 351, 499-500.

⁴⁴ On 1838-41, at Erciş, see Lynch, *Armenia*, I.29-30. At Ahlat the same increase in level seems to have submerged the shore wall of the Ottoman citadel: cf. the contrast between Brant's account of the walls in 1838 (J.Brant, 'Notes of a Journey through part of Kurdistan', *Journal of the Royal Geographical Society* 10 (1840), 341-432, p. 407) and Lynch's of the citadel in 1893 (*Armenia* II.287-8). On the late nineteenth-century increase in the lake's level, F.Oswald, *A Treatise on the Geology of Armenia* (Beeston, Notts. 1906), 104, 105. On the earthquake and final abandonment, De Cholet, *Voyage*, 216. Cf. Sinclair, 'Two Problems' 213-14.

⁴⁵ The two zaviyes mentioned in the tahrir defters as being near the city probably lay within what for our purposes counts as the city's inhabited area. For the zaviyes, Kılıç, *Adilcevaz ve Ahlat*, 101, 102.

The Town of Çankiri: Its Population and Development

M. Mehdi İlhan

Although there are fourteen registers on the Ottoman province of Çankırı (Kengiri) in the Başbakanlık (Prime Ministerial) Archives (BA) of Istanbul, five in Tapu Kadastro Genel Müdürlüğü Kuyud-i Kadime Archives of Ankara (TKGM) and two in İstanbul Belediye (Municipality) Library, I made use only of those registers that had information on the population and economy of the town. Two of these registers were detailed (*mufassal*) ones. The one in İstanbul [BA, TD (*Tabrir Defter*) No. 100] is dated 927/1521 and the other one in Ankara (TKGM TD No. 81) is dated 986/1578. Both of these registers have detailed information on the quarters of Çankırı. However, there is a third register that also has information on the quarters. This third one, the so called *muhasebe defteri* (summarised account register) is already published in facsimile.¹ Although this third register stored in Başbakanlık Archives of İstanbul (TD No. 438), is dated 937/1530 a study of it shows that it is a synopsis of the *mufassal* register dated 1521. First, the *hane* (household) and *mücerred* (bachelor) entries were the same for almost all the quarters with some minor exceptions. These exceptions were either due to some minor changes that were actually recorded by the register or they were due to scribal errors. The second case is more likely for there is no doubt that the 1530 register is actually a summarised account of the 1521 register.

In all three registers there are fairly good records of tax-exempts. In particular, religious personages, particularly imams and muezzins, appear to be fully recorded. We can classify these tax-exempts under three categories:

1. Religious personages such as imam, muezzin, *hatib* (preacher), *müderriş*, *sermahfil* (chorus head), *hafız*, *şeyb*, *kayyum* and *kadı* (judge).
2. Non-clerical officials such as *kethuda*, *muhassil* (tax collector), *mütevelli* (administrator, trustee of an endowment), *emir*, *mülaẓım* (lieutenant).
3. Disabled personages such as *mecnun* (crazy, mad) *divane* (insane), *a'ma* (blind), *kötürüm* (paralysed) and *ma'lul* (disabled).

Quite a number of poor (*fakir*, six according to 1521 register) were also recorded as tax-exempts. Two blind and one disabled were also recorded as poor. Only one person was recorded as missing (*ğayıb*). The status of the disabled and poor was determined in the court before witnesses.²

Education

The personal names recorded in the 1521 register seem to reflect a town with strong religious inclination. Most of the names used by the inhabitants are either the names of the Prophet and his companions or of the other prophets. The most common of these names are Muhammed, Ahmed, Mahmud, Mustafa, Hamza, 'Ali and Hüseyin on the one hand, and Musa, 'Isa and Yusuf on the other. Such names are not an indication of ethnic groups, but rather point to an Islamic religious community. Such a community could also be considered educated.

The basic units of education in the Ottoman Empire were *medreses* and schools, but at the same time the mosques and other religious foundations such as *zaviyes* served equally as bases of both religious and secular education. Many learned men such as müderrises, imams, muezzins and hafizes employed in these institutions were not only highly educated, but served as educators to the community. In a study I found that about 2% of the adult males in the province of Anatolia were educators in one way or another.³ This ratio is very high considering that the whole population including the inhabitants of villages was taken into account. The ratio in the towns was most probably higher. However, we cannot say the same for the town of Çankırı, for my calculation shows that only 1% of the population were educators. There were 24 quarters in the town of Çankırı according to the 1521 and 1530 registers, and 22 (plus an empty quarter) according to the 1578 register. There was almost one imam in every quarter and perhaps an equal number of muezzins, although 5 in 1521 and 12 in 1578 register were recorded. Adding to these numbers hatips (preachers), sermahfil, hafizes and şeyhs we arrive at a figure of 1% of the population of the town as educators. A müderris and a *kadı* are registered only in the 1578 register. We know that Ebu'su'ud Mehmed Efendi was offered the post of müderris at the medrese of Çankırı in 1516. However, it is debatable whether he accepted the post or not.⁴ Also according to the Ottoman administration there was a *kadı* and a *müfti* in Çankırı as well as *kadıs* in its *kazas* and *nahiyes* such as Çerkeş, Kurşunlu, Tosya and Tohte.⁵ There were 35 men of religion in 1521 and 36 in 1578. That is one man of religion per 12 or 13 households.

Quarters

There were 24 quarters recorded in 1521 and 1530, and 23 in 1578.⁶ There is no record of Tohte quarter in 1578 and Şeyh Hünkar Hacı Bahaeddin quarter is recorded as empty (*bali*). It is possible that its inhabitants moved to other quarters. Some quarters had an increase in the number of households whereas almost half had a decrease. Karataş quarter had the highest increase in the number of households while Cami‘ quarter had the most noticeable decrease. The population decrease in Cami‘ quarter was most probably due to the construction of the Sultan Süleyman Mosque that started in 1552 and ended in 1558. According to the sources Sultan Süleyman I ordered the construction of the mosque during his 1548 Persian campaign. It is probable that this mosque was constructed to replace an old Seljukid mosque built over the ruins of a church. There are still two Byzantine columns on the sides of the entrance to the mosque’s garden.

The quarters of Çankırı, as in any other town, were named after a mosque or a distinguished man. All the names are either of Turkish or Islamic origin. Apart from perhaps Karataş-ı Kayser, there is no other quarter that has its origin in from before the Turkish conquest. The quarters named after Şeyh Hünkar Hacı Bahaeddin, Umur Fakih, and Şeyh ‘Osman, the companions of Karatekin in the conquest of Çankırı, most probably originate from Seljukid period.⁷ The quarter of Mescid-i Havace Kasım might have had its roots in the period of the Isfendiyarid principality since Kasım Bey, son of Isfendiyar Bey, had a mosque, *‘imaret*, zaviye and a medrese⁸ built in the town. The Candarid Kasım Bey also had a mosque called ‘Imaret built in 1397 on the present day ‘Imaret Street.⁹ It is possible therefore, that the ‘Imaret quarter originated from the Candarids.

Unfortunately, I was unable to find a good map to work out the boundaries of the quarters. Most of the names have changed and the map, drawn by the municipality, had the names of only a few quarters and of the new streets. A close study of this map shows that the boundaries of the old town have been preserved since Ottoman days. More houses were certainly built from seventeenth up to twentieth century, but the boundaries remained almost the same. In other words, the old town stretched along the foot of the hill on the northern side of the modern town. The castle¹⁰ was built on this hill, where the tomb of Karatekin, the conqueror of Çankırı in 475/1082, also stands. The Karatekin quarter that stretches immediately along the foot of the hill after the cemetery is recorded in both registers under the name Mir-i Ahur. Taş Mescid, the hospital section of which was built by Çankırı Atabeyi Cemaleddin Ferruh in 633/1235 during the reign of the Seljukid Sultan Alaaddin Keykubad I, son of

Keyhüsrev, is recorded in both registers as Bimarhane. A medrese was added to the hospital in 640/1242. I have worked out in an unpublished article on Amasya that the Seljukids built their own quarters and did not infiltrate into the Christian quarters. For instance Torumtay Medrese, Gök Medrese and Bimarhane, with quarters grown around them in Amasya, are on the outskirts of the ancient town. Likewise Taş Mescid is also on the outskirts of the ancient town of Çankırı. Karatekin, also a Seljukid quarter, is at the northern periphery.

The quarter of Cami' (Cami'-i Sultan Süleyman), originally a Seljukid quarter, is called Mimar Sinan, although the mosque was built by Sadık Kalfa, Mimar Sinan's assistant master. The boundaries of present day Mimar Sinan quarter reach as far as the upper boundaries of the foot of the hill.¹¹ The lower boundaries of the Ottoman quarters excluding Taş Mescid were most probably the present day Orgeneral Haluk Karadayı Street stretching from northwest and continuing with Atatürk Bulvarı in the south. The north-western boundary was most probably the cemetery. Karataş quarter¹² is situated at the north-western end of the old town.

There were twenty-four inhabited quarters in 1521 and twenty-two in 1578 within a small area that stretched half a kilometre from south to north and a kilometre and half from west to east. They were very small quarters both in 1521 and 1578 with an average of about 9 to 10 household. Dividing the town into small quarters was perhaps a matter of convenience for both registrars and administrators. This, with some exceptions, was generally the case with most registers. For instance, there were only four quarters of Amid named after four gates in the walls of the town in 1518 register, carried out in a period of a year or so, but in 1540 they were increased to 42, all named after mosques.¹³

The number and the names of the quarters continued almost unchanged at the end of seventeenth century. There are seventeen quarters recorded in the documents of court registers of Çankırı¹⁴ with only the Yoğurtçu quarter as an addition. The quarter of Cami' is recorded in one place as 'Cami'-i Kebir'¹⁵ and as the Hıdırlık quarter in another.¹⁶ There is a mention of Şeyh Osman quarter on a gravestone inscription dated 1277/1860-1. The inscription runs as follows:

Huve'l-Baki
Dem çeker ez durr (ezder?) misali
Yeniçerinin erleri
Dilerim Bari' Huda'dan
Cennet olsun yerleri
Şeyh Osman mahallesinden
El-Seyyidi (?) Kul Muhammed Ağa
Fatıha Sene 1277

Population

A close study of the quarters and comparison of the registers invites some observations. There are no major differences between the 1521 and 1530 registers, although there are some discrepancies that were most probably due to the carelessness of the scribe. Both in 1521 and 1530 there were 409 households and 215 (214 in 1530) bachelors. It is difficult to believe that the number of households went up from 409 in 1521 to only 417 in 1578 and the number of bachelors from 215 to 217, an increase of 8 and 2 respectively for a period of 57 years. The number of bachelors is unusually high when compared with the registers of some other provinces such as Amid¹⁷ and Şehrizol.¹⁸ The number of blind 5, and crippled 1, were the same in 1521 and 1578.

The Quarters of Çankiri in 1521 and 1578

Quarter	Population*	
	1521	1578
Mescid-i Hatib	101	108
Karataş-ı Kayser	202	252
Şeyh Osman	93	76
Haci Musa	115	205
Imaret	127	169
Mescid-i Halil Ağa	152	179
Mescid-i Havace Kasım	103	47
Pürdedar Gazi	80	93
Cami' (Sultan Süleyman)	62	42
Tohte	31	0
Küçük Menare	155	104
Alaca Mescid	139	137
Emir-i Ahur	111	123
Hıdırlık	29	64
Mescid-i Haci Mü'minin	123	112
Havace Bahşayış	46	108
Şeyh Hankah-i Haci Bahaeddin	30	0
Kadi	94	53
Bimarhane	83	112
Çukur	22	64
Ümur Fakih (Havace Elvan)	141	125
Çetince	114	40
Havace İbrahim	60	98
Kara Taş	148	216
TOTAL	2361	2527

*Figures for population are found by hane x 5 + mücerreds

The reason behind the low population of Çankırı in both 1521 and 1578 and the very low rate of increase in 57 years might be due to certain events that took place in the sixteenth century. An earthquake lasting 45 days shook Anatolia in 1509. Çankırı was one of the towns affected and many lives were lost. Quite a number of revolts took place that had negative effects on both the 1521 and 1578 surveys. A *timar* holder called Kızılbaş Celal of Bozok, a Turcoman from the town of Turhal near Amasya declared himself as Mahdi and started a revolt with twenty thousand followers just before the 1521 survey of Çankırı started. The revolt was backed up by Shah Isma'il. Şehsuvar Ali Bey, the governor of Elbistan, defeated the rebels in 1518. Although Kızılbaş Celal managed to escape, he was caught near Erzincan and was beheaded.¹⁹ A famine broke out in Çankırı in 1574 and lasted three years²⁰ coinciding with the time or about a year or two before the start of survey for the province of Çankırı that was completed in 1578. Most important of all, about a decade before the start of the survey a series of *suhte* (theological student), *kurbet* (stranger/exile; wretched; hermit) and *çingan* (gypsy) movements took place, and according to the Mühimme documents lasted at least two decades. These movements must have played a great role not only in the depopulation of the province of Çankırı and its surroundings, but must also have hampered the process of carrying out the surveys.

A Mühimme decree addressed to the beys and kadıs of all the *sancaks* in the provinces of Anadolu, Karaman, Dhu'l-Kadirli, Aleppo and Diyarbekir orders them to suppress the *kurbet* and *çingan* groups who were causing havoc throughout Asia Minor. They were lawbreakers committing all kinds of atrocities: travelling from one province to another, stopping at crowded market and meeting places in the cities, towns and villages in order to pervert men with their musical instruments of entertainment and prostitutes, and whenever they were alone with anyone they would kill and rob. They were also highway robbers.²¹

In 1566, according to some other Mühimme documents, the brigands called Kara Kader, Cafer, Kirmani and Şah with fifteen horsemen were holding up people and robbing them in the mountain passes in Çorum and Çankırı provinces.²² Likewise some *kurbet* and *suhte* groups were killing and plundering people in Çankırı, Bolu and Kastamonu provinces in the same year.²³ These *suhte* and *kurbet* movements appear to have continued for at least two decades. Bahattin Ayhan²⁴ mentions another *suhte* and *kurbet* movement that took place in 1576, about the same time that officials started to carry out the survey in the province of Çankırı that was concluded in 1578. There are also Mühimme documents ranging from 1581 to 1588 that give full details on these *suhte* and *kurbet*

movements. According to these decrees addressed to the beys and kadis of Çankırı, Kastamonu and Bolu certain groups of *suhte*, *kurbet* and other bandits under the leadership of rebels such as Çalık Veliyuddin, Ekmekoğlu, Arpacıoğlu, Kılıçoğlu, and Fakihoglu were raiding towns and villages, and were waylaying highways. They were collecting 'alms' (*zekat*) from people in excessive cash and injuring those who did not comply. They were carrying away with them 'smooth-faced young boys' and young girls. They beat and robbed people. Most important of all, these criminals were sheltered by both officials and inhabitants in the provinces.²⁵

The Ottoman government issued decrees ordering the officials to catch these criminals, imprison them and send them to the Porte. However, there were cases where they deceived officials such as *sekbans* and janissaries sent to investigate and catch them.²⁶ Some even managed to escape after they were arrested and brought to Istanbul.²⁷ These *suhte* and *kurbet* movements usually took place whenever there were military campaigns. In fact, in one of the *Mühimme* decrees it is specifically mentioned that these *suhte* movements had been going on since the start of Eastern Campaign.²⁸ The population of Çankırı grew rapidly in the seventeenth century. According to one of the Court register documents there were sixteen quarters with 34 *avarız hanes* in Çankırı²⁹. *Avarız hanes* can vary between 3 to 10 hanes and may even reach 20 depending on the economic conditions of the region. It is however unlikely that all the quarters were included in these *avarız hanes* which makes it very difficult to calculate or even estimate the population of the town based on these *avarız hanes*. However, if we assume that there were only sixteen quarters in Çankırı and the hanes for one *avarız hane* were as many as 20, then we could say that there were about 680 hanes in Çankırı; which multiplied by five gives us 3,400 as the population of Çankırı at the end of the seventeenth century, a figure more than those recorded in both the 1521 and 1578 registers. According to Evliya Çelebi (died c. 1095/1684), there were 4,000 houses in Çankırı³⁰. This means a population of 20,000 which sounds like an exaggeration, for according to other sources, mentioned below, the population of Çankırı was 12,000 in 1831 and 15,000 at the end of the nineteenth century. Both these figures and the one I calculated from *avarız hanes* for the end of seventeenth century are below that of Evliya Çelebi and fit an average growth.

The total number of households recorded by the scribe did not always correspond to the actual household entries. I therefore did my own calculation and included such tax-exempts as imams, muezzins and *a'mas* assuming that they also had families. The population of the quarters and that of the town were then worked out. The 10% military as suggested by Ö. L. Barkan was excluded, as

my purpose was to work out the distribution of population to the quarters. The quarter with the highest population both in 1521 and 1578 was Karataş-ı Kayser, perhaps one of the oldest quarters of the town. The quarter with the lowest population in 1521 was Çukur with only 4 household and 2 bachelors, and in 1578 it was Cami'-i Sultan Süleyman that was simply called Cami' in 1521. The quarter of Tohte with 6 households and 1 bachelor in 1521 was not recorded in 1578. Another quarter with low population was Şeyh Hünkar Bahaeddin with 5 households and 5 bachelors in 1521. This quarter is recorded as empty (*hali*) in 1578. There are virtually no traces of Christian quarters. It is believed that shortly after the Turkish conquest in 1082 most of the inhabitants, perhaps almost all gradually converted to Islam and the chief-bishopric was moved from Çankırı to Amasra.³¹ It is also possible that those who did not convert emigrated to Amasra and other neighbouring towns.

The population of the town of Çankırı was 2,361 in 1521 and 2,527 in 1578. There was an increase of only about 7% in 57 years, a very insignificant growth each year (about 10 out of 10,000 in one year). The population of the town grew to 3,400 by 1698 according to the Court Register. Its population was 12,203 in 1831 according to the census carried out by Silahşoran-ı Hassa Süleyman Bey.³² Charles Texier, French archaeologist and traveller, estimates it as 16,000 with only 40 Greek families at the end of the first half of the nineteenth century.³³ But then it is not possible to explain the figures given by Tshichatsheff (1839) who estimates that there were 1,800 (when multiplied by 5 giving us a population of 9,000) households in Çankırı of which 40 were non-Muslims.³⁴ On the other hand the population of the town according to the 1869 *Salname* was 16,605 Muslims, 207 Greeks and 70 Armenians.³⁵ Here at least the non-Muslim population can be verified with figures for 1882 quoted by Bahattin Ayhan who gives no source. The non-Muslim population of Çankırı was 758 Greeks and 298 Armenians. According to Ali Cevad's census (1898) there were 969 Greeks and 959 Armenians in Çankırı.³⁶ Furthermore, Cuinet's (1894-6) figure is 15,632 for the population of Çankırı. Of this 780 were Greeks and 472 were Armenians.³⁷ These figures may sound well, but it is difficult to understand why the town's population should fall to 11,200 according to 1899 *Salname* of Kastamonu.³⁸ Out of this population 476 were Greek men, 415 Greek women, 186 Armenian men and 179 Armenian women.³⁹ During the First World War and the War of Independence the population of the town must have fallen drastically, for the population of the town in 1927 was 8,847 and in 1940 was 10,235. In 1960 the town's population doubled, that is increased to 20,047 and in 1990 increased again to 45,496, a figure more than double.⁴⁰ The population figures given for the Republican

period are most probably reliable and can be explained with natural growth such as birth rate. But the figures for the Ottoman period show a considerable variation and at times unreliability. However, a close study of the graphics at least gives us an idea of what the population of the town was for each century starting from 1521. The sources on the non-Muslim population figures are also inconsistent and at times exaggerated. However, it appears that there was a steady rise, most probably due to immigration rather than to natural growth.

Economy

The information on the economic activities in the town of Çankırı is derived from several registers. The information is scattered.

The basic income in the town was from the *mumbane* (candle factory), the *bozahane* (boza factory, beverage made of fermented millet) and salt. The income for the first two cannot be calculated because it is cited along with the taxes which include sheep tax, oxen tax as well as taxes taken from fruit, pastures, *mezra'as* (arable fields), vineyards and orchards. The total income from all these was 15,000 akçes in 1521 and 16,000 akçes in 1578 and went to *mir-i liva*.⁴¹ The income from salt according to both the 1521 and 1578 registers was considerably higher. In 1521 it was 55,000 akçes plus an income of 5,000 akçes from base (a chemical substance capable of combining with an acid to form salt) which increased to 71,667 akçes in 1578.⁴² The income from salt went to the Imperial Hass. According to the 1530 *icmal* (synopsis) register the total income of the Imperial Hass from the nahiye of Kengiri was 225,000 akçes. Of this 60,000 akçes was from rice, 80,000 akçes from [illegible word in document], 55,000 akçes from salt work and 30,000 akçes from *mevkufat* (vacant fief-holdings). The total income for the mir-i liva was 216,000 akçes. His income was from the bozahane and the candle factory mentioned above as well as from some villages and *yaylak*es (summer pastures).⁴³

The 1521 register also has valuable information on agriculture, husbandry and stockbreeding. However the income from these is low. Çift tax (*resm-i çift*) is only 112 akçes. The income from wheat, barley, orchards and beehives is equally low. The income from all amounted to only 924 akçes. There are quite a number of orchards and pastures around the town. However, the income from them varies between 4 and 25 akçes. The description given of these orchards and pastures gives us pretty good idea of where they are scattered. At least we know that they were scattered around places such as Karataş, Acı Su, Bimarhane and Tabbağlar.⁴⁴

The income from casual taxes (*bad-i hava ve cürm ve cinayet ve resm-i arusane*) in 1578 was 60,775 akçes. The income from sheep tax (excluding that of Yörügan) according to the 1578 register was 150,000 akçes, from *mevkufat-i yava* (capturing runaways) 30,000 akçes, capitation tax (*ciçye-i nefis-i Kengiri*), perhaps from some Christians living near or in town, was 5,000 akçes and *ibtisab* 4,300 akçes.⁴⁵

Although it is not possible to come to a definite conclusion from the information given in these two registers on the education, population and economy of the city, it cannot be denied that the material is rich enough to at least gain an idea about the population of the town and its distribution among the quarters, the social strata of the town and the sources of income for the town and its inhabitants.

Notes

I would like to thank the British Institute of Archaeology at Ankara and Dr. Roger Matthews, the former Director of the Institute, for the financial help in carrying out the field work for this paper.

¹ *438 Numaralı Muhasebe-i Vilayet-i Anadolu Defteri (937/1530)* II (Ankara 1994). For the province of Çankırı see index and 703 ff.

² According to a document of the court registers of Çankırı dated 11 Ramazan 1109/23 March 1698 Mehmed bin Yusuf of Alaca Mescid quarter was recorded as meczub (insane). See Çankırı Şer'iyye Sicils, Defter No. 5, Document 46, quoted from Kezban Kaya, *5 Numaralı Şer'iyye Sicillerine Göre XVII. Yüzyıl Sonlarında (H. 1109-1110/M. 1697-1698) Çankırı Sancağı*, M.A. thesis present at the Institute of Social Sciences at Ankara University, Ankara 2001, 39. Hereafter as K. Kaya, document no./page number). Hasan, an inhabitant of the village of Kavra declared himself as bankrupt on 6 Zilhicce 1109/15 June 1698, K. Kaya, 86/219.

³ M. Mehdi İlhan, 'The Ottoman Province of Anatolia: Introducing '438 Numaralı Muhasebe-i Vilayet-i Anadolu Defteri (937/1530)' *Kütahya, Kara-bisar-ı Şahib, Sultan-önü, Hamid ve Ankara Linaları* (Ankara 1993). XXI+92+212 pages+6 maps', *Al-Manarah*, vol. I, No. 1, Mafraq (Jordan 1996), 128.

⁴ According to Bahattin Ayhan, *Çankırı Tarihi* (Ankara 1998), 156, hereafter B. Ayhan) and İ. Hakkı Uzunçarşılı *Osmanlı Tarihi*, vol. II, 677, he accepted, while according to M. Cavid Baysun ('Ebussu'ud Efendi', *İslam Ansiklopedisi*), he rejected and was sent to İshak Paşa Medrese in İne-Göl.

⁵ MD 6, 537, 22 December 1564; MD 6, 890, 25 March 1565; MD 6, 1347, 6 July 1565; MD 71, 55, 6 October 1593; MD 82, 48, 11 December 1617. The numbers following MD (Mühimme Defter) refer to volumes and document numbers respectively. The Hicri dates are converted to A.D.

⁶ B. Ayhan, 152, records only 15 quarters in 1530. All these quarters with the exception of the quarter of Hamam are same as those of the registers.

⁷ Umur Fakih was conqueror of Ilgaz. B. Ayhan, 99, 105.

⁸ Kalecik and Sarayköy villages were vakıf holdings of these institutions according to their *vakfiyes* dated 1451 and 1463 respectively. See B. Ayhan, 130.

⁹ B. Ayhan, 130-1.

¹⁰ B. Ayhan, 105, states that the castle was a crowded quarter until 1847. With the outbreak of cholera its inhabitants moved down to the foot of the hill. Quoting Flotwell, he also says that the castle was in ruins in 1893.

¹¹ B. Ayhan, 156.

¹² A Mühimme decree (MD 71, 55, 6 October 1593) regarding this quarter gives valuable information not only on this quarter but also on the town itself:

‘Order to the Sancak Bey of Kangiri and its Mufti and Kadi:

A person named Ramazan Çavuş had the mosque (*mesjid*) and the teacher’s school (*mu’allimhane*) pulled down and (then) had a stable (*ahır*) and a barn built in their place. He also had houses built on the town’s drinking water conduit. Geese and hens dirty the water that people use for drinking and cooking. He is also hurting the learned and righteous men who do not obey him. The situation should be investigated in accordance with the Shari’a, and if the complaints are true it should be prevented’.

¹³ M. Mehdi İlhan, ‘XVI. Yüzyılın ilk yarısında Diyarbakır şehrinin nüfusu ve vakıfları: 1518 ve 1540 tarihli tapu tahrir defterlerinden notlar’, *Tarih Araştırmaları Dergisi*, 1992-4, vol. XVI, no. 27, (Ankara 1994), 57-8.

¹⁴ K. Kaya, 38 (20-1)/17; 42(25)/29-30; 47(30)/39-40; 59/51-2; 78/72; 97(67)/86-7; 135/117-18; 152/133; 211/194-5; 236/200-1.

¹⁵ K. Kaya, 136(97)/230.

¹⁶ K. Kaya, 106(73)/223.

¹⁷ M. Mehdi İlhan, *Amid (Diyarbakır)* (Ankara, 2000), 152 ff.

¹⁸ M. Mehdi İlhan, ‘XVI. Yüzyılda Şehrizol Sancağı’, *OTAM* 4 (Ankara, 1993), 169.

¹⁹ I. Hakki Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Tarihi*, vol. II (Ankara, 1998), 297.

²⁰ B. Ayhan, 159.

²¹ MD 6, 206, 6 October 1564.

²² MD 5, 1224, 12 March 1566.

²³ MD 5, 1301, 24 March 1566; MD 5, 1582, 11 May 1566.

²⁴ B. Ayhan, 149-50, 159.

²⁵ MD 46, 64, 27 July 1581; MD 52, 617, 29 January 1584; MD 53, 700, 7 January 1585; MD 60, 586, 9 May 1586; MD 61, 43, 23 June 1586; MD 64, 382, 15 October 1588.

²⁶ MD 53, 730, 12 February 1585.

²⁷ MD 62, 59, 13 March 1587.

²⁸ MD 60, 640, 24 May 1586; MD 64, 382, 15 October 1588.

²⁹ According to the document dated 4 Muharrem 1110/13 July 1698 Mustafa Ağa collected the so-called tax ‘avarız and bedel-i nüzul’. See K. Kaya, 97(67)/86-7.

The quarters with ‘avarız hane entries were the following: Mahalle-i Karataş: hane 4; Mahalle-i Kayser Beğ: hane 3; Mahalle-i Dabbağlar: hane 1.5; Mahalle-i ‘İmaret: hane 3; Mahalle-i Yoğurtçu: hane 1.5; Mahalle-i Mirahor: hane 1.5; Mahalle-i Halil Ağa: hane 4; Mahalle-i Çukur: hane 2; Mahalle-i Şeyh ‘Osman: hane 1; Mahalle-i Taş Mescid: hane 0.5; Mahalle-i Çetinçe: hane 1.5; Mahalle-i Hoca Elvan: hane 3; Mahalle-i Pürdedar: hane 1; Mahalle-i Alaca Mescid: hane 2; Mahalle-i Hoca Bahşayış: hane 3.5; Mahalle-i Hoca İbrahim: hane 1.

³⁰ Flotwell, most probably deriving his information from Evliya Çelebi, also says there were 4,000 households with 32 quarters in 1893 in Çankırı (B. Ayhan, 202, but cf. p. 187 where the date is given as 1827).

³¹ B. Ayhan, 100.

³² B. Ayhan, 188.

³³ B. Ayhan, 177. Charles Texier (1802-71) had published a book entitled *Description de L'Asie Mineure*, Paris 1839-49

³⁴ B. Ayhan, 193.

³⁵ B. Ayhan, 196.

³⁶ B. Ayhan, 199 and 203.

³⁷ B. Ayhan, 203; V. Cuinet, *La Turquie d'Asie Mineure* (Paris, 1894), IV, 551 ff.

³⁸ J.H. Mordtmann, 'Çankırı', *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, second edition

³⁹ In 1913 there were 1,337 Greeks and 482 Armenians in Çankırı, B. Ayhan, 202, 204 and 209.

⁴⁰ İlhan Şahin, 'Çankırı', *TDV İslam Ansiklopedisi* (İstanbul, 1993).

⁴¹ Başbakanlık Archives (BA) Tapu Tahrir Defteri (TD) No. 100, 88; Tapu Kadastro Genel Müdürlüğü, Kuyud-i Kadime Archives (KK), TD 81, fol. 10b. BA, TD No. 375 is also a summary of 1521 register and therefore has the same figures.

⁴² BA, TD 100, p. 87 and KK, TD 81, fol. 11b.

⁴³ BA, TD No. 375, 242-3.

⁴⁴ KK, TD No. 81, fols. 9b-11b.

⁴⁵ KK, TD No. 81, fol. 11b.

Defending the Cult of Saints in Seventeenth–Century
Kastamonu: Ömer El-Fu’âdî’s Contribution to
Religious Debate in Ottoman Society

John J. Curry

On the northwest side of the modern town of Kastamonu in the Black Sea region, behind the hilltop fortifications that once guarded this strategic route through northern Anatolia, there lies the tomb and shrine of the great Halveti saint Şa’bân-ı Veli Efendi. It remains an important spiritual and historical landmark in the city of Kastamonu right down to the present day. He is best known for founding one of the major branches of the Halveti *tarikât*, which came to be known as the Şa’bâniyye. In the second half of the seventeenth century, under the guidance of such key figures as Karabâş ‘Ali Veli and Nasûhî Efendi, this branch of the Halveti *tarikât* would come to be one of the most powerful and influential Sufi orders in the Ottoman Empire, capable of influencing even the Sultan himself.¹

The Halveti order had originated in the area of western Iran and Azerbaijan during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, most notably through the activities of the Baku-based Şeyh Yahyâ-yı Şîrvânî (d. 1464-5).² Yahyâ’s spiritual descendants, of whom there would be many (one account claims more than 10,000)³, spread throughout the Ottoman Empire in the two centuries after his death, most notably in Egypt, Anatolia, and large parts of the Balkans.⁴ Even before the rise of the Safavids under Şâh Ismâ’îl at the end of the fifteenth century that would spark an exodus of learned figures into the growing Ottoman domains, individuals from various parts of Anatolia were travelling to places like Tabriz, Baku, and other centres of learning to study with Yahyâ and his followers. According to Şeyh Şa’bân’s *silsile*, he was the spiritual grandson of one of the most important of these figures, Cemâl el-Halveti, also known in the biographical compilations as ‘Çelebi Halife.’⁵ Cemâl el-Halveti was a pivotal figure who established the Halveti *tarikât* in Istanbul through his close links with Sultan Bayezid II, both before and after his accession to the sultanate in 1481. He is best known today as the teacher of Sünbül Sinân Efendi (d. 1529), founder of the Sünbülüyye

branch of the order, which based itself at the Kocamustafa Pasha mosque and tomb complex in south-western Istanbul, and is still considered a holy place today.⁶

Unfortunately, Şa'bân's early life is not nearly as well-documented as that of some of his predecessors and contemporaries. He was born in a small village close to the town of Taşköprü, which lies to the east of Kastamonu, near the end of the fifteenth century. Supposedly, his mother and father died when he was very young, leaving him to be brought up by a generous woman who saw to his early education, which included lessons with local scholars in Kastamonu in addition to his hometown of Taşköprü. She reportedly even helped him to go to Istanbul to continue his studies, but died shortly thereafter.⁷ Like most of the great Sufis of his era, despite his growing knowledge of the exoteric aspects of the Islamic sciences, he felt dissatisfied, and began to search among the Sufi orders for a mystical guide. But most of the Sufi masters that he sought out in Istanbul did not appeal to him.⁸

In fact, there is some confusion in the historical sources about who Şa'bân's *şeyh* actually was. The generally accepted personality among Şa'bân's successors was Hayreddin Tokâdî (d. 1525), a successor to Cemâl el-Halveti. However, Nev'izâde 'Atâ'î (d. 1635) provides contradictory information about Şa'bân's place in the Halveti chain of transmission. At one point, he concurs with the standard account and names Hayreddin Tokâdî, but in another part of the work devoted to the biography of Şa'bân himself, he claims that Şa'bân's *şeyh* was in fact Konrapalı Muslihuddin Efendi. In the narrative of Ömer el-Fu'âdî's *Menâkıb*, on the other hand, this individual was a contemporary follower of Hayreddin Tokâdî alongside Şa'bân.⁹ To complicate matters further, when Şa'bân was sent back to his home region of Kastamonu by his teacher, he established himself at the Seyyid Sünnetî mosque on the present site of his tomb complex. Seyyid Sünnetî, whose biography is included in Fu'âdî's work and placed in a separate section just before that of Şa'bân himself, was reportedly a follower of Yahyâ-yı Şirvânî. Unfortunately, his post in Kastamonu had fallen vacant after his death, and no one seemed to have replaced him until Şa'bân arrived during the 1520s and inserted himself into the position.¹⁰ After his arrival, Şa'bân settled in Kastamonu to guide the local people there, persevering in various locations until he died in the year 1569.

Yet aside from Nev'izâde 'Atâ'î's brief mention, it is clear that almost all of our knowledge about Şa'bân-ı Veli and his life that I have just outlined comes almost exclusively from the aforementioned work of Ömer el-Fu'âdî (d. 1636). Ömer was the fifth of a series of successors to head the Şa'baniyye tarikat in Kastamonu, having been trained by his predecessors 'Abdülbâkî Efendi (d. 1589)

and Muhyüddin Efendi (d. 1604). He was born in the year 1560 in Kastamonu, and had known the great saint Şa'bân Efendi in his youth, as his father, Himmet Dede, had been one of the şeyh's followers. However, the şeyh had died when he was only nine years old.¹¹ In the hopes of acquiring a lucrative position as part of the *ilmiye* hierarchy in his home town of Kastamonu, he studied in the local *medreses* and learned Arabic and Persian, in addition to his native language of Turkish.¹² But doubt overcame him, and he withdrew from the company of his fellow men and the pursuit of worldly goals, and began to keep the company of a number of local şeyhs in the area of Kastamonu. He wanted to entrust himself for guidance to 'Abdülbâkî Efendi, but since he was in İskilip (near to Çorum) at the time, he was not able to do so until 'Abdülbâkî returned to Kastamonu towards the end of his life. As a result, Ömer had to complete his training with 'Abdülbâkî's successor Muhyüddin, before succeeding himself to the head of the order in 1604 upon Muhyüddin's death.¹³

It is the contention of this article that this marked a turning point in the development of the Şa'bâniyye branch of the Halveti tarikat. Ömer el-Fu'âdî differed from his predecessors in a key respect, which was that he was a prolific writer and an activist for the wider Halveti cause in the Ottoman society of his time, despite being a provincial Kastamonu scholar for the duration of his life. He maintained his position at the head of the Şa'bân-ı Veli complex in Kastamonu for 33 years, until his death at the age of 76 in the year 1636.¹⁴ This makes him an unusual figure worthy of our attention, as he stands out in contrast to the multitude of big-city denizens that normally make up the ranks of *ulema* authors in archival card catalogues.

Interestingly enough, the biographical dictionaries produced by Istanbul-based ulema contemporaries like Nev'îzâde 'Atâ'î make little mention of Ömer el-Fu'âdî. 'Atâ'î makes only a desultory reference to him as the keeper of Şa'bân's tomb at the time he was composing the work, and borrows a small snippet of his poetry to round out his already brief entry on Şa'bân-ı Veli himself.¹⁵ A later copy of Sünbül Sinân Efendi's *Risâlatu'l-tahqîqiyyab* also extends the silsile chain of the Halveti order included in the original text of the work (composed circa 1528) up into the time of Fu'âdî's successor, Çorumlu Şeyh İsmâ'il Efendi (d. 1644).¹⁶ In fact, these two authors seemed to be more generous than most. Many works dealing with the various notables of the Halveti tarikat ignored the Şa'bâniyye branch of the order altogether, focusing their attention only on the Istanbul-based Sünbüliyye and Sivasiyye, along with the Egyptian-based Gülşeniyye branches of the Halveti order.¹⁷

At first glance, it is not entirely clear why this should be so. One

could, arguably, suggest an Ottoman intellectual bias against provincials not from the religious establishments of the big three cities of Istanbul, Edirne, and Bursa, at least in the case of someone like 'Atâ'î. Yet this does not explain the case of someone like Mahmûd Celâleddin Hulvî, whose work is littered with şeyhs from such centers of civilization as Cavdar, Şeyhlû, and Hayrebolu, to name but a few. The fact that Şa'bân's spiritual descent did not pass through the more notable successors to Yahyâ-yı Şirvânî and Cemâl el-Halveti, as discussed previously, may also have caused some to dismiss the Şa'bâniyye as unimportant or outsiders.

However, it is also possible that up until the time of Ömer el-Fu'âdî, the followers of Şa'bân-ı Veli may have had a dubious reputation among the wider Halveti community. During the *şebzâde*-governorship of Murad III in the sancak of Manisa, a Şa'bâniyye dervish by the name of Şeyh Şücâ', reportedly of Albanian origins, was patronized by Râziye Hatun, Murad's sister. After he interpreted some of the odd dreams that Murad had been having upon Râziye's suggestion, Murad also became attached to him as one of his devotees.¹⁸ This relationship continued into Murad's accession to the sultanate in 1574, and the şeyh became a powerful and influential member of the court up until his death in 1580. This was not viewed positively by many Ottoman notables, and Gelibolulu Mustafa 'Ali in particular argued that this was one of the factors which led to the failure of Murad's reign and the subsequent weakness of the Ottoman state.¹⁹ Even Sinâneddin Yûsuf b. Ya'kûb, author of one of the first extended hagiographical-historical works of the Halveti order, a copy of which was presented to Murad III himself, contented himself solely with noting Şa'bân-ı Veli's existence through the chain of authority passing through Cemâl el-Halveti and Hayreddin Tokâdî. He then added that 'the Şeyh Şücâ' that came with the Sultan [from Manisa] is from the silsile of Şa'bân Efendi.'²⁰ This seems out of place with the level of influence that Şeyh Şücâ' had attained by 1576-7 when this particular work was submitted, and may reflect the ambivalence of an established leader of the Sünbüliyye about the political success achieved by a member of an upstart of questionable character.

The problems that the tomb complex of Şa'bân-ı Veli suffered in the aftermath of Murad's reign may also reflect the political fallout from the enemies made by the upstart Şücâ'. It is clear that before his death, Şücâ' had been funnelling resources into the renovation of the complex that had been associated with his master. An inscription over the door of the mosque in Kastamonu reads 'Şücâ' Efendi, spiritual guide to Sultan Murad * Renovated the building and made it into a mosque full of light * Dervish Ömer Fu'âdî recited a chronogram for the renovation * Şa'bân Dede made the mosque

more prosperous * 984 H. (1576).²¹ This inscription poses a major problem, as the date does not correspond with the period in which Ömer el-Fu'âdî was active at the complex, unless we accept that the second half of the inscription was added considerably later during Fu'âdî's overseeing of the building of additional structures. If so, this would demonstrate that Ömer el-Fu'âdî, during his completion of this construction and dedication of the tomb complex in 1611, took the step of renaming the mosque after Şa'bân Efendi, in place of Şücâ'.²² In other words, this chronogram represents a potential slight against Şücâ's legacy.

Fu'âdî's insistence on the change may have something to do with the history of the construction of the tomb structure over the graves of Şa'bân and his followers. After Fu'âdî took over as head of the Şa'bâniyye in Kastamonu in 1604, he managed to secure the assistance of a *kethüdâ* of Sultan Ahmed I's grand vizier Murad Pasha by the name of Ömer. Unfortunately, catastrophe struck, as Murad Pasha died in Diyarbekir, and his *kethüdâ* Ömer was subsequently imprisoned and then murdered by a rival, Nâsûh Pasha.²³ All of Ömer's wealth was immediately impounded by the state, and even his inheritors were not able to move quickly enough to lay a claim to some of it. As a result, the tomb was left half finished and began to fall into a ruined state after some time due to lack of progress.²⁴ It is instructive, however, that when approached by some of the notables and scholars of the region who wanted to press a claim to the deceased Ömer's wealth to allow for the completion of the tomb, Fu'âdî's response was rather pointed:

No! In our path there is no asking, laying claims, or requesting favours from anyone. From Şa'bân Efendi in particular there was never any demand or claim in worldly matters by requesting or asking from anyone else throughout his entire life. He never chose [to accept] the services of a pious foundation. In his human needs and livelihood he entrusted himself to God, saying 'the sustenance is God's affair.' This poor one [meaning Fu'âdî] seated on his prayer-rug follows his example, albeit with weakness and defects. Previously, we didn't ask Ömer Kethüdâ for the building of the tomb. He began this job himself with the permission of God. This time also we commend it to God most High, with assistance from spiritual power of [Şa'bân Efendi].²⁵

Such a model is in stark contrast to that of Şeyh Şücâ', who regularly sought favours from Sultan Murad III.²⁶ This perhaps indicates an insistence on the part of Fu'âdî towards abandoning the legacy of previous Şa'bâniyye supporters of the tomb complex.

However, other even more troubling problems began to arise.

Observing the problems that the tomb construction had encountered, certain people began to mutter accusations that Ömer Kethüdâ's death was caused by Şa'bân Efendi himself from beyond the grave, due to his anger at the building of the tomb. More critically, other people whom Fu'âdî refers to as 'censurers, fanatics, and ignorant people' began to criticize the project and its backers. They confronted Fu'âdî and his followers and said:

Building tombs over the graves of the people of God and the şeyhs, and burning candles and lamps in the tombs is not appropriate. It is a waste of resources and it is unlawful. And it is not appropriate to build it with the money of the Sultan, the viziers, or the administrators [either].²⁷

The language of this criticism is indicative of the rhetoric employed by the *Kadıızâdeli* (or more accurately in this case, proto-Kadıızâdeli) movement, which has already been the subject of several articles and monographs in the scholarly literature.²⁸ Fu'âdî found these criticisms sufficiently threatening that he insisted on including a *fetvâ* from the *şeyhülislâm* of that era, Sa'deddin Efendi, in addition to advancing his own arguments refuting each part of his opponent's claims in turn.²⁹ But this proto-Kadıızâdeli faction had put Fu'âdî into a bind. If the tomb construction remained in limbo, this would be interpreted by the local community as being a *de facto* sign from God and Şa'bân Efendi himself, a sign indicating a potential rejection of the practices and institutions associated with the cult of saints. But at the same time, Fu'âdî had ideologically boxed himself into a corner by forbidding any request for money or support from the men of the state, one of the few areas in which he concurred with his critics.

Nevertheless, the solution was to come in part through the agency of representatives of the Ottoman government in Istanbul. Mehmed Ağa, the head of the palace guard in Istanbul, and Hibetullah Efendi, a *kadı*, came to assess the situation of the tomb. Fu'âdî explained the problem to them, and once again rejected their attempts to act as intermediaries to free up money from Istanbul to complete the project. But then the two men suggested that if they were to contribute funds of their own free will, they would merely be following in the steps of Ömer Kethüdâ, and would not contravene Fu'âdî's prohibition. So a sum of gold coins was submitted by each, and then a remarkable thing happened. Following the example of the two notables from Istanbul, the notables of Kastamonu sensed their opportunity and began to contribute to the sum already raised to the extent they were able. Some of Ömer Kethüdâ's old followers then got word of the new developments, and began to contribute as well. Soon the project raised enough money for its final completion,

with Fu'âdî acting as overseer for the funds, which were recorded in a *defter*.³⁰ It seems that once the local community in Kastamonu received a positive sign from the circles of power in the capital, they rapidly moved to make the project their own.

The hagiography that Fu'âdî wrote to describe this and other events played a critical role in all of this. The first part of Fu'âdî's hagiography, which mostly described the life of Şa'bân Efendi and Fu'âdî's immediate predecessors, was completed in the year 1608 and dedicated to Sultan Ahmed I. However, it was written at the request of his contemporaries, who complained that many other saints had such a *menâkıbnâme* work, while their hometown hero Şa'bân Efendi did not.³¹ This would have been during the period when the tomb complex was looking to strengthen itself, and probably aimed to play a direct role in securing the support of the community in defending Şa'bân's legacy.

But the second half of the work, known as the *Türbenâme*, was actually added more than a decade later, as its dedication to Sultan Osman II (r. 1618-22) indicates.³² As the audience can probably sense from the aforementioned narrative, its tone is considerably more defensive and troubled than the chronologically-earlier parts, and it reads more like an apologetic than a hagiography, despite being considered a part of the overall *Menâkıb-ı Şa'bân-ı Veli* as a sort of appendix. One gets the distinct feeling that the reign of Osman II was viewed with some misgivings by Fu'âdî, as he also fired off another tract entitled *Risâletü'l-müselleşât* as an advisory letter to the Sultan. Building on a story about the Prophet and his companions, where they each relate in turn the three things they love most, Fu'âdî demonstrated for the Sultan what values the leaders of the Muslim community should emulate. He then concludes by warning the Sultan to emulate the Prophet and his successors in wielding 'both the manifest and the spiritual sword,' and not just the former. Even more cryptically, he also alludes to events at the time by saying that 'it is not a good thing to kill some of the men of the state, the edifice of God will collapse.'³³

Unfortunately, this short paper cannot hope to fully pursue all of the complexity of these issues. But it is clear that Ömer el-Fu'âdî played a critical role in reviving the cult of Şa'bân Efendi, through his creation of a literature that could be utilized for the purpose of defending his tarikat against the growing anti-Sufism polemic that marked the early 17th-century milieu in which he lived. He also sought to refine the ideological stance of the tarikat's followers by avoiding abuses and clarifying confusing issues, partially by translating and simplifying existing materials into a more simple form of Turkish.³⁴ The first chapter of the *Menâkıb* speaks for itself—it is in fact not an anecdotal biography at all, but is instead summed up

with the pointed title ‘Who is a Real Saint?’³⁵ His activism and his legacy were to transform the subsequent followers of the Şa‘bâniyye, and for the Ottoman historian, his works are invaluable in assessing the provincial context of Ottoman cultural and political life.

Notes

¹ Nasûhî Efendi and his works have been the subject of a recent monograph, see Kemal Edib Kürkçüoğlu, *Şeyh Muhammed Nasûbî: Hayatı, Eserleri, Divanı, Mektupları* (Istanbul: Alem Tic. Yayıncılık, 1996). Basic information on the lives, works, and tarikat successors of both figures are also given in the recent monumental work of Necdet Yılmaz, *Osmanlı Toplumunda Tasavvuf: Süfîler, Devlet ve Ulema (XVII. Yüzyıl)* (Istanbul: Osmanlı Araştırma Vakfı, 2001), 102-23. The Kadızadeli leader Vani Mehmed Efendi found Karabâş ‘Ali Veli dangerous enough to force his exile for four years from Istanbul, see Fahri Getin Derin, *Abdurrahman Abdî Paşa Vekâyi’nâme’si: Tablîl ve Metin Tenkîdi (1058-1093/1648-1682)* (Istanbul: unpublished Ph.D. Diss., Istanbul University, 1993), 420.

² For a good short history of the Halvetî *tarikât* and its origins, see B.G. Martin, ‘A Short History of the Halvetî Order of Dervishes,’ *Saints, Scholars and Sufis: Muslim Religious Institutions in the Middle East Since 1500*, ed. Nikki R. Keddie (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), 275-305.

³ Hâcî ‘Alî (d. after 1074 H.), *Tühfetü’l-Mucâhidîn* (Istanbul: Nuruosmaniye Ktp. MS #2293), fols. 526a-527a.

⁴ The spread of the order in the Balkans in particular has been well-documented by Nathalie Clayer, *Mystiques, État et Société: Les Halvetis dans l’aire Balkanique de la fin du XV^e siècle à nos jours* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1994).

⁵ See the silsile document of the Şa‘bâniyye tarikat presented and photographed in Musa Seyfî Cihangir, *Şeyh Şa‘bân-ı Veli Hazretleri’nin Hayatı ve Manevî Silsilesi* (Kastamonu, 1997). The original document is found in the museum on the grounds of the Şa‘bân-ı Veli complex in Kastamonu, 13. See also Reşat Öngören, *Osmanlılar’da Tasavvuf: Anadolu’da Süfîler, Devlet ve Ulema (XVI. Yüzyıl)* (Istanbul: İz Yayıncılık, 2000), 81.

⁶ An account of Cemâl el-Halvetî’s life and career first appeared in Lâmi‘î Çelebi’s 16th-century attachment to the *tabaqat*-genre work of Abdurrahman Câmî, see Süleyman Uludağ and Mustafa Kara, ed., *Nefahâtü’l-Üns: Evliya Menkıbeleri*, 2nd ed. (Istanbul: Marifet Yayınları, 1998), 706-10. This account was followed by a commentary of Lâmi‘î Çelebi’s that attacked the critics of the order. A more extensive hagiographical account of Cemâl el-Halvetî’s life appears in the important Halvetî hagiographical work by Sinâneddîn Yûsuf b. Ya‘kûb el-Germiyânî (d. 1581?), *Tezkîretü’l-Halvetiyye* (Istanbul: Süleymaniye Ktp. MS Es’ad Efendi #1761/2), fols. 10a-18a.

⁷ Abdulkerim Abdulkadiröğlü, *Halvetilik’in Şa‘baniyye Kolu: Şeyh Şa‘ban-ı Veli ve Külliyesi* (Ankara: Türk Hava Kurumu Basımevi, 1991), 37. The hagiographer, Ömer el-Fu‘âdî, stresses here that Şa‘bân’s being an orphan, and therefore dependent on the kindness of others, put him in the same situation as the Prophet Muhammad. Ömer el-Fu‘âdî (d. 1636), *Menâkıb-ı Şeyh Şa‘bân-ı Veli ve Türbenâme* (Kastamonu, 1277 H.), 37 (hereafter referred to as *Menâkıb-ı Şa‘bân*). This work also exists in a passable modern Turkish translation sold on-site at the tomb complex in Kastamonu, see Muhammed Safî, ed., *Menâkıb-ı Şeyh Şa‘bân-ı Veli ve Türbenâme* (Kastamonu: Şa‘bân-ı Veli Kültür Vakfı, 1998).

⁸ Şa'bân's dissatisfaction with 'ilm-i zâbir and his search for a proper *mürşid* fall squarely into a hagiographical trope that guides the lives of most Halveti şeyhs. See, for example, the mind-numbing regularity of this pattern for the early Halveti figures up through Cemâl el-Halveti and his Sünbüliyye tarikat successors in the 17th-century biographical encyclopedia of Halveti şeyhs in Hâcî 'Alî, fols. 517b-550a.

⁹ The two contradicting references can be found in Nev'izâde 'Atâî, *Hadâ'ikü'l-bakâ'ik fî tekmiletü'l-şekâ'ik* (also known as the *Zeyl-i Şekâ'ik*) (Istanbul: Çağrı Yayınları, 1989), Vol. II, 62 and 199. For a laudable attempt to resolve the confusion in the sources, which also included information found in the early twentieth-century work of Hüseyin Vassaf, the *Sefîne-i Enliyâ*, see Öngören, 80-1.

¹⁰ See *Menâkıb-ı Şa'bân*, pp. 35-36. Since Ömer el-Fu'âdî's other writings demonstrate a strong devotion to the continuance of the Halveti tradition as laid down by Yahya-yı Şirvânî, this is perhaps a significant point worth considering.

¹¹ Abdulkadiroğlu, 61.

¹² See Yılmaz, 94. Fu'âdî's noted works include at least two written in Arabic that have survived, the *Makalat at-tavashshaqiyyah wa risâlat at-tahhidiyyah* (Istanbul: Atatürk Kitaplığı MS Osman Ergin #1514 being the best preserved of a number of copies), and the *Risâlatu'l-hayatiyyah* (Istanbul: Süleymaniye Ktp. MS Hacı Mahmud Efendi #2287/11). In addition, the stated motivation for much of his work was to translate Arabic and Persian works into Turkish so his compatriots could better understand them.

¹³ Ömer el-Fu'âdî, *Risâle-i Silsilenâme* (Istanbul: Süleymaniye Ktp. MS Hacı Mahmud Efendi #2287/13), fols. 258b-259a.

¹⁴ Yılmaz, 95.

¹⁵ 'Atâî, v. 2, 199.

¹⁶ Sünbül Sinân Efendi (d. 1529), *Risâlat at-tahqiqiyyah* (Istanbul: Süleymaniye Ktp. MS Kasidicizâde #340), fol. 30a-b.

¹⁷ See for example Mahmûd Celâleddin Hulvî, *Lemezât-ı Hulviyye ez-lemma'at-ı 'ulviyye*, ed. Mehmet Serhan Tayşi (Istanbul: Marmara Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Vakfı Yayınları, 1993), who presents the Halveti order as being a combination of the Sünbüliyye and Gülşeniyye branches only, and Hâcî 'Alî, fols. 517b-608a, who presents a number of various Halvetis from their inception up through the same branches as Hulvî, and also adding the Sivâsiyye along with several unaffiliated Halvetis, while completely ignoring the existence of the Şa'bâniyye branch despite being of provincial background himself (based in Szigetvár in Hungary).

¹⁸ For a brief description of the development of these connections from the point of view of a Halveti dervish from the İmrâhor tekke, who later compiled Murad III's correspondence with Şeyh Şücâ', see Sultan Murad III, *Kitâb-ı Manâmât* (Istanbul: Nuruosmaniye Ktp. MS #2599), fols. 2a-b (hereafter referred to as *Manâmât*).

¹⁹ See the observations in Cornell Fleischer, *Bureaucrat and Intellectual in the Ottoman Empire: Gelibolulu Mustafa Ali (1541-1600)* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), 296. There seems to be some substance to the complaints that Mustafa 'Alî makes, as Murad III's correspondence with his şeyh in the *Kitâb-ı Manâmât* frequently reflects tensions over Şücâ''s attempts to place his followers into state positions, see note 26 below.

²⁰ Sinâneddin Yûsuf b. Ya'kûb el-Germiyânî (d. 1581), *Tezkiretü'l-Halvetiyye* (Istanbul: Süleymaniye Ktp. MS Es'ad Efendi #1372/1), fol. 17a. For more information on the structure and importance of this work for the development of Halveti hagiographical literature, see John Curry, 'The Growth of Turkish Hagiographical Literature Within the Halveti Order in the 16th and 17th Centuries,' *The Turks*, ed. Hasan Celal Güzel (Ankara: Yeni Türkiye, 2002), Vol. III, 912-20,

or in Turkish, John Curry, 'XVI. ve XVII. Yüzyıllarda Halveti Tarikatı İçindeki Türkçe Menakıb Edebiyatının Gelişmesi,' *Türkler* (Ankara: Yeni Türkiye, 2002), Vol. XI, 815-22.

²¹ This is found over the entrance to the mosque just across from the tomb of Şa'bân and his successors. For a reproduction of the inscriptions found in the mosque and tomb complex, see Ziya Demircioğlu, *Şeyb Şa'bân-ı Veli ve Postnişinleri* (Kastamonu: Azim Matbaası, 1997), insert between page 18 and 19.

²² This would also explain why the mosque is known by both names in some works, see for example Abdulkadiroğlu, 101-2.

²³ Prof. William Griswold, however, has informed me that Ömer Kethüdâ in fact probably died of old age, and that the myth of the murder had more to do with popular dislike of Nâsûh Pasha's fearsome reputation than reality. See William J. Griswold, *The Great Anatolian Rebellion (1000-1020/1591-1611)* (Berlin: K. Schwarz Verlag, 1983), 210-1, esp. n. 3, 8, and 9. I thank Prof. Griswold for sharing these insights with me.

²⁴ *Menâkıb-ı Şa'bân*, 149-50.

²⁵ *Ibid.* 150.

²⁶ In his correspondence with his şeyh, Murad III frequently makes reference to his inability to fulfill Sücâ's demands at the present time, and begs his indulgence in delaying the request. See for example, *Manâmât*, fols. 158a, 159a-b, 160b, and 165b-166a, among others.

²⁷ *Menâkıb-ı Şa'bân*, 153.

²⁸ See for example Madeline C. Zilfi, *The Politics of Piety: The Ottoman Ulema in the Postclassical Age* (Minneapolis: Bibliotheca Islamica, 1988), and another more recent article that more or less echoes Zilfi's views, Hüseyin Akkaya, 'XVII. Yüzyıl Osmanlı Devleti'nde Görülen Fikir Hareketlerinde Kadizadeliler-Sivasiler Tartışması,' *Osmanlı*, Vol. VII (Düşünce), 170-5.

²⁹ *Menâkıb-ı Şa'bân*, 162-3. The fetvâ demands that the person guilty of advancing such arguments either repent of their actions or face potential execution.

³⁰ *Ibid.* 166-7.

³¹ *Ibid.* 4-5.

³² *Ibid.* 144.

³³ Ömer el-Fu'âdî, *Risâletü'l-müsellesât er-reşâdî* (Istanbul: Süleymaniye Ktp. MS Hacı Mahmud Efendi #2287), fols. 282b-283a. Fu'âdî does not explicitly state what he is referring to here, but the overtone of what had happened to Ömer Kethüdâ in the previous decade might be inferred.

³⁴ *Menâkıb-ı Şa'bân*, 5-6. Fu'âdî mentions here that he had originally written a longer text, but on account of most people not being able to understand or benefit from it, he abridged it and converted it into a simpler form of Turkish. The original, more extensive text has not survived. It may not have ever been completed in the first place, due to its poor reception. See Abdulkadiroğlu, 64.

³⁵ *Menâkıb-ı Şa'bân*, 8.

A Developing Village in the Middle of the Nineteenth Century: Salihli

Nejdet Bilgi

Introduction

Entries in *tabrir* surveys¹ from the early sixteenth century indicate that Salihli, a village in the *kaza* of Sart in the *sancak* of Aydın, was established by Turkish settlers after their capture of the area. These surveys record the name of the village as Veled-i Salih.² In the nineteenth century it became known as Salihli. After the declaration of the Tanzimat in 1839, Sart together with Salihli, was annexed to the sancak of Saruhan. According to the census records, in 1842 Salihli was one of seven districts³ in Sart. In the *salnâme* (government yearbook) of 1857 it was again shown in Saruhan⁴ as *Sart ma'a Salihli*. In 1867, with the introduction of new administrative regulations Sart became a township in the *kaza* of Adala. In 1872 Sart's name was altered to Salihli but remained in the sancak of Saruhan until the end of the Ottoman era.⁵

In short, when Sart lost its importance in the nineteenth century, Salihli became the centre of the district and finally gave its name to the district itself. Salihli had been a village until the beginning of the nineteenth century; it developed to become a small *kasaba* (town) around the middle of the century; and it has been a developing *kaza* since the 1890s.

In this study, I analyze the social and economic structures underlying this development, using mainly the *temettüat defterleri* (records of profits) of 1844-5 from the Prime Ministry Archives in Istanbul.⁶ I used two of these. The first (no. 4612) has 39 pages and records Turks/Muslims, *reaya* (non-Muslim Ottoman subjects)/*Rum* (Ottoman Greeks), *Aşiret-i İfraz-ı Ceridi* ('the tribe of İfraz-ı Ceridi), and *Aşiret-i Saçlı Ceridi* ('the tribe of Saçlı Ceridi).⁷ The second (no. 2498) has 25 pages, with the records of the *Aşiret-i Elçi-i Karahızırlı* and *Aşiret-i Çakal*.⁸

Population

According to the tahrir defter of 1528 the village of Veled-i Salih had 14 households; according to the tahrir defter of 1574 it had 17 soldiers and 9 households.⁹ In his book published in 1828, the traveller Arundel states that there were 13 Greek and 35 Turkish households in the village when he passed through in 1826.¹⁰ However, in his book published in Paris in 1834, Arundel reported that there were 50 households and that only one of them was Greek.¹¹

According to the results of the census of 1831, published by Karal and Karpat, 'Sard ma'a Salihli' had a population of 501 males of whom 381 were Turkish and 120 were Greek.¹² Of these 120 Greeks, 29 lived in the village of Salihli. Of these 11 were heads of households while 18 were bachelors.¹³ All these figures approximate to the numbers given by Arundel. At the beginning of the Tanzimat era Sart was annexed to the sancak of Saruhan. According to the census records of 1842, there were 52 households with 87 male subjects in the village of Salihli.¹⁴

Table 1. Communities in Salihli¹⁵ and their Populations and Households in 1845

Communities	Households	Household x 4.5 = Approx. pop.
Resident Muslim/Turk	52	234
Reaya/Greek	33	148
Aşiret-i İfraz-ı Ceridi	60	270
Aşiret-i Saçlı Ceridi	9	41
Elçi Aşireti/ Karahızırlı	115	517
Aşiret-i Çakal	9	41
Total	278	1,251

Source: BOA, *ML VRD TMT*, no. 2498 and 4612.

In temettüat defters, for 1845, populational data is quite different from the census results of 1842. According to these defters there were 278 households with a population of 1,251.¹⁶ The Greek population was 148 persons in 33 households. Records of 1845 indicate that there was not much change in the resident Turkish population but that the main change was because of the settlement of tribes. The temettüat defters for four different tribes show 193 households. This corresponds to 70% of the population in proportion to the total number of households. The Greek population made up 12% of the general population, and the Turkish population 88% (Table 1). The peculiarity of the Greek population has to be underlined here: the defter records show that 17 of 33

Greek households had come to Salihli from other places: 8 households from Rhodes, 3 from Kasaba (Turgutlu), 2 from Akşehir, and one each from Yanya, Mihaili, Dereköy and Adala. When this is taken into consideration, the population is approximately the same as the numbers given by Arundel.

The *salnames* from the last years of the nineteenth century also show the population of Salihli. In 1890, as the centre of the kaza, Salihli had a population of 3,091 in 510 households.¹⁷ This population was made up of 1,410 females and 1,681 males. This included 665 non-Muslim subjects, but how many of them lived in the kasaba of Salihli is not certain¹⁸. However, according to the *salname* of 1908 3,002 Muslims, 1,139 Greeks, 215 Jews, and 85 Armenians—4,441 people in total—were living in the kasaba.¹⁹ The proportion of Greeks in the kasaba was 12% in 1845, 20% in 1890, and 25.6% in 1908.

Cultivating Lands

According to the *temettü* records the village of Salihli had 6,046.5 *dönüms* of cultivated land (1 *dönüm* = 1,160.4 m²).²⁰ In addition there were 187 walnut trees. The resident Turks possessed 2,701.5 *dönüms* of land. 39 Turkish households out of 52, or about 75% had agricultural lands, an average of 69 *dönüms* (Table 2). Only 4 Greek households out of 33, or 12% had cultivated fields, totalling 59 *dönüms* of land, suggesting that the Greek settlement was relatively recent.

The Aşiret-i İfraz-ı Ceridi, a newly settled tribe in Salihli, made up of 60 households, had 1,081 *dönüms* of land. 51 of these 60 families, or 85%, had an average of 21 *dönüms* of land, marking a distinct break with the tribe's originally nomadic nature. Saçlı Ceridi, another tribal settlement in Salihli, had 191 *dönüms* of land. 5 households, or 55.5% of the tribe, owned an average of 38 *dönüms* each. Elçi Aşireti, the most populous tribal settlement in Salihli, had 1,747 *dönüms* of land, divided between only 28.5% of households with an average of 59 *dönüms* each. The relatively small number of households possessing land suggests that the Elçi, in contrast to other tribes settled in Salihli, had not entirely lost their nomadic way of life. Another tribal settlement in Salihli was Çakal Aşireti, made up of 9 households, 3 of which had 90 *dönüms* of land, giving an average of 30 *dönüms* each.

The average of amount of land owned by residents of Salihli was 21.75 *dönüms*. However, since almost half of the households had no land at all, the average holding among the 135 households that had some land is actually 44.8 *dönüms*. The biggest land-holding group

consisted of 58 people with 11–25 dönüms each. The second largest group had 26–50 dönüms each (Table 3).

Table 2. The Cultivated Lands of the Village of Salihli and Its Communities (in dönüms)

Communities	Turkish Resident	Non-Muslim/Greek	Aşiret-i İfraz-ı Ceridi	Aşiret-i Saçlı Ceridi	Elçi Aşireti/Karabazırlı	Çakal Aşireti	Total	Percentage (%)
households	52	33	60	9	115	9	278	-
sown fields*	2,115	230	826	170	1,271	90	4,702	77.36
fallow*	427	6	216	20	394	-	1,063	17.58
let out on lease*	125				52		177	2.92
vineyard*	2.5		39	1			42.5	0.7
pasture*					30		30	0.5
forage fields*	1						1	0.02
rented lands*	31						31	0.52
total*	2,701.5	236	1,081	191	1,747	90	6,046.5	100
walnut trees (unit)	11		143	33			187	-

Source: BOA, *ML VRD TMT*, no. 2498 and 4612.

Table 3. Distribution of Cultivated Fields among Households

Dönüms	Households	Percentage(%)
0	143	51.4
1 – 5	11	3.9
6 – 10	13	4.7
11 – 25	58	20.9
26 – 50	20	7.2
51 – 75	13	4.7
76 – 100	3	1.1
101 – 150	9	3.2
151+	8	2.9
Total	278	100

Source: BOA, *ML VRD TMT*, no. 2498 and 4612.

Agricultural Products

According to temettüat records, different communities in Salihli engaged in different types of agricultural production, and there is a

relationship between land-holding and cultivation type. The Greek community had the smallest amount of land and the smallest crop. Of the 6 communities that lived in Salihli, all 6 cultivated wheat, barley, and maize (Table 4) whereas, among 9 products, only one community cultivated grapes.

Table 4. The Tithes on Communities' Agricultural Products in Salihli in 1844

Communities	Wheat	Barley*	Tobacco**	Sesame*	Maize*	Sand-maize*	Grapes**	Walnut*	Cotton**
Resident Turkish	93.5	168	75	16	119	8		1	59
Non-Muslim Subjects/Greek	12	5	20	1	25				8
Aşiret-i İfraz-ı Ceridi	19	47.5			88.57	4.5	511.5	5	
Aşiret-i Saçlı Ceridi	8	19	5	3	32			1	
Aşiret-i Elçi/Karahızırılı	53.5	138.5		10	87	8			140
Aşiret-i Çakal	3	6			4				
Total	189	384	100	30	355.57	20.5	511.5	7	207

* Çeki (a *çeki* = kile = 20 kıyye x 1.283 kgs. = 25.66 kgs.)

** Kıyye (a *kıyye* = okka = 1.283 kgs.)

Source: BOA, *ML VRD TMT*, no. 2498 and 4612.

There were only 9 agricultural products recorded in Salihli. These were in order of amount: barley, maize, wheat, sesame, grapes, sand-maize (*kumdari*), cotton, walnut, and tobacco. In the order of value, tobacco, the least cultivated product, has fifth place (Tables 5-6). Gross agricultural earnings, estimated according to the values of tithes, amounted to 69,089,430 piasters in 1844. With the deduction of the tithe at 10%, the agricultural income of Salihli's townspeople amounted to 62,180,487 piasters, or 28.3% of the total income of Salihli in 1844.

The wheat crop amounted to 48,497 kg yearly, and of maize to 91,239 kg. Given a population of 1,251, every person consumed on average 111.7 kg of wheat and maize.²¹ However, since average wheat consumption is 190 – 235 kg per person when his/her diet is based mainly upon cereal,²² Salihli needed 237,690 kg of wheat per annum, assuming a person consumes at least 190 kg wheat a year. Only 20%, therefore, of its cereal need was grown in Salihli. When agricultural produce is sorted according to amount, wheat had the

third place from the top. Maize, which was another major source of nutrition, had the second place. When maize is taken into account with wheat, only 59% of the demand for wheat and maize was cultivated by the townspeople of Salihli. For the rest, they had to buy from the market.

Table 5. Total of Agricultural Products of Salihli in 1844

Product	Çeki*	Kıyye	x 10**	In kilograms
Barley	384		3,840	98,534,400
Maize	355.57		3,555.7	91,239,262
Wheat	189		1,890	48,497,400
Sesame	30		300	7,698,000
Grape	-	511.5	5,115	6,562,545
Sand-maize (<i>Kumdari</i>)	20.5		205	5,260,300
Cotton	-	207	2,070	2,655,810
Walnuts	7		70	1,796,200
Tobacco	-	100	1,000	1,283,000

* In the temettüat defters, a çeki is actually a kile.

** Ten times the tithe equals the whole crop because the tithe percentage was 10%.

Source: BOA, *ML VRD TMT*, no. 2498 and 4612.

Table 6. The Value of Agricultural Products in Salihli in 1844

Product	amount x price of a unit*	value in piasters
Maize	3,555.7 x 5.25	18,667,425
Wheat	1,890 x 9	17,010,000
Barley	3,840 x 4	15,360,000
Sesame	300 x 20	6,000,000
Tobacco	1,000 x 5	5,000,000
Cotton	2,070 x 1.875	3,881,250
Grapes	5,115 x 0.3	1,534,500
Sand-maize (<i>Kumdari</i>)	205 x 5.25	1,076,250
Walnuts	70 x 8	560,000
Total		69,089,430

* The values are calculated from the tithe records in temettüat defters.

Source: BOA, *ML VRD TMT*, no. 2498 and 4612.

The prices for agricultural products in Salihli differed slightly from those in other districts in the sancak of Saruhan: a çeki of maize was 5.25 piasters, a çeki of wheat was 9 piasters, a çeki of barley was 4

piasters, a çeki of sesame was 20 piasters, a kıyye of tobacco was 5 piasters, a kıyye of cotton was 75 para, a kıyye of grapes was 12 para, and a çeki of walnut was 8 piasters.

Occupations

When heads of the families are categorized according to occupation, 78 were labourers, 47 were farmers, and 32 were shepherds. This is peculiar because, although tribesmen formed an important part of the village's population, the majority of the occupations have a settled nature such as café owner, grocer, blacksmith, baker, innkeeper, soap seller, or farrier (Table 7).

113 people either from outside Salihli or seeking a second source of income were sharecroppers. Greek-Ottoman subjects were mostly artisans and tradesmen rather than farmers, but they also engaged in stockbreeding.

Livestock Count

The people of Salihli altogether most commonly owned milch goats, 1,060 head in all. They also owned 782 sheep, 566 rams, and 425 milch cows. The different communities tended to specialise in different types of livestock: the Greeks and the Aşiret of Elçi had mostly sheep; İfraz-ı Ceridi and Aşiret of Elçi had mostly goats and cows (Table 8).

The aşirets owned most of the riding animals, with the aşirets of Elçi and İfraz-ı Ceridi owning most of the saddle horses and donkeys. Not all of the animals had a commercial value. Some of the livestock were bred for their flesh, milk, or as draught animals. They were also used for transportation.

Salihli had 4,702 dönüms of cultivated land, and its farmers possessed 84 oxen and 37 buffalos as draught animals, a single animal working 39 dönüms of land in average. This average was 31.5 in Marmara, 29 in Saruhanlı, 19 in Uncuboz. Apparently, therefore, the farmers of Salihli were short of draught animals, although horses or mules could also be put to work.

Income

Most of the income in Salihli was gained from services, trade and artisanship, amounting to 91,580 piasters 39.5% of general income. The second commonest source of income was farming with 74,275.75 piasters, or 32%. The next source was livestock breeding,

Table 7. Occupations in Salihli and Communities

Communities	Turkish resident	Non-Muslim / Greek	İfraz-ı Ceridi	Elçi aşireti	Saçlı Ceridi	Çakal aşireti	Total
labourer	11	1	14	43	5	4	78
farmer	17		17*	9	3	1	47
shepherd		9	8	14		1	32
servant	4	1		6			11
farm labourer			2	2	1		5
gardener		1					1
orphan				9			9
old, handicapped, insane, etc.	2		4	5			11
carpenter	1						1
café owner	4						4
grocer		3					3
blacksmith						3	3
imam/priest	1			1			2
helva maker	1						1
tobacco labourer	2						2
teacher	1						1
baker		6					6
builder		4					4
herdsman	1						1
police officer	1						1
potter	3						3
primary school teacher	1		1				2
horseshoer	1						1
poultryman	1						1
oil dealer		2					2
innkeeper		1					1
soap seller		1					1
tradesman				7			7
miller		4					4
woodsman			3				3
camel raiser				1			1
soldier				1			1
mounted yeoman				1			1
vet				1			1
tribe leader			1	1			2
elder of a tribe				1			1
sharecropper			8	12			20
other sharecroppers **	47	9	23	26	6	2	113

*2 family heads were recorded as 'unskilled' but added here according to their jobs.

** Sharecroppers from out of Salihli or those whose second job was sharecropping.

Source: BOA, *ML VRD TMT*, no. 2498 and 4612.

amounting to 54,472 piasters, or 23.5%. The townspeople also earned 11,360 piasters from rents, that is 5% of general income. The total income was 231,687.8 piasters altogether, including tax deductions. This amount is the average for the two years, 1844 and 1845.

Service jobs, trade and artisanship were major occupations in Salihli. It is peculiar that there were more tradesmen and artisans than farmers, as this does not correspond with the characteristics of a village. Economically, in fact, Salihli turns out to have been a town, and not a mere village. Not only was there a large group of labourers, tradesmen and artisans but also the 5% of income derived from rented premises such as shops and stores, unlike any other village.

Agriculture and livestock breeding altogether made up 55.5% of the total income while it comprised 77% in Marmara, a centre of a kaza in the sancak of Saruhan. At the same time, while Marmara's townspeople earned 8% of their income from livestock, in Salihli this is 23.5%, evidently because the *aşirets* of Salihli had not entirely cast off their nomadic nature.

From income for the years 1844 and 1845 and the arithmetic mean of these values, it is possible to calculate the approximate annual income in Salihli. In fact, in the two years only agricultural income varied, while the other sources of income stayed at the same level, at least in according to the *temettii* defters (Table 10). The average annual income of Salihli was 231,687 piasters; 219,592 piasters in 1844, 243,782 piasters in 1845.

The average annual income, divided by 278, the number of households, equals 833.4 piasters. In the kasaba of Marmara this figure is 1,934 piasters, and in Saruhanlı 1,782 piasters²³. Apparently, therefore, the townspeople of Salihli had low incomes.

Taxes

The tax collected in Salihli in 1844 amounted to 52,028 piasters: 23,781 piasters for *virgii-yi mahsusa*, 18,118 piasters for *mirisi* (a special tax collected from *aşirets* only), 6,720 piasters for tithe, and 3,409 piasters for various taxes and tariffs. In 1844 the people in Salihli had to pay 19.2% of their income as taxes. If annually calculated it is 18.3% of general income. These figures are higher by 3-4% than the percentages in Saruhan.²⁴ This difference must have been because of income sources other than farming and somewhat higher taxes on these sources.

The person who paid the highest tax gave 44% of his income. The second highest taxpayer however paid 24% of his income, while the

Table 8. The Communities in Salihli and Their Livestock (head)

Communities	Turkish resident	Non-Muslim /Greek	İfraz-ı Ceridi	Elçi aşireti	Çakal aşireti	Saçlı Ceridi	Total
milch cow	25	5	79	19	9	288	425
cow			26	5	8	130	169
female calf	20		16			10	46
male calf	18	4	24	5	7	106	164
heifer	8	3	5	7	5	147	175
younger calf						7	7
yoke buffalo	31	6					37
milch buffalo	33	1	1			4	39
barren buffalo	1					1	2
buffalo heifer	3						3
buffalo calf						1	1
younger buffalo calf	8					2	10
ox	17		29	7	3	28	84
bullock	1		7			16	24
mare	9	3	24	6	4	125	171
foal	4	3	9	1	1	55	73
horse			1			10	11
baggage horse	16	7	13	3	3	19	61
mule			2				2
ass	24	5	39	13	14	130	225
donkey foal	3	2					5
camel				4	4	9	17
milch goat			631	65	67	297	1,060
male goat			17	3		33	53
kid					10		10
ram		403	145	5		13	566
milch sheep	5	405			16	356	782
lamb					10	4	14
beehive	16		231	2	21	122	392

Source: BOA, *ML VRD TMT*, no. 2498 and 4612.

Table 9a. Source of Income of Communities in Salihli
(in piasters, estimated average of 1844 and 1845)

Communities	Turkish resident	Non-Muslim /Greek	Ifraz-ı Ceridi	Saçı Ceridi	Çakal aşireti	Elçi aşireti	Total
sown field	19,117.75	1,517.25	8,528.75	2,244.5	660.5	1,5419.5	47,488.25
rented land	286					160	446
fields taken on lease	3,836.25						3,836.25
grapevines	42		1,324	50			1,416.75
rental money from forage	60						60
sharecropping	7,800.5	1,981.5	2,585	926.5	311	6,783.5	20,388
walnut trees	6		577.5				640.5
milk buffalo	3,100	100	100			400	3,700
milk cow	1,450	250	4,000	950	300	15,150	22,100
milk sheep / sheep	60	6,412	1,440	60	198	4,302	12,472
milk and male goat			5,960	597	603	2,826	9,986
camel					1,000	2,050	3,050
shares of oil mills		1,000					1,000
oil manufacture		1,250					1,250
builder		2,400					2,400
payment to head of an aşiret			1,600			7,500	9,100
shepherd					250	2,700	2,950
woodman		500					500
farming	900		150		300		1,350
millers		4,700					4,700
renting of soap shops	300	450					750
renting of barber shops		100					100
poultry	550						550
trade						9,700	9,700
mounted yeoman						800	800

Table 9b. Source of Income of Communities in Salihli
(in piasters, estimated average of 1844 and 1845)

Communities	Turkish resident	Non-Muslim / Greek	İfraz-ı Ceridi	Saçlı Ceridi	Çakal aşireti	Elçi aşireti	Total
vet of horses						300	300
carpenter	950						950
zuhurat			250				250
bunch maker	1,350						1,350
herdsman	500						500
police officer	500						500
primary school teacher	550						550
imamship	200		400			1,000	1,600
grocery		2,750					2,750
inn keeping		1,500					1,500
gardener		350					350
renting of inns		80					80
renting of shops		120					120
renting of saddle shops		180					180
blacksmith					1,000		1,000
renting of greengrocer's		150					150
renting of oil shop		410					410
Soap manufacture		2,000					2,000
dessert selling	900						900
baker		5,450					5,450
renting of baker's	300	350					650
renting of gardener's	80						80
renting of coppersmith	30						30
renting of cafes	300						300
renting of shops	50						50

Table 9c. Source of Income of Communities in Salihli
(in piasters, estimated average of 1844 and 1845)

Communities	Turkish resident	Non-Muslim /Greek	İfraz-ı Ceridi	Saçlı Ceridi	Çakal aşireti	Elçi aşireti	Total
barber's	150						150
renting of mill	3,800						3,800
renting of stores	3,550	100					3,650
workman	5,000	500	2,750	1,400	1,300	16,000	26,950
renting of horse-shoer's	100						100
horse-shoeing	700						700
café	4,000						4,000
owning							
renting of store-houses	510						510
renting of pie shops	250						250
bee-hives	128		2,020	16	56	944	3,164
servants	2880	750				2,050	5,680
total							
annual income	64,344.25	34,850.75	32,185.25	6,244.00	5,978.50	88,085.00	231,687.80

Source: BOA, *ML VRD TMT*, no. 2498 and 4612.

Table 10 Taxes Collected in Salihli in 1844 (in piasters)

Communities	Turkish resident	Non-Muslim/Greek	Aşiret-i İfraz-ı Ceridi	Aşiret-i Saçlı Ceridi	Elçi aşireti	Çakal aşireti	Total
virgü-yi mahsusa mirisi	16,830.00	5,279.50	196.00	500	525.00	450.00	23,781.00
aylak ve kışlak tithe	2,976.75	394.25	1,040.50	449	1,787.75	72.00	6,720.25
tithe on walnut			15.00				15.00
tithe on melon field	205.00	30.00			75.00		310.00
tithe on beehive						5.25	5.25
grape tax	4.50						4.50
fixed tax		1,200.00					1,200.00
tax on wool		401.00					401.00
tax for the poor		360.50					360.50
total	20,016.25	7,665.25	4,923.50	2,009	16,527.00	887.25	52,028.25

Source: BOA, *ML VRD TMT*, no. 2498 and 4612.

Table 11. Income Types in Salihli

Income type	1844		1845		Average	
	Piasters	Percentage	Piasters	Percentage	Piasters	Percentage
Service, trade, artisanship	91,580	41.7%	91,580	37.6%	91,580	39.5%
Farming	62,180	28.3%	86,370	35.4%	74,275	32%
Livestock	54,472	24.8%	54,472	22.3%	54,472	23.5%
Rental income	11,360	5.2%	11,360	4.7%	11,360	5%
Total	219,592	100%	243,782	100%	231,687	100%

Source: BOA, *ML VRD TMT*, no. 2498 and 4612.

Table 12. Comparison of Income and Tax by Communities

Communities	House no.	Tax	Income	Total	Percentage
<i>Maximum</i>					
Non-Muslim/Greek	8/17	1,615	2,000	3,615	44.67%
Turkish resident	6/13	1,317	3,961	5,278	24.95%
Turkish resident	17/29	1,063	919.25	1,982.25	53.62%
<i>Minimum</i>					
Çakal aşireti	5/6	20 ^a	300	320	6.25%
Elçi aşireti	49/61	23 ^b	450	473	4.86%
Aşiret-i İfraz-ı Ceridi	9/11	25 ^c	286	311	8.03%
<i>Average</i>					
Elçi aşireti	75/94	190 ^d	1650	1,840	10.32%
Asiret-i İfraz-ı Ceridi	53/75	187.5	1,423.25	1,610.75	11.64%
Turkish resident	13/25	185	600	785	23.56%

^a Paid by one of the two families.

^b Paid by one of the three families.

^c Paid by one of the four families.

^d Paid by one of the four families.

Source: BOA, *ML VRD TMT*, no. 2498 and 4612.

third highest had to pay 53%, more than half of his profits. Seemingly there was no equitable tax policy.

Among the lowest taxpayers, there were still differences of 4% to 8%. Even if the differences seem to be small one cannot assume that there was a fair tax system.

The percentages of taxes in proportion to the income of a family differed from one household to the other, for example 10% to 23%. This indicates the failure of one of the main goals of the Tanzimat reforms: fair taxation.

Conclusion

In the mid- nineteenth century, Salihli was the biggest village of the kaza of Sart in the sancak of Saruhan. With the settlement of Greeks and tribesmen, it was being transformed into a kasaba, with services, commerce and artisanship flourishing by the 1840s. Its population was 1,251 distributed among 278 households: more crowded than a typical village but socially and economically not yet as advanced, balanced, or harmonized as a modern kasaba.

Salihli's sources of income were service, commerce and artisanship; agriculture; livestock; and rents. These sources of income were as various as those of some of the kaza centres of the sancak, but much lower in amount. Taxes however were higher in proportion and badly organized although one of most important goals of the Tanzimat was a well-balanced taxation.

The temettüat defters allow us to see that, around the middle of the nineteenth century, the village of Salihli had developed the characteristics of a kasaba. Originally an average-sized village in the kaza of Sart, Salihli had grown sufficiently itself to become the centre of a kaza in 1872.

Notes

¹ *Muhasebe-i Vilâyet-i Anadolu Defteri No.166 (937/1530)*, Ankara 1995, 467.

² Füsün Baykal, *Salihli Kent Coğrafyası*, İzmir 1988, 37; Teoman Ergül, *Antik Uygarlıkların Mirasçısı Bir Kentin Özgün Taribi (Türkleşen Anadolu'da Sardes. Ve Salihli)* (İzmir, 1992), 42-3.

³ Nejdet Bilgi, '1842 Yılında Saruhan Sancağı'nın Nüfusu ve İdari Bölünüşü', *Manisa Araştırmaları*, Volume 1, Manisa 2001, 102. Baykal and Ergül writes that Sart had been one of the kazas of the sancak of Aydın until 1867 (Baykal, 1988, 39; Ergül, 1992, 108).

⁴ Tuncer Baykara, *Anadolu'nun Taribi Coğrafyasına Giriş I Anadolu'nun İdari Taksimatı* (Ankara, 2000), 226.

⁵ Nejdet Bilgi et al, *Manisa 2000*, İzmir 2000, 99.

⁶ For temettüat records, see Mübahat S. Kütükoğlu, 'Osmanlı Sosyal ve İktisadi Tarihi Kaynaklarından Temettü Defterleri', *Belleten*, CLIX/225 (August 1995), Ankara 1995, 395-412+6 panels; Mustafa Serin, 'Osmanlı Arşivi'nde Bulunan Temettuat Defterleri', *I. Milli Arşiv Şurası (Tebliğler -Tartışmalar)*, 20-21 Nisan 1998 *Ankara* (Ankara, 1998), 717-28.

⁷ Prime Ministry Ottoman Archives (BOA), *Maliye Nezâreti Temettüat Defterleri (ML VRD TMT)*, no.4612.

⁸ BOA, *ML VRD TMT*, no. 2498.

⁹ Baykal, 38; Ergül, 42-3.

¹⁰ Ergül, 50.

¹¹ Ergül, 47; Baykal, 40.

¹² Kemal H. Karpat, *Ottoman Population 1830-1914; Demographic and Social Characteristics*, Wisconsin 1985, 111; Enver Ziya Karal, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda İlk Nüfus Sayımı 1831* (Ankara, 1997), 126,131.

¹³ Karal, 131.

¹⁴ Bilgi, '1842...', 102.

¹⁵ In *temettüat defters* records were titled by the names of the communities. These communities are, in the original order: Karye-i Salihli (Resident Muslim/Turk), Yerlü Reaya in Salihli (Greek), Aşiret-i İfraz-ı Ceridi, Aşiret-i Saçlı Ceridi, Nefs-i Salihlü Aşiret-i Elçi-i Karahızırlı, Tâbi-i Salihli Aşiret-i Çakal.

¹⁶ The census of 1842 recorded only males. However, assuming an equal number of women, we multiplied the figure by two and divided the result by the number of the households. The average household population seems to be 4.36. As a round number we used 4.5 which gives a figure close to the figure in the census of 1845 (cf. Bilgi, '1842...', 93).

¹⁷ İ. Cavid, *Aydın Vilâyetine Mahsus Salnâme Sene-i Hicri 1308-sene-i Mâli 1307*, Cild-i sâni, 480.

¹⁸ İ. Cavid, *Aydın...*, II, 582.

¹⁹ *Salnâme-i Vilâyet-i Aydın 1326 Sene-i Hicriyesine Mahsus*, Defa 25, Vilâyet Matbaası, 632.

²⁰ 1 dönüm was 1,160.4 m² in Anatolia but 701.9 m² in Istanbul. However it equalled 2,062.9 m² in Egypt, Iraq and Iran. See Feridun Emecen, 'Dönüm', *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslam Ansiklopedisi*, v. 9 (Istanbul, 1994), 521.

²¹ This figure in the village of Uncuboz, today a region in Manisa, was 377 kg (Nejdet Bilgi, 'Temettüat Kayıtlarına Göre Manisa Uncuboz Köyü ve Tarihi Gelişmesi', *E. Ü. Edebiyat Fakültesi Tarih İncelemeleri Dergisi*, XIII, İzmir 1998), 133, 971 kg in Saruhanlı (Bilgi, 'Tanzimat Döneminin Başlarında Saruhanlı -Manisa'da Bir Ova Köyünün Sosyo-Ekonomik Yapısı', *Uluslararası Osmanlı Tarihi Sempozyumu (İzmir 8-10 Nisan 1999) Bildirileri*, (ed). Turan Gökçe, (İzmir, 2000), 434), was 270 kg in the center of the kaza of Marmara.

²² Tefik Güran, *19. Yüzyıl Osmanlı Tarımı Üzerine Araştırmalar* (İstanbul, 1998), 93.

²³ Bilgi, 'Saruhanlı', 425, 429 and 437.

²⁴ This percentage in 1844 in the kasaba of Marmara was 15%, in the village of Saruhanlı, it was 14% (Bilgi, 'Saruhanlı', 437-8).

The Urban Fabric of Damascus in the Middle of the
Nineteenth Century: A Study of the Tax Register
(*Rüsum Defteri*) of 1852

Tomoki Okawara

The purpose of this paper is to reconsider the urban fabric of Damascus, using a tax register (*rüsum defteri*) established in the middle of the nineteenth century. Studying the urban fabric of cities in the Middle East has been a recurrent theme, since Max Weber defined a normative 'European city' as a self-governing commune whose inhabitants possessed a distinct sense of collective identity on the one hand and a normative 'Islamic and other non-European city' as lacking the defining tradition of civic culture.¹

The concept of the 'Islamic city' came into being as a topic of discussion among Orientalists who were involved in the study of the Arab regions during the period of colonial rule. They produced an imagery of the 'Islamic city' which possessed a landscape and culture quite different to those of European cities. Gustave E. von Grunebaum summed up the concept and stated that unlike Greek and medieval Western European cities, which enjoyed a political autonomy, represented by the famous 'communes' as Max Weber characterized them, Islamic cities allowed the free entry and exit of people of different occupations and social classes, and no concept of citizenship emerged. The townspeople lived in guilds and quarters isolated from each other according to religion, origin and occupation, with no system in place for political integration, but with integration coming rather by religious ideology alone.²

A few Orientalists have, since the 1850s, laid the foundations for the study of the urban fabric of Damascus. The earliest example is Alfred von Kremer, an Austrian Orientalist who wrote *Topographie von Damaskus* (Wien, 1855), based on a land survey and field study of historical monuments. His topographic work was further developed during World War I by two German researchers, Karl Wulzinger and Carl Watzinger, and crystallized in the 1930s by Jean Sauvaget, a French Orientalist who used a highly detailed land survey, conducted under the French mandate.³ Sauvaget, studying Aleppo and Damascus, asserted dogmatically that the residential quarters performed the role

of self-governing communities and they were 'mosaic societies' without any sense of integration with the city as a whole.⁴ We will discuss his argument critically in the section three.

Studies criticizing the 'Islamic city' started in the 1970s, particularly in the field of urban studies in the Ottoman period, where researchers could use new historical sources to produce detailed urban studies at definite periods, using sharia court records (*ser'iyye sicilleri*), registers of the Imperial Council (*mühimme defterleri*) and the land survey records (*tapu tabir defterleri*). According to Toru Miura, these sources made it possible for researchers to (i) make topographical reconstructions of particular localities and concrete investigations of the structure and function of religious institutions and *waqf* properties in the cities and of the role of governors, merchants and the 'ulama' in urban development, (ii) examine the city administration and its relationship to the central government, and (iii) describe the social and economic conditions of townspeople in terms of private houses and commercial facilities. They used primary materials to paint a vivid picture of the multiple relationships and historical change in specific societies, and so provide concrete counter-evidence against the stereotyped view of the 'Islamic city'.⁵

As to studies on Damascus, historians, exploiting these precious sources, examined in detail previously hidden aspects of social 'reality' in the city; e.g. 'Abdul-Karim Rafeq's study on the social and economic structure of the Bab al-Musalla quarter; Jean-Paul Pascual's study of the urban expansion of Damascus at the end of the sixteenth century; Brigitte Marino's study on al-Midan district; Toru Miura's study on the Salihyya quarter and 'Abd al-Razzaq Moaz's study on the urban fabric of the Saruja quarter. These studies are based primarily on sharia court records.⁶

However, there is little comprehensive work on Damascus based on primary sources. This is because sharia court records are not well suited to such work. As each register is compiled from fragmentary documents of various kinds, each of which reflects some aspects of social 'reality', it is almost impossible for a single person to accumulate all the data necessary for an analysis of macro-urbanism, meaning the fabric of the city as a whole.⁷ We are firmly convinced that the tax register of 1852 could provide a solution to the problem.

The Tax Register (*Rüsum Defteri*) of 1852

Since the early 1840s, at least, the city of Damascus had been divided into eight administrative districts (*thumns*). The register was arranged according to that order, that is, the districts of Qanawat, Midan Tahtani and Midan Fawqani in a suburb south westward from the city centre, then the districts of Shaghur, Qaymariyya and 'Amara in the

walled city, and the districts of Suq Saruja and Salihyya in a suburb north westward. Each district was composed of a number of quarters (*mahallas*), and district administration was under the charge of its council. The district council of 'Amara, for example, had seven members: a chairman (*ra'is majlis thumm*), a deputy (*mu'awin*), an imam, and the headmen (*mukhtars*) of the four quarters of al-'Amara al-Juwvaniyya, Bab al-Barid, Mazz al-Qasab, and al-'Amara al-Barraniyya.⁸

Aghas of the district (*aghawat al-thumm*) provided for public security and law enforcement. These aghas were originally commanders or officers of various military troops, for example, the Janissary corps stationed in the province of Damascus. After these troops were abolished by the sultan Mahmud II, the aghas banded closely together from ties of mutual interest, that is to say, anti-reform, and they formed a social group of aghas in the latter half of the 1820s.⁹ At the beginning of the *Tanzimat* period, dominant aghas, who had succeeded in solidifying a power base around their residential area, were incorporated into the Ottoman administrative institutions as local security authorities. A commander of these aghas was elected in each district by agreement of the aghas and appointed officially by the provincial council of Damascus (*majlis shura wilaya al-Sham*). For example, upon the death in 1842 of Hasan Haydar Agha, agha of the district of Suq Saruja, sixteen aghas of the district elected Sa'id Agha Rimahi as a new commander, and the provincial council gave its official approval. These aghas were also engaged in collecting taxes and weapons in the district.¹⁰

The tax register of Damascus was drawn up in 1852 for the purpose of new taxation, and contains 25,602 entries of data about all taxable real estate in Damascus and its suburbs in the 1850s, e.g. shops, warehouses, workshops, residences, orchards. The register was arranged by the provincial council, based on each district council's assessment of property. This register is of great size (75.5 x 17.5 cm) and volume (482 pages). Almost every part of the register consists of a list of taxable establishments, its first part showing the shops (*dukkans*), belonging to the market of Darwishyya in the district of Qanawat. Here we find 5 wood turners' (*kharrat*) shops, 2 cafés, 2 shops for Persian tobacco (*tunbakji*), an oven for roasting coffee beans (*mahmas qahwa*), a dairy product (*ghalla balib*) shop, and a vegetable (*khudari*) shop.¹¹ This market is at the centre of the city, a crossing point of the main north-south and east-west streets, and thus places of information exchange and social intercourse such as cafés and public baths were more likely to be concentrated there.

The last few pages are damaged due to humidity. On the last page important information, such as the provincial council's report addressed to the central government in Istanbul, is mostly unreadable.

This report supposedly contains information about tax assessment and problems. Fortunately the date of the report is clear and shows when the register was established, that is, around 4 Rabi' al-Awwal 1269/16 December 1852.¹²

The register's content is arranged by district, and each district is divided into an agricultural, industrial and commercial area (*maghaliq*)¹³ and a residential area (*buyut*). This theoretically covers all real estate except tax-exempt property such as mosques, *madrasas*, churches, synagogues, law courts, public offices etc.

The most problematic point relates to the historical background of why the real estate survey was conducted in Damascus in the 1850s. According to the catalogue of the Maliyeden Müdevver Tasnifi, to which the register now belongs, the purpose of the register is to collect a fixed assets tax every year from shops, houses, cafés, public baths, workshops, orchards and farms, located at places, main streets, routes and so on, in order to extend the water system running under the citadel of Damascus.¹⁴

According to a contemporary chronicle by al-shaykh Muhammad Sa'id al-Ustuwani, published recently in Damascus, and some documents preserved in Istanbul,¹⁵ the water system running under the Umayyad Mosque (the same system as under the citadel) was surely repaired and extended at this time. It is not a new idea that the Ottoman Empire levied taxes for repairing water systems. For example, in the city of Aleppo at the beginning of the nineteenth century, a tax named *salyan* was collected every six months from each quarter for repairing the water system, and in 1819 the Aleppines revolted against the tax.¹⁶ The introduction of this *salyan* tax to Damascus was tried twice, at the end of the 1820s and in 1831, but both attempts were in vain due to revolts by Damascenes.¹⁷

In the Ottoman Empire, townspeople traditionally pay two taxes: *ih̄tisab*, a tax on industrial and commercial activities, and *avarızhane*, a tax on housing. Since the beginning of the nineteenth century, however, the taxation system had changed slightly, because the central government suffered permanently from a lack of fiscal resources. Under the sultan Mahmud II, collection of *ih̄tisab* was transferred to the newly established Ministry of *İhtisab* in 1826.¹⁸

The tax of 1852 was apparently different from the *ih̄tisab* of 1827-8; *ih̄tisab* tax was levied on industrial and commercial establishments only, but the tax of 1852 applied to all real estate, including farm lands and houses. Also, the total tax ran up to 1,051,600 qursh, far greater than the tax of 1827-8.¹⁹ What is the exact name of the tax, *rūsum* or another name? A contemporary French source reported that a new tax named *verko* was introduced to Aleppo and that the tax rate was 11 qursh 26 para per 100 qursh of yearly rental fee (tax rate: 11.65%). As the date of introduction, content, and tax rate of *rūsum* are just the

same to this werko tax,²⁰ we can understand that the exact tax name was werko, *vergü* or *vergi*, not rüsum, and thus reasonably conclude that the register name is also vergü defteri or vergi defteri, not rüsum defteri.

Although the tax rate is clear, we do not know how the yearly rental fee was evaluated. That the tax fee of real estate designated as waqf property is relatively lower than for *milk* property suggests a potential tax cut for the former. The highest yearly rental fee is 12,000 qursh, levied on an orchard (*bustan*) in the district of Salihyya. There are 22 cases of yearly rental fees of more than 8,000 qursh: 7 orchards, 6 public baths, 5 mills (*tabuns*), 2 khans, an oil mill (*ma'sara*) and a house.²¹

Sauvaget's Model of a Quarter Reconsidered

Sauvaget's quarter model, as it appears in his article about the developmental pattern of the city of Damascus, is one of the most famous in the field of Islamic urban studies. Although he did not use the term 'Islamic', researchers tended to cite his model as an example of a quarter model for the 'Islamic city'.²² He explained the pattern of the historical development of Damascus chronologically:

- (i) the primitive city originated as an Aramean colony,
- (ii) the Greco-Roman city,
- (iii) the Umayyad period,
- (iv) the medieval city, where he indicated the quarter model,
- (v) the Atabeg and Ayyubid period,
- (vi) the Mamluk period,
- (vii) the Ottoman period, and
- (viii) the modern city.²³

He described his quarter model as follows:

La ville se présente désormais sous l'aspect d'une juxtaposition de *quartiers* (*hāra*) formant autant de compartiments étanches, vivant chacun de leur vie particulière à l'écart de leurs voisins. Chacun de ces quartiers est comme une ville en miniature, ayant sa mosquée, son dispositif d'adduction d'eau, son bain public, son petit bazar (*sweyqa*) où l'on trouve les denrées et objets de première nécessité...; il a son chef responsable (*cheykh*) et sa police (le veilleur qui, la nuit, reconnaît ceux qui se présentent), jusqu'à ses fortifications (les portes) et son armée (*ahdāt*; les hommes appartenant à la milice corporative).²⁴

He stated that as a result of wars and social disorders, the city of

Damascus in medieval times became divided by quarters, distinct from each other, and every quarter was as if ‘a city in miniature’ (that is, a small city), with a mosque, a water system, a public bath and a small market where inhabitants could find food and other necessities. Such a quarter was under the responsibility of a *shaykh* and protected by quarter gates and a popular militia. Apparently his argument is influenced by the model of the commune of medieval Europe, and he considered the guilds and the residential quarters as being responsible for self-government in the ‘Islamic city’.²⁵

Although his model of a quarter in medieval Damascus seems to have considerable persuasive power, a methodological issue can be raised here. He adopted historical terms like *shaykh*, *abdath* or *hara* from historical sources in medieval times and adopted the public bath, mosque, small market, bakery, fountain and hundred houses from the field survey of the 1930s, and then he combined them in one model despite the approximately one-thousand-year gap between them. To the Orientalist, ‘an immobilized or unproductive quality’ in Oriental societies is a major premise, where ‘the very possibility of development, transformation, human movement—in the deepest sense of the word—is denied the Orient and the Oriental’,²⁶ but we cannot accept such a premise.

Sauvaget adopted a quarter (*hara*) at the city centre (Al-Naqqashat, east of the Grand Umayyad Mosque) in the 1930s as a model of a quarter in medieval times. According to this model, there are two quarter entrances to the northeast and southwest (he does not clearly indicate any quarter gate). There is also a public bath, a mosque, a small market, a bakery and a fountain, as well as about one hundred houses, all of whose doors faced a quarter path inside instead of a main street outside. The facilities in his model seem to have existed in the 1930s, but until now no one has confirmed how long each type of facility had existed there. Note the difference between the Naqqashat quarter recorded in the register of 1852 and that of the 1930s indicated in Sauvaget’s model. In the first register, we cannot find the public bath at the north end. We may conclude that in the Naqqashat quarter a public bath did not exist until 1917 or later, because Wulzinger and Watzinger record the same building as the mausoleum of al-shaykh Salih al-Dasuqi in 1917.²⁷ Our observation is supported by the distribution of public baths in Damascus, because their number was fixed at 58 throughout the nineteenth century and they were located along the line of the main streets where the water systems also ran. In general, it is difficult to suppose any public bath inside a closed quarter in point of water supply, repair and maintenance of water pipes.

Our observations fit not only the public bath but also the other facilities, except for the mosque and fountain. A bakery and a small market are not recorded in the register, even though those facilities are

to be found outside the quarter; near to the north-east end of the quarter was the market of Qaymariyya street where there were 4 bakeries and 11 shops offering foodstuffs, with 192 shops that offered various commodities and services. Most important, no shop is found in the Naqqashat quarter, because it was regarded as a residential area, neither commercial nor residential-commercial.²⁸

We can hardly get any information about mosques or fountains in the register, because both were tax-exempt facilities. According to Wulzinger and Watzinger, in 1917 Sauvaget's 'mosque' was a mausoleum, and the location of the fountain is slightly different. But these facilities seem to be necessary to the people for daily life, even though the quarter is very near the Grand Umayyad Mosque. Here we can stop and confirm that no public bath, bakery, or small market existed in that quarter in the middle of the nineteenth century. It is worth mentioning, in passing, that these facilities nowadays no longer exist. Sauvaget's quarter model may well be reconsidered not only as a model for quarters in the medieval period, but as a provisional conclusion, at least, it should be reconsidered critically and should not be adopted as a model for the Ottoman period. Although some historians have adopted his model as a quarter model for the Ottoman period, its adoption requires circumspection.²⁹

It may be stated as a conclusion that quarters in late Ottoman Damascus from the nineteenth century to the end of Ottoman rule, were not cities in miniature, but rather complicated entities intricately intertwined with the other quarters. Each quarter was enclosed as private residential space, equipped with a mosque and a fountain. Each kept a community spirit not only for the sake of a social life on the occasion of ceremonies such as marriages and funerals, but also to maintain an administrative unit for purposes like taxation. Management of the quarter, however, had already been transferred from a shaykh to a mukhtar and an imam, both lowly positions in the administrative sense.³⁰ The military organization of medieval communes like *ahdath* or *ḡuḡ* had disappeared in days long gone, and the military and police system was the responsibility of the aghas of the district, whose jurisdiction covered the entire district, beyond each quarter. People of each quarter went out of the quarter gate towards a market on the main street to get food and other essentials. It was not a commune but a quarter in the terminal position in the municipal hierarchy, that is, city - district - quarter.³¹

Agricultural, Industrial and Commercial Areas in Late Ottoman Damascus

Here we would like to consider the geographical distribution of agricultural, industrial and commercial areas in late Ottoman

Damascus. According to previous studies, the social and economic structure of Ottoman Damascus can, to some extent, be characterized in terms of districts. The northwest area of the intramural part was the commercial heart of the city, because a custom-house and markets dealing in precious metals like gold and silver, valuables, and textile goods were concentrated there. The khans (caravansaries) were particularly regarded as symbolic of this area, because about 75% of them were concentrated there.³² This area overlapped with the commercial areas of both the 'Amara and Shaghur districts. The eastern area of the intramural part was regarded as a residential area, where Christians and Jews lived and no distinct industry or commerce existed. This area overlapped with the district of Qaymariyya.³³ Near to the northwest and western area of the intramural part, outside the citadel, were markets dealing in harnesses, arms, horses and fresh foods, as well as many residences of military officers and high-ranking officials dispatched from the central government. This area overlapped with the districts of Suq Saruja and Qanawat.³⁴ The south of the city was regarded as an area for supplying grain and meat, because it was connected with a grain- and meat-producing hinterland, the Hawran plain. This area was characterized by a grain warehouse named *ba'ika*,³⁵ and overlapped with the districts of Midan Tahtani and Midan Fawqani. There were houses of peasants and Bedouins migrating from neighbouring areas, and residences of aghas who controlled the grain trade of the city.³⁶ The district of Salihyya, located at the foot of Mount Qasiyun, was regarded as a town of Islamic scholars. Here also, no particular industry or commerce has been observed.³⁷

Although the agricultural, industrial and commercial pattern in nineteenth century Damascus, as outlined above, seems very plausible, we must be careful not to create stereotypes. So, here we will first take a bird's-eye view of agricultural, industrial and commercial activities by district and then reconsider the industrial structure as a whole by focusing on khans, cribs, mills, and grain warehouses.

From this perspective, all data in the register can be classified under four divisions:

- (i) Agriculture
- (ii) Manufacturing industries
- (iii) Wholesale and retail trade
- (iv) Others

They are divided into eighteen categories: (a) crops and (b) livestock and animal specialties under Agriculture; (c) food, (d) tobacco, coffee and beverages, (e) textile, (f) lumber and wood, (g) chemicals and allied products, (h) leather and leather goods, (i) stone, clay, glass and bricks,

(*j*) metal products, (*k*) accessory, and (*l*) miscellaneous manufacturing under Manufacturing Industries; (*m*) foodstuffs, (*n*) miscellaneous goods, and (*o*) unclassifiable products under Wholesale and Retail Trade; and (*p*) banking, (*q*) miscellaneous services, and (*r*) unclassifiable establishments under Others. (See Tables 1-3)

Some entries classified under the division of the Manufacturing Industries involve retail trades as well. For example, many producers of damask (*alaja*), which was one of the most famous products of the textile mills in Damascus at that time, were also engaged in its trade.

The total of entries recorded is 11,412.³⁸ 'Amara and Shaghur have the largest numbers, 2,175 and 2,170 each, followed by Qaymariyya (1,675). 68.6% of crop production took place in Salihyya and Shaghur, and 51.3% of livestock and animal specialties in Midan Fawqani and Qaymariyya. Characteristic figures are observed in tobacco, coffee and beverages in Suq Saruja (22.9%), textile mill products in Qaymariyya (32.1%), lumber and wood products in 'Amara (46.3%), chemicals and allied products in Qanawat (51.1%), leather and leather goods in 'Amara (36.1%) and Suq Saruja (30.3%). 44.3% of stone, clay, glass and brick production took place in Suq Saruja and 'Amara. Also metal products were specialised in Suq Saruja (39.9%), accessories in 'Amara (98.9%), miscellaneous manufacturing in Shaghur (61.4%), wholesale and retail trade of foodstuffs in Salihyya (19.6%), miscellaneous goods in Suq Saruja (30.1%). 74.8% of wholesale and retail trade of unclassifiable products and 87.5% of banking are concentrated in Shaghur and 'Amara.

The largest share of Qaymariyya in textiles shows that this district was the centre of textile manufacturing. The banking business and wholesale and retail trade of unclassifiable products were oligopolistic in Shaghur and 'Amara. Salihyya had more than 40% of crops and many entries related to wholesale and retail trade of foodstuffs.³⁹ 'Amara and Suq Saruja had four characteristic categories, (lumber and wood products, leather and leather goods, stone, clay, glass and bricks, and miscellaneous services). Also 'Amara was distinguished in the category of accessories, and Suq Saruja in metal products. Over half of chemicals and allied industries were characteristically located in Qanawat.

Next we examine what categories were dominant inside each district (See Tables 1 and 3). Almost all districts had many entries related to textiles, foods, and foodstuffs. Even in Midan Fawqani, almost half of the entries related to textiles (30.7%) and food (17.3%) products, which means that economic activities inside Midan Fawqani were actually specialized. The only exception is Salihyya, where entries engaged in textile productions were few, and crops and wholesale and retail trade of foodstuffs were high.

Next we examine some aspects of the social and economic

structure by focusing on khans, cribs, mills, and grain warehouses. The number of khans recorded in the register was 182, among which khans located in the northwest area of the intramural part was only 28, indicating that the ratio of khans in the central area was actually 15%, not 75%. We should treat the term 'khan' carefully, however, because khan did not always mean caravansary, but covered wider institutions such as cribs (*khan marbat dawabb*) or textile factories equipped with looms (*anwal*). If we exclude cribs and factories from those khans and regard the rest as caravansaries, the number was 68, among which khans located in the northwest area of the intramural part were 24. Even in this case, the percentage is 35%, far lower than the 75% of the previous study, even though khans located in the central area were relatively large scale. Generally speaking, khans can be classified as caravansaries, textile factories, or cribs. Caravansaries were most likely to be in 'Amara, Shaghur, and Suq Saruja. In the district of Qaymariyya, apparently there was a concentration of textile factories instead of caravansaries. Surprisingly, khans used as cribs were concentrated in Qaymariyya and Suq Saruja, rather than Midan Tahtani and Midan Fawqani. The total number of cribs, including the other small ones, was 275. The number of cribs in Qaymariyya (69) and in Midan Fawqani (72) was about same. As cribs of the former were more likely to be large scale, we see that the role Qaymariyya played in the category of livestock and animal specialties was more important than that of Midan, contrary to the conclusions of the previous study.

A mill at that time was a place where wheat was ground into flour, and mills had an intermediate position in the circulation of bread. They were located beside rivers for the power supply. According to the register, the city had 75 mills, among them 22 in the district of 'Amara and 26 in Salihyya. The Barada River runs through the former, and the rivers of Yazid and Thawra through the latter. Those two districts played an important role in the circulation of bread. In addition, dye houses (*masbaghas*) and tanneries (*dibaghas*) were concentrated in 'Amara.

As mentioned above, a typical grain warehouse of Damascus is called ba'ika, which originally meant a fat female camel, on account of its shape being similar to a sitting camel.⁴⁰ The register shows the city with 708 of such buildings, among them 222 in the district of Salihyya. This supports the conclusion that Salihyya was heavily engaged in agriculture and the wholesale and retail trade of foodstuffs. The reason Salihyya had the majority of such warehouses was not only that this area had a lot of mills, but also that it was at a carry-in entrance for grain from the Biqa' high plain. Small-scale warehouses rather than large-scale khans or granaries (*makhzans*) seem to have been preferred, because this area was on a slope.

All these findings raise questions about the role of the Midan area in the circulation of grain, because there were only 139 warehouses located in Midan Tahtani and Midan Fawqani. Salihyya reasonably played a greater role than Midan in production, stock, and milling. Contrary to common belief,⁴¹ Salihyya was important to Damascus's food supply.

The Geographical Distribution of Residential Areas in Late Ottoman Damascus

Let us now discuss the geographical distribution of residential areas. The city of Damascus in 1852 was composed of 189 quarters, with 14,869 houses.⁴² On average, a quarter had about 80 houses. The number of houses differed by quarters, ranging from 8 to 537 per quarter.⁴³

Average rent value also differed greatly: the minimum was the Akrad quarter of Salihyya, 40 qursh, and the maximum was the Tali' al-Fidda quarter of Qaymariyya, 1,053 qursh. The difference seems related to the accessibility of the city centre and large markets, floor space, or water facilities. The Akrad quarter was located on a slope and farthest from the city centre. An imbalance between the number of houses (537) and the size of the neighbouring market (25) also seems to have affected the value. The market was composed of 2 shoemakers (*surmayati*, *jazmati*), 2 animal doctors (*baytar*), a vegetable shop, a fruit shop (*fakihani*), a butcher (*labham*), a seller of raisins (*z'abib*), a perfumer/druggist (*'attar*), 11 other shops, 2 oil presses and 3 storehouses. There was no bakery or public bath. On the other hand, the Tali' al-Fidda quarter was in the intramural area and was a safe place. Water was adequate because of the Qanawat River, and a public bath was reasonably near. In addition, the quarter is located at a crossing of two main commercial streets, Bab Tuma and Bab Sharqi. These factors seem to have increased the average rent. Of course, there were a few exceptions. For example, the Naqqashat quarter was in the city centre and accessible to large markets and public baths, yet its average rent was only 201 qursh. Possibly water supply and floor space affected its value. The rent of the Jura quarter of Qaymariyya was also relatively low, supposedly due to a bad smell and poor water quality, both caused by dye houses and tanneries.

Let us consider a general aspect of residential distribution of the city by classifying quarters into four classes according to average rent: (1) less than 250 qursh, (2) more than 250 and less than 500, (3) more than 500 and less than 1,000, (4) more than 1,000.

At first, the average rent in the intramural quarters tended to be higher. Security, accessibility to the city centre and large markets and water facilities seem to have affected it, as in the case of the

Tali' al-Fidda quarter. Even at that time, the city wall had some importance; for example, average rents in the intramural quarters of 'Amara and Shaghur were higher than average rents in the extramural quarters of both districts. The remoter a quarter was from the city centre, the cheaper its average rent tended to be. Some quarters can be grouped together around a core quarter by rent fee. For example, a group of quarters, whose core was the quarters of Mufti and Jawza al-Hudaba of Suq Saruja, is of this type, in which the average rent fee of the two quarters was higher than that of the surrounding quarters. This was also the case for the quarters of Tali' al-Fidda of Qaymariyya, Mahmas of Midan Tahtani, and Na'ir of Midan Fawqani.

These findings indicate that, in the mid-nineteenth century, although the walls no longer served as fortifications, the average rent in intramural quarters was apparently higher than that in extramural quarters. This seems to have been the situation until the end of the century when a new civic centre was formed around the Marja square to the west of the citadel and modern or European city planning started from there. Thus, we can say that geographical distribution of residential areas at that time indicates the final state of the 'traditional city' before the modern urbanization.

Concluding Remarks

About seventy years ago, Sauvaget presented a model, which made a strong impression on historians, who accepted it as an 'Islamic' quarter model, in the same way that they accepted von Grunebaum's 'Islamic' city model. Both models gained a wide acceptance and have been treated as authoritative. However, our observations of the 1852 register allow us to criticize Sauvaget's model. Basically public and commercial facilities were distributed along by the main streets and/or streets of secondary importance. As a historical phenomenon, the nature of, and changes in the quarters in the city of Damascus is a highly complicated issue, and we should proceed cautiously.

These findings demonstrate that we must once again consider the social and economic structure of Damascus from primary sources. In particular, the register of 1852 is an important source for this re-evaluation. We have first of all confirmed that the basic industries of Damascus in the middle of the nineteenth century were still textile mill products, food products and foodstuffs. Secondly, we recovered the unknown role of Salihiyya in Damascus' food supply. Detailed analysis of economic activities will provide a better understanding of agricultural, industrial and commercial structures in the city.⁴⁴

We should notice that our analyses are provisional and rigidly applicable to the urban fabric of Damascus in the middle of nineteenth century only. A full understanding of its historic fabric

awaits more detailed analyses of its urban fabric in different periods and more careful comparative studies. Particularly the urban development of Damascus since the last quarter of the nineteenth century and its change under the French rule need further examination.

Table 1. Number of Economic Establishments in Damascus in 1852

Category/District	Qanawat	Midan Tahani	Midan Fawqani	Shaghur	Qaymariyya	'Amara	Suq Saruja	Salihyya	Total
Agriculture	111	1		187	1	109	2	301	712
Livestock & Animal specialities	8	34	72	22	69	28	31	11	275
Manufacturing Industries	192	170	122	145	188	147	221	115	1300
Tobacco, Coffee & Beverages	67	37	14	45	34	62	83	20	362
Textiles	108	185	217	356	599	221	164	15	1865
Lumber & Wood	38	39	16	31	17	169	45	10	365
Chemicals & Allied Products	23	3		9	4	4	2		45
Leather & Leather Goods	46	126	17	42	2	274	230	21	758
Stone, Clay, Glass & Bricks	9	23	8	12	11	28	30	10	131
Metals Products	32	45	13	14	14	23	97	5	243
Accessories						88		1	89
Miscellaneous	3	9	3	215	2	66	45	7	350
Foodstuffs	155	137	92	154	167	205	139	255	1304
Miscellaneous	2	19	7	13	14	6	28	4	93
Unclassifiable	50	91	15	620	106	517	118	2	1519
Banking				7		7			16
Miscellaneous	44	34	22	34	30	58	72	21	315
Unclassifiable	271	313	89	264	417	163	66	87	1670
Total	1159	1266	707	2170	1675	2175	1375	885	11412

Source: BOA, MAD no.22733

Table 2. Distribution of Economic Establishments by Districts in Damascus in 1852 (percent)

Category/District	Qanawat	Midan Tahrani	Midan Fawqani	Shaghur	Qaymariyya	'Amara	Suq Saruja	Salihiyya	Total
Agriculture	15.6	0.1		26.3	0.1	15.3	0.3	42.3	100
Crops									
Livestock & Animal specialities	2.9	12.4	2.2	8.0	25.1	10.2	11.3	4.0	100
Manufacturing Industries	14.8	13.1	9.4	11.2	14.5	11.3	17.0	8.8	100
Tobacco, Coffee & Beverages	18.5	10.2	3.9	12.4	9.4	17.1	22.9	5.5	100
Textiles	5.8	9.9	11.6	19.1	32.1	11.8	8.8	0.8	100
Lumber & Wood	10.4	10.7	4.4	8.5	4.7	46.3	12.3	2.7	100
Chemicals & Allied Products	51.1	6.7		20.0	8.9	8.9	4.4		100
Leather & Leather Goods	6.1	16.6	2.2	5.5	0.3	36.1	30.3	2.8	100
Stone, Clay, Glass & Bricks	6.9	17.6	6.1	9.2	8.4	21.4	22.9	7.6	100
Metals Products	13.2	18.5	5.3	5.8	5.8	9.5	39.9	2.1	100
Accessories						98.9		1.1	100
Miscellaneous	0.9	2.6	0.9	61.4	0.6	18.9	12.9	2.0	100
Wholesale & Retail Trade	11.9	10.5	7.1	11.8	12.8	15.7	10.7	19.6	100
Miscellaneous	2.2	20.4	7.5	14.0	15.1	6.5	30.1	4.3	100
Unclassifiable	3.3	6.0	1.0	40.8	7.0	34.0	7.8	0.1	100
Others				43.8		43.8	12.5		100
Banking	14.0	10.8	7.0	10.8	9.5	18.4	22.9	6.7	100
Miscellaneous	16.3	18.8	5.4	15.9	25.1	9.8	4.0	5.2	100
Unclassifiable	10.2	11.1	6.2	19.0	14.7	19.1	12.0	7.8	100
Total									

Source: BOA, MAD no.22733

Table 3. Distribution of Economic Establishments in Each District in Damascus in 1852 (percent)

Category/District	Qanawat	Midan Tahani	Midan Fawqani	Shaghur	Qaymariyya	'Amara	Suq Saruja	Salihiyya	Total
Agriculture	9.6	0.1		8.6	0.1	5.0	0.1	34.0	6.2
Crops									
Livestock & Animal specialities	0.7	2.7	10.2	1.0	4.1	1.3	2.3	1.2	2.4
Manufacturing Industries	16.6	13.4	17.3	6.7	11.2	6.8	16.1	13.0	11.4
Food & Beverages	5.8	2.9	2.0	2.1	2.0	2.9	6.0	2.3	3.2
Tobacco, Coffee & Beverages									
Textiles	9.3	14.6	30.7	16.4	35.8	10.2	11.9	1.7	16.3
Lumber & Wood	3.3	3.1	2.3	1.4	1.0	7.8	3.3	1.1	3.2
Chemicals & Allied Products	2.0	0.2		0.4	0.2	0.2	0.1		0.4
Leather & Leather Goods	4.0	10.0	2.4	1.9	0.1	12.6	16.7	2.4	6.6
Stone, Clay, Glass & Bricks	0.8	1.8	1.1	0.6	0.7	1.3	2.2	1.1	1.1
Metals Products	2.8	3.6	1.8	0.6	0.8	1.1	7.1	0.6	2.1
Accessories						4.0		0.1	0.8
Miscellaneous	0.3	0.7	0.4	9.9	0.1	3.0	3.3	0.8	3.1
Wholesale & Retail Trade	13.4	10.8	13.0	7.1	10.0	9.4	10.1	28.8	11.4
Miscellaneous	0.2	1.5	1.0	0.6	0.8	0.3	2.0	0.5	0.8
Unclassifiable	4.3	7.2	2.1	28.6	6.3	23.8	8.6	0.2	13.3
Others				0.3		0.3	0.1		0.1
Banking									
Miscellaneous	3.8	2.7	3.1	1.6	1.8	2.7	5.2	2.4	2.8
Unclassifiable	23.4	24.7	12.6	12.2	24.9	7.5	4.8	9.8	14.6
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Source: BOA, MAD no.22733

Notes

- ¹ Eldem, E., D. Goffman and B. Masters, *The Ottoman city between east and west* (Cambridge, 1999), 1.
- ² Haneda, M. and T. Miura (eds.), *Islamic urban studies: Historical review and perspectives* (London, 1994), 3, 84, 88.
- ³ Kremer, A. V., *Topographie von Damaskus* (Wien, 1855). Wulzinger, K. and C. Watzinger, *Damaskus, Die islamische Stadt*, Berlin, 1924. Sauvaget, J. 'Esquisse d'une histoire de la ville de Damas,' *Revue des Etudes Islamiques*, 8 (1934), 421-80.
- ⁴ Ibid. 87-8.
- ⁵ Ibid. 91.
- ⁶ Rafeq, A-K., 'The social and economic structure of Bab-al-Musalla (al-Midan), Damascus, 1825-1875,' in *Arab civilization: Challenges and responses*, ed. G. N. Atiyeh and I. M. Oweiss, (New York, 1988), 272-311. Marino, B., *Le faubourg du Midan à Damas à l'époque ottomane: Espace urbain, société et habitat (1742-1830)* (Damas, 1997). Miura, T., 'Formality and reality in shari'a court records: Socio-economic relations in the Salhiyya quarter of nineteenth century Damascus,' *The Memoirs of the Toyo Bunko*, 59 (2001), 109-41. Moaz, 'A., 'The urban fabric of an extramural quarter in 19th-century Damascus', in ed. Philipp, T. and B. Schaebler, *The Syrian land: Processes of integration and fragmentation: Bilad al-Sham from the 18th to the 20th century*, (Stuttgart, 1998), 165-83.
- ⁷ Regarding possibilities and limitations of sharia court records, see Ze'evi, D., 'The use of Ottoman shari'a court records as a source for Middle Eastern social history: A reappraisal', *Islamic Law and Society*, 5-1 (1998), 35-56.
- ⁸ Markaz al-Watha'iq al-Tarikhyya [MWT], Mahakim Shar'yya [MSh], Dimashq 525, 1.
- ⁹ Regarding aghas as a social group, see Okawara, T. 'Formation of the Aghawat stratum in Damascus,' *Annals of Japan Association of Middle East Studies (AJAMES)*, 7 (1992), 39-84 (in Japanese). Schilcher, L. S., *Families in politics* (Stuttgart, 1985).
- ¹⁰ MWT, Awamir Sultanyya [AS], Dimashq 5, 249 no.309. Many examples of the aghas' engagement in collecting taxes are found in a minute of the district council of 'Amara. MWT, MSh, Dimashq 525.
- ¹¹ The register is now preserved in the Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi [BOA] in Istanbul, Turkey and classified in Maliyeden Müdevver [MAD] no.22733. From a comparative viewpoint, there are also important studies done by Pascual who studied commercial facilities in Damascus using the *ih̄tisab* tax register of 1827-8. Pascual, J.-P. 2001. 'Boutiques, ateliers et corps de métiers à Damas d'après un dénombrement effectué en 1827-28,' in *Études sur les villes du Proche-orient XVIe-XIXe siècle*, Damas, 177-99.
- ¹² BOA, MAD no, 22733, 482.
- ¹³ The term '*maghaliq* (sin. *mughlaq*)' means locked places.
- ¹⁴ BOA, MAD Defter Katalogu.
- ¹⁵ Al-Ustuwani, M. S., *Mashahid wa abdash dimashqiyya fi muntasaf al-qarn al-tasi'a 'ashara 1256-1277.AH./1840-1861.AD.* (Dimashq, 1994), 155-8. BOA, Irade, Dahiliye 16969.
- ¹⁶ Regarding the revolt, see Kuroki, H., 'Social relations in an urban disturbance: Aleppo, 1819-20,' *AJAMES*, 3-1(1993), 1-59 (in Japanese).
- ¹⁷ Regarding the process, see Anonymous, *Mudhakkirat tarikhiyya 'an hamla Ibrahim Basha 'ala Suriya*, ed. A. Gh. Sabbanu, (Dimashq, n.d.), 22-40.
- ¹⁸ The salyan tax is possibly same as ihtisab tax, because both taxes were levied on commercial facilities. Kazıcı, Z., *Osmanlılarda İhtisab Müessesesi* (İstanbul, 1987), 188-92.

¹⁹ According to Pascual, the total amount of ihtisab tax in 1827-28 was 21,549 para, which is equivalent to 538 qursh 29 para only, however the ihtisab tax of 1828 registered in sharia court records preserved in MWT is 19,741 qursh. MWT, AS 4, no.4.

²⁰ Rafeq, A.K., 'The impact of Europe on a traditional economy: The case of Damascus, 1840-1870,' in J. L. Bacqué-Grammont and P. Dumont (eds.), *Économie et sociétés dans l'empire ottoman (fin du XVIIIe-début du XXe siècle)* (Paris, 1983), 430.

²¹ BOA, MAD 22733, 16-18, 126, 181, 200, 244, 286, 336-7, 343, 389, 440-1. It may be said in passing that the house was a residence of the 'Azms, the most eminent notable family in Damascus.

²² The notion of the 'Islamic city' came into use when von Grunebaum published 'The structure of the Muslim town.' He stated that, unlike ancient Greek and medieval Western European cities, which were—as Max Weber pointed out—integrated politically by the self-government of the citizens themselves, Islamic cities allowed the free entry and exit of people of different occupations and social classes, and a specified form of citizenship did not emerge. Islam is the 'religion of the townspeople,' and only in towns with a congregational Friday mosque (*jami'*) could the religious duties of a Muslim and Islamic social ideas be completely fulfilled. We can find earlier studies related to the concept of the 'Islamic city' that influenced von Grunebaum's thesis. Sauvaget's argument of a mosaic society also contributed to the theory to some extent; that is, the quarters and guilds were communes but the city as a whole lacked unity.

Scholars from various fields, including geography, sociology, cultural anthropology and architecture, have had heated discussions about the 'Islamic city.' Japanese scholars also contributed with a symposium held in Tokyo in 1989, 'Urbanism in Islam.' Scholars nowadays, however, prefer to use terms such as 'Arab city,' 'Syrian city,' or 'Ottoman city.' For example, A. Raymond concludes in his article reviewing 'Islamic urban studies,' as follows; 'For the time being, it is wise to resort to the notion of a traditional city marked by 'regional' aspects (Arab in the Mediterranean domain, Irano-Afghan and Turkish), but naturally fashioned in depth by the Muslim population that organized it and lived in it (with its beliefs, institutions, and customs, all profoundly impregnated with Islam): it is the most prudent approach we can suggest.' See Raymond, A. 'Islamic city, Arab city: Orientalist myths and recent views,' in *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, 21-1 (1994), 18.

²³ Sauvaget, op.cit.

²⁴ Sauvaget, op.cit. 230.

²⁵ Ibid. 87-8.

²⁶ Said, E., *Orientalism* (New York, 1979), 208.

²⁷ Wulzinger and Watzinger, op.cit. 127-8. Sack also ignores Sauvaget's public bath. Sack, op.cit. 19.

²⁸ Also to judge from the circulation of bread in Damascus, his opinion that a bakery was located inside the quarter is very curious. Abdel Nour, A., *Introduction à l'histoire urbaine de la Syrie ottomane (XVIe-XVIIIe siècle)*, Beirut, 1982, 232-9.

²⁹ For example, H. A. R. Gibb and H. Bowen described a city in the Ottoman period as follows: 'the urban area was subdivided into a large number of separate quarters, called *hara*, each self-contained, with its own communal buildings (mosque, bath, market) and its own gates, by which it asserted and maintained its separate existence.' See Gibb, H. A. R. and H. Bowen, *Islamic society and the west*, vol.1, part 1, London, 1950, 279. Another example is a study of the urban fabric of Cairo, which uses Sauvaget's quarter model as a *hara* model in eighteenth-century Cairo and stated that each *hara* formed a self-contained small world. Hayashi, T., *Politics and societies in the modern Arab world* (Tokyo, 1974), 152-62 (in Japanese).

³⁰ The introduction of the mukhtar system is apparently related to the ihtisab tax. Shaw stated '(s)oon afterward, as part of the new census structure that Mahmut (II) was building up for tax and conscription purpose, local mayors (*mukhtar*) or lieutenants (*ka'alya*) were appointed in every Muslim or non-Muslim quarter of every city of the empire, under the authority of the *ih̄tisap aġası* in Istanbul, at first to count the people and later to enforce the clothing regulations'. Shaw, S. and E. K. Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and modern Turkey*, Cambridge, 1987 (rep. of 1977), 46-7.

³¹ 'Allaf, A., *Dimashq fi matla' al-qarn al-'isbrin*, ed. 'A. J. Nu'aysa (Dimashq, 2nd ed., 1983), 41-3.

³² Schilcher, *op.cit.* 12-14.

³³ Schilcher, *op.cit.* 8.

³⁴ Schilcher named this area 'the Ottoman area.' Schilcher, *op.cit.* 14-16.

³⁵ Qasimi, S., *Qamus al-sina'at al-shamiyya*, ed. Z. al-Qasimi, (Dimashq, 1988), 54.

³⁶ Schilcher named this area 'the localist area'. Schilcher, *op.cit.* 16-19.

³⁷ Schilcher, *op.cit.* 12-20.

³⁸ Although the total number of entries recorded in the register is 25,482, the number was revised. For example, a datum recorded as '*dukkān wa makbẓan*' is regarded as 2 establishments. In order to revise lost entries of the first part of the district of Qanawat, 120 supposed entries had been inserted as nonclassifiable establishments. Residential establishments (14,869) are also excluded from these data.

³⁹ Shaghur had 26.3% of establishments in the category of crops, where agricultural lands were irrigated by the Qanawat River.

⁴⁰ Qasimi, *op.cit.*, 54. Such a building was sometimes used as a crib.

⁴¹ Rafeq, *op.cit.* 1988, 287-90. Nu'aysa, Y. J. *Mujtama' madina Dimashq* (Dimashq, 1986), 226-9.

⁴² As smaller residential units (e.g. *oda*, *tabaq*) are contained in this category, the actual total number of houses was smaller than this figure.

⁴³ The minimum number was that of the Nuriyya quarter of Midan, and the maximum was the Akrad quarter.

⁴⁴ This paper is a part of my research project, 'Family history study in the Middle East based on sharia court records: Damascus from the nineteenth century to the beginning of twentieth century,' by a grant from the Japan Society for Promotion of Science (JSPS).

ARAB AND JEWISH COMMUNITIES

Cultural Ties between Istanbul and Ottoman Egypt

Michael Winter

The Mamluk Background and the Ottoman Conquest

When Egypt was the centre of the Mamluk Empire (1250-1517) its population—predominantly Arabic-speaking—was ruled by a Turcophone military elite. Since the end of the fourteenth century, most of the Mamluks were Circassians. Since they spoke Turkish—they learned that language in Egypt and Syria, as it was not their native language—and were called by Turkish names, they were called ‘*Atrak*’ (Turks) in the Arabic chronicles of the time.¹ Their Turkishness was a means to mark them off from the native people of Egypt and Syria whom they ruled. The Mamluks were devoted Sunni Muslims and were introduced and trained in their adopted faith by the local ‘*ulama*’, the religious scholars of Islam. Some members of the ruling Mamluk elite were attracted to Sufi mystics of Syria and Egypt and supported them, either because they genuinely believed in their holiness, or because they realized that the common people believed in them, and they manipulated these sentiments to their political advantage. The administration in the Mamluk state was conducted in Arabic. So the culture of Mamluk Empire was Arabic and Islamic, in spite of the Turkish identity of the military rulers.

With the conquest of Syria and Egypt by Yavuz Selīm, the Ottoman Sultan, in summer 1516 and early 1517, the Turkish presence in Egypt and Syria increased dramatically. Now the former Mamluk lands became provinces of the Ottoman Empire.² After the first governors in Syria and Egypt who were Mamluks, all the *vâlîs* (provincial governors) were pashas who came from the centre. The

higher military command, the chief judges, the ranking bureaucrats, the various regiments of the Ottoman garrison in Egypt—all were Turkish-speaking men. Now Ottoman Turkish became the language of the administration. In sheer numbers, the presence of the Turkish speakers in Ottoman Egypt became more discernible than it had been under the Mamluks. In the early sixteenth century, several Sufi shaykhs arrived in Egypt from the Turkish regions, such as the well-known mystics of the Khalwati order, Ibrāhīm Gülşenî (d. 940/1534) and Demirdāsh al-Muhammadi (d. 929/1522 or 1523).³

It is the purpose of this paper to make a general assessment of the cultural ties and influences between the Ottoman centre (Istanbul) and Egypt (mainly Cairo). Of course, the term ‘culture’ is too broad and complex, and the period under discussion—from the early sixteenth century through the eighteenth century—is too long for generalizations. Moreover, in spite the important research that has been done during the last decades, much more is to be learned about the sub-field of Ottoman Egypt generally and its cultural developments in particular. I will limit my discussion here to language, the all-important aspects of religion, some remarks about architecture, and questions of cultural identities in Ottoman Egypt.

Languages: Turkish and Arabic

Shams al-Dīn Muhammad ibn Tūlūn, the Damascene *‘ālim* and author of many important historical works about the last decades of Mamluk rule in Syria (primarily Damascus) and the first decades of Damascus under the Ottomans, tells that immediately after the Ottoman conquest of Damascus, he entered the Ottoman camp hoping to talk with his Ottoman colleagues. He was disappointed, however, since the language barrier made any communication impossible.⁴ This is understandable, despite the fact that any educated *‘ālim* must have known how to read the Arabic religious texts. Naturally, having a conversation in Arabic was another matter. A similar situation must have existed in Egypt, and it is possible that language barriers caused some Egyptians, like the chronicler Ibn Iyās, Ibn Tūlūn’s Cairene contemporary, to describe the Ottoman *qādīs* ignorant. He calls an Ottoman *qādī*-*’askar* ‘more ignorant than an ass, who does not know anything in the matters of the Islamic law’.⁵

Ibn Tūlūn’s complaint is an isolated case, however. After a while—certainly a long while—many Ottomans learned to speak and write Arabic, in some cases on a level that won the admiration of Arab chroniclers and biographers.⁶ Many Egyptians and Syrians learned to speak Turkish. They had to—it was their masters’ language. The sources are full of information about men who

travelled to Istanbul from the Syrian towns or from Cairo to make contacts with influential men in the Ottoman capital in order to gain a nomination (*berāt*, in Arabic *barā'a*) for a position in their own hometown.⁷ In addition, as indicated above, the administration, financial, judicial and other, was conducted in Turkish. This necessitated the employment of personnel with good knowledge of Turkish in Egypt, as well as in other Ottoman provinces. The bureaucrats in the service of the Ottoman governor, the military administration, the *qādi'asker*, the *defterdār*, and the like, knew Turkish and very often were bilingual, with at least some knowledge of Arabic. It is important to note that the Ottoman personnel in Egypt resided in that country for life, especially from the seventeenth century on. They raised families in Egypt and must have contributed to the spread of Turkish language and culture. They were of course loyal Ottoman subjects, but identified with Egypt, where they lived and which they considered as their homeland, *watan*. A good example is a treatise written in Turkish in the seventeenth century by one 'Ali Efendi, a clerk in the service of an emir, praising the Egyptian army as devoted and well behaved while criticizing the morality and religiosity of the *kapıkulları*.⁸

In her study of eighteenth century chronicles in Egypt, Jane Hathaway, writes of '... the existence of a group of men of letters—spearheaded, perhaps, by the children of Turkish officials on the spot—who functioned with some facility in both languages and who were therefore able to achieve cross-fertilization between the two languages and the two literary traditions.'⁹ This is certainly convincing as far as a certain genre of chronicles is concerned. I would add, however, that this definition does not cover the most important chroniclers of the eighteenth century, Ahmad Shalabī (Çelebî) ibn 'Abd al-Ghanī and 'Abd al-Rahmān al-Jabartī, or before them, Ibn Abī'l-Surūr al-Bakrī al-Siddīqī, the most important chronicler of the seventeenth century, whose knowledge of Turkish was very limited, and whose milieu was anything but bilingual.

Generally speaking, in Cairo there were relatively (and perhaps even absolutely) fewer people who were bilingual than in Ottoman Damascus or Aleppo. The matter warrants a thorough research, but this is the impression from studying the excellent Damascene biographical dictionaries of al-Ghazzī (for the sixteenth and the first third of the seventeenth century), al-Muhibbī (for the seventeenth century) and al-Murādī (for the eighteenth century).¹⁰ A not insignificant number of the Damascus élite, definitely including not only bureaucrats, but 'ulama as well, were fluent both in Arabic and Turkish. The best examples were the above-mentioned biographers themselves, who travelled several times to Istanbul and seem to have had frequent contacts with the governors and the qādīs of their town

and province. This kind of linguistic proficiency and the close relations of 'ulamā with the Ottoman ruler is not absent from Cairo—Hasan al-Jabartī, the historian's father, is one notable example to show that such men could be found in Egypt as well.¹¹ Al-Sayyid Murtadā al-Zabīdī, the famous scholar and linguist, is another.¹² (Both knew also Persian). Yet such people were very few. The reason for this difference between Cairo and Damascus (and Aleppo as well) lies primarily in the size of Cairo. This great city was home to many communities of various backgrounds and it seems that the Turkish minority in Cairo was the largest one for the reasons that have been mentioned above. Evliyâ Çelebî, the famous traveller who visited Egypt during the 1670s, is perhaps the best source for the various Turkish enclaves in Cairo, but the Arabic chronicles, particularly al-Jabartī's *'Ajā'ib al-āthār* also provides evidence to the same effect, although less directly¹³. Evliyâ, who was very much interested in his countrymen in Cairo, and who frequently compared Cairo to Istanbul, describes the mosques and *tekkes* (Sufi lodges) of Cairo. He describes many such institutions as having Turkish congregations (*Arvām kavm, jamā'at-ı Arvām*). He makes such references to the mosques of al-Mardānī, Altı Parmak, the Gülşenî tekke and others.¹⁴ The Mu'ayyadī mosque, that had been built under the Mamluk Sultan al-Malik al-Mu'ayyad, also had an exclusively Turkish congregation. Muhammad Bey Abū al-Dhahab founded a lodge for Turkish Sufis.¹⁵ Evliyâ Çelebî, the prejudiced observer, often mentions that only members of the educated Turkish élite (*khanwās al-khāss*) entered this or that mosque and none of the Arabs (*Evlād-i 'Arab*) or *fellāhīn* (Egyptian peasants), or common people (*avāmm*) went there.¹⁶ The students at al-Azhar great mosque-*madrassa* lived and studied at least a part of their lessons within the framework of hostels (*arwiqa*, sing. *rivāq*), most of which were organized by ethnic groups or places of origin groups, Maghribis, Syrians, Turks and others. There is evidence that at least some teaching even at the al-Azhar was conducted in Turkish; this was done in the Turkish hostel (*rivāq*) at al-Azhar.¹⁷ It can be safely assumed that the Turkish students at al-Azhar were more proficient in Arabic than most other Turkish residents of Cairo.

There are several references to Turkish or Turkish-speaking preachers (sing. *wā'iz*) who spoke before Turkish audiences. One popular preacher delivered his sermons in both languages at once; there is little wonder that his audience consisted of both Turks and Arabs.¹⁸ Al-Jabartī tells that his father taught in both languages, holding separate classes for Arabs and others for Turks and Persians. He names his father's assistants, each for the natives of one language.¹⁹

The Mamluks who lived in Egypt, or were born there (and as such by definition could not be Mamluks; but who identified with the Mamluk society) had better Arabic than the Mamluks in the old Sultanate. Nevertheless, they were primarily Turcophone. To Evliyâ Çelebî, their Turkish sounded heavily arabized. In an interesting passage Evliyâ Çelebî provides a short glossary of the Mamluks' vocabulary, that consisted of Turkish auxiliary verbs and Arabic nouns used in Egypt, instead the Turkish words he was accustomed to.²⁰

Despite the Mamluks 'Egyptian' identity, the Mamluk emirs and other military officers as well had also an ethnic or racial awareness that distinguished them from the Arabic-speaking Egyptian population. It is noteworthy that al-Jabartî, with his keen social and cultural insights, did not fail to observe this divide. In his obituaries of several Turkish preachers (*wuâ'iz*, singular *wâi'iz*), including one Bosnian, al-Jabartî always notes that the man was popular with the emirs by dint of his ethnicity, or racial affinity (*li'l-jinsiyya*).²¹

There are indications that there was a negative attitude toward the Turkish language (and by extension toward the Turks) that could have been widespread. Let us repeat again that such attitudes, where they existed, were by no means political, or expressions of Arab or Egyptian nationalism. That would be vastly anachronistic. I will cite only a few examples out of many to demonstrate the point.

In a lengthy obituary dedicated to an Egyptian poet named 'Abdallâh ibn 'Abdallâh ibn Salâma al-Idkâwî (d. 1184/1771), Al-Jabartî recounts a literary dispute he had with a certain Turkish man of letters who recited to him a chronogram verse (*ta'rikh*) containing six dates, asserting that Arabic poets were not adept at such things. Idkawi composed verses of his own to prove him wrong.²²

Ahmad Shalabi indulges in ethnic slurs against the Turks. He refers to a preacher (*wâ'iz*) of the race of the Turks who did not distinguish between *mîn* and *nûn*.²³ In the aftermath of Jazâ'irli Hasan's invasion of Egypt in 1202/1786 to drive the Mamluk emirs out of power, an imperial order was read in the presence of the notables. Shaykh al-'Arûsî, the Shaykh al-Azhar at the time, snapped impatiently: 'Come to the crux of the matter, we do not understand Turkish'. When the order was translated to him, he criticized the decision as causing unnecessary suffering to the civilian population.²⁴

Perhaps the most telling evidence is the following reference by Evliyâ Çelebî concerning a certain Azhari shaykh named al-'Ayyâshî: 'Since he speaks a few Turkish words, the other 'ulama are jealous, saying 'he associates with the Ottomans.' Yet he is a patient, moderate and quiet man'. *Lisân-i Türki kelimât etdiğinden, sayir ulema: 'Osmanlı ibtilât ider' deyü hased iderler. Ammâ bir hamul ve mutedil sâkin ademdir*.²⁵

Ottoman Rulers and Egyptian Culture

Speaking of cultural ties between Istanbul and Cairo, we ought to mention the interest shown occasionally by Sultans or viziers in outstanding Egyptian scholars.

The reputation of Egypt as a centre of Islamic and Arabic learning was very high.²⁶ Even the prejudiced Evliyâ Çelebî shows respect toward the al-Azhar mosque and its scholars.²⁷ Al-Jabartî tells that the emirs came to listen to Murtadâ al-Zabîdî's classes. He was invited to visit Istanbul but declined the offer, yet accepted an allowance from Egypt's treasury. The Reîs Efendi, the most important Ottoman bureaucrat, came to Egypt to receive from al-Zabîdî an *ijāza* (a teacher's licence to teach some text that his student has studied under his supervision). The Reîs Efendi was interested in the classical Arabic literary masterpiece *Maqāmāt al-Harīrī*.²⁸ Another Azhari 'ālim, named 'Umar al-Tahlawī, travelled to Istanbul to arrange a few things for Egyptian emirs there. He taught *Hadīth* at the Aya Sofiya mosque; many important Ottoman 'ulama reportedly attended his lessons. After his return to Cairo, he came to the pasha every Friday to teach him *Hadīth*. Several governors of Egypt studied Qur'an and *Hadīth* with Cairo 'ulama. Some even bothered to obtain *ijāzāt*. These basic texts, easier for a non-'ālim layman than *fiqh* treatises, were popular.²⁹

According to 'Abd al-Rahmān al-Jabartî, his father excelled in disciplines for which Egypt did not have a good reputation. In 1160/1747, Kur Ahmet Pasha, a new governor of Egypt, met with the leading shaykhs of al-Azhar, and was disappointed that none of them was able to discuss the mathematical sciences with him. Finally, they mentioned to him Hasan al-Jabartî. A meeting was arranged and al-Jabartî impressed the pasha with his knowledge and afterwards they met regularly to talk about mathematics and astronomy. Hasan al-Jabartî made several sundials for him.³⁰ Al-Jabartî's reputation reached Istanbul, and the Sultan sent him Persian books from his library. Hasan maintained scholarly relations with three enlightened governors of Egypt: 'Alī Pasha ibn al-Hakim, and the above-mentioned Ahmet Pasha al-Kur, and Rāghib Mehmet Pasha.³¹ The latter was an educated man. He is the author of a work entitled *Safinat al-Rāghib*, a collection of essays on various topics, mostly dealing with theology, Qur'an interpretation, Islamic sects, mysticism, and the like. The book is not well organized and is not original.³² Yet that an Ottoman pasha bothered to put together such a big volume written mostly in Arabic, with a few passages in Persian, is in itself interesting. Rāghib was *Reîsülküttab* (chief clerk in the foreign service); this explains his education and interest in learning.

Ottoman 'Ulama and Qādīs

The Ottomans were careful to refrain from interfering unnecessarily in Egypt's religious life. After a rough beginning immediately after the conquest, the Ottomans and Egyptians adjusted to each other without much friction. The Ottomans held all the positions that were related to the business of ruling the province, that is, all the military and administrative posts, including the chief and several of his Hanafī deputies (with time, the number of Egyptian qādīs increased at the expense of the Turkish ones, yet the chief judge, (qādī'asker), was always Turkish-speaking and Hanafī.³³ It is important to notice that despite the qādī'asker's high position, his impact on Egypt's religious and social life was extremely limited, as I hope to demonstrate below. This applies also to other Ottoman 'ulama. The number of Turkish 'ulama in Ottoman Egypt was very small. Evliyâ Çelebî, who carefully notes all the important Turks in Egypt, mentions only a few names. In the Arabic chronicles of Ottoman Egypt, there are almost no references to such persons. Again, a notice by Evliyâ illustrates this situation. Evliyâ tells about Boluvî Mustafa Efendi who settled in Egypt. In fact, the Grand Vizier Köprülü exiled Boluvî, a former Şeihülislam, to Egypt for refusing to issue a fatwa authorizing a death sentence against a military commander accused of inefficiency in the campaign to conquer Crete. Boluvî was given the district (qaza) of Giza as a fief (arpalık) in order to support him. He was meant to be the chief Hanafī mufti in Egypt. Yet Evliyâ sourly notes that no one there needed his fatwas, since for a mere pittance one could go to al-Azhar and get a fatwa from one of the many 'ulama in that institution. Ever critical, Evliyâ adds that there is no way one could get justice in Egypt. (*Mısır dîyarında ihqaq-i haq olmaq ihtimali yoktur*).³⁴

As already indicated above, despite the high position of the chief Ottoman qādī in Egypt, his influence on that country's religion and society was almost non-existent. First, there are only very few references to the qādī'askers in the chronicles and the biographies of the period. Again, it is in striking contrast to the situation in Damascus, where the sources abound with biographies and references to the qādīs who had served a period in that city. The biographers often wrote their obituaries even when the qādī died outside Damascus, as usually was the case. The few obituaries of qādī'askers in the Egyptian sources are very short and do not provide much information. Moreover, when the sources do mention the chief Ottoman qādī of Egypt, it is clear that he was of little relevance for the country's religious life, his high judicial and administrative position notwithstanding. A few examples may illustrate my point.

Ahmad Shalabi tells of a newly appointed qādī who arrogantly declared upon his arrival in Egypt in 1133/1720 that he would 'renovate' (i.e., reform—*tajdid al-dīn*, being a well known idea, based on a famous Hadith that in the beginning of each century a man will appear for the Muslim community and will renovate its Islam). During that qādī's term, he accomplished nothing, and was dismissed by the central government amidst accusations of financial scandals and political intrigues. The Egyptians ridiculed him for his presumption.³⁵

In another serious incident that happened in 1123/1711, a religious confrontation in Cairo between a Turkish crowd and the Egyptians shows again the irrelevance of the qādī'asker, supposedly the highest Islamic authority in Egypt. The incident is well known to students of Ottoman Egypt, but will be described here briefly, since it throws light on several religious and social aspects of life in Ottoman Cairo. The riot was started by a man identified only as 'the Turkish preacher' (*al-wā'iẓ al-Rūmī*) in the Arabic chronicles, and the *softa* (the student of religion) in a Turkish chronicle. The man preached in the month of Ramadan before the audience of the Mu'ayyadī mosque, an exclusively Turkish centre at the time. The preacher, who was influenced by the purist and fundamentalist teaching of the sixteenth century writer, Birgili Mehmet, put out a list of 'blameworthy innovations' (*bida'*) and incited his audience to denounce and remove them. The beliefs and practices were related to Egyptian Sufism, such as the dervishes' custom of performing *dhikr* near the Zuwayla Gate during the nights of Ramadan. (It was believed that it was the seat of the unseen *Qutb*, or Axis, the master of the saints). He also attacked ideas from the writings of 'Abd al-Wahhāb al-Sha'rānī, the popular sixteenth century Cairo mystic and saint. It is noteworthy that the preacher also called to close down the Turkish dervish centres of the Gülşenī, Mevlevī and Bektaşī, and convert them into madrasas. The crowd attacked the Sufis at the Zuwayla Gate with swords and cudgels. The Sufis complained to the leading 'ulama at al-Azhar and obtained from them legal opinions fully justifying the Egyptian Sufis. When the Turkish preacher was shown the written fatwas, he dismissed them, claiming that they had issued by 'your Arab 'ulama (awlād al-'Arab)'. Another version says: 'the 'ulama of your country ('ulama' *baladikum*)'. The crowd then marched to the residence of the qādī'asker in order to obtain a fatwa that would counter the Azharis' fatwas. The alarmed qādī escaped to his private rooms (*barīm*). His deputy was forced to write as the mob demanded. Now the issue had become not only a confrontation between orthodoxy, or rather fundamentalism, and Sufism, and between Turks and Egyptian Arabs, but also principally a matter of law and order. The Turkish preacher was exiled, and his admirers

were ejected from the Mu'ayyadi mosque where they had been staying. This incident, that rightly drew the attention of modern researchers, sheds light on several aspects. In the present context, it also illustrates the insignificance of the qādī'asker.³⁶ Again, it is inconceivable that if a dispute of this kind had happened in Damascus, the qādī would sit out in such a case.

Another struggle, this time over the position of Shaykh al-Azhar, the 'rector of al-Azhar,' that took place in 1192/1778, can again serve as indication to the qādī'asker's lack of public influence in the affairs of the most important religious institution of the Islamic world. Shaykh 'Abd al-Rahmān al-'Arīshī, an unusually ambitious Hanafī 'ālim from al-'Arīsh struggled hard, by all his means, some of them fraudulent, to rise to that position. He enlisted to his side the Mamluk emirs, several 'ulama of al-Azhar, and Shaykh al-Sadat, head of a vastly influential Sufi family-order, although of course, he did not belong to the al-Azhar establishment. Al-'Arīshī's rivals protested that al-'Arīshī was not qualified for the post, claiming that 'this is the land of al-Imam al-Shāfi'ī' (who is buried in Old Cairo and whose *madhhab* had by far more adherents than the other legal schools) and that there had been no precedent that a Hanafī had been appointed to that office. Besides, al-'Arīshī was an outsider from Syria (*al-Sham*). The emirs retorted that a Hanafī should not be disqualified, since the Sultan, the pasha, the chief qādī and the emirs themselves were Hanafis. Also, the Hanafī madhhab was the earliest in Islam. The opposition did not give up, and united behind Shaykh al-'Arūsī, a Shafī'ī candidate. They also won over supporters in and outside al-Azhar, including Shaykh al-Bakrī, Shaykh al-Sadat's rival in the Egyptian Sufi society. The continuation of the strife ended with the total victory of the Shāfi'īs, owing to impressive rallying at the sepulchre of al-Imam al-Shāfi'ī, the symbol of Egyptian Islam, and owing to quite stupid mistakes made by al-'Arīshī.³⁷ The details need not concern us here. It is highly significant that no one of the parties in that strife turned to enlist the support of the chief Ottoman qādī of Egypt. (Also the pasha, the governor, was left out). Of course, it was the deliberate (and wise) policy of the Ottomans to refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of al-Azhar.³⁸ Still, the fact is that the Ottomans had no involvement in Egypt's religious matters.

Al-Jabartī writes the biography of al-Sayyid Najm al-Din ibn Salih al-Timurtashi al-Ghazzi (d. 1200/1786), an 'Ottomanized' 'ālim who travelled to Istanbul and succeeded in enrolling in the cadre of the Ottoman judiciary. It is important to note that he was a Hanafī which facilitated his appointment. Upon his return to Egypt, he was named the *na'ib* (provincial qādī) of the town of Abyar. Al-Jabartī disapprovingly reports that al-Ghazzi 'innovated' unjust practices, such as conducting investigations into the documents of persons

who were in control of old *maqāṣ* or dilapidated mosques, thereby extorting money and enriching himself. Finally, he achieved an appointment of deputy judge in Cairo itself. He also introduced the strange innovation of swearing in witnesses. Al-Jabartī says that al-Ghazzi persuaded Jaza'irli Hasan Pasha to invade Egypt.³⁹

We see that the image of the Ottoman *qādīs* in Egypt was negative, although the vitriolic attacks that Ibn Iyās had heaped on them right after the conquest were not repeated; attitudes were reserved if not hostile. Once again, the comparison with attitudes of the Damascene historians and biographers can be helpful. Although several *qādīs* who served in Damascus are described as being greedy and corrupt, many receive warm praise for their honesty, justice, charitable treatment of the people, and love of learning, sometimes including Arabic learning.⁴⁰ One *qādī* is described as interceding with the authorities for the people of Damascus with a successful effort to reduce their extraordinary taxes (*avariz*).⁴¹ Another *qādī*, named Ibrāhīm al-Izniki, acted diplomatically to stop the siege of the city by 'Ali Janbulat, a notorious rebel leader from the north of Syria in 1015/1606 and worked hard to alleviate the people's special dues to the government.⁴² Another did not think it beneath his honour to act personally as a *muhtsib*, or market inspector checking the weights and measures.⁴³ I have not come across anything similar in Egypt. Again, the huge difference in size between these two major Ottoman Arab towns can explain the difference in attitudes, but fact remains that the Egyptians never considered the *qādī* as someone who could be on their side.

Egyptian Sufism and the Ottomans

The very limited impact of the Ottomans on Egypt's religious culture is evident also in Sufism. Egyptian Sufi practices and beliefs owe almost nothing Ottoman influences. 'Abd al-Wahhāb al-Sha'rānī, (d. 973/1565) the most important religious writer in sixteenth century Egypt, who was a mystic and an historian of Sufism, was of course fully aware of the status of Egypt as an Ottoman province. He lived during the reign of Qānuni Sultan Süleyman, and as a timid Sufi had nothing but the loftiest praises to him, once referring to him as 'the visible Axis' (*al-qutb al-ẓāhir*), the earthly parallel to the mystical head of the invisible saints. At the same time, he was repulsed by the Khalwatiyya, which was in his time a branch of a Turkish highly unorthodox order. Moreover, there are hints in his writings that his attitude toward the Ottoman regime was ambiguous at best. In one passage he quotes cryptically one of his shaykhs as saying that from the beginning of the year 923, knowledge has left people's hearts. The solution to al-Sha'rānī's

riddle is not difficult: The Ottoman conquest of Egypt took place on 1 Muharram 923/1 January 1517.⁴⁴

Even Ibn Abi'l-Surur al-Bakri al-Siddiqi, the most important chronicler of Egypt in the seventeenth century, who happened to be a member of an aristocratic Sufi family-order and was extremely loyal to the Ottomans, did not have any affinity to Turkish Islam. Later writers, however, were much more outspoken about how they felt about the Ottoman version of Sufism, which as we have seen, was represented in Egypt among the Turkish enclaves in Cairo. Al-Jabartī in particular is repulsed by what he saw as the ways of the Turkish dervishes. At the same time, he also condemned in the strongest terms the vulgar forms of Egyptian Sufism. The advent of the reformed Khalwātī order is the most important development in eighteenth century Egypt. The strict al-Jabartī is full of praise for the Khalwatiyya, whose *dhikr* is consistent with the first *Shahada* ('*la ilaha illa Allah*'), the best phrase a Muslim can utter, says Jabartī.⁴⁵ Reformed Sufism, made more compatible with Islamic orthodoxy in the eighteenth century in many parts of the Muslim world, was expressed in Egypt through the Khalwatiyya. A Syrian named Mustafa ibn Kamal al-Din al-Bakri (d. 1162/1749) transformed the order into a pillar of orthodoxy.⁴⁶ His chief deputy (*khalīfa*) in Egypt was Muhammad al-Hifni, who was to rise to become Shaykh al-Azhār (his incumbency lasted from 1171/1757 until 1181/1767). It is remarkable that the *tariqa* became the dominant order of the leading 'ulama, including nearly all those who held the position of Shaykh al-Azhar. Although al-Hifni paid token respect to the sepulchres of the sixteenth century Turkish Khalwātīs, the new Khalwatiyya did not resemble the old version. Yet it is noteworthy that Mustafa al-Bakri propagated the Sufism of the line of a Turkish Shaykh called 'Ali Efendi Qarabash. Nevertheless, al-Jabartī, who was without any doubt a true representative of attitudes of the educated Azharis, frequently voices his criticism not just against unorthodox Sufism, but also against Turkish Sufism, which he regarded as both wrong and foreign. Al-Jabartī often writes: 'They (the Turks), incline to this kind (of unruly dervishism)'.⁴⁷ Speaking of a certain Sufi from Ta'if who visited Cairo, al-Jabartī says: 'He was inclined to believe in incarnation and monism (*hulul* and *ittihad*, the mystical doctrines of Ibnal-Farid and Ibn 'Arabi, respectively, both famous thirteenth century mystics). Our masters the Maghribis do not approve of these things, as they adhere strictly to the external words of the Shari'a law. Yet the Turks (*ahl al-Rum*) strongly believe in this Sufi (and his doctrines).'⁴⁸ Other expressions used by al-Jabartī like: 'Knowledge according to their country' (*al-'ilm 'ala tariqāt biladibim*), are typical of his rejection of their kind of Islam.⁴⁹ It should be noted that Muhyī al-Din Ibn al-'Arabi's monistic doctrines

were always much more popular among the Turks than among the Arabs, who are culturally less inclined to extreme mysticism. It should be recalled that it was Sultan Selim I who built a mosque on Ibn al-‘Arabi’s grave in Damascus before returning to Istanbul after the conquest of Syria and Egypt.⁵⁰ Sultan Süleyman was also said to be also a strong believer in that Andalusian mystic, and qādīs who did not share his views could be dismissed.⁵¹

It is illuminating to see how much al-Jabartī despised the Turkish dervishes. It comes through in his recounting of two Turkish swindlers, one who tried to be appointed as Egypt’s *Naqib al-Ashrāf* and the other who renovated the dilapidated Bektashi *tekke*. Both crooks took advantage of the Ottomans’ proclivity to Sufism. The renovator of the Bektashi cloister was a man who had served as a *sarrāj*, one of the notorious bodyguards of some Egyptian amirs. He dressed up as a dervish, thereby convincing Hasan Pasha, ‘since they are inclined to this kind’. He rebuilt the *tekke* (monastery or hospice for Turkish Sufis) from the funds that he had taken as bribes from the custom officials so he would intercede for them with Hasan Pasha.⁵²

Yusuf Efendi, the Naqib al-Ashrāf hopeful, was originally a seller of metal wares and fruit in the Khan al-Khalili market. ‘He was also one of those Turkish Sufis who read aloud and preach in their language’. He was the director of the Turkish *riwaq* (hostel) at al-Azhar, where he embezzled some funds. He succeeded in obtaining a letter appointing him as Naqib al-Ashraf, presenting himself as a scholar. Finally he was found out and dismissed.⁵³

Speaking of the post of Naqib al-Ashraf, it was an old position in the history of Islam that had existed also under the Mamluks. The Ottomans continued this post, to which they appointed a man from Istanbul. The Ottoman appointees were officially ranking notables, but they had very small effect on the social and religious life of Egypt. During the eighteenth century, the office passed to the heads two distinguished Sufi families of Egypt, the Bakris and the al-Sadat al-Wafā’iyya, both believed to be of Sharifi descent. The two families fulfilled various public roles, and contested for the post of the Naqib al-Ashrāf. In our context it is important to note only that when that post passed from the Istanbul appointees to the aristocratic Egyptian families it acquired public and religious importance and power.⁵⁴

Architecture

Finally, for another aspect of cultural ties and influences between Istanbul and Cairo, I would like to make a few observations about the Ottoman architecture of Cairo, relying mainly on the book *Egypt’s Adjustment to Ottoman Rule* by Doris Behrens-Abouseif.

When Evliyâ Çelebî was touring the streets of Cairo, he was constantly looking for things that would remind him of Istanbul; he must have been really homesick. Several mosques reminded him of those in Istanbul. In particular, those that had been built by governors during the sixteenth century struck him as being built after the style of Turkey (*Rum tarzı*), or as having a Turkish minaret (*Rum minâresi*). Dukakin Mehmet Pasha's Mosque, one of Qanuni's viziers, resembled Rüstem Pasha's mosque in Istanbul. The mosque of Mahmut Pasha, yet another sixteenth century governor (who was assassinated by a soldier) is described by Evliyâ as 'a tall mosque in the Turkish style, with an Istanbul style minaret'.⁵⁵ Yet these are a traveller's impressions.

Behrens-Abouseif, who has studied the buildings thoroughly, analyzes the architecture of the mosques grouped into the types of plan by which they were built. Here I will quote some of her main conclusions that are relevant to the present paper. I quote from page 222 in her book: 'Unlike Aleppo and Damascus, where the governors erected buildings with predominantly Ottoman features and with a tendency towards a monumentality that these cities had not witnessed before in their Mamluk history, the mosques erected in Cairo by the pashas were, with a few exceptions of a local non-monumental style, and without the decoration and creative innovations that made the charm of Mamluk mosques. Very few buildings—and only outside the urban core—recall the Ottoman style, and even these are a compromise between Ottoman and Cairene traditions. Only the minarets, pencil-shaped but rather squat, pointed to the fact that a shift of power had taken place...' Further, on page 223: '...why Ottoman architecture had such little influence on Cairo's appearance'. And more, on page 227: 'The Ottomans' contribution to Cairo's architecture lays therefore in preservation and restoration rather than innovation or in the transfer of imperial art.' Finally, a quotation from the summary (p.273): 'The Mamluks had energetically replaced old buildings with new ones. The Ottomans simply restored and maintained the Mamluk architecture they inherited. The most persistent aspect of Mamluk culture throughout the Ottoman period proved to be its architectural style. Only four mosques in two centuries were built using an Ottoman plan, and even in those the style is otherwise not purely Ottoman'.⁵⁶

A group of distinguished researchers who wrote a comprehensive study about palaces and houses in Ottoman Cairo arrived at similar conclusions.⁵⁷

It can be cautiously suggested that in architecture as in other spheres of culture, Egypt's strong cultural personality and heritage, as well as Cairo's size and importance, may account for the differences between the Ottoman cultural impact on Syria to that of

Cairo. With their famous pragmatism, the Ottomans realized the special characteristics and status of Egypt, their largest province. As a consequence, they respected this heritage and culture and acted accordingly. My paper was an attempt to show that the important and obvious influences of the Ottoman system on Egypt in many spheres—the political, social, and economic—nonwithstanding, we are looking at one empire, one civilization, a shared religion, but at two distinct cultures—Turkish and Ottoman vis-à-vis Egyptian and Arabic.

Notes

¹ See, for example, Muhammad ibn Ahmad ibn Iyās, *Badā'i' al-Zubūr fī waqā'i' al-dubūr*, Muhammad Mustafa (ed.), (Cairo, second edition, 1961, 5 vols.), passim; Muhammad Shams al-Din Ibn Tūlūn, *Mufākabat al-khullān fī hawādith al-zamān*, Muhammad Mustafa (ed.) (Cairo, 1961, 2 volumes), passim.

² For the general historical background, see P. M. Holt, *Egypt and the Fertile Crescent 1516-1522: A Political History* (Ithaca and London, 1966), chapters 1-7. On the Ottoman occupation of Egypt and Egypt in the sixteenth century, see my chapters 'The Ottoman Occupation', in Carl F. Petry (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Egypt*: vol. I, *Islamic Egypt, 640-1517*, (Cambridge, 1998), 490-516; and 'Ottoman Egypt, 1525-1609', in M. W. Daly (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Egypt*: vol. II, *Modern Egypt, from 1517 to the end of the twentieth century* (Cambridge, 1998), 1-33.

³ On Ibrāhīm Gūlşeni, see J. S. Trimmingham, *The Sufi Orders in Islam* (Oxford, 1971), 76-7. On the Khalwatiyya in the sixteenth century, see my *Society and Religion in Early Ottoman Egypt: Studies in the Writings of 'Abd al-Wahhāb al-Sha'rānī* (New Brunswick and London, 1982), 105-12. See also Ibn G. Martin, 'A Short History of the Khalwati Order of Dervishes', in N. R. Keddie (ed.), *Scholars, Saints and Sufis* (Berkeley, Los Angeles and London, 1972), 290-305.

⁴ Ibn Tūlūn, *Mufākabat al-khullān*, 2: 31.

⁵ Ibn Iyās, 5: 467.

⁶ See, for example, Najm al-Din al-Ghazzī, *Lūtf al-samar wa-qatf al-thamar min tarājim a'yan al-tabaqa al-ūla min al-qarn al-hādī 'ashar*, Mahmūd al-Shaykh, ed. (Damascus, 1981-82, 2 vols.), 102-6, and *ibid.*, 607-10, where the author mentions two Turks whose Arabic was even better than that of Kamal Efendi Taşköprüzade, the subject of that obituary.

⁷ See, for example, *ibid.*: 26-9; Muhammad Khalīl al-Murādī, *Silk al-durar fī a'yan al-qarn al-thānī 'ashar* (4 vols in 2, Baghdad, 1966), 1: 205-6; 4: 28; Muhammad Amin al-Muhibbi, *Khulāsāt al-āthār fī a'yan al-qarn al-hādī 'ashar*, (Beirut, 1966, 4 vols), 3: 308; 'Abd al-Rahman al-Jabartī, *'Ajā'ib al-āthār fī'l-tarājim wa'l-akhbār* (4 volumes, Cairo, Bulaq, 1297/1880), 1: 288; 2: 127-8.

⁸ See my 'Ali Efendi's "Anatolian Campaign Book": a Defence of the Egyptian Army in the Seventeenth Century?, *Turica* 15 (1983), 267-309.

⁹ Jane Hathaway, 'Sultans, Pashas, *Taqwims*, and *Mühimmes*: A Reconsideration of Chronicle-Writing in Eighteenth Century Ottoman Egypt', in Daniel Crecelius, ed., *Eighteenth Century Egypt: The Arabic Manuscript Sources*, (Los Angeles, 1990), 73.

¹⁰ Najm al-Din Muhammad al-Ghazzi, *al-Kawākib al-sā'ira bi-a'yān al-mi'a al-'āsbira* (Beirut, Jounieh and Harissa, Lebanon, 1945-59, 3 vols); idem. *Lutf al-samar* (see note 6 above); Muhammad Amin al-Muhibbi, *Kbulāsāt al-āthār fī a'yān al-qarn al-hādī 'ashar*, (Beirut, 1966, 4 vols); Muhammad Khalil al-Murādī, *Silk al-durar fī a'yān al-qarn al-thānī 'ashar* (4 vols in 2, Baghdad, 1966).

¹¹ 'Abd al-Rahman al-Jabartī, *'Ajā'ib al-āthār fī'l-tarājim wa'l-akhbār* (4 volumes, Cairo, Bulaq, 1297/1880), 1: 398.

¹² Ibid., 2:199.

¹³ Ibid., 1: 163; 2: 248-9.

¹⁴ See, for example, Evliyâ Çelebî, *Seyabatname*, vol. X (Istanbul, 1938), 216, 218, 235, 239, 467.

¹⁵ See Jabartī, 1: 418.

¹⁶ Evliyâ Çelebî, *Seyabatname*, vol. X, 195, 467.

¹⁷ Jabartī, 2: 248-9.

¹⁸ Ibid. It is worth noting that also in Damascus 'a preacher for the Turks', is mentioned. Al-Ghazzi, *Lutf al-samar*, 341-2.

¹⁹ Jabartī, 1: 398.

²⁰ Evliyâ Çelebî, *Seyabatname*, vol. X, 159-60.

²¹ Jabartī, 2: 210, 2:248-9.

²² Ibid., 1: 352-7.

²³ Ahmad Shalabi ibn 'Abd al-Ghanī, *Andah al-ishārāt fīman tawallā Mīsr wa'l-Qābira min al-wuzāra' wa'l-bashāt al-mullaqab bi-Ta'rikh al-'Ayn*, ed. 'Abd al-Rahim 'Abd al-Rahman 'Abd al-Rahim (Cairo, 1978), 253.

²⁴ Jabartī, 2: 158.

²⁵ Evliyâ Çelebî, *Seyabatname*, X, 530.

²⁶ Egypt was considered in Istanbul as 'the spring of virtues and scientific knowledge' Jabartī, 1: 187, cited in H. A. R. Gibb and Harold Bowen, *Islamic Society and the West* (London, 1957), Volume One, Part II, 100.

²⁷ Evliyâ Çelebî, *Seyabatname*, X, 195 ff.

²⁸ Jabartī, 2: 198.

²⁹ Ibid. 1: 176-7, 288.

³⁰ Ibid. 1: 187-8.

³¹ Ibid. 1: 395.

³² Rāghib Mehmed Pasha, *Safinat al-Rāghib* (Cairo, 1282/1866).

³³ See G.N. El-Nahal, *The Judicial Administration of Ottoman Egypt in the Seventeenth Century* (Minneapolis and Chicago, 1979), 14.

³⁴ Evliyâ Çelebî, *Seyabatname*, X, 527, 530.

³⁵ Ahmad Shalabi ibn 'Abd al-Ghanī, *Andah al-ishārāt*, 305, 315.

³⁶ On this conflict, see my *Egyptian Society under Ottoman Rule*, 157-9, citing Arabic and Turkish sources and modern scholars' analyses.

³⁷ Jabartī, 2: 52-4.

³⁸ Gibb and Bowen write: 'It speaks eloquently of the independence of the Egyptian 'ulema' that although the Hanefī rite was officially adopted by the Ottoman Sultans, no Hanefī Sheikh held the coveted post of Sheikh al-Azhar until the French occupation, and that it was monopolized during the greater part of the eighteenth century by the Shāfī'īs.' Gibb and Bowen, *Islamic Society and the West*, II, 100.

³⁹ Jabartī, 1: 176-7.

⁴⁰ See, for example, al-Murādī, *Silk al-durar*, 3:257 f.; al-Ghazzī, *al-Kawākib al-sā'ira*, 2: 27-9; idem. *Lutf al-samar*, 1: 102-6; ibid. 2: 661-2.

⁴¹ Al-Muhibbī, *Kbulāsāt al-āthār*, 1: 172-3; al-Ghazzī, *Lutf al-samar*, 1: 296-300.

⁴² Al-Ghazzī, *Lutf al-samar*, 1: 231-40; al-Muhibbī, *Kbulāsāt al-āthār*, 1: 31-2.

⁴³ See Ahmad Budayrī al-Hallāq, *Hawādīth Dimāshq al-yawmīyya, 1154-1175/ 1741-1762*, Ahmad ‘Izzat ‘Abd al-Karīm (ed.) (second edition, Cairo, 1418/1997), 260.

⁴⁴ On al-Sha‘rani’s attitudes to Ottoman rule, see my *Society and Religion in Early Ottoman Egypt*, 60-68, 262-72.

⁴⁵ Jabartī, 1: 294-5.

⁴⁶ See his biography in *ibid.* 1: 165-6.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.* 2: 144, 238.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.* 2: 238.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.* 2: 210.

⁵⁰ Ibn Tūlūn, *Mufakabat al-Khillan*, 2: 68, 79, 80.

⁵¹ Al-Ghazzī, *al-Kawākib al-sā‘ira*, 2: 28.

⁵² Jabartī, 2: 144.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 3: 203-4.

⁵⁴ See my *Egyptian Society under Ottoman Rule*, 192-8.

⁵⁵ Evliyā Çelebi, *Seyahatname*, Vol. X, 205, 207, 218-20, 293, 325.

⁵⁶ Doris Behrens-Abouseif, *Egypt’s Adjustment to the Ottoman Rule: Institutions, Waqf and Architecture in Cairo (16th and 17th Centuries)*, (Leiden, 1994).

⁵⁷ B. Maury, A. Raymond, J.Revault and M. Zakarya, *Palais et maisons du Caire. II Epoque Ottomane (XVIe- VIIIe siècles)* (Paris, 1983), for example, 97.

The *Evlâd-i ‘Arab* (‘Sons of the Arabs’) in Ottoman Egypt: A Rereading¹

Jane Hathaway

Around the middle of the seventeenth century, the Ottoman governor of Egypt issued a series of orders (*buyruldu*) directing the officers of Egypt’s seven regiments of Ottoman soldiery to expel a group of people known as *evlâd-i ‘Arab/awlâd al-‘Arab* (literally, ‘sons of the Arabs’). This essay reopens the question of just who these *evlâd-i ‘Arab*, as depicted in Arabic and Ottoman Turkish chronicles of pre-nineteenth-century Egypt, were. The overriding tendency among scholars of Ottoman Egypt has been to interpret this expression at face value and, moreover, in accordance with the modern meaning of the word *‘Arab*. To uncover the *evlâd-i ‘Arab*’s identity, I contend, we must subvert the prevailing historiography by restoring the expression to its pre-nation-state context.

Representative of the conventional historiography of Ottoman Egypt is Michael Winter’s *Egyptian Society under Ottoman Rule, 1517-1798*, in which the author claims that ‘In the seventeenth century,...Arabs flooded the regiments,’ a development that he credits with inciting the ‘anti-Arab’ campaign of Rıdvan Bey, later known as al-Faqârî, and his ally Ali Bey, governor of the Upper Egyptian super-province of Jirja.²

Winter’s source for this assertion is a passage in the *Tarih-i Mısır-ı Kabire* of Mehmed b. Yusuf Al-Hallâq (to 1127/1715)³, in which the chronicler quotes verbatim a *buyruldu* of 10 Şaban 1057/10 September 1647 from the governor of Egypt to the regimental officers:

Yedi bölüğün içinde ne kadar *evlâd-i ‘Arab* varsa, eğer Mısırlı ve eğer Şamlı ve eğer Halebli, eğer Bağdadî, eğer *‘Acem*, eğer *Özbek*, cümlesi Bayram mevâcibine değin ‘ulûfeleri ferâgat idüp, satan satsun, varsa satmıyup kalursa, bi’l-kullîye ref’ olunsun (f. 109r-v, emphasis mine).

However many *evlâd-i ‘Arab* there are in the seven regiments—be they Cairene, Damascene, Aleppine, Baghdadi, ‘Acem,

Özbek—their stipends must be ceded and sold before the Bayram payday [the bonus payday at the end of Ramazan]; any remaining unsold will be cancelled.

Al-Hallāq's narrative continues:

Yeniçeri taifesi ekseri evlâd-i 'Arab olmağın, haber gönderdiler ki 'Evlâd-i 'Arab çıkarsak, lâzım gelen hidmet-i Padişahî'ye kim gider?' dinledikde, 'Ali Bey eyitdi, 'Bende Rûm oğlanı sekban çokdur; onların yerine چراغ iderim.'

Since the Janissary corps was mostly evlâd-i 'Arab, [the officers] responded, 'If we expel the evlâd-i 'Arab, who will go to perform the necessary sultanic service?' Overhearing this, Ali Bey replied, 'I have many *Rûm oğlanı sekban*. I will promote them instead of [the *evlâd-i 'Arab*].'

Winter is able to adduce this episode as proof of anti-Arab sentiment among Egypt's military leadership because he understands evlâd-i 'Arab as a reference to ethnic Arabs in the modern sense. The problem with this interpretation lies with the last two groups included under this rubric. 'Acem and Özbek could conceivably refer to Arab populations in Central Asia,⁴ but to make this interpretation, we would have to assume that 'Arab normally referred to an ethnic Arab, and this was not the case during the seventeenth century. Meanwhile, 'Acem during the Ottoman period typically means 'Persian' or, more broadly, 'foreign', as in '*Acemî Oğlan*, the 'sons of foreigners', or 'foreign boys'—almost all of them, ironically, Anatolian and Balkan Christians—who were removed from their families in the *devşirme* and taken into Ottoman service.⁵ In the case of what the Ottomans knew as 'the two Iraqs' (*Irakeyn*), moreover, the word is used to differentiate eastern, Persophone *Irak-i 'Acem* (that is, modern-day Iran) from western, Arabophone *Irak-i Arab*. Özbek, for its part, refers to the Central Asian Turkic population known in English as Uzbeks. In Central Asian historiography and ethnography, they constitute the population of the countryside, whose nomadic Turkishness is contrasted with the Persianate culture of the urban-dwelling Tajiks and the sedentarization of the Turkic-speaking Sarts.⁶ Therefore, in this particular instance, evlâd-i 'Arab cannot refer to, or at least cannot refer solely to, ethnic Arabs.

To identify a more likely meaning for evlâd-i 'Arab, we must address three issues: (i) the common element linking the adjectives included in the buyruldu quoted by al-Hallāq, (ii) the context within which this passage appears in al-Hallāq's chronicle and in roughly contemporary chronicles, (iii) the implications of *evlâd*.

Mısırlı, Şamlı, Halebli, Bağdadî, ‘Acem, Özbek

The adjectives listed in the *buyruldu* refer first to major cities in the Ottoman Arab provinces, then to two almost unequivocally non-Arab ethnic groupings. Whom would all these adjectives describe—or, more appropriately, what group would they describe? In the context of the order, such a group would have to consist of soldiers, or at least potential soldiers. In the case of Cairo, Damascus, Aleppo, and Baghdad, the reference could be to Janissaries, regardless of ethnicity or provenance, stationed in these provincial cities and perhaps operating or seeking to operate in Cairo as free agents. The example of the *sarrāj* (literally ‘saddler’), a mercenary soldier who also, at least in Ottoman Egypt, seemed to perform the services of a security guard or watchman, suggests that this kind of free agency was fairly common in the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Ottoman provinces. In Egypt during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, an individual *sarrāj* could evidently negotiate his service to a particular grandee patron.⁷ In light of this consideration, ‘Acem and Özbek might perhaps refer to soldiers in the Safavid (‘Persian’) and Shaybanid (Özbek) armies who sought similar free agency through desertion. Indeed, the Safavid argument is especially compelling in view of the Safavid Shah Abbas I’s (r. 1588-1629) attempts to displace the *Kızılbaş*, the Turkoman tribesmen who had brought the Safavids to power and formed the backbone of their armies. Likewise, the movement and upheavals among the Turkic and Mongol populations of Central Asia in the early seventeenth century would have made it more likely that members of these groups could have spun off into Ottoman service.⁸

Evlâd-i ‘Arab in the Chronicles

If, however, we evaluate Al-Hallâq’s passage in light of its position within the chronicle, we must take into account the implicit opposition between *evlâd-i ‘Arab* and *Rûm oğlanı*. For whenever the *evlâd-i ‘Arab* are mentioned, they appear to be contrasted, implicitly or explicitly, with *Rûm oğlanı*. In the passage cited above, Ali Bey, the governor of Jirja and ally of the famous Rıdvan Bey al-Faqārî, proposes replacing the *evlâd-i ‘Arab* with *Rûm oğlanı* *sekbans*, or mercenaries. From succeeding narrated events, however, it is clear that the expulsion of *evlâd-i ‘Arab* and their replacement with (*Rûmî*) *sekbans* constitute part of the triumph of Rıdvan and Ali Beys over their enemies, Qansuh and Memi (Mamay) Beys: while the latter employed *evlâd-i ‘Arab*, the former patronized *Rûmî sekbans*.⁹

Some ten folios and ten years later, al-Hallâq reports that during the governorate of Kapudan Mustafa Pasha (1066-7/1655-6), forty

Cairene and forty Damascene evlâd-i ‘Arab were expelled from the regiments and their salary rights sold (*‘evlâd-i ‘Arab kısmı kırk Mısırlı ve kırk Şamî bölüklerden çıkarıp, ‘ulûfelerini satdardılar*).¹⁰ This incident is presented simply as one of the events of Mustafa Pasha’s tenure. But in an anonymous chronicle evidently composed in the 1680s and bearing the title *Kitâb-i Tevârih-i Mısırî Kahire [Hattı Hasan Paşa]*, the episode unfolds in a much broader context:

1066 mâh-i Zilkâde zuhûr iden zorba-i Mustahfızândan Bayram nâm kimesne başbuğ ve kendüye bir alay adam uyarup, alet-i harbiye pur-silah dîvâne çıkup, ‘Elbet evlâd-i ‘Arab ‘ulûfeleri kat’, yerlerine yarâk adamlar tahrir olunsun’ (f. 67v).

In Zilkade 1066/August 1655, someone named Bayram from the rebels of the Mustahfizan (Janissaries) [proclaimed himself] commander, rallied a troop of men to himself, and went up to the governor’s council loaded with weapons of war. [He declared,] ‘The stipends of the evlâd-i ‘Arab absolutely must be cut off, and useful men appointed in their places.’

They managed to have the Janissary ağa deposed, after which:

Ve zümre-i evlâd-i ‘Arabın ‘ulûfeleri kat’ olunup, zümre-i zorbadan çok kimesne ‘ulûfe sahibi oldu. Ol gün Çavuşlar arzuhal idüp, ‘Aramızda olan evlâd ve Qutbi ve Şamî ve Halabî olanların ‘ulûfeleri ref’ oluna’ (f. 67v-68r).

And the gang of evlâd-i ‘Arab’s salaries were cut off, and many people from the gang of *zorbas* acquired salaries. That day, the Çavuş regiment sent a petition [saying], ‘The salaries of the evlâd and Copts and Damascenes and Aleppines among us should be suspended.’

Soldiers called *zorba* or some variation thereon appear in a number of chronicles of Egypt as troops from the imperial centre who wreak havoc in Cairo during the 1660s.¹¹

In several chronicles, as in the anonymous chronicle just cited, the chief patron of these zorbas is Mehmed Bey, the mamluk of Ali Bey who succeeded his patron as governor of Jirja on the latter’s death. Mehmed Bey went farther than his master in attempting to turn Jirja into a fiefdom of his own; consequently, the Ottoman governor of Egypt ordered an expedition against him, which defeated and killed him in 1659.¹² What seems to be occurring in these accounts, then, is an intense struggle for positions in the regiments, with their attendant salaries, between Anatolian and Balkan mercenaries, on the

one hand, and *evlâd-i 'Arab*, on the other. A parallel struggle is played out among the *grandees*, typically *beys*, who patronize these different groups of mercenaries. The identity of the *evlâd-i 'Arab* in the chronicles seems rather diffuse: in one passage, the term appears to encompass Persians and Özbeks; in another it seems to include Coptic Christians. In general, the term seems commonly to be associated with specific Arab provincial capitals. In all instances, the *evlâd-i 'Arab* stand in contradistinction to Anatolian and Balkan populations.

The expression *evlâd-i 'Arab* appears in as early a source as Mustafa Ali's famous 1599 *Description of Cairo*. Here, the opposition between this population and that of *Rûm* is only implicit, although the implication is unmistakable since Mustafa Ali constantly compares conditions in Cairo to those of *Rûm*, almost exclusively to the benefit of the latter. Discussing Egypt's military classes, he mentions a population of soldiers 'under the name *evlâd-i 'Arab* who have the ugliest features' (*evlâd-i 'Arab namında ki çirkân-i şamâ'il*).¹³ The wording implies that he is not completely sure what kind of people these are; he simply knows that they are called *evlâd-i 'Arab*. For bedouin tribes, in contrast, he typically employs the plural '*urbân*'.¹⁴ The singular '*Arab*', on the other hand, seems to refer to a sub-Saharan African.¹⁵ Notwithstanding, his wording implies that the *evlâd-i 'Arab* are highly localised: that is, they belong to the established Cairene population and thus qualify as *beledî*.¹⁶

Muhammad 'Abd al-Mu'ti al-Ishaqî, the Egyptian chronicler who composed his brief *Kitâb Akhbâr al-Uwal* in 1623, notes that Hasan Pasha al-Khâdim ('The Eunuch', 988-91/1580-2) 'confiscated [the wealth] of some of the *grandees* of Egypt from *evlâd-i 'Arab*'.¹⁷ His terse account, unfortunately, does not divulge the specific *grandees* to whom he refers; hence, there is no way to ascertain what the term might connote in this instance. The chronicler later mentions a military rebellion during the tenure of Uveys Pasha (995-9/1586-91) that resulted in the *evlâd-i 'Arab* being prohibited from joining the Ottoman soldiery or dressing as they did.¹⁸ Mustafa Ali may vaguely refer to this incident when he notes that 'if one of the notables of Cairo dresses his local servant as a *Rûmî*, they [the *cundis*, or soldiers] forbid him to do so.'¹⁹

'Arab vs. Rûm

The tension between *evlâd-i 'Arab* and *Rûm oğlanı* stems at least in part, of course, from the disparate meanings of '*Arab*' and *Rûm*. Before the nineteenth century, '*Arab*' was typically used to designate the nomadic bedouin or, more broadly, nomads in general, including those who might not be Arabic-speaking or ethnically Arab.²⁰ We

have already noted Mustafa Ali's tendency to use the word to designate a sub-Saharan African, which, indeed, seems to have been widespread among Turcophone Ottomans.²¹

Rūm, on the other hand, derives from 'Rome,' and in the pre-Ottoman period was more or less synonymous with 'Byzantine,' insofar as the Byzantine, or Eastern Roman, Empire was the eastern successor of the Roman Empire that had dominated the Mediterranean during the early centuries of the Common Era. Used more broadly, the word denoted those who spoke Greek and followed the Orthodox Christianity that became the Byzantine state religion following the Council of Chalcedon in 451 C.E.²² There is also a geographical connotation to Rūm in the pre-Ottoman period: it refers to Asia Minor, as opposed to the Greek 'heartland' of the Peloponnese, which usually goes by *Yunān* ('Ionia').²³ In the Ottoman era, however, the meaning of Rūm becomes somewhat more ambiguous. It can still mean 'Greek' in the broadest sense, yet its territorial meaning has shifted from Asia Minor as a whole to the central Ottoman territory, centred on Istanbul but also including the Ottoman Balkan territories that comprised Rūmelia. This is unquestionably the sense in which Mustafa Ali uses the word.²⁴ Likewise, the Ottomans are not infrequently termed Rūmīs by Arabophone and Turcophone chroniclers alike, and their sultan *sultān ar-Rūm*.²⁵

In contrasting 'Arab and Rūm, I would argue, Al-Hallāq is tapping into a dichotomy that is primarily geographical. Rūm denotes the western Ottoman territories: the Balkans and western Anatolia, including Istanbul. In contrast, the place names and ethnic groups associated in the above-cited passages with *evlād-i 'Arab* all refer to regions in the Asiatic provinces of the empire, as well as beyond the eastern borders of the empire, in Iran and Central Asia.

This difference between western, European populations in Ottoman service and eastern, Asiatic populations would have resonated in 1646, when the order was issued. As Metin Kunt has pointed out, the tension between 'eastern' and 'western' ethnic groups was particularly acute in the seventeenth century, above all between soldiery and palace functionaries of Balkan origin and those from the Caucasus Mountains, notably Circassians and Abkhazians.²⁶ There was, moreover, a reason for this tension in the seventeenth century that went beyond what modern-day news media like to call 'ancient ethnic hatreds'. Balkan and western Anatolian Christian populations had historically supplied the *devşirme*, the levy of village boys who were removed from their families, converted to Islam, and trained either as Janissaries or as palace pages. Even as the *devşirme* began to fall into disuse, the *kullar*—that is, the 'sultan's servants,' comprising Janissaries, palace soldiery, and palace functionaries—

were of overwhelmingly 'western' origin well into the seventeenth century. With the conquest of the Arab lands, however, and as a result of continuous warfare against the Safavids in Iran, an alternative source of manpower (and woman power) presented itself: the various peoples of the Caucasus and far eastern Anatolia, who had long been exploited by the Mamluk sultanate and who were beginning to dominate the Safavid armies and administration. Since almost all of these populations lived outside of the Ottoman domains, they had to be imported through the slave trade, although some offered themselves as mercenaries and others were captured in warfare, particularly warfare against the Safavids. Thus, these new populations represented what we might call a mamluk alternative to the *devşirme* recruits. It is important to note, however, that the system of recruitment was no great differentiator between the two pools of potential recruits. The only real difference between a mamluk and a *devşirme* recruit was that the former was imported from outside Ottoman territory while the latter was an Ottoman Christian subject. Otherwise, the personal status of the two types after recruitment was virtually identical; indeed, Ottoman chroniclers not infrequently refer to *devşirme* recruits as mamluks and to mamluks as *kuls*.²⁷ The term *kul*, in any case, applies to all of them.

The competition between these two pools of *kuls* taps into a deep-seated ambivalence, if not antagonism, between the Ottoman Empire's two principal sources of manpower at the far north-western and far north-eastern edges of the empire. The wars between the Ottoman Empire and the Mamluk sultanate in the late fifteenth century,²⁸ followed by Sultan Selim I's conquest of the Mamluk domains in 1516-7, provided the first opportunity for sustained contact between Balkan and Caucasian populations. It is fair to say that the Ottoman soldiers, mostly of Balkan and Anatolian origin, were predisposed to regard the Mamluk armies with disgust, if not contempt, owing to the tenor of Ottoman propaganda as reflected in *fettnames*, *Selimnames*, and early chronicles of Ottoman Egypt. In such works, the Mamluks are habitually labelled *Çerâkise-i nâkise* ('loathsome Circassians'); their sultans are derided as slaves and sons of slaves, in contrast to Selim, 'sultan, son of sultan, son of sultan'.²⁹

It is difficult today to imagine the shock of the initial encounter between the *Rûmî kullar* and the various Caucasian mamluks who began to enter Ottoman palace and provincial service in significant numbers during the seventeenth century. (Indeed, the Ottoman Empire itself provided a degree of unity among these disparate populations.) Although the homelands and, in some cases, religions of the Balkans and the Caucasus shared key features, the languages and customs of the two regions differed radically. While the Balkan

populations, with the key exception of the Bosnians, were overwhelmingly Christian and were organized in villages, the basic economic unit of which was the *çiftthane*, or family farm,³⁰ numerous Caucasian populations were still ‘pagan,’ or animist, and still functioned as tribes. Visitors to the Caucasus, not least the famous seventeenth-century Ottoman traveller Evliya Çelebi, give an impression of peoples who were still somewhat ‘wild’ and unpredictable. Thus, Evliya describes the Mingrelians and Abkhazians as ‘warlike’ and ‘riotous’ peoples who steal each other’s children for the slave trade.³¹ Although Evliya was himself Abkhazian on his mother’s side, his careful reproduction of samples of various Caucasian languages excites curiosity precisely because these languages are so very different from Ottoman Turkish or, indeed, from any language with which Ottoman subjects would have been familiar, including the languages of the Balkans.³²

To a remarkable extent, furthermore, the Caucasian populations retained their distinctiveness, never assimilating fully with the indigenous populations of the various Ottoman territories, for all that many of them would become the sultan’s servants. Through his own patron, Melek Ahmed Pasha, Evliya became acquainted with the Circassian and Abkhazian custom known as the *ataliqate*, whereby a young boy was sent away to be raised by ‘strangers’ so as to prevent his being raised a weakling by the women of the family household.³³ As an Abkhazian born in Ottoman territory, the young Melek Ahmed had been sent back to his ancestral homeland for such an upbringing. Referring to this custom in his description of the Mingrelian tribe of Kamiş, Evliya notes, ‘Among these people of Kamiş, the children of the Abaza are sent from Istanbul and Cairo.’³⁴ Given the scale on which mamluks were imported into the empire from the Caucasus, this arrangement must surely have resulted from some sort of agreement between the Ottoman administration and the people of the region in question.

Evlâd and Oğlan

Even if ‘Arab’ does not refer to Caucasian populations specifically, there is clearly a prevailing tension between the ‘eastern’ populations whom it does denote in Ottoman usage and the Rûm, or westerners. Why, then, do the chroniclers speak of Rûm oğlanı and evlâd-i ‘Arab? Why not simply Rûm and ‘Arab? Could this be simply a stylistic device? ‘Son of’ in many languages can be an intentionally degrading term. Even when used with the name of the legitimate father or mother, it can imply a diminution of stature relative to the parent.³⁵ In an Ottoman context, used with a generalized collective such as Rûm or ‘Arab, it calls to mind the rhetoric of the anti-

Mamluk fethnames: the laudatory ‘sultan, son of sultan’ versus the derogatory ‘slave, son of slave’. At the same time, the Arabic rendering *awlād al-‘Arab* is reminiscent of nothing so much as the designation *awlād al-nās* (literally, ‘sons of the people’) in the Mamluk sultanate. The *awlād al-nās* were the sons of mamluks who, according to the military culture observed by the Mamluk sultanate, were forbidden to join the sultanate’s armed forces.³⁶ Here, the extremely vague term *nās* (people) would seem to apply to the mamluks themselves rather than to the population of Egypt or Cairo at large. The phrase, then, serves to underline the contrasting statuses of the two generations although it also connotes the ‘localisation’ of the second generation: they are no longer literal outsiders but ‘of the people’.

By the same token, *evlād-i ‘Arab* and *Rūm oğlanı* could signify generational difference. Thus, the *evlād-i ‘Arab* may not necessarily be Arabs themselves but the children of Arabs, with all that this implies. If we take ‘Arab here to mean a nomadic or semi-nomadic population from the Asiatic provinces of the Ottoman Empire, or from the Empire’s Asiatic peripheries, then perhaps the implication is that of being only a generation removed from the ‘barbarous’ nomads, such as the wild Circassians who leap into the Ottoman ships—or, for that matter, the Arab bedouin. By this reasoning, *Rūm oğlanı* would perhaps imply a population only a generation removed from the Christians of the Balkans and Anatolia. Semantically, this construction makes a certain amount of sense, for it was the young *sons* of these established populations who would be uprooted from their birth cultures and transformed into the sultan’s soldiers—absorbed into state military service just as the sons of the Mamluks had been debarred from it.

Kul vs. Ümerâ’

A final consideration that is not immediately apparent has to do with political circumstances in the Ottoman Empire at the time at which this animus against the *evlād-i ‘Arab* manifested itself. It is no coincidence, I believe, that an order to expel the *evlād-i ‘Arab* from Egypt’s regiments was issued in the 1640s. At this point, the Empire was only twenty years past the regicide of Sultan Osman II (‘Genç Osman’), who in 1622 was murdered by Janissaries and palace *kullar* who feared his scheme of displacing the Janissaries with troops recruited from the Empire’s Asiatic provinces, while moving the capital to Asia.³⁷ The Genç Osman affair pointed up as never before the tension between the *kullar* of Balkan and western Anatolian origin, who dominated palace service, and the mercenaries, or *sekbans*, recruited from both European and Asian territory, who

served the governors of the Ottoman provinces. Genç Osman's murder proved a victory for the kullar, but it fuelled a rebellious streak among key provincial governors (*ümerâ*). Abaza Mehmed Pasha, the governor of Erzurum in northeastern Anatolia, marched toward Istanbul with an army of sekbans, intent, he claimed, on avenging Osman II's murder and carrying through his scheme of disempowering the kullar. His cause was evidently joined by the governor of the southeastern Anatolian province of Diyarbakır.³⁸ The fact that Mehmed Pasha himself was Abaza, or Abkhazian, is not insignificant in this context. Writ large, his rebellion can be read as the revolt of the Asiatic *evlâd-i 'Arab*, patronized by provincial *ümerâ*, against the hegemony of the Rûm oğlanı.

A similar scene would play out some three decades later, when Abaza Hasan Pasha, the governor of Aleppo, rebelled against the centralizing policies of the Albanian grand vizier Köprülü Mehmed Pasha in 1658-9. Intent on quelling the revolt at all costs, Köprülü sent Melek Ahmed Pasha, the patron of Evliya Çelebi, with a punitive expedition to Aleppo. However, he was sensitive to the ethno-regional tensions and reportedly asked Melek Ahmed if he were willing to undertake the command, given that the rebel was a fellow Abkhazian.³⁹

The central-provincial/east-west antagonism that informed the Genç Osman affair and its aftermath certainly contributed to the milieu within which the expulsions of *evlâd-i 'Arab* occurred. Nonetheless, the expulsions seem to have resulted not from a conflict of interests between (Rûmî) kullar and (Asiatic) sekbans but from competition between two conflicting ethnic pools of sekbans: Rûmîs and *evlâd-i 'Arab*. The Rûmî sekbans may well have included former kullar in their ranks since, as I have noted elsewhere, the boundary between Janissary and mercenary during this chaotic period was quite blurry.⁴⁰ I would tend to doubt, however, that the *evlâd-i 'Arab* included Caucasian mamluks. The term's usage in the various contexts that we have examined implies localised, even integrated, elements; indeed, as noted above, this is a key implication of *evlâd*. Hence, the expression is probably restricted to Asiatic sekbans of various kinds.

Conclusion

It appears from this discussion that the terms Rûm oğlanı and *evlâd-i 'Arab* were, perhaps deliberately, vague; they represented not so much specific ethno-geographic designations as broad ethno-geographic categories that could include different varieties of peoples. Their respective meanings derived in large part from the contrast between the two groups they represented: Rûm oğlanı were

‘western’, ‘European’, Balkan, Rūmelian, whereas *evlād-i ‘Arab* were ‘eastern’, Asiatic, of the Arab provinces. In most of the contexts in which we have observed it, moreover, *evlād-i ‘Arab* is, at least implicitly, a pejorative term implying inferiority to the contrasting Rūm oğlanı, even though the Rūm oğlanı are implicitly associated with rebels (*zorbalar*).

I would hesitate to assert that Rūm oğlanı and *evlād-i ‘Arab* are simply bywords for the Balkan-Caucasian divide pointed out by Metin Kunt or the kul-ümerâ’ antagonism examined by Gabriel Piterberg. The two phrases might encompass both these rivalries, but they seem broad and flexible enough to go well beyond the populations considered by the aforementioned two scholars. Furthermore, the generational element implied by oğlan and *evlād* seems significant, given Mustafa Ali’s references to ‘locals’ and the repeated associations in later chronicles with specific Arab provincial cities. *Evlād-i ‘Arab* may indeed be the offspring of nomadic tribal levies of various kinds, or mamluks or mercenaries of various Asiatic provenances, who settled in the large provincial cities, perhaps married local Arabophone (or Persophone or Turcophone) women, and passed their profession on to their sons. In this sense, *evlād-i ‘Arab* might have similar negative overtones to the expression ‘first generation off the farm’ in the modern United States: these are the children of bedouin or Turkic nomads, or Caucasian mamluks, or perhaps even long-established locals, settled in large cities with Ottoman garrisons and worming their way into these garrisons. In so doing, they have usurped the place of the children of the long-established Balkan and Anatolian peasant population, who have historically formed the backbone of the Ottoman armies.

In this context, a much later occurrence of the expression is notable: in the infamous 1711 incident in which a ‘Rūmî’ mosque preacher (*vâ‘iz*) incited a band of Ottoman soldiers to attack Cairo’s sufis, the soldiers insult the Cairene ulema by calling them *evlād-i ‘Arab*—perhaps an evolution of the term to refer to descendants of Asiatic nomads or, more specifically, bedouin, regardless of profession. The soldiers themselves, however, are not labelled Rūmî but are instead condemned by the chronicler, Ahmed Çelebi, as *min jins al-atrāk alladīna lam yafriqū bayna mīm wa-nūn* (‘of the race of Turks who did not distinguish between *mīm* and *nūn*’), an allusion to the sexual dissoluteness of Anatolian ‘hillbillies’.⁴¹

Rapid demographic change of the sort that the entire Ottoman Empire experienced in the early seventeenth century, with its accompanying conflicts of interest, cannot help but breed negative stereotypes and derogatory labels. The challenge to historians is to interpret these labels in the context of the times in which they were invented and used, rather than anachronistically assigning modern

nationalist meanings to them. Although it remains unclear just who the *evlād-i ‘Arab* were—and perhaps that was part of the point of this vague label—it is clear that they were *not* simply Arabs.

Notes

¹ The current version of the paper benefits from the comments of participants in the conference ‘Chronicle’s Text, Rebel’s Voice,’ University of Leiden, Leiden, Netherlands, January 2002.

² Michael Winter, *Egyptian Society under Ottoman Rule, 1517-1798* (London and New York, 1992), 55; see also 54, 56.

³ Mehmed b. Yusuf Al-Hallāq, *Tarih-i Mısır-ı Kâhire*, Istanbul University Library, T.Y. 628.

⁴ I am grateful to Erik Jan Zürcher for this insight.

⁵ Encyclopaedia of Islam, 2nd ed., s.v. ‘Adjami Oghlān’ (Harold Bowen).

⁶ Svat Soucek, *A History of Inner Asia* (Cambridge, 2000), 31-4, 186-7.

⁷ Jane Hathaway, *The Politics of Households in Ottoman Egypt: The Rise of the Qazdağlıs* (Cambridge, 1997), 55 and n. 13; 57 and n. 22; 58; 63 and n. 44.

⁸ For an example of desertion from the Ottoman to the Safavid army (if not vice versa), see Ahmed Kâhya ‘Azaban al-Damürdāshī, *Al-Durra al-musāna fī akhbār al-Kināna*, British Library, MS Or. 1073-1074, 56-7. On Shah Abbas, see Iskandar Munshī, *The History of Shah ‘Abbas the Great*, trans. Roger M. Savory, 3 vols. (Boulder, CO, 1978). On the Shaybanids, see Soucek, *History of Inner Asia*, 149-66, 177-87.

⁹ Al-Hallāq, *Tarih-i Mısır-ı Kâhire*, f. 150v-153v; see also anonymous, *Kitab-i Tarih-i Mısır-ı Kâhire* [*Hattī Hasan Pasha*] (to 1094/1683), Süleymaniye Library, MS Hacı Mahmud Efendi 4877, f. 57v-59r.

¹⁰ Al-Hallāq, *Tarih-i Mısır-ı Kâhire*, f. 158v.

¹¹ Anonymous, *Akbbār al-nuwwab min dawlat Āl ‘Uthmān min bin istawla ‘alayhā al-sultān Salīm Khān*, Topkapı Palace Library, MS Hazine 1623, f. 29v ff.; Ahmed Çelebi b. ‘Abd al-Ghani, *Avdab al-isharāt fī man tavalla Mısır al-Qāhira min al-wuzarā’ wa’l-bashāt*, ed. A.A. ‘Abd al-Rahīm (Cairo, 1978), 162; ‘Abdülkerim b. ‘Abdurrahman, *Tarih-i Mısır*, Süleymaniye Library, MS Hekimoğlu Ali Pasha 705, f. 80v-84v; Al-Hallāq, *Tarih-i Mısır-ı Kâhire*, f. 139-44 (where no label is applied to the soldiers). See also Hathaway, *Politics of Households*, 62 and n. 42.

¹² Al-Hallāq, *Tarih-i Mısır-ı Kâhire*, f. 160v ff.

¹³ Mustafa Ali, *Hālāt al-Qāhira min al-‘adāt al-ḡāhira*, Süleymaniye Library, MS Fatih 5427/14, f. 47r; MS Esad Efendi 2407, f. 14r. See also Andreas Tietze, ed. and trans., *Mustafa Ali’s Description of Cairo of 1599* (Vienna, 1975), 40 and Plate XXIV (MS Hacı Selim 757, f. 61r).

¹⁴ For example, Tietze, ed., *Mustafa Ali’s Description*, Plate XLVI (MS Hacı Selim, f. 72r).

¹⁵ Ibid. Plates XXVIII, XXXII (MS Hacı Selim, f. 63r, 65r). Furthermore, the black eunuch Kafūr, who ruled Egypt at the end of the Ikshidid dynasty, is described as an ‘Arab’. MS Fatih 5427/14, f. 58r.

¹⁶ MS Fatih 5427/14, fos. 54r (*evlād-i ‘Arab’dan bir beledi piyāde hidmetkār*: ‘a local footsoldier-servant from the *evlād-i ‘Arab*’); Tietze, ed., *Mustafa Ali’s Description of Cairo*, Plate XLIII (MS Hacı Selim, f. 70v).

¹⁷ Muhammad ‘Abd al-Muṭī al-Ishāqī, *Kitab Akbbār al-umal fī man tasarrafa fī Mısır*

min arbāb al-duwal (Bulaq, 1304/1887), 156: ‘*musādarāt li-bāʿi akābir Misr min awlād al-ʿArab.*’

¹⁸ Ibid. 157.

¹⁹ Tietze, ed., *Mustafa Ali's Description of Cairo*, Plate XLIII (MS Hacı Selim, f. 70v): ‘*ʿAḡyān-i Mısır dan biri beledī olan hīdmetkārīne Rūmī libās giydirse, mānī olur.*’

²⁰ Reinhart Dozy, *Supplément aux dictionnaires arabes*, 2 vols. (Leiden, 1927).

²¹ This meaning, or the more general ‘Negro,’ is also adduced in Sir James W. Redhouse, ed., *A Turkish and English Lexicon*, 7th ed. (Istanbul, 1978), 1292.

²² See, for example, ‘Abdallāh Muhammad b. Ibrāhīm b. Battūta, *Rihla Ibn Battūta*, intro. by Karam al-Bustānī (Beirut, 1964), 290, 356; see also 344-5, where he refers to Turks and Rūmī Christians in the same locale.

²³ For example, *ibid.* 283.

²⁴ See, for example, Tietze, ed., *Mustafa Ali's Description of Cairo*, 32, 35, 36, 39-44, 46, 47, 49, 54, 57.

²⁵ See, for example, *Sübeylī Efendi, Tevārih-i Mısır-ı [sic] ül-Kadīm*, Süleymaniye Library, MS Fatih 4229, f. 92v. For an intriguing discussion of the evolution of the term among Portuguese warriors and statesmen in the sixteenth century, see Salih Özbaran, ‘Ottomans as “Rūmes” in Portuguese Sources in the Sixteenth Century’, *Portuguese Studies* 17 (2001): 64-74.

²⁶ İbrahim Metin Kunt, ‘Ethnic-Regional (Cins) Solidarity in the Seventeenth-Century Ottoman Establishment’, *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 5 (1974): 233-9, esp. 237-8.

²⁷ See, for example, Al-Hallāq, *Tarih-i Mısır-ı Kahire*, f. 158v.

²⁸ Carl Petry, *Twilight of Majesty: The Reigns of the Mamluk Sultans al-Asraf Qaytbay and Qansub al-Ghawri in Egypt* (Seattle, 1993), 88-103.

²⁹ For example, Keşfi Mehmed Çelebi, *Selimname*, Süleymaniye Library, MS Esad Efendi 2147, f. 69r, 78v; Ridvan Paşazade, *Tarih-i Mısır*, Süleymaniye Library, MS Fatih 4362, f. 128v; see also f. 94r, 134r, which implicitly contrast the Mamluk sultan Barquq’s (1382-1399) slave status with the lengthy genealogy of the Ottoman dynasty.

³⁰ Halil İnalçık, Part 1 of İnalçık, with Donald Quataert, ed., *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire* (Cambridge, 1994), chapter 6.

³¹ Evliya Çelebi, *Evliya Çelebi Seyahatnamesi*, ed. Ahmed Cevdet, vol. II (Istanbul, 1314 A.H.), 98, 102-9. See also Jean de Chardin (1643-1713), *The Travels of Sir John Chardin into Persia and the East Indies...*, published simultaneously in French and English, Early English Books, 1641-1700 (London, 1691), vol. I, 76-8.

³² Evliya Çelebi, *Seyahatname*, vol. II, 109-10.

³³ EI², s.v. ‘Çerkes’ (Charles Quelquejay); s.v. ‘Çerkes: Ottoman Period’ (Halil İnalçık); George Leighton Ditson, *Circassia, or a Tour to the Caucasus* (New York and London, 1850), 416.

³⁴ Evliya Çelebi, *Seyahatname*, vol. II, 104.

³⁵ Even in the Book of Isaiah in the Hebrew Bible, King Pekah of Israel is referred to as ‘son of Remaliah’ so as rhetorically to diminish his stature (Isaiah 7:4; see also 1 Samuel 10:11).

³⁶ David Ayalon, ‘Studies on the Structure of the Mamluk Army’, Part 2, reprinted in *Studies on the Mamluks of Egypt (1250-1517)* (London, 1977).

³⁷ Gabriel Piterberg, ‘The Alleged Rebellion of Abaza Mehmed Pasha: Historiography and the Ottoman State in the Seventeenth Century’, in Jane Hathaway, ed. *Mutiny and Rebellion in the Ottoman Empire* (Madison, WI, 2002), 14-15.

³⁸ Ibid. 18-9; Baki Tezcan, ‘The 1622 Military Rebellion in Istanbul: A Historiographical Journey’, in Hathaway, ed., *Mutiny and Rebellion in the Ottoman*

Empire, 33.

³⁹ Kunt, 'Ethnic-Regional (Cins) Solidarity', 239; P.M. Holt, *Egypt and the Fertile Crescent: A Political History, 1516-1922* (Ithaca and London, 1966), 105.

⁴⁰ Hathaway, *Politics of Households*, 62.

⁴¹ The expression refers to homoeroticism and/or bestiality. I owe this interpretation to Dr. Jan Schmidt of the University of Leiden Library. For the incident, see Al-Hallāq, *Tārīh-i Mısr-ı Kabīre*, f. 296r-301r; Ahmed Çelebi, Awdah, 251-5. See also Barbara Flemming, 'Die Vorwahhabitische Fitna im osmanischen Kairo, 1711', in *İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı'ya Armağan* (Ankara, 1976); Rudolph Peters, 'The Battered Dervishes of Bāb Zuwayla: A Religious Riot in Eighteenth-Century Cairo', in Nehemia Levtzion and John O. Voll, eds., *Eighteenth-Century Renewal and Reform in Islam* (Syracuse, 1987).

The Young Turks and the Arab Press

Caesar E. Farah

This paper deals with the remarkable transformation of attitudes in the post-Hamidian era towards the press in general, and the Arabic in particular.¹ Up until the revolution by the Young Turks, Abdülhamid (1876-1909) pursued a policy of watchful patience interfering only when he found it in the interest of the Ottoman state to stop publications injurious to his policy of combating foreign encroachments, which the Arab press in general still deemed an act of tyranny on his part. His official censors (*mektupçus*) kept him informed on the seditious writings of authors influenced by the negativism current in the Western press whose mission it was to counter what they termed a potential showdown with a potentially insurgent Islam.

Ottoman newspaper editors found succour in the French liberal writers who had inherited a campaign against the tyranny of rule from their revolution, in which now liberal Ottoman authors found a good model to emulate. They joined the eastern chorus in denouncing what they termed the tyranny of their ruler. They spoke out in all ardour for a reform of their state of affairs, demanding first and foremost the freedom to express their opinions, regardless of the consequences for their society, by further inviting and encouraging diatribes of the Western press against Islam and its values.

Ottoman reformers dubbed such diatribes liberal, echoing them as if they had received the blessing of their Western supporters to criticize their own society, their Sultan ruler, and the elements within it which they alluded to as reactionaries, thus simplifying the struggle as one between traditional Islamic reaction and European notions of liberalism, guided by unbridled freedom of expression and all the criticism they could muster with but a superficial knowledge of what freedom to speak out entailed. Some writers were mere opportunists, believing that the Sultan would buy their silence by grants of money or appointments. They anticipated rewards in lieu of earned punishment for preaching treason and sedition.

Within a year after the Young Turks assumed the reins of government, they launched a vicious campaign against the Ottoman and Arab press for daring to criticize their own policies, which had quickly convinced the public that it was based on self-service and personal gain. Arab Muslims soon saw through the acts of betrayal on the part of Young Turk leaders who, by the way, were not of Turkic or Arab background, being Jewish, Bulgarian, Armenian and of other minorities who had enlisted Arab support only to betray their cause at the earliest opportunity, thus driving them to turn against the new régime and revolt against it, contributing to its demise in World War I.

Battling the Hostile Press Prior to 1909

As the press in the Arab provinces, especially in Egypt, shifted into high gear to denounce the alleged tyranny of the Ottoman censor (mektupçu) who managed to censor the articles being written up in the Arabic newspapers when they increased publication in the 1870s,² the Sultan's agent sought to curb their negativism either by bribery or by shutting down their publications for a period of time and fining the publishers. Reports from Washington by Ali Ferruh Bey, the Ottoman ambassador, spoke of his having to resort to the court system three times to put an end to the vicious attacks launched by one paper whose owner was imprisoned in the end for treason and the preaching of sedition. The American courts ruled in favour of the Ottoman government, and the paper was abolished. The name of both the paper and its editor was not given in the report to Istanbul.³ Another detailed report to Tahsin, the Sultan's first secretary, accused Ibrâhîm Nu'mân Ma'lûf of Zahlé of emulating his father in insulting the Sultan. He sought permission to prevent the dissemination of his publication *al-Ayyâm*, which he did not believe was difficult to do since both had little money to continue publishing.⁴

A draft report to the grand vizier's *müşavırhık* accuses the Syrian Khalîl Ayyûb of the Ottoman translation bureau of being involved in a sedition in Syria/Lebanon aimed at gaining independence for the country as Egypt had. He had been exiled from Syria, but now was permitted to return there to settle his own affairs. The grand vizier instructed the *vali* of the province to keep a close eye on Khalîl, who had denied there was any truth to the rumours spread by the foreign press that Syrians wanted to be attached to Egypt. The report stated that most Syrians were Muslims and were loyal to the caliphate. What they wanted were *tamyiz* (cassation) courts to hear the backlog of complaints. In Damascus, there was only one court per ten

thousand inhabitants. People were arrested and held without the benefit of a hearing.

The other problem of which they complained was the lack of knowledge of Arabic by the authorities, which meant hearings had to be translated. This accounted for additional delays. Orders to conduct secret inquiries, leading to detention and interrogation only led to creating a negative image of the state, and contributed to arousing unnecessary discontent. Such a situation applied in most cases to journalists and their newspapers.⁵

Most of the hostile press operated out of European capitals prompting the Sultan to dispatch his own men to track them down and report on their editors and supporters. Dissident members of the Ottoman government had already fled to conduct their agitation against the government abroad, where censorship did not apply. Mahmud Pasha (brother-in-law of the Sultan), Ahmed Cevdet (Ottoman author), and the Young Turk group supporting them were shuttling back and forth between Brussels, Paris and London. Abu al-Diyā' (Ziya) Tevfik, who was dispatched to keep an eye on them, complained of the expenses involved, asking for an increased allocation from the Sultan. The hostile newspaper *Istiqbāl* was printed in Naples and attracted much Ottoman attention for its vicious attacks on the Sultan.⁶

Mehmed Ali Bey was appointed to the bureau of 'Référéndaires' of the Imperial Council of the Sultan on 7 October 1890 after having served with distinction as the mektupçu of the grand vizier and whom the Sultan held in high esteem. Munir Bey, a mektupçu of the Ottoman Foreign Ministry and director of the bureau of the Press returned from Paris by the Orient Express on October 8 1890 where he had undergone a similar mission of checking up on the activities and writings in the European press of Ottoman dissidents.⁷

Another report from the Ottoman embassy in Paris claimed that the newspaper *Tan* was inflaming both Muslims and non-Muslims and agitating against the imperial government. The Ottoman Foreign Ministry submitted a copy of the inflammatory article submitted to the Sultan seeking his response.⁸

So determined was the Sultan in banning hostile foreign journals from entry that on 22 February 1902 he ordered the Foreign Ministry to issue such an order to the embassy in Vienna, which it did by telegram two days later, relaying instructions of the Sultan to notify foreign embassies to enforce the ban.⁹

The Ottoman Foreign Ministry was on the alert for publications prepared in an Ottoman province and sent to a European capital to be shipped into Ottoman lands. On 11 June 1902 the embassy dispatched the translation of an article appearing in the newspaper *Khilafat*.¹⁰ The Foreign Ministry's copy came from Basra and

instructions went out to notify the Ottoman Commission in Cairo to take all necessary steps to prevent the dispatch of this newspaper by British mail. Foreign Minister Tevfik issued orders to the embassy to lodge a formal complaint with the British Foreign Ministry and demand that it prevent the distribution of the newspaper through its mail. It could not prevent its being published in London but it could prevent it from reaching Ottoman provinces to corrupt the thinking of Muslims. Meanwhile the death penalty was issued against Hindiyah, who was a resident of London at the time. An imperial *ferman* was issued on 24 Safer 1320/4 May 1902 to prevent the publication from being disseminated.¹¹

The Young Turks and the Arab Press

Abdülhamid had managed to appease and neutralize the attacks of the press and editors with hopes he would buy their silence if not reverse their attitudes towards him, but the same could not be said of the Young Turks, who earned the enmity of the Arabs from the outset with their narrow policies based on Turkism rather than Ottomanism as advocated by the majority of subjects, who were Arab and Muslim at the time of the revolution against the Sultan. In an article appearing in *al-Muqtabas*, a leading newspaper published by Muhammad Kurd 'Ali in Damascus, the editor replies to a political correspondence article appearing in Vienna stating that eighty four Arab delegates (actually sixty) of the Chamber of Deputies would not accept being called 'Turk'.

Speaking on behalf of the Arab Society formed in Istanbul, the deputies wanted the Ottoman sultan to be called 'Emperor of the East' and demanded the appointment of two Arab ministers on grounds that Muslim Arabs constitute the majority of citizens and were more numerous than their Turkish counterparts. The article stated that the Arab deputies would not participate in the meetings of the Society of Union and Progress (CUP) because they wished to pursue an independent course that would attract more Arabs to their ranks. The Turkish newspaper *Sabah*, organ of the CUP, denounced *al-Muqtabas*, accusing it of seeking to drive a wedge between Arab and Turk and create a rift. It emphasized the common interest of both elements in resisting tyranny and denounced the handful of pro-British Arabs in Egypt, home of the Arab press, who called for an Arab caliphate, as harmful to the common heritage of both Arab and Turk. The *Muqtabas* reminded *Sabah* that in Syria there is no adherence to the idea of an Arab caliphate and pointed out that the Syrians were first to volunteer for Ottoman military service. It defended the Society for Arab-Ottoman Brotherhood of Istanbul as an organization with no political aims, dedicated only to safeguarding

the constitution and to spreading education and commerce among Arabs. False rumours reaching the European press were allegedly misrepresenting the common objective of Arab and Turk.¹²

Disenchantment with the CUP's agenda induced opponents led by Prince Sabahuddin to call for decentralization, or granting the provinces more say over their own affairs. The grand vizier Kamil Pasha was reportedly of the old school. He believed in absolutism and was not capable of following the new trend as the editor of *al-Muqtabas* proclaimed in the article 'Our Ahrār (Freedom Party) and Our Constitution'.¹³ In a separate article entitled 'The Arab Question', the editor claims that those of our leaders who call for separatism must realize that the day this happens 'we are doomed', as no nation divided survives. All Ottomans are one (entity).

The paper alleged that a few years earlier two representatives from France came to the Emir of Nejd, Ibn Sa'ūd, promising him money if he would help invade Syria and take over. His reply: 'it would be an easy matter for my men, but then what guarantee would I have that some foreign power would not step in. There are too many foreign ambitious [powers] against us. We cannot divide!'¹⁴

The paper strongly criticized dissidents writing abroad for sowing dissension in Ottoman ranks. Under the title 'What are these corrupt trends, or our response to the sons of al-Mutrān?' In Cairo, Rafiq al-'Azūm attacked the founders of the 'Syrian Unity Society' in Paris, which was attributed to Nakhlah Pasha al-Mutrān and Rashīd Beg al-Mutrān for preaching Syrian independence when in his view Ottoman unity was the only source of strength and survival.¹⁵

The Arab Caliphate and its Critics

The British-inspired preaching for an Arab caliphate was essentially a political manoeuvre designed to split the Arabs from the Young Turks and to fan their hostility towards them. The subject occupied much space in the Arab press as the call for such a caliphate struck a responsive cord among those who became convinced that the party they had supported into power in the hope of undoing what they termed the tyranny of the previous régime turned out more tyrannical than its predecessor. This was particularly evident in the Arab press of the United States. Under the title 'The Arab Caliphate and the Reactionary Party or a Treatise on the Independence of Syria', Yūsuf Jirjis Żakhm wrote that there were 100,000 Syrians in the United States who were divided over the question into three groups. The first consisted of followers of Nakhlah and his compatriots from Ba'albak, with two newspapers: *Mir'āt al-Gharb* (Mirror of the West) and *al-Huda* (The Guidance) serving as their organ. The *Mirror* publicizes Nakhlah's ideas among simpletons

urging their support of the Freedom Party (*Abrār*)¹⁶ when it is known that he had been the most notorious of government spies. *Al-Huda* defends him and his position while claiming to be non-political. Owners of both newspapers advocate the return of the caliphate to its rightful owners, the Arabs.

The second group, adherents of the Syrian Unity Society, also founded by Nakhlah a few months after he came to the United States, had 120 members, mostly in New York, led by Dr. Rizk Efendi Haddad. The third group consisted of the rest of the Syrians, all excited over Nakhlah and his preaching, including al-Jāmi‘ah,¹⁷ which allegedly supported Nakhlah’s personal aims. On the other hand the newspaper *al-Dalil* (The Guide) attacked ‘this pasha’ and demanded that he repent his sins and foul deeds, and his association with other reactionaries who came to America like ‘Izzet al-‘Ābid, Abu‘l-Huda al-Sayyādi (both of Syrian origin and key members of the deposed sultan’s personal entourage and advisers), who came to America after the revolution (1909) to deceive Syrians claiming they were among the leading opponents of tyranny.¹⁸ Exposed by *al-Jāmi‘ah*, Nakhlah goes to Paris to continue his foul work’ hoping to gain the attention of the Committee of Union and Progress and a position in their government; but he is rejected; so he turns to preaching an Arab caliphate and Syrian independence through the Society of Syrian Unity. ‘Izzet allegedly came secretly to Paris to consult with Nakhlah, proof that the reactionary party works for the overthrow of a free state supported by 100,000 Syrian Christians in America. None of these emigrants have the right to preach an Arab caliphate, which right belongs to Muslims only.¹⁹

Criminal Behaviour of the CUP Towards the Arab-Islamic Press

Shortly after the deposition of Sultan Abdülhamid II, those who opposed the arbitrary and repressive methods of the CUP launched the Muhammadiyah movement in order to preserve the primacy of the *shari‘ah*. This soon led to strong demonstrations against the new régime and its organizers who were mostly converts from Jewish backgrounds. The CUP launched concerted efforts throughout the Arab provinces to extirpate members of the Muhammadiyah who quickly came to number over 30,000. Within a month following their assumption of power, the Young Turks ordered the arrest of its leaders and its members in Damascus, confining them to prison both in the citadel of the city and in the government centre.²⁰

Judging from the daily arrests, trial, and execution of army officers high and low throughout the country for allegedly rising against the CUP-led coup, their counter-coup would have failed in 1909 were it

not for the bold initiative of Mahmud Şevket and the rapid deployment of the Macedonia-based army in the capital. The Sultan had far greater army support there and in the ranks. He could have chosen to put down Mahmud's army, but as Abdülhamid wrote later, he did not want to shed the blood of his 'children', contrary to what CUP propaganda would have us believe. It is ironical how viciously *al-Muqtabas* attacked the Sultan in support of the CUP only to find itself under fire when its leaders got the upper hand and ignored the support of its editor, whom they arrested on shallow pretexts, and suspended his paper, relying on the testimony rumourmongers, unascertained facts, and granting no benefit of the doubt to those who had ardently supported them to power.

Another report in *al-Muqtabas* of 21 June 1909 stated that Murad Beg, the owner of the newspaper *Miẓan* was transferred from the Ministry of War to the prison for officers in the capital, then condemned to life imprisonment, and later exiled to Rhodes. He was accused of spending allegedly millions in gold to entice the army to rise and demand rule by the shari'ah; and that had he succeeded, members of the Freedom party and the constitutionalists would have been slaughtered in a bloodbath worse than that of the French Revolution.²¹ The physician Hussein Remzi, owner of the newspaper *Miqyās* was condemned to six years in prison.

The martial court condemned al-Hajj 'Ākif to life imprisonment for distributing harmful papers among the 'rebellious' troops and inciting them to defend the shari'ah. Other newspapers accused of supporting restoration of the Shari'ah, closed down and their editors/owners arrested included *Volkan*, the main organ of the Muhammadan Society, *Izmir*, *Serbesti* and the *Independent*. The *Muqtabas* claimed it was their journalistic duty to demand investigation of the ill intentions of the Muhammadan Society in Syria and its close ties to Nazım Pasha, the vali, especially when the list of members was burned after it was abolished from the capital. Citing an article in the English *Daily Telegraph* under the title 'Beginning of the Republic's Pains', it registered abhorrence at the assertion of the editor that western authors who claim that the Ottoman state should return to basic Islamic principles, which are democratic in conception and freedom-promoting, in order to acquire a guiding ideology. The newspaper quoted Le Chatelier, a Professor of Islamic Studies at the Collège de France and a critic of pan-Islam, who alleged that the new order has exchanged one dictator (Abdülhamid) for two hundred (Chamber of Deputies), each pulling in a different direction.²²

The hunt was on in Syria. Some 400 members of the Society were arrested and the CUP government was after another 1,000 individuals who had scattered. The paper compared Mahmud Şevket

to Napoleon and claimed that he deserved the Nobel prize. Muhammad Kurd 'Ali, owner and publisher of *al-Muqtabas*, wrote that the greatest evil inflicted on the empire was to permit the exercise of religious and political authority to men of religion—Muslim, Jewish and Christian.²³ It appears he bore a special hatred for 'Izzet Pasha al-*Ābid*, a fellow Damascene who had served as the second secretary and confidant of the late sultan, whom members of the Freedom Party considered the chief architect of Abdülhamid's tyrannical rule. They tended to refer to him as the 'Second Sultan' on account of his loyal services and main liaison with the Arabs. They alleged that 'Izzet flattered Abdülhamid and induced him to enforce policies that were harmful to the opposition by claiming that Muslims knew no other leader than him. The end result was that the nation awakened to his false policy of agitating Muslims and giving rise to the Muhammadan Society as the organ of reaction aimed at uniting subjects on the basis of their common religion, or Islam, thus ending his reign on 14 April 1909.²⁴

The paper delighted in reporting that 'Izzet's property in the capital was seized, including his own residence, which was leased out to Halil Pasha Hamādah, Minister of Awqāf. Reporting on the basis of what was published in the newspaper *Ittihad* in Istanbul, Kurd 'Ali wrote that the martial court retrieved the medals from forty-three 'spies of the Hamidian era' and ordered their arrest; two of whom were relatives of Abu 'l-Huda.²⁵ Three days later the paper reported that orders were issued not to employ muftis, judges and heads of the *Ashraf* (descendants of the Prophet) in any of the councils of administration.²⁶

An uproar was raised in the Egyptian press when the appeals court condemned Shaykh 'Abd al-*Āziz Jāwīsh*, chief editor of the Islamic newspaper *al-Liwa'* to three months of imprisonment for his attack on the prime minister. The press speculated that the recently enacted law by the Chamber of Deputies against insulting or casting aspersion on members of government might not have influenced the decision of courts in Egypt.²⁷

Yet in spite of the loyal support by *al-Muqtabas* for the new government, it was to fall into disgrace within months, and one has to question whether its publishing an open letter addressed to the Chamber of Deputies by 'Abdallah Mukhlis of Haifa calling attention to the opening up of Palestine to Jewish immigration following the CUP's taking over the reins of government was a principal factor. The new finance minister Hussein Javid, a Jew, had been encouraging stepped-up Jewish immigration to Palestine while Arab deputies were oblivious to its danger. Jewish purchases at inflated prices of land and businesses in Palestine, hiring only Jews, buying only from Jews even if it meant traveling for miles to do so, all were

deemed reasons for alert. As Mukhlis naively wrote ‘we do not fear Palestine becoming Israel, that is impossible, but our government seems to be indifferent while as finance minister Javid tacitly encourages this trend. They could not have done so under the previous régime (Abdülhamid’s).’²⁸

Downgrading the role of religion constituted another cause of complaint, especially by Ibrāhīm Mashāqah who defended the programme of religious instruction in the American College of Beirut, which in keeping with the provisions of its statutes for forty years had offered such instruction according to the Evangelical Church’s teaching. He rejected the complaints of students, declaring in his written retort ‘let Muslims and Jews each have their own college.’²⁹

The rift with the CUP was growing noticeably in the next years. The Syrian newspaper *Barada* attacked its leaders—Javid, Talaat and Hakk—accusing them of selling Tripolitania to the Italians who for over thirty years had been manoeuvring to take possession of it. The paper also took them to task for manipulating elections in Baghdad to ensure the election of their candidate and threatening those who did not vote for him.³⁰

The vali of Basra reported to the Interior Ministry the need to bar the publication and dissemination of the pamphlets and other tracts of the National Reform Society, which were deemed harmful to the state. The Naqīb Sayyid Jālib Beg was distributing *al-Muqtabas* in Basra, which he claimed was seeking to incite the public against the state because it alleged CUP policies only encouraged more foreign encroachments.

The governor demanded that *al-Muqtabas* must cease publication in keeping with article 23 of the Law of Publications, and its editor tried for sedition.³¹ The *beyannamé* of the Society was delivered to the vali of Basra by the chief of the Banu Sālim tribe, Sālim al-Khayyūn, and another copy by the chief of the Muntafiqah tribe, Mansūr al-‘Ajami. It was reproduced in part in *al-Dustūr*. The vali ordered the immediate translation of the Arabic original of sixteen pages, which had apparently come from *al-Muqtabas* into Ottoman.³² In his response of 14 Zilhicce 1331/14 November 1913 the Minister of Justice ordered suspension of the newspaper and ordered its publisher imprisoned for one month.³³ The *mutasarrif* of ‘Amārah dispatched an enciphered report to the Interior asking permission to suspend *al-Dustūr* which had published the suspension of *al-Muqtabas* and the imprisonment of its publisher.³⁴

The counsellor of the grand vizier reported to the Interior Ministry disturbing news out of Egypt, namely that Rafiq al-‘Azam of Damascene origin had published an article in the Islamic newspaper *al-Mu’ayyad* calling on Syrians not to be duped by the government’s

appointing a commission to look into reforms for Syria stating 'how can we trust these people who have given so many concessions to foreigners in order to raise money for promoting their own aims!'³⁵ The minister of interior Talaat dispatched a telegram to the vali ordering him to ban the issue of 17 February 1328/2 March 1912 of *al-Mu'ayyad* from entering Syria.³⁶ The grand vizier had issued instructions to all *vilayets* and subdivisions on 31 August 1325/13 September 1910 following the recommendations of valis and mutasarrifs to ban the dissemination of the newspapers *al-Mu'ayyad*³⁷ and *Nahdat al-'Arab* for their anti-government policies, also issues of *al-Muqattam*—all published in Egypt. Notification of the ban went out to Hijaz, Yemen, Tripolitania, Ben Ghazi, and 'Asir *mutasarrifliks* and the *muhafaza* of Medina as well.

An enciphered telegram from vali Refik of Aleppo to the Ministry of the Interior of 23 October 1911 recommended closing down *al-Taqaddum* (Progress) of Aleppo for its reporting Ottoman military reversals, deaths and loss of military equipment and other unpleasant military matters with the aim of stirring up upheavals. He also recommended remanding to trial its publisher, as well as the publisher of *al-Muqtabas*, whose agitation he claimed, was harmful to the people and the state. The minister, however noted on the back of the report that closing the paper was illegal and that any decision to try must be awaited.³⁸ The administration of the martial court recommended to the Interior Ministry closing down the journal *Tasvir-i Efkar*, known also as *Tafsir-i Efkar*, and *Tabbij-i Efkar* for its 'disturbing minds', as well as banning Abu 'l-Diyā's press and closing down his establishment. The order was signed by the first army's commander-in-chief's deputy and the *muhafiz* of Istanbul on 31 December 1328/10 January 1910. Talaat responded on the same date saying that the basic law does not permit the administration to interfere in such a matter.³⁹

One paper that escaped the axe of the censure was *al-Ra'y al-'Amm* (Public Opinion) of Taha Mudawwar Efendi. It had offended the French consulate general by its language. The French demanded a retraction but vali Nureddin rejected the French demand, and so informed minister of the interior Talaat, claiming that no offence had taken place; indeed, he praised Mudawwar for his loyal support of the régime.⁴⁰ To deflect from criticism of the press, Ghālib, the governor of Syria, sent an enciphered dispatch⁴¹ urging emendation of the law on publication given the sensitive situation in Syria and the importance of the province in order to be more flexible if the situation decrees it, and the opposite if the situation should demand it.⁴² According to the reply received, the current session of the Chamber of Deputies did not allow for emendation of the law on publications. It only permitted that reporting in newspapers of

conspiracies and devious entries harmful to the state should be in clear language.⁴³

Silencing the press's criticism of the Young Turk régime did not succeed, and it soon became obvious more stringent counter-measures were in order. This was particularly obvious when talks of an Arab caliphate increased in the Arab press. The publisher of *Barada* overstepped his boundaries when he published the article 'Tyranny against Freedom' severely attacking the Young Turk government. The vali of Syria recommended, the Minister of Justice obliged, and both the Interior Ministry and Grand Vizier's Office approved life exile for its publisher Muhammad Fihmi al-Ghazzi. Fihmi's appeal by telegram to the grand vizier was rejected and the sentence formerly passed on 12 June 1328/26 June 1910 stood.⁴⁴

The grand vizier Gazi Ahmed Mehmed informed the minister of the interior on 4 July 1912 that reports from the Arab provinces, especially Egypt, indicated mounting attacks on the CUP. Threats of a general uprising appeared in the making against their rule. There was an increase in negative publication against CUP leaders and government officials. The negative press was secretly distributed to all parts of Arabia and Syria. The grand vizier asked that the Ottoman commissariat in Egypt be instructed to take counter measures. In another notice to the Interior three weeks later the Grand vizier warned that the talk of an Arab caliphate was yielding results in the formation of special committees in all the provinces to propagate the appeal for it. Men of bad intentions are seeking to agitate the Arabs and it is imperative that they be tracked down and remanded to the courts, wrote the grand vizier.⁴⁵

The American Arab press was no less critical. Nāsir Shatīla, owner of *al-Fajr* in Rio de Janeiro accused Mehmed Reşad, the sultan-caliph, and his ministers of cowardice in criticizing the reverses in the war against the Italians in Tripolitania. 'Your Ottoman ancestors', wrote Shatīla 'would have been in the forefront of the battlefield. We thought Abdülhamid was a tyrant and a despot and hoped for better days. Then members of the CUP take over and all they have wanted to do is to monopolize rule, appointing all ministers from their own ranks. They denied Yemen local rule and not one fulfilled Islam's injunctions towards other races'. He berates these Turks, stating in verse form: 'you were given the reigns of governing for 650 years—and all who do not rule justly [are] to be deposed.'⁴⁶ The recommendation of vali Kazim of Syria and vali Edhem of Beirut to the Interior Ministry on 22 and 24 November 1911 to the government was for the Foreign Ministry to issue instructions barring entry of the newspaper into the Arab provinces.⁴⁷

The negative attitude of the press in Syria towards the government and the harsh response of the CUP stemmed in part from the Italian bombardment of Beirut during the war over Tripolitania. When matters calmed down, the War Ministry informed the Interior Ministry on 30 October 1911 that there was no more need for a martial court in Beirut and in Hawran. Vali Edhem of Beirut had recommended its abolition a week earlier to the minister of interior Talaat, and both the Council of Ministers and Sultan Mehmed Reşad had approved the recommendation authorizing abolition of local administration of court procedures. A petition for abolition had come also from the notables of Beirut, who argued that to keep such a court was to serve the aims of the CUP.⁴⁸ The powerful Senusi leader of Cyrenaica had criticized the CUP policy towards the Italians, and had vowed to oppose any peace concluded by its leaders and Italy, which had offended the honour of the Islamic Ottoman state. He reflected thus the views of the Arabs of both Tripolitania and Cyrenaica.

The CUP government found support in the newspaper *Filistin*. Its owner ʿĪsa Dāʿūd al-Īsa in his lead article entitled 'A cry in the wilderness' attacks the ministers led by former grand vizier Kâmil Pasha who when they were in command betrayed the principles of the CUP by granting pardon to those formerly condemned officials who had served the 'tyrant' Abdülhamid and all they got in return for faith in the constitution was the abolition of the present chamber and an attempt to reconstitute its membership to serve the interest of the present membership and secure pardon for ʿIzzet Pasha. The author asks: 'what has happened to the original program of the Unionists?' alleging that 'the next chamber will make sure to bring down this present one.' The article was translated into Ottoman. Accompanied by a French summary, it was dispatched to grand vizier Muhtâr Pasha.⁴⁹

The Divan of War, however, was not ready to quit yet. It had recommended the suspension of the Beirut Jesuit publication *al-Bashir* and the French-protected 'Le Revue' in keeping with the law on publications because they had published a map of the Bosphorus in non-detailed form. France complained to the Ottoman Foreign Ministry that the map was designed for *Gotha's Mittheilung* of the Geographical Society's collection of some 179 pages; so why punish the *Revue* for contributing to it! The suspension of *La Revue* was then rescinded.⁵⁰

The minister of the interior Talaat had issued strict orders to keep a close watch over the 'Umm al-Qura' (the reference is to Mecca) Society in Syria and its implications for an Arab awakening; indeed already there were a *Nahdab* (Awakening), *al-Nahdab al-Suriyah* (The Syrian Awakening), *Nahdat al-'Arab* (Arab Awakening), and *Umm al-*

Qura (Mother of Towns)⁵¹ Societies in both Damascus and Beirut, as well as a number of secret groupings in the Arab provinces preaching the return of the caliphate to the Arabs and publishing articles to that effect in a number of journals in both Egypt and Syria, deprecating the treachery of the Young Turk government and criticizing generally both Turks and Turkish rule. It was alarming to the authorities because such negative publications reached as far south as Yemen and Hodeidah. They recommended that they be stopped.⁵² *Al-Muqtabas* was named as the leading culprit. When its publisher Muhammad Kurd 'Ali fled, his brother Ahmad took over the editorship of the paper, continuing in this capacity until it was ordered to cease publication and Ahmad remanded to trial by the martial court in Istanbul.⁵³

The Trial by Military Courts

We have the court records of two investigative trials, that of Muhammad Kurd 'Ali of *al-Muqtabas* and Muhammad al-Bāqir, editor-publisher of *al-Balāgh*, a paper which al-Bāqir claimed was 'dedicated to political and social reform and to the service of Islamic unity.'⁵⁴ Both men were arrested and sent to Istanbul for trial before a martial court on accusation that al-Bāqir published a poem by al-Uskūbi and Kurd 'Ali had reproduced it in his newspaper. Al-Uskūbi was the instructor of the Prophet's school in Medina and had been disturbed by the lack of serious reaction on part of the central government to Italy's invasion of Tripolitania. He was unaware of the fact that CUP leaders had practically sold the province to Italy, hence their anger at his rebuking and chiding them for inaction. The poem was cast in an Islamic tone, considering an Islamic reaction appropriate and reminding the present régime that Europe did not intervene because it was aware of what Ottoman ancestors had done to them and that they were not going to miss an opportunity to strike back at them.⁵⁵

Muhammad Kurd 'Ali had fled Damascus to the Hijaz to escape arrest and trial. There apparently, he met secretly with Hasan Awliyā', Abu Bakr Daghistāni, Muhamman Hammūdah, and 'Abd al-Rahmān Ilyās purportedly to discuss means to reconstitute the Arab caliphate.⁵⁶ The *muhajir* of Medina reported to the governor of Syria that the four had conducted conspiratorial talks for several nights at the 'Dār al-Surūr' hotel and were planning to publish articles deprecating the rule of the Ottomans and derogatory to the present sultan's government.⁵⁷ The immediate cause for shutting down both *al-Balāgh* and *al-Muqtabas* was their publishing al-Uskūbi's poem entitled '*Nabmu wa l-Gharb*' (We and the West), more to alert the Ottoman government of the western plan to end their rule than to

attack them. Perhaps he hit a sensitive nerve of the Young Turk leadership, which was already aware of the rising anti-CUP sentiments among Arab Muslims, who suspected their loyalty to Islam, especially after they had launched a systematic policy to abolish the Muhammadan movement, arrest its leaders and remand them to trial. Since Muhammad had fled after turning over the editorship of the paper to his brother his trial was in absentia. The recommendation for the trial of *al-Muqtabas* and *al-Balāgh* for publishing the poem 'We and the West' was submitted by the colonel in charge of the martial court. It claimed that the poem, which *al-Muqtabas* published under the heading 'Yā Āl 'Uthmān' deprecated the 'great [Ottoman] caliphate'.⁵⁸

From his place of imprisonment Ahmad protested the recommendation to trial alleging what he published was not intended to attack or deprecate the sultanate.⁵⁹ But Talaat did not see it that way in recommending to minister of war Mahmud Şevket the trial of both publishers for having suggested that the caliphate be transferred to a descendant of Quraysh.⁶⁰ Shutting down both newspapers was based on the recommendation of the governor general of the Syrian vilayet, who had accompanied his recommendation with a list of particulars, fifty-seven in all, which reflected an Islamic sentiment when any publication of this nature was considered anathema to the Young Turk government.⁶¹

Transcript of the Pre-Trial Inquiry of the Owner of *al-Balāgh*

I reproduce hereunder nearly verbatim the transcript of the investigation conducted by the officer of the martial court prior to official trial. The nature of the inquiry and questions asked casts light on how the Young Turks in their frantic attempts to head off criticism went about terrorizing their victims, often by willfully distorting the responses, more out of ignorance of the Arabic language nuances than deliberateness.

Q: Your name, profession and place of residence?

A: Muhammad al-Bāqir, son of Mirza al-Bāqir, resident of Beirut, owner of the newspaper *al-Balāgh*, 25 years of age, know Arabic well and write in it well.

Q: Were you ever subjected to trial before and were you successful?

A: No.

Q: Are you the responsible director of the newspaper *al-Balāgh*?

A: Yes.

Q: The poem 'We and the West' appearing on page 8 of issue 39, who composed it and where is he now?

A: The composer is an instructor of the Prophet's Haram in Medina, and his name is Ibrāhīm Efendi al-Uskūbi and he sent the poem through the aegis of my representative in Medina and asked that I publish it. He told me that the person is respected in that town and I published it even though its expressions are weak, and its meanings are of no importance. My representative also told me that by publishing it the newspaper would gain followers. He who reads it will notice that the composer urges the Ottomans particularly and the Muslims generally to follow their religion's teachings and to restore it to its earlier glory, and that the abandonment of the faith is what encouraged the foreigners to take advantage to lay their hands on their country, most recently Italy. In his composition he employed the critical approach to call attention to their current situation using the words 'Oh Ottomans, had you not abandoned the faith you would have been in the highest of heights' and I believe that this method encourages the nation to progress.

Q: What is the name of your representative who sent you this poem; for how long has he been in Medina, and do you have with you now the letter he sent you; also, do you know Ibrāhīm Efendi al-Uskūbi personally?

A: His name is Mahmud Wāqif 'Ali Shuwayl. I believe he is a resident of Medina. I have known him since the appearance of the newspaper as he sent me a letter asking to buy every issue that comes out at half price in his capacity as its representative. I answered that if he finds many other subscribers I would not charge any money. And so it was; he did send me the names of many other new subscribers. From that time on he has been its representative in Medina, looking after the affairs of the newspaper remitting the funds. The letter in which he suggests publishing the poem is with me and here I produce it for you. As for Ibrāhīm al-Uskūbi, I have no knowledge of him whatsoever. He is, however, a subscriber of the newspaper. I do not know if the representative has any special relations (with him), other than his serving as representative for newspapers (generally).

[The Arabic letter is produced. It is dated 23 Ra 1330/11 March 1912. The last thirteen lines bear the signature of Shuwayl]

Q: The poem published in your journal, was it in the (hand) writing of your representative Murād Wāqif or in that of its composer al-Uskūbi?

A: It is written in the handwriting of my representative in Medina and was included in the papers sent from the vilayet of Beirut to that of Syria.

Q: Has it been customary for Uskūbi to send you, directly or through some mediator, poems or articles in this manner to publish?

A: No, it has not been his custom, nor did I know he composed poetry until my representative sent it.

Q: After you read the poem and its prolegomena addressing the Ottoman sultanate with threats and warning, what induced you to print it when the meaning was clear to you?

A: There is no attack in the poem on the Sultan's family; if there was any, I would have been the first to defend it (the family). I started the newspaper *al-Balāgh* for only one reason: to tie all Muslims to the centre of the Ottoman caliphate, which is evident to anyone who reads the paper from the first issue to the present one containing the poem. I was the one to call upon Muslims to defend the voice of the caliphate, and he who has this as a principle cannot permit attacks on the head of the sultanate's family. The composer intended by his use of the word 'Al 'Uthmān' Ottomans in general, as he understands it; this is evident in the trend of the poem. Nevertheless, I could not discern the meaning of his words as I do not know what the author intended. The meaning, as they say, is in the heart of the poet. The composer utilized the Arabic mode of prosody; that is he addressed the Ottomans then changed over to Muslims, then to Arabs, then to previous dynasties, and then to Europeans. The caliphate was not always the property of the Ottomans, and I believe the composer did not intend to attack them; rather, to urge Muslims to resist foreign encroachments and to eject them, especially the Italians. That is what induced me to publish it. The responsibility for its intended meaning rests with the composer. My policy has been to defend Muslim interests, the Ottoman state, and to resist foreign aggression.

Q: [quotes several verses wherein there are warnings to the Ottomans concerning the designs of the foreign powers on Ottoman lands and urges them not to be oblivious to them.]

A: [repeats defence of Islam and the caliphate citing entries from all previous issues to that effect and expressing hope that Sultan-Caliph Mehmed Reşad would serve as honorary leader of Muslims (everywhere). He concludes by asserting his loyalty and support for the Ottoman caliphate, appealing to all Muslims to rally behind it, and emphasizes the point that the printing of the poem was only out of good intentions and his being convinced no insult or deprecation

of the sultanate was intended by the author. He concludes by asking to be absolved, indeed even rewarded for his loyalty.]

Q: Do you have anything else to add?

A: What I mentioned before is sufficient.

There follows an affidavit dated 10 April 1328/1912 from Uskūbi himself, sent by the muhafiz of Medina in which he answers the investigator's questions, as follows:

Q: Your name and profession?

A: Ibrāhīm Uskūbi, son of Hasan Uskūbi. I am a lecturer and teacher in the Prophet's Haram school. My ancestors came to Medina over a hundred years ago and settled there.

Q: What other writings have you done?

A: I authored works on prayer, religious beliefs connected with the requirements of the imam [title given] 'The Ultimate Quest for what the Imam Needs'.

Q: Do you preoccupy yourself with composing poetry?

A: No, because I am preoccupied with teaching matters and official work, which provide little time for other pursuits.

Q: The poem 'We and the West' that appeared in *al-Balāgh* and then in *al-Muqtabas*, did you compose it?

A: I have composed ten thousand verses [*sic*].

Q: Who composed this poem, and what was the purpose behind it?

A: I composed it in the month of Dhu 'l-Qa'dah after I heard that the Italians had landed troops in Tripolitania in 1330/1912 and my purpose, which God inspired me, was to appeal to the rest of the Muslim Ottoman nation not to be oblivious to their enemies' intentions, and to be alert in striving to acquire useful knowledge so they could move forward and progress; to become enlightened and to abandon innovations that might hinder their progress; to restore their old honour, and not to depend on other than their creator by following the light of the Qur'ān, which is the remedy for every ailment that had led to their decline. I did not intend to be specific as concerns individuals, families or the imperial state. I concluded with an appeal that we be taught the use of modern weapons as we are ignorant of their manufacture; also to prevent innovations that hinder us, waste our money uselessly, and not to listen to the speeches of hypocrites and those with diabolical aims who claim that if the Ottomans learn how to manufacture weapons they would cause problems for you, etc.

Q: How did this poem reach the two newspapers, *al-Balāgh* and *al-Muqtabas*? Did you send it? How was it done?

A: As concerns its reaching *al-Balāgh*, I have no real idea; as for its reaching *al-Muqtabas*, one day I was in the market of Medina and some dignitary said [the representative of] *al-Muqtabas* wanted to visit me, but I strongly excused myself. He then suggested I visit him for an hour and I did. The newspaper *al-Balāgh* with the poem in it had reached Medina by then and I noticed there were many changes, including additions and distortions, in the published form. So I went with that person to his house and met with *al-Muqtabas* [sic]⁶² and we exchanged views concerning how publishers distort publications a lot and I showed him what had happened to my poem in this regard, then we parted.

Q: The man who called for the meeting with the owner of *al-Muqtabas*, who is he; and the owner of *al-Muqtabas*, what is his name, and have you had previous knowledge of him prior to the meeting?

A: His name is Abu Bakr Daghistāni Efendi; as for the owner, I do not know his name but I do not believe he engages in harmful writings; nor do I wish to meet with him. My meeting with him was not on purpose, and Abu Bakr Efendi is an *Imam Khatib* (sermon giver) in the Prophet's Noble Sanctuary and the deputy representative for appeals of the honorable treasury.

Q: We have heard that this owner of *al-Muqtabas* whenever he comes to Medina, he stays in the house of Abu Bakr Efendi Daghistāni and does not part from him when he is staying there; do you have any information on this?

A: I have no knowledge of this, nor do I wish to know.

Q: The owner of *al-Muqtabas* says that you gave him a copy of *al-Balāgh* in which the poem appears and urged him to publish it in his newspaper; is there truth to this?

A: Absolutely not; had I wished to have him publish it, I would have contacted somebody else.

Q: If you did not intend to have it published, then what is the benefit of composing it?

A: I composed it with the view of submitting it to someone whose advice I value and to consult on whether there is something critical in it so I could desist from offering it.

Q: There is in Medina a man who calls himself Muhammad Efendi 'Ali al-Shuwayl; who is he; do you know him?

A: I know him by appearance not by association. He is one of the students of *‘ilm* (theological knowledge) in Medina.

Q: Did you show the said Muhammad Efendi this poem?

A: Absolutely not. I do not know who did.

Q: No doubt someone who wished to have it published in *al-Balāgh* did.

A: I do not know how it was copied; nor do I know who copied it.

Q: This poem reached the newspaper *al-Balāgh* through the aegis of Mahmūd Efendi ‘Ali al-Shuwayl; how did it reach the aforementioned Mahmūd Efendi?

A: I do not know from where he copied it, nor do I know how he got to it.

Q: You said in your previous answer that your aim in composing it was to alert the entire Ottoman Muslim community, but you did not employ in your address ‘O family of ‘Uthmān’; what is the reason for this omission?

A: I did not intend in the use of ‘Āl’ other than the entire Ottoman citizenry; you have books on language, why don’t you consult them!

Q: Do you mean by ‘Ottoman citizenry’ all contemporaries or the ancestors; also, do you mean by such an expression all Ottomans regardless of their religions?

A: Yes I meant by the use of ‘Āl-‘Uthmān’ every Ottoman, regardless of faith, who has love of this citizenship.

Q: Among what you say in your poem is the expression ‘you conquered by means of the Book of God their lands’; if this is so, then do you include all Ottomans regardless of their religions, that is Christians and Jews, among the conquerors; how is that?

A: I meant essentially Muslims and their followers among other sects. They all pass into the general descent of the conquering ancestors, so the absent gets a free passage with the present [ones].

Q: [He cites a couplet from the poem which the prosecutor claims applies to the ruling family’s luxurious living while citizens at large are wanting in basics.]

A: I meant in this couplet he who wastes his time in luxury then is impoverished so he can discover the need to unite with other of the faithful, as the Lord said he had bought the souls and possessions of the faithful. As concerns your question that my reference is to members of the ruling family, God forbid; I did not intend any of

them, only every wasteful Ottoman. These expressions are poetic only.

Q: [He cites verse 57 and alleges only men of the state are intended by it, and seeks clarification.]

A: This couplet was intended to render wise advice not to criticize; calling for teaching us to use modern weapons was to enable us to be partners when and if attacked by the enemy. Perhaps there was a misunderstanding in rendering advice but I do not see in it reasons for blame because I am not familiar with current politics.

Q: Defence of country and its existence is one of the duties of the state, and our state has one of the greatest and well-armed armies with complete up-to-date weapons, so why do you ask for arming all Turks and Arabs and teaching them the manufacture of weapons; what is the purpose of that?

A: As for your words in defence of the country and preserving it forever, I say may it be granted strength and a glorious victory. My aim was not to say that it is incapable of repelling its enemy, but rather that its Muslim subjects be prepared to defend it when the enemy attacks, and to be prepared when our country calls upon us to do so. This is an appeal on my part, and may God be witness to my good intentions.

Q: You said in your previous answers that you were a teacher and lecturer, responsible for a number of obligations; this means you have many commitments, then you said that you have no knowledge of political matters; if this is the case, what propels you [to compose], and how did you find time to compose this poem?

A: What propelled me to do so is my dedication to my country, and learning that the Italians had occupied Tripolitania. I wanted to be among the first to express concern. Poetry is the greatest stimulant for enlivening cooperation and strengthening the bond (of Muslims) for as the Prophet (pbuh) proclaimed: the faithful constitute one edifice, each part supports and strengthens the other; so I composed it little by little until it grew.

Q: What do you mean by your words ‘*yā li’l-rijāl*’ ‘oh for men’, which men do you intend by this?

A: I mean those who are able to teach us and improve our knowledge of wars and how to face our enemies.

End of inquiry, signed by the investigator and the defendant.⁶³

The tenor of the trial of the publishers of *al-Muqtabas* and *al-Balāgh*, indicates clearly that the officer conducting the inquiry was not an Arabic speaker, nor did he understand Arabic, if at all, well. This would explain why he hung on to expressions without understanding their contextual meaning, or the nuances of Arabic prosody. Such lack of informed knowledge characterized the whole approach of Ottoman censors, especially during the Young Turk era as being hasty in judging, condemning, and abolishing newspapers that once were among their most faithful supporters, as in the case of the two newspapers for which we have records of trial. This would also explain how the Young Turks succeeded in completely alienating the Arabs after they captured the reins of government. Had the Young Ottoman movement prevailed with its stress on reform and modernization for all citizens, the Young Turks with their limited and chauvinistic goals would not have been able to succeed them and bring about the break with the Arab component of the movement, nor the sad consequences thereof during the course of World War I when the Arabs rose in revolt against them.

Notes

¹ For the best account of this critical period affecting Arab-Turkish relations see Hasan Kayalı, *Arabs and Young Turks: Ottomanism, Arabism and Islamism in the Ottoman Empire, 1908-1918* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997).

² A pamphlet published in Egypt by Salīm Sarkīs entitled '*Ajaib al-Makṭūbī*' details incidents where the censor not knowing the Arabic language decimated articles being submitted to his review prior to being allowed to appear in newspapers. For a study of this process see my 'Censorship and Freedom of Expression in Ottoman Syria and Egypt' in W. Ochsenwald & W. Haddad's *Nationalism in a Non-National State* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press), 152-94.

³ Ali Ferruh Bey's No. 87 (telegram) to Tahsin, first secretary of the Sultan. Imperial Turkey [sic] Legation, Washington, 24 November 1898. Başbakanlık Arşivi. *Yıldız Esās Evrakı* (henceforth YEE) 136/302

⁴ No. 88 from Washington of 29 November 1898. YEE 136/251-6.

⁵ No date or signature, presumed to be the vali's discreet report (he was to report back on the movements of Ayyūb only orally. YEE 35/553-210.

⁶ See YEE 15/74/21 for details.

⁷ See article in *La Turquie*, 24th year. No. 230, 9 October 1890/24 S 1308.

⁸ *Miitenevi Maruat. Dosya* 171. No. 43 of 11.8.1315/1897.

⁹ Sultan's order dated 15 Z 1319/23 February 1902. Foreign Ministry, *Hususiyē* 742. *Yıldız Miitenevi* 226/69.

¹⁰ In issue no. 120 accompanied with an Arabic letter by the editor Najīb Hindīyah, prepared in Cairo by his brother then sent to London for publication and distribution by British mail.

¹¹ Imperial ferman relayed by Tevfik (No. 1). Summary translation from London [no.2]. *Yıldız Miitenevi* 231/111.

¹² Title of the article in *al-Muqtabas* of 8 Z 1326/31 December 1908, no. 14 of the first year: 'Turks and Arabs'.

¹³ Issue of 7 Z 1326/30 December 1908. No. 13 of the first year.

¹⁴ Issue of 20 Z 1326/19 January 1909. No. 20 of the first year.

¹⁵ Article in *al-Muqtabas*, year 1, No. 31 of 4 M 1327/25 January 1909.

¹⁶ When the revolution was over and the Deputies were allowed to form parties, the first to appear was the Freedom Party headed by Prince Sabahuddin, Ismail Kemal Beg, and former grand vizier Kamil Pasha, and Ali Kemal Beg, which opposed the CUP's policy of centralization versus decentralization. Editor-in-chief of the newspaper *Iqdam* demanded that the CUP withdraw from government because its policy was going to encourage separatism and independence through its appointment and removal of officials opposed to decentralization. See Shākir al-Hanbali of al-Qunaytarah's article 'al-Āsitānah ba 'd al-Dustūr: al-Firaq al-Siyāsīyah', in *al-Muqtabas*, year 1, no. 94 of 18 Ra 1327/8 April 1909.

¹⁷ Founded by Farah Antūn in Cairo but transferred to New York when Farah was compelled to emigrate under strong criticism by its critics, led by followers of Muhammad 'Abduh, rector of al-Azhar, notably Rashīd Rida, himself an emigrant from Farah's own city, Tripoli [Lebanon].

¹⁸ For 'Izzet's role under Sultan Abdūlhamid II see my 'Arab Supporters of Abdūlhamid II' *Archivum Ottomanicum*, 15 (1997), 189-219.

¹⁹ A lengthy discourse on the subject in *al-Muqtabas*, year 1, no. 63 of 11 S 1327/3 March 1909.

²⁰ Specifically they were 'Abdallah Pasha al-Asani, 'Abd al-Qadir Efendi Manjak, Tawfiq Efendi al-Qudsi, and Salih Efendi al-'Arjawi. They were accused of organizing the Muhammadan Society. See *al-Muqtabas*, no. 138 of 11Ca 1327/30 May 1909.

²¹ No.157 of 30 C 1327/21 June 1909.

²² No. 128 of 28 R 1327/18 May 1909.

²³ Reference here is to the Ottoman *millet* system, dating back to over four hundred years.

²⁴ No. 124 of 23 R1327/13 May 1909.

²⁵ One was his son Khālīd, the other his brother 'Abd al-Razzāq, and among the rest: Ibrāhīm Qadri—inspector of internal publications, Haqqi 'Abdallah Tahīr, a member of the *Ma'arif*; Rif 'at, son of the Imām of the Kağthane, Hacci Nāzim, *mirliva* of Yemen, and Commissar Sokollu, one of the spies of Fahim (the notorious head spies), 'Izzet, director of the Mabeyn (Sultan's private entourage), Kara Mustafa, one of the cipher writers, and Habīb Muqīm, the physician; all of whom were arrested at the behest of the Ministry of Interior. No. 209 of 5 B 1327/21 August 1909.

²⁶ No. 218 of 15 B 1327/31 August 1909.

²⁷ Ibid. Governments of foreign countries apparently notified Turkish ambassadors that they were displeased with the nationalistic course being adopted by the Young Turk government.

²⁸ The open letter was the lead article in No. 318 of 4 Ra 1328/15 March 1910. Kurd 'Alī followed up with another in the next issue continuing the urgent appeal of Mukhlis to the Deputies under the title 'Zionist colonization of Palestine' raising the alarm flag over the Zionist agenda. See page 1 of the *al-Muqtabas*, No. 319 of 5 Ra 1328/16 March 1910.

²⁹ No. 224 of 22 B 1327/7 September 1909.

³⁰ Issue of 10 R 1330/28 March 1912 owned and published by Muhammad Fahmi al-Ghazzi.

³¹ Basra's *wakil's* annex of 24 L 1331/26 September 1911 announces dispatching sixty-nine copies he had confiscated to the Ministry of the Interior and seeks

instructions to belie the allegations raised in issue of 13 L 1321 of *al-Muqtabas*. Dispatch in cipher dated 10 September 1329/23 September 1911.

³² Incl. 18 in *Dabiliye Siyasiye* 117/2.

³³ See *Ibid.* for additional details.

³⁴ *Ibid.*

³⁵ Copy of the Arabic article (Incl. no. 2) sent on to the Ministry of the Interior. See *Dabiliye Siyasiye* 52-2.

³⁶ Incl. 5 in *Dabiliye Siyasiye* 57-2.

³⁷ In defence of Arab views, the publisher of *al-Mu'ayyad* issued a lengthy treatise entitled 'an exposé of *al-Mu'ayyad*'s policy towards the Ottoman state' on 14 C 1327/2 June 1909. *Dabiliye Siyasiye* 58/3.

³⁸ Reply to the vali by cipher dated 26 October 1911. *Dabiliye Siyasiye* 57-2/36.

³⁹ *Dabiliye Siyasiye* 57-2/43.

⁴⁰ Enciphered message from the Nureddin, the vali of Beirut dated 12 October 1911. *Dabiliye Siyasiye* 57-1/5.

⁴¹ No. 112 of 20 April 1327 4 May 1909.

⁴² No.1 (in cipher) to the *Dabiliye* of 25 April 1327/9 May 1909. *Dabiliye Siyasiye* 64/25.

⁴³ *Ibid.*

⁴⁴ For relevant dispatches from and to Syria see nos. 20, 13, 8 and the Grand vizier's request for an Ottoman translation of the article from the vali; see correspondence to the vali of 17 L 1330/30 September 1910. *Dabiliye Siyasiye* 57-2/55.

⁴⁵ No.41 in *Dabiliye Siyasiye* 57-2.

⁴⁶ From the lead article of year 2, issue of 1 December 1912. *Dabiliye Siyasiye* 57-2/46

⁴⁷ Copies of the newspaper were intercepted with only a few reaching Syria and the *mutasarrifiya* of Mount Lebanon. *Dabiliye Siyasiye* 57-2/46.

⁴⁸ The petitions (nos. 47-8) dispatched by telegram to Nazim Pasha, Minister of War dated 20 July 1328/2 August 1911 War Ministry's notification to the Interior Ministry dated 19 Z 1330/1 October 1912. *Dabiliye Siyasiye* 58/5.

⁴⁹ See *Filistin*, year 2, nos. 161-2 of 14 August 1912.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

⁵¹ It became the subject of a book-size publication later by Muhammad Kurd 'Ali detailing his vision of an Arab caliphate based on Mecca, the mother town of Islam.

⁵² Report from the correspondence bureau to the Minister of the Interior enclosing copies of *al-Muqtabas* and *al-Mufid* wherein derogatory language was used. No. 71 addressed the government as being led by Tatars, descendants of Cingiz Khan and Hulagu, the Mongol Khans who destroyed Arab civilization and shed innocent blood. See No. 43 of *al-Muqtabas*, wherein reference to an Arab caliphate is made. See also all issues for the year 1325/1909. No. 41/1 in *Dabiliye Siyasiye* 58/6.

⁵³ Vali of Syria to the head of the martial court of the *Divan-i Harb* of 16 Ca 1330/3 May 1912. No. 41/1 in *Dabiliye Siyasiye* 58/6.

⁵⁴ Description used by the publisher.

⁵⁵ For the full Arabic text of the poem see *al-Balagh*, No. 39 of 28 March 1912, 8.

⁵⁶ The offending issue of *al-Balagh*, No. 39 of 10 R 1330/28 March 1912 and of *al-Muqtabas*, No. 955 of 27 R 1330/14 April 1912. *Dabiliye Siyasiye* 58/6.

⁵⁷ For a summary of his report see No. 4 from Medina to the vilayet of Syria in *Dabiliye Siyasiye* 58/6 no. 38.

⁵⁸ *Divan-i urf* to the Minister of War. No. 368 of 23 May 1328/5 June 1912. *Dabiliye Siyasiye* 58/6. No. 3.

⁵⁹ Formal petition to the head of the martial court of 17 May 1328/30 May 1912. *Dabilye Siyasiye* 58/6. No. 10.

⁶⁰ No. 196 of 8 Ca 130/25 April 1912. *Dabilye Siyasiye* 58/6. No. 50.

⁶¹ For an itemization, see the vali's report of 15 Ca 1330/2 June 12912 to the Interior relaying the report and particulars drafted by the muhafiz of Medina in cipher dated 4 April 1328/27 April 1912. *Dabilye Siyasiye* No. 58/6. No. 40/1.

⁶² Presumably the reference is to the owner Muhammad Kurd 'Ali, a frequenter of the Hijaz.

⁶³ For the full transcript of this and Ahmad Kurd 'Ali's investigation and all relevant correspondences from Medina to Beirut and then to Istanbul and the martial court see *Dabilye Siyasiye* 58/6 and enclosures.

Secular and Jewish Studies among Jewish Scholars of the Ottoman Empire in the Sixteenth Century

Shaul Regev

In attempting to evaluate the influence of general culture and philosophy on Jewish thinkers during a particular period, one needs only to examine their use made of philosophical literature. Through such an examination it is possible to determine the degree of involvement of Jewish scholars in the non-Jewish culture, as well as their attitude to—and use of—this literature. Jewish scholars wrote the majority of their works in Hebrew, whereas the general literature was not written in that language. One needs to examine the use by Jewish thinkers of books by non-Jewish authors, whether expressed in the writing of entire tracts or in the use of this literature and its incorporation within the Hebrew text.¹ On the other hand, this may be accomplished by examining the libraries of these scholars and the presence of such books within their libraries,² particularly if they troubled to disseminate them in a new form, by translation or by writing a commentary. The works of the Greek philosophers, particularly those of Aristotle, are frequently mentioned in the writings and sermons of these thinkers, and one must examine whether such quotations are taken from a primary source or are second- or third-hand. However, in those cases in which the author himself translated or wrote a commentary on such a book, it is clear that one is dealing with a primary source.³ Sixteenth-century literature already reflects the influence of printing, and the manner of distribution of books at that time was different than during the period preceding the invention of printing.⁴

The invention of printing caused the dissemination of books in numerous copies, but at the same time caused the loss of numerous other books. Prior to the invention of printing, books were hand-copied in several copies and distributed in manuscript form. Printing led to a situation in which those books that were not printed for any number of reasons—not necessarily related to quality or contents, or the author's fame—were generally put away and lost. From this point on, the printing of books became a function of initiative and

financial wherewithal, and was not indicative of the quality or nature of the printed book.

In the present discussion, I shall attempt to examine the attitude of various scholars, mostly sixteenth-century, to philosophy, based upon the use they made of this literature and the writings and printing of this literature by themselves or their relatives.

One of many examples, for illustrative purposes, is the printing of R. Moses Almosnino's book *Ma'amaṣ Koab*.⁵ This book incorporates twenty-eight sermons that were gathered from a larger collection of sermons.⁶ In his introduction,⁷ Almosnino states that the initiative for the printing of the book was not his own, but that of the printer and of various friends who wished to publish these sermons.

The request by the printer and friends referring to Almosnino's method, is evidently referring, not to that of his sermons, but to his philosophical method. To this end, Almosnino chose fourteen from among all his sermons which seemed to him most significant for clarifying his approach to various philosophical issues.⁸ After choosing the first group of fourteen sermons, he added an equal number of sermons dealing with similar issues, thereby bringing the total number of sermons to twenty-eight.

Other contemporary authors occasionally refer the reader to one or another of their books that are not extant, and of which we know nothing apart from this reference. On occasion, such a book may be mentioned by another scholar of the period, giving evidence that the book existed and was distributed in several copies, but no other detail relating to the book is known.⁹ Some of these books remained as isolated manuscripts, whereas the majority has disappeared completely. Upon inspection, we find that the vast majority of those books that were lost were of a philosophical nature. As a rule, these were commentaries written by the author of a philosophical work, whether on one of Aristotle's works or of some other author, from among those books which were in common use among the scholars of the period. Among the unpublished works of R. Moses Almosnino, for example, was a commentary on Aristotle's *Ethics* entitled *P'nei Moshe*.¹⁰ Indeed, this was not the only book of Almosnino that was not printed. By way of elimination, all those books by Almosnino that were printed dealt with Jewish thought, homilies and exegesis, rather than with philosophical literature.

R. Shmuel ibn Shuaib, son of R. Joel ibn Shuaib, copied his father's book *Nora' Tehillot*¹¹ evidently printing it thereafter. From the words of the son and from Ibn Shuaib's other book, *Olat Shabbat*,¹² we learn of a number of other books by R. Joel ibn Shuaib in the area of philosophy. He mentions, for example, that he wrote a commentary to Aristotle's *Ethics*¹³ and a commentary on Al-Ghazali's

tractate *De Naturis*.¹⁴ He wrote 'other commentaries regarding external wisdom [i.e. philosophy], too numerous to count'.¹⁵

R. Moshe Albelda¹⁶ wrote various books, several of which were published by his sons after his death. The published volumes were books of his sermons and two other books which also dealt with subjects related to Judaism,¹⁷ while those two books which were not published and did not even remain in manuscript form were his commentaries on works by Aristotle: a commentary on *Physics*, and a commentary on *Ethics*.¹⁸

R. Abraham ibn Migash was evidently one of the most prolific writers and thinkers of the sixteenth century, but only one of his philosophical-religious works, *Kevod Elohim*, is extant.¹⁹ In this work, Ibn Migash mentions the other books that he wrote which were not published, and which did not even remain in manuscript form. These books include a commentary on Aristotle's *Physics*; *Sefer Birkat Avraham*, a work on medicine, which was evidently composed of several volumes; a work on astronomy, called *Avodat Halevi*; and *Sefer Emek Hashbedim*, which 'is called thus because it expounds upon the nature of demons (*shedim*), how they are and what they are and from what they are made, with clear proofs based on the knowledge of scholars and some of the great philosophers, and philosophical and Rabbinical proofs'.²⁰ *Magen Avraham* is similar in format to *Kevod Elohim*, its contents being of a philosophical-religious nature. *Derush Nishmat Adam* is a sermon, evidently dealing with psychology. None of this literature is extant, and even *Kevod Elohim* would not have been published had it not been for his wife's initiative, who wished to perpetuate his name, as they were childless.

We learn more about the situation of religious and philosophical enlightenment during this period from the case of R. Shlomo Almoli, than from any other description. R. Shlomo Almoli is less well known than other scholars of his time,²¹ due to the fact that he did not leave behind many books in writing. Almoli did not find any Talmudic scholars of stature with whom he could also study philosophy in addition to Torah studies.

Almoli arrived at the decision to study philosophy indirectly. He decided to study medicine in order to make a living from this profession. Once he began to study medicine he decided that he also needed to study other subjects, and in this way covered all of the philosophical disciplines. However he observes several problems that he encountered along the way.

1. The small number of people dealing in philosophy and in secular studies. Almoli had unique demands: he wanted a teacher who would be expert in both philosophy and sciences and in Jewish religious literature. Had Almoli been willing to

study philosophy from a secular or Christian approach, he almost certainly would not have encountered any difficulty in finding such teachers. Even though these may have been more plentiful outside of the Ottoman Empire—in Italy for example, or in Christian countries generally—it seems unlikely that he would have had a problem finding such teachers within the empire. But Almoli did not want a teacher of this type, because they were one-sided and not comprehensive. He felt it important to have a combination of the two sources of knowledge or of the two cultures.

2. The large number of books that say nothing new. In examining the philosophical sources that served the thinkers of his period, we find that the choice is limited and almost uniform. They all use almost the identical literature and quote the same books by Aristotle. Unlike the greater variety that existed in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, the choice becomes narrower in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. One even feels that the authors did not see these books and made use of them via a secondary or tertiary source. This is particularly true regarding those who mention philosophical literature in their writings, but not of those who interpret the literature. The latter certainly used the original book (in its Hebrew translation, of course) and were not satisfied with quoting from secondary sources. Very few of these scholars mention more specialized books, such as the writings of Seneca, Ovid and others that were not so widespread during the preceding generation. This is perhaps one of the characteristics of the Renaissance in the Jewish world.

3. The dissemination of the material. As we have seen, philosophical literature was not readily available to all. Books concerning classical philosophy, such as the works of Aristotle or Averroes' commentaries on these works, were not printed in Hebrew translations. Those books that are extant were evidently remnants of the period preceding the expulsion from Spain,²² and not new acquisitions. The number of copies was limited, and generally speaking those books that did survive were of a more practical genre. After he was expelled from Spain and had settled in Italy, R. Isaac Abravanel testified that he was unable to find philosophical books in his new venue, but only halakhic works, that were ubiquitous²³. Sermoneta likewise notes that there were several basic books in philosophy that were used by every preacher, while others were not

touched at all. Among the books most widely cited was Aristotle's *Ethics*.²⁴ None of these books was ever printed.

This dismal situation, in which philosophical books or commentaries on philosophical tracts were scarcely published or printed, coupled with the small number of people involved in this area of learning implied by Almoli's testimony, is in inverse relation to what we have found regarding those writings that were printed, whether books of Biblical exegesis or homilies and other writings. In these books we find extensive reference to, and use of, philosophical literature to help understand passages from the Bible or midrash, even on the part of those scholars who did not themselves write exegesis to philosophical literature. The central question confronting the study of homiletic literature is the use of philosophical literature by Jewish scholars and its status.

The issue of Jewish thinkers' attitude toward philosophy in sixteenth-century Jewish thought has already been discussed in many studies.²⁵ R. Saadya Gaon already discussed this question during the Middle Ages, as did Maimonides after him²⁶. There are two aspects to this question. On the one hand, there is the issue of the attitude towards what might be called practical sciences. Here the issue is less serious, because Jewish scholars did not hesitate to make use of these sciences and to utilize them for various purposes, and even developed approaches which were thereafter accepted among the Gentiles as well. This is true not only of such sciences as medicine, but even of astronomy and other sciences. On the other hand, there was no uniform view with regard to philosophical studies. Can it serve as a tool for understanding the Torah, or does it only harm the study of Torah and upset the pure belief in it?

In summary we have to mention two points:

1. That the greatest importance must be attributed to the central thing—the Torah—and less to the decoration and addition, which is philosophy.
2. In terms of the order of study, the traditional order of study must be preserved: first of all the basis of the house—the Torah, and only thereafter the upper story, the philosophical addition.

By its nature, such a discussion brings us to an examination of the exegesis of the books of wisdom, in which the various realms of philosophy find expression. The Book of Job presents the problem of Divine Providence and ethical problems, while the books of Proverbs and Ecclesiastes are intended to guide the reader through the mazes of philosophy. The exegetes give their own interpretation

to these texts, each one according to his own personal background. Some are based upon ethical problems and ethical and political guidance, while others added various aspects of exegesis based upon rabbinic dicta, Kabbalah, and even philosophy. Even those whose interpretations were based upon Aristotelian philosophy could not refrain from presenting the confrontation between philosophy as one source of knowledge as opposed to Torah and revelation as an alternative source of knowledge. Once the problem had been formulated thus, they could not refrain from taking a position.

During the sixteenth century, we find hardly any purely philosophical commentaries on Proverbs or Ecclesiastes. Alongside the Aristotelian and Scholastic philosophical sources incorporated within the commentaries, we also find rabbinic exegesis, Kabbalah, and philological and grammatical explanations. The most widely-used philosophical texts were Aristotle's *Ethics*, the *Organon* (concerned with logic), and *Politics*. These three areas also correspond to the contents of the books of Proverbs and Ecclesiastes, the exegete usually contrasting the Aristotelian system of ethics with the Torah and commandments, which are a system of ethics unique to the Jewish people. These two books were written by King Solomon, who was called 'the wisest of men.' This title in itself creates a certain problem vis-à-vis the status of Moses, who reached a higher level of perfection than any other member of the human species, and attained the highest level of prophecy.

The difficulty involved in the title generally attributed to King Solomon, 'the wisest of all men,' as opposed to the high level of Moses, to whom no such title was attributed, is explained by R. Shlomo Duran (sixteenth century) in terms of the difference between wisdom that is the product of human intellect and that which is the result of Divine intellect.

Solomon's wisdom was a human wisdom, and as such he was the wisest of all men, but he was unable to attain Moses' level of prophecy by means of this wisdom. In terms of prophecy, Moses was the 'father of the prophets', a divine level not attained by Solomon. Solomon's wisdom was a human philosophical wisdom, while that of Moses was divine wisdom. Therefore, Moses' wisdom was superior to that of Solomon's in terms of what was created as a result, whereas in terms of human attainment Solomon reached a higher level of perfection, and in this sense was on a higher human level than Moses.

Duran goes on to explain the relationship between prophecy and human knowledge. Human knowledge is limited, and due to the limitations of human intellect, is unable to fully ascertain the truth. Prophecy is a kind of divine grace completing that which is lacking in human wisdom and which it can never succeed in attaining. This

aspect of completion enables man to arrive at human perfection, so that he may encompass all knowledge.

R. Shlomo le-Beit ha-Levi²⁷ places the Torah above all other perfection, as it includes the entire wisdom. This inclusiveness of the Torah does not originate on only one plane, but is the result of inquiry and searching out of different layers of the Torah. The literal meaning of the Torah teaches us on one literal level, which parallels philosophical ethical teaching. This is ethical guidance but, as in philosophy, this guidance is neither the essence of Torah nor the essence of philosophical guidance. It is well known that ethical doctrine is no more than an anticipatory form of guidance which accompanies the one studying it throughout the process of examination, and not an independent area of study as an end in itself. On the second level, we find in the Torah theoretical intellectual guidance. This is the level parallel to philosophical study, whose purpose is to give us theoretical knowledge. According to the rationalistic philosophical approach, this knowledge can bring the one engaged in reflection thereupon to attachment to the Active Intellect. But according to R. Shlomo, such knowledge is insufficient to bring one to the purpose of intellect and to attachment. To this end, one must attain a further level, the divine level unique to Torah, in which are revealed the secrets of existence, and with whose help the universe exists.

It means that man's true perfection lies in the ability to attach himself to God or the possibility of unique prophecy for those engaged in the inner secrets of the Torah. It follows that it is unique to the Jewish people and is not the heritage of the Gentiles. This, notwithstanding the fact that R. Shlomo le-Beit ha-Levi notes elsewhere the parallel between the wisdom of the Gentiles and that of Israel, and that the ideas found among Jewish sages find parallels in the wisdom of the Gentiles.

It is interesting to note that R. Shlomo le-Beit ha-Levi does not attempt to draw a link between these two orientations. Each orientation receives its knowledge from different sources unique to it. On the one hand, there is the Torah orientation represented by the Sages, whose words are adduced in the midrash, and on the other hand, Ovid and others of the philosophical orientation. These two orientations received their knowledge independently, and are not influenced by one another. The identification of these identical theories in both the Sages and in Ovid as Platonic theories does not elicit any surprise, and is intended to demonstrate R. Shlomo le-Beit ha-Levi's expertise in external philosophical literature. The philosopher of a later period finds before him two traditions, different in their sources but identical in their contents, and attempts to find a common denominator between them. What may elicit

surprise is his understanding of the sources of this knowledge. The source for the rabbis is the tradition, that is, the tradition given to Moses at Sinai as Oral Torah. And if external sources arrived at the same evident outlooks, R. Shlomo says that these too had such traditional knowledge that caused them to arrive at the same conclusion or the same conjecture.

Jewish scholars, on the other hand, could not accept such views, as they contradict the entire doctrine of individual reward and punishment, just as they were unable to accept the approach of inclusiveness, as here too we confront the same problem of reward and punishment. Generally speaking, in Jewish thought, as Maimonides claimed, happiness and eternity are identified with reward, and loss with punishment. While it is true that the source of this reward is in knowledge, the fulfillment of the commandments also plays a significant role in human success. The commandments, as already taught by Maimonides, are only the framework for implanting knowledge among the common people within the Jewish nation, and not an end in themselves. This argument is similar to the claim of the philosophers from Aristotle's time onwards, that character and ethics are necessary surrounding conditions for bringing about success, but are not a part of bringing about intellectual perfection per se.

R. Joseph ibn Yahya devotes the first part of his book *Torah Or*²⁸ to various views on this subject. He cites the view of the Greek philosophers, but this path cannot be correct, as according to it only isolated individuals may reach perfection, and it is not suitable to the general run of people.

Therefore, the literature of the sixteenth century, whether homiletic or Biblical exegetical literature, and particularly the exegesis of the Books of Wisdom, is filled with philosophical material, based upon both first, second and third hand sources. Even those scholars and exegetes whose general orientation may be described as Kabbalistic rather than as philosophical, made use of philosophical treatises and methods. Nevertheless, hardly any books were printed whose main concern was with exegesis of the writings of Aristotle or with general philosophical issues in Hebrew dress. Hence, we need to distinguish between the use of these writings and their printing and publication. The conditions of printing of the period were such that the printing of a book was financed entirely by its author, and generally speaking such books were not sold on the open market but to those people in the author's immediate circle or to those who took an interest in it. In one case we even know of the establishment of a printing house for the specific purpose of publishing a certain book—in this special case, the widow used the money of the inheritance for the publication of the book.²⁹ At times the sale of a

book occurred even before its printing, the money being in practice contributed by the purchasers for the publication of the book, in which case it was necessary to ascertain that the publication would be covered or at least justify itself. Thus, when the authors themselves or their sons decided to publish writings, they preferred those subjects that seemed to them more acceptable to the buying public and possibly more important. Hence they did not publish commentaries on philosophical texts, but preferred printing books which were more pertinent to religious life and to the study of Torah, such as responsa or books of sermons. The philosophical intellectual who wished to engage specifically in philosophical matters would certainly find the way to acquire these books in the libraries of other intellectuals like him.

Notes

¹ J. B. Sermoneta, 'Scholastic Philosophic Literature in R. Joseph Taitazak's *Sefer Porat Yosef* (Hebrew), *Sefunot* 11 (1971-78), 137-85.

² M. Idel, 'R. Johanan Allemanno's Order of Study' (Hebrew), *Tarbiz* 48 (1979), 303-31.

³ H. A. Wolfson, 'The Classification of Science in Medieval Jewish Philosophy', *Hebrew Union College Jubilee Volume*, 1925, 263-315.

⁴ S. Baruchson, *Sefarim ve-Qor'im*, (Ramat Gan, 1993), 19-59.

⁵ See on him now M. Z. Benayah, *Moshe Almosnino Ish Salonica - Po'alo ve-yezirato* (Tel Aviv, 1996).

⁶ The sermons gathered in this book would seem not to be original, but are combined from several sermons pertaining to a particular topic. The choice was made according to subject, and not according to any other criterion; hence there is no particular chronological order to the sermons. Nor were they selected on the basis of a common denominator of place where delivered or occasion. This collection differs in its structure from other sermon collections of Almosnino extant in manuscript.

⁷ R. Moses Almosnino, *Ma'amaẓ Koab* (Venice, 1588), Introduction.

⁸ The sermons deal with such matters as: Divine Providence, Providence and the stellar system, the nature of the soul, the perfection of the soul, human perfection, *creatio ex nihilo*, miracles, union with and love of God, etc.

⁹ For example, Almosnino mentions R. Eliyahu Mizrahi's commentary to Algazali's *Kavanot ha-Filosofim*, and even quotes from it (see *Ma'amaẓ Koab*, Fifteenth Sermon), but this book is not known to us from any other source.

¹⁰ This book is extant in a single manuscript, on which see N. Ben-Menahem, 'The Writings of R. Moshe Almosnino' (Hebrew), *Sinai* 19 (1946), 282. The manuscript is incomplete, and large sections are missing.

¹¹ R. Joel ibn Shuaib, *Nora Tehillot* (Salonica, 1569).

¹² R. Joel ibn Shuaib, *Olat Shabbat* (Venice, 1576).

¹³ R. Joel ibn Shuaib, *Olat Shabbat, Parashat Vayeze*, fol. 22b.

¹⁴ *Ibid. Migez*, fol. 38a.

¹⁵ *Nora Tehillot*, *ibid.*, Introduction by the author's son. It is interesting to note that Ibn Shuaib did not give his writings to his son, but distributed them among his

disciples, and only two of these works came into his son's hands later on, after they had gone from Spain to Egypt, and from there to Turkey, where his son found them. It may be that the son was young at the time of the Expulsion and therefore his father did not rely upon him to preserve the books, and thus gave them to his disciples, whom he thought would know how to value them and preserve them properly. In fact, the opposite was the case: the disciples did not preserve them, while the son reconstructed and copied and even published his father's works.

¹⁶ On him, see *Encyclopaedia Judaica*, vol. 2, 529.

¹⁷ His published works are: *Reshit Daat* (Venice, 1583); *Sha'arei demah* (Venice, 1586); *'Olat Tamid* (Venice, 1600); *Darash Moshe* (Venice, 1603).

¹⁸ These two commentaries are mentioned several times in his *Reshit Da'at*.

¹⁹ R. Abraham ibn Migash, *Kevod Elohim* (Constantinople, 1585; reprinted: Jerusalem, 1977). On him, see the introduction, *ibid.*, 7-37.

²⁰ Kevod Elohim, 67a.

²¹ See on him: H. Yallon, 'On the Life of R. S. Almoli' (Hebrew), in S. Almoli, *Halikhot Sheva*, ed. H. Yallon (Jerusalem, 1945), 79-85; S. Regev, 'Redemption and Enlightenment in the Thought of R. Shlomo Almoli' (Hebrew), *Proceedings of the Tenth Congress of Jewish Studies* (Jerusalem, 1990), Section C, I: 345-52. Wolfson, *op. cit.* n. 3.

²² Z. Baruchson, 'The Dissemination of Books—Holy Writings and Classic Literature in the Libraries of Jews in Renaissance Italy' (Hebrew), *Italia* 8 (1989), 87-99.

²³ I. Abravanel, *Shee'lot le-Rabbi Shaul Ha-kohen*, Venice, 1574, 15b, 20b.

²⁴ J. B. Sermoneta, *op. cit.* (n. 1), 138.

²⁵ See, for example: S. Regev, 'Studies of Philosophy in 15th Century Jewish Thought: R. Joseph ibn Shem Tov and R. Abraham Bibago' (Hebrew), *Da'at* 16 (1986), 57-85; J. Hacker, 'R. Abraham Bibago and the Controversy about The Study of Philosophy' (Hebrew), *Proceedings of the Fifth World Congress of Jewish Studies* (Jerusalem, 1969), 151-8; *idem.*, 'The Polemic Against Philosophy in Sixteenth Century Istanbul' (Hebrew), in *Mehqarim be-Qabbalah, be-Filosofiyah...* [Tishby Festschrift], ed. J. Dan & J. Hacker (Jerusalem, 1986), 507-36; J. B. Sermoneta, 'Scholastic Philosophical Literature' (*op. cit.* n. 1); A. L. Ivry, 'Remnants of Jewish Averroism in the Renaissance,' in *Jewish Thought in the Sixteenth Century*, ed. B. D. Cooperman (Cambridge, Mass., 1983), 243-65; H. Davidson, 'Medieval Jewish Philosophy in the Sixteenth Century,' in *Jewish Thought*, *ibid.* 106-45.

²⁶ S. Pines, Introduction to his English translation of Maimonides' *The Guide to the Perplexed*, Chicago, 1964; 'Scholasticism after Thomas Aquinas and the Teachings of Hasdai Crescas and his Predecessors', *Proceedings of the Israel Academy of Arts and Sciences*, 1:10, Jerusalem, 1967. Reprint in *idem*, *Studies in the History of Jewish Philosophy* (Hebrew), Jerusalem, 1977, 178-222.

²⁷ See on him S. Rosanes, *Qorot ha-Yehudim be-Turqiya ve-Arẓot Qedem* (Sofia, 1937), Vol. II, 108-110. Cf. J. Hacker, 'Israel among the Nations as Described by R. Shlomo le-Beit ha-Levi of Salonica' (Hebrew), *Zion* 34 (1969), 43-89; *idem.* 'Despair of Redemption and the Messianic Hope in the Writings of R. Shlomo le-Beit ha-Levi' (Hebrew), *Tarbiz* 39 (1970), 195-213.

²⁸ R. Joseph ibn Yahya, *Torah Or* (Bologna, 1525).

²⁹ R. Abraham Ibn Migash, *Kevod Elohim* (*op. cit.* n. 19), Introduction, 7, and n. 3 there.

The Importance of the Archive of the Hakham Bashi in Istanbul for the History of Ottoman Jewry

Yaron Harel

In recent years various articles have appeared evaluating the importance of various Ottoman archives for the history of the Jews of the Empire.¹ Consequently I do not need to reiterate the great importance of the archival material for historical research. Indeed, the archival sources are not the only sources available to the historian. History, and in particular modern history, may be written without resorting to archives. The historian of Jewish communities in the Middle East in modern times would seem to have an abundance of other sources of information available to him. Among them we should mention rabbinical literature of various kinds, travellers' accounts of their visits, periodicals, biographies and autobiographies. This list of sources creates a sense of abundant knowledge, which enables us to write historical monographs, based on relatively reliable sources. In fact, the information in these sources is fragmented and partial. Dr. Alexander Bein, who served as director of the Central Zionist Archives in Jerusalem and was the first state archivist of Israel stated:

Anyone who wishes to follow and describe the performance of individuals and public institutions in detail and in depth, to discern their motives with clarity, combining both personal-psychological factors and material ones, rational and irrational, substantive and subjective—and to describe this life faithfully, cannot do so without the most intimate material of public and private archives.²

The archive I wish to discuss in this paper is that of the Hakham Bashi in Istanbul, the Chief Rabbi of the Ottoman Empire. The discovery of the existence of this complete archive is a very significant landmark in the study of the history of the Jews in the Ottoman Empire in modern times. For many years the archive was thought to have been lost. Rumours regarding its having been burnt, stolen or hidden away passed by word of mouth for years. To the

best of my knowledge only two or three studies on Ottoman Jewry have made use of documents from this archive.³ At any rate this archive, which is still not yet open to the scholarly world, was photographed in the early 1970s, and since then—for over 25 years—the photos have lain dormant without exposure to a scholarly eye. One of the reasons for this was the assumption, which in the end turned out to be completely wrong, that most of the material in the archive concerns matters of marital status. Ms. Hadassah Assouline, director of the Central Archive for the History of the Jewish People at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, revealed the existence of the photos to me. Their importance became apparent only after I examined the various documents.

Avigdor Levy, showed that for the Jewish community of Istanbul the office of the Hakham Bashi was not of great importance until 1860. Until that year the appointees to the office did not come from the first echelon of the élite rabbis of the capital, and consequently the position was mostly representative and ceremonial. According to Levy, if the Hakham Bashi in those years also served as a liaison between the community and the authorities, he did so only in a limited way. Only from 1860 were leading rabbis appointed to the office, such as Rabbi Jacob Avigdor (1860-3) and Rabbi Yaqir Giron (1863-72) and the stature of the office increased as a result. Two offices were combined, for example, Hakham Bashi and Rav Hakolel, into one office.⁴ At the same time, every major community throughout the Middle East was entitled to elect its own Hakham Bashi and to manage its own affairs with total autonomy.

In fact, the Hakham Bashi in Istanbul was recognized officially by the authorities as the head of the Jewish community (*millet*) throughout the empire, and he represented the Jewish millet at imperial ceremonies. However, he actually had no hierarchal superiority with respect to chief rabbis of other communities in the empire, nor did he have any authority to interfere in their internal affairs. Until the 1870s chief rabbis in the major cities of the empire were appointed at the behest of the Hakham Bashi of Istanbul, but this was only a formality, usually only a rubber stamp, certifying the will of the local community.

Nevertheless the other Jewish communities recognized the Hakham Bashi in Istanbul as the liaison between them and the Sublime Porte. In times of trouble or danger in which communities felt the need to appeal to the central authorities, they did so through the intervention of the Hakham Bashi in the capital.⁵ Since he was the chief Jewish figure in the Ottoman Empire, the Hakham Bashi was referred to in these documents with royal epithets, such as 'the king sitting on the throne' or 'king of the Jews.' Thus the primary importance of the archive of the Hakham Bashi of Istanbul is that it

is a Jewish archive. Such an archive provides testimony and direct information on the internal life of the Jews, on their communal organization, national and international, from the point of view of the Jews themselves. Anyone who has perused the national archives of European countries—which do not have separate files on Jews alone – and have material only on the relations between the Jews and their surroundings, almost always from an external point of view— appreciates the great advantage of a corpus of documents written by Jews about themselves and from their own point of view, and not reflecting them from an external vantage point.⁶

A Jewish archival source, most of which is not written in Hebrew, is the archive of the Alliance Israélite Universelle in Paris. It is difficult to overestimate the importance of this archive for the history of communities in the Near East. Emissaries of the AIU, who operated in nearly all of the large communities of the area, sent back detailed written reports about these communities. These reports dealt with spiritual and cultural life, matters of leadership and communal organization, relations with the authorities and the surrounding society, the economic situation and even matters such as the beating up of a Jew in the streets. Nevertheless, as in the case of various national archives, the writers were delegates of the AIU, not local people, and described what they saw subjectively and from the point of view of the AIU's agenda. Their devotion to the ideas of the AIU often led the emissaries to paint the situation in dark colours.⁷

Consequently the correspondence found in the archive of the Hakham Bashi in Istanbul has the greatest importance. It enables us to see how these communities and their activities appeared to their own people. This archival material includes about 10,000 pages, most of them well preserved. The main subject of the correspondence is appeals to the Hakham Bashi regarding relations with the authorities and internal relations within the communities. It also contains discussions of matters of administration, finance, religion, the rabbinate, leadership, communal organization, taxation, law, education, marital status and more. Most of the documents were written in Hebrew in semi-cursive script. Not a small part of them were written in Ladino, Ottoman Turkish and French. There are also some documents in other languages including English, Russian, Bulgarian, Italian and Yiddish.

The archive includes numerous documents from between 1837 and 1872, but most of the documents are from the period of the two chief rabbis who served after that. The first was Hakham Bashi Moshe Halevy (1872-1908). His term was a significant turning point in the involvement of the Hakham Bashi of Istanbul in the internal affairs of the various communities. Indeed his term of service was

described recently as a period of 'darkness', during which conservative forces within Jewish society in Istanbul once again took over communal institutions.⁸ Nevertheless, the term of Rabbi Moshe Halevy was characterized by the penetration of modernization into various communities, modern education for increasing numbers of Jewish children, changes of life style in the home, the street, society, economy and government. The increase in disagreements within the communities regarding leadership and communal rule led to an increase in appeals to the head of the millet in Istanbul, asking him to use his influence in the halls of power in order to advance the cause of the disputing parties. This may explain why there are so many documents from this period.

The second Hakham Bashi from whose term there are many documents is Rabbi Haim Nahum, who served as Hakham Bashi after the Young Turk revolution in 1908. Letters addressed to him as late as 1919 may be found in the archive. This important period in Istanbul, has already been described by Esther Benbassa⁹ using documents about Rabbi Nahum that are found mainly in the archive of the AIU, but also in other archives, from the rabbi's point of view. A number of documents from the archive of the chief rabbinate of Istanbul also reached Prof. Benbassa. Nevertheless the documents in the archive of Haim Nahum himself draw a much fuller picture of the situation at the time, when the Hakham Bashi of Istanbul sought to expand his areas of influence on the internal affairs of other communities in the Empire. Many documents deal with requests for Rabbi Nahum to involve himself in disputes within the rabbinates of other communities, and in particular the rabbinate of Jerusalem. For example, Dr. Abraham Haim, published a single document the importance of which derives from its being the only primary source known on the correspondence between Istanbul and Jerusalem concerning this famous dispute over the rabbinate of Jerusalem.¹⁰ However, in the archive of the Hakham Bashi of Istanbul there are dozens of letters that were sent to Rabbi Haim Nahum on this matter by all of the sects and parties in Jerusalem.

The archive has extraordinary importance for the history of Jewish settlement in the Land of Israel, both traditional settlement and Zionist, and for the history of Zionism.

Naturally it would be even better if we had originals or copies of the responses by the Hakham Bashi to these requests. However, some of these responses are available in other archives, such as that of Rabbi Jacob Shaul Elyashar, in the Department of Manuscripts at the Jewish National and University Library, Jerusalem.

Thus the archive is the largest single collection of documents that deal exclusively with the Jewish communities of the Ottoman Empire. These documents shed light on the communities and on

unknown episodes in their history, provide new information regarding matters that were already discussed and verify or refute scholarly assumptions. An examination of these documents gives us the opportunity to encounter key figures in the communities and enriches our knowledge and understanding of how they operated.

Among the communities within the Empire and outside it who wrote to the Hakham Bashi of Istanbul, and whose appeals are found in the archive, we can point out: Damascus, Gaziantep, Diyarbakir, Aleppo, Antioch, Sida, Beirut, Alexandria, Cairo, Helwan, Port Said, Ankara, Smyrna, the Dardanelles, Adrianople, Gallipoli, Bursa, Asmara (in Ethiopia), Arta, Thessalonica, Ioanina, Crete, Rhodes, Drama, Corfu, Athens, Malta, Calcutta, Mosul, Baghdad, Basra, Benghazi, Tripoli, Sofia, Bucharest, Budapest, Sanaa, Bukhara, Kokand, Tashkent, Kermanshah, Tlemcen, Tunis, Jerba, Tangiers and many more. From the communities in the area of present-day Israel we find letters from Tiberias, Safed, Jerusalem, Acre, Jaffa, Haifa, Rishon le-Zion, Rosh Pinah, Yesod Hama'alah, Kefar Saba, Menahemiah, Zikhron Ya'aqov. In addition to appeals from communities in the Near East and from nearby communities in the Empire, there are collections of letters addressed to the Hakham Bashi of Istanbul from Eastern and Western Europe and the Americas, including: Amsterdam, Antwerp, Brussels, Paris, Bordeaux, Grenoble, Nice, Marseilles, London, Manchester, Rome, Livorno, Pizarro, Florence, Padua, Trieste, Berlin, Frankfurt, Hamburg, Munich, Lucerne, Vienna, Horodenka, Warsaw, Cracow, Radom, Vilna, Riga, Minsk, Pinsk, Brisk, Byalistok, Brest-Litovsk, New York, Baltimore, Cincinnati, Buenos Aires, Rio de Janeiro and more.

Professor Jacob M. Landau ended his article on sources for the history of the Jews of Egypt and Turkey with the words:

If we do not quickly make use of the sources on the last generations, some of these written sources will be lost, and the potential informants will pass away. The solution for this urgent task is to operate teams that will work on one country, or one period, or one discipline, in a concerted effort to examine and collect all the sources for the history of the Jews in the East, in order to prepare them for scientific research.¹¹

The academic committee of the Ben-Zvi Institute approved my proposal to carry out a basic study of this archive in the framework of the 'Oriens Judaicus' Project. The Israel Academy for Science and Humanities has agreed to support this project and granted a budget for research for four years. The research will also be conducted under the auspices of the Department of Jewish History at Bar Ilan

University and of the Central Archives for the History of the Jewish People, Jerusalem.

The purposes of the project are:

1. To catalogue the documents according to community.
This stage was completed over two years ago.
2. To transcribe and translate selected documents.
3. To publish a critical version of documents that are of particular interest together with an introduction to each document and notes.
4. To create an index to be made available both on computer and in printed form of all of the documents according to place, name and topic.

The importance of this basic research project is to provide scholars access to a corpus of documents from an enormous archive that deals primarily with the Jewish communities of the Ottoman Empire. As a result scholars will be able to improve our knowledge and understanding of the way of life of most of the Jewish communities in the Eastern Mediterranean area at the end of the Ottoman period. Likewise our understanding of inter-communal ties will increase, especially of the relations of the centre in Istanbul with communities in the periphery and with various Jewish communities throughout the world.

Documents

Below I present two documents from the archive of the Hakham Bashi in Istanbul. The first document is from the heads of the 'Society for the Support of Jews engaged in Agriculture and Crafts in Syria and the Land of Israel' to Hakham Bashi Haim Nahum, 1910. In the Central Archive for the History of the Jewish People, Jerusalem, it is document no. TR/Is-64, Microfilm no. HM2/8644.

Chief Rabbi Nahum, who had a centralistic attitude, made a tour of four months in communities of the Empire, among them the communities in Israel. During his stay in Israel he visited many settlements and met with representatives of various groups, among them residents of the *moshavot*. At the same time Rabbi Nahum was active in helping the Zionist leadership to remove the limitations that the Ottoman authorities had put on Jewish settlement in Israel. To sum up his visit the heads of the aforementioned society sent him a letter in which they expressed their feelings and their expectations from him.

The second document is from the heads of the community of Mosul to Hakham Bashi Haim Nahum, with regards to Jewish soldiers in the Ottoman army at the outbreak of the First World War. Its number in the Central Archive for the History of the Jewish People, Jerusalem, is TR/Is-168, microfilm no. HM2/9071.2.

One of the primary subjects that troubled Jewish communities throughout the Ottoman Empire after the revolution of the Young Turks was the question of the draft of young Jews, and respect for their religious rights during their military service. In conformity with the principles of the revolution, soldiers from non-Muslim minorities were entitled to practise their religion freely during their service. Nevertheless, the obligation of military service that began in the summer of 1909 caused a wave of emigration and flight among many young men, Jews and Christians alike, from the Arab provinces of the Empire to the West. With the outbreak of the First World War the Ottoman regime increased the pressure to draft young men into the military and did not take care to ensure the religious rights of minority soldiers. As a result of this situation the heads of the community of Mosul sent their letter to Rabbi Haim Nahum.

Document No. 1

The Executive Committee in the Holy Land
of the Society for the Support of Jews
engaged in Agriculture and Crafts
in Syria and the Land of Israel
Jaffa

To the Chief Rabbi of all the Jews in Turkey, the great Rabbi Haim Nahum, Shalom (Peace) and Berakha (Blessing).

Your excellency the Rabbi!

We see that you came to the Land of Israel not only in order to grace its dust, but also to see the life that is developing here, not only to visit the ruins and the holy graves of our people, but also to see the new, living and vibrant Hebrew settlement. After the great effort that you made in the holy city in order to make peace between its different parties,¹² you allowed yourself, with every right, to enjoy a rest of the spirit in the Hebrew settlements (moshavot), in a place where our brethren Israelites live normal lives, lives of health for both the body and the mind, lives of unity and fraternity. We hope that during the two first days that you passed in the settlements you already noticed that our Hebrew brethren in the land of our forefathers are capable of not only receiving charity, but also of enjoying the fruits of their own labour; you saw the divine garden of Eden, which they created in this forsaken land by the sweat of their brows and their undaunted spirit. And we are certain that the Sabbath that you first spent in a Hebrew settlement in the Land of Israel,¹³ will be a Sabbath of Sabbaths in your life that will always arouse in your soul the warmest and most pleasant feelings, the most Hebrew feelings.

Our noble Rabbi! You will yet visit and see Hebrew settlements flourishing in the Holy Land, and you will see and appreciate what our brethren have done in the land with their blood, sweat and great efforts. It would be difficult for any of us to tell you all the work and difficulty that these our brethren have suffered in their work and all the sacrifices they have made on the altar of this temple of theirs. God in heaven is our witness, the pure skies of our land are witnesses, and the Land that has absorbed their drops of sweat and blood, and in which those of our brethren who collapsed dead in the middle of their holy and pure toil have found eternal rest. They will give testimony without speech or words, and you in your Hebrew soul will absorb and feel all of this.

However all the work of the pioneers of the new Hebrew yishuv (settlement) in the Land of Israel might have been in vain, if helpers

and supporters had not come to them from outside. The first to aid them was the association *Hovevei Zion* ('Lovers of Zion');¹⁴ next came our distinguished brother, Baron Rothschild,¹⁵ and after him other organizations came quickly,¹⁶ who are working today for the benefit of the Jewish settlement in the Land of Israel.

As the officers of the *Hovevei Zion* Association we shall allow ourselves to relate to you briefly the history of the work of our society in the Land of Israel and the way it works today.

Already thirty years ago, when the first Hebrew settlements for cultivating the Land of Israel were established, many of our brethren in Russia were aroused and came together to found the *Hovevei Zion* Association, whose object was to help the farmers in the Land of Israel both materially and spiritually. In their work the *Hovevim* in Russia joined the *Hovevim* of settlement in the Land of Israel in other countries, and would help from time to time, particularly the settlements Gedera, Petakh Tiqva and Yesod Hama'alah.

In 1890 the *Hovevim* in Russia received a licence from the government to establish a society for the support of Jews cultivating the land and engaged in crafts in Syria and the Land of Israel,¹⁷ and in this way the work of the *Hovevim* became more permanent and organized.¹⁸ In the first years the work of the society in the Land of Israel helped to establish and maintain the *moshava* (settlement) Qastina. During the crisis in the settlement of *moshavot* between 1900 and 1903, when hundreds of Hebrew workers remained unemployed,¹⁹ our society founded a special fund for workers and thus tens of families of workers settled on the land. Recently the workers' farms 'Ein Ganim and Beer Ya'aqov have been established with its help. According to the annual budget enclosed herein, the honourable rabbi will see that our society cannot set up new *moshavot* with its minimal funds, but it tries to help as best it can some of the existing settlements in matters that a new settlement can never handle on its own in the first years of its existence: guarding the settlement, the *verqa* tax,²⁰ maintaining a ritual slaughterer, medical aid and in particular maintaining schools. These settlers in the cities of the Land of Israel benefit from the work of the society, which participates together with other societies in founding *hamalveh* (cheap credit), support for hospitals and workshops in Jaffa, kindergartens and schools. In its work for the benefit of the schools the society is notably active in Jaffa. Here it has built a wonderful house for the girls' school that serves four hundred girls. With its minimal material aid, but with its mainly moral support, it has set up and maintained the Hebrew Gymnasium, and also helped the Orthodox Tahqemoni school to the best of its ability. Our society supplies a Hebrew teacher to the Bezalel school in Jerusalem and also helps to pay the

Hebrew language teacher in the schools of the Alliance Israélite Universelle in Beirut, Haifa and Tiberias.

Our society is aware that with its limited resources it cannot supply much material aid to the Hebrew *yishuv*; for that there exist larger and wealthier societies. However our society knows the great value of educating children as a primary means for deepening their roots and strengthening their ties to the Land and the value of the Hebrew language as the only national language that can unite all the parts of our people here, so that they understand one another and help one another in material and spiritual life in order to settle and develop in the Land.

And in one more respect our society aids the settlers in the Land of Israel. A great number have suffered in previous years because those who wished to settle in the Land of Israel did not have the right information regarding what transpires in this land, and even when they came to the Land, they were like the blind groping in the dark. And now our society has established information offices in Odessa, Istanbul, Haifa, Jaffa and Jerusalem. The offices provide accurate information to all who request it regarding the conditions whereby they can settle in Turkey in general and in the Land of Israel in particular, and help with advice and knowledge of the place for those who have already arrived as settlers, especially if they need to make a living from work and crafts. That is the work of our society using its meagre resources.

Our noble rabbi! The compassionate mother, who accompanies her beloved son when he travels far away worries about him in her heart and blesses him with the hope that God will send his angel before him in the form of generous people who will take him close to them and guide him with good advice in the new land in which he lives. The central committee of our society in Odessa accompanies with concern all of our brethren, who are forced to seek material and spiritual refuge beyond the sea. The first city for these migrants on their way is Istanbul,²¹ the capital of Turkey. There you preside in glory as the official head of the Jews of Turkey, and your influence is great in the highest levels of the government. Please be a merciful father to those who come to devote the best of their material and spiritual powers to productive and useful lives for themselves and for others, guide them with good advice and be for them a help and a source of support at all times when they turn to you.

Please try to remove the ugly stain from them, the 'red note,'²² which casts them, and together with them all the Jews of Turkey, into disgrace and defamation before the other peoples among us. And when enemies rise up against them from among other peoples and religions, accusing them falsely for their own purposes, please be their defender, proving their innocence and make their justice as

clear as sunlight. When you are here with them where they live, you may see for yourself, that while providing sustenance for their families, they are beneficial to their land and to their neighbouring peoples as honest and diligent citizens. By increasing the crop yield of the land they increase the government's income; in the vicinity of the settlements many peasant villages have developed and grown wealthier, and also in the cities they improve the material and spiritual situation with their diligent labour. Please make all of this clear to the noble government, to the mighty of the kingdom, and to all the best of the people, since it is not easy to find such beneficial citizens as they are, who settle the barren land, build its ruins for their own happiness and that of the general public. The hearts of those returning from the Diaspora are full of longing for the land of the fathers and great love for their old-new homeland, in which they hope to find rest for their weary souls from the hands of their oppressors, in which under the flag of freedom and the symbol of innocence and hope they wish to develop naturally both materially and spiritually and to become the chosen people among the other neighbouring peoples in the great, united and progressive Ottoman Empire.

Most noble rabbi! Many before you have been Hakham Bashi of Togarma,²³ but none of them saw an obligation to visit the Holy Land. Who knows if it was not for this purpose that you reached the greatness of head of the Jews of Turkey, for this mission, to be the father of those of our brethren who sought to restore the stones and the earth of the land of the Patriarchs? Who knows if it will not be written in the history of our people that during the period of the Chief Rabbi of Turkey, Rabbi Haim Nahum, he knew how to maintain the highest level of his office?

We have done our part, please do your part, and the Lord of Israel will do his part, its strength since antiquity. We are sure that together with us, all the mourners of Zion and Jerusalem from all over the Diaspora send you a blessing at this hour, all the healers of its injury²⁴ and all those who dream of the return of the Exiles. Peace be upon you, our brother and our head,²⁵ a blessing from the depths of our heart, may you succeed in your path reaching old age.

On behalf of the society 'for the Support of Jews engaged in Agriculture and Crafts in Syria and the Land of Israel,'

Dr. H. Hisin²⁶ M. Shenkin²⁷ Jaffa, Sunday, 19 Sivan 5670
(26 June 1910)

Document No. 2

...Dear Sir!

It is well known that ever since the creation of liberty in the government of Turkey, may it be exalted, it drafts both Jews and the uncircumcised²⁸ as soldiers just as it takes Ishmaelites,²⁹ and all of the people offer their sons with great love to do this service willingly. And out of the love of the exalted government for the soldiers, it decreed saying that the Jews may rest on their Sabbath days and be exempt from any service on those days. However since the wars and these great upheavals, because of which twenty to forty-five-year olds have become soldiers, they have started to make them work on Sabbaths and Holidays, and the cry of the people breaks out and rises to the heart of the heavens and there is no grace and no mercy! And since the Days of Awe, the days of *Rosh Hashbana* and the *awe-inspiring Yom Kippur* are approaching, we fear that they may make them work on them as well, God forbid. Therefore we have come to knock on the gates of your mercy, and have cast our eyes up to you, our father... so that you would speak on their behalf to whoever has the authority to allow them total rest on these Days of Awe, and especially the *awe-inspiring Yom Kippur* to refrain from work as required because at this time more than one thousand five hundred Jewish souls work here in this city as soldiers, and are not allowed to rest on the Sabbath day.

We trust that because of your love and compassion for your people you will make every effort to see that the decree of Berat apply to the aforementioned Days of Awe since it is a great commandment, incomparable, and might shield those who observe it like a thousand shields and all that belong to them.

Spoken by your servants the directors and leaders of the Community of Yeshurun, here in the city of Mosul, may God protect it, who sign with tears in their eyes and in their hearts.

The young Eliyahu b. Moshe Barazani, may his end be good.

The young Moshe Shim'on Eliyah, may God sustain and preserve him.

The young Suleiman b. Hakham Eliyahu Barazani.

The young Zemah Suleiman Reuven

Zalah Aharon Sasson

Notes

- ¹ See for example A. Cohen, 'Ottoman Sources for the History of Ottoman Jews: How Important?', in A. Levi ed., *The Jews of the Ottoman Empire*, Princeton 1994, 687-704; H. Inalcik, 'Ottoman Archival Materials on Millets', in B. Braude & B. Lewis ed., *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire*, Vol. 1 (London, New York 1982), 437 ff.
- ² A. Bein, 'Al Atido shel Avareinu – Matsavam veGoralam shel ha'Arkhionim ha'Yehudim baTefutsot uv.Arets', *Arkhion*, 4 (1990), 30-1 (in Hebrew)
- ³ See for example Y. Ratsabi, 'Igrot Yehudei Teman leRabbi Haim Nabum', *Sinai*, 72 (1973), 147-60. (in Hebrew). As far as I know, Prof. Ratsabi did not see the whole archive. He received only some photocopies of some documents about the Jews of Yemen. My colleague Prof. E. Benbassa informed me that she also saw some documents from the archives at the time she was writing her books (*Un grand rabbin sépharade en politique, 1892-1923*, Paris 1990; and *Ha'Yabadut haOthmanit ben Hitma'arevut leTsiyonot*, Jerusalem 1996 (in Hebrew).
- ⁴ A. Levi, 'The Creation and Development of the Institution of 'Hakham Bashi' in the Ottoman Empire', *Pe'amim*, 55 (1993), 38-56 (in Hebrew).
- ⁵ Questions concerning the Jewish religious law were sent to the high religious court (Bet Din) in Jerusalem
- ⁶ On European and Ottoman archives and their importance to the history of the Jews of the Ottoman Empire see for example M. Eliav, *Under Imperial Austrian Protection—Selected Documents from the Archives of the Austrian Consulate in Jerusalem 1849-1917*, Jerusalem 1985 (In Hebrew); E. Bashan, *The Taragano Family—Jewish Diplomats in the Dardanelles 1699-1817*, Jerusalem 1999 (In Hebrew); B. Lewis, 'Ha'Arkhionim haOthmanim keMakor leToldot haYehudim beErets Yisrael', in B. Lewis, *On History – Collected Studies*, Jerusalem 1988, 111-28 (In Hebrew); B. Lewis, 'Ha'Arkhionim haOthmanim keMakor leToldot haYehudim', op.cit. 235-45; A.M. Hyamson, ed., *The British Consulate in Jerusalem*, 2 Vols. (London, 1939-41)
- ⁷ See A. Rodrigue, *De l'instruction à l'émancipation* (France, 1989), 75-7; P. Dumont, 'Jewish Communities in Turkey during the Last Decades of the Nineteenth Century in the Light of the Archives of the Alliance Israélite Universelle,' in B. Braude & B. Lewis ed., *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire*, Vol. 1 (New York, London 1982), 210-16.
- ⁸ E. Benbassa, in her study *Le Judaïsme ottoman entre occidentalisation et sionisme 1908-1920*, Paris 1990, 25. On the other hand Prof. Avigdor Levy described the same term as the best years of Ottoman Jewry in modern times. A. Levi ed., *The Jews of the Ottoman Empire* (Princeton, 1994), 121.
- ⁹ E. Benbassa, *Un grand Rabbin sépharade en politique 1892-1923, ...*
- ¹⁰ A. Haim, 'The Hakham Bashi of Istanbul and the 'War of the Rabbinate' in Jerusalem,' *Pe'amim* 12 (1982), 105-113 (in Hebrew).
- ¹¹ J.M. Landau, 'The Sources for Research of the Jews of Egypt and the Jews of Turkey in the Last Generations', *Pe'amim*, 23 (1985), 110
- ¹² By this they refer to the disagreement over the Rabbinate in Jerusalem.
- ¹³ Rabbi Haim Nahum spent one Sabbath in Rishon Le-Zion
- ¹⁴ A movement founded in the wake of the publication of Dr. Leon Pinsker's *Auto-Emancipation* in 1881. Its members intended to emigrate to the Land of Israel and settle it. The name of the movement, which had many branches in Eastern Europe and elsewhere, was given it in June 1887 in the second convention of Hovevei Zion in Russia, which met at Drosgenik. See below.
- ¹⁵ Edmond James Rothschild (1845-1934), who was called *Hanadiv Ha-yadu`a* (the well-know philanthropist).
- ¹⁶ e.g. IKA, founded by Baron Maurice de Hirsch.

¹⁷ The Odessa Committee, founded by the efforts of A. Cederbaum, editor of *Hamelitz*.

¹⁸ The following addition appears in the margins of the page: 'Besides the settlements mentioned, it helped the settlements Rehovot, Hedera, Mishmar etc'.

¹⁹ In these years, the IKA, hoping to improve the economic status of the *moshavot*, conducted a policy of preferring cheap Arab workers to expensive Jewish workers. Many Jewish workers were fired and needed help

²⁰ Land tax.

²¹ The text reads Qushta, i.e. Constantinople, as the city was called by the Jews at the time.

²² The *tizgara*. From 1901, in order to prevent any immigration to Israel, every Jew entering the land was required to submit his passport to the Ottoman authorities and receive instead a temporary resident licence for three months. Because of its red colour, the licence was called by contemporaries 'the red note'.

²³ As the Ottoman Empire was called by Jews, after the expression in Genesis 10:3.

²⁴Cf. Nahum 3:19.

²⁵ cf. Genesis 46:21.

²⁶ Mir 1865 – Tel Aviv 1932. Member of the first group of Bilu immigrants. Hisin studied medicine in Switzerland. From 1905 he was the representative of 'the Odessa Committee in Jaffa'. During World War I Hisin served as a military physician in the Turkish army.

²⁷ Ula (Belarus) 1871 – Chicago 1924. One of the leading communal workers of the *yishuv* in many areas. Among other things he served as a member of the Zionist Executive Committee, head of the *Aliyah* Office and the Information Office of *Hovevei Zion* in Jaffa

²⁸ Christians

²⁹ Muslims.

Jewish Entrepreneurship in Salonica during the Final Decades of the Ottoman Regime in Macedonia (1881-1912)

Orly C. Meron

Introduction

During the final decades of Ottoman rule in Macedonia the area experienced a boom of entrepreneurial activity. Several scholars including Paul Dumont,¹ and Donald Quataert² commented on the spectacular industrial and commercial development and its impact on the indigenous population. They emphasized the significant role of Jewish individuals, e.g. Allatini, Modiano and Mizrahi, in Salonica at the turn of twentieth century. Quataert, who documented and analysed the industrial development of the entire Empire,³ stated that Salonica was unique in the sense that its industrial promoters were Jews.⁴

The present study focuses on the economic activity of Jewish entrepreneurs at the close of the twentieth century. Adopting the methodological stance introduced by Simon Kuznets, we will focus not only on 'the exceptional individual case' but on the 'mass of small and medium business that determine the group function'.⁵ In order to assess Jewish entrepreneurial activity, I will examine the entrepreneurial activity of this group as a minority in the plural Ottoman society,⁶ from a comparative inter-ethnic perspective.⁷ According to a methodological framework for the study of entrepreneurship of minorities in general, and of Jewish minorities in particular, I assume that the magnitude and strategies of Jewish entrepreneurship in Salonica derived from the interaction between the group characteristics and the structure of available opportunities.⁸ The latter element includes market conditions and the ease of access to business opportunities and is highly dependent on the level of inter-ethnic competition and state policies (Section I). The first element includes the group's reaction to the changing conditions in Ottoman society and its ability to mobilize ethnic resources to promote its business interests (Section II).

The aim of this paper, which presents and interprets findings of an empirical study based on official Austro-Hungarian data,⁹ is to offer a quantitative analysis of the entire scope of Jewish business entrepreneurship from a comparative inter-ethnic perspective of the entrepreneurial activity of Ottoman Macedonia on the eve of the Greek annexation. The empirical study, based upon a complete list of firms operating in the province of Salonica, systematically illuminating the entrepreneurial patterns and strategies of the Jewish entrepreneurs as an integral part of the Jewish community. More specifically, this article demonstrates how the Jewish minority of Salonica became a surrogate for the Ottoman bourgeoisie during the semi-colonial phase of Ottoman Macedonia.

I: European Semi-Colonialism in Ottoman Macedonia: A New Opportunity Structure

The legal liberal reforms initiated by the Ottoman Empire not only removed the obstacles to capital accumulation faced by entrepreneurs, but also encouraged foreign investment in Ottoman territories. The enlightened Ottoman legislation provided equal legal status to foreigners and non-Muslims (1839, 1856, 1869, 1876). Reforms included protection of private assets of Ottoman subjects from arbitrary confiscation, cancellation of the prohibition on sale of realty to foreigners (1856), including consent to foreign ownership of realty (1867), and tax shields and benefits to foreigners stipulated in the Capitulation agreements, designed to encourage foreign investments in the infrastructure.¹⁰ The equalitarian legal framework thus granted foreigners and non-Muslim minorities access to new entrepreneurial opportunities.¹¹

The abolition of the trade monopolies of the Ottoman Empire and the establishment of free trade zones (1838) effectively transferred control of imports from the Ottoman authorities and guilds to European hands.¹² The formation of the Ottoman Public Debt Administration (1881) laid the foundation for European semi-colonialism based on a division of authority between economic (European) and political legislative (Ottoman) spheres.¹³ The institutionalisation of the foreign financial sector led to substantial changes in the modes of production (e.g. new agricultural technologies), trade and consumerism, which in turn created new socio-economic conditions for the masses in Macedonia. Historians such as Stavrianos have observed that from 1878 onwards, concurrent with the incursion of European imperialism into the region,¹⁴ substantial changes in the socio-economic existence of Balkan citizens occurred.

Foreign investments in Macedonian infrastructure promoted the consolidation of a single 'economic unit',¹⁵ comprised of the city of Salonica and its hinterland area. Recurring fire damage in Salonica during the 1890s stimulated the city's development as the Macedonian metropolis, both as an administrative capital and as a casern for Ottoman troops.

The present discussion is limited to the geographical boundaries of the Ottoman Salonica Province (*vilayet*), roughly the area of Greek Macedonia (from November 1912), identified as the historical geopolitical framework relevant to the transition from Ottoman Empire to modern economic units that are states. Economic growth, driven by both regional and world markets created new opportunities for entrepreneurs in this region, where the majority (87%) of the Macedonian Jewish population was concentrated.¹⁶

II: The Jewish Minority: A Demotic Ethnic Community in Transformation

The new economic conditions and the new liberal legislation for the non-Muslims in the late nineteenth century impacted the demographic development of the entire Jewish minority and stimulated changes in its internal structure. Since the first half of the nineteenth century, the Salonican Jewish minority had been perceived as a deep-seated demotic ethnic-religious community of Ottoman Jews,¹⁷ impoverished and lacking modern education and skills.¹⁸ Within this larger community, however, a tiny, favoured Jewish elite comprised of both 'foreign' and Ottoman Jews holding *berats*, enjoyed privileged commercial conditions embodied in the Capitulations. This privileged élite acquired capital, as well as linguistic and commercial skills, as economic intermediaries in international trade in the Mediterranean.¹⁹

A comparison of official Ottoman data (1893, 1906) published by Karpat, indicates a 40% increase in the province's Jewish population at the turn of the twentieth century, in contrast to a decline of about 7% in the total population of the province.²⁰ The latter was due primarily to casualties of the military conflict in Macedonia and the emigration of peasants to the New World while the demographic growth of the Macedonian Jewish population was pronounced due to the compact nature of its historically urban spatial distribution.²¹ The mass of the Jewish population was concentrated in the central sub-district of Salonica, and became the dominant demographic ethnic component in the city. According to official data (1905/6), the Jewish element constituted the majority in the city (55%), larger than either the ruling Muslim segment (ca. 31%) or the Greek minority (ca. 13%).²²

Population growth was a response to the attraction the Macedonian metropolis held for Jewish immigrants, both Ottoman subjects and foreign citizens. The Jewish population of Salonica, similarly to other Jewish communities in Ottoman territories,²³ was comprised of a numerically dominant, indigenous core, together with 'recently arrived' immigrants. The former included refugees from Ottoman areas lost to the Empire, especially the new national Balkan states,²⁴ while the latter, usually from Italy, were attracted by the favourable economic conditions facilitated by the Capitulation regime.²⁵ The Italian Jews became an integral part of the group's collective economic action. This élite utilized their accumulated financial and human capital, to stimulate the adaptation of the entire Jewish community to modern Western civilization. Solidarity between Jewish local élites and their local masses, and also with their counterparts in other European states, was renewed as a result of a combination of events: the new economic opportunities, which required an injection of loyal local labour, on one hand and anti-Semitic incidents, both in Europe and the Ottoman Empire, which functioned as 'reactive ethnic resources' by regenerating solidarity,²⁶ on the other hand. Jewish philanthropic associations, the most prominent being the Alliance Israélite Universelle, contributed to this growing sense of group identification by bolstering the weak community institutions with investments in education and welfare.²⁷

In this formative era of the new national states of the Balkans, the historical reputation of the Jewish community as a loyal religious *millet* was reinforced. The Jewish Ottoman citizens, lacking in political and territorial aspirations, became favourites of the Ottoman élites. The political behaviour of the Jewish community remained faithful and pro-Turkish, even in the brief period under the Young Turks' régime.²⁸ Thus, with its dominant demographic presence, its political loyalty and repository of suitable skills, the Jews were uniquely positioned to fulfil functions, which were beyond the abilities or desires of the demographically or politically Ottoman dominating class.

III: Data and Variables

The empirical study reported herein is based on an official, undisclosed, 200-page report (1915) in German, compiled and issued by the Museum of Commerce, by order of the Austro-Hungarian authorities.²⁹ Since it was not issued or used for propaganda purposes, I assume that the report is not biased.

The data, derived primarily from previous Austrian Consular Reports (1904-14), have been thoroughly researched by scholars, including Donald Quataert, in relation to the industrialization in the

Empire at the turn of twentieth century.³⁰ The list of firms operating in Salonica, which appears at the end of the report, apparently derived from *Annuaire Oriental 1913* (Ottoman year-book), however, has not been quantitatively analysed to date.

This list includes firms located in the city of Salonica and its surrounding countryside. Due the unsystematic recording of the data, recurring firms' names caused statistical dependency in the original list. In order to generate an independent sample suitable for statistical analysis, I classified the firms by two variables:

1. 'Ethnic origin', based on a name criterion, following a method used by several scholars, including B. Lewis and C. Issawi.³¹ Categories were Jewish, Greek, Turkish and 'others'. The latter included Slavic, European or anonymous firms as well as multi-ethnic partnerships. Attribution of ethnic origin by names, using onomastic methods, is supported by the fact that 96% of the firms were privately owned.

2. 'Branch' of economic activity, based on sub-divisions of the following sectors appearing in the Greek census (1928): industry, commerce, finance and brokerage. Each firm was attributed to a single branch, based on its primary activity. Thus, the list effectively provides a 'natural sample' composed of commercial and industrial enterprises for the final year of Ottoman rule in Salonica (1912) (see Appendix). The resulting frequency distribution by 'ethnic origin' and 'branch' supports an empirical, inter-ethnic comparative analysis of entrepreneurship.

The list, which excludes peddlers and petty artisans, serves as a reliable source for analysing the significant economic activity in the urban business sector, in which the majority of Jewish labour was involved. According to a report by the *Union des Associations Israélites* delegation, which visited the city in January 1913, 23,955, of a total 24,385 Jewish workers were employed in commerce, industry and services (transportation).³²

IV: Economic Conditions and Firm Ethnicity

The distribution of firms by branch (see Fig.1) points to a structure of economic opportunities, which emerged as a result of the legislative and economic developments accompanying the European semi-colonialism in Ottoman Macedonia.

Fig. 1: Distribution of Firms by Branch (N=931) (Salonica, 1912)

No.	Branch	Number of Firms	% of Total
1	Food and beverages	100	10.7
2	Chemicals	28	3.0
3	Construction materials	49	5.3
4	Energy and public utilities	16	1.7
5	Metal	42	4.5
6	Wood	29	3.1
7	Hides, leather and footwear	57	6.1
8	Textiles	50	5.4
9	Clothing	98	10.5
10	Printing, paper and office equipment	52	5.6
11	Tobacco	18	1.9
12	Domestic wares and furniture	41	4.4
13	Trade in agricultural products (incl. grain)	135	14.5
14	General wholesale and retail	39	4.2
15	Finance and commission trade	177	19.0
	Total sum	931	100.0

Source: Adapted from the Appendix.

Specifically, we note the emergence of three types of opportunities:

1. A demand for primary exports from the district of Salonica to European states, including agricultural raw material (tobacco, opium and wool) and mining products, based on a budding world demand;
2. A demand for imported industrial products, including machinery (for agriculture, spinning and sewing); materials for industry (yarn for weaving, fabrics for clothing) and luxury products (jewellery, pharmaceuticals), based on new domestic demand, and;
3. A demand for local craft ware and manufacturing products, including furniture, clothing, construction materials (bricks, cement, glass plates) and printing, also supported by domestic demand.

Segmentation of the firms by 'ethnic origin' (see Fig. 2) highlights the dominant share of the Jewish enterprises in the Salonican economy. The high percentage of Jewish enterprises (58%) compared with the small share of Turkish enterprises (8%), is basically explained by the different settlement types of the Salonican Jewish and Turkish populations. In contrast to the Turkish majority dispersed throughout the Macedonian countryside, the Jewish minority was concentrated in the Macedonian metropolis, consistent

with their ‘urban economic heritage’. This traditional preference necessitated by the Jewish communal lifestyle explains Jewish density in urban occupations (commerce and industry).

Fig.2: Firms by Ethnic Origin (4) (N=931) (Salonica, 1912)

Ethnic Origin	Frequency	%
Jewish	538	57.8
Greek	164	17.6
Turkish	76	8.2
Others	153	16.4
Total	931	100

Source: Adapted from the Appendix


V: Ethnic Representation in the Business Sector

As equal conditions are a necessity in order to quantify the ethnic distribution in business, I therefore calculated the representation of ethnic enterprises exclusively in proportion to the corresponding ethnic segments of the city population (that is, urban occupations among urban populations). This calculation is based on the Greek census (1913), conducted in the city by the Greek governor immediately following the invasion.³³ Of all available data, this source reflects the smallest proportion (39%) of the Jewish element in the total population, i.e. 61,439 of the total population of 157,889 (see Fig. 3).

The smallest value found for ‘Turkish’ in contrast to the highest value found for ‘others’ illuminates the economic nature of the prevailing semi-colonialism in the region. The absence of state initiative was the *raison d’être* for the intensive economic activity by foreign entrepreneurs, especially in establishing infrastructure for utilities where the lack of state involvement was especially prominent.³⁴

The results show an over-representation of ‘Jewish’ and ‘others’ in the Salonican business sector, in contrast to the under-representation of ‘Turkish’ and ‘Greek’ enterprises. The relatively high proportion of Jewish enterprises stemmed from the effective exclusion of Jews from public sector activities, as well as this minority’s preference for economic activity in the competitive private sector. Even after the establishment of the new bureaucracy, the politically dominant Turkish majority prevented the entry of Jews and other non-Muslim minorities into the ranks of the public sector.³⁵ Moreover, the élites’ traditional inclination for government and the military resulted in an absence of a business tradition of their own. Finally, the delayed

Fig.3: Ethnic Representation Index



Source: See Fig. 1

Note: Ethnic Representation Index =ERI; $ERI = E_j/P_j$

When E_j = percentage of the total sum of the enterprises of a given ethnic group (j) out of the total sum of the whole enterprises constituting the sample. P_j = percentage of the given ethnic group (j) out of the total city population. For the population data by the ethnic groups see below note 33. ERI values of 'others' include Multi-ethnic groups. The ERI value is greater than 0.

development of a modern, public education system led to a shortage in Western business and linguistic skills, essential for the politically dominant masses' access to the newly emerging opportunities. In this lacuna, Jewish entrepreneurs were well-equipped to pervade the new niches, by virtue of their commercial skills, available labour and political loyalty. Greeks and Armenians, who served as consul dragomans and clerks, were rejected by the Ottomans due to their collective Russian patronage and nationalist aspirations,³⁶ yet 'foreign' Jews, although no more than a minor element in the total Jewish population,³⁷ enjoyed the confidence of both European interests which they even represented as consuls³⁸ and of the Ottoman élites, owing to their affiliation to the mass of the loyal Jewish community. The loyalty of the local majority of the Jewish population to the Ottoman Empire and the absence of any local territorial aspirations of their own is highlighted by the lack of any official connection to the Central Zionist Organization prior to the Greek Occupation (1912).³⁹ Thus, Ottoman Jews, as favoured co-

citizens and trustees of the old Ottoman élites, and 'foreign' Jews, as representatives of European economic semi-colonialism, cooperated in assuming a key role in the local economy. By virtue of its competitive advantages over the Ottoman majority and over other minorities, the Jewish community in the Macedonian metropolis was able to fulfil functions that the indigenous majority was unable or unwilling to provide.

Despite the increasingly intense political struggle in Macedonia during the last decades of the Ottoman régime, there is merit to the argument that the antithetical aims and aspirations of the various ethnic elements in Ottoman Macedonia promoted pragmatic adhoc co-operation with the Jewish intermediaries in the rural region.⁴⁰ For example, political rivalry between Greeks and Bulgarians, and between Greeks and Turks, on one hand, added to historically-rooted competition between Jewish traders and Greek rivals on the other side,⁴¹ enabled Jews to assume a role of intermediates for both Slavic peasants and Muslim large-estates (*çiftlik*) owners.⁴²

In addition to the business climate, influenced both by inter-ethnic relations as well as intra-ethnic relations, the ethnic demographic compositions of local consumer markets was a crucial factor for Jewish initiative activity. The demographic dominance of the Turkish element in rural Macedonia,⁴³ in addition to the demographic superiority of the Jews in the Macedonian metropolis, ensured stable markets, both rural and urban, for Jewish commercial initiatives.


VI: Ethnic Entrepreneurial Concentration by Branch

Jewish enterprises were scattered in all 15 branches, highlighting the absence of concentration in any particular sector. In 14 out of the 15 branches, Jewish enterprises comprised no less than one half of the total industry enterprises; in 9 industries, the proportion of Jewish enterprises exceeded their proportion in the total sample (58%). In contrast, 30% of the 76 Turkish enterprises were concentrated in labour-intensive textiles, characteristically associated with minorities and immigrants.

The Entrepreneurial Concentration Index validates these findings. The values of this global index range from 0 (for total equal dispersion) to 1 (not including 1). The greater the index value, the greater the concentration of the group's enterprises, i.e. dispersion in a small number of branches (see Fig.4). The lowest index of the Jewish group (0.111) shows that this ethnic group behaved as a majority, while the highest index (0.628) of the Turkish group, influenced by their high concentration in the 'clothing' branch, indicates an entrepreneurial pattern characteristic of minorities.

The ethnic distribution by branch contradicts the existence of an ethnic division of entrepreneurship, and demonstrates both vertical and lateral involvement of Jews in the city’s economy. Furthermore, the above findings support the argument that the interaction between the demographic size of the Jewish minority, its geographical concentration and its ‘economic heritage’²⁴⁴ influence the extent of the minority’s distribution throughout the industries in the economy.

Fig. 4: Entrepreneurial Concentration Index



Source: See Fig.1

Note: Entrepreneurial Concentration Index= $EI_i = \sum_{i=1}^{15} |1 - I_{ij}| * W_i$

$I_{ij} = O_{ij} / E_i$ when O_{ij} = percentage of the enterprises in branch (i) out of the total sum of enterprises of a given ethnic group (j) ; E_i = percentage of the enterprises in branch (i) out of the total sum of enterprises in the whole sample. W_i = The relative portion ($W_i < 1$) of branch (i) in the whole sample ($\sum A_{ij}$), when $\sum A_{ij}$ = Distribution of the firms of a given ethnic group (j) by branch (i). This index refers to the whole sample and assumes that the total number of firms is not distributed equally between the 15 branches. This index is the weighted average of the absolute representational disparity (1-I) in the various branches of a given ethnic group. An hierarchic version of this index was used in ethnic research focused on on Israeli society, conducted by sociologists including S.N.Eisenstadt and Moshe Lissak. The index was introduced by Yaacov Nahon. See: Yaacov Nahon, *Trends in the Occupational Status: The Ethnic Dimension 1958-1981*, (Jerusalem: The Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies, 1984), (in Hebrew with an introduction in English).

VII: Jewish Areas of Specialty

Despite their overall dispersion in the economy, Jewish enterprises were found to dominate specific sub-branches. Those niches controlled by the Jews reflect their preference for entering the new, relatively high-growth sectors, which offered profitable opportunities for entrepreneurs (see Figure 1).⁴⁵ For example, Jewish merchants were active in the export of opium, being a new commercial branch which emerged in response to world market forces, driven by the development of the pharmaceutical industry, especially morphine.⁴⁶

The *Jewish specialties* comprise three main groups, based on their economic activity type (see Fig.5).

Fig. 5: 'Jewish' Sub-Branches (Salonica, 1912)

Sub-branch	Total firms (N)	Jewish firms (N)	% Jewish Firms out of the total
Grain and flour	34	29	85.3
Banking	39	33	84.6
Silkworms & cocoons	13	11	84.6
Opium	10	7	70
Pharmaceutics	13	9	69.2
Watches & valuable articles	19	17	89.5
Colonial commodities	47	38	80.9
Bones & rags	5	5	100
Cotton yarn (Trade)	7	7	100
Wood coal	8	8	100
Glass, plates & metals	17	16	94.5
Leather	8	7	87.5
Ropes & jute sacks	15	12	80
Wool, yarn & fabrics	14	10	71.4

Source: See Fig.1

The first group includes finance, banking and the organization of primary exports. The absence of Ottoman banking and credit institutions able to finance the growing Macedonian economy, left this niche open for local and foreign non-Muslim élites, most of which were Jews (85%). Jewish banks, with capital accumulated from previous foreign trade activity,⁴⁷ an ability to mobilize additional capital through networks of co-religionists or co-citizens in European states or the new Balkan states,⁴⁸ and an economic tradition in banking and money lending, functioned as a source of

local credit.⁴⁹ By virtue of their dominance in the finance sector, and the political support they enjoyed from the Ottoman élites, Jewish businessmen wielded an advantage over their Greek competitors,⁵⁰ and supported the finance of large-scale trade. This included primary agricultural exports to European states and imports of semi-raw material and manufacturing products from Western states to Macedonia. Jewish merchants' ability to finance costs of storage, transportation and shipping and insurance, all necessary for supplying valuable agricultural products (e.g. opium, silk cocoon) to the Western monopolies, facilitated their vertical penetration into the entire chain of international commerce. In the nationalist Macedonian hinterland, fraught with terror, 'Ottoman' Jewish traders' mobility and access enabled them to serve as loyal, skilled middlemen between the rural cultivators and the officials of Public Debt Administration in Salonica Province. Business networks between co-religionists, which included both officials at the port of Salonica and intermediaries at ports of destination, ensured efficient handling of the vulnerable and expensive raw materials. Finally, favourable international connections ensured immediate profit realization by Salonican Jewish merchants from sales of raw materials to western industrialists.

The second group of Jewish specializations (see Fig. 5) includes wholesale distribution to retailers of 'colonial commodities' (sugar, coffee, rice), the main import to Salonica at the time.⁵¹ Jewish dominance in this field may be attributed to the economic heritage of those Jewish merchants of Spanish origin.⁵² Their traditional presence in this field was enhanced by their financing ability and by their international networks. Jewish domination in the sub-branch of 'watches and valuable articles',⁵³ emphasized the strong preference of Jewish merchants to invest in portable valuables, reflecting the instability of their minority status. Further, the highest level of over-representation of Jewish enterprises is found in the entire sector of 'furniture and domestic appliances' which included the sub-branch 'watches and valuable articles'. This confirms the tendency of minorities to prefer trade in final consumer goods sold directly in competitive markets to individual consumers.⁵⁴ In Salonica, especially, convenient market conditions prevailed in the city and country, compensating for the heavy competition with Greek traders.

The third group of Jewish specializations (see Fig. 5) reflects Jewish control of trade in semi-raw materials and highlights the nature of Jewish manufacturing *vis-à-vis* Greek competition in Salonica Province (where local industry was comprised of light, metal industries, primarily, mechanical repair, blacksmith and ironsmith). At the end of the Ottoman era in Salonica, Jewish

manufacturers showed a strong preference for importing semi-raw manufacturing inputs, limiting integration of production to the final stage of the process, close to both the traders and the end consumers. For example, Jewish merchants in the flourishing cotton industry controlled 100% of 'trade in [imported] cotton yarn,' while Greek entrepreneurs dominated (78%) 'cotton spinning and weaving'.⁵⁵ Failure of the technologically obsolete Jewish spinning mills in the city in face of countryside-based Greek competition⁵⁶ diverted Jewish urban entrepreneurs to the manufacture of cotton socks based on imported cotton yarn in small plants. Thus, Jewish entrepreneurs shifted competition from production of industrial inputs towards production of finished garments for the individual consumer, competing with clothing producers in European states rather than with Greek locals, who benefited from low production costs. This was the optimal solution, which maximized profits by exploiting favourable international affiliations to obtain imported high quality semi-raw materials, in lieu of intense long-term capital investments. Costs were reduced through a combination of imported, refined cotton threads produced in Italy, England and Austria, by new technology not yet introduced in Salonica,⁵⁷ and the utilization of an inexpensive, local, co-ethnic labour force. As a result, the locally produced imitations satisfied local taste at a cheaper price,⁵⁸ and sold side by side with imported original products.

In-depth analysis of the detailed activity in the significantly 'Jewish' niches reveals intra-dependency within those sub-branches and interdependency between them. For example, Jewish control in 'grain and flour' involved both importation of wheat flour and grain from Romania, Serbia, Bulgaria and Russia for local consumption, and the exportation of low quality local grain, including flour, to Albania and Ottoman markets.⁵⁹ 'Foreign' and Ottoman Jews holding berats financed the wholesale purchase, transport and storage of the grain. They engaged sub-intermediate Ottoman Jews, who had the linguistic skills and the contacts necessary to communicate personally and developed trust with Ottoman estate holders and their managers throughout the Macedonian hinterland.⁶⁰ Jewish entrepreneurs' vertical control of the grain and flour industry included milling,⁶¹ wholesale distribution of wheat flour to retailers and control of raw materials for the food industry. This also explains Jewish involvement in the production of macaroni, bakery and beer brewing.⁶²

The vertical integration strategy appears to be confirmed by the prevalence of family firms, the 'ethnic mode of production', and may be explained by the formation of family cartels e.g. the Allatini concern, which embraced extensive businesses through marital

relationships with the Fernandez, Mizrahi and Torres families.⁶³ In addition, Jewish intra-dependency deepened owing to increasing competition between Jewish traders and artisans with their Greek rivals.

The vertical integration of the Jewish participation in these industries also demonstrates the dependence of the industrialist consumers in European states upon the Jewish middlemen. For example, the 'opium' sub-industry included 'export of opium' to America, Germany, Austria and Italy,⁶⁴ through the 'import of pharmaceuticals and photographic materials'. Their vertical connections were vital in supporting the commercial chain, from the purchase of raw materials to the distribution of end products in the Macedonian market. This dependency was described by a teacher of the Alliance Israélite Universelle (1909):

No significant business can be carried out without one of these brokers [in Salonica] as an intermediary agent. It happens that almost all of these brokers are Jews. They are rather well-off; often they advance funds to the merchants and they almost always act as guarantors for their clients in their dealings with the large commercial enterprises. Even the banks sometimes grant credit to the merchants only because of the recommendation and the guarantee of the brokers.⁶⁵

VIII: Conclusion

The present paper illustrates how Jewish entrepreneurship stimulated and bolstered industrial and commercial growth in semi-colonial Ottoman Macedonia during the final decades of the Ottoman rule, at the end of the nineteenth century and beginning of the twentieth century. Excluding European companies, which developed public infrastructure projects as substitutes for the Ottoman state, Jewish firms filled the lacuna of entrepreneurship in the diminished middle class of the dominant population. Similar to other minorities in colonial regions, including the Chinese in South-East Asia at the turn of nineteenth – twentieth century; the Pakistanis and Indians in East Africa; the Lebanese in West Africa prior to the 1960s,⁶⁶ Jewish entrepreneurs offered a viable economic alternative, primarily to the Ottoman petite bourgeoisie, but no less to entrepreneurs who developed large-scale businesses. These entrepreneurs functioned as a bridging population, mediating between Macedonian cultivators and European industrialists. Jewish entrepreneurs made an essential economic contribution through their remarkable bi-directional mode of entrepreneurship, engaging in primary exports to the Western states (mining products and agriculture cash crops), as well as in the

distribution of European imported manufactured products to local Macedonian consumers.⁶⁷ The empirical study, based on a list of business firms, enabled a systematic trace of the entrepreneurial behaviour of the Jewish minority from a comparative inter-ethnic perspective. The entrepreneurial strategies adopted by the Jewish group were influenced by both the political and economic system in which they operated, as well as the internal community structure. The combination of the inherent characteristics of the Jewish Salonican population; the new profitable opportunities created in semi-colonial Ottoman Macedonia; Ottoman state policy and the inter-ethnic competition explain the entrepreneurship strategies adopted by the Jewish minority during the last decades of Ottoman rule over Macedonia. Ottoman anxiety in face of impending Greek domination through local Greek co-religionists worked in the Jewish minority's favour. Their privileged position as a loyal millet facilitated their access to the new opportunities. With their newly adapted skills, they were instrumental in establishing and developing economic relationships linking the interdependent regions.

European semi-colonialism in Ottoman Macedonia offered a haven for Jewish entrepreneurs. In the vast world market, stateless Jewish middlemen exploited their cohesive international network and functioned as 'Israélites du Levant'.⁶⁸ However, the transition to an autarchic national economy highlighted their civil inferiority. Decolonization processes culminating in the annexation of the Salonican province (1912) into the Greek national state, signified the extreme transition to Balkanisation, that is, separate, non-cooperative national economies, ultimately preventing the realization of mutual advantages. These geopolitical changes would have an adverse affect on the Salonica Jewish minority, which henceforth relinquished its unique role in the Salonican economy.

Appendix

Firms (N=931) in Salonica (1912) by
Ethnic Origin (4) and by Branch (15)

Branch	Ethnic origin of firms in a given branch				Total sum of firms in branch
	Jewish	Greek	Turkish	Other	
Food and beverages	61	27	6	6	100
Chemicals	17	5	1	5	28
Construction materials	31	11	1	6	49
Energy and public utilities	8	1	1	6	16
Metal	15	5	5	17	42
Wood	20	5	3	1	29
Hides, leather and footwear	28	18	3	8	57
Textiles	34	8	5	3	50
Clothing	48	10	23	17	98
Printing, paper and office equipment	26	8	4	14	52
Tobacco	10	2	4	2	18
Domestic wares and furniture	30	3	2	6	41
Trade in agricultural products	77	34	4	20	135
General wholesale and retail	24	2	6	7	39
Finance and commission trade	109	25	8	35	177
Total number of firms per an ethnic group	538	164	76	153	931

Source: Adapted from Austrian Report, 1915, pp.138-84.

Notes

¹ Paul Dumont, 'The social structure of the Jewish Community of Salonica at the End of the Nineteenth Century', *Southeastern Europe* 5 (2) (1979), 33-72.

² See Donald Quataert 'Premières fumées d'usines', in G. Veinstein (ed.), *Salonique, 1850-1918: La ville des juifs et le réveil des Balkans* (Paris: Éditions Autrement, 1993), 177-94.

³ Donald Quataert, *Ottoman Manufacturing in the Age of the Industrial Revolution* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993); Donald Quataert, Ottoman Manufacturing in the Nineteenth Century, in id., *Manufacturing in the Ottoman Empire and Turkey, 1500-1950* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), 87-122; Donald Quataert, 'The workers of Salonica, 1850-1912', in D. Quataert, and E.J. Zürcher (eds.), *Workers and the Working class in the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic 1839-1950* (London and New York: Tauris Academic Studies), 1995, 59-74; 171-3.

⁴ Quataert, 'Premières fumées d'usines', 189.

⁵ Simon Kuznets, 'Economic Structure and Life of the Jews', in L. Finkelstein (ed.), *The Jews, Their History Culture and Religion*, Vol. II (New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1960), 1624.

⁶ The original concept of a 'plural society' was formulated by Furnivall (1948) for societies observed in South Asia. According to a refined version presented by M. G. Smith (1960) the 'plural society' is a multi-ethnic society characterized by the existence of separate institutions (family, religion etc.) for various ethnic segments and a common government for all ethnic segments. As a result, structural pluralism or cultural pluralism are merely different points on the continuum of societies with plural structures. For an exhaustive discussion, R.A. Schermerhorn, *Comparative Ethnic Relations: A Framework for Theory and Research* (New York: Random House, 1970), 122-58.

Adapting this concept, Braude and Lewis held that 'The Ottoman Empire was a classic example of the plural society'. Benjamin Braude and Bernard Lewis, 'Introduction', in B. Braude and B. Lewis (Eds.) *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire*. Vol. I. (New York: Holmes & Meier Publishers, 1982), 1.

⁷ Nachum Gross, 'Introduction: On Jewish Entrepreneurship', in R. Aaronsohn and Shaul Stamper (eds.), *Jewish Entrepreneurship in Modern Times: East Europe and Eretz Israel* (Jerusalem: The Hebrew University, Magnes Press, 2000), 17-24. (in Hebrew).

⁸ On the methodology of ethnic entrepreneurship, Howard Aldrich and Roger Waldinger 'Ethnicity and Entrepreneurship', *Annual Review of Sociology* 16 (1990), 111-35; R. Waldinger, 'The Two Sides of Ethnic Entrepreneurship', *International Migration Review*, 7 (1993), 692-701. For methodological framework of Jewish entrepreneurship in modern times till the Second World War, Kuznets, 'Economic Structure and Life of the Jews'; Arcadius Kahan, 'Economic History – Modern Period', *Encyclopaedia Judaica*, Supplementary Entries, (Jerusalem: Keter, 1972), 1311-24; idem, 'Notes on Jewish Entrepreneurship in Tsarist Russia,' in R.W. Weiss (ed.), *Essays in Jewish Social and Economic History* (Chicago and London: Chicago University Press, 1986), 82-100.

⁹ K Und K. Österreichisches Handelsmuseum, (Dezember, 1915) *Salonik, Topographisch - Statistische Übersichten*, Wien (II.41.821) (hereafter: *Austrian Report*, 1915). I would like to thank the Bibliothek des Österreichisches Staatarchivs for lending the document to Bar Ilan University.

¹⁰ Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey* Vol. II (London, New York and Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1979), Ch.2.

¹¹ Charles Issawi, 'The Transformation of the Economic Position of the Millets in the Nineteenth Century' in B. Braude and B. Lewis (eds.), *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire: The Functioning of a Plural Society*, Vol. I (New York and London: Holmes & Meier, 1982), 262-85.

¹² Charles Issawi (ed.), *The Economic History of Turkey, 1800-1914* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), 82; Şevket Pamuk, 'The Ottoman Empire in the 'Great Depression' of 1873-1896', *The Journal of Economic History* XLIV(1) (1984), 107-18; Ezel Kural Shaw, 'Integrity and Integration: Assumptions and Expectations Behind Nineteenth-Century Decision Making', in C.E. Farah (ed.), *Decision Making and Change in the Ottoman Empire* (Northeast Missouri State University: The Thomas Jefferson University Press, 1993), 39-52.

¹³ The 'semi-colonial situation' characterised by the absence of direct European political control, e.g. Thailand, from the middle of the nineteenth century until 1932 (establishment of the modern state), is a typical example of a semi-colonial situation. See Gary G. Hamilton and Tony Waters, 'Ethnicity and Capitalist Development: The Changing Role of the Chinese in Thailand', in Daniel Chivot and Anthony Reid (eds.), *Essential Outsiders - Chinese and Jews in the Modern Transformation of Southeast Asia and Central Europe* (Seattle and London: Washington University Press, 1997), 258-84.

¹⁴ L.S Stavrianos, *The Balkans, 1815-1914* (U.S.A: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1963), 72-86; See also Meropy Anastasiadou, *Salonique, 1830-1912* (Leiden, New York and Koln: Brill, 1997), 97-103.

¹⁵ Alexandra Yerolympos and Vassilis Colonas, 'Un urbanisme cosmopolite', in G. Veinstein (ed.), *Salonique, 1850-1918: La ville des juifs et le réveil des Balkans* (Paris: Éditions Autrement, 1993), 158-76; Anastasiadou, *Salonique*, Ch.8 and 421-6.

¹⁶ According to the Ottoman census, which was completed in 1893, the total number of Jews in the Salonica Province was 42,714. My calculations are based on the data published by Kemal H. Karpat, *Ottoman Population, 1830-1914: Demographic and Social Characteristics* (Wisconsin: Wisconsin University Press, 1985), Tab I.8A, 133-7; 140-1; 144-5.

¹⁷ An 'ethnic community' encompasses established institutions, which function as an internal framework for the economic activities of members of the ethnic minority. On the definitions of 'ethnic minority' see, for example, Ernest Krausz, *Ethnic Minorities in Britain* (London: MacGibbon and Kee, 1971), 10; On 'ethnic community' Anthony David Smith, 'The problem of national identity: ancient, medieval and modern?', *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 17(3) (1994), 383. According to A.D. Smith's typology, 'Demotic/vertical ethnic-community', in contrast with 'aristocratic/lateral ethnic community', refers to the diffusion of solidarity throughout the social strata of an ethnic community and emphasizes intra-group endogamy. Anthony D. Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986), 79-89.

¹⁸ For the report of Dr. Moise Allatini on the state of the Jewish community of Salonica in the middle of the nineteenth century, see Y. Barnai, 'Sources', in *History of the Jews in the Islamic Countries*, Vol. III (Jerusalem: The Zalman Shazar Center for Jewish History, 1986), 108. See also Bernard Lewis, *The Jews of Islam* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984), 171.

¹⁹ Minna Rozen, 'Contest and Rivalry in Mediterranean Maritime Commerce in the First Half of the Eighteenth Century: The Jews of Salonica and the European Presence', in M. Rozen, *In the Mediterranean Routes* (Tel Aviv University: Chair for the History and Culture of the Jews of Salonica and Greece, 1993), 65-113 (in Hebrew).

²⁰The calculations are based on data published by Kemal H. Karpat, *Ottoman Population, 1830-1914*. For 1893, Tab.I.8.A., 134-7; for 1896, Tab.I.12, 158-9; for 1897, Tab.I.13, 160-1; for 1906, Tab.I.16.A, 166-7.

²¹ Justin McCarthy, 'Jewish Population in the Late Ottoman Period' in Avigdor Levi (ed.), *The Jews of the Ottoman Empire* (Princeton, New Jersey: The Darwin Press, Inc, 1994), 378.

²² Anastassiadou, *Salonique, 1830-1912*, 95.

²³ Justin McCarthy, 'Jewish Population in the Late Ottoman Period' in Avigdor Levi (ed.), *The Jews of the Ottoman Empire*, 375-97.

²⁴ Stanford J. Shaw, *The Jews of the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic* (New York: New York University Press, 1991), 193, 204; Yitzchak Kerem, 'The Influence of Anti-Semitism on Jewish Immigration Patterns from Greece to the Ottoman Empire in the Nineteenth Century', in C. E. Farah (ed.), *Decision Making and Change in the Ottoman Empire* (Northeast Missouri State University: The Thomas Jefferson University Press, 1993), 305-14; Justin McCarthy, 'Jewish Population in the Late Ottoman Period', 379.

²⁵ Attilio Milano, *Storia degli Ebrei Italiani nel Levante* (Firenze: Casa Editrice Israel, 1949), 185-9; Edgar Morin, *Vidal et les siens* (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1989), 24-6.

²⁶ On the distinction between 'orthodox' and 'reactive' components in 'ethnic resources', see Ivan Light, 'Immigrant and Ethnic Enterprise in North America', *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 7 (2)(April, 1984), 195-216.

²⁷ Georges Weill, 'The Alliance Israélite Universelle and the Emancipation of the Jewish Communities in the Mediterranean', *The Jewish Journal of Sociology* 24 (1982), 117-34; Esther Benbassa, 'Associational Strategies in Ottoman Jewish Society in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries', in Avigdor Levi (ed.), *The Jews of the Ottoman Empire* (Princeton, New Jersey: The Darwin Press, Inc, 1994), 457-84; Rena Molho, 'Education in the Jewish community of Salonica at the beginning of the Twentieth century', in *Proceedings of the Eleventh World Congress of Jewish Studies, Jerusalem, June 22-29, 1993*, Division B, Vol. III (Jerusalem: The World Union of Jewish Studies, 1994), 179-86.

²⁸ Feroz Ahmad, 'Unionist Relations with the Greek, Armenian and Jewish Communities of the Ottoman Empire, 1908-1914', in B. Braude and B. Lewis (eds.), *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire*, Vol. I (New York: Holmes & Meier Publishers, 1982), 401-34; Rena Molho, 'The Jewish Community of Salonika and its incorporation into the Greek state (1912-1919)', *Middle Eastern Studies* 24 (4) (1988), 391-403.

²⁹ See above note 9.

³⁰ See above note 3.

³¹ For example, Charles Issawi (ed.), *The Economic History of Turkey*, 13-14; Bernard Lewis, *The Jews of Islam* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984), 64.

³² American Jewish Year Book, 1913-1914, (Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication), 203.

³³ The census data was first published by Vassilis Dimitriadis, 'The Population of Salonica and its Greek Community in 1913', *Makedonika* 23 (1983), 88-116 (in Greek). According to the census, distribution was as follows: Jews (39%); Greeks (25%); Turks (29%); Bulgars (4%) and foreigners (3%). In the present study, Bulgars and foreigners are classified within a single category of 'others' (7%).

³⁴ The category of 'Electricity, Gas and Water', a sub-branch of 'Energy and Public Utilities' (branch no. 4, Figure 1), was exclusively comprised of European firms.

³⁵ Carter V. Findley, 'The Acid Test of Ottomanism: The Acceptance of Non-Muslims in the Late Ottoman Bureaucracy', in Braude and Lewis, *Christian and Jews*, 339-68.

³⁶ Feroz Ahmad, 'Unionist Relations'; Benjamin Braude and Bernard Lewis, 'Introduction', 1-34; Roderic H. Davison, 'The *Millets* as Agents of Change in the Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Empire', in Braude and Lewis, *Christian and Jews*, 319-37; Charles Issawi, 'The Transformation of the Economic Position of the *Millets* in the Nineteenth Century'. in Braude and Lewis, *Christian and Jews*, 262-85; Lewis, *The Jews of Islam*, 61; Ezel Kural Shaw, 'Integrity and Integration'.

³⁷ 2.8% of the entire Salonican Jewish population (1914). See Risal (pseudonym of Joseph Nehama), *La ville convoitée, Salonique* (Paris: Perrin et Cie, 1917), 255.

³⁸ Jews, Greeks and Armenians served as Dragomans and High Secretaries in the consular representations of the following states: Austro-Hungary, Germany, Persia, Britain, France, Belgium, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Denmark and U.S.A. *Austrian Report*, 1915, 194-8.

³⁹ Rena Molho, 'The Jewish Community of Salonika'.

⁴⁰ For testimonies of contemporaries, Leon Sciaky, *Farewell to Salonica: Portrait of an Era* (New York: Current Books, Inc, 1946), 157; Y. Uziel, *Salonica Mother City of Israel*, (Tel-Aviv: Saloniki Research Center, 1967), 54-5 (in Hebrew). See also, Mark Mazower, 'Salonica between East and West 1860-1912', *Dialogos* 1 (1994), 104-27.

⁴¹ Traian Stoianovich, 'The Conquering Balkan Orthodox Merchant', *Journal of Economic History* 20 (1960), 244-8. On manifestations of Greek incitement rooted in economic nationalism against Jewish traders and craftsmen from the end of the nineteenth century until the Greek annexation (1912), Dumont, 'The Jewish Community of Salonica', 62-9. For contemporary testimony e.g. Shaw, *The Jews of the Ottoman Empire*, 203-6.

⁴² For contemporary testimony, Leon Sciaky, *Farewell to Salonica*.

⁴³ According to the official data published by Karpat, at the beginning of the era (1893) the Greek component in Salonica villayet contained only (28%) compared to the Turkish (45%) and the Bulgarian (22%) elements. In 1906 these proportions changed but the majority was still Turks (45%) compared with Greeks (31%) and Bulgarians (17%). Adapted from Karpat, *Ottoman Population*, Tab I.8.A, 134-7; 1906/7: I.16.A., 166-7.

⁴⁴ 'Economic heritage' is defined as a form of accumulated human capital, that plays an important role in the initial routine of immigrants' occupational selection. Yehuda Don, 'Economic Behaviour of Jews in Central Europe Before World War II', in E. Aerts and F.M.L. Thompson (eds.), *Ethnic Minority Groups in Town and Countryside and Their Effects on Economic Development (1850-1940)* (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1990), 116.

⁴⁵ For similar conclusions on Jewish minorities, see above notes 7, 8, 44.

⁴⁶ On the increasing demand in opium used in the developing pharmaceutical industry (morphine) in USA, Germany and France, see *General Report on the Industrial and Economic Situation in Greece, 1923*, London: His Majesty's Stationery Office. Opium exports (1912) totalled 7,500,000 FF, i.e. half of the tobacco export value of 16,800,000 FF. See *Austrian Report*, 1915, 78. The total value of silkworm cocoon exports from Salonica reached 3,400,000 FF, a quarter of the tobacco exports. See *Austrian Report*, 1915, 79.

⁴⁷ See for example, Jean Pierre Filippini, 'Le Rôle des Négociants et des Banquiers Juifs de Livourne dans le Grand Commerce International en Méditerranée au XVIII^e Siècle,' in A. Toaff and S. Schwarzfuchs (eds.), *The Mediterranean and the Jews* (Ramat Gan: Bar Ilan University Press, 1989), 123-50.

⁴⁸ For examples of Jewish networks including co-religionists from Salonica, London, and Sarajevo see Edgar Morin, *Vidal et les siens*, 52-3. Correspondences

between Salonican Jewish firms and their representatives scattered abroad are found in archives such as 'Central Archives for the History of the Jewish People' in Jerusalem.

⁴⁹ The primary Jewish financial institution *Banque de Salonique* was established (1888) by Allatini brothers in cooperation with the Austrian *Länderbank* and the French *Comptoir d'Escompte*. See *Austrian Report*, 1915, 127.

⁵⁰ The Ottoman Authorities prevented activities by the Greek National Bank, which represented Greek national elites active in the Ottoman territories. See Stavros Theophanides, 'The Economic Development of Greek Macedonia after 1912', in M. B. Sakellariou (ed.), *Macedonia – 4000 Years of Greek History and Civilization* (Athens: Ekdotike Athenon S.A., 1991), 509-27. At the same time, Jewish financiers refused to give Greek entrepreneurs credit. See Aron Rodrigue, *Images of Sephardi and Eastern Jewries in Transition: The Teachers of the Alliance Israélite Universelle, 1860-1939* (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1993), 235.

⁵¹ Total value (1913) of sugar from Hungary, 2,691,026 FF, ranks it as the highest value import. Rice from Hungary totalled 318,682 FF and coffee, 355,652 FF. *Austrian Report*: 25.

⁵² Nachum Gross (ed.), *Economic History of the Jews* (Jerusalem: Keter Publishing House, 1975), 275-6.

⁵³ For testimony of a contemporary, e.g. Hayim Toledano, 'Hayehudim behayey hamis-har ve-hata-asiya shel Saloniki', in David Recanati (ed.), *Zikhron Saloniki* (Tel Aviv, 1986), Vol.II, 203. (in Hebrew). On the exclusivity of the Jews in the jewellery trade, Saloniki Research Center, *Salonica Mother City of Israel*, 1967, 237. (in Hebrew).

⁵⁴ Yehuda Don, 'Economic Behaviour of Jews', 121-3.

⁵⁵ According to the sample 7 out of 9 cotton spinning and weaving mills were Greek.

⁵⁶ Production costs in the city's mills exceeded competitors' costs in the countryside, due the following reasons: 1. Energy costs, especially coal, compared to hydro-energy in interior Macedonia; 2. Higher land values in the city; 3. Higher labour costs (1913) in the city, which were as much as three times higher than labour costs in the countryside, especially as a result of the booming tobacco industry, and; 4. The mills in the countryside added lines of productions (grinding flour; weaving cotton) that increased their incomes. See Quataert, 'The workers of Salonica', 64.

⁵⁷ Imported cotton-yarn was valued at (1913) 912,403 FF, and ranked third in value of imports, after sugar and flour. (*Austrian Report 1915*, 85)

⁵⁸ See, for example, Quataert, 'The workers of Salonica', 63.

⁵⁹ On the degeneration of the *çiftlikes*, that contained the granaries of the Salonica province, which left little surplus in quality and quantity, see John R. Lampe & Marvin R. Jackson, *Balkan Economic History 1550-1950: From Imperial Borderlands to Developing Nations* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982), 280-4. The export (1912) of cereals from Salonica to England, Germany, Austro-Hungary and France, Greece and Asiatic Turkey was valued at (1912) 3,300,000 FF (*Austrian Report*, 1915, 78). The export of flour from Salonica (1912) to Albania and Turkey was valued at (1912) 1,200,000 FF (*Austrian Report*, 1915, 82-3). Import of flour (1913) was valued at 1,394,941 FF and became the second largest import after sugar (*Austrian Report*, 1915, 85).

⁶⁰ See, for example, Leon Sciak, *Farewell to Salonica*.

⁶¹ In Salonica, as in other Ottoman towns, most of the flour mills were owned by grain merchants. See Quataert, *Ottoman Manufacturing*, 189.

⁶² The brewing industry developed after transfer of control (1881) to the PDA. See in Stanford J. Shaw, 'The Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Tax Reforms and Revenue System', *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 6 (1975), 443.

⁶³ On the Allatini Brothers, see *Austrian Report 1915*, 48-50; Sam Levy, 'Les grandes familles Séphardites: Les Allatini', *Le Judaïsme Sephardi* 51 (1937), 24-5; 58-9.

⁶⁴ *Austrian Report*, 1915, 78.

⁶⁵ From the letter of the teacher M. Benghiat, Salonica, 1 December 1909, cited in Aron Rodrigue, *Images of Sephardi*, 235.

⁶⁶ For the so called Middleman Minorities in colonial frameworks, Karl A. Yambert, 'Alien Traders and Ruling Elites: The overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia and the Indians in East Africa', *Ethnic Groups* 3 (1981), 173-98; Vincent Cable, 'The Asians of Kenya', in A.M. Rose and C.B. Rose (Eds.), *Minority Problems* (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), 103-11; Parakash C. Jain, 'Towards Class Analysis of Race Relations - Overseas Indians in Colonial/Post-Colonial Societies', *Economic and Political Weekly*, 23 (1988), 95-103; Leighton, Neil O., 'The Political Economy of a Stranger Population', in William A. Shack, and Elliot Skinner, (Eds.) *Strangers in African Societies*. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979), 85-103.

⁶⁷ For similar conclusion, Issawi, 'The Transformation of the Economic Position of the *Millets*'.

⁶⁸ See Edgar Morin, *Vidal et les siens*, 88; 114.

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