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LXXV

VIRGINIA H. AKSAN

OTTOMANS AND EUROPEANS: *CONTACTS AND CONFLICTS*



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Virginia H. Aksan, currently Associate Professor and Chair of the Department of History at McMaster University, began her post-secondary education at Allegheny College in Meadville, PA, with a BA in French in 1968. In 1966-67, she spent her junior year at Princeton University, as a Critical Languages Student, a program under the aegis of the Carnegie-Mellon Foundation, which aimed at redressing the lack of crucial foreign languages in the United States of the time. The languages considered critical were Arabic, Persian, Turkish, Chinese, Japanese and Korean. Her teacher at Princeton was Talat Halman, whose command of the language and literature of Turkey was unparalleled. After graduating from Allegheny College, the next few years were spent in Palo Alto, California. Following several years of work in Stanford University Library, Aksan commuted to U. C. Berkeley for a library degree (MLS), acquired in 1973. Returning to Princeton as a librarian, she worked at Firestone Library from 1973 to 1981. A brief interlude in Chicago, including work at Northwestern University, was followed by relocation to Toronto, Ontario, Canada, where the option to return to graduate study of the Ottoman Empire presented itself. Enrolling in the Department of Middle East and Islamic Studies, she was awarded an MA in 1984, and the PhD in 1991, both in Middle East history, and assumed her teaching position at McMaster University in the fall of 1992.

Aksan is the author of *An Ottoman Statesman in War and Peace: Ahmed Resmi Efendi, 1700-1783* (E. J. Brill, 1995), which was translated into Turkish by Tarih Vakfı *Savaş ve Barışta Bir Devlet Adamı: Ahmed Resmi Efendi 1700-1780* (Istanbul, 1997). The articles included in this volume represent work from that period as well as preliminary explorative essays concerning her new work, *Ottoman Warfare 1700-1870*, which is scheduled for publication with Pearson Education (Longman) in 2005. One of them, "Breaking the Spell of the Baron de Tott," was a recipient of an Honorable Mention for the Turkish Studies Association's Ömer Lütfi Barkan Article Prize 2003 competition. She is completing an edited volume with Daniel Goffman called "The Early Modern Ottoman World: A Reinterpretation," under contract with Cambridge University Press. Three extensive reviews of recent publications on the Ottomans not included in this volume are: "The Ottoman Story Today," a review article published in the *Middle East Studies Association Bulletin* 25 (2001), 35-42, "Ottoman Military Matters," a review article of twelve works, *Journal of Early Modern History* 6 (2002), 315-25, and "Finding the Way Back to the Ottoman Empire: Review Article," *International History Review* 25 (2003), 96-107.

Aksan serves on editorial boards, and as a reader for several presses and journals, notably the *Islamic Civilization* series for Cambridge University Press. She served as Secretary of the Turkish Studies Association from 1992-97; as President-Elect from 1999-2000, and as President from 2000-2001. While associated with TSA, she was instrumental in the start of the TSA website and H-Turk. She has organized three workshops on Ottoman history (conversations) at MESA annual meetings. She also served on the Board of the Middle East Studies Association of North America from 1997-99.

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INTRODUCTION

It is a privilege to be included in the ISIS Press series "Analecta Isisiana" which Sinan Kuneralp publishes as a service to the Ottomanist international community. Much as I think we are products of, and write within, our own, sometimes narrow, intellectual milieu, I believe it essential that we make the effort to engage with the larger debates about the Ottomans and world history. This is especially necessary in the age of globalization, when North American students think of themselves as connected to the world, but remain rather ignorant of anything outside their immediate neighborhood.

In my childhood in Indiana, and then New York (actually Long Island), I don't think anyone worried too much about the global, at least, until the death of President John F. Kennedy and the arrival of the Beatles. I first understood my own cultural narrowness when I spent a year in Istanbul in 1961-62. One of a handful of non-Turks at the American Academy for Girls in Üsküdar, Istanbul, I experienced minority and foreign status for the first time, and reveled in being an outsider in the school, the city and country. Not quite an epiphany, the experience was nonetheless profound enough to mark my educational and career choices forever. Istanbul in the early sixties had a population around 2,000,000. Moda, where I lived, retained its cosmopolitan society of Greeks, Armenians, Jews and Turks, rapidly vanishing. The Fenerbahçe tramway, open-sided in the summer, was still in operation, perhaps for in its last year.

The questions I was asked by my Istanbul companions revolved not around popular music, or TV, not yet available in Turkey, but rather about black and white. It was a time of urban rioting in the States, and young Turks wanted to know why the United States was so racist, and why it had taken so long for the Afro-American population to gain essential rights and freedoms. This, I understood in retrospect, from young citizens of a country that had violently carved itself of a dying empire, declared itself Turk, and had not yet confronted the challenges to that identity of later decades.

Suffice it to say that the experience left me an outsider in my own country, which I remain to this day. Not an ex-patriot; rather I am a permanent exile from the idea of the American nation, with all its lethal consequences. The time in Turkey also left me with a wealth of curiosity about other cultures, especially one so different from my own. Hence, attempts at cross-cultural mediation invest my teaching and research. I spent

many years at the edge of the scholarly cauldron, in libraries at Stanford, Princeton, Northwestern and Toronto, before being brave enough to jump from the frying pan into the fire.

Although suggested to me by Meredith Owens, then teaching at the Middle East and Islamic Studies Department of the University of Toronto, my PhD topic, Ahmed Resmi Efendi (1700-1783) and his milieu, suited my interests in learning about east-west misunderstandings and misrepresentations. The University of Toronto, in its benign neglect of a mature student, allowed me the great privilege of pursuing Ahmed Resmi's life into the recesses of Ottoman libraries and archives. Several of the articles in this volume grow out of that work.

Shortly after completion of the degree, I was hired into the History Department at McMaster University, once again an outsider, as I proved to be the only one on campus who taught Islamic and Ottoman subjects for the first ten years at McMaster.

Research and publishing is probably the greatest exile of all, especially now, when historians have forgotten how to connect with their audience, and often write for themselves and a small circle of readers. Teaching has been one of the greatest connectives of my scholarly life, because I learn more from my students than any half-dozen books on the Ottomans. Unknowingly, they tend to ask the big questions, and force me to reevaluate my presentation, written or oral.

While working on the life and times of Ahmed Resmi, I was stuck by the absolute certainty of the narratives of the Ottoman decline in the eighteenth century, and the complete paucity of detailed studies on the military of the same period. Several of the articles in this volume reflect speculations about such matters, as well as a struggle I have had to write out of, or around "The Eastern Question," in which as Juan Cole recently put it, "the Ottomans are reduced to the burghers of Hamelin, forced to call upon a British pied piper who would rid them of the French rats."* My obsession with the life and works of Baron François de Tott, evident in several articles in this volume, arises from his position as the sole contemporary authority (for western historians) on the Ottoman military of the eighteenth century. I owe a debt of gratitude to Edward Ingram, editor of *The International History Review*,

*Review of Bernard Lewis' "What Went Wrong: Western Impact and Middle East Response" *Global Dialogue* 27, January, 2003.

whose close (and critical) reading of "Breaking the Spell of Baron de Tott," led us into a long discussion of Eastern Questions.

When I finish the book, "Ottoman Warfare 1700-1870," in preparation for the Longman series *Modern Wars in Perspective* (Pearson Education), I intend to return to the question of cross-cultural mediation, by examining those who have served as our interpreters of the age, such as Tott, or Ibrahim Müteferrika, or Ebu Bekir Ratıb Efendi. My article here on *The Turkish Spy* is a playful exploration of the territory of the Oriental Tale and its relation to the historiography of the Ottoman Empire. I may even surrender to the impulse to write some fictional tales of my own.

One of the greatest cross-cultural risks of my life was to wed a Muslim Turk. He too is an exile, from the imagined Turkish nation, so we deal happily, if noisily, with one another. I first met Oktay Aksan on the road in Turkey, in 1962, and we have since made many trips together, the most recent the length of the Black Sea coast as far as Trabzon, and the Bulgarian Danubian coast from Vidin to Silistre. I could not imagine my research journey without him.

Virginia H. Aksan
Hamilton, Ontario
February, 2004

PART ONE

CONTACTS

OTTOMAN SOURCES OF INFORMATION ON EUROPE IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY*

One of the favorite stories concerning Ottoman ignorance of European geography in the eighteenth century appeared in its most recent version in Bernard Lewis' *Muslim Discovery of Europe*.[1] The Ottomans were reputedly astonished at the appearance of the Russian fleet in the Dardanelles in 1770, and made a formal protest to the Venetians for allowing the Russians to sail from the Baltic to the Adriatic Sea, alluding to a non-existent channel connecting the two.[2] One of the sources for this story is Vasıf Efendi, the official chronicler of the latter half of the eighteenth century. His version of the story is worth quoting. After a brief digression on Peter the Great and his construction of the modern Russian navy, Vasıf adds: "This time, because the Russians had insufficient ships and untrained captains they hired Venetian and English captains from the Christian seafaring nations, and became well-versed in the science of the sea. Some nations who hated the Russians secretly informed the *Devlet-i Aliye* of their intention and suggested that the Ottomans prepare for war. The men of rank of the time assumed this circumstance false and unsubstantiated, as they were unable to fit the sending of Russian fleet from Petersburg to the Mediterranean into their way of thinking... They considered the matter ridiculous and arrogantly rejected the advice of those who contradicted them. So the Russians appeared at Lepanto and brought terror with them... Those who had considered the Russian feat impossible were drowned in a sea of shame and the violence which had united them in opposition turned to mildness."[3]

This passage suggests that the Ottomans, privy to what is known today as intelligence doubted the value of the information, and they learned by it, albeit as an after effect of the event — in this case, the destruction of the Ottoman fleet at Çeşme in 1770. Perhaps in emphasizing the ignorance and reactionary attitudes of certain elements of the Ottoman ruling elite, we have tended to overlook those who were better informed, or rather, who allowed themselves to become better informed, as Vasıf himself adequately demonstrates. This is particularly true of the period prior to the reforms of Selim III in the 1790s, when, according to most historians, the Ottoman enlightenment began.

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*Text of a paper originally presented at CIEPO VIII, University of Minnesota, August, 1988.

[1]Lewis pp. 153-154.

[2]Von Hammer, 2nd ed., 1834-1836, iv, 602, reprint (1963 ed.) viii, pp. 355-356.

[3]Vasıf, ii, p. 70.

This paper will attempt to establish what geographical and political information about Europe the Ottomans had at their disposal in the period roughly from 1740-1783, that is, following the Treaty of Belgrade in 1740 and prior to the Russian annexation of the Crimea in 1783. Because the Ottomans remained at peace with Europe for the entire period, the assumption has often been made that they were uninterested in the affairs of Europe; but the opposite may have been the case. The Polish question, the War of Austrian Succession (1740-1748), the Seven Years' War (1756-1763), and Russian aggression in the Crimea caused an intense level of diplomatic activity in Istanbul, in the course of which a great deal of information on politics and geography crossed into the *Dar al-Islam* (the abode of Islam). Assuming that to be true, the attempted reforms of Selim III can then be interpreted as a continuation of a trend rather than a "flash in the pan", as they are often characterized.[1] An overview of the sources, some of which are already familiar and a brief discussion of the kinds of information available in them will be followed by a tentative analysis of the possible uses made of this kind of material in Ottoman decision making.

Geographical information was available through a number of channels: maps, translations of European atlases, and embassy reports. An example of each follows. There is a very large map drawn on silk housed in the Archeology Museum Library, dated 1768, by "Enderunlu Ressam Mustafa, on the staff of the Grand Vizier". This would appear to be an indigenous piece of work, representing the countries of Europe, as Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Russia, France, the island of England, Germany and the Netherlands, Poland, Spain, Portugal, Italy and the western part of the Ottoman Empire, all of which are described as surrounded on the north and west by the Atlantic ocean, on the east by Asia, and on the south by Africa. The map includes, among the names of the seas and islands in the Mediterranean, the Straits of Gibraltar. As part of a descriptive paragraph on one edge of the map the cartographer notes "Even though the area of the region known as Europe is small, it is worthy of respect because of the skill of its population in various arts and sciences (*fimun* and *ulum*), especially in the science of geography, which ranks first".[2]

[1]Shaw, *History*, i, p. 256. Studies on the earlier series of reforms, the Tulip Period, which ended with the death of Ahmet III in 1730, have dwelt on the contribution of two individuals as agent of change: Müteferrika, the founder of the first Islamic/Turkish press and Humbaracı Ahmet Paşa — and the 1721 embassy of Yirmi Sekiz Çelebi as the catalyst. (*see* Ménage, Göçek on that period). The period under discussion in this paper starts with 1740 because of the relative unknown nature of the sources for the quiescent period, 1740-1768, and because the treaty of 1740 was a significant moment, the last great diplomatic triumph over Europe in the eighteenth century.

[2]Archaeology Museum Library Ms 1074 — in danger of being completely lost by disintegration.

While the science of cartography may have been languishing in the Ottoman Empire, it was not entirely dead.

An example of a geography/atlas which appears to be a translation is the *Coğrafya-yi cedit,* two copies of which are to be found in Süleymaniye Library. The notes on one of the copies say that Resmi Efendi, the diplomat and historian, obtained it when he went to Vienna as ambassador in 1757, and that it is a translation; the other copy states that Ahmed Resmi Efendi wrote it down following his return from Berlin in 1763 and that it is an anonymous work.[1] The latest internal date of the work would appear to be 1714, in a mention of the Treaty of Utrecht.[2]

The text must have been in Latin but the introductory chapter has both Latin and Arabic definitions so perhaps it was already a translation out of Latin into Arabic. Chapter two discusses Europe, with seventeen countries listed, including the western parts of the Ottoman Empire, and, among the seas of Europe, the "Mare Balticum" and the "Mare Germanicum".[3] There is quite a bit of detail on Paris, with a note to the effect that the English channel is called "La Manche" by the French.[4] That some additions were made by Resmi Efendi, or his translator, is evident in notes such as that on Rome, referred to as "the name they give to Kızıl Elma".[5] While neither of these examples is particularly innovative, they do suggest a continuing tradition of observation.

Embassy reports were another source of geographical as well as political information. Beginning with the official chronicler Raşit, who covers the period from 1660-1721, the full reports of the ambassadors were incorporated into the official histories, making them available to anyone who had access to those histories.[6] To name just one example, Ahmed Resmi's embassy to Frederick the Great in Berlin is incorporated in its entirety in Vasıf Efendi.[7] It contains similar information to that already described above (Resmi probably used the *Coğrafya-yi cedit* for his notes on Europe in the embassy

[1]Husrev 268 and Husrev 269 in Süleymaniye — Husrev 268 is Ahmet Azmi Efendi's copy, himself a brother-in-law of Ahmet Resmi and ambassador to Berlin, 1790-1792 (*see* Unat, p. 149). Husrev 269 has an ownership date of 1220 (1805).

[2]Husrev 269, folio 243.

[3]Husrev 269, folio 7b.

[4]Husrev 269, folio 16a.

[5]Husrev 269, folio 70.

[6]Raşid comment from Lewis, p. 166.

[7]Vasıf, i, 239-262.

report), with extensive comments on the river transportation systems of Europe, as well as a careful catalog of the fortresses on the route.[1]

The embassy reports were, of course, equally important for the political and social information about Europe they could impart, although the accuracy and value of the information depended entirely upon the receptiveness of the ambassadors. Contrasting the report of Resmi in Berlin, who is quite keen to record the strangeness about him in an objective fashion, with that of Vasıf Efendi, whose 1787 report on Spain contains many comments on the stinginess of his hosts, is a valuable lesson in the limitations of the genre.[2] If the number of copies can serve as an indicator to the extent of the circulation of a particular report, *sefaretnames* (embassy reports), such as Resmi's *Prusya sefaretnamesi* were well read.[3] Of particular interest are his notes on Frederick's well-trained and disciplined troops, especially the infantry.[4] Another ambassador to Berlin in 1791-1792, Ebu Bekir Ratip Efendi, is credited with conveying information on European financial systems to the Ottoman Empire, at the request of Selim III.[5]

The foreign diplomatic community in Istanbul is perhaps the most colorful of the sources of information available to the Ottomans. The dispatches and memoirs of all the diplomats of the period can be plumbed for their observations about the Ottoman court and its knowledge (or ignorance) of European affairs, with the similar caveat about the limitations of these observers that was made concerning the Ottoman ambassadors. Nonetheless, there is evidence in the reports of Porter, English ambassador 1746-1762 and Vergennes, French ambassador 1756-1768, that a great deal of information was exchanged between countries, especially on the part of France, the Ottoman Empire's oldest confidant. The diplomats' chief contact was with the *Reisülküttâp*, Head of the Chancery. As external affairs were increasingly centralized in his office, he came to be viewed as "Foreign Minister", at least in the eyes of the foreign community.[6] There are notable interviews recorded by Vergennes when the current *Reis* is not only aware of European affairs but

[1]Ahmet Resmi, *Prusya*, p. 24ff.
[2]For Vasıf Efendi's report on Spain, *see* Unat, p. 144; *see* also Barbier de Meynard. Vasıf Efendi saw the magnificent Islamic collection at the Escorial.
[3]Over twenty copies examined in Istanbul alone.
[4]Ahmet Resmi, *Prusya*, pp. 56-60.
[5]On Ebu Bekir Efendi, *see* Unat, p. 144; also the Stein article.
[6]It is doubtful if the Ottomans themselves thought of him that way. The office of the *Reisülküttâp* does, however, become the Foreign Ministry under Mahmut II, in 1836 (Findley, *Bureaucratic*, p. 139). On the Ottoman perception of the role of the *Reis*, *see* Findley, *Bureaucratic*, p. 87; Porter, i, p. 268-269.

also accusing the French government of betrayal for not excepting the Ottoman Empire from the *casus foederis* of the new Franco-Austrian alliance of 1756.[1] Political information was obviously used as a weapon in the diplomatic maneuverings at the Porte, a phenomenon hardly restricted to the Ottoman Empire.

In a dispatch dated October 1764, a long conversation between Vergennes and the *Reis* is transcribed. The recent election of Stanislaus Poniatowski (September 1764) to the throne of Poland under Russian pressure annoyed the Ottomans, who had opposed his election. The *Reis*, probably Yağlıkçızade Hacı Mehmet Emin Efendi (August 1764-May 1765), was interested in dethroning Poniatowski and pressed Vergennes for further information regarding the numbers of Russian troops in Poland, etc. While Vergennes was very free with the information on Russia requested by the *Reis*, when asked what France would do should the Ottoman Empire refuse to recognize Poniatowski, a virtual declaration of war, he became more typically reticent. The most interesting aspect of the conversation is the depth of the *Reis'* knowledge about the Russians, Catherine II and the recent murder of Ivan, heir to the Russian throne. The *Reis* even mentions the fact that in consulting the annals on Poland, he has ascertained that the Ottoman Empire has traditionally played a secondary role in Polish politics, leaving the active role to various Christian nations, to which Vergennes responded that the only open frontier left to the Poles at this point was the Ottoman Empire, accurately forecasting the events of 1768, the violation of the Polish-Ottoman border by the Russians, which served as the *casus belli* of the 1768-774 Turco-Russian war.[2]

This passage confirms that the office of the *Reisülküttâp* was the central locus of information on foreign affairs. That it later became the agent of change has been effectively demonstrated in a number of studies, notably those of Itzkowitz and Findley.[3] In the tradition of the chancery itself lay the record keeping aspect, and in the educational system of the *kâtip* lay the interest in affairs outside the *Dar al-Islam*.[4] Thus, an indigenous source of information on Europe the Ottomans had in the mid-eighteenth century (as well as in earlier centuries) was the collection of writings (*Münşeat*) of important statesmen, and in particular, of Koca Ragıp (1757-1763), the most

[1]Bonneville de Marsangy, i, pp. 343-344.
[2]Ibid, ii, pp. 277ff; Ivan VI, Antonovich, died July 5, 1764, in an attempted coup against Catherine II. (*Great Soviet Encyclopedia* X, pp. 494-495).
[3]*See* Itzkowitz, Findley, "Legacy", Lalor, İnalcık.
[4]On *kâtip*, see Findley's works.

talented grand vizier of the age. To judge by the number of copies extant in Istanbul, his collection had become a textbook of foreign affairs.[1] Compiled when he was *Reisülküttâp* (1741-1744), it contains numerous summaries (*telhis*) for the grand vizier concerning the Austrian Emperor (Charles VI) running the 1737-1739 war, the possibility of peace with the Russians from the same period, peace with the Italian king, the articles of peace of Koca Ragıp concerning Austria, and a great deal of information on relations with the Persians and Nadir Shah, all of which reflect the political concerns of his period.[2]

A further source of information on Europe was the translation of European texts. Here again, it is possible to see a bit of sophistication following 1740. Prior to that time, the known translations were more or less restricted to lists of the dynasties of Europe and brief potted histories, such as the *İcmal-i ahval-i Avrupa* (A Summary of the Affair of Europe) described by both Lewis and Ménage.[3] Their presence in Ottoman libraries is usually ascribed to Ibrahim Müteferrika or Humbaracı Ahmet Paşa, the Comte de Bonneval, French renegade (d. 1747). Copies of similar texts exist from throughout the century.[4]

Of more interest are two further manuscripts, one on Russia, the other on Austria and Prussia, which are remarkably detailed. The manuscript on Russia is a report of a "Kazak Beyzade" which starts with a description of Russia, traces the history of the Russian interest in an invasion of the Crimea, with particular attention to the campaigns of Münnich and Lacy in the 1737-1739 war. The manuscript also includes lists of the Russian commanders and the infantry and cavalry regiments.[5]

The anonymous text on Austria and Prussia describes the Holy Roman Empire from its earliest days, and its current condition, with special emphasis

[1]Twenty copies examined in Istanbul.

[2]Cairo University Library Ms 679T is the manuscript described here; among others IU TY5711, TOP EH1463.

[3]Lewis, pp. 168-169; Ménage, describing Esat 2061; another copy, Atıf 1885.

[4]Two later versions describe the rulers of Europe: Esat 2104 from 1214 (1799) and IU TY3781 from 1214 (1799), both anonymous. An acknowledged Turkish translation of Castera's *Histoire de Catherine II de Russie*, Paris, from 1800 (GOW 3110) exists in Halet Efendi 637. From the period under discussion, a text exists on the "Christian nations" which was translated at Şumnu, in 1187 (1772), presumably in preparation for the abortive peace treaty at Bucharest that same year (IU TY 6095, folio 410b-430a).

[5]IU TY 6095 folio 62-87 *Memalik-i Mosku dair Kazak Beyzadesinin takriri*, part of a collection of *risales* on European affairs, including most of the works of Ahmet Resmi. The latest date on the manuscript is 1197 (1783), the year of Ahmet Resmi's death. *See* Fisher, p. 24 for description of Münnich and Lacy campaigns.

on Brandenburg, *i.e.*, Frederick the Great of Prussia. The colophon notes that "the matters described were sometimes taken from the historians and sometimes acquired from the newspaper [*gâzetâ*], a word for printed papers of events, which arrive from time to time". The latest date in this text is 1169 (1755/1756), the beginning of the Seven Years' War.[1]

Further direct evidence that the court translators made use of foreign newspapers in this early period is to be found in the Başbakanlık archives, especially in the Cevdet Hariciye Collection. That Abdülhamit I established a newspaper translating office around 1780 is known from Prussian dispatches, but prior to that time translation appears to have been more ad hoc.[2] One such document, dated 28 Rebiyülevvel, 1160 (9 April 1747), has the heading: "Events of a newspaper which has arrived from Europe", and consists of short summaries on France, Genoa and Stockholm. The most interesting piece of news is that the French King (Louis XV) has held a great assembly of all his nobles and officials at which it was decided that he should march into the Netherlands. (Louis XV attacked the Netherlands at the end of the 1740-1747 War of Austrian Succession).[3] The Hariciye Collection also contains evidence of the penetration of information on Europe into Ottoman decision making by other means: reports (*takrirs*) compiled by the Chief Translator of the Divan, prepared either for the *Reisülküttâp* or for the Grand Vizier, and intelligence reports from the Moldavian and Wallachian *Voyvodas* (Governors) who, after 1711, were appointed from among the Phanariot community in Istanbul, following the treachery of the local governors during the Russo-Turkish confrontation of 1710-1711.[4]

A report prepared in 1751 by the Chief Translator, based on information received from a report of "one who knows the true state of affairs", reviews Russo-Turkish relations during the 1737-1739 war. It goes on to discuss Elizabeth, then tsarina, the court factions around her and her interference with the borders of Islam in the Crimea and Poland, whose

[1]IU TY 6095, folio 129-145; the peculiar spelling of *Gâzetâ'*, with an *elif* at the end, may mean the author was reading the *Gazetta*, a political journal which started publication in Venice in 1770 (Smith, p. 68); Hazai, p. 73, mentions another copy of this text in Hungary, with later additions.

[2]*See* Davison, p. 17 — his source is Zinkeisen. Frederick the Great recommended the *Gazette de Clèves* and the *Courrier du Bas-Rhin* for the purposes of translation — Both decidedly pro-Russian.

[3]CH2737.

[4]Shaw, *History*, i, p. 331; the Phanariots were Greeks from the Fener district of Istanbul. The governors for Wallachia and Moldavia were appointed from a small number of those families.

agricultural abundance was advantageous for the quartering of the Russian troops and facilitated access to the Crimea.[1]

From the Moldavian *Voyvoda*, a report, dated 1761, describes the agreements reached by Austria, England and Prussia, concerning the succession to the Polish throne in the event of the death of August III, which finally occurred after a lingering illness in 1763, initiating a sequence of events which led to the Russo-Turkish War of 1768.[2]

Ottoman political knowledge of Europe, to judge from the evidence presented here, appears not to have extended much beyond the realm of her neighbors and potential enemies: Austria, Russia, Poland and Prussia. In that sphere, however, sufficient information was available to make reasonable decisions. The question of the accuracy of the information is beyond the scope of this paper, and may be relevant only in discussions of specific courses of action pursued as a result of misinformation.[3] The problem of misinformation in government is hardly limited to the eighteenth century.

How the information was used in Ottoman decision making is a more difficult question to address. It is possible to extract evidence of the use made of such information by the ruling elite from many of the same sources just cited, from which one can infer government practice. While this may seem an inadequate approach, it will have to suffice until more practical information on the internal organization of the eighteenth-century Ottoman administration is available.

Three categories of evidence have been utilized in this paper: the documentary, the anecdotal (scanty but significant), and the records of *meşveret*, the ad hoc councils, which assume a significant place in Ottoman decision making in the latter half of the eighteenth century.[4]

The first category is self evident, an example being a Hatt-ı hümayun of 4 April, 1754, stating that information has been received concerning the

[1]CH 8300, 1165 (1751) "*Divan-i tercümani kullarının takriridir*". As other examples CH1795, 1205 (1790), translated newspapers; CH 8398, 1198 (1783), on Austrian, French, and Dutch relations, the continental wars; TOP E5801/1 1175 (1761) on imminent attack on Frederick by Russians and Austrians; TOP E7151 on Polish affairs, circa 1768.

[2]CH8335 Rebiyülevvel 1176 (September 1762).

[3]Fisher, *The Russian Annexation*, p. 131. In reference to incoming reports on the Crimean crisis of 1783, Fisher notes "... it is understandable that the Ottoman reaction was a confused one" because of the varying reports on the situation which contradicted one another.

[4]*See* Findley, "Majlis al-shura" for a complete analysis of the place of the *meşveret* in Ottoman history. *See* also Shaw *Between*, p. 72.

construction of a fortress by Elizabeth of Russia which was encroaching on Ottoman territory, and that the Russian envoy had been duly informed.[1]

Anecdotal material can be relevant, though difficult to unearth from the chronicles and biographical materials at hand. Resmi's description of Grand Vizier Muhsinzade Mehmet, who was dismissed in 1769 for opposing the war with Russia, and reinstated in 1772, as he proved to be the only general capable of handling the forces in the last stages of the 1768-1774 war, can serve as an example. Muhsinzade, notes Resmi, was a man inclined to making himself aware of conditions around him. Day and night, he was "fond of reading the newspaper" (*havadis-i rüzgâr kağıtları*).[2]

The ad hoc council (*meşveret*) begins its regular appearance in the chronicles of the latter half of the eighteenth century, notably with Enverî and Vasıf. They themselves probably made use of the summaries of these meetings to be found in the archives. Two such documents, from around 1780, concern the ongoing Crimean crisis, which remained unresolved until Russian annexation in 1783. One in particular is worth summarizing in part. While it is undated, it clearly stems from the time of Şahin Giray's first rule in the Crimea, with Russian backing (1777-1782).

A number of officials had assembled including the *Kethüda Bey* (Deputy to the Grand Vizier), the *Defterdar* (Chief Financial Officer), and the *Reisülküttâb*, "to read one by one the summary of an interview with the Russian ambassador, the content of the news sent to the Reis Efendi by the ambassador's translator, and the report of two individuals from the Crimea". Thereafter, the *Şeyhülislâm* gave his opinion about what preparations should be made on land and sea. "It was apparent from the news and documents that the Russians intended, like it or not, to support the Han ... and would not only be content to allow Şahin Giray to enter the Crimea but might possibly break the treaty completely and trespass our borders..."[3]

That a forum existed for the review of information on hand, and for discussion of particular problems, is evident from this document. The constraints are also evident: the weight given to the opinion of the *Şeyhülislâm* and the attempt to arrive at a consensus, the latter perhaps a false conclusion to reach based, as it is, on the nature of the documents which

[1]Beydilli, p. 22, footnote 103.

[2]Ahmet Resmi, *Hulâsat*, p. 82.

[3]CH534; the other *meşveret* is CH5611 from 1193 (1779) with similar information.

survive, i.e., the summary of discussion rather than a full transcript. Without a doubt, opposition could mean disgrace and dismissal, but no longer death. One further interesting aspect of this particular document is that two of the council participants are not current office holders, an attempt, perhaps, to call on the expertise available, regardless of status.[1]

Thus, when Selim III called for a general consultative council in May of 1789 to discuss the need for reforms, it was not entirely without precedent, though its size and scope were innovative. Over two hundred members of the ruling class were drawn together to debate what could be done to save the Empire.[2] At least a few of them were prepared with recommendations based on information about Europe that had been gathered during the preceding four decades.

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[1] Resmi Ahmet Efendi and Defter Emini Sâbık el-Hâc Mustafa Efendi.

[2] Shaw, *Between*, p. 73; Ahmet Cevdet, iv, pp. 271-277,

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OTTOMAN POLITICAL WRITING, 1768-1808

The Ottomans, after a long period of peace that began in 1740, declared war on Russia in 1768, disputing territory essential to the continued existence of the empire: Moldavia, Wallachia, the Crimea, and Georgia. The war lasted until 1774, during which time the Ottomans proved that they no longer posed a military threat to Europe. The signing of the Küçük Kaynarca treaty of 1774, which granted Tatar independence in the Crimea, was the first instance of an Ottoman cession of a predominantly Muslim territory to a European power, and it provoked an internal crisis and long debate over the future of the empire.[1] The Ottoman administration, especially the scribal bureaucracy, contributed a number of political advice manuals to the debate, which form the core of the following discussion.[2] Four examples have been selected with the purpose of extending the analysis of Ottoman advice literature into the 18th century and testing the assumption of Ottoman inability to accommodate changing political realities.[3]

Imperial Islamic advice to rulers reflects a patrimonial climate, Persian notions of kingship, and a Muslim communal commitment to the idea of good government and a just ruler.[4] This was certainly true of the Ottoman

[1]The gradual shrinking of Ottoman western and northern borders is well described in William H. McNeil, *Europe's Steppe Frontier, 1500-1800* (Chicago, 1966). For a description of the war, see Richard Ungermann, *Der russich-türkische Krieg 1768-1774* (Vienna, 1906). Nothing has superseded the comprehensiveness of Ungermann's study, although there are many Russian studies available; see particularly Iv. R. Klokman, *Feldmarshal Rumiantsev ve Period Russko-Turetskoi Voiny 1768-1774* (Moscow, 1951).

[2]Douglas A. Howard, "Ottoman Historiography and the Literature of 'Decline' of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth centuries," *Journal of Asian History* 22 (1988): 54, refers to such works as "a literary genre of political and social commentary." On the advice literature in general, there are numerous works. The basis for much later discussion is Bernard Lewis's "Ottoman Observers of Ottoman Decline," *Islamic Studies* 1 (1962): 71-87. Agah Sırrı Levend contributed "Siyaset-nameler," *Türk Dili Araştırmaları Yıllığı Belleten* (1962): 167-94, which includes a comprehensive list of manuscript copies of various types of advice literature; Cornell Fleischer, *Bureaucrat and Intellectual in the Ottoman Empire: Mustafa Ali (1541-1600)* (Princeton, 1986), 100-102, presents a useful summary of the genre; see also Rhoads Murphey in "Review Article: Mustafa Ali and the Politics of Cultural Despair," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 21 (1989): 243-55; Pal Fodor, "State and Society, Crisis and Reform, in 15th-17th Century Ottoman Mirror for Princes," *Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarium Hungaricae* 40 (1986): 217-40; and Ahmet Uğur, *Osmanlı Siyâset-nâmeleri* (Istanbul 1980?), which is so poorly organized and printed as to make it almost unusable; see Douglas Howard's review in *Turkish Studies Association Bulletin* 13 (1989): 124-25.

[3]According to Fodor, by 1683 "the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire was an irreversible process which numbered among its many causes the inadequate appraisal of crisis and reform, and the incapability of spiritual, or, to put it in modern terms, 'ideological' revival," Fodor, "State and Society," 240.

[4]See Ira M. Lapidus, *A History of Islamic Societies* (Cambridge, 1988), 186-91. Fodor, "State and Society," 218, discusses early Islamic mirror literature. Howard, "Ottoman Historiography," 55, notes three political cultures as the Islamic source: "the ancient Persian concept of ruler as embodiment of Justice; the Greek (Platonic) concept of Justice as social harmony; and the Judeo-Christian concept of the sovereign being subject to the law of God."

examples. Ottoman writers had numerous models of the genre from which to draw, but the ones most frequently cited are the *Qabusnama* of 1082, written by Kay Kaus ibn Iskandar, and the better known *Siyasatnama* of 1090 by the Seljuq vizier Nizam al-Mulk. The harmonizing of the Islamic and Turkish ethos occurred in *Kutadgu Bilig*, written in 1069 by Yusuf Khass Hajib, which added a religious dimension to Central Asian notions of statescraft. The chief intent of the Islamic/Ottoman mirror literature was to promote the "royal ideology," to borrow Dankoff's term,[1] and they were conceived as words of etiquette and advice not only for the rulers themselves but also for viziers and their entourages.[2] One of their primary duties was the promulgation of the faith: "Crush the infidel foe with your armies, seeking strength and support from God. One who dies while fighting the infidel is not dead but alive... Open a way for Islam. Spread abroad the Shari'ah."[3]

The books of morals and ethics best exemplified by Kınalızade's *Ahlak-ı Ala'i* of 1564, served as another model.[4] According to the "circle of equity" Kınalızade describes — which by the 17th century had become one of the recurrent motifs of Ottoman political theory — each of the four classes of society (the military, the religious/intellectual, the merchant, and the peasant) had its own place and was dependent upon the justice of the sultan for its well-being. The ruler drew his authority from the Islamic shari'a and the Ottoman *kanun*. A pleasing harmony and careful delineation of the functions of each member of society was often mentioned in this advice literature though it rarely fit Ottoman political reality.[5]

[1]Yusuf Khass Hajib, *Wisdom of Royal Glory,* trans. Robert Dankoff (Chicago, 1983), 4-5, 9.

[2]Fodor, "State and Society," 217-18, prefers the term "mirror for princes" for his discussion of this kind of literature, noting that they have been called "political tracts, memoranda, socio-political treatises, reform proposals or advice literature."

[3]Yusuf Khass Hajib, *Wisdom,* 218. The source is the Qur'an 3:169. A theme common to all Islamic advice literature was the idea of a victorious army continuously expanding the frontier of Islam. In the Turkish context, the idea of the ever-expanding frontier combined with Central Asian theories of world domination, revived as an ideal by the Ottomans, what Abou El-Haj refers to as "the ideological justification for a mandate over the Muslim people." Osman Turan, "Ideal of World Domination among the Medieval Turks," *Studia Islamica* 4 (1955): 77-90; Rifaat Ali Abou El-Haj, "Ottoman Attitudes Toward Peace Making: The Karlowitz Case," *Der Islam* 51 (1974): 135.

[4]Kmahzade himself incorporated the ethics of Dawani (d. 1502) and Nasir al-Din Tusi (d. 1274); see Fleischer, *Bureaucrat and Intellectual,* 100, n. 73; Kınalızade, *Ahlak-ı Ala'i* (Bulaq, 1832); Adnan Adıvar, "Kınalızade," *İslam Ansiklopedisi* 6:709-12. The literature of ethics is discussed by Cornell Fleischer in "Royal Authority, Dynastic Cyclism and 'Ibn Khaldunism' in Sixteenth Century Ottoman Letters," in *Ibn Khaldun and Islamic Ideology,* ed. Bruce Lawrence (Leiden, 1984), 49.

[5]See Fleischer, "Royal Authority," 49, for the complete circle; see also Rhoads Murphey, "The Veliyyuddin Telhis: Notes on the Sources and Interrelations Between Koçi Bey and Contemporary Writers of Advice to Kings," *Belleten* 43 (1979): 556. See also Şerif Mardin, "The Mind of the Turkish Reformer," in *Arab Socialism,* ed. S. A. Hanna (Salt Lake City, 1969), 31.

A final source of inspiration for the authors of political advice, at least in the 17th century, was the work of Ibn Khaldun (d. 1406). His description of the cycle of dynasties — four generations lasting 120 years — confirmed for the Ottomans their own sense of the "decline" of their dynasty and served both as a prescription and a warning that Ottoman institutions needed rejuvenation to the state of vigor of previous generations.[1]

By the end of the 17th century, an Ottoman literary vision of political harmony had developed based on justice, piety, and adherence to the sharia' and *kanun*.[2] The harmony of that state depended on an "ever-victorious army" and the "ever-expanding frontier," two obligations of the ruler to fulfill as the basis for the prosperity of "religion and state" (*din-ü-devlet*).[3] The two works of the 16th century most often cited are Grand Vizier Lufti Pasha's *Asafname* and Mustafa Ali's *Nushat ül-Selatin* (Counsel of Sultans).[4] For Mustafa Ali, "the honor of empire and nation (*mülk-ü-millet*) suffers from both ends and the basis of the structure of Faith and Fatherland (*din-ü-devlet*) resembles a castle built on ice."[5] Akhisari (d. 1616), another advice author, made some observations that would be echoed in the following centuries. In his *Usui ül-Hikem fi Nizam ül-Alem* (Philosophical Principles Concerning the Order of the World), he outlined four causes for the disorder in the empire: unsuitable leaders who neglected justice; a disregard for the opinion of the ulema; a breakdown of army discipline and training; corruption, covetousness, and the reign of women.[6] Akhisari's recommendations to the sultan stressed the

[1]Ibn Khaldun, *The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History,* trans. Franz Rosenthal (Princeton, 1967), 136-38, 141-42; Fleischer, "Royal Authority," 48-49; Murphey, "The Veliyyuddin Telhis," 556. Howard, "Ottoman Historiography," 72, wonders if Ibn Khaldun didn't have a "stilling influence on Ottoman intellectual life."

[2]Howard, "Ottoman Historiograpy," 55-57.

[3]This is a simplified explanation for a highly complex pair of terms, the expression in Ottoman political theory, perhaps, of the explicit manifestation of the shari'a and *kanun*. For further definitions, see L. Gardet, "Dīn," *EI*2, 2:293-96; in the framework of the historian Mustafa Ali (d. 1600), "the strength of the soldiers produces the power of [their] leader and the army-leader's victory appears [in cooperation] with the victory-oriented army," Andreas Tietze, *Mustafa 'Ālī's Counsel of Sultans of 1581,* 2 pts. (Vienna, 1979-82), pt. 2, 42.

[4]While the *Asafname* is a fairly straightforward "mirror for princes," the *Counsel of Sultans* may have signaled a new stage of development in the literature of advice as argued by Fleischer, insofar as it turned a literary exercise into an administrative handbook; Fleischer, *Bureaucrat and Intellectual,* 101-2; see also Lewis, "Ottoman Observers," 71-73. Lutfi Pasha's *Asafname* was written in 1541.

[5]Tietze, "*Mustafā 'Ālī's Counsel,*" pt. 2, 21.

[6]Fodor, "State and Society," 226-27; M. Garcin de Tassy, "Principes de sagesse, touchant l'art de gouverner," *Journal Asiatique* 4 (1824): 213-27, 283-90, for a French translation; published in Arabic as *Usūl al-Hikam fi Nizam al-'Ālam: Risāla fi al-Fikr al-Siyasī al-Islām* (Kuwait, 1987); see also Mustafa A. Mehmed, "La Crise ottomane dans la vision de Hasan Kiafi Akhisari (1544-1616)," *Revue des études Sud-Est européennes* 13 (1975): 385-402, whose conclusions are to be used with caution; see Fodor's comments, "State and Society," 226, n . 20; a manuscript copy dated 1284 (1867), (Düğümlü Baba 438 in the Süleymaniye Library collections) alternates Arabic and Turkish texts.

necessity of properly arming and training the Janissaries and linked the defeats of the recent long war against the Austrians (1593-1606) to an ignorance of the new firearms in use by the enemy and to a disregard for the religious norms. He ended with a long plea concerning the benefits of peace, supporting his arguments with examples from the Qur'an and the hadith.[1] What Murphey has called this "politics of cultural despair" conveyed "an underlying message of hope for the redemption of society through an affirmation of faith, both in God's grace and in the restorative power conferred by upholding traditional ethical values."[2] These works reflect an anxiety in administrative circles over the welfare of the empire before the political and fiscal crises of the 17th century prompted further expression of concern.

The best known of the advice authors of that period was Koçi Bey, whose *Risale*, presented to Murad IV (r. 1623-40) in 1630 has earned him the sobriquets of the "Ottoman Montesquieu" and the "Ottoman Machiavelli."[3] Koçi Bey was concerned with what he perceived to be the military and agrarian breakdown of the empire. Corruption was rampant, and respect for the shari'a and *kanun* had diminished. The sultan's authority had been affected by the influence of palace favorites, the bartering of offices, the breakdown of the *timar* land distribution system, and the losses in tax revenue. Of the Janissaries he said, "In the past, when the army of Islam was small and pure, pious and firm, wherever it turned, by the will of God, victory appeared and the majesty of Islam advanced."[4] The remedy for Koçi Bey lay in the restoration of the purity of all classes, the elimination of bribery and corruption, and adherence to the shari'a which "was the basis of order of sovereignty and nation (*mülk-ü-millet*) and the reason for the strength of religion and state (*din-ü-devlet*)".[5]

A quarter of a century later, the Ottoman polymath Katib Çelebi was prompted to write about the financial crisis of the Ottoman state. His *Düstur ül-Amel fi-Islah ül-Halel* (Regulations for Reforming Defects) incorporated

[1]Mehmed, "La Crise ottomane," 400-401; Düğümlü Baba 438, fols. 33-35 on the army and fols. 48-50 on peace. Akhisari's work was presented to Mehmed III (r. 1595-1603) in 1596, Fodor, "State and Society," 225.

[2]Murphey, "Review Article," 250.

[3]Lewis, "Ottoman Observers," 73, calls him the "Ottoman Montesquieu"; Gülbende Kuray, "Türkiye'de Bir Machiavelli," *Belleten* 52 (1988): 165-62, likens Koçi Bey to Machiavelli.

[4]See Colin Imber, "Koçi Bey," *EI2*, 5:248-50; also M. Çağatay Uluçay, "Koçi Bey," *İslam Ansiklopedisi*, 6:632-35. Koçi Bey's *Risale* has been published many times: in Ottoman Turkish as *Koçi Bey Risalesi* (Istanbul, 1885); modernized as *Koçi Bey Risalesi*, ed. Kemal Aksüt (Istanbul, 1939), and others. See also Fodor, "State and Society," 231-33. The quotation is from the 1885 edition, 63-64 (Aksüt, *Koçi Bey*, 46).

[5]*Koçi Bey* (1885), 8; Aksüt, *Koçi Bey*, 19.

the ideas of Ibn Khaldun and Kınalızade in a skillful example of Ottoman advice literature. Not only were societies subject to cycles as were the lives of individuals, but each aspect of Ottoman society could be likened to parts of the human body, recalling the four humors. Restoration of the power of the state required a strong hand to curb excesses, revitalize the treasury, and reduce the size of the army. Katib Çelebi concluded his recommendations about the army with: "May God bless with success works benefiting religion and state (*din-ü-devlet*)."[1]

The literary tradition continued into the early 18th century with Sarı Mehmed Pasha, who was chief financial officer (*defterdar*) six different times over a period of fifteen years, from 1703 to 1716. Calling his own contribution *Nasaih ül-Vüzera ve-ül-Ümera* (Counsel for Viziers and Commanders), he referred to Lutfi Pasha's *Asafname* and entitled his first chapter "The Behavior and Habits and Actions of the Illustrious Grand Vezir."[2] His topics of concern are familiar: bribery and corruption, the importance of the Janissaries; the condition of the peasantry; protection of the frontier; the collapse of morality and the resulting corruption; and finally, the condition of the military fiefs.[3] Sarı Mehmed's prescription for the reform of Ottoman society was dependent on the balance of just rule and a full treasury: "The basis of the ruler's system is the man of consequence, and the raising of troops requires paying ready money by the Treasury, and the prosperity of the country comes through its healthy condition, and the flourishing of the country comes through granting of justice and the punishment of oppressors."[4]

Sarı Mehmed's experience both in office and on the battlefield had made him aware that the Ottomans could no longer withstand European military forces.[5] The chapter entitled "The State of the Ever-Victorious Frontier and the Qualities of Commanders" concentrated on some of the more obvious problems such as corruption and lawlessness on campaign and lack of troop discipline.[6] War, according to Sarı Mehmed, was in the hands of God, so

[1]Lewis, "Ottoman Observers," 77-80; see also Orhan Şaik Gökyay, "Kâtib Çelebi," *İslam Ansiklopedisi* 6:432-38; Fodor, "State and Society," 233-34. Katib Çelebi's text is available in Ottoman and modern Turkish versions: the 1863 istanbul edition published with 'Ayn 'Ali's *Kavanin Âl-i Osman*, 119-40, is used here. The modernized version is available as: *Bozuklukların Düzeltilmesinde Tutulacak Yollar*, ed. Ali Can (Ankara, 1982). For the text used here, see 'Ayn 'Ali, *Kavanin*, 124-26, 129-33, esp. 133.

[2]Sarı Mehmed Pasha, *Ottoman Statecraft*, ed. and trans. W. L. Wright (Princeton, 1935), 64.

[3]Ibid., 63.

[4]Ibid., 119-120.

[5]Ibid., 5-9, on Sarı Mehmed's background.

[6]Ibid., 126-28.

preachers should continue to exhort the troops to holy war, to restore order and piety to campaigning,[1] but good, experienced leadership was also essential to maintain the proper order on the battlefield and to see to the morality of the troops in training, logistics, and provisioning.[2] Care should be taken to learn more of the enemy's tricks and stratagems and to "make wise preparation against whatever style of warfare is peculiar to that army. Let them [the officers] not suppose that warfare of all enemies is of one sort."[3] Commanders should exercise the greatest caution before starting a battle, after consulting with men of experience and good judgment.[4] In correcting abuses, trust worthy officers should be striving "to gain the favor of God and endeavoring to protect the public treasury of the Moslems and to recognize that services to the Faith and government (*din-ü-devlet*) are a blessed capital for themselves in the future state."[5] Sarı Mehmed also listed his concerns for the enlisted men: proper pay, provender, and provisions; care for the morality of the soldiers and the inexperienced fighters; concern for the heavy loads and excess baggage the troops carry; and solicitude for their well-being.[6]

Ibrahim Müteferrika (d. 1745) concentrated on Ottoman military failures contrasted to Western victories. The founder of the first Islamic printing press in the Ottoman Empire, he was a Hungarian convert known for the breadth of his learning.[7] His essay, *Usul ül-Hikem fi Nizam ül-Ümem* (Philosophical Principles for Organizing Nations), printed in 1731 on his own press, was submitted to Mahmud I (r. 1730-54) following the violent 1730 Patrona Halil rebellion, which had brought an abrupt close to the reform era of Damat Ibrahim Pasha.[8] Whether or not Mahmud I acted upon the recommendations of Müteferrika has not yet been determined, but later text suggests that he at least read it.[9] Tangible evidence of the direct impact of these kinds of works at this stage of research in the field begins with the court of Selim III.

[1]Ibid., 126-27.
[2]Ibid., 127-31.
[3]Ibid., 130-131.
[4]Ibid., 131.
[5]Ibid., 114.
[6]Ibid., 130. These were many of the same concerns of European military reformists of the period.
[7]Niyazi Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey* (Montreal, 1964), 36-45.
[8]Berkes, *The Development of Secularism*, 42; Berkes translates the title as *Rational Bases for the Polities of Nations.*
[9]See, C. U. MS 6548T, fol. 67 ; Wilkinson, 245; *Risale*, 45-50.

Berkes finds Müteferrika's originality to be in his introduction into Ottoman political discourse the idea of government based upon reason rather than religion,[1] but another contribution was his ability to universalize the Ottoman experience and recognize the virtue of amalgamating the successful attributes of the Christian armies into the Ottoman military. In the manner of his predecessors, Müteferrika still included the "circle of equity", stressing that maintaining the status quo and purity of each of the classes was essential to prosperity.[2] He broadened his world view, however, to factor in some of the external causes of Ottoman weaknesses. The Christians had prevailed because the Muslims, out of indolence and indifference, had done nothing in response. Like all empires before them, infidel or Muslim, they should learn from the strategies of their successful enemies.[3] It would be possible to restore Ottoman greatness because the Ottomans had the advantage of the shari'a and holy war.[4] The courage, bravery, agility, and heroic nobility so common to the Ottomans was unknown to the Christians and only needed to be harnessed and disciplined.[5] A well-organized, disciplined army and adherence to the shari'a would reaffirm Ottoman indomitability.[6] Müteferrika's prescription for victory focused on Russia, the chief threat to Ottoman security, citing the reforms of Peter the Great as an example of how a ruler succeeded in rebuilding his army and navy by modeling himself on the organization of victorious nations.[7]

The "circle of equity" and the "ever-victorious" frontier were repeated in the advice literature for at least the first three decades of the 18th century, even as individual authors struggled with the specific problems of their own era. In the interval of peace from 1740 to 1768, a number of factors began to erode Ottoman reliance on an ideal model of political and social harmony, forcing a reassessment of its appropriateness. These factors included the politics of shrinking borders as well as defeat on the battlefield, which led the Ottomans

[1]See particularly Berkes, *The Development of Secularism*, 42-43. Müteferrika's French translator of 1769 was impressed that Müteferrika had been allowed to publish it: *Traité de tactique*, trans. Károly Imre Sándor Revicsky (Vienna, 1769), v.
[2]Especially Akhisari. See Mehmed, "La Crise ottomane," 395-96. The resemblance of the titles of the two works must be more than just coincidental; see İbrahim Müteferrika, *Usul ül-Hikem fi Nizam ül-Ümem* (Istanbul, 1731), fols. 22b-23 for the full text.
[3]Müteferrika, *Usui ül-Hikem,* fols., 4b-12; pp. 35-39 of Revicsky's translation.
[4]From Müteferrika, *Traité* 146; see Berkes, *The Development of Secularism*, 43-44, for fuller translation.
[5]Müteferrika, *Traité,* 127, summarized in Berkes, *The Development of Secularism*, 43-44 as well.
[6]Müteferrika, *Usul-ül-Hikem*, fols. 33b-34; Müteferrika, *Traité,* 150 ff.; Berkes, *The Development of Secularism*, 44-45.
[7]Müteferrika, *Traité,* 154 ff.; Müteferrika, *Usul ül-Hikem,* fol. 34 ff.; Berkes, *The Development of Secularism*, 45.

into new diplomatic strategies with their Western enemies. As put by Abou El-Haj: "the acceptance of defeat... would amount to a total abandonment of the ideological justification of the Ottoman state and would have led to the dissolution of the emotional bond this theory effected in the Ottoman social fabric."[1] Abou El-Haj concludes from an examination of the Karlowitz negotiations that the Ottomans "resorted in effect to a sort of make-believe" in order to accept the terms of the treaty.[2] Treaty negotiations were only part of the enlarged Ottoman contact with Europe. The 18th century was a time of intense diplomatic activity as evidenced by the number of surviving embassy reports from the period.[3] Ottoman statesmen, chosen primarily from the scribal bureaucracy after 1699, negotiated treaties, traveled to European courts, and fashioned Ottoman diplomatic practices for a new era of fixed boundaries. In so doing, they gradually incorporated European practices and languages into the Ottoman context. The evidence is available in the libraries of Turkey, in embassy reports, translations of European newspapers, and small essays on the European diplomatic system, among others.[4]

The growing complexity of government, contributing to an increase in the number of scribal offices and demanding facility with the intricate language and style of Ottoman documents, led to the complete domination of the scribal bureaucracy in administrative affairs by the end of the 18th century.[5] In addition, most of the grand viziers who served as commanders in

[1]Abou El-Haj, "Ottoman Attitudes," 136. This line of inquiry could fruitfully be applied to the Küçük Kaynarca Treaty and might contribute to an explanations as to why an intense and lengthy debate ensued in Ottoman circles (1774-83) over many of the terms of that treaty; see Bernard Lewis, *The Political Language of Islam* (Chicago, 1988), 111-12, on the significance of the choice of the word "freedom" in that treaty.

[2]Abou El-Haj, "Ottoman Attitudes," 136.

[3]Of the forty-four are from the 18th century and of those only eight *do not* deal with Europe. Elena Maştakova, "Türk Aydınlaşma Ön-Tarihi XVIII. Yüzyıl Edebiyatı Üzerine," in *Sovyet Türkologlarmın Türk Edebiyatı İncelemeleri* (Istanbul, 1980), 20.

[4]In this regard, see J. C. Hurewitz, "The Europeanization of Ottoman Diplomacy: The Conversion from Unilateralism to Reciprocity in the Nineteenth Century," *Belleten* 25 (1961): 455-66; see also Virginia Aksan, "Ottoman-French Relations, 1739-1768," in *Studies on Ottoman Diplomatic History*, ed. Sinan Kuneralp (Istanbul, 1987), 41-58; Virginia Aksan, "Ottoman Sources of Information on Europe in the Eighteenth Century," *Archivum Ottomanicum* 11 (1986 [1988]): 5-16. Şerif Mardin, "Some Notes on an Early Phase in the Modernization of Communications in Turkey," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 3 (1960/61): 265, comments on the introduction of European concepts such as "status quo" into Ottoman official documents during the reign of Selim III.

[5]An interesting comparison could be made with Eastern Europe, especially Austria and Russia, which underwent similar kinds of centralization processes in this period: see, in that regard, Marc Raeff, "The Russian Autocracy and Its Officials," *Harvard Slavic Studies* 4 (1957): 77-91. On the interelite struggle as related to the production of advice literature, see Rifaat Ali Abou El-Haj, "Fitnah, Huruc ala al-Sultan and Nasihat: Political Struggle and Social Conflict in Ottoman Society, 1560's-1700's," in *Comité international d'études pré-ottomanes et ottomanes VIth Symposium, Cambridge, 1st-4st July 1984 proceedings*, ed. Jean-Louis Bacqué-Grammont and Emeri van Donzel (Istanbul, 1987), 185-91. For a discussion of what Mardin styles "a communications crisis of some importance," see Mardin, "Some Notes," 252-55.

chief in the 1768 to 1774 war were chancery products who had seen very little campaigning, a result of the long period of peace and a continuation of the efendi-turned-pasha pattern described by Itzkowitz.[1] War and diplomacy were now exclusively conducted by the scribal bureaucracy, and the articulation of Ottoman official history, in the office of *vak'anüvis*, was in their hands. During this period, Ottoman history caught up with itself: the chancery on the battlefront ran the war, recorded the events, negotiated the outcome, and brought an immediacy and veracity to what they had to say about the collapse of the Ottoman military machine. The chronicle of Sadullah Enveri covering the period from 1768 to 1774 reads like a war diary and vividly records the sense of despair on the battlefront after the disasters of the battles of Hotin (1769) and Kartal (1770).[2] The sample of the works that follow reflect an intense debate between conservative and "modernist" forces on the subject of military reform. In a subtle way, the debate may have further undermined the appeal of the "circle of equity" paradigm that restricted an individual's freedom of action by its emphasis on social harmony and the sultan as the source of justice. What can be detected in the writings that now appeared is the emergence of the idea that war could be rationalized.[3]

This is especially true in the writings of Ahmed Resmi Efendi (1700-83), author of the harsh, often satirical criticism of the war, *Hülasat ül-I'tibar* (A Summary of Admonitions).[4] In 1763, Ahmed Resmi Efendi was the first Turkish ambassador to travel to Prussia and meet Frederick the Great. While in Berlin, Ahmed Resmi was treated to a review of Frederick's troops, reputedly the best in Europe at the time.[5] Resmi also served as second in command (*kethüda*) to the grand vizier on the battlefront for almost the entire war.[6] In the course of that service, he composed two small essays, one on military mustering and provisioning and the other on the European diplomatic system. The first, written in December 1769, was presented on the battlefront to the newly appointed grand vizier, Halil Pasha, following the end of the disastrous campaign of that year. As a result of a thirty-year hiatus in campaigning, Ahmed Resmi began, the rules for careful and solicitous

[1]Suraiya Faroqhi succinctly reviews current research on the trend in "Civilian Society and Political Power in the Ottoman Empire: A Report on Research in Collective Biography (1480-1820)," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 17 (1985): 115.

[2]On the official historians, see Bekir Kütükoğlu, "Vekāyinüvis," *İslam Ansiklopedisi*, 13:271-87.

[3]See Mardin, "The Mind," 27-30, for a further discussion.

[4]Probably composed between 1774 and 1781, from textual evidence: Ahmed Resmi, *Hulasat ül-İ'tibar* (Istanbul, 1869).

[5]Ahmed Resmi, *Sefaretname-yi Ahmed Resmi* (Istanbul, 1886), 54-55.

[6]See İ.H. Uzunçarşıh, *Osmanlı Tarihi* (Ankara, 1982), vol. 4, pt. 2, 616-19.

organization of an army had been neglected and forgotten. He produced a list of thirteen matters that required immediate attention, which can be summarized as follows: (a) the necessity for discipline on the march, that is, the protection of the towns on the campaign route so that provisions and supplies would be available for the army; (b) proper control of the horses, buffalo, and camels, and discipline of the men responsible for them; (c) proper discipline and reorganization of the troops from Anatolia whose commanders gathered around them nothing but thieves and vagrants, and caused untold suffering to the towns and villages on the campaign route; (d) the necessity for bringing order to the army winter quarters in Babadağı (present-day Bulgaria): for every 100 men, he supposed there were 2,000 followers and animals; (e) the necessity for reorganizing and drilling the palace regiments, who should be subjected to regular roll call; and finally, (f) the necessity for proper provisioning, especially in the matter of hardtack which had become a source of much corruption. Ahmed Resmi was especially concerned about the regulation of prices.

On each of these matters, he went into some detail concerning the problem and proposing appropriate solutions. On the matter of reorganizing the palace corps, for example, Ahmed Resmi noted that of the 20,000 on the rolls, only 2,000 men actually existed. He recommended eliminating the abuses in the entitlement (*esame*) for nonexistent soldiers that had been assigned to the men of state, the viziers, and the Janissaries. As a remedy for the ineffectiveness of the current troops, he recommended that 2,000 men of lowest rank be enlisted, drilled, and inspected every two to three days.[1]

Embodied in this simple work is most of the reform agenda that would absorb Selim III (r. 1789-1807) and his ministers two decades later.[2] Of

[1]This work exists in manuscript only: Istanbul University (İ.U) Ms. TY419, 11 fols., submitted to Halil Pasha on 17 Şaban 1183 (16 december 1769), according to a textual note. The copy itself is undated but a marginal note by Ahmed Resmi's son states that his father had composed it and hoped eventually to turn it into a complete essay wtih seventeen articles — it consists of only thirteen. The passage on the neglect of the army is on fol. 1b; that on the Janissaries is on fol. 6 of the manuscript. Discipline and training were two of the 18th-century developments that gained currency in the European military context, especially in Prussia. Interestingly enough, Ahmed Resmi's list of abuses reproduces a few of those of Mustafa Ali's, obviously not new problems: standardization of prices (Tietze, *Mustafā 'Ālī's Counsel*, pt. 2, 25-27); army provisions (*nüzül*: Tietze, *Mustafā 'Ālī's Counsel*, pt. 2, 35), by far the most significant problem according to Ahmed Resmi (I.U. Ms. TY419, fols. 7-10).

[2]The reference to *esame*, for example, which by this time was a very serious problem of the salaried corps. Each soldier registered in a muster roll was entitled to an *esame*, proof of his right to salary and benefits. The *esame* of long-dead or retired soldiers were routinely kept by regimental commanders to enrich their own pockets, a problem common to all the armies of Europe. The reformers who advised Selim III were preoccupied with the problem: see Enver Z. Karal, "Nizam-ı Cedide Dâir Layihalar," *Tarih vesikaları* 1 (1942): 414-25; idem, *Tarih vesikaları* 2 (1942/43): 104-11, 342-52, 424-32.

particular interest is Ahmed Resmi's emphasis on drills and inspection, then foreign to the Janissaries.[1] An objectivity of tone, a willingness to chastise high and low, and a perceptive understanding of the need for a well-organized, well-disciplined, and well-fed army characterize its few pages. Neither the "circle of equity" nor the "ever-victorious frontier" appears here or in the other work to follow.[2]

The second piece written by Ahmed Resmi was requested by Muhsinzade Mehmed Pasha, grand vizier and commander in chief of the Ottoman army from 1771 to 1774. The memorandum was written in 1772 in the midst of the protracted Ottoman-Russian negotiations in Bucharest to end the war, "as a response to those who state that it is impossible to expel the Russians or to consider that they might withdraw from the territories they have occupied in Bender, Bucak, Iflak, and Boğdan."[3] Alluding to Ibn Khaldun, Ahmed Resmi remarked that states in their age of decline ought to be content within the boundaries of their own lands. Too often rulers of such states undertook misguided ventures to expand their territories and cast their people into misery in the name of fame and glory, discovering to their sorrow that they not only lost territory but also destroyed the affluence and abundance of their lands. He produced examples from the past fifty to sixty years, considering that recent events would have a greater impact on his readers. He dwelt on the futility of the long campaigns in Iran that had involved Russia, Iran, and the Ottomans and had resulted in a return to the status quo after twenty years of futile warfare. Ottoman occupation with Iran had encouraged the Russians and Austrians to aggression on the western frontier of the empire to little avail. After much difficulty, both states were obliged to give up the territory they had conquered, including the city of Belgrade. Frederick the Great of Prussia then used Austrian weakness to increase his territories, but had to be satisfied with Silesia after fifteen years of continual warfare that engulfed most of the lands of Europe.[4]

[1]See Baron François De Tott, *Memoirs of Baron De Tott*, vols. (London, 1785) [New York, 1973]), 2:139 ff., for a somewhat biased view of the state of Janissary discipline in this period.

[2]Of equal interest is Ahmed Resmi's simplicity of style; for example, on the *esame*: "Sipah ve Silahdar Ocaklarında mestur olan yirmi bin esameden vaktıyla bin adam tedariki mümkün olmadığı görülmüştür" (Ahmed Resmi, I.U. Ms. TY419, fol. 6). The advice pieces examined here exhibit for the most part a return to simplified Turkish and a preference of their authors for drawing examples from their own era and dynasty.

[3]That is, the Ukraine, Wallachia, and Moldavia. A facsimile of a manuscript in the National Library in Ankara (unidentified) was published by İsmet Parmaksızoğlu, "Bir Türk Diplomatının Onsekizinci Yüzyıl Sonunda Devletler Arası İlişkilere Dair Görüşleri," *Belleten* 47 (1983): 527-45, and includes a modernized version.

[4]Parmaksızoğlu, 529-31; Ahmed Resmi refers to the War of Austrian succession and the Seven Years War during the period 1740-63.

As examples of Asian rulers who had overextended themselves Ahmed Resmi chose Sultan Siileyman I and Genghis Khan and his descendants in Anatolia and Syria. In the first instance, Siileyman's campaign to Yemen had come to nothing; in the second, expansion had meant the collapse of the Ilkhanids.[1] Ahmed Resmi considered the current struggle with Russia in the nature of a storm or tempest that would disappear under the influence of the stars or the death of the ruler. The Russian state, which had overextended itself in Poland, Georgia, and the Mediterranean, would ultimately find it necessary to withdraw to the safety of its own territory because of insufficient income, exhaustion, and internal strife. Ahmed Resmi's final comment criticizes the Ottoman decision to go to war: had the Ottomans stayed within their boundaries, adequately defending their own territory, he admonished, then naturally the Russians would have been obliged to keep the peace.[2]

The importance of Ahmed Resmi's two works lies in the suggestion that within the confines of the God-given order, kings and rulers could exercise their will (and restraint) in order to contain the devastations of war and maintain the prosperity of their populations. When wars did break out, however, they could not be won unless discipline was instilled into the army on campaign, and corruption at all levels was eliminated. Victory of one nation over another was not inevitable but was dependent on the resources of that nation and its understanding of the maximum reach of its boundaries. The latter idea could be read as Ahmed Resmi's interpretation of the balance-of-power concept of the European state system. Absent are the familiar literary devices of earlier political literature: Ahmed Resmi refers to *devlet*, *memleket*, and *taife* throughout and does not use *din-ü-devlet* or shari'a and *kanun*. He was clearly interested in convincing his reader of the necessity and benefits of peace and restraint as the principle tenets of government policy, following on his own experiences of the misery and pain of war.

The next political treatise to be discussed is both undated and anonymous. References to the newly enthroned Abdülhamid I (r. 1774-89), the collapse of the peace negotiations of Foksani and Bucharest (1771-73), and the problems inherent in the resumption of fighting make it fairly clear, however, that it was written before the beginning of the final campaign season of 1774, in response to a request from the new sultan concerning which European nation would make the best mediator for the peace treaty. Entitled *Avrupa'ya Mensub Olan Mizan-i Umur-u Hariciye Beyamndadır*. (An Explanation of

[1]Ibid., 532-34. Ahmed Resmi discusses at some length the period from 1223-1336.
[2]Ibid., 534-35.

the Balance of Foreign Affairs Relating to Europe), the work displays a detailed knowledge of recent European history and some evidence of the author having been an eyewitness to some of the events of the war he describes.[1] It is a polemical piece about the role of European negotiators, the usefulness of Western military expertise, and the range of choices the Ottomans and for ways to end the war.

The author began his discussion by saying that as Siileyman I had supplied laws for the "ever-lasting Ottoman state," so too, other groups of people (*güruh*) had invented laws that had brought an order to foreign affairs for the last 100 years, especially in Europe. Should Spain, France, or England step beyond the bounds of their own countries, as they all had in recent days, the other states checked their power by cooperating with one another. While the alliances they shared differed from time to time, they managed to contain one another by this system. Most recently, the astute diplomacy of France's statesmen had kept her from suffering too much damage from the treaties following the wars on land and sea (The Seven Years War and the Colonial Wars). Thereafter, the situation had remained fairly tranquil until the balance of power had shifted to favor Russia.[2]

The author then launched into a description of the current status of the Ottoman forces. Five years of warfare, the neglect of the craft of war, inadequate finances, and an army that fled in the face of the enemy made peace imperative. Furthermore, the division of Poland, which had occurred in 1772, meant that the Ottoman Empire could no longer influence the outcome of events in that country. Both sides were having difficulty raising soldiers, and the imminent possibility of either Austria or Prussia entering the war was unthinkable, because Austria had some old scores to settle and Prussia's fame in the art of warfare "reached to the skies."[3]

As peace was absolutely necessary, the anonymous author continued, a mediator experienced in European foreign affairs should be chosen from one of three possible countries: France, Holland, and England. France had helped the Ottoman Empire in the past, most notably in 1739, and was currently sending and paying for a technical expert to train Ottoman soldiers. (He had already

[1]Two manuscripts have so far been examined: Topkapı H375, n.d., fols. 1-14 and Istanbul University MS TY6065, n.d., fols. 277b-90. The two texts differ very little. References are to the foliation of the Topkapı copy.
[2]*Avrupa*, fols. 1b-3b; *güruh* also has the sense of "gang, class, flock, horde," sometimes "nation." Elsewhere, the author uses *devlet* and *memleket* in referring to the nations of Europe.
[3]Ibid., fols. 6-8.

dismissed Prussia and Austria as mediators because they had conspired to cause the breakdown of negotiations at Foksani and Bucharest from 1771 to 1773.[1]) The mention of French technical help prompted a digression on the differences between the Christian and Muslim military systems. The author felt that while Western military innovations might prove useful, it was odd that Muslims were forced to undergo this training when the infidels had always claimed that the Ottomans were confessing their deficiency in the arts of war not just to the enemy but to the rest of the world?[2] These new troops would surely fail, whereas the brave traditional forces, whose zeal was undiminished, had been shamed and martyred by the ignorance and unconcern of their leaders.[3]

Reverting to his original topic, the author dismissed France and England as mediators because they had proved unreliable in the past and had too close an interest in the Black Sea trade. Holland might be the best choice, but it would make more sense for the Ottomans to negotiate their own peace.[4] The histories taught one thing: Muslims could prevail provided they respected the laws of their ancestors, the experience of well-meaning men of state, and the commanders of their regiments. In a cautionary aside, the author reminded the sultan that war and peace were in the hands of men of state who sometimes proved incapable of leadership and that it was an imperative to restore piety to the empire by consulting with the ulema.[5] The dilemma of the Ottoman reformer is amply demonstrated in this work: to join the European diplomatic system meant accepting Western concepts of war and peace which would subsequently lead to a betrayal and denial of the Islamic values that had made the Ottoman Empire what it was. The literary tradition of previous advice literature is in evidence only in the final paragraphs where the author stresses the need for a just and pious sultan to restore order.

The final piece of political writing under consideration embodies even more explicitly the conflict over reform in the Ottoman administration by the end of the 18th century. Koca Sekbanbaşı or Çelebi Efendi, as he is variously known, wrote his *Hülasat ül-Kelam fi Redd ül-Avamm* (The Summary of the Discourse to Refute the Rabble) to respond to the critics of the new, Western-

[1]Ibid., fols. 8-9. Concerning the technical expert, although he refers only to a French "army officer" who had helped the Ottomans refortify the Dardanelles (1770-71), he obviously means Baron de Tott. De Tott's rapid-fire artillerymen (*sür'at topçuları*) were tested for the first time in the 1774 campaign.

[2]Ibid., fols. 9b-10.

[3]Ibid., fols. 10b-11a; especially the late Sultan Mustafa III (r. 1757-74).

[4]Ibid., fols. 10b-13a.

[5]Ibid., fols. 13b-14. Perhaps the author was a member of the ulema?

style troops organized by Selim III.[1] While little is known about Koca Sekbanbaşı, it is clear that he was thoroughly conversant with the condition of the Janissaries, having, by his own account, witnessed campaigns since 1733, served continuously since 1768, and been held prisoner by the Russians. In contrast to all the other writers mentioned in this paper, Koca Sekbanbaşı was a seasoned soldier. At the time of writing, in the first decade of the 19th century, he claimed to be eighty-seven years old.[2] The *Nizam-ı Cedid* troops had by this time proved their potential, if limited, usefulness in the campaign against Napoleon, in spite of continuous opposition to their existence from the traditional forces.[3]

The essay is couched as a series of questions and answers between the author and his critics. Koca Sekbanbaşı likened his treaties to that of Müteferrika and also reflected on the wisdom of Mustafa Ali.[4] In a second mention of Müteferrika, Koca Sekbanbaşı, having convinced a few of his listeners of the benefits of military discipline, heard them respond that Sultan Mahmud I had intended to establish discipline according to the principles of *Nizam ül-Hikem* but had not lived long enough to do so. (A nice conceit, perhaps, considering that Sultan Mahmud I had a long time to think about it, from 1731 when the book was published until 1754 when he died.[5]) To those who argued that the new troops were the cause of all the disorder in Ottoman Europe, Koca Sekbanbaşı responded that such disturbances were neither tied to a given period nor to a particular region. Were the *Nizam-ı Cedid* troops responsible, he asked, for the failure of the Ottoman army throughout the 1768-74 campaigns when the new troops did not exist? Such troubles were not confined to the Ottoman Empire or to Europe, but could be found in all

[1]Published as *Koca Sekbanbaşı Risalesi,* ed., Abdullah Uç (Istanbul, 1975; hereafter referred to as *Risale*). William Wilkinson translated it as an appendix to *An Account of the Principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia* (London, 1820 [New York, 1971]; hereafter referred to as Wilkinson). A Cairo University manuscript (C.U. MS) copy of the original text, 6548T, n.d., fols. 53-92 (hereafter referred to as C.U. MS 6548T) was used for verification. Another copy can be found in Istanbul: Hacı Mahmud 4890, n.d., fols. 1-20. Koca Sekbanbaşı is said to have presented his text to Mustafa IV (r. 1807-1808); *Risale,* 27. *Sekbanbaşı* in this period was the name for one of the commanding officers of the palace troops second only to the commander of the Janissaries.

[2]C.U. MS 6548T, fols. 63b and 92; Wilkinson, 239, 286; *Risale,* 44-45, 87. He died in 1808; Mehmed Tahir Bursalı, *Osmanlı Müellifleri,* 3 vols. (Istanbul, 1914-23), 2:236.

[3]The troops were sent to Syria and Egypt in 1799.

[4]For the comment on İbrahim Müteferrika, see C.U. MS 6548T, fol. 67; Wilkinson, 245; *Risale,* 49-50; on Mustafa Ali, see C.U. MS 6548T, fols. 53a, 60b; *Risale* 30, 40, both of which sources specifically mention Mustafa Ali's *Fusul-i Hall ve Akd fi Usul-i Harc ve Nakd* (The Seasons of Sovereignty on the Principles of Critical Expenditure), written in 1598-99; Wilkinson, 217-232, does not specify the author. The introduction to *Fusul* is a "mirror for princes" piece of writing (see Fleischer, *Bureaucrat and Intellectual,* 177, 302).

[5]C.U. MS 6548T, fol. 67; Wilkinson, 245; *Risale,* 49-50.

parts of the world.[1] Selim III had felt compelled to establish the new troops so that the Russians should not find the Ottomans unprepared, continued Koca Sekbanbaşı, "since we are instructed by the example of so many states that owed their loss of reputation and ruin to the want of care in observing the machinations of their enemies and in neglecting to provide in proper time efficient troops and military stores."[2]

When the *Nizam-ı Cedid* troops have become sufficiently numerous, Koca Sekbanbaşı noted in another passage, "terror and consternation will take possession of the hearts of the Russians, the Germans and the other enemies of our faith and Empire (*din-ü-devlet)*, to such a degree that they will no longer think of imposing on the Sublime Government hard and insolent conditions; and that, lastly, this institution of regular soldiers... will perpetuate the duration of the Sublime Government even to the end of the world, and will give us victory over all our enemies."[3] Koca Sekbanbaşı recalled the abysmal record of the Janissaries in the 1768-74 war, a section of his work that closely resembles the criticisms of Ahmed Resmi a quarter of a century earlier. If the Janissaries felt that the new troops were useless, Koca Sekbanbaşı asked, how could they account for the fact that they themselves had exhausted their supplies, complained about their salaries and rations, destroyed houses and property on the campaign march, and run in the face of the enemy? The result was that the Crimean Khanate was now infidel territory (annexed by Russia in 1783). "As the superiority which the practice of military exercise gives to the infidels in war is clearly evident, as well as the deficiency of the people of Islam in several points connected with military science, is not the obstinacy with which you oppose the introduction of this exercise purely a treason against our religion and empire (*din-ü-devlete ihanet değil midir*)?"[4]

Following a long description of the actual organization of the new troops — the advantages of uniforms and discipline, the forming of ranks, the discharging of muskets, the rotation of the ranks under fire, among other things — Koca Sekbanbaşı reminded his listeners that should two enemies then be of equal training and skill, the one that would be victorious would with "the favor of Divine Providence apply ... the new science and stratagems

[1]C.U. MS 6548T, fols. 55b-56a; Wilkinson, 224-25; *Risale,* 34.
[2]C.U. MS 6548T, fol. 60; Wilkinson, 232; *Risale,* 39-40.
[3]C.U. MS 6548T, fol. 63; Wilkinson, 238; *Risale,* 44.
[4]C.U. MS 6548T, fols. 64-68a; Wilkinson, 246-48; *Risale,* 50-51.

of war which they have learned, because the apostle of the most high, our great prophet... himself condescended to use military stratagem."[1]

The intent of this memorandum was not just to convince the opponents of the *Nizam-ı Cedid* of the necessity of military discipline but to reassure them of the legitimacy of military reform in an Islamic context, measure of both the strength of the opposition of the traditionalists and the pragmatic approach of the administrative class to innovation. Koca Sekbanbaşı inverted the arguments of the conservatives to strengthen his polemic about the necessity of adopting the infidel ways. To judge from the four samples chosen for this paper, the Ottoman elites slowly evolved an ethos in the 18th century to accommodate the idea of change and the control of the outcome of war. As Mardin notes, it is imperative in this context to remember the "general framework of deep, genuine and all-pervasive concern for the welfare of the Islamic community. This feeling was translated, following the Ottoman ascendance in the Islamic world, into a profound and sincere devotion to the Ottoman state."[2]

The sincerity evinced in the preceding passages and the sense of urgency regarding the necessity for reform reflect a new court atmosphere that may have enabled Selim III to prosecute his reform program. Shortly after his accession in 1789, Selim III convened a grand council of notables to discuss the future of the empire and what could be done to halt the disorder. Over 200 members of the ruling class attended the council.[3] It was the sultan's signal to his administration that he intended to address vigorously the problems of the empire.[4] It was not until the Ottomans extracted themselves from the 1787-92 war with Austria and Russia, however, that he could seriously return to his reform agenda, having now at his disposal a number of recommendations prepared at his request by members of his administration.[5] The authors of a majority of the works were chancery members: Sadullah Enveri, the official chronicler of the two recent wars; Halil Nuri Bey, another chronicler; several

[1]C.U. MS 6548T, fol. 80; Wilkinson, 270; *Risale,* 69.
[2]Şerif Mardin, *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought* (Princeton, 1962), 105-6; see also Mardin, "The Mind", 28-30.
[3]Stanford Shaw, *Between Old and New: The Ottoman Empire Under Selim III, 1789-1808* (Cambridge, Mass., 1971), 73.
[4]Shaw, *Between Old and New,* 73-75.
[5]Ibid., 91-92. It is *not* the intention here to discuss these reports in detail. Shaw's work discusses the reports and their authors, 86-111; some of the reports survive in the Topkapı Archives as document number E447 and in summary as transliterated in Karal, "Nizam-ı Cedid," from a manuscript copy, Ali Emiri 71. Karal's text has been used here. For further bibliographic information, see Shaw, *Between Old and New,* 93, 249. Shaw presents the contents of these reports in summary form only, so a great deal of analysis remains to be done on the full text of these works.

financial officers: defterdar Şerif Mehmed; Moralı Osman Efendi (then head of the Imperial Arsenal, subsequently *defterdar*): Laleli Mustafa Efendi, an ex-treasury official; Ali Raik Efendi, former *defterdar*; and chancery officials involved with foreign affairs: Reisülküttab Mehmed Raşid Efendi; Ebubekir Ratib Efendi, ambassador to Vienna, 1791-92; Abdullah Berri, a former *reisülküttab*.[1]

The bulk of the recommendations concerned military reform, then the most pressing example of the failure of the Ottoman system. The recommendations reflected three types of reformer: "the conservatives, who sought to recover the military glories of the Ottoman golden age by reverting to its military methods. Then there were the romantics and compromisers who sought various ways of insinuating Frankish training and weapons into the existing military order by claiming that this was in fact a return to the pure Ottoman past. Finally there were the radicals, who believed that the old army was incapable of reform, and urged the Sultan to set up a new one, trained, equipped, and armed from the start along European lines."[2] All agreed on one thing: the need to call on the expertise of Europe. This was succinctly put by Reisülküttab Abdullah Berri: To create a new army, it was necessary to recruit untried villagers and orphans and have them trained by 50-100 Prussian officers. Over a period of years, an army of 20,000 infantry and 5,000 cavalry could be created. The organization of these soldiers should resemble exactly their European counterparts. Abdullah Berri reminded his audience that the Ottomans had created a navy by imitating the Europeans, and that Ottoman naval terms still reflected that. It was a fact, he concluded, that the Russians had strengthened themselves in just this fashion.[3]

Of the reformers in the entourage of Selim III, Ebubekir Ratib Efendi probably exerted the greatest influence. He was instructed to gather information on the affairs of Europe in the course of his embassy to Vienna. His detailed report reiterated the argument for the legitimacy of military reform: "The Ottoman sultans had been the first rulers in the word to establish military laws in order to organize their armies, so that the imposition of such laws in the nineteenth century would hardly be an imitation of Europe. Ottoman cavalry and infantry had achieved greatness because they had observed their laws and supplemented them when necessary. It had been the failure of

[1]Shaw, *Between Old and New*, 91-93.
[2]Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey* (London, 1965), 58. The *reisülküttab* was both chief scribe and foreign affairs minister.
[3]Karal, "Nizam-ı Cedid," 2:424-25.

their successors to observe them and change them according to the needs of the time which had led to disintegration and disorganization." The restoration of the ancient laws, modified as necessary, and the introduction of the "new order" (*nizam-ı cedid*) of Europe would be needed for the Ottoman Empire to regain its former position of power. Ebubekir Ratib Efendi's work represents a carefully thought out articulation of the ideas represented in the works of the individuals previously discussed, and it deserves far closer study.[1]

The cautious statements exhibited in the political writings examined in this paper would appear to negate the idea of Ottoman ideological paralysis in the 18th century. In a limited way, Ottoman bureaucrats were now recommending that their leaders needed to imitate the victorious infidel in order to survive; they must incorporate new equipment and instill discipline and training, while at the same time restoring the piety of the troops and adhering to the shari'a. By pointing to the efficacy of rationalizing warfare, they were suggesting that the outcome of war could be influenced by man, though divine intervention remained the deciding factor. The ideology of the "ever-victorious frontier" and the "circle of equity" was slowly being replaced with that of service to *din-ü-devlet* on the part of each individual. A final example drawn from the chronicler Vasıf Efendi should suffice to demonstrate the change. Grand Vizier Halil Hamid convened a council in December 1783 to consider accepting the annexation of the Crimea by the Russians or declaring war. In the course of the discussion, Hasan Pasha, admiral of the Ottoman navy, known to be a warmonger and arch enemy of Halil Hamid, stated that the condition of the treasury and armed forces precluded entering what could be a disaster. Halil Hamid reminded them all that he was prepared to sacrifice himself for the sake of *din-ü-devlet*, but the refortifying and strengthening of the empire's boundaries had just begun as part of his reform program. The army officers present equivocated about the ability to raise troops, and, when pressed by representatives of the ulema, one of them said that they must consider the welfare of *din-ü-devlet*: in his opinion, the army was useless and the council should vote for peace. Admiral Hasan Pasha

[1]Shaw, *Between Old and New*, 95-98; or Ratib Efendi, see Berkes, *The Development of Secularism*, 77-78, and more recently, J. M. Stein, "An Eighteenth-Century Ottoman Ambassador Observers the West: Ebu Bekir Râtip Efendi Reports on the Habsburg System of Roads and Posts," *Archivum Ottomanicum* 10 (1985 [1987]): 219-312, who provides evidence of the direct link between the report and reform program of Selim III (223),and, Cahit Bilim, "Ebubekir Ratib Efendi, Nemçe Sefaretnamesi," *Belleten* 54 (1990): 261-96, which discusses only the social and economic ideas of Ratib Efendi. By *nizam-ı cedid*, Ebubekir Ratib Efendi apparently meant the new military order — new cannons, rifles, and hips — of the European states.

conceded that it was unreasonable to go to war at the moment and the most beneficial thing for the empire was peace, to which all agreed.[1]

A difference in tone characterizes the discussion at this council from the records of previous meetings: a frank assessment of the condition of the army and treasury and a rationalizing of current resources; a willingness to abandon factional politics for the good of the state; hesitancy among the ulema and their deference to the opinions of chancery and military; and the acquiescence by all to the unpopular choice of peace. The inclusion of the lengthy discussion in the official chronicle for the period verifies the legitimacy of the proceedings.

Somewhere in the midst of the debate over the survival of the empire, the model of social and political harmony embodied in the "circle of equity" lost its force as a literary convention. The expression *din-ü-devlet*, never absent from this kind of literature, appears to assume a new, more concrete significance in the works sampled for this period. Further analysis of more of the political writings and council deliberations of this generation of reformers is required to bear out these conclusions and to identify more term that may have evolved in a similar manner. There also remain many unanswered questions devolving from an almost complete lack of research into the self-definitions of the ulema and military classes of the period. Nonetheless, arguments in the Ottoman-Islamic context for the legitimacy of peace amongst equals, fixed and defensible boundaries, and European style discipline and training, by calling on one's duty to *din-ü-devlet*, may have been persuasive and could explain in part the apparent willingness of some of the ulema to accept fundamental changes to the traditional order such as the elimination by Mahmud II (r. 1808-39) of the Janissaries in 1826.[2]

[1]Ahmed Vasıf Efendi, *Mehâsinü'l-Âsâr ve Hakâikü'l-Ahbâr*, ed. Mücteba Ilgürel (Istanbul, 1978), 90-99.

[2]See Uriel Heyd, "The Ottoman 'Ulemā and Westernization in the Time of Selim III and Mahmūd II," in *Studies in Islamic History and Civilization, Scripta Hierosolymitana* 9 (1961): 63-96.

IS THERE A TURK IN THE *TURKISH SPY*?

> Mahmut the Arabian and vilest of the Grand Seignior's slaves, to Hasnadarbassy, Chief Treasurer to his Highness at Constantinople: "I have at length finish'd my journey [description of itinerary] ... I have suffered my hair to grow a little below my ears; and as to my lodging, 'tis in the house of an old Flemming, where my room is so small, that jealousie itself can scarce enter. ... Being of low stature, of an ill-favoured countenance, ill shap'd, and by nature not given to talkativeness, I shall the better conceal myself. ... I make two figures, being in heart what I ought to be; but outwardly and in appearance what I never intend."[1]

So begins the first letter of Mahmut the Arabian, alias Titus the Moldavian Cleric, alias L'Esploratore Turco, L'Espion Turc, or the Turkish Spy for the Ottoman court in Paris. The fame of *L'Espion turc*, or, *Letters Writ by a Turkish Spy*, first of the satirical, epistolary spy "novels" that formed such an integral part of eighteenth-century French and English intellectual life, rests largely on its having been a model for Montesquieu's *Lettres persanes* of 1721.[2] For the purposes of this paper, the *Turkish Spay* will also serve as the focus for a discussion of the process of factualization of the Orient and the merging, as Henry Laurens describes it of "Orient scientifique" and "Orient romanesque"[3] in a new version of the East as the seat of despotism. The discourse of the *Turkish Spy*, published at a moment when Europe, particularly France, was engaged in a debate about the nature of good government, brings together a wide range of information about the Orient and offers both admiration and criticism of the two great absolutisms, French and Turkish. By merging political and literary evidence, it also makes an innovative assumption about the ability of a popular audience, to draw its own conclusions.[4]

[1]*The Eight Volumes of Letters Writ by a Turkish Spy, Who Lived Five and Forty Years, Undiscover'd at Paris* (London: Printed for H. Rhodes, D. Brown, R. Sare, J. Nicholson, B. Tooke, and G. Strahan, 1718), 1:1, letter 1 (dated 1637). The McMaster University Library copy to which I refer throughout appears to be a made-up set. Vol. 1 (call number B1660) is identified as the 19th edition; vols 2-8 (call numbers B1661-7) are called the 7th edition (vols 5-6 bear the publication date 1717). See ESTC n036604 for vols. 2-8.

[2]See especially William H. McBurney, "The Authorship of the *Turkish Spy*," *PMLA* 72 (1957), 915-16.

[3]Henry Laurens, *Les Origines intellectuelles de l'expédition d'Egypte: l'orientalisme islamisant en France (1698-1798)* (Istanbul: Isis, 1987), p. 10.

[4]Dena Goodman suggests that readers can only change the world when the public "constitutes itself, or is constituted, as a political agent." *Criticism in Action: Enlightenment Experiments in Political Writing* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989), p. 6. The literature of political theory and dissent is most recently reviewed in both Goodman and in Patricia Springborg, *Western Republicanism and the Oriental Prince* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1992).

The publishing history and authorship of the *Turkish Spy* have proved an elusive puzzle. Volume 1 in Italian was first published in Paris in 1683 by Jean Paul Marana, a refugee from Genoa at the court of Louis XIV.[1] That was immediately followed by a French version, *L'Espion du grand seigneur* (1684-86), in three volumes and 102 letters — also credited to Marana — which in various editions had reached nine volumes by 1756. An expanded English version, in eight volumes and 600 letters, entitled *Letters Writ by a Turkish Spy*, first made is appearance from 1687-94. Thereafter the bibliographical history of the wok becomes decidedly murky, with "pirated" editions in Amsterdam and Cologne, and much rearrangement, exclusion, and inclusion of old and new letters, published all over Europe. Discussion about authorship numbers of letters, and who stole what from who assumes a decidedly nationalistic cast, with claimants periodically surfacing for either English or French authorship, of the bulk of the approximately 500 letters beyond Marana's original 102.[2] The 1718 eight-volume expanded English edition has been used for this discussion, one of at least ten, and possibly more than twenty-six editions published between 1687 and 1801 in England,[3] where it enjoyed an enormous success. By 1783, it was completely out of vogue in France, read only by "credulous youth."[4]

Jean Paul Marana, who died in 1693,[5] is himself something of an enigma, generally accepted as an avid royalist and apologist historian, whose encomiums to Louis XIV, even considering the time, have been described as expressing "une bassesse révoltante."[6] There is a remote possibility that Marana himself wrote all the letters, as he himself suggested in 1690.[7] This view is reiterated in the introduction to volume 2 of the English translation, which contains a prefatory letter from a certain Daniel Saltmarsh, who confesses to having acquired the Italian manuscript from the hands of an

[1]Joseph Tucker, "On the Authorship of the *Turkish Spy*: An *Etat Présent*," *Papers of the Bibliographical Society of America* 52 (1958), 34.

[2]See Tucker, and especially Jean Pierre Gaudier and Jean-Jacques Heirwegh, "Jean-Paul Marana, l'espion du grand seigneur et l'histoire des idées," *Etudes sur le XVIII^e siècle* 8 (1981), 25-52, who provide lengthy lists of possible candidates, and discuss the debate in great detail. No further Italian editions beyond the first volume published in Paris have been discovered.

[3]Gaudier and Heirwegh have identified only 10 editions and suspect publishers from both sides of the Channel may have exaggerated the number (p. 35). The 1770 edition is called the 26th.

[4]Gaudier and Heirwegh, p. 25nl. A full-length study and comparison of the French and English editions has never been undertaken.

[5]Gaudier and Heirwegh, p. 31.

[6]G. Almansi and D. A. Warren, "Roman épistolaire et analyse historique: *L'Espion turc* de G. P. Marana," *XVIII^e siècle* 110/111 (1976), 64.

[7]Gaudier and Heirwegh, p. 30; McBurney, p. 917.



Frontispiece illustration to vol. 1, *The Eight Volumes of Letters Writ by a Turkish Spy, Who Lived Five and Forty Years, Undiscover'd at Paris* (London, 1718).
Engraved by Frederick Hendrick van Hove (1628-98).
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Italian, and having had it translated directly into English. Suffice it to say that there are insoluble problems about the authorship of the *Turkish Spy* and all its European relatives candidates as varied as Defoe, Meslier, Bayle, Cotolendi, Bradshaw, and Midgeley are suggested in debates in the 1840s in the *Gentleman's Magazine* and elsewhere.[1] The remarkable aspect of the work, apart from its invention of the epistolary spy novel, is that it forms part of "the crisis of the European conscience," and expresses many of the ideas of the enlightenment by the 1680s.[2]

There are many literary quirks familiar to later eighteenth-century literature that are innovations in the *Turkish Spy*. The title-page and preface of the first English volume establish the "fiction" of the cache of papers and letters in Arabic characters found by an Italian in his room in Paris in 1682, and translated first into Italian and then into English. The author of the letters is described on the title-page as a Turk who has lived in Paris forty-five years, and in the preface to volume 1 as "a stranger, native of Moldavia, dressed as an ecclesiastic, greatly studious, small of stature, coarse countenance, and surprising goodness of life." The editor of succeeding volumes is very careful to maintain his distance from both author and substance of the letters, a feature designed both to avoid censorship and to add veracity to the undertaking by carefully contriving a hierarchical relationship of author, translator, and editor. In the preface to volume 3, the editor comments, "Our Arabian, having met with so kind entertainment in this nation since he put on the English dress, is resolved to continue, and visit you as often as convenience will permit ... if his philosophy will not abide the best of our learned virtuosi, yet it may pass muster in a Mahometan, since it is taken for granted, that the men of that faith rarely apply themselves to such studies, or, at least, not in the method used in Christian schools."

The preface to volume 4 responds apparently to the criticism of readers who objected to the extensive use of foreign words in the text by blaming the translator and defending the author, who was known to have been well read. Further supposed criticism prompted a reply in the preface to volume 5 concerning the strength of Mahmut's Muslim convictions, amidst fears that he might be too convincing: "Some may be offended at the zeal ... when he writes in honour of the Mahometan faith; others complain of his scepticism. We need not fear that any Christian, or any man of sense will be proselytised

[1]Gaudier and Heirwegh, pp. 41-42; Tucker, "On Authorship," p. 40.
[2]Joseph Tucker, "The *Turkish Spy* and Its French Background," *Revue de la littérature comparée* 32 (1958), 74.

by his letters, to a religion which he himself tho' professing it, yet so often doubts of and ridicules." In the same preface, the editor comments that, should the author seem, "in this volume, or in those that are to come to alter his opinion, and contradict his former sentiments," it is no more than any other writer would do in response to criticism about lack of coherent style and uniformity. In the preface to volume 6, resounding to those critics who, claiming to have found the Italian original, were finding fault with the translation, the editor completely reverses his position in the preface to volume 4 and apologizes for the overuse of the vernacular. The increasing sophistication of the supposed readers of the *Turkish Spy*, which prompted this editorial comment, is an engaging device. The preface to the final volume is the most explicit in drawing a clear distinction between the opinions of the oriental spy and his erstwhile translator and editor. Responding to those who objected to the "lewdness of his sentiments," the editor notes that even though Mahmut is a Muslim, he is "embued with sense and reason," a "deist rather than an atheist, absorbed and swallowed in profound contemplation of Divine Majesty," but also a spy, responding as necessary to the questions of his masters.

The author of the letters, Mahmut, Arab by birth, ex-slave of Sicilian Christians, and obedient servant to Turkish masters, suffers as much from psychological conflict as any modern hero forced to assume a character and religion abhorrent to him, his greatest fear being that his having been circumcised will be discovered (2:268-73).[1] The mental anguish of the spy forms an exact counterpoint to his philosophical speculations, as his situation as an outsider forces him to observe and contrast two distinct but imperial cultures.[2] As Arthur J. Weitzman points out, his "defense of his own religious beliefs is a knife that cuts both ways. On the one hand it boldly rips the fabric of Christian self-righteousness ... while on the other hand, it subtly cuts the inner lining of all dogmatic and absolute opinions."[3] In one sense, the *Turkish Spy* is an extended soap opera, in which we follow the vicissitudes of Mahmut's life in Paris, as Cartesian sceptic, court advisor, and besotted lover in an illicit affair with a married Greek lady. The voices of the seraglio, however, though unheard, are omnipresent in the univocal correspondence carried on by Mahmut with over fifty different individuals,

[1]At one point he is imprisoned, suspected of being a spy, but he escapes after six months, having convinced Cardinal Mazarin of his innocence.
[2]A subject addressed by Safa Fadel Shimi in "Portrait d'un espion du XVII[e] siècle," *Les Lettres romanes* 35 (191), 129-43.
[3]Giovanni P. Marana, *Letters Writ by a Turkish Spy*, ed. Arthur J. Weitzman (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970), p. xiv.

officials and friends alike. Mahmut's character is subtly influenced by the stature of the addressee, and maintains a consistency of topic and obsequiousness as each case requires. To the chief religious officer of the empire (the *mufti*), for example, he addresses questions and observations about his religious compromises, and the possible cost to his soul. When addressing his betters, the grand vizier and the chief foreign minister (the *reis*), he assumes the role of loyal and obedient civil servant, and describes important political events of the day, as well as making complaints about his position, lack of pay, and so forth. Letters to relatives and friends especially Isouf and Dgnet Oglou, reveal Mahmut's inner life and loves. Moreover, the letters to Isouf and Dgnet Oglou serve as travel diaries, since both correspondents were well travelled in the world, as we see in Mahmut's responses to their letters.

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The levels of discourse and distance in the *Turkish Spy* are myriad and fascinating, its satire deft and unsparing, the character of Mahmut consistently devious of necessity,[1] and convincing, clearly demonstrating at least one source of the work's popularity. It spawned several generations of spy letters, from all continents and ethnic groups, of which *Letters persanes* is only the most famous.[2] The chief appeal of the *Turkish Spy* for its audience, however, may have been its rich and detailed history of seventeenth-century France. The letters are dated 1637-82, and contain extensive discussion of the courts and intrigues of Louis XIII and Louis XIV, especially under the stewardship of Cardinals Richelieu and Mazarin.

Marana was first and foremost a court historian, and at moments, the *Turkish Spy* is more chronicle than novel, leading some critics to dismiss its importance in the development of the epistolary genre.[3] To ignore the historicity of the *Turkish Spy*, however, is to deny its significant contribution to European historiography, since it was written at a time when changing notions of history and increasing information about the Orient coalesced to create a new vision and consensus about the nature of the east and, with it, the nature of good government. The process of demystification of the Orient

[1]Mahmut comments ruefully that he was "always a counterfeit," forced "to act two contrary parts at the same time; to be true and false; a Mussulman and servant of the Grand Signior in reality; a Christian and subject of France in appearance" (5;31).

[2]Pierre Martino, *L'Orient dans la littérature française au XVII^e et au XVIII^e siècle* (Paris: Hachette, 1906), pp. 284-302; McBurney, pp. 915-16; Weitzman, pp. XVI-XVII.

[3]Almansi and Warren, pp. 61-62.

involved both increasing intimacy with and dismissal of the greatest of European enemies, the Ottoman Empire. Laurens has demonstrated the link between Orientalist book production of the eighteenth century and periods of significant interaction with the Turks, or with upheavals in the Ottoman court.[1] Why then is the period 1637-82 important in that regard? In the general introduction to the English text, entitled "A General Preface to the Whole," the editors obliged the readers with an historical survey of the two halves of the French-Ottoman equation dominating the text of the letters, including a discussion of wars in both worlds: first the wars of religion in Europe; then, the struggles between Spain and France in the 1630s contrasted with the Ottoman wars with Persia in the 1640s; the Venetian-Ottoman conflict, especially over Crete, and Louis XIV's imperial ambitions in the latter part of the century. It was a period when Ottoman power was severely tested and found wanting.

Mahmut is in a unique position to draw parallels between the governments of Constantinople and Paris. He describes Louis XIV as "the most Christian Turk" of Europe (8:139), thereby contributing the increasing criticism of absolutist government, even as he himself remains an avid monarchist. Mahmut muses on the rise and fall of kingdoms, and the various changes of government, as themes worthy of a Muslim's thoughts. Speaking, as he says, from the vantage point of the universal empire of the Ottomans, he describes for the *reis* the various countries of Europe: Germany is the empire of the land; England and Holland those of the sea; the Duke of Savoy is a "tennisball"; the Swiss poor and mercenary. Spain is the country boasting of her gold; while France is using it to pay her armies (6:153 letter dated 1664). Further descriptions of the various kingdoms of Europe are scattered throughout the eight volumes of the *Turkish Spy*. Mahmut shows no preference for any of them, but occasionally makes a barbed comment about France.[2] Consider his remarks on the French dynasty:

> Tis a maxim in the Salick law, that the King of France never dies. But this indeed is altogether as true in Spain, Great Britain and other hereditary kingdoms till the succession fails. For then it degenerates to an elective monarchy, or otherwise into aristocracy, or last of all into democracy, or a republic. ... France is yet free from these pointed forms of slavery. There never wants an heir ... which secures the nation from a thousand calamities which attend elective monarchies and more popular forms of government. (7:208, letter dated 1672)

[1]Laurens, p. 9.

[2]On the Netherlands, 8:123; Switzerland, 8:138; Geneva, 8:178; Venice, 8:202. The latter is described in such glowing terms that Mahmut is obliged to comment: "We ought to give them their due even though they be enemies" (8:210).

On the war between France and Spain in the 1630s, Mahmut comments: "These two nations do the duty of the Mussulmans in destroying one another; and when this is done, they give thanks for the evil they have committed. Whence we may judge of the wisdom and piety of the Mahometans amongst whom ther's seldom been an open war; and if it should happen, 'tis generally condemned."[1] The targets may be various, but clearly the spy device is already operating to promote and popularize political discussion.

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What did the portrait of Mahmut contribute to European knowledge of the Ottoman world, or, in other words, is there a Turk in the *Turkish Spy?* Mahmut is first and foremost a Muslim, and secondarily a servant of the Ottoman court. The Muslim-Christian dialogue in the *Turkish Spy* is as important as its historical detail, allowing the "author" to rehearse all the features of the "Mahometan" religion through Mahmut's defensive responses to Christian criticism of Muslim beliefs and practices. He observers that "I have counterfeited a Christian, that I might better perform the duty of a Mussulman. I have seemed devoutly attentive to the Roman missal that I might be instrumental to propagate the Alcoran" (2:55). The effect is to reinforce received opinions about Islam, while legitimating criticism of Christianity.[2] Mahmut notes at one point:

> Here in the west they accuse the Mussulmans for having more wives than one ... whilst they themselves have their wives almost in common, and lie with every wench that comes their way. Adultery pases with 'em for good breeding, and fornication is esteem'd as innocent an action as eating and drinking, whereas thou know'st, among the true believers, these crimes are punish'd with death. (8:87)

Mahmut is an Arab, but is referred to by the editor and translator throughout as a Turk, in a conflation of Arab and Turk that was typical of European practice at the time, the result of the Ottoman replacement of the Arabs (Saracens) as the Muslim enemy of the crusaders in the fourteenth century. Other Oriental devices enrich the letters: recipients of the letters are addressed by exotic titles and names, many of them real: "Vizir Azem,"

[1]Weitzman, p. xiii.
[2]For example, see 3:128 on the differences between the Koran and Old and New Testaments; 2:109 on the differences between Muslim and Christian heavens.

referred to as Achmet Cupriogli at one point (Grand Vizier Ahmed Köprülü, 1661-71); "Kaimacham" ("lieutenant," generally to the grand Vizier}; "the Venerable Mufti"; "Bedreddin, superior of the Dervises at Cogni in Natolia" (the Whirling Dervishes of Konya in Anatolia), and so forth. The letters abound with the supposed intrigue of the seraglio, as Mahmut constantly tries to extricate himself from one intrigue or another through his correspondence, in an endeavour to maintain his position and reputation. An even more artificial device, much imitated, was the dating of the letters according to the lunar month of the Muslim calendar: for example, "Paris, 15th of the 11th moon, year 1637" (1:17), which lent further verisimilitude to the whole endeavour.

As a man of learning, Mahmut is, strictly speaking, a sceptic more closely resembling a *philosophe* than a Muslim scholar. According to Tucker, "Nowhere ... outside the great corpus of Voltaire's work is there to be found a discussion of such a wide range of the major themes of the Enlightenment."[1] Mahmut's sources of inspiration, apart from his constant companion the Koran, are St Augustine, Tacitus, Plutarch, Thuchydides, Herodotus, and Xenophon. And yet, in one important way, Mahmut is very much in the Ottoman tradition: in his appreciation of the importance and influence of history and the role of the historian as critic. He congratulates the Commander-in-Chief of the Janissaries for reading histories, extolling their value: "In fine, there is nothing publick or private, in the courts or camps of the greatest monarchs, to which an historian is a stranger. I applaud your choice of Greek and eastern histories" (3:133). Mahmut proposes the writing of a universal history both to the *mufti* and to "Ibro Kalphafer Effendi, a Man of Letters," advising them that such a history requires a wide reading of all the models, of which he claims to be enclosing the examples of Plutarch and Heredotus. The author of such a history should discriminate in his reading and not restrict himself to any one point of view, Mahmut notes further, as there are those who may be "guilty of fiction in history" (8:245-46). To the *mufti* he mentions his desire to see knowledge flourish in the Ottoman Empire, and encourages the translations of histories into Turkish, recommending again a complete history of the world down to the present emperor, to include chronicles of the Persians, Egyptians, Greeks, and especially the Chinese and Indians, who had a fine knowledge of the system of ancient history (7:72). He boasts: "What is now become of Babylon, Persia, Assyria, Macedon, Greece and Rome, Egypt, the religious state of the Jews, Athens, with many other countries mention'd in the records of time, and we shall find them all

[1]Tucker, *"The Turkish Spy"*, p. 79.

swallowed up in the universal empire of the Ottomans" (6:153). Mahmut contrasts the Persians and Germans, who "have some shadow of former majesty but have grown effeminate and weak (6:154). He comments that "The triumphs of the past but serve as foils to our immortal sultans" (6:154). Compare Naima, one of the official historians of the Ottoman state, writing at approximately the same time on the nature of history and the task of the historian:

> the science of history and the science of biography are the quintessence of instruction and information ... an august and great study whose subject is of universal utility, for it teaches those happenings and lessons which have been manifested in the world, from the earliest periods up to this very moment. It ... puts the commonality into possession of the story of what has happened afortime, and gives the elite knowledge of secrets which would otherwise be concealed.[1]

A historian was responsible for informing himself of the affairs of men, of problems of administration and finance, and then, knowing "what it was that men thought and what it was over which they disagreed," for speaking "frankly and fairly."[2] The Turks were both experts in the fine art of ideological history and adept at criticism of their government, as the writing of political advice had a long and accepted tradition in the Muslim world.[3] Mahmut himself writes that his superiors have told him that he "may freely and without fear reprove the vices and encourage the virtues of the greatest governors and princes among the Mussulmans" (4:122).

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* *

Is this simultaneous passage from "annals" to "analysis" in historiography in both European and Ottoman worlds simply a coincidence, or can we discern the real influence of the "Turkish" spy as Oriental observer and critic? The tone of what Mahmut the spy has to say is somewhat ambiguous: monarchist, tolerant, humane, but equally sceptical, ironic, and critical of the two great absolutist empires of the period. In this regard, the *Turkish Spy* marks a moment of transition between acceptance and rejection of a system of government which had dominated Europe for well over a hundred years and

[1]Lewis V. Thomas, *A Study of Naima,* ed. Norman Itzkowitz (New York: New York University Press, 1972), p. 110.
[2]Thomas, p. 113.
[3]See Virginia H. Aksan, "Ottoman Political Writing, 1768-1808," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 25 (1993), 53-69.

Asia for far longer. Though the political agenda may still be flexible, the intention of engaging the audience is clear. The Turk poses the question which the European reader is poised to answer. In Europe's collective intellectual history the *Turkish Spy* represents an important signpost in the process of the reorientation of European thought, incorporating and taming "the present terror of the world,"[1] as part of the passage from universal and cyclical to national and progressive history.

The merging of "fact" and "fiction" in the spy novel represented a new addition to the kind of material available about the Orient, which had previously included travel literature, histories, and ambassadors' report. Information on the Ottoman Empire proliferated during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, as travel literature — long a popular source of information on "otherness" — was increasingly supplemented by more accurate and readily available information.[2] Of the new, critical histories, one in particular, published in London in 1688, had an enormous impact: *The Present State of the Ottoman Empire* by Paul Rycaut, a veteran of many years' service in Turkey. His observations on the Turkish government are those of an English gentleman of the Restoration period, and became a commonplace of discourse on the Ottoman Empire over the next decades. The first chapter bears the title: "The Constitution of the Turkish Government being Different from Most Others of the World, Hath Need of Peculiar Maxims, and Rules Whereon to Establish and Confirm Itself."[3] Contrasting the Turkish government with "Common-wealths (such as are supported with reason and with religion)," he observed the absoluteness of an emperor, without reason, without virtue, irrational but the primary source of law; his actions irregular, and yet a model; corrupt, yet his decrees were irresistible. The "Grand Signior" had total control over his subjects, who were accustomed to and happy under tyranny, slaves of their great patron and master. What held the nation together was the quickness and severity of sultanic justice;

[1]Christine Woodhead, "The Present Terorr of the World'?: Contemporary Views of the Ottoman Empire c. 1600," *History* 72 (1987), p. 20, quoting Richard Knolles, the first historian of the Turks in English: *The Generall historie of the Turkes* 2nd edition (London, 1610). Knolle's history was published first in 1603, and again, with additions, in 1621, 1631, 1638, and 1687-1700 (See Woodhead, p. 22). Knolles viewed the Ottomans as the "Just and Secret Judgement of the Almighty" for the incompetence and sinfulness of Europe's princes (Woodhead, p. 23).
[2]For research on the popularity of the Orient as a publishing phenomenon, see Springborg, p. 276, where she notes that 1,000 publications on the Orient were published between 1501 and 1550, and 2,500 publications between 1550 and 1600; Laurens analyses Latin and French publications for the eighteenth century, in an effort to link the changing ideas on the Orient with Napoleon's invasion of Egypt, while Wallace Cable Brown considers book publishing in England on the Orient in "The Popularity of English Travel Books about the Near East, 1775-1825," *Philological Quarterly* 15 (1936), 70-80.
[3]Paul Rycaut, *The Present State of the Ottoman Empire* (London, 1668), p. 2.

otherwise, the nation would burst apart and turn into several "signories." It would be [as] unnatural to loose the reins as it would be unnatural for a Christian prince to exercise a tyrannical power over their [Christian] estates and lives, and change their liberty into servitude and slavery."[1] Rycaut had widened the fissure, first observed by Machiavelli as "the hairline political fracture between Ottoman and European regimes."[2]

Compare Mahmut, who contrasted the execution of Charles I with the deposition and strangulation of Sultan Ibrahim in the same period. He is shocked to hear that the *mufti* has played a part in the affair, and exclaims: "Now can we reproach the Christians with their frequent treasons and murderings of their kings since they can retort that the Supreme Patriarch of our law entered into revolt?" (3:28). And elsewhere, "When sovereign monarchs become the merchandize of factions, they commonly pay the price with their own blood" (3:285, letter dated 1649). The English murder of their king had no precedent in history, but they at least had formally tried Charles I, and condemned him as a tyrant and traitor, before executing him.

The same device of comparing the deaths of the two monarchs became a weapon in the absolutist/anti-absolutist debates in France,[3] and was employed in other types of literature, available on both sides of the Channel: the broadsheet and the periodical press. Domestic as well as international news from Constantinople was a regular feature of the *Gazette de France*, the close interest in the Ottoman siege of Crete being an example. In England, magazines such as the *Gentleman's Magazine* and the *Spectator* aroused great interest in the Orient, making such words as "Vizier Azem" and "Grand Signior" a familiar part of the discourse on the Ottomans.

A third, less studied source of such information, of particular interest here, is the Venetian ambassadors' official reports to their court. These, according to at least one scholar, were partly responsible for creating the popular paradigm of the despotic state which, by the end of the eighteenth century, was the European consensus about the Ottoman Empire.[4] Between the ages of Machiavelli and Montesquieu, political theory about the Ottoman

[1]Rycaut, p. 2.

[2]Thierry Hentsch, *Imagining the Middle East* (Montreal: Black Rose, 1992), p. 75.

[3]Clarence Dana Rouillard, *The Turk in French History Thought and Literature (1520-1660)* (Paris: Boivin, 1940; reprinted New York: AMS Press, 1973), pp. 416-18.

[4]Lucette Valensi, "The Making of a Political Paradigm: The Ottoman State and Oriental Despotism," in *The Transmission of Culture in Early Modern Europe*, ed. Anthony Grafton and Ann Blair (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1990) pp. 197-98.

Empire evolved from a discussion of the nature of a virtuous empire in Machiavelli[1] to the account of the despotic government of Turkey in Montesquieu.[2] Lucette Valensi argues that Italian thinkers, in part because of the close observations of the Venetian ambassadors, whose reports were public property and widely distributed, had "already appropriated Aristotle's terminology by the end of the sixteenth century," popularizing the image of the government of the Ottoman Empire as irrational and violent. After 1575, "the entire construct [i.e., Ottoman despotism] was perceived as the largest tyranny in history."[3] In England, Hobbes and Locke used the word "despotical" to refer to recent political events rather than to the Ottoman world. Similarly, in France, the word first started to make its appearance in the late 1640s in pamphlets about the *Fronde*, and persisted even in the face of severe censorship of its usage under Louis XIV, with the concept of despotic rule becoming a common referent for both France and Turkey with Pierre Bayle in 1704.[4] By 1768 Voltaire complained that the word "despot", which in its original Greek simply meant head of family, was now widespread. "Nous donnons aujourd-hui libéralement ce titre à l'Empereur de Maroc, au Grand Turc, au Pape, à l'Empereur de la Chine."[5] In this context, the immensely popular *Letters Writ by a Turkish Spy*, a satirical docu-drama of Italian origin, published at a crucial moment in the evolution of political thinking about the Ottoman Empire, assumes a far greater significance than as the progenitor of the epistolary spy novel and the forerunner of Montesquieu, who realized the stylistic device more fully. Rather, the *Turkish Spy* represents an emerging social consensus about non-Western governments in general, part of "a conscious act to change the common way of thinking,"[6] by comparison and contrast with European monarchies, grounded in the actuality of recent Ottoman defeats, and evolving from real assumptions of Turkish superiority to the parody of superiority in "Mahmut the Arabian, vilest of the Grand Seignior's slaves."

> Et lorsque je tente d'aller voir, derrière ce que je crois être le point, là-bas dans l'autre monde, d'où ça me regarde, c'est moi-même, et notre monde, à la fin, que je retrouve.[7]

[1]Valensi, pp. 195-97.

[2]R. Koebner, "Despot and Despotism: Vicissitudes of a Political Term," *Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institute* 14 (1951), 275. Many studies have traced the passage of the word "despot" from Aristotle to Montesquieu, demonstrating the persistent reluctance of European intellectuals to substitute "despotism" for "tyranny," a word used of a monarch who "did not respect the laws or nature of his subjects and acted abusively toward men and property." Valensi, p. 196. See also A. Grosrichard, *Structure du Sérail* (Paris: Seuil, 1970), and Laurens, pp. 43-62.

[3]Valensi, pp. 200, 191. "Despotico" appears hesitantly between 1579 and 1582, returning after an absence in 1634 (p. 192).

[4]Koebner, pp. 288-92, 293-96, 300-301.

[5]Koebner, p. 275.

[6]Goodman, pp. 3-5, echoing Diderot.

[7]Grosrichard, p. 59.

CHOISEUL-GOUFFIER AT THE SUBLIME PORTE 1784-1792

I

In the two decades prior to Napoléon Bonaparte's invasion of Egypt in 1798, French enthusiasm for travel to the Orient reached a new and feverish pitch. It was as if the "star of the French Empire was... moving eastward and French travelers and scholars were the new astronomers"[1].

The flow of archaeologists, adventurers and technicians to the Ottoman Empire grew to such an extent that Saint-Priest, French Ambassador in Istanbul from 1763-1784, was prompted to advise that an announcement be published in the *Gazette de France* to the effect that the Sultan was not accepting Christian officers in his service[2]. Bonaparte himself expressed interest in serving in 1783 but was dissuaded from the plan[3].

What makes the France of the 1780s and 1790s so interesting is the early appearance of a particular blend of enthusiasm for the exotic combined with a rising sense of mission to save the Ottoman Empire from itself, and an urge to territorial power which would become the familiar and well-documented ideology of the nineteenth century empires[4]. The pre-revolutionary euphoria about the Orient was not entirely restricted to France. England, too, succumbed to the romance of eastern adventures. From 1775-1825, seventy travel accounts of trips to the Orient were published in England[5].

In a sense, the "Eastern question", which so dominated political discourse in the nineteenth century, arose in response to the philosophical demystification of the Orient. To quote Schwab : "Between 1770-1850 ... the image of the Orient passes from primitive to actual, that is, from disruptive invigoration to condescending veneration"[6].

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[1]Dennis, p. 149.
[2]In 1783; Boppe, "La France," p. 398.
[3]Gaulmier, p. 305.
[4]Laurens' book on the intellectual origins of Bonaparte's expedition to Egypt makes very interesting reading in this regard.
[5]Brown, p. 77.
[6]Schwab, p. 8.

French philosophers and travelers, in particular, by factualizing and rationalizing the Orient, made explicit the link between philosophy and politics. Arguments about the rebirth of Greece, Oriental despotism and decay,[1] and the essential torpitude of Islam, fed directly into the spate of proposals concerning the future of the Ottoman Empire which flooded the French Foreign Office beginning in the 1770s[2].

This peculiarly French fusion of philosophical and political discourse is especially apparent in the life and work of Choiseul-Gouffier, the last ambassador of the "ancien régime" at the Ottoman court, (1784-1792). Aristocrat, hellenist and diplomat, Choiseul-Gouffier has deliberately been chosen for this study because he typifies, perhaps in an exaggerated way, the attitudes of certain French intellectuals of the period, and because, as a representative of the French court, he is an explicit example of the impact of those attitudes on the political climate of pre-revolutionary France.

II

Marie Gabriel-Florent Auguste de Choiseul was born in 1752, into an illustrious family whose most famous member was the Duc de Choiseul, Minister to Louis XV. His marriage to Adélaïde-Marie-Louise de Gouffier d'Heylli in 1771 secured his fortune and added Gouffier to his name[3]. Choiseul-Gouffier studied at the Collège de Harcourt and served in the army from 1776 to 1784. He spent those years in Marie-Antoinette's entourage at court, under the tutelage of l'abbé Barthélemy, the great popularizer of the ancient Greek world[4]. Choiseul-Gouffier's ardent hellenism earned him the nickname "le grec"[5] and he numbered Talleyrand among his close friends at court.

[1]Besides the obvious ones (Voltaire, Montesquieu, Volney), Anquetil-Duperron, *Législation orientale* (1778), Linguet, *Du plus heureux gouvernement* (1774), and Boulanger, *Recherches sur l'origine du despotisme oriental* (1761) should be noted.

[2]Herold, pp. 12-13. Djuvara's *Cent projets de partage de la Turquie* (1914) is a curious book offering in summary form the major "solutions" to the question of the Ottoman Empire for a period of two hundred years.

[3]Information on Choiseul-Gouffier's early life has been drawn from the several biographical dictionaries listed in the bibliography. The work by Pingaud treats Choiseul-Gouffier's political career in full, especially the period 1783-1802. The 1842 edition of *Voyage pittoresque* also contains full biographical information.

[4]L'abbé Jean-Jacques Barthélemy, 1716-1795, friend and protégé of the Duc de Choiseul, and a great influence on both Choiseul-Gouffier and Talleyrand. Barthélemy's publication of *Voyage du jeune Anacharsis* from 1757 onward capped a lifetime of influence on young French intellectuals.

[5]Pingaud, p. 36, and *Recueil*, p. 467.

In March of 1776, at the age of twenty-four, he sailed for Greece accompanied by artists and other philhellenes. The fruits of this expedition were published serially from 1779-1783 as plates with an accompanying descriptive text, and gave Choiseul-Gouffier an international reputation. On the basis of this *Voyage pittoresque de la Grèce*, he was elected to l'Académie des inscriptions in 1779 and l'Académie française in 1784. For the first time Europe had a visual image of the ancient civilization it had long been extolling[1].

Choiseul-Gouffier's political career began with the *Discours préliminaire* to the *Voyage* which was published as an ensemble in 1783. The *Discours préliminaire* was an exquisite blend of youthful naïveté, ecstatic philhellenism and careless political ignorance, recommending the rebirth of the Greek nation in the Morea, a phoenix that would rise from the ashes of the Ottoman Empire. The title page of the 1783 edition of the *Voyage* was illustrated with a portrait of a woman representing Greece in chains, surrounded by monuments raised in honor of the great men of ancient Greece who were sacrificed for her liberty. Greece appears to be evoking the spirits of these men, and an inscription on a nearby rock reads : *Exoriare aliquis*[2].

For Choiseul-Gouffier, the anticipated pleasure of wandering among the beautiful and illustrious region of Homer and Herodotus was shattered by the reality of the Morea and the Maniotes of the 1770s[3]. He was indignant against the Turks, whom he considered grossly ignorant and burdened by Islam, which made it a superstitious duty to break statues and destroy pictures. "Comment voir sans indignation le stupide Musulman appuyé sur les ruines de Sparte ou d'Athènes..."[4]. Choiseul-Gouffier discerned in the faces of the Maniotes the core of a revolutionary band, lovers of liberty, who with European backing, could overthrow the Turks and regain Istanbul. Catherine II had already conceived of such a plan, but a new independent state of Greece was preferable to Russian conquest of the area. An independent Greece would suit Austria, France and Russia, and open the way, through the Bosphorus straits, to commerce in the north[5].

[1]Bertrand, p. 65.

[2]Choiseul-Gouffier, *Voyage pittoresque* (1782), title-page and pp. i-xv. The Latin is an allusion to Virgil's "May some avenger arise from my bones..." perhaps an allusion to Catherine II whom Choiseul-Gouffier admires in his *Discours*.

[3]The Morea had just been the scene of a revolt fomented by the Russians and repressed by the Ottomans, in the midst of the Russo-Turkish war, 1768-1774.

[4]Choiseul-Gouffier, *Voyage*, p. v.

[5]Summarized from Choiseul-Gouffier's *Discours préliminaire* to his *Voyage...*, pp. i-xv.

A measure of the influence of Choiseul-Gouffier's *Discours* can be found in a contemporary account of him in the *Annual Register* for 1788 : "... the celebrated, learned and elegant Count de Choiseul-Gouffier, whose curious researches into Eastern antiquities, and unceasing labor and experience in preserving memorials of the remaining vestiges of Grecian science and art, ... are everywhere known, and can never be forgotten, while any taste for the noblest monuments of human genius and art subsists"[1].

While Choiseul-Gouffier may never have intended the *Discours* as a political tract, it was rapidly transformed into one, for Choiseul-Gouffier now developed diplomatic aspirations. In 1783, an anonymous memoir entitled *Notions sur l'état actuel de l'Empire Ottoman* was submitted to Vergennes, then French Foreign Minister and himself an ex-ambassador to Istanbul (1755-1769). The memoir was written by Choiseul-Gouffier and Talleyrand to support the former's candidacy as ambassador[2].

The memorandum outlined the policy France should follow: the weakness of the Ottoman Empire and the necessity of balancing the ambitions of Austria and Russia made it imperative that an independent state of Greece be established, with the consent of the Turks. The essential was to convince the Turks. The author of the memorandum was confident of "l'ascendant de la France et l'empire des lumières," and of France's ability to make of the Ottoman Empire a vast French colony, a source of new commerce[3].

This memoir and the intercession of Marie-Antoinette secured Choiseul-Gouffier his coveted post as Ambassador in 1784. There were mixed reactions to his appointment. Many wondered how someone who had publicly proclaimed the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire could adequately represent French interests in Istanbul, but Choiseul-Gouffier remained serene. "I will do everything in my power to rectify my imprudence, he noted in a letter to a friend. I will undertake to retrieve the remaining copies of the *Discours* and destroy them. I am certain that none of them will penetrate the Levant, and that I will be well received by the Turks"[4]. Many felt as he did.

[1] *Annual Register*, 1788, p. 23.
[2] Choiseul-Gouffier acknowledged his authorship in 1788. (Pingaud, footnote, pp. 62, 63-65. The document itself is in the archives of the Ministère des Affaires Étrangères de France.
[3] *Ibid.*
[4] Pingaud, pp. 66-67. Volney in *Considérations...* published in 1788 remarks : "l'on a compté sur le crédit de notre cour ; mais a-t-on pris les moyens de l'assurer et de le soutenir ? Par exemple... peut-on exiger de M. le C. de Choiseul beaucoup d'influence ? Les Turcs doivent-ils déférer aux avis d'un Ambassadeur qui, dans un ouvrage connu de toute l'Europe, a publié les vices de leur administration et manifester le cœur de voir renverser leur Empire?", pp. 18-19.

He was called a "confesseur chargé d'exhorter convenablement à la mort un malade désespéré," and "le phare de la Propontide"[1].

III

Choiseul-Gouffier arrived in Istanbul at a particularly turbulent moment in the history of Ottoman-European relations. Since 1768, the Empire had been engaged in a struggle with Russia over the hegemony of the Crimea. The annexation of the Crimea by Russia in 1783, in violation of the Küçük Kaynarca treaty of 1774, was reluctantly accepted by the Porte as a *fait accompli* in the Aynalıkavak agreement of 1784, upon the advice of the diplomatic community in Istanbul. The 1781 Austro-Russian alliance, continuing Prussian-Austrian hostilities, and Anglo-French antagonism preoccupied the powers of Europe, leaving Turkey temporarily isolated[2].

The exception to the general lack of interest in the plight of the Ottoman Empire was France. Foreign Minister Vergennes made hesitant and inconsequential efforts to other countries of Europe to act in concert against the Russian incursions, but to no avail. After decades of continental and colonial wars, France was simply in no position, financially or militarily, to effect any change in the political balance of power in the East. Vergennes settled for education. In his instructions to the new ambassador, he said that Choiseul-Gouffier's chief aim should be to convince the Turks that their traditional armed forces were no longer effective; that only modern tactics and artillery could place them on a par with their enemies. Further, Vergennes noted, the Turks, either through ignorance, indolence or resignation, were inclined to regard with indifference anything outside of the narrow circle of their habitual occupations. That, combined with the weakness and unpopularity of the government, dominated by the men of law, made Turkey vulnerable to internal or external occupation. It was Choiseul-Gouffier's charge to educate the Turks concerning the necessity of adopting the now unavoidable means to prevent the total ruin of the empire[3].

Thus, the man who "n'avait guère vu de musulmans que dans *Zaïre*",[4] assumed his post in Istanbul on September 27, 1784. Despite his efforts to suppress the remaining copies of the *Discours*, by an English or Russian

[1] Pingaud, p. 71.
[2] Anderson, "The Great powers...", pp. 19 ff.
[3] *Recueil*, pp. 474 ff. — a very abbreviated summary.
[4] Pingaud, p. 67.

"indiscretion", the most damaging passages of his work were translated and presented to the Grand Vizier, Halil Hamid. A more suitable, expurgated version was printed on the press at the French residence in Istanbul and presented to the Sultan as the original version, which momentarily reinstated Choiseul-Gouffier's credibility[1].

Choiseul-Gouffier assiduously cultivated the cooperation of Halil Hamid, one of the most reform-minded of the eighteenth century grand viziers. Together, they inaugurated a series of reform measures aimed at modernizing the Ottoman artillery and training Ottoman soldiers in contemporary tactics and strategy. Thus, Choiseul-Gouffier became the patron and leader of the French military mission, which at its height was extensive: military strategists and technicians, engineers, architects and cartographers repaired forts, established and staffed schools, and charted the Straits[2]. This reform initiative was interrupted by Halil Hamid's dismissal and execution, on April 27, 1785, after an abortive attempt to place Prince Selim on the throne[3]. French collusion was certainly involved. When Selim III finally did replace Abdülhamid I as Sultan in 1789, he remained a close friend of France[4].

The rest of Choiseul-Gouffier's term as ambassador was beset with difficulties, as he was forced on numerous occasions to interpret France's ineffective and hesitant eastern policy, which attempted to placate Russia and England simultaneously. War broke out again in 1787 between Russia and Turkey, and in 1788, between Austria and Turkey. Choiseul-Gouffier's efforts at mediation were less successful than his efforts at protecting and freeing prisoners of war from both sides. In the chaos of the period, he was himself threatened by the Istanbul mobs[5]. In a letter to Vergennes dated 1786, he expressed his frustration: "I have tried vainly to awaken those who lead or who think they lead this empire: they are all struck by blindness"[6].

Although French political influence reached its nadir during the tenure of Choiseul-Gouffier, the achievement of the technical and cultural mission

[1]Pingaud, p. 78.
[2]Apart from the description of the mission in Pingaud, Boppe's article is very detailed and informative.
[3]Shaw, p. 14.
[4]Shaw, pp. 14 ff. İshak Bey, Selim's confidant, after escaping from Istanbul after the abortive coup, was sent to France and maintained there by Vergennes. He carried Selim's letters to Louis XVI, gestures designed to demonstrate Selim's intention to maintain western, especially French, contacts.
[5]After the outbreak of the Russo-Turkish war of 1787, chaos reigned in Istanbul and Choiseul-Gouffier was attacked at his residence, Pingaud, p. 192.
[6]Pingaud, p. 90.

was much more tangible. A Turkish press at the French residence produced translations of military texts for use in the schools established by the mission, for example, *Elémens de castramétation et de fortifications passagère*, by La Fitte-Clavé, and *Traité de la manœuvre pratique* by Truguet[1]. Further, under Choiseul-Gouffier's own auspices, presumably at his expense, a Turkish grammar by Viguier in French, and topographical maps of Istanbul and the Bosphorus by Kauffer, were produced[2]. The ambassador was at the same time working on the second volume of his *Voyage*, employing L. F. Cassas as artist and Kauffer as cartographer[3].

The 1787/88 Austro-Russian and Ottoman war had put an end to the brilliant period of the French scientific and military mission[4] and the French Revolution two years later forced Choiseul-Gouffier into self-imposed exile in Istanbul. In 1791, he refused a diplomatic position with the new government, remaining in contact with the royal family in exile. For this, he was arrested *in absentia*, and replaced by Citizen Descorches in 1793. Unable to return to France, he fled to St. Petersburg, and spent the years from 1793 to 1802 in the courts of Catherine II and Paul I. Talleyrand secured his return to France in 1802, but Choiseul-Gouffier was an unreformed courtier of the "ancien régime", and his age had gone. Only under the restoration, shortly before his death in 1817, was he reinstalled in his former privileges and offices[5].

Although far from a successful ambassador, Choiseul-Gouffier exemplified the spirit of his age in his eagerness to explore the Orient and glorify the Hellenistic heritage. His contributions and influence in that regard are substantial.

The French Republic appointed Général Aubert du Bayet Ministre Plénipotentaire to Istanbul in 1797. His instructions included this note : "The French, restored to reason and wisdom, wish at last to open their arms to their old friends and divert from them the storm of passion and ambition which rumbles over their heads"[6]. The following year Napoleon invaded Egypt.

[1]Boppe, p. 497.
[2]Boppe, p. 497.
[3]*Élémens de la langue turque*, by M. Viguier, Constantinople, 1790, "sous les auspices de M. le Comte de Choiseul-Gouffier". The Kauffer maps were later incorporated into *Voyage pittoresque de Constantinople et des rives du Bosphore* by M. Melling, Paris, 1819. The very tide of the book honors its patron, by imitation. Choiseul-Gouffier's work on Greece in fact inaugurated a rage for "Voyage(s) pittoresque(s)" all over Europe. A second edition of the *Voyage* appeared in 4 volumes in 1842, with various writings of other oriental travelers; Chateaubriand, Melling, d'Ohsson, Lamartine, etc., appended.
[4]The mission was recalled on the 27 of October, 1787, after war between Turkey and Austria broke out. France was still tied to Austria through Marie Antoinette and the alliance of 1756.
[5]Pingaud, p. 288.
[6]Bruneau, pp. 87-88.

AN OTTOMAN PORTRAIT OF FREDERICK THE GREAT*

The military prowess of Frederick the Great of Prussia (1712-1784) excited the Ottoman imagination in the mid- 18th century so much so that in 1757, after his surprising victories over the Austrians and Russians during the Seven Years War (1756-1763), the streets and coffee-houses of Istanbul resounded with the cry of "Brandenburg, Brandenburg".[1] By besting the traditional enemies of the Ottomans, Frederick unwittingly strengthened his case for a defensive alliance, and determined Sultan Mustafa III to reactive desultory negotiations with Karl Adolf Rexin, Frederick's representative in Istanbul.[2] The negotiations resulted in the first Prusso-Ottoman Capitulations, and an Ottoman embassy to Berlin in 1763/64. Included in the report of the embassy (*sefaretname*) by Ambassador Ahmed Resmi Efendi is an interesting portrait of Frederick the Great, notable for its breadth and sympathy, and revealing much about both biographer and biographee.[3] The lengthy description of Frederick raises some interesting questions about 18th-century Ottoman ideas of leadership. While personal characterizations of Ottoman sultans are rare, portraits of civil servants (and *ulema*) are frequent, if adulatory, in the writings of the period, and especially in those of Ahmed Resmi. By contrasting Ahmed Resmi's choice of language in his comments about his superiors he knew well with his portrait of Frederick, it will be

*The substance of this paper forms part of chapter two of Aksan, V., *An Ottoman Statesman in War and Peace: Ahmed Resmi Efendi, 1700-1783,* Leiden, 1995, p. 67-99.

[1]From the July 15, 1758 report of the Prussian representative in Istanbul. Karl Adolf Rexin, Bratter, Carl Adolf, *Die preussisch-türkische Bundnispolitik Frederichs des Grossen,* Weimar, 1915, p. 75; Beydilli, Kemal, *Büyük Frederich ve Osmanlılar - XVIII. Yüzydda Osmanlı Prusya Münasebetleri,* Istanbul, 1985, p. 37, note 47. Brandenburg was the commonly used Ottoman name for Frederick.

[2]Beydilli, *op. cit.,* p. 25-26. Rexin whose real name was Gottfried Fabian Hande, had already had some experience working in Istanbul but for Austria, not Prussia. A Silesian by birth, he had joined Prussian service after the 1740 invasion of his homeland. The name change was to disassociate him from his past. Though he spoke some Turkish, by all accounts, his diplomatic skills were insufficient to the demands of the Istanbul diplomatic scene. Yet, he remained Frederick's chief negotiator throughout this period (Beydilli, *op. cit.,* p. 25-56, note 2).

[3]The records for this embassy are rich and interesting. On the Turkish side, Topkapı E5033/1, dated 14 July 1764, is a preliminary report to the sultan immediately upon Ahmed Resmi's return to Istanbul, which records details not in the *Sefaretname* itself. Other evidence is to be found in the Başbakanlık archives: Cevdet Hariciye (CH) 7239, 8818 and 8824, with various dates, which concern the expenses of the embassy. Twelve manuscript copies of the *sefaretname* have been examined. The Istanbul Ebüzziya edition of 1886, entitled *Sefaretname-yi Ahmed Resmi* (commonly known as *Prusya Sefaretnamesi* and cited hereafter as *Prusya*), has been used for this discussion. The earliest surviving manuscript would appear to be from 1764 (Aşir Efendi 252). The full text appears in Vasıf, Ahmed, *Mehasin iil-Asar ve Hakaik iil-Ahbar,* 2 vols., Istanbul, 1804, 1, p. 239-262. The text has been converted to modern Turkish by B. Atsız with that of Ahmed Resmi's report on his 1757/58 embassy to Vienna in *Ahmed Resmi Efendi'nin Viyana ve Berlin sefaretnameleri,* Istanbul 1980.

possible to make some assumptions about the uniqueness of that portrait, and about the nature of Ottoman perceptions of leadership and consultation in general.

Ahmed Resmi was an accomplished biographer, especially in *Sefinet ül-Rüesa,* his biographical sketches of the Ottoman *Reisülküttab* as well as an acerbic critic of faltering Ottoman military leadership in his description of the 1768 to 1774 war in *Hulāsat ül-İ'tibar.*[1] An experienced civil servant who served as second-in-command on the battlefront for almost the entire war, Ahmed Resmi can be numbered among those who pondered waning Ottoman military efficiency and spelled out its causes, notably in the introduction to *Hulāsat ül-İ'tibar* where the dismissal of an experienced grand vizier like Muhsinzade Mehmed Paşa, opponent of the Ottoman 1768 declaration of war, is cited as one of the war's "ill-omens".[2] Ahmed Resmi began his career, however, as protégé of Tavukçubaşı Mustafa Efendi, twice *Reisülküttab*, 1736-1741 and 1744-1747, and a leading intellectual of his age.[3] It was shortly after the death of his patron in 1749 that the earliest known copies of "*Sefinet ül-Rüesa*" appeared.[4] The work was clearly undertaken to eulogize Mustafa Efendi, whose description is a model of the idealized Ottoman gentleman and statesman so typical of the Ottoman biographical dictionaries and chronicles and so frustrating to historians.[5]

Tavukçubaşı Mustafa is described as full of virtues (*vafir ül-mehasin*), upright of disposition and knowledge *(mühezzeb ül-şema'il ve-ül-şinasın*), without parallel in energy and endeavor (*azimet-ü-i-hümmette adem ül-misal*), the most generous of gentlemen, extremely accomplished in the arts (*fünun*), especially literature, etiquette, manners (*edeb*), and the art of conversation. He had the power of memory and an eloquence of discourse and recall as well as the ability to judiciously silence argument (*iskat-i-ilzam*). He was self-disciplined and dignified (*vakar*), avoiding the forbidden and immoral. He was a humble man, inclined to be cheerful (*bişr-ü-beşuşet*), assiduous in the performance of the litanies (*evrad-u-ezkâre müdavim*), and the obligatory

[1]The biographies were published as Ahmed Resmi, *Halifet ül-Rüesa,* Istanbul, 1853, although generally referred to as *Sefinet ül-Rüesa* and hereafter cited as such (see Aksan, *op. cit.*, p. 50) and Ahmed Resmi, *Hulāsat ül-'İ'tibar,* Istanbul, 1869. The *Reisülküttab* was by the 18th century the chief foreign affairs officer of the empire.

[2]Ahmed Resmi, *Hulāsat*, p. 9.

[3]Ahmed Resmi, *Sefinet,* p. 2.

[4]Topkapı R 1455 and Ali Emiri 720, both dated April 1750.

[5]Mustafa Efendi's biography is complete in a single entry and is followed by that of Koca Ragıp, the *Reis* for the intervening three years, a practice followed by Ahmed Resmi throughout the text: Ahmed Resmi, *Sefinet* p. 66-70.

prayers which he celebrated with the community. A master of the three languages in both poetry and prose, he astonished the Arab *ulema* with his fluency in their language.[1] A catalogue of the adjectives used to describe the model Ottoman statesman would appear to include virtuous, upright, generous, eloquent, learned, dignified, self-disciplined, pious, modest, and master of Arabic, Turkish and Persian and their accompanying literatures. Tavukçubaşı Mustafa seems to have surpassed his contemporaries in his learning, piety and generosity of spirit, although sorting the wheat from the chaff in these descriptions is a Herculean labor. The ability to lead is implicit in this kind of characterization, a matter of commanding respect through learning rather than decisiveness and charisma. Each of the clichés signified behavior obligatory for membership in the court bureaucracy (the *hacegan*), to which Ahmed Resmi belonged. Unlike many of his contemporaries, however, Ahmed Resmi had the opportunity to experience at first hand an alternative model, by observing Frederick the Great of Prussia, the reigning European master of the art of command. His inclusion of the description of Frederick in an embassy report attracts our attention, promoting an analysis of Ahmed Resmi's choice of terminology and possible motivation, in an attempt to make sense of Frederick recast through Ottoman eyes.

Prussian-Ottoman negotiations began in 1740, when Frederick invaded Silesia and began his decades long quarrel with Maria Theresa of Austria. His approach to the Ottomans set the pattern for negotiations for the next 50 years, invariably initiated when Frederick's sense of isolation among hostile neighbors was most acute.[2] His second approach to the Ottomans occurred early in 1755 when he sent Karl Adolf von Rexin to Istanbul on an investigatory mission to gauge the condition of the Ottoman empire and its willingness to establish relations with Prussia. Frederick was interested in securing the capitulatory rights already enjoyed by other European nations as well as a defensive alliance.[3] The documents which survive from this period indicate a polite postponement of discussion of the proposals on the part of

[1]Ahmed Resmi, *Sefinet,* p. 69.

[2]On this particular series of events, see Tansel, Selâhattin, "Büyük Friedrich devrinde Osmanlı-Prusya münasebetleri hakkında", in: *Belleten,* X (1946), p. 133-165, 271-292. Prussian and Ottoman relations have been fairly well addressed by both German and Turkish historians. Until recently, however, the pivotal importance of the 1763 embassy of Ahmed Resmi to Berlin had been overlooked. Beydilli's study makes considerable use of the German works of the period, and corrects some facts in the formidable Tansel article, adding further documentary evidence from the Turkish archives. In an interesting article published in 1977, H. M. Scott questions whether Frederick had any serious intentions about an alliance and sees the Ahmed Resmi embassy as significant only in as far as it was used "as a pawn to achieve the Russian-Prussian Alliance of April 1764", in: *European Studies Review,* VII (1977), p. 153-175.

[3]Beydilli, *op. cit.*, p. 27, also p. 35; Bratter, *op. cit.*, p. 47.

sultan, just short of an outright refusal.[1] Rexin was in Istanbul once more in January of 1757 with a serious proposal for an alliance.

Frederick was then embroiled in the Seven Years' War against Russia, France and Austria.[2] After much diplomatic feinting on both sides over a number of years, an alliance between the two states had been reduced to a treaty of friendship and commerce as of November 1760.[3] By July 1761 both sides had accepted and ratified the Prussian Capitulations.[4]

The two years between the signing of the July 1761 treaty and the departure of Ahmed Resmi's embassy in July 1763 witnessed the renewal of Frederick's proposals for a defensive alliance and a series of offers and counter offers which depended upon events as the unfolded in Europe. Upon the death of Elizabeth of Russia early in January 1762 the new Tsar, Peter III, a great admirer of Frederick, immediately ceased hostilities and concluded a peace treaty between Russia and Prussia by May 1762.[5] Proposals circulated between Berlin and Istanbul focusing on hostility towards Austria, the Ottomans seeking a guarantee of Russian neutrality in return for a campaign against Austria. In June 1762, Rexin once more had a defensive alliance ready to be signed, when the news arrived in Istanbul of Catherine II's coup in Russia. Catherine failed to ratify the recent Prussian-Russian peace treaty, once again reawakening Frederick's sense of isolation. By October 1762, the Ottomans had rejected a Prusso-Ottoman alliance outright.[6]

Sultan Mustafa III had along been interested in a defense alliance with Frederick but had been prevented from signing on the advice of his Grand Vizier, Koca Ragıp Paşa, who died in April of 1763. By June of the same year Mustafa III announced that Ahmed Resmi Efendi would go to Berlin as ambassador.[7] The ostensible reason for the proposed embassy was as a follow-up to the 1761 treaty and exchange of gifts, but Mustafa's additional agenda

[1]This diplomatic initiative is fully discussed in Beydilli, *op. cit.*, p. 28-32; see Scheel, H., *Preussens Diplomatic in der Türkei*, Berlin, 1931, p. 11-12, for copies of Frederick's letters.

[2]Beydilli, *op. cit.*, . 36; see also Tansel, *op. cit.*, p. 138-139.

[3]Beydilli, *op. cit.*, p. 56.

[4]Beydilli, *op. cit.*, p. 59.

[5]Beydilli, *op. cit.*, p. 68.

[6]Beydilli's summary of this period is masterful, *op. cit.*, p. 73-77, making full use of documentary evidence.

[7]Rexin noted that Ahmed Resmi was a minister praised as an unpretentious and reasonable man, who had won himself much love and esteem. Volz, Gustav B., "eine türkische Gesandschaft am Hofe Friedrichs des Grossen in Winter 1763/64" in: *Hohenzollern Jahrbuch*, (1907), p. 33-34. See Hammer-Purgstall, Joseph von, *Histoire de l'Empire Ottoman*, Paris, 1844, XVI, p. 116-117, for Ahmed Resmi's instructions; also Beydilli, *op. cit.*, p. 83. The Sultan himself informed Ahmed Resmi of his charge.

was to ascertain Frederick's willingness to reopen discussion concerning an Ottoman-Prussian alliance.[1] Frederick was not entirely without his own reasons for attempting to reopen negotiations at this time, although initially he opposed the sending of an Ottoman embassy without full signatory powers.[2] The February 1763 Treaty of Hubertusberg ending the Seven Years War had achieved little apart from recognizing Prussia's significance as a major power in eastern Europe. Frederick remained isolated in his own mind, having been deserted by Britain and not yet having achieved an agreement with Catherine II.[3] The future of Poland, a question which was to preoccupy Europe and the Ottoman empire for the next decade, was the deciding factor in the Ottoman determination to send an ambassador to Berlin at this juncture.[4]

Ahmed Resmi's version of these events is set out in the early pages of his embassy report.[5] Frederick, Ahmed Resmi began, was famous as the Elector of Brandenburg and now King of Prussia. Since his accession to his father's throne in 1740, Frederick had aimed at increasing his territory and prestige, resulting in constant war with Austria. Though renowned for his stability and perseverance during the conflict, Frederick felt the necessity of an alliance with a large, neutral state. Envious of the honor which his neighbors and co-religionists Poland, Denmark, the Netherlands, Sweden and England had acquired by allying themselves with the Porte, he persisted in his efforts to achieve similar glory. His wish was fulfilled in 1761, when the sultan saw fit to "open the gate of kindness and permission". In the course of what naturally follows such a treaty, a Prussian ambassador was sent to Istanbul with costly valuable gifts. Frederick then requested the sending of a special Ottoman ambassador to his court, in order to enhance his stature and that of his successor(s) among the kings of Europe. It was decided that the sultan should send Frederick twice as many gifts as he had received in order to demonstrate the glory and stature of Islam and the caliphate. The "insignificant servant" (i.e. Ahmed Resmi himself) had been appointed as ambassador to

[1]Scott, *op. cit.*, p. 163; Ahmed Resmi revealed to Janokaki Frankopulo, Rexin's hand picked interpreter who accompanied Ahmed Resmi to Berlin, that his chief task was to reopen the defensive alliance negotiations, cited in Nottebohm, Wilhelm, "Die preussiche-türkische Defensiv-Allianz 1763/65: ein Beitrag zu Friedrichs des Grossen orientalisches Politik", in: *Festschrift des Friedrich Werdeschen Gymnasiums*, Berlin, 1881, p. 137, from Rexin correspondence of 24 July 1763.

[2]Beydilli, *op. cit.*, p. 79-81, from Frederick's correspondence of 2 May 1763. Frederick was notorious for his dislike of court ceremonials and expenses. Scott, *op. cit.*, p. 163, notes Frederick's disillusionment with Ottomans as a potential ally: from Frederick II, King of Prussia, *Politische Correspondenz Friedrich des Grossen*, 46 vols., Berlin, 1879-1939, XXII, p. 204-205, 9 September 1762; also XXIII, p. 17-18.

[3]Scott, *op. cit.*, p. 156; Beydilli, *op. cit.*, p. 80.

[4]Scott, *op. cit.*, p. 163.

[5]Ahmed Resmi, *Prusya*, p. 7-8. What follows is a partial summary of the text.

carry out this mission.[1] Ahmed Resmi reverses the facts to suit his rhetoric in this introductory passage, and the high Ottoman style of the opening probably reflects his perceived importance of this embassy and his intention to reach a wider audience. He says as much in his conclusion.[2]

> The written details are common knowledge for the moment, so one can answer those purists who object to the need for such detail by saying that 20 or 30 years from now the stories of those who are versed in this subject, wise and experienced, dead or alive, will differ. The man whose words can be relied upon will be rarer that the philosopher's stone or the phoenix. Therefore, with a willful pen and a willing wrist [we have] set down the truth of the histories in the register of certainty which will in time result in a variety of benefits and surely give rise to a beautiful thought. It is well known that as the need occurs here and there to record events, many stories and work which should be mentioned or recalled are buried in neglected and forgotten corners, either because of the inadequacy of the writers or speakers, or the indifference of the readers and listeners. Therefore, just as our ancestors and brothers, by mastering the events and histories, have shared with us the benefit of a thousand years of knowledge and information, so too... have we written this little work ... for our descendants...[3]

When the embassy had first arrived in Berlin in November 1763, it was decided that Ahmed Resmi would remain there for six months as guest of the king because it was winter and travel was difficult.[4] In the course of his stay, Ahmed Resmi had a number of opportunity to meet and observe Frederick. To the astonishment of the diplomatic circles of Berlin, accustomed to Frederick's isolation and disdain of diplomatic niceties, Ahmed Resmi received a private invitation to join the king at his Potsdam palace and to observe the military

[1] *Ibid.*

[2] Typically such work began with a florid style, but then slipped into simpler prose as the text progressed. Such is the case here. On the gifts presented to Frederick see Volz, *op. cit.*, p. 40. Louis Bonneville de Marsangy, *Le Chevalier de Vergennes: son ambassade à Constantinople*, 2 vols., Paris, 1894, II, p. 251-252, produces this list: a tent, embroidered in gold, 12 horses, 2 Persian rugs, sword inlaid with precious stones, 20,000 *akçe*, a flagon of rose essence. The list of a total of 46 presents was published in *Berlinische Nachrichten von Staats-und Gelehrten Sachen*, on 29 November 1763, was unavailable for this research. Volz does not reproduce it, but notes Frederick's reaction. In a letter to Prince Heinrich, Frederick commented that they should not be a source of envy, and lists various bolts of muslin, silk, "chap d'or", *etc.*, Volz, *op. cit.*, p. 40. By February, Frederick was issuing instructions for the discreet selling off of the Ottoman presents such as the saddles and riding equipment, silk, woolen and camel hair stuffs, see Frederick, XXIII p. 268 and Volz, *op. cit.*, 40. Ahmed Resmi himself mentions one or two of the imperial gifts: a ceremonial tent and horses *Prusya*, p. 43-44.

[3] Ahmed Resmi, *Prusya*, 67-68. It is somewhat unusual for Ahmed Resmi to include a defense of the virtues of his work, more typically found in the chronicles, in a *sefaretname*. There are two interesting points made in the stylized effusion: the emphasis on accuracy and on the need to educate.

[4] As described by Ahmed Resmi in *Prusya*, p. 46-47.

maneuvers which the king himself had organized.[1] During his stay he was invited to a private interview with the king, the topic being the proposed defensive alliance. Ahmed Resmi responded to the proposal in a manner "so as not to cause Frederick to despair", as he was without full signatory powers to make such an agreement.[2] The matter was necessarily delayed until Ahmed Resmi's return to Istanbul, one of the factors prompting Frederick to encourage his departure from Berlin after only five months had passed. Ahmed Resmi took official leave of Frederick of April 20, 1764, offended because of Frederick's indecent haste in bidding him adieu, and because he felt he was owed both the remainder of his six month allowance and travel expenses. Furthermore, Ahmed Resmi carried the proposal back with him in vain, as Frederick had in the meantime signed an alliance with Russia, totally unacceptable to the Ottomans.[3]

Ahmed Resmi's impressions of Berlin and its king are scattered throughout the embassy report. He was generally impressed with the grandeur of Berlin and Frederick's shrewd finances, and acutely aware of the damage and

[1] The invitation to Potsdam was part of Frederick's strategy to stir up speculation in Moscow and Istanbul about potential alliances. The Berlin diplomatic representatives were astonished as none of them had ever been similarly honored (Scott, *op. cit.*, p. 64). In the midst of negotiating an alliance with Catherine II, Frederick made use of Ahmed Resmi's visit to startle Moscow into an agreement with Prussia. On 22 November 1763, the day after his official reception with the Ottoman ambassador, Frederick wrote Finkelstein that he should arrange a visit by Ahmed Resmi to Potsdam. Further, he noted, "... pour donner à penser à certaines gens sur ce voyage, je voudrais, qu'il eût un air comme s'il y avait du mystère caché. C'est en conséquence qu'il faudrait qu'il commençât à aller à Charlottenburg, comme par un simple motif de curiosité, pour voir cette maison de plaisance, et qu'il poursuivit de là son voyage ici". Such an undertaking was in his mind as early as 10 November 1763, in a letter to Finkelstein (Frederick, v XXIII, p. 177-178). In another letter to comte de Solms, Frederick's representative in Saint Petersburg, Frederick noted that he planned a private interview with the Turkish ambassador, "... de lui ôter tout ombrage et jalousie qu'on pourra avoir inspirés à la Porte par rapport aux affaires présentés de la Pologne et au sujet de la Russie". (Frederick, v. XXIII, p. 191).

[2] Ahmed Resmi, *Prusya*, p. 47. The interview took place on 29 November 1763. On 30 November, Frederick reiterated the proposed points of the alliance in a letter to Ahmed Resmi (Frederick, v. XXII, p. 201-202). Frederick noted that his recent separate peace treaty with Russia (May 1762) had created a rift between Austria and Russia and that Prussia's current influence over Russia would keep Russia from interfering with the Polish election of a native king. It was in Ottoman interests to prevent the election of an Austrian prince to the throne of Poland or the perpetuation of the Saxony line. Frederick proposed a defensive alliance that would call for diversionary tactics should either one of the signatories be attacked by Austria. Prussia would create a diversion in Austrian territory and the Ottomans would do the same in Hungary? Frederick undertook no guarantees against Russia, however, as Prussia neither bordered Russian territory nor had the necessary Black Sea fleet to undertake such an attack. The exception of Russia of course was totally unacceptable to Istanbul, Russia having assumed the role of chief enemy of the Ottomans at this point. It certainly throws into doubt the sincerity of Frederick's proposals. Frederick wrote Finkelstein the same day that he should inform his diplomatic representative in Russia of the recent meeting so as to dispel doubts about his intentions (Frederick, v. XXIII, p. 202).

[3] *Prusya*, p. 52-53. Ahmed Resmi himself only refers to the "trifling gifts" he received from Frederick. The Prusso-Russian alliance was signed on 11 April 1764 (Scott, *op. cit.*, p. 167). According to Scott, this accounts for the brevity and ill-tempered departure ceremonies (Scott, *op. cit.*, p. 168; see also Volz, p. 50; Frederick, v XXIII, p. 327, 335 ff.; Beydilli, *op. cit.*, p. 89).

expenses of the extensive wars undertaken by the king.[1] At one point in his discussion of Berlin, Ahmed Resmi contrasts Frederick's imperial ambitions and successes with the recent inability of Muslim leaders to extend their territories by conquest.[2] Frederick "was heedless of self preservation and accomplished things simply by planning and zeal. Boiling in his brain was the intense ambition to conquer the German states and maybe even all of Europe". By his victories in Silesia and Saxony, it appeared as if he would achieve his aim. However, "The Christian states had continuously adhered to rules concerning quarrels and the maintenance of equilibrium among themselves", which is why "Russia and France sided with Austria in order to cut off Frederick's vigor and violence and confine him in his original position". Prussia had been attacked and subdued. Berlin became the target of Frederick's foes in 1760, "who had spread like mange (*cerb-i frengi*) throughout the settled areas", destroying everything and "quenching Frederick's fiery attack and destructive ambition". Three conditions had forced the conclusion of a peace treaty: the change of government in Russia, the exhaustion of both the army and the treasury of the Austrians, and the alliance between Frederick and the Ottomans. Ahmed Resmi understood that the question of Silesia remained a "large, indigestible morsel". Austria could no more think of abandoning it than Frederick could think of giving it back, in spite of all the misfortune attached. The only consolation for the Austrians, who considered themselves the rightful owners, was to wait a more favorable moment. For Frederick to be forced to give it up would be a source of shame and would mean that the hardships of the last 25 years had been for nothing. The threat of being beaten by the enemy was naturally a source of anxiety and astonishment, but Frederick had no choice but to pursue his aims.[3] Ahmed Resmi's observations on the European balance of powers are evident in this passage, as well as a keen sense of the dilemma facing Frederick: the retention of his captured territories as a base power and the over-extension of his nation's resources to do so threatened to destroy him. On one occasion,

[1]Ahmed Resmi, *Prusya,* p. 32-37.

[2]Ahmed Resmi, *Prusya,* p. 39. Ahmed Resmi refers specifically to the failure of Mir Vays (d. 1715) and Nadir Shah (First ruler of the Afshar dynasty in Iran, 1736-1747) to extend their territories, even after 20-30 years of struggle.

[3]Ahmed Resmi, *Prusya,* p. 40-41. This passage is partially paraphrased from the text. The events Ahmed Resmi described are those of the beginning of the War of the Austrian Succession in 1740 though the Russian and Austrian occupation of Berlin for a few days in 1760. The change of government in Russia obviously refers to the death of Elizabeth and the accession to the throne of Tsar Peter, the Prussophile. Ahmed Resmi was an eyewitness to the destruction caused by the successive wars, arriving in Berlin only a few months after the Treaty of Hubertusberg in February 1763. Frederick and Maria Theresa had indeed reached an impasse over Silesia. As Williams notes: "For the remainder of his reign, Frederick was condemned to ceaseless diplomatic and military activity designed to head off Austrian attempts at revenge". Williams, E. N., *The Ancient Regime in Europe,* Harmondsworth, 1970, p. 381.

Frederick asked Ahmed Resmi directly about he Prut campaign of 1711 demonstrating his preoccupation with the Russian threat. Why, he wondered, had the Ottoman empire treated the Russian Tsar (Peter the Great) so leniently when it would have been possible to capture and enslave him? Ahmed Resmi answered rather lamely that the Ottomans had only recently been at war with four kings for 17 years, that the campaign had been rather hastily arranged to repel the attack and that the sultan had acted most generously because "forgiveness is the charity of victory".[1] Although the king appeared to accept that, Ahmed Resmi observed, it was clear that as Frederick himself had been extremely vexed by the Russians, he was mortified at the kindness which had been shown them by the Ottomans earlier in the century.[2]

During his stay in Potsdam, Ahmed Resmi was struck by Frederick's constant preoccupation with the ways to administer his country and pursue strategies of war, and his continual suggestions and admonitions to his men of state and commanders.[3] The final portion of his embassy report is devoted to an analysis of Frederick's character and his military expertise. The tone of the description, while not entirely adulatory leaves one with no doubt that Ahmed Resmi was impressed with the quality of Frederick's leadership.[4] Frederick, he began, was well-versed in all fields of knowledge but he was especially familiar with history. Day and night he studied the works of famous leaders such as Alexander and Tamerlane, emulating the strategies and plans they used on the battle fields. He was free from the preoccupations of family and children and the restrictions of creed and piety. His thoughts and behavior were focused on widening the borders of his kingdom and envisioning fame and fortune. He showed great humility and reliance on men he had need of, and to his neighbors and relatives he could feign friendship or demand retribution according to the occasion. He had a number of relatives as commanders and most of the time kept them at his side, saying "The fruits of my labors will one day be yours", so they might be obedient to him. He honored and respected his men of state and his commanders, allowing them freedom of operation in their particular assignments. Should it become necessary to warn

[1]Ahmed Resmi, *Prusya,* p. 51-52. The 1699 Karlowitz Treaty ended some 17 years of continuing campaigning.

[2]*Ibid.* The Prut campaign of 1711 was indeed a source to surprise of the Ottomans as well as the rest of Europe - Baltacı Mehmed Paşa, Grand Vizier and commander of the army at the time, was excoriated for his allowing Peter the Great, over extended and trapped, to escape so lightly. (The Ottomans (re)gained only Azov on the Black Sea).

[3]Ahmed Resmi, *Prusya,* p. 48.

[4]Ahmed Resmi, *Prusya,* p. 55. The section is entitled "Evsaf-i Kral-i Brandenburg".

or instruct one of them about some matter, he would do it discreetly, thinking thus to attract their affection and earn their gratitude.[1]

Ahmed Resmi considered Frederick a complete master at military and political strategy. He was skillful and wily in the use of words, both poetry and prose, and adept at poetic play and high-style pleasantries.[2] As an example, Ahmed Resmi included a letter Frederick had sent to Maria Theresa of Austria, a letter which had puzzled the diplomatic world, given the long hostility between the two monarchs. When they were in Poland, Ahmed Resmi and his entourage had been shown the letter and had had it read out loud to them. He chose to include it as "... one's prose and poetry can be considered the manifestation of one's mind and ideas".[3]

> "My beloved friend and fortunate neighbor", began Frederick. "After offering the worthy greetings and salutations suitable to a deeply felt trust and a visible amity, I entreat your everlasting friendship. The matter is as follows: it is perfectly clear that in the conflict which fate has dictated for us, we are equally capable of exterminating one another. It is also not beyond the realm of possibility for a powerful man to serve as an instrument or pretext for great benefit against such total destruction. In consideration of that, it is hoped that you will strive for eternally peaceful friendship with us and have the kindness not to listen to the words of those around you who prefer the road of enmity. In order to demonstrate to you the constancy and firmness of our sincere attachment and friendship, shortly, God willing, it is in my heart to show you a kindness and a humane act, so much so that those who see it will admire it and those who hear of the faithful endeavor will say 'Well done!".[4]

Ahmed Resmi then added another story about Frederick. A wise and educated acquaintance of the king had apparently written to him with the following advice: "My dear sir! While it may be true that luck and prosperity shine currently upon you to the envy of all, the ways of the world are not at all stable. It is not beyond the habits of fortune to turn against you when you least expect it. While victory and conquest are yours, it would be beneficial for you to prefer peace and friendship with your enemies and to make the effort to raise the voice of caution". The king responded: "My eloquent, wise and dear friend! Were you a rich man to spend lots of money, they would call you a

[1]Ahmed Resmi, *Prusya*, p. 55-56.
[2]Ahmed Resmi, *Prusya*, p. 61.
[3]Ahmed Resmi, *Prusya*, p. 62.
[4]*Ibid.* If this is a faithful rendition of Frederick's letter, it is small wonder that it was causing a sensation in diplomatic circles. The quarrel between Maria Theresa and Frederick was more than 20 years old, dating from 1740. The letter may have pre-dated the Treaty of Hubertusberg of 1763 which ended the Seven Years War.

wastrel and a spendthrift (*müsrif-ü-mütlif*). Should you spend a little, they would call you stingy and a miser (*müsnik-ü-müfrit*). Therefore you need to seek the road of moderation and balance between the two. As follows this introduction then, in your current state you are neither so important and heroic (*cesim-ü-bahadır*) that they are terrified of you nor are you so insignificant or humble (*sagir ül-cism-ü-kasir*) that people ridicule and make a laughing stock of you, amusing themselves at your expense. If this is the real situation, what is the remedy (*retk-ü-fetk*) except your thunder and lightening (*ra'd-ü-berk?*). You should be chided for your audacity but you can be excused (*mazur-ü-ma'fu*) because you offered advice (*irşad-ü-irad*) based on analogy with yourself. In fact, were I a literary and philosophical man like you (*edib-ü-filosof*), sound in heart, I might give such advice to a friend. The road I have chosen, however, aims at humiliating enemies and my life's coin is spent on organizing the state. Thus, it is not possible to follow your opinion and advice. My conversation and correspondence with you resembles a story about Alexander the Great. One day, they brought before him a man who deserved reproach and punishment (*itab-ü-i'kab*). Alexander forgave him and treated him well. One of Alexander's more naive companions exclaimed "O Emir! If I had been in your place I would have punished that fellow". "That's right", Alexander is said to have replied "because I am not in your place, I forgave this man and freed him (*afv-ü-azad*)".[1]

Unquestionably, Ahmed Resmi was impressed by what he had seen and heard of Frederick. Of the Ottoman gentleman little survives in Frederick except the rhetorician, the historian of Alexander and Tamerlane, the humble (if feigned) and respectful leader of his men, and the skilled poet and master of prose, the curious example of the latter Frederick's use of Ottoman rhyming descriptors in the typically moral tale about the just ruler and his naive companion, capped by his likening of himself to the most famous of all charismatic leaders, east or west. The catalogue of adjectives describing Frederick would also have to include: ambitious, zealous, single-minded, unscrupulous, devious, impious, and above all, pragmatic and decisive. Frederick admits in the story about his naive advisor that his life is bent on the humiliation of his enemies and the organization of his state, preventing him from following the road of caution and moderation, in much contrast to the previously described Tavukçubaşı's dignity, self-discipline, and modesty.

Subsequently, Ahmed Resmi's long service on the battlefront during the 1768 to 1774 war afforded him ample opportunity to observe the qualities

[1]Ahmed Resmi, *Prusya*, p. 63-64.

of Ottoman leadership. His despair and anger at the ineptitude of the grand viziers is most evident in *Hulāsat ül-İ'tibar* written by him following the conflict, where he blamed the outbreak of the war on the "armchair heroes" who thought that going to battle was a simple matter of "raising 12,000 select soldiers under a pious, wise-as-Aristotle vizier, who prays with the community five times a day, and marching as far as Kızıl Elma".[1] His experience as *kethüda* (deputy) to the grand vizier had taught him otherwise. He most admired Grand vizier Muhsinzade Mehmed Paşa, Commander in Chief of the Danubian battlefields from 1771 until his death shortly after the signing of the Küçük Kaynarca treaty in 1774. Ahmed Resmi described him as a veteran of 30 years experience, well versed in army affairs and logistics, and a skillful vizier "who was aware of the plans and provisions of the Russians".[2] He knew the ways of the world by constantly informing himself of the conditions around him, and had a fondness for studying the reports of events.[3] He was an experienced, self-possessed, dignified and modest vizier.[4] In one instance only, Ahmed Resmi characterized Muhsinzade Mehmed Paşa as "anxious" (*vesveseli*). That was when he showed a lack of initiative in bringing an end to the war.[5] Considering the vituperations he heaped on the other grand viziers of the period, accusing them of madness, corruption and general ineptitude, it is a mild and admiring portrait that Ahmed Resmi has left of his commanding officer.[6] Muhsinzade Mehmed Paşa is further described in *Hadikat ül-Vüzera* as an experienced and intelligent vizier, a prudent individual, inquisitive and aware of the conditions of other states. His sound ideas and valid opinions were well guided and proof of his perception.[7] This portrait of Muhsinzade Mehmed is sparse and austere, restricted to many of the same attributes as that of Tavukçubaşı Mustafa: self possessed, dignified, modest, prudent and intelligent, but it includes what Ahmed Resmi appears to have admired most in a statesman: experience, awareness of the enemy and general curiosity about the world around him. Of most interest is what left out of these descriptions of Muhsinzade Mehmed, considering that he was responsible for the greatest military humiliation the Ottomans had yet experienced.

[1]Ahmed Resmi, *Hulāsat*,, p. 3, "Kızıl Elma", or "red", sometimes "golden" apple, representing the Christian world, especially Italy and Austria.
[2]Ahmed Resmi, *Hulāsat*, p. 9.
[3]*Ibid.*, p. 82.
[4]*Ibid.*
[5]*Ibid.*, p. 58-59.
[6]Aksan, *op. cit.*, p. 131-134.
[7]Osmanzade Taib Ahmed, *Hadikat ül-Vüzera*, Istanbul, 1854; reprint Freiburg, 1969, in the Ahmed Cavid continuation, *Verd-i Mutarrâ*, p. 15-16.

What to make of the disparity between Ahmed Resmi's description of fellow Ottomans and of an infidel monarch? How much of it is "real", and how much a fabrication? If one assumes Ahmed Resmi's membership in a cultural elite, sharing an Ottoman-Islamic tradition and upholding what Fleischer has described as the idealization of "an Ottoman polity [which] explicitly expressed a moral and ethical dimension", where state and religion were "combined in the person of the monarch and secondarily in his survivors",[1] then the restraint and respect can be understood as convention, aptly demonstrated in the two Ottoman portraits by Ahmed Resmi, who, while clearly capable of distinguishing the qualities of Frederick which made him one of the great monarchs of Europe, would not or could not ascribe the same characteristics to his own superiors.

Why the description of Frederick in the embassy report at all? Ahmed Resmi returned to Istanbul with a concrete proposal for an alliance, to a court already inclined to its acceptance. The generally positive portrayal of Frederick and the close analysis of his predicament with Austria all point to the author's acute sense of his primary purpose in going to Berlin.

Secondarily, Ahmed Resmi was committed to an accurate preservation of information and its dissemination, well within the long Ottoman historiographical tradition, and was most concerned with instruction and advice to his ruler, perceived as an obligation and right of Ottoman bureaucrats from the 16th century forward. Of greatest interest in the portrait of Frederick is the evidence concerning his treatment of his advisors and those close to him, which obviously impressed Ahmed Resmi, who had at least two private conversations with Frederick, when his own opinion had been sought. Frederick is portrayed as tolerant and respectful of the independence and pride of his men of state, and as listening to, though not always following, advice. Intentionally or unintentionally, Ahmed Resmi perhaps meant to insert an oblique comment on the nature of the Ottoman court politics in his report, and to suggest himself as an obvious candidate for the role of advisor. Beyond political realities and didacticism, however, the nature of the portrait calls to mind a similar role played by the "virtuous Oriental" in European renaissance literature, from whose mouth advice and criticisms concerning European culture could issue without fear of censure.[2] The portrait of Frederick as the "virtuous Occidental" both recalls the familiar Islamic paradigm of leadership

[1]Fleischer, Cornell, *Bureaucrat and Intellectual in the Ottoman Empire*, Princeton, 1986, p. 269.
[2]Frank Lestringant, "Altérités critiques: du bon usage du Turc à la Renaissance", in: *D'un Orient à l'autre* 2 v., Paris, 1991, I, p. 85-105.

by consultation with trusted advisors, and asserts the need for the reactivation of Ottoman sultanic authority. The value of both the portrait and the embassy report in general remains in what it tells us of Ottoman abilities to observe and interpret "the other" in an age when rapid change was forcing a revaluation of the idealization of the Ottoman statesman.

LOCATING THE OTTOMANS AMONG EARLY MODERN EMPIRES*

Neither fish nor fowl, the Ottomans have rarely found a niche in the pantheon of early modern land-based empires. When they have, it has generally been as a counterpoint, an example of Asiatic despotism contrasted to the more easily definable eastern European empires, the Russians, the Austrians, even the Soviets.[1] More, recently, world history has drawn the Ottomans into the orb of the grand sweep of Muslim societies that confronted European colonialism, an exercise which has reawakened a great deal of interest in the empire among historians in general.[2] Yet the Ottomans devoted considerable resources and manpower to the protection of the Danubian and Black Sea regions after 1700, and were faced with many of the same choices confronting the Habsburgs and Romanovs. It is object of the exercise that follows to attempt a siting of the Ottomans on the early modern European imperial map, as part of a project considering the nature of Ottoman war and society from the late seventeenth through the nineteenth centuries.[3]

Peter Sugar once used the Ottomans as an example of "The Near-Perfect Military Society."[4] In spite of that of the-repeated idea, it remains one of the curiosities of Ottoman historiography that military history per se, the nuts and bolts of mobilization, supply, and logistics, has been neglected, especially for the period following 1700. Little systematic work has been

*I should like to thank the four *JEMH* anonymous reviewers of the original draft of this article for their acute, but encouraging comments which considerably enabled the revision process.

[1]William O. McCagg, "The Soviet Union and the Habsburg Empire: Problems of Comparison," in *Nationalism and Empire: The Habsburg Empire and the Soviet Union*, ed. Richard L. Rudolph and David F. Good (New York, 1992), 53-54.

[2]See Halil Berktay and Suraiya Faroqhi, eds., *New Approaches to State and Peasant in Ottoman History* (London, 1992), especially Berktay's "Three Empires and the Societies They Governed: Iran, India and the Ottoman Empire," 242-63.

[3]I am working on a study of Ottoman warfare from 1700-1870. My interest in the subject grows out of earlier research on Ottoman intellectuals of the eighteenth century. See my *An Ottoman Statesman in War and Peace: Ahmed Resmi Efendi, 1700-1783* (Leiden, 1995), for an initial discussion of the 1768-1774 Russo-Ottoman War. Ahmed Resmi was one of the first modern bureaucrats to spell out in detail the problems within the latter-day military organization. Rhoads Murphey has a volume in press on Ottoman warfare from 1500 to 1700. See also Caroline Finkel's work on the Hungarian campaigns: *The Administration of Warfare: the Ottoman Military Campaigns in Hungary, 1593-1606* (Vienna, 1988). Hungarian collegues are some of the leading scholars on Ottoman military questions, but they have dealt primarily with the conquest of Hungary in the sixteenth century. See, for example, Géza Dávid and Pál Fodor, eds., *Hungarian-Ottoman Military and Diplomatic Relations in the Age of Süleyman the Magnificent* (Budapest, 1994).

[4]Peter F. Sugar, "A Near-Perfect Military Society," in *War: A Historical, Political and Social Study*, ed. L. L. Farrar (Santa Barbara, 1978), 104.

undertaken on the imperatives of warfare, on the essential relationship between imperial choices and the control of resources required to conduct pre-modern warfare, largely because of the daunting size and linguistic inaccessibility of the Ottoman archives,[1] but equally because of an outline of Ottoman history that has resisted alteration.[2]

My research into the evolution of the Ottoman army over the period from 1600 to 1800 has convinced me that a different system of recruitment, parallel to the Janissaries, emerged in this period which was increasingly coercive, forced by the exigencies of war and shrinking borders, and drew from manpower overwhelmingly Muslim and tribal. This Ottoman military evolution is commensurate with what John A. Lynn, in a study of the army of Louis XIV, has called the evolution from aggregate contract ("off the shelf") to "state commission" armies.[3] I will illustrate the change by discussing three crises in the Ottoman context, crises which I believe forced the transition from the Janissary-style tributary-based army to the conscripted troops of Selim III (d. 1808).

Comparing apples and oranges[4]

My aim is also to place the Ottomans in a normative discussion of the limits and choices of pre-modern states and their armies. I propose to contrast Ottoman rule and its military transformation with other land-based empires in eastern Europe, specifically the Habsburgs and the Romanovs.[5] The period under discussion is crucial to the survival of the Ottomans, the emergence and dominance of the Romanovs, and the experiment in absolutism and eclipse of the Habsburgs in the politics of eastern Europe.[6] I will restrict the comparison to two aspects of imperial dynamics as a framework for the discussion of the

[1]The situation of the archives has changed remarkably in my own ten years of visits: in 1987, the reading room in mid-summer had less than ten visitors per day; by summer 1997, daily use had increased tenfold.

[2]That outline describes a golden age of the Ottomans under Süleyman I, then a long, slow, two hundred year descent into stasis and decay, and a re-centralization of the empire in the latter half of the nineteenth century, when the Ottomans were briefly revived by modeling themselves along western lines. The notion of "evolving internal dynamics" has generally remained foreign to that paradigm until recently.

[3]John A. Lynn, *Giant of the Grand Siècle*: *The French Army, 1610-1715* (Cambridge, 1977), 5-9.

[4]István Deak, "Comparing Apples and Pears: Centralization, Decentralization and Ethnic Policy in the Habsburg and Soviet Armies," in Rudolph and Good, *Nationalism and Empire*, 225-43.

[5]A rough definition of such "universal" empires would describe them as agrarian, with multiethnic populations, and ruled by a single dynasty, which expresses political sovereignty in personal as well as religious terms through the use of iconography and ceremony.

[6]Charles Ingrao refers to the period as the "Second Hasburg Empire (1700-1740)," the sub-title of chapter four of his *The Habsburg Monarchy 1618-1815* (Cambridge, 194).

military transformation: the geopolitical realities of warfare in the Danubian Basin, and the relationship between ruler and ruled, or, more explicitly, between a dynasty and the distinct multiethnic groups it dominates, those who are responsible for the success or failure of the military enterprise.[1]

The problematics of early modern empires, both east and west, are particularly stimulating in the areas of comparative military evolution and provincial survival strategies in the pre-Napoleonic age. Power exercised by early modern empires was determined by the ability of any one ruling dynasty to control internal and external violence. Crises that mark the history of empires often included attacks on political legitimacy, and exposed the fallibility of absolutist government. They could also exert a significant pressure on state resources. Warfare was at the center of these crises of absolutism, and a primary catalyst for change. My focus will be on the survival strategies of both ruler and ruled, and on the consequent changes to the nature of the empire in question.[2]

Geopolitics of "Europe's Steppe Frontier"[3]

The geopolitics of shared territories is an obvious starting point for comparison. The Danube and its tributary system are emblematic of the role rivers play in the vast expanse farther east as well, between the Pruth and the Volga. Rivers in and of themselves are extremely important to military strategy, and the Danube figures largely in all of the crises under discussion. A marshy river, requiring bridge and pontoon systems, the Danube was unnavigable in some parts, unpredictable in floods, and an incubator of disease. One of the consistent images of pre-modern warfare is the helplessness of soldiers, most of whom could not swim, retreating to and attempting to cross large rivers like the Danube — indeed, there were as many deaths, perhaps more, from drowning and disease as from wounds.[4] The

[1]As was recently noted by Paul Sonnino in reviewing a book by John Lynn: "Absolutism all over Europe depended on a pervasive fear of socio-religious disorder and a corresponding willingness to put up with one's local monarch, of which armies, diplomacy, palaces, and wars were merely the ruler's dividend, to squander in whatever fashion he thought best." "Review of *Giant of the Grand Siècle*," H-Net Book Review, [H-France@vm.vm.cc.purdue.edu], April 1998.

[2]Alexander Motyl, "From Imperial Decay to Imperial Collapse: The fall of the Soviet Empire in Comparative Perspective," in Rudolph and Good, *Nationalism and Empire,* 31-34, includes revolution as an additional catalyst of "crisis". See also Karen Barkey and Mark von Hagen, eds., *After Empire: Multiethnic Societies and Nation-Building* (Boulder, 1997).

[3]William H. McNeill *Europe's Steppe Frontier 1500-1800* (Chicago, 1964).

[4]In the 1735-1739 Austro-Russian-Ottoman War, 30,000 Russian soldiers died in the first year from disease: scurvy, typhus, and dysentery were among the killers, as well as plague — a majority of the 100,000 casualties were caused by illness in that war. In the 1770s, it was cholera that carried off many. William C. Fuller, *Strategy and Power in Russia, 1600-1914* (New York, 1992), 49, 112.

Ottoman chronicles are particularly evocative of this imagery in describing defeats on the Raab (St. Gotthard in 1664) and on the Danube (Kagul in 1770).[1]

Sufficient men and material to tame the rivers of this particular battlefield arena could be crucial of the success or failure of campaigns. The Ottomans, for example, built three bridges across the Pruth in 1711 under the very noses of the Russians. The bridges allowed them to surround Peter the Great's outnumbered army. In 1769, flooding of the Danube washed out the Ottoman bridge at İsakçı, delaying the crossing by several weeks.[2] Marsigli, the indefatigable soldier, diplomat, and cartographer of the Danubian territories in the late seventeenth century, rarely traveled without pontoons.[3]

All three political empires had to come to grips with border populations and unfixed boundaries, what McNeill called the "Steppe Frontier." Differing ethnic and religious affiliations forced the redefinition of legitimacy, with evolving circles of inclusion and exclusion. It was precisely in the period from 1600 to 1800 that these questions became a matter of survival not just for the Ottomans, but also for the Poles, the Tatars, renegade Cossack groups, and hosts of other ethnicities.

Military strategy could be influenced by the necessity of making compromises with native elites, be they settled or nomadic populations. One solution was to form ethnic regiments, sometimes as mercenaries, other times as regimental components of a centralized army. This was the more typical evolution of the central army of the Habsburgs in the period under study, from the use of German mercenaries, then Serbian and Hungarian auxiliaries, and finally to the formation of both an imperial and a Hungarian army, two-thirds of the latter composed of non-native soldiers.[4] The Russians experimented with ethnic regiments, but moved much more quickly than the Austrians to a centralized army, in part because they could do so. Pintner reminds us that the Russians advantage was simply in numbers: success was not dependent on technology or command, but was "...merely a matter of conscripting peasants,

[1] Rhoads Murphey discusses St. Gotthard in his forthcoming book; Aksan, *An Ottoman Statesman,* 53-154, includes contemporary descriptions of the flight from Kagul (Kartal) in 1770.

[2] See Aksan, *An Ottoman Statesman,* for the problems of campaigning in 1769.

[3] John Stoye, *Marsigli's Europe 1680-1730: The Life and Times of Luigi Ferdinando Marsigli, Soldier and Virtuoso* (New Haven, 1994), 75. Marsigli described the pontoons as sixty small boats on carts. Stoye also reproduces the marvelous drawing by Marsigli of his crossing the river with his Tatar captors, 35. Marsigli was briefly captured in 1683, but escaped.

[4] See the discussion in Jean Bérenger, *A History of the Habsburg Empire, 1700-1918* (Longmann, 1997), 40-46; Ingrao, *The Habsburg Monarchy,* 133.

feeding them, drilling them in the simple techniques of eighteenth-century warfare, and providing them with equipment supplied by a minuscule domestic industry."[1]

Habsburg and Romanov strategists also chose to establish military corridors, and to settle and employ distinct populations (such as the Croats and Serbs, or Cossacks and Tatars) in the border territories. By 1800, the Habsburg frontier extended 1,000 miles from the Adriatic coast to the northern end of Moldavia.[2] The Russians also had a series of military corridors, which were enlarged precisely at the beginning of the period under discussion, defensive lines against raids from Tatars and other peoples of the Volga region. The number of fortresses had doubled by the mid-seventeenth century, and the defensive corridors were realigned again in the eighteenth century as the borders expanded.[3] Both systems resulted in the gradual settlement, and occasional assimilation of border populations as a direct or indirect consequence.

The Ottomans in their period of expansion, especially in Hungary in the sixteenth century, had made use of the latter approach to the settlement of disparate populations on frontier territories. The strategy is less evident in the period of contraction, for obvious reasons. Ethnic militias made up the bulk of the Ottoman army by 1800, but the evolution of ethnic regiments into regular units of the pre-modern army in the European sense was a slower process. Contraction forced the Ottomans to adopt a defensive posture and a determination to preserve the border fortress system from Belgrade to Azov at

[1] Walter M. Pintner, "Russia's Military Style, Russian Society, and Russian Power in the Eighteenth Century," in *Russia and the West in the Eighteenth Century,* ed. A. G. Cross (Newtonville, Mass., 1983), 267. The piece was surely meant as a salutary corrective to overemphasis on the "military revolution" or on the "centralized, bureaucratic state". See also Christopher Duffy, *Russia's Military Way to the West: Origins and Nature of Russian Military Power 1700-1800* (London, 1981).

[2] Gunther Rothenberg's well-known works on the Military Border (*Militärgranze*) are encapsulated in his "The Habsburg Military Border Systems: Some Reconsiderations," in *War and Society in East Central Europe,* vol. 1, *Special Topics and Generalizations on the 18th and 19th Centuries,* ed. Béla Király and Gunther E. Rothenberg (New York, 1979), 361-92. See also Carol Belkin Stevens, *Soldiers on the Steppe: Army Reform and Social Change in Early Modern Russia* (DeKalb, III., 1995). Ingrao notes that the territories of the Banat in southern Hungary, settled after its surrender to Austria by the Ottomans in 1718, spoke seventeen languages as a result of the resettlement of the area. *Habsburg Monarchy,* 141.

[3] The number rose from 8 to 17 garrison towns. Stevens, *Soldiers on the Steppe,* 20. For a similar settlement in Ukraine, see John L. H. Keep, "The Army Takes to the Countryside," chapter 12 of *Soldiers of the Tsar: Army and Society in Russia, 1462-1874* (Oxford, 1985), 277-78, on the settlement of six regiments of Serbs (south Slavs) as *Landmilitia,* an organization disbanded by 1769. One could add Muslim Kazakhs, Karakalpaks, Bashkirs, Nogays, and, even later, other peoples of the Caucasus. See Michael Khodarkovsky, "Not by Word Alone': Missionary Policies and Religious Conversion in Early Modern Russia," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 38 (1996): 267-93; see also John P. LeDonne, *Ruling Russia: Politics and Administration in the Age of Absolutism, 1762-1796* (Princeton, 1984), 295-96.

all costs. Manning those garrisons was one of the most significant problems the Ottomans faced in the eighteenth century.

The Ottoman system of clientage with the border territories north of the Danube, a practice in place since the fifteenth century, was nonetheless continued. An attempt was made to exert more control with the appointment of select Greek/Phanariot families as rulers in the Wallachian and Moldavian Principalities in the early 1700s, once the local dynasties proved unreliable, but the effects of that change in status were deleterious, both to the military defense system and the local economy.[1] None of the three dynasties was particularly willing to share power with their new military forces, one of the causal factors of the multiplicity of rebellion in all three cases.[2]

Geopolitics and frontier ideologies

A further aspect of geopolitical influences on the military transformation was the question of political sovereignty and the religious affiliation of ruler and ruled. Persuading local populations of the legitimacy of a particular universal world-view was not an easy business in a region well-known for its slippery and syncretic religious identities. Competing versions of religious authority and propaganda could and did, however, influence the survival strategies of newly incorporated populations, be they Christian, in either Catholic or Orthodox rites, or Muslim. Military logic could also overlook the profound disagreements between Catholic and Protestant, or between the Roman and Greek churches,[3] the latter exacerbated by the end of the early modern period, when the Romanovs assumed the role of protectors of all their co-religionists in the Ottoman Empire. That story is well-known, an integral assumption of the historiography of the "eastern question". As another example, implicit Habsburg tolerance of Catholic proselytizing in the Military Border settlements was a major factor in a considerable number of

[1]Several articles on Romania in Gunther E. Rothenberg, Béla Király, and Peter F. Sugar, eds., *East Central European Society and War in the Pre-Revolutionary Eighteenth Century* (New York, 1982), 371-414, argue for the intensification of "feudalism" under the Phanariots.

[2]See the interesting collection of essays in Daniel R. Bower and Edward J. Lazzerini, eds, *Russia's Orient: Imperial Borderlands and People, 1700-1917* (Bloomington, 1997). The most famous instances are the Pugachev rebellion in 1773 in Russia and the Ferenc II Rákóczi rebellion, called the *kuruc war*, in Hungary, ending in 1711. An Ottoman version was the great 1807-1808 revolt against Selim III's reforms, which ended in his downfall and death.

[3]Consider, for example, the exhortation of the delegates of Emperor Leopold I at the Russian court in 1684, in an effort to convince Russia to join the Holy League: "Fight for the Cross of Christ! Lead your privileged peoples to destroy the cruel enemy... Occupy Constantinople, where your patriarch is forced to be a guest... Regain your seat of your church, where now idols reign." Hans-Heinrich Nolte, in an unpublished paper. The quotation is from a document in the Staatsarchiv Detmold L 114 A (von Blomberg-Iggenhausen, Nr. 737).

revolts among the Orthodox Serbs after 1699.[1] The closing of the frontier territory meant that newly incorporated populations had to clarify their religious affiliations.

Less well examined is the Ottoman context, where fixed boundaries, and the increased presence of Catholic and Orthodox missionaries in shrinking Ottoman territories forced significant compromises in the matter of Ottoman/Muslim political sovereignty in the Balkans after 1700. Migrations, external and internal, altered the ethnic mix in Ottoman territories in Europe, making it far more Muslim demographically than it had been before. Warfare and changing boundaries forced the relocation of Muslim populations, whose world-view was influenced by their dislocation as well as by the increasing volume of rivals' Christian rhetoric justifying imperial territorial claims. Such populations were distant from and far less attuned to Ottomanism, fertile fields for Muslim rhetoric.[2] The psychological impact of the abandonment of the idea of the "ever-expanding frontier" of Islam should not be underestimated.[3]

The contest between Ottoman dynastic aims and the reassertion of Muslim identities on the popular level required a reformulation of the

[1]See Rothenberg, "The Habsburg Military Border System," in Király and Rothenberg, *War and Society in East Central Europe*, 1: 366; also, in the same volume, see Wayne S. Vucinich, "Serbian Military Tradition," 285-324.

[2]Compromises in diplomatic language, and the move to a strategy of non-engagement are the most obvious manifestations of it. By 1800, the Ottomans had adopted survival techniques on the western front, including multilateral treaties, international mediation, and prolonged negotiations, trends which have been described by J. C. Hurewitz in "The Europeanization of Ottoman Diplomacy: The Conversion from Unilateralism to Reciprocity in the Nineteenth Century," *Belleten* 25 (1961): 455-66. In the 1606 Zsitvatorok treaty, an attempt had been made to require the Ottomans to refer to the Habsburg rulers as "Emperors," but the Ottomans ignored the clause. A powerful evocation of the change in the balance of power in eastern Europe is evident in the language of the Karlowitz treaty of 1699, where the Holy Roman Emperor and the Sultan of the Ottoman Empire are styled as their "... Most Serene and Most Powerful Prince and Lord Leopold, the Most Serene and Most Powerful Prince of the Ottomans and of Asia and Greece and his glorious predecessors..."

[3]Even on the eastern frontier, there were significant attempts at negotiation between the dynasty and various religious officials on the recognition of Jafari Shi'ism as one of the orthodox legal systems following the fall of the Safavids in the 1720s. In the end, four different attempts at negotiation failed, because the Ottoman ulema would not allow for the compromise. The language of the treaty of 1639 following the reconquest of Baghad by Murat IV (d. 1640) illustrates the posture: "... the most glorious Padishah who is the Defender of the faith, whose Majesty is as great as that of Solomon, who is the substitute of God in the world, and who has justified the maxim that 'An equitable Sultan is the shadow of God on earth,' ... the supporter of Islamism and Musulmans, the exterminator of heresies and of the polytheists, the Sovereign of the two Orients and the two Occidents, the servant of the two Holy Cities, the Treasure of Mankind and the apple of the age, who is protected by the Supreme Being whose divine assistance men implore, and favoured by the most high and propitious God.." J. C. Hurewitz, ed., *The Middle East and North Africa in World Politics: A Documentary Record*, 2d ed., rev. and enl. (New Haven, 1975), 1: 26. See also Robert W. Olson, *The Siege of Mosul and Ottoman-Persian Relations, 1718-1743: A Study of the Siege in the Capital and War in the Provinces of the Ottoman Empire* (Bloomington, 1975), for the later period.

ideological terms of empire which was resisted vigorously at the center. Islam as a propaganda tool for a secularized army was not reappropriated by the Ottoman household until the time of Mahmud II (d. 1839), and continued by Abdülhamid II (1918), once it became clear that Ottomanism was essentially bankrupt.[1]

Imperial aims, provincial realities

Any erosion of political sovereignty had an immediate impact on the relationship between the imperial center and its native elites. This second point of comparison among the three empires may, in fact, be more important, as loyalties to an existing dynasty were integral to its military survival. The Habsburgs ruled over a complex federation of well-entrenched nobilities, economically self-sufficient for the most part, but tied to an imperial center through a common mentality.[2] In the period from 1680 to 1740, the Habsburg model of universal sovereignty had its moment of fruition, even as more disparate populations were added to its territories. In the attempt to centralize and enlighten, Maria Theresa and Joseph II laid the foundation for the dual monarchy in the unification of Austrian and Hungarian dynasties in the nineteenth century. Roman Catholicism was the bulwark of their universal message: the preferred dynastic style was Germanic, although the empire was robustly multilingual. Military reform and centralization was accompanied by a gradual increase in toleration, making the Habsburg realms of the late nineteenth century the most liberalized of the territories under question.

Concessions to the nobility were very often predicated on mutual benefit: the Thirty Years' War, a watershed for the Habsburgs, also produced Wallenstein, who "...brought the freelance private sub-contract army to its point of highest development, after which nothing remained but for it either to disintegrate or to be permanently attached to some state." The war "... never seriously imperiled the governing classes. On the contrary, they emerged from

[1]Şerif Mardin, "The Ottoman Empire," in Barkey and von Hagen, *After Empire,* 115-28, esp. 119-20, where he discusses the proto-nationalist debates of the late eighteenth century. See also Virginia H. Aksan, "Ottoman Political Writing, 1768-1808," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 25 (1993): 53-69. Recent work by Hasan Kayalı, *Arabs and Young Turks: Ottomanism, Arabism, and Islamism in the Ottoman Empire, 1908-1918* (Berkely, 1997), and Selim Deringil, *The Well-Protected Domains: Ideolgy and Legitimation of Power in the Ottoman Empire, 1876-1909* (London, 1998), is recasting the general view of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

[2]A mentality that has been called "...a mildly centripetal agglutination of bewilderingly heterogeneous elements." R. J. W. Evans, *The Making of the Habsburg Monarchy, 1550-1700: An Interpretation* (Oxford, 1979), 447.

it with a new and powerful political and military implement: 'the standing army' composed of mercenaries, but permanently attached to a given government."[1] A century later,, confiscated Hungarian estates generously rewarded loyal ministers and generals. The peasant tax load quintupled in some Austrian territories over the same period.[2]

In the Russia of Peter and Catherine, truly vast expanses of territory and multiethnic populations in great numbers were added to the Russian dominions, and the construction of universal political sovereignty was intricately bound up with local military and administrative service and supply of men and arms. Centralization accompanied the creation of a "national," rationalized armed force in Russian imperialism. Peter the Great is credited with the revolution of the army, though the process was underway long before, under earlier Romanovs. The 1721 Table of Ranks, which included the military, had brought some coherence to the Russian administration, but it tied the nobles to service to the ruler without necessarily creating loyalty to the state. Catherine the Great's Charter of the Nobility of 1785 both liberated the nobles from servitude to the state and guaranteed their rights of ownership, and by extension, their rights over their serfs. Two "mutually exclusive and hostile" cultures were at work in Russia: traditional folk-society and 'a national culture group bound to the folk-mass by apolitical order on a class system."[3] Russification and adherence to orthodoxy were integral parts of the equation of later Romanov universalism; the army was the vehicle for a new synthesis.[4]

[1]V. G. Kiernan, "Foreign Mercenaries and Absolute Monarchy," in *Crisis in Europe 1560-1660,* ed. Trevor Aston (New York, 1965), 132. A recent study by Peter H. Wilson argues the case even more clearly: *War, State, and Society in Württemberg, 1677-1793* (New York, 1995).

[2]Ingrao, *Habsburg Monarchy,* 124, 135.

[3]LeDonne, *Ruling Russia,* 17-19. The Charter of Nobility was a confirmation of a manifesto originally drafted in 1762. Its significance is debated, and Isabel De Madariaga discusses both sides in *Russia in the Age of Catherine the Great* (London, 1981), 296-300. Fuller notes two things: the small size of the provincial administration (5,000 bureaucrats for the entire empire in this period), and the fact that the peacetime military *was* that administration. *Strategy and Power,* 97.

[4]The struggle over baptism by Orthodox missionaries and subsequent apostasies by frontier populations played itself out well into the nineteenth century. See Khordarkovsky, who writes: "Missions in Russia were part of a concerted colonization process directed by the state, and, as such, were subservient to government interests." "Not by Word Alone'," 292. See also Agnès Kefeli, "Constructing an Islamic Identity: the case of the Elyshevo Village in the Nineteenth Century," in Bower and Lazzerini, *Russia's Orient,* 271-91; as one later example, Muslim-born but Orthodox-Baptized Tatars of Kazan collectively apostatized to Islam on numerous occasions: 1802-03, 1827-30, 1865-70, and 1905 (271). See also Emmanuel Sarkisyanz, "Russian Imperialism Reconsidered," in *Russian Imperialism from Ivan the Great to the Revolution,* ed. Taras Hunczak (New Brunswick, 1974), 69-70.

While the Ottoman claim to universality was Muslim, in practice it was generally (theoretically) tolerant of multiethnic polities, even in dynastic terms. To become Ottoman was to assume a cultural, rather than an ethnic, identity. The perceived impartiality of Islamic law, however imaginary, exerted a powerful unifying ideology, and combined with sultanic law codes, accounted for the "amalgam of religion and secularism" that separated the Ottomans from other pre-modern Muslim societies.[1] Proselytizing was frowned upon, and though religious communities were separated by preference and by law, the reality was far more complex. The web of inter-faith and ethnic relationships that united Ottoman society in this middle period is still being untangled by social historians.[2]

The two centuries after 1600 witnessed the gradual creation and accommodation of new landed gentries, especially apparent in the final crisis of the era, when the Ottoman dynasty had to rely entirely on the provincial officials and elites for its survival. It was precisely in the conflict between the de-absolutizing process and the reiteration of imperial universality that the behavior and decisions of native elites became pivotal.

Imperial crises and military transformation

Those conflicts were particularly acute when exacerbated by warfare, which required the participation of the entire population on some level in early modern societies. As I have suggested, armies were the primary unifying instrument of such empires. Changes were wrought to the imperial endeavor by the control of violence, and, in this case, by the confrontation of these three empires on their mutual borders.[3] The military transformation that occurred in each of the three cases was the product of a specific imperial context and the geopolitics of the Danubian region rather then a sui generis "revolution" within the armies themselves.

[1]Karen Barkey, "Thinking about Consequences of Empire," in Barkey and von Hagen, *After Empire*, 102.

[2]New interest in an "Ottomanization" process of the eighteenth century is evident in the works of Dina Rizk Khoury, *State and Provincial Society in the Ottoman Empire: Mosul 1540-1834* (Cambridge, 1997); Beshara Doumani, *Rediscovering Palestine: Merchants and Peasants in Jabal Nablus, 1700-1900* (Berkeley, 1995) and, on Aleppo, Abraham Marcus, *The Middle East on the Eve of Modernity: Aleppo in the Eighteenth Century* (New York, 1989), as well as Bruce Masters, "Power and Society in Aleppo in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries," *Revue du monde musulman et de la Méditerranée* 62 (1991): 151-58. Masters is preparing a book on non-Muslim identities in the Ottoman Arab world.

[3]McCagg notes that "...strong supranational military organizations are probably advantageous instruments for ensuring political dominance in multinatonal regions." "Soviet Union," 52.

To illustrate these observations, I have isolated three crises in which to he survival of the Ottoman dynasty depended on an alteration of the imperial system. They fall at the beginning, middle, and end of the 1600-1800 period, and were generated by large military campaigns. The first crisis as driven by the Long War between the Austrians and Ottomans, roughly from the 1590s to the 1610s. The second was the crisis beginning in the 1690s and stretching to the 1730s, driven by the equally long war between the Ottomans and the Holy League. The third was the crisis driven by warfare in the years around the long Russo-Ottoman conflicts beginning in 1768 and ending (temporarily) with Selim III's reforms in 1793.

Habsburg-Ottoman contests circa 1600

The 1593-1606 Habsburg-Ottoman struggle in Hungary arose over disputed territories and unstable borders, especially on the Danube above Budapest. Rudolf II, Holy Roman Emperor, had at his disposal some of the best European mercenaries of the period: Germans, Italians, and Walloons, tenacious, if unruly infantry, with the latest in hand-guns and cannon. The Austrian army was contractual, relying on foreign mercenaries and the fickle alliances of the greater and lesser members of the Holy Roman Empire, with an imperial guard around the emperor himself. The conflict with the Ottomans re-awoke among Europeans the crusading zeal that had been distracted for the previous fifty years by the reformation. Though lengthy, at least in part because of the federative nature of Austrian efforts, the long confrontations managed to check the Ottoman advance.

One of the main issues of contention in the Long War was the vassal territories of Transylvania, Wallachia, and Moldavia (the Principalities), which turned to the Habsburgs for protection in this round of confrontations. The 1606 Treaty of Zsitva-Torok was a draw, and the status of the Principalities, once again Ottoman clients, remained the same. The language of the treaty reads like a straightforward agreement between equals; as there was not a tremendous dislocation of multiethnic populations, there was little of the posturing of later treaties concerning protection of co-religionists.

Ottoman military adjustments post-1606

The significance of the 1593-1606 war to Ottoman military history lies in the increased recruitment of the peasantry as regiments of infantrymen and cavalrymen, and their penetration into the imperial elite corps, the Janissaries.

The effective fighting force of janissary infantry and garrison troops in this period was probably about 50,000 infantry and cavalry: the palace contingent of some 10,000 made the difference in the Ottoman victory at the battle of Mezokeresztes in 1596. The ue of war captives and the forced recruitment of non-Muslims from the Balkans as a reserve for the Janissaries was still part of the Ottoman mobilization strategy, but was no longer sufficient to man an army of the size required of maintain a stabilized border fortress system and counter the increased firepower of the enemies on the western frontier.[1]

Country-wide rebellion and a major revolt by the Janissaries themselves against their debased pay in Istanbul in 1589 are indicative of the financial and disciplinary difficulties that now faced the Ottomans. The role of the timariots, of fief-style cavalry (*sipahis*), in this war is still a matter of some debate. The revenues extracted from their assigned lands no longer supported an individual soldier (this was true of the Janissary salary as well) and being called to campaign had become an expensive ordeal to be avoided. An alternative source of manpower in this war, peasants, often landless, were mobilized as *levend* into infantry regiments, because the Ottoman officials recognized the need for more firepower against European armies.[2] This policy of mobilizing and arming the countryside had the unintended consequence of generating a cycle of lawlessness and banditry in the countryside, which could be influenced by the cycles of warfare and peace of the later empire and was often taken advantage of.[3] The so-called *Celali* revolts which dominated this period were partially caused by the demobilization of both timariots and *levend* after the 1596 campaign, and the confiscation of fiefs of perhaps as many as 20,000-30,000 timariots who had failed to appear, or had deserted. Thus, the effort to restore some control over the system backfired in violent rebellion, affecting even the capital. Order was not restored until 1603, and violence continued sporadically until mid-century.

[1]The *devşirme*, or "round up" system was basically abandoned by the 1660s, and had fallen into desuetude long before.

[2]*Levend* or *levent* is the most common name for troops of this kind, also meaning both "bandit" and "warrior." See Virginia H. Aksan, "Whatever Happened to the Janissaries? Mobilization for the 1768-1774 Russo-Ottoman War," *War in History* 5 (1998): 23-36, for a fuller discussion of the trend.

[3]Karen Barkey, *Bandits and Bureaucrats: The Ottoman Route to State Centralization* (Ithaca, 1994), and Halil İnalcık, "Military and Fiscal Transformation in the Ottoman Empire, 1600-1700," *Archivum Ottomanicum* 6 (1980): 283-337. İnalcık refers to the *sekban*, similarly organized, and the predecessors of the *levend*. Both terms survive into the early eighteenth century.

New relationships with the periphery

In order to finance a new military system, the Ottomans began a process of devolving revenue collection to provincial bases. The reassignment of *timar* lands as tax farms accelerated the rise of the provincial gentry: the chief beneficiaries were the Janissaries, initially dispatched to the provinces to restore control, who gradually lost their vaunted discipline and esprit de corps and emerged as the most powerful of the countryside elites. Large parcels of land continued to move into the purview of the imperial household, with much the same result in terms of the creation of mediators between urban and rural power centers, who then themselves became the locus of power.

Janissary garrison troops were financed through the non-Muslim poll tax base, that is, the non-Muslim head and household taxes, which were controlled by the army treasury when on campaign. This system had numerous variants, but what is important about the Janissaries is that they were salaried, standing army, and the privileges they derived by registration in the muster rolls and possession of a pay ticket (*esame*) kept them in being as a military force, but one which remained difficult to reform.

Temporary local troops in this period were raised and paid by a combination of volunteerism and coercion. As in earlier campaigns, villages could volunteer and finance soldiers from their midst as part of their military commitment. Increasingly, provincial governors, appointed from the palace, were ordered to raise 1,000-2,000 troops (called *kapıhalkı*, or *sekban*) in addition to their personal retainers and entourage, financed out of tax revenues and their own pockets. The possibility of aggrandizement at the local level should be obvious, and it is one of the most significant provincial trends of the seventeenth century. All early modern contenders for empire had armies made up of these diverse elements — palace guard, militia, and mercenaries. Both Christians and Muslims were part of the Ottoman contingents. The military was evolving from a standing into a largely "volunteer" army, the use of the word requiring caution when applied to communal, potentially coercive settings.

Emerging Russian military power post-1600

The Russians, as contrasted to both Ottomans and Austrians, moved to a conscription system by the late 1600s, even before Peter the Great eliminated the outmoded and rebellious *streltsy* guard in 1699. The reform

was driven by many of the same imperatives as those of the Ottomans, especially the need for trained infantrymen (musketeers) in the Polish and Swedish Wars. There were as many as 55,000 musketeers under arms in Russia in 1681.[1] The Romanovs too had a mixed system, however, maintaining a mixed cavalry-infantry *Landmilitia*, which protected nomadic borders, and small foreign mercenary contingents. Peter's preference for foreign officers is well-known, yet the thrust of military reform after the 1760s was towards a national army, with de-emphasized ethnicity.[2]

The salaries and support system for the military placed a particular burden on the sparsely populated southern tier of the expanding empire, which was to be the site of almost constant warfare from the 1680s until well into the nineteenth century.[3] For the general war effort of the two great reformers of the Russian eighteenth century, Peter and Catherine, between one and two million serfs were conscripted. (Military conscription in theory meant freedom, but conditional upon a lifetime of service, commuted to twenty-five years at the end of the eighteenth century.)[4]

Russo-Ottoman-Austrian contests circa 1700

The next moment of crisis for the Ottomans, the period from the 1680s to the 1730s, pitted soldiers of all three empires on the Danube and Black Sea against one another. Emblematic Ottoman defeats, first at the siege of Vienna in 1683, and then to Zenta in 1697, in which Ottoman armies were led by the sultan himself (Mustafa II, d. 1703), were continuing evidence of the breakdown and inadequacy of the traditional system. A sustained crisis in the ruling household was fueled by revolutions taking place among units of the Ottoman armies. One solution was to go to war. Stoye adroitly notes: "campaigning on a large scale justified enlarging the army to a maximum, and within this expanded force it was easier to contrive a balance of power which

[1]Stevens, *Soldiers on the Steppe*, 45. Kiernan discusess briefly the pre-Romanov Russian forces in "Foreign Mercenaries," 136-40, where he comments: "Gunpowder helped to destroy peasant freedom as it spread eastward," 137.

[2]On the 1762 Military Commission, see John P. LeDonne, "Outlines of Russian Military Administration 1762-1796, Part I: Troop Strength and Deployment," *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* 31 (1983): 321-47.

[3]One quarter of the regular army, 27 regiments, formed the Ukrainian division of the Russian military in the mid-eighteenth century. Of those regiments, 10 were *Landmilitia*, 4 were hussar cavalry. In 1779, 52 of 114 regiments of the regular army were concentrated on the Ottoman frontiers. LeDonne, "Outlines of Russian Military Administration," 330-31.

[4]Although much has been done on the Russian army, the definitive work is still Keep's *Soldiers of the Tsar*. For the post-1800 period, see also Elise Kimmerling Wirtschafter, *From Serf to Russian Soldier* (Princeton, 1990).

subdued the more refractory elements,"[1] a very considerable argument for the regularity with which the Ottomans chose war over peace until the early 1700s.

There are a number of contemporary estimates on the size of the Ottoman army in the 1680s, even if unreliable. Marsigli's figure of 30,000 Janissaries and 155,000 provincial cavalry and infantry has been generally accepted, a figure which included the timariots, household militias and the Tatars.[2] The Danube proved essential for Ottoman mobilization and the movement of supplies, as in the previous crisis.[3]

The Holy League, by 1697 comprised of Austria, Venice, Poland, the Pope, and Russia, was slow to take advantage of the evident weakness in the Ottoman strategy and command. As one might suspect, the greatest problem in such a many-headed coalition also lay in command and the federative nature of the assembled force. Leopold I could raise only 25,000 men, even those representing inflated muster rolls. The princes of the Holy Roman Empire were less and less reliable. The estates were given patents to raise their own infantry troops; Poland secretly signed on to add 40,000 men.[4] The light cavalry hussars were made into imperial regiments in the midst of this war, in 1688, a Hungarian militia model (and distinctive dress) which soon spread all over Europe.[5]

The contrasts with the Ottomans is striking.[6] The Tatars were always in a clientage/tributary situation with the Ottoman house, increasingly unreliable in their loyalties, and riven by conflicts among various Tatar confederative groups. The Khan and his sons were paid considerable sums by the Ottomans as the raiding vanguard of the military system, and the Crimean Khanate had a princely status that no other group attained in the empire.

[1]John Stoye, *The Siege of Vienna* (New York, 1964), 30.

[2]Luigi F. Marsigli, *Stato militare dell'Imperio Ottomano. Etat militaire de l'Empire ottoman* (The Hague, 1732), 20-28, a work curiously imprecise and difficult to use as regards statistics, but full of interesting details and pictures of camp life and Ottoman ordinance.

[3]The Ottomans excelled at building and maintaining an intricate system of pontoons and bridges. Stoye, *Siege of Vienna*, 21.

[4]See Stoye, *Siege of Vienna*, 91 ff. Bérenger describes the size of the Austrian forces in *History of the Habsburg Empire*, 43. Eugene was outnumbered by two to one at Zenta, with a force of 50,000. David Chandler, *The Art of Warfare in the Age of Marlborough* (London, 1976), 302.

[5]André Corvisier, "Military Emigration from Central and Eastern Europe to France in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Century," in Rothenberg, Király, and Sugar, *East Central European Society*, 515-45.

[6]The contrast is a product of post-1699. Ottoman settlement policies in the Hungarian territories in the mid-sixteenth century resemble those of the Romanov. See Dávid and Fodor, *Hungarian-Ottoman Military and Diplomatic Relations*.

While it is difficult to distinguish them from other types of cavalry troops on the ground in this period, they were never incorporated other than as a wing of the battlefront, acting with an autonomy that was detrimental to any sustained Ottoman war effort by the late eighteenth century. For the Tatars, the relationship was always one of equality, no matter how unequal to the task they had become. Contemporary witnesses universally blamed them for the general routs of the Ottomans, as they tended to scatter at first fire.

The other tributary territories, it will be remembered, had their autonomy curbed by the first decade of the eighteenth century, as members of the Phanariot Greek community in Istanbul were appointed as the rulers of Wallachia (1711) and Moldavia (1715), a direct result of the "treason" of the native princely houses, especially Dimitrius Cantemir, in the Pruth campaign of 1711. One of the consequences was to reduce the size of the manpower contributions from the principalities, as they were banned from organizing their own armies, considered untrustworthy. The monetary and supply contributions to Ottoman campaigns perforce continued.

Among the peasantry of the Balkans in general, the Albanians and Bosnians held a unique position in the empire: Albanians historically served in the palace and were much admired for their martial traits, used in the early period as source of Janissary recruits, and sometimes as a curb on the Janissaries.[1] The Bosnian militia contributed 3,000 men to large campaigns on a tributary basis, allowing them considerable autonomy in their own territories. By the eighteenth century, both traditions had declined, the militia undermined by the changes to the tax farming system that had supported their regiments, the Albanian mountain men filling the ranks of the state commissioned militias as raw and undisciplined recruits.[2]

The Ottoman implicit compromise in the synthesis of secular and sacred was increasingly undermined by the geopolitics of fluctuating borders and populations. In previous campaigns, Christians had played an integral role, not just as local auxiliaries, mercenaries or tributary forces, but as

[1]İnalcık notes their distinguished record as part of the early empire: as many as thirty grand viziers were Albanian. "Arnawutluk," *Encyclopedia of Islam*, 2d ed., 1: 650-58. Rycaut observed that the Köprülü family of grand viziers had a security force of 2,000 Albanian *delis* (volunteers). Paul Rycaut, *The Present State of the Ottoman Emmpire* (London, 1688), 202-3.

[2]They were known as the "highlanders." See "Arnawutluk," 651, 656-57. Michael Hickok, *Ottoman Military Administration in Eighteenth-Century Bosnia* (Leiden, 1997), discusses the change to the financing of the militias. As with Bosnia, Egypt's Janissary garrison was obligated to send 3,000 men when called to campaign. They are often described as some of the best of the Janisaries of the middle period, although similar trends are in evidence in that contingent as well.

voluntary (or coerced) partners in the imperial enterprise. There were still ways in which they did: the fleets in the Danube ports generally had Christian oarsmen, and the supply fleets were captained, as one might suspect, by a mixture of Christians and Muslims, but a growing prejudice against non-Muslims as the source of fighting men is in evidence in this period.

Since records are insufficient and little studied, the difficulty of separating out Christians from Muslims among volunteers should be obvious. The prospect of booty, or just adventure, should never be ruled out as an inducement for service in early modern armies. I also think we do not have a proper handle on coercion and choices: sources that address the issue are generally colored with nationalistic fervor. One man's lawless *hayduk/haydut* (bandit in modern-day Turkish) is another man's admired revolutionary, or protonationalist. An interesting observation by a Janissary illustrates the problem. He reported that an estimated 50,000 Serbs and Croats, soldiers he call militias (*miri levendat*), joined the Ottomans during the 1711 Pruth campaign.[1] The famous Russian general of the 1770s, Rumiantsev, expressed what was probably the pragmatic military view of the Principalities. They were "similar to Janus, having two faces and two hearts and both are cunning."[2]

The rhetoric of inclusion on the Danube was not ethnic but religious, as a very late conversation between a journalist and young Slav-speaking villagers from Ochrid, site of Byzantine ruins, suggests. Asked whether or not they knew the builders of the ruins, they gave the following response: "The free men, our ancestors." 'Were they Serbs, Bulgarians, Greeks or Turks?" asked the interviewer. The young boys replied: "No, they were not Turks; they were Christians."[3] I am arguing for the split personality of populations in the Balkans, and also of nomadic and confederative peoples from the east, who, after 1699, were more adroitly manipulated and coerced by the Russians than by either the Austrians or the Ottomans.

[1]He may have confused them with Bosnians and Albanians as often happened, but the observation is intriguing, though the number is undoubtedly an exaggeration. He saw them arriving by ship at the Ottoman crossing at İsakçı on the mouth of the Danube. Hasan Kūrdī, [History of the Prut] Russian National Library, St. Petersburg Fond 933, TNSA Collection 155, folio 26b. Hasan Kūrdī describes himself as the son of a Janissary, and a veteran of many years' standing in numerous fortresses of the empire.

[2]George F. Jewsbury, *The Russian Annexation of Bessarabia: 1774-1828, A Study of Imperial Expansion* (New York, 1976), 8.

[3]Basil G. Gouranis, "Social Cleavages and National 'Awakening' in Ottoman Macedonia," *East European Quarterly* 29 (1996): 421. The date of the conversation was 1903. The equation of Turk and Muslim was an ancient one, and still vexing, to judge by recent events in Bosnia. "Turk" as a nationalist category was a product of the 1908 Revolution. The Ottomans would have resisted the appellation "Turkish," even though Europe insisted on it. The imposition of Turkish as the "national" language of the empire was part of the nineteenth-century reiteration of Ottomanism, its use made official in the 1876 Constitution.

A further problem in the Ottoman context was the insistence on maintaining the Janissary-style standing army, and the refusal to share the structures of military command with the nomadic populations and provincial gentry that were now the source of manpower: the militias and their local masters, governors, administrators of *sancaks*, and tribal chieftains. These were the emerging provincial aristocracies. The Ottoman central administration hated them as upstarts, outsiders, rubes. These "rubes" included Kurds, Cossacks, Tatars, Georgians, Circassians, and other peoples of the Caucasus, as well as the ubiquitous mountain Albanians. They had become essential on the battlefield. The eighteenth century witnessed Ottoman, Habsburg, and Romanov competition for the services of many of the same fighting men.

Fighting power for both cavalry and infantry in the campaigns of this period was drawn from this source, an increasing use of the *miri levendat*, the state funded militias. These were commissioned by Istanbul, but organized by the sub-provincial *sancak* officials, the *mutasarrıfs*, and rounded up for individual campaigns on the basis of six-month assignments.[1] A further monetarization of the economy forced the evolution of a tax farming system into a lifetime affair (*malikane*), supporting state endeavors by the annual auctions of potential revenues. Less and less of the revenue base was reaching the capital, forcing the sultan into minting and debasing the currency, and dipping into his inner treasury.[2] Provincial governors, called to command on the battlefront, who were often given large advances to support their particular campaign command, were just as often required to loan money to the government at the beginning of a campaign, and might find their estates and taxing rights confiscated if they refused or failed in other ways.[3] A special

[1]Halil İnalcık's "Centralization and Decentralization in Ottoman Administration," in *Studies in Eighteenth Century Islamic History*, ed. Thomas Naff and Roger Owen (Carbondale, 1977), 27-52, is still a reliable introductory assessment of the problem, although newer work by other scholars cited in this paper broadens the discussion beyond his Anatolian base. He calls the officials *mütesellim*, an earlier term for provincial tax officials which also occurs, with much less frequency, in the eighteenth-century documents.

[2]Linda Darling, *Revenue-Raising and Legitimacy: Tax Collection and Finance Administration in the Ottoman Empire, 1560-1660* (Leiden, 1996), and Ariel Salzmann, "An Ancien Régime Revisited: 'Privatization' and Political Economy in the Eighteenth-Century Ottoman Empire," *Politics & Society* 21 (1993): 393-423, both point to these trends.

[3]Benjamin Brue, on campaign with the Ottoman army in Morea (Mora) in 1715 on the Peloponnesian Peninsula, described the downfall of Ali Paşa, Governor of Karaman. Arriving in camp, he was stripped of his titles and exiled to a remote fortress because he brought insufficient troops to the front, and had spent all his advances on the estimated forty (!) women he had with him. Brue adds that Ali Paşa was about 60 years old. *Journal de la campagne que le grand vesir Ali Pacha a fait en 1715 pour la conquête de la Morée* (Paris, 1870), 2. I have seen numerous requests in the archives for leniency on the part of such governors and military contractors. Most complain of poverty, or of illness and old age, or that the advances from the sultan have not arrived.

campaign tax, the *imdad-i seferiye* was first widely imposed in the early decades of the 1700s, income designed to finance the personal military entourage of the governor and designated more or less as his private right. To give some idea of the growth of the number of *miri levendat*: in 1683, there were probably under 10,000 at Vienna; at Pruth in 1711 there were 20,000; and in the 1768-1774 Russo-Turkish War there were an estimated 85,000-90,000 men.[1] Ninety separate commanders were called to arms in 1768, most accompanied by 1,000-2,000 *miri levendat* troops.[2]

The Karlowitz treaty of 1699 had meant not just the end of Ottoman control over Hungary, the loss of a great swathe of territory, and the stabilization of the Ottoman-Austrian border, but also further demographic changes within Ottoman territories. The movement of Serbs, including the Serbian patriarch, from Ottoman into Habsburg territory is well-attested. The Habsburgs resettled many Serbs in new military corridors. Imagine a similar context in Vidin, bouth of the Danube, as thousands of Janissaries poured into and further destabilized what had become Ottoman border territory. The court records of the seventeenth and eighteenth century from Vidin indicate that most residents considered themselves Janissaries, or in some ways tied to the regimental corps. Attempts to regulate such populations were scattered and ineffectual.[3]

Ottoman strategy after 1699

From 1699 forward, two things characterized all Ottoman strategy on this frontier: first, an absolute insistence oh the restoration of border fortresses to Ottoman control, and a destruction of enemy fortifications, from Belgrade to Azov, and considerable investment in the maintenance of that frontier, especially a rebuilding program in the early decades of the eighteenth century. Secondly, the whole bureaucratic apparatus of diplomacy in Istanbul moved to strategies of peace which involved mediation and fixed borders. The humiliating Karlowitz treaty was couched in language which in the Ottoman version suggested that peace with infidels might be considered *jihad* by other means. That this was contrary to the basic premise of the empire is self-

[1]Hans Georg Majer, "Albanien und Bosnier in der osmanischen Armee. Ein faktor der Reichsintegration in 17. und 18. Jahrhundert," in *Jugoslawien: Integrationprobleme in Geschichte und Gegenwart*, ed. Klaus-Detlev Grothusen (Göttingen, 1984), 105-117. See also my discussion in "Whatever Happened to the Janissaries?"

[2]Mustafa Kesbi, *İbretnüma*, Millet Kiltüphanesi, Istanbul, Ali Emiri Ms. 484, folio 35b. Commanders were expected to have an escort of a minimum of 200 of their own household soldiers as well.

[3]From an unpublished paper by Rossitsa Gradeva.

evident. It is small wonder that there was a major revolt in Istanbul in 1703, as Mustafa II, who retreated to Edirne, was challenged by a new coalition of artisan, soldier, and religious leaders, disdainful of the attempt to mask the loss of political legitimacy.

The 1703 revolt was also a challenge to the Ottoman grand households, the centrally-appointed governors and their entourages, whose emergence in the countryside throughout the seventeenth century has been well documented.[1] Their competition for power in the eighteenth century was with local, native elites — what one might call, for lack of a better word, "new Ottomans' — some of them officially appointed, but most emerging locally, initially in service to the governors, then in competition with those very same hated central appointees. Both groups have ubiquitously been called *ayans*, but they should be distinguished by those who represented the older elite, whose palace training and allegiance to the sultan guaranteed the privileges of provincial appointments, and those proved their mettle in other ways, as contractors and tax collectors for the cash-strapped and soldier-needy empire.

The new Ottomans were mediators between center and periphery, whose power came from protection and camaraderie in small towns and cities all over the empire. They could and did build fortunes by negotiating the purchase of men and supplies through the system of local village and town committees, which often meant a collusion of the men of wealth and the chief judge of the Muslim courts, where all such transactions came to be recorded. These were the native elites who were integral to an effective military: Muslim recruits and their contractors in the *sancaks*, the *mutasarrıfs* — non-*devşirme*, non-Janissary, definitely not part of the sacred circle. The discontented ulema gave this new class the rhetoric of rebellion.

Reform under Maria Theresa

For the fifty years after 1699, Austrian strategy was preoccupied by controlling the newly-acquired Hungarian territories and by the challenges first

[1]Metin Kunt was the first to describe the empowerment of provincial governors for the earlier period: see his *The Sultan's Servants: The Transformation of the Ottoman Provincial Government, 1550-1650* (New York, 1983); Hickok's *Ottoman Administration* argues that the decline of the provincial governors was linked to the appropriation of the tax base by local officials as described.

of France in Spain, and then of Prussia in Silesia, preventing the Habsburgs from following up on the successes of Karlowitz.[1] The Ottomans strove to maintain peace with Austria while they confronted the Russians on the Pruth in 1711 and recaptured the Morea from the Venetians in 1715. When Austria declared war in 1716, Prince Eugene of Savoy was prepared to deal a crushing blow to the Ottomans, "to convince the Porte and Europe once and for all that Austria was now the dominant power in southeastern Europe and that Turkish presumptuousness would be permitted no longer." Confidence was high: estimates at the time predicted that 30,000 Germans would be sufficient to defeat an army used to flight rather than victory.[2] Popular support for crusading and confidence in Eugene were pervasive in the early decades of the century. In the event, the confidence was more than justified at Peterwardein and at Belgrade, both great Austrian victories. At Peterwardein, Eugene and Damad Ali Pasha were evenly matched, with roughly 60,000 soldiers apiece. At Belgrade, a reputedly 150,000- strong Ottoman force, surprised by 50,000 imperialists under Eugene, simply dissolved after the first hard-fought clash. Both territories were ceded to Austria along with Temeşvar (the Banat), the last Ottoman fortress on the northern bank of the Danube.[3]

The Habsburg eastern strategy then faltered because they underestimated Ottoman determination to regain Belgrade, and had become more fearful of the Russian threat to Austria's ambitions in the Principalities. That ambivalence colored all possible alliances between the two imperial powers and seriously impeded concerted military efforts against the Ottomans on the Danube and the Black Sea.

Singular failures in military command following the death of Eugene in April 1736 squandered both manpower and supplies. His brilliance had masked the weaknesses in the Austrian military system, which resulted in the surrender of the fortress to the Ottomans in the Belgrade treaty of 1739, a massive psychological blow to the Habsburgs. The following year, Frederick the Great of Prussia invaded Silesia, a challenge to Maria Theresa which she

[1]Charles W. Ingrao, "Habsburg Strategy and Geopolitics During the Eighteenth Century," in Rothenberg, Király, and Sugar, *East Central European Society and War*, 53, describes what he calls the development of a quadrilateral approach to war and diplomacy, in response to new regional challenges.

[2]Karl A. Roider, *Austria's Eastern Question, 1700-1790* (Princeton, 1982), 44. The confidence was expressed by Anselm Fleischmann, envoy to Istanbul.

[3]The casualties were lopsided: 20,000 Ottomans (includes 5,000 prisoners of war) to 5,400 imperialist. Chandler, *Art of Warfare*, 305. The remarkable victories were seldom equaled in the rest of the century. The Austrian central army numbered 110,000-120,000 throughout most of the eighteenth century, with an additional 10,000-12,000 troops of the military frontier. Bérenger, *History of the Habsburg Empire*, 43.

survived, but which prompted her to insist on a complete overhaul of the Habsburg military. Its organizational problems were compounded by the conservative outlook of the War Council and by continuous underfinancing.

The Austrians and Russians were both participants in the Seven Years' War (1756-1763), which the Ottomans only observed. The battlefields of that war, pushing the limits of pre-modern coalitions and communal participation, proved to be catalytic in modernizing the bureaucracy and army in Habsburg and Romanov circles alike. In the Austrian case, mistrust of popular armies was pervasive, and the continual negotiation with Hungary and the other princes of the Holy Roman empire militated against the creation of a national, conscript army. Joseph II attempted to impose conscription along with other reforms after 1765, but this was resisted in Italy and Hungary, where militia and mercenary-style forces persisted. Hungary had its own standing army after 1715, but the feudal levy (*insurrectio*), called up by Maria Theresa in desperation in 1740, was not officially outlawed until 1790. It persisted as a tax exemption from the Hungarian nobility.[1] In spite of masterful advances in the state bureaucracy, "rational military effort" eluded Austrian strategists, although the centralization of all military matters in the Court War Council (*Hofkriegsrat*) after the 1760s would eventually be effective in creating an Austrian national army. Aristocratic leadership, contractual warfare and preference for foreign mercenaries, however, persisted into the Napoleonic age.[2]

The 1736-1739 war was the last time that contributions by the pope and the ringing of the *Türkenglocken* helped to incite war fever against the infidels. When Austria's major challenge in eastern Europe became Orthodox Russia, populations were no longer swayed by Austria's role as the Christian bulwark against the infidel, certainly not in the last Austro-Ottoman war of our period, 1787-1791. Rather, "Orthodox internationalism" and Russian military strength fed Habsburg fears of the disaffection of the large Slavic subject populations under Austrian rule.[3]

[1]William O. Shanahan, "Enlightenment and War: Austro-Prussian Military Practice, 1760-1790," in Rothenberg, Király, and Sugar, *East Central European Society and War*, 91-92.

[2]Shanahan, "Enlightenment and War," 100.

[3]Karl A. Roider, "No More Infidels: Enlisting Popular Support for a Turkish War in the Age of Enlightenment," in Rothenberg, Király, and Sugar, *East Central European Socitey and War*, 147-56. The *Türkenglocken* were the bells rung in the churches at 7 am each morning to remind people to pray for a victory over the Muslims. Roider, *Austria's Eastern Question*, 78. See also A. V. Florovsky, "Russo-Austrian conflicts in the Early 18th Century," *Slavonic and East European Review* 47 (1969): 94-114. Florovsky's term "Orthodox internationalism" is meant to convey an idea or ethos rather than a conspiracy.

Russia under Peter and Catherine

Russia's Peter the Great had been the only holdout at Karlowitz. Joining the Holy League late, he was reluctant to call an end to the conflict on the southern frontier, hoping to find a foothold on the western end of the Black Sea to match Azov, which he captured in 1696. He misread the consequences of going to war with the Ottomans in 1711, and was forced to concede Azov after being completely outmaneuvered by the Ottoman forces on the Pruth River. The size of the Ottoman force was estimated at 140,000 infantry and 100,000 cavalry; if the actual number was even half that high, it attests to a continued commitment by the populace at large to Ottomanism, exemplified in its army, which had just emerged from a challenge at the imperial center. (Peter the Great had 40,000 troops: 33,000 infantry, 7,000 cavalry.) The role of the "treacherous" principalities at Pruth has already been mentioned.

Russo-Ottoman contests 1760-1800

In 1705, Peter had created the conscription system which lasted until 1874. The country was subdivided into blocks of twenty households: each block was to supply one twenty-year-old recruit every year. After 1750, Russia maintained the world's largest standing army, although its revenues were less than twenty percent of those of the French monarchy.[1] The majority of the conscripts were "Great Russian peasants" who proved to be ferocious in their plundering, such as at the siege of Ochakov in 1788, when 20,000-30,000 Ottoman soldiers and civilians of the fortress were massacred. Conscription was a form of "civil death." The consolation for the common Russian soldier, as for all pre-modern armies, was religion. "The popular world-view was bound up with all kinds of semi-pagan superstitions, and also with chiliastic longings for a 'just tsardom' — beliefs which clergymen and officers strongly disapproved of," but could manipulate.[2] Although Field Marshals Rumiantsev and Suvorov, famous generals of the Ottoman wars, commanded what had become a secularized, conscripted, and largely regimental army, the simple soldier required the solace of the icon of Mother Russia. In his famous *Science of Victory*, Suvorov exhorted the men to: "Die for the

[1]Fuller, *Strategy and Power*, 45, 105.

[2]Keep, *Soldiers of the Tsar*, 205-10. The Russian-Ottoman battlefields of the later eighteenth century were considered the bloodiest and most savage of all Europe.

Virgin, for your mother the Empress, for the royal family. The Church will pray to God for the dead. The survivor has honour and glory."[1]

Colonization of newly acquired territories meant the incorporation of new populations with heterodox beliefs, many of them the same ethnic groups fleeing into Ottoman territories. A new fortress line was built in the northern Caucasus, further closing the ill-defined border between Russian and nomad, between Orthodoxy and Islam.[2] By the 1770s, the civilizing mission on the eastern frontier involved a Russification process that recognized the separateness of the non-Orthodox populations, but required a final conversion truly to join the subjects of Catherine's Russia, even though Catherine's interest in her non-Orthodox subjects was enlightened for the age.[3]

On the western front, and especially on the frontiers closest to the Danube, the implication of the civilizing mission was that Russia was the protector of the Christian populations remaining subjects of, or somehow tied to the Ottoman House. It was precisely at this moment that many more native elites started to make choices. The particular example I have in mind is the revolt of the inhabitants of the Morea in 1770s, in the midst of the 1768-1774 war, fostered by the Orlov brothers and Orthodox priests, which failed in the end to rally the populace at large.

The two Russo-Turkish wars, 1768-1774 and 1787-1792 (the latter including a reluctant Austria from 1787-1791), interrupted Catherine's legislative reforms, created havoc with the Russian economy, and gave rise to opposition from noble and peasant alike.[4] After such an astonishing series of

[1]Philip Longworth, *The Art of Victory: The Life and Achievements of Generalissimo Suvorov, 1729-1800* (London, 1965), 217. The exhortation is to be found is Suvorov's "The Science of Victory," as part of the "Address to Soldiers in Their Language," composed in 1765, and reproduced in A. V. Suvorov, *Pis'ma,* ed. V. S. Lopatin (Moscow, 1986), 397-400. It was part of a soldier's catechism reputedly memorized by tens of thousands of officers and their men. Just so, the Austrians continued the use of the image of the Virgin Mary, called the *Generalissimo* of the imperial army, on all flags and standards. Bérenger, *History of the Habsburg Empire,* 42. That the banner of the Prophet Muhammad sanctified Ottoman campaigns is well-known; less well-known is the Ottoman adoption in the nineteenth century of the emblems and shields bristling with both eastern and western symbolism: see especially the work of Deringil.

[2]"Redefining the status of the non-Christians clearly reflected a change in the self-perception of the Russian state and its evolution into an empire... Non-Russian pagan peoples considered Christianity a Russian faith and Islam a Tatar one." Khodarkovsky, "'Not by Word Alone', 270. See also his contribution to Bower and Lazzerini, *Russia's Orient.*

[3]De Madariaga, *Catherine the Great,* 510. In 1764, Catherine abolished the Office of the Converted, which had been responsible for great brutality in Muslim communities in the name of conversion; by 1788, she had created a central administration for Muslims of the empire in Orenburg, a "Moslem Spiritual Assembly," which supervised the religious aspects of life.

[4]See Robert E. Jones, "Opposition to War and Expansion in Late Eighteenth Century Russia", *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* 32 (1984): 34-51.

achievements, the Romanovs failed to capitalize on the new society charted by Catherine. Her successors, Paul and Alexander, repealed much of her legislation, reinstated the supremacy of the military, and strengthened the hand of the Church in imperial affairs. As a consequence, Russian evolution to a modern, bureaucratic state slowed over the next century.[1]

Further Ottoman military transformations

The Russian victories over the Ottomans in the 1768-1774 war astonished Europe. It seemed as if the entire empire was on the run. At the battle of Kagul in the summer of 1770, Rumiantsev's better organized, but sick and exhausted troops dispersed an army perhaps five times their number after a battle which lasted about four hours.[2] When the Ottomans chose to go to war with Russia in 1768, they had to rebuild their own army. The victory of Belgrade, and twenty-five years of peace had lulled them into complacency, and the military was allowed to fall into further disarray. What had happened to the Janissaries? Some had become the power brokers of the countryside, in urban as well as rural contexts. Recent studies of Cairo in the eighteenth century have demonstrated just how long this struggle took, and how pervasive it was in imperial politics by the 1770s.[3] The Janissaries were a fictional fighting force. As an example, 30,000 names could be struck from the muster rolls in 1772 without a hint of rebellion.[4] Their entitlements had become marketable and were supporting the entire bureaucracy.[5] Fighting regiments were simply built on the road, once war was declared.

State funded militias were ubiquitous in the 1768 campaign, financed mostly from the sultan's purse directly, supplemented by other tax revenues: their mobilizers and commanders were not only the Ottoman governors and their households but also the new Ottomans I have been describing: the governors of *sancaks* (the *mutasarrıfs*). The importance of those individuals as the source of both finance and supply was recognized by perhaps the most

[1]Well summarized in De Madariaga, *Catherine the Great,* 587-88.

[2]A contemporary source estimated that no one fought more than half an hour. Aksan, *An Ottoman Statesman,* 152-54.

[3]André Raymond, *Le Caire des Janissaires: L Apogée de la ville ottomane sous 'Abd al-Rahman Katkhuda* (Paris, 1995), and Jane Hathaway, *The Politics of Households in Ottoman Egypt: The Rise of the Qazdağlıs* (Cambridge, 1997), to name two of the more recent efforts.

[4]Sadullah Enveri, *Tarih* (1780), Istanbul University Ms. TY 5994, folios 328-29. This was in the midst of the cease-fire of late 1771 to early 1773 of the 1768-1774 war, and at the end of the normal season of campaigning. The description says that all of the commanders of the various regiments and branches of the army were required to clean up their registers.

[5]One example is the grand vizier's estate of the period which contained enough *esames* for 600 soldiers. Ignatius Mouradgea d'Ohsson, *Tableau général de l'Empire othoman,* 7 vols. (Paris, 1788-1821), 7: 337-39. This is a subject which needs far more investigation.

astute grand vizier of the age, Muhsinzade Mehmed Pasha. It was he who successfully put down the rebellion in the Morea in 1770 with troops that had been mobilized from Albania in the fashion described, diverted on their way to the battlefront on the Danube.[1] He also rewarded such new military gentry with appointments to command on the battlefront. His, however, was a lone voice among the to other palace-raised commanders of the war, whose contempt for the "bandits" is palpable in the chronicles.

Albanians were everywhere after the 1770s — they were sent directly from the mountains to re-man the Danubian frontier, to fortresses like Ochakov (Özü), Bender, etc. There, they mixed with the nomadic forces of various Turkic and other ethnicities from the Caucasus, some of them refugees from lost Ottoman territories, most even less close of notions of Ottomanism. This is the mix that the Ottomans needed as cannon fodder, but refused to let into the sacred circle; they were seldom part of the ruling elite, which continued to draw its commanders from the sultan's entourage. Entitlement was serendipitous and temporary; the occasional commander during a campaign, a *sancak* with vizierial status, or Janissary status. In an age when everyone and no one was a Janissary, it meant little except admission to privilege and a license to plunder.[2]

Increasing distrust and a reluctance to use non-Muslims on the battlefield further limited the shrinking geographic range of sources of manpower. These latter-day soldiers were increasingly less willing to put up with Ottoman-style hierarchies: the battlefields of the 1770s are sprinkled with names like Çerkes Süleyman, Abaza Mehmed, and Dağıstanlı Ali, all drawn from the Caucasus, who expected a mutuality of respect alien to Ottoman dynastic objectives. This was not so much a new phenomenon as an increase in the proportion of influence wielded on the battlefield by Kurds, Albanians, Georgians, and Circassians among others. The consequences of

[1]Yuzo Nagata, "Greek Rebellion of 1770 in the Morea Peninsula: Some Remarks from the Turkish Sources," in *Studies on the Social and Economic History of the Ottoman Empire* (İzmir, 1995), 103-19, discusses the participation of the *kocabaşı*, the local *ayans*. Another study has examined the largely ineffective efforts by the central government to control Albanian militias: Yücel Özkaya, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Âyânlık* (Ankara, 1994), 76-79. The Albanian (and Macedonian) pillage of the Peninsula after the suppression of the rebels was instrumental in accelerating considerable immigration of Greeks to Anatolia, as well as stiffening local resistance.

[2]See my discussion of this problem in "Mutiny in the Eighteenth-Century Ottoman Army," *Turkish Studies Association Bulletin* 22 (1998): 166-25, concerning an Albanian commander of this type, Kahraman Paşa.

their dominance in Middle Eastern military affairs are familiar to students of nineteenth-century politics.[1]

Unity of command and the hierarchy of authority, reinforced by trust between officers and men, combined with a common understanding of the aims of the exercise, were absent from the Ottoman battlefields of 1768-1774 and 1787-1792. Coercion appears not to have been enough, though it increased throughout the period.[2] I think we cannot underestimate the powerful volunteerism that drove the landless and nomadic groups, which was reinforced by the practice of sometimes very large bonuses given on the battlefield for valor, battle wounds, and the number of men slain.[3] We should also not slight their dedication to the Muslim cause, which they saw the Ottoman household as denying and betraying. One of the greatest crises of this era was the loss of the Crimea in 1783, a psychological blow to the Ottoman enterprise which colored all the war or peace debates that occurred in the decade that followed. New pressure groups forced Ottoman dynastic consideration of reconquering the northern shores of the Black Sea, long after they were able to do so, and in direct contrast to the policy of wide frontier territories with clientage buffer populations which underwrote their imperial strategy.[4]

Financing war and the new gentry

Consistent underfinancing on the Ottoman side was just as important a reason for the disasters of 1768-1774 and thereafter. In contrast to the Romanovs and Habsburgs, the Ottomans failed to develop alternative means of financing war other than increasing the level of exaction from already over-taxed populations.[5] There were, however, alterations to this financial system

[1]"Abaza Mehmeds" are at the head of revolts throughout Ottoman history. These same source volunteered to serve as officers in Mehmed Ali's new army in Egypt well into the nineteenth century, which Khalid Fahmy notes, guaranteed the continuation of a "household-style" army. Fahmy, *All the Pasha's Men: Mehmed Ali, His Army and the Making of Modern Egypt* (Cambridge, 1997), 176-177.

[2]Further close studies of provincial towns like Tokat, in heartland Anatolia, or Sinop, the Black Sea port essential to supplying the Crimea, will tell us much of the ethnic composition of troops in the eighteenth century, and their involvement in the rebellions of the period.

[3]Aksan, *An Ottoman Statesman*, 153. Brue estimated that on campaign in the Morea in 1715, the grand vizier had handed out 250 purses (at 500 *kuruş* per purse) in that fashion by mid-July. *Journal de la campagne*, 29.

[4]As evidenced in the numerous naval and proposed and abortive land campaigns following 1774 until Catherine's outright annexation of the Crimea in 1783. See Alan W. Fisher, *The Russian Annexation of the Crimea, 1772-1783* (Cambridge, 1970).

[5]While banking systems, international loans, and the development of local industries gradually became alternative means of financing war, the fact remains that pre-Napoleonic warfare was ultimately limited by the agrarian revenue base of most of the participants. Ahmed Resmi, who visited both the Habsburg and Prussian courts, was struck by the frugality of both Maria Theresa and Frederick. See Aksan, *An Ottoman Statesman*, chap. 2.

which were instrumental in creating the new provincial gentry. One was the evolution to lifetime tax farms. Increasingly large, privatized tax farms became personal estates and absorbed territories which had supported garrison forces (*ocaklık*), such as the Bosnian militias. Often they belonged to absentee landlords, and their local deputies proved to be the ones to benefit. The other development, the imposition of the *imdad-i seferiye*, an extraordinary campaign tax, became the right not just of governors, but of the *mutasarrıfs*, who had become primarily responsible for supplying the battlefield with men and food. The individuals responsible for the tax farm and/or for requisitioning were often the same. For the recruitment of men and supplies, they acted as state commissioners (*mubayaacıs*), resembling the *munitionnaires* of the French army of Louis XIV, and often had large sums of money at their disposal to ensure the collection and delivery of the all-essential grain, or biscuit. This development has been traced in the case of Bulgaria, where local financial affairs were concentrated in the hands of these official by the 1750s. We need far more micro-studies of surviving local court records to verify the trends elsewhere.[1]

At the height of the greatest crisis in the life of the Ottoman dynasty, between 1787 and 1792, Selim III inherited problems which had been in the making for two hundred years, a system which had evolved military solutions to account for new social realities, but had not changed its imperial rhetoric to justify changing definitions of Ottomanism as driven by the composition of the army and potential "citizenry." In the midst of the bankruptcy and chaos around him, Selim III and his advisers did construct a new model army of the raw material I have described, but hesitated to push the reforms to their natural consequence, the destruction of the mythical Janissary system, or to a reiteration of the Muslimness of Ottomanism. Selim III's *nizam-i cedid* (new order) moved the Ottomans one step closer to a conscription system, and attempted a reordering of state finances.[2] Mahmud II succeeded in disbanding the old system within thirty to forty years (by 1826), but many of the native, non-Muslim elites had long since made their choices to take their loyalties elsewhere. Furthermore, the destruction of the Janissary privileges broke the

[1]Evgenij Radušev, "Les dépenses locales dans l'empire ottoman au XVIII[e] siècle," *Études balkaniques* 3 (1980): 74-94. Radušev describes the process not as the decline of the Ottoman feudal system, but as a reaffirmation of it: the trends in these two centuries "... conduisait à une affirmation toujours plus marquée de son caractère féodal" (93). I do not entirely agree with the interpretation, but the findings are definitive. Yuzo Nagata, *Tarihte Ayânlar: Karaosmanoğulları üzerine bir İnceleme* (Ankara, 1997), is a solid study of the largest *ayan* family of western Anatolia.

[2]Stanford J. Shaw, *Between Old and New: The Ottoman Empire under Sultan Selim III, 1789-1807* (Cambridge, Mass., 1971), remains the most complete survey of the reforms.

last the to Ottomanism. By naming the new, western-style troops the "Victorious Soldiers of [the prophet] Muhammad," Mahmud II redirected the appeal to a Muslim population, the bulk of his forces. The inherent conflict between a redefined Muslim Ottomanism in the army and an attempt to attract non-Muslim loyalties in subsequent *Tanzimat* legislation has been explored elsewhere.[1]

Some final points of contrast

Both Habsburg and Romanov strategists were successful in combining colonization and agricultural development in the newly-acquired buffer territories that came under their hegemony after 1700. Success was less measurable concerning the different ethnic and religious groups, but again, a degree of assimilation is discernible in both contexts. This was achieved in large measure by the military policies they adopted. Armies embodied the arrival of the new state's power: in the Russian case, many of the new settlers were former military men, or militias of local elites organized to guard the frontier. The Ottoman eighteenth-century army was both "parasitic upon and unsympathetic toward the plowing peasantry... Ottoman armies tended to discourage settlement rather than to advance it,' creating "agricultural vacuums."[2] Furthermore, they were fighting for the most part in their own territory, a condition which contemporary military strategists knew was a recipe for disaster.

Imbedded in the contradictory impulses of dynastic and universal claims of political sovereignty, especially in these three early modern examples, were the very seeds of their destruction. In order to survive, they had continually to make concessions to the native elites who were responsible for their continued existence. The elites in turn had to acquiesce to the particular religious and ethnic guise of the universal claims of the monarchy. Forging new alliances was considerably enabled by enlightenment rationality, but genuine progress could often mask the entrenchment of noble privilege. A further aspect of rationalizing warfare resulted in what LeDonne has called a "monumental contradiction": appeals to the "general good," the welfare of the entire society, meant "the ruler needed to frame policies favoring social differentiation and

[1]Şerif Mardin's works are fundamental to this discusison, as is that of Deringil cited above. An interesting discussion of the early terminology of the nineteenth-century reformers can also be found in Ruben Safrastjan, "Ottomanism in Turkey in the Epoch of the Reforms in XIX C.: Ideology and Policy I-II," *Études balkaniques* 24 (1988): 72-86; and 25 (1989): 34-44, using Russian and Bulgarian sources.

[2]McNeill, *Europe's Steppe Frontier*, 186-187.

economic liberalism, policies which... threatened to undermine the internal stability of the ruling class and destroy the very foundations of the ruler's strength."[1] This was true of the Russians and the Austrians. In the Ottoman context, the rewards were more fleeting, the rhetoric less satisfactory as the army continued to fail on the battlefield. In some sense, the Ottoman denial of class or status in anyone besides themselves did serve the opportunist, creating what I have called the "new Ottomans" of the late eighteenth century. Private localized consolidation of agricultural lands convinced enough men to stay the course for individual or communal benefits, until even that was strained by the disastrous campaigns under Selim III.

During the years 1787-1792, all three empires flinched. The Austrians proved incompetent and demoralized on the battlefield, and removed themselves from the Balkan arena for over a century. The Russians won more territory, but at a considerable loss to the progressive program and fiscal responsibility of Catherine. The Ottomans conceded enough territory to allow for the elimination of most of the no-man's zone dividing Russia, Austria, and the empire, but retained a considerable piece of territory in the Balkans which became the new "steppe frontier." One reason for Ottoman survival at all was the reforms that were begun after the disastrous treaty of 1774, but which required another half-century to bear fruit.

When Ottoman intellectuals discussed models for reform, they generally mentioned two: Peter the Great's military reforms, specifically in the work of Ibrahim Müteferrika in the 1720s, and Joseph II's administrative reforms, the latter particularly after Ebubekir Ratıb Efendi's investigatory embassy in the 1790s.[2] While we as historians have been reluctant to draw these parallels, the Ottomans themselves recognized the restructuring of their rivals, however imperfectly they implemented the models around them.

[1]LeDonne, *Ruling Russia,* 12.

[2]I have discussed the eighteenth-century reform literature in "Ottoman Political Writing."

BREAKING THE SPELL OF THE BARON DE TOTT: REFRAMING THE QUESTION OF MILITARY REFORM IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE, 1760-1830

One of the persistent and unanswered questions in the 'West against the Rest' debate embedded in recent world histories asks why the rest, including the Ottomans, did not keep up with Europe.[1] Why did the Ottomans not adopt Western technology, for which one is to read weapons, or clocks, when their own military systems began to fail them so badly after 1700? However unsatisfactory, there are now several alternatives to the stereotypes of religious obscurantism, conservatism, and backwardness most often proffered as the primary cause of the Ottomans' ineptitude.[2] Assumptions about the role of culture, in particular religion, in the military context, and the sources we choose as evidence when analyzing the reorganization of society, often prove inadequate to explain Ottoman history. This article on the influence of source and the debate on the relationship between reform and technology argues for multiple causality, and privileges the role of technical exchanges, or 'conversations',[3] over the hierarchy of knowledge and power embedded in Enlightenment debates about Ottoman civilization which persist to the present.

The period under consideration, 1760-1830, covers the transformation of the Ottoman ancien régime during the reigns of Mustafa III (1757-74), Abdülhamit I (1774-89), Selim III (1789-1807), and Mahmud II (1808-39), the last considered to be the architect of nineteenth-century Ottoman absolutism. The period also covers the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, when geopolitical and commercial systems were reordered in favor of the

[1]V. Aksan, 'The One-Eyed Fighting the Blind: Mobilization, Supply, and Command in the Russo-Turkish War of 1768-74', *International History Review,* XV (1993), 221-38.

[2]For some of the worst examples of the stereotypes, see F. Ajami's review of J. Goodwin, *Lords of the Horizon* (New York, 1999), 'The Glory Days of the Grand Turk', New York Times Book Review, 2 May 1999, p. 7. See also V. Aksan, 'The Ottoman Story Today', *Middle East Studies Association Bulletin,* XXXV (2001), which reviews some of the most recent histories of the Ottomans. The newest version is that of B. Lewis, *What Went Wrong?: Western Impact and Middle Eastern Response* (Oxford, 2002), which has a full chapter on clock and calendar. Particularly egregious is the conflation of time in his own work: he uses eighteenth-century ignorance to account for present-day backwardness (p. 47, on why the Ottomans did not have an Industrial Revolution).

[3]See A. Pacey, *Technology of World Civilization* (Cambridge, 1990) pp. vii-viii.

British Empire.[1] The Ottomans' struggle against European colonialism forms the backdrop to the issues discussed here, which are chosen in an attempt to penetrate beyond the long-lived stereotype of the Ottoman Empire as the 'sick man' of Europe.

The intellectual construct of the 'sick man' was a product of the debate in France and Britain about Oriental despotism. In France, the debate, stimulated by the work of Montesquieu in the mid-eighteenth century, operated on two levels of discourse: as a discussion of the nature of the Ottoman empire, and as a sustained critique of the 'despotic' French monarchy. Characteristics of Ottoman despotism included 'hypocrisy, baseness, licentiousness ... cruelty, violence, ignorance, and corruption'. Such a government was arbitrary; property was held at the whim of the sultan, and 'such a political system ... approximating a Hobbesian "continual state of war," defied the natural order, and the proof lay in its inherent chaos and instability.'[2] The construct suffered from a basic contradiction: how had a polity so contrary to nature managed to survive? Those who favored continuing France's long friendship with the Ottomans were just as often to be found in the pro-monarchist camp as not, and denying the despotism of either. In Britain, the pages of the Gentleman's Magazine reflected the Continental debates, and fed into the long discussion over the Eastern Question which emerged at the end of the century. The construct still serves as the primary interpretative device by which historians explain the decline of the Ottoman and Mogul Empires.[3]

The most pervasive intelligence about Ottoman technological decline came from the military adventurers - self-appointed cultural mediators, often double agents, rarely trusted by those they served - who crowded into Istanbul

[1]W. McNeill, *The Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Force, and Society since AD 1000* (Chicago, 1982); G. Parker, *The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West* (Cambridge, 1988). See also, *The Military Revolution Debate*, D. C. J. Rogers (Boulder, 1995). For the economic arguments about European supremacy, see J. L. Abu-Lughod, review of A. G. Frank, *ReOrient: Global Economy in the Asian Age* (Berkeley, 1998), in *Journal of World History*, xi (2000), 111-14.

[2]T. Kaiser, 'The Evil Empire? The Debate on Turkish Despotism in Eighteenth-Century French Political Culture', *Journal of Modern History*, lxxiii (2000), 18-22.

[3]E.g., see P. Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500-2000* (London, 1998), p. 15: The Mogul Empire was 'despite ... the sheer size of the kingdom at its height, and the military genius ... weak at the core ... Hindu religious taboos militated against modernization ... the caste system throttled initiative, instilled ritual, and restricted the market; and the influence wielded over Indian local rulers by the Brahman priests meant that this obscurantism was effective at the highest level.' In the last two decades, of course, the narrative of the Mogul Empire has been vastly improved upon, e.g., J. F. Richards, after Richards *The Mughal Empire: The New Cambridge History of India*: I, pt. 5 (Cambridge, 1993). Ottoman historiography has not similarly been enriched.

in the late eighteenth century. The most malignly influential of them was a Hungarian-born French consul, Baron François de Tott, military adviser to Mustafa III and, briefly Abdülhamid I, whose memoirs underpin every history of the eighteenth-century Ottoman Empire written since. His only rival was Constantin Volney, said to have been Napoleon Bonaparte's primer on the Middle East in 1798-9, whose writing on Syria and Egypt, with its vivid portrayal of passivity, indolence, and decrepitude, encouraged Europeans (and more important, their politicians), to think the Middle east ripe for the plucking.[1]

Eyewitness accounts of the Oriental Other played on the Europeans' studied ignorance. In France, Tott and others were encouraged by the foreign minister and a former ambassador at Istanbul, the Comte de Vergennes, to engage in the debate about despotism used to justify or denounce France's continued relations with the Ottomans.[2] In Britain, the public's understanding of the Ottoman government was determined by the work of Paul Rycaut, restoration gentleman and a veteran of Levant company service at İzmir, and originator of much of the language on the characteristics of Ottoman despotism.[3] Despite the flood of writings on the Near East published in the 1780s and 1790s, William Pitt the Younger's government was both ignorant of and uninterested in the Ottoman Empire, or the debates on despotism, largely on account of the decline in the Levant trade and the strength of the pro-Russian party in parliament. Thus, the British government underestimated the gift Selim III offered to them when, in 1793, he sent the first resident Ottoman ambassador, Yusuf Agah Efendi, to London, rather than to Paris, in a bid to challenge the overweening pretensions of France and Russia at Istanbul.[4]

The paradigm of the despotic empire was part of a larger discourse that assumed the equation of European rationality and interest in technology with progress. Europeans could not comprehend why the Ottomans, generally acknowledged as the rulers of an empire geared to conquest, had lost the

[1]See H. Laurens, *Les origines intellectuelles de l'expédition d'Egypte: L'Orientalisme Islamisant en France (1698-1798)* (Istanbul, 1987), pp. 180-2.

[2]Kaiser, 'Evil Empire?', pp. 17-18.

[3]Aksan, 'Is There a Turk in the *Turkish Spy?*, *Eighteenth-Century Fiction*, vi (1994), 201-14. Rycaut's work was *The Present State of the Ottoman Empire* (London, 1668).

[4]A. Cunningham, *Anglo-Ottoman Encounters in the Age of Revolution: Collected Essays*, ed. E. Ingram (London, 1993), pp. 57-8. Mehmet Alaaddin Yalçmkaya , 'Mahmud Raif Efendi as the Chief Secretary of Yusug [*sic*] Agah Efendi, the First Permanent Ottoman Turkish Ambassador to London (1793-7). *Ankara Üniversitesi Osmanlı Tarihi Araştırma ve Uygulama Merkezi Dergisi* (1994), 385-434, contains a great deal of information on that embassy. Selim III apparently read Yusuf Agah's report personally, to judge from the marginal notes (p. 420).

organizational and technical skills which had served them so well. Observers seeking answers could bolster their arguments with Tott's readily available testimony, and tended to ignore evidence advanced by more knowledgeable European sources as well as indigenous informants and representatives of local communities. Many of the latter two groups remained invested in and committed to both the ideological and economic status quo, although not by the end of the period under discussion.

Even now, two centuries later one cannot read recent work on the period without encountering Tott's writings, as the works of Andrew Wheatcroft and Jason Goodwin demonstrate. Wheatcroft, after recounting one of Tott's tales, continues in this fashion: 'The sacred laws of Islam, were, by definition, incapable of improvement, and the Ottoman government, which was the political expression of those laws, was also immutable.' Or as Goodwin begins a chapter: 'By the eighteenth century, the calcifying empire appeared encrusted with peculiar polities that had grown up in the vacuum of initiative.'[1]

Hence, an examination of Tott's construction, especially his comments on the Ottoman artillery corps, anchors this discussion of the representation of Ottoman military reform. The article analyses alternative ways of viewing military information systems and exchanges among eastern and Western societies, using the Ottomans as an example. Adaptive strategies in particular settings were just as important, if not more so, to the evolution of Ottoman society as the religious message embedded in the debate between Christians and Muslims.

In order to set aside the question of economics, one must acknowledge that the Ottoman Empire, an agrarian society similar to its neighbor, Russia, pursued inherently 'economical' policies. In the decade 1760-70, the East India Company had spent £8 million on the Sepoy army of India, numbering 4,000 British officers and 26,000 natives by 1770. By contrast, Mustafa III's budget in 1768 probably was between 20 to 30 million kuruş (or £2 to 3 million - 9-10 kuruş/£, or 4 kuruş per Venetian ducat) at the beginning of the Russo-Ottoman War, an estimation of twice the known annual revenues of the Ottomans before and after the war.[2]

[1]Goodwin, *Lords of the Horizons*, p. 269; A. Wheatcroft, *The Ottomans* (London, 1993), p. 69. See N. Berkes' satiric comment on this point of view, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey* (Montreal, 1964), pp. 68-9.

[2]The term 'econocidal' belongs to B. P. Lenman, 'The Transition to European Military Ascendancy in India, 1600-1800', in *Tools of War: Instruments, Ideas, and Institutions of Warfare, 1445-1871*, ed. J. A. Lynn (Boulder, 1990), pp. 108, 119; M. Genç, 'L'économie ottomane et la guerre du XVIIIe siècle', *Turcica*, xxvii (1995), 190. See Ş. Pamuk, *A Monetary History of the Ottoman Empire* (Cambridge, 2000), pp. 163-71 for the exchange rate, and discussion of the finances of the period. In addition, the indemnity to Russia after 1774 was 7.5 million kuruş, half of the projected Ottoman revenue: Y. Cezar, *Osmanlı Maliyesinde Bunalım ve Değişim Dönemi* (Istanbul, 1986), p. 76.

Selim III found his coffers empty when he ascended the throne in 1789 largely because of the unsuccessful war the empire was fighting with Russia. Both he and Mahmud II struggled to remain financially independent of the great powers, though their successors did not. To the extent that military fiscalism — the ability to harness a state's economy to its geopolitical goals - accounts for Britain's success in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the lack of the money to invest in the latest weapons, or even to pay the wages of a large standing army, partly explains the Ottomans' failure. In Allan Cunnigham's words: 'Beneath the defeats inflicted by Russia between 1774 and 1829, and the search for a reliable European ally during the Napoleonic age, lay an impoverishing contest between a desperate central government in Constantinople and a kaleidoscope of regional interests frustrating its pursuit of greater control over the scale and regularity of state income.'[1]

Even as the Ottomans lost on the battlefield, they were keen to rebuild the artillery corps; to adopt the new weapons crucial to victory. This was no less true in the eighteenth than in the seventeenth century. The transformation to a disciplined and standardized Western-style military, however, would take decades of debate and a reworking of the Ottomans' definition of themselves. The Western technical challenge occurred simultaneously with the challenge from the peripheries to 'Ottomanism' itself. Normally applied to the mid-nineteenth century, to the merging alternatives to Ottoman citizenship (pan-Turkism, pan-Islamism, Greek or Armenian nationalism), the term is used here to describe the 'connectedness' among peripheral élites in the latter half of the eighteenth century, as the imperial government increasingly relied on provincial power centers for survival. The 'Ottomanism' of the eighteenth century was far more inclusive and heterodox, though rigorously challenged, than that of the nineteenth century, which was recast by Mahmud II as Turkish and (Sunni) Muslim. Nationalist historiography has ignored that possibility in its retelling of the turn-of-the century narrative.

Tott and his disciples, imbued with their own progressive, superior view of the world, were neither able to recognize that Ottoman resistance to

[1]A. Cunningham, *Eastern Questions in the Nineteenth Century: Collected Essays*, ed. E. Ingram (London, 1993), p. 87.

social and cultural change might have had causes other than religious fanaticism, nor to distinguish between what was said to them and what was meant. Evocations of Islam and the Prophet served as public rhetoric in a debate that became more vociferous as frontiers contracted, and heterodox voices, Muslim and non-Muslim, began to challenge the center.[1] Embedded in the discourse was a contest over governance and ideology. Cunningham agrees that nowhere do the contemporary Ottoman sources imply that 'refurbishing an Islamic imperium with borrowed, infidel technology presented serious moral dilemmas for those in authority.'[2]

The increasing numbers of studies of Ottoman lives and writing make it easier to imagine that the imperial bureaucracy both recognized the necessity of importing, or manufacturing, what they saw merely as weapons, while remaining wedded to the cultural system of which they were the principal beneficiaries. A similar problem confronted Peter I and Catherine II of Russia, and every other military reformer of the period. Only belatedly did Ottoman bureaucrats recognize the social and cultural costs of adopting Western military systems, beginning with the discipline required of conscripted and regimented troops, and ending with the destruction of the vast, if imperfectly distributed, social welfare system of the Janissaries: a muster roll of close to half a million men, who were paid a fee per man. Probably 1 in 10 were actual fighting forces.[3] The destruction of the janissary army, and its replacement in 1826 with a 'citizens' army', signaled the arrival of an Ottoman absolutism, based on a more rigorously defined (Turkish and Muslim) citizenship. Hence, the military reforms of Mustafa III and his successors ultimately undermined a centuries-old way of life, and hence their resemblance to the reforms begun in Russia under Peter I.

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Our information about Ottoman military reform derives largely from foreigners such as Tott, members of the 'clan interventionniste' in French

[1]That a similar process occurred precisely in the some period in the Mogul Empire has recently been highlighted by Richards, *Mughal Empire*, pp. 296-7, and discussed by C. A. Byly, 'The First Age of Global Imperialism, c. 1760-1830', *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, xiv (1998), 28-47 and 'India and West Asia c. 1700-18304, *Asian Affairs*, xix (1988), 3-19.

[2]Cunningham, *Anglo-Ottoman Encounters*, p. 61.

[3]See D. B. Ralston, *Importing the European Army: The Introduction of European Military Techniques and Institutions into the Extra-European World, 1600-1914* (Chicago, 1996), chs. 3-4; V. Aksan, 'Whatever Happened to the Janissaries? Mobilization for the 1768-74 Russo-Ottoman War', *War in History*, xv (1998), 23-36.

political circles who advocated the penetration of the Ottoman Orient. Tott's *Memoirs*, published in French in 1784-5, English in 1785, and German in 1787-8, were an immediate best-seller throughout Europe and influenced Maurice de Talleyrand to promote Napoleon's invasion of Egypt in 1798[1]. Tott's career is well known, owing to the increasing interest in the influence of the eighteenth-century Hungarian intellectual élite on Europe generally.[2]

Tott was the son of a Hungarian gentleman, András Tóth (or Tott), who fled Hungary after the collapse of the Rákóczy rebellion in 1711, and found refuge in Ottoman territory in present-day Romania with Miklós Bencsényi, one of the rebellion's leaders. Tott joined the Berchény hussars (commanded by László Bercsényi, son of Miklós) in France in 1720, where his own son François was born in 1733. François joined the hussar regiment at age ten, and accompanied his father to Constantinople in 1755, in the entourage of the new ambassador, Vergennes, to learn Turkish. Though the father died in Constantinople in 1757, the son remained there throughout the Seven Years War. Returning to France, he was appointed French consul to the Crimean Tatar Khan in 1767. That is when he began to offer advice to the sultan. His ostensible mission was the inspection of French trading posts; his secret mission was to stimulate the Ottomans to go to war against Russia over Poland.

Although the *Memoirs* begin in 1767, when Tott first visited the Crimea, his connection with Mustafa III only began three years later when he was hired to rebuild and rearm the forts along the Dardanelles, after the

[1]See H. Laurens, *L'orientalisme Islamisant en France*, ch. 11, for the reading habits of the Napoleonic generation, The *Memoirs* had a long publishing history. A four-volume edition was published in French in Amsterdam in 1784-5 (*Mémoires du baron de Tott sur les turcs et les tartares*); a second French edition appeared in 1786. The latter included a critique by Louis Charles de Peyssonnel (1727-90) called *Lettre de M. Peyssonnel*. Two English editions appeared in London in 1785, one published by Jarvis, the other by Robinson (used here in the version reprinted by the Arno Press, *Memoirs of Baron de Tott* [New York, 1973]). A second edition of the Robinson version was published in 1786, with the English version of Peyssonnel's criticism as an appendix. The *Memoirs* were also published in Dublin in three volumes in 1785, and in a German translation in Frankfurt, in two volumes, in 1787-8. An English review appeared in *Gentleman's Magazine*, lv (1785), 372-4, with extracts, 636-6; likewise, a review of Peyssonnel in *Gentleman's Magazine*, lvi (1786), 411. His *Lettre* was also published separately by T. Hookham as *An Appendix to the Memoirs of Baron de Tott* (London, 1786), the version used here.

[2]The discussion of Tott draws on V. Aksan, 'Enlightening the Ottomans: Mustafa III and Tott', in *International Congress on Learning and Education in the Ottoman World*, ed. A. Çaksu (Istanbul, 2001), pp. 163-174. See also, A. Boppe, 'La France et le "militaire turc" au XVIII[e] siècle', *Feuilles d'histoire* (1912), 386-402, 490-501; M. Kaçar, 'Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Askeri Teknik Eğitimde Modernleşme Çalışmaları ve Mühendishanelerin kuruluşu (1808'e Kadar)', *Osmanlı Bilimi Araştırmaları*, ii (1998), 69-137; F. Hitzel, *Relations interculturels et scientifiques entre l'Empire Ottoman et les pays de l'Europe occidentale 1453-1839* (Ph.D. dissertation, Paris-Sorbonne, 1995), and *Le Rôle des militaires français à Constantinople (1784-98)* (MA dissertation, Paris-Sorbonne, 1987).

Russian fleet had defeated the Ottoman fleet at the battle of Çeşme. Although he remained in French service, the Ottomans contracted him sporadically until 1775. Returning to France, he was sent to the Middle East again in 1777 on a mission to inspect the other French consulates throughout the Mediterranean, and to report on the feasibility of invading Egypt. He returned after eighteen months. His memoirs were published almost five years later.[1]

A short piece of gossip in the *Gentleman's Magazine* of 1786 told its readers that Tott had been committed to the Bastille, 'where it is in general believed he will be made a sacrifice, notwithstanding his great interest at court, to the resentment of the Porte'.[2] The gossip hints at the suspicion that must have faced Tott on his return from the Middle East that his work for the Ottomans had been treasonous. He died in Hungary in 1793.

Tott could not detect the social changes under way in the empire, because his own attitudes hid them from him. Here is a brief sample of his style of presenting himself as a brilliant amateur and the Ottomans as buffoons. Between 1770 and 1772, the Ottomans asked Tott to train artillerymen at Istanbul and to improve the casting of cannons. He both implies that they tried to cast brass cannon using a process and furnaces suited only to iron, and confesses his own ignorance: 'I had never seen a foundry thus the Memoirs of Saint Remi [*sic*] and the *Encyclopédie* were my constant guides.' He succeeded, nonetheless, in 'casting 20 pieces of cannon ... which surprised and enchanted the Turks ... and astonished nobody so much as myself'.[3]

Tott abhorred what he described as the stupidity and cupidity of the Ottoman officer corps, and was contemptuous of the quality of the rank and file:

[1]F. Tóth, 'Voltaire et un diplomate français d'origine hongroise en Orient', *Cahiers d'études hongroises*, vii (1995), 78-86. Tott's brother, André Tott, was at St Petersburg at the time. With the outbreak of war in 1768, he was expelled, after Catherine had been made aware of secret correspondence between André and François implicating them both (and France) in inciting the Ottomans. On the diplomacy of the period, see A. I. Bağış, *Britain and the Struggle for the Integrity of the Ottoman Empire: Sir Robert Ainslie's Embassy to Istanbul, 1776-94* (Istanbul, 1984). On Vergennes, see R. Salomon, *La Politique Orientale de Vergennes, 1780-4* (Paris, 1935) and L. Bonneville de Marsangy, *Le Chevalier de Vergennes: son ambassade à Constantinople* (Paris, 1935) and L. Bonneville de Marsangy, *Le Chevalier de Vergennes: son ambassade à Constantinople* (Paris, 1894). For earlier periods, see F. Saint-Priest, *Mémoires sur l'ambassade de France en Turquie et sur le commerce des Français dans le Levant* (Paris, 1877); L. Pingaud, *Choiseul-Gouffier: La France en Orient sous Louis XVI* (Paris, 1887).

[2]*Gentleman's Magazine*, lvi (1786), pt. 2. 704.

[3]For St Rémy, see S. de St Rémy, *Memorial de l'Artillerie* (Paris, 1693; Amsterdam, 1702); Tott, *Memoirs*, ii, pt. 2.116-19.

> To the haughty ignorance of the generals was added the stupid presumption of the subalterns; and the Turks, who took the field with a prodigious train of artillery, but which consisted of pieces ill mounted, and full as badly served, slaughtered in every action by the cannon of their enemies, could only avenge themselves for their disasters by accusing the Russians of cowardly artifice. They overpower us, said they, by the superiority of their fire, which, in fact, it is impossible to approach; but let them leave their abominable batteries, and, encounter us like brave men hand to hand, and we shall soon see whether these infidels can resist the slaughtering sabre of the true-believers. This multitude of wretched fanaticks even reproached the Russians for having attacked them during the holy season of Ramadan.[1]

Tott's *Memoirs* were a phenomenal success partly because such adventures suited the tastes of a rapidly expanding reading public in Europe. They cap a century of fictional fascination with the East, exemplified in such works as Montesquieu's *Lettres persanes* and the *Letters Writ by a Turkish Spy*, published in twenty-five editions during the eighteenth century.[2] A nineteenth-century biographer of Tott attributes his success to publishing first, ahead of rival accounts by A. H. Anquetil-Duperron and Volney, and to the 'abundance and novelty of the notions and opinions that he presented about the history, customs and institutions of the Turks'. He 'should be credited with dispelling with exactitude ...and often with impartiality' the European myths concerning the Ottoman Empire.[3] Reviews at the time of publication noted: 'In these memoirs of his transactions, [Tott] has given many melancholy instances of the ignorance, cowardice, tyranny, injustice, and supineness of the Turks, as well as many striking proofs of the unlimited confidence reposed in him by his employers'.[4]

The story from the memoirs reproduced most often goes as follows: having trained fifty gunners at Kağıthane on the Golden Horn, Tott put them through their paces in front of the grand vizier, possibly Silâhdar Mehmed (1771-4) and an estimated ten thousand spectators. After the artillerymen had demonstrated a discharge rate of five rounds a minute, the following exchange took place. The treasurer (*defterdar*), possibly İsmetî Ali, asked Tott what the rammers were made of. He, perhaps rightly spotting a set-up, replied: 'Hair.' İsmetî Ali then asked, 'What sort of hair?', to which Tott answered 'Pig's

[1]Tott, *Memoirs*, ii, pt. 3.9-10, 114, 116-19.

[2]See Aksan, 'Is There a Turk?', pp. 201-14.

[3]J. C. F. Hoefer, from *Nouvelle biographie générale* (1852), excerpted and reprinted in *Archives biographiques françaises*: II (New Providence, NJ, 1993-), fiche no. 994, 159. See A. H. Anquetil-Duperron, *Législation orientale* (Amsterdam, 1788); and C. F. C. Volney, *Considérations sur la guerre des Russes et Turcs* (London, 1788).

[4]*Gentleman's Magazine*, lv (1785), 373.

hair.' A huge cry arose from the crowd: 'God forbid!' Tott asked a painter in the crowd what he used when painting mosques, to receive the answer pigs' bristles, which he acknowledged leaves hair on the walls. 'If then bristles do not defile your mosques,' Tott exclaimed, 'it cannot surely be improper to make use of them against your enemies!' This led the multitude to exclaim, 'Praise be to God!'.[1]

The book's popularity, as illustrated by this anecdote, is attributable as much to the entertaining stories as to the information about the Ottomans it supplies. The stories generally compliment the raconteur and discredit his hosts. The same year, Rudolf Erich Raspe published a fictional account of a similar adventurer, *The Travels and Surprising Adventures of Baron Munchausen*, with similar success. In fact, Tott figures in the satire as a rival to Munchausen, who would not be outdone by Tott in firing the largest cannon in the world.[2] One should not be surprised that the only other ostensible autobiography of an Ottoman military adviser, by the Comte de Bonneval (Humbaracı Ahmed Pasha), who rebuilt the Ottoman Mortar corps, though published anonymously in 1750, is also a work of fiction.[3] While there is no doubt that Tott did advise the Ottomans about how to improve their artillery, the *Memoirs* appeared in the midst of much imaginative rendering of the East, and have to be used with skepticism and only when corroborated.

As the first eyewitness to publish so voluminously on the Ottomans, it is small wonder that few of Tott's contemporaries doubted his accuracy. Even Voltaire mentioned him several times in his voluminous correspondence. In 1773, for instance, he warned Catherine II to drive the Ottomans out of Europe at once, as 'I am a little afflicted, as a Frenchman, to hear said that there is a chevalier de Tott who is fortifying the Dardanelles.' Voltaire dubbed Tott 'Protector of Moustapha and the Koran', though, as always with Voltaire, one cannot be sure he was not being ironic.[4] If he was not being, however, he neatly illustrates the conflicting interests of the French intellectual élite and the French state.

[1]Tott, *Memoirs*, ii, pt. 3. 85-90. Tott used two 4-pounder Russian guns for the exercise (p. 83).
[2]L. Wolff, *Imagining Eastern Europe: The Map of Civilization and the Mind of the Enlightenment* (Stanford, 1994), pp. 100-6, 359.
[3]*Memoirs of the Bashew Count Bonneval, From His Birth to His death: Shewing the Motives which Induced him to Quit the Service and Dominions of France...* (London, 1750); also published in French.
[4]Wolff, *Imagining Eastern Europe*, p. 218.

The only informed critique of the *Memoirs* was written by Louis Charles de Peyssonnel, French consul in the Crimea and, later, at İzmir, who reproached Tott for misrepresenting the Ottomans' military technology. Peyssonnel noted:

> I cannot believe it to be throughout, such as it is published, by Baron de Tott, because there are faults that could not have been committed by a man of his education and parts who has so long and so advantageously seen the Turks ... The Turks have no iron cannon, and do not know how to make them, or disdain to; all their artillery is of brass ... if some pieces of iron are found in their places of war, and merchantmen, they have been taken from the enemy ... It is, as such, most surprising that in their foundries they should have only furnaces particularly appropriate to the casting of iron, as a prodigious number of brass pieces have been brought, and come every day from their foundry at Tophana, at Constantinople, of middling, large and enormous bores very fine, very good, and long since brought to perfection, after the proportions and models of the European artillery. Rows of them have been continually seen all along the flat of Tophana, often two and three deep, and these sometimes of double and treble ranks; and one cannot, without injustice, accuse the Ottomans of a total ignorance in the art of founding cannon.

He added: 'It is difficult even to conceive how they have been able to succeed to make so fine an artillery, with furnaces that it would be impracticable to use in making small field pieces, which they have neglected to attempt, and with which Baron de Tott was desirous of furnishing them.'[1]

Peyssonnel was an orientalist of equal or greater standing than Tott, author of several works on the ethnography and trade of the Black Sea. In another instance, he countered Tott's contempt for the supposed lack of architects, masons, stonecutters, blacksmiths, and locksmiths among the Ottomans thus:[2] '[Let] us invoke the august shades of the emperors Selim, Soliman, Bajazet, Achmet, Mahmud, who have left superb mosques, Khans, Bezestins, and several other monuments of their grandeur and magnificence. All these Princes certainly never sent to Europe for any one to come and build those noble edifices: they have all been raised by architects and workmen of the country.'[3]

Peyssonnel was one voice which tried to refute Tott's ideas in print. He took part in the debates, promoted by Vergennes and explored by Henry

[1]Peyysonnel, *Appendix*, pp. 3, 118-22.
[2]Tott, *Memoirs*, ii, pt. 3. 118.
[3]Peyssonnel, *Appendix*, p. 221.

Laurens, over the utility of the Ottoman alliance. Tott's popularity and his recommendations concerning the state of Egypt were more influential, but both would be eclipsed by Volney whose works inspired Napoleon.[1] That Tott became the twentieth century's most frequently consulted witness to Ottoman military reform in the 1770s is remarkable.

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The Ottomans were competitive on the battlefields of eastern Europe until 1740; only thereafter did their military machine collapse. To understand what happened, one needs to compare the Ottomans' military reforms with those of the Russians on the one hand, and the other Muslim empires, especially the Mogul on the other. Two issues are pertinent here: the extent of the international arms market and the possibility of reading local or indigenous evolution as an aspect of reform.[2] The world history industry has taken up the question of cultural exchange and technology transfer in an attempt to find a better explanation than superior military technology for the success of the European powers. William R. Thompson, influenced by imperial historians such as C. A. Byly, stresses 'the relative vulnerability of the targets of expansion; [and] the interrelated need for local allies to make military victories on land possible'.[3]

Jonathan Grant, in an analysis of the Ottoman domestic arms industry, stress the similarity between the Russian and Ottoman military systems. Following Thomas Esper, he notes that Russia only became self-sufficient in metallurgy and armaments in the early eighteenth century, to lose its self-sufficiency in the nineteenth owing to the lack of the industrial economy needed to pay for and develop increasingly complex weapons. Similarly, although the Ottoman Empire possessed an armament industry, which Selim III reinvigorated at the end of the eighteenth century, it could not be developed further owing to the predominance of agrarian sources of revenue, in steep decline, and the state's gradual incorporation into an international economy. Grant, following Keith Krause, locates Ottoman domestic production in the second tier of an international hierarchy in which first-tier countries innovate; second-tier countries adapt; and third-tier countries reproduce, but 'do not

[1] Laurens, *L'orientalisme Islamisant en France*, chs. 2-4.
[2] See V. Aksan, 'Locating the Ottomans among Early Modern Empires', *Journal of Early Modern History*, v (1999), 103-34.
[3] W. R. Thompson, 'The Military Superiority Thesis and the Ascendancy of Western Eurasia in the World system', *Journal of World History* x (1999), 144.

capture the underlying process of innovation or adaptation'.[1] Thus, even though Grant tells us more about the actual reforms, he, too, assumes that one must explain why the Ottomans failed to anticipate the Europeans.

We might more profitably describe technology transfer as an 'interaction' between cultures, in the manner of Arnold Pacey, who sees the process 'like a conversation in which incomplete information sparks new ideas and what we can call 'responsive inventions"'. The conversation is dialectical. As recipients of a new body of knowledge or technique 'interrogate' it on the basis of their own experience and understanding of local conditions, the initial transfer is only the first stage in a longer process.[2] Cultural systems are resilient, and innovation occurs in the interplay between military technology and the political evolution of the particular environment.

In fact, the arguments about metallurgy and the casting of canon could use more of an airing in the Ottoman context. Pacey, for example, posits Indian, Persian, and Ottoman use of brass cannon, the thrust of Peyssonnel's critique of Tott. Brass, cheaper to produce in Asia than in Europe because of techniques perfected in India, was used into the eighteenth century throughout the 'gunpowder empires'. Military historians seeking to explain the long evolution from bronze to brass and later to cast-iron guns, attribute their adoption in some states and not in others to the availability of resources and the period in which the transfer of technical expertise occurs. Asian (Ottoman, Afghan, and Mogul) musket barrels and Damascene swords, often made from imported Indian steel by a process Europeans could not reproduce until the early 1800s, are an apt example. Europeans prized the barrels of Asian guns, while the Ottomans and the Moguls prized the mechanical parts of European guns.[3] It is easy to imagine the existence of an early modern military bazaar, in which Ottoman (Asian) arms experts, like their European counterparts, sold their expertise to fellow Muslim dynasties such as the Moguls. P. J. Marshall and Randolph G. S. Cooper argue the case for the continued adaptation of firearms and resistance by both the dynasties and mogul successor states throughout the eighteenth century.[4]

[1] J. Grant, 'Rethinking the Ottoman Decline: Military Technology Diffusion in the Ottoman Empire, Fifteenth to Eighteenth Centuries', *Journal of World History*, X (1999) 181; T. Esper, 'Military Self-Sufficiency and Weapons Technology in Muscovite Russia', *Slavic Review*, xxviii (1969), 185-208; S. K. Krause, *Arms and the State: Patterns of Military Production and Trade* (Cambridge, 1992).
[2] Pacey, *Technology of World Civilization*, pp. vii-viiii.
[3] Pacey, *Technology of World Civilization*, pp. 71-80.
[4] P. J. Marshall, 'Western Arms in Maritime Asia in the Early Phases of Expansion', *Modern Asian Studies*, xiv. (1980), 13-28; R. G. S. Cooper, 'Wellington and the Marathas in 1803', *International History Review*, xi (1989), 31-8.

Although Pacey's dialectic acknowledges the potential of every society to contribute to the general technology gene-pool of human history, it is impossible to say at this time whether the Ottomans did engage in a two-way exchange on the eastern frontier similar to the one he and Marshall describe between Persia and India. The most important obstacle to understanding is the lack of archival studies, one reason why the stereotypes about Ottoman collapse derived from Tott have proved so resilient.

Ottoman evidence in support of Pacey's theory, however, is available from the later stages of the Russo-Ottoman War of 1768-74. Experiments with training as well as casting continued throughout 1772 and 1773. For instance, to cite the tip of the iceberg, the Cevdet Askeriye collection of the Başbakanlık Arşivleri (Prime Minister's Archives) in Istanbul includes an order from November 1772 for gunpowder for the drill of cannons; one from March 1773 for 50 mobile artillerymen remaining in Istanbul; and a requisition from July for the purchase of monthly rations for 50.[1]

Mustafa III had expressed the wish for a corps of rapid-fire artillery, by which he meant mobile field artillery, in late 1770.[2] As he had already spent 25,000,000 kuruş on the war, he fonud 12,500 kuruş to pay for the new unit, given the name of *sür'atçıs* in Januray 1774, only with difficulty.[3] Tott certainly helped to set up the regiment, but with what kind of authority and to what degree is unclear. In theory, he was still in the employ of France. The Ottoman order setting up the unit was preceded by this explanation: 'Even though the imperial arsenal is known for its perfection in the arts of war ... in recent times, other states have invented and developed small, well-crafted cannon capable of rapid fire, reaching an understanding of the science through experimentation ... The Ottoman state likewise wishes to organize a company of rapid-fire artillerymen, and is issuing this imperial order to that effect.'[4] Such an explanation, rare among Ottoman documents, suggests a deliberate attempt to legitimate the procedure. Light, mobile field artillery, for rapid deployment, had become standard by the middle of the century and was regularly deployed during the Seven Years War.

[1][Istanbul] B[aşbakanlık] A[rşivleri], C[evdet] A[skeriye Collection] 30301, 15612, 29732, 20344. Tott's narration of this second initiative begins in *Memoirs*, ii, pt. 3-136.

[2]See S. Shaw, *Between Old and New: The Ottoman Empire under Sultan Selim III, 1789-1807* (Cambridge, Mass., 1971). See also, E. Z. Karal, *Selim III'ün Hattı Hümayunları: Nizâmı Cedit 1789-1807* (Ankara, 1988); A. Levy, 'The Military Policy of Sultan Mahmud II, 1808-39' (Ph. D. Dissertation, Harvard, 1968).

[3]BA, M[aliyyeden] M[üdevver Collection] 4844, pp. 8-9, a register of the *Sür'atçı;* French partial translation in Boppe, 'La France et le "militaire turc", pp. 391-3; Tott, *Mémoires*, ii, pt. 3-136.

[4]On the *Sür'atçıs*, BA, MM 4844, p. 9; Kaçar, 'Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda', pp. 78-81.

The regulations for the regiment describe its organization and pay, but also its distinct uniforms, inspections, daily roll-calls, an patrol and guard duties. Tott, who received the blessing of the religious officials, tried to ensure that wages were paid on time, argued for the rationalization of punishment, and as he noted, 'inspir[ed] a sense of honor, which no soldier fought to be without, even though the word is unknown to the Turkish language'.[1] In fact, it contains at least two words with that meaning.

A different sort of evidence for the Ottomans' skill is obtainable from Ottoman observes, especially someone like Sadullah Enverî, battlefront bureaucrat and chronicler, and the author of one of innumerable eighteenth-century texts available only in manuscript. Others, written by Canikli Ali Pasha, with the army in the Balkans in the war of 1768-74 and commander of the Crimea in 1773, who was executed after turning traitor in pique at the paucity of his rewards, and by Vasıf Efendi, Ottoman chronicler and diplomat, part of whose vast work was published in 1804 in an Ottoman edition, have barely been quarried.[2]

Sadullah Enverî spent most of the war on campaign with the grand vizier, Muhsinzade Mehmed, south of the Danube. The incident described bellow, which occurred in 1772, illustrates the Ottomans' discipline and training of their gunners during an extended truce. As desertion and disorder had reduced the numbers and quality of the gunners attached to the artillery corps at the front, the grand vizier ordered a training exercise that Enverî witnessed along with other Ottoman commanders. After the gunners, equipped with ill-processed gunpowder and ill-mounted guns, failed in three attempts to hit their target, they succeeded at the fourth attempt and were suitably rewarded. The grand vizier ordered daily practice, which he supervised himself now and then, and in time, the gunners became proficient at rapid-fire target and mortar fire, master gunners emerged from among the novices, and the regiment's morale improved.[3]

Enverî makes no mention then or later of either Tott or the cannons he cast. According to Tott, however, Mustafa III, pleased with the results of his

[1]Tott, *Memoirs*, ii, pt. 3-136-43. 'Honor' is expressed in at least two Ottoman words, *namus* and *şeref*, both in use in the eighteenth century.

[2]See Y. Özkaya, 'Canikli Ali Paşa', *Belleten*, cxliv (1972), 483-52; A. Vâsıf, *Mehâsin ül-Âsâr ve Hakâik ül-Ahbâr* (Istanbul, 1804); and V. Aksan, *Ottoman Statesman in War and Peace: Ahmed Resmi Efendi 1700-83* (Leiden, 1995), pp. 100-2, for a description of Vâsıf and his work.

[3]S. Enverî, *Tarih*, Istanbul University MS, T 5994, copied in 1780, covering the years 1768-74, folios 271 ff.

efforts, ordered 50 gunners and 50 four-pounder cannons to the front in 1774. Tott adds, in disgust, that the Ottomans abandoned the cannons, sent without rammers, at their supply base at Varna.[1] But Field Marshal A. V. Suvorov of the Russian army, a young officer at the time, was impressed with the cannons abandoned by Ottoman artillerymen fleeing from the final battle of the war, at Kozluca in July 1774. The news even made the *Annual Register*.[2] Tott, either misinformed or unable ten years later to remember what had happened, exaggerated for effect the Ottomans' supposed aversion to the adoption of infidel technology.

The *sür'atçıs* were reorganized in January 1775. Ten guns and eighty soldiers were placed under the command of Seyyid Mehmed Emin Ağa, a confidant of Abdülhamit I, his sword-bearer (*Silâhdar*) and briefly grand vizier between 1779 and 1781, who died of tuberculosis in office at the age of 45.[3] The corps survived until September 1776, despite Tott's departure from Istanbul in 1775.[4] A French military mission, which may have numbered as many as 300 officers and engineers during the 1780s, continued to serve the Porte in other capacities until 1788 when the mission was recalled.[5] Artillery reform continued under Selim III, beginning in March 1793, following the series of disasters during the Russo-Ottoman War of 1787-92. Selim's reforms, which need not be discussed in detail here, include the strengthening of the artillery corps, which in 1796 had 2,875 cannoneers in 15 companies of 115 officers and men. By 1806, the numbers had risen to 4,910. Similarly, Selim reorganized the cannon-wagon and mortar corps, the foundry, and the powder works.[6] His principal efforts, however, were directed at organizing a body of troops along European lines, wearing European uniforms, following European drill, and living in separate barracks. According to Stanford J. Shaw, the numbers trained had risen to 23,000 before Selim was toppled.[7] He also

[1]Tott, *Memoirs*, ii, pt. 3-97.

[2]*Russkie polkovodtsy: Dokumenty i materialy, v. 2: Generalissimus Suvorov*, ed. N. Korobko (Leningrad, 1947), p. 59; 'diplomaticheskaia perepiska angliiskikh poslov i poslannikov pri russkom dvorie', *Sbornik Imperatorskago Russkago Istoricheskago Obshchestva*, xix. 419; *Annual Register*, xvi (1774), 6, describing the surrender on 20 June of the 'whole Turkish camp ... with a fine train of brass artillery, which had been cast under the directions of the Chevalier Tott'.

[3]On the *Sür'atçıs*, BA, MM 4844, pp. 33-7.

[4]Boppe, 'La France et le "militaire turc"', p. 396.

[5]Levy, 'Military Policy of Sultan Mahmud II', p. 23; L. Pingaud, *Choiseul-Gouffier*, pp. 99ff.

[6]See Shaw, *Between Old and New*, pp. 122-37, who may not have had access to BA, MM 4844. See also, M. R. Efendi, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Yeni Nizamların Cedveli* (Istanbul, n.d.) which includes a facsimile of the original French edition (*Tableau de nouveaux réglemens de l'Empire Ottoman*, Istanbul, 1798).

[7]Shaw, *Between Old and New*, p. 134.

set up a separate treasury, in an attempt to acquire some hold over Ottoman financial affairs, and opened new technical schools.

Of the two dozen treatises on reform written by Selim III's advisers, only one, by Abdullah Molla Efendi, acknowledged Tott's work, and recommended the further use of foreign advisers and the reorganization of the rapid-fire artillery corps.[1] There is little other evidence from Ottoman sources of Tott's work. That is understandable given the intense rivalries at the Ottoman court, and also reflects a dislike for foreigners ('hats') among the political élites similar to the one Peter I and Catherine II encountered in the anti-German xenophobia at the Russian court.

Juchereau de Saint-Denys, a French army officer who witnessed the revolutions of 1807-8 that brought down Selim III, and who traced the development of the Ottoman artillery from Tott's time to his own, acknowledged that Tott had introduced field artillery and rapid-fire discipline. Selim, however, not Tott, had ordered the manufacture of the small-caliber 4-, 8-, and 12-bore cannon which became a standard component of the Ottoman arsenal. In adopting new weapons, the Ottomans did not slavishly imitate the French, but adapted both Russian and Austrian weapons which had proved their worth on the battle field. Their arms began to fit the European pattern.[2] Similarly, when Selim built new foundries, he imported both machinery and expertise from Spain and Britain as well as from Revolutionary France.

The final obstacle to the creation of a modernized Ottoman army was the janissaries, on whom Mahmud II turned the reformed artillery. By 1827, he had increased the size of the force to 14,000 artillerymen with 4,414 waggoners, and continued to pay more attention to it than to any other service.[3] While the numbers may be impressive, the Ottoman artillery corps was less impressive than it looked. Helmuth von Moltke, later the famous Prussian field marshal, who observed the corps in Ottoman Europe in 1828, remarked: 'although the Turks and made great improvement in their artillery, they were still very far behind their opponents ... The guns were 3-, 6-, 8-, 12-, and 24-pounders, roughly mounted, and the shot ill cast. The effect of their artillery could never be very great; nevertheless, as the Turks laid great

[1]E. Z. Karal, 'Nizam-i Cedid-e Dâir Lâyihalar', *Tarih Vesikaları*, i (1941-2), 419.

[2]A. Juchereau de Saint-Denys, *Révolutions de Constantinople en 1807 et 1808* (Paris, 1819), i. 66; Shaw, *Between Old and New*, p. 131.

[3]Levy's dissertation remains the most authoritative account of Mahmud II's reforms. See also, S. J. Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey* (Cambridge, 1976-7), ii. 24-7. G. Goodwin, *The Janissaries* (London, 1994), pp. 213-33, is to be treated with caution.

stress upon this arm, it had its moral worth.'[1] Elsewhere he notes that the sultan lavished attention on the artillery to the detriment of the infantry, and that 'the employment of Prussian officers as sergeants has led to the attainment of a perfection far in excess of anything which at Constantinople had ever been thought possible.'[2]

While much of what was reported in the European press (and by eyewitnesses) about Ottoman politics under Selim III is contradictory, European soldiers usually disdained the army for its undeniable, by European standards, lack of order, discipline, and leadership. The standard explanation, following Tott, was religious obscurantism. Writing in 1807, Thomas Thornton, fourteen years a Levant company representative at Istanbul, claimed:

> In representing foreign manners I have divested myself of national prejudices; in describing foreign religions I have not confronted them with the opinions and practices of other sects or persuasions. I have endeavored to avoid those expressions of malevolence which sully the pages of preceding Christian writers. I am not, however, conscious that I have glossed over any error, concealed any absurdity, or misrepresented any dogma, practice or ceremony. The doctrines of Islamism, founded as they are in the religion of nature and the revelations of both our scriptures, must necessarily possess a considerable portion of intrinsic worth; but this acknowledgment by no means implies respect for the artificial and heterogeneous superstructure which peculiarly constitutes Mahometanism.[3]

Such was the general explanation of the cause for the Ottomans' military woes.

If the analysis of Ottoman eighteenth-century military reform ends with Tott, religious obscurantism serves as the primary cause of the Ottomans' failure to keep pace. One must, however, strip away the eighteenth century's cultural biases in order to understand a society that was inimical to the discipline commonplace among European armies. Reforming the Ottoman military meant restructuring the ideological premise of government and the relationship between ruler and ruled. Instead of asking who stood to lose from reform, one should ask who stood to gain by trying to sustain 'Ottomanism' and who declined the invitation to modernize the army for more concrete

[1] Baron H. von Moltke, *The Russians in Bulgaria and Rumelia in 1828 and 1829* (London, 1854), p. 19.
[2] Baron H. von Moltke, *Essays, Speeches and Memoirs* (New York, 1893), p. 293.
[3] T. Thornton, *The Present State of the Ottoman Empire* (London, 1807), p. xi.

reasons than religion. Similarly, in Peter I's Russia, the use of coercion to further modernization had the unexpected result of retrenching privilege, as both Peter and Catherine II had to compromise with the nobility in order to organize and man what became, by the end of the eighteenth century, Europe's largest standing conscript army.[1]

The cost to society of a similar reform of the Ottoman imperial system was increasing intolerance of the heterodox, semi-autonomous communities in the empire's periphery, and the abolition of the social welfare system of the janissaries, who presented themselves as guardians of the traditional order and keepers of the peace in cities and towns. The new-style army, modeled on the surrender of the individual to the discipline of the corps, and to the orders of a command hierarchy increasingly based on merit rather than privilege, challenged the notion of individual valor in battle that underpinned the janissaries' code. Central to their world-view was the special father-son relationship which permeated the military, but, by the late eighteenth century, operated only as iconography. The sultan was no more than the symbol of an ideal system of justice that continued to work itself out in the shari'a courts, with judges appointed from Istanbul.

By the late eighteenth century, a nomadic, ethnic, military symbiosis, rather than the élite, disciplined corps generally evoked by the name janissary, had become the backbone of the Ottoman army. The putative janissary regiment existed on paper, reproducing itself as molecules in the provinces, but no longer able to defend the empire against foreign threats or the sultan against over-mighty subjects. Tott himself was enrolled in a janissary regiment, as were some 400,000-500,000 others, Christian and Muslim alike. Local militias throughout the empire mirrored and blended with the so-called janissary regiments, attaching themselves to whoever offered the most. Pay was not always the attraction, although it served as the excuse for revolt, itself essentially a license to loot. The real attraction lay in the attachment to 'Ottomanism' represented by the piece of paper (the janissary ration-ticket — *esame*) that linked the individual to the imperial idea (or occasionally directly to the bureaucratic center in Istanbul), and the privileges supposedly to be derived from inclusion.

[1] As the title of a translation of E. V. Anisimov suggests, *'The Reforms of Peter the Great: Progress through Coercion in Russia* (Armonk, 1993). For the Ottomans, see E. Toledano, 'The Emergence of Ottoman-Local Elites (1700-1900): A Framework for Research', in *Middle Eastern Politics and Ideas: A History from Within* ed. I. Pappé and M. Ma'oz (London, 1997), pp. 145-62.

Those at the center and the margins alike benefited from perpetuating the system. For example, the estate of one grand vizier, Çelebi Mehmed Pasha, was discovered in 1778 to contain ration-tickets for more than 600 non-existent soldiers.[1] Nonetheless, the innovative thinking among Ottoman bureaucrats and their foreign advisers about the reform of the artillery began in Istanbul. Mahmud II's success at monopolizing violence led to the destruction of an imperial system, and allowed the empire to try to recreate itself as a European-style, neo-absolutist state.

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To understand the indigenous resistance to Europeanization, one needs to understand the Ottomans' Asian roots. Even in the empire's sixteenth-and seventeenth-century heyday, it was never highly centralized. It had a 'preference for a cellular rather than a unitary administrative structure'; a molecular political system composed of a series of self-regulatory bodies such as the *sipahi-timar* (the provincial cavalry army, based on distribution of rights to land in return for military service), the *imaret* (soup kitchen and related charitable organizations), and the guilds.[2] The 'central' government, Mogul as well as Ottoman, which had to try to control larger areas and a greater variety of ethnic and religious groups than the European states, was incapable of monopolizing violence. Ottoman sultans organized vast armies and sophisticated supply systems well before the European states, and on an unheard-of scale. In the seventeenth century, their campaigns were highly orchestrated: they deployed huge numbers of both peasants and nomads as soldiers, supported by well-organized logistical systems that took account of distance and the availability of the logistical systems that took account of distance and the availability of the indispensable horses. The shortage of horses, in addition to the Ottomans' increasing reliance on nomads for troops led, by 1650, to the regular recruitment and deployment of militias, and to the hire of private armies in place of the disciplined standing armies which had won the Ottomans their victories in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries.

[1]See V. Aksan, 'Ottoman Military Recruitment Strategies in the Late Eighteenth Century', in *Arming the State: Military Conscription in the Middle East and Central Asia, 1775-1925*, ed. E. Zürcher (New York 1999), pp. 21-39.
[2]Cunningham, *Eastern Questions*, p. 88.

The Ottoman militia/mercenary system of the eighteenth century tolerated raiding and plunder not only as a reward for allegiance,[1] but also as an alternative to the logistically impossible control of such vast territory. The Ottomans tolerated zones of influence where the payment of tribute worked to mutual benefit. Karen Barkey elaborates a model of Ottoman sovereignty that excluded as well as included by mobilizing mobile frontier peoples, not yet 'Ottomanized', to guard the frontier and property, while branding them as rebels and outlaws whenever they proved too unruly.[2] Both Ottomans and Moguls were preoccupied with internal instability, fearing the *fitna*, or agrarian rebellion, that hampered the creation of international frontiers. Sultans and their bureaucrats had to negotiate constantly with an armed population which, when mobilized, represented a formidable, if unruly, force.

As Dirk Kolff explains, the Moguls operated a similar military labor market on a grand scale, and according to Jos Gommans, who calls it 'the *sine qua on* of empire', carried the principle of the imperial parade as the cement of loyalty even further than the Ottomans. 'Imperial [Mogul] campaigns often came down to dignified, slow-moving processions ... the emperor ... theatrically presented as the glorious and conquering warrior'.[3] The object of the parade was to attract potential clients among local magnates, who would exchange manpower and loyalty for status and opportunity. Thus, the Ottoman armies of Sultan Süleyman were likened to 'a wedding feast'.[4]

A political economy based on a 'policy of conciliation, gift-giving, and sowing dissensions', redefines *fitna* to mean 'the manipulation of ever-crumbling alliances'.[5] Barkey adds that, in the Ottoman case, 'the low level militarization' of rural society turned peasants into bandits, manipulated by the Ottomans as 'disposable, bargain recruitment' but also as partners in state building. Until the mid-seventeenth century, they succeeded 'in convincing bandits [for which read nomads and peasants] that their best bet was

[1]Aksan, 'Whatever Happened to the Janissaries?', pp. 23-36, and P. Lorge, 'War and Warfare in China, 1450-1815', *War in the Early Modern World, 1450-1815*, ed. J. Black (London, 1999), pp. 25-52.
[2]K. Barkey, *Bandits and Bureaucrats: The Ottoman Route to State Centralization* (Ithaca, 1994). A theory designed for peasants and state bureaucrats is applied here to militias and tribal horsemen.
[3]J. Gommans, 'Warhorse and Gunpowder in India, c. 1000-1850', in *War in the Early Modern World*, ed. Black, p. 108; D. H. A. Kolff, *Naukar, Rajput, and Sepoy: the Ethnohistory of the Military Labour Market in Hindustan, 1450-1850* (Cambridge, 1990).
[4]See V. Aksan, 'Ottoman War and Warfare 1453-1812', in *War in the Early Modern World*, ed. Black, pp. 147-76.
[5]Gommans, 'Warhorse and Gunpowder', p. 108.

incorporation into the Ottoman administration'.[1] Although Barkey adduces little evidence from the seventeenth century in support of her theory, her system can be applied to the eighteenth century when groups of exiles destabilized the countryside as a result of the empire's contraction.

European observers, and some contemporary local critics of Ottoman and Mogul campaigns, marveled at the array of supporting services for the troops as well as the imperial entourage. (The quantities of foods, luxury items, and servants, even in the late eighteenth century, are remarkable when contrasted to the deliberate parsimony and scant diet of European, especially Russian, rank-and-file conscript armies). The assumption underlying the provision of such services also determined the Ottoman formation for battle. S. T. Christensen explains that it was emblematic of the sultan's household: units were deployed according to their claim to proximity to the source of legitimacy rather than to achieve a strategic goal.[2] Field Marshal P. A. Rumiantsev, who describes the janissaries as tired old men, observed the swansong of the formation on the plains of Kartal in 1770. Perhaps that battle, not the coup of 1826, marks the true end of the janissary corps.[3]

The army was arrayed in a crescent, with Anatolian cavalry on the left flank, Rumelian cavalry on the right, and the Tatars positioned in advance to operate as raiding parties. The grand vizier's huge, richly embroidered tent was pitched in the center of the janissaries, themselves at the heart of the camp, even when the Ottomans were fighting the Russians along the Danube in the 1760s. Such a formation acted throughout as both magnet and focus of kinship. The ceremonial meal with commanders and senior officials, and the janissaries, at headquarters the night before battle, was emblematic of the paternal relationship between officer and soldier that infuriated European observers in the later eighteenth century who assumed that familiarity undermined discipline. Such gestures, which strengthened what were never more than temporary allegiances, were an aspect of the government on parade. Large guns, thousands of camels and horses, enormous baggage trains, were enticements for mounted populations who always had the option to fly, and did so with increasing frequency.

[1] Barkey, *Bandits and Bureaucrats*, pp. 236-7. See also, Aksan, 'Ottoman Mobilization'.
[2] S. T. Christensen, 'The Heathen Order of Battle', in *Violence and the Absolutist State: Studies in European and Ottoman History*, ed. S. T. Christensen (Copenhagen, 1990), pp. 75-138.
[3] P. A. Rumiantsev, *Sbornik dokumentov*, ed. P. K. Fortunatov (Moscow, 1953), i. 347.

Large guns continued to be dragged on campaign, long after their usefulness had passed. By 1769, Ahmed Resmi, deputy commander under Mehmed Muhsinzade, wondered at the purpose of dragging huge siege guns into steppe territories, when all of the Ottoman fortresses along the Danube were well- and sometimes over-equipped with smaller-caliber arms.[1] If, however, one reads the description of the Ottoman campaign, or rather parade, in the Morea in 1715, the symbolic role of the big gun is obvious. The siege guns, which usually arrived by sea the day of, or the day after, the confrontation, served as the *coup de grâce* for already cowed populations.[2]

The large guns were meant to overawe not only the nominal enemy but also the undisciplined, fiercely loyal — however temporarily — to local leaders, and independent, even entrepreneurial troops, who required constant rewards for service and bribes to undertake special duties both before and during the campaign. Examples of the practice of doling out money in the course of the campaign - for risky service, for trophies such as ears or noses of slain enemies, as compensation for wounds graded according to severity - dot the campaign records. This was neither a population, nor a practice, that could be easily tamed into European-style discipline.

Moltke reckoned that as late as 1829 a third of the Ottoman forces were 'chiefly Asiatic horsemen'. About the infantry, he added: 'Although it was difficult to teach [them] regular movements in compact bodies ... on occasions when their courage carried them away, and they threw off the severe control placed upon them, they could charge the foe with their old impetuosity."[3]

In such circumstances, zones of influence remained more important than delineated boundaries — another difference from the European states — and allegiance had to be purchased repeatedly by allowing the warrior horseman his traditional privileges. During the eighteenth century, Tatars were joined by Albanians, Kurds, Caucasians, and lastly, Bedouin Arabs, all of them knocking at the door of Ottoman privilege, as the concentric circles marking zones of influence shrank under Austrian and Russian assault, and as molecular politics moved from the periphery towards the empire's heartland. The British ambassador at Istanbul, Robert Liston, encountered one such motley crew at Edirne in 1794, 'a large army of irregulars, marching along

[1] See Aksan, *Ottoman Statesman*, p. 135.
[2] B. Brue, *Journal de la campagne que le grand vesir Ali Pacha a faite en 1715* (Paris, 1870).
[3] Moltke, *Russians in Bulgaria and Rumelia*, p. 16.

"with flying ensigns [and] a full complement of firearms"; warrior soldiers hired by the rebel Osman Pazvantoğlu of Vidin, among whom were many Frenchmen.[1] It is no small coincidence that the reformers, Selim III and Mahmud II alike, had their greatest success in creating provincial militias — in Mahmud's case, the *Reâîfs* in 1834 — because they drew on two centuries of evolution of the sources of manpower.

This evolution represents Ottoman difference, military reform driven by the geopolitical environment and the type of resources available to them. When mobilization was required, as it was after a considerable hiatus in 1768, the state had to conjure up an army, called 'janissaries', out of heterodox ethnicities who clamored for a redefinition of their relationship with the state designed to share the empire's wealth more evenly, of the notion of governance, and of its ideological underpinning. The typical example is the struggle of the *ayans*, such as Ali Pasha of Iannina, to assert their territorial autonomy.[2]

Mahmud II's chief task, as he saw it, was the opposite: to recentralize the imperial administration, its army, and its revenues by breaking the hold over the countryside of the multitude of mini-despots such as Ali Pasha, or Osman Pazvantoğlu to cite the two best-known Balkan examples. The basic tool required would be a 'native' or 'national' army with a new Turkish and Muslim identity. The creation of this army was the sultans' greatest achievement between 1760 and 1830. Selim III's advisers recommended him to draw recruits from rural Anatolia uncorrupted by urban life, while Mahmud added religion to social background to the identity of the ideal recruit.[3]

The rationalization under Mahmud II of the conscription of Ottoman Muslim subjects as the 'Trained Victorious Soldiers of Muhammad' (*Muallim Asâkir-i Mansure-yi Muhammediye*) differed radically from the evocation to voluntary service of able-bodied men in the period preceding Selim III's reforms. Selim's solution to the system of *levents*, or country-side militias, who were called up during campaigns but between times loosed on the provinces to be scooped up by the likes of Ali Pasha or Pazvantoğlu to form their armies of insurgence, was to station men like them in barracks at Istanbul and to discipline them in the European style. Thus, the Ottomans

[1]Cunningham, *Anglo-Ottoman Encounters*, p. 69.
[2]K. E. Fleming, *The Muslim Bonaparte: Diplomacy and Orientalism in Ali Pasha's Greece* (Princeton, 1999); see also, Toledano, 'Emergence of Ottoman-Local Elites', pp. 145-62.
[3]Karal, 'Nizam-i Cedid-e Dâir', pp. 415-421, 424.

began the long march to a disciplined army, from the *Asâkir-i Mansure* of 1826, which was quickly increased to 27,000, to the first real conscription law, with rules about drawing lots, in 1848, which set the regular army (called Nizamiye after 1841) at 150,000. The result was the rank-and-file soldier, known today as 'Mehmetcik' (Little Mehmet, GI Joe) whose reputation for endurance was earned at Gallipoli.[1]

Ottoman notions of absolutism and of Ottoman 'ethnicity' as applied to the remodeled army became, in turn, one aspect of nineteenth-century Ottoman colonialism. The Ottomans not only recentralized much of the state's activities, but had considerable success in bringing the Arab tribal forces to heel. 'Ottoman modernity' led to control over the Hijaz by 1841 and over Eastern Arabia in 1871, and the Ottomans even went so far as to make a final colonial thrust into Yemen at the turn of the century. Eugene Rogan argues that their success at negotiating with the groups of tribes in Jordan accounts for the ease with which Britain established its mandate among the Bedouin.[2]

The crucial tool of reform used by the sultans was ideology. Between the reigns of Selim III and Mahmud II lay the Greek and Serbian revolts, and the challenge from Mehmed Ali in Egypt and Syria.[3] Selim's army was made up largely of volunteers. When Mahmud wished to introduce conscription, the most accessible manpower was to be found among the most independent populations within the empire, tribal groups from the Iranian border, the Caucasus, and Albania. Combined with the peasant recruits from Anatolia, they constituted the core of the army in the nineteenth century. Everyone else was deemed to be unreliable. This was a Muslim army, by directive from 1826, and by practice, if not law, until 1909, when the Young Turks reorganized it. Although the declaration of citizenship extended conscription to all Ottomans in 1856, in practice non-Muslims either bought themselves out or were excluded. The participation of infidels was never popular on either side of the religious divide. As late as 1909, 'conscription' in Albania and

[1]Contemporary Turkey maintains the second largest army in NATO, with some 800,000-900,000 conscripts on the rolls. Service in the military is the rite of passage for all 20-year-olds.
[2]For late Ottoman colonialism, see E. Rogan, *Frontiers of State in the Late Ottoman Empire: Transjordan, 1850-1921* (Cambridge, 1999), pp. 12-13. See also I. Blumi, 'Looking beyond the Tribe: Abandoning Paradigms to Write Social History in Yemen during World War I', *New Perspectives on Turkey*, xxi (2000), 117-43; on the Gulf, see F. F. Anscombe, *The Ottoman Gulf: The creation of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar* (New York, 1993), and on the tools of Ottoman absolutism, see S. Deringil, *The Well-Protected Domains: Ideology and the Legitimation of Power in the Ottoman Empire, 1876-1909* (London, 1998).
[3]F. H. Lawson, 'Economic and Social Foundations of Egyptian Expansionism: The Invasion of Syria in 1831', *International History Review*, x (1988), 378-404.

Kurdistan often simply meant recruits who were selected by their tribal chiefs.[1]

The Ottoman state re-emphasized its ideological legitimacy — and its claim to the caliphate — by drawing from the store of Muslim motifs: that the Prophet's own willingness to use military stratagems to defeat an enemy justified reform, and that failure to submit to the discipline of the *Nizâm-ı Cedid* was tantamount to treason to religion. Such iterations of the righteousness of reform were not restricted to army officers exhorting their men. İbrahim Müteferrika, the founder of the Ottoman printing press in 1727, wrote extensively on the Islamic justification for printing, and for military reform, modeled after the Russians, in precisely the same way. He has recently been called among the first to stress 'Islamic étatisme' in the Ottoman Empire, part of an ongoing discussion of the best political systems and the restoration of order (*nizâm*) throughout the eighteenth century.[2]

In the preface to the *fetva* placed before the religious officials in 1826 to legitimize the destruction of the janissaries, Mahmud II used Muslim rhetoric to justify reform:

> Vengeance, people of Muhammad and you zealous servants of this Ottoman monarchy which will endure forever: officers of all classes, all you faithful adherents, defenders of the faith, friends of religion and glory come to us ... Force cannot be exerted today except in the study and practice of the military arts, knowledge of which is indispensable to combat a disciplined enemy advantageously. The Qur'an shows us our obligation in this regard. It is thus with a consciousness of accomplishing a religious obligation, that the government has decided, with the inspiration of the Prophet ... to form a new corps.[3]

The statement was only one expression of a concerted attempt to invent a tradition for the army; the name given to it by Mahmud II was another. The

[1] E. J. Zürcher, 'The Ottoman Conscription System in Theory and Practice', in *Arming the State*, ed. Zürcher, pp. 79-94.

[2] S. Reichmuth, 'Islamic Reformist Discourse in the Tulip Period (1718-30): Ibrahim Müteferrika and His arguments for Printing', in *International Congress on Learning and Education in the Ottoman World*, ed. Çaksu, pp. 160-1.

[3] *Précis historique de la destruction du corps des Janissaries par le Sultan Mahmud, en 1826*, trans. A. P. Caussi de Perceval (Paris, 1833), pp. 44-5.

use of such symbols to boost army morale is well attested in both Russia and Austria in the same period.[1]

What Kemal Karpat referring to II calls the politicization of Islam can be backdated to Mahmud II, and applied to the Orthodoxy of Catherine II's St Petersburg and the Catholicism of Maria Theresa's Vienna.[2] We need to bury the Ottoman 'sick man' in order to develop other models of reform in early modern empires. Only then shall we be able to explain the survival and 'rebirth' of the Ottoman Empire between 1760 and 1830, while the Muslim territories to the east in the Caucasus and South in Egypt and the Arabian Peninsula gradually succumbed to British or Russian influence.

[1] J. Keep, *Soldiers of the Tsar: Army and Society in Russia, 1462-1874* (Oxford, 1985), pp. 206-10, on the deliberate manipulation of the common soldier under Alexander I into believing in a religious Utopia. *East Central European Society and War in the Pre-Revolutionary Eighteenth Century*, ed. G. E. Rothenberg, B. K. Kirâly, and P. F. Sugar (New York, 1982) is full of remarkable essays on the Habsburg-Ottoman frontier, where Catholic and Orthodox populations marched under the banner of the Virgin Mary. For similar efforts in the First World War, see G. Hagan, 'The Prophet Muhammad as an Exemplar in War: Ottoman Views on the Eve of World War ', *New Perspectives on Turkey*, xxii (2000), 145-72.

[2] Karpat defines his Ottomanism as 'an attempt by the Ottoman government to use a single citizenship as a common political identity', in order to achieve equality and unity among all Ottoman subjects and supersede differences of faith, ethnicity and language': K. Karpat, 'Historical Continuity and Identity Change or How to be Modern Muslim, Ottoman, and Turk', in *Ottoman Past and Today's Turkey*, ed. K. Karpat (Leiden, 2000), pp. 1-28.

PART TWO

CONFLICTS

OTTOMAN WAR AND WARFARE 1453-1812

Introduction

In 1453, while western Europe finally brought to an end the long series of confrontations and skirmishes which had characterized the Hundred Years' War, the Eastern Roman Empire faced its last and most formidable foe in the Ottomans, whose conquest of Constantinople meant an end to the city which had resonated for a thousand years as the capital of eastern Christendom. Within the Christian world the fall of Constantinople served thenceforth as the icon of the destruction of the civilized east by the barbarian Turk, a threat which dated from the eleventh century and formed part of the history and lore of the Crusades. For the Muslim world the fall of Constantinople remained equally iconographic — the triumph of Muslim armies who had attempted the conquest of the city on numerous occasions since the seventh century.

The events of 1453 are equally important in military history as witnessing the inauguration and escalation of new kinds of warfare organized around the use of gunpowder. Without the enormous firepower of the huge cannons which the Ottomans brought to bear on the formidable walls of Constantinople, breaching those walls would have remained an impossibility. Similarly, the Hundred Years' War is often characterized as the last gasp of medieval chivalric warfare, and the beginning of the age of absolutist monarchies in Europe, whose rise to power was dependent on varying success in harnessing the new tools of war.

Such historical comparisons have only recently become part of the apparatus of military historiography in Europe. For centuries the Ottomans straddled east and west on the Dardanelles, but were never fully integrated into the construction of European history, which, for reasons far beyond the scope of this discussion, elaborated two trajectories of development: one, western Europe and the naval empires; the other, eastern Europe and the persistence of agrarian and neofeudal-style empires. The Balkans, occupied for close to 500 years by the Ottomans, was viewed as the theatrical set on which great power politics and diplomacy were staged. Balkan and Turkish Republican historians, similarly, have simply ignored the Ottoman presence whenever possible, casting back to the pre-Ottoman period for ethnicity and grand narratives to bolster nationalist aims. As a result, there is a paucity of studies on the

Ottoman military — surprising in light of the fact that the Janissaries constituted the "Terror of the World" for Europe until the end of the seventeenth century.

The absence of the Ottoman voice has led to many lopsided versions of the east-west confrontation which are based primarily on the accounts of travelers and the chancellery and foreign office documents of various European powers. Little of empirical or archival evidence has been readily available until recently, allowing for the persistence of certain assumptions about a 600-year history which would be ludicrous if applied, say, to Roman, or Byzantine history. One assumption is that the Ottoman military structure and financing did not change after the death of Süleyman the Magnificent in 1566, and the empire only survived until 1918 because it was rescued and bolstered by the European powers after 1800. The Ottoman house is often described as having set up its tents in the city of Constantinople and squatted there in true Central Asian nomadic fashion until brought down in the First World War. Another misconception insists on calling the Ottomans "Turks": this because Europe continued to call them that — a legacy of the crusades, when "Turk" replaced "Saracen" as the enemy of Christendom. No Ottoman sultan after Orhan (1326-62), the second in line, had a Turkish mother: they were Circassian, Georgian, Slavic, Greek, etc., but not "Turk" — a term reserved for the rude and ill-lettered until the end of the nineteenth century. The Ottomans, and anyone who identified with them, were part of cultural milieu which amalgamated Middle Eastern cultures and languages: Arabic, Persian, Turkish, and a range of ethnicities from Slavic to North African. conversion to Islam was the prerequisite.

In military histories this translates into a reluctance to give the Ottoman dynasty any agency in organizing or controlling violence. The history of Ottoman warfare has been built around difference, rather than similarity. There are, however, obvious parallels in the Ottoman context with many of the recent concerns of military historiography — for example, the increased use of standing armies to replace militia-style warfare in the late seventeenth and eighteenth century; the role of foreign advisors and technology-transfer in military reform; and, finally, the stalemate imposed by the limitations on warfare in pre-modern societies. As Guilmartin has noted: "the roots of war lie deep within the social fabric".[1]

[1] J. Guilmartin, "Ideology and conflict: the wars of the Ottoman Empire, 1453-1606", *Journal of interdisciplinary history*, 18, 1988, p. 746.

This discussion of Ottoman warfare will consider the most important campaigns in three chronological periods, following a brief description of the formative period 1300-1453: "the imperial age 1453-1566"; "the limits of empire 1566-1699", and "the compromise 1699-1812". Coverage for each period will also include the major peace treaties, Ottoman approaches to evolving military technology, and an assessment of the impact of war on Ottoman society at large.

The formative period 1300-1453

In the late thirteenth century the territory surrounding Constantinople belonged largely to the Byzantines, who represented Orthodoxy in the eastern Mediterranean. Schisms within the western and eastern churches, as well as external threats from numerous Muslim kingdoms in the south and east, had long since broken the back of a centralized empire, making Anatolia and large parts of the Balkans frontier "march" territory, where petty dynasties played out their endless quarrels, and energetic mercenaries were very much in demand. The main Muslim threat of the period was the Seljuk Turkish dynasty, actually a series of petty kingdoms, the principal one by the thirteenth century centered in Konya in southern Anatolia. The warriors for the Seljuks included Turkish cavalrymen, horsemen who could use a compound bow with ease and devastating accuracy.

It was also a time of disorder in the Balkans, as the breakdown of Byzantine hegemony, schisms between Catholic and Orthodox, and nomadic incursions exacerbated the natural rivalries of the Kingdoms of Bulgaria, Serbia, and Hungary, and increased the vulnerability of lesser lords, such as those in Macedonia and Albania. In that context, just as in eastern Anatolia, effective warriors, regardless of religious affiliation, were in great demand.

Nonetheless, how did it happen that the Ottomans emerged from a number of rivals in Anatolia? The Seljuk dynasty maintained its power through a system of clients, called principalities, whose vassals were allied by military service to the Seljuk figurehead in Konya. In the mid-thirteenth century one of several rival principalities was that of Osman, eponymous founder of the Ottomans, who held the territory nearest Constantinople and the Balkans.

Osman (1280-1326), son of Ertuğrul (d. 1280), assumed the leadership of his loyal bands of *gazis* (warriors for the faith) in the 1290s, making a name for himself by defeating the Byzantines at Bapheon, near Nicea in 1301. Victory over the infidel brought Osman fame and more warriors, creating the basis for the political and cultural development of the empire, which his son and successor, Orhan (1326-62), consolidated in the first capital, Bursa, in 1326. Their expansion was slow, but was aided by having the Byzantines call on them as allies and by actually marrying into the imperial family. The new Ottoman power was permanently established in Europe by 1354, when the Ottomans crossed the Dardanelles at Gallipoli. Under Murad I (1362-89), *gazi* raids became consolidated offensives, culminating in the famous battle of Kosovo in 1389 against the Serbian aristocracy. The distinguishing feature of this Muslim dynasty was its occupation of both east and west, concentrating on the latter as a result of their early history, but also because of the rich agricultural lands which became the bread basket of the new imperial capital after 1453.

The Ottoman notion of rule, combining central Asian and Muslim elements, was based on the perception of the state as the patrimony of the sultan, with the court organized as a grand household. That patrimony was divided up into those who ruled, called the *askeri*, or military, and those who were ruled, the *reaya*, or flock, the tax-payers, primarily peasants. When the sultan went on campaign, he was accompanied by his household, which was also his army; military headquarters were arranged around the sultanic tent, with proximity determining status. This accounts for the colorful names surrounding the Ottoman palace contingents: *ocak*, the word for a regiment, literally means hearth, for example, and the *Bostancılar*, or Gardeners, were actually the sultan's elite guard. Ottoman military thinking was determined by the household hierarchy, which accorded primary place to the elite infantry, and left and right wings to the cavalry: the order of battle was arranged in a crescent spreading out from the sultanic tent.[1] Between 1389 and 1453 most of the elements which made up the Ottoman military battle formation and strength were forged into a formidable balance of infantry, cavalry and artillery, supported by a well-regulated system of supply, a century before similar institutions were effectively in place in Europe.

[1]S. T. Christensen, "The heathen order of battle", in S. T. Christensen (ed.) *Violence and the absolutist state: studies in European and Ottoman history* (Copenhagen, Center for Research in the Humanities, Copenhagen University, 1990), pp. 75-138.

The bulk of the fighting force was made up of the Anatolian and Balkan cavalryman (*sipahi*, or *timariots*). They were obligated to outfit themselves and report to the battlefront in return for the distribution of land grants known as *timars*, assignable by the sultan and his deputies, but not generally inheritable. Failure to appear could mean the revocation of the grant; success on the battle-field could mean an increase to the size of the estate. This system was in place until at least the last siege of Vienna in 1683, although alternative methods of recruitment were by then already in existence. There were, additionally, six regiments of palace horsemen distinguished by unique names, but generally also referred to as *sipahis*. These were the sultan's own standing cavalry numbering 2,300 at the time of Mehmed II (1451-81).[1] They were generally better paid than the Janissaries.

The Janissaries constituted the standing, salaried infantry of the Ottomans, starting out as the elite troops of the court, an innovation at least partially driven by the need of the dynasty to counter the strength of the provincial *timariots*. At sometime between the years 1380 and 1390 a levy of Christian male children, from 8 to 15 years old, called the *devşirme*, was inaugurated. Approximately every three to five years after the initial conquest the Christian territories of the Balkans were visited to collect one boy from every 40 families. At its peak, under this system these children were brought to Constantinople, trained in the palace schools, and the majority of them relegated to the fighting troops that came to be known as the New Troops (*Yeni-Çeri*), the Janissaries. A smaller number of the hand-picked intelligent boys were especially trained for bureaucratic service, and a number of them served as Grand Viziers (Prime Ministers) of the empire, second in command to the sultan.

Two thousand archers were reported as being with the Commander of the Janissaries at the battle of Kosovo against the Serbs in 1389. By the beginning of the reign of Mehmed II the Janissaries numbered 3,000. In addition to a daily salary, the Janissaries were given rations, cloth for uniforms, and weapons. Besides those in the imperial city, garrisons of these troops were stationed at all the major fortresses of the Ottoman borders along the Danube, Black Sea, Dardanelles and eastern frontiers. We know very little about their conditions of employment in the fortresses before the time of Mehmed II, when documentation about military rules and regulations becomes more plentiful. It was Ottoman practice to leave a garrison, representing

[1]G. Káldy-Nagy, The first centuries of the Ottoman military organization, *Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae*, 31, 1977, p. 168.

sultanic law, a judge, representing Islamic law, and Muslim preachers in all newly-conquered territories. Fortress and mosque symbolized the sultan's presence in these early cities, sometimes built within the Christian towns, but equally often built apart. Relocation of populations into Balkan territories and, after 1453, to the new imperial capital was a routine policy of Ottoman settlement.

Firearms were also present at Kosovo in 1389. New research on the transfer of military technology between the east and west has demonstrated that knowledge of firearms, both cannons and arquebuses, was fairly common by the mid-fourteenth century, both in the Balkans and in Mamluk territory (Egypt, Palestine and Syria). Italian and Ragusan merchants alike exported arms to the Ottomans. It was, however, Mehmed II who made them a regular part of the Ottoman arsenal, as his interest in military science was well-known in Europe, and attracted the interest of military experts.[1] The widespread adoption of firearms by the Janissaries was a slow process — probably a majority used arquebuses by 1590 — with even more disdain for the clumsy arquebus expressed by the cavalry, although even they wore pistols by the mid-seventeenth century.[2]

Locally-raised infantrymen, and auxiliary corps, called by a bewildering variety of names, but most often *azabs*, were also part of the Ottoman army from an early period. These were troops whose primary duties included guarding roads and passes, digging trenches, serving as local militias or marines in the navy, fighting alongside the Janissaries as infantrymen or cavalrymen, and raiding in front of the army, the latter called *akıncı*. Both *azab* and *akıncı* were at Kosovo. Drawn from the countryside, they were generally supplied by villagers as part of military taxation.

The Tatar Khan, ruler of the descendants of the Golden Horde in the Crimea, would assume the role of the *akıncıs*, once they became vassals to the Ottomans, following the completion of conquest of the Black Sea region in 1475, when the Black Sea is said to have become an "Ottoman lake". Until Catherine II's annexation of the Crimea in 1783, they could and often did contribute up to 100,000 horsemen to Ottoman campaigns, a third wing of the army, capable of inflicting considerable damage. The Tatar Khan, whose legitimacy was often determined by Ottoman recognition, was handsomely rewarded for his efforts by the sultan.

[1]G. Ágoston, "Ottoman artillery and European military technology in the fifteenth and seventeenth centuries", *Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae,* 47, 1994, pp. 24-6.
[2]V. J. Parry, Bārūd iv. Ottoman Empire, *Encyclopedia of Islam,* 2nd edn (Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1960- [unfinished]), pp. 1061-6.

The process of subduing and consolidating an empire was a long-drawn-out one, and Ottomans made use of a variety of strategic campaigns to maintain Balkan loyalties; establishing a buffer zone between Venetian and Ottoman in Ragusa (Dubrovnik); adding Wallachia and Moldavia as vassals; sustaining the Dulkadir and the Karamanid dynasties in Anatolia as allies and marcher territory between Ottoman and Mamluk, until they were in a position to confront the Mamluks and establish the Taurus Mountains as a boundary by 1491.[1] Military strategy had to be augmented with the creation of a navy before the Ottomans could conceivably take control of the Dardanelles, the Bosphorus and the Black Sea. By the 1470s, the Ottoman fleet included 92 galleys.[2]

The story of Mehmed II's conquest of Constantinople has been well-documented.[3] What needs to be re-emphasized is the fact that the city had been reduced to a population of 30,000 by the time of the siege, and contained within itself the seeds of its own destruction in the endless quarrels between Catholic and Orthodox, and also in the foreign merchant quarter of Galata (Pera), where Genoese and Venetian were slow to defend and quick to join the victors to gain commercial advantage. Mehmed II is generally accounted as the true founder of the empire, both because of the conquest and because of the imperial vision he brought to the new Ottoman capital, which reached an estimated population of 100,000 by 1500, rivaling all the cities of Europe in size, and also because of the almost 30 bellicose years following 1453, when much of the core territory which made up the empire until 1918 came under Ottoman hegemony.

The imperial age 1453 - 1566

The era between the conquest of Constantinople and the death of Süleyman I (1520-66) is generally acknowledged as the golden age of the empire, when a series of extraordinary sultans expanded Ottoman territory to bring into, at least nominal, Ottoman control: North Africa as far as Algeria; Mecca and Medina, Egypt, Syria and all of Anatolia; the Morea, Bosnia and Albania; Belgrade and large parts of Hungary, the Crimea and the Black Sea. It is an equally important period for the consolidation of Ottoman institutions,

[1]Shai Har-El, *Struggle for domination in the Middle East: the Ottoman-Mamluk War, 1485-91* (Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1995).
[2]H. İnalcık, *The Ottoman Empire: the classical age, 1300-1600* (London, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1973), p. 26.
[3]S. Runciman, *The fall of Constantinople* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1961) and bibliography.

court life and ceremonial, including the construction of a new palace, the Topkapı Sarayı, started by Mehmed II on the site of a Byzantine palace. The Ottomans of the sixteenth century had imperial ambitions to match those of Habsburg and Valois or Bourbon, and were a significant factor in European politics and diplomacy of the age. The Spanish Habsburgs and the Ottomans played out their rivalry in the western Mediterranean, while the Austrian branch of the house and Hungary fought one another and the expansion of the Ottoman frontier across the Danube into Europe. In the Muslim world the Ottomans became the supreme power, and the greatest of the Muslim empires, their chief rival for control of Eastern Anatolia after 1500, the Shiite Safavids in Iran. Besides the significant dates already mentioned, there are major victories and setbacks in this period that warrant discussion: the eastern campaigns of Selim I (1512-20), especially the 1514 defeat of Shah Ismail (1501-24) at Çaldıran, and the 1517 capture of Cairo; Süleyman's addition of Belgrade, the gateway to central Europe, to the empire in 1521; his victory at the battle of Mohacs against the Hungarians in 1526; the addition of the Hungarian province of Buda in 1541, but equally Süleyman's failure to capture Vienna in 1529, are indicative both of the successes and of the failures of the Ottoman military machine.

The various military units of the empire, as well as the navy, saw tremendous growth in this period. The continued development of the artillery branches, the *topçular* (artillerymen), the *cebeciler* (the armourers), and the *top arabacılar* (the gun carriage drivers), is one of the striking features of this growth. Mehmed II is credited with building the state cannon foundry (the *Tophane)*, probably on the site of a Genoese foundry in Pera. Foreign experts were numerous in the court of Mehmed II, establishing a pattern of borrowing expertise that continued until the nineteenth century, although this may have impeded the development of indigenous expertise. Bronze cannons were cast locally by the mid-fifteenth century, but standardization and quality would never keep up with Europe. Until the late seventeenth century, the Ottomans were self-sufficient in the production of copper, iron and gunpowder, maintaining mines and factories all over the empire.[1] Ottoman gunners were esteemed by the Mughals in India, and gunpowder played a large role in Babur's conquest in 1526.[2] The Ottomans maintained a large fleet of specially-designed ships for use in troop, artillery and munitions transport on the Danube.

[1]Ágoston, "Ottoman artillery", p. 46.
[2]Parry, Bārūd, p. 1062.

Selim I, whose sobriquet in western sources, "the Grim", is apt, spent most of the eight years of his reign on horseback. He had 10,000 Janissary infantry, the majority with firearms, and 348 artillerymen accompanying him of campaign to Çaldıran, where he defeated Shah Ismail and the Safavids, a confrontation that would continue for 200 years, requiring repeated, grueling campaigns in inhospitable territory. After the victory at Çaldıran, attributable to the impressive firepower of the Ottomans, Selim I turned south and, in a series of confrontations with the Mamluks in 1516-7, completely defeated that Muslim power, again at least partially because the Mamluk military ethos completely rejected the use of the messy firearms.

Two imperatives drove Selim I's campaigns. The contemporary Reformation movement in Europe had its parallel in the East in the religious confrontation between Sunni and Shiite. The hard-won treaty of Amasya in 1555, like the treaty of Augsburg in the same year, attempted to delineate the border between Orthodox Sunni and minority Shiite views of Islam. Capture of Cairo in 1517 would make the Ottomans the supreme Sunni Muslim dynasty, since Cairo was the gateway to the two most sacred Muslim cities, Mecca and Medina. The Ottomans adopted "Guardian of the Two Sacred Cities," as part of their titulature, and profited from the annual tribute, an extremely important source of revenue for the palace.

Equally important was control over the Red Sea and access to the lucrative space trade of the Far East, routes challenged by the Portuguese when they captured Hormuz in 1511. The capture of Cairo gave the Ottomans the port of Suez, where a fleet was maintained to counter the Portuguese presence in both Red Sea and Indian Ocean, and new considerations about Ottoman strategy suggest that they tried hard, with some success, to reopen the trade routes, which were important to their economy. The last major campaign in the Indian Ocean in 1552, against Hormuz itself, reputedly failed only because of the sinking of a supply ship, leaving the troops short of munitions and food.[1] Mediterranean naval historians have demonstrated that the Ottoman galley, designed for coastal warfare and defense, was useless in open water against the ocean-going ships of the Portuguese.[2] The Ottoman Mediterranean fleet was built around the imperative of protecting fortresses such as Suez,

[1]S. Özbaran, "Ottoman naval policy in the south", in M. Kunt and C. Woodhead (eds) *Süleyman the Magnificent and his age: the Ottoman Empire in the early modern world* (London, Longman, 1995), p. 64.
[2]C. M. Cipolla, *Guns, sails and empires: technological innovaton and the early phases of European expansion, 1400-1700* (New York, 1965); also J. F. Fuilmartin, *Gunpowder and Galleys, changing technology and Mediterranean warfare at sea in the sixteenth century* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1974).

Basra and Aden, as well as the shipping lanes to Istanbul. For the confrontations with the Spanish Habsburgs, the Ottomans relied on famous captains such as Barbarossa, with local fleets and Ottoman supplies, primarily from Algiers, which began as a garrison, then became a vassal to the Ottomans in the 1520s.

By the time of Süleyman I's succession to his father's throne in 1520, the Ottoman threat to Europe proper was real, Martin Luther had dubbed the sultan the Antichrist, and politicians like Machiavelli saw much to admire in the Ottoman system. The core of that system as viewed by Europeans was the Janissary and the slave household of the sultan. Impressions of foreign visitors, like Ogier Ghiselin de Busbecq, Austrian ambassador to Süleyman (1554-62), have strongly influenced our thinking about the military of the Ottoman sixteenth century:

> The Turks come together for war as if they had been invited to a wedding; I think there is no prince in the world who has his armies and camps in better order, both as regards the abundance of victuals and other necessities, and as regards the beautiful order and manner they use in encamping without any confusion; The Turks surpass our soldiers for three reasons; they obey their commander promptly; never show the least concern for their lives in battle; they can live a long time without bread or wine, content with barley and water; peace and silence reign in a Turkish camp — such is the result produced by military discipline.[1]

The palace Janissary corps stood at roughly 11,000-12,000 in 1527, rising to 20,000 in 1567[2] and to 37,000 by the end of the Long War (1593-1606).[3] This number does not include the palace cavalry regiments, whose numbers increased from 5,088 to 11,251 in that same time-period. Nor does it take into account the provincial *timariot* forces, called to war in large numbers (as many as 100,000 throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries), or the local garrison forces, averaging 100-200 at the lowest, while several thousand might be assigned to the major fortresses serving as the Ottoman primary line of defense, especially on the European frontier.[4]

In fact, for the Ottomans to organize and go on campaign was a cumbersome and lenghty process. The call to arms was sent out on the main

[1]A. Stiles, *The Ottoman Empire, 1450-1700* (London, Hodder & Stoughton, 1989), p. 72.
[2]Káldy-Nagy, p. 167.
[3]H. İnalcık, Istanbul, *Encyclopedia of Islam,* 2nd edn (Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1960- [unfinished]), p. 242.
[4]Káldy-Nagy, pp. 168-9.

campaign routes to Anatolia and the Balkans in December of the year before the campaign. Troops raised from the countryside were ordered to join the main army on the march; those in Istanbul mobilized and left the city in early spring. The tremendous distances, and an average day of no more than 10-12 miles, meant that arrival to the actual battlefields in Hungary or in eastern Anatolia might not occur until mid-June. Major confrontations were often confined to August-October, when field conditions and the lack of fodder generally forced the suspension of hostilities, and, traditionally, the Janissaries returned to Constantinople.

Ottoman soldiers were well, if frugally, fed, and sober. Bread and/or biscuit were imperatives, with rice and mutton forming part of the rations, and barley for the horses and pack animals. Camels, water buffalo and oxen were the draught animals of supply wagons and artillery, the largest of the cannon requiring up to twenty oxen. Early on, supporting the numbers described above forced the creation of a system of warehouses and well-stocked way-stations, a responsibility of the towns and villages of the area, who, at least in this period, were paid for the goods they brought to the army, or whose taxes reflected their commitments to military supply. Representatives from all the guilds of Istanbul were required to accompany the army on campaign: millers, bakers, butchers, saddlers, cobblers and the like-again part of the commitment of the population to the military effort, in an age when all expected to be tapped to support the campaigns.

It was with this "wedding party" that Süleyman embarked on the conquest of Hungary, taking the western gate to Europe, Belgrade, in 1521, engaging and routing the forces of young king Lajos (Louis) II of Hungary at Mohacs in 1526, and establishing by the end of his reign the provinces of Buda in 1541, the vassalage of Transylvania, and a second province of Temeşvar (Timişioara) in 1552. His final campaign in 1566 meant the capture of yet more Hungarian territory, especially Szigetvar, before his own death on that campaign. His successor, Selim II (1566-74), signed a treaty with the Habsburgs in 1568 which survived until 1593. Maintaining control over such distant lands was costly, requiring a large system of fortresses along the Drava, Sava and the Danube, as well as the chain of garrisons bordering on the Hungarian Kingdom.[1] Between 1569 and 1590 an average of 10,500 troops were stationed in Buda, of which only 900 roughly were designated as

[1]K. Hegyi, "The Ottoman military force in Hungary", in G. David and P. Fodor (eds) *Hungarian-Ottoman military and diplomatic relations in the age of Süleyman the Magnificent* (Budapest, Loránd Eötvös University, 1994), pp. 133-4.

Janissaries.[1] In the 1520's, an estimated 58 per cent of 41,000 registered Ottoman troops were stationed in the Balkan Peninsula; by 1613, perhaps 73 per cent of an estimated 38,000 were stationed in Hungary and Bosnia alone. Such estimates demonstrate the paramount importance of Danubian defense to Ottoman strategy.[2]

Süleyman's campaigns on land and sea were costly, and the imperial endeavors required a court and administration reflective of that power. İnalcık has estimated that the palace personnel (excluding the *Kapukulu* troops of Janissary and cavalry) grew from 3,472 in 1514 to *c.* 12,971 in 1609.[3] Such a figure excludes the harem organization, an exclusively feminine domain which housed not only the salaried favorites and mothers of sultans and heirs of the throne, but all their servants, closely controlled by the black eunuchs, themselves some of the most politically powerful palace administrators of the post-Süleymanic age. Much of Süleyman's later reign was taken up with the control and manipulation of palace rivalries.

The Janissaries had begun to acquire the reputation for unruliness rebellion and stubbornness that was to become such a feature of later descriptions of the corps. Süleyman's decision to leave Vienna in 1529 was based as much on their restlessness, and also the lateness of the campaign season and insufficiency of supplies, as it was on the threat mounted by Ferdinand and Charles V. The demands of the provincial, fief-based *timariots* were equally pressing, for most wished to return to their assigned lands over the winter. The over- emphasis on the role of the Janissaries has long eclipsed the significance of the mounted troops, who until well into the seventeenth century remained the most dreaded and unpredictable of all the forces at the sultan's command. The Ottomans were attempting to support two military systems: the *timariots;* and the salaried palace army from the center in Constantinople, in order to cover campaigns east and west.

Internal problems start to make their appearance in the latter days of Süleyman. Inflation in prices due to shortages of gold and silver, driven at least partially by the European expansion from 1500 onwards, led to coin debasement and new exigencies, such as extraordinary taxes and the confiscation of the estates of the empire's wealthy. The eastern frontier remained nomadic and uncontrolled, causing disruption to agrarian systems,

[1]Hegyi, pp. 139-40.
[2]Hegyi, pp. 147-8.
[3]İnalcık, Istanbul, p. 242.

and desertion of the land. Demobilized armed soldiery began to influence political and military thinking, as local bands could be manipulated to gain control of the countryside and to counterbalance governmental attempts at centralization. Thus, the "golden age" that lost its luster with the death of Süleyman in 1566 was equally a harbinger for the problems which faced his successors.

The limits of empire 1566-1699

Between 1566 and 1699, the Treaty of Karlowitz, the Ottoman Empire experienced a critical challenge to its hegemony on the Hungarian frontier, on the Safavid border and in the Mediterranean. To maintain the focus on the military, this discussion of the crisis period will consider two lengthy campaigns which open and close the seventeenth century: the Habsburg-Ottoman War of 1593-1606; and the War of the Holy League of 1683-99. In the middle of the century Murad IV's campaign to Baghdad in 1638, which consolidated that frontier until the end of the empire, is also worth noting, as is the direction of Ottoman naval policy in the Mediterranean after the battle of Lepanto in 1571.

The 200 years following 1566 are commonly described as the era of decline, stagnation, decentralization and decomposition. Much has been made of the feebleness of the sultan, the killing of potential rival brothers and cousins, the confinement of heirs to the palace proper, and the influence of the harem, dubbed the "sultanate of the women". It is equally the period when the Grand Vizierate, exemplified by the extraordinary Köprülü family, assumed control of the administration, acquiring autonomy from the palace in separate quarters in 1657, initiating reforms in both army and finances, and gaining some notable successes in the field against the Safavids and even on the European front. Preference for the sensational and the exotic has prohibited historians from attempting an integrative view which might interpret the changing role of the sultan and his elite groups as a reconfiguration of monarch and aristocracy, and as the emergence of potential rival provincial households, strengthened by the empire's constant need for men and supplies which only they could supply. Crippling expenses, exacerbated by the demands of the Janisarry corps for payment of the "accession fee" by the new sultan, diverted revenues and the sultan's private treasury away from military essentials, and forced the conversion of extraordinary into ordinary taxes, increasing the burden on peasant and grandee alike. In this regard the Ottoman sultans were restricted to the limited choices agrarian societies offered for

financing, and failed to make the conversion to the kind of mercantilism that enabled their European counterparts to begin to exert some control over the military in this transitional period.

Finkel's masterful account of the 1593-1606 Habsburg-Ottoman struggle in Hungary allows us some glimpse into the state of the Ottoman military of the period, the obduracy of the Janissary corps, and the acceleration of alternative systems for getting the job done. The borderlands described in the previous section remained the scene of cross-border skirmishes, but until the Ottomans closed along confrontation with the Safavids in 1590, by which they established a tenuous hegemony over Azerbaijan and the Caucasus, they were unable to turn their attention to the Danubian battlefront. According to contemporary historians, the choices then open to the Ottomans were: to renew war with Persia; or to attack Morocco, Spain, Malta, Venice, some part of Italy, Poland, or the Habsburgs and Hungary.[1] Lateness of the annual 30,000-ducat tribute money from Vienna, combined with a Hungarian-Ottoman confrontation at Siska in 1593, gave Murad III (1574-95) and Grand Vizier Sinan an excuse to order the Balkan troops to mobilize in the spring of 1593, the Habsburg emperor having already abrogated the treaty. Ottoman troops were initially successful in 1593 and 1594, saving Estergom from an Austrian attack and capturing the fortress of Györ (Yamk) farther west.

The issue of contention continued to be the vassal territories of Transylvania, Wallachia and Moldavia (the Principalities), who turned to the Habsburgs for protection in this round of confrontations. In 1595 the Austrians regained the advantage, but a thrust of the entire Ottoman force in 1596, with the sultan (Mehmet III 1595-1603) at their head for the first time since 1566, forced a major confrontation and success at Mezokeresztes in October. By the end of 1598, in spite of the successes, disarray in command and in the forces headquartered in Belgrade led the grand vizier to initiate inconclusive peace talks in 1599. Further events, such as the capture of Kanija by the Ottomans, and the realignment of the principalities as vassals (Wallachia in 1599, Moldavia in 1600 and Transylvania in 1605) which left the Ottomans in a position of strength, were offset by the necessity to mount a campaign against the Safavid Shah Abbas (d. 1629) in the east after 1603, and by a very considerable countrywide rebellion in the Celâli Revolts which began in 1599.

[1]C. Finkel, *The administration of warfare: the Ottoman military campaigns in Hungary, 1593-1606* (Vienna, VWGÖ, 1988) p. 9.

The 1606 Treaty of Zsitva-Torok, which conceded Kanija, Eger to the Ottomans and confirmed their control of Estergom, represented little else for an effort which left both sides exhausted and reflective, although the reacquisition of the loyalties of the Principalities, which remained the bread basket of Istanbul, was also vitally important. By 1699, however, the military balance would no longer be a *status quo*, because the Thirty Years' War would change European warfare forever.

The significance of the 1593-1606 war to Ottoman military history is in the increased recruitment of the peasantry to form regiments of infantrymen and cavalrymen. This is in addition to the Janissary infantry and garrison troops, who continued to be paid on the tri-monthly basis, according to their enrollment in the pay registers. Access to Janissary pay tickets, the *esame*, was the greatest privilege of the corps, coveted by many but leading to abuses such as maintaining long-dead or inactive soldiers on the rolls for the sake of their salaries. The effective fighting force of palace troops in this period was probably somewhere about 50,000 infantry and cavalry, and certainly the palace contingent of some 10,000 made the difference at Mezokeresztes.

The issue of the *timariots* role in this war is still a matter of some controversy. The revenues extracted from their assigned lands no longer supported an individual soldier, and being called to campaign had become an expensive ordeal to be avoided. An alternative force, the countryside landless, was mobilized as armed infantry regiments (*sekban* is the most common name) in this war, leading to a cycle of lawlessness and banditry in the countryside, which was influenced by the cycles of warfare and peace of the later empire, the first being the Celâli Revolts referred to above.[1] The general cause of the revolts has been assumed to be the demobilization of both *timariots* and *sekban* after Mezokeresztes, and the confiscation of the assignments of as many as 20,000-30,000 *timariots*, who had failed to appear, or deserted. The effort to restore some control over the system backfired in violent rebellion, affecting even the capital and was not brought under control until 1603, continuing sporadically until mid-century. Anyone who has studied European warfare of the period may recognize the general phenomenon, as mercenaries and autonomous regiments came to be replaced by indigenous standing armies of the idle, hungry, potentially lawless, and often willing peasants.

[1]K. Barkey, *Bandits and bureaucrats: the Ottoman route to state centralization* (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1994]; H. İnalcık, "Military and fiscal transformation in the Ottoman Empire, 1600-1700", *Archivum Ottomanicum*, 6, 1980, pp. 283-337.

The means of financing such local troops were various: villages could volunteer and finance soldiers from their midst as part of their military effort as in earlier campaigns; or provincial governors, appointed from the palace, could be ordered to bring together 1,000-2,000 troops in additional to their personal retainers and entourage, financed out of their own pockets. The possibility of aggrandizement at the local level should be obvious, and it is one of the most significant provincial trends of the seventeenth century.

The Crimean Tatars (and other smaller contingents from the Principalities), remained the Ottoman mercenaries, an unpredictable and increasingly unreliable force, at least partially so because of increased Ottoman interference with succession quarrels in the khanate, but equally because of mixed loyalties, and the threat of an emerging Russia in the Ukraine, the Black Sea and the Caucasus. In open, mobile warfare, the Tatars excelled at raiding and harassing supply trains and soldiers on the march, but, at the siege warfare which characterized much of Danubian fortress campaigning, they were inept. In the subsequent European and Ottoman diplomacy over Poland and the Ukraine, they continued to be both an irritant and a significant catalyst of events. Countryside manpower continued to staff the auxiliary needs — whether for drovers, trench diggers, the preparation of roads — in a bewilderingly complex systems of compensation and exemptions.

The Ottoman army was often compared with a mobile fortress which dragged around with it everything it required to live and fight. This continued to be the practice, one which would work to the detriment of later campaigns. Nonetheless, supply systems in 1593-1606 were very resilient and relied on two variables: the well-defined series of warehouses at billets and in frontier fortresses, stocked by state commissioners, and the willingness of local peasantry to bring supplies to the troops in return for cash. The period under discussion saw the gradual imposition of new extraordinary taxes (in cash rather than in kind) to replace more voluntary systems, as contingents and their demands grew larger.

To what extent the Ottoman soldier fed off the land or purchased his own supplies is as yet undetermined, but the salaried palace troops expected rations and the system was constructed to satisfy that demand first and foremost. The single largest item of concern to pre-modern armies was grain: for the Ottomans it was for wheat flour and barley, the latter used primarily for fodder for the horses and other stock. Biscuit, or hardtack, substituted for fresh bread, when battlefront circumstances necessitated it, were the staples of

the Ottoman soldier's diet. Any given district (a collectivity of villages, called *avarizhane*) could be required to contribute a portion of their crops at fixed (and generally lower) prices, or to prepare (bake) and ship biscuit to the front. That same district might also find it hard to supply firewood, hay and straw, oxen, horses, mules and carriages, again for fixed rates for leasing or wages for the drovers and wagoneers. Some districts close to billets found their taxation linked to supplying the way-stations, and many may have benefited from being allowed (required - the term *sürsat* remaining a matter of controversy among historians) to sell their goods directly to the soldiers at market rates.

Local, centrally-appointed judges and members of the gentry were responsible for both mobilization and supply. State-appointed commissioners and fortress commissaries were also an integral part of the Ottoman supply system. Each major fortress had its own commissary official and chief accountant (who might be one and the same), and records even for the eighteenth century indicate that the supply levy (*nüzül*), system was still in force. Cash substitution for kind makes its regular appearance by the mid-sixteenth century, contributing to an evolution of countryside indebtedness that created provincial gentry families, many of whom started out as Janissaries.

Records for Murad IV's (1623-40) campaign to Baghdad in 1638 permit a glimpse of Ottoman organization in mid-century. Murad, who, for the first decade of his reign, faced significant military resistance and open revolt in Anatolia, a continuation of the Celâli Revolts, is often credited with restoring order to the anarchy. His predecessor, the hapless young sultan Osman II (1618-22), had undertaken to curb excesses of the Janissaries, to attempt to stem the flood of successes of the Safavids (Baghdad eventually fell in 1629) and to fend off the Poles at Hotin (1621) in a pitiful performance by both sides. Although an energetic and idealistic ruler, Osman II's attempts at reform simply hastened his downfall, as the former "terrors of the world" had now become the terrors of Constantinople and the sultan himself.

Murad's solution was to encourage the countryside to eliminate the rebels themselves, after securing the oath of loyalty from the majority of the Janissaries. In effect, his brutality allowed for a systematic review of the *timariot* lands, with many transferred to Janissaries and palace staff, and the further evolvement of the system known as *iltizam*, which substituted a tax-farming system for the fief-based *timariots*. Murad also used the campaign to regain Baghdad in 1638 as an opportunity to do some scouring of the

countryside himself, eliminating Shiite resistance, and in the treaty of 1639 generally fixing the Iraq - Iran border much as it stands today. A *devşirme* levy was conducted in 1638, one of two in Murad's reign. Probably 70,000 - 80,000 provincial troops and levies, all the Janissaries (60,000-80,000), and Turcoman (Kurdish) and Tatars numbering 60,000-100,000 horsemen were mobilized in the course of the two seasons spent in the east. For an estimated 80-day, 80,000-man march, approximately 5,000,000 kilograms of biscuit were requisitioned, on a proposed ration of 200 grams of biscuit per day. 200 grams of mutton was also the daily ration for the Janissaries.[1]

Murad IV had as advisor, Koçu Bey, a palace official whose brief essay on the ills of the empire has long served as the prime source of information on reform agendas of the seventeenth century. In a tradition of criticism which would continue into the nineteenth century, Koçu Bey described four causes of the anarchy of the period: (1) lack of leadership, i.e. the sultan's withdrawal from military affairs; (2) eclipse of the office of the grand vizier; (3) the rise and dominance of factional politics and (4) widespread corruption. Included in further lists by early reformers were the corruption of the muster rolls of the Janissaries, and the ineffectiveness of the provincial troops. Koçu Bey proposed an idealized version of the age of Süleyman as the model for a revived empire, which became a standard theme of Ottoman political discourse. Its accuracy as representative of the real state of affairs has only recently been questioned.[2]

A moment of crisis in 1656 during the reign of Mehmet IV (1648-87), can be used to illustrate Ottoman politics and negotiations. A major revolt in Constantinople, initiated by the Janissaries who were protesting about the debasement of the coinage used for their salaries, in effect closed down the city. Their chief opposition lay in the provincial *timariots* and the *sekbans*, the local militias who replaced them. Large numbers of these provincial troops were then in the city. This era also saw the dominance of an intolerant Muslim revival movement, the *Kadızadeler*, which was attempting to

[1]R. Murphey, *The functioning of the Ottoman army under Murad IV (1623-1639/1032-1049): key to the understanding of the relationship between center and periphery*, 2 vols (Phd thesis, Department of History, University of Chicago, 1979), especially vol. 1, chaps 2, 4-5. Vol 1, p. 133 includes one round-up of 19,901 sheep from the period (1633) to give an idea of the quantities required.

[2]The issues and text are discussed in the following articles: D. Howard, "Ottoman historiography and the literature of "decline" of the sixteenth and seventeneth centuries", *Journal of Asian History*, 22, 1988, pp. 52-77; V. Aksan, "Ottoman political writing, 1768-1808", *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 25, 1993, pp. 53-69; G. Piterberg, "Speech acts and written texts: a reading of a seventeenth century Ottoman historiographical episode", *Poetics Today*, 14, (1993), pp. 387-418, concentrates on the "orality" of the narratives.

reimpose a strict orthodoxy upon both the sultan and the city's population, attacking particularly the pervasive Sufi mystical orders. A decade of incompetent grand viziers, generally Palace favorites, meant the dominance of factional politics between the Janissary Commander-in-Chief, the harem and the black eunuch. Finally, the Venetians, in May 1656, defeated and destroyed an Ottoman fleet at the Dardanelles, blocking them so thoroughly that scarce food and fear of enemy attack created panic in the populace at large. Comparisons with the house of Bourbon in France are apt in this period, particularly under Louis XIV, where the buying and selling of offices, the extension of government in the *intendant* system, household politics in an inflated palace operation, religious opposition and the suppression of the Huguenots, and constant warfare forced oppressive and unwanted exactions on aristocrat and peasant alike. The extension of the arm of the sultan over proud autonomies and deeply-entrenched privileges led countryside and city to raise its voice.

The normal Ottoman palace response to such revolts was to give in to the demands, sacrifice high officials of the state, up to and including the sultan himself, and distribute largesse. In this case, the 80-year old respected and honest Mehmed Köprülü negotiated sole power as Grand Vizier (1656-61), and proceeded with rare swiftness to restore order to the city by banishing and confiscating the property of his rivals, military and religious, and installing loyal men from his own household into positions of power. Bozcaada (Tenedos) and Limni (Limnos) were recaptured from the Venetians, and the Straits secured by 1657. A significant revolt under Abaza Hasan Pasha was similarly quelled by the harsh measures and political savvy of the first of the Köprülüs, a dynasty continued with his son Fazıl Ahmed (1661-76).[1] It was still possible to restore the fortunes of the Ottoman house, and even immediately to rebuild the Ottoman fleet, as had been the case in 1571 after the battle of Lepanto.

There is a certain refusal in Mediterranean historiography to accord the Ottomans a naval policy. Against that might be set Süleyman's capture of Rhodes in 1522, to eliminate the Knights of St. John from within striking distance of the Ottomans; the brief alliance with Francis I of France which saw an Ottoman fleet winter over in Marseilles in 1536, and rewarded the French with the first of the favorable trade agreements known as the

[1]İnalcık, *The Ottoman Empire* p. 48: *timariots* numbered about 8,000 in this period. See also S. J. Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1976), vol. 1, pp. 208-12.

"Capitulations"; and, finally, the operations in Yemen against the Portuguese in 1538 and again in 1552. After Kazan and Astrakhan were conquered by Tsar Ivan IV in 1552-6, the Ottomans under the renowned Grand Vizier Sokollu Mehmed Pasha, conceived a project to build a canal between the Don and the Volga to accommodate the fleet, an unrealistic undertaking attempted in 1569. The building of such a canal would not be achieved until the twentieth century. In 1570-1, the conquest of the island of Cyprus required significant mobilization of both army and navy, and one of the consequences of Ottoman aggression was the amassing of an allied fleet, under Don Juan of Austria, which confronted and destroyed the Ottoman fleet at Lepanto, a naval battle involving 438 ships. Of the 230 which the Ottomans brought to the conflict 200 were destroyed, but the Ottomans rebuilt the navy over the winter, and the Venetians were finally forced to accept the surrender of Cyprus in 1573.

The lengthy siege of Crete, by contrast, represented the final struggle of two naval powers, Venice and the Ottomans, for the largest of the islands in the eastern Mediterranean. It would not be completely conquered until 1669, after a long siege. While the Venetians received support from Malta, the Pope, and the French, the Ottomans supported the effort in the Mediterranean at the same time that they were defending the Black Sea littoral against Cossack raids even into the Bosphorus, and extending Ottoman power to its farthest north point, with the temporary gain of Podolia (1671-99). Ottoman naval practice continued to operate on the principle of defense of the ports and the trade corridors, concerned as it always was with the feeding of Constantinople and the mobilization and feeding of troops. Crete remained nominally in Ottoman hands until 1913, an important source of olive oil, wine and grain. Cyprus was occupied by Britain in 1878.[1] By the late eighteenth century, Ottoman naval efforts were rarely rewarded with success. In 1770 the entire fleet was destroyed, when, to the astonishment of Europe, a Russian flotilla (with a number of British captains), appeared in the Aegean and engaged the Ottomans at Çeşme, west of present-day İzmir. The Ottomans did rebuild, but the creation of a modern style navy was a product of the mid-nineteenth century.

The latter half of the seventeenth century saw some success in re-establishing order in the army and treasury, and extending Ottoman control, for example, along the Black Sea littoral, reforms which were checked by the

[1]R. C. Jennings, *Christians and Muslims in Ottoman Cyprus and the Mediterranean world, 1571-1640* (New York, New York University Press, 1993), offers a revised look at this period from Ottoman sources.

extended war against Habsburg, Pole and Hungarian which broke out in 1683. The Ottoman-Habsburg War of 1683-99 focused Ottoman attention on the Danubian border and the north coast of the Black Sea, the center of confrontation with Austria and Russia for the next 200 years. The years 1683-99 were those of the struggle for possession of Hungary between Ottoman and the Holy League which by 1697 included Austria, Venice, Poland, the Pope and Russia, but also of considerable upheaval at the center of power, as four different sultans were enthroned and deposed in the course of the war. Two battles, the siege of Vienna in 1683, and the massive confrontation at Zenta in 1697, demonstrate the strength and weaknesses of the Ottoman military organization. The 1683 siege, late in the campaign season, and lifted by the arrival of a Polish army under Jan Sobieski, was on the brink of success, when the obstinacy of Grand Vizier Kara Mustafa Pasha left the Ottomans unaware of the impending attack of the Poles from the rear, and forced a rout of the entire army, leaving behind enough booty (300 guns, 5,000 tents, provisions and all the banners of the Janissary regiments) to fill the many museums which proudly display their trophies in Vienna today.[1] Buda held out till 1686, but following its surrender, the Ottomans retreated to Belgrade. Grand Vizier Fazıl Mustafa (1689-91) briefly made great strides in reforming the army, but was himself killed in August 1691 at Szlankemen. The Janissaries were still capable of considerable resistance in entrenchments, such as that at Sofia in 1697, but further humiliation followed in September, when the renowned commander Prince Eugene of Savoy destroyed another Ottoman army, under Sultan Mustafa II (1695-1703), at Zenta. Out numbered two to one, the imperial forces suffered 2,100 casualties by contrast with the 30,000 Ottomans wounded and drowned in the river Tizsa.[2] In spite of that Austrian triumph, lack of money and the general exhaustion of both main belligerents forced a conclusion of the Karlowitz treaty in January 1699, with the Ottomans ceding Hungary and Transylvania, and recognizing the equality of their fellow European rulers — a first in Ottoman-European diplomatic relations, which now entered a new phase, as bureaucrats rather than military men served as the chief negotiator and the notion of "fixed" borders and "permanent" peace began to replace the Muslim version of peace with infidels — that is, temporary truce in the perpetual war for the expansion of the world of Islam.

[1]G. Goodwin, *The Janissaries* (London, Saqi Books, 1994), p. 176.
[2]D. Chandler, *The art of warfare in the age of Marlborough* (London, B. T. Batsford, 1976), p. 302, lists 60,000 Ottoman infantry, 40,000 cavalry and 200 guns.

According to Marsigli, soldier, engineer, messenger and diplomat, who was captured by and escaped from the Tatars at the siege of Vienna, the Ottomans fielded no more than 30,000 *kapukulu* (Janissary and other corps) troops and approximately 155,000 provincial troops, the latter being divided into cavalry and infantry, *timariots*, troops raised by the governors of provinces, and the Tatars. Marsigli also noted that the Ottomans made strategic adjustments to their entrenchments and the positioning of their forces as a result of the lesson learned at Vienna in 1683. While he described the variety and quality of armaments, few statistics were included, although he did remark on the presence of Christian-style muskets and fusils, which he attributed to the Ottoman willingness to learn from the infidel.[1] Astute military observers of this and subsequent campaigns claimed as did Maurice de Saxe: "neither valor, nor number, nor wealth was lacking to them - but order, discipline, and 'la manière de combattre'". Others added the following list: incompetence in high command, lack of an efficient artillery, ignorance of tactics and of the art of maneuver.[2]

The compromise 1699-1812

Faced with considerable failure on the battlefield, another round of which led to the fall of the reputedly impregnable Belgrade to the Habsburgs in August 1717, and increasingly aware of the threat of Russia on the northern and eastern frontiers, the Ottomans began an imperceptible tilting toward things European, both in diplomacy and in military reform. For the sake of this discussion, the century can be framed by the Russian humiliation and lucky escape at Pruth in 1711, and the Ottoman debacle and diplomatic humiliation at the 1774 treaty of Küçük Kaynarca, ending the 1768-74 Russo-Ottoman war. The chapter ends with the description of another treaty, that of Bucharest of 1812, which capped a series of three debilitating and futile wars with the Russians (1768-74, 1787-92 and 1806-12), ruinous in their effects on the Balkans, especially the Principalities, and inaugurating, in many ways, the Eastern Question of the nineteenth century.

[1] J. Stoye, *Marsigli's Europe, 1680-1730: life and times of Luigi Ferdinando Marsigli soldier and virtuoso* (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1994), p. 93; L. F. Marsigli, *Stato militare dell'Imperio ottomanno, L'État militaire de l'empire ottoman* (La Haye, Amsterdam, 1732), pp. 20-8.

[2] V. J. Parry, Harb iv. Ottoman Empire, *Encyclopedia of Islam,* 2nd edn, p. 193.

The confrontation between Russian and Ottoman in July 1711, when the Ottomans completely surrounded the Russians on the Pruth, outnumbering them by more than six to one (260,000 to 40,000; casualties 3,000 Ottomans, 7,000 Russians),[1] but failed to press the advantage, has very often been held up as an example of Ottoman stupidity and cupidity in warfare and negotiations. Pruth was probably the last time that the Tatars and Cossacks effectively united against the Russians, one of the significant reasons for the victory, a lesson understood by Catherine and her famous Field Marshal Rumiantisev in the 1768-74 war in the same arena, when Cossack regiments served as auxiliaries of the Russian main army.

Mistrust of mutinous local rulers of the Principalities (Wallachia and Moldavia) by the Ottomans led to a new administrative tactic there — the appointment of overlords from the Phanariote Greek families of Istanbul, a policy which led to the disaffection of the populace at large. The changes reflect the significant difference between Ottoman and Russian frontier strategies: for the Ottomans the Principalities were always perceived as clients and vassals; for the Russians of the eighteenth century, in spite of much rhetoric about Orthodox brothers, the chief aim was territorial expansion. Catherine's strategy in the Crimea was clearly that: territorial victories were always accompanied by settlement, to the detriment ultimately of the Tatars, exiled after 1783. At Pruth the check on that expansion by the Ottomans was only temporary.

Frederick the Great, whose own experience of Russian might was quite recent, in conversation with Ahmed Resmi Efendi, the first Ottoman ambassador to Prussia in 1763, wondered why the Ottomans had been so lenient with Tsar Peter? Ahmed Resmi in true ambassadorial fashion equivocated, stating that the mobilization had only been to halt the onslaught of the Russians, and regain Azov, and that the sultan had been charitable.[2] In fact, the frontier fortresses captured by the Russians, including Azov, were surrendered. Given the general Ottoman fixation with the frontier fortress strategy, that may have been considered sufficient.

The Russian army developed more effective tactics in its conflicts with the European powers, especially during the Seven Years' War (1756-63), a war which helped to perfect the use of mobile, rapid-fire, small caliber cannons,

[1] Chandler, p. 305.

[2] V. H. Aksan, *An Ottoman statesman in war and peace: Ahmed Resmi Efendi 1700-1783* (Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1995), pp. 89-90.

and which relied on the rapid deployment of highly-trained and disciplined infantry. The socket bayonet came back into use, and represented a formidable weapon against the headlong charges of cavalry, all tactics which Rumiantsev put to good use against the Tatars in the 1768-74 war. Siege warfare was gradually being abandoned because of wastefulness and inconclusiveness. Massive confrontations, generally to be avoided, and carefully orchestrated when necessary, grew to be the norm by mid-century. European warfare had reached its apogee of pre-modern warfare, when mobilization of huge numbers of soldiers and the logistics of transportation and supply stretched the limits of even the healthiest state budgets.

For Russia, distance and manpower were a continual preoccupation in the Danubian context, conscription a lifetime sentence of the serf (for 25 years only after 1793). Self-mutilation was a frequent method of avoiding the levy.[1] In the 1680s the Russian standing army was more than 200,000 strong, representing 4.4 per cent of the population.[2] During Peter's reign, there were 53 levies of 300,000 recruits.[3] For the 1768-74 war alone 300,000 troops were levied.[4] The massive Pugachev rebellion of 1773, started among the Cossacks, can easily be interpreted as evidence of the strain which constant warfare in the south had begun to have on the populace at large.

By contrast, conscription in the Ottoman army did not become a mobilization tactic until the 1790s. One of the striking aspects of this period is the continued volunteerism evident in the campaigns that unfold, though death and desertion were endemic to both Russian and Ottoman, with losses (wounded, dead and from disease) as high as 25 per cent, often higher on the long forced marches. The Ottomans sat out most of the developments evident in the Seven Years War, although not entirely. They remained wedded to siege warfare and the efficacy of the horseman, even as they increased the proportion of infantry in the provincial levies. Consolidation of the Danube frontier with "an unprecedented program of fortress building during the first decades of the century gave perfect architectural expression to a more defensive outlook on the world", a system which ran from Belgrade to Azov.[5] Such a strategy was consistent with that of both Russian and Austrian military thinking, as

[1]J. L. H. Keep, *Soldiers of the Tsar: Army and Society in Russia 1462-1874* (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1985), p. 155.
[2]Keep, p. 88.
[3]Keep, p. 107.
[4]R. Ungermann, *Der russich-türkische Krieg 1768-1774* (Vienna, 1906), p. 232.
[5]H. İnalcık and D. Quataert (eds) *Economic and social history of the Ottoman Empire* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 639.

studies of the military frontiers of both have indicated.[1] The battlefield moved home: Ottoman military headquarters were often south of the Danube, especially after 1768, a fact which made supplying the troops difficult, when the Principalities and their agricultural wealth were cut off. Diplomatic alternatives became the norm. In most of the major campaigns after 1700, the Ottomans sought mediators, preferring truces to sustained warfare.

The 1736-9 Austro-Russian-Ottoman War is illustrative of many of the problems just described. Austrian incompetence in leadership and French brilliance in diplomacy are the usual reasons proffered for the Austrian return of Belgrade to the Ottomans in the 1739 treaty of that name. Little was gained by either side, but in many ways the psychological impact of the recapture of Belgrade blinded Ottoman administrators to the true state of the army. By 1739 the Ottomans had gained the upper hand against Austria, whose commanders decided to settle. French Ambassador Villeneuve's negotiated Belgrade treaty was a true disaster for Austria, which had to surrender the gains of 1718. The Russians were initially victorious in capturing Azov in 1746, when Field Marshal Münnich and 50,000 soldiers marched 300 miles on biscuit to face 4,000 Janissaries and, reputedly, 100,000 Tatars[2] They were crippled in the end by the distance from sources of supply and forced to evacuate the Crimean Peninsula. More successful in the Principalities, they were forced to conclude a separate peace when the Austrians deserted them, even though they had penetrated Moldavia and captured Hotin (August 1739) as part of a plan to join the Austrians at Belgrade. Russian losses were severe, estimated at 100,000.

During Frederick the Great's bid for power in the Austrian War of Succession 1740-8 and the subsequent continental conflict, the Seven Years' War (1756-63), the Ottomans struggled to contain the integrity of their eastern frontier, which was once again disrupted by the collapse of the Safavid dynasty in the 1720s. The eastern frontier always represented a different series of challenges to the Ottomans: "unwalled cities and restless nomads" as one author has recently argued.[3] Artillery and siege warfare were less useful than cold steel and the sturdy little Central Asian horse. The Janissary revolts were

[1]G. E. Rothenberg, *The military border in Croatia 1740-1881: a study of an imperial institution* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1966); C. B. Stevens, *Soldiers on the steppes: army reform and social change in early modern Russia* (DeKalb, University of Illinois Press, 1995).
[2]L. Cassels, *The struggle for the Ottoman Empire 1717-1740* (London, John Murray, 1966), p. 103.
[3]R. Mathee, "Unwalled cities and restless nomads: firearms and artillery in Safavid Iran", in C. Melville (ed.) *Safavid Persia, the history and politics of an Islamic society* (London, J. Robinson, 1785).

frequent in the period because of their reluctance to travel the distances, fight fellow Muslims, and suffer the deprivations involved in eastern warfare. Neither the 1736-9 conflict nor the Iranian Wars have been given the attention they deserve from the Ottoman point of view.

Emerging in this period, and accelerating until the final dissolution of the Janissary corps in 1826, is a concern among Ottoman statesmen about the need for improvements along western lines, the thinking being that disembodied Western technology would be sufficient to restore Muslim-Ottoman greatness. The earliest efforts in the eighteenth century surrounded the Bombardier (*Humbaracı*) Corps under Ahmed Bonneval Pasha, a renegade who reorganized and began to school the troops in the expertise required for artillery and its uses. The century is dotted with many such men and the best-selling *Memoirs* (1786) of one of them, Baron de Tott, who claimed to have reformed the Ottoman artillery single-handedly, established a rapid-fire regiment, and rebuilt the defenses of the Dardanelles in the 1770s, remains the paradigmatic view of Ottoman obscurantism, religious fanaticism, and decadence, which has only recently been challenged.[1]

The real issues involved in military reform in the late Ottoman context are only now beginning to emerge. One was the intractability of a fictitious Janissary corps, a supposed standing force of perhaps as many as 400,000 members, of which maybe 20,000-50,000 could be considered "actives". The other was the Ottoman alternative fighting forces which became a reality in the 1768-74 war, necessity requiring the circumvention of the traditional force. The fictional fighting force was based on corrupt muster rolls, and the pay tickets of the Corps started to be sold as stock or bond certificates. This system began as early as in the reign of Mahmud I (1730-54). Such sales generated much needed income, and benefited Ottoman administrators and bureaucrats at large.[2] The functioning army strength remained unknown.

Fighting forces were increasingly drawn from the Asian countryside, as the *devşirme* had been discontinued by 1700, and few remaining *timariots* were no longer of any use as a military force. While empressment was practiced among prisoners (especially for the navy), volunteers could still be counted on to fill the Janissary regiments on the road. Manpower was not the issue: organization and training were. Records from the 1768-74 war refer to the use of provincial levies (*levend*) in very significant numbers: perhaps as

[1]Baron de Tott, *Memoirs of Baron de Tott*, 2 vols. (London, J. Robinson, 1785).
[2]*Economic and social history*, p. 716.

many as 100,000 such men were called up during the course of the campaigns. Payment came directly from the center, with a significant sign-on bonus as part of the incentive, and enlistment periods of six months, with frequent two-month renewals. A very careful formula of rations accompanied the records of troop mobilization, with cash equivalents ascribed. These were both infantry and cavalry troops, commanded most often by local provincial officers, resembling to some degree the militia of earlier periods in Europe, organized out of a central treasury.[1]

The unintended result of such a system was the considerable aggrandizement of a lower level of gentry, at the district (*sancak*) level, reflected in a new series of taxes controlled by them, the *imdad-i seferiye* (campaign tax), which was first assessed in the early decades of the 1700s, specifically tagged for these locals for the purpose of organizing troops. Such governors and tax collectors always maintained a household corps, as well as mustering the *levend* described above, and were expected at the front with both.

The 1768-74 war included the Khan and his horsemen, again estimated at the magical number of 100,000, whose precipitous flight occasioned the general rout at the battle of Kartal (Kagul) in 1770. Sources on troops strength are widely various: 80,000 Ottoman infantry *v.* 40,000 Russian infantry represents the most realistic spread, but both sides made extensive use of irregulars as described. The triumph of the outnumbered, but far better organized and disciplined, Russians under Field Marshal Rumiantsev astonished the rest of Europe, and signaled to all the true state of the Ottoman military. Thousands of Ottoman soldiers drowned attempting to cross the Danube to reach their headquarters at Babadağı.

The major problems of the Ottoman 1768-74 campaigns concerned leadership and systematic discipline, both of which were noticeably less visible than in previous wars, a curiosity which cannot be explained away entirely by unruly Janissaries. Supply systems remained unaltered, and in a context where fighting and quartering troops were concentrated on one's own territory, famine and desertion were inevitable. Janissary pay was erratic, but no more or less than in the European context, and the provincial levies were recruited with cash. 50,000,000 lb of biscuit were requisitioned for the 1769 campaign, one of the few aspects of this war which has been examined from

[1]V. H. Aksan, "Whatever happened to the Janissaries?" *War in History*.

the Ottoman side, leaving the field wide open for study and reinterpretation.[1] The opportunities for abuse and self-aggrandizement were legion: the narratives of the period include exemplary, loyal and brave citizens, but just as many corrupt state commissioners, accountants, local judges, and provincial regimental commanders. This war is also notable for the three years of truce and negotiations which followed 1770, testimony to Grand Vizier Muhsinzade Mehmed's clear understanding of the state of his forces, but more often represented as a hiatus until Austria, Poland and Russia had decided on the fate of Poland.

By the time of Selim III (1789-1807), when disastrous defeats in the 1787-92 campaign against Russia led to pressure for serious reform, Ottoman military thinking had grown accustomed to the recruitment of youth from the Anatolian heartland, the advantage being they could be molded into the type of modern army required to defeat the Europeans. Many of the advisors around Selim III were perfectly aware of the need for a dissolution of the lucrative Janissary pay system, since it represented an excuse for the maintenance of a completely outmoded military organization, but they were incapacitated by the lack of significant leadership from the palace, and by intrigue and collusions among different factions. It must also be stated, unequivocally, that the three decades of futile warfare left the Ottoman state at the brink of bankruptcy.[2] The failure of Selim III's *Nizam-i Cedid* or "new order" troops (some 22,700 and almost 1,600 officers by 1806) to replace the Janissaries, was at least partially due to the state of the economy, but mostly to Selim III's spinelessness when faced with the rebellion of the Janissaries over the parallel army.[3] Selim III's hesitation in employing the new army against the rebels led to his own overthrow in 1807.

The creation of significant numbers of western-style, uniformed troops, an officer corps, systematic training schools, and modern ministries, is a product of the nineteenth-century reforms, begun under Selim III, but truly established by Mahmud II (1807-39), whose careful planning and conciliatory gestures to reactionary forces allowed him finally, in 1826 to eliminate the traditional corps. Interestingly enough, his success in doing so was based on a continuous and careful attention (from the time of Mustafa III (1757-74)) to the maintenance and reform of the artillery corps - a process which accelerated

[1] V. H. Aksan, "Feeding the Ottoman troops on the Danube, 1768-1774", *War and Society*, 13, 1995 pp. 1-14.
[2] *Economic and social history*, pp. 966-70.
[3] S. Shaw, *Between old and new: the Ottoman Empire under Sultan Selim III, 1789-1807* (Cambridge, Mass, Harvard University Press, 1971), pp. 130-2.

in the time of Baron de Tott, to be sure - but which continued demonstrably as indigenous reform throughout the latter period under discussion, an Ottoman equivalent of similar, but more successful, reforms in France, which gave centrality of place to the artillery as the basis of the modern army.[1] By 1826 Mahmud I could count on the loyalty of some 15,000 modern artillerymen, who served as an effective counterweight to the Istanbul Janissaries.[2]

Michael Mann has argued that inventiveness in large territorial empires has less to do with technological innovation or change, but rather with "extensive social organization", and the ability to expand and organize a wide variety of multicultural elites, and diverse agrarian environments.[3] Throughout the eighteenth century the Ottomans were negotiating the social and cultural transitions required for them to be able to field an army, and to survive, and allowing, without acknowledging it, the access to power of a series of provincial elites. Such negotiations altered permanently the relation of the household of Osman to its citizenry, a prelude to nineteenth-century absolutism, as part of the adoption, not just of western military technology, but also of the cultural system embedded in the control exerted by the modern nation-state.

The emphasis here has been on indigenous reform, but by 1798 the larger context is, of course, the Great Power conflicts of the Napoleonic Wars, inaugurated in Ottoman territories by Napoleon's invasion of Alexandria in that year. The British armed response, the rise of Muhammad Ali in Egypt, and the 1807 Franco-Russian Tilsit agreement over division of the Ottoman Empire inaugurated a century of imperial ambitions and diplomacy on the part of Britain and France, whose chief aim in the eastern Mediterranean was the blocking of Russian aspirations, and the protection of trade corridors. Clearly the 1812 Treaty of Bucharest, which ended another exhausting round of Danubian confrontations between Russians and Ottomans, each time with the Russians moving closer and closer to Istanbul, was simply a respite in the long process of curing the "sick man of Europe".

[1] W. McNeill, *Pursuit of power: Technology, armed force and society since AD 1000* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1982).
[2] Shaw, *History*, vol. 2, p. 6.
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THE ONE-EYED FIGHTING THE BLIND: MOBILIZATION, SUPPLY, AND COMMAND IN THE RUSSO-TURKISH WAR OF 1768-1774

The Ottoman Empire of the eighteenth century has been ignored by historians of the military revolution, who contrast the Ottoman army's inflexibility with the 'revolutions' in the armies of Europe. It is still perceived as an alien culture whose military technology froze in the siege mentality of the seventeenth century, primarily because historians have had recourse only to contemporary, generally hostile, European accounts and have yet to utilize the abundant Ottoman chronicles and archives. A recent article, comparing Austrian with Ottoman tactics on the battlefield, states without further comment that Ottoman aggressiveness derived from the use of drugs and the zeal to spread Islam by the sword.[1]

Discussion of the Ottoman role in the Russo-Turkish war of 1768-74 is also limited to the implications of the treaty of Kutchuk-Kainardji, which inaugurated the Eastern Question.[2] While numerous Russian studies examine the war from the viewpoint of Catherine II, owing to the importance to Russia of the annexation of the Crimea, the impact of its loss on the Ottomans has been neglected.[3] The standard Ottoman historians, Von Hammer, Creasey, and Uzunçarşıh, make use of the nineteenth-century history of Ahmed Cevdet, himself indebted to Ahmed Vasıf (d. 1806), whose complete chronicle remains unpublished.[4] Other eyewitness accounts, notably those of Mustafa Kesbi (*fl.* 1770), Sadullah Enveri (d. 1794), and Ahmed

[1] Alexander Balisch, 'Infantry Battlefield Tactics in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries on the European and Turkish Theatres of War: Austrian Responses to Different Conditions', *Studies in History and Politics*, iii (1983-4), 49, 52. Two contemporary commentaries are Baron de Tott, *Memoirs of Baron de Tott* (London, 1785) and C.F.C. Volney, *Considérations sur la guerre des Russes et Turcs* (London, 1788).

[2] M.S. Anderson, *The Eastern Question, 1774-1923* (London, 1966); A. Sorel, *The Eastern Question in the Eighteenth Century* (New York, 1898); Roderic H. Davison, 'Russian Skill and Turkish Imbecility: The Treaty of Kuchuk Kainardji Reconsidered' *Slavic Review*, xxxv (1976), 463-83.

[3] E.I. Druzhinina, *Kiuchuk Kainardzhis mir 1774 goda* (Moscow, 1955); Iv. R. Klokman, *Feldmarshal Rumantsev ve Period Russko-Turctskoi Voiny 1768-74* (Moscow, 1951). The one exception is Alan Fisher, who has explored the relationship of the Tartars and the Ottomans in *The Russian Annexation of the Crimea, 1772-83* (Cambridge, 1970).

[4] Joseph von Hammer-Purgstall, *Geschichte des osmanischen Reiches* (Pest, 1827-35; repr., Graz, 1963); E.S. Creasey, *History of the Ottoman Turks* (London, 1856); I.H. Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Tarihi*, esp. vol. 4 (Ankara, 1982-3); Ahmed Cevdet, *Tarih* (Istanbul, 1858-83); Ahmed Vasıf, *Mehâsin ül-Âsâr ve Hakâik ül-Ahbâr* (Istanbul, 1978), a modernized version for the period 1783-7. A significant portion of his later chronicle is available only in manuscript. Of particular interest is the chronicles for 1774-9, Topkapı Library, MS H 1406.

Resmi (d. 1783), are available only in manuscript.[1] A vast amount of material for this period, however, is emerging from the Prime Ministers Archives in Istanbul. The preliminary research on war and society in the eighteenth-century Ottoman world reveals both important similarities between the Ottoman Empire and Russia; in particular, the two states faced similar difficulties in mobilizing and feeding their troops, in setting up an effective command structure, and in prosecuting reform.

Two of the assumptions underlying recent research into eighteenth-century military history are that the period between 1750 and the outbreak of the French Revolution was marked by experimentation in new military techniques, though little of the new technology was institutionalized until the Napoleonic Wars,[2] and that the testing of new ideas and equipment took place not only in France, but also in eastern Europe against the armies of the Ottoman Empire. The reason was partly, at least, the unconventional nature of Ottoman warfare: the Ottomans relied on irregular troops and cavalry, in contrast to the predominantly infantry-based European armies of the period. In this view, Russia, the chief opponent of the Ottomans in the latter half of the eighteenth century, was the beneficiary, as the Ottoman style of warfare led to Russian innovations and to stunning victories. One of the by-products of this research is the illumination of attitudes to military reform - for example, a persistent preference for traditional methods of warfare. The degree to which the élites of France, Poland, Austria, and Russia facilitated or inhibited military reform is still under discussion. The recognition by such élites of the profound societal changes inherent in the rationalization and bureaucratization of the military, threatening both power-base and intellectual systems, was certainly part of the process of reform common to both empires.[3]

The 1768-74 war saw similar, sporadic efforts in both Russia and the Ottoman Empire to adopt and incorporate military innovations. The Russians were guided mostly by Germans, the Ottomans by a French military mission

[1]Mustafa Kesbi, 'İbretnuma-yi Devlet', Süleymaniye Library, Ali Emiri collection, MS 484, n.d., deals with the Tartars and the war; Sadullah Enveri, 'Tarih', Istanbul University Library, MS T 5994, 1780, covers 1768-74; Ahmed Resmi Efendi, second-in-command on the battlefield, 1771-4, wrote *Hulâsat ül-I'tibar*, last published in 1869. His other works remain in manuscript.

[2]See Bruce W. Menning, 'Russian Military Innovation in the Second Half of the Eighteenth Century', *War & Society*, ii (1984), 23-41. See also William H. McNeill, *The Pursuit of Power* (Chicago, 1982), ch. 5; *Studies in History and Politics*, iii (1983-4), a whole volume devoted to eighteenth-century eastern Europe and military reform.

[3]See McNeill, *Pursuit*, pp. 172-4; David Ralston, *Importing the European Army* (Chicago, 1990), pp. 21, 173-7.

until the eve of the French Revolution.[1] However, military innovations in both empires appear to have been grafted onto resistant limbs. Russia established in 1763 a permanent general staff of the Prussian model, which proved a key to her success in the war. It was abandoned, however, by Grigori Potemkin, a declared enemy of science in military affairs, in the war of 1787-92. The Ottomans, meanwhile, started their western innovations in the eighteenth century with the French adventurer, the count de Bonneval, otherwise known as Humbaracı Ahmed Pasha, and his Ottoman bombardiers of 1734. Although the newly trained artillerymen of baron de Tott joined the regular Ottoman army at the battlefront in 1774, in the last days of the war, they never achieved equal status with the traditional forces.[2]

The Ottomans and the Russians shared not only a battleground and resistance to reforms, but also cultural similarities, in particular a strong link between church and state. In the case of Russia, Eric Hobsbawm's 'holy icons', faith and the tsar, continued to provide a 'proto-nationalist' ideology in the popular mind until the nineteenth century.[3] The sanctity of Holy Russia, embodied in the divinity of the tsar, persisted despite Peter the Great's efforts to reform the Russian state along secular European lines: witness the number of rebellions in the name of the resurrected Peter III, the largest of which, that of Pugachev in 1773-5, almost brought down Catherine II.[4] Meanwhile, in the Ottoman Empire, the concept of *din-ü-devlet*, inadequately translated as 'religion and state', exerted a similar ideological force, the sources of authority being both Islamic law and the Sultan's prerogative (*shari'a* and *kanun*).

Second, the bureaucracy was similar. Both Catherine II's and the Ottoman government were run by political cliques for whom state service meant access to wealth and graft. Rank-and-file officials were ill-prepared, ill-educated placemen; court officials were referred to as slaves (*kul* in Ottoman). It was only in Catherine II's time that the use of the term slave (*rab*) or serf (*kholop*) to refer to citizens of the state was prohibited.[5] The curious

[1]On Russia, see Christopher Duffy, *Russia's Military Way to the West: Origins and Nature of Russian Military Power 1700-1800* (London, 1981), pp. 126-98; on the Ottomans, see A. Boppe, 'La France et le "militaire turc" au XVIII[e] siècle', *Feuilles d'histoire* (1912), pp. 386-401, 490-501, still the most comprehensive look at the French military mission.

[2]De Tott, *Memoirs*, ii, pt. 3. 143-66.

[3]E.J. Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780* (Cambridge, 1990), p. 50. He takes that idea from M. Cherniavsky, *Tsar and People: Studies in Russian Myths* (New Haven, 1961), pp. 113-14.

[4]John T. Alexander, *Autocratic Politics in a National Crisis: The Imperial Russian Government and Pugłachev's Revolt, 1773-1775* (Bloomington, 1969), pp. 7, 39.

[5]Marc Raeff, *Plans for Political Reform in Imperial Russia, 1730-1905* (Englewood Cliffs, 1966), p. II and 'The Russian Autocracy and Its Officials', *Harvard Slavic Studies*, iv (1957), 77-91. In Ottoman political theory, all non-tax paying citizens were called *asker* (soldier). On the Ottoman bureaucracy, see Carter Findley, *Ottoman Civil Officialdom: A Social History* (Princeton, 1989), pp. 40-86.

contradiction between rigid recruitment and fluid movement between military and 'civilian' offices is characteristic of both empires. The reformer in either empire therefore found himself obliged to support an administration that was the source of the very evil he wished to correct.

Frederick II of Prussia, in a well-known comment, contemptuously dubbed the Russo-Turkish war of 1768-74 'one-eyed men who have given blind men a through beating'.[1] Another contemporary observer, the count de Langeron (1763-1831), who served in Potemkin's army in the next war, found organizational and theoretical weaknesses in the Russian command structure, over-confidence because of easy victories over the Ottomans, and 'venality and rapacity in the Russian supply system'.[2] Although Langeron regarded the Ottomans as a holdover from feudal times, before the study of tactics, he thought that they could nonetheless pose a threat: their discipline and training, combined with native daring, Islam, and the use of opium, might render them invincible. Indeed, it is generally conceded that in October 1768, when the Ottomans declared war on Russia for violating their territory, and even to the end of the war, the Ottoman army remained a formidable threat on the battlefield.

The Russian army, however, in spite of its apparent unreadiness, inefficiency, and numerical inferiority, gained and maintained the edge over the Ottomans from the spring of 1769. Catherine II, whose troops were already engaged in Poland, was aiming at the settlement of the Polish border question, at the acquisition of a port on the Black Sea - if not the whole of the Crimea — and at access to the Mediterranean. An additional goal was insurrection among the Greeks, the germination of the 'Greek Project' which gained momentum a decade after the war. The campaign in Wallachia and Moldavia in 1769 gave the Russian army a toehold in the important borderlands between Austria and Russia, while the campaign of 1770 was directed at the capture of important fortresses in the Crimea and at the defeat of the Ottoman navy in the Aegean. Thereafter, Catherine II's troops remained in almost uncontested occupation of the north bank of the Danube, until a final crossing and assault upon the grand vizier's camp at Shumla on the south bank in 1774 forced the Ottomans to surrender. By the treaty of Kutchuk-Kainardji, Catherine II more

[1]Sorel, *Eastern Question*, p. 54.
[2]George F. Jewsbury, 'Chaos and Corruption: The Comte de Langeron's Critique of the 1787-1792 Russo-Turkish War', *Studies in History and Politics*, iii (1983-4), 80-1.

than reached her goals and succeeded in frightening all Europe with her military might.[1]

Ottoman war aims appear to have been confined to support for the Polish Confederation of Bar, whose members fought alongside the Ottomans in the early part of the war,[2] and to remind Russia of her territorial limits on the Black Sea in retaliation for the death of Muslims and the violation of Muslim territory. After declaring war first and an offensive into Russian territory by the khan of the Crimea, Kırım Giray, in January 1769, however, the Ottomans fought a defensive war, especially after the fall of Kartal (Kagul) in 1770, when they moved headquarters to the south bank of the Danube and sought ways to end the conflict by mediation.

The battles of this war and the one to follow were mainly fought in Ottoman territory along the Danube and the Black Sea coast, where near-constant war caused brigandage, depopulation, plague, destruction of territory, and famine. As Ottoman headquarters for most of the time were at Babadagi, just south of the Danube, and as the three regions of Rumelia, Wallachia, and Moldavia formed the bread basket of Istanbul, and traditionally provisioned the army, there was much deprivation in the city.[3] The northern shore of the Black Sea was nominally part of the Ottoman Empire, although the Crimea itself was officially a vassal state, a steppe frontier inhabited largely by Tartars. The Ukrainian and Polish territory to the north was a noman's land. Catherine II established a new province, the Ukraine, in 1763, and her extension of control over the area was considerably abetted by the war. De Tott, an eyewitness in 1769 to the condition of the region, noted: 'the most dreadful devastation had preceded the war, and this had been occasioned by the terror of the inhabitants, which was produced by the incursions of some troops. The desertion of the villages, and the cessation of all culture did not promise the Ottoman army that abundance which it was natural to expect in

[1]The campaigns are most thoroughly covered by Richard Ungermann, *Der russich-türkische Krieg 1768-1774* (Vienna, 1906). See also Karl A. Roider, *Austria's Eastern Question, 1700-1790* (Princeton, 1981), pp. 158-63 on the 'Greek Project'; Druzhinina, *Kiuchuk Kainardzhis*, p 31, is particularly insistent on a Black Sea port as Catherine II's foremost aim in the war.
[2]Fisher, *Russian Annexation*, p. 117; Druzhinina, *Kiuchuk Kainardzis*, p. 90. Resmi, *Hulâsat*, pp. 11-12, says of the confederation of Bar: 'A tramp named Potoski [Count Vincenti Potocki] came [to Istanbul] with a private army of 300-500 and sought protection of the Ottoman state ... He was given refuge along with thirty to forty bags of piastres as monthly pay and rations.' Resmi uses Potocki as an example of the dangers of sheltering political refugees who cause more trouble than they are worth.
[3]See P. G. Inciciyan, *XVIII. Asırda Istanbul* (Istanbul, 1956); de Tott, *Memoirs*, ii. pt. 3-83.

the neighborhood of the Danube.'[1] As John T. Alexander suggests, 'much more fearsome than the Turks' disorganized armies were the natural characteristics of the distant theater - the sun-parched, fever-ridden Balkans and the Black Sea littoral.'[2]

To enable the Russians to fight on the Danube, a tremendous effort was required. Between 1705 and 1802, there were seventy-three levies of soldiers for service in the Russian army, all of serfs conscripted for life. That meant that 3.3 per cent of the eligible male population was under arms in the 1760s, in contrast to the European average of 1.5 per cent. Forced marches of 1.000 or more miles to the Ottoman frontier, disease, religious fasts, and a severely limited diet led to death and desertion, so that only one-half of any levy reached the front. The reputed strength of 300,000-400,000 troops in the Russian army by the end of the century was therefore mythical, as were similar accounts of the size of the Ottoman army. Long-dead soldiers, for instance, remained on the books so that their officers could draw the added pay and rations, a problem common to all European armies.[3] A levy of one man in 300 in October 1768 raised 19,500 soldiers, and another in November brought the size of the army up to 50,747 men.[4] Levies continued throughout the war: one man per 150 in 1769 and 1770, and one man per 100 in 1771. The toll on peasant and noble alike was considerable. In addition, the great plague of 1770-1, transmitted to Russia from Moldavia and Wallachia, caused an estimated 100,000 deaths and great popular unrest. At the beginning of the war, the Russians committed 60,000 troops to the Polish front and Moldavia and 40,000 to the Crimea, the latter augmented by 24,000 irregular troops, composed of Cossack and Kalmuk cavalry.[5] Control of the Cossacks, and their gradual incorporation into the regular army, was one of the significant Russian achievements of the war.

There remains a paucity of campaign histories for the post-Süleyman, pre-Mahmud II era of Ottoman history. Apart from the pioneering work of V. J. Parry and M. E. Yapp, the study of the Ottoman campaigns in Hungary

[1]De Tott, *Memoirs*, i. pt. 2. 137. See also William H. McNeill, *Europe's Steppe Frontier* (Chicago, 1966), pp. 142-7; Zenno Kohut, *Russian Centralism and Ukrainian Autonomy* (Cambridge, 1988), pp. 104 ff.

[2]Alexander, *Autocratic Politics*, p. 17.

[3]Duffy, *Russia's Military Way*, pp. 126-9. Abuse of the *esame* (entitlements of the common soldier) was the chief target for reform under Selim III.

[4]Isabel de Madariaga, *Russia in the Age of Catherine the Great* (New Haven, 1981), pp. 206-13.

[5]Ungermann, *Der russisch-türkische Krieg*, pp. 28-32. A third army in Poland under General Weimar consisted of 6,000-10,000 men.

from 1593 to 1606 by Caroline Finkel, and the fine, unpublished thesis of Rhoads Murphey on the campaigns of Murad IV (1623-39), there is little to aid research on the Ottomans except the contemporary work of Massigli and D'Ohsson.[1] Part of the explanation lies in the disappearance of the Janissaries, or rather their increasing integration into Ottoman society, both in the capital and the provinces.[2] By the eighteenth century, campaigning meant organizing on two levels: re-organizing the standing army, and mustering the provincial irregulars, both hampered by the continuance of the archaic, fief-based cavalry system. The Ottomans' third fighting force was the reputedly 100,000 cavalry supplied by the khan of the Crimea.[3] The Crimean Tartars, over whom the Ottomans exercised little control, were one of a number of increasingly irritating obstacles to the development of the kind of strategic warfare in vogue in Europe. As Yapp remarks: 'Whereas European rulers had, by the eighteenth century, gained sufficient control over the armed forces within their states to make them efficient police forces, the Ottoman sultan was still in the position of being only the principal shareholder.'[4]

Because thirty years had passed since the last war, the standing army - which included infantry (Janissaries), cavalry (*sipahi*), and artillerymen - had to be rebuilt in 1768 from other sources. Of the palace troops, Richard Ungermmann estimates that there were 10,000-12,000 Janissaries and 12,000-15,000 cavalry in the regular army for the initial campaign.[5] Sadullah Enveri, an Ottoman eyewitness to the war, estimated in 1769 that 10,000 Janissaries, 3,400 artillerymen, and 1,000 *serdengeçti* (shock-troops) had assembled on the battlefield. 10,000 salaried *sipahis* had previously been sent to join Kırım

[1]V. J. Parry, 'La Manière de combattre', in *War, Technology, and Society in the Middle East*, ed. V. J. Parry (London, 1975), pp. 21-56, and 'Materials of War in the Ottoman Empire', in *Studies in the Economic History of the Middle East*, ed. M.A. Cook (London, 1970), pp. 219-29; M. E. Yapp, 'The Modernization of Middle Eastern Armies in the Nineteenth Century', in *War, Technology and Society*, pp. 330-66; Caroline Finkel, *The Administration of Warfare: The Ottoman Campaigns in Hungary, 1593-1606* (Vienna, 1985); Rhoads Murphey, 'The Functioning of the Army under Murad IV (1623-39)' (Ph.D. dissertation, Chicago, 1979); L. F. Marsigli, *Stato militare dell'imperio ottomanno: L'Etat militaire de l'empire ottoman* (Haya, 1732; repr., Graz, 1972); Ignatius D'Ohsson, *Tableau général de L'empire othoman* (Paris, 1788-1824). Not to be neglected, of course, is Uzunçarşılı's description of the military organization: *Osmanlı Devleti Teşkilatından Kapıkulu Ocakları* (Ankara, 1943), concentrating for the most part on the earlier period.

[2]As an example, from *The Memoirs of Prota Matija Nenadovic*, ed. and trans. L.F. Edwards (Oxford, 1969), on janissary / provincial relations in late eighteenth-century Serbia, where he remarks: 'those Turks who did not want to work went to the Janissary again and enrolled as Janissaries in whatever regiment they liked; then they called themselves true sons of the sultan and aga, but the sipahis who from older times had had the sultan's decree they pushed aside and called them policemen': quoted in Yapp, 'Modernization', p. 345.

[3]Ungermann, *Der russich-tiirkische Krieg*, p. 35; de Tott, *Memoirs*, i. pt. 2. 151. De Tott was with Kırım Giray in 1769.

[4]Yapp, 'Modernization', p. 346.

[5]Ungermann, *Der russich-türkische Krieg*, p. 15; Uzunçarşıii, *Osmanlı Devleti*, i. 618.

Giray for the opening offensive in January 1769, raising the total to 24,400. De Tott notes that the *sipahi*, 'accustomed to the sweets and inactivity of a long peace, not able to endure fatigue, incapable of resisting cold, and of ill-clothed likewise to support it, were especially useless'.[1] At the beginning of the campaign in 1771, the number of the regular standing army had increased significantly to 62,611,[2] which can be interpreted either as example of the resilience of the Ottoman recruiting system or of the unreliability of this kind of statistic.

Local troops, mustered by imperial decrees issued at the beginning of the campaign, accounted by the eighteenth century for most of the Ottoman light infantry, variously called *levend*, *miri levend*, *miri piyade*, and *miri süvari*.[3] The difficulty in raising, paying, and controlling these provincial troops, especially those from Anatolia, is clear from the numerous follow-up orders sent to the governors of Karaman, Diyarbakır, Sivas, and Rakka, for example, from as early as May 1769, demanding to know why promised troops had not arrived at the front. The dismal performance of these troops prompted the abolition of the *levend* system in 1775.[4]

Ahmed Resmi, as second-in-command at the front from 1771 to 1774, criticized the organization of the troops for the 1769 campaign.[5] According to Resmi, while 30,000 to 40,000 soldiers were enough, 100,000 were mustered. One officer was assigned one thousand soldiers drawing monthly rations, of

[1]De Tott, *Memoirs*, i. pt. 2. 158-9; Sadullah Enveri, 'Tarih', Istanbul University Library, MS T 5994, 1780 (covering the period 1768-74), fo. 8b. The *serdengeçti* troops acted as a vanguard.

[2]P[rime] M[inister's Archives], M[aliyeden] M[üdevver Collection], no. 17383,, a 'Tashihat Defteri, early June 1771. For other calculations of the size of the eighteenth-century Ottoman army, see Yapp, 'Modernization', p. 344.

[3]Ungermann remarks that 200 such decrees had been sent at the start of the 1769 campaign: *Der russich-türkische Krieg*, p. 35. Mustafa Cezar, *Osmanlı Tarihinde Levendler* (Istanbul, 1965), p. 350. Cezar (pp. 265 ff.) distinguishes beween the *Kapı Halkı Levendler* (retainers, slaves, and militiamen of the notables [*ayans*]), who were the responsibility of the notables, and the mustered troops, paid by the state, under discussion here. On the growth of the power of the *ayan*, and the increasing dependence of the government on this particular class, see Yuzo Nagato, *Muhsin-zade Mehmed Paşa ve Ayanlık Müessesesi* (Tokyo, 1976). Finkel (*Administration*, p. 310) has commented for the 1593-1606 Hungarian campaigns on the increasing conscription of peasants (from Bosnia in her case), who were paid in cash. See also Halil İnalcık, 'Military and Fiscal Transformation in the Ottoman Empire 1600-1700', *Archivum Ottomanicum*, vi (1980), especially 303 ff., for the increasing use of the provincial troops paid in cash after the mid-seventeenth century.

[4]See, for example, PM, C[evdet] A[skeriye Collection] 1007, May 1769. The archives are full of documents calling for more soldiers as replacements for desertions and losses; for instance, PM CA 2586, 2868, July 1770; Cezar, *Levendler*, pp. 307-10, asserts that the change was in name only for the period following the war (pp. 311-16). Historians like the figure of 100,000 for this war.

[5]Especially in his work, *Hulâsat* and 'Layiha' (memorandum), the latter presented to the commander-in-chief, the grand vizier Halil Pasha, to explain the deficiencies during the campaign of 1769. See Istanbul University Library MS TY 419, n.d., II fos.

whom five hundred never arrived. After forty days, four of the five hundred who had arrived had scattered because of lack of food, while the hundred who remained continued to demand the rations of the thousand.[1] Of the provincial troops ordered from Anatolia, Resmi noted: 'The pashas who came from Anadolu ... gathered around them a filthy horde of thieves and the homeless, who left nothing but destruction and ruin in their passage ... even though they brought enough men for a battalion, within three days, they were all gone.' In fact, the main Ottoman camp, in common with all the armies of Europe of the period, appears to have contained as many retainer and camp followers as soldiers. Resmi estimated that between 20,000 and 30,000 camp followers accompanied the army in 1769, including 'tent-pitchers, servants, beggars and hucksters, parasites, perhaps Jews and infidels, and the riffraff of Istanbul'.[2]

From the outset, then, the reputed Ottoman numerical superiority was mythical. While the Russians mustered the makings of a modern professional army from conscripted serfs, and augmented it with the use of irregular cavalry, the Ottomans continued to rely on the anarchic Tartar cavalry and a highly decentralized provincial mustering system, at the same time paying for a dysfunctional standing army. It was lack of control over the Tartars and irregulars that most weakened the Ottoman capacity to withstand the Russian assaults.

Supplying armies up to 100,000 strong was one of the great challenges of the eighteenth century, and cash flow for both provisions and salaries was a major preoccupation for both Ottomans and Russians. Recent work on the pre-Tanzimat economy of the Ottoman Empire by M. Genç, Y. Cezar, and others, demonstrates both the desperation and the flexibility of a state in constant need of cash for the care and feeding of its troops. The extension of the system of tax-farming (*malikane*), the increased use of extraordinary taxes (*imdad-i seferiye*), and 'loans' to and from state officials are just some of the means by which the Ottomans financed the war.[3] No attempt has yet been made to examine the expenditures of the campaigns of 1768 to 1774, though

[1]Resmi, *Hulâsat*, pp. 12-15.

[2]Resmi, 'Layiha', fos. 3-4a. He mentions by name the governors of Karaman, Diyarbakır, and Rakka.

[3]Mehmet Genç, 'XVIII. Yüzyılda Osmanlı Ekonomisi ve Savaş, *Yapıt*, xlix (1984), 52-62; Yavuz Cezar, *Osmanlı Maliyesinde Bunalım ve Değişim Dönemi* (Istanbul, 1986); Ahmet Tabakoğlu, *Gerileme Dönemine Girerken Osmanlı Maliyesi* (Istanbul, 1985).

the documentation is extensive and detailed.[1] The Ottoman Empire as a war economy, particularly its highly sophisticated system of production and supply of food for the army, is worthy of closer attention.

The war put a similar strain on Russian finances and supply.[2] In the matter of provisions, the Russians appear to have lagged behind Europe, where an organized system of magazines, spaced a five-day intervals along an army's route, had begun to replace living off the land. Operating in theaters so far from sources of supply always place Russian forces at a disadvantage, and this war was no less marked than others of the time by starvation, pillage, and abuse of local populations. Although Peter the Great had established a chancellery for provisioning, it proved cumbersome, and by mid-century ran a deficit equivalent to one-half the army's budget. The government provided the common soldier with a monthly ration of thirty kilograms of flour or twenty-two kilograms of biscuit, plus approximately two kilograms of groats, from which *kasha,* a kind of gruel, was made. This was occasionally supplemented by cabbage and meat, expected to be found locally and paid for by the soldier. Provisioning proved to be such a problem that the Russians had experimented during the Seven Years War with contracting out to foreign suppliers, but the system was resisted by many at court who disliked enriching foreign rather than local entrepreneurs.[3] This time, eight depots and a mobile warehouse containing thirty-two days' flour and groats, requiring 14,000 oxen for transport, were organized during the mobilization. In the early days of the siege of Hotin in 1769, however, it was the lack of provisions that forced the Russians to withdraw from an advantageous position,[4] and it was also one of the reasons for the Ottoman abandonment of Hotin in September.[5] Horses likewise caused a particularly acute problem for armies such as these, with

[1]Archival evidence abounds, from lists of sums of cash sent to the battlefield to the cost of ermine collars for the vizierial robes. Some examples: central campaign account books for 1768-72 in PM MM 5970, 11786; and tax registers for campaign taxes and exemptions, such as PM D.BSM.NZE 19004 'Bedel-i Tayinat', 1772-3, and Kamil Kepeci 2358 'Ahkâm Defteri' 1770. Chronicle eyewitness evidence suggests, on the one hand, that the state coffers were empty in 1768 (Mustafa Kesbi, 'Ibretnuma', fo. 32b) and, on the other, that delivery of the salaries in cash to the battlefront was still commonplace. Enveri noted in 1769 the delivery of the salaries in cash to the battlefront was still commonplace. Enveri noted in 1769 the delivery of 6,440 bags of piastres to Hantepesi (see his 'Tarih', fo. 46b, 3,440 bags, and fo. 69, 3,000 bags) which had dropped to 1,000 bags to Babadagi by 1773 (fos. 395b and 398).

[2]Robert E. Jones, 'Opposition to War and Expansion in Late Eighteenth-Century Russia', *Jahrbücher für die Geschichte Osteuropas,* xxxii (1984), 42, notes one estimate of a cost of 25,000,000 rubles for the first two years of war, equalling the total treasury receipts for the same period.

[3]John Keep, 'Feeding the Troops: Russian Army Supply Policies during the Seven Years War', *Canadian Slavonic Papers,* xxix (1987), 24-33; Duffy, *Russia's Military Way,* p. 13.

[4]Ungermann, *Der russisch-türkische Krieg,* p. 48.

[5]Resmi, *Hulâsat,* p. 32.

sizable numbers of cavalry. An eyewitness to the Seven Years War described Russian soldiers 'hauling carts along sodden, muddy tracks because their horses, with only oak leaves to eat, were collapsing by the hundred each day'.[1]

The Ottomans had an enviable supply system, by all accounts, well into the eighteenth century. While research into the logistics of Ottoman campaigning in this period is virtually non-existent, some general observations can be made about normal provisioning, based on analogies with the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The central government traditionally took care simultaneously of feed the army and protect peasants by means of an elaborate system of irregular taxes in cash and kind, a prepared line of march with adequate provision of food and war *matériel* at posts or billets, and large supply depots.[2] To that should be added the fertility of the Danubian theater and the ease with which it could support the army's requirements. The central government was apparently responsible for the provisioning of the regular and provincial troops, while the Tartars provided for themselves.[3] Thus, while the system was not without abuse, and no campaign without periods of acute shortage, the Ottomans appear to have maintained control over the process for over two hundred years and, in fact, were better equipped than European armies of the time.[4]

By the late eighteenth century, however, the Ottomans seem to have had difficulty in feeding the army adequately, either when on the march, fighting the Russians, or in winter quarters, perhaps because the system had been in abeyance since 1739. While the traditional methods of provisioning were still in place, cash and crop shortages, hoarding, inflated prices, and occupation were constant. Though common in all wars, they seem to have been particularly acute in 1769. In the normal course of affairs, the *nüzül emini* (roughly a commissary officer), in co-operation with the campaign accountant (*defterdar*), was assigned the task of feeding the army through a

[1]Keep, 'Feeding the Troops', p. 31. Resmi 'Layiha', fo. 2, was most incensed by the treatment of horses in the campaign of 1769. Horses supplied by the drivers arrived at the post stations (*menzil*) exhausted and hungry; many died or were destroyed *en route.*

[2]V.J. Parry, 'Harb IV: Ottoman Empire', *Encyclopedia of Islam,* 2d ed, iv. 191-4, describes the organization of the campaigns; Finkel, *Administration,* pp. 121 f., 147-9, 198-208 discusses provisioning and reviews the state of research into the taxation system used by the Ottomans to support the war; see also Bruce McGowan, *Economic Life in Ottoman Europe: Taxation, Trade, and the Struggle for Land, 1600-800* (Cambridge, 1981), p. 106 on Balkan taxation.

[3]Finkel, *Administration,* pp. 198-208, on the dearth of information for the 1593-1606 campaigns on *timarh* provisioning.

[4]Parry, 'La Manière de combattre', p. 253.

network of agents and suppliers.[1] The army was provided with biscuit or hardtack (*peksimet*), along with rice bulghur, barley, clarified butter, coffee, honey, flour, and meat, a much more varied diet than that of the Russian soldier.[2] Resmi, who was responsible for overseeing the procurement of provisions, was acutely aware of its importance for the success of the campaign. A big army, he noted, was 'both an enemy to itself and a pickpocket of the Padishah's treasury, to such an extent that, before being attacked by an external army, it naturally deserts from lack of provisions and fodder ... When 40,000 - 50,000 troops leave on campaign, 10,000 tents, each with three to five attendants, and 50,000 camels, mules, and horses for each of the 50,000 were required. Each day, food and fodder were necessary, and if the rations were not there for even one day, quarrels would erupt.'[3]

Famine and disease existed even as the army left Istanbul in early 1769, continued Resmi. When the troops arrived in İsakcı (Isaccea in Romania) on the Danube, the *nüzül emini* in charge of cooking the biscuit adulterated the new flour by crushing and adding the lime and dirt-like flour and biscuit left in the storehouses from forty years earlier. From billet to billet, dirt was added at will, producing bread that looked like mud and caused the death of many who had no choice but to eat it.[4] The Cevdet Askeriye collection in the Prime Minister's Archives contains numerous accounts of orders for biscuit from all over the empire. One such order to governor of Egypt for 40,000 bushels of biscuit and 100,000 bushels of rice illustrates the Ottomans' reliance on Egypt for supplies, which might help to explain their difficulties, especially after the destruction of the fleet at Chismé (Çeşme) in August 1770, when the Russians blockaded the Dardanelles, cutting the sea route from Egypt to Istanbul.[5]

After twenty days in İsakcı while a bridge was built across the Danube, in early June 1769 the army crossed the Danube to Kartal *e n route* to

[1]See Finkel, *Administration*, pp. 151-64, noting the difficulty in extracting data from the archives, where grain is generally referred to as *zahire*, which also means provisions in general, and specific items are rarely itemized.

[2]Resmi, 'Layiha', fos. 8b-9; Süleymaniye Library, Hacı Mahmud Collection, MS 4859, fo. 39b, 15 April 1771, listing the provisions recommended for purchase for the 1771 campaign: flour, barley, meat, oil, and rice. Barley was normally used as fodder but may have been mixed with the flour for bread. All soldiers of the standing or irregular army expected daily rations, but whether in cash or kind was determined no doubt by circumstances and availability.

[3]Resmi, *Hulâsat*, pp. 13, 14. The government did try to pave the way: PM CA 8716, June 1769, contains an order, one of many such to officials at Bender to prepare bread for the army.

[4]Resmi, *Hulâsat*, pp. 13-14 and 'Layiha', fos. 7b-8. Water was also in short supply: p. 25.

[5]PM CA 2784, Dec. 1769. Egypt supplied soldiers as well: in one instance, 35,000 were delivered by ship to the Black Sea for the Crimean battlefront (PM, Hatt-i Humayun Collection 288, 26 Sept. 1769).

Hantepesi, traditionally the main supply depot for Ottoman campaigns, which apparently had sufficient supplies. The army then left Hantepesi for Bender. The preparations, or rather lack of them, for the crossing of the Danube are vividly recorded by Resmi:

> When the provisioning of the imperial army has been adequately prepared in one region, the damage that can occur if the army moves from that camp is well-known ... The order was given to take along a certain amount of provisions by carriage from Hantepesi, because there were none in Bender. Everyone knows that taking provisions by carriage alongside an army is just like setting out on a picnic. No one had any idea of the outcome. 'Bender is a big city tied to Tartaristan [the Crimea], so it will be well supplied [they said]. Let us go as though we were out for pleasure. If nothing else, with the change of scenery we will be rid of the flies which have surrounded us like a cloud.' So several hundred carriages of barley were requisitioned, with the result that part of the provisions was exhausted by the oxen pulling the wagons, part by the drivers, and part by a number of thieving servants. The Bender road was not as we expected: it was steep and uneven and there was little water. It took us seven days to reach Bender after a thousand hardships. The day we arrived, the people of Bender said: 'Why did you come? We have no provisions!' The flies that had plagued us in Hantepesi appeared here, too, as if they had come with us. The world was covered with them.[1]

Sadullah Enveri also described conditions in Bender after the army's arrival. By that time, according to him, more than 400,000 soldiers, camp followers, and animals had reassembled. Throughout the journey from Hantepesi, shortages of food had caused minor revolts, and morale had been maintained by the hope of finding adequate supplies in Bender. The provisions the troops carried with them consisted of 125,000 bushels of barley, 6,900 bushels of flour, and more than 4,000 *kantar* of biscuit, but it had not been sufficient. Arriving at Bender, they discovered that the ovens for baking bread had not been dug, even though the local officials had been ordered to find provisions for a thirty-day stay. As a result, prices shot up for whatever was available and the army became rebellious. Enveri estimated that 5,000-6,000 infantrymen and cavalrymen deserted.[2] Interestingly enough, after 1769, complaints about provisioning drop off considerably, suggesting that the Ottoman administration regained some control over the supply system.

[1]Resmi, *Hulâsat*, pp. 27-8.

[2]Enveri, 'Tarih', fos 22b-4. He records their date of arrival as 29 June 1769. *A kantar* is a variable measure of weight.

An additional contribution to the confusion which reigned on the battlefield was the ineffectiveness of the Ottoman leadership and system of command. The Russians had the distinct edge. Catherine II had the help of an able general, Count Petr Rumiantsev, the leading Russian military reformer of the period; in fact, the 1768-74 war is often referred to as 'Rumiantsev's War'.[1] The Seven Years War had proved to be a good training school for Rumiantsev and the Russians, who emerged much stronger from their confrontation with the well-disciplined Prussian army, as Resmi learned from his observation of Frederick II's army while ambassador at Berlin in 1763-4. The Russians, he claimed, 'taught the Austrians the tricks and stratagems of war. They attached small cannons to wagons and used them as rifles, a trick learned from the Prussians.' Frederick himself told Resmi that 'the Russian sheep-herders learned the rules of war from us and clobbered us with them'.[2]

Rumiantsev, particularly after his appointment as governor-general of the Ukraine in 1763, was one of the chief innovators of new tactics such as light infantry used against the Ottomans. His reorganization of the Cossacks enabled the Russian army to counter the Ottoman offensive, especially the undisciplined Tartar cavalry, and the regulations for the troops he compiled during the war were later adopted as the official instructions throughout the Russian army. Among his innovations were strict discipline, the use of night attacks, and the emphasis on maneuverability and on the bayonet in close combat, in preference to firearms, then still a feature of western European warfare.[3]

The Ottomans relied on the practices which had brought success as recently as the Austro-Ottoman war of 1737-9, when they recaptured Belgrade. In theory, the grand vizier had complete command on the battlefield; in fact, the existence of two chanceries, one traditionally accompanying the grand vizier, and the other under the direction of a substitute grand vizier (*kaymakam*) in Istanbul, inhibited communications and led to confusion at the front.[4] The Russians were similarly restricted: Rumiantsev was the first

[1] Duffy, *Russia's Military Way*, p. 168. On Rumiantsev, see Klokman, *Rumiantsev*, esp. pp. 23 ff.
[2] Resmi, *Hulâsat*, p. 6.
[3] Klokman, *Feldmarshal Rumiantsev*, pp. 167-180; Kohut, *Russian Centralism*, pp. 110-11, 115-20. See also Béla K. Király, 'War and Society in Western and East Central Europe in the Pre-Revolutionary Eighteenth Century', in *East Central European Society and War in the Era of Revolutions 1775-1856*, ed. G.E. Rothenberg (New York, 1982), p. II. Harassing the enemy at night was an east European speciality. Rumiantsev's regulations, 'Obriad sluzb', are reproduced in P.A. Rumiantsev, *Tsentral'nyi gosudarstvennyi voenno-istoricheskii arkhiv*, ed. P.K. Fortunatov (Moscow, 1953), iii. 233.
[4] D'Ohsson, *Tableau général*, vii. 399-403.

Russian Field Marshal to acquire complete battlefield autonomy, and only in 1774.

By this period, competent Ottoman generals were hard to come by.[1] Transitional figures from the war of 1737-9, such as Muhsinzade Mehmed Pasha, who would have been able to contribute most to planning the campaign, were few and generally ignored. A summary of a battlefront council, recorded by Enveri, illustrates the inadequate lines of command and the lack of military expertise. Mehmed Emin Pasha, a product of the palace scribal corps, was appointed commander-in-chief in October 1768, in place of the grand vizier, Muhsinzade Mehmed Pasha, who was dismissed on account of his opposition to the war.[2] Sudden promotion to command of the imperial army was a shock from which Mehmed Emin never recovered and which cost him his life. According to Resmi, when Mehmed Emin arrived with the army at Edirne, he was already ill. After arriving with the army at İsakcı in May 1769, Mehmed Emin convened a council of war to answer the question: 'When we cross the Danube, which way shall we go? We need to know before driving this numerous army in the direction of Hotin or Bender ... as I am unfamiliar with this region and have not been on a campaign, in these matters I should be accounted among the ignorant.'[3]

The available supplies at İsakcı had already been exhausted by the army's stay of more than fifteen days but, as the discussion in council continued, it was agreed by all that the deficiencies could be made up along the line of march. But which road to choose? Although the Russians had already appeared once near Hotin, no one knew of their current intentions, so no one ventured an opinion. 'Some of the commanders of the Janissaries, however, argued that the fortresses at Bender and Özü [Ochakov] were [already] well-defended and stated their preference for crossing the Danube to Hotin and, once learning the state and position of the enemy, taking action accordingly.' Sound advice at the time, it conformed to instructions from Istanbul and was accepted, though the army later headed for Bender instead.[4] Everyone believed Mehmed Emin to be incompetent: de Tott noted his lack of talent and his audacity in disobeying direct orders from the sultan to defend Hotin as the reasons for his downfall.[5] He was blamed for most of the chaos marking the

[1] Voltaire wrote: 'You [Russians] have very able generals but the imbecile Mustafa Pasha [1757-74] takes the very first man from his saray' (Druzhinina, *Kiuchuk Kainardzhis*, p. 101).
[2] Uzunçarşıh, *Osmanlı Tarihi*, iv. pt. 2. 405-6.
[3] Resmi, *Hulâsat*, p. 10; Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Tarihi*, iv. pt. 2. 406-9.
[4] Enveri, 'Tarih', fos. 11-12; Resmi, *Hulâsat*, p. 26.
[5] De Tott, *Memoirs*, ii. 357.

first year of the war, dismissed in August 1769, and later executed. In fact, not until the re-appointment of Muhsinzade Mehmed Pasha in 1771 as commander-in-chief, was an effort made to set up a general command. Given the nature of the Ottoman military in this period, the lack of co-ordination and central control are not hard to understand, though they crippled the Ottoman war effort.

Leadership was the deciding fact and Field Marshal Rumiantsev the key to the outcome of the war: his military expertise, flexibility in difficult circumstances and dedication carried the Russian troops in 1774 to within a few days' march of Istanbul. It was a lesson the Ottomans would not quickly forget. As Rumiantsev noted in his report on the battle of Kartal: 'The Ottoman soldiers shouted at the grand vizier: "We have no power to combat the Russians."[1] They had innumerable witnesses to the foolhardiness of the traditional approach to war. Ahmed Resmi, Sadullah Enveri, and Ahmed Vasıf, all of whom took part in the Danubian campaigns, were eloquent in their descriptions of the breakdown of Ottoman military discipline and command and of the superiority of Russian training. As a result of the war, a small Ottoman reform party emerged, and the record of council meetings indicates that Resmi often spoke for it. Sadullah Enveri, a courtier of Selim (1789-1807), submitted one of the many proposals for reform that led to Selim's *Nizam-ı Cedid* ('the New Order').

In the long, painful process between 1774 and 1792 of adjusting to the loss of the largely Muslim Crimea, many of the voices calling for peace were veterans of the 1768-74 war, most of them from the central bureaucracy.[2] From 1774 to the first convention of Ainali-Kavak of 1779 with Russia, the war and peace factions at court held power by turns, resulting in two abortive attempts by the Ottoman navy to regain a foothold in the Crimea in 1778, before jointly resolving to keep the peace in 1779. From 1779 to 1783, when Catherine II finally annexed the Crimea, the debate about Tartar freedom continued in Istanbul, until, in a rare instance of harmony, the faction-ridden court of Abdülhamid I decided to sign the second convention of Ainali-Kavak of January 1784, recognizing the *fait accompli*.[3] A secret council meeting unanimously decided that the Janissaries were useless and that the military and

[1]Rumiantsev, *Tsentral'nyi*, ii. 357.

[2]See Virginia Aksan 'Ahmed Resmi Efendi, 1700-1783: the Making of an Early Ottoman Reformer' (Ph.D. dissertation, Toronto, 1991), pp. 264-84.

[3]See especially Resmi's comments abou the Tartars, Hulâsat, p. 5. On the conventions, see A. İ. Bağış, *Britain and the Struggle for the Integrity of the Ottoman Empire: Sir Robert Ainslie's Embassy to Istanbul, 1776-1794* (Istanbul, 1984).

naval reforms begun by the grand vizier, Halil Hamid Pasha, and the grand admiral, Gazi Hasan Pasha, were not far enough along to justify the risk of another war with Russia. The arguments of the veterans of the 1768-74 war carried the day.[1]

In spite of the spectacular victories promised by her favorite, Prince Potemkin, opposition to Catherine II's expansionist policies increased between 1774 and 1787, because nobles and officials felt that they would lead of another costly and undesired war with the Ottomans. In fact, the war of 1787-92 did not go so well for the Russians: military reform was resisted and military leadership faltered. Though Catherine II's dream of annexing Istanbul, her celebrated 'Greek Project', may have been little more than 'neo-classical iconography and political theater', it tapped into universal notions of Holy Russia and Moscow as the Third Rome.[2] Her policy, however, was consistently opposed by her more enlightened ministers at home.[3] In similar fashion, evocation of the elusive 'Kızıl Elma' ('Red Apple') — a distant goal of conquest in the Christian world — in the calls for Holy War could easily incite the crowd at Istanbul and influence Ottoman policy.[4] Collusion between the lesser ulema, the large Tartar exile community, and conservative grand viziers such as Koca Yusuf Pasha determined the course of Ottoman foreign affairs, especially after 1786.[5] Only with the final settlement of the Crimean question by the treaty of Jassy in 1792 would the voices calling for reform again be heard, this time with the enthusiastic support of Selim III.

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After thirty years of peace, the Ottomans returned to the battlefield in 1769, mustering as many as 60,000 Janissaries and perhaps 100,000 infantry and cavalry irregulars, while also relying on the 100,000-strong cavalry of the khan of the Crimea as an advance raiding force. Supplying the Janissaries and irregulars with daily rations appears to have been an acute problem in the first year of the war, when famine and plague combined with unreliable methods of distribution to cause starvation and desertion. nonetheless, documentary

[1]Vasıf, *Mehâsinü'l-Âsâr*, pp. 90-9.

[2]Hugh Ragsdale, 'Evaluating the Traditions of Russian Aggression: Catherine II and the Greek Project', *Slavonic and East European Review*, lxvi (1988), 114 ; Cherniavsky, *Tsar and People*, p. 36.

[3]Ragsdale, 'Evaluating', p. III ; Jones, 'Opposition to War', pp. 50-1.

[4]Resmî, *Hulâsat*, p. 3, blamed those who bragged about the 'Red Apple', as if it were a thing to be eaten like the apples of Moldavia, for starting the 1768-74 war.

[5]Fisher, *Russian Annexation*, pp. 62, 154.

evidence of the ability of the state to reorganize and redirect resources to the Danube front is impressive and deserves further investigation.

The real Ottoman disadvantage lay in the lack of any semblance of a command structure. Grand viziers were no longer seasoned soldiers but chancery products, who competed for battlefield control with powerful provincial governors surrounded by their own troops, expecting both pay and rations from the central government. Communication between Istanbul and the battlefront was sporadic, strained, and characterized by misinformation and suspicion. After the two major defeats at Hotin in 1769 and Kartal in 1770, the Ottomans delayed further offensives by extended negotiations conducted o the battlefield and orchestrated by Istanbul, forestalling the final confrontation until 1774.

Relying on the observations of foreign observers, even those as illustrious as Frederick the Great, can no longer substitute for a detailed campaign history of the war of 1768-74. By focusing on the internal dynamics of a society reconstructing its command economy, it would draw the study of the Ottoman military and administrative systems more fully into comparative European historiography.

OTTOMAN MILITARY RECRUITMENT STRATEGIES IN THE LATE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

The Ottoman Empire is generally characterized as one of the most militarized societies of early modern Europe. The iconography of the Janissaries, whose gunpowder weapons, zeal, discipline and ferocity astonished observers in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, commands an audience even today. Lurid tales of their decline into an unruly rabble by the eighteenth century, which dominate the general surveys of Ottoman history, have prevented a more complex view of the evolution of the Ottoman military from emerging.[1] While it is generally conceded that by the middle of the eighteenth century the Janissaries were unequal to the task of defending the empire, a discussion of their replacements in this transition period is only now beginning. This chapter offers a framework to redress the neglect, by suggesting that the nineteenth-century Ottoman army evolved from a combination of voluntary feudatory militias and Janissary-style conscripted infantries into a system of state-funded militias, with periods of short-term conscription, particularly in the 1768-74 Russo-Turkish War. Though the transition to a system of the theoretically universal conscription was not completed until the era of the 'Trained Victorious Muhammadan Soldiers' of Mahmud II (1808-39), it will be argued that after 1750 the Ottomans accelerated mobilization practices which anticipated the 'New Model Army' (*Nizam-i Cedid*) of Selim III (1789-1807), and, in fact, influenced its composition and sources of manpower.

Discussion of that evolution is dependent on a number of assumptions, the first one being that Ottoman military strategy was driven as a response to both endemic internal and external violence, much as European dynasties struggled to balance the two by creating standing armies out of the landless and unemployed, a view which has linked militarization and the articulation of the modern state.[2]

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[1] Geoffrey Goodwin, *The Janissaries* (London, 1995); John Keegan, *History of Warfare* (New York, 1994), especially p. 182: 'Planted though it was in the capital city of the eastern Roman empire, the Topkapı remained a nomadic camp, where the horsetail standards of battle were processed before great men, and stables stood at the door'.

[2] For example, see Charles Tilly, *Coercion, Capital and European States AD 990-1990* (Oxford, 1990), and 'States Making Wars Making States Making Wars', Jack Goldstone's review of that book in *Contemporary Sociology* 20 (1991), pp. 76-8.

This seems particularly apt in the Ottoman context, where control of internal violence and defense of shrinking borders drove mobilization and military fiscalism in the late eighteenth century, and propelled the emergence of Ottoman mid-nineteenth-century absolutism. That is to say that the escalation of war required more army, hence, more taxes and more bureaucracy. Successive wars increased indebtedness, which required further intrusion into the countryside in order to finance mobilization and supply, through a process of oppression and negotiation with native elites which gradually reduced the political autonomy of local communities. Changing Ottoman strategies for manning the battlefield both reflect similar developments in European armies, and also represent a continuation of earlier Ottoman practice.

Secondly, the cultural adaptation required to make the transition to European-style discipline and hierarchies of command, far more disruptive in the end of Ottoman household dynamics and political legitimacy, is less immediately apparent in this transitional period. What is apparent is the (re)construction of a Muslim army, ultimately both exclusionary and punitive. The manpower for these late Ottoman armies was drawn exclusively from Muslim, often nomadic or tribal, sources, part of a deliberate policy but also influenced by the increasingly restricted territory as the borders shrank. The secularization and rationalization of making war forced a conscription strategy which professed universality but in reality was restricted largely to Muslim peasants, and which replaced volunteerism with coercion, denying pious loyalties but maintaining Muslim iconography in service to state-driven priorities.

Maintaining massive armies, often larger than the population of many of the towns and cities of the continent, was a pattern of development which occurred in European societies of the eighteenth century as well. The logistics of making war were a considerable problem, as is suggested by estimates about late-seventeenth-century warfare an army of 60,000 soldiers required a daily ration of 45 tons of bread, 40,000 gallons of beer, 200-300 hundred head of cattle for meat, and 90 tons of fodder for animals.[1] According to one source, a wagon train 198 kilometers long was required to feed an army of similar size for a month.[2] Military strategists of the eighteenth century estimated that 100 wagons a day were required to feed an army of similar size for a month required to supply 50,000 men who were 15 miles, or one to two days' march, from

[1]Tallet, *War and Society in Early Modern Europe 1495-1715* (New York, 1992), p. 55, on the late seventeenth century.
[2]G. Perjés, 'Army Provisioning, Logistics and Strategy in the Second Half of the 17th century', *Acta Historica Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae* 16 (1970), p. 11.

their base.[1] Pre-modern societies found their capacity to sustain warfare stretched to its natural limit, forcing a rethinking and gradual rationalization of both men and supplies.

Armies made up of multi-ethnic federative forces were gradually superseded by more cohesive, but costly, standing armies made up of native volunteers and recruits, the flotsam and jetsam of rural society, and, latterly, conscripts. Local feudatory lords, who mobilized and supplied their own troops, were replaced by the military contractors and suppliers of competing states, the most obvious example being the France of the Bourbons, which moved from an army of 'aggregate contract[s]' to 'state commission[s]' to 'popular conscription' by 1800 in order to mobilize and supply the most massive army of Europe.[2]

In similar fashion, the Ottomans evolved an eighteenth-century standing army by increasing use of the armed irregular, the *levend*. Many of the same imperatives of the European versions operated in the Ottoman context, even if the means were different. The *levend* regiments recruited for the Russo-Ottoman wars which began in 1768 represented an army parallel to the Janissaries often numerically greater, and replacing the completely useless benefice-style soldiers (the *timariots* or *sipahis*).[3]

By the late fourteenth century, the Ottomans had created a standing army, the converted slave army of the Janissaries, an elite, highly educated infantry corps, drawn from tributary Christian children (the *devşirme* system), primarily from the European territories of the new empire. Ottoman logistical mastery was well ahead of similar developments in European military thinking, and was based on a system of well-maintained roads and warehouses, to allow for the smooth passage of the army to battlefronts both west and east. This was the organization which startled the Austrian envoy de Busbecq, eye-witness to the camp of Süleyman the Magnificent, into warning his Austrian masters of their potential threat.[4]

[1]Jeremy Black, *European Warfare 1660-1815* (London, 1994), p. 98.
[2]John A. Lynn, *Giant of the Grand Siècle: The French Army 1610-1715* (New York, 1997), pp. 4-9.
[3]The decline of the *timar* system, the assignment of a fief in exchange for military service, while related to a number of the issues discussed above, is beyond the purview of this chapter. *Timariot* soldiers were simply not present in any great numbers on the Danube in 1768.
[4]Among the many editions of de Busbecq, E. Forster, ed., *Turkish Letters of Ogier de Busbecq* (Oxford, 1927) is often the most accessible.

The system had been allowed to fall into disarray after the 1660s, and the Janissaries had become 'an almost unpaid militia, made up of small tradesmen whose main rewards were judicial and tax immunities, which they were increasingly unable of justify on the battlefield'.[1] Increasingly such a force was ineffective in the kinds of warfare in which the Ottomans were engaged, partly because of a typical, elite military resistance to innovation but more particularly because of their gradual merging with rural and urban society, what one might characterize as the gentrification of the military. Preservation of the privilege of being a Janissary remained the primary aim of the new gentry, however, and is reflected in the long struggle against attempts to reform the army muster rolls, and the revolts thus engendered, one of the most damaging being the 1730 revolt in Istanbul.[2]

The single greatest privilege of the corps, registration in such rolls, and a soldier's certificate (*esame),* guaranteed both the monthly salary and the daily rations, or their monetary equivalent. The entire Ottoman bureaucracy, up to and including the grand vizier, profited from the salaries of fictional lists of combatants. Corrupted rolls remained the most intractable problem in the Janissary organization, similar to that facing all the armies of Europe of the period, as thousands of mini armies or militias, commanded by officers who ran their own troops as corporations, were gradually drawn under state control.

Ottoman eighteenth-century battle strength was based on such rolls. By the end of the century, of a possible 400,000 such chits in circulation, only 10 per cent may have represented live soldiers ready for duty.[3] Janissary pay and ration tickets had begun to be sold and traded in the market in the reign of Mahmud I (1730-54), a system which, as noted, benefited Ottoman administrators at large. A particularly interesting example is Grand Vizier Çelebi Mehmed Pasha, whose brief career in 1778 ended with the discovery in

[1]Halil İnalcık with Donald Quataert, eds., *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire 1300-1914* (Cambridge, 1994), p. 659. On the Janissaries themselves, there is an appalling lack of systematic studies; Halil İnalcık, *The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age, 1300-1600* (London, 1973), remains a useful introduction; H.A.R. Gibb and H. Bowen, *Islamic Society and the West,* vol. 1, pt. 1-2 (London, 1950-57), is a now very outdated study of Ottoman institutions. Goodwin's *The Janissaries,* a series of sensational anecdotes, purports to be a history of the corps.

[2]Also called the Patrona Halil Revolt, after its leader. This 1730 revolt and, especially, another Janissary revolt of 1740 were also driven by the corps' resistance to campaigning in the east: dislike of fighting fellow Muslims was coupled with a dislike of the hardships, distance and deprivation, of that front.

[3]İnalcık and Quataert, *Economic and Social History,* p. 716. How the system actually worked remains to be studied. The source for the figure of 400,000 is Baron de Tott, an eye-witness to the condition of the Ottoman forces in 1768.

his possession of pay tickets representing 12,700 akçe (asper) a day.[1] The average soldier in the Janissary system probably never received more than a maximum of 20 akçe a day in this period, suggesting that the grand vizier possessed *esames* representing over 600 soldiers![2] Such a profitable trade which meant that thousands of non-combatants were enriched, while many an ordinary soldier went unpaid, was especially difficult to reform. The majority of the advisors to Sultan Selim III cited the *esame* as the chief problem surrounding the Janissary and almost universally recommended the reform of the rolls.

The breakdown of the Janissaries' fighting capability meant that the Ottomans had to accelerate alternative systems to face the greatest challenge to their power in the Russia of Catherine the Great, which, by 1750, was maintaining the world's largest standing army on one-fifth of the revenues of the French monarchy.[3] The 1699 reforms of Peter the Great created a new standing army, but the countryside had become used to mobilization a half century earlier. in the 1680s, the Russian standing army was more than 200,000 strong, representing 4.4. per cent of the population.[4] During Peter's reign, there were fifty-three levies for a total of more than 300,000 recruits.[5] For the 1768-74 war alone, under Catherine II, 300,000 troops were levied.[6] By 1795, the standing army numbered 450,000.[7] Russia relied on the conscription of serfs, for whom mobilization meant a lifetime sentence (for twenty-five years only after 1793). Self-mutilation was a frequent method of avoiding the levy.[8] Certainly one of the causes of the massive Pugachev rebellion of 1773, started among the Cossacks, and led by a Cossack officer, was the strain that conscription and constant warfare in the south had begun to put on the populace at large. Other causes of revolt during the Russo-Turkish wars, such as the devastation of agriculture and the destruction of human and

[1]Ignatius Mouradgea D'Ohsson, *Tableau général de l'Empire othoman* (7 vols., Paris, 1788-1821), vol. 7, pp. 337-9. D'Ohsson distinguishes between a pay ticket (*memhur*) and a ration ticket (*esame*), but most sources refer most often to *esame*. He also mentions the government's attempts at intervention, including an amusing conversation between the agha of the Janissaries and Mustafa III (1757-74) in which the agha informs him that the Janissaries received only half of the quarterly pay, while the rest passed into the houses of the ulema, the ministers of the state and the officers of the palace.

[2]Juchereau de Saint-Denys, *Révolutions de Constantinople en 1807 et 1808* (2 vols., Paris, 1829),vol. 1, p. 49.

[3]William C. Fuller, *Strategy Power in Russia, 1600-1914* (New York, 1992), p. 105.

[4]John L.H. Keep, *Soldiers of the Tsar: Army and Society in Russia 1462-1874.* (Oxford, 1985), p. 88.

[5]Ibid., p. 107.

[6]Richard Ungermann, *Der russich-türkische Krieg 1768-1774* (Vienna: 1906), p. 232.

[7]Black, *European Warfare,* p. 122.

[8]Keep, *Soldiers of the Tsar,* p. 155.

animal life, are fairly well documented for the Russian side, less so for the Ottomans. Death by cholera and plague as well as combat were endemic (to Russian and Ottoman armies alike), with losses as high as 25 per cent, ad sometimes closer to 50 per cent on the long forced marches, when desertion made armies vanish into thin air.[1] Distances and food supply were a continual preoccupation in the Danubian context. Disease was particularly virulent in the region, and often accounted for more deaths than actual battlefield confrontations.

Still, the Russians had vast manpower resources on which to draw, and by 1800 had become master strategists against their primary foe on the Black Sea. Incorporation and settlement of new territories, and the curbing of Cossack and Tatar alike by the creation of separate regimental structures within the Russian army were part of the keys to their success. The Ottomans, by contrast, had a shrinking manpower supply, exacerbated by the assumed and demonstrably increasing unreliability of Christian populations in the border regions, particularly the client principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia, but also in Greece. For the Ottomans to reach a battlefront strength of 100,000 to 200,000 various recruitment strategies were used: the Janissaries were effectively a fictional army, the remaining effective corps had to be supplemented by the latter groups, especially the levies, which had become the only way to get troops in any number to the battlefront. Just how fictional can be demonstrated by a roll call on the battlefront in late 1772, when more than 30,000 names were struck from the Janissary registers.[2]

The need for soldiers was especially great in 1768, when the Ottomans declared war on Russia. Her army had to be rebuilt after a hiatus from fighting of some thirty years during which the Danube region had been relatively tranquil. The striking aspects of this period is the continued volunteerism and emphasis on individual valor evident in the campaigns that unfolded. One of the more confusing aspects is that official documentation appears to maintain a distinction between a Janissary and other types of soldiers, but on the ground, as eyewitness accounts indicate, everyone appears to be a Janissary or Janissary aspirant. The corps' iconography and privileges still drew volunteers, even though methods and sources of recruitment had changed.

[1]These topics are treated at some length in Fuller and Keep as regards the Russians. Black tackles the topic for the more general European arena. The discussion of losses on the march is from Christopher Duffy, *Russia's Military Way to the West* (London, 1981), pp. 126-9. Tallett suggests that a 25 per cent loss-rate of all men under arms was standard in the seventeenth-century French army (Tallet, *War and Society*, p. 105).

[2]Sadullah Enverî, *Tarih* (1780), Istanbul University MS T 5994, fos. 328v-329.

While the Janissaries are still recorded as a prominent part of the campaigns of 1768-74, at least nominally, the true cannon fodder was drawn from the Balkan and Anatolian peasantry, as well as from the landless and lawless. They were untrained, raw recruits. Anecdotal evidence suggests an acceleration of '*bedeliyat*', or substitutions, an attempt to avoid service by buying out: 25 to 30 *kuruş* per soldier seems to have done the trick,[1] but there is very little evidence of massive resistance to recruitment, probably because the control over populations thus raised was far less coercive than in the Russian context.

Raising troops locally as a strategy to augment or counterbalance the Janissaries was the continuation of an old practice in the constellation of the Ottoman forces. The Janissary corps, primarily infantry troops loyal to the sultan, was initially created to counteract the power of local feudatory forces, whose cavalry troops were given land grants (*timars*) as salaries. The influence of the corps itself was subsequently checked by the recruitment of local irregular bands. These were called by any number of names: *levend*, *sarıca* and *sekban*, and began to appear as early as the sixteenth century.[2] *Sarıca* and *sekban* were armed infantry musketeers, similar to the local militias of Europe of the same period. Such troops were drawn from among the *levend*, a term which retains the meaning of 'hero' or 'adventurer', but which then conjured up the lawless. All of these terms also stood for 'independent soldiery companies', whose mobilization and demobilization have been linked to great rural upheavals such as the rebellions of the late sixteenth century.[3]

Roving bands, once organized into fighting forces, were called household *levend*, or state *levend*, the distinction being whether they were part of the provincial governors' personal forces (*kapılı* or *kapı halkı*) or were paid directly by the state (*miri*).[4] The bands were organized into companies

[1]Süleyman Şemdanizade, *Mür'i-'t-Tevârih*, ed. M. Münir Aktepe (4 vols., istanbul, 1980), vol. 2 (B), pp. 59-61.

[2]İnalcık, 'Military and Fiscal Transformation in the Ottoman Empire, 1600-1700', *Archivum Ottomanicum* 6 (1980), p. 292; Mustafa Cezar

[3]Inalcık, 'Military and Fiscal Transformation', p. 295. '*Levend*' is an elastic term, with other meanings, such as 'bandit' or 'outlaw', in the period under discussion. It is also used for 'marine' in the navy.

[4]Cezar, *Osmanlı Tarihinde Levendler*, pp. 214-16; also d'Ohsson, *Tableau général de l'Empire othoman*, vol. 7, p. 381ff. Such terms had replaced all earlier names for locally raised forces, such as *yaya*, *müsellem*, *azab* and *yürük;* latterly, *sarıca* and *sekban* also fell out of use, though *sekban* (also *segban* or *seymen*) was retained in the Janissaries as a regimental division (D'Ohsson, *Tableau général de l'Empire othoman*, vol. 7, p. 308).

(*bayrak* or *bölük*), generally of 50 soldiers, and could be either cavalry (*suvari*) or infantry (*piyade*). Their commander was a *bölükbaşı*.[1]

After 1700, the organization and control of such *levend* companies changed, tied to the growth of the provincial dynasties of local notables, the *ayans*, who emerge as their leaders especially after the 1720s. The provincial *ayans* represented a powerful source of manpower; their opportunity for aggrandizement and accumulation of wealth should be self-evident. Mobilization for the 1768-74 war was predicated on the ability to persuade these local magnates and the centrally appointed provincial judges, or *kadıs*,[2] to participate in the coercion and extraction required to get men and supplies to the battlefront. These militias were often used to curb the abuses of the centrally appointed military administrative class in the countryside, and sometimes to control countryside violence. Just as often, the militias instigated local rebellion. Ottoman strategy was to eliminate the militia-turned-bandits by arming the countryside for its own protection, and then enlisting the resulting bands for the next campaign.[3]

The *levend* regiments under discussion evolved to replace the *timariots*, whose few remaining numbers, no longer of any use as a military force, clung to their rights because of the entitlement value of the *timar*.[4] Equally arguably, these troops served as an alternative to Janissary recruitment, as the *devşirme* tributary system of recruitment had been completely abandoned by 1700. State-funded militias served as the majority of the troops for Mustafa III (1757-74), who feared increasing the number of the traditional forces, following upon their excesses under Ahmed III (1703-30).[5] Payment for such troops came directly from the center, with a significant sign-on bonus part of the incentive, and enlistment periods of six months, with frequent two-month renewals. A very careful formula of rations accompanied the records of troop mobilization, with cash equivalents ascribed. In sum, these were infantry and cavalry troops, commanded most often by

[1]Cezar, *Osmanlı Tarihinde Levendler*, p. 289; İnalcık, 'Military and Fiscal Transformation', p. 295.
[2]İnalcık with Quataert, *Economic and Social History*, p. 659.
[3]İnalcık, 'Military and Fiscal Transformation', pp. 301, 307-8. Karen Barkey, *Bandits and Bureaucrats: The Ottoman Route to State Centralization* (Ithaca, 1994), develops this theme.
[4]This was noted by Ahmed Resmi in 1769. See Virginia H. Aksan, *An Ottoman Statesman in War and Peace: Ahmed Resmi Efendi, 1700-1783* (Leiden, 1995), p. 136.
[5]D'Ohsson, *Tableau général de l'Empire othoman*, vol. 7, p. 382.

local provincial officers, resembling to some degree the militia of earlier periods in Europe, organized out of a central treasury.[1]

Most of the mobilization statistics for the Ottoman wars are unreliable, but a few samples of the *levend* troops present prior to the 1768 war can be used as illustrative of an ongoing practice. For example, at Egri, Hungary, in 1596 an estimated 15,000-20,000 *levend* and *sekban* troops were present, serving in the lengthy campaign against the Habsburgs that ended in 1603.[2] Figures for the eighteenth century are scattered, but one from a mobilization register for 1738 records that 6000 *miri levendat* were recruited for the Iranian front.[3]

Figures for the total size of the assembled forces in the Danubian basin in 1768-74 vary from 80,000 to 600,000, depending upon the source of information.[4] The most interesting figure derives from a contemporary source who gave a total of 254,900 for Janissaries and *miri levendat*.[5] This appears to represent the expectations of the government at the beginning of the war: 45 commanders were each to bring 1000-2000 *levend* recruits to the front, an initial recruitment of 45,000-90,000, not including their own entourages, which were often quite large, or the officers of the recruits.[6] According to d'Ohsson, 97 regiments of 1000 *miri askeri* each participated in 1769.[7] Thus, approximately 100,000 *miri levendat* may have reached the Danubian battlefront in 1769, suggesting a mobilization of perhaps twice that number of men from the countryside of the Balkans and Anatolia, less so from the Arab provinces of the empire. Adding an estimated 30,000-60,000 Janissaries, a figure closer to 130,000-160,000 is suggested as a realistic estimate for Ottoman mobilization for the first year of the campaign. The Janissaries

[1]The evidence for these assertions comes from a register and account book devoted exclusively to the mobilization of the *miri levendat:* Prime Minister's Archives, Maliyeden Müdevver Collection (hereafter MM), 4683, various pages. This remarkable record includes both the source of recruits and where they were being sent. See Virginia H. Aksan, 'Whatever Happened to the Janissaries?', *War in History*, 5 (1998), pp. 23-36, for a micro-study of the register.
[2]Cezar, *Osmanlı Tarihinde Levendler*, p. 308.
[3]MM 611, fo. 2, and repeated on fo. 18. This particular register is full of other provincial troops, and also notes the reorganizing of Janissary regiments and garrisons throughout eastern Anatolia.
[4]One Ottoman source recorded that 400,000 men and animals assembled in Bender in 1769 (Sadullah Enveri, *Tarih*, Istanbul University MS T 5994, dated 1780, fos. 8v and 22v-24). A roll call of Janissaries from early 1771 listed a total of 62,611, though a year later half that number were struck from the list (MM 17383). This figure is suspect, as the long period (1771-3) of truce and negotiation was then under way.
[5]Mustafa Kesbi, *İbretnüma-yi Devlet*, Süleymaniye Library, Ali Amiri Collection MS 484, fo. 35v.
[6]Ibid., fo. 35.
[7]D'Ohsson, *Tableau général de l'empire othoman*, vol. 7, pp. 381-82.

continued to be paid from local taxation, but the *miri levendat* salaries were drawn from the privy purse, one of the main reasons for the increased Ottoman indebtedness by the end of the war.[1]

The documents of recruitment demonstrate the ways in which these troops were perceived by the state. Most orders for the mobilization recognized the lawless and landless as the source of the manpower, noting that their misbehavior had been the cause of much harm to the countryside, but indicating also that the lack of campaigns had cut them off gainful employment. The orders announced the forthcoming campaign with Russia, and stressed the pressing need for soldiers. A general amnesty was extended to the miscreants, and instructions concerning their recruitment followed. Explicit also is the role of the local provincial officials (*ayans* and *mutasarrıfs*: governors of *sancaks*, sub-divisions of a province, and *kadıs*) in the organization of the *miri levendat* troops.[2]

Companies (*bayrak*) of fifty *levend*, usually expressed in terms of 500 or 1000 soldiers (ten or twenty companies), were to be mobilized by local officials. Formulaic orders from Istanbul always included the number of soldiers, and several other items: the mobilization or sign-up bonus (*bahşiş*), the monthly salary (*ulufe*), in six-month lump sums, as the general estimated length of the campaign season, a 10 per cent commission for the officers (*ondalık*), and a calculation of the daily rations, similarly defined for six months service. Two-month periods were also often specified, sometimes as an extension of service, sometimes for winter quarters, for passage to the front, or for fortress duty.

These were contractual troops, paid from the central treasury, and guaranteed by regional notables who could be fined double the advance from the imperial treasury for the desertion of their soldiers, although the fine was rarely imposed. Local officials were also responsible for the appointment of the company commander, often the *mutasarrıf* himself. Many of them became commanders of various divisions of the battlefront, and were generally very important in sustaining the Ottoman campaigns throughout the war.[3] The

[1]See Aksan, 'Whatever Happened to the Janissaries?', for more details.

[2]Prime Minister's Archives, Mühimme Collection, defter 167, fo. 25.

[3]The example used here is Prime Minister's Archives, Cevdet Askeriye Collection 18671, from September 1770, which is reproduced in Cezar, *Osmanlı Tarihinde Levendler*, pp. 443-4. He considers 1737 as the date of the regular appearance of such officers of rank and file as *yüzbaşı* (captain) and *binbaşı* (major), p. 360. For more details, see Aksan, 'Whatever Happened to the Janissaries?'.

ratio of cavalry to infantry varied from an estimated two to one (1770) to an estimated one in four (c. 1810).[1]

The purpose of the sign-on bonus was probably to equip a *levend* with ethier with a gun or a horse.[2] It certainly also served as an enticement to impoverished young men, the attraction universal to military service. Many of the orders for *levend* call for expert marksmen, without explicitly stating that they must own a weapon. Small arms and their distribution were under the jurisdiction of the imperial armory, while guns were generally destined for the various Janissary corps. According to one observer, even the Janissary was expected to supply his own arms, and at the battlefront weapons were distributed only to those who had none.[3] There is much evidence to suggest that the armory possessed prodigious quantities of weapons, but little information on their distribution.[4] Fear of armed populations was no less an Ottoman than a European obsession. Similarly, hiring an armed soldier parallels the European situation in the eighteenth century, but the word 'armed' should be used with caution. One eye-witness of this war remarked that recruits who enlisted for the Ottoman side came armed with clubs as weapons, complaining that a sword or a rifle was too expensive.[5]

Daily rations in the *miri levendat* records were of four or five staples: bread and meat for both infantry and cavalry, but additionally rice, cooking fat, and barley were calculated for the horses of the cavalry. The *levend* infantryman at war was expected to need a daily intake of a double loaf of bread and more than a pound of meat (over 600 grams), the equivalent of the Janissary rations. The cavalryman was entitled to the same amount of bread, but half the amount of meat, (roughly 300 grams), plus a similar amount of rice, 80 grams of cooking oil or fat, and roughly 6.5 kilograms of barley per day per man for fodder. These rations were far more generous than those of the

[1]The first figure is based on calculations from the appendices in Yuzo Nagata, *Muhsinzâde Mehmed Paşa ve Âyânlık Müessesesi* (Tokyo, 1976); the second is from Saint-Denys, *Révolutions de Constantinople*, vol. 1, p. 92.

[2]Cezar, *Osmanlı Tarihinde Levendler*, pp. 353-4.

[3]D'Ohsson, *Tableau général de l'Empire othoman*, vol. 7, pp. 345-6. The Janissaries in Constantinople were not allowed to bear arms during peacetime. He adds that, once distributed, the weapons would never be seen again.

[4]See Gabor Agoston, 'Ottoman Artillery and European Military Technology in the Fifteenth and Seventeenth Centuries, *Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae* 47 (1994), pp. 15-48, and 'Gunpowder for the Sultan's Army: New Sources on the Supply of Gunpowder to the Ottoman Army in the Hungarian Campaigns of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries', *Turcica* 25 (1993), pp. 75-96; also Saint-Denys, *Révolutions de Constantinople*, vol. 1, p. 66; and Virginia H. Aksan, 'Baron de Tott's "*Wretched Fanaticks*" and Ottoman Military Reform in the Late Eighteenth Century', unpublished paper.

[5]Şemdanizade, *Mür'i't-Tevârih*, vol. 2 (B), p. 12.

Russian soldier, who was expected to live on rye flour and groats to make gruel (*kasha*),[1] and forage for the rest. The Ottoman formulas may well have been unrealizable on the battlefront; perhaps Russian expectations were more realistic. Cash substitution for rations became the norm on the Ottoman side, certainly by the end of the war, calculated as part of the formula in the documents, and probably never equivalent to battlefield prices, inflated by scarcity and hoarding.

The state records throughout this period continue to make a clear distinction between the Janissary troops and the irregular *levend*, but at the provincial level the two appear often to have been conflated. *Levend* troops are everywhere, side by side with Janissaries, in the fortresses as well as in the large-scale battles, rare in this war. An attempt was made to eradicate the use of the term '*levend*' by the government in 1775 because of the vocation of the disasters of the recent war.[2] Still, the accounts for the *levend* troops continue in exactly the same manner in the register used in this study, but the word '*asakir*' (singular: *asker*, 'soldier') replaced 'levend' in 1777.[3] The two had come to mean the same thing to Ottoman officials. The last date in the register is 1789.

The 1768-74 war was therefore crucial in the Ottoman evolution to a more 'modern' standing army, in the increased enrollment of infantry and cavalry regiments from indigenous, Muslim, landless populations, and their payment from central treasury funds. The combination of volunteer and conscripted men also indicates an army in transition from the original forced recruitment of the Janissaries in the fourteenth century, through federative militias to regiments of state-funded militias to the new conscript army of the nineteenth century.

The 1787-92 campaigns, however, broke the back of the traditional forces altogether. Statistics of recruitment and active forces for that war, much as with the previous one, are exaggerated and unreliable, and as yet remain unstudied to any degree. The problem of the elusive nature of information on

[1]See Prime Minister's Archives, Bab-ı Defter, Baş Muhasebe Kalemi (hereafter D.BşM), Ordu Hazinesi (Army Treasury) Collection (ORH) dosya 48, gömlek 91, dated July 1769, a formula for that office; D.BşM 4250, p. 8, dated June 1771, for a detailed cavalryman's account; Duffy, *Russia's Military Way to the West*, p. 131, for the Russian side.

[2]Cezar, *Osmanlı Tarihinde Levendler*, p. 307. The tactic was previously tried on the far smaller *sekban* organization in 1718; Cezar, *Osmanlı Tarihinde Levendler*, pp. 303-5. Such names persist as part of the military ethos long after their organizational function has been superseded.

[3]MM 4683, pp. 578-9.

the Ottomans' true military force of the period was acutely observed in the early 1800s:

> Sir James Porter [British Ambassador to Ottoman Empire] considers the army to be composed of the body of the people, and the Janissaries to amount to two to three hundred thousand men, independently of those who get themselves enrolled to enjoy the privileges. Pey[s]sonnel supposes they may consist of many millions. Baron de Tott calculates them to be four hundred thousand: and finally, Mr. Eton... determines them to be an hundred and thirteen thousand four hundred. But the number of effective Janissaries is best determined by the amount of their pay. Two thousand four hundred purses are issued every six months from the treasury; a sum which allows thirty piastres a man for an army calculated at forty thousand.[1]

The documentary sources have only partial information on the 1787-92 campaigns but they do reveal a continuing trend. In early 1787, for example, 5750 cavalry ad 2000 infantry were mobilized just for the army at the Ismail fortress, in exactly the manner described above, with the term 'miri' persisting as meaning 'state-funded'.[2] Hence, though it was possible to prohibit the use of the term '*levend*' in official documents, the phenomenon of mobilizing the rural landless and lawless continued, and in the transition to non-Janissary standing army, a plethora of names for such sources of manpower came into use, including the return of the term '*sekban*'.[3] The ethnicity of such troops was increasingly Albanian and Bosnian in the Balkans; Kurds and Caucasus tribal groups from Anatolia. In 1770 Albanians recruited as *miri levendat* were diverted on the way to the Danubian battlefront to quell the Morean rebellion. They also were called upon to reman the fortresses of the Danube and Black Sea following the war, and during the 1787-92 disasters, and later

[1]Thomas Thornton, *The Present State of Turkey* (London, 1807), pp. 173-4. Even Stanford Shaw's *Between Old and New: The Ottoman Empire under Sultan Selim III, 1789-1807* (Cambridge, MA., 1971) does not include recruitment numbers for that war. James Porter's *Observations on the Religion, Law, Government and Manners of the Turks* was published in London in 1768. Peyssonnel and de Tott were both French consuls to the Ottoman court, and authors of studies of the Ottomans; de Tott's *Memoirs of Baron de Tott*, published in English and French in 1785-6, was a European best-seller; Eton's famous diatribe against the Turks, *A Survey of the Turkish Empire* (London, 1798), long served as a major source of information for nineteenth century European historians. A close study of the Ottoman archives such as I pursued for the 1768 war needs to be undertaken for all the subsequent confrontations of the pre-Tanzimat period.

[2]MM 4683, pp. 885-7. In point of fact, the term '*İsmail ordusu*' ('Ismail army') represents a new departure in the Ottoman documents, perhaps a recognition of various fronts requiring smaller armies. Similarly, the term '*sefer-i hümayun*' ('imperial campaign') has disappeared. These are straightforward military orders, couched in the formulas described above.

[3]Cezar, *Osmanlı Tarihinde Levendler*, pp. 297, 314, notes that *sekban, sarıca, levend, deli* ('crazy'), and *gönüllü* ('volunteer'), among others, were all in circulation at the time.

were one source of Selim III's *Nizam-i Cedid* troops. Provincial, non-Janissary *miri* troops had become the real army, in place of both Janissaries and *timariots*.[1]

In 1793-4, Selim III moved to create a small corps of soldiers (*asakir*) to be trained and disciplined in European fashion. He was responding to the advisers around him who made a series of recommendations on military reform: first and foremost, that a new budgetary regime be introduced; then, that a new core army be created from the young Muslim population of Anatolia, that it be trained by foreign officers, and that it be supported by mobile artillery corps. Rather than calling directly for the dissolution of the Janissaries, most reformers asserted the need to regain control over the *esame* lists, as it was an excuse for the maintenance of a completely outmoded military organization.[2] The most significant military official among the reformers was Koca Yusuf Pasha, grand vizier and commander-in-chief during most of the 1787-92 war. His recommendations recognized the necessity of organizing well trained, armed recruits (*tüfenkçi*, or 'musketeers'), both in the countryside under powerful provincial leaders, and in Istanbul, in barracks separated from the traditional corps. Others suggested that winter (peacetime) and summer (campaign) armies should be established, the former drawn from the Janissaries and the Balkans, the latter from the peasants of Anatolia.[3] Implicit in these reforms was a prototype conscript standing army and a reserve, with being a Muslim the prime condition of service. The extent of coercion is not spelled out. The first recruits for Selim III's experiment were renegades of the recent 1787-92 war and young men from the streets of Istanbul. Later, recruits came from Anatolia; they were housed in new, isolated barracks in Istanbul. By the time of Selim III's fall in 1807, the corps comprised upwards of 22,000 cavalry and infantrymen and almost 1600

[1] Yuzo Nagata, *Studies on the Social and Economic History of the Ottoman Empire* (İzmir, 1997), p. 111, in a chapter based on his dissertation and called 'the Greek Rebellion of 1770 in the Morea Peninsula'; fuller information is to be found in his *Mulıisinzâde Mehmed Paşa*. The new regiments of Mustafa Bayraktar Pasha, organized at the same time as those of Selim III were called *Sekban-i Cedid*. (Cezar, *Osmanlı Tarihinde Levendler*, p. 115).

[2] İnalcık with Quataert, *Economic and Social History*, pp. 966-70. While Shaw's work discusses the reformers and their agendas in a general way, the actual reform documents have yet to be published, analyzed and discussed in any real systematic fashion. The texts themselves are available in summarized form in modern Turkish, in Enver Ziya Karal, 'Nizâm-ı Cedid'e Dâir Lâyihalar', *Tarih Vesikaları* 1 (1941-2), pp. 414-25, and 2 (1942-3), pp. 104-11, 342-51, 424-32.

[3] Shaw, *Between Old and New*, pp. 100-101; but he likens the new troops to the *devşirme* system. In that he is mistaken: the reformers abandoned any idea of using enslaved or otherwise tributary non-Muslims in these new armies.

officers, of whom half were in Istanbul and the Balkans, and the others in Anatolia.[1]

The first, small corps of disciplined troops (perhaps 500) were important in the defeat of Napoleon's army at Acre in 1798.[2] Encouraged, Selim III furthered his *Nizam-i Cedid* agenda by extending recruitment for the new corps to the provinces, with command controlled by officers from Istanbul. At the same time, this initiative was strengthened by the new barracks in Üsküdar, which included a printing press, technical support and a hospital.[3] In 1802, Abdurrahman Pasha, governor of Karaman, and colonel of the *Nizam-i Cedid* regiments, one of the few of the independent provincial governors to take advantage of the access to power afforded by the new hierarchy of command, introduced a system of levies, and raised eight regiments himself. Provincial officials were to send specific numbers of recruits to Istanbul for a training period of six months to a year; half the recruits stayed in Istanbul, and half returned to their local militias. New barracks were built across Anatolia, and resistance seems to have been slight. Attempts to move the *Nizam-i Cedid* regiments into the Balkans, however, met with stiff resistance. In 1803-4, a rebellion in Rumelia and Bulgaria was put down by the new troops: one company of light artillery, a squadron of cavalry and three of the Karaman regiments, according to Saint-Denys.[4] The Balkans continued to resist the attempt to centralize the control of violence. In 1805, Abdurrahman Pasha attempted to conscript 20-25 year-olds from among the Janissaries and the villages of European Turkey. There was an immediate violent reaction, from Janissary and countryside alike, especially in Edirne in 1806.[5] Similar efforts led to the revolt of the fortresses of the Bosphorus by 1807 which brought down both Selim III and his *Nizam-i Cedid*. The failure was as much a result of Selim III's lack of spine, as of the new troops, who remained confined to their barracks by the sultan as the revolt unfolded.

When Mahmud II proclaimed the *Eşkinci* ordinance in May 1826 in his major initiative to reform the Janissaries, he introduced drill based on the new Egyptian model of Mehmed Ali, and called for a reform of the *esame*, the

[1] Shaw, *Between Old and New*, pp. 130-32; see also Mahmud Raif Efendi, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Yeni Nizamların Cedveli* (Istanbul, 1988).

[2] Saint-Denys, *Révolutions de Constantinople*, vol. 1, pp. 92-5, and vol. 2, pp. 12,13.

[3] See Kemal Beydilli's monumental study on the technical support, schooling and publishing of the period, *Türk Bilim ve Matbaacılık Tarihinde Mühendishâne, Mühendishâne Matbaası ve Kütüphanesi (1776-1826)* (Istanbul, 1995).

[4] Saint-Denys, *Révolutions de Constantinople*, vol. 2, pp. 24-5; Shaw, *Between Old and New*, p. 132.

[5] Saint-Denys, *Révolutions de Constantinople*, vo. 2, pp. 26-9.

same persistent problem which had plagued Selim III. The ordinance received prior approval from the *şeyhülislam*, the empire's chief religious authority. The Janissaries' mutinous response to the public display of the new drill forced the issue and resulted in the dissolution of the corps on June 15 of that year.

Significantly, the courts martial that followed included a question to each prisoner: 'Are you a Janissary or Muslim?' By 20 June 1826, the 'Trained Victorious Muhammadan Soldiers', the core of the New Army, as it was called, numbering perhaps 2000, were assembled and paraded before the sultan.[1] The regulations were based on those of Selim III's *Nizam-i Cedid* army.[2] It was the beginning of the set of regulations that completely reformed the Ottoman military along European lines, and meant the imposition of both conscription and new taxes on the Muslim population. Because of strong resistance from both the veteran soldiers and the peoples of the Balkans, Mahmud II focused his conscription on the ranks of young Anatolians, especially in a levy *en masse* in 1828, justifying it as a holy war against the Russians. Islamic slogans were reiterated to convince, just as Orthodoxy in the Russian context remained a tool for troop encouragement, masking what had become a secularized institution.[3]

Rationalized conscription depended upon a census (1831), and an officer training school (1834). The significant problem remained mistrust of the nature and length of conscription (twelve years), and relationships between officers and the common soldier, as exemplified by the defeat at Nizib (1839), when even Von Moltke acknowledged that the Ottomans had 'without doubt by far the best trained, best disciplined and best drilled [army] the Porte had ever put in the field.'[4] The Egyptian army under Ibrahim Pasha triumphed because of better command.

[1]Howard Reed's description of this, 'The Destruction of the Janissaries by Mahmud II in June 1826', PhD thesis (Princeton University, 1951), remains useful. I have consulted here Max Gross, 'Military Reform in the Ottoman Empire: The Military Reforms of Sultan Mahmud II (1808-1829')', MA thesis (American University of Beirut, 1971), which made extensive use of Reed's work. Of course, asking the Janissary that question was equally prompted by the attempt to eliminate the heretical Bektaşi influence. The result was the same. See also Avigdor Levy, 'Military Problem of Centralization in the Ottoman Empire in the Eighteenth Century', *Middle Eastern Studies* 18 (1982), pp. 227-49, and 'The Officer Corps in Sultan Mahmud IPs New Ottoman Army, 1826-39', *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 2 (1971), pp. 21-39.

[2]Gross, 'Military Reform', p. 193, compared the two.

[3]Keep, *Soldiers of the Tsar*, pp. 205-6. The famous Suvorov exhorted his troops to 'die for the Virgin, for your mother the Empress, for the royal family' (Philip Longworth, *The Art of Victory: The Life and Achievements of Generalissimo Suvorov, 1729-1800* (London, 1965), p. 217). The original Russian has 'mother' only, referring either to Russia or to Catherine II.

[4]Gross, 'Military Reform', p. 211.

Of most interest, from the point of view of this chapter, was the creation in 1834 of the *redif*, conceived of as a national militia, or reserve corps, of every able-bodied Muslim man. Mahmud II's motives were twofold: to create a reserve force for the army for external uses and to further the imposition of central authority over eastern Anatolia, particularly over the rebellious Kurdish tribes.

Most arguments about the failure of the military reforms of Selim III and Mahmud II point to the imposition of new ideas from above, and to the Ottomans' inability to generate significant reform from within. I have argued the influence of the essential catalyst of control of external and internal violence, combined with certain social and cultural attributes of the Ottoman Empire, on the evolution of military mobilization. Clearly, the experience of a century of recruitment of *levendat*-style forces from the countryside, both Anatolia and the Balkans, contributed in no small way to the thinking of the advisers of Selim III, whose levies of *Nizam-i Cedid* troops drew most heavily from the Muslim population of Anatolia. Just as clearly Mahmud II, both building a new standing army and backing it up with province-wide *redifs*, based his new organization on the manpower and geographic range of his predecessors. His particular contribution lay in his firm commitment to the changes, as contrasted with Selim III, and in the calculated redefinition of holy war as the property of secularizing monarchy and its people, justifying modernization, and thereby delegitimizing the Janissaries as its icon, as exemplified in this excerpt from the *Eşkinci* ordinance:

> Vengeance, people of Muhammad, and you, zealous servants of this Ottoman monarchy which must last as long as the world, officers of all ranks, who are all faithful believers, defenders of the faith, friends of religion and glory, come unto us, let us unite our efforts to repair our breaches, and to raise up before our land the rampart of an army which is as trained as it is brave, and whose strokes directed by science, will travel far to attain their objective and to destroy the arsenal of military inventions of infidel Europe.[1]

[1]Gross, 'Military Reform', p. 233, as translated by Howard Reed.

FEEDING THE OTTOMAN TROOPS ON THE DANUBE, 1768-1774

Provisioning of armies of 100,000 and more was one of the great challenges of all the states of Europe in the eighteenth century forcing the coordination of production and supply of foodstuffs, and contributing to the incorporation of the military systems into the early modern state.[1] Mobilization and provisioning of the army were likewise the prime economic motivators of the Ottoman Empire, which had a long and distinguished history of the production and distinguished history of the production and distribution of war supplies over vast distances, originally for the Janissary corps, and subsequently for the irregulars (*levendler*), the bulk of the fighting forces in the eighteenth century. Focusing on the production of biscuit, or hardtack (*peksimet*) for the Danubian battlefront during the 1768-74 Russo-Ottoman War, this article examines the costs and methods of financing its production, the success and failure of distribution as well as the benefits and hazards of participation in Ottoman military fiscalism. The Ottoman government had come to rely on a provincial class of notables, consistently called *ayans* in the documentary evidence, for the oversight and completion of transactions driven by the exigencies of a war economy. Although the emergence of this class of officials has been corroborated by a number of studies, no one has yet considered the impact of war on these 'stewards of redistributions',[2] who both profited and were co-opted as the state 'reached directly into communities and households to seize the wherewithal of war'.[3]

One estimate for the problems facing the armies of Europe during the later seventeenth century indicates that 60,000 soldiers and 40,000 horses required close to one million pounds of food a day.[4] Costs of such demands on the society at large are extremely hard to calculate, even in western Europe, which has been far more extensively studied in this regard than the Ottoman Empire.[5] One recent study of the Russian army acknowledged that the lack of

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[1]See especially Charles Tilly, *Coercion, Capital and European States AD 990-1990* (Cambridge 1990), and William H. McNeill, *The Pursuit of Power* (Chicago 1982).

[2]Tilly, *Coercion, Capital and European States*, 24, quoted from Traian Stoianovich, 'The Segmentary State and la Grande Nation', in Eugene d. Genovese and Leonard Nochberg (eds.), *Geographic Perspectives in History*. (Oxford 1989), 262-3.

[3]Tilly, *Coercion, Capital and European States*, 104.

[4]Ibid., 81, citing Martin Van Crevled, *Supplying war: logistics from Wallenstein to Patton* (Cambridge/New York 1977).

[5]M. S. Anderson, *War and Society in Europe in the Old Regime, 1618-1789* (London 1988), 36.

data on prices combined with existing contradictory evidence makes estimating costs for the eighteenth century practically impossible.[1] The Ottoman case may prove similarly intractable, but few attempts have been made even to pose the question. Clearly, armies of larger and larger size forced the mobilization of a state's energies at all levels, whether in the production, transport or storage of the massive amounts of foodstuffs, especially grain for bread and fodder.[2] The period 1768-74 is particularly instructive in this regard, as both Ottoman and Russian faced formidable obstacles in fielding large, undisciplined forces covering tremendous distances, in one of the continuous confrontations of the two empires that occurred once in every generation until 1918.[3] The costs of this war, financially and psychologically, were considerable, crippling the economies of both empires for decades beyond.[4]

The primary arena of the 1768-74 war was the Danubian basin, noted for the frequency of plague as much as for agricultural abundance, although increasingly notorious for the extent of devastation and deserted villages.[5] Forced marches of 1000 or more miles by soldiers on both sides contributed to as many losses as the battlefields themselves; half of every Russian levy of soldiers never reached the front, succumbing to disease and starvation.[6] The Ottomans mobilized troops from every corner of Anatolia and the Arab provinces as well as from the Balkans, and their rapacity en route is the single most often repeated complaint of eyewitnesses.[7] The Russians probably fielded over 100,000 men in the Danube area alone, deploying other forces simultaneously in Poland, the Crimea and the Caucasus, constituting 3-5 per cent of the population, as contrasted with the more normal 1,5 per cent of European armies.[8] Estimates for the size of the Ottoman army of 1768-74 vary tremendously: probably at its greatest extent, about 60,000 Janissaries, cavalry and artillerymen, along with perhaps as many as 100,00 provincial

[1]John Keep, *Soldiers of the Tsar* (Oxford 1985), 135-7.

[2]McNeill, *Pursuit of Power,* 158-60.

[3]Keep, *Soldiers of the Tsar,* 6.

[4]Ibid., 90-1, on Russia's woes; Robert Jones, 'Opposition to War and Expansion in Late Eighteenth Century Russia', *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas,* 32 (1984): 44; John Alexander, *Autocratic Politics in a National Crisis: the Imperial Russian Government and Pughachev's Revolt, 1773-1775* (Bloomington, IN 1969), 15, estimates a deficit of 9,300,000 roubles by 1772.

[5]Baron, De Tott, *Memoirs of Baron de Tott* (London 1785; repr., New York 1973), i, pt 2, 137; Alexander, *Autocratic Politics,* 17.

[6]Christopher Duffy, *Russia's Military Way to the West* (London 1981), 126-9.

[7]De Tott, *Memoirs,* i, pt 2, 137; Ahmed Resmi Efendi, *Layiha* (memorandum presented to Grand Vizier Halil Pasha 16 December 1769) f. 3, Istanbul University MS TY 419; Ahmed Resmi Efendi, *Hulâsat ül-İtibar* (Istanbul 1869), 18-19; an anonymous report on battlefront conditions, 22 June 1769, Topkapı Sarayı document E866/9, Istanbul.

[8]Duffy, *Russia's Military Way,* 126-9; Keep, *Soldiers of the Tsar,* 89.

infantry and cavalry irregulars were drawn to the center of the war on the Danube. In addition, the Tatar Khan supplied 100,000 horsemen, at this point more of a hindrance than a help in the Ottoman prosecution of war, but still capable of exerting a nuisance value.[1]

The Russian soldier was conscripted for life (technically 25 years) and was expected to survive on a monthly ration of approximately 30 kilograms of rye flour, plus 15 kilograms of groats, for *kasha*, a kind of gruel.[2] For the rest, he had to buy his own provisions or forage in the neighborhood of the battlefield.[3] The Ottoman elite soldier still appears to be the Janissary in this war, but increasingly the armed irregular, recruited from the countryside or local militias, provided most of the fighting forces. The Ottoman government found itself as the 'principal shareholder' of power, relying on provincial power bases and their households for fighting men, and negotiating their commitment to a massive effort. The irregulars in this period seem to include both provincial soldiers raised by recruiting sergeants (*çavuş*) for official regiments of the army for the duration of the campaign, and the household troops of provincial governors (*kapı halkı*). Manpower and zeal seem never to have been a problem: discipline and perseverance certainly were.[4] Both Janissary and *levend* were entitled to pay and rations, whether in cash or kind, although the matter of entitlement versus purchase of rations by the irregulars has yet to be determined — both were practiced, and appear to have been dictated by circumstance. Pay for the Janissaries in the Ottoman army was calculated on a daily basis, distributed in cash in four installments, with the last two combined into one. The irregulars were paid by a system of *ulufe* and *bahşiş*: an advance wage (*ulufe*), based on the estimated length of the campaign, and *bahşiş*, incentives distributed before battle or after meritorious

[1]A Janissary roll call, June 1771, Maliyeden Müdevver collection (MM) 17383, Prime Minister's Archives, Istanbul, has a figure of 62,611 Janissaries; other estimates include those of Sadullah Enveri Efendi, official Ottoman historian throughout the war, who estimated that 14,400 Janissaries from Istanbul plus 10,000 court cavalry (*Sipahis)* previously sent to join the Tatar Khan in 1769, gathered on the battlefront: *Tarih,* 1780, covering 1768-74, f. 8b, Istanbul University MS T 5994; and Richard Ungermann, *Der russisch-türkische Krieg 1768-1774* (Vienna 1906), 15, who estimated that 22,000-27,000 Janissaries assembled at the beginning of the war.

[2]Duffy, *Russia's Military Way,* 13; Keep, *Soldiers of the Tsar,* 113.

[3]The pay for the common Russian soldier in the late seventeenth century ran from 7,25 to 11 roubles a year. By the eighteenth century, it was 11 roubles, paid in three to four-month installments (Keep, *Soldiers of the Tsar,* 84 and 108).

[4]M. E. Yapp, "The Modernization of Middle Eastern Armies in the Nineteenth Century: a Comparative View", in V. J. Parry and M. E. Yapp (eds.), *War, Technology and Society in the Middle East* (London 1975), 346, uses the term 'principal shareholder'. See particularly Halil İnalcık, "'Military and Fiscal Transformation in the Ottoman Empire 1600-1700", *Archivum Ottomanicum,* 6 (1980): 283-337, and Mustafa Cezar, *Osmanlı Tarihinde Levendler* (Istanbul 1960), on the subject of *levend.*

action. There are literally hundreds of orders for pay and rations on this war awaiting detailed analysis.[1]

Lack of food and pay were the two primary causes of desertion,[2] preferable no doubt to riots and or plunder, also as common to this war as to all others in the pre-modern period. Shortages of food forced the withdrawal of Russian troops from the Hotin confrontation in 1769, and then the abandonment of that same fortress by the Ottomans later in the year.[3] When the entire Ottoman army arrived in Bender in 1769 scarce resources caused both riots and desertions on a large scale.[4] Studies of earlier individual campaigns would indicate that the Ottoman soldier was generally treated quite well, expecting fresh baked bread (*nan-i aziz* for the Janissaries; *nan-i çift* for the ordinary soldier, the difference being the quality of the ingredients), biscuit when bread was unavailable; a daily meat ration (lamb and mutton) of approximately 200 grams; honey, coffee, rice, bulghur, and barley for the horses.[5] The Comte de Marsigli noted the following daily ration for the late seventeenth century campaigns: 100 drachma (*dirhem*) of bread; 50 of biscuit; 60 of beef or mutton; 25 of butter; 50 of rice on Fridays, as well as the same amount of bulghur.[6] By the time of D'Ohsson's account of the Russian campaigns of the late eighteenth century, each cohort (*orta?* or 120 men) of Janissaries received a daily ration of four *okkas* of mutton and 20 loaves of bread (of 75 drachmas or a quarter *okka* each). The officers of each regiment were to see to the supplying of rice, butter and legumes to their men, probably by purchase. During wartime, the daily ration increased to two *okkas* of meat and half an *okka* of bread for every five men, plus forage for their animals, a significant increase in the amount of protein, amounting to well over an improbable pound of meat and more than a third of a pound of bread or biscuit per man per day.[7] Finkel's findings on biscuit for the 1593-1606 Habsburg-Ottoman confrontation corroborate the estimates of Marsigli and

[1]Mouradgea D'Ohsson, *Tableau général de l'empire othoman divisé en deux parties* (Paris 1788-1824), 7: 332-3, quotes a pay scale for the Janissaries of 1-100 *akçe* per day, depending on length of service and deserving exploits. He also calculated that the *levend* was engaged at 25 piastre (*kuruş*) and paid an additional 2.5 or 5 *kuruş* per month, depending on whether he was an infantry or a cavalryman (D'Ohsson, *Tableau général*, 7: 382).

[2]Keep, *Soldiers of the Tsar*, 114.

[3]Ungermann, *Der russisch-türkische Krieg*, 48; Resmi, *Hulâsat*, 32.

[4]Enveri, ff. 22b-24.

[5]Rhoads Murphey, 'The Functioning of the Ottoman Army Under Murad IV (1632-1639 / 1032-1049): Key to the Understanding of the Relationship Between Center and Periphery in Seventeenth Century Turkey' (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 1979), 130, on the 1639 campaign.

[6]Comte de Marsigli, *L'Etat militaire de l'Empire Ottoman* (the Hague 1732), 2: 68,400 *dirhem* = 1 *okka* = 2.8 pounds.

[7]D'Ohsson, *Tableau général*, 7: 341.

D'Ohsson.[1] The Ottoman soldier was considerably better fed than his Russian fellow, if such figures are in any way indicative of reality.

In previous centuries, supply routes and foodstuffs had been rigorously controlled to the Janissaries and the sultan's household staff in order to guarantee the success of the campaign, with periods of shortages and famines which are endemic to warfare. The logistic for this campaign, at least for the first year 1769, seem full of confusion and disorder, as the Ottomans made the attempt to rebuild the military supply system after a hiatus of almost 30 years. The list of supplies is much the same: fresh bread, when available, biscuit, rice, bulghur, butter, coffee, lamb / mutton, flour, and barley for the horses,[2] but biscuit appears to be assuming a larger proportion of the soldier's rations than previously, to judge from the numbers involved although in light of the paucity of studies of Ottoman logistics, that statement may ultimately have to be modified. It was neither the first nor the last time it would be used, nor were the Ottomans unique in their reliance on biscuit. The Spanish army of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, for example, 'lived on bread which contained flour, offal, broken biscuits and lumps of plaster.'[3] Hardtack was a staple of both the eighteenth century English navy, and of the American frontier, up to and including at least the Civil War, where the ration of the Union army was one pound, or nine to ten biscuits, per man per day. Weevils plagued the American soldier, who dipped his biscuit in coffee so the bugs would float to the top. Extreme hardness and indelibility are the general complaints in the Ottoman texts, further described below.[4]

Evliya Çelebi, Ottoman traveler and polymath of the seventeenth century, counted 105 ovens in Istanbul alone for the baking of the biscuit for the army and navy stores. On Murad IV's 1639-40 Baghdad campaign, 82,972 *kantar* (more than five million kilograms) of biscuit were collected for the march across Anatolia, which it was then estimated could sustain 80,000 men for the duration of the march.[5] Biscuit available to the Ottoman army of the late seventeenth century was reputedly good, plentiful, and very useful on the

[1]Caroline Finkel, *The Administration of Warfare: Ottoman Campaigns in Hungary, 1593-1606* (Vienna 1988), 169-72.

[2]Resmi, *Layiha*, ff. 8a-9b; f. 39b, from 1771, Hacı Mahmud Collection MS 4859, Süleymaniye Library, Istanbul, list of recommended purchases for 1771: flour, barley, meat, oil and rice.

[3]Geoffrey Parker, *The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road, 1567-1659* (Cambridge 1972), 163-4.

[4]John D. Billings, *Hardtack and Coffee* (Chicago 1960), 112-14.

[5]Murphey, "Functioning of the Ottoman Army", 229, on the ovens; a ration of 700 grams a day for the march, per Murphey's calculations: 1 *kantar* (quintal) = 56,443 kilograms; ibid., 124.

march.[1] It had other uses as well, if the story about the soldiers at Plevne in 1878 using hardtack as ammunition when they ran out of bullets is to be believed.[2]

Biscuit was made of wheat flour (*dakik*) mixed with water, and may have been cut with other grains, such as barley, or millet, when shortages occurred. The problem with such definitions is that to discuss any provision in the Ottoman context is to enter the ill-defined world of *zahire* (plural: *zehayir*), the general word for provisions, used ubiquitously in the documents.[3] Nonetheless, a number of clear orders at the beginning of the 1768-74 war, setting out the ratio of 2,5 *kile* (bushels) of flour for every *kantar* of biscuit, are convincing as to its composition.[4] Also set out in these documents are the wage (*ücret*) for the baking per *kantar*,[5] costs of shipping and even, occasionally, the cost of the sacks (*çuval*) for transport.[6] Orders were sent out, often before the harvest, concerning the purchasing and storage of the new season's grain. State commissioners (*mubayaacıs*) were appointed to buy the grain (wheat, flour, barley, sometimes oats and millet) and transport it to the battlefront warehouses, where it became the concern of the various commissary officials, most often called *emin*. The larger questions about the buying and selling of grain in the eighteenth century, which are naturally important in a consideration of the impact of a war economy, have been very inadequately treated and must be considered as beyond the purview of this discussion. A combination of purchase at fixed prices, taxation and outright confiscation was the norm.[7] Bender, Isakcı, Hantepesi and Babadağı, the latter south of the Danube, appear to have been the major points of supply in this war, although other towns along the river, such as Rusçuk, also served as depots and distribution centers. The *Mubayaacı* oversaw, in theory, the purchase of the grain, the baking and shipping of biscuit, but manpower and

[1] Marsigli, *L'Etat militaire de l'Empire Ottoman*, 2: 68.

[2] As related to me by Hasan Kayalı.

[3] Caroline Finkel, 'The Provisioning of the Ottoman army During the Campaigns of 1593-1606', *Habsburgisch-osmanische Beziehungen CIEPO Colloque* (Vienna 1983), 111.

[4] Cevdet Askeriye Collection (CA) 12626, June 1979, Prime Minister's Archives; a series of orders relating to biscuit production in Bolu, June 1770 - April 1772, CA 2684; a series of orders relating to biscuit production in Plevne, May 1773 to April 1774, CA 13131. 1 *kile* = 1 bushel (36.5 kilograms).

[5] The cost of baking ranged from 30 *akçe* (CA 12626) to 48 *akçe* (CA 13544, July 1769) to 60 *akçe* (MM 10384, 'Kuyud-ı Mühimmat', December 1769-February 1770, f. 209). Finkel has a figure of 20 *akçe* for 1597 in Belgrade (*Administration of Warfare*, 171).

[6] CA 13544, where the 48 *akçe* appears to include the cost of the sacks.

[7] The only works yet to deal with the grain trade in any detail are John McGowan, *Economic Life in Ottoman Europe: Taxation Trade and the Struggle for Land, 1600-1800* (Cambridge 1981), and Lütfi Güçer, *XVI-XVII. Asırlarda Osmanlı Imparatorluğunda Hububat Meselesi ve Hububattan Alman Vergiler* (Istanbul 1964).

supplies for the baking process were a local matter, and therefore under the jurisdiction of the local judges (*kadis*) and / or, increasingly, local notables (*ayans*). It has been argued that the *ayans* were in fact usurping the *mubayaacı* positions normally reserved for Istanbul appointees, an indication of the increasing power of provincial elites, which was enhanced by the exigencies of supplying this war.[1] There is more confusion than clarity in the documents so far explored concerning the exact duties of the *mubayaacıs*, but whether state officials or local appointees, they were generally given a certain small sum of cash as an advance, and ordered to secure designated amounts of grain from each *kaza* (district), based on the tax household accounts, though there is no direct correlation of that transaction in the central record of expenses.[2] Bakers, drafted or appointed by the state, accompanied the army for the baking of bread and biscuit, although the latter was more often baked at long distances from the battlefront and shipped overland or by sea to the Danube. Veinstein includes bakers as part of the *orducu* system of guildsmen, commandeered for imperial campaigns, and in fact, often supported by the members of the guild who did not have to report, an unpopular system and far less in evidence in this war than previously.[3] Distribution of foodstuffs from state supplies and warehouses was the duty of various bureaucrats: the *Nüzül Emini*, generally in charge of grain supplies; the *Anbar Emini*, the official in charge of the warehouse, and so forth.

Direct evidence of the distribution of biscuit to the army indicates that it was the chief sustenance on board ship during transport of infantry and cavalry troops to the battlefront; on quick forced marches, and a standard part of the supplies for border fortresses, as in the following examples: an order for the supply and distribution of 1063 *kantar* of biscuit to *serdengeçti* troops for the passage between the ports of Bartın and Bender;[4] an order for the daily rations for seven regiments of *serdengeçti* and 1000 *dalkılıç* on the march to Hotin in late 1769, requesting 50 *kantar* and 11 *okka* of biscuit, amounting to roughly one-third of a *kantar* for each individual;[5] a detailed account of the distribution of biscuit to individual regiments of *serdengeçti* and other soldiers from Anatolia, as they boarded ships in Sinop bound for the battlefront, at a ratio of half a *kantar* per individual in 1769 and 1770, and

[1] Yuzo Nagata, *Muhsin-zâde Mehmed Paşa ve Ayânlık Müessesesi* (Tokyo 1976), 74-80.

[2] McGowan's is still the best description of the tax household (*avarizhane*).

[3] Gilles Veinstein, "Du marché urbain au marché du camp: l'institution ottomane des *orducu*", *Revue d'histoire maghrébine*, 47/48 (1987): 313-15.

[4] CA 13072, April 1771.

[5] CA 2677, 8 November 1769. *Serdengeçti* and *dalkılıç* were advance infantry or 'shock' troops, always given the most dangerous assignments, and paid accordingly: D'Ohsson, *Tableau général*, 7: 383.

one-third of a *kantar* per soldier in 1771;[1] a requisition for 10 *okka* each of biscuit for 70 artillerymen and an officer ordered from Istanbul to Varna by ship in 1771.[2] A ration, in other words, of somewhere in the neighborhood of 18-28 kilograms (roughly 40-60 pounds) of biscuit was distributed to the soldiers in these examples, presumably to last for their entire journey.

Orders antedating the spring campaign indicate that the expectation of the government was that before the army left Istanbul, the warehouses along the march, at the way stations and at headquarters on the Danube would be fully supplied with the soldiers' needs in the matter of biscuit. The initial request for biscuit in 1769 included 100,000 *kantar* from Istanbul; 100,000 from Gelibolu, and 200,000 from Isakçı, approximately 22,400,000 kilograms.[3] It can be assumed that those three areas were central distribution points, to judge by other numerous documents coning biscuit from the same year: Egypt 40,000 *kantar* (along with 100,000 *kile* rice);[4] Edirne 20,000 *kantar*; Isakçı 20,000 *kantar*; Rusçuk 20,000 *kantar*;[5] and from a list of expenses of the privy purse for war supplies, these additional locations: Sinop, Silistre, Thessalonika, Cyprus, Keffe, Bolu, and Özü.[6] That particular privy purse account totals 5,590,507 *kuruş*, of which 13-14 per cent was spent on supplies, baking and transport of biscuit.[7] That this was not a one time affair is evident in repeated calls for the purchase and production of biscuit throughout the war years, as for example, Silistre, where an order went out for 350,000 bushels of flour to be brought to the Silistre wharf, along with a request for 79,783 *kuruş* for the production of biscuit for the 1770 campaign season in Isakçı.[8] Acquisition of flour proved increasingly difficult as the territories north of the Danube were occupied by the Russians: urgent instructions were sent, for example, to the former *Kethüda* Ahmed in

[1] Bab-ı Defteri Baş Muhasebe Collection (D. BSM), 4010, 1769, Prime Minister's Archives; D.BSM Peksimet Emini collection (D.BSM.PKE) 12325, 1770 and D.BSM.PKE 12336, 1771, respectively.

[2] CA 1834, April 1771.

[3] Mustafa Kesbi, *İbretnüma*, undated, f. 38a, Ali Emiri Collection MS 484, Süleymaniye Library.

[4] CA 2784, December 1769, addressed to the Governor of Egypt and other officials.

[5] CA 12626, which breaks down by district the amount of flour contributed from Edirne; CA 13544, for Isakcı; CA 8710, January 1770, for Rusçuk.

[6] D.BSM 3913, 1768-9, ff. 2-3, amounts in *kuruş* only.

[7] Ibid. Another total of 1,325,306.5 *kuruş* occurs in a series of central accounts labeled 'monies for the purchase of various supplies for biscuit for the imperial campaign, July 1769', M 11786, 'Masarifat Defteri', ff. 8-9 and MM 5970, 'Masarifat Defteri', ff. 28, 34-5, where the total are identical and then continue in MM 11786 —coverage reaches into 1770— both are central expense accounts.

[8] MM 3582, May 1770, ff. 15-16. In this case, Istanbul *kite*, intended as an official standard, but seldom operating that way. Ottoman metrology is in its infancy; see Halil İnalcık, 'Introduction to Ottoman metrology', *Turcica*, 15 (1983): 311-48.

February 1770 to see personally to the purchase and transport of 120,000 bushels of flour and 345,500 bushels of barley in districts such as Zagra-Atik and Zagra-Cedid in Bulgaria, from the wharves of Burgos to those in Isakçı, because war and rebellion in Wallachia and Moldavia were making the normal supply routes and methods impossible. He was given 330,333 *kuruş* in cash for that purpose from the privy purse, on the face of it, an enormous sum of money, rarely doled out to individuals in such a context.[1]

Is it possible to assess the success or failure of this elaborate system of wartime supply and demand? As it happens, there are numerous eyewitness accounts on the availability and effectiveness of the supply of biscuit. A report from Hantepesi (headquarters and depot on the Hotin/Bender axis) dated late June 1769, when the army had assembled just prior to the first campaign season, is perhaps the most reliable. By its account, the required biscuit and barley had been transported from Isakçı, but beyond that the entire area from the Danube to Hotin had been devastated by the oppression of Kahraman Pasha and his Albanian soldiers even though they had been sent money from the government (600 bags of *akçe*). As the number of soldiers increased at Hantepesi, shortages occurred, an *okka* of biscuit selling for 20 *para*. Then supplies arrived from Isakcı and the Crimea, alleviating the situation.[2] In the confusion of this report, it is clear enough that the delivery system, however haphazard, was in place. Sadullah Enveri witnessed the arrival of the army at Bender later in 1769, and had his own comments: the Chief Accountant of Bender (*Defterdar)* had been instructed to collect rations for 31 days but had failed to do so, neglecting also to see the proper number of ovens prepared, so that when the army arrived in Bender from Hantepesi, rebellion broke out, and 5000-6000 infantry and cavalrymen fled. In spite of that, more than 90 ovens were dug, and during the 27 day stay in Bender, 125,000 bushels of barley, and more than 6900 sacks of flour, and 4000 *kantar* of biscuit were delivered from surrounding areas.[3]

Ahmed Resmi was particularly incensed by shortages and abuses in the supply system. In Isakçı, he noted, the *Nüzül Emini* adulterated the newly baked bread with dirt and left-over biscuit from the storehouses, causing many deaths. For this he blamed the *Mubayaacıs* and bakers, who hoarded the flour

[1] Kemal Kepeci Collection (KK) 2929, 'Ahkam Defteri', ff. 5-6, Prime Minister's Archives. This refers to Ahmed Resmi Efendi, who, better known as a historian and diplomat, was also second-in-command on the Danube battlefront (*kethüda*) to the Grand Viziers, once in 1769 and again in 1771-74.

[2] Topkapı Sarayı E86/6/9.

[3] Enveri, ff. 22b-24.

for their own profit.[1] Canikli Ali Pasha, one of the commanders ordered to Hotin in the early days of the war, noted that both the *Mubayaacıs* and the captains of the transport ships cut the barley with straw, and the flour with sand and dirt, a fact well known to one and all.[2] The *ayans*, he asserted, sold rotten and insect-infested wheat to the *Mubayaacıs*.[3] Finally, from another eye-witness in Isakcı in 1768, Mustafa Kesbi, the astonishing information that 3000 *kantar* of biscuit were literally unearthed from the warehouse, 'pure, white and edible' leftover from the 1738-39 campaign against Russia and Austria.[4]

While it may never be possible to present realistic total figures in the matter of biscuit (or any other foodstuff), clearly a significant amount of money was sunk into its manufacture and distribution, involving all levels of society. How was it financed and who stood to benefit? The following are some preliminary observations. Apart from the 'cash on account' distributed to the *Mubayaacıs* indicated above,[5] which in most of the instances I have surveyed to date represents a very small proportion of the total transactions, there seems to have been a great deal of paper transfers, or application of what was owed the state by was of taxation from the generic *avariz*, and what was demanded by the state by way of extraordinary war services. Another feature very much in evidence in this war is the system of *bedeliyat*, the substitution of cash for supplies and / or services, by either the state, in the case of rations, or the local population, unable or unwilling to fulfill the demands of the war economy. Many of the documents refer to another cash source as the office of *mevkufat*, or bureau of Contributions in Kind, which collected the *avariz* and *bedeliyat* taxes and was routinely involved in the supply of war materials, especially on the march.[6]

The carefully recorded central accounts mask the extent and depth of the impact of the process of acquisition and production of biscuit on local communities, a process generally involving both negotiation and coercion. Other surviving documents, however, reveal the negotiations between the

[1]Resmi, *Hulâsat*, 13-14, and *Layiha*, ff. 7b-8.
[2]He is mentioned in Topkapı Sarayı E866/9 as ordered to Hotin; his comments on biscuit are in his *Nasayih al-Muluk*, Esad Efendi Collection MS 1855, f. 26, Süleymaniye Library.
[3]Canikli Ali, f. 23a.
[4]Kesbi, f. 38. He was appointed as part of the team sent to repair and enlarge the fortress at İsakcı.
[5]Part of the accounts of income and expenditure called *teslimat* (Finkel, 'Provisioning', 111).
[6]Colin J. Heywood, 'The Ottoman *Menzilhane* and *Ulak* System in Rumeli in the Eighteenth Century', in Osman Okyar and Halil İnalcık (eds.), *Türkiye'nin Sosyal ve Ekonomik Tarihi (1071-1920): Social and Economic History of Turkey (1071-1920)* (Ankara 1980), 180.

government and the agricultural sector, as in the two that follow: one from Bolu in 1770-71 and the other from Plevne in 1773-74. The Bolu example involved orders for the production of 6000 *kantar* of biscuit at a cost of 20,250 *kuruş*, of which only 9000 *kuruş* had been advanced by Istanbul. The Bolu Voyvoda, Yusuf Bey, found himself with a rebellion on his hand: through the order for biscuit had been completed, various villages in the Bolu region were refusing to hand over the requested items until they were paid, and Yusuf Bey had had to imprison a number of the offenders. He had repeatedly requested the remaining 11,250 *kuruş*. The government's response involved the transfer of the money owing from the *imdad-i seferiye* (campaign taxes) levied on the same region, some 16,500 *kuruş*. Further investigation revealed that 10,500 of the *imdad-i seferiye* had already been spent on other war needs. The upshot was that the 6000 *kuruş* left in the *imdad-i seferiye* was applied to the debt, with a note to the effect that the remaining 5250 *kuruş* still owed to the Bolu producers of biscuit would be transferred later from some 'suitable source'. This appears to be a classic case of 'robbing Peter to pay Paul', and one has to wonder how much cash actually ever exchanged hands. Yusuf Bey, the local tax collector, an Istanbul appointee, has become both policeman and middleman.[1]

The other example, from Plevne in 1773-74, starts with a representation from the entire populace of the district about their absolute inability to supply the 6000 bushels of flour and the biscuit they were to bake from that amount, even though half of it was already finished, because excessive rains had ruined the crops and impoverished the peasantry, and they had received neither penny (*akçe*) nor kernel (*habbe*) from the government. Investigation in Istanbul revealed that the original contribution from Plevne was to be 43,350 bushels of barley and 20,000 bushels of flour, of which 6000 was to be baked as biscuit, and delivered to Niğbolu. Five thousand *kuruş* had been advanced to Varnalı Ibrahim Agha for this purpose, of the total 29,670.5 *kuruş* bill. The final order is addressed to İbrahim Agha, and the *ayan* and *zabitan* of the area, and reiterates that the original order must be fulfilled, and that Ibrahim Agha had better come up with the 5000 *kuruş*, and deliver whatever was left of the order to Niğbolu, after determining how much had already been delivered. The remainder of the debt was to be applied from the *Mevkufat*.[2] Ibrahim Agha is elsewhere described as the *ayan* of Niğbolu, functioning as both *Mubayaacı* and *Nüzül Emini*.[3] There is no indication of

[1]CA 2684, with the pleas from the Voyvoda in 1771.
[2]CA 13131.
[3]Nagata, *Muhsin-zâde Mehmed Paşa ve Ayânhk Müessesesi*, 75.

mercy for the impoverished inhabitants of Plevne here, but a clear understanding of the real message about the possible abuse of state funds. Both examples elucidate the kinds of negotiation required by the Ottoman government to secure the much-needed battlefront supplies.

The officials responsible for the oversight and termination of this type of transaction were increasingly drawn from the group called *ayans*, though it is sometimes unclear as to whether a glorified bandit, a lapsed Janissary, or a local notable is meant. The term *ayan* was not new to the eighteenth century, having always been a part of the provincial landscape, but the extortionary role played by the *ayans* in the town and countryside of Anatolia and the Balkans increased dramatically after 1750. In the vacuum created by the much detested officially appointed governors (*valis*) called to the battlefront, local strongmen and their households became the official presence in numerous towns and villages, and the government was forced to rely on them for continuity of coercion and supply.[1] This class of officials, thrust up and increasingly vital to the operation of the state in the desperation of the needs of war, can be distinguished from the rebels of previous periods, or even the ubiquitous bandits of much of later Ottoman history because both government and peasantry agreed to their election and mediation. Nagata emphasizes the role of Muhsinzade Mehmed (Grand Vizier 1765-68; Grand Vizier and Commander-in-Chief on the battlefield from 1771-74), in recognizing and utilizing the *ayans* in order to raise funds and recruits for the war effort,[2] initiating a period of negotiation over their right to control and represent provincial populations.[3] Grand vizierial control over appointment of the *ayans* was first instituted by Muhsinzade Mehmed in 1765, in an effort to stop widespread extortion and abuse of peasant populations, but such attempts at central control were abandoned in 1769, upon the outbreak of war, when the necessity of supplying foodstuff expeditiously prevented the lengthy correspondence involved in selecting new *ayans*, and the election was left to the notables of each region.[4] *Ayans* thus gained further autonomy and power, and were instrumental in provisioning the army throughout the war, as well as policing, and often fleecing, local populations. While many *ayans* shirked their responsibility, just as many served the state effectively.[5] Postwar

[1] Ibid., 77-8. His research concluded that the Rumeli *ayans* may have contributed as many as 30,000 men to the battlefront, in addition to their role as commissioners and local police.
[2] H. Bowen, 'A'yān, *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, 2nd edn, vol. 1,778.
[3] Nagata, *Muhsin-zâde Mehmed Paşa ve Ayânlık Müessesesi*, 27-38. See also Sadat, 'Rumeli Ayanları: the Eighteenth Century', *Journal of Modern History*, 44 (1972): 346-61.
[4] Nagata, *Muhsin-zâde Mehmed Paşa ve Ayânlık Müessesesi*, 38.
[5] Ibid., 74-78.

attempts to eliminate the *ayans* were interrupted by the outbreak of the next war with Russia in 1787.[1]

A number of studies of provincial elites have detected a significant difference in those involved in countryside unrest and control between the first and second halves of the eighteenth century, without relating the change to the increasing scale and scope of Ottoman warfare in that period. Both Masters and Marcus, writing on Aleppo in the eighteenth century, note a signal change in the distribution of coercive power to *ayans* in the latter part of the century, although they do not link it to the demands of war, but rather to the domination of certain local elites in international trade.[2] Uluçay on the bandits of the Aegean region (*eşkiya*), especially Saruhan, also comments on the change from bandit to local lord (*ayan*) beginning in the second half of the eighteenth century.[3] For Schatkowski-Schilcher, local 'paramilitary' groups in Damascus, drawn from the aghas and *kapı kulu*, especially after 1600, dominated the urban grain market until the latter part of the eighteenth century, when centralization disrupted much of the factional politics, especially under strongman Ahmad Pasha al-Jazzar, both defender of and threat to the central government.[4] A more recent study argues effectively that the 'privatization' of the tax-farming system (*malikâne*) can explain the increasing power of local provincial classes, yet concludes that the primary beneficiaries continued to be the officials and households of the central state.[5] Consideration of the pressures of war on the economies of all areas of the empire should produce stronger evidence to account for the significant societal disruption already well documented.

This type of study of the provisioning of the Ottoman army elucidates the effective functioning of a massive supply system along with the increasing appearance of the dialogue and collaboration (meaning both submission and resistance) of the Istanbul bureaucracy and lower level administrative officials, in turn contributing to the centralization often observed as a byproduct of military fiscalism in Europe.[6] The impact of the

[1] Bowen, 'A'yān, 778.
[2] Bruce Masters, *Origins of Western Economic Dominance in the Middle East: Mercantilism and the Islamic Economy in Aleppo 1600-1750* (New York 1988); Abraham Marcus, *The Middle East on the Eve of Modernity: Aleppo in the Eighteenth Century* (New York 1989).
[3] M. Çağatay Uluçay, *18. ve 19. yüzyıllarda Saruhan'da Eşkiyalık ve Halk Hareketleri* (istanbul 1955).
[4] Linda Schatkowski-Schilcher, *Families in Politics: Factions and Estates of the 18th and 19th Centuries* (Stuttgart 1985), 111.
[5] Ariel Salzmann, 'An Ancien Régime revisited: "Privatization" and Political Economy in the Eighteenth Century Ottoman Empire', *Politics and History*, 21 (1993): 393-423.
[6] Tilly, *Coercion, Capital and European States*, 103-4.

immediacy of the demands of war on the Ottoman economic and social system is undeniable, as the entire population of the empire was mobilized in the logistics effort, from producer to consumer. The nature of the negotiations as outlined above produced stronger provincial elites some of very dubious backgrounds, who would make themselves overtly felt in the events leading up to the governmental crisis an the 'Pact of Alliance' of 1808, when a coalition of *ayans* brought their demands to the doorsteps of Istanbul. While the emergence of powerful provincial elites was neither initiated nor terminated by this war, nor were such elites ultimately successful against what has been described as the Ottoman 'legal-administrative system of checks and balances that contained provincial power building',[1] as they became the target of Mahmud II's reforms in the early decades of the nineteenth century, the demands of the military economy accelerated their rise to power and provoked the transition to direct rule and centralization more evident by mid-century.

[1]Salzmann, 'Ancien Régime Revisited', 408, 397.

WHATEVER HAPPENED TO THE JANISSARIES? MOBILIZATION FOR THE 1768-1774 RUSSO-OTTOMAN WAR

While most Ottoman historians would acknowledge warfare as an implicit or explicit part of the Ottoman *modus operandi,* no studies of a majority of the Ottoman military campaigns exist, exceptions being those of Rhoads Murphey and Caroline Finkel for the post-Süleymanic period.[1] What follows is a preliminary exploration of the mobilization practices of the 1768-74 Russo-Ottoman War, part of a larger study in progress on the nature and impact of that war on Ottoman society of the period. For the Ottomans, like their European counterparts, found the costs of war in the eighteenth century outstripping revenue, and the results of such warfare devastating, disappointing and inconclusive. Ottoman historians have long asked what became of the Janissaries after 1700. The question might be better framed as who or what replaced them, how they were recruited and how the central government viewed them.

One of the more interesting views on state formation in the early modern European world interprets it as a response to endemic internal violence, an increasingly costly spiral of control of the military and the technology required to make it efficient. Some western historians see state formation as the struggle over ancient territorial rights, viewing the rise of local leaders and aristocracies as directly related to the management of military manpower for and / or against the state. Others construct models to account for the rise of bureaucracies and tax systems as a direct result of the need to finance violence, considering success or failure in harnessing and financing the military as the sole imperative of state formation. In Tilly's *Coercion, Capital and European States,* militarization and state formation are inextricably linked. To put it crudely, as many of his critics have, states make wars make states make wars.[2] It would seem obvious that the escalation of war, its increasing size and extent, would mean a deeper mobilization of state

[1]R. Murphey, 'The Functioning of the Ottoman Army under Murad IV (1623-1639/1032-1049)' PhD dissertation, Univ. of Chicago, 1979); C. Finkel, *The Administration of Warfare: Ottoman Campaigns in Hungary, 1593-1606* (Vienna, 1988). This paper was originally presented at the American Research Institute in Turkey in Istanbul, Apr. 1995.

[2]C. Tilly, *Coercion, Capital and European States AD 990-1990* (Oxford, 1990). See also 'States Making Wars Making States Making Wars', the title of J. Goldstone's review in *Contemporary Sociology* XX (1991), 176-8; H. W. McNeill, *The Pursuit of Power* (Chicago, 1982).

resources, determining the essential link of militarization and bureaucratization, i.e., more war, more taxes, more bureaucracy. Each successive war, especially in the eighteenth century, meant increased indebtedness, which meant 'oppression', here meaning conscription and discipline of the countryside, and 'negotiation', meaning financing mobilization and supply, leading to increased taxation and to a further reduction of the financial autonomy of local communities.

While European historians examining military history in the social context are anxious to include the Ottoman empire in their works, and have already done so with some success,[1] many others stress the limitations inherent in a comparison of western and Ottoman economic models, and have begun the construction of a non-western theory of state formation. The military imperatives of Mughal India, for example, have been studied by Dirk Kolff, who sees state formation in seventeenth-century India as a process of negotiation between a minority government and an armed agrarian class so huge and diverse that it 'did not allow the court to become the foundation of a unilateral "law and order" imposed on the peasant strata'. He adds that 'political and military energies' could not possibly be frozen into any kind of '"early modern" repose'. Though they could not be ruled, he continues, such autonomous communities could be 'let into the empire' by the state which was 'the largest and most honorable employer of the country, whose huge army was the fundamental expression of its achievement', a view that one might characterize as the 'billiard ball model'. More recently, Karen Barkey has drawn similar conclusions about the Ottoman state, arguing that it was most effective in 'embodying within itself the potential forces of contention'.[2] Both eastern and western models of state formation remain provocative, and have influenced what follows.

In the Ottoman empire, the countryside was more or less armed by 1600, as it was in Europe in the same period, and control of the armed, landless peasantry was a continual preoccupation.[3] The long history of the Ottoman empire can be studied from a perspective which assumes that the

[1] As examples J. Black, *European Warfare 1660-1815* (London, 1994), treats the Ottomans as active players in the European arena, whereas J. Keegan, *History of Warfare* (New York, 1993), describes Ottoman Istanbul as 'planted ... in the capital city of the eastern Roman empire ... where the horsetail standards of battle were processed before great men, and stables stood at the door' (p. 182).

[2] D. Kolff, *Naukar, Rajput, and Sepoy: The Ethnohistory of the Military Labour Market in Hindustan, 1450-1850* (Cambridge, 1990), pp. 2, 19; K. Barkey, *Bandits and Bureaucrats: The Ottoman Route to State Centralization* (Ithaca, NY, 1994), p. 241.

[3] *Op. cit.*, and H. İnalcık, 'Military and Fiscal Transformation in the Ottoman Empire, 1600-1700'. *Archivum Ottomanicum* VI (1980), pp. 283-337.

control of violence at all levels remained the chief imperative of whatever one means by 'the state', and that that imperative had a very significant impact on Ottoman society, which in turn altered the ideological assumptions and relationships of various constituencies (or elite groups) within the Ottoman hegemony. As the state was forced to dip deeper and deeper into the resources of provincial society, a process of social transformation was initiated that diminished the rights of access of the traditional aristocratic households, and empowered a new class of regional upstarts, who then either challenged the central government with raised expectations, much as did the displaced grandees, or cooperated in the creation of the absolutism of the nineteenth-century Ottoman empire. The trends appear to coexist in the later eighteenth century, when the continuing monetarization of state revenues was radically transforming rural social relations. If we accept the management of war as the primary cause of that evolutionary transformation of the Ottoman state, then we can effectively address the strategies of negotiation with peasant and elite, and the impact of those strategies on the ideological assumptions of the empire.

For military historians in general, 1700-1800 is viewed as the period of greatest difficulty for pre-modern societies in raising and maintaining massive armies, often larger than many of the towns and cities of Europe. One estimate for the late seventeenth century suggests that an army of 60,000 soldiers required a daily ration of 45 tons of bread, 40,000 gallons of beer, 200-300 cattle for meat, and 90 tons of fodder for animals. Perjés, studying the same period and similar size army, calculated that a projected one month's supplies would require a wagon train 198 km long.[1] The mercenary, multi-ethnic federative forces of the sixteenth to mid-seventeenth centuries were gradually being replaced by cohesive, expensive, standing armies made up of native volunteers, recruits and, latterly, conscripts. Local landed aristocracies, accompanied by military entourages which they recruited and supported, were replaced by military contractors and suppliers of emerging states, who increasingly drew on native manpower, the flotsam and jetsam of the agrarian unemployed, always a real presence and threat to rural (and urban) society before the nineteenth century.

The creation of a new-style army to replace the Janissaries in the Ottoman empire can be examined from much the same point of view. 'Simply

[1] Tallet, *War and Society*, p. 55. G. Perjés, 'Army Provisioning, Logistics and Strategy in the Second Half of the 17th Century', *Acta Historica Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae* XVI (1970), p. 11.

keeping the army in being became an end in itself'.[1] The Ottomans implicitly embarked on the creation of an eighteenth-century standing army by the increasing use of the armed irregular, the *levend*, which evolved from many of the same fundamental territorial imperatives as the European versions: the need to control local violence internally and the need for larger armies externally. The *levend* regiments under discussion here for the 1768-74 war constituted an army parallel to the Janissaries, numerically greater, replacing the now completely dysfunctional benefice-style soldiers (the *timarlıs, or sipahis*),[2] and on occasion merging with the Janissaries themselves.

The Ottomans had created a standing army, the converted slave army of the Janissaries by the late fourteenth century, an elite, highly educated infantry corps, drawn from the tributary Christian children of newly acquired Balkan territories. Equally well developed was Ottoman logistical mastery, far ahead of similar developments in European military thinking. By the eighteenth century, however, when new territory was no longer added to the empire, the system had been discontinued, and was in complete disarray. The Janissaries had become increasingly ineffective in and irrelevant to the kinds of warfare in which the Ottomans were engaged, partly because of a typical elite military resistance to innovation, partly because of the dissolution of their discipline and solidarity and their gradual merging with rural and urban society, where they had evolved into 'an almost unpaid militia, made up of small tradesmen whose main rewards were judicial and tax immunities, which they were increasingly unable to justify on the battlefield'.[3]

Such privileges were deeply entrenched within all levels of Ottoman society, especially after the Patrona Halil rebellion in 1730. This was in part a janissary reaction to the Ottoman government's abortive efforts to curb the excesses of the corps, particularly in the matter of the pay tickets of the

[1]Tallet, War and Society, p. 61.

[2]The decline of the *timar* system — the assignment of a fief in exchange for military service — while related to a number of the issues discussed above, is beyond the purview of the present paper. *Timarlı* soldiers were simply not present in any great numbers on the Danube in 1768. A new study by A. Salzmann is radically altering our conception about Ottoman fiscal decline: 'Measures of Empire: Tax Farmers and the Ottoman Ancien Regime, 1695-1807', (PhD dissertation, Columbia University, 1995).

[3]H. İnalcık and D. Quataert, eds, *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, 1300-1914*, (Cambridge, 1995), p. 659. On the janissaries themselves there is an appalling lack of systematic studies: H. İnalcık, *The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age, 1300-1600* (London, 1973), remains a useful introduction; H.A.R. Gibb and H. Bowen, *Islamic Society and the West* I, pts. 1 and 2 (London, 1950, 1957), is now a much outdated study of Ottoman institutions. A recent work, G. Goodwin's *The Janissaries* (London, 1994) a series of sensational anecdotes, purports to be a history of the corps.

muster rolls, entitlements to salaries and rations, which were inflated to a great extent by names of the long dead and of deserters.

Registration in the rolls of the Janissaries, which guaranteed both the monthly salary and the daily rations, or their monetary equivalent, represented the single greatest privilege of the corps, by which all profited, up to and including the grand vizier. The income from fictional lists of combatants was in fact lining the pockets of officers and civil administrative officials alike, and constituted the most intractable problem in the janissary organization - much the same problem as that facing all the armies of Europe of the period, as thousands of mini-armies or militias, with officer corps which benefited from control of mobilization and muster rolls, were gradually drawn under central control.[1] In the Ottoman empire the trade in pay coupons, or certificates, sold and bartered for their potential profitability by the end of the eighteenth century, was a privilege especially resistant to reform. Of a possible 400,000 in circulation, only 10 per cent of that number may have represented live soldiers ready for duty.[2] That the reform agenda of the advisors of Selim III (1789-1807) addressed the problem of the certificates, along with recommendations concerning the creation of regiments of trained, disciplined soldiers from raw Muslim recruits of Anatolia, should come as no surprise; but in view of the widespread benefits of the janissary pay system the recommendations themselves should be seen as courageous.[3]

The state's need for soldiers was especially acute in 1768, when the Ottomans decided to undertake a western campaign against Russia after a hiatus of some 30 years. Although the long confrontation with the Persians on the eastern front had continued until the 1740s (itself part of the reason for the janissary rebellions of 1730 and 1740, as they were reluctant to battle against fellow Muslims, even though Shiite, and to endure the great hardships imposed by the march across Anatolia), the Danube region had been relatively tranquil. Mobilization in 1768, however, inaugurated an endless round of confrontations with the Russians, which had a disastrous effect on Balkan and Ottoman society. While the Janissaries were still a prominent part of the

[1]Tallett, *War and Society*, ch. 3.

[2]İnalcık and Quataert, *Economic and Social History*, p. 716. The source is Baron de Tott, eyewitness to the condition of the Ottoman forces in 1768.

[3]For more information on reform in the Ottoman context, see S. Shaw, *Between Old and New: The Ottoman Empire under Sultan Selim III, 1789-1807* (Cambridge, MA, 1971); D.A. Howard, 'Ottoman Historiography and the Literature of "Decline" of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries', *Journal of Asian History* XXII (1988), pp. 52-77; V.H. Aksan, 'Ottoman Political Writing, 1768-1808', *International Journal of Middle East Studies* XXV (1993), pp. 53-69.

campaigns, and were vilified by the public for the disasters of this war, others, in equal or greater numbers, made up the cannon fodder in 1768.

The use of local forces to supplement and counterbalance the Janissaries was not a new phenomenon in Ottoman history. Just the reverse. As it can be argued that the janissary corps itself was created to exert hegemony over local feudatory forces, so too was janissary power both checked and enhanced by the recruitment of local irregular bands, variously known as *levend, sarıca* and *sekban*, as early as the sixteenth century.[1] The terms require some definition. *Sarıca* and *sekban* both refer to armed infantry musketeers, similar to the local militias of Europe, and drawn from among the *levend*. In the earlier period, the term *levend* most certainly referred to armed, vagrant and landless peasants, or, as with *sarıca* and *sekban*, 'independent soldiery companies',[2] whose mobilization and demobilization have been linked to great rural upheavals such as the rebellions of the late sixteenth century. Such roving bands, when organized into fighting forces, were called 'household *levend*' or 'state *levend*', the distinction being whether or not they were part of the provincial governors' forces (*kapılı* or *kapı halkı*) or paid directly by the state (*miri*).[3] The bands were organized into companies (*bayrak* or *bölük*), generally of 50 soldiers, both cavalry (*süvari*) and infantry (*piyade*), commanded by a *bölükbaşı*.[4]

İnalcık argues for a profound change in the organization and control of *levend* after 1700, relating it to the growth of the provincial dynasties of local notables, the *ayans*, who emerge as their leaders especially after the 1720s, organizing local resistance in cooperation with the state-appointed religious official, the *shari'*a court judge (*kadı*), to curb the abuses of the military administrative class and to control countryside violence.[5] It was common enough for the Ottomans to eliminate the militia turned-bandits by arming the countryside for its own protection, and then enlisting the resulting bands for the next campaign. *Ayans* and *kadıs* remain the two most consistently addressed officials in all documents relating to the mobilization and supply of *levend* for the 1768-74 war. McGowan calls these officials 'committees of

[1] İnalcık, 'Military and Fiscal Transformation', p. 292; M. Cezar, *Osmanlı Tarihinde Levendler* (Istanbul, 1965), pp. 351-56.
[2] İnalcık, 'Military and Fiscal Transformation', p. 295.
[3] Cezar, *Osmanlı Tarihinde Levendler*, pp. 214-16.
[4] *Op. cit.*, p. 289; İnalcık, 'Military and Fiscal Transformation', p. 295.
[5] *Op. cit.*, pp. 301, 307-8.

notables', which evokes both some sense of solidarity at the local level and the need for cooperation against government demands.[1]

The *levend*, the locally mustered soldier, universal in all societies, had become central to Ottoman warmaking by 1750. Recruited in a standardized format by this combination of state-appointed and locally recognized (often elected) officials, he formed the bulwark of the Ottoman army in this war,[2] the alternative to the janissary, ultimately serving as the model for Selim III's 'new Order' (*Nizam-i Cedid*) troops. These were not so much an innovation as an extension and centralization of existing practices in response to a new situation, a continuation of the attempt to accommodate the conflicting demands of both external and domestic violence.[3]

Such temporary mobilization as a means both of raising troops and of controlling banditry (on the rise again in the second half of the eighteenth century) is ubiquitous by the war of 1768-74, so much so that the term *levend* has assumed a far more generalized sense of 'recruit', organized into state financed regiments (*miri levend*). Indeed, the link to the Ottoman official military is so great that the government took steps in 1775 to eradicate the name *levend* from military usage, blaming the failures of the 1768-74 war on them.[4] Other names existed for such troops before and after 1774, but *levend* is by 1768 far and away the most prevalent term in the documentary evidence.[5] That the other names persist at all can be attributed to a general military mentality concerning titles and trappings of distinction and solidarity, and a popular evocation of earlier heroes.

The evidence for these assertions, compiled from a register and account book devoted exclusively to the mobilization of the *levend* from 1768-74, points to as many as 100,000 — 150,000 of these troops who may have reached the battle-front in the course of war, suggesting, if the death and desertion rate for the Russian levies of one in two can be used as a guide,[6] a

[1] İnalcık and Quataert, *Economic and Social History*, p. 659.
[2] Cezar, *Osmanlı Tarihinde Levendler*, p. 350.
[3] Barkey, *Bandits and Bureaucrats*, p. 75, on the practice under Osman II and Murad IV.
[4] Cezar, *Osmanlı Tarihinde Levendler* p. 306. The tactic was previously tried on the far smaller *sekban* organization in 1718 and equally unsuccessfully; *op. cit.*, 303-5.
[5] İnalcık, 'Military and Fiscal Transformation', p. 303.
[6] Prime Minister's Archives, Maliyeden Müdevver Collection [MM] 4683. This remarkable record includes both the source of recruits and where they were being sent. The statistic on Russian mobilization is from C. Duffy, *Russia's Military Way to the West* (London, 1981), pp. 126-29. Tallett suggests that a 25 % loss rate of all men under arms was standard in the seventeenth-century French army (p. 105). The distances which both Ottoman and Russian soldiers had to cover to get to the battle-front in this war accounts for the greater number of casualties. Disease also took its toll in an area notorious for waves of the plague.

mobilization of perhaps twice that number of men from the countryside of the Balkans and Anatolia, less so from the Arab provinces of the empire.

Mobilization statistics for all wars are generally unreliable, but indications from earlier studies are that such mobilization of *levend* in sixteenth-century campaigns (Egri, Hungary, in 1596) was more along the lines of 15 — 20,000 *levend* and *sekban*,[1] and for the later seventeenth century regiments of 4000 *sekban* have been noted.[2] Figures for the total size of the assembled forces in the Danube basin from 1768 to 1774 vary from 80,000 to 600,000, depending upon the source of information. Sadullah Enverî, court historian and battle-front chronicler, lists 20-30,000 Janissaries, ignoring the composition of the rest of the forces except to say that over 400,000 men and animals assembled in Bender in 1769.[3] A janissary roll from early 1771, as the army left Babadağı (in present-day Romania) winter quarters for İsakçı and Kartal on the Danube, gives a total figure of 62,611, a roll perhaps inflated by the 'pay certificate disease' mentioned above.[4] Perhaps the most interesting figure comes from the contemporary Mustafa Kesbi, one of the chief accountant's staff, who gives a total of 254,900 Janissaries and *miri levend*, a figure which does not include the Danube fortress guards.[5] Furthermore, in a breakdown of those figures, Mustafa Kesbi lists 45 commanders (*paşas* and/or governors of provinces) who were each to bring 1000-2000 *levend* recruits to the front, an initial recruitment of 45,000-90,000, not including their own entourages, which were often quite large, nor the officers of the recruits.[6]

An account notebook, which lists the total monies (*kuruş*)[7] spent on *levend* for July 1769 to June 1772 (36 months) as 3,744,131 *kuruş*, may at least give some idea of the proportional representation of the two types of troops, when contrasted to janissary salaries for a similar period. It cannot be considered a final total, as the sources of income for the *levend*, as for the

[1]Cezar, *Osmanlı Tarihinde Levendler*, p. 308.

[2]Murphey, 'Ottoman Army', p. 55.

[3]*Tarih*, Istanbul University, MS T 5994,dated 1780, fos. 8b and 22b-24.

[4]MM 17383. This figure is suspect, as the long period of truce and negotiation (1771-3) was then under way.

[5]*İbretnüma-yi Devlet*, Millet Library, Ali Emiri collection, MS 484, undated, fo. 35b. This figure represents the expectations of the government at the begining of the war. It has been estimated that 97,000 *miri* soldiers participated in the 1769 campaign: M. D'Ohsson, *Tableau général de l'empire othoman* (Paris, 1788-1824) VII, pp. 381-382.

[6]Kesbi, *İbretnüma*, fo. 35.

[7]One Ottoman *kuruş* (or piaster) was equal to 120 *akçe*. An idea of the value of the *kuruş* can be gained from eighteenth-century exchange rates: one Venetian ducat was worth between 3 and 8 *kuruş*, while one pound sterling was worth from 5 to 15 *kuruş*. (İnalcık and Quataert, *Economic and Social History*, pp. 966-7).

Janissaries, were diverse and dispersed.[1] My own figure to date is closer to 6,000,000 *kuruş* for the three years.[2] By contrast, the payrolls for the Janissaries at Babadağı headquarters for the period February 1769 to September 1771 (20 months, not quite two years), amounted to 6,005,443 *kuruş*, with the last payment made in September 1772, a year late but still prompt by general military standards.[3] A preliminary figure for the war expenses distributed from the privy purse (*rikab-i humayun*) and the state mint (*darbhane*) for the period July 1768-September 1772 (four years and two months) is 32,884,543 *kuruş*.[4] That is only the actual cash distribution part of the war costs, but should give some idea of the scale — the Ottoman budgets we know of before and after the war running at only 14,000,000 - 15,000,000 *kuruş* a year.[5]

Of more compelling interest is the evidence of the ways in which these troops were perceived by the central government. One order, addressed to the governor of the province of Anatolia, is quite explicit about the control of the *levend*. Beginning with the statement that their misbehavior was the cause of much harm to the countryside, especially as they had been cut off from service and rations due to the lack of campaigns, the order goes on to announce the coming campaign with Russia, and the need for many soldiers. It continues by extending an amnesty to the miscreants, and emphasizing the necessity of gathering them up for the spring offensive. It also spells out the explicit role of the local provincial officers (*mutasarrıfs*: governors of *sancaks*, subdivisions of a province) in the organization of the provincial troops.[6]

Orders for companies of 50 *levend*, usually expressed in terms of 500 or 1000 soldiers (10 or 20 companies), were addressed to the *mutasarrıf* and the judge of a particular region, with stipulations concerning salary and rations. Expressed in the formulaic style of the Ottoman chancery, they can only be read as the expectations of the government, not the reality of the battle-front. The orders include the number of soldiers (*nefer*), the mobilization or sign-up bonus (*bahşiş*), the monthly salary (*ulufe*) distributed

[1]MM 5970, fos. 20-3.

[2]Calculations drawn from MM 4683, which include rations.

[3]MM 11786, fo. 110, Feb.-Oct. 1769, 909 750 *kuruş*, n.d.; fo. 105, Nov. 1769-Jan. 1770, 919 500 *kuruş*, paid in May 1770; Prime Minister's Archives, Bab-ı Defter Baş Muhasebe Collection [D.BŞM] 4144, fos. 4-9, Feb.-Sept. 1770, 1,801,250 *kuruş*, paid in Dec. 1770, D.BŞM 4203, Oct.-Dec. 1770, 474 480 *kuruş*, paid in Dec. 1771; MM 5970, fos. 4-5, Jan.-Mar. 1771, 649 928 *kuruş* paid in Apr. 1772, and Apr.-Sept. 1771, 1 250 000 *kuruş*, paid in sept. 1772. This represents the janissary salaries (*mevacip*) only.

[4]D.BŞM 4203, fo. 100; D.BŞM 4144; MM 5970, fos. 2-6.

[5]İnalcık and Quataert, *Economic and Social History*, p. 717.

[6]Prime Minister's Archives, Mühimme Collection, defter 167, fo.25.

in six-month lump sums, as the general estimated length of the campaign season, with a 10 per cent commission for the officers (*ondalık*), and a calculation of the rations, similarly defined for six months' service, based on the daily individual ration, the *yevmiye*. Six months was the norm, but two-month periods were also specified, sometimes as an extension of service, sometimes for winter quarters, for passage to the front, or for fortress duty. In addition, money for other supplies, such as tents, copper cauldrons, frying-pans, ladles, water-skins, spigots, buckets, and packhorses, was routinely distributed to each company. The latter equipment was sometimes delivered in kind from central stores, as it would be for the Janissaries. The officers of the company, two or more in number, were expected to buy the necessaries for their companies and distribute them.

Conditions of service are also described in the orders, in what amounts to a contract between the central government and the local recruiting officials: that the conscripts/ recruits be upright, handsome Muslims, committed to war for the faith; that they have guarantors in the region from which they are supplied, responsible for their behavior, and fined at two times the advance from the imperial treasury for the desertion of their soldiers, and that deserters be returned to the imperial army under heavy guard within 30 days. The local officials were responsible for the selection of officers, and it is certainly in this period that terms like *yüzbaşı* (captain) and *binbaşı* (major) make a regular appearance.[1]

The striking absence of any reference to guns, ammunition, etc., needs mention. It must have been assumed that any *levend* signing on for a campaign came with a gun and, in the case of the cavalryman, his horse. One historian has speculated that the sign-on bonus was intended for that purpose: for the recruit to outfit himself for a campaign.[2] Perhaps, but the bonus must also have served as an enticement to impoverished young men, the attraction universal to military service. Many of the orders for *levend* specify that the recruits should know how to use a gun, without also specifying that they own one. Small arms and their distribution were under the jurisdiction of the imperial armory (*Cebehane*), guns being destined for the various janissary corps. This story is by no means complete.[3] The practice of hiring an armed

[1]The example used here is Prime Minister's Archives, Cevdet Askeriye Collection [CA] 18671, from Sept. 1770, which is reproduced in Cezar, *Osmanlı Tarihinde Levendler*, pp. 443-44. In many instances, the *mutasarrıf* himself was the commander of the forces.

[2]*Op.cit.*, pp. 353-354.

[3]New work on Ottoman armaments is beginning to change that picture, e.g. the articles by G. Ágoston, 'Ottoman Artillery and European Military Technology in the Fifteenth and Seventeenth Centuries', *Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae* XLVII (1994), pp. 15-48, and 'Gunpowder for the Sultan's Army: New Sources on the Supply of Gunpowder to the Ottoman Army in the Hungarian Campaigns of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries', *Turcica* XXV (1993), pp. 75-96.

soldier parallels the situation in the European eighteenth century, but 'armed' could be a relative term in both cases. Şemdanizade Süleyman Efendi, a key eyewitness in this war, noted that the whole world turned up to enlist, considering 'sopa' and 'zerdeste' (clubs) as weapons, a sword or a rifle being too expensive.[1]

The only variables in the *levend* formula were in the sign-up bonus, which distinguished first and foremost between a cavalryman and an infantryman, generally distributing double the amount for the horseman, with a concomitant amount of fodder (barley) in the calculations of daily rations. The range varied considerably, from 5 to 80 *kurus*.[2] The normal bonus was 12 *kuruş* for an infantryman and 20-25 for a cavalryman, but it varied, based probably on the negotiating ability of the locals involved, and most certainly on the length of the war, as the incentive appears to have increased as the war drew on. The salary (*ulufe*) remained consistent at 2.5 *kuruş* per month, or 10 *akçe* a day for both cavalry and infantry, a figure continuously distributed until at least the early decades of the nineteenth century, and totally unrealistic in terms of its ability to support the individual soldier. The janissary salary is equally difficult to calculate for this period - in the seventeenth century in never topped 12 *akçe* a day.[3] The sign-on bonus, salary and commission monies were distributed in cash directly from the army treasury (*ordu hazinesi*).

The daily rations were broken down into four or five categories: bread, meat, and barley for the packhorses of both infantry and cavalryman, but additionally rice, cooking fat and additional barley for the saddle horses of the man with a horse. The privileges for the mounted soldier are significant, in common with the normal janissary expectations, suggesting a greater value attributed to the services of the man with the horse, but the protein needs of the man on foot are also recognized in the formula as described below.

The *levend* infantryman at war was expected to need a daily intake of a double loaf of bread (100 dirhem or roughly 320 gm), or a 50-dirhem biscuit (160 gm), and was allowed half an okka of meat (641 gm); a half kile (12-13 kg) of fodder barley for the packhorses of 50 men. This was the equivalent of the janissary rations. The cavalryman was entitled to the same amount of

[1]S. Şemdanizade, *Mür'i't-Tevârih*, ed. M. Münir Aktepe (Istanbul, 1980) II (B), p. 12.

[2]CA 42036, 15 *kuruş*, and D.BŞM 4250, fo. 10, 30 *kuruş*, both for cavalrymen; CA 18671, 12 *kuruş* for an infantryman; Cezar cites the figure of 80 *kuruş*, *Osmanlı Tarihinde Levendler*, p. 355.

[3]İ. H. Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Devleti Teşkilâtında Kapıkulu Ocakları* (Ankara, 1988) I, p. 413.

bread, but only 100 dirhem (320 gm) of meat, and additionally 100 dirhem of rice (320 gm), 25 dirhem (80 gm) of cooking oil or fat, and a *yem* of barley, roughly 6.5 kg per day per man. These rations are far more generous than those of the Russian soldier, who was expected to live on rye flour and groats to make gruel (*kasha*),[1] and to forage for the rest. The Janissaries expected their wartime rations in kind. It must be noted, however, that cash substitution for rations was initially the norm for the *levend*, calculated in the formula on the documents, and probably never equivalent to battlefield prices. Many of the records of the fortress commissaries complain about being forced to purchase provisions at inflated prices, which (of course) they had to account for in their records. Abundant documentary evidence also indicates the persistence of the Ottoman central government in tracing misspent or mislaid funds, especially regarding provisioning.

Later in the war, an initial distribution of one or two months' cash equivalent was distributed to the company and their officers as 'rations money for the march', and further rations were distributed from the commissary stores, as with the Janissaries. We are a long way from solving the problem of how responsible the Ottoman soldier was for his own welfare. There was a real distinction between being at war and being at peace in the amount of calories and the ways in which rations were distributed.[2] In any event, the proposed meat ration must have served largely as an ideal, rarely achieved, as those who study military records are well aware. The primary preoccupation of the documents so far examined is grain, bread and fodder.

It is tempting to see the changes over the course of this war - the fact that for the first time the Ottoman grand vizier and commander-in-chief stayed on the battlefront through the winter, and the gradual centralization of the distribution of provisioning to the entire assembled army - as part of the evolution to 'modern' systems. The main problem facing the Ottoman commanders was, according to contemporary accounts, that too many men showed up for the war. Şemdanizade commented that the whole of Rumeli and Anatolia were passing themselves off as janissaries, and that anyone who

[1]D.BŞM, Ordu Hazinesi (Army Treasury) Collection [ORH] dosya 48, gömlek 91, July 1769, a formula for that office; D.ŞBM 4250, fo. 8, June 1771, for a detailed cavalryman's account; Duffy, *Russia's Military Way*, p. 13, for the Russian side. 1 okka = 400 dirhem = 1,282 k; 1 kile = 20 okka = 25,659 kg (İnalcık and Quataert, *Economic and Social History*, pp. 990-91).

[2]The protein increase for men at war was a standard military practice of European armies as well. See V. H. Aksan, 'Feeding the Ottoman Troops on the Danube, 1768-1774', *War and Society* XIII (1995), pp. 1-14 ; D'Ohsson, *Tableau général* VII, p. 341, lists the late eighteenth-century janissary requirements. A janissary *Serdengeçti* fortress guard could count on a double loaf of bread with 1 okka of meat and 1 kile of barley per 5 men (CA 13272 for Silistre in 1772).

claimed to be a Janissary was accepted as such. Some regiments had 20,000 men. While the government prepared rations for 120,000 men, 600,000 turned up.[1] Ahmed Resmi, second-in-command during much of the war, saw the arrival of the irregulars on the Danube:

> The *paşas* from Anatolia recruited thieves and the homeless and then were held captive by them - at every hamlet or bridge-crossing, the men demanded salaries and bonuses, a tyranny completely contrary to custom. Such men were disruptive in camp by his estimation. Even though the *paşa* brought along enough men for a battalion, in three days they had scattered, and they could not even raise 100 men.[2]

On one occasion, as the army tried to cross the Danube bridge at Isakçı, the entourage of the grand vizier, some 800, demanded 400 *kuruş* apiece of Grand Vizier Mehmed Emin, surely an exaggeration.[3] Is this rebellion, or chaos and decline? Or is it representative of a true social transformation, a democratization of the army?[4]

That there was no shortage of manpower, no matter how widespread the desertion, appears a certainty. A Russian observer at Hantepesi (the major Ottoman mobilization and supply camp north of the Danube) noted in June 1769, as the Ottomans prepared to confront the Russians at Hotin:

> On 21 June, they began to dispatch military supplies to Hotin ... Mehmet Paşa was declared the Commander, and entrusted with 15 Janissary regiments (around 8000 men), and a hundred *bayraks* [of *levend*],... approximately 15,000 troops ... Abaza Paşa, with 100 cavalry *bayraks*, several thousand Janissaries, and the Hotin garrison troops (4000-5000 men) was ordered to support him [Mehmet Paşa], for a total of around 60,000 troops.[5]

What about the soldier's point of view? Anecdotal material is scarce, but the occasional story emerges from the narrative and documentary sources. While serving as a judge in Tokat in 1771, Şemdanizade was required to enlist 1500 soldiers he calls janissaries, to be sent to Özü on the Black Sea. He

[1]Şemdanizade, *Mür'i't-Tevârih* II (B), pp. 7, 13.

[2]*Layiha* (for Grand Vizier Halil Paşa), Istanbul University, MS TY 419, fo. 3. Ahmed Resmi was equally censorious about the janissaries.

[3]Şemdanizade, *Mür'i'-Tevârih* II (B), pp. 4, 12.

[4]The large body of literature on the restless peasants of Europe has demonstrated that the practice of enrolling them as recruits for the standing armies of the Napoleonic period initiated a process of 'democratization' and 'solidarity' that revolutionized man's view of government, one of the fundamental theses of McNeill's *Pursuit of Power*.

[5]P.A. Levashev, *Plien i stradanïe Rossian u turkov* (St Petersburg, 1790), p. 74. The total number here is not as important as the proportion of designated janissary to non-janissary troops.

refused further applications once the number reached 6000, rejecting the young and the old, and organized 1500 for the battle-front (30 companies of 50 each, presumably). Subsequently, he encountered the same troops in Sinop, and discovered that each company now comprised only 11 men and a commander. When he asked the reason, he was told that his successor in the office of *kadı*, and the Tokat governor had excused the men from service for a payment of 25 *kuruş* (the sign-of bonus given the men?), which they split and pocketed. The soldiers were glad to escape the discipline and hardships, estimating that it would cost each of them 250 *kuruş* to go to war.[1] Many of the deserters of the first year of the war complained that rations in kind were distributed only every three to five days (the normal practice for the janissaries), while the money distributed as substitute for food and supplies was insufficient: one week's allotment barely sufficed for a day, because of insufficient control of the prices.[2] Ottoman estimates of the individual soldier's need, in this period at least, never reflected the reality of battlefield or market.

A final story about one Genç Ali, charged with bringing 1000 *levend* to the battlefront in the spring of 1771, may serve to illustrate the difficulty in preserving order with this kind of recruitment system. In fact only 400 were enrolled, and when Genç Ali was ordered to Rusçuk he mustered his troops instead near Babadağı, oppressing the local population. The janissary commander was himself forced to return the miscreants to Babadağı, where Genç Ali continued to insist on rank, pay and rations for his men.[3] Desertion and disobedience, of course, were endemic to armies of pre-modern Europe, and preoccupied the strategists of the eighteenth century.

This article began by asking what had happened to the janissaries by the eighteenth century. Although central state records continue to make a clear distinction between the janissary troops and the irregular *levend*, at the provincial level, as in Şemdanizade's example, and on the battlefield, the two appear often to have been conflated. This was particularly true of the *Serdengeçti* corps, which traditionally served as auxiliaries (shock troops and reserves) for all the imperial corps, and which in this war was recruited on the march. The rump of the janissary organization was to be found in the imperial guard in Istanbul and, in small numbers, on the battle-front and in the fortresses. *Levend* troops, however, are encountered everywhere, side by side with Janissaries, in the fortresses as well as in the massive confrontations,

[1] Şemdanizade, *Müri'i't-Tevârih* II (B), p. 61.
[2] *Op. cit.*, p. 10.
[3] Süleymaniye Library Collection Hacı Mahmud, MS 4859, fos. 40b-41.

scarce for this war, but significant at Hotin (1769) and Kartal (also known as Kagul, 1770). Significantly, the word prohibited by the government because of the evocation of the disasters of the recent war. It is interesting to note, however, that the accounts for the *levend* troops continue in the previously described account book in the same manner, with the same formula of 2.5 *kuruş* a month, the only difference being that the word *asakir* (sing. *asker*, 'soldier') has replaced *levend*.[1] The two had come to mean the same thing to Ottoman officials, among whom began to emerge men like Ahmed Resmi, calling for reform of the army and its leadership.[2] It was as 'soldiers' (*asakir*) that Selim III established his standing army in 1793, building separate barracks, and deliberately recruiting Anatolian, Muslim Turkish stock.

On the local level there were large numbers of *levend* and janissary aspirants and just as many passing themselves off as the real thing on the fictional pay certificate system which maintained the privileges of the corps. In order actually to get troops to the battle-front and simultaneously to curb the demands of the landless, the Ottomans had to accelerate alternative systems, such as the *levend* troops, with the pragmatism which characterize the lengthy history of the empire. It is possible to argue that the 1768-74 war is crucial in the transition to a more 'modern' Ottoman army, in the creation from indigenous, landless populations of the infantry and cavalry regiments who would face Napoleon and Muhammad Ali of Egypt in the decades following the end of the war. Equally, the impact on Ottoman historians and bureaucrats, must have been considerable, and is obvious from the disdain of the statesmen and civil servants evident in the stories above.

War-making had grown prohibitively expensive, and the Ottomans hovered on the brink of bankruptcy at the conclusion of this war, provoking a monetary crisis that would extend into the middle decades of the next century.[3] Dipping so deeply into local resources, through levies and taxation, paved the way for the bureaucratic absolutism of the nineteenth century, as was the case in Europe.[4] The spiraling debt entailed increasing reliance on local officials for men and war *matériel*, which in turn precipitated the significant rise in power of the rural gentry in the latter half of the century, some of whom would eventually challenge Ottoman centrality, others of whom would form the bulwark of nineteenth-century Ottoman bureaucracy. The particular Ottoman

[1] MM 4683, fos. 578-9.
[2] See V. H. Aksan, *An Ottoman Statesman in War and Peace: Ahmed Resmi Efendi, 1700-1783* (Leiden, 1995), especially chs 3-4.
[3] İnalcık and Quataert, *Economic and Social History*, pp. 966-70.
[4] Tilly, *Coercion, Capital and European States*, p. 104.

strength lay in its ability to 'convince the contenders of its legitimacy' and in its creative 'distribution of rewards' often 'temporary, calculated and reversible'.[1] Control of internal violence and the prosecution of war, early modern state preoccupations everywhere, drove Ottoman mobilization and military fiscalism in the late eighteenth century, propelling the emergence of Ottoman mid-nineteenth-century-style hegemony.

[1]Barkey, Bandits and Bureaucrats, p. 239.

MUTINY AND THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY OTTOMAN ARMY

Power and legitimacy for the monarchies of early modern society were tied among other things to two basic principles: security of the countryside and defense (and expansion) of the borders. In the Ottoman Empire, the countryside was more or less armed (the term being relative) by 1600, as it was in Europe in the same period, and control of the potentially violent, landless peasantry was a continual preoccupation of the central government.[1] Protection and expansion of borders were equally a concern of the Ottoman sultans whose legitimacy was determined by the winning of the ideologies of universal empire with the preservation and enlargement of the *Dar al-Islam.* Even though it is a well-known cliché of Ottoman historiography, it is worth repeating that the failure of the state to prevent the contraction of the Ottoman territories after 1700 continually challenged that legitimacy. The dynamics of mobilization of the countryside for defense of three separate battlefront (east, west and south), and the continuing justification of the failure of such massive efforts, are a constant backdrop to the narration of events which follows. The discussion of those events assumes that the control of violence at all levels remained the chief Ottoman imperative for action and change, an imperative significantly affecting local communities, for whom participation in war remained an essential part of local definition, "'the virtual permanence of internal armed conflict'" being "'one of the hallmarks of the climate of Absolutism.'"[2]

The focus of this paper is rebellion (*isyan*), or, more particularly mutiny (*fitne*), the reaction of solders to coercion imposed by the dictates of the battlefront, a response to perceived impossible conditions or demands. What mutiny signifies in the Ottoman Empire, especially in the pre-modern age, we are only now beginning to understand, and it is clearly bound up with definitions of leadership and negotiation among groups with conflicting agendas, also just now a matter of discussion among Ottoman historians.

[1]This is a revised version of a paper presented at the 1996 meeting of the Middle East Studies Association, held in Providence, R.I., November, 1996, as part of panel: *Mutiny: Idea, Narrative and Event in Ottoman Contexts, 16th-19th centuries,* organized by Palmira Brummett, University of Tennessee. For a recent review of these issues surrounding the Ottoman state and provincial violence, see Karen Barkey, *Bandits and Bureaucrats* (Ithaca, N. Y., 1994); and the earlier, formative article, Halil İnalcık, "Military and Fiscal Transformation in the Ottoman Empire, 1600-1700," *Archivum Ottomanicum* 6 (1980), 283-337.

[2]Perry Anderson in Andre Wink, *Land and Sovereignty in India; Agrarian Society and Politics under the Eighteenth Century Maratha Svarajya* (Cambridge, 1986), 32-33.

I wish to consider the nature of two minor mutinies of the late eighteenth century Ottoman army, which occurred during the 1768-1774 Russo-Ottoman War on the Danube. The two examples chosen are unusual in that they are represented by a fair level of contemporary witnesses and documentation. I choose to interpret the narratives as emblematic of the growing pains of an organization in transition to a modern-style military, amplified by the increasing use of Anatolian, Muslim, non-Janissary troops, and a heightened sense of solidarity of the rank and file against the incompetence of palace-trained commanders. Resistance to the imposition of new orders and regulations violating traditional military ethos and the well-known military problem of the competition between corps, as, for example, between infantry and cavalry, is also represented in these stories. I will conclude by posing some questions about the possible motives for the revolts described, about the nature of Ottoman military leadership in this transitional era, and about the social transformation and its rhetoric represented by the events.

The main problem facing the Ottoman commanders in 1768-1774, was, according to contemporary accounts, that too many men showed up for the war on the Danube. Şemdanizade, a judge involved in mobilizing troops in Anatolia, whose stories of the war are graphic and convincing, commented that the entire population of both the Balkans and Anatolia was passing itself off as Janissaries. Anyone who clamed to be a janissary was accepted as such. Some regiments had, by his account, 20,000 men. While the government prepared rations or 120,000 men, 600,000 turned up.[1] It was still an age when the whole society went to war, so much so that campaign headquarters probably resembled a bazaar as much as a disciplined military machine.[2]

The grand vezir was still the commander-in-chief of the army and the Janissaries remained the elite of the military organization, no matter how fictional their prowess and strength had become.[3] The Janissaries in Istanbul remained the escort corps for the grand vezir. What appears to be the case, not

[1]Şemdanizade Fındıklılı Süleyman Efendi, *Mür'i't-Tevârih* (Istanbul, 1980) II B, 7 and 13.

[2]See Virginia H. Aksan, *An Ottoman Statesman in War and Peace: Ahmed Resmi Efendi 1700-1783* (Leiden, 1995), chapter 3, for a preliminary study of the 1768-1774 war through the eyes of Ahmed Resmi Efendi, Second-in-Command (*Kethüda*) to Grand Vezir Muhsinzade Mehmed, 1771-1774, and signatory to the disastrous Küçük Kaynarca treaty.

[3]A fictional army, based on registration in the muster rolls, and the practice of issuing pay tickets, called *esame*, bought and sold without reference to actual number of soldiers, makes it difficult for the researcher to have a real sense of who or where the janissares are for this 1768-1774 war. A further difficulty is the dissarray and scarcity of the archival records concerning the janissaries, the excuse often offered being their destruction in 1826, when the janissary corps was eliminated.

a new problem, but increasingly a very large one, was that the countryside themselves entitled to the janissary privileges, and yet proved to be a very unreliable fighting force. The janissary army was essentially rebuilt on the road as they headed for campaign from Istanbul, by enrolling any live body in the *serdengeçti* corps, normally translated as the vanguard, often engaged in guerrilla-style tactics, and the first to throw themselves at the enemy.[1]

The Janissaries, as previously suggested, constituted only part of the fighting forces mustered by the Ottomans for this new era of warfare on the northern and western frontiers. An expansion of the practice of temporary mobilization as both a means of raising troops and controlling banditry is very evident during this war, the troops thus raised from the provinces called *miri levend*, state financed regiments of both infantry and cavalry, who might have numbered as many as 100,000 actives in the course of the campaigns. They were led to the battlefront by local officials and governors (*mutasarrıfs* or *valis*), sometimes as their commanders, sometimes not, and are to be distinguished from Janissaries by organization, command, and term of service, usually 3-6 months.

The fortress troops, notably along the Danubian line of defense, were drawn from local communities, to support small regiments of Janissaries, on duty as *nöbetçis* (guards), who were reinforced from the capital as campaigns approached.[2] These garrison forces are most often called *yamaks*, an old term for locally raised troops, which continued to be used in the eighteenth century, meaning roughly auxiliaries, but also sometimes, apprentices, veterans and/or pensioners of the janissary corps. *Yamak* became a term of opprobrium by the mid-nineteenth century, synonymous with banditry, oppression, and rebellion. While it is often hard to distinguish janissary from *miri levend* from *yamak*, they represent elite infantry, provincial irregulars, both cavalry and infantry, and territorial fortress troops, respectively, and as such, developed different battlefield ethos and demands.

That there was no shortage of manpower, no matter how widespread the desertion, appears a certainty, but discontent was endemic. Narrative sources give us a picture of the causes: terrible weather, both floods and drought, rampant disease, especially plague, poor and limited supplies, inflated prices, delayed payment of salaries, all circumstances universal to early modern

[1]The *Serdengeçti* now served as an apprenticeship corps as well.

[2]Cvetana Georgieva, "Organisation et fonctions du corps des janissaires dans les terres bulgares du XVIe jusqu'au milieu du XVIIIe siècle," *Etudes historiques* 5 (1970), 322.

armies, but particularly acute in the first Ottoman campaign of the war in 1769. Ottoman provincial recruits were still, for the most part, drawn from a volunteer and willing population, as contrasted to the Russian serfs, the conscripted (for 25 years) cannon fodder of post-Petrine Russia. Russian soldiers suffered cruelly, with one estimate that only half of those mobilized actually made it to the battlefront.[1]

The first confrontation between the Russian and Ottoman forces during the campaign season of 1769 occurred at Hotin in three stages. Hotin represented the gateway to northern Europe, and was of strategic importance to both sides. Two times the Russians crossed the Dniester and attacked the fortress; the second time they succeeded in besieging Hotin for twenty-seven days, causing considerable suffering on both sides, before withdrawing again upon the arrival of Ottoman reinforcements. Ottoman attempts to cross the Dniester and attack the Russians at Kameniçe ended in failure and the rout of the Ottoman army, which abandoned Hotin in mid-September 1769.[2]

The mutiny of the *yamaks* in the Hotin fortress occurred at the beginning of this sequence of events. In early May of 1769, as the main army approached İsakçı on the Danube, news arrived from Hotin of the rebellion of the fortress guard and the murder of Hüseyin Pasha, its Commander.[3] Şemdanizade related the story concerning the rebellion which he had heard from a colleague on the spot, the Hotin judge Sahhafzade Mustafa Efendi. The *yamaks*, began Şemdanizade's version, were used to misbehaving on the slightest pretext, be it arrears in pay, or the reprimand of a friend.[4] On this occasion, the officers and commander of the fortress had decided in council that

[1]The statistic on mobilization is from Christopner Duggy, *Russia's Military Way to the West* (London, 1981), 126-9. Tallett suggests that a 25 percent loss rate of all men under arms was standard in the seventeenth century French army (Frank Tallett, *War and Society in early Modern Europe, 1495-1715* [Routledge, N.Y., 1992], 105). The distances which both Ottoman and Russian soldiers had to cover to get to the battlefront in this war account for the greater number of casualties. Estimates about Ottoman loss rates may never be discernable from the limited sources available to researchers.

[2]Aksan, *An Ottoman Statesman*, 144-8.

[3]Aksan, *An Ottoman Statesman*, 144, drawn from Sadullah Enveri, eyewitness to all the campaigns of the war, folio 9-10 of the Istanbul University Ms T 5994, dated 1780, covering 1768-1774.

[4]Statistics are unreliable, but we have one figure for July, when Hotin was besieged, that there were some 15,000 soldiers in the fortress; 1220 palace janissaries had been ordered to the fortress in April 1769 (Prime Minister's Archives, Maliyeden müdevver collection 4783,178). Louis Felix Keralio, *Histoire de la dernière guerre entre les russes et les turcs* 2 vols. (Paris, 1777) 1:73, whose work is based on the commander of the Russian First Army of the time, Golitsyn, mentions 12,000 fortress guards. The estimates for total Ottoman forces amassed at Hotin by July 1769 reach as high as 200,000 infantry, cavalry and fortress guards. These are, needless to say, hostile estimates, and probably exaggerations. See also Aksan, *An Ottoman Statesman*, 144-6.

it was best to concentrate on improving the Hotin defenses and artillery, rather than manning the trenches and sending out retaliatory raids in response to Russian attacks on nearby villages. The decision to await reinforcements had been based on the erratic behavior of the *yamaks*, for, as their commander, Süleyman Ağa, had noted, while they might be intent on revenging themselves on the Russians, they were not to be trusted, because when they confronted the infidel, they simply plundered whatever was available and fled.

The *yamaks* continued to mill about, demanding to confront the enemy. Süleyman, understanding that their insistence could become a rebellion, wisely tried to placate them by promising a grand council on the morrow with the commander himself, Hüseyin Pasha. The revolt escalated, with the rebels yelling "Let's go to the pasha's quarters". They filled the courtyard in front of the commander's private quarters, saying "The Russians have destroyed our villages and captured our animals. Why won't the pasha give us permission [to retaliate]?" and other such nonsense. Süleyman tried again: "Disperse, and tomorrow we will have a council with all the elders."

Hüseyin Pasha, hearing the racket, came out of his private quarters. "The infidels are in the neighborhood," he began. "Such a display is no response to the enemy. Don't be disobedient. We are more concerned than you about protecting the sultan's fortress. I was appointed to guard the fortress, not as a field commander (*serasker*). Be patient. As soon as the sultan hears the enemy has come, he will send a *serasker* and help," he reasoned, knowing full well that help was on the way, but afraid to alert the enemy by saying so to the troops. Raiding was the intent of the rebels, however, so the commander's words were to no avail. They began to shout that he was a turncoat (apostate); as he protested "God forbid," someone shot and killed him. Then the rebels plundered the fortress and the belongings of the martyred Hüseyin. The chronicler adds in disgust that the grand vezir failed to punish the rebels sufficiently, but God did in subsequent events, as many were killed, enslaved, or drowned in the Dniester river as they tried to escape.[1]

Although the fortress was left in chaos, reinforcements under *Serasker* Abaza Mehmed Pasha arrived shortly with as perhaps as many as 70,000 and repulsed the Russian advances, until a new, firmer commander, Hasan Pasha,

[1]Şemdanizade, IIA, 123-4.

was appointed by the grand vezir. In the meantime, the *yamaks* had elected Kahraman Pasha, one of the provincial commanders in the area, to lead them.[1]

Kahraman Pasha figures in the second of the mutinous events I wish to describe. Listed as one of three majors (*binbaşı)* at the beginning of the 1769 campaign, Kahraman Pasha, described as an Albanian, who had been locked up in Kavala, was released, and ordered to the battlefront with his men and equipment, in the company of *Binbaşı* Canikli Ali Bey (later Pasha) and under the command of the previously mentioned Abaza Mehmed Pasha. The last two are distinguished officers of this war, although Canikli Ali Bey would later lead a significant revolt against the Ottoman government between the two Russo-Ottoman wars of the period.[2] Kahraman Pasha appears in a register of the provincial irregulars twice; once in command of 3000 infantry appointed to guard Hotin, and once as commanding 3000 cavalry sent into Moldavia.[3] In other words, he was a recognized organizer of Ottoman provincial levies, the *miri levend*, dependent upon to bring forces to the new campaign. From the story above, he was also obviously a popular leader, a man in sympathy with the *yamaks*.

There are two versions of his confrontation with Grand Vezir Mehmed Emin Pasha, in the midst of the 1769 Hotin confrontations: one from Sadullah Enverî, battlefront "official" chronicler, and the other, from our previous source, the judge Şemdanizade. Enverî's account begins by stating that Kahraman Pasha had been ordered on campaign as *Mutasarrıf* of Dukagin sancak (in Albania)[4] with 6000 state-funded infantry troops for wintering over in Hotin, but that he had not done what had been asked; rather, with some 3000 infidel rebels he had made his way to Hotin, oppressing peasants,

[1]Enveri, folio 8b-9. Hasan Pasha is described as the *Mutasarrıf* from Salonika. The term used for Kahraman Pasha is *mlrmiran*.

[2]Şemdanizade, IIA, 123; Yücel Özkaya, "Canikli Ali Paşa," *Belleten* 144 (1972) 483-525. It is not clear why Kahraman Pasha is *mahbus* (imprisoned), although the following stories indicate chronic misbehavior. The pasha honorific is added to Canikli Ali Bey's name in the course of this war.

[3]Maliyeden Müdevver 4683, 17, 60, 76, recorded in late 1769. A further source indicates that Kahraman Pasha was ordeed to Hotin earl in 1769 as the *Mutasarrıf* of Köstendil sancak, and given the right to 11,000 kurush of extraordinary campaign taxes (*imdad-i seferiye*). The *imdad-i seferiye* revenues were an innovation of the eighteenth century, diverting some local taxes to local officials so they could fulfill their military obligations. (*Osmanlı Maliyesinde Bunalım ve Değişim Dönemi, VIII. yy'dan Tanzimat'a Mali Tarih* [Istanbul, 1986], 53). This revenue is different from the cash generally supplied to organize the provincial levies. Local officials always arrived on the battlefront with their own entourages, often as many as two hundred men.

[4]The discrepancies in the accounts are common to the battlefront records I have encountered, but at least Kahraman Pasha's rank, and the number of troops he was assigned to deliver remain more or less consistent.

inciting other disturbances and destroying property and lives. Enverî goes on to say that upon arrival at Hotin, Kahraman Pasha circulated rumors about pay disputes, implying that he was the cause of the martyrdom of Hüseyin Pasha.[1] In the first Hotin confrontation, when troops deserted the battlefield without putting up a fight, Kahraman Pasha reputedly yelled: "Why should we stay and fight?" causing the scattering of the army. He had previously been ordered to Bender fortress, and refused, daring to disobey direct commands. For his proud and boastful ways he had been dismissed, and his punishment ordered repeatedly by the sultan.[2]

When the news arrived in the camp of the grand vezir of the martyrdom of Hotin Commander Hüseyin Pasha, it was accompanied by a petition from Kahraman Pasha requesting the rank of vezir. The grand vezir showed the face of acquiescence, and quickly appointed him as deputy commander (*Kaymakam*) of Hotin, with the rank of Governor of Rumeli (*Rumeli Beylerbeyi*), a rank far greater than those of his peers, and the cause of envy among them. The grand vezir also sent him a luxurious fur and dictated a letter of goodwill. Kahraman Pasha, taking the letter at face value, then traveled to the grand vezirial camp, as Enverî notes, in the hopes of being of use, and to ask for forgiveness in the presence of the sacred banner (of the Prophet Muhammad). He was invited with all due ceremony into the presence of the grand vezir, who had previously arranged to have him captured and killed. When Kahraman entered the canopy, several of the grand vezir's entourage grabbed him, bound him, and began dragging him away. A loyal follower, intending to rescue him, attacked and shot one of the grand vezir's guards. Thereupon, to quell both the momentary and any future rebellions, both servant and master were executed on the spot. Kahraman was attacked in a flurry of swords, and his head left under an abandoned tent for two days. As a further deterrent, the head was then sent to Istanbul.

In order to confiscate Kahraman Pasha's wealth and worldly goods, another commander, Karasu *Mutasarrıfı* Abdullah Pasha, was ordered to guard the belongings. His soldiers, also Albanians, plus a detachment of Janissaries were more interested in plundering than protection the dead man's goods, so a three way confrontation ensued which resulted in the wounding of some of Kahraman's loyal followers. Enverî's final observation is also telling: the grand vezir, still afraid of open rebellion, ordered the return of the belongings

[1]This allusion to "pay disputes" may indicate that the *yamak* rebellion was about far more than not being allowed to attack the Russians.

[2]The brief allusion may account for his having been in prison before the campaign.

to Kahraman Pasha's followers, who had come before him screaming and complaining.[1] This footnote to the hapless Kahraman's tale is related entirely without further comment by the chronicler, typical of the cinematic quality of his narrative.

I am not yet finished with the story of Kahraman Pasha, as there is another version by Şemdanizade which presents a different picture. Kahraman Pasha had been ordered to the 1769 campaign, but had deserted at Hotin with his troops, who destroyed numerous villages in their retreat. He is called before the grand vizier, and accused of insubordination: "Not only did you refuse to fight, your desertion caused the troops to scatter and plunder as they fled, using as an excuse that you would never fight for such a *serasker* (Abaza Mehmed Pasha) who didn't make use of you in the proper fashion. If your crudeness here is any indication, who knows how you acted towards the *serasker*, causing him to ignore you. You don't know your limits!" Kahraman responded: "As long as a guy (*herif*) like you is grand vezir, my kind (*bizim gibiler*) will never fight." The grand vezir, incensed, ordered him to be taken away, at which point Kahraman removed a pistol hidden at his waist, and aiming at the chest of his supreme commander, shot and killed instead one of the officers of the court. He was immediately pounced upon and torn apart.[2]

Is this chaos and decline, rebellion in the ranks, an indication of social transformations, or all three? Until recently, it was fairly standard to interpret events such as those just described in a number of ways: as representative of the complete breakdown of the Ottoman military system; as representative of ethnic quarrels, in this case Albanians versus the world (although whether or not Kahraman Pasha is himself Albanian is not entirely clear); or, simply as a continuation of the competition between the traditional (Anatolian, Turkish) cavalry troops and the palace trained elite janissary corps. All surely form a part of the battlefront negotiations represented in these mutinies. Yet, by the eighteenth century, other factors are also at work. Kahraman Pasha's contempt for the grand vezirial command is reflected in all the chronicles of the period, the leadership exception being Grand Vezir Muhsinzade Mehmed, commander-in-chief on the battlefront from 1771-1774, portrayed as an experienced and able commander who was responsible for quelling the revolt in the Morea in 1770. Close study of central archives concerning Muhsinzade and his relations

[1]Enveri, 36b-38.
[2]Şemdanizade, II B, 8-9. In this version of events, Kahraman Pasha uses the familiar you (*sen*), rather than the formal you (*siz*) required by the context.

with provincial leaders like Kahraman pasha reveal that Muhsinzade's sustained recognition of their contribution to the Ottoman war effort, and his considerable use of such grandees (*ayans)* as money-lenders, and suppliers of troops and campaign necessities contributed to his success as a commander.[1] A culture of service and rewards that we can easily recognize is at work here," ...as powerful a force as politics in the choice of military means."[2]

Moreover, in spite of our deeply-rooted assumptions about hierarchy and tyranny in "despotic" governments, respect and equality would seem to be more important than awe in the context of command just described. Ahmed Resmi, Second-in-Command to Grand Vezir Muhsinzade Mehmed, was acutely aware of the deficiencies in the Ottoman command structure, and referred in his writings to Frederick the Great of Prussia (and Frederick's model, Alexander the Great), as an example of a learned and just military genius, whose familiarity and respect for his soldiers and commanders attracted loyalty and service.[3] This was clearly no longer the case in the Ottoman context. The *yamak* example above describes a profound disjuncture between the ordinary soldier and his commanding officers; the second between the palace-trained commander and his provincial subordinates. In the latter case, the two variants of the story are revealing: the one, Enveri, the palace chronicler establishes Kahraman Pasha as a rebel (*eşkiya*) from the moment he mustered troops; clearly Enverî views him as an outsider. Şemdanizade, a judge with considerable provincial experience, views both the Hotin rebellion and Kahraman Pasha as challenges to the order of the military, and urges discipline as the solution, one of the major themes of his work, common to other chronicles of the age.

A military historian could interpret leadership for admittance into the ranks of power. Arguably, the creation of an officer corps and a hierarchy of ranks was one of the European solutions to the problem of access to power expressed in countryside violence. Equally arguably, regiments of soldiers, trained in close order drill, made communities of camaraderie out of raw, agrarian recruits, what McNeill calls the "New Leviathan," the nation at arms of the Napoleonic period, for whom discipline and response to command was a matter of course.[4]

[1]Yuzo Nagata, *Muhsin-zâde Mehmed Paşa ve Âyânlık Müessesesi* (Tokyo, 1976).
[2]John Keagan, *A History of Warfare* (New York, 1994), 39.
[3]Aksan, 83-97 passim.
[4]Studies on the restless peasants of Europe have illustrated that the practice of enrolling them as recruits for the standing armies of the Napoleonic period initiated a process of "democratization" and "solidarity" that revolutionized man's view of government, one of the fundamental theses of William McNeill's *Pursuit of Power* (Chicago, 1982), 133.

The Ottomans clearly understood the necessity of engaging the services of new hierarchies of command, such as Kahraman Pasha.[1] Position and status, however temporary as in the case of Kahraman Pasha, were all weapons of distributing power. Yet, there remained a steadfast refusal to broaden permanently the definition of the standing army beyond the fictional elite crops, the Janissaries, who represented not just a physical threat, but also a cultural icon of considerable resonance, especially as the pay system of the Janissaries sustained the entire Ottoman bureaucracy.[2] That is, until the attempts by Selim III (1789-1807), beginning in 1793, as a result of the disastrous defeats of the Russo-Ottoman wars, to introduce a new army (*Nizam-ı Cedid*), made up of recruits from among the very same provincial levies (*miri levends*) here described, who, now called soldiers (*asakir*), were organized as a standing army, kept apart from the intractable Janissaries, and trained and disciplined along western-style military lines. That story does not belong here, but some comments about our interpretation of that attempt at reform do.

The ideology which accompanied the confrontation of the traditional Janissary army with the discipline and order required to transform the Ottoman army has long diverted us from examining the real issues around the Ottoman "military revolution." Rhetorical use of such terms as "brave Muslim heroes," "armies of Islam," or "victorious soldiers of God and the Prophet," to justify resistance to "infidel innovations" conveniently fed into western historiographical categories of progressive (read rational and secular) and regressive (read reactionary and religious), accounting for the failure of the Ottomans to make the transition to a modern-style army. In the stories I have just told, the referants are there: Hüseyin Pasha is accused of heresy by the rebels for not permitting raid and plunder, while Kahraman Pasha counts on the sanctity of the sacred banner of the Prophet to protect him when he enters the grand vezir's presence. I'm not here to rehearse the debate concerning Ottoman obscurantism, but rather to suggest that the Ottoman discourse embodied in the anti-infidel, anti-Christian rhetoric could equally have had to do with convincing the "old order" that the "new order" could be accommodated. In other words, ideology could be bent to serve military innovation.

[1]Canikli Ali Pasha, for example, was appointed in 1772 (in the middle of the extended truce of the war) to the Amasya sancak to control local insurrections, and guarantee the passage of troops and supplies from the Black Sea [Sinop] to the battlefront (Özkaya, 483-4).

[2]I have dealt with this elsewhere, in "Whatever Happened to the Janissaries? Mobilization in the 1768-1774 Russo-Ottoman War," *War in History,* 5 (1998), 23-36, as has Bruce McGowan in H. İnalcık and D. Quataert, eds., *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire* (Cambridge, 1994), 716.

Consider the arguments of an old soldier at the turn of century (ca. 1806), referring to janissary resistance to the creation of Selim III's New Order troops. Their complaints centered on the fear of losing their right to quarterly pay in the muster-rolls (*esame*). "They suggested also... [that as the new troops] performed an exercise similar to that of the Ghiaours [infidels], the Musulman faith is thereby injured. Although these blockheads had never before given themselves any concern about our faith or government, and indeed knew nothing of what belongs to Mussulman purity; yet, on the present occasion, they showed a mighty anxiety for religion." By contrast, the author continues, the new troops showed great valor in the contest with the French in Acre: "Wherever they have been opposed to the infidels, although few in number, they have never turned their faces back, but broke the enemy, or were themselves broken; and as not one of them dared to mention the word flight, they have always, in exact obedience to the will of the great and mighty Prophet, punctually discharged the duties which appertain to a holy war, and steady zeal for the faith."[1]

There is a social transformation at work here, which we now generally recognize, to borrow David Ralston's terminology, as driven by "Importing the European Army," particularly in the decades of the reforms of Mahmud II (1808-39) and Mehmed Ali of Egypt in the early nineteenth century.[2] Importation of new military technology eventually forced an alteration of a culture which had originally only though to adopt a new tool with which to confront a better armed and organized enemy. Western-inspired military reforms are readily recognized and acknowledged to have had a profound impact on Ottoman social order, but the transformation driven by mutinies, the demands of soldiers like those at Hotin and their hero Kahraman Pasha, created largely by the military requirements of continued Ottoman survival, and exerting equal pressure on traditional assumptions of military privilege, have been less generally recognized as an impetus of reform.[3] The revived Muslim rhetoric of the period served as a place where the demands of the new provincial "Leviathan," and the reform agenda of sultans Selim III and Mahmud II could meet in a redefined ideology of Ottoman commonality, which both Mahmud II and then Abdülhamid II (1876-1908) would exploit with considerable success, in the continuing effort to maintain or extend control over a splintering empire.

[1]William Wilkinson, *An Account of the Principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia* (London, 1820), which includes the text of Koca Sekbanbaşı, known as *Hulâsat ül-Kelâm fi Redd il-Avam,* quoted here, 262-4, passim. Published in a modernized version as *Koca Sekbanbaşı Risalesi,* ed. Abdullah Uçman (Istanbul, n.d.), in the *Tercüman 1001 Temel Eser* series. The translation is that of Wilkinson.

[2]David Ralston, *Importing the European Army* (Chicago, 1990).

[3]The distinction being between the privileged, untaxed military class (*asker*) and the population at large.

MANNING A BLACK SEA GARRISON IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY: OCHAKOV AND CONCEPTS OF MUTINY AND REBELLION IN THE OTTOMAN CONTEXT

For most of the eighteenth century, Ochakov (Özü) was one of the largest of the Ottoman fortresses on the Belgrade-Azov defensive line along the Danube and the northern shore of the Black Sea. That line became the do-or-die border for the empire in the late eighteenth century, contested territory between the Ottomans and the Romanov emperors of Russia. Located on and dominating a thirty-mile-long estuary at the mouth of the Dnieper River, Ochakov was the key to control over the coast between it and the Dnieper, and the scene of some of the bloodiest confrontations between the Russians and the Ottomans in 1737 and again in 1788. Ochakov was surrendered finally to the Russian forces under Marshal Grigorii Potemkin and ceded to the Russians with the treaty of Jassy in 1792, when they gained the land between the Dnieper and Bug Rivers. Ochakov was permanently attached to Russia with the cession of Bessarabia in the Treaty of Bucharest, 1812.

In times of peace, the Janissary garrison at Ochakov probably numbered between 6,000 and 8,000 men.[1] During the famous sieges of the period, the garrison stood at more than 20,000 men-Janissaries and other auxiliary forces-reflecting its importance to the Ottoman line of defense. That partly explains why the Ottomans chose to prolong debilitating wars in the latter half of the eighteenth century and were obdurate in negotiations about Ochakov's possible surrender. In 1737 and again in 1771, in the course of peace conferences to attempt mediation and the end of hostilities between the Russians and the Ottomans, the status of Ochakov was one of the more contentious issues.

This paper proposes to consider why the ways in which the Ottomans manned the Ochakov fortress were, *ipso facto,* a recipe for insubordination, rebellion, and mutiny. It will focus on archival and chronicle evidence from the 1768-74 Ottoman-Russian war following a brief review of the more famous confrontations before and after. This discussion will lead to some concluding speculative arguments about the relationship between late Ottoman recruitment practices and mutinies.

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[1] Istanbul, Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi (B.O.A.), Bab-ı Defter Baş Muhasebe Kalemi Defter Kataloğu (D.BŞM) 4274, p. 12, a listing of the Janissary salaries for various of the Ottoman fortresses, gives four years of figures for Ochakov; in 1773, there were 8,267 Janissaries; in 1774, 7, 123; in 1775, 7, 915; and in 1776, 7,875. The figures are only a gauge, as the Janissary rolls were notoriously inaccurate; and other kinds of local garrison forces are not represented.

Definition

Those of us who study the Ottoman Empire have not yet reached a consensus about what constitutes rebellion and/or mutiny in this non-western military context, although Palmira Brummett has recently moved us admirably in that direction.[1] Rebellion was endemic in the last two centuries of the empire's existence, but we still are asking what form revolts took, who joined them, and what they meant. Numerous Ottoman Turkish words-*isyan* (rebellion, riot, mutiny); *eşkiya/eşkiyalık* (bandits, banditry; also rebels/rebellion); *fitne/fitna* (rebellion, sedition, disorder) — are used in the documents. It would be possible to argue some nuances about the legitimacy of rebellion, as in the case of *fitne*, which to many Muslims constituted the legitimate right to overthrow an unjust government, but the terms were for the most part interchangeable in the period under discussion. The central government considered an *isyan* the most serious form of revolt, requiring a forceful response. A "mutiny" presupposed discipline, an environment in which the men who stood up for their rights understood the consequences of their actions. In the eighteenth-century Ottoman context, discipline was swift but not always predictably applied. Mutinies often ended in negotiation or desertion, rather than discipline, because the locales allowed for flight.

"Mutiny" could be defined as an expression by confined soldiers of perceived legitimate grievances concerning late pay, unjust officers, or revoked privileges. Elsewhere, I have offered an example of that form of "mutiny" in an Ottoman garrison.[2] Here, I would like to broaden the typology of "mutiny" in a non-western setting to encompass four approaches. Regarding the definition of any particular mutiny by a military formation in a battle field context as well as the subsequent evocation of that mutiny in narratives, those approaches would consider locale, or topography; impetus, or motive; explicit and implicit agendas; and short or long-term memory.

By locale and topography, I mean any confined, restricted, or isolated environment, a definition I would stretch to include mountains, seas, and/or steppes. Ochakov, for example, was surrounded by much unsettled as well as deserted territory and easier to approach by sea than by land. Supplying it was

[1]Palmira Brummett, "Classifying Ottoman Mutiny: the Act and Vision of Rebellion," *Turkish Studies Association Bulletin* 22:1 (1998): 91-107. She concludes by calling for more studies of battlefront mutinies, as opposed to the Istanbul versions of the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries that are her examples (pp. 106-07).

[2]See my "Mutiny and the Eighteenth Century Ottoman Army", *Turkish Studies Association Bulletin* 22:1 (1998): 116-25.

very difficult, maintaining a garrison a hazardous proposition. Disease, desertion and ill-trained, undisciplined soldiery were problems common to all armies who fought there.

The impetus for resisting military commands was most often desperation, coercion, or the basic urge to self-preservation, all pressure point *in extremis*. explicit agendas might include hunger, missing pay, or regimental or fraternal "rights", such as the right of plunder or camaraderie. Implicit agendas might be the recognition and preservation of status or traditions, or the perception that societal contracts had been broken or that the make-up of ruling circles was based on class, ethnicity, or religion. In Ochakov, Cossacks, Tatars, Christians, and Muslims, but more specifically Albanians, Bosnians, Kurds, and others populated a military landscape commanded by the Ottoman Istanbul elite. The very nature of the strategies of conscription and utilization of non-Janissary recruits in this context incubated mutinous behavior.

The evocations of revolts in eyewitness reports and later chronicles impart an iconographic importance to resistance. In the imperial setting, such narratives may well have provided an oblique critique of Ottoman policies. As Brummett notes, "Mutiny was the yardstick by which the justice of the regime and the loyalty of its subjects were measured."[1]

The Siege of 1737

Before discussing the events of 1769, I would like to describe the two largest sieges of Ochakov in order to convey the scale and human cost of defending this fortress. The siege by general Münnich and his Russian troops began on 10 July 1737. "...Münnich and his army of 60,000 men, encumbered by an enormous baggage train, had taken over three months to reach Ochakov. By the time they got there the heat was appalling, and for over eight miles around there was not a stick of wood, a scrap of forage or a drop of water."[2] They found Ochakov well defended and well stocked, with over 20,000 men and sufficient artillery and supplies for a sustained siege. Turkish sources, however, claim that the Ottoman commander Yahya Paşa appealed to the grand vezirial camp on the Danube for men as well as supplies, having only 6,000 in the fortress. Grand Vezir Silahdar Mehmed Paşa ignored the appeal, but 4,000 troops were sent by Bender field commander (*serasker*)

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[2]Lavender Cassels, *The Struggle for the Ottoman Empire, 1717-1740* (London, 1966), p. 132.

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Muhsinzade Abdullah Paşa, who later became grand vezir in place of the incompetent Silahdar Mehmed.[1] In either case, the Ottomans were outnumbered by at least three to one.

The garrison repelled the first storm of the fortress by the Russian troops, although Yahya Paşa failed to follow up the advantage gained. The Russians were without their large artillery, had to cross a large trench around the fortress, and lacked proper equipment for scaling the walls. Nevertheless, on the second day of the siege a Russian mortar blew up the fortress powder magazine, killing an estimated 6,000 defenders. The fortress capitulated, and in the ensuing slaughter, in spite of the white flag, all but 3,000 of the garrison died. "[Within] twenty-four hours the stench of decaying corpses was such that the Russians had to withdraw fifteen miles from the fortress."[2] Russian casualties were estimated at 4,000, but disease and hunger took an additional toll, making the Russian losses more than equal to those of the Ottomans.[3]

In October, which is usually late in the campaign season, the Ottomans attempted to retake Ochakov, besieging it with an estimated 20,000 soldiers and an additional 20,000 Tatars.[4] Huge losses, torrential rains, and desertions on all sides forced the Ottomans to abandon the siege in early November.[5] By the time of the Belgrade treaty in 1739, however, the Russians had been forced to withdraw from Bessarabia and the Crimea because of the impossibility of maintaining healthy and well-supplied garrisons in the area. At Ochakov alone, some 60,000 Russians were lost before it was leveled and abandoned in 1738.[6]

[1]Cevat Erbakan, *1736-1739 Osmanlı-Rus ve Avusturya Savaşları* (Istanbul, 1938), pp. 27-30. Muhsinzade Abdullah had a distinguished career as a soldier and statesman and was the father of Muhsinzade Mehmed Paşa, the most experienced of the generals of the 1768-74 War, grand vezir on the Danube from 1771-74.

[2]Cassels, *Struggle*, p. 132.

[3]Edward S. Creasy, *History of the Ottoman Empire* (London, 1878), still a generally impartial, lively, and passionate account, pp. 365-68. Creasy and Cassels blame the Cossacks for the slaughter of the Ottoman side. General Münnich had a reputation for severity and brutality.

[4]The numbers are probably overestimated: Karl A. Roider, *The Reluctant Ally: Austria's Policy in the Austro-Turkish War, 1737-1739* (Baton Rouge, LA, 1972), pp. 123-24.

[5]Louis Feliz Keralio, *Histoire de la guerre des Russes et des impériaux contre les Turcs en 1736, 1737, 1738 & 1739 & de la paix de Belgrade qui la termina* (Paris, 1780), I: 144-52.

[6]Cassels, *Struggle*, p. 152. At the Belgrade siege the same year, an estimated eighty to one hundred Austrian troops died each day of plague, malaria, and dysentery (p. 153). Excavations are under way at Ochakov although the modern town is built upon the site, making it difficult to proceed. Caroline Finkel and Victor Ostapchuk are members of the group studying the Ottoman fortress rebuilt after 1739, using both on-site and archival evidence to do so (personal communications with both).

The Siege of 1788

Ochakov remained the key to naval control of the northern Black sea coast and the mouth of the Danube. In 1788, the Russian and Ottoman fleets played a larger role in the defense of the fortress than they had in 1737. Since Kilburun, the sister fortress across the estuary from Ochakov, had been surrendered to the Russians in 1774, the first Ottoman objective after declaring war in 1787 was its recapture. An assault by 6,000 Ottomans on that fortress, however, was repulsed by general Suvorov. His name has been forever linked with audacity and genius, in part, at least, because of his defense of Kilburun and the taking of Ismail on the Danube in 1790, but he was wounded before the final assault on Ochakov.[1]

Between the middle of June and December, when the fortress surrendered, Potemkin cautiously moved 50,000 troops to surround the fortress from the land. The Ottoman garrison was estimated at 20,000. The Russians invested the fortress by August, but the Ottomans were able to continue to supply it by sea, running a Russian blockade with 1,500 troops as late as the middle of October. Potemkin ordered the final assault on 16 December, after a month of heavy shelling from the fleet in the harbor:

> Valour, maddened to ferocity, was shown on both sides... The Turks of Oczakof, had before the siege, surprised a Russian village in the vicinity, and mercilessly slaughtered all the inhabitants. Potemkin and Suwarrow caused the Russian regiments that were there to assault the town, to be first led through this village as it lay in ashes, and with its streets still red with the blood of their fellow countrymen:.. [The] Russians advanced on the 16th of December... Whole ranks were swept away by the fire of the besieged; but the supporting columns still came forward unflinchingly through musketry and grape; 4,000 Russians fell; but the survivors bore down all resistance, and forced their way into the city, where for three days they reveled in murder and pillage. No mercy was shown to age or sex; and out of a population of 40,000 human beings, only a few hundreds (chiefly women and children) escaped...[2]

The war of 1768-74 on the same terrain had been tame by comparison. Largely because the operations of the main Russian army were concentrated in Moldavia and along the Danube, Ochakov was not similarly besieged except for one occasion in August of 1771, when the Turkish garrison repulsed the

[1]Creasy, *History of the Ottoman Empire*, p. 428.

[2]Ibid., p. 432, says 16 December; Isabel de Madariaga, *Russia in the Age of Catherine the Great* (London, 1981), pp. 404-05, has the date as 17 December.

attempt to capture the fortress. Evidence of the ways the Ottomans saw to manning the fortress during this war, however, are instructive.

In August 1769, Ochakov commander Canikli Süleyman Paşa reported a mutiny among the *yamak*s (Janissary recruits) under his jurisdiction. An enemy raiding party, made up of Cossacks, had crossed into Ottoman territory, where they were joined by many of Süleyman Paşa's own garrison, who revolted, plundered and burned a number of the nearby Ottoman fortress, and killed many of the local residents before crossing back over the Bug River into enemy territory. Süleyman himself had gone after the mutineers, then deserters, with loyal troops, following them for some distance, but he was forced to return to Ochakov for fear of an attack on the fortress by the enemy. He requested reinforcements led by an experienced commander, arguing that the 5,000 soldiers remaining were insufficient to defend the fortress. His request was seconded by both the *kadı* (judge) of the fortress and his fellow officers. In the end, he was sent an additional 5,000 troops some of them Janissaries but more than half of them *levends* (state-funded militias) under the command of Karasu *mutasarrıfı* Abdullah Paşa and *Binbaşı* Osman Ağa, a *levend bölükbaşı* (present-day equivalents might be major and captain, respectively).[1]

One of the most interesting aspects of the account by Sadullah Enverî, summarized above, is the paragraph just before it, which argues that Muslim soldiers were accustomed to raids (*çete tarikiyle*) into infidel territory as part of their official duties.[2] The implicit message is that they had been prevented from undertaking such raids, forcing a mutiny and flight of large numbers, irresistibly drawn to natural inclinations that were traditionally sanctioned as an honorable aspect of their service.

There are two categories of soldiers mentioned in the account: *yamak* and *levend*. Mobilization in 1768-69 involved a combination of systems. Included were the salaried corps-the Janissaries and their recruits, the *yamaks*— and the state funded militias— the *levends*, who signed on for a limited period, usually six months, and were paid in cash, either at the place of mobilization or upon arrival at the battlefront. Because the commanders and suppliers of those militias were drawn from the countryside power-brokers, by

[1]Sadullah Enverî, *Tarih*, Istanbul University Library, MS T. 5994 (1780), fols. 48b-49. One documentary account corroborates these events, an official appeal to the Bender field commander, Dağıstanlı Ali Paşa, to send more troops to Özü, as the garrison had already engaged 10,000 of the enemy (B.O.A. Mühimme Defteri 168, p. 1). The events sound very much like the situation in 1737.
[2]Enverî, *Tarih*, fol. 48b.

the late eighteenth century tax farmers or tax collectors had become the vital link to successful campaigning for the Ottomans. John Lynn has called this style of recruitment "aggragrate contracting", a mixture of a core permanent force and soldier bands who could be quickly organized and just as quickly disbanded.[1]

The Janissary corps, which had not been on campaign for more than twenty-five years, had to be completely rebuilt in 1768. The Istanbul contingent probably numbered no more than 20,000; most of the recruitment to increase the size of the corps occurred on the road in the spring of 1769. A record of the Ochakov Janissary garrison from that period conveys the problem: of the 8,216 listed as "new" *yamak*s, an additional 989 as "old" *yamak*s, probably meaning present at the last roll call, in total some 4,216 untrained troops.[2] Without a doubt, the newly enrolled caused most of the trouble at the beginning of the war. The number of registered Janissaries at Ochakov rarely topped 8,000 throughout the war.[3]

Each year of campaign, the army had to be rebuilt. Meanwhile, the grand vezir stayed on the frontier, generally at his headquarters in Babadağı, south of the Danube in present-day Romania. In January 1771, a fleet of ten ships left Istanbul with men and supplies, for the specific task of refortifying Ochakov. Four of the ships carried an estimated 600 Janissary *serdengeçtis*, in this war a term synonymous with *yamak*. When the ships stopped at ports *en route* to gather more supplies (Varna and Köstence, for example), many of the new recruits fled, forcing guards to round them up and put them back on the ships bound for Ochakov.[4] One can only speculate how many actually arrived there.

[1]John A. Lynn, "The Evolution of Army Style in the Modern West, 800-2000," *International History Review* 18 (1996): 514.
[2]B.O.A., Cevdet Askeriye (CA) 30706, dated 1771 but referring to the previous two years. "Old" may well refer to age. Rumiantsev, victorious field marshal of the Russian army, commented after the renowed victory at Kagul (Kartal) in the summer of 1770, "...the ancient janissaries and sipahis, who seemed so by their appearance and age,... perished here completely." P.A. Rumiantsev, *Sbornik documentov (Collected Documents)* (Moscow, 1953), I: 345, translation by Maryna Kravets.
[3]One register lists 7,311 Janissaries at Ochakov in 1770-71 (B.O.A., Maliyeden Müdevver (MM) 17405 p. 108); the same register records 9,709 Janissaries in 1771-72 (MM 17405, p. 121) for later years, see above, n. 1. There seems to be little difference between war and peacetime mobilization, suggesting fictional registers. I have discussed the problem of fictional Janissary rolls elsewhere: "Whatever Happened to the Janissaries?" *War in History* 5 (1998): 23-36.
[4]*Serdengeçtis* were soldiers who volunteered for difficult, sometimes suicidal, duty and were given bonuses accordingly. The eighteenth-century versions were generally new recruits, which is why I equate the term with *yamak*. Enverî, *Tarih*, fols. 180b-181. Both Enverî and another contemporary source say 10,700 men were to be sent from Istanbul and Anatolia; see *Şemdanizade Fındıklılı Süleyman Efendi Tarihi Mari't-Tevârih*, ed. M. Münir Aktepe (Istanbul, 1980), IIB: 61. Şemdanizade puts the number of ships carrying the 600 men from Istanbul at 6 *firkate*.

The other main source of cannon fodder for the Danube in 1768 was the *levend* system. Men from all over the empire, both infantry and cavalry, were organized into detachments of fifty or one hundred men each (*bayrak*), commanded by the chief officer of the *sancak*, called the *mutasarrıf*. This system of recruitment, pay, and provisioning was completely cash based. Generally, the provincial *mutasarrıf* took responsibility for feeding his men; the money for (substantial) sign-on bonuses and six months' pay came from the sultan's purse or, on account, from the pocket of the commander himself, who was required to report to the front with his own entourage of over 200 troops, plus 1,000 to 2,000 *levends*. A special tax, the *imdad-i seferiye*, was assigned to the commander appointed to bring the troops to the front.[1]

Two records of substantial numbers of *levend*-style troops called up specifically to guard Ochakov have been found. The first, dated September 1768, represents a call to arms for a winter contingent of 10,000 troops to guard the fortress and, presumably, to be present for the campaign that would get underway the following May. Each of the ten *mutasarrıfs* was exhorted to arrive with 200 of his household guard, as well as 500; 1,000; or 2,000 infantrymen (*piyade*), to make a total of 12,200 men.[2] The most interesting aspect of this particular record is the geographic source of the recruits: Albania, Macedonia, Bosnia, and northern Greece (among the *sancak*s listed: Prizren, Üsküp, Delvine, Avlonya, Elbasan). The second record is from June 1773, listing a total of 12,500 troops largely from the same area, whose commanders are being compensated for passage to the Danube in order to guard the frontier fortresses.[3] Getting men to the frontier was no easier for the provincial commanders than for their Janissary equivalents. In 1775, the *mutasarrıf* of Köstendil, Mehmed Paşa, was requested to return the balance of the advance he had been given, for while waiting for transportation to Ochakov from the port of Burgos on the Black Sea, 600 of the 1,000 infantrymen he was supposed to mobilize had fled.[4]

Mobilizing a largely untutored and undisciplined force, especially after a hiatus of a quarter of a century, obviously contributed to the massive failures of the 1768-74 war. Mutinies, such as those of Süleyman Paşa's garrison at

[1]Described in Aksan, "Whatever Happened to the Janissaries?"
[2]B.O.A., CA 16288; also Mustafa Cezar, *Osmanlı Tarihinde Levendler* (Istanbul, 1965), pp. 438-39.
[3]B.O.A., CA 12906. This followed a two-year truce; war was resumed early in 1773.
[4]Ibid., CA 9247. These are samples of hundreds of documents that make difficult and confusing reading.

Ochakov, were more commonplace than exceptional. *Yamak*s were probably drawn from the same sources of manpower as *levend*s even though their records were separately maintained. This army, once mobilized, dissolved rapidly when soldiers deserted and formed autonomous bands and raiding parties. Severe discipline and the exercise of command were serendipitous on the battlefront. Frequent cash rewards for valor, a significant incentive, were very often more than double the six-month salaries of the *levend* recruits.[1]

Even with an army unsuitable for the defense of a garrison line, there were heroic stands and able commanders. No sustained siege occurred at Ochakov in the 1768-74 war, but the garrison did repulse Russian attackers in the summer of 1771, one of the very few occasions when Ottoman arms were successful in this particular war. The soldiers were supported by the Ottoman fleet in the harbor as in 1788,[2] a contemporary recounted.

> The Russians surrounded the fortress from one sea to the other. A number of courageous ones (*dilaver*) left the fortress and engaged the enemy for five hours. As the Russians fled, they were fired upon from both the fortress and the fleet in the harbor, and many of the infidels were destroyed... Three days later they came back, but as before many were disgraced. When the news of this bravery was learned, 3,000 *altın* was sent by the grand vezir, 350 *kise* by the *devlet* (sultan).[3]

Although Bender had fallen in 1770 after a lengthy siege, the Russians made no further advance after the unsuccessful attempt on Ochakov. They had instead invested most of the Danubian fortresses by the end of 1770. The Ottomans, however, would not admit defeat until the spring of 1774, when Russian field marshal Rumiantsev surrounded the Ottomans at Şumla (Shumla), deep in Ottoman territory south of the Danube. Grand Vezir Muhsinzade Mehmed reputedly had fewer than 10,000 troops with him by that time.[4] Under the terms of the treaty of Küçük Kaynarca, the Russians acquired Kilburun, considerably facilitating their final capture of Ochakov in 1788, as described above.

[1]The miserly monthly salary for *levend* recruits remained 2.5 *kuruş* for over a century. Refer to Aksan, "Whatever Happened to the Janissaries?"
[2]Enverî, *Tarih*, fol. 219.
[3]Şemdanizade, *Şemdanizade Tarihi*, IIB: 74.
[4]See my *An Ottoman Statesman in War and Peace: Ahmed Resmî Efendi (1700-1783)*. (Leiden, 1995) for a fuller description of the war; Creasy, *History of the Ottoman Empire*, pp. 403-10.

The fourth approach to the definition and subsequent evocation of mutiny concerns memory, both long and short-term. Şemdanizade framed his story of the defense of Ochakov in 1771 with an interview of Abaza Mehmed Paşa, the renowned field commander, that Şemdanizade had conducted just prior to Abaza Mehmed's execution for insubordination the same year. Ordered to go to the defense of the Crimea by sea, Abaza had refused to land and sailed to Sinop on the northern Anatolian coast instead. Explained the now-disgraced soldier: "I had no money. I requested twenty *kise* from the grand vezir. 'Lend me the money [I said], so that I can procure soldiers, in the customary fashion of a commander.' He didn't give it to me. So I came [here], thinking that if I were to disembark [there], I would be enslaved and scorned by the army, damaging the imperial honor." Şemdanizade chided proponents of Abaza Mehmed's speedy demise for executing such an honorable man, whose martyrdom was celebrated in infidel church services.[1]

A critique of the government was implicit in the narrator's championing of a loyal Ottoman mountain man. (Abaza referred to a soldier of Abkhazian origin, a distinguished/notorious line of able servants turned state rebels throughout the centuries.) The interview with Abaza Mehmed is followed by the Ochakow account and several others of the bravery of individual soldiers in the face of the infidel onslaught. Demonization of the Abkhazian (and/or Albanian and other mountainman) soldiers' excesses in official documents contradicted both the realities of the battlefront and the persistence of the *topos* as a popular model of bravery.[2] The occasional clear-eyed commentator, in this case a judge, revealed the essential dilemma in the recruiting system that prevailed by the end of the 1768-74 war. Mobilization strategies and incentives brought the Ottomans only temporary raiding parties, of dubious loyalty and quick to flight.

Conclusion

Late Ottoman military recruitment was a combination of voluntary and coercive systems, some permanent and some contractual. Its mobilization systems thus resemble those utilized by other early modern empires. So, too, do the persisting ethos of the individual warrior and the admiration for the man with the horse and cold steel. There are, however, a number of unique aspects to the Ottoman context.

[1]Şemdanizade, *Şemdanizade Tarihi*, IIB: 73-74.
[2]See my "Mutiny and the Eighteenth Century Ottoman Army" for a further example.

Integral to the Ottoman pursuit of war was the maintenance of a wide band of frontier-style borders, defended by clientage relationships, which included the Danubian Principalities and the Crimea. The eighteenth-century evolution from a hegemonic to a territorial empire meant the delineation of fixed borders and the move to a garrison defense line along the Danube. This, in turn, required a different style of warfare, with more disciplined and continuous garrisons. In a territory of scarce men and supplies, troops had to be brought in from greater and greater distances in two senses of the word. Geographically, Kurds and Abkhazians were sent to the Danubian shores while Albanians were sent to the Caucasus. Culturally, newly recruited mountain men were introduced to high Ottoman palace-style elitism. The net result was increased nomadization and loss of control on the peripheries of Ottoman territory, as well as continuous tension between the grand vezirial command (and household politics) and undisciplined provincial prowess on the battlefield.