

ISLAMKUNDLICHE UNTERSUCHUNGEN · BAND 91

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Klaus Schwarz

KLAUS SCHWARZ VERLAG · BERLIN

ISLAMKUNDLICHE UNTERSUCHUNGEN, BAND 91

Adel Allouche

**The Origins and
Development of the
Ottoman - Safavid Conflict**

(906 - 962 / 1500 - 1555)



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To Jeanette and her grandmother

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NOTES


The transliteration of Arabic and Persian names is done according to the romanization system adopted by the Library of Congress. Most Turkish names are rendered in their common form with the exception of substituting "j" for the Turkish "c".

Frequently, two dates separated by an oblique stroke appear in this work. The first date refers to the Hijrī calendar and the second to the Gregorian.

Ithnā ʿasharī, Imāmī or Twelver Shīʿism are used interchangeably. Likewise, Sunnī and Shīʿī are used for Sunnite and Shīʿite, respectively.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Belleten	Türk Tarih Kurumu. Belleten.
BSOAS	Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London. London.
CMRS	Cahiers du Monde Russe et Soviétique. Paris.
EI ¹	<u>The Encyclopaedia of Islam</u> . 4 vols. London: Luzac and Co., 1913-34.
EI ²	<u>The Encyclopaedia of Islam</u> . New Edition. Leiden: Brill, 1960.
IC	Islamic Culture. Heyderabad, India.
IJMES	International Journal of Middle East Studies. New York.
Iran	Iran. Journal of the British Institute of Persian Studies. London.
JA	Journal Asiatique.
JAOS	Journal of the American Oriental Society. New Haven, Conn.
JESHO	Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient. Leiden.
JNES	Journal of Near Eastern Studies. University of Chicago.
JRAS	Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland. London.
JRCAS	Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society. London.
REI	Revue des Etudes Islamiques. Paris.
SI	Studia Islamica. Paris.
WZKM	Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes. Wien.
ZDMG	Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft. Wiesbaden.



The Ottoman, Şafavid, Mamluk and Uzbek Empires in 1514, Prior to Chāldīrān

INTRODUCTION

In 907/1501, Shah Ismā'īl (907-30/1501-24) succeeded in defeating Alvand Mirza, one of the Aq Qoyunlu petty rulers, whereupon he entered the capital city of Tabriz to declare the birth of the Şafavid dynasty, whose members were destined to rule Iran for over two centuries (907-1148/1501-1736), and to establish Ithnā 'Asharī Shi'ism as the state religion. This event would deeply alter the geopolitical pattern of the entire Middle East by creating a rift between Iran and its Sunnī Muslim neighbors.

The founding of the Şafavid dynasty constituted a unique phenomenon. Prior to 907/1501, the Şafavids had been known as the leaders of the eponymous Şūfī order which had been founded by Shaykh Şafī al-Dīn Ishāq (650-735/1252-1334) at Ardabil, in the aftermath of the Mongol conquest of Iran. Thereafter, the original Şafavid Şūfī order developed into an important political force which later succeeded in its bid for supreme power in Iran, a metamorphosis which was completed by Shah Ismā'īl who came to hold the functions of spiritual leader of the Şūfī order as well as the temporal powers of a dynast. Moreover, the establishment of Twelver Shi'ism as the official religion in Iran constituted the final outcome of a process that the original Şafavid Şūfī order had undergone. At its inception, the Şūfī order at Ardabil belonged to the general framework of Sunnī Islam. By the time it was transformed into a ruling institution, its leaders had become strong advocates of Shi'ism. The roots of this double metamorphosis of the Şafavid Şūfī order can be traced back to the events which raked western Asia in the fifteenth century. Timūr's

(771-807/1370-1405) campaigns which stretched from Transoxania to Iran, as well as to Anatolia and Syria, failed to build an enduring empire and resulted in the destabilization of the area. Timūr's defeat and capture of the Ottoman Sultan Yıldırım Bayezid (791-804/1389-1402) at Angora (modern Ankara) led to the revival of the independent Turkoman principalities in the area, the leaders of which had been resentful of Ottoman power. In the aftermath of the Timūrian campaigns, the history of Iran, Anatolia and northern Syria was characterized by the ascendancy of the Turkomans who were eager either to affirm their independence or to seek it through rebellions.

In Iran, the Qara Qoyunlu and the Aq Qoyunlu Turkoman clans rose from their respective traditional centers of Lake Van and Diyār Bakr and built two rival dynasties. Later, the Aq Qoyunlu ruler Uzun Ḥasan (857-82/1453-78) was able not only to eliminate his rivals the Qara Qoyunlus and become master of all Iran, but also to plan for a "greater Iran" which would include the Turkomans of eastern Anatolia. However, he was unable to withstand the military superiority of the Ottomans who, under the leadership of Sultan Mehmed II (855-86/1451-81), inflicted upon him a crushing defeat which dissipated his grandiose plans.

With the rise of the Ṣafavids, Shi^cI Iran became surrounded by Sunni Muslim powers: to the northwest, the Ottomans; to the east, the Uzbeks; and to the west, the Mamluks.¹ Of these three, the Ottomans

¹Later, the Mughal empire in India, founded in 932/1526, should be added.

and the Uzbeks were to become entangled separately in a series of bitter confrontations with the Ṣafavids. The conflict which opposed the Ṣafavids to the Uzbeks was the result of their rivalry for the control of the province of Khurāsān. The Ottoman-Ṣafavid conflict was also inevitable: the supporters of the Ṣafavids, known as the qizilbāsh, belonged in their majority to the Turkoman tribes in Anatolia and were linked to Shah Ismā^cil by strong spiritual ties which were the legacy of prior Ṣafavid propaganda in that area. As it will be demonstrated in the present work, Shah Ismā^cil's ambitions were directed first toward Anatolia. The establishment of the Ṣafavid dynasty in Iran was intrinsically a threat to the stability of the Anatolian provinces of the Ottoman empire, due to the Ṣafavid leadership's inherent ability to use its influence among the population of these regions for the achievement of its political designs. Hence, it is no coincidence that the rise of the Ṣafavids led immediately to a period of internal instability within Ottoman Anatolia, a fact which placed the then Ottoman Sultan Bayezid II (886-918/1481-1512) on the defensive vis-à-vis this nascent neighboring dynasty.

Only with the advent of the Ottoman Sultan Selim I (918-26/1512-20) did a reversal of fortunes occur. Selim decided to deal with the problem of the restive Anatolian Turkomans, not as a purely internal question but rather to strike at its roots by planning an offensive against the Ṣafavids in Iran, a decision which resulted in Shah Ismā^cil's defeat on the battlefield of Chāldirān in Rajab 920/August 1514. Although this Ottoman victory was not followed by an effort to cause the downfall of the Ṣafavids, it nevertheless placed the latter

on the defensive and caused a sharp decline in Safavid activities within Anatolia.

Under Sultan Sulayman II (926-74/1520-66) Ottoman policy toward Iran consisted of geographically containing the Safavids. This policy was dictated by the other challenges that this Ottoman Sultan was compelled to meet along the European borders of his empire. During this same period, Shah Tahmāsp (930-84/1524-76) inherited the Safavid throne and adopted a less belligerent stand with regard to the Ottomans. Moreover, this Safavid ruler was faced with internal unrest caused by feuding among his tribal supporters as well as among members of his family. These conditions were exploited by the Ottomans who launched a number of campaigns which resulted in territorial gains. In fact, the Ottoman-Safavid conflict was relegated during the respective reigns of Sulayman and Tahmāsp to a border problem which both parties were eager to resolve by signing the treaty of Amasya in 962/1555.

The reduction of the Ottoman-Safavid conflict to a confrontation between two countries which had adopted two different forms of Islam is a mere simplification of the problem and does not withstand a closer examination. It is a fact that the Ottomans were Sunnite, and that the Safavids were Shi'ite. It is also a fact that each had used an extensive religious propaganda against the other. However, one of the ramifications of this conflict was the fall of the Sunnite Mamluk empire at the hands of the Sunnite Ottomans, while the Shi'ite Safavids were able to retain their sovereignty. The Ottoman-Safavid conflict should be considered within the framework of the entire geopolitical pattern of the Middle East and Transoxania at the end of the fifteenth century and the beginning of the sixteenth rather than

within the simplistic framework of Shi'ism versus Sunnism. Ideally, such a study should encompass the state of relations between the then existing Muslim powers. In other words, the Ottoman-Safavid confrontation should be viewed in light of these two antagonists' relations with the Mamluks, the Uzbeks, and the Mughals of India, on the one side, and with Western Christendom on the other. The present study is in fact an attempt to research this question within such a framework and emphasizes the state of relations between Ottomans, Safavids, and Mamluks, while developments on Iran's other borders are mentioned only when they are relevant to this central topic.

Note differences in policy
1. Bayezid II
2. Selim
3. Sulayman

THE FALL OF CONSTANTINOPLE AND ITS AFTERMATH

The history of the Middle East in the second half of the fifteenth century was unquestionably marked by the ascendancy of the Ottoman Turks. Following their capture of Constantinople (Istanbul) in 857/1453 and the subsequent extension of their hegemony over Anatolia and the Black Sea region, the Ottomans became a threat to their neighboring Muslim brethren in Syria and in Iran as well as to the Italian republics trading with those areas.

Along the Taurus mountain range, the two Turkoman principalities of Ramazan¹ (780-922/1378-1517) and Dulğadır² (740-921/1339-1517) whose rulers were traditional vassals of the Mamluks, functioned as a buffer zone between the latter and the Ottomans. Opposite the powerful Ottomans, the Mamluk empire was suffering from lethargy. It remained dormant within almost the same boundaries it had acquired in the aftermath of ³Ayn Jālūt. By the latter half of the fifteenth century the Taurus area became a zone of contention between Mamluks and Ottomans and led to the frequent opening of hostilities. The task

¹Arabic: Banū Ramaḍān.

²Arabic: Dhū'l-Qadr.

³On the battlefield of ³Ayn Jālūt in 658/1260, the Mamluks were able to defeat the Mongols and check their westward advance. Later, Sultan Baybars (658-76/1260-77) extended the northern borders of the empire to Cilicia (Lesser Armenia), although the full annexation of this province took place about a century later with the capture of its capital SIs in 776/1375.

of keeping in check especially the turbulent rulers of Dulğadır became an onerous task for the Mamluks, since this province was increasingly subjected to Ottoman interference.

The strengthening of Ottoman grip over eastern Anatolia represented a menace to the western borders of Iran. There, Uzun Ḥasan (857-82/1453-78), the ruler of the Aq Qoyunlus, realized the far-reaching consequences of the fall of Byzantium to his foes and made overtures toward the adversaries of the Ottomans in an attempt to form an alliance aimed at reversing the tide of events. His plans finally came to naught, since he was in no position to challenge the Ottomans militarily.

The fall of Constantinople constituted no less a threat to the Ottomans' European rivals, especially those whose interests in the area were at stake. The firm control of the Straits enabled the Sultan to isolate the Frankish settlements along the Black Sea littoral and placed him in a position to cut off any future help sent to them from the Aegean or the Mediterranean. This strong posture allowed the Ottomans to direct their war machine toward the annexation of strategic territories and led to a systematic expansion around the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov on the one hand, and in the Aegean and Adriatic Seas on the other. In this respect Genoa, and especially Venice, will be dealt with in this study, while Ottoman relations with other European powers will be mentioned when they have a bearing upon political developments in the Middle East.

At the outset, Venice and Genoa accommodated the victorious Sultan Mehmed II (855-86/1451-81) with the hope of retaining the

commercial privileges they had enjoyed under Byzantine rule. Indeed, Ottoman control of the Straits bore potential repercussions with regard to trade with the Black Sea and particularly the Sea of Azov where the two Italian republics maintained important outposts in Caffa and Tana. While both secured the renewal of their commercial agreements shortly after the fall of the former Byzantine capital, Venice felt compelled later to ward off the danger of the Ottomans whose conquests in the Balkans increased the vulnerability of her possessions in the Morea. In addition, the Republic of St. Mark sought allies among the Ottomans' Muslim adversaries, particularly Uzun Hasan, but this attempt ended with failure.

The present chapter is a synopsis of the major events, in the latter half of the fifteenth century, which affected the geopolitical structure of the area comprising Anatolia, Syria and western Iran on the one side, and the Aegean, Adriatic and Black Sea regions on the other. It attempts to analyze the impact of the conquest of Constantinople on the future of the Ottomans' relations with their Muslim neighbors, namely the Mamluks and the Aq Qoyunlus, as well as their relations with Venice and Genoa, the two most important merchant powers which held a quasi-monopoly of trade between the Muslim East and Western Christendom.

A. Ottoman - Aq Qoyunlu Relations.

On 29 May 1453, Constantinople fell to the besieging Ottomans while its last emperor, Constantine Paleologus (1448-53) died during

the final assault on his capital.⁴ Sultan Mehmed II followed up this success by initiating a series of campaigns in central Europe and the Balkans, annexing parts of the Morea and of Greece.⁵ These campaigns were brought to a standstill at the walls of Belgrade where the famous John Hunyadi (d. 1460) led the resistance. Another campaign in the years 1458 and 1459 resulted in the annexation of parts of Serbia.⁶

In Anatolia, two Turkoman principalities have been successful in accommodating the Ottomans while maintaining their independence: Karaman with its capital Konya and Kastamonu with its capital Sinop, respectively ruled by the Karaman and Isfandiyār families. In addition to these two provinces, the minuscule Greek empire of Trabzon, ruled by the Komneni, represented the last vestige of Byzantine rule in the area. The Komneni maintained special ties with Uzun Hasan, the Aq Qoyunlu ruler of Iran, who was married to Catherina Komnena -- known as Despina Khātūn and daughter of Calo Johannes

⁴It is beyond the scope of this chapter to describe the fall of Constantinople. The reader will find accounts in the translated works of fifteenth century Greek historians such as Doukas and Kritovoulos. Among moderns, the works of Steven Runciman, The Fall of Constantinople, 1453 (Cambridge: The University Press, 1969); Franz Babinger, Mahomet II le Conquérant et son temps, 1432-1481 (Paris: Payot, 1954) idem, Mehmed the Conqueror and his Time, translated by Ralph Manheim, edited with a preface by William C. Hickman (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978), and A.A. Vasiliev, History of the Byzantine Empire (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1964) 2:580-656, are of interest.

⁵Kritovoulos, History of Mehmed the Conqueror, translated from the Greek by Charles T. Riggs (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1970), pp. 136-160; Babinger, Mahomet le Conquérant, pp. 191-218.

⁶Kritovoulos, Mehmed the Conqueror, pp. 111-116; Hammer-Purgstall, Histoire de l'Empire Ottoman (Paris: Bellizard, Barthes, Dufoer and Lowels, 1835), 3:30-36 and 62-67.

Komnenus (d. 1457).⁷ Trabzon was also a major Black Sea outlet for Iranian commerce and was linked to Tabriz, the Aq Qoyunlu capital, by an important land route.

In Iran, the Aq Qoyunlus emerged as the main power in the country at the expense of their rivals the Qara Qoyunlus (782-873/1380-1468) and the Timūrids (771-906/1370-1500).⁸ Their leader, Uzun Hasan, followed an aggressive policy, internally as well as externally. As a reaction to the Ottoman threat and in an attempt to secure his control of the Upper Euphrates, an area which was at the crossroads of important trade routes connecting Iran to Anatolia and northern Syria, he made overtures toward the rulers of the still independent Anatolian principalities with the aim of shaping an anti-Ottoman alliance.

⁷Uzun Hasan was not the only Aq Qoyunlu prince to have married a Komnene princess. One of his ancestors, Qutluğ, married Maria Komnene in 1352. See: John E. Woods, The Aqquyunlu Clan, Confederation, Empire (Minneapolis and Chicago: Bibliotheca Islamica, 1976), pp. 20-21 and 46-47; Abū Bakr Tihirānī, Kitāb-i Diyārbakrīyah, edited by Faruk Sümer (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1962), 1: 12-14.

⁸After Timūr's death in 807/1405, Iran was divided among his successors in Samarqand, the Jalāyir rulers in Baghdād, the Qara Qoyunlus in Tabriz and the Aq Qoyunlus in Amīd in the Diyār Bakr region. Of these, the Qara Qoyunlus wrested power from the Jalāyirs in 813/1410; the Timūrid empire plunged into civil strike following the death of Shah Rukh in 850/1447. The Aq Qoyunlus, under the leadership of Uzun Hasan, emerged as the major power in Iran following the campaigns of the years 872-3/1468-9 which resulted in the defeat of the Qara Qoyunlus and the Timūrids, respectively. See: Abū Bakr Tihirānī, Diyārbakrīyah, 2:406-491; V. Minorsky, La Perse au XV^e siècle entre la Turquie et Venise (Paris: E. Leroux, 1933), pp. 9-10; J. Woods, The Aqquyunlu, pp. 111-112; R.M. Savory, "The Struggle for Supremacy in Persia after the death of Timūr," Der Islam, 40 (1964): 38-51.

News of this alliance reached Pope Pius II (1458-64) in April 1460 by way of "a certain Moses Giblet, Archdeacon of Antioch."⁹ The allies sought the support of Western Christendom through an embassy headed by the controversial Ludovico da Bologna, who reached Rome on the night of 26 December 1460 as part of a mission which led him to the influential courts of the West.¹⁰ Meanwhile, Uzun Hasan took to the offensive both militarily and diplomatically, entrusting his son -Oğurlu Mehmed with the launching of a series of raids against Ottoman posts in eastern Anatolia¹¹ while dispatching his nephew Murād Bey to the Ottoman court with a message destined for Mehmed II to warn him against attacking Trabzon.¹² When the Sultan lent a deaf ear to Uzun Hasan's claim that he considered this Byzantine enclave a vassal state, the Aq Qoyunlu resorted to diplomacy and sent a second embassy with peace overtures. This led to a truce which the Ottomans used to prepare for their planned expeditions in Anatolia.¹³ In swift campaigns between 1460 and 1461, the Sultan moved against territories extending along the southern shores of the Black Sea, annexed the

⁹Babinger, Mahomet le Conquérant, p. 221.

¹⁰See the analysis of this embassy in the article of Anthony Bryer, "Ludovico da Bologna and the Georgian and Anatolian embassy of 1460-1461," Bédi Kartlisa. Revue de Kartvélogologie, 19-20 (1965): 178-198; Babinger, Mahomet le Conquérant, pp. 221-228.

¹¹This led to the capture of Koyulhisar. Abū Bakr Tihirānī, Diyārbakrīyah, 2:382.

¹²Ibid.

¹³Ibid., pp. 385-386.

province of Kastamonu and incorporated Trabzon.¹⁴ While the Ottoman army was marching against the latter province, Uzun Hasan deemed it wise to send his mother Sārah Khātūn to meet with the Sultan. This embassy failed to deflect Mehmed's resolve and could only witness the fall of the last Greek enclave in Anatolia.¹⁵ Thus, the Ottoman - Aq Qoyunlu rivalry ended in favor of the former.

Soon, these two antagonists were in open confrontation over southern Anatolia where new developments were to come about, following the death of Ibrāhīm Beg (827-68/1424-63), the ruler of Karaman. In this province, two of Ibrāhīm's sons contended for power: Pīr Ahmad at Konya and Ishāq at Selefke.¹⁶ The latter lost no time in seeking help from Uzun Hasan. The Aq Qoyunlu ruler acquiesced and his armies soon took the road to Erzinjan and Sivas before reaching Karaman where they obliged Pīr Ahmad to evacuate Konya and to flee to the Ottomans.¹⁷ These reacted quickly: their armies crossed into Karaman and reinstated the fugitive Pīr Ahmad at Konya.¹⁸ In later years, the unstable situation in this province prompted further Ottoman involvement which consisted of several campaigns into the area and led to the partial annexation of this dominion as well as the alienation

¹⁴Solakzade, Solakzade Tarihi (Istanbul: Ma'arif Nizaratı, 1897), pp. 223-224; Neşri, Cihan-Nüma, edited by Faik Reşit Unat and Mehmed A. Koymen (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1957), 2:740-750; Ibn Kemāl, Tevārīh-i Āl-i Osmān, VII defter, introduction by Şerafettin Turan (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1954), pp. 186-220.

¹⁵Tihri, Divārbakrīyah, 2:391-392; Neşri, Cihan-Nüma, 2:750-753; Solakzade, Tarih, pp. 222-223.

¹⁶Hammer-Purgstall, Histoire de l'Empire Ottoman, 3:116.

¹⁷Ibid., pp. 116-117.

¹⁸Ibid., pp. 117-118.

of their former ally, Pīr Ahmad, who in turn took refuge in the Aq Qoyunlu domains.¹⁹

Faced with the might of the Ottomans, Uzun Hasan's last hope resided with the conclusion of an effective alliance with the West. Following the previously mentioned embassy of Ludovico da Bologna, the Papacy and Venice favorably received the project of an anti-Ottoman league. Both made overtures toward Uzun Hasan since the early 1460s and promised to send a fleet armed with artillery to be used in a joint action against their common foe.²⁰ This alliance was the outcome of diplomatic activity initiated by Venice after the fall of Trabzon in 1461. On 2 December 1463, the Venetian Senate approved the dispatch of Lazzaro Quirini to the court of Uzun Hasan, where he would reside until 1471.²¹ Meanwhile, two Aq Qoyunlu envoys reached Venice in 1464 and 1465, respectively.²² In 1471, upon the return of Lazzaro Quirini accompanied by a Persian envoy, the Venetian Senate voted by a margin of 148 to 2 in favor of the Venetian - Aq Qoyunlu alliance.²³ A decision was made to send Caterino Zeno, a Venetian nephew of

¹⁹Ibn Kemāl, Tevārīh-i Āl-i Osmān, pp. 325-326. A review of these events is found in pp. 247-253 of the same.

²⁰C. Zeno, "Travels in Persia", in A Narrative of Italian Travels in Persia in the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries, edited and translated by Charles Grey (London: The Hakluyt Society, 1873), pp. 12-13.

²¹V. Minorsky, La Perse au XV^e Siècle entre la Turquie et Venise, p. 12; Babinger, Mahomet le Conquérant, p. 365; G. Scarcia, "Venezia e la Persia tra Uzun Hasan e Tahmāsp, 1454-1572," Acta Iranica, 3 (1974): 421-422.

²²Guglielmo Berchet, La Repubblica di Venezia e la Persia (Torino: Tipografia G. B. Paravia e Comp., 1865), pp. 3-4.

²³G. Berchet, Venezia e la Persia, p. 6.

Despina Khātūn, to Iran for the implementation of the project.²⁴ As shown by later events, this generated the arming of one hundred galleys and the provision of the Aq Qoyunlu forces with artillery. The plan also called for Uzun Ḥasan to open a corridor through Karaman or preferably through Syria as a prelude to a coordinated attack against the Ottomans by land and by sea.²⁵

The Aq Qoyunlu ruler began the execution of this plan by ordering a two-front offensive against the Ottomans. Part of his army attacked the Ottoman domains in eastern Anatolia and succeeded in capturing Tokat²⁶, while another marched toward Karaman.²⁷ Despite the inclusion of the fugitive Karamanlı prince Pīr Ahmad's supporters within this army, it was utterly defeated by the Ottomans in August 1472 when it was pressed to give battle before the arrival of the Venetians.²⁸ Following this defeat in Karaman, Uzun Ḥasan attempted to open a corridor through Syria and raided al-Bīrah and al-Ruhā (modern Urfa, also known in medieval Christian sources as Edessa). However, these attacks only clouded his relations with the Mamluks who

²⁴Ibid., pp. 6-7.

²⁵Barbaro, "Travels of Josafa Barbaro," in Travels in Tana and Persia, translated by Lord Stanley of Alderly (London: The Hakluyt Society, 1873), pp. 37-39; Berchet, Venezia e la Persia, pp. 8-13.

²⁶Ḥasan-i Rūmlū, Aḥsan al-Tavārīkh, in: Abū Bakr Tihriānī, Diyārbakrīyah, 2:567.

²⁷Ibid., p. 556.

²⁸Hammer-Purgstall, Histoire de l'Empire Ottoman, 3:140-150; Babinger, Mahomet le Conquérant, pp. 370-371.

were able to defend their domains.²⁹ The Venetian fleet reached the coasts of Karaman after the end of these events and busied itself with the petty seizure of some coastal outposts.³⁰

The failure of the Venetian project compelled Uzun Ḥasan to seek other alternatives. He attempted to create another front in Europe aimed at diverting Ottoman efforts. For this purpose, he dispatched envoys to Matthias Corvinus (1458-90), king of Hungary, bidding him to open hostilities against the Turk. Unfortunately for him, these ambassadors were apprehended by the Ottomans and presented to Sultan Mehmed II.³¹ This incident might have been behind Mehmed II's decision to cut short Uzun Ḥasan's meddling in the affairs of Anatolia. On 16 Rabī^c I 878/11 August 1473, the Ottomans struck a heavy blow to the Aq Qoyunlus, defeating them at Terjan.³²

This defeat marked the end of Uzun Ḥasan's ambitions and allowed the Ottomans to further tighten their grip over the Anatolian peninsula by incorporating the province of Karaman within their dominions, in 880/1475.

B. Ottoman - Mamluk Rivalry over the Taurus area.

The Ottomans succeeded in keeping the Mamluks at bay in their feud with the Aq Qoyunlus and at warding off a potential alliance between their two adversaries. The Mamluks' neutral stand constituted

²⁹Ibn Iyās, Badā'i^c al-Zuhūr, edited by Muhammad Mustafā (Cairo: Dār Ihyā' al-Kutub al-^cArabīyah, 1963), 3:80-87.

³⁰Barbaro, "Travels," pp. 37-43; Babinger, Mahomet le Conquérant, pp. 379-380.

³¹On 13 September 1472. Babinger, Mahomet le Conquérant, p. 367.

³²Neşri, Cihan-Nūma, 1:808-823; Ibn Kemāl, Tevārīh-i Āl-i Osmān, p. 396; John E. Woods, The Aqquyunlu, pp. 131-132, states that this battle was fought at Bashkent, modern Başköy.

only a short but peaceful interlude in a long conflict which had opposed them to the Ottomans over the control of the Taurus, a strategic area which was at the crossroads of important trade routes linking Syria and the Upper Euphrates to Anatolia. There, the province of Dulḡadīr, which was under Mamluk suzerainty, became increasingly subject to Ottoman meddlings.

The Mamluks had to reckon with the rulers of this province. In 870/1465, the Mamluk sultan Khūshqadam (865-72/1461-67) instigated the murder of Aṣṡān, the ruler of Dulḡadīr, and replaced him with his brother Būḡāq, a more reliable ally.³³ Another Dulḡadīr brother, Shah Savār, took this opportunity to claim the succession. The Ottomans did not hesitate in lending support to this pretender. This backing enabled Shah Savār to meet with success in his confrontation against his rival brother who had no choice but to flee to the Mamluk court.³⁴ Despite the sending of several expeditions into Dulḡadīr territory, the Mamluks failed to reinstate immediately their suzerainty over the province.³⁵

On the Ottoman side, Sultan Mehmed II was planning for his impending campaign against the Aq Qoyunlus. In the midst of these preparations, he deemed it wise to relinquish his support for Shah Savār as a means to cultivate the friendship of the Mamluks. This

³³Ibn Taghrībirdī, al-Nujūm al-Zāhirah, edited by Jamāl al-Dīn al-Shayyāl and Fahīm Muḡammad Shaltūt (Cairo: al-Hay'ah al-Miṣrīyah al-^cAmmah lil-Kitāb, 1972), 16:345.

³⁴According to Ibn Taghrībirdī, the Mamluk governor of Syria--by the name of Burd Beg al-Zāhirī--sided with Shah Savār; see Ibid., p. 362. For these events see: Ibn Iyās, Kitāb Tārīkh Miṣr. al-Mashhūr bi-Badā'i'c al-Zuhūr (Būlāq: al-Maḡba^cah al-Amīrīyah, 1894), 2:109-117.

³⁵The narrative of these expeditions is found in: Ibn Iyās, Badā'i'c al-Zuhūr, (M. Muṣṡafā edition), 3:7-15, 19-51, 56-60, 69 and 73-74.

stand allowed Yashbak al-Zāhirī, the commander of the Mamluk expedition which left Cairo in 875/1471, to capture the rebellious Shah Savār and bring him to Cairo to meet death by hanging and be exposed at the notorious gate of Bāb Zuwaylah.³⁶ This change of Ottoman policy became evident when an ambassador of Mehmed II arrived in Dulḡadīr territory to meet with the commander of the Mamluk expedition. He was relaying assurances of Mehmed's readiness to help the Mamluk army with food supplies, if needed.³⁷ Later, an Ottoman envoy arrived in Cairo with copies of the intercepted messages between Uzun ḡasan and Venice, showing evidence of an anti-Ottoman alliance.³⁸ The Mamluks, despite the suspicion that the Ottomans might turn against them once successful against the Aq Qoyunlus, elected to adopt a neutral stand.³⁹ They also took advantage of Uzun ḡasan's preoccupation with the war to settle a number of minor border questions through an embassy sent to his capital Tabriz.⁴⁰

Ottoman - Mamluk relations took a turn for the worse during the reign of Mehmed's son and successor, Bayezid II (886-918/1481-1512), when Qāyṡbāy (872-901/1468-96) interfered in his feud with his brother Jem. The latter -- then governor of Karaman -- laid claim to the Sultanate but was defeated and fled to the Mamluks who received him

³⁶A contemporary account is found in: Ibn Ajā, Tārīkh al-Amīr Yashbak al-Zāhirī, edited by ^cAbd al-Qādir Aḡmad ṡulaymāt (Cairo: Dār al-Fikr al-^cArabī, n.d.), pp. 130-160.

³⁷Ibid., p. 142.

³⁸Ibn Iyās, Badā'i'c al-Zuhūr, 3:87.

³⁹Ibid.

⁴⁰Ibn Ajā, Tārīkh Yashbak, pp. 95-112. Ibn Ajā headed this embassy.

with full honors (886/1481). A year later, he crossed into Karaman after securing Mamluk support but met with utter failure. Jem then sailed to the island of Rhodes where he was welcomed by Pierre d'Aubusson, Master of the Knights of St. John.⁴¹

Other factors contributed to the deterioration of Ottoman - Mamluk relations: Bayezid II reacted to Sultan Qāyṭbāy's bellicose stand by supporting Dulgadıṛ's ruler °Alā al-Dawlah (also known as °Alī Dawlāt) who succeeded in removing his pro-Mamluk brother. The Ottoman sultan also encouraged him to raid Mamluk territory, thus bringing about a similar reaction of the Mamluks who initiated attacks against Ottoman outposts in southern Karaman.⁴² Moreover, the Mamluk governor of Jedda seized the presents that the envoy of the Bahmanid Muḥammad Shah (867-87/1463-82), a ruler of India, brought with him on his way to the Ottoman court.⁴³ These incidents led to open hostilities: first, the Mamluks had to dispatch a number of expeditions to Dulgadıṛ province against the Ottoman-backed °Alā

⁴¹ See for example: Ibn Iyās, *Badā'i'c al-Zuhūr*, 3:183-185, 195; Solakzade, *Tarih*, pp. 279-283. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to discuss the whereabouts of Jem and the intense diplomatic activity it caused. The reader might find in the following works further information: E. Charrière, *Négociations de la France dans le Levant* (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1848), 1:CXXIV-CXXVIII; Vladimir Lamansky, *Secrets d'Etat de Venise* (New York: Burt Franklin, 1968 Reprint), 1:201-242; S.N. Fisher "Civil Strife in the Ottoman Empire, 1481-1503," *Journal of Modern History*, (13 December 1941): 449-456, and V.L. Ménage, "The Mission of an Ottoman Secret Agent in France in 1486," *JRAS* (1965): 112-132.

⁴² Solakzade, *Tarih*, pp. 295-297.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 295; Ibn Iyās, *Badā'i'c al-Zuhūr*, 3:215. Mamluk suzerainty extended to the Hijāz during the rule of Barsbāy (825-41/1422-37) who, by 828/1425, established a garrison in Jedda, a port which then competed with Aden as a terminus for the ships of India. Ibn Taghrībirdī, *Nujūm*, 14:271-272.

al-Dawlah.⁴⁴ Second, the border skirmishes developed into intermittent wars: Ottoman and Mamluk forces became entangled in frequent clashes from 888/1484 to 896/1491.⁴⁵ The only salient event of this period was the eventual siding of °Alā al-Dawlah with the Mamluks.⁴⁶ At last, the mediation of the Ḥafsid ruler of Tunis,⁴⁷ Abū °Umar °Uthmān (839-93/1435-88), and of the Ottoman theologian Shaykh (or Mullā) °Arab paved the way for peace. An agreement between the two antagonists was finally reached in 896/1491.⁴⁸

The outcome of the Ottoman - Mamluk conflict over the Taurus area resulted in no territorial changes and maintained the *status quo ante*. Nevertheless, it aggravated the financial woes of the Mamluk empire, since the soaring military expenditures "totally depleted the state coffers."⁴⁹

About a quarter of a century after the 896/1491 treaty between Bayezid II and Qāyṭbāy, the Ottomans were able to renew hostilities, not to limit them to the Taurus area but to carry them to the heart of the Mamluk empire. Their conquest of Syria and Egypt in 922/1516-17 was dictated by the long rivalry over the control of the Turkomans of the Taurus region in addition to other geopolitical considerations

⁴⁴ Ibn Iyās, *Badā'i'c al-Zuhūr*, 3:202-203; 206, 210, 213 and 220.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 213-219, 226, 229-230, 251 and 255-266; Ibn Ṭulūn, *Mufākahat al-Khillān fī Ḥawādith al-Zamān*, edited by Muḥammad Mustafā (Cairo: al-Mu'assasah al-Misriyah lil-Ta'lif wa al-Tarjamah wa al-Ṭibā'ah wa al-Nashr, 1962), 1:70-80, 92-98.

⁴⁶ Ibn Ṭulūn, *Mufākahat al-Khillān*, 1:107.

⁴⁷ Solakzade, *Tarih*, pp. 303-304.

⁴⁸ Ibn Ṭulūn, *Mufākahat al-Khillān*, 1:132, 138-141; Ibn Iyās, *Badā'i'c al-Zuhūr*, 3:281-282.

⁴⁹ Ibn Iyās, *Badā'i'c al-Zuhūr*, 3:278.

which will be studied later in this work. In this respect, the prophecies of Sultan Barqūq (784-801/1382-99) and of the famous historian Ibn Khaldūn (d. 808/1406) that the Ottomans constituted a deadly threat to the Mamluk empire, became a reality.⁵⁰

C. The Impact of the Ottoman Expansion on International Trade.

The Ottoman ascendancy in the second half of the fifteenth century had a great impact on trade between East and West. The enhancement of the geopolitical stature of the empire placed the Ottomans in control of most of the land routes between Asia and Europe, while their domination of the Bosphorus enabled them to influence the flow of trade between these two continents as well as between the Black Sea and the Aegean. This was viewed as an inauspicious development by the Ottomans' Muslim neighbors and by the Italian merchant republics.

The Anatolian peninsula had distinctive eminence with regard to commercial exchanges between Iran and Syria on the one hand, and Turkey and Europe on the other. A number of caravan routes originated in western Iran and Syria and crossed the Anatolian highlands before converging on the main emporia within the Ottoman empire.

Although they considered the Ottoman hegemony over Asia Minor a menace, the Mamluks were in a position that was less vulnerable than

⁵⁰ Ibn Hajar al-ʿAsqalānī, *Inbāʾ al-Ghumr bi-Anbāʾ al-ʿUmr*, edited by Ḥasan Ḥabashī (Cairo: al-Majlis al-ʿAḥadī lil-Shuʿūn al-Islāmiyah, 1969), 1:492, quotes Barqūq as saying: "I do not fear Tīmūr because everyone will help me against him; however, I fear Ibn ʿUthmān (the Ottomans)". The same author mentions that he often heard Ibn Khaldūn say: "The kingdom of Egypt should fear (for its existence) only Ibn ʿUthmān (the Ottomans)."

that of the Aq Qoyunlus because of their reliance to a great extent on their mediterranean ports for their commercial exchanges with the West. However, they entertained an active commerce with Anatolia through the important route which linked Damascus to Konya and Bursa. It was this route that Bertrandon de la Brocquière took on his way to Turkey.⁵¹ This was also the same route that caravans of Ottoman subjects followed on their pilgrimage to the Holy Places in Mecca and Medina.

Unlike Syria, Iran's economic posture became precarious as a result of Ottoman supremacy in Anatolia. Iran was an important transit center for trade between China⁵² and India⁵³ on the one hand and the Black Sea and southern Europe on the other.⁵⁴ After the virtual closing of this country to the European merchant following the fall of the Il-Khāns in 736/1336 and the breakdown of the "Pax

⁵¹ La Brocquière, "The Travels of Bertrandon de la Brocquière, 1432-1433," in *Early Travels in Palestine*, translated and edited by Thomas Wright (London: Henry G. Bohn, 1848), pp. 307-341.

⁵² Clavijo, *Narrative of the Embassy of Ruy Gonzales de Clavijo to the Court of Timour at Samarcand, A.D. 1403-6*, translated by Clements R. Markham (London: The Hakluyt Society, 1859), p. 75.

⁵³ See: Pedro Teixeira, *The Travels of Pedro Teixeira; with his "Kings of Harmuz" and Extracts from his "Kings of Persia,"* translated and annotated by William F. Sinclair, with notes by Donald Ferguson (London: The Hakluyt Society, 1902), pp. 168-190; Duarte Barbosa, *The Book of Duarte Barbosa*, translated and edited by Mansel Longworth Dames (London: The Hakluyt Society, 1918), 1:68-81 and 91-97. Among modern sources, the following works of Jean Aubin are of importance: "Les Princes d'Ormuz du XIII^e au XV^e Siècle," *JA* 241 (1953):77-138; "Cojeatar et Albuquerque," in *Mare Luso-Indicum* (Paris: Droz, 1971), 1:99-109; "Le Royaume d'Ormuz au début de XVI^e Siècle," in *Mare Luso-Indicum*, (Paris: Droz, 1973), 2:77-179.

⁵⁴ Contarini, "Travels," in *A Narrative of Italian Travels in Persia in the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries*, edited and translated by Ch. Grey (London: The Hakluyt Society, 1873), pp. 138-164.

Mongolica," Iran's external commerce came to depend on land routes which were largely beyond the control of its rulers.

The Anatolian routes played a prominent role in Iran's commercial exchanges and their importance was one of the underlying factors in the conflict between Uzun Hasan and Mehmed II. The Aq Qoyunlu capital of Tabrīz was connected to Anatolia by several routes: the Tabrīz-Trabzon route passed through Khūy, Akhlāt, Kharpūt, Erzerum and Bāybūrt,⁵⁵ while another took a northwestern direction before reaching Bursa, the former Ottoman capital.⁵⁶ A third route joined Tabrīz with Konya, the capital of Karaman, through Sivas, Kayseri and Aksaray.⁵⁷ A parallel route started at Konya and reached Tabrīz after passing through the domains of the Ramazan Oğulları, who were Mamluk vassals, as well as through Mārdīn and Khūy.⁵⁸ In addition to these itineraries, other routes linked Tabrīz to Syria,⁵⁹ India,⁶⁰

⁵⁵On the importance of the Tabrīz-Trabzon trade route, see: Barbaro, "Travels," pp. 83-86.

⁵⁶Halil Inalcık, "Bursa XV. Asır Sanayı ve Ticaret Tarihine Dair Vesikalar," Bellekten, 24 (January, 1960): 50-52.

⁵⁷A. S. Erzi, "Akkoyunlu ve Karakoyunlu Tarihi Hakkında Araştırmalar," Bellekten 18 (April 1954): 216-217.

⁵⁸Barbaro, "Travels," pp. 46-51.

⁵⁹Halil Inalcık, "The Ottoman Economic Mind and Aspects of the Ottoman Economy," in Studies in the Economic History of the Middle East, edited by M. A. Cook (London: Oxford University Press, 1970), p. 211. The importance of al-Ruhā and al-Bīrah for the control of communications between Syria and Iran explains the many attacks to which these two places were subjected in the fifteenth century, chiefly during the rule of Uzun Hasan. See: Ibn Iyās, Badā'i al-Zuhūr, 3:80-86.

⁶⁰India was reached overland through the passes of Tirmīz and Bāmiyān and mostly by sea through Hormuz. Barbaro, "Travels," pp. 80-83, and note 53.

China⁶¹ and the island of Hormuz,⁶² respectively, while a trans-Caucasian route reached the Georgian port of Astrakhan near the mouth of the Volga. From Astrakhan, a merchant could either follow the river up to Moscow or take the road to Tana and Caffa in the Crimea.⁶³

Genoa held a favorable position in the Black Sea area since the signing of the treaty of Nymphaeum (13 March 1261) with the Byzantine emperor Michael VIII Paleologus (1259-82),⁶⁴ while its rival, Venice, specialized in trade with the Levant where the Mamluk empire was its chief partner. Foreseeing the fall of Constantinople as a fait accompli, the Genoese of Galata hastened to declare their neutrality to Mehmed II during the siege of the city.⁶⁵ In the summer of 1453, the Genoese Gattilusi family, which had jurisdiction over a number of islands in the Aegean, dispatched a delegation to the sultan to present the family's congratulations and to seek his recognition of its rights over those possessions. Mehmed II agreed to maintain the status quo ante in exchange for a three thousand Ducat annual

⁶¹Clavijo, Embassy to Timour, p. 173; Barbaro, "Travels," p. 75.

⁶²Hormuz was connected with the emporia of the Asiatic mainland, especially the cities of Tabrīz and Sulṭāniyah, through a route joining Lar, Shiraz, Yazd, Isfahān, Kāshān, Qum and Sāvah. Barbaro, "Travels," pp. 80-83; Nikitin, "The Travels of Athanasius Nikitin of Tver," in India in the Fifteenth Century, translated and edited by R.H. Major (London: The Hakluyt Society, 1857), p. 31.

⁶³Ibid., Contarini, "Travels," pp. 138-158; on the segment to Darband, see: Barbaro, "Travels," pp. 86-89.

⁶⁴W. Heyd, Histoire du Commerce du Levant au Moyen Age (Amsterdam: Adolf M. Hakkert, 1959), 1:428-430.

⁶⁵Doukas, Decline and Fall of Byzantium to the Ottoman Turks, translated and annotated by Harry J. Magoulias (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1975), p. 218.

tribute.⁶⁶ However, this respite given to Genoa was shortlived: between the years 1455 and 1458, the Ottomans undertook a series of naval expeditions which resulted in the annexation of most of those Aegean domains. Four years later, in 1462, Lemnos fell in turn to the Sultan. Chios was operated by the Mahona (the Genoese merchant company) and had been paying an annual tribute of six thousand Ducats to the Ottomans.⁶⁷

Venetian possessions within the defunct Byzantine empire met a similar fate. The Republic of St. Mark had eagerly secured a commercial agreement with the Sultan, dated 18 April 1454, despite its previous support of the Byzantines.⁶⁸ However, Venetian colonies in the Morea, notably Naxos, Negroponte, Coron, Modon, Lepanto, Navarino and Argos, soon became a source of friction in Venetian - Ottoman relations.⁶⁹ Mehmed II's reduction of the Duchy of Athens and the subsequent incorporation of the Morean domains of his vassals, the Paleologi brothers Demetrius and Thomas, increased the vulnerability of the Venetian possessions in the area.⁷⁰ In 1463, the Ottomans

⁶⁶J. Heers, Gênes au XV^e Siècle (Paris: S.E.V.P.E.N., 1961), p. 587; Heyd, Histoire du Commerce, 2:313; Runciman, The Fall of Constantinople, p. 168.

⁶⁷Heyd, Histoire du Commerce, 1:320-322; Hammer-Purgstall, Histoire de l'Empire Ottoman, 3:8. Chios withstood several attacks of the Ottoman fleet until its fall in 974/1566, at the end of Sultan Sulayman's reign (926-74/1520-66). Ibid., 4:304-305.

⁶⁸Heyd, Histoire du Commerce, 2:315-317; P. Daru, Histoire de la République de Venise (Paris: Firmin Didot, 1821), 2:510-514.

⁶⁹Hammer-Purgstall, Histoire de l'Empire Ottoman, 3:17.

⁷⁰For these campaigns, see: Kritovoulos, Mehmed the Conqueror, pp. 126-136 and 151-159; Doukas, Decline and Fall, pp. 257-258.

seized the opportunity of a minor incident caused by the defection to Coron of a slave of the Pasha of Athens and began launching raids against Venetian establishments in the Morea.⁷¹ The resulting warfare ended with the signing of the peace treaty of 26 January 1479, by which Venice conceded Negroponte and paid reparations.⁷² Nevertheless, the Ottomans viewed the Venetian presence in the Morea as an obstacle to their expansion in the Adriatic and the Aegean. In 1498, Venice sanctioned France's project for the annexation of Milan in exchange for a joint anti-Ottoman alliance. News of the ongoing negotiations led to the formation of a rival coalition directed by Florence.⁷³ Sultan Bayezid II took advantage of this freshly created rift among the Franks and initiated an extensive campaign against the Venetian domains in the Morea and Dalmatia. Despite the securing of French naval aid and the opening of a second front against the Ottomans through Hungary,⁷⁴ the Republic of St. Mark was unable to withstand its enemy. Bayezid II captured most of the Morea, including

⁷¹Daru, Histoire de Venise, 2:563-565, thinks that this incident was planned by the Ottomans. He shows that Valaresso, who gave refuge to the slave, fled to the Ottomans during the war. For a review of these wars, see: Ibid., pp. 562-600; Heyd, Histoire du Commerce, 2:324-329.

⁷²Daru, Histoire de Venise, 2:600; M. Belin, "Relations Diplomatiques de la République de Venise avec la Turquie," JA (November-December 1876): 385-388. Heyd, Histoire du Commerce, 2:327, states that Venice paid 10,000 Ducats annually for the rights of trade within the Ottoman empire.

⁷³A summary of these events could be found in: S. N. Fisher, The Foreign Relations of Turkey, 1481-1512 (Urbana, Ill.: The University of Illinois Press, 1948), pp. 60-65.

⁷⁴Venice was able to lure Hungary to declare war against the Ottomans in August 1500. Fisher, Foreign Relations of Turkey, p. 76.

such key outposts as Modon, Coron and Lepanto.⁷⁵ Venice finally acknowledged Ottoman sovereignty over the Morea by agreeing to the peace treaty of 14 December 1502.⁷⁶

At the close of the fifteenth century, the Ottomans prevailed in Anatolia, Greece and the Aegean. Only the islands of Chios and Rhodes, respectively under the control of the Genoese and the Knights of St. John, were able to put up strong resistance. Ottoman attempts to set a foothold on the northern littoral of the Black Sea were first met with failure. There, Stephen the Great, the prince of Moldavia, put up strong resistance and defeated the invaders (January 1475).⁷⁷ This success temporarily saved from falling into Ottoman hands the two key outposts in Kilia and Akkerman, where the trade routes linking Moldavia with central Europe originated.⁷⁸

During the same year, unexpected developments took place in the Crimea. A number of local princes who had been discontented with the meddling of Genoa in their internal affairs since the death of Ḥājī

⁷⁵ Heyd, Histoire du Commerce, 2:330-331. See the text of the Fathnāmāh sent by Bayezid II and its French translation in: George Vajda, "Un Bulletin de Victoire de Bajazet," JA (1948): 87-102.

⁷⁶ Hammer-Purgstall, Histoire de l'Empire Ottoman, 4:74; Fisher, Foreign Relations of Turkey, pp. 83-88. Heyd, Histoire du Commerce, 2:331, dates the treaty to 10 August 1503.

⁷⁷ Georges Bratianu, La Mer Noire des Origines à la Conquête Ottomane (Monachii: Societatea Academica Romana, 1969), pp. 322-323; Șerban Papacostea, "Venise et les Pays Roumains au Moyen Age," in Venezia e il Levante fino al Secolo XV, 1:613-614.

⁷⁸ Akkerman was the name used by the Turks. It was also known as Maurocastron or Moncastron. It is presently known as Citatea-Alba or Belgorod Dniestrovskij. See: Marie Nystazopoulou Pelekidis, "Venise et la Mer Noire du XI^e au XV^e Siècle," in Venezia e il Levante fino al Secolo XV, 1:573; Bratianu, La Mer Noire des Origines à la Conquête Ottomane, p. 322.

Ghirāy in 871/1466,⁷⁹ called on the Ottomans for help. Mehmed II seized this opportunity and ordered his fleet to set sail for the Crimea. On 31 May 1475, the Ottoman flag was fluttering outside Caffa which surrendered a week later. Soon, the whole peninsula with its other emporia in Tana and Sudak (Soldaia) came under the suzerainty of the Sultan.⁸⁰ Genoa, which considered the Crimea its major establishment in the Black Sea, lost its privileged position. The Crimea soon became a base for Ottoman expansion along the northern shores of the Black Sea. In the summer of 1484, the Ottoman army crossed the Danube and laid siege to Kilia, while the fleet blockaded the port of Akkerman. Both cities surrendered after heavy bombardment.⁸¹ This event finally brought the Black Sea under Ottoman sway. The ports of Kilia and Akkerman, located respectively on the Danube and the Dniester, were of prime importance: they were considered the gates to the European hinterland and played an important role in commercial exchanges between the Black Sea ports. Sultan Bayezid II viewed them as "the gate to Moldavia, Poland, Wallachia and Hungary."⁸² These two ports were connected to the

⁷⁹ Until 1430, the Crimea was part of the Golden Horde. In that year, its ruler, Ḥājī Ghirāy, a descendant of Jenghis Khan, declared his independence. Bratianu, La Mer Noire des Origines à la Conquête Ottomane, p. 304.

⁸⁰ Ibid., pp. 323-325; Heyd, Histoire du Commerce, 2:400-402; M. Cazacu and K. Kevonian, "La Chute de Caffa en 1475 à la Lumière de Nouveaux Documents," CMRS 17 (1976): 495-538.

⁸¹ Bratianu, La Mer Noire des Origines à la Conquête Ottomane, pp. 325-326; Șerban Papacostea, "Venise et les Pays Roumains au Moyen Age," p. 624.

⁸² Bratianu, La Mer Noire des Origines à la Conquête Ottomane, p. 326; Nicoara Beldiceanu, "La Moldavie Ottomane à la Fin du XV^e Siècle et au Début du XVI^e Siècle," REL, 3 (1969): 239-241.

important Polish trade center of Lwow and to Brasso in Transylvania.⁸³
The Ottomans already were in control of another route which started at Adrianople (Edirne) and reached Germany and Western Europe. This itinerary was followed by de la Brocquière in 1434 on his return journey to France: after leaving Adrianople he arrived at Sofia, then reached Belgrade. There, he followed the road to Buda, the capital of Hungary, before finally approaching Austria and Germany.⁸⁴

The Ottoman expansion in the aftermath of the conquest of Constantinople (Istanbul) was dictated by territorial, political and economic imperatives. This represented a threat to the Ottomans' Muslim neighbors in Asia as well as to the traditional adversaries in Europe. The bellicose reaction of the Aq Qoyunlu and Mamluk rulers illustrated their common fear of the impact of Ottoman hegemony in Asia Minor upon their own realms. It was within this framework that Uzun Hasan attempted to prevent Mehmed II from taking over Trabzon and Karaman, while Qaytbay struggled to thwart the Mamluk dominions in the Taurus area from falling into Bayezid's hands. On the European side, the events of the second half of the fifteenth century weakened the position of Venice and Genoa, and allowed the Ottomans to seize or tighten their grip over commercially strategic outposts in the Black Sea, the Adriatic and Aegean Seas. Despite these gains, the Ottoman

⁸³ Bratianu, *La Mer Noire des Origines à la Conquête Ottomane*, p. 327; Paul Sigismund Pach, "La Route du Poivre vers la Hongrie Médiévale," in *Mélanges en l'Honneur de Fernand Braudel* (Paris: Privat, 1971) 1:449-458.

⁸⁴ La Brocquière, "Travels," pp. 343-380.

empire was shaken in the first years of the sixteenth century by abrupt upheavals: the rise of the Safavid dynasty in Iran caused a deep political and religious rift with the Ottomans and threatened the internal stability of their empire, a situation which was at the origins of the Ottoman - Safavid conflict.

CHAPTER TWO

THE ORIGINS AND RISE OF THE SAFAVIDS

At the turn of the sixteenth century, Iran was raked by sweeping developments which were to affect deeply the future of that country as well as that of the Islamic world west of India and east of the Maghrib. Shah Ismā'īl I succeeded in eliminating the power of the Aq Qoyunlus and in putting under his sway various petty rulers, thereby laying the foundation of the Safavid dynasty. Shah Ismā'īl's ascension to supreme power in Iran constituted a unique phenomenon, for he was both a religious and a political leader. Although only in his teens at the time of his coronation, he was viewed by many of his supporters as a semi-divine figure. On the other hand, the historical Shah Ismā'īl was the hereditary leader of the Safavid Sūfī ṭarīqah¹ (mystic order). The roots of the Safavid dynasty could therefore be traced to the process of the conversion of the Sūfī religious order at Ardabīl into a successful political force.

The Safavid claim to power had begun to emerge under Junayd (851-64/1447-60), Shah Ismā'īl's grandfather. He had the support of

¹On Sūfism and ṭarīqah, see the articles of Louis Massignon, "Tarīka," EI¹, 4:667-672 and "Ṭasawwuf," EI¹ 4:681-685. Massignon defines ṭasawwuf as the "act of devoting oneself to mystic life." J.S. Trimingham, The Sūfī Orders in Islam (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1971), especially pp. 31-36 and 133-217; S.H. Nasr, Sūfī Essays (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1973).

an army of followers, the majority of whom were Turkomans who dwelt in a wide area which included parts of Anatolia and Syria. Their fanatical religious beliefs were exploited by Junayd and his successors to secure political gains. When in power, Shah Ismā'īl adopted the doctrine of Imāmī/Twelve Shi'ism as the state religion of Iran. The institution of Shi'ism in Iran created a rift--if not a deep schism--within the Islamic world, at a time when the Portuguese penetration into the Indian Ocean signalled a successful offensive of the Christian West against the economic interests of the Muslim East.² Safavid Iran became an enclave governed by Shi'ites and surrounded by powerful Sunnī potentates, namely the Uzbeks in Transoxania, the Ottomans in Anatolia and the Balkans, and the Mamluks in Syria and Egypt. Of these three, the Ottomans and the Uzbeks posed a real and immediate menace to the survival of the newly born dynasty. The Ottomans gained ascendancy in the northwest following their capture of Constantinople in 857/1453, after which they embarked on a successful expansionist policy in both Anatolia and the Balkans. To the east, the Uzbeks, who had wrested power from the Timūrids, considered themselves heirs to Chengiz Khan, and started an offensive against their neighbors which brought them into a long conflict with the Safavids over the control of the province of Khurāsān. In the west, the Mamluk empire presented no immediate threat to the Safavids. Its

²It is outside the scope of this work to discuss the Portuguese thrust into the Indian Ocean. In regard to their capture of the Island of Hormuz in the Persian Gulf and their relations with the early Safavids, the reader might refer to the following recent studies: J. Aubin, "Cojeatar et Albuquerque," pp. 77-179. See also R. B. Smith, The First Age of the Portuguese Embassies, Navigations, and Peregrinations in Persia (1507-1524) (Bethesda, Maryland: Decatur Press, 1970).

Sultans had adopted a conciliatory policy toward the new rulers of Iran, partly because of the deteriorating situation of the empire, but mostly in an effort to gain a new ally against the Ottomans.

The history of Safavid Iran in the sixteenth century was predominantly marked by an intensified struggle against the Ottomans on the one hand and an unremitting fight with the Uzbeks on the other. Whereas the Safavid-Uzbek conflict became the object of study by a modern Iranologist, Martin Dickson³, little attention has been paid by historians to the early developments in Ottoman-Safavid relations.⁴ The remainder of the present study is intended as an attempt to fill this gap in the annals of Ottoman-Safavid relations. In this context, a brief survey of the Safavid religious order and the process of its development into a major political movement will be made, with particular reference to the rise of Shah Ismā'īl and the impact of this event on the relations between Iran and the Ottoman empire.

A. The Sūfī Order at Ardabīl.

The eponym of the Safavids is Shaykh Ṣafī al-Dīn Ishāq (d.732/1334), the founder of a Sūfī ṭarīqah in Ardabīl, a town located

³Martin B. Dickson, "Shāh Tahmāsb and the Uzbeks (The Duel for Khurāsān with 'Ubayd Khan: 930-946/1524-1540)" (Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University, 1958).

⁴Except for the articles of Jean-Louis Bacqué-Grammont, Attaché de Recherche au Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (Paris) and editor of Turcica, who informed me in 1976 that he was preparing a doctoral dissertation under the supervision of Professor Claude Cahen on the early development of Ottoman-Safavid relations (to 1514).

in Āzarbāyjan.⁵ Although belonging to a wealthy family, he renounced worldly interests and elected mysticism as a way of life. His initiation was at the hands of Shaykh Tāj al-Dīn Ibrāhīm Zāhidī (615-700/1218-1301), whom he joined at the village of Hilyah Karān in Gilān.⁶ His relationship with his murshid⁷ was enhanced by his marriage to Shaykh Zāhidī's daughter. After returning to his native Ardabīl, Shaykh Ṣafī al-Dīn attracted a large following. Twenty years later and after the death of his father-in-law and mentor, Shaykh Ṣafī founded his own Sūfī order which became known as the Safaviyah (or Safavid order).⁸ The fame he gained in his lifetime was echoed in the works of two of his contemporaries. First, the geographer and historian Ḥamd Allāh Mustāwfī Qazvīnī (d. 750/1349) who, in his Tārīkh-i Guzīdah, stated that this Sūfī Shaykh possessed a large following, and that the great influence he wielded among the Mongols protected the population from any abuse.⁹ In his geographical work

⁵For a description of Ardabīl, see: Fakhr al-Dīn Mūsavī-Ardabīlī Najafī, Tārīkh-i Ardabīl va Dānishmandān (Najaf: Maṭba'at al-Ādāb, 1968), 1:10-31; Laurence Lockhart, Persian Cities (London: Luzac and Co., 1960), pp. 51-57.

⁶Ibn Bazzāz, Safwat al-Safā done by Ahmad ibn Karīm Tabrizī (Bombay: Lithographed, 1911), pp. 12 and 23-26; idem, Leiden MS, fol. 9a. Ḥusayn ibn Abdāl Zāhidī, Silsilat al-Nasab Safaviyah (Berlin: Intishārāt-i Irānshahr, 1924), p. 24; Khwāndamīr, Ḥabīb al-Siyar fī Akhbār al-Bashar, edited by Humā'ī (Tehran: Khayyām, 1975), 4:413-415; Najafī, Tārīkh-i Ardabīl, 1:263-346. On the location of Hilyah Karān, see: Minorsky, "A Mongol Decree of 720/1320 to the Family of Shaykh Zāhid," BSOAS 16 (1954): 520-522.

⁷Murshid means "guide"; while murīd is synonymous with disciple. In Sufism, murshid became the equivalent of Master, "Shaykh". See: Trimmingham, Sūfī Orders, pp. 3, 13, 136 n. 2 and 166-193.

⁸Ibn Bazzāz, Safwat al-Safā, (Bombay), pp. 42-50; Khwāndamīr, Ḥabīb al-Siyar 4:415-419; and Zāhidī, Silsilat al-Nasab, p. 28.

⁹Ḥamd Allāh Mustāwfī Qazvīnī, Tārīkh-i Guzīdah, (Selected History), edited by 'Abd al-Ḥusayn Navā'ī (Tehran: Amīr Kabīr, 1960), p. 675.

Nuzhat al-Qulūb, the same author reported that the majority of the population of Ardabil practiced Shāfi'ism and were followers of Shaykh Ṣafī.¹⁰ Another contemporary, the famous historian as well as a statesman of the Mongol period, Rashīd al-Dīn Ṭabīb (d. 718/1318), revealed in his correspondence the reverence he and the Mongol authorities had for the Ṣafavid religious leader.¹¹ Thus, the Ṣafavīyah was viewed at its inception as a Ṣūfī order within the framework of Sunni Islam. It was not until later that crosscurrents surfaced.

The death of Shaykh Ṣafī signalled the start of various claims as to his genealogy and teachings. The main biographical work about him is Ṣafwat al-Ṣafa, completed in 759/1358. Its author, Ibn Bazzāz, was a disciple of Shaykh Ṣadr al-Dīn Mūsā (735-94/1334-91), Shaykh Ṣafī's son and successor at the head of the order. The original manuscript of this work disappeared. Extant pre-Ṣafavid copies¹² contend that Shaykh Ṣafī's genealogy can be traced to the prophet Muḥammad, thus

¹⁰ Ḥamd Allāh Mustawfī Qazvīnī, The Geographical Part of the Nuzhat al-Qulūb, Part 1, edited by Guy Le Strange (London: Luzac and Co., 1915), Pers. text, p. 81. Shāfi'ism is one of the four major "orthodox" schools of Islamic jurisprudence: J. Schacht, The Origins of Muhammadan Jurisprudence (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1950); N. Coulson, A History of Islamic Law (Edinburgh: University Press, 1964).

¹¹ Rashīd al-Dīn Ṭabīb, Mukātabāt-i Rashīdī, edited by Muhammad Sharīf (Lahore: Nashriyāt-i Kulliyah-i Panjāb, 1945), pp. 265-273 (no. 45) and 296-311 (no. 49).

¹² Those which were copied prior to the rise of the Ṣafavids. See Appendix B for details on some of them.

making him a Sayyid.¹³ This opinion prevailed for centuries until it came under close scrutiny by two modern historians: Aḥmad Kasravī Ṭabrīzī (d. 1946) and Ahmed Zeki Velidi Toḡan (b. 1890). Both authors independently reached the same conclusion: that the forebears of the Ṣafavids were descended from Iranized Kurds and bore no blood relationship to the Prophet of Islam.¹⁴ In fact, the Shī'ite leanings within the Ṣafavid order, together with the legend of the noble origin of the founder, developed later and became predominant at the time of the transformation of the order into a political force.

During the tenure of Shaykh Ṣadr al-Dīn, the Ṣafavid order expanded its membership. Its disciples and propagandists were to be found as far east as Harāt in Transoxania.¹⁵ A decree of Sultan Aḥmad Jalāyir, dated 22 Dhū'l-Qa'dah 773/16 May 1372, exempted the endowments and properties of the order from taxation.¹⁶ In that document, numerous titles were bestowed upon the Ṣūfī Shaykh, all of which indicated that his teachings were still within the framework of

¹³ The titles sayyid and sharīf refer to descent from the Prophet Muḥammad. The title sayyid is of special significance among the Shī'ites because it corresponds to a descent from Muḥammad through his daughter Fāṭimah and her husband 'Alī. In Shī'ism, the Imāms--who are all descendants of 'Alī himself--are the only rightful successors of Muḥammad. For further details, see: C. Van Arendonk, "Sharīf," EI¹, 4: 324-329.

¹⁴ See Appendix B. These views are accepted by Dihkhudā, Ṣafavīyah, Lughatnāmah, 17:255-264 (Tehran: Dānishgāh-i Tihān, 1946-).

¹⁵ Such was the case of Qāsim al-Anvār, see: R. Savory, "A 15th Century Ṣafavid Propagandist at Harāt," in American Oriental Society, Middle West Branch, Semi-Centennial Volume, edited by Dennis Sinor (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1959), pp. 189-197.

¹⁶ The original Persian text of this decree and a French translation may be found in H. Massé, "Ordonnance Rendue par le Prince Ilkhanien Ahmad Jalāyir en Faveur du Cheikh Ṣadr od-Dīn (1305-1392)," JA 230 (1938): 465-468.

Sunnī Islam.¹⁷ The famous Arab historian Ibn Khaldūn (d. 808/1406) who was a contemporary of Ṣadr al-Dīn spoke of the latter as a great Shaykh (Shaykh al-Shuyūkh), a title which emphasized his recognition as a mystic leader.¹⁸

The Ṣafavid order attained new heights under the leadership of Khwājah ʿAlī (794-830/1391-1427). Tradition maintains that he met with Tīmūr on the return of this conqueror from his Anatolian campaign of 804/1402. Tīmūr acquiesced to the request of the Ṣafavid Shaykh to free most of the captives he brought from Anatolia. These were settled in the village of Ganja-bah-Kul and later became fervent followers and staunch supporters of the Ṣafavids.¹⁹ Moreover, the Ṣafavid order received land endowments (waqf) in the villages of Talvār, Qizil Uzun, Kumrāh-i Isfahān and Hamadān.²⁰ The account of that deed would indeed confirm the expanding numbers of the Ṣafavid followers as well as the increasing needs of the Order.

Khwājah ʿAlī's decision to settle in Jerusalem following his pilgrimage to the Muslim Holy Cities of Mecca and Medina opened new horizons for the order. He became acquainted with the theologians of

¹⁷ The titles used were: شيخ الإسلام اعظم سلطان المشايخ و المحققين
قدوة السالكين ناصح الطوك و السلاطين مرشد الخلائق اجمعين

These titles only refer to Ṣadr al-Dīn as the great Ṣūfī master. Henri Massé translated these titles as follows: "(Le) grand Cheikh de l'Islam, le Sultan des cheikhs et des grands initiés, le modele des contemplatifs, le loyal conseiller des rois et des princes, le guide de toutes les créatures, le Cheikh chef de la verité, de la communauté et de la religion..." See: Massé, "Ordonnance," pp. 465-467.

¹⁸ See Ibn Khaldūn, Kitāb al-ʿIbar edited by Y. A. Dāghir (Beirut: Maktabat al-Madrasah, 1951), 5:1171.

¹⁹ Zāhidī, Silsilat, p. 48.

²⁰ Ibid.

Syria and acquired a reputation as a famous jurist and a Ṣūfī leader. The last factor contributed to the future expansion of the Order in Syria. However, Khwājah ʿAlī did not show signs of Shīʿī leanings and his teachings were within Sunnī Islam. In a biographical notice, his contemporary, the Arab historian Ibn Hajar al-ʿAsqalānī (d. 852/1449), wrote that Khwājah ʿAlī was the leader of a Ṣūfī order in "Iraq" and that his following numbered over one hundred thousand.²¹ The absence of any reference in the text to the Shaykh's leanings would imply that he showed no evident signs of Shīʿism or extremism, since Ibn Hajar did not fail to mention the heterodoxies of others.²² Another Arab historian, Muḥīr al-Dīn al-ʿUlaymī (860-927/1456-1521), writing ca. 900/1494-95, gave a fuller notice on Khwājah ʿAlī and some of his disciples in Jerusalem, which contains a number of facts deserving close attention. First, Khwājah ʿAlī was considered a famous Shaykh and a Sunnī theologian. This was confirmed by the same author in his biography of Ibn al-Ṣāʿigh, a disciple of the Ṣafavid leader. Although he was given the title of 'Khalīfah (Successor) of the Ardabīlī (i.e., of Khwājah ʿAlī),' Ibn al-Ṣāʿigh was a renowned Hanafite jurist.²³ Second, al-ʿUlaymī reported the probability of Khwājah ʿAlī's descent from ʿAlī, but did not confirm it.²⁴ This

²¹ Ibn Hajar al-ʿAsqalānī, Inbāʾ al-Ghumr bi-Anbāʾ al-ʿUmr, edited by H. Ḥabashī (Cairo: al-Majlis al-ʿAlī lil-Shuʿūn al-Islāmīyah, 1972), 3:427-428.

²² See, for example, his biography of the poet Nasīmī, who propagated the Ḥurūfī doctrine; Ibid., pp. 136-137.

²³ Muḥīr al-Dīn al-ʿUlaymī, al-Uns al-Jalīl bi-Tārīkh al-Quds wa al-Khalīl (al-Najaf: al-Maṭbaʿah al-Ḥaydarīyah, 1968): 2:236.

²⁴ Ibid., p. 169. The text states "ويقال أنه علوي" which translates: "and it is said that he was an ʿAlawī (i.e., descendant of ʿAlī)."

demonstrates that at the time of the composition of al-^cUlaymī's work, and seventy years after Khwājah ^cAlī's death, the "legend" of the ^cAlawī (or ^cAlid) origin of the Safavid leaders had begun to take root among their followers, including those in Syria. Third, Khwājah ^cAlī's stay and eventual death in Jerusalem (between 830-32/1427-29) earned him veneration and new disciples. Upon his death in Jerusalem, "his funerals were a memorable day" and--added al-^cUlaymī--"his followers built a large domed shrine on his tomb, which became famous and also became a place of visitation."²⁵ While in Jerusalem, Khwājah ^cAlī had given up the leadership of the Order in favor of his son Ibrāhīm who had accompanied him to the Muslim Holy Places and Syria before returning to Ardabil.²⁶

Ibrāhīm's death in 851/1447 marked the end of an era during which the Safavid leaders had considered themselves primarily the spiritual guides of their disciples and followers. Meanwhile, the Safavid order developed steadily and secured the adherence and devotion of a large following, particularly among the Turkoman tribes of northwestern Iran, eastern Anatolia, and northern Syria. The passing of Ibrāhīm brought about abrupt and radical changes which were to affect the vocation as well as the role of the Order. His son Junayd who succeeded him nurtured political ambitions and set in motion the process of converting the once purely spiritual Sīfī order into a political and military force to be reckoned with.

²⁵Ibid. See also Michel M. Mazzaoui, The Origins of the Safawids (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag GMBH, 1972), p. 55.

²⁶Zāhidī, Silsilat, pp. 49-50.

B. From Sīfism to Politics.

When Junayd took over the destiny of the Safavid order in 851/1447, Iran was caught in sudden developments which were precipitated by the death in 850/1446-47 of the last great Timūrid ruler Shah Rukh. The subsequent disintegration of the Timūrid empire presented an opportunity for the Qara Qoyunlu ruler Jahān Shah to enlarge his dominions at the expense of both Timūrids and Aq Qoyunlus. While he met with success in his drive against the Timūrids, Jahān Shah encountered stiff opposition from the Aq Qoyunlus and their leader Uzun Ḥasan. The resulting rivalry came to a violent end in 872/1467 with the death of Jahān Shah in the aftermath of his expedition against Diyār Bakr, the hearth of the Aq Qoyunlus. This event, coupled with the defeat of the Timūrid Abū Sa^cid (855-73/1451-69) the following year, established Uzun Ḥasan as the undisputed master of Iran.

The first half of the fifteenth century was also characterized by the resurgence of the Turkoman element as a result of the Timūrian campaigns and the subsequent rebirth of independent Turkoman principalities in Anatolia. Timūr's victories against the Mamluks and the Ottomans constituted a long sought opportunity for the Turkoman tribes in the area to raise the standard of rebellion.

On the Ottoman side, the long reign of Murad II (824-55/1421-51) finally restored the empire to its pre-Timūrian boundaries. However, the chaotic period between 805/1403 and 824/1421 engendered several rebellious movements which acquired political, social and religious characters. Among these, the revolt in 819/1416 of Badr al-Dīn ibn Qāzī Samāwnah and his followers--although originally of a religious and fanatical color--bore political overtones which reflected a

general discontent with the political situation of the empire. The magnitude of this revolt was comparable to that of Bābā Rasūl Allāh and the Bābā'īs whose insurgence took place in 637/1239-40 under the Saljūqs of Rūm.²⁷ Badr al-Dīn, who formerly assumed the functions of Qāḍī 'Askar (Judge of the Army) resented his dismissal from that position and called upon a certain Yūraklujah Muṣṭafā to foment a "revolt of dervishes".²⁸ Soon, other Ottoman subjects--including Christians and Jews--joined in, thus causing this movement to spread throughout the empire.²⁹ Although the Ottomans succeeded in quelling this widespread rebellion, and hanged Badr al-Dīn within the same year (819/1416), the latter's rebellious teachings survived among his followers who proliferated especially among the Turkomans of Anatolia, some of whom later espoused the cause of other movements such as the Bektāshī and the Ṣafavid.³⁰

During the same period, the Mamluks were faced with the danger of an extremist religious Ḥurūfī sect on their northern borders.³¹ There,

²⁷For further details on this insurrection, see: Kōprülū, Les Origines de l'Empire Ottoman (Paris: Editions de Rocard, 1935), pp. 58-61.

²⁸So called by Hammer-Purgstall, Histoire de l'Empire Ottoman, 2:181.

²⁹The details of these revolts were covered by Hammer-Purgstall, ibid., pp. 181-190. See also Aşıkpaşazade, Tevārīh-i Āl-i Osmān, edited by Ali Bey (Istanbul: Matba'ah-i 'Amirah, 1914), pp. 91-93; and M. J. Kissling, "Badr al-Dīn b. Kādī Samāwna," EI², 1:869; Kara Çelebizade, Rawdat al-Abrār (Cairo: Būlāq, 1832), p. 364.

³⁰Aşıkpaşazade, Tevārīh, p. 166; Kissling, "Badr al-Din," p. 869.

³¹The Ḥurūfī sect is an extremist Muslim sect with predominantly Shi'ī tendencies. For more details see: E. G. Browne, A Literary History of Persia (Cambridge: The University Press, 1969), 3:365-375; E. J. W. Gibb, A History of Ottoman Poetry (London: Luzac and Co., 1900), 1:336-388.

Nasīm al-Dīn Tabrīzī--better known as Nasīmī and a disciple of Faḍl Allāh Ibn Muḥammad Tabrīzī who was executed in 804/1401-2³²--won the adherence of large numbers of followers from among the Turkomans. His major success was the conversion to the Ḥurūfī sect of the Dulḡadir ruler Nāṣir al-Dīn (800-46/1397-1443).³³ This favorable reception motivated Nasīmī to widen the scope of his endeavor by moving to Aleppo where he was apprehended and killed on the order of the Mamluk Sultan in 820/1417-18.³⁴ Nasīmī's activities resulted in the diffusion of heterodox teachings among the Turkomans of northern Syria, especially around Antioch where major disturbances necessitated the dispatch of a Mamluk expedition.³⁵ In addition to this movement, Mamluk authorities were faced with the contagious restlessness of the Turkoman tribes in the regions of the Taurus and the Upper Euphrates.

It was against this background that Junayd changed the raison d'être of the Ṣafavid order. Several sources have related the story of his expulsion from Ardabīl on orders from Jahān Shah Qara Qoyunlu who replaced him at the head of the Order with his uncle Ja'far.³⁶

³²A short biographical notice on Faḍl Allāh Tabrīzī exists in: Ibn Ḥajar al-'Asqalānī, Inbā', 2:219.

³³Ibid., 3:136-137, note 3.

³⁴Ibid., pp. 136-137.

³⁵Ibid., p. 137.

³⁶Khawāndamīr, Ḥabīb al-Siyar, 4:425; Aşıkpaşazade, Tevārīh, p. 264; Najafī, Tārīkh-i Ardabīl, 1:171-172; Tadhkirat al-Mulūk; a Manual of Safavid Administration, translated by V. Minorsky (London: Luzac and Co., 1943), p. 190; Ilia P. Petrushevskii, Islām dar Īrān, translated by Karīm Kishāvarz (Tehran: Payyām, 1972), pp. 385-387.

However, the same sources failed to specify the causes of this move apart from agreeing that it was due primarily to Junayd's political ambitions. This development was best summarized by Faḡl Allāh Ibn Rūzbihān--better known as Khunḡī (d. 927/1521)--who wrote in his Ālam Ārā-yi Amīnī that:

When the boon of succession reached Junayd, he altered the way of life of his ancestors: The bird of anxiety laid an egg of longing for power in the nest of his imagination. Every moment he strove to conquer a land or a region. When his father Khwājah Shaykh-Shah [Ibrāhīm] departed, Junayd for some reason or other had to leave the country.³⁷

Khunḡī's statement is not specific as to the causes of Junayd's expulsion. An investigation of the motive underlying this event should take into consideration the following facts. In the first place, Junayd's rise to the position of leadership took place in 851/1447, a few months after the death of the Timūrid ruler Shah Rukh, thus coinciding with the disruption of the political status quo in Iran and Transoxania. In the second place, the stage was left in Iran to the rival dynasties of the Aq and Qara Qoyunlus. In the third place, political and religious differences separated these two dynasties, since the former were Sunnī while the latter were Shī'ī.³⁸ Moreover, both were embarking on an expansionist policy against each other on the one hand and against the Timūrids on the other.

This evaluation of the situation which prevailed simultaneously

³⁷Ibn Rūzbihān, Persia in A.D. 1478-1490, translated by V. Minorsky (London: The Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland, 1957), p. 63.

³⁸Uzunçarşılı, Anadolu Beylikleri ve Akkoyunlu, Karakoyunlu Devletleri (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1969), pp. 186-187.

in Iran and Transoxania with the rise of Junayd would shed some light on the causes of Junayd's expulsion from Ardabīl. Knowing that Jahān Shah Qara Qoyunlu was an extremist Shī'ī,³⁹ one might raise the question of the probability of religious differences separating these two men. In other words, did Junayd's Sunnism lead to his being ousted by this Shī'ī ruler? The answer could only be negative. Junayd's father and predecessor cooperated with the Qara Qoyunlu ruler to the extent of joining him in an expedition against Georgia.⁴⁰ Hence, other reasons should be sought to explain the conditions surrounding Junayd's accession to the Ṣafavid leadership. Unfortunately, contemporary sources remain vague if not silent in regard to this question. The only illuminating information was given by the Turkish historian Aşıkpaşazade (d. 924/1518) who, in his Tevārih-i Āl-i Osmān, indicated that Junayd had put forth a threefold claim to the royal succession in that country. First, he pretended to be a descendant of Ālī. Second, he claimed that his descendants

³⁹V. Minorsky, "Jihān-Shah Qara Qoyunlu and his Poetry," BSOAS 16 (1954): 271-297.

⁴⁰See V. Minorsky, "Thomas of Metsop^c on the Timurid-Turkoman Wars," in Professor Muhammad Shafi^c Presentation Volume, edited by S. M. Abdullah (Lahore: Majlis-e Armughān-e Ālī, 1955), pp. 169-170. Thomas of Metsop^c wrote: "In Armenian [year] 889/1439-40 Jihānshāh, lord of Tabrīz, taking with him the cruel governor of Ardabīl (Ardabīl) and accompanied by all his qadis and mudarrises led an army into Georgia." (p. 169). He later stated: "Soon after Jihānshāh summoned the heads of his religion and asked: "All the calamities you have caused us will be pardoned to you by God. Anything you do within seven years will be pardoned. But I advise you: as the Christians abused our prophet, assess them with heavy taxes and tributes." (p.170).

The date given in this text leaves no doubt as to the identity of the Shaykh of Ardabīl. It is none other than Ibrāhīm, known as Shaykhshāh, son of Khwājah Ālī and father of Junayd. He was the leader of the Ṣafavid order from 830/1427 to 851/1447.

would have precedence to rule the Islamic community even over the companions of the Prophet, an extremist Shī'ī attitude. Third, he developed political ambitions and falsified his genealogy to back his contention and gain the support of the various Shī'ī elements in Anatolia.⁴¹ These factors would undoubtedly create a threat to the Qara Qoyunlu ruler's power, due to the large following of the Safavid order.

Following Junayd's eviction from Ardabil, the leadership of the Safavid order was entrusted to his uncle Ja'far who was on good terms with the Qara Qoyunlu ruler. Information about this Safavid leader is scanty and no mention of his religious leanings could be found.⁴² However, V. Minorsky has postulated that he must have been Sunnī and that he conformed to the traditional leadership of the Order.⁴³

Junayd left Ardabil for Konya, the capital of the then independent province of Karaman. While crossing Ottoman territory, he sent--as a goodwill gesture--a symbolic present to Sultan Murad II who reciprocated in kind.⁴⁴ In Konya, Junayd began to claim descent from 'Alī, while propagating extremist Shī'ī ideas and showing ambitions

⁴¹ Aşıkpaşazade, *Tevārīh*, pp. 264-269. On Junayd's Shī'ī leanings, see Appendix B.

⁴² Zāhidī, *Silsilat*, pp. 49-50, does not mention Ja'far replacing Junayd as the head of the Safavid order. He refers to him as a scholar and learned man.

⁴³ V. Minorsky, "La Perse au XV^e Siècle," in *Iranica. Twenty Articles* (Tehran: Publications of the University of Tehran, 1964), p. 321.

⁴⁴ Aşıkpaşazade, *Tevārīh*, p. 264. Junayd sent Murad II a prayer rug, a copy of the Qur'ān and a *tasbīh* (Muslim rosary). Murad reciprocated by sending a gift of money.

for power.⁴⁵ The unfavorable reaction of the ruler and theologians of Konya compelled him to flee southward to Cilicia, where he met with an identical reception.⁴⁶ Finally, he entered Syria where he settled in the towns of Kilis and Jabal Mūsā, both in the vicinity of Antioch,⁴⁷ an area where the Ḥurūfī influence was strongly felt. According to Aşıkpaşazade, the Mamluk Sultan Jaqmaq (842-57/1438-53) sent an expedition which drove Junayd from northern Syria and killed a number of his followers.⁴⁸ After these failures, Junayd turned his followers into a band of *ghuzāt* (singular: *ghāzī*) and led them on a raid against the "infidels" of Trabzon in 861/1456.⁴⁹ Finally, he settled in

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 265-266. See also Appendix B.

⁴⁶ Junayd was well received by the Varsaq, a Turkoman tribe dwelling in the vicinity of Adana, in the territory of the Ramazan Oğulları, who were vassals of the Mamluks. See: *Ibid.*, p. 265; Minorsky, *Tadhkirat al-Mulūk*, p. 190.

⁴⁷ According to Minorsky, *Tadhkirat*, p. 190, Junayd reached Jabal Arşūş and not Jabal Mūsā. However, 'Abbās al-'Azzāwī, *Tārīkh al-'Irāq bayna Ihtilālayn* (Baghdad: By the author, 1939), 4:334-335, states that Junayd lived in Kilis and Jabal Mūsā. He took this information from *Kunūz al-Dhahab*, a chronicle which was contemporary with Junayd. On the location and variations of spelling Kilis, see: Yāqūt, *Mu'jam al-Buldān* (Beirut: Dār Ṣādir, 1955), 4:476. Yāqūt states that it was inhabited by Turkomans, among whom spread bizarre beliefs.

⁴⁸ According to Aşıkpaşazade, *Tevārīh*, p. 266. It is impossible to verify this information among contemporary Arabic sources.

⁴⁹ Yahyā ibn 'Abd al-La'if Qazvīnī, *Lubb al-Tavārīkh*, edited by Jalāl al-Dīn Tihirānī (Tehran: Mu'assasah-i Khāvar, 1935), p. 238; Petrushevskii, *Islām dar Irān*, p. 386; Hammer-Purgstall, *Histoire de l'Empire Ottoman*, 3:78-79. A *ghāzī* is the one who participates in a *ghazwah*, "a raid against the infidels." See I. Melikoff, "Ghāzī," *EI*², 2:1043-1045. Further information is given by M. Mazzaoui, "The Ghāzī Backgrounds of the Safavid State," *Iqbal Review* 12 (1971): 79-90. The date of this raid is based on Chalcocondyles, a Greek historian of the fifteenth century.

Diyār Bakr where he was well received by the Aq Qoyunlu ruler Uzun Ḥasan.⁵⁰

The warm reception that Uzun Ḥasan gave Junayd was seemingly dictated by two factors. First, Uzun Ḥasan was related to the Komneni family which ruled Trabzon. The invitation that he extended to Junayd might be interpreted as an effort to forestall any future Ṣafavid attack against that territory, particularly at a time when Ottoman designs over the rest of Anatolia had become obvious. Second, a strong alliance with Junayd would enhance the prestige and position of Uzun Ḥasan vis-a-vis Jahān Shah Qara Qoyunlu.⁵¹ Furthermore, Junayd's marriage to Khaḍījah Begum--Uzun Ḥasan's sister--made him a member of the ruling dynasty, thus strengthening his claim to power. As for Uzun Ḥasan, he viewed this marriage as an opportunity to acquire a strong ally in his conflict with the Qara Qoyunlus.

Following a three year stay in Diyār Bakr, Junayd made an unsuccessful attempt to re-enter Ardabīl.⁵² Shortly thereafter, he contemplated the resumption of the ghazw (raiding) activity. This time his attention was focused on Daghestan, in the Caucasus area. However, Junayd had to secure the permission of Amīr Khalīl Allāh Shīrvānshāh (821-69/1418-64), the ruler of Shīrvān, whose territory he had to cross before reaching Daghestan. When responding to Junayd's

⁵⁰ Khwāndamīr, Ḥabīb al-Siyar, 4:425-426; Ibn Rūzbihān, Persia in A.D. 1478-1490, p. 63; Petrushevskii, Islām dar Īrān, p. 386.

⁵¹ A passage of Faẓl Allāh Ibn Rūzbihān might be enlightening in this respect. He wrote: "Junayd's marriage became known even in the farthest corners of Rūm and Syria and, in view of this honour, the Khalīfas of the earlier Shaykhs wanted to wait on him." See: Persia in A. D. 1478-1490, p. 64. See also note (1) of the same page for Minorsky's comment on Khalīfas (Arabic: Khulafā).

⁵² Petrushevskii, Islām dar Īrān, p. 386.

request, Shīrvānshāh admonished the Ṣafavid leader to concentrate on his spiritual teachings and discouraged him from executing his project. This message also ended with a warning and veiled threat from Shīrvānshāh.⁵³ Notwithstanding this threat, Junayd led ten thousand followers to raid Daghestan and, on his return, attacked Shīrvān and its capital Shamākhī as a riposte to its ruler's stand.⁵⁴ Junayd was killed during the ensuing battle which took place near Shamākhī in 864/1460.⁵⁵

In his lifetime, Junayd converted the Ṣafavid order into a potent political force whose strength rested upon the adherence of a heterogeneous Shī'ī following dominated by a number of Turkoman tribes. Moreover, his marriage to Uzun Ḥasan's sister gave his offspring a legitimate claim to power as members of the ruling Aq Qoyunlu dynasty. Henceforth, the Ṣafavid Shaykhs added to their status as religious leaders that of royal princes, thus directly involving the Ṣafavid order in Iranian politics. From Junayd's death to the rise of the Ṣafavid dynasty in 907/1501, the increasingly political aspect of the Order greatly overshadowed its original religious nature.

⁵³ The text of Shīrvānshāh's message is found in: Mu'ayyad Ṣābīṭī, comp., Asnād va Nāmāhā-yi Tārkhī az Avā'il-i Dawrahā-yi Islāmī tā Avākhir-i Ahd-i Shāh Ismā'īl Ṣafavī (Tehran: Kitābkhānah-i Tahūrī, 1967), pp. 375-376.

⁵⁴ Ibn Rūzbihān, Persia in A.D. 1478-1490, pp. 64-65; Khwāndamīr, Ḥabīb al-Siyar, 4:425; Ahmad Ibrāhīmī Husaynī, Die Frühen Safawiden nach Qāzī Ahmad Qumī, edited and translated by Erika Glassen (Freiburg: Schwarz, 1970), Pers. text, pp. 57-59.

⁵⁵ Khwāndamīr, Ḥabīb al-Siyar, 4:416; Ibn Rūzbihān, Persia in A.D. 1478-1490, pp. 64-65; Husaynī, Die Frühen Safawiden, pp. 57-57. Most of these sources put Junayd's death in 860/1455-56; however, it has been established that he was killed no earlier than 864/1460. See: Petrushevskii, Islām dar Īrān, p. 386; Minorsky, Tadhkirat al-Mulūk, p. 190.

C. From Haydar to the Coronation of Shah Ismā'īl.

Junayd transformed the Ṣafavid order into an important political and military force by showing Shī'ite leanings, thus winning the support of a number of Turkoman tribes in Anatolia and northern Syria. As Minorsky remarked, "it is possible that having discovered Shī'ite leanings among the Anatolians, he felt that a wider scope for his enterprise would open with his own move in the same direction."⁵⁶ As a result, he left his descendants a threefold legacy: the spiritual leadership of the Order, the command of a large following of Sūfī ghāzīs who were eager to fight non-Muslim neighbors as well as "Muslim foes"; and finally, a firmly entrenched position in the ruling Aq Qoyunlu dynasty.

Junayd's heir was his son Haydar, scion of his union with Khadījah Begum, Uzun Ḥasan's sister. The infancy of Haydar was inadequate to the increasing responsibilities of a Ṣafavid leader, thus creating a void which was filled by the influential members of the Order. These were primarily khulafā⁵⁷ (singular: khalfah) drawn from among the tribal following and forming a powerful link between the Ṣafavid leader and those tribes or clans which owed him

⁵⁶ Minorsky, "Shaykh Ballī-Efendi on the Ṣafavids," BSOAS 20 (1957): 439.

⁵⁷ R.M. Savory, "The Office of Khalīfat al-Khulafā under the Ṣafavids," JAOS 85(1965): 497-502; Ibn Rūzbihān, Persia in A.D. 1478-1490, p. 64, note 1.

allegiance.⁵⁸ Together they constituted an informal regency council and took over the spiritual, military and political responsibilities as well as the duties of guardianship and education of the infant Ṣafavid heir.

Haydar was installed in Ardabīl in 874/1469 by his maternal uncle Uzun Ḥasan, who had put an end to the Qara Qoyunlu dynasty and expanded his authority over its former dominions.⁵⁹ At that date, Haydar was merely nine years of age.⁶⁰

The reinstatement of the Ṣafavid order in Ardabīl resulted in an influx of waves of adherents and followers from eastern Anatolia and northern Syria, who converged upon the hereditary seat of the Ṣafavid Shaykhs.⁶¹ Details regarding Haydar's immediate entourage are scarce. The researcher is left uninformed as to the respective responsibilities and positions of the khulafā. It appears that during the early years of Haydar's tenure at the head of the Order, these khulafā formed a quasi-collective leadership. In fact, it was only

⁵⁸ Information regarding geographical areas where the followers of the Ṣafavid order existed could be gathered from the following sources: Aşıkpaşazade, Tevārīh-i Āl-i Osmān, pp. 264-269; Ibn Bazzāz, Ṣafwat al-Ṣafā (Leiden MS), fol. 255b; Ḥusaynī, Die Frühen Safawiden, Pers. text pp. 28 and 30; Ibn Rūzbihān, Persia in A.D. 1478-1490, p. 62; Zāhidī, Silsilat, pp. 28 and 47; ^cAzzāwī, Tārīkh al-ʿIrāq, 3:334-335; Faruk Sūmer, Safevi Devletinin Kuruluşu ve Gelişmesinde Anadolu Türklerinin Rolü (Ankara: Güven Matbaası, 1976), pp. 43-49 and 209-214.

⁵⁹ Minorsky, "La Perse au XV^e Siècle," p. 324; Petrushevskii, Islām dar Irān, p. 387.

⁶⁰ Here, the estimate of Haydar's age is given by Minorsky, Ibid. No date of birth is recorded for Haydar in original sources.

⁶¹ Ibn Rūzbihān, Persia in A.D. 1478-1490, pp. 65-66; Minorsky, Tadhkirat al-Mulūk, pp. 190-191.

after Ḥaydar's death and during the tenure of his sons ʿAlī Pādīshāh and Ismāʿīl that the first mention occurred of a hierarchy and distribution of tasks among the khulafā. Under Ḥaydar, only two are known to have reached eminence. These were Ḥusayn Beg Shāmlū and Qara Pīrī Qājār,⁶² who participated next to Ḥaydar in the battle of Ṭabarsarān against the ruler of Shīrvān in 893/1488.⁶³

During Ḥaydar's short lifetime, the Ṣafavid order became crystallized as a politico-religious movement. Ḥaydar strengthened his ties with the Aq Qoyunlus by marrying Ḥalīmāh Begum--known as ʿĀlamshāh--Uzun Ḥasan's daughter.⁶⁴ This union placed him a step closer to power and gave him quasi parity with that ruler's own offspring. He also converted his heterogeneous following into an organized force of ghāzīs at his service. However, this seems to be more the result of an influx of Turkomans of eastern Anatolia than the outcome of Ḥaydar's own decision. In fact, these Turkomans were able to apply increased pressure upon the Ṣafavid leader and succeeded in transforming the Order into a militant organization. Petrushevskii rightly remarked that "the influence of the warlike and nomadic

⁶²According to Sarwar, History of Shah Ismāʿīl Ṣafavī (Aligarh: By the Author, 1939), p. 25. In ʿĀlam Ārā-yi Ṣafavī, edited by Yad Allāh Shukrī (Tehran: Bunyād-i Farhang-i Īrān, 1971), pp. 31-32, he is mentioned as Qara Pīrī Ustājū and in other copies of the same manuscript as Qara Pīrī Qaramānlū. The Ustājū formed a clan of the Qaramānlū; see: F. Sümer, Kara Koyunlular (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1967), 1:27, note 44.

⁶³Sarwar, Shah Ismāʿīl, p. 25; ʿĀlam Ārā-yi Ṣafavī, pp. 31-32.

⁶⁴Khvāndamīr, Habīb al-Siyar, 4:427; Husaynī, Die Frühen Safawiden, pp. 59-60; and Zāhidī, Silsilat, p. 68.

Turkish tribes changed the original character of the Ṣafavid order."⁶⁵ These followers became known as the qizilbāsh (literally: Red Heads) due to their distinctive headgear consisting of a twelve-layer red cap which Ḥaydar ordered them to wear. This characteristic headgear was described in later sources as the tāj-i Ḥaydarī (the Ḥaydarī Crown).⁶⁶

The beliefs of the majority of the Turkoman supporters of Ḥaydar were markedly heterodox and took extremist Shīʿī overtones. Ibn Rūzbihān noted that they "foolishly announced the glad tidings of his [Ḥaydar's] divinity."⁶⁷ This same author mentioned that "it is reported that they considered him as their god and, neglecting the duties of namāz and public prayers, looked upon the Shaykh as their qibla and the being to whom prostration was due."⁶⁸ These remarks undoubtedly prove that extremist heterodoxy (ghuluw) was widespread among the supporters of the Ṣafavids. This "deification" of the Ṣafavid leader was strikingly obvious to some Western travelers who visited the Ṣafavid court during the reign of Shah Ismāʿīl.⁶⁹

⁶⁵Petrushevskii, Islām dar Īrān, p. 388.

⁶⁶Khvāndamīr, Habīb al-Siyar, 4:426-427; E. Denison Ross, "The Early Years of Shah Ismāʿīl, Founder of the Safavī Dynasty," JRAS (April 1896): 253-255; Iskandar Beg Munshī, Tārīkh-i ʿĀlam Ārā-yi ʿAbbāsī, edited by Iraj Afshār (Tehran: Amīr Kabīr, 1971), 1:19-21. The qizilbāsh were also mentioned as "Kulāh-i Surkh," "Qizil Bōrk" and "Qizil Qalpāq." See: Ibn Rūzbihān, Mihmān Nāmāh-i Bukhārā, edited by Manūchīhr Sutūdah (Tehran: Bangāh-i Tarjumah va Nashr-i Kitāb, 1962), pp. 57 and 104-107.

⁶⁷Ibn Rūzbihān, Persia in A.D. 1478-1490, p. 66.

⁶⁸Ibid., pp. 67-68. Namāz is the Persian synonym for "prayer"; qibla is the direction of Mecca.

⁶⁹See Minorsky's remarks in his "Persia: Religion and History," in Iranica: Twenty Articles (Tehran: Publications of the University of Tehran, 1964), p. 252.

Simultaneously with these developments within the Safavid order, the political situation in Iran took a downward course. The end of the long and stable reign of Uzun Hasan inaugurated an era dominated by interfactional strife. After the assassination of Khalil, Uzun Hasan's son and appointed successor in 883/1478, the future Sultans became manipulated by the powerful and influential military commanders and the chiefs of the clans which formed the Aq Qoyunlu federation. Subsequent to Khalil's death, the majority of the Aq Qoyunlu rulers were enthroned while in their teens. These conditions reached a chronic level in 896/1490 when, upon the death of Sultan Ya'qūb (883-96/1478-90), the entire country was converted into a battlefield for the many rival princes, thus precipitating the downfall of the dynasty.⁷⁰

Safavid leaders from Haydar to Shah Ismā'īl exploited to their own advantage the decaying internal conditions of Iran. Haydar's leadership was marked with recrudescing ghazw activity in the Caucasus, notably against the Christians of Daghestan. He led a first raid into that area in 891/1486 and the following year he launched a large scale raid which brought him approximately six thousand

⁷⁰It is beyond the scope of the present work to detail the events of this period. Only those pertinent to the Safavid movement could be mentioned. The reader will find ample information in the excellent work of John E. Woods, The Aqqyunlu, pp. 138-178. Shorter notices might be found in: 'Abbās al-'Azzāwī, Tārīkh al-'Irāq, 3:284-306; E. G. Browne, Literary History of Persia, 4:414-418; Petrushevskii, Islām dar Irān, pp. 395-396 and Sarwar, Shah Ismā'īl, pp. 106-109.

Christian captives.⁷¹ Subsequently, Sultan Ya'qūb summoned him to court in a effort to dissuade him from launching further raids.⁷²

These relatively extensive military operations of the qizilbāsh aroused the apprehension of Sultan Ya'qūb Aq Qoyunlu who was a strong ally as well as the son-in-law of Farrukh Yasār Shīrvānshāh (869-906/1465-1500), the ruler of Shīrvān.⁷³ Moreover, the possibility of an attempt by Haydar to avenge his father's death would constitute a real threat to the security of Shīrvān and to the existence of its ruling dynasty. Ya'qūb failed to deflect Haydar's will and, in 893/1487-88, a third expedition was contemplated. On their way to Darband, the qizilbāsh encroached upon the domains of the ruler of Shīrvān and descended upon the capital Shamākhī. At Gulistān--to the northeast of the capital--a brief encounter ensued, after which Farrukh Yasār was compelled to seek refuge and safety behind the fortified walls of the castle of Gulistān, while awaiting succor from his ally and relative Sultan Ya'qūb.⁷⁴ In the meantime, Haydar moved

⁷¹According to Ibn Rūzbihān, Persia in A.D. 1478-1490, p. 70. W. Hinz dated the first raid in 1483 and followed it by two more, in 1487 and 1488. See the discussion of Minorsky in the above mentioned work, Annex III, pp. 117-118.

⁷²Ibid.

⁷³Ghaffārī, Tārīkh-i Jahān Ārā, edited by M. Mīnuvī (Tehran: Kitāb-furūshī-yi Hāfiz, 1953), p. 262; Ibn Rūzbihān, Persia in A.D. 1478-1490, p. 74.

⁷⁴Ibn Rūzbihān, Persia in A.D. 1478-1490, pp. 71-77; Khwāndamīr, Ḥabīb al-Siyar, 4:432-433; Ghaffārī, Jahān Ārā, p. 161 and Sarwar, Shah Ismā'īl, p. 25.

south of Darband.⁷⁵ There, the qizilbāsh were routed by the combined forces of Shīrvānshāh and the four thousand cavalymen who were previously dispatched under the command of Sulaymān Beg on orders from Sultan Ya^cqūb.⁷⁶ This battle, which was fought at Ṭabarsarān on 29 Rajab 893/9 July 1488, was Ḥaydar's last. He was killed in battle and his severed head was sent by Farrukh Yasār to Sultan Ya^cqūb as a token of recognition.⁷⁷ It was on this occasion that contemporary sources mentioned Ḥaydar's close lieutenants for the first time. They were Qara Fīrī Qājār and Ḥusayn Beg Shāmlū, respectively in command of the qizilbāsh right and left wings.

The first official Ottoman reaction to Ḥaydar's death as well as to the new direction that the Safavid order had taken since Junayd's time is recorded in Ferīdūn Bey's Munsha'āt-i Salāṭīn.⁷⁸ It has been already mentioned that the Turkomans of eastern Anatolia formed the bulk of Ḥaydar's supporters. A contemporary Ottoman source also

⁷⁵ Most modern scholars agree that Ḥaydar was halted south of Darband on this last expedition. See Minorsky's views in Ibn Rūzbihān, Persia in A.D. 1478-1490, Annex III, p. 119. A similar opinion is that of Sarwar, Shah Ismā'īl, p. 25.

⁷⁶ Khwādamīr, Ḥabīb al-Siyar, 4:432-433; quotes this number.

⁷⁷ The date of 29 Rajab 893/9 July 1488 is commonly agreed upon by most modern Iranologists. However, earlier sources either failed to mention the exact date or recorded the event on a different date. The accepted date is the one given by Ibn Rūzbihān, Persia in A.D. 1478-1490, p. 79. Qazvīnī, Lubb al-Tavārīkh, p. 239, places it in Sha^cbān 892/July-August 1487, while Husaynī, Die Frühen Safawiden, p. 65, gives the date in Sha^cbān 893/July-August 1488. 20 Rajab 893/1 July 1488 is given by Zāhidī, Silsilat, p. 68, and accepted by the modern Sarwar, Shah Ismā'īl, pp. 25-26. Ghaffārī, Jahān Ārā, p. 262, mentions only the year 893, while Khwādamīr, Ḥabīb al-Siyar, 4:434, gives no date at all.

⁷⁸ Ferīdūn Bey, Munsha'āt-i Salāṭīn, (Istanbul: n.p., 1858), 1:311-312.

stated that Ḥaydar's khulafā in Rūm (eastern Anatolia) "treated Bayezid II with disdain,"⁷⁹ implying a lack of submission to the Ottomans on the part of these Turkomans. In answering Ya^cqūb's message which conveyed the tidings of Ḥaydar's death,⁸⁰ Bayezid II clearly expressed his pleasure. He wrote that "hearing of Ḥaydar's death had increased my delight."⁸¹ He also called Ḥaydar's followers "the strayed hordes of Ḥaydar, God's curse be upon them."⁸²

Ya^cqūb resolved to remove Ḥaydar's sons from Ardabīl and banish them to the province of Fārs. There, the governor Mansūr Beg Purnāk confined them to the fort of Istakhr.⁸³ Of Ḥaydar's seven sons, chronicles recorded the whereabouts of those born of his marriage to Ḥalīmah Begum ^cĀlamshāh, Ya^cqūb's sister.⁸⁴ These were three: ^cAlī Mirza, better known as Sultan ^cAlī Pādīshāh, Ḥaydar's successor

⁷⁹ Aşıkpaşazade, Tevārīkh, p. 268.

⁸⁰ Ferīdūn, Munsha'āt, 1:309-311.

⁸¹ Ibid., 1:312.

⁸² Ibid.

⁸³ Ālam Ārā-yi Safavī, p. 33; Ālam Ārā-yi Shah Ismā'īl, edited by Aghar Muntazar Shīb (Tehran: Bangāh-i Tarjamah va Nashr-i Kītab, 1967), p. 29; Ghaffārī, Jahān Ārā, p. 262; Husaynī, Die Frühen Safawiden, p. 66; Khwādamīr, Ḥabīb al-Siyar 4:435-436; and Iskandar Munshī, Ālam Ārā-yi Abbāsī, 1:21. Sources do not mention the date of the exile. However, it is believed that it took place either in 893 or 894 A.H./1488 or 1489 A.D.

⁸⁴ Ḥaydar had seven sons from two marriages. In addition to the three born from his union with ^cĀlamshāh, he had four sons from a Circassian slave girl. They were: Hasan, Sulaymān, Dāwūd and Mahmūd. Rūmlū, A Chronicle of the Early Safawis; Being the Aḥsanu't-Tavārīkh of Hasan-i Rūmlū, translated by C.N. Seddon (Baroda: Oriental Institute, 1934), 1:7 and 2:3.

at the head of the Order; Ibrāhīm⁸⁵--whose biography has been ignored by most sources--and Ismā'īl, the future founder of the Ṣafavid dynasty. The exile of the Ṣafavid princes reflected Ya^qūb's determination to cut off Ḥaydar's heirs from their followers with the hope of paralyzing the activities of the Order. This decision resulted in effectively halting any warlike activity of the Ṣafavid followers during the remainder of Ya^qūb's reign. However, after the latter's death which occurred in 896/1490 the country became plagued with internecine strife caused by the feuding of the numerous Aq Qoyunlu princes and their struggle for power.⁸⁶

Ya^qūb was succeeded by his son Bāysunqur (896-98/1490-93) whose mother was the daughter of Farrukh Yasār, the ruler of Shīrvān.⁸⁷ By 898/1493, Bāysunqur was challenged by his cousin Rustam and fled to Shīrvān with the expectation of enlisting military support from its ruler who was also his maternal grandfather.⁸⁸ At this juncture,

⁸⁵Information about Ibrāhīm is still lacking. He is known as Ismā'īl's older brother. Some sources mention that he returned to Ardabīl after leaving for Lāhijān with Ismā'īl, following the death of their eldest brother Sultan ^ḤAlī Pādīshāh. Others report that he joined the Aq Qoyunlus on his return to the traditional Ṣafavid center. Among these were: Rūmlū, Aḥsanu't-Tawārīkh, 1:21 and Husaymī, Die Frühen Safawiden, p. 74. Another source, Ālam Ārā-yi Shāh Ismā'īl, p. 37, relates that he was driven by the desire to visit his mother who did not accompany him and Ismā'īl to Lāhijān and that when Ismā'īl objected, he threw off his qizilbāsh hat and wore the headgear of the Aq Qoyunlus. Hammer-Purgstall, Histoire de l'Empire Ottoman, 4:93-94, wrote that in 1508, Selim, then governor of Trabzon and future Ottoman Sultan, raided Erzinjan and Bayburt and made Ibrāhīm--brother of Ismā'īl--prisoner.

⁸⁶Khawādamīr, Ḥabīb al-Siyar, 4:436-437.

⁸⁷Ibid., p. 438; Ālam Ārā-yi Shāh Ismā'īl, p. 29 and E. Denison Ross, "Early Years," p. 256.

⁸⁸Husaymī, Die Frühen Safawiden, p. 70; Ross, "Early Years," p. 56, Khawādamīr, Ḥabīb al-Siyar, 4:438 and Ālam Ārā-yi Shāh Ismā'īl, p. 29.

Rustam deemed it best to secure the backing of the qizilbāsh army whose leaders were the archfoes of Bāysunqur as well as of his ally and relative Shīrvānshāh.⁸⁹ He therefore ordered the release of Ḥaydar's three sons from Istakhr and brought them to Ardabīl, whereupon he bestowed the title of Pādīshāh (King) on ^ḤAlī, Ḥaydar's eldest son and recognized heir. Sultan ^ḤAlī Pādīshāh became Rustam's ally and his qizilbāsh army swelled the ranks of the Aq Qoyunlu prince.⁹⁰ The command of the combined forces was shared by ^ḤAlī Pādīshāh and Aybah (or Abyah) Sulṭān, Rustam's chief supporter.

The task of this military alliance was to ward off the advance of Bāysunqur from Shīrvān to Azarbāyjān. During their march, they sighted Bāysunqur and his Shīrvānī supporters near the Kur River, but neither side ventured to commence hostilities.⁹¹ A second encounter was decisive. The ensuing battle was fought between the districts of Ahar and Mushkīn, resulting in Bāysunqur's death and eliminating the threat which was menacing Rustam.⁹²

⁸⁹Farrukh Yasār Shīrvānshāh and Ya^qūb Aq Qoyunlu were responsible for the killing in 893/1488 of Ḥaydar at the battle of Tabarsarān.

⁹⁰Ālam Ārā-yi Shāh Ismā'īl, pp. 29-30; Ālam Ārā-yi Ṣafavī, pp. 33-34; Ghaffārī, Jahān Ārā, pp. 262-263; Husaymī, Die Frühen Safawiden, pp. 69-70; Khawādamīr, Ḥabīb al-Siyar, 4:439; Qazvīnī, Lubb al-Tawārīkh, pp. 226-227 and Ross, "Early Years," pp. 256-257.

⁹¹Ālam Ārā-yi Ṣafavī, p. 34 and Khawādamīr, Ḥabīb al-Siyar, 4:439.

⁹²Ālam Ārā-yi Shāh Ismā'īl, pp. 30-31; Ghaffārī, Jahān Ārā, p. 263; Ross, "Early Years," p. 260. See also: ^ḤAzzāwī, Tārīkh al-Īrāq, 3:295. The accepted date for these events is 898/1493, such as given by Ghaffārī. John E. Woods, Aqqyunlu, p. 165 places the death of Bāysunqur in 898/1493 and gives further chronological details about this troubled period in the history of Iran.

The role of [°]Alī Pādīshāh did not only consist of helping Rustam rid himself of his main rival, it also extended to quelling internal dissent. It is reported that prior to his second expedition, the Ṣafavid leader dispatched Qara Firī Qājār to crush the revolt of the governor of Isfahān who had rebelled against Rustam.⁹³

The rising star of [°]Alī Pādīshāh became a source of anxiety for Rustam. The latter grew increasingly apprehensive of the qizilbāsh and decided to restrict the movement of the Ṣafavid leader with the aim of diminishing his contacts with his followers. Finally, he considered it best to eliminate his former but now cumbersome ally altogether. Abyah Sultān carried out this task by assassinating [°]Alī Pādīshāh in an ambush near Ardabīl.⁹⁴

[°]Alī Pādīshāh's ephemeral leadership of the Ṣafavid order was marked by the increasing power of his immediate entourage of khulafā who clearly formed the nucleus of a governing body. Despite the exaggerated image given to him by most Ṣafavid historians, [°]Alī Pādīshāh was only in his teens at his release from Istakhr,⁹⁵ thus

⁹³ Qara Firī Qājār is mentioned in Khwāndamīr, Habīb al-Siyar, 4:439-440 as Qara Firī Tavvāchīl. Sarwar, Shah Ismā[°]īl, p. 27, thinks that it is the same person.

⁹⁴ Ālam Ārā-yi Shāh Ismā[°]īl, pp. 33-34; Ālam-Ārā-yi Ṣafavī, pp. 36-39; Ghaffārī, Jahān Ara, p. 263; Husaynī, Die Frühen Safawiden, pp. 71-72; Khwāndamīr, Habīb al-Siyar, 4:440-441; Ross, "Early Years," pp. 261-262; Most of these sources agree on the date 898/1493 as that of [°]Alī Pādīshāh's death (Ghaffārī, Khwāndamīr). [°]Azzāwī, Tārīkh al-[°]Irāq, 3:295-296, agrees with this dating; Sarwar, Shah Ismā[°]īl, p. 28, thinks that it occurred at the end of 899/ mid 1494.

⁹⁵ Knowing that Ḥaydar was installed at Ardabīl in 874/1469 at the age of nine, it becomes evident that his son [°]Alī Pādīshāh was only in his teens by 898/1493. Had Ḥaydar lived, he would have been only thirty three at that date.

making the task of running the Order rest on the shoulders of a council of khulafā. For the first time in the history of the Ṣafavid order, members of this council officially held specific positions and responsibilities. Thus, Ḥusayn Beg Shāmlū, who was at Ḥaydar's side in the battle of Ṭabarsarān, became a lālā or tutor of the young [°]Alī Pādīshāh and later of his brother Ismā[°]īl.⁹⁶ Khādīm Beg, a veteran servant of the Ṣafavid leaders since the time of Junayd, took on the duties of khalīfat al-khulafā, to coordinate the activities of Ṣafavid propagandists.⁹⁷ The hierarchy of the Order also doubled as commanders of the qizilbāsh, each leading a group of fighters from his own tribe or clan. Among the known commanders--and in addition to the two previously mentioned--were: Rustam Beg Qaramānlū and Dede Beg Ṭālish, famous as Abdāl Beg. All were present at the side of [°]Alī Pādīshāh when he was ambushed and killed by Rustam Aq Qoyunlu's men.⁹⁸

Shah Ismā[°]īl, born on 25 Rajab 892/17 July 1487, was still an infant when he was destined to succeed his eldest brother.⁹⁹ The persecution of the Ṣafavid heirs and their followers by Rustam Mirza and Aybah Sultān led the hierarchy of the Order to seek refuge in

⁹⁶ Ālam-Ārā-yi Shāh Ismā[°]īl, p. 35; Ālam-Ārā-yi Ṣafavī, p. 36 and Ross, "Early Years," pp. 258-259.

⁹⁷ Iskandar Munshī, Ālam Ārā-yi Abbāsī, p. 24.

⁹⁸ Ross, "Early Years," pp. 258-259.

⁹⁹ Date given by Husaynī, Die Frühen Safawiden, p. 75. Zāhidī, Silsilat, p. 68, gives Ismā[°]īl's date of birth as 20 Rajab 893/30 June 1488, although he speaks of it later as having occurred in 892/1487-88.

Lāhijān at the court of Kārkiyā Mirza °Alī (883-910/1478-1504-5) the ruler of Gilān.¹⁰⁰ This choice might have been motivated by the enmity of Kārkiyā toward Rustam Mirza with whom he was at war in 898/1492.¹⁰¹ Until his departure from Gilān, Ismā°il was given a religious education at the hands of Shams al-Dīn Lāhijī.¹⁰² Sources lack information regarding the doctrinal orientation of these teachings which must have been within the framework of Shī°ism. The fact that Shams al-Dīn Lāhijī was selected by Kārkiyā Mirza °Alī to instruct the young Ismā°il on religious matters, together with the existence of Zaydī Shī°ism as the official religion of the Kārkiyā dynasty,¹⁰³ would logically lead to the conclusion that Ismā°il was influenced by those Shī°i teachings. Moreover, the same Shams al-Dīn Lāhijī was the first to hold the position of Sadr (equivalent of Grand Vizir) in the Safavid administration.¹⁰⁴

¹⁰⁰ Alam Ārā-yi Shāh Ismā°il, pp. 34-41; Khwāndamīr, Habīb al-Siyar, 4:441-442; Ross, "Early Years," pp. 266-270 and Rūmlū, Aḥsanu't-Tawārīkh, 1:4-9.

¹⁰¹ In 898/1492, Rustam attacked the forces of Kārkiyā in retaliation for the latter's raids against Aq Qoyunlu dominions. See: °Azzāwī, Tārīkh al-°Irāq, 3:294-295.

¹⁰² Ross, "Early Years," p. 271 and Rūmlū, Aḥsanu't-Tawārīkh, 1:9.

¹⁰³ The Kārkiyā dynasty was founded in 771/1369-70 by Sayyid °Alī Kārkiyā, a renowned Zaydī preacher. See: Zahīr al-Dīn Mar°ashī, Tārīkh-i Tabaristān va Rūvān va Māzandarān, edited by Manūchīhr Sutūdah (Tehran: Bunyād-i Farhang-i Irān, 1968), pp. 40-41 and 45-47. See also: E. de Zambaur, Manuel de Généalogie et de Chronologie pour l'Histoire de l'Islam (Hanovre: Librairie Heinz Lafaire, 1927), p. 193.

¹⁰⁴ Ghaffārī, Jahān Ārā, p. 266. See a different interpretation in: Mazzaoui, Origins, p. 80.

In Muḥarram 905/August-September 1499, Ismā°il decided to leave Lāhijān for Ardabīl.¹⁰⁵ He departed accompanied by seven of the influential members of his entourage.¹⁰⁶ These were: Husayn Beg Shāmlū Lālā, Abdāl Beg Dede, Khādīm Beg Khaḫīfat al-Khulafā, Qara Pīrī Qājār, Rustam Beg Qaramānlū, Bayram Beg Qaramānlū and Ilyās Beg Igūr Oġlu.¹⁰⁷ Upon reaching Ardabīl, they were served notice by its governor Sultan °Alī Chākīrlū to leave the city. Ismā°il and his party acquiesced to this order and proceeded to Arjuwān--a locality near Astār on the Caspian--where they spent the winter of 905/1499-1500.¹⁰⁸ In the meantime, they sent word to their followers in eastern Anatolia and Syria to assemble the following spring at Erzīnjan. Sources related that seven thousand followers answered this call. They belonged to a number of Turkoman tribes which formed the core of the qizilbāsh army as well as the vital power base of the Safavid dynasty. These tribes were: Shāmlū, Rūmlū, Ustājū, Tekkelū, Dulgadr, Qājār and Varsaq. In addition, followers from Qarājah Dāgh converged upon Erzīnjan.¹⁰⁹

From Erzīnjan, Ismā°il led the qizilbāsh against Shīrvān. There, he avenged his father's death by defeating Farrukh Yasār Shīrvānshāh. The latter was killed in battle and, on Ismā°il's order, was burnt

¹⁰⁵ Husaynī, Die Frühen Safawiden, p. 79.

¹⁰⁶ Sources mention that Ismā°il was accompanied by these seven men. They probably refer only to those who held key positions within the Order and not to the exact number of those who actually accompanied Ismā°il from Lāhijān to Ardabīl.

¹⁰⁷ Ross, "Early Years," p. 315.

¹⁰⁸ Rūmlū, Aḥsanu't-Tawārīkh, 1:27; 2:13.

¹⁰⁹ Husaynī, Die Frühen Safawiden, p. 91; Qazvīnī, Lubb al-Tawārīkh, pp. 240-241 and Rūmlū, Aḥsanu't-Tawārīkh, 2:18.

thereafter.¹¹⁰ According to a later source, this took place shortly after 21 Sha^obān 906/12 March 1501.¹¹¹ During that same year, two Aq Qoyunlu princes, Alvand and Murād, agreed to end their feud by dividing Iran between them. Alvand's dominions included Āzarbāyjān and Diyār Bakr while those of Murād expanded over ^oIrāq and Fārs.¹¹²

The news of the successful qizilbāsh campaign against Shīrvān compelled Alvand to take the precaution of advancing north to Nakhchivān and to prepare to repel a potential Safavid attack. On hearing of these developments, Ismā^oil and his qizilbāsh leaders decided to cut short the Shīrvānī campaign and prepare themselves for the coming battle against Alvand Aq Qoyunlu. The two armies met on the battlefield of Sharūr (or Shurūr) near Nakhchivān. The outcome of this confrontation was in Ismā^oil's favor. The qizilbāsh, although largely outnumbered, succeeded in inflicting a crushing defeat upon their enemy.¹¹³

As a result, the road to Tabriz became open to the Safavid leader and his followers. Shortly after his victory at Sharūr, Ismā^oil entered the Aq Qoyunlu capital in triumph and proclaimed himself Shah.

¹¹⁰ Ghaffārī, Jahān Ārā, pp. 264-265; Husaynī, Die Frühen Safawiden, pp. 95-100; Khwāndamīr, Ḥabīb al-Siyar, 4:454-459 and Rūmlū, Aḥsanu't-Tawārīkh, 2:18-19. Ismā^oil's father, Haydar, was killed by the same Shīrvānshāh at the battle of Tabarsarān in 893/1488.

¹¹¹ Husaynī, Die Frühen Safawiden, p. 98.

¹¹² Woods, Aqquyunlu, pp. 171-173, and ^oAzzāwī, Tārīkh al-^oIrāq, 3:306.

¹¹³ Ghaffārī, Jahān Ārā, p. 266; Husaynī, Die Frühen Safawiden, pp. 116-121; Khwāndamīr, Ḥabīb al-Siyar, 4:464-466, and Rūmlū, Aḥsanu't-Tawārīkh, 2:26.

As such, he decreed that Imāmī/Twelve Shi^ocism would be henceforth the state religion of Iran and followed up this decree by forcibly converting the Sunnī population.¹¹⁴ By 914/1508, date of his capture of Baghdād, Shah Ismā^oil succeeded in putting the whole country under his sway.¹¹⁵

The dating of Shah Ismā^oil's coronation (ju^lūs) at Tabriz has been controversial. Two of his contemporaries, the historian Khwāndamīr (d.941/1535) and Idrīs Bidlīsī (d. 926/1520), date this event in 906/1500, while most of the later historians report the coronation among the events of 907/1501.¹¹⁶ The date corresponding to the beginning of 907/mid-1501 is commonly accepted by modern historians.¹¹⁷

The process of transforming the Safavid Ṣūfī order into a viable political organization that was inaugurated by Junayd culminated with Shah Ismā^oil and his founding of the Safavid dynasty in 907/1501. The key factor behind this success was undoubtedly Junayd's espousing of extremist Shi^ocī beliefs which spread among the nomadic Turkomans of eastern Anatolia and northern Syria. The rallying of these Turkomans to the Safavid movement accelerated its metamorphosis into a militant and aggressive force. This change was also the result of the long

¹¹⁴ Ghaffārī, Jahān Ārā, pp. 266-267; Husaynī, Die Frühen Safawiden, p. 122, and Khwāndamīr, Ḥabīb al-Siyar, 4:467-468.

¹¹⁵ See: ^oAzzāwī, Tārīkh al-^oIrāq, 3:316-317.

¹¹⁶ Khwāndamīr, Ḥabīb al-Siyar, 4:467. Bidlīsī is quoted by John Woods, Aqquyunlu, p. 178. Among later chronicles, see: Rūmlū, Aḥsanu't-Tawārīkh, 2:25-26.

¹¹⁷ For example, Sarwar, Shah Ismā^oil, pp. 38-39, and Mazzaoui, Origins, p. 1. Browne, Literary History of Persia, 4:51, adopts 907/1501-2, although in p. 49 a subtitle bears the date 905/1499-1500.

lasting instability which existed in Iran throughout the second half of the fifteenth century.

The ghuluw (extremism) of the qizilbāsh led to the "deification" of the Şafavid leaders, from Junayd to Shah Ismā'īl. This factor played an important role in the Şafavid struggle against the Aq Qoyunlu rivals, since the Şafavid princes were considered spiritually superior to their opponents. This attitude existed during the lifetime of Junayd and Haydar as reported by Fazl Allāh Ibn Rūzbihān.¹¹⁸ The poetry of Shah Ismā'īl further confirms the remarks of this anti-Şafavid historian: the founder of the Şafavid dynasty clearly claims a divine nature and requests his followers to blindly obey him and prostrate themselves to him.¹¹⁹

The establishment of the Şafavid dynasty in Iran resulted in imposing Imāmī/Twelver Shī'ism as the official religion. Şafavid Iran became a threat to its most powerful neighbor, the Ottoman empire. Not only did the Şafavid rulers adopt Shī'ism, a doctrine which contrasted with the Sunnism of the Ottomans, they were also capable of stirring trouble within the Ottoman empire through the Turkoman tribes of eastern Anatolia which owed allegiance to the rather distant Şafavid rulers as leaders of the Şifī order. Consequently, relations between the Şafavids and the Ottomans were marked with conflict, an aspect which will be investigated in the following chapters.

¹¹⁸Ibn Rūzbihān, Persia in A.D. 1478-1490, pp. 65-68.

¹¹⁹See Appendix A.

CHAPTER THREE

THE OTTOMAN-ŞAFAVID CONFLICT:

THE ŞAFAVID OFFENSIVE

In the first half of the sixteenth century, the history of Iran was dominated by the conflict between its Şafavid rulers and the Ottomans on the one hand¹ and the contest with the Uzbeks on the other.² Although having religious overtones, the latter was to a large extent the result of the Şafavid-Uzbek rivalry over the control of Khurāsān. The conflict with the Ottomans was more than territorial: Şafavid ability to manipulate their large qizilbāsh following beyond their borders and throughout Anatolia had become a threat to the very foundations of the Ottoman empire. Hence, the

¹To date a small number of monographs have dealt with the relations between Safavid Iran and Europe, largely focusing on the period beginning with the rule of Shah 'Abbās I (996-1038/1588-1629). See for example Khanbaba Bayani, Les Relations de l'Iran avec l'Europe Occidentale à l'Époque Safavide (Paris: Imprimeries Les Presses Modernes, 1937), and Nasr Allāh Falsafī, Tārīkh-i Ravābiṭ-i Irān va Urūpā dar Dawrah-i Şafavīyah (Tehran: Chāpkhānah-i Irān, 1937). Iran's relations with the Ottomans during the formative period of the Safavids have received far less attention. The work of S. N. Fisher, Foreign Relations of Turkey has been extensively quoted for the last three decades. In that work, Turkey's relations with Iran are treated briefly (pp. 90-102).⁷ In addition to Fisher's monograph, some aspects of early Şafavid-Ottoman relations could be found in a number of biographical works, the most important of which are: Sarwar, Shah Ismā'īl Şafawī; Selahattin Tansel, Sultan II Bayezit'in Siyasi Hayatı (Istanbul: Millî Eğitim Basımevi, 1966); idem, Yavuz Sultan Selim (Istanbul: Millî Eğitim Basımevi, 1969). The articles of Jean-Louis Bacqué-Grammont shed new light on the early development of Ottoman-Şafavid relations.

²This question has been dealt with for the period 930-46/1524-40 by Martin B. Dickson. Detailed studies of the earlier period (1501-24) are still lacking.

Ottomans were compelled to divert their effort from Europe to their Asian hinterland and deal with the rebellions of their restive Anatolian subjects.

The Safavid-Ottoman conflict had repercussions upon a third Muslim power which shared common borders with both antagonists. The Mamluks of Egypt and Syria, apprehensive about any future Ottoman expansion beyond the Taurus, and aware of the Safavid menace along their eastern borders, deemed it wise to adopt a conciliatory attitude with their neighbors and refrained from taking a definitive stand toward the Ottoman-Safavid conflict. Only after 918/1512, when the rise of the Ottoman Sultan Selim (918-26/1512-20) augured a heightening of tensions between Ottomans and Safavids, did the Mamluks take a pro-Safavid stand; a decision which was at the origin of their downfall.

This was the geopolitical pattern along Iran's western and northwestern borders. On its eastern borders, the rising power of the Shaybānī Uzbeks of Transoxania (905-1007/1500-98), descendants of Jūchī son of Chengiz Khan,³ and their claim to large parts of the defunct Mongol and Tīmūrian empires, led to bitter confrontations with the Safavids for the control of the province of Khurāsān. The death in battle of the Uzbek ruler Muḥammad Shaybānī Khan (905-

³On the origins and rise of Uzbeks, see: Howorth, History of the Mongols (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1880), vol. 2, pt. 2, pp. 686-698; F. H. Skrine and E. D. Ross, The Heart of Asia. A History of Russian Turkestan and the Central Asian Khanates from the Earliest Times (London: Methuen and Co., 1099), pp. 182-188; and G. Hambly, ed., "The Shaybanids", in Central Asia (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1969), pp. 162-174.

16/1500-10) failed to put an end to this contest.⁴ On the contrary, both Safavids and Uzbeks were to be entangled in a series of confrontations for decades to come. Religious differences between the Shī'ī Safavids and the Sunnī Uzbeks also intensified the atmosphere of hostility. Moreover, Safavid support of Bābur (d. 937/1530) -- a Jagatay who was at war against the Uzbeks in the hope of recapturing his ancestral lands -- added further dimensions to this conflict.⁵

These internecine struggles took place at a time when Western Christendom was seriously threatening the foundations of Muslim power. At the close of the fifteenth century, two major events inaugurated a new and crucial episode in the relations between Islam and the West: these were the rounding of Africa via the Cape of Good Hope and the discovery of the Americas. Although the latter event was not immediately felt as a threat to the Muslims, the establishment by the Portuguese of a direct sea route linking Europe to India was regarded as a tangible menace to the economic interests of the Islamic countries which had been relying on the Eastern trade as an important source of revenue. A collective Muslim response to the Portuguese became impossible, due to the atmosphere of mutual distrust which prevailed and became aggravated by the schism between Iran and its

⁴In the present chapter, only relevant events up to 916/1510 will be mentioned. The reader will find useful information about Uzbek-Safavid relations in Sarwar, Shah Ismā'īl, pp. 58-71.

⁵Bābur's genealogy is given by Ḥaydar Dūghlāt, Tārīkh-i Rashīdī, translated and edited by N. Elias and E. D. Ross (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1972), pp. 172-173. Bābur's memoirs, The Bābur-Nāma in English, translated by Annette Susannah Beveridge (London: Luzac and Co., 1969) offer original information about Safavid dealings with him. Bābur founded in 932/1526 the Mughal empire in India.

neighbors. Although the Mamluks attempted to check the Portuguese advance in the Indian Ocean, their lone endeavor came to naught, due to their rivalry with the Ṭāhirids (rulers of Aden from 855 to 922/1451 to 1517) as well as the inferior equipment of their fleet.⁶

Venice, whose economic interests in the Middle East were at stake, was in no position to respond to the Portuguese challenge. The Republic of St. Mark had been in confrontation with the Ottomans in the Morea and also against its Christian enemies who, led by the Papacy, had formed the primarily anti-Venetian League of Cambrai. Moreover, her attempts to form an alliance with Shah Ismāʿīl angered both Mamluks and Ottomans.

The present chapter focuses on Iran's relations with the Ottomans from the rise of Shah Ismāʿīl to the death of Sultan Bayezid II, namely from 907 to 918/1501 to 1512. It deals especially with the multiple effects of the metamorphosis of the Ṣafavids from a militant Ṣūfī order into a ruling body, a transformation which influenced not only the internal situation in Iran but also the evolution of that country's relations with its neighbors. As the leader of the qizilbāsh followers who spread over Anatolia and northern Syria, Shah Ismāʿīl had the ambition to establish an empire which would include, in addition to Iran, Ottoman and Mamluk domains where his supporters were established. In fact, the designs of the Ṣafavid ruler over Anatolia became evident prior to building his power in Iran. Ottoman reaction under Bayezid II was flexible if not actually hesitant. The

⁶A brief account of these expeditions may be found in E. Denison Ross, "The Portuguese in India and Arabia between 1507 and 1517," JRAS (1921): 545-562.

Ottoman ruler, aware of the support which Shah Ismāʿīl enjoyed among the numerous qizilbāsh in Anatolia, preferred to avoid a direct confrontation with the Ṣafavids, thus allowing the latter to adopt an offensive posture. These conditions afforded Shah Ismāʿīl the opportunity to create trouble within the Ottoman empire through the numerous rebellions of his followers.

A. The First Contacts. *(Why Erzurum as meeting place)*

The accounts given by the various Ṣafavid chronicles regarding the events of the two years which preceded the coronation of Shah Ismāʿīl in 907/1501, have never been subjected to close scrutiny. The majority of modern specialists in Ṣafavid history have accepted the versions presented in these narratives. However, a closer look at these chronicles for the period 905-7/1499-1501 would reveal discrepancies and inconsistencies which might be corrected in light of information furnished by contemporary Ottoman, Mamluk and Venetian chronicles or documents. Such an undertaking would undoubtedly shed some light on the first contacts between the Ottomans and the Ṣafavids.

Except for minor details, all Ṣafavid chronicles present similar versions of the events which occurred shortly before the rise of Shah Ismāʿīl. In these sources, the image of the founder of the Ṣafavid dynasty is overshadowed by his spiritual and almost divine role as the hereditary leader of the original Ṣafavid Ṣūfī order. Thus, these narratives contain not only a recording of events, but abound in legendary exaggerations as well. It is beyond the scope of the present work to deal in detail with the information presented by chronicles of the early Ṣafavid period. Only events having a bearing

upon Safavid-Ottoman relations will be studied. For this purpose, it has been deemed necessary to make a summary of relevant events in order to facilitate further investigation.

In the middle of Muharram 905/August 1499, Ismā'īl Safavī--then a lad who was nonetheless the recognized leader of the eponymous Sūfi order--left his refuge in Gīlān, accompanied by seven of his closest khulafā. He proceeded by way of Tārum and Khalkhāl to Ardabil, the traditional center of the Order. On the way, numbers of followers flocked to him and formed an army of 1,500 men. In Ardabil, Ismā'īl visited the tomb of his ancestor and founder of the Order, Shaykh Ṣafī al-Dīn. The governor of that city served him notice to leave; Ismā'īl acquiesced and encamped outside the city.⁷ From there, he headed toward Ṭawālīsh, an area bordering on the Caspian Sea, where he set up his winter camp at Arjuwān. The following spring (905/1500), he evinced an inclination to raid Georgia, and was persuaded by his chief advisors to call upon his followers in Anatolia and Syria to assemble in Erzinjan,⁸ the gateway to Ottoman territories in Asia Minor. Subsequently, he set out toward Erzinjan where 7,000 adherents had assembled.⁹ At Erzinjan, Ismā'īl held a "council of war" with his chief khulafā, in which future plans were debated. It became clear during the discussion that they had no predetermined course of action as to what to do after reaching Erzinjan. The suggestions put forth

⁷ Husaynī, Die Frühen Safawiden, p. 79; Khwāndamīr, Habīb al-Siyar, 4:448; Rūmlū, Aḥsanu't-Tawārīkh, 1:27; Ross, "Early Years," pp. 316-317.

⁸ Husaynī, Die Frühen Safawiden, pp. 80-90; Khwāndamīr, Habīb al-Siyar, 4:449; and Ross, "Early Year," p. 326.

⁹ Husaynī, Die Frühen Safawiden, p. 91; Khwāndamīr, Habīb al-Siyar, 4:451-453; Rūmlū, Aḥsanu't-Tawārīkh, 1:41-42 and 2:18.

by his advisors could be summarized as follows: one group suggested remaining in Erzinjan and spending the winter there; the second group advocated raiding Georgia in the winter; yet another faction proposed to return to Chukhūr Sa^cd, a location closer to Iran,¹⁰ to pass the winter there. Faced with this lack of consensus, Ismā'īl finally decided that a campaign against Shīrvān was the most favorable course to follow.¹¹ Hence, he marched against Shīrvān where--by mid 906/end of 1500--he defeated and killed its ruler and ordered his corpse burned, and built pyramids of the skulls of the vanquished Shīrvānīs.¹² From Shīrvān, Ismā'īl and his followers moved toward Āzarbāyjān where they successfully engaged the army of Alvand Aq Qoyunlu at the battle of Sharūr. This success led to the capture of Tabrīz and the birth of the Safavid dynasty, following Ismā'īl's coronation as the new Shah of Iran at the beginning of 907/mid-1501.¹³

¹⁰ It seems that Chukhūr Sa^cd is a location close to Chāldīrān and might correspond with Erivan. See Tadhkirat al-Mulūk, p. 165. Shah Tahmāsp I, Rūznāmah-i Shāh Tahmāsp Avval Safavī, in Maṭla' al-Shams, by Muḥammad Hasan Khān (Tehran: Imperial Organization for Social Services, 1976), 2:194-195, states that Qārs is located between Chukhūr Sa^cd and Erzerum.

¹¹ This detailed version is given by Rūmlū, Aḥsanu't-Tawārīkh, 1:41-42. The original Persian text is even more explicit about Shah Ismā'īl's indecisiveness. Rūmlū states that the Safavid leader resorted to an istikhārah to make a final decision. This is a special ritual aimed at "entrusting God with the choice between two or more possible options;" see T. Fahd, "Istikhārah," EI², 4:259-260.

¹² Husaynī, Die Frühen Safawiden, pp. 99-103; Khwāndamīr, Habīb al-Siyar, 4:453-459; Rūmlū, Aḥsanu't-Tawārīkh, 1:43-47 and 2:19-20.

¹³ Husaynī, Die Frühen Safawiden, pp. 119-123; Khwāndamīr, Habīb al-Siyar 4:463-468; Rūmlū, Aḥsanu't-Tawārīkh, 1:57-61; Qazvīnī, Lubb al-Tawārīkh, p. 242.

This version does not fully account for the motive behind Ismā'īl's--or more specifically, his advisors'--decision to call upon his followers in Anatolia and Syria to gather in Erzinjan in the spring of 905/1500. Considering that, from Arjuwān, a traveller would have to cover a distance of approximately one thousand miles in a westward direction to reach Erzinjan, and that the same traveller would have to undertake a trip of similar length, this time in an easterly direction, to go from Erzinjan to Shīrvān, it would be futile on the part of Ismā'īl to have moved in person from Arjuwān to Erzinjan only to assemble his Anatolian and Syrian supporters.¹⁴ Such a task could have been equally fulfilled by sending some of his chief khulafā instead. In addition, a number of sources indicate that Ismā'īl and his advisors had no definite plan of action either prior or even subsequent to their arrival in Erzinjan. While in Erzinjan, the Ṣafavid leadership made the decision to summon the followers of Anatolia and Syria, with the intention of making preparations to raid Georgia. In the interim, plans were changed and Shīrvān became the primary target of the future expedition.¹⁵ Although these details might enlighten the reader as to the lack of consensus among Ismā'īl's close advisors (he himself was only about twelve years of age at this time),¹⁶ they still leave unanswered the question of the choice of

¹⁴The closest distance between Ardabīl and Erzinjan on a map is over 500 miles. Considering the winding roads of this mountainous region, the road distance between these two locations could easily be doubled.

¹⁵Husaynī, Die Frühen Safawiden, pp. 80-81 and 91-92; Khwāndamīr, Habīb al-Siyar, 4:449 and 4:453-454; Rūmlū, Asanu't-Tawārīkh, 1:41.

¹⁶Ismā'īl was born on 25 Rajab 892/17 July 1487.

Erzinjan as the gathering place for Ismā'īl's army of murīds (followers).

The answer to this question should be sought in the events which were taking place beyond the borders of Iran, specifically within the Ottoman empire. There, the province of Karaman was in the throes of a large-scale rebellion instigated by Muṣṭafā Karaman Oĝlu who, with the support of the Tūrghūd (or Turgut) and Varsaq tribes, known for their religious extremism as well as for their allegiance to the Ṣafavids,¹⁷ took advantage of the Ottoman campaign against the Venetian outposts in the Morea to stir rebellion in southern Anatolia. Begun in 905/1500, this rebellion was ultimately put down in Ramaḍān 905/March 1501 following Karaman Oĝlu's defeat at the hands of Maṣḥ Pasha, the Ottoman Grand Vizir.¹⁸ The rebels' leader then escaped to Syria where he was incarcerated in Aleppo by Mamluk authorities.¹⁹

From these events the only discernible indication of a potential alliance between Karaman Oĝlu and Shah Ismā'īl is the role played by the pro-Ṣafavid Tūrghūd and Varsaq tribes. This constitutes an insufficient criterion, since contemporary Ottoman sources

¹⁷The Varsaq tribe is known as a Ṣafavid supporter since the times of Shaykh Junayd. See: Aşıkpaşazade, Tevārīh, p. 265; and V. Minorsky, Tadhkirat al-Mulūk, p. 190. The Tūrghūd tribe was known for its religious unorthodoxy. Claude Cahen, Pre-Ottoman Turkey (New York: Taplinger Publishing Co., 1968), p. 355, wrote: "We are told in the fourteenth century that certain Turkish or Mongol tribes, like the Turgut on the Anatolian plateau, were dominated by ibāhiyya, indifference to the current ordinances of morality and religion." On the Ṣafavid-Tūrghūd links, see Appendix C.

¹⁸Tansel, Bayezid, p. 123; Hammer-Purgstall, Histoire de l'Empire Ottoman, 4:92.

¹⁹Solakzade, Tarih, pp. 311-312, mentions that Karaman Oĝlu lived in Iran in his youth.

advanced other causes for the rebellion. As an example, Aşıkpaşazade reduces the revolt of what he calls "the false son of Karaman" to a manifestation of overwhelming disaffection with the administrative reorganization of the province of Karaman which had reduced the size of the tīmār holdings allocated to the sipāhīs and resulted in increased taxes.²⁰ These measures caused further resentment on the part of the population because they gave the state a stronger hand in the management of the vaqf lands (religious endowments). These facts fully explain the participation of the sipāhīs in the rebellion.²¹ The only documented evidence of external intervention in the general uprising of Karaman is that of Venice who had an interest in keeping Anatolia in turmoil in the hope of creating internal trouble spots for the Ottomans, against whom she was on the defensive on the battlefields of the Morea.²²

Among Persian sources, only Ghaffārī mentions the dispatching of a message to the Ottoman Sultan Bayezid II from Shah Ismā'īl, while the latter was encamped at Erzinjan. He dates this correspondence around the end of 905/mid-1500 or the beginning of 906/second half of

²⁰ A tīmār is a fief with an annual revenue of more than 20,000 Aqches, given to a sipāhī (a cavalryman) in return for military service. See: Halil İnalcık, The Ottoman Empire; The Classical Age; 1300-1600 (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1973), pp. 108-118 and 225-226.

²¹ Aşıkpaşazade, Tevārīh, pp. 260-261. Irène Beldiceanu-Steinherr and N. Beldiceanu, "Deux villes de l'Anatolie Préottomane," REI 39 (1971): 337-386, mention two recensions of the province of Karaman during Bayezid's rule: the first in 888/1483 and the second in 906/1500. The latter coincides with the rebellion and might have been one of the causes, since the religious class lost part of its revenues.

²² Fisher, Foreign Relations of Turkey, pp. 91-92, quoting Marino Sanudo.

1500, the latter date being the most probable, since it coincides with that of Shah Ismā'īl's stay in that city.²³ Among modern scholars, Professor Michel Mazzaoui tentatively ascribes that correspondence to this period.²⁴ However, a number of chronicles, among which are those of Sharaf al-Dīn Bidlīsī and Solakzade, date this first exchange of messages in 908/1502-3.²⁵ A close study of the contents of the missives reveals the validity of Ghaffārī's version.

The text of the correspondence has been reproduced by Ferīdūn Bey in his Munsha'āt-i Salātīn.²⁶ In his message to Bayezid II, Shah Ismā'īl reminds the Ottoman Sultan of the large following that the Şafavid order has traditionally enjoyed in Anatolia. He then complains that the Ottoman authorities have prevented the movement of his followers from Anatolia to Iran and asks Bayezid to allow them free movement in the future.²⁷ This letter reveals Shah Ismā'īl's disappointment with the relatively small number of followers who gathered in Erzinjan. In fact, only seven thousand supporters were able to reach that city, a small number if compared with those who took part in later Şafavid-instigated rebellions in Anatolia. Thus, the hypothesis that Shah Ismā'īl preferred to meet with his followers in Erzinjan with the hope of depleting Anatolia of a significant

²³ Ghaffārī, Jahān Ārā, p. 265.

²⁴ M. Mazzaoui, Origins, p. 81.

²⁵ Sharaf al-Dīn Bidlīsī, Chéréf-Nameh ou Fastes de la Nation Kourde, edited by V. Velyaminov-Zernov, 2 vols (St. Petersburg: 1860-1862), and translated into French by F. B. Chamoy (St. Petersburg: Académie Impériale des Sciences, 1873), 2:509; and Solakzade, Tarih, p. 317.

²⁶ Ferīdūn Bey, Munsha'āt, 1:345-346; also reproduced in Şābitī, Asnād, pp. 420-422.

²⁷ Ferīdūn, Munsha'āt, 1:345; Şābitī, Asnād, pp. 420-421.

proportion of its manpower before moving deeper into Ottoman territory to join the rebellion of Karaman Oğlu deserves attention. In this respect, it could only be the meager showing of followers in Erzinjan which compelled the Şafavid leadership to change plans and decide on a military action of smaller scale, choosing Shīrvān as a target.²⁸ This interpretation is capable of explaining the motives behind Shah Ismā'īl's move to Erzinjan and his subsequent attack on Shīrvān.

The confirmation of this thesis rests with the solution of three major questions: first, the definitive dating of the aforementioned messages between Shah Ismā'īl and Bayezid; second, the evidence that the choice of Erzinjan was not made solely because it was the location "where his followers could have an easy access to him;"²⁹ third, that Venice had initiated contacts not only with Karaman Oğlu but also with the Şafavid leadership to form an anti-Ottoman league.

Ferīdūn Bey mentioned two exchanges of messages between Shah Ismā'īl and Sultan Bayezid, and reproduced the texts of the four missives.³⁰ Although these letters were undated, the date of the second set is easily verified, since a close reading reveals that they were exchanged shortly before Shah Ismā'īl's campaign against Dulğadır, which took place in 913/1507.³¹ As for the first set, which contains Shah Ismā'īl's complaint concerning Ottoman obstruction of

²⁸Fairly detailed accounts are given by Husaynī, *Die Frühen Safawiden*, pp. 80 and 91-92; and Khwādamīr, *Habīb al-Siyar*, 4:449 and 453-454.

²⁹According to Sarwar, *Shah Ismā'īl*, p. 34; who followed the version given in Ross, "Early Years," p. 325.

³⁰Ferīdūn, *Munsha'āt*, 1:345-347.

³¹In his message, Ismā'īl informed Bayezid that he would be crossing Ottoman territory on his way to Dulğadır.

the movement of his followers, its dating has never come under scrutiny. Among original sources, Ghaffārī relates that Shah Ismā'īl sent a letter to Bayezid II from Erzinjan in 906/1500, while Sharaf al-Dīn Bidlīsī and Solakzade mention that Shah Ismā'īl lodged his complaint to the Ottomans in 908/1502-3.³² Sultan Bayezid's response tends to confirm Ghaffārī's version. The Ottoman ruler addressed Shah Ismā'īl as a *Sayyid*, and as the spiritual leader of the Şafavid Sūfī order,³³ and promised him that he would give permission--with certain restrictions--for his followers to make the pilgrimage to Ardabīl.³⁴ Had Sultan Bayezid sent this message in 908/1502-3, he would have addressed the Şafavid leader with royal titles and would also have congratulated him for his successes against the Aq Qoyunlu Alvand, since Shah Ismā'īl was crowned at least a year earlier, at the beginning of 907/mid-1501. Moreover, Naṣr Allāh Falsafī has published the text of a message from Sultan Bayezid to Shah Ismā'īl, sent in 910/1504-5 with an ambassador by the name of Muḥammad Chāvūsh

³²See above, notes 23 and 25.

³³Ferīdūn, *Munsha'āt*, 1:345.

جناب سلطنت مآب حکومت نصاب شوکت قیاب سعادت ایاب سیادت انتساب
مبارزا للسلطنة والحكومة والعز والاقبال شاه اسماعیل اسسس
الله بنیان عدله و افضاله الی یوم الدین

³⁴*Ibid.*, pp. 345-346. The Anatolian followers of the Safavids had been visiting Ardabīl since the time of Shaykh Ṣafī al-Dīn, the founder of the Order. Bayezid informed Ismā'īl that the free movement of Şafavid followers to Iran would disrupt the economy and the military levy system in Anatolia. Only those going with the intention of returning--in other words those going to visit Ardabīl--would be allowed to leave Anatolia. However, this response was tantamount to a refusal from Bayezid. This "pilgrimage" should not be confused with that prescribed by Islam (to the Holy Places of Mecca and Medina). It is rather a customary visit to the shrines of the founders of mystical orders.

Bālābān.³⁵ Among other things, Bayezid reproached Ismā'īl for not dispatching an ambassador to inform him of his successes.³⁶ The Ottoman Sultan enumerates these successes starting with Ismā'īl's campaign against Shīrvān, which took place in 906/1500-1, shortly after his departure from Erzinjan. Thus, it is evident that no correspondence existed between the two rulers in the interval between the time Shah Ismā'īl left Erzinjan (mid 906/1500) and 910/1504-5, date of the embassy of Muhammad Chāvūsh Bālābān. This conclusion clearly shows that both Bidlīsī and Solakzade were in error when they dated Shah Ismā'īl's complaint in 908/1502-3. Therefore, the validity of Ghaffārī's version, according to which the Ṣafavid leader had written to the Ottoman court from Erzinjan in 906/1500 before marching against Shīrvān, is beyond any doubt.

The second aspect of the present analysis deals with the motives behind Shah Ismā'īl's choice of Erzinjan as the place of assembly for his followers from Anatolia and Syria. As has been shown above, it seems illogical for the Ṣafavid leader to have moved in person from

³⁵ N. Falsafī, "Jang-i Chāldirān," Tehran. Dānishgāh. Majallah-i Dānishkadāh-i Adabīyāt 1 (1953): 53-55. The arrival of the ambassador, who reached Shah Ismā'īl's camp at Isfahān, was recorded by contemporary sources. See for example: Khwāndamīr, Habīb al-Siyar, 4:480-481; and Rūmlū, Aḥsanu't-Tawārīkh, 2:37.

³⁶ Falsafī, "Jang-i Chāldirān," pp. 53-55. Ismā'īl failed to follow the diplomatic tradition of the time which consisted of sending ambassadors to friendly rulers informing these of his accession. This might be the reason which motivated Bayezid to address the Ṣafavid ruler by the same titles he used in his message of 906/1500-1, in response to the letter that Shah Ismā'īl had sent from Erzinjan. In fact, in a later message, dated 912/1507-8, Bayezid addresses Shah Ismā'īl using royal titles, as shown in the following reproduction from Ferīdūn, Munsha'āt, 1:347: شهریار اعظم و تاجدار اکرم ملک ممالک العجم و نوین بلاد التورک و الدیلم جمشید دوران و کیخسرو زمان الموبد من عند اللہ الملک الجلیل شاه اسماعیل.

Arjuwān to Erzinjan and from there to Shīrvān for the sole purpose of meeting his followers, when he could have saved himself this trouble by sending a number of his lieutenants or selecting an intermediate location. Among modern historians, Ghulām Sarwar speculates that Erzinjan was "where his followers would have an easy access to him."³⁷ However, this assertion is proven wrong by Rūmlū and Khwāndamīr, who report that while Shah Ismā'īl was in Shūrah Gul (in the Chukhūr Sa'ad area), there arrived Qarāchah Ilyās with a group of followers from Anatolia. From there, the members of this group accompanied Shah Ismā'īl to Erzinjan by way of Terjan.³⁸ This episode illustrates two important facts: first, that the Anatolian followers could have assembled at a site beyond Erzinjan on their way to Iran; second, that the choice of Erzinjan was motivated by factors which would go beyond the simple gathering of followers. The fact that the Ṣafavid leadership deemed it necessary to have Qarāchah Ilyās and his Anatolian troops present at Erzinjan instead of assigning them to a camp closer to Iran or Shīrvān, clearly demonstrates that Shah Ismā'īl was planning on using the maximum manpower that he could collect.

Among Venetian sources, the voluminous Diari of Marino Sanudo "the Younger" are of paramount interest. Although the complete set was not accessible to this writer, the works of Guglielmo Berchet, Sydney N. Fisher, and the recently published compilation of excerpts

³⁷ Sarwar, Shah Ismā'īl, p. 34.

³⁸ Khwāndamīr, Habīb al-Siyar, 4:451-453; and Rūmlū, Aḥsanu't-Tawārīkh, 1:35-37 and 2:15.

from the Diarii, edited by Biancamaria Scarcia Amoretti,³⁹ would furnish sufficient reliable information drawn from Sanudo's own work. The existence of contact between Venice and Karaman Ođlu is clearly confirmed.⁴⁰ There are also indications that the Republic of St. Mark had approached Shah Ismā'īl for the purpose of forming a Safavid-Karamanid alliance against the Ottomans. Berchet, quoting Sanudo, mentions the report in December 1501 of a nuncio by the name of Dell'Asta [or Dell'Arta] concerning Shah Ismā'īl.⁴¹ In Sanudo/Amoretti, a message reaching Venice from one of its agents in the Levant and dated 25 November 1502, reported that the "Sofi" (Shah Ismā'īl) wanted to secure artillery from the Christians.⁴² Fisher, again relying on Sanudo, tells of the sending of Constantino Laschari from Cyprus to Karaman and Shah Ismā'īl "to promise aid and artillery," without specifying the date.⁴³ In Sanudo/Amoretti, a document records this mission in the first half of 1502,⁴⁴ while Berchet mentions the valuable desposition to the Senate of Venice, made in 1502 by one of its subjects living in Cyprus, about Shah Ismā'īl.⁴⁵ These reports point to the fact that Venice entered into contact with Shah Ismā'īl at least by the

³⁹ Marino Sanudo, Šāh Ismā'īl I nei "Diarii" di Marin Sanudo, vol. 1, edited by Biancamaria Scarcia Amoretti (Rome: Istituto per l'Oriente, 1979), hereafter quoted as Sanudo/Amoretti.

⁴⁰ Fisher, Foreign Relations of Turkey, pp. 91-92.

⁴¹ Berchet, Venezia e la Persia, p. 23.

⁴² Sanudo/Amoretti, Šāh Ismā'īl, 1:9-10.

⁴³ Fisher, Foreign Relations of Turkey, p. 92.

⁴⁴ Sanudo/Amoretti, Šāh Ismā'īl, 1:9-10.

⁴⁵ Berchet, Venezia e la Persia, p. 22.

beginning of 1502. Nevertheless, a further analysis of these documents will indicate that these contacts had started earlier. The document concerning Laschari's mission (June 1502) as well as the report of Dell'Asta tend to confirm this hypothesis. The letter sent from Cyprus stated that "come quel regimento havia mandato domino Constantino Laschari, per ambassador im Persia, al-Caraman e al nuovo profeta; lo qual partite."⁴⁶ Thus, Laschari was dispatched to "Persia" (Iran), Caraman (either the province of Karaman or Karaman Ođlu himself) and to the "nuovo profeta" (new prophet, i.e., Shah Ismā'īl). Considering that Shah Ismā'īl had proclaimed himself the new ruler of Iran in the middle of 1501, it would be unusual to encounter this dual reference to Shah Ismā'īl and to "Persia". Moreover, by 1502, a year would have passed since the rebellion in Karaman was put down and its leader escaped to Syria where he was incarcerated by the governor of Aleppo. Thus, an ambassadorial mission to both Karaman and Shah Ismā'īl would be meaningless unless it took place prior to 1502 and more precisely unless it happened prior to the end of the uprising in Karaman (March 1501).

In addition to these documents, contemporary Mamluk sources would have been of interest in determining the relationship between Shah Ismā'īl and Karaman Ođlu. Unfortunately, no direct reference has been made to the rebellion of Karaman by any contemporary Mamluk chronicle. The imprisonment of Karaman Ođlu in Aleppo was mentioned only by Venetian and Ottoman sources.⁴⁷ Relying exclusively on

⁴⁶ Sanudo/Amoretti, Šāh Ismā'īl, 1:9-10.

⁴⁷ Sanudo as quoted by Fisher, Foreign Relations of Turkey, p. 92; Sclakzade, Tarih, p. 312.

Sanudo, Fisher reported that the Mamluk Sultan responded with a refusal "when Ismā'īl requested the governor of Aleppo to free the Karamanian leader."⁴⁸ This Ṣafavid demand illustrates the special relationship which existed between Karaman Ođlu and Shah Ismā'īl. Moreover, Mamluk sources tend to support the validity of such an assertion. They relate among the events of 908/1502-3, that rumors of a move against Aleppo by Shah Ismā'īl had reached Cairo and that the Sultan had reacted by dispatching a military contingent to that city, a fact also confirmed by Sanudo.⁴⁹ Since a Ṣafavid campaign against Aleppo did not take place, it would appear that Mamluk reaction was caused by verbal threat from Shah Ismā'īl.

The previous arguments demonstrate that the choice of Erzincan as a gathering place for Shah Ismā'īl's Anatolian and Syrian followers was neither accidental nor was it decided upon merely because of the city's location. The preceding analysis shows that Ismā'īl's hidden intention was to enter Anatolia from Erzincan to join the widespread rebellion of Karaman Ođlu. The obstruction of the movement of his followers by the Ottomans and the unexpectedly low number of adherents who managed to reach Erzincan caused the Ṣafavid leadership to change plans and decide instead upon a relatively minor operation in Shīrvān, a decision which was to alter the course of Iranian history.

⁴⁸Fisher, Foreign Relations of Turkey, p. 92.

⁴⁹Sanudo as quoted by Fisher, *ibid.* Ibn Iyās, Badā'i' al-Zuhūr, 4:39 and 46-47; and Ibn Ṭūlūn, Mufākahat al-Khillān, 1:262-264.

B. The Road to Chāldirān.

The capture of the capital city of Tabrīz in 907/1501 represented the first step toward the spread of Ṣafavid hegemony over the rest of Iran. The main obstacles in Shah Ismā'īl's path were the numerous petty rulers among whom the country was divided; the most prominent being the Aq Qoyunlu princes Alvand and Murād.⁵⁰ The former fled to Erzincan following his defeat at Sharūr. Upon receiving the news of his pursuit by the qizilbāsh army, he took the road to Baghdād, whence he reached Diyār Bakr, an area which was considered to be the hearth of the Aq Qoyunlu confederation and where his uncle Qāsim Beg ruled. Alvand had to fight his way into that region, due to the opposition of Qāsim Beg, whom he defeated and later killed in 908/1502.⁵¹ From then until his natural death in 910/1504, the former ruler of Tabrīz was able to temporarily safeguard the independence of Diyār Bakr which was finally annexed by the Ṣafavids three years later, in 913/1507-8.⁵² The following year (914/1508), Shah Ismā'īl

⁵⁰For a list of these rulers, see: Rūmlū, Aḥsanu't-Tawārīkh, 1:62 and 2:26-27; and Sarwar, Shah Ismā'īl, p. 43. Sir Percy Sykes, A History of Persia (New York: Barnes and Noble, 3rd edition, 1969), 2:159, wrongly stated that the two Aq Qoyunlu princes were brothers. Alvand was the son of Yūsuf, while Murād was the son of Ya'qūb; see: Khwāndamīr, Ḥabīb al-Siyar, 4:443-444. The reader will find an excellent account of these events, together with genealogical tables in the work of John Woods, Aqquyunlu, pp. 173-178, and appendices 1, 9, and 12.

⁵¹Rūmlū, Aḥsanu't-Tawārīkh 1:64 and 2:28, Khwāndamīr, Ḥabīb al-Siyar, 4:468-469; Woods, Aqquyunlu, p. 175.

⁵²Bidlīsī, Chérēf-Nameh, 2:518; Khwāndamīr, Ḥabīb al-Siyar, 4:488; Rūmlū, Aḥsanu't-Tawārīkh, 1:93-94 and 2:41-43; Woods, Aqquyunlu, pp. 175-177.

entered the former ^cAbbāsīd capital of Baghdād, thus extending his authority over Arab Iraq.⁵³

The movements of Alvand's cousin, Murād, who ruled over Persian Iraq and Fārs, were more complex. Although the qizilbāsh were able to defeat his supporters at Ulmah Qulāghī near Hamadān (24 Dhū'l-Ḥijjah 908/21 June 1503), and put his dominions under their sway,⁵⁴ Murād succeeded in escaping to Aleppo where he sought the help of the Mamluks, but failed to receive a positive response to his request.⁵⁵ This Mamluk reluctance compelled him to move to Dulgadīr, where its ruler ^cAlā' al-Dawlah offered him support and sealed his new alliance through the marriage of one of his daughters to the fugitive Aq Qoyunlu prince.⁵⁶ Subsequently, Murād sided successively with Dulgadīr and with the Ottomans in an effort to regain his lost power in Iran. Finally, his death in 920/1514, shortly after Sultan Selim's campaign in Iran, removed the last Aq Qoyunlu challenge to the Ṣafavids.

The consolidation of Ṣafavid power in Iran was met with hostility on the part of the Ottomans. Bayezid had clearly demonstrated his anti-qizilbāsh stand as early as 893/1488, on the occasion of

⁵³ Bidlīsī, Chérēf-Nameh, 2:518; Khwāndamīr, Habīb al-Siyar, 4:488; Rūmlū, Aḥsanu't-Tawārīkh, 1:102-104; ^cAzzāwī, Tārīkh al-^cIrāq, 3:338-343.

⁵⁴ Khwāndamīr, Habīb al-Siyar, 4:469-475; Rūmlū, Aḥsanu't-Tawārīkh, 1:64-69 and 73-74 and 2:28 and 32; Sarwar, Shah Ismā^cīl, pp. 44-45; R. M. Savory, "The Consolidation of Ṣafavid Power in Persia," Der Islam 41 (October 1965): 71-72.

⁵⁵ Ibn Iyās, Badā'i^c al-Zuhūr, 4:143; Khwāndamīr, Habīb al-Siyar, 4:486; Savory, "Consolidation of Ṣafavid Power," p. 72.

⁵⁶ Khwāndamīr, Habīb al-Siyar, 4:486; Rūmlū, Aḥsanu't-Tawārīkh, 1:92; Woods, Aqquyunlu, pp. 177-178; Savory, "Consolidation of Ṣafavid Power," p. 72.

Ḥaydar's death.⁵⁷ In this respect, the attitude of the Ottoman Sultan remained unchanged, as shown through the missives he sent, first to Alvand Aq Qoyunlu prior to the battle of Sharūr (907/1501)⁵⁸ and later to the Kurdish Amīr Ḥājī Rustam.⁵⁹ In both messages, Bayezid referred to Shah Ismā^cīl and his supporters in antagonistic terms, such as "qizilbāsh hordes", "the oppressive qizilbāsh faction, may God defeat them" and the like.⁶⁰ Moreover, the rebellion of Karaman in 906/1501 increased Ottoman suspicion of the qizilbāsh. Although Bayezid refrained from initiating military action aimed directly at Shah Ismā^cīl, his decision to relocate thirty thousand of his extremist Shī^cī subjects from Anatolia to the newly conquered European domains in the Morea could be interpreted only as a precautionary measure intended to disperse Shah Ismā^cīl's followers in Anatolia, thus weakening their esprit de corps and solidarity.⁶¹ In addition, the atrocities which had been inflicted by the qizilbāsh upon the Sunnī population in Iran, further heightened tensions between Ṣafavids

⁵⁷ See Chapter Two, notes 80-82.

⁵⁸ The Text of this correspondence is reproduced in Ferīdūn, Munsha'āt, 1:351-353.

⁵⁹ Ibid., 1:353-354.

⁶⁰ Ibid., "طائفه باغيه قزلباشيه خذلم الله" "مجوسيان روزادگان", "جماعت قزلباش"

⁶¹ Tansel, Bayezid, p. 237; Hammer-Purgstall, Histoire de l'Empire Ottoman, 4:92-93; Fisher, Foreign Relations of Turkey, p. 92. The number of 30,000 is mentioned by Sanudo/Amoretti, Shāh Ismā^cīl, 1:141.

and Ottomans.⁶² At the very outset, Shah Ismā'īl adopted a distinct anti-Ottoman attitude. Not only did he refrain from sending an embassy to the Ottoman court to inform the Sultan of his accession to power, he also mistreated the Ottoman envoy whom Bayezid dispatched when news of the numerous successes of the new dynasty had become known. The Ottoman ambassador reached Shah Ismā'īl's camp at Isfahān in the winter of 910/1504-5.⁶³ He carried a message in which the Ottoman Sultan vigorously condemned Ismā'īl's treatment of the Sunnites, equating him with al-Hajjāj, Chengiz Khan and Tīmūr. The greater portion of the letter contained a number of recommendations to Shah Ismā'īl, mostly focusing on the necessity of changing his attitude toward his Muslim brethren as a primordial condition for improving relations between the two countries. Sultan Bayezid concluded with a veiled ultimatum, reminding the Šafavid ruler that he would be held responsible for his actions if he persisted in persecuting his co-religionists.⁶⁴ Shah Ismā'īl reacted defiantly by obliging the Ottoman ambassador to watch the burning of two of his

⁶²Jean Aubin, "La Politique Religieuse des Safavides," in le Shi'isme Imamite (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1970), p. 237, made the following comment on Shah Ismā'īl's atrocities, which even included anthropophagy: "Les atrocités commises par Shah Ismā'īl et ses adeptes ne sont pas inférieures à celles qu'on impute aux Mongols."

⁶³His arrival was recorded by Khwāndamīr, Ḥabīb al-Siyar, 4:480-481; Rūmlū Aḥsanu't-Tawārīkh, 1:86-87. A more detailed account of this embassy, together with a reproduction of Bayezid's message is found in Falsafī, "Jang-i Chāldirān," pp. 53-55.

⁶⁴Ibid.

adversaries, one of them known to be Sunni.⁶⁵ He also added insult to injury by compelling the same ambassador to eat pork, the consumption of which is forbidden to all Muslims.⁶⁶ Venetian sources reported that in response to this mission Shah Ismā'īl dispatched an envoy to Istanbul to lay claim to the province of Trabzon.⁶⁷ Shortly thereafter, the Šafavid ruler made overtures to Venice through Bartolomeo Contarini, her consul in Damascus. According to Marino Sanudo, this consul informed the Signoria in a letter dated 5 November 1505 that he had received--through an intermediary--a message from Shah Ismā'īl, which was written in Persian, expressing that ruler's hopes for improved relations with the Republic of St. Mark and for a common policy toward the Ottomans.⁶⁸ In turn, Venice instructed her consul to pursue these contacts.⁶⁹

Faced with Shah Ismā'īl's defiance, Bayezid was unable to carry out his threat and elected to temporize. This stand was probably

⁶⁵Reported by Khwāndamīr, Ḥabīb al-Siyar, 4:478 and 481-482. These were Muḥammad Karrah, the governor of Abarqūh and Ḥusayn Kiyā, governor of Fīrūzkūh. See also Rūmlū, Aḥsanu't-Tawārīkh, 1:87 and 2:37.

⁶⁶Reported by Sanudo/Amoretti, Šāh Ismā'īl, 1:80-81. This embassy is mentioned by Sarwar, Shah Ismā'īl, pp. 72-73, but his version lacks analysis.

⁶⁷Sanudo/Amoretti, Šāh Ismā'īl, 1:81, #113, dated August 1505. Uzun Hasan married Catherina, a daughter of Calo Johannes Komnenus, who ruled Trabzon until his death in 1457. Haydar, Ismā'īl's father, married ʿĀlamshāh Begum--also known as Marta--who was the daughter of Uzun Hasan and Catherina Komnena. Thus, Shah Ismā'īl considered himself heir to Trabzon through his mother.

⁶⁸Sanudo/Amoretti, Šāh Ismā'īl, 1:84, #117 and 118, respectively dated November and December 1505. Shah Ismā'īl's message reached Venice in January 1506. For its translation in old Italian see Ibid., 1:91-92, #132. Further information is furnished by Berchet, Venezia e la Persia, p. 24.

⁶⁹Ibid., p. 25.

motivated by the effect that a military operation against Iran might have upon the restive qizilbāsh followers in Anatolia. Moreover, later events reflected the existence of a deep split among the Ottoman princes, especially in regard to the course of action that should be taken vis-à-vis the qizilbāsh question.⁷⁰ These domestic factors compelled Sultan Bayezid II to decide on a conciliatory stand toward the new ruler of Iran, at a time when the possibility of a common venture with the Mamluks was nil. The latter were not only traditionally suspicious of the Ottomans, but were also experiencing political and economic difficulties⁷¹ and deemed it advantageous to maintain their mighty neighbor on the defensive. This situation, coupled with the effect of Shah Ismā'īl's rise upon his followers in Syria,⁷² led Sultan Qānsūh al-Ghawrī (906-22/1501-16) to adopt a moderate stand toward the new dynasty in Iran.

⁷⁰Tansel, Bayezid, pp. 238-240.

⁷¹Precedents of Ottoman-Mamluk rivalry date back to the rule of Mehmed II, following the capture of Constantinople. As for the internal situation, the Mamluk empire was raked by the feuds of its commanders, from the death of Sultan Qāyrbāy in 901/1496 to the accession of Sultan Qānsūh al-Ghawrī in 906/1501. This sultan spent the first years of his reign in pacifying the realm. Moreover, the empire's economy was worsening. Ibn Iyās, Badā'i' al-Zuhūr, 4:259, reported that no ships came from Jedda from 914 to 920/1508 to 1514.

⁷²News of Shah Ismā'īl's move from Gilān to Anatolia and Shīrvān reverberated among his Syrian followers. Ibn Tūlūn, Mufākahat al-Khillān, 1:244, reported that on 'Āshūrā' (the 10th of Muharram, celebrated by the Shī'ites in commemoration of Ḥusayn ibn 'Alī ibn Abī Tālib's martyrdom at the hands of the Umayyads), a group of Persians and Qalāndars [Kalendarlar] assembled defiantly in Damascus and demonstrated their Shī'ī beliefs. This event, and the false rumors of Shah Ismā'īl's march against Syria, compelled the government to forbid the sale of weapons except to the soldiery. Ibid., 1:252.

Bayezid's policy of appeasement with respect to the Şafavids gave the latter a free hand, not only to consolidate their power and spread Shī'ism within Iran, but also to take the initiative within the Ottoman empire by fomenting rebellions and stirring trouble later on. In any case, this situation further deepened the rift which had existed among the Ottoman princes and was the primary cause behind the challenge of Sultan Selim and the forced abdication of Bayezid II in 918/1512.

The first test of Ottoman attitude occurred in 913/1507-8, date of the Şafavid punitive campaign against 'Alā' al-Dawlah Dulgadr for his alliance with Murād Aq Qoyunlu.⁷³ In order to reach Dulgadr, the qizilbāsh army had to cross either Ottoman territories in southern Anatolia or Mamluk dominions in northern Syria. Shah Ismā'īl elected to cross Kayseri [Qaysariyah] and informed Sultan Bayezid of this decision. Not only did the Ottoman Sultan accept this as a fait accompli but he also addressed the Şafavid ruler with most glowing titles.⁷⁴ At the same time, Shah Ismā'īl dispatched an emissary to the Mamluk Sultan Qānsūh al-Ghawrī. This ambassador, who reached

⁷³Details of this campaign are found in the following: Khwandamīr, Ḥabīb al-Siyar, 4:486-490; Bidlīsī, Chérèf-Nameh, 2:518; Rūmlū, Aḥsanu't-Tawārīkh, 1:92-96 and 2:41-43; and Ghaffārī, Jahān Ārā, pp. 270-271.

⁷⁴The text of this correspondence is found in Ferīdūn, Munsha'āt, 1:346-347. To the present writer's knowledge, this was the first time that Bayezid addressed Ismā'īl with full royal titles. This exchange of messages took place in 913. In a message dated 12 Rabī' II 913/21 August 1507, the Şafavid ruler informed Bayezid that he was already on his way against Dulgadr. Rūmlū, Aḥsanu't-Tawārīkh, 1:93, reported that Shah Ismā'īl issued orders for his army to assemble for the expedition in the summer of 913. This year 913 started on 13 May 1507, corresponding to late spring. Thus 12 Rabī' II would correspond to 21 August 1507.

Cairo in the month of Sha^cbān 913/December 1507,⁷⁵ conveyed his master's claim to Adana and Tarsus, territories which belonged to the Ramazan Oğulları, who were vassals to the Mamluks.⁷⁶ When, at the end of the campaign, the qizilbāsh army returned to Iran via Mamluk territory,⁷⁷ Sultan Qānṣh al-Ghawrī took the precaution of sending an expedition to Syria, but his soldiers avoided engaging the qizilbāsh who moved unhampered to Iran.⁷⁸ Thus, with one stroke, Shah Ismā^cīl succeeded in defying both Ottomans and Mamluks, and confirmed their inability to face his challenge. On the Ottoman side, this occasion demonstrated the discontent of Sultan Selim, then governor of Trabzon, with the passive policy of his father. This future Ottoman Sultan and successor to Bayezid ordered raids to be carried out against Safavid territory in Erzinjan and Bayburt, as a reprisal against Shah Ismā^cīl's crossing of Ottoman territory.⁷⁹

⁷⁵ According to Ibn Iyās, Badā'i^c al-Zuhūr, 4:123.

⁷⁶ According to Sanudo/Amoretti, Shāh Ismā^cīl, 1:138, #218. The Venetian document reported that Shah Ismā^cīl threatened "to come to Aleppo and Damascus and all of Syria, and to issue money in his name in Cairo." Among Mamluk sources, only Ibn Iyās mentioned the arrival of the ambassador without giving further information.

Shah Ismā^cīl's claim to Adana and Tarsus proves that he had the ambition to establish an empire comprising, next to Iran, the areas inhabited by Safavid followers. In fact, it was at Adana and Tarsus that his grandfather Junayd was well received by the Varsaq tribe during his flight from Konya.

⁷⁷ Khwāndamīr, Habīb al-Siyar, 4:488; Ibn Tūlūn, Mufākahat al-Khillān, 1:316.

⁷⁸ Ibn Tūlūn, Mufākahat al-Khillān, 1:316 and 318; Ibn Iyās, Badā'i^c al-Zuhūr, 4:118-119.

⁷⁹ Ālam Ārā-vi Safavī, p. 142; Solakzade, Tarih, p. 324; and Hammer-Purgstall, Histoire de l'Empire Ottoman, 4:93-94. Shah Ismā^cīl was to remind Sultan Selim of this episode in one of the messages he sent him prior to the battle of Chāldirān.

Meanwhile, the Safavid ruler stepped up his efforts to win Venetian support against the Ottomans by initiating direct contacts with the Signoria. A Safavid embassy, composed of five envoys, reached Venice in May 1509 with instructions to seek the sending of artillery masters and to formulate a military alliance against the Ottomans, requests to which Venice was non-committal.⁸⁰ News of this mission leaked to the Mamluks who arrested the Safavid envoys and their Venetian companions at al-Bīrah, in Syria, on their return journey to Iran (Rabī^c II 916/July-August 1510).⁸¹

While seeking a rapprochement with Venice, Shah Ismā^cīl was secretly plotting the disruption of the Ottoman empire from within. He succeeded in winning to his side Bayezid's son Shāhīnshāh, then governor of Karaman, with whom he maintained a secret correspondence. This matter was brought to Bayezid's attention by Khāyir Beg, the Mamluk governor of Aleppo, who--in 1510--had intercepted two messages from Shah Ismā^cīl and Khān Muḥammad Ustājū (Safavid governor of Diyār Bakr) addressed to the Ottoman prince.⁸² Shāhīnshāh's loyalty to the qizilbāsh was also confirmed in a letter sent by his lālā Ḥaydar Pasha to Bayezid.⁸³

⁸⁰ Sanudo/Amoretti, Shāh Ismā^cīl, 1:162-163, #251 and 252; Berchet, Venezia e la Persia, p. 25.

⁸¹ Ibn Tūlūn, Mufākahat al-Khillān, 1:342-343; Sanudo/Amoretti, Shāh Ismā^cīl, 1:181, #279. Sultan Qānṣh al-Ghawrī also imprisoned the Venetian consuls in Alexandria and Damascus. These events led Venice to send a special emissary to defuse the crisis. Her envoy, Domenico Trévisan, left a narrative of his mission to Cairo, published by Ch. Schefer in his Voyage d'Outremer de Jean Thénaud (Paris: Ernest Leroux, 1864), pp. 147-226.

⁸² Tansel, Bayezid, pp. 238-239, according to Topkapı Sarayı Arşivi, Doc. #5594.

⁸³ Ibid., according to Topkapı Sarayı Arşivi, Doc. #6352.

Shah Ismā'īl's hostility toward both Ottomans and Mamluks surfaced again in 916/1510 on the occasion of the death of a third Sunnī potentate, the Uzbek ruler Muḥammad Shaybārī Khan, also known as Shaybak or Shāhī Khan. This ruler had met with success in his drive against the Timūrid princes and--in a series of campaigns from 906/1500 to 913/1507--was able to put Transoxania, Khwārizm and Khurāsān under his sway.⁸⁴ He also adopted a distinctly anti-Ṣafavid stand while seeking friendly relations with the Ottomans.⁸⁵ Not only did he belittle Shah Ismā'īl in an insulting message,⁸⁶ he also ordered raids to be carried out against Iran.⁸⁷ The ensuing clash with the Ṣafavid army resulted in his defeat and death in a battle fought in the vicinity of Marv on 30 Sha'abān 916/2 December 1510.⁸⁸ Shah Ismā'īl, who commanded the Ṣafavid army, ordered the head of his fallen adversary cut off and made a gold-mounted drinking cup out of

⁸⁴ A detailed analysis of the rule of Shaybak Khan is lacking. The reader might consult the following original sources: Bābur, The Bābur-Nāma in English, pp. 127-328; Ḥaydar, Tārīkh-i Rashīdī, pp. 232-237. A brief survey could be found in Savory, "Consolidation of Ṣafavid Power," pp. 77-79. Notes on the Turkic calendar, also used by Ḥaydar, are found in R. D. McChesney, "A Note on Iskandar Beg's Chronology," JNES 39 (January 1980): 53-64.

⁸⁵ Ḥaydar, Tārīkh-i Rashīdī, pp. 232-237. No evidence exists of an alliance between Uzbeks and Ottomans. They enjoyed normal relations, a fact illustrated by the arrival in 1508 at the Ottoman court of an Uzbek envoy. See Hammer-Purgstall, Histoire de l'Empire Ottoman, 4:4.

⁸⁶ Ḥaydar, Tārīkh-i Rashīdī, pp. 232-233; Rūmlū, Aḥsanu't-Tawārīkh, 1:112-113 and 2:51-52.

⁸⁷ Khwādamīr, Ḥabīb al-Siyar, 4:504-506.

⁸⁸ Ḥaydar, Tārīkh-i Rashīdī, pp. 233-236; Khwādamīr, Ḥabīb al-Siyar, 4:506-517; Rūmlū, Aḥsanu't-Tawārīkh, 1:118-123 and 2:52-54.

the skull.⁸⁹ He further seized this opportunity to demonstrate his defiance to the two other Sunnī rulers by sending the straw-stuffed head of the former ruler to Bayezid II,⁹⁰ while conveying the severed heads of a number of prominent Uzbeks to the Mamluk court, together with a demand to cover the Holy Ka'bah in Mecca.⁹¹

During this period, the rift within the ruling Ottoman dynasty became manifest. Sultan Bayezid's favoring of his son Aḥmad over the younger Selim for the succession to the throne resulted in open rebellion by the latter who, with the backing of the Janissaries, succeeded in forcing the abdication of his father; whereupon he himself ascended the throne (7 Ṣafar 918/24 April 1512).⁹² These developments--the roots of which might be traced back to 915/1509⁹³

⁸⁹ Rūmlū, Aḥsanu't-Tawārīkh, 1:122 and 2:54. See also the eloquent account of E. G. Browne, A Literary History of Persia, 4:64-66.

⁹⁰ Rūmlū, Aḥsanu't-Tawārīkh, 1:122 and 2:54. See Ālam Ārā-yi Ṣafavī, pp. 328-329, where the name of the envoy is given as Ṣifī Khalīl Rūmlū.

⁹¹ Ibn Ṭūlūn, Mufākahat al-Khillān, 1:354-357.

⁹² It is beyond the scope of the present work to deal with the details of Selim's challenge to his father. The reader might refer to the following sources for further information: Hammer-Purgstall, Histoire de l'Empire Ottoman, 4:103-154; Çagatay Uluçay, "Yavuz Sultan Selim nasıl Padişah oldu?" Türk Tarih Dergisi, Pt. 1, 6:9 (1954): 53-90; Pt. 2, 7:10 (1954); 117-142; Pt. 3, 8:11-12 (1955): 185-200; Tansel, Bayezid, pp. 267-305; İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, Osmanlı Tarihi (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1964), vol. 2, pt. 2, pp. 238-345.

⁹³ By a decree of 6 August 1509, Bayezid II bowed to the pressure of his other sons and cancelled a previous decree by which he appointed Sulayman son of Selim as governor of Bolu. Instead, Sulayman was given Caffa. This event marked the beginning of the open rivalry among the Ottoman princes for the succession to the throne. Bayezid's older son, Aḥmad, objected to the appointment of his nephew Sulayman at Bolu, on the grounds that this locality would place him close to the capital, a fact which might facilitate Selim's task in the race for the throne. For further information, see: Tansel, Bayezid, pp. 266-268; Uzunçarşılı, Osmanlı Tarihi, vol. 2, pt. 2, p. 238.

were accelerated from 916 to 918/1511 to 1512 and reached their conclusion in 919/1513 with the defeat and death of Selim's brother and rival Ahmad.⁹⁴

These years of civil strife afforded Shah Ismā'īl the opportunity to further aggravate the situation. In the western Anatolian province of Tekke, Shāhqūī Bābā Tekkelu⁹⁵--whose father Hasan Khalīfah had served Shaykh Junayd and Shaykh Ḥaydar (respectively Shah Ismā'īl's grandfather and father)⁹⁶--raised the standard of rebellion and planned a general uprising.⁹⁷ Large numbers of qizilbāsh followers as well as discontented sipāhīs rallied to him and enabled him to spread the rebellion to other areas.⁹⁸ Not only did the rebels

⁹⁴ Ahmad died in battle fighting Sultan Selim on the plain of Yenishahr (27 Muḥarram 919/15 April 1513). See: Tansel, Yavuz Sultan Selim, pp. 1-18; Hammer-Purgstall, Histoire de l'Empire Ottoman, 4:146-154.

⁹⁵ His real name is unknown. Shāhqūī (a title meaning the slave or servant of the Shah) is also known in a number of Ottoman sources as Shaytānqūī (the slave or servant of the devil) and as Qarah Biyik Oğlu (the son of the one with the black mustache). See: Uzunçarşılı, Osmanlı Tarihi, vol. 2, pt. 2, p. 230.

⁹⁶ The majority of Ottoman sources mention that Hasan Khalīfah served only Ḥaydar, a theme echoed by modern Turkish historians. However, the manuscript of the anonymous history of Shah Ismā'īl reported that he served both Junayd and Ḥaydar. See: E. D. Ross, "Early Years," p. 309.

⁹⁷ Shāhqūī sent four propagandists to Rumelia, an indication that he planned a widespread rebellion. See: Uzunçarşılı, Osmanlı Tarihi, vol. 2, pt. 2, p. 230. The rebellion started at the end of 916/March 1511. See: Uluçay, "Selim," pt. 1, p. 63; and Tansel, Bayezid, p. 249.

⁹⁸ Uluçay, "Selim," pt. 1, pp. 63-68; Uzunçarşılı, Osmanlı Tarihi, vol. 2, pt. 2, pp. 230-231; Tansel, Bayezid, pp. 249-251; Hammer-Purgstall, Histoire de l'Empire Ottoman, 4:111-112.

succeed in defeating and killing the Beylerbey of Anatolia,⁹⁹ they were also able to reach the vicinity of Bursa, the capital of the first Ottoman Sultans.¹⁰⁰ The magnitude of the rebellion compelled the Ottoman Grand Vizir Khādim ^{CAI} Pasha to move in person with fresh troops from Rumelia in pursuit of Shāhqūī and his supporters. An encounter near Sivas on 5 Rabī' ^C II 917/2 July 1511 decided the fate of the rebellion and ended with the defeat of the qizilbāsh and the death of Shāhqūī, while on the Ottoman side the Grand Vizir Khādim ^{CAI} Pasha perished in battle.¹⁰¹ Qizilbāsh survivors took the road to Iran, where--in the vicinity of Erzinjan--they plundered a caravan and killed five hundred of its merchants,¹⁰² an act for which they were reprimanded by Shah Ismā'īl who ordered the spoils to be taken away from them. He also ordered a number of their leaders to be put to death as an example of strict discipline to the rest of the group.¹⁰³

⁹⁹ Tansel, Bayezid, pp. 251-252; Uluçay, "Selim," Pt. 1, p. 68; Hammer-Purgstall, Histoire de l'Empire Ottoman, 4:108. This encounter took place near Kutahya on 23 Muḥarram 917/22 April 1511.

¹⁰⁰ Shāhqūī reached the vicinity of Bursa in pursuit of Prince Ahmad (4 Ṣafar 917/3 May 1511). See: Uluçay, "Selim," Pt. 1, p. 70. See also: Tansel, Bayezid, p. 252. Bursa was the capital of the Ottomans until 767/1366, when Edirne (Adrianople) in the European side of the empire was chosen by Sultan Murād I (761-91/1360-89) as the new capital. From 1453 onward, Istanbul shared that role with Edirne.

¹⁰¹ Rūmlū, Aḥsanu't-Tawārīkh, 1:126; Munajjim Bāshī, Ṣaḥā'if al-Akḥbār (Istanbul: Matba'ah-i ^{CA}Amirah, 1868): 3:348; Uluçay, "Selim," Pt. 1, pp. 70-72; Tansel, Bayezid, pp. 253-256; Hammer-Purgstall, Histoire de l'Empire Ottoman, 4: 111-113.

¹⁰² Rūmlū, Aḥsanu't-Tawārīkh, 1:126; Munajjim Bāshī, Ṣaḥā'if al-Akḥbār, 3:438, mentions one thousand killed.

¹⁰³ Rūmlū, Aḥsanu't-Tawārīkh, 1:126; Bidlīsī, Chérèf-Nameh, 2:524-525. Hammer-Purgstall, Histoire de l'Empire Ottoman, 4: 114-115, quoted the Ottoman historian Sa'd al-Dīn who stated that two of their chiefs met their death by being thrown in cauldrons of boiling water.

News of Shāhquh's rebellion prompted Shah Ismā'īl to further undermine the Ottoman empire by instigating another large scale uprising in Anatolia. He dispatched to this effect Nūr °Alī Khalīfah to whom he entrusted the leadership of the qizilbāsh followers.¹⁰⁴ Soon, thousands of supporters from among the Turkoman and Kurdish tribes answered Nūr °Alī Khalīfah's call and joined in the rebellion.¹⁰⁵

The disparity between the respective Safavid and Ottoman sources does not permit to give a definite account of those events.¹⁰⁶ However, it seems that the activities of the qizilbāsh

¹⁰⁴ Rūmlū, Aḥsanu't-Tawārīkh, 1:134, 2:62; Munajjim Bāshī, Ṣaḥā'if al-Akhhbār, 3:440; Uluçay, "Selim," Pt. 2, p. 128; and M. C. Şehabettin Tekindağ, "Yeni Kaynak ve Vesikaların ışığı altında Yavuz Sultan Selim'in İran Seferi," Istanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi Tarih Dergisi 17 (March 1967):51.

¹⁰⁵ These followers were from the Varsaq, Afshārlū, Qaramānlū, Tūrhūdū, Bozūqlū, Tekkelū and Ḥamīdlū tribes. See: Munajjim Bāshī, Ṣaḥā'if al-Akhhbār, 3:440-441.

¹⁰⁶ The best Safavid version is given by Hasan-i Rūmlū in his Aḥsanu't-Tawārīkh, 1:134-135, 2:62-63; while Khwāndamīr, Ḥabīb al-Siyar and Bidlīsī, Chéréf-Nameh, totally ignore the events related to Nūr °Alī Khalīfah. Rūmlū's version is reproduced in the anonymous history of Shah Ismā'īl [British Museum MS, Or. 3248], a first part of which has been edited and translated by Sir E. Demison Ross in JRAS (1896). It is on this version that both Sarwar, Shah Ismā'īl, p. 73, and Savory, "The Consolidation of Safavid Power in Persia," pp. 82-83, have relied. Both sources state that the first encounter between Nūr °Alī Khalīfah and the Ottomans occurred at Malatya. However, this is highly improbable, since the bulk of the rebellion centered around Tokat, Amasya and Chorum, locations closer to Erzincan than to Malatya. Moreover, another anonymous history of Shah Ismā'īl gives a totally erroneous version when it states that--on his return journey to Iran--Nūr °Alī Khalīfah captured Aleppo where he read the Khuṭbah in the name of Shah Ismā'īl; a version easily dismissed in light of information contained in Safavid and Mamluk sources. See: Ālam Ārā-yi Shāh Ismā'īl, pp. 189-190.

The publication by Çagatay Uluçay of a number of documents dealing with these events, from Topkapı Sarayı Arşivi in his article, "Selim nasıl Padişah oldu?" sheds some light on this rebellion and affords the researcher further details. The version adopted in the present chapter relies on the narration of Ḥasan-i Rūmlū as well as on the information given by Çagatay Uluçay.

centered around the cities of Tokat (Tūqāt), Amasya and Chorum (Chorum),¹⁰⁷ and that the rebellion started shortly after Prince Aḥmad captured Konya from his nephew Mehmed son of Shāhinshāh.¹⁰⁸ Nūr °Alī Khalīfah succeeded first in entering Tokat where he read the Khuṭbah (Friday Sermon) in the name of Shah Ismā'īl before deciding to leave for Adına Bazarı.¹⁰⁹ Meanwhile, two local qizilbāsh leaders--Qarah Iskandar and °Isā Khalīfah--secured the backing of Murād son of Aḥmad. The latter, who then governed Amasya in the name of his father joined the rebels with thousands of his supporters and turned a deaf ear to his father's orders to dissociate himself from the qizilbāsh.¹¹⁰ At the end of Muḥarram 918/April 1512, Murād and the qizilbāsh laid waste areas in the vicinity of Chorum and Amasya,¹¹¹ before establishing contact with Nūr °Alī Khalīfah and his men in a location between Qāz Chāyırī and Tokat.¹¹² Subsequently, the combined forces marched against Tokat and burnt it when the inhabitants put up a stubborn resistance.¹¹³ Following this event, Murād and his supporters set out toward Iran, where the Ottoman prince had been

¹⁰⁷ Uluçay, "Selim," Pt. 2, p. 128; Munajjim Bāshī, Ṣaḥā'if al-Akhhbār, 3:441; Rūmlū, Aḥsanu't-Tawārīkh, 1:134-135 and 2:62-63.

¹⁰⁸ Munajjim Bāshī, Ṣaḥā'if al-Akhhbār, 3:440. It began toward the end of Muḥarram 918/April 1512. See: Uluçay, "Selim," Pt. 1, 124 and 129, note. 26.

¹⁰⁹ Rūmlū, Aḥsanu't-Tawārīkh, 1:134 and 2:62-63.

¹¹⁰ Uluçay, "Selim," Pt. 2, p. 129.

¹¹¹ Ibid., pp. 128-129.

¹¹² Rūmlū, Aḥsanu't-Tawārīkh, 1:135 and 2:63.

¹¹³ Ibid.

promised a fief in the province of Fārs.¹¹⁴ In the meantime, Nūr °Allī Khalīfah left Tokat and headed for Sivas, near where he encountered--at Koyulhisar--an Ottoman expedition under the leadership of Sinān Pasha, Ahmad's vizir. The outcome of the ensuing engagement was in favor of the qizilbāsh who succeeded in killing Sinān Pasha as well as hundreds of his men.¹¹⁵ After this victory, Nūr °Allī Khalīfah led his men back to Iran by way of Erzinjan.¹¹⁶

The feuding among Bayezid's three sons--Ahmad, Korkud and Selim--for the succession to the throne, presented Shah Ismā°il with another opportunity to meddle in the affairs of the Ottoman empire. Through his network of khulafā who doubled as spies, the Şafavid leader was informed of the developments taking shape in Anatolia. In this respect, a message of Shah Ismā°il to Mūsā Tūrghūd Ođlu, from the Tūrghūd tribe, reveals beyond any doubt the existence of Şafavid informants and agents in Asia Minor. In this letter, dated 7 Rabī° I 918/23 May 1512, Shah Ismā°il requests Mūsā Tūrghūd Ođlu to contact Ahmad Āghā Qaramānlū, a Şafavid emissary to Anatolia, and to heed his orders; he also enjoined him to report in detail all activities in the area.¹¹⁷

¹¹⁴Ibid., Murād died on his way to Fārs. See Khwādamīr, Ḥabīb al-Siyar, 4:523.

¹¹⁵Rūmlū, Aḥsanu't-Tawārīkh, 1:132, 2:63. The location of the battle is given by Uluçay, "Selim," Pt. 2, p. 130, note 27.

¹¹⁶Rūmlū, Aḥsanu't-Tawārīkh, 1:132, 2:63.

¹¹⁷A photocopy of Shah Ismā°il's message was first published in 1968 as an appendix to S. Tekindağ's article "Yeni Kaynak ve Vesfkaların Işıđı altında Yavuz Sultan Selim'in İran Seferi," and references to that document (Topkapı Sarayı Arşivi, no. 5460) were made in pp. 51-52 of that article. A year later, S. Tansel reproduced the same document as an appendix to his book Yavuz Sultan Selim. See also Appendix C of the present work.

This message was sent after Sultan Selim had succeeded in forcing the abdication of his father Sultan Bayezid II. Selim, who then firmly controlled Rumelia, was faced with the challenge of his older brother Ahmad, who placed himself as de facto ruler over Anatolia. During the ensuing civil war which ended with Ahmad's defeat at Yenisehr [Yenişehir] on 8 Şafar 919/15 April 1513,¹¹⁸ the Tūrghūd, Dulğadr and Ramazan tribes entered Bursa in support of Ahmad (4 Rabī° II 918/19 June 1512).¹¹⁹

Sultan Selim's triumph was a bad omen for Shah Ismā°il and the qizilbāsh, since his aggressiveness toward the Şafavids had been demonstrated when he was governor of Trabzon. As Sultan, Selim would follow the same policy with regard to the Şafavids and would succeed in turning the tide of events in favor of the Ottomans.

¹¹⁸For a review of these events, see: Uluçay, "Selim," Pt. 2, pp. 125-142 and Pt. 3, pp. 185-200; Tansel, Yavuz Sultan Selim, pp. 1-30; Hammer-Purgstall, Histoire de l'Empire Ottoman, 4:146-154. A third son of Bayezid, Korkud was no real threat to Selim; however, the latter took the "precaution" of having him strangled.

¹¹⁹Uluçay, "Selim," Pt. 2, pp. 132-133.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE OTTOMAN-SAFAVID CONFLICT:

THE OTTOMAN OFFENSIVE

The events which rocked Anatolia during the last decade of Sultan Bayezid's rule, demonstrated not only the Safavids' ability to stir their Turkoman followers in that region but also clearly showed the precarious state of Ottoman security along the eastern and southern Anatolian borders. Such instability, although largely due to active Safavid propaganda among the Turkoman tribes in that area, was also the result of Sultan Bayezid's preoccupation with the northern Anatolian borders as illustrated in his duel with Venice for the control of the Black Sea and the Morea. While concentrating on dislodging the Signoria from her outposts in those two areas, Bayezid maintained a conciliatory stand toward the Safavids.

The rule of Sultan Selim I (918-26/1512-20), Bayezid's son and successor, was marked by a major shift in Ottoman expansionist policy.

The outbreak of several Turkoman rebellions, instigated by the Safavids, compelled the new Ottoman Sultan to deal with the roots of the problem. Hence, instead of placating the Safavids as had Bayezid, Selim adopted a clearly aggressive policy toward Shah Ismā'īl. The outcome of this new direction was drastic for the future of Ottoman-Safavid relations as well as for the rest of the Middle East. Selim succeeded in carrying the offensive into his enemy's territory on the battlefield of Chāldirān (2 Rajab 920/23 August 1514). The defeat of Shah Ismā'īl at Chāldirān placed the Safavids on the defensive vis-à-vis the Ottomans for decades to come. In fact, it was not until

the rule of Shah Abbās (996-1038/1588-1629) that the Safavids were able to turn the tide in their favor.

From a strategic standpoint, the campaign of Chāldirān resulted in the Ottoman occupation of Diyār Bakr and the strengthening of their hold over eastern Anatolia through the capture of Erzinjan. Of these two, the control of Diyār Bakr was of utmost importance, since it led to the creation of an Ottoman zone in the Upper Euphrates, an area crossed by major routes linking Iran to Anatolia and northern Syria, especially Aleppo. This permitted the Ottomans not only to keep a watchful eye on the respective movements of the Safavids and the Mamluks, thus decreasing the chances of coordination among their armies, but also involved a logistic advantage: the Ottomans, having acquired such a permanent base, would be able to launch future expeditions into either Iran or Syria with relative ease.

Selim's campaign of 920/1514 against Iran aroused the apprehension of the Mamluks. Having been in a bitter contest against the Ottomans over the control of the Taurus area, the Mamluks were alarmed upon receiving intelligence of the movement of their traditional foe into Iran. This attitude was clearly expressed through the hostile actions of their vassal 'Alā' al-Dawlah Dulgadīr (885-921/1480-1515) who attacked the Ottoman supply line in southern Anatolia. The subsequent annexation of Dulgadīr province by the triumphant Ottoman armies in 921/1515 further hastened the impending confrontation between Ottomans and Mamluks. Soon thereafter, Selim led his men into Syria where he engaged Sultan Qānṣāh al-Ghawrī and his troops at Marj Dābiq (922/1516) in northern Syria. There, the well equipped and better disciplined Ottoman army won the day; the Mamluks were not only defeated, but lost their aging Sultan in battle.

The remnants of the Mamluk army were unable to check the advance of the Ottomans against Egypt. A second encounter on the battlefield of Raydānīyah (922/1517), on the outskirts of Cairo, ended in favor of the Ottomans. This last victory placed the dominions of the former Mamluk empire within Ottoman fold.

Sultan Selim's conquest of Syria and Egypt and the subsequent extension of Ottoman suzerainty to the Hījāz, stretched the empire longitudinally from the plains of Central Europe to the shores of the Red Sea. This new reality dictated a new orientation in Ottoman policy, the shaping of which fell to Selim's successor.

The reign of Sultan Sulayman II (926-74/1520-66) which corresponded to that of Tahmāsp I (930-74/1524-76) in Iran, was marked by the divergence of Ottoman policy, a trait that a modern historian characterized as a "crisis of orientation".¹ During this period, the Ottomans were compelled to fight almost simultaneously on four separate fronts: Europe, the Mediterranean, Iran and the Indian Ocean. Of these four, only the Iranian front will be considered in the present work; however, references to events occurring on the other fronts will be made whenever they influence Ottoman-Safavid relations.

The main feature of Ottoman policy toward the Safavids during the era of Sultan Sulayman the Magnificent consisted of an effort to contain and isolate Iran rather than to conquer it. The Ottomans, having to spread their effort over several fronts and engaging in a duel with the rising star of Western Christendom both on land--in

¹Subbi Labib, "The Era of Sulayman the Magnificent: A Crisis of Orientation," *IJMES* 10(1979):435-451.

Central Europe--and at sea--in the Mediterranean and in the Indian Ocean--were in no position to further aggravate the state of their relations with Iran, and avoided initiating a policy of systematic conquest. Moreover, the aftermath of Chāldirān showed a sharp decline in Safavid activity in Anatolia. The policy of containment that Sultan Sulayman pursued toward Iran rested upon two major tenets: first, gaining control over Armenia and Kurdistan, especially the fortresses around Lake Van, in order to secure eastern Anatolia from potential qizilbāsh incursions; second, making the Euphrates river a natural boundary between Ottoman and Safavid dominions. These two features dominated the history of Ottoman-Safavid relations during the respective rules of Sultan Sulayman and Shah Tahmāsp.

While facing the Ottoman danger on the western and northwestern borders, the Safavids had also to meet the challenge of the Shaybānī Uzbeks on the eastern borders. Opposite the Ottomans, the qizilbāsh leaders took into account the lesson of Chāldirān and avoided engaging the Ottoman army in pitched battles. In this respect, the superiority of Ottoman artillery compelled the qizilbāsh to limit themselves to occasional attacks and skirmishes. On the other hand, the same qizilbāsh forces were a match for the Shaybānī Uzbeks, a fact which led to several confrontations or even --in the words of a modern historian-- to a "duel" over the control of Khurāsān.² The vicissitudes of the Safavid-Uzbek conflict have been studied by the same modern historian and are beyond the scope of the present work. Only those events in Khurāsān which might have relevance to the relations between the Ottomans and the Safavids will be mentioned.

²Martin B. Dickson, "Shah Tahmāsb and the Uzbeks."

The present chapter is a review of Ottoman-Safavid relations, starting with Sultan Selim's campaign of Chaldirān in 920/1514 to the end of Sultan Sulayman's rule, a span of time which corresponds to the reigns of Shah Ismā^cIl and Shah Tahmāsp in Iran. More precisely, this period embraces the events which took shape from the launching of the first Ottoman offensive against Iran to the conclusion of the treaty of Amasya in 962/1555, which relatively maintained the status quo between the two countries until the dawn of the seventeenth century.

A. Chaldirān and Its Aftermath.

Sultan Selim rose to power amid chaotic internal conditions which were threatening the future of the empire. Anatolia had been ravaged by the ongoing civil war between Selim and his brother Ahmad, as well as by a major rebellion led by Nūr ^cAlī Khalīfah, a Safavid agent. This last event, which was the result of Safavid propaganda within the Asiatic part of the Ottoman empire, also reflected a popular discontent with the government. A document reproduced by Selāhattin Tansel³ and consisting of a complaint addressed to Sultan Selim by a certain ^cAlī ibn ^cAbd al-Karīm Khalīfah⁴ reveals the depth of the popular resentment toward the Ottoman administration and is a clear indictment of the religious establishment as well. In addition to the oppressive taxation of the peasants and the numerous injustices committed by Ottoman officials, ^cAlī ibn ^cAbd al-Karīm depicts the

³S. Tansel, Yavuz Sultan Selim.

⁴A biography of ^cAlī ibn ^cAbd al-Karīm Khalīfah is still lacking.

rapacity and greed of the religious class and asserts that its members are untrustworthy.⁵

On the Safavid side, Shah Ismā^cIl was not as successful within Iran as he was without. While his agents were achieving a relative success in Anatolia, his armies were suffering reverses at the hands of the Uzbeks in Transoxania. His effort to help his traditional ally Bābur (d. 937/1530) recover Samarqand and Bukhārā from the Uzbeks came to naught. After initial successes, the allied armies were utterly defeated at Ghujduwān on 3 Ramadān 918/12 November 1512.⁶ In this battle, Najm-i Sānī, the Safavid commander and close advisor of Shah Ismā^cIl, lost his life.⁷ Following this defeat, the Safavid ruler had to reckon with the Uzbeks' intermittent incursions into Khurāsān in 918-19/1512-13.⁸ While in Khurāsān, Shah Ismā^cIl's half-brother

⁵For the full text of this complaint, see: Tansel, Yavuz Sultan Selim, pp. 20-27.

⁶Bābur was then the ruler of Kābul. Having promised Shah Ismā^cIl to read the khutbah and to strike coins in his name, he received Safavid military support to enable him to recapture his ancestral lands in Transoxania. For further details see Bābur, The Bābur-Nāma in English, pp. 352-361; Khwāndamīr, Ḥabīb al-Siyar, 4:523-530; Rūmlū, Aḥsanu't-Tawārīkh, 1:127-134 and 2:59-62; Ālam Arāyi Shāh Ismā^cIl, pp. 402-441.

⁷Najm-i Sānī, whose real name was Yār Ahmad Khūzānī Isfahānī, was a close associate of Shah Ismā^cIl and held at his death the title of vakīl (Viceroy). See: Khwāndamīr, Ḥabīb al-Siyar, 4:526-529; J. Aubin, "Etudes Safavides I. Shah Ismā^cIl et les Notables de l'Iraq Persan," JESHQ 2(1959):67-68. On the importance of the office of vakīl, see: R.M. Savory, "The Principal Offices of the Safavid State during the Reign of Ismā^cIl I (907-930/1501-1524)," BEOAS 23 (1960): 93-96.

⁸Khwāndamīr, Ḥabīb al-Siyar, 4:532-533 and 535-536; Rūmlū, Aḥsanu't-Tawārīkh, 1:137-139 and 2:64-66 Ghaffārī, Jahān Arā, pp. 275-277.

Sulaymān Mirza attempted to seize power in Tabriz, but this threat proved ephemeral and Sulaymān was quickly put to death.⁹

✓ Safavid attitude toward the Ottomans subsequent to the rise of Sultan Selim continued to be hostile and became increasingly aggressive. The civil war which opposed Selim to his brother, Ahmad, was an opportunity for Shah Ismā'īl to interfere in Ottoman internal affairs by supporting Ahmad against Selim and by giving refuge to his fugitive sons. Shah Ismā'īl's stand was also reflected through the rebellion of Nūr 'Alī Khalīfah which had started in the middle of Selim's challenge to the throne of his father Bayezid and only days before the abdication of the latter.¹⁰ Moreover, the message that the Safavid ruler had dispatched to the Anatolian chieftain, Mūsā Tūrhūd Oġlu, dated two months after Selim's coronation¹¹, together with the support lent by the Tūrhūd tribe to Ahmad, revealed a persistent

⁹ Among contemporary chronicles, that of Khwāndamīr does not mention this incident. Rūmlū, Ahsanu't-Tawārīkh, 1:139-140 and 2:66 states that Sulaymān was Ismā'īl's half brother; while in Ālam Ārā-yi Shāh Ismā'īl, pp. 479-482, it is stated that Sulaymān was the son of Sultan 'Alī. This could only be 'Alī Pādīshāh, Ismā'īl's older brother, thus considering Sulaymān as Ismā'īl's nephew and not half-brother. Sarwar, Shah Ismā'īl, p.71, mentions that Sulaymān Mirza "was put to death by Mustafa Beg Ustājlū." This name should be corrected to "Mantashā Beg Ustājlū".

¹⁰ There is a discrepancy concerning the date of Selim's coronation. Munajjim Bāshī, Ṣahā'if al-Akhhār, 3:442, dates this event on Saturday 7 Safar 918; Solakzade, Tārīh, p.344, places the same event on Saturday 8 Safar 918. Among modern historians, Zambaur, Manuel de Généalogie et de Chronologie, p. 161, dates it the 9th of Safar, while Hammer-Purgstall, Histoire de l'Empire Ottoman, 4:121-122, adopts the date of 8 Safar/15 April. Among modern Turkish historians the date of 7 Safar 918/24 April 1512 is accepted. See: Tansel, Yavuz Sultan Selim, p.1; Uluçay, "Selim," p. 127. This last date is the correct one since the 24th of April 1512, falls on a Saturday which is the day mentioned in Ottoman sources.

The rebellion of Nūr 'Alī Khalīfah started in Muḥarram 918/March-April 1512.

¹¹ This letter is dated 7 Rabī' I 918/23 May 1512.

antagonistic position vis-à-vis Selim on the part of the Safavid ruler. This became confirmed when Shah Ismā'īl failed to follow the diplomatic tradition of the time and declined to send an embassy to congratulate the new Ottoman ruler upon his coronation.¹² In fact, Selim's victory at Yenishehr (8 Safar 919/15 April 1513) and the immediate assassination of his rival brother Ahmad dashed Safavid hopes of having a conciliatory ruler in Istanbul.

The next phase of the Ottoman-Safavid conflict consisted of Selim's offensive against Iran, which culminated with the defeat of Shah Ismā'īl and his qizilbāsh forces on the battlefield of Chāldirān on the second of Rajab 920/23 August 1514. Although the real motives behind Selim's decision are self explanatory in light of the role played by the Safavids in the uprisings that had shaken Anatolia as well as in the civil war, a number of Safavid sources blame Khān Muḥammad Ustājlū, the qizilbāsh Beylerbey of Diyār Bakr, for having precipitated Selim's invasion of Iran.¹³ They state that this Safavid high official dispatched an envoy to the Ottoman court, carrying an insulting message and a "gift" consisting of feminine garments to Selim.¹⁴ These sources fail to date this embassy which, among modern historians, Falsafī and Sarwar place shortly before Selim's decision

¹² Falsafī, "Jang-i Chāldirān," p.65; Tansel, Yavuz Sultan Selim, p.32.

¹³ Such was the case of Hasan-i Rūmlū, Ahsanu't-Tawārīkh, 1:143-144 and 2:68; and of the anonymous history of Shah Ismā'īl (British Museum MS, Oriental 3248) as quoted in Sarwar, Shah Ismā'īl, pp. 73-74. Although contemporary with these events, Khwāndamīr makes no mention of it in his Ḥabīb al-Siyar.

¹⁴ Rūmlū, Ahsanu't-Tawārīkh, 1:143-144 and 2:68, Sarwar, Shah Ismā'īl, pp. 73-74.

to march against Iran.¹⁵ However, a close scrutiny of a detailed account contained in the anonymous Ālam Ārā-yi Shāh Ismāʿīl points otherwise. Although it does not date the above-mentioned embassy, this source clearly implies that it took place earlier; more precisely, during the reign of Sultan Bayezid and not that of Selim. It states that the envoy of Khān Muḥammad Ustājlū was granted an audience with Bayezid to whom he handed the message and the "gift" addressed to his son Selim.¹⁶ As to the precise date of this mission, it seems that the year 913/1507-8 is most appropriate. [Three important events which occurred during this year tend to support this hypothesis: first, Shāh Ismāʿīl crossed Ottoman territories on his expedition against ^ḶAlā al-Dawlah Dulḡadır; second, Khān Muḥammad Ustājlū captured Diyār Bakr and received the governorship of this province;¹⁷ third, Selim -- then governor of Trabzon -- showed the first signs of his displeasure with his father's policy vis-à-vis the Ṣafavids and ordered raids carried out against Shah Ismāʿīl's dominions in the environs of Erzinjan and Bayburt. In the framework of these events, it would be shrewd of Khan Muḥammad Ustājlū to initiate such an embassy with the aim of achieving the dual purpose of defying Selim while complaining of his bellicose stand to his ruling father, Bayezid.

The search for the official casus belli that Selim might have fabricated to launch his campaign against Iran has been hampered by

¹⁵Falsafī, "Jang-i Chāldirān," pp.63-64; Sarwar, Shah Ismāʿīl, pp.73-74.

¹⁶Ālam Ārā-yi Shāh Ismāʿīl, pp. 243-247.

¹⁷Khwādamīr, Ḥabīb al-Siyar, 4:488-490; Rūmlū, Aḥsanu't-Tawārīkh, 1:94-96 and 2:41-43.

the emphasis placed by contemporary as well as modern historians on the previous Ṣafavid activities in Anatolia and by the view that Selim's decision was only an aggressive reaction against the Ṣafavids.¹⁸ Although the validity of such a view is undoubted, a unique passage in the anonymous Ālam Ārā-yi Shāh Ismāʿīl sheds further light on Selim's political maneuvering prior to the campaign of Chāldirān. It reveals that this Ottoman Sultan dispatched an embassy to the Ṣafavid court to demand the return of his fugitive nephew Murād and to lay his "hereditary" claim to the province of Diyār Bakr.¹⁹ Selim's envoys met with Shah Ismāʿīl at Isfahān.²⁰ The date of this mission is easy to identify, since it was at Isfahān that Ismāʿīl spent the winter of 919/1513, following his campaign in Khurāsān.²¹ As to Selim's claim to Diyār Bakr, it was seemingly intended as a provocation aimed at justifying the start of future hostilities. In fact, Selim had no "hereditary" rights²² over that province. To give more credibility to his demand, Selim secured the alliance of a rival of Shah Ismāʿīl, the former Aq Qoyunlu ruler Murād who was then a fugitive at the Ottoman court.²³ In his answer, Shah Ismāʿīl stated that he considered Selim's nephew a guest and that as

¹⁸Among earlier sources one might cite Rūmlū, Aḥsanu't-Tawārīkh, 1:143-144 and 2:68; while the following modern historians hold the same view: Falsafī, "Jang-i Chāldirān," pp. 61-64; Sarwar, Shah Ismāʿīl, pp. 73-74.

¹⁹Ālam Ārā-yi Shāh Ismāʿīl, pp. 511-513.

²⁰Ibid., p. 511.

²¹Rūmlū, Aḥsanu't-Tawārīkh, 1:139 and 2:66.

²²This is probably a reminder of Shah Ismāʿīl's claim to Trabzon, made while Selim was governor there.

²³Murād accompanied Selim during the campaign of Chāldirān; see Rūmlū, Aḥsanu't-Tawārīkh, 1:150-151 and 2:72.

such he could not turn him over to the envoys.²⁴ In the same message, the Şafavid ruler included an insulting refutation of Selim's claim to Diyār Bakr, implying that this province was his by right of conquest and that only by the force of arms would he cede it.²⁵ Selim's envoys departed from İsfahān probably toward the end of 1513.²⁶

The failure of this embassy gave Selim grounds to open hostilities and to gear the Ottoman religious and military institutions for a campaign against the Şafavids. He secured the fatwās (formal religious ordinances) of two influential theologians, Ḥamza Saru Gōrez (d. 927/1512)²⁷ and Kemal

²⁴Murād, son of Selim's brother Ahmad, fled to Iran in the middle of Nūr ^cAlī Khalīfah's rebellion of 918/1512. He was given a fief in Fārs. A source states that he was with Shah Ismā^cīl in Hamadān when he fell ill and that he was rushed to İsfahān which was the Shah's destination and where the Şafavid ruler spent the winter of 919/1513-14. Although only the year 919/1513-14 is given for Murād's death, it is probable that it occurred after the sojourn of the Ottoman embassy in İsfahān. See Ālam Ārā-yi Şafavī, p. 471. For Shah Ismā^cīl's message, see Ālam Ārā-yi Şah Ismā^cīl, p. 512.

²⁵Ibid.

²⁶Judging from the cold reception given to the envoys and the deterioration of Ottoman-Şafavid relations, it is doubtful that the members of this embassy remained at İsfahān to spend the winter there. Therefore, their departure must have taken place at the beginning of the winter of 919/1513.

²⁷Irène Beldiceanu-Steinherr, "A Propos d'un Ouvrage sur la Polémique Ottomane contre les Safavides", REI 39 (1971): 397, incorrectly places Ḥamza's death in 967/1559. Ḥamza's fatwā was mentioned with no details by Hammer-Purgstall, Histoire de l'Empire Ottoman, 4:107. M.C. Şehabettin Tekindağ, "Yeni Kaynak ve Vesikaların Işığında Yavuz Sultan Selim'in İran Seferi", reproduced a copy of the document corresponding to Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Arşivi no. 6401 as an appendix and gave a romanized version in pp. 54-55 of his article. S. Tansel, Yavuz Sultan Selim, gave a romanized version in note 61, pp. 35-36 of his work and summarized it in pp. 34-36. He also reproduced copies of the documents, corresponding to Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Arşivi nos. 5960, 6401 and 12077. These sources refer to

Paşazade (d. 940/1533),²⁸ condemning the qizilbāsh and sanctioning their persecution. Both men also declared it an individual duty upon every Muslim to annihilate the followers of Shah Ismā^cīl.

The fatwā of Ḥamza Saru Gōrez was composed in Turkish and has been reproduced separately by S. Tansel and Ş. Tekindağ in their respective works. This document is a strong indictment of the qizilbāsh who are viewed as "unbelievers" and "heretics". Its author concludes it by requesting Sultan Selim to order "their (the qizilbāsh) men killed and their possessions, women and children, divided among the army." He also added that "once captured, their repentance should not be accepted and that they should be equally killed."²⁹

The second fatwā, that of Kemal Paşazade and composed in Arabic,³⁰ follows a similar line and describes the Şafavid followers

Bursalı, Osmanlı Müellifleri (İstanbul: Matba^cah-i ^cAmire, 1914), 1:341, for a biography of Ḥamza Saru Gōrez, however, none refers to a more complete biography found in Tāshkubrīzādah, al-Shaqā'iq al-Nu^cmānīyah fī ^cUlamā al-Dawlah al-^cUthmānīyah (Beirut: Dār al-Kitāb al-^cArabī, 1975), p. 181. This is partly due to the fact that this work is in Arabic, and mostly because Ḥamza is listed as Nūr al-Dīn al-Qaraşwī, being a native of Karasu in northern Anatolia.

²⁸A biography of Kemal Paşazade is given by Tāshkubrīzādah, al-Shaqā'iq al-Nu^cmānīyah, pp. 226-228. The text of the fatwā has been reproduced by Ş. Tekindağ, "Yeni Kaynak ve Vesikaların Işığında Yavuz Sultan Selim'in İran Seferi," pp. 77-78. It is reproduced in Appendix D of the present work.

²⁹Tekindağ, "Yeni Kaynak ve Vesikaların Işığında Yavuz Sultan Selim'in İran Seferi," p.55; Tansel, Yavuz Sultan Selim, p.35, note 61.

³⁰Elke Eberhard, Osmanische Polemik gegen die Safawiden im 16 Jahrhundert; nach Arabischen Handschriften (Freiburg im Breisgau: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 1970), pp. 164-165, mentions two fatwās of Kemal Paşazade, one composed in Arabic, the other in Turkish. This is confirmed by I. Beldiceanu-Steinherr, "A Propos d'un Ouvrage sur la Polémique Ottomane contre les Safavides," p.395.

as anti-Muslims. This Ottoman theologian states that "their status is that of the apostates, and once conquered...their possessions, women and children would be considered spoils; as for their men, they should be killed unless they become Muslims."³¹ He also concluded that "it is the duty of the Sultan of the Muslims (namely Selim) to fight these unbelievers in accordance with the Qur'ānic verse: "O Prophet! Strive hard against the unbelievers and hypocrites, and be firm against them. Their abode is Hell, an evil refuge indeed."³²

Having obtained legal justification for fighting the qizilbāsh, Selim ordered his army to prepare for a campaign against Iran and left Edirne on 23 Muḥarram 920/20 March 1514 to start what proved to be an eventful crossing of Anatolia before he finally reached Erzinjan, the last stop before entering Iran, on 20 Jumādā I 920/13 July 1514.³³

Considering that the fatwās were aimed at Shah Ismā'il's followers, he decided to deal with the Shi'ites of Anatolia and punish them for their past revolts. However, unlike his father Bayezid who had relocated thirty thousand of them to the Morea following the rebellion of 906/1501 in Karaman, Selim followed a policy of annihilation and ordered the massacre of forty thousand qizilbāsh.³⁴

³¹Tekindağ, "Yeni Kaynak ve Vesikaların Işığında Altında Yavuz Sultan Selim'in İran Seferi," p.77.

³²Ibid., p. 78. The verse is Qur'an IX:73 (Yūsuf ^{al}Alī's translation.)

³³According to the Journal of Haydar Çelebi, in Feridūn Bey, Munsha'āt, 1:396-399.

³⁴Solakzade, Tarih, pp.360-361: Tansel, Yavuz Sultan Selim, p. 38: Hammer-Purgstall, Histoire de l'Empire Ottoman, 4:173-176; Tekindağ, "Yeni Kaynak ve Vesikaların Işığında Yavuz Sultan Selim'in İran Seferi," p.56. For the verses composed on this occasion by Abū'l-Faḍl, son of the historian Idrīs Bidlīsī, see E.G. Browne, A Literary History of Persia, 4:72-73.

Selim also ordered a commercial blockade against Iran, a measure aimed at halting the export of Iranian silk to the Ottoman markets.³⁵ Although this act resulted in the reduction of the volume of trade between the two countries for years to come, a fact illustrated by the customs receipts for the city of Bursa,³⁶ it was not, however, a total success. Persian merchants were able to channel their goods through the Syrian emporia and at times directly to Anatolia.³⁷ As to the timing of the blockade, it has been recently established that it went into effect at the beginning of the summer of 1514 and lasted through Selim's reign.³⁸

³⁵References to the blockade are given in the following: Tāshkubrīzādah, al-Shaqā'iq al-Nu'māniyah, p.175, within the biography of ^{al}Alī al-Dīn ^{al}Alī ibn Ahmad ibn Muhammad al-Jammālī (d. 932/1526) who interceded with Selim on behalf of four hundred merchants who were imprisoned for not abiding by the blockade decree. A letter from Selim addressed to the Mamluk Sultan Qānāsh al-Ghawrī and dated the beginning of Muḥarram 922/February 1516 confirms the existence of the blockade; see Feridūn, Munsha'āt 1:425. Recently, Jean-Louis Bacqué-Grammont, "Etudes Osmano-Şafavides, I. Notes sur le Blocus du Commerce Iranien par Selim 1^{er}," Turcica 6 (1975): 68-88, was able to show that the blockade was in effect by the beginning of the summer of 1514.

³⁶Halil İnalcık, "The Ottoman Economic Mind and Aspects of the Ottoman Economy," p.210. The customs receipts from Bursa dropped from 130,000 ducats in 1512 to 40,000 ducats in 1521.

³⁷This is indicated by the incident of ^{al}Alī al Dīn al-Jammālī and the four hundred merchants in Tāshkubrīzādah, al-Shaqā'iq al-Nu'māniyah, p. 175, and by Selim's decision that all merchants entering the Ottoman empire and coming from the Mamluk empire should be inspected. See his letter of Muḥarram 922/February 1516 in Feridūn, Munsha'āt, 1:425. See also Jean-Louis Bacqué-Grammont, "Notes sur une Saisie de Soie d'Iran en 1518," Turcica 8:2 (1976): 237-253, concerning the confiscation of goods brought from Iran in 1518 by seven merchants of Tokat and Erzinjan.

³⁸Bacqué-Grammont, "Notes sur le Blocus du Commerce Iranien par Selim 1^{er}," pp. 69-70. This author reached his conclusion after he discovered a copy of the message sent by Selim to the Aq Qoyunlu prince Farrukhshād (and not Farahshād) at the beginning of the summer 1514. On the correction of "Farrukhshād" instead of "Farahshād", see: Woods, Aqquyunlu, p.178, note 139.

Prior to his campaign against Iran, Selim had to secure the neutrality of the Mamluks. He disregarded the traditional suspicion which had marked Ottoman-Mamluk relations as well as the unfriendly if not antagonistic attitude of Sultan Qānsūh al-Ghawri who had sided with Ahmad during the civil war and dispatched an embassy relaying his amicable intentions toward the Mamluks.³⁹ In fact, Selim's strategy consisted of aborting a Safavid-Mamluk rapprochement which might force him to fight on two fronts. Although Qānsūh al-Ghawri had given refuge to two sons of Ahmad,⁴⁰ Selim's envoy conveyed to the Mamluk Sultan his master's wishes that both Ottomans and Mamluks unite against Shah Ismā'īl.⁴¹ He also informed him of Selim's impending move against Iran.⁴² This embassy should be considered as a veiled ultimatum to the Mamluks not to support the Safavids, rather than a genuine invitation to join an anti-Safavid alliance.⁴³

³⁹The arrival of this embassy has been recorded by the contemporary Ibn Iyās. No mention of this embassy is recorded by Ferīdūn Bey in his Munsha'āt. However, the journal of Selim's campaign records the arrival of a Mamluk ambassador to the Ottoman camp at Erzinjan on 26 Jumādā I 920/19 July 1514; Ferīdūn, Munsha'āt, 1:400. This obviously was in response to Selim's initiative. In fact, Ibn Iyās states that the Ottoman envoy reached Cairo on 23 Rabī' I 920/18 May 1514. See: Ibn Iyās, Badā'i' al-Zuhūr, 4:372-373.

⁴⁰Two nephews of Selim, 'Alī and Sulaymām, fled to the Mamluks. Both died in 919/1513-14 of the plague in Cairo. See: Ibn Iyās, Badā'i' al-Zuhūr, 4:297-306; Ibn Tūlūn, Mufākahat al-Khillān, 2:372. A third nephew, Qāsim, was present at the battle of Marj Dābiq on the Mamluk side. He was later strangled on Selim's order following the conquest of Egypt. See Ibn Iyās, Badā'i' al-Zuhūr, 5:63 and 116.

⁴¹Ibid., 4:372-373.

⁴²Ibid.

⁴³Ibid., pp. 374-381, states that Mamluk reaction to this Ottoman move reflected their apprehension and consisted of the testing of a number of cannons and the sending of troops to Aleppo.

Selim made overtures toward Shah Ismā'īl's foes in the East. He sent a message to 'Ubayd Allāh Khān, the de facto ruler of the Uzbeks,⁴⁴ informing him of his intention to march against Iran and suggesting joint action against their common enemy.⁴⁵ In his answer, 'Ubayd Allāh Khān expressed his readiness to join in an attack on the Safavid state.⁴⁶ However, it appears that internal problems rendered Uzbek participation in such a venture impossible.⁴⁷ Among those who rallied to Selim and joined in the campaign were Murād, the last Aq Qoyunlu ruler, who had escaped to the Ottomans, as well as Farrukhshād, another Aq Qoyunlu prince who governed Bayburt and threw off his allegiance to the Safavids at the beginning of the summer of 1514.⁴⁸ In addition to these two princes, Selim was also accompanied by 'Alī Beg, son of Shāh Savār Dulgadir. 'Alī Beg was a rival of 'Alā al-Dawlah, ruler of Dulgadir and vassal of the Mamluks.⁴⁹ Finally,

⁴⁴At this time, the ruler of the Uzbeks was Kuchkunjū Khān (916-37/1510-31); however, 'Ubayd Allāh Khān was the most influential among the leaders of the Uzbek federation, a fact which explains Selim's correspondence with him and not with Kuchkunjū Khān. He was described by Hydar Dughlāt as follows: "From the year 911... he ('Ubayd Allāh) had, in reality, conducted the entire affairs of the State; and if he had chosen to assume the title of Khān, no one could rightfully have opposed him." See his Tārīkh-i Rashīdī, p. 283.

⁴⁵Ferīdūn, Munsha'āt, 1:375-377; dated the end of Muharram 920/March 1514.

⁴⁶Ibid., 1:378-379; dated the end of Jumādā II 920/August 1514.

⁴⁷See the narration of Hydar, Tārīkh-i Rashīdī, p. 282. See also Howorth, History of the Mongols, 2:714-715.

⁴⁸Munajjim Bāshī, Ṣahā'if al-Akhhār, 3:452.

⁴⁹Rūmlū, Ahsanūt-Tawārīkh, 1:145; Solakzade, Tarih, p.366.

the Ottoman Sultan received the allegiance of a number of influential Kurdish chieftains prior to the start of the campaign.⁵⁰

The military details of Selim's campaign against Iran have been studied by Moukbil Bey in his monograph *La Campagne de Perse (1514)*, parts of which have been paraphrased by N. Falsafī in his lengthy article on the same subject.⁵² Hence, the following review will encompass only the events pertaining to the political aspects of the campaign and its aftermath.

Selim reached Istanbul on the second of Šafar 920/29 March 1514, whence he set out for the plain of Yenishehr where a one hundred and forty thousand man army was assembled.⁵³ Prior to his arrival at this destination, he dispatched an envoy conveying a declaration of war to the Šafavid ruler. In this message, dated Šafar 920/April 1514, Selim informed Shah Ismāʿīl that he had secured *fatwās* from Ottoman theologians sanctioning a war against him and that he was marching immediately on Iran.⁵⁴ A second message followed a month later and

⁵⁰Bidlīsī, *Sharafnāmah*, translated into Arabic by Muḥammad ʿAlī ʿAwnī and edited by Yahyā al-Khashshāb (Cairo: Dār Iḥyā al-Kutub al-ʿArabīyah, n.d.), 1:431-432.

⁵¹Moukbil, *La Campagne de Perse (1514)* (Paris: Editions Berger-Levrault, 1928).

⁵²Falsafī, "Jang-i Chāldirān". In addition to paraphrasing parts of Moukbil's monograph, Falsafī reproduced a number of plates illustrating the battle as well as the march of the Ottoman army, which had been made by Moukbil. He made no mention of Moukbil's work either in the text or in the bibliography.

⁵³Moukbil, *La Campagne de Perse*, pp. 21-27; Falsafī, "Jang-i Chāldirān." pp. 77-79; S. Tekindağ, "Yeni Kaynak ve Vesikaların Işığında Yavuz Sultan Selim'in İran Seferi," pp. 57-60; Sarwar, *Shah Ismāʿīl*, pp. 74-76.

⁵⁴Ferīdūn, *Munsha'āt*, 1:379-381. This message was composed in Persian.

was transmitted through a captured Šafavid spy. This document does not differ significantly from the first, except in that the Ottoman Sultan included a demand that Shah Ismāʿīl repent and become his vassal.⁵⁵

Selim received Shah Ismāʿīl's response to his first missive as he was approaching Erzincan.⁵⁶ The Šafavid ruler's reply was channeled through his envoy Shāh Qūlī Aqā-yi Būyi Nūkar. In this message, Shah Ismāʿīl evoked the "friendship" which had existed between the two dynasties during the lifetime of Sultan Bayezid, as well as Selim's bellicose stand against the *qizilbāsh* while he was governor of Trabzon. He also boasted that he could have moved against Anatolia, but had decided against it, because a majority of the inhabitants of that area were his followers. He concluded his letter with an insult, remarking that Selim's letter showed a lack of respect which was worthy not of a ruler but of a person addicted to opium.⁵⁷ Selim's wrath fell upon the Šafavid ambassador, whom he ordered to be executed.⁵⁸

⁵⁵*Ibid.*, 1:382-383; also Sābitī, *Asnād*, pp. 422-424. This message was also composed in Persian.

⁵⁶Sarwar, *Shah Ismāʿīl*, p. 76, quoting an anonymous history of Sultan Selim (British Museum MS, add. 24, 960), states that on 27 Jumādā I 920 Selim received the Šafavid envoy at Aq-Dih, near Kamākh. Selim's third message was dated the end of Jumādā I at Erzincan. Therefore, this embassy was in response to Selim's first message, since his second was sent at the end of Rabīʿ I, a month before the arrival of this ambassador; this time period is too short to have permitted a reply from the Šafavid ruler. This remark is intended to correct E.G. Browne and others who state that Ismāʿīl's message was sent in response to Selim's three letters. See for example, Browne, *A Literary History of Persia*, 4:75.

⁵⁷Ferīdūn, *Munsha'āt*, 1:384-385; Sābitī, *Asnād*, pp. 86-87.

⁵⁸Sarwar, *Shah Ismāʿīl*, p. 77; Hammer-Purgstall, *Histoire de L'Empire Ottoman*, 4:188

Upon reaching Erzinjan at the end of Jumādā I 920/end of July 1514, Selim sent a third message to Shah Ismā'īl in which he stated that he had left forty thousand men between Kayseri and Sivas "to decrease Shah Ismā'īl's fear of the Ottoman might," and again expressed his warlike intentions.⁵⁹ In fact, Selim's decision to station part of his army in eastern Anatolia is a clear indication that the threat of a popular uprising was still real. It was also a precautionary measure aimed at protecting the main army's rearguard. As a reciprocal insult to Shah Ismā'īl, Selim included a "gift" consisting of a rag, a staff, a device for cleaning the teeth, a rosary and begging bowl, intended as a reminder that Shah Ismā'īl was unfit to rule and would be better off to follow his ancestor's way of "mendicant" mysticism.⁶⁰

From Erzinjan, the Ottoman army proceeded toward Erzerum by way of Terjan. There, Selim sent a fourth message to Shah Ismā'īl challenging him to battle. He also "advised" him to show his valor instead of running away "like a woman": "In such case," said he, "you had better wear a chādūr (a veil) instead of your armor."⁶¹ Finally,

⁵⁹Feridūn, Munsha'āt, 1:383-384; Falsafi, "Jang-i Chāldirān," pp. 84-85. This letter was originally written in Turkish and a Persian translation is given by Falsafi.

⁶⁰Falsafi, "Jang-i Chāldirān," p. 84; Uzunçarşılı, Osmanlı Tarihi, Vol. 2, pt. 2, p. 261.

⁶¹This letter was sent from Charmuk, near Terjan. See: Feridūn, Munsha'āt, 1:385-386 (in Turkish); Falsafi, "Jang-i Chāldirān," pp. 88-89 (in Persian); Tansel, Yavuz Sultan Selim, p. 48.

an Ottoman spy brought the news to Selim that Ismā'īl had let it be known that their next meeting would be on the plains of Chāldirān.⁶²

The Ottomans reached Chāldirān on the first of Rajab 920/22 August 1514 and engaged the qizilbāsh army the following day, the second of Rajab/23 August.⁶³ This rapid move was a precaution taken to avoid any possible rebellion within the army as well as to prevent qizilbāsh commanders from gathering any intelligence about the Ottoman camp.⁶⁴ While the Ottomans deployed their troops in the plain of Chāldirān, the Şafavids occupied the hills to the west. The two antagonists were of unequal strength: while Sultan Selim led more than one hundred thousand men into battle, supported by three hundred guns, Shah Ismā'īl was only able to muster an army of forty thousand.

⁶²Moukbil, La Campagne de Perse, p. 39; Falsafi, "Jang-i Chāldirān," p. 91; Tansel, Yavuz Sultan Selim, pp. 50-51; Hammer-Purgstall, Histoire de l'Empire Ottoman, 4:192.

⁶³Here, the date of 2 Rajab 920/23 August 1514 is retained despite the variations in some sources which date this battle either on the first, second or third of Rajab. Sultan Selim in a number of fathnāmahs (message announcing his victory) stated that the battle took place on Wednesday, the second of Rajab; see Feridūn, Munsha'āt, 1:390 and 392. In Cattenoz, Tables de Concordance, the second of Rajab 920 falls on a Wednesday. The journal of Haydar Çelebi states that the battle took place on Wednesday the first of Rajab (see Feridūn, Munsha'āt, 1:402), while Uzunçarşılı, Osmanlı Tarihi, Vol. 2, pt. 2, p. 268, dates it 3 Rajab. In any case, the general agreement that it took place on Wednesday permits its dating to the 23rd of August, 1514.

⁶⁴Uzunçarşılı, Osmanlı Tarihi, vol 2, pt. 2, p. 265-268. Falsafi, "Jang-i Chāldirān," p. 92; Moukbil, La Campagne de Perse, pp. 46-47; Tansel, Yavuz Sultan Selim, pp. 52-53; S. Tekindağ, "Yeni Kaynak ve Vesikaların Işığında Yavuz Sultan Selim'in Iran Seferi," p. 65.

which consisted mainly of cavalrymen.⁶⁵ Faced with this superior Ottoman army, the qizilbāsh charged the Ottoman left wing in an effort to avoid the deadly power of the artillery. In response, Selim ordered the cannons to be brought into action,⁶⁶ subsequently inflicting heavy losses upon the Ṣafavids. Unable to withstand the Ottoman might, the qizilbāsh had no choice but to retreat. Shah Ismāʿīl lost the battle⁶⁷ as well as his favorite wife Tājli Khānum who was captured and later taken to Turkey.⁶⁸

The victory of Chāldirān opened the road to Tabriz, which surrendered peacefully. Selim entered the city on 15 Rajab 920/5 September 1514, where he sojourned eight days before leaving for the

⁶⁵These figures are given by Moukbil, La Campagne de Perse, pp. 27-28 and 48-55. Among Persian sources, there is a tendency to inflate the numbers of the Ottomans while minimizing the size of the qizilbāsh army. Khwādamīr, Habīb al-Siyar, 4:546, states that the Ottomans numbered over two hundred thousand, while the qizilbāsh were only twelve thousand. Iskandar Beg Munshī, ʿĀlam Ārā-yi ʿAbbāsī, 1:42 states that the Ṣafavid army consisted of only twenty thousand men. Among Ottoman sources, Munajjim Bāshī, Ṣahāʿif al-Akhbār, 3:451-453, estimates the qizilbāsh army to be forty thousand men and the Ottoman forces at one hundred thousand.

⁶⁶Khwādamīr, Habīb al-Siyar, 4:546; Iskandar Beg Munshī, ʿĀlam Ārā-yi ʿAbbāsī, 1:42-43; Munajjim Bāshī, Ṣahāʿif al-Akhbār, 3:454; Rūmlū, Aḥsanu't-Tawārīkh, 1:146-147.

⁶⁷Details concerning the battle are found in the following: Moukbil, La Campagne de Perse, pp. 47-82; Falsafī, "Jang-i Chāldirān," pp. 98-106; Tansel, Yavuz Sultan Selim, pp. 53-62; Hammer-Purgstall, Histoire de l'Empire Ottoman, 4:196-206. See also the following Persian original sources: Khwādamīr, Habīb al-Siyar, 4:545-548; Rūmlū, Aḥsanu't-Tawārīkh, 1:143-149 and 2:68-70.

⁶⁸About Tājli Khānum, see: Falsafī, "Jang-i Chāldirān," pp.106-109 and 116-120; Hammer-Purgstall, Histoire de l'Empire Ottoman, 4:208-209 and 214; Tansel, Yavuz Sultan Selim, pp. 62-65. At Selim's instigation, she was married to the army chief judge Jaʿfar Çelebi who was later executed.

region of Qarabāgh where he planned to spend the winter.⁶⁹ However, a revolt of the Janissaries, who were complaining of the hardships of the campaign and who showed their discontent by shooting arrows at the imperial tent, compelled the Sultan to give orders for a hasty return to Amasya in Anatolia where he remained throughout the winter.⁷⁰ There, he received a four man delegation from Shah Ismāʿīl requesting the return of Tājli Khānum. Selim, however, lent a deaf ear to this demand and jailed the Ṣafavid envoys.⁷¹

The primary consequence of this campaign was not the capture of Tabriz, as this capital city was re-occupied by Shah Ismāʿīl one month after Selim's departure; of greater importance were the secondary operations which took place almost simultaneously. Before Chāldirān, Selim sent Mustafā Beg with orders to capture the stronghold of Bayburt while another Ottoman force stormed the fort of Bayezid.⁷² A detachment was dispatched with Murād Aq Qoyunlu against Diyār Bakr where part of the Kurdish population had evinced discontent with Ṣafavid rule. Although the forts of Bayburt and Bayezid were easily

⁶⁹Khwādamīr, Habīb al-Siyar, 4:548; Rūmlū, Aḥsanu't-Tawārīkh, 1:149 and 2:70; Hammer-Purgstall, Histoire de l'Empire Ottoman, 4:203; Moukbil, La Campagne de Perse, pp. 83-84; Falsafī, "Jang-i Chāldirān," pp. 109-11; Tansel Yavuz Sultan Selim, pp. 68-69.

⁷⁰Moukbil, La Campagne de Perse, pp. 85-86; Falsafī, "Jang-i Chāldirān," pp. 115-116, states that Selim had reached Amasya on 6 Shawwāl 920/25 November 1514; Tansel, Yavuz Sultan Selim, pp. 71-72; Hammer-Purgstall, Histoire de l'Empire Ottoman, 4:204-206.

⁷¹These four men were all theologians. See: Solakzade, Tarih, p.373 where their names are given as: Sayyid ʿAbd al-Wahhāb, Qādī Ishāq, Mullā Shukr Allāh and Hamzah Khalīfah; this same version is given by Munajjim Bāshī, Ṣahāʿif al-Akhbār, 3:457.

⁷²Solakzade, Tarih, p. 364; Moukbil, La Campagne de Perse, pp. 36 and 40; Falsafī, "Jang-i Chāldirān," p.89.

captured,⁷³ the conquest of Diyār Bakr proved more difficult, claiming the life of Murād Aq Qoyunlu (d. 920/1514)⁷⁴ and necessitating the sending of a number of expeditions until the area was finally subjugated in 922/1516, together with Kurdistan.⁷⁵ Meanwhile, the Ottomans also captured Kamākh, a key fortress near Erzinjan on 5 Rabī^c II 921/19 May 1515.⁷⁶

The campaign of Chāldirān resulted in the expansion of Ottoman domains in eastern Anatolia to include such vital centers as Erzinjan and Erzerum, and in the conquest of Kurdistan and Diyār Bakr, thus tightening the Ottoman vise around Iran. The weakened state of the Safavids prompted the Portuguese to undertake the conquest of Hormuz: only a year after Chāldirān, Albuquerque captured that city, thus placing the entrance to the Persian Gulf in the hands of the Portuguese for a century to come.⁷⁷

⁷³Moukbil, *La Campagne de Perse*, pp. 36 and 40; Hammer-Purgstall, *Histoire de l'Empire Ottoman*, 4:205.

⁷⁴The best details are given by Rūmlū, *Aḥsanu't-Tawārīkh*, 1:150-152 and 2:71-72.

⁷⁵*Ibid.*, 1:156-159 and 2:75-76; Moukbil, *La Campagne de Perse*, pp. 95-97; Hammer-Purgstall, *Histoire de l'Empire Ottoman*, 4:221-259, states that the conquest of Kurdistan and Diyār Bakr were completed prior to the campaign against Syria which took place in 922/end of 1516.

⁷⁶Rūmlū, *Aḥsanu't-Tawārīkh*, 1:153 and 2:73-74; Munajjim Bāshī, *Ṣaḥā'if al-Akhbār*, 3:457-461; Tansel, *Yavuz Sultan Selim*, pp. 75-76. The *fathnāmah* concerning this victory is in Ferīdun, *Munsha'āt*, 1:409-410.

⁷⁷Starting in 1507, Hormuz paid tribute to the Portuguese as well as to the Safavids. Finally in April 1515, Albuquerque captured the city and established a Portuguese garrison there. For details, see Albuquerque, *The Commentaries of the Great Alfonso d'Albuquerque, Second Viceroy of India*, translated by Walter de Gray Birch (London: The Hakluyt Society, 1875-84), 1:132-149; 4:137-184. In pages 4:175-176 and 180-184 are mentioned two embassies to Albuquerque in 1515, one from Shah Ismā^cīl and a second from one of his governors,

Mamluk reaction to the Ottoman success was marked by anxiety, if not alarm. Sultan Qānṣūh al-Ghawrī showed his disappointment and expressed his apprehensions to his aides, after receiving an Ottoman envoy with the news of Selim's victory against Shah Ismā^cīl, and ordered that no celebration take place.⁷⁸ In fact, the Mamluk Sultan was fully justified in expecting further trouble with Selim. First, Ottoman territorial gains in eastern Anatolia and Diyār Bakr extended their common borders with the Mamluks, thus increasing the chances of confrontation. Second, the antagonistic stand of ^cAlā al-Dawlah, ruler of Dulğadir and vassal of the Mamluks, who had disrupted Ottoman supply lines in Anatolia during the campaign of Chāldirān,⁷⁹ was one

both seeking Portuguese and Christian help against the Ottomans. The reader might also refer to the excellent articles of Jean Aubin which are listed in the bibliography of the present work.

⁷⁸Ibn Iyās, *Badā'i^c al-Zuhūr*, 4:398 and 402-404. In page 398, this author summarized Mamluk reaction as follows:

وقد ملك بن عثمان غالب بلاد الصوفي من ممالك الشرق ، فلم يرسم
السلطان بدق الكوسات لهذا الخبر وكذلك الامراء اخذوا حذرهم من بن عثمان
وخشوا من سطوته لما يحدث منه بعد ذلك الى جهة بلاد السلطان

⁷⁹Most Arabic sources agree that ^cAlā al-Dawlah was acting on orders from Qānṣūh al-Ghawrī. See: Ibn Zunbul, *Tārīkh al-Sultān Salīm Khān Ibn al-Sultān Bāyazīd Khān ma^ca Qānṣūh al-Ghawrī Sultān Miṣr* (Cairo: n.p., 1870), p.9; al-Bakrī, *Nuṣrat Ahl al-Imān bi-Dawlat Al^cUthmān* (University of Utah: Aziz S. Atiya Middle East Library; Microfilm Reel no. 359), fol. 18a; idem, *al-Minah al-Rahmānīyah fī al-Dawlah al-^cUthmānīyah* (University of Utah: Aziz S. Atiya Middle East Library; Microfilm Reel no. 190), fol. 16a; al-Karmī, *Nuzhat al-Nāziri fīman Waliya Miṣr min al-Khulafā wa al-Salāṭīn* (University of Utah: Aziz S. Atiya Middle East Library; Microfilm Reel no. 304), fol. 49a-b; al-Qaramānī, *Akhbār al-Duwal wa Athār al-Uwal* (University of Utah: Aziz S. Atiya Middle East Library; Microfilm Reel no. 472), fol. 250b (wrongly marked fol. 253b). See also Rūmlū, *Aḥsanu't-Tawārīkh*, 1:154-156 and 2:74.

of the factors behind Selim's hurried withdrawal from Iran, and could be exploited by the Ottomans as a casus belli to open hostilities.⁸⁰ Third, Selim's appointment of [°]Alī Beg Dulḡadır, a nephew and rival of [°]Alā al-Dawlah,⁸¹ as governor of Amasya upon his return from Iran, indicated that Selim's will was bent on punishing the vassal of the Mamluks.⁸² In addition, a fourth and most crucial factor unknown to the Mamluk Sultan, consisted of the Ottoman success in maintaining an elaborate spy network within the Mamluk ruling elite.⁸³

Selim formally complained to al-Ghawrī about [°]Alā al-Dawlah's attitude. The Mamluk Sultan attempted to avoid further complications and dissociated himself from his vassal's actions.⁸⁴ The Ottomans swiftly responded by invading the province of Dulḡadır, killing [°]Alā al-Dawlah and extending their suzerainty over that territory by installing [°]Alī Beg as the new ruler in Rabī[°] II-Jumādā I 921/May-June 1515.⁸⁵ Selim showed further aggressiveness by sending [°]Alā

⁸⁰ al-Bakrī, Nuṣrat Ahl al-Imān, fol. 18a; al-Karmī, Nuzhat al-Nāziri, fol. 49b.

⁸¹ [°]Alī Beg was the son of Shāh Savār, brother of [°]Alā al-Dawlah and a former ruler of Dulḡadır who was assassinated by the Mamluks for his cooperation with the Ottoman Sultan Mehmed II.

⁸² Munajjim Bāshī, Ṣaḡā'if al-Akḡbār, 3:456-457; Moukbil, La Campagne de Perse, p. 87.

⁸³ For the secret correspondence between Khāyir Beg, the Mamluk military commander of Aleppo, and Sultan Bayezid, see Chapter Three, n.82. The same Khāyir Beg played a key role in facilitating Selim's victory over the Mamluks and was sometimes referred to in contemporary chronicles as "Khāyin Beg", meaning "Traitor Beg".

⁸⁴ Ibn Zunbul, Tārīkh al-Sulṭān Salīm Khān, p. 8.

⁸⁵ Ibn Iyās, Badā'i[°] al-Zuhūr, 4:458-466; Ibn Ṭīlūn, Mufākahat al-Khillān, 1:384; Rūmlī, Aḡsanu't-Tawārīkh, 1:154-156 and 2:75; Munajjim Bāshī, Ṣaḡā'if al-Akḡbār, 3:458 states that the decisive battle took place on 29 Rabī[°] II 921/13 June 1515, while Selim's message to al-Ghawrī (Ferīdūn, Munsha'āt, 1:411-413) dates it on the first of Jumādā I 921/14 June 1515.

al-Dawlah's head, together with a warning, to Qānsūh al-Ghawrī.⁸⁶ Following this episode, al-Ghawrī made preparations for war while beginning a two-fold diplomatic offensive which aimed first at discouraging Selim from renewing hostilities against Shah Ismā[°]īl; second, at cementing a Mamluk-Ṣafavid military alliance. In fact, while writing to the Ottoman Sultan that he was moving to Aleppo — with the army — to "mediate between him and Shah Ismā[°]īl,"⁸⁷ the Mamluk Sultan secretly dispatched a close and "trustworthy" confidant to the Ṣafavid ruler to initiate a joint effort against the Ottomans.⁸⁸ Unfortunately for Qānsūh al-Ghawrī, this envoy, who returned from Iran on 9 Rabī[°] II 922/9 May 1516, also doubled

⁸⁶ The text of the message is in Ferīdūn, Munsha'āt, 1:411-413. On Mamluk reaction to this embassy, see: Ibn Iyās, Badā'i[°] al-Zuhūr, 4:462:463 and 467.

⁸⁷ For Mamluk preparations for war, see: Ibn Iyās, Badā'i[°] al-Zuhūr, 4:470-483 and 5:14-61; Ibn Ṭīlūn, Mufākahat al-Khillān, 2:6-13. The version that Qānsūh al-Ghawrī intended to "mediate" between Selim and Shah Ismā[°]īl was the cover used by the Mamluk Sultan to move to Syria. This was expressed in his message to Selim, in Ferīdūn, Munsha'āt, 1:423-424. In the same message, al-Ghawrī suggested to Selim to think of conquering the island of Rhodes rather than fighting other Muslims.

⁸⁸ Ibn Iyās, Badā'i[°] al-Zuhūr, 5:35, gives the name of the envoy as al-[°]Ajamī al-Shanqajī and refers to him as "nadīm al-Sulṭān" (the drinking companion of the Sultan). Due to the importance of this mission and the lack of attention that modern historians have given to it, it is preferable to reproduce Ibn Iyās' version:

حضر الى ابواب الشريفة العجمي الشنقجي نديم السلطان
... فظهران السلطان كان أرسله الى شاه اسماعيل
الصفوي في خفية في خبر سر للسلطان بينه وبين الصفوي كما أشيع بين الناس

Ibn Ṭīlūn, Mufākahat al-Khillān, 2:23 confirms this version but gives the name of the envoy as "al-bahlawān" which seems to be nothing other than a surname for the same person mentioned by Ibn Iyās, since he refers to him as "aḡad jamā[°]at sulṭānīnā", or a member of the Sultan's close circle.

as an Ottoman agent.⁸⁹ Three months after this embassy, Selim sent the Mamluk Sultan an insulting message, dated mid-Rajab 922/mid-August 1516, informing him that his spies had kept him informed of Mamluk dealings and challenging him to war.⁹⁰ Meanwhile, the Ottoman Sultan secured the allegiance of Maḥmūd Beg, the ruler of Ramazan Oğulları and vassal of the Mamluks, who later participated in the campaign.⁹¹

It is beyond the scope of this work to give details concerning Selim's conquest of the Mamluk empire; it would suffice to mention that on the battlefield of Marj Dābiq north of Aleppo, on 25 Rajab 922/24 August 1516, due to the defection of Khāyir Beg, the commander of Aleppo, with his army, as well as the superiority of Ottoman firepower, the Mamluks were easily defeated and lost their Sultan in battle.⁹² Hence, Syria was laid open to the victorious Ottomans and a

⁸⁹This is clear when reading Ibn Iyās, Badā'i' al-Zuhūr, 5:35-84. The passage in Ibn Tūlūn, Mufākahat al-Khillān, 2:23 is somewhat ambiguous. It confirms that Selim received intelligence about this mission but is equivocal as to the source of the leak of news concerning it.

⁹⁰Ferīdūn, Munsha'āt, 1:426-427. Hammer-Purgstall, Histoire de l'Empire Ottoman, 4:360-361, states that al-Jammālī issued a fatwā against the Mamluks.

⁹¹Munajjim Bāshī, Ṣaḥā'if al-Akḥbār, 3:171-172, states that Maḥmūd Beg became the ruler of Ramazan Oğulları in 919/1513-14 and died in 922/1516-17 during the campaign against Egypt.

⁹²Details of the battle are given by the contemporary chronicles of Ibn Iyās, Badā'i' al-Zuhūr, 5:4-75; the part concerning Selim's campaign against the Mamluks has been translated into English by William H. Solomon under the title An Account of the Ottoman Conquest of Egypt in the Year A.H. 922 (A.D. 1516) (London: The Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland, 1921); Ibn Tūlūn, Mufākahat al-Khillān, 2:6-30. This author was able to visit the Ottoman camp in Syria after the battle and recorded his impressions about its organization. The most extensive account is that of Ibn Zūbul, an eyewitness who wrote an important and lengthy monograph about the campaign. To date, only an abridged lithographed edition of the work is available. About Marj Dābiq, see: Ibn Zūbul, Tārīkh al-Sultān Salīm, pp. 12-24.

second encounter at Raydānīyah, on the outskirts of Cairo, between the Ottomans and the remnants of the Mamluk army under the new Sultan, Tūmān Bey, on 20 Dhū'l-Ḥijjah 922/23 January 1517, ended again with an Ottoman victory. It sealed Selim's conquest of the Mamluk empire⁹³ and was followed by the submission of the Muslim Holy Places of Mecca and Medina.⁹⁴

Thus, the Mamluk empire bore the consequences of its attitude toward Selim and Shah Ismā'īl. This event illustrated the Ottoman Sultan's success in fighting his foes in two separate and victorious battles. As for the failure of Shah Ismā'īl to abide by his alliance with Qānṣāh al-Ghawrī and join in the war against the Ottomans, the answer could be found only in the Venetian dispatches contained in Marino Sanudo's Diarii. These documents reveal intense diplomatic activity between al-Ghawrī and Shah Ismā'īl after the defeat of the latter at Chāldirān, as well as the existence of an alliance between them.⁹⁵ More importantly, they state that Shah Ismā'īl moved toward Syria with 60,000 men to join the Mamluks, but was unable to reach the border, due to the fact that Selim had stationed an equal number of

⁹³Tūmān Bey was not killed during that battle and succeeded in escaping to organize local resistance against the Ottomans. He was finally captured and hanged at the gate of Zuwaylah in Cairo on 22 Rabī' I 923/14 April 1517; see Ibn Iyās, Badā'i' al-Zuhūr, 5:166-167 (about Tūmān Bey) and 5:122-150 (about the campaign against Egypt). See also Ibn Tūlūn, Mufākahat al-Khillān, 2:43-44; Ibn Zūbul, Tārīkh al-Sultān Salīm, pp. 28-122.

⁹⁴Ibn Iyās, Badā'i' al-Zuhūr, 5:192 and 206; al-Nahrawālī, Kitāb al-I'clām bi-A'clām Bayt Allāh al-Ḥarām, vol. 3 of Akḥbār Makkah al-Musharrāfah, edited by H.F. Wüstenfeld (Beirut: Khayat, 1964), pp. 284-289.

⁹⁵Sanudo/Amoretti, Ṣāh Ismā'īl, 1:317 and 345.

soldiers to guard the passes of al-Bīrah, the main crossing point between Diyār Bakr and Syria.⁹⁶

After their conquest of the Mamluk empire, the Ottomans started a propaganda campaign against Shah Ismāʿīl who became cursed in the Friday prayer.⁹⁷ Moreover, they encouraged the spread of rumors describing the former Mamluk Sultan Qānsūh al-Ghawrī as a member of the Hurūfī sect and a "close friend of the Persians."⁹⁸

Toward the end of Selim's reign, Anatolia was again shaken by a new rebellion. In 925/1519, a man by the name of Jalālī declared himself the Mahdī⁹⁹ and rallied round him a large following which included a number of qizilbāsh. This rebellion, which had started at Turkhāl near Tokat, spread to Sivas where ʿAlī Beg the ruler of Dulgadir succeeded in defeating the rebels and killing their leader.¹⁰⁰ This atmosphere of heterodoxy favored the spread of rumors

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 351-353, 401 and 447.

⁹⁷ Ibn Mlūn, *Mufākahat al-Khillān*, 2:74-75.

⁹⁸ Ibn Iyās, *Badāʿiʿ al-Zuhūr*, 5:88.

⁹⁹ The Mahdī is the twelfth and last Imām in the Shīʿī Imāmī doctrine, who disappeared and who will return at the end of time. See, al-Shībī, *al-Silah bayna al-Taṣawwuf wa al-Tashayyūʿ* (Cairo: Dār al-Maʿārif, 1969), pp. 121-131 and 227; Tabātabāʿī, *Shīʿite Islam*, translated and edited by S.H. Nasr (London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1975), pp. 173-217.

¹⁰⁰ Munajjim Bāshī, *Ṣaḥāʿif al-Akhhār*, 3:471; Solakzade, *Tarih*, pp. 414-415; Usunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Tarihi*, vol. 2 pt. 2, p. 297 (dates it in 924); Hammer-Purgstall, *Histoire de l'Empire Ottoman*, 4:351-352 (gives no date). Sanudo/Amoretti, *Ṣāh Ismāʿīl*, 1:494-495, confirms that the rebels were in favor of Shah Ismāʿīl and that 15,000 were killed. Tansel, *Yavuz Sultan Selim*, pp. 94-98, reproduces a document from Topkapı Sarayı Arşivi no. 5293 confirming the qizilbāsh connection.

that Murād, son of Ahmad, was still alive. However, these rumors died out without causing further complications.¹⁰¹

On the Safavid side, the last years of Shah Ismāʿīl were marked by diplomatic overtures to Western Christendom in an effort to create an alliance against the Ottomans. He contacted the Grand Master of the Knights of St. John at Rhodes and asked him to hand over a cousin of Selim who was in the custody of the Hospitallers, a request which was denied.¹⁰² The Safavid ruler was equally unsuccessful with the Portuguese,¹⁰³ with Ladislas II (1490-1516), king of Hungary and Bohemia,¹⁰⁴ as well as with Charles V, Emperor of the Habsburg Empire

¹⁰¹ Munajjim Bāshī, *Ṣaḥāʿif al-Akhhār*, 3:471-472, dates this event in 925/1519; Tansel, *Yavuz Sultan Selim*, pp. 99-100. Rumors were spread by a Sifī who later stated that Murād had died at Uskudar. In order to stop these rumors, Selim went to Uskudar and ordered the body exhumed. Historically, it is a known fact that Murād had died in Iran around 1513.

¹⁰² Sanudo/Amoretti, *Ṣāh Ismāʿīl*, 1:330-331. This was the son of Sultan Jem, brother of Bayezid II, who escaped to Rhodes and later died in France.

¹⁰³ See note 77 of the present chapter concerning Shah Ismāʿīl's embassy to Albuquerque at Hormuz in 1515. In a message dated Shawwāl 924/October-November 1518 and addressed to Emperor Charles V, Shah Ismāʿīl confirms having received an envoy from the King of Portugal. See: K. Lanz, ed. *Correspondenz des Kaisers Karl V* (Frankfurt/Main: Minerva GMBH, 1966), 1:52-53; Falsafī, *Tārīkh-i Ravābiṭ-i Irān va Urūpā dar Dawrah-i Ṣafavīyah*, p. 164, mistakenly rendered Lusitania as Susitania. In a note, he adds that he has no knowledge of this country. Lusitania is the ancient name for Portugal.

¹⁰⁴ In the same message mentioned above, Ismāʿīl acknowledges the receipt of a message from the "king of Hungary" through "Brother Peter", a Maronite from Mount Lebanon. This king is Ladislas II, who died in 1516. See: Lanz, *Correspondenz des Kaisers Karl V*, 1:52; Falsafī, *Ravābiṭ-i Irān va Urūpā*, p. 163. On Ladislas' rule, see: Setton, "Pope Leo X and the Turkish Peril," *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society* (1969): 377-383.

(1519-58).¹⁰⁵ Papal plans to include the Safavids in an anti-Ottoman alliance also came to naught.¹⁰⁶

B. Ottoman Containment of the Safavid Empire.

The Ottoman-Safavid conflict entered a new phase after the death of Selim in 926/1520. On the Ottoman side, the subsequent reign of Sultan Sulayman II was destined to inaugurate a new era, the foundations of which had been completed by Selim who had expanded the empire southward from the Taurus region to the Upper Euphrates, Syria, the Hijāz and Egypt, thus reaching the Mediterranean coast of Africa as well as the Indian Ocean. Such an achievement was made possible by halting the campaign against Europe and concentrating on the Middle East. Sulayman's policy was characterized by a return to the European tradition of the empire, in addition to the consolidation of Selim's legacy.

In Syria, Jān Birdī al-Ghazzālī attempted to take advantage of the change of government in Istanbul and proclaimed the secession of this province from the empire. According to a number of sources, Jān

¹⁰⁵Shah Ismā'īl sent a letter to Emperor Charles V, dated Shawwāl 924/October-November 1518 through the same Peter the Maronite asking him to unite with him in an attack against the Ottomans the following spring. However, it seems that Ismā'īl's message did not reach the Habsburg court in time. Charles' answer is dated 25 August 1525 at Toledo, thus sent after Ismā'īl's death which occurred in 930/1524. This message was dispatched with Jean de Balbi, a Frenchman who was also a Knight of the Order of St. John. A number of letters sent by de Balbi to Charles V show that this envoy reached Aleppo on 12 August 1529 and Baghdād on 13 May 1530, after which de Balbi's letters ceased. Copies of these letters are contained in Lanz, *Correspondenz des Kaisers Karl V*, 1:52-53, 168-169, 192-206, 329-330, 335-336, 379 and 385.

¹⁰⁶Setton, "Pope Leo X and the Turkish Peril," p.389. For papal plans to include Iran in an alliance against the Ottomans, see: Charrière, *Négociations de la France dans le Levant*, 1:49-63.

Birdī acted in league with Shah Ismā'īl who then marched closer to the Ottoman borders. This rebellion began at the end of Dhū'l Qa'dah 926/November 1520 and was crushed at the end of Safar 927/January 1521, when Farhād Pasha defeated its leader and sent his head to the Sultan.¹⁰⁷

After this episode, Sulayman turned his attention to the Danubian borders of his realm. There, the king of Hungary showed defiance and killed the Ottoman ambassador who had been sent to collect the annual tribute. Immediately, Sulayman made preparations for a fresh campaign under his personal command, which resulted in the siege and fall of Belgrade on 26 Ramaḍān 927/30 August 1521.¹⁰⁸ This success, which further strengthened Ottoman hold over the Lower Danube and opened the road to Hungary, was coupled a year later with the capture of the island of Rhodes from the Knights of St. John

¹⁰⁷Jān Birdī al-Ghazzālī, a former Mamluk commander, is depicted in contemporary Egyptian chronicles as a traitor who took Selim's side during the Ottoman conquest of Egypt and who later was rewarded with the governorship of Syria. Upon receiving the news of Selim's death, he attempted to induce Khāyir Beg, then commander-in-chief of the army of Egypt, to revive the defunct Mamluk empire. He met with Khāyir Beg's refusal and limited his project to Syria. For details, see Ibn Iyās, *Badā'i' al-Zuhūr*, 5:367-369, 382 and 422-423; Solakzade, *Tarih*, pp. 433-437. A document reproduced by Sanudo implies a connection between Jān Birdī's rebellion and the Safavids. It states that Shah Ismā'īl had promised the rebellious governor 10,000 men to help him achieve his plan. See Sanudo/Amoretti, *Shāh Ismā'īl*, 1:522. This version is confirmed by Munajjim Bāshī, *Shāhā'if al-Akhhār*, 3:476-477, who wrote that Ismā'īl came close to the Ottoman border but returned to Qazvin upon hearing of the defeat of Jān Birdī. He also stated that Farhād Pasha, the commander of the expedition against Syria, received orders to place an army contingent at Kayseri to guard the borders against the Safavids.

¹⁰⁸Munajjim Bāshī, *Shāhā'if al-Akhhār*, 3:477-478; Solakzade, *Tarih*, pp. 438-439. The journal of the campaign is found in Ferīdūn, *Munsha'āt*, 1:507-515.

(the Hospitallers) who represented a threat to the safety of navigation between Anatolia and Egypt.¹⁰⁹

While Sulayman was launching these offensives, Shah Ismā'īl was still in search of allies among Western Christendom. In 1521, envoys from Pope Leo X (1513-21) and from Venice reached Iran separately and were granted audience with the Shah at Marāghah.¹¹⁰ However, after hearing of Sulayman's victories against his European adversaries, Shah Ismā'īl deemed it wise to keep the status quo ante with the Ottomans and sent his first and only embassy to Sulayman on the occasion of the conquest of Rhodes. In this document, the Ṣafavid ruler congratulated the Sultan on his victory and on his accession to the Ottoman throne, and expressed his condolences for the demise of Sultan Selim,¹¹¹ three events which occurred during a two-year period. Sulayman reciprocated with a message dated 14 Muḥarram 930/23 November 1523 which was a

¹⁰⁹Munajjim Bāshī, Ṣahā'if al-Akḥbār, 3:478, states that Rhodes surrendered on 5 Ṣafar 929/24 December 1522. Sulayman gives an account of the siege in a fathnāmāh addressed to the governor of Bursa; see Ferīdūn, Munsha'āt 1:522-525. Further details are given by Hammer-Purgstall, Histoire de l'Empire Ottoman, 5:27-43, and by Eric Brockman, The Two Sieges of Rhodes, 1480-1522 (London: John Murray, 1969). The Hospitallers first settled in Cyprus following the fall of Ḳakka in Palestine in 1291. By 1308, they took over Rhodes. See A.S. Atiya, The Crusades in the Later Middle Ages (London: Methuen and Co., 1938), pp. 286-290.

¹¹⁰Sanudo/Amoretti, Ṣāh Ismā'īl, 1:545-547. This document is dated 16 January 1521, a fact which seems doubtful, since it is classified among those of the year 1522. As the full set of the Diarii of Marino Sanudo was not available to the present writer at this time, verification of the date was not possible. However, this writer's suspicions concerning the date are supported by a passage in Khwāndamīr, Ḥabīb al-Siyar, 4:474, where it is stated that Shah Ismā'īl had spent the month of Ramaḡān 927/August-September 1521, at Marāghah.

¹¹¹Ferīdūn, Munsha'āt, 1:525-526. This document is undated, but internal evidence shows that it was composed after the Ottoman conquest of Rhodes, i.e., after December 1522.

masterpiece of diplomatic ambiguity.¹¹² While coldly thanking Shah Ismā'īl for his initiative, he referred to Selim as the one "who had suppressed the deeds of the profligates and the rebels," a direct allusion to the Ṣafavids.¹¹³

Shah Ismā'īl died on 19 Rajab/23 May 1524 and was succeeded by his young son Ṭahmāsp (930-984/1524-76) then only ten years of age.¹¹⁴ The minority of the new Shah led to infighting among the prominent leaders of the qizilbāsh tribes, each eager to ascertain his own control over the affairs of the state. At the death of Shah Ismā'īl, the position of vakīl (viceroy) was held by Div Sulṭān Rūmlū, who retained this same office under Ismā'īl's successor, Ṭahmāsp. He also filled the function of lālā (tutor) to the young ruler and of amīr al-umarā' (commander-in-chief) of the qizilbāsh forces. Div Sulṭān Rūmlū became the de facto ruler of the Ṣafavid state, a role which aroused the jealousy of his rivals, the most prominent of whom was Kupak (Köpek) Sulṭān Ustājīlū. This rivalry was at the origins of the rebellion of the Ustājīlūs and led to a civil war which first opposed the latter to the Rūmlūs, both being respectively backed by the Shāmlūs

¹¹²Ibid., pp. 526-527.

¹¹³Ibid., p. 527.

¹¹⁴A discrepancy concerning the birthdate of Ṭahmāsp exists among several sources. In his memoirs, Ṭahmāsp states that he was born on 19 Dhū'l-Ḥijjah 920/3 February 1515; see his Rūznāmāh, p.166; idem, "Die Denkwürdigkeiten des Ṣāh Ṭahmāsp I von Persien," edited by Paul Horn, ZDMG 44 (1890): 576. Rūmlū, Aḥsanu't-Tawārīkh, 1:132 and 2:67, gives Ṭahmāsp's date of birth as the 26th of Dhū'l-Ḥijjah 919/22 February 1514, while Khwāndamīr, Ḥabīb al-Siyar, 4:531, states that Ṭahmāsp was born at the end of 918/February-March 1513. Iskandar Beg Munshī, Tārīkh-i Ḳālam Arā-vi Ḳabbāsī, 1:45, confirms the date given by Rūmlū. This date (26 Dhū'l-Ḥijjah 919/22 February 1514) seems to be the correct one, since the contemporary Khwāndamīr confirms that it took place near Isfahān, where Shah Ismā'īl was encamped following his campaign against the Uzbeks in Khurāsān.

and the Tekkelū tribes. From 931/1525 to 940/1532-33, Iran was shaken by intermittent warfare between the several qizilbāsh factions.¹¹⁵ Finally, in 940/1532-33, Ṭahmāsp succeeded in putting an end to what a modern scholar has called "the qizilbāsh interregnum"¹¹⁶ and assumed the reins of power.¹¹⁷

Iran's unsettled conditions prompted the Uzbeks to launch a series of attacks against the Ṣafavids in Khurāsān, especially against the city of Harāt. This episode in the history of Ṣafavid-Uzbek relations has been researched by Martin B. Dickson. As for the Ottoman reaction vis-à-vis Ṭahmāsp and the internal conditions which characterized the first decade of his rule, it had been marked by the absence of military initiatives against Iran, despite the anti-Ṣafavid stand Sultan Sulayman had adopted. This Sultan's attitude toward the new government of Iran is revealed in a number of documents, two of which will be mentioned. First, instead of the customary congratulatory embassy, Sulayman dispatched a threatening message to Ṭahmāsp, reminding him of Selim's campaign against Iran

¹¹⁵The details of these events will not be dealt with here. The reader might refer to a number of articles and monographs by modern scholars who researched this period. Among these, the following are of special interest: Martin Dickson, "Shāh Ṭahmāsb and the Uzbeks," mostly pp. 51-203; Jean-Louis Bacqué-Grammont, "Une Liste d'Emirs Ostagelū Révoltés en 1526," Studia Iranica 5 (1976): 91-114; idem, "Un Document Ottoman sur la Révolte des Ostagelū," Studia Iranica 6 (1977): 168-184; Roger M. Savory, "The Principal Offices of the Ṣafavid State during the Reign of Ṭahmāsp 1st (930-84/1524-76)," BSOAS 24 (1961): 65-85. Among original sources, see Ṭahmāsp, Rūznāmah, 2:167-170 and 173-4; Rūmlū, Aḥsanu't-Tawārikh, 1: 187-236 and Iskandar Beg Munshī, Tārīkh-i ʿĀlam Ara-vi ʿAbbāsī, 1:47-49.

¹¹⁶Expression used by Savory, "The Principal Offices of the Ṣafavid State during the Reign of Ṭahmāsp," p. 70.

¹¹⁷Ibid.

and indirectly requesting him to "follow the right path".¹¹⁸ Second, the Sultan demonstrated an equal aggressiveness in a letter sent to Khusrū Pasha, the Ottoman governor of Diyār Bakr, dated mid-Ramaḥān 931/July 1525. In this document, Sulayman ordered his governor to win the support of the Kurds, give refuge to the ʿUlamā' (theologians) fleeing Iran, and to keep the central government informed about the affairs of Iran. The Ottoman Sultan also added that he would eventually march on Iran.¹¹⁹

Despite Sulayman's threats to invade Iran, the Ottomans had first to face the challenge of the Habsburgs who, under the leadership of Louis II, King of Hungary (1516-26), were menacing the Danubian borders of the empire. In response, the Ottoman army crossed the Danube and won a strategic and decisive victory at Mohács, on 21 Dhū'l-Qa'dah 932/29 August 1526,¹²⁰ thus opening the road to Hungary.

¹¹⁸Ferīdūn, Munsha'āt, 1:541-543; ʿAbd al-Ḥusayn Navā'ī, comp., Shāh Ṭahmāsb Ṣafavī. Majmū'ah-vi Asnād va Mukātabāt-i Tārīkhī hamrah-i Yaddāshtihā-yi Tafsīlī (Tehran: Intishārāt-i Bunyād-i Farhang-i Irān, 1971), pp. 151-153. This message is undated but includes a reference to Sulayman's conquests of Belgrade in 927/1521 and Rhodes in 929/1522. Knowing that Ṭahmāsp ascended the throne on 19 Rajab 930/23 May 1524, and that Sulayman's next victory was at Mohács in 932/1526, it would be logical to assume that this message was sent shortly after Ṭahmāsp's coronation.

¹¹⁹Ferīdūn, Munsha'āt, 1:543-544.

¹²⁰There was a split in Hungary between the German and the Magyar nobles. The Magyars were led by John Zapolya, Voivode of Transylvania, who was installed as King of Hungary by Sulayman following the battle of Mohács. On the Habsburg side, Archduke Ferdinand, the future Holy Roman Emperor (1556-64), and a younger brother of Emperor Charles V (1519-56), became the new King of Bohemia and Hungary with its capital at Vienna, following Louis II's death in 1526 at Mohács. See D. Vaughan, Europe and the Turk. A Pattern of Alliances, 1350-1700 (Liverpool University Press, 1954), pp. 109-114; W.E.D. Allen, Problems of Turkish Power in the Sixteenth Century (London: Central Asian Research Centre, 1963), pp. 68-71; C. Max Kortepeter, Ottoman Imperialism during the Reformation: Europe and the Caucasus (New York: New York University Press, 1972), pp. 124-131. In

Its capital, Buda, fell to the Ottomans two weeks later on 3 Dhū'l-Ḥijjah 932/10 September 1526.¹²¹ A year later, Ottoman authorities had to deal with several rebellions which occurred in parts of Anatolia and the Taurus region at the end of 933 and the beginning of 934/mid-1527-beginning of 1528. These were uprisings among the peasantry who were protesting against a newly ordered cadastral survey.¹²² From the end of 934/mid-1529 to the beginning of 939/end of 1532, the Ottoman army was preoccupied with campaigns in Hungary and Austria. Among the events of this period, most notable was Sulayman's failure to capture Vienna after a month-long siege which lasted from 23 Muḥarram to 10 Ṣafar 935/17 September to 14 October 1529.¹²³ In May 1533, an armistice was signed between the Ottomans and King Ferdinand of Hungary and Bohemia.¹²⁴

these sources as well as in Hammer-Purgstall, Histoire de l'Empire Ottoman, 5:78-86, the date of the battle of Mohács is given as August 29, 1526. However, in Sulayman's fathnāmah published in Ferīdūn, Munsha'āt, 1:546-551, this date is 20 Dhū'l-Qa'dah 932/28 August 1526; Munajjim Bāshī, Ṣahā'if al-Akḥbār, 3:481-482 states incorrectly that the battle took place on 20 Dhū'l-Ḥijjah 932/27 September 1526.

¹²¹Solakzade, Tarih, pp. 458-460; Peçevi, Peçevi Tarihi, edited by Murat Uraz (Istanbul: Neşriyat Yurdu, 1968), 1:59-60; Hammer-Purgstall, Histoire de l'Empire Ottoman, 5:88-91.

¹²²Munajjim Bāshī, Ṣahā'if al-Akḥbār 3:482-485; Solakzade, Tarih, pp. 462-468; Peçevi, Tarih 1:67-68; Hammer-Purgstall, Histoire de l'Empire Ottoman, 5:92-101.

¹²³The Ottomans signed a treaty of alliance with John Zapolya on 29 February 1528, aimed against the Habsburg Ferdinand who laid claims to Hungary. Hammer-Purgstall, Histoire de l'Empire Ottoman, 5:114-127; Vaughan, Europe and the Turk, pp. 114-116.

¹²⁴Hammer-Purgstall, Histoire de l'Empire Ottoman, 5:179-180; Vaughan, Europe and the Turk, pp. 118-119.

The conclusion of this treaty allowed Sulayman to turn his attention away from Europe and toward the Ṣafavid state. In 934-35/1528-29, Dhū'l-Fiqār Mawṣillū killed his uncle Ibrāhīm Mawṣillū, who governed Baghdād and Arab Iraq in the name of the Ṣafavids, and assumed that office, whereupon he declared his allegiance to the Ottomans and ordered that the khutbah be read in the name of Sultan Sulayman. This rebellion was short-lived; Dhū'l-Fiqār was assassinated by his own brothers who were in league with Shah Tahmāsp.¹²⁵

The ongoing civil war, together with the incessant Uzbek attacks against Khurāsān, emboldened Ulāmah Tekkelu, governor of Āzarbāyjān and a member of the eponymous tribe, to openly seek the office of vakil, but his designs were thwarted following his defeat in 937/1530-31 at the hands of Tahmāsp's loyal supporters. He then fled to the Ottomans and secured their firm backing.¹²⁶

The positive Ottoman reaction to the defection from the ranks of the Ṣafavids of Ulāmah and his Tekkelu supporters was dictated by a number of factors. First, the Ṣafavid state had become increasingly

¹²⁵There is a considerable discrepancy among sources as to the date of this rebellion. Rūmlū, Aḥsanu't-Tawārīkh, 1:208-209, does not date the rebellion of Dhū'l-Fiqār but leads the reader to believe that it started late in 934/mid-1528. However, he gives the exact date of Dhū'l-Fiqār's death 3 Shawwāl 935/10 June 1529. Bidlīsī, Chérēf-Nameh, 2:553-556, states that the rebellion started on 14 Ramadān 934/2 June 1528 and was put down at the end of 935, corresponding to the summer of 1529. An Ottoman source, that of Kara Çelebizade, Rawdat al-Abrār (Cairo: Būlāq, 1832), p. 424, dates the revolt in 940/1533-34. Among modern historians, ḤAbbās al-Ḥazzāwī, Tārīkh al-Iraq, 3:362-365, dates this rebellion in 936/1529-30.

¹²⁶During this same period, the Uzbek ḤUbayd Khan launched a series of attacks on the main cities of Khurāsān, especially Harāt. Iskandar Beg Munshī, Ālam Āra-yi ḤAbbāsī, 1:59-61; Rūmlū, Aḥsanu't-Tawārīkh, 1:237; Bidlīsī, Sharafnāmah, (Arabic) 1:434-438.

weakened by the continuous civil strife. Second, the recurrent Uzbek raids on Khurāsān had developed into what was virtually a war of attrition against the Ṣafavids. Third, the rebellions of Dhū'l-Fiqār and Ulāmāh illustrated the considerable attenuation of the hold of the central government over the western and northwestern reaches of the country.

These conditions permitted Sultan Sulayman to decide upon a large scale campaign against the Ṣafavids with the aim of accomplishing two major objectives: first, the establishment of Ottoman control over the passes which linked Iran to eastern Anatolia and Georgia, by bringing Armenia and Kurdistan under Ottoman hold; second, a southward expansion to the Persian Gulf through the occupation of Arab Iraq, including the city of Baghdād.

Sulayman left Uskudar at the end of 940/mid-1534 to command his forces and head a two-year campaign against Iran.¹²⁷ However, Ottoman military operations against the Ṣafavids had started as early as 938/1531-32 and had been precipitated by Sharaf Khān Rūzakī, the governor of Bidlīs--the capital of Kurdistan--who had declared his allegiance to Shah Ṣahmāsp after having initially adopted a neutral stand between the Ottomans and the Ṣafavids. Sulayman immediately reacted by appointing the fugitive Ulāmāh Tekkelu as governor of Bidlīs and providing him with troops to conquer Kurdistan. After initial failures, Ulāmāh succeeded, in 939/1532-33, in capturing the city of Bidlīs and killing its ruler.¹²⁸ However, the difficulties

¹²⁷The journal of Sulayman's campaign is found in Ferīdūn, Munsha'āt, 1:584-598.

¹²⁸The best details are given by Bidlīsī, Sharafnāmāh, 1:434-456; Rūmlū, Ahsanu't-Tawārīkh, 1:239-240 and 246-247.

encountered by the Ottoman party prompted Sultan Sulayman to dispatch reinforcements under his Grand Vizir Ibrāhīm Pasha during this same year, and finally to take personal command of the campaign the following year, 940/1534.¹²⁹

As a result of this campaign, which lasted until mid-942/end of 1535,¹³⁰ the Ottomans succeeded in establishing a cordon sanitaire around Ṣafavid Iran and in further containing this country. First, the conquest of Kurdistan together with the submission of Gilān,¹³¹ increased Ottoman control over Iran's links with eastern Anatolia and Georgia. Second, the peaceful possession of the city of Baghdād, which was entered by Sulayman on 24 Jumādā II 941/1 December 1534,¹³² and the subsequent capitulation of Arab Iraq, including the port city of Basrah,¹³³ expanded Ottoman boundaries to the Persian Gulf.

Following this campaign, Ṣafavid Iran became virtually surrounded by enemies. In addition to his perennial conflict with the

¹²⁹The military operations included the capture of Kurdistan and of the fortresses surrounding Lake Van, the peaceful submission of Arab Iraq and the temporary seizure of Tabrīz. Accounts of the campaign are found in the following: Rūmlū, Ahsanu't-Tawārīkh, 1:247-260; Iskandar Beg Munshī, Cālam Arā-yi CAbbāsī, 1:66-69, refers to this campaign as two. In fact, Sulayman entered Tabrīz on his way from Anatolia and a second time on his way back after having spent the winter in Baghdād. However, these movements should not be considered as two separate campaigns. See also Hammer-Purgstall, Histoire de l'Empire Ottoman, 5:203-228.

¹³⁰Sulayman returned to Istanbul on 14 Rajab/8 January 1536. See Ferīdūn, Munsha'āt, 1:598.

¹³¹Muzaffar Khān, the ruler of Gilān, joined the Ottomans with ten thousand men. See Peçevi, Tarih, 1:99.

¹³²Ibid., 1:101-103; ^cAzzāwī, Tārīkh al-'Irāq, 4:28-37.

¹³³Basrah submitted without a struggle in 945/1538. See Peçevi, Tarih, 1:113.

Uzbeks and the Ottomans, Shah Ṭahmāsp also maintained unfriendly relations with the Mughals of India.¹³⁴

The main feature of this campaign was the strategy that Ṭahmāsp and his commanders had adopted regarding the superior armies of the Ottomans. In his Memoirs, Shah Ṭahmāsp estimated that three hundred thousand Ottoman cavalrymen had participated in this campaign. He added that he realized the impossibility of facing such a huge number of men, and had thus decided not to engage them in battle.¹³⁵ He further wrote that the size of the invading army would render an extended campaign against Iran impossible, due to the problems of supply and the previous burning of the crops in the area.¹³⁶ In fact, the Safavids had learned a lesson from their defeat at Chāldirān in 920/1514 and avoided engaging the Ottomans in pitched battles. Through this strategy, Ṭahmāsp was able to keep his losses to a minimum and prevented the Ottomans from winning a major battle which would substantially weaken the qizilbāsh forces.

Sultan Sulayman led two more campaigns against Iran; however, Ottoman-Safavid boundaries remained virtually unchanged, compared with those which had resulted from the first campaign of

¹³⁴In the midst of the campaign against the Ottomans, Sām Mirza--Shah Ṭahmāsp's brother--started an offensive against the Mughals and invaded Qandahār, but was defeated in 941/1534-35. See Rūmlū, Aḥsanu't-Tawārīkh, 1:260-261. Following Bābur's death in 937/1530, the Mughal empire was ruled by Humāyūn (937-47/1530-40) and (962-63/1555-56) who was rivalled by another brother, Kamrān Mirza. A summary of the state of relations between Bābur's successor and Shah Ṭahmāsp is given by Riazul Islam, Indo-Persian Relations. A Study of the Political and Diplomatic Relations Between the Mughal Empire and Iran (Tehran: Bunyād-i Farhang-i Irān, 1970), pp. 22-39.

¹³⁵Shah Ṭahmāsp, Rūznāmah, 2:192.

¹³⁶Ibid., 2:192-193.

940-41/1533-35. These two campaigns, which will be briefly summarized, consolidated Ottoman hold over Kurdistan and parts of Armenia, areas which had been targets for Safavid attacks.

In 953-54/1546-48 Alqāṣ Mirza--brother of Ṭahmāsp and governor of Shīrvān--rebelled and subsequently fled to the Ottomans.¹³⁷ He sent a message to Sultan Sulayman, promising to become his vassal if he would agree to furnish him with the necessary military support.¹³⁸ The Ottoman Sultan seized this opportunity to launch his second campaign against Iran with the aim of achieving two objectives: first, the securing of a government friendly to the Ottomans in Iran in the case of a clear victory of Alqāṣ Mirza over Ṭahmāsp; second, the strengthening of Ottoman military presence in Kurdistan and Armenia through the capture of the two key strongholds of Vān and Qārā. During this expedition which covered the years 955-56/1548-49, Sulayman succeeded in attaining the last objective only.¹³⁹ As for

¹³⁷Alqāṣ Mirza showed insubordination toward his older brother Ṭahmāsp. In 953/1546-47, Ṭahmāsp decided to march against Shīrvān, and concealed his plan by raiding Georgia first, then moving against Shīrvān on his return journey. After his defeat, Alqāṣ fled to the Ottomans, via Caffa in the Crimea. In addition to the contemporary chronicles, the following articles are of interest. Ḥusayn Mir Ja'farī, "Zindigānī-yi Alqāṣ Mirzā Safavī," Barrasihā-yi Tārīkhī 11 (December 1976-January 1977): 145-182; John Walsh, "The Revolt of Alqāṣ Mirza," WZKM 68 (1976): 61-78.

¹³⁸Naṭā'i, Ṭahmāsb, pp. 170-172.

¹³⁹Sulayman left Uskudar on 20 Ṣafar 955/31 March 1548 and returned to Istanbul at the beginning of Dhū'l-Ḥijjah 956/end of December 1549. The highlight of this expedition was the capture of Vān on 18 Rajab 955/24 August 1548 and a successful expedition of Vizir Ahmad Pasha against a number of forts in southern Georgia. For details, see Peçevi, Tarih, 1144-152; Munajjim Bāshī, Ṣaḥā'if al-Akḥbār, 3:498-500; Shah Ṭahmāsp, Rūznāmah, 2:196-200; Rūmlū, Aḥsanu't-Tawārīkh, 1:327-336 and 339-342; Iskandar Beg Munshī, Ālam Arā-yi Abbāsī, 1:69-75. See also the interesting memoirs of Ma'mūn Beg, composed in Turkish and reproduced by Ismet Parmaksızoğlu, "Kuzey Irak'ta Osmanlı Hakimiyetinin Kuruluşu ve Memūn Bey'in Hatıraları," Belleten 37 (April 1973), fols. 11b-33a.

Alqāṣ, he led his forces against Hamadān, Qum, Kāshān and Isfahān, but failed to win popular support. Realizing that he would be defaulting on his promise to the Ottoman Sultan, he elected to negotiate his surrender to his brother Tahmāsp who ordered him imprisoned in the fortress of Qahqahah where he finished his days.¹⁴⁰

Unlike the previous two, Sulayman's third campaign against Iran was motivated to a large extent by Ottoman internal politics. Sulayman fell under the deep influence of his favorite wife Khurram Sulṭān, the Roxolana of Western sources,¹⁴¹ and of his Grand Vizir Rustam Pasha, and appointed as his successor his son Selim, the future Selim II (974-82/1566-74), scion of his marriage to Khurram. This decision was made at the expense of his eldest son Muṣṭafā, Selim's half brother, who enjoyed the backing of the Janissaries.¹⁴²

Meanwhile, the Ṣafavids had started a major offensive against Ottoman outposts in Kurdistan and attacked the city of Erzerum in eastern Anatolia.¹⁴³ These conditions compelled Sulayman to send

¹⁴⁰ Alqāṣ died in Qahqahah in 984/1576. For details about his expedition and his life, see Mir Ja'farī, "Zindigānī-yi Alqāṣ," pp. 154-168; Walsh, "The Revolt of Alqāṣ Mirza," pp. 63-78. Among contemporary sources, the best account is given by Rūmlū, Aḥsanu't-Tawārīkh, 1:327-340 and Bidlīsī, Chérēf-Nameh, 2:580-585.

¹⁴¹ First mentioned by Ogier Ghiselin de Busbecq, The Turkish Letters of Ghiselin de Busbecq, Imperial Ambassador at Constantinople, 1554-1562, translated from the Latin of the Elvezir edition of 1663 by Edward Seymour Forster (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1968), pp. 28-33.

¹⁴² Ibid. See also Hammer-Purgstall, Histoire de l'Empire Ottoman, 6:53-57.

¹⁴³ Munajjim Bāshī, Ṣaḥā'if al-Akhhbār, 3:501-502; Rūmlū, Aḥsanu't-Tawārīkh, 1:356-370; Peçevi, Tarih, 1:158-159. In addition to Erzerum, the Ṣafavids attacked the forts of Vān, Arjīsh, Akhlāṭ and Adiljavāz.

reinforcements to the area and later to decide upon dispatching an expedition under the command of his Grand Vizir Rustam Pasha. While on his way to Iran, the latter sent emissaries to Sulayman urging him to move in person and informing him of the rebellious state of the army which was unhappy with the elimination of Muṣṭafā from the succession. Upon receiving this information, the Ottoman Sultan resolved to head the expedition and departed from Uskudar on 20 Ramaḍān 960/30 August 1553.¹⁴⁴ As later events showed, this was part of a plan engineered by Rustam Pasha and Khurram Sulṭān to provoke the death of Muṣṭafā. This scheme was effective since Sulayman ordered the death of his son Muṣṭafā while he was still marching with the army in Anatolia at Ereğli, on 20 Shawwāl 960/29 September 1553, causing him to be strangled in the imperial tent.¹⁴⁵

This campaign, which took place in 960-61/1553-54, resulted in the capture of the strongholds of Shahrīzūl and Balqāṣ, thus placing the Ottomans in full control of Kurdistan.¹⁴⁶ Returning from

¹⁴⁴ Date given by Munajjim Bāshī, Ṣaḥā'if al-Akhhbār, 3:502.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid. The best details concerning the conspiracy of the Grand Vizir Rustam Pasha and Khurram Sulṭān against Prince Muṣṭafā are given by De Busbecq, The Turkish Letters, pp. 28-33. Rustam was later put to death on Sulayman's orders for his role in the conspiracy.

¹⁴⁶ For details, see Peçevi, Tarih, 1:158-175; Munajjim Bāshī, Ṣaḥā'if al-Akhhbār, 3:502-505; Rūmlū, Aḥsanu't-Tawārīkh, 1:377-382; Parmaksızoğlu, "Kuzey Irak'ta Osmanlı Hakimiyetinin Kuruluşu," fols. 43b-45b.

Three documents found in Ferīdūn, Munsha'āt, 2:80-85, and consisting of one message from Sultan Sulayman to Burāq Khān Uzbek and two messages from the latter to the Ottoman Sultan, are of interest in relation to the creation of an Ottoman-Uzbek alliance against the Ṣafavids. In this last letter, Burāq Khān acknowledges the receipt of three hundred Janissaries and a number of cannons from the Ottomans and apologizes for not having been able to move against Iran (pp. 80-81, dated Rabi' II 963/February-March 1556). Sulayman answered him at

Iran, Sulayman granted an audience to Shāh Qūlī, Ṭahmāsp's envoy, who was conveying his master's overtures for peace (in Dhū'l-Qa^cdah 961/September 1554).¹⁴⁷ On 18 Jumādā II 962/ 10 May 1555, a second embassy was received by the Ottoman ruler at his camp in Amasya.¹⁴⁸ In response, the Sultan sent a message to the Ṣafavid ruler wherein he acknowledged having received the two envoys and asked him to send an embassy with a mandate to negotiate and conclude peace.¹⁴⁹ On 8 Rajab 962/29 May 1555, the peace treaty of Amasya was signed between Ottomans and Ṣafavids. In ratifying this treaty, the Ṣafavids recognized Ottoman sovereignty over Arab Iraq and the areas north of Āzarbāyjān, including Kurdistan.¹⁵⁰

The treaty of Amasya represents the success of the policy of containment which Sulayman had pursued vis-à-vis the Ṣafavids. By the same token, on the Ṣafavid side, it demonstrates the pragmatic course of action taken by Ṭahmāsp when confronted with the overwhelming superiority of Ottoman military power. Following the ratification of this treaty, there was a noticeable effort on the part of the Ṣafavids to abide by its provisions and to maintain friendly relations with the

the beginning of Rajab 964/May 1557, informing him of the newly achieved peaceful relations with Ṭahmāsp (pp. 84-85). Burāq Khān is, according to Ghaffārī, Jahān Arā, p. 208, another name for Nawrūz Āmad, who ruled the Uzbeks from 959/1556 to 963/1561.

¹⁴⁷ Hammer-Purgstall, Histoire de l'Empire Ottoman, 6:68-69.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid., 6:69. See also the eyewitness account of De Busbecq, The Turkish Letters, p. 62. The names of his ambassador and of the previous one appear in the message sent by Ṭahmāsp to Sulayman, found in Ferīdūn, Munsha'āt, 1:620-623.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid., pp.623-625.

¹⁵⁰ Hammer-Purgstall, Histoire de l'Empire Ottoman, 6:70; Zünçarşılı, Osmanlı Tarihi, vol. 2, pt. 2, p. 361.

Ottomans. The good will of the Ṣafavids was again demonstrated when they handed over Bayezid, another son of Sulayman, who had taken refuge in Iran following the failure of his rebellion against his father.¹⁵¹ In fact, no major change in Ottoman-Ṣafavid relations took place until the advent of Shah ^cAbbās (996-1038/1588-1629) who embarked on a general offensive against Ottoman dominions in Arab Iraq and succeeded in capturing the city of Baghdād.

¹⁵¹ In 966/1559, Bayezid disobeyed his father's order to assume the governorship of Amasya and to relinquish that of Kūtahya to his brother Selim the heir-designate. A battle ensued between the two brothers on 22 Sha^cbān 966/30 May 1559 which ended with Bayezid's defeat; he then fled to Iran. From that time until 15 Muḥarram 969/25 September 1561, when Bayezid was delivered to the Ottoman envoys who strangled him on the spot, intense negotiations took place between Ottomans and Ṣafavids. No fewer than fifteen letters were exchanged relating to this matter, and were recorded by Ferīdūn, Munsha'āt, 2:23-50. For details about Bayezid's rebellion, see: Peçevi, Tarih, 1:206-218; Munajjim Bāshī, Ṣahā'if al-Akhhār, 3:511-514; Shah Ṭahmāsp, Rūznāmah, 2:210-213.

GENERAL CONCLUSIONS

The Ottoman-Şafavid conflict was the result of the final transformation of the Şafavid Şifī order into a ruling institution, an accomplishment which was achieved by Shah Ismāʿīl I. The political roots of this conflict can be traced back to the social history of western Iran, southern Anatolia and northern Syria, areas overwhelmingly populated by Turkoman tribes which gained increased power during the first half of the fifteenth century following the breakdown of the Ottoman policy of centralization in the aftermath of Timūr's campaigns. However, the consolidation of Ottoman power after the conquest of Constantinople and the subsequent expansion of the empire in Anatolia, resulted in the reduction of the power and quasi-independence of the Turkoman tribes. These conditions were favorable for the success of religious propoganda which bore political overtones.

It was during this period that Shaykh Junayd undertook his journey to Anatolia and parts of Syria. Faced with prevailing extremist Shīʿite beliefs in those areas, and being himself in search of supporters following his eviction from Ardabil, Junayd decided to win to his side the Turkomans who dwelled in those regions, by adopting their form of popular or--in the words of Michel Mazzaoui--"folk Shīʿism".¹ He thus succeeded in forming a mass of supporters

¹Mazzaoui, Origins, pp. 58-66.

which he, and later his descendants, were able to manipulate for the achievement of their own goals.

The success of Shah Ismāʿīl in establishing the Şafavid dynasty in 907/1501 constituted in itself a danger for the rulers of Syria and those of Anatolia, namely the Mamluks and the Ottomans. Within these two empires, the Şafavids had long maintained close spiritual ties with their Turkoman followers. The events which shook Anatolia during the second half of the fifteenth century contributed to instability in that area, conditions that the Şafavid leadership had exploited through an elaborate network of khulafā.

Hence, the confrontation between Ottomans and Şafavids, following the rise of the latter dynasty, was not as much of the Sunnī Ottomans against the new Shīʿī state in Iran, but rather it was an Ottoman reaction to the political ambitions of the Şafavids who nurtured expansionist designs with regard to Anatolia. Two important facts tend to support this interpretation: first, prior to the rise of the Şafavid dynasty, Shah Ismāʿīl focused his attention primarily on Anatolia. As was demonstrated in the present work, the Şafavid leadership planned on joining in the widespread rebellion of 906/1500 in Anatolia, but was prevented from effectively participating by the decisive measures taken by the Ottomans to hinder the movements of Şafavid followers. Second, the proclamation of Imāmī/Twelve Shīʿism as a state religion in Iran was made mostly to provide a legal administrative framework for the new state. During the period under study, "folk Shīʿism" was predominant in Iran both on the popular level and among the ruling class. In this respect, the poetry of Shah Ismāʿīl, together with the observations of a Western envoy to the

Shah was?

court of Ṭahmāsp,² are clear evidence of the survival of extremist Shi'ism in that country to the end of the first half of the sixteenth century. Moreover, it was only at the end of Shah Ismā'īl's reign and during that of Ṭahmāsp that a number of Ithnā 'Asharī religious scholars had reached Iran from neighboring Syria and became instrumental in the development of this form of Shi'ism.³

The reduction of the Ottoman-Safavid conflict to a mere religious confrontation does not withstand close scrutiny. Although the religious factor is undeniable, the origins and development of this conflict should be sought within the geopolitical pattern of the Middle East at the end of the fifteenth century and the beginning of the sixteenth, including the relations of these antagonists with the other Muslim powers in the area on the one hand, and with Western Christendom on the other.

²See Appendix A for Shah Ismā'īl's poetry. D'Alessandri, "Narrative of the Most Noble Vincentio D'Alessandri, Ambassador to the King of Persia for the Most Illustrious Republic of Venice," in A Narrative of Italian Travels in Persia in the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries, edited and translated by Charles Grey (London: The Hayluyt Society, 1873) p. 223, states that Ṭahmāsp's subjects worshipped him almost as a god.

³These Shi'ite theologians were mostly from the area of Jabal 'Āmil in Syria (in the southern part of modern Lebanon). Among them were Muhammad al-'Āmilī, Husayn ibn 'Abd al Samad al-'Āmilī, Ḥsan ibn al-Sayyid Ja'far al-'Āmilī al-Karakī, who arrived in Iran during the reign of Shah Ismā'īl. See Husaynī, Die Frühen Safawiden, Persian text, p. 126. The most famous of the 'Āmilī group was Nūr al-Dīn Abū'l-Ḥasan 'Alī ibn al-Ḥusayn ibn 'Abd al-'Alī al-Karakī al-'Āmilī, who reached Iran during the reign of Shah Ṭahmāsp after having studied in Syria and Egypt. His date of death is given as 937/1530-31 by al-Khuwānsārī and as Dhū'l-Hijjah 940/July 1534 by Rūmlū. Both of these authors give lengthy bibliographies of this scholar. See Muhammad Bāqir al-Khuwānsārī, Kitāb Rawdat al-Jannāt fī Ahwāl al-'Ulamā' wa al-Sādāt (Tehran: Maktabat Ismā'īliyyān, 1972), 4:36-45; Ḥsan-i Rūmlū, Aḥsanu't-Tawārikh, 1:253-256.

Having followers in both Syria and Anatolia, the Safavids decided to direct their expansionist efforts against the Ottoman empire while at the same time befriending the Mamluks. This is clearly a political strategy which transcends the religious level. Such a policy was dictated by the realization that the nascent Safavid state was unable to fight two enemies on its northwestern and western borders while contending simultaneously with the Uzbeks on the eastern frontiers. It is this strategy which led Shah Ismā'īl to actively seek an alliance with the Mamluks against a power which was regarded by both as an enemy. Thus, the Shi'ī Safavids became the allies of the Sunnī Mamluks. In this respect, the campaign of Chāldirān in 920/1514, despite the religious propaganda which surrounded it, should not be considered merely as a war against "heretics" but as a measure taken by the Ottoman Sultan Selim I to put an end to Safavid activities in Anatolia, by carrying the offensive into his enemy's territory and compelling the Safavids to adopt a defensive posture. As a direct result of this campaign, Selim was able, two years later--922/1516-17--to defeat the Mamluk Qānṣh al-Ghawrī, an event which was followed by the conquest of Syria and Egypt and the extension of Ottoman suzerainty to the Muslim Holy Places of Mecca and Medina.

These facts show clearly the preeminence of the political dimension over the religious one in Ottoman-Safavid relations. This interpretation is capable of explaining the downfall of a Sunnī power, namely the Mamluks, at the hands of another Sunnī power, namely, the Ottomans, while the Shi'ī Safavids suffered territorial losses only.

The Ottoman-Safavid conflict afforded Europe a respite from Ottoman aggressiveness when Selim totally focused his attention on his Muslim neighbors. The fall of the Mamluk empire and the integration

of its dominions within the Ottoman fold, together with new developments which were taking shape in Europe, relegated the Safavid question to a position of secondary importance for the rulers of Istanbul. This last feature became obvious during the rule of Sultan Sulayman II who had to deal with the ascending power of his European enemies who took the offensive not only on the battlefields of Central Europe but at sea as well, both in the Mediterranean and in the Indian Ocean. The expansionist policy of the Holy Roman Emperor Charles V (1519-56) as well as his connections with the Habsburgs in Hungary and Bohemia, together with the increased presence of the Portuguese in the Indian Ocean, constituted a threat to the security of the Ottoman empire and dictated a decisive response on the part of Sulayman II. This period corresponded in Iran to the rule of Shah Tahmāsp, which was marked by the steadily increasing menace of the Shaybānī Uzbeks led by Ubayd Khān. In view of these conditions, Tahmāsp resolved to meet the Uzbek challenge and avoid engaging the Ottomans in pitched battles. This strategy proved profitable for the Safavids since the Ottomans were not in a position to direct their military machine exclusively against them. Hence, Sulayman chose to adopt a policy of containment vis-à-vis Iran rather than to attempt to systematically conquer this country. Sulayman's first campaign against the Safavids in 941-42/1534-35 resulted in the extension of Ottoman borders to Arab Iraq and to Kurdistan, borders which remained unchanged until the conclusion of the peace treaty of Amasya on 8 Rajab 962/29 May 1555, despite two other campaigns which took place in 955-56/1548-49 and 960-61/1553-54.

Sulayman's reign was marked by the diffusion of the Ottoman military effort from Europe to Asia and North Africa on land, and from the Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean at sea, a fact which was the result of the sudden expansion of the empire following Selim's campaigns of 922/1516-17 against the Mamluks. It was during Sulayman's rule that the decline of Ottoman power became perceptible. On land, he failed before the walls of Vienna in 1529, while at sea, his expeditions against the Portuguese in the Indian Ocean met with disaster. He became embroiled in a competition with the Habsburgs of Spain over the control of the southern Mediterranean coast. However, while Spain was crossing the Atlantic and building an empire in the Americas, the Ottomans were meeting the challenge of the West only in the Mediterranean. This lack of foresight on the part of the Ottomans was to alter the East-West balance of power and augured the decline of the empire and of the Muslim Middle East.

APPENDICES

- A. Shah Ismā'īl and his Poetry
- B. The Genealogy of the Safavids
- C. A Message from Shah Ismā'īl to Mūsā Tūrghūd Oġlu
- D. The Fatwā of Kemal Paşazade Concerning the Qizilbāsh

APPENDIX A

SHAH ISMĀ'ĪL AND HIS POETRY

Shah Ismā'īl was a statesman as well as a poet whose works reflected his esoterical religious beliefs and his intrinsic views. He wrote under the pen name of Khaṭā'i and composed mostly in a Turkish dialect.¹

Several recensions of his works have been made. The most recent was given by Cahit Öztelli and included manuscripts and published works. This classification divides Shah Ismā'īl's poetry into four major collections corresponding to the following:

A. Works composed in Turkish:

- The dīvān, or the major collection of poems;
- The dihnāmah, another collection of poems of masnavī style and composed when Ismā'īl was of "mature age";
- The naşihatnāmah, a long masnavī poem.

B. A dīvān in Persian.²

Vladimir F. Minorsky, who made a comprehensive study of Shah Ismā'īl's Turkish dīvān, wrote that:

¹Alessio Bombaci, Histoire de la Littérature Turque, translated by I. Melikoff (Paris: Librairie C. Klincksieck, 1968), p. 200.

²Cahit Öztelli, "Les Oeuvres de Hatayî," Turcica 6 (1975): 7-10. For other classifications, see: Azizaga Mamedov, "Le plus Ancient Manuscrit du Dīvān de Shah Ismā'īl Khaṭā'i," Turcica 6 (1975): 11-23; Vladimir F. Minorsky, "The Poetry of Shah Ismā'īl I," BSOAS 10 (1940-1942): 1006a-1053a.

The language of the dīvān is a Southern Turkish (Turcoman) dialect associated with the so-called "Āzarbāyjānī Turkish," as spoken in North-western Persia and North-eastern Transcaucasia. Shah Ismāʿīl still uses a number of words and forms which are unknown in the present day speech. On the other hand, his Turkish already shows traces of decomposition due to the influence of the Iranian milieu.³

Shah Ismāʿīl's dīvān abounds with signs of heresy and contains various themes which denote a mixture of extremist Shīʿism (ghuluw) and mystical imagery. According to Minorsky, "the dīvān alone gives a clue to the secret heresy of the early Ṣafavids. These dynamic ideas, mystical and religious as they were on the surface, easily found their expression in direct action."⁴ ʿAlī--whom the Shīʿites view as the sole rightful successor to the Prophet--⁵ is considered as having precedence above the Prophet himself.⁶ This conception is familiar to some extremist Shīʿite groups of that time.⁷ Shah Ismāʿīl goes further to deify ʿAlī, presenting him as "the creator of Heaven and Earth."⁸

The dīvān also reflects Shah Ismāʿīl's ambitions as well as his introspective thoughts. He envisions himself as another world conqueror: "After conquering and subduing the country of Rūm

³V. Minorsky, "Poetry of Shah Ismāʿīl," p. 1010a.

⁴Ibid., p. 1025a.

⁵On Shīʿism, see: ʿAllāmah Sayyid Muammad Ḥusayn Tabāṭabāʾī, Shīʿite Islam.

⁶Minorsky, "Poetry of Shah Ismāʿīl," pp. 1025a-1026a.

⁷For a brief listing and general background to these movements, see Mazzaoui, Origins, pp. 63-71 and 83-84.

⁸Minorsky, "Poetry of Shah Ismāʿīl," p. 1026a.

(Anatolia), I will turn against the Franks."⁹ He also considers himself as an emanation of God to whom his followers should prostrate themselves.

"Come to meet (me), prostrate yourself (sijda). I am the faith of the Shah."¹⁰

In another poem, he makes his divine claim clearer:

"I am God's eyes (or "God Himself"); come now, o blind man gone astray, to behold Truth (God). I am that Absolute Doer of whom they speak. Sun and Moon are in my power. My being is God's house, know it for certain. Prostration before me is incumbent on thee, in the morn and even."¹¹

In this respect, the reports by some sixteenth century Western travellers that Ismāʿīl was considered a God by his followers should not be disregarded. A Venetian merchant who sojourned in Tabriz ca. 1518 remarked that "this Sophy is loved and revered by his people as a God and especially by his soldiers, many of whom enter into battle without armour, expecting this master Ismael to watch over them in the fight."¹²

Referring to similar statements, Minorsky warned future scholars that "when the travellers of Ṣafavid times declared that the Shahs were worshipped as God, these statements were interpreted figuratively, but they should rather be taken literally."¹³ This stand could be further confirmed in the writing of an Arab historian

⁹Bombaci, Histoire de la Littérature Turque, p. 201.

¹⁰Minorsky, "Poetry of Shah Ismāʿīl," p. 1043a, no. 18.

¹¹Ibid., p. 1047a, no. 204.

¹²Charles Grey, ed., A Narrative of Italian Travels in Persia, p. 206.

¹³Minorsky, "Persia: Religion and History," p. 252.

of the sixteenth century, Qutb al-Dīn al-Nahrawālī (d. 990/1582), who stated that Shah Ismā'īl "almost claimed godship and his soldiers prostrated before him and blindly obeyed him."¹⁴

Shah Ismā'īl's poetry reveals the influence upon him of the beliefs of different extremist Shi'ite groups, corresponding to what Michel M. Mazzaoui calls "Folk-Islam in Anatolia."¹⁵

Shah Ismā'īl was deeply affected by his defeat at Chāldirān in 920/1514. According to a modern Iranian historian, the Safavid ruler spent the rest of his life "mourning" this event. "He wore black clothes, a black turban and ordered the members of the aristocracy to wear black."¹⁶

The defeat at Chāldirān had an impact upon Shah Ismā'īl's poetry as well. In contrast to his previous extremist religious poetry, Shah Ismā'īl's later poems were more "earthly" and consisted primarily of lyrics which formed his dihnamah.¹⁷

¹⁴ Qutb al-Dīn al-Nahrawālī, Kitāb al-I'ālām bi-A'ālām Bayt Allāh al-Ḥarām, 3:275. The original is:

"وكأد ان يدعي الربوبية وكان يسجد له عسكره ويأتعون بأمره"

¹⁵ Mazzaoui, Origins, pp. 67-71 and 83-84.

¹⁶ Naṣr Allāh Falsafī, "Jang-i Chāldirān," p. 121.

¹⁷ Öztelli, "Les Oeuvres de Ḥaṭayī," pp. 9-10.

APPENDIX B

THE GENEALOGY OF THE SAFAVIDS

The main work dealing with the genealogy of the Safavids is Ṣafwat al-Ṣafā, also known as al-Mawāhib al-Saniyah fī Manāqib al-Safawiyah,¹ composed in 759/1358 by Ibn Bazzāz, a disciple of Shaykh Ṣadr al-Dīn. This work was revised during the reign of Shah Ṭahmāsp I by Mīr Abū'l-Faṭḥ al-Ḥusaynī.² The latter version of Ṣafwat al-Ṣafā became the "official" source for Safavid genealogy. As for the lithographed edition published by Mirza Ahmad Tabrizī in Bombay in the year 1911, it was based on three "unofficial" manuscripts.³

Abū'l-Faṭḥ confirms the Safavids' claim that their lineage traces back to ^cAlī, the fourth Caliph and son-in-law of the Prophet Muḥammad,⁴ thus making themselves Sayyids, a title which enhanced their prestige. The "official" genealogy was to be found in sources contemporary with the rise of Shah Ismā'īl I and thereafter.⁵

¹ This second title is mentioned by Z. V. Toḡan, "Sur l'Origine des Safavides," p. 345.

² A. Kasravī, "Shaykh Ṣafī va Tabārash," pp. 63-64.

³ Ibid., p. 62.

⁴ ^cAlī is considered by Sunnī Muslims as the fourth Caliph. His rule extended from 35/656 to 40/661. The Shi'is acknowledge him as the only rightful successor to the Prophet Muḥammad and believe that the Caliphate belongs to his descendants after his death. Ḥabīb al-Ṣayyid, Shi'ite Islam, pp. 29-85.

⁵ For a contemporary of Shah Ismā'īl I, the best example is that of Khwāndamīr, Ḥabīb al-Siyar, 4:409-410.

This claim prevailed until modern times and had been accepted by scholars as well as laymen. The Iranian scholar Ahmad Kasravī Tabrizī (1890-1946) was the first to have ever systematically questioned its validity. He has done so in a series of articles published in Āyandah in 1926-27 under the title: "Nazhād va Tabār-i Ṣafavīyah." These were later edited and published as a monograph under the title Shaykh Ṣafī va Tabārash in 1944. Finally in 1974, it was published among his collected articles.

Kasravī's methodology consisted to a large extent of a critical study of the published version of Ṣafwat al-Ṣafā,⁶ but often resorted to a contrastive analysis of the text with an earlier Turkish version. His conclusions could be summarized as follows: first, the ancestors of the Ṣafavids had no blood relationship to ^ʿAlī.⁷ Second, the "fabrication" of their descent from ^ʿAlī was accomplished when Shiʿite tendencies began to surface among the Ṣafavid religious order.⁸ Kasravī drew these conclusions after demonstrating the following facts:

A--According to Ṣafwat al-Ṣafā, Shaykh Ṣadr al-Dīn was told by his father Ṣafī that he was a descendant of ^ʿAlī, but was never told through which line: paternal or maternal;⁹ namely if he was Sayyid or Sharīf.¹⁰

⁶The Bombay edition.

⁷Kasravī, "Shaykh Ṣafī," pp. 78-79.

⁸Ibid., pp. 70-71 and 84.

⁹Ibid., p. 67.

¹⁰Ibn Bazzāz, Ṣafwat al-Ṣafā (Bombay), p. 11.

B--Shaykh Ṣadr al-Dīn learned from a nobleman in Mecca that he descended from either of ^ʿAlī's two sons: Ḥasan or Ḥusayn.¹¹

C--Shaykh Ṣadr al-Dīn was informed by his mother that his ancestry traced back to Ḥusayn son of ^ʿAlī.¹²

These "stories" contained in Ṣafwat al-Ṣafā cast great doubt on the Ṣafavids' claim to Siyādat, i.e. the descent from the Prophet and ^ʿAlī through paternal lineage. Indeed, it would be inconceivable in medieval times that a family of the Prophet's extraction had no full record of its genealogy. This well known fact led Kasravī to raise the following objections:

D--Ibn ^ʿInabah (d.828/1424-25), who tabulated the genealogy of the clans and families of ʿAlawī¹³ descent in his ʿUmdat al-Ṭālib fī Ansāb ʿAl Abī Ṭālib and who also spent his lifetime in Iraq and Iran, made no mention of the Ṣafavids' immediate ancestors.¹⁴

E--A decree of Prince--and future Sultan--Ahmad Jalāyir issued in favor of Shaykh Ṣadr al-Dīn and dated 22 Dhū'l-Qaʿdah 773/26 May 1372

¹¹Kasravī, "Shaykh Ṣafī," pp. 67-68; Ibn Bazzāz, Ṣafwat al-Ṣafā (Bombay), p. 11.

¹²Kasravī, "Shaykh Ṣafī," p. 69; Ibn Bazzāz, Ṣafwat al-Ṣafā (Bombay), p. 11.

¹³Attributed to ^ʿAlī.

¹⁴Kasravī, "Shaykh Ṣafī," pp. 77-78. Ibn ^ʿInabah composed this work in Arabic. Although he was contemporary with Shaykh Ṣadr al-Dīn and his son Khwājah ^ʿAlī, he made no mention of the Ṣafavid family in his genealogical tabulation. See: Ibn ^ʿInabah, ʿUmdat al-Ṭālib fī Ansāb ʿAl Abī Ṭālib, edited by Nizār Riḍā (Beirut: Dār Maktabat al-Ḥayāt, 1963).

profusely enumerated the Shaykh's title but failed to mention any special lineage.¹⁵

F--The historian Ḥamd Allāh Mustawfī Qazvīnī (d. 750/1349)--a contemporary of Shaykh Ṣafī--made no comment regarding the supposed genealogy while acknowledging his fame as a Ṣafī leader.¹⁶

G--A letter of ḤUbayd Allāh Khan ruler of the Uzbeks (940 946/1534-39) to Shah Ṭahmāsp ridiculed the Ṣafavids for the forgery of their genealogy.¹⁷

Kasravī also disputed other information given in Safwat al-Safā. He finally established that the Ṣafavids were Iranized Kurds whose early ancestors migrated from the area of Sanjār.¹⁸

These conclusions were confirmed thirty years later by the Turkish scholar Zeki Velidī Toḡan (b.1890) who examined the origins of the Ṣafavids in an article published in 1957 in Mélanges Louis Massignon.¹⁹ Although the result of his inquiry was identical to

¹⁵Kasravī, "Shaykh Ṣafī," p. 74. The text of this decree is found in: H. Massé, "Ordonnance Rendue par le Prince Ilkhanien Ahmad Jalāir en Faveur du Cheikh Sadr-od-Dīn (1305-1392)," pp. 465-468; also in: Jahāngīr Qā'im Maqāmī, comp., Yakṣad va Panjāh Sanad-i Tārīkhī az Jalāvirān tā Pahlavī (Tehran: Chapkhānah-i Artash-i Shāhinshāhī-yi Irān, 1969), p. 13-16.

¹⁶Kasravī, "Shaykh Ṣafī," pp. 81-82. See the text of the original passage in: Qazvīnī, The Geographical Part of the Nuzhat al-Qulūb, Persian text., p. 81; English text pp. 83-84.

¹⁷Kasravī, "Shaykh Ṣafī," pp. 79-80. The text of this message is found in: Ḥusayn Navā'ī, Shāh Ṭahmāsb Ṣafavī, pp. 18-34.

¹⁸Kasravī, "Shaykh Ṣafī," p. 79.

¹⁹Z. V. Toḡan, "Sur l'Origine des Safavides," pp. 347-357.

Kasravī's, Toḡan was at first unaware of the Iranian scholar's research. In a postscript to the article he stated that: "Après avoir envoyé cet article à l'imprimerie, j'ai pu voir une brochure persane d'Ahmad Kasravī, sur la généalogie des Safavides: "شیخ صفی و تبشارش" editée à Téhéran en 1323/1944."²⁰

Toḡan's methodology rested on the contrastive study of two manuscripts of Safwat al-Safā preserved at Ayasofya in Istanbul. MS (A) was dated 18 Jumādā I 896/29 June 1491 and catalogued under number 3099 and MS (B), a second copy, dated 914/1508 and bearing the catalogue number 2123. He was therefore comparing a manuscript copied prior to the rise of the Ṣafavids to power with another copied during the reign of Shah Ismā'īl I. He also mentioned that the late Karl Jahn had contrasted MS (B) with the Leiden MS number 2639 and dated 890/1485. The Leiden MS was referred to as MS (C). This comparative study clearly showed that the copyist of MS (B) [i.e. that of 914/1508] had tampered with the original text and made additions which matched the Ṣafavids' claim regarding their genealogy, and especially their descent from ḤAlī.²¹

The version contained in Leiden MS²² is almost identical to that given in MS (A) [Ayasofya, no. 3099]. The following is a comparison of the transcribed texts of the three manuscripts regarding Shaykh Ṣafī's genealogy. The Leiden MS is represented by (C):

²⁰Ibid., p. 356.

²¹Ibid., p. 347.

²²The catalogue number inscribed on the back of this MS is 465. However, there is no doubt that it is the same copy that Toḡan mentioned as number 2639. The colophon indicates that it was copied in 890 A.H. (1485 A.D.).

فصل أول: در ذکر نسب قدس سره شیخ صفی الدین ابو الفتح اسحق ابن الشیخ امین الدین جبرئیل ابن الصالح قطب الدین ابو بکر ابن صلاح الدین رشید ابن محمد الحافظ لکلام الله ابن عواض ابن بیروز الکردی السعجانی رحمة الله علیهم.

حکایت سلطان المشایخ فی العالمین شیخ صدر الدین ادم الله برکاته فرمود که شیخ قدس سره فرمود که در نسب ما سیادت هست لیکن سوال نکردم که علوی یا شریف و مشتبه ماند.

B. [Fol. 14b/15a]

فصل أول: در ذکر نسب قدس سره شیخ صفی الدین ابو الفتح اسحق ابن شیخ امین الدین جبرئیل ابن صالح قطب الدین ابو بکر ابن صلاح الدین رشید ابن محمد الحافظ لکلام الله ابن عواض ابن بیروز الکردی السعجانی.

حکایت سلطان المشایخ فی العالمین شیخ صدر الدین ادم الله برکاته علی العالمین فرمود که شیخ قدس سره افرمود که در نسب ما سیادت هست لیکن سوال نکردم که علوی یا شریف و همچنان مشتبه ماند تا آن وقت تخصص اسمای نسب کردند یافت شد در بحر الانساب و غیر او از موردان مستن که مطلق بودند برین که اینها سید اند و از اولاد امام حسین صدر الدین ادم الله برکته در زمان سلطان برقوق در سنه سبعین

و سماعیه بزبارة حج اتقاق افتاد چون حاضر شد ند بروضه شریفه مدینه نویسه حال حنان افتاد که جمله اشراف مدینه و غیره مجتمع بودند ادم الله برکته از سلطان سید الشریف (15a) الحسب و النسب سید شهاب الدین ابن احمد بن حسین که سلطان مدینه بودند ابا عن جد الی یومنا ادم الله برکته عرض نسب خود که تا بیروز زین کلاه.

فصل أول در ذکر نسب شیخ قدس الله روحه العزیز شیخ صفی الدین ابو الفتح اسحق بن الشیخ امین الدین جبرئیل ابن الصالح قطب الدین ابو بکر بن صلاح الدین رشید بن محمد الحافظ لکلام الله ابن عواض بن بیروز (بیروز) الکردی السعجانی نعمة الله علیهم اجمعین.

حکایت سلطان المشایخ فی العالمین شیخ صدر الدین ادم الله برکته فرمود که شیخ قدس الله سره فرمود که در نسب ما سیادت هست لیکن سوال نکردم که علوی یا شریف و همچنین مشتبه ماند.

C. [Fol. 6a]

سید شهاب الدین گفت که این نسب در غایت خوب است از بیروز تا حضرت نبی صلوة الله علیه السلام عدد کرد و مجموع سادات با تفاق مسلم داشتند و محقق کردند و جماعت صحیح که بودند برین حال شاهد شدند ذکر باقی فیوس ابن مهدی ابن علی ابن حسین ابن احمد ابن ابو القاسم ابن النابت ابن حسین ابن احمد بن داود ابن علی بن

موسى الثانى ابن ابراهيم ابن موسى الكاظم ابن جعفر صادق ابن محمد
باقر ابن امام زين العابدين (ابن) حسين ابن على بن ابى طالب
عليه الصلاة والسلام*

Kasravī and Toḡān's studies led to the conclusion that the Ṣafavids were not Sayyids and that the alteration of their genealogy to support their claim regarding their supposed descent from ʿAlī occurred at a later stage. However, these two authors were in disagreement with regard to the exact timing of the modification: while Toḡān deemed it safe to correlate it with the access to power of Shah Ismāʿīl I,²³ Kasravī placed it during the leadership of Khwājah ʿAlī (794-930/1391-1427) or of his son Ibrāhīm (830-51/1427-47).²⁴ Nevertheless, information contained in other sources tends to dispute both findings. Ibn Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalānī's biographical notice on Khwājah ʿAlī made no mention of an ʿAlīd origin. The fact that Ibn Ḥajar was contemporary with the latter and that Khwājah ʿAlī sojourned to and died in Jerusalem, leads us to believe that--up to then--the Ṣafavids made no serious claim to the ʿAlawī line. Ibn Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalānī stated the following:²⁵

²³Toḡān, "Sur l'Origine des Safavides," p. 347.

²⁴Kasravī, "Shaykh Ṣafī," pp. 70-71.

²⁵Ibn Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalānī, Inbāʾ, 3: 427-428.

على بن محمد الصفى، علاء الدين بن صدر الدين بن صفى الدين الاردبيلي
شيخ الصوفية بالعراق قدم دمشق سنة ثلاثين ومعه اتباعه، فحجّ و جاور،
ثم قدم دمشق ولده ومعه جمع كبير، وذكروا أن له ولوالده بتلك البلاد
أكثر من مائة ألف مرید، ومات علاء الدين المذكور بعد رجوعه من الحجّ
و دخوله بيت المقدس فى شهر ربيع الآخر (سنة اثنين وثلاثين وثمانى مائة)*

It is quite probable that the altered genealogy was officially espoused by Shaykh Junayd (851-64/1447-60). During his peregrinations in Anatolia--following his expulsion from Ardabīl by Jahān Shāh Qara Qoyunlu (841-72/1438-67)--Junayd was quoted by Aşıkpaşazade as saying that his descendants were "worthier than the Prophet's companions."²⁶ Such a statement is meaningful only within a Shīʿite framework. It implies that Junayd was not only convinced of his ʿAlīd lineage, but also that he espoused Shīʿism. In fact, only within Shīʿism would the descendants of ʿAlī have precedence over the companions of the Prophet--including the first "Orthodox" Caliphs--in regard to the government of the Islamic community. Junayd's statement led his interlocutor--Shaykh ʿAbd al-Laṭīf--to hastily send a message to

²⁶Aşıkpaşazade, Tevarīh, p. 265.

The original Turkish text is as follows:

"شيخ جنيد شيخ عبد اللطيفه سوال ايتدى: اصحابى اولادر، يوخسه
اولاد مى اولادر؟ ديدى"

Ibrāhīm Beg, the ruler of Karaman (827-68/1424-63), warning him against the ambitions of the Ṣafavid leader. He wrote that "the aim of this Shaykh Junayd is not religious devotion, but the violation of Islamic Law [Sharī'at] and the claim of power to himself."²⁷ The altered genealogy would in fact suit Junayd's ambition for power by securing the support of the various Shi'ī elements in Anatolia.

²⁷Aşıkpaşazade, *Tevārīh*, pp. 265-266.
The original Turkish text is the following:

"شیخ عبد اللطیف قرمان اوغلو ابراهیم بکه کوندردی ، مکتوب یازد یکم * بو شیخ جنیدک مرادی صوفولق د کلد ر ، شویعت بوزوب ، کند و امارت طلب ایدر ، دیدی"

APPENDIX C

A MESSAGE FROM SHAH ISMĀ'İL TO MŪSĀ TŪRĠHŪD OĖLU

DATED 7 RABĪ' I 918/23 MAY 1512¹

(TOPKAPI SARAYI ARŞİVİ, NUMBER 5460)

This message, composed in Turkish and dispatched only one month after Sultan Selim's coronation, proves the existence of an elaborate network of Ṣafavid agents within the Ottoman empire, especially in Anatolia. In this letter, Shah Ismā'īl requests the leader of the TŪrġhŪd tribe to contact Aḥmad Aghā QaramānlŪ, a Ṣafavid envoy to Anatolia, and to heed his orders; he also enjoins him to report in detail his activities in the area.

¹Source: M. C. Şehabettin Tekindağ, "Yeni Kaynak ve Vesikaların Işığında Yavuz Sultan Selim'in İran Seferi".

الشیخ
سوز

امیر اعظم اکرم موسیٰ دورغوت اعلیٰ عنایت و شفقت

امیدوار اولدن صونکره شیله بلسون کیم افتخار الاعاضم و الاعیان

احمد آقا قرمانلو اول طرفه گوندردوک و اول مرکه اختیارکنی کندونه

شفقت اتسون کرک کیم مشار الیه سوزندن و مصلحتدن چخمسون و متابعت

و یاردم اونکا قیلسون کیم انشاء الله تعالیٰ هر نه کیم اتمک مرادی و استکی

اولسه حاصل دور. گوندن گونه هر ایش واقع بولسه احمد آقا اتفاقی ایله درگاه

معلمزه بیلدر سونلر کیم هر نوع بویور غمز اولسه عمل اتسون کونلیمزه

خوشدوتوب مرحمتزه امر دار السون

خوشدوتوب مرحمتزه امر دار السون

تحریر ۷ ربیع الاول سنه ۹۱۸

والایع اجراما و ایل اول طرفه گوندردوک و اول مرکه اختیارکنی کندونه

کرک کیم شلار سوزندن چخمسون و متابعت و یاردم اونکا قیلسون کیم انشاء

الله تعالیٰ هر نه کیم اتمک مرادی و استکی اولسه حاصل دور. گوندن گونه

هر ایش واقع بولسه احمد آقا اتفاقی ایله درگاه معلمزه بیلدر سونلر

کیم هر نوع بویور غمز اولسه عمل اتسون کونلیمزه خوشدوتوب مرحمتزه

امر دار السون

APPENDIX D
THE FATWĀ OF KEMAL PAŞAZADE
CONCERNING THE QIZILBĀSH

Kemal Paşazade (d. 940/1533) is known to have issued two fatwās against Shah Ismā'īl and the qizilbāsh: one in Turkish, and a second in Arabic.¹ Of the two, only the Arabic version is known. It is not clear whether the Arabic version is a translation of the original Turkish or if they constitute two separate fatwās. The present edition is based on the text published by M. C. Şehabettin Tekindağ as an appendix to his article on Selim's 920/1514 campaign against Iran.²

In this fatwā, Kemal Paşazade strongly indicts the qizilbāsh whom he considers "enemies of Islam" and "apostates" and states that it is incumbent upon the Ottoman Sultan to fight them.

¹Eberhard, Osmanische Polemik gegen die Safawiden im 16 Jahrhundert; nach Arabischen Handschriften; Beldiceanu-Steinherr, "A Propos d'un Ouvrage sur la Polémique Ottomane contre les Safavides."

²M. C. Şehabettin Tekindağ, "Yeni Kaynak ve Vesikaların Işığında Altında Yavuz Sultan Selim'in İran Seferi."

رسالة للمولى الشهير بابن كمال الوزير

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم المستغنى عن البيان لكونه مشتهرا في الأزمان حتى سار بذكره الركبان في جميع الاقطار والعموان في إكفار شاه اسمعيل و جنوده المخذولين و اتباعه و اشياعه الملعونين الى يوم الدين * الحمد لله العلي العظيم القوي الكريم، و الصلوة على محمد الهادى الى صراط مستقيم و على الذين اتبعوه في الدين القويم، و بعد ، قد تواتر الاخبار و توافر الآثار في بلاد المسلمين و ديار المؤمنين أن طائفة من الشيعة قد غلبوا على بلاد كثيرة من بلاد السنيين حتى أظهروا مذاهبهم الباطلة فأبرزوا سب الامام ابى بكر و الامام عمر و الامام عثمان رضوان الله تعالى عليهم اجمعين و انهم كانوا ينكرون خلافة هؤلاء الخلفاء الراشدين و الائمة المهديين و كانوا يستحقرون الشريعة و اهلها و يسببون المجتهدين زعما منهم بأن سلوك مذهب المجتهدين لا يخلو من مشقة بخلاف سلوك طريق رأسهم و رئيسهم الذى سموه بشاه اسمعيل ، فإنهم يزعمون أن سلوك طريقه فى غاية السهولة و بهيلة المنفعة و يزعمون أن ما أحله شاه فهو حلال و ما حرّمه فهو حرام و قد أحلّ شاه الخمر فيكون الخمر حلالا و بالجملّة لئن انواع كفرهم المثقولة الينا بالتواتر ممّا لا يعدّ و لا يحصى ، فنحن لا نشكّ فى كفرهم و ارتدادهم و أن دارهم دار حرب و أن كآح ذكورهم و اناثهم باطل بالاتفاق فكل واحد من اولادهم يصير ولد الزنا لا محالة و أما ما ذبحه واحد منهم يصير ميّتا و أن من لبس قلنسوتهم الحمراء المخصوصة بهم من غير ضرورة كان خوف الكفر غالبا فلئن ذلك من امارات الكفر و الالحاد ظاهرا ثم ان احكامهم كانت من احكام

المرتدّين حتى انهم لو قتلوا على ماقتهم صارت هي دار حرب فيحلّ للمسلمين اموالهم ونساءهم واولادهم واما رجالهم فواجب قتلهم الا اذا أسلموا فهم يكونون احرارا كما سائر الاحرار المسلمين، بخلاف من ظهر كونه زنديقا فإنه يجب قتله البيّنة ولو ترك واحد من الناس دار الاسلام واختار دينهم الباطل فالحق بدراهم فللقاضي ان يحكم ببعثه ويقسم ماله بين الورثة ويتحجج بوجهه لزوج آخر ويجب ان يعلم ايضا ان الجهاد عليهم كان فرض عين على جميع اهل الاسلام الذين كانوا قادمين على قتالهم وسنتقل من المسائل الشرعية ما يصحح الاحكام التي ذكرنا بها آتيا فنقول وبالله التوفيق قد ذكر في البرازيلية أن من أنكر خلافة ابي بكر رضي الله عنه فهو كافر في الصحيح وأن من نكر خلافة عمر رضي الله تعالى عنه فهو كافر في الأصح وكفر في الكفار الخوارج بكفارهم عثمان رضي الله تعالى عنه و ذكر في التاتارخانية أن من أنكر خلافة ابي بكر رضي الله عنه فالصحيح أنه كافر وكذا خلافة عمير رضي الله تعالى عنه فهو أصح الاحوال وكتب الشيخين كافر ولو قال انبي بصرى من مذمب ابي حنيفة رحمه الله تعالى او قال انبي بصرى من مذمب الشافعي رحمه الله يكفر، ومن استحلت حراما علم حرمةه في دين الاسلام ككرب الخمر فهو كافر، و ذكر في القسنية ان استهزاء العلم او العالم كفر، و ذكر في البرازيلية ان احكام هؤلاء الاحكام المرتدّين، و ذكر في الاختيار الذي هو شرح المختار ان المرتدّين لو قتلوا فقد صار درايم دار حرب و اموالهم فنميمه، و ذكر في الكافي ان نكاح المرتدّين باطل اتفاقا و لا يقبل من المرتدّين اذا ظهورنا اى قلوبنا عليهم الا الاسلام او السيف كمشركي

العرب ويقسم الاموال و الازواج بين المسلمين و تقسم اموالهم ونساءهم و ذرياتهم و صح في بعض الكتب الشرعية ان من ارتدّ و العياذ بالله و لحق بدار الحرب و حكم به صار عبده معتقا و صارت اولده معتقة و قال صدر الشريعة اذا مجم الكفار على شجر من الشجر يصير الجهاد فرض عين على من كان يقرب منه و يقدر على الجهاد و اما من كان وراءهم فاذا بلغ الخبر اليهم يصير فرض عين عليهم اذا احتجج اليهم ثم و تم الى ان يصير عينا على جميع اهل الاسلام شرقا و غربا . هذا كلام صحيح ، فالواجب على سلطان المسلمين ان يجاهد هؤلاء الكفار كما قال الله عارك و تعالى " يا أيها النبي جاهد الكافرين و المنافقين و أعانك عليهم و ماؤاهم جهنم و بنس المصير ألا الى الله تصير الامم ----- " .

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