


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Ottoman Diplomacy

Conventional or Unconventional?

Edited by
A. Nuri Yurdusev



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
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Conventional or Unconventional?

Edited by

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Preface

The idea for preparing this collection on Ottoman diplomacy was born out of a discussion I had with Geoff Berridge some years ago. We were talking about the possibility of incorporating people who were studying diplomacy in Turkey into an international network of students of diplomacy. Then our talk proceeded to the Ottoman Empire and its diplomacy. I suggested that a collection on Ottoman diplomacy might be a good starting point. Geoff agreed and stood by me throughout all stages of the book. Words are not enough to express my gratitude to him.

After I had the idea for the book, I began to teach a course on Ottoman Diplomacy and the European States System in the Department of International Relations of the Middle East Technical University, Ankara. Over the years, I increasingly felt the need for a comprehensive book on Ottoman diplomacy. The present book, which has ended up having a narrower and shorter scope than I had originally planned, does not claim fully to meet that need. Yet I hope that it is a start.

Two of the chapters, Chapter 3 by Halil İnalçık and Chapter 4 by Rifa'at Ali Abou-El-Haj, were published earlier in the *Journal of Turkish Studies* (1979) and the *Journal of the American Oriental Society* (1967), respectively. I am grateful to both authors for their permissions to reproduce the articles here.

Acknowledgements are owed to my students and research assistants at the Middle East Technical University. I would like to mention especially Eda Benlioglu, Bayram Sinkaya, Abdullah Taskin and Neslihan Temelat. The last-minute push for getting the manuscript completed has been provided during my stay at St Antony's College, University of Oxford, as a Senior Associate. I should like to record my thanks to those especially at the Middle East Centre and the Oriental Institute. Finally, I would like to express my thanks to Anne Rafique, my copy-editor, for her admirable work, and Palgrave Macmillan for their patience.

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Introduction

A. Nuri Yurdusev

The purpose of this book is to explore some aspects of Ottoman diplomacy from the viewpoint of how it is formulated and conducted. Ottoman diplomacy has been a rather under-researched area. Although we have a well-established literature on the social, economical, political and to some extent cultural systems of the Ottoman Empire, studies dealing with its external relations are comparatively scarce, and very few of these have been devoted to an analysis of diplomacy.

Usually, when the international relations of the Ottoman Empire are studied, the focus does not extend beyond narrative diplomatic history and the careers of individual Ottoman statesmen. Indeed, 'Ottoman diplomacy', to many scholars, means no more than Ottoman foreign policy. Issues such as *how* the Ottoman Empire formulated its policies vis-à-vis other states or empires and *how* it carried out its policies, what sort of means and instruments were used to conduct diplomacy and who were the agents carrying out those policies have been widely neglected.

From the very beginning to its collapse in the early twentieth century, the Ottoman Empire had interactions with Europe that were unbroken and intensive. These interactions ranged from warlike encounters to peaceful cooperation and ranged through economics, politics, culture, trade and diplomacy. The economic and political interactions of the Empire with Europe, the integration of the Ottoman economy into the expanding European economy and the attempts to Europeanize the Ottoman polity have been the subject of historical studies. However, a comprehensive history of the relations between the Ottoman Empire and the European states system is yet to be written.

A more pessimistic picture appears when we look at those few studies dealing with the external relations of the Ottoman Empire. Whether

these deal generally with Ottoman diplomacy or with a particular period in time, they usually rest on a mistaken assumption. This is that the Ottoman Empire was an Islamic or *Shari'a* state that conducted its external affairs on the basis of a conception of *Dâr al-Islam* (the abode of Islam) versus *Dâr al-Harb* (the abode of the infidels) which involved a permanent state of war. The Empire consequently, so it is argued, conducted its external policies with a view to constant expansion. Given that it was an expansionist polity that could conceive of nothing but a permanent state of war with other polities, little room remained for normal peaceful interactions. Therefore the logical conclusion is that there was actually no such thing as Ottoman diplomacy.

Diplomacy is generally defined as the peaceful relations of political bodies that are defined in terms of equality and reciprocity. It is true that diplomacy cannot be separated from the foreign policies of states and the mutual relations among them. In other words, diplomacy is closely interwoven with international relations and foreign policy. But diplomacy is not identical with foreign policy and international relations. While diplomacy is an instrument of foreign policy for individual states, it constitutes an institution of the international system. Conventionally speaking, diplomacy signifies the reciprocal exchange of resident ambassadors, multilateral conferences, detailed rules of procedure and protocol, immunities and privileges for the diplomatists, a diplomatic corps, explicit rules of ranking and precedence, professional training and recruitment, some common diplomatic language, elegant and subtle styles and tactful manners.

Ottoman diplomacy was not like this, or so it is conventionally assumed. It had many 'unconventional' characteristics. The Ottoman Empire did not establish resident ambassadors abroad to reciprocate the actions of the European states that sent envoys to reside in Istanbul from the beginning of the sixteenth century. The first Ottoman resident ambassador was established, in London, only in 1793. Until about the eighteenth century, the Empire did not recognize the principle of the equality of sovereignties. Ottoman statesmen did not participate in the multilateral conferences that were held from the late fifteenth century onwards. The Empire was frequently uncomfortable with the rules of procedure and protocol common in Europe. Though the ambassadors in Istanbul were granted immunities and privileges under the Capitulations, from time to time they were put in the prison of the Seven Towers. The Capitulations themselves were, after all, unilateral rather than bilateral instruments. Precedence within the diplomatic corps in Istanbul was a function of the whim of the Sultan or Grand Vizier. And finally, a body of professionally

trained diplomatists, fluent in the diplomatic language of the time and adept in the conventional styles and manners of diplomacy, did not seriously begin to emerge before the mid-nineteenth century. These are some of the more obvious of the so-called 'unconventional' features of Ottoman diplomacy and those on which attention is customarily focused. However, its practice was more complex than this.

The Ottoman Empire was a composite polity with multilingual, multi-ethnic and multi-religious communities. It ruled over a vast area that extended from Central Europe to Transcaucasia, from Poland to Yemen, and from Morocco to the Persian Gulf. The Empire lasted for over six centuries, from the Late Medieval period to the twentieth century. An empire like this cannot be reduced to sweeping generalizations of constant expansionism, a permanent state of war between the *Dâr al-Islam* and *Dâr al-Harb*, the absolutism of the Sultans and the nomadic behaviour or barbarism of the Turk. It may serve the purpose of simplicity, but it does not do justice to the historical record. Similarly, an analysis of Ottoman diplomacy needs more than such conceptualizations as the Sultan's contempt for the states of Europe, 'Islamic religious conservatism', the unilateral grant of Capitulations and the Seven Towers.

In fact, Ottoman diplomacy combined both conventional and unconventional characteristics. European resident ambassadors were not reciprocated, but the fact remains that they *were* allowed to reside in Istanbul. Ottoman envoys and ambassadors were frequently sent abroad on an ad hoc basis for various reasons of protocol and expediency. The Capitulations were unilateral instruments, but they included reciprocal clauses. Ottoman statesmen may not have been among the participants at multilateral conferences, yet they were at the conference leading to the Second Holy League at the end of the fifteenth century, which was perhaps the earliest of multilateral conferences. It is true that the Empire did not have a professionally trained body of diplomatists, but Ottoman negotiators did well on various occasions. The Ottoman Empire may even be said to have had its own distinctive institutions or mechanisms of diplomacy such as the Capitulations, the *sefaretnâmes* and the dragomans.

When we refrain from the sweeping conceptual and historical generalizations and do justice to the complexity of the Empire and its historical practice, then I think we will identify some other characteristics of Ottoman diplomacy. We shall, for example, learn that the Capitulations were not just mere commercial privileges for foreign merchants, but also instruments regulating the relations between the Ottoman Empire and other states, a mechanism that paved the way for modern

consular establishments. We shall also learn that the *sefaretnâmes* were not mere ambassadorial reports, but effective instruments of modernization in the Ottoman Empire, something which shows the link between domestic and international affairs. We will see that the dragomans were in fact part of the diplomatic corps, not just translators or interpreters.

Modern students of diplomacy may also benefit from a careful study of Ottoman diplomacy. When it is noticed that the Empire shifted between conventional and unconventional diplomacy and when the nature and development of 'diplomatic' relations between Europe and the Ottoman Empire is examined, they will realize that diplomacy as an institution of the states system has not had a linear evolution. At the end, the distinction between 'conventional' and 'unconventional' diplomacy will fade away.

This book, then, aims to be a starting point for the study of Ottoman diplomacy that extends beyond narrative histories of foreign policy. The first two chapters deal with the general characteristics of Ottoman diplomacy in its classical age. While Chapter 1 examines the nature of the Ottoman Empire and its attitude towards the European states system and modern diplomacy, Chapter 2 analyses the basic features and conduct of Ottoman diplomacy during what might be called the ad hoc period. The next two chapters provide case studies. The first of these (Chapter 3) comes from the late fifteenth century, when modern diplomacy was in its beginnings and the Ottoman Empire became a fully imperial system. The second (Chapter 4) comes from the late seventeenth century, when modern diplomacy was well on the way to full institutionalization in Europe and the Ottoman Empire came to the end of its period of greatness. These cases show that Ottoman diplomacy was not carried out on the basis of exclusivism or a conservatism based upon religion.

Against this background, then, it is argued that the Ottoman Empire was, contrary to the conventional view, fully integrated into European diplomacy before Selim III (Chapter 5). Examining the adoption and use of permanent diplomacy from the late eighteenth century to the twentieth century, Chapter 6 shows that Ottoman diplomacy performed fairly well despite the Empire's steady decline. When that 'unconventional' mechanism of Ottoman diplomacy, the body of native dragomans, became something of a nuisance, we see that it not only led to the establishment of the Translation Department at the Sublime Porte, but to other expedients. These are illustrated in Chapter 7, which deals with the early nineteenth-century attempt to anglicize the *drogmanat* of the British embassy in Istanbul. Finally, a general overview of the sources for the study of Ottoman diplomacy is made in Chapter 8.

1

The Ottoman Attitude toward Diplomacy

A. Nuri Yurdusev

This chapter discusses the Ottoman attitude toward diplomacy as an institution of the modern international system as it emerged from its European basis via the formation of the European states system. The distinctive nature of diplomacy as an institution of the modern international system is said to be the establishment of resident embassies first in the Italian city-states and then at other European courts. The Ottoman attitude toward resident diplomacy has been described as at best exclusive and repudiatory, at worst dismissive and derisory. In this chapter, those orthodox views have been critically examined and it has been suggested that it is more meaningful and historically correct to describe the Ottoman attitude toward diplomacy as favourable and not formally but practically reciprocating.

In what follows, I shall first present the prevalent view that the Ottoman Empire, which sent her first resident ambassador to London in 1793, had a negative attitude toward diplomacy due to the 'Islamic' character of the Empire. I shall examine in detail why that attitude has been considered negative, and argue that this view is based upon some misunderstandings with regard to both the Ottoman Empire and diplomacy. When dealing with the Ottoman attitude, I shall suggest, besides the so-called 'Islamic' character of the Empire, that one should take into consideration the nature and development of the modern European states system in general and its institution of diplomacy in particular, the 'imperial' feature of the Ottoman Empire and its position vis-à-vis the modern European states system, and the mutual perceptions of the Europeans and Ottomans vis-à-vis each other. Finally, in order to be able to better evaluate the Ottoman attitude towards resident embassies, I shall stress that one needs to consider the matter from a comparative perspective.

The 'Islamic' Ottoman distancing himself from the 'Infidel' European

According to the prevalent view the Ottomans, being faithful to Islamic precepts, distanced themselves from the infidel Europeans and, adopting a negative attitude toward (European) diplomacy, refused to send resident missions to the European capitals until the late eighteenth century. At this point the Empire had lost its strength in comparison to the European powers and had to establish resident embassies as part of its reform attempts. On the other hand, the major European states sent their resident ambassadors to Istanbul from the sixteenth century onwards as soon as resident embassies became common Europe-wide. As the European ambassadors were received by the Sublime Porte, but not reciprocated, the Ottoman Empire followed a unilateral diplomacy towards European states. As an Islamic empire, so it is argued, she carried out her relations with the Europeans on the basis of the conception of a permanent (actual or potential) state of war.

The view that the Ottoman Empire had a negative attitude toward the modern European (residential) diplomacy runs on the following logic. First, the Ottoman Empire was an Islamic polity. Secondly, the Ottomans had a sense of the absolute superiority of Islam and consequently a contempt for Christian Europe. Thirdly, Islam required the Empire to conduct its external relations within the framework of the dichotomy of *Dâr al-Islam* (where Islamic law obtains and the Muslims live under the law of Islam) versus *Dâr al-Harb* (where the infidels live outside the law of Islam and with which the Muslims are at war). This dichotomy thus envisaged a permanent state of war between the two ends. Fourthly, the Sublime Porte therefore repudiated resident diplomacy of Europe, which involved some sort of equality and secular relations, *raison d'état*, among the relevant parties.

These interpretations are based upon the assumption that the Ottomans adopted an orthodox version of Islam. In this version, not only are the relations between Muslims and non-Muslims described to be in a state of continuous conflict, but also a Muslim is, by definition, considered to have an absolute superiority over a non-Muslim person. Therefore one cannot expect normal peaceful (diplomatic) relations and reciprocal exchange of resident representatives between Muslims and non-Muslims.

One can see such evaluations in the writings of many eminent scholars. According to Hurewitz, for example, unilateralism between the Ottoman Empire and Europe furnished the Sultans of the day with 'a means of expressing

contempt for the emerging nation-states of Europe'. The European unilateralism was, he goes on, perceived by the Ottoman Empire as an 'acknowledgement of its superiority' by the European states. Then he grounds such notions on the basis of the prevalent orthodoxy: 'as a universal religion [Islam, and thus the Ottoman Empire] remained theoretically at war with the infidel world.'¹ With a belief in permanent war with, the inferiority of and contempt for the emerging European nation-states, the Ottomans cannot of course have been expected to have a positive attitude toward diplomacy, described as the principal institution of those very nation-states of Europe.

It was the combination of Ottoman military might and traditional Islamic learning that, argued Lewis forcefully, led the Ottomans to have a sense of the 'immeasurable and immutable superiority of their own way of life', and caused them 'to despise the barbarous Western infidel from an attitude of correct doctrine'. The concept of the *jihad* (holy war) divided the world into 'two great zones, the house of Islam and the house of war, with a perpetual state of war, or at best truce, between them'.² When there is a perpetual state of war, of course, there is no room for the conduct of regular diplomacy.

Years later, Anderson repeated the same argument. The reason why the Ottoman Empire did not feel any need for organized diplomatic relations with Europe was, to him, not only because it controlled a huge territory and the greatest military resources, but also because of its 'unshakable sense of superiority to the entire Christian world'. The lack of interest in any active Turkish diplomatic relations with Europe resulted from a deep-seated view of the world which drew

a clear dividing-line, one impossible to cross, between the 'abode of Islam' and the outside non-Muslim world, the 'abode of war'. Between these different worlds relations must always be those of actual or at least potential hostility. It was the duty of the ruling Sultan, at least in principle, to extend so far as he could the area controlled by true believers at the expense of that ruled by Christian infidels. An attitude of this kind, backed by all the great weight of Islamic religious conservatism, made diplomatic relations of what was now the normal European kind impossible. By sending permanent representatives to the courts of Europe the Ottomans would have been accepting a kind of regular and established contact with the west which denied their most deeply held assumptions, which implied an at least partial renunciation of the inherent superiority to the Christian world...³

Anderson thus presents us with a picture of the Ottoman Empire as having no interest in diplomatic relations with Europe, with a deep-seated vision of the world in terms of the *Dâr al-Islam* versus *Dâr al-Harb* dichotomy, devoid of regular contacts and besieged by the great weight of Islamic religious conservatism. In his analysis, one does not find any discussion of those terms in Islamic law, what is meant by Islamic religious conservatism and what the historical record could tell us about the existence or absence of 'diplomatic' relations and regular contacts between the Ottoman Empire and Europe. It is simply suggested that the Porte was detached from the European courts and rejected diplomacy.

We find similar interpretations in Naff's account, though he in many ways provides us with a more comprehensive and balanced view. Naff too begins with the argument that the Ottoman Empire was an Islamic polity and the Ottomans had a sense of superiority to the Europeans. The source of Ottoman unilateralism was their 'conviction of the superiority and self-sufficiency of True Believers'.⁴ They continued to harbour the Muslim feelings of superiority well into the eighteenth century and conducted their relations with Europe under the guiding principle of 'the inadmissibility of equality between *Dâr al-Islam* (the abode of Islam) and *Dâr al-Harb* (the abode of war, i.e. the Christian West)'.⁵ In their external relations, the Ottomans assumed the Islamic world-view according to which 'any Muslim community/state is, theoretically, morally superior to all other societies' and the Muslims were under the obligation of *jihâd*, to wage holy war against the abode of war until the ideal of a single universal Muslim community under a single law was realized.⁶ It was because of their Muslim prejudices that they 'refused to employ the infidel lingua franca of European diplomacy'⁷ and because of their view of the inferiority of Christian Europe that the Capitulations were unilaterally granted and European rulers were not accorded equality of sovereignty with the Sultans.⁸

The Ottoman Empire thus, unequivocally states Naff, implemented the rules and precepts of Islam or *Shari'a* in all governmental and administrative affairs, both internally and externally. It is worth while to quote his words:

Ottoman thinking in diplomacy, as in all matters of government, derived from the Muslim concept of the state, which was rooted in the *Shari'a* (Holy Law); traditionally, the *Shari'a* provided for all the exigencies of life and government, thus making the Muslim state, in theory, self-sufficient. In this sense, the Ottoman Empire was pre-eminently a *Shari'a* state. The Ottomans clung stubbornly to the

illusion of Islam's innate moral and cultural superiority over Christian Europe. They expressed this belief in their ideas of self-sufficiency and in their practice of non-reciprocal diplomacy. The Muslim prejudice that whatever was western was tainted prevented the Ottomans from wholly accepting or imitating western ways.⁹

Though Naff joins those who depict the conduct of Ottoman diplomacy in terms of a *Dâr al-Islam* versus *Dâr al-Harb* duality, as pointed out earlier, he is more comprehensive and balanced. He acknowledges that the boundaries between the so-called Ottoman *Dâr al-Islam* and the European *Dâr al-Harb* were not altogether impenetrable.¹⁰ He notes that this picture begins to change from the beginning of the eighteenth century. Although Ottoman statesmen still maintained feelings of superiority to Europe even in the eighteenth century, they began to move towards integration with the European states system. This meant a more positive attitude for diplomacy as seen in the acceptance of the equality of sovereignty and reciprocity of relations, the adoption of European diplomatic communications and usages, and recognition of some aspects of the European law of nations, including extraterritoriality.¹¹

In any case, for Naff as well, we see that the argument of being an Islamic polity and conducting its internal and external governmental affairs according to the doctrine of *Shari'a* is valid with regard to the Ottoman Empire, at least, until the eighteenth century. This conventional argument has not been advanced only by 'western' scholars. It is prevalent among Turkish scholars, too. Kuran may be taken as a typical example. He argued that the Ottoman Empire did not establish resident embassies in the European capitals because Europe was, for the Ottomans, part of *Dâr al-Harb*. Following the law of Islam according to which the Christian and Muslim states are not considered equal and it is not right to sign peace treaties with the infidels, it was only natural for the Ottoman Empire not to exchange resident ambassadors. They even considered, so he argues, that it was not right for a Muslim to stay in infidel lands for long periods.¹²

So it seems obvious. The Ottoman Empire was not only a polity that happened to be established by Muslims, it was also an empire of *devoted* Muslims. These Muslims were devoted in the sense that for them Islam encompassed every corner of life and they organized their polity strictly under the guidance of Islamic precepts. Both their internal and external governmental or administrative affairs were determined in the light of the law of Islam, namely the *Shari'a*. In support of this conventional view, it is frequently asserted that Islam, unlike Christianity which mainly deals

with private and other-worldly affairs, has rules for both public and private affairs; in other words state and religion are not separated in Islam and thus not in the Ottoman Empire.¹³ Since the state, polity, is defined by religion, it was not, so it is argued, easy for the Ottomans to transcend Islamic exclusivism and consequently establish diplomatic relations with non-Muslims. This attitude and policy lasted until the eighteenth century or even well into the nineteenth century. To sum up, then, the Ottoman Empire had a negative attitude toward the diplomacy of the European states system, at least until the eighteenth century.

A corollary of this view is that the Ottoman Empire had a negative attitude toward diplomacy because she was outside the European states system of which diplomacy is conventionally considered to be one of the principal institutions. The Ottoman Empire as an Islamic state was not a member of the European states system. Having a world-view that prescribed a permanent state of war and being outside the European system, then, it was considered to be normal for the Ottoman Empire to have a negative attitude toward diplomacy. We must here briefly recapture the development of diplomacy and the European states system that formed the basis of the modern world-wide international system.

Diplomacy and the European states system

A comprehensive definition of diplomacy may be given as 'the conduct of relations between states and other entities with standing in world politics by official agents and by peaceful means'. It includes both the formulation and execution of foreign policy. It is the system and art of communication between sovereign states and its chief function is negotiation.¹⁴ Diplomacy, then, relates to peaceful relations; war is not diplomacy. It involves mutual dependence, permanent relations, living together, the need for the other, some idea of equality and mutual recognition. Diplomacy as such is considered to be one of the principal institutions of the modern European states system as it emerged and developed together with sovereign territorial states in Europe from the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries onwards.

The historical development of diplomacy has conventionally been traced as the emergence of resident embassies in the Renaissance Italy of the fifteenth century, its spread northward and adoption by the major European states in the sixteenth century, recognition of the principle of extraterritoriality in the seventeenth century, the eighteenth-century development of the diplomatic corps and the nineteenth-century settlement of the issue of ranking and precedence according to the conception

of legal equality with the Congress of Vienna in 1815.¹⁵ Diplomacy was thus invented in the city-states of Renaissance Italy and it developed together with the beginning and growth of the sovereign territorial states that came to assume the notion of *raison d'état* rather than existing for Christendom.¹⁶

Modern European diplomacy came to be distinctively defined with resident embassies. The mutual exchange of resident missions and rules regarding their ranking and precedence were gradually adopted by, and began to constitute a significant institution of, the modern European states system, which later spread to the whole world with the expansion of the European system. In its broad sense as a communication and negotiation mechanism, diplomacy cannot, as already suggested, be confined to the modern European states. Yet, the modern European states have been characterized by the establishment and exchange of resident embassies. Wight, for example, takes the emergence of resident missions in fifteenth-century Italy and then their spread in sixteenth-century Europe as one of the ways of marking the development of the modern European states system from medieval Christendom.¹⁷ Similarly, Mattingly, in his authoritative book on the emergence of diplomacy, considers resident ambassadors as the most characteristic officers of western diplomacy since the late fifteenth century and makes the point that 'they differentiate our system strikingly from any other we know about elsewhere'.¹⁸

Indeed, the emergence of resident embassies and sovereign territorial states that came to form the European states system are said to be parallel and concomitant processes. In all the accounts of the development and growth of the sovereign territorial states system in Europe, diplomacy is considered as not only the principal, but also the earliest institution of that system. Bull stated that diplomacy presupposes an international system or, in his terms, an international society.¹⁹ From the end of the fifteenth century onwards, we have been informed by Anderson, the idea that only sovereigns could play the great game of diplomacy was slowly crystallizing and gaining acceptance. It had begun to be recognized that the sending and receiving of diplomatic representatives was an attribute of sovereignty.²⁰ Both the sovereign territorial state with the logic of *raison d'état* and especially diplomacy with reciprocally exchanged residential missions began to emerge in fifteenth-century Italy.

Why was it the Italian city-states that invented resident representatives? Mattingly tells us that by about 1400, in contrast to other parts of Europe, the city-states of Italy had become more interdependent. Space was limited and completely organized, margins were narrow and

the city-states of Italy had to be continuously alert to each other. It became a system of mutually balanced parts in an unstable equilibrium. The condition for such a system to work was a state of relative isolation and this was enjoyed by the Italian peninsula for more than a century from about 1378 to 1492, despite occasional intrusions. '[T]he immediate result of the absence of severe outside pressures was to set the states of Italy free for their competitive struggle with one another, and so to intensify their awareness of the structure and tensions of their peninsular system.' Diplomacy came into being against such a background. 'Mainly it was', concluded Mattingly, 'these tensions that produced the new style of diplomacy. Primarily it developed as one functional adaptation of the new type of self-conscious, uninhibited, power-seeking competitive organism.' The nature of warfare in Italy, which was mainly conducted by mercenary armies, also contributed to the development of diplomacy. When war was professionalized, success required vigilant and agile politics. 'The diplomat was needed to supplement the soldier.' Besides the new war, Mattingly adds upper-class Italian culture as another, secondary, factor.²¹ Of all the states of Italy, according to Mattingly, Venice played the central role in the invention of modern diplomacy. 'Above the welfare of Italy or Christendom, above any considerations of religion or morality, the rulers of Venice preferred...the self-preservation and aggrandizement of their own republic.'²²

Other scholars have explained the development of modern resident diplomacy in Renaissance Italy in more or less the same way. The invention of the resident mission was seen as the result of the intensification of diplomatic activity in the fifteenth century, especially among the Italian city-states. 'It was discovered to be more practical and more economical to appoint an ambassador to remain at a much frequented court.'²³ In an environment of increasing competition and interdependence and finding themselves in a system of unstable equilibrium, to meet the constant need of visiting and overseeing each other the city-states of Italy invented resident missions for reasons of convenience and economy. Later it was adopted by other European states and became an institution of the European system.

Besides diplomacy, the European states system is characterized by some other distinctive rules and institutions. The rules of the system may take the form of international law, moral rules, custom or established practice, operational rules or 'rules of the game'. Such rules include those constitutional ones that identify the members of the system as states. They also include the rules of coexistence such as that requiring respect for sovereignty, those restricting the use of force governing the conduct

of war and confining its legitimate employment to states, the rule that agreements made should be kept and the rules of cooperation.²⁴ The institutions of the European system comprise first the states themselves and then the balance of power, international law, the diplomatic mechanism, the managerial system of the great powers and war.²⁵

Although Bull is perhaps the most prominent advocate of this account of the development of the European states system from the sixteenth century onwards, it has been shared by many. Basically, it is held that the principal institutions of the European states system began to emerge in fifteenth-century Italy. They were then adopted by the monarchies north of the Alps in the sixteenth century and by the mid-seventeenth century they were more or less Europe-wide. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries they became more institutionalized and gradually expanded into the non-European parts of the world. The Ottomans did not take part in this system in the beginning and it officially became a member only with the Treaty of Paris of 1856.²⁶ It is therefore concluded that the Ottoman Empire, which was not part of the European states system, did not share its rules and institutions. That is why it had, or is supposed to have had, a negative attitude toward diplomacy, the principal institution of the system.

When the idea that the Ottoman Empire was an Islamic polity is added to the argument that it was not part of the European states system until the nineteenth century, it would seem impossible to avoid the conclusion that the Empire was not only outside the *diplomatic* system of Europe but ill-disposed towards it. The Ottomans were alien, if not hostile, to European rules, customs, mechanisms, institutions, styles and ways of doing things. In the following section I shall take issue with the argument that the Ottoman Empire was an Islamic polity and thus outside the European system.

The Ottoman Empire: an Islamic state?

In Ottoman historiography, there have been four different theses regarding the origins and the nature of the Empire, each of them propounded by scholars whose names are associated with that thesis. The first argues that the Ottoman Empire was a direct/indirect continuation of the Byzantine Empire and the Ottoman system was derived from the Byzantine institutions.²⁷ The second argument was put forward by Köprülü in his lectures given at the University of Sorbonne in 1934. In response to Gibbons, he argued that the origins of the Ottoman Empire and its character could be considered as part of the movements of migrating

Turkish tribes and thus within the Turkic tradition.²⁸ Thirdly, the Ottoman Empire was a *ghazi* state and based upon Islam and the idea of *jihād*. It was established by the *ghazis* who strived for *jihād* and conquest.²⁹ Finally, it is also common to treat the Ottoman Empire as an example of nomadic empires springing from tribal institutions.³⁰

Of all of these theses, the *ghazi* thesis has been the most widely supported. Ever since Wittek, many scholars have argued that the Ottoman Empire was an Islamic empire, founded by warriors devoted to the spread of Islam in infidel lands; accordingly, the Empire was organized upon the principles of Islam and its law, government and external affairs were directed under the *Shari'a*. As an Islamic state based upon the policy of *ghaza*, 'perpetual warfare carried on against unbelievers', the Ottoman Empire from its very beginning was 'geared for conquest. It constantly had to expand, gain new territory, provide new outlets for the energies of the *ghazis*.'³¹ According to İnalçık, the policy of *ghaza* was the foundation stone of the Empire.³² Yet he is cautious. The reason why the Ottomans attached so much importance to *ghaza* was because of its prestige. It was indeed a significant source of power and prestige in the Muslim world. The Ottoman Sultans regularly sent *fethnâmes*, the account of their conquests in the Balkans and Europe, to the Muslim rulers. In other words, to gain prestige among Muslims was a primary motive in the *ghazas*.

But, to repeat an earlier question, how Islamic was the Ottoman Empire? Was it an empire established and governed by Muslims, or was it strictly based upon the Islamic law, *Shari'a*? Officially speaking, the Ottoman Empire was claimed to be an Islamic system. Ottoman rulers always championed themselves for defending the cause of Islam. In theory, they always tried to observe Islamic rules via *fetva*, the declaration that whatever was done was compatible with the rules of Islam, issued by the Grand Mufti, Sheik ul-Islam. Ottoman rulers repeatedly made it known that they could go to war when they were attacked and Islam was insulted. They considered themselves to be the servants and protectors of Islam. The principal Ottoman institutions were referred to as being 'of Islam'. Ottoman territories were referred to as 'the land of Islam', its sovereign as 'the Padishah of Islam', its army as 'the soldiers of Islam', and the head of its religious bureaucracy as 'the Sheik of Islam'. Furthermore, the state itself was described as 'Devlet-i Aliyye'yi Muhammediyye' (the Sublime State of Muhammad) when it was referred to in its official texts. This was how the Ottoman Empire appeared in theory and official texts. But to what extent did the practice match the theory?

In fact, when the actual historical record is taken into account, it is clear that the Ottoman Empire was not an orthodox Islamic state.

Its governmental and administrative affairs were not only directed under the strict observance of Islamic law or *Shari'a*. It is widely agreed that the Ottoman Empire was heavily influenced by the customary law and was respectful of local customs. According to İnalcık, in line with the Turkish state tradition which entrusted the ruler with the right and authority to promulgate rules for the regulation of state affairs and policies, the Ottoman sultans themselves issued the *qanun-nâmes* or 'books of law', most famous of them initiated by Mehmed II.³³ In other words, the administration was based not only upon the Muslim law, but also upon the state law or law of the ruler.

Furthermore, both in terms of texts and in terms of actual historical practice, it is hardly possible to argue for a monolithic theory based upon the duality of *Dâr al-Islam* versus *Dâr al-Harb*. In the history of Islamic societies we see various practices. In terms of theory, again, it is not always possible to justify a perpetual war between Muslims and non-Muslims. It is expressly stated in the Koran that if the non-Muslims incline for peace, then the Muslims are advised to make peace (*Sura Anfal*, 61). Of course, one may find textual support for the contrary view. Yet, it is debatable if *jihâd* means the obligation to make constant war against non-Muslims.³⁴

Besides the concepts of *Dâr al-Islam* and *Dâr al-Harb*, there is another concept, *Dâr al-Sulh* (where the Muslims and non-Muslims live in peace). The reason for the view that Islam prescribes an impenetrable duality in terms of *Dâr al-Islam* and *Dâr al-Harb* is indeed the analogy between the medieval Christian conceptualization of *Christendom* versus *non-Christendom* and that of Islam. Though we could find many different practices in history, Christianity comprised an exclusive universalism. In Christianity, there is no equivalent of the *Dâr al-Sulh*. With the conception of *Dâr al-Sulh*, then, Islam cannot be considered as exclusively universalistic as Christianity.³⁵ Whatever is preached in the texts and however it is interpreted, what is significant is the actual historical record. Both in Muslim and Christian societies, texts were historically understood and applied in various ways.

Ottoman practice was rather pragmatic. They pragmatically interpreted the precepts of Islam especially with regard to external affairs. They not only made use of the *amân* system or the system of *ahdnâme*, granting safe conduct and freedom to live by themselves in respect of subject populations who were non-Muslims, but also in their external relations. They did not actually follow a policy of permanent war and had been observing the 'existing customs' and 'agreements'. When Mehmed II granted Capitulations to the Venetians in 1454, it was stated that the decision was taken according to the existing custom, by which was meant

the previous capitulatory agreement between the Byzantine Empire and the Venetians.³⁶ Respect for existing customs (that agreements made should be honoured) can be seen in the practice and implementation of the *amân* system.³⁷ After the fall of Istanbul, Mehmed II granted the Greeks, Genoese and Latins *amân* and when Selim I later wanted to get rid of some Byzantine notables in Istanbul due to their suspected efforts to re-establish the Byzantine Empire, the Sultan was reminded of the *amân* given by Mehmed II and he retreated from his compulsory conversion or expulsion policy. Similarly, Suleiman the Magnificent, in his *firman* to the *beys* of Bosnia and Buda, stressed that the *beys* must observe the *Ahd-u Amân* of the Sultan.

Islam did not prevent the Ottomans from reaching or making agreements with non-Muslims. It is true that such agreements were considered to be unilateral truces rather than bilateral treaties. Yet they signed truces for long periods and these were more or less automatically renewed, so that, in practice, there was a permanent state of peace with a considerable number of states. As İnalçık shows us in Chapter 3, as early as the time of Beyazid II, an agreement was made between the Sultan and Pope Innocent VIII. In this Beyazid II promised to deliver the City of Jerusalem to the French King after it was captured from the Mamluks, in return for the King keeping his brother Jem in custody in France instead of sending him to the enemies of the Ottomans. This is most striking. Beyazid II, known to be one of the most religious sultans, was to deliver the City of Jerusalem, sacred for Muslims, to the King of France, king of the infidels, after he captured it from the Mamluks, a Muslim state! What could show better than this that the Ottomans were behaving according to self-interest rather than the strict requirements of religion?

In the second half of the eighteenth century, it was heavily debated within Ottoman circles whether the alliance with Prussia was compatible with Islam. In the end, the *fetva* affirmed that it was. Similarly, Ottoman policy-makers did not have any difficulty in securing a *fetva* for the alliance between the Ottomans and the Austrians against the Russians. On the other hand, Frederick the Great had a hard time in his efforts to explain the alliance with the Ottomans.³⁸ There are many other examples demonstrating that the Ottomans did not strictly abide by a policy which the *ghaza* or *jihad* thesis would have us believe that they did. But there is no need to rehearse them. What we know historically is that the Ottomans were quite pragmatic and observed the rules of expediency or, to use the present-day terminology of the students of international relations, the requirements of Realpolitik. The Ottoman Empire was not then an orthodox Islamic state.

The Ottoman Empire: an imperial system

The Ottoman Empire was first and foremost an empire, an imperial system deriving from many sources. Islam was one of them, if without doubt the dominant one. As already stated there were others drawn from the Byzantine Empire and the Turkic and nomadic traditions. The Empire had what one may call an 'Inner Asian heritage'³⁹ and in time borrowed from Europe. No doubt, it incorporated elements of the local Anatolian environment as well. The Capitulations developed, on the one hand, as part of the *amân* system of Islam, and as a continuation of the Byzantine tradition on the other. Similarly the relations of the *Ulama* and the Grand Mufti to the Sultan reflected both the Sunni path and practice of Islam and the position of the Patriarchate in the Byzantine Empire. The Ottoman sultans were not only referred to as the *Padishah of Islam*, but also as *Sultan-ı İklîm-i Rum* (Emperor of the Realm of Rome).⁴⁰ The infiltration into the frontier zones and subsequently their administration and the entrusting of the young princes with the government of some provinces derived from the nomadic and Turkic heritage. The interrelationships of these different sources and influences allowed the Empire to have a rich culture and diversity in its composition and administration. As it grew from a small frontier *beylik* (principality) to a world-wide empire, the diversity increased and it came to comprise multiple peoples, ethnic groups, religions and vast territories. Logically speaking, it could have been possible to confine a small *beylik* to a single tradition, say the nomadic; but it is not possible to confine and reduce a large and diverse empire within the limits of a single tradition or religion such as Islam. In other words, by definition, it is hard to define the Ottoman Empire as an 'Islamic' or *Shari'a* state.

In the proper sense of the word as we use it now, the Ottoman Empire was not even a state. It was a kind of polity different from the one to which we are accustomed today, namely the nation-state. A nation-state is a territorially defined and consolidated polity. It is defined by a clearly and horizontally demarcated territory. The principle of territoriality constitutes the basis of the principle of sovereignty and nationality. A nation-state has sovereignty over a definite territory; anything or anybody that happens to be in that territory is bound by the sovereignty and authority of the state. The people living in that territory are entitled to some common rights and obligations without regard to their ethnic or religious character, or personal wishes. A nation-state thus imposes some degree of uniformity upon the people; hence the principle of nationality. Sovereignty is in practice exercised by the central political

institutions and the state as the totality of public bodies is the final arbiter and authority: here comes the principle of centrality. In sum, then, a *nation-state* is a polity defined by *territoriality*, *sovereignty*, *nationality* and *centrality*. Imperial systems such as the Chinese Empire, the Roman Empire and the Ottoman Empire were not like this.

An imperial system or an empire is, to borrow Tilly's definition, 'a large composite polity linked to a central power by indirect rule'. The relationship between the central or imperial ruler and the linked units of the system is based upon the principle of allegiance. The imperial ruler

exercises some military and fiscal control in each major segment of its imperial domain, but tolerates two major elements of indirect rule: 1) retention or establishment of particular, distinct compacts for the government of each segment; and 2) exercise of power through intermediaries who enjoy considerable autonomy within their own domains in return for the delivery of compliance, tribute, and military collaboration with the center.⁴¹

Imperial systems, then, are composite polities, not consolidated polities.

They are not territorially consolidated because they were never territorially demarcated. In the imperial systems, territory was not the defining element; this was allegiance. It is thus not surprising that the Ottoman sultans, for example Suleiman the Magnificent, were unlikely to have been able to identify the exact boundaries of their empire, though the fact that they were constantly changing was a subsidiary reason for this. Suleiman knew that his Empire comprised the lands of the Crimean Khanate, the principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia, the lands of the Emirs of Hijaz and Yemen, and the Beyliks of Tunis and Algiers. But if he had wanted to know their exact boundaries, it would have been necessary to ask the Khanates, Princes, Emirs and Beys. What was important for the imperial centre was the continuing allegiance of those local rulers.

The Ottoman Empire, just like previous empires, was not territorially defined, demarcated and consolidated. Imperial systems are not territorially demarcated because they claim to rule the whole world, in other words, for them, the whole Earth potentially constitutes their territory. If some parts of the world are not under their rule and do not offer allegiance, it is a temporary situation. One day or another, they are bound to fall under their imperial domain. There was then no need for territorial demarcation or boundary delimitation. The meaning and tone of the letters of the Sultan Suleiman the Magnificent to King Francis I in the early sixteenth century and of the Chinese Emperor Qianlong to King

George III in the late eighteenth century indicate clearly the claim of imperial systems to rule the whole Earth and thus universalism and self-sufficiency. Imperial systems are potentially universal and self-sufficient polities. Let us read it first in the Sultan's letter:

I, who am Sultan of the Sultans of East and West, fortunate lord of the domains of the Romans, Persians and Arabs, Hero of creation, Champion of the earth and time, Padishah and Sultan of the Mediterranean and the Black Sea, of the extolled Kaaba and Medina the illustrious and Jerusalem the noble, of the throne of Egypt and the province of Yemen, Aden and Sana'a, of Baghdad and Basra and Lahsa and Ctesiphon, of the lands of Algiers and Azerbaijan, of the regions of the Kipchaks and the lands of the Tartars, of Kurdistan and Luristan and all Rumelia, Anatolia and Karaman, of Wallachia and Moldavia and Hungary and many kingdoms and lands besides; Sultan Suleiman Khan, son of Sultan Selim Khan.⁴²

In the letter of the Sultan, the French king is merely addressed thus: 'You, who are Francis, king of the land of France.' For himself, however, the Sultan lists the territories and lands that are linked to him and then gives it up. This is partly because they are countless and partly because it is just a matter of time before he rules the whole Earth. Similarly, the Chinese Emperor speaks of his Empire as 'the Celestial Empire . . . ruling all within the four seas' and 'vast territories', while Britain is just described as a country that 'lies in the far oceans' and inclines 'towards civilization'. The emperor expressly names the King, together with all other kings and rulers, as his vassal.⁴³ The wording, tone and meaning of both letters makes it obvious that they thought of their imperial rule as universal and self-sufficient. In both China and the Ottoman Empire, the rulers, like the Roman emperors, were conceived to be rulers of the Universe. The Chinese emperor was the only legitimate ruler and the single 'Son of the Heaven'. The Ottoman Sultans were *Halife-i Ru'i Zemin* (the successor to the Prophet Muhammad in the Earth) and *Zillulahi fi-l Arz* (the Shadow of God on Earth). That the Ottomans thought of themselves as presiding over a universal empire may also be seen in their chronicles. In the seventeenth century, when Koçi Bey discussed the emerging signs of deterioration in the Ottoman system, he spoke of the 'deterioration of the order of the World'.⁴⁴ The order of the Ottoman Empire, for Koçi Bey, meant the order of the world.

The Ottoman Empire, just like most imperial systems, was not a centralized polity. A nation-state is a centralized polity in the sense that all

individuals are directly linked to the central political body. In imperial systems, there are intermediary rulers who are autonomous in their own domains. Though we see a strong political centre in the Ottoman Empire, it is widely acknowledged that the local and regional units enjoyed great autonomy so that it would not be wrong to characterize the Ottoman Empire as granting more autonomy than many of the empires known to us. This autonomy was not only granted to those non-Muslim subjects or principalities under the *amân* system or the *millet* system, but also to the Muslim provinces as well. The Crimean Khanates, Emirs in the Middle East and Beys in North Africa enjoyed governmental autonomy, even to the point of independently engaging in external affairs. The Bey of Algiers did not, for example, recognize the privileges of the French merchants for commerce and fishery in Algerian territorial waters, granted by the Sublime Porte under the agreement between the Ottoman Empire and France in 1604. The French had to get those privileges directly from the Bey of Algiers, which they did via an agreement in 1628.⁴⁵

In the Ottoman Empire, until the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, governmental tasks such as administration, taxation and preservation of order and stability were carried out by the central government in Istanbul and the local notables together. Indeed, the reform attempts aimed at centralizing these governmental functions. In other words, reform policies were gradually making the Ottoman Empire a nation-state proper. That is why it is meaningful to speak of the 'westernization of the Ottoman diplomacy in the nineteenth century'.⁴⁶ By the nineteenth century, the Empire came to adopt the governmental, military and diplomatic techniques common in European nation-states. However, the roles of the local notables were not altogether eliminated even in the last century of the Empire.⁴⁷

In the Ottoman Empire as in other imperial systems, we do not see a uniform collective identity such as that of nationality as seen in the nation-states of today. As a diverse system, it encompassed a variety of identity units. We certainly see a supreme identity, a loose universal identification which brought some degree of uniformity as expressed in the allegiance to the Sultan and Sublime Porte. These allegiances, together with identification with the Dynasty, formed a universal identity for all Ottoman subjects. On the other hand, we see multiple identities in terms of religion and ethnicity. Thus people still identified themselves with the family, locality, city, *tariqats* (religious sects), tribes and villages. I fully agree with the formulation that the Ottoman imperial system was a cosmopolitan system combining both universality and locality.⁴⁸

To summarize thus far, the Ottoman Empire was not a consolidated polity like those that began to emerge first in Renaissance Italy and later in Europe. The modern European colonial empires were not really imperial systems. They were just colonial empires, having territorially consolidated states in their metropolitan area in Europe and colonies overseas. As an imperial system, the Ottoman Empire had all the notions and, perhaps, pretensions of universalism and self-sufficiency. When one examines the Ottoman attitude towards the emerging European states and diplomacy, the imperial character of the Ottomans must not be forgotten. The source of the Ottoman sense of superiority was partly Islam but more its imperial nature. Modern European diplomacy required mutual dependence, living together and the need for the other. The Ottoman Empire did not feel like this until the eighteenth century. Yet the Ottoman Empire was born and grew alongside Europe when the European states were beginning to emerge. To understand adequately the Ottoman attitude toward diplomacy, we need to examine the respective positions of the Ottoman imperial system and the European states system.

The Ottoman imperial system and the European states system

With the conquest of Istanbul in the mid-fifteenth century, the Ottoman Empire can conveniently be considered as an imperial system. From its emergence as a power in the beginning of the fourteenth century, the Ottoman Empire expanded at the expense of Europe. It occupied, controlled and administered one-quarter to one-third of the European continent from the fourteenth century to the late nineteenth century. As already shown, the modern European states system is conventionally said to have emerged from the late fifteenth century onwards and consequently the Ottoman Empire was in Europe when the European system began to come into being. From its emergence as a formidable power, the Ottoman Empire had been a continuous consideration for the Europeans. So, the modern European states system and the Ottoman imperial system were never isolated from each other. The Ottomans actively and intensively engaged in European affairs. It can rightly be asserted that the Empire played a major part in the formation and working of the European states system and this shows that a process of mutual dependence operated between the two systems, despite the historical prejudices of the Europeans towards the Turks and the pretensions of self-sufficiency on the part of the Ottomans.

As early as the first stage of the Italian Wars from 1494 onwards, the Ottoman Empire was an important actor in the Italian system, traditionally considered as the forerunner of the modern European system. The Italian courts maintained diplomatic relations with the Porte. In 1494, faced by the first French triumphs in Italy, Naples and the Papacy itself negotiated with the Sultan for help against Charles VIII. In order to keep France out of Italy, when the Second Holy League was signed in 1495 with an almost Europe-wide participation, not just by the Italian states, Mattingly tells us, the Ambassador of Sultan Beyazid II was present, in a sense, as an observer to the signing ceremony. The New League is said to have transformed the Italian system into a European one. In 1500, a Turkish ambassador offered Pope Alexander VI Ottoman military support in return for the port of Toronto, while in the same year Emperor Maximilian sent an ambassador to Istanbul.⁴⁹ The Ottomans engaged, as an active party, in the second stage of the Italian Wars. It was suggested that the struggle between the Ottomans and the Habsburgs throughout the sixteenth century linked the two European systems, the Southern system centred in Italy and the Northern system that comprised Sweden, Poland-Lithuania and Muscovy.⁵⁰

The historical record shows that the Ottoman Empire became an active participant in the emerging European balance system. The Sultans pursued a conscious policy of balance vis-à-vis the European powers so that the rise of the nation-states was to a certain degree facilitated. Similarly, the European sovereigns took into account the Sublime Porte in their calculations regarding the balance of power in Europe and did not hesitate, from time to time, to align with the Sultan against each other. According to Dehio, the Ottoman Empire became a counterweight to the unifying tendency represented by Charles V. The introduction or intervention of the Empire into the European balance-of-power system and European diplomacy played a most significant part in preserving the freedom of the system of states.⁵¹ In 1532, Francis I admitted to the Venetian Ambassador that he saw in the Ottoman Empire the only force guaranteeing the continued existence of the states of Europe against Charles V. Indeed, in 1535/36 we see that this guarantee was in some sense given with the bid for a Franco-Turkish Treaty, which is said to have provided the Europeans with a model in their relations with the Asian empires later in terms of unequal treaties. The Ottoman Empire had a significant role in the emergence of the nation-states and then in the preservation of the balance among those states.

The role of the Ottoman Empire in preserving the European balance and thus the nation-states can be seen in the sixteenth and seventeenth

centuries. The Ottomans encouraged and supported the English and Dutch in the period after 1580 when these nations proved to be the champions of European resistance to the Habsburgs' attempts at hegemony. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, support for the Protestants and Calvinists was one of the fundamental principles of Ottoman policy in Europe. The Ottoman pressure on the Habsburgs was an important factor in the spread of Protestantism in Europe. The Westphalian settlement of 1648, the coexistence of multiple sovereign states, became possible through this pressure on the Habsburgs as observed by Watson: 'The Habsburg bid to establish a hegemonial system in Christian Europe was defeated, and decisive Westphalian formulation of the anti-hegemonial nature of the European international society was made possible by the Ottoman pressure on the Habsburgs co-ordinated by the Franco-Turkish alliance which brought the other anti-hegemonial powers into friendly relations with the Ottomans.'⁵²

In terms of trade relations, we can observe that both the Europeans and the Ottomans took the other into account. The Ottoman Empire pursued the balance policy in its trade relations with the Europeans, notably in terms of the Capitulations. In order to prevent the dominance of one state in the Levant trade they always favoured the rival nations. Against Venetian dominance, they supported first the Genoese, then the Ragusans and then the Florentines in the fifteenth century. In the sixteenth century the French took the lead and in the seventeenth century came the English and the Dutch.⁵³ In short, the Ottoman Empire was a significant force in the European balance-of-power system from the fifteenth century to well into the seventeenth century, the formative centuries of the system.

The contemporaries indeed recognized that the Ottoman Empire was in and essential to the European balance system and there was a mutual dependence between them. As already noted, in the early sixteenth century Francis I admitted that the Ottoman Empire was the only force to prevent the emerging states of Europe from being transformed into a Europe-wide empire by Charles V. In the late sixteenth century, Queen Elizabeth I opened relations with the Ottoman Empire. One of the motives of the Queen was certainly the expansion of trade and a further motive was the idea that the Sultan could balance the Habsburgs in the East and consequently relieve Spanish pressure upon England. Elizabeth I even stressed that Protestantism and Islam were equally hostile to 'idolatry' (Catholicism). In granting Capitulations to the English and the Dutch, the Sultan, too, considered that these nations were the champions of the struggle against the idolaters.⁵⁴ In the late eighteenth

century, the place of the Ottomans in the European balance system was acknowledged in the British Parliament. Similarly it has been reported that Catherine the Great of Russia explicitly recognized it.⁵⁵ Writing in 1566, the Venetian Ottoviano Maggi thought that a good ambassador should be able to speak Turkish.⁵⁶ This clearly indicates the degree and extent of the Ottoman engagement with Europe. It seems obvious that the Ottoman Empire was within the European balance system from very early on. While Vaughan speaks of a 'pattern of alliance' between the Turk and Europe, Goffman makes the point that the Ottomans were an indispensable part of, and fully integrated into, the European diplomatic system.⁵⁷

What one can draw from the foregoing analysis of the mutual positions of the emerging European international system and the Ottoman imperial system is that the two systems were closely interwoven and were in constant interaction. This analysis of the mutual dependence between the Ottoman Empire and the European international system in its formative (and, of course, later) centuries unequivocally leads us to conclude that the two systems were not isolated. They had frequent relations with each other and the nature of these relations was not always warlike. The Europeans and the Ottomans did not always aim at plundering each other, they were not in a permanent state of war as the orthodox understanding of the *Christendom* versus *non-Christendom* or *Dâr-al-Harb* versus *Dâr-al-Islam* dichotomies would have us believe. The Ottoman imperial system and the European states system do not seem to constitute two antagonistic systems, but parts of a greater system, that is the Afro-Eurasian system, together with the other societies and civilizations of the Afro-Eurasian zone.⁵⁸

In light of all those contacts, wars, conflicts, alliances, agreements and commercial exchanges between the Ottoman Empire and Europe, and given the actual control, administration and government of one-quarter to one-third of the European continent for half a millennium, 'the logical conclusion ought to be', Naff puts it, 'that the Ottoman Empire was, empirically, a European state. The paradox is that it was not. Even though a significant portion of the Empire was based *in* Europe, it cannot be said to have been *of* Europe.'⁵⁹ Despite the existence of extensive relations so as to form 'a pattern of alliance' between Europe and the Turk, the fact that the Empire was considered in Europe but not of Europe shows not only the differences between the two systems, but also the cultural rift. Nevertheless, as I have already said, there were permanent and extensive interactions between the European states and the Ottoman imperial system so that their attitudes were not always antagonistic. They even, in Bull's sense,

shared and worked in some common rules and institutions such as conferences, treaties, the Capitulations and diplomacy. Indeed, the Ottomans did not have a dismissive attitude towards European diplomacy at all.

The favourable Ottoman attitude toward diplomacy

When examining the Ottoman attitude toward diplomacy one should, as already noted, take into consideration two major points. First, strictly speaking, the Ottoman Empire was not, as widely supposed, a *Shari'a* state; nor was it a nation-state proper. Instead, it was an imperial system with claims to universal rule and self-sufficiency. Secondly, this imperial system developed side by side with the European states system and actively engaged with and in this system. It was not like the Chinese imperial system, which was isolated and apart from the European system. On their part, the emerging European states, *pace* the continuous crusading spirit, did not hesitate to establish a variety of connections with the Sublime Porte. The Empire was highly influential in the making of the European states system and its institutions. Diplomacy and the resident missions form one of them.

We should also consider the context in which modern European diplomacy originally developed. The development of modern diplomacy among the Italian city-states and later in the wider European system occurred in interaction with the Ottomans. In the fifteenth century, the Italian city-states, Venice above all of them, was more connected to the Eastern Mediterranean and thus the Ottoman world than to the rest of Europe. The experiences of the Italian states with the Ottoman Empire have significant input to the development of resident missions. While the Italian states had an understanding of the Ottoman system, the Ottoman Empire itself had the ability to accommodate the Christian populations. 'Indeed', concludes Goffman, 'the formulating of some of the most essential elements of the modern world's diplomatic system – permanent missions, extraterritoriality, and reciprocity – drew upon the experiences of the directors of Florentine, Genoese, and Venetian settlements in the Ottoman domain.'⁶⁰ Indeed so. Having implemented the *amân* system through the granting of *ahdnâmes* to the non-Muslim communities within its own world, by which the Christian and Jewish subjects of the Empire lived under their own laws and traditions, it was just one step further for the Ottomans to grant the same rights and privileges to those Christian states or communities which lay outside the Ottoman world. Goffman, again rightly, notes that the extent of the extraterritorial rights the European resident missions enjoyed in Istanbul

from the very beginning was achieved among the European states only after the end of religious wars in the seventeenth century.⁶¹ This was not something that might have been expected from an empire which derided and dismissed diplomacy and the diplomatic representatives.

Another point that needs to be taken into account in the evaluation of the Ottoman attitude is the process of the development of the European states system. Although the beginning of the European states system may be traced back to the fifteenth-century Italian city-states, it does not mean that the system with its rules and institutions, which now seem so obvious to us, became mature in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries or even in the seventeenth. The balance of power as a check mechanism against any great power with ambitions to impose its hegemony upon the system came to be accepted by the major members of the system only in the eighteenth century. The privileges and obligations of the great powers were not finally recognized until the Congress of Vienna in 1815. Jurists and statesmen began to speak of international law only in the late sixteenth century. The mutual recognition of sovereignty and legal equality of states are usually thought to have come into effect only with the Treaty of Westphalia of 1648. And even this conventional date is questioned now.⁶²

Though diplomacy is widely viewed as the earliest institution of the European states system, its development was not smooth and it, too, came to be accepted only in time. It was frequently disrupted by wars, especially by religious wars of the second half of the sixteenth century and the early seventeenth century, and the professionalization of diplomacy did not seriously emerge until the nineteenth century.⁶³ The mutual exchange of resident ambassadors, common in Italy by the end of the fifteenth century and which began to be adopted by the rest of Europe in the sixteenth century, did not become universally prevalent within the system; examples of unilateralism persisted. 'Not all resident embassies were reciprocal' before 1648, as the authoritative text informs us.⁶⁴ In other words, receiving but not sending resident ambassadors was not exclusively an Ottoman practice in the early centuries of its development. Until the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, perhaps not even then, great powers were not enthusiastic about sending resident representatives to the courts of the lesser powers. In the fifteenth century, the Pope received ambassadors but sent none.⁶⁵ Even Venice did not always reciprocate with the small Italian courts. Again, in the fifteenth century, when the Italian city-states sent permanent ambassadors to England, France, Spain and the Emperor, they were not reciprocated by these European monarchies. Even, Louis XI of France refused to allow the

Venetian ambassador to stay in 1463 and a renewed attempt in 1470 was also turned down.⁶⁶ To a present-day student of diplomacy with conceptions of the Ottoman Empire as an Islamic state, it may look awkward that the Venetian ambassadors were allowed by the Ottoman Sultans to reside in Istanbul from 1453 onwards, while they were still refused by the French at the end of the fifteenth century. Yet, history always presents us with such awkward situations, just as those European monarchies not reciprocating the Italian city-states in the fifteenth century were in turn not reciprocated by the Ottoman Sultans later.

That the Sublime Porte did not reciprocate the European resident embassies until 1793, when the first resident embassy was opened in London, has frequently been given as an example of the Porte's rejection of diplomacy. But this cannot be taken as evidence of a negative Ottoman attitude. As will be explained later, there were various reasons why the Ottomans refrained from sending permanent ambassadors until the late eighteenth century, but religion was not one of them, since the Sublime Porte did not send permanent ambassadors to Muslim powers either. As already said, reciprocity in this matter required the existence of powers among which there was a condition of rough equality, or at least a nominal recognition of it. The Ottoman Empire, as an imperial system, did not recognize the notion of equality until the eighteenth century. However, among the contemporary non-European states or empires, the Ottoman case was unique. After all, it accepted that ambassadors might come to stay in Istanbul from the very beginning. The first English ambassador, Sir William Harboure, was received by the Sultan in 1583 in spite of fierce protest from the French. By contrast, more than two hundred years later, Lord Macartney's request to establish a permanent mission was refused by the Chinese emperor. Until the nineteenth century, the Europeans had no permanent embassies or missions in the non-European world except Istanbul. Furthermore, the Ottoman Empire frequently sent temporary envoys to the European courts. From 1384 to 1600, according to Mansell, 145 temporary envoys were sent by the Sultan to Venice alone.⁶⁷ The mission of most temporary envoys lasted for years. Therefore it would not be wrong if we said that diplomacy between the Sublime Porte and the European courts was in fact permanent.

The Ottoman practice of diplomacy and the conduct of its external affairs did indeed observe the principle of reciprocity in some way. Modern students very often confuse reciprocity with equality. However, these principles are not identical. While the concept of legal equality necessitates reciprocity, the reciprocal interactions are not always equal. The principle of legal equality and sovereignty is a modern concept.

The principle of reciprocity was known and probably practised in inter-societal relations from time immemorial. According to McNeill, long before the modern period, the imperial rulers of the Eurasian civilizations developed a reciprocal code of conduct for inter-societal relations. 'Even the arcanum of religion', he rightly maintains, 'made room for outsiders and unbelievers, since the principal religions of the Eurasian world – Christianity, Confucianism, Buddhism and Islam – all agreed in exhorting the devout *to treat strangers as they would wish to be treated themselves*.'⁶⁸ The principle of reciprocity was keenly observed by the Sublime Porte. In granting each *ahdnâme* (Capitulation), the Ottomans insisted upon the inclusion of reciprocal rights for their merchants. For example, Article XV of the non-ratified first French Capitulations of 1535 reads as follows: 'In the dominions of the King reciprocal rights shall be granted to the subjects of the Grand Signior.'⁶⁹ Similar clauses were entered into all subsequent Capitulations.

The favourable stance of the Ottomans towards European diplomacy may be seen in their attitude towards foreign envoys in Istanbul, whether they were temporary or permanent ambassadors. The Sublime Porte, indeed, took up a receptive and very favourable attitude towards foreign representatives. All of their expenses were paid by the Ottoman government from the moment they entered into the Ottoman territory until they left. This had been 'the common practice of Christendom',⁷⁰ later renounced by the modern European states. Surprisingly, the Sublime Porte preserved this 'practice of Christendom' until 1794.⁷¹ Besides being a way of showing off the magnificence of the Ottoman Empire, this was a gesture of hospitality to the envoys and ambassadors. The ambassadors were in theory the Sultan's guest. The ceremonial governing the reception of the ambassadors not only exalted the Sultan, but also honoured the ambassador. 'If in other capitals ambassadors lived like princes,' said Mansell, 'in Constantinople they lived like kings.'⁷²

It is true that the practice of putting ambassadors in the prison of the Seven Towers constitutes an example – usually regarded as the prime example – of the maltreatment of ambassadors in Istanbul. And there is no doubt that this was not the right way to treat ambassadors. Having said this, we must note that it was not exclusively an Ottoman practice and had some justification. Permanent representatives were regarded with deep suspicion in almost all countries. Imprisonment of diplomats was practised in Moscow in 1660 and in Peking much later.⁷³ The Ottomans practised it during times of war. The justification for it was to ensure the safe return home of any Ottoman subjects and merchants who happened to be in the warring state.⁷⁴

Finally, the Ottoman practice of sending ambassadors, even though they were temporary ambassadors, to European and indeed other courts is clear evidence of a positive attitude toward diplomacy. This can be seen from the Ottoman practice of sending ambassadors in order to inform the European rulers about the enthronement of a new Sultan, as this could easily have been learned by the Europeans from their own ambassadors in Istanbul. Similarly, the Sublime Porte sent ambassadors to attend European coronations.⁷⁵ Of course, the Ottomans sent ambassadors for reasons of protocol and display as well as for reasons of necessity. This cannot be expected of a power without any regard for diplomacy. Likewise, the fact that the Ottoman Empire took into consideration and gave importance to the 'rules of protocol in the countries to which they sent ambassadors'⁷⁶ can be taken as evidence of the importance they attached to diplomacy.

Conclusion

When those students of diplomacy and diplomatic history portray the Ottomans as having an inclination to refusal – a dismissive attitude toward the institution of diplomacy, it is impossible to see the influences of the conception of the nation-state as the right polity and the prejudices of Europe of the Enlightenment. In this understanding, the Ottoman Empire as an imperial system was an outmoded polity and Islam, which constituted the basis of this imperial system, necessitated a polity of strong conservatism and prescribed a policy of constant war, *jihad*, with the non-Muslim world. In addition to these latter-day prejudices, the evaluation of the Ottoman Empire in general and the way it conducted its external affairs – its diplomacy in particular – has been under the impact of the prejudices of the early modern Europeans, expressed in such concepts as 'the Terrible Turk' or 'the Unspeakable Turk'. The result is then to see the Ottoman policy in terms of a sharp dichotomy of *Dâr al-Islam* versus *Dâr al-Harb* as presented here. However, as I have already shown, the historical record does not support such a picture of permanent war between the Ottomans and Europeans.

Having said this, we cannot deny the cultural differences, mostly derived from religion, between the European states and the Ottoman Empire, and the impact of those differences upon their mutual interactions. The general public perceptions of the Europeans and Ottomans vis-à-vis each other were based upon, to use again a present-day expression, the process of 'otherization', describing your opponent in negative

terms so as to affirm your own identity. Many learned men and statesmen in Europe for years saw the Ottoman Empire as the ‘other’ of the common identity of the states of Europe. The Turk then constituted the ‘perfect barbarian’ for the Europeans in order for them to readily affirm the ‘civilized’ Europe.⁷⁷ *Pace* Anderson, it was not just ‘all the great weight of Islamic religious conservatism’ that hindered ‘normal’ diplomatic relations between the Sublime Porte and the courts of Europe. If there was a religious conservatism, one should speak of the ‘European Christian conservatism’ as well, which endured in spite of the Renaissance, Humanism, the Enlightenment and the conception of *raison d’état*. We should here remind ourselves of the fact that the European states abandoned the principle of *cuius regio eius religio* – the idea that the ruler’s religion should be the people’s religion – only in the mid-seventeenth century. We do not see the principle of *cuius regio eius religio* in Islamic history, certainly not in the Ottoman Empire.

The Ottoman Empire did not formally exchange resident ambassadors until the late eighteenth century. Those scholars who take this as an indication of the Ottoman contempt for European diplomacy do not ask the question: ‘Had the Sublime Porte attempted to send a permanent resident ambassador to the European capitals earlier than it did, what would have been the attitude of the European courts?’ The European courts sending their ambassadors to reside in Istanbul did not display much enthusiasm for having Ottoman ambassadors residing in their own capitals. As Berridge shows us in Chapter 5, ‘Diplomatic Integration with Europe before Selim III’, unilateralism suited both sides, and an Ottoman attempt to send a permanent ambassador to London prior to Yusuf Agah Efendi had been rebuffed by the Foreign Office. If there is to be blame for the lack of formal exchange of resident ambassadors, it would fall on both the Europeans and the Ottomans.

Nevertheless, despite the great weight of conservatism of whatever kind expressed in theory and enjoyed by the general public, there have been extensive interactions between the Ottoman imperial system and the European states system in practice, as I have shown. Beyazid II, the most pious of the Ottoman sultans, did not hesitate to make an agreement with the Pope. Similarly, Francis I, the Most Christian King, did indeed ask for the help and alliance of the ‘Terrible Turk’. Despite the contrary arguments we find in the literature and mutual pejorative perceptions among the general public, the historical record enables us to argue for the existence of extensive and intensive diplomatic activities between the modern European states and the Ottoman Empire and a favourable attitude on the part of the Ottomans.

Notes

1. J. C. Hurewitz, 'Ottoman Diplomacy and the European States System', *The Middle East Journal*, vol. 15 (Spring 1961), 145–6.
2. Bernard Lewis, *The Middle East and the West* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1964), 30, 32.
3. M. S. Anderson, *The Rise of Modern Diplomacy 1450–1919* (London: Longman, 1993), 9, 71.
4. Thomas Naff, 'Reform and the Conduct of Ottoman Diplomacy in the Reign of Selim III, 1789–1809', *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, vol. LXXXIII (1963), 314.
5. Thomas Naff, 'Ottoman Diplomatic Relations with Europe in the Eighteenth Century: Patterns and Trends', in T. Naff and R. Owen (eds), *Studies in Eighteenth Century Islamic History* (Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, 1977), 93, 97.
6. Thomas Naff, 'The Ottoman Empire and the European States System', in H. Bull and A. Watson (eds), *The Expansion of International Society* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), 144.
7. Naff, 'Reform and the Conduct of Ottoman Diplomacy . . .', 299.
8. Naff, 'The Ottoman Empire and the European States System', 148.
9. Naff, 'Reform and the Conduct of Ottoman Diplomacy . . .', 296. He expressed these ideas in more or less the same terms in his 'Ottoman Diplomatic Relations . . .', 97, and 'The Ottoman Empire and the European States System', 152.
10. Naff, 'The Ottoman Empire and the European States System', 144.
11. Naff, 'Ottoman Diplomatic Relations . . .', 93.
12. Ercüment Kuran, *Avrupa'da Osmanlı İkamet Elçiliklerinin Kuruluşu ve İlk Elçilerin Siyasi Faaliyetleri, 1793–1821* (*The Establishment of the Ottoman Resident Embassies in Europe and the Political Activities of the First Ambassadors, 1793–1821*) (Ankara: Türk Kültürünü Araştırma Enstitüsü Yayınları, 1988), 10–11.
13. We, of course, nowadays know very well that it is neither logically nor practically possible to make a clear-cut distinction between the so-called 'private' and 'public' realms. Furthermore, the students of history are well aware of the fact that the separation of the church and the state in Christian societies is a result of historical process rather than the precepts of the Bible. On the other hand, the students of society are not so naive as to assume that Christianity, or any religion for that matter, can be confined to the individual or private domain. Finally, the view that state and religion are united in Islam and Muslim societies is not borne out by the historical record. For an analysis of this, see I. M. Lapidus, 'State and Religion in Islamic Societies', *Past and Present*, no. 151 (May 1996), 4–27.
14. Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics* (London: Macmillan, 1977), 162, 164–5. See also Martin Wight, *Power Politics* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1979); and G. R. Berridge, *Diplomacy: Theory and Practice*, 2nd edn (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002).
15. Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, 166.
16. Of course, the origins of diplomacy in its broad sense of the communication and negotiation between separate entities can be taken back to the beginning of inter-societal relations. See Ragnar Numelin, *The Beginnings of Diplomacy:*

- A Sociological Study of Inter-Tribal and International Relations* (London: Oxford University Press, 1950); and Harold Nicolson, *The Evolution of Diplomatic Method* (London: Constable, 1954). Watson even tells us that we can trace the early examples of multilateral diplomacy to Ancient India and Greece. Adam Watson, *Diplomacy: The Dialogue between States* (London: Methuen, 1982), 85–8, 91.
17. Wight, *Power Politics*, 113.
 18. Garret Mattingly, *Renaissance Diplomacy* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1955), 60.
 19. Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, 167.
 20. Anderson, *The Rise of Modern Diplomacy*, 5–4.
 21. Mattingly, *Renaissance Diplomacy*, 56–8.
 22. Mattingly, *Renaissance Diplomacy*, 89.
 23. D. E. Queller, *The Office of Ambassador in the Middle Ages* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1967), 82. See also Berridge, *Diplomacy*, 105–6.
 24. Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, 13, 67–71.
 25. Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, 13, 71, 74.
 26. The literature on the historical development and expansion of the European states system is vast. In addition to Bull's *Anarchical Society*, for notable examples, see Hedley Bull and Adam Watson (eds), *The Expansion of International Society* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1984); Gerrit W. Gong, *The Standard of 'Civilization' in International Society* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1984); F. S. Northedge, *The International Political System* (London: Faber & Faber, 1976); Adam Watson, *The Evolution of International Society: A Comparative Historical Analysis* (London: Routledge, 1992); and Martin Wight, *Systems of States* (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1977). The view that the Ottoman Empire became a full member of the European system with the Treaty of Paris is argued by Bull, Gong, Northedge and Wight.
 27. This thesis is associated with Herbert A. Gibbons, *The Foundation of the Ottoman Empire: A History of the Osmanlis, 1300–1403* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1916).
 28. Mehmed Fuat Köprülü, *The Origins of the Ottoman Empire*, trans. and ed. Gary Leiser (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992).
 29. In the Ottoman historiography, the *ghazi* thesis was propounded by Paul Wittek, *The Rise of the Ottoman Empire* (London: Royal Asiatic Society, 1938).
 30. One of the best works on this is Rudi P. Lindner, *Nomads and Ottomans in Medieval Anatolia* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1983).
 31. Norman Itzkowitz, *Ottoman Empire and Islamic Tradition* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1972), 6, 11.
 32. Halil İnalçık, 'The Rise of the Ottoman Empire', in M. A. Cook (ed.), *A History of the Ottoman Empire to 1730* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), 31.
 33. İnalçık, 'The Rise of the Ottoman Empire', 47–8.
 34. For a good summary of these debates, see Abdul Hamid A. Abu Sulayman, *The Islamic Theory of International Relations: New Directions for Islamic Methodology and Thought* (Herndon: International Institute of Islamic Thought, 1987).
 35. For a similar view, see F. Parkinson, *The Philosophy of International Relations: A Study in the History of Thought* (London: Sage Publications, 1977).
 36. See Nasim Sousa, *The Capitulatory Régime of Turkey: Its History, Origin, and Nature* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Press, 1933), 16. Article XVI of the Agreement

read as follows: 'that his lordship of Venice may, if he desires, send to Constantinople a governor (consul), with his suit, according to existing custom, which governor (consul) shall have the privilege of ruling over, governing, and administering justice to the Venetians of every class and condition.' Emphasis added.

37. See Mehmet İpşirli, 'Osmanlı Devletinde "Eman" Sistemi' ('The Aman System in the Ottoman Empire') in İsmail Soysal (ed.), *Çağdaş Türk Diplomasisi: 200 Yıllık Süreç (Contemporary Turkish Diplomacy: The Course of Two Hundred Years)* (Ankara: TTK Basımevi, 1999), 4–5.
38. For these alliances, see Kemal Beydilli, *Osmanlı-Prusya İttifakı: Meydana Geliş-Tahlili-Tatbiki (Alliance between the Ottomans and Prussia: Its Development, Analysis and Implementation)* (Istanbul: Günyay, 1984); and *Büyük Frederik ve Osmanlılar: XVIII. Yüzyılda Osmanlı-Prusya Münasebetleri (Frederick the Great and the Ottomans: Ottoman-Prussian Relations in the Eighteenth Century)* (Istanbul: İstabil Üniversitesi Yayınları, 1985).
39. The argument for the Inner Asian heritage has been suggested by Isenbike Togan, 'Ottoman History by Inner Asian Norms', *Journal of Peasant Studies*, vol. 18, no. 3–4 (1991), 185–210.
40. It was not only the Ottoman Sultans who considered themselves as *Sultan-ı İklım-i Rum*, but also they were called the 'Emperor of Rome' by some contemporary Byzantine historians. G. Trapezuntios said to Mehmed II: 'No doubts that you are the emperor of the Romans. Whoever is legally master of the capital of the Empire is the Emperor and Constantinople is the capital of the Roman Empire.' Quoted in İnalçık, 'The Rise of the Ottoman Empire', 41.
41. Charles Tilly, 'How Empires End', in K. Barkey and M. von Hagen (eds), *After Empire: Multiethnic Societies and Nation-Building, The Soviet Union and the Russian, Ottoman, and Habsburg Empires* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997), 3.
42. Quoted in Geoffrey Lewis, *Turkey*, 3rd edn (London: Ernest Benn, 1965), 24.
43. The full and complete translation of Emperor Qianlong's letter to King George III is supplied in Alain Peyrefitte, *The Collision of Two Civilizations: The British Expedition to China in 1792–4*, trans. Jon Rothschild (London: Harvill, 1993), 288–92.
44. Koçi Bey, *Koçi Bey Risalesi* (Ankara: Kültür ve Turizm Bakanlığı Yayınları, 1985).
45. For the agreements, see J. C. Hurewitz (ed.), *The Middle East and North Africa in World Politics: A Documentary Record*, 2nd edn (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1975), 19–22.
46. Roderic H. Davison, 'The Westernization of the Ottoman Diplomacy in the Nineteenth Century', in Edward Ingram (ed.), *National and International Politics in the Middle East* (London: Frank Cass, 1986).
47. In the view of one student, the Ottoman Empire became a nation-state only with the government of the Committee for Union and Progress in the early twentieth century. See Caglar Keyder, 'The Ottoman Empire', in Barkey and von Hagen, *After Empire*.
48. Şaban H. Çalış, *Hayalet Bilimi ve Hayali Kimlikler: Neo-Osmanlılık, Özal ve Balkanlar (Hauntology and Imagined Identities: Neo-Ottomanism, Ozal and the Balkans)* (Konya: Çizgi Kitabevi, 2001), 40.
49. Anderson, *The Rise of Modern Diplomacy*, 30; and Mattingly, *Renaissance Diplomacy*, 136–7.

50. See H. İnalçık, 'The Turkish Impact on the Development of Modern Europe', in K. H. Karpat (ed.), *The Ottoman State and Its Place in World History* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1974), 51–2; Naff, 'The Ottoman Empire and the European States System', 145–6; and Adam Watson, 'European International Society and Its Expansion', in Bull and Watson (eds), *The Expansion of International Society*, 16–17.
51. Dehio, *The Precarious Balance: Four Centuries of the European Power Struggle* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1962), 40–1.
52. İnalçık, 'The Turkish Impact on the Development of Modern Europe', 52–3; Mattingly, *Renaissance Diplomacy*, 169–70; Naff, 'The Ottoman Empire and the European States System', 216; and Watson, *The Evolution of International Society*, 177–8, 216.
53. İnalçık, 'The Turkish Impact on the Development of Modern Europe', 56–7; H. İnalçık, *The Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 188, 366; H. İnalçık, 'İmtiyazat', *Encyclopedia of Islam*, 2nd edn (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1971), 1179; and Sousa, *The Capitulatory Regime of Turkey*, 16.
54. Maxime Rodinson, *Europe and the Mystique of Islam* (London: I. B. Tauris, 1987), 34–5.
55. H. Butterfield, 'The Balance of Power', in H. Butterfield and M. Wight (eds), *Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory of International Politics* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1966), 143; and R. H. Davidson, 'Ottoman Diplomacy and Its Legacy', in L. Carl Brown (ed.), *Imperial Legacy: The Ottoman Imprint on the Balkans and the Middle East* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 175.
56. Mattingly, *Renaissance Diplomacy*, 206. According to Maggi, in addition to Turkish, an ambassador should speak Latin, Greek, Italian, French, Spanish and German. English was not required.
57. Dorothy M. Vaughan, *Europe and the Turk: A Pattern of Alliances, 1350–1700* (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1954); and Daniel Goffman, *The Ottoman Empire and Early Modern Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 18, 20, 224.
58. I have discussed the Afro-Eurasian international system elsewhere. See my *International Relations and the Philosophy of History: A Civilizational Approach* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003).
59. Naff, 'The Ottoman Empire and the European States System', 143. Emphases added.
60. Goffman, *The Ottoman Empire . . .*, 186.
61. Goffman, *The Ottoman Empire . . .*, 187.
62. See Andreas Osiander, 'Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Westphalian Myth', *International Organization*, vol. 55, no. 2 (Spring 2001), 251–87.
63. Anderson, *The Rise of Modern Diplomacy*, 11, 80–96, 119–28.
64. Mattingly, *Renaissance Diplomacy*, 60.
65. Mattingly, *Renaissance Diplomacy*, 99.
66. Anderson, *The Rise of Modern Diplomacy*, 9; and Mattingly, *Renaissance Diplomacy*, 91.
67. Philip Mansell, *Constantinople: City of the World's Desire, 1453–1924* (London: John Murray, 1995), 193.

68. W. H. McNeill, 'The Changing Shape of World History', *History and Theory*, Theme Issue 34, *World Historians and Their Critics*, vol. 34, no. 2 (1995), 17. Emphases added.
69. For the text, see Hurewitz, *The Middle East and North Africa in World Politics*, 1–5.
70. Mattingly, *Renaissance Diplomacy*, 33.
71. Faik Reşit Unat, *Osmanlı Sefirleri ve Sefaretnameleri (Ottoman Ambassadors and Their Sefaretnames)*, ed. Bekir Sıtkı Baykal, 3rd edn (Ankara: TTK Basımevi, 1992), 14–16.
72. Mansell, *Constantinople*, 190–1, 194.
73. Harold Nicolson, *The Evolution of Diplomatic Method*, 34–5.
74. I. H. Danişmend, *İzahlı Osmanlı Tarihi Kronolojisi (Annotated Chronology of Ottoman History)* (Istanbul: Türkiye Yayınevi, 1971), VI, 43. On the imprisonment of the ambassadors in the Seven Towers, see also Berridge, Chapter 5, this volume.
75. Unat, *Osmanlı Sefirleri ve Sefaretnameleri*, 17–19.
76. Unat, *Osmanlı Sefirleri ve Sefaretnameleri*, 24.
77. I have extensively discussed the question of identity and perceptions between Europe and the Turk in my 'Turkey and Europe: The Other in Identity Formation', *Zeitschrift für Türkeistudien*, 13. Jahrgang, Heft 1 (2000), 85–94; and 'Perceptions and Images in Turkish (Ottoman)–European Relations', in Tareq Ismael and Mustafa Aydın (eds), *Turkey's Foreign Policy in the 21st Century: A Changing Role in World Politics* (New York: Ashgate, 2003).

2

Early Ottoman Diplomacy: Ad Hoc Period

Bülent Arı

Throughout many centuries, until the period of overall reform by Selim III, the Ottoman sultans carried out their relations with foreign rulers in the form of ad hoc diplomacy. Although that was the general practice of the Middle Ages, as early as 1454 the Ottoman court had become acquainted with a residential ambassador in Constantinople. The Venetian *bailo* permanently resided in Istanbul to carry out relations with the Ottoman Empire as well as secure the interests of Venetian merchants. Nevertheless, successive Ottoman sultans preferred ad hoc diplomacy, and sent out representatives of various ranks as necessity required. In this study, the reasons for such a preference – Ottoman approach to diplomacy, Islamic influences, Ottoman diplomatic protocol and conduct of diplomacy – will be illuminated by the archives, with selected examples from contemporary sources and chronicles.

Early background

Just as the rules of diplomacy in Europe were framed in accord with the ethical principles of Christianity,¹ early Ottoman diplomacy was mostly shaped by the general principles of Islam. The pillars of Ottoman diplomacy were based on Islamic law, as the Ottomans were becoming a world power throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. From the eighteenth century onwards, however, the relative strength of the Ottoman State greatly decreased vis-à-vis the European powers. As a result, western standards of diplomacy were widely imposed on the Ottomans. By the nineteenth century, the conduct of diplomacy was totally shaped by the major states of Europe. As a result of the Paris Conference in 1856, the Ottomans were considered fit to benefit from the European Public Law of Nations. There was no more unique ‘Ottoman’ diplomacy. The

Concert of Europe had its own diplomatic tradition which was to be accepted by the Ottomans.

In addition to the requirements of 'power relations', the Ottoman state of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries based its relationships with other nations on the general rules of Muslim international law, the basic principles of which are known as *Dâr al-Harb*, *Dâr al-Islam*, *Dâr al-Sulh*, *amân* (safe conduct) and *dhimme* (status given to non-Muslims in a Muslim state). In the period that we are dealing with, Ottoman peace agreements with other nations were considered by the Ottomans to be truces rather than bilateral treaties. Since a continuous status of peace with infidels is not permissible according to classical Islamic principles, it was the usual practice for the Ottomans to conclude a temporary truce of ten, twenty and even thirty years.

It has been assumed that the Ottoman Empire was only concerned with waging *jihad* and conquest, and consequently the importance of Ottoman diplomacy in the arena of international relations has been underestimated. The lack of Ottoman residential ambassadors at the major European capitals until the late eighteenth century has been cited as proof of Ottoman negligence in the realm of diplomacy. However, it is more accurate to characterize Ottoman practice as a synthesis of abstract Islamic principles with Ottoman Realpolitik. In other words, the Ottomans created their own method of diplomacy while respecting the pillars of Islam.

The Ottomans were the only medieval Muslim nation to have had close contacts with the European powers, both peaceful and belligerent. Since their foundation of a small principality, the Ottomans were surrounded by Muslim and non-Muslim rivals. Beginning with the early conquests in the Balkans, they were confronted with Crusader attacks. Prevention of Christian alliances led by the Pope was a constant concern for the Ottoman statesmen. For this reason they could not ignore the power-balance system, and diplomacy was an essential instrument in carrying out its relations with European nations. Even at the zenith of Ottoman military power during Suleiman the Magnificent's reign, the Sublime Porte did not only rely on sheer force, but also looked for allies among the Christian world and played one country off against another.

The Ottomans played an important role in the European balance of power throughout the sixteenth century by virtue of their military strength, which they employed in order to control the Mediterranean trade. The only way for European powers to facilitate their merchants' activities in Ottoman territories was through obtaining an *ahdnâme*,² that is capitulations, from the Sultan. The Porte deliberately granted

ahdnâmes to establish friendly relations with countries which were deemed politically and strategically advantageous. In order to prevent economic dependence on the Venetians, Mehmed II encouraged their rivals, Florence and Dubrovnik, to undertake commerce in Ottoman territories. Likewise, capitulations were granted to France on the eve of the Ottoman attempt to seize the island of Cyprus in 1569, to Britain in 1580 and to the Dutch in 1612 after the Lepanto disaster of 1571 when the Venetian–Spanish–Papal coalition endangered vital Ottoman interests in the Mediterranean. The Protestant northerners were not chosen by chance. Engagement with them was an important strategic decision. British and Dutch naval supremacy was an important factor in this preference. Venetian galleys in the Mediterranean were easy targets for the English *bretonis*, which were heavily armed with bronze and iron guns.³ The magnitude of the English ambassador Edward Barton's ship amazed the contemporaries in Istanbul.⁴ The Venetian *bailo* in Istanbul, Giovanni Francesco Moresini, wrote⁵ to the Doge and Senate in March 1584 and expressed his discontent about the arrival of English ships to the Levant: 'The Englishman had more guns than goods, which proved that her real object was to go pirating on her way home.' According to the dispatch⁶ of Antoino Foscarini, the Venetian *bailo* in England: 'There is not either in England or in Holland a berton so small that she could not out-fight the biggest Venetian.'

Through relationships with England and the Dutch Republic, the Ottomans were able to break up the embargo, imposed by the Pope, on the strategic war materials of lead, tin, cannon balls and gunpowder.

The extent of Ottoman involvement in European politics can be illustrated by the fact that the Italian city-states would threaten to call on the Ottomans against their enemies when in dire straits. In 1525 the French followed the same strategy when François I was defeated and imprisoned in Spain by Charles V. His mother could apply to no sovereign at that time other than Suleiman the Magnificent to rescue his son. The Ottomans took this opportunity to conquer Hungary in 1526.⁷ Only after the military pressure of the Ottoman armies was François I able to return his throne.⁸ The support of Protestants such as the Calvinists in the same period was one of the fundamental principles of Ottoman policy in Europe.⁹ In this way the Ottomans greatly influenced the balance of power in Europe which in turn affected the rise of the nation-states in the west. The Ottoman state played a crucial role in the shaping of the European political map in the sixteenth, and partially in the seventeenth, century. Without Ottoman influence, the European map, undoubtedly, would be different.

Nevertheless, it was not so easy to make contact with the Ottoman government in those times. Let alone an alliance, even diplomatic correspondence with the Sultan was not acceptable within the Christian world. In the early sixteenth century Papal fanaticism was so influential that François I could not send a written letter with his envoy to Sultan Suleiman the Magnificent. The French envoy could only transmit oral information from his king to the Sultan in 1525.¹⁰

The Ottoman diplomatic efforts at breaking Catholic fanaticism were always fruitful. For instance, the Venetians joined the Spanish–Papal coalitions against the Turks only when their own imperial territories and trade privileges were under direct attack, and whenever the Turks showed willingness to renew peaceable relations, the Venetians were eager – treacherously eager from a crusading Christian point of view – to make peace and reopen trade with the Levant.¹¹ Observing the quick recovery of the Ottoman navy after the significant damage inflicted upon the Ottomans at Lepanto in 1571, Venice had dropped out of the Holy League, and concluded a truce with the Ottomans in 1573. The conditions of the peace treaty were so favourable that contemporaries said, as Charrière noted, ‘it would seem that the Turks had won the battle of Lepanto’.¹² The disagreement between Venice and the Pope on relations with the Ottoman state was clearly indicated by the report of the Venetian *bailo*, dated 27 December, to Ottavio Bon in Constantinople. He explains to Lieutenant Grand Vizier ‘the reason for the quarrel between Venice and the Pope is the determination of the Republic not to break with the Grand Turk’.¹³

After the conquest of Constantinople, when Ottoman supremacy began to be felt in Europe, they were proud of accepting western residential ambassadors. But at the same time the Ottomans declined to follow the same path. The Venetian *bailo* Bartelemi Marcello in 1454 was followed by the residential ambassador of France Jean de la Forêt (1535), of England William Harborne (1583) and of the Netherlands Cornelis Haga (1612) at the Porte. However, there was severe competition among the first residential ambassadors in Istanbul to prevent newcomers. When the first capitulations were granted to England and William Harborne was recognized as the residential representative of English merchants in the Ottoman territories, the Venetian *bailo* and the French ambassador in Istanbul allied to prevent his accreditation by the Sultan. The Venetian Senate instructed the *bailo* in Istanbul on May 1583 to cooperate with the French ambassador on this case:

As regards the arrival of that English ship, and the operation of the French ambassador to disturb the negotiations; in view of the

damage to us which English trade in those parts would produce, we charge you, as we charged your predecessor, to co-operate with the French ambassador in upsetting the negotiations.¹⁴

Cornelis Haga was faced with the same fate in 1612. The trio of ambassadors from Venice, France and England obstructed the first Dutch ambassador then in Istanbul. They went even further and did not hesitate to resort to bribery. According to the dispatch of Christoforo Valier, the Venetian *bailo* in Istanbul:

The [Dutch] Ambassador encountered the greatest opposition from the French envoy, who went the length of offering ten thousand sequins to upset the negotiations and although the English Ambassador was displeased at seeing the successful issue of the affair, at first he took no steps; however, when it far advanced he endeavoured to join with France, and on his side also offered to spend a similar sum for that same purpose.¹⁵

Despite these early examples, the Ottoman state waited until 1793 to send its first residential diplomatic mission to a foreign country.

The Islamic basis of Ottoman diplomacy

The basis of international relations with non-Muslims, the conditions of war, peace and truce, is clearly set out in the Holy Qur'an:

If ye gain the mastery over them in war, disperse, with them, those who follow them, that they may remember. If thou fearest treachery from any group, throw back (their covenant) to them, (so as to be) on equal terms: for God loveth not the treacherous.¹⁶ But if the enemy inclines towards peace, do thou (also) incline towards peace, and trust in God: for He is the One that heareth and knoweth (all things).¹⁷ But if they violate their oaths after their covenant, and taunt you for your Faith, fight ye the chiefs of unfaith: for their oaths are nothing to them: that thus they may be restrained.¹⁸

Ottoman diplomatic and administrative practice also observed the following Islamic territorial classifications:

- **Dâr al-Islam** – Islamic territories where the *Shari'a* is enforced and the residing non-Muslims, *dhimmi's*, were required to pay *jizya*, that is the poll tax, annually;

- **Dâr al-harb** – territories ruled by non-Muslims, open to *jihād* and conquest;
- **Dâr al-sulh** – Ottoman vassal principalities and other tribute-paying administrations.

Beside these territorial divisions, *amân* was also granted to certain nations in the form of capitulations, that is *ahdnâme*, so that merchants of a capitulatory nation could move freely within the Ottoman dominions with the status of *musta'min* for a term of one year without paying *jizya*. In practice, freedom of commercial activity in Ottoman lands was extended to the merchants of non-capitulatory nations as long as they sailed under a capitulatory nation's flag and paid *cottimo* (*elçilik ve konsolosluk hakkı*), the consulate fee, to the relevant consul.

The ad hoc nature of diplomacy

Capitulations

Although most of the Ottoman capitulations became permanent in practice, until the mid-eighteenth century they were technically and legally temporary instruments unilaterally granted by the existing Sultan and needed to be renewed by each incoming Sultan. A noteworthy Ottoman practice regarding the early capitulations was the treatment of resident ambassadors and consuls as the representatives of the merchants within the Ottoman dominions rather than as representatives of the country itself. Indeed, the English ambassadors in this early period were paid by the Levant Company.¹⁹ The consuls and the dragomans could carry out their activities with a diploma, *berat*, issued by the Sultan. The grant of a *berat* was a prerequisite for all positions in the Ottoman bureaucracy that describe the authority and responsibilities. The issuance of a *berat* meant the Sultan accredited him. Furthermore, the Porte never allowed any member of the capitulatory nations to establish fortified cities or regions such as the Genoese fortresses of Caffa and Pera which were permitted during Byzantine times. Together with the granting of immediate capitulations after the fall of Constantinople, Mehmed II had the walls surrounding the Genoese colony of Pera demolished.

The conquest of Constantinople ushered in a new conception of the Ottoman state. Mehmed II declared himself heir to the East Roman Empire and undertook the institutionalization of the state in all respects. The continuous rise of Ottoman power inevitably affected diplomatic relations with other nations. Until the late seventeenth century, the Ottomans did not recognize the European rulers as their equals.

For a long time European rulers were treated only as equivalent to the Ottoman Grand Vizier. Not until the peace treaty of Zsitva-Török in 1606 was the ruler of Austria recognized by the Porte as having the status of emperor (*Nemçe Châsârî*). Likewise, the Russian tsars were not recognized as emperors until 1740. All of these truces were unilateral documents, issued by the Sultan, and included his oath before God. Thus the Ottoman sultans considered themselves responsible only to God for the keeping of their oaths. The practice of unilateral agreements came to an end with the Treaty of Karlowitz in 1699 when, for the first time, the Ottoman Sultan acknowledged a multilateral document to sustain a peace treaty.²⁰

A diplomacy characterized by the recruitment of career diplomats, an emphasis on the acquisition of local language and an elaborate hierarchy became, by the end of the eighteenth century, an inseparable part of European foreign policy. In the Ottoman Empire, relations with other nations were still governed by Islamic principles. As mentioned above, rather than being trapped by inflexibility, the Ottomans followed Muslim jurists who elaborated a series of interpretations which allowed for temporary truces and a system of safe conduct to facilitate relations with Europe.²¹

The modern practice of international rights and immunities was clearly observed by the Ottomans. All kinds of safe conduct were provided to merchants travelling by both sea and land. Since the danger of corsair activities was so great in the Mediterranean, merchant ships, their crews and the merchants of any capitulatory country were protected from piracy and slavery. Full safe conduct was also given in the Ottoman territories to such an extent that foreign merchants were allowed to wear Muslim clothes and even to carry arms (which was prohibited for Ottoman subjects under normal circumstances) during their travels through the countryside to protect them from banditry.²² The Ottoman Sultan, in return, expected similar respect for the Ottoman merchants. When the Ottoman merchants were detained in Venice during the siege of Cyprus and battle of Lepanto in 1571, Venetian merchants, in reciprocity, were not allowed to leave Istanbul. An imperial *firman* was sent to the Venetian *bailo* in Istanbul to inform him that the Venetian merchants would be unable to leave the city unless the Ottoman merchants were released.²³

The Ottoman government acknowledged the legal superiority of the capitulations, and in case of conflict, *firmans* were sent by the Sultan to the local authorities. The resident ambassadors in Istanbul, the consuls and the dragomans were equipped with diplomatic and commercial

immunities in the modern sense except the state of war. The Venetian *bailos* in Istanbul were held under custody many times in the Seven Towers when the Ottoman Empire was at war with Venice.²⁴ As soon as the long war of 1463–79 erupted, Venetian *bailo* Paolo Barbarigo was put into prison, but was released earlier in the year through the mediation of Mahmud Pasha.²⁵ In another case, in 1730 an Iranian diplomatic delegation was in Istanbul for peace talks. They stayed for about seven months. Meanwhile it was learned that Iranian troops had captured Erivan (Yerevan). The Ottoman authorities were convinced that the Iranian delegation had distracted the Ottoman government. They were soon imprisoned at the castle of Mardin. Since Ahmed III was dethroned as a result of the Patrona Halil rebellion and Mahmud I had ascended the Ottoman throne, the Iranian Shah conveyed another envoy named Veli Kulu to congratulate the new Sultan. He was also imprisoned at Bozcaada without passing through Istanbul.²⁶

Consuls and dragomans were exempt from customs duties. However, the foreign representatives abused the status of dragomans and issued certificates (*berats*) to irrelevant people in return for money. The Sultan, in the end, issued a *firman* in 1787 to regulate their status and limited the number of dragomans.²⁷ An inspection in Aleppo revealed 1500 'dragomans' employed in the city.²⁸ The Sultans also issued *firman*s prohibiting the appointment of consuls from among Ottoman subjects who were trying to escape taxes by acquiring this status.²⁹

Likewise, extraterritorial rights were granted in lawsuits between the members of a capitulatory nation unless an Ottoman subject was involved. Cases exceeding the amount of four thousand *akças* were to be heard in the Imperial Chancery at the capital to prevent local abuse. Guarantees were also given that the legacy of a dead merchant should be returned either to his company or to his embassy. In conclusion, principles of international general and private law were mentioned in the capitulations in detail.

The Ottoman approach to diplomacy

Ottoman conduct of international relations in the absence of a fixed diplomacy was generally attributed to its negligence of diplomatic means, its principles and its universally accepted rules. Moreover, many authors are inclined to describe the system of ad hoc diplomacy as a natural aspect of Islamic beliefs which prohibited peaceful relations with non-Muslims. Although the Ottoman state system observed basic Islamic principles in many respects, it also combined them with pre-Islamic

Turkish traditions and often followed a practical path without adhering strictly to religious law. Being an expansive empire, accommodating both three religions and many nations within her vast territories, it is hardly to be expected that the Ottoman state would run the state machinery along strict lines. It is true that the Sultans always sought the approval of the *Shaikh al-Islam* prior to the ratification of any international document, but at the same time the Sultans never hesitated to recruit Ottoman subjects of Christian and Jewish origin.

It is also true that as late as 1798 Ottoman religious scholars were involved in diplomatic affairs. When Napoleon occupied Egypt – then an Ottoman territory – and the dispute was to be discussed with the Russian embassy in Istanbul, Sultan Selim III required to be accompanied by a scholar in the discussions for consultation.³⁰

When the recognition of the status of Napoleon as an emperor and the attitude of the European powers towards his policies were under discussion with the Russian ambassador, the subject of a declaration of war came to the table. The Ottoman foreign minister, Reisülküttab, apprised the Russian ambassador that a declaration of war strictly necessitated a *fetva*, the approval of *şeyhülislam*. This would only be possible, he went on, on the conditions that religious law, that is *Sharia*, had been violated, the state threatened and the dispute could not be settled by peaceful means.³¹

The establishment of continuous diplomatic representation in Istanbul by the maritime states of the French, English and Dutch was basically prompted by commercial ambitions in the Ottoman market. The Ottomans approached these three powers because of their potential naval superiority against the Spanish and Venetian armadas. As indicated by Hurewitz,³² when the Ottoman state was at its zenith, the Sultans were under no pressure to abandon a system that produced results. As an acknowledgement of her superiority, the Ottoman government conducted a unilateral system of diplomacy with the European states. Sending an ambassador to a foreign country, particularly to the enemy, was considered a sign of inferiority. Until the long-lasting Austrian wars of 1593–1606, no Ottoman ambassador was sent to Vienna, since the status of the Austrian Emperor was not equal to that of the Ottoman Sultan.³³ Indeed, diplomatic non-reciprocity constituted a source of strength not weakness. Negotiations were conducted strictly on Ottoman terms. The Sultan's plenipotentiaries could take immediate decisions while their European counterparts were obliged to await instructions from their sovereigns. Besides, the dragomans of the Sublime Porte and of the European diplomatic missions came from the Greek Phanariote families, who were also

subjects of the Sultan and thus could not fully represent the interests of the European governments which employed them. Strangely enough, the Ottoman government itself suffered much from the treason of those Greek interpreters in the early nineteenth century, which resulted in the execution of three dragomans of Greek origin and the establishment of a Chamber of Interpretation at the Porte in 1821.³⁴

Collection of information

The utilization of ad hoc diplomacy by the sultans did not mean that the Ottoman court was unaware of European political developments. From the very beginning, potential Crusader attacks always kept the Ottoman army on the alert. The sultans established a well-run espionage system that provided a continuous flow of information from all over Europe. Hans Derscham, the secretary of Austrian envoy Ogier Ghiselin de Busbecq to Sultan Suleiman in 1555, is clearly complaining about this situation in his memoirs: 'The Jews have information whatever happens in the Christian world. They travel all the countries and pick secret information. Because of this, they are the traitors and spies that the Turks use against Christianity.'³⁵ Mehmed the Conqueror also paid great attention to intelligence. According to a diplomatic dispatch: 'Mahomet Bey told the Venetians that the Sultan [Mehmet II] maintained two spies in Venice, whom he paid 4,000 ducats each, annually, and informed him of all the secrets of the city. According to Mahomet Bey, "the Venetians could not even clean their teeth without the spies informing immediately the Sultan".'³⁶

The princes of Wallachia, Moldavia and Dubrovnik regularly conveyed information about military and political developments in Europe, which they obtained through merchants, who travelled all around the continent.³⁷ From the documents available in the Ottoman archives, we learn that any kind of military preparations by the enemy was reported to the Ottoman court. Sometimes the commanders of the frontier fortresses sent their own spies to pick up information about the enemy.³⁸ The interpreters of the Imperial Chancery also transferred valuable information to the Sultans which they had obtained from foreign missions at the Porte.³⁹ Through the reports from Ragusa, the Ottomans monitored Venetian and Spanish shipping in the Mediterranean.⁴⁰ The Crimea was also a source of information about Russia. Clearly, the Ottoman government had established a network of information to compensate for the lack of residential ambassadors at the major European capitals. It can be observed from the existing documents available in Ottoman archives

that there was a continuous flow of information from the above-mentioned sources.

To obtain information about the exact military capacity of the enemy, Ottoman authorities sometimes resorted to diplomatic tricks. During the 16-year long Ottoman–Venetian wars (1463–79), one of the diplomatic practices employed by Grand Vizier Mahmud Pasha was to sound out the enemy’s peace proposals, without actually having any intention of concluding peace but with the sole purpose of finding out whether the Venetians were willing to fight and their readiness for concessions.⁴¹

Diplomatic protocol in the Ottoman court

The Ottoman court gave utmost priority to the ceremonial magnificence attending both Ottoman diplomatic delegations sent abroad, and the reception of foreign delegations by the Sultans. The Ottoman government paid all the expenditures of foreign envoys in the Ottoman territories. For this purpose a special fund of one million *akças* was allocated in the budget.⁴² The audience for foreign envoys coincided with payment day (*ulûfe günü*) of the janissaries at the Topkapi Palace. Envoys were welcomed at the outer gate of the Topkapi Palace by the master of horses, *mirahur*, together with dozens of gold and silver equipped horses. The envoy was first met by the Grand Vizier at the Imperial Chancery after the colourful ceremony of the quarterly payment to the janissaries, who numbered over ten thousand. He was then received by the Sultan in person with a splendid ceremony and exchange of expressions of goodwill.⁴³ The rank of the envoy was considered to reflect the importance given both to his mission and to the Sultan. During the Ottoman–Iranian wars, the Iranian Shah had sent Hızır Beg to request a truce vis-à-vis the Ottoman military advance in 1635. Since he was of a lower rank, Sultan Murad IV did not hold the envoy in esteem and declined to write an imperial letter to the Shah of Iran. The Ottoman Grand Vizier only wrote a letter to the Iranian Vizier Rustem.⁴⁴

The envoy then presented a royal letter of friendship and gifts to the Sultan. Envoys without a royal letter were not accepted by the Sultan at court. The importance of the letter of goodwill and promise of friendship was also clearly emphasized in the introductory part of all granted and renewed capitulations. The Ottoman Sultans expected the expression of an intention to sustain friendly relations from their counterparts.⁴⁵ The foreign representatives might never privately see the Sultan again. In short, the first steps of the Ottoman government to establish a peaceful

relationship with a non-Muslim country conformed completely to the Islamic principle of *amân*.

Other than ad hoc envoys, there were resident representatives of certain countries. Venice, Genoa and France were the earliest states to establish diplomatic missions at the Porte. Despite the fact that these residents were sent by their own sovereigns, for a long time the Sublime Porte considered them as the representatives of their merchants in the Ottoman territories. Dependent principalities such as the Crimean khan, the principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia as well as major Ottoman viceroys had a special man, called *kapı kethüdası*, at the Porte to carry out their bureaucratic affairs.

The most favoured nation clause was somewhat obscure in Ottoman practice. The most favoured nation at the Porte could only be tacitly understood. The rank of the ambassadors before the Ottoman government changed from time to time as the influential viziers inclined from one state to another. In this respect, the personality of the ambassadors also played a great role. A general capitulation was granted to England in 1583, while the French ambassador had lost his previous prestige. The same attitude can be observed when the Dutch ambassador Cornelis Haga gained prestige through the favour of Admiral Halil Pasha in 1612.⁴⁶ However, diplomatic protocol always caused friction among the *corps diplomatique* in Istanbul.⁴⁷ One such instance was the claim of precedence between the French and English. The French ambassador De Germiny had to leave Istanbul in 1584 because of his disfavour at the Porte. The English ambassador sent his secretary to welcome the new French ambassador De Lancome. When the secretary began 'My master the ambassador . . .', De Lancome said: 'Your master is a merchant. I know only one ambassador at the Porte, and that is myself.'⁴⁸ De Lancome went so far as to officially request the expulsion of the English ambassador at his audience with the Grand Vizier. In 1612, as soon as the Dutch ambassador had arrived, a new conflict arose in Istanbul for precedence. English ambassador Paul Pindar criticized the attitude of Haga for his immediate claim on his place at the protocol:

The Fleming standes in defence of his and chalengeth place before the Venice bailo; verrie ignorantly in my opynion, because the state of Venice hath kingdoms in domynion, butt the states of the Low countreyes have nott yet found out the qualitie of their tenure . . .⁴⁹

According to historian Selaniki Mustafa Effendi, representatives of Wallachia, Moldavia, Dubrovnik and Venice were not given a banquet

at the court, since they were considered to be of a lower rank at the Porte. With the truce signed in 1573 after the battle of Lepanto, the *bailo* of Venice was given the privilege of having a banquet on the condition that he would contribute a thousand gold pieces for the expenses.⁵⁰

Ottoman envoys

The economic and commercial structure of the Ottoman Empire did not necessitate the establishment of residential diplomatic missions at the major capitals of Europe. Furthermore, as mentioned above, the lack of such missions did not deprive the Ottoman court of information about military and political developments in Europe. For these reasons, the sultans conveyed temporary envoys, extraordinary and plenipotentiary, only for the purposes of:

- informing or greeting accessions to the throne;
- delivering ratified peace agreements (*ratificatio*);
- conveying Sultans' letters (*credential*);
- peace talks and discussion of truces;
- frontier demarcations;
- reciprocating a foreign envoy;
- the establishment or continuance of peaceful and friendly relations.

Envoys sent on routine missions involving the transfer of imperial letters were called *nameres*.⁵¹ When an Ottoman diplomat was assigned for frontier demarcations after a peace treaty, a scholar, called *hudud mollası*, also accompanied him to register the bilateral agreement on exact frontier line.⁵²

The Ottoman court placed great importance on diplomatic protocol. Because of this, the envoys were expected to reflect the superiority and magnificence of the Ottoman state in all respects. There was no special class of professional diplomat during the ad hoc period. Envoys were generally chosen from among the prominent members of the Ottoman Chancery of noble background. Personality was also an important factor in the selection of the envoys.⁵³ The sultans distinguished envoys according to destination, the nature of the mission and the importance of the receiving country. Knowledge of a foreign language was a determinant factor in selection and the sultans did not hesitate to send even their non-Muslim subjects.⁵⁴

When the backgrounds of the envoys with a specific mission during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries are examined, it is clear that

almost all of them had occupied important positions in the Ottoman bureaucracy. They usually were either a senior official or an experienced member of the Imperial Chancery. Many of them had occupied lower positions in previous Ottoman delegations.⁵⁵ Naturally, during their long years of service, competence in the job and loyalty to the Sultan were confirmed in the bureaucratic hierarchy.

Preparations for an envoy

The court was sensitive even about the smallest details of an Ottoman foreign mission. Preparations were made long before an envoy departed from the capital. He was first granted a title of a senior position in conformity with the importance of his mission. Generally, the titles of *Defterdar* (Exchequer) or *Nishancı* were given to the envoys and *Beglerbegi* (Governor General) to ambassadors.⁵⁶ When the rank of the Austrian representative was learned to be merely that of an envoy, the rank of the Ottoman ambassador, Ebubekir Ratib Effendi, was also reduced to the same level and the gifts he was carrying were returned from Adrianople in 1791.⁵⁷ The Iranian ambassador to Istanbul in 1737, Abdülbaki Han, on the other hand, insisted on the Ottoman counter-envoy being that of the rank of a vizier. After long discussions, although contrary to the Ottoman practice, his wish was granted.⁵⁸

The typical Ottoman delegation consisted of hundreds of individuals, and preparations often took months. İbrahim Pasha, who went to Vienna after the Treaty of Passarowitz in 1718, was accompanied by 763 people, while Cânibî Ali Pasha who went after the treaty of Belgrade in 1739 was accompanied by 922 people.⁵⁹ Iranian delegations were no smaller. The envoy of Shah Abbas, Zulfikar Khan, came to Istanbul in 1597 with a company of a thousand people.⁶⁰

An envoy was supplied with all kinds of logistical support before his departure. The Porte provided the envoy with the necessary funds to pay for equipping the delegation and covering the costs of transportation: the horses, the rental of ships and so on.⁶¹ *Firmans*, that is decrees from the Sultan, were conveyed to the local authorities within the Ottoman territories to provide for the envoy's needs both in cash and in kind, which were met through local tax funds. It was usual Ottoman practice that the taxes of certain localities were ordered to be paid on site.⁶² The wages of the envoy and of the delegation, the costs of the horses and the rental of vessels were all provided from the relevant sources. Despite all the detailed needs that were taken into consideration, it appears that envoys sometimes covered additional expenditures from their own pockets. For example, it was reported that an envoy to

Russia, Abdulkerim Pasha, went into debt of five thousand *guruş* on official business and petitioned the Sultan to be refunded for this amount.⁶³ Much of the equipment was temporarily entrusted to the envoy with the expectation that it be returned to the Porte intact.⁶⁴ Certain provisions such as ceremonial jewelled weapons, ceremonial robes and other trappings of protocol were carefully recorded and with the return of the delegation they were stored away until needed again. According to Faik Reşit Unat, around the mid-eighteenth century a special treasury for diplomatic missions, called *elçi hazînesi*, was formed which was separate from the main treasury.⁶⁵

The gifts to be presented by the Ottoman envoy were also carefully chosen. Clothes embroidered with precious metals, valuable dishes, horse equipment, decorative household items, weapons, furs, jewellery and even elephants,⁶⁶ all worth considerable sums, were conveyed by the envoys.⁶⁷ The Ottoman sultans themselves expected to be presented with valuable gifts by foreign envoys. Traditionally, the foreign envoys should bring considerable souvenirs to the senior authorities as well. Viziers, the grand admiral and the chief of the janissary corps should especially not be forgotten. Up to the beginning of the long-lasting Ottoman–Austrian War (1593–1606), the Austrian Emperor was to deliver thirty thousand ducats of gold annually through his envoy. He should also send presents consisting of silver goods and clocks. On the way from Vienna to Istanbul, the envoy was to give presents to the Viceroy, the Accountant and the Commander of the Janissary Corps of Budha. In Istanbul, the Grand Vizier was also at the first rank that should be given a present.⁶⁸

Envoys from Iran and other Muslim countries used to bring jewellery, silk carpets, embroidered tents, valuable cloths, swords and daggers inlaid with jewels. The favourite presents of European ambassadors were woollen fabrics, clocks and luxurious utilities made of gold and silver. Among the long list of presents from States General to the Sultan, conveyed by the first Dutch ambassador at the Porte, Cornelis Haga, in 1612, there were also strategic naval maps, which were very valuable for Ottoman navigation.⁶⁹

The estimated amount of the delegation's travel expenses was first reported to the Sultan and, after his approval, the sum was handed over to the envoy.⁷⁰ The allowances of Ahmed Resmî Effendi, Ottoman envoy to Prussia in 1763, were reported by the government to be equal to those paid to Hattî Mustafa Effendi, who was sent to Austria in 1748.⁷¹ When all preparations were complete, the envoy was received by the Sultan in person. The Sultan would present the envoy with instructions, a robe of honour and the imperial letter to be conveyed to the foreign

ruler. Soon the envoy would start his mission by summoning his entourage and arranging a ceremonial departure. The route followed by Ottoman envoys to each country was, with some exceptions, almost traditional. Journeys to destinations other than to France were generally made over land. When another state sent a counter-envoy, both he and the Ottoman envoy met at a common frontier. Sometimes disagreement over the route to be taken by envoys and the location of exchange caused diplomatic crises. An example of such a case was the mission of the Ottoman envoy to Russia, Mehmed Emni Pasha. When he set out to meet the Russian envoy, he passed directly into Russian territories through the city of Bender, crossing the Dnieper, whereas the Russian envoy insisted on taking the route via Kiev, passing through Polish lands. Since both ambassadors had set off on their journeys without agreement, a compromise could only be reached after a long series of intensive communications causing considerable delay.⁷²

The meeting of the envoys at the frontier constituted a major diplomatic event accompanied by magnificent ceremony. The exchange ceremony between the Ottoman ambassador Ibrahim Pasha and the Austrian ambassador Graf Virmondts in 1719 was realized with the participation of fifteen thousand troops from each side.⁷³ Each party assigned an officer for the exchange.⁷⁴ At the border, an Ottoman officer was responsible for obtaining a document from the other side citing that the envoy had been delivered, signed by the counter-authorities.⁷⁵ The document was returned when the Ottoman envoy was back from his mission. An Ottoman court official, called *mihmandar*, accompanied the counter-envoy along the road to Istanbul.

When the ceremony of exchange was conducted on land, three stones were erected on the borderline and the ambassadors were brought by their entourages between these stones. Traditionally, the moment of border crossing was celebrated by the shooting of guns by the troops. When a river constituted the frontier, the meetings were more elaborate. The welcome ceremony was held on a raft, located in the middle of the river. Since the Dnieper was the borderline between Russia and the Ottoman Empire, the ambassadors would board the raft, which was located in the middle of the river, near the city of Bender. Following the ceremony on the raft, the two ambassadors would proceed on their separate journeys. The welcoming ceremony in Vienna in 1757 for the Ottoman envoy Ahmed Resmî Effendi was carried out with difficulty, since the Sava River had frozen in the dead of winter. The ice had to be broken before the ceremonial raft could be floated on the river.⁷⁶

Ottoman envoys at the foreign courts

Once over the border, according to the records of the ambassadors (*sefâretnâme*), impressive ceremonies were held at each city through which the Ottoman diplomatic delegation passed on the way to the capital. When Yirmisekiz Çelebi Mehmed Effendi, the Ottoman ambassador to Paris, sailed for Toulon in 1720, the celebrations and the greetings of the nobles in each French city that he passed through greatly surprised him.⁷⁷ Thousands of people gathered along the canal to watch the Ottoman delegation during their trip towards Paris. The commander of Bordeaux, who had never seen an Ottoman until then, pressed the ambassador to visit his castle.⁷⁸ According to the ambassador, thousands of people gathered from all around in order to view his delegation.

The celebrations at the capital, of course, were the most magnificent. The Ottoman delegation could hardly make its way to the palace due to the large numbers of people and the thirty thousand soldiers who filled the streets of Paris. The Parisians showed an extraordinary interest in their Oriental guests⁷⁹ and their insatiable curiosity over the appearance and habits of the Ottoman delegation caused quite a furore in the capital. The wives and the young women of the nobility insisted on viewing the Ottomans as they were dining. The Parisian women came in groups to the Ottoman delegation's residence merely to observe their eating manners, just as if they were at the theatre.⁸⁰

Mehmed Effendi had the opportunity to meet the twelve-year-old French king Louis XIII. Strangely enough, the king's tutor proudly pointed out that the hair on the young king's head was real, not a wig. He even had the king run around in the salon in front of Mehmed Effendi. The ambassador caressed the king's hair and admired his youthful beauty. He also attended a royal hunting party with the king, and an opera which was held at the palace. According to protocol, at the Paris opera, the Ottoman ambassador preceded all other foreign representatives in Paris. This highly ceremonial visit of the Ottoman delegation to France, for the sole purpose of transmitting an imperial letter from the Sultan to the French king, lasted a whole year.

The second siege of Vienna in 1683 and other Ottoman defeats at the hands of the Austrian armies caused Ottoman diplomats to confront unusual situations. Zülfikar Pasha was sent to Vienna to notify Emperor Leopold of the accession of Suleiman II to the throne, and to carry out peace talks as the Ottoman plenipotentiary and extraordinary. The Austrian authorities requested Zülfikar Pasha to bow three times and kiss the emperor's hand at the presentation of the imperial letter. Zülfikar Pasha replied to this suggestion mildly, but behaved as usual before the

emperor at the court. During the discussions, he said that although the Ottoman armies had been victorious for over four centuries, the Ottoman sultans had never acted with conceit. The Austrians should not, therefore, show excessive pride at a few recent battlefield successes and must behave in accordance with the grandeur and power of the Ottoman State.⁸¹ Actually, the envoys were not dispatched from Istanbul to Vienna for a long time since the Austrian emperor was not considered an equal to the Ottoman sultans. The Viceroy of Budha used to send one of his officers to Vienna to demand the annual tribute.

The ceremonies of exchange could be the cause of major conflicts. During their era of military superiority, the Ottomans imposed their own ceremonies on foreign delegations.⁸² The Treaty of Karlowitz in 1699 constituted the turning point in this respect. Besides their territorial losses, the Ottomans began to lose prestige on the diplomatic front as well. When the plenipotentiaries of all participant belligerents claimed equality, an interesting solution was reached to prevent diplomatic conflict in protocol: a round building was constructed in Karlowitz, with many doors allowing each plenipotentiary to enter at the same time.⁸³ The Ottoman–Russian War of 1768–74 and the Treaty of Küçük Kainarja was a turning point in Ottoman–Russian relations. Following the loss of Ottoman military supremacy over the Russians in the late eighteenth century, the Ottomans became subject to Russian diplomatic caprices and humiliations. In accordance with the Küçük Kainarja Peace Treaty of 1774, the Ottomans and the Russians sent ratifications through their ambassadors. In 1775, at the point of exchange, the Russian ambassador, Repnin, requested his chair on the raft to be covered with gold embroidered fabric and to sit on the right-hand side. The discussions on the matter lasted ten days before a settlement was reached.⁸⁴ In 1793, the Russian ambassador, General Kutuzov, rejected the exchange raft and the colours of the chairs on the raft, which once more caused long discussions.⁸⁵ Yet, despite continuous defeats on the battlefield, up to the late eighteenth century the Ottoman state was strong enough to sustain diplomatic equality in Europe.

The ceremonies at the Russian court for the Ottoman delegations were more troublesome. The rise of Russia's military strength was gradually reflected in its treatment of Ottoman diplomacy. Russian caprice reached a point in 1782 at which the Tsarist authorities requested a repetition of the procession for their ambassador in Adrianople of 1740. The Russian request was inspected by the Ottoman government 42 years later.⁸⁶ Ottoman diplomats were faced with a string of Russian humiliations throughout the eighteenth century. The gradual change in Russian

attitudes towards Ottoman envoys and ambassadors can be easily understood by thorough examination of the *sefâretnâmes*. These show that envoys were sent to Russia from the early sixteenth century on but, unfortunately, only the *sefâretnâmes* of the eighteenth-century envoys remain available. However, these records also provide us with valuable information about contemporary Russia.

The first significant *sefâretnâme* regarding Russia was written by the Ottoman envoy Kapıcıbaşlı Mehmed Agha.⁸⁷ He was sent to Peter the Great by Sultan Ahmed III in 1722 to explore the possibility of an alliance against Iran, and to express dissatisfaction about Russian military movements in Caucasia. Along the way he received a warm and respectful welcome at every stop. In Moscow, he expected to receive high dignity in every detail and objected to even minor counter suggestions, claiming that it would mean humiliation to the imperial letter he was carrying. The Russians accepted without resistance all of Mehmed Agha's insistences on diplomatic precedence. During his stay in Moscow, Peter the Great showed the utmost respect to him on many occasions. The Tsar personally came to discuss with the Ottoman envoy the Russian troops' activities in the Caucasus, even demonstrating their movements on a map, and guaranteeing him that they were present only for border security and were not a threat to Ottoman territories.

In contrast to Mehmed Agha's experience, ambassador Mehmed Emnî Pasha, who went on a mission to Russia in 1740, was faced with endless difficulties.⁸⁸ First a conflict arose over where the exchange of ambassadors should take place, and it took six months before this issue was resolved and he could step into Russian soil. The subsequent succession of a new tsar further delayed his mission. The Russians expected the dispatch of a new imperial letter from the Ottoman Sultan to the new tsar, Ivan Antonovich. After Mehmed Emni Pasha finally entered St Petersburg, with a magnificent ceremony in which four thousand soldiers participated, he delivered the *ratificatio* of the Treaty of Belgrade. With this treaty, the title of 'emperor' was acknowledged for the tsars. Unbeknown to the ambassador, however, the newly enthroned Tsar Ivan Antonovich had been removed by a sudden *coup d'état* and the new Tsarina, Elizabeth Petrovna, received him instead. It took two years to complete his mission.

Shehdî Osman Effendi, who was sent to notify the Russian Tsarina of the accession of Osman III to the Ottoman throne, completed one of the most exciting diplomatic missions in 1757⁸⁹ and secured the release of Ottoman prisoners of war. In St Petersburg, he was shocked by the unusual suggestions of the Russian authorities regarding protocol. For example, he was ordered to kneel before the prime minister. Shehdî

Osman Effendi considered this an insult to the honour and dignity of the Ottoman state and refused to do so. As a result, he was not able to secure the release of the Ottoman prisoners of war, but in the meantime three of them obtained refuge with the Ottoman delegation. This enraged the Russian authorities, and the envoy was threatened with punishment if he did not release the 'slaves'. Replying that return of the Ottoman prisoners of war was one of the conditions of the treaty existing between them, Shehdî Osman Effendi nevertheless refused to surrender the prisoners.

Another conflict arose before Osman Effendi was received by the tsarina. The Russian royal dragoman, Constantin, requested amendments in his address to the court, but kept the content of the amendments to himself. Osman Effendi was informed that the text of the requested speech would be delivered to him only if he accepted the Russian changes. Shehdî Osman Effendi rejected this proposal, and consequently the reception by the tsarina was postponed. In the meantime additional conditions were brought to him:

- the envoy must wait for the Russians to accompany him across the river,
- no Ottomans could get on the royal coach but Russian soldiers would stand on both sides;
- at the entrance to the Tsarina's saloon the envoy was expected to make many exaggerated bowings;
- at the reception he would be held by both arms and forced to kiss the ground.

When all of these suggestions had been rejected by Shehdî Osman Effendi on the ground that they were not customary, and when he had reminded them of the practice in 1741 of the reception of Mehmed Emnî Pasha, the authorities indicated that Russia was now more powerful than ever, and the usual practices were no longer appropriate. His request to send a man to Istanbul for instructions under those circumstances was kindly obstructed on various grounds. In the end, the Russians gave up their demands and a moderate solution was found. Osman Effendi was to be accepted by the tsarina, almost three months later, following his arrival in St Petersburg.

The adventures of Osman Effendi continued on his way back to Istanbul. The Russians insistently demanded the return of the Ottoman slaves held by the delegation, and at one stop about a hundred and fifty soldiers attacked the Ottoman delegation to recapture them. Eight

Ottomans beat all the Russians after a deadly fight. The Russian officer in charge was shamed by this result and Shehdî Osman Effendi safely passed into Ottoman territory.

As mentioned above, similar difficulties were encountered by ambassadors Abdülkerim Pasha in 1775 and Mustafa Rasih Pasha in 1793 regarding precedence at the points of exchange on the border. While Abdülkerim Pasha was not faced with unacceptable demands in the capital, Rasih Pasha could not rescue any Ottoman slaves in Russia.⁹⁰ Indeed his continuous requests for release were met with insults and humiliations. In contrast, the Russian ambassador General Kutuzov received a warm welcome in Istanbul.⁹¹

The gradual change in Russian diplomatic attitudes determined the end of the Ottoman period of influence. Russian victories on the battlefield were more heavily felt in the diplomatic sphere towards the end of the eighteenth century. However, according to the *sefâretnâmes*, the Ottoman ambassadors still received warm welcomes in the other European capitals and the Russian style of insults and diplomatic humiliations remained exceptional.

Intensive diplomacy

Another noteworthy Ottoman ad hoc diplomatic experience occurred during the early years of the reign of Sultan Bayezid II. The death of Mehmed II the Conqueror in 1481 gave rise to a struggle between his sons, Bayezid and Djem. After his final defeat at Ankara in 1482, Jem took refuge in Rhodes, relying on the promise of the Knights Hospitallers that he would be transferred to Rumelia to continue the fight against his brother. But he was first kept as a prisoner by the Grand Master, Pierre d'Aubusson, and then by Charles VIII in France, and finally by the Pope, Innocent VIII. The position of Jem as an hostage in the hands of European states gave rise to new developments in relations between western governments and the Ottomans.

Throughout his 13 years in Europe, Jem was the object of unceasing intrigues and negotiations among the Christian rulers. The aim of Ottoman diplomatic efforts was to prevent a crusade and to keep Jem from joining forces with the Christians. To this end, the peace treaty with Venice was confirmed in 1482 in order to achieve the neutralization of the Republic. The Venetian authorities kept the Sultan informed of Jem's movements in Italy and France, and of the progress of the major powers' intentions and plans.⁹² During this period Bayezid II sought particularly active diplomatic relations with all Christian governments suspected of aiding

Jem and the proposed crusade. He also created a spy network to keep himself informed of political developments in various western countries.⁹³

The transfer of Jem from France to Rome in 1489 caused alarm in Istanbul as signalling the beginning of a crusade. Indeed, a congress was convened by the Pope in Rome in 1490 with the participation of delegates from all European Christian states. All Ottoman tactics during the Jem crisis were to neutralize the West by activist diplomacy, on the one hand sending envoys with lavish promises, presents and money, and on the other discouraging Christian attack by showing strength.⁹⁴ The Porte made persistent efforts, both by diplomatic approaches to the European powers and by the dispatch of secret agents, to discover Jem's whereabouts, to recover his person and even to arrange his assassination.⁹⁵

For these purposes, Bayezid II sent a number of envoys to Europe. One of them, Ismail Beg, who was sent to Lorenzo de' Medici of Florence experienced a long and dangerous trip. His real mission was to detect Jem's location. But he was imprisoned by the Knights of St John for nearly two years and taken from one city to another. From the island of Rhodes he managed to send a letter through an Ottoman envoy and was released by the special request of the Sultan. The ill-fated mission of Ismail Beg lasted for four and a half years.⁹⁶

Another Ottoman diplomat involved in the Jem case is Hüseyin Beg, who signed an agreement with the Grand Master d'Abusson in Rhodes providing that forty thousand gold ducats would be paid annually by the Sultan in return for keeping Jem in custody.⁹⁷ Learning that Jem was in France, Hüseyin Beg went to the French king, Louis XI, in the summer of 1483. But, he was unable to meet Jem. Following the sudden death of Louis, he was sent to the new French king, Charles VIII, in 1484. Hüseyin Beg engaged in a kind of 'shuttle diplomacy' in Europe and most probably he personally received the reply of Jem to the Sultan, requesting his immediate return to the homeland.

In accordance with the agreement between Pope Innocent VIII and Charles VIII of France, Jem was taken by the papal nuncios to be brought to Italy, based on the argument that Rhodes and Italy were under serious threat of Ottoman invasion and that only the presence of Jem in Rome could deter Bayezid II. Aware of the Pope's intentions, the Sultan sent his envoy, Greek-born Antonios Ciritho, to the French court with the following offers to persuade the king to continue holding Jem under custody in France:

- Bayezid was ready to sign a peace treaty with the king of France, and with the entire Christian world;

- the king would provide military support against Bayezid's enemies;
- a considerable sum of money would be paid to France;
- the city of Jerusalem would be delivered to the French after its capture from the Mamluks.

Despite the fact that the king's council was impressed by the Sultan's offers, and orders were sent out to stop Jem on his way to Rome, the nuncios were able to put Jem in a boat and set out for Rome in early 1489.⁹⁸ This time the Ottoman Sultan chose Kapııbaşlı Mustafa Agha to ensure Jem was guarded by the Pope. Mustafa Agha reached Rome in November 1490 with the Sultan's letter, precious gifts and 120,000 gold ducats, three years' pension for Jem's expenditures. However, the real mission of the envoy Mustafa Beg was said to be to assassinate Jem. The letter said that the Sultan would be pleased if Jem was kept at the Vatican on the same terms as the Grand Master had previously undertaken. If his conditions were accepted and the idea of using Jem in a crusade was relinquished, the Sultan would keep peace with Christendom.⁹⁹

The policy of Bayezid II to appease Innocent VIII with generous gifts was successful in preventing a crusade against the Ottomans. Although no written document exists between the Pope and the Sultan, the request of forty thousand gold ducats by the Pope through his envoy in Istanbul seems to confirm the existence of a secret agreement between Bayezid II and the Pope. When Charles VIII invaded Italy in 1494, the new Pope Alexander VI demanded the payment of the annual pension in advance, relying on the excuse that he needed money immediately to resist the French invasion. But the money (40,000 ducats), carried by Kasım Chavush, with the company of papal envoy Bocciardi, was captured near Ancona by French partisans. The Italian alliance could not stop Charles VIII and he took Jem from the Pope in February 1495. However, on the way to Naples, Jem caught a deadly illness and died on 25 February 1495, though there were rumours that he was poisoned before his departure from Rome.¹⁰⁰

The intensive diplomatic activity carried out for thirteen years during the Jem crisis constituted a considerable page in both the Ottoman and European histories of the time. Until the Ottoman Empire established residential ambassadors in the major European capitals, the Porte preferred a pragmatic method, while observing the established rules of protocol and precedence.

Conclusion

The ad hoc period of Ottoman diplomacy up to the establishment of residential ambassadors displays a unique character. Particularly in parallel with the adoption of the philosophy of 'world power' after the conquest of Istanbul in 1453 by Mehmed the Conqueror, great importance was given to diplomatic protocol by the Ottoman court. The victories of Suleiman the Magnificent reinforced the Ottoman perception of world supremacy. Special colourful ceremonies were organized at the Topkapi Palace when a foreign envoy came. If the sultans were out of the capital on expedition, similar protocol was observed at military camps. During such expeditions envoys were sometimes deliberately invited to march with the army to observe the military strength of the Ottoman forces personally. It was considered to be part of the diplomacy.

The Ottoman ambassadors accorded the utmost importance to being received with the highest protocol in the foreign capitals. They considered any negligence on this matter a humiliation of the Ottoman Sultan and the state they represented. Until the early seventeenth century Ottoman sultans considered themselves the most powerful sovereigns on earth. The Ottoman sultans used the titles of *tâc bahş-ı husrevân*, *padişah-ı âlem-penah*, *padişah-ı cihan-muta'*, meaning 'the Sultan who crowns the kings, the Sultan is the only one from whom help is asked, the Sultan to whom everyone in the world is obedient', respectively. These principles and the pillars of Islam guided Ottoman diplomacy for a long time. Many principalities were either tributary or dependent on the Ottoman Empire. Even the Austrian emperor was not considered equal to the Ottoman sultan until 1606.

The Ottoman state was able to sustain its unique diplomatic character up to the late eighteenth century. Although there was no formal education for the diplomats or any diplomatic institution, an informal diplomatic protocol and a tradition developed throughout this period. When their armies were victorious on the battlefields, the Ottomans could insist on their own impositions. From the mid-eighteenth century on, Russia began to rise as a powerful rival to the north. Military defeats by Russia after the mid-eighteenth century caused continuous disputes on diplomatic precedence. Diplomacy became a vital instrument to balance Russian power. Western involvement was urgently required to contain Russian imperialism. Hence the Ottoman rulers began to adopt permanent diplomacy and other western methods in their relationships with the European powers of the time.

Notes

1. J. C. Hurewitz, 'Ottoman Diplomacy and the European State System', *Middle East Journal*, vol. 15, no. 2 (1961), 141.
2. Capitulations are documents unilaterally granted by the Sultan to the subjects of a non-Muslim country that provide permission to trade in the Ottoman territories and regulate their legal status during their stay.
3. Halil İnalçık, *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 366.
4. Edward Barton's ship is described in *Tarih-i Selânikî* in an astonished manner: 'Vilâyet-i cezîre-i İngiltere elçisi pîş-keş ve hediyesi gelüb çekildi. Gemisi gibi turfa-numûne gemi İstanbul limanına gelmemişdi. Üçbin yediyüz mil deryadan sefer eder ve seksenüç pare heman top kullanır. Sâir yarakdan ğayrı ateş-eşân heyet-i hâriciyyesi şekl-i hınzır idi. Ucûbe-i devran idi ki tahrîr olundu.' *Selânikî Mustafa Efendi, Tarih-i Selânikî*, ed. Mehmet İpşirli, Vol. I (İstanbul: İ. Ü. Edebiyat Fakültesi, 1989), 334.
5. *Calendar of State Papers and Manuscripts, Venice*, Vol. VIII (London, 1894), 84.
6. 12 December 1611, to the Doge and Senate, *Calendar of State Papers*, Vol. XII, 249.
7. H. İnalçık, 'The Turkish Impact on the Development of Modern Europe', in Kemal Karpat (ed.), *The Ottoman State and Its Place in World History* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1974), 51.
8. H. İnalçık, 'Turkey and Europe: A Historical Perspective', *Perceptions* (Ankara), vol. II, no. 1 (1997), 82; and 'Türkiye ve Avrupa: Dün Bugün' ('Turkey and Europe: Past and Present'), *Doğu Batı* (Ankara), no. 2 (1998), 10.
9. H. İnalçık, 'The Turkish Impact . . .', 52.
10. H. İnalçık, 'Avrupa Devletler Sistemi, Fransa ve Osmanlı: Avrupa'da Geleneksel Dostumuz Fransa Tarihine Ait Bir Olay' ('European States System, France and the Ottomans'), *Doğu Batı*, no. 14 (2001), 128.
11. William H. McNeill, *Venice, the Hinge of Europe 1081-1797* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1974), 140.
12. Kenneth Setton, *The Papacy and the Levant*, Vol. IV (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1984), 1091.
13. *Calendar of State Papers*, Vol. X, 449.
14. *Calendar of State Papers*, Vol. VIII, 57.
15. *Calendar of State Papers*, Vol. XII, 420.
16. *The Holy Qoran*, Sura Anfâl, 56, 57, 58.
17. Sura Anfâl, 61.
18. Sura Taube, 12.
19. *Calendar of State Papers*, Vol. XII, 248.
20. *Mecmu'a-i Muahedât*, Vol. 3 (İstanbul, 1298), 92-102.
21. Virginia Aksan, *An Ottoman Statesman in War and Peace, Ahmed Resmî Efendi* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1995), 45.
22. Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi (Prime Ministry Ottoman Archive; hereafter BOA), *Düvel-i Ecebiye Defterleri, Felemenk Ahdnâme Defteri*, 22/1, document 88: '... esnâ-yı tarîk eşkıyâ havfından kendüyü korumak için Müselman libası giyüb ve âlât-i harb getürdüğün bir ferd rencide ve remide eylemeyüb ...'
23. 'Venedik Balyosuna hükmi-î şerif yazıla ki, ... imdi eğer adavet zamanında ve eğer itaatiniz eyyamında taife-i tüccara zulm ü taaddi olunduğuna asla

rıza-yı şerifim olmamıştır. Amma adavet zamanından mukaddem ol canibde olan taife-i tüccara hilaf-i ahd taarruz olunub esbab ü emvali girift olunmağla, Memalik-i mahrusede bulunan tacirlerinize memleketlerine gitmeğe ruhsat verilmemişti. . . . ol canibde alkonulan tüccar salıverülüb esbab ü emvaliyle gelüb vasıl olmalarını mutazammın olursan tacirlerinize ruhsat ihsan olunub, . . . Emin ve salim gelüb yollarda dahl olunub mallarına ve canlarına zarar erüşdürüle, özrün makbul olmayub senden sual olunur, ana göre tedarük eylesün.' BOA, *Mühimme Defteri*, 12, Nos. 530 and 987.

24. Selahattin Tansel, *Fatih Sultan Mehmet'in Siyasi ve Askeri Faaliyeti (Political and Military Policies of Mehmed II)* (Ankara: TTK, 1999), 195–216.
25. Theoharis Stavrides, *The Sultan of Vezirs* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 2001), 212.
26. Şanizade Fındıklılı Süleyman Efendi, *Mür'it-Tevarih*, Vol. I (İstanbul: İ. Ü. Edebiyat Fakültesi Yayınları, 1976), 21–2.
27. BOA, *Felemenk Ahdnâme Defteri*, Document 1.
28. Thomas Naff, 'Reform and the Conduct of Ottoman Diplomacy in the Reign of Selim III, 1789–1809', *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, vol. 83, no. 3 (1983), 301.
29. In a document dated c. 1178/1764 (BOA, *Cevdet Hariciye*, No. 422) the appointment of Dimitri Gaspari as the French consul of Athens and his refusal to pay tax was the subject of petition and complaint by the residents of Athens, since his share was charged on the others. He was reminded of the *fırman* and was ordered to give up the consulate.
30. 'Böyle vakitlerde asıldan ulemeden bir kimesne mükalemelere refik olurdu. Yine ihtara sebebdir. Zira umur-i azîmedendir.' E. Z. Karal, *Selim III'ün Hatt-ı Hümayunları (Firmans of Selim III)* (Ankara: TTK, 1999), 58.
31. 'Devlet-i Aliyye'nin harbe karar vermesi Şeriat-i mutahharaya bina kılunarak istiftâya merhûn olmağla bu dahi iki şıkka muhtasardır: biri şeriatımıza muğayır bir teklif vaki olur ve biri mazarrat-i mülkiyye zuhur eder ise, Ve ol dahi evvel-emirde hüsn-i müdafaa ile ber-taraf kılınmağa sa'y olunub Bi'l-istifta herkesin malumu olarak i'lân-ı muharebe olacağı zahirdir.' BOA, *Hatt-ı Hümayun*, No. 1480.
32. Hurewitz, 'Ottoman Diplomacy and the European State System', 146.
33. 'Ve Beç'e Asitaneden varmak vâki olmamışdır. Ancak Budin Beğlerbeğisi tarafından ya Budin çavuşlarından biri varub hazine talep ederdi.' Hezarfen Hüseyin Efendi, *Telhisü'l-Beyan Fî Kavânin-i Al-i Osman*, ed. Sevim İlgürel (Ankara: TTK, 1998), 178.
34. Ahmed Cevdet Paşa, *Tarih-i Cevdet*, Vol. IX (İstanbul: Matbaa-i Osmâniye, 1309), 145.
35. Hans Derschwam, *İstanbul ve Anadolu'ya Seyahat Günlüğü (Diary of a Journey to Istanbul and Anatolia)* (Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı, 1992), 152.
36. Stavrides, *The Sultan of Vezirs*, 233.
37. Examples to such reports are: BOA, *Cevdet Hariciye*, Doc. Nos. 6416, 8036, 8055, 8335, 8836, 8821, 8372, 9230 and 9312.
38. See BOA; *Cevdet Hariciye*, Doc. Nos. 6040, 8158.
39. See BOA; *Cevdet Hariciye*, Doc. Nos. 8300, 8602, 9290.
40. The letters of Süleiman I and Selim II to Dubrovnik on the flow of information from Ragusa were published by N. H. Biegman under the title 'Ragusan Spying for the Ottoman Empire', *Bellefen*, no. 27 (1963), 237–55.
41. Stavrides, *The Sultan of Vezirs*, 234.

42. 'Etraf-i mülûk-i memâlikden Rikab-i Hümayuna gelen elçiler mühimmâtına senede on yük akça Hazine-i Amire'den verilir.' Hezarfen Hüseyin Efendi, *Telhîsü'l-Beyan Fi Kavânîn-i Al-i Osman*, 99.
43. 'Tevki'î Abdurrahman Paşa Kanunnâmesi', *Milli Tettebbu'lar Mecmuası*, Vol. 1, 513.
44. 'Şah Hızır Beğ'i gönderüb sulh taleb eylemeğin, saâdetlü padişahımız dahi, Hızır Beğ küçük elçi olmağla sözüne çokluk itimad ve itibar eylemeyüb Hünkârımız tarafından Şah'a name yazılmadı. Ancak vezir-i azam tarafından Rüstem Han'a bir mektub yazulub... ' IV. *Murad'ın Revan ve Tebriz Seferi Ruznâmesi*, ed. Yunus Zeyrek (Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı Yayınları, 1999), 84.
45. An example of such phrases is provided by the first British capitulations, dated 1580 (BOA, *İngiltere Nişan Defteri*, 35/1): 'Vilhelmuş Harborne nâm âdeminiz ile mektublar gönderüb, âdemleri sâbika âsitâne-i sa'âdet-âşiyânımıza gelüb izhâr-i 'ubûdiyet... eyleyüb ol tarafdân âdemleri ticaret için memâlik-i mahrûsemize gelüb gitmek bâbında isticâze eylemeğin, ... mâdâm ki müşarûniyehâ tarafından şerâit-i ahd ü peymâna riâyet ve kavâid-i sulh u amân kemâyenbağı sıyânet oluna...'
46. The behaviour and character of Cornelis Haga was praised both by the Sultan and the Ottoman statesmen, and this situation was mentioned in the letter of Deputy Grand Vizier Hadım Mehmed Pasha to the States General: 'Elçinüz rikâb-I hümayuna yüz sürdükde âdab ve hayâ üzre hareket etmekle saadetlü padişahımız küllî hazz u safâ eylemişlerdür. Hidmet ise ancak olur. Tamam mertebe elçiliğe layık âdemdir.' Den Haag, Algemeen Rijksarchief, Staten Generaal, 1.01.08, 12593.13.
47. K. Heeringa (ed.), *Levantschen Handel*, Vol. 1 ('s Gravenhage: 1910), 258.
48. *Calendar of State Papers*, Vol. VIII, XL. The English ambassador was paid by the Levant Company.
49. *Public Record Office, State Papers, Foreign, Turkey*, 7; Heeringa, *Levantschen Handel*, 258.
50. Selanikî Mustafa Efendi, *Tarih-i Selanikî*, Vol. 2 (İstanbul: İ.Ü. Edeb. Fak. 1989), 661.
51. The missions of such envoys were to notify accessions to the throne, victories and to demand payment of delayed tribute. However, annual tribute had to be delivered in Istanbul by the envoy of the vassal state together with precious gifts. For the list of Ottoman Envoys of the ad hoc period, see Faik Reşit Unat, *Osmanlı Sefirleri ve Sefaretnameleri (Ottoman Ambassadors and their Sefâret-nâmes)*, ed. Bekir Sıtkı Baykal, 3rd edn (Ankara: TTK, 1992), 221–36.
52. Ebu Sehl Numan Efendi, *Tedbîrât-ı Pesendide*, ed. Ali İbrahim Savaş (Ankara: TTK, 1999).
53. Unat, *Osmanlı Sefirleri ve Sefaretnameleri*, 23.
54. Sultan Bayezid II sent his special envoy Antonios Ciritho to the French court in 1489 to ask the French king not to surrender his brother Jem to the enemies of the Ottomans. Jem was defeated by Bayezid and imprisoned after his flight with the help of knights of Rhodes. See: Halil İnalçık, 'A Case Study in Renaissance Diplomacy: the Agreement Between Innocent VIII and Bayezid II on Djem Sultan', *Journal of Turkish Studies*, vol. 3 (1979), 209–30.
55. Yirmisekiz Çelebi Mehmed Efendi was present at the Passarowitz Peace Agreement of 1718 in the Ottoman delegation. His son, Mehmed Said Efendi (Ottoman envoy to Sweden 1732–33), had accompanied his father in

1722 to Paris. Mustafa Nazifi Efendi, Ottoman envoy to Iran in 1746, accompanied the previous envoys twice in 1729 and in 1741. The envoy to Iran in 1747, Hacı Ahmed Pasha, had been appointed to talk to Nadir Shah of Iran previously. Dervish Mehmed Efendi was appointed to Russia as an envoy in 1755 and 1764. Ahmed Resmî Efendi was sent to Austria in 1757, to Prussia in 1764 and was the chief of the Ottoman delegation at the peace talks. Mehmed Agha was envoy to Warsaw in 1757, and Shehdî Osman Efendi, envoy to St Petersburg, had accompanied the Ottoman envoy to Russia, Mehmed Emnî Pasha, in 1740. Abdulkерim Pasha, envoy to Russia in 1775, was previously appointed for the peace talks in 1772 to end the war with Russia.

56. According to a document (BOA, *Cevdet Hariciye*, No. 9275), Yirmisekiz Çelebi Mehmed Efendi requested the grant of the title First Exchequer, indicating that he was appointed as envoy to Paris in 1720.
57. Topkapı Arşivi No. 4819.
58. 'Elçi Han "tayin olunacak elçi elbette üç tuğlu olsun" dedikte, "bu devletde kaide daima elçi beğlerbeği olmalıdır" deyu beyan olunduğu müfid olmayacak nâ-çar Büyük Mir-ahur Kara Mehmed Paşazade Mehmed Bey'e üç tuğ verilüb elçi nasb olundu.' *Mür'it-Tevarih*, Vol. I, 62.
59. Ali İbrahim Savas, *Tedbirât-i Pesendîde* (Ankara: TTK, 1999), 12.
60. Selanikî Mustafa Efendi, *Tarih-i Selanikî*, Vol. 2, 634.
61. BOA, *Cevdet Hariciye*, Nos. 361, 8925, 8911, 9070, 6800, 6780, 6799, 5954, 6114, 6124, 6127, 6532, 6611, 7094, 7239, 7380, 7727, 7782, 7816.
62. Since the transport of cash was dangerous because of banditry, the cheque system was preferred for payments both in cash and in kind. In a case in 1744, the money, belongings and weapons of an envoy were seized by bandits in Bosnia (BOA, *Cevdet Hariciye*, No. 8049). According to the *firman* (Başbakanlık Arşivi, *Cevdet Hariciye*, No. 8333) dated 18 Dhu al-hijja 1176/1763, the costs of Ahmed Resmî Efendi as far as the Polish frontier were to be paid and discounted from their annual *jizya*. The costs of the envoys between the stops were shared among the localities. For another example see BOA, *Cevdet Hariciye*, Nos. 9070, 7285.
63. BOA, *Cevdet Hariciye*, No. 6175.
64. BOA, *Cevdet Hariciye*, Nos. 6801, 6534, 9092, 8410, 8981, 8911, 361. Other than these examples, there are also various such documents in the Ottoman archives.
65. Unat, *Osmanlı Sefirleri ve Sefaretnameleri*, 24.
66. An elephant was sent to the king of Sicily in 1742 to reinforce the friendly relations between the two countries (BOA, *Cevdet Hariciye*, No. 7814).
67. For a full list of the gifts, with their values, to the French king in 1740, and to the Russian tsar in 1793, see BOA, *Cevdet Hariciye*, Nos. 9275, 5967.
68. Hezarfen Hüseyin Efendi, *Telhîsü'l-Beyan*, 178.
69. Bulent Arı, *The Conflicts Between the Dutch Merchants and the Ottoman Local Authorities According to Felemenk Ahdname Defteri*, unpublished MA thesis (Ankara: Bilkent University, 1996), 17. For the full list of Haga's presents see: Heeringa, *Levantschen Handel*, Vol. I, 266–74.
70. For a detailed list of would be payments en route to the Ottoman envoy to Austria, *Ali Pasha*, in 1740, see BOA, *Cevdet Hariciye*, Nos. 7782 and 7816.
71. BOA, *Cevdet Hariciye*, No. 8818.

72. See *Mehmed Emnî Paşa'nın Rusya Sefâreti*, by Münir Aktepe (Ankara: TTK, 1974), 12–15.
73. İbrahim Pasha, *Viyana Sefaretnâmesi*, *TOEM*, VII/40, 214.
74. For the assignment of Mehmed Pasha, to exchange Abdülkerim Pasha with the Russian ambassador in 1775, see BOA, *Cevdet Hariciye*, No. 9090.
75. F. R. Unat, 'Kapıcıbaşı Nişli Mehmed Ağa'nın Moskova Sefâretnamesi', *Tarih Vesikaları*, vol. 2 (1943), 9.
76. Ahmed Resmî Efendi, *Viyana Sefâretnâmesi*, *Vasıf Tarihi*, Vol. 1, 77–8.
77. *Sefaretnâme-i Mehmed Efendi* (Istanbul: Matbaa-i İlmiye-i Osmâniye, 1283), 5.
78. *Sefaretnâme-i Mehmed Efendi*, 19.
79. *Sefaretnâme-i Mehmed Efendi*, 28–9.
80. *Sefaretnâme-i Mehmed Efendi*, 29.
81. *Silahdar Tarihi*, vol. 2, 661.
82. Even when Ottoman glory was greatly depreciated by the Passarowitz Peace Treaty of 1718, and ambassadors were exchanged between the Ottomans and the Austrians in 1719 to convey the *ratificatio*, the Ottoman plenipotentiary Abdullah Pasha insisted on a demonstration of Ottoman superiority on the frontier. See İbrahim Pasha, *Viyana Sefâretnâmesi*, 214.
83. Mehmed Hilmi, *Hukûk-i Umûmiye-i Beyn al-Düvel*, Vol. 3 (Istanbul: 1328), 46.
84. For the detailed description of this exchange and the long discussions between the Ottoman and the Russian delegations, see *Sefâretnâme-i Abdülkerim Paşa* (Istanbul, 1316), 16–23.
85. H. İnalçık, 'Yaş Muahedesinden Sonra Osmanlı-Rus Münasebetleri', *A.Ü. DTCF Dergisi*, IV (1946), 197–8.
86. BOA, *Cevdet Hariciye*, No. 9096.
87. 'Kapıcıbaşı Mehmed Ağa'nın Moskova Sefâretnâmesi', *Tarih Vesikaları*, Nos. 10–12 (1943).
88. *Mehmed Emnî Paşa'nın Rusya Sefareti ve Sefâretnâmesi* (Ankara: TTK, 1974).
89. 'Şehdî Osman Efendi Sefâretnâmesi', *Tarih Vesikaları Dergisi*, Nos. 1–5.
90. The exchange of slaves, who refused religious conversion, was also mentioned in the second article of the 1774 Küçük Kainarja Peace Treaty. It seems that the Ottoman government had taken it seriously, and *firmans* were sent to local *kâdîs* to return the Russian slaves, who were insistent in Christianity. For instance, the *kâdî* of Kayseri sent 14 Russian slaves to Istanbul in 1775 (BOA, *Cevdet Hariciye*, No. 8472). On the contrary, the Russian authorities were negligent on the issue, indicating that all Ottoman slaves had chosen the Christian religion.
91. İnalçık, 'Yaş Muahedesinden Sonra Osmanlı-Rus Münasebetleri', 195–203. According to BOA *Cevdet Hariciye* classification registers, the Ottoman government has conveyed orders to every province for the slaves of Russian origin to be returned to Russia via Istanbul, in accordance with the Yassy and Belgrade Treaties.
92. H. İnalçık, 'The Ottoman Turks and the Crusades 1451–1522', in Kenneth Setton (ed.), *A History of the Crusades*, Vol. VI (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1969–89), 332–3.
93. İnalçık, 'The Ottoman Turks and the Crusades 1451–1522', 334.
94. İnalçık, 'The Ottoman Turks and the Crusades 1451–1522', 340.
95. V. L. Menage, 'The Mission of a Secret Agent in France in 1486', *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* (October 1965), 112.

96. İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, 'Cem Sultan'a Dair Beş Orijinal Vesika', *Belleten*, vol. XXIV (1960), 458–9.
97. The report of Hüseyin Beg from Rhodes, which is registered in Topkapı Sarayı Arşivi, No. 3286, is published in Uzunçarşılı, 'Cem Sultan'a Dair Beş Orijinal Vesika', 464.
98. İnalçık, 'A Case Study in Renaissance Diplomacy', 211.
99. İnalçık, 'The Ottoman Turks and the Crusades 1451–1522', 341.
100. İnalçık, 'The Ottoman Turks and the Crusades 1451–1522', 346.

3

A Case Study in Renaissance Diplomacy: the Agreement between Innocent VIII and Bayezid II on Djem Sultan*

Halil İnalçık

A review of the Turkish sources

When modern historians refer to the Ottoman sources on Djem Sultan they usually give priority to Sadeddin (Sa'd al-Din), who submitted to Sultan Murad III in 1584 his *Tadj al-Tawarikh*, a history of the Ottoman Empire to the end of Selim I's reign in 1520.¹ The principal source, however on which Sadeddin drew his information, is a biography of Djem, *Waki'at-i Sultan Djem*,² written by one of his intimates who accompanied him in his exile to his death. It is a simple and faithful story, and undoubtedly the most detailed and reliable account of Djem's life. It was written in the year 920/1514 when Selim I, son of Bayezid II, had recently overcome his rival brothers. The author concealed his name.

A modified version of the same work with a new title, *Ghurbetname-i Sultan Djem*³ was made under Suleyman I. The author of this work provides a completely different story about Djem's death, and inserts, quite awkwardly, a long controversy on Islam and Christianity which supposedly took place between Djem and the Pope. Otherwise, the work is simply a copy of *Waki'at*.

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Sadeddin's second source on Djem Sultan was Idris's *Hasht Bihisht*. Sadeddin added to *Waki'at* Idris's account on Djem's death. Hakim al-Din Idris al-Bidlisi wrote, upon Bayezid's order, a general Ottoman history down to the year 915/1509. It appears that Idris's main source on Djem was Mustafa Pasha, who was grand vizier at the imperial council when Idris was writing his history.⁴ In 1489–90 Mustafa, then a *kapidji-bashi*, was sent to Pope Innocent VIII as an ambassador.⁵ Here is a summary translation of what Idris told us about Djem Sultan: the Grand Master of the Hospitallers (*hakim-i Rodos*) sent Djem Celebi to the Pope 'who is the leader of the Kings in Europe and head of the Christians'. The Pope guarded him in Rome, and saw to it that no one Muslim or non-Muslim could have contact with Djem. He made this matter a means to establish friendly relations with Bayezid 'the Sultan of Ghazis', so that hostility was replaced by agreement between Islam and Christendom. Since the city of Rome was too far away, no news had been received for a long time about Djem's life or death. 'The Sultan who is compassionate' became distressed. He, therefore, decided to send Mustafa to Rome in order to ascertain the truth of the situation. To quote from Idris: 'Mustafa Pasha who is now a vizir of high esteem was at that time a *hadjib al-hudj-djab* at the Sultan's place and a loyal man to whom the Sultan entrusted all his important affairs, open or secret.' After the hazards of the trip on land and sea he reached Rome. By relating the messages of the Sultan, he was able to bring the Pope into a conciliatory mood. The Pope permitted him to see Djem 'in the place where he was kept confined [*mahbus ve madbut*]. He heard from Djem's mouth his complaints of homesickness and his request of forgiveness from his elder brother and Sultan of Islam.' After that he brought up with the Pope the matters which the Sultan had entrusted him to negotiate. 'And he consolidated with the Pope by documents and oaths which are acceptable according to the Christian practice the ties of agreement and compact.' The most important point on which both sides agreed to honour their pledge was to keep Djem guarded and not 'let him fall upon Islamic territories' as long as the Sultan and Pope lived. In return the Sultan promised to never attack him and to consider the Pope one of the rulers with whom the Sultan was in compact and agreement. This sworn agreement remained intact for a period until the time when the French King 'rebelled' against the Pope, occupied several countries in Italy, and planned an invasion of Muslim lands. He demanded Djem from the Pope. 'Since the Pope considered himself in religious and worldly affairs the highest authority [*khalife*=caliph] and successor to Jesus Christ he always rejected the request of the king in order not to infringe upon the

agreement solemnly sworn with the Sultan.’ Then, the French King marched ‘on Rome which is equal to Mecca in the eyes of the Christians’. He abused and threatened the Pope with harsh words and took Djem from his hands by force. He intended to use Djem for his evil purposes. Deeply offended by this behaviour of the French King, the Pope wanted to retaliate. ‘It is a widely circulated rumour that the Pope secretly instructed a man who came into Djem Sultan’s service as a *dellak* [bath attendant] and chief barber, and secretly put a killer poison at the back of a razor. When he shaved Djem Celebi with this poisoned razor it caused a fatal disease and the demise of Djem who, until that time, had been a healthy and strong man. He died in this way in the company of the King of France, and, thus, the King’s evil plans and ideas came to nothing.’ When the news of Djem Sultan’s death reached the Ottoman lands, the Sultan sent agents to the Christian lands to verify the matter. The European kings sent the corpse of Djem Sultan to the Ottoman lands to be buried in his ancestor’s graveyard in the year 907/1501 [*sic*]. Upon his arrival those people of evil intention in the country and abroad in Christian and Islamic countries now took a loyal course.

Based on the information supplied by Mustafa Pasha, Idris’s account obviously reflects the Pasha’s personal views – the hazards of his trip to Rome, the great importance of the peace treaty concluded with the Pope, and so on. The account of Djem being poisoned by Pope Alexander VI apparently came from Mustafa, since this report was the most widely spread rumour in Italy about Djem’s death, and Mustafa must have preferred it. Even if Mustafa was involved in the conspiracy against Djem, he could not confess it publicly.

There was nothing against the law or custom in Djem’s claim to the sultanate, though he was the younger brother of Bayezid II. In the Turco-Mongol world there was no definite rule or custom for the succession to the throne. Whatever circumstances eventually brought one of the sons of the deceased ruler to the throne, they regarded it as planned by divine wisdom. The actual ruler was recognized legitimate as long as he was capable of maintaining himself on the throne.⁶ This belief was still strong with the Ottoman Turks in the fifteenth century. What made Djem different from previous pretenders was that in 1481, upon the death of Mehmed II, he had occupied the first Ottoman capital, Bursa, and struck silver coins in his name which were considered symbols of sovereignty, making him, at least for a time, an Ottoman sultan. After his flight, Djem Sultan continued to have supporters and sympathizers, including members of the military who for promotion and booty wanted the continuation of the Conqueror’s aggressive war

policy, and dissident and discontented elements in the Ottoman society who always supported pretenders to the throne. Also, Djem had the reputation of being better qualified and prepared for rulership, and preferred by the Conqueror to be his successor on throne.⁷ Bayezid was aware of widespread pro-Djem feelings in the country, and he, in his turn, sought to create for himself an image of a sultan abiding by the religious law and justice, and returned the *wakf* and *mulk* lands confiscated under Mehmed II, a policy which satisfied and won the support of the higher members of the ruling class and men of religion, including mystic orders. Besides, the Ottomans had suffered so much in the past from the internecine wars between the sons and grandsons of Bayezid I that Ottoman society was in general against the unstable situation created by pretenders to the throne. Once Bayezid firmly established himself on the throne, the Ottomans, in general, felt that they had to support him, as Tursun Beg put it,⁸ for the sake of peace and order and predominance of the *Shari'a* in the society. It was in a similar atmosphere that Mehmed the Conqueror had included the following provision in his law book: 'It is appropriate for anyone from among my sons to whom the sultanate befalls to eliminate his brothers for the sake of the good order of the state and society [*nizam-i alem*]; majority of the doctors of law found this permissible [*djaiz*].'

The reaction to Djem's death in Ottoman territory is also illustrative. While some could not refrain from expressing their sorrow for the unfortunate prince, the majority shared a feeling of relief from the danger of an internecine war and invasion by a crusader's army, some citing the saying attributed to the Prophet: 'Civil war is definitely worse than execution [of trouble makers].'

Conditions after Djem's transfer to Rome

Djem's transfer from French territory to Rome to be put directly under the Pope's custody was considered in Istanbul as the beginning of the crusade and caused alarm. Thus Bayezid II, sending an envoy to Rhodes, declared the transfer of Djem to Rome a breach of the pact between the Porte and the Order, and took a threatening attitude towards the Hospitallers in 1489. On the other hand, the negotiations of the Mamluk ambassador in France and, later, in Rome to obtain Djem to use against the Ottomans was followed with anxiety that this was a greater and more immediate danger.

The Mamluks of Egypt were involved from the beginning in the intense international struggle to obtain Djem to use him in their fight

against the Ottomans. Especially after war broke out between the Ottomans and the Mamluks in 1485, Kayitbay, Sultan of Egypt (1468–96), did his utmost to bring Djem to Egypt.⁹ After Djem's transfer to Rome in 1489, Djem seemed to prefer to join Kayitbay, a Muslim ruler, rather than Matthias [Corvinus], for his fight against Bayezid.¹⁰ Even if Kayitbay could not use Djem directly in the Egyptian campaign against the Ottomans, Djem's participation in a Crusade from the West would divert Ottoman forces from the Egyptian front. This cooperation between Christian Europe and the Islamic state of Egypt, once the sole protagonist of the Muslim Holy War, against the Ottoman *ghazi* state indicates that during the fifteenth century, in the East as well as in the West, political expediency superseded strict religious idealism.

In his attempts to obtain Djem, the Mamluk Sultan chose the mediation of Lorenzo de' Medici, apparently because of Lorenzo's influence in the courts of France and the Papacy, as well as his extensive banking operations. In November 1487, when the Egyptian ambassador arrived in Florence, Lorenzo first wanted to limit the negotiations to the commercial sphere, seeking to avoid offending the Ottomans with whom Florence had developed an extensive trade during the preceding twenty years.¹¹ However, Lorenzo did not hesitate long before taking advantage of opportunities of financial profit and the trade privileges which the Mamluk Sultan had promised him in return for his efforts to obtain Djem.¹² In the spring of 1488, Lorenzo Spinelli, one of Medici's agents in France, offered the French King one hundred thousand gold ducats in the name of Kayitbay for the delivery of Djem.¹³ Since papal nuncios had already been granted permission to take Djem to Rome by the French government, which believed that this was in the best interests of Christendom, Egyptian and Hungarian requests were declined. The nuncios had argued that Rhodes and Italy were under serious threat of an Ottoman invasion and that only the presence of Djem in Rome could deter Bayezid.¹⁴ The French chancellor agreed that only the Pope could restore peace and unity among the Christian nations and lead a crusade against the Ottomans. Of course, the French were expecting political advantages in return, in the form of papal support in their own problems in Flanders against Maximilian and in the inheritance of Bretagne.

Before long, on 21 January 1489, Bayezid's envoy, Greek-born Antonios Ciritho (or Antonio Rericho),¹⁵ together with Camillo Pandone, the envoy of the King of the Naples, arrived at the French court and made most attractive offers on condition that the French King not surrender Djem to the enemies of the Ottomans. In order to foil his enemies' plans, Bayezid had instructed his envoy to say that he was ready to sign

a peace agreement with the King of France and to make peace with the entire Christian world, as well as to pay a considerable sum of money. Moreover, Bayezid offered a military alliance promising the King aid against his enemies. Even more surprising was the Ottoman Sultan's promise to deliver the city of Jerusalem to the French after its capture from the Mamluks. All of this would be in exchange for the King's promise to keep Djem guarded in France.¹⁶ Alongside these generous offers, however, Bayezid warned the King that, should he refuse to accept the offer of friendship, Bayezid would make peace with the Sultan of Egypt and combine with his forces against the Christian world. The Sultan's offers impressed the King's council, and orders were sent out to stop Djem on his way to Rome. But, in the end, the nuncios succeeded in putting Djem on a boat belonging to the Knights of Rhodes bound for the papal state (21 February 1489). The Ottoman prince entered Rome on 13 March.

The Egyptian ambassador, who was still hoping to obtain Djem, was present in Rome at Djem's reception by the Pope, and Innocent VIII (1484–92) sent his envoy, Filippo Canovi, to Rhodes to negotiate with Kayitbay on the matter of Djem. By this time the prize for Djem's delivery was increased to six hundred thousand gold ducats, and d'Aubusson was instructed by the Pope to conduct the negotiations with the Egyptian Sultan on this basis. In justification for his constant bartering, the Pope expressed his intention to spend this sum in order to equip a fleet for the crusade against the Ottomans.¹⁷

Now that Djem was in Rome, the power and influence of the Pope was greatly enhanced, and papal diplomacy became increasingly complex. While Matthias was pressing the Pope to deliver Djem to him as the only power capable of fighting against the Ottomans, the Pope declared his decision to convene a congress to be attended by the delegates of all the Christian states in Europe to prepare a crusade.¹⁸ At the same time, the Egyptian ambassador in Rome declared Kayitbay's willingness to join an anti-Ottoman league, should Djem be delivered to him, and promised to return all the Christian territories conquered by the Ottomans.

The *Türkenkongress*, opened in Rome on 15 March 1490, was the logical outcome of the papal diplomacy of bringing Djem to Rome. The Pope declared that this was the most favourable moment to take action against the Ottomans. The Ottoman prince was most valuable as a standing menace to the Sultan and as a means of breaking up the Ottoman Empire. It was believed that Djem was prepared, in the event that he obtained the Ottoman throne through Christian help, to withdraw from the Balkans, even to give up Istanbul.¹⁹ In the crusading plan

prepared during the Congress, a general peace of three years in Europe was proposed together with the formation of an army of about 95,000 men. Whether Djem would take part in the campaign in custody or free was to be decided later on. The army was to contain contingents from Italy, Germany, Hungary, Poland, Wallachia, Moldavia, France, Spain, England and other northern countries. The crusader's plan was to invade the Balkans through Hungary and Wallachia while the Christian navy was to attack the Morea and Euboea. An attack on the Muslims of the Maghreb was also being considered. The Sultan of Egypt would, however, be invited to participate in the war against the Ottomans.²⁰ The Pope had declared to the Egyptian ambassador that the delivery of Djem to the Hungarian king would better serve the interests of the crusade. However, with the unexpected death of Matthias Corvinus on 6 April 1490, all the plans for the crusade fell through. In addition, the struggle between various European powers, between Charles VIII and Maximilian as well as between Ferrante and Innocent VIII, started up once again. While the Ottoman war against the Mamluks in Cilicia continued, a crusader's attack from the West would have created a most dangerous situation for the Ottoman Empire. Ottoman tactics all during the Djem crisis were to neutralize the West by an aggressive diplomacy, sending envoys with lavish promises, presents, money and relics on the one hand, and to dishearten Christians with a show of strength by building up a strong navy ready to strike and preparing large-scale raids on the Danube and Bosnian frontier on the other hand. Friendly relations were sustained with Venice, whose sea power was thought to be of crucial importance for the realization of a crusade against the Ottoman Empire. In the face of the most dangerous situation following Djem's transfer to Rome in 1489, Bayezid used the same tactics and found Innocent VIII quite amenable to negotiation.

Mustafa's mission and the agreement between Bayezid II and Innocent VIII

We do not know who made the first move for an exchange of ambassadors, but we do know that the Grand Master of Rhodes, P. d'Aubusson, who was the central figure in east-west relations during the Djem crisis and manipulated things to get maximum profit for the island and his person, now offered his mediation in an agreement between the Sultan and the Pope. Bayezid promptly sent his envoy to Rhodes.²¹ From 1482 on, d'Aubusson had pretended to be a collaborator of Bayezid II in his plans to assassinate Djem and had squeezed extra money from Bayezid II

while the Grand Master received at the same time the cardinal's cap from the Pope and money from the Egyptian Sultan for the use of Djem in a war or crusade against the Ottomans. In other words, the prolongation of the custody of Djem rather than the use of him was the real concern of the Grand Master. In order to appease Bayezid II after Djem was transferred to Rome, d'Aubusson wrote that the Pope's²² custody of Djem was eventually less dangerous to the Ottoman interests than the French King's control, because it was difficult for the Pope to unite the Christian nations for a crusade while the French King had sufficient resources for such an undertaking. The prime concern of the Grand Master and the Pope at that time was apparently to neutralize an Ottoman offensive against Rhodes and Italy. Innocent came to think along the same lines and what is more, short of money, the Pope wanted to receive a regular and substantial income from his function as custodian of Djem Sultan.²³ The earliest documents bearing testimony to Innocent VIII's interest in establishing relations with the Sultan date from 21 December 1489.

To negotiate with the Sultan, the Pope employed one of his compatriots, Giovanni-Battista Gentile, a Genoese merchant in Istanbul.²⁴ The Venetian government suspected Gentile's secret practices with the Sultan about Djem Sultan's person and through the Venetian oratore in Rome, Domenico Trevisan, warned the Pope about it, but the Venetians were unaware of the fact that Gentile was actually in the service of the Pope.

In a letter dated 17 May 1490,²⁵ the Sultan wrote to Innocent VIII that he had learned of the transfer of Djem to Rome through the Grand Master with great satisfaction, and that he was hoping that an agreement with the Pope would soon be reached about his custody. Later, a Genoese Dominican, Fra Leonardo of Chiavari, who apparently lived in Pera, was employed as an envoy in the Pope's relations with the Sultan.²⁶

Leonardo had made the personal acquaintance of the Sultan, and was referred to in the Sultan's letter to the Pope dated 28 October 1490.²⁷ In the late spring or summer of 1490, Leonardo came to Rome in the company of an Ottoman envoy to negotiate Djem's custody.²⁸

Leonardo was back in Istanbul in the autumn (before October 1490). These preliminary secret rapports between the Curia and the Porte apparently served to prepare the ground for Bayezid's sending of an ambassador to Rome to finalize the agreement. In fact, upon the transfer of Djem into the custody of the Pope in Rome, the Porte had lost the guarantee under the pact with the Grand Master of Rhodes that Djem was not going to be delivered to the enemies of Bayezid II. The Pope, in his turn, needed an agreement with the Sultan to receive the yearly

payment of forty thousand gold ducats which he was entitled to get in accordance with the concord signed with the French King.²⁹ Apparently, Bayezid II was concerned about concluding the agreement as soon as possible, while Innocent VIII had to make the Christian world believe his intention of initiating a crusade by taking Djem to Rome. The Sultan had chosen for this crucial mission an important man of his court, *kapıdjı-başlı* Mustafa,³⁰ and was ready to send him to the Pope via Rhodes in March. But, because of the Pope's crusade manoeuvre in Rome, the Ottoman embassy was delayed for four months. (The Türkenkongress held its sessions in Rome between 3 June and 30 July 1490). Mustafa came to Rhodes in June and conducted talks with the Grand Master while waiting to be taken on a Rhodian ship to Italy.³¹ On his way to Ancona, he was accompanied by Prior of Auvergne, Guy de Blanchefort (Biyanke - Kort [Fort] in *Waki'at*, p. 23), the Grand Master's representative.³²

P. Pandolfini, the Florentine ambassador in Rome, reported in a letter dated 18 November 1490³³ the purpose of the Ottoman embassy as follows:

... Et perché ha havuto notitia che questo suo fratello e in mano dal Papa, manda decto Imbasciadore per vedere si il fratello e vivo, et notificare al Papa questa conventione facta col Maestro di Rodi, stimando gli habbi ad essere grata, et per consequens habbi a tenere il fratello a buona gardia, ne permettere gli possi far guerra. Questo e quello che ho inteso...

Venice had intelligence that Mustafa's real mission was to assassinate Djem. The Venetian ambassador in Rome, Ermolao Barbaro,³⁴ was instructed to warn the Pope about the danger before the arrival of the Ottoman ambassador. Mustafa was bringing large sums of money (120,000 gold ducats) which the same report speculated were to be used for the conspiracy against Djem's life. The Venetian authorities had no trust in John Kendall, the Rhodian knight who was in charge of the guardianship of Djem and feared that he might be tempted by Mustafa.³⁵ Franz Babinger³⁶ seems to be inclined to dismiss all these rumours of conspiracy against Djem, and questioned the real part Giovanni-Battista Gentile and Dominican Leonardo played in this connection, whereas Thuasne and others, following Venetian intelligence reports, believed them to have participated in a conspiracy against Djem.³⁷

It is to be remembered that Bayezid's purpose was always the elimination of his brother, as disclosed in his secret personal correspondence with

the Grand Master d'Aubusson from 1482 who, in order to squeeze money, feigned to cooperate with the Sultan.³⁸ The extraordinary measures taken against an attempt at poisoning Djem during Mustafa's visit indicate that the Pope took the Venetian warning seriously.³⁹ What is more, there were rumours that the conspirators had an accomplice in the papal court itself.⁴⁰ In 1491, Venetians confirmed that the Sultan was trying to bribe certain members of their court to assassinate Djem by poison or any other means.⁴¹ In a letter dated 16 February 1490 to Lorenzo de' Medici,⁴² the conspirator inside the papal court was believed to be Niccolò Cibo, archbishop of Arles.⁴³ Cibo was to serve as an interpreter during Mustafa's talks with Innocent VIII in 1490, and made friends with him as he later called him 'his beloved friend Mustafa Beg' in his report to Bayezid II in 1494.⁴⁴ In the same year, the Sultan recommended to Pope Alexander VI that he make Cibo a cardinal. All this seems to confirm the suspicions about Cibo.

Mustafa's activities while in Rome are described in detail by the contemporary Italian sources and have been fully explored by modern historians.⁴⁵ Mustafa's visit to Rome made it possible for Bayezid to get direct contact with the Pope and to disclose the secret practices and pretensions of the Grand Master. Besides, d'Aubusson's pretension to secretly be cooperating with the Sultan to assassinate Djem was to compromise the Pope's position and dignity. The big sum Mustafa brought to Rome was said to be for the same purpose.⁴⁶ At any rate, one week after the formal audience on 1 December 1490, when Mustafa delivered the Sultan's letter and made clear the purpose of his embassy, the Pope had a special interview with Mustafa in the presence of Francesco Cibo and the cardinals and wanted to learn all about the agreements between the Sultan and the Grand Master and the amount of money received.⁴⁷ Mustafa's disclosures proved that d'Aubusson was concealing his special agreements with the Sultan which were all secret and verbal and that he received much more money than was stipulated in the written agreement. Also, in another meeting with Mustafa, only in the presence of the cardinals, Mustafa's clarifications demonstrated that the Grand Master's claim that Bayezid II wanted only the Hospitallers to be the guardians of Djem was not true.⁴⁸ It became evident that in all of his dealings, d'Aubusson had regarded Djem as his own prisoner rather than the prisoner of the Order or of any other authority.⁴⁹ As to the key issue to be decided between the Sultan and the Pope, it was made clear in the letter from Bayezid II and in Mustafa's statement during the first audience before the ambassadors of European nations. In his letter to the Pope,⁵⁰ Bayezid II said that he was pleased to learn

that Djem was conveyed to Rome and hoped that Djem was being maintained at the Vatican on the same terms as the Grand Master had undertaken for his custody some years ago 'according to a convention of peace entered into between them which has been kept by both sides up to now, and has been the cause of friendship'. To secure papal approval of the conditions of Djem's pension 'we have sent', the Sultan said, 'our faithful slave the kapıdjı-başı⁵¹ Mustafa, with one of the officials of the cardinal [Grand] Master in order that we may be assured by him that you also have confirmed this agreement, so that our friendship may increase: whatever therefore our envoy, the most faithful slave Mustafa, shall say in the presence of your Magnificence receive as though they were our own words.'

Thus Bayezid's concern was to guarantee that Djem was now kept in the custody of the Pope under the same conditions as had been agreed upon with the Hospitallers. In return, the Sultan was ready to pay 'the pension' and keep peace. The Sultan's ambassador declared that if the conditions were accepted, which meant the relinquishment of the idea of using Djem in a crusade against the Ottoman Empire, the Sultan would keep peace with *all the Christian nations*.⁵²

It should be noted that throughout Mustafa's stay in Rome, the Pope took pains to show that the Christian ambassadors who had come to discuss the plan of a crusade against the Ottomans took part in the decision to be made. In the final audience on 3 January 1491, the Pope found it necessary first to explain to the Christian ambassadors that Mustafa asserted, contrary to his first declaration, that the Sultan promised peace only with *Rhodes and the Papal state* (and Venice at sea) excluding other Christian nations.⁵³ When Mustafa was received afterwards, he repeated it in the presence of the ambassadors, and the Rhodian representative contradicted him, saying that Mustafa was talking about peace with *all Christian princes* while he was in Rhodes. When the Sultan's ambassador left the hall of audience, the Pope, addressing again the Christian ambassadors, told them that now they had witnessed all that had happened, they should report it to their respective governments and seek their advice so that the Pope could give his answer to the Sultan's proposals.⁵⁴

In his letter dated 3 January 1491,⁵⁵ the Pope wrote to Bayezid II that because of the importance of the proposals he had let all the Christian states know about them and had asked them to send their advice. Since this would take some time, he said, he was sending Mustafa back to Istanbul, adding that Mustafa had seen Djem safe and sound.

Mustafa immediately set out for Istanbul. Now the question arises whether or not there was any agreement between the Pope and the Sultan's ambassador at this point. Mustafa himself, in the information he gave to the historian Idris, claimed to have made with the Pope an agreement sworn on oath as required in the Christian religion to the effect that the Pope should keep Djem in custody and not let him attack Bayezid's lands, and that in return the Sultan would not harm the Pope's country.⁵⁶

In his biographical note on Mustafa, Idris emphasized that he had returned from his mission 'with a sworn agreement [ahd u misāk] with the European rulers'.

On the occasion of Mustafa's visit to Rome, the author of *Waki'at* (p. 24), an intimate of Djem, says that in the meantime there also took place several exchanges of letters between the Pope and the Sultan about *the delivery of Djem to the Sultan*. Thuasne, Pastor and Setton, who carefully examined the western sources on the Djem affair, did not detect any secret dealings of the Pope with the Sultan's ambassador. Babinger,⁵⁷ however, noted that the Pope had been carrying on some secret relations with the Sultan since December 1489. In fact, the Pope's behaviour looked somewhat suspicious. While he took pains to show the Christian ambassadors that all his dealings with the Sultan's envoy were taking place openly before their eyes and no agreement was made beyond their knowledge, the Pope immediately sent an envoy to Istanbul and requested payment of forty thousand ducats.

There were some nasty rumours in France about Pope's dealings with the Sultan over Djem. To prevent it, the Pope's nuncios produced his letter to Bayezid II where it was said that the Pope would not make any decision about Djem without first taking the advice of the Christian princes.⁵⁸ Nevertheless, Charles VIII, the French king, was said at this point to be interested in taking back Djem from the Pope, as nuncios in France suspected from Guy de Blanchefort's secret talks with the King in the spring of 1491. Guy was d'Aubusson's nephew and his representative for his affairs in Europe at this time. The Grand Master evidently did not feel happy that Djem's pension⁵⁹ and other benefits were diverted from him. (In the summer of 1494, Mustafa Beg reported that the French King wanted to take back Djem 'to deliver him to the person from whom he took [d'Aubusson]'.)⁶⁰ But it was only when the question of the succession of Naples came up (February 1494) that the French King would declare formally to the Pope his determination to have Djem back and to attack the Ottoman Empire in a crusade. During Charles VIII's expedition to

Italy in the autumn of 1494, d'Aubusson was believed to be ready to cooperate with the French.⁶¹

The Sultan's agreements with Christian rulers were usually made verbally, and Mustafa, his plenipotentiary ambassador to the Pope, was empowered to make vows and agreements on his behalf as specified in the Sultan's letter to the Pope.

During his stay in Rome, Mustafa, as instructed by his master, wanted to meet Djem personally in order to see if he was alive before any payment was made. Despite the concern expressed by the Rhodians, the Pope gave his permission.⁶² As we learn from the instructions given to his envoy dated 18 January 1491,⁶³ the Pope even requested some extra favours from the Sultan – bestowal of some relics preserved in the Sultan's treasury, and amenities for certain of the Pope's relatives in Galata and for a Florentine family dispossessed by Mehmed II.

Just as the Pope employed his nephew Niccolò Cibo during the negotiations with the Sultan's ambassador, so the Pope's envoy to the Sultan, sent to request payment of forty thousand ducats, was another member of the Cibo family, Giorgio Bocciardi (Bucciardus or Buzardus), brother of Niccolò.⁶⁴ In the secret instructions given to him dated 18 January 1491, a fortnight after Mustafa's audience, the Pope gave details of how 'the pension' or 'tribute' should be paid – in Venetian gold ducats every year on 1 December.⁶⁵ The Pope's dispatch of a nuncio to collect Djem's pension can be considered a positive indication that an agreement, verbal and secret, was reached between the Pope and Mustafa.⁶⁶ The Sultan's request as expressed in his letter and through his ambassador was definite: confirmation of the convention made with the Grand Master which provided that custody of Djem was a precondition of peace and payment of forty thousand gold pieces.⁶⁷ It is assumed that Mustafa delivered 120,000 ducats to Innocent VIII, which corresponded to three years' pension for Djem, after seeing him.⁶⁸

As a result of the agreement made by Mustafa in Rome in January 1491, the Ottoman Porte believed that a crusade was not likely in the near future, and this belief must have encouraged them to resume their aggressive policy against Hungary. The internal conflicts and Maximilian's invasion of Hungary following Matthias Corvinus's death in 1490 had created for the Ottomans extremely favourable conditions to consolidate their position on the Danube. Inactive for a long time, the frontier forces were impatient to resume their raids into Hungary, which they believed was now incapable of putting up serious resistance. The Hungarian ambassador to the Sultan, Emerich Czobor, was unsuccessful in his attempt at the renewal of the truce ending in 1491,⁶⁹ and Ujlaki, ban of

Macsói (Machwa), an opponent of the King Wladislaw, was giving hope to the Ottomans for a possible surrender of Belgrade. The first large-scale Ottoman raid made under the frontier beg Mihal-oghlu Ali through Severin and Pojejan into Varád and Temesvár was not very successful.⁷⁰ In the same year Bayezid II concluded a peace agreement with Egypt,⁷¹ and made large-scale preparations for a campaign on land and sea for the following year. Again Idris gives us first-hand details on the planning and real objectives of the campaign.⁷² The secret preparations, construction of a large fleet, 'eighty sails including thirty galleys'⁷³ in particular, gave rise to speculation about the real target of the Ottomans in Italy. Venice and Naples took defensive measures, and both demanded that, for their common safety, the Pope use the *instrumentum* in his hands, that is Djem Sultan.⁷⁴ The Italian states did not have to be alarmed since the Sultan did not have any intention or plan to attack Italy.⁷⁵ The Venetians were assured about it by June.⁷⁶ According to Idris's observations, Suleyman Pasha, the Ottoman frontier lord at Smederevo, had invited the Hungarian ban (Ujlaki) to recognize Ottoman suzerainty and surrender Belgrade by promising to add to his possessions the Ottoman fortresses of Aladjahisar (Krusevac) and Zvornik. Bayezid II, who himself did not give too much credit to the reportedly favourable disposition of the ban, suggested, in case the ban changed his mind about surrendering Belgrade, that the army should change its destination toward the Adriatic Sea to crush Albanian rebels and submit Montenegro.⁷⁷ When in Sofia at the head of his army the Sultan received the news that the Hungarian ban had changed his mind and that the Hungarians were united to resist the Sultan, he set out with the bulk of his army to invade northern Albania. On his way back from his campaign, near Monastir, a dervish attempted to kill the Sultan. On the Hungarian front, raids under the frontier begs, Mihal-oghlu Ali and Suleyman Pasha, as well as the blockade of Belgrade were foiled in the face of stiff Hungarian resistance.

Before he had left Istanbul for this campaign on 6 April 1492, the Sultan showed his intention to keep peace with the Pope by sending an envoy⁷⁸ to Innocent VIII with 40,000 gold ducats along with valuable relics including the iron head of the lance which pierced Christ's side at the crucifixion, which the Pope had specifically requested through his ambassador Bocciardi.

According to a report dated 2 May 1492 by Filippo Valori,⁷⁹ Florentine envoy to Rome, the Ottoman ambassador 'viene per praticare qualche modo di compositione per assecurar e pricipi cristiani, et appresso per far doglienza al Papa del Gran Maestro di Rodi che da ricepto a tutti e corsoli che danneggiano ne mari di jurisdictione del Turco; facendo intendere

che volendo conservare buona pace'. The complaint about the Christian corsairs which was justified by certain recent events was actually designed to alleviate the worry and suspicion arising from the Ottoman naval preparations. The fleet was, the Ottoman government maintained, against the corsairs. The delivery of the 40,000 ducats with the most generous gifts was indeed a positive indication of Bayezid II's appeasement policy with the Pope and the existence of a tacit agreement between the two parties about the custody of Djem and keeping peace.

Notes

1. In his chapter on Djem, Joseph von Hammer-Purgstall, *Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches*, II, Pest, 1828 (reprint, Graz 1963), 250–79, drew mainly on Sadeddin as his authoritative source. He also made use of Idris (Edris), Ali and Solak-zade. Ali, *Kunh al-akhbar* (many manuscripts exist – see F. Karatay, *Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Türkçe Yazmalar Kataloğu*, II, Istanbul, 1961, 422), used Idris independently from Sadeddin, while Solak-zade followed Sadeddin. L. Thuasne, *Djem Sultan*, Paris, 1892, made use of only a French translation of Sadeddin (Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris, MS fr. 6075). More recently Sydney N. Fisher, *Foreign Relations of Turkey, 1481–1512*, Urbana, IL 1948, 21–50, relied mainly on Hammer-Purgstall. Translation into Italian of Sadeddin's work is made by V. Bratutti, *Chronica dell'origini et progressione della caso ottomana* I, Vienna, 1649. As for the modern Turkish historians, Ismail Hikmet Ertaylan, *Sultan Cem*, Istanbul, 1951, and Dr Selahattin Tansel, *Sultan II Bayezid'in Siyasi Hayati*, Istanbul, 1966, 1–69, both made use of contemporary Ottoman sources, including an important collection of documents preserved in the Topkapı Sarayı Archives (hereafter TSA). Ertaylan and Tansel drew on *Waki'at* and Idris, the most important contemporary sources on Djem. But a critical study of the sources they made use of is still needed. The contemporary historian Kemal Pasha-zade, *Tawarikh-i Al-i Osman*, Defter VIII, is surprisingly brief on Djem's life in Europe. We have not been able to examine *Wakayi'name-i Bihishti* or *Tarikh-i Sultan Djem* (TSK Library, R 1270), the anonymous *Wakayi-i Sultan Bayezid ve Selim Khan* (TSK Library, E. H. 1416), a treatise on Bayezid II and Djem (TSK Library, Medjmu'a, E. H. 1774) and a *Tarikh-i Sultan Bayezid* (TSK Library, R 1272).
2. Mehmed Arif, editor of *Waki'at*, supplement to *Tarikh-i Osmani Endjümeni Medjmu'ası*, Istanbul 1330/1914, thinks that the author is Haydar Beg, a secretary and literary man. Sehi, *Heşt Bihişt*, ed. Günay Kut, Harvard, 1978, 246–7, tells that Haydar, an able poet, spent his life with Djem in Europe. In Latifi, *Tedhkire*, Istanbul, 1314 H., 140, 'Haydar Çelebi' was Djem's *defterdar* and brought Djem's belongings after his death to Turkey (in *Waki'at*, 33, 'Khatib-zade ve sa'ir khalkı'). Bayezid II granted him a *ze'amet* at Germiyan, but he believed he was disesteemed. It appears that Latifi had a good source on Haydar but makes no mention of *Waki'at*. Shahidi was another *defterdar* of Djem Sultan (Latifi, p. 200). A 'Haydar Çelebi' *re'is al-kuttab* (see *Tezkere of Aşık Çelebi*, ed. G. M. Meredith-Owens, London, 1971, 44a, 151a and 151b) lived under Suleyman I. V. Ménage, 'The Mission of an Ottoman Secret Agent in France

in 1486', *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* London, 1965, 129–30, argues that the author was among those who were separated from Djem between 1483 and 1486 or 1487. Incidentally, it is clear that only one man, Djelal Beg, was left with Djem in September 1483 (see *Waki'at*, 12–14). As for the return of Sinan Beg and Ayas Beg, this occurred before the death of 'the son of the king of Naples in Rome' (see *Waki'at*, 16), which took place on 17 October 1485 (L. Pastor, *Geschichte der Papste*, III, Freiburg, 1899, 192). Thus the return of Sinan and Ayas cannot be later than this date. At any rate, the author of Djem's biography was one of his intimates who was with him until his death and loyal to his memory. For obvious reasons he concealed his name. He says he wrote this book to tell the true story of Djem in simple language to be read by as wide an audience as possible. His goal, he confesses, is simply to cherish Djem's memory and attract prayers for his soul (see *Waki'at*, introduction and epilogue, 1 and 34). There is no complaint or criticism of Bayezid II. At the conclusion of the work he invites his reader to make prayers for the long life of the Sultan (then Selim I) 'who is the mainstay for the security of those who live in this world'. The date of the completion of the work was 920/1514 as given in the edition of M. Arif. M. Arif in his introduction to *Waki'at*, b, mentions another MS in the Halis Efendi Library.

3. The Paris MS of *Ghurbetname* is edited in the Modern Turkish alphabet by İsmail Hami Danişmend (*Fatih ve İstanbul*, vol. I-3/6, 1953–54, İstanbul, 211–71). Here is *Ghurbetname's* story about Djem's death (247): 'The Pope appointed his son Messir Franceško commander of the army, and, in early September 1494, the Pope's son, along with other lords and the envoy of the Hungarian King all set out from Rome towards Hungary. I stayed in Rome to attend some business regarding Djem. When Djem reached a point near Naples at the fourth resting station, the French King learned of Djem's flight to Hungary. Mustering his troops he pursued him. The Pope, seeing the turn of the events, immediately sent word to his son, advising him not to lose custody of Djem at any cost. Thereupon, the Pope's son gave him a sweet mixture in the course of three days, and Djem's soul departed for the heavens.' From this fanciful story it is evident that he was not an eyewitness of the events in Italy at the time of Djem's death, but that he seems to have simply reproduced a rumour widespread in Italy and the Levant in the sixteenth century. It is to be noted, however, that his version of the poisoning is different from Idris's account (according to Idris the poisoning resulted from shaving with a razor). There is no doubt that *Ghurbetname* was compiled under Suleyman I (see 227–8). The author mentions the prophecy about the entry into Rome of an Ottoman Sultan who, in his belief, was to be Sultan Suleyman Khan, not Djem as interpreted in Europe. F. Babinger, *Geschichtsschreiber der Osmanen und ihre Werke*, Leipzig, 1927, 32, mentioned a biography of Djem in rhyme, called *Ghurbetname* by Sa'dullah b. Mustafa also known as Djem Sa'disi. No copy of it has been found; on Sa'di see Sehi, ed. Günay Kut, 198–200; Latifi, 188–9: 'Aşık Çelebi, ed. G. M. Meredith-Owens, 67b, says that Djem sent his favourite Sa'di to Bayezid II with his poems including his 'madjeray ve dastan'.
4. For Idris (died 12 November 1520) and his work, see Babinger, 45–9: F. R. Unat, 'Neşri Tarihi Üzerinde Yapılan Çalışmalar', *Bellekten*, VII (Ankara, 1943), 197–200. An autographed copy of the earlier version of *Hasht Bihisht* which

we made use of was written in 915/1509; here we give a facsimile copy of the section concerning Djem from this version.

5. Idris's testimony provides definitive evidence that Kapıdjı-başlı Mustafa and Grand Vizir Kodja Mustafa Pasha were the same person. Idris gives a relatively detailed account of Mustafa's life in his history along with great praise. Mustafa, Idris says, started his career as a Seraglio page (*ghulam*). Entrusted with the responsibility of handling important affairs, he was promoted to higher offices in the Seraglio. Then the Sultan sent him as an envoy to Djem 'to bring news of great kings and rulers of the infidel. From this journey full of dangers and fighting against all kinds of enemies, he returned with an agreement made under oath with the Italian rulers ['ahd wa misak-i salatin-i Frenk'] as the Sultan wished.' Upon this success he was made Beylerbeyi of Rumili in Dhu'l-ka'da 903/June–July 1498, and later, in Djumada II 907/12 December 1501 – 9 January 1502, a vizier in the imperial council, and finally a grand vizier. Idris places emphasis on his unusual interest in mysticism and his companionship with mystics. I. H. Uzunçarşılı (*Osmanlı Tarihi*, II, 2nd edn, Ankara, 1964, 541, and *Bellekten*, XXIV, 469 note 11) using a *wakf* record gives the date of his beylerbeylik as 904 and that of his vizierate as 906 H. On the basis of the same document Uzunçarşılı notes that Mustafa b. 'Abd al-Şamad was made khazine-dar-başlı in 886/1481, sandjak-begi of Avlonya (Valona, Vlore) in 901/1495–96 (in *Osmanlı Tarihi*, but in *Bellekten* : 900 A. H.), sandjak-begi of Gelibolu (admiral of the Ottoman navy) in 903/1497–98, Beylerbeyi of Rumili in 904/1499; for a discussion of this chronology see our explanations in the article. Mustafa was made grand vizier on Shawwal 16, 917/6 January 1512, as a document from TKS claims (see Ç. Uluçay, 'Yavuz Sultan Selim Nasıl Padişah oldu', *Tarih Dergisi*, VII-10, İstanbul, September 1954, 122). However, if T. Gökbilgin's reading is correct (*Edirne ve Paşa livası*, İstanbul, 1952, 107), Mustafa was already grand vizier on 17 September 1511. Documents exist on Mustafa as second vizier on Sha'ban 912 (Gökbilgin, 379), on Ramadan 22, 914 (Gökbilgin, 92, 103, 167) and on Rabi I, 915 (Gökbilgin, 235); as grand vizier on Radjab 4, 917 (Gökbilgin, 107) and Djumada I, 21, 918 (?) (in Gökbilgin: 911). On 23 January 1504 Mustafa received a present of sixty thousand *akça* from Bayezid II (Gökbilgin, 476). For the charitable works and endowments of Mustafa Pasha see Gökbilgin, 441–8; Ö. L. Barkan and E. H. Ayverdi, *İstanbul Vakıfları Tahrir Defteri*, İstanbul, 1970, 366–9; an anonymous chronicle, particularly important for the chronology of this period (Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris, Sup. turc 104, folio 144–5) tells us that on 17 October 1501, Rumili Beylerbeyi Mustafa Pasha left İstanbul and came to the area of Filibe on the rumours of a Hungarian threat, and on his return to İstanbul he was elevated to the office of vizier on Radjab 13, 907/22 January 1502.
6. See my 'Osmanlılar'da Saltanat Veraseti Usulü ve Türk Hakimiyet Telakkisi ile İlgisi', *Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi*, vol. XIV, 69–94.
7. While Djem was in Europe 'there was always unrest [*fetret*] among the corps at the Porte until, when, by God's order, Djem Sultan died. Only then people had some peace and comfort' (Sehi, ed. Günay Kut, 323); Théodore Spandouyn Cantacasin, *Petit Traicté de l'origine des Turcqz*, ed. C. Schefer, Paris 1896, 43.
8. *The History of Mehmed the Conqueror by Tursun Beg*, ed. H. İnalçık and Rhoads Murphy, Minneapolis and Chicago, 1978, 20–4.

9. Djem's mother Çiçek Khatun in Egypt was urging the Sultan through his wife to free and bring her son to Egypt – see intelligence from Egypt to Bayezid II, TKS no. 6008/3, signed by Ya'kub; for Çiçek Khatun in Egypt see Ibn Iyas, *Bada'i al-Zuhur fi Waka'i al-Duhur*, III, ed. M. Mostafa, Cairo, 1963, 390; an intelligence report, TKS 6071/3 dated 16 Djumada II 892/9 June 1487 and signed by Mustafa, informed the Sultan that Djem sent word and wanted Venice and the King of Hungary to deliver him from his captivity in France and that, thereupon, Venice and the King in agreement sent their envoys to France. In actual fact the King had appointed an ambassador to France in January 1487, and Venice was secretly supporting the Pope's efforts to get Djem from the King of France. In the meantime in March 1487 a Turkish envoy arrived in Venice; see L. Thuasne, *Djem Sultan*, Paris, 1892, 149–56.
10. To the Pope's demand about joining the king of Hungary Djem replied: 'If I go to Hungary I have to be with the Hungarian army in an attack against Muslims. This would cause the Ottoman ulema to declare that I became an infidel. I cannot abandon my faith even for the rule of the whole world' (*Waki'at*, 23).
11. In 1483 Bayezid II made promises to purchase yearly 5000 bales of costly woollen cloth from Florence – see Wilhelm Heyd, *Histoire du Commerce du Levant*, vol. II, trans. F. Raynaud, Leipzig, 1936, 342. The exchange of woollen cloth with Iranian silk at the Bursa market was of vital interest to Florence – see H. İnalcık, 'Bursa and the Commerce of the Levant', *Journal of Economic and Social History of the Orient*, III-2, 131–47; for Ottoman–Florentine relations in the period see G. Müller, *Documenti sulle relazioni delle città toscane coll' Oriente cristiano e coi Turchi*, Florence, 1879; F. Babinger, 'Lorenzo de Medici e la corte ottomana', *Archivio Storico Italiano*, 121 (1963), 305–61.
12. For these privileges see John Vansbrough, 'A Mamluk Commercial Treaty Concluded with the Republic of Florence', *Documents from Islamic Chanceries*, ed. S. M. Stern, Cambridge, MA, 1965, 39–79.
13. Thuasne, 193; Babinger, 353, 54.
14. Thuasne, 176–86.
15. E. Charriere. *Négociations de la France dans le Levant*, I, Paris, 1848, CXXIV; F. Babinger, *Reliquienschacher am Osmanenhof im XV. Jahrhundert*, Munich, 1956, 17–18.
16. Thuasne, 217–18.
17. Thuasne, 254.
18. Ludwig Pastor, *Geschichte der Papste*, III, Freiburg 1899, 218–24.
19. F. Cognasso, 'Il Sultano Djem alla Corte di Alessandro VI', *Popoli* (1942), 96–103.
20. Pastor, III, 231–3; for Spanish reconquista and Islam in general see Andrew C. Hess, *The Forgotten Frontier. A History of the Sixteenth Century Ibero-African Frontier*, Chicago, 1978, 1–44; the history of the relations between Muslims in the eastern and western Mediterranean in the face of Spanish expansion during the period 1490–1510 is still to be written. The peace between the Ottomans and the Mamluks was concluded upon the appeal of the Sultan of Tunis as the contemporary historian Idris, *Hasht Bihisht*, tells us (Sa'd al-Din, *Tadj al-Tawarikh*, II, Istanbul, 1863, 66–8, followed Idris). The earliest record about Kemal Re'is's naval raids against Spain is dated 1487 – see H. A. von Burski, *Kemal Re'is, Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der türkischen Flotte*, Bonn, 1928,

- 21–2; the Ottoman-Mamluk peace treaty was ratified in Cairo in Djumada II, 896/April 1491 – see Ibn Iyas, *Bada'i al-Zuhur fi Waka'i al-Duhur*, 280–2; also H. Edhem, 'Hersek Oğlu Ahmed Paşa'nın Esaretine dair Kahire'de bir Kitabe', *TOEM*, V, 272–4; an ambassador of 'the Sultan of Maghreb' was killed on his way to the Bayezid's court in 1481, TKS no. 11981, in Ertaylan, 188.
21. Thuasne, 264.
 22. Thuasne, 263–4; 'I tell you,' said Matthias Corvinus to the Pope's legate in June 1489, 'the Pope can do nothing with the Turk [Djem Sultan] except what the King of France decides.' So, Corvinus insisted that Djem be delivered to him for organizing the crusade. See Setton, 408–9.
 23. For the Pope's financial difficulties see Pastor, III, 270–2, 281–5; Thuasne, 189; H. Pfefferman, *Die Zusammenarbeit der Renaissancepapste mit den Türken*, Winterthur 1946, 89; according to the agreement with Charles VIII the Pope was to receive the money paid by the Sultan for Djem's maintenance. According to Sigismondo de' Conti, it cost the papacy 15,000 ducats a year to maintain him – see Setton, II, 410. In 1489, Innocent was quite ready to deliver Djem to the Egyptian Sultan Kayitbay for 200,000 ducats – see Setton, II, 407, note 91. The original agreement between Bayezid II and P. D'Aubusson stipulated that on 1 August each year the Sultan was to pay 45,000 gold ducats – see Thuasne, 86. According to Bosio (Thuasne, 86, note 2) 35,000 of it was for the maintenance of Djem and 10,000 for the Grand Master.
 24. Franz Babinger, *Spätmittelalterliche fränkische Briefschaften aus dem grossherrlichen Seraj zu Stambul*, Munich, 1963, 64–75.
 25. *Ibid.*, 68–9.
 26. *Ibid.*, 69–71.
 27. *Ibid.*, 71.
 28. The Florentine oratore in Rome Pier-Filippo Pandolfini heard about these negotiations and reported to Lorenzo de' Medici in a letter dated 19 July 1490 – see Babinger, *Spätmittelalterliche fränkische Briefschaften*, 70–1.
 29. Setton, *The Papacy and the Levant*, II, Philadelphia 1978, 406.
 30. 'Domini Turcorum discessit unus orator nomine Mustafa bey, vir magnae auctoritatis et gratiae apud ipsum Turcum', Babinger, *Spätmittelalterliche fränkische Briefschaften*, 72.
 31. Thuasne, 264–5. The Venetian dispatch giving these details is published by Babinger, *Spätmittelalterliche fränkische Briefschaften*, 71–2.
 32. But Mustafa was already in the Anconitan territory on 13 October 1490 – see Thuasne, 276; Babinger, *Spätmittelalterliche fränkische Briefschaften*, 72.
 33. Thuasne, 276, note 5.
 34. V. Lamansky, *Secrets d'État de Venise, documents, extraits, notices et études servant à éclaircir les rapports de la seigneurie avec les Grecs, les Slaves et la Porte Ottomane à la fin du XVe et du XVIe siècle, I*, Saint-Petersburg, 1884 (reprint: New York, 1968), 234–7; Thuasne, 273–4.
 35. *Ibid.*, 272–5.
 36. *Spätmittelalterliche fränkische Briefschaften*, 54–75.
 37. Thuasne, 268–70; Setton, II, 425.
 38. Bayezid's letters concerning the conspiracy against Djem's life will make the subject matter of another article; some of the letters are published by Ertaylan, 160–1, 206–7; and I. H. Uzunçarsılı, 'Cem Sultan'a Dair Beş Orijinal Vesika', *Belleten*, XIV, 476. Western sources were informed of this constant

- threat against Djem's life by his brother, see Thuasne, 262–4, 269–73, 279; Lamansky, 201–62; I think Barak and Ismail were two agents sent by Bayezid II to conspire against Djem; for Barak's itinerary see V. L. Menage, 'The Mission of an Ottoman Secret Agent in France in 1486', *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, 1965, 112–32; Babinger, *Spätmittelalterliche fränkische Briefschaften*, 30.
39. The Knights of Rhodes who accompanied the Sultan's ambassador to Rome in 1489 were suspicious about Mustafa's intentions – see Thuasne, 279.
 40. *Ibid.*, 263.
 41. Lamansky, 238–9, cited in Setton, II, 425.
 42. Thuasne, 263, the letter in Appendix no. 14, 428–9.
 43. In the report sent to Bayezid II in the summer of 1494 by *Nikolo Simo* (Niccolò Cibo) *peshkopokdartli* (archiveschovo di Arli), published by S. Tansel, 'Yeni Vesikalar Karşısında Sultan İkinci Bayezit', *Bellekten*, vol. XXVII, document no. II, 201.
 44. Niccolò Cibo was a relative of Innocent VIII; for the genealogy, see Babinger, *Spätmittelalterliche fränkische Briefschaften*, 64, note 30; and Setton, II, Index: Cibo.
 45. The most important sources for Djem in Rome are Stefano Infessura, *Diario della città di Rome*, ed. O. Tommasini, Rome, 1890; Sigismondo de' Conti, *Le storie de suoi tempi dal 1475 al 1510*, I, Rome, 1883; Marino Sanuto, *La Spedizione di Carlo VIII in Italia*, ed. R. Fulin, Venice, 1883, and, in particular, Johann Buarchard (or Burckard), master of ceremonies at the papal court – for his life and work see Setton, II, 338, note 24. These sources and state papers from Italian archives in the Vatican, Venice, Florence and Mantua have been studied by V. Lamansky, *Secrets d'État de Venise*, St Petersburg, 1884; P. Ferrato, *Il Marchesato di Mantova e l'impero Ottomano alla fine del secolo XV*, Mantua, 1876; L. Thuasne, *Djem Sultan*, Paris, 1892; and more recently by F. Babinger, H. J. Kissling and K. Setton.
 46. That was a Venetian conjecture – see Thuasne, 273.
 47. As for the 20,000 gold pieces the grand master extorted from the Egyptian Sultan, or rather from Djem's mother in Egypt by pretending to bring Djem to Egypt, a settlement was reached to the effect that the Grand Master was to reimburse to Djem only 5000 gold ducats instead (see *Waki'at*, 15, 23; Thuasne, 281). *Waki'at*, 15, also added that the Grand Master was writing false letters using blank papers with Djem's seal. D'Aubusson had procured them by bribing Djem's chancellor while he was in Rhodes. An intelligence report about the efforts of Djem's mother to bring him to Egypt is preserved in TKS, no. 6008/3. For Djem's correspondence with his mother, see Ertaylan, 226–7 (three letters); for the intimate relations of the Egyptian ambassador in Rome and Djem, see Thuasne, 273. The name of the Egyptian ambassador in 1494, Delü Naşûh, evidently an Ottoman, is known through a report of Mustafa Beg – see Uzunçarşılı, *Bellekten*, XXIV, 482.
 48. Thuasne, 277–83.
 49. *Ibid.*, 281, note 3.
 50. The letter was written in Greek; for a Latin version of it see Setton, 418, note 7; an Italian version is to be found in Doando da Lezze, *Historia Turchesca*, ed. I. Ursu, Bucharest, 1909, 187–8. The date on the Latin and Italian versions varies, with 17, 20 and 28 May 1490. Mustafa had arrived in Rhodes in June.

We could not identify the Turkish draft of this letter among the TKS papers. Here we follow the summary of the letter made by Setton, 418.

51. In Setton, 418, 'Kapudan Pasha', cf. Babinger, *Spätmittelalterliche fränkische Briefschaften*, 71, note 57.
52. Mustafa said: '... Oltre di questo ti promette et giura il detto Gran Signore cheper il tempo che'l detto suo fratello sarà custodito da cristiani, de i quali tu sei Capo et Principe, nè in persona, nè in beni, nè in terre, nè in altre cose a Te et cristiani pertinenti, quanto lui porta niun danno farà, nè permettera che sia fatto' (Donado da Lezze, ed. Ursu, 188–9).
53. Upon the death of Matthias Corvinus on 6 April 1490, the Ottoman frontier begs were in agitation and pressing the Sultan to wage a full-fledged campaign against Hungary. Such a campaign was to be made with the Sultan's participation in the spring of 1492 – see Donado da Lezze, 190–2; J. W. Zinkeisen, *Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches in Europa*, II, Gotha, 1854, 502–3; N. Iorga, *GOR*, II, Gotha, 1909, 283–4; H. J. Kissling, *Sultan Bâyezid's II. Beziehungen zu Markgraf Francesco II. Von Gonzaga*, Munich, 1965, 12; S. N. Fischer, *The Foreign Relations of Turkey, 1481–1512*, Urbana, IL, 1948, 46.
54. See Thuasne, 176–84; Setton, II, 418–22.
55. Setton, 421.
56. For many years the Ancona area within the Papal state was a target of Ottoman raids – see N. Iorga (Jorga), *Notes et Extraits pour servir à l'histoire des croisades au XVe siècle, 1476–1500*, Bucharest, 1915, 157–9, 163–4; Babinger, *Spätmittelalterliche fränkische Briefschaften*, 1, note 3; Jean Delumeau, 'Un ponte fra Oriente e Occidente: Ancona nel Cinquecento', *Quaderni Storici*, 13 (Ancona, 1970), 26–48; Setton, II, 397. There were settlers in the city and the countryside from the Ottoman lands, and Ottoman trade was to develop there so rapidly that it caused concern in Venice. In 1514 Ancona had to grant privileges to Ottoman merchants including Muslims; see T. Stoianovich, 'The Conquering Balkan Orthodox Merchant', *Journal of Economic History*, XX (July 1960), 237; Peter Earle, 'Commercial Development of Ancona, 1479–1551', *Economic History Review*, XXIV (1969), 28–44.
57. *Spätmittelalterliche fränkische Briefschaften*, 54–75.
58. Thuasne, 286–8.
59. For Djem's pension see note 65.
60. Mustafa's report in the Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Archives, reproduced in Tansel, 'Yeni Vesikalar' 64, no. 9; we shall analyse this important document in another paper. When Innocent VIII died (the night of 25–26 July 1492), d'Aubusson urged the new Pope to resume an energetic anti-Ottoman policy; see Setton, II, 453–6.
61. H. François Delaborde, *L'expédition de Charles VIII en Italie*, Paris, 1888, 323; Thuasne, 328.
62. Thuasne, 279.
63. Setton, II, 421, note 13; the summary of the letter is in Thuasne, 283.
64. See Setton, II, 421, note 12.
65. See the text of this important document in Setton, II, 419, note 10; 421, note 13. According to the original agreement made on 7 December 1482, with the Grand Master, Bayezid II vowed to pay a sum of 45,000 gold ducats every year on 1 August for the maintenance of Djem Sultan. In his work Giacomo Bosio (1594), chronicler of the Hospitallers, added that 35,000

of it was for Djem's maintenance and the remaining part for d'Aubusson (see Thuasne, 86; cf. Setton, 384). Innocent VIII himself once called this payment by the Sultan a kind of tribute; see Thuasne, 239. Djem's personal expenses ('ses dépenses privées') were 300 ducats a month. According to Setton, 435, note 66: 'It would seem quite unnecessary to observe that the 40,000 ducats a year paid by the Porte for Djem's maintenance was tribute and hardly a true pension.' According to Sigismondo de' Conti, Djem's yearly expenses amounted to 15,000 ducats; see Pastor, III, 228. Pfeffermann, 88–90, and Setton, 425, think that Innocent VIII was concerned with getting Djem's pension as a source of income. At his death bed he asked the cardinals' consent to his distribution of 48,000 ducats among members of his family (see Setton, II, 437).

66. Cf. Pfeffermann, 89: 'Obwohl durch die Annahme des Betrages die vom Grossmeister seinerzeit ratifizierte Gefangenhaltungskonvention in Kraft gesetzt ist, gibt sich Innocent den Anschein, noch nicht entschlossen zu sein.'
67. See Setton, II, 418–19.
68. Pfeffermann, 88–9, based on St. Baluzii, *Miscellanea*, Lucae, 1761, 518; cf. Thuasne, 179. If the 120,000 ducats were actually delivered, the 80,000 ducats of it must have been considered as a gift or bribe since the Pope demanded Djem's pension in 1491.
69. See I. A. Fessler, *Geschichte von Ungarn*, III, ed. E. Klein, Leipzig, 1874, 149; however, the Turkish Anonymous Bibl. Nationale, MS supp. turc 1047, 100r reads: 'In Ramadān 895/July 1491 the ambassador of the new Hungarian king came, and a peace was concluded with Hungary.'
70. For details see Katona cited by Zinkeisen, II, 502; and in particular, Anonymous Ottoman Chronicle no. 1047, folio 100; Tansel, 'Yeni Vesikalār Karşısında Sultan İkinci Bayezit', 152–3, relying on Kemāl Pashazāde and sources of later dates, is not clear.
71. The negotiations started in Adrianople in the last days of 1490. The peace was concluded in Djumāda II 896/April 1491; see Ibn Iyās, *Badā'i al-Zuhur fi waka'i al-Duhur*, III, ed. M. Mostafa, Cairo, 1963, 280–1. It was ratified in Istanbul on 11 October 1491. The Sultan of Tunis, alarmed by the Spanish reconquista, played an important part in bringing about the peace between the two major Muslim states – see note 20 above.
72. Here, too, Idris, the source of Sadeddin (II, 69–72), should be followed; cf. Hammer-Purgstall, GOR, II, 303; Tansel, 153–4; Kissling, 10–13.
73. According to a Venetian intelligence of 7 May 1492; see Setton, II, 415. In Idris: 20 coques, 5 *barcas*, eighty galleys and about 200 smaller ships or transports.
74. See Setton, II, 425–6.
75. However, in June 1491, news reached Rome that the Turks with 16 galleys and 14 *fuste* came and made a landing in Sicily; see Setton, II, 425, note 23.
76. Setton, 426, note 26.
77. For the situation in Albania, see Jorga, GOR, II, 276–89; for Montenegro, see F. von Miklosich, 'Die serbischen Dynasten Crnojevici', in *Sitzungsberichte der philos.-hist. Klasse der Kais. Akademie der Wissenschaften*, XVII (Vienna, 1886); F. Babinger, 'Das Ende der Arianiten', in *Bayer. Akademie der Wissenschaften, philos.-hist. Klasse, Sitzungsber. 1960*, Heft 4, Munich, 1960, 13, note 1; *Kanun-i*

Kanun-name, eds B. Durdev et al., Sarajevo, 1957, 153–77; a report to the Sultan, TKS 5904, in Ertaylan, 232, informed him that Leka Dukagin in northern Albania was in rebellion and was inviting European powers to invade the country. The report must have been written in the summer or autumn of 1493; cf. Thuasne, 318. According to the Anonymous chronicle (Paris, no. 1047, 101) ‘they sent by sea a fleet to obstruct the ways of escape to the infidel’. The King of Naples lost to the Ottomans the fortresses of Himara (Chimera) and Sopot (Sopoto) on the Albanian coast – see Jorga, GOR, II, 284.

78. Although F. Babinger, *Reliquiensbacher am Osmanenhof im XV. Jahrhundert*, Munich, 1956, 26, asserts that this envoy was again kapıdji-başı Mustafa, but no reference is given for it; cf. Thuasne, 296–7; Setton, 425; Kissling, 18. Once, 70,000 ducates were offered by the Venetians for the iron head of the Holy Lance (Setton, II, 427).
79. The text is in Thuasne, 279, note 1.

4

Ottoman Diplomacy at Karlowitz*

Rifa'at Ali Abou-El-Haj

L. V. Thomae in memoriam

At nine o'clock Saturday morning, 13 November 1698, an Ottoman diplomatic mission opened negotiations with the delegations representing the Holy League Powers (the Habsburg Monarchy, Poland, Muscovy and Venice) at the site of the ruined Serbian town of Karlowitz (Karlovoi Sremski in modern Yugoslavia).¹ The occasion for this confrontation was the settlement of territorial claims and the differentiation of frontiers between the Habsburg Kaiser and his Allies on the one hand and the Sultan on the other, commencing the formal assessment of decisions which had been forced over the previous 14 years on the battlefields of eastern and southeastern Europe.

These 14 years of Ottoman defeats, only occasionally interspersed with victories, can be said to have revealed the insufficiency of the Ottoman military arm as an instrument of foreign policy. Armed confrontation had been until 1683 almost consistently the chosen Ottoman mode of settling disputes with enemies.

From its inception, perpetual war in *darülharb* (abode of war) had been the *raison d'être* of the Ottoman *ghazi* state. Other than submission to tribute, its enemies had no alternative but war for reaching any type of accord over territorial disputes. When the latter alternative had been chosen, a diktat was invariably the price of peace. This condition was almost reversed in 1697 when, at the battle of Zenta, the Ottoman armies were overwhelmed and utterly defeated. Since a resumption of war at that juncture pointed to probable disaster and a dictation of terms, the Ottoman court was faced with the issue of negotiating from a weak

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position. Although there were some military commanders with a large following (such as Daltaban Mustafa Paşa)² who would have opted for a continuation of the war, the Sultan, upon the urgent bidding and insistence of his lieutenants, chose the way of peace.

It is proposed that for Ottoman history the decision to negotiate peace had far-reaching implications. Now for the first time in its annals the Ottoman state, as the price of defeat on the battlefields of Europe, was to give formal recognition to major territorial excisions. Realization of the necessity for these concessions must have been painful for a state whose initial, avowed and expressed justifications had been based upon the precept of an ever-expanding frontier.³ Given this patently militant ideology, it is perhaps only a truism to assert that war rather than compromise had been its chosen and preferred instrument of international intercourse with Europe. The equation of foreign policy with military adventure was, however, contingent upon Ottoman military superiority. Thus military reversals posed a new and unique problem: in the absence of necessity there had developed neither the formal apparatus for diplomatic communication nor the corps of trained personnel requisite for the negotiation of peace.

And yet, despite the apparent handicaps of the Ottoman state in terms of personnel properly trained in the intricacies of negotiating peace, and the circumstance of a nearly complete military disaster, the Karlowitz mission discharged its responsibilities quite admirably without compromising the interests of the Sultan. Moreover, it can be argued that the Sultan's representatives demonstrated a broader knowledge of Europe (intelligence being the *sine qua non* of every diplomat),⁴ a greater capacity for judicious compromise, and a more sophisticated application of diplomatic precedents and practices than has heretofore been acknowledged.⁵

Preliminaries and proposals

The 14 years' war culminated in 1697 with the conclusive defeat of the Ottomans at Zenta. This military disaster signalled an end to Ottoman hopes for a forcible recovery of territories lost to the Allies. Earlier, Ottoman readiness to end the war was checked not only by unreasonable Allied dictates,⁶ but also by a short-lived Ottoman military recovery in 1690–92⁷ and French moral and material support.⁸ With the imminence of peace between Louis XIV and the Habsburg Kaiser (late in 1697), Ottoman designs for immediate territorial restitution were completely dashed. Thus, despite further French efforts to dissuade the Ottomans

from making peace, with the defeat at Zenta hesitancy and reticence were converted into an anxiety for an immediate termination of hostilities with the Holy League.

As with any power faced with military disaster, Ottoman aims were confined to obtaining the best possible peace conditions. In light of earlier Allied overtures and propositions, an Ottoman peace formula was devised. The principle of *uti possidetis*, which seems to have served on previous occasions as the basis for peace between sultans and European kings, was adopted.⁹ However, in its proposals the Ottoman court requested the following modifications:

- Habsburg troops were to evacuate all forts in Transylvania and the forts were to be returned to the 'leaders' of that principality. The territory itself would then revert to its previous status as an autonomous state under the protection of both Sultan and Kaiser.
- The Tisza and Mureş rivers would be the boundaries of the Ottoman province of Timișoara.
- Fort Titel was to remain evacuated, and no new fortifications built on that site.
- Territory on the further (namely Habsburg) side of the Save river, which had formerly been part of Belgrade province, would be returned.
- The fort of Petrovaradin would be razed, and the forts of Illok, Esseg and Brod evacuated, with the line of demarcation, if possible, to be made there.
- The *palangas* (redoubts) within the Bosnian frontier on the further (namely Habsburg) side of the Una river, with their dependent lands, would be held by the Ottomans, and the rest of the *palangas* on the same river, in order to avoid conflict, would be evacuated.

Once agreement had been reached with the Habsburg Monarchy, peace with Poland and Venice was to be made on the following conditions:

- Fort Kamenets-Podolsk would be demolished by the Ottomans.
- In return, the Poles were to completely evacuate the principality of Moldavia.
- The old frontier with Poland would then be maintained.
- The principle of *uti possidetis* would be the basis upon which peace would be made with Venice.
- The plenipotentiaries of the various powers would, through consultation, rectify the frontier, and where necessary, the evacuation and/or demolition of certain forts would be decided upon.¹⁰

Ottoman objectives, as indicated by this formula and their proposed articles appended to it, were concrete, realistic and strategically sound. The Sultan's insistence on the return of Transylvania to its former status is an exception, an insistence which seems to have been motivated by two factors. The principality, wedged as it was between Hungary and the eastern European tributaries of the Ottoman state, was strategically valuable for the security and defence of those possessions and the remaining Ottoman territory in Subdanubia. Furthermore, as long as the territory remained an autonomous region, a status guaranteed by the Kaiser and the Sultan in 1664 by the Treaty of Vasvar, Protestant dissidents would continue to find it a haven from Habsburg (Jesuit-inspired) persecutions, and it would thus serve to check further Habsburg expansion in the Balkans. But it was primarily for these same reasons that the Kaiser could not tolerate making an exception of Transylvania to a strict interpretation of the principle of *uti possidetis*.

The absence of an allowance for Muscovite participation in the negotiations and in both the general and specific conditions for demolition of fortified positions and evacuation of territory along the frontier is among the other more noteworthy features of these proposals. The Tsar's initial reluctance to subscribe to any of the preliminaries, along with his sudden recall from Vienna due to the Streltsy Revolt in 1697, made it impossible for either Vienna or Istanbul to include Russia in the early stages of the negotiations.¹¹ However, with the Kaiser's insistence upon making peace the Tsar had little choice but to concur. Therefore, in response to Vienna's subsequent request, Muscovy was eventually included along with the other members of the Holy League in the Ottoman proposals.

Ottoman conditions for evacuation and demolition by the Kaiser and his Allies in the League were insisted upon at the outset by the Sultan as a precondition for his acceptance of *uti possidetis* as the general basis for the negotiations. For a strict adherence to and application of *uti possidetis* would have amounted to a dictation by the Allies of their terms, which the Ottoman court would have considered a direct affront. It was partly to avoid imposing this indignity that the Kaiser had agreed generally to the inclusion of the provisions of evacuation and demolition, to be applied, however, equitably throughout the negotiations.¹²

Once the Sultan agreed to include Muscovy in the proposed articles for peace, all parties to the conflict appointed their respective missions for the negotiations. Count Öttingen and Count Schlick were named to the Habsburg mission, along with Count Marsigli. The representative of the Kingdom-Republic of Poland was Count Stanislas Malachowski, and

Count Vozhnitsin attended on behalf of the Tsar. Venice despatched its envoy to the Viennese court, Cavalier Carlo Ruzzini.¹³

The Ottoman court appointed Rami Mehmed Efendi, the incumbent *Reisülküttab* (chief of secretaries at the Grand Vizier's chancery),¹⁴ and Chief Dragoman Iskerletzade Alexander.¹⁵

The negotiations

If the Allied plenipotentiaries anticipated that their mission would be a simple diktat, they were bound for a jarring disappointment. For neither in its approach to the conference nor in its deportment at the negotiation table was the Ottoman delegation to show weakness or subservience, despite the recent military defeat and Allied threats to resume hostilities.¹⁶ On the contrary, the pomp and circumstance attending the representatives of a still powerful potentate,¹⁷ the successful insistence upon meeting at a neutral site not of the choosing of the Kaiser¹⁸ and the contemptuous disposition towards the squabbles contracted by the Kaiser's allies over punctilious insistence on points of etiquette¹⁹ point to a demeanour far removed from that of a defeated power.

This demeanor accorded fully with the Sultan's directive that peace be concluded only in circumstances fully conforming with imperial honour and dignity.²⁰ The Ottomans had taken a realistic attitude toward territorial adjustments along the existing frontiers. An honourable peace was facilitated further by the expectation of resumed conflict in Western Europe and the persistent offers of mediation by Britain and Holland. The prospects of military conflict over the Habsburg and French claims to the Spanish Crown generated in Vienna the proper atmosphere for the conclusion of peace as a means of averting the prospects of a two-front war and providing a much needed respite before the return to a state of belligerency. Though neutral in the Habsburg–Ottoman 14-year tug-of-war, Britain and the Netherlands were just as anxious to see an end to the conflict in the east. Both were now anxious for an alliance with the Kaiser to discourage French pretensions in the Iberian Peninsula. It was with this in mind that the two countries renewed their intercessions and offered their good offices at both courts to serve as mediators between Kaiser and Sultan. Lord William Paget,²¹ along with the Dutch envoy Jacobus Collier,²² served as the mediators both in the preliminaries and at the congress.²³

With their task thus lightened, and through a fairly sophisticated handling of diplomatic tactics, while capitalizing at almost every turn on both the Kaiser's anxiety to conclude peace and on the dissension which

existed in the Allied camp over the meaning and application of the agreement in principle and the Ottoman conditions, the Sultan's envoys were able to follow their directives: wrest, when possible, the best territorial and frontier adjustments and conclude an honourable peace.

Since the proposals for peace were vague and general, and the preliminary agreement was only in principle, the Kaiser's delegates at Karlowitz requested, through the mediators, that the Ottoman mission submit its demands in writing. It is probable that the Habsburgs were motivated in this manoeuvre by the tactical advantage of having precise knowledge of their opponents' instructions and the real basis upon which the Sultan was ready to make peace, an advantage which was not to be realized.²⁴ Rami Mehmed Efendi and Iskerletzade Alexander, complying ostensibly with this request, chose from the list of Ottoman-proposed articles the principle of recognition of conquests, excepting Transylvania from its strict application and emphasizing the allowance for evacuation and demolition of some forts and redoubts concomitant with the rectification of the frontier.

Predictably, the exception of Transylvania from the agreement in principle threatened to jeopardize the whole conduct of the negotiations. Reminding the Ottomans of its conquest by force and at a high sacrifice in men and arms, the Kaiser's representatives intimated that Ottoman insistence upon this point would terminate the preliminaries and lead to war.²⁵ Feigning concession, the Ottoman delegation changed its tactics and requested in return the payment by the governing body of the territory of an annual gift to the Sultan as a consolation prize.²⁶ The Habsburg delegation, taking this manoeuvre as a veiled attempt at reasserting recognition of the Sultan's suzerainty, threatened once again to leave Karlowitz and thereby signal the resumption of hostilities.²⁷

Even as early as this stage in the debate, Ottoman strategy becomes discernible. Here, as in the ensuing opening sessions of the negotiations with the Allies, the Ottomans refused to divulge their instructions, partly as a precaution against a mistaking of their instructions for commitments on behalf of the Sultan. The Ottomans explained their refusal to comply on the grounds that had there been the likelihood of arriving at a settlement by such an exchange, which would be tantamount to negotiation by correspondence, neither delegation would have taken the trouble to convene at Karlowitz. In reality, this manoeuvre allowed the Ottomans the advantage of negotiating from a broad and flexible base rather than being rigidly held to a strict observance of a concrete commitment of terms. Terms could then be varied as they were needed for specific concessions on separate problems, an

advantage which was to serve the Ottomans well with both the Kaiser and his Allies.

The Ottoman adoption intact of the proposed article on Transylvania further probed the extent of the Kaiser's anxiety for peace. Once assured of Habsburg adamancy, all Ottoman claims to Transylvania were dropped immediately, only to be picked up in subsequent sessions both as a bargaining point and as the setting of a precedent.

In the first three formal encounters between Habsburg and Ottoman plenipotentiaries, the two major points of contention over the procedure for negotiation and the meaning of the provisions for evacuation were resolved. Whereas the Habsburgs preferred to negotiate the frontier settlement from the general to the specific, the Ottomans, appealing to precedents in past negotiations between their joint predecessors, insisted upon starting at one end of the frontier and disposing of it piece by piece until its entirety had been covered. On the first day after several hours of heated debate, the latter procedure was adopted with the additional proviso that unknown or ill-defined frontiers, especially in areas where there was no natural boundary, would be designed generally, to be rectified following the negotiations by a joint Austro-Ottoman commission on the spot.²⁸

Not without apprehension did the Habsburg mission adopt the Ottoman position on procedure. As it turned out, suspicions that the Ottomans would use this method to try to wring concessions from the Kaiser were fully justified, beginning with the negotiations which took place on the second day.

The discussion was, at first, centred upon the agreement in principle and the adopted provisions allowing for the demolition of forts and evacuation of territory concomitant with the rectification of the frontier. Earlier, it may be recalled, the Ottoman court had regarded *uti possidetis*, without exception and restrictions, as contrary to and incompatible with the dignity and honour of the Sultan. Thus the provisions for demolition and evacuation of specific forts and districts had been incorporated in the Ottoman proposals in order to rectify this possible indignity. The Habsburgs had allowed, though generally and with little specification, for these terms, but on condition that such provisions were to be applied equitably.

At the negotiation table, however, the Ottoman mission insisted upon raising this concession to a principle, a *quid pro quo* for the Sultan's acceptance of unrestricted *uti possidetis*.²⁹ In practice, thus, both principles would receive equal weight. Whereas *uti possidetis* would apply to former Ottoman territory in Habsburg hands, evacuation and demolition

would apply to the Habsburgs exclusively. In vain, the Kaiser's envoys tried to assert that unrestricted *uti possidetis* was the basis for the agreement in principle, and that the provisions allowing for demolition and evacuation were meant to apply equally to both parties: for every fort or territory the Kaiser would evacuate or demolish, the Sultan would do the same to an equivalent.³⁰ The support which the mediators accorded the Habsburg interpretation went unheeded. Paget and Collier finally suggested that negotiations should proceed and, when the territory of each side was determined, then the designation and rectification of the frontier would become possible. Only then would the necessity of evacuation and demolition be seen, after which the process might be resolved without creating unnecessary problems or delays.

To the support which the mediators accorded the Habsburg stand, the Ottoman mission prepared a rebuttal. Interpreting the vagueness of the initial proposed articles to their advantage,³¹ they explained that the drawing of fine distinctions between *uti possidetis* and the provisions for rectification of the frontier was equivalent to splitting hairs.³² To illustrate this point, a concrete example was introduced. According to the strict application of the agreement in principle, Transylvania fell to the Habsburgs, but this principality had a common frontier with Timișoara province which would have to be designated simultaneously with the disposal of the article on Transylvania. In such a case, the Kaiser would have to evacuate the redoubts which his forces held in Timișoara, thereby putting into effect both *uti possidetis* and the provisions for evacuation and demolition.

The irate Habsburg response notwithstanding, the Ottomans had, without conceding or modifying their initial stand, shifted the debate from the theoretical level to the concrete, thereby breaking the deadlock.

In justification for their claims for Timișoara, the Habsburgs argued that with the exception of the main fort, the whole province had been conquered by the Kaiser's armed forces, including several major forts. By requesting evacuation of their holdings in the province, the Ottomans were being quite unreasonable, acting contrary to the military axiom of conquest: whoever claims by seizure the greater part of a territory is entitled to the whole of it.³³

In disputing these Austrian 'pretensions', the Ottoman mission first enumerated the holdings of the Ottoman state in the region and then indicated that fort Timișoara, which had always had a capacity for accommodating a garrison of over a thousand troops, was the seat and capital of the provincial government, now in Ottoman hands, and therefore its districts and dependencies would have to remain within

Ottoman jurisdiction. The forts which the Kaiser claimed, according to the Ottomans, were redoubts with maximum capacity for several scores of troops each. Even if it were conceded theoretically that these were more than redoubts, still, being dependencies of the capital and seat of power, they formed part and parcel of the province. Thus, according to this reasoning, though their aggregate would amount to more than the capital and the total of Ottoman holdings in quantity, number and size would not exempt dependency. For, the fort, being the capital, would necessarily command a higher rank than the sum total of its dependencies, a precedent which both Kaiser and Sultan had agreed to in preceding negotiations. Accordingly, the Ottoman spokesmen insisted, the forts and districts of Timișoara held by Habsburg forces would have to be evacuated.³⁴

Following these claims and counterclaims, the remainder of the second day was spent in an exchange of acrimony and imputations of bad faith. Finally, recognizing that neither delegation was willing to concede or compromise on its rigid position with regard to Timișoara, the mediators proposed the postponement of negotiations over the articles of evacuation and demolition in order that the debate might move on to the next part of the frontier.

The third consecutive day of negotiation with the Habsburgs proved to be the most crucial of the entire congress. The suggestion of the mediators was ignored and the debate over the province continued. Although the Kaiser's envoys tried to justify their claims to Timișoara on the grounds of conquest of the largest provincial fort,³⁵ the Ottomans would not budge from their initial stand. In face of Ottoman adamancy they advanced two compromises. At first, the Habsburgs consented to hand over fort Lugoj to the Ottomans, but demanded in return the delimitation of the province at the Bega river.³⁶ Since the compromise solution would deprive the Ottoman province of the use of both the Tisza and Mureș rivers, and because the Bega had flowing water for only nine months of the year, thus being a poor line of demarcation, the Ottoman spokesman declined to accept this first compromise.³⁷

The Habsburgs responded to these objections by agreeing to evacuate the region north of the Bega, on condition that the area remained neutral – uninhabited and uncultivated, serving as a buffer zone between the possessions of the Sultan and the Habsburgs. The Ottomans again objected on the grounds that this arrangement was contrary to the spirit of peace – peace was, after all, for the repose and tranquillity as well as prosperity of the peoples of both powers, and for the resuscitation and recultivation of their lands.³⁸ Before adjournment, towards the end of

the third day of intensive deliberations, the Habsburgs modified their second compromise by reducing the buffer zone to an area of three to four miles in depth delimited by the Mureş and Tisza rivers. Although on the following day the Kaiser's envoys insisted upon the buffer zone as their absolute maximum concession on the Timișoara case, the Ottoman mission was undeterred from seeking the total evacuation of the province and recognition of the Sultan's full title to it.³⁹ It was quite obvious that exclusive and full control of the waters of the two rivers was the main point at issue. For the Ottomans these bodies of water were important not only as a means of transportation, but also for fishing rights and cultivation – two important features for the economic well-being of the whole northern region of the province.

What seems to have puzzled the Ottomans was the fact that they had readily given accord to the Kaiser's full control of Transylvania without restrictions, whereas his plenipotentiaries were balking at ceding only sectors of a province almost wholly controlled by the Sultan. When it became clear that there was no possible compromise forthcoming from the Sultan's side, the Habsburg delegates finally agreed to have the two rivers serve as the northern and western boundaries of the province with the stipulation that transportation and fishing rights were to be freely used by Transylvanians and Ottomans alike.⁴⁰

Separate articles were then drawn up, one giving the Transylvanian principality with its old frontier to the Kaiser, and the other according Timișoara to the Sultan, with the Transylvanian border in the east and the Mureş and Tisza in the north and west as its limits. Thus by the first article, all Ottoman claims to the principality were dropped, but not without subsequent benefit. By conceding the whole province of Timișoara to the Sultan, the Kaiser had in effect given tacit recognition to the Ottoman promotion of the provisions for rectification of the frontier as a principle, and strengthened the position of the Sultan's envoys by providing them with a potent precedent. In their negotiations with the Kaiser's unequal partners in the League, the representatives of the Ottoman state were to try to apply this precedent to its fullest extent.

Despite known and anticipated Habsburg opposition to any Ottoman claims to the Transylvanian principality, by pressing this item, Rami Mehmed Efendi and Iskerletzade Alexander were in effect following the probable injunctions of the Ottoman court to pursue every item of the proposed articles. The Ottoman representatives had everything to gain by pressing their demands on the principality and similar territory which was not held by the Sultan's forces. It has already been noted that the Ottoman withdrawal of their claim on this item was used immediately

in the following conference as a *quid pro quo* for the Sultan's demands for exclusive retention of the province of Timișoara. One feature, however, differentiates the Ottoman view and treatment of the two territories. Transylvania had been lost in its totality through military conquest. In the other case, however, the Sultan could claim, with legal justification, retention of at least the middle dependencies of the province, including the provincial capital and principal fort. Thus, as long as the land in dispute was outside the control of the Sultan, for instance Transylvania, it was possible for the Ottoman mission to drop its initial demands. At the same time, though the Habsburgs were the victors in the recent campaigns, the Sultan's mission did not concede any of the territorial claims concerning Timișoara which the Ottoman state had first made in the articles of January 1698.

In the following negotiations with the Kaiser's envoys, the Ottoman mission at Karlowitz continued to hold steadfast to one principle: no Ottoman-held territory in the frontier areas would, under any circumstances, be abandoned as a result of the negotiations. Thus, in the next confrontation with the Habsburgs, no objections were raised to the Kaiser's retention of the whole district of Bačka, an area located between the Danube and the Tisza, seized during the war. But when the settlement of the Serm territory was raised a contest ensued.⁴¹ Here the problem was further complicated by the lack of natural boundaries between the holdings of both sides, a condition which did not facilitate the quick designation of the frontier without the necessity of large land concessions by either party.

In the proposed articles, the Ottomans had demanded the evacuation of several forts in the Serm district and Slavonia-Petrovaradin, Ilok and Brod among others. All these forts were at the time in Habsburg possession. The Ottoman side suggested further the delineation of the frontier at the said forts. When, in accordance with their adopted procedure, they tried to press settlement in this region in accordance with the proposed articles, they faced a determined Habsburg opposition.

The Kaiser's envoys at this point protested that the whole province of Timișoara had, despite extensive Habsburg holdings, just been conceded in its entirety to the Sultan. It was difficult for them to understand the equity of evacuating their forts in the Slavonian district. Once the Ottomans dropped their request for the evacuation of these forts, it became possible to designate the frontier in the region. This settlement, embodied in Article IV of the treaty, reflected two aspects of Ottoman aspirations.⁴² They were assured a foothold in the Serm, in full conformity with the directives that some of the dependencies of Belgrade

across the Save should be retained within Ottoman jurisdiction. Furthermore, they were, by virtue of this same article, assured of Ottoman retention of territory already held by the Sultan's troops across the river from Belgrade. Hence, as long as Ottoman holdings in eastern Slavonia were preserved, the Sultan's envoys did not find it onerous to drop their initial demands for the evacuation of forts in Habsburg possession.

Agreement over the designation of the territory and frontier in Bosnia-Croatia was much more difficult to reach. During the war, Austrian troops, though successful in entering the northern regions of Bosnia, had failed to capture the whole of Croatia on the western bank of the Una river. A request that this river be made the boundary between the contending powers was refused by the Ottomans. In the proposed articles, the Sultan had requested the evacuation of all Habsburg-held fortifications and fortified positions across the Una (on the west bank) and the return of all the districts which were dependencies of Ottoman-held strong points. When the Habsburg delegation protested against this Ottoman demand on the grounds that it would be a virtual dictation,⁴³ it was reminded that the territory which the Kaiser had captured from the Ottomans was quite extensive, and should the Sultan's consent for the ratification of the peace be desired, some territorial concession would have to be made. It was then asserted that inasmuch as Ottoman holdings on the western bank of the river were quite considerable, the dependencies would have to revert to the Sultan by virtue of the equation of the principle of *uti possidetis* with the provisions for evacuation. Although several hours of heated discussion ensued, no agreement was reached over the exact designation of the frontier. A general and provisional line was drawn for later rectification by a joint Habsburg-Ottoman mission.⁴⁴ Once the frontier and territorial articles were settled, the major points of contention between the delegations of the Kaiser and Sultan were resolved.⁴⁵

In its discussions with the Habsburg mission, the Ottoman delegation had managed, through negotiation, to gain most of the limited objectives outlined for it in the proposed articles. As compared with losses, Ottoman gains were perhaps trivial. However, the Sultan's envoys had succeeded in obtaining what the court considered an equitable settlement without compromising the dynasty's honour or dignity. Moreover, the strategic and economic importance of the concessions which were accorded the Ottomans cannot be ignored.⁴⁶ By obtaining exclusive hold over Timișoara, which lies between Hungary and Transylvania, the Ottomans assured the inhabitants of the province all the economic benefits to be derived from the use of land and water, and placed the Hungarian capital within striking distance of their armed forces. When the time was ripe,

they could have mounted expeditions both against Habsburg holdings in the Kingdom of Hungary and into Transylvania as well. Similarly the Sultan's Slavonian and Croatian holdings would serve as convenient stepping-stones for the possible recovery of territory in Croatia on the one hand and Slavonia and southern Hungary on the other.⁴⁷

The diplomatic gains have already been noted. *Uti possidetis* had been successfully interpreted by the Ottomans as the equivalent of the provisions for evacuation and demolition. Whatever territorial gains the Ottomans obtained were justified by this special interpretation of the agreement in principle. This special interpretation, having received tacit recognition by the Kaiser's plenipotentiaries, had profound repercussions in the negotiations with the lesser powers in the League.

Negotiations with the Polish Kingdom-Republic mission revolved around two territorial claims. Whereas the armed forces of Poland had succeeded in wresting and fortifying strategic points in northern Moldavia, they had not, despite several attempts, wrested the entire Podolian province. Its major fort and capital, Kamenets-Podolsk, which at the time accommodated an Ottoman garrison of over four thousand,⁴⁸ was held securely, although it was continuously under threat. But in the proposed articles, the Sultan accorded a rare concession: an exchange of the Podolian capital for the Polish withdrawal from Moldavia.

At the outset, the Polish–Ottoman negotiations were deadlocked by the spokesman for the Kingdom-Republic. Not only did he create doubt about the initial Polish adherence to the Ottoman proposals by arguing that King August II had not subscribed to them,⁴⁹ but he also threatened to jeopardize the entire work of the congress, should the Ottomans refuse his demands. Ottoman evacuation of the Podolian capital he took for granted.⁵⁰ Refusing even to consider the Ottoman provisions for exchange, he insisted that by right of conquest the whole of Moldavia should be evacuated and surrendered.⁵¹ To him, then, the Sultan's surrender of Podolia and Moldavia, in addition to dropping all claims of sovereignty over western Ukraine, would serve as the minimal acceptable basis for negotiation.

Ottoman strategy in the face of these 'preposterous' dictations was to drop at the outset the exchange clause accorded by the Sultan and then to insist upon Polish evacuation and surrender of the entire Podolian province.⁵² The Ottoman counter-dictation was justified on the legal and precedented grounds that the capital and its immediate dependencies – as in the case of Timișoara – were securely held by Ottoman forces; therefore the entire province of Podolia should revert to Ottoman suzerainty.⁵³

The resulting impasse was broken gradually, as in the case of *Timișoara*, by a series of compromises. At first Malachowski offered to have some of the Polish-held strongholds in Moldavia evacuated on condition, however, that *Kamenets-Podolsk* be abandoned.⁵⁴ To make this offer less attractive, he insisted on the disposal of the latter clause before proceeding to the study of his offer of evacuation. Thus, anxious to obtain immediate satisfaction over the *Podolian* question, the Polish envoy had conceded far short of what the Ottomans had expected. For, by not offering to drop all Polish claims on Moldavia, he forced the Ottomans to take the compromise as an empty gesture.⁵⁵

Their reaction to this offer came indirectly. It was claimed that before any concessions could be made pertaining to the disposal of their positions in *Podolia*, the whole question had to be referred to the Sultan, since he alone could allow for such concessions. Ottoman strategy at this point is readily understandable: by denying their ability to determine the *Podolia* article and referring it to the Sultan, they had hoped to sway Malachowski to concede fully on Moldavia. Reasoning in the Habsburg manner with regard to *Timișoara*, the Polish envoy, nevertheless, belittled Ottoman strategic and legal claims in the province and exaggerated the military and financial importance of Polish holdings in Moldavia. To Poland, then, the Ottoman offer of exchange was regarded as an unfair bargain.

At the penultimate conference between the two delegations, the Polish count, still persisting in his stand, turned the discussion to the problem of the *Crimean Tatars*.⁵⁶ In the past, the Kingdom-Republic had paid them for mercenary services against their enemies. On such occasions, the sum which was paid was determined on each occasion separately. The practice had evolved into an annual tribute designed as a bribe to control Tatar raids into Polish territory. That same day, Malachowski insisted that the tribute to the Tatars constituted a violation of his country's sovereignty and independence, and requested that the Sultan's envoys agree to bring to an end this odious practice.⁵⁷ Should the Ottoman state find it impossible or difficult to maintain control over the Tatars, he allowed, it should withdraw its protection and eventually evict them from the *Crimea*.⁵⁸

After several hours of fruitless negotiation over the Tatar problem – the Ottomans having insisted upon maintaining the status quo in Polish-Tatar relations – the mediators suggested the postponement of discussion over this article until other clauses were settled and drawn up. The meeting was adjourned until the next conference when the Polish envoy finally consented to the exchange clause, thereby allowing for Polish evacuation

of northern Moldavia.⁵⁹ As for the Tatar question, he was satisfied with Ottoman assurances of the Sultan's ability and readiness to halt all violations of the Polish frontier, and his consent to drop the yearly tribute.

Negotiations with the Tsar's mission were hampered at the outset by the limited instructions and powers which had been given to Count Vozhnitsin.⁶⁰ Peter, the most vehement opponent of peace, hoping perhaps to dissuade the Kaiser from going on with the negotiations, had not only refused to treat on any basis other than *uti possidetis* but also refused the mediation of England and Holland. Russian troops had, during the latter phase of the war, captured Azov in the east and several strongholds in the west on the lower cataracts of the Dnieper, thereby controlling the land route between Sultan and Tatar Khan. It was the Tsar's hope, while Ottoman forces were in the main tied down in Subdanubia, to push on right into the Crimea and capture Fort Kerch, finally ridding Russia of the Tatar menace.

The Kaiser's anxiety to reach an early accord with the Ottomans, and secret Russian negotiations with Poland and Denmark early in 1698 in anticipation of military conflict with Sweden (which finally broke out in 1700), forced Peter to appoint a representative at Karlowitz. Thus temporarily blocked from attaining his territorial objectives by military force despite Muscovy's ability to resume the war, Peter resorted, though quite sceptically, to negotiations. Vozhnitsin was apparently instructed to demand not only recognition of Russian conquests, but also the evacuation and surrender of Fort Kerch, which controlled the southern marine entry into the Sea of Azov, as the minimum basis for the settlement of peace with the Sultan.⁶¹

The Ottomans, having obtained territorial satisfaction from their chief contender in the League, were not anywhere close to allowing for a Russian dictation at the negotiations. Their terms, in full accordance with those obtained from the Kingdom-Republic and Habsburg Monarchy, set as a minimum the complete evacuation of the newly erected Russian fortresses on the Dnieper,⁶² in return for the Sultan's acknowledgment of Russian possession of Azov. Peter's envoy at Karlowitz, having no authority to treat on other bases than *uti possidetis* and Ottoman surrender of Kerch, and seeing that the Sultan's envoys were not budging from their demands for the evacuation of the western land route into the Crimea, finally accepted a truce of two years,⁶³ until a later date when some kind of accord could be reached and a final peace settlement facilitated.⁶⁴

Unlike the proposed articles for the Habsburg Monarchy and the Polish Kingdom-Republic, those offered to the Republic of St Mark were

general and without special modifications. Yet it was with the concurrence and eventual encouragement of the Kaiser's envoys that Venice, by the end of the conference at Karlowitz, was to suffer the most from the Sultan's equation of *uti possidetis* with the provisions for evacuation.

Contentions over Venetian-held territory in Dalmatia, Bosnia-Croatia and the mountains north of the Morea, and some Aegean islands blocked the path of an easy negotiation between the representatives of the Sultan and the Doge. The preoccupation of the former's forces in the Hungarian plains for most of the 14 years of war had allowed the relatively weakened Republic to capture and retain the whole of the Morea in the south, to gain control of the Corinthian gulf through fortifications at Lepanto, and to hold strong points along the Adriatic from northern Greece to Dalmatia. It was thus with high hopes of consolidating these positions there, if not for further territorial acquisitions, that Venice had been, along with the Tsar, reluctant to see the cessation of hostilities. But unlike the Tsar, who could have resumed the war with a minimum of help, the Republic could not delay the conclusion of peace in 1698–99 by simply signing a truce, for fear of isolation and the prospect of facing the Sultan single-handed while its Allies were occupied elsewhere in Europe.

Armed with this awareness of the relative weakness of Venice in Europe generally, and in its possessions in the Balkans especially, and close to agreement with three of the four Allies in the League, the Sultan's envoys were all set to press on Ruzzini, the representative of the Venetian Senate, the provisions for evacuation and demolition. Notwithstanding the Cavalier's frequent resort to delaying tactics,⁶⁵ the Ottoman mission, after long and arduous sessions, managed to wrench consent for the abandonment of all Venetian possessions north of the Morea on the northern shores of the Gulf of Corinth (including Lepanto) and obtained free access to Ragusa.⁶⁶ This virtual dictation of terms was achieved by the adamantness of the Ottoman envoys and threats to reopen campaigns on all fronts, and by the anxiety and impatience of the Kaiser's envoys for a rapid conclusion of peace even at the price of abandoning Venice to its fate.⁶⁷

Résumé and conclusions

In his relation of the transactions at Karlowitz, Ruzzini first observes with admiration the ability of the Ottomans to turn dramatically from war to negotiation as a means of settling disputes with their neighbours⁶⁸ and then expresses frustration with their disposition at the conference table.⁶⁹

Military defeat had obviously not tempered the Sultan's proclivities for dictating terms. Perhaps in self-defence for his poor diplomatic performance, the Venetian ambassador places the blame on the Republic's Allies – especially the Habsburg Monarchy – for allowing the Ottomans to have their way in the initial stages of the actual negotiations.⁷⁰ With both bitterness and disappointment, he admits to the Signoria that the ambitions and interests of its Allies had already begun to shift away from the Ottoman frontier. By inference, Ruzzini points to an obvious contemporary political reality which expedited the aims of the Ottomans: no major continental power could have successfully sustained a two-front war for any length of time. With the imminence of renewed conflict with France over the Spanish succession,⁷¹ the Habsburgs were anxious to come to terms with the Sultan. The Kaiser's Allies in turn had very little choice but to follow suit.⁷²

In 1698, the Ottoman state was ready and willing to negotiate peace with the Holy League powers. The deliberateness of this decision is perhaps best reflected in the Ottoman aims as advanced in the proposed articles which were forwarded to the Kaiser and his Allies. Its aims were limited and realistic, though not devoid of either dignity or strategy – initially the Ottoman court accepted *uti possidetis* only after it was assured of provisions for evacuation.

By rapidly disposing of their business with the Habsburg representatives in the first set of formal negotiations, the Sultan's delegates cleared the greatest hurdle which could have blocked the attainment of peace. The first phase of the negotiations acquires deeper significance with the commencement of debate with the Kaiser's Allies. For, in their deliberations with the Kaiser's envoys, the Ottoman delegates succeeded, within their limited aims, in establishing precedents and interpretations advantageous to their sovereign's claims. From the very beginning, the Ottomans refused to comply with the Habsburg request for a written statement of their general demands, for compliance would have deprived them of the opportunity to obtain minor territorial concessions.

The two basic and most central themes of the first negotiation were the interpretation and application of both the agreement in principle and the provisions for evacuation and demolition. These two component parts of the general agreement had been approved by both Kaiser and Sultan (the former acting on behalf, though obviously not with the concurrence, of his Allies). This was done before their respective missions had arrived at Karlowitz. Yet, at the conference table, three basic interpretations emerged. The one given by the Habsburg delegation differed widely not only from the interpretation given by the Ottomans, but also

from those of the Allies. Originally, concessions with regard to the provisions for evacuation had been made on the understanding that they would be applied equitably and for the mutual benefit of both sides. Instead, the Ottoman mission equated the provisions with the agreement in principle, placing the two on the same par.

The Kaiser's three Allies had agreed that *uti possidetis* should be the only basis for the negotiation of peace, thereby according no recognition to the allowance made by the Kaiser for demolition and evacuation. Thus, although the Habsburgs were finally to accept the Ottoman equation, the Venetian envoy as well as the Russian and Polish plenipotentiaries refused to negotiate on any basis other than a strict application of *uti possidetis*. The three, at one point in their respective negotiations, tried to dictate their terms – Kerch to go to Russia, Moldavia to Poland, and the mountains near Athens to Venice. None of the three achieved its immediate territorial aim. Thus Russia chose a two-year peace once it became apparent that no Ottoman concession was forthcoming. Venice, despite the delaying tactics of its envoy at Karlowitz, had to accept virtual dictation by the Sultan. Poland, however, having been allowed an exchange in the preliminaries, obtained Kamenets-Podolsk and hence the whole of Podolia in return for Ottoman recovery of Moldavia.

Once the Habsburg peace mission acceded to the Ottoman position on both procedure and agreement in principle, the task of the Sultan's mission in the rest of the negotiations was simplified. Yet Allied refusal to adhere to the Kaiser's acquiescence necessitated the tedious task of Ottoman reiteration, at every set of negotiations, of the same arguments for the equation of the principle of *uti possidetis* with the provisions for demolition and evacuation. But, unlike the discussions with the Kaiser's envoys, where stubborn adherence to one position usually produced most of the desired results, in the confrontations with the Allies it was necessary sometimes to resort to ultimatums. Thus the Venetian envoy was informed that unless he conceded to Ottoman demands, the Republic might be confronted with isolation from her Allies and a probable state of war with the Ottomans.

Throughout the negotiations, the Ottoman mission adhered to one sacred principle: unless specified, as in the case of the Podolian capital, no part of Muslim-held territory was negotiable. This principle, it should be noted, the Sultan's envoys successfully upheld. Thus the almost exclusive application of the provisions for demolition and evacuation to Allied-held strong points on the frontier should be taken as a corollary of the principle of inalienability.



Map 1 Points of negotiation

From the very beginning of the preliminaries, the Ottoman executive and its mission at Karlowitz were guided by both this principle and its corollary. In effect, this meant the Sultan would not accept a dictated peace: a position both delicately concealed by his insistence upon upholding the dignity and honour of the Ottoman dynasty and more openly expressed in demands for concrete evidence that a dictation had not taken place.

Though neither the strategic nor the economic aspects of the final frontier settlement can be ignored, the Ottoman executive's insistence on this stand was necessitated by two considerations. First, it was a face-saving device. In the wake of military disasters, the Ottoman peace mission was expected to minimize the territorial price of defeat – hence the insistence on land concessions, however minor, from each one of the Allies. By the end of the negotiations, not one of the Allied delegations could claim to have dictated its terms.

Second, it was a foregone conclusion that subsequent to the negotiations the Sultan would accord formal recognition to vast territorial acquisitions by the Allies. Both the Ottoman court and its mission at Karlowitz had to take into full consideration the internal repercussions of these losses. Hence, at the negotiation table measures had to be taken to make the final settlement palatable to the Sultan's subjects generally and to the

once indomitable military establishment especially. For the dislocation and hardships endured by the former during 14 years of continuous warfare, and the humiliation of the latter in eastern and southeastern Europe, rendered a dictated settlement virtually unacceptable.

Notes

1. An abbreviated version of this study was presented in March 1966 as a lecture to the Center for Near Eastern and North African Studies, the University of Michigan. In 1960–61 a Foreign Area Study Fellowship, then of the Ford Foundation, facilitated part of the research for this article in Turkey.
2. Daltaban/Daltabal Mustafa Paşa had distinguished himself as a competent though ruthless commander and administrator in both the European and Asiatic provinces of the Sultan's domains. Upon the resignation of Amcazade Hüseyin Paşa in 1702, Mustafa Paşa was appointed Grand Vizier. During his short service in high office he was accused of having encouraged the rebellion of the Crimean Tatars who apparently had been dissatisfied with the outcome of the negotiations and peace of Karlowitz. Due to his implication in this rebellion and in the alleged conspiracy to get rid of the most powerful personage at the court, the Şeyhülislam Feyzullah Efendi, he was dismissed in January 1703, after only four months of service, and executed shortly thereafter. See Defterdar Mehmed Paşa, *Zubdat ul-vakay'* (Istanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Esad Efendi ktb., 992), 409a ff. for a report of the Grand Vizier's satisfaction with the Tatar revolt and of his corruption while in office.
3. Concomitant with the territorial losses was the dissipation of religious élan which can be inferred from the concerted effort of the Ottoman executive to 're-educate' the *reaya* (subjects) in Muslim precepts. An example of the directives initiating religious propaganda can be seen in the Ottoman Archives (Başbakanlık Arşivi) in Istanbul, Mühimme Defteri 112, 1991–93.
4. Although some European states were represented at Istanbul by resident ambassadors, the Ottoman court had no reciprocal diplomatic representatives abroad. Thus intelligence and information of the outside world were obtained either by Ottoman envoys appointed ad hoc for the duration of their mission or through resident diplomats in Istanbul. The latter kind of intelligence was obviously slanted to favour the governments submitting it; nevertheless the basic issues were usually incorporated in their reports: thus between 1688 and 1701, the Ottoman court was fully cognizant of the English Glorious Revolution and the French attempts to halt the debarkation of William of Orange in England (summary in Silihdar Mehmed Aga, *Silihdar Tarihi*, 2 vols (Istanbul, 1928), Vol. II, 480, 534, hereafter cited as Silihdar, *Tarih.*); of the departure of Peter I of Russia on his famous tour of Europe (Rami Mehmed Efendi, *Karlofça mukalesesi* (Istanbul: Istanbul Üniversitesi Kütüphanesi, Türk Yazmaları), 3514 18a, source hereafter cited as Rami Mehmed, *Karlofça*); and of the progress of the French campaign against the Netherlands during the first phase of the War of the Spanish Succession (Mühimme defteri 111, Istanbul, Başbakanlık Arşivi), 715 ff.

5. Thus far two studies have been devoted to the negotiations which took place at Karlowitz: one by M.R. Popovič, *Der Friede von Karlowitz* (Leipzig, 1893) (hereafter cited as Popovič, *Der Friede*) and the other by W. B. Munson, 'The Peace of Karlowitz', unpublished PhD dissertation (University of Illinois, Urbana, 1940) (hereafter cited as Munson, 'Peace'). Due to several factors, not the least important of which was the unavailability of Ottoman sources to both authors, neither one attempted to study and evaluate adequately the position and performance of the Sultan's mission at the conference.
6. Termination of hostilities between the belligerents was entertained in 1688–89 and 1692–94. On both occasions, though propositions were exchanged, the negotiations were deadlocked by exorbitant demands from both sides.
7. In 1690, under Köprülü Mustafa Paşa, Fazıl Ahmed Paşa's brother, the Ottomans recovered Bulgaria and Serbia and recaptured Belgrade.
8. France had, throughout the 14 years' war, encouraged the Ottomans to maintain a state of belligerency against the Habsburgs. Thus it was partly to relieve the Ottomans that Louis XIV finally resumed hostilities in 1688 in the West. Yet, with the imminence of peace between Sultan and Kaiser in 1697–98, pressure was placed on the Ottomans to continue their campaigns in the east, with the oral assurance by the resident French ambassador that France would be resuming its campaigns against the Habsburg Monarchy with the death of the Spanish King. When documentary proof of French promises was not forthcoming, the Ottomans, exhausted from the war and desirous to set their house in order, simply ignored the French overtures and resumed their efforts to facilitate the peace. For a report of these overtures, see Rami Mehmed, *Karlofça*, 28a.
9. V. L. Ménage suggests that as early as the fifteenth century, the Ottomans used *uti possidetis* as a basis for peace. Ménage, 'Seven Ottoman Documents', in S. M. Stern (ed.), *Documents from Islamic Chanceries* (Oxford, 1965), 82–3, 102.
10. Copy of Ottoman text in Rami Mehmed, *Karlofça*, 17a–18a. A copy of the Latin text sent to the King of England can be seen in Paget Papers, Public Records Office, State Papers 97/21, 12a (hereafter cited as PRO SP 97/21). The date given for the Latin rendition is 15 Recep, 1109 or 26 January 1698. In the negotiations the disposition of the forts after evacuation, whether by demolition or by reoccupation by the other party, was determined separately for each fort.
11. PRO SP 16a, for the English Ambassador's explanation of the conspicuous absence of the Tsar in the preliminary negotiations.
12. Rami Mehmed, *Karlofça*, 32b–33a.
13. For short biographies of members of these missions see Popovič, *Der Friede*, 43–6.
14. The Reisülküttab's functions had expanded by the second half of the seventeenth century to include internal, military and foreign affairs. This observation is based on a study of the Mühimme defterleri nos. 105 through 115 (covering the years 1694–1703). For further details see Rifa'at Ali Abou-Ei-Haj, 'The Reisülküttab and Ottoman Diplomacy at Karlowitz' (unpublished PhD dissertation, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ, 1963). The expansion of the Reisülküttab's functions points to a larger pattern of development in Ottoman institutions starting at least from the beginning of the century.

There is enough evidence to warrant a tentative hypothesis that the Ottoman state was undergoing an inevitable transformation from a strictly medieval, militant, expansionist state to a bureaucratic one whose primary intent was self-preservation against external threat, and whose *raison d'être* was self-perpetuation. It should be noted, however, that this institutional transformation and the concomitant modification of the Ottoman ethos were neither easy nor fully successful, for they were of necessity accompanied by the loss of position and prestige of the military establishment, whose perpetual preoccupation with regaining its privileged and enviable position (through both internal and external ventures) rendered the internal political history of the state, until its virtual dissolution, a series of one *coup d'état* after another. (The present author plans to elaborate on some of these tentative observations in his forthcoming study of the *coup d'état* of 1703.) For a recent biography of Rami Mehmed Efendi/Paşa see *Islam Ansiklopedisi*.

15. For a detailed, though somewhat partisan, account of Iskerletzade Alexander, known to contemporary Europeans as Mavrocordato, see Alexandre A. C. Sturdza, *L'Europe Orientale et le Rôle Historique des Maurocordato, 1660–1830* (Paris, 1913), 33–50.
16. Anticipating the possible continuation of the war, the Ottoman court had taken precautions by raising and equipping new troops. Rami Mehmed, *Karlofça*, 29a corroborated by PRO SP 97/21, 8b. To supplement a depleted war treasury, the Ottoman executive resorted in November and December 1697 to what had become by now a common practice of taking extraordinary 'contributions' from both high officers of the government and *evkaf* (religious endowments). Maliye defteri 6006 (Istanbul, Başbakanlık Arşivi), 13–27, has a detailed listing of each endowment with the amount of contribution both anticipated and collected. Although two hundred *kese* (of five hundred *guruş-i esedi* each) were anticipated, it was possible, without jeopardizing the proper functioning of these religio-philanthropic enterprises, to collect 137 *kese*. See Maliye defteri 6006, 4ff. for amounts collected from officers of the administration, from whom the total of 785 *kese* was collected.
17. The Ottoman mission to Karlowitz was accompanied by a military escort of over 1200 men dressed and equipped in their colourful ceremonial uniforms and parade arms. For more details see Rami Mehmed, *Karlofça*, 63b. Forty *üstüaçik* vessels and 15 *şayka* were used for the transportation of provisions. (*Üstüaçiks* were special vessels for transport on the Danube, carrying one helmsman and eight oarsmen, whereas the *şayka* was a kind of sea-going boat which was in general use on the Black Sea.) A detailed report of provisions for the Ottoman mission and entourage for 22 June 1698 to 25 February 1699 (the entire period of the negotiations) is found in Maliye defteri (financial register) 7744, 6a–b and in the İbnülemin tasnifi, Hariciye no. 379, both at the Başbakanlık Arşivi (Prime Minister's archives), Istanbul.
18. Though held by the Kaiser, Karlowitz was right on the frontier between Ottoman and Habsburg forces. The Kaiser, and probably his Allies also, would have preferred to meet in Vienna. The Ottomans would not agree, perhaps to avoid undue and unwonted political pressure and to avoid the possibility of facing indignities at the hands of their victorious opponents, should they prove difficult at the negotiation table – as in 1688–89, when an Ottoman mission was insulted and humiliated and, after an unsuccessful negotiation,

- was finally confined for several years. The Ottomans insisted upon holding the congress in the open, somewhere close to the Ottoman frontier. Rami Mehmed, *Karlofça*, 38b–39a. A full report of the 1688–89 Ottoman mission can be seen in manuscript form only (Zülfikar Efendi, *Zülfikar mükalemesi* [*Zülfikar's Negotiations*], Vienna, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, H.O. 90). For a summary of the report see Joseph von Hammer-Purgstai, *Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches*, Vol. 1, 528 ff. (Pest, 1827–35). (Hereafter cited as von Hammer, *GOR*).
19. To the Ottomans, such squabbles were taken as further evidence of European frivolity. For their mission's relation of such incidents at Karlowitz see Rami Mehmed, *Karlofça*, 66a–b.
 20. The text of the imperial rescript (Hatt-i Hümayun) is in Rami Mehmed, *Karlofça*, 33b. The Grand Vizier's 'buyuruldu' empowering the Ottoman mission to negotiate is in Mehmed, 34a.
 21. For a biography of Lord William Paget see *Dictionary of National Biography* (London, 1885–1900).
 22. For a short biographical sketch see A. A. Kampman, 'XVII ve XVIII. yüzyillarda Osmanlı imparatorluğunda Hollandalılar', *Belleten*, vol. 23, 1959, 518–19.
 23. In 1688–89 and 1692–94, William of Orange had offered to mediate between Kaiser and Sultan, first on behalf of the Dutch and then as King of England as well. For 1688–89, see summary in Silihdar, *Tarih*, II, 365. For a summary of the Allied proposed articles presented in 1692–94, see Silihdar, *Tarih*, 693 and von Hammer, *GOR*, Vol. 6, 571–2. For a first-hand report of the same negotiations see Paget Papers, British Museum, Egerton mss. 918 17a ff. and Additional mss. 28939, 290a ff.
 24. Rami Mehmed, *Karlofça*, 69a.
 25. Rami Mehmed, *Karlofça* 70b–71a, and von Hammer, *GOR*, Vol. 6, 662.
 26. Von Hammer, *GOR*, Vol. 6, 662 which corroborates Rami Mehmed, *Karlofça*, 71b.
 27. Rami Mehmed, *Karlofça*, 72b–73a.
 28. Rami Mehmed, *Karlofça*, 76a–77b.
 29. Rami Mehmed, *Karlofça*, 78a.
 30. Although the Ottoman mission was well aware of the Habsburg stand concerning an equitable settlement of the evacuation and demolition provisions, it is perhaps significant that this same mission in its special interpretation of these provisions simply ignored the Kaiser's stand.
 31. Rami Mehmed, *Karlofça*, 79a.
 32. Rami Mehmed, *Karlofça*, 79b.
 33. Rami Mehmed, *Karlofça*, 79b.
 34. Rami Mehmed, *Karlofça*, 81b–84b.
 35. Rami Mehmed, *Karlofça*, 83b–84a.
 36. Rami Mehmed, *Karlofça*, 83b–84a and von Hammer, *GOR*, Vol. 6, 665.
 37. Rami Mehmed, *Karlofça*, 84a.
 38. Rami Mehmed, *Karlofça*, 84b, and von Hammer, *GOR*, Vol. 6, 665.
 39. Rami Mehmed, *Karlofça*, 85a.
 40. Articles of the treaties are found in English in William Horsley, *The Political History of Europe 800–1716* (London, 1746), 288 ff. (hereafter cited as Horsley, *Political History*).
 41. Rami Mehmed, *Karlofça*, 86a.

42. For articles designating the frontier, see Horsley, *Political History*; for the Ottoman commissioner's report on the rectification of the frontier, see *Muahadat Mecmuasi* (Istanbul, 1294), Vol. 2, 217–70 (hereafter cited as *Muahadat*).
43. Rami Mehmed, *Karlofça*, 87a.
44. Although one item – concerning the districts of Fort Bihac (Wihitsch) on the western banks of the Una River – in the frontier settlement in Bosnia-Croatia was not settled until 1703, the final rectification of the frontier in that area favoured the Ottoman proposals. The Ottoman frontier was finally to extend as far as the Glina and Korana rivers. *Muahadat*, Vol. 2, 225 ff.
45. One other article pertained to the status of Ragusa. A tributary of the Ottoman Sultans since 1459, the Republic found it advisable during the 14 years' war to join the Holy League (March 1684). In August of the same year, however, a treaty was signed with the Habsburg Monarchy declaring the free state a protectorate of the Kaiser, a precaution which the Ragusans took to avoid Venetian conquest. Cf. Luigi Villari, *The Republic of Ragusa* (London, 1904), 321 ff. Once the war was over, however, the Ottomans insisted and obtained the return of Ragusa to its former dependent status. The Habsburg concession on Ragusa later facilitated Ottoman demands from Venice for a direct land access to the Republic.
46. For a recent study of the economic importance of the frontier regions between the Ottoman state and its European antagonists, see W.H. McNeill, *Europe's Steppe Frontier, 1500–1800* (Chicago, 1964).
47. For the importance of Ottoman possession of Fort Bihac, see G. E. Rothenberg, *The Austrian Military Border in Croatia 1522–1747* (Urbana, IL, 1960), 96.
48. The figure is estimated from a Financial Register which has a record of the reassignment of Ottoman forces with dependents to Forts Bender, Özü, Kilbirun, Akkerman, Kelli and Yanik Hissari. For an itemized list of expenditures for their transportation, provisions and victuals from June 1699 to November 1708, see Maliye defteri 6006, 90 ff. (Istanbul, Başbakanlık Arşivi).
49. Rami Mehmed, *Karlofça*, 94b.
50. Rami Mehmed, *Karlofça*, 95b.
51. Rami Mehmed, *Karlofça*, 94b–96a
52. Rami Mehmed, *Karlofça*, 96a.
53. Rami Mehmed, *Karlofça*, 95a ff.
54. Rami Mehmed, *Karlofça*, 97a, von Hammer, in *GOR*, Vol. 6, 687, states that out of five Polish-held cloisters in Moldavia, Malachowski proposed to evacuate two, leaving those remaining in Polish hands.
55. Rami Mehmed, *Karlofça*, 97b–98a.
56. Rami Mehmed, *Karlofça*, 105a–b.
57. Rami Mehmed, *Karlofça*, 105a–b.
58. Rami Mehmed, *Karlofça*, 107a.
59. Rami Mehmed, *Karlofça*, 108b.
60. Vozhnitsin was initially not even provided with instructions. B. H. Sumner, *Peter the Great and the Ottoman Empire* (London, 1949), 20, note 1. An important source for these negotiations is H. Übersberger, *Russlands Orientalpolitik* (Stuttgart, 1913) (hereafter cited as Übersberger, *Russlands*).
61. Rami Mehmed, *Karlofça*, 101b.

62. Rami Mehmed, *Karlofça*, 102a, and Übersberger, *Russlands*, 64. The forts were Togan, Gazikerman, Nüsretkerman and Kilbirun.
63. Rami Mehmed, *Karlofça*, 110a and Übersberger, *Russlands*, I, 64. A copy of the text of the truce can be found in Silihdar Mehmed Aga, *Nusretname* (Istanbul Bayazit Umümi Kütüphanesi), No. 3216, 265b–226a. The date given for the document is 22 Recep, 1110/late January 1699.
64. Tsar Peter's reluctance to negotiate in 1698 turned, with the imminence of war with Sweden, into a desperate effort for concluding an immediate peace in 1700. The English King's mediation was requested, and with the conclusion of peace, Russia agreed to evacuate the forts on the lower Dnieper.
65. Rami Mehmed, *Karlofça*, 88b.
66. For a detailed first-hand relation of the Venetian position see 'Relatione del Congresso di Carloviz e dell' Ambasciata di Vienna di Sr. Carlo Ruzzini Cavr.', *Fontes Rerum Austriacarum*, vol. 27, 345–444 (hereafter cited as Ruzzini, 'Relatione'). For Ottoman negotiations with Ruzzini, see Rami Mehmed, *Karlofça*, 88b–93b, 110b–117a.
67. Ruzzini, having no authority to accord the Ottomans the concessions which were finally embodied in the treaty, allowed the Habsburg and Polish missions at Karlowitz to draw up the articles, pending his receipt of authority. By the time the conference came to an end, Paget relates that '... tho. the Venetian Ambassador has not subscribed and signed his, nor seems to like them, yet they have been so well and carefully drawn, with the intervention, assistance and industry of the Imperial ambassadors that 'tis not doubted but the State of Venice will readily approve them, but because that Ambassador has not orders to conclude, time is allowed for his subscription to this treaty so that it is not doubted but the Peace will be general so soon as that Plenipot. can hear from Venice.' No authority arrived from the Signoria. Final ratification was not received until a month after the congress had come to an end (23 February 1699). Details can be seen in PRO SP 97/21, 37b–38a, 49a.
68. Ruzzini, 'Relatione', 352–3.
69. Ruzzini, 'Relatione', 355.
70. Ruzzini, 'Relatione', 353.
71. Poland and Russia were making preparations for a joint military effort against Sweden.
72. Ruzzini, 'Relatione', 353.

5

Diplomatic Integration with Europe before Selim III

G. R. Berridge

It was believed at the Sublime Porte during the early modern period, at least intermittently, that participation in the European balance of power was useful and perhaps sometimes even essential to the security of the Ottoman Empire, not least because of its virtually permanent military conflict with Shi'ite Persia. For their part the states of Europe were inclined to see Turkey as even more important to their own security, as well as providing valuable opportunities for trade.¹ The Porte's religious hostility to Europe was also by no means completely fanatical and, as is widely acknowledged, cultural toleration was a hallmark of the Empire. Furthermore, while communications between the Levant and Europe were generally slow and sometimes insecure they were by no means impossible.² These were the key circumstances that provided both incentives and opportunity for the integration of the Ottoman Empire into the diplomatic system of Europe.

The fact remains, however, that although since the sixteenth century the Ottomans had been content to receive permanent diplomatic missions and consular outstations, until the reign of the reforming sultan Selim III at the end of the eighteenth century, they were themselves unwilling to reciprocate.³ In this system of so-called 'unilateral diplomacy' – and in the view of some in part because of it⁴ – the personnel of the foreign embassies in Istanbul were periodically mistreated, especially on the outbreak of war. Furthermore, it was not until the end of the Crimean War in 1856 that the Empire was acknowledged to be a full member of the European states system. These facts have sometimes tended to suggest that the diplomatic links that connected the Ottoman Empire to Europe in the early modern period were weak and unsatisfactory. They have even been taken to signify that, committed by the demands of Islam to a condition of permanent war with Christendom, the Empire was 'largely'

cut off from the European states system altogether.⁵ It is the purpose of this chapter to analyse the *mechanisms* of this diplomatic relationship and to suggest that well before Selim III attempted to bring the system of 'unilateral diplomacy' to an end, the Ottoman Empire was quite effectively integrated into the diplomatic system of Europe.

Special envoys and other agents

The Porte may not have enjoyed the benefit of permanent envoys abroad until the end of the eighteenth century but it was by no means entirely unrepresented beyond the Empire's fluctuating borders. There were, to begin with, residents of Europe who reported on local conditions to the government in Istanbul, either out of anticipation of reward or genuine admiration for its power and beneficence. Attention has been drawn to this Ottoman 'fifth column' in Europe chiefly in the context of the Empire's fifteenth-century expansion,⁶ but there is little reason to suppose that it was significantly diminished for some time thereafter. A second source of information, and probably much more important, was provided by the Orthodox (chiefly Greek) merchants of Istanbul, Salonika and Smyrna. They gradually wrested control of the trade between the Ottoman Empire and Europe from Venice and Genoa after the fall of Constantinople, and before long acquired their own consuls.⁷ In the eighteenth century they appear to have been of diplomatic value in Russia.⁸ Couriers, too, were a source of information on the territories through which they passed, and then, of course, there were spies.⁹ Naff mentions the importance of the Beys of the Danubian principalities in this connection, noting that throughout the following centuries it was they who maintained the agents in the capitals of central and Eastern Europe and were responsible for forwarding their reports to Istanbul.¹⁰ These reports may have been 'unsifted and often inaccurate'¹¹ but this was true of the reports of many accredited diplomats in this era; not all were up to Venetian standards.¹²

Special envoys despatched from Istanbul were an additional source of information for the Porte. However, prior to the early eighteenth century they seem to have been used chiefly for additional purposes, ones common to the special envoys of other states. Thus Ottoman special envoys might be used for the delivery of an invitation for an important ceremony, as when Henri III was invited to the circumcision feast of the sultan's son by an envoy sent to Paris in 1582.¹³ They might also be used for lobbying a powerful neighbour, as at the court of the Great Mogul in 1615.¹⁴ And activities in connection with peace negotiations

were of course a particularly important responsibility for them. These included exploring the possibilities of a settlement, as at the court of Vienna in 1688;¹⁵ negotiating a treaty at some spot adjacent to the line where military stalemate had been marked, as at Karlowitz in Croatia in 1698;¹⁶ or arranging for the fulfilment of some previous peace treaty.¹⁷ Between 1384 and 1600, 145 temporary envoys were sent by the sultan to Venice alone.¹⁸

Following the introduction of what was undoubtedly a European flavour into Ottoman diplomacy by the plenipotentiaries at Karlowitz,¹⁹ however, it was not long before special envoys were being sent out from the Porte in a more systematic fashion and for the deliberate purpose of acquiring more knowledge of Europe. This was especially pronounced during the period in the 1720s when Damat Ibrahim Pasha was grand vizier. Paris and Vienna were the main destinations, but envoys also went to Moscow and Poland, and all sent back reports to Istanbul.²⁰

It is sometimes said that when it came to launching a *discreet* diplomatic initiative in a foreign capital, states in the pre-telegraphic era that were dependent on special envoys were at a disadvantage compared to those using residents. This was because the arrival of a special envoy was bound to attract attention. Indeed, Queller suggests that this was one of the reasons for the growth in popularity of the resident mission at the end of the fifteenth century.²¹ However, it is possible that this point has been exaggerated. After all, a resident agent would not normally take an important initiative without fresh instructions from home and usually these could only be brought by a means almost equally well designed to attract the attention of the professionally curious: a courier, often an 'express'. Indeed, this very problem was a source of frequent irritation to Sir Robert Ainslie, who was the very capable British ambassador in Istanbul from 1776 until 1794. In a letter to a British diplomatic colleague in 1778 he noted that: 'A courier arrived on the eighteenth ultimo, who brought dispatches from St. Petersburg... Another courier arrived the next day from Ockzacow... The frequency of this correspondence, and the deliberations to which it gives rise, make the public conclude that fresh proposals have been made...'²² Four years later Ainslie is to be found complaining to the Secret Committee of the East India Company of the 'inconveniences suffered... chiefly from the publicity of the arrival of our Extraordinary couriers from Vienna'.²³ His attempts to pass off at least one of these couriers as a 'gentleman in trade' appears to have met with only limited success and his efforts to have more money spent on securing greater 'secrecy, security, and despatch' none at all.²⁴ In short, the absence of Ottoman residents abroad was perhaps

not such a significant handicap in the business of putting out discreet feelers as might at first glance be imagined.

‘Unilateral diplomacy’: permanent envoys in Istanbul

The Ottoman Empire may not have seriously contemplated establishing permanent ambassadors and consuls of its own abroad until the reign of Selim III. Nevertheless, it had no compunction about admitting European and other envoys to permanent residence in Istanbul, as well as receiving a continuous stream of temporary ones. Though the Venetian *bailo*²⁵ had actually fought alongside his co-religionists on the walls of Constantinople against Mehmed II in 1453 and was (along with his son) beheaded for his pains,²⁶ the Conqueror permitted the appointment of a new resident within a year after the fall of the city.²⁷ The real breakthrough, however, came when France was permitted to establish a diplomatic presence in Istanbul in 1535. By the end of the sixteenth century most of the major European powers had permanent embassies in Istanbul, while those with significant commercial interests in the Ottoman Empire – Venice, Genoa, France, the Dutch republic and England – also possessed or were soon to acquire consulates scattered throughout its domains.²⁸ By the early years of the following century, the English Ambassador, Sir Thomas Roe, could write from Istanbul that: ‘Here are many ambassadors, all experienced and tried in other parts, before they arrive at this trust. Here is a concourse of all nations, great and many varieties, important to Christendom.’²⁹ Furthermore, the Porte – unlike the regimes of the Great Kings of the Ancient Near East³⁰ – was relatively tolerant of resident embassies from states that it regarded (in its heart) as unfriendly, especially Austria.³¹ It is true that Russia, which by the end of the seventeenth century had clearly become one of the most serious threats to the security of the Ottoman Empire, was initially an exception. In fact, it was not permitted a permanent mission in Constantinople until 1700 and this right was temporarily denied again in 1711 following the Turkish humiliation of the forces of Peter the Great at the Pruth. Nevertheless, it was regained in 1720,³² and even during this latter interruption in diplomatic relations the Porte permitted protection of Russian interests by the envoy of a third state, in fact the long-entrenched Dutch ambassador.

But how could such a system of unilateral diplomacy provide the basis for the efficient integration of the Ottoman Empire into Europe? Was not the Porte placed at a debilitating disadvantage when it came to gleaning information and promoting its own views in Europe? As for

the European powers, did not the absence of Ottoman ambassadors as hostages in their capitals guarantee that their own ambassadors in Istanbul would be treated badly?³³ Is not, therefore, the complaint of Abraham de Wicquefort, the great documenter of the diplomatic practice of the *ancien régime*, that European diplomats in Turkey were 'among Barbarians who have no respect for the Law of Nations', entirely justified?³⁴ And, if he was correct, how could they *function* effectively? Even if they could, were not the states of Europe placed at a permanent disadvantage by the need to rely exclusively on their own, distant ambassadors when it came to any negotiations with the Porte? In fact, these disadvantages were either more apparent than real, or rendered tolerable by compensating advantages. As a result, the system of unilateral diplomacy suited both the Ottomans and the Europeans well enough.

Why unilateral diplomacy suited the Ottomans

As is well known, the attendance of Europe's ambassadors on the Ottoman sultans was considered 'a mark of submission',³⁵ the effect of which would hardly have been the same had the sultans been in the habit of reciprocating. These envoys also brought them – and other influential members of their governments – rich and intriguing presents.³⁶ Special envoys, however, would have sufficed for these purposes, as they did in Manchu China until the middle of the nineteenth century. Receiving *permanent* ambassadors without sending similar envoys back was an arrangement that was valued for different reasons.

The most obvious though not necessarily the most significant advantage to the Porte of this system was that it gave it hostages for the good behaviour of the ambassadors' states and their co-nationals residing in the Ottoman Empire, without having to surrender hostages in return. As Sir Robert Ainslie urgently reminded the Foreign Office following a serious misdemeanour by a British subject that had caused him difficulties with the Porte, 'It has been their constant practice, to look upon them [foreign envoys] as hostages, and to make them personally responsible for all events.'³⁷ It was in general for this reason that envoys were sometimes roughly handled even in peacetime, and that those from states with which the Ottoman government found itself at war were usually doomed to a sojourn in the prison of the Seven Towers.³⁸

Whether fear for the fate of their ambassadors (as opposed to fears for commercial and other interests) actually influenced the attitude of the powers towards the Porte, whether, in other words, the threat of the Seven Towers was an effective instrument of Ottoman foreign policy, is

not entirely clear. On the face of it it must be admitted that it is unlikely. After all, Europe's crowned heads were not famous during this period for sensitivity to the plight of their ambassadors *anywhere*. It is also evident that the hostage status of ambassadors in Istanbul and in particular the threat of the Seven Towers may occasionally have worked *against* the Ottoman interest, as well as against the interests of diplomacy as such. For one thing, it probably discouraged states without significant commercial interests in the Ottoman Empire from establishing permanent envoys in Istanbul in the first place, if only because of the difficulty of finding volunteers; this appears to have been the case with Poland in the early 1620s.³⁹ For another, if an envoy was pessimistic about the prospects of avoiding war between his state and the Ottoman Empire, he was likely to give more attention to making good his escape than to pursuing eleventh-hour negotiations at the Porte or last-minute intrigues in the Seraglio. This is illustrated by the demeanour of the Russian ambassador on at least two occasions in the 1780s. Fearing failure in his tense negotiations at the Porte following Catherine's annexation of the Crimea in 1783 and the consequent outbreak of war, Bulgakow made no secret of his anxiety to 'demand passes, and quit this court', even though Ainslie correctly forecast that 'there is great reason to hope that, if any time is granted by Russia, the present storm will blow over . . .'.⁴⁰ When serious Russo-Turkish tension was renewed in early 1787, Bulgakow solicited his recall.⁴¹ In the event, war did break out but not until August. In the meantime the ambassador appears to have spent an unusual amount of time at his country house outside Istanbul, and on 15 April he actually left the capital to attend the Empress Catherine on her visit to the Crimea and did not return until 7 July.⁴² Poor Bulgakow! By now he had good reason to be apprehensive. Five weeks later, on 16 August, he was arrested. At the end of 1787 the Austrian internuncio, Baron d'Herbert, whose government was on the point of joining the war on the side of Russia and who therefore assumed that his own seizure was imminent, was reported by Ainslie to have 'freighted . . . a French ship, in order, it is supposed, to attempt a retreat, in case of a sudden rupture, under the protection of that Ambassador'.⁴³

Nevertheless, if the prospect of the Seven Towers may have had an anti-diplomatic effect if the ambassador assumed that war was inevitable, it seems quite possible that it may have produced the opposite tendency if he was more optimistic. This effect would have been reinforced if he was under orders to remain at his post and if, in any case, he feared that for logistical reasons escape was unlikely in the event that war broke out. The logic here is obvious: in such circumstances, probably in reality the

more usual, the thought of the Seven Towers gave the ambassador in Istanbul a powerful incentive to keep talking. Furthermore, if war still proved unavoidable, the Ottoman reflex of ambassadorial imprisonment was better than expulsion. No European ambassador was ever put to death in Istanbul⁴⁴ – despite occasional threats⁴⁵ – and direct communication with the enemy thus remained in place, albeit rather muffled and, no doubt, somewhat bad-tempered. In this connection it is worth noting that the Venetian *bailo* appears to have been able to maintain something approaching normal communications during his own imprisonment in the long war between Venice and the Ottoman Empire for control of Crete which started in 1645.⁴⁶ After the outbreak of fighting with Russia in 1736, the Russian resident, Wieschnyakov, was not thrown into the Seven Towers but taken with the Grand Vizier's army to be on hand in the event of the negotiations which were initially desired by the Porte.⁴⁷ He reappeared in Istanbul at the end of 1739, following signature of a peace treaty in October.⁴⁸ And during the internment in the Seven Towers from 1787 until 1789 of another Russian envoy, Bulgakow, there appear to have been no insuperable obstacles to communication either with his own government or with the diplomatic corps of Istanbul. In this city, as Ainslie was fond of remarking, almost anything could be achieved with money.⁴⁹ A systematic investigation of Ottoman diplomatic history would no doubt turn up many similar examples.

Whether the unreciprocated hostage status of the permanent ambassadors in Istanbul was always to the Porte's advantage or not, it is more obvious that it needed them as mediators in relations with whichever European power it happened to be attempting to make a peace settlement at any particular time.⁵⁰ Permanent ambassadors were necessary for this because mediation could be a lengthy process, as Sir Everard Fawkener, the British Ambassador to Istanbul from 1735 until 1742, found to his cost in 1737, and because it was work which needed a person well acquainted with the ways of the Porte.⁵¹ Despite the alternative means available to it, the Porte also found the ambassadors – especially those from Venice – valuable as sources of information on conditions in Europe and thinking in its courts.⁵² Diplomats were accustomed to trading information and, invariably competing with each other for influence at the Porte, could not afford routinely to deceive it with false information or for long be without intelligence to impress their Turkish interlocutors.⁵³ It is significant that even in the lengthy cyphered sections of Sir Robert Ainslie's many letters to the Foreign Office, the Porte was never criticized for ignorance of foreign events; on the contrary, he more than once remarked on how well

informed it was.⁵⁴ At the same time the Porte had no fear that the foreign embassies were nests of subversives, since the Christian communities in Istanbul were politically insignificant and in any case the envoys were rarely able to have intercourse with Turks except through the medium of a native interpreter.

As for the key diplomatic function of direct negotiations with the states of Europe, executing this via the embassies in Istanbul placed the Porte at a distinct advantage. In the first place this was because of the dragoman system, which gave a great deal of the responsibility for conducting negotiations on behalf of the embassies to the sultan's own all-too-easily intimidated subjects.⁵⁵ As is well established, and was widely suspected at the time, this provided the Porte with the opportunity both to emasculate the demands of the ambassadors and to acquire information about them that they would have preferred kept concealed. Since the ambassadors were usually forced to exchange written communications with their own governments both before and during any negotiations in Istanbul, surreptitious interception of these messages provided a further opening to the Porte to examine their thinking. With no equally exposed lines of communication, the Porte did not, of course, present the European powers with an equivalent opportunity.

For the Ottoman Empire, then, unilateral diplomacy was not simply the politically naive reaction of a militarily and morally complacent empire, as is sometimes suggested. On the contrary, it was a system that had distinct political and diplomatic advantages, which is why other states have preferred it as well. Unilateral diplomacy was certainly unusual by the standard of relations between great powers or powers of similar rank – though the papacy had received but refused to send ambassadors throughout the fifteenth century.⁵⁶ However, it was by no means rare in relations between great powers and lesser states; this is as true now as it was in the early modern period. The Venetians, for example, 'did not condescend to appoint standing ambassadors to every Italian court, and could usually make use of the ambassadors sent to Venice for any relevant business of their own'.⁵⁷ In the twentieth century, especially during the Cold War, when there was a competition for the allegiance of small states which themselves found maintaining an extensive network of representation abroad beyond their means, the reverse pattern was common. The Istanbul diplomatic corps itself would probably have grown even more quickly in the early modern period had not the existing permanent envoys invariably gone to considerable lengths to prevent the establishment of ministers from unfriendly courts.⁵⁸

Why unilateral diplomacy suited the Europeans

It was in substantial part because unilateral diplomacy suited the Ottomans so well that it also suited the Europeans. This was because it would not have worked for the former had the ambassadors in Istanbul of the latter not been permitted privileges similar to those enjoyed by diplomats elsewhere⁵⁹ (though it is important to add that this disposition was reinforced because such privileges were consistent with the assumptions on which the capitulations were based,⁶⁰ and because the relative decline of Ottoman power made the sultans progressively fearful of the consequences of any harsh treatment of diplomats).

It is certainly true, as was regularly bewailed by Europeans without direct experience of Turkey, that the reception of envoys in Istanbul during the early modern period did not altogether accord with European customs, and the main difference, as already noted, was the hostage status that implicitly attached to them. However, the fact remains that during the good behaviour of their states the ability of permanent envoys in Istanbul to function as effectively as diplomats elsewhere was not significantly impaired by any constant threat of deliberate harassment and arrest. Janissaries were provided for the protection of the embassies, and their chapels – alone among the churches of Istanbul – were permitted to ring their bells.⁶¹ Significant if qualified consular immunities were added to the English capitulations in 1601 and to the French in 1604.⁶² A consular *berat* of the late seventeenth century, summarized by Sonia Anderson, is particularly unambiguous: ‘The consul could not be arrested for interrogation, imprisoned or dismissed from office; his house could not be searched or sealed up; his clothing, victuals, and other domestic supplies could be imported free of custom; lawsuits in which he was involved had to go straight to the supreme court.’⁶³ In general, moreover, these immunities appear to have been observed by the Ottoman authorities,⁶⁴ at least in Istanbul, and when they were not this was sometimes a result of arrogant behaviour on the part of the diplomats themselves.⁶⁵ As for their communications, these were more likely to be tampered with in Venice or Vienna than in the Ottoman capital itself. And even in the seventeenth century, when there was no great apprehension of English power in Istanbul, Englishmen were so little apprehensive of abuse in the city that they scrambled for the post of ambassador, from which in any case they confidently expected to return as rich men.⁶⁶

The fact that permanent envoys in Istanbul were granted important privileges provided a necessary if not a sufficient condition for them to

function effectively. And for one power in Christendom this was a special blessing. In England, there was a general preference on the part of the secretaries of state to conduct negotiations with foreign states via English diplomats resident in their capitals. Known in Berlin as 'the English plan', this was favoured for two main reasons. In the first place, the written instructions given to all English ambassadors provided a record of decisions and broadened the base of political responsibility for them. In the second place, the secretaries could rarely speak foreign languages other than French and sometimes not even that, while foreign ambassadors in London were usually ill at ease in English; hence negotiating with foreign ambassadors in London was often somewhat awkward.⁶⁷

It is true that exclusive reliance on the ambassadors in Istanbul for the conduct of negotiations between Europe's governments and the Porte exposed their communications to interception and thus gave the latter an advantage, as of course did the native dragoman system. On the other hand, many of these ambassadors were resourceful. They were also quite experienced in dealing with the Porte because the hazards and length of the journey to Istanbul, at least from Northern and Western Europe, meant that on average they remained at their posts – without 'home leave' – for what would today be regarded as unusually long periods.⁶⁸ For example, between 1583, when the first English ambassador took up residence in the city, until the end of the eighteenth century, the average tour of an English envoy lasted for seven years. Ten of them had tours of ten years or longer, Sir Robert Sutton remaining at the Porte from 1700 until 1718 at an especially important period in European history, while Ainslie himself was also there for 18 years. An even more remarkable example comes from the history of the Dutch mission in Constantinople, which was led by Jacobus Colijer from 1684 until 1725; his predecessor was his father!⁶⁹ As a result of these long tours, European ambassadors generally became well accustomed to dealing with the Porte, some even learning to speak Turkish as well as the other languages of the Levant, including Italian, French and Latin.

If there were certain advantages to negotiating in Istanbul rather than in Europe, and if some of the disadvantages could be reduced, it is also obvious that the European powers were happy to forgo the need to accommodate permanent Turkish embassies in their own capitals. In the first place, this was because the view remained strong in the early modern period that resident embassies were chiefly devices for 'spying' on foreign powers and 'making mischief' for their governments. As a result, it was believed to be better to send than to receive. Cardinal

Richelieu was perhaps just the best-known exponent of this view.⁷⁰ In the second place, while 'the Turk' remained a major figure in popular demonology it is likely that permanent Ottoman embassies in Europe's capitals would periodically have presented its governments with public order problems. Finally, since the Ottoman government subsidized their own embassies in Istanbul, it may have been feared that the opening of permanent Turkish embassies would lead either to pressure for them to reciprocate or – as in fact happened – to the withdrawal of the Turkish subsidy when the Porte learned of the treatment of the sultan's own envoys.

Against this background, it is not difficult to understand why Europe's governments were not anxious to supplant unilateral with bilateral diplomacy. It should also be recalled that the initiative for the creation of permanent Turkish embassies abroad during the latter part of the eighteenth century came from Istanbul rather than from Vienna, St Petersburg, London, Berlin or Paris. Furthermore, in London at any rate, and for whatever reason, the idea was at first received with hostility.⁷¹

Conclusion

In sum, while the Ottoman government did not dispatch permanent envoys to Europe during the early modern period it admitted them from Europe. Provided it was technically at peace with them, it also admitted ambassadors from states with which there was invariably underlying tension and, in general, permitted the representatives of even these sufficient liberties to do their work. In wartime they were not expelled but incarcerated – and not always incommunicado. Many ambassadors remained at this post for very long periods.

A substantial diplomatic corps was thus well established in Istanbul by the beginning of the seventeenth century. The Porte could also employ its own special envoys, as well as Orthodox merchants, couriers and spies. As a result, it seems clear that there was a degree of diplomatic intercourse between the Ottoman Empire and the major powers of Europe that was, on the whole, adequate to the purposes of both throughout the early modern period. The fact that the Ottoman system of unilateral diplomacy was unusual, perhaps unique, by the standard of relations between European great powers, and that the treatment of ambassadors in Istanbul was by European standards a shade exotic, should not blind us to this basic fact.

Notes

I am grateful to the Nuffield Foundation for supporting the research on which this chapter is based. All official papers cited are held in the Public Record Office, London.

1. Dorothy M. Vaughan, *Europe and the Turk: A Pattern of Alliances* (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1954), 110ff.; Ludwig Dehio, *The Precarious Balance: The Politics of Power in Europe 1494–1945* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1963), 39–41.
2. On this, see John B. Allen, *Post and Courier Service in the Diplomacy of Early Modern Europe* (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1972); C. J. Heywood, 'English Diplomatic Relations with Turkey, 1689–1698', in William Hale and Ali Ihsan Bağış (eds), *Four Centuries of Turco-British Relations* (Beverly: Ethoen Press, 1984); and Lavender Cassels, *The Struggle for the Ottoman Empire, 1717–1740* (London: John Murray, 1966), 74–5.
3. Carter J. Findley, 'The Foundation of the Ottoman Foreign Ministry', *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, vol. 3 (1972), 395–9. Even this was a false start that petered out in 1821 under the impact of the outbreak of the war for Greek independence. Permanent embassies abroad were not established on a durable basis by the Sublime Porte until 1834, on the initiative of Sultan Mahmud II, J. C. Hurewitz, 'Ottoman diplomacy and the European state system', *Middle East Journal*, vol. 15, no. 2 (1961), 147–8.
4. For a recent version of this argument, see Linda S. Frey and Marsha L. Frey, *The History of Diplomatic Immunity* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1999), 393–403. I have reviewed this book at http://homepage.dtn.ntl.com/simon.kear/booknote_reviewed.htm#frey.
5. Hurewitz, 'Ottoman Diplomacy and the European State System', 145; and M. S. Anderson, *The Rise of Modern Diplomacy, 1450–1919* (London: Longman, 1993), 9, 71–2. See also Thomas Naff, 'Reform and the conduct of Ottoman diplomacy in the reign of Selim III, 1789–1807', *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, vol. 83 (1963), 292–315. In *The Ottoman Centuries: The Rise and Fall of the Turkish Empire* (London: Cape, 1977), 383–4, Lord Kinross also takes this line. However, significantly he dates the ending of the period of 'unilateralism' at the end of the seventeenth rather than the end of the eighteenth century, that is at Karlowitz. On Turkey's admission to the European states system at the end of the Crimean War in 1856 (Treaty of Paris), see, for example, Martin Wight, *Power Politics*, eds. Hedley Bull and Carsten Holbraad (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1978), 303.
6. Vaughan, *Europe and the Turk*, 27.
7. T. Stoianovich, 'The Conquering Balkan Orthodox Merchant', *Journal of Economic History*, vol. 20 (1960), 234–313 (on the Phanariote and Levantine Greeks, pp. 269–73); Findley, 'The foundation of the Ottoman foreign ministry', 396–7.
8. Stoianovich, 'The Conquering Balkan Orthodox Merchant', 262.
9. Kinross, *The Ottoman Centuries*, 175.
10. Naff, 'Reform and the Conduct of Ottoman Diplomacy', 302. See also Philip Mansel, *Constantinople: City of the World's Desire 1453–1924* (London: John Murray, 1995), 193: 'Agents maintained by the Princes of Wallachia and

Moldavia in Germany, Poland and Russia were another source of information. In 1774 the Grand Vizier knew of the death of Louis XV five days before the French ambassador.'

11. Naff, 'Reform and the Conduct of Ottoman Diplomacy', 303.
12. Even these have been severely criticized for inaccuracy, though Queller has sprung to their defence: Donald E. Queller, 'The Development of Ambassadorial Relazioni', in J.R. Hale (ed.), *Renaissance Venice* (London: Faber, 1973), 191–2, note 47.
13. Mansel, *Constantinople*, 193. Abraham de Wicquefort notes, albeit only for illustrative purposes, that Turkish envoys also arrived in France in 1601, 1607 and 1669, *The Ambassador and His Functions*, first publ. 1680/1, trsl. by John Digby 1716, repr. with an Introductory Essay by Maurice Keens-Soper (Leicester: Centre for the Study of Diplomacy, University of Leicester, 1997), 162.
14. For example, in 1615 a Turkish envoy was sent to India to try to persuade the Great Moghul to deny assistance to the Persians, the great enemies of the Ottomans in the east, *The Embassy of Sir Thomas Roe to the Court of the Great Moghul, 1615–1619, as narrated in his Journal and Correspondence*, ed. William Foster (Hakluyt Society, 1899; repr. by Kraus: Nendeln, Liechtenstein, 1967), 113. He failed.
15. At this juncture, 'Zulfikar, a senior official, and Alexander Mavrocordato, the highly influential First Dragoman of the Porte, were sent to Vienna, ostensibly to announce the accession of Suleiman II, in fact to probe the possibilities of agreement', J.S. Bromley (ed.), *The New Cambridge Modern History*, Vol. 6 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), 621.
16. Here the Turkish plenipotentiaries were Mavrocordato (once more) and Rami Mehmed Efendi, who was afterwards grand vizier, *The New Cambridge Modern History*, Vol. 6, 626.
17. Stanford J. Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*, Vol. 1, *Empire of the Gazis: The Rise and Decline of the Ottoman Empire, 1280–1808* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), 233.
18. Mansel, *Constantinople*, 193.
19. *The New Cambridge Modern History*, Vol. 6, 636.
20. Shaw, *Empire of the Gazis*, 233, 235; Kinross, *The Ottoman Centuries*, 366.
21. D.E. Queller, *The Office of Ambassador in the Middle Ages* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1967), 83.
22. Ainslie to Hugh Elliot (Berlin), 3 June 1778, FO261/3.
23. 10 Sept. 1782, FO261/4.
24. 10 Sept. 1782, FO261/4; also Ainslie to Consul Abbott (Aleppo), 3 April 1782, FO261/3; Ainslie to East India Company (London), 12 April 1782, FO261/4; Ainslie to P. Mitchell (London), 17 June 1782, FO261/4.
25. The bailage at Constantinople was established in 1205. The 'bailo' (from *baiulus*, tutor or protector) was part ambassador, part consul and part governor of the Venetian trading colony in Constantinople. On this, see Horatio F. Brown, *Studies in the History of Venice*, Vol. II (London: John Murray, 1907), 1–38; and Niels Steensgaard, 'Consuls and Nations in the Levant From 1570 to 1650', *Scandinavian Economic History Review*, Vol. XV, Nos. 1 and 2 (1967), 25–6.
26. John Julius Norwich, *Venice: The Greatness and the Fall* (London: Allen Lane, 1981), 75; Halil İnalçık, *The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age, 1300–1600*, trans. N. Itzkowitz and C. Imber (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1973), 23.

27. Brown, *Studies in the History of Venice*, 3–5; İnalçık, *The Ottoman Empire*, 134–5.
28. Steensgaard, 'Consuls and Nations in the Levant'.
29. Roe to Grandison, 9 Dec. 1624, in *The Negotiations of Sir Thomas Roe, in his Embassy to the Ottoman Porte, from the Year 1621 to 1628 Inclusive* (London: Samuel Richardson, 1740).
30. R. Cohen and R. Westbrook (eds), *Amarna Diplomacy: The Beginnings of International Relations* (Baltimore, MD and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000).
31. Kinross, *The Ottoman Centuries*, 201–3.
32. *The New Cambridge Modern History*, Vol. 6, 627, 634.
33. There is a well entrenched view among modern scholars that at least until the nineteenth century there was no diplomatic immunity in Istanbul. See, for example, Anderson, *The Rise of Modern Diplomacy*, 72; Frey and Frey, *The History of Diplomatic Immunity*, 393–403; Mansel, *Constantinople*, 193.
34. *The Ambassador and His Functions*, 337, 163. He was, however, willing to qualify this point. Thus on p. 146 he observes that 'The Turks know very well what is due to ambassadors, and are not backward in doing them the honours their character challenges, when they are not incompatible with their interest; and in that sense', he admits as an afterthought, 'there are also a great many Turks in Christendom'.
35. Mansel, *Constantinople*, 192.
36. Stanley Mayes, *An Organ for the Sultan* (London: Putnam, 1956). Brown, drawing on Venetian sources, notes that the income of the Porte 'from presents amounted to about eight million ducats a year, or about as much as the revenue from other sources', *Studies in the History of Venice*, 19.
37. Ainslie to Hillsborough, 16 Sept. 1780, FO78/1.
38. Anderson, *The Rise of Modern Diplomacy*, 73; Mansel, *Constantinople*, 193. The practice of 'visiting the sins of the master upon his servants' was not unknown in early modern Europe, though it was comparatively rare. When ambassadors were roughly handled in Europe this was normally because they were suspected of plotting against the government to which they were accredited. It was chiefly around this issue that the debate on their criminal immunity revolved, E. R. Adair, *The Exterritoriality of Ambassadors in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries* (London and New York: Longmans, Green, 1929), 41–4.
39. *The Negotiations of Sir Thomas Roe*, Relations from Constantinople, 9/19 Feb. 1621; and Roe to Calvert, 25 Jan. 1623.
40. Ainslie to Fox, 10 Dec. 1783, FO78/4.
41. Ainslie to Carmarthen, 23 Feb. and 10 Mar. 1787, FO78/8.
42. Ainslie to Carmarthen, 7 and 25 Apr., 25 June and 10 July 1787, FO78/8
43. Ainslie to Carmarthen, 10 Jan. 1788, FO78/9. In the event, the Baron was permitted to leave despite the Austrian declaration of war at the beginning of 1788, Ainslie to Carmarthen, 11 and 22 Feb. 1788, FO768/9.
44. With the exception of the special case of Girolamo Minotto, the Venetian *ballo* at the time of the fall of Constantinople in 1453, the only ambassadors executed in Istanbul were from Persia, in 1524 and 1729, Mansel, *Constantinople*, 190. However, Jules Cambon notes that a Venetian ambassador died while incarcerated in the Seven Towers, and that the Bey of Algiers had a French consul blown from the muzzle of a gun, *The Diplomatist*, trans.

C. R. Turner (London: Philip Allan, 1931), 107. It is also true that an Italian serving as a French consul, Paulo Mariani, was hanged in Cairo in 1596, and this is cited by Steensgaard as evidence of 'the comparatively late exemption of the consuls from the jurisdiction of the local authorities'. See 'Consuls and Nations in the Levant', 18, 24. However, it is possible that he unduly minimizes evidence in mitigation of this Ottoman action, the evidence of John Sanderson, a Levant company factor serving in the English embassy in Istanbul at the time. According to Sanderson, Mariani had a most unsavoury reputation (to put it mildly) and the Turks dispatched him at the behest of his own ambassador in Istanbul, François Savary de Brèves! See on this Sir William Foster (ed.), *The Travels of John Sanderson in the Levant, 1584–1602* (London: Hakluyt Society, 1931), 10, 13, 61–2. Quoting rival sources in addition to Sanderson, Steensgaard is nevertheless only sufficiently confident to say that 'presumably' (emphasis added) this was 'slander' on Sanderson's part; he also admits that this was not altogether abnormal behaviour within the French 'nation' in the Levant. (*The Travels of John Sanderson in the Levant*, 24–5). Sanderson himself had formed a low opinion of Mariani when he had also served as a secretary at the English embassy and achieved great influence over the ambassador. Mariani was, according to Sanderson, 'a maker of patriarks and princes, a setter up and pullar downe of them and ambassadors, a poysoner and filthy liver, a warrs and peace maker, a garboyer... a Matchivilian Italian', 13. On the other hand, it has to be admitted that Sanderson was abusive in writing of almost all of his English colleagues as well (Foster's Introduction to *The Travels*, xvii–xviii), and the English had no interest in giving a halo to the French ambassador. It would be useful to know the truth of the Mariani incident.

45. Brown, *Studies in the History of Venice*, 16–17.
46. D. Goffman, *Britons in the Ottoman Empire 1642–1660* (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1998), 151–2, 162,
47. Fawkener to Newcastle, 27 April and 1 June 1736; and trans. of Grand Vizier to Count Osterman, 23 May 1736, SP97/28, following the peace treaty concluded between Russia.
48. Fawkener to Newcastle, SP97/30.
49. On 10 September 1787 Ainslie informed the Foreign Office of a rumour that a guard at the Seven Towers had been put to death for helping Bulgakow with his correspondence, that his doctor had also been caught carrying an official 'Packet' to him, and that in consequence 'great precautions are now employed to prevent any correspondence with the Seven Towers...', Ainslie to Carmarthen, FO78/8. However, within a month of this Ainslie is to be found reporting in the most matter-of-fact way that 'A letter written by Monsieur de Bulgakow a few days ago, from the Seven Towers, was circulated here...', Ainslie to Carmarthen, 10 Oct. 1787, FO78/8.
50. At least a century before the end of the Ottoman Empire's 'unilateralism' the Porte had employed European mediation. The first occasion was at Karlowitz in 1698–99, when the maritime powers (England and the United Provinces) successfully mediated between the Ottomans and the Habsburgs. Thereafter mediation, in which Britain played a pronounced role, was fruitfully employed on at least four more occasions in major conflicts between the Porte and its chief European enemies: Adrianpole, 1713 (Russia); Passarowitz,

- 1718 (Austria); Belgrade, 1739 (Austria); Sistovo, 1791 (Austria); and Jassy, 1792 (Russia). During the War of the Austrian Succession, in 1745, the Porte itself offered its services as mediator, though this was refused by the French.
51. See for example, despatches of Fawkener to Newcastle, SP97/29.
 52. Kinross, *The Ottoman Centuries*, 175, 197, 201; Naff, 'Reform and the Conduct of Ottoman Diplomacy', 303; Vaughan, *Europe and the Turk*, 120; and Mansel, *Constantinople*, 193–4.
 53. On this point, see, for example, Ainslie to Leeds, 8 Mar. 1791, FO78/12.
 54. For example, Ainslie to Carmarthen, 1 Feb. 1789, FO78/10 ('The Grand Admiral was exactly informed of the new situation of things in Poland...'), and Ainslie to Leeds, 22 Jan. 1790, FO78/11 ('the Porte is well informed of the Disorders in Europe, and of the real Situation of the Imperial Courts...').
 55. For example, Murray to Shelburne, 2 Mar. 1767, SP110/86.
 56. G. Mattingly, *Renaissance Diplomacy* (Penguin: Harmondsworth, 1965), 147.
 57. David S. Chambers, 'Benedetto Agnello, Mantuan Ambassador in Venice, 1530–56', in D. S. Chambers et al. (eds), *War, Culture and Society in Renaissance Venice: Essays in Honour of John Hale* (London: Hambledon Press, 1993), 135.
 58. *The Negotiations of Sir Thomas Roe*, Roe to Conway, 30 June 1625 (old style), with regard to the threatened appearance of a Spanish minister, bearing a large quantity of gold.
 59. On the development of customary diplomatic law during this period, see Adair, *The Exterritoriality of Ambassadors in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries*; Frey and Frey, *The History of Diplomatic Immunity*, chs 4–7; and E. Young, 'The Development of the Law of Diplomatic Relations', *British Yearbook of International Law* 1964, Vol. 40 (London and New York: Oxford University Press, 1966), 141–82.
 60. The ambassadors' immunities were reinforced by the Ottoman assumption that they were the leaders of their local trading colonies or 'nations'. Under the capitulations, all members of officially recognized groups or 'protected' religions (*millets*) within Ottoman society were granted rights of protection and internal jurisdiction in return for preserving order and collecting taxes. The foreign 'nations' – Venetian, French, English and so on – were thus given their privileges in tacit if strong expectation of some form of political and economic reciprocity. An influential example – if not the 'model' – of such capitulations was that granted to the French in 1569. See Steensgaard, 'Consuls and Nations in the Levant', 16–18; H. İnalçık, 'İmtiyazat', in *The Encyclopaedia of Islam*, new edn, Vol. III (Leiden: Brill and London: Luzac, 1971), 1183–4.
 61. Mansel, *Constantinople*, 194.
 62. Steensgaard, 'Consuls and Nations in the Levant', 18; the English capitulations are reproduced in Foster (ed.), *The Travels of John Sanderson*, 284. The relevant article is number 5: 'Item, that within my dominions no English consull, appointed for the governinge and defending of their nation, shalbe imprisoned or molested in any sute, deprived, or his house sealed up, untill ars [a petition] be made first unto my happy Port and the English ambassador advised, to thend he may answer any cause alleaged against him.'

63. S. Anderson, *An English Consul in Turkey: Paul Rycaut at Smyrna, 1667–1678* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), 95.
64. Alexander Mavrocordato twice received asylum in the French embassy, in 1688 and 1703, as did his son in 1710, Mansel, *Constantinople*, 150, 157.
65. Mansel, *Constantinople*, 194–7.
66. Alfred C. Wood, *A History of the Levant Company* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1935), 86–7; and Michael Strachan, *Sir Thomas Roe, 1581–1644: A Life* (Salisbury: Michael Russell, 1989), 167.
67. D. B. Horn, *The British Diplomatic Service, 1689–1789* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961), 5–8.
68. In the particularly well regulated Venetian diplomatic service, however, the *bailo's* term of office was fixed at a mere two years; though certainly not without its perils, his journey to Istanbul was, of course, relatively short. See Brown, *Studies in the History of Venice*, 6, 8–15.
69. *The New Cambridge Modern History*, Vol. 6, 622, note 3.
70. In December 1626, Richelieu prohibited all communications between French subjects and foreign ambassadors, including the papal nuncio.
71. Ainslie to Grenville, 10 July 1793, FO78/14.

6

The Adoption and Use of Permanent Diplomacy

Ömer Kürkçüoğlu

Among its many definitions, diplomacy may be summarized as ‘the persons, institutions, rules and concepts concerning the art and style of the implementation of foreign policy’.¹ The Foreign Ministry, as the institution related to diplomacy, is also a domestic factor in the formulation of foreign policy.² In other words, diplomacy can be likened to the constructor of a building who is also one of its architects.

In the Ottoman case, however, although the state had a foreign policy right from the start, diplomacy developed very little until the late eighteenth century. As to the role of diplomacy as a domestic factor in the formulation of foreign policy, it was of even less significance.

Therefore, contrary to the general expectation that the ‘diplomacy of a strong power is also strong’, Ottoman diplomacy was very underdeveloped even during the heyday of the Empire, the first three centuries of more than six centuries of its lifetime.³ That is to say, Ottoman diplomacy was weak when the state was strong. As a further exception to the rule, Ottoman diplomacy became strong when the state was weak.

Permanent diplomacy as a measure to offset the decline in military power

Until the late 1700s, Ottoman diplomacy was unilateral (non-reciprocal), that is other countries had resident ambassadors at the Ottoman capital from the fifteenth century onwards while the Sultan sent envoys abroad only for temporary missions on an ad hoc basis. What prompted the change to resident diplomacy?

The Ottoman state was based on the notion of ‘ghaza’, war on behalf of Islam. Therefore, military power was the most essential element of the Ottoman state. The state considered itself to be in continuous

warfare with the non-Muslim world – *Dar al-Harb*. Hence diplomacy was neglected purposely, since the Ottomans could not consider themselves to be at peace with the non-Muslims.

However, from the late sixteenth century onwards, the Ottomans had lost much of their military power. Towards the end of the eighteenth century, Ottoman military power had reached its lowest ebb. The Ottomans were at war again with Austria on the one hand and Russia on the other, as had been the case from time to time since the previous century.

The reform-minded Ottoman Sultan of the era, Selim III, made two main attempts to alleviate the problems of the Empire. On the one hand, again giving priority to the military – like all other Ottoman reformers earlier and afterwards – he established the ‘Nizam-ı Cedid’ (the New Order) Army in 1793.⁴

On the other hand, Selim III signed a treaty of alliance with Prussia in 1790, which was approved by the high religious authority (the ‘Sheikh al-Islam’) only after long discussion, since it was the first Ottoman alliance with a non-Muslim great power. This development indicated that the Ottomans were now becoming aware of the significance of diplomacy, which had made it possible for many states to sign such treaties ever since the fourteenth century, when the system of ‘balance of power’ began to regulate the relations among the city-states in Italy.⁵

The more significant Ottoman step towards diplomacy, however, was the establishment of resident embassies. The development took place in 1793, only three years later than when the *Nizam-ı Cedid* was formed. Thus Ottoman diplomacy, by sending resident ambassadors abroad, adopted the reciprocal exchange of ambassadors, terminating the ‘unilateralism’ of the previous era. Hence, it became ‘ad permanentum’ or ‘ad perpetuum’ instead of ‘ad hoc’. Hurewitz evaluates this change as follows:

... The Ottoman Empire was the first non-Christian country to participate in the European state system and the first unconditionally to accept its form of diplomacy. The Ottoman realization of full diplomatic reciprocity with Europe thus constituted a major step in the transformation of the European state system into a world system. It also constituted a major step in the Westernization of the Ottoman state...

... [Also] permanent diplomacy arose in the Ottoman Empire much in the way it had originated in the first place in Renaissance Italy and

Reformation Europe, almost imperceptibly as a concrete response to a concrete need (i.e. to end the supreme crisis when the survival of the state hung by a hair) . . .⁶

Why was London the first choice?

Had it not been for the revolution in 1789, France would almost certainly have been the first destination for the newly established Ottoman resident ambassadors. This was because of the traditional friendship between France and the Ottoman Empire going back to the early sixteenth century. In view of Sultan Selim III's personal closeness to the French,⁷ the traditional friendship with France and the fact that no war had been fought between the two states, Paris was under consideration at the beginning to send the first Ottoman Ambassador. That consideration, however, had to be changed upon the outbreak of the French Revolution. The Ottoman Sultan could not afford to draw the hatred of the major European powers, which were appalled by the Revolution. However, Selim III found himself again in difficulties when the new French regime sent high-level representatives to Istanbul to impose diplomatic recognition, which it very much needed in the days of isolation in the immediate aftermath of the Revolution. The Ottoman Empire, probably showing the first significant display of artful diplomacy in this new era, announced that it would recognize the new French regime only after any other European power did so. The Ottomans duly recognized the new French regime after Prussia.

Due to these inconveniences and complications caused by the Revolution, as a result it was London which was the first to receive a permanent Ottoman ambassador. Great Britain as the 'rising star' of European diplomacy since the seventeenth century, had an influential position in the Ottoman Empire, where it had been represented by the resident ambassadors since 1583. British ambassadors with their elegant styles were exceptionally successful in dealing with Oriental potentates. In contrast to the not infrequent disastrous collisions between Ottoman officials and representatives of some other countries, the British diplomats' patience and tactful manners obviated such clashes. Also, Great Britain – along with the United Provinces – had mediated on many occasions since the previous century to patch up peace between the Ottomans and the Austrians, thus increasing its influence with the Sublime Porte.

London – as common sense dictated right from the start – was, thereupon, chosen to receive the first Ottoman resident ambassador. Yusuf Agah

Efendi was selected for this mission, in preparation for which the view of Sir Robert Ainslie, the British Ambassador to Istanbul, was considered.⁸ Before his departure from Istanbul, Yusuf Agah Efendi was strictly instructed by the Sublime Porte not to accept any travel expenses which might be offered by the British government.⁹ Since the intention of the Ottoman government was to start with London as a 'pilot' assignment, and eventually expand the diplomatic representation of the Empire, soon afterwards Ottoman resident ambassadors were sent to other capitals as well: Berlin, Vienna and Paris.

Why were the first Ottoman ambassadors unsuccessful?

Sultan Selim III's attempt at resident diplomacy coincided with a period 'when diplomacy in Europe was temporarily breaking down as one of the effects of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic wars which followed'.¹⁰ This was inauspicious, but the early period of the Ottoman resident ambassadors was not successful¹¹ for many additional reasons.

First, as discussed above, it was natural that the diplomacy of a weakening power could not ordinarily be expected to be very strong. The new resident ambassadors of the Ottoman Empire were faced with the difficult task of representing a state which had passed its halcyon days long ago. The Ottoman Empire, which was perceived in Europe as having treated foreign ambassadors condescendingly in its days of superiority, could not expect a totally dissimilar attitude to its own ambassadors now, at a period when it was showing every sign of decline.

Secondly, Sultan Selim III 'had taken no more than half measures. His scheme made no provisions for a foreign ministry that might have coordinated the activities of his diplomats in Europe.'¹²

Thirdly, the early Ottoman ambassadors did not even receive enough respect and support from their own government. There were undue delays in receiving instructions from the Sublime Porte, and they were not well enough informed about the state of affairs back home. Hurewitz says:

... Often the Sultan took decisions simply by consulting the vizier or court favorite who happened to be close at hand. The missions in the four capitals thus frequently received conflicting instructions, when they received any instructions at all. The correspondence reaching the Sublime Porte from the Continent was assiduously collected; but the archivists – unlike their predecessors of the sixteenth century – had forgotten how to file, so that it became impossible to keep track

of commitments, negotiations and intelligence. Precisely because there was a good deal of communication where none existed before, the confusion was compounded...¹³

Fourthly, since diplomacy had not yet become a profession in the Ottoman Empire, the early ambassadors were not well-versed in international affairs. Many able statesmen – not career diplomats though – who might still be eligible to represent their country preferred to stay at home with the expectation of some high-level post in the government. After all, serving as an ambassador abroad was a new career about which little was known, and was, therefore, considered to be not prestigious enough to leave the mainstream of politics in the capital.

Fifthly, the early ambassadors were chosen mainly from among officials who had specialized in financial matters. Apart from their lack of professional knowledge of diplomatic affairs, they had not even mastered a foreign language. This factor inevitably increased the role of their embassy dragomans or interpreters who were mostly non-Muslims.¹⁴ Thus, the ambassadors might even be faced with the danger of becoming a ‘tool’ in the hands of their interpreters.

As a sixth factor, the financial costs of running an embassy were too high for the weakening Ottoman Empire to endure. The Ottoman government attached great importance to not sacrificing anything when the honour and grandeur of the state were at issue. The early Ottoman ambassadors were strictly instructed not to accept any offer by the other side to meet their expenses after they had passed the frontier. They were also instructed to be lavishly liberal in the choice of the most precious gifts they presented to their hosts, an act considered by Istanbul to demonstrate again the grandeur and richness of the Empire. However, despite their initially very high salaries (which were determined by their earlier government service), the ambassadors were not given the necessary funds to meet their expenditures.¹⁵ The early ambassadors’ specialization in financial matters would not be sufficient to ‘create miracles’ out of such restricted means.

As a seventh factor, the early ambassadors were devoid of ‘professional guaranty’. That is to say, although they were normally expected to serve for three years abroad, some of them were called back earlier whenever they fell out with their superiors back home, generally owing to sentimental reasons. Also, for quite some time the early ambassadors had to leave their families at home, though they were looked after by the government.

Finally, the ambassadors were not supported by consular services. One rare consular office was established by the ambassador to Paris, Sait Halet Efendi, in Marseilles in 1803. Given the reasons cited above, it would be quite natural that the early Ottoman ambassadors would not be especially successful in correctly evaluating the run of events in the capitals in which they were stationed, apart from raising some interest towards the Empire in the countries they served. The typical example is the great failure of Seyyid Ali Efendi who was the Ottoman ambassador in Paris. No less than one month after the French invasion of Egypt – still part of the Ottoman Empire – the ambassador reported to Istanbul that France had no antagonistic designs whatsoever against his country and that it only wanted to occupy Malta. The Ottoman government had learnt about the French intentions concerning Egypt only through other sources. What is even more interesting is the fact that the Ottoman ambassador heard about the French invasion of Egypt only after his government informed him to that effect.¹⁶ The *Sefâretnâmes*, which were the collections of reports covering the Ottoman ambassadors' observations abroad, were, nevertheless, of great use in enabling Turkish society to learn about the other countries. This was despite the fact that those reports tended to emphasize non-political issues like protocol, social institutions and so on since political activity was considered to involve 'state secrets'.¹⁷

For the reasons mentioned above, the Ottoman ambassadors were withdrawn by Selim III in 1802. Selim III had not obtained what he had expected from his expensive resident representation. The fact that he had spent so much on it showed that he had expected too much.¹⁸ Nevertheless, he did not want to put an immediate end to the practice. For a while, he thought of sending Phanariot Greeks as ambassadors, but he later decided to keep the dragomans in the Ottoman missions abroad as *chargés d'affaires*.¹⁹ The Ottoman Empire was represented at this level for some time. After the outbreak of the Greek revolt for independence in 1821, the Sublime Porte finally decided to wind up its missions in Europe, all by then directed by *chargés d'affaires*.²⁰ In the meantime, nevertheless, significant steps were taken to improve the quality of the diplomatic service in the Ottoman Empire.

The establishment of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Sultan Mahmut II reactivated resident diplomacy in 1834, and two years later established Umur-u Hariciye Nezareti (the Ministry of Foreign Affairs).²¹ This was a great reform, indeed. It was the first time that foreign

affairs were going to be dealt with by a separate ministry instead of a department attached directly to the Prime Minister's office. Until 1836, the 'Reis-ül-küttab', or briefly 'Reis Efendi' (the chief of the secretaries), was in charge of foreign affairs in the Ottoman government. In the early periods of the Empire, it was the 'Nişancı' who was in charge of foreign affairs. The last Reis-ül-küttab Akif Efendi became 'Nazır', the Foreign Minister.

The office in charge of foreign affairs now became much larger, with the formation of new departments. The Foreign Ministers soon became very influential in the Cabinet, second in prestige after the Prime Minister (Sadrazam). Indeed, the Foreign Minister was in a way the 'Prime Minister of External Affairs', while the Sadrazam was the 'Prime Minister of Internal Affairs'. This prestigious position of the Foreign Minister would be lowered somewhat in the latter part of the nineteenth century during Abdülhamid II's rule (1876–1909). Abdülhamid took foreign policy into his own hands, thus leaving little to the Foreign Minister. In fact, the personal centralization of state affairs in his period diminished the role of even the Prime Minister. In such a period, therefore, it was quite natural that great personalities like Reşit Pasha, Ali Pasha and Fuat Pasha who had already died, could no longer be at the helm of domestic or foreign affairs.²² Nevertheless, Abdülhamid II's reign excepted, the foreign ministers were greatly influential. It was quite natural, therefore, that in the mid-nineteenth century, in particular, many foreign ministers became prime minister on several occasions, and vice versa.

The return of the Ottoman resident ambassadors

Mahmut II, as already noted, permitted the Ottoman resident ambassadors to return to their posts in 1834. In addition to the four main European capitals (London, Berlin, Vienna and Paris), an embassy was set up in Teheran in 1849 and five resident missions were organized at that time starting out as legations: Athens in April 1840; Stockholm (also accredited to The Hague) in June 1854; St Petersburg²³ in March 1857 (embassy, July 1873); Turin, January 1857 (replaced by one in Rome in 1870, raised to embassy in the early 1880s); Brussels in October 1857 (in the custody of a chargé d'affaires until 1879 when a fully fledged minister took over); and Washington in April 1867.²⁴

In the meantime, the Tercüme Odası (the Translation Department) had been established in 1823, and was another significant development. This would attack the foreign language deficiency of the Ottoman ambassadors, which had proved such a handicap in the initial period.

Also, the Department would be a 'school' for future diplomats. One other development in that direction was the establishment of Mülkiye, the Imperial School, to educate civil bureaucrats in 1859.

The advent of the telegraph, which in September 1855 linked Istanbul to the Continent, accelerated overnight the pace of Ottoman diplomacy and toned up the service, as it had been doing in Europe, by tightening the controls of the Foreign Ministry over its missions abroad. The Foreign Ministry itself became a progressively bigger and busier establishment, as the communications traffic mounted.²⁵

A general evaluation of the period

General characteristics

As the Ottoman Empire lost its supremacy, the general attitude of the state was to keep away from European politics. When turmoil existed in Europe, the Ottoman Empire benefited from such a situation by using it as a 'period of respite'. At such times, the Ottoman Empire left Europe alone with its problems. The Ottomans, too, were left face to face with theirs.

In the early fourteenth century wars in many parts of Europe had expedited the expansion of the Ottoman Empire, while in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries wars of religion in Europe had saved a weakening Ottoman Empire from collapse. The net result was a period of respite (stagnation) for the Empire. Similarly, in the late eighteenth century, the Napoleonic Wars following the French Revolution again saved the Empire from a speedy collapse. Thus an external factor, that is turmoil in Europe, had acted as an expediting element in all those three main periods, accelerating expansion in the first period and decelerating decline in the other two.

However, the main common element in most of these periods was the Ottomans' mistake in regarding the European system as alien. Of course Europe, too, regarded the Ottomans as aliens. However, at least at the beginning, the Ottomans' relationships with the Byzantium Empire and the kingdoms in the Balkans, which vacillated between friendship and enmity, presented them to European eyes as yet another Balkan nation not totally unacceptable in the continent.²⁶ Instead of becoming part of the European system, the Ottoman Empire preferred to pose a fatal threat to the continent when it was militarily strong. Thus the Ottomans indirectly contributed to the very development of the European system and the sense of 'Europeanness' which was based mainly upon anti-Turkish sentiments fed by the Ottoman Empire's thrust

into the heartland of the continent until the late sixteenth century. Therefore the Ottomans who 'attacked' Europe when they were strong did not try to 'defend' themselves as the West gained ascendancy.

The effects of the French Revolution in increasing nationalist movements in the Balkans, Russia's desires for expansion and great power rivalry in the Near East, were the major causes of the Ottoman Empire's problems. The 'Eastern Question', that is the fate of the Ottoman Empire, thus became the main problem of the period. Within such a framework, the Ottomans were on the defensive, trying to counterbalance the deteriorating situation by military and other reforms. The Ottoman reforms in diplomacy, which gave the Empire the chance of playing off one great power against another, were introduced in such an atmosphere.

Able diplomats like Reşit, Ali and Fuat Pashas certainly postponed the inevitable demise of the Empire. It was in that period in the mid-nineteenth century that the Ottoman Empire was at last aware of the significance of becoming part of the European system. In the Paris Treaty of 1856, signed after the Crimean War (which was the only war the Ottomans had won against Russia in the nineteenth century, thanks to the alliance of Britain, France and Piedmont), Turkey was finally accepted as part of the European states system. Article 7 of the Treaty declared that 'the Sublime Porte [is] admitted to participate in the advantages of the public law and system (*Concert*) of Europe'. However, this was rather 'too late', in the sense that by the same treaty the Ottoman Empire had admitted its weakness by accepting the protection of the major European powers. Within this framework, Ottoman diplomacy had to cope with the following developments in the period after the late eighteenth century.

Until the Congress of Vienna

When the French Revolution broke out, the Ottoman Empire was at war with Austria and Russia. However, the turmoil in Europe distracted them and enabled the Ottomans to sign peace treaties in 1791 and 1792 respectively. Nevertheless, the Ottoman Empire could not long enjoy remaining aloof from the European turbulence. In 1798, hoping to deliver an indirect blow to Britain by cutting its links with India, France attacked Egypt, which was Ottoman territory. It would have been extremely difficult for the Ottoman Empire to fight against revolutionary France alone. However, Russia and Britain, which were already fighting it in Europe, came to the Ottomans' rescue. The Ottoman Empire signed treaties of alliance with Russia in 1798 and Britain in 1799. The treaty with Russia, the Ottomans' arch-enemy, would obviously be of a

temporary character, as indeed the developments to follow soon would manifest. However, the cooperation with Britain proved to be of a much longer duration.

The Ottomans thus embarked upon a 'policy of balance', that is playing off Britain against the other major powers in general and Russia in particular. Anglo-Ottoman friendship continued – despite certain setbacks – until 1878. In that year, the Ottoman defeat at the hands of Russia proved to Britain that the Turkish Empire might collapse at any moment. Therefore Britain began to think that to avoid such an eventuality, which would serve only Russia, it should seek its own interests by taking precautionary measures, like settling in Cyprus in 1878 and Egypt in 1882. Upon that development, the Ottoman Empire began to look for another great power in line with its 'policy of balance'. The change of policy in Germany towards colonialism in the Near East after Wilhelm II became Emperor soon paved the way for partnership between Berlin and Istanbul.

Allied with the two major European powers, Britain and Russia, in 1799 the new Ottoman Army (Nizam-ı Cedid) fought well enough to force the French out of Egypt. After eliminating the French threat, the Ottoman Empire found itself again in difficulty with Russia, which led to a war in 1806, and ended in Ottoman defeat in 1812. Bessarabia was the most significant among the Ottoman territorial losses. Soon afterwards, the Napoleonic Wars in Europe also came to an end and the Congress of Vienna was held in 1814–15.

Having fought against France, it would be quite natural that the Ottoman Empire should participate in this great historic gathering in Vienna. However, the Russians feared it would be forced by the other major European powers to cede back to the Ottomans some of the territories – mainly Bessarabia – which they had gained in the 1806–12 War. The Ottomans, on the other hand, acting upon their chronic reflex to keep away from European affairs, also feared that they might be forced to cede still more territories to Russia. Thus the Ottoman Empire was only too relieved not to be invited to the Congress of Vienna. It was within the framework of this 'isolation' that the Ottoman Empire found itself face to face with the Greek revolt for independence.

The Greek revolt for independence

The Ottoman Empire found itself engaged with the decade-long Greek crisis throughout the 1820s. The Greek revolt in 1821 revealed the 'isolation' of the Ottoman Empire. The major European powers – including

Britain, the linchpin of the Ottoman 'policy of balance' – sided with the Greeks. Austria's Chancellor Metternich, in line with his general policy of standing against any liberal and nationalist movement which would damage his system, attempted to organize opposition against the Greek movement at the Congress of Verona in 1822. However, that Congress, which was held as the fourth follow-up to Vienna, displayed the differences among the major powers and was, therefore, a failure, thus bringing to an end the series of such gatherings after 1815.

The Ottoman armada at the port of Navarin was set on fire by the British, French and Russians in 1827, and in the following year, the Ottomans found themselves at war with Russia, prompted by a claim for leadership in solidarity with the Orthodox Greeks. Russia was also anxious to avoid the possibility of British supremacy over them. The Ottoman Empire was defeated in 1829 and had to accept the independence of Greece, which was expedited by the war with Russia. Greek independence was the first such success against the Ottoman Empire and would, in the near future, set an example for other nations in the Empire in general, and the Balkans in particular.

The insurrection of Mehmet Ali Pasha

Immediately after the decade-long Greek question of the 1820s, the Ottoman Empire found itself in another protracted crisis. Mehmet Ali Pasha, the Governor of Egypt, had also lost some of his fleet during the Navarin raid in 1827. He now put forward certain demands to Sultan Mahmut II, among which was the governorship of Syria in addition to Egypt, for the reconstruction of his fleet by using the forests in that region.²⁷ Thus the Greek revolt of the previous decade affected another delicate area of the Ottoman Empire, the Near East. Apart from its indirect effect – the demand concerning the reconstruction of the Egyptian fleet – the Greek revolt seemed to have set an example for Mehmet Ali Pasha who had been engaged for quite some time in infrastructure projects, sending students to Europe and so on. He was acting rather too independently of the Sultan with whom he had developed a more or less personal rivalry. The demands of Mehmet Ali Pasha would lead to Egypt's independence.

The Ottoman Sultan could not tolerate his behaviour any longer and decided to bring to heel a man who was, after all, a mere governor of the Empire. However, when force was resorted to, Mehmet Ali Pasha's army delivered a disastrous blow to the Ottomans. The situation was dramatic: the authority of the Sultan of the Empire was demolished by one of his governors.

As in the Greek case, a domestic affair soon turned into an international issue. Russia was not happy with the growing western influence in Egypt and also feared that the vigorous Mehmet Ali Pasha might even replace the decrepit Ottoman dynasty. Accordingly, Russia imposed a treaty of alliance upon the Ottoman Empire in Hünkâr İskelesi, Istanbul, in 1833.

This provoked British anxiety at the growing Russian influence over Istanbul. In actual fact, the Ottoman Sultan, who had had no other alternative except the Russian one, also sought to attract the attention of Britain, with whom relations had deteriorated during the Greek revolt. The Anglo-Turkish trade agreement of 1838 lowered the Ottoman customs for British goods. In the following year, the *Tanzimat Firman* was promulgated in Istanbul as the first major step towards constitutional monarchy.

The *Firman*, which introduced certain basic rights and freedoms, was promulgated by the new Sultan Abdülmecit – who was also a reformist ruler – upon the advice of the Ottoman Foreign Minister Reşit Pasha. Reşit Pasha had served earlier as an ambassador in Europe and was, therefore, acquainted with the strength of the liberal movements there. He believed that by introducing a liberal reform itself, the Ottoman Empire might regain the sympathy of the West in general, and Britain in particular. This development was significant for various other reasons. First, it showed the effect of an external factor, the need for support from abroad, upon a domestic element, the political system at home. Secondly, the era of able diplomats was beginning with Reşit Pasha. Diplomatic skill would, from now onwards, be a decisive factor in the solution of at least some of the major problems – as indeed future developments would show.

In this favourable atmosphere, the Ottoman Empire regained the support of Britain. Accordingly, to prevent Russia from imposing another ‘alliance’ upon the Ottoman Empire through which she could ensure the closure of the Turkish straits to the warships of other powers, Britain saw to it that the status of the Turkish Straits – their closure in peacetime to the warships of other countries – was put under the guarantee of the major powers by the London Convention in 1841. Within that positive atmosphere, the ‘Mehmet Ali Pasha Question’ had been solved two months earlier. According to the new status of Egypt, the basic principles of which were earlier signed again in London in 1840, Syria was not given to Mehmet Ali Pasha. However, the governorship of Egypt was left to Mehmet Ali Pasha’s family to pass from father to son on inheritance. Thus, while the intervention of the major powers had

led to the loss of Greece in the previous decade, the European powers this time helped to preserve Egypt for the Ottoman Empire.²⁸

The Sultan was made, once again, master in his own domain but at the price of making his Empire subordinate to the European states system. This development was textually reflected in the designation of the Sultan as 'His Highness', while diplomatic protocol demanded that the monarchs of Europe be addressed as 'Their Majesties'.²⁹ It was only after the alliance with Britain and France during the Crimean War that the Ottoman plenipotentiaries persuaded their European colleagues to drop 'His Highness' as a mode of addressing the Sultan, in favour of 'His Majesty', a style that stuck until the demise of the Ottoman Empire in 1922.

The Crimean War

Apart from the unrest in the Lebanon and Crete, the Ottoman Empire was not engaged with any major foreign policy issue throughout the following decade until the early 1850s when Russia began to create problems. As mentioned above, the Ottoman Empire, having regained the friendship of Britain and France – accompanied by Piedmont as well – found itself at war with Russia in 1853. When not left alone in front of Russia, the Ottomans could manage to come out the winner in 1856, as mentioned earlier.

In the Peace Treaty of Paris in 1856, which as a further check on Russian power in the area also demilitarized the Black Sea, the Ottoman Empire had reached its most favourable standing in the eyes of the major European powers. In the meantime, Sultan Abdülmecit – this time upon the advice of his Prime Minister Ali Pasha – had issued another *Firman* (*Islahat Fermanı*, the Reform Edict), which introduced new fundamental rights for the non-Muslim subjects of the Empire. This development was also significant in the same vein as the *Tanzimat* reform mentioned above.

In this period, diplomacy again played a significant role in the Empire's gains. Indeed, it was the period of Ali Pasha and Fuat Pasha.

The Lebanese settlement

The Lebanese question had preoccupied the Ottoman Empire for several decades in the mid-nineteenth century. The Christian-Muslim duality of the area, plus the different sects of each religion, had turned the problem into a multi-faceted one, with the inevitable intervention of major European powers. Indeed, France supported the Catholics (the Maronites), while Britain was in touch with the Druses, basically a Muslim group yet rejected for historical reasons by their co-religionists.

The Ottoman government, through the wise statesmanship of the Foreign Minister Fuat Pasha, introduced a *sui generis* status for the Lebanon in 1861. The new status of the Lebanon produced a Christian governor and an administrative body comprising all the communities of the region in accordance with certain contingencies. This solution was a really successful one. Indeed, all parties – domestic and foreign – were satisfied. The system worked well and foreign intervention ceased.

The Balkan revolt and the 1877–78 Russo-Ottoman War

In the last quarter of the nineteenth century, the Ottoman Empire was preoccupied with the constant turmoil in the Balkans. The most prominent three statesmen of the century (Reşit, Ali and Fuat Pashas) had all died by then. Diplomatic skill, therefore, could not be used to avert crises in the Balkans, which had increased by the latter part of the century due mainly to Russo-Austrian rivalry in the area. Furthermore, the major European powers were all pressing for reform projects lest any one of them should gain ascendancy in the region.

In such an atmosphere, the new Ottoman Sultan, Abdülhamid II, introduced a constitution in 1876. The introduction of constitutional rule (*Meşrutiyet*) was a result of many domestic factors as there were, now, an increasing number of liberal intellectuals and politicians in the Empire who were pressing for a constitutional regime. However, at least the timing of constitutional rule had an external element. Indeed, an international conference to deal with the reform projects in the Balkans was to open in Istanbul on the day the constitutional rule was promulgated. The Ottoman Foreign Minister, Safvet Pasha, announced to the foreign participants that with the introduction of constitutional rule in the whole country, there remained no reason to discuss any reform project for the Balkans and the conference duly ended.

This display of diplomatic acumen could not, however, save the Empire from further turmoil in the Balkans. At a time when the country was engaged with adapting itself to the new regime – accompanied by domestic political rivalry between liberals and conservatives – Russia made best use of the situation by stirring up turmoil again in the region. As a result, the Ottoman Empire found itself in 1877 once again at war with Russia. Despite the Paris Treaty of 1856, Britain and France did not side with the Ottoman Empire this time. Thus the Ottomans were utterly defeated. The San Stefano Peace Treaty signed in 1878 registered many losses for the Ottomans both in the east and the west.

Just like the influence of the external factor upon the promulgation of constitutional rule in 1876, the war with Russia caused suspension of

it. Foreign policy issues were discussed at some length in the Ottoman Parliament – probably with greater criticism of the government than anywhere else in the world at that period – thus giving the Sultan enough pretexts for suspension of the constitutional rule on grounds of safety of conduct of the war. However, the main reason was the authoritarian-minded Sultan's displeasure as regards the constitutional rule. Indeed, even after the war ended in 1878, the suspension of the constitution lasted until 1908, when Sultan Abdülhamid II had to put it into force again only after a revolt.

With the San Stefano Peace Treaty of 1878, the major European powers awoke to the sudden supremacy of Russia over the Ottoman Empire. Austria (Austria-Hungary since 1867) was embittered most. Chancellor Bismarck, the architect of the newly-born German Empire, was quick to display his diplomatic skill to keep the Austrians and the Russians on his side by organizing a new peace conference in Berlin. To this Britain and France also lent their support.

The new Treaty signed at the Congress of Berlin in 1878 was milder. However, it did not placate the Ottomans. The only change was to diminish some of Russia's gains, mainly in favour of Austria. The Ottomans could not display any diplomatic skill in those peace conferences to counterbalance their military weakness. What is more, Britain, upon which the Ottomans had based their 'policy of balance' since the late eighteenth century, began to change its attitude towards the Sublime Porte. To avoid a new surprise victory of Russia over the Ottomans, Britain – as mentioned earlier – entered Cyprus in 1878 and Egypt in 1882. Also, again with a view to blocking the Russians, Britain began to lend its support to the Armenians.

The Cretan question and the Greco-Ottoman War of 1897

Like the Lebanese problem, the Cretan question, too, became a constant element of uneasiness for the Ottoman Empire. Although the Lebanese question was settled in the manner mentioned above, the Cretan affair occupied the Ottoman Empire's mind for a much longer period in the nineteenth century.

After the independence of Greece, secessionist feelings in Crete also increased. The idea of union with mainland Greece was, of course, actively supported by Athens. Greece was generally successful in winning the support of major European powers as well.

As in some other cases, the Ottoman Empire vacillated in Crete between resorting to force and introducing reforms. At the time when Fuat Pasha was Foreign Minister, the Empire had recourse to

diplomacy. Indeed, in 1867, Sultan Abdulaziz, upon Fuat Pasha's insistence, visited major European capitals – mainly Paris and London. This was a historic event, indeed, as the first, and the last for that matter, diplomatic visit of an Ottoman Sultan to a foreign country. The basic purpose of the visit was to win French and British support in the Cretan question.³⁰ These efforts were not without effect. Indeed, the Cretan problem did not turn into a big crisis for quite some time.

However, during Abdülhamid II's absolute rule, in 1897, when able diplomats were no longer in government service, the Empire found itself at war with Greece. The Ottoman Empire was, nevertheless, successful in defeating the Greeks in the military field. However, except for a fledgling friendship with Germany, the Ottomans were isolated internationally. Hence, the Greeks managed to get away with a mild peace treaty with the Ottomans.

The Cretan question remained as a thorny issue for some time longer. Anti-Ottoman propaganda in the West continued in the meantime.³¹ Finally, during the Balkan Wars of 1912–13, Crete was lost by the Ottoman Empire.

The Armenian question

As mentioned above, the 1877–78 Russo-Ottoman War left behind yet another thorny issue for the Ottoman Empire: the Armenian question. Thus, despite the fact that the Armenian nation had, for centuries, been regarded as the most 'loyal' non-Muslim ethnic group of all ('millet-i sadıka') in the Empire, which had thoroughly adapted itself to the Ottoman way of life, estrangement began to grow and soon led to mutual animosity.

The degeneration of the Ottoman administration was certainly a poisoning factor which contributed to the deterioration of the situation. However, the nationalist winds of the 1789 French Revolution and major power rivalry to back up the Armenians were the more fundamental causes of that question. The autocratic rule of Abdülhamid II, leaving little ground for democratic and diplomatic manoeuvring, found itself faced with a tremendous problem. The Armenian organizations resorted to violence, which reached such a pitch that in 1905 there was an abortive attempt on the life of the Sultan himself.

Hence, the Armenian question became a constant element damaging the international image of the Ottoman Empire, thus acting as yet another factor which brought about its downfall.

Conclusion

As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, normally a strong country's diplomacy will also be strong. It is, therefore, ideal to be militarily, politically and economically strong on the one hand and diplomatically strong on the other. Out of the three other possibilities, the worst is, needless to say, to be weak in both aspects.

During its lifetime of more than six centuries, the Ottoman Empire was militarily strong in its first three centuries but diplomatically weak. As regards the last one and a quarter century period of permanent diplomacy, the Empire was militarily weak but, in general, diplomatically strong. That explains why Napoleon Bonaparte, who, on the eve of his attack upon Egypt, had expected only 25 years more for the Ottoman Empire,³² was proven wrong. Indeed, the Ottoman Empire went on to live for nearly five times longer than the duration Napoleon Bonaparte had foreseen. Moreover, if the Ottoman Empire, itself, as during the era of Abdülhamid II, had not decelerated the development of its civilian and diplomatic bureaucracies the state might have lived even longer. Nevertheless, Reşit, Ali and Fuat Pashas had laid the foundations of the Ottoman diplomatic service so well that even Abdülhamid II allowed the Foreign Ministry some scope for discretionary action. More than that, the number of Ottoman missions abroad was augmented from ten at the time of his assuming power to 15 by the end of the century.³³

However, as with the mistake of depending too much upon military power, and too little upon diplomacy, doing the opposite would be similarly inadequate to ensure the security of the Empire. Therefore, taking into consideration the insufficiency in solving the basic political, economic and social problems which brought about the downfall of the Empire, no miracle could have been expected from diplomacy.

What is more, the profound international problems and the bitter rivalry between the two blocs reached such a precarious stage at the beginning of the twentieth century that it became more and more difficult to keep the Ottoman Empire safe and sound. Inevitably, therefore, the Ottoman Empire suffered further losses in the Bosnia-Herzegovina crisis of 1908, in the Tripoli War of 1911 and in the Balkan Wars of 1912–13. Finally, the Ottoman Empire allied itself with Germany on 2 August 1914 and after only three months entered the War which heralded the demise of the Empire.

As a final word, it can be argued, with some justification, that among the institutions which have remained from the Ottoman Empire, the diplomatic establishment is one of those which still have high prestige today.

Notes

1. For other definitions, see Mehmet Gönlübol, *Uluslararası Politika: İlkeler, Kavramlar, Kurumlar*, (International Politics: Principles, Concepts and Institutions) (Ankara: A.Ü. Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Yayınları, 1978), 112.
2. See: Ömer Kürkçüoğlu, 'Dış Politika Nedir? Türkiye'deki Dünü ve Bugünü' ('What is Foreign Policy? Its Past and Present Situation in Turkey'), *SBF Dergisi*, Cilt: XXXV, no. 1-4 (1981), 335.
3. For its causes, see Hüner Tuncer, '*Eski' ve 'Yeni' Diplomasi (Old Diplomacy and the New Diplomacy)* (Ankara: Dış Politika Enstitüsü, 1991), 42; and J. C. Hurewitz, 'Ottoman Diplomacy and the European States System', *Middle East Journal* (Spring 1961), 146-7.
4. Previous attempts like those of Osman II in the early seventeenth century to establish a new army unit without dissolving the decrepit Janissaries had caused great domestic turmoil, thus bringing the attempt at military modernization to a disastrous end. Selim III was now repeating the same mistake. Unfortunately, Selim III, too, was eventually overthrown in the end and lost his life. It was Mahmut II, who, about two decades later, managed to dissolve the Janissaries and establish a new army.
5. The late eighteenth century, like the fourteenth century, was a turning point for both the world in general and the Ottoman Empire in particular. Indeed, in the period following the French Revolution, diplomacy had developed to such an extent that the Ottomans, too, could no longer neglect it.
6. Hurewitz, 'Ottoman Diplomacy and the European States System', 141, 150.
7. Selim III was well-acquainted with French culture. Before he became Sultan, he was planning to introduce reforms in the country on the French model. Selim III also enjoys an exceptional place in Ottoman history as the only prince who sent a personal envoy abroad before coming to the throne. He had sent his envoy, İshak Bey, to King Louis XVI to establish better ties between the Ottoman Empire and France against 'the joint Russian-Austrian thereat' facing Istanbul. See Faik Reşit Unat, *Osmanlı Sefirleri ve Sefaretnameleri (Ottoman Ambassadors and Their Sefaretnames)*, 2nd edn (Ankara: TTK Yayınları, 1987), 21-2.
8. Selçuk Ünal, Osmanlı Diplomatik Teşkilatı (Ottoman Diplomatic Organization), unpublished report (Ankara: A.Ü. Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi, 1990), 9. See also Berridge's chapter on 'Diplomatic Integration with Europe Before Selim III', in this book.
9. This was a manifestation of the Ottoman concern to avoid any image of inferiority. Yusuf Agah Efendi did his best to perform his duties in London. Among his achievements was to arrange the sending to Istanbul of some British officers who agreed to work for the reorganization of the Ottoman Empire. Ünal, *Osmanlı Diplomatik Teşkilatı*, 9-10.
10. Hurewitz, 'Ottoman Diplomacy and the European States System', 147.
11. Hurewitz evaluates it as follows: 'If judged by results, [this] project could hardly be described as more than a false start.' See 'Ottoman Diplomacy and the European States System', 147.
12. Hurewitz, 'Ottoman Diplomacy and the European States System', 147-8.
13. Hurewitz, 'Ottoman Diplomacy and the European States System', 148.

14. To make things even worse, some of the dragomans were not too loyal to their own state, a centuries-old problem in the Empire, which would in later years necessitate the establishment of the Tercüme Odası (the Translation Department).
15. One typical example is as follows: Yusuf Agah Efendi, the first Ottoman resident ambassador to London, had given to the British officers to be sent to Istanbul to work for the modernization of the army 10,000 *kuruş* (piasters) from his own allowance to meet their travel expenses. In return, he received from the Sultan only 450 *kuruş*. Yusuf Agah Efendi's response to the Sultan was to write out a letter in which he asked for his recall, on the grounds that he spent no less than 100 *kuruş* for a mere opera when necessary. Ünal, *Osmanlı Diplomatik Teşkilatı*, 10.
16. Tuncer, 'Eski' ve 'Yeni' Diploması, 54–5.
17. Ünal, *Osmanlı Diplomatik Teşkilatı*, 13.
18. Ünal, *Osmanlı Diplomatik Teşkilatı*, 10.
19. Ünal, *Osmanlı Diplomatik Teşkilatı*, 10.
20. Hurewitz, 'Ottoman Diplomacy and the European States System', 148. Sultan Mahmut II took that decision when it was understood that the *chargés d'affaires* sent deliberately incorrect reports to the Sublime Porte. Ünal, *Osmanlı Diplomatik Teşkilatı*, 11.
21. The date of foundation was 11 March 1836 (23 Zülka'de 1251). İsmail Hami Danişmend, *İzahlı Osmanlı Tarihi Kronolojisi (An Annotated Chronology of Ottoman History)*, 2nd edn (Istanbul: Türkiye Yayınevi, 1961), 648.
22. On this, see F. A. K. Yasamee, *Ottoman Diplomacy: Abdulhamid II and the Great Powers, 1878–1888* (Istanbul: ISIS Pres, 1996), chs 2 and 3.
23. The establishment of an Ottoman resident mission in the capital of the Empire's 'arch-enemy', Russia, manifested a change of mentality in the right direction. Indeed, until then, the Ottoman government had sent ambassadors only to 'friendly countries'.
24. Hurewitz, 'Ottoman Diplomacy and the European States System', 148.
25. Hurewitz, 'Ottoman Diplomacy and the European States System', 149–50.
26. Edward P. Cheyney, *The Dawn of a New Era, 1250–1453* (New York: Harper Brothers, 1936), 306–19.
27. In the mountains of today's Lebanon (Cebel-i Lübnan).
28. Hüner Tuncer, *Metternich'in Osmanlı Politikası (1815–1848) (Metternich and His Ottoman Policy)* (Ankara: Ümit Yayıncılık, 1996), 105.
29. Hurewitz, 'Ottoman Diplomacy and the European States System', 151.
30. For other purposes, see Reşad Ekrem Koçu, *Osmanlı Padişahları (Ottoman Sultans)* (Istanbul: Ana Yayınevi, 1981), 404.
31. See, for instance: 'Turkey and Crete', *International Herald Tribune*, 28–29 June 1911 which censured the Turks with such language as this: '... primitive peoples are more likely to go off at half cock about a matter of sentiment than about a matter of real importance...' See also: *International Herald Tribune*, 6 December 1910: '... The European powers have recognized that the basic element of the Cretan population is Greek, by allowing the King of the Hellenes to appoint the Cretan High Commissioner and by making the latter responsible not to Turkey, the suzerain power, but to the Protecting Powers, Great Britain, France, Russia and Italy... Turkish sovereignty is a political fiction, given a semblance of

reality by the Christian Powers of Europe. Crete is a living body bound to a corpse . . .'

32. Enver Ziya Karal, *Fransa-Mısır ve Osmanlı İmparatorluğu, 1797-1802 (France-Egypt and Ottoman Empire, 1797-1802)* (Istanbul: İstanbul Üniversitesi Yayınları, 1938), 43.
33. Hurewitz, 'Ottoman Diplomacy and the European States System', 151.

7

Dragomans and Oriental Secretaries in the British Embassy in Istanbul

G. R. Berridge

The native dragomans, or interpreters, of the British embassy in Istanbul – like those of the other embassies – were indispensable to its work. This was because after the early years (the embassy was established in 1583), no ambassador appears to have spoken Turkish or found it easy quickly to pick up the manner of conducting business at the Porte.¹ However, they were also indispensable because they were relied on for much more than merely ‘interpreting’. They were commonly employed as message-bearers, negotiators of routine and not-so-routine matters,² and – in the case of the most senior – as advisers as well. They also served as intelligence gatherers, not least because the Levant Company, which financed the embassy until the early nineteenth century, refused to give ambassadors a secret service allowance. Together with the secretaries – perhaps more so – they also provided institutional memory and continuity of procedure to the embassy.

There had, of course, always been misgivings about the timidity and loyalty of the native dragomans, who remained slaves of the Ottoman sultan. However, these misgivings were generally kept in check until the early nineteenth century, and it is not difficult to understand why. For one thing, more experienced ambassadors appreciated that by softening the language of self-important and short-tempered envoys, the dragomans often performed a valuable service.³ Others developed a great respect for their dragomans, especially those whose families had served the embassy for generations and had much to lose by disloyalty. And in any case, it was rare for an ambassador to be *totally* dependent upon his dragomans. Most of them had alternative lines of communication to both the Porte and the Seraglio that could be used instead of, or as a check on, the dragomans in particularly sensitive matters; this was essential when the Turks themselves did not trust the dragomans.⁴

From time to time these alternative lines of communication included the chief dragoman of the Porte, with whom ambassadors sometimes had at least one language in common;⁵ embassy doctors;⁶ and a secretary of embassy, or even a treasurer, who had sufficiently good Turkish to do some of the work that would normally be done by a dragoman.⁷ Finally, to the extent that ambassadors seemed dependent nevertheless on their native dragomans, this fact alone was usually sufficient to preserve inertia on the issue of reform. Who else could do the job? An attempt to replace the native dragomans with natives of Britain had failed when tried in the 1640s.⁸ Why, then, was a new attempt to launch the anglicization of the British embassy *drogmanat*⁹ made in the early nineteenth century (which by the end of the century had proved successful), and what shape did this take?

In the following attempt to answer these questions, attention will be directed in particular to the role of the Levant Company. This had financed the embassy since it was first established and retained great influence in its affairs until 1825 but its contribution to anglicization has been overlooked both by the historian of the British dragomans and, more surprisingly, the historian of the Levant Company.¹⁰ Also overlooked has been the contribution of Robert Liston, the experienced diplomat who had been ambassador in Istanbul in the period 1794–95 and served in that post again from 1812 until his final retirement from the diplomatic service in 1820.¹¹ As a result, Liston's ideas and example will also receive special attention. First, however, what was the position of the *drogmanat* at the beginning of the century?

The *drogmanat* at the beginning of the nineteenth century

From its beginnings in the late sixteenth century the English embassy had employed a substantial body of dragomans, traditionally Christian 'Franks' of mainly Italian origin born in Pera. As the system became established, attached to this body were younger men learning the craft who were known as *giovanni di lingua* or later as student interpreters or junior dragomans. In the interests of economy, the Levant Company laid down a maximum of three dragomans and three *giovanni*.¹² However, it found it difficult to enforce this formula because ambassadors nearly always seemed to feel the need for more.¹³ The embassy chaplain sometimes needed a dragoman as well, though in that event he employed one at his own expense.¹⁴ Enjoying new prosperity and under pressure of increased work in the embassy, by the beginning of the nineteenth century the company appears to have increased the

approved formula to four dragomans and four *giovanni di lingua* and by the early 1820s to five plus five.¹⁵ They were ranked 'first dragoman', 'second dragoman' and so on, in terms of seniority, and salaried accordingly. The first dragoman, subsequently known as the 'confidential' or 'political' dragoman, handled the most sensitive business and usually had a free run of the embassy's archives.

By the end of the French revolutionary wars, therefore, the *drogmanat* was a sizeable establishment. At this juncture it also became one which was more responsive to the political needs of the ambassador. Moved by the much greater importance assumed by Turkey in European diplomacy at this time, in 1804 the British government had taken over from the Levant Company responsibility for paying the salary of the ambassador. Henceforth the ambassador was to surrender his commercial duties to a consul-general, although, after a period of uncertainty on this point, it had been agreed that he would remain 'supreme chief' of the embassy.¹⁶ Among other things, this meant company acknowledgement of the authority of the ambassador to allocate the number of dragomans between political and commercial work as he saw fit, which provided a welcome relief from his recent tug of war with the merchants over their services.¹⁷ Furthermore, in 1814 the Levant Company began to inform newly appointed *giovanni di lingua* that they could not, as before, 'look to seniority alone for progressive rank or separate functions' but would be 'employed at the pleasure of their superiors according to their respective qualifications'.¹⁸ And shortly after his arrival as ambassador in 1821, Lord Strangford, impatient with the sensitivity of his predecessor to the feelings of the established dragomans, took this one step further and made his fifth dragoman his 'political dragoman'.¹⁹ Afraid of testing their loyalty too severely or even of losing them altogether, all ambassadors at this period were keen supporters of greatly increasing the payments to their interpreters, the purchasing power of which had recently been severely depressed. Ambassadorial praise of their virtues was thus at this point more audible than worries over their vices.²⁰

Levant Company agitation for English student interpreters

Nevertheless, in the early nineteenth century reform sentiment began to strengthen. Some of this may have had its origins, as has been claimed, with the young Stratford Canning, who was exceptional among heads of mission of this period in his generalized dislike of the dragomans – not to mention Turkey in general.²¹ However, Stratford had many other things on his mind at that time and there is no evidence

that he waged any sustained campaign against them. It is also probably fair to say that he held the Pisanis in high regard,²² and was fulsome in his praise of the dragomans (the third, Francis Charbert, in particular) in running 'to snatch the public property from the flames' when fire seriously threatened the embassy buildings in May 1810.²³ In fact, it seems likely that pressure from the Levant Company for reform of the dragoman system was initially more important than any agitation in the embassy or the Foreign Office.

In 1804 the Levant Company had agreed to continue to pay the salaries of all of the embassy staff other than the ambassador. This included the dragomans involved exclusively in political work, and it continued to pay them all until its demise in 1825.²⁴ It also knew that it would probably need the dragomans more than ever after 1804. This was because the change in the position of the ambassador introduced in that year had given him ample excuse to wash his hands of its affairs, and a consul-general, as the company well knew, could carry nothing like the same authority at the Porte.²⁵ Against this background, it is hardly surprising that it began to agitate for reform of the dragomans when it began to suspect that 'want of zeal' on their part was responsible for recent embassy failures to secure redress of commercial grievances at the Porte.²⁶ Responding to the request for further salary increases made on their behalf by Liston in 1814, the company told the consul-general, Isaac Morier, that while the past accomplishments of the dragomans were not in doubt, if they were to be paid by results they could not expect much more now. 'We really cannot longer conceal our mortification at their continual defeats,' it concluded.²⁷ Four years later, in 1819, it expressed in even stronger terms its lack of faith in the dragomans – and Liston himself. Complaining directly to the Foreign Secretary, Lord Castlereagh, of serious breaches in the capitulations by the Turks recently, the company secretary, George Liddell, charged that this was a consequence of 'our too ready acquiescence in repeated previous encroachments, and by too mild a conduct on the part of the Ambassador... [If] any new instructions be sent to HM Ambassador', he added, 'they might be effectively seconded by an official note of similar import addressed to the Turkish resident here: at least the feeling of His Majesty's Government would thereby be more certainly conveyed to the Porte than through the doubtful medium of a dragoman, who may not choose or who may not dare to deliver it with all its original energy.'²⁸

The reform tendency had in fact begun visibly to stir into life in 1810, though its first steps were slow and faltering. In March of that year, in announcing the new salaries and embassy establishment, the Levant

Company drew the attention of the consul-general to the fact that it had increased the salaries for the *giovanni di lingua* even beyond the original increase proposed. It had done this, he was told, 'with a view to induce young men of respectable connections to enter our service'. It also asked him 'particularly to notice what effect has been produced by the increased allowances'.²⁹ What the company had in mind began to become clearer when George Wood, who was British-born but not so young (he had served Lord Elgin as an interpreter in Egypt), was appointed a *giovanni di lingua* in the following year. The company secretary told Morier on that occasion that it 'would give singular satisfaction to the Company to have frequent opportunities of employing our countrymen in that department'.³⁰

It is hardly surprising therefore that the company should have taken up this matter with more energy in the same letter of June 1814 in which it blamed the dragomans for its recent failures at the Porte. Ask the ambassador, it directed its consul-general, to 'favour us with a plan for supplying the class of *giovanni di lingua* with our young countrymen, and we will strenuously endeavour to carry it into immediate execution. We know', it added, 'that His Excellency concurs in our opinion of the expediency of this measure'.³¹ This was probably true but Liston did not seem to share the company's sense of urgency about the matter. Certainly, only a few months before it made its request, the ambassador had told Morier that it would be wrong – as the first dragoman had recently suggested – to increase the strength of the *giovanni di lingua* to six and fill it immediately with recruits from the usual source. This would 'shut the door against our young countrymen', he observed. On the other hand, he had prefaced this with a qualification: 'Though this [plan] may not be immediately carried into execution, it may be resorted to at some future period.' This was not the conclusion of an enthusiastic reformer. Nevertheless, towards the end of 1814, having given as his reason for delay his uncertainty as to what the company could afford,³² Liston provided it with his 'preliminary answers'. These were copied to the Foreign Office³³ and reward careful scrutiny.

Liston's response: a mixed establishment

Having rehearsed the usual arguments against the dragomans and saying that at least some of them should be 'native Englishmen', Liston proceeded to outline his draft plan. Since the English dragomans would need perfect Turkish, they would have to be sent out 'at the age of 10 or 12 perhaps, or of 15 at the latest'. The work entailed much drudgery

and would have to be regarded as a profession for life, so children from well-favoured families would have to be ruled out – they would get much better positions at home. Instead, the right sort of material might come ‘perhaps from some of our charitable institutions’. (The ambassador appears to have had in mind orphanages and poor houses.) The German mission at the Porte, said Liston, boarded its own trainees with Armenian families (who, unlike the Greeks, favoured Turkish as their first language) and employed masters to give them regular lessons. The French had a proper academy with about 12 students in it at the time, though some were destined to be consuls and agents at ‘interior stations’, as well as dragomans. Preferring the less healthy and morally-threatening French solution but surmising that the company would jib at its cost, Liston proceeded to recommend a compromise. This, he suggested, might be a ‘small house . . . in the immediate neighbourhood of the British Palace’ with a ‘respectable family’ placed in it ‘on the condition of receiving two or three young men as boarders’. However, Liston emphasised that ‘[w]ith a view to perfect their education, to refresh their patriotism, perhaps even to preserve their native language, it would be essential that they should return and spend a year or two in their own country’. It was partly because this would be expensive and because it was an experiment, he said, that he recommended only a small number of students. But there was another reason, Liston continued:

It does not strike me that we ought entirely to overthrow the present system and to confine the service strictly to British subjects. The establishment contains individuals of great merit – and besides, there may be cases where a native of England might perhaps unseasonably think himself called upon to uphold the firmness of our national character, and where the pliability and mild deportment of the class of men from whom our present interpreters are selected might secure a point of importance to the nation.

Nevertheless, he had come out for a mixed establishment, even if this meant only one British dragoman, ‘for the existence of even *one* Dragoman *perfectly qualified* would be an object of real importance to all our interests in this country’.³⁴

Liston ended this letter to the Levant Company by saying that he had avoided ‘for the present entering into very particular detail’, though he assured them that he stood ready to answer any of their questions. He also informed Castlereagh that he would write to him later on the subject at greater length.³⁵ Whether he ever did submit a more detailed plan,

however, seems very unlikely. He had provided a sketch of ideas that he probably realized were not what the Levant Company had hoped for,³⁶ in terms of either the social background of the boys or the cost of their education. As a result, he may well have calculated that fleshing out these ideas would be a waste of time. He was already in his seventies and no doubt looking forward to his retirement. In any case, as we shall see, he had already put into action a version of his own ideas and would shortly take a further step to implement it. In any event, over a year later, in April 1816, the company told its consul-general, with only thinly concealed frustration, that it was still waiting for 'the advantage of Mr Liston's cooperation' in this matter. In the meantime, it continued, since 'the present plan of employing natives is not to be wholly abandoned', it agreed to take the first dragoman's grandson into the service.³⁷ Nevertheless, the company's agitation had already left its mark, though the first real evidence of this was more the creation of the new post of 'oriental secretary' than the appointment of Englishmen to the ancient post of dragoman.

First steps towards anglicization

At some point in the period when Lord Wellesley was Foreign Secretary, that is from December 1809 until March 1812, it was decided to send out to the embassy an Englishman to be trained for the post of 'Principal Interpreter'. Terrick Hamilton, 31 years old and the fourth and youngest son of the vicar of the church of St Martin-in-the-Fields, was the first sent out with this end in view.³⁸ However, the thinking behind the creation of this post is best seen in a letter sent in May 1817 by Liston to Wellesley's more organized successor, Lord Castlereagh.³⁹ This recommended one of his own protégés as the 'eventual successor' to Hamilton, who was reportedly not an outstanding interpreter.⁴⁰ 'It appears to be essential to the public interest', began Liston, 'that there should be permanently attached to the embassy at Constantinople a person well acquainted with the oriental languages, and perfectly master of the Turkish, whose assistance may render the ambassador in some degree independent of the common class of interpreters, 'natives of the country'. In addition, Liston continued, '[h]e ought to be a natural-born subject of his Majesty, to have had a good education, and to have imbibed English ideas and English principles'.

In this letter we see the post of oriental secretary emerging more clearly than in Hamilton's appointment in 1812 or in Liston's 'preliminary answers' of 1814. Hamilton had been conceived as a dragoman – the

first or political dragoman but a dragoman nevertheless, with all the drudgery of translation and frequent attendance at the Porte and elsewhere that this occupation invariably demanded. In 1814, there was a clear hint of the new post in Liston's argument that one British dragoman was infinitely better than none and in his somewhat discouraging intimation that this might be all that was possible – but he had spoken of dragomans nevertheless. By 1817, however, the ambassador had moved on. He did not use the term 'dragoman' in connection with the post for which he wanted a natural-born British linguist; in fact, he did not apply a title to it at all. What he did say was that the occupant of the post should be separate from and, by clear implication, *above* 'the common class of interpreters'. This was further underlined by the candidate Liston had in mind.

In 1812 Liston had taken out with him to Istanbul a 'youth' called Robert Liston Elliot, with whose family the ambassador had close connections going back many years, as might readily be deduced from the name by which the boy had been christened.⁴¹ As he told the Foreign Secretary in May 1817, Elliot was 'of respectable connections, well disposed, with a turn for languages, and at so early a period of life that he acquired the Turkish accent in perfection'. Liston had subsequently sent him home to complete his education and his father had dispatched him to the University of Cambridge. Except that he was not a product of one of England's 'charitable institutions', young Elliot's early career was a carbon copy of the blueprint presented in Liston's 'preliminary answers' to the Levant Company of 1814. But the social difference was crucial. Someone from Elliot's background could not be a mere dragoman. Liston asked Castlereagh to post him to the embassy as a paid attaché.

The Foreign Secretary readily fell in with Liston's suggestion, in the course of his reply referring now to Hamilton as the 'oriental secretary'. The allowance of Elliot, who was in effect the first 'oriental attaché' at the British embassy though the title was not formally introduced until the 1840s, was to commence in July 1817; and the ambassador was to oversee his studies.⁴² When Hamilton was promoted to secretary of embassy in 1820, Elliot duly took his place as oriental secretary. His instructions were to continue his studies of Eastern languages but by no means to overlook the procedures of the Ottoman court and courts of justice and 'learn the principles upon which their commercial transactions are conducted'. He was to 'so far associate with the dragomans of the Levant Company' as to learn how to deal with the Ottoman authorities should it be necessary for him, from time to time, to perform the functions of 'confidential interpreter'. And he should generally be available to

assist, when required, the ambassador 'in transacting the public business of the embassy'.⁴³ Elliot turned out to be more successful and, despite an appeal from his father, was not permitted leave of absence until relations with Turkey were broken in 1828.⁴⁴ Nevertheless, he no more replaced the first dragoman than did Terrick Hamilton, even after Bartholomew Pisani's replacement, Francis Chabert, fell under strong suspicion of serious disloyalty.

The post of oriental secretary was a clever attempt to overcome the problems with the endeavour to anglicize the *drogmanat* by the method of appointing English boys as *giovanni di lingua* – problems which Liston's 'preliminary answers' of 1814 had in reality made quite clear. Since the oriental secretary had higher status than a dragoman, it was reasonable to assume that it would be easier to attract the right sort of recruit, whose family, moreover, was likely to be able to afford the cost of his British university education. As in the case of Elliot, he could still be brought out at an early age as a member of the ambassador's official family and thereby be fairly well placed to acquire good Turkish. Moreover, while both Hamilton and Elliot appear to have been inadequate to the task of regularly taking on the work of confidential dragoman, their local knowledge and their Ottoman Turkish presumably made it possible for them to help the ambassador supervise the native dragomans more effectively. And it was indeed particularly for its usefulness in this respect that the post was valued by Edmund Hammond, the Foreign Office clerk (eventually to be permanent under-secretary), when he was stirred to comment on the issue by Palmerston in 1838. Like Liston, he believed that it would be very difficult and in fact inadvisable to replace all of the dragomans with Englishmen. The trick would be to obtain 'an efficient check' upon them. If the oriental secretary turned out to be very good, then he could replace the confidential dragoman but this would be a bonus.⁴⁵ In the event, though, it proved difficult to obtain – and hold – good candidates. Elliot appears not to have returned and the post was left vacant for nearly a decade.⁴⁶

There had also been initial progress in anglicizing the *drogmanat* itself by the time that the Levant Company handed responsibility for it to the government in 1825, though this was largely because it was 'anglicization' of a special kind. There was certainly a natural-born English dragoman in the embassy, George Wood. Moreover, though nominally only fifth dragoman, under the more flexible system insisted on by Lord Strangford, Wood had served ably as confidential dragoman and would have been reinstated in this position by Palmerston had he not died in 1834.⁴⁷ However, though two of the four new students appointed in

the early 1820s – Richard Wood (the son of the fifth dragoman) and Henry Simmons – were regarded as ‘English by blood and feeling’,⁴⁸ they both appear to have been born in the Levant. They were, in other words, ‘Levantine’, in the broad, non-pejorative sense attached to that term in the first half of the nineteenth century – Europeans born and resident in the Levant.⁴⁹ Nevertheless, this gave them the obvious advantages – which came to be so prized by Stratford Canning – of fluency in Turkish as well as intimate knowledge of the country.⁵⁰ Unfortunately, though Stratford might otherwise have looked back on this ‘mixed establishment’ with envy from the vantage point of the 1850s,⁵¹ he was greeted on his return to the embassy in 1826 with alarming news. This was that Francis Chabert, first dragoman since the retirement of Bartholomew Pisani in 1824 and the man he had praised so highly for his behaviour in the fire of 1810, was strongly suspected of betraying the secrets of the embassy to the Prussian envoy, Baron Miltitz.⁵²

The Chabert affair gave another push to the drive to anglicization but it was not until the early 1840s that a serious experiment with English student interpreters was made, and this was deemed a failure.⁵³ In fact, success did not come until much later in the century following the creation in 1877 of a modest academy for English-born, as opposed to English Levantine, students similar to that recommended by Robert Liston in 1814 (the students were older). This was the establishment at Ortakeui, on the north side of the Golden Horn three miles from Galata, set up not only to provide British dragomans for the embassy in Istanbul but also officers for outlying posts in the new Levant Consular Service.⁵⁴ For reasons chiefly of expense, Ortakeui itself did not endure beyond 1890, though it produced some remarkable graduates, among them the controversial Dublin-born Catholic, Gerald Fitzmaurice, who rose to be Chief Dragoman in the years before the First World War.

Notes

A slightly different version of this chapter has appeared in the journal *Diplomacy and Statecraft*, published by Frank Cass. The editor and author are grateful for the permission to reprint it here.

I am grateful to the Nuffield Foundation for supporting the research on which this chapter is based. All records of the Foreign Office and Levant Company cited below are held in the Public Record Office, London.

1. G. F. Abbott, *Under the Turk at Constantinople: A Record of Sir John Finch's Embassy, 1674–1681* (London: Macmillan, 1920), 46.
2. Seventeenth-century Levant Company instructions specifically permitted the ambassador to leave to his dragomans the seeking of redress at the Porte for

- all but the most serious grievances of English factors. See for example, Instructions to Sir William Hussey (1690–91), SP105/45.
3. This understanding was an interesting feature of Robert Liston's thinking about the future of the dragomans, discussed below. See also A. Cunningham, *Anglo-Ottoman Encounters in the Age of Revolution: Collected Essays, Volume One*, ed. E. Ingram (London: Cass, 1993), 162, 164–5, 174, 282–3.
 4. A.N. Kurat (ed.), *The Despatches of Sir Robert Sutton, Ambassador in Constantinople (1710–1714)*, Camden Third Series, vol. LXXVIII (London: Royal Historical Society, 1953), 8–9, 50.
 5. During Liston's first embassy (1794–95), the ambassador and chief dragoman had two languages in common, for both could speak Hebrew as well as Greek, Cunningham, *Anglo-Ottoman Encounters in the Age of Revolution*, 79.
 6. Kurat (ed.), *The Despatches of Sir Robert Sutton, Ambassador in Constantinople (1710–1714)*, 50.
 7. Paul Rycaut and Dudley North (treasurer) in the seventeenth century, and David Morier in the early nineteenth, for example. On Rycaut, see S. Anderson, *An English Consul in Turkey: Paul Rycaut at Smyrna, 1667–1678* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), 31. On North, see Richard Grassby, *The English Gentleman in Trade: The Life and Works of Sir Dudley North, 1641–1691* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), 130, 191, and esp. 195; and Abbott, *Under the Turk in Constantinople*, 62–3. Morier's family was originally Huguenot but had been long settled in the Levant; his father, Isaac, the Levant Company's first consul-general, was a naturalized Englishman and his mother was Dutch. Born in Smyrna, David was subsequently educated at Harrow School and entered the diplomatic service in 1804. Subsequently he became a close friend as well as secretary to Stratford Canning during his first tour as head of mission – see Stanley Lane-Poole, *The Life of the Right Honourable Stratford Canning, Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe*, Vol. I (London: Longmans, Green, 1888), 71, 73, and his entry on Morier in the *Dictionary of National Biography*; Cunningham, *Anglo-Ottoman Encounters in the Age of Revolution*, 111–12, 182; and Canning's praise of Morier in his valedictory dispatch to Castlereagh of 3 July 1812, FO78/77.
 8. '[T]he education of Greek boys at Gloucester Hall, Oxford, with a view to their subsequent employment as dragomans, proved equally disappointing at the end of the century', Anderson, *An English Consul in Turkey*, pp. 108–9. See also Phyllis S. Lachs, *The Diplomatic Corps under Charles II & James II* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1965), 74–5.
 9. That is, the dragomans' section of the embassy. The English term was 'dragomanat' but the French 'drogmanat' was often preferred, not least, no doubt, because it trips off the tongue more readily.
 10. See A. C. Wood, *A History of the Levant Company* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1935; repr. London: Cass, 1964). Wood gives much attention to the embassy but deals rather superficially with the dragomans. The weakness of Allan Cunningham's treatment in ch. 1 of *Eastern Questions in the Nineteenth Century: Collected Essays Volume Two*, ed. E. Ingram (London: Cass, 1993), is that it ignores completely the records of the Levant Company.
 11. Liston's diplomatic career, which had taken him, among other cities, to Munich, Ratisbon, Berlin, Madrid, Stockholm, Washington and The Hague, is detailed in the *Dictionary of National Biography*. When he died in 1836 he

was described by one journal as 'the father of the diplomatic body throughout Europe'.

12. Wood incorrectly states that 'there were four dragomen' at Constantinople '[f]rom at least as early as 1650', citing as his source the court book of the Levant Company covering that year. It is true that the wording of the minutes on which he drew is misleading. These minutes, which are of a meeting held on 12 February 1650, contain a statement (itself headed 'December 19, 1650' – the date cited by Wood) of the salaries to be paid to the dragomans. These are listed as 'the Chiefe', 'the Second', 'the Third' and 'the young Druggerman' (Wood, *A History of the Levant Company*), 227. However, it is obvious that 'the young Druggerman' was a *giovanni di lingua* and not a full dragoman. Only six days earlier the Levant Company had written to the ambassador (Bendysh), saying 'We shall further mind your Lordship that whereas by your Articles with us you are limited to 3 Druggermen only, we observe more of them are employed by you at our expense; which we expect to be eased of', Co. to Bendysh, 6 Feb. 1650 (old style), SP105/112. In fact, in the second half of the seventeenth century, company instructions to the ambassador generally drew explicit attention to the three plus three formula. For example: Company Instructions to Chandos (1680), Trumbull (1687), Hussey (1690), Paget (1692) and Sutton (1701 – 'The usual number of our Drugermen at Constantinople being three . . .'), all in SP105/145. Of course, Wood might have countered that he was referring to the actual as opposed to the company's preferred number but even so his claim – which suggests a fixed and approved figure – is misleading. In any case, while four might well turn out to have been fairly close to the real average, it was sometimes more and sometimes less.
13. Lachs, *The Diplomatic Corps under Charles II & James II*, 75; Levant Co. to Bendysh, 6 Feb. 1650 (old style), SP105/112. In advancing his case for a larger *drogmanat* in the early nineteenth century, Bartholomew Pisani, the first dragoman, himself drew attention to this: 'By the ancient records of the Company it appears that there were, at times, no less than nine officers in their service on pay at Constantinople', Pisani to Isaac Morier [consul-general], 10 Feb. 1814, SP105/134.
14. Lachs, *The Diplomatic Corps under Charles II & James II*, 76.
15. The Levant Company's records, which are incomplete, do not provide the whole answer to this, though the Constantinople Treasurer's account books for 1804–16 are very helpful. In 1804 and 1806 (the first years available) these show that he had four dragomans and four students on his books. And Castlereagh's 'Memorandum of Salaries directed to be paid to the Dragomans in the service of the Levant Company at Constantinople' (Castlereagh to Liston, 7 Mar. 1812, FO78/79) officially confirmed the new, *ideal* four plus four formula. Subsequently, the Treasurer's account books reveal the following numbers *actually* on his books for the last quarter of each of these years: 1812 (four plus three), 1813 (four plus three), 1814 (five plus three), 1815 (five plus two), and 1816 (five plus two); see SP105/205 and SP105/206. For the establishment in 1825 and 1827, see FO78/157 (folio 61) and FO366/569 (folio 169) respectively.
16. Copy of Instructions sent to Lord Harrowby, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in order for their being conveyed to Charles Arbuthnot Esq.,

Ambassador Elect for the Sublime Porte [1804], SP105/122, folios 442–6. On the question of the status of the new consul-general and his relationship to the ambassador, these instructions had stressed the former's complete independence of the ambassador (Instructions to Arbuthnot, 1804). There was also strong sentiment among the British merchants in Istanbul in favour of a split in the *drogmanat* between those employed on political work by the ambassador and, like him, paid by the government, and those employed on commercial work who would still be paid by the company and answer only to the autonomous consul-general. However, these attitudes appear to have generated Foreign Office and ambassadorial resentment and led Arbuthnot to insist on his right to correspond directly with outlying consuls, as all his predecessors had done, and drag his feet in securing recognition of the new consul-general at the Porte. Partly for these reasons, partly because they knew that they would still need the ambassador's support, and partly because they found that on returning from Istanbul Arbuthnot was appointed one of the joint-secretaries of the Treasury (where he remained until 1823), the senior officers of the company in London clearly had second thoughts on this matter. At an important, ice-breaking meeting with Arbuthnot at his house on 19 January 1810, Green, the company's treasurer, was most anxious to distance the company from seditious sentiment in Istanbul and stress its unqualified support for the supremacy of the ambassador, Green to Bosanquet [deputy governor of the Levant Co.], 20 Jan. 1810, SP105/123. See also the following document, essentially the revised version of the Instructions to Arbuthnot, 1804, Levant Co. to Morier, 7 Mar. 1810, SP105/123.

17. Cunningham, *Eastern Questions in the Nineteenth Century*, 4–7.
18. Co. to Morier, 10 June 1814, SP105/123.
19. Bosanquet to Strangford, and Liddell [secretary of the Levant Co.] to Cartwright [consul-general following the death of Morier], 4 Oct. 1820, SP105/124; and Cunningham, *Eastern Questions in the Nineteenth Century*, 8–9. The fifth dragoman was George Wood, on whom see below.
20. Even Stratford Canning thought that they should be paid more; see Canning to Wellesley, 7 May 1811, FO78/73. For Liston's support, see Liston to Castlereagh, 11 July 1812, FO78/79, and for his particular reasons for supporting the dragomans' claim for higher salaries, Cunningham, *Anglo-Ottoman Encounters in the Age of Revolution*, 88–91, and *Eastern Questions in the Nineteenth Century*, 8.
21. Cunningham, *Eastern Questions in the Nineteenth Century*, 1, 6–7; Lane-Poole, *The Life of Stratford Canning*, vol. 1, 68–9, 70, 135–6. Lane-Poole actually says that 'it is a vast improvement, which we owe to Canning's representations, that we have now a regular school of student interpreters composed of English gentlemen' (p. 136). However, what Lane-Poole does not say – Cunningham seems to misread him on this – is that he made these 'representations' during his first mission to Istanbul.
22. Leo Gerald Byrne, *The Great Ambassador* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1964), 44–5.
23. Stratford Canning to Wellesley, 16 May 1810, FO195/7.
24. All of the company's 'Out Letters' dealing with the dragomans up to 1825 refer to its payment of their salaries; see SP105, 122–4. Cunningham rather blurs this fundamental point in *Eastern Questions in the Nineteenth Century*, 8,

- while in *A History of the Levant Company*, 184, Wood effectively denies it by asserting, quite unaccountably, that after 1804 the Levant Company's association with the embassy was 'finally closed'.
25. In 1804 the company had been at pains to impress on both Arbuthnot and the Foreign Office the importance of missing no symbolic opportunity to underwrite the consul-general's authority; see Instructions to Arbuthnot, 1804.
 26. These probably included the reluctance of the Turkish authorities to give the company satisfaction in certain cases consequent upon French privateering against British merchantmen in the Aegean archipelago over recent years. Despite Turkey's neutrality in the war between Britain and France, the French vessels involved had been allowed to shelter themselves and their booty with impunity in Turkish ports. Stratford Canning had raged against this in 1810–12 (Lane-Poole, *The Life of Stratford Canning*, vol. 1, ch. 3). In late 1814, even the more worldly-wise Liston was beginning to show signs of irritation over this and sought Castlereagh's approval for a tougher line, though in this letter he does not mention the dragomans, Liston to Castlereagh, 22 Oct. 1814, FO78/82.
 27. Levant Co. to Morier, 10 June 1814 and 6 Apr. 1815, SP105/123.
 28. Liddell to Castlereagh, 27 Dec. 1819, SP105/124. At this time the British factory in Istanbul was particularly exercised by outrages at the customs house; see Proceedings of an Assembly of the British Factory held at the house of HBM Consul General in Pera the 30 June 1819, SP105/212 [Minute Book of the Constantinople Factory].
 29. Co. to Morier, 7 Mar. 1810, SP105/123.
 30. Liddell to Morier, 3 Sept. 1811, SP105/123. Having subsequently done well for the factors at the customs house, he was promoted to full dragoman in 1817 (Liddell to Morier, 15 May 1817, SP105/124) but he remained in commercial work until advanced by Strangford to 'political dragoman' in 1821. On Wood's background and career, see Cunningham, *Eastern Questions in the Nineteenth Century*, 9, and *The Early Correspondence of Richard Wood, 1831–1841*, ed A. B. Cunningham, Camden Fourth Series, vol. 3 (London: Royal Historical Society, 1966), 3–4.
 31. Co. to Morier, 10 June 1814, SP105/123. This was confirmed by Liston in his letter to the company of 25 November 1814 (see below).
 32. Liston to Bosanquet, 24 Nov. 1814, SP105/134.
 33. Liston to Castlereagh, 1 Dec. 1814, FO78/82.
 34. Liston to Bosanquet, 25 Nov. 1814, SP105/134, emphasis in original.
 35. Liston to Castlereagh, 1 Dec. 1814, FO78/82.
 36. I can find no record of its reaction.
 37. Liddell to Morier, 4 April 1816, SP105/123.
 38. Castlereagh to Liston, 27 Mar. 1812, FO78/79; see also Cunningham, *Eastern Questions in The Nineteenth Century*, 7. Like Cunningham, I have been unable to find any Foreign Office papers bearing directly on the origins of this decision, perhaps because Wellesley, 'an unconscionably bad Foreign Secretary', had reportedly reduced the Foreign Office to 'a state of incredible confusion', Wendy Hinde, *George Canning* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989), 234. I am grateful to Alex May of the *New DNB* project for tracking Hamilton's origins.

39. 4 May 1817, FO78/89.
40. He never replaced the first dragoman, Bartholomew Pisani, and was promoted to be secretary of embassy when Strangford became ambassador in 1820. Strangford did not think much of him in this capacity either, and he was effectively sidelined, though from September 1822 until January 1823 he was in charge of the embassy with the rank of minister plenipotentiary during the ambassador's absence. See Cunningham, *Anglo-Ottoman Encounters in the Age of Revolution*, 195, 220–1, and *Eastern Questions in the Nineteenth Century*, 8–9.
41. Naming one's children after people one admired or from whom favour might be expected seems to have been as common then as it is now. George Canning, for example, called his second son 'William Pitt Canning'.
42. Castlereagh to Liston, 20 May 1817, FO78/89.
43. Planta to Elliot, 11 Oct. 1820, FO78/96.
44. Thomas Elliot to Planta (FO), 17 Oct. 1825, FO78/139; Stratford Canning to Dudley, 5 Oct. 1827, FO78/157; and Stratford to Aberdeen, 13 Oct. 1828, FO78/166.
45. Memorandum respecting Dragomans, 14 Feb. 1838, FO366/569.
46. Hammond's Memorandum respecting Dragomans of 14 Feb. 1838, says that 'the office of Oriental Secretary might be re-established' if a suitable candidate could be found, FO366/569. Shortly after this, Charles Alison was appointed.
47. Cunningham, *Eastern Questions in the Nineteenth Century*, 12.
48. Cunningham, *Eastern Questions in the Nineteenth Century*, 9, esp. fn. 16. Simmons has been barely noticed by earlier historians, probably because he appears to have been unremarkable. Nevertheless, there was a British merchant family of this name in Istanbul at this time and it is reasonable to assume that he came from it. In 1856 Stratford Canning referred to him as 'an Englishman', Canning to Clarendon, 3 June 1856, FO366/569. On Richard Wood, see Cunningham's introduction to *The Early Correspondence of Richard Wood*. Richard's appointment was facilitated by the resolve of his father to give him an 'English education', Liddell to Cartwright, 1 July 1824, SP105/125. Since, according to Cunningham, he had already had 'several years schooling in Exeter' before 1823 (*The Early Correspondence*, 4), this was presumably a reference to a British university education. In the event, he appears not to have enjoyed one.
49. Elie Kedourie, *England and the Middle East: The Destruction of the Ottoman Empire, 1914–1921* (Hassocks, Sussex: Harvester Press, 1978), 73.
50. Report from the Select Committee on Diplomatic Service; together with the Proceedings of the Committee, Minutes of Evidence, Appendix, and Index (House of Commons, 23 July 1861), esp. para. 1675. Canning's evidence on this subject is generally of great interest. This report was reprinted by the Irish University Press in 1969.
51. Palmerston had refused to appoint any more native dragomans, the British oriental attachés were regarded as a sorry lot by Canning, and his *drogmanat* was literally dying out.
52. Lane-Poole, *The Life of Stratford Canning*, vol. 1, 391, 410–14; Cunningham, *Eastern Questions in the Nineteenth Century*, 9–11.
53. On this subject, which is beyond the scope of this essay, see D. C. M. Platt, *The Cinderella Service: British Consuls since 1825* (London: Longman, 1971),

164–5; Cunningham, *Eastern Questions in the Nineteenth Century*, 10–19; Raymond A. Jones, *The British Diplomatic Service, 1815–1914* (Gerrards Cross, Bucks: Colin Smythe, 1983), 84–7; and S. T. Bindoff, 'Lord Palmerston and the Universities', *Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research*, 12 (1934), 39–43.

54. Platt, *The Cinderella Service*, 165–8.

8

Studying Ottoman Diplomacy: a Review of the Sources

Esin Yurdusev

This chapter seeks to provide the new researchers into Ottoman diplomacy with introductory information about the available sources in the field. Although there are valuable works in connection with the basic materials on Ottoman history in general, they do not give much space to Ottoman diplomacy in particular. The sources of Ottoman diplomacy are yet to be uncovered. However, I make no claim to having produced an exhaustive list. The chapter simply aims to review and, if possible, introduce relatively new sources.

To begin with, the study of Ottoman history and diplomacy is essential for understanding not only the foreign policies of the Republic of Turkey and other post-Ottoman states, but also the development of modern European diplomacy. In other words, it could rightly be argued that extensive studies of the histories of the Balkan states, Hungary, Southern Russia, the Arab countries and the history of the Turks for the last six hundred years effectively necessitate the study of Ottoman diplomacy and history. Last but not least, one of the key elements in comprehending the main features of the relations and diplomacy among the European states, especially in the early modern period, is the study of Ottoman history and diplomacy.¹

Although the Ottoman Empire came to terms with the necessity of developing a European style of diplomacy rather late, she was the first non-European country to participate in the European states system and the first to establish resident embassies in Europe's capitals. The Ottomans have never neglected diplomacy, though for a long time it was used on an ad hoc basis. On many occasions, ad hoc diplomacy was used so often and over such long periods that it came close to being a form of permanent diplomacy. The Ottoman Empire embraced the institution of diplomacy in the form of permanent embassy in the late eighteenth

century. However, it was during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries that the European powers established their own permanent embassies on the shores of the Bosphorus. When we consider that European representations in other countries outside Europe started at the beginning of the nineteenth century, the very special position of the Ottoman Empire with respect to European politics and diplomacy needs neither proof nor justification.²

For any student of Ottoman history and diplomacy, the starting point is bound to be the Ottoman Archives, which include enormous sources for the researcher. Although the term 'Ottoman Archives' may broadly be taken to include any archive that once fell within the boundaries of the Ottoman Empire, the main sites are the *Başbakanlık Arşivleri* (Archives of the Prime Ministry) and that of the Topkapı Palace in Istanbul.³ However, the Ottoman archival materials found in other countries⁴ are no less significant than those found in the Archives of the Prime Ministry. But they are not as abundant as the Ottoman Archives in Istanbul.

General characteristics of the Ottoman Archives

The idea of archiving had a very significant place in the Ottoman Empire. This may be considered a reflection of a powerful and centrally unified Ottoman bureaucracy. To keep all the state documents and registrations, without making any differentiation as to their importance, was the main feature of the Ottoman bureaucracy. The decisions taken in different branches of the imperial departments never ceased to influence each other. There were profound interrelations and a constant flow of information between them. In time, this created highly complex relations and an intensive accumulation of documents.

For the Ottomans, paper was a much-respected element in the registration of state affairs. That is why they used the best quality papers for the use of documents. Different qualities were chosen according to the importance of the subjects being treated. Moreover, the quality of the ink too was selected in relation to the significance ascribed to the documents. The most costly materials were used for the most important subjects even when the Empire was financially bankrupt. The policy of the Ottomans to save and keep every document concerning the state affairs and their keenness on the documentation style led to an immense accumulation of archival materials which created the well-known Ottoman Archives.

Although the official language was Turkish in the Ottoman Empire, in archival documents, Arabic, Persian and Turkish words have been

used. Arabic and Persian words were generally used by the clerks and other officials working in the state departments. The Ottoman Sultans and ordinary people generally used Turkish. Therefore familiarity with the Ottoman paleography and alphabet in use at the time is not sufficient to understand the main characteristics of the documents. It is also necessary to know the language known as Ottoman Turkish (*Osmanlıca*) which is a combination of the vocabulary, grammar and syntactic rules of the Turkish, Arabic and Persian languages.⁵ Another important language, especially for the study of archival materials in the Ottoman Foreign Ministry Archive, is French. Since French was the language of diplomacy until the early twentieth century, Ottoman diplomats and consular officials used French not only in their correspondence with foreign states but among themselves as well. Almost 90 per cent of the documents kept in the Ottoman Foreign Ministry archive are French.

There is no consistent system of classification in the Ottoman Archives. Different classification systems were applied in different times. Therefore it is not surprising to find one particular document or *defter* of a particular Ottoman office belonging to different periods, scattered through various types of classification. This presents an obstacle to research but not one that is insurmountable.

Braudel once said that 'the secret, or some of the secrets, lie hidden in the vast archives in Istanbul. Access to them is difficult and it is only now that we are seeing some of the results of investigation of these sources.'⁶ Now, thanks to a government decision it is no longer difficult to obtain access to the State Archives.⁷ But there are still certain problems which are not easy to overcome. First, only 20 per cent of the 150 million documents for the years 1300–1920, housed in Başbakanlık Arşivleri in Istanbul, have been classified analytically. On the dossier basis, 40 per cent of the documents have been classified. The work on them is still going on. Since there were not enough staff to conduct the classification, and since it was really time-consuming and would take years to overcome the difficulties and complete the work, a practical decision was made. All of the documents will be microfilmed and transferred into the computer environment. By this means, there will be no document which is not reviewed. The documents which are classified according to the dossier system will be open to researchers via the Internet. The timetable is not certain for this target, but it is stated that the process will be speeded up.

Another important problem is the time-consuming nature of study in the Ottoman Archives in Istanbul. First of all, it is necessary to conduct an extensive study of the published catalogues about the *evraks* (documents)

and *defters* (registers, account books, notebooks and so on). To get one document and copy it used to take from three to six days. Nowadays, it has been much improved and you may get it on the day of request. The catalogues published and housed in the Başbakanlık Arşivleri in Istanbul can also be accessed at the General Directorate of State Archives, which is a new building located in the Yenimahalle region of Ankara. There are not many researchers there, though it is quite an efficient place for catalogue search.

Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivleri in Istanbul (Ottoman Archives of Prime Ministry)

The archival materials related to Ottoman diplomacy, found in the Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivleri⁸ in Istanbul, may be summarized in the following headings.

Divan-ı Hümayun Defterleri (the Imperial Chancery of State Registers)

Amedi Kalemi Defterleri (Registers of Amedi Office)

This office prepared and arranged the texts of every kind of treaty and *ahdnâmes*, minutes of meetings, protocols and official writings related to foreign ambassadors, consuls and traders. The codes or ciphers of the reports that came from the embassies of the Ottoman Empire were also deciphered and their replies were prepared here. The records of the meetings between the Reis Effendi (Reis ül-Küttab) and foreign envoys were also kept. The original copies of all these were preserved in this office. These registers are classified in *Amedi Defterleri Kataloğu*, under the code of A.AMD, 'fon' number 19, covering the years *h.*1255–1342/*c.*1839–1923. There are 425 *defters* here. Some registers in this office are called *Ecnebi* or *Düvel-i Ecnebi Defterleri* (Registers Related to Foreigners). Most of the affairs concerning the presence of foreign envoys in the Ottoman Empire and relations of the Ottomans with the respective states were recorded in these *defters*. There are 32 countries in them and they are noted between the 1–111 serial numbers, the dates of *h.*975–1332/*c.*1567–1915. For example, the *defters* relating to England cover the years 1675–1913.

Beylikçi Kalemi Defterleri (Registers of Beylikçi Office)

The documents of the decisions taken in *Divan* (Imperial Chancery) came to this office and from here they were sent to the related offices or branches. This is indeed a subsection of the *Divan* in charge of issuing and recording various documents such as treaties made with foreign

states and those concerning their execution. Within this office there are registers called *Name-i Hümayun Defterleri* (Registers of the Letters of the Ottoman Sultans). The originals of the letters and greetings sent to the sultans by the rulers of various countries, personalities and people were recorded in *Name Defteri*, and the answers to them by the sultans and their viziers were called *Name-i Hümayun*. The numbers of *ahidnâmes* or *ahdnâmes* were also registered in these *defters*. There are 17 *Name-i Hümayun* registers and they are noted under the 'fon' number 19 covering the years *h.1111–1336/c.1699–1918*.

Şehbenderlik Defterleri (Registers of Consular Appointments)

The consuls appointed by the Ottoman Empire to foreign countries were called *şehbenders*. These registers include the rules about the appointment of *şehbenders* and the affairs classified under the scope of *Şehbenderlik*. They contain the years *h.1217–1330/c.1802–1911*, which are numbered in three *defters*.

Ru'us Defterleri (Registers of Brevets of Appointments)

These are the records which include most of the things related to the appointments of almost all Ottoman officials. Serials concerning these *defters* cover the years *h.1116–1362/c.1704–1908* and are numbered in 261 *defters*.

Bab-1 Asafi Evrakı (Documents of the Central Office of the Imperial Court)

The documents related to *Bab-1 Asafî* are scattered in various classifications made in different times. The most important of these is *Amedi Kalemi Evrakı* (Amedi Office documents) comprising a period of 112 years. The documents of this office before the *Tanzimat* period are classified under the name of *Hatt-ı Hümayuns* (Imperial Decrees) and bear the name of *Hatt-ı Hümayun Tasnifi* (Classification). They were classified under the 'fon' number 15 with 36 volumes, covering the years 1708–1880. There is no chronological order in these volumes so it is necessary to scan all the pages. But indexes for the first 17 volumes have been prepared and studies on indexing are still going on. The documents of *Amedi Office* in the *Tanzimat* period were classified as *Irades*⁹ (the written expression of the sovereign's will). *Irades* belonging to this period were classified under five headings¹⁰ and by five different systems of logic as they were recorded in the *Amedi* office. *Hatt-ı Hümayuns* and *Irades* are crucially important in understanding the main tenets of Ottoman diplomacy, foreign policy and their specific concerns about European countries.

Bab-ı Ali Evrak Odası Defterleri ve Dokümanları (Registers and Documents of Documentary Office of the Sublime Porte)

In *h.1267/c.1851*, the *Bab-ı Ali Evrak Odası* (BEO) was established in order to gather all the documents in one place, notably those issued by the central office of the imperial government comprising the office of the Grand Vizier, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Meclis-i Vukela or Meclis-i Vala.¹¹ The classified *Sadaret Evrakı Defterleri* covered the years *h.1256–1341/c.1840–1923* and after *Tanzimat*; they were divided into *idari* (administrative), *siyasi* (political), *hukuki* (juridical) and *mütenevvia* (miscellaneous) categories. The *siyasi* category comprised everything about Ottoman relations with foreign states, sending and receiving envoys and ambassadors, and so on. Countries were here specifically cited with their names. In the *mütenevvia* category, appointments of Ottoman officials including envoys and ambassadors, and affairs concerning their foreign counterparts in the Ottoman Empire, were registered. These were classified under the ‘fon’ number 19 with specific codes representing the offices from which the documents came such as A.AMD, A.DVN-MHM, A.DVN-DVE, A.MKT, A.TŞF and scattered in volumes 1 to 54. Strikingly, the *defters* of *Bab-ı Ali Evrak Odası* contained specific *defters* bearing the name *Hariciye* (things concerning foreign affairs);¹² these were represented with the numbers 145–192 (between the years of 1880 and 1922, numbered 30) and 706–715 (between the years of 1886 and 1922, numbered 10).

Osmanlı Dışişleri-Hariciye Arşivleri (Ottoman Archives for Foreign Affairs)

Osmanlı Dışişleri-Hariciye Arşivi is divided into two groups: one is the *Merkez Arşivi* (Central Archive) which means *Osmanlı Hariciye Nezareti Arşivi* (Ottoman Foreign Ministry Archive) and the other is the *Taşra Arşivi* (Province Archive) which means the archives of consulates and embassies. The *Merkez Arşivi* is in Istanbul. In the beginning the *Merkez Arşivi* of the Ottoman Foreign Ministry was under the control and administration of the Turkish Foreign Ministry. But later this was transferred to the control of the General Directorate of State Archives. But archives of consulates and embassies of the Ottoman period still belong to the Turkish Foreign Ministry. The Ottoman Foreign Ministry archive including both *Merkez* and *Taşra Arşivi* starts with the period of *Tanzimat*. Although this period of 80 years seems very short compared to the 600 years of the Empire’s lifetime, this should not lead to the underestimation of their importance. The

nineteenth century is, perhaps rightly, considered as 'the longest century of the Ottoman Empire'.¹³ Viewed this way, the Ottoman Foreign Ministry Archive is quite rich and very important for diplomatic studies.

The Ottoman *Merkez Arşivi* is open to researchers, but the situation of *Taşra Arşivi* is not convenient for research. The documents related to the *Taşra Arşivi* are still in the embassies and consulates of the Turkish Republic abroad.¹⁴ Although they are a rich source, because of the lack of staff, organization and space to study, they are not open to researchers. As emphasized before, the language of writing and correspondence between the embassies and the Ottoman Foreign Ministry for this period was French; Turkish was used only in the correspondences with the other state departments and within the Empire. The use of Turkish in communication started in 1908 with the Second Constitutional Period and later it was accepted as a general rule. Some important sections of the documents in this archive are:

- *Idare Kısmı* (Administrative Section). There are various dossiers dating from the 1870s and later.
- *Nizamât ve Kavanin* (regulations and laws). These are mostly in printed form.
- *Sicill-i Ahval* (personnel files). These include the original questionnaires filled out by the individuals themselves, for some 771 officials who served in the Foreign Ministry at various posts from the late 1870s to 1908. If the name of a person in question and his father's are known, the required information can be obtained.¹⁵
- *Mütenevvi Tasnifi* (Miscellaneous Collection). This is perhaps the most valuable source on the reform of the ministry during the Young Turk Period.
- *Tercüme Kalemi Evrakı* (Papers of the Translation Office). There are several thousands of bundles in file boxes. Both in topical and chronological terms, this collection is broader than its name would imply and is in fact one of the most important collections in the Foreign Ministry Archive.

Catalogues concerning the documents of *Hariciye Nezareti* (the Ottoman Foreign Ministry) and its subsections have been prepared. They are served under the 'fon' number 28 comprising eight volumes referring to the years 1832–1923.

Hariciye (Foreign Affairs) documents scattered in the other collections

- *Cevdet Tasnifi, Hariciye Kısmı* (Cevdet Collection, Section on Foreign Affairs). Documents were noted under the 'fon' number 3, in volumes 22 and 23, for the years from 1616 to 1895.
- *Ibn-ül Emin Tasnifi, Hariciye Kısmı* (Ibn-ül Emin Collection, Section on Foreign Affairs). Documents were noted under the 'fon' number 2, in volume 15, for the years covering 1501–1726.

Salnâmes (Official Yearbooks of the Central Government)

This title was later expanded to *Salnâme-i Devlet-i Aliye-i Osmaniye*.¹⁶ There are 67 volumes, which cover the years between *h.*1263–1334/*c.*1847–1918. *Salnâme-i Nezaret-i Hariciye* (*Salnâmes* of Foreign Ministry) comprise four volumes, covering the years *h.*1302, 1306, 1318, 1320/*c.*1884–85, 1888–89, 1900–01, 1902–03. All were published in Istanbul and cover subjects related to administrative, juridical and personnel affairs, and problems of the Foreign Ministry. It is easy to follow the structural development of the Ottoman Foreign Ministry in time through the *Salnâmes*.

Treaties

Treaties signed by the Ottomans from 1580 onwards can be found in *Mecmua-i Muahedat*, I (Istanbul, 1294). The originals of the treaties signed with foreign countries can be found between the numbers 199 and 200 in *Başbakanlık Arşivi* in Istanbul.

Topkapı Palace Museum archive

Catalogues of 153,000 documents have been prepared here. The types of documents that are kept in the Topkapı Palace vary considerably. Some of the most important are the letters and greetings sent to the sultans by the rulers of various countries such as France, Austria and Venice; petitions sent to the Porte by the *Sancağ-begs* and various officials; reports on the battles and preparations for wars; and also documents such as *hatt-ı hümayuns*, *ahdnâmes*, *berats* (patents), *hükms* (verdicts), *temliknames* (decrees for transfer of property) and intelligence reports.¹⁷

Vekayinüvis or Vak'a nüvis histories as a source of Ottoman diplomacy

*Vekayinüvises*¹⁸ were the official historians in the Ottoman Empire. They tried to define, describe and sometimes narrate the events as they were.

In most cases they used the documents, papers or registers of the Sublime Porte. Some of these cannot be found today in the archives: they were either not classified or lost. In both instances, *Vekayinüvis* histories fill the gap. These are quite important in understanding the main features of Ottoman foreign policy and diplomacy. Most of the original copies of the works of the *Vekayinüvises* are in the Topkapı Palace Library, the Istanbul University Library and the Türk Tarih Kurumu Library (Turkish Historical Society)¹⁹ in Ankara. Some of them were transliterated into the Latin alphabet and others even translated into modern Turkish.²⁰

***Sefâretnâmes* as sources of Ottoman diplomacy**

Permanent embassies were first introduced to the Ottoman system in the late eighteenth century during the reign of Selim III. The first ambassadors were sent to London, Vienna, Berlin and Paris and, later in the first half of the nineteenth century, several other European capitals. Their primary task was, apart from routine embassy business, to learn as much as possible about the countries to which they were sent. This included the language and the social, cultural and economic levels of the states. Most Ottoman ambassadors recorded their experiences in *sefâretnâmes*²¹ or *sefaret takrirs*. Although we have early examples of *sefâretnâmes* going back to the fifteenth century,²² by the second half of the seventeenth century, it was not common for the ambassadors or their retinue to write a general account of their travels, observations and experiences apart from their official correspondences. The majority of the *sefâretnâmes* extant were written in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries by both temporary and resident ambassadors who had spent many months at their posts. These reports were written in the form of *takrirs* (detailed explanations), *nâmes* (letters), *risales* (booklets), *havadis-nâmes* (newsletters) and *telhises* (summary accounts), and sometimes in the form of *layihâs* (treatises), all of which were generated under the name of *sefâretnâme*. More than 45 *sefâretnâmes* have survived in part or in full.²³ Although they are mostly in Turkey, they can be found in libraries and archives in France, Austria, Germany and Egypt.²⁴

Sefâretnâmes were reports in which the Ottoman envoys wrote their observations and perceptions of the countries where they stayed on official duty.²⁵ They are different from their official letters or dispatches and contain no mention of secrets. Although there is no standard type of *sefâretnâme* writing, *sefâretnâmes* are generally the travel accounts of the Ottoman ambassadors and the description of the facts, momentary interpretations, immediate impressions, conversations with ministers and audiences with princes and kings. The contents of the *sefâretnâmes*

vary according to the socio-political status, interests and educational background of the envoys, and according to the purpose of the visit and circumstances of the mission.²⁶

Nevertheless, some *sefâretnâmes* or *sefâretnâme takrirs* differ in character from others. They go beyond the geographical descriptions²⁷ and the problems concerning protocol methods and rules. Their main concerns are with the structural strength (including economic, military and administrative power) and the development level of the states as well as with the variety of innovations observed. These reports give inside information and present a general picture of the leading states in Europe like France, Britain, Austria and Prussia together with an analysis and interpretation by the ambassador. The *sefâretnâmes* of Yirmisekiz Celebi Mehmet Effendi (*Sefâretnâme of France 1720–21*),²⁸ Mustafa Effendi (*Istilah-i Nemce, sefâretnâme of Austria 1730*),²⁹ Ahmed Resmi Effendi (*sefâretnâme of Prussia 1763–64*),³⁰ Ahmet Azmi Effendi (*sefâretnâme of Prussia 1790–92*),³¹ Ebubekir Ratib Effendi (*sefâretnâme of Nemce-Austria 1791–92*),³² Mahmut Raif Effendi (*Journal du Voyage de Mahmoud Raif Effendi en Engleterre, écrit par luy même 1793–96*)³³ and Yusuf Agah Effendi (*Havadisnâme-i İngiltere – Accounts of Events in England 1793–97*)³⁴ are worth noting in this context. The subject formulations of these types strikingly resemble the Venetian *Relazioni*.³⁵ Although the Ottoman state did not oblige their envoys to write *sefâretnâme*-type reports, unlike the Venetian practice of *Relazione*,³⁶ it was understood that a kind of report³⁷ was required from the ambassadors, especially in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries when systemic transformation was increasingly needed within the Empire. They contained the first-hand knowledge of Europe which provided the Ottoman rulers with generally accurate information about their counterparts. In the eighteenth century when the signs of decline in the Ottoman Empire became apparent, *sefâretnâmes* played a crucial role in supplying Ottoman sultans, who wanted to modernize the Empire in order to restore its previous glory, with sound knowledge about techniques and developments in the military, administrative, political, economic and diplomatic fields.

Yirmisekiz Celebi Mehemed Effendi's *sefâretnâme* can certainly be considered the first to include comprehensive information. Apart from the detailed information about the European system and lifestyle, he introduced various innovations, most significantly printing technology, to the Ottoman Empire. All these made some impact in the technical and socio-cultural fields which led to a new epoch called *Lale Devri* (the Tulip Era) in Ottoman history. A very tiny window was opened towards the West in this period. The following *sefâretnâmes* further contributed

to this process. Ottomans were able to learn some valuable details of the Austrian state system with all its institutions from the *Sefâretnames* of Mustafa Effendi and Ebubekir Ratib Effendi. Mustafa Effendi provided the Empire with particular information about the Holy Roman-German Empire ruled by the Habsburgs. He describes the formation of the Empire including the states constituting it and the disposition of its power among them. He goes on to speak of the ruler, for example how he was crowned; his attitude towards his neighbours and other states; his ordinary and extraordinary revenues; the financial and military strength of the empire; the degrees of nobility; the privileges of the nobles; and their relations with the ruler. He also makes a very important analysis of the economic system of the Empire. Ebubekir Ratib Effendi goes one step further and compares the systems of the two empires, thereby producing some ideas for the improvement of the Ottoman system. It is believed that this *sefâretnâme* and especially the great *layiha* of Ebubekir Ratib Effendi³⁸ suggested a comprehensive programme to the Sultan and made a very important contribution to modernizing activities in the Empire during the reign of Selim III.³⁹

The two significant examples through which the Ottomans were able to picture the Prussian state system were the *sefâretnâmes* of Ahmed Resmi Effendi and Ahmet Azmi Effendi.⁴⁰ Although Ahmet Resmi Effendi's *sefâretnâme* is relatively short, he summarizes the working of the Austrian state system with all its institutions. Ahmet Azmi Effendi too makes a very comprehensive analysis. Like Ebubekir Ratib Effendi, he puts forward an exceptionally detailed report on the economic, social, military and administrative structure of the Prussian state with the life-style, nature, customs and habits of its people. His characterization and portrait of Frederick the Great of Prussia especially give interesting clues about the nature of Ottoman perceptions of leadership and consultation in general,⁴¹ and make some projections on how a ruler must behave for the well-being of his people.

The British people and their system were introduced to the Ottoman Empire through the extensive reports of the ambassador Yusuf Agah Effendi and his chief secretary Mahmut Raif Effendi. Yusuf Agah's manuscript is in the form of accounts of events⁴² in England (*Havadisnâme-i İngiltere*). He is mainly concerned with British and European affairs, summarized from the newspapers with his comments on them. He deals secondly with the instructions given to him by the Porte, and his reports sent back on his diplomatic and commercial activities. The *sefâretnâme* of Mahmud Raif (*Journal du voyage de Mahmoud Raif Efendi en Angleterre, écrit par luy même*)⁴³ is much more extensive than Yusuf Agah's accounts

and it has, in a way, a subject formulation which is complementary to the previous one. First of all, he gives some information about the journey of the Ottoman mission from Istanbul via Austria, Germany and Belgium. It also covers the early days of the embassy in London, giving brief information about the royal family and their activities at court. He presents true and interesting descriptions of King George III.⁴⁴ He later explains in detail the working of British institutions including Parliament, the armed forces, Cabinet, political parties, trade companies, and the social and cultural life of the time. Finally he portrays the city of London with its palaces, parks, churches, hospitals, schools and factories.

In sum, all these *sefâretnâmes* and several others supplied significant knowledge of Europe with valuable examples and contributed at length to the activities of reformers to reorganize and improve Ottoman institutions along European lines. They certainly accelerated the process of westernization.⁴⁵ The efforts to develop Ottoman diplomacy and the Ottoman Foreign Ministry in line with their European counterparts⁴⁶ are the best examples.

From another angle, *sefâretnâmes* can be considered as valuable sources for studies on the comparative history of civilization since they reflect the perceptions of the Eastern world about the developments in all fields in alien lands. From this point of view, they may provide students with interesting clues for an understanding of the diplomatic, political, economic, social and cultural relations between the Ottoman Empire and the states of Europe. Given that *sefâretnâmes* represent the first impressions of the Ottoman envoys, they may also include some interesting details in all fields for students of European history.

Although *sefâretnâme*-type writings are not unique to the Ottoman Empire,⁴⁷ they have occupied a significant place in the conduct of Ottoman foreign affairs for a considerable period of time. *Sefâretnâmes* are to a large extent valuable sources for the history of diplomacy in general and Ottoman diplomacy in particular. They present some examples on the use of Ottoman protocol methods and rules as well as the diplomatic and technical language of inter-state relations of the period in which they were written. It is quite possible to see in them some samples of diplomatic negotiations for the purpose of forming alliances, gaining some concessions, making trade and peace agreements, and so on. In the end, they form to a certain extent a collection of the correspondence between the Porte and its ambassadors. A careful study of these special writings might shed light on the development of the techniques of Ottoman diplomacy.

The main manuscripts of the *sefâretnâmes* and some of their copies are in the Topkapı Palace Museum, *Türk Tarih Kurumu*, *Milli Kütüphane* and a variety of university libraries. It is sometimes possible to see these *sefâretnâmes* in full or in part within the context of the *Vakanuvis* histories.⁴⁸ A number of *sefâretnâmes* have been transliterated and translated into modern Turkish.

Memoirs, biographies and letters of Ottoman statesmen and members of the sultanate

In some cases, prominent members of the Ottoman sultanate, important statesmen and officials of the Empire wrote their memoirs. In others, the private papers, letters or official writings of the Ottoman sultans, state officials and diplomats were collected either by their family members or scholars. In each case, we have striking inside information about the policies of the Ottoman Empire and the workings of diplomacy on the Ottoman side.⁴⁹

Biographies, memoirs and letters of foreign ambassadors and statesmen

Although the available Ottoman archival materials are the main sources for the study of Ottoman history in general, when the matter of concern is Ottoman diplomacy, the presence of other European sources of biographies, memoirs and letters cannot simply be neglected.⁵⁰ The information provided by the personnel of the foreign embassies in the Ottoman Empire is crucially important. In some cases they exclusively narrate their experiences in their memoirs with reference to the methods of Ottoman diplomacy and the attitudes of Ottoman rulers towards the representatives of European states. Therefore it is sometimes quite interesting to come across examples of Ottoman methods of negotiation, techniques of discussion, rules of protocol and so on in the memoirs of ex-ambassadors with their valuable comments on the political developments of the period. Biographies of ambassadors and other agents also provide us with valuable information on their experiences of Ottoman diplomacy, based on or derived from their personal accounts or letters. The biographies written about Sir Stratford Canning and Sir William White⁵¹ are good examples of this type.

Travelogues of European travellers and statesmen⁵²

An interesting source of information that can be cited within the context of travel literature is the travel accounts of the foreign statesmen including ambassadors together with their relatives and other travellers concerning the Ottoman Empire and her dominions. There is a considerable amount of bibliographical data about travellers.⁵³ A noteworthy example comes from the British Ambassador Edward Burton who joined the campaign of Sultan Mehmed III in 1596 against Hungary. Since the time of Suleyman the Magnificent, as a tradition, the French ambassadors had joined the Ottoman sultans in their campaigns against Hungary. This was an interesting institution of Ottoman diplomacy. On the one hand they represented the Europeans by taking their place as observers; on the other, they played the role of mediator between the Hungarians and the Ottomans. However, when Edward Burton was an ambassador to the Ottoman Porte, there was no French representative in Istanbul;⁵⁴ therefore, inevitably, he was chosen for this mission. This constituted a turning point in Anglo-Ottoman relations; afterwards, British ambassadors gained the privilege of taking a place under their own flags in the Ottoman campaigns against Hungary⁵⁵ and both British and French flags were represented equally. The experience of the British Ambassador on this occasion was written by his Embassy Clerk Thomas Glover (who became an ambassador later) and published by the Hakluyt Society.⁵⁶ Thomas Glover's account of this campaign gives us an interesting depiction by a European observer.

Among travel writings, the publications of the Hakluyt Society form an important source for the study of Ottoman history and diplomacy. For a time, they were among the most important publishers of the travel experiences of the English nation to the Ottoman lands, especially in the earlier period of relations.⁵⁷ When, in late January or February 1589–90, the Younger Richard Hakluyt first published his *Principal Navigations, Voyages, and Discoveries of the English Nation*, it was just ten years after a letter of March 1579 from Sultan Murad III to Queen Elizabeth,⁵⁸ and her answer of 25 October had opened the way to Anglo-Ottoman relations. According to Paul Wittek's study, the first and second editions of Hakluyt Society publications include, in translations, 17 Turkish documents,⁵⁹ which are mainly authentic in nature, concerning the beginning of Anglo-Ottoman commercial and political relations. Some of them may not even be found among the available Ottoman documents for that period.

Of course, travel literature cannot be deemed the main source of Ottoman diplomacy. Yet it may sometimes provide students with challenging clues for further studies.

Archival sources for Ottoman diplomacy outside Turkey

Although the main source of the study of Ottoman diplomacy is the available archival materials within Turkey, it is not easy to underestimate the importance of the archival materials found elsewhere.⁶⁰ This is the case, especially when we think of the age-old relations of the Ottoman Empire with Europe and dominance over Arab lands. With reference to our subject area, our vital concern is the archives relating to the foreign ministry and foreign relations of European and Arab countries. However, on this point, it would be worth mentioning the Study of S. Faroqi, *Approaching Ottoman History: An Introduction to the Sources*. Although her main attention is on the economic and social aspects of Ottoman history, she gives very detailed information about the archives and possible materials for Ottoman history in general outside Turkish territories, in both Europe and non-European countries.⁶¹ Given that information, one can find the key elements of the work on these archives for the purpose of the study of Ottoman diplomacy.

Concerning European archival materials, the correspondence of European diplomats with reference to the Ottoman state constitutes an important source for the study of Ottoman diplomacy, since it shows us the two sides of the relationship from another perspective. Among these, it is necessary to note the archival sources available in England.

The main interest here will be confined to the sources in England since she was one of the first European states to open a permanent diplomatic mission in the Ottoman territories and had long-lasting relations with that country. At the same time, the present writer happens to be much more familiar with the archival materials in England relating to Ottoman diplomacy.

Archival material in the Public Record Office (London)

Foreign Office documents (FO)

Class number FO78 comprises the general correspondence before 1906, between the years of 1780 and 1905, and is very well known by all researchers studying Anglo-Ottoman relations. That class is divided into various subsections covering all types of communication about Turkey: between the Foreign Office and the embassy and consulates, between the consulates and the embassy, between the Turkish embassy and the

Foreign Office, between the embassy in Istanbul and the Turkish government, and so on. FO195 is the general correspondence that covers the years 1808 to 1962 including 2722 volumes. FO196 comprises the letter books of the Foreign Office about the Embassy and consulates in the Ottoman Empire from the year 1810 to 1860 with 61 volumes. FO197 is the register of correspondence from 1823 to 1921 between the Foreign Office and the embassy and consulates in Turkey with 74 volumes. FO198 covers miscellaneous papers related to Turkey from 1775 to 1941 with 107 volumes. This includes various Turkish documents in bound volumes in different subsections. FO881 is very important, and comprises various memoranda about different subject areas concerning Turkey. The Confidential Prints series of FO documents are also worth consulting, for example FO406, FO421, FO424 and so on.

Documents relating to English treaties with other countries, including the Ottoman Empire, can be found in class numbers FO366, FO95 and FO372. English Capitulations are to be found in FO323.

The PRO also holds the letters and communications of English statesmen and ambassadors with the Foreign Office and other personalities. It is possible to find very significant information in them about Ottoman officials, their policies and diplomacy. Of particular interest are: FO519 Cowley Papers, Henry Richard Charles Wellesley; FO352 Stratford Canning (Lord Stratford De Redcliffe), 1778–1873; FO800/35–113 Sir Edward Grey 1892–95, 1905–16; FO343 Sir Edward Mallet 1884–95; FO800/3 Sir Henry Ponsonby, 1870–94; FO364 Sir William White 1857–91; FO30/26/72 and FO261 Sir Robert Ainslie 1776–94, 1783–87; FO800/229–231 George Canning 1824–27 and so on.

State Papers (SP)

State Papers Foreign (SP) supplementary in SP110 includes letter books and correspondence of British envoys to the Ottoman Empire. SP96, 97, 102, 103, 104, 105 and 108 comprise the letter books, diaries, and correspondence between embassies, consulates and the Foreign Office and various miscellaneous papers. However, it needs to be emphasized that there are some overlaps between the State Papers and Foreign Office classes.⁶²

Historical manuscripts in various libraries

Britain is rich in historical manuscripts⁶³ scattered among different libraries in the country. Noteworthy libraries include the British Library, Oxford University (Bodleian) Library, National Library of Scotland, Durham University Library and Nottingham University Library.

To conclude this chapter, I have tried to highlight the important sources of Ottoman diplomacy as much as possible. I have not addressed the bulk of the secondary sources which are available for the study of Ottoman diplomacy. Such an attempt would extend beyond the scope of the chapter. Needless to say, it is hardly possible to provide an exhaustive account of all possible sources.

Notes

1. For the significance of the Ottoman archives in historical studies of countries other than Turkey, see M. Bilge, 'Osmanlı Arşivlerinin Arap Ülkeleri Tarihi Bakımından Önemi', in *Osmanlı Arşivleri ve Osmanlı Araştırmaları Sempozyumu* (Istanbul: İstanbul Matbaası, 1985); M. Mehdi İlhan, 'The Ottoman Archives and their Importance for Historical Studies: With Special Reference to Arab Provinces', *Bellekten*, vol. LV (1991), 415–72; B. Lewis, 'The Ottoman Archives as a Source for the History of the Arab Lands', *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* (October 1950), 139–55; B. Lewis, 'The Ottoman Archives: a Source for European History', *Archives*, vol. 4 (1960), 226–30; and F.R. Unat, *Importance des Archives de L'Empire Ottoman du point de vue des Etudes Balkaniques* (1962).
2. For ad hoc diplomacy in the Ottoman Empire, see in addition to Bulent Ari and G.R. Berridge's contributions to this book, J.C. Hurewitz, 'Ottoman Diplomacy and European State System', *Middle East Journal*, vol. 15 (Spring 1961), 141–52; D.S. Margoliouth, 'Turkish Diplomacy in the 18th Century', *Moslem World*, vol. VII (1917), 36–54; Hadiye Tuncer and Hüner Tuncer, *Osmanlı Diplomasisi ve Sefaretnameler* (Ankara: Ümit Yayıncılık, 1997); F.R. Unat, *Osmanlı Sefirleri ve Sefaretnameleri* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi (TTKB), 1992). For the establishment of the resident embassies and the use of permanent diplomacy, see Ö. Kürkçüoğlu's contribution in this book, C.V. Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform in the Ottoman Empire: The Sublime Porte 1789–1922* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1980); E. Kuran, *Avrupa'da Osmanlı İkamet Elçiliklerinin Kuruluşu ve İlk Elçilerin Siyasi Faaliyetleri 1793–1821* (Istanbul: Türk Kültürünü Araştırma Enstitüsü Yayınları, 1988); T. Naff, 'Reform and Conduct of Ottoman Diplomacy in the Reign of Selim III, 1789–1807', *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, vol. 83 (1963), 295–315; S. Kunalalp, 'The Ministry of Foreign Affairs Under the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic', in Z. Steiner (ed.), *The Times Survey of Foreign Ministries of the World* (London: Times Books, 1982), 494–500. For the Ottoman treatment of foreign ambassadors, see Z. Orgun, 'Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Name ve Hediye Getiren Elçilerle Yapılan Merasim', *Tarih Vesikaları*, vol. I, no. VI (Haziran 1941 – Mayıs 1942), 407–13; O. Zirogeviç, 'Yabancı Elçilerin Osmanlı Memleketlerinde Seyahatleri ve Huzura Kabulleri', *Belgelerle Türk Tarihi Dergisi*, vol. I, no. IV (Ocak 1968), 45–9; M. Sertoğlu, 'Osmanlı Hükümdarlarının Elçi Kabul Töreni', in his *Tarihten Sohbetler* (Ankara: TTKB, 1994), 247–53; I.H. Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Devletinin Merkez ve Bahriye Teşkilatı* (Ankara: TTKB, 1948), 287–317.
3. For a list of archives that exist in Turkey see N. Çağatay, 'Osmanlı Arşivlerine Dış Dünyadaki İlgisi', in *Osmanlı Arşivleri ve Araştırmaları Sempozyumu* (Istanbul: İstanbul Matbaası, 1985); S. J. Shaw, 'The Archives of Turkey: An Evaluation',

- in *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes* (Vienna, 1977), 91–8; S. J. Shaw, 'Ottoman Archival Materials for the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries: The Archives of Istanbul', *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, vol. VI (1975), 100–6; A. Çetin, 'Les Archives de la Présidence du Conseil a Istanbul', in *Etudes Médiévales et Patrimoine Turc*, éditions du CNRS (Paris: Cultures et Civilisations Médiévales, 1983), 27–54; A. Çetin, 'Les Archives de Turquie. Aperçu Historique et perspectives', in *Collection Turcica IV* (Paris, 1984), 161–78; P. Wittek, 'Les Archives des Turqui', *Byzantion*, vol. XIII (1938), 691–9; C. Türkay, 'Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Arşiv', *Belgelerle Türk Tarih Dergisi*, vol. II, no. VII (1968), 44–8. For concise and helpful information about the libraries in Istanbul, see İ. Binark, 'Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Kütüphanesi ve Kütüphane Koleksiyonları ile İstanbul Kütüphaneleri Hakkında Yerli Yabancı Kaynaklar Bibliografyası', *Vakıflar Dergisi*, no. XIII (1981), 717–43. See also M. Eren and O. Ersoy, *Bir Kısım Batılı Eserlerde Kütüphanelerimizle İlgili Bilgiler Bibliografyası* (Ankara: TTKB, 1969).
4. For the archives pertaining to Ottoman history that exist in the Balkans and the West see, İ. Ortaylı, 'Balkanlar ve Batıda Osmanlı Tarihi ile İlgili Arşivler', in *Osmanlı Arşivleri ve Osmanlı Araştırmaları Sempozyumu*; R. H. Davison, 'Yakın Çağ Osmanlı Tarihinin Kaynağı Olarak Avrupa Arşivleri', *Belleten*, vol. XXVIII (1965), 311–26; Z. N. Zeine, 'The Ottoman Empire in the Archives of the Great Powers in the 19th Century', in *VII. Türk Tarih Kongresi: Kongreye Sunulan Bildiriler* (Ankara: TTKB, 1972–73); Z. Lito, *Arnavutluk'ta 18. Yüzyıl Osmanlıca Kodeksleri* (Ankara: TTKB, 1994); İ. Soysal, 'Fransa Dışişleri Bakanlığı Arşivleri ve Türk-Fransız Diploması Münasebetlerine Ait Belgeler', *Belleten*, vol. XV (1951), 709–12; A. Karahan, 'British Museum'da Tetkik Edilmemiş Bazı Diplomatik Dokümanlara Dair', in *VI. Türk Tarih Kongresi: Kongreye Sunulan Bildiriler* (Ankara: TTKB, 1967); T. Gökbilgin, 'Venedik Devlet Arşivindeki Türkçe Belgeler Koleksiyonu ve Bizimle İlgili Diğer Belgeler', *Belgeler*, vol. I, no. 2 (1964), 119–225; T. Gökbilgin, 'Venedik Devlet Arşivindeki Vesikalar Kulliyatında Kanuni Sultan Süleyman Devri Belgeleri', *Belgeler*, vol. V–VIII, no. 9–12 (1972), 1–151; V. Kopcan, *Academician Jan Rypka and Research into Ottoman Documents in Slovakia* (Bratislava: Archiv Orientalni, 1986).
5. For detailed information about Ottoman Turkish (*Osmanlıca*) and the language of Ottoman documents and diplomatics, see J. Reychman and A. Zajackowski, *Handbook of Ottoman Turkish Diplomats*, trans. Andrew S. Ehrenkreutz (The Hague: Mouton, 1968); M. S. Kütükoğlu, *Osmanlı Belgelerinin Dili: Diplomatiği* (Istanbul: Kubbealtı Akademisi Kültür ve Sanat Vakfı, 1994); J. Reychman, *Osmanlı Türk Diplomatiği El Kitabı*, trans. A. S. Ehrenkreutz (Istanbul: Devlet Arşivi Genel Müdürlüğü, 1993); F. K. Timurtaş, *Osmanlı Türkçesi Grameri, Eski Yazı ve İmla: Arapça-Farsça-Eski Anadolu Türkçesi* (Istanbul: Edebiyat Fakültesi Matbaası, 1979); L. Fekete, *Einführung in Die Osmanisch-Türkisch Diplomatiği der Türkischen Botmassigkeit in Ungarn* (Budapest, 1926); M. T. Gökbilgin, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Medeniyet Tarihi Çerçevesinde Osmanlı Paleografya ve Diplomatiği İlimi* (Istanbul: İstanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi, 1979); M. Güboğlu, *Paleografya si Diplomatiği Turco-Osmana* (Bucharest: Editura Academiei Republicii Populare, 1958). For learning Ottoman Turkish, see M. Ergin, *Osmanlıca Dersleri* (Istanbul: Edebiyat Fakültesi Matbaası, 1975); Y. Kurt, *Osmanlıca Dersleri I* (Ankara: Ecdad, 1991); Y. Kurt, *Osmanlıca Dersleri II* (Ankara: Ecdad, 1993); A. K. Belviranlı, *Osmanlıca Metinler Rehberi* (Istanbul: Marifet Yayınları,

- 1998); A. Aktan, *Osmanlı Paleografyası ve Siyasi Yazışmalar* (Istanbul: Osmanlılar İlim ve İrfan Vakfı, 1995); M. B. Yazır, *Eski Yazıları Okuma Anahtarı* (Ankara: Vakıflar Genel Müdürlüğü, 1978); D. Günaydın, *Arşiv Belgelerinde Siyakat Yazısı, özellikleri ve Divan Rakamları* (Ankara: TTKB, 1974).
6. F. Braudel, *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II* (New York: Harper & Row, 1972), 13.
 7. Researchers have to fill out an application form that can be obtained from the General Directorate of the State Archives in Turkey and from the embassies and consulate generals of the Republic of Turkey outside Turkey. It can also now be obtained from the website (www.devletarsivleri.gov.tr) of the General Directorate. In order to study the archival materials housed in the State Archives, researchers need to apply to the General Directorate of State Archives. In order to conduct research in specific archives other than the State Archives, researchers need to apply to the ministry or agency having jurisdiction over the archives in question. These applications may be submitted either in person or by mail. Outside Turkey, applications must be submitted to an embassy or consulate general of the Republic of Turkey. See A. W. Fisher, 'Research Access in Turkey', *Turkish Studies Association Bulletin*, vol. 14, no. 2 (1990), 139–55.
 8. For a guide to study the documents in Başbakanlık Arşivleri, see M. Sertoğlu, *Muhteva Bakımından Başvekalet Arşivi* (Ankara: TTKB, 1955); A. Çetin, *Başbakanlık Arşivi Klavuzu* (Istanbul: Enderun, 1979); *Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi Katalogları Rehberi* (Ankara: Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü Yayını, 1995). For information about the specific words, phrases and terms about Ottoman archival materials, see A. Çetin, 'Arşiv Terimleri ve Deyimleri', *Vakıflar Dergisi*, no. 12 (1978), 351–94; M. Z. Pakalın, *Osmanlı Tarih Deyimleri ve Terimleri Sözlüğü*, 3 vols (Istanbul: Milli Eğitim Basımevi, 1993); M. Sertoğlu, *Osmanlı Tarih Lügatı* (Istanbul: Enderun Yayınları, 1986); B. S. Baykal, *Tarih Terimleri Sözlüğü* (Ankara: TDK, 1981); F. Develioğlu, *Osmanlıca-Türkçe Ansiklopedik Lügat* (Ankara: Doğu Matbaası, 1970); M. N. Özön, *Türkçe Yabancı Kelimeler Sözlüğü* (Istanbul: İnkilap Kitabevi, 1962); I. H. Danişmend, *İzahlı Osmanlı Tarihi Kronolojisi*, 5 vols (Istanbul: Türkiye Yayınevi, 1961).
 9. These *Irades* were of two kinds: (a) a sovereign command appended to a submission made by the minister, a sovereign command taken; (b) a sovereign command on white paper, issued *proprio motu*, a sovereign command received, a command *proprio motu*. See J. W. Redhouse, *A Turkish and English Lexicon* (Constantinople/Istanbul: A. H. Boyajian, 1890). In the pre-Tanzimat period, *Irades* had been known as *Hatt-i Humayun*. Both terms referred to the Sultan's commands. Down to 1832, the ruler added in his own hand onto a paper on which the Grand Vizier had previously explained the fact of the case. After that date, these summaries were addressed no longer to the ruler himself but to his chief scribe, who really explained the relevant cases to the Sultan and took down the latter's oral comments. This practice continued down to 1908; after that time, the Sultan as a constitutional ruler merely confirmed the decisions of his Council of Ministers. See Suraiya Faroqhi, *Approaching Ottoman History: An Introduction to the Sources* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 51–2.
 10. These are Mesail-i Mühimme Iradeleri, 1255–1309 Yılları Iradeleri, 1310–1334 Yılları Iradeleri, Dosya Usulü Iradeler, Eyalat-ı Mümtaze Iradeleri.

11. Although in theory all the decisions were the Sultan's, in practice the Ottoman government, following the mid-nineteenth century, made major decisions by collegial consensus. The deliberative body was the council of ministers, appointed by the Sultan, the so called *Meclis-i Vukela* or *Meclis-i Vala*.
12. This was because the *Hariciye Nezareti* (Foreign Ministry) was established in March 1836.
13. İlber Ortaylı, *İmparatorluğun En Uzun Yüzyılı* (Istanbul: Hil Yayınları, 1983).
14. For instance, in the Turkish Embassy in London, there are 2000 boxes of Ottoman diplomatic documents. See B. Şimşir, 'Osmanlı Dışişleri Arşivleri', in *Osmanlı Arşivleri ve Osmanlı Araştırmaları Sempozyumu* (Istanbul: İstanbul Matbaası, 1985), 98; B. Şimşir, *Osmanlı Dışişleri Arşivi* (Istanbul: İstanbul Matbaası, 1985). Recently, plans have been made to transfer the *Taşra Arşivi* to the *Merkez Arşivi*.
15. For the lists and information about the personnel working in the Ottoman administration and especially in the Ottoman diplomatic services, see also Mehmed Süreyya, *Sicill'i Osmani or Tezkire-i Meşahir-i Osmaniyye*, I-II (Istanbul, 1308–16); for the list of the Ottoman Foreign Ministry bureaucrats such as foreign ministers and consuls, see K. Girgin, *Osmanlı ve Cumhuriyet Dönemleri Hariciye Tarihimiz: Teskilat ve Protokol* (Ankara: TTKB, 1994), 71–8.
16. From the reign of Süleyman the Magnificent to the publication date of the *Salname-i Nezaret-i Hariciye*, names and durations of the foreign ambassadors (envoys) were also recorded in the yearbooks of the Ottoman Foreign Ministry. See Hasan Duman, *Ottoman Yearbooks: Salname and Nevsal* (Istanbul: Organization of Islamic Conference, 1982).
17. Some of these documents are also found in other places. Of these, *ahdnâmes* have great significance for the study of Ottoman diplomacy. *Ahdnâmes*, or the Capitulations as they are known in European literature, were unilateral grants by the Sultans of privileges and special rights to the merchants of foreign countries. However, they were not purely of a commercial character and increasingly comprised issues of politics, law and religion. In a sense they were the instruments for the regulation of the relationships between the Ottoman Empire and the states of Europe. *Ahdnâmes* for the seventeenth century and after are found in *Düveli Ecnebiye Defterleri* kept in *Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivleri*. *Name-i Hümayun Defterleri* contains copies of *ahdnâmes* for the nineteenth century. The original copies of some *ahdnâmes* may be found in European archive collections as well. Printed texts of *ahdnâmes* are available in various collections such as *Muahadat Mecmuası*, 5 vols (Istanbul, 1294–98 [1877–81]); *Treaties between Turkey and Foreign Powers, 1535–1855*, comp. by the librarian and keeper of the papers, Foreign Office (London, 1855); G. M. Thomas, *Diplomatarium Veneto-Levantinum*, 2 vols (Venice, 1880–89); Gabriel Noradounghian, *Recueil d'actes internationaux de l'empire Ottoman*, 4 vols (Paris, 1897–1903); Ernest Charrière, *Négotiations de la France dans le Levant, ou Correspondances, mémoires et actes diplomatiques des ambassadeurs de France à Constantinople*, 4 vols (Paris, 1848–60); Dariusz Kolodziejczyk, *Ottoman-Polish Diplomatic Relations (15th–18th century): An Annotated Edition of Ahdnames and other Documents* (Leiden: Brill, 2000). For a general analysis of *ahdnâmes*, see Halil İnalçık, 'İmtiyazat', in *Encyclopedia of Islam*, 2nd edn (Leiden: Brill, 1971), 1179–89. İnalçık's article, which remains the best to date, also provides a full bibliographical list.

18. For detailed information about Vekayi'nüvis, see B. Kütükoğlu, *Vekayi'nüvis Makaleler* (Istanbul: Fetih Cemiyeti, 1994); 'Vekayi'nüvis', *İslam Ansiklopedisi*, vol. XII, 271–87.
19. Türk Tarih Kurumu, Kızılay Sok. 1 Sıhhiye, Ankara. Phone: +90 (0)312 3102368. The Turkish Historical Society has a good collection of new and antiquarian books. It is also a main publisher of books on history and has a good catalogue and back stock. It has a bookstore where books are cheaply priced, even by Turkish standards. Books are posted at reasonable cost. Check its website: www.ttk.gov.tr.
20. For examples of translation, see Ahmed Cevdet Paşa, *Tarih-i Cevdet: Osmanlı Tarihi*, 10 vols (Istanbul: Üçdal Neşriyat, 1994); Abdurrahman Şeref Efendi, *Osmanlı Devleti Tarihi* (Izmir: Kaynak Yayınları, 1995). For examples of translation, see B. Kütükoğlu, *Çeşm-i Zade Mustafa Reşid, Çeşmi-Zade Tarihi* (Istanbul: İstanbul Fetih Cemiyeti, 1993).
21. More than 45 *sefâretnâmes* have survived. See M. Alaaddin Yalçinkaya, 'Mahmud Raif Efendi As the Chief Secretary of Yusuf Agah Efendi, the First Permanent Ottoman Turkish Ambassador to London 1793–1797', *OTAM Ankara Üniversitesi Osmanlı Tarihi Araştırma ve Uygulama Merkezi Dergisi (Journal of the Centre for the Study of Ottoman History)*, no. 5 (1994), 398. Most are in Turkey; however, some are kept in the libraries of France, Austria, Germany and Egypt. They were all written in Ottoman Turkish, with one exception written in French: 'Journal du Voyage du Mahmoud Raif Efendi en Angleterre, écrit par luy meme', by Mahmud Raif Efendi, the Chief Secretary of Yusuf Agah Efendi. For general information about *sefâretnâmes*, see M. A. Yalçinkaya, 'Osmanlı Zihniyetindeki Değişimin Göstergesi Olarak Sefaretnamelerin Kaynak Değeri', *OTAM*, no. 7 (1996), 319–39; Unat, *Osmanlı Sefirleri ve Sefaretnâmeleri*; Tuncer and Tuncer, *Osmanlı Diplomasisi ve Sefaretnameler*.
22. The first known *sefâretnâme* was written by Hacı Zağanos during the reign of Mehmed II in the fifteenth century.
23. For the list of known *sefâretnâmes*, see Unat, *Osmanlı Sefirleri ve Sefaretnameleri*; Yalçinkaya, 'Osmanlı Zihniyetindeki . . .', 331–2.
24. See, Yalçinkaya, 'Mahmud Raif Effendi . . .', 398.
25. Although most of the known *sefâretnâmes* are about European states, there are some on non-European states such as Ak Koyunlus (1), Iran (7), India (1), Morocco (2) and the Khanate of Bukhara (1).
26. There are several studies on the personalities and missions of the Ottoman envoys and ambassadors. Some examples are: S. Ghorbal, 'The Mission of Ali Effendi in Paris and of Sedki Effendi in London, 1797–1811. A Contribution to the Study of the Westernization of Ottoman Institutions', *Bulletin of the Faculty of Arts University of Egypt*, no.1 (1933), 114–29; R. J. von Hammer, 'An Account of the Mission of Yusuf Agah, Ambassador from Turkey to the British Court', *Transaction of the Royal Asiatic Society*, vol. VII (1833), 496–504; J. M. Stein, 'An Eighteenth Century Ottoman Observer of the West: Ebu Bekir Ratip Efendi Reports on the Habsburg System of the Roads and Posts', *Archivum Ottomanicum*, vol. 10 (1987), 219–312; A. Ucman, *Ebubekir Ratip Effendi'nin Nemçe Sefaretnamesi* (Istanbul: Kitabevi, 1999); S. Kunalp, 'Bir Osmanlı Diplomatı Kostaki Musurus Paşa 1807–1891', *Belleten*, vol. XXXIV (1970), 421–35; S. Altundag, 'Mehmed Ali İsyânında, Yardım Talebinde Bulunmak Üzere 1832 Tarihinde Namik Paşa'nın Hususi Elçi Olarak Londra'ya

Gönderilmesi', *Tarih Vesikaları*, vol. II, no. 12 (1943), 441–51, vol. III, no.14 (1944), 127–36; M. Aktepe, 'Durri Ahmet Efendi'nin İran Sefareti', *Belgelerle Türk Tarihi Dergisi*, vol. I, no. I (October, 1967), 56–60, no. II (1967), 60–3, no. III (1967) 64–9, no. IV (1968), 60–2, no. V (1968) 53–6, and no. VI (1968), 82–4; D. E. Lee, 'A Turkish Mission to Afghanistan, 1877', *Journal of Modern History*, vol. XIII, no. 3 (1941), 335–56; S. Kunalp, 'Tanzimat Sonrası Osmanlı Sefirleri', in Ismail Soysal (ed), *Çağdaş Türk Diplomasisi 200 Yıllık Süreç* (Ankara: TTKB, 1999), 113–27; M. Aktepe, *Mehmed Emni Beyefendi Paşa'nın Rusya Sefareti ve Sefaretnamesi* (Ankara: TTKB, 1989); E. Kuran, '1793–1811 Döneminde İlk Osmanlı Mukim Elçilerin Diplomatik Faaliyetleri', in Ismail Soysal (ed.), *Çağdaş Türk Diplomasisi 200 Yıllık Süreç*, 55–61; A. Süslü, 'Sefaretname de Seyyid Mehmed Emin Vahid Efendi', *Belleten*, vol. 50 (1986), 127–67; I. H. Uzunçarşılı, 'Viyana Büyük Elçisi Vezir Sadullah Paşa'nın İntiharına Dair', *Belleten*, vol. XIV (1950), 419–479; C. Fikirkoca, 'Bir Osmanly Gözüyle İngiliz Siyasi Sistemine Bakış', *Tarih ve Toplum*, no. 10 (1984), 65–7; H. A. Schmiede, *Osmanlı ve Prusya Kaynaklarına Gore Giritli Ali Aziz Efendi'nin Berlin Sefareti* (Türk Dunyası Araştırmaları Vakfı, 1990); C. Bilim, 'Ebubekir Ratib Efendi, Nemçe Sefaretnamesi', *Belleten*, vol. 54 (1990), 261–95; E. Z. Karal, *Halet Efendi'nin Paris Büyükelçiliği 1802–1806* (İstanbul: İstanbul Üniversitesi, 1940); Y. Ercan 'Mehmed Vahid Efendi'nin Fransa Sefaretnamesi', *OTAM*, no. 2 (1991), 73–125; F. R. Unat, 'Kapıcıbaşı Nişli Mehmet Ağa'nın Moskova Sefaretnamesi', *Tarih Vesikaları*, vol. II, no. 10 (1943), 284–99, no. 11 (1943), 352–71, no. 12 (1943), 462–72; C. Bilim, 'Mustafa Rasih Paşa'nın Rusya Sefaretnamesi', *OTAM*, no. 7 (1996), 15–37; H. İnalçık, 'Rasih Efendi ve General Kutuzoff Elçilikleri', *Dil ve Tarih Coğrafya Fakültesi Dergisi*, vol. IV (1945–46), 195–203; M. Aydın, 'Livadya Sefaretleri ve Sefaretnameleri', *Belgeler*, vol. 14, no. 18 (1989–92), 321–57; Y. Ozkaya, '18. Yüzyılda Prusya'da Osmanlı Elçileri ve Bu Elçilerin Sefaretnamelerine Göre Almanya', in *Uluslararası Seyahatnamelerde Türk ve Batı İmajı Sempozyumu* (Eskişehir: Anadolu Üniversitesi, 1987); Y. Ercan, 'Bir Türk Diplomatının Gözüyle 19. Yüzyıl başında Üc Avrupa Kenti, Viyana, Varsova, Paris', in *Uluslararası Seyahatnamelerde Türk ve Batı İmajı*; I. H. Uzunçarşılı, 'Amedi Galip Efendi'nin Murahhaslığı ve Parisden Gönderdiği Şifreli Mektuplar', *Belleten*, vol. I (1937), 357–448.

27. Such features as the sites, roads, names of the places, boundaries and subdivisions, most important cities on the way, famous ports, fortresses, climate, fertility of the land, some resources and animals found there and so on.
28. There are many manuscript copies in different libraries, a variety of publications and a few French translations of this *sefâretnâme*. Original copies are in İstanbul Köprülü Library, number 202 d.; İstanbul Topkapı Palace Museum, Hazine No. 1432, 92–137; Paris, Bibl. Nat. No. 1408. Printed copies: Yirmisekiz Celebi Mehemed Effendi, *Paris Sefaretnamesi* (İstanbul: Kitabhane-i Ebuuziyya Serisi, 1306), 151; *Tacryr ou Ralation de Mohammed Effendi* (Paris: Imprimerie de Victor Goupy, 1872). French Translation, *Relation de l'Ambassade de Mehemet Effendi a la cour de France en 1721. Ecrite par lui-meme et traduite du turc*. By Julien-Galland (Paris, 1757).
29. Manuscripts are in İstanbul Fatih Millet Library, No. 843–4; İstanbul Topkapı Palace Museum, Baghdad, No. 224.

30. Ahmed Resmi Effendi, *Sefaretname-i Ahmet Resmi* (Istanbul: Matbaa-i Ebuuzziya, 1303); Ahmed Resmi Effendi, *Sefaretname-i Ahmet Resmi*, Istanbul Topkapı Palace Museum, Hazine No. 1311, 1576.
31. Ahmed Azmi Effendi, *Sefaretname-i Prusya* (Istanbul: Matbaa-i Ebuuzziya, 1303).
32. The original Sefaretname is in Istanbul, Topkapı Palace Museum Archive, No. E. 14/3919. His great *layiha* (490 pages) is kept in Istanbul, Fatih Millet Library, No. 845.
33. Istanbul, Topkapı Palace, III. Ahmet Library, No. 3707.
34. This manuscript is also known as the Sefâretnâme of Yusuf Agah Effendi. Its manuscript can be found in Fatih Millet Library, Ali Emiri, No. 840. For a study of Yusuf Agah and his embassy, see M.A. Yalçınkaya, *The First Permanent Ottoman-Turkish Embassy in Europe: The Embassy of Yusuf Agah Effendi to London 1793–1797* (PhD dissertation, University of Birmingham, 1993).
35. The *relazione* was a stylized device for providing information concerning 'the power and disposition of all great lords and princes of the world as well as of the condition of the lands and of the people who dwell in them'. This was an essential part of the duty of a Venetian ambassador, along with following his instructions and reporting frequently on the results of his mission. See D. E. Queller, 'The Development of Ambassadorial Relazioni', in J. R. Hale (ed.), *Renaissance Venice* (London: Faber & Faber, 1973), 173. Considerable amounts of *relazioni* were edited by E. Alberi in *Relazioni Degli Ambasciatori Veneti al Senato*, (Florence, 1839–61), 15 volumes. There are many examples of *relazioni* relating to the Ottoman Empire such as: A. Erizzo 'Sommario Della Relazione di Antonio Erizzo Bailo A Constantinopoli Letta in Senato Nel 1557', Alberi, vol. 3, no. 3; C. Garzoni, 'Relazione Dell'Impero Ottomano Del Senatore Costantino Garzoni Stato All'Ambascieria Di Constantinopoli Nel 1573', Alberi, vol. 1, no. 1; D. de Ludovisi, 'Relazione Dell'Impero Ottomano Riverita in Senato Dal Secretario Daniello De'Ludovisi A Di 3 Giugno Del 1534', Alberi, vol. 1, no. 3; B. Navagero, 'Relazione Dell'Impero Ottomano Del Clarissimo Bernardo Navagero Stato Sailo A Constantinopoli Fatta in Pregali Nel Mese Di Febraio Del 1553', Alberi, vol. 1, no. 3; A. Tiepolo, 'Relazione dell'Impero Ottomano Del Clarissimo Bailo M. Antonio Tiepolo Letta Senato il 9 Giugno, 1576', Alberi, series 3, vol. 2; D. Trevisan, 'Relazione Dell'Impero Ottomano del Clarissimo Domenico Trevisan Tornato Bailo da Constantinopoli, Sulla Fine Del 1554', Alberi, vol. 1, no. 3; J. Soranzo, 'Relazione e Diario del Viaggio di Jacopo Sorenzo Ambasciatore Della Repubblica di Venezia per il Rigatlio di Mehmet Figliuolo di Amurat Imperatore dei Turchi 1581', Alberi, vol. 2, no. 3; D. Barbarigo, 'Relazione Dell'Impero Ottomano Del Clarissimo Daniele Barbarigo Tornato Bailo da Constantinopoli Nel 1564', Alberi, vol. 2, no. 3; L. Bernardo, 'Relazione Dell'Impero Ottomano Di Lorenzo Bernardo, 1592', Alberi, vol. 2, no. 3; P. Bragadin, 'Sommario Della Relazione Di Pietro Bragadin Bailo A Constantinopoli Letta in Pregadi Al 9 Di Giugno 1526', Alberi, vol. 3, no. 3; P. Contarini, 'Relazione di Paolo Contarini Bailo A Constantinopoli Letta in Pregadi L'Anno 1583', Alberi, vol. 3, no. 3; and so on.
36. Venetian ambassadors, upon their return, were required to present a comprehensive report (*relazione*) before the Venetian Senate. From the very beginning *relazioni* were invariably delivered in the Senate. This situation was regulated by the Acts of 1296 and 1401. The fully developed *relazione* of the sixteenth century was delivered both in the College and in the Senate. This was

- mentioned in the Act of 1425. See Queller, 'The Development of Ambassadorial Relazioni', 179.
37. The *sefâretnâme* was submitted to the Sultan, the Grand Vizier and other dignitaries of the state. The ambassadors or members of their staff composed the accounts.
 38. For the transliteration into Turkish, see Uçman, *Ebubekir Ratib Efendi'nin Nemce Sefâretnâmesi*.
 39. Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar, *Ondokuzuncu Asır Türk Edebiyatı Tarihi* (Istanbul: Edebiyat Fakültesi Yayınları, 1949), 53–4. See also I. H. Uzunçarşılı, 'Tosyalı Ebubekir Ratib Effendi', *Belleten*, vol. XXXIX, no. 153 (1975), 49–76; and E. Z. Karal, 'Ebubekir Ratib Efendi'nin Nizam-i Cedit Islahatında Rolü', in *V. Türk Tarih Kongresi* (Ankara: TTKB, 1960), 347–55.
 40. Ahmed Resmi Effendi and his *sefâretnâme* were analysed by H. G. Yurdaydın, 'Ahmed Resmi Efendi ve Bazı Düşünceleri', in *Mustafa Reşid Paşa ve Dönemi Semineri: Bildiriler* (Ankara: TTKB, 1994), 65–70. For a translation into modern Turkish of Ahmet Azmi Effendi's *sefâretnâme*, see H. and H. Tuncer, *Osmanlı Diplomasisi ve Sefâretnameler*, 94–104.
 41. V. H. Aksan, 'An Ottoman Portrait of Frederick the Great', *Turkish Studies Association Bulletin*, vol. 16, no. 2 (1992), 200.
 42. For the accounts of his mission see, R. J. von Hammer, 'An account of the Mission of Yusuf Agah'. His *sefâretnâme* was partly transliterated into Latin script in Unat, *Osmanlı Sefirleri ve Sefâretnâmeleri*, 171–6.
 43. The diary of Mahmud Raif Efendi's voyage to England was translated into English by Yalçınkaya and presented in the appendix of his 'Mahmud Raif Effendi as the Chief Secretary of Yusuf Agah Efendi', 422–34.
 44. Yalçınkaya, 'Osmanlı Zihniyetindeki . . .', 324.
 45. For the role of the Ottoman permanent embassies in the westernization of the Ottoman Empire see E. Kuran, 'Türkiye'nin Batılılaşmasında Osmanlı Daimi Elçiliklerinin Rolü', *VI. Türk Tarih Kongres: Bildiriler*, vol. IX, no. 6 (Ankara: TTKB, 1961), 489–496; E. Z. Karal, *Selim III'ün Hat-ti Hümayunları: Nizam-i Cedit 1789–1807* (Ankara: TTKB, 1988), 163–87.
 46. On this see Hurewitz, 'Ottoman Diplomacy and the European State System'; C. V. Findley, 'The Foundation of the Ottoman Foreign Ministry: Beginnings of Bureaucratic Reform Under Selim III and Mahmud II', *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, vol. III (1972), 388–416; I. Soysal, 'Umur'u Hariciye Nezaretinin Kurulması', in *Sultan II Mahmud ve Reformları Semineri* (Istanbul: İstanbul Üniversitesi, 1990); Naff, 'Reform and Conduct of Ottoman Diplomacy'.
 47. We have some samples of these types from European ambassadors, such as Venetian *relazioni*. But we also have similar examples from the Eastern world. Persian ambassadors also prepared reports akin to the Ottoman *sefâretnâme*. One of the most well known of them is the work of Mirza Ebul Hasan Han, which was written during the time of King George III of England in 1809–10. This was translated by M. M. Cloake, *A Persian at the Court of King George 1809–1810: The Journal of Mirza Abul Hasan Khan* (London: Barrie & Jenkins, 1988).
 48. Such as Silahdar Tarihi (1654–94), Tarih-i Rasit (1660–1721), Izzi Tarihi (1744–51), Seyyid Hakim Tarihi (1747–66), Tarihi Vasif (1752–75), Tarihi-i Cevdet (1774–1826). See also Yalçınkaya 'Osmanlı Zihniyetindeki . . .', 330–1.

Unat too gives very detailed information about the publication of the *sefâret-nâmes* in the *Vakanüvis* histories at the end of each *sefâret-nâme*. See Unat, *Osmanlı Sefirleri ve Sefâret-nâmeleri*.

49. Examples of such sources are: A. Özcan and I. Şahin, 'II. Abdülhamid'in Hususi Mektup ve Telgrafları', *Edebiyat Fakültesi Dergisi*, No. III-IV (1984), 417-74; Said Pasha, *Said Paşa'nın Hatıratı* (Istanbul, 1328/1912); A. Osmanoğlu, *Babam Sultan Abdülhamid* (Istanbul: Selçuk, 1986); H. Menteşe, *Osmanlı Mebusan Meclisi Reisi Halil Menteşe'nin Anıları* (Istanbul: Hürriyet Vakfı, 1986); Ahmed Niyazi Bey, *Hatırat-ı Niyazi* (Istanbul, 1326/1910); H. E. Cengiz, *Enver Paşa'nın Anıları 1881-1908* (Istanbul: İletişim, 1991); K. N. Duru, *İttihat ve Terakki Hatıralarım* (Istanbul: Sucuoğlu Matbaası, 1957); Ali Haydar Midhat Bey, *The Life of Midhat Pasha: A Record of his Services, Political Reforms, Punishment and Judicial Murder* (London: John Murray, 1903); G. K. Söylemezoğlu, *Hariciye Nezaretinde 30 Sene 1892-1922* (Istanbul: Saka Matbaası, 1949); Mahmud Şevket Paşa, *Sadrazam ve Harbiye Nazırı Mahmut Şevket Paşa'nın Günlüğü* (Istanbul: Arba, 1988); I. Parmaksızoğlu, 'Bir Türk Diplomatının Onsekizinci Yüzyıl Sonunda Devletlerarası İlişkilere Dair Görüşleri', *Belleten*, vol. 47 (1983), 527-35; A. K. Aksut, *Sultan Aziz'in Mısır ve Avrupa Seyahati* (Istanbul, 1944); A. Said, *Saray Hatıraları: Sultan Abdulhamid'in Hayatı* (Istanbul: Nehir, 1994); I. Bozdağ, *İkinci Abdulhamid'in Hatıra Defteri* (Istanbul: Kervan, 1975); C. Baysun, 'Mustafa Reşid Paşa'nın Paris ve Londra Sefareti Esnasındaki Siyasi Yazıları', *Tarih Vesikaları*, vol. I, no. 1, 2, 4, 6 (Haziran 1941 - Mayıs 1942), 31-44, 145-55, 283-95, 430-42; vol. II, no. 7, (1942), 41-55; vol. II, no. 9 (1942), 208-19; vol. II, no. 12, (1943), 452-61; vol. III, no. 13 (1944), 51-7; R. H. Davison, 'Halil Serif Paşa, Ottoman Diplomat and Statesman', *Osmanlı Araştırmaları*, vol. II (1981), 203-21; R. H. Davison, 'Mithat Paşa and Ottoman Foreign Relations', *Osmanlı Araştırmaları*, vol. V (1986), 161-73.
50. Some examples may be given as follows: C. L. Smith, *The Embassy of Sir William White at Constantinople, 1886-1891* (London: Oxford University Press, 1957); E. H. Sutherland, *Sir William White... ambassador at Constantinople, his life and correspondence* (London, 1902); S. Lane-Poole, *The Life of the Rt. Honorable Stratford Canning*, 2 vols (London: Longmans, Green, 1888); E. F. Malcolm-Smith, *The Life of Stratford Canning* (London: Ernest Benn, 1933); L. G. Byrne, *The Great Ambassador* (Stratford Canning) (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1964); *Sir A. H. Layard... Autobiography and Letters* (ed.) William N. Bruce (London, 1903); G. F. Abbot, *Under the Turk in Constantinople: A Record of Sir John Finch's Embassy 1674-1681* (London: Macmillan, 1920); A. N. Kurat, *The Dispatches of Sir Robert Sutton Ambassador in Constantinople 1710-1714*, Camden third series, Vol. LXXVIII (London: Camden Society, 1953); A. H. Layard, *Layard's Unpublished Memoirs* (British Museum, Add. M. S. 38 935 fol. 77); A. Vandal, *Une Ambassade de Française en Orient Sous Louis XV* (Paris, 1887); O. Burian, *The Report of Lello, the Third English Ambassador to the Sublime Porte* (Ankara: TTKB, 1952); J. Chesneau, *Le Voyage de Monsieur D'Aramon. Ambassadeur pour le Roy en Levant Escript par Noble Homme Jean Chesneau l'un des Secretaires dudict Ambassadeur* (Paris, 1680); A. Galland, *Journal d'A Galland Pendant Son Sejour A L'Ambassade de France A Constantinople* (Paris, 1680); B. Lorenzo, *Viaggio di un Ambasciatore Venezianne da Venesia a Constantinopoli nel 1591* (Venice, 1886); M. Nointel, *L'odyssée d'un Ambassadeur. Les Voyages*

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51. On Canning, see Lane-Poole, *The Life of the Rt. Honorable Stratford Canning*; Malcolm-Smith, *The Life of Stratford Canning*; Byrne, *The Great Ambassador*; M. Warr, *A Biography of Stratford Canning: Mainly His Career in Turkey* (Oxford: Alden Press, 1989). On White, see Sutherland, *Sir William White*; Smith, *The Embassy of Sir William White*. For detailed information about the private papers of the British diplomats, see C. Cook, *Sources in British Political History 1900–1951* (London: Macmillan, 1975).
52. Such as Sir A. Slade, *Records of travels in Turkey, Greece, &c. and of a cruise in the Black sea, with the Capitan pasha, in the years 1829, 1830, and 1831* (London, 1832); L. M. W. Montagu, *The Travel Letters of Lady Mary Wortley Montagu*, ed. A. W. Lawrence (London: Cape, 1930); W. Wittman, *Travels in Turkey, Asia Minor, Syria and Across the Desert into Egypt during the Years 1799, 1800, and 1801, in Company with the Turkish Army and the British Military Mission* (London: R. Philips, 1803); R. Walsh, *A residence at Constantinople: during a period including the commencement, progress, and termination of the Greek and Turkish revolutions* (London: Richard Bentley, 1838); S. T. Roe, *The Negotiations of Sir Thomas Roe in his Embassy to the Ottoman Porte, from the year 1621–1628* (London: Samuel Richardson, 1740); Sir E. Pears, *Forty Years in Constantinople, 1873–1915* (London, 1916); J. Burbury, *Relation of a Journey of the Right Honorable My Lord Henry Howard from London to Vienna and thence to Constantinople in the company of His Excellency Count Lesley* (London, 1671); Samuel S. Cox, *Diversions of a Diplomat in Turkey* (New York: Charles L. Webster, 1887); J. Richards, *Diary of a Journey from Naples to Constantinople and thence to Vienna on his Discharge from the Venetian Service 15 July 1699 – 21 September 1700* (Ms. British Museum, Stowe 462, fol. 76).
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54. Before this campaign, the French ambassador in Istanbul had been exiled to Malta on the basis of his spying activities for Spain, and the new French Ambassador had not yet arrived.

55. Before, they joined the campaigns under the French flag.
56. *Hakluyt Posthumus or Purchas His Pilgrimes, Contayning a History of the World in Sea Voyages and Land Travelles, by Englishmen and Others*, ed. Samuel Purchas (Glasgow, 1905–07) 20 vols.
57. Such as W. Harborne, *The Return of Master William Harborne from Constantinople Overland to London*, extra series, Vol. 3 (Glasgow: Hakluyt Society, 1903); W. Foster, *Travels of John Sanderson in the Levant, 1584–1602 with his Autobiography and Selections from his Correspondence* (Glasgow: Hakluyt Society, 1931); J.T. Bent, *Early Voyages in the Levant* (Glasgow: Hakluyt Society, 1893); J. Fox, *The Worthy Enterprise of John Foxe an Englishman in Delivering 266 Christians out of the Captivitie of the Turks at Alex., the 3 of Jan. 1577*, extra series, Vol. 5 (Glasgow: Hakluyt Society, 1903–05); R. Wrag, *A Description of a Voyage to Constantinople and Syria, begun... 1593 and ended... 1595* (Glasgow: Hakluyt Society, 1903); *A Description of the Yearly Voyage or Pilgrimage of the Mahumitans, Turkes and Moores unto Mecca in Arabia 1580*, extra series (Glasgow: Hakluyt Society, 1904).
58. This document was published by I.H. Uzunçarşılı in 'On Dokuzuncu Asır Başlarına Kadar Türk-İngiliz Münasebatına Dair Vesikalar', *Bellekten*, vol. XIII, nos. 49, 50, 51, 52 (1949), 615–16.
59. P. Wittek, 'The Turkish Documents in Hakluyt's Voyages', *Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research*, vol. 19 (1942–43), 121–47. He emphasizes the fact that the translation in Hakluyt has been made from the unique copy destined to be sent to the Queen.
60. See note 4.
61. Faroqhi, *Approaching Ottoman History*, 58–81.
62. For instance with FO 78.
63. For the research in historical manuscripts, the website of the Historical Manuscripts Commission, UK National Registers of Archives, can be used. The web address is www.hmc.gov.uk/NRA/Searches.

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