

Frontispiece. Interior of a Financial Bureau, Istanbul, Late Eighteenth Century.

Ottoman Civil Officialdom

A Social History

CARTER VAUGHN FINDLEY

Princeton University Press · Princeton, New Jersey

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Published by Princeton University Press, 41 William Street,
Princeton, New Jersey 08540

In the United Kingdom: Princeton University Press, Guildford,
Surrey

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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Findley, Carter V., 1941–
Ottoman civil officialdom : a social history / Carter Vaughn Findley
p. cm.
Bibliography: p.
Includes index.
ISBN 0–691–05545–9 (alk. paper)
1. Civil service—Turkey—History—19th century. 2. Turkey—
Officials and employees—History—19th century. 3. Turkey—Politics
and government—19th century. I. Title.
JQ1806.Z1F56 1988
354.561006—dc19 88–17810
CIP

This book has been composed in Merganthaler Primer, with A.M.
Varityper Century Oldstyle Bold italic for display.

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Printed in the United States of America by
Princeton University Press,
Princeton, New Jesey

For Lucia

Princeton Studies on the Near East

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Preface

This study is a sequel to my *Bureaucratic Reform in the Ottoman Empire: The Sublime Porte, 1789–1922* (Princeton, 1980). Both books have grown out of a single program of research. The first examines administrative reform and development during the Ottoman reform era (c. 1789–1922) in terms of the development of organizational, procedural, and regulatory apparatus, particularly as found at the Sublime Porte, the executive headquarters in Istanbul that ultimately included the offices of the grand vezir, Council of Ministers, Council of State, and the ministries of internal and foreign affairs. The present study examines administrative reform in terms of the social history of Ottoman civil officialdom over roughly the same time span.

Careful readers of both works will notice a certain inevitable modification of interpretations over time, just as the present volume also reflects significant additions to the range of sources used. Since I had done much of the analysis for the present volume before I wrote the first one, however, the two should be found in conformity on important points. The same conformity also characterizes what may be termed the basic techniques of scholarship. Readers of the present volume who wish clarification of the system used for rendering Ottoman Turkish names and terms should therefore refer to the "Notes on Usage" in the 1980 volume, pp. xxv–xxix. Simply put, my system is to follow the modern Turkish spellings in U. Bahadır Alkım et al., eds., *Redhouse Yeni Türkçe-İngilizce Sözlük: New Redhouse Turkish-English Dictionary* (Istanbul, 1968), in which the Arabic script orthography appears following the entry in Latin letters, so permitting relatively easy verification of Ottoman orthography. All Islamic dates cited in this book are in the lunar *hicrî* calendar, unless they are explicitly noted as being in the solar financial (*malî*, or *rumî*), calendar.

In works based even partly on quantitative analysis, the need usually arises to explain how the data were collected and how the results presented and discussed in the text were produced. On the general principle that good architecture requires putting the plumbing and wiring out of sight, it seems wise to move as much as possible of these explanations into appendices. At the same time, it does not seem a good idea to launch into analysis of a set of tables, at a given point in the text, without explaining points that must be understood before the tables can be correctly interpreted. In the sections of this book that discuss the results of quantitative analysis, I have therefore tried to strike a balance, interrupting the flow of the substantive discussion as little as possible, but telling enough to make the combination of text and tables self-explanatory. At the same time, I have tried to put a complete explanation of the quantitative part of my research in the two appendices. The one point where the volume of required explanation makes it unworkable even to summarize it in the text is in chapter 8, where the presentation of salary statistics begins after little more than a cross-reference to the appendices.

All readers of this book are seriously urged to read the appendices at some point. Those wishing to quote any of the quantitative evidence presented below, to reuse such evidence for purposes of their own, or to cite any of the conclusions based on this evidence will find it in their own interest to examine the appendices carefully. This is especially true of the price and salary statistics, whose computation required certain adjustments and assumptions, which the appendices alone explain. Other readers interested in quantitative analysis—a genre of which this study offers but a humble example of some of the more elementary techniques—may also wish to read the appendices first and will find in appendix A, especially, a history of a research project that was as exciting at many points as it was taxing.

Acknowledgments

Anyone attempting to recall all those who have contributed to a research program carried out over more than twenty years faces a daunting task. Here I may as well begin by begging the pardon of those whose names I have failed to mention. It is, however, always a pleasure to remember so much help and kindness over so many years.

Most of the scholars, archivists, and librarians who have contributed to my work on this volume have already been listed in the "Acknowledgments" section in my *Bureaucratic Reform in the Ottoman Empire* (1980); here I again acknowledge my debt to the Turkish authorities who have on several occasions permitted me to do research in the Başbakanlık, Hariciye, and Topkapı Sarayı Archives, and in numerous Turkish libraries. Below, for the sake of concision, I shall name only those who have joined the multitude to whom I owe thanks since I published my first book, or whose contributions in the intervening period have been especially important.

Among scholars, archivists, and librarians, I should like to express my indebtedness to Tekin Akıllıoğlu, Filiz Çağman, Leyla Çambel, Robert Dankoff, Yılmaz Esmer, Marie-Luise van Ess-Bremer, Cornell Fleischer, Mehmet Genç, Metin Heper, Albert Hourani, J. C. Hurewitz, Selim İlkin, Halil İnalcık, Charles Issawi, David Landes, Eve Levin, Bernard Lewis, Şerif Mardin, Justin McCarthy, İlber Ortaylı, Şevket Pamuk, Donald Quataert, Michael Rogers, Rudolf Sellheim, Annemarie Schimmel, Stanford Shaw, James Stewart-Robinson, Dona Straley, Nermin Menemencioğlu Streater, Maria Subtelny, Andreas Tietze, Zafer Toprak, Jim Wagner, Tom Whitney, and the late Wilford L'Esperance. Only those who saw early versions of the following chapters can realize how much some of these individuals contributed to their improvement. For help in the search for illus-

trations, I am especially indebted to my friend, Sinclair Hitchings, Keeper of Prints at the Boston Public Library. Other individuals whose assistance has been especially helpful at a given point will be mentioned there in the notes.

Completing a twenty-year research program prompts me to take a long view and acknowledge my debt to several people of special importance in my professional formation. Cleanth Brooks did more than anyone else to set me a high example of professionalism in scholarship. Robin Winks gave encouragement and good counsel. Gaddis Smith ably guided my first attempt at a large-scale research project. Dorothy Fargason did more than anyone else to consolidate my knowledge of English grammar and stylistics.

Several individuals in the field of computer software have made contributions of inestimable value to my research in general. I owe thanks to Steve Siebert of Dragonfly Software for his initiatives in helping make it possible to combine the Nota Bene word processing program with a modified character set. To Rick Cooper and Lynn Fauss, then of Ohio State University, now of Oberon Resources in Columbus, Ohio, I am vastly indebted for custom modification of software, and in general for support and friendship at points more numerous than I can enumerate. At the Ohio State Humanities College Computing Center, Michael Szczepanik and Tad Lamb provided expert assistance in producing camera-ready copy of the tables. Lynn Fauss and Linda Darling assisted in indexing.

My wife, Lucia, aided my research efforts in many ways, especially in their earlier stages. My children, Madeleine and Benjamin, have also helped with a number of those important tasks that so deplete an unaided scholar's energy.

Since the publication of my first volume in 1980, material support has come from the Institute for Advanced Study (Princeton), the National Endowment for the Humanities, the Joint Committee on the Near and Middle East of the Social Science Research Council and the American Council of Learned Societies, the Institute of Turkish Studies, the Fulbright Islamic civilization program, and Ohio State University.

My debts to the staff of the Ohio State University Libraries, especially to the reference librarians and those in interlibrary loans, are manifold. I am indebted to Yvonne Holsinger for her elegantly designed graphics.

To Margaret Case goes the special gratitude that an author feels for an editor who has become a friend. Ann Hirst did an outstanding job as copy editor, and Jenna Dolan ably presided over the production process.

A study in social history inevitably names many individuals, usually on the basis of what others have said about them, whether in praise or blame. Probably none of those mentioned is still alive, but many of them are remembered by associates or descendants. The adoption of the Turkish surname law in the 1930s makes it difficult for a researcher who has studied an earlier period to know whose sensibilities he or she may offend. In introducing this work, it therefore seems appropriate to beg the indulgence of readers who may have personal links to individuals mentioned in the text, and to assure those readers that no offense is intended to any person. The object of this study is to understand a social system that has ceased to exist—a task that would surely be impossible without reference to the people associated with that system. These references depend on the observations of contemporaries, and the very effort of collecting those observations illustrates the large potential for disagreement in views of any one person or episode.

LIST OF SPECIAL ABBREVIATIONS

Abbreviations of names of archives are followed by an asterisk.

AAE*	*Archives des Affaires étrangères*, Paris
A.D.	Aşçı Dede İbrahim Halil
AHR	*American Historical Review*
B	*Receb*, seventh month of the *hicrî* calendar
BBA*	*Başbakanlık* (formerly *Başvekâlet*) Archives, Istanbul
Bd.	*Band* (volume), in citations from PAAA
BEO	*Bab-ı Âli Evrak Odası*, papers of the Records Office of the Sublime Porte, BBA
BMCCFC	*Bulletin mensuel de la Chambre de commerce française de Constantinople*
BP	Palmerston Broadlands Papers, National Registry Archives, London
Buy.	*Buyuruldu Defterleri*, registers of grand-vezirial orders, BBA
C	*Cemazi ül-ahir*, sixth month of the *hicrî* calendar
CA	*Cemazi ül-evvel*, fifth month of the *hicrî* calendar
DSA	*Dahiliye Sicill-i Ahval*, registers containing official biographies, classified in BBA as pertaining to the Ministry of the Interior
EI²	*Encyclopedia of Islam*, second edition
El	*Evail*, the first ten days of a month
Er	*Evahir*, the last ten days of a month
Et	*Evasıt*, the middle ten days of a month
FO*	Foreign Office Papers, Public Record Office, London
GAL	Carl Brockelmann, *Geschichte der Arabischen Literatur*
Har.*	*Hariciye* (Foreign Ministry) Archives, Istanbul
HHS*	*Haus-, Hof-, und Staatsarchiv*, Vienna
İA	*İslâm Ansiklopedisi*, Turkish Encyclopedia of Islam
IFM	*İstanbul Üniversitesi İktisat Fakültesi Mecmuası*, Journal of the Economics Faculty, Istanbul University
İ.H.	İbrahim Hakkî Paşa
IJMES	*International Journal of Middle East Studies*
JCCC	*Journal de la Chambre de commerce de Constantinople*

L	*Şevval*, tenth month of the *hicrî* calendar
M	*Muharrem*, first month of the *hicrî* calendar
Mal. Müd.	*Maliyeden Müdevver*, a classification of financial registers, BBA
MHBD	İbrahim Hakkî Paşa, *Medhal-i Hukuk-ı Beyn el-Düvel*
MHD	İbrahim Hakkî Paşa, *Medhal-i Hukuk-ı Düvel*
MENA	J. C. Hurewitz, ed., *The Middle East and North Africa in World Politics*
Müh.	*Mühimme Defterleri*, registers of important affairs, BBA
Müt.	*Mütenevvi*, "miscellaneous" files, Har.
N	*Ramazan*, ninth month of *hicrî* calendar
Niz.Kav.	*Nizamat ve Kavanin*, collection of laws and regulations, Har.
O.	Ottoman
O.E.	Ottoman Empire
OTD	Mehmed Zeki Pakalın, *Osmanlı Tarih Deyimleri ve Terimleri Sözlüğü*
PAAA*	*Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes*, Bonn; consulted via the microfilm collection in the U.S. National Archives, Washington, D.C., whence the inclusion of microfilm roll numbers in the citations.
PA	*Politisches Archiv*, HHS
PRO*	Public Record Office, London
R	*Rebi ül-ahir*, fourth month of the *hicrî* calendar
RA	*Rebi ül-evvel*, third month of the *hicrî* calendar
S	*Safer*, second month of the *hicrî* calendar
Ş	*Şaban*, eighth month of the *hicrî* calendar
SA	*Sicill-i Ahval*, personnel records, Har.
Staats.	Joseph von Hammer, *Staatsverfassung und Staatsverwaltung des osmanischen Reichs*
TKE	*Tercüme Kalemi Evrakı*, papers of the Translation Office of the Sublime Porte, Har.
TPK*	Topkapı Palace Archives
Z	*Zi 'l-hicce*, twelfth month of the *hicrî* calendar
ZA	*Zi 'l-kade*, eleventh month of the *hicrî* calendar

Ottoman Civil Officialdom

CHAPTER I

Introduction

Any study of civil officials must come to terms with the variety of meanings and feelings associated with the idea of bureaucracy. Definitions of the term have varied so widely that some have little in common with one another. Some analysts have understood bureaucracy as a system of rule, analogous to monarchy, aristocracy, or democracy. Others have given the word a more limited scope, to refer to a way of organizing government administration. Early on, the term "bureaucracy" acquired a twofold application, both to a pattern of administrative organization, and to the people who worked in such organizations. The term "bureaucracy" has also acquired a twofold application in a different sense, in that some discussions dwell on the negative dimensions of the phenomenon and some on the positive. Honoré de Balzac, who helped popularize the term, spoke in *Les employés* (1836) of "Bureaucracy, the giant power wielded by pygmies."[1] In such contexts, "bureaucracy" comes to mean neither a way of organizing administration nor a group of people, but rather the red tape and paper shuffling, the muddling and frustration, that officials introduce into people's lives. To this day, almost the only discussions of bureaucracy that arouse any popular response are the attacks—especially the humorously conceived ones—on bureaucracy in this sense.[2] Yet by Balzac's time, the centralized continental European governments were largely staffed by professional officials, who were supposed to apply official administrative doctrines and regulations, which had become the subject

[1] Cited in Martin C. Albrow, *Bureaucracy*, New York, 1970, 18.

[2] E.g., Laurence J. Peter and Raymond Hull, *The Peter Principle*, New York, 1969; Laurence J. Peter, *Why Things Go Wrong, or, The Peter Principle Revisited*, New York, 1985; id. *The Peter Pyramid, or, Will We Ever Get the Point?* New York, 1986; Jonathan Lynn and Antony Jay, *Yes Minister*, New York, 1984; C. Northcote Parkinson, *Parkinson's Law and Other Studies in Administration*, Boston, 1957; Edmund G. Love, *Arsenic and Red Tape*, New York, 1960; James H. Boren, *When in Doubt, Mumble: A Bureaucrat's Handbook*, New York, 1972.

matter of an academic subdiscipline recognized as a branch of legal studies: administrative law. As a result, while an oppositional literature also emerged in these societies, much of the writing on bureaucracy set out to define a normative picture of what it should be like. Max Weber's "ideal type" of bureaucracy, the most influential such view ever produced, has to be seen against this backdrop.[3]

Weber defined what he saw as ideal attributes, not only of bureaucracy, but also of the legal authority system that he regarded as its necessary context. He also contrasted both these ideal types with other alternatives. He contrasted bureaucracy with patrimonial officialdom, and legal authority with traditional and charismatic authority. Later social scientists have found his views easy to criticize. This is especially true of scholars who lack Weber's historical perspective, or who assume that he meant to equate the formal rationality that he associated with modern bureaucracies—and the authority systems in which they operate—with efficiency.[4] Among the critics, Peter Blau emphasized that the requirements of rational administration change over time, and that efficiency depends on adapting to changing circumstances, rather than adhering to fixed rules.[5] Henry Jacoby spotlighted the "forceful transformation of rational administration into the irrational exercise of power."[6]

[3] Max Weber, *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology*, ed. Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich, 2 vols., Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1978; Albrow, *Bureaucracy*, 26–27 and passim; Robert D. Miewald, *The Bureaucratic State: An Annotated Bibliography*, New York, 1984.

[4] Weber's use of terms differs from that of later scholars in that his "bureaucracy" is what most of them would call "modern bureaucracy." Indeed, while he cited the exceptional cases where earlier administrative systems, like the Chinese, approximated his ideal type, his main discussion of bureaucracy begins with a section on "Characteristics of Modern Bureaucracy"; Weber, *Economy and Society*, II, 956. What another scholar might call "premodern bureaucracy," so emphasizing the comparison of the two phenomena, is in Weberian terms "patrimonial officialdom." While there is no necessary historical sequence between the two phenomena, Prussian history, as Weber was well aware, presented one of many examples of a stage-wise progression, through the evolution from the collegial system of administration to the bureau system; Weber cited many other cases. In a Weberian perspective, a modern administrative system is not rational in any unlimited sense, but can be so described in that it emerges from developmental processes that include efforts at rational systematization. Albrow has pointed out that the rationality Weber had in mind was the "formal rationality" he associated with the implementation of rules by trained, professional officials (as opposed to the reliance on discretion and custom that characterize patrimonial officialdom, or the amateurism of any administrative system that relies on nonprofessionals). Had Weber dealt more fully with the different but related question of bureaucratic efficiency, the limits of his claims concerning rationality would probably have been clearer to later scholars. See Weber, *Economy and Society*, II, 994–98, 1025–28; Albrow, *Bureaucracy*, 27, 63, 66. Another factor complicating reactions to Weber's ideas about administrative systems is that most social scientists lack his depth of interest in the history of administration. As a historical sociologist studying administrative systems, Weber's most important continuator is S. N. Eisenstadt; see his *Political Systems of Empires*, New York, 1963.

[5] Albrow, *Bureaucracy*, 57–58, and Peter Blau, *The Dynamics of Bureaucracy*, Chicago, 1955.

[6] Henry Jacoby, *The Bureaucratization of the World*, trans. Eveline L. Kanes, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1973, 2, 147ff.

As the debate has progressed, no new synthesis has emerged. This appears to be partly because what bureaucracy is, or thinking about what it is, has changed. For example, the rise of modern governmental bureaucracies in western Europe and North America is largely the result of an increase in middle-level positions requiring a relatively high level of qualifications. In Great Britain, to cite one influential instance, the Northcote-Trevelyan report of 1853, a milestone in the evolution of the British civil service, proposed a division between "intellectual" and "routine" work, with separate recruitment systems based on that division.[7] The nineteenth-century rise in expectations about what a civil service could or should be had important implications not only for the most developed governments of Europe and North America, but even for the Ottomans, as this study will show. In nineteenth-century Europe, this transformation of civil administration into more of a "white-collar" pursuit made it increasingly attractive as a career to the burgeoning middle class. The growth in the power and importance of civil officials, and in scholarly interest in them, was partly a consequence of this *embourgeoisement* of administration.

More recently, with the growing organizational complexity of modern societies, the scope of discussions of bureaucracy has broadened to take account of the bureaucratic attributes of large organizations outside government. While many historians still have trouble following other social scientists in applying the term "bureaucracy" to branches of government service other than civil officialdom, sociologists have long been accustomed to talk of industrial bureaucracy and the like. For sociologists, the study of bureaucracy has thus broadened into a sizable subtopic within the field of organizational theory. One consequence of this broadening has been to highlight the difficulty of defining the attributes that distinguish bureaucracy from other types of organization. The broadening of scope has progressed to the point where some writers have discussed the "bureaucratization of the world."[8] No wonder that one recent writer has said of bureaucracy: "few concepts in social science have undergone such a continual process of fragmentation and transformation."[9]

A scholar studying the history of a group of civil government officials—bureaucracy in a "classic" sense—is mercifully exempt from some of the definitional and other problems raised by the broadening in scope of the recent literature on bureaucracy. Yet the need for conceptual clarity remains; so does the need to recognize differences in the roles or the importance of officials in different societies, and to identify major forces impinging on administrators in a given environment. The remainder of this

[7] Samuel Krislov, *Representative Bureaucracy*, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1974, 11.

[8] Bruno Rizzi, *La bureaucratisation du monde*, Paris, 1939 (cited in Albrow, *Bureaucracy*, 76); Henry Jacoby, *The Bureaucratization of the World*.

[9] Albrow, *Bureauracy*, 120.

chapter addresses these needs. The first section will define essential terms by posing the obvious first question: "Why study Ottoman officials?" The second will consider ways and means of carrying out such a study. And the last will discuss five major issues that interacted in especially important ways to direct the evolution of Ottoman civil officialdom and so to define the context of the present inquiry.

WHY STUDY OTTOMAN OFFICIALS?

This study takes as its subject the transformation, during the Ottoman Empire's reform era (1789–1922), of the branch of the "ruling class" known historically as the scribal service (*kalemiye*) into a new form known after the 1830s as civil officialdom (*mülkiye*). Within this branch, we shall at times select smaller units for closer scrutiny; most often, our choice will fall on the staff of the Foreign Ministry, the best-documented civil administrative agency. The organizational dimensions of the transformation from *kalemiye* to *mülkiye* having been examined in an earlier work,[10] this study examines the social history of Ottoman scribes and civil officials.

The significance of the terms "civil officialdom" and "Foreign Ministry" may seem self-evident, even if "scribal service" is more remote from present-day awareness. But it could be misleading to assume that the significance of any of these terms is self-evident in the Ottoman context. An examination of the reasons for this statement helps to bring out the importance of Ottoman civil officialdom as an object of study.

The term "scribal service," precisely because it is remote from present-day realities, requires comparatively little comment in order to disentangle it from assumptions derived from other places and times. In the Ottoman Empire and earlier Islamic states, these were the men who produced the government's correspondence, kept its financial accounts, and compiled its records on land tenure. By the eighteenth century, the scribes formed one branch of a "ruling class" that also included the military, the Islamic religious establishment, and the palace service.[11] By then, the scribes had begun to gain promotion into a larger variety of roles, as we shall note in chapter 2, a diversification that would help to shape the civil officialdom of the nineteenth century.

To understand Ottoman scribal officialdom, however, it is necessary to understand the character of the governmental system in which the scribes operated. This can be classified on one level as an Islamic sultan-

[10] Carter Vaughn Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform in the Ottoman Empire: The Sublime Porte, 1789–1922*, Princeton, 1980. I shall cite my own works often below. This procedure may appear immodest, but will help to minimize repetition and economize on annotation.

[11] Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform*, 43–58, 64–66, 69–111.

ate, and on a more inclusive level as a patrimonial monarchy, that is, a state conceived on the model of a vastly extended household.[12] Prior to the reform era, this was a culturally conservative governmental system, in which authority and tradition were closely associated, whether in the centuries-old encrustation of ideas and values that served to legitimate the imperial system, in the ostensible legal primacy of the sharia (Islamic religious law) as compared to the decrees of the sultan, in the role of custom as a third source of law, or in the prevalence of habit and happenstance, over rational plan, in the definition of government functions. The conditions of scribal service differed from those characteristic of modern administrative systems in virtually all the ways that Weber defines as distinctive of patrimonial officialdom. Scribes and other members of the ruling class were seen as servants of the ruler, not free men who had accepted a contractually limited obligation to serve the state. Systems for recruitment and training tended to be rudimentary and ad hoc, more so for scribes than for some of the other elites, although nepotism and favor-

[12] In reviewing my *Bureaucratic Reform* in *AHR*, LXXXVI (1981), Kemal Karpat objected to my referring to Max Weber on the ground that he "had a very scant and, for the most part, biased knowledge of Islam (to which the Ottoman bureaucracy owed so much) and of the special patrimonial features in the class of the sultan's servants." The review overall was quite favorable and much appreciated, and what follows is no "rebuttal." The need to refer to Weber and patrimonialism again in this study suggests, however, that it may be appropriate to emphasize a distinction that I perhaps did not make clearly enough in my earlier work. In fact, I have not used Weber as a source on Islam or on the "special" features of the Ottoman system (for a sociological study of Weber's views on Islam, see Bryan S. Turner, *Weber and Islam: A Critical Study*, London, 1974). Rather, I have consulted Weber, and others, on the theory of administrative systems, patrimonialism being a concept that comes up in this context. Patrimonialism is essentially a form of governmental organization. Its viability in any cultural setting depends on the rulers' success in *legitimating* their system of rule by identifying it with paramount values of their culture or by performing indispensable culturally valued functions (I owe my awareness of this point to Said Amir Arjomand). For example, the Ottoman state, growing out of the household of the earliest Ottoman beys (patrimonial organization), staked claims to legitimacy through fulfillment of the *ghazi* role, supervision of the pilgrimage, patronage of Islamic institutions, and so forth (Islamic legitimation). To use Weber as a source on patrimonialism is thus not at all the same as using him as a source on Islam or on the specifics of Ottoman history and institutions.

As for the "special" features of the Ottomans, however, there is no way to identify them without the kind of comparative historical study that lies behind the theorizing of comparative sociologists like Weber and Eisenstadt, as behind the work of some historians. Without a comparative perspective, everything Ottoman tends to appear unique and *sui generis*. Such an interpretation may appeal to some scholars, but implicitly neglects, or even denies, those universalities of the human experience that social science aims to discover. Viewed in comparative perspective, the most "special" things about the Ottoman imperial system are probably the points where the Ottomans, as the last great continuators of the Islamic and Turkic traditions of state formation, evolved facets of those traditions to unprecedented degrees of elaboration: e.g., the Child Levy (*devşirme*), the "bureaucratization" of the *ulema*, or the legal promulgations of the state (*kanun*). Such traits certainly gave the Ottoman system a distinctive quality. In general, however, the resemblances between the Ottoman system and other patrimonial monarchies appear at least as numerous and significant as the traits that can be regarded as uniquely Ottoman.

itism had come to prevail for all branches of service. The scribes' responsibilities tended to be miscellaneous, shaped more by custom than by plan, and poorly demarcated from one another. The sultan's favor and his power arbitrarily to punish his officials were key determinants of their fortunes. And scribal compensation took the form of revenue-collection rights (prebends) rather than salaries.[13] Over the centuries, Ottoman history displays a kind of gradation between these attributes of the scribal service (traits that chapter 2 will illustrate with concrete examples) and the corresponding attributes of civil officialdom, to be listed below. In some ways, however, the state's ability to create the conditions associated with modern administration—such as highly institutionalized systems of recruitment and training, or salaries—had been greater in the sixteenth century, before the traditional imperial system went into decline, than it was in the eighteenth.

Concerning the term "civil officialdom," there is no need for qualification as to the roles these men filled. By the end of the nineteenth century, they were local administrators, diplomats, treasurers, inspectors, statisticians, magistrates, and so on, much like their counterparts in western countries. Yet a number of issues about the emergence of civil officialdom were controversial and do require clarification. For example, while no single act or statement had made as clear-cut a distinction among the Ottomans as the Northcote-Trevelyan report of 1853 demanded in Britain between "intellectual" and "routine" functions, one fact, as administrative reform progressed, was that the traditional secretarial skills of the scribe (*kâtib*)—or at least the intellectual horizons that usually went with them—ceased to be all a person needed to fill the most important roles. Cultural change within civil officialdom and a new idea of professionalism thus became important issues. On a broader scale, the extent to which Ottoman "civil officialdom" was a "civil service" in the modern sense was also a question. For "civil service" in this sense hardly existed before the later nineteenth century anywhere.[14]

With time, the Ottoman administration did begin, in a ragged way often clearer in concept than implementation, to take on the traits of a modern bureaucracy, as opposed to those of the earlier scribal corps. In the famous Weberian listing, this meant that the officials should be personally free, that the offices should be hierarchically organized, that each office

[13] Cf. Weber, *Economy and Society*, II, 1025–31.

[14] Like "bureaucracy," this is a term whose meaning has changed. Originally only the civil as opposed to the military staff of a government, "civil service" came, in the second half of the nineteenth century, to refer also to a particular way of regulating and administering such a service. The pattern has much in common with Weber's (modern) bureaucracy, but in Anglo-American thinking perhaps places more emphasis on the officials' political nonpartisanship. E. N. Gladden, *Civil Services of the United Kingdom, 1855–1970*, New York, 1967, 1–5; id., *A History of Public Administration*, London, 1972, II, 307–23.

should have distinct and specific functions, that the officials' obligations should be contractually limited (as opposed to the patrimonial officials' unconditional personal dependence on the sovereign), that officials should be recruited on the basis of their qualifications (preferably by examinations), that they should be compensated by salary, that the office must be their sole or at least primary occupation, that there should be a definite career pattern with promotion by seniority or merit, that officials would acquire no proprietary right in their posts or in the resources that went with them, and that the officials should be subject to a unified system of disciplinary control in the conduct of their duties.[15] Counterparts to Weber's listing can be found in other sources, necessarily so, since it describes a pattern replicated in different countries and repeatedly defined in statute and regulation. Ottoman officials perhaps never acquired all these traits (their personal freedom and the contractual limitation of their obligations were certainly unclear through 1908), nor had the implied opposites of these traits all existed among the scribes of the prereform era (for example, Ottoman scribal officials never acquired proprietary rights in their offices). Yet the Weberian list of bureaucratic traits can be taken as an indication of the orientation of Ottoman administrative reform, manifested with special clarity in regulatory acts, which often followed foreign models, and in the thinking of leading reformers. A key concern of this study must be to assess how far mundane reality caught up with these regulatory acts.

If, as reform occurred, the Ottoman governmental system remained an Islamic sultanate and a patrimonial monarchy—indeed, Sultan Abd ül-Hamid II (1876–1909) and the Young Turk triumvirate (1913–1918) "modernized" and reasserted patrimonial authoritarianism—a transition away from traditionalism *toward* rational-legalism was under way nevertheless. To return to the point where many critics have attacked Weber, it would not do to make sweeping claims about the rationality or efficiency of Ottoman administration; the chapters that follow will amply substantiate this point. Yet in proportion as Ottoman reformers began deliberately changing inherited patterns defined by tradition, they had no choice but to use reason to develop their plans and then, if they were to project these plans effectively, to embody them in laws and regulations.

This shift from traditional to rational-legal authority remained incomplete, largely because the processes of rationalization and regulation often were subverted to serve the ends of patrimonial discretionalism in high places.[16] Yet it is impossible to understand Ottoman administrative reform without recognizing that a shift in underlying authority concepts had at

[15] Weber, *Economy and Society*, I, 220–21; Albrow, *Bureaucracy*, 44–45.

[16] Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform*, 196–97, 201, 220, 226, 228–29, 239, 268, 269, 275–76, 287.

least begun and progressed far enough to become a subject of controversy. This shift also made political life more contentious. For innovative reform—the deliberate breaching of patterns sanctioned by tradition—opened an unprecedented range of policy controversy. With the emergence of the Young Ottoman ideologues of the 1860s and later the Young Turk revolutionaries, Ottoman political life began, for better or worse, to assume some of the most distinctive forms of the secular western polities of the day.

Our subject, then, is the transformation of a scribal corps, operating under conditions of traditional patrimonialism, into something more like a modern civil administration or even civil service, operating in an environment where the very idea of reform pointed toward a greater need for law and rationalization, inflaming political controversy as it did so. Yet why is this an important subject for study? This question has answers both external to the field of Ottoman studies and internal.

Externally, in terms of comparisons with other societies, the Ottomans' efforts to reform and preserve their state—one of only a handful in Asia and Africa to retain nominal independence throughout the great age of European imperialism[17]—mark them as pioneers of the struggle for development that has become a universal Third World theme in this century. Chronologically, the Ottomans were the first nonwestern society—unless we count Russia as such—to embark on that path. This fact gives the Ottoman experience with reform a comparative interest little appreciated, as yet, among nonspecialists, particularly those who assume that "development" is solely a twentieth-century issue. As concerns government administration in particular, the fact that the Ottomans were the last great representatives of a millennial Islamic tradition of statecraft adds an extra dimension of comparative interest.

Within a purely Ottoman frame of reference, one conventional way to justify our choice of subject would be to argue that Ottoman scribes and civil officials formed an especially important social group. This was true; yet it would be misleading to present this as an "elite study" without further qualification. For example, a number of recent studies have focused on "elites" as defined in terms of high-level officials.[18] By comparison with such studies, which tend to have the generic problem of studying the "elite" without comparing it to the non-elite, this is not an "elite study" at all, at least not a study of only top-level officials. Rather, as much as possible, our social history will present a top-to-bottom view of Ottoman civil

[17] By 1914, the only nominally independent Asian and African states were Liberia, Ethiopia, the Ottoman Empire, Iran, Siam, China, and Japan.

[18] E.g., John A. Armstrong, *The European Administrative Elite*, Princeton, 1973; Ezra Suleiman, *Politics, Power, and Bureaucracy in France: The Administrative Elite*, Princeton, 1974; id., *Elites in French Society*, Princeton, 1978.

officialdom. This is especially true of the sections based on the personnel records of the Foreign Ministry, which provide a "vertical slice" of civil officialdom, rather than a picture of its topmost layer alone.

Yet, if we are not studying the elite of the administrators, were the administrators all "elite" in relation to the rest of society? By 1908, it is possible to argue that this was no longer true as much as it once had been, although income differentials—to cite only one indicator—appear to have remained very wide, as we shall see in chapter 8.

Still, as a result of unevenness in the development of different social roles, Ottoman civil officials had a social prominence different in kind from that of their western European counterparts. The traditional concept of Ottoman society as divided into "ruling" and "subject classes," and the fact that the ruling class was almost exclusively Muslim while the subject classes were religiously mixed, played a part in defining this prominence. With time, the Ottomans' economic decline in relation to Europe also played a part, especially in the nineteenth-century era of free trade, when the competition of European industry virtually obliterated much of Ottoman manufacturing. While a preponderance of officials and an underrepresentation of economically productive occupations is not surprising for the Ottoman capital (Istanbul was also a great seaport, however), the same appears true—if available statistics are reliable—of the Ottoman lands more generally.[19] Ottoman social structure did not remain invariable throughout the century—recent research highlights refugee movements and the growth of the urban working class, for example.[20] Such changes probably diminished the officials' relative social prominence, but did not eliminate it.

In an ironic way, then, late Ottoman society became doubly "imperial," for it combined its imperial traditions of social organization with the distorted occupational profile of an economically colonial society. In this re-

[19] Kemal H. Karpat, *Ottoman Population, 1830–1914: Demographic and Social Characteristics*, Madison, 1985, 218, census of "professions in the Ottoman state," 1894–95, showing 353,000 "government clerks" and 185,000 "government officials," compared to 583,000 Muslim religious functionaries of various types, 186,000 laborers (*amele*), 10,300 lawyers (*avukat*), 9,760 bank officials, 6,520 secretaries or accountants of corporations, 5,850 engineers, and so on. The listing is incomplete. For example, it excludes military personnel, non-Muslim religious functionaries, and peasants. And the numbers are hard to evaluate. For example, the implied census total of 2.25 million is much too low for the number of gainfully employed persons in a total population probably on the order of 18–19 million in the 1890s (ibid., 190). The numbers shown for "government clerks" and "government officials" are also three or more times higher than we would expect based on the number of files surviving in the civil official personnel records; the two categories may thus well include others than civil officials. Yet, if at all reliable, these figures give a picture of a society top-heavy with government functionaries and stunted in the development of its manufacturing and commercial sectors.

[20] Ibid., chap. 4 on population movements; Donald Quataert, *Social Disintegration and Popular Resistance in the Ottoman Empire, 1881–1908: Reactions to European Economic Penetration*, New York, 1983, on workers.

spect, the Ottomans were not altogether unlike colonial societies all over the nonwestern world in the heyday of European imperialism. What differentiated the Ottoman case from most others was that the empire retained the governmental apparatus of a sovereign state struggling to defend its interests. This struggle produced, among other things, the group of men who form the subject of this study.

Literary pictures of Ottoman society reflect this occupational pattern in the prominence of civil officials or former officials as leading characters.[21] In a society with a largely invisible royal family, few military heroes of recent memory, no media celebrities, and perforce no captains of industry, handsome young officials figured as literary protagonists to a degree that is difficult for anyone unacquainted with the literature to imagine. In Ahmed Midhat's *Felâtun Bey ile Râkım Efendi* (1876), Felâtun Bey—a Frenchified dandy and nominal civil official—serves as a foil to the hero, Râkım Efendi, a paragon of virtue who had been an official until he developed a "private practice" in related fields as a journalist, translator, and writer of petitions for foreign businessmen who needed an intermediary to handle their business with the Ottoman government.[22] In Recaizade Mahmud Ekrem's *Araba Sevdası* (1896), the central character, Bihruz Bey, is another nominal official and Frenchified dandy—the frequency of the type will merit comment in chapter 5—memorable for his passion for fine carriages, which gives the novel its name, and for his piebald, half-French and half-Turkish speech, taxing both to other characters in the novel and to generations of readers.[23] In Mizancı Murad's *Turfanda mı yoksa Turfa mı* (*First Fruits or Forbidden Fruits*, 1891), the hero, Mansur Bey, again becomes an official for a time—and an earnest one—even though he had completed training in France to be a physician.[24]

The literary prominence of such characters is not an accident, but

[21] I am indebted to the late Mehmet Kaplan, professor of Turkish literature at Istanbul University, for pointing this fact out to me.

[22] Ahmed Midhat, *Felâtun Bey ile Râkım Efendi*, ed. Sacit Erkan, Istanbul, n.d. Ahmed Midhat translated Samuel Smiles' *Self-Help* (see Şerif Mardin, "Super Westernization in Urban Life in the Ottoman Empire in the Last Quarter of the Nineteenth Century," in *Turkey: Geographical and Social Perspectives*, ed. Peter Benedict et al., Leiden, 1974, 415, 445). Râkım exemplifies the self-help spirit and a certain awareness that there might be more productive occupations than being an official. Yet his work as petition-writer (*arzıhalci*) for foreign businessmen signals a limited awareness of what those occupations might be and tells more than Ahmed Midhat may have realized about the colonial subordination of the Ottoman economy. See also Robert P. Finn, *The Early Turkish Novel, 1872–1900*, Istanbul, 1984, 15–21; Ahmet Ö. Evin, *Origins and Development of the Turkish Novel*, Minneapolis, 1983, 83–95.

[23] Recaizade Mahmud Ekrem, *Araba Sevdası*, ed. Fâzıl Yenisey, Istanbul, 1963; Finn, *Early Turkish Novel*, 65–74; Evin, *Origins*, 158–72.

[24] In this case, the modern Turkish edition (the only one readily available to me) omits the author's byname *Mizancı* and bears a different title from the Ottoman original: Mehmet Murat, *Mansur Bey*, ed. M. Ertuğrul Düzdağ, Istanbul, 1972. Cf. Finn, *Early Turkish Novel*, 51–64; Evin, *Origins*, 113–28.

rather reflects Ottoman traditions and nineteenth-century socioeconomic conditions. Indeed, it is not too much to argue that the prominence of civil officialdom as a segment of late Ottoman society approximated that of the bourgeoisie in western Europe, a similarity perhaps obliquely reflected in the criticisms that Ottoman literary men and ideologues heaped on the officials.[25] To consolidate the argument, we may cite a different kind of literary evidence: "officialdom" and "intelligentsia" were so nearly coterminous that İnal's compendium of late Ottoman "poets" lives is one of the premier biographical sources on civil officials.[26] Certainly, a study of civil officials deals with a group of greater importance for the understanding of social conditions in the late Ottoman Empire than would be the case in many other societies, including ones in western Europe. By the 1908 revolution, at least one other social group—the military officer corps—was acquiring comparable, or even greater, prominence among Ottoman Muslims. The fact remains that "elite" may be almost an understatement as a term for the social standing of Ottoman civil officialdom.

Somewhat comparable points also require note as concerns the Foreign Ministry. A study of the corresponding agency in a nineteenth-century European state would presumably concentrate on its role in the conduct of foreign policy, or perhaps on its diplomatic staff as an elite segment of officialdom. Ottoman diplomats, in contrast, played a disproportionately large role in making and conducting policy at some times, especially during the *Tanzimat* (c. 1839–1871), and a very small role at other times, especially under Sultan Abd ül-Hamid.[27] Given the empire's weakness and its dependence on the European powers, however, what generally differentiated the Ottoman diplomats' role from that of their western counterparts was that they represented the outside world to their compatriots, more than the other way round. Certainly through the mid-nineteenth century, the diplomats were virtually *the* vanguard of westernizing cultural change, with all its mixed blessings. Thereafter, Ottomans with comparable knowledge of European ways began to be fairly common in other fields as well, so that the Foreign Ministry lost its once-unique eminence. Yet the fact remained that in the topsy-turvy world of the weak and dependent, the role of a foreign ministry was only superficially the same as among the great powers.

To study the social transformation from "scribal service" to "civil officialdom," then, is to study a key phase in the social history of the Ottoman

[25] Evin, *Origins*, 124; Şerif Mardin, *Jön Türklerin Siyasî Fikirleri, 1895–1908*, Ankara, 1964, 48–49, 56–57, 73, 82–83, 86–89, 219–20.

[26] Mahmud Kemal İnal, *Son Asır Türk Şairler*, 10 fascicles, Istanbul, 1969. What unites the three categories—intellectuals, officials, poets—is that the nineteenth-century Ottoman gentleman normally held a government post and, like his Elizabethan English counterpart, wrote verse.

[27] Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform*, 153–55, 230–31.

government services and of Ottoman society in general, precursor in the struggle for development of the many Third World societies of the twentieth century. In one sense, our subject is the transition from patrimonial officialdom, operating in a context of cultural traditionalism, toward a more modern type of administration operating in an environment characterized by innovation and defined increasingly by law and rational plan. In another sense, our subject is a social group, Ottoman civil officialdom, that can perhaps better be described as "preponderant," rather than merely "elite," under the peculiar socioeconomic conditions of the time and place. Within this group, the Foreign Ministry possesses exceptional importance as one of the leading sectors—for much of the period, *the* leading sector—in the processes of westernization that surrounded the advent of the civil administration. All the dimensions of their dependency on the West were understandably fraught with conflict for Ottomans. The goal of this study is to understand the social evolution of civil officialdom amid the stressful circumstances that formed its context.

WAYS AND MEANS OF MEASURING A COMPLEX SOCIAL REALITY

Probably the simplest way to study the effects of a century of change on the social fabric of any human collectivity is to compare its states as of the beginning and end of that period. In the case of officials or any other career group, an equally natural principle for the internal structuring of each pendant of the comparison is to follow a typical life sequence.

So this study will do. Chapter 2 will assess the social state of the scribal service on the eve of reform. The remaining chapters will do the same for civil officialdom as of roughly the end of the nineteenth century. The fact that the Young Turk period ended in dissolution, and the character of some of the sources discussed below, unfortunately make it impracticable—in some, but not all, respects—to look past 1908 to describe a "final state" of civil officialdom. This fact complicates our task of comparison, introducing a messiness that is, however, realistic; for most late Ottoman officials would have had some experience of both the Hamidian and Young Turk periods. For the scribes and the civil officials, we shall examine essentially the same topics: social origins, education and intellectual productivity, career patterns, and compensation. The unequal numbers of chapters for the two dates reflect the growth of the administration in size and complexity, and the far better documentation of the later period.

Our discussions must also include a certain amount of comparison among different parts of the scribal service, as of the beginning of the reform era, and civil officialdom, as of its last years. These "synchronic" comparisons among administrative organizations will be secondary in importance to the "diachronic" one across time, between scribal service and civil officialdom. Yet the "synchronic" comparisons serve the important purpose of establishing controls on the reliability of generalizations that might otherwise be drawn from evidence on particular branches of administration.[28]

A comparison across time between scribal service and civil officialdom, organized in terms of the officials' life sequence, with secondary comparisons among different parts of the scribal and civil services—this is the plan of our study. But how, in terms of sources and their analysis, can we realize this plan? This question gains in urgency from the fact that the late nineteenth-century sources, especially, confront us by their very nature with the need either to choose between, or to combine, methods of analysis whose merits have been hotly debated among historians in recent years.[29]

A scholar setting out to gather documentation on Ottoman civil officials confronts a surprising fact. Out of a vast array of materials, including published books, manuscripts, and archival documents ranging from rules and regulations to personal correspondence, appears something as modern-looking as systematic personnel records. The creation of these records was actually one sign of the metamorphosis from scribal service to civil bureaucracy, approximating even a civil service as the term is used today. Moreover, these records exist in very great numbers. They may well cover more people than any other collection of biographical data created in the Islamic world before the twentieth century, although the collection from the Foreign Ministry—including roughly 1 percent of the civil personnel files in existence—is the only set that is both of manageable size for a

[28] The indispensability of "synchronic" comparisons among agencies for verifying the accuracy of our interpretations is the reason why this study does not follow a solely "diachronic" approach, even though the latter would facilitate greater attention to intermediate states in the evolution across the time span of the reform era. The value of the comparisons among agencies is best illustrated below in chapter 3, where the synchronic comparisons help revise the conclusions of my essay, "The Acid Test of Ottomanism: The Acceptance of Non-Muslims in the Late Ottoman Bureaucracy," in *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire: The Functioning of a Plural Society*, ed. Benjamin Braude and Bernard Lewis, New York, 1982, I, 339–68. Of the intermediate states that a purely chronological approach could have highlighted, the one of greatest interest to most historians is the *Tanzimat*. This period (c. 1839–1871) has, however, been much emphasized in most other studies of administrative reform; see my *Bureaucratic Reform*, chap. 5, and sources cited there.

[29] The following comments on historiography reflect my understanding of developments discussed in Lawrence Stone, *The Past and the Present*, Boston, 1981, chaps. 1–3, and François Furet, *In the Workshop of History*, trans. Jonathan Mandelbaum, Chicago, 1984, chaps. 1–4—two substantially different views. The actual source of my decisions about method was my sense, first, of the possibilities that the sources offered and, second, of general developments in historiography. Discussions at the Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, in 1981–1982 greatly stimulated my thinking; I am indebted to John Rothney for reactions to an earlier version of these comments.

single researcher and readily accessible.[30] (See appendix A for a description of the records and the methods used in analyzing them.)

The researcher who becomes habituated to the format of the personnel records soon realizes that it was well known indeed to Ottoman writers of the period—and not only because so many of them were officials. Many of the encyclopedic biographical compendia adapt this format for their entries, and often number the personnel records among their sources. Officials sometimes used this format to sum up their careers in their memoirs. Officials became familiar with the format by filling out the questionnaires that form the basic document in each file. Personnel record offices existed to keep the records up to date thereafter by entering later personnel actions, all in standardized format.[31]

The only way to make effective use of large numbers of biographical records, other than summarizing them individually, as the authors of the biographical compendia have done, is to subject them to collective quantitative analysis. In contrast, a qualitative analysis can yield only impressionistic conclusions. For quantitative analysis to produce useful results, however, the records must be in uniform format—must give the same kinds of information about each individual. Otherwise, there will be so many cases for which a given item of data is missing that the results of the analysis will be difficult or impossible to evaluate.[32] The archival personnel records—though not their literary adaptations—possess the needed uniformity in high degree.

As a result, not only does the researcher find in Ottoman archives something as modern-looking as systematic personnel records, but—more modern yet—their uniformity suits these records for computer analysis. As explained in appendix A, this is the method used in this study to analyze the Foreign Ministry personnel data. The quantitative analysis will take as its central hypothesis that reform and numerical growth had differentiated three major groups within the staff of the ministry—"traditionalist" Muslims, "modernist" Muslims, and non-Muslim officials, all the last being cultural "modernists"—and that the experiences of these three groups differed in ways reflecting critical contemporary issues that we

[30] The size and accessibility of the Foreign Ministry personnel records are not the reason why this study emphasizes that ministry at points, but may well reflect what Ottomans saw as its special importance, which is the reason for our emphasizing it. Perhaps because of the importance Ottomans attached to it, the Foreign Ministry left behind archives well-enough organized to be opened to the public, as the Finance Ministry, for example, did not.

[31] Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform*, 267–73, 326–27.

[32] I.e., if fifty out of one hundred officials say nothing of their education, but twenty-five say they went to School A, did 25 percent of the officials go to School A, or did 50 percent of those on whom we have data do so? Only having the same kinds of data on all, or nearly all, cases can diminish such uncertainty.

shall identify later in this chapter.[33] Where the data in published biographical sources are uniform enough to permit doing so, we shall also use them to establish controls on the Foreign Ministry analysis by presenting quantitative evidence on other sectors of civil officialdom.

After a period in vogue, when quantitatively oriented disciplines like demography and economics inspired growing numbers of historians, quantitative analysis has come under attack from some historians in recent years. The most trenchant criticism, other than that directed at the flaws of this or that study or scholar, is that the method is "reductionist," that it reduces reality to only a few measurements. Another point, significant in connection with past societies less number-oriented than those of today and inaccessible for field research, concerns historians' difficulties in finding and analyzing suitable sources. While these criticisms are apt, it does not require great imagination to sense that they also have a psychological dimension—that they sometimes express the determination of scholars uncomfortable with numbers and tables to reclaim the "turf" of a discipline traditionally little cluttered with them.

Still, when applied to sources suited for it, quantitative analysis offers means to accomplish goals that cannot be reached so well by qualitative methods. Quantitative analysis makes it possible to define typicalities characterizing many cases and so to verify whether an example that we may wish to cite as "typical," really is. Was Aşçı Dede İbrahim Halil, the most prolific civil official memoirist, "typical" because he resembled other officials, or because his memoirs tell so much that we allow them to fill in our picture without questioning his representativity? For comprehensiveness and precision of measurement, quantitative analysis has advantages that make it worthwhile to put up with its undecorative mechanics, even if measurement proves possible only at points and seldom brings the past back to living reality before our eyes.

Even before quantification went through its recent rise and—to some degree—fall in popularity, other realms of historical scholarship were experiencing an important revitalization.[34] In its current manifestations, this is the culmination of a long-term process of change that has shifted scholarly emphasis away from history as that of nations (political history) to history as that of peoples (social and economic history, for example), from history as the story only of the powerful or influential to that of the powerless as well, from history as essentially the story of Europe and North

[33] I broached this hypothesis in my *Bureaucratic Reform*, 201–18. I published some of the quantitative evidence in my "Acid Test," the conclusions of which are substantially modified in this book.

[34] A phenomenon especially associated with the *Annales* historians in Paris; see Robert Forster, "Achievements of the Annales School," *Journal of Economic History*, XXXVII (1978), 57–80; François Furet, "Beyond the *Annales*," *The Journal of Modern History*, LV (1983), 389–410; Furet, *Workshop*.

America (the "exotics" being relegated to orientalism and the "primitives" to anthropology), to history as the story of all peoples. Simultaneously, historians have begun to look increasingly beyond "events" to—first—the material forces and structures that underlie them and—more recently—to the ways people of other places and times understood and interpreted their world and the "events" that occurred in their midst. As these shifts have occurred, historical writing has become less and less a matter of the chronologically structured causal narrative beloved of traditional historians, and more a matter of defining and understanding the relations between a specific phenomenon and the context in which it occurs and is perceived. Where quantification does not become an end in itself, it has served an important role in such studies, especially in economic and demographic history. But nonquantitative approaches have also proven highly productive and have attracted increasing attention in recent years. Here, too, the influence of other social science disciplines has been important. This has been especially true of anthropology, an influence perhaps most identified in the United States with Clifford Geertz' concept of "thick description," which emphasizes "inspecting events" so as to "gain access to the conceptual world in which [the participants] live."[35] Long present in France, this kind of concern has found a major focus in the study of collective mentalities. Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie's *Montaillou*[36] symbolizes such research as much as Fernand Braudel's works symbolize the earlier emphasis on the ecological and material conditions that define the context of human life and action.[37]

The proliferation of new methods and approaches in the most intensely worked fields of historical scholarship has a way of leaving scholars in Ottoman studies behind.[38] Worse than that is the danger of being caught in a crossfire when partisans of one approach take up arms against other

[35] Stone, *The Past and the Present*, 86, citing Clifford Geertz, "Deep Play: Notes on the Balinese Cock-fight," in his *The Interpretation of Cultures*, New York, 1973, 412–53. See also Geertz' essay "Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture" in the same volume, pp. 3–30. Geertz borrowed the term "thick description" from Gilbert Ryle (p. 6); the phrases quoted in the text come from pp. 17 and 24. Cf. also Eric R. Wolf, *Europe and the People without History*, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1982.

[36] Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie, *Montaillou: The Promised Land of Error*, trans. Barbara Bray, New York, 1978; id., *Montaillou, village occitan de 1294 à 1324*, Paris, 1975; cf. Stone, *The Past and the Present*, 90.

[37] Fernand Braudel, *La Méditerranée et le monde méditerranéen à l'époque de Philippe II*, Paris, 1949, second revised edition, two vols., Paris, 1966; id., *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II*, two vols., trans. Siân Reynolds, New York, 1972–77; id., *Civilisation matérielle, économie et capitalisme, XVe–XVIIIe siècle*, 3 vols., Paris, 1979; id., *Civilization and Capitalism, 15th–18th Century*, 3 vols., trans. Siân Reynolds, New York, 1981–1984.

[38] This phenomenon may now be entering a new phase: Mark Silk, "The Hot History Department: Princeton's Influential Faculty," *New York Times Magazine*, vol. CXXXVI, 19 April 1987, 42ff. (discussing recent developments).

factions, as some paladins of quantification did in the still-recent past, or as some champions of the "new history," with its triumphal rehabilitation of description and narrative, have done since. Yet the historian who examines the evidence on Ottoman civil officialdom realizes that he or she has sources for "thick description" and for exploring the officials' mentalities. Increasingly, scholars who were taught—as those in all Islamic fields used to be—that the Islamic seclusion of private life kept Muslims from writing intimate accounts of their thoughts and experiences are finding this an overstatement. For this study, the premier source for reconstructing the social, and partially also the intellectual, setting of Ottoman civil officialdom is the vast, mostly unpublished autobiography of Aşçı Dede İbrahim Halil (1828–c. 1910), dervish and civil official in the Ministry of War.[39] This is the work of an articulate but naive and culturally conservative author with a strong impulse to record his thoughts and experiences. As significant for the qualitative side of our analysis as the personnel records are for the quantitative, this autobiography requires to be kept in perspective. Luckily, since without this manuscript the Islamic conservatives of civil officialdom would be much less well documented than the westernizers, the means to maintain perspective are at hand. Of special importance among literary sources are the biographical compendia of Mahmud Kemal İnal, one of the last great continuators of the scribal literary culture and an exponent, with these works, of one of its oldest genres.[40]

In the present instance, given the coexistence of such evidence with the quantifiable data of the personnel records, what seems strange is the idea of choosing between the different types of evidence and analysis. The advantage lies in combining them. Through detailed exploration of the acts or thoughts of particular individuals, we can then hope to gain the contextual richness and lifelike immediacy that quantification lacks. Quanti-

[39] Aşçı Dede İbrahim Halil, *Risale-i Tercüme-i Ahval-i Aşçı Dede-i Nakşî-Mevlevî*, Istanbul University Library Mss. TY3222 (autograph), TY78, TY79, TY80 (copy and continuation). Cf. Marie Luise Bremer, *Die Memoiren des Türkischen Derwischs Aşçı Dede İbrāhīm*, Walldorf-Hessen, 1959, containing a summary of the contents that is an indispensable aid to use of the Mss.; Aşçıdede Halil İbrahim, *Geçen Asrı Aydınlatan Kıymetli bir Eser: Hatıralar*, ed. Reşad Ekrem Koçu, Istanbul, 1960; Carter Vaughn Findley, "Social Dimensions of the Dervish Life, as Seen in the Memoirs of Aşçı Dede Halil İbrahim," in *Economie et sociétés dans l'Empire ottoman (fin du XVIIIe-début du XXe siècle*, ed. Jean-Louis Bacqué-Grammont and Paul Dumont, Paris, 1983, 129–44; id., "A Muslim Pilgrim's Progress: Aşçı Dede İbrahim Halil on the Hajj, 1898," forthcoming in a volume in honor of Bernard Lewis, edited by Charles Issawi and Avrom Udovitch. Koçu first published the author's name as Halil İbrahim, but the form found in the Mss. is the other way around. Many scholars have assisted my research on A.D.: Marie-Luise van Ess-Bremer, Albert Dietrich, Alexandre Popovic, Rudolf Sellheim, Otto Spies, and especially Annemarie Schimmel and Andreas Tietze.

[40] İnal was a cultural conservative, but wrote about intellectuals of many types. See especially Mahmud Kemal İnal, *Osmanlı Devrinde Son Sadrıazamlar*, 14 fascicles, Istanbul, 3d printing, 1964–65; id., *Şairler*.

fication, in turn, can aid us in establishing the typicality of individuals and incidents and thus in generalizing about collectivities. On a certain scale, this must be true even when, as in the present study, we can apply the quantitative techniques only to particular segments—primarily the Foreign Ministry staff—of the larger body—all of civil officialdom—to which we should ideally like to apply them.

Research techniques of either type are difficult to use well; to combine them effectively is yet more challenging. Approaching each of the topics it discusses in the way or ways that the evidence best supports, this book will undertake such a combination of approaches as it pursues its goal of comparing scribal and civil official careers across a century of radical change.

MAJOR FORCES AND ISSUES IN THE TRANSFORMATION OF CIVIL OFFICIALDOM

To study the social history of Ottoman civil officialdom requires awareness of several issues that helped define the context of the subject but cannot be highlighted appropriately in a discussion organized in terms of the officials' life sequence. The best response to this problem is to combine discussion of these issues with the initial definition of concepts and methods. Taking this approach, we can group these issues under five headings: the reassertion of central government authority, the corporate state of civil officialdom, government finance and economics, egalitarianism, and cultural dualism. The importance of these issues for the transformation from scribe to civil official will become clear from the frequent references to them in later chapters.

Reassertion of Central Government Authority

Like adherents of other great cultural traditions, Ottomans and other Muslims historically believed in the integrity and self-sufficiency of their culture, looking down on outsiders as inferior. Across the Islamic world, however, European expansionism had begun to create an uneasy awareness by the eighteenth century that Muslims faced trouble from the infidel world. At first, and in some places ever after, those aware of the challenge understood the needed response in terms of a reinvigoration of Islam. At the center of the Islamic world's most important state, Ottomans understood the challenge more as a threat to what they saw as an undifferentiated totality of religion-and-state (*din-ü-devlet*). The gravity of the situation, the recognition that Muslims could not look down on the infidels' power but might have to learn to beat them at their own game, seems to have penetrated Ottoman statesmen's awareness with the disastrous Russian wars of the last third of the eighteenth century.

A number of secondary conclusions eddied outward from this shocking realization. First and foremost, Ottomans looked for ways to strengthen the empire militarily. The costs of military reform sharpened the awareness of need to increase revenues. This implied a need to improve the regularity and efficiency of administration. All these objectives suggested that the central government must reassert its power over the provinces, many of them under the de facto control of local notables. Reform and governmental reassertion would require intensified use of the sultan's powers of decree, the only recognized source of legislative authority other than Islamic religious law (the sharia) and custom, which could hardly serve to sanction innovation along alien lines.

To Ottomans, the response to the European challenge meant centralization. They soon discovered that this was a demon with various avatars. In some instances, centralization meant the outward push to restore central government control in the provinces. In others, it meant the inward pull to concentrate power and resources in Istanbul. And where in Istanbul—in the Sublime Porte (*Bab-ı Âli*, the executive headquarters of the grand vezir), in the palace?

For the ruling class, the consequences of the foreign threat and the push for centralization were profound. Perhaps most difficult to deal with was the fact that the empire no longer had the strength to protect itself against European might as it once had, by military force. The *ghazi* ideal—that the Ottomans were above all warriors fighting to expand the domain where Islam was the dominant religion—had become unworkable. The result was a general loss of prestige, especially in the nineteenth century, for the branches of the ruling class most associated with the *ghazi* ideal and its Islamic bases, that is, the religious and military branches of the ruling class. Correspondingly, branches that could play more positive roles in the empire's efforts at self-preservation grew in prestige—the palace service (at least under sultans strong enough to centralize power there), and especially the scribal service. Now that the empire had to rely on negotiation more than force, the scribal officials became increasingly occupied with foreign affairs. Vulnerability to the infidels' power and desire to appropriate the secrets of their strength created a love-hate relation with Europe, amid which those who knew most about the West—at first the scribal diplomats—became a vanguard of westernization, an evolution toward which their historical cultural orientations inclined them, as we shall note. In the nineteenth century, the scribal service would gain vastly—in numbers, functions, and power—from the reassertion of central governmental power. As it did so, the scribes metamorphosed into civil officials.[41]

[41] Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform*, 114–20.

The Corporate Evolution of Civil Officialdom

At the intersection of the organizational history of Ottoman administration, treated in an earlier work, and the social history of the officials lies an important topic: the corporate state of officialdom. This theme recedes into the background in any discussion that looks at the officials themselves, as this book primarily will. When the emphasis shifts back to the officials as a collectivity, however, a key theme in the transformation of the scribal service appears in the evolution of this corporate identity. In the long run, this is a less informative study than that of how officials lived and worked. Yet we need to make such a shift of emphasis, at least long enough to understand the major milestones in the corporate transformation. Two types of evidence require consideration: the growth of civil officialdom in size and functions, and the evolution of civil personnel policy.

Centralization produced a very large growth in the scribal service—or in civil officialdom, as it can more appropriately be termed from the late 1830s on. An exceptionally precise source, datable from internal evidence to the years between 1777 and 1797, places the number of clerks (*kâtib*) then in the central scribal offices in Istanbul at 869. Another passage in the same document adds personnel of lower (apprentices and students) and higher ranks (supervisors) in the same departments to produce a round total of 1,500 scribal personnel of all types in these departments. Allowing for scribes known to have served elsewhere in this period, either in other departments in the capital or in the provinces, we can estimate the total size of the scribal service, as of the year 1790, at about 2,000 men.[42] The number seems startlingly small for an empire of such size, but is not implausible, considering that scribal officials had never yet acquired primary responsibility for local administration.

The source for establishing the size of civil officialdom a century later is the personnel records. Among these, the collection preserved as the Interior Ministry personnel records—the central place of record for civil personnel files—reportedly contains 92,137 officials.[43] Created by a records-keeping system that operated rather consistently from 1877 to 1908 and to some degree from then until the collapse of the empire, these records—some of which belong to men already old in 1877—obviously include several generations of officials. We can only estimate the number of

[42] TPK, D3208; cf. the lower estimate of 1,000 to 1,500 in Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform*, 56, 101, 106–11, 363 n. 41. The lower estimate was based on the total of 869 scribes (*kâtib*) in the tabular section of TPK, D3208, and overlooked the reference, in the text below the table, to the larger total for the central departments when the apprentices and supervisors were taken into account. Actually, the wording is sloppy and could be interpreted literally to mean that there were 1,500 apprentices and supervisors in addition to the 869 regular clerks; but that seems an improbable ratio.

[43] Attilâ Çetin, *Başbakanlık Arşivi Kılavuzu*, Istanbul, 1979, 46.

civil officials in service at one time—say, a top figure of 70,000. However, the majority of those recorded served under Abd ül-Hamid, who used patronage to inhibit political activism by pressuring huge numbers of men into government service, where he thought he could control them. Study of the Foreign Ministry personnel records—one of many sets created in a particular ministry for later enrollment in the master set at the Interior Ministry—shows that just under half of the cases in that collection had career records spanning as much as fifteen years. Many records break off after only one or two appointments. Literary evidence confirms that there was a pattern of obtaining one or two appointments but not making a career in government service. Assuming that this pattern prevailed elsewhere as much as at the Foreign Ministry, we should halve the estimate of the top number "in service" at one time to approximate the total number of career civil officials under Abd ül-Hamid at about 35,000, a number greatly reduced in the purges that followed the 1908 revolution. The fact that the purges also gravely impaired the functioning of the personnel records system—most of the files used in this study break off by 1908—underscores that the personnel records are primarily sources on the Hamidian period.[44]

Comparatively, Ottoman civil officialdom was not large. Russia already had 38,000 civil officials in 1800, a total that grew to 114,000 by 1856.[45] Among twentieth-century Middle Eastern comparisons, almost any ministry building in Ankara today is as big as the Sublime Porte (illustration 1), the grand-vezirial headquarters that included roughly five ministerial-size agencies. Muhammad Reza Shah (1941–1979), whose patronage policy very much resembled that of Abd ül-Hamid, increased the number of Iran's civil officials to 304,000. At the end of the Nasser period, 1.3 million languished in the ill-paid ranks of the Egyptian civil service.[46] Abd ül-Hamid's neopatrimonialism was nothing in scale compared to either tsarist autocracy, Muhammad Reza Shah's "petrolic despotism," or Nasser's "pharaonic socialism." Yet for the Ottoman Empire of 1900, 35,000 civil officials represented an immense growth over a century before.

As far as Ottomans knew, they had experienced the rise of "big government," and their feelings about this were as ambiguous as those of others who have lived through twentieth-century versions of the phenomenon.

[44] The estimate of 35,000 civil officials is again a refinement of an earlier estimate of 50,000 to 100,000; see Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform*, 65, 167–68, 267–68, 271–73, 364 n. 65.

[45] Walter M. Pintner, "The Evolution of Civil Officialdom, 1755–1855," in *Russian Officialdom: The Bureaucratization of Russian Society from the Seventeenth to the Twentieth Century*, ed. Walter McKenzie Pintner and Don Karl Rowney, Chapel Hill, 1980, 192. A more meaningful statistic, if available, would be the ratio of officials to population in each state.

[46] Ervand Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, Princeton, 1982, 438; John Waterbury, *The Egypt of Nasser and Sadat: The Political Economy of Two Regimes*, Princeton, 1983, 242.



Ill. 1. Center and One End of the Facade of the Sublime Porte (*Bab-ı Âli*) on the Side toward the Golden Horn. The higher part, with the arched colonnade surmounted by two structures with pediments, formed the center of this facade and housed the offices of the Council of State (*Şura-yı Devlet*). Often burned and rebuilt, the Sublime Porte was completed in this form in 1844.

The numerical growth of civil officialdom reflected a growth in the variety of governmental functions and in the immediacy of their impact on the subjects' lives. Scribes had traditionally busied themselves with government correspondence, accounts, and land records. Most of them had worked in Istanbul and had little way of knowing how or whether their acts affected the empire's subjects. From the late eighteenth century on, governmental reassertion and centralization meant that scribes or civil officials staffed almost all new systems outside the military field. The rise of the Foreign Ministry, with its diplomatic and consular services, was one example of this; but the numbers of officials involved were much greater in cases where empire-wide infrastructure had to be created. After the attack on the local notables, civil officials for the first time acquired prime responsibility for local administration. With the creation of a secular legal and judicial system, they acquired major judicial functions for the first time. Modern systems of census and population registration required Ottoman subjects to deal with civil officials to get identity papers and passports. The teachers in the new schools under the Ministry of Education were essentially civil bureaucrats. Civil officials played a major role in quarantines that restricted merchants' and pilgrims' movements. Most of these new functions could be denounced as infidel innovations, and often were. In the meantime, civil officials had come face to face with the populace as never before.

From 2,000 scribes to 35,000 civil officials, the changes were qualitative as much as quantitative. Nothing expresses this fact better than the evolution of personnel policy. The eighteenth-century scribal service scarcely had any such policy, except as defined by custom and the personal discretion of those in high places. In the nineteenth century, this changed markedly.

Traditionally, members of the ruling class had stood in the legal status of slaves of the sultan. Few eighteenth-century scribes entered the ruling class through literal enslavement, and it is no doubt appropriate to distinguish the lot of the sultan's official slaves from that of slaves in the houses and workshops of private individuals—still more from that of slaves in the plantation economies of the western hemisphere.[47] In the Islamic world, it could easily be more advantageous to be a great man's slave than a free peasant. Many slaves of the sultan, in particular, enjoyed great wealth and power. The point of their slave status was that they enjoyed these things—and their lives, too—on their imperial master's sufferance. The sultan punished his officials at will, even had them executed, without judicial process. He was in principle their heir, a rule often applied with the confiscation of their estates (*müsadere*). Official servitude was thus no matter of empty rhetoric. For the sultan, it guaranteed the agent's dependence on the master. For the officials—at least for those who rose to the high ranks where the vulnerabilities of the status became palpable—accepting this dependence was the way to power and wealth. In the patrimonial government of the Islamic state, the idea of official slavery was the way for officials to understand their relationship to a sovereign who was "the shadow of God on earth" (*zill Allâh fî 'l-âlem*).[48]

[47] Halil Sahillioğlu, "Onbeşinci Yüzyılın Sonu ile Onaltıncının Başında Bursa'da Kölelerin Sosyal ve Ekonomik Hayattaki Yeri," *Gelişme Dergisi*, special number (1979–1980), 67–138. However, some of the attempts made to distinguish the lot of "*köle* over whom the owner had proprietary rights" and the *kul*s or members of the ruling class "who had a permanent quasi-contractual and personal relationship with the sultan" appear to me overdrawn; the quoted phrases appear in Kemal Karpat's review of my *Bureaucratic Reform*, in *AHR*, LXXXVI (1981), 434. An incident like the fall of Pertev Paşa (1837), discussed in chapter 2, clearly illustrates the slave-official's vulnerabilities, with no sign of a "quasi-contractual and personal relationship," once the victim had lost the sultan's favor.

[48] The Turkish term used for the slave-officials, *kul*, corresponds to the Arabic *ʿabd*, which comes from a root that combines the ideas of slavery and worship. The idea that officials were slaves of "the shadow of God on earth" paralleled the idea that all Muslims are slaves (or devotees) of God, as many men's names proclaim (ʿAbd Allâh, ʿAbd al-Raḥmân, ʿAbd al-

If the most salient fact about the traditional ruling class was official slavery, the next most salient, where scribes were concerned, was that systems of training, recruitment, and promotion were defined by little but custom and the will of the powerful. As we shall note more fully in the next chapter, if the patrimonial state was organized overall on the lines of a great household in which the ruling class were the ruler's slaves, the personnel "system" of the scribal service was deeply enmeshed, for want of a clearly defined policy, in the officials' own household-centered webs of personal relations.

The reassertion of central authority led to changes in these patterns when it became clear to Mahmud II (1808–1839) that even he, to whom centralization meant concentration of power in the palace, required an upgraded cadre of government servants to represent him across his far-flung dominions and abroad. In the 1830s, he consequently laid the foundations of civil personnel policy. He founded—at least in name—the first "ministries," created a new hierarchy of civil ranks, abandoned the old practice of annual reappointment (*tevcihat*) to all high positions, replaced older forms of compensation with salaries, founded the first secular civil schools to train officials, and decreed legal reforms eliminating some of the most troublesome attributes of official slavery. These reforms did not affect only civil officials. For the Gülhane Decree of 1839, the key document in restricting the disabilities of official slavery, extended its guarantees of "security for life, honor, and property," and of public trial for all accused persons, not just to members of the ruling class, but to all the empire's peoples.[49] Significantly, it was about this time, with growing use of the term *mülkiye* to refer to local administration (the basic associations of the term are with both landownership and sovereignty), that it became common to refer to the former *kalem efendileri*, the "gentlemen of the offices" (*efendi* being then a title of address for a literate gentleman), as civil officials (*mülkiye memurları*).[50]

'Azîz, and other names combining *'abd* with one of the divine names). Ottoman poets, too, spoke of slavery to describe the lover's relationship to the beloved, a relationship closely identified with that of slave and ruler: Walter G. Andrews, *Poetry's Voice, Society's Song: Ottoman Lyric Poetry*, Seattle, 1985, 90–91, 93, 95–97, 121.

[49] Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform*, 140–47; Şerif Mardin, *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought: A Study in the Modernization of Turkish Political Ideas*, Princeton, 1962, 155–68; J. C. Hurewitz, *The Middle East and North Africa in World Politics: A Documentary Record*, I: *European Expansion, 1535–1914*, New Haven, 1975, 269–71.

[50] A note on usage: Ottomans were normally addressed by their given names, followed by a title of address. Only families with claims to high status had surnames (actually familial forenames). Most scribes or civil officials were "efendis," unless they were sons of paşas (in which case they were called "bey") or had themselves acquired the rank of *vezir*, which entitled them to be called "paşa" (a title of address also used in the nineteenth century for holders of several high military ranks). "Efendi" remained the prevalent title of address for civil officials, and most others regarded as literate gentlemen, until the fall of the empire. A lady was usually addressed as "hanım." Among Ottomans, such titles of address would scarcely ever have been

Excepting only the reform decree of 1856, discussed below in connection with egalitarianism, comparable developments in civil personnel policy did not occur again until the reign of Abd ül-Hamid (1876–1909).[51] He put in place the regulatory bases for a modern civil service system of the sort then emerging in western nations. The process began in 1877 with the creation of the personnel records (*sicill-i ahval*), which thenceforth played a basic role in the choice of candidates for appointment. Another major step was a decree on the promotion and retirement of civil officials (*memurin-i mülkiye terakki ve tekaüd kararnamesi*), promulgated in the 1880s and later much amended. Under this decree, the Ottomans first attempted to create a modern type of retirement fund (*tekaüd sandığı*) financed by deductions from salaries. Other measures defined systems for the investigation and prosecution of officials accused of misdeeds.[52] Meanwhile, a series of civil officials commissions developed in different ministries, the upshot being a central Civil Officials Commission (*Memurin-i Mülkiye Komisyonu*), created in 1896 to supervise both the personnel records system and the appointment of "civil and financial officials." Thereafter, virtually all such officials—excepting only the highest, whom the sultan appointed on his own initiative or the grand vezir's, and the lowest, who were still appointed by their superiors—were to be nominated by their ministries, recommended (after examination of their personnel files) by the Civil Officials Commission to the palace, and then, following another investigation of their files, appointed by imperial decree. Abd ül-Hamid also enacted comparable measures for the military and religious services.[53]

In the Young Turk period, despite an initial tendency to dismantle the Hamidian measures as parts of the apparatus of despotism, a contrary tendency soon emerged to restore and reorganize the personnel system. The catastrophic end of the Young Turk period kept many of these initiatives from coming to fruition. Yet—for example—the period witnessed the start of a vigorous effort to grade and classify all civil administrative positions, something barely attempted under Abd ül-Hamid.[54] The Young Turk reformers correctly understood that Abd ül-Hamid had used some of his reforms as tools of despotism rather than as means to achieve ration-

omitted in speech or writing, unless by intimates of the addressee. For reasons of economy, however, we shall normally omit the title "efendi" in this study (leaving it to be assumed), but include the titles "bey" and "paşa" after the names of those for whom they are appropriate.

[51] On the reasons for this discontinuity in the evolution of civil personnel policy, see Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform*, 194–97.

[52] I omitted this aspect of administrative justice from *Bureaucratic Reform* for reasons of space. See A. Heidborn, *Manuel de droit public et administratif de l'Empire ottoman*, Vienna-Leipzig, 1908–1912, I, 187–91.

[53] Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform*, 266–79.

[54] Ibid., 326–33.

ality and regularity; they soon found that the Hamidian personnel system was not therefore expendable, but rather required retention and—ideally—implementation in a different spirit. In this study, we must keep this discovery in mind as we examine life within the formal structures that civil official personnel policy was supposed to regulate.

Government Finance and the Economy

From the reassertion of state authority followed several other phenomena of special importance for the scribal service. One of the most critical was the failure of this reassertion in the field of government finance.

By the time the Ottomans realized the gravity of the European challenge, their economic subordination had gone very far. Mehmet Genç's research on eighteenth-century economic history has yielded clear indicators of the extent to which the empire was already becoming another of Europe's economic colonies. The unsuccessful wars at the end of the century weakened the Ottoman economy much more.[55] The same period also marked a critical phase in the European powers' long-continuing efforts to consolidate the capitulations—the grants of privileges traditionally used to organize foreign trade in the empire—as a system for undermining the empire's economy and breaching its sovereignty.[56]

The Europeans tightened Ottoman economic subordination yet further in 1838 with the Anglo-Ottoman commercial treaty of Balta Liman. The Egyptian crises of the 1830s, when the sultan's rebellious vassal, Muhammad Ali Paşa of Egypt, twice defeated Ottoman armies and threatened the survival of the empire, created a situation where the Ottomans had to bid for European diplomatic and military support by making concessions and enacting reforms that Europeans would find meaningful. Followed by similar agreements with other states, the 1838 commercial treaty was such a concession. By the treaty, the Ottomans accepted what amounted to free trade, so assuring the decline of their manufactures, which could not compete with British industry.[57]

[55] Mehmet Genç, "Osmanlı Maliyesinde Malikâne Sistemi," in *Türkiye İktisat Tarihi Semineri, Metinler/Tartışmalar, 8–10 Haziran 1973*, Ankara, 1975, 231–91; id., "Foreign Trade and Government Policies Towards Industrialization in the Ottoman Empire, 1700–1850," paper presented at the International Conference on Problems and Policies of Industrialization, Istanbul, 24–28 August 1981; id., "XVIII. Yüzyılda Osmanlı Ekonomisi ve Savaş," *Yapıt: Toplumsal Araştırmalar Dergisi*, no. 49 (1984), 52–61; no. 50 (?) (1984), 86–93. See also Yavuz Cezar, *Osmanlı Maliyesinde Bunalım ve Değişim Dönemi (XVIII. yy dan Tanzimat'a Mali Tarihi)*, Istanbul (?), 1986.

[56] H. İnalcık, art. "Imtiyāzāt," *EI²*, III, 1179–89.

[57] İnalcık, "Imtiyāzāt," *EI²*, III, 1187; Mübahat S. Kütükoğlu, *Osmanlı-İngiliz İktisâdî Münâsebetleri, II (1838–1850)*, Istanbul, 1976. Europeans appear to have found the system of economic relations they had developed in the Middle East so advantageous that they took it as a model elsewhere in the world in the free-trade era. The unequal treaty system installed in China and, for a time, in Japan, appears to have been an elaboration of the capitulatory pattern of commercial and legal privileges. In Latin America, too, the British balanced recognition of Brazilian independence with treaty demands for concessionary tariffs and extraterritoriality—in sum, political independence at the price of economic colonialism. Neither the Ottomans, nor most historians, have realized how much the empire may have contributed to the consolidation of European economic dominance by serving as a laboratory for the development of such a system. See John K. Fairbank, Edwin O. Reischauer, and Albert M. Craig, *East Asia: Tradition and Transformation*, Boston, 1978, 460–61, 488–89, 575–79 on the unequal treaty system (I lack concrete evidence of an influence from the Ottoman to the East Asian trade regimes, but my colleague, Samuel L. Chu, shares my sense of such a link); E. Bradford Burns, *A History of Brazil*, 2d ed., New York, 1980, 146. In India, the British were in position to get what they wanted by act of parliament, notably the economic provisions of the Charter Act of 1833; Stanley Wolpert, *A New History of India*, 2d ed., New York, 1982, 213.

Ironically, it was also in 1838 that the Ottomans attempted to carry their program of governmental reassertion into the field of finance by streamlining the tax system, replacing tax farming with centralization of receipts and disbursements in the state treasury, and assigning salaries to officials to replace their old prebendal forms of compensation. The salaries were an indispensable part of this reform package, for prebendalism had meant that officials were assigned revenue sources or collection rights, so compensating themselves directly through a form of fiscal decentralization. Fiscal centralization required paying officials from the state treasury instead.

Enacted without adequate preparation and against opposition from powerful vested interests, fiscal centralization failed. The new salary system was never abolished; politically, it probably could not have been. But it could not function properly, either. Officials collected their salaries when they could, while continuing to expect their old perquisites—the fees and such, now officially illegal—from the public. The result was a blow to the administrative upgrading required to make the reassertion of central initiative effective.[58]

The abortive reform of government finance, coupled with the introduction of free trade, started a downward spiral, from which the Ottomans never recovered. The deteriorating economic situation led to the issue in 1840 of the first Ottoman paper money, which remained in circulation until 1862, giving rise to serious problems of counterfeiting and depreciation. Paper money was again issued in the wake of the Russo-Turkish War and during World War I. The monetary problems were aggravated by lack of modern banking facilities; when such facilities were created, they were essentially foreign enterprises. To make matters worse, the Ottoman gov-

[58] Halil İnalcık, "Application of the Tanzimat and Its Social Effects," *Archivum Ottomanicum*, V (1973), 97ff.; id., "Tanzimat'ın Uygulanması ve Sosyal Tepkileri," *Belleten*, XXVIII (1964), 623ff.; Stanford J. Shaw, "The Nineteenth Century Ottoman Tax Reforms and Revenue System," *IJMES*, VI (1975), 421–59; Mehmet Zeki Pakalın, *Maliye Teşkilâtı Tarihi*, Ankara, 1977, III, 52–54; Roderic H. Davison, art. "Kā'ime," *EI²*, IV, 460; id., "The First Ottoman Experiment with Paper Money," in *Türkiye'nin Sosyal ve Ekonomik Tarihi (1071–1920)*, ed. Osman Okyar and Halil İnalcık, Ankara, 1980, 244–51; Cezar, *Maliye*, part iv.

ernment began during the Crimean War (1854–1856) to contract foreign loans. In a little over twenty years, the empire accumulated a foreign debt of over 200 million pounds sterling and experienced a complete collapse of its credit. The result in 1881 was the creation of an international Council of the Public Debt, to which the Ottoman government was forced to cede control of a number of revenues to be administered primarily in the interests of the bond holders. The indemnity of 35 million Turkish pounds (equivalent to about 31.5 million British pounds) that the Russians demanded at the end of the Russo-Turkish War (1877–1878) was an added blow.

At least in Anatolia, the last part of the nineteenth century brought a railroad-related expansion of agriculture; this appears to have had some positive impact on government revenues.[59] Otherwise, the possibilities of economic expansion were severely limited. By the time the Ottomans were able to repudiate the capitulations, as they did unilaterally during World War I, it was too late to save the Ottoman economy. Chapter 8 will explore what these economic problems meant for civil officials, as they reacted to the problems of the salary system in the light of their rising political awareness.

Egalitarian Reform

As the formal apparatus of civil officialdom evolved during the reform era, some of the most important questions arose around the issue of egalitarianism. As already noted, the Gülhane Decree of 1839 began the process of granting guarantees of rights to Ottoman subjects. The decree also mentioned the drafting of new laws, which would be needed to implement its promises.

Şerif Mardin has plausibly argued that these provisions of the decree represented a form of special pleading on the part of westernized civil officials who sought to escape the disabilities of official slavery by inflating their own interests and articulating them in terms of the rights of man.[60] By the 1830s, too, European powers, especially England, had begun urging specific reforms on the Ottomans, and questions about equality had

[59] Mehmet Genç, "Foreign Trade and Government Policies Towards Industrialization in the Ottoman Empire, 1700–1850"; Donald Quataert, "Ottoman Reform and Agriculture in Anatolia, 1876–1908," Ph.D. dissertation, University of California at Los Angeles, 1973, 15–17, 189–91, 352–54; id., "Limited Revolution: The Impact of the Anatolian Railway on Turkish Transportation and the Provisioning of Istanbul, 1890–1908," *Business History Review*, LI (1977), 143, 159–60; id., "Agricultural Trends and Government Policy in Ottoman Anatolia, 1800–1914," *Asian and African Studies*, XV (1981), 83; C. V. Findley, art. "Māliyye," *EI²*, forthcoming.

[60] Mardin, *Genesis*, 162; Hurewitz, *MENA*, I, 269–71.

come up, if only indirectly. The empire's desperate need for support against the Egyptians lent extra weight to such suggestions at that time.[61]

None of those directly involved appears to have foreseen the implications of this fact, but from the beginning the egalitarian reform thus encompassed two related issues: the rights of officials and those of all the sultan's subjects. In this century, Turkish historians of the early republic used to praise Mustafa Reşid Paşa, who wrote the Gülhane Decree and had a major hand in the reforms that followed, as a great statesman; some of their successors have instead condemned him as a tool of western imperialism. It perhaps makes more sense to recognize that even a great statesman would have had little freedom for maneuver in the Ottoman Empire of 1839 and look instead at the consequences of these reforms, as we have already done in the case of trade and government finance.[62]

When the Gülhane Decree of 1839 extended guarantees of life, honor, and property to all the sultan's subjects, the empire had essentially nothing of the kind of secular legal system that would be required to make the guarantees fully meaningful. Instead, this was an explicitly Islamic state, where Islamic religious law held priority among the three sources of law—the sharia, custom, and the sultan's power of decree—that the state recognized. The key problem about equality for non-Muslims was that it had no basis under the sharia, which emphasizes first and foremost Muslims' ritual obligations to God (thereby strongly emphasizing equality *among Muslims*) and treats civil and penal law only secondarily. Muslim and non-Muslim could not be equal in sharia law, for they could not participate alike in the acts most important under the law.

Egalitarianism—like other westernizing reforms—would therefore require massive reassertion of the state's legislative power and its use in ways incompatible with the sharia to create common standards applicable to the sultan's subjects without regard to religion. Bringing this need to the fore more dramatically than any other measure, the egalitarian promises of Gülhane launched the reformers into a trackless domain to pursue the paradoxical goal of legal westernization (and therefore secularization) in an explicitly Islamic state. The pursuit was bound to be painful. Legal secularization did begin to occur from 1839 on and became the leitmotif of the next political period, the *Tanzimat* (c. 1839–1871). With the new legislation came ongoing controversy about its relationship to the sharia. The most conspicuous symbol of the controversy is the effort, led by Ahmed Cevdet Paşa, to turn the tide back toward the sharia by codifying

[61] Sir Charles Webster, *The Foreign Policy of Palmerston, 1830–1841: Britain, the Liberal Movement, and the Eastern Question*, New York, 1969, II, 541–44, 656–57. Cf. İlber Ortaylı, "Tanzimat Bürokratları ve Metternich," in *Profesör Fehmi Yavuz'a Armağan*, Ankara, 1983, 361–67.

[62] Cf. İlber Ortaylı, *İmparatorluğun en Uzun Yüzyılı*, Istanbul, 1983, 13.

it instead of borrowing law from the West. This effort produced its one great monument in the *Mecelle*, the Ottoman civil code, and the tide of legal secularization rolled on.[63]

The controversy as a whole is too broad to examine here, but dimensions especially significant for Ottoman officials require comment. For example, the guarantees of life, honor, and property—to the extent that they were intended to benefit those in government service—dealt only with attributes of official slavery, but did not touch the underlying principle. Nor could they have. The sultan's power and legitimacy remained too great to attack without risking disintegration of the imperial system. Having no legislative power except the sultan's will to draw on to legitimate their innovations, even the highest statesmen had to cling to the idea that they acted as his agents; and they had to project this idea in terms understood in their environment. Long after 1839, they held fast to the customary "etiquette of servility" (*âdab-ı ubudiyet*) in dealings with the sultan. In writing to the palace, they continued to refer to themselves as "slaves" (*kul*), "possessed slaves" (*abd-ı memlûk*), even as "slaves who would not accept freedom" (*azad kabul etmez abd-ı memlûk*).[64] As epistolary forms, these phrases resemble the complimentary closing, "Your obedient, humble servant," that still appeared in British correspondence; but the legal and social context in which people used the Ottoman phrases was quite different. The concessions of 1839 were not yet secure. A sultan of sufficient grit—meaning Abd ül-Hamid—could always show that there was more to the servility than mere etiquette.[65]

Meanwhile, the largest questions about egalitarianism pertained to intercommunal relations—again, a topic significant for officials. Initially, this question focused on the non-Muslim communities. Since assimilation of the Ottoman-Islamic high culture had traditionally been the most fundamental attribute of membership in the ruling class—only a few non-Muslims being found on its flanks in quasi-official functions—one dimension of any thorough drive for egalitarianism would presumably have been free admission of non-Muslims into official service. In the immediate wake of the Gülhane Decree, this did not occur. A few Greek army doctors, Armenian palace architects, and the like continued to appear, as in the past—exceptions confirming the de facto rule of a Muslim ruling class. The closest thing to a fundamental change was the admission of

[63] Heidborn, *Manuel*, I, 283–441; Hıfzı Veldet Velidedeoğlu, "Kanunlaştırma Hareketleri ve Tanzimat," in *Tanzimat I*, Istanbul, 1940, 139–209; İlber Ortaylı and Tekin Akıllıoğlu, "Le Tanzimat et le modèle français: mimétisme ou adaptation?" in *L'Empire ottoman, la République de Turquie et la France*, ed. Hâmit Batu and Jean-Louis Bacqué-Grammont, Istanbul and Paris, 1986(?), 197–208; Ali Himmet Berki, *Açıklamalı Mecelle (Mecelle-i Ahkâm-ı Adliyye)*, Istanbul, 1982.

[64] İnal, *Şairler*, 1420; id., *Sadrıazamlar*, 1002.

[65] Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform*, 163–67, 235–36.

representatives of the non-Muslim communities to the local administrative councils set up in 1840, but these were not actually officials.

No more substantial change occurred until the time of the Crimean War—another crisis when Ottomans assessed their ideas on reform in the light of a special need for European support. One result was an announcement in 1855 that non-Muslims should be admitted to military service through the rank of colonel and to civil service without limit of rank, and that the poll tax traditionally indicative of the subordinate status of non-Muslim subjects of the Islamic state should be abolished. More conspicuously, the Reform Decree of 1856 proclaimed that "all the subjects of my empire, without distinction of nationality, shall be admissible to public employments, and qualified to fill them according to merit, and conformably with rules to be generally applied. . . ." The decree also affirmed the liability of non-Muslim subjects to military recruitment, but permitted them to send substitutes or purchase exemption.[66]

Promulgation of general rules on conditions of service did not follow as promptly as the decree implied; yet it was essentially in its wake that the non-Muslim presence in government service began to grow, especially in the civil administration. Non-Muslims obviously could not take a place in the religious establishment of a Muslim state, although the old tendency to think of the religious leaders of the non-Muslim communities as having a kind of semi-official status found new expressions with the inclusion of these leaders *ex officio* in the local administrative assemblies and with the insertion of a special section for "religious leaders" in the government yearbooks.[67] In the military, too, while some non-Muslims still appeared as military doctors or in other special roles, most non-Muslims preferred the option of purchasing exemption. Seeing Islam as the main factor motivating men to risk their lives for the state, Muslims shared this preference. The purchasing of exemption therefore became institutionalized as a special tax on non-Muslims, a tax collected just as the old poll tax had been. There appears to have been no further effort to draft non-Muslims before 1909, when the exemption tax was abolished, although other measures authorized purchase of exemption in certain instances, even then. Parts of the palace service seemed, meanwhile, to be easier of access

[66] Findley, "Acid Test," 341–43. The article's conclusions on the admission of non-Muslims into civil officialdom are revised in this book in light of the comparisons among agencies, mentioned earlier, and information on demographic change from Karpat, *Ottoman Population*.

[67] Findley, "Acid Test," 342; Roderic H. Davison, "The Advent of the Principle of Representation in the Government of the Ottoman Empire," in *Beginnings of Modernization in the Middle East: The Nineteenth Century*, ed. William R. Polk and Richard L. Chambers, Chicago, 1968, 99; İlber Ortaylı, *Tanzimattan sonra Mahalli İdareler (1840–1878)*, Ankara, 1974, 58–62. Among the yearbooks, see e.g. *Salname-i Devlet-i Aliye-i Osmaniye*, Istanbul, 1315/1897, 604–15; ibid., Istanbul, 1326/1908, 1034–48.

or more attractive, not only for artists, craftsmen, and merchants, but also for men who actually became palace functionaries. Under Abd ül-Hamid, for example, Armenian administrators played key roles in the Privy Treasury (*Hazine-i Hassa*). Where the non-Muslim presence became most prominent, however, was in civil officialdom, especially in the Foreign Ministry. During the quarter-century or so following the Reform Decree of 1856, enough non-Muslims turned up in the growing roster of civil administrative agencies to make it meaningful to question—as we shall do in chapter 3—whether they had achieved representation in proportion to their numbers.

This question proves more difficult to answer in the Ottoman case than in the history of some other states. For the heterogeneity of Ottoman society, while never lost, varied over time in its composition, and even in the criteria that the sultan's subjects found most meaningful in defining their collective identities. A relic of times when religion was the prime loyalty, the empire had survived into the era of nationalism, which undercut both the old intercommunal synthesis and the newly proclaimed egalitarianism. From the mid-*Tanzimat* on, Ottoman statesmen attempted to inject affective appeal into the egalitarian policy and parry the separatist-nationalist threat by promoting a new concept of Ottomanism, no longer as the elite identity of the ruling class, but as an imperial supranationalism. The concept acquired enough life to confuse the issues, especially for the Ottoman elites. Indeed, egalitarian Ottomanism remained a political force into the Young Turk period: despite their name, the Young Turks were Ottoman, rather than Turkish, nationalists until after the 1908 revolution.[68] Yet even those most bent on defending the empire could not change the fact that the ground was shifting under their feet.

Long before Turkish nationalism or the Young Turks, the circumstances of imperial disintegration had begun to change Ottoman ideas about egalitarianism. As we shall see more clearly in later chapters, the Greek revolution of the 1820s effectively made it impossible for Greeks to benefit fully from the egalitarian policy in official service. The Russo-Turkish War of 1877–1878 became another watershed, above all through the loss of many of the empire's former Balkan territories, and the migration into the empire of large numbers of Turkic, and other Muslim, refugees. The result was to leave the empire "an overwhelmingly Muslim country whose main territory lay in Asia Minor and the Middle East."[69] The rise of Armenian nationalism tragically disrupted relations between the Turks and one of the most important of the non-Turkish peoples remaining under Ottoman sovereignty past this point. The subsequent advent of Arab nationalism did the same for the other most important of the non-Turkish peoples of the empire, even if the numbers who suffered dire consequences permit no comparison on that point with the Armenian case.

[68] Carter Vaughn Findley, "The Advent of Ideology in the Islamic Middle East," Part II, *Studia Islamica*, LVI (1982), 156, 159–60.

[69] Kemal H. Karpat, *Ottoman Population*, 28, 55, 57.

The social framework in which Ottomans attempted to apply the policy of egalitarianism was thus unstable: in a way not noted in policy statements, demography altered perceptions of the interests that the administration should represent. The *Tanzimat* policy of admitting non-Muslims was neither renounced in principle nor totally abandoned in practice. The Hamidian period, however, witnessed an enlarged effort to draw into official cadres Muslims from outlying provinces—from the Balkans, especially Albania, and from the Arab lands. The progressive triumph of Turkish nationalism in the Young Turk period pointed to yet another change, which only became definitive under the republic, by implying that membership in the company of equals required possessing a Turkish identity.

Egalitarianism remained one of the most important issues affecting civil officialdom, but population changes thus caused basic shifts in understanding of the idea. Later chapters, in analyzing the careers of officials of different social backgrounds, must acknowledge these changing perspectives on egalitarianism. The Foreign Ministry personnel records prove especially useful in throwing light on the experiences of non-Muslim officials. Other sources shed a comparative light on later forms of egalitarianism, as well.

Cultural Dualism

The disruption of religious by secular nationalist identity concepts points to another of the most divisive issues of the reform era. This is what Niyazi Berkes has described as "cultural bifurcation."[70]

Islamic civilization was already entering the thirteenth century by the time Ottoman statesmen began to consider that the European threat had perhaps breached their long-assumed cultural self-sufficiency. Islamic civilization had once passed through a great phase of borrowing from others; but this was a thousand years in the past by then, and the components of the civilization—while some were not Islamic in origin or fully compatible with Islamic values—had come to seem "Islamic" by long habituation. More recently, borrowings from other civilizations had occurred in "peripheral" fields, like military technology, or been kept confined within narrow circles, like the intellectual elites of Istanbul, where some people always seem to have taken an interest in western ideas.[71] Espe-

[70] Niyazi Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*, Montreal, 1964.

[71] Heidrun Wurm, *Der osmanische Historiker Ḥüseyn b. Ğa'fer, genannt Hezārfenn, und*

cially because Islamic law asserted its capacity to regulate all phases of life so vigorously, any idea that the scope of borrowing should be enlarged, or that the Ottomans were slipping into cultural dependence on the infidels, was bound to upset most Ottomans profoundly.

By the nineteenth century, it was clear that Ottomans would have to live through such an upset. What followed is most easily understood as an influx of foreign ideas—like nationalism. Yet an organic connection also existed between this phenomenon and preexisting traits of the Ottoman world of knowledge.[72]

Views about the traditional organization of knowledge in the Islamic world vary; but one of the simplest and most compelling posits a fourfold articulation into the religious studies with their rational concept of knowledge (*ilm*), the gnosticism (*irfan*) of the mystics, the philosophical-scientific culture (*falsafa*), and the worldly literary culture (*adab*).[73] The greatest monuments of the *adab*-tradition were belletristic, such as the works of the major poets, whose popularity over the ages proves that the *adab*-culture—like that of the religious scholars and mystics—had a mass following. The fact remains, however, that the main place for practical application of the *adab*-culture was in scribal service, and most exponents of that culture were secretaries.

Worldly as well as belletristic, the *adab*-culture had always ranged over subjects that the most strictly Islamic-minded scholars—the exponents of the religious studies, the *ulema*—thought unseemly. Already in the ninth century, Al-Jâḥiẓ, himself an outstanding litterateur (*adîb*) and man of scribal training, had summed up their criticisms, which echoed down the centuries.[74] For example, while the religious scholars' studies required mastery of Arabic, Ottoman scribal intellectuals needed to study Persian, as well. Some of the pious would say of this: "Whoever studies Persian loses half his religion" (*Kim ki okur farisî / Gider dinin yarısı*). The literary-minded would retort: "Whoever studies Persian pays half his debt" (*Kim ki okur farisî / Gider deynin yarısı*).[75] Fuller study of great exponents of the *adab*-culture, like Gelibolulu Mustafa Âli (1541–1600), Kâtib

die Istanbuler Gesellschaft in der zweiten Hälfte des 17. Jahrhunderts, Frieburg-im-Breisgau, 1971, 122–49, 167.

[72] Halil İnalcık first called attention to this fact: "On the Secularism in Turkey," *Orientalistische Literaturzeitung*, LXIV (1969), col. 439–42.

[73] Marshall G. S. Hodgson, *The Venture of Islam: Conscience and History in a World Civilization*, Chicago, 1974, I, 238–39. The major cultural orientations were not sealed off from one another: most intellectuals took interest in several.

[74] Al-Jâḥiẓ, *Rasâ'il al-Jâḥiz*, ed. 'Abd al-Salâm Muḥammad Hârûn, Cairo-Baghdad, 1965–1979, III, 194; cf. Charles Pellat, *The Life and Works of Jâḥiz*, trans. D. M. Hawke, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1969, 273–75; cf. Halil İnalcık, art. "Reis-ül-küttab," *İA*, IX, 679.

[75] Osman Ergin, *İstanbul Mektepleri ve İlim, Terbiye ve San'at Müesseseleri Dolayısile Türkiye Maarif Tarihi*, Istanbul, 1939–43, I, 135. Both couplets are written identically in Arabic script. The opposition of piety and Persian must not be exaggerated. Most mystics would have favored study of Persian, and in this period even religious scholars were often mystics.

Çelebi (1609–1657), Hezarfenn Hüseyin (d. 1691–1692), and Yirmisekiz Çelebi Mehmed (d. 1732) will do much to stimulate reassessment of the intellectual vitality of the Islamic world during the Ottoman centuries.[76]

Pending such reassessment, several points—in addition to its worldliness—stand out about the Ottoman scribal *adab* as of the start of the reform era. On one hand, the best Ottoman scribes could still impress knowledgeable Europeans in at least some fields.[77] On the other, their tradition had reached a level of hyperrefinement or involution such that the effort required to master the artificial Arabo-Perso-Turkish literary language, with its immense vocabulary, its numerous script styles, and its complex stylistic conventions for drafting official documents in a large array of stereotyped genres, was apparently far greater than that required to train secretaries in some other cultures, especially European ones. The effort was also out of proportion to anything to be learned from most of the texts that Ottoman scribes produced. Cultural elitism was an ancient Middle Eastern legacy, but it placed the scribes—and other Ottoman intellectuals—at more of a disadvantage than they realized as they faced the European challenge of the nineteenth century.

Yet largely because so many of them were scribal officials, who fell heir to the role of negotiating with Europeans when the empire could no longer deal with them successfully by force, the exponents of the *adab*-culture had begun by the eighteenth century to extend the scope of their worldly knowledge westward. Diplomatic experience became a major factor in this expansion, and the writing of embassy narratives—an old literary genre—acquired new life as these began to convey more than perfunctory information about the outside world.[78] Selim III's attempt in the 1790s to found a system of permanent Ottoman diplomatic representation in European capitals strengthened the new tendency, so making it possible from then on to speak of a western-oriented cadre within the scribal service.[79] Discovery of the more secure conditions of official service in Europe then wedded these men's self-interest to the goal of westernization.[80]

In general, while the cultural cleavage of the nineteenth century did

[76] Cornell Fleischer, *Bureaucrat and Intellectual in the Ottoman Empire: The Historian Mustafa Âli (1541–1600)*, Princeton, 1986; Andreas Tietze, *Muṣṭafâ 'Âlî's Description of Cairo of 1599*, Vienna, 1975; id., *Muṣṭafâ 'Âlî's Counsel for Sultans of 1581*, 2 vols., Vienna, 1979–82; cf. O. Gökyay, art. "Kātib Çelebi," in *EI²*, IV, 760–72; V. Ménage, art. "Ḥusayn Efendi," in *EI²*, III, 623–24; Heidrun Wurm, *Hezārfenn*; Mehmed Efendi [Yirmisekiz Çelebi Mehmed], *Le paradis des infidèles*, ed. Gilles Veinstein, Paris, 1981.

[77] See Abbé Giambattista Toderini, *De la littérature des turcs*, trans. Abbé de Cournand, Paris, 1789, I, 87 for Ottoman financial officials' mathematical ability; see George Larpent, *Turkey: Its History and Progress, from the Journals and Correspondence of Sir James Porter . . .*, London, 1854 (reprinted 1971), I, 268–69 for the efficiency of eighteenth-century scribes at the Sublime Porte.

[78] Faik Reşit Unat, *Osmanlı Sefirleri ve Sefaretnameleri*, Ankara, 1968.

[79] Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform*, 127–32; Ercümend Kuran, *Avrupa'da Osmanlı İkamet Elçiliklerinin Kuruluşu ve İlk Elçilerin Siyasî Faâliyetleri, 1793–1821*, Ankara, 1968.

[80] Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform*, 118–19, 138–39.

result on one level from the influx of foreign ideas, a full understanding requires noting, on a deeper level, that this process meshed with an unbalanced growth and extension of the *adab*-culture, one of the four main strands interwoven over the centuries to produce Islamic learning. In a sense, what the westernizing statesmen, and the other intellectuals who emerged largely from their midst, had done was to put Islamic civilization back where it was a millennium before by opening a new era of translation and cultural borrowing.[81] However creative the long-run potential of this new phase, in the short run it was painful for exponents not just of the *adab*-tradition, but of the other formulations of the Ottoman-Islamic learned culture as well.

Among scribes and civil officials, first, the cultural reorientation was anything but smooth or trouble-free. The reorientation, by itself, did not produce a decided upgrading of skill levels among the westernizing civil officials, as compared to their scribal forebears. Furthermore, not all civil officials shared equally in the process. With time, those who did not join in the opening to the West tended to assume the profile of Islamic conservatives, while those who did became increasingly secularized. This secularization did much to intensify political controversy. For the civil official culture-brokers combined their role as vanguard of westernization with the ability, at times, to influence policy in ways that had such drastic consequences as we have noted in the case of trade relations, the abortive fiscal reform, and egalitarianism. The mid-century reform period known as the *Tanzimat* ("the Reforms" par excellence) was a time of almost unrestrained control of policy-making by westernist civil officials. It was in reaction to their domination that a type of political protest movement then new to the Islamic world, though common in Europe, emerged: the Young Ottoman opposition movement of the 1860s and 1870s, precursor to the Young Turk movement of a generation later.

In the meantime, the other formulations of Ottoman culture were passing through painful transitions. The scientific tradition, having all but lost its continuity, was now entering a translation phase of its own; this was associated mainly with efforts at military reform and industrialization and was hindered not only by European competition but also by the high requirements of the technical fields in resources and expertise.[82] Religious scholars, after initially supporting reform in the belief that it would strengthen the empire as an Islamic state, seemed to fall into confusion when they discovered that reform was going to mean secularization.[83] In

[81] Cf. Ibrahim Abu-Lughod, *Arab Rediscovery of Europe: A Study in Cultural Encounters* (Princeton, 1963), 58–59.

[82] Carter Vaughn Findley, "Knowledge and Education in the Modern Middle East: A Comparative View," in *The Modern Economic and Social History of the Middle East in its World Context*, ed. Georges Sabagh, Los Angeles, forthcoming.

[83] Uriel Heyd, "The Ottoman 'Ulemâ and Westernization in the Time of Selîm III and Maḥmûd II," *Scripta Hierosalymitana.* IX: *Studies in Islamic History and Civilization* (1961), 63–96.

addition, religious scholars and mystics were divided among themselves over the acceptability, in sharia terms, of the then most prevalent forms of Islamic popular piety. Religious activists would have to resolve these problems—which the need to respond to the western challenge had brought to the fore—among themselves before they could again play an assertive role in relation either to other Ottomans or to the outside world.

In chapter 4, we shall consider Ottoman efforts to broaden literacy, examining one group of civil officials' educational experiences as we do so. In chapter 5, by exploring representative individuals' thought worlds, we shall also examine some of the ways Ottoman Muslims characteristically responded to the hard choices created by their cloven culture. As we pursue our collective biographical analysis through these and other chapters, we shall compare the experiences of non-Muslim officials and—among Muslims—of those who did, and did not, join in the cultural reorientation to the West—of both "modernists" and "traditionalists." As this analysis will show, the cultural rift in late Ottoman society was surely one of the most serious problems of the times, one whose aftereffects would remain key issues of the twentieth century.

IN SUMMATION

The drive for governmental reassertion, the transformation in conditions of service, the chronic fiscal-economic crisis, egalitarianism, and cultural dualism—these issues played key roles in shaping the context in which Ottoman civil officialdom developed. To analyze its emergence, we shall compare the scribal service of roughly 1800 with the civil officialdom of a century later. The voluminous documentation will make it possible both to measure quantitatively the attributes of sizable numbers of officials and to recover the thought world of particular individuals or the social contexts in which they lived and worked. As we do so, we shall compare the experiences of several types of officials—distinguished by ethnoreligious identity and cultural orientation—that emerged as reform progressed and the administration grew in size. In studying Ottoman civil officialdom in this way, we shall examine a group whose importance in relation to its own society may well have exceeded that of its western European counterparts. One evaluative problem we face, in fact, is that government functionaries of one sort or another dominated the discourse of late Ottoman society to the degree that they did. As the novelistic depictions cited in this chapter show, however, evidence exists to put the officials into critical perspective. To do so is a primary goal of the chapters that follow.

C H A P T E R I I

The Scribal Service on the Eve of Reform

While available sources on the scribal service of the late eighteenth century are not nearly so voluminous as those on the civil service that evolved out of it over the next century, they permit reconstruction of a synthesized view covering most of the topics that we shall analyze, in greater detail, for the later period. This chapter will present such a view, including discussion of the social origins of the officials, education and intellectual life, career patterns, and compensation. In the rest of the book, these subjects will become the themes of a series of chapters on the later period. As the analysis progresses, a comparative view of change between the two periods will emerge.

SOCIAL ORIGINS

To trace the social roots of a given group of people is often an elusive task, especially when ideas about how to understand their society are contradictory, as in the Ottoman case. Yet amid the confusion of views about the Ottoman milieu, certain organizational patterns stand out as especially significant. In addition, while concrete data do not exist for the eighteenth century on the social origins of scribal officials at all levels, such data do exist on those who achieved the highest offices, so providing a factual basis for conjectures about more controversial points.

The Structure of Ottoman Society

When we attempt to understand how the ruling class fitted into Ottoman society, contradictory indicators seem to stand in our way. At first, these

indicators appear quite heterogeneous. Scrutiny suggests, however, that they sort themselves into levelling forces, on one hand, and differentiating and stratifying forces, on the other. The interaction of these forces over the long sweep of Islamic history further suggests a pattern of oscillation over the centuries, as now one type of force prevailed, and then another. Part of this wave effect appears within the six-century span of Ottoman history.[1]

The levelling forces are associated with the two most important foci of authority in Islamic history, at least as seen from an Ottoman vantage—religious values, especially as embodied in the sharia, and the state. As widely noted, the Islamic legal tradition is strongly egalitarian in emphasis, recognizing essentially no collectivities intermediary between the individual and God, except for the community of the faithful (*umma*). This egalitarianism expresses itself in ways different from those of a modern secular legal system. We have mentioned that the sharia—a religious legal system emphasizing ritual and moral matters—could not assign equal status to believer and nonbeliever. The sharia did, however, sanctify a historically evolved system of accommodation for other monotheists living as minorities within predominantly Muslim societies (the *dhimma* system). Further, the sharia evolved in an environment where slavery and highly differentiated sex roles were as much a part of existing reality as was religious pluralism. The sharia developed its strong egalitarian emphasis, focused on the individual in relation to God, without eliminating these distinctions—male-female, slave-free, Muslim–non-Muslim—although the Qur'ânic revelation did upgrade the status of women and other disadvantaged groups from what it had been in pre-Islamic Arabia.[2] Whenever or wherever *shar'î* values have been highly influential, a push toward what we may term the sharia pattern of equality within recognized status groups has become a hallmark of Islamic societies.

The levelling tendency associated with strong Islamic states expresses both their championship of Islamic values—necessary, at least as a matter of expediency, if they are to achieve legitimation—and also a practical problem of power and self-preservation. In a complex society naturally articulated into groupings defined primarily in terms of kinship and religion, creating and maintaining a strong state meant limiting the autonomy of these natural groupings, or others derived from them. In the Middle East, an age-old way of asserting authority has been to portray the social or political order as a vastly extended household in which every

[1] This discussion revises Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform*, 18–20. I arrived at the idea of oscillation by comparing Hodgson's concept of the *a'yân-amir* system of the "middle periods" (c. 945–1500) with what Ottoman historians call the "*ayan* system" of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. See Hodgson, *Venture*, II, 64–69, 91–93.

[2] Hodgson, *Venture*, I, 180–83, 340–44.

member of society stands in a relation of dependency to the household head. The Ottoman idea of the state as a dynastic household, in which the sultan was head and every other person, outside the dynasty proper, was either his slave (that is, his agent, a member of the "ruling class") or part of his "flocks" (that is, a member of the "subject class"), expresses this view of sociopolitical relations in highly elaborated form. It should be noted that the terms western scholars translate as "ruling" and "subject classes" in themselves contain no counterpart of the term "class."[3] They are classificatory terms, but they denote none of the associations of "social class" as encountered in discussions of British, French, or German history, for example. The two Ottoman "classes" were not "estates," and the terms do not refer to a *ständische Gesellschaft*. The essential difference is that neither "ruling" nor "subject class" had access to status, wealth, or power by right, independently of the sultan. The whole meaning of the principle of official slavery was that those who enjoyed power, and thus also wealth and high status, should do so—not as members of social entities that controlled their own status or identity, independent of the state—but solely as agents of the sultan and solely at his pleasure. At the beginning of the sixteenth century, Machiavelli understood the point perfectly when he contrasted France, a state ruled by the prince and his barons, with the Ottoman Empire, a state ruled by the prince and his servants, who held power only by delegation and could not advance the French barons' pretensions to autonomy or even sovereignty.[4] Meanwhile, the kinship or household networks and the religious communities or other groupings that existed among the subject classes were supposed to be excluded from the exercise of political power by definition, since they were excluded from the ruling "class."

Sharia values, or what in time became known as such, influenced Islamic society most strongly in its earliest decades, under the Prophet and the Rightly Guided Caliphs (622–661). With varying success, pious activists have struggled to assert them ever since. After those early decades, as it evolved into a dynastic monarchy, the caliphate of Umayyads and Abbasids was strong enough to assert the primacy of state in relation to society, at least part of the time, until the end of Hodgson's high caliphal period (945). No states of comparable size or consolidation existed again until the rise of the Ottoman Empire, between the fourteenth and the sixteenth century, and the other Islamic regional empires contemporary

[3] The traditional terms for "ruling class" were *Osmanlı*, "belonging to the House of Osman" (cf. the *Tanzimat* idea of *Osmanlılık* as an imperial Ottoman supranationalism) or *askerî*, "military, belonging to the sultan's [originally] military retinue." The term for "subjects" was *reaya*, "flocks." In Ottoman patrimonial imagery, one was either the sultan's slave-soldier or part of his "flocks," over whom he exercised a divinely conferred trusteeship.

[4] Nicolò Machiavelli, *The Prince*, trans. W. K. Marriott (?), London, 1948, 29–30.

with it. These states then began to weaken in the seventeenth century, so opening another period of disintegration that lasted until the modern era of rapid change began at the end of the eighteenth century.

The long-term oscillation between levelling forces and stratifying forces basically results from the processes of disintegration that occurred in periods when strongly institutionalized authorities were not present to assert sharia values, or the state's pretension to control the social order, or both. The similarity of name betwen the *aʿyân-amîr* system that Hodgson associates with his "middle periods" (c. 945–1500)[5] and the *ayan* system of the Ottoman age of decline (c. 1600–1789) indicates a long-term consistency in the forces that characterize the periods of decentralization and disunity.

To sum the problem up, we can say that in the absence of strong central authorities to assert the levelling tendencies of religion and state, a variety of differentiating and stratifying forces, which were always present, would assert themselves. Lacking effective large-scale integration, such periods were dominated by local notables (*ayan*). The power of these figures depended on a variety of resources: kinship solidarity, wealth (especially control of land and water), often also the important social positions attainable through advanced religious education, or the ability to wield armed force. Sometimes the notables appeared primarily as professional religious specialists, especially judges (*kadı*), sometimes primarily as military commanders (*amir*). Beneath the notables, the urban society stood divided into its occupational specialties, organized more or less into "guilds." It is important to remember that the term scholars translate as "guild" literally means only "class" (*esnaf*, singular *sınıf*) and may often mean only an occupational classification, rather than an organized guild. Also found in the towns, especially, were certain voluntary associations, the most important in the long run being the devotional societies of mystics (*sufi*, *derviş*). Moving from town to countryside, we find the different worlds of peasant and pastoralist. At the "lowest" level, closest to the individual, we find the social entity that to many was most meaningful of all, or second most meaningful after Islam: the kinship network.

Muslims were always conscious of the forces for variegation and stratification that existed in their midst and would express them in various ways, even when the levelling forces were strongly asserted. For example, Ottoman literary evidence highlights a contrast between the egalitarian ethos of the poor and pious, on the one hand, and the grand pretensions of the wealthy and powerful, on the other.[6] Political philosophers, too, were fond of describing Islamic societies as consisting of several classes

[5] Hodgson, *Venture*, II, 64–69, 91–93.

[6] Sabri F. Ülgener, *İktisadî İnhitat Tarihimizin Ahlâk ve Zihniyet Meseleleri*, Istanbul, 1951, 45 and passim.

or estate-like entities; a typical conception is the fourfold one (*erkân-ı erbaa*) of scholars, warriors, tradesmen, and peasants. Such ideas partially overlap the articulation of official elites and that of the urban and rural economy, but are best understood as artifacts of a philosophical tradition going back to ancient Greece.[7] Detailed descriptions of Ottoman society, finally, use such terms as *esnaf* (guilds, classes, classifications) and *taife* (class, sect, body of people, or "nation"), so implying a consciousness of diversity that in some ways—as in the mere cataloguing of occupational or religious differences—was not at all incompatible with assertion of what we have called the levelling forces.

Sorting out the terms that have been used to talk about the structure of Islamic societies into levelling forces and differentiating or stratifying forces helps us see that the Ottoman system at its height represented the first alternative by asserting both the official primacy of the sharia and the state's control over articulation of "ruling" and "subject classes." Yet even when it was at its height, and still more in the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century era of decline, when notables prevailed at the local level, the state could not keep some organizational concepts derived from a more highly differentiated view of Islamic society from working their way into even the official view of social relations. Strongly in evidence at the end of the eighteenth century, these ideas continued to exert their influence into the reform era.

Among scribes and, later, civil officials, three such organizational forms came into view. Since they did not appear in unique cases, but recurred in a variety of settings, they can be regarded as organizational models. We may define the three as the models of the semi-autonomous confessional community, of the guilds and dervish orders, and of the patrimonial household.[8]

The first of these models was the normal historical means for integrating the non-Muslim communities into the fabric of Islamic state and society. The point was to give the religious leadership of each community legal and administrative duties, in addition to their religious ones, in the internal affairs of the community. The non-Muslim religious leaders' administrative and judicial functions in communal affairs corresponded roughly to the role that the *kadı* filled for the Muslims. The non-Muslim

[7] Mardin, *Genesis*, 94–102; id., "Historical Determinants of Social Stratification: Social Class and Class Consciousness in Turkey," *Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi*, XXII (1968), 116–17, 125–27; Lewis V. Thomas, *A Study of Naima*, ed. Norman Itzkowitz, New York, 1972, 78; Kemal Karpat, "The Transformation of the Ottoman State, 1789–1908," *IJMES*, III (1972), 243–44.

[8] Cf. Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform*, 20–39; id., "Acid Test," 339–41. While I referred in earlier publications to the "autonomous" confessional community, I have concluded that "semi-autonomous" is more accurate, since the non-Muslim religious communities in fact had only partial autonomy.

religious and communal leaders' administrative functions also helped to extend the government's—by modern-day standards—limited range of control over the populace. The pattern of treating non-Muslims as distinct, partially self-regulating enclaves within the Islamic state was then repeated on a smaller scale in various settings where non-Muslims were found—for example, where they served on the flanges of, or eventually within, the government services. Through the beginning of the nineteenth century, the best-known example associated with the government consisted of a set of offices monopolized by Phenariot Greeks, who rose through a distinct *cursus honorum* to the translatorship of the Imperial Fleet, to that of the Imperial Divan, and finally to the two princely thrones of Moldavia and Wallachia.[9] The growth in the urgency of diplomatic business attracted increasing attention to the role of the translators, arousing anxiety among Ottomans about the reliability of these coreligionists of the tsar, until the outbreak of the Greek Revolution provoked the dismissal and execution of the last translator of the Imperial Divan in 1821 and the attempt to replace him with what became the nucleus of the modernist Muslim diplomatic elite. The model of the semi-autonomous confessional community later reappeared, however, when non-Muslims again moved into the civil administration thanks to *Tanzimat* egalitarianism.

The model of the guilds and dervish orders emerged from the interconnected histories of those two types of voluntary associations, which the state found it useful to tolerate and try to dominate, through patronage if not by more assertive means. Key traits of this model include hierarchies that paralleled—in both nomenclature and organization—the familiar three-level guild pattern of apprentice, journeyman, and master.[10] Equally shared was the conception of the distinctive knowledge of guild and der-

[9] Cf. Benjamin Braude, "Foundation Myths of the *Millet* System," in *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire*, ed. Braude and Lewis, I, 69–88; Bernard Lewis, *The Jews of Islam*, Princeton, 1984; Steven Runciman, *The Great Church in Captivity*, Cambridge, 1968, 360–84; Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform*, 20–24, 77–78, 91–92. Essentially the upper crust of the Istanbul Greek families, the Phenariots were so called after the Fener (Phenar) quarter, where the Oecumenical Patriarchate is located.

[10] In the guilds, the basic term for apprentice was *çırak*; the journeyman was a *kalfa* (from Arabic *khalîfa*); the master was an *usta* (from Arabic *ustâdh*). Among mystics, the correspondingly tripartite pattern runs from disciple (*mürid*), to deputy of the spiritual master (*halife*, again from Arabic *khalîfa*), and spiritual master (*şeyh, pir*). Among scribes, the apprentices were called *çırak* or *şagird* ("student"); the regular clerks were commonly referred to in the plural as *kulefa*, singular *halife* or colloquially *kalfa* (all from Arabic *khalîfa*); the bureau chiefs were also usually referred to in the plural, as *hacegân*, singular *hace*, "master" (a Persian term sometimes also used among dervishes—cf. Arabic *ustâdh*), or colloquially *hoca*, "teacher." See Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform*, 24–30, 93–100; Cengiz Orhonlu, arts. "Khwādjegān-ı Dīwān-ı Hümāyūn," *EI*², IV, 907–909. The three-level hierarchies appear in different settings with variations and additions, some of the latter designating offices, rather than what can best be termed—at least among mystics—initiatic degrees.

vish order as something occult or secret that could only be learned by prolonged service to a master, not as a matter of facts or principles whose essence could be formulated and conveyed directly in words. Surely few things did more to set the tone of Muslim Ottoman society than did the pervasive influence of the mystics' concept of knowledge (*irfan*), with its esoteric overtones. The organizational model of the guilds and dervish orders reappeared in many social settings, including schools and government offices. Not dominated by the politicization that ruled the upper ranks, the lower scribal service offered one of the best examples of the pattern. The relevance of the dervish and guild traditions to civil officialdom has found imaginative confirmation in Ahmed Hamdi Tanpınar's novel, "The Chronometric Institute" (*Saatleri Ayarlama Enstitüsü*), which explores the death of Ottoman society and the troubled infancy of its republican replacement. The "clock-setting institute," a futuristic symbol of technological mastery, is actually a government agency, linked in its "origins" both to the dervish milieu, through the "patronage" of the imaginary şeyh Ahmed Zamanî, and to the world of the bazaar, through the hero's boyhood apprenticeship to watchmaker Nuri Efendi.[11]

The patrimonial household, finally, was the basic structural unit—with variations in different settings—for all of Ottoman society. At the lowest level, it characterized the extended families and other kinship networks in which the lives of individuals were submerged. At a higher level, this model structured the household-centered factionalism that characterized political life in the ruling class. At the highest level, this model provided the means, in metaphorically extended form, for integrating the entire state into a single "household." For the scribal service, this pattern became especially important for those of high rank, whose proximity to the sultan forced them to face at close range both the realities of their slave status and the intrigues of rivals for the sultan's favor. Later in this chapter, we shall examine a classic example of the ruthless struggles that resulted.

Other parts of this book will present examples of all three organizational patterns, so demonstrating that they remained important forces into the reform era. Initial insights into how these models affected Ottoman officials' lives appear as soon as we pursue the study of social origins into an examination of the family backgrounds of prominent late eighteenth-century officials.

Social Origins of the Last Chief Scribes

On the eve of the nineteenth-century era of reform, as noted in chapter 1, the Ottoman scribal service was a relatively small and homogeneous

[11] Ahmed Hamdi Tanpınar, *Saatleri Ayarlama Enstitüsü*, Istanbul, 1961 (originally published, 1954). It would be tempting to translate Şeyh Zamanî as "Father Time."

group of men, including some 2,000 officials, mostly serving in Istanbul. All of them were Muslims, but for a few non-Muslim translators. While biographical details exist only on officials who achieved prominence, most Muslim scribes probably entered official service via scribal households in Istanbul. There was enough of a hereditary motif in recruitment that one eighteenth-century chief scribe (*reis ül-küttab*), head of the grand vezir's chancery at the Sublime Porte, was described as having a dynastic claim on the office, inasmuch as his father, his mother's father, and a third man related to his mother had all held the office.[12] This case was exceptional only in degree. Scribal officials of this period were not always sons of other scribes; yet inbreeding was extensive.

In the biographies of the thirty-nine men who held the office of chief scribe between the outbreak of the Russo-Ottoman War of 1768–1774 and the transformation of the chief scribe into a foreign minister in 1836, the data on birthplaces, and on fathers' occupations, illustrate these points.[13] Fathers' occupations are recorded for all but eleven cases. Since enough is said about two other fathers to rule them out as members of the ruling class, the number of men whose father's occupation remains totally unindicated drops to nine.[14]

Of the thirty fathers with at least partially known occupations, six were scribal officials of the Sublime Porte. Of these six fathers, three had served as chief scribe.[15] Six more of the fathers had served at the Treasury or in other scribal positions outside the Sublime Porte.[16] This means already that 40 percent of the fathers with known occupations were scribal officials. But that does not exhaust the matter. Of the fathers with known occupations, one other held a nonscribal provincial administrative post,

[12] Ahmed Resmî, *Halifet ül-Rüesâ*, Istanbul, 1269/1852–1853, 128, on Mehmed Ataullah (*hanedan-ı riyasetden zuhur*); cf. İsmail Hami Danişmend, *İzahlı Osmanlı Tarihi Kronolojisi*, Istanbul, 1961, IV, 640 (*mansıb-ı mevrus*).

[13] Ahmed Resmî, *Halifet*, 106ff.; Danişmend, *Kronoloji*, IV, 636–48. The thirty-nine include the *rikâb reisleri*, whom Danişmend omits. These were deputies appointed to remain in Istanbul when the titular *reis ül-küttab*, as was customary, accompanied the commander in chief on campaign. On high-ranking scribal officials of slightly earlier date, see Norman Itzkowitz, "Eighteenth Century Ottoman Realities," *Studia Islamica*, XVI (1962), 73–93.

[14] Ahmed Resmî, *Halifet*, 102 (El-Hacc Mehmed Emin Recaî's father), 106 (Yenişehirli Osman Paşa's), 140 (Mustafa Rasih's father—but his father-in-law was Atıfzade Ömer Vahid, one of the thirty-nine chief scribes whose origins we are examining), 146 (Mehmed Emin Nahifî's father), 150 (Ahmed Vasıf's), 159 (Safî's), 164 (Ayntabîzade Mustafa Mazhar's), 170 (Ulu Arif Mehmed's); Danişmend, *Kronoloji*, IV, 647 (Mehmed Said Pertev's). The two fathers who can be ruled out as members of the ruling class are 118–19 (Halil Hamid Paşa's) and 162 (Mehmed Emin Vahid Paşa's); see below. Additional information is available from other sources about M. Said Pertev's family, as we shall see later in this chapter.

[15] Ahmed Resmî, *Halifet*, fathers who served as chief scribe: 108 (Abd ul-Rezzâk Bahir's), 128 (Mehmed Ataullah's), 132 (Seyyid Abdullah Berrî's father, who was El-Hacc Mustafa, another of the thirty-nine chief scribes of the years 1768–1836); other fathers at the Sublime Porte: 129 (Mehmed Raşid's), 166 (Mehmed Said Galib's), 191 (Mehmed Hâmid's).

[16] Ibid., 116 (Vahid Ömer's father), 125 (El-Hac Mustafa's; cf. Danişmend, IV, 639), 126 (Seyyid Feyzullah's), 145 (İngiliz Mahmud Raif's), 186 (Canib Efendi's); in addition Süleyman Necib's father served as official historian (*vak'anüvis*): Danişmend, *Kronoloji*, IV, 647.

two were religious functionaries, three were in palace service, and three more were military men.[17] Nine more fathers—another 30 percent of those with known occupations—were thus associated with branches of the ruling class other than the scribal service. Another three chief scribes began life as slaves.[18] Little or nothing is known of their fathers. But their masters, who stood *in loco parentis* as far as launching their careers went, were scribal officials. Thus the slaves were three more men who entered the scribal service through scribal households. Adding the three slaves to the twelve scribal officials' sons mentioned above brings the total proportion of chief scribes who came from scribal households to half. Adding the nine sons of men in other branches of the ruling class brings the proportion of chief scribes from ruling-class households to 80 percent. Only the final six fathers were free men who were not officials.[19]

Clearly most of the thirty-nine chief scribes of the period 1768–1836 were officials' sons, but the example of the slaves illustrates that hereditary links were not the only ones that could serve to launch scribal careers. In addition to master-slave relationships, other types of personal connections could suffice. For example, one chief scribe was a craftsman's son, orphaned at age three, and reared thereafter by one of the scribes of a prestigious office of the Sublime Porte.[20] This makes him yet another person who really entered scribal service through a scribal household, bringing those who did so to sixteen out of thirty with fathers, masters, or patrons of known occupation.

Scribal officials who did not grow up in scribal households were especially dependent for the success of their careers on establishing a patron-client "connection" (*intisab*) with a well-placed official. A vivid example of the importance of such relationships appears in the career of Ahmed Vasıf (c. 1730–1806), chief scribe in 1805–1806, but better remembered

[17] Ahmed Resmî, *Halifet*, provincial administrator father: 122 (Seyyid Mehmed Hayrî's); *ulema* fathers: 137 (Ebû Bekir Ratib's), 157 (Seyyid Mehmed Said Halet's); fathers in palace service: 175 (Mustafa Refik's), 177 (Küçük Arif Mehmed's), 183 (Mehmed Seyyidâ's—cf. Danişmend, *Kronoloji*, IV, 645); military fathers: 116 (İsmail Raif's), 147 (Çelebi Mustafa Resid's), 179 (Hüseyin Hüsnî's).

[18] Ahmed Resmî, *Halifet*, 112 (İbrahim Münib), 120 (Süleyman Feyzî—father a Georgian), 136 (Firdevsî Mehmed Emin—cf. Danişmend, *Kronoloji*, IV, 642).

[19] Ahmed Resmî, *Halifet*, 118 (Halil Hamid's father—cf. Danişmend, *Kronoloji*, IV, 638), 142 (Atıf Ahmed's, a perfumer [*attar* or *aktar*] and dervish), 135 (Dürrî Mehmed's, identified as Nakkaş-Başı Kayserili Mustafa Ağa in Danişmend, IV, 641), 162 (Mehmed Emin Vahid's), 193 (Mehmed Sadık's, a spinner of goat's hair [*muytab*]); also Danişmend, *Kronoloji*, IV, 647 (Mehmed Said Pertev's father, apparently a landowner; cf. İnal, *Şairler*, 1301). Halil Hamid's and M. Emin Vahid's fathers' occupations are not stated, but Ahmed Resmî says enough to indicate that they were very likely free men from the provinces with particularistic identifications incompatible with membership in the ruling class. Halil Hamid's father is described as İranî Mustafa; Vahid's is described as reportedly a Syrian Nusayrî, i.e., an Alawî, a member of a Shii subsect.

[20] Ahmed Resmî, *Halifet*, 193 (Mehmed Sadık).

for his work as official historian.[21] Born in Baghdad to a family about which no information survives, he was educated in Van, Kars, and Aleppo, began his career as librarian to one paşa, then "adhered" (*yapışıp*) to another who was appointed governor of Kaffa (Feodosia) in the Crimea. This connection ended abruptly when the Russians captured Vasıf, sent him to St. Petersburg as a prisoner of war in 1771, then sent him back in 1772 to convey Empress Catherine's peace proposals to Istanbul.

The dramatic circumstances of his return attracted attention to Vasıf and really seem to have launched his official career. The sultan sought information from Vasıf and gave him gifts. Thereafter, Vasıf "frequented" (*tereddüd*) a powerful chief scribe until their relations broke down, then finally acquired the connection (*kesb-i taalluk*) with another prominent scribal official that got him an appointment in the scribal service proper, in one of the prestigious offices of the Sublime Porte, and admission to the rank of the *hacegân* (discussed in the next section). From the early 1770s on, Vasıf rose through a series of scribal posts, with incidents of dismissal and hardship along the way. Participating in a number of important diplomatic negotiations, he served as envoy to Spain (1787–1788) and was three times official historian (*vak'anüvis*), before capping his career by serving as chief scribe. Vasıf's professional start depended entirely on gaining important men's patronage, a process in which both his talents and the exceptional circumstances of his return from Russian captivity played major roles. Even for those who came from scribal families, such patronage relations could be very important, as many examples attest.[22]

Since the Ottoman state had no clearly defined personnel policy for the scribal service, it relied, in effect, on personal forms of cooptation among its officials. This state of affairs was not limited to the scribes. Even the religious establishment, which supposedly had an elaborate system of recruitment by examination, was famous for favoritism and nepotism.[23] To

[21] Ahmed Resmî, *Halifet*, 148–51; Mücteba İlgürel, art. "Vâsıf," *İA*, XV (?), 214–17; Ahmed Vâsıf, *Mehâsinü 'l-Âsâr ve Hakâikü 'l-Ahbâr*, ed. Mücteba İlgürel, Istanbul, 1978, XIX–XXXVI.

[22] Ahmed Resmî, *Halifet*, 166 (Mehmed Said Galib), 186 (Canib Efendi); Mustafa Mazhar (ibid., 164) himself became the protector of his nephew Âkif, whose rivalry with Pertev Paşa will be discussed below. The most colorful illustration of the importance of patronage relations in this period concerns Keçecizade İzzet Mollâ, father of Fuad Paşa, one of the grand vezirs of the *Tanzimat*. As a young religious scholar, İzzet Mollâ became so despondent about his prospects that he bought an oversized bottle of *rakı* and set out by boat for Göksu, an outing spot on the Bosphorus, to commit suicide in pleasant surroundings. As he passed the mansions fronting the Bosphorus, a Phenariot dignitary, who was struggling to read an Ottoman literary work, caught sight of the young mollâ's turban and hailed him for help with difficult passages. Their conversation deflected İzzet from his plan for the day, led to his being introduced by his interlocutor to Halet Efendi, then Mahmud II's favorite, and so solved İzzet's problem by helping launch his career. See İnal, *Şairler*, 736.

[23] Madeline Zilfi, "Elite Circulation in the Ottoman Empire: Great Mollas of the Eighteenth Century," *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient*, XXVI (1983), 318–64.



Ill. 2. A Provincial Governor-General, with His Retinue, en Route to a New Post, Late Eighteenth Century.

be eligible for appointment as a provincial governor-general (*vali*), too, a high official of the seventeenth or eighteenth century had to have the immense household that could fill the manpower needs of a provincial government.[24] One of the most arresting images of the period was the lengthy procession that such a household made on the march from one post to another (see illustration 2).

The scribal service of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century was thus recruited first from sons of scribes and other persons reared in scribal households and secondarily from others who were not from scribal households but had established patronage relationships with scribal figures.

The data on the birthplaces of the chief scribes are fragmentary, but support this interpretation obliquely. Only sixteen men's birthplaces are clearly stated. Among these, only twelve—about 30 percent of the thirty-nine chief scribes—came from someplace other than Istanbul: Georgia in the case of one slave, Baghdad in one case, otherwise towns in Anatolia.[25] In most other cases, the birthplace remains unnamed, but was probably

[24] I. Metin Kunt, *The Sultan's Servants: The Transformation of Ottoman Provincial Government, 1550–1650*, New York, 1983, 88–93.

[25] Ahmed Resmî, *Halifet*, 102, 106, 112, 118, 120, 122, 126, 135, 137, 142, 150, 159, 164, 170, 193; Danişmend, *Kronoloji*, IV, 647.

Istanbul, considering that most chief scribes began as sons, slaves, or protégés of members of the ruling class, who tended to concentrate—the scribes, especially—in the capital. Mention of birthplaces outside Istanbul thus becomes a crude indicator of the extent to which scribal recruitment was not fully hereditary, although the provincial-born might have connections of other kinds with the ruling class. In fact, of the thirty-nine chief scribes under study, so few appear to have started out as provincials with no familial or patronage connections to the ruling class as to suggest gaps in the recording of a consistent reality.[26]

To sum up the inferences that emerge from the data on the origins of the thirty-nine chief scribes of the period 1768–1836, referring also to our discussion of broader questions of Ottoman social organization, recruitment through familial or other personal connections is a trait of both the guild tradition and the model of the patrimonial household. The fact that recruitment was not exclusively hereditary finds its full significance in the context of the patrimonial outlook. For, as is clear from the patrimonial conception of the state, with the ruling class as "slaves" of the ruler and the subjects as his "flocks," relationships of kinship were not the only meaningful ones in this context. Where the junior member of the relationship possessed potential for a scribal career, master-slave or patron-client relationships could serve equally well. Many a young man got his start in the scribal service by such links, which marriage to a woman from the master's or patron's household often later reinforced. The senior parties to the relationships used them to augment the household-centered networks through which they sought to defend themselves in the intense factionalism of the upper official echelons. We shall presently encounter examples of such marriages and factional alliances.

EDUCATION AND INTELLECTUAL HORIZONS

In introducing the problem of cultural dualism, we have already spoken about the worldly literary culture (*adab*) and its close links to the scribal service. We also emphasized how expansion of the domain of the *adab*-culture helped to launch Ottoman westernization, and thus to define the arena of cultural conflict in the nineteenth century. Here we must tie these general considerations to the specific cultural conditions existing at the end of the eighteenth century, before the scribes had felt the impact of the nineteenth-century reforms. We shall do so by examining the educational opportunities open to scribes and the intellectual activity of a leading scribal litterateur.

As in so many other respects where we survey the conditions of the

[26] Ahmed Resmî, *Halifet*, 118–19 (Halil Hamid Paşa), 135 (Dürrî Mehmed); Danişmend, *Kronoloji*, IV, 647 (Mehmed Said Pertev Paşa).

scribal service on the eve of reform, one of the most important points is the low horizon from which the reformers would have to begin. Such was the case, however oddly it contrasts with the importance of the scribal *adab*-culture. In fact, the elitism of Ottoman intellectual life links these facts together in an easily understood way. For prevailing ideas about literacy and education would have kept Ottoman society from producing many highly qualified individuals under any conditions, and imperial decline had surely aggravated such problems.

Given the millennial Middle Eastern tradition of cultural elitism and low literacy, Ottoman society was not the region's first to regard the written word, not as a means of mass communication, but as a restricted medium in which the cognoscenti displayed their erudition to one another. By Ottoman times, it is not too much to see in this attitude another aspect of the influence that the mystical concept of knowledge as esoteric exerted across all domains of cultural life. Linguistic and literary elitism was, if anything, one more Middle Eastern tradition that the Ottomans carried to new heights of elaboration. For their official language—an artificial composite of Turkish, Arabic, and Persian—was probably more remote from common speech than that of any other Islamic state. The character of the language forced a strong identification of education with acquisition of language skills—an association that acquired a new life in the reform era, as chapter 4 will show. Meanwhile, the literacy rate of Ottoman Muslims in 1800—while it can only be estimated—cannot have stood much above 1 percent, compared to a Chinese rate of 15 to 25 percent and a Japanese rate of 25 to 40 percent at the same date.[27] The debit side of Ottoman cultural elitism was, then, a prodigious waste of human resources.

Had Ottoman educational institutions been in a flourishing condition in the eighteenth century, the waste might have been less; but education was not flourishing. The Ottoman capital, home to most of the scribal officials of the period, had an impressive array of educational institutions, but they were not organized for efficient use. The leading historian of Turkish education has described most prominent officials and writers of

[27] Carter Vaughn Findley, "Knowledge and Education in the Modern Middle East: A Comparative View," in *The Modern Economic and Social History of the Middle East in its World Context*, ed. Georges Sabagh, forthcoming; Evelyn Rawski, *Education and Popular Literacy in Ch'ing China*, Ann Arbor, 1979, 23; Ronald P. Dore, *Education in Tokugawa Japan*, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1965, 317–22. These figures must be used with caution. What it means to be literate varies among cultures. If ability to write one's name provides a minimal standard in western Europe, it would not do so in China, where it would signify only ability to write two or three characters out of thousands. Some of the variations in literacy figures reported for the late Ottoman Empire may have to do with variations in standards of measurement, especially given the remoteness of education in the Qur'ânic elementary schools from meaningful literacy.

the early nineteenth century as "autodidacts."[28] An examination of educational facilities shows why.

For officials from affluent families, education often began under the care of a slave "tutor" (*lâla*). The *lâla* was generally ignorant and unqualified to do more than introduce the child to certain facets of the popular culture while taking care of him. The *lala*'s function was not without value for a child of elite family who might not otherwise acquire much of the "common touch"; but it is not surprising that nineteenth-century intellectuals, in an era of rising expectations, commented critically on the *lâla*'s role.[29]

The formal institution for educating children was the Qur'ânic elementary school (*mekteb*). This was generally a one-room schoolhouse that adjoined a mosque and was presided over by a teacher (*hoca*) from the lesser *ulema*. While modern views of these schools are highly negative, some of their traits appear in the best U.S. elementary schools of the late twentieth century. The schools had a kind of "open-classroom" system, with students of different levels in the same room, although the range of ages was so wide as to bear closer analogy to the one-room schoolhouses of the U.S. pioneer era. The teacher might use more advanced students as assistants (*kalfa*) to tutor the less advanced.[30] As always in "open classrooms," there was some noise and confusion. Students were allowed to leave the room one at a time. To keep track of entrances and exits, there was, by the door, a "came and went board" (*geldi gitti tahtası*), with *gitti* ("he or she went") on one side and *geldi* ("he or she came back") on the other, so that each student could turn the board over on the way out and back. Students would write on slates (*yaz boz tahtası*) or else—presage of today's plastic overlays—on "write and wipe" papers (*yaz sil kâğıtları*) lacquered so that they could be written on with a special ink and then wiped clean for reuse.[31]

[28] Ergin, *Maarif*, I, 315–17.

[29] Mehmed Kaplan et al., *Yeni Türk Edebiyatı Antolojisi*, Istanbul, c. 1975, II, 157–60; cf. Yahya Kemal Beyatlı, *Çocukluğum, Gençliğim, Siyasî ve Edebî Hatıralarım*, Istanbul, 1971, 17–18. Cf. the view of the old servant Hüseyin Ağa in Abdülhak Şinasi Hisar, *Ali Nizamî Beyin Alafrangalığı ve Şeyhliği*, Istanbul, 1952, discussed in chapter 5.

[30] The terms for student (*şagird*), assistant (*kalfa*), and teacher (*hoca*) recall the personnel designations of guilds, dervish orders, and scribal bureaus.

[31] I am indebted to my son, Benjamin Findley, and his second grade teacher, Nancy Blume of Barrington School in the Upper Arlington system, Columbus, Ohio, for making me aware of the resemblances between contemporary open classrooms and Islamic *mektebs* of yore. Miss Blume's "came and went board" has the names of the students with a revolving arrow to point to them. Cf. Mehmet Zeki Pakalın, *Osmanlı Tarih Deyimleri ve Terimleri Sözlüğü* (*OTD*), Istanbul, 1946–1953, I, 661 (*geldi gitti tahtası*); James W. Redhouse, *A Turkish and English Lexicon*, Istanbul, 1890, 2184, s. v. *yaz*; Hermann [Ármin] Vámbéry, *Sittenbilder aus dem Morgenlande*, Berlin, 1876, 121; Halid Ziya Uşakhgil, *Kırk Yıl*, Istanbul, 1969, 17, 19. These sources date from well after the eighteenth century but describe a conservative milieu in which such conditions are not likely to have changed much during the interim.

Despite these resemblances, the *mektebs* differed from present-day ideas of pedagogy in many ways, some of which give just ground for criticism. Most teachers were ill-qualified. Much of the noise came from children repeating their lessons in unison, struggling to memorize everything, whether or not they understood it. As much as rote learning, strict discipline distinguished the concept of education: not just *talim*, inculcation of rational knowledge, but *terbiye*, which includes character development. The reigning idea of character development had its symbol hanging on the wall. This was the *falaka*—used to secure the ankles of one who was to be whipped on the soles of his or her feet. Not without reason did a father taking his son to school for the first time repeat to the teacher a ritual phrase: "His flesh is yours, but his bones are mine."[32] The schools opened early in the morning and ran until the time of the midafternoon prayer, with no provision for play or exercise.

The greatest problem, however, was curricular. The fullest descriptions say that the curriculum included the alphabet, writing, fundaments of religion (*ilm-i hal*), arithmetic, some history and geography, Qur'ân, and Qur'ân recitation (*tecvid*). As commonly experienced, however, the object of a *mekteb* education was to memorize the Qur'ân—without systematic instruction in Arabic.[33] The religious ceremonies that attended enrollment in school and completion of the Qur'ân offered moving examples of the way religious values suffused Ottoman life.[34] Yet the ritual emphases could not conceal the likelihood that such schools would produce many functional illiterates. A child might "finish" the Qur'ân without understanding anything, even without being able to identify the letters of the alphabet.[35] To become a great intellectual, one had to be made of stern stuff indeed.

For boys who completed the *mekteb*, the only other formal education was that of the *medrese*, or higher school of religious studies, although there were a variety of educational opportunities of other types. (Girls got no further education at all, except at home.) Most boys would go on from the *mekteb* to apprenticeship, the normal route even into the scribal offices. An apprentice scribe would learn not only from working under the direction of a senior official, but also from teachers retained in the Sublime Porte and the Treasury offices, until late in the nineteenth century, to teach Arabic, Persian, and various script styles.[36] Apprentice scribes were virtually expected to come from homes where needed skills were known and presumably taught to them: this was one rationalization for nepotism in recruitment.[37] Those from wealthy families often had private tutors. Because the workday did not begin in government offices until late morning, young scribes had time to attend lectures in the *medreses*.[38] Some of them frequented dervish meeting halls where Persian and other subjects might be taught.[39] Scribes also had access to the libraries scattered about Istanbul, many of them endowed by scribal intellectuals of earlier generations.[40] Many of the learned turned their homes into virtual literary clubs. A young man in regular attendance at such a household might further not only his education, but also his career.[41] Government offices, too, were scenes of ongoing discussion. The main problem with this rich cultural environment was that it was loosely organized, so that a young man could spend a great deal of time going about the city from one type of facility to another.[42]

A great scribal intellectual of the late eighteenth century, like Ahmed Vasıf Efendi, gives a clear indication of what this cultural environment could produce. We have already encountered him as a man of nonscribal background who had to depend entirely on personal connections to launch his career—and who had certain misadventures in the process. Here our interest shifts to Vasıf the intellectual. In the late 1770s or early 1780s, we find Vasıf taking part in efforts to revive Ottoman printing by acquiring the equipment of the first Ottoman press from the heirs of its founder, İbrahim Müteferrika. Vasıf then served, jointly with another official, Mehmed Raşid, director (*beylikçi*) of the Office of the Imperial Divan, as the first director of the government printing works (*Matbaa-ı Âmire*).[43] In addition, Vasıf produced a number of literary works. Along with some indifferent poetry and several translations from Arabic, these

[32] Beyatlı, *Hatıralarım*, 24; Ömer Seyfettin, *Bütün Hikâyeleri*, Istanbul, 1974, III, 1372–79 ("Falaka").

[33] Pakalın, *OTD*, III, 202 (*sıbyan mektebi*); Uşaklıgil, *Kırk Yıl*, 10, 17.

[34] Beyatlı, *Hatıralarım*, 1–2, 21–27.

[35] Ergin, *Maarif*, I, 70 n. 2 (his own experience); II, 384–86; Aşçı Dede İbrahim, *Risale*, TY3222, 14b ff., TY78, 87ff. (failure to learn the Qur'ân in *mekteb*, c. 1840); İnal, *Şairler*, 1113–14, bitter memories of Süleyman Nazif (b. 1869); Tahsin Demiray, ed., *Canlı Tarihler*, Istanbul, 1944–1947, I, 13–17 (Ebubekir Hâzım Tepeyran's school experiences); IV, 3–5 (Veled Çelebi İzbudak's).

[36] Ahmed Lûtfi, *Tarih-i Lûtfi*, Istanbul, 1290–1328/1873–1910, IV, 115–16; İnal, *Şairler*, 1382, 1412, 1483; on the Sublime Porte and other major government departments as "schools," Ergin, *Maarif*, I, 51–67.

[37] Ahmed Resmî, *Halifet*, 128, referring to chief scribe Mehmed Ataullah as the "necessarily well-educated son" (*mahdum-ı maarifüzum*) of another chief scribe and as a member of a "dynasty of chief scribes" (*hanedan-ı riyaset*).

[38] Aşçı Dede İbrahim, *Risale*, TY3222, 40b; TY78, 187 (late 1840s).

[39] Ergin, *Maarif*, I, 133–35, 197–201; the Aşçı Dede İbrahim memoirs contain much evidence of this practice.

[40] Ergin, *Maarif*, I, 209–16; Toderini, *Littérature*, II, 33–34.

[41] Ergin, *Maarif*, I, 315–17.

[42] Cf. Richard L. Chambers, "The Education of a Nineteenth-Century Ottoman *Âlim*, Ahmed Cevdet Paşa," *IJMES*, IV (1973), 440–64.

[43] Vâsıf, *Mehâsin*, ed. İlgürel, 132–34.

include a narrative of his embassy to Spain (*İspanya Sefaretnamesi*),[44] a work on the Napoleonic invasion of Egypt, and—most important—a great history, his *Mahasin ül-Âsar ve Hakaik ül-Ahbar*. Two volumes of this, covering the period 1752–1774, were published at the government printing plant in Vasıf's lifetime. Additional manuscript volumes continued the account to 1804.

Written in the ornate style beloved of scribal intellectuals, Vasıf's history stands out for its critical evaluation of earlier works and for the immediacy gained from original documentation and extensive personal experience. For example, he had participated in a number of the councils, and witnessed some of the battles, that he recounts from the tense period preceding the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca in 1774.[45] In 1791–1792, to cite another example, he performed important missions in connection with negotiation of the Treaties of Sistova and Jassy.[46] Based on records kept at the time, his accounts of the assemblies convened to debate difficult issues contain some of the most dramatic documentation available for any facet of Ottoman history.[47] Selim III admired the early part of Vasıf's history and asked him to continue it. The leading Ottoman historian of the nineteenth century, Ahmed Cevdet Paşa (1825–1892), preferred Vasıf to other Ottoman historians of the late eighteenth century.[48] Most knowledgeable scholars today would no doubt share this evaluation.

Vasıf's work represents both the best standards of the *adab*-culture and its westward expansion.[49] We might well ask, however, how many more Vasıfs Ottoman educational institutions of his day might have produced, had they been better equipped for the task? Ottoman statesmen of the period were beginning to ponder this question and look for ways to answer it.

[44] Perhaps partly because of his destination, Vasıf's narrative is not one of the most significant; see Unat, *Sefaretnameler*, 144–47.

[45] Vâsıf, *Mehâsin*, ed. İlgürel, XXIII–XXIV; id., *Mahasin ül-Âsar ve Hakâik ül-Ahbar*, Bulak, 1246/1830–31, II, 141–42, 144–48, 143, 177–78, 181.

[46] Vâsıf, *Mehâsin*, ed. İlgürel, XXIX–XXX; id., *Mahasin ül-Âsar ve Hakâik ül-Ahbar*, Istanbul U. Library, TY5980, pp. 221–25 (my pagination of unpaginated Ms.); Ahmed Cevdet, *Tarih-i Cevdet*, 2d ed., Istanbul 1309/1891–1892, V, 122, 159–61 (armistice negotiation with Russians at Kalas, 1791), 232–33 (appointed to receive fortresses surrendered by Austrians, 1791).

[47] Carter Vaughn Findley, art. "Madjlis al-Shūrā," *EI*², V, 1082–86. Vasıf and other historians, like Şanizade and Cevdet, include accounts based on contemporary records detailed enough to enable them to quote statements—often colorful and heated—that participants made in the councils.

[48] Ahmed Resmî, *Halifet*, 148–51; Franz Babinger, *Geschichtsschreiber der Osmanen und ihre Werke*, Leipzig, 1927, 335–37; Mücteba İlgürel, art. "Vâsıf," *İA*, XV (?), 214–17; Vâsıf, *Mehâsin*, ed. İlgürel, XIX–LIV.

[49] He was not entirely a paragon, however: he may have been vain and corrupt: Vâsıf, *Mehâsin*, ed. İlgürel, XXXI–XXXII, XXXVI–XXXIX.

CONDITIONS OF SERVICE

To understand what life was like inside late eighteenth-century scribal bureaus requires considering such points as their physical setting and ambiance, characteristic lines of promotion, and the politicization of high office. Two centuries after the fact, evidence on some of these points is difficult to recover, but a fortunate conjuncture of pictorial and literary evidence makes it possible to launch this discussion with an exceptional insight into one of the most ephemeral and ill-documented aspects of Ottoman official life.

Physical Setting and Ambiance of the Offices

The frontispiece reproduces an engraving from one of the most valuable caches of visual evidence on the eighteenth-century Ottoman Empire: the more than 200 engravings in the large folio edition of Ignatius Mouradgea d'Ohsson's *Tableau général de l'Empire othoman*.[50] The text identifies the office shown as a department of the "Ministry of Finance" (*Bab-ı Defterî*), but nothing differentiates this office discernibly from those under the grand vezir at the Sublime Porte. So far as can now be stated, this may be the only interior view of an Istanbul government bureau for the entire time span that this book covers.

The engraving, while well executed, would be difficult to interpret without textual evidence, which d'Ohsson does not supply in this instance. Since there is little reason to think that physical conditions in the offices changed greatly until the introduction of European-style furnishings in the later nineteenth century, texts from mid-century prove helpful, the key question being whether or not they make it possible to "read" the visual detail in the engraving. Several sources do so, the most useful being a passage, referring to the 1840s, in the memoirs of Aşçı Dede İbrahim Halil.

The frontispiece shows an interior decorated in the style, influenced by the European baroque, that was popular in the Ottoman Empire in the eighteenth century and the early nineteenth.[51] The style itself indicates the Ottoman intellectuals' westward reach—as well, perhaps, as the east-

[50] Ignatius Mouradgea d'Ohsson, *Tableau général de l'Empire othoman*, 3 vols. in folio, Paris, 1787, 1789, 1820. Cf. the contemporary edition in seven small volumes, with apparently the same text, but few of the illustrations. What we have used as a frontispiece appears as plate 178, following p. 340, in vol. III of the large folio edition. Although not published until 1820, the illustrations of vol. III are by the same artists as those in the earlier volumes and thus presumably are contemporary with them. The small format edition (VII, 264) includes a reference to this plate, even though it is not reproduced there, indicating that the office shown was in "l'hôtel du ministère des finances."

[51] Günsel Renda, *Batılılaşma Döneminde Türk Resim Sanatı*, Ankara, 1977.

Ill. 3. Officials Shown Meeting as a Council (*Divan*)—and Sitting on a *Divan*—c. 1800–1830. The original caption (not shown) identified the figures (L. to R.) as a servant (*hademe*) waiting on the officials, the head of the Appointments (*Rüus*) Office, the secretary of the grand vezir's steward (*kâhya*), the grand vezir's corresponding secretary (*mektubî*), the purse-bearer (*kisedar*) of the Appointments Office, and the purse-bearer of the chief bailiff (*çavuş başı*); on these officials, all subordinates of the grand vezir, see Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform*, 70–79. A small tray with writing implements rests on the *divan* at right; a brazier for heat rests on a metal tray on the floor.

the supervisory officials, bearing titles such as chief clerk (*ser kalfa*), examining clerk (*mümeyyiz*), or purse-bearer (*kisedar*),[61] and the director of the office, whose title would have been specific to the bureau and who would have been classed as one of the master clerks (*hacegân*) of the imperial divan. This term had become, in effect, a rank designation signifying admission into the upper scribal service.

As the frontispiece shows, the clerks had no desks. Rather, between clerks and apprentices stood low chests, on which registers and writing implements were laid. Sitting cross-legged, the officials held the papers or registers on which they wrote in their hands or on their knees. To see the calligraphic elegance with which they wrote—except in special situations

[61] The purse-bearer (*kisedar*)'s functions included filing documents in sacks (*torba, kise*) and collecting fees for the transactions performed in his office; see Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform*, 83.

where it was permitted to use "broken" (*kırma*) script styles—is to marvel that scribes and calligraphers could write in this way.[62] As the picture shows, the documents might take the form of either separate sheets or register (*defter*) entries; the artist gives a good idea of the characteristic, long and narrow shape of Ottoman registers.

The chests in the left foreground of the frontispiece were for document storage. Documents on single sheets were first rolled up, often with enclosures, then put in sacks, which would be stored in the large chest when not in use. According to Aşçı Dede İbrahim,[63] every examining clerk (*mümeyyiz*), in addition to checking over the work of the ordinary clerks, had a special "in-hand sack" (*derdest torbası*), containing documents that were not yet finished. Every morning, this would be taken out of the chest, and the examining clerk would distribute the documents to the clerks who were working on them. Officials who took work home with them had a special sack for that purpose. In general, storage in sacks and chests was the Ottoman counterpart of the file folders and filing cabinets of today.

The frontispiece gives an idea, further, of the writing implements that the clerks used. At the knee of the first apprentice on the right, lying on his cushion, appears a *divit*—a utensil, normally made of brass, consisting of a pen case joined to an inkwell with a tight-fitting cover, the whole made so that the owner could transport it stuck into his sash. Atop the chests between clerks and apprentices other implements appear less clearly. These would have included another type of pen case with a sliding top.[64] According to one source, each chest would have had on it eight or ten small porcelain vessels, containing red and black ink—both thick and thin—as well as water, small sponges, and gold or blue blotting sand, all this set on a small tray and surrounded with reed pens, pen knives, and paper shears.[65] One of the first tasks of an apprentice would be to learn how to care for these implements. Scholars working in the Istanbul archives today come to associate their labor with seeing and hearing tiny grains of blotting sand, still stuck to the dried ink, roll down the document as it unfolds, then fall onto the tabletop and into their laps.

Enough has been written about procedure in the offices and councils that these subjects need not be taken up here in detail.[66] Several points merit emphasis, however, as evidence of the spirit that animated the

[62] Cf. Galip Kemali Söylemezoğlu, *Hariciye Hizmetinde Otuz Sene*, Istanbul, 1949–1955, I, 10, photograph of his elderly father, Ali Kemali Paşa, governor of Konya (1896), seated on his divan, pen and inkpot on a cushion at his side, with one knee drawn up and a paper resting on it.

[63] Aşçı Dede İbrahim, *Risale*, TY3222, 40b; TY78, 187.

[64] Ibid., TY3222, 43b; TY78, 193.

[65] Vámbéry, *Sittenbilder*, 205.

[66] E.g., Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform*, 85–91; id., "Madjlis al-Shūrā," *EI²*, V, 1083–84.

scribal service. For example, the workload of the offices, while varying from time to time, would not appear strenuous by present-day U.S. standards. We have noted that apprentices were allowed to attend *medrese* lectures in the morning. Nineteenth-century evidence indicates that activity in the offices scarcely began more than an hour before noon. The workday varied in length seasonally, with the stated number of hours at times falling below five.[67] During working hours, too, the pace of labor appears in all periods to have left a good bit of time for conviviality, or for other pursuits, such as the learned or mystical discussions that made of the offices major centers of intellectual life.

The outstanding traits of scribal procedure, certainly, were formalism and repression of individual initiative. The scribes seemed to conceive of their work in craftsman-like terms, as a matter of producing documents in established genres. In terms of the linguistic skills required, the variety of script styles, and the formal properties of the different genres, an apprentice scribe did have a great deal to learn before he could pass as a master. In that sense, the scribal craft was a demanding one. But the repetitiveness and formalism of the work in some departments must have been mind-numbing indeed.

To cite an extreme example, the *Rüus Kalemi*, a section of the Office of the Imperial Divan at the Sublime Porte, was responsible for producing and recording warrants of appointment (*rüus*). While there were several varieties of these, the registers of the office show them to be documents of sometimes several hundred words in length, hardly varying from example to example of a given variety except in the name of the recipient and the date. The warrants recorded in the register must have corresponded to identical texts written out separately for transmission to the appointees.[68] Both the warrants and the register entries were exactly the kind of thing that a modern government would handle with blank forms. The Ottomans, too, began to do this in the mid-nineteenth century; but through the 1780s, they had no way to produce printed forms.

The routine of this particular office surely would have been unendurable without a relaxed pace. Even in other offices, eighteenth-century Ottoman officials, like their contemporaries in other countries, presumably spent far more time on repetitive tasks like copying than would have been the case at any time in the twentieth century, even before the advent of photocopying machines and word processors. For example, the only way to produce multiple copies of a document was to assemble a number of efendis in a room and have someone dictate the text to all of them simultaneously. If Ottoman scribes, devoting their lives to document-producing

[67] Vámbéry, *Sittenbilder*, 205; Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform*, 191–94.

[68] Observations based on research in BBA, Rüus defterleri 163, 168, 175, 184, 217, 221–23, 234–35, 250, entries on appointments in central offices, c. 1830s and after.

routines like these, seemed oblivious to the impact of their work on the outside world, perhaps it was because the impact occurred far beyond the domain of their experience, except for those who rose to hold high offices outside the traditional scribal bureaus proper.

The lack of individual initiative, meanwhile, becomes unmistakable from the stereotyped genres of the documents and from the many checks and approvals required for the issue of almost any document. The role of the *mümeyyiz* or examining clerk, a supervisor found in almost every office, combined this function with a kind of stylistic quality control. But his was normally only one of several approvals required—a fact of which visible evidence appears on the margins and backs of many archival documents. Ottoman officials were, after all, slaves of the sultan, not servants of the public; and it was all too easy to learn the hard way that one had acted in a way that higher authority did not approve. This concern no doubt helps explain the oblique phraseology of scribal documents, the preference for passive verbs that conceal the subjects of the actions recounted or recommended, the rhetorical convention of referring to oneself in the third person singular with expressions of debasement and to one's addressee in the third person plural with expressions of exaltation, the common omission of signatures or other express indications of authorship, and the subjoining to even the faintest suggestion of some stock concluding phrase such as "and to command belongs to him to whom all commanding belongs."[69]

To anyone acquainted with the documentation, then, the d'Ohsson engraving used as the frontispiece for this volume conjures up not only a physical setting, but also a complex of social relations and procedural conventions. It even begins to evoke a distinctive thought world. What was it like to pursue a career in a room like the one the engraving shows? What changes did a young man experience as he moved from the apprentices' low cushion to the clerks' higher one, to the ranks of the supervisors at the far end of the room, or beyond?

Recruitment, Training, and Promotion

The best way to summarize scribal service patterns of the late eighteenth century is to examine the fullest contemporary description of them. Like the d'Ohsson engraving, this refers to conditions in the offices of the Treasury (*Bab-ı Defterî*), rather than the grand-vezirial chancery, headed by the chief scribe, at the Sublime Porte (*Bab-ı Âli*). While this study emphasizes the grand-vezirial chancery and the offices that evolved out of it,

[69] Redhouse's translation of the Arabo-Perso-Turkish jumble that was the gala windup of many documents submitted to the palace: *emr-ü-ferman hazret-i men lehü 'l-emrindir*. See *A Turkish and English Lexicon*, 198, s.v. *emr*.

the Treasury did employ a larger number of scribes, the ratio being—according to the same source—on the order of five to one: 714 clerks (*kâtib*) in the financial offices and 155 at the Sublime Porte, not counting apprentices or higher-level supervisory officials.[70] This exceptional source is thus of value, both in its own right, and as a basis for comparison with conditions in the Sublime Porte.

This fullest surviving account of eighteenth-century career patterns takes the form of a vision of the future that a young boy might see opening before him at the time of his apprenticeship in the financial offices. Internal evidence indicates that the document came from a scribal pen and was intended for the sultan. Apparently a draft, the document is polished at first, but becomes less so, to the point that it breaks off, with the last several lines crossed out. The text reads as if written by a senior scribe to present a benevolent view of his milieu and to affirm the loyalty of people like himself to their sovereign master. The quotation that follows comes from the polished part of the text.

The Circumstances of the Apprentices of the Aforementioned Offices[71]

One who wants to become an apprentice in the Chief Accountant's Office[72] . . . should be aged seven or eight. Having reached the age of responsibility,[73] the child who has by then learned to read and wants to learn writing and spelling is brought before the chief treasurer's purse-bearer, and the request made. The purse-bearer takes down his name and prepares an interoffice memorandum[74] as follows: "To the honorable Chief Accountant, notice is hereby given that Mehmed, a person of rectitude,[75] is capable with pen and cipher [*ehl-i kalem ve sahib-i rakam*] and is to be employed in your office as an apprentice," with the date. The memorandum is sent for signature to the Treasurer of the First Division,[76] then placed in [the child's] hand. A messenger is appointed to

[70] TPK, D3208. Lajos Fekete first called attention to this document in his *Die Siyâqat-Schrift in der türkischen Finanzverwaltung*, Budapest, 1955, I, 68 n. 2. Cf. Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform*, 69–79; id., "A Vision of a Brilliant Career," *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes*, LXXVI (1986), 95–101.

[71] Section heading in colored ink on l. 34 of first page of document. The "aforementioned offices" are by implication those of the Treasury.

[72] *Baş Muhasebe Kalemi*, the largest Treasury office: Joseph von Hammer, *Staatsverfassung und Staatsverwaltung des osmanischen Reichs* (hereafter *Staats.*), Vienna, 1815 (reprinted Hildesheim, 1963), II, 146–48; d'Ohsson, *Tableau*, VII, 265; İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Devletinin Merkez ve Bahriye Teşkilâtı*, Ankara, 1948, 346–47.

[73] *Kemal-i rüşd.* The term *rüşd* implies rectitude, correct judgment, or—in present-day usage—being of age. A later application of the term to an age closer to adolescence appears in the name *rüşdiye*, used for the government elementary schools founded in 1838 to take up where the Qur'ânic elementary schools left off (see chapter 4). In the 1830s, the age of apprenticeship at the Sublime Porte was about eight or ten; Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform*, 125; cf. art. "Bāligh," *EI²*, I, 993; Ergin, *Maarif*, II, 323.

[74] *Divan tezkeresi*—see Pakalın, *OTD*, I, 467–68.

[75] The phrase is *reşid Mehmed.* Calling the apprentice Mehmed is like saying Mr. X. The term *reşid* refers to his having attained the age of responsibility (*kemal-i rüşd*). I am indebted to Andreas Tietze for comments on this passage.

[76] *Defterdar-ı şıkk-ı evvel*—the head of the entire Treasury in this period, the treasurers of

take him to the chief clerk of the office in question. The latter scrutinizes both the interoffice memorandum and the child who is to become an apprentice, after which he gives the memorandum to his purse-bearer. After he, too, has examined it, he registers it with the date in his register of apprentices, following which he writes the gloss "registered" [*kayd-şude*] on the margin of the memorandum. After returning it to the hand of the child, he orders that he be in training [*terbiye*] under a scribe who has few apprentices.

Thereafter, the apprentice comes early every morning, without compensation. He continues, rising up to serve his teacher [*hace*], and departing with his teacher in the evening. In the matter of mastering writing and ciphering, he labors and exerts himself without rest; and if his aptitude is apparent, after five or six years [the officials of the office] take note of his assiduity and give him a share of a hundred *akçe* a month. That is, when they divide the proceeds of the fees collected in one month, under the laws of the *padişah*, for marginal notes on the petitions of persons with official business,[77] they give him one hundred *akçe*, which amounts to a monthly income of thirty-three *para* one *akçe*.[78] After five or six years of persistence and so much expense, when he, out of all the other children his peers, acquires such a sum, he becomes happier than a Maghrebî who has found buried treasure and experiences every sort of joy.[79]

He begins to dream: If God wills, I shall become a junior clerk[80]; then a clerk[81]; purse-bearer; or—among the eminences of that office—the clerk for life-term tax farms, the clerk for government receivables, or the clerk for estates of deceased officials[82]; then clerk for the imperial tents or the kitchen[83]; or cashier[84]; or clerk for the artillery and the cannon wagoneers[85]; or clerk for one of the accountancies of the chief of the market, or of the chief of the spinach sellers or musk dealers, or of the cashier, or of the chief of the yoghurt sellers or

the second and third divisions being essentially his deputies. See Hammer, *Staats.*, II, 145; d'Ohsson, *Tableau*, VII, 261; Uzunçarşılı, *Merkez*, 325–34.

[77] *Erbab-ı masalhın arzıhali derkenarlarından*—on fee-collection and procedural formalism (the scribes' tendency to think of official action solely in terms of document-producing processes, without regard to the ends the documents should effect outside the administrative apparatus), see Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform*, 86–87, 99.

[78] The *akçe* was a traditional silver coin, much depreciated. Three *akçe* equalled one *para.* Forty *para* equalled one *kuruş.* See H. Bowen, art. "Akče," *EI²*, I, 317–18.

[79] I have not discovered the point of the slur against North Africans.

[80] *Halife zeyline/zirine dahil.*

[81] *Kalfa*, written *halife.*

[82] Hammer, *Staats.*, II, 147–48, identifies these three "eminences"—the *malikâne kalfası*, *zimmet kalfası*, and the *muhallefat kalfası*—as heads of subdivisions of the Chief Accountant's Office; cf. d'Ohsson, *Tableau*, VII, 271–72; Uzunçarşılı, *Merkez*, 360.

[83] The clerkships for the tents (*hayme-i hassa kâtibi*) and the kitchen (*matbah kâtibi*) were jobs at the palace for someone with accounting skills. See Hammer, *Staats.*, II, 31; Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Devletinin Saray Teşkilâtı*, Ankara, 1945, 379.

[84] *Sergi kalfası*—Hammer, *Staats.*, II, 146, identifies a *sergi kalfası* as one of two cashiers in the Great Daybook Office (*Büyük Ruzname Kalemi*) of the Treasury. The two were responsible for all sums received or disbursed by the Treasury. Cf. Uzunçarşılı, *Merkez*, 364. D'Ohsson, *Tableau*, VII, 264, identifies the *sergi kalfası* as one of five prominent subordinates of the chief treasurer. The term may also have had a more general meaning as the clerk of any pay office; Redhouse, *Lexicon*, 1054, s.v. *sergi.*

[85] *Tophane ve arabacılar defteri*—Hammer, *Staats.*, II, 226, 229, refers to a *kâtib* for each of these services. In the text, the term *defter*, literally "register," could imply that the office was that of a treasurer (*defterdar*), or, as here translated, simply that of a clerk (*kâtib*) who kept a register.

the *boza* sellers[86]; then treasurer [*defterdar*]; steward of a vezir[87]; chief scribe [*reis ül-küttab*]; and finally commander in chief [*serdar-ı ekrem*]. He becomes eager to learn, to persevere in his duty, and to make a good name for himself. For when his ever-increasing perseverance and fidelity attract the notice of the most senior clerks and the purse-bearer, every month they will reward his deserts—he hopes—with a raise of five or ten *akçe*.

When, after ten years of service, they appoint him to a clerkship [*kitabet*] worth five hundred *kuruş*, this appears a fabulous sum to the young gentleman [*çelebi*] who has passed his youth with a mere thirty paras a month. Taking care in his duty out of fear that he may be deprived of this benefaction, he gradually rises and finally takes his place in one of the regular clerkships [*hilâfet*]. If the least mistake occurs, it is clear that those below and above him will be summoned, his living [*nanpare*] will be taken from his hand, he will be expelled from the office, and will acquire a bad name among all the clerks. Therefore, having acquired a living from the sovereign by being specially trained from childhood and by enduring poverty and voluntary deprivation, they [the scribal officials] know the worth of beneficence and are bound in fidelity to our Lord and Master, the Benefactor of the World [*veli niam-i âlem efendimizin hazretine sadakata mecbur*].

Stated or implied in this account are many of the most typical features of scribal life; many of these traits evoke the guild tradition, the patrimonial household, or both. The early age of recruitment implies an important role for older patrons, often the apprentices' fathers, themselves in scribal service. Alongside this motif common to both guilds and patrimonial households, others are more distinctive of the guilds. Training by apprenticeship,[88] and personnel designations such as "student" (*şagird*), the synonymous "apprentice" (*çırak*), "clerk" (*kalfa*), or *hace*, were among many guild-like traits of the scribal milieu. Office procedure also displayed a craftsman-like fixation on details of document production, a concern apparent here in the details of the paperwork required to admit the new apprentice to the office, and in the reference to collecting fees for writing

[86] *Bazar başı . . . ıspanak ve miskci başı . . . sergi kalfası . . . yoğurtcı başı ve bozacı başı.* I am indebted to Professor Halil İnalcık for help with this part of the text. These offices again pertain mostly to the palace kitchen. The *bazar başı* appears to have been a purchasing agent. The others appear to have been clerks dealing with particular categories, perhaps guilds (*hassa esnafları*), of palace suppliers, except for the *sergi kalfası*. He may have been a paying agent for the palace kitchen. Or, since the same title appears earlier in the same line of text, it may be an inadvertent repetition not belonging to this group. The title rendered as *bozacı başı* is actually written *bozaycı* or *bozayıcı*. It could just as well be read, in this text, as *buğdaycı başı* (with no *vâv* in the first syllable), chief of the wheat sellers. I have preferred the reading *bozacı*, as such are mentioned among the *hassa esnafları*. A *bozacı* is a maker or seller of *boza*, a beverage made of fermented millet. See Uzunçarşılı, *Saray*, 380–81, 384.

[87] *Kethüdâ*, colloquially *kâhya*, probably referring to the "agent of the gate" (*kapu kâhyası*) that a provincial governor, typically holding the rank of vezir in this period, would have to represent him in Istanbul; see Hammer, *Staats.*, II, 134; Pakalın, *OTD*, II, 172–73. A vezir would also have a household steward (*kâhya*), but that was hardly a position that an upwardly mobile official would hold after serving as treasurer.

[88] For a memorable passage from this document on the rationale for training by apprenticeship, see Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform*, 95.

marginal notes on petitions, rather than for deciding the matters contained in the petitions, or for carrying out the decisions. In this connection, we note, too, the reliance on prebendal compensation systems—essentially revenue collection rights assigned along with the duties of office—in want of salaries. As will be recalled from chapter 1, prebendalism is one of the distinctive traits of patrimonial officialdom, as contrasted to modern civil administration. The assignment to clerks, in shares, of fees collected in the offices for the documents they issued was only one type of prebendal income; we shall discuss others in the last section of this chapter. Finally, the ethos of personal service to the sovereign, strongly expressed at the end of the passage, is another hallmark of the patrimonial monarchy.

Perhaps the most interesting feature of the passage, however, is the *cursus honorum* that it traces. Whether in the chancery offices of the Sublime Porte or the financial offices of the Treasury (*Bab-ı Defterî*), there appears to have been a strong tendency to think of scribal careers in such terms. Biographical sources seem to show that real-life officials seldom followed these patterns with unwavering fidelity, but this impression may emerge because such sources exist only for prominent officials whose careers advanced rapidly. Perhaps the best way to think of the *cursus* defined here is as another ideal type.

In this view, the apprentice would rise gradually to the status of full-fledged clerk (*kalfa*), then move through a series of supervisory positions within his office.[89] Next, he would move to positions outside his original department. At first sight, it is surprising that he would move to positions outside the Treasury, rather than to another Treasury office, the number of which the same source puts at twenty-nine.[90] Yet most or all the positions named here—certainly those in the imperial kitchen, including those with responsibilities in purchasing, and that in the artillery—were in agencies whose accounts were under supervision of the Chief Accountant's Office.[91] Having proved himself in his original office, then, the young official would go on to "detached service" in capacities related to his original employment.

After he proved himself there again, by this account, his career would take a sharp upward turn, as he moved into the scribal elite. Here some levels that he would have to pass have surely been omitted. Without ever holding the headship of a major Treasury department, which would admit

[89] Specialized roles like the supervisory positions (*mümeyyiz*, *kisedar*, etc.), performed by senior *hulefa*, illustrate the point that the tripartite scheme of *çırak*, *halife/kalfa*, and *hace* existed in the offices with *elaborations*.

[90] TPK, D3208, tabular listing at head of text. Hammer, *Staats.*, II, 145, mentions twenty-seven; d'Ohsson, *Tableau*, VII, 264, twenty-five.

[91] Hammer, *Staats.*, II, 247. TPK, D3208, tabular listing at head of text, including descriptions of the responsibilities of the various offices.

him to the important rank of the bureau chiefs (*hacegân*),[92] our apprentice imagined serving next as head of the entire Treasury (*defterdar*). Past that point, he would of necessity become an administrative generalist, serving next as the Istanbul agent of a provincial governor ("steward of a vezir"), then as head of the grand vezir's chancery at the Sublime Porte (chief scribe, *reis ül-küttab*), then as commander in chief, which amounts to saying as grand vezir, since it had long been customary to designate that official commander in chief in wartime.

At the highest point of his imagined trajectory, then, the apprentice saw himself as an "efendi-turned-paşa," as one of those who rose through the scribal service into such high positions as provincial governorships or the grand vezirate.[93] These last parts of the apprentice's vision are, however, the most dreamlike. They ignore the fact that, in the late eighteenth century, it was almost always scribes from the grand vezir's chancery, rather than the Treasury, who rose to be chief scribe (*reis ül-küttab*). Even among chief scribes of chancery background, few went on to become grand vezir.[94]

The apprentice's vision is also unrealistic in ignoring the politicization that made life at and above the level of bureau chief so uncertain. The difficulty was partly a matter of altered conditions of service. Below the *hacegân*, scribes pursued their document-producing routines in obscurity and might hold a position for many years. Advancement to the *hacegân* was a matter of great honor, entitling one to inclusion in tables of precedence (*teşrifat*) and receipt of a robe of honor (*hil'at*—see illustration 4), together with greatly increased emoluments. Achievement of this rank also meant enlargement of the scope of lateral mobility, as the apprentice's account acknowledges. Yet high status carried with it important liabilities. By this period, all such positions were conferred through a system of annual appointment (*tevcihat*). Tenure was limited to one year at a time, although reappointment to the same position was possible.[95] Since there was a surplus of aspirants, appointees commonly had to reckon on one year in office at most, with a year or more out of office between ap-

[92] Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform*, 91, 93, 100. There was, as yet, no fully developed table of ranks for the scribal service, but appointment as one of the *hacegân* symbolized admission to the upper scribal echelons. The rank of *vezir* signified the very highest level. Scribes who became vezirs were addressed as paşa, and no longer as efendi (or bey, if they were sons of paşas).

[93] Itzkowitz, "Eighteenth Century Ottoman Realities," 86; Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform*, 106–11.

[94] Between 1768 and 1836, only one person served as both treasurer and chief scribe; see Ahmed Resmî, *Halifet*, 126–27 (Seyyid Feyzullah). Of thirty-nine chief scribes in that period, many were of chancery background. Of them, only two became grand vezirs who also, in that capacity, headed the empire's military forces: ibid., 119 (Halil Hamid), 169 (Mehmed Said Galib). Whether a scribe should have headed the armed forces is another question.

[95] Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform*, 101–102; d'Ohsson, *Tableau*, VII, 191–209.

Ill. 4. Investiture of a Newly Appointed Scribal Bureau Chief with His Robe of Honor (*Hil'at*), c. 1800–1830. The original caption, in Ottoman and French (not shown), identified the five main figures as (L. to R.) the master of ceremonies (*teşrifatî*) holding the list of honorees, the grand vezir's steward (*kâhya*), the clerk handing out the *hil'at*s on behalf of the master of ceremonies, a newly invested official receiving his *hil'at*, and another newly robed honoree leaving the room.

pointments. Because there were fees, if not also bribes, to pay for appointment, the stimuli to corruption were great. As an official rose into proximity with the sultan, he also came face to face with the realities of official slavery, as discussed in chapter 1. Competition for office compounded the dangers of trying to please such a powerful master. The result was a political climate of intense factionalism and intrigue, not so much over issues as over the personal loyalties from which the factions grew. High officials struggled constantly to build up their networks of supporters and dependents—whence the political importance of the great official households and the patron-client networks formed around them—and to destroy their rivals.

The author of our apprentice's vision did not acknowledge the political problems of high office. As if in recognition of the difficulty of making it to the top, however, he did go on, from describing the vision, to relate how it spurred the apprentice to redouble his efforts, until he "finally [took] his place in one of the regular clerkships" (*hilâfet*). Assuming that the ap-

prentice entered the office at age eight, spent six years as an apprentice, and another ten as an official prior to this appointment—so the document states or implies—this amounts to saying that he assumed his "final" position at age twenty-four and never passed the second level of his imagined ascent. Long years in such a clerkship—not the high offices the youth dreamed of—was how most such youngsters ended up. Yet for those who did scale the heights, it was no doubt as important to begin with the dream as it was, in time, to learn to cope with the politics of service at the top.

Factional Rivalry in High Places: Pertev Paşa's Fall, 1837

To complete the picture of career patterns that the apprentice's vision provides requires separate examination of high-level factional rivalry, for the lengths to which rivals would go to "put out one another's hearthfires"[96] form one of the most striking themes of the period. No example proves this better than the rivalry between Pertev and Âkif Paşas, which climaxed in 1837. Its circumstances already reflect the innovations of the reform era in some ways. An account of the rivalry must mention diplomatic missions in Europe, the official newspaper, the intensification of policy controversy, and the growing influence of European ambassadors. Yet the reforms that could have changed the way this crisis ended—those of 1838 and 1839 that first restricted the arbitrary punishments associated with official slavery—came too late for Pertev Paşa. If anything, his fall, and the reaction of his friends to it, generated much of the pressure for those very reforms. Pertev's fall thus pointed toward a new phase in administrative history. In itself, however, it marked an exceptionally well-documented climax to an old tradition of factional conflict.

Pertev (1785–1837), the story's central figure, came from a family that professed to be of prophetic descent and to have migrated, over generations, from the Hijaz to Istanbul via the Crimea. He rose through the bureaus of the Sublime Porte, serving in the Offices of the Imperial Divan, Corresponding Secretary (*Mektubî*), and Receiver (*Amedî*), before becoming chief scribe (*reis ül-küttab*, 1827–1830).[97] After that, he served as steward (*kâhya*) to the grand vezir, a post transformed into that of minister for civil affairs (*umur-ı mülkiye nazırı*) in 1835. He retained the post in this form until his fall in 1837. Pertev also performed some important special missions, accompanying his patron, Galib Efendi (later Paşa) to

[96] İnal, *Şairler*, 1310.

[97] Ibid., 1301–1308. Based on both written and oral sources, İnal's accounts of Âkif and Pertev are the most detailed. Some of the information gathered from descendants may not be entirely factual, but the same is true of the reports in contemporary documents, many of them based on hearsay. İnal's account of Pertev, one of the best illustrations of the thoroughness of his method, thus merits consideration as much as any other.

Bucharest in 1811, and headed a mission to Egypt in 1830 to solve Ottoman-Egyptian problems.

Pertev reportedly knew no European language, except some Russian. He was known for religiosity and closeness to the dervish orders. This fact led some Ottomans and Europeans to label him a bigot or reactionary. Yet such terms tell little about a milieu where most people were actively religious and many religious orientations were possible. It tells more to know that Pertev was a disciple of a dervish spiritual master (*şeyh*), Ali Behcet Efendi, who was affiliated with both the Mevlevî and Nakşbendî orders. Pertev was reportedly one of the şeyh's deputies (*halife*) and thus an advanced mystic. His master's dual affiliation links Pertev to both the order most associated with the Ottoman court and high culture, the Mevleviye, and the one most known for that strict conformity to religious law that many dervishes neglected, the Nakşbendiye. None of this makes Pertev a reactionary by any standard appropriate to his milieu. If anything, he had progressive traits.[98] Incorruptible, though some of his associates were not, Pertev became identified with pro-British ideas about foreign policy. He maintained close relations with ambassador John Ponsonby.[99] Pertev's patron, Galib Paşa (d. 1829), had had diplomatic experience in the West under Selim III.[100] And Pertev patronized the young diplomats of the 1830s, who became the leading statesmen of the new period, the *Tanzimat*, that opened in 1839.

Âkif Paşa (1787–c. 1845) was from Yozgat in Anatolia. Before coming to Istanbul, he served as the private secretary (*divan kâtibi*) of a local notable. In Istanbul, his paternal uncle, Mustafa Mazhar Efendi, then chief scribe, placed him in the Office of the Imperial Divan (*Divan-ı Hümayun Kalemi*) in 1814.[101] Within months, Âkif had advanced to the Of-

[98] Mahmud Kemal İnal, *Son Hattatlar*, Istanbul, 1970, 739 (the şeyh's dual affiliation, Pertev's status as his *halife*). Cf. Cambridge University Library Ms. Or. 2055(10), *Divan-ı Pertev Paşa*, containing both Mevlevî (fol. 9a [my foliation]) and Nakşbendî (fol. 12a) allusions, along with references to "Hazret-i Behcet" (fols. 8b, 11b). Belediye Kütüphanesi (Istanbul), Ms. Muallim Cevdet 58, correspondence on fall of Pertev Paşa, p. 173, undated letter of Âkif to Said Bey, secretary at the palace: Âkif tries to put Pertev's dervish affiliations in a bad light, linking him to two şeyhs—Rıfkî Efendi, whose *tekke* was at Un Kapanı, and İbrahim Efendi, deputy şeyh at Selimiye *tekke* (Ali Behcet's own). Cf. Ahmed Cevdet Paşa, *Tezâkir 13–20*, ed. Cavid Baysun, Ankara, 1960, 77; id., *Tezâkir 40—Tetimme*, ed. Cavid Baysun, Ankara, 1967, 220; Butrus Abu-Manneh, "The Naqshbandiyya-Mujaddidiyya in the Ottoman Lands in the Early 19th Century," *Die Welt des Islams*, XXII (1982), 21, 27–28, 33: Pertev, and the Nakşbendîs in general, played a "progressive" role in the abolition of the Janissaries (1826) and the related attack on the Bektaşî order.

[99] HHS (Vienna), Türkei VI/66, Stürmer to Metternich, 19 April 1837, 332b; Public Record Office, London, Foreign Office Papers (FO) 78/303, Ponsonby to Palmerston, 28 June 1837, p. 152 ("Pertev . . . is admitted even by his enemies to be incorruptible"). I am indebted to Mr. M. Shoukru, then of the London School of Economics, for research assistance in certain British archival sources.

[100] Ahmed Resmî, *Halifet*, 169; Ş. Turan, art. "Pertev Paşa," *İA*, IX, 554.

[101] İnal, *Şairler*, 69–72; Ahmed Resmî, *Halifet*, 164–66.

fice of the Receiver (*Amedî*) and been assigned a substantial income. Within a dozen years, he had risen to head that office, from which he went on to head that of the Imperial Divan and become chief scribe in 1832. He still held that post in 1836 when it was transformed into that of foreign minister, following which he enjoyed the new title until his fall later in the same year over the Churchill affair (discussed below). Upon his rival, Pertev's, fall in September 1837, Âkif succeeded in triumph to the post of minister of civil affairs (soon changed to internal affairs). Thereafter, he held some provincial posts, but his official fortunes did not long survive the climax of his rivalry with Pertev.

Âkif is remembered as much as a writer—although his claims to be a literary innovator have been much challenged[102]—as for his rivalry with Pertev. Âkif's education was traditional and, unlike Pertev, he had no diplomatic experience. If Pertev's foreign policy ideas were pro-English, Âkif's were in some degree oriented toward Austria and Russia. At least twice after Pertev's fall, the russophobic British ambassador, Ponsonby, reported that Âkif disliked the Russians.[103] Well he might, but the fact remained that Âkif had been chief scribe at the conclusion of the Russo-Ottoman Treaty of Hünkâr İskelesi in 1833 and was one of three Ottomans who signed it.[104] For a time, the Churchill affair of 1836 made it utterly impossible for him to be identified as pro-British. To the Austrian envoy, Stürmer, the Pertev-Âkif rivalry thus had the character of a clash between one faction that was pro-British and one that was pro-Russian (and pro-Austrian).[105] Since Mahmud II (1808–1839) was bent on controlling the government from the palace and kept a colorless individual, Mehmed Emin Rauf Paşa, in the grand vezirate from 1833 to 1839,[106] the conflict of Âkif and Pertev, incumbents of the two top posts at the Sublime

[102] İnal, *Şairler*, 74–76; Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar, *XIX. Asır Türk Edebiyatı Tarihi*, Istanbul, 1967, 60–67; id., art. "Âkif Paşa," *İA*, I, 245–46.

[103] Palmerston Broadlands Papers (National Registry Archives, London; cited below as BP), GC/PO/307, Ponsonby to Palmerston, private, 8 Oct. 1837; GC/PO/319, id. to id., private, 5 Jan. 1838 ("Akiff . . . dislikes the Russians extremely—but He is not invulnerable by presents").

[104] Concluded after the Ottoman defeat by Muhammad Ali's forces from Egypt, the treaty was a defensive alliance between the Ottoman and Russian empires—a frightening vista both for Ottomans and for the other European powers; Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel K. Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*, II: *Reform, Revolution and Republic: The Rise of Modern Turkey, 1808–1975*, New York, 1977, 34–35.

[105] HHS (Vienna), Türkei VI/64, Stürmer to Metternich, 23 March 1836, 169a (Âkif agrees with S. on the merits of Butenev, the Russian ambassador, and on the friendship of Austria and Russia for the Ottoman Empire); Türkei VI/65, id. to id., 3 August 1836 (Âkif had, unknown to his colleagues or the sultan, asked Metternich to intervene on his behalf in the Churchill affair); Türkei VI/66, id. to id., 19 April 1837, 332b–333a (all three signers of the 1833 treaty—Âkif, Husrev, and Ahmed Fevzî—are now out of power). On Fevzî's rivalry with Pertev, see Lûtfi, *Tarih*, V, 92. Husrev's role in Pertev's fall will be discussed in the text.

[106] Danişmend, *Kronoloji*, IV, 496.

Porte after the grand vezirate, affected scribal officialdom at its highest level.

The rivalry went far back. Their patrons, Mustafa Mazhar and Galib Paşa, had been rivals.[107] Jealousy had appeared between Âkif and Pertev by the time they served together as clerks (*hulefa*) in the Office of the Receiver (*Amedî*) at the Sublime Porte. By the mid-1830s, when Âkif was chief scribe and Pertev was steward (*kâhya*) to the grand vezir, relations between the two were very taut. The effects were strongly felt. For Pertev headed a well-entrenched faction, and Âkif at least knew how to make common cause with Pertev's other opponents.

What made Pertev so powerful was that he not only occupied one of the most important positions at the Sublime Porte, but also had a number of well-placed dependents. His son-in-law Vassaf was a secretary at the palace and a favorite of the sultan. That enabled Pertev to control communications with the palace, so hindering Âkif's efforts to appeal to the sultan against him. Even the foreign envoys in Istanbul were bidden to go only through Vassaf to communicate with the sultan.[108] Pertev's brother Emin served as supervisor of military supply (*mühimmat-ı harbiye nazırı*). This, too, was a strategic appointment, considering the emphasis on military reform since the abolition of the Janissaries (1826), the uncertainty of relations with Egypt and Russia, and the fact that both the minister of war (*serasker*), Husrev Paşa, and the grand admiral (*kapudan paşa*), Ahmed Fevzî Paşa, had signed the treaty with Russia in 1833, along with Âkif. Some of the most important of Pertev's protégés served in the mid-1830s under Âkif in what became the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Uneasiness over the Russian alliance had led to a revival in the 1830s of the Ottoman system of permanent diplomatic representation in Europe, a system suspended after Selim III's fall (1807); and a number of the young diplomats had connections with Pertev.[109] This was true of Mustafa Reşid Bey (Paşa), later foreign minister and grand vezir; of Sadık Rifat Paşa, future minister of foreign affairs and finance[110] and of such lesser lights as Sarım and Nuri Efendis.[111] Since Âkif and Pertev had different views about foreign affairs, the fact that Pertev had this much influence among Âkif's diplomatic corps, which was still very small, must have created an explosive situation. Like Âkif's, as we shall see below, Pertev's faction even extended into the Phenariot Greek community,

[107] İnal, *Şairler*, 72; Ahmed Resmî, *Halifet*, 165.

[108] HHS, Türkei VI/63, Stürmer to Metternich, 8 April 1835, 62a; Türkei VI/65, id. to id., 20 July 1836, 22a.

[109] Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform*, 126–40.

[110] Pakalın, *Maliye Teşkilâtı*, III, 76–78.

[111] HHS, Türkei VI/66, Stürmer to Metternich, 20 September 1837, 217b (Sarım was "entirely devoted to Pertev" and Mustafa Reşid was "Pertev's creature"); Reşat Kaynar, *Mustafa Reşit Paşa ve Tanzimat*, Ankara, 1954, 63 (Nuri was Mustafa Reşid's sister's son).

where the Prince of Samos, Vogorides (known to Ottomans as İstefanaki Bey), reportedly served as a secret communication link between Pertev, the sultan, and the British ambassador, Ponsonby.[112]

Naturally irascible, Âkif on occasion gave vent forcefully to his resentments against Pertev. For a long time, Pertev reacted calmly, a difference perhaps due partly to his character as a dervish, and partly to the superiority of his position.[113] Pertev reportedly enjoyed such favor that the populace referred to him as something like an uncrowned king (*tuğsuz padişah*). Mahmud II showered him with gifts, set his poems to music, and even professed to sleep better knowing that Pertev was in service.[114]

The events that led to Pertev's downfall seem to have been the consequence partly of circumstance, and partly of the dangers of proximity to an absolute sovereign. As time passed, it was inevitable that Pertev would make enemies, and that he, or his protégés, would overreach themselves in use of their influence. By 1835, there were reports that Pertev had taken it on himself to alter an appointment that had been decided in council and approved by the sultan. Pertev could rely on Vassaf to straighten things out at the palace, but the affair was of a nature to cause public embarrassment to Âkif.[115]

In June of 1836, an incident involving a British subject led the British ambassador, Ponsonby, to demand satisfaction at Âkif's expense. William Churchill, who resided on the outskirts of Istanbul, had wounded a Turkish child while hunting and been imprisoned, first at the Sublime Porte and then, after Âkif turned him over to Ahmed Fevzî Paşa, at the naval arsenal. Ponsonby protested vigorously, alleging mistreatment. A furor developed, and Âkif was dismissed from his post as foreign minister. Âkif's supporters attempted to get Ponsonby recalled. He responded by attempting to get Ahmed Fevzî dismissed as grand admiral. Both these efforts failed.[116]

The extent of Pertev's involvement in Âkif's dismissal is unclear. As minister of "civil affairs," Pertev was not responsible for foreign affairs,

[112] Sir Charles Webster, *The Foreign Policy of Palmerston, 1830–1841*, London, 1951, I, 265–66 and passim; BP, GC/PO 298/5, Ponsonby to Palmerston, July 1837, private (requesting a "very handsome present in money" for "Vogorhedes, Prince of Samos," who "has immense influence just now with Pertev Pasha . . . and is extremely well with the Sultan also"). On the status of Samos under Ottoman rule, see Heidborn, *Manuel*, I, 23–25.

[113] On personalities: HHS, Türkei VI/63, Stürmer to Metternich, 8 April 1835, 61b; Türkei VI/66, id. to id., 20 September 1837, 215b (Pertev's probity; Husrev's intrigue and venality); Lûtfi, *Tarih*, V, 48; İnal, *Şairler*, 73–74. While virtually all sources indicate the one-sided nature of the dislike, Tanpınar (art. "Âkif Paşa," *İA*, I, 244) goes further, arguing that Âkif for a time enjoyed Pertev's virtual patronage.

[114] Lûtfi, *Tarih*, V, 88; İnal, *Şairler*, 1303–5, 1309; Edhem Ruhi Üngör, *Güfteler Antolojisi*, Istanbul, 1981, 152, 427, two songs (*şarkı*), music by Mahmud II, words by Pertev (my thanks to Walter Feldman for this reference).

[115] HHS, Türkei VI/63, Stürmer to Metternich, 15 April 1835, 81b–85a.

[116] Tanpınar, art. "Âkif Paşa," *İA*, I, 243; Webster, *Foreign Policy of Palmerston*, II, 530–34.

Âkif's portfolio. But clear separation along departmental lines was still a novel idea, and many people became involved in the affair who had no direct role in foreign affairs. This may simply have been when Pertev's patience with Âkif gave out (*esması yanarak . . .*).[117] Surely, Âkif had been unwise to make such an issue of an incident involving a subject of a friendly power when the empire had the larger problem of being allied with its greatest enemy, Russia. Assuming the air of a clash between pro- and anti-British factions, the Churchill affair provided the occasion for all those opposed to Âkif to topple him.

Âkif remained out of office for fifteen months. One factor compounding his bitterness was that since his kinsman and successor as foreign minister, Ahmed Hulusî Paşa, already had the title of *paşa*, Pertev, as minister of civil affairs, also received that title.[118] On 13 June 1837, Hulusî was succeeded as foreign minister by Pertev's protégé, Mustafa Reşid Paşa. The Austrian envoy ruefully noted that all the signers of the Treaty of Hünkâr İskelesi had been removed from the center of power—Âkif; Husrev, who had lost his post as *serasker* in January 1837; and Ahmed Fevzî, still grand admiral but no longer in proximity to the sultan. Pertev was alone at the helm of state.[119] But not for long.

At the end of June 1837, Vassaf Efendi was abruptly sent away from the palace to inspect the mines of eastern Anatolia.[120] Speculations about the causes of his fall included misappropriation, presumptuous behavior toward the sultan, and orders issued to high officials without the sultan's knowledge.[121] On 12 September 1837, Pertev and his brother, Emin, were also dismissed and exiled. Succeeding his nemesis as minister of civil affairs, Âkif, too, became a paşa. Since the Ottoman term *mülkiye*, used in the title "minister of civil affairs," suggested associations with sovereignty as well as landownership and, thus, local administration, Âkif suggested—with an added jab at Pertev, who had held this title—that it was out of keeping with the ruling class "etiquette of subservience" (*âdab-ı ubudiyet*). He proposed changing the title to interior minister (*dahiliye nazırı*), to correspond to the title for the foreign minister (*hariciye nazırı*).[122] The change was made and became permanent.

Âkif now went to work on the sultan, asking to have Pertev Paşa exe-

[117] Lûtfi, *Tarih*, V, 48; İnal, *Şairler*, 70.

[118] Lûtfi, *Tarih*, V, 47–48.

[119] HHS, Türkei VI/66, Stürmer to Metternich, 19 April 1837, 332b–333a; Ercümend Kuran, art. "Reşid Paşa," *İA*, IX, 701–2.

[120] Lûtfi, *Tarih*, V, 91–92.

[121] HHS, Türkei VI/66, Stürmer to Metternich, 5 July 1837, 52r–52v; PRO, FO78/303, Ponsonby to Palmerston, 28 June 1837; Lûtfi, *Tarih*, V, 100.

[122] This episode is one of the first indications that the term *mülkiye* was coming into use as a designation especially for internal or local administration, and by extension for civil officials (*memurin-i mülkiye*).

cuted (*işi bitirip . . .*).[123] In memoranda that he reportedly submitted to the palace, he accused Pertev of diverse misdeeds: using English policy "as a tool to preserve his own favor," being greedy for influence, even corresponding secretly from his exile at Edirne with the British consul there.[124] Working to get him poisoned, Âkif saw to it that reassuring letters were sent to Pertev from the palace until the deed could be brought about.[125] Âkif closely followed the torture of Emin and Vassaf and the attempts to uncover their suspected wealth. Âkif drew on his knowledge of scribal procedure to ferret out incriminating documents, he offered suggestions for the interrogation of Vassaf's wife and the torture of his servants, and he urged the interrogation of Pertev's and Vassaf's money changers and the attempt to press them into confidential service.[126]

Finally, the sultan did order Pertev executed. By the next morning—so the story goes—the sultan had changed his mind and issued a counterorder. But in Edirne, the executioner had already done his work. Documents circulated later, presumably by his enemies, purport to show Âkif drafting an order in his own hand to be sent from Said Bey at the palace to Emin Paşa, *mutasarrıf* of Çirmen near Edirne, to poison Pertev secretly. Another text shows the eager Âkif taking it on himself to communicate directly with Emin to this effect.[127] The official gazette carried an announcement, thought to be from Âkif's pen, that Pertev had died suddenly (*füc'eten*) after being sick for some time—a wording that sensitive observers found contradictory. Vassaf was also killed. His and Emin's estates were confiscated by the government, as was part of Pertev's.[128]

[123] Kaynar, *Mustafa Reşit Paşa*, 30–37.

[124] Lûtfi, *Tarih*, V, 153–55, 156–59; Tanpınar, art. "Âkif Paşa," *İA*, I, 243–44; Belediye Kütüphanesi, Ms. Muallim Cevdet 58, 168–73, 179–83.

[125] Belediye Ms. Muallim Cevdet 58, 176, 178–79, 186–87.

[126] Ibid., 173–74 (Âkif on the "inappropriately named Emin" [*zıddiyle müsemma Emin*—Emin means "trustworthy"]), 176–78 (Âkif proposes to interrogate Vassaf in a way that will "change his countenance" by "going at him with things like 'If you don't tell the truth, you have no salvation' " [*çehreyi değiştirerek ve doğrusu söylemezsen sana necat yoktur gibi üzerine vararak sual ve istintak*]), 188–95. Cf. Kaynar, *Mustafa Reşit Paşa*, 36 (a document raising the question of whether to prolong Vassaf's life for five or ten more days so as to interrogate him further [*Vassaf'ın bir kat dahi sıkıştırılarak istintakı zımnında beş on gün ibka-yı hayatı mı*]). Below, however, we shall question whether these texts may have been altered after Âkif's fall to make him look worse.

[127] Ibid., 175–78, 185 (Âkif informs Said Bey at the palace that he has dared to inform Emin Paşa to "finish the business" and come [to Istanbul?]: *Emin Paşa hazretlerinin bu işi bitirip gelmeleri suretini işare cesaret etmişidim*).

[128] Lûtfi, *Tarih*, V, 100; İnal, *Şairler*, 1306–1308. The theme of the ruler who orders his favorite executed, then repents but finds it too late to countermand the order, is such a literary cliché that it is unclear whether life imitated art in this instance, or art (accounts of Pertev's fall) has obscured what actually happened. The point about the counterorder comes from İnal, who supports it with much detail. There is no reference to the counterorder in Belediye Ms. Muallim Cevdet 58, in what purports to be the correspondence of Âkif and others about the affair. There and elsewhere, what remains most cloudy is Sultan Mahmud's thoughts and actions. İnal says that Pertev was strangled with a greased thong. Other sources say that he

A new guard had come to power. New secretaries came in at the palace. To neutralize the Foreign Ministry, Pertev's protégés were sent abroad as ambassadors, even while they maintained the highest posts in the ministry, including those of minister and undersecretary.[129] The personnel turnover at the Sublime Porte was so extensive that the official history, written many years later, mentioned some ten changes, which would have been only the more important ones.[130] One source likens the polarization of the officials to that created by the *Hamzaname*, stories that were recited in coffeehouses, so stirring the listeners that partisans of the leading characters would come to blows.[131]

Yet the sultan was unhappy about Pertev's fall, and Âkif's triumph did not last. He, too, soon fell and spent his last years in exile, partly in Edirne, where Pertev had met his end. The last item in a manuscript collection of correspondence about the Âkif-Pertev affair shows Âkif grovelling before the sultan, protesting his servile devotion in much the language that the distraught Pertev used during his last days at Edirne.[132] Âkif did get to defend his actions in a literary work, as Pertev could not. Written in a relatively simple style, the work helped both to promote Âkif's view of the affair, and to lay the basis for his reputation as a literary innovator. The first to promote this controversial reputation appear to have been intellectuals associated with the Young Ottoman movement of the 1860s and 1870s, specifically Namık Kemal and Ebu 'l-Ziya Tevfik. Since the Young Ottomans opposed the *Tanzimat* statesmen, who began as Pertev's protégés, Namık Kemal's and Ebu 'l-Ziya's praises of Âkif's style may in themselves have been distant echoes of the Âkif-Pertev clash.[133]

To emphasize only Âkif's role in unseating Pertev implies, however, that the crisis was confined to the scribal service, when it had become bigger than that. After his fall as foreign minister, Âkif not only went to work writing memoranda to the palace. He also sought out others of Pertev's opponents, especially the former war minister (*serasker*), Husrev Paşa (c. 1756–1855), who blamed Pertev for his fall from office. Husrev had played a major role in the conflict with Muhammad Ali of Egypt and in

was poisoned, or poisoned and then strangled: BP, GC/PO/314, Ponsonby to Palmerston, private, 26 November 1837; HHS, Türkei VI/66, Stürmer to Metternich, 29 November 1837, 418b. In Belediye Ms. Muallim Cevdet 58, the letters attributed to Âkif refer to poisoning Pertev secretly so that it cannot be found out: 175–76, 182, 185.

[129] Carter Vaughn Findley, "The Foundation of the Ottoman Foreign Ministry," *IJMES*, III (1972), 408.

[130] Lûtfi, *Tarih*, V, 101, 175–76.

[131] Pakalın, *Maliye Teşkilâtı*, III, 78.

[132] Belediye Ms. Muallim Cevdet 58, 198–99, a letter presumably from Âkif to palace secretary Said Bey (exceptionally, this entry has no heading, but the preceding one is so headed, and the content supports the inference that the heading applies to both); cf. ibid., 178, Pertev at Edirne to Said Bey at the palace, C 1253/September 1837.

[133] Tanpınar, art. "Âkif Paşa," *İA*, I, 245–46.

concluding the Russo-Ottoman alliance, and he was the last great exemplar of the practice of training large numbers of slaves for placement in official positions. Among his protégés were Halil Rifat Paşa, son-in-law (*damad*) of the sultan and *serasker* at the time of Pertev's fall, and Said Paşa, another son-in-law of the sultan.[134] Even the official to whom the order for Pertev's execution was sent was the son of one of Husrev's slaves.[135] Like Pertev's faction, the Âkif-Husrev network also included a Phenariot go-between, Logothete Aristarchi (Loğofet Bey to the Ottomans).[136] Using his connections, Husrev launched a double intrigue. He attempted to gain Pertev's good will, in case the latter somehow retained power, but also worked with Âkif and others at the palace to topple Pertev.[137]

Exactly how the conspirators managed to bring Pertev low is not clear. At the time, many stories circulated about the matter.[138] According to one, Pertev's enemies told the sultan that people saw him as Pertev's "puppet."[139] Other reports accused Pertev of scheming to depose the sultan.[140] The favor Pertev enjoyed should have made that idea implausible, but may not have done so to the jealous Mahmud, who well remembered Selim III's deposition.

According to the most detailed account, which Ponsonby had at one remove from Halil Rifat Paşa, Husrev and his friends succeeded by tricking Pertev into expressing support for a view that offended the sultan. In this version, the chief of Halil Rifat's military staff, Hüseyin Paşa, was sent to Pertev to express concern about the state's financial inability to support the regular army. Hüseyin Paşa was then to suggest that it be disbanded, and the government's resources used to maintain a militia (*redif*—here, pro- and anti-British factionalism came into play, for creation

[134] Halil İnalcık, art. "Husrev Paşa," *İA*, V, 613. Halil Rifat and Said Paşas are thought to have been behind Husrev's fall from the post of *serasker*, in which Halil Rifat succeeded Husrev. If so, it is ironic that Husrev would have blamed his fall on Pertev. We shall see further signs of duplicity in Husrev's faction.

[135] İnal, *Şairler*, 1307 n. 2, referring to the man in question, Emin Paşa, as the governor-general of Edirne. In Belediye Ms. Muallim Cevdet 58, 175, Emin Paşa is addressed as governor (*mutasarrıf*) of Çirmen, near Edirne.

[136] Lûtfi, *Tarih*, V, 154; HHS, Türkei VI/70, Stürmer to Metternich, 7 August 1839, 112a (reporting that Aristarchi was getting 3,000 kuruş per month from the Russians). The grand logothete was the Oecumenical Patriarch's representative to the Ottoman authorities.

[137] HHS, Türkei VI/66, Stürmer to Metternich, 20 September 1837, 212b–213b, also naming another supporter at the palace, Rıza Bey, and saying that Husrev used Vogorides as his go-between with Pertev, and Logothete Aristarchi as intermediary with Âkif and the men at the palace.

[138] HHS, Türkei VI/66, Stürmer to Metternich, 13 September 1837, 181a–183b, listing many "reasons" communicated from palace secretary Said Bey to Stürmer.

[139] PRO, FO78/305, Ponsonby to Palmerston, 16 September 1837.

[140] BP, GC/PO/314, Ponsonby to Palmerston, private, 26 November 1837; İnal, *Şairler*, 1307; Tanpınar, art. "Âkif Paşa," *İA*, I, 244.

of the militia was a British idea).[141] For good measure, Hüseyin Paşa added that *serasker* Halil Rifat Paşa was young and imprudent. Pertev reportedly agreed about the expense of the army and the desirability of disbanding it; concerning Halil Rifat, Pertev agreed that he was young. Halil Rifat reported these words to the sultan, suggesting that he send one of his secretaries to confirm the story. When this had been done and the report came back as before, Sultan Mahmud, founder of the new army, ordered Pertev's disgrace. The sultan later had the poison sent to Edirne, according to this account, with orders to strangle Pertev if the poison failed.

Ponsonby saw this story as an illustration of how despotic Mahmud had become since the abolition of the Janissaries had removed the last control on his power. To Ponsonby, the establishment of the new army had also established Mahmud's power, and to replace the army with a militia would have threatened him with a reversion to the situation that existed with the Janissaries:

> The Sultan fears the establishment of any Corps in the State, even one of Ministers of His own selection, as has been shewn by the degradation of the powers of the Grand Vizier, who is almost a nullity, and by the capricious elevation of sometimes one favourite, and sometimes another, to be the temporary instruments of His Government, whereby all the Ministers become little more than Chief Clerks of their respective Departments executing a will, itself moved by the intrigues . . . of the Seraglio.[142]

Whether even this report fully distinguishes fact from rumor may never be clear. Still, important traits—old and new—of the kind of politics that the Âkif-Pertev rivalry represents are clear. Acted out on grand scale, their conflict typifies an implacable (if one-sided) hatred between figures close to an absolute sovereign, whose favor was almost bound to be overcome in time by his jealousy to defend his power. Given such personalization of power under a strong-willed sultan, the mere idea that he might appear as his favorite's "puppet" could undo the latter, without policy issues coming into play. The best protection for the favorite was to create a large network of well-placed and reliable dependents. Pertev did better at this than Âkif, but the latter eventually tapped into probably the largest network of the day, Husrev Paşa's.

Yet loyalty and favor were not the only considerations in this episode. The imperial system had historically produced a certain range of differences about policy or about the relative merits of different branches of service; and the opening of the reform era was beginning to widen the

[141] Webster, *Foreign Policy of Palmerston*, II, 535. Mahmud did see the *redif* as a potential threat to his centralizing policies; see Avigdor Levy, "The Military Policy of Sultan Mahmud II, 1808–1839," Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1968, 582–87; Shaw and Shaw, *History*, 43–44.

[142] PRO, FO78/329B, Ponsonby to Palmerston, secret, 10 February 1838.

scope for such differences by launching the state into deliberate efforts to innovate in policy and develop new institutions. Pertev's fall, then, was due not simply to old-style considerations of favor and loyalty, but also to the growth of controversy about questions such as the orientation of the empire's foreign or military policy. Husrev Paşa's role highlights the issue of interservice rivalry, a theme that acquired special acuity in the 1830s, when reform efforts had begun to aggravate old questions of this kind. Which was to be the most influential government elite—the military, or the civil? Would the empire survive by its might, or by pursuing its interests in peaceful relations with other states? Âkif and the old soldier Husrev represented one answer to these questions. Pertev, the Islamic activist with his British leanings and diplomatic protégés, combined an intriguing combination of traits to offer a different answer.

In 1837, Âkif's and Husrev's approach appeared to prevail. The climactic phase of the Ottoman-Egyptian rivalry (1839–1841) changed that, however, bringing Pertev's diplomatic protégés, starting with Mustafa Reşid Paşa, to the fore as the leading men of a new period, the *Tanzimat*. Mustafa Reşid and his friends then used their influence to obtain reforms that changed conditions of official service and proclaimed, as general principles, the security of life, honor, and property so conspicuously violated at Pertev's fall. Documents circulated at that time about Pertev's fall may have been doctored to support this effort; for the brutality of the letters attributed to Âkif and Husrev crystallizes the issues that led up to the personnel reforms of the late 1830s and the Gülhane Decree almost too well not to have been the work of minds deeply in sympathy with those reforms.[143] However that may be, the aftermath of the Âkif-Pertev rivalry seemingly helped open a new period in the history of the ruling elites. As for the rivalry itself, exemplifying the old pattern of patrimonial factionalism among the sultan's official slaves, it had still reflected much the same scribal world as the d'Ohsson engraving of a government bureau or the apprentice's alluring but naive vision of his future.

COMPENSATION

Maintenance of a large household retinue or factional network was obviously very costly. Consideration of the financial side of official life suggests, in fact, that prominent figures of the eighteenth century must have worried about their finances almost as much as about their rivals' intrigues. The circumstances of Ottoman decline had, if anything, compounded such worries. To appreciate these compensation problems, it helps to consider them in relation to the government's general effectiveness in financial administration.

[143] Şerif Mardin emphasized the link between Pertev's fall and the *Tanzimat* reforms in *Genesis*, 158–62; cf. Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform*, 136, 138, 163–64. Belediye Ms. Muallim Cevdet 58: Pertev's enemies invoked the disabilities of official slavery, to which they too were subject, to entice Mahmud to topple his favorite. Writing to the palace, Husrev implies that Vassaf has probably hidden his wealth among his relatives and dependents, who are not "possessed slaves" (*abd-i memlûk*) and whose "property and souls" are therefore not "our master's" (167–68). Pertev's and Vassaf's property and souls did belong to "their master," since they were officials. In one of his memoranda calling for Pertev's execution, Âkif argues that if the sultan wishes to reclaim the property of Pertev and the others as his own, "that has nothing to do with [foreign] policy, but is a purely internal matter" (182).

If comparative study of administrative systems requires defining indicators by which to assess their effectiveness, some of the most important indicators clearly pertain to government finance. The discussions of patrimonialism and government finance in chapter 1 suggest two indicators as especially noteworthy: the extent to which the government can concentrate control of receipts and disbursements in a central treasury, and the government's ability to provide salaries—as opposed to other forms of compensation—to those who work for it. It is easy to forget how exceptional the salary systems that officials now take for granted have been historically. Yet it does not follow that payment of salaries to officials is a solely modern phenomenon.

A sketch of where the Ottoman Empire stood in different periods in terms of these two fiscal indicators will illustrate this point. To make this sketch, it helps to think of the empire's history as dividing into three eras: one of rise and florescence, roughly 1300 to 1600; one of decline, from about 1600 to 1789 (taking the accession of Selim III as the dividing line); and one of attempts to reverse the decline—the reform era—from 1789 until 1922.

In the first era, 1300–1600, the economy was—despite the dynamism of the imperial system—incompletely monetized. Facilities for transportation and communication were also limited. These facts restricted possibilities for economic integration and fiscal centralization. Ömer Lûtfi Barkan has aptly spoken, in Braudelian tones, of an empire "divided into administrative-fiscal units closed against the intervention of the state."[144]

The amount of revenue that could be extracted in coin and concentrated in Istanbul was small, a fact that limited the government's ability to pay salaries. Consequently, judges (*kadı*) depended on fees; and cavalry officers stationed in the provinces to provide administrative and military services depended on *tımar*s, which amounted economically to rights to collect certain revenues in kind from a given area during the assignee's service there.[145]

What is most interesting by later standards, is that some government servants did receive salaries in this period. The Janissary infantry corps did. So did six cavalry regiments, also stationed at the palace. The fact that they were stationed in the capital, rather than in the provinces like

[144] Ömer Lûtfi Barkan, "Osmanlı İmparatorluğu 'Bütçe'lerine dair Notlar," *IFM*, XV (1954), 245.

[145] Ömer Lûtfi Barkan, art. "Timar," *İA*, XII, 286–333.

the *tımar*-holding cavalry, no doubt explains why the Janissaries and the six palace cavalry regiments were compensated out of such revenues in coin as the government was able to concentrate there, rather than out of revenues in kind, which it made more sense to utilize near their points of origin, so as to avoid unmanageable transport problems. Other, smaller groups of palace functionaries also received salaries, including the few-score scribes who then sufficed to keep the records of the central government. Available sources indicate about 24,000 such salary recipients in 1527 and about 88,000 in 1609.[146]

In the era of decline the fiscal system weakened in every respect. Fiscal decentralization increased, and the government's ability to maintain salary payments crumbled. In the case of the Janissary infantry corps—which continued to exist nominally, although its discipline fell apart—the difficulties of the state in meeting salary payments became a cause of repeated insurrection. In the case of the scribes, their numbers increased by a factor of more than ten to perhaps 2,000 at the end of the eighteenth century. Yet salaries for scribal officials disappeared and were replaced by prebendal forms of compensation.

Prebendal compensation systems have consisted historically either of rights ceded to the officials to collect revenues for their own use, or of various forms of maintenance in kind, supplied by the ruler to his officials.[147] Prebends in the form of revenue collection rights included fee benefices, that is, rights to charge fees for official services rendered, or benefices in land, like *tımars*. Prebends in kind included rights of commensality and rations assigned to officeholders. Some of the most colorful scenes of Ottoman official life—like the quarterly paying of the Janissaries—climaxed in ceremonial meals. Sometimes, as when the grand vezir hosted dinners for other high officials during Ramazan, the economic significance of these occasions might be so deeply embedded in ritual as almost to be invisible.

Prebends of all types—in kind, in fees, in land—show up in records on the scribal service. By the eighteenth century, we find scribes compensated with revenues from provincial landholdings. This was true in the Office of the Imperial Divan (*Divan-ı Hümayun Kalemi*) at the Sublime Porte and in the Land Registry (*Defter-i Hakanî*). The landholdings were assigned to the bureaus in which the officials served, and the incomes were only for officials below the rank of the *hacegân*—a rule often

[146] H. İnalcık, "Ghulām," *EI*², II, 1089; cf. Ömer Lûtfi Barkan, "H. 933–934 (M. 1527–1528) Malî Yılına âit bir Bütçe Örneği," *IFM*, XV (1953–54), 309, 323–26; id., "1070–1071 (1660–1661) Osmanlı Bütçesi ve bir Mukayese," *IFM*, XVII (1955–56), 316–17; id., "1079–1080 (1669–1670) Mâlî Yılına âit Bir Osmanlı Bütçesi ve Ek'leri," *IFM*, XVII (1955–56), 229–30; M. Belin, "Essais sur l'histoire économique de la Turquie," *Journal asiatique*, 6e série, IV (1864), 256–57.

[147] Weber, *Economy and Society*, II, 1032.

breached. In line with then-current ideas about recruitment, the incomes were hereditable on condition of service in the same office.[148] Practically, the assignment of a provincial landholding to a clerk in Istanbul meant assignment of an income from a landholding administered by an agent, such as a tax-farmer. By the eighteenth century, the incomes from landholdings had declined greatly in value.[149]

Probably more commonly, scribes received income in the form of shares of fees (*harc, rüsum, aidat*) charged in the offices for the transactions performed there. The apprentice's vision discussed above shows how a young official might begin to receive income in this form. The types of official transactions for which fees were due included appointments in the various branches of government service. For the high-ranking, especially, these assumed great importance, both as costs of pursuing their careers, and as sources of income. High officials with many appointments at their disposal might take in hundreds of thousands of kuruş a year from appointment fees (*caize*). To keep the fees rolling in and to satisfy the surplus of aspirants to high office that had existed ever since the empire's rapid expansion ended in the sixteenth century, the state had developed the system of annual appointment or reappointment (*tevcihat*) to high positions, which—for scribal officials—meant those at or above the level of the bureau chiefs (*hacegân*). Especially in provincial administration, the combined operation of the systems of fee collection and annual appointment had become a prime cause of decline in the quality of government. For the expenses of the governors, with their huge households that had to be moved sometimes long distances to take up each appointment, were especially heavy.[150]

Some high-ranking officials also received rations—allowances of meat, bread, charcoal, and oil that they used to feed, heat, and light their official suite and household—no distinction being made between the two.[151]

[148] Uzunçarşılı, *Merkez*, 48 n. 5, 49 n. 5; Findley, "The Legacy of Tradition to Reform: Origins of the Ottoman Foreign Ministry," *IJMES*, I (1970), 348, 353; BBA, Rüus defteri 217, entries of Et RA 1180/1766 and 7 Şaban 1251/1835; BBA, Mühimme defteri 165, p. 30, order of Et RA 1180/1766. On assignment of incomes from landholdings to clerks in the Land Registry, see BBA, Mühimme defteri 165, p. 44, entry of El R 1180/1766.

[149] Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform*, 99; BBA, Buy. 1, entry of *selh* C 1236/1821, forbidding recipients of incomes (*bedel-i iltizam*) from *tımars*, *zeamets*, and *mukataas* to request increases in the monthly payments they received from the farming out of those holdings.

[150] Findley, "Legacy," 353–54; Klaus Röhrborn, *Untersuchungen zur osmanischen Verwaltungsgeschichte*, Berlin, 1973, 114–25, 149–52; d'Ohsson, *Tableau*, VII, 181–89, 191–209, 256–57; Hammer, *Staats.*, II, 152–53; Pakalın, *OTD*, I, 255–56 ("caize"); Cevdet, *Tarih*, III, 264–65 (anecdote about an official who tried to secure a post by overbidding the *caize* for it); IV, 152, 285–86 (relation between *caize* and ruin of the countryside); IX, 47, 284–86 (annual appointment register for 1223/1808); X, 86–87, 212; XI, 29; Lûtfi, *Tarih*, IV, 58–59, 63–65 (appointments of 1248/1832–1833).

[151] Hammer, *Staats.*, II, 152. For a register recording rations assigned to officials of the Sublime Porte, c. 1815–1820, see Har., TKE 1151.

Some of the highest officials had the right to eat at the table of the sultan or grand vezir on ceremonial occasions, as noted. In a governmental milieu where there was much gift-giving, again in ritualized patterns, some officials received their sole compensation in the form of an annual gift from the sultan.[152]

Finally, there were also ancillary forms of income that a scribal official might receive, in some cases independently of his official character. Some high officials served ex officio as supervisors (*nazır*) of major charitable foundations (*evkaf*) set up by sultans and statesmen.[153] In a wider range of cases, including foundations set up by their families to protect family wealth from expropriation by the sultan, officials might profit by serving as trustees (*mütevelli*) of such foundations. Some dignitaries would bid on, and hold, tax farms[154]; in fact, some held their positions as tax farms.[155] At least some elderly officials received pensions assigned from government revenues.[156] Like everyone else, officials who could would invest in business ventures or land.[157]

While it is perhaps conceivable that officials might fare better under prebendalism than under a salary system, it seems clear that this was not true for eighteenth-century Ottoman officials, still less for those under their rule. The principles of rotation and limited tenure in office are indicative of this fact. While the ruling class was historically exempt in principle from taxation, the appointment fees amounted practically to a tax on officeholding. The principle of limited tenure meant, too, that the fee conveyed no right of property in the office. Over the generations, officials who had paid stiff fees to assume important posts, like provincial governorships, knowing that they had at most one year to recoup their outlay, had imposed an ever-growing series of arbitary exactions on the populace, exactions that these officials pocketed, in the spirit of fiscal decentralization, for their own use.[158]

[152] Uzunçarşılı, *Merkez*, 55, 156; Findley, "Legacy," 353; Cevdet, *Tarih*, VI, 154–55.

[153] Pakalın, *OTD*, III, 579–80 ("vakıf").

[154] Cevdet, *Tarih*, IV, 91–92; VI, 58; VIII, 184, 325; X, 86, 183.

[155] Kunt, *The Sultan's Servants*, 96; Klaus Röhrborn, *Untersuchungen zur osmanischen Verwaltungsgeschichte*, 125–44.

[156] D'Ohsson, *Tableau*, VII, 255–57; BBA, Rüus defteri 217, p. 8, entry of 25 R 1178/1764; p. 110, entry of 15 Ş 1255/1839; p. 113, entry of 14 S 1258/1842 on pensions (*vazife*) assigned from the proceeds of certain revenue farms.

[157] Enver Ziya Karal, "Zarif Paşa'nın Hatıratı, 1816–1862," *Belleten*, IV (1940), 454–55, recounting his investments with bazaar merchants.

[158] "Bribery and corruption, which is simply a matter of the disorganization of an unregulated system of fees . . ." (Weber, *Economy and Society*, I, 239–40). Ahmed Vasıf once commented on a period out of office with a couplet to the effect that "if your star is not strongly in the ascendant, you cannot nourish your household with annual appointments" (*Tali'in olmaz ise burc-i saadette kavi / Senevî mansıb ile besleyemezsin sen evi*); Vâsıf, *Mehâsin*, ed. İlgürel, XXXI; Cevdet, *Tarih*, V, 233.

The practical problems of collecting their various forms of prebendal income, while coping with the intrigues of their rivals and their insecure status as slave officials, must have kept eighteenth-century Ottoman officials busy and left them little energy or incentive to strive for high-quality administration. In local administration, it became almost impossible for any official to avoid abusive practices; for the combination of fee-collection and limited tenure in office had elevated corruption from an individual fault to a systemic trait of Ottoman administration during the era of decline.

As we have seen, the disastrous Russian wars of the late eighteenth century brought Ottoman statesmen at last to the point where they were ready to contemplate radical and innovative solutions to the problems of imperial decay. The changes that followed during the reform era ranged far beyond issues of imperial finance and official compensation systems; yet those issues were especially important in shaping the course of change. In particular, perceptions of these issues led to the reformers' efforts to introduce fiscal centralization and a salary system. In general terms, we have already noted the disappointing outcome of these efforts in chapter 1. The specific effects of these disappointments on the fortunes—and on the thoughts and behavior—of late nineteenth-century civil officials will require attention in chapter 8.

CONCLUSION

As the eighteenth century ended, Ottoman scribes entered one of the most important phases of their history. Already, the role of the chief scribe (*reis ül-küttab*) and his staff in foreign affairs was increasing the importance of the scribes, as compared with other branches of the ruling class. Yet the scribes' readiness to meet the demands of a new era of reform was questionable in many ways. Despite their numerical growth since the sixteenth century, scribes were still few in numbers to serve increasing administrative needs. The narrow scope of cooptation certainly required broadening if the scribal corps was to grow in size and perform adequately in new functions. Systems for training needed a sharp upgrading, as the extremely low literacy levels of the general populace indicated. However impressive the scribal *adab*-culture was in its greatest exponents, the guild-like pattern of training by apprenticeship and the typically narrow concept of scribal functions gave clear measure of the average scribe's limited horizons. In order to concentrate on performing their duty rather than protecting themselves, Ottoman officials needed relief from the insecurities of official slavery and the vicious factional politics that accom-

panied it. The ramshackle series of prebendal compensation systems required reform, as well; and the reform could only succeed through a general overhaul of fiscal administration. The requirements facing the scribes of Selim III's reign were daunting ones that only a new type of official would be able to face effectively.

C H A P T E R I I I

Social Origins of the Civil Officials

Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar's novel, *The Chronometric Institute* (*Saatleri Ayarlama Enstitüsü*), includes a memorable portrayal of an old mansion in Istanbul. With its seemingly endless facade, this was home in the time of Abd ül-Hamid II (1876–1909) to Abd ül-Selâm Bey, kinsman of the bey of Tunis and member of the Ottoman Council of State (*Şura-yı Devlet*). The house's thirty-seven residents formed a microcosm of Muslim Ottoman society. Crowded into the house so that a visitor would return home confused and exhausted from so many encounters were Abd ül-Selâm Bey's wives, children, sons-in-law, daughters-in-law, nephews, nieces, cousins, in-laws' in-laws, and eight or ten servants. The relationships among these people were a subject of daily argument. Among the women who had married into the family were daughters of a family descended from the Prophet Muhammad, of the khedive of Egypt, of a Caucasian chieftain, of an Albanian bey, and of several vezirs. Fearing that so notable an assemblage would excite the sultan's suspicion, Abd ül-Selâm Bey had married a daughter to one of the sultan's secret agents, who was also a secretary of the Council of State, on which Abd ül-Selâm Bey served. Since the new son-in-law also moved into Abd ül-Selâm Bey's household, the latter could watch his spy-son-in-law at home and at the office. In time, the two became close enough to collaborate on the son-in-law's reports to the palace. To be safe, Abd ül-Selâm Bey submitted his own reports on the son-in-law. So protected, the household went on, virtually supporting the neighborhood's confectioner, butcher, druggist, and two grocers.

After the Revolution of 1908 overthrew the Hamidian regime, as more of the territories from which members of the household had come were lost to Ottoman rule, the household broke up. The successive departures

underscored how much the household had been a simulacrum of the empire itself. Finally, no one remained but Abd ül-Selâm Bey and his son-in-law, the former secret agent.[1]

In everyday life, few households illustrated the parallelism between patrimonial household and patrimonial state as clearly as does this example, in which literary artistry has enhanced the traits of the mundane. Yet this image of the great household as model of imperial society is an idea to retain as we consider the social origins of the civil officials of the reform era, with whom Abd ül-Selâm Bey's membership in the Council of State connects even him.

The common task of the remaining chapters of this book is to analyze the social consequences for the Ottomans of the transformation from scribal service to civil officialdom, from *kalemiye* to *mülkiye*. This chapter begins the analysis by examining the civil officials' social origins and changes that had occurred over a century in patterns of recruitment. In analyzing a governmental system that to the last had few explicitly representative institutions, a system where the traditional identification of politics with administration was only beginning to break down, we must also ask to what extent the recruitment systems of the civil agencies enabled them to play a representative role.[2] If Abd ül-Selâm Bey's household brought together influential individuals from different sectors of society in a way that the sultan might find politically significant, could the civil administration do so in a way that would help accommodate the political demands emerging out of the rapid change of the reform era?

This chapter approaches these questions from two angles of vision. First, through quantitative analysis of official personnel records, we shall present a collective view of a large group, the staff of the Foreign Ministry, organizationally the most direct successor to the chancery that once served under the chief scribe (*reis ül-küttab*) at the Sublime Porte. As a check on the Foreign Ministry evidence, we shall compare it on selected points with data on other ministries and on alumni of the School of Civil

[1] Tanpınar, *Saatleri Ayarlama Enstitüsü*, 38–42.

[2] Where separate representative institutions are lacking, "politics" in great part has to occur within the bureaucracy, even when it supposedly exists only to carry out the ruler's wishes. In addition to the representative role that Ottoman officialdom played in bureaucratic politics, the reform era also witnessed creation of conciliar bodies with overtly representative roles (in the sense of including representatives of the populace). Such were the local administrative councils created early in the *Tanzimat*; these included both officials and representatives of the people. The line of development from these bodies to the parliaments that existed in 1877–1878 and from 1908 on is direct. See Roderic H. Davison, "The Advent of the Principle of Representation in the Government of the Ottoman Empire," in *Beginnings of Modernization in the Middle East: The Nineteenth Century*, ed. William R. Polk and Richard L. Chambers, Chicago, 1968, 93–108; İlber Ortaylı, *Tanzimattan Sonra Mahalli İdareler (1840–1878)*, Ankara, 1974, passim; Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform*, 157, 172, 175, 180–81, 182, 226–28, 311.

Administration (*Mülkiye Mektebi*). For a fuller idea of the context from which the quantifiable indicators emerge, we shall then examine what the most prolific official memoirist, Aşçı Dede İbrahim, had to say about his social origins, which lay in a milieu with interesting points of comparison to Abd ül-Selâm Bey's household.

SOCIAL ORIGINS OF FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIALS: A COLLECTIVE VIEW

The extent to which officials represent the society they serve—or rule over, as the case may be—is a question that scholars frequently ask.[3] Yet the question cannot be applied to other cultures or eras without reflection. For thinking about how the composition of ruling groups should correspond to that of society in general has varied widely in different settings. We have mentioned several types of social groups that were meaningful to Ottomans at different times—ruling and subject "classes," religious and ethnic groups, guilds and dervish orders, kinship and household networks. In the reform era more than ever, ideas about the relative importance of these entities were in flux.

Assessed with care, however, the representativity of the administrative system proves an important question in the Ottoman case, too. To pose the question is certainly not anachronistic. While differing on details, scholars agree that the significance of traditional recruitment systems like the child levy (*devşirme*), which brought boys of non-Muslim origin into military-administrative ranks, or the educational system that trained the Muslim religious leadership, lay partly in the way they drew members of different groups into the ruling class.

In the nineteenth century, as nationalism began to rip asunder the traditional Ottoman social fabric, with its assumed primacy of religious rather than ethnic identity, statesmen and sultans responded by proclaiming egalitarianism and redefining Ottomanism as an imperial supranationalism. As they did so, they recognized that the question of administrative representation had acquired new significance. Over the decades that followed the Reform Decree of 1856, however, expectations about equality and representation changed with the empire's circumstances, as noted in chapter 1. Understood during the *Tanzimat* to mean primarily admission of non-Muslims, administrative representation came under Abd ül-Hamid to mean increasingly the recruitment of Muslims, often ethnically non-

[3] Samuel Krislov, *Representative Bureaucracy*, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1974; J. Donald Kingsley, *Representative Bureaucracy*, Yellow Springs, Ohio, 1944; Robert D. Miewald, *The Bureaucratic State: An Annotated Bibliography*, New York, 1984, 184–94; cf. Lisa Anderson, *The State and Social Transformation in Tunisia and Libya, 1830–1980*, Princeton, 1986, 77–78.

Turkish, from outlying provinces. Ultimately, equality underwent redefinition yet again, as the disintegration of the empire devalued the Ottoman ideal, like all other imperial symbols, and exclusivist nationalism began to prevail among the Turks, too. Described here with clinical detachment, these changes occurred amid great conflict, which few contemplated with detachment at the time, and many people—even many scholars—still cannot.

These changes in thinking occurred at a time when the rapid growth of government would in any case have strained the ability of traditional recruitment methods to fill official ranks. Yet how well could even a much enlarged administration play a representative role in such a complex and unstable society? Unlike some governments today, the Ottomans never formally took *proportional* representation of different groups in the government services as their goal. Yet examining how close they came to proportionality provides a way to measure what they accomplished in administrative representation. In this examination, it helps to consider equality, both of access to official careers, and of reward. (This chapter and the next consider access in terms of the officials' family backgrounds and education, respectively; chapters 7 and 8 take up promotion and compensation.)

Yielding an insight into the difficulty of achieving any great degree of administrative representativity, the Foreign Ministry personnel records (discussed in appendix A) reflect a particular stage in the evolution of Ottoman thinking about egalitarianism. Among the 366 career officials on whom records can be recovered, a number of ethnoreligious groups appear. While it seems to straddle two categories about which Ottomans were confused, and which should be distinguished if possible, "ethnoreligious" seems to be the term most applicable to these records. The questionnaire on which the records were based normally did not require the officials to state their religious or ethnic identification.[4] Some officials voluntarily did so, but the main indicator of ethnoreligious identity, among the questions that each official had to answer, was his name and that of his father.[5] Some other types of data, such as claims to knowledge of certain languages, provide leads, but are not always conclusive.

[4] Examination of the personnel records makes this clear, although the instructions for maintenance of the records at times demanded the contrary: *Düstur*[1], V, 966, instructions of 19 Ş 1304/1887, art. 2, calling for non-Muslim officials to mention their communal affiliation. Appendix A includes a translation of the questions printed on the personnel records questionnaire, as found in the file of Sadullah Paşa (Har., SA424). There, and in other files, I found no question about communal affiliation.

[5] Names provide good indicators of ethnoreligious identity in the Ottoman setting, perhaps more so than in some other Islamic societies. Here, the effects of religion as a determinant of identity were very far-reaching and definitely included the choice of names. The fact that the minority groups prominent in or near Istanbul, where most civil officials were born, had distinctive languages increases the value of the names as indicators of ethnoreligious identity

The need to rely primarily on names to study ethnoreligious particularism affects what we can learn in important ways. Among Muslims, there is usually no way to detect either ethnic or sectarian differences. Of course, Ottomans had long understood membership in the ruling class—being an "Ottoman" in the old sense—in terms of assimilating an imperial culture and accepting an ethos of service that took precedence over details of birth. Any sectarian Muslims in the sunnî sultan-caliph's service had strong incentives to be inconspicuous. The records do reveal that various types of non-Turkish Muslims—Kurds, Circassians, other Caucasians, and Albanians—served in the Foreign Ministry.[6] In no case do the records show that more than a few percent of the 259 Muslims fell into any of these groups. The fact that the questionnaire did not require officials to state their ethnicity makes it impossible to know, however, whether we have identified all cases belonging to each group. In addition, Ottoman censuses—even after they had begun to take some note of ethnic differences among non-Muslims—never did so for Muslims.[7] The personnel

(cf. the situation in Syria or Lebanon, where the Christians are native speakers of Arabic and may be indistinguishable in name, even if that is often not the case). In this period, the Muslim officials usually had names—at least given names—from Islamic religious tradition. We do not yet find Turks with given names from the pre-Islamic Turkish past. Ethnically non-Turkish Muslims are seldom distinguishable in these records by name. Among non-Muslims, we occasionally find individuals with names at least partly "translated" into Turkish. Without the incentives that the exclusivist nationalism of the republican period has created to "pass" for members of the dominant population, however, the masquerade never seems complete. As a result, assigning each individual by name to his correct ethnoreligious category is seldom difficult. Among examples of partially "assimilated" cases, Yahya Karaca Paşa (BBA, DSA II, 1030) said that his father was the bey of Wallachia, Karaca Beyzade Kostaki (short for Constantine, obviously a Greek, or at least Greek Orthodox). Mısırlızade Edouard Bey (Har., SA450)—the affectation of a French given name shows that he was not a Muslim—names his father as Bogos Bey, an Armenian name (cf. Çark, *Türk Devleti Hizmetinde Ermeniler*, 165). Yusuf Misak (Har., SA36) names his father as Varteres; Yusuf himself was otherwise known as Hovsep Misakian (Çark, *Ermeniler*, 151). Two brothers, Cemil and Selim Gürcî (Har., SA513 and 551) might have been mystery men, except that they named their father as Benyamin and said they were Jewish. The one minority group that would systematically have concealed its identity were the *Dönme*, a Judeo-Islamic syncretist sect whose members maintained an outwardly Muslim appearance. At various times, I went over the files of the non-Muslim officials with A. Bodurgil and A. Sporidi, then both of the Library of Congress, and with Butrus Abu-Manneh, now of Haifa University; I am indebted to them for their help in correctly identifying and reading the Armenian, Greek, and Arab Christian names. Since I encountered the Greek and Armenian names transcribed *à la turca* into Arabic script, it has seemed better in this study to present them essentially as I found them, rather than try to reconstruct them according to the conventions of the original languages.

[6] Identifiable examples include four Kurds (Har., SA646, Ahmed Nâzım Bey; SA125, Mehmed Emin Yümnî Efendi; SA315, Bedirhan Paşazade Abd ül-Rezzak Bey; BBA, DSA I, 576–77, "Kürd" Mehmed Said Paşa); two Circassians (Har., SA73, Ismail Hakkî Bey; SA147, Halil Hilmî Bey—both sons of Circassian chieftains, *ümera-yı Çerakiseden*); one Georgian (Har., SA696, Mustafa Efendi); one otherwise unidentified Caucasian (Har., SA195, Abd ül-Kerim Bey); and perhaps one or two Albanians (Har., SA716, Resul Hayrî Efendi; and SA645, Feyzî Bey).

[7] Karpat, *Ottoman Population*, 45, 55, 122ff.

records thus give only glimpses of the Muslims' ethnic complexity—an increasingly important issue, as the shrinkage of the empire's borders and the influx of refugees increased the Muslim majority—and the census data provide no way to assess proportionality of representation for different ethnic categories among Muslims.

In the case of non-Muslims, a comparable problem appears in terms of sectarian rather than ethnic divisions. The 366 men under study include 107 non-Muslims: 30 Greeks, 52 Armenians, 12 Jews, 7 Arab Christians, and 6 men of European extraction, some of the last being locally born "fresh-water Franks" (*tatlısu frenkler*) and others being born Europeans who had taken service under the sultan. Among the Greeks, exceptionally, there may have been no Greek Catholics to dilute the Orthodox majority.[8] The other non-Muslim groups were more heterogeneous. The Armenians included at least a few Armenian Catholics with the Gregorian majority, though no acknowledged Protestants.[9] The Jews included representatives of the Ashkenazic and Karaite, as well as the larger Sephardic, community.[10] The Arab Christians included Maronites, Latin Catholics, Greek Orthodox, and perhaps others.[11] The men of European extraction were probably all Latin Catholic in origin.[12] Yet again, the number of non-Muslims who named their denominational affiliation was too small to provide reliable evidence on the representation of different sects.

[8] Har., SA122 (Moiz Atanasiadi, says that his father was a merchant from the *rum milleti* at Niğde). Otherwise, the clearest hint of communal affiliation is usually reference to study in Orthodox schools.

[9] Har., SA530 (Zare Demirian, whose file includes reference to his petition of 29 November 1313/1897 to have his religious affiliation recorded as Armenian Catholic), SA133 (Yusuf Domnian [?], says that his family was Armenian Catholic); SA733 (Andreas Hasun, identifies himself as Armenian Catholic [cf. Çark, *Ermeniler*, 147]); SA301 (Krikor Yaldızıan, identifies his father as Armenian Catholic). Some others mention study at Armenian Catholic schools: e.g., Har., SA131 (Avnik Minecian, Ortaköy Armenian Catholic school).

[10] E.g., Har., SA500 (Kemal, said his father had been a Hebrew teacher at the Karaite School at Halıcıoğlu in Istanbul); SA768 (Emil Rosenfeld Efendi identified his father as a merchant, originally from Russia, who had taken refuge in Ottoman lands "thirty-three years ago," i.e., c. 1275/1858–1859); SA347 (Yûşa' Bey identified his father as the son of Moiz Levi Efendi, deputy [*kaimakam*] to the grand rabbi of Istanbul [*Der Saadet haham başı*]).

[11] E.g., Har., SA529 (Camille Eddé, son of Eddezade Michel Efendi of Beirut); SA146 (Yusuf Tanus, identifies himself as Greek Orthodox, born at Damascus to a father from the *kaza* of Hisn al-Akrad in the province of Beirut); SA132 (Paskal Triha, born at Istanbul to a Latin Catholic father originally from Aleppo); SA66 and 173 (Nasrî and Feyzî Bey, two Istanbul-born sons of Franko Paşa, *mutasarrıf* of Mount Lebanon; Feyzî Bey's file says that his full name was Feyzî Bey Kûsâ and that the family was originally from Aleppo).

[12] Har., SA258 (Henri Armaon, son of Georges, says that he was born at Istanbul and was an Ottoman subject of the Latin *millet*); BBA, DSA I, 1016 (Edouard Blacque, born at Izmir in 1240/1824–1825, a diplomat, says that he was the son of the French subject, M. Blacque, who was director of the *Moniteur ottoman* [the French edition of the official gazette] in the reign of Mahmud II); Har., SA35 (Nihad Paşa, born Seweryn/Sévérin Bilinski in Austrian Galicia [c. 1821], son of a local noble and landowner; came to Ottoman Empire as a refugee and entered Ottoman service as an officer during the Crimean War); BBA, DSA II, 100 (Rüstem Paşa, son of Francesco, born in Germany, c. 1815). There is no evidence that either Nihad or Rüstem had converted to Islam. Their assumed names are Persian rather than Arabic, have literary rather than religious associations, and may well have been chosen for purposes of blending in.

For Muslim and non-Muslim officials alike, finally, the personnel records include no data on mixed pedigrees of the sort that many denizens of Abd ül-Selâm Bey's household had, or that the Levantine communities of Istanbul were famous for.[13] The omission from the personnel records of evidence on female relatives, while understandable in a rather old-fashioned Islamic context, compounds this problem. Every Ottoman subject did have to have one community—traditionally understood as religiously defined—to belong to, however. It is basically this idea that the personnel record data reflect.

Examination of the Foreign Ministry personnel records thus discloses a large proportion of Muslims, among whom neither sectarian nor ethnic differences are clearly discernible, and a category of non-Muslims divisible into Greeks, Armenians, Arab Christians, Jews, and men of European origin, without more precise indication of sectarian differences. The idea of equality that the records document most closely is therefore the religiously oriented *Tanzimat* concept. More exactly, because they mostly date from Abd ül-Hamid's reign, what these records illustrate best is the later fate of the *Tanzimat* concept, after thinking about equality had begun to assume a different emphasis.

Combining these ethnoreligious categories with the differing cultural orientations that cultural dualism had introduced among the officials, we may show the representation of the various categories of Foreign Ministry officials as in table 3.1. The table presents the staff of the ministry as falling into three groups: two of Muslims and one of non-Muslims. The two categories distinguish Muslims of traditionalist education (designated in the table headings as Muslim I) from those of modernist education (Muslim II). The criterion used to make this distinction is a linguistic one—proficiency in French—the significance of which we shall explain in the next chapter.[14] Almost all as westernized as the modernist Muslims by this criterion, the non-Muslims still formed a distinct group, subdivided along ethnoreligious lines. This and later tables will distinguish subgroups of Greeks, Armenians, and other non-Muslims. The normal

[13] The same lack of evidence on mixed pedigrees recurs in Çankaya's work on graduates of the School of Civil Administration, who mostly went on to serve in the Interior Ministry. Exceptionally, one "classic" Levantine official turns up there under the name of Edmond Polikarp François Rossi Terzian. See Ali Çankaya, *Son Asır Türk Târihinin Önemli Olayları ile Birlikde Yeni Mülkiye Târihi ve Mülkiyeliler*, Ankara, 1968–1969, III, 127. He also served in the Foreign Ministry (too briefly to be included in the quantitative analysis), professing to be the son of an Italian (Har., SA86; cf. Har., TKE 1400, petition for employment, 13 November 1308/1892).

[14] The implicit equation of "modern," "western," and "secular" reflects biases common among nineteenth-century Ottomans, not those of the author of this study.

Table 3.1.
PERSONNEL GROUPS AND SUBGROUPS IN THE FOREIGN MINISTRY STAFF

	ALL RESPONDENTS (1)	*MUSLIM I*[a] (2)	*MUSLIM II*[a] (3)	*NON-MUSLIM* (4)	*Greek* (5)	*Armenian* (6)	*Jewish* (7)	*Arab Xn.* (8)	*Europ. Origin* (9)
Total Number in Each Group or Subgroup	*366*	*115*	*144*	*107*	*30*	*52*	*12*	*7*	*6*
Number as % of Total in Col.1	100	31	39	29	8	14	3	2	2
OLDER GENERATION (CAREERS BEGINNING THROUGH 1875)									
Number of Men in Generation	*187*	*63*	*55*	*69*	*20*	*38*	*1*	*5*	*5*
Number as % of Column Total[b]	51	55	38	64	67	73	8	71	83
YOUNGER GENERATION (CAREERS BEGINNING 1876 OR LATER)									
Number of Men in Generation	*179*	*52*	*89*	*38*	*10*	*14*	*11*	*2*	*1*
Number as % of Column Total[b]	49	45	62	36	33	27	92	29	17

NOTE:
[a] In this and later tables, "Muslim I" refers to those of "traditional" education (who did not claim proficiency in French), and "Muslim II" refers to those of "modern" education (who claimed proficiency in French). Virtually all the non-Muslims were "modern" by this criterion.
[b] To show the percentage of each personnel category that fell into each generation, these percentages have been computed by dividing the actual number of cases for each generation by the total number of cases shown at the top of the column for that personnel category. In each column, the percentages for older and younger generations therefore sum to 100.

layout of the tables will be as follows: the entire staff of the ministry (column 1), breaks down into three groups (columns 2–4), while the non-Muslims, shown together in column 4, break down into subgroups of their own (columns 5–9; for further information on the tables, see appendix A).

At points in the text, we shall also mention comparisons that are not consistently enough noteworthy to merit inclusion in the tables. This will normally be true of differences among the three smallest subgroups of non-Muslim officials—Jews, Arab Christians, and men of European origin, shown separately in tables 3.1–3.3 but collectively as "other non-Muslims" in most later tables. The attributes of these three small subgroups differ sharply, but their numbers are too small to yield reliable statistics separately. Another distinction that we shall usually not show in the tables, though it is desirable to analyze change over time in such a way, is the "generational" one between senior and junior officials, defined in terms of date of first appointment. When the entire ministry staff is divided in half on this basis, the younger generation proves to consist of men who began their careers in or after 1876—a date that has only a

fortuitous connection in this case with Abd ül-Hamid's accession. None of the other groups and subgroups divides into halves at this date, however (table 3.1, columns 2–9); and additional conclusions do not always emerge from the generational contrast. In general, we shall therefore only mention this contrast in the text when it adds to the analysis.

The fact that the relative size of different ethnoreligious categories varied over the years among officials, as in the general population, suggests that assessing administrative representation requires taking account of change over time more fully than the generational contrast permits. Ideally, we could do so simply by tabulating how many members of each personnel category were in service at different dates. As explained in appendix A, however, a combination of factors creates the factitious appearance of a sharp rise and fall over time in the actual numbers of Foreign Ministry officials in service. To keep this artificial ebb and flow from distorting our conclusions, we may convert the number of members of each personnel category in service in a given year into a percentage of the total number of officials then serving. Table 3.2 shows such percentages, computed at five-year intervals, with the one exception of the figures for 1908, the last year before the Young Turks' purges (*tensikat*) produced a major dropoff in the number of cases for which the Foreign Ministry records include data. The last rows of the table show the maximum number of officials who ever served in each personnel category and the year or years in which that number of men were in service together.

The table gives an idea of how difficult it would be to make a government agency with a staff of a few hundred very fully representative of a society with dozens of ethnic and religious groups, some of them quite small, not to speak of a culturally divided Muslim majority. The table shows that the modernist Muslims grew uninterruptedly in relative strength from 1870 on, while the traditionalist Muslims declined from about 1860. At least in this ministry, the modernists were clearly supplanting their traditionalist coreligionists.

The non-Muslims' proportional importance, in turn, peaked in the mid-1870s, a fact implicitly reflecting the shift away from *Tanzimat* thinking about egalitarianism after the Russo-Turkish War. Comparison shows variations among the non-Muslim subgroups, however. For example, the Greeks' proportional importance peaked about the mid-1860s. In contrast, the Armenian percentage did so about a decade later, and the actual number of Armenians who served in the ministry was substantially higher than that of Greeks. These facts remind us that the Greeks' former preponderance as non-Muslims in official and semi-official positions had declined drastically following the Greek Revolution of the 1820s.[15] Impor-

[15] Findley, "Acid Test," 340–41; Richard Clogg, "The Greek *Millet* in the Ottoman Empire," in *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire*, ed. Braude and Lewis, II, 185–207.

Table 3.2.
COMPOSITION OF FOREIGN MINISTRY STAFF AT SELECTED DATES
(as percentage of numbers shown for each year in column 1)

	ALL RESPONDENTS (1)	*MUSLIM I* (2)	*MUSLIM II* (3)	*NON-MUSLIM* (4)	*Greek* (5)	*Armenian* (6)	*Jewish* (7)	*Arab Xn.* (8)	*Europ. Origin* (9)
1850	*27*	37	37	26	4	11	-	-	11
1855	*41*	41	32	27	10	7	-	-	10
1860	*64*	44	31	25	9	8	-	2	6
1865	*102*	40	26	33	14	13	-	2	5
1870	*129*	39	25	36	12	18	1	2	4
1875	*182*	34	29	37	11	20	1	3	3
1880	*222*	32	33	35	10	18	1	3	2
1885	*258*	34	34	32	10	16	2	2	2
1890	*303*	32	39	29	9	15	3	2	1
1895	*293*	31	41	28	8	14	4	2	1
1900	*256*	30	43	27	8	13	4	2	1
1905	*232*	28	45	27	7	13	4	2	1
1908	*213*	29	47	24	7	13	3	1	1
1910	*116*	21	52	28	9	14	3	1	0
1915	*42*	29	50	21	2	10	7	2	0
MAXIMUM NUMBER EVER IN SERVICE IN EACH GROUP OR SUBGROUP:									
Number of Officials	*310*	*99*	*123*	*92*	*27*	*47*	*12*	*6*	*5*
Year or Years	1891-1892	1889	1892-1893	1889, 1892-1893	1889	1888-1889	1893-1894	1880-1893	1863-1882

tant numbers of Greeks remained under Ottoman sovereignty, and some continued to work for the government. Yet table 3.2 confirms that the Greeks had gone into eclipse as officials, so opening the way for the Armenians to become the chief beneficiaries of *Tanzimat* egalitarianism.[16] Referred to then as the *millet-i sadıka* (faithful people or nation), the Armenians retained this prominence until the last quarter of the century, when nationalist conflict disrupted Ottoman-Armenian relations. Among the three smallest non-Muslim subgroups, finally, the figures indicate that the men of European origin were indeed men of the *Tanzimat*, while the Arab Christians were chronologically intermediary, and the Jews were men of the Hamidian era. Had the empire lasted longer, it is interesting to speculate whether Ottoman Jews could have succeeded Armenians as the leading non-Muslim minority in official service, as the Armenians had supplanted the Greeks. Such a succession would still have signalled an erosion of *Tanzimat* egalitarianism; for Ottoman Jews were only about one-fifth as numerous as Ottoman Armenians around 1900 and about

[16] Ergin, *Maarif*, II, 626; Karpat, *Ottoman Population*, 51.

one-tenth as numerous as Ottoman Greeks.[17] Yet it is interesting that the last Translator of the Imperial Divan (*Divan-ı hümayun tercümanı*), a position that Greeks monopolized for over a century until 1821, was a Jew, Davud Efendi.[18]

One way to verify the inferences just drawn about how officials of different types moved through the administrative system is to examine their dates of birth and first appointment, shown in table 3.3. At least for the three large personnel categories, the *ranges* of dates of birth and first appointment—from earliest to latest—are broad but vary rather little among groups (table 3.3, columns 2–4). The medians,[19] however, show that most traditionalist Muslims did begin their careers—in terms of both date and age—before most modernists did. Most non-Muslims had begun their careers at an even earlier date than the traditionalist Muslims, though not at an earlier age. The comparison among non-Muslim subgroups again suggests that Armenians supplanted Greeks. The men of European origin emerge as the most senior personnel category by a large margin, while the Jews are the youngest.

The final point about table 3.3 concerns the ages of first appointment. These figures show that of the three large groups, traditionalist Muslims mostly began their careers at the earliest age and non-Muslims at the latest. The significance of the age figures lies in what they imply about education, which the next chapter will discuss. It is worth noting that the approximate median age of first appointment for most personnel categories increased between "generations" by about a year, a fact that suggests increased educational attainment.

The tables presented so far provide a basis, through comparison with

[17] Karpat, *Ottoman Population*, 160, census of 1897.

[18] Ergin, *Maarif*, II, 534.

[19] The *median*, a statistic emphasized in table 3.3 and many later tables, is the middle value when the values for all the cases are ranked in numerical order. If the number of cases is even, the median is the average of the two middle cases. For example, column 1 of table 3.3 shows that while the *range* of years of birth for all 366 of the Foreign Ministry officials under study was from 1808 to 1880, the median birth year was 1856. This means that half the officials were born between 1808 and 1856, and half between 1856 and 1880. As a statistical way to define the midpoint of the range of values for a given variable, the median is preferable to the arithmetic mean (commonly called the "average") in that calculation of the median is not influenced by extreme values for individual cases. The significance of this difference becomes clear where the range of values is very wide, as in the salary data presented in chapter 8. There the extreme inequality of the salary system makes the means much less representative of a typical official's fortunes than the medians. Because of its mode of calculation, however, the median differs from the arithmetic mean in not being mathematically manipulable. Cf. Hubert M. Blalock, Jr., *Social Statistics*, 2d ed., New York, 1972, 55–72. For example, in table 3.3, there is really no way to calculate the median year of birth for all officials (column 1) from the median years of birth shown for the three large personnel groups (columns 2–4); the fact that the three median birth years shown in columns 2–4 "average" to the value in column 1 is irrelevant. Similarly, the median birth year for all non-Muslims (column 4) cannot be computed from those of the five non-Muslim subgroups (columns 5–9).

Table 3.3.
DATES OF BIRTH AND FIRST APPOINTMENT, AGE AT FIRST APPOINTMENT

	ALL RESPONDENTS (1)	*MUSLIM I* (2)	*MUSLIM II* (3)	*NON-MUSLIM* (4)	*Greek* (5)	*Armenian* (6)	*Jewish* (7)	*Arab Xn.* (8)	*Europ. Origin* (9)
N	*366*	*115*	*144*	*107*	*30*	*52*	*12*	*7*	*6*
RANGE									
...of Years of First Appt.	1831-1899	1834-1891	1831-1899	1831-1899	1848-1895	1843-1890	1867-1892	1857-1899	1831-1890
...of Years of Birth	1808-1880	1819-1878	1817-1878	1808-1880	1832-1873	1823-1869	1845-1872	1835-1880	1808-1863
MEDIAN									
...Year of First Appt.	1875	1873	1879	1871	1869	1871	1885	1871	1843
...Year of Birth	1856	1856	1860	1851	1845	1851	1865	1851	1823
MEDIAN AGE AT FIRST APPOINTMENT[a]	18	16	18	19	19	19	19	19	19

NOTE:
[a] The median ages may appear erroneous in that they do not equal the difference between the median years of birth and first appointment, shown just above them. Because medians are not mathematically manipulable, however, the median ages cannot be computed that way (see page 97, note 19). The median ages shown here were computed by subtracting each individual's date of birth from his date of first appointment and then finding the median of the ages so computed.

census figures, for assessing how the representation of different groups in civil officialdom corresponded to their strength in the general population. But from what "general population" did the Foreign Ministry draw its personnel? Were these men really representative of the whole empire? Or was the effective zone of recruitment smaller, as it had been at the end of the eighteenth century? A consideration of the officials' birthplaces throws light on this question.

Table 3.4 shows that three-fourths of Foreign Ministry officials were Istanbul-born, with very little variation among the three major groups. Among the other regions distinguished in this table, seldom did any one account for 10 percent of any personnel category. Considering that only about 30 percent of the chief scribes of the period 1768–1836 were clearly from places other than Istanbul, and few indeed were provincials with no discernible links to the ruling class, table 3.4 shows no clear broadening in the geographical scope of recruitment, although broadening had occurred in other senses, as we shall see when we consider the evidence on fathers' occupations.

Table 3.4.
BIRTHPLACES OF FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIALS
(as percentage[a] of the number of officials shown for each category)

	ALL RESPONDENTS (1)	*MUSLIM I* (2)	*MUSLIM II* (3)	*NON-MUSLIM* (4)	*Greek* (5)	*Armenian* (6)	*Other N-M.* (7)
N	*366*	*115*	*144*	*107*	*30*	*52*	*25*
Istanbul and Suburbs	76	78	74	78	70	88	64
Anatolia	6	4	8	7	7	8	4
Balkans[b]	10	10	11	7	17	2	4
Arab Lands	4	3	5	5	-	2	16
Non-Ott. Territory[c]	2	2	1	4	3	-	12
Other, Unclear	1	2	1	1	3	-	-

NOTES:
[a] The percentages in each column should sum to 100, but may not do so exactly because of rounding. The same holds true of other analogously formatted tables in this and later chapters.
[b] Includes Aegean islands and Cyprus.
[c] In Europe or the Caucasus.

Of the geographical designations in table 3.4, Anatolia refers, in terms of late nineteenth-century Ottoman administrative geography, to all of Asia Minor, including, in the East, the provinces (*vilâyet*) of Trabzon, Erzurum, Van, and Diyarbakır.[20] Aydın province, which included Izmir, was the most frequently mentioned Anatolian birthplace. Among Balkan birthplaces, Macedonia was the most frequently mentioned region, and Bulgaria second, at least among Muslims. Of the Arab lands, Iraq was most frequently mentioned among Muslims, and geographical Syria, including Lebanon, among non-Muslims. Of the non-Ottoman territories, the Caucasus was the birthplace of most Muslims; Germany, France, and Poland accounted for the few non-Muslims, all in the subgroup of European origin. If we break these large units—Anatolia, the Balkans, Arab lands—into units no bigger than the provinces of the period, then almost none accounted for more than a trace of the total staff of the Foreign Ministry. Compared to natives of any other place, Istanbulites enjoyed a heavy preponderance indeed.

Generational differences add nuances to this picture in ways that differ for Muslims and non-Muslims. For the Muslims, the generational con-

[20] Small parts of the Ottoman provinces of Diyarbakır and Van extended into what is now Syria. Conversely, much of the province of Aleppo and part of the *sancak* of Zor lay in what is now Turkey. None of the officials covered in the tables was born in any locality difficult to assign on account of these overlaps. To verify the location of birthplaces, I used Vital Cuinet, *La Turquie d'Asie: Géographie administrative, statistique, descriptive, et raisonnée de chaque province de l'Asie Mineure*, Paris, 1890, I, map frontispiece; Şems ül-Din Samî [Frasheri], *Kamus ül-A'lâm*, 6 vols., Istanbul, 1306–1316/1889–1898; see also maps in Justin McCarthy, *Muslims and Minorities: The Population of Ottoman Anatolia and the End of the Empire*, New York, 1983, 146.

trast shows declines over time in recruitment from Istanbul and Anatolia and small increases in recruitment from the Balkans and—for modernist Muslims only—the Arab lands. Even with these increases, the proportion of the younger generation of either Muslim group that came from any of these places, as they are distinguished in the table, never exceeded 12 percent. Considering that the last quarter of the nineteenth century was marked, not only by Sultan Abd ül-Hamid's pro-Arab policy, but also by the immigration of several million mostly Muslim refugees,[21] the broadening of the scope of recruitment does not seem impressive. Of course, growth in recruitment of Arab Muslims, as an expression of Abd ül-Hamid's Arab policy, requires consideration together with the recruitment of Arab Christians, whose representation in this ministry peaked roughly in the years 1875–1880 (see table 3.2).

If the recruitment of Muslims from places other than Istanbul increased over time even slightly, for non-Muslims, not only did their numbers decline between generations, but the field of recruitment also contracted until it hardly extended beyond the capital city at all. The change is most associated with the "other non-Muslims" (table 3.4, column 7), of whom three-fourths of the younger generation were Jewish, and with the Armenians. The fact that all fourteen of the Armenians who began their careers in or after 1876 were Istanbul-born offers the sharpest instance in these data of a falloff in geographical scope of recruitment, and certainly also a reflection of nationalist tensions, which were particularly associated with eastern Anatolia in the Armenian case.[22]

While most Foreign Ministry officials of the late nineteenth century were still Istanbul-born, this was no doubt also true of many denizens of Abd ül-Selâm Bey's mansion, as depicted in Tanpınar's novel. As in that household, many Istanbul-born Foreign Ministry officials could have had parents born in other places. Many who were sons of officials would have lived in different parts of the empire as their fathers went from post to post. It may be, too, that official recruitment mechanisms exerted their effects over a period of generations, so that some provincial families established a branch at Istanbul and then worked their way into official ranks. Do the personnel records throw any light, then, on the officials' earlier family origins?

Nothing on the questionnaire used to create the records required the respondents to indicate whether their place of birth was different from the

[21] Kemal Karpat evaluates the total number of immigrants into the empire for the period 1862–1914 at 3.5–4 million; personal letter of 1 March 1982. See also Karpat, *Ottoman Population*, 60–77.

[22] Armenians did, however, serve in Ottoman administration in the East in this period; see Mesrob K. Krikorian, *Armenians in the Service of the Ottoman Empire, 1860–1908*, London, 1977.

family's traditional home. Two-thirds of the respondents gave no such information; yet inferences emerge from the responses of those who did. In the three large personnel categories, the percentages who gave no indication on this point range from almost 90 for traditionalist Muslims, to about 60 for modernist Muslims, to roughly 50 for non-Muslims. These differences hint at a greater geographical scope of recruitment for the modernist Muslims and non-Muslims, of which either group's mobility will prove greater than the traditionalist Muslims' in almost every meaning of the term. Not surprisingly, the indications of movement over generations to Istanbul are strongest in the case of the non-Muslims, the group historically least associated with official careers.

Perhaps the firmest indicator among the data on places of familial origin pertains to places mentioned as ancestral residences but not as places of birth. In Anatolia, several more non-Muslims mentioned the province of Bursa as their original family home than as their birthplace. Other Anatolian places mentioned as prior family homes but not as places of birth include the provinces of Ankara, Konya, Sivas, and Mamuret ül-Aziz; men who mentioned these provinces were modernist Muslims and, somewhat more frequently, Armenians. For localities outside Anatolia, there is no other comparable indication of migration over a period of generations, except in the case of Syria. The percentage of non-Muslims who mention the present-day territory of Syria as their birthplace is less than half the percentage who mention it as the home of their family at some time prior to their birth. (As it happens, four of the seven Arab Christians included in the tables were Istanbul-born). As at Abd ül-Selâm Bey's mansion, then, familial migration over generations did help shape the staff of the Foreign Ministry, at least in a small way. Yet if we assume that most of the two-thirds who said nothing about prior family home were from families resident at Istanbul for more than one generation, and add to them those who named Istanbul as their prior family home, we can conclude that something like three-fourths of Foreign Ministry officials were both sons and grandsons of Istanbul-dwellers.

The population in relation to which the representativity of the Foreign Ministry staff can best be tested remains, then, that of the capital city. Table 3.5 compares Ottoman statistics on the city's population with data of the most nearly corresponding dates on the Foreign Ministry staff.[23]

[23] Here we use Karpat's study of Ottoman population as the most recent. It should be noted that the dates of the censuses are not always exact. The census of 1881–1882 was not completed until 1893, and the "1914" figures apparently date from c. 1905–1906; Karpat, *Ottoman Population*, 33, 35. Other scholars have also done important work on Ottoman demography, especially Justin McCarthy, *Muslims and Minorities: The Population of Ottoman Anatolia and the End of the Empire*, New York, 1983; also Stanford Shaw, "The Ottoman Census System and Population, 1831–1914," *IJMES*, IX (1978), 325–38; id., "The Population of Istanbul in the Nineteenth Century," *Tarih Dergisi*, XXXII (1979), 403–26; id., "Otto-

Since the population data do not make any distinction, such as appears in the tables above, among Muslims on the basis of education, here the two groups of Muslims appear as a single category. Some incompatibilities also exist between the population categories in the Foreign Ministry data and the censuses. The term used in censuses to designate Greeks really referred to Greek Orthodox Christians, with the result that some of the population figures for Greeks may overstate the ethnically Greek population of the city by at least a slight margin. The absence of population figures for Arab Christians signifies that they belonged to various of the religious communities recorded in the censuses, including, in the case of the Orthodox, the category labeled as "Greek." The comparisons in the table are thus inexact in some respects. In addition, fluctuations over time in the population totals suggest that the censuses cannot be taken without reservation, although refinements in technique probably made the later ones more reliable than the earlier ones. Here the census figures stand simply as the most detailed available about the city.

The first comparative finding that stands out from table 3.5 is that the non-Muslims collectively never made up as large a share of the Foreign Ministry staff as of the population of the city. The figures in this table suggest that the gap was narrowest in the early 1880s, although comparison with table 3.2 implies that non-Muslim representation would prove strongest in the 1870s, if we had population data of that decade to compare with.

Among non-Muslim subgroups, the Greeks never came close to making as large a percentage in the ministry as in the city. Even allowing that a few of the "Greeks" in the census figures would have been Orthodox but not ethnically Greek—and this would have been less often the case in Istanbul than in parts of the Balkans or the Arab lands—the underrepresentation of Greeks is clear. We have already noted the reasons for this, going back to the Greek Revolution.

For Armenians, table 3.5 creates the impression that they began by being underrepresented in the ministry and ended by being overrepresented. Obviously, this was not the whole story. Comparison with table 3.2 shows that the relative prominence of Armenians in this ministry fell throughout Abd ül-Hamid's reign, as did that of non-Muslims in general. The "overrepresentation" in the later years evidently results from an even more rapid fall in the Armenian share of the population of Istanbul after 1897, a period of great tension in Ottoman-Armenian relations.[24] By then,

man Population Movements during the Last Years of the Empire, 1885–1914," *Osmanlı Araştırmaları*, I (1980), 191–205.

[24] According to population figures of 1906–1907, Armenians then accounted for only 6 percent of the male population of Istanbul and environs: Karpat, *Ottoman Population*, 168–69.

Table 3.5.
REPRESENTATION OF ETHNORELIGIOUS GROUPS IN THE FOREIGN MINISTRY AND IN THE POPULATION OF ISTANBUL
(as percentage of totals shown in columns 8 or 9[a])

	Muslim	*Non-Muslim*	*Greek*	*Armenian*	*Jewish*	*Arab Xn.*	*Europ. Origin*	*No. of (Males in Istanbul)/ [FM Offcls]*	*Total Istanbul Popn.*[a]
	(1)	*(2)*	*(3)*	*(4)*	*(5)*	*(6)*	*(7)*	*(8)*	*(9)*
Population, 1844	48	52	21	23	5	?	2[b]	*(213,693)*	?
For. Min., 1850	74	26	4	11	0	0	11	*[27]*	
Population, 1857	47	53	25	19	6	?	1[b]	*(238,234)*	?
For. Min., 1857	72	28	9	9	0	2	8	*[53]*	
Population, 1882	54	47	20	18	6	?	0.3[b]	*(219,431)*	*(380,804)*
For. Min., 1882	66	34	10	18	2	3	2	*[236]*	
Population, 1897	55	45	19	17	4	?	0.3[b]	*(522,144)*	*(903,482)*
For. Min., 1897	72	28	8	13	4	2	1	*[286]*	
Population, 1914	62	38	23	8	6	?	0.3[b]	?	*(909,978)*
For. Min., 1908	76	24	7	13	3	1	0.5	*[213]*	

SOURCE OF POPULATION DATA:
Karpat, *Ottoman Population*, 160-61, 188-89, 203, 206-207.
NOTES:
[a] Since all Ottoman officials were male, and since the undercounting problem in Ottoman censuses appears especially severe where females are concerned, figures for males only will be used in computing percentages from census data whenever those data are broken down by sex; otherwise, totals for males and females must be used.
[b] These percentages are based on census data for Latin Catholics.

the Armenians' position in the central administration was becoming uncertain, as had happened earlier to the Greeks.

If there were non-Muslim subgroups that achieved proportional representation in the ministry, they were the smaller ones. At certain dates, this appears true of both the subgroups on which the data permit comparison—the men of European origin and the Jews—at least if we assume that the 1914 population figure for the Jews is erratic.[25] Is it possible that members of the smallest non-Muslim communities were favored under Abd ül-Hamid, at a time when other non-Muslims were not? We have already noted that the Jews to some degree replaced the Armenians in this ministry. In chapter 7, we shall see qualitative evidence that Abd ül-Hamid may have favored the smaller minorities.

[25] Figures of 1906–1907 show Jews as 4.6 percent of the male population of Istanbul, a figure closer to the percentage found among Foreign Ministry officials than is the 1914 population figure: ibid., 168–69.

So far, we have treated the question of social origins chiefly in terms of ethnic and religious affiliations and places of birth. Given the governmental expansion of the nineteenth century, another point also merits consideration. For however inbred the old scribal service had been, the number of civil officials could not have grown from 2,000 at the end of the eighteenth century to some 35,000 careerists—and more hangers-on—without bringing in men whose fathers were not officials. Table 3.6 summarizes the evidence on this point.

Table 3.6.
OCCUPATIONS OF FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIALS' FATHERS
(as percentage of fathers with known occupations)

	ALL RESPONDENTS (1)	*MUSLIM I* (2)	*MUSLIM II* (3)	*NON-MUSLIM* (4)	*Greek* (5)	*Armenian* (6)	*Other N-M.* (7)
N of Fathers with Known Occupation[a]	*319*	*104*	*132*	*84*	*27*	*42*	*15*
Civil Officialdom	45	41	63	21	30	14	27
Palace	6	9	6	4	11	0	0
Religious Establishment	5	9	5	-[b]	-[b]	-[b]	-[b]
Military	11	15	11	5	15	0	0
Other Official	8	8	5	11	15	7	13
Landowner, Local Notable	5	4	5	6	4	2	20
Merchant, Money Changer	16	10	4	43	22	64	20
Craftsman,Small Trader	3	4	0	8	0	12	13
Other	1	1	1	2	4	0	7
N of Fathers with Unknown Occupation	*36*	*10*	*8*	*18*	*2*	*8*	*8*

NOTE:
[a] Adjusted to eliminate multiple counting of fathers with more than one son included in the files, and to exclude fathers of unknown occupation; percentages are based on the numbers in this row.
[b] Non-Muslims could not serve in the Islamic Religious Establishment.

Several points require notice prior to interpretation of the table. First, while slavery was still a reality in Ottoman society, the practice of training slaves for government service had died out to the extent that the records under analysis include only one such case: İbrahim Edhem Paşa, who had been reared in the household of grand vezir Husrev Paşa (d. 1855), and who eventually served as foreign minister, ambassador, and briefly even grand vezir.[26] In this case, the master is counted in place of the father.

A second point is that the number of men shown in table 3.6 is not

[26] BBA, DSA II, 218, İbrahim Edhem Paşa; cf. İnal, *Sadrıazamlar*, 600–35. On slavery, see Ehud R. Toledano, *The Ottoman Slave Trade and its Suppression: 1840–1890*, Princeton, 1982.

that of Foreign Ministry officials, as in previously presented tables, but rather that of their fathers. The difference arises from the fact that several sets of brothers appear among the officials. There is one trio of Muslim brothers, two of them in the traditionalist group and the third among the modernists.[27] Among modernist Muslims are four pairs of brothers.[28] The non-Muslims include one pair of Greek brothers, two of Armenian, one of Jewish, and one of Arab Christian.[29] All figures in the table are adjusted to eliminate multiple counting of fathers with more than one son in a given personnel category. The total number of cases also appears as one less than the total for the three major groups; this is to prevent double counting of the father with sons in both Muslim groups.

Finally, fathers with unknown occupations have been excluded from computation of the percentages. Since the personnel records questionnaire called for specification of the father's occupation, it is not clear why any officials omitted this information. The fact that such omission occurs most often among non-Muslims may have something to do with their newness to officialdom and may signify a feeling that the father's occupation was nothing to brag about. Proportionately the highest rate of nonresponse on father's occupation occurs among the Jews, who—as will gradually become apparent—were mostly of comparatively humble origins. Conversely, the lowest nonresponse rate was for the Greeks, who display many signs of social advantage.[30]

[27] Among traditionalist Muslims, Mustafa Nuri Bey and Ali Rifat Bey (Har., SA305 and 62); among modernist Muslims, Grand Vezir Ahmed Tevfik Paşa (Har., SA429); all were sons of Major General (*Ferik*) İsmail Hakkî Paşa. The personnel records, incidentally, normally include no dates pertaining to the fathers' lives or careers. Inferences can be drawn from the fact that the fathers are one generation older than the officials whose dates of birth and first appointment appear in table 3.3.

[28] Çapanzade Yusuf Agâh Efendi and Ahmed Şakir Paşa (BBA, DSA I, 196 and 606), sons of Ömer Hulusî Efendi; Mehmed Esad Bey and Sadullah Paşa (Har., SA172 and 424), sons of former governor of Kurdistan Esad Paşa (whom Sadullah Paşa further identifies as Muftîzade Esad Muhlis Paşa); Mehmed Feridun Bey and Aziz Harun Bey (Har., SA33 and 181), sons of *chef de protocole* (*teşrifat nazırı*) Mehmed Kâmil Bey; Mehmed Nuri Rifat Bey and Mustafa Şekib Bey (Har., SA148 and 169), sons of foreign minister and grand vezir Ârifî Paşa.

[29] Alexander and "Etienne" Karatodori (Har., SA42 and 30), sons of Constantine Karatodori; Aram and Ohan Bağdadlian (Har., SA45 and 31), sons of Minas der Mesrob Bağdadlian; Hımayak and Neşan Safer (Har., SA138 and 124), sons of Agop Canik; Cemil and Selim Gürcî (Har., SA513 and 551), sons of Benyamin Gürcî of Baghdad; Feyzî and Nasrî Franko (Har., SA173 and 66), sons of former *mutasarrıf* of Lebanon, Franko Paşa.

[30] A number of Greek officials' fathers appear to have been of higher status than their sons. Fedon Andoniadi (Har., SA176) held his last verifiable post as first secretary of embassy in Stockholm; his father was Hristaki Paşa, chief physician at the Army Engineering School and private physician to the late Sultan Mother. Aristarki Beyzade Aleko Bey (Har., SA504) became the second man (*müsteşar*) at the Brussels legation; according to other sources, he may or may not have later become minister at The Hague; he identifies his father as the Prince of Samos, Miltiadi Paşa. Alexander Dosios (Har., SA505), who ended his career with a series of consular appointments, was the son of a palace physician, Dr. Yorgi Dosios Efendi. İstefanaki Fotiadi Bey (Har., SA4) served on the Council of State (*Şura-yı Devlet*), but his father, Fotiadi

The fathers' occupations shown in table 3.6 fall into three groups: civil officialdom, other branches of government service, and occupations outside government. The nongovernmental careers accounted for about a quarter of the fathers. The corresponding proportion for free, nonofficial fathers of the chief scribes of the period 1768–1836 was about 20 percent. Of course, this slightly increased recruitment from nonofficial households was unevenly distributed among the personnel groups, with the lowest rate—10 percent—among modernist Muslims and the highest—59 percent—necessarily among non-Muslims. Although the Foreign Ministry staff was still about as much Istanbul-born as the chief scribes of a century before had been, at least some broadening of recruitment had occurred in occupational terms.

The nonofficial fathers' occupations are also of specific interest. For the late eighteenth century, the analogous data are fragmentary but seem to refer to craftsmen or tradesmen, or perhaps provincial landowners. In contrast, the occupations of nonofficial fathers of Foreign Ministry men suggest that most of them were urbanites with significant business interests. The ostensibly nonurban element, confined to a few landowners and local notables, would have had important economic interests and most likely been town dwellers, in fact. The one recognizable group lacking important economic interests were at least urban—namely, the craftsmen and small traders. Few such individuals appear in the table, although conceivably a good proportion of the fathers of unknown occupation belonged in this modest category. The ultimate sign of broadening in the scope of recruitment would have been the appearance in the Foreign Ministry of peasants' sons. Unthinkable in western European foreign ministries of this date, that kind of recruitment also did not appear here, although it was neither out of keeping with Ottoman traditions of elite recruitment nor unexampled in other sectors of Ottoman officialdom under Abd ül-Hamid.[31]

The largest category of nonofficial fathers in table 3.6 is that of merchants and money changers. For non-Muslims (column 4), whose admission into official ranks was mostly recent, such commercial families were twice as important as any other source of recruitment. The fathers in this category, Muslim and non-Muslim, also prove interesting. Among traditionalist Muslim officials with merchant fathers, four out of ten—all older officials—identified their fathers as *hayriye tüccarı*, members of a privileged merchant group originally formed to help Muslims compete with Europeans.[32] The point strikes an elitist note in recruitment of Muslims from commercial families. Among non-Muslims, the *sarraf*s stand out. The term refers to money changers, or at times something close to a banker or financier. This characteristically non-Muslim occupation accounted for 29 percent of Armenian officials' fathers whose callings are known.[33] This amounts to an elitist note in non-Muslim recruitment, too.

Looking next at branches of government service outside civil officialdom, we find 30 percent of the fathers in such positions. The proportion is almost identical to that of the chief scribes' fathers who served in branches of the ruling class other than the scribal service in the late prereform period (nine out of some thirty fathers of known occupation). Yet the composition of the category had changed considerably in the interim. For both periods, it included men in the palace, the religious establishment (*ilmiye*), and the military. In discussing the earlier period, we treated fathers in provincial administrative posts as a distinct subcategory, for provincial administration had not then become thoroughly identified with the scribal service. By the late nineteenth century, in contrast, provincial administration was characteristically a civil function—indeed, was the one above all others from which the name *mülkiye* came; the next table will show what percentage of the fathers appearing as civil officials in table 3.6 were in local administration. The category of "other officials" in table 3.6, finally, had no counterpart in the data on the chief scribes. This is a residual category, in which the largest single component consists of men employed in government enterprises and various other quasi-official capacities. It is no accident that the non-Muslims are the one of the

Paşa, had been governor-general (*vali*) of Crete. Yahya Karaca Paşa (BBA, DSA II, 1030) died as minister (*orta elçi*) to Stockholm and The Hague; his father, Karaca Beyzade Kostaki Bey, had evidently been ambassador (*büyük elçi*) to Berlin. "Etienne" Karatodori (Har., SA30), for a quarter-century minister in Brussels, and his brother Alexander (Har., SA42), who may never have gotten beyond first secretary at Madrid, were sons of Constantine Karatodori, whom "Etienne" describes as personal physician to Mahmud II and Abd ül-Mecid and a member of the Senate under Abd ül-Hamid. Exceptionally, İstefanaki Musurus Paşa (BBA, DSA I, 684) ended in the very post that his father had long held, that of ambassador in London; the father was more prominent, however. See Sinan Kuneralp, "Bir Osmanlı Diplomatı, Kostaki Musurus Paşa," *Belleten*, XXXIV (1970), 421–35.

[31] Among 1,533 graduates of the School of Civil Administration in the period 1860–1914, 49 (3 percent of the total) were sons of peasants; Çankaya, *Mülkiye Târihi*, VIII, chart preceding p. 265. Historically, one way the sultans had sought to prevent the emergence of privileged high-status groups independent of their control was by recruiting persons of obscure origin into a ruling elite that owed its standing solely to the sultan.

[32] Fathers of Mehmed Emin Efendi (BBA, DSA I, 264), İsmail Hakkî Efendi (Har., SA329), Abdullah Niyazî Efendi (BBA, DSA I, 550), Ali Şinasî Efendi (Har., SA724). Cf. Musa Çadırcı, "II. Mahmut Döneminde (1808–1839) Avrupa ve Hayriye Tüccarları," in *Türkiye'nin Sosyal ve Ekonimik Tarihi (1071–1920)*, ed. Osman Okyar and Halil İnalcık, Ankara, 1980, 237–41.

[33] On the mostly Armenian *sarraf*s, see Hagop Barsoumian, "The Dual Role of the Armenian *Amira* Class within the Ottoman Government and the Armenian *Millet* (1750–1850)," in *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire*, ed. Braude and Lewis, I, 171–77. In the Foreign Ministry personnel records, out of forty-two Armenian officials' fathers whose occupations are stated, twelve were *sarrafs*. These are the fathers of Arzuman İstepan (BBA, DSA I, 52), Mihritad [for Mihridat] Babayan (Har., SA427), Neşan Civanian (Har., SA210), İstepan Çayan (Har., SA180), Dakes Daksian (Har., SA6), Rupen Davud (Har., SA164), Haçik (Har., SA137), Ohannes Majakian (Har., SA191), Avnik Maksud Bey (Har., SA204), Artin Markarian (Har., SA52), Mısırlızade Edouard Bey (Har., SA450), and Mığırdiç Norigian (Har., SA57). Cf. Çark, *Ermeniler*, 146, 147, 151, 165.

three major personnel groups that is most associated with this category, and the modernist Muslims least so; for functions such as those of government architect or palace purveyor were ones in which non-Muslims had traditionally appeared—not quite in, but at the edges of, the ruling class.

As to specific branches of service in which noncivil or earlier nonscribal, fathers were found, no clear pattern appears, except that the most important late nineteenth-century source for such recruitment was the military, whereas the most important source a century before had been the religious establishment. Relatively few non-Muslims' fathers served in any of these branches of government. None could have served in the Islamic religious establishment; none was a priest or rabbi, either. Among non-Muslim subgroups, the seemingly high percentages of Greek fathers who served in the palace or the military represent a number of physicians, a capacity in which non-Muslims had appeared in military ranks even prior to the Reform Decree of 1856.[34]

The most conspicuous fact illustrated in table 3.6 is that 45 percent of the fathers with known occupations were still civil officials. This figure is several times higher than that for any other category of employment distinguished in the table, and only a bit lower than the proportion of chief scribes of the period 1768–1836 who were sons or otherwise dependents of scribal officials (sixteen men out of thirty). The extent of this kind of recruitment varied widely, however, among personnel categories. Among modernist Muslims, over 60 percent were civil officials' sons. For traditionalist Muslims, the proportion was only about 40 percent; for non-Muslims, only about 20 percent. Among non-Muslim subgroups, the history of a strong association between the Greeks and government service produced a comparatively high figure. Inspection of the records shows, too, that older Greek officials were more likely to have had fathers in the civil administration than were their junior coreligionists.[35]

Where hereditary recruitment is concerned, however, it would not do to leave the question of fathers' occupations without breaking down the civil official category into components. Table 3.7 presents a detailed view of where civil official fathers of Foreign Ministry officials actually served.

This view proves that "hereditary recruitment," in the sense of son succeeding father in the same or a successor agency, had fallen quite low. Among the chief scribes' fathers, adoptive fathers, or masters, discussed in chapter 2, a fifth, or even a quarter, of those with known occupations served in offices headed by the chief scribe—the ones from which the Foreign Ministry emerged.[36] For late nineteenth-century Foreign Ministry officials' fathers, the figure is only 6 percent. Among personnel categories, the highest such percentage is the Greeks'—another sign linking them to patterns of an earlier era. A breakdown of these figures by generation would show, further, that "hereditary recruitment" was declining, both for the two Muslim groups and for the Greeks.

Where did other civil official fathers serve? A few came from other agencies of the Sublime Porte: the grand vezirate and its staff, the Ministry of the Interior, and the Council of State (*Şura-yı Devlet*). Such recruitment declined in importance over time. A substantial percentage of the fathers served in other civil agencies of the central government, outside the Sublime Porte but still in the capital.[37] The extent of recruitment from central civil agencies other than the Sublime Porte was largest—and was growing with time—among modernist Muslims. No one agency accounted for much of this recruitment.

The last category in table 3.7 is that of local administration. Scribal officials of the eighteenth century and earlier had been known to hold im-

[34] Ergin, *Maarif*, II, 280–97, 626.

[35] Twenty out of the thirty Greek Foreign Ministry officials belonged to the older generation; but of those with civil official fathers, seven out of eight were in the older generation. The one younger man was İspiraki Filoksenidi (Har., SA440), whose father had a minor job as special official, stationed at Orsova, for the Ottoman outpost at Ada Kale. Older Greek officials with civil official fathers are Aleko Bey Aristarchi (Har., SA504), İstefanaki Fotiadi Bey (Har., SA4), Yahya Karaca Paşa (BBA, DSA II, 1030), Pandeli Logaris (Har., SA9), İstefanaki Musurus Paşa (BBA, DSA I, 684), Kostaki Panciri (Har., SA177), and Kostaki Petropoulo (Har., SA713).

Table 3.7.
FATHERS SERVING IN THE CIVIL ADMINISTRATION
(as percentage of fathers with known occupations)

	ALL RESPONDENTS (1)	*MUSLIM I* (2)	*MUSLIM II* (3)	*NON-MUSLIM* (4)	*Greek* (5)	*Armenian* (6)	*Other N-M.* (7)
N of Fathers with Known Occupation	*319*	*104*	*132*	*84*	*27*	*42*	*15*
Foreign Ministry and Predecessor Agencies	6	5	8	6	15	0	7
Other Sublime Porte	5	3	10	1	0	2	0
Other Civil Agencies of Central Government	21	21	30	7	4	10	7
Local Administration	12	13	15	7	11	2	13
TOTAL PERCENTAGE IN CIVIL OFFICIALDOM	45	41	63	21	30	14	27

[36] Ahmed Resmî, *Halifet*, 108 (Abd ül-Rezzak Bahir; cf. Danişmend, *Kronoloji*, IV, 632, 637); 128 (Mehmed Ataullah); 129 (Mehmed Raşid); 132 (Seyyid Abdullah Berrî), 166 (Mehmed Said Galib), 193 (Mehmed Sadık); Danişmend, *Kronoloji*, IV, 641–42 (Firdevsî Mehmed Emin; cf. *Halifet*, 136).

[37] Cf. Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform*, 5, 64–66, 238–69, 298–326, on the composition of the Sublime Porte and the central civil agencies outside it.

portant positions in provincial administration; yet in the period 1768–1836 only one chief scribe's father was mentioned as a provincial official.[38] A century later, 12 percent of the fathers of Foreign Ministry officials were civil officials who served in local administration, mostly as the chiefs of the top three out of four echelons of local government—as governors-general (*vali*) of provinces, governors (*mutasarrıf*) of *sancak*s, or as district officers (*kaymakam*) of *kaza*s. Among modernist Muslims' fathers, 15 percent were in local administration. The figure for traditionalist Muslims was smaller but increasing more rapidly over time. Like the data on father-son succession in the Foreign Ministry and predecessor agencies, the recruitment of provincial civil officials' sons shows that changes in the breadth of civil-administrative recruitment were much greater than the aggregate data in table 3.6 indicate.

Considered together, the evidence in tables 3.6 and 3.7 makes important points about changes in recruitment patterns. Not only had "hereditary recruitment" within the Foreign Ministry or its predecessor offices declined considerably, but a totally new type of recruitment had appeared with the expansion of civil officialdom into local administration. The overall extent to which civil officials were recruited among sons of civil officials had declined only slightly by eighteenth-century scribal standards. Yet recruitment of sons of men outside official service had increased at least correspondingly, accounting for a majority of all non-Muslim recruitment into the ministry.

To return to the question of representativity, the Foreign Ministry of the Hamidian or Young Turk periods was far from having achieved proportional representation of the ethnic or religious groups of the empire, or even of its capital city, unless in the case of the smallest non-Muslim subgroups identified in the tables. Such non-Muslim representation as there was also declined under Abd ül-Hamid. Since Ottoman reformers never committed themselves to proportional representation of non-Muslims, it is a question of judgment to evaluate what they accomplished before the policy went into decline; we shall return to this point in analyzing service patterns and compensation. Aside from its relatively small size, one obstacle to making the Foreign Ministry very representative of Ottoman society was that its zone of recruitment was effectively limited to the capital city, cosmopolitan though it was. Perhaps the clearest indication of broadening social mobilization lies in the evidence on Foreign Ministry officials' fathers' occupations. In this ministry, governmental expansion had forced a broadening of the old patterns of cooptation, occupationally if not geographically.

This discussion has, however, examined evidence on only one ministry.

[38] Ahmed Resmî, *Halifet*, 122 (Mehmed Hayrî).

How did conditions there differ from those discernible in other agencies? And how does this collective biographical portrait of Foreign Ministry officials compare with the officials' own way of thinking about their social origins? The remainder of this chapter examines these questions.

COMPARATIVE INSIGHTS FROM OTHER MINISTRIES

While readily available sources do not provide the basis for an equally detailed assessment of the backgrounds of other civil officials, the fact that the Foreign Ministry may have differed in social makeup from other civil agencies makes it important to establish comparisons where possible. If the Foreign Ministry was of limited effectiveness in representing Ottoman social diversity, did other agencies compensate for its deficiencies?

An analysis of Ottoman government yearbook listings for various ministries offers one way to make comparisons. The yearbook data have their weaknesses, however. For example, while the yearbooks of the central government were published almost without fail from 1847 until 1918, only after the accession of Abd ül-Hamid did the listings begin to be organized in a way that clearly differentiated staffs of different agencies. Even then, the yearbooks listed only incumbents of supervisory or higher-level positions, with the number of listings for a given ministry varying over the years. Since the entries gave little identifying information on individuals beyond name, position, and rank, determining some officials' ethnoreligious affiliations is harder than in the personnel records. The social realities discernible from the yearbooks are thus different from those of the personnel records. Yet within these limits, a comparative survey, based on yearbooks for selected years, proves informative.

The yearbook listings do not permit differentiation of officials in terms of education or cultural orientation, as we have differentiated Muslim officials in most tables so far, but otherwise make it possible to distinguish essentially the same groups as in the preceding section. The first thing that stands out in comparing table 3.8 with earlier tables is that the representation of different groups in the Foreign Ministry does not appear the same in these data. Based on the yearbooks, the percentages for non-Muslims (table 3.8, columns 3–9) are usually lower than the corresponding percentages from the Foreign Ministry personnel records (table 3.2, columns 4–9). Since the yearbook listings include only fairly high positions, this suggests that non-Muslims did not achieve promotion as readily as Muslims. If so, the yearbooks may understate the presence of non-Muslims in other agencies, too.

With this possibility in mind, we still have to conclude from table 3.8 that if the Foreign Ministry staff was not highly representative of Ottoman

Table 3.8.
COMPOSITION OF VARIOUS AGENCIES' PERSONNEL AT SELECTED DATES
(as percentages[a] of the numbers shown for each year in column 1)

	TOTAL[b]	MUSLIM	NON-MUSLIM	Greek	Armenian	Jewish	Arab Xn.	Europ. Origin	Other, Indeterm.
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
FOREIGN MINISTRY									
1883	*55*	75	26	4	13	4	2	4	0
1900	*175*	85	16	3	8	2	1	2	0
1908	*211*	86	15	3	6	3	1	1	1
1917	*143*	93	7	1	4	3	0	0	0
MINISTRY OF JUSTICE									
1883	*198*	81	19	10	8	1	0	0	1
1900	*272*	89	11	4	6	0	1	0	0
1908	*302*	89	11	4	5	1	1	0	0
1917	*371*	94	6	2	2	1	1	0	1
MINISTRY OF INTERIOR[c]									
1883	*42*	95	5	0	5	0	0	0	0
1900	*110*	94	6	4	3	0	0	0	0
1908	*148*	92	5	2	2	1	0	0	1
1917	*169*	99	1	0	1	0	0	0	1
MINISTRY OF FINANCE									
1883	*76*	96	4	1	0	1	0	1	0
1900	*185*	96	4	1	2	1	0	0	1
1908	*326*	97	3	1	1	0	0	0	0
1917	*164*	92	9	1	6	0	1	1	0
MINISTRY OF WAR									
1883	*560*	98	2	0.4	0.4	0	0	1	0.4
1900	*686*	98	2	1	0	0	0	1	0
1908	*709*	98	2	0.4	0.1	0	0	1	0
1917	*?*[d]	100	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
COUNCIL OF STATE									
1883	*81*	89	11	7	4	0	0	1	0
1900	*195*	92	8	4	2	1	1	0	1
1908	*240*	94	6	3	2	0	1	0	0
1917	*45*	94	7	2	4	0	0	0	0
SENATE									
1883	*33*	73	27	15	9	3	0	0	0
1900	*7*	43	57	43	0	14	0	0	0
1913[e]	*52*	77	23	12	8	2	0	0	2
1917	*63*	87	13	6	3	2	2	0	0

SOURCES:
Salname-i Devlet-i Aliye-i Osmaniye, Istanbul, volumes for 1300/1882-1883, 1318/1900-1901, 1326/1908, 1329/1913-1914, 1333-1334/1917-1918. The dating of the volumes is *hicrî* for the first three and *malî* for the last two. I am indebted to Sedef Torunoğlu and Ethem Eldem for assistance in preparing this table.

NOTES:
[a] In each row, the percentages in columns 2 and 3 should sum to 100, but sometimes do not because of rounding. The sum of the percentages in columns 4 through 9 should equal that in column 3, but may not for the same reason.
[b] The totals are those of the number of listings found for each agency in the yearbook of the indicated year.
[c] Interior Ministry totals are for the central offices in Istanbul.
[d] Changes in layout make it hard to be sure where the listings for this ministry end in the yearbook.
[e] I have used the 1913 figures for the Senate because the 1908 yearbook shows it as having a membership of only three.

diversity, other agencies were less so.[39] At least this is true of non-Muslim representation, ethnic differences among Muslims being almost totally invisible in these data. Further, almost all the agencies in the table declined in non-Muslim representation over time. Non-Muslims were especially few in the Ministry of War (and other military departments). This is not surprising, given Ottoman statesmen's reluctance about non-Muslim participation in defending the Islamic state. Non-Muslim representation also appears low in the Interior Ministry; but this may reflect the fact that these figures come only from the ministry's central offices. In local administration, the presence of non-Muslims, and non-Turkish Muslims, would have been stronger in many localities.[40]

The only agencies that ever appear to have matched or exceeded the Foreign Ministry in non-Muslim representation, to judge from table 3.8, were the Council of State (*Şura-yı Devlet*) and Senate (*Heyet-i Ayan*).[41] Both were representative bodies at least in part, however. From the prorogation of the first Ottoman Chamber of Deputies in 1878 until the restoration of the constitution in 1908, furthermore, the Senate—in which membership was solely by appointment—survived only as a place where Abd ül-Hamid would pension off a few elderly men of proven loyalty. The fact that a high percentage of this tiny group were non-Muslims signifies little, unless that Abd ül-Hamid practiced a certain tokenism to prove his liberality. After the Young Turks restored the parliament, non-Muslims made up 13 percent of senators, to judge from the 1917 yearbook listings. They accounted for 12 percent of the empire's 243 representatives in the Chamber of Deputies (*Meclis-i Meb'usan*) at that time, with the distribution among communities roughly as in the Senate. These percentages exceed those found in any of the other agencies tabulated in table 3.8 as of that date. According to 1914 population figures, however, non-Muslims, after losing ground proportionately, still accounted for 38 percent of the population of Istanbul, and 19 percent of the population of the empire, reckoned then at 18.5 million.[42]

On the basis of table 3.8, other late nineteenth-century governmental organs thus appear even less accommodative of the empire's social diversity, as represented by non-Muslims, than the Foreign Ministry. The sole exceptions were the Senate and Chamber of Deputies; but they, too, did

[39] This conclusion fundamentally revises Findley, "Acid Test," which was based primarily on the Foreign Ministry data.
[40] Cf. Krikorian, *Armenians in the Service of the Ottoman Empire, 1860–1908*, passim; also local government listings in the official yearbooks; e.g., *Salname*, 1317, 376–680; 1326, 692–994.
[41] Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform*, 175–76, 247–50, 307–9; Robert Devereux, *The First Ottoman Constitutional Period: A Study of the Midhat Constitution and Parliament*, Baltimore, 1963.
[42] Karpat, *Ottoman Population*, 188–89.

TABLE 3.9.
BIRTHPLACES OF GRADUATES OF THE SCHOOL OF CIVIL ADMINISTRATION, 1880-1884, 1908-1912
(as percentages of the numbers of graduates in each column)

	TOTAL		*MUSLIM*		*NON-MUSLIM*	
	1880-1884	*1908-1912*	*1880-1884*	*1908-1912*	*1880-1884*	*1908-1912*
	(1)	*(2)*	*(3)*	*(4)*	*(5)*	*(6)*
N of Graduates	*74*	*397*	*59*	*380*	*15*	*17*
Istanbul	72	28	69	29	80	18
Anatolia	11	32	8	33	20	29
The Balkans	15	24	19	23	0	35
Arab Lands	1	11	2	11	0	6
Non-Ottoman Territories	1	1	2	1	0	0
Other, Unclear	0	3	0	2	0	12

SOURCE:
Çankaya, *Mülkiye Târihi*, III, 81-179, 1145-1200; IV, 1205-1548.

not represent non-Muslims in proportion to their strength in the general population. The same agencies may, of course, have done better at representing non-Turkish Muslims in the years shown; the yearbook entries do not make it possible to check this point.

For want of data on birthplaces or fathers' occupations, the yearbooks also do not make possible comparisons on other aspects of social representativity; but Çankaya's biographical work on alumni of the School of Civil Administration does provide such information on large numbers of men who mostly served in the Interior Ministry. Since his compilation includes data on graduates of classes through the 1960s, without the disruption found in the personnel records in 1908, his work also makes it possible to extend the period under analysis.[43] Table 3.9 does so by examining the birthplaces of men who graduated from the School of Civil Administration in two five-year periods, 1880–1884 and 1908–1912.

The School of Civil Administration (*Mülkiye Mektebi*), which has since evolved into the Faculty of Political Science of Ankara University, was founded in Istanbul in 1859, but operated only on a small scale until expanded by Abd ül-Hamid. The 162 who graduated through 1879 were all Muslims. Of them about 15 percent appear to have been ethnically non-Turkish (mostly Albanian). A smaller percentage were probably Turks

[43] The notes appended to each entry show that Çankaya used Ottoman official personnel records as one source. However, as an official of the Ankara Faculty of Political Science, he also had access to personnel records of the republic for men who continued to serve after 1922; and he used published sources and corresponded with graduates or their families. The result is to give many of his biographies unbroken coverage from the time of Abd ül-Hamid to that of Atatürk or beyond, though without all the exact references to dates of appointment, salaries, and the like, which play key roles in our analysis of the Foreign Ministry personnel records; Çankaya, *Mülkiye Târihi*, passim.

whose origins lay outside the empire, or at least outside what is now Turkey. The student body in these early years thus displayed much the kind of representativity that appears among Muslims of the Foreign Ministry. One curious feature of this period is that thirteen people—8 percent of the total—came from the single village of İbradı in the province of Konya (Tekke *sancak*, Akseki *kaza*).[44] Not enough biographical information survives to prove it, but this suggests that one of the directors or instructors of the school may have come from that village. Recalling the pattern that brought people of certain geographical or ethnic origins to Istanbul to practice a particular trade, this village link suggests a "guildlike" motif in the early history of one of modern Turkey's most distinguished schools.

Dating from the period when the School of Civil Administration was just beginning to expand, the graduates of 1880–1884, shown in table 3.9, are contemporary with some of the younger-generation Foreign Ministry officials, with virtually the same non-Muslim percentage in both cases (about 20 percent), and a similar Armenian preponderance among non-Muslims. If the expansion of civil officialdom into local administration had helped broaden recruitment at the Foreign Ministry, it was only fitting that the student body of a school closely associated with local administration should include a lower percentage of the Istanbul-born (though still over 70 percent) than did that ministry, while the percentages from Anatolia and the Balkans—though not from the other localities listed in the table—were higher at the school. One motif appearing at the school was the representation among Muslims from the Balkans and the Arab lands, especially, of non-Turks and Turks from outside present-day Turkey. Of the eleven Muslim graduates of the period 1880–1884 from the Balkans (a heading that includes the Aegean and Mediterranean islands as far east as Cyprus in these tables), seven probably had some kind of particularist identity: two Albanians, two Bulgarian Turks, two Cypriots, one Cretan Turk.[45] The one Arab of this period was a Jerusalem Arab; the one from outside the empire was a Circassian.[46]

Dating from a quarter century later, the data on graduates of 1908–

[44] Çankaya, *Mülkiye Târihi*, III, 5–66. İbradı is mentioned as the birthplace in the following biographies: A/49, A/53, A/73, A/75, A/77, A/80, A/81, A/85, A/86, A/87, A/88, A/95, A/125; in addition, A/147 was the son of a man from İbradı. Graduates of this period who appear to be ethnically non-Turkish are A/14 (Palestinian), A/51 (Iraqi), A/82 (Circassian), A/100 (Syrian), A/102 (Georgian), A/113 (Bosnian), A/120 (Circassian), A/128 (Arab or Kurd?), A/134 (Palestinian), plus fourteen (probable) Albanians: A/56, A/62, A/70, A/74, A/76, A/89, A/91, A/96, A/104, A/105, A/114, A/116, A/122, A/144. Graduates who appear to be Turks from outside present-day Turkey are A/16 (Chios), A/27 (Kazan), A/35 (Crete), A/37 (the Crimea), A/45 (Crete), A/54 (Daghestan), A/69 (Batum), A/98 (the Crimea), A/115 (Batum), A/132 (Kerkuk), A/140 (Crete); Batum, however, was only ceded to Russia in 1878. (Çankaya numbers the pre-1879 graduates in a separate series with the prefatory "A/.")

[45] Ibid., III, bios. 53 & 75 (Albanian), 76 and 84 (Bulgarian Turks), 73 and 86 (Cypriots, both sons of Grand Vezir Kâmil Paşa), 68 (Cretan Turk).

[46] Ibid., III, bios. 74 (Jerusalem Arab) and 19 (Circassian).

1912 throw added light on the decline of the non-Muslim presence in official ranks and on the growth in that of different categories of Muslims. While the total number of graduates was more than five times that of the earlier period, the number of non-Muslims had hardly increased. The seven Armenians, six Greeks, two Jews, and two Balkan Christians who graduated in this period were but a shadow of Ottoman egalitarianism as understood during the *Tanzimat*.[47]

Compared to what we have seen at the Foreign Ministry, and to its own record of 1880–1884, however, the school's Muslim students had acquired a remarkable diversity. Now a third of the students came from Anatolia, virtually another quarter from the Balkans, and another tenth from the Arab lands, mostly from the Fertile Crescent. Since Çankaya was able to supplement the Ottoman personnel records with other sources, including official ones of the republican period and direct correspondence with graduates or their families, particular ethnic or regional identifications stand out in his biographies more clearly than in the Foreign Ministry records. This is especially true where non-Turkish graduates passed into the service of other governments following the collapse of the empire. It can still sometimes be difficult to distinguish an Albanian, say, from an ethnic Turk born in Albania while his father was serving there. Yet it appears that almost a third of the Balkan-born Muslim graduates of this period were either non-Turks, again mostly Albanians, or else of Balkan Turkish ancestry.[48] Among those born in the Arab lands, the proportion who can plausibly be identified as non-Turkish rises to 80 percent, most of them from geographical Syria.[49] This phase in the history of administrative representation had begun under Abd ül-Hamid and would not continue long into the Young Turk period before the Balkan wars, the rise of Arab and Turkish (as opposed to Ottoman) nationalism, and World War I ended it, too. Still, the decline of the non-Muslims' presence had signalled, not an end to civil-official representation, but a new assessment of the interests that needed to be taken into account.

[47] Ibid., III–IV, bios. 1055, 1122, 1266, 1273, 1391, and 1413 (Greek); 1267, 1268, 1269, 1318, 1321, 1356, and 1406 (Armenian); 1314 and 1371 (Jewish); 1089 (Macedonian) and 1411 (Romanian).

[48] Of the Muslim graduates of 1908–1912, 87 were born in the Balkans. Of the 87, 25 men (29 percent) appear to be non-Turks or Balkan Turks: ibid., III–IV, bios. 1071, 1121, 1144, 1150, 1171, 1181, 1279, 1285, 1297, 1298, 1339, 1347 (Albanian); 1063, 1247 (Bosnian); 1075, 1219, 1250, 1284, 1312 (Macedonian Turks); 1080, 1275, 1282 (Bulgarian Turks); 1088, 1164 (Cretan Turk); 1091 (Turk from Rhodes). The evidence for such identifications includes references to the man's parents as notables (*ilerigelen*) of a given locality, or his knowledge of distinctive languages, like Albanian; such knowledge is not conclusive proof by itself.

[49] Among Muslim graduates of 1908–1912, 42 were born in the Arab lands. Of the 42, 33 men (79 percent) apparently were Arabs: ibid., III–IV, bios. 1079, 1107, 1111, 1112, 1114, 1153, 1192, 1343, 1397, 1425 (Lebanese or Syro-Lebanese); 1095, 1110, 1131, 1146, 1156, 1186, 1210, 1212, 1216, 1271, 1301, 1303, 1322, 1336, 1348 (Syrians); 1083, 1084, 1182, 1313 (Iraqis); 1120, 1241, 1289, 1387 (Palestinians).

Table 3.10.
OCCUPATIONS OF FATHERS OF GRADUATES OF THE SCHOOL OF CIVIL ADMINISTRATION, 1880-1884, 1908-1912
(as percentage of fathers with known occupation)

	TOTAL		MUSLIM		NON-MUSLIM	
	1880-1884 (1)	*1908-1912* (2)	*1880-1884* (3)	*1908-1912* (4)	*1880-1884* (5)	*1908-1912* (6)
No. of Fathers with Known Occupation[a]	*38*	*352*	*31*	*342*	*7*	*10*
Civil Officialdom--Istanbul	32	14	33	14	29	10
Local Administration	29	28	33	28	14	10
Palace Service	3	2	0	2	14	0
Religious Professionals	8	11	10	11	0	20
Military, including Police	3	8	3	8	0	0
Other Official	0	8	0	8	0	0
Landowner, Local Notable	8	17	10	17	0	10
Merchant, Money Changer	11	8	10	7	14	30
Craftsman, Small Trader	5	4	0	3	29	20
Peasant	0	1	0	1	0	0
No. of Fathers with Unknown Occupation	*35*	*43*	*27*	*36*	*8*	*7*

SOURCE:
The same as in Table 3.9.

NOTE:
[a] Adjusted to eliminate multiple counting of fathers with more than one son included in the data, and to exclude fathers with unknown occupation; percentages are based on the numbers in this row.

In a different sense, the data on fathers' occupations also suggest a heightening of expectations about administration representation. As demands for political participation broadened in the years leading up to the Young Turk revolution,[50] the scope of social mobilization through the civil agencies evidently did also. Table 3.10 presents evidence on this point. Since the Muslim graduates of 1880–1884 prove to include two sons of a single father, while those of 1908–1912 appear to include two such pairs, and since many fathers' occupations are unknown for both periods, the percentages have been calculated—as in tables 3.6 and 3.7—only on the basis of fathers with known occupations.

In contrast to the situation in the Foreign Ministry, the proportion of *Mülkiye* graduates' fathers employed in civil agencies in the capital was lower and declined with time. The percentages of fathers employed in the central offices of the Interior Ministry, never above 2 percent in these data, were even lower than those of Foreign Ministry officials' fathers

[50] Findley, "Advent of Ideology," Part II, 162–66.

serving in the Foreign Ministry or its predecessor agencies. Not surprisingly, however, the percentage of *Mülkiye* graduates' fathers serving as civil officials in local administration was several times higher than the corresponding percentage for Foreign Ministry fathers in table 3.7 and showed little decline over time. In other respects, too, table 3.10 suggests that men of local prominence appreciated the importance of sending their sons to the School of Civil Administration. Other than civil officials, the largest proportion of *Mülkiye* graduates' fathers appears to have been in a group of occupations—religious professionals (including two Greek Orthodox priests),[51] landowners or local notables, and merchants or money changers—that were all strongly represented in the provinces. Of these categories, only the merchants and money changers were less prominent here than in the Foreign Ministry data. Inspection of individual biographies shows that the fathers of Muslim graduates with ethnically or regionally distinctive identities were mostly provincial civil officials, local notables, or both (in which case the fathers are counted as local officials).

Two categories that did not account for many graduates' fathers, but were significant where social mobilization is concerned, are those of craftsmen or small traders (*esnaf*) and peasants. The former were less common among Foreign Ministry fathers; the latter, totally absent. Since *Mülkiye* graduates of 1908–1912 were about a generation younger than either the younger Foreign Ministry officials or the 1880–1884 *Mülkiye* graduates, the scope of elite recruitment does seem—if we may judge by comparing tables 3.10 and 3.6—to have extended somewhat further outward and downward into Ottoman society over time.

Comparative data from official yearbooks and biographies of graduates of the School of Civil Administration serve as valuable controls, in sum, on what the personnel records show about the social backgrounds of Foreign Ministry officials. The rise and fall of the non-Muslim presence in that ministry signifies but one phase—*Tanzimat* egalitarianism—in the history of administrative representation. Even then, this phase affected the Foreign Ministry more strongly than other governmental agencies. Clearly, using such agencies to accommodate the political interests of such a diverse and noncohesive society remained an unpromising task. The expansion of civil officialdom into local administration did serve, however, as one means to broaden recruitment, especially to judge from the *Mülkiye* data, which reflect a later phase, the Hamidian egalitarianism oriented toward non-Turkish Muslims. In an era of rapid governmental expansion and mounting demands for broader political participation—a phenomenon clearly expressed in the Young Turk revolution—the scope

[51] Çankaya, *Mülkiye Târihi*, IV, bios. 1122, 1273 (fathers of Hristo Gika and Yorgi Papaçamet).

of elite recruitment was also bound to extend progressively beyond the sons of the central elites. By World War I, the empire had still not entered the age of mass politics, but the evidence on civil official recruitment shows a trend in that sense. This trend continued into the post-imperial era, when Turkish nationalism again redefined the practical meaning of egalitarianism, and when politics and administration became more fully differentiated than under the empire.

AN OTTOMAN OFFICIAL IN HIS SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT

It is one thing to consider questions of administrative representativity by examining quantifiable evidence on sizable numbers of officials, another to have a fuller picture of the officials in their social setting. The latter approach implies a narrower focus, but potentially yields a fuller realization of how those studied emerged from their background and remained linked to it. Among sources useful for achieving such an understanding of officials of this period, one stands out as especially fruitful. This section will accordingly examine what the author of this autobiographical account tells about his family background. The account appears at first to ramble, but ultimately proves purposefully organized. Moreover, it illustrates the manifold links that could exist between members of ruling and subject "classes."

The connections we shall describe are those of Aşçı Dede İbrahim Halil, the most candid and prolific of nineteenth-century official memoirists. Aşçı Dede, as we shall call him for ease of recognition, was not an official of the Foreign Ministry, or any other agency at the Sublime Porte. But he was a civil official, employed in the War Ministry (*Bab-ı Seraskerî*). He had a lot in common with our Foreign Ministry officials. For example, his highest rank, attained after more than fifty years in service, was the first rank, second class.[52] Of the Foreign Ministry staff, almost exactly half achieved that rank or higher. In attitude and outlook, Aşçı Dede was an Islamic conservative, much the same as the Foreign Ministry's traditionalist Muslims. His lengthy career, running from the 1840s to about 1906—a span not unique among officials who were apprenticed as boys and lived to an old age—included almost the entire period covered by the Foreign Ministry personnel records. During that time, he experienced, and recorded, almost everything that could happen to a civil official. His memoirs are thus of exceptional value in giving access to the world—one of the worlds—behind the terse entries in the personnel records.

Aşçı Dede—this is a title that he picked up later in his life as a

[52] Aşçı Dede İbrahim, *Risale*, TY80, 817–18; Bremer, *Die Memoiren*, and Aşçıdede Halil İbrahim, *Hatıralar*, ed. Koçu. I am indebted to Frank Spaulding for aid in designing the genealogy charts used below to illustrate A.D.'s family background.



Fig. 3.1 Aşçı Dede İbrahim Halil's Family Connections

dervish[53]—identifies himself as El-Seyyid İbrahim Halil, son of Mehmed Ali, born in 1244/1828–1829 at Kandilli, a village on the Asian side of the Bosphorus, close enough to Istanbul that many residents of the capital had summer residences there.[54] The term *el-seyyid* signifies a claim to descent from the Prophet Muhammad through his grandson, Imam Husayn. The evidence of the official personnel records suggests that Aşçı Dede resembled many other Ottomans in claiming this title when formally registering his names, but otherwise made little use of it or the

[53] Findley, "Social Dimensions of the Dervish Life, as seen in the Memoirs of Aşçı Dede Halil İbrahim," 133–34; Bremer, *Die Memoiren*, 58. Although we shall usually call him by this title for ease of recognition, he did not actually acquire it until 1867, when he was appointed to an office in a dervish organization. The following account of Aşçı Dede's family also includes several titles of address that have not yet been explained (cf. chap. 1, n. 50, and chap. 2, n. 10). For men, these are *ağa*, a term used in the nineteenth century both generally for those lacking the qualifications of gentility and literacy to be known as "efendis" and also for many special cases, as below for holders of certain military ranks (Mehmed Ali Ağa) or for the head servant in a great man's household (Beşir Ağa); and *baba*, literally "father," applied here to a dervish elder. Forms of address used in the account for women, aside from the previously noted *hanım* for ladies, are *mollâ*, on which see n. 58 below; and *kalfa*, evidently applied to a woman with supervisory responsibilities over the other servants in a harem (cf. the application of the same term, a colloquial derivative of *halife*, to men in many occupational settings).

[54] Aşçı Dede İbrahim *Risale*, TY3222, 9a–10b; TY78, 75–81.

claims to status that it implied. He also did not say enough about his genealogy to support his use of the title.

For a man who tells so much about his family, Aşçı Dede says relatively little—at least in the context of that description—about his father, Mehmed Ali Ağa. He was a former Janissary, who survived the abolition of that corps thanks to the people of Kandilli, who hid him. The paternal grandfather, Halil Ağa, from Kastamonu in Anatolia, had become one of the "leading residents" of Anadolu Hisar, also on the Asian side of the Bosphorus, between Kandilli and Istanbul. Aşçı Dede was thus another official who was born in the Istanbul area but had family roots elsewhere. Aşçı Dede says that Halil Ağa died leaving his son, Mehmed Ali, as a boy of four or five to be brought up by Halil's unnamed brother, the "steward" (*kâhya*) of the Egyptian Market in Istanbul.

Aşçı Dede's father, Mehmed Ali, proved to be a weak character. Having survived the abolition of the Janissaries and gotten into the new army as a lieutenant, he requested early retirement on the misguided assumption that he would be pensioned at full pay. Left with thirty kuruş per month, a derisory sum, he remained dependent on family and friends.

Mehmed Ali made no conspicuous effort, however, to adjust his domestic life to his economic situation. He married three times. The first wife, Behiye Hanım, whom Mehmed Ali married while still a soldier, was part of an extended kinship network that included Mehmed Ali Ağa and his father Halil Ağa but was ultimately much more important to Aşçı Dede than they were personally. Behiye had two children, Aşçı Dede being the second and the only one to reach maturity.

When he was still small, his mother developed some kind of nervous condition, which Aşçı Dede understood in terms of possession by spirits (*cinn*). The father divorced her some years later, after Aşçı Dede had begun his career, and married a slavewoman from the household of a man referred to as Nafi' Mollâ Efendi, an inspector in the Ministry of Finance.[55] Subsequently, the father divorced her and married, for the third time, the daughter of a military official and dervish acquaintance in Erzincan.[56] By these later marriages, the father had several more children, of whom at least two sons reached maturity.[57]

Aşçı Dede does not appear to have been close to his stepmothers and stepbrothers. His own mother survived until the 1860s, at least. In addition, his own second wife could not get along with his father's third during the time they lived in Erzincan together.

Aşçı Dede's father's weak character and the grandfather's early death

[55] Ibid., TY3222, 12b; TY78, 83–84.
[56] Ibid., TY3222, 102a, 103b–104a; TY78, 415–16.
[57] Ibid., TY3222, 160a; TY78, 522–23.

left it to the women to maintain the solidarity of what would otherwise have been the patriarchal family. Aşçı Dede's paternal grandmother, known "according to the custom of the time" as Emine Mollâ, played the pivotal role.[58] She was one of three sisters, through whom Aşçı Dede claimed kinship with over half the residents of the Muslim quarter of Kandilli. After the death of grandfather Halil Ağa, Emine Mollâ married one Hasan Ağa of Bolu, from a family known as the Çerkeş oğulları, or "sons of Çerkeş," that being a town they had founded near Kangırı in the Anatolian province of Kastamonu. Hasan Ağa was retired, with a pension of 500 kuruş a month, from service as the chief cook (*aşçı başı*) of Mustafa Paşa, the "confidential secretary" (*sırr kâtibi*), presumably of the sultan. Hasan Ağa had been married once before. By this marriage, he had a daughter, Behiye Hanım, who was to become Aşçı Dede's mother. The narrative is not explicit; but since Emine Mollâ was widowed when her son Mehmed Ali was only four or five, and since she moved to Kandilli shortly thereafter to be near her two sisters, it seems likely that her marriage to Hasan Ağa of Bolu preceded, and opened the way for, the marriage of their children by different marriages, Behiye Hamım and Mehmed Ali Ağa, who then became Aşçı Dede's parents.

The fact that Emine Mollâ was married in sequence to both of Aşçı Dede's grandfathers, and was both his father's mother and his mother's stepmother, helps explain her prominence in the story, but matters do not stop there. Emine Mollâ and her new husband, Hasan Ağa, proceeded to have a child of their own, Esma Hanım, who grew up to be a beauty with many suitors. Hasan Ağa refused them all, except for Beşir Ağa, the black slave of one Salih Paşa, who was household steward of the Sultan Mother and had a seaside mansion at Kandilli.

Following a pattern long familiar in the households of the great, Beşir Ağa, reared and educated by the paşa, had become a man of wealth and influence in his own right. His success in competition with the beautiful Esma's other suitors spread consternation at Kandilli and tells, better than almost anything else could, how much slavery represented in Ottoman eyes, not degradation, but a form of surrogate kinship, and at times even a way to high social status.[59]

[58] Ibid., TY3222, 9a ff.; TY78, 75ff. *Mollâ* was a title ordinarily reserved for religious scholars. Its meaning as applied to Ottoman women seems unclear. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's mother, who was very religious, was known as Zübeyde Mollâ; Vamık D. Volkan and Norman Itzkowitz, *The Immortal Atatürk: A Psychobiography*, Chicago, 1984, 24. In some cases, the title may have signified that the woman knew how to read—perhaps specifically that she could read the Qur'ân. In a different Islamic environment, the title *mollâ* has been applied to women who served as religious teachers to other women: Elizabeth Warnock Fernea, *Guests of the Sheik: An Ethnography of an Iraqi Village*, New York, 1965, 53, 105, 107–15, describing a Shî'î community.

[59] Beşir Ağa's role in the story also epitomizes the complexity of Ottoman attitudes about race. On one hand, Islamic egalitarianism counted for enough that someone like Beşir could be an acceptable marriage partner. On the other hand, his blackness did not pass without notice and seems to have contributed to the resentments over his success as a suitor. One of his daughters by Esma Hanım, called Emine, was later deemed unmarriageable because—says Aşçı Dede—of her lameness, shortness, and *habeşî* (Abyssinian) color; ibid., TY3222, 12b; TY78, 83–84. The use in Turkish of the term *arab* to refer to blacks gives an idea of the complex coexistence of racial and ethnic particularism with Islamic egalitarianism. Cf. Bernard Lewis, *Race and Color in Islam*, New York, 1979.

Marrying Beşir Ağa, Esma Hanım became a part of Salih Paşa's household, which wintered at his mansion (*konak*) in Istanbul. A few years later, when Salih Paşa was appointed to a provincial governorship, rather than take his harem with him, he left them in Istanbul, with Beşir Ağa in charge as his agent in the capital. Thereafter, Beşir Ağa bought a mansion of his own in the Şehzade quarter. Emine Mollâ and Hasan Ağa then moved into the city to live with Esma and Beşir, their daughter and son-in-law. At that time, Aşçı Dede and his mother remained at Kandilli, usually without the father, who was still in the army and usually in the provinces. Mother and son would, however, go into the city for visits at Esma Hanım's house. Finally, when Aşçı Dede was eight or ten, they moved and became part of that household.

Having no children of his own yet, Beşir Ağa began to treat Aşçı Dede like a son. He played the most important role in launching Aşçı Dede's education.[60] A dervish, he also stimulated the interest in mysticism that became the leitmotif of Aşçı Dede's life. It is noteworthy, too, that when Esma Hanım and Beşir Ağa eventually had two daughters of their own, they named them after grandmother Emine and one of her sisters, Hadice. Of the two daughters, Emine was in poor health throughout her life, spent many years in the care of the woman who became Aşçı Dede's third wife, and died at their home in 1903.[61]

This link with Beşir Ağa hardly exhausted grandmother Emine's importance in the family setting. Aşçı Dede could recall nothing about her parents. But he had much to say about her sisters, who also lived in Kandilli. As the account implies, it was the links between Emine and the sisters that held together the family nexus shown in figure 3.1, extending it well beyond the bounds it would have had, had it consisted only of descendants of her husbands.

The sense of family solidarity among the sisters must have been quite strong. Emine Mollâ's return to Kandilli to be near her sisters following Aşçı Dede's paternal grandfather's death is one sign of this. Another is the amount of attention the sisters receive, and the way Aşçı Dede places them, in his account of his family. Directly after mentioning his paternal grandfather, his father, and the paternal great-uncle who cared for his father after the grandfather's death, Aşçı Dede shifts to an extended ac-

[60] Aşçı Dede İbrahim, *Risale*, TY3222, 36a; TY78, 139–40.

[61] Ibid., TY80, 216–17.

count of his grandmother, her sisters, and their families. Of the two sisters, one, Ayşe Mollâ, receives less notice. Her husband remains unnamed; and only one son, Murad Ağa, one of the sultan's boatmen (*hünkâr hamlacılarından*), rates mention.

The other sister was Hadice Mollâ, married to Esad Ağa, the barber at Kandilli. They had two sons and three daughters, who were Aşçı Dede's father's maternal first cousins. Both sons became barbers like their father, but differed in that İsmail Ağa led a life of dissolution, while Emin Efendi succeeded his father as a respectable village figure. Emin Efendi eventually had a daughter, Zekiye Hanım, who for a time owned a slavegirl, Dilberyar, who acquired a connection with Aşçı Dede in later life.[62] Hadice Mollâ and Barber Esad Ağa's three daughters—Fatıma, Nefise, and Âdile—were married, respectively, to a cook, another of the sultan's boatmen, and a captain (or former captain?) of the Janissary force at nearby Göksu (*Göksu ustası*). Fatıma's husband, the cook, Hacı Ahmed Ağa, was also a nephew of Aşçı Dede's grandmother's (Emine Mollâ's) second husband, Hasan Ağa of Bolu, also a cook. This added tie of kinship and trade must have reinforced familial bonds. For a future official to have such close ties to cooks, boatmen, and barbers, as well as soldiers, leaves little mystery as to how social patterns and attitudes reminiscent of the marketplace would find their way into government offices.

The family of Hadice Mollâ's husband, Barber Esad Ağa, merited notice in several respects. Esad Ağa's grandfather, known as Salih Dede or Lûleci Baba, was remembered at Kandilli for his sanctity. Meaning "Father Pipebowl Maker," the sobriquet Lûleci Baba links Salih Dede's occupational and mystical identities in a way that evokes the manifold links between guild and dervish traditions, alluded to in chapter 1. Esad Ağa also had a brother, Ârif Ağa, who had been Janissary ağa at Göksu. Out of sixteen children, Ârif had one who lived to maturity. This was Abd ül-Kadir Efendi, an inspector in the imperial artillery foundry (*Tophane yoklamacısı*), who had two sons of his own. The boys' mother was named Dilber. Sister of the Dilberyar mentioned above, she had once been a slave of Âdile Hanım, one of Hadice and Esad Ağa's daughters. Âdile had sold her slave to her paternal first cousin, Abd ül-Kadir Efendi. Dilber Hanım became the mother of his sons and thus, at his death, a free woman.

Up to this point, Aşçı Dede's account of his Kandilli connections seems to have become increasingly remote from himself. As it turns out, however, he has included nothing irrelevant to explaining the family relationships that proved important to him as his life progressed. The best way to illustrate this is to move on to events of Aşçı Dede's mature years, particularly his marriages (see figure 3.2).

[62] Ibid., TY3222, 340a; TY79, 311.



Fig. 3.2 Aşçı Dede İbrahim Halil's Marriages, Descendants, and Additional Connections

Aşçı Dede married three times, though he was only polygamous for one brief episode. His first marriage occurred early in his career, probably in the early 1850s, when he was becoming deeply absorbed in the dervish life. His mother, father, and grandmother became concerned, warning him of possible dangers of excessive absorption, and decided to marry him off. Aşçı Dede acquiesced in the plan only at the insistence of the şeyh under whose influence he then was, and his mother found him a bride. Her choice was a Circassian slavegirl, reared in the home of a wealthy Istanbul merchant named Mehmed Ali Ağa. The marriage duly took place. Mehmed Ali Ağa became fond of Aşçı Dede, treating him as a real son-in-law; and the bride, Hamide Hanım, became the mother of Aşçı Dede's two sons, Hasan Hüsam el-Din and Salih. The marriage hardly distracted Aşçı Dede from his dervish life; yet he appears to have loved Hamide. She was a woman of great piety, and Aşçı Dede says that her death in Ramazan 1281/1865 produced a strong effect even on his spiritual leader, the prominent Nakşbendî-Halidî Şeyh Fehmî of Erzincan, where Aşçı Dede was then serving at the headquarters of the Ottoman Army of Anatolia.[63] At that point, Aşçı Dede found himself alone with his grief, two small sons, and debts so great as to kill any hope of remarriage.

Hardly had he begun to ponder this prospect before someone came to

[63] Ibid., TY3222, 47a–48a, 61a–62a, 112a, 156a–57b; TY78, 199–201, 324–26, 430–31, 515–18.

Aşçı Dede's family connections at Kandilli and his three marriages scarcely exhaust the story of his connections to the society around him. For example, we have not mentioned the phenomenon of milk siblings (*süt kardeşliği*), who would retain a lifelong bond on account of having been nursed by the same woman. Aşçı Dede had a milk brother, who had been nursed by his mother and who, as second secretary (*ikinci mabeynci*) at the palace of Abd ül-Mecid (1839–1861), played an important role in Aşçı Dede's life and career in the years leading up to the Crimean War.[70] Here, too, we have no more than alluded to the social bonds formed through the dervish orders. These were phenomena of Aşçı Dede's mature years, rather than of his social origins. We could also continue the story of marriage and kinship into the next generation, with the marriages of Aşçı Dede's sons. But to do so would take us far afield. The first marriages of Hasan Hüsam el-Din and Salih were with women from official families met in Syria and Albania, respectively.[71] By then, new familial frames of reference were coming into being. The old one, centered on Kandilli, however important it remained to Aşçı Dede and Dilber in their old age, was breaking up. Its many ramifications made that inevitable eventually, as did the fact that many children of those who had lived at Kandilli now lived elsewhere, like Aşçı Dede and his sons.

CONCLUSION

Just as the quantitative analysis of data on a large number of officials helps show how Aşçı Dede compared with his colleagues, the contextual richness of his account yields a more nuanced view of some of the realities that the quantitative data summarize. Aşçı Dede's experiences obviously represent a conservative, exclusively Muslim milieu. However different things may have been for his westernized Muslim colleagues or for non-Muslim officials, this was a milieu in which a number of significant traits stand out with special clarity.

We have noted Aşçı Dede's numerous familial links to the world of guilds and tradesmen and the ease with which ideas and practices from that milieu could have passed, through people like him, into the government offices, which they strongly influenced. Through individuals like Aşçı Dede, the transmission of influences from the dervish orders was equally likely. This point will become clearer in chapter 5, when we discuss Aşçı Dede's cultural horizons.

Another striking fact in this account—a point that remains totally invisible in the personnel record data—is women's prominence in maintaining,

[70] Ibid., TY3222, 62a–63b; TY78, 326–29.
[71] Ibid., TY3222, 218b–219a, 236b; TY78, 632–33.

extending, and reinforcing family structures in a society characterized by a high degree of ostensible male dominance. As Aşçı Dede's first and third marriages illustrate, the role of women in arranging marriages does much to explain this prominence. In want of equally detailed information on other Ottoman families of the period, it is difficult to evaluate the typicality of the matriarchal role that grandmother Emine and her sisters played, but it is not out of line with evidence on women's roles—especially older women's—as revealed in other evidence on the recent Middle East.[72]

The evidence on Aşçı Dede's relatives is also significant in another sense; for while his family hardly offered such a grand-scale example of a patrimonial household as Abd ül-Selâm Bey's mansion, cited at the opening of this chapter, even Aşçı Dede's family included people of different ethnic backgrounds. As it happens, all of the identifiable cases concern slaves. The first is the black slave, Beşir Ağa, who married Esma Hanım, half-sister of both of Aşçı Dede's parents. Aşçı Dede's first marriage was with a Circassian slavegirl. His third wife was a former slave. His second may have been, too; her status in Derviş Paşa's household certainly had been that of a servant. Despite the lack of references to non-Turkish ethnicity, such was bound to be true of slaves; for the sharia prohibition on enslaving free-born Muslims required the importation of slaves from outside the Islamic world.[73] Something of the cosmopolitanism of the grandee families thus appeared even among Aşçı Dede's relatives.

In a different sense, the importance of the women is but a part of a larger topic: the range of relationships that could serve to structure a familial network and what they imply about administrative representation. Aşçı Dede's was not merely a family—not even an extended one—made up solely of relatives by blood or marriage. Slavery, milk brotherhood, or patron-client relationships could create equally powerful bonds, which might be reinforced by marriage, as happened with Aşçı Dede's second and third marriages. While ethnic and racial differences did not pass unnoticed, and while status disparities certainly existed, as between slaves and free people, or men and women, or between Aşçı Dede and Derviş Paşa, the dominant impression is of an overriding egalitarianism that could make a slave a desirable marriage partner, or give Aşçı Dede lasting claims on a man who outranked him as much as Derviş Paşa did. If an official like Aşçı Dede had close relatives who were cooks and barbers, if marriage to a servant consolidated a valuable connection with a field marshal, if Aşçı Dede's having a sister-in-law who was a slave in the sultan's harem gave him even a hope of influence at the palace, then his life provides strong evidence for our argument that the traditional distinction of ruling and subject "classes" did not refer to classes at all in the European

[72] E.g., Lois Beck and Nikki Keddie, ed., *Women in the Muslim World*, Cambridge, Mass., 1978, 311, 331, 338, 345–46, 496–98; Fernea, *Guests of the Sheik*, 54–56, 164–66, 237–38.
[73] E.g., Toledano, *Ottoman Slave Trade*, 6.

sense. Rather, the traditional distinction referred to a state-imposed dichotomy that defined one's standing in relation to the state's power.

The personal relations that Ottomans valued bridged status disparities, including that between rulers and subjects, to bind together the familial and household networks that Aşçı Dede's account shows us on two different levels—his own and, to a degree, also Derviş Paşa's. If administrative agencies served to represent different social entities, then the groups that required representation consisted not only of the religious, or later the ethnic, groups emphasized in the quantitative analysis earlier in this chapter, but also, on a smaller scale, these familial and household networks. The crowds of hangers-on and favor-seekers at Derviş Paşa's mansion stand as living proof of this point.

During the nineteenth century, the task of aggregating the interests of these different social entities was complicated, both by changing ideas about definition of the communities whose interests needed to be represented, and by demographic change. As was inevitable in a multinational empire with shrinking frontiers, within which the religious and ethnic mix shifted progressively, Ottoman reformers were always in the position of reacting to these changes and could never keep abreast of them. The changes over time in the patterns of representation that the quantitative analysis reveals reflect part of this problem. The household networks that emerge from Aşçı Dede's account do so less obviously. It is worth remembering, however, that Tanpınar's literary example of Abd ül-Selâm Bey's household, appearing first as a model of imperial integration, turns into a model of imperial disintegration. By that time, the role of the household-centered networks in administrative politics had also begun to change, as we shall see in chapter 7, when we consider the evidence that Aşçı Dede's autobiography offers on the workings of patronage in the reform era.

C H A P T E R I V

Education

As the discussion of cultural dualism in chapter 1 has indicated, cultural change stands as a major issue in the transformation from scribal service to civil officialdom. To develop an understanding of this issue, this chapter will survey the course of educational reform during the reform era and analyze the educational records of the Foreign Ministry staff.[1] The next chapter will continue the analysis by contrasting contending cultural orientations of the period as embodied in representative individuals. These discussions will yield insights into both the social impact of educational reform, and the tensions that cultural dualism produced.

OTTOMAN EDUCATIONAL REFORM: OBSTACLES AND ACCOMPLISHMENTS

In introducing the theme of cultural dualism and discussing education in the late eighteenth century, we have identified some of the problems that

[1] Some readers may question why this chapter does not emphasize instead the copious biographical data on graduates of the School of Civil Administration, available in Çankaya, *Mülkiye Târihi*. Actually, the strategy to follow in a collective biographical analysis of data on education is somewhat a matter of choice. In a study that is not especially oriented toward a particular school, it seems advantageous to use biographical data reflecting a variety of educational options. The fact that the School of Civil Administration was a higher school reinforces this argument. In biographies of its graduates, naturally everyone appears headed for the *Mülkiye*, which then becomes a major influence on their careers. To analyze the educational records or careers of *Mülkiye* graduates would be a fascinating exercise; Çankaya has carried out parts of the analysis. In this study, however, it seems best to use the evidence from the School of Civil Administration as something other than the main source on education. This chapter accordingly cites Çankaya on the history of that school. The next devotes a section to an exemplary *Mülkiye* graduate: İbrahim Hakkî Paşa. Chapter 6 uses the alumni association journal, *Mülkiye*, as a source on the growing sense of professionalism among civil officials.

made educational reform such an urgent and difficult endeavor. We spoke of literacy levels that were low by the best Asian standards, the cultural elitism expressed in the composite character of Ottoman Turkish and in obscure literary styles, the state of the various branches of knowledge, the pervasive influence of the mystical concept of knowledge, and the bad state of the schools. Ottoman reformers early realized the connection between education and their goal of centralization. The founding of the first modern military schools by the 1770s and of the first secular civil schools in the 1830s attests this fact.[2] Yet the obstacles in the way of reform remained immense. As a result, the government's efforts in educational reform compared poorly with those of some other states—Japan, for example—and even with private initiatives undertaken inside the empire by Muslim Ottomans, the non-Muslim communities, or foreign missionaries.

The Ottoman Government Schools and Their Problems

Probably the most serious obstacle facing Muslim Ottomans' efforts to create new types of schools consisted of the religious authorities' monopoly over traditional educational institutions, the *mektebs* and *medreses*. At least until the Young Turk period, Ottoman reformers never felt strong enough to attack this monopoly head on, although supervision of the pious foundations (*evkaf*) used to support the schools was gradually concentrated in the Ministry of Pious Foundations created under Mahmud II.[3] Where educational reform was concerned, the gravest consequence of continuing *ulema* power in education came not so much with the *medreses*, though many Ottomans saw them as dens of obscurantism, but with the Qur'ânic elementary schools (*sıbyan mektepleri*), described in chapter 2. Ottoman reformers broached the idea of reforming the *mektebs* as early as the 1840s, but never frontally attacked this vested interest of the *ulema* until 1916, when responsibility for elementary education was shifted from the *şeyh ül-İslâm* to the minister of education. Until then, educational reformers limited themselves to founding new schools at levels supposedly superior to the *mektebs* and trying to influence what went on in them by providing supplementary equipment, books, and financing—so creating upgraded *mektebs* that became known as *ibtidaî* or primary schools—or founding teacher training institutes.[4] The higher schools that the Ministry of Education had created were supposed to compensate for the deficiencies of the *mektebs* by inculcating the rudiments

[2] Ergin, *Maarif*, II, 264–80, 321–41.

[3] İbnülemin Mahmud Kemal [İnal] and Hüseyin Hüsam el-Din, *Evkaf-ı Hümayun Nezaretinin Tarihçe-i Teşkilâtı ve Nüzzarın Teracim-i Ahvali*, Istanbul, 1335/1916–1917, 26–37.

[4] Ergin, *Maarif*, I, 102–20, 135–46; II, 383–97, 481–89; III, 725–35; IV, 1173–80; Vámbéry, *Sittenbilder*, 120–27; Cevdet, *Tezâkir 40*, 123–31; Berkes, *Secularism*, 400–16; Shaw and Shaw, *History*, II, 306–307.

of literacy in Turkish more or less from scratch. In a sense, the religious scholars won out even there; for at first, the new schools remained heavily laden with subjects, books, and teachers from the *medreses*. To the extent that a new educational system emerged, then, it did so without the foundation it logically needed.

Thanks to the institutional duality of religious and secular schools and the special problem of *ulema* control of primary education, the foremost trait of Ottoman education throughout the reform era was its lack of overall system. Students and their parents faced confusing choices between religious, secular governmental, and—as we shall see—other schools. But that was not all.

When the government began to found new schools, the lack of suitable preparatory institutions forced those schools to operate at first at much lower levels than intended. Only in proportion as a general system of modern schools emerged could the supposedly higher schools be upgraded. As late as the Young Turk period, a colorfully named debate pitted partisans of the idea that the empire's scarce resources should go first into developing lower-level schools against partisans of what was known as the "*Tûba* tree theory," who argued that those resources should go first to the university. Drawn from the sufi tradition, the image of the *Tûba* tree—which grows in paradise, with its roots upward and its branches reaching downward into the abodes of the blessed to bring them flowers and fruits—epitomized the top-down approach that had characterized the development of the government schools from the start.[5]

While efforts to found what were supposed to be modern military academies went back to the late eighteenth century,[6] the first institution designed to provide a new kind of training to civil officials only came into being in 1821. This assumed the old-fashioned form of, not a school, but a government office, the Translation Office of the Sublime Porte (*Bab-ı Âli Tercüme Odası*), the first function of which was to teach Muslim Ottomans French, so that they could take over the role of government trans-

[5] Ergin, *Maarif*, IV, 1056–59. Proponents of the "bottom-up" approach were led by Sati Bey, a prominent Ottoman educator better known in later life as Sâṭiʿ al-Ḥuṣrî, a leading Arab nationalist thinker; see William L. Cleveland, *The Making of an Arab Nationalist: Ottomanism and Arabism in the Life and Thought of Satiʾ al-Husri*, Princeton, 1971. The *Tûba* tree theory is identified with the education minister, Emrullah; Çankaya, *Mülkiye Târihi*, III, 96–102; Hilmi Ziya Ülken, *Türkiye'de Çağdaş Düşünce Tarihi*, Istanbul, 1979, 174–90. As developed in sufi tradition, the *Ṭûbâ* tree image appears to take its ultimate origin from the Qur'ân, presumably through association of the reference to *ṭûbâ*, "God's beatitude or blessing" (sura 13/29), with the "good tree" (14/24). Annemarie Schimmel, to whom I am indebted for my information on these points, informs me that the tree image appears frequently in sufi texts, including Ibn ʿArabî (letters of 3 March and 9 May 1986).

[6] These are the Navy and Army Engineering Schools (*Mühendishane-i Bahrî-i Hümayun*, *Mühendishane-i Berrî-i Hümayun*), founded in 1773 and 1795–1796; Ergin, *Maarif*, II, 264–80.

lator, monopolized up to that time by Phenariot Greeks. The first actual schools for training civil officials were not created until 1838–1839, the *Mekteb-i Ulûm-i Edebiye* and the *Mekteb-i Maarif-i Adliye*.[7]

Perhaps the most important single step in educational reform was the transition from founding unique institutions to founding a generalized system of schools. The first such step came with a plan of 1845 that envisaged a three-tiered system of reformed Qur'ânic *mekteb*s, an intermediate level known as the *rüşdiye*, and a university (*dar ül-fünun*). None of this materialized at the time but the *rüşdiye*s, and they amounted only to upper primary schools. Still, by the early 1880s, there were roughly 120 *rüşdiye*s in the provinces and 20 in Istanbul. The first *rüşdiye* for girls opened in 1858.[8]

The first lycées had already been created in 1868 before the effort to create a multileveled government school system resumed with the Ottoman law of 1869 on education. This called for a five-tiered hierarchy: a Qur'ânic elementary school in every village or quarter, a *rüşdiye* in every town of 500 households, a middle school (*idadî*) in every town of 1,000 households, a lycée (*sultaniye*) in every province capital, and higher schools, including teachers' colleges for men and women and—again—a university. There was no other legislation of such scope until 1924.[9]

Implementation of this plan was slow but perceptible. By the Young Turk era, there were *rüşdiye*s all over the empire. Training colleges for men and women *rüşdiye* teachers had opened in 1848 and 1870. There were close to seventy *idadî*s in cities and towns of what is now Turkey alone; financial problems had especially hindered development at this level. By 1918, there were eleven Ottoman lycées, perhaps only one of them for girls. After several attempts, the Istanbul university (*dar ül-fünun*) had finally opened in 1900.[10] Comprehensive measures of the growth of Ottoman education are difficult to arrive at. Yet Abdul Latif Tibawi concludes that geographical Syria and Iraq ultimately had 570 Ottoman government schools, with 28,400 pupils in elementary and 2,100

[7] Ergin, *Maarif*, II, 324–41. The name *Mekteb-i Maarif-i Adliye* comes from *adlî*, "the Just," referring to Mahmud II, and does not mean that the school had anything to do with legal education, as some authors assert.

[8] Ergin, *Maarif*, II, 321–23, 361, 367–75, 381–83, 418–23; III, 736–43; IV, 1180–86.

[9] Ibid., II, 412–17; Andreas M. Kazamias, *Education and the Quest for Modernity in Turkey*, Chicago, 1966, 63–64. Actual Ottoman usage appears to have been—despite the inconsistency of doing so—to refer to the *rüşdiye* and sometimes other schools with feminine Arabic terms and the *idadî* schools with a masculine Arabic term. The phenomenon of grammatical gender is foreign to Turkish per se, as opposed to the Arabic component of Ottoman, however. In written Ottoman, *rüşdî* and *idadî* could appear as adjectives in either masculine or feminine forms, depending on the gender or number of the nouns with which they were in construct. An Ottoman might refer to such schools as *mekteb-i rüşdî* in the singular, or *mekâtib-i idadiye* in the plural. Evidently, there was an element of randomness as to which form passed into vernacular usage.

[10] Ergin, *Maarif*, II, 453–68, 475–89, 557–72; III, 709–15, 997–1041; IV, 1186–1204.

in secondary grades, from which many had gone on to the higher Istanbul schools.[11]

Such numbers mark a great change for the Ottoman Empire, but one slight in relation to need. The achievement was slight, too, compared to that of the most successful Asian reformers, the Japanese, who created a national school system, from compulsory elementary schools through university, within three decades after the Meiji revolution of 1868. They had the luxury, however, of creating a national school system without having to face acute cultural dualism, or anything like the *ulema*'s vested interest in education, or the cultural aspirations of a number of discontented subject nationalities.[12]

For the aspiring Ottoman official of the nineteenth century, charting a course through the educational institutions of his culturally schizoid society could be extremely difficult. We shall illustrate this problem below from biographical data. Where the new government schools were concerned, qualitative problems further complicated the difficulties of choice.

Standards and levels of discipline at the new schools, for example, were not high. From the start, there were chronic problems in the supply of teaching materials and suitably trained instructors; these problems reflected the critical shortage of human and economic resources needed to support the new schools. At first, the curriculum hardly had any new subject matter in it at all.[13] As a new western-style curriculum came into existence, its content was identified to great extent simply with knowledge of French. Just as the run-of-the-mill scribal efendi of the old days might have little to his credit intellectually other than knowledge of the Ottoman chancery style, together with some Arabic and Persian and several forms of Arabic script, the Europeanized but intellectually undistinguished efendi of the late nineteenth century might have little to claim beyond the corresponding skills in French. The Ottomans were slow to develop interest in more advanced western subjects of a technical nature, except for those of military significance. Even where they did—for example, in the law school created to study the new secular legal system—textbooks remained in short supply even at the end of the century, so that students still had to race to take down everything the teacher said.[14]

[11] Abdul Latif Tibawi, *Islamic Education: Its Traditions and Modernization into the Arab National Systems*, London, 1972, 64, 82–84; id., *A Modern History of Syria, including Lebanon and Palestine*, London, 1969, 168–69, 181–82, 194–96.

[12] James R. Bartholomew, "The 'Feudalistic' Legacy of Japanese Science," *Knowledge: Creation, Diffusion, Utilization*, VI (1985), 350–76; personal communications, spring 1985.

[13] Aşçı Dede İbrahim, *Risale*, TY3222, 38a–39b; TY78, 182–85; Ergin, *Maarif*, II, 330, 334–36.

[14] Esat Cemal Pâker, *Siyasî Tarihimizde Kırk Yıllık Hariciye Hatıraları*, Istanbul, 1952, 7; cf. Çankaya, *Mülkiye Târihi*, II, 947; shortage of books and teachers was a major impediment to teaching Turkish in non-Muslim schools: Ergin, *Maarif*, III, 856–57.

Another acute problem of the new schools was their unabashed vocationalism. One of the stated motives for creating the first secular civil schools had been to separate the teaching and administrative functions of the central governmental offices, and so provide a more efficient system than apprenticeship for training officials.[15] In fact, the initial unpaid apprenticeship in the offices never disappeared; but the advent of the secular civil schools did encourage the idea—found throughout the Middle East ever since—that they provided simply a way into official service. The founders of the new schools fostered this idea by using the term *mahrec* (in the sense of "source point" or "training place") in naming more than one of the schools—"Source Point of the Offices," and the like.[16] Regulations of 1876 for the School of Civil Administration specifically named the posts for which its graduates were eligible, specifications that were printed on the diplomas the school gave.[17]

From the first, the civil schools did have examinations, supposedly to assure the preparation of those appointed to office. But the barriers were not hard to hurdle, especially for those with connections. In 1846, the written examination for students of the first two of the civil schools was given on a set text, amounting to no more than the one-line Arabic formula used in dating imperial decrees.[18] Thirty-five years later, matters had progressed to the point that one of the Foreign Ministry officials whose personnel files will be examined in the next section, Rupen Karakaşian, had submitted a doctoral dissertation at the Istanbul law school. The major historian of Ottoman education, having examined the French version of this essay, which ran to forty-four pages, found it a jumbled discussion of the "close connections" between a principle from the Ottoman civil law, the *Mecelle*, and both the sharia and the Roman law dear to the Frenchmen among Rupen Efendi's instructors.[19] Upgrading the education of officials and naturalizing alien bodies of knowledge into the Ottoman cultural setting proved to be difficult tasks indeed.

The lack of social supports for the new schools did not facilitate these tasks. The vocationalism of the new schools would have been bad enough had students and their families taken them seriously, but too often they

[15] Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform*, 125.

[16] Ergin, *Maarif*, II, 395–400: *Mahrec-i Aklam*, M. of the (Civil) Offices, and *Mahrec-i Mekâtib-i Askeriye* (a variation on the theme, this was a preparatory school for the higher military schools).

[17] Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform*, 276; Çankaya, *Mülkiye Târihi*, I, 114.

[18] Aşçı Dede İbrahim, *Risale*, TY3222, 39b–40a; TY78, 184–85: the exam passage for that year was "*taḥrîran fî awwâ'il Rabî' al-awwal sanata ithnayn wa sittîn wa mi'atayn wa alf.*" The students were to put this into *risale* form and spent two months preparing for the exam. There may also have been oral questions on other lessons. The two schools were the *Mekteb-i Maarif-i Adliye* and the *Mekteb-i Ulûm-ı Edebiye*. The examination on the date formula followed the form used for *medrese* graduates: Ergin, *Maarif*, II, 327 n. 1, 331.

[19] Ergin, *Maarif*, II, 586–87; cf. Har., SA737 (Rupen Karakaşian).

did not. The "itinerant state" in which many official families lived had something to do with that.[20] But the infrequency with which students finished their studies in any given school suggested something more: a lack of esteem for the ideas that the new curricula were supposed to convey. From the beginning, some students of the new civil schools—and many others who did not bother to become students in them at all—found "shortcuts" (*takrib*) into the offices without finishing their studies, much to the discouragement of the other students.[21] To make matters worse, the new schools were subject, even in the latter part of the century, to violent attack by reactionaries, who raided school buildings, smashed infidel-style desks, and stuffed books and maps down latrines.[22] The reign of Abd ül-Hamid brought a great expansion of educational facilities, but combined this paradoxically with the same suspicion and repression that afflicted every other aspect of cultural life under his police state.[23]

Perhaps the greatest obstacle to development of the new schools, however, was lack of widespread understanding, even among educators, of the knowledge they should convey. The terms used for the new knowledge make this quite clear. So strong were the associations of the Arabic term that properly refers to rational knowledge, *ilm*, with the religious studies of the *ulema* (the men of *ilm*) that the term could not ordinarily be used to refer to any branch of the new learning without special qualification. One of the first secular civil schools was called the *Mekteb-i Ulûm-ı Edebiye*, the "School of Literary Sciences"—a jumble of words that probably seemed even stranger to a traditional Ottoman than to present-day English-speakers, with the difference that he would have associated *ulûm*, "sciences," primarily with religious studies. While *ilm* is the most obvious choice to translate "science" as used in English, it seemed to take an additional modifier to show that this was the intended meaning; the usual choice of the later nineteenth century was *müspet ilimler*, "positive sciences." For technical subjects in general, *fenn* seemed a handy term. Having meant in classical Arabic things like "sort, variety, condition, mode," this was another of those classificatory terms that Ottomans appeared to like. Its plural, *fünun*, figured in the Arabic-derived term for

[20] Har., SA302, Mehmed Safvet Bey, never received a diploma anywhere because his family was in an "itinerant state" (*seyyar bir halde*), his father being a provincial governor. Other officials' sons whose families' frequent moves affected their educations appear in İnal, *Şairler*, 582 (Ahmed Hâşim), 827 (Namık Kemal), 980 (Mehmed Muhsin), and 1113–14 (Süleyman Nazif Bey).

[21] BBA, Irade D1749 of 1257/1841, report of İmamzade Mehmed Esad; cf. BBA, Rüus Defteri 217, p. 112 (entry of 25 RA 1257/1841), p. 120 (entry of 12 S 1266/1849), p. 122 (entry of 28 CA 1268/1852); BBA, Buyuruldu 5, p. 41 (entry of 19 ZA 1278/1862, again referring to shortcuts [*takrib*]), p. 42 (entry of 15 Z 1278/1862), p. 96 (entry of 5 L 1284/1868), p. 98 (entry of 15 B 1285/1868).

[22] Ergin, *Maarif*, II, 383–84, 395–97.

[23] Ibid., III, 677ff.; Demiray, ed. *Canlı Tarihler*, II, 8–9 (autobiog. of Mehmed Ali Aynî).

"university," *dar ül-fünun* ("house of sciences"—or perhaps "arts and sciences").

It is revealing, however, that the term that found the widest application to the new knowledge was etymologically related to the word *irfan*, which mystics used to refer to the intuitive experience of the divine that was for them the most valuable form of knowledge. The term in question, *maarif*, in fact became the general term for the new education. Few Ottomans probably thought much about the etymological connection between these two words.[24] Yet old attitudes about different sorts of knowledge did not die out. At least some mid-nineteenth-century Ottomans regarded technical studies of sorts not encouraged by the *ulema* much as their forebears had regarded mystical poetry, tolerable at best as an avocation for the learned, but not appropriate fare for the masses. In 1870, Lûtfi Efendi, religious scholar and official historian, bitterly opposed holding public lectures on scientific subjects for just this reason.[25]

Any idea that there existed an agreed-on body of knowledge, going beyond the rudiments of religion, that everyone needed in order to lead a meaningful life was missing. One illustration of this fact was the incredulous silence that fell over a council at the Sublime Porte when Fuad Paşa, one of the grand vezirs of the *Tanzimat*, answered a question about what the graduates of a new school would become by saying they would become men (*adam olacaklardır*).[26]

One of the greatest obstacles to the development of new schools, and to the diffusion of the new knowledge in general, was thus lack of appreciation of what the new ideas signified. Without question, this lack was a major complicating factor in the struggles over cultural dualism. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (1881–1938), first president of the Turkish republic, said in one of his most-quoted appeals: "In life, the truest guide is science"

[24] Originally, the Arabic verb *'arafa* meant "to know" in the sense of "have cognition of" or "be acquainted with." *Maarif* is the plural of *marifet* (as pronounced in Turkish, *ma'rifa* in Arabic), which originally meant "knowledge, cognition, cognizance, or acquaintance," so that the original meaning of the plural was "sorts of knowledge." In Ottoman times, *marifet* also had the meaning of "knowledge" in the sense of "intervention or mediation": many officials got appointments through a patron's *marifet* ("influence," essentially). See Edward W. Lane, *An Arabic-English Lexicon*, ed. Stanley Lane Poole, London, 1877 (reprinted Cambridge, 1984), II, 2016, s.v. *ma'rifa*; Franz Rosenthal, *Knowledge Triumphant: The Concept of Knowledge in Medieval Islam*, Leiden, 1970, esp. chap. 6; Redhouse, *A Turkish and English Lexicon*, 1896, s.v. *ma'ârif*, and 1907, s.v. *ma'rifet*; I am also indebted to Andreas Tietze for a communication on this subject, March 1986. Redhouse was the first European authority to identify the Ottoman term *maarif* with "education," in his first lexicographical work, of which the presentation manuscript dates to 1842 and the first printing to 1269/1852–1853. See Anon. (James W. Redhouse), *Müntahabât ül-Lûgat il-Osmaniye*, Istanbul, 1281/1864–1865, 153, 157, s.v. *maarif* and *marifet*. *Maarif* had been used in the implicit sense of "education" a few years earlier in naming the school, *Mekteb-i Maarif-i Adliye*.

[25] Ergin, *Maarif*, II, 462; cf. Vámbéry, *Sittenbilder*, 125.

[26] Ergin, *Maarif*, II, 507; Çankaya, *Mülkiye Târihi*, II, 1011.

(*hayatta en hakikî mürşit ilimdir*).[27] The statement appropriates the mystic's term for a spiritual master (*mürşid*) and the traditional term for religious studies (*ilm*) and applies them to science in the modern secular sense. Between Fuad Paşa's day and Atatürk's, what cultural struggles would have to be won and lost before this appropriation of terms could occur and such a terse expression of it be found so meaningful!

Before leaving this survey of the government schools and their problems, it is important to reemphasize that educational reform did produce results. With the growing numbers of schools—including those discussed in the next section—came a growth in literacy, from perhaps 1 percent in 1800 to 5–10 percent for the empire in 1900.[28] This is an impressive rate of growth—between starting and ending levels that were both terribly low.

The Challenge of the Nongovernmental Schools

Ottoman government schools, and traditional religious ones, were not the only institutions that trained future officials or contributed to the growth in literacy. There were also private schools founded by Muslims, by non-Muslim communities within the empire, and by foreigners. An account of how these schools developed throughout the empire would quickly become lengthy and would illustrate parallel developments in a number of places. A survey of these schools as found in Turkey proper, especially at Istanbul, and in Syria and Lebanon will therefore suffice to indicate how such educational alternatives developed in both the Turkish- and Arabic-speaking parts of the empire.[29]

By the 1880s, Turkish Muslims had begun to form private schools. In contrast to the dreary *mekteb*s and their bedraggled *hoca*s, the private schools, at least the best of them, were the creations of highly motivated and energetic people. They used advertising and other promotional activities to build up school spirit. Prominent Ottoman writers of the period—

[27] The full statement, made during a speech in Samsun in 1924, is: *Dünyada her şey için, medeniyet için, hayat için, muvaffakıyet için, en hakikî mürşit ilimdir, fendir* ("For everything in the world, for progress [lit., civilization], for life, for success, the truest guide is science."). Inclusion of the term *fen* reinforces the point that "science," rather than "knowledge" more generally, is the intended meaning of *ilim*. See *Atatürk'ün Öz Deyişleri*, Ankara, 1975, 17 (a collection of Atatürk's sayings, published by the Turkish Historical Society, no editor named). I am indebted to James Stewart-Robinson for this reference.

[28] These figures are estimates; see Findley, "Knowledge and Education in the Modern Middle East" and sources cited there. Cf. Karpat, *Ottoman Population*, 221, figures of 1894–1895 on illiteracy, implausibly low.

[29] This account omits Egypt and Tunisia (two autonomous provinces from which very few late nineteenth-century Ottoman officials appear to have come) and the Balkans. Egypt, especially, experienced educational reforms that for a time set the pace for those of the Istanbul government. See J. Heyworth-Dunne, *An Introduction to the History of Education in Modern Egypt*, London, c. 1938; Robert L. Tignor, *Modernization and British Colonial Rule in Egypt, 1882–1914*, Princeton, 1966; L. Carl Brown, *The Tunisia of Ahmad Bey, 1837–1855*, Princeton, 1974.

such as Ahmed Midhat and Ahmed Rasım—either taught in the private schools, wrote about them, or wrote books for them. By 1908, Istanbul had twenty-eight such private schools. In the Young Turk period, their growth accelerated. However darkly some memoirists portray their experiences in the Qur'ânic *mektebs*, just as brightly do they portray their feelings after finding their way into these new schools.[30]

The private Turkish schools were but recent innovations compared to the private schools run by the Ottoman non-Muslim communities and foreigners. Among the subject communities, the Greeks were first to develop a significant school system. By 1878, the Greek community of Istanbul reportedly had 105 schools in that city alone, twenty-two of these being for girls. In these schools were 12,000 students, 3,000 of them girls.[31] The Greek schools of Istanbul included the Greek National School in the Fener quarter, with grades running through lycée level, several other lycée-level schools, and the commercial and theological schools on Heybeliada, one of the islands in the Sea of Marmara. The Greek community of Istanbul enjoyed, in addition, a rich cultural life, much of it organized through cultural societies (*syllogoi*). Greeks were widespread in Ottoman territories, and the network of schools was correspondingly far-flung. For Izmir, Uşaklıgil has left a wistful portrayal of how the poor Turkish *rüşdiye* of his day compared with the non-Muslim schools, including Greek lycées for boys and girls.[32] Similar judgments could have been formed in many places.

Among Armenians, the growth of schools giving more than religious instruction appears to have been an eighteenth-century phenomenon, associated with intellectual revival and the Mekhitarist uniate movement. Within the fold of the Apostolic church, modern parochial schools began to be founded in Istanbul in the late eighteenth century, and a major expansion began in 1844. By 1866, there were reportedly thirty-two Armenian boys' schools in Istanbul, with 4,700 students, and fourteen girls' schools, with 1,472; and private cultural societies, libraries, adult education courses, and newspapers had begun to proliferate. By 1900, there were over 800 Armenian primary schools in Anatolia and schools of lycée level in centers like Istanbul and Izmir.[33]

In last place educationally among the non-Muslim communities prominent in Turkey proper, Ottoman Jews suffered initially from the lack of strong support from coreligionists in western Europe. The first modern school for Jews in Istanbul did not open until 1854. Modern Jewish schools suffered attacks from conservative Jews that resembled complaints heard in the Muslim, but not the other non-Muslim, communities over "infidel practices," such as using benches and desks, or teaching French. The positive side of the situation, from the Ottoman point of view, was that the Jews took the teaching of Turkish more seriously than did the other non-Muslim communities, especially the Greeks, who had their own agenda of using their schools to hellenize Orthodox non-Greeks.[34] The major work of upgrading education for Ottoman Jewry remained for the Alliance Israélite Universelle, which opened its first schools in the empire in Edirne in 1867, in Istanbul in the 1870s, and thereafter in many other places.[35]

Missionary efforts in education had begun long before the nineteenth century, but expanded greatly in scale then. In Istanbul, Latin Catholic churches and schools had existed ever since the Ottoman conquest and had become numerous by the nineteenth century.[36] American missionaries launched their educational efforts in Istanbul in the 1820s and 1830s, opened their first secondary school in 1840, and in 1863 founded what became known as Robert College. A higher school for women, known initially as Constantinople Woman's College, followed in 1871. Over the next thirty years, seven other colleges, usually comparable in U.S. terms to a combination of high school and junior college, followed in various parts of Anatolia. By 1914, there were 2,500 students in colleges, 4,500 in high schools, and 20,000 in elementary schools run by U.S. missionaries in the northern part of the Ottoman Empire, plus 6,000 more in U.S. missionary schools in Ottoman Syria.[37] As will be recalled, the Ottoman government did not create a university until 1900.

In geographical Syria, meanwhile, significant educational developments had also occurred among the Christian communities, especially in Lebanon. There the Maronites, uniates who had for centuries sent the best of their clergy to Rome for education, stood out as the first to acquire any significant educational institutions beyond the primary level, such as the schools of ʿAyn Tura (1728) and ʿAyn Waraqa (1787). The Greek

[30] Beyatlı, *Hâtıralarım*, 21–29; Uşaklıgil, *Kırk Yıl*, 18; Ergin, *Maarif*, II, 395–96, 423–24; III, 758–840; IV, 1204–11; Volkan and Itzkowitz, *The Immortal Atatürk*, 28–33.

[31] A. Synvet, *Les grecs de l'Empire ottoman: Etude statistique et ethnographique*, Istanbul, 1878, 10.

[32] Uşaklıgil, *Kırk Yıl*, 82–83.

[33] Davison, *Reform in the Ottoman Empire*, 121–22; M.-B. Dadian, "La société arménienne contemporaine," *Revue des deux mondes*, LXIX (1869), 921–25; Avedis Sanjian, *The Armenian Communities in Syria under Ottoman Dominion*, Cambridge, 1965, 76–77; Ergin, *Maarif*, II, 379–80, 621–35.

[34] Ergin, *Maarif*, II, 636–37; III, 841–55; Avram Galanti, *Türkler ve Yahudiler: Tarihî, Siyasî Tetkik*, Istanbul, 1947, 153–55; id., *Türk Harsı ve Türk Yahudisi: Tarihî, Siyasî, İctimaî Tetkik*, Istanbul, 1953, 12–13.

[35] Paul Dumont, "Jewish Communities in Turkey during the Last Decades of the Nineteenth Century in the Light of the Archives of the Alliance Israélite Universelle," in *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire*, ed. Braude and Lewis, I, 209.

[36] Ergin, *Maarif*, II, 637–48.

[37] Joseph L. Grabill, *Protestant Diplomacy and the Near East: Missionary Influence on American Policy, 1810–1927*, Minneapolis, 1971, 10–27.

Catholics, also stimulated via union with Rome, founded their first higher school at ʿAyn Traz about the 1780s. The Greek Orthodox, most numerous of the Christian communities in this part of the Arab world, began late, founding their first school in Lebanon in 1833.[38]

Here, too, missionary endeavor further stimulated educational development. The Jesuits had acquired responsibility for some Maronite foundations in the eighteenth century. But it was American Protestant missionaries, arriving in Lebanon in 1820, who touched off the competitive expansion of missionary activity in education. Their first school was for girls—probably the first girls' school in the Ottoman Empire. By 1867, there were Protestant schools in twenty Lebanese villages, and secondary boarding schools had begun to be founded. The American missionary system in Lebanon received its capstone with the opening of the Syrian Protestant College, later the American University in Beirut, in 1866. Meanwhile, Catholic religious orders had created a system of their own in Lebanon, capped from 1875 on by the Université Saint-Joseph.

Eventually, most of the other local religious communities had school-building programs, too. By 1914, when the overall Ottoman literacy rate was probably 5–10 percent, the highest rates for any zone of the Middle East—about 50 percent—appear to have been found in Lebanon, with the rest of geographical Syria at about 25 percent.[39]

What completes the account of non-Muslim schools and ties that subject back to governmental efforts in education is that members of these communities, too, began to attend government schools. The first place where this occurred was the Imperial Medical School (*Mekteb-i Tıbbiye-i Şahane*) in Istanbul. Partly because the school still taught in French, which few Muslims as yet knew, non-Muslims gained admission there in the early 1840s—the first fruit of *Tanzimat* egalitarianism in education.[40] The reform decree of 1856 then proclaimed non-Muslim eligibility to enter the government's civil and military schools. The education law of 1869 again called for admitting members of the different communities to these schools, referring to the need to consolidate harmony and friendship (*i'tilâf ve muhadenet*) among the children at an early age.[41]

Not many years were to pass, however, before governmental faith in this concept began to falter. The Russo-Turkish War of 1877–1878, and especially the disloyalty of Bulgarians educated in the Ottoman military schools, reportedly convinced the authorities that non-Muslims had to be gotten out of the military schools. At that point, there was no such decision about other government schools.[42] Yet in time, later crises further eroded educational egalitarianism, or shifted its manifestations in the way that the composition of the student body of the School of Civil Administration shows. In the next section, we shall see some of the effects of this erosion as it appears in the Foreign Ministry.

[38] Kamal S. Salibi, *The Modern History of Lebanon*, New York, 1965, 123–26.
[39] Charles Issawi, *An Economic History of the Middle East and North Africa*, New York, 1982, 114.
[40] Ergin, *Maarif*, II, 602–3.
[41] Quoted in Ergin, *Maarif*, II, 413–14.

In the nineteenth-century Ottoman Empire, then, educational reformers faced massive problems and could only produce uneven results. The elitism of the Ottoman cultural tradition, tragically low literacy rates, inadequate popular appreciation of the new learning, the cultural split among Muslims, the diversity of the non-Muslim peoples, the lack of resources, and the difficulties of disseminating large volumes of new ideas—all these problems limited educational achievement. Under the circumstances, it was an accomplishment by 1908 to have a Qur'ânic elementary school in every quarter or village, something approaching an empire-wide network of *rüşdiye* schools, an *idadî* in the central town of more or less every province and sancak, two government lycées in Istanbul, a number of civil and military professional schools—some rather good—and the barest beginnings of a modern university, along with the non-Muslim and foreign schools and the remnants of the *medrese* system.[43]

The non-Muslim and foreign schools were better, as thoughtful Ottomans admitted.[44] Indeed, in commenting on education, even more than in other fields, nineteenth-century Ottoman writers display a self-contempt that reminds us of their contemporaries in Russia. Still, it would not do to dismiss even the Ottoman government schools too quickly. They made ideas more widely accessible than they had been before. Many of the ideas were new ones. As the expressions of dissatisfaction show, the new ideas stimulated a desire for further change. And, as richer societies have proved, the impact of education is not strictly proportional to the grandeur of the facilities or the sums invested. The intellectual and political ferment of the Young Turk era made clear that educational reform had begun to produce a wide impact, even if mass education and mass literacy still lay far in the future.

THE EDUCATIONAL CHOICES OF CIVIL OFFICIALS

The social historian finds greatest interest not in the formal organization of educational institutions, but in the way people use them. Together with other sources, the information that Foreign Ministry officials recorded on their personnel questionnaires about their schooling throws much light on this topic. In want of any coherent "system" of education, however,

[42] Ibid., II, 605–9.
[43] Ibid., III, 711–16, 748–52.
[44] Uşaklıgil, *Kırk Yıl*, 82–83; Ergin, *Maarif*, III, 856–57.

any analysis must begin by arbitrarily defining criteria of classification for the data.

Elements of System

Deriving from the acute cultural cleavage of the period, our first organizing principle contrasts a new cultural orientation responsive to—often dominated by—western ideas with a conservative, Islamic orientation. Many Ottoman Muslims responded to both orientations to some degree, so internalizing the conflict between them. In this sense, a given individual might not have a single cultural orientation. Contemporary Ottomans tended not to see things this way, however. Having historically identified erudition largely with the linguistic medium of its expression, they now tended to take the languages a person knew or used as indicative of that person's cultural tendency.

Among civil officials, the minimum prerequisite for whose careers had historically been the ability to perform the duties of a scribe (*kitabet*) in Ottoman Turkish, the nineteenth century witnessed the rise of a demand for men with the analogous qualification—again referred to as *kitabet*—in French. For them, proficiency in French became not only the symbol, but virtually the content, of cultural "modernity." Conversely, a conservative Muslim—while perhaps seeing no harm in such innovations as the steamship or telegraph—might urge his fellows not to study French.[45] Where our analysis focuses on the Foreign Ministry staff, for whom proficiency in the then-current language of diplomacy made a significant difference in the duties they could perform, the value of French as an indicator of cultural bent becomes especially clear.

The meanings that Ottomans attached to proficiency in French thus lead us to take that as the criterion for separating "traditionalist" from "modernist" Muslims,[46] respectively the first and second Muslim groups in the tables. Muslims who knew some French but could not perform the duties of a clerk in the language will be relegated to the "traditionalist" group. Since virtually all the non-Muslims of the Foreign Ministry staff did claim proficiency in French, there is, significantly, no need for such a cultural differentiation among them.

The second principle that we shall use to structure analysis of the personnel record data on education concerns the categorization of different levels of schooling. Even though the nineteenth century was a period of flux educationally, analysis of the experiences of a large number of people

[45] Aşçı Dede İbrahim, *Risale*, TY3222, 194b: their common spiritual mentor, Şeyh Fehmî, sends word through Aşçı Dede to Derviş Paşa that he should not have his son taught French, c. 1871.

[46] Cf. Vámbéry, *Sittenbilder*, 196–97, "nationals" and "internationals."

becomes impossible without at least a loose concept of a hierarchy of schools. Even if Ottomans did not have a single "school system," we must define a classificatory grid by drawing on criteria that meant something to them. We shall do so by sorting educational opportunities first into "traditional" and "modern." Since the Qur'ânic elementary schools acquired a place on the modern side of the scheme by default, the main types of unequivocally traditional education will be *medreses* or private study of religious subjects.

To classify the modern schools, we shall draw on the thinking of Ottoman reformers, expressed in the education law of 1869, and assume a sequence running from the Qur'ânic elementary schools (*sıbyan mektebi*) to the upper elementary (*rüşdiye*), middle school (*idadî*), lycée (*sultaniye*), and university (*dar ül-fünun*). Non-Muslim and foreign schools, in the empire or abroad, must necessarily be assimilated to these categories, as the officials often did in referring to such schools in their personnel records. The roughness of these categories will become clear from the way some officials appear to have skipped levels. In fact the older officials would not have had good opportunities to attend the higher-level schools. The curricular upgrading that some government schools went through over time also makes it difficult to classify them. Our analysis can thus not pretend to high precision, yet throws light on how people made their way among the confusing educational alternatives of the times.

Modern, Traditional, or Mixed Education?

In applying these organizing principles to the records, a logical beginning is to classify the Foreign Ministry officials' descriptions of their educations in terms of the traditional-modern distinction. The men themselves did not do so, but we can sort out the types of education they mentioned into these two categories. The results are necessarily different from what the breakdown based on knowledge of French would imply; for as table 4.1 shows, the educational histories of the men under study were normally mixed. Many Muslims of the first group knew at least some French or had other "modern" attainments. The modernists, too, had to be prepared to function successfully, not only in French, but also in Ottoman Turkish. This meant at least some study of subjects basic to the traditional *adab*-culture, especially Arabic and Persian, even if a person did not venture much further into traditional religious or literary studies. Non-Muslims, too, needed some grounding in *adab*-subjects, and it is in this sense that we shall apply the term "traditional education" to them.

Table 4.1 shows the preponderance of "mixed" education to be substantial, but with differences among personnel categories. Almost the only officials who described their education as entirely traditional were "tradi-

Table 4.1.
TYPES OF EDUCATION OF FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIALS
(as percentage of number of officials shown for each column)

	ALL RESPONDENTS (1)	*MUSLIM I* (2)	*MUSLIM II* (3)	*NON-MUSLIM* (4)	*Greek* (5)	*Armenian* (6)	*Other N-M.* (7)
N	*366*	*115*	*144*	*107*	*30*	*52*	*25*
No Indication	1	1	2	1	3	0	0
Traditional Only	5	14	1	0	0	0	0
Mixed	75	83	95	39	67	35	16
Modern Only	17	0	1	59	27	65	84
Unclear	1	3	1	1	3	0	0

tionalist" Muslims; even among them the proportion fell from about a quarter to almost zero between generations. The two modernist Muslims of solely traditional education were among the oldest and were presumably "autodidacts" who learned French after beginning their careers.[47] The officials who most often claimed only "modern" education were non-Muslims; very likely these figures mask a fairly high frequency of study in Arabic and Persian, at least. Interestingly, among non-Muslims, Greeks show the greatest preponderance of mixed education—again a sign that their families were especially well able to prepare them for official careers. The low percentage for "mixed" education among "other non-Muslims" reflects several facts: some were of European origin and educated in Europe;[48] several Arab Christians had educations so westernized as to neglect their native language;[49] the Jews in general were comparatively disadvantaged. Still, as we shall see, over three-fourths of the non-Muslims professed to be able to use Ottoman Turkish in writing for official purposes (*kitabet*).

Elementary Schools, Through the Rüşdiye

Turning from general educational orientations to the different levels of study, we note in table 4.2 the evidence on elementary education. The rather high rate of nonresponses presumably reflects the fact that the personnel record questionnaire, while it asked respondents to name the schools they studied in, did not make explicit that the listing must be

[47] BBA, DSA II, 690 (Mehmed Neş'et Bey, born 1821); Har., SA428 (Hüseyin Sermed Efendi, born 1832).

[48] BBA, DSA I, 1016 (Edouard Blacque Bey), DSA IV, 280 (Yusuf/Joseph Player), DSA II, 100 (Rüstem Paşa, son of Francesco); Har., SA434 (Morel Bey), SA35 (Nihad Paşa, original name Seweryn/Sévérin Bilinski, a Polish refugee).

[49] Har., SA173 (Feyzî Bey Franko), SA66 (Nasrî Bey Franko), SA332 (Nikola Gadbân Efendi), SA132 (Paskal Triha).

Table 4.2.
ELEMENTARY EDUCATION OF FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIALS
(as percentage of number of officials shown in each column)

	ALL RESPONDENTS (1)	*MUSLIM I* (2)	*MUSLIM II* (3)	*NON-MUSLIM* (4)	*Greek* (5)	*Armenian* (6)	*Other N-M.* (7)
N	*366*	*115*	*144*	*107*	*30*	*52*	*25*
No Indication, Unclear	27	22	26	36	50	29	32
Qur'ânic Elementary	45	66	61	0	0	0	0
Non-Muslim Elementary	13	0	1	45	30	48	56
Private Tutors	12	9	11	16	17	19	8
Other, More than One	3	3	1	4	3	4	4

complete from the beginning. Most respondents provided a complete listing, but some did not.[50] It is probably reasonable to assume that in each personnel category, most nonrespondents had their elementary education in the same type of school as most of their fellows. This supposition reinforces the conclusion that a majority of Muslims began their education in the Qur'ânic elementary schools—either the plain old-fashioned *mekteb* or the upgraded version referred to as the *ibtidaî*. Non-Muslims most often—complete data would probably show a majority of cases—began their educations in separate non-Muslim primary schools, but appear slightly more likely than Muslims to have relied on private tutors. The one modernist Muslim who went to a non-Muslim primary school was born on the Greek island of Euboea (Ağrıboz), where there was probably no choice.[51] The data on elementary education show very little change between generations, except that younger Muslims appear more likely to mention the *ibtidaî*, rather than the *mekteb*—necessarily so, since the former was an innovation of the 1860s.

Thoughtful Ottomans were keenly aware of the deficiencies of the Qur'ânic elementary schools as concerns both instruction and character development. Until Muslims began to found private schools late in the century, however, those who were not wealthy enough to hire private tutors had no real alternative.

This fact reinforced the importance of the *rüşdiye*s, founded in growing numbers from the 1840s on. These became the most important government schools in the sense that most of those who attended them never

[50] A normal statistical procedure is to exclude nonrespondents and compute percentages only for those who provided information, as we did in chapter 3 in examining the officials' fathers' occupations. Here we shall not follow this procedure. Failure to mention study at a given level will become valid data, which should be included in the analysis, in proportion as the discussion advances to higher educational levels. At university level, especially, those who do not mention such study did not have it.

[51] Har., SA645 (Feyzî Bey).

Table 4.3.
UPPER ELEMENTARY *(RÜŞDİYE)* EDUCATION OF FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIALS
(as percentage of number of officials shown in each column)

	ALL RESPONDENTS (1)	*MUSLIM I* (2)	*MUSLIM II* (3)	*NON-MUSLIM* (4)	*Greek* (5)	*Armenian* (6)	*Other N-M.* (7)
N	*366*	*115*	*144*	*107*	*30*	*52*	*25*
No Indication	40	26	29	68	77	69	56
Rüşdiye	36	49	51	1	3	0	0
Military *Rüşdiye*	10	15	12	2	3	0	4
Non-Muslim "*Rüşdiye*"	4	0	0	12	7	15	12
More than One	3	6	1	3	7	2	0
Other, Unclear	8	4	8	14	3	13	28

went beyond them. Table 4.3 presents the evidence on Foreign Ministry officials' study at *rüşdiye* level.

The first thing that stands out in table 4.3 is the high nonresponse rate for non-Muslims. The reasons for this seem to be either failure to mention all early education, or that the organization of the non-Muslim schools did not necessarily follow the distinction between lower and upper elementary levels that resulted from the way the *rüşdiye*s developed as a supplement to the Qur'ânic elementary schools. As a result, while some non-Muslims said that they had studied in non-Muslim "*rüşdiye*s," they were very likely translating their experiences into the nomenclature of the government schools. As we shall see, over 80 percent of the non-Muslim officials did claim some study at the next higher level; their elementary education thus could not have been incomplete.

The data on the *rüşdiye*s are really informative only for Muslims, for whom the table makes the importance of these schools clear. Almost two-thirds of both Muslim groups studied in *rüşdiye*s, either civil or military. Given the numbers of Muslims who said nothing about their studies at this level, the real percentages were no doubt higher. As for the military *rüşdiye*s, they were created to prepare students for higher military schools and emphasized military discipline and uniforms. Yet the students were not required to continue their education in military institutions.[52] The earliest *rüşdiye*s appear to have had a two-year program, later upgraded to three or four years.[53]

Considering the important place of the *rüşdiye*s in Ottoman education, it is not surprising that the memoir literature contains many vivid accounts of them, with the evaluations varying widely. Aşçı Dede İbrahim

[52] Ergin, *Maarif*, II, 361, 418–23; III, 742–43; Uşaklıgil, *Kırk Yıl*, 19ff.

[53] Ergin, *Maarif*, II, 371 (two years); III, 755 (three in 1903); Uşaklıgil, *Kırk Yıl*, 84 (four years, c. late 1870s).

Halil, for example, regarded the *Mekteb-i Ulûm-ı Edebiye*, which he attended in the 1840s, as a *rüşdiye*. While this was intended to be a higher school, it and others like it could not be very "high" until lower schools like the *rüşdiye*s came into existence. Aşçı Dede's assessment of the school's level was correct for the time and tells a great deal about what *rüşdiye*s continued to be like thereafter.

Aşçı Dede's reaction to the school was typically positive; yet as so often in his memoirs, his naive enthusiasm allowed the bases for a more critical view to show through. The highlight of his school memories was his association with another student from Kandilli, Ziya Bey (later Paşa), who would become one of the outstanding literary figures of the century. On one occasion, Aşçı Dede says, Ziya proposed a scheme to help get his friend promoted. When the school director, İmamzade Mehmed Esad Efendi, called Aşçı Dede to examine him on the *İzhar*, an Arabic grammar, Ziya would hide behind a curtain and whisper the correct answers, so that Aşçı Dede could pass his test. Alas, Ziya raised his voice too much, and İmamzade realized something was going on. Yelling "bring the swine here" (*getirin şu hınzırı*), he ordered Ziya whipped on the soles of his feet with the *falaka*. Then addressing the blond Aşçı Dede as a "yellow centipede" (*sarıçıyan*), he threatened him with what would happen if he could not pass the exam by himself the next week. Aşçı Dede saw to it that he did.[54]

The outstanding traits of this account, other than its nostalgia, are the conservatism of the curriculum, which came out of the *medrese* tradition (as did İmamzade, "son of the *imam*") and as yet had no "modern" subjects in it at all, and the combination of brutal discipline with academic standards that were, in fact, not high. A report that İmamzade submitted in 1841[55] classified the school's students in terms of four groups studying works on Arabic morphology (*sarf*)—first the *Emsile*,[56] then the *Bina*,[57]

[54] Aşçı Dede İbrahim, *Risale*, TY3222, 36a–40a; TY78, 139–40, 182–85; Ergin, *Maarif*, II, 325–28; Koçu, *Hatıralar*, 20–21; Bremer, *Die Memoiren*, 239–41.

[55] BBA, Irade D1749, report on the *Mekteb-i Maarif-i Adliye* and *Mekteb-i Ulûm-ı Edebiye*, signed Mehmed Esad, 1257/1841.

[56] The *Emsile* (*Amthila* in Arabic), was an anonymous work containing verbal paradigms, on which commentaries exist by at least two Ottoman authors, Muslih al-Dîn Mustafa b. Şa'ban al-Surûrî (d. 1561) and Birgili Mehmed (Mehmed Birgevî); Carl Brockelmann, *Geschichte der Arabischen Litteratur* (*GAL*), Leiden, 1936–1949, II, 579, 583; Atsız, *İstanbul Kütüphanelerine göre Birgili Mehmet Efendi (929–981/1523–1573) Bibliyografyası*, Istanbul, 1966, 79. I am indebted to Eric Ormsby, and especially Dona Straley, for help with these references. The remaining book titles, cited Turkish-style in the text, will also be transliterated from Arabic in these notes.

[57] On the *Binâ'*, I have been able to find no identification beyond Uzunçarşılı's cryptic reference to a source attributing both it and the *Maqṣûd* to the "*İmâm-i Âzam*," i.e., Abû Ḥanîfa (699–769); İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Devletinin İlmiye Teşkilâtı*, Ankara, 1965, 30 n. 1.

then the *Maksud*,[58] then the *İzzi*,[59]—and three classes studying works on Arabic syntax (*nahv*)—the *Avamil*,[60] then the first half of the *İzhar*,[61] finally the rest of the *İzhar* and the *Kafiye*.[62] So stereotyped was this curriculum that late in the century, Ottomans still described their education by saying that they had read Arabic "as far as" one of these works and Persian "as far as" one of those that held an equally immutable place in the Persian curriculum. The teacher rewarded students who did well with "bravo" (*aferin*) and promotion. Aşçı Dede tells us that İmamzade would spit in the faces of those who did poorly, not to speak of subjecting miscreants to the *falaka*. Ziya Bey and Aşçı Dede had reason to be worried on the occasion he described. Yet he easily passed the following week; and this was the same school that spent two months preparing, as we know from his account, for a graduation examination that consisted of writing an explanation of the Arabic formula used in dating imperial decrees.

A generation later, probably around 1880, Halid Ziya Uşaklıgil attended a *rüşdiye* in Izmir. He described it in detail, following his account of Izmir's non-Muslim schools, which included several lycées. The *rüşdiye* was then the highest government school in the city, and Uşaklıgil's comparison spotlights its shortcomings. The building was small, he says, but at least new and clean with one teacher for each class, plus one extra for Turkish. The school had about a hundred students, but only about eight or ten received diplomas each year. With a four-year program, this meant a very high failure rate. As for curriculum, the students had a Turkish

[58] *Al-Maqṣûd fi'l-Ṣarf*, an anonymous work, though sometimes attributed to Abû Ḥanîfa; Brockelmann, *GAL*, suppl. I, 287.

[59] ʿIzz al-Dîn al-Zanjânî (d. 1257), *Al-ʿIzzî* or *Kitâb al-Taṣrîf al-Zanjânî*; some half dozen nineteenth-century Istanbul printings, among others; see Brockelmann, *GAL*, I, 336–37, and suppl. I, 497–98.

[60] Abû Bakr ʿAbd al-Qâhir al-Jurjânî (d. 1078), *Kitâb al-ʿAwâmil al-Miʾa*; Brockelmann, *GAL*, I, 341, and suppl. I, 503. Or perhaps more likely the reference is to Birgili Mehmed, *Al-ʿAwâmil al-Jadîda*, which went through thirty-eight nineteenth-century printings (often together with the *Kâfîya* and the *Iẓhâr*) and has seventy-six manuscript copies surviving in Istanbul libraries; Atsız, *Birgili Mehmet Bibliyografyası*, 64–69; Brockelmann, *GAL*, II, 585–86, suppl. II, 657. The sources cited here do not specify what connections exist, if any, between the works of al-Jurjânî and Birgili.

[61] Birgili Mehmed (Mehmed Birgevî), *Iẓhâr al-Asrâr*, forty-two nineteenth-century printings and sixty-eight mss. in Istanbul libraries; Atsız, *Birgili Mehmet Bibliyografyası*, 70–75; Brockelmann, *GAL*, II, 585, suppl. II, 656–57.

[62] Jamâl al-Dîn ibn al-Ḥâcib (d. 1174), *Al-Kâfîya*, many manuscripts and some twelve nineteenth-century printings in Istanbul; probably studied together with a commentary by Mollâ Jâmî (d. 1492), whose name is frequently mentioned in sources on the schools, *Al-Fawâʾid al-Ḍiyâʾîya*, also known as *Şerḥ-i Mollâ*; Brockelmann, *GAL*, I, 367–70, suppl. I, 531–35. On these and the preceding works as parts of the lower *medrese* curriculum, see Uzunçarşılı, *İlmiye*, 30; also Heidborn, *Manuel*, I, 279–80. This curriculum appears to have remained much the same across vast reaches of time and space: cf. Sadr al-Din Aynî, *Boukhara*, trans. S. Borodine and P. Korotkin, Paris, 1956, 176–82, on the late nineteenth century; Maria Subtelny, "The Poetic Circle at the Court of the Timurid, Sultan Husain Baiqara, and its Political Significance," Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1979, 88–89.

grammar and, for a reading book, a 200-page Ottoman history. The students learned fractions and decimals, ratio and proportion. They learned to locate a few places on the map. They studied Persian from the Gulestân of Saʿdî (d. 1292) and a Persian grammar. But the lesson on which they spent most time was still Arabic.

Using familiar terms, Uşaklıgil describes the Arabic curriculum as beginning with the *Emsile*, *Bina*, and *Avamil*, then going on to the *İzhar* and an elementary work on logic that he refers to as the "four treatises" (*Resail-i Erbaa*).[63] The students advanced through these works at the rate of four or five lines a day. The school did not require written homework or the writing of essays. What it mostly did was go over and over the Arabic lessons, first in small groups in the morning, with the better students serving as drill instructors (*müzakereci*) for their fellows, then later before the teacher. He followed a rigid instructional plan: vocalization of the text, translation, and explanation. The way to come out first in the class was to repeat exactly what the teacher said. Not to learn the lines for the day should have been impossible after such pounding; yet the failure rate was high. This was the education, Uşaklıgil says, with which Turkish youngsters went out to compete with the non-Muslim lycée graduates. And it was what most of those who aspired to become officials brought with them to their apprenticeship.[64]

Uşaklıgil has been criticized for the negativism of his account,[65] which certainly expresses the self-contempt we have noted. To maintain perspective, it helps to note also that the *rüşdiye*s played a part in training many intellectuals and public figures—including Uşaklıgil himself. As with the *mekteb*s, we also find that some of the traits he most disliked live on in other, more successful institutions. The routine of the Arabic class—vocalization, translation, explication—has many counterparts in language classes at U.S. universities of the present day, though the academic levels, failure rates, and overall curricula of the institutions are vastly different.

Middle Schools

Even if other aspirants to official appointment did not pursue their education beyond the *rüşdiye*, most Foreign Ministry officials did, whether by formal schooling or informal means such as study with tutors. Yet most of the Foreign Ministry officials under study could not take advantage of

[63] Albert Hourani suggests that the "four treatises" may be Arabic versions of Porphyry's *Isagoge*, plus Aristotle's *Categoriae*, *De Interpretatione*, and *Analytica Priora*, probably studies through later commentaries and glosses. See Nicholas Rescher, *The Development of Arabic Logic*, Pittsburgh, 1964, 18–19 (the "four books").

[64] Uşaklıgil, *Kırk Yıl*, 84–86; Ergin, *Maarif*, III, 748, confirms that students commonly sought official careers without education past the *rüşdiye*.

[65] Pakalın, *OTD*, III, 67, (*rüşdiye*).

Table 4.4.
MIDDLE SCHOOL *(İDADÎ)* EDUCATION OF FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIALS
(as percentage of number of officials shown in each column)

	ALL RESPONDENTS (1)	*MUSLIM I* (2)	*MUSLIM II* (3)	*NON-MUSLIM* (4)	*Greek* (5)	*Armenian* (6)	*Other N-M.* (7)
N	*366*	*115*	*144*	*107*	*30*	*52*	*25*
No Indication	38	46	47	18	33	12	12
Early Professional Schools	10	17	10	1	0	2	0
İdadî	1	1	2	1	0	0	4
Non-Muslim Middle Schools	10	1	1	32	43	29	24
Foreign Middle School (in Ott. Empire)	4	0	3	9	3	8	20
Foreign Middle School (abroad)	4	3	3	8	10	10	4
Private Tutor	18	23	15	17	7	25	12
More than One	8	6	12	4	3	6	0
Other, Unclear	7	3	8	10	0	10	24

the next level in the sequence of government schools, the *idadî*s, which developed too late for them. The term *idadî* ("preparatory") had been used from the early days of educational reform to refer to schools, or even classes, at various levels, created to prepare students for other, higher schools. In the specific sense of a level of government schools higher than the *rüşdiye* and preparatory to the lycée-level institutions, *idadî*s did not begin to be created until 1873, and then only in Istanbul. Bankruptcy and the Russo-Turkish War inhibited further expansion until the 1880s, when grand vezir Said Paşa hit upon the expedient of raising funds by adding an education surtax to the agricultural tithes (*âşar*). By about 1890, over thirty *idadî*s existed, from Macedonia to Palestine.[66]

Most of the Foreign Ministry officials in our tables had already begun their career by 1876. What table 4.4 shows, then, is how they proceeded at the next phase of their education beyond the *rüşdiye* level. A tabulation based on a younger group of men would normally show study in *idadî*s per se.[67]

Table 4.4 shows that the role of actual *idadî* schools in training the

[66] Ergin, *Maarif*, II, 412–17; III, 748–58; Mehmed Said Paşa, *Said Paşa'nın Hâtıratı*, I, 156–57, 159–60.

[67] Ergin, *Maarif*, III, 756; Çankaya, *Mülkiye Târihi*, III, 1143–1200; IV, 1205–1548, graduation from *idadî* appears normal in these biographies. Ç.'s evidence on this point has to be evaluated with care, however, as he interprets the *idadî*s as lycées. The reason is that the *Mülkiye* had a "preparatory" (*idadî* in that sense) school, and—since Ç. regards the *Mülkiye* as having become the equivalent of a university faculty at a rather early date—it follows that this *Mülkiye İdadisi* must have been a lycée. This view is hard to defend against Ergin, an authoritative source.

officials under study was very slight; it was also confined to the younger generation. What the table refers to as the early professional schools made a more important contribution to the training of Muslims, especially the older men. The category "early professional schools" is intended to capture a phase in the evolution of what were meant to be higher professional schools for civil and military officials, a phase when those schools were beginning to move beyond the *rüşdiye* level, to which Aşçı Dede rightfully assigned the earliest of them in the 1840s, but could not yet be regarded as having become lycée equivalents, which the later professional schools were, at least, by 1908. In the table, the "early professional school" category includes the *Mekteb-i Maarif-i Adliye* (1839), the *Dar ül-Maarif* (1849) and the *Mahrec-i Aklâm* ("Training Place for the Offices," 1862).[68] Another comparable educational opportunity that the table does not include—since it occurred within the offices and so does not figure in what the officials wrote about their schooling—was service in the Translation Office of the Sublime Porte (1821), the government's first means for teaching French to civil officials and the training ground for the *Tanzimat* elite.

For non-Muslims, the most important schools at this level were those of their religious communities, some of them located abroad,[69] followed by schools run by foreigners, both in the empire and in Europe. Non-Muslim reliance on each of these types of schools appears to have grown by the younger generation. Some of the non-Muslim and foreign schools included in table 4.4 may have offered instruction that went beyond the level of the Ottoman *idadî*s; exact information on this point is lacking. In at least two cases, Muslim officials responded to the underdevelopment of the Ottoman middle schools by attending those of non-Muslim communities. One, a traditionalist, was a native of Albania, who went on from his town's *rüşdiye* to the local Greek school.[70] The other, a modernist and the son of a local official, studied at a Greek school on Cyprus while his father served there, prior to the British takeover.[71]

For officials of all categories, especially the older men, one of the most common forms of study at this level was with private tutors, particularly for languages. The frequency with which officials had educational experiences of more than one type at this level expresses the confusion resulting from the underdevelopment of the *idadî*s and the hodgepodge of other

[68] For the 1860s, Ergin, *Maarif*, II, 413, supports assignment of all these schools to the *idadî* level.

[69] E.g., among Armenians Bartev Antoine (BBA, DSA III, 264) studied at the Mekhitarist School, Padua; Yusuf Domnian (?; Har., SA133) studied at the Murad (Muradian?) School, Paris; Krikor Hakimoğlu (Har., SA68) studied at the Mekhitarist School, Venice; Krikor Yaldızıan (Har., SA301) studied at the Muradian School, Paris, and the Andonian School, Rome.

[70] Har., SA40, Şevkî Kemal Efendi.

[71] Har., SA89, Ahmed Kâmî Efendi.

Table 4.5.
HIGHER AND PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION OF FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIALS
(as percentage of number of officials shown in each column)

	ALL RESPONDENTS (1)	*MUSLIM I* (2)	*MUSLIM II* (3)	*NON-MUSLIM* (4)	*Greek* (5)	*Armenian* (6)	*Other N-M.* (7)
N	*366*	*115*	*144*	*107*	*30*	*52*	*25*
None	40	70	24	32	17	37	40
Galatasaray Lycée	16	6	25	14	17	13	12
School of Civil Administration (*Mülkiye*)	4	3	7	0	0	0	0
Language Schools	6	9	9	0	0	0	0
Private Tutors	7	3	8	8	7	13	0
Non-Muslim Higher School	3	0	1	9	20	8	0
Foreign Higher School in Ottoman Empire	1	1	0	4	3	2	8
European Lycée or Equivalent	6	1	1	16	17	13	20
More than One	12	7	18	10	13	8	12
Other, Indeterminate	5	1	6	7	7	6	8

available facilities. One consequence of the late development of the *idadîs* is the apparent lack of vivid memoir accounts from this period, comparable to those for the *rüşdiyes*.

Higher and Professional Schools

The higher and professional schools present a picture of greater clarity. Table 4.5 refers to educational facilities at this level as "higher and professional," rather than "lycée-level," since only one actual lycée was mentioned in the records, discounting foreign schools. The Ottoman professional schools that were frequently cited were essentially lycée equivalents in this period, as best can be determined. Since one of these institutions, the School of Civil Administration, has since become a university faculty, its inclusion in this table may seem questionable to readers more familiar with later conditions. During the reign of Abd ül-Hamid, however, this school was still in the process of extending its range of instruction gradually upward. The first Ottoman university was not founded until 1900; and the School of Civil Administration did not become a part of it—or at least move into the same building—until 1909, in which year the school also adopted the curriculum of the *Ecole libre des Sciences politiques* in Paris.[72] Considering that even the younger Foreign Ministry

[72] Ergin, *Maarif*, II, 515–17; III, 913; Çankaya, *Mülkiye Târihi*, I, 104–106, 116, 141, 157, 249–50, 348–50.

officials were mostly well into their careers by the Young Turk revolution, it does not seem unjust here to place the contributions of the School of Civil Administration to their education still at the lycée-level, while acknowledging the school's progressive rise toward higher status.

The first noteworthy point about table 4.5 concerns officials claiming no education at all at this level. For traditionalist Muslims, this percentage has increased ever since the elementary level, shown in table 4.2, so indicating a steady attrition in the percentage of traditionalists continuing their studies at each higher level. The other personnel categories, however, display smaller nonresponse rates in table 4.5 than at some of the lower educational levels. For the Greeks, the percentage recording no education at the higher and professional level is actually lower than the percentage of nonresponses in any of the three preceding tables. The reasons for these seeming anomalies must include the highly educated officials' tendency to mention only the last schools they attended, as well as the imperfect correspondence between the hierarchies of governmental and other schools.

A more significant fact is that the percentages of Foreign Ministry officials recording no study at the higher-professional level fell considerably between older and younger generations. For all respondents, those with no education at this level fell from 48 to 32 percent between generations. Among the three large groups, proportionately the greatest decline was among the modernist Muslims, for whom the rate fell from 31 to 19 percent. To judge from this evidence, the growth of the Ottoman schools appears to have been associated with a strong rise over time in the officials' educational levels.

Of the higher and professional schools in which Foreign Ministry officials studied, the Galatasaray Lycée, or *Mekteb-i Sultanî*, was most important by far (illustration 5). This lycée was one of two, not counting minority and missionary schools, in the empire prior to 1908, the other being the *Dar ül-Şafaka*, a school for Muslim orphans. The origins of both schools go back to the 1860s; both still exist; both have produced many distinguished graduates.[73] While the *Dar ül-Şafaka* was founded for charitable reasons, the original goal at Galatasaray was to create a lycée on a par with the best in Europe, to train members of all segments of the population for public service. Galatasaray became one of the first important schools, after the Medical School, to have a religiously mixed student body, largely from wealthy families. The curriculum was initially that of a French lycée, and most of the instruction was in French. The first director and many teachers were French, as well. This French emphasis may have helped consolidate the tie between the school and the Foreign Ministry. Given the opening date of the school (1868), those of the officials included

[73] Ergin, *Maarif*, II, 400–412.

Ill. 5. Galatasaray Lycée, Istanbul. Taken from a raised vantage point, this view shows the ceremonial gateway fronting what was then known as the Grand'rue de Pera (now İstiklâl Caddesi, Beyoğlu), with gardens and the main building of the lycée in the background.

in the table who studied there were concentrated in the younger generation.

The early years of Galatasaray Lycée display some of the ups and downs so common in Ottoman education. One of the ups consisted of an effort, launched in 1874 and evidently abandoned some time in the early 1880s, to expand the lycée into a university with faculties of law (*hukuk*, the new secular legal system), engineering, and letters. Among those who appear in table 4.5 as studying at Galatasaray, 3 percent of each of the Muslim groups and 2 percent of the non-Muslims recorded study in the Galatasaray Law School. An insight into what it was like around 1880 appears in the previously mentioned dissertation of one of the officials included in table 4.5, Rupen Karakaşian.[74] The Law School later became a separate institution and, after the 1908 revolution, another faculty of Istanbul University.[75] As for Galatasaray Lycée, a study of the political elite of the Turkish republic, published almost a century after that school's opening, found that attendance at a prominent secondary school remained a key

[74] Ibid., II, 585–87; Har., SA737, Rupen Karakaşian.
[75] Ergin, *Maarif*, II, 581–92; III, 890–918.

Ill. 6. The School of Civil Administration (*Mekteb-i Mülkiye*): The Garden, with Students Assembled in the Background, Late Nineteenth Century.

determinant of later success in public life in Turkey, and that graduates of Galatasaray held a particularly advantageous position.[76]

What is at first surprising is that the School of Civil Administration (*Mülkiye Mektebi*, 1859) did not make a comparable contribution to the education of Foreign Ministry officials. Two factors help to explain this fact. First, while the *Mülkiye* (illustration 6) was almost a decade older than Galatasaray, its upgrading under Abd ül-Hamid did not occur until the late 1870s. The reformed school did not produce its first class of graduates until 1879, at a time when most of the men included in table 4.5 had already begun their careers. Furthermore, according to Çankaya's tabulation, out of 1,604 *Mülkiye* graduates in the classes of 1879–1922, 8 percent (124 men) became Foreign Ministry officials. Over the same period, however, 70 percent of the graduates (1,127 men) served in the Interior Ministry.[77] The stronger tie to the Interior Ministry is the second reason why the *Mülkiye* was not so well represented in the table as Galatasaray. The School of Civil Administration had been expressly founded to

[76] Frederick W. Frey, *The Turkish Political Elite*, Cambridge, Mass., 1965, 35–37.
[77] Çankaya, *Mülkiye Târihi*, VIII, calculated from chart opp. p. 164.

train local administrative officials. In the long run, that was not the school's only contribution, but it remained the primary one.[78]

Whether or not their part in training the Foreign Ministry staff was the same, the School of Civil Administration clearly resembled Galatasaray in helping to introduce new standards into Ottoman education. Even if we do not agree with Çankaya about when the School of Civil Administration became the equivalent of a university faculty, it progressively did so. Its faculty included some of the most influential intellectuals of the late Ottoman period—men like Mizancı Mehmed Murad, who taught history there for seventeen years, until he had to flee in 1894 because of his role in political opposition, or Recaizade Ekrem, who taught there for eight years until forced to resign because of "liberal teaching" in 1889.[79] As *Mülkiye* professors, these men symbolize the relative intellectual freedom of the Hamidian regime through the 1880s, compared to the harsher climate that prevailed thereafter.[80] To cite a new standard of an entirely different kind, the *Mülkiye* reportedly became the first civil school to introduce physical training (illustration 7 shows some Galatasaray students who might have contested this claim). Like Galatasaray, the *Mülkiye* helped introduce a new kind of school spirit. It became the first Ottoman school to have a student association, as well as an alumni association that published an interesting professional journal, called *Mülkiye*, in the Young Turk period. By then, *Mülkiye* graduates, already playing major administrative roles, began to rise to the highest posts, as we shall note in the next chapter.[81]

Virtually the only other Ottoman higher schools that had any impact worthy of individual notice in the training of Foreign Ministry officials were two language schools. These appear to be two generations of the same thing. The first lasted from 1864 until about 1870; the second, from 1883 to 1891.[82]

The other government schools, lumped in the residual category at the foot of table 4.5 include the Military Academy (*Mekteb-i Harbiye*), Military Medical School, and the Ottoman School (*Mekteb-i Osmanî*) that existed in Paris from the mid-1850s to 1874, training two modernist Mus-

[78] Ibid., I, 31–34, 42–43, 70, 73–74, 177, 197, 249.

[79] Ibid., II, 1009–20, 1047–51. Recaizade later also taught at Galatasaray; Mizancı Murad later collaborated with the Hamidian regime.

[80] Ibid., I, 211.

[81] Ibid., I, 211–24, 298–99, 335–38; II, 1323–32.

[82] Ergin, *Maarif*, II, 533–42; III, 1046–52. Traditionalist Muslims mentioning the Language School: Har., SA646 (Ahmed Nazım Bey), SA126 (Mehmed Refik Bey), SA765 (Mustafa Reşid Bey); modernists who did so: Har., SA206 (Hasan Mahır Bey), SA2 (Mehmed Refik Efendi). The reason for classifying the school at this level is the reference in Har., SA126, to its being superior to (*ma fevkinde*) the *Mahrec-i Aklâm*, classed in table 4.4 at *idadî* level.



Ill. 7. Students of Galatasaray Lycée Performing Gymnastics, Late Nineteenth Century.

lims included in the table.[83] The Ottoman School's small contribution to training Foreign Ministry officials seems to support the interpretation that the school's costs were out of proportion to its benefits, a view that helped prompt the founding of Galatasaray Lycée.

Other than the Ottoman government schools, the lycée-level schools that did most to educate the Foreign Ministry staff were in Europe, usually in France. The Sainte-Barbe, Louis-le-Grand, and Charlemagne Lycées at Paris each trained at least a few non-Muslim officials.[84] Lycées maintained by the minority communities, sometimes outside the empire, made an important contribution to the education of Greeks and Armenians. Foreign higher schools inside the empire were particularly important

[83] Har., SA71 (Mahmud Esad Paşa), SA167 (Mahmud Münir Paşa); cf. Richard L. Chambers, "Notes on the *Mekteb-i Osmanî* in Paris, 1857–1874," in *Beginnings of Modernization in the Middle East*, ed. William R. Polk and Richard L. Chambers, Chicago, 1968, 313–29.

[84] Those mentioning Ste.-Barbe: Har., SA722 (Dimitraki Lefteriadi), SA300 (Manuk Azarian), SA725 (Pozik Yusuf Azarian), BBA, DSA I, 1016 (Edouard Blacque Bey), and also one modernist Muslim, Har., SA690 (Mehmed Süleyman Faik). Those who studied at Louis-le-Grand: Har., SA9 (Pandeli Logaris Efendi), SA435 (Artin Dadian Paşa), and BBA, DSA IV, 280 (Yusuf Player Efendi). Those who studied at the Lycée Charlemagne: Har., SA48 (Edouard Bey, an Armenian), SA434 (Morel Bey).

for Arab Christians, thanks to the variety of such schools in Lebanon. Other missionary schools, including Robert College at Istanbul,[85] rated at least occasional mention. Since the minority and foreign schools were most patronized by non-Muslims, it is interesting to note a sharp generational change. The percentage of non-Muslims who studied at such schools inside the empire almost doubled by the younger generation, while the percentage studying at lycées abroad declined sharply. Although the reasons for it probably include other factors, too, this change must reflect improvement in the quality of educational choices within the empire, including Galatasaray Lycée, in which over a fifth of the younger-generation non-Muslims studied. At the lycée-level as at others, finally, some officials studied privately, and others had more than one type of education.

University Study

It has been worthwhile to look closely at lycée-level education, for officials who went beyond that level were very rare. Nor is that fact nearly so remarkable by European standards of the time as the expectations of a later era might suggest. Of British Foreign Office clerks recruited between 1871 and 1907, for example, barely half held university degrees.[86] Even in imperial Germany, that beacon of administrative rationality and high standards, stringent-looking requirements for university degrees and examinations were readily dissolved at the Foreign Office by such emollients as suavity and family connections.[87] For the Ottomans, of course, one key fact was the tardy advent of the Istanbul *Dar ül-fünun* (1900). As it happened, none of the men included in the tables appears to have had university-level study at any of the missionary institutions in the empire. For these officials—excepting only one modernist Muslim who completed a law degree at Istanbul University in 1913, almost twenty years after beginning his career[88]—university study meant study in Europe. Table 4.6 shows how many accomplished so much.

Table 4.6 shows that 6 percent of the modernist Muslims studied in Europe in universities or other institutions of comparable level, but fully 16 percent of the non-Muslims did. The Greeks were clearly the non-Muslim subgroup for whom such study was most frequent. Partly for that reason, the non-Muslims who studied in European institutions of higher

[85] Har., SA127 (Mehmed Kadrî Bey), SA262 (Yusuf Ziya Bey), both modernist Muslims. They do not say that they studied in the preparatory, rather than the higher, division of the college; but their records make this the only plausible interpretation.

[86] Ray Jones, *The Nineteenth Century Foreign Office*, London, 1971, 64; cf. Zara Steiner, *The Foreign Office and Foreign Policy, 1898–1914*, Cambridge, 1969, 16–20, 217–21.

[87] Lamar Cecil, *The German Diplomatic Service, 1871–1914*, Princeton, 1976, 26–39.

[88] Har., SA578 (Abd ül-Rahman Ramiz Bey).

Table 4.6.
UNIVERSITY EDUCATION OF FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIALS
(as percentage of number of officials shown in each column)

	ALL RESPONDENTS (1)	*MUSLIM I* (2)	*MUSLIM II* (3)	*NON-MUSLIM* (4)	*Greek* (5)	*Armenian* (6)	*Other N-M.* (7)
N	*366*	*115*	*144*	*107*	*30*	*52*	*25*
No Mention	93	100	93	84	73	87	92
Istanbul University	0[a]	0	1	0	0	0	0
European Universities	6	0	5	12	20	12	4
European Technical and Military Institutions	1	0	1	3	7	2	0
More than One European University or Equivalent	0[a]	0	0	1	0	0	4

NOTE:
[a] Computed value less than 0.5 percent.

learning were heavily concentrated in the older generation, where the proportion with such study reached 22 percent. Here, again, we sense that the decline in the non-Muslims' representation in the ministry had qualitative as well as quantitative dimensions. Often, Foreign Ministry officials who studied at European universities appear to have been in Europe on assignment at the time of their studies. At least half of all those who studied in European institutions of higher learning went to Paris. The German universities collectively were perhaps next best represented. Those who did not study at Paris or in Germany were scattered from Rome to Brussels to Lvov. The institutions listed as technical and military institutions were a Belgian agricultural school, schools of engineering and commerce in Paris, and the French general staff school.[89] The only individual who studied at more than one European institution of higher learning was a European: Seweryn Bilinski, known in Ottoman service as Nihad Paşa. He had studied both at the University of Lvov (or Lemburg in Galicia, as he says) and—having fled Poland following the Revolution of 1848—at the general staff school (*Ecole d'état major*) in Paris.[90] The officials who studied in Europe do not always name the courses they studied, but law appears to have been the most frequent choice.

Completion of Studies

The assiduity with which Ottomans pursued their studies in European universities was of a piece with their approach to the Ottoman schools.

[89] Har., SA726 (Hüseyin Hüsnî Paşa, French general staff school, following St.-Cyr), SA271 (Andon Hrisafidi, Belgian agriculture school), SA519 (Dimitri Yovanidi, "engineering school" at Paris); SA56 (Artin Kanburian, *Ecole spéciale de commerce*, Paris).

[90] Har., SA35 (Nihad Paşa).

Table 4.7.
COMPLETION OF STUDIES AT DIFFERENT EDUCATIONAL LEVELS
(as percentage of number of officials shown in each column)

	ALL RESPONDENTS (1)	*MUSLIM I* (2)	*MUSLIM II* (3)	*NON-MUSLIM* (4)	*Greek* (5)	*Armenian* (6)	*Other N-M.* (7)
N	*366*	*115*	*144*	*107*	*30*	*52*	*25*
Studied in *Rüşdiye* or Equivalent	61	74	72	32	23	30	44
Completed *Rüşdiye* or Equivalent	25	33	31	7	7	6	12
Studied in Middle (*İdadî*) School	44	31	39	65	59	65	76
Completed Middle School or Equivalent	7	2	4	17	23	19	4
Studied in Higher and Professional Schools	53	28	67	60	77	50	60
Completed Higher-Profl. (Lycée) Level	23	5	31	32	50	19	36
Studied at University	7	0	7	16	27	14	8
Received University Degree	4	0	4	9	10	10	8

Indeed, if we ask, not what schools Foreign Ministry officials attended, but how many of them completed the course of study at any level of education, we find that their educational attainments were even more limited than might have been supposed from evidence presented so far. Table 4.7 illustrates this point by comparing the percentages who attended schools at each level with the percentages who recorded finishing those schools. The personnel questionnaire did ask each respondent to tell which schools he had attended and say whether he had received a diploma (*şehadetname*). Some individuals said that they had gone to school before diplomas were given; but they would usually add whether they had finished the course. In table 4.7, the percentages shown as having studied at a given level have been computed by summing each column in tables 4.2 through 4.6, excluding only those who recorded no study at the level in question or who studied only with tutors, since private study would not lead to a diploma.

Table 4.7 vividly illustrates the lack of discipline in Ottoman education. These figures show that seldom as many as half of those who studied at a given level completed their studies. Considering that the incompleteness

of the data on lower scholastic levels may overstate the problem, the most significant fact that emerges from this table is probably that 53 percent of the officials had at least some formal instruction at lycée level, but only 23 percent completed their studies there. Most traditionalist Muslims never went past the *rüşdiye* level in the secular government schools. At the other extreme, the non-Muslims, especially the Greeks, were the most highly educated officials of all. Even among those who attended European universities, however, the record of completion was generally not impressive. Too often, it seems, university study was but a pastime for bored embassy secretaries. Even those who were serious were apt to be reassigned before they could complete their studies. The records under study do, however, include two officials who won doctorates. One modernist Muslim, Mehmed Erşed Bey, received his in law at Geneva; he went on to serve as director of the Office of Legal Counsel (*İstişare Odası*) in the Foreign Ministry from 1911 to 1913 and in other important posts.[91] The other, "Etienne" Karatodori, received his doctorate, also apparently in law, from Berlin University; he made his career as a diplomat and served as minister in Brussels throughout the last quarter of the nineteenth century.[92]

Religious Study

This discussion of university study completes the account of "modern" education; yet even in such a bastion of westernism as the Foreign Ministry, some officials may also have studied Islamic religious subjects at advanced levels. What do the personnel records have to tell about cultural traditionalism, not in the general sense of continued interest in the *adab*-culture, but in the stricter sense of the Islamic religious studies?

In the Foreign Ministry personnel records, references to higher study in religious subjects are few but interesting. Even among traditionalist Muslims, the proportion with *medrese* education was only 12 percent. Among modernist Muslims, it was only 4 percent. In both groups, the *medrese* men were mostly of the older generation. Not surprisingly, in view of what we have already seen of the officials' record in qualifying for diplomas, even smaller proportions had received an *icazet*, a *medrese* diploma attesting that the recipient had studied a certain subject under a given teacher and was qualifed to teach the subject.[93] All in the older gen-

[91] Har., SA278 (Mehmed Erşed Bey); cf. Çankaya, *Mülkiye Târihi*, III, 391–92. He graduated from both *idadî* and higher sections of the *Mülkiye*. From the latter he received a diploma (*şehadetname*) in political science (1889), before going on to Paris and Geneva for the *licence* and doctorate.

[92] Har., SA30 (Etyen Karatodori).

[93] Uzunçarşılı, *İlmiye*, 75–77.

eration, 3 percent of traditionalist Muslims and but 1 percent of modernists could claim such a diploma. Two of these older officials, including the one "modernist," followed lackluster careers, both in the Turkish Correspondence Office (*Mektubî-i Hariciye Kalemi*).[94] Two others were really *ulema*. One served as consular *imam* on Malta.[95] The other, Ahmed Ataullah, was an atypical individual. Both he and his father, who came from Şehrizor in Iraq, had been sent by the Ottoman government to promote Islam among the Muslim inhabitants of Cape Colony.[96] An Azhar graduate, Ahmed Ataullah had learned English, Dutch, and Urdu to perform his South African mission. His dossier is one of the few direct expressions in the Foreign Ministry personnel records of Abd ül-Hamid's pan-Islamic policy.

In other cases, Foreign Ministry officials studied religious subjects informally, if at all. While most of those who had private tutors studied the same subjects that they could have in government schools—Arabic, Persian, French, and to a lesser degree history, geography, or arithmetic—a handful went more deeply into Islamic religious subjects.[97] Some officials no doubt returned to religious studies later in life. Some surely did so as participants in dervish orders, a subject about which the personnel questionnaire did not ask.

Though evidence on religious study among Foreign Ministry officials is scanty, it is appropriate to recall that even the "modernists" were among the first of their kind. The more learned were likely to have been steeped in their early lives in the traditional culture, through the *mekteb* and *rüşdiye* curriculum and contacts with older family members, if by no other means. The writings of Namık Kemal (1840–1888) or Ziya Gökalp (1876–1924) remind us that even the most westernized intellectuals of their generations could usually still discuss major facets of their religious tradition in its own terms.[98] In the next chapter, we shall encounter an intellectual whose writings express a highly Europeanized outlook; yet even for him, western culture was an acquired taste.

Most officials at the turn of the century probably still had some ground-

[94] Har., SA202 (İsmail Zühdî, a "traditionalist" who claimed limited knowledge of French), SA360 (Ahmed Asaf Bey, the "modernist").

[95] Har., SA770 (Mustafa Hamdî).

[96] Har., SA687, Ahmed Ataullah, in South Africa from 1885 until the outbreak of the Boer War in 1898; thereafter appointed vice consul general at Singapore, he had died there by 1904 (Har., İdare 322, letter from German Consul General Eschke in Singapore, 21 Mar. 1904).

[97] Har., SA134 (Hafız Mehmed Besim), SA342 (Mehmed Emin), SA53 (Nazırzade Mehmed Baha al-Din Bey, who mentions *fiqh* among other subjects)—all "traditionalist" Muslims. Alone among modernists: Har., SA428 (Hüseyin Hüsnî Sermed, also mentioning *fiqh*).

[98] Mardin, *Genesis*, 283–336; Ziya Gökalp, *Turkish Nationalism and Western Civilization: Selected Essays of Ziya Gökalp*, ed. and trans. Niyazi Berkes, New York, 1959, passim; Uriel Heyd, *Foundations of Turkish Nationalism: The Life and Teachings of Ziya Gökalp*, London, 1950.

Table 4.8.
INCIDENCE OF TECHNICAL AND PROFESSIONAL QUALIFICATIONS
(as percentage of number of officials shown in each column)

	ALL RESPONDENTS (1)	*MUSLIM I* (2)	*MUSLIM II* (3)	*NON-MUSLIM* (4)	*Greek* (5)	*Armenian* (6)	*Other N-M.* (7)
N	*366*	*115*	*144*	*107*	*30*	*52*	*25*
None Mentioned	81	94	75	75	67	81	72
Telegraphy	1	1	0	2	3	2	0
Stenography	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
Commerce	1	0	1	3	0	2	8
Engineering	1	0	1	1	3	0	0
Medicine	1	1	1	0	0	0	0
Military Science	2	2	3	1	0	0	4
Law (European)	4	0	3	8	17	6	4
Law (Ottoman)	8	3	12	7	7	6	12
Other, More than One	2	0	3	3	3	4	0

ing in both "modern" and "traditional" culture, then, even if they emphasized one at the expense of the other. Like one real example, a not atypical official might study at a *rüşdiye*, then at a *medrese*, then with a Persian tutor on Cyprus, then return to Istanbul to enter the "Training Place of the Offices" (*Mahrec-i Aklâm*), before beginning his career. This same man later studied law in Paris, but was called home by the government before he could complete his degree. Thereafter he worked in a government office, wrote for a newspaper, and taught composition (*inşa*) at a *rüşdiye*—a combination of jobs common among officials then and since.[99]

Content of Education: Technical Skills

Where content of education is concerned, proficiency in French was clearly not the only "modern" skill a person could have. It is worthwhile to consider the prevalence of other "modern" skills and what this implies about the value placed on such qualifications in the administrative environment. Table 4.8 presents the data on a variety of technical skills mentioned in the records.

The skills shown in table 4.8 and the levels of education they imply form a mixed assortment, and several of the qualifications bear no connection to the mission of a foreign ministry. Since Ottoman civil officialdom still made no distinction between clerical and professional employment[100] and had no firm educational requirements for recruitment,

[99] İnal, *Şairler*, 1142 (Hüseyin Nazım Paşa).

[100] At the eve of World War I, the British Foreign Office, too, still conservatively resisted such a differentiation of tasks, even though "intellectual" and "mechanical" functions had long since been separated in other departments: Steiner, *Foreign Office*, 14; Gladden, *History of Public Administration*, II, 312.

such a mix was perhaps inevitable. Further, since the government schools were still new, and the world of western learning still unfamiliar in many parts, it may have been inevitable that many newly acquired skills would be misapplied—by employment of engineers and physicians in the Foreign Ministry, for example.[101] Similar problems of manpower usage have been frequent in the Third World in the twentieth century.

What stands out most in the table, of course, is the infrequency with which Foreign Ministry officials could claim any of these qualifications. Whether performed in Ottoman Turkish or in French, the general duties of a clerk (*kitabet*) were indeed what most Foreign Ministry officials could perform. The few who had technical competencies of the sort measured here were most often among the modernist Muslims and the non-Muslims, especially the Greeks.

As concerns specific skills, we should note that the extension of telegraph lines into the empire at the time of the Crimean War, and their utility to the Hamidian police state, had made it a high priority to develop a pool of manpower skilled in their use.[102] Less information seems to be available about Ottoman stenography; but its usefulness is apparent from the fact that one of the stenographer officials served both on the staff of the first Ottoman Chamber of Deputies (*Meclis-i Meb'usan*), whose proceedings were recorded and preserved, and in the Foreign Ministry.[103]

Among skills that reflect a more professional level of qualification, the lack of interest in commerce is unfortunate, given the empire's economic situation and the important connections between commerce and diplomatic, or at least consular, service. In fact, most non-Muslims interested in commerce would not have gone into government service, and Muslim Ottomans were just beginning to take a larger interest in commerce about 1900.[104] The percentages shown for military science reflect the employment of army officers in militarily sensitive consular or diplomatic posts.[105] Not surprisingly, the field in which the greatest number of Foreign Ministry officials took an interest was law, whether European or Ottoman. Even in this field, however, the number of qualified individuals was relatively small.

[101] Mizancı Mehmed Murad, who grew up in the Russian Empire and who, as a graduate of the Sevastopol Gymnasium, had an exceptionally good western education for an Ottoman of his period, depicted Mansur Bey, the hero of *Turfanda mı yoksa Turfa mı*, as having received a medical education in France, but combined medical practice with service as a government translator in Istanbul: Mehmet Murat, *Mansur Bey*, 35ff., 79ff.; Finn, *Early Turkish Novel*, 51–52.

[102] Lewis, *Emergence*, 185–87; Ergin, *Maarif*, II, 517–23.

[103] Har., SA414 (Mehmed İhsan Bey). Ottoman scribes had long kept proceedings of meetings, including actual statements of participants. Such texts appear in the histories of Vasıf or Cevdet Paşa. Turks still say that one advantage of Arabic script lay in the skilled writer's ability to record an oral presentation as fast as it was delivered. Ottoman stenography is thus a subject about which it would be interesting to know more. For proceedings of the first Ottoman Chamber of Deputies, see Hakkı Tarık Us, ed., *Meclis-i Meb'usan, 1293:1877 Zabıt Ceridesi*, 2 vols., Istanbul, 1939–1945.

[104] On preferred careers of Muslims and non-Muslims, see Ergin, *Maarif*, III, 932–46. Indications of changing Muslim attitudes toward commerce appear in occasional articles in the *Journal de la Chambre de Commerce de Constantinople*. An 1894 article, "Elèves diplomés," cited "cet amour illimité pour les fonctions publiques" among Muslims (*JCCC*, X, no. 471, 6 January 1894, 1). Later, an article entitled "L'esprit d'initiative chez les jeunes musulmans," noted a "tendance de ne point dédaigner les affaires commerciales" (*JCCC*, XVII, no. 876, 19 October 1901). A subsequent article, "L'émulation musulmane," cited "la transformation radicale subie par l'âme, la mentalité, musulmanes durant ces dernières années" (*JCCC*, XXX, no. 1522, 7 March 1914, 145). See also Zafer Toprak, *Türkiye'de "Millî İktisat," 1908–1918*, Ankara, 1982.

[105] E.g., Har., SA457 (Aydınoğlu Ahmed Fevzî Paşa, military attaché in St. Petersburg, then ambassador at Cetinje, Montenegro, 1891–c. 1908), SA726 (Hüseyin Hüsnî Paşa, ambassador at Cetinje and St. Petersburg), SA34 (Danyal Saib Bey, consul at Kars, 1885–1895), SA723 (Sarayhzade Ahmed Tevfik Paşa, ambassador in Berlin, 1890s–c. 1908), SA35 (Nihad Paşa Bilinski, Ottoman commissioner in Bulgaria, 1879–1885); BBA, DSA I, 606 (Çapanzade Ahmed Şakir Paşa, ambassador in St. Petersburg, 1878–1889). Their educations and ranks identify these men as military.

Content of Education: Languages

If proficiency in French was not the only "modern" skill noted in the personnel records, French was also far from the only language mentioned there. The section of the questionnaire that dealt with education asked each respondent to name the languages he knew and tell whether he merely spoke the language, or was capable of writing in it for official purposes (*kitabet*). Self-ratings are bound to be unreliable in a matter where vanity and professional interest are at stake. Yet *kitabet* did imply a certain standard, and a claim to it could readily be tested on the job. If we assume that the extent of misrepresentation was more or less equal in the self-ratings of officials of different personnel categories, interesting evidence about levels and kinds of cultural achievement emerges from the total spectrum of evidence on language knowledge.

The evidence indicates, first, that two-thirds of all Foreign Ministry officials had some knowledge of three languages or more, including their native tongue. Among the major personnel groups, 53 percent of traditionalist Muslims and 57 percent of modernists knew three languages or more, while 51 percent of non-Muslims knew five languages or more. Considering that effective use of Ottoman required at least limited knowledge of Arabic and Persian, and that French was a professional necessity in many positions in this ministry, the Muslims' levels of language knowledge are not impressive, especially since the number of languages known declined fractionally from the older to the younger generation. Even the larger numbers of languages the non-Muslims knew diminish in significance when we note that one or more of them were apt to be "minority" languages, often of little professional use. The empire did struggle—too

Table 4.9.
CLAIMS TO PROFICIENCY IN LANGUAGES
(as percentages of numbers of officials shown in each column)

	ALL RESPONDENTS (1)	*MUSLIM I* (2)	*MUSLIM II* (3)	*NON-MUSLIM* (4)	*Greek* (5)	*Armenian* (6)	*Jewish* (7)	*Arab Xn.* (8)	*Europ. Origin* (9)
N	*366*	*115*	*144*	*107*	*30*	*52*	*12*	*7*	*6*
A. Turkish	93	99	99	78	77	85	92	57	17
Arabic	6	6	6	6	3	2	8	57	0
Persian	6	7	8	0	0	0	0	0	0
B. Modern Greek	10	1	2	31	93	4	8	0	33
Armenian	10	0	1	34	0	69	0	0	0
Spanish	2	0	0	7	0	4	42	0	0
Hebrew	1	0	0	3	0	0	25	0	0
C. French	68	0	100	96	97	98	83	100	100
Italian	10	0	4	30	40	25	8	29	67
English	8	1	6	19	27	15	8	14	33
German	6	0	1	17	27	12	17	0	33
Russian	2	1	1	5	3	6	8	0	0
D. Rumanian	1	1	0	3	3	2	8	0	0
Serbo-Croatian	1	0	0	3	0	4	8	0	0
Bulgarian	1	0	1	2	3	0	8	0	0
Albanian	0[a]	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

NOTE:
[a] Computed value less than 0.5 percent.

often fruitlessly—with projects such as publishing parallel editions of the *Düstur*, the official volumes of laws, in Greek, Armenian, and Bulgarian, or teaching every student of the School of Civil Administration Arabic, Armenian, Greek, or Bulgarian.[106] In general, however, such languages had greater application in local administration than in the Foreign Ministry—although the retraction of the frontiers had created places for consuls knowing Balkan languages.

Table 4.9 shows in exactly which languages Foreign Ministry officials claimed proficiency. Since most "minority" languages were highly specific to a particular community, this table once again includes columns for each subgroup.

The lettered "panels" divide the table horizontally into groups of languages with common traits. Panel A lists the "big three" languages of the *adab*-tradition. The first point worth note concerns proficiency in Turkish. Not surprisingly, nearly all Muslims claimed proficiency in that language. Among non-Muslims, in contrast, almost a quarter could not claim proficiency in Turkish; and strong generational differences appear.[107] In the older generation, 30 percent could not claim such proficiency; in the much smaller younger generation (see table 3.1), fewer than 10 percent could not. The older non-Muslims who lacked proficiency in Ottoman were mostly Arab Christians, Greeks, and men of European origin, the last two being the most senior of all personnel categories (see table 3.3). The intergenerational increase in the non-Muslims' Turkish proficiency reflects the way the Jews, the subgroup with the largest percentage of members claiming that qualification, succeeded the Arab Christians and men of European origin on the ministry's staff.

In the case of Arabic and Persian, even among traditionalist Muslims, strikingly few could claim proficiency in these "classical" languages of their culture. The only personnel category with even a bare majority that could claim proficiency was the Arab Christians, among whom we might have expected Arabic proficiency to be universal. Particularly since many of those who claimed Arabic or Persian proficiency came from places where those languages were in current use, or at least from border regions, or else had family connections with places where the languages might be known,[108] our figures indicate that the traditional ideal of the Ottoman efendi able to produce verses in each of the three classic Islamic languages (*elsine-i selâse*) was no longer widely realized, at least not among Foreign Ministry officials, if it ever had been.

For Muslims, the percentage with mastery in Arabic at least remained fairly stable over time at the levels shown in the table. But the percentage for Persian virtually collapsed. Among older traditionalist Muslims, 10 percent said they could use Persian for official purposes, against 4 percent in the younger generation. Among modernist Muslims, the percentages

[106] Ergin, *Maarif*, II, 534; Çankaya, *Mülkiye Târihi*, I, 249.

[107] Evidence of limited knowledge of Turkish appears in some non-Muslims' personnel files: SA725 (Pozik Yusuf Azarian, spelling and grammar errors), SA6 (Dakes Efendi, an Armenian: *ifade-i merama tahriran muktedir olabilirim*, "I can be able to express the meaning in writing"), SA36 (Yusuf Misakian, did not mention Turkish among languages he knew), SA128 (Moise Hanail, rated himself as limited in Turkish). Similar evidence from other sources includes Esat Cemal Pâker's account of the inadequate Turkish of Musurus Paşa, ambassador in London: *Kırk Yıllık Hariciye Hatıraları*, 21–22.

[108] Men claiming proficiency in Arabic and Persian: Har., SA592 (Mehmed Mihrî Bey, born at Kerkuk) and SA125 (Mehmed Emin Yümnî, from Süleymaniye, Mosul province), both "traditionalist" Muslims, and two "modernists": BBA, DSA III, 246 (Mehmed Tahır Münif Paşa, born at Ayntab, an important literary figure) and SA315 (Bedirhanpaşazade Abd ül-Rezzak Bey, born at Istanbul of Kurdish family). Men proficient in Arabic: Har., SA687 (Ahmed Ataullah, born at Capetown, father from Şehrizor, Iraq, a "traditionalist" in terms of language knowledge but "modern" as a missionary to South African Muslims), and three "modernists": SA729 (Ahmed Hamdî, born at Alexandria), SA731 (Fahr el-Din Nihad Bey, born at Tripoli in Syria) and SA641 (Şekib Bey, born at Homs). Men proficient in Persian: one "traditionalist," SA533 (Resul, born near the Iranian border at a village in Khâniqîn *kaza*, Baghdad province), and three "modernists": SA259 (Ahmed Ramiz, born at Erzurum), SA424 (Sadullah Paşa, also born at Erzurum, a highly educated literary figure), and SA168 (Ahmed Rıfkî, born at Istanbul to a Circassian father).

were 16 for the older generation and only 3 for the younger. Of course, the percentage who claimed a smattering of these two languages—"small Arabic and less Persian," to adapt Ben Jonson's famous description of Shakespeare's classical education—was larger. Among Muslims, about 55 percent of the older generation knew at least some Arabic, compared with 33 percent of the younger. For Persian, the figures are very similar, except that the dropoff in the younger generation is a bit greater, to slightly under 30 percent. Among those advancing such claims to limited knowledge, the percentages for traditionalist and modernist Muslims vary little, whichever the generation or language in question. Given that about two-thirds of the Muslims, if not more, had been through the Arabic-heavy *rüşdiye* curriculum, the figures tell a lot about what these men thought they had learned.

In sum, the evidence on proficiency in Islamic languages underscores how much the traditional literary culture—to the extent that it required mastery in all three languages—was an elite phenomenon even within the official class, or else by the late nineteenth century was in severe decline, even among Muslim traditionalists. The stability between generations in Arabic proficiency may have various explanations, including growth in the Arabs' relative importance among subject nationalities as the empire contracted. The dropoff among adepts in Persian must tell something about shifting cultural orientations. Considering how Ottomans learned Persian in many cases, this may signify a decline of interest in certain dervish orders. The personnel records contain no evidence on this point, but we shall return to it in the next chapter.

Panel B of table 4.9 presents the evidence on proficiency in "minority" languages, among which Arabic should be included in the case of the Arab Christians, as should French for the men of European origin. The most important conclusion that emerges from this part of the table concerns the generally inverse relationship between the non-Muslims' proficiency in Turkish, on one hand, and in their own distinctive language, on the other.

The data certainly hint at varying degrees of cultural affinity between the non-Muslim subgroups and the Turks. The governing factors in these variations, we sense, are the general cultural levels of the subgroups, and the extent of national self-consciousness among them. The Greeks were clearly highest in cultural consciousness and relatively low in proficiency in the official language. The Armenians had historically been lower in national self-consciousness and higher in assimilation of Turkish culture. But nationalism was at work among them, too, by the late nineteenth century; and the rate of proficiency in Armenian increased in these data from about 60 percent of the older generation to over 85 percent of the younger. Ottoman Jews, in contrast, were essentially devoid of separatist nationalist

feeling, and their educators were more committed than their Greek or Armenian counterparts to education in Turkish, as we have noted. Other factors lowering proficiency in "minority" languages among Jews are the fact that the records mention two such languages—Spanish (Ladino) and Hebrew—and the growing preference in the nineteenth-century Istanbul Jewish community for French over Ladino as a language for everyday use.[109]

A final point about minority languages concerns their diffusion outside the subgroup to which they belong. Greek proves to be the only such language known with any frequency by members of other personnel categories. Otherwise, except for Arabic, which was no mere "minority" language from the Muslim viewpoint, these languages remained essentially unknown outside the communities of which they were distinctive. A survey of "minority" language data of later date, for example among *Mülkiye* graduates of the Young Turk period, would turn up a somewhat different list of languages, including more knowledge of languages like Arabic and Albanian among Muslims. But despite the *Mülkiye*'s contribution to promoting both high standards in Turkish and knowledge of minority languages among officials, the main points of this discussion—the inverse relationship between each nationality's cultural self-consciousness and its linguistic affinity with the Turks, and the limited knowledge of most "minority" languages outside the minority in question—would surely have remained just as true.

Panel C of table 4.9 concerns knowledge of the languages presumably most important for the Foreign Ministry, those of Europe. French was the most widely known by a very great margin. The fact that proficiency in French was nearly universal among non-Muslims, especially in subgroups where proficiency in Turkish was less common, suggests that the egalitarian reforms of the *Tanzimat* had not so much eliminated, as "modernized," the old cultural marginality that had long made a few western-educated Greeks useful as translators. It was still a peculiar skill, not universally found among Muslim officials, that seemed to assure non-Muslims their place in the ministry, egalitarianism notwithstanding.

French, of course, was not the only western language that Foreign Ministry officials knew. The others were far less widely known; but here, too, the non-Muslims led the pack. Italian, eclipsed by French as a major lingua franca of the eastern Mediterranean only in the early nineteenth century, was still the most widely known after French, especially among older officials. English, German, and Russian were less widely known; claims to proficiency in English and Russian did at least increase slightly in the

[109] Ergin, *Maarif*, II, 637, 663–64, partly following works of Avram Galanti. Ladino is the Spanish dialect that Jews brought to the Ottoman Empire from Spain at the end of the fifteenth century.

younger generation. Considering the importance to the empire of relations with the great powers whose languages these were, these hardly seem like impressive indicators of linguistic skill.

Panel D of table 4.9, finally, documents proficiency in Balkan languages. Most of them could have been included among "minority" languages, if members of the appropriate communities were unequivocally identifiable from the records—as would probably have been the case at a later date. As it was, Foreign Ministry officials sometimes served as provincial foreign affairs directors or translators in provinces where these languages were spoken.[110] And some such territories had gained independence, a fact that made these languages important for diplomatic and consular functions. That being the case, it is difficult to believe that the need for men speaking Balkan languages did not exceed the supply. Here, again, the non-Muslims display the greatest skills. In eastern Anatolia and the Caucasus, we may note, there were other regional languages, but the recorded levels of proficiency are too low to figure in the table.[111]

OVERVIEW: FROM ACCULTURATION TO CULTURE-CREATION

Integrating the evidence on language knowledge with other evidence on education leads to general conclusions about the impact of educational reform on civil officials. Obviously, whether "traditionalists" or "modernists," most officials had a mixed education. Given the hard choices that cultural dualism created and the inefficiency of even the new schools, as seen in memoirists' criticisms of the *rüşdiye*s, it is not surprising that most officials lacked impressive educational records. For example, the officials were bad about acquiring specialized skills going beyond the level of literacy required to conduct official business in Turkish or French. Even more significant was their poor record in completing the schools they attended.

Amid the generally low achievement levels, the non-Muslims' situation stands out as exceptional. A variety of indicators, such as number of languages known or frequency of university study, show that the non-Muslims were mostly better educated than their Muslim colleagues, even though more than a fifth of the non-Muslims still could not claim proficiency in Ottoman, the primary language of administration. These facts raise questions as to whether the non-Muslims still owed their position in

[110] Cf. Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform*, 189, 262–63, 323.

[111] Har., SA125 (Mehmed Emin Yümnî, limited knowledge of Kurdish); Har., SA696 (Mustafa, spoke Georgian); two Circassian speakers: SA73 (İsmail Hakkî Bey) and SA420 (Mehmed Nurî Bey). The first two were traditionalist Muslims; the Circassian-speakers, both modernists.

the ministry to its special need for their skills, more than to egalitarian principles. The fact that non-Muslims served far less often in other agencies implicitly suggests this was the case.

Since the non-Muslims' administrative prominence proved a localized and temporary phenomenon, what is more widely significant in the long run is the evidence of general improvement in educational achievement. While most traditionalist Muslims had no formal education past the *rüşdiye*, most modernist Muslims and non-Muslims had at least some study at lycée level, and the percentages who did so increased sharply from older to younger generation. Few yet had university education, but factors such as the evolution of the School of Civil Administration toward university level and the founding of the Istanbul *Dar ül-fünun* (1900) pointed to the day when it would be common to do so.

These improvements again illustrate the dominant paradox of Ottoman educational reform: that marked growth and improvement occurred, but between tragically low starting and ending levels. The historical cultural elitism of the ruling class had, of course, been a prime factor in creating this paradox. This elitism had long found expression not only in the officials' education, but even more in their later cultural creativity. To complete the survey of intellectual life, the next chapter takes up this topic and examines the officials' intellectual orientations.

C H A P T E R V

Intellectual Orientations

In introducing cultural dualism in chapter 1, we showed how it signified on one level the introduction of western ideas, and on a deeper level a phase of imbalance among the four major "strands"—the religious studies, mysticism, the philosophical-scientific tradition, and the worldly literary culture—woven together over the centuries to make up the Islamic learned culture. The imbalance arose from the fact that while the other domains of the learned culture were in disarray, the literary, or *adab*, tradition essentially extended the scope of its worldliness to the West, as its chief exponents, the scribal officials and their civil official successors, became a vanguard of political and intellectual innovation. This change produced far-flung, often painful, consequences. Indeed, a sense of cultural conflict pervaded all phases of intellectual life, helping create a melancholy that few could ignore as the twilight of empire deepened. As Sadullah Paşa, an ambassador and man of broad learning, stated in a poem on "The Nineteenth Century": "The old knowledge has collapsed, perhaps from its very foundations. . . . / Nothing is left of the fame of Turk or Arab, of Egypt or Herat. . . ."[1]

The cultural changes occurring in the *adab* domain were not the only ones, but they became driving forces in a series of developments felt far beyond the confines of the literary-official intelligentsia. As already noted, the literate percentage of the population multiplied impressively during the nineteenth century, even if it remained a small minority. A communications revolution began,[2] as printing became established, as the reformers realized they would have to use the official language more simply in order to project their plans throughout society,[3] and as the new interest in the West opened an era of translation and popularization. New media and literary genres competed for popular attention. Demands for simplification of Ottoman Turkish arose in official and literary circles.[4] The administrative and intellectual elites began to differentiate, far more than in the past, as the rise of journalism and a publishing industry made possible literary careers independent of imperial patronage or official appointment.[5] This differentiation contributed to the heating up of political controversy by making intellectuals bolder as policy critics. With that, the old personalization of patrimonial factionalism began to give way to a new kind of politics that focused on the many controversial issues created by reform and sought to advance coherent political ideologies.[6]

To cite only a few landmarks in these complex developments, although the history of Ottoman printing only became continuous from 1783 on, the first official newspaper was founded in 1831 and the first private Ottoman-language newspaper owned by an Ottoman subject, the *Tercüman-ı Ahval*, in 1860. The translation movement, at first limited to works of technical, especially military, interest, began to spill over into other realms with Mehmed Tahir Münif Paşa's translation of several works of the philosophes, published in 1859. İbrahim Şinasî published the first western-style Turkish play in 1860. The first man of the people—in terms of both social origins and outlook—to take a place in the literary movement of westernizaton and popularization was Ahmed Midhat (1844–1912), a "forty horsepower writing machine" who wrote, translated, or adapted some 150 volumes aimed at a popular audience, for whom these works amounted to a first taste of western culture.[7] Of comparable importance in opening a new world of ideas was the work, as writer and publisher, of Ebu 'l-Ziya Tevfik (1848–1913), whose magazine, *Mecmua-ı Ebu 'l-Ziya*, and whose series of popularly priced editions, the *Kitabhane-i Ebu 'l-Ziya*, helped acquaint Ottoman readers with everything from the aphorisms of Ben Franklin to optics, along with the works of the most popular Ottoman authors, all rendered in elegant typography that set a new standard.[8]

Already before Ebu 'l-Ziya and Ahmed Midhat hit full stride, the first

[1] "Yıkıldı belki esasından eski malûmat. . . . / Ne kaldı şöhret-i Rum-ü-Arab, ne Mısr-ü-Herat. . . ." See İnal, *Şairler*, 1547–48; Kenan Akyüz, *Batı Te'sirinde Türk Şiiri Antolojisi*, Ankara, 1970, 78–79; these two lines are separated in the original and do not form a couplet there; cf. Har., SA424 (Sadullah Rami Paşa).

[2] Şerif Mardin, "Some Notes on an Early Phase in the Modernization of Communications in Turkey," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, III (1961), 250–71.

[3] The legal texts in *Düstur*[1] contain some of the simplest examples of nineteenth-century Ottoman and compare favorably in that regard with most twentieth-century Turkish texts.

[4] Berkes, *Secularism*, 313–22; David Kushner, *The Rise of Turkish Nationalism, 1876–1908*, London, 1977, passim.

[5] İnal, *Şairler*, 1018–19; Mardin, *Genesis*, 124–27, 258–59; id., *Jön Türkler*, 94.

[6] See Findley, "Advent of Ideology," and sources cited there.

[7] Sabri Esat Siyavuşgil, art. "Ahmed Midhat Efendi," *İA*, I, 186; no source cited for the quotation about "forty horsepower"; Berkes, *Secularism*, 281–85, one of the best evocations of A.M.; Ahmed Hamdi Tanpınar, *XIX. Asır Türk Edebiyatı Tarihi*, 433–66.

[8] Fevziye Abdullah [Tansel], art. "Ebüzziya Tevfik," *İA*, IV, 100–103.

Ottoman ideological movement—the Young Ottomans—had emerged. Its leaders not only produced literary works whose popularity frightened the authorities, but—preferring exile to conformity, at least for a time—defied would-be patrons' blandishments in a novel way by continuing to publish their ideas. Their thought helped foster the first Ottoman constitutional movement. Abd ül-Hamid managed to suppress them almost as fast as it; yet his success proved temporary. When the opposition came back to life, from 1889 on, it acquired the broader base and stronger organization that produced the Young Turk revolution.[9]

Literature had never been the sole mode of expression for officials of intellectual or artistic bent. A comprehensive survey would have to discuss other artistic endeavors such as calligraphy, music, or even painting. Such a survey would also have to pay special attention—as we shall do in this chapter—to mysticism, since the mystical orders remained, for all but the most secularized, a major forum for intellectual as well as spiritual expression. But literature held pride of place. In chapter 1 we noted how the close identification between "officials" and "littérateurs" makes İnal's biographies of the late Ottoman "poets" a premier source on civil officialdom. It is not difficult to find other evidence to reinforce this point.

For example, among 5,993 graduates of the School of Civil Administration for the period 1860–1967, 266 are identifiable as artists in one sense or another. Of these, the overwhelming majority of 231 were writers of poetry or prose fiction. If we broaden the definition of "literature" to include writing for publication on any subject, then for the same long period, the number of "writers" more than doubles, to 499, or 8 percent of the 5,993 graduates, with the most common fields of publication being prose fiction by a wide lead, followed by poetry, history, and law. Through the end of the empire, the proportion of each class with publications to its credit sometimes reached 25 percent. In the republican period, the proportion of publishing graduates fell lower, predictably so, if we assume a continuation of nineteenth-century trends toward differentiation of bureaucratic and literary roles.[10]

In the Foreign Ministry personnel records, the evidence on authorship does not cover such large numbers of individuals or years, but is both quantitatively and qualitatively impressive. Out of 366 officials under study, 14 percent (53 men) claimed at least one publication, with the proportions of publishing authors in the three main personnel groups ranging from 7 percent of the traditionalist Muslims, to 13 percent of the non-Muslims, to 21 percent of the modernist Muslims. Partly because one of

[9] Şerif Mardin, *Genesis*; id., *Jön Türkler*; Findley, "Advent of Ideology," Part II, 147–66; M. Şükrü Hanioğlu, *Bir Siyasal Örgüt Olarak 'Osmanlı İttihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti' ve 'Jön Türklük,'* I: *(1889–1902)*, Istanbul, 1987 (?).

[10] Çankaya, *Mülkiye Târihi*, II, 1239–98; VIII, 266–74.

its earliest-founded organizational components was the Translation Office of the Sublime Porte (*Bab-ı Âli Tercüme Odası*, 1821), where many of the best-known statesmen and littérateurs of mid-century learned their French,[11] the Foreign Ministry was also more closely identified than any other government agency with the cutting edge of literary innovation. The officials associated with the ministry whose records are analyzed in our tables include Mehmed Tahir Münif Paşa, who produced the first Ottoman translations from the *philosophes*, as we have noted.[12] They include two charter members of the Young Ottoman movement, Çapanzade Yusuf Agâh,[13] who was also cofounder with İbrahim Şinasî of the newspaper *Tercüman-ı Ahval*, and Namık Kemal (1840–1888)—probably the most influential Ottoman literary figure of the century.[14] Both of these, like essentially all the leading figures of the Young Ottoman movement—and for that matter the *Tanzimat* statesmen whom they opposed—had served in the Translation Office.[15] The records also include lesser literary figures—Sadullah Paşa (1838–1891),[16] whose poem we have quoted, and Samipaşazade Sezaî Bey, a younger associate of the Young Ottomans who formed a link between them and the Young Turks.[17] Our records also include Abd ül-Halik Nasuhî Bey,[18] eccentric poetasting brother of probably the greatest late nineteenth-century Ottoman poet, Abd ül-Hak Hâmid, who from his diplomatic exile in Europe never complied with demands to return his personnel questionnaire.[19] This is to say nothing of other literary figures who were associated with the ministry and also, for whatever reason, did not make it into the records.[20]

[11] Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform*, 132–35, 186, 211, 216, 257.

[12] BBA, DSA III, 246 (Seyyid Mehmed Tahir Münif Paşa).

[13] BBA, DSA I, 196 (Yusuf Agâh); Mardin, *Genesis*, 10 n. 1, 44, 50, 54, 77, 78, 254, 259, 263.

[14] BBA, DSA I, 210 (Mehmed Namık Kemal Bey); cf. Mardin, *Genesis*, 283–336; Mithat Cemal Kuntay, *Namık Kemal, Devrinin İnsanları ve Olayları Arasında*, 2 vols. in 3, Istanbul, 1944–1957; Akyüz, *Antoloji*, 52–76.

[15] Mardin, *Genesis*, 10.

[16] Har., SA424 (Sadullah Rami Paşa); cf. İnal, *Şairler*, 1542–48.

[17] Har., SA49 (Samipaşazade Mehmed Sezaî Bey); Şerif Mardin, "Libertarian Movements in the Ottoman Empire, 1878–1895," *Middle East Journal*, XIV (1962), 170; id., *Jön Türkler*, 188ff.; Evin, *Origins*, 144–58.

[18] Har., SA714 (Abd ül-Halik Nasuhî Bey); cf. İnal, *Şairler*, 1099–1103.

[19] İnal, *Şairler*, 561–70; Tanpınar, *XIX. Asır Türk Edebiyatı Tarihi*, 496–595; Akyüz, *Antoloji*, 119–78. Cf. Har., İdare 663, "Etats de service des fonctionnaires ottomans," letter of 25 June 1887 from Ambassador Rüstem Paşa in London to Foreign Minister Said Paşa: Hâmid Bey, asked to fill out his questionnaire, responds that he does not have the papers he would need to prompt his memory and requests that the matter be postponed until he can return on leave to Istanbul.

[20] This category includes some non-Muslim officials, whose literary activity was in languages other than Turkish, including western languages. E.g., Paskal Uncian, educated at the "Istituto Moorat-Raphaël" in Venice, an Armenian school, entered the *Concours poétique du Midi de la France* at Agen in 1892 and was awarded a certificate admitting him as *membre d'honneur* (copy attached to petition for employment in the Foreign Press Office, Har., TKE

While Ottoman civil officials' intellectual and artistic interests found expression primarily in writing, then, those interests varied widely, in ways that tell much about the cultural climate of the times. Out of the broad range of responses to cultural dualism, we may select three as points by which to characterize the continuum. On one hand, even Foreign Ministry officials counted cultural conservatives among their number. Some of these remained so wrapped up in traditional thought forms as scarcely to perceive the tensions between westernizers and traditionalists—except in terms of related conflicts among traditionalists. At the other extreme, we find westernizers. Most of them were still people of mixed culture; and many approved only selective adaptation of western ideas and institutions, although there was a definite shift of emphasis—measurable in the decline over time in the Islamic content of the Young Ottoman and Young Turk ideologies—from the Islamic toward the western. Lost between the two poles of Islamicism and westernism, finally, were those who could not or would not choose—the casualties of cultural change.[21]

The remainder of this chapter will examine representatives of these three cultural orientations. Since a full cultural history of the period would go far beyond anything that can be attempted here, and since most civil officials were spearbearers in the drama of cultural change rather than heroes like Namık Kemal, we shall deliberately not look at men who stand out more as intellectuals than officials. For an Islamic traditionalist, we shall again turn to Aşçı Dede İbrahim (1828–c. 1910). For a man lost between cultures, we shall consider the one literary work, out of many, that perhaps best evokes the type: Abdülhak Şinasi Hisar's *Ali Nizamî Beyin Alafrangalığı ve Şeyhliği.*[22] The title, sharply focused in Turkish but difficult to translate smoothly, means "Ali Nizamî Bey's Europeanism and his (Dervish) Shaykhhood." Finally, while it is impossible to pick any one as epitomizing westernist creativity, we shall examine the career of İbrahim Hakkî Paşa (1862–1918), graduate of the School of Civil Administration, Foreign Ministry official, grand vezir, and pioneer of the Turkish legal profession.

1400, petition of 8 September 1308/1892). Another example found among the manuscripts sold by the great Istanbul book dealer, Raif Yelkenci, in 1971: Krikor Efendi, "Sarf ve Nahv-i Fransevi," vol. I, Istanbul, 1275, calligraphic ms. of a French grammar; Krikor identified himself on the title page as an official of the Translation Office of the Sublime Porte and translator in one of the offices at the Ministry of War (the book was published in 1275/1879; Fehmi Edhem Karatay, *İstanbul Üniversitesi Kütüphanesi Türkçe Basmalar Alfabe Kataloğu*, Istanbul, 1956, I, 437).

[21] Findley, "Advent of Ideology," Part II, 149–51, 160–62. On the various schools of thought, c. 1908, see Berkes, *Secularism*, passim; Tarık Z. Tunaya, *İslâmcılık Cereyanı: İkinci Meşrutiyetin Siyasî Hayatı Boyunca Gelişmesi ve Bugüne Bıraktığı Meseleler*, Istanbul, 1962.

[22] Published Istanbul, 1952. Ottomans dichotomized things as *alafranga* (from Italian *à la franca*) or *alaturka*; use of *frank* as a label for all Europeans goes back to the Crusades.

INTO THE "TANGLED MAGIC GARDEN" WITH AŞÇI DEDE İBRAHİM HALİL

Aşçı Dede İbrahim Halil's thought world is extremely remote from that of westernized ambassadors or *Mülkiye* graduates. For at heart, more than an official, he was a dervish, affiliated at different times with several different orders. Given his naïveté and the particular formulation of the mystical tradition that he represented, his world is even remote from that of the best-known Islamic revivalists of the era, such as Jamâl al-Dîn al-Afghânî (c. 1838–1897) or—closer to home—Mehmed Âkif Ersoy (1870–1936).[23] Yet Aşçı Dede's private world was that of many conservative Muslims, including many civil officials, and rewards examination in a number of respects.[24]

Superficially, Aşçı Dede appears to prove that a pious Muslim could live through the nineteenth century almost untroubled by the westernist-Islamicist culture clash that looms so large in the writings of intellectuals. Far more than we can recount here, he conveys vast amounts of information about the social life of the dervish orders.[25] As he does so, he gives the impression that for him, the orders simply continued to be the focal point of spiritual and intellectual life that they had been for countless Ottomans of the past. Yet, almost in spite of himself, Aşçı Dede does provide insights into tensions among mystics, and between them and other Muslim activists. Recent scholars have tended to discuss the tensions among mystics in terms of a polarization between orders that were strict about observance of the sharia and others that were lax about it. To judge from Aşçı Dede's account, this distinction is clearer in the abstract than in the existential realities of the nineteenth century. Some signs of such a polarization do appear in his memoirs, however. In fact, to the extent that he was concerned about any cultural conflict, it was this one, rather than that of westernists and Islamicists.[26]

[23] Nikki R. Keddie, *Sayyid Jamâl ad-Dîn "al-Afghânî": A Political Biography*, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1972; Fevziye Abdullah Tansel, *Mehmed Âkif*, Istanbul, 1945; Berkes, *Secularism*, 342–43, 488–89.

[24] Aşçı Dede İbrahim, *Risale*, Mss. TY3222 (autograph), TY78, TY79, TY80 (copy and continuation).

[25] Findley, "Social Dimensions of the Dervish Life," 129–44.

[26] The two problems are related, of course, in that the impact of the West had played a key part in prompting sharia-minded activists, by the eighteenth century, to take stock of the laxity of their brethren and argue that Muslims must get their house in order, if they were to defend themselves against the infidel. See Wilfred Cantwell Smith, *Islam in Modern History*, New York, 1957, chap. 2; Albert Hourani, "The Changing Face of the Fertile Crescent in the XVIIIth Century," *Studia Islamica*, VIII (1957), 106–10; Fazlur Rahman, *Islam*, New York,

Aşçı Dede was not a man of outstanding education or intellect—a fact that combines paradoxically with his verbal facility to make of his memoirs an intriguingly unself-conscious portrait of Ottoman life. In chapter 4, we saw him as a boy studying at one of the first of the secular government schools. The examination he took upon completing this school in 1846 qualified him for appointment to one of the government agencies, and he chose the Ministry of War. Apprenticed in one of the offices there, he was seated, not on one of the low cushions like the other apprentices, but—in tribute to his education—on one of the high cushions with the regular clerks (cf. frontispiece).[27]

Young İbrahim's school days were over, but his education was not. Although he does not say much about it, as an apprentice, he obviously learned the skills of a bookkeeper, the function he performed throughout his official life. He also continued his education by attending the lectures that a well-known religious scholar, Kara Halil Efendi, gave on the *İzhar*—a work familiar from the discussion of the *rüşdiye* curriculum in chapter 4—at the Bayezid Mosque. He continued in this way for several years, and his studies helped to assure him rapid progress in his office.[28] Later, after his career had taken him away from Istanbul, he recorded further periods of study. From 1866 to about 1868, he studied subjects from the *medrese* curriculum—logic, jurisprudence—with one of the Nakşbendî dervishes in Erzincan, receiving from him a diploma.[29] Subsequently, in Damascus, he spent two years studying works on mysticism under Shaykh Muḥammad Khânî, including the *Mawâqif* of the Maghrebî Seyyid ʿAbd al-Qâdir and the *Fuṣûṣ al-Ḥikam* of Ibn ʿArabî. For a

1966, 181–202, 237–40, 253–60; Annemarie Schimmel, *Mystical Dimensions of Islam*, Chapel Hill, 1975, 228–86, 363–83, and works of Hamid Algar on the Nakşbendiye, cited below. Hourani's formulation (op. cit., 106–107) of the tension among sufis is elegant and classic:

> For Islamic mysticism admitted of two different developments: that which, while accepting the formulations of the theologians and the importance of obedience to the Law, emphasized the importance of meditating on the Qoran, and of inner purity, as alone giving value to external obedience; and that which elaborated a theology of its own to explain and justify its spiritual practices, and one which, if pushed to its conclusion, was incompatible not only with the orthodox theology but with the first affirmations of Islam. To think of finite beings as emanations of the one Being is not the same as to think of them as creatures of a God infinitely above them; to lay stress on the solitary path of the soul towards direct knowledge of God may obscure, if it does not undermine, the importance of the Law and obedience to it.

[27] Aşçı Dede İbrahim, *Risale*, TY3222, 40a; TY78, 186.

[28] Ibid., TY3222, 40b; TY78, 187.

[29] Ibid., TY3222, 163a–b, 186a–187a; TY78, 528–29, 570–73. Aşçı Dede refers to the diploma, which he received from Haccî Sıddik Hoca, as an *izinname*. The key term in its text is *ajâza*: *fa-ajaztu iyyâhu jamîʿa majâzâtî uṣûlan wa-furûʿan ʿaḳlîyatan wa-naḳlîyatan siyyamâ aḥâdîth Nabînâ . . . ḥasabamâ ajâzanî akmalu 'l-kâmilîn . . . al-sayyid Muṣṭafâ Fahmî . . .*, followed by Şeyh Fehmî's initiatic chain, going back through Alî ibn Abî Ṭâlib to the Prophet Muḥammad.

man of Aşçı Dede's interests, this must have been a profoundly rewarding experience.[30] Copious quotations suggest that he studied the *Mesnevî* of Celâl el-Din Rumî throughout his life.

Aşçı Dede's studies reflect his life as a mystic. Much of the interest of his memoirs comes from the fact that his career took him to different places, where he found himself drawn to different mystical orders. Neither an intellectual nor a spiritual master—he himself records how his contemporaries rudely reminded him of these facts, although he also treasured every shred of evidence to the contrary[31]—he was able over the years to combine in his mystical life a variety of interests and attachments that a more self-conscious mystic might have found incompatible. His memoirs thus present a naive disciple's view of the broad world of late Ottoman mysticism, a panorama in which the incompatibilities appear at key points as existential problems that he could live with or even transcend through enthusiastic commitment—even when others held them up to him as irreconcilables.

Aşçı Dede's interest in mysticism began during childhood, when he and his mother lived with his uncle, Beşir Ağa, a dervish who eventually gave up everything for mysticism and disappeared. In those days, the boy played dervish and visited a nearby meeting hall (*tekke*) of the Rifaî or-

[30] Ibid., TY3222, 215a; TY78, 625. Ibn ʿArabî (1165–1240) was one of the most influential figures in the history of sufism; see, e.g., Schimmel, *Mystical Dimensions*, 263–74; Henry Corbin, *Creative Imagination in the Ṣûfism of Ibn ʿArâbî*, trans. Ralph Manheim, Princeton, 1969. ʿAbd al-Qâdir (1807–1883), better known in the West for his resistance to the French in Algeria, was a major exponent and exemplar of the Ibn ʿArabî legacy; al-Sayyid al-Amîr ʿAbd al-Qâdir al-Jazâ'irî, *Kitâb al-Mawâqif fî 'l-Taṣawwuf wa'l-Waʿẓ wa'l-Irshâd*, 3 vols., 2d ed., Damascus, 1966–1967; Emir Abd El-Kader, *Ecrits spirituels*, trans. Michel Chodkiewicz, Paris, 1982; Émir Abd al-Qâdir l'Algérien, *Poèmes métaphysiques*, trans. Charles-André Gilis, Paris, 1983; James Winston Morris, "Ibn ʿArabi and His Interpreters, Part II (Conclusion): Influences and Interpretations," *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, CVII (1987), 115–19; Ph. de Cossé-Brissac, art. "ʿAbd al-Ḳādir," *EI*², I, 67–68. ʿAbd al-Qâdir had been initiated into the Nakşbendiye-Halidiye by Şeyh Halid himself; see Albert Hourani, "Shaykh Khalid and the Naqshbandi Order," in *Islamic Philosophy and the Classical Tradition*, ed. S. M. Stern, Albert Hourani, and Vivian Brown, Columbia, S.C., 1972, 100. A.D.'s teacher, Muḥammad Khânî, was a prominent Nakşbendî, whose biography appears in a book by his son, ʿAbd al-Majîd al-Khânî, *Al-Ḥadâ'iq al-Wardiyyah fî Ḥaqâ'iq Ajillâ' al-Naqshbandiyyah*, Cairo, 1308/1890–1891, 276f.; my thanks to Albert Hourani for this reference.

[31] A.D. dreamt that God had appointed him a *halife* (a term that dervishes use for a *şeyh*'s deputy and potential successor) of the Halidiye (Aşçı Dede İbrahim, *Risale*, TY3222, 124b; TY78, 454); he wrote several works in addition to his memoirs (TY3222, 262a–63b; TY79, 57–60); he believed that the saints (*erenler*) appointed a spiritual deputy (*halife*) in his place when he left Damascus (TY3222, 315b; TY79, 261); and he let other people read his manuscript memoirs, believing they would get blessings (*bereket*) from them (TY3222, 288a, 327b; TY79, 287; TY80, 290–91). On the other hand, he was advised that if his books were printed, no one would read them (TY3222, 268a). He had the experience of being addressed by a *şeyh* in ways that showed the latter did not regard him as an advanced sufi (TY3222, 250a; TY79, 36). And once asked by a young man for instruction, A.D. had to tell him that he had not attained the grade of a spiritual master (*mürşid*; TY3222, 327a).

der.[32] His formal affiliation with the dervish orders began in the early part of his career, when—after a period of attachment to different *şeyh*s—he decided to become a Mevlevî. Orienting his life in a lasting way, or perhaps merely providing an outlet for an orientation that was there anyway, this decision exposed him to the poetry of Mevlâna Celâl el-Din Rumî (d. 1273), about whose writings and mystical practice the order, with its stately ceremony of music and dance, had grown up.[33] Aşçı Dede's discovery of the not dissimilar thought-world of Ibn ʿArabî (d. 1240) may have occurred in the same context. Even before he joined the Mevleviye, Aşçı Dede's mother, fearing that he might give up his career as Beşir Ağa had, decided to marry him off. Still, it was not long after his joining the Mevleviye that he secured his wife's and mother's consent to spend only two nights a week at home, and the other five at the Mevlevî meeting hall. With characteristic reasoning, he explained to his *şeyh* that this was one night for his mother, one for his wife, one for Mevlâna Celâl el-Din, and one for each of the four rightly guided caliphs (*çar yar-ı güzin*).[34]

Within a few years, Aşçı Dede found himself transferred to Erzincan in eastern Anatolia. Having found the order with which he ultimately most identified in the Mevleviye, he now found his spiritual master in a different quarter, in Şeyh Mustafa Fehmî of the Halidî branch of the Nakşbendî order. Aşçı Dede regarded Şeyh Fehmî (d. 1880), who appears in fact to have been a man of great spiritual and even political influence, as the true successor of the Prophet and as head of the sufi hierarchy of the time.[35] Soon becoming the şeyh's secretary, our memoirist in 1867 also acquired the title *aşçı dede*, which identified him essentially as manager of the Halidî meeting hall in Erzincan.[36]

Thereafter, Aşçı Dede struggled to adapt his personal predilections, which were much more attuned to the Mevleviye, to the more strictly *sharʿî* demands of the Nakşbendîs. But his interest in sufism remained essentially all-embracing. During a stint of service in Erzurum, he affiliated with the Kadirî order.[37] During his years in Damascus, starting in 1872, he says—expressing the breadth of his sufi interests in terms of the opposition between esoteric (*bâtinî*) and exoteric (*zâhirî*) conceptions of religious truth—that he was *bâtinî* with the *bâtinî*s and *zâhirî* with the *zâhirî*s.[38] In Istanbul again for a time in 1894, he sought out all the popular dervish *şeyh*s he could find and thought he had again found in one of them—an illiterate known as *Bizim Köylü Baba* (Our Villager Father, the Father from Our Village)—the spiritual "pole" (*kutb*) of the age.[39] In Edirne, his last post, Aşçı Dede returned to the Mevlevî order in 1898 and remained with it. On the title page of his memoirs, he referred to himself in terms of his life's two great spiritual attachments as a Nakşî-Mevlevî.

The history of sufism is full of people who were initiated into more than one order, and a considerable amount of syncretism appears in the practices and beliefs of the orders. Aşçı Dede's dual affiliation was not unique. In chapter 2, for example, in discussing the Âkif-Pertev rivalry of 1837, we saw that Pertev's spiritual mentor, Şeyh Ali Behcet Efendi, was affiliated with both the Nakşbendî and Mevlevî orders. Yet in a sense, this particular combination represented an attempt to reconcile what recent scholars have seen as irreconcilables, a fact that Aşçı Dede himself had to face up to on occasion. The Nakşbendiye are renowned as an order committed to combining sufism with strict observance of the sharia; and the Halidiye, which Şeyh Fehmî represented, was a revivalist branch of the Nakşbendiye.[40] This was an approach to mysticism that sought in principle to keep the search for *irfan* within the bounds drawn by *ilm*. In contrast, while Celâl el-Din Rumî had opposed dervishes of his day who neglected the sharia, the Mevleviye represented a tradition of mysticism for which *irfan* tended to become more important than *ilm*, that is, the search for mystical union with God would come to seem more important than observance of the forms of religious law. The devotional use of music and dance in the *sema*, the Mevlevîs' central rite, was but one feature of the order that strictly sharia-oriented Muslims were wont to disapprove. Another was the concept that the mystic, as he attempted to grow in love of God to the point of achieving a sense of union with Him, could begin with love of an earthly object in whom something of the divine was present. This concept of love—exemplified in the mystical attachment of Celâl el-

[32] Ibid., TY3222 13b–14b; TY78, 85–87. On the Rifaiye, see Schimmel, *Mystical Dimensions*, 248–49.

[33] Schimmel, *Mystical Dimensions*, 309–28; Abdülbâki Gölpınarlı, *Mevlâna'dan Sonra Mevlevîlik*, 2d ed., Istanbul, 1983.

[34] Aşçı Dede İbrahim, *Risale*, TY3222, 59b–60a.

[35] Ibid., TY3222, 80a–80b; Bremer, *Die Memoiren*, 40–41, 43–44, 55–60, 73, 76; Findley, "Social Dimensions of the Dervish Life," 132. A.D. referred to the şeyh as *sultan-ı ulema bi'llâh* (roughly, spiritual caliph of the Prophet), *ğaus* (help), *kutb* (pole), or *insan-ı kâmil* (perfect man); on such terms, see Schimmel, *Mystical Dimensions*, 200, 224, 272–74, 280–82. The şeyh did not reject these appellations. At least once, Şeyh Fehmî was invited to Istanbul and shown favor by Abd ül-Hamid (TY3222, 219a); the şeyh's death in 1880 makes it impossible to know how much recognition he might have acquired among the religious dignitaries of the Hamidian era had he lived longer.

[36] Aşçı Dede İbrahim, *Risale*, TY3222, 170b; TY78, 542; Findley, "Social Dimensions of the Dervish Life," 143.

[37] Ibid., TY3222, 128a ff.; his account implies the Nakşbendîs had a spiritual "monopoly" in Erzincan; the Kadirîs, in Erzurum. On the Kadiriye, Fazlur Rahman, *Islam*, 193–94; Schimmel, *Mystical Dimensions*, 247–48.

[38] Aşçı Dede İbrahim, *Risale*, TY3222, 197b; TY78, 593–94.

[39] Ibid., TY79, 425ff., described as illiterate (*ümmî*) on 430.

[40] Hamid Algar, "The Naqshbandî Order: A Preliminary Survey of its History and Significance," *Studia Islamica* XLIV (1976), 123, 125, 140, 150; id., "Some Notes on the Naqshbandî Ṭarîqat in Bosnia," *Die Welt des Islams*, XIII (1971), 168–203; Albert Hourani, "Shaikh Khalid and the Naqshbandi Order," 91, 92, 100–101.

Din Rumî to Şems el-Din Tebrizî, to cite one celebrated example—represented the absorption into the "lax" side of the sufi tradition of the platonic love philosophy.[41] But there was even more to the opposition of outlooks than this. For in contrast to the austere monotheism of Qur'ân and *sunna*, popular sufism had developed a mentality characterized by exaggerated emphasis on the esoteric, on shrines and relics, and on the charisma (*bereket*) and miracles (*keramat*) of *şeyh*s and saints, living and dead. Compared to the rational orderly world of the sharia-minded, this was a very different thought world, which Michael Gilsenan has aptly described as the "tangled magic garden" of the old-fashioned ecstatics and thaumaturgics.[42]

Aşçı Dede was a spiritual denizen of the "tangled magic garden," and one valuable point about his memoirs is the proof they offer that a mid-level civil official could find it habitable as late as the beginning of this century. He was certainly not oblivious to the modernity that Sadullah Paşa praised in his famous poem. Aşçı Dede sent telegrams to Şeyh Fehmî, rode Istanbul's tramways to visit mystic şeyhs, took a steamer when he went on the pilgrimage; he even allowed himself to be photographed and expressed satisfaction at the results.[43] In one instance, his interests extended beyond the limits of the Islamic world in a way that anticipates a more recent kind of Third World consciousness. Excited by the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905, he felt called to pray for the Japanese, and even came to believe he was their "spiritual commander."[44]

Yet Aşçı Dede's was still a world where one used oracles and auguries to make important decisions.[45] In his eyes, Şeyh Fehmî was a miracle-worker who could, for example, cause a rain cloud to appear in a blue sky and rain on a particular spot.[46] For Aşçı Dede, Şeyh Fehmî could foretell

[41] Schimmel, *Mystical Dimensions*, 137–38, 272–74, 279–82, 287–301, 318; id., *The Triumphal Sun: A Study of the Works of Jalâloddin Rumi*, London, 1978, 18–24, 332–52; Hellmut Ritter, *Das Meer der Seele*, Leiden, 1955, 491 and passim; J. Spencer Trimingham, *The Sufi Orders in Islam*, Oxford, 1971, 160–65, 303, 309.

[42] Michael Gilsenan, *Saint and Sufi in Modern Egypt: An Essay on the Sociology of Religion*, Oxford, 1973, 12. The "magic-garden mentality" includes the pantheistic alternative in Hourani's formulation (quoted in n. 26) and many popular religious practices like those referred to in this paragraph.

[43] Aşçı Dede İbrahim, *Risale*, TY3222, 191a; TY79, 425, 509 (A.D. was pleased that the steamer he set out on was the *Tevfik-i Rabbanî*, "Divine Guidance"), 513; TY80, 142–43 (group photograph with other officials).

[44] Ibid., TY80, 348, 360. For comparison with a more sophisticated Islamicist's "Japan-consciousness," see Mehmet Âkif Ersoy, "The Secret of Progress," in *The Penguin Book of Turkish Verse*, edited by Nermin Menemencioğlu in collaboration with Fahir İz, Harmondsworth, Middlesex, U.K., 1978, 176.

[45] E.g., Aşçı Dede İbrahim, *Risale*, TY3222, 189a; TY78, 577 (using his rosary to determine whether to continue a journey); TY79, 506 (opens a book at random to determine whether to go on pilgrimage). The term in both instances for drawing auguries is *tefâ'ül*.

[46] Ibid., TY3222, 169a; TY78, 539–40.

and influence the future,[47] and those who opposed him or failed to take the *şeyh*'s advice came to bad ends.[48] Mystical love relationships, especially, were among the highlights of Aşçı Dede's life from childhood on, despite the sneers they sometimes evoked among his colleagues, or the especially negative reaction they got from the Nakşbendî dervishes in Erzincan.[49] He discussed the mystical theory that categorizes these relationships in terms of "love of the semblance" of the Divine Truth (*işk-i mecazî*) and—the higher stage—"love of the Truth made manifest" (*işk-i hakikî*), to which Aşçı Dede thought he had risen in his devotion to Şeyh Fehmî.[50] And he confided to his memoirs his displeasure at any imputation that his infatuations were not exclusively spiritual.[51]

Scholars are indebted to Aşçı Dede for telling them so much about his thought world for two main reasons. First, as he had to admit, his kind of Islamic conservatism was not the only type known in his times. Despite its rich musical and literary tradition, the Mevleviye—and other sufi orders—had always possessed qualities to shock the strictly sharia-minded. Westernization introduced another standard that made some of Aşçı Dede's beliefs, especially the superstitious and magical practices of the "magic garden" mentality, look bad. For Sadullah Paşa, no extreme secularizer, progress was sweeping away such practices and ideas, even while belief in the unity of God remained the foundation of wisdom.[52] For sharia activists who asked themselves how Muslims could defend themselves against the western challenge, the need to clean the House of Islam was an inescapable conclusion. Within a few decades after Aşçı Dede's death, religious thinkers from Rashîd Riḍâ in the Arab world to Muhammad Iqbal in British India, and secularists as extreme as Kemal Atatürk in Turkey, had essentially agreed on the need to clear out the "tangled magic garden."[53]

The seeming triumph of secularism in the Islamic world of the early twentieth century thus reflects conflict among Muslims as much as the impact of western ideas. The late twentieth-century revelation that the

[47] E.g., ibid., TY3222, 173a–b.

[48] Ibid., TY3222, 254b–255b.

[49] Ibid., TY3222, 150b–151b; Şeyh Fehmî defended him, but later admitted he was so displeased that he almost repudiated him (*olkadar canım sıkıldı ki hemen usturayı urup ipinizi [?] kesecek idim*; TY3222, 161b; TY78, 525).

[50] E.g., ibid., TY3222, 33b–34b, 88a–88b, 148b, 230b–31a; TY80, 70.

[51] Ibid., TY3222, 270a–271a (A.D. complains that practitioners of the *işk-i mecazî* are becoming rare). Cf. TY80, 55–56 (A.D. remonstrates with young Mevlevîs for performing the *sema* in a fast and disorderly manner), 70–74 (his reaction to someone who he thought was taking the wrong kind of interest in a young clerk). As far as his memoirs show, A.D. faithfully exemplified the high ethical standards of the major sufi orders.

[52] Akyüz, *Antoloji*, 79: *Esas-ı hikmet-i asr oldu vahdet-i Barî* (l. 35 of Sadullah Paşa's poem, "On Dokuzuncu Asır").

[53] Schimmel, *Mystical Dimensions*, 238, 341; Albert Hourani, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age*, Oxford, 1962, 225.

secularist triumph was temporary must be related to the resolution of this internecine conflict with the loss by sufism, at least that of the Rumî-Ibn ʿArabî variety, of its centuries-old preeminence as a form of popular religious expression.

In addition to documenting what has turned out to be the losing side of this conflict among religious activists, Aşçı Dede's memoirs also have value for what they show of the prevalence of ideas like his among civil officials of his day. Even if he exaggerated on this point, he was not unique. In discussing one of the spiritual infatuations of his early days in the Ministry of War, he quotes a colleague as saying that all the clerks in their office had "eight or ten ships on the sea of love."[54] While there were those who disapproved, Aşçı Dede never lacked colleagues in whom he could confide. Nor was this simply a difference between civil officials in the Ministry of War and those in other agencies, like the Foreign Ministry. Among the traditionalist Muslims of that ministry were men whose educations and careers resembled Aşçı Dede's. In addition to several who were sons of religious functionaries, who may or may not have been dervishes, at least one was the son of a dervish *şeyh*.[55]

Aşçı Dede even recounts one specific link, forged in terms of the "magic garden" mentality, between a senior Foreign Ministry official and the Nakşbendî dervishes in Erzincan. When the Halidî meeting hall (*dergâh*) at which Aşçı Dede acquired the function of *aşçı dede* was under construction in Erzincan in 1867, Abdullah Niyazî Efendi, acting head of the Office of the Imperial Divan, a traditional chancery office that had become part of the Foreign Ministry, donated to it a then widely found kind of relic, a hair from the beard of the Prophet.[56] By the 1930s, popular forms of religious expression had changed enough that the historian of education, Osman Ergin, felt he had to include a note to explain how widespread veneration of such whiskers of the Prophet (*lihye-i şerif*) once had been.[57] For the 1860s, Niyazî Efendi's donation not only establishes a bridge between the Foreign Ministry and people like Aşçı Dede, but also shows that even the Nakşbendîs' sharia-mindedness was not without its

[54] Aşçı Dede İbrahim, *Risale*, TY3222, 42b: *bizim odada olan efendilerin her birisinin bu derya-yı işkde sekiz on kıta sefineleri vardır.*

[55] Har., SA567 (İsmail Halid Bey described his father as *aizze-i kiramdan Yahya Efendi Hazretleri Hankahları postnişini Hüseyin Hüsnî Efendi*).

[56] Aşçı Dede İbrahim, *Risale*, TY3222, 166b; TY78, 534; Abdullah Niyazî (BBA, DSA I, 550, one of the traditionalist Muslims included in the tables in other chapters).

[57] Ergin, *Maarif*, I, 172 n. 1; cf. Nurhan Atasoy, art. "Liḥya-yi Sherîf," *EI*², V, 761, citing the *Ṣaḥîḥ* of al-Bukhârî to the effect that the Prophet allowed followers to get and keep his hair while he was being shaved. Such *ḥadîth*s do not, of course, expressly legitimate a cult of relics. Whiskers of the Prophet are still preserved and venerated in some places, including Konya: Annemarie Schimmel, *And Muhammad is His Messenger: The Veneration of the Prophet in Islamic Piety*, Chapel Hill, 1985, 43; cf. Ignaz Goldziher, "The Cult of Saints in Islam: Relic Worship," *Muslim World*, I (1911), 302–308; Samuel M. Zwemer, "Hairs of the Prophet," in *Ignace Goldziher Memorial Volume, Part I*, Budapest, 1948, 48–54.

points in common with the "magic garden" mentality. According to Aşçı Dede, the first time Şeyh Fehmî unwrapped the *lihye* to expose it for veneration, he "tested" its authenticity in a way that can only be described as magic. Without looking at the relic himself, he lowered his eyes in meditation before it, having asked Aşçı Dede to observe from the side whether the hair inclined toward him in return. Aşçı Dede triumphantly reported that it did.[58]

There was much more to the resemblances than this relic. Belief in Şeyh Fehmî's ability to predict and control the future—a belief of which a *şeyh*'s spiritual power over his disciples can produce tangible proofs—was strong in the dervish milieu at Erzincan. Şeyh Fehmî himself claimed to have prevented war between Ottomans and Russians in 1866 by prayer and weeping.[59] Holding Celâl el-Din Rumî in high esteem, as have Nakşbendîs in other places and times, the Nakşbendîs in Erzincan read from his *Mesnevî* at their gatherings,[60] and at times even called in a Mevlevî flute player to play, as at the Mevlevî *sema*.[61]

Examples like this suggest that the contrast between dervish orders that were strict about the sharia and those that were lax about it, a contrast sharply drawn in recent scholarship, was not so clear on the ground in the nineteenth century. Or, since the consensus of the faithful is a major determinant of what sunnî Muslims recognize as proper in matters of faith and practice, it may be more accurate to say that standards have tightened since the days when Aşçı Dede—or before him an advanced mystic like Pertev Paşa's mentor, Şeyh Ali Behcet—were initiated into both the Nakşbendî and the Mevlevî orders. Either formulation helps explain why in the twentieth century, when both secularists and sharia-minded religious activists turned on the sufi orders, they tended not to discriminate among them, but to oppose sufism root and branch. Islam in general—and no doubt also sufism, which has survived the loss of its old prominence—emerged from this change of mentality strengthened. But some of the social and cultural forms most characteristic of Ottoman times, even among civil officials, had passed largely into history.

ALİ NİZAMÎ BEY, PLAYBOY AND ŞEYH

While biographical sources on real-life Ottoman officials must document many casualties of cultural change, the type emerges most clearly in Ot-

[58] Aşçı Dede İbrahim, *Risale*, TY3222, 175a; TY78, 549–50. For other evidence of "magic garden" practices among Nakşbendîs, see Albert Hourani, "Shaikh Khalid and the Naqshbandi Order," 97–98, 100–101.

[59] Aşçı Dede İbrahim, *Risale*, TY3222, 253b–254a; TY79, 40.

[60] Ibid., TY3222, 172b; TY78, 545; Algar, "Naqshbandî in Bosnia," 174 n. 1.

[61] Aşçı Dede İbrahim, *Risale*, TY3222, 87b; M. L. van Ess-Bremer, art. "Fehmī," in *EI*², II, 878–79.

toman and republican Turkish fiction. The reasons for this fact are several. Official curricula vitae seldom tell enough about the circumstances that surrounded a man's progress up the official ladder to indicate reasons for his success or failure in adjusting to changing cultural conditions. For example, the Foreign Ministry personnel records include a number of top officials' sons or grandsons who achieved high ranks and positions without doing anything visible to distinguish themselves. But it would be unfair to dismiss all such individuals as playboys or parasites on the basis of limited evidence.

Further, several reasons converge to explain the prominence of the semi-westernized efendi, really at home in neither culture, in literature. Şerif Mardin, the first to call attention to this theme, interprets its treatment in fiction as a form of social control, by which various interests—serious-minded Islamic conservatives, intellectual westernizers, ordinary folk shocked at excess in high places—sought to restrain the culturally uncommited.[62]

Powerful forces combined, as Mardin sees it, to unite Ottomans of various types in the desire for such controls. Changes in official personnel policy, coinciding with the growth of civil officialdom, had slowed turnover in high office during the *Tanzimat*, consolidating the power of a much-resented coterie of westernizers. Among their protégés were some, indeed, who did not deserve the prominence they enjoyed. Moreover, the slowing of elite turnover coincided with the intrusion into Ottoman society of capitalist economic ideas and values, in place of an older economic ethic that stressed reciprocal and redistributive exchanges. The growing westernization of the elites tended on this account to express itself in new forms of conspicuous consumption that roused resentment both by their "frankishness" and by the decreased extent to which they benefited poorer Ottomans, whose spirit remained one of "communitarian puritanism."[63]

The social history of civil officialdom amplifies this argument by disclosing additional circumstances surrounding the emergence of a new type of superficially westernized dandy. The Ottoman diplomats who played a key role in introducing western ideas into the empire dealt with European counterparts who were almost invariably aristocrats, or at least had assimilated aristocratic values through their professional socialization. Interaction with diplomats and foreign ministry officials was not the best way, then, to discover the secrets of Europe's economic dynamism.[64]

[62] Şerif Mardin, "Super Westernization in Urban Life in the Ottoman Empire in the Last Quarter of the Nineteenth Century," in *Turkey: Geographic and Social Perspectives*, ed. Peter Benedict et al., Leiden, 1974, 412–14, 425.

[63] Ibid., 412–22.

[64] Despite differences, this generalization appears to hold for diplomats of countries as diverse as Metternich's Austria, Palmerston's England, or Bismarck's Germany. By the late nineteenth century, Germany had probably the most dynamic industrial economy in Europe; and the German Foreign Office had the best commercial services of any in Europe. Yet Otto von Glasenapp, member of the German Foreign Office examination board from 1899 to 1914, summed up the diplomat's ideal traits in terms untouched by any business mentality, terms that most Ottoman diplomats would have liked to think described them too:

Sieben Gaben muss ein Gesandter haben.
Er sei aus edlen Geschlecht entsprossen,
Beredt geschickt und zur Tat entschlossen,
Muss freundliche Worte zu reden verstehn,
Genau berichten, was er gesehn,
Und ein gutes Gedächtnis haben,
Das sind die sieben Gaben.

Glasenapp's mention of noble family first, and of word, thought, and act only thereafter, highlights the preference for aristocratic values rather than achievement. Not surprisingly, the German Foreign Office's Commercial Division was separate from—and disdained by—its Political Division. See Lamar Cecil, *The German Diplomatic Service, 1871–1914*, Princeton, 1976, 7–10, 36; Paul Gordon Lauren, *Diplomats and Bureaucrats: The First Institutional Responses to Twentieth-Century Diplomacy in France and Germany*, Stanford, 1976, 22.

Nor did the Ottoman elites have close links with the economically most productive sectors of their own society. Over the centuries the Ottoman economy's own commercial and manufacturing sectors had become the preserve more and more of non-Muslims, many of them operating under European protection. In an era when, in the name of free trade, industrial Europe sought to penetrate and undermine nonwestern economies everywhere, it was perhaps especially easy for the Ottoman elites to interpret westernization in terms of adopting western patterns of consumption, rather than production.[65] Europe's proximity magnified the corrupting influence; for no part of the nonwestern world was more acessible to Europeans and their goods—including shoddy goods and scoundrels—than the Mediterranean coasts of Asia and North Africa.[66]

The temptations and dangers that Ottomans faced were very great, and it is no wonder that thoughtful Ottomans of all types reacted in concern against those who fell an easy prey to them. Ahmed Midhat summed up the problem in an exchange between one of his heroes, Râkım Efendi, and his sympathetically portrayed European friend, Josephine. Commenting on the ruin of Felâtun Bey, the spendthrift, at the hands of an unscrupulous European actress, Râkım stated to Josephine that "the bad things about this Europe of yours far exceed the good." She replied that "the fools in this Istanbul of yours far exceed the wise."[67] No doubt, she spoke for Ahmed Midhat and many other Ottomans.

Novelistic treatments of people like Felâtun Bey are numerous, as Mardin has pointed out. We have cited some of the examples in chapter 1.

[65] Charles Issawi, *An Economic History of the Middle East and North Africa*, New York, 1982, 156.

[66] Davison, *Reform in the Ottoman Empire*, 69–79.

[67] Ahmet Midhat, *Felâtun Bey ile Râkım Efendi*, 180.

him up the back stairs into the harem. Later, he would return in the same way, sneaking back into his own house like a thief. Especially since there were always people and boats out on the water and enough light to see, the danger of detection was very great. Sultan Abd ül-Hamid's secret police did soon learn what was going on. Ali Nizamî's wife left him after she learned. The other woman's husband found out. The sultan, too, found out; and Ali Nizamî Bey was left, on top of everything else, to worry about what might befall him as a result of the imperial displeasure.[75]

In addition to his own tastes and exploits, two other characters play an important role in defining Ali Nizamî Bey's character and milieu. One of these is his mother, referred to as Hatçanımefendi (a contraction of Hadice Hanımefendi, "Miss Hadice") or, on account of her coloring, as Penbanımefendi (for Pembe Hanımefendi, "Miss Pinky"). The impression she made on the narrator as a child was as vivid as if a miniature by a great artist had come to life.[76] Her powder-pink skin, dyed blonde hair, and unfailing smile gave her a girl-like quality, despite her age. The other women of the island thought she still had something provincial about her and did not quite measure up as an Istanbul lady, but the children loved her. This was partly because of her eccentricities. For example, she was quite religious, but in an unschooled way expressed chiefly in exaggerated reverence for the color green, which does have important religious associations in Islam. Since the matchboxes of the day contained matches with both red and green heads, she would strike only the red. The children loved to get her to open the locked room that contained Ali Nizamî Bey's picture collection and would ask her to do so again and again, just for the pleasure of watching her hop over the green places in the carpet, as she would do to avoid stepping on them. In deference to her feelings, Ali Nizamî Bey wore the green pair included in his army of shoes only once.[77]

The other character who plays a special role in defining Ali Nizamî Bey's identity is the old manservant who had cared for him as a child, his *lâla*, Hüseyin Ağa. In one of his few didactic statements, the author reminds us of the rights and privileges that custom guaranteed the many servants who used to be found in large households. As a result, while Ali Nizamî Bey looked down on everyone else, the only person who could criticize him was Hüseyin Ağa. After all, he had taken Ali Nizamî Bey as a boy to the various schools that he never liked and always left without finishing; now Hüseyin Ağa was doing the same for Ali Nizamî Bey's children. Exercising his right to criticize, Hüseyin Ağa denounced his master's extravagance as forbidden (*haram*) and his lifestyle as irreligious

[75] Ibid., 47–52.
[76] Ibid., 17. A *hanımefendi* is, of course, a gentlewoman.
[77] Ibid., 20–21.

(*dinsiz*). To sum it all up, "let flatterers say what they will, our little bey is crazy, and that's all there is to it."[78]

Part of the literary type of the super-westernized playboy is his obligatory bad end, and Ali Nizamî Bey is no exception. If he is a larger-than-life playboy in the first half of the novel, he meets a fate much worse than do many of his literary counterparts in the second. As usual, the circumstances of his downfall grow directly out of his cultural rootlessness.

The account of this phase of Ali Nizamî's life begins, after the passage of several years, with a dramatic encounter between him and the narrator. The latter had by then become a boarding student at the Galatasaray Lycée and had almost forgotten about many of his childhood experiences on Büyük Ada. The meeting occurred on "the bridge," that is the Galata Bridge that joins the old city of Istanbul, with its imperial and Islamic monuments, to the largely European quarters on the other side of the Golden Horn—a meeting place obviously evocative of cultural dualism. The narrator was surprised one day to encounter there a man in the garb of a Bektaşî dervish şeyh who resembled Ali Nizamî Bey, and was astounded to discover that the man was in fact Ali Nizamî. The latter had swung "like a seesaw" from extreme Europeanism (*alafrangalık*) to extreme "orientalism" (*şarklılık*), affecting not only the attire of a şeyh but also a slow, ponderous gait and "transcendentalized" (*maverâîleşmiş*) speech.

Yet reality did not, could not, match appearance. Recognizing the young man, Ali Nizamî proclaimed, "My son, kiss my hand! . . . I have become a 'father'! I have opened a *hanekah* [a dervish meeting place] at Çamlica!" Could one achieve the spiritual dignity of a şeyh, just like that, and literally command others to recognize this by kissing one's hand? Ali Nizamî Bey had to confess that "so far, I have only one disciple: our own Hüseyin Ağa," the old servant. But he hoped for more and invited the young narrator to join him. From the look in his eyes, the latter concluded that Ali Nizamî had lost his old haughtiness and achieved a kind of peace, but had also lost his mind.[79]

The narrator waited impatiently for a chance to recount what he had seen to his mother, grandmother, and great-grandmother, only to discover that they already knew more than he. From them, he learned about the chain of catastrophes that had occurred on Nizam ("Order") Street. As usual in such stories, the trouble began when the father died and the spendthrift son ran through his inheritance. The invariable fact that the literary playboys are spendthrifts (*mirasyedi*, one who has eaten his inheritance) underscores the danger they pose to their families and society.

[78] Ibid., 70–72.
[79] Ibid., 74–78.

There were added complications, too. The father turned out to have another son, living elsewhere, with whom the inheritance had to be divided. The mother, "Miss Pinky," died in the midst of the confusion. Ali Nizamî Bey, overwhelmed by debt and distress, fell sick in body and mind, began stealing things from the homes of friends and relatives to pawn, and ended up being rejected by everyone. At that point, he withdrew to a ramshackle little house at Çamlica on the Asian side of the Bosphorus, overlooking the Karacaahmet cemetery, and set himself up as a Bektaşî şeyh.[80]

Unable to resist Ali Nizamî's invitation to visit, the narrator found his host's past splendors, nostalgically catalogued in the text, all vanished. Now Ali Nizamî Bey himself had found consolation in the "Muslim resignation" (*müslüman tevekkülü*) that had so contrasted before with his daring nocturnal trysts. To the narrator, Ali Nizamî's current "resignation" resembled what Ibsen called a "vital illusion."[81] In contrast to his former pride, Ali Nizamî Bey had found contentment—but, we have to note, because he thought he had become an important person. During the visit, the narrator learned how the idea of being a şeyh had come to Ali Nizamî. His mother, the nature of whose religious sensibilities we have noted, had appeared to him in a dream and wanted him to do so. Upon awakening, he had set out to fulfill her wish. Ironically, the old servant, Hüseyin Ağa, who had before seen Ali Nizamî Bey's failings when no one else did, now became the only one to believe in him.[82]

The author came away from his visit painfully aware of Ali Nizamî's inability to understand or teach the tenets of the Bektaşî order. In fact, Ali Nizamî's period of happiness—with Hüseyin Ağa playing Sancho Panza to his Don Quixote—proved but an interlude in the history of his illness. Eventually, he became quite mad. It was hard to say when, partly because of the sanctity that the common people assign to the insane. But eventually, the symptoms became so unmistakable that he was tied up and placed in a mental asylum. By then, he had begun loudly expressing his

[80] Ibid., 79–86. On the Bektaşis, an order strongly associated with Turkish popular culture, see John Kingsley Birge, *The Bektashi Order of Dervishes*, 2d ed., London, 1965; Suraiya Faroqhi, *Der Bektaschi-Orden in Anatolien*, Vienna, 1981. Many Turkish readers must have sensed a subliminal connection between Ali Nizamî's choice of this order and his former life. The Bektaşis were unique among sufi orders in admitting women on a basis of equality with men. This fact led to accusations of immorality. A novelistic treatment of this danger, Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu's *Nur Baba*, first published in 1922, may have helped convince Mustafa Kemal Atatürk to close down the dervish orders; see Schimmel, *Mystical Dimensions*, 337–41, 432. Annemarie Schimmel translated *Nur Baba* into German, under the title *Flamme und Falter*, Gummersbach, 1948, reissued 1986. Hisar's plot does not develop any connection between Ali Nizamî's former life and his choice of the Bektaşî order, but a certain parallelism may be implicit.

[81] Henrik Ibsen, *The Wild Duck*, trans. Christopher Hampton, London, 1980, 104, "life-lie" in this translation.

[82] Hisar, *Ali Nizamî Bey*, 87–101.

fears of Sultan Abd ül-Hamid, with the result that medical personnel became afraid to come near him for fear of being reported by the secret police, as Ali Nizamî Bey had once been for his amatory escapades. Eventually Ali Nizamî died, although the fact remained unannounced at the time. The narrator could only guess that Ali Nizamî Bey was buried near the hospital where he died, in the Karacaahmet cemetery that he had so feared and disliked.

In a negative sense, Ali Nizamî Bey had been larger than life in his illusory phase as a şeyh, as much as in his career as a playboy. Few clerks of the Foreign or Interior Ministries had the means to match his excesses. Especially with the added focus imparted by Hisar's literary artistry, however, Ali Nizamî's downfall highlighted a danger to which every nineteenth-century Ottoman was exposed: that of the rootless individual, whose ignorance of all but the fads and superficialities of western culture was, if anything, exceeded by his lack of grounding in his own. It is as well to have discussed this problem on the basis of a fictional example; for something of Ali Nizamî Bey was present in many Ottomans of his day, including some of the Translation Office clerks and embassy secretaries whom we shall look at in the next chapter.

İBRAHİM HAKKÎ PAŞA: NEW IDEAS, NEW ROLES, A NEW MAN

Excluding those whose careers belong more to literary than to administrative history and who could be adequately discussed only on larger scale than is possible here, perhaps no one better epitomizes the creative potential of the civil official westernizers than does İbrahim Hakkî Paşa (colloquially, Hakkı, 1862–1918). Teacher, legist, diplomat, and grand vezir, he illustrates an uncomfortable, intermediate stage in the differentiation of administrative, political, and intellectual roles—a fact that the crises of the Young Turk years magnified painfully in 1911.[83] While these difficulties dominated many Ottomans' views of him at the time, in hindsight İbrahim Hakkî's difficulties seem worthy of empathy, while his achievements merit respect.

Born at Istanbul to a family of Georgian origins, İbrahim Hakkî, whose father held an important post in the Istanbul city administration,[84] studied

[83] A number of people have aided my research on İbrahim Hakkî: Leyla Çambel (who has shared personal reminiscences and several photographs of her grandfather, İ.H.), Şerif Mardin (who first pointed İ.H. out to me), İlber Ortaylı, Metin Heper, Selim İlkin, Tekin Akıllıoğlu, Günay Kut, Dona Straley, and Kay Ritchie.

[84] A.A.A. [Abdülhak Adnan Adıvar?], art. "İbrâhîm Hakkı Paşa," [properly Hakkî], *İA*, V, 892. Additional family background from Leyla Çambel, letters of 22 April and 7, 9, and 11 August 1987: İ.H.'s father, Remzî Efendi, was the son of a Georgian who entered Ottoman service after being taken as a prisoner of war; this grandfather of İ.H. rose to high position

in a Qur'ânic elementary school, a *rüşdiye*, the "Training Place of the Offices" (*Mahrec-i Aklâm*), and in both the preparatory and higher divisions of the School of Civil Administration (*Mülkiye Mektebi*), from which he graduated first in his class in 1882.[85] From the time he was in the *rüşdiye*, he had private lessons in French and English. Since he never studied abroad or at foreign schools inside the empire, his career became a test of what the empire's modern educational facilities could produce—and of his own autodidacticism.

His first official position was an unpaid apprenticeship (*mülâzemet*) in the Foreign Correspondence Office of the Foreign Ministry (*Tahrirat-ı Hariciye Kalemi*).[86] In 1883, he was appointed to a salaried position as translator at the palace secretariat (*Mabeyn*), where his chief task was at first to translate murder mysteries for the sultan's entertainment.[87] In 1886, he acquired additional roles in teaching—first history and constitutional law at the Law School,[88] then also economics and commercial law at the School of Commerce.[89] In 1889, as the sultan tightened his controls on educational institutions, İbrahim Hakkî's teaching responsibilities at the Law School were shifted from history to administrative and international law. In addition to his translatorship and teaching positions, he was also appointed a member of the Board of Health, which oversaw the quarantine system.

In 1894, on the sultan's initiative, İbrahim Hakkî was appointed as one of two legal counsellors (*hukuk müşaviri*) of the Sublime Porte, thus becoming codirector of the Office of Legal Counsel of the Foreign Ministry.[90] The appointment of one so young as the government's counsellor on international law aroused surprise. But the appointment had a larger significance, too. For the empire had until then employed foreign experts in these positions. The simultaneous appointments of İbrahim Hakkî and Gabriel Noradounghian presented Ottomans with exciting proof that the empire could produce its own experts for this function.[91] Although Grand Vezir Said Paşa once unsuccessfully proposed him to the sultan for appointment as undersecretary for foreign affairs, İbrahim Hakkî remained legal counsellor until shortly after the Young Turk revolution.

and married a woman from the imperial harem. The grandparents bought and educated a Circassian slave, Mir'at, to marry their son Remzî. Mir'at became İ.H.'s mother. Remzî himself had some diplomatic experience in Europe early in his career as a civil official, was known for his liberal sympathies, and was a Freemason. Family memories include some traits from the "magic garden mentality": Remzî was considered able to cure people with his breath while reading from the Qur'ân; an Armenian friend of the family was considered to have the same ability, even though a Christian, and once used it to cure İ.H.'s sister's granddaughter.

[85] Çankaya, *Mülkiye Târihi*, III, 103.

[86] Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform*, 187, 208, 256–59.

[87] A.A.A., art. "İbrâhîm Hakkı Paşa," *İA*, V, 892, citing four such translations now in Ist. U. Lib. The image of the paranoid, insomniac sultan listening from his bed while a courtier behind a screen read such works aloud by a night light is one of the most vivid from the period; see Osman Nurî, *Abd ül-Hamid-i Sani ve Devr-i Saltanatı: Hayat-ı Hususiye ve Siyasiyesi*, Istanbul, 1327/1909, II, 577. Abd ül-Hamid's early awareness of İ.H. was probably due to the latter's high class standing at the School of Civil Administration; see PRO, FO371/548, file no. 29285 (confidential print no. 8982), "General Report on Turkey for the Year 1906," 31.

[88] Considering İ.H.'s impact on legal education, it is strange that Ergin says nothing about his work at the Law School: *Maarif*, III, 890–918.

[89] Ibid., III, 932–46.

[90] Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform*, 258, 322–23.

In retrospect, İbrahim Hakkî's years as teacher and legal counsellor appear his most successful. His formal training in law must have consisted of no more than a few courses—administrative, commercial, international, constitutional, and Ottoman civil law—included in the higher-division curriculum of the School of Civil Administration.[92] During his years of teaching, İbrahim Hakkî must have broadened his legal expertise considerably by his own efforts. Those who knew him were impressed by his mental acuity, studiousness, and eloquence.[93] During the 1880s, he began to publish books, chiefly on law and history. Obviously intended for instructional use, these were unequal in value. At a time when almost nothing of the kind had been available in Ottoman Turkish,[94] his legal works were especially appreciated, not only by students, but to a degree by the Ottoman reading public in general.[95]

In his role as legal counsellor, İbrahim Hakkî had occasion to perform a number of special missions. Some of these were of a purely ceremonial nature, such as escorting foreign rulers during state visits to Istanbul. Others offered opportunities to widen his horizons, whether by representing the empire at the Columbian Exhibition in Chicago or the Rome conference on anarchism, or by chairing commissions formed to settle legal problems, such as extradition or trade agreements, between the Ottoman Empire and neighboring states.[96] These experiences broadened his expertise perceptibly over the years.[97] On international legal questions, his opinions and those of his colleague Gabriel Noradounghian were regularly consulted by the Council of Ministers.[98]

By 1908, people were beginning to wonder why İbrahim Hakkî had not yet been appointed to a ministerial post. Some attributed this to his youth (by Ottoman standards), or to his desire for restoration of constitutional rule, or to his comparatively free and easy style of life. Indeed, he had

[91] Çankaya, *Mülkiye Târihi*, III, 103–104, quoting Abd ül-Rahman Şeref.

[92] Ibid., I, 120–22; II, 945.

[93] Halid Ziya Uşaklıgil, *Saray ve Ötesi: Son Hatıralar*, Istanbul, 1965, 170; A.A.A., art. "İbrahim Hakkı Paşa," *İA*, V, 893, 894; İnal, *Sadrıazamlar*, 1783.

[94] Çankaya, *Mülkiye Târihi*, II, 947.

[95] A.A.A., art. "İbrahim Hakkı Paşa," *İA*, V, 894; Uşaklıgil, *Saray ve Ötesi*, 170.

[96] Çankaya, *Mülkiye Târihi*, III, 104.

[97] Uşaklıgil, *Saray ve Ötesi*, 170.

[98] İnal, *Sadrıazamlar*, 1783–84.

Ill. 8. İbrahim Hakkî Paşa (1862–1918) in Official Uniform with His Decorations. The photograph is undated, but presumably shows Hakkî Paşa in the uniform of a holder of the highest civil rank (*rütbe-i vezaret*).

traits that suggested the advent of a new personality type in elite circles, in contrast to the ponderous paşas of old. He, too, was rotund and bewhiskered, as a statesman had to be in those days, but in a fairly dapper, up-to-date way (illustration 8). At some point, he acquired a fine stone house with a large garden in one of the city's most modern neighborhoods, Nişantaş; he lived there with his daughter Ayşe Remziye after the premature deaths from tuberculosis of another daughter and his wife, Suad. Centrally heated at a time when that was almost unknown in Istanbul, the modern house, where there was always wine on the table, told something about the man. İbrahim Hakkî also shocked conservatives, like Mahmud Kemal İnal, by his habit of walking about the city, like an ordinary person. Moralizing copiously, İnal implied that İbrahim Hakkî's steps took him where they should not have. Other accounts suggest they took him to the theater or open-air coffeehouses, where his greatest offense was to sit among the people like one of them.

İbrahim Hakkî retained his democratic habits even after becoming grand vezir. For İnal, this going out on foot among all kinds of people (*ecnas-ı nas*) was something unheard of for a statesman; ordinary people would interpret it as a sign of the end of the world (*kıyamet alâmetlerinden*). A less hidebound writer interpreted İbrahim Hakkî's nocturnal hab-

its with an image of modernity, albeit one that could only have applied to the Young Turk period, by saying that İbrahim Hakkî's habit of smoking his nargile in the public places of Tepebaşı and Taksim made him the first modern grand vezir. When challenged, he defended himself in terms that indicated a strong personal dimension to his interest in rights. Confronted, as grand vezir, with complaints about his appearing in "inappropriate places," he retorted that after he had performed his duties, he was free and would do whatever he pleased, as he continued to do.[99] Part of what shocked conservative Ottomans, it seems, was a certain insouciance, a note of the *bon vivant*—traits not unusual in European statesmen of the day.[100]

Whatever the reasons for his not having done so before, İbrahim Hakkî did break through into ministerial ranks soon after the Young Turk revolution, becoming minister of, first, education, and, then, the interior.[101] Like many another who achieves high office, he was no longer as successful as before. His tenure as interior minister was overshadowed by the purges and reorganizations (*tensikat*) being carried out to prune the administration of the useless and undesirable types with which Abd ül-Hamid had padded it.[102] Under attack from the press and the victims of the purges, he was eased out in December 1908 to become ambassador in Rome.[103] In December 1909, he was brought back to Istanbul with the rank of vezir to become grand vezir.[104] One view of his appointment is that while he was not a member of the Committee of Union and Progress, it chose him in order to replace the ministerial types left from the Hamidian period with a younger generation.[105] His Circassian mother took another view, advising him not to accept the post, lest he become another of the empire's gravediggers.[106]

One biographer, expressing an evaluation that would not be universally

[99] A.A.A., art. "İbrahim Hakkı Paşa," *İA*, V, 893; İnal, *Sadrıazamlar*, 1784–88.

[100] E.g., a few months after becoming grand vezir, İ.H. set out for a vacation in Europe. He was much criticized for this, even by critics who acknowledged that a European statesman might have done the same; İnal, *Sadrıazamlar*, 1769–70.

[101] Çankaya, *Mülkiye Târihi*, III, 104. The British and German ambassadors reported favorably on İ.H. about this time: PRO, FO371/548, file 29285 (confidential print no. 8982), "General Report on Turkey for 1906," 31; PAAA (Bonn), Türkei 161, Bd. 2, Marschall von Bieberstein on "Das neue türkische Ministerium," 13 August 1908 (T139, roll 394), terming İ.H. an outstanding choice. Marschall went on to describe Gabriel Noradounghian as a pettifogger (*Rabulist*) and accuse him of corruption (*allerlei unsaubere Geschäfte*).

[102] Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform*, 296–98.

[103] PRO, FO371/561/44441, Lowther to Grey, 15 December 1908; PAAA (Bonn), Türkei 162, Bd. 7, telegs. from Marschall, Istanbul, 8 and 12 December 1908 (T139, mf. roll 395). Based on what he learned from foreign minister Ahmed Tevfik Paşa, Marschall reported that Grand Vezir Kâmil Paşa was using this ambassadorship to get İ.H., his sharpest critic, out of the cabinet. The latter had opened legal proceedings against the newspaper *Yeni Gazete*, Kâmil Paşa's organ, which had attacked him most sharply.

[104] PAAA (Bonn), Türkei 161, Bd. 3, teleg. from Marschall, 29 December 1909.

[105] A.A.A., art. "İbrahim Hakkı Paşa," *İA*, V, 893–94.

[106] Letters from Leyla Çambel, 22 April and 9 August 1987.

shared today, has asserted that İbrahim Hakkî Paşa was the first "free-thinking partisan of innovation and progress" to occupy the grand vezirate since the *Tanzimat*. By this account, Hakkî Paşa was an attractive figure who understood freedom and constitutionalism and differed from his predecessors in not always yielding to prejudice. His respect for freedom of the press was such that when his cabinet colleagues had gotten fed up with being caricatured, he said "My caricature is really good; I can't forbid such good things."[107] Even at the palace, where the sultan might have preferred an old-fashioned grand vezir, İbrahim Hakkî made a good impression and won affection.[108]

İbrahim Hakkî Paşa's grand vezirate was not without successes. Returning from Italy to a tumultuous welcome (largely student-orchestrated),[109] he announced that his principles as grand vezir would be "justice and good will" (*adil ve ihsan*). The very idea of proclaiming such a slogan suggests his awareness that the grand vezirate was becoming more a political than an administrative office and his attempt to operate in the mode of a European-style politician. Counting himself—the first School of Civil Administration alumnus to become grand vezir—his cabinet included five *Mülkiye* graduates out of a total of thirteen men; certainly an example of the old school tie, this was not a bad thing at this date, given the school's role in training administrative manpower.[110] Such was İbrahim Hakkî's eloquence that the speech in which he announced his program to the Chamber of Deputies won him a vote of confidence by the margin of 187 in favor and 34 against. Thereafter, his administration witnessed the settlement of disturbances in Yemen and a vigorous effort at reform and reorganization in government agencies.[111]

The Italian attack on Libya and the Italo-Turkish War soon overshadowed the successes, however. Since İbrahim Hakkî Paşa had come to the grand vezirate from the Rome embassy, had continued to socialize with the Italian envoy in Istanbul, and was also acting foreign minister at the time of the attack, he was viciously attacked for having been duped in this affair.[112] The optimism with which he had assumed office entirely

[107] A.A.A. art. "İbrahim Hakkı Paşa," *İA*, V, 894.

[108] Uşaklıgil, *Saray ve Ötesi*, 171.

[109] A.A.A., art. "İbrahim Hakkı Paşa," *İA*, V, 893; *Mülkiye*, no. 12, 1 January 1325/1910, 1 (separately numbered pages at back with alumni news).

[110] Çankaya, *Mülkiye Târihi*, III, 107; *Mülkiye*, no. 12, 1 January 1325/1910, 1 (separately numbered pages at back). İ.H. was probably the first grand vezir *young enough* to have attended the *Mülkiye*.

[111] Uşaklıgil, *Saray ve Ötesi*, 169; A.A.A., art. "İbrahim Hakkı Paşa," *İA*, V, 893. Cf. Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform*, chap. 7 passim on administrative reorganization of Young Turk period (little or no mention of İ.H. in sources used there, but the reforms correspond to his outlook).

[112] He had been to the extent that he thought he had maintained good relations between the two governments. Uşaklıgil, *Saray ve Ötesi*, 274–77; İnal, *Sadrıazamlar*, 1771–81; Çankaya, *Mülkiye Târihi*, III, 112–15.

dashed—a disillusionment that will become more fully understandable when we look at his ideas on international law—he resigned on 10 September 1911. No doubt remembering his mother's advice against assuming the grand vezirate, he expressed his despondency with an allusion to the tradition of official slavery, made all the more poignant by his standing as a legist: "In the old days, the sultans would have grand vezirs who got into my situation beheaded on their mounting block."[113]

A period of political disgrace followed. Then, in January 1913, the Committee of Union and Progress leadership pressed him to resume the grand vezirate following their daring raid on the Sublime Porte; but he refused.[114] He did undertake a mission to London to resolve various problems, particularly ones concerning the Baghdad railway project. Successful in this, he returned to Istanbul at the outbreak of World War I. He was then appointed ambassador in Berlin. As such, he negotiated with Trotsky at the conclusion of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, by which the Bolshevik government took Russia out of World War I and the Ottomans were supposed to regain Kars, Ardahan, and Batum.

By the time of his death in Berlin in 1918, then, İbrahim Hakkî Paşa's reputation was at least partly restored.[115] In Berlin, incidentally, Hakkî Paşa again liked to use his free time to go to the theater. He was especially fond of the Wagner operas. A convivial host, he entertained on a large scale and would invite guests for late-night suppers after the theater.[116]

While a discussion of İbrahim Hakkî's career already tells much about what kind of man he was, his writings provide further evidence, even though he was not primarily a writer. The best of his writings are on law. More precisely, in terms of the French organization of legal studies that he acquired from his training and sources, they fall into the domain of public law, which concerns the state, as contrasted to private law, which concerns individuals.

In the French tradition, public law divides into two branches: external public law, dealing with relations among states (international law, or the law of nations), and internal public law, dealing with relations between the state and the individual. Internal public law includes constitutional, administrative, and penal law; the last pertains to the domain of the private law in many ways, but is assigned to the public in the sense that the crimes it deals with are offenses against the state as well as against its subjects.[117]

[113] İnal, *Sadrıazamlar*, 1085, 1771–76.

[114] Letter of 9 August 1987 from Leyla Çambel, recounting first-hand experiences and statements of both her parents.

[115] A.A.A., art. "İbrahim Hakkı Paşa," *İA*, V, 894; İnal, *Sadrıazamlar*, 1792–93.

[116] Uşaklıgil, *Saray ve Ötesi*, 405; letters of August 1987 from Leyla Çambel.

[117] René David and Henry P. de Vries, *The French Legal System: An Introduction to Civil Law Systems*, New York, 1958, 56–59; Robert Beudant and Paul Lerebours-Pigeonnière,

In keeping with his character as advisor to the Ottoman government on international law and instructor at the Law School, İbrahim Hakkî's published legal works pertain to the explicitly state-oriented fields of public law, or such of them as could be discussed under Abd ül-Hamid. That is, he did not concentrate on either penal law, which straddles the border between public and private law, or constitutional law, a dangerous subject under Abd ül-Hamid; he did write about administrative and international law. Paradoxically, in view of İbrahim Hakkî's experience in international law, his published works treat administrative law more fully. Presumably the imbalance is the result of official distractions. Yet even if Hakkî Paşa's legal publications do not cover everything he had to say, they provide important insights into his mental world.

At least four small volumes on international law bear İbrahim Hakkî's name; one of these was actually published by a former student from his lecture notes.[118] These works reflect the common tendency of the period to trace the evolution of international law in historico-philosophical terms.[119] In these works, Hakkî Paşa did not indicate his immediate sources as clearly as he did in his work on administrative law. But he did emphasize the paucity of Ottoman-language works that had preceded him in this field.[120] And although he probably knew most of them only through

Cours de droit civil français, Paris, 1934, I, 42–47 (definitions); İbrahim Hakkî, *Mukaddime-i İlm-i Hukuk*, Istanbul, 1319/1901–1902, 37; id., *Hukuk-ı İdare*, Istanbul, 1312/1894–1895, I, 6; id., *Medhal-i Hukuk-ı Beyn el-Düvel*, Istanbul, 1303/1885–1886, 7. I am indebted to Michael Kindred of the Ohio State University College of Law for helping me clarify this discussion.

[118] İbrahim Hakkî, *Tarih-i Hukuk-ı Beyn el-Düvel*, Istanbul, 1303/1885–1886 (not seen); id., *Medhal-i Hukuk-ı Beyn el-Düvel*, Istanbul, 1303/1885–1886 (referred to below as *MHBD*); id., *Hukuk-ı Düvel*, Istanbul, 1320/1902–1903 (not seen); id., *Medhal-i Hukuk-ı Düvel*, Istanbul, 1327/1909 (referred to below as *MHD*), preface signed by İzmirli İsmail İrfan, who says he published the book from lecture notes. The fullest list of İ.H.'s publications appears to be Çankaya's: *Mülkiye Târihi*, III, 119–20; cf. Karatay, *Türkçe Basmalar Kataloğu*, I, 260. The only one of these works that might include a topically organized survey of major problems in international law, or at least of the Ottoman Empire's international commitments, would be the *Hukuk-ı Düvel*, which I have not been able to examine. In the other works, İbrahim Hakkî discusses these commitments chronologically, without indication of the completeness of coverage.

[119] René David and John E. C. Brierley, *Major Legal Systems in the World Today*, London, 1978, 4.

[120] İbrahim Hakkî, *MHBD*, 3: earlier Ottoman-language works on international law had been incomplete, as well as few. He mentioned Rifat Bey's translation of a "law book" by P. Pradier-Fodéré, a translation into Ottoman by Ottokar Schlechta-Wssehrd entitled *Hukuk-ı Milel*, Hasan Fehmî Paşa's *Telhis-i Hukuk-ı Düvel*, Said's *Hukuk-ı Düvel* (cf. Karatay, *Türkçe Basmalar Kataloğu*, II, 706), and a few smaller works. Paul-Louis-Ernest Pradier-Fodéré wrote several works on international law, culminating in his *Traité de droit international public européen et américain, suivant les progrès de la science et de la pratique contemporaine*, 9 vols. in 8, Paris, 1885–1906. The most likely basis for Rifat's translation is his *Cours de droit diplomatique à l'usage des agents politiques du Ministère des Affaires étrangères des États européens et américains*, 2 vols., Paris, 1881; see *Catalogue général des livres imprimés de la Bibliothèque Nationale*, Paris, 1937, CXLII, cols. 277–80. Ottokar Maria von

other writers, he introduced his students to a score of major names in international law, including Grotius, Pufendorf, Wolff, Montesquieu, the Abbé de Saint-Pierre, Vattel, and Bentham.[121]

In keeping with the historico-philosophical approach, Hakkî Paşa focused on problems like defining international law; examining the views of several figures (Henry IV of France, the Abbé de Saint-Pierre, Jeremy Bentham, and Immanuel Kant) on the requirements of permanent peace; summarizing recent progress in the law of peace and war; and surveying the international relations of Europe and the Ottoman Empire in much the way that a diplomatic historian might.[122] Along the way, he explored such topics of interest to the Ottomans as European efforts to control the slave trade, the capitulations, and the gradual extension of the European international system, until Japan, for example, effectively became a member of it.[123] What was missing was a comprehensive, topically organized survey of international law as it related to the Ottoman Empire.[124] Perhaps Hakkî Paşa would have liked to produce such a treatise but never got to it.

In contrast, his work on administrative law, together with his study on public finance, is in the nature of a comprehensive treatise.[125] Here again, the conception of the subject is French. In French thinking, litigation between government agencies and private parties is only one aspect of administrative law, the *contentieux administratif*. The total scope of the subject is much larger and includes all aspects of the structure and functioning of government as defined in law and regulation. So conceived, administrative law absorbs part of the domain assigned in U.S. thinking to political science and much of that assigned to public administration. İbrahim Hakkî's work on administrative law thus had the merit of presenting his students with a comprehensive overview of the entire governmental system. At a time when laws and regulations were still not published in a systematic way and no comparable book appears to have been

Schlechta-Wssehrd's *Kitab-ı Hukuk-ı Milel*, Vienna, 1847, was a translation of an unnamed German work on the law of peace; see anon., "Die ersten orientalischen Druckwerke der k. k. Hof- und Staatsdruckerei in Wien," *Zeitschrift der deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft*, I (1847), 367–68. This work was republished in Istanbul in 1295/1878; see Karatay, *Türkçe Basmalar Kataloğu*, II, 726.

[121] Cf. Ernst Reibstein, *Völkerrecht: Eine Geschichte seiner Ideen in Lehre und Praxis*, Munich, 1957–1963, I, 333–61, 488–95, 502–508, 528–34, 553–609; II, 20–30, 153–63.

[122] All but the last of these discussions appears in *MHBD*; the diplomatic-historical discussion is in *MHD*.

[123] On slave trade, *MHBD*, 82–84; *MHD*, 148–52. On capitulations, *MHD*, 102–12. On scope of the European international system, *MHD*, 22–24 (but curiously saying nothing of the Ottoman Empire's formal admission into the European concert by the Treaty of Paris, 1856; cf. J. C. Hurewitz, *MENA*, I, 319–22).

[124] At least, this is true of the two international law works that I could examine. Either the title or the size of the other two suggest the same of them.

[125] İbrahim Hakkî, *Hukuk-ı İdare*; id., *Usul-ı Maliye*, Istanbul, 1315/1897–1898.

available in Ottoman, this was a contribution of extreme importance, which probably only a functionary of İbrahim Hakkî's standing could have produced.[126]

While he indicated that the treatise of Anselme Batbie on administrative law was his main inspiration, İbrahim Hakkî nonetheless preferred to follow the organizational framework of another mid-century French writer, Jules Mallein. The result is a treatise in five parts. The first explains administrative organization. The next three discuss the various "interests" (*menafi*) entrusted to the administration: first the "moral" (*manevî*) or nonmaterial interests, then the "material" (*maddî*), then the "combined" interests that partake of both categories. The fifth and last part takes up the administrative organization's means for executing (*vesait-i icraiye*) its various responsibilities.[127]

Whatever the merits of this scheme—and İbrahim Hakkî pointed out that European writers did not agree on the organization of the subject—he used it as the basis for an extensive examination of the workings of Ottoman government. Part One surveys central and local administration, the police, the civil official personnel system, and the administrative courts. Throughout, the text discusses the relevant laws and regulations. At appropriate points, Hakkî Paşa includes historical discussions of earlier Ottoman practice or comments on that of other nations, ranging as far as the "United Governments of America." Some of his discussions have obvious relevance to later administrative reforms. His emphasis on the French *département* as a legal person (*şahs-i manevî*), on the conciliar bodies found in each *département* government, and on the capacity of the *départements* to raise revenue by levying surtaxes all anticipated ways in which the Ottoman provincial administration law of 1913 differed from

[126] On the irregular publication of laws and regulations, see Heidborn, *Manuel*, I, 102–104. Heidborn's work, while incomplete, is an excellent manual of Ottoman administrative law in the continental European sense. Heidborn does not appear to have been aware of İ.H.'s work. Their books have much in common, however, except that İ.H.'s—if only because he published under the Hamidian press restrictions—lacks Heidborn's critical dimension. (I have not been able to determine who Heidborn was or how he acquired his expertise. I suspect that he was an Austro-Hungarian functionary. I have found two contemporary reviews of his work, but neither is informative on this point: *Journal of Political Economy*, XXI [1913], 274–75 [unsigned]; *Zeitschrift für Völkerrecht und Bundesstaatsrecht*, III [1908–1909], 206–207 [by Josef Kohler].

[127] İbrahim Hakkî, *Hukuk-ı İdare*, I, 16, mentioning Batbie and Jules Mallein (the names transcribed into Arabic script) without naming their works. Anselme Batbie wrote a *Traité théorique et pratique du droit public et administratif*, published at Paris in seven volumes (1868) and again in nine (1885–1894), together with many other works; see *Catalogue général des livres imprimés de la Bibliothèque Nationale*, Paris, 1901, VIII, cols. 689–98. The relevant work by Jules Mallein is *Considérations sur l'enseignement du droit administratif*, Paris, 1857, especially 203–207 (plan for an administrative law course laid out in five parts, as indicated in the text). I am indebted to Albert Hourani for identifying and locating the Mallein work. For a recent study of İ.H.'s work on administrative law, see Tekin Akıllıoğlu, " 'Hukuku İdare' üzerine," *Amme İdaresi Dergisi*, XVI (1983), 56–69.

those that had preceded it. His observation that the French *départements* more nearly resembled the Ottoman *livas* in size and importance anticipated the restructuring of local administration under the Turkish republic.[128]

In his survey of the different "interests" that fell under administrative control or influence, İbrahim Hakkî devoted Part Two of his treatise to the "moral" or intangible interests: religion, the press, and education, including such related topics as antiquities and libraries. Under the heading of "material" interests, he dealt in Part Three with the legal and administrative regime of real property, natural resources, public works, and the government's right of eminent domain. Under the heading of "combined" interests, Part Four took up such subjects as the regulation or licensing of businesses and professions, government promotion of manufactures by such means as registration of patents and trademarks, charitable institutions, and the property of orphans.

Part Five, on the government's means of executing its responsibilities, begins with a preface explaining that these are of two kinds, the military and the fiscal, but that since understanding the latter requires discussion of fiscal theory and practice, the subject would have to be left for a separate work. Part Five of Hakkî Paşa's book on administrative law therefore deals only with military recruitment and transport.[129] His discussion of the "fiscal system" then appeared under separate title as the *Usul-ı Maliye*, the preface of which acknowledges as its source a work by Paul Leroy-Beaulieu, surely his *Traité de la science des finances*. In fact, Hakkî Paşa's book takes up only the subject of Leroy-Beaulieu's first volume, public revenues, and not those of the second, the budget and public credit.[130]

In Parts Two through Five of Hakkî Paşa's discussion of administrative law, the comparative interest noted in Part One continues. For example, his discussion of charitable institutions includes comments on those of

[128] İbrahim Hakkî, *Hukuk-ı İdare*, 132–33; id., *Usul-ı Maliye*, 34; cf. Carter Vaughn Findley, "The Evolution of the System of Provincial Administration as Viewed from the Center," in *Palestine in the Late Ottoman Period: Political, Social, and Economic Transformation*, ed. David Kushner, Jerusalem-Leiden, 1986, 3–29.

[129] Even accepting İ.H.'s explanation of the work's organization, this looks like an incomplete list of governmental "means of execution" outside the fiscal field. This last part of *Hukuk-ı İdare* appears, however, to deal with a residual category. He had discussed the police, for example, in Part One.

[130] Paul Leroy-Beaulieu, *Traité de la science des finances*, 8th ed., 2 vols., Paris, 1912. İbrahim Hakkî, *Usul-ı Maliye*, 4–6, says that there was "no comprehensive work in our language on finance," yet mentions Nail and Rakım, *Hayat-ı Düvel* (Istanbul, 1306/1888–1889, 501 pages), implying that it showed the breadth of the subject, as well as Süleyman Sudî's *Defter-i Muktesit* (3 vols., Istanbul, 1306–1307/1888–1890), which he said remained incomplete. Either of these works is much larger than Hakkî Paşa's sixty-four-page treatise; Leroy-Beaulieu's two volumes contain about 1,800 pages.

France, England, and Spain.[131] In the discussion of finance, the comparative interest broadens into a theoretical treatment of the ideas of Leroy-Beaulieu, Léon Say, and especially Adam Smith, on the relative merits of progressive as opposed to fixed-rate taxes, direct as opposed to indirect levies, and so forth.[132]

Surveying İbrahim Hakkî's legal works in general and attempting to sum up their significance, we have little trouble finding fault; yet the flaws are in many ways those of a pioneer blazing a trail into a new intellectual realm. Much of the discussion is highly abstract. For example, the work on financial administration discusses a number of economists' theories, but scarcely names any Ottoman taxes, let alone discussing their problems of assessment and collection. All of these books except that on administrative law are skimpy or incomplete, discussing financial administration as it relates to taxation but not budgeting, or naming various of the empire's international commitments without attempting a general survey of the leading issues. İbrahim Hakkî's literary works could clearly have been better or more complete. At times, too, his descriptions of Ottoman administrative reality are unconvincingly sunny, as when he described how the advent of the reformed system of personnel administration did away with nepotism.[133] It is appropriate to remember, however, that İbrahim Hakkî wrote under Abd ül-Hamid's censorship. His students must have understood what he meant when he alluded to the evolution of the Ottoman constitution without mentioning the written one of 1876, or when he spoke of extensive government control of the press as if it were normal and natural.[134] Otherwise, it is difficult to believe that he would have been so popular as a teacher or become grand vezir when and as he did.

To some degree, then, assessing Hakkî Paşa's works requires reading between the lines. To the reader who approaches his works with this thought in mind, several facts stand out. One of these, despite Hakkî Paşa's evident ability to fit into the Hamidian "establishment," is his absorption in nineteenth-century political liberalism—a leitmotif of the "modernist" intelligentsia of the late Ottoman period. Hakkî Paşa advocated—and clearly explained—such concepts as separation of powers,[135] the independence of the judiciary,[136] and basic freedoms like those of con-

[131] İbrahim Hakkî, *Hukuk-ı İdare*, II, 184–88.
[132] Idem., *Usul-ı Maliye*, 29, 35–37 and passim.
[133] Idem., *Hukuk-ı İdare*, I, 210.
[134] Ibid., I, 8, 341, 348. Cemil Bilsel, professor of international law at Istanbul University, used to recount to his students that two agents of the sultan always attended Hakkî Paşa's classes, "in which a spirit not approved of by the sultan predominated" (recollections of Leyla Çambel, letter of 22 April 1987).
[135] İbrahim Hakkî, *Hukuk-ı İdare*, 13, 59.
[136] Ibid., 13–14.

science and education.[137] He lectured his students about unlawful detention, inviolability of domicile,[138] or the free-enterprise concept that governments cannot exploit resources as efficiently as can their citizens.[139] He gave the impression that his faith in these concepts—the most "advanced" political ideas with much currency in the Ottoman environment at the time—was complete, although his experiences, from the Italian attack on Libya onward, must have shaken his faith in the progress of the international legal order, another point that he had often emphasized.[140]

Some of his statements show Hakkî Paşa as having a certain religious consciousness; but he was not an observant Muslim,[141] and his books suggest a highly secularized outlook. He was capable of giving a brief description of Islamic jurisprudence (*fıkh*), and its bases in the Qur'ân and *hadîth*, in terms that no religious conservative could have opposed.[142] Yet he unabashedly referred to people like Jeremy Bentham and Adam Smith as *ulema*,[143] "men of knowledge," an appellation long monopolized by Islamic religious scholars; he did not hesitate to refer to secular legal studies as *ilm*[144] ("science" in the broad sense, a term that Muslims historically applied to the religious studies only, as we have noted); and he presented the sharia, not only as the basis of equality, which it is for Muslims, but also as identical in its requirements with natural law—a point that just might be difficult to prove.[145] Some of his most breathtaking brushes with Islamic tradition appear in his adaptive reuses of terms from Islamic religious-legal thought. For example, he described the citizen's obligation to participate in the national defense as a *farz-ı ayn*, a term used in Islamic jurisprudence for obligations which are incumbent on every Muslim, as contrasted to those (*farz-ı kifayet*) which it suffices for some Muslims to perform for the community. Elsewhere, he blithely stated that the French revolutionary wars made all Europe a *dar ül-harb* ("land of war"), when in traditional sharia terms, all territory where non-Muslims rule forms the *dar ül-harb*, as contrasted to the *dar ül-İslâm*, the lands under Muslim rule; and this distinction remains true at all times, whether a war is in progress or not.[146]

To speak of Hakkî Paşa's liberalism or secularism is, however, not ade-

[137] Ibid., 296, 378.
[138] Ibid., 175, 178.
[139] İbrahim Hakkî, *Usul-ı Maliye*, 22.
[140] İbrahim Hakkî, *MHBD*, 52, 70, 121, 136; id., *MHD*, 14.
[141] İnal, *Sadrıazamlar*, 1797–98.
[142] İbrahim Hakkî, *Mukaddime-i İlm-i Hukuk*, 25–26; cf. id., *MHBD*, 40–41.
[143] E.g., İbrahim Hakkî, *MHBD*, 109 (Bentham as one of the *ulema* of England); id., *Usul-i Maliye*, 29 (Adam Smith and others as "famous *ulema*").
[144] E.g., in the title of his *Mukaddime-i İlm-i Hukuk*, "introduction to the science (or study) of law."
[145] İbrahim Hakkî, *MHBD*, 27, 34.
[146] Ibid., 86–87; id., *MHD*, 123.

quate to appreciate his importance: two larger facts require notice. First, while many of his ideas or conceptual frameworks were borrowed, Hakkî Paşa was an original thinker. Whatever his study of administrative law owes in form to Batbie or Mallein, for example, the Ottoman administrative system, a vast subject that Hakkî Paşa understood in detail, provides the work's substance.

Secondly, Hakkî Paşa played a major role in opening an intellectual world to which Ottomans had long needed access. By the 1880s, the empire was long-embarked on that course of legislative eclecticism—the borrowing of foreign laws and codes—that continued under the Turkish republic. The one alternative that had been advanced to this course of action was in itself an innovation, the partial codification—therein lay the innovation—of sharia provisions on civil law in the *Mecelle*.[147] Legislative eclecticism, which has worried foreign scholars and created practical problems for those directly affected, is not highly unusual in the modern world.[148] What Ottomans had lacked, however, was a systematic awareness of the framework of legal thought from which the borrowings came—thence, in large part, the unforeseen explosions that occurred, from the Gülhane Decree of 1839 onward, as new laws were dropped like bombshells into the Ottoman environment. Even if he could not totally eliminate such detonations, Hakkî Paşa's greatest significance lay, as Turkish legal scholars have realized, in his pioneering role in elucidating the principles and theories of European jurisprudence and so making available to his fellows the framework of thought from which they took their borrowings.[149] It was unfortunate for Ottomans to have to wait a half-century after Gülhane for someone to perform this service; yet the fact that he did so imparts to Hakkî Paşa's legal works a significance greater than their sometimes modest aspect suggests.

In the long run, then, İbrahim Hakkî's impact appears greatest as a legal expert. His diminishing success, as he moved from teacher and legal counsellor to ambassador to grand vezir, implies that the complexity of administrative and political life was growing in a way that made it harder for even a talented individual to play such varied roles. Hakkî Paşa's times were trying ones, when it would have been difficult for anyone to look good in all the roles he had to fill. The Italian attack on Libya was no more his fault, we might say, than Ottoman gains at Brest-Litovsk were his achievement. If there really were Ottomans—other than İnal—who saw

[147] Ali Himmet Berki, *Açıklamalı Mecelle (Mecelle-i Ahkâm-ı Adliye)*, Istanbul, 1982; Hıfzı Veldet Velidedeoğlu, "Kanunlaştırma Hareketleri ve Tanzimat," in *Tanzimat I*, Istanbul, 1940, 139–209; Carter Vaughn Findley, art. "Medjelle," *EI²*, forthcoming.

[148] David and Brierley, *Major Legal Systems in the World Today*, 69–73.

149 Akılhoğlu, " 'Hukuku İdare' üzerine," 57, citing S. S. Onar *İdare Hukukunun Umumi Esasları*, introduction to the first edition, 1952

Hakkî Paşa's actions as signs of the end of the world, they were right, as far as the Ottoman world was concerned. The fact remains that he was an original figure in thought and deed. And—to return to a concept mentioned in chapter 1—his works, whatever their flaws, were major milestones in the much-interrupted drive toward rational-legalism.

CONCLUSION: CONTRASTING CULTURAL ORIENTATIONS

While it is impossible within the scope of this study to survey the general intellectual history of the late Ottoman Empire, we can certainly distinguish a variety of responses to the possibilities resulting from cultural dualism. Aşçı Dede İbrahim Halil's memoirs reveal the thought world of a conservative dervish of primarily Mevlevî leanings, together with some of the tensions that prevailed between representatives of the "magic garden" mentality, like him, and either sharia-minded Muslims or secularists. Abdülhak Şinasi Hisar's playboy-şeyh, Ali Nizamî Bey, provides a larger-than-life example of those lost between cultures and not prepared to deal productively with either. İbrahim Hakkî Paşa, finally, represents one of the most dynamic examples of the westernizing official and intellectual, a man more successful in giving his fellows access to a new world of knowledge—and in offering them a systematic, integrated view of it—than in protecting them against the empire's imminent collapse.

These three examples stand at key points in an extremely wide cultural continuum that characterized a particular society at a particular point in its history. The coexistence of two cultural worlds almost totally out of touch with each other—represented by Aşçı Dede's absorption in Celâl el-Din Rumî on one hand, and İbrahim Hakkî's love of Wagner on the other[150]—with Ali Nizamî's wasteland in between, was obviously not a stable situation for the long run. Indeed, even a brief discussion of these examples shows Aşçı Dede's thought world headed for decline (a decline that would leave the Islam of Qur'ân and sunna strengthened), the Ali Nizamîs doomed by their own nonviability (although the continued literary treatments of the type signify their capacity to reproduce), and the Hakkî Paşas visualizing a brighter future whose hopes—for example, his faith in the international legal order—were in part destined for cruel deception. The inconsistency that characterized Ottoman education thus in-

[150] Two cultural worlds almost, but not quite, totally out of touch with each other. . . . From Hakkî Paşa's family background, recall his father, Remzî, who was both Freemason and healer, reputedly able to cure the sick with his breath while reading the Qur'ân (n. 84, above). Conversely, Aşçı Dede was up to date, as noted, in his use of the telegraph, tramways, and steamers. In chapter 6, discussion of suggestions he made for improving office procedures will show that he also had something of Hakkî Paşa's rationalizing tendency within the "magic garden" of his mind.

evitably appeared throughout the intellectual life of the period, fraught with anxiety, and working itself out toward a dénouement never reached before the collapse of the empire. How, indeed, would it be possible to sort out such tensions and disparities without either adapting to an unprecedented cultural pluralism, or going through a cultural revolution?

CHAPTER VI

Career Patterns: Office Environment, Procedure, Sense of Professionalism

As Ottoman civil officials of the Hamidian and Young Turk periods, with their divergent cultural orientations, moved beyond their educations to begin their careers, they plunged into a complex of social realities much different from those known to scribes of the preceding century. Earlier chapters have already mentioned some of the factors that had changed service conditions: reassertion of the central government, administrative growth and acquisition of new functions, changing concepts of egalitarianism, the attempt to create a salary system, and the development of the formal personnel policy of civil officialdom. In this chapter and the next, we shall consider how civil officials functioned professionally in this changed environment. This chapter will examine the physical setting of the offices, the climate of social interaction within them, and work patterns. It will look for evidence of whether new role concepts and a new sense of professionalism had emerged. The next chapter will examine how officials moved through the organizational structures of the civil administration as their careers progressed, and how fully the new personnel policy defined in law and regulation had supplanted the personalism of the patrimonial tradition.

PHYSICAL SETTING AND AMBIANCE OF THE OFFICES

In discussing conditions in the scribal service, we used an engraving from the late eighteenth century, showing the interior of a bureau, together with literary texts that helped explain the detail in the engraving. The fact that these texts dated from the mid-nineteenth century shows that the transformation from scribal service to civil officialdom did not quickly

modify the physical aspect or social dynamics of the offices. In time, however, factors as disparate as the introduction of European-style furnishings or the development of new official roles did begin to make changes. Alterations in the physical setting and ambiance of the offices illustrate these points.

Where the physical appearance of the offices—as distinct from the officials—was concerned, things appear to have changed but little between the d'Ohsson engraving of roughly 1790 (frontispiece) and the Crimean War. Speaking of about that date, Vámbéry describes the Turkish Correspondence Office of the Foreign Ministry as furnished with *divan*s made of red-covered cushions, between which small chests bore the writing implements of the clerks, as in the frontispiece.[1] Use of European-style furniture appears to have become fairly general over the next few decades, however.[2] About mid-century, each member of the Supreme Council of Judicial Ordinances (*Meclis-i Vâlâ-yı Ahkâm-ı Adliye*), an important conciliar body that met at the Sublime Porte, had a European-style settee, on which he would sit cross-legged as on a *divan*, with a little table nearby for writing.[3] By the time the first Ottoman parliament opened in 1877, the deputies had European-style desks, which they sat at European-style, though the desks took the form of long straight rows, resembling school desks, as opposed to either the fan shape of continental European assemblies or the facing rows of the British (illustration 9).[4]

More important than changes in furnishings were changes in people and ways of doing business. The human changes had a number of dimensions, including those in education and intellectual life, to name two topics already discussed, and others in dress and manner. Easily dismissed as superficial, the latter assume deep significance where dress and manner have symbolic significance, as they so often do, or where changes have to be made against the will of the individual. Ottoman military reform had included much-resented changes of uniform as early as the time of Selim III, and definitive changes with the abolition of the Janissaries

[1] Vámbéry, *Sittenbilder*, 205; id., *La Turquie d'aujourd'hui et d'avant quarante ans*, trans. Georges Tirard, Paris, 1898, 14 (for date). On the Turkish Correspondence Office, Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform*, 187, 188, 199, 203, 257, 258, 320. I have not found an illustration of the interior of a civil administrative office of the middle or late nineteenth century.

[2] Vámbéry, *La Turquie d'aujourd'hui*, 14. Aşçı Dede İbrahim (*Risale*, TY3222, 191b; TY78, 581) mentions a meeting of N 1287/1870 in Erzincan where he sat in a chair at the general's side and another official sat on the *kilim* (flatwoven rug) in front of them.

[3] Vámbéry, *Sittenbilder*, 206; cf. Stanford J. Shaw, "The Central Legislative Councils in the Nineteenth Century Ottoman Reform Movement before 1876," *IJMES*, I (1970), 54–69.

[4] An original engraved illustration of the period has been reproduced on the cover of *Armağan: Kanun-u Esasî'nin 100. Yıl*, Ankara, 1978 (no editor named, published by the Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi of Ankara University). The source of the illustration is *Illustrated London News*, LXX, no. 1970, 14 April 1877, pp. 344–45.



Ill. 9. The Ottoman Chamber of Deputies (*Meclis-i Meb'usan*) in Session, 1877. The illustration documents the combination of semi-European and traditional dress on the deputies, some of whom were religious functionaries, and also the use of European-style furnishings, though not in any of the arrangements generally associated with European parliaments.

(1826).[5] The vestimentary reform extended in 1829 to civilian officials, whose old, heavy turbans were then replaced by the fez.[6]

During the *Tanzimat*, the normal civil official costume became the combination of fez, the modified frock coat known as the *istanbulin*, and trousers, an ensemble familiar in portraits of the period. The *istanbulin* combined the knee-length skirt of the European frock coat with a closed front and standup collar, supposedly adopted to spare elderly officials the torments of starched shirtfronts and neckties. Under Abd ül-Hamid, the then normal European frock coat (*redingot*), worn with vest, starched shirt, and necktie, took over instead.[7] In addition, civil officials also had

[5] D'Ohsson, *Tableau* (large folio edition), III, 412, plate 221 (*Yeni tufenkdji*); Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, London, 1961 (hardbound edition), pl. 4 (following 272), two otherwise identical equestrian portraits of Mahmud II, one in traditional dress before the destruction of the Janissaries (1826), one in western-style uniform thereafter.

[6] Lewis, *Emergence* (1968 reprinting), 100–102; Lûtfi, *Tarih*, I, 191–93, 255–56; II, 148, 269–73. Reşad Ekrem Koçu, *Türk Giyim, Kuşam ve Süsleme Sözlüğü*, Ankara, 1967, 113, (*fes*), speaking of a "dress revolution" (*kıyâfet inkilabı*) following abolition of the Janissaries.

[7] Koçu, *Giyim Sözlüğü*, 134, 196–97, arts. "istanbulin," "redingot."



Ill. 10. Ottoman Envoys in Their Official Role:
(L.) Yusuf Misak (Hovsep Misakian), Ottoman Minister at The Hague, 1898–1913. His official uniform is presumably that of an official of the first rank, first class (*rütbe-i ulâ sınıf-ı evveli*), his highest recorded rank.
(R.) İbrahim Hakkî Paşa, apparently shown as Ambassador in Berlin, 1915–1918. Hakkî Paşa's uniform is obscured by his cloak (but cf. ill. 8); the exact occasion and date were not recorded.

military-looking dress uniforms, in designs proportioned to their ranks, with high collars and—at least for the high-ranking, dress swords and gold embroidery down the front (illustrations 8 and 10).[8] Those who had them would wear their decorations with these uniforms. Many paşas accumulated so many decorations, Ottoman and foreign, that they were quite encrusted with them and must have clattered at every move when they appeared in dress uniform. Mehmed Said Paşa, who held the all-time record of nine incumbencies in the grand vezirate but was short, shaggy bearded, and none too debonair, had so many decorations that he would

[8] Both types of outfits are plentifully illustrated in the photographs in İnal, *Sadrıazamlar*: e.g., Mehmed Emin Âli Paşa following 4, the frock-coated group on 996, or the dress-uniformed portrait following 1320.

pin the overflow on the skirts of his frock coat. He was lampooned for doing so.[9]

Behind the gold embroidery and decorations were men slowly accustoming themselves to new roles and responsibilities. As of mid-century, Vámbéry typified officials of the Sublime Porte in terms of a majority of "nationals" and a minority of "internationals." He drew sharp and highly colored contrasts between them in dress and manner. The essence of the difference was that the former placed highest value on proficiency in the chancery style (*kitabet*), which Vámbéry identified as a "useless literary frivolity" that sacrificed meaning to form, while the hallmark of the latter was their French, learned either at the Porte or, "unfortunately" (Vámbéry was writing in German in the 1870s), in Paris, where these men would haunt the *cafés chantants* more often than the *collèges*. Vámbéry rightly pointed out that the "nationals," since they never learned European languages, served largely in local administration, sometimes becoming bureau chiefs or provincial governors. Among the "internationals," he conceded, there were a few serious men—for example, the foreign minister and grand vezir Âli Paşa, whose writing style in French was highly appreciated, as many sources attest, even in France.[10]

Obviously, there was still a long way to go in raising standards among civil officials. As much as we can examine this problem in individual biographies, we can follow it in accounts of how bureaus functioned. Mid-century sources imply considerable confusion and disorder, although the problems most noticeable to Ottomans and foreigners were often different. Vámbéry likened the Foreign Ministry's Turkish Correspondence Office to a bazaar or coffee house. This evocation of settings so much associated with guilds and craftsmen resonates significantly with the discussion of models of social organization in chapter 2. The clerks worked attentively for only a few hours a day, from about 11 a.m. to 2 p.m.—less even than the clerks of the British Foreign Office, who were said, like the fountains in Trafalgar Square, to "play from ten to four, with an interval for lunch."[11] Vámbéry says that Ottoman clerks spent much of their time milling about, eating, or drinking. All the while, people streamed in and out of the offices—*çubukçu*s with their masters' pipes, *kahveci*s with coffee or tea for the officials and their visitors, embassy dragomans coming to pick up whatever information they could from the all-knowing *çubukçu*s (a major source of intelligence, according to Vámbéry), creditors in pursuit of indebted officials, private individuals seeking help with official business, peddlars, beggars, and even entertainers.

[9] Ibid., 1174–75.
[10] Vámbéry, *Sittenbilder*, 196–97, 203–204.
[11] Steiner, *Foreign Office*, 12.

Meanwhile, upstairs, the meetings of the Supreme Council of Judicial Ordinances (*Meclis-i Vâlâ-yı Ahkâm-ı Adliye*) offered a variation on the same theme. As the high-ranking members of the council sat cross-legged on their sofas, a paper would be read on each question before the council—a time-consuming procedure, given the grandiloquence of Ottoman officialese. Then each council member would be asked his opinion. As it happens, according to Vámbéry, many of them would have been conversing among themselves while the paper was read, and would go home at the end of the meeting scarcely aware that they had helped decide important matters of state. In the council, there was at least an attempt to assure confidentiality. This was done through the antique Ottoman method of requiring all the *çubukçu*s and other servants to be deaf and dumb.[12]

These vignettes have a whiff of orientalizing romanticism about them. Yet they are verifiably not divorced from reality. İnal's account of how well Yusuf Kâmil Paşa (1808–1876) ran the Supreme Council of Judicial Ordinances, and how well he understood the issues before it, suggests that Vámbéry's description was not always on target; yet it is significant that İnal offered his observations to defend Yusuf Kâmil against much of the charges Vámbéry makes.[13] Meanwhile, for the offices downstairs, orders issued by *Tanzimat* grand vezirs give little hint of their supposedly bazaar-like aspect. Yet there was persistent concern about office hours, which may have declined between the 1840s and 1860s from about 7 to 4.5 hours per day—excessive and growing numbers of officials would explain both the initially short hours and the downward trend.[14] Other orders attack problems such as unexcused absence or a practice known as *kâğıd haffaflığı*, which amounted to writing petitions or other official papers for private individuals in return for payment, a practice that could become abusive when performed in the offices on government time.[15] Some sources acknowledge the presence of unauthorized persons, including beggars. Some such persons represented security risks; yet embassy translators, for example, retained virtually free run of the Sublime Porte

[12] Vámbéry, *Sittenbilder*, 205–209; cf. Sir Charles Eliot, *Turkey in Europe*, London, 1965, 126–54 (a more hostile view).

[13] İnal, *Sadrıazamlar*, 230–31. For analyses of how the Council of Ministers dealt with diplomatic negotiations, see Roderic H. Davison, "Ottoman Diplomacy at the Congress of Paris (1856) and the Question of Reforms," *VII. Türk Tarih Kongresi, Kongreye sunulan Bildiriler*, Ankara, 1973, II, 580–86; id., "The Ottoman Empire and the Congress of Berlin," in *Der Berliner Kongress von 1878: Die Politik der Grossmächte und die Probleme der Modernisierung in Südosteuropa in der zweiten Hälfte des 19. Jahrhunderts*, ed. Ralph Melville and Hans-Jürgen Schröder, Wiesbaden, 1982, 205–24.

[14] Cf. Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform*, 192, 383 n. 106. I owe the idea of a decline in length of the official workday to Mehmet Genç. Late nineteenth-century officials still had leave until noon to attend schools like the Law School; see Ergin, *Maarif*, III, 902.

[15] The term implies making shoes out of paper; Redhouse translated it as pettifoggery.

until the Young Turk period.[16] Repeated orders on the same subjects show that such problems were indeed chronic.

Under Abd ül-Hamid, who aggravated many of these problems by using the civil administration as a huge patronage machine, the concern about official discipline that the vezirial orders express seems to have dried up. Other documentation proves the continuation of the problems, however. For example, Mizancı Mehmed Murad's novel, *Turfanda mı yoksa Turfa mı* ("First Fruits or Forbidden Fruits," 1890) includes a caustic portrayal of what has to be the Translation Office of the Sublime Porte—the same office that had earlier served as the seedbed of the *Tanzimat* elite. Mizancı Murad later wrote elsewhere that the account portrayed his own days of service at the Sublime Porte.[17]

In this account, the hero, Mansur Bey, who wanted to make his way by his talents, found himself treated with favor out of deference to his influential uncle. No sooner was he appointed to the office than he was given a chair and slant-topped desk at the right side of the examining clerk (*mümeyyiz*)—this in preference to other clerks with years of service. Mansur found that there was no specific division of tasks in the office and not nearly enough work to occupy all the officials. He learned to bring a book to the office. Most of the others spent their time eating sweets, drinking fruit drinks or coffee, smoking, yawning, or strolling about outside. The earnest Mansur Bey concluded that of the office's thirty officials, only three were needed to do the work. He was supposed to become one of the twenty-seven who got a salary for doing nothing. Here was a situation unknown to C. Northcote Parkinson—one where the paperwork could not expand to fill the time available for its completion.[18]

Inquiring about salaries, Mansur Bey found that the examining clerk's was 3,000 kuruş per month—two or three times what he probably needed to support his family, as will appear in chapter 8. The other clerks' salaries ranged from 1,500 kuruş down to 50, with no correlation between salary and seniority or qualifications. Mansur Bey was further startled to discover that peddlers and beggars wandered in and out of the offices; when he inquired, he was told simply that this had always been allowed. He had trouble with the official etiquette that required him to kiss his superiors' coatskirts on ceremonial occasions (this was a "modernization" of an older practice of kissing the hem of the robe). But he had even more trouble with his superiors' efforts to give him promotions and raises for nothing

[16] Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform*, 98, 192–93, 384 n. 110; Çankaya, *Mülkiye Târihi*, III, 95 (Mehmed Rif'at Paşa, foreign minister, 1910–1911, finally refused to see embassy translators whenever they wished); Aşçı Dede İbrahim, *Risale*, TY79, 257–58 (a beggar in his office in Damascus).

[17] Evin, *Origins*, 119; Mehmet Murat, *Mansur Bey*, ed. Düzdağ, 83–85, 97–108.

[18] C. Northcote Parkinson, *Parkinson's Law, and Other Studies in Administration*, Cambridge, Mass., 1957, 2.

except deference to his uncle and their refusals to understand his wish to decline these honors. He soon decided to resign, but could not make his uncle understand. What finally settled the issue was his physically patriotic reaction to a European embassy translator who came into the office and made insulting demands—a reaction that the examining clerk explained to his superiors as an offense on Mansur Bey's part.

Mizancı Murad's account of conditions in government offices is thus highly critical, implying much the self-contempt that emerges from Uşaklıgil's account of the schools. Perhaps it is no coincidence that the Ottoman novelist who wrote such a critical account of a prestigious government office, confirming Vámbéry's criticisms so closely, was born and educated in the Russian Empire. For a society that had idealized its officials, Mizancı Murad's presentation of them as parasites was an important innovation, which he coupled with demands for a new type of official oriented toward service and efficiency and endowed with a higher level of awareness about Ottoman interests.[19] Changes in the physical aspect of offices and officials—chairs, tables, frock coats, and uniforms—were perhaps not meaningless externals, then, but outward signs of deeper changes and of rising expectations.

EVOLVING ADMINISTRATIVE ROUTINES

Accounts like Vámbéry's and Mizancı Murad's are of interest in showing that the offices and councils did not generally work very efficiently. Yet they do not tell how government agencies accomplished the tasks they did perform. Nor do they throw much light on whether the creation of new types of agencies and functions, different from those known to the scribes of earlier times, had introduced new procedural patterns. This section will explore these questions by considering work patterns in the provinces and at Ottoman embassies. The next will examine whether there were Ottomans who did work hard.

Provincial Paper-Pushing

A. Heidborn, a knowledgeable observer at the beginning of this century, described the conduct of affairs in a provincial government center in a way that showed the document-fixation of the old scribes still very much alive.[20] He began by pointing out that the authorities would not themselves record or compile information for private individuals. Since only a tiny minority of the populace had mastered the chancery style, the rest

[19] Mardin, *Jön Türkler*, 87–88.

[20] Heidborn, *Manuel*, I, 167–69. See also Bedi' Nurî, "Hükûmet-i Kırtasiye," *Mülkiye*, no. 8 (1 September 1325/1909), 19–25.

had to resort to one of the petition writers (*arzıhalci*) who set up shop near the government building. Once the nature of the individual's business had been suitably hidden in rhetorical undergrowth, it did not suffice to submit the document and await the results. Rather, the supplicant either had to watch over the fate of his or her request personally, or appoint someone else to do so. Heidborn spoke of appointing a lawyer; other accounts suggest that officials in the office, or even servants (*hademe*) like the *kahveci* or *kilerci*, might be called on by humble folk.[21]

In sum, the wheels of administration did not grind by themselves; rather, interested outside parties had to stand by and lend a hand to turn them. Sometimes called "external administration," this pattern is considered one of the hallmarks of "underdeveloped" administrative systems, but traits of it can be found in some settings even in the United States, for example, in student registration procedures at some universities. Heidborn pointed out the connection between this pattern and the crowding that gave provincial government offices the aspect of "picturesque little fairs."

A person with a petition (*arzıhal*) to submit in a provincial office would try to submit it directly to the chief administrative officer of the place, or at least to a member of his personal staff, and only failing that to the responsible department. From there, the petition would go to the records office (*evrak odası*) for registration, and the petitioner would be given a registry number in return for a payment of 20 paras. The records officer would forward the petition directly to the responsible official if the matter was important, otherwise to the head of the correspondence office (*mektubcu, tahrirat müdürü*) who would put on the document a note for its transmission (*havale*) to the head of the appropriate department and return the document to the records office, whence it would be forwarded to the indicated official after registration of a summary. The decision on the petition would normally take the traditional form of a marginal note (*derkenar*). In more important cases, a senior clerk would draft (*tesvid*, literally "blacken," from the color of the ink) a new document, of which a copyist would make a fair copy (*tebyiz*, "whiten," from the color of the blank paper on which the copy would be put) and attach it to the petition.

Since most requests passed through several bureaus—often for no clear reason—the ultimate result was usually a set of documents (*evrak takımı*), attached to one another, hard to handle, and dirtied and torn from being rolled up and unrolled. The petition would eventually be submitted, depending on its importance, to either the chief administrative officer or the head of the correspondence office, who would note on it an order for execution and return it to the records officer for him to commu-

[21] Vámbéry, *Sittenbilder*, 202; Lûtfi, *Tarih*, V, 133.

nicate the decision to the petitioner at his next visit, no official initiative being taken to notify him.

Heidborn concludes that this mode of procedure had three main faults. The first was the delays that resulted from the habit of continually referring matters to other offices. This habit had its roots in the officials' age-old fear of assuming responsibility for anything, but had gained strength as the complexity of government and the drive for centralization progressed. The delays became especially great when matters were referred from the provinces to Istanbul. While serving in the nearby military headquarters at Edirne in 1896–1897, Aşçı Dede İbrahim Halil found that it took at least four months to refer a trivial matter to the War Ministry in Istanbul and get an answer.[22] The scope that such referrals could assume at Istanbul appears truly extraordinary. Mütercim Mehmed Rüşdî Paşa (1811–1882), a military grand vezir and source of almost surrealistic anecdotes about government in his day, told a story about sending a document to the Sublime Porte during his second tenure as minister of war to request timbers to use as wagon tongues on gun carriages.[23] A few months later, the paper came back to him, having been routed or rerouted through nine departments. The attachments to his original document had become as thick as a timber. He then had to refer the matter to another department himself; and when it came back, the set of documents was twice as thick as before. When he became minister of war the third time, the bundle came before him again. Seeing that the wagon tongues had been forgotten and a regulation on forests had appeared on top, he threw the bundle into the fire to spare the offices further trouble.

The second flaw Heidborn saw in the prevailing system of administration was that the authorities would not deign to notify their decisions to the petitioner, but rather waited for him or her to appear, a requirement that occasioned considerable trouble and expense to those who did not live in province or district capitals. It would have been difficult for the government to do otherwise, he added, since the postal service was not well enough organized to assure delivery of notice to the petitioners at their residences.[24]

The third flaw, according to Heidborn, was the "supreme disorder" of the archives and records offices. Except for the French-language correspondence of the Foreign Ministry and the papers of some semi-official (and European-controlled) agencies such as the Public Debt Administra-

[22] Aşçı Dede İbrahim, *Risale*, TY79, 476.

[23] İnal, *Sadrıazamlar*, 144. For his image of the state as a "ship of fools," see ibid., 138, and Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform*, 165.

[24] Cf. Bedi' Nurî, "Hükûmet-i Kırtasiye," 21. Here, the last stage in processing a poor boy's application to a government school as a non-fee-paying student—one of several needlessly complicated procedures discussed—is to notify him by mail.

tion, documents were still not filed by subject in dossiers. Rather, they were put in envelopes, alone or with other documents. The envelopes were put—an old story—in sacks, the sacks in chests, the chests in storerooms (*mahzen*). There, the documents became the prey of insects and mice, sometimes also of wind and rain. Whether or not the storeroom was full, there always seemed to be enough chests in the corridors to impede movement among the offices. Officials could never know what was in a chest except by rummaging through it, a procedure that led them usually to come back saying the paper requested was not there. It was "only fair to add," however, that upon insistence—"for example, that of a consul"—the officials could usually find what was needed.[25] A half-century earlier, Ahmed Cevdet Paşa had discovered even graver problems in the handling of provincial records. Sent to Bosnia in 1863–1864 to investigate disturbances in the countryside, he discovered that a special agricultural regulation for the province, drawn up in Istanbul four years earlier, printed in both Ottoman and Bosnian, and sent out in many copies for distribution, had remained unknown in Bosnia. Poking about in the storeroom at Mostar "as if digging for buried treasure," he and a clerk found the unopened bundles, with the labels and markings that Cevdet himself had had placed on them in Istanbul still intact.[26]

Embassy Life and Work

The aspect of official procedure that Heidborn's account evokes is what Turks call "stationery business" (*kırtasiyecilik*). Many languages have expressive names for this aspect of administration: red tape in English, *paperasseries* in French, *Amtsschimmel* ("chancery mold") in German, *graphiokratia* or "write-ocracy" in modern Greek; *kâghaz-bâzî* or "playing with paper" in Persian, *uslûb dîwânî* or "chancery style" in Arabic—a fascinating conflation of writing style and procedure in general. If such a concept of procedure still prevailed in settings relatively close in origin to the scribal tradition, surely the same would not be true in the quintessentially modern agencies, specially created to perform new and different functions. There, surely, we should find roles and functions defined in terms of goals external to the agencies and their routines. Or had the spores of the "chancery mold" blown over into these new agencies? A look at Ottoman embassies answers this question.

By nature, an embassy is a microcosm of the society it represents. Problems that might be manageable at home assume enlarged importance in a small exile community duty bound to keep up appearances and play a

[25] Heidborn, *Manuel*, I, 169.

[26] Cevdet, *Tezâkir 21–39*, 3–5; I am indebted to İlhan Başgöz for recalling this passage to my attention.

representational role. We have seen that the Ottoman embassies played an important role in the early reform era, if primarily in the inverted sense of representing the West to the Ottomans. By the late nineteenth century, how were they performing?

It is not hard to find Ottoman diplomats who performed their missions dutifully and sometimes gained recognition as successes in their profession.[27] Partly, the Ottoman envoys' performance has to be judged by standards of a more relaxed age. A lot of their successes were probably social. Some of them were polished *hommes de salon* or ladies' men, and amusing anecdotes about their escapades are not lacking.[28] Perhaps a king should have the last word on the social side of Ottoman diplomacy. Notified that the poet and *bon vivant* Abd ül-Hak Hâmid might be appointed Ottoman ambassador in London, Edward VII pulled himself away from more pressing business to send the following cipher telegram:

> Biarritz, 17 March 1908
> Quite agree to Hamid Bey being Ambassador.
> He looks very presentable, trust he is intelligent.
> Edward R. I.[29]

Whether the sultan's diplomats were presentable at court or intelligent or not, the extreme centralization of affairs at Yıldız palace largely deprived them of their ostensible mission. Abd ül-Hamid acknowledged that he attached little importance to his diplomats stationed abroad: he would

[27] Roderic H. Davison has done more than anyone else to study the performance of Ottoman diplomats. See his " 'Russian Skill and Turkish Imbecility': The Treaty of Kuchuk Kainardji Reconsidered," *Slavic Review*, XXXV (1976), 463–83; id., "Ottoman Diplomacy at the Congress of Paris (1856) and the Question of Reforms," II, 580–86; id., "Halil Şerif Paşa, Ottoman Diplomat and Statesman," *Osmanlı Araştırmaları: The Journal of Ottoman Studies*, II (1981), 203–21; id., "Midhat Paşa and Ottoman Foreign Relations," *Osmanlı Araştırmaları: The Journal of Ottoman Studies*, V (1986), 161–73; id., "The Ottoman Empire and the Congress of Berlin," 205–23; id., "The Secret Report on the Congress of Berlin," *Tarih Dergisi*, XXXII (1979), 639–52. We have already noted Âli Paşa's proficiency in diplomatic French (Vámbéry, *Sittenbilder*, 197). Esat Cemal Pâker, *Kırk Yıllık Hariciye Hâtıraları*, includes numerous evaluative comments: the positive impression that ambassador Rif'at Bey and his wife, the daughter of a Russian general, made in London, 1905–1909 (41–44); diplomatic and social success of his successor Ahmed Tevfik Paşa (45–48); encounter in Berlin with Osman Nizamî Paşa, outstanding as both soldier and diplomat (73); a French official's admiration at the French style and content of a note written by Grand Vezir Ahmed Tevfik Paşa (101–102). One of Pâker's purposes is to compare diplomats of the Young Turk years favorably with those of the preceding period.

[28] Anon., *Turkish Diplomatic Life in Washington under the Old Regime, by the Wife of a Diplomat*, New York, 1910, perhaps the best source of this kind. A wealthy relative of the khedive of Egypt, as well as a diplomat and foreign minister, Halil Şerif was socially almost in a class by himself. In addition to the Davison article on him, cited above, see Hajo Holborn, ed., *Aufzeichnungen und Erinnerungen aus dem Leben des Botschafters Joseph Maria von Radowitz*, Berlin and Leipzig, 1925, I, 240: ". . . Halil-Pascha, der reiche Ägyptier, ein sonderbar aus modernster Zivilisation und orientalischem Naturell zusammengesetzter Weltmensch, der lange in Paris gelebt hatte, wo Alphonse Daudet ihn zum Vorbilde für seinen berühmten 'Nabab' nahm."

[29] PRO, FO371/532/308(?), "Decypher of Telegram from H.M. The King."

conduct his own foreign relations with the envoys at his court.[30] This procedure distorted the Ottoman diplomats' role, but did not leave them without things to do.

To the extent that the diplomats retained an active role, it was as agents of the palace. The best evidence of this is the vast correspondence that passed between the palace secretariat (*Mabeyn*) and the embassies and that now survives in the Yıldız collection of the Prime Ministers' (*Başbakanlık*) Archives. Diplomatic appointments were now controlled from the palace.[31] The palace-centered system of spies and informers extended into the embassies.[32] In 1885, we find a case of an ambassador, Ahmed Tevfik Bey (Paşa) being secretly accompanied to his post in Berlin by one of the sultan's secretaries, without either the grand vezir, foreign minister, or German ambassador being informed of this.[33] In 1890, the sultan called the same ambassador back to Istanbul for consultations, but then forgot about him—the Foreign Ministry apparently had no part in the recall—until there was barely time to send the ambassador back to Germany to attend a royal wedding.[34] But one of the best proofs of how heavily palace dominance bore on the embassies emerges from the complaints of a later ambassador in Berlin, also named Ahmed Tevfik Paşa, about his inability to get either palace or ministry to respond to evidence he had submitted implicating high officials in the sale of decorations and theft of ciphers. This ambassador became so frustrated that he tried to resign, only to be told, like many others, that his request was refused and he would continue to serve as in the past. Perhaps he did not know that one of those he opposed—Mehmed Nurî Bey, head of the Foreign Correspondence Office at the Foreign Ministry—was a leading palace agent and presumably able to block appeals to the sultan.[35]

The idea Abd ül-Hamid had in mind for his ambassadors left them at best in an uncomfortable situation. He had forbidden Muslim dependents to accompany diplomats abroad, and the rule was difficult to circumvent. It must have been keenly resented, especially since it did not apply to non-

[30] Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform*, 231.

[31] PRO, FO78/4343, White to Salisbury, 23 Mar. 1891.

[32] Pâker, *Hariciye Hâtıraları*, 49; anon., *Turkish Diplomatic Life in Washington*, 54–58, on M. Ali Bey, "a spy in the service of Abdul Hamid" and son of "Izzet Pacha, . . . mind of [the] Yildiz Camarilla."

[33] PAAA (Bonn), Türkei 134, Bd. 14, cipher telegram from Radowitz to Foreign Office, 20 Nov. 1885 (T139, roll 392). The Ahmed Tevfik Paşa referred to here is the later grand vezir (Har., SA429; İnal, *Sadrıazamlar*, 1704–62), who was ambassador in Berlin 1885–1895.

[34] PAAA (Bonn), Türkei 162, Bd. 2, Radowitz to Caprivi, 6 November 1890 (T139, roll 394).

[35] This ambassador is Sarayhzade Ahmed Tevfik Paşa, a military man who served in Berlin c. 1897–1906 (Har., SA723). On Mehmed Nurî Bey (Har., SA420), Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform*, 257; and BBA, Yıldız 36.2328/2.146.XV, items no. 152, 155, 157–62, 178, dated 17 October 1320/1904–20 February 1320/1905. The two Ahmed Tevfik Paşas are often confused, but are distinguishable wherever their ranks are mentioned, inasmuch as the first, who later became grand vezir, held civil ranks, and the latter held military ranks.

Muslim diplomats' families, or even to non-Muslim dependents of Muslim diplomats.[36] This prohibition may have increased the frequency of marriages—and less formal liaisons—between Ottoman diplomats and foreign ladies, some of them unsuitable choices, with the result that a decree issued after the 1908 revolution required all Foreign Ministry officials to obtain approval from the ministry for their marriages.[37] Especially where diplomatic appointments served as a form of exile, Abd ül-Hamid would sometimes not even allow a diplomat to return home in the event of illness in the family. This was true of the literary ambassador Sadullah Paşa, whose distress reached the point that he committed suicide at the embassy in Vienna in 1891.[38] A key part of the diplomats' hardship was that their salaries were not regularly paid—unless they had connections at the palace. The same was true for officials in general; but the situation of the diplomats—isolated from their families and expected to maintain a certain standard as a matter of duty—appears especially painful.[39]

Under the circumstances, the conditions of embassy life often became uncomfortable, if not hellish. Esat Cemal Pâker paints a memorable picture of his first diplomatic assignment, at the London embassy under ambassador İstefanaki Musurus (1902–1907), an Ottoman Greek and son of Kostaki Musurus, who had been ambassador at London for many years

[36] Galip Kemali Söylemezoğlu, *Hariciye Hizmetinde Otuz Sene*, Istanbul, 1949, I, 82–83; Anon., *Turkish Diplomatic Life in Washington*, 10, 24–25 ("Mme. Sidky Bey," an Armenian married to a Turk, "was able to come to Washington. . . . Ali Ferrouh Bey . . . smuggled [his wife] out. . . . every one knows that Mohammedan ladies are not allowed out of their own country."); 54 (Mehmed Ali's arrival with his wife, children, and domestic staff passes without comment, perhaps a matter of course, given his status as a palace spy).

[37] *Düstur*[2], I, 725, irade of 21 Ş 1327/1909; this issue was a concern of foreign minister Rif'at Paşa (1861–1925), whose foreign marriage was one of the most brilliant: Çankaya, *Mülkiye Târihi*, III, 95. The fact that R.'s wife was the daughter of a Russian general caused anxiety, however.

[38] Har., SA424; İnal, *Şairler*, 1542–48; BBA, Yıldız 18.91.5.45, papers about Sadullah Paşa's suicide.

[39] Anon., *Turkish Diplomatic Life in Washington*, 55 (Mehmed Ali Bey, son of "Arab" İzzet Paşa, got his salary on time; "the rest of the personnel, as usual under the old regime, had to wait"). In the mid-1890s, Ottoman diplomats and students in Germany had extreme difficulty because of nonpayment of their salaries and stipends. The ambassador had to sell the embassy carriage and horses to cover daily expenses; BBA, Yıldız 36.139/24.139.XVIII, items no. 35, 106, 147, 205, 210–11, 249 of 19 March 1895–14 November 1897; cf. Yıldız 36.2328/2.146.XV, items no. 144, 148, 150, 25 September–4 October 1320/1904. Probably because of the Ottoman-Greek War of 1897, the financial problems of Ottoman consuls and diplomats reached an extreme then everywhere from Tehran to Washington: BBA, BEO 64096, 68244, 68595, 68635, with numerous enclosures. A Brussels newspaper once (c. 1907–1909) quipped that Esat Cemal [Pâker] had more gold (embroidery) on his uniform than the Ottoman government had in its treasury; Pâker, *Hariciye Hâtıraları*, 69. Investigating salary problems in 1902, Grand Vezir Said Paşa identified special problems about consular and diplomatic salaries. These were supposedly paid out of customs revenues, but so many more pressing claims—including ones from the palace—had been made against these that nothing was left but the Baghdad customs, which were inadequate for the consular-diplomatic payroll; Mehmed Said Paşa, *Said Paşa'nın Hâtıratı*, 2 vols. in 3, Istanbul, 1328/1910, II, 118–19.

(1851–1885).[40] The European-educated ambassador had the problem that while he spoke both English and French like a native, he did not know Ottoman Turkish well. The main thing he wanted to know about his new embassy secretary, a graduate of Galatasaray, was thus whether or not the young man could speak and write his native language. Writing for a Turkish readership after the struggle between Ottomanism and nationalism had long since been won and lost, Pâker did not mince words about what things like this, or incidents in which non-Muslim diplomats displayed a lack of qualification or of identification with the state they represented, did to his "national feelings."[41] A further problem took the form of "amateur officials" like Abd ül-Hak Hâmid, counsellor of embassy, who neither pushed papers like an old-fashioned scribe nor did anything else much of an official nature.[42] If we add a few more secretaries who knew little or no Turkish, a perpetually drunk French translator, and an embassy imam who was another Abd ül-Hak Hâmid in style and dress, we have the London embassy staff as Pâker recalled it.[43] This was not the worst situation

[40] Sinan Kuneralp, "Bir Osmanlı Diplomatı, Kostaki Musurus Paşa," *Belleten*, XXXIV (1970), 421–35; BBA, DSA I, 684, İstefanaki Musurus Paşa.

[41] Pâker, *Hariciye Hâtıraları*, 14, 17, 19–22; cf. 58 (episode concerning Diran Noradounghian, second secretary at Brussels, son of Gabriel Noradounghian).

[42] There was, however, at least one episode in which Abd ül-Hak Hâmid created real trouble. This occurred in 1889, when he returned from Istanbul with recommendations from the first secretary at the palace to contact Gladstone, then in opposition, and try to influence him so as to improve the British attitude toward the Ottomans. Abd ül-Hak Hâmid wrote to Gladstone, signing himself Abd ül-Hak Bey, and saying nothing about his connection to the Ottoman embassy. Gladstone responded, not to "Abd ül-Hak Bey," but to the Foreign Office, writing to ask if it knew of this individual. The Foreign Office then wrote to the Ottoman ambassador, Rüstem Paşa (one of the Foreign Ministry officials of European origin, BBA, DSA II, 100). Rüstem was about to respond that he had never heard of such a person when it occurred to him to ask Hâmid Bey, who admitted making this overture without the ambassador's knowledge. Great embarrassment resulted for Rüstem Paşa, who felt he had no choice but to take advantage of the mystery, respond that he knew of no Abd ül-Hak Bey, and hope Gladstone would let the matter drop. Rüstem did write a highly didactic letter—in French—to the palace secretariat to emphasize the dangers that such an overture to the opposition might antagonize the foreign secretary, Salisbury. "Votre Excellence n'ignore pas que dans les Etats constitutionnels, les membres du corps diplomatique doivent être excessivement prudents dans les relations qu'ils peuvent avoir avec les chefs de l'opposition" (BBA, Yıldız 18.75/4.75/4.51, items no. 74–77, 26 November–23 December 1889). Another irregularity involving Abd ül-Hak Hâmid occurred several years later, while Rüstem Paşa was on medical leave, when Hâmid Bey was appointed to the unheard-of post of "assistant ambassador" (*sefaret-i seniye muavini*). This occassioned another didactic dispatch from Rüstem to the *Mabeyn*—this time he took the trouble to send it in Turkish—pointing out that diplomatic ranks and titles were matters of reciprocity and mutual recogition and that Hâmid Bey—despite his mastery in poetry and prose—confessed his incapacity for political affairs beyond the occasional drafting of a document in Turkish (*iştigali yalnız bir kaç türkçe tahrirat karalamaktan ibaret kalmış ve masalih-i siyasiye ile iştigale iktidarı olmadığını kendisinin mu'terif bulunmakta olduğundan . . .*). Rüstem requested that this "bad influence" be removed (BBA, Yıldız, 18.1624.51.78, Rüstem to *Mabeyn*, 23 August 1310/1894). Abd ül-Hak Hâmid held positions at the London embassy from 1886 to 1908, most of the time on condition that he not publish; Sabri Esat Siyavuşgil, art. "Abdülhak Hâmid," *İA*, I, 69.

[43] Pâker, *Hariciye Hâtıraları*, 15–16, 53–57.

on record. In 1911 Madrid became the scene of an outright blowup between the minister, Samipaşazade Sezaî Bey, and secretary of legation Spiro Efendi over questions of document security and staff loyalty.[44]

Under such circumstances, what could Ottoman diplomats accomplish? To what extent did they escape the concept of official function as document production for newer, goal-oriented role concepts? In fact, the need to correspond with the foreign ministry of the country where the embassy was located and with both Yıldız palace and the Foreign Ministry in Istanbul did require a good bit of time for document production. Pâker has left a humorous account of the "letter-writing ceremonies" that brought Ambassador Musurus, the boozy French translator M. Jolivard, and himself together each morning in London to attend to the French correspondence. They would debate each word, passing all possibilities "in review," the ambassador ever reluctant to concede that a Turk could think up a better choice than he. Then the session would degenerate into a duel of obscenities in French between Musurus and M. Jolivard, until they exhausted their stock and got back to business.[45] The Turkish correspondence does not appear to have benefited from such ceremony. But Pâker does recount an incident when Musurus Paşa asked him to draft a telegram, rejecting draft after draft on the ground that more Arabic and Persian words were needed to communicate with the palace. Musurus finally accepted a draft of which he did not understand a single word.[46] To judge from archival evidence, this concept of how to communicate with the palace was quite widespread.

When they were not worried about finding just the right word in Ottoman or French, Ottoman diplomats of this period did have a number of goals to think about. Some of them are rather surprising compared to what might be considered normal diplomatic functions. One task was to respond to constant demands from the palace for exotic goods. Even at the tensest moments in Ottoman-British relations, cipher telegrams would come from the palace conveying the sultan's decree for—one example—immediate acquisition of an all-white talking parrot.[47]

A more serious object of diplomatic and consular endeavor under Abd ül-Hamid was surveillance of Ottoman students, intellectuals, or other political activists abroad. In 1890, for example, Ambassador Rüstem Paşa in London was trying to keep track of two small societies, one of Indian Mus-

[44] Har., Müt 156, dossier on "Remplacement de Spiro Effendi 2me Secrétaire de la Légation Ottne à Madrid, 1912."

[45] Pâker, *Hariciye Hâtıraları*, 19–20. It is not clear how literally to take Pâker's accounts of Musurus' shabbiness, anti-Turkish feeling, or corruption. Pâker's memories may have been colored by his view of the Hamidian period in general and by the breakdown of intercommunal relations he describes in occupied Istanbul after World War I.

[46] Ibid., 38.

[47] Ibid., 24, with other examples.

lim students and another of Armenians. In addition, in an effort to identify the author of an *odieuse brochure*, he had Salîm Fâris, whom he connects with the Arabic newspaper *Al-Jawâ'ib*, under surveillance. Rüstem was also trying, through detectives, to locate another suspect whom he identifies as Osman Seyfî, son of a Madame Millingen, who used to live at Istanbul and was for a time married to Grand Vezir Kıbrıslı Mehmed Paşa.[48] From faraway Washington at the end of the same decade, Ali Ferruh Bey reported on Armenian and Zionist activities.[49]

Given the numbers of Ottoman subjects present, the centers of surveillance efforts were France and Germany. In the late 1890s, as on other occasions, Abd ül-Hamid sent abroad a special mission to buy off the opposition. The correspondence between the palace and this mission includes many of the best-known names of the Young Turk movement—[Ahmed] Rıza, İshak Sükûtî, Tunalı Hilmî, Abdullah Cevdet.[50] Assigning stipends to troublesome intellectuals abroad and trying to get them to return and accept appointments in Istanbul was typical of the sultan's use of patronage in an effort to reintegrate the entire politically conscious segment of society into his dependent bureaucracy.

Such attempts to neutralize the opposition were subject to countermanipulation, however; and coping with this became another task for the embassies. More than once, ambassadors found themselves dealing with confidence men who professed to have information about plots to assassinate the sultan.[51] More frequently, the sultan's envoys had difficulties because of his inability to understand that he could not control the press in Europe in the same way that he could at home. Inside the empire, the press was completely controlled through censorship and subsidies to more or less all the newspapers, including the few that contemporaries regarded as independent. The sultan probably thought that he had also

[48] BBA, Yıldız 18.75/4.75/4.5, correspondence between Rüstem Paşa and *Mabeyn*, items no. 78, 80–82, 84, 86, 88–89, 103–104, 12 January–21 July 1890. Salîm Fâris was the son of Ahmad Fâris al-Shidyaq, founder of *Al-Jawâ'ib* (1861–1884), the first widely circulated Arabic newspaper. Cf. Hourani, *Arabic Thought*, 97–98; Mardin, *Jön Türkler*, 14–15. On the Millingens, see Davison, *Reform in the Ottoman Empire*, 103, 209 n. 128, 215 n. 152, 450.

[49] BBA, Yıldız, C II.–.54.136, various entries, e.g., p. 61 of 17 May 1898 and p. 89 of 18 June 1898.

[50] BBA, Yıldız, 36.2328/4.146.XV, items no. 1, 3–6, 9–11, 13, 15–16, 18–21, 23–25 of 27 July 1899–20 June 1316/1900; roughly contemporary documentation on student affairs in Germany in BBA, Yıldız, 36.139/52.139.XVIII, items no. 65–66, 87, 92–94, 99, 177, 181, 211, 213, 218, 220, 225, 227, 229, 236. Cf. Mardin, *Jön Türkler*, 70–71, 93–94; M. Şükrü Hanioğlu, "Genesis of the Young Turk Revolution of 1908," *Osmanlı Araştırmaları: The Journal of Ottoman Studies*, III (1982), 287–92; id. *Jön Türklük*, 304–309; Erik Jan Zürcher, *The Unionist Factor: The Rôle of the Committee of Union and Progress in the Turkish National Movement, 1905–1926*, Leiden, 1984, 13–18.

[51] BBA, Yıldız 36.2467/3.146.XV, pp. 4–5, 26 (reports from Vienna, February 1884); Yıldız 36.139/52.139.XVIII, item no. 225 (report from Berlin, 6 April 1315/1899).

"bought" some European publications, like *Punch*, though their editors probably saw the payments merely as multiple subscriptions.[52]

Ottoman intellectuals, and even some diplomats, eventually realized that the freedom of the press in the outside world offered them leverage. In 1901, an extraordinary correspondence began between the minister in Madrid, Keçecizade İzzet Fuad Paşa, and both the palace and the Foreign Ministry. Grandson of the grand vezir Fuad Paşa, İzzet Fuad Paşa was a military officer and a bit of a megalomaniac, who once referred to himself as "a man whom Europe adored" (*benim gibi Avrupa'nın tapındığı bir adam*). He had several grievances: the confiscation of his papers, the inadequacy of his allowances for the proper furnishing of the legation, the official disapproval of a book he had written. He threatened to join the opposition and write another book unless his demands were met. He did write the book, and it, too, was disapproved.[53] Commenting on another Ottoman's threats, a German diplomat concluded that it had become "a regular sport" for individuals wanting advancement to threaten to go abroad and publish in order to get the sultan to buy them off with raises and promotions.[54]

Meanwhile, İzzet Paşa's colleagues in busier posts were steadily occupied with reporting unfavorable publications, trying to find ways to thank or honor authors of favorable pieces, appealing—usually unsuccessfully—to the foreign ministers of the host governments for help in suppressing unfavorable publicity, and responding to orders from the palace to follow the movements of people like "the outlaw Murad"—that is, Mizancı Murad in exile.[55] The seriousness that the ambassadors had to attach to these undertakings became clear in November 1900, when the envoy Karatodori, who had represented the Ottomans at Brussels for twenty-five years, learned from the newspapers that he was to be replaced. The reason was his failure to prevent publication of a libel against the sultan. The author, a former translator at the French embassy in Istanbul, had written it to extort money. Trying to dissuade him from publishing, Karatodori had bargained him down from ten thousand pounds to six thousand. But the government declined to come through with that, and sacrificed its envoy instead.[56]

Correspondence between the palace and the Berlin embassy shows extra dimensions in Ottoman relations with the most supportive of the great powers. One theme is purchasing. The orders range from large amounts of military supplies to small amounts of clothing and kitchen utensils, presumably for the palace. One order informs the ambassador that the first secretary at the palace, obviously speaking for the sultan, has read about Professor Ro'engen (Roentgen)'s invention for photographing things behind walls, in boxes, or under the skin, and wants a set of the apparatus bought and one of the Ottoman officers then in Europe trained in its use. A later communication from the palace announces the discovery that the Krupp firm has sold to other governments at lower prices. The empire has been buying from Krupp for a long time, and the sultan has shown favor to the present Krupp and his father. The firm should sell to the Ottomans more cheaply and not force them to go elsewhere. The sultan was prepared to place a large order, on condition that the firm give a good price and send someone from Germany to negotiate, rather than leaving the matter to its Istanbul representative—terms that Krupp accepted. Sometimes military purchasing abroad was left to the ambassador (perhaps a military man himself); sometimes senior military officers were sent from Istanbul to do the ordering.[57] The opportunities for illicit gain were

[52] BBA, Mal. Müd. 19871, page recording payments of March 1303/1887 (4,000 kuruş to the *Phare du Bosphore*, 3,000 to the newspaper *Vizantis*, 1,500 to *La Turquie*, another 3,000 to the same, 2,000 to M. Bianchi [otherwise unidentified], 2,000 to the newspaper *Hıfz ul-Sıhha*, 1,000 to the newspaper *Istanbul*); entry several pages later, 5 January 1303/1888, on payment of 250 liras, fourth installment of the year on the 1,000 ordered paid by imperial decree, to M. Whitaker (?), holder of the concession for the *Levant Herald*, which some thought the only independent paper in Istanbul. Cf. BBA, BEO 253176, 12 B 1326/August 1908, ordering termination, under the (restored) constitution, of monthly payments of 1710 kuruş to censorship officials, and of various sums to the following newspapers and periodicals: *Saadet*, 5,000; *Manzume-i Efkâr*, 1083 kuruş 30 paras; *Handelsblatt*, 2,000; *Punch*, 1,083 kuruş 30 Paras; *Ceride-i Şarkiye*, 722 kuruş 20 paras; *Levant Herald*, 6,021; *Moniteur oriental*, 4,071; BEO 253008 of 13 B 1326/August 1908, cutting off allocations of 1,227 kuruş per month to the Agence Fournier (?) news agency, 1,700 to the Agence Nationale, 2,000 to the newspaper *La Turquie*, and 1,700 to the newspaper *Istanbul*. Could the editors of *Punch* have been bought for ten pounds a month?

[53] BBA, Yıldız 15.74/40–b,c,d.74.15, correspondence of 8 ZA 1318/1901–24 June 1904 (the phrase "a man whom Europe adored" is in İzzet's letter of 8 ZA 1318/1901 to first secretary at the palace). Cf. Har., Müt. 8, dossier "Corps diplomatiques et consulaire Ottoman. Démissions. 1862," correspondence on "resignation" of İzzet Paşa, 9 September 1901–18 March 1902. Ottoman agents in Paris also got involved in coping with İzzet Paşa: BBA, Yıldız 36.2328/4.146.XV, from Feridun in Paris, nos. 26–27, dated 29 September 1316/1900 and 9 October 1900. Cf. BBA, Yıldız 5.1695.83.2, from grand vezir, 19 M 1326/1908, announcing receipt of İzzet Paşa's new book, *Zayi olmuş başka Fırsatlar* (actually in French: *Autres occasions perdues: critique stratégique de la campagne d'Asie Mineure, 1877–1878*, Paris, 1908): the book is provocative and makes clear that İzzet cannot retain his post as minister in Madrid. İzzet Fuad also published *Les occasions perdues: études stratégiques et scientifiques sur la campagne turco-russe de 1877–78*, Paris, 1900; *Le contact: étude de guerre moderne*, Paris, 1906, and *Paroles de vaincu . . . : après le désastre—avant la revanche*, Paris, 1913.

[54] PAAA (Bonn), Türkei 159, Bd. 3, Bodenau (?) to Bülow, Tarabya, 9 July 1904, on Major Ahmed Rifat Bey, son of late Grand Vezir Halil Rifat Paşa.

[55] BBA, Yıldız 36.139/24.139.XVIII, correspondence between Berlin embassy and *Mabeyn*, items no. 6, 13, 16, 25, 27, 34, 145 (*şaki Murad*), 146, 151, 13 January 1895–7 September 1896; on Mizancı Murad, Mardin, *Jön Türkler*, 55–65; Hanioğlu, *Jön Türklük*, 178ff.

[56] PAAA (Bonn), Türkei 162, Bd. 5, Alvensleben in Brussels to Bülow, 19 November 1900; Har., SA30, "Etienne" Karatodori. After his dismissal, the Brussels post was given as an additional duty (along with that at Berne) to Paris ambassador Salih Münir Paşa (Har., SA438), a palace protégé whose intrigues—Alvensleben and Karatodori thought—may have caused the dismissal.

[57] BBA, Yıldız, 36.139/24.139.XVIII, items no. 2, 14, 18–20, 107–109, 112–13, 126, 132, 136,

great.[58] Not unrelated to questions of purchasing were attempts to get technical help from the Germans—for example, for control of cholera—or questions pertaining to Germans, especially military officers, in Ottoman service.[59]

Perhaps the next most outstanding trait of the *Mabeyn*-Berlin correspondence is the frequent demands from Istanbul concerning the state of Ottoman-German relations. It would not be too much to see in these queries expressions of Abd ül-Hamid's paranoia. Anxiety rose when the German ambassador was changed in the midst of the Armenian problems of the mid-1890s; it fell when Bismarck proposed a toast to the sultan; it rose again when the newspapers reported that the Kaiser was going to England for a regatta.[60] The Germans did not fail to set a price on their friendship. When the Ottomans sought to get more support from them in the Armenian crisis, the German Foreign Office responded that the Ottomans had not carried through all the reforms promised for the eastern provinces, that they had not gotten their finances in order, that they needed to define the responsibilities of all officials from the grand vezir down, and that they needed to create a committee at the Sublime Porte to select and appoint officials. In the upshot, the Ottoman ambassador concluded, the empire could not expect much help from the Germans. This correspondence demonstrates, incidentally, that the law-oriented mentality that appears in İbrahim Hakkî Paşa—and even the creation of the Civil Officials Commission (*Memurin-i Mülkiye Komisyonu*) in 1896—partly reflected an impetus coming from Germany.[61]

Even under Abd ül-Hamid, then, Ottoman diplomats still at times played the role of culture brokers with the outside world. Yet if they had

148, 206–209, 219, December 1895–April 1897 (Roentgen apparatus in 109); 36.2328/2.146.XV, items no. 55, 78, 81, 88, 104, 131, 141, dated 13 February 1319/1904–11 September 1320/1904 (131 and 141 about Krupp).

[58] I found no documentation on corruption in military purchasing in Germany, but did find a case in Washington. As Foreign Minister Ahmed Tevfik Paşa related to Marschall von Bieberstein, German ambassador in Istanbul, a Philadelphia firm from which a cruiser had been ordered had made known that the price could be lowered by 20,000 pounds if a check made out to Ali Ferruh Bey, minister in Washington, was voided. Tevfik Paşa had attempted to get Ali Ferruh recalled, but his effort was frustrated at the palace, he thought because Ali Ferruh threatened to go over to the Young Turks; PAAA (Bonn), Türkei 162, Bd. 5, Marschall to Bülow, 1 January 1901 (T139, roll 395).

[59] BBA, Yıldız, 36.139/24.139.XVIII, items no. 17, 22, 24, 39, 24 January 1310/1895–16 March 1895 on cholera, and 46, 49, 50, 184, and 188, 27 April 1895–20 February 1897 on German officers in Ottoman service.

[60] BBA, Yıldız, 36.139/24.139.XVIII, items no. 36–37, 41 (Bismarck's toast, on his eightieth birthday), 45, 69–70, 21 March–11 August 1895.

[61] BBA, Yıldız, 36.139/24.139.XVIII, items no. 72–78, 91, 176–78, 181, 21 August 1895–5 January 1897; the committee to select officials is discussed in no. 73. The Germans were not alone in advocating the appointment board; e.g., Mizancı Murad had also done so (Mardin, *Jön Türkler*, 89). The Ottomans had had smaller-scaled appointment boards for a quarter century before 1896.

in some degree escaped the paper-pushing of the old scribes, they had not in any sense acquired a "normal" range of policy-oriented functions as diplomats. However much Ottoman envoys had seemed to acquire policy-related roles during the *Tanzimat*, Abd ül-Hamid had reversed the trend. Even abroad, Ottoman diplomats remained both prisoners and agents of the palace system in Istanbul.[62] More than a century after Selim III instituted permanent diplomatic representation of the empire in Europe, then, conditions of life and work in Ottoman embassies remained as problem-fraught as those Heidborn described in local administration.

OVERWORK IN THE OTTOMAN ADMINISTRATION?

The problems we have discussed do not mean that no Ottoman officials ever got to see their performance in an exemplary light, or at least feel that they were working hard. Indeed, enough men gave a credible impression of diligence to make it surprising that they never seemed to attract the notice of those who wrote about Ottoman administration but saw only its failings. Perhaps the hard workers were always few, and their exertions may at times have been more a matter of personality than of the demands of the service. Some of their outpourings of energy would have been unnecessary had the administration run more efficiently. "Hard work" and "exemplary performance" were relative concepts in that sense. Again, the best-documented example is Aşçı Dede İbrahim, but there is also an intriguing one from high places: that of Mahmud Kemal İnal and grand vezir Said Paşa.

Aşçı Dede at Work

Over the many years of his career, Aşçı Dede's memoirs suggest that his workload rose and fell for a variety of reasons, and that personality problems sometimes made life in the offices trying. Perhaps the earliest acceleration he experienced in the pace of his work occurred as the "scent" of war with Russia—the Crimean War (1854–1856)—began to be noticed and he found that he was no longer free to go to the Mevlevî meeting hall any day but Sunday.[63]

The cases about which he says most all occurred years later. At the army headquarters in Erzincan, trouble started to mount for him about the beginning of 1870, when the director of daily accounts (*jurnal müdürü*) died, leaving no one who knew how to do them. The accounts fell

[62] The sources analyzed here, mostly from Abd ül-Hamid's palace archives, do not make it possible to discuss equally well diplomatic functions in the Young Turk period. It would be worthwhile for some scholar to undertake such a study, which would almost certainly reveal significantly different conditions.

[63] Aşçı Dede İbrahim, *Risale*, TY3222, 61b; TY78, 325.

to Aşçı Dede. About the same time, Aşçı Dede acquired a new supervisor, who was an old friend. They cheered each other on: "Look, just make it up" (*Bak uydur*). The field marshal in command, however, was a stern man who realized that the supervisor did not understand his duties and began to call Aşçı Dede in for explanations. Soon Aşçı Dede was spending so much time with the marshal that his comings and goings became the talk of Erzincan, he says, and the accounts had to be left to others.

At that point, another paşa appeared with the mission of catching up four or five years of inspectorial work. This required preparing summary accounts for many offices and troop units—another task for Aşçı Dede. He likened his situation to that of someone who had fallen into a deep sea and was washed from shore to shore without getting help from either. Dervish that he was, he felt he had spiritual help that enabled him to manage. Others were not so fortunate. His supervisor took sick from the field marshal's wrath (*hiddet şiddet*), went to Istanbul for a change of air, and died there.[64] Aşçı Dede's understanding of the cause of the man's death may not be correct. But it is not hard to find among civil officials, especially prominent ones, cases where career-related stress looks—as far as we can now judge—like a probable cause of death. The three major grand vezirs of the *Tanzimat*—Mustafa Reşid (1800–1858), Âli (1815–1871), and Fuad (1815–1869) Paşas—all seem to offer examples of this.[65]

In 1874, Aşçı Dede found himself assigned to Damascus to work under the Fifth Army commander, Yaver Paşa, who had previously formed a dislike for him and now opposed his appointment. Presently, however, a crisis blew up over allegations that other officials had falsified documents, and the offices became extremely short-handed while the accused were taken away from their work for the investigation. Aşçı Dede's exertions in performing extra duties converted the paşa's opposition into goodwill by the time the officials under investigation were exonerated and returned to their posts.[66]

Aşçı Dede served in Damascus for over twenty more years, during which other incidents also shed light on his workload. Certainly not all his associates thought work was the only thing on his mind. About 1890, an officer whom Aşçı Dede had known previously arrived to take up a position there. Hardly had Aşçı Dede paid his respects to the man than he went to ask Aşçı Dede's superior to give him a lot of work to keep his mind off spiritual infatuations. In fact, Aşçı Dede and the supervisor had common sufi interests, which produced a benign result from the unfriendly

[64] Ibid., TY3222, 191a–92a; TY78, 581–82.

[65] Mustafa Reşid died of heart failure; E. Kuran, art. "Reşid Paşa," *İA*, IX, 704. Âli died of tuberculosis, contracted a few months before his death; İnal, *Sadrıazamlar*, 25. Fuad died of heart disease; İnal, *Sadrıazamlar*, 177.

[66] Aşçı Dede İbrahim, *Risale*, TY3222, 210a–b; TY78, 616–18.

overture, for Aşçı Dede was soon loaning the supervisor his autobiography to read.[67]

The reference to the sufi conversation and the autobiography identify some of the things, other than official business, that did occupy at least part of Aşçı Dede's time at the office. Aşçı Dede may well have worked on writing his autobiography at the office. In preparing the fair copy and continuation, he certainly drew on the assistance of people encountered through his office, starting with an apprentice clerk. They came in early to work together, with Aşçı Dede reading from the autograph to his copyist.[68]

About 1891, Aşçı Dede had a major problem in the form of an irascible superior, Cemal Bey, who complained about Aşçı Dede's inability to get all his work done on time. Aşçı Dede pointed out that he was old—by the *hicrî* calendar he would have then been about sixty-five—and, with no assistant, was being crushed under the weight of work. Matters reached the point that Aşçı Dede and a colleague began going to the shrine of John the Baptist in the Umayyad Mosque to pray for Cemal Bey's removal. They soon received a first report that their prayer was to be answered. Still matters trailed on, as they seemed to where communications had to pass between Istanbul and the provinces.

During the months of uncertainty, Cemal Bey surprised Aşçı Dede by suddenly beginning to treat him with consideration. It turned out that Cemal needed Aşçı Dede's help to complete the year-end summary accounts (*Şubat icmalleri*) for financial years 1294 and 1295 (roughly 1878–1879). Aşçı Dede and several others then had to search the records storeroom, finding enough—with some records that had remained in Aşçı Dede's office—to piece together the accounts. Finally, the order for Cemal's transfer arrived, and the rush to complete the 1294 and 1295 accounts was forgotten. The narrative throws no light on why it had suddenly been found necessary to complete accounts over ten years past due.[69]

Hardly had this crisis passed than the War Ministry began to apply pressure for the updating of a different type of accounts known as the "unified summary" (*tevhid icmali*), which was due monthly from the Fifth Army Supply Office (*Levazım Dairesi*) but had not been forwarded in a long time. The pressure to meet this requirement was so great that the officials had to come to the office at night, and the battalion clerks had to be brought in to help. So many people were affected that the circle

[67] Ibid., TY3222, 269a–70b; TY79, 157–60.

[68] Ibid., TY79, 591–96 (A.D. promises to reward his copyist, an apprentice official [*mülâzım*] named Mustafa, by paying to marry him off, and they begin), 600, 617; TY80, 53, 60–63, 65. Cf. Bremer, *Die Memoiren*, 10–11.

[69] Aşçı Dede İbrahim, *Risale*, TY3222, 279b–82b; TY79, 180–86.

performing a Nakşbendî rite known as the *hatm-ı hacegân* had to suspend its meetings for the time being. Aşçı Dede had the added problem that his wife was then an invalid and required his care at night. Fortunately, the major general (*ferik*) supervising this project knew about his circumstances and would excuse him from the evening work sessions.[70]

Finally a dream helped Aşçı Dede devise improvements in some of the quartermaster procedures that were so disorderly and needed to be systematized and done in a uniform way (*suret-ı muttaride*)—the way he puts this is a fascinating blend of his sufi mentality, in which dreams played a large role, and the rationalizing outlook of someone like İbrahim Hakkî Paşa. Aşçı Dede's dream gave him the idea for a system by which to get in the regimental and battalion accounts on time, so that the combined accounts could go forward from army headquarters promptly. Aşçı Dede wrote up his plan in a memorandum produced in what he described as a virtual state of possession by the saints (*erenler*)—he was sure he could not have done it by himself. He submitted the memorandum to the deputy director of the General Accounts Office (*Muhasebat-ı Umumiye Dairesi*) at the War Ministry, explaining that the idea had come from a dream so as to make clear that it was not merely his own! His recommendation was adopted, and he was rewarded—two years later—both with the Mecidiye order fourth class, and with promotion to the second rank, second class.[71]

Aşçı Dede was also responsible for further improvements, including ones made after his transfer in 1896 to his last post in Edirne. What tells more about life in the offices, however, are problems he faced during his later years in Damascus with the corruption and intrigue of colleagues. Military supply, the field in which he worked then, offered opportunities for corruption inside the empire, as well as abroad. The problems he experienced with this, and his not unrelated conflicts with Syrian fellow officials, crystallized in him a vigorous dislike of Arabs. This was a feeling totally at odds with sharia egalitarianism, but in keeping with an old ethnic particularism that gained new acuity as nationalism spread among Turks and Arabs. By way of interpreting his experiences, Aşçı Dede repeated sayings such as "Damascus is a golden cauldron full of scorpions" or—a well-known Turkish proverb—"neither the sweets of Damascus, nor the face of the black" (*ne Şam'ın şekeri ne arabın yüzü*), as if to say that one should forego the sweets of Damascus rather than look at the face of the black (or Arab) to get them.[72] Such feelings explain why Aşçı Dede insisted that his third wife not be from Damascus.

[70] Ibid., TY3222, 303a–b; TY79, 237–38. On the *hatm-i hacegân*, see Algar, "Naqshbandî in Bosnia," 184.

[71] Aşçı Dede İbrahim, *Risale*, TY79, 342–43, 367, memorandum c. 1311/1893.

[72] Ibid., TY79, 375. A.D. did note that what is incumbent on us is not to look at the scorpions, but respect Syrians in every way we can. The common Turkish use of the term *arab* for blacks is, however, a clear illustration of the ethnic animosity here referred to. This usage requires the phrase *beyaz arap*, "white Arab," for an Arab. The evidence of his memoirs suggests that the only Arabs A.D. was able to respect were those whom he identified primarily as religious scholars or fellow dervishes. Cf. Philip S. Khoury, *Urban Notables and Arab Nationalism: The Politics of Damascus, 1860–1920*, Cambridge, 1983, 46–52, on political behavior of leading Damascene families.

During his last years in Damascus, Aşçı Dede seemed to experience problems of every kind with his Damascene colleagues. For example, there was the clever Galib Bey, whom Aşçı Dede had watched grow from a boy apprentice to deputy director of the first branch of the supply office—obviously bypassing Aşçı Dede as he did so. Galib's misdeeds ranged from the apprentice's prank of cutting the heels off Aşçı Dede's slippers to a more grown-up episode when Galib and an accomplice took charge of a mandated reorganization of the offices, trying to give a directorship to a man who had been expelled from the government offices in Syria years before. Galib Bey was also in league with a large Damascus merchant, named Salah el-Din, with whom a number of officials from the military offices had invested money. Among their misdeeds were throwing contracts to Salah el-Din when other local merchants had placed lower bids, or accepting delivery of textiles from Salah el-Din's mill that did not match contract specifications. Such episodes hint at one reason why some provincial families sought to place members in government service.

Aşçı Dede was not the only official upset by these abuses. One of his most searing experiences in Damascus occurred in Ramazan 1312/1895 in mosque one evening, when a major approached Aşçı Dede and berated him because boots ordered for the troops long ago had still not been delivered. The major, also a dervish, was in a righteous fury at seeing his men virtually barefoot. Aşçı Dede, who was having extreme difficulty himself because of his unpaid salary, had to try to calm the major and intercede in the offices on his behalf.[73]

The crowning irony of Aşçı Dede's trials with Galib Bey occurred when the latter found that Aşçı Dede was about to return to Istanbul at last. Despite all that had happened, Galib Bey then tried to ingratiate himself, reasoning that Aşçı Dede had more influence in the capital than he and might be able to help him get promoted. Discovering that Aşçı Dede's influence could get him only a medal, not a promotion, Galib Bey turned again and accused Aşçı Dede of embezzlement.

Such is Aşçı Dede's version of his strivings during an unpleasant phase of his career. He was obviously not successful in coping with all the colleagues he had to deal with. But he appears to have brought the same industry to his official labors as to the writing of his memoirs.

[73] Ibid., TY79, 355–56, 375–84.

Mahmud Kemal İnal and Grand Vezir Said Paşa

It is difficult to find equally vivid insights into the flow of work in the central offices in Istanbul; yet there is one notable interaction between two outstanding personalities of the Hamidian and Young Turk periods: Grand Vezir Mehmed Said Paşa (1840–1914) and that last great exemplar of the scribal *adab*-tradition, Mahmud Kemal İnal (1870–1957). Enough has been written by or about both these men and their lengthy careers that it would be pointless to mention more than a few high spots here. The two differed chiefly in that the elder, Said, had become a statesman, while the younger, İnal, remained a *kâtib* and littérateur—arguably the last brilliant example of the type. Otherwise, both men appear to have been alike in many ways.[74]

Both men were from families with important civil administrative connections. Said Paşa's father had served as Ottoman chargé d'affaires in Tehran; İnal's had been seal-bearer (*mühürdar*) to Yusuf Kâmil Paşa (1808–1876), a well-known intellectual and grand vezir. Both were men of primarily traditional education, including *medrese* study. Yet Said Paşa learned enough French to speak it haltingly,[75] and İnal, while he does not mention studying the language, refers occasionally to French writers on Ottoman subjects. İnal admired Said Paşa's mastery of Arabic, Persian, and the Ottoman chancery style. But he also criticized Said's excessive use of obscure Arabic and Persian expressions, quoting a statement by one of Fuad Paşa's grandsons about how fear of being addressed with strange expressions that he would not be able to answer made his feet sweat whenever he visited Said Paşa.[76] Both Said and İnal were from pious Muslim families. In terms of religiosity and education, both were cultural conservatives. The biggest difference in their family backgrounds was perhaps that Said was born in Erzurum, İnal in Istanbul. İnal had known Said Paşa since childhood, and says that the latter once tried to make him his son-in-law.[77]

Both were also men of exceptional energy and productivity with long careers. Of the two, İnal remained closer to the old roles of the scribal intellectual. Especially for a man who had not studied or served in Europe, Said Paşa displayed a striking ability to adjust to the new role of a statesman thinking in terms of policy issues. Though not a new man in the same sense as İbrahim Hakkî Paşa, who was more than twenty years his junior, Said already represents the naturalization into the Ottoman setting of such a role concept. Said's career began about 1853 and continued, with nine stints as grand vezir, until his death in 1914. İnal entered the Sublime Porte still a child, he says. He left it the day it closed, in 1922. Thereafter, he held various positions, mostly under the republican government, retiring in 1935. He seems never to have recovered from the collapse of the empire, which caused him such traumas as the occupation of his family home by French troops following World War I.[78]

Both men were highly verbal and—unfortunately for later generations—could write with speed and ease in the Ottoman chancery style as it flourished under Abd ül-Hamid. Said Paşa wrote the largest and most informative memoirs of any grand vezir. He had little competition, but the work is impressive by any standard appropriate to the genre of statesmen's memoirs. İnal—as if restless with the knowledge that he embodied a dying tradition—produced his large biographical compendia on the late Ottoman "poets" (that is, the intelligentsia) and the grand vezirs, together with other works, such as a short history of the Ministry of Pious Foundations (*evkaf*), and a biographical work on calligraphers.

Perhaps the most interesting similarities of the two men appear in their psychic and emotional makeup. High achievers, both appear to have been high-strung and quick to criticize other people. In his memoirs, Said Paşa claimed credit for services to the state, in all policy fields, that it took İnal several pages just to list in summary form; nor is the list incredible.[79] At least as İnal saw it, both of them, while from families with official connections, had to make it essentially alone by their talents, enduring the envy of the less able. To express Said Paşa's industry and intelligence, İnal used a number of phrases, some quoted from others. Said was "intelligence personified" (*zekâ-yı muşahhas*). He "encompassed all the best and excluded all the rest" (*efradını câmi ve ağyarını mâni*). "Whatever stone you lift, he comes out from under it" (*hangi taşı kaldırırsanız altından çıkar*).[80] Said was also a man of high ethical standards, İnal says, clean of the bribery, or the kickbacks from foreign business interests, that enriched others in high places.

Said Paşa was not without his faults, however. We have already mentioned his unconcern about his appearance, which combined with his

[74] Since our focus is on İnal's reaction to working for Said Paşa, our chief sources will be İnal, *Sadrıazamlar*, 989–1263 on Said and id., *Şairler*, 2147–86, on himself. İnal liked to give his name in full as İbnülemin Mahmud Kemal İnal, İnal being the surname he adopted under the surname law in 1935. We shall refer to him by the surname, despite the anachronism of doing so for earlier dates, on the ground that it is his most distinctive name. See also Said Paşa, *Hâtırat*; Mehmed Zeki Pakalın, *Son Sadrâzamlar ve Başvekiller*, Istanbul, 1940–1948, vol. V; Ercümend Kuran, "Küçük Said Paşa (1840–1914) as a Turkish Modernist," *IJMES*, I (1970), 124–32.

[75] İnal, *Sadrıazamlar*, 989.

[76] Ibid., 1244–45.

[77] İnal, *Şairler*, 2150 n. 3.

[78] İnal, *Şairler*, 2158–61. Modesty forbade him, he said, to recount how some of his manuscripts were used while his house was occupied. "We already knew what Western civilization amounted to; now we learned even better."

[79] İnal, *Sadrıazamlar*, 1232–37.

[80] Ibid., 1099, 1243–51.



Ill. 11. Mehmed Said Paşa (1840–1914), Nine Times Grand Vezir, in Fez and Frock Coat.

short stature and shaggy white beard to give him the appearance of a tousled gnome (illustration 11).[81] İnal, who loved to moralize, went into high gear on the question of Said's dress, invoking the Prophet Muhammad's example in cleanliness and personal grooming.[82] Said was stingy. In an era when the houses of high government officials were expected to be open to all comers for the meal (*iftar*) that breaks the day-long fast during Ramazan, people simply had to learn not to go to Said's house.[83] On other occasions, however, Said would surprise everybody by doing lavish things—giving magnificent feasts or huge tips. He was suspicious and fearful in the extreme, even of family members and close associates. Perhaps this was natural for a prominent official in a government full of spies and informers, headed by a paranoid sultan who sometimes praised Said's abilities and sometimes accused him of every kind of plot, even holding a revolver to Said's head on one occasion to demand back the seal of the grand vezir's office.[84] Said became haughty and unwilling to help old friends when in office, and quite the opposite when out. At least, İnal

[81] Ibid., photos following pp. 988, 1080.
[82] Ibid., 1106.
[83] Ibid., 1112.
[84] Ibid., 1014 (events of 1883). In 1895, Said took refuge at the British embassy for a time to escape the sultan's harassment; ibid., 1027ff.

added, Said never did anything vengeful to anyone while in power or—here İnal repeats a phrase he had applied to the Âkif-Pertev rivalry of 1837—tried to "put out anyone's hearthfire."[85] İnal's comments on Said's haughtiness in office contrast oddly with his criticisms of İbrahim Hakkî Paşa's more democratic style.

For his subordinates, perhaps Said's most important flaw was that his energy and quickness included a concern for detail that got him into doing the work of his clerks. On one occasion, a senior official at the Sublime Porte, Şefkatî Efendi, head of a prestigious office known as that of the Receiver (*Amedî*), became so exhausted from being sent back to his office to change details in documents that he told Said Paşa he would imitate the itinerant Albanian drink sellers who went about with their tank of *boza* strapped to their backs and a case containing glasses strapped to their waists. Şefkatî Efendi would get one of these cases, strap it to his waist, and put pens, pen knives, an inkpot, and blotting sand into the openings for the glasses, so that when Said Paşa demanded a change, he could make it right there in the grand vezir's office, without having to go back to his own.[86] In the short run, this witty allusion to the world of craftsmen and peddlers got Şefkatî Efendi relief; in longer perspective, it exposes a generic problem of highly centralized governmental systems, a problem repeatedly illustrated in this period.

İnal, in turn, had qualities that resembled Said Paşa's and implied fascinating potentials for any situation where the two had to work together. As much as Said Paşa's photograph does not suggest his quickness, İnal's does, with his birdlike head atop a long neck, his aquiline nose, prominent ears, and penetrating eyes (illustration 12).[87] Beginning his career at the Sublime Porte quite young—İnal gives no dates or other indications of his own age, although he always does in writing about others—he quickly distinguished himself by his talent and education and was soon assigned to draft (*tesvid*) small documents, a task normally assigned to clerks only after five or ten years, if they ever got past merely copying (*tebyiz*). Within a few years, he received such assignments as the chief clerkship of an important commission and experienced many difficulties (*çok çille*) from the heavy workload and the envy of others.[88]

Throughout, İnal gives the impression of someone who had a very high estimation of his own abilities, who saw few others as his peers, and who

[85] Ibid., 1140–41, 1172.
[86] Ibid., 1181–83; id., *Şairler*, 1743.
[87] İnal, *Sadrıazamlar*, following p. 2131. İnal's photograph does not appear with his autobiography, the last, but for the appendix, in *Şairler* (2147–86). Rather it appears as the last illustration in his work on the grand vezirs, after a long series of portraits of grand vezirs, including Said, and sultans. Whether İnal made the decision to place the photo this way or not is unclear. From his autobiography, I have the impression he might have.
[88] İnal, *Şairler*, 2149–50.

Ill. 12. İbnülemin Mahmud Kemal İnal (1870–1957) in Later Life (c. 1930s).

did not quite understand how this attitude complicated his interactions with his colleagues. At least, his psychic defenses were strong enough that he had no trouble sallying forth into a world of fools, continuing his career for decades, becoming the acquaintance or friend of hundreds of intellectuals, visiting them in their homes, corresponding with them, and copying documents about them, even though they seldom appreciated his efforts to immortalize them.[89] As a result, his literary works—while greatly in need of careful editing[90]—give almost the feel of "total recall" of late nineteenth-century Istanbul that Boswell's *Life of Johnson* gives of eighteenth-century London.

Over the years, İnal resented the way Said Paşa used to question him as if he were examining a schoolchild.[91] Like Mizancı Murad's fictional

[89] Ibid., X.

[90] İnal's Hamidian-style Ottoman was already a dead language by the time his major books were printed. *Şairler* and *Sadrıazamlar* were first printed in Latin characters (in use in Turkey since 1928), rather clearly from manuscripts in Arabic script, without editing, by typesetters who had not mastered the correspondences between the alphabets. The results, full of errors, make İnal's language even harder to understand. One must be able to reconstruct what it looked like in Arabic script, in which a style as full of Arabic and Persian as his is easier to read. I had difficulty understanding İnal's works until after I had done research on the Yıldız papers in BBA. There must be very few Turks today, certainly young ones, who can understand İnal at all. The Turkish Ministry of Education has done an important service by keeping these works in print, but it is very difficult to realize their value in their present editorial state. The physical aspect of his printed works reinforces the point that İnal had essentially outlived the *adab*-culture he represented.

[91] The most sarcastic of many references is in *Sadrıazamlar*, 1145.

alter ego, Mansur Bey, İnal resented the favoritism that seemed to rule in official life in his day, a time when honor and merit were a matter, not of one's qualifications, but of one's connections (*zatî değil, izafî idi*).[92] He resented the hauteur of superiors at the Sublime Porte, who expected worshipful obedience from subordinates, with no criticism of anything, and who took for granted that their staff members were not more able than themselves. Perhaps there is a tinge of narcissism in these strictures! İnal likened the Office for Provinces in Special Status (*Eyalât-ı Mümtaze Kalemi*), which he headed for a time, to other states' colonial ministries.[93] In fact, the office managed Ottoman relations with provinces that had become semi-independent and was more nearly the opposite of a colonial ministry. He seems to have been very much impressed with his name Kemal, "Perfection," and used it repeatedly in titles of his works—for example, "Kemal ül-Kâmil," an unpublished biography of Yusuf Kâmil Paşa.[94] He referred to his family home as the *Dar ül-Kemal* ("house of perfection"), a name that one of his literary friends had thought up for it. In fine, this embodiment of perfection did not lack some of the same hauteur that he saw in his superiors.

What it would be like for İnal to work for Said Paşa was revealed in the hectic circumstances of Said's seventh grand vezirate, which began in July 1908, one day before the restoration of constitutional rule, and lasted only thirteen days.[95] To deal with the emergencies of the Young Turk revolution, Said asked to have a trustworthy, able secretary sent to work at his mansion. İnal was the choice. He tried to get out of the job. "For aside from the fact that it was difficult to work for an exceptional grand vezir like Said Paşa, who never tired of work, who did not eat and drink like other people, who did not like anything, and who would not overlook the slightest mistake, I did not want to be secretary to the grand vezir in such a confused and dangerous time, when it was clear that important events would occur and all hell would break loose (*kıyamet kopacağı*) from morning to night."[96] İnal was pressured to try it, "at least for tonight."

Things turned out as he expected. Said Paşa's habit of "working all the time, like a machine, is not every young man's game" (*her yiğidin kârı değil*). Said would start dictating a document on one problem, or describing what sort of document he wanted written, when something more im-

[92] İnal, *Şairler*, 2151, 2170.

[93] Ibid., 2155.

[94] Ibid., 2176–77, a dozen titles including "kemal," mostly unpublished. I have not found any place where he tells how he acquired this name. He might have adopted it as a pen name, or it might have been given to him—as it was to Mustafa Kemal, later Atatürk—because of his intelligence.

[95] Danişmend, *Kronoloji*, IV, 519.

[96] İnal, *Şairler*, 2152; İnal named more reasons, but several amount to the same thing in different words, a time-honored way for scribal intellectuals to display their virtuosity and underscore their point.

portant would come up. He would abandon the first matter to take up the second. But more important matters would continue to come up, until there were eight or ten unfinished documents. Eventually, all of them had to be completed on time and to Said Paşa's satisfaction.[97] Sometimes, he would reject one version of a document and demand that it be rewritten, but without saying how he wanted it changed, a practice that wore down İnal's patience and forced him to ask for explanations.[98]

It would be too much to say that İnal perceived his work for Said Paşa merely in terms of "documents." İnal, too, was sufficiently policy-minded to warn Said Paşa against the step that caused his fall. Significantly, however, İnal did so as Said Paşa was dictating to him the text for a decree. This contained a clause to the effect that the sultan would appoint not only the grand vezir and the *Şeyh ül-İslâm*, but also the ministers of war and the navy. İnal argued that the constitution left the appointment of the military ministers, and almost all others, to the grand vezir. Said responded that it was not clear; but in fact, his version, which he insisted on, touched off a furor when the decree was publicly read the next day. The episode shows that İnal was not indifferent to substantive issues; yet he introduces even this phase of his account by saying that his work with Said Paşa meant "plunging into a sea of writing," adding that his appointed role was that of a secretary, not an advisor.[99] Even if it was his appointed role, the fact that this really high-powered intellectual quite contentedly found himself in a secretarial role casts a piercing light, and from a late date, on the formalism and involution of the scribal *adab*-tradition. However much a traditionalist he may have appeared compared to someone like İbrahim Hakkî Paşa, Said Paşa would surely have thought of the matters he and İnal dealt with, not as a "sea of writing," but as substantive problems or issues.[100]

İnal went on from this stint at the paşa's mansion to the directorship of the Correspondence Office (*Mektubî odası*) at the Grand Vezirate. This, too, was a difficult job, for the return to constitutional rule had made the office responsible again for many matters previously treated at the palace. Summing things up in hindsight, İnal said that he had worked under sixteen different grand vezirs, among whom he never encountered anyone like Said Paşa.[101]

Insights into two rather different official settings—the provincial military offices where Aşçı Dede İbrahim Halil spent most of his career, and

[97] Ibid., 2152–53.

[98] İnal, *Sadrıazamlar*, 1181–82.

[99] Ibid., 1066–68.

[100] Cf. Said Paşa, *Hâtırat*, II, ii, 440–69; this part of the memoirs is in diary form, however, a fact that somewhat obscures the policy emphasis of earlier sections; cf. Feroz Ahmad, *The Young Turks: The Committee of Union and Progress in Turkish Politics, 1908–1914*, Oxford, 1969, 19–21.

[101] İnal, *Sadrıazamlar*, 1099.

the Istanbul milieu of İnal and Said Paşa—show clearly, then, that not everyone experienced the pace of official work in the way that Vámbéry or Mizancı Murad described. Clearly, there were civil officials of probity and industry, who were prepared to make extraordinary exertions to do their duty. While all governments face their emergencies, the circumstances that required these exertions would in some cases never have occurred in a better-run administrative system, or were sometimes products of the empire's approaching breakup. At least, there were professionally committed officials on hand. Had their numbers, or their sense of professionalism, increased during the reform era?

TOWARD A NEW PROFESSIONALISM

The discussion of İbrahim Hakkî Paşa in chapter 5 is already enough to indicate that a new type of official was to be found by the Young Turk period. A look at İnal and Said Paşa also makes clearer why the Young Turk leadership, anxious to bring a new generation to the grand vezirate, might have thought Hakkî Paşa was the man they sought. But were enough such people on hand to make a difference? Had a new professionalism—substantially different from the scribal document-fixation that still lived in İnal, and linked to more up-to-date cultural and political horizons than Said Paşa's—really become widespread?

Once we go beyond describing single examples like Hakkî Paşa, these are hard questions to answer. Something as subtle as a new professionalism—a change of mentality accompanied by new practical capabilities—produces few quantifiable indicators of a sort suited for collective biographical analysis. To the extent that an effort to train a new type of civil official had occurred under Abd ül-Hamid, however, the effort was his, made chiefly through the School of Civil Administration. Had his effort borne fruit—more than he intended, perhaps—enough to yield an answer to our questions by the Young Turk period?

The best answer to this question comes from the journal *Mülkiye* ("Civil Administration"), published monthly for several years, starting in February 1909, by the school's alumni association.[102] The journal suggests that a new professionalism was indeed emerging, and that it did have some intellectual and numerical depth, even if its exponents were a minority among graduates of the school, who were a minority among civil officials, and even if war and imperial collapse for a time drowned out the advocates of this new outlook.

The very existence of the society that published the journal is a sign of changing times and growing professionalism. Neither society nor journal

[102] Çankaya, *Mülkiye Târihi*, II, 1329, says that forty-three numbers of the journal appeared. The collection used here runs through no. 30, published in August 1327/1911. Up to that point, the numbers are dated the first of each month.

would have been possible without the freedoms of speech, press, and association that came with restoration of the constitution in 1908. Formed in the first excitement of the revolution, in August 1908, the association took the name "School of Civil Administration Graduates Unity and Mutual Aid Society" (*Mekteb-i Mülkiye Me'zunları İttihad ve Taavün Cemiyeti*). One of its goals, as stated in its regulations, was to publish a journal as a means to exchange ideas, serve the fatherland, and protect the rights of graduates. The journal was to publish both news of the association and substantive articles by members.[103]

The journal became an important part of what was reportedly the empire's first organized experience with the "old school tie." Other things about the association expressed this fact more literally, such as the enameled lapel pins—now commonly worn in Turkey—that this association pioneered as a way for its members to recognize one another.[104] Rather than "old school tie," the members of the association preferred the image of a family—a not surprising choice in the Ottoman context. They referred to everyone associated with the School of Civil Administration as the "*Mülkiye* family" and to one another individually as brothers (*kardeş*)—still a common salutation among workmates or former schoolmates—or at least associates (*rüfeka*). A discussion of local administration might naturally refer to relations between the governor-general and his staff in terms of father and sons. Given the authoritarian relations between seniors and juniors in Turkish families, even among older and younger siblings, the image is not exclusively one of coziness, and the implications for administration may not be all ideal; yet the family terminology points to a strong solidarity, even as it evokes the heritage of patrimonialism.

The news of the association, published in separately numbered pages at the back of the journal, makes clear that the members saw themselves as an interest group. It was a matter of collective pride to note members retained in service in the post-revolutionary purges and to announce new appointments. Then, too, the politics of the association required discussion: its annual meetings, elections of officers, editorial policy for the journal, the association's finances, and the problem of nonpayment of dues. Inevitably, the Istanbul-based association had the problem that members either could not remain active because of their official responsibilities in the capital, or were transferred away from the capital city. The number of nominal members of the association remained above 800 through 1908, 1909, and 1910, but the number of dues-paying members fell from 528 to 150.[105] During World War I, so many members were mobilized that the

[103] Çankaya, *Mülkiye Târihi*, II, 1323, 1327.

[104] Ibid., II, 1328, with illustration.

[105] These references are in the separately numbered pages at the back of the journal: *Mülkiye*, no. 8 (1 July 1325/1909), 1–7 (graduates retained in the reorganizations, new appointments); no. 11 (1 December 1325/1909), 3–8 (appointments); no. 12 (1 January 1325/1910), 1–2 (alumni in Hakkî Paşa's government); no. 14 (1 March 1326/1910), 1–8, 17–19 (officers of association, membership, budget); no. 17 (1 June 1326/1910), 1 (annual meeting, only 80 present); no. 25 (1 February 1326/1911), 1–8 (report of meeting of December 1326/1910, statistics on dues-paying and nonpaying members). An editorial policy announcement appeared as a lead article by Yahya Sezaî in no. 25 (1 February 1326/1911), 1–5.

association dissolved itself and did not re-form until 1921; the school itself shut down from 1915 to 1918.[106] War and political disaster could disrupt the association and the school, but not destroy the mentality they represented.

The orientation to professional and political questions carried over strongly into the articles published in the journal. Some of these can only be described under headings such as encyclopedic popularization or general culture. Even so, they reflect wide interests in the social sciences and contemporary social issues. Popularizing articles ranged from Ottoman history of the reform era to "How Does Intellectual Development Occur?" "Psychological Inclinations of the Turks," "How Does a Nation Achieve Greatness?" and "The Necessity of Moderation in Sports."[107] Discussions of current issues ranged from "Military Service by Non-Muslim Ottoman Subjects" or "Love of the Fatherland among Ottomans," to "Primary Education," "Women's Education and Moral Uplift," and "University Life in Istanbul."[108] Some of these articles are not very original. Yet we can imagine how *Mülkiye* graduates in remote posts must have awaited them with interest and found in them a way to keep in touch with fellow alumni and

[106] Çankaya, *Mülkiye Târihi*, II, 1332.

[107] E.g., Ali Seydî, "Devlet-i Osmaniyenin son bir asırlık Tarih-i Teceddüd ve İnkilabı," *Mülkiye*, no. 8 (1 September 1325/1909), 41–59, one of many historical articles by this author. Hüseyin Cahid, "Terbiye-i Fikriye Nasıl Olur," no. 1 (1 February 1324/1909), 49–55, continued in later numbers; Ali Seydî, "Türklerin Temayülât-i Ruhiyesi," no. 6 (1 July 1325/1909), 14–19; Ahmed Mâcid, "Bir Millet nasıl Taali Eder," no. 17 (1 June 1326/1910), 23–36; Abd ül-Feyyaz Tevfik, " 'ispor'da Lüzum-ı İtidal," no. 18, 13–19. Best known of these authors, Hüseyin Cahid [Yalçın] (1875–1957) made his career under the republic as politician, journalist, and popular writer (Çankaya, *Mülkiye Târihi*, III, 648–78). Ali Seydî (1869–1933) was an official, teacher, and author; he became a School of Civil Administration faculty member under the republic (Çankaya, *Mülkiye Târihi*, III, 465–67). Ahmed Mâcid [Gören] (1871–1946) served in the Interior Ministry and taught (ibid., III, 420–22). Abd ül-Feyyaz Mehmed Tevfik [Yergök] (1870–1947) became a prominent science educator; he wrote hundreds of articles and several books (ibid., III, 554–55).

[108] Hasan Hâmid, "Gayr-i Müslim Tebaa-ı Osmaniyenin Hizmet-i Askeriyesi," no. 4 (1 May 1325/1909), 1–8; Efdal el-Din, "Osmanlılarda Vatan Muhabbeti," no. 10 (1 November 1325/1909), 37–43; Emrullah, "Tedrisat-ı İbtidaiye," no. 23 (1 December 1326/1910), 42–64; Abd ül-Feyyaz Tevfik, "Terbiye-i Nisvan ve Tasfiye-i Ahlâk," no. 26 (1 March 1327/1911), 74–78, Aynîzade Hasan Tahsin, "İstanbul'da Tahsil-i Âli Hayatı," no. 30 (1 August 1327/1911), 330–32. Of these writers, Hasan Hâmid, who signed himself a graduate of the class of 1305/1889, would have to be the man later known as Hâmid Hasancan (1870–1943; Çankaya, *Mülkiye Târihi*, III, 363–65); Efdal el-Din is Mehmed Efdal el-Din [Tekiner] (1873–1957), who had made a career up to this period as an official of the Sublime Porte and a professor at Istanbul University and the *Mülkiye* itself (ibid., III, 517–20); Hasan Tahsin [Aynî] (1876–1962) was, among other things, a professor at the *Mülkiye* and an expert on finance (ibid., III, 645–47); Emrullah (1858–1914) was minister of education and proponent of the "*Tûba* tree" theory (ibid., III, 96–102).

the outside world. The pages of the journal show that one man did this as far away as Yemen, "that South Pole of our state" (*şu kutb-ı cenubî-i mülkümüz*).[109]

More central to the concerns of alumni association members were articles on administrative questions, especially local administration, the field in which most graduates of the school served. Many such articles dealt with conditions in specific localities. Abd ül-Gani Senî [Yurdman], probably the journal's most prolific author, contributed some sixteen articles on Yemen, at least one appearing in each number of the journal for over a year. Together, they add up to far more about Yemen than most Ottomans could have known; and their author, if not an unbiased observer, at least had the advantages of fluency in Arabic and experience in other parts of the Arab world.[110] This series of articles is only the most conspicuous example of such locally concentrated coverage. The journal also published articles on the Kurdish regions,[111] on Adana,[112] and on the general ques-

[109] Abd ül-Gani Senî [Yurdman], "Her Valinin Derece-i Salahiyeti Bir mi Olmalıdır," *Mülkiye*, no. 12 (1 January 1325/1910), 34. It took two or three weeks for his numbers of the journal to reach him at his post in Yemen.

[110] Abd ül-Gani Senî, "Yemen'in Hayat-ı İstikbali: San'â-Hüdeyde Şimendifer Yolu," *Mülkiye*, no. 5 (1 June 1325/1909), 1–7; id., "Yemen Memurları," no. 6 (1 July 1325/1909), 5–10; id., "Yemen'de Meskukat Meselesi," no. 6 (1 July 1325/1909), 29–37; id., "Yemen'de İdare-i Mülkiye," no. 7 (1 August 1325/1909), 1–8; id., "Yemen'in Esbab-ı Asayişinden Milis Askeri," no. 8 (1 September 1325/1909), 32–38; id., "Yemen İmameti Âm Olabilir mi," no. 9 (1 October 1325/1909), 29–35; id., "Yemen'de Hatiat-i İdare," no. 9 (1 October 1325/1909), 46–58; id., "Yemen Vilâyeti Jandarma Tensikatı ve 326 Senesi Büdcesi," no. 10 (1 November 1325/1909), 48–52; id., "Yemen Şimendiferinin Güzergâhı ve Te'siratı," no. 11 (1 December 1325/1909), 23–28; id., "Yemen'in Esbab-ı Muhafazası: Sevahil, Postalar, Telgraf, Tedabir-i Lâzime," no. 11 (1 December 1325/1909), 54–62; id., "Yemen'in Da'aim-i Umran: Tarihî Sedler, Bunların İhyası," no. 12 (1 January 1325/1910), 16–24; id., "Yemen'in Necat ve Selâmeti: İhya-yı Maarif," no. 13 (1 February 1325/1910), 45–52; id., "Yine Yemen'in Hususiyat-i Ahvalinden," no. 13 (1 February 1325/1910), 57–64; id., "Yemen'de Mahakim-i Şer'iye: Arzu-yı Halk," no. 14 (1 March 1326/1910), 33–39; id., "Kavanin-i Sabite-i İctimaiye Nokta-ı Nazarından Yemenliler Hakkında Tedkikat," no. 15 (1 April 1326/1910), 33–56; id., "San'â'da Sırf Yemenlilere Verilen İlk Konferans: İane-i Milliye Münasebetiyle," no. 16 (1 May 1326/1910), 32–44. An Istanbul-born Turk, Abd ül-Gani Senî [Yurdman] (1871–1951) had part of his education and began his career in Palestine. He served under the Interior Ministry until 1918, thereafter under the imperial and republican Foreign Ministries, and also taught. He published some eighteen books, several of them in Arabic, and reportedly as many as a thousand articles; Çankaya, *Mülkiye Târihi*, III, 774–79.

[111] Ahmed Mâcid, "Kürdistan Ahvali—ve Mesele-i Islahat," *Mülkiye*, no. 8 (1 September 1325/1909), 1–18, with continuations in nos. 9 and 10; Şefik, "Dirsem Kıtasının Ahval-i Umumiye ve Esbab-ı Islahiyesi," no. 14 (1 March 1326/1910), 40–56, continued as "Dirsem Ekradının Ahval-i Mezhebiyeleri," no. 15 (1 April 1326/1910), 9–13. Ahmed Mâcid [Gören] has been identified in n. 107. The Şefik who wrote the article on Dirsem signed himself as *mutasarrıf* of Erzincan and thus has to be Mehmed Şefik (1876–1916), who spent his career in local administration, much of the time in the Arab provinces. He was born into a landowning family near Yanina, knew Greek and could speak Albanian; Çankaya, *Mülkiye Târihi*, III, 807.

[112] Abd ül-Gani Senî, "Adana'da İlk Meşhudat ve İhtisasatim," *Mülkiye*, no. 20 (1 September 1326/1910), 42–49.

tion of tribal settlement.[113] Yet the men who wrote for *Mülkiye* had more on their minds than discussion of regional conditions and problems.

Perhaps the journal's most important articles were those on conditions of service, especially in local administration. This category includes articles on the purges and reorganizations that followed the 1908 revolution,[114] on administrative justice,[115] or on the need to simplify paperwork.[116] Other articles explored the local officials' special problems,[117] needs found at the lowest local administrative echelons,[118] what we may term the general theory of administration,[119] or—as the new provincial

[113] Zeki el-Hatib, "Tavtin-i Aşair," *Mülkiye*, no. 16 (1 May 1326/1910), 1–16; Abd ül-Gani Senî, "Temdin-i Aşair," no. 17 (1 June 1326/1910), 37–43. The first author is Muḥammad Zakî al-Khaṭîb (1886–1961) from Damascus, who graduated from the *Mülkiye* in 1907 and held several local administrative positions until his involvement in Syrian nationalist activities forced him into hiding in 1916. He served in the Arab Kingdom founded in Syria after World War I, reentered Syrian politics during the mandate period, becoming prime minister in 1953. He published three books in Arabic, the first (1941) again on settlement of the Beduin (Çankaya, *Mülkiye Târihi*, III, 1106–1107).

[114] Cevdet, "Tensikat—Islahat," *Mülkiye*, no. 4 (1 May 1325/1909), 11–14; H. B., "Tensikat ve Mezunin-i Mülkiye," no. 6 (1 Temmuz 1325/1909), 20–28. Cevdet, who signed himself a member of the class of 1316/1900, must be Hüseyin Cevdet (1878–1942), who served in local administration and went into trade under the republic (Çankaya, *Mülkiye*, III, 834, no surname given); H. B. is probably Hakkî Behic, a member of the editorial board. Apparently the same as İsmail Hakkî Behic Bayıç (1882–1943), he became a politician and journalist under the republic (ibid., III, 1058–59).

[115] Kevakibîzade Abd ül-Hâlik Midhat, "Memurin Muhakemesi," *Mülkiye*, no. 2 (1 March 1325/1909), 29–31; Mehmed Âsım, "Memurin Muhakemesi" (rejoinder to the former), no. 3 (1 April 1325/1909), 45–50; Kevakibîzade Abd ül-Hâlik Midhat, "Memurin Muhakemesi" (a surrejoinder to Mehmed Âsım), no. 4 (1 May 1325/1909), 26–29. Abd ül-Hâlik Midhat (1868–1911) was then director of the Istanbul Law School (Çankaya, *Mülkiye Târihi*, III, 460); among several homonymous individuals of the right period, the other author is probably Mehmed Âsım [Us] (1884–1967), who made his career largely in teaching, journalism, and politics, and one of whose books, published in 1912, was on law (ibid., III, 1136–38). Çankaya's account gives no sign of whether the Istanbul-born Kevakibîzade had any connections with his Arab contemporary, 'Abd ul-Raḥmân al-Kawâkibî.

[116] Bedi' Nurî, "Hükumet-i Kırtasiye," *Mülkiye*, no. 8 (1 September 1325/1909), 19–25; El-Seyyid Mehmed Emin, "Hükumet-i Kırtasiye ve Teşevvüş-i İdare," no. 11 (1 December 1325/1909), 50–53. Badî' Nûrî al-Ḥuṣrî (1872–1913), born at Tripoli in Lebanon and murdered at Basra on his way to take up an assignment in Iraq, made his brief career in local administration and teaching. He was well known as a journalist in the Young Turk period (Çankaya, *Mülkiye Târihi*, III, 641–42). He was the elder brother of Sâṭi' al-Ḥuṣrî, also a *Mülkiye* graduate. The other author, who signed himself *kaymakam* of Wâdî al-'Ajam, is Muḥammad Amîn 'Abd al-Hâdî (1878–?), who was from a prominent Nablus family and represented Nablus in the Ottoman parliament, c. 1914–1919 (ibid., III, 935).

[117] Abd ül-Gani Senî, "Taşrada İdare Memurlarının Hal ve Mevkii," *Mülkiye*, no. 1 (1 February 1324/1909), 56–61; Bedi' Nurî, "Vazifelerimiz," no. 4 (1 May 1325/1909), 49–62; Abd ül-Gani Senî, "Siyaset-i İdareden bir Nümune: Rıfk mı, Şiddet mi," no. 5 (1 June 1325/1909), 55–60.

[118] Bedi' Nurî, "Belediyelerimiz," *Mülkiye*, no. 5 (1 June 1325/1909), 21–26; Cevdet, "Müntahab Nahiye Müdürleri," no. 13 (1 February 1325/1910), 32–35. Cevdet, who signed himself *kaymakam* at Büyük Çekmece, is Hüseyin Cevdet (1878–1942), mentioned in n. 114.

[119] Abd ül-Gani Senî, "Felsefe-i İdareden bir Nebze," *Mülkiye*, no. 10 (1 November 1325/1909), 21–30; Bedi' Nurî, "Ulûm-ı İctimaiye ve Fenn-i İdare," no. 11 (1 December 1325/1909), 29–33; Abd ül-Gani Senî, "İdarede Şahis, Meslek," no. 18 (1 July 1326/1910), 42–48;

the central government, the entire local administrative infrastructure had developed in the meantime. Especially after the hypercentralization of the Hamidian era, there was a need to achieve a balance between central and local government agencies that were all administered by officials of the central government—a situation that had not existed when the drive for centralization began under Selim III and Mahmud II.

Experience in facing powerful provincial vested interests made some *Mülkiye* writers reluctant about decentralization. On the other hand, it did not remain unnoted that greater discretion for local authorities—including limited revenue-raising powers—would facilitate accomplishment of practical projects, a matter that would greatly influence the peasants' evaluation of the abstract political freedoms guaranteed in the constitution.[125] In the event, the local administration law of 1913 included such decentralizing measures as limited provincial control of revenues and expenditures and power for provincial general assemblies to raise additional fractional taxes (arts. 79–83, 130). That the problem that worried some *Mülkiye* writers persisted under the republic is clear, however, from Yaşar Kemal's story, "The Drumming Out," about a newly graduated official's unsuccessful first confrontation with provincial society.[126]

Perhaps the most interestingly debated concern of the journal's contributors was the question—closely linked to that of decentralization—of how much competence (*salahiyet*) should be left to local administrators, especially the provincial governors-general (*vali*). *Mülkiye* writers viewed this question from two perspectives. In one, the opposite of local competence was the necessity, keenly remembered from the Hamidian years, to seek authorization (*istizan*) from Istanbul for everything and anything. All the writers championed *salahiyet* over *istizan*. The other perspective was that of individual competence or discretion, as opposed to specification by law. Perhaps in reaction against Abd ül-Hamid's arbitrariness, the

[125] E.g., Abd ül-Gani Senî, "Taşrada İdare Memurlarının Hal ve Mevkii," *Mülkiye*, no. 1 (1 February 1324/1909), 58–59 (how notables manipulate officials); Bedi' Nurî, "Vazifelerimiz," no. 4 (1 May 1325/1909), 52–54; Bedi' Nurî, "İdare-i Vilâyat ve İzah," no. 9 (1 October 1325/1909), 41–45 (both the old-style officials—accustomed to give orders to their subordinates but to seek authorization from Istanbul for everything they were supposed to do—and the local interests that dominated the provincial general assemblies—abolishing taxes they disliked, for example—would wreck decentralization); Abdullah Cemal, "Vilâyat Mecalis-i Umumiyesi," no. 16 (1 May 1326/1910), 45–48 (while last year's provincial general assembly meetings were followed with interest in the press, their decisions were sent to the ministries and nothing done; the ministers cannot appreciate the needs of every province; the provincial assemblies need discretion in things like public works and surtax levies; the political freedoms of the constitution are not enough for villagers; they want improvements in roads, bridges, and agriculture). Cf. Yıldızhan Yayla, *Anayasalarımızda Yönetim İlkeleri Tevsi-i Mezuniyet ve Tefrik-i Vezaif*, Istanbul, 1984 (not seen).

[126] Findley, "Evolution," 19–21; text of 1913 provincial administration law in *Düstur*[2], V, 186–216; Yashar [for Yaşar] Kemal, *Anatolian Tales*, trans. Thilda Kemal, New York, 1968, 46–102.

journal's writers tended in this perspective to go overboard in assuming the possibility of a complete legal specification of duties and functions. It took one of the most insightful *Mülkiye* authors, Bedi' Nurî, to point out that a complete specification was impossible, and that the attempt would leave no room for adaptation to local differences. He went the other way, arguing that the administration was already overregulated. When most of his colleagues shared the idealization of rule of law that we find in İbrahim Hakkî Paşa, Bedi' Nurî anticipated a post-Weberian view of administration, in which efficiency and productivity assume a higher value than formal regularity. To clinch his argument, he brought the question back around to competence versus the requirement to obtain authorization by citing the example of a famous bridge that needed repairs, the cost of which had risen from 6,000 to 300,000 kuruş while the local officials awaited authorization to undertake the task.[127]

More important than the contents of the discussions found in the journal's pages is its total significance for the growth of professionalism. After the repressiveness of the Hamidian years and the conditions that Mizancı Murad had parodied, here was a sudden ferment of ideas, a forum where officials debated their duty, exchanged information about different provinces, and analyzed pending changes in the administrative system on a sometimes sophisticated level. From men like the *Mülkiye* writers came probably the empire's best response to the demands that Mizancı Murad—a former professor of theirs—had made for an official elite committed to service and efficiency.

To a later generation, this sense of professionalism displays limitations, to be sure. The *Mülkiye* writers were too self-congratulatory in their elitism. But of course, "France is what we imitate," to adapt one writer's phrase, and the School of Civil Administration was supposed to be a counterpart of the prestigious *Ecole libre des Sciences politiques*.[128] They were a bit quick to liken outlying parts of the empire to "colonies"; yet colonial administration was a large part of pre-World War I thinking about admin-

[127] Bedi' Nurî, "İdare ve Salahiyet," *Mülkiye*, no. 12 (1 January 1325/1910), 30–33, expressing the idea of efficiency with the image of a fast-working machine. In contrast to the argument here, he had opposed decentralization, at least under existing conditions, in his "İdare-i Vilâyat ve İzah," no. 9, 1 October 1325/1909, 41–45. See also Abd ül-Gani Senî, "Bir Hükumet-i Meşrutada Rüesa-yı İdarenin Daire-i Salahiyetleri ne Raddede Olmalıdır," no. 10 (1 November 1325/1909), 59–63; id., "Her Valinin Derece-i Salahiyet Bir mi Olmalıdır," no. 12 (1 January 1910), 34–38; Bedi' Nurî, "İdare ve Kanun," no. 13 (1 February 1325/1910), 40–44; id., "İdare ve Nizamat," no. 14 (1 March 1326/1910), 27–32; Mehmed Cemalî, "Valilerin Derece-i Salahiyetlerine Dair," no. 15 (1 April 1326/1910), 30–32; Abd ül-Gani Senî, "Muvaffakiyat-i İdareden: Kararda Teenni, İcrada Ciddiyet ve Sebat," no. 19 (1 August 1326/1910), 42–47. The only one of these authors not yet identified, Şirvanizade Mehmed Cemalî (1867–1910) made his career in local administration (Çankaya, *Mülkiye Târihi*, III, 249–50).

[128] Mehmed Âsım, "Memurin Muhakemesi," *Mülkiye*, no. 3 (1 April 1325/1909), 50 (*ma bihi 'l-taklidimiz olan Fransa*). On the *Ecole libre des Sciences politiques*, see, e.g., Suleiman, *Elites in French Society*, 49–52.

istration, and these men could not foresee the irony in their describing their work in terms congruent with the derogatory view of Ottoman rule taken by later Arab nationalists.[129] Obviously, the legalistic formalism we sense in İbrahim Hakkî Paşa appeared in many other *Mülkiye* alumni. This tendency received reinforcement from diverse quarters in this period: from nineteenth-century political liberalism, from Germany, and most immediately from reaction against Abd ül-Hamid's despotism. At least, voices were raised in the journal to argue that results mattered more than observance of forms, that official performance should be measured in accomplishment of practical goals rather than completion of paperwork, that time was of the essence, even that roads and bridges would do more to influence how peasants evaluated constitutionalism than would freedoms of speech and assembly.

The last years of the empire subjected the men who wrote for *Mülkiye* to rude tests. Perhaps the trials would have been less severe had a mentality like that expressed in the journal prevailed in the Committee of Union and Progress leadership. Men endowed with such a mentality had never yet set the tone for Ottoman civil officialdom overall, but their emergence was the most significant social development to occur in its midst during the reform era.

FROM "ADMINISTERING AFFAIRS" TO "ADMINISTERING THE COUNTRY"

To examine the physical setting, social ambiance, and work patterns of the civil administration is to confront hard evidence of the uneven pace of change during the reform era. A variety of sources, Ottoman and foreign, some of which might have appeared biased or incomplete in isolation, has converged to shape the view of these problems presented in this chapter. Initially, the dominant impression that emerges from this picture is of a disorder that justifies the cynical view of officialdom found in Vámbéry's orientalizing vignettes or in Mizancı Murad's novel, *First Fruits or Forbidden Fruits*. Sustained scrutiny brings to light more positive signs, however. Through the Hamidian period, we find these in men like Aşçı Dede, Grand Vezir Said Paşa, or Mahmud Kemal İnal, men who, close to traditional norms in many ways, combined them with ability, industry, and—at least in Said's case—even statesmanship. By the Young Turk period, exponents of a new professionalism appeared considerably more sophisticated and numerous, as the *Mülkiye* writers attest, however far their outlook remained from dominating Ottoman administration in its last years.

[129] Abd ül-Gani Senî, "Siyaset-i İdareden bir Nümune: Rıfk mi, Şiddet mi," *Mülkiye*, no. 5 (1 June 1325/1909), 58 (asking how Arabia or Libya differ from colonies); id., "İdare-i Vilâyat ve Taksimat-i Mülkiye," no. 7 (1 August 1325/1909), 16.

An opposition of terms that appears in some of the *Mülkiye* articles epitomizes the growth of professionalism. Several writers implicitly contrasted *idare-i maslahat* and *idare-i memleket*.[130] The first meant "administering affairs" but—since *maslahat* had been a favorite term of nineteenth-century reformers—conjured up a vision of the past, with its paper pushing, constant requests to Istanbul for authorization, and reforms (*ıslahat*—another word from the same Arabic root) that often failed to produce much practical impact.[131] The second phrase meant "administering the country," an expression that lacked the encrusted associations of the first and seemed to sum up the outward view and activism needed of administrators in a new age.

The challenge for people like the *Mülkiye* writers was to make this new concept of administration prevail and to keep it from becoming mired in the paper-pushing routines, irregularity, or restriction of official competence that had so distinguished and frustrated Ottoman officials historically. Of course even the best will and the finest sense of professionalism would not enable officials to meet this challenge until they could operate in a political climate free of both the despotism of the Hamidian years and the militarism and military disaster that overwhelmed the Young Turks. Even then, nothing guaranteed that the traditional faults of Ottoman administration, after surviving more than a century of reform under the empire, might not resurface and flourish anew.

[130] Bedi' Nurî, "Hükûmet-i Kırtasiye," *Mülkiye*, no. 8, 1 September 1325/1909 (compares *muamelât-ı kırtasiye*, or "paperwork transactions" with *idare-i memleket*); id.,"İdare-i Vilâyat ve İzah," no. 9 (1 October 1325/1909), 41–42 (linking *idare-i maslahat* with the "old mentality" that led administrators to request authorization [*istizan*] from Istanbul even for acts that they had regulatory authority to carry out); El-Seyyid Mehmed Emin, "Hükûmet-i Kırtasiye," no. 11 (1 December 1325/1909), 50–51 (uses both phrases, but without bringing them into direct opposition).

[131] The term *maslahat* has a long history. In Islamic jurisprudence, *maṣlaḥa* designates "public interest," one of the criteria that can be used to guide the process of reasoning by analogy (*qiyâs*) that plays a key role in the interpretation of legal questions (*ijtihâd*). In the nineteenth century, the term began to take on the added meaning of "utility" and came to serve, especially for those who were not rigorous about Islamic law, as a rationalization for any sort of cultural borrowing. See Albert Hourani, *Arabic Thought*, 20, 144 and passim; Malcolm Kerr, *Islamic Reform: The Political and Legal Theories of Muḥammad ʿAbduh and Rashīd Riḍā*, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1966, 55–56, 75–76, 80–86 and passim. Thence came the Ottomans' use of *maslahat* as a nontechnical term for any sort of business or affair. As a term in the Ottoman common lexicon, *maslahat* appears also to have gone through an extensive devaluation. At Ohrid in Yugoslavian Macedonia, I encountered a local resident in 1967 who was fluent in spoken Turkish, though not a Turk, and who used the phrase *çok maslahat* the way people in Turkey say *çok güzel* (literally, "very pretty," but effectively "very good," "fine," "nice"). The change of meaning did not stop at that point. Redhouse, after the Arabic meanings of the word, adds an off-color meaning from Turkish usage; see *A Turkish and English Lexicon*, 1890 edition, p. 1880, s. v. *maslahat*.

C H A P T E R V I I

Career Patterns: Patronage and Promotion

While career patterns and lines of promotion in the scribal service seem comparatively simple to account for, given the social homogeneity that emerges from available sources, civil official careers of the Hamidian or Young Turk periods are harder to summarize for a number of reasons. One consists of the increased differentiation that cultural change and broader recruitment introduced into the social fabric of officialdom. The growth in the number of agencies also exerted its effect, compounded by gaps in the development of personnel policy. For example, Ottoman personnel regulations never fully classified the positions in all major departments, despite efforts made in that direction under the Young Turks.[1] A fuller development of "civil service" legislation in that sense would probably have had a standardizing effect on careers in different agencies.

Under the circumstances, career patterns in the various ministries—bound to retain some differences for reasons of functional specialization—remained more diverse than they otherwise might have; and it takes precise documentation to interpret them. For example, from the summaries of personnel files that Çankaya integrated into his biographies of graduates of the School of Civil Administration, it is difficult either to reconstruct each phase of the officials' careers, or to determine what enabled some to march from early appointments as *kaymakam* of this district (*kaza*) and that to become governor-general (*vali*) at Bursa or Izmir or minister in Istanbul, while others got stuck in district-level appointments and never went higher. With complete, dated notations on appointments, salaries, ranks, and so on—things that appear in the original personnel

[1] Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform*, 328.

records but are often omitted in works like Çankaya's—we could collectively analyze basic traits of a large number of careers. Or, with fuller qualitative documentation than Çankaya usually provides, we might learn whether the upward march of the man who became a minister was more due to his talents or his family, and whether the other man's stagnation as *kaymakam* was the result of incapacity, his superiors' malice, poor health, or other causes.[2]

Given the great number of officials who served in local administration, it is unfortunate that Çankaya's accounts present such problems, as the published biographical compendia generally do. For specific sectors of civil officialdom, however, different sources permit both quantitative and qualitative analyses, so making it possible to examine two key questions about career patterns in the reform era. First, as their careers progressed, how did officials move through the formal organizational structures of the civil administration? Second, as they did so, to what degree did officials find that the legally defined procedures for appointment and promotion, discussed in chapter 1, actually outweighed the patronage relations that had governed careers before? This chapter explores the first of these questions through study of the Foreign Ministry personnel records. It approaches the second through Aşçı Dede İbrahim's sometimes comical account of how he negotiated the major turning points of his career.

CAREER PATTERNS IN THE FOREIGN MINISTRY

By present-day standards, it is difficult to imagine a foreign ministry that does not distinguish between consular-diplomatic and administrative officials, or perhaps among political, commercial, cultural, and administrative services. Yet just as the scribal service had no stratification of secretarial and professional grades, and just as the reformed civil administration never classified all its jobs, so the Ottoman Foreign Ministry never achieved this level of organization in its personnel procedure. It does not follow that no patterns existed in the way individuals pursued their careers. Not explicitly defined, however, the patterns emerge only from analysis of actual career records—an analysis that might yield results different from those in idealized descriptions, if such existed. To discover such actual career patterns, this section examines what the personnel records tell about how officials moved, as their careers progressed, through the various Foreign Ministry agencies.

[2] These observations emerged from an attempt to analyze careers of graduates of 1306/1890 and 1324/1908 in Çankaya, *Mülkiye Târihi*, III, 415–56, 1141–1200. Such a collective analysis is possible to a degree, but lacks either the clarity and completeness of one based directly on the personnel records, or the contextual fullness of one based on more copious qualitative documentation, like the Aşçı Dede memoirs.

To launch such an analysis requires confronting a question that our quantitative discussions so far have not had to face. This is how to account for change over time, in the sense—not of contrasting "older" and "younger" generations, as we have done heretofore and shall continue to do—but of following change across the span of each official's career. Our answer to this question, explained more fully in appendix A, is to divide the career span into segments and examine the status of the officials during, or at the end of, each segment. Requiring several columns to present the data on each personnel category, instead of the single columns that have sufficed in earlier tables, this procedure makes it necessary to present tables 7.2–7.5 in sections, which will be placed separately at suitable points in the text. Section A of each table will present data for all officials, with one column for each of the basically five-year segments into which we divide the career span. Section B will present the data for the three large personnel groups—traditionalist Muslims, modernist Muslims, and non-Muslims—and section C will present the evidence for the non-Muslim subgroups. So that sections B and C can appear on one page each, they will include columns only for alternate ones of the five-year periods of the career span. The generational contrast will again not be shown in the tables, but mentioned in the text when appropriate.

As noted in the appendix, the data collection method accepted only those cases in the personnel records where the recorded career spanned at least fifteen solar years. While most such individuals served beyond that limit, the numbers remaining in service declined considerably after the fifteenth year. Since small numbers of officials in some categories hinder analysis even without this problem, examination of how the numbers of men in service fluctuated across the career span forms a necessary preliminary to analysis of career patterns. Table 7.1 documents this point. The table omits median and mean career spans for the two generations, since the seemingly shorter career spans of the younger generation result primarily from the purges of the Young Turk period, and not from any characteristic of the officials themselves. Indeed, some of those purged later found ways to resume their careers.

While cases like Aşçı Dede İbrahim or Grand Vezir Said Paşa prove that some Ottoman officials served sixty years or more, table 7.1 shows median career spans falling roughly in the range of thirty to thirty-five years for all personnel categories. This fact reflects the incompleteness of our sources, as well, surely, as late Ottoman life expectancies. By or before the thirtieth year of the career span, in any case, the decline in the numbers remaining in service had become precipitous, a fact of particular consequence for the smallest personnel categories and the generational comparisons. For this reason the career span analysis will emphasize the period through the end of the thirtieth year, although some tables will,

Table 7.1.
NUMBER OF OFFICIALS IN SERVICE AT SELECTED POINTS IN CAREER SPAN

	Officials in Service at End of the...							*Career Lengths (Years)*	
	5th	*10th*	*15th*	*20th*	*25th*	*30th*	*30+ Yr.*[a]	*Median*[b]	*Mean*[b]
	(1)	*(2)*	*(3)*	*(4)*	*(5)*	*(6)*	*(7)*	*(8)*	*(9)*
ALL RESPONDENTS									
Total (Both Gens.)	366	366	366	355	310	247	189	*31.6*	*31.7*
Older Generation[c]	187	187	187	186	181	168	148		
Younger Generation[c]	179	179	179	169	129	79	41		
MUSLIM I[d]									
Total (Both Gens.)	115	115	115	114	98	80	64	*32.3*	*32.3*
Older Generation[c]	63	63	63	62	61	58	53		
Younger Generation[c]	52	52	52	52	37	22	11		
MUSLIM II[d]									
Total (Both Gens.)	144	144	144	139	124	87	65	*29.3*	*30.4*
Older Generation[c]	55	55	55	55	54	46	44		
Younger Generation[c]	89	89	89	84	70	41	21		
NON-MUSLIM									
Total (Both Gens.)	107	107	107	102	88	82	60	*33.1*	*32.8*
Older Generation[c]	69	69	69	69	66	64	51		
Younger Generation[c]	38	38	38	33	22	16	9		
Greek									
Total (Both Gens.)	30	30	30	29	26	25	20	*35.3*	*34.7*
Older Generation[c]	20	20	20	20	19	19	17		
Younger Generation[c]	10	10	10	9	7	6	3		
Armenian									
Total (Both Gens.)	52	52	52	50	43	39	27	*33.5*	*32.8*
Older Generation[c]	38	38	38	38	36	34	25		
Younger Generation[c]	14	14	14	12	7	5	2		
Other Non-Muslim									
Total (Both Gens.)	25	25	25	23	19	16	13	*29.0*	*30.5*
Older Generation[c]	11	11	11	11	11	11	9		
Younger Generation[c]	14	14	14	12	8	5	4		

NOTES:

[a] In this and other tables in chapter 7, "30+ Yr." refers to the last position an individual was appointed to, when the appointment occurred after the end of the 30th year of the career span.

[b] The career span data analyzed here include information from supplementary sources, to compensate for the incompleteness of many Foreign Ministry personnel files. These sources are listed in Appendix A, n. 5.

[c] "Older generation" refers to all officials who began their careers through 1875; "younger generation" refers to all who began in 1876 or later.

[d] "Muslim I" refers to "traditionalist" Muslims knowing little or no French; "Muslim II," to "modernists" claiming proficiency in that language.

like table 7.1, add one final column for the last recorded position of officials who served longer than that.[3]

Places of Service Within the Foreign Ministry

Table 7.2 begins the analysis by examining places of service for Foreign Ministry officials. Of the offices listed in the table, the traditional chancery offices are those of the Imperial Divan (*Divan-ı Hümayun Kalemi*, including its subordinate sections), the Office of the Corresponding Secretary of the Grand Vezir (*Mektubî-i Sadr-ı Âli Kalemi*), and the Office of the Receiver (*Amedî Kalemi*). All these offices had been under the supervision of the chief scribe (*reis ül-küttab*) prior to his change of title to foreign minister in 1836, and all of them remained attached to the Foreign Ministry for a time, before shifting to become parts of the staff of the grand vezir—a process completed by the 1880s.[4] Historically, diplomatic matters formed part of the mixed functions of these offices, and it is not surprising that numbers of men who served in them show up in the Foreign Ministry personnel records.

The next three offices listed in table 7.2 were large and important Foreign Ministry bureaus: the Turkish Correspondence Office (*Mektubî-i Hariciye Kalemi*), Translation Office of the Sublime Porte (*Bab-ı Âli Tercüme Odası*), and Foreign Correspondence Office (*Tahrirat-ı Hariciye Odası*). In contrast, the Office of Legal Counsel (*İstişare Odası*) never included more than a small number of career officials. But it was headed by two experts on international law known as the Legal Counsellors of the Sublime Porte—İbrahim Hakkî Paşa being one of the best known of these—and was a prestigious place to serve.[5]

Last among central agencies in the table, Consular, Commercial, and Mixed Legal Affairs refers to what were, under Abd ül-Hamid, three separate directorates, later combined. The duties of the third concerned legal conflicts that were "mixed" in the sense that one party was an Ottoman subject and one a foreign national.[6] The missions of all three pertaining to consular and commercial affairs, they are combined here for purposes of concision.

The next four rows of the table group consular and diplomatic missions in terms of whether or not they were located in major European capitals.

[3] The interval of time between the end of the thirtieth year and the end of these most senior officials' careers will no longer be essentially five years, but will vary for each individual. This fact should not materially hinder the analysis, however. Arguably, several years more or less of service would not have the same effect on the officials' status at the end of the career span as at the beginning.

[4] Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform*, 74–79, 170–71, 185, 243–45.

[5] Ibid., 132–35, 186–87, 257, 260, 320, 322–23.

[6] Ibid., 259.

Table 7.2A.
PLACES OF EMPLOYMENT IN THE FOREIGN MINISTRY
(ALL RESPONDENTS)
(as percentage of the number of officials shown for each column)

	First Posn. (1)	*5th* (2)	*10th* (3)	*15th* (4)	*20th* (5)	*25th* (6)	*30th* (7)	*30+ Yr.* (8)
	Position at End of the...							
Number of Officials	*366*	*366*	*366*	*366*	*355*	*310*	*247*	*189*
Traditional Chancery Offices	5	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Turkish Correspondence Office	11	11	11	11	11	11	10	10
Translation Office	16	16	16	10	9	7	8	8
Foreign Correspondence Office	16	11	8	7	6	4	4	2
Office of Legal Counsel	0	1	2	4	4	4	5	3
Consular, Commercial, and Mixed Legal Affairs	7	6	6	7	7	8	5	5
Major European Diplomatic Mission	1	4	4	6	5	5	6	7
Other Diplomatic Mission	2	4	7	8	7	11	10	12
Major European Consular Mission	0	2	2	1	2	2	2	1
Other Consular Mission	2	6	12	13	18	16	17	15
Total of Percentages Shown Above	60	62	69	68	70	69	68	65
Total Percentage Serving in Foreign Ministry	70	73	84	87	88	90	87	81

The "major" category consists precisely of London, Paris, Berlin, Vienna, and St. Petersburg, and excludes everything else, even consular posts in provincial cities of the five great powers. Since table 7.2 deals with places of service, rather than specific types of positions, the figures shown for consular and diplomatic missions include personnel at all levels, from secretary and vice-consul up, as well as the "commissioners" (*komiser*) and "commercial agents" (*tüccar vekili*) who took the place of ambassadors and consuls in lands, like Bulgaria, whose independence the Ottomans did not wish to recognize.[7]

Another fact essential for correct interpretation of tables 7.2–7.5 is that percentages can be compared only within rows. The point is that the sizes of the different bureaus or categories of positions were as unequal as their importance. One reason why three times as many career officials ended their careers in the Turkish Correspondence Office as in the Office of Legal Counsel is that the former was larger; the latter was more prestigious.

[7] E.g., Har., SA35, Nihad Paşa (=Seweryn Bilinski, *Bulgaristan komiseri*, 8 December 1295(?)/1879–21 S 1303/1885); Har., SA335, İsmail Zühdî, (*Sırbistan komiseri*, 1299/1882–3 B 1303/1886).

With this explanation of its organization, the first substantive point to note about table 7.2A concerns the total percentages at its foot. While a large majority of the officials under study served, at each point in the career span, in the Foreign Ministry, the total percentage was lowest for the first position and always higher thereafter. These figures suggest something about whether the Foreign Ministry was an "elite" ministry. Table 3.7 showed that only a small percentage of Foreign Ministry officials were sons of men who served in that ministry or predecessor agencies, a fact partly reflecting governmental expansion. Yet, to the extent that Foreign Ministry men were sons of officials who served elsewhere, the Foreign Ministry clearly had the power to draw men in, at least over a period of two generations. Here, we see a similar attraction operating within the career spans of the men under study. Fully to assess the Foreign Ministry's drawing power, we must compare the percentages shown as beginning their careers there, not with the higher percentages shown as serving there later in the career span, but rather with 100 percent, for all the officials shown in the table spent much of their careers in this ministry, even if they were not all there at once. The fact that 30 percent of Foreign Ministry officials began elsewhere before moving into this ministry suggests that Ottomans did, indeed, regard the Foreign Ministry as a highly desirable place to serve. Whether they were still right in doing so by the end of the nineteenth century was perhaps debatable. Yet older and younger generations differ little in this pattern of movement into the ministry after first appointment.

Looking at the proportions serving in various offices and missions, we note that the percentages in some rows of table 7.2A remain nearly stable, while those in other rows rise or fall. The percentages in the Turkish Correspondence Office remain stable across the career span. The percentages for the chancery offices are so from the fifth year on. The offices for consular, commercial, and mixed legal affairs vary little; so do the major European consular posts from the fifth year on. Places of service where the percentages drop over time include the chancery offices at the start of the career span, or the Translation and Foreign Correspondence Offices. Places of service where the percentages increase include the Office of Legal Counsel, both types of diplomatic missions, and, through the twentieth year, the "other" consular missions.

As for intergenerational changes in places of service, the strongest change is a decline, by eight to ten percentage points for the various time points in table 7.2A, in the proportion serving in the Turkish Correspondence Office, and a stronger gain in the percentage serving in the offices for consular, commercial, and mixed legal affairs. The relatively late foundation of the consular, commercial, and mixed legal agencies largely explains this pattern.[8] Manpower reassignments appear to have occurred as the new offices emerged, largely to the detriment of the Turkish Correspondence Office. One factor in intergenerational shifts appears, then, to be the ministry's structural development.

Table 7.2B.
PLACES OF EMPLOYMENT IN THE FOREIGN MINISTRY
(MAJOR PERSONNEL GROUPS)
(as percentage of the number of officials shown for each column)

	Muslim I				*Muslim II*				*Non-Muslim*			
	1st Posn.	*Posn. at End Yr. 10*	*20*	*30*	*1st Posn.*	*Posn. at End Yr. 10*	*20*	*30*	*1st Posn.*	*Posn. at End Yr. 10*	*20*	*30*
	(1)	*(2)*	*(3)*	*(4)*	*(5)*	*(6)*	*(7)*	*(8)*	*(9)*	*(10)*	*(11)*	*(12)*
N	*115*	*115*	*114*	*80*	*144*	*144*	*139*	*87*	*107*	*107*	*102*	*80*
Chancery Offs.[a]	8	3	2	3	8	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Turk. Corr. Off.	26	29	27	24	8	6	6	6	0	0	0	0
Translatn. Off.	12	14	11	15	23	25	12	7	9	5	2	1
Forgn. Corr. Off.	1	3	3	3	16	6	5	3	34	15	10	5
Off. Legal Counsel	0	1	4	3	0	2	3	6	0	2	5	5
Cons-Com-Mx. Lgl.	7	10	11	6	8	4	4	3	6	4	6	5
Maj. Euro. Dipl.	0	1	1	3	1	4	9	10	2	7	3	6
Other Dipl.	0	1	2	3	0	8	12	13	6	11	7	15
Maj. Euro. Cons.	0	0	0	1	0	2	3	2	1	3	4	1
Other Cons.	3	8	11	9	0	10	13	13	5	18	31	30
Total of %s Shown Above	57	70	72	70	64	68	67	63	63	65	68	68
Total % Serving in For. Miny.	70	85	90	89	67	86	88	82	73	81	87	93

NOTE:
[a] The abbreviated row labels mean the same as those in Table 7.2A.

Reasons why percentages for some places of service held steady across the career span, while others rose or fell, emerge from the comparisons among major personnel groups in table 7.2B. The figures on traditionalist Muslims show, for example, that the stability of the percentages for the Turkish Correspondence Office was largely a trait of this group. This office was the traditionalists' most frequent entry point, and most typical place of service in the ministry, ever after. Originally, this had been the ministry's only bureau, other than the chancery offices, working solely in Ottoman, not French. Traditionalist Muslims were not associated with this office so much as confined in it.

The organizational development of the ministry caused intergenerational change in this regard, however. While always more than 30 percent

[8] Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform*, 187, 259, 261.

of older traditionalist Muslims served in this office, the percentages for the younger generation were not half so great, while the percentages serving in the newer offices for consular, commercial, and mixed legal affairs varied the other way, from zero or little more at each phase of the career span in the older generation to 15 or 20 percent in the younger. The manpower reassignments among these offices, noted above, thus especially affected Muslim traditionalists.

The traditionalist Muslims' representation in some other places of service also merits comment. While they and modernist Muslims were likely to begin their careers in the chancery offices, traditionalists were more apt to remain there. Not surprisingly, in view of the eventual reassignment of these offices to the grand vezir's staff, service in them was almost entirely limited to the older generation. For men of traditional education to be associated with the chancery offices was as natural as their "confinement" in the one of the ministry's newer bureaus that did not require the modernists' distinctive skill.

By that criterion, the fact that a rather strong proportion of Muslim traditionalists served in the Translation Office, created to train Muslims as diplomatic translators, seems anomalous. Almost 40 percent of traditionalists did, however, claim limited knowledge of French. The mission of the Translation Office also ultimately settled down to translating foreign documents into Turkish—a task demanding less skill than it took to draft documents in French, by then the mission of the newer Foreign Correspondence Office.[9] At times, too, translators for Arabic and Persian served in the Translation Office.[10]

Among the consular and diplomatic missions, finally, it is not surprising to find traditionalist Muslims serving in the least prestigious posts—the "other" consular missions, often located around the Black Sea, in the Balkans, or in Iran.[11] This pattern changed little between generations.

If stability throughout the career span was a hallmark of traditionalist Muslims, mobility among places of service characterized both modernist Muslims and non-Muslims. Modernist Muslims, especially in the older generation, were as likely as traditionalists to begin their careers in the old chancery offices. However, the modernists' distinctive starting place

[9] Ibid., 187.

[10] Traditionalist Muslims with long service in the Translation Office: Har., SA765, Mustafa Reşid Bey, appointed corrector (*musahhih*) of Arabic and Persian documents, RA 1302/c. January 1885; SA303, Mehmed Suad Bey, career in the office, becoming examining clerk (*mümeyyiz*) in ZA 1302/1885; SA384, Mehmed Zekî, appointed registrar (*mukayyid*) in the records room of the Translation Office, Z 1309/1892. All three knew some French.

[11] E.g., Batum, Tiflis, Odessa (Hoca Bey), Kerch, Poti, or Sukhumi in Russian territory; Tabriz or Khvoy in Iranian Azerbaijan; Patras, Trikkala, and Arta (Narda) in Greece; Galaţi, Constanţa, Braila, Turnu Severin, Iaşi, or Tulcea in Rumania; Niš or Kragujevac in Serbia; Podgorica or Bar and Ulcinj (Olgun) in Montenegro; cf. listings in *Salname*, 1326/1908, 1012–29; all these posts are mentioned in Har., SA, various files.

was the Translation Office of the Sublime Porte, which had served as the seedbed of the *Tanzimat* elite. The office retained its prestige into the late nineteenth century—however aptly Mizancı Murad caricatured conditions in it. Yet the ambitious Muslim westernist would not have wanted to remain there too long. The figures in table 7.2B indicate a slight increase, between the first appointment and the end of the tenth year of the career span, in the percentage of modernists in this office, an increase confined to the older generation. For the rest of the career span, the percentages of modernists in this office declined for both generations.

After the Translation Office, modernist Muslims' next most important starting point was the Foreign Correspondence Office. Again, at each point in the career span, higher percentages served there in the older generation than in the younger. Modernists who started out in Foreign Correspondence included the two diplomatic memoirists, Esat Cemal Pâker and Galip Kemalî Söylemezoğlu.[12] The declines between generations in the percentages serving in the Translation and Foreign Correspondence Offices have various possible explanations: diffusion of their distinctive language skill, reorientation of role concepts away from secretarial functions, political changes cutting off the lines of advancement that the diplomatic culture brokers of the *Tanzimat* had ascended, or development of newer agencies. One reason why the proportion of modernists was smaller in the Foreign Correspondence than in the Translation Office was, as we shall see, the non-Muslims' special association with the former.

For the ambitious modernist Muslim who began his career in the Translation Office, there were a number of later destinations. One, small in size but large in importance, was the Office of Legal Counsel. The percentage of modernist Muslims serving there increased steadily over the career span. The fact that men who so seldom had legal training could be employed in this office again reflects the limited availability of manpower with technical training.[13]

More common as midcareer destinations for modernist Muslims were consular and diplomatic posts. There, members of this group enjoyed a special advantage. Higher percentages of non-Muslims often served in these areas, but the Muslim modernists had greater access to the most desirable posts. In both twentieth and thirtieth years, for example, the modernist Muslim percentage in major European diplomatic missions

[12] Pâker, *Hariciye Hâtıraları*, 7–8; Söylemezoğlu, *Hariciye Hizmetinde Otuz Sene*, I, 53, 60.

[13] Of twelve men serving in the Office of Legal Counsel at the end of their thirtieth year of service, only four, all modernist Muslims, claimed formal study of law: Har., SA278 (Mehmed Erşed Bey; cf. Çankaya, *Mülkiye Târihi*, II, 391–92); SA172 (Mehmed Esad Bey); SA65 (Ahmed Subhî Bey); SA199 (Ahmed Tevhid).

was more than two-thirds the percentage in the least desirable—and largest—category, the "other" consular missions.[14] For non-Muslims, the balance was sharply weighted toward "other" consular missions.

The places non-Muslim officials filled were more like the modernist Muslims' than the traditionalists'; yet important differences appeared between modernist Muslims' and non-Muslims' careers. Non-Muslims, too, had a clearly marked point of entry into the ministry, the Foreign Correspondence Office. This was especially true for Armenians. Greeks were almost as likely to start in the Translation Office. Other non-Muslims were as apt to begin in minor consular missions as in the Foreign Correspondence Office, and over half of them began outside the ministry—an unusual performance by an exceptional subgroup.

The special association of the Armenians with the Foreign Correspondence Office went back to its early years, when, at the end of the Crimean War, Sahak Abro, an able Armenian official well regarded by the *Tanzimat* leadership, became head of the office and—a familiar motif—made of it something like a preserve for people he found congenial, namely, his coreligionists.[15] By the end of the Hamidian period, however, the Armenians had lost their status as a favored minority, and the office was losing its predominantly Armenian character.[16]

In the later part of the career span, the non-Muslim presence in the ministry's central offices (table 7.2B) shifted until the non-Muslim proportion in the offices for consular, commercial, and mixed legal affairs, or even in the Office of Legal Counsel, was as large as that found in the Foreign Correspondence Office. Of course, the distribution of the non-Muslim subgroups among these bureaus was unequal (table 7.2C). At the end of the thirtieth year, Greeks were concentrated in consular, commercial, and mixed legal affairs, Armenians were still strongest in the Foreign Correspondence Office, while those in the Office of Legal Counsel were either Armenian or "other" non-Muslims. The Armenians' association with the prestigious Office of Legal Counsel perhaps resembled their connection with the Foreign Correspondence Office. For one of the first Ottoman subjects appointed legal counsellor, and thus codirector of the office, was an Armenian, Gabriel Noradounghian. By the late 1890s, the office included a fairly strong Armenian minority.[17]

As with modernist Muslims, the non-Muslims' main places of service from midcareer on were consular and diplomatic, especially the less prestigious posts away from major European capitals. Compared to traditionalist Muslims, non-Muslims were better represented in almost all types of consular and diplomatic posts. While caution is in order in evaluating percentages based on small numbers of cases, the "other" non-Muslims appear to have been more favored than Greeks or Armenians, at least in late career, in access to the best such positions.[18] An independent source confirms this inference and suggests a reason. Commenting in 1890 on the

[14] Modernist Muslims serving in major European diplomatic missions at the end of their thirtieth year (with the date in which that year fell for them) were: Har., SA29 (Mehmed Cemal Bey, first secretary, Paris, 1894); SA71 (Mahmud Esad Paşa, ambassador, Paris, 1880); SA436 (Mahmud Nedim Paşa [not the grand vezir of that name], ambassador, Vienna, 1904); SA759 (Rif'at Paşa, ambassador, Paris, 1913); SA424 (Sadullah Paşa, ambassador, Vienna, 1883); BBA, DSA II, 416 (Mehmed Esad Safvet Paşa, ambassador, Paris, 1865); BBA, DSA I, 606 (Çapanzade Ahmed Şakir Paşa, ambassador, Saint Petersburg, 1887); Har., SA429 (Ahmed Tevfik Paşa [the one who became grand vezir], ambassador, Berlin, 1888); SA723 (Sarayhzade Ahmed Tevfik Paşa, ambassador, Berlin, 1908).

[15] Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform*, 208, 257, 383 n. 95; Çark, *Ermeniler*, 130–32; Findley, "Acid Test," 354; BBA, DSA IV, 178 (Sahak Abro, directed the office 1857–1867). Pâker, *Hariciye Hâtıraları*, 8, recounts serving under an Armenian director in this office at his appointment there upon graduation from Galatasaray Lycée in 1896.

[16] E.g., *Salname* 1317/1899–1900, 152–55; *Salname*, 1326/1908, 232–33; but yearbook listings include only the supervisory-level officials.

Table 7.2C.
PLACES OF EMPLOYMENT IN THE FOREIGN MINISTRY
(NON-MUSLIM SUBGROUPS)
(as percentage of the number of officials shown for each column)

	Greek				*Armenian*				*Other Non-Muslim*			
	1st Posn.	*Posn. at End Yr.*			*1st Posn.*	*Posn. at End Yr.*			*1st Posn.*	*Posn. at End Yr.*		
		10	*20*	*30*		*10*	*20*	*30*		*10*	*20*	*30*
	(1)	*(2)*	*(3)*	*(4)*	*(5)*	*(6)*	*(7)*	*(8)*	*(9)*	*(10)*	*(11)*	*(12)*
N	*30*	*30*	*29*	*25*	*52*	*52*	*50*	*39*	*25*	*25*	*23*	*16*
Chancery Offs.[a]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Turk. Corr. Off.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Translatn. Off.	17	7	3	0	10	2	2	3	0	8	0	0
Forgn. Corr. Off.	20	7	0	0	52	25	18	10	12	4	4	0
Off. Legal Counsel	0	3	3	0	0	2	6	8	0	0	4	6
Cons-Com-Mx. Lgl.	3	3	10	8	6	4	2	5	8	4	9	0
Maj. Euro. Dipl.	7	7	3	0	0	8	4	3	0	8	0	25
Other Dipl.	13	17	10	20	0	10	8	8	8	8	0	25
Maj. Euro. Cons.	0	0	3	0	2	6	2	3	0	0	9	0
Other Consular	3	23	34	40	2	13	24	23	12	20	43	31
Total of %s Shown Above	63	67	66	68	72	70	66	63	40	52	69	87
Total % Serving in For. Miny.	73	77	83	92	85	87	90	90	48	76	87	100

NOTE:
[a] The abbreviated row labels are the same as in Table 7.2A.

[17] *Salname*, 1317/1899–1900, 156–58; Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform*, 260.

[18] Non-Muslims serving in major European diplomatic missions at the end of their thirtieth year (with the date at which that fell for them): SA36 (Yusuf Misak [Hovsep Misakian], counsellor of embassy [*müsteşar*], Paris, 1894); SA66 (Nasrî Bey Franko, an Arab Christian, counsellor of embassy, Vienna, 1894); SA434 (Morel Bey, a French-born Ottoman subject, counsellor of embassy, London, 1892); BBA, DSA II, 100 (Rüstem Paşa, minister in Italy, 1864).

chances that one of the men of European origin, Edouard Blacque Bey, might be appointed ambassador in Berlin, the German ambassador in Istanbul argued that a Muslim would be preferable on the ground that a Christian would be more vulnerable to intrigue. But the ambassador added: ". . . it has almost always been a question of Greek[s] and Armenian[s]" as non-Muslim envoys. "The only Christian diplomat in high position . . . who does not belong to one of these nationalities, Rüstem Paşa, rightly figures . . . as one of the best and most reliable of Turkish ambassadors."[19]

While it is not fully clear why non-Muslim officials should have been especially vulnerable to intrigue, those from the smallest subgroups would at least have little association in Ottoman minds with separatist nationalisms like those of Greeks and Armenians. Potentially, this fact might have benefited Ottoman Jews, as well as Arab Christians and men of European origin, the other members of the "other non-Muslim" category in the tables. In practice, the Jews' character as the newest and least advantaged non-Muslim subgroup seemed to keep this from happening. Of "other non-Muslims" who served in major European diplomatic missions, none were Jewish.[20] Almost all non-Muslims who did serve in major European diplomatic missions were from the older generation—another sign that *Tanzimat* egalitarianism declined under Abd ül-Hamid.

To judge from table 7.2, then, career patterns of the Foreign Ministry's various groups and subgroups were substantially different. Each of the three major groups had a distinctive point of entry in one of the ministry's major bureaus. Throughout their careers, traditionalist Muslims necessarily remained confined to places of service for which they were linguistically qualified—a fact that gave their careers remarkable stability. Only among them was it common to find officials who spent their entire careers in one or two bureaus, pursuing their way from apprentice to supervisor and no further, as in the eighteenth century. Among traditionalist Muslims, in fact, 20 percent spent thirty or more years in a single place of service.[21]

[19] PAAA (Bonn), Türkei 162, Bd. 2, Radowitz to Caprivi, 16 May 1890 (T139, roll 394); BBA, DSA I, 1016, Edouard Blacque Bey; DSA II, 100, Rüstem Paşa, son of Francesco.

[20] Cf. Findley, "Acid Test," 353, Table 16–5.

[21] I.e., 23 men out of 115, grouped here by place of service. Turkish Correspondence Office, 11 men: Har., SA364 (Ahmed Esad Bey, 1850–c. 1906); SA118 (Osman Fahrî Bey, 1864–1897); SA603 (Ali Mazhar Bey, 1855–1894); SA59 (Mehmed Murad Bey, 1855–1900); SA27 (Mehmed Muhyi 'l-Din, 1871–c. 1908); SA418 (Mustafa Münir Bey, 1857–1908: he entered the office at age fourteen and became director in 1895); SA734 (Ali Nihad Bey, 1875–1908); SA413 (Mehmed Nurî, 1862–c. 1897); SA334 (Mustafa Sabit Bey, 1855–1891); SA141 (Hasan Tahsin, 1856–1895); SA202 (İsmail Zühdî, 1872–c. 1908). Translation Office, 5 men: SA151 (Ahmed Celâl Bey, 1866–1898); SA162 (İsmail Cemal Bey, 1861–1908); SA126 (Mehmed Refik Bey, 1869–c. 1908); SA765 (Mustafa Reşid Bey, 1868–1909); SA724 (Ali Şinasî, 1861–c. 1893). Foreign Correspondence Office, 2 men: SA187 (Baha el-Din Bey, 1875–c. 1908); SA740 (İsmail Şerif, 1863–c. 1892). Foreign Ministry Records Office, 2 men: SA675 (Ahmed Cemal Bey, 1863–1908); SA135 (Mehmed Râşid Bey, 1856–1888). Foreign Ministry Accounts Office, 2 men: SA101 (Osman İhsan Efendi, 1880–c. 1918); SA107 (Mehmed Şakir Bey, 1882–1912). Mixed Legal Affairs Office, 1 man: SA201 (Ahmed Celâl el-Din Bey, 1881–c. 1918). The final dates in most cases are simply the last verifiable; many of these men must have served past the date shown. Some also served in other bureaus, as well as the one named.

While the modernist Muslims and non-Muslims, too, had distinctive starting places, they differed in that movement out of them—most often into consular or diplomatic missions—became the dominant theme for both groups by midcareer. Considering the non-Muslims' marginality to the old scribal service, the extent to which they had moved into the same types of positions as the modernist Muslims is remarkable. But just as the non-Muslims' movement into the mainstream had few parallels elsewhere in government, even in the Foreign Ministry modernist Muslims enjoyed readier access to the best posts; and the official role of the non-Muslims was in decline by the late Hamidian period.

Service Outside the Ministry

Up to this point, we have considered career patterns primarily as they relate to service within the Foreign Ministry. Yet officials moved in and out of it, and it is logical to look more closely at their patterns of movement. Table 7.3 summarizes the data on this aspect of career patterns.

Of the headings in the table, "Other Central Civil Agencies" refers to agencies in Istanbul, other than the Foreign Ministry. These begin with other components of the Sublime Porte—the staffs of the grand vezir and Council of Ministers, the Council of State (*Şura-yı Devlet*), and the central offices of the Interior Ministry. The list continues with agencies outside the Sublime Porte: the Ministries of Justice, Finance, Public Works, or Education; the civil staffs of the Ministries of War, Artillery, and the Navy; and other agencies like the Receivership of Customs and Prefecture of Istanbul. The other headings in the table are mostly self-explanatory. In connection with the heading "Military Service," it should be noted that Foreign Ministry personnel files include a few military officers, usually serving in strategically sensitive diplomatic or consular posts in Russia or the Balkans. When serving in such posts, these soldiers are counted as serving in the Foreign Ministry. The "Military Service" heading in the table is for properly military assignments. Civil officials who served in the military ministries, as did Aşçı Dede, would be counted under "Other Central Civil Agencies." The one branch of the ruling class that remains unmentioned in the table—the religious service (*ilmiye*)—had a few men in the ministry, mostly as consular imams. Otherwise, religious function-

TABLE 7.3A.
PLACES OF EMPLOYMENT OUTSIDE THE FOREIGN MINISTRY
(ALL RESPONDENTS)
(as percentage of the number of officials shown for each column)

	First	*Position at End of the...*						
	Posn.	*5th*	*10th*	*15th*	*20th*	*25th*	*30th*	*30+ Yr.*
	(1)	*(2)*	*(3)*	*(4)*	*(5)*	*(6)*	*(7)*	*(8)*
Number of Officials	*366*	*366*	*366*	*366*	*355*	*310*	*247*	*189*
Other Central Civil Agencies	13	9	5	5	5	5	5	13
Provincial Administration	7	4	3	3	2	2	4	4
Palace Service	2	1	1	0	0	0	0	1
Military Service	3	3	2	1	0	0	0	0
Other, Indeterminate	4	8	4	4	5	2	3	1
Total of Percentages Shown	29	25	15	13	12	9	12	19
Total Percentage in Foreign Ministry (from Table 7.2A)	70	73	84	87	88	90	87	81

aries fall into the final residual category, which covered a variety of positions, never in any concentration.

Table 7.3A spotlights the way the Foreign Ministry not only drew in men who began their careers elsewhere, but also sent out some of its most senior men to serve in other roles. The most common type of starting point for officials who began outside the Foreign Ministry was the other civil positions in the capital. Within this category, the actual positions varied widely, the only ministry or other comparable agency accounting for as much as 2 percent of the newly appointed officials being the Ministry of Finance, one of the largest. The second most important category of starting positions, those in local administration, was another large branch of civil officialdom. Other areas of service made only slight contributions to the Foreign Ministry at this stage, the military men being those who later assumed the sensitive consular and diplomatic posts mentioned earlier. The final residual category includes a few teachers and functionaries of the European-controlled Public Debt Administration.

The movement outward from the ministry at the end of the career span did not assume the same proportion as the inward movement at the beginning, as the percentages at the foot of table 7.3A show, but was qualitatively significant. Again, it was a question mostly of other civil positions in the capital, secondarily of local administration. Considering the association in the scribal service between high rank and increased lateral mobility, it is natural to ask whether the movement of senior officials out of the Foreign Ministry was still a concomitant of high status. Given the way the *Tanzimat* elite had used the Foreign Ministry as its channel of ascent to the administrative heights, we might expect so, however much conditions had changed after Abd ül-Hamid's accession. In fact, the appointments of senior Foreign Ministry officials to positions outside the ministry did seem to be associated with high rank. Inspection of the records shows that increased late-career mobility was largely a matter of appointment to bodies like the Council of State (*Şura-yı Devlet*) or the Senate (*Heyet-i Ayan*), high positions such as governor-general (*vali*) of a province (*vilâyet*) or governor (*mutasarrıf*) of a *sancak*, or—higher yet—cabinet posts or the grand vezirate. Some officials held many such positions, which mostly went to holders of the highest two or three in the nine-grade civil rank table.[22]

To what we have already seen about how official careers began, table 7.3B adds that the extent of movement into the Foreign Ministry from other civil agencies in Istanbul was essentially equal for all three major personnel groups. Between generations, the extent of such recruitment increased for the entire population and for both Muslim groups. For the non-Muslims, conversely, there was a strong intergenerational decline in almost all types of recruitment from outside the ministry. This fact underscores the virtual confinement of the proportionally small "younger generation" of non-Muslims to the Foreign Ministry and reminds us again of the long-term decline of the non-Muslim role in government service. The anomalous-looking non-Muslims in military service prove to be Nihad Paşa, born Seweryn Bilinski, a Polish refugee who entered Ottoman service during the Crimean War, and Yahya Karaca Paşa, the son of a prominent Ottoman Greek family, who had a partly military education in Berlin and held military rank for a few years during a mostly civil career.[23]

As concerns the most senior officials' movement back out of the Foreign Ministry, table 7.3B shows little evidence of this. But this table does not include the figures for the final positions of those who served more than

[22] Members of the Council of State: Ahmed Ârifî Paşa (BBA, DSA, XXI, 37, chairman, 1880s–early 1890s), Mehmed Âsım Paşa (BBA, DSA, IV, 114), Mustafa Reşid Bey (grandson of Grand Vezir Mustafa Reşid Paşa; BBA, DSA, IV, 308–309), Mehmed Said Paşa (BBA, DSA, I, 576–77; this is "Kürd" Said, best known for serving as foreign minister, as distinct from "Küçük" Said, the grand vezir), Sahak Abro (BBA, DSA, IV, 178), Hmayak Safer (Har., SA138). Senate members: Mehmed Âsım Paşa (BBA, DSA, IV, 114), Manuk Azarian (Har., SA300; Çark, *Ermeniler*, 152–53). Provincial governors-general, *sancak* governors, or analogous local administrative positions: Mehmed Âsım Paşa (BBA, DSA, IV, 114, *vali* of several provinces), Mustafa Fahrî Bey (BBA, DSA, I, 584), Mehmed Namık Kemal Bey (BBA, DSA, I, 210, several appointments as *mutasarrıf*, a form of exile for him), Mehmed Said Paşa (BBA, DSA, I, 576–77, several posts as *mutasarrıf*), Çapanzade Ahmed Şakir Paşa (BBA, DSA, I, 606), Ohannes Paşa Kuyumcıan (Har., SA442, *mutasarrıf* of Mount Lebanon); cf. Edouard Blacque Bey (BBA, DSA, I, 1016, director of sixth municipal district, Istanbul). Ministers in other departments: Ahmed Ârifî Paşa (BBA, DSA, XXII, 37), Mehmed Âsım Paşa (BBA, DSA, IV, 114), İbrahim Edhem Paşa (BBA, DSA, II, 218), Mehmed Tahir Münif Paşa (BBA, DSA, III, 246), Mehmed Esad Safvet Paşa (BBA, DSA, II, 416). Grand vezirs: Ahmed Ârifî Paşa (BBA, DSA, XXI, 37), İbrahim Edhem Paşa (BBA, DSA, II, 218), Mehmed Esad Safvet Paşa (BBA, DSA, II, 416), Ahmed Tevfik Paşa (Har., SA429).

[23] Har., SA35 (Nihad Paşa); BBA, DSA, I, 1030 (Yahya Karaca Paşa).

TABLE 7.3B.
PLACES OF EMPLOYMENT OUTSIDE THE FOREIGN MINISTRY
(MAJOR PERSONNEL GROUPS)
(as percentage of the number of officials shown for each column)

	Muslim I				*Muslim II*				*Non-Muslim*			
	1st Posn.	*Posn. at End Yr. 10*	*20*	*30*	*1st Posn.*	*Posn. at End Yr. 10*	*20*	*30*	*1st Posn.*	*Posn. at End Yr. 10*	*20*	*30*
	(1)	*(2)*	*(3)*	*(4)*	*(5)*	*(6)*	*(7)*	*(8)*	*(9)*	*(10)*	*(11)*	*(12)*
N	*115*	*115*	*114*	*80*	*144*	*144*	*139*	*87*	*107*	*107*	*102*	*80*
Other Central Civil Agencies	15	5	4	6	13	4	4	8	13	7	7	0
Provl. Admin.	9	3	4	4	6	1	2	7	7	6	0	1
Palace Service	2	1	0	0	3	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Military Service	1	1	0	0	6	3	0	1	1	2	1	0
Other, Indeterm.	3	5	2	1	6	5	6	2	7	5	5	6
Total % Shown	30	15	10	11	34	14	12	18	28	20	13	7
Total % in F.M. (Cf.Table 7.2B)	70	85	90	89	67	86	88	82	73	81	87	93

thirty years. Those figures show that 9 percent of the traditionalist Muslims, 17 percent of the modernists, and 12 percent of the non-Muslims whose careers spanned more than thirty years held their last positions in central civil agencies other than the Foreign Ministry. While the modernist Muslims' percentage is higher, the non-Muslims' is especially noteworthy, since it shows that the total absence of non-Muslims from positions of this type at the end of the thirtieth year (table 7.3B, column 12) is an anomaly. Among officials who served more than thirty years, the percentages ending their careers in *any* agency outside the Foreign Ministry were 13 for traditionalist Muslims, 23 for modernists, and 17 for non-Muslims. Given the association of such mobility among senior officials with high rank, these figures implicitly show how the promotion prospects of officials of these three types compared.

Table 7.3C shows that among the non-Muslims, initial service outside the Foreign Ministry was most characteristic of "other non-Muslims," specifically—since such service proves more typical for this subgroup's older generation—the Arab Christians and men of European origin, as opposed to the much younger Jewish officials. Again, though the table does not show it, another outward movement occurred among senior officials after the thirtieth year. Of the small number of non-Muslim officials included in these tables who served more than thirty years, two out of twenty Greeks, six out of twenty-seven Armenians, and three out of thirteen "other non-Muslims" ended their careers outside the Foreign Ministry.[24]

[24] It seems appropriate to state the figures in this way, rather than in percentages, to underscore that the data come from small numbers of cases. Of the men in question, the Greeks were: Har., SA270 (Nikolaki Faler Bey, legal affairs director, Konya province, until 1919); SA4 (İstefanaki Fotiadi Bey, Council of State). The Armenians were: BBA, DSA IV, 178 (Sahak Abro, Council of State); DSA III, 264 (Bartev Antoine, judicial inspector, Edirne province); DSA I, 52 (Arzuman İstepan, judicial inspector, Aydın province); Har., SA300 (Manuk Azarian, Senate); SA442 (Ohannes Kuyumcıan Paşa, *mutasarrıf* of Mount Lebanon, or Senate: see next note); SA138 (Hımayak Safer, Council of State). Other non-Muslims: Har., SA279 (Nesim Soriçon, French teacher, Aydın Lycée); BBA, DSA I, 1016 (Edouard Blacque Bey, director, sixth municipal district, Istanbul); DSA IV, 280 (Yusuf/Joseph Player, member, commercial appeals court). Two other Armenians held office both inside the Foreign Ministry and outside at the end of their careers: Har., SA435 (Artin Dadian Paşa, Council of State, undersecretary for foreign affairs); and SA124 (Neşan Safer, director of the Foreign Press Office, translator at the Palace Secretariat).

Table 7.3C.
PLACES OF EMPLOYMENT OUTSIDE THE FOREIGN MINISTRY
(NON-MUSLIM SUBGROUPS)
(as percentage of the number of officials shown for each column)

	Greek				*Armenian*				*Other Non-Muslim*			
	1st Posn.	*Posn. at End Yr. 10*	*20*	*30*	*1st Posn.*	*Posn. at End Yr. 10*	*20*	*30*	*1st Posn.*	*Posn. at End Yr. 10*	*20*	*30*
	(1)	*(2)*	*(3)*	*(4)*	*(5)*	*(6)*	*(7)*	*(8)*	*(9)*	*(10)*	*(11)*	*(12)*
N	*30*	*30*	*29*	*25*	*52*	*52*	*50*	*39*	*25*	*25*	*23*	*16*
Other Central Civil Agencies	10	13	14	0	10	6	4	0	24	0	4	0
Provl. Admin.	10	7	0	0	4	4	0	3	8	8	0	0
Palace Service	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Military Service	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	4	4	0
Other Indeterm.	7	0	3	8	2	4	6	8	16	12	4	0
Total % Shown	27	23	17	8	16	14	10	11	52	24	12	0
Total % in F.M. (Cf.Table 7.2C)	73	77	83	92	85	87	90	90	48	76	87	100

Their usual places of final service were the Council of State and local administration. Throughout the non-Muslims' careers, service outside the Foreign Ministry was proportionately most common for the older generation. Among the younger-generation Armenians, none served outside the Foreign Ministry at any of the points of the career span shown in the table, although one younger-generation Armenian with more than thirty years' service did hold his last post in provincial administration.[25]

The evidence on Foreign Ministry officials' service outside that ministry thus shows fairly predictable places of service, mostly in other civil agencies of the capital or in local administration. The concentration of service outside the ministry at the extreme ends of the career span further shows

[25] Har., SA442, Ohannes Paşa Kuyumcıan, first appointment October 1877, last recorded post as *mutasarrıf* of Mount Lebanon, 1912–1915. (Çark, *Ermeniler*, 153, says, however, that he became a member of the Senate in 1915.)

that the ministry continued both to exert a certain drawing power and—given the association of outward movement at career-end with high rank—to contribute significantly to the pool of senior administrative generalists. Unlike the initial inward movement, which was more equally distributed, the outward movement of senior officials varied in frequency among personnel categories, in addition to being associated with achievement of the top ranks. Among those with over thirty years of service, such movement was least common for traditionalist Muslims, and most so for modernists, with the non-Muslims in an intermediate position. The evidence on service outside the ministry thus reinforces our conclusions about the relative standing of the major personnel groups and the erosion of *Tanzimat* egalitarianism.

Positions Held in the Foreign Ministry

So far, we have considered Foreign Ministry officials' *places of service*, in the sense of departments or types of missions. To look at the *positions* they held also proves instructive. Table 7.4 categorizes Foreign Ministry positions, beginning with those in the central agencies, then the consular and diplomatic missions, and finally other posts mentioned in the personnel records. The layout of the table does not indicate any overall rank-ordering; nor was there a formal distinction between consular-diplomatic and other services at the time. This listing simply bears a pragmatic correspondence to the recorded data. As with places of service, differences in numbers of positions of the various types limit valid comparisons to those among figures in the same row of the table.[26]

In the data for the entire population (table 7.4A), certain types of positions again show no consistent variation over the career span, while others do. Those lacking a clear pattern of variation are the three last rows in the table. Of these, the first refers both to provincial foreign affairs directors and translators that the government maintained in provinces where subjects—and consuls—of foreign powers were especially numerous and troublesome,[27] and to special temporary missions for purposes such as border delimitation. The last two rows are residual categories. The episodic nature of most phenomena recorded in the last three rows explains the lack of clear patterns there.

The rest of the percentages in table 7.4A generally either decrease over the career span or increase, displaying complementary patterns. These patterns begin to identify ladders that officials climbed as their careers

[26] The variety of positions these men held outside the Foreign Ministry, and the small numbers in most of them, make it impractical to extend the analysis undertaken in table 7.4 to positions outside the Foreign Ministry.

[27] Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform*, 189, 200, 262–63, 323.

Table 7.4A.
POSITIONS HELD IN THE FOREIGN MINISTRY
(ALL RESPONDENTS)
(as percentage of the number of officials shown for each column)

	First Posn. (1)	*5th* (2)	*Position at End of the... 10th* (3)	*15th* (4)	*20th* (5)	*25th* (6)	*30th* (7)	*30+ Yr.* (8)
Number of Officials	*366*	*366*	*366*	*366*	*355*	*310*	*247*	*189*
Minister, Undersecretary	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	2
Bureau Chief	0	0	1	3	5	7	8	10
Supervisory Official	0	2	7	15	19	20	22	19
Routine Clerical	4	43	40	32	25	17	13	9
Apprentice	61	9	5	1	0	1	0	1
Head of Diplomatic Mission	0	0	0	1	2	6	9	12
Staff of Diplomatic Mission	2	7	11	13	9	7	5	4
Consular Official	2	8	13	14	21	19	21	19
Provincial Post, Special Mission	1	3	4	4	2	4	3	1
Between Posts	0	1	3	5	5	6	4	4
Indeterminate	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1
Total Percentage in For. Miny.[a]	70	73	84	88	88	89	86	81

NOTE:
[a] The percentages in this row should match those in the last row of percentages in Table 7.2A, but differ slightly in some cases because of rounding and the fact that this table presents other, separately coded data.

progressed. As in earlier times, almost all officials began as unpaid apprentices (*mülâzım*). Here the table understates the case, as most who began outside the ministry's central offices, or outside it altogether, would also have been unsalaried. Some of those who began in the central offices remained there, pursuing their way upward through the steadily smaller categories of salaried clerk, supervisor, then bureau chief. Among these categories, there is a rank order. Given fewer places at higher levels, not all who started on this ladder could have gone far up it. Some stayed on it but did not go far. Others went on to consular and diplomatic posts, for which the percentages increase sharply after the earliest phases of the career span. Some officials showing up in the figures by the tenth year had also come from outside the Foreign Ministry.

The percentages in consular posts varied in a rather narrow range from the end of the tenth year on, although more and more of these officials probably rose to relatively important posts as consuls or consuls general as time went by. Among the diplomats, the percentages in staff positions peaked about the fifteenth year of the career span, just as those for heads of diplomatic missions were beginning to assume appreciable size.

Clearly, then, there was a tendency for some of those who began in the central offices as apprentices to move out, in fifteen years or less, into consular or diplomatic positions. The data suggest the existence, at least de facto, of both consular and diplomatic career ladders. The most successful diplomats moved back eventually to serve as foreign minister, often to revolve through other ministerial posts, to sit on the Council of State, perhaps to become grand vezir. The *Tanzimat* grand vezirs—Mustafa Reşid, Âli, and Fuad Paşas—had blazed this trail, and its exemplars had been numerous ever since. Such were the legist-diplomat grand vezir, İbrahim Hakkî Paşa; his *Mülkiye* classmate, the ambassador and foreign minister, Mehmed Rif'at Paşa; or their elder contemporary, Ahmed Tevfik Paşa, ambassador, foreign minister, and last grand vezir.[28] Between generations, a slight decline appears in the diplomatic staff positions and a slight increase in the consular posts.

Comparing members of the major personnel groups, table 7.4B adds nuances to the picture. Traditionalist Muslims, essentially confined to the ministry's central offices, pursued their careers, to much greater degree than did members of the other groups, on the ladder that rose to the supervisory levels within those offices. Even here, the traditionalists' relative disadvantage reappears: their percentages rising to be bureau chiefs were only half the modernist Muslims' percentages. Outside the central offices, the most typical posts for Muslim traditionalists were consular, primarily posts outside the major capitals.

For modernist Muslims, in contrast, the percentages on the ladder rising through the central offices were comparatively higher at the upper levels. Figuratively speaking, the ladder was easier to climb and reached higher for this group. For them, the same was true of the ladder rising through the diplomatic missions. By the end of the thirtieth year, a remarkable 20 percent of this group headed diplomatic missions. Of those whose careers spanned more than thirty years, almost a quarter headed a diplomatic mission in their last recorded position. Among modernist Muslims, the percentages who headed diplomatic missions were also higher at some points of the career span for the younger generation than for the older. Of the officials here under study, the only ones who held the office of foreign minister, or held a number of different ministries and other appointments of comparable level, were modernist Muslims.

For non-Muslims, advancement through the central offices was less important than for the other personnel groups. In contrast, their prominence in consular and diplomatic positions at times exceeded that of modernist

[28] I do not have a personnel file on İbrahim Hakkî Paşa. On Rif'at Paşa, Har., SA759; Çankaya, *Mülkiye Târihi*, III, 91–96. On Ahmed Tevfik Paşa, four times grand vezir, Har., SA429; İnal, *Sadrıazamlar*, 1704–62. Many of the "interministerial" types named in n. 22 fit this pattern.

Table 7.4B.
POSITIONS HELD IN THE FOREIGN MINISTRY
(MAJOR PERSONNEL GROUPS)
(as percentage of the number of officials shown for each column)

	Muslim I				*Muslim II*				*Non-Muslim*			
	1st Posn.	*Posn. at End Yr. 10*	*20*	*30*	*1st Posn.*	*Posn. at End Yr. 10*	*20*	*30*	*1st Posn.*	*Posn. at End Yr. 10*	*20*	*30*
	(1)	*(2)*	*(3)*	*(4)*	*(5)*	*(6)*	*(7)*	*(8)*	*(9)*	*(10)*	*(11)*	*(12)*
N	*115*	*115*	*114*	*80*	*144*	*144*	*139*	*87*	*107*	*107*	*102*	*80*
Minr., Undersecy.	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0
Bureau Chief	0	1	3	6	0	1	6	13	0	1	4	5
Supervisory	0	4	21	30	0	12	22	21	0	5	14	16
Clerical	4	63	49	33	4	37	17	3	2	21	11	4
Apprentice	63	6	0	0	63	4	0	0	55	5	0	0
Hd., Dipl. Mssn.	0	0	0	1	0	1	4	20	0	0	0	6
Staff, Dipl. Mssn.	0	2	3	4	1	12	14	1	7	19	10	11
Consular	3	8	11	10	0	13	19	17	6	21	35	35
Provl., Spcl. Mssn.	0	0	0	0	0	3	1	1	4	8	6	8
Between Posts	0	1	3	4	0	4	4	2	0	3	8	8
Indeterminate	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0
Total % in F.M.[a]	70	85	91	89	68	87	88	81	74	83	88	93

NOTE:
[a] The percentages in this row should match those in the final row of percentages in Table 7.2B but differ slightly in some cases because of rounding and the fact that this table presents other, separately coded data.

Muslims by quantitative, if not by qualitative, indicators. The difference in promotion prospects for the two groups manifested itself in the absence of any marked "ladder" effect for non-Muslims in such posts. In fact, of the 19 percent of non-Muslims who held diplomatic staff positions at the end of the tenth year of their careers, it is difficult to see where they had gone by the twentieth year, other than into consular posts, mostly the less desirable ones, as we know from table 7.2B. Among non-Muslims who served more than thirty years, the 12 percent who ended their careers as heads of diplomatic missions represented only about half the corresponding proportion for modernist Muslims. A final point is that non-Muslim officials were more likely than others to serve in provincial and special missions. As concerns the provincial foreign affairs posts, this suggests a tendency to employ minority members to deal with problems that often pertained to non-Muslims who had acquired foreign nationality.[29]

Among non-Muslim subgroups, table 7.4C discloses rather sharp differ-

[29] Uşaklıgil, *Kırk Yıl*, 307–11, experiences as assistant to an Armenian foreign affairs director at İzmir.

Table 7.4C.
POSITIONS HELD IN THE FOREIGN MINISTRY
(NON-MUSLIM SUBGROUPS)
(as percentage of the number of officials shown for each column)

	Greek				*Armenian*				*Other Non-Muslim*			
	1st	*Posn. at End Yr.*			*1st*	*Posn. at End Yr.*			*1st*	*Posn. at End Yr.*		
	Posn.	*10*	*20*	*30*	*Posn.*	*10*	*20*	*30*	*Posn.*	*10*	*20*	*30*
	(1)	*(2)*	*(3)*	*(4)*	*(5)*	*(6)*	*(7)*	*(8)*	*(9)*	*(10)*	*(11)*	*(12)*
N	*30*	*30*	*29*	*25*	*52*	*52*	*50*	*39*	*25*	*25*	*23*	*16*
Minr., Undersecy.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Bureau Chief	0	0	3	8	0	2	4	3	0	0	4	6
Supervisory	0	0	10	4	0	8	20	31	0	4	4	0
Clerical	0	13	7	0	4	29	14	8	0	12	9	0
Apprentice	47	7	0	0	75	2	0	0	24	8	0	0
Hd., Dipl. Mssn.	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	25
Staff, Dipl. Mssn.	17	23	14	12	0	17	12	10	8	16	0	13
Consular	3	23	38	44	4	19	26	26	12	20	52	44
Provl., Spcl. Mssn.	7	3	3	8	2	10	2	5	4	12	17	13
Between Posts	0	7	7	12	0	0	12	8	0	4	0	0
Indeterminate	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total % in F.M.[a]	74	76	82	92	85	87	90	91	48	76	86	100

NOTE:
[a] The percentages in this row should match those in the final row of percentages in Table 7.2C but differ slightly in some cases because of rounding and the fact that this table presents other, separately coded data.

ences. Promotion through the central offices proves comparatively important for the Armenian officials. While consular service is important for non-Muslims of all types, it and diplomatic service are especially frequent among Greeks and "other" non-Muslims, especially, among the latter, those of the older generation—the Arab Christians and men of European origin. We have already noticed a certain "tokenism" and preference for the smallest non-Muslim communities.

Rate of Movement Between Posts

Evidence on areas of service and types of positions held have indicated rather clearly defined avenues of promotion in the Foreign Ministry. For an added understanding of service patterns, it helps to look also at rates of movement among positions. Table 7.5 examines two indicators of these rates: the number of years the officials remained both in specific *posts* and in the *departments* or areas of service where those posts were located.[30]

[30] An explanation of two statistical points will facilitate interpretation of table 7.5. Some figures in the table may appear impossibly large at first glance. For example, table 7.5A, column 2, indicates that Foreign Ministry officials spent a mean of 8.2 years in the post held at the end of the fifth year of the career span, and a mean of 12.8 years in the department in which they served at that time. For the end of the fifth year, how can there be mean periods of service exceeding a value of 5 years? The explanation is that the periods of service that the statistics represent *straddle* the time points indicated in the column heading, running from an appointment that preceded the end of the fifth year of the career span to a change of position that occurred later. The second point concerns the variation of actual values about the mean. Normal statistical practice would be to include some indicator of this variation, usually the standard deviation (the computation of which is explained in statistical manuals such as Blalock, *Social Statistics*, 80), so that the distribution of actual values could be compared with the mean and median. In the present analysis, however, the standard deviations were computed and found to vary so little over time as to add nothing to the analysis. They have been omitted for that reason, and for the sake of concision.

Table 7.5A.
DURATION OF SERVICE IN THE SAME POST OR DEPARTMENT
(ALL RESPONDENTS)

	Years Service in Same Post or Department as at Time Indicated:							
	First	*End of Year...*						
	Posn.[a]	*5*	*10*	*15*	*20*	*25*	*30*	*30+ Yr.*
	(1)	*(2)*	*(3)*	*(4)*	*(5)*	*(6)*	*(7)*	*(8)*
Number of Valid Cases[b]	*336*	*348*	*354*	*349*	*335*	*266*	*217*	*143*
Years in the Same Post								
Median	1.5	5.9	7.5	8.0	7.6	7.4	8.1	6.7
Mean	2.1	8.2	9.6	10.2	10.3	10.3	11.3	10.1
Years in the Same Department[c]								
Median		8.4	12.0	13.3	12.8	13.5	12.6	11.6
Mean		12.8	14.6	15.2	15.2	16.7	16.8	16.3

NOTES:
[a] Statistics in first position generally refer to the unpaid apprenticeship.
[b] These totals vary from those in earlier tables because of the necessity of excluding indeterminate cases from calculation of the statistics.
[c] "Department" refers to the departments of the Foreign Ministry and other central governmental agencies, and to other analogous organizational units--embassies, consulates, provincial administrative staffs. Given the amount of time the officials spent in these "departments" or places of service and the fact that the first change of position was almost invariably promotion from unpaid apprentice to salaried official within the same department, it seems redundant to include statistics by "department" in column 1.

The figures for all officials of the ministry, in table 7.5A, show that after the initial unpaid apprenticeship, in which most officials spent about a year and a half, the median duration of an assignment remained fairly stable for the rest of the career span at roughly six to eight years. The fact that the means always exceeded the medians indicates an uneven data distribution, with extreme high values more numerous than extreme low ones. That is, a minority of the officials had careers much more static than those of their colleagues. Comparison of the upper and lower halves of the table also indicates that mobility from post to post often meant movement

Table 7.5B.
DURATION OF SERVICE IN THE SAME POST OR DEPARTMENT
(MAJOR PERSONNEL GROUPS)

	Muslim I				*Muslim II*				*Non-Muslim*			
	Years Service in same Post or Department as at Time Indicated:											
	1st	*End of Year...*			*1st*	*End of Year...*			*1st*	*End of Year...*		
	Posn.[a]	*10*	*20*	*30*	*Posn.*	*10*	*20*	*30*	*Posn.*	*10*	*20*	*30*
	(1)	*(2)*	*(3)*	*(4)*	*(5)*	*(6)*	*(7)*	*(8)*	*(9)*	*(10)*	*(11)*	*(12)*
N Valid Cases[b]	*109*	*110*	*110*	*70*	*129*	*142*	*130*	*73*	*98*	*102*	*96*	*72*
Years in Same Post												
Median	2.0	11.8	11.2	12.5	1.0	5.9	5.4	6.3	1.1	6.3	7.5	8.3
Mean	2.5	13.5	13.4	15.2	1.9	7.6	8.0	8.4	1.9	8.0	9.8	10.4
Years in Same Department[c]												
Median		18.7	21.0	26.3		10.4	9.3	9.5		10.2	10.4	11.5
Mean		19.6	20.4	23.6		12.5	12.3	12.9		12.0	13.2	14.0

NOTES:
See Table 7.5A.

within the same department or other analogous agency. Median amounts of time in the same department or mission as great as twelve or thirteen years suggest very low rates of turnover, compared to present-day foreign ministries, with their two- and three-year tours. The best use of the figures in this table is, however, as a benchmark against which to compare the performance of specific personnel categories.

Table 7.5B makes these comparisons for the three major personnel groups. Some of the conclusions that emerge from this table parallel those from the preceding one: means that almost invariably exceed medians, indicating that a minority of officials served for very long periods in the same post or area, and relative stability of the statistics for successive phases of the career span after the first appointment. Table 7.5B provides new evidence, however, of the traditionalist Muslims' lack of mobility. Most of them had apprenticeships (column 1) twice as long as did members of the other two groups—a significant career handicap. Thereafter, the traditionalist Muslims' number of years in a given post or department stayed about twice as high as the modernists'. The figures for non-Muslims, in contrast, generally indicate turnover only slightly slower than the modernist Muslims'—one more sign that non-Muslims' service records resembled modernist Muslims' more than traditionalists'.

The comparative data on the non-Muslim subgroups in table 7.5C indicate little pattern to the differences among them. Given what we have seen of a tendency to prefer the "other" non-Muslims, however, the fact that they tended to experience more rapid changes of position or place of

Table 7.5C.
DURATION OF SERVICE IN THE SAME POST OR DEPARTMENT
(NON-MUSLIM SUBGROUPS)

	Greek				*Armenian*				*Other Non-Muslim*			
	Years Service in same Post or Department as at Time Indicated:											
	1st	*End of Yr...*			*1st*	*End of Yr...*			*1st*	*End of Yr...*		
	Posn.[a]	*10*	*20*	*30*	*Posn.*	*10*	*20*	*30*	*Posn.*	*10*	*20*	*30*
	(1)	*(2)*	*(3)*	*(4)*	*(5)*	*(6)*	*(7)*	*(8)*	*(9)*	*(10)*	*(11)*	*(12)*
N Valid Cases[b]	*27*	*29*	*27*	*30*	*48*	*50*	*46*	*38*	*23*	*23*	*22*	*14*
Years in Same Post												
Median	1.1	6.9	7.2	7.5	1.2	4.5	10.0	8.5	0.7	8.1	6.0	7.5
Mean	1.8	8.1	8.3	10.1	1.9	7.7	11.5	10.9	1.8	8.7	8.3	9.4
Years in Same Department[c]												
Median		13.0	10.0	13.5		6.0	11.5	9.5		13.7	10.0	8.5
Mean		12.7	11.9	14.6		13.7	14.7	14.9		12.5	11.4	10.9

NOTES:
See Table 7.5A.

service than did Greeks or Armenians appears to be another indication of their relatively advantaged status.

Summary and Implications: Career Ladders Compared

Analysis of career records recorded in personnel files of a major ministry has revealed points that would have been difficult to establish with certainty through a qualitative evaluation of other sources. Like the figures in earlier tables, these on length of service in specific posts and departments illustrate that Foreign Ministry careers displayed definite patterns, even if no explicit guidelines existed to regulate them. The late nineteenth-century Foreign Ministry, while recruiting most of its officials directly, drew in men who began their careers outside it and, in the later phases of the career span, sent out officials to serve in high-level positions elsewhere. The most common places of service outside the ministry were other civil agencies of the capital, although there was at least some movement between the Foreign Ministry and all major branches of government service, at least for Muslim officials. Within the Foreign Ministry, moreover, were different points of entry and ladders of advancement for members of different personnel categories.

For traditionalist Muslims, the characteristic point of entry and of service thereafter was the Turkish Correspondence Office. To the extent that members of this group enjoyed upward mobility, they climbed either a "ladder" leading from apprentice as far as supervisory official or bureau

chief in the central offices, or another leading toward minor consular posts. In fact, the traditionalist Muslims' main characteristic was stability, not mobility. They were less likely than others to move to posts outside the ministry at the end of the career span. They stayed in each position longer than did other officials. And they stayed in the same department or other place of service so long that given a median career span of thirty-two years (see table 7.1), most could not have known more than two such places of service during their careers.

For modernist Muslims, the Translation Office served as the characteristic point of entry; but what really distinguished this group was mobility. After about the tenth year, some modernists remained on a promotion ladder that ran through the central offices, at least as high as bureau chief. Others moved into consular and diplomatic positions, where a comparatively strong percentage rose to be chiefs of mission. Where men who had risen through the Foreign Ministry rose to head that ministry or others, or to go on to others of the highest positions, like the grand vezirate, they were usually Muslim modernists with diplomatic experience. The mobility of this group tended to manifest itself in frequent changes of position, common movement outside the ministry at the end of the career span, and the association of such movement with high rank.

For non-Muslims, too, there was a distinctive entry point, especially for Armenians: the Foreign Correspondence Office. Characteristically, again, the officials moved on. The promotion ladder of the central offices was least important for this group. The consular-diplomatic ladder was most important, although it generally led less high than for modernist Muslims. While the percentages of non-Muslims serving in consular and diplomatic posts were greater than for either Muslim group, most non-Muslims served in minor consular posts. The non-Muslim percentage in such posts grew from older to younger generations, while the non-Muslim percentage in other types of consular and diplomatic posts declined. While some non-Muslims rose to serve in—or even head—major embassies, they were often from the smallest, "safest" communities; and their prominence, under Abd ül-Hamid, was a matter of "token" mobility.

Comparison of these career ladders with patterns found in the unreformed scribal service discloses important similarities and differences. The main differences concern the distinctive traits and relative importance of the major personnel groups. Now, the main division among Muslims was no longer simply that between lower and upper elements of a culturally homogeneous group. Rather, major cultural differences, whose significance chapter 5 has discussed, now divided the Muslims. The two Muslim groups' different career patterns reflected life courses that differed even before their careers began.

The non-Muslims' situation had also changed drastically over the century. In place of the few Greeks who had once held positions on the periphery of the scribal service as interpreters, much larger numbers of non-Muslims, from different communities, had moved into a number of the ministry's principal organizations. They had their own entry point, but had the same distinctive skill and performed many of the same roles as the modernist Muslims. To the extent that this movement of non-Muslims into the administrative mainstream awakened resentments among Muslims—especially among traditionalist officials, whose achievements the non-Muslims excelled—such resentment must have become a factor in undermining *Tanzimat* egalitarianism. Evidence on generational change among non-Muslims in the Foreign Ministry suggests that the youngest lived on little but an afterglow of that concept. As noted in chapter 3, it had never seemed to affect other governmental agencies as much as the Foreign Ministry.

Among similarities between the Foreign Ministry and the old scribal offices, the clearest, aside from the traditionalist Muslims' conservative traits, was that the marginality of the non-Muslims had never totally vanished. If we recall that they were the most highly educated of the personnel groups in the ministry, yet were, with "token" exceptions, outstripped in their professional achievements by the modernist Muslims, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that the game had never ceased to operate according to different rules for non-Muslims and Muslims. Even the different personnel groups' distinctive entry points into the Foreign Ministry—and the fact that the non-Muslims' had essentially been created by an influential Armenian's use of patronage—suggest that the old enclavement and marginality had not vanished. Only an impartially applied personnel policy, and a firmer commitment to equality among religious communities, supported by a cohesion that Ottoman society lacked, could have made things otherwise. Without these, it is perhaps remarkable that *Tanzimat* egalitarianism produced the results it did before mutating into the Hamidian emphasis on representation of non-Turkish Muslims, and at last into equality under the aegis of Turkish nationalism.

PATRONAGE OR IMPERSONAL PROCEDURE: EXPERIENCES OF AŞÇI DEDE İBRAHİM

Episodically, especially in the 1830s, 1880s, and under the Young Turks, the Ottomans made strides toward creating the legal framework of a system of civil personnel administration that could be described as up to date by international standards appropriate to those dates. The imperfect realization of equality in access to office and in promotion indicates that impartial regularity did not always prevail. Yet the policy produced practical results, including the personnel records analyzed above. That being the

case, it is logical to ask: to what extent did the new policy produce perhaps its most important possible result, that of supplanting the patronage relations that had formerly held the place of an official personnel policy? An examination of how Aşçı Dede İbrahim tried to negotiate the turning points of his career provides evidence on this point. His testimony gains in credibility from his naïveté and cultural conservatism, which seemed to keep him from realizing that things were supposed to have changed, or that patronage was no longer supposed to prevail.

The social environment of civil officialdom as Aşçı Dede first knew it was still little changed from that of the Âkif-Pertev rivalry, discussed in chapter 2. Aşçı Dede began his career within a decade after Pertev Paşa's fall. Having entered one of the first modern schools for training civil officials in 1841, he took his examination for appointment to the offices in 1846. When time came to indicate his choice of appointment, he was one of the few to request the military offices, rather than those at the grand vezirs' power center, the Sublime Porte. His reason was that while there are many ways to reach God, the great roads were two: one was the twelve ways (*turuk*) opened by the great sufi masters (*piran-ı izam*), and the other was the way of struggle for Islam (*tarik-i cihad*). Aşçı Dede committed his private life to the mystical orders (*turuk*). As an official, he committed himself to the holy war, at least to the extent of becoming a civil functionary in the Ministry of War (*Bab-ı Seraskerî*).[31]

Having declared his choice, the young graduate was sent to the minister of war's undersecretary. Since Aşçı Dede knew nothing about the ministry's offices, the undersecretary chose the one in which to apprentice him, that which kept the daily accounts for the armies (*ordular ruznamçe kalemi*). There, Aşçı Dede was placed under supervision of the examining clerk (*mümeyyiz*) of the Army of Istanbul (*Der Saadet ordusu*). Having come from one of the new schools and passed an examination, he was seated on the regular clerks' high cushions, as we have seen, rather than on the apprentices' low ones. He quickly began to catch on to his work and won the goodwill of both the examining clerk, under whom he was apprenticed, and the director. He made rapid progress in salary and other respects. Within a few years, he was doing the work of an assistant to the examining clerk. In view of this advance in status, and partly because of his *sufi* leanings, he began to grow a beard, even before he was twenty years old.[32]

Aşçı Dede was still in the same office when the Crimean War broke out. By then, he had become so well established that the director of the office, Halil Efendi, was jealous of him. Afraid the young man would supplant

[31] Aşçı Dede İbrahim, *Risale*, TY3222, 39b–40b; TY78, 184–86.
[32] Ibid., TY3222, 40b–41a, TY78, 187.

him, Halil executed the classic maneuver of recommending the person he wanted to get rid of for a better post, that of daybook accountant (*ruznamçeci*) for the Army of Anatolia, headquartered at Erzurum. There was a twist of the knife to Halil's maneuver, for the Russians had already advanced within six hours of Erzurum. Otherwise, the post was quite a promotion for Aşçı Dede. It carried a salary of 2,500 kuruş per month and a colonel's rations. This was the highest level of compensation Aşçı Dede was ever offered, but in fact he never fully received it. On accepting the post, he learned that 1,000 kuruş per month of the salary would be withheld as a retirement pension for his predecessor. Regular pension funds for officials were still unheard of. Dervish enough to be unconcerned about the money or the Russians, Aşçı Dede set out with a light heart for the new post.[33]

Aşçı Dede assumed his post with the Army of Anatolia in April or May of 1856 and retained it until 1871,[34] moving between Erzurum and Erzincan as the headquarters shifted. During this period, he served with a number of civil officials and military commanders, the army commanders being rotated with some frequency. He worked with these men during the day and socialized with them after hours. For him as for many Ottoman officials, the avocational interests appear really to have given form to these relationships.

In his case, the primary avocational interest was mysticism. Through this, Aşçı Dede formed in Erzincan the most important associations of his life, both as a dervish—the link to his spiritual master, Şeyh Fehmî, successor to the founder of the local brotherhood of the Halidî branch of the Nakşbendî order—and as an official—the patronage relationship with Derviş Paşa, whom Aşçı Dede knew first as chief of staff and later as commander (*müşir*) of the Army of Anatolia.[35] As a military officer of the highest rank, Derviş Paşa might hardly have been aware of Aşçı Dede, but for meeting him in the entourage of the şeyh, to whom the paşa was also devoted. What established the patronage relationship between Aşçı Dede and the paşa was, as seen in chapter 3, Şeyh Fehmî's appeal to the paşa on the newly widowed Aşçı Dede's behalf and his remarriage in 1865 with a woman from Derviş Paşa's household.

An avocational affinity consolidated with an official connection and a marital tie—the "personnel policy" of the patrimonial household was still operative, and was to remain so. Şeyh Fehmî and Derviş Paşa, and their sons after them, remained the most important figures in Aşçı Dede's offi-

[33] Ibid., TY3222, 63a–64b; TY78, 328–30.
[34] Ibid., TY3222, 66a, 192a–193b; TY78, 334, 582–85.
[35] Ibid., TY3222, 79a, 85b, 150b; TY78, 503. Derviş Paşa became commander of the Army of Anatolia c. 1279/1862. He later left and returned in 1868 (TY 3222, 177a–78b) to resume this command.

cial and mystical life. Clearly, too, the mystical and official networks of which Aşçı Dede was now part were extensive and tightly interlinked. Aşçı Dede never seemed to encounter either şeyh or paşa except in a large company of supporters. Aşçı Dede makes it sound as if all the officials he worked with were Şeyh Fehmî's disciples, and all the residents of the town were in awe of the şeyh.[36] The relation between Şeyh Fehmî and Derviş Paşa was so close that the şeyh had designated the paşa defender of the family of the founder of the Erzincan branch of the Nakşbendî-Halidî order.[37] Şeyh Fehmî's influence also extended far enough beyond Erzincan that he was able to play a role in securing the promotion of Aşçı Dede's superior, the army treasurer, to vezirial rank as Halet Paşa.[38]

In September 1870, Aşçı Dede received a letter from Derviş Paşa asking him to resign and come with his family to Istanbul. Aşçı Dede was reluctant. But after Derviş Paşa appealed to Şeyh Fehmî to persuade Aşçı Dede and sent a bill of exchange for 10,000 kuruş to settle his debts, he had no choice but to resign from his post, even though several officers on the army staff, brother dervishes, tried to block acceptance of his resignation.[39] With this, Aşçı Dede began one of those voluntary absences from the offices about which the personnel records never say much. On his personnel questionnaire, he himself later attributed his resignation to financial difficulty and—a favorite cliché for such situations—inability to adjust to the air and water of Erzurum (*idaresizlikten ve birde Erzurum'un ab-u-havasiyle imtizac olunamadığından*).[40] For once, the memoirs make it possible to discover what that cliché could mask.

In Istanbul, Aşçı Dede and his wife moved into Derviş Paşa's mansion (*konak*), as they normally did, as long as this wife lived, when in the capital. Derviş Paşa presently revealed to Aşçı Dede what was on his mind. The paşa wanted to use Aşçı Dede's accounting skills for himself by sending the latter to Syria to serve as inspector and accountant for his estates in the Biḳâ' valley. Part of the mission was to defend a lawsuit against Nabulsîzade Abdullah Efendi, who was trying to claim part of the paşa's land. Aşçı Dede's wife and children were to remain at Derviş Paşa's mansion in Istanbul, and he—now an agent of the household, rather than a government official—was to go to Syria alone.[41]

[36] Ibid., TY3222, 169a: not only the Muslims of Erzincan but also the non-Muslims, indeed all nature (*dağ taş*), stood in awe of the şeyh; 188a: all the other efendis in Erzincan were brethren of the order; TY78, 540, 575.

[37] Ibid., TY79, 400, applying the phrase *ehl-i beyt* ("people of the house"), normally used for the Prophet's family, to Pir Mehmed Vehbî Hayyat's.

[38] Ibid., TY3222, 173a–b; TY78, 546.

[39] Ibid., TY3222, 192a–193b; TY78, 582–85.

[40] Ibid., TY80, 818, copy of résumé submitted with request for retirement in S 1324/1906; follows format of personnel questionnaire; cf. TY79, 373.

[41] Ibid., TY3222, 195a–196b; TY78, 588–90.

Aşçı Dede devoted roughly two years to this mission, unhappily and unsuccessfully. His duties in Syria included such uncongenial tasks as marketing agricultural produce, entering into a tax farming contract as the collector, and above all the lawsuit. Aşçı Dede proved no match for Abdullah al-Nâbulsî, who came before the court armed with lawbooks and legal opinions (*fetvas*), and with the influence that accrued to a descendant of Abd al-Ghânî al-Nâbulsî (1641–1731), the Damascene mystic and author.[42] Losing the lawsuit had several consequences, one being that Derviş Paşa later sought a man with the standing to match Nabulsîzade's to supervise the Syrian estate. The man in question was a grandson of Mevlânâ Halid, founder of the Halidî branch of the Nakşbendiye.[43]

Frustrated on the estate, Aşçı Dede missed his old life. As a result, he sought out contacts in Syrian dervish circles, such as the Bakrî family of Damascus, descendants of Abd al-Ghânî al-Nâbulsî's student, Mustafa al-Bakrî.[44] When estate business took him to Damascus, Aşçı Dede would also haunt the offices and try to help out in the work. He made some official friends this way. With twenty-five years of government service behind him, he also encountered old colleagues. Perhaps Aşçı Dede's most important official contacts in Damascus were İzzet Paşa, who was commander (*müşir*) of the Fifth Army and shared some of Aşçı Dede's religious interests,[45] and Halet Paşa, whom Aşçı Dede had known as treasurer of the Army of Anatolia and disciple of Şeyh Fehmî, and who arrived in Syria as governor in January 1873.[46] Some of Aşçı Dede's most memorable moments from these years occurred when he accompanied Halet Paşa through the city on ceremonial occasions, receiving petitions and throwing handfuls of small coins on the paşa's behalf to the poor.

Since neither İzzet nor Halet were happy—so Aşçı Dede says—that he had resigned his official position,[47] they made efforts to get him a new appointment. They carried the matter all the way to the minister of war—who turned it over to the selection board for civil officials of the ministry (*İntihab-ı Küttab-ı Askeriye Komisyonu*), which had by then come into existence. When these efforts failed, İzzet and Halet saw nothing to do but furnish Aşçı Dede with letters and send him back to Derviş Paşa to

[42] W.A.S. Khalidi, art. "'Abd al-Ghânî al-Nâbulusî," *EI*², I, 60.

[43] Aşçı Dede İbrahim, *Risale*, TY79, 326.

[44] Ibid., TY3222, 204a; TY78, 604–605; Ernst Bannerth, "La Khalwatiyya en Egypte: Quelques aspects de la vie d'une confrérie," *Mélanges de l'Institut dominican d'études orientales du Caire*, VIII (1964–1966), 8; Linda Schatkowski Schilcher, *Families in Politics: Damascene Factions and Estates of the 18th and 19th Centuries*, Stuttgart, 1985, 156–60, with a Bakrî family tree; Khoury, *Urban Notables and Arab Nationalism*, 34–35 and passim.

[45] Aşçı Dede İbrahim, *Risale*, TY3222, 197b; TY78, 593.

[46] Ibid., TY3222, 203a; TY78, 603.

[47] Ibid., TY3222, 195b, 207a; TY78, 589, 610.

beg the latter's pardon and help in getting reappointed to a post with the Fifth Army at Damascus.[48]

Later events showed that Derviş Paşa held a grudge against Aşçı Dede over the lawsuit; yet as long as the paşa was in control of himself he did not show this, but rather behaved in a forgiving way. Returning to Istanbul in late 1873, Aşçı Dede had to wait six months at Derviş Paşa's mansion before getting a new appointment. Derviş Paşa started things off without delay, taking Aşçı Dede to see the undersecretary at the ministry, and asking the latter to use his influence to get Aşçı Dede a post with the Fifth Army. "Whenever you need him, he's our guest at the *konak*."[49] Complaining about how long it took the ministry to decide anything, Aşçı Dede also approached Râşid Efendi, who was then head of one of the ministry's accounting offices and had served long ago in Aşçı Dede's daybook accounts office with the Fourth Army. Before the matter was settled, Derviş Paşa was appointed governor of Bosnia and tried to take Aşçı Dede with him. Not liking that idea, Aşçı Dede begged Râşid to make another effort with the selection board, which finally decided on a series of personnel changes in the Fifth Army headquarters, one result being a position for Aşçı Dede.[50]

Aşçı Dede returned to Damascus in 1874 as a second-class clerk in the office that kept muster rolls for the militia (*redif yoklaması*). At first, his status was unsure, thanks to the distaste that the army commander, Yaver Paşa, had formed for him when he was still working for Derviş Paşa and spending a lot of time in the offices. Yaver Paşa threatened to refuse Aşçı Dede's appointment. Only by exceptional efforts during a crisis was Aşçı Dede able to overcome this threat, as noted in chapter 6, and so consolidate his position.

Aşçı Dede continued to serve in Damascus for over twenty more years, with occasional movements from one position to another in the army command.[51] Though he was physically isolated from Derviş Paşa, the patronage relationship remained important for Aşçı Dede and other members of his family. One illustration of this fact dates from about 1880, when Aşçı Dede's second son, Salih, having completed military service as a volunteer, received his discharge (*ihrac tezkeresi*) and went to Derviş Paşa in Istanbul for help in getting an official position. This initiative started Salih Efendi on a period of service in the Balkans.[52] By 1887, he had decided that he wished to serve in the Ministry of War, like his father. While on active military service, he had taken the examination required for appointment to a battalion clerkship (*tabur kâtipliği*), and his paper had been sent to Istanbul, although no such position was open at the time. Going to Istanbul to revive the idea of the appointment, he served some months on Derviş Paşa's private staff before being gratified with an appointment to the clerkship of the second battalion of the thirty-first regiment of the Fourth Army, stationed at the Anatolian town of Siirt.[53]

[48] Ibid., TY3222, 201a–208a; TY78, 599–612.
[49] Ibid., TY3222, 208a–b; TY78, 612–13.
[50] Ibid., TY3222, 208b–210a; TY78, 613–16.
[51] Ibid., TY3222, 211a, 218a, 231b, 339a; TY78, 617–18, 631, 657; TY79, 309–10, 338.
[52] Ibid., TY3222, 218b–219a; TY78, 632–33.

On his way to Siirt, Salih Efendi stopped at Harput to visit his father's stepmother and half-brother, Mehmed Vehbî. The result of this renewal of contact was a surprise visit from Mehmed Vehbî, then a sergeant major (*baş çavuş*) of the Harput militia, to Aşçı Dede in Damascus. Moved by the visit of a half-brother whom he had not seen in fifteen years and who looked exactly like his father as a young man, Aşçı Dede gave Mehmed Vehbî letters to take to both Derviş Paşa and his son, Ahmed Bey, in Istanbul, to request Mehmed Vehbî's promotion to lieutenant (*mülâzım*). Derviş Paşa, now aged, greeted Mehmed Vehbî with an outburst about how Aşçı Dede, when supervisor of his estates in Syria, had given away land to Nabulsîzade Abdullah. Derviş Paşa's son, Ahmed Bey, for the sake of his former nursemaid, now Aşçı Dede's wife, used his influence by sending a request to the Fourth Army commander. In September 1888, Aşçı Dede in Damascus learned that Mehmed Vehbî had been promoted. The relationship between the two families had begun to pass to the next generation.[54]

In 1892, Aşçı Dede and his wife again went to Derviş Paşa for help. Aşçı Dede was having trouble with his eyesight, his wife had been sick for five years, and he had obtained a medical leave to go to Istanbul for treatment. As usual, they stayed at Derviş Paşa's mansion, where they also encountered his son Ahmed, now a paşa himself, and Şeyh Fehmî's son, Ahmed Fevzî Efendi. This time, Derviş Paşa's response to Aşçı Dede was cordial. Aşçı Dede sought treatment for his wife. He also sought to retire. Derviş Paşa encouraged him to believe that he could do so at full salary. As usual, Aşçı Dede sought to work through other channels, too. At the Ministry of War, he encountered Osman Faiz Bey, who had been apprenticed under him many years before, becoming his protégé, and was now a member of the selection board of the ministry. Aşçı Dede also appealed to Ahmed Fevzî as spiritual successor (*halife*) of his father, Şeyh Fehmî.

As the months wore by, no more was heard of retiring at full pay. Aşçı Dede decided instead to request a post in Istanbul.[55] Via Osman Faiz Bey, he submitted a request to the selection board for such an appointment. While the request was pending, the director of a department at the War

[53] Ibid., TY3222, 238a–b; TY79, 13–14.
[54] Ibid., TY3222, 259a–62a; TY79, 52–57.
[55] Ibid., TY3222, 316a–20a; TY79, 263–70.

Ministry died. On the recommendation of Ahmed Fevzî, Osman Faiz, and others, an appeal was made to the grand vezir, Cevad Paşa, who sent a memorandum to the Ministry of War, favoring Aşçı Dede's appointment to the post. The ministry's selection board responded that the appeal to the grand vezir was a violation of the rules, and that Aşçı Dede, a first-class clerk, was not qualified for a directorship.

The response, in short, was a picture of administrative regularity, although it tells nothing about how the vacant position was actually filled and gives a possibly false impression—so later events suggest—of the propriety of the selection board's proceedings. To make Aşçı Dede even less happy, the board no sooner issued this response than it also rejected his previous request for a post in Istanbul on the ground that there was no vacancy.[56] Eventually, there was nothing to do but go back to Damascus. It was on this occasion that Aşçı Dede, at the urging of his deathly ill second wife, married for the third time.

Troubled increasingly in Damascus by his eyesight and by difficulties with colleagues, Aşçı Dede returned to Istanbul on leave in the spring of 1895, again intending to angle for a position in the capital. Since his second wife, Hadice Hanım, the woman from Derviş Paşa's household, was dead, he and his third wife, Dilber Hanım, no longer went to Derviş Paşa's mansion, but rather to Kandilli, Aşçı Dede's native village, on the Bosphorus, just above Istanbul.[57] By then, Derviş Paşa had declined in body and mind so much that he was no longer any help. In fact, when Aşçı Dede visited his elderly benefactor, the latter denounced him before the ever-present guests as the man who "ruined our estate" in Syria, causing "several hundred thousand kuruş" in damages.[58] Aşçı Dede did not see Derviş Paşa again, although he continued to call on his sons, Ahmed Paşa and Halid Paşa, the latter married to a woman from the imperial family and therefore known as Damad Halid Paşa. Derviş Paşa died in June 1896. Aşçı Dede attended his funeral, helping to carry the paşa's coffin, and called on one or both of the sons during the mourning period that followed.[59] Aşçı Dede's contacts with members of Derviş Paşa's family continued to his last days; and they, especially Damad Halid Paşa, helped him on a number of occasions in his later years. Aşçı Dede also kept in touch with Şeyh Ahmed Fevzî, Şeyh Fehmî's son.[60]

After his last unhappy meeting with Derviş Paşa, Aşçı Dede had to pursue his goal of getting a new appointment through other channels. On the insistence of his third wife, he made his main effort through her sister, Dilberyar Kalfa, who was a slave in the imperial harem, where she had become head of the household staff of the mother of the sultan's eldest son. Aşçı Dede wrote Dilberyar, asking her to get word sent to the minister of war, Rıza Paşa, to the effect that Aşçı Dede should be appointed, with his current salary of 1,600 kuruş per month, to a post in Istanbul. Dilberyar Kalfa submitted the papers to the sultan mother, who sent her chief eunuch, Server Ağa, to give them to the sultan's first chamberlain, Hacı Ali Bey, who was to submit them to the minister of war. Meanwhile, Aşçı Dede submitted a petition through the corresponding secretary (*mektubcu*) of the Ministry of War to the minister, arranging things so that when the minister questioned why Aşçı Dede had appealed to the palace, that could be explained as his wife's doing. Aşçı Dede's petition was forwarded to the selection board for civil officials in the War Ministry (*İntihab-ı Küttab Komisyonu*)—by now a familiar body. The petition summed up Aşçı Dede's service record, requested that he be reassigned for health reasons, but that he not be retired, as he would be unable to manage on his pension. The petition then requested an appointment in Istanbul or, failing that, with the First or Second Army, both headquartered in places with suitable climates.[61]

Receiving no response, Aşçı Dede launched another effort through Dilberyar Kalfa, the result being a comical insight into the inner workings of the War Ministry. This time, the sultan mother sent her chief eunuch directly to the minister of war to explain things. The minister, Rıza Paşa, was well known for subservience to the palace and dilatoriness. Some thought, too, that his immense, unsoldierly girth told something about where part of the military budget ended up.[62] The minister responded that Aşçı Dede should submit a petition to him at his mansion saying that he was unable to go to Damascus and offering a brief excuse. Aşçı Dede had already submitted a petition to the ministry; but, ever respectful to his superiors, he went to the paşa with a new petition. The seal-bearer (*mühürdar*) showed him in. Aşçı Dede kissed the hem of the minister's coat and presented his petition. The minister examined the document, but responded that there was no available position at the appropriate salary. Aşçı Dede replied: "If our master orders, they will find one." Only then did the minister ask what his salary was. The minister continued, "If I make your salary 2,000 kuruş, will you go back to Damascus?" Aşçı Dede saw no point in resisting and answered, "It is for our master to command (*irade efendimizindir*)." The seal-bearer brought an inkstand. The minister

[56] Ibid., TY3222, 323a–24a; TY79, 278–80.
[57] Ibid., TY79, 360–64.
[58] Ibid., TY79, 392–93.
[59] Ibid., TY79, 395–97. "Damad Halid" means "Son-in-law Halid," the usual way of referring to a man married to a woman from the imperial dynasty. This Halid was named after the founder of the Halidî branch of the Nakşbendiye; cf. TY79, 406.
[60] Ibid., TY79, 406–408, 439–40, 443, 539; TY80, 88–90, 108, 232–36, 240–41, 243, 253–54, 256–57, 262, 265–66, 333–36, 847–48.
[61] Ibid., TY79, 372–74.
[62] Osman Nurî, *Abd ül-Hamid-i Sani ve Devr-i Saltanatı*, II, 531.

wrote an order, attached it to Aşçı Dede's petition, and told him that he would receive the appropriate documents from an official at the ministry. As he left, Aşçı Dede saw that the minister's order also called for his promotion.

Going straight to the ministry (*kapı*), Aşçı Dede explained the minister's actions to the corresponding secretary, who immediately questioned how the increased salary could be paid, unless a vacancy occurred.[63] Aşçı Dede sensed with relief that he might not have to go back to Damascus after all. Other surprises followed, not all so pleasant. Having access to enough officials in the ministry to follow his case, Aşçı Dede discovered over the next several days that other officials had changed the minister's order to read that the matter should be turned over to the selection board. Aşçı Dede reported the matter to the minister's seal-bearer, and was shocked when the latter confusedly denied that any change had been made and attempted to argue that the altered order was really the minister's, even though the writing was different. Presently, it became apparent that those responsible for changing the order thought Aşçı Dede had not seen what the minister wrote, and that they regularly rewrote the minister's orders. A tumultuous meeting of the selection board ensued.

From Aşçı Dede's point of view, the whole affair was an outrageous abuse of authority by the board. Others of those involved obviously thought that it was the minister who abused his authority by sitting at his mansion and attempting to treat appointments in the old style, merely as matters of personal patronage, as if regular procedures for appointment-making had not come into existence. Eventually, in fact, the documents reappeared, covered by an order from the minister's pen to refer the matter to the selection board.[64] Aşçı Dede was flabbergasted at that. Fortunately for him, his friends on the selection board went to work and found him a position at the Second Army headquarters in Edirne, which Aşçı Dede had requested in his original petition. By chance, the post even carried the salary of 2,000 kuruş per month that the minister had promised.

This assignment to Edirne—the result of a burlesque of prescribed procedure, involving everyone from a slave in the imperial harem and the sultan mother's eunuch to a minister of war not in command of his staff—opened the last phase of Aşçı Dede's career. Going there in the 1896 as the examining clerk (*mümeyyiz*) in one of the bureaus of the Second Army headquarters, he continued to serve in Edirne, with changes of assignment, until he was pensioned in October 1906, sixty years after he had entered the offices.[65]

Witness to the accession of Abd ül-Mecid in 1839 and perhaps also to

[63] Aşçı Dede İbrahim, *Risale*, TY79, 374–75.
[64] Ibid., TY79, 389–91.
[65] Ibid., TY79, 411–12; TY80, 843.

the Young Turk revolution of 1908,[66] Aşçı Dede lived through virtually all the nineteenth-century changes in civil personnel procedure. For him, as for many of those around him, the social world of civil officialdom continued to present itself in terms of the old personalism of master and apprentice, patron and client. There were many reasons why it would have done so. His career was well advanced before many of the reforms occurred. His major professional link, that with Derviş Paşa, gave him multiple ties to a very important figure, whose good offices produced results on a number of occasions; and the patronage relationship continued to function, into the lifetimes of their sons.

Although Aşçı Dede and others, such as Minister of War Rıza Paşa, did not seem to recognize them for what they were, the reforms in personnel procedure nonetheless gradually made their effects felt. As a youngster, Aşçı Dede attended one of the first of the new civil schools. The systems of salaries and ranks, also instituted in the 1830s, marked major milestones in his professional progress. Quite possibly, Aşçı Dede's patron, Derviş Paşa might not have been around to provide protection for as long as he did, but for the reforms of the 1830s that made official service so much more secure for officials of high rank. The effects of the late nineteenth-century reforms are even clearer. Aşçı Dede may never have realized it clearly, but his later experiences suggest that it had become difficult even for an official with friends in high places to outmaneuver the selection boards. The personnel records system was familiar enough to Aşçı Dede that he several times summed up his career in the format of the personnel questionnaire.[67] Finally, though he postponed it as long as he could, Aşçı Dede became a dependent of one of the government retirement funds.

The modern administrative world of impersonal rules and procedure was beginning to make itself felt. Yet the new systems remained a long way from fulfilling any ideal of rationality or efficiency. Matters had evidently not yet reached the point where an official in the provinces could avoid coming to Istanbul periodically and trying through personal contacts to make the wheels of the appointment-making system turn for him. Even allowing that Aşçı Dede was not psychologically prepared to give a good account of them, the workings of the appointment board do not appear entirely impartial, either. If patronage no longer prevailed as in the past, impersonal procedures had not fully replaced it. What existed was at best a confusing hybrid of the two. Aşçı Dede was not entirely to blame for not grasping that things had changed. In his later years, perhaps more

[66] Ibid., TY80, 430; cf. Bremer, *Die Memoiren*, 169 and n. 1. The ms. breaks off without mention of the Young Turk revolution, although it extends somewhat beyond Aşçı Dede's retirement in 1906.
[67] Aşçı Dede İbrahim, *Risale*, TY79, 372–75; TY80, 429–30, 817–19.

than before, he needed to be able to perceive the administration, at least for some purposes, as a manageable network of human relations in order to cope with it. In this point, surely, lies one vestige of patrimonial tradition still vital for members of even the most rational administrative systems.

CONCLUSION

This chapter has examined the career patterns of Ottoman civil officials in two different perspectives. In one, we have examined the ladders of advancement that officials followed in the Foreign Ministry. In this discussion, while identifying some of the limits of *Tanzimat* egalitarianism, we defined career patterns that existed de facto where none existed as matters of formal specification. In the other perspective, we have focused on the gradual intrusion of a modern type of rational, systematic personnel policy—much abused or misunderstood—into a milieu historically dominated by patronage relations.

Both perspectives make clear that the reformers of the day were not in total command of the processes of growth occurring around them. There was no thorough classification of civil positions, and the officially defined personnel policy did not have more than a partial hold on matters of appointment and promotion. Yet pattern there was; and the visions of reformers and regulators—however muddled or imperfectly applied—did not remain only on paper where matters of appointment and promotion were concerned. What happened instead was that the reforms made themselves felt increasingly in actual appointment-making procedures, to the partial detriment of older patterns of patronage and influence, and yet did not totally supplant the old mentality or the old bureaucratic politics. Even for men as conservative as the traditionalist Muslims of the Foreign Ministry or Aşçı Dede, Ottoman civil official careers were beginning to resemble those in western civil services as much, in some respects, as their Ottoman scribal prototypes. Yet some of the old ways were working through into the new systems and surviving there. The results of reform would be "Ottoman," as much as "European."

C H A P T E R V I I I

Salaries and Living Standards

A government's ability to get effective service from its officials depends on its setting standards, rewarding officials who fulfill them, punishing those who violate them, and maintaining a clear difference between reward and punishment. The Ottoman Empire had had difficulty in these endeavors for centuries. So it remained in the reform era, despite significant efforts to change. Together with other sources, official personnel records prove uniquely valuable for study of these problems. The analysis falls under three headings: problems of the salary system, reward and punishment (a topic that leads back to the issue of egalitarianism), and official living standards. Analysis of the compensation system tells perhaps more than any other indicator about the limited success of administrative reform, and about the links between the social history of civil officialdom and the larger intellectual and political issues of the times.

MAKING A LIVING IN A BANKRUPT BUREAUCRACY: PROBLEMS OF THE SALARY SYSTEM

Chapters 1 and 2 discussed prebendal compensation in the eighteenth century and the introduction of salaries in 1838. That effort was part of a larger, but abortive, one at fiscal centralization. As noted, the salary system was not abolished—and probably could not have been politically—after fiscal centralization failed. But that failure doomed the salary system to a troubled existence. The starting point for this discussion must be a survey of the compensation system, which seemed to combine reward and punishment. We must consider how the system was supposed to work, what was wrong with it, and what officials could do to protect themselves. These discussions will provide the background for analysis of salary statistics later in this chapter.

How the Compensation System Was Supposed to Work

The civil officials' salary system, inaugurated in 1838, was one of several reforms in official personnel policy that together marked the watershed between scribal service and civil officialdom. Like other aspects of the new policy, however, the compensation system did not reach full elaboration until the 1880s.

From 1838 on, each civil official was supposed to get a monthly salary (*maaş*)[1] from the Treasury. As of 1880, the payroll for all central governmental offices except those with enough receipts to cover their own payrolls amounted to about 32,000 Ottoman liras a month, or roughly 3.5 million kuruş at then prevailing rates.[2] Officials out of office were supposed to receive unemployment stipends (*mazuliyet maaşı*), financed by deductions.[3] There were also systems for travel pay (*harc-ı rah*) and per diem.[4] Retirement pensions, again financed by deductions, had been created in the 1880s under the Decree on Promotion and Retirement of Civil Officials.[5] An aid fund existed for officials in distress because of calamities such as fire.[6] Officials with special duties might receive allowances for various purposes. The practice does not seem very systematic, but heads of diplomatic and consular missions supposedly received allowances (*tahsisat, allocations*) to cover official expenses.[7] The Ottomans also cre-

[1] As far as civil officials go, this may be the point at which *maaş* became the normal word for a monthly salary or stipend. Earlier usage seems to have referred to salaries and stipends with a variety of other terms, e.g., *şehriye, müşâhere, mahiye, mevacib, vazife.*

[2] BBA, Yıldız, 36.156.142.XI, on budget of 1296/1880–1881. As noted in appendix A, the Ottoman (gold) lira stood in the late nineteenth century at about 1.11 to 1 British pound; at the rates reflected in the salary documentation studied here, the Ottoman silver coinage stood at about 108 kuruş to 1 Ottoman lira (= 100 kuruş in gold). The agencies in Istanbul that had receipts to apply to their salaries were, as of the late 1890s, Customs, Land Registry, Posts and Telegraphs, the Ministry of Justice in part, Education, and Public Works; Said Paşa, *Hâtırat*, II, i, 114.

[3] BBA, BEO 64769, Tevfik Paşa to grand vezir, 25 CA 1314/November 1896, showing the deduction for unemployment stipends as 1 percent and its monthly yield from civil officials' salaries as 200,000 kuruş (implying a total monthly payroll—for provincial and central civil officials—of 20 million kuruş). The 1 percent rate is confirmed in a decree of 17 CA 1309/December 1891 in *Düstur*[1], VI, 1145, art. 10.

[4] *Düstur*[1], III, 10–17, regulations of 9 CA 1290/July 1873; V, 392; VI, 999; VII, 199–203.

[5] Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform*, 278–79, 396 n. 167. I do not know exactly when retirement pensions financed by salary deductions were introduced for civil officials, but I have found references to deductions at a rate of 5 percent for this purpose as early as 1869 (Har., SA300, file of Manuk Azarian, entry of CA 1287/August 1869) and 1879 (Har., SA442, Ohannes Kuyumcıan, entry of c. Ş 1298/1881 saying that the imperial treasury had withheld *tekaüt hakkı* at this rate since he was first assigned a salary in 1296/1879). Responsibility for administering the pension system appears to have been shifted from the Treasury to a distinct organization, the Retirement Fund (*Tekaüt Sandığı*) in December 1879: BBA, Buy. 5, entry of 19 November 1295/1879. By 1913, deductions of all types amounted to 9 percent (Har., Mütenevvi 156, Turhan Paşa to Said Halim Paşa, 9 10bre [*sic*] 1913).

[6] Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform*, 265–66.

[7] Har., Niz.Kav. 27/1, "Règlement organique pour les consulats ottomans / Saltanat-ı Seniye

ated nonmonetary forms of reward, starting with the nine-level civil rank table, introduced in the 1830s and 1840s, or honorific titles of address (*elkab*), which varied according to rank. There were decorations like those that European governments gave in this period. The most widely held Ottoman decorations were the *Mecidiye* and *Osmaniye* orders, each with several grades.[8]

As this compensation system took shape, older forms of reward were abolished or changed. The assignment of rations (*tayinat*) to some civil officials continued at least until the Crimean War. Thereafter the rations were converted into cash and added to salary, until the law of 1880 on official salaries finally forbade assignment of rations to civil officials.[9] In a way typifying Ottoman gradualism in the face of vested interests, the first efforts were made to restrict assignment of incomes from benefices in land (*tımar, zeamet*) to officials of offices that had traditionally had such incomes, or to those officials' survivors, in 1845. In June 1880, government bankruptcy led to more serious investigation of these incomes, aimed at diverting into the Treasury as much as possible of the million kuruş per year to which such incomes amounted. Criteria of eligibility to receive the incomes were tightened, and they were made nonhereditable. The result of this gradualism was that vestiges of the long-archaic *tımar*-system survived until the dawn of the twentieth century.[10] Where gift-giving was concerned, after talk of prohibiting the practice, the long-term policy appears to have been to limit gifts to items like foodstuffs or flowers in small quantities. Anything beyond that was divested of whatever legitimacy custom had given it and officially proscribed.[11]

Official fees survived in practice and continued to figure in some officials' compensation at least until 1860.[12] But the fee system began to be "modernized" with the adoption in 1845 of a system of stamped papers (*evrak-ı sahiha*), replaced in 1873 with revenue stamps (*damga pulu*), such as are still used in Turkey and other countries.[13] The stamped papers

Şehbenderlerine dair Nizamname-i Dahiliye," 1881; George Young, *Corps de droit ottoman*, Oxford, 1905–1906, III, 2–10, arts. 10–11; Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform*, 397, n. 182.

[8] Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform*, 143–44, 195.

[9] Har., Niz.Kav. 34/32, printed French text of 1880 law on official salaries, p. 34, art. 64; cf. *Düstur*[1], *zeyl* 1, 57, art. 64; cf. Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform*, 277–78.

[10] BBA, İrade D5041 of 15 RA 1261/March 1845; Rüus 217, entry of 27 R 1261/May 1845; Buy. 6, entry of 25 C 1297/June 1880; Buy. 7, entries of 24 May 1293/June 1877, 9 February 1297/1882, and later.

[11] Lûtfi, *Tarih*, V, 180–81, document of 7 S 1254/May 1838; Pakalın, *OTD*, I, 795 (*hedaya*); cf. BBA, Meclis-i Tanzimat Nizamat defteri 1, pp. 12–17, Men'-i irtikaba dair cezaname lâyihası, 15 CA 1271/February 1855.

[12] Ahmed Cevdet, *Tezâkir 1–12*, 18; BBA, DSA II, 546, Mustafa Vehbî (received "two shares of the office fees" [*aidat*] in the Rüus Office through B 1272/March 1856); DSA III, 164, Mehmed Besim (appointed director of the Office of the Imperial Divan in R 1277/October 1860, with 20,825 kuruş per month in salary and half as much again in official fees).

[13] Pakalın, *OTD*, I, 391–92, 574–75 (*damgalı kâğıt, evrak-ı sahiha*); Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform*, 197.

and revenue stamps no doubt resembled the old chancery fees to nonofficials. For officials, however, the new systems differed in that the money received supposedly went, not to those who collected it, but to the Treasury. We have to say "supposedly," since one consequence of the failure of fiscal centralization was that revenue-collecting agencies did all they could to hold onto their receipts and use them, first and foremost, to cover their officials' salaries.

Problems of the Compensation System

A summary of how the salary system was supposed to work leaves most of its problems, and the difficulties they created for officials, still unindicated. These problems begin with the unrealistically high levels at which the top salaries were originally set—one more indication of the inadequate planning that went into the reforms of 1838. Comments on the size of the salaries were especially frequent in foreign sources of the late 1830s, but did not end then.[14] A vast gap between highest and lowest salaries remained a hallmark of the Ottoman official salary system, even if the gap narrowed with time. This fact underscores the indications that the salary system, without efficient tax collection or a dynamic economy behind it, had created an immense fiscal drain. The treasurer protested from the start that he could not meet the payments.[15]

As a result, while intended to do the opposite, the salary system heightened officials' economic worries and created incentives to perpetuate old forms of compensation that salaries were supposed to replace. Some Ottomans concluded that the old system had been better. The official historiographer of the period, Lûtfi, argued against the salaries in an incisive passage, asserting that giving officials the supposed certainty of a regular income in place of official fees meant depriving them of incentive to exert themselves in the service of the state. "In some offices," he grimly opined, "attention to business was left to the incitement of public spirit." Here is his vision of the result:

> You go in one day. "The registrar (*mukayyıd*) has not come." You ask again the next day. "Come back day after tomorrow" is the answer. When you go in that day and ask, if the man is an incompetent, "What's your hurry? Take it easy (*yavaş yavaş*)," is what he says. And so on; wasting time this way, if you know what you are doing, you promise some money to one of the office servants (*hademe ve uşaklardan ve odacılardan bir vasıtaya*) to get the business attended to.[16]

[14] Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform*, 145, 377 nn. 122–24; *Levant Herald*, 11 September 1872, 10, "The Financial Condition of Turkey" (the highest official salaries appear 50 percent higher than in Europe).

[15] AAE, Turquie 276, Roussin to Molé, 16 July 1838; cf. Cezar, *Osmanlı Maliyesi*, 270, 299–300.

[16] Lûtfi, *Tarih*, V, 133; my thanks to Robert Dankoff for advice on this passage.

The idea that a private individual had to watch over the processing of his official business, or else pay someone else to do so, is already familiar. The salary system neither created this pattern, nor really alleviated it.

The problems of the compensation system were indeed many. The old practice of an unpaid apprenticeship continued throughout the reform era, although the economic significance of the apprenticeship implicitly changed, as educational reform shifted it out of the teens into the early twenties. The mere existence of a system of unemployment stipends certainly did not mean that every official between positions got one; many examples in the personnel records prove this. Given the lack of an overall grading of positions by salary, or of a table linking salaries systematically to seniority or other criteria, as does the *barem* (from French *barème*) adopted under the republic,[17] officials also often experienced drops in salary along with routine changes of position. Aşçı Dede İbrahim, whose sixty-year career ended in 1906, had his highest nominal salary during the Crimean War.[18] He postponed retirement as long as he could because of the uncertainty of pension payments from the retirement fund. As of 1902, the civil official pension fund's income did fall short of its obligations to the 16,625 persons who then had pension entitlements.[19]

Further problems of the salary system included complicated paperwork and the disruption of the monetary system. Receiving a voucher (*suret*) recognizing one's entitlement to a salary payment and getting the money were two separate events that stood in a rather unpredictable relationship to each other.[20] Abd ül-Hamid complicated things further by requiring various documents needed for salary payments, and also personnel files, to be drawn up on stamped papers, so taxing the officials even while he made them wait for their salaries.[21] Another favorite expedient, once an entitlement was acknowledged, was to pay with a *havale*, an order to pay that one treasury, such as the central one in Istanbul, would draw on another, such as that of a remote province. An ancient instrument that an effective fiscal centralization would have abolished, the *havale* was not convertible into cash as a matter of course. Bankers were sometimes willing to cash them at discounts of up to 50 percent, and sometimes not.[22]

[17] Leslie L. Roos and Noralou P. Roos, *Managers of Modernization: Organizations and Elites in Turkey*, Cambridge, Mass., 1971, 36–37. On attempts to classify civil positions, in 1880 and under the Young Turks, see Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform*, 277–78, 331–32.

[18] Aşçı Dede İbrahim, *Risale*, TY3222, 63a–64b; TY78, 328–30; TY79, 411–12; TY80, 843.

[19] Aşçı Dede İbrahim, *Hatıralar*, ed. Koçu, 114; Said Paşa, *Hâtırat*, II, ii, 31–32.

[20] BBA, Mal. Müd. 11738, *surets* for salary payments of 1256/1840. Cf. Pakalın, *OTD*, III, 278 (*suret*).

[21] E.g., *Düstur*[1], VII, 86–89, 1168–69; VIII, 625–27 (documents of 24 B-4 Z 1313/1895, 24 L 1320/1903, and 6 C-27 B 1324/1906).

[22] H. İnalcık, art. "Ḥawāla," *EI*[2], III, 283–85; PRO, FO78/3752, White to Salisbury, 7 July 1885; *Eastern Express*, 3 June 1884, "Havalles" (in English), "Les Havales" (same article in French); Eliot, *Turkey in Europe*, 145–46.

Not totally unlike the problems of the *havale*s were those of the monetary system. As indicated more fully in appendix A, the monetary system was in disarray throughout the nineteenth century. Part of the problems pertained to the coinage, which was officially bimetallic. The gold liras were mostly hoarded, with the result that the main money in use was the silver, in which the largest denomination was twenty kuruş, nominally a fifth of a lira. There were also smaller silver coins, and yet smaller coins of base metal. Such was the state of the coinage, says one memoirist, that when you finally got your salary, the coins might be unidentifiable from wear.[23]

The values of the different monetary units varied according to place and even purpose. From the 1870s on, the decline of silver in relation to gold further complicated the picture. The width of the gap was, however, partly offset by an odd circumstance; for the supply of silver and especially base-metal coins was so short in Istanbul, partly due to official manipulation, that they circulated at a premium to their intrinsic value.[24] As if this were not enough, the government also issued paper money at three times of exceptional stress. The government had difficulty retiring these issues; the first period of circulation lasted over twenty years.[25] During the three periods—1840–1863, 1876–1883, 1914–1922—the paper money depreciated drastically.[26] Just as the government had to accept its own notes, including *havale*s and salary vouchers, in payment of taxes, it used paper money at least partly in paying salaries.[27]

[23] Uşaklıgil, *Kırk Yıl*, 312.

[24] F. W. Hirst, "Token Money in Turkey," *The Economic Journal (Journal of the British Economic Association)*, VII (1897), 110: "If there can be too much token-money there can also be too little. . . . The Sultan's . . . Finance Minister has discovered that a corner can be made in small change. The Mint officials are apparently in conspiracy with the money changers, and while the former keep the supply of 'billon' below the demand for it, the money changers find themselves able to charge a discount, not . . . on the small money, but on the large. Out of this profit a small gratuity goes back to the Government officials." Cf. Adrien Biliotti, *La banque impériale ottomane*, Paris, 1909, 111–31; E. G., "Monnaies usées," *Bulletin mensuel de la Chambre de commerce française de Constantinople (BMCCFC)*, no. 234, 30 September 1906, 367–68; id., "Monnaies d'appoint," *BMCCFC*, no. 235, 31 October 1906, 563.

[25] A. Du Velay, *Essai sur l'histoire financière de la Turquie, depuis le règne du Sultan Mahmoud II jusqu'à nos jours*, Paris, 1903; C. Morawitz, *Les finances de la Turquie*, Paris, 1902; Donald Blaisdell, *European Financial Control in the Ottoman Empire*, New York, 1929; Charles Issawi, *The Economic History of Turkey, 1800–1914*, Chicago, 1966; id., *Economic History of the Middle East and North Africa*.

[26] To judge from money rates published in the newspapers used to compute the grain price indicator (see appendix B), the value of the paper money of 1840–1863 fell by about half by the time it was withdrawn from circulation. The paper money of 1876–1883 fell by more than 90 percent.

[27] E.g., Halil İnalcık, "Tanzimat'ın Uygulanması ve Sosyal Tepkileri," *Belleten*, XXVIII (1964), 637, 671–72, salary payments half in cash (*nakden*) and half in *esham kavaimi*, the first type of Ottoman paper money, on which see B. Lewis, art. "Ashām," *EI²*, I, 692–93; R. Davison, art. "Ḳā'ime," *EI²*, IV, 460–61. Later Treasury registers gloss over the question of money of payment by describing the salary payments simply as "cash" (*nakd*); see BBA, Mal. Müd. 10542, payments of 1269 *malî*/1853–1854. *La Turquie*, no. 202, 1 September 1876, under "Actes Officiels," on use of paper money to pay back salaries. On use of salary entitlements, etc., to cover property taxes, see *Düstur*[1], VI, 325–26, and VII, 1045–47, decrees of 29 B 1306/1889 and R 1321/1903.

The best-known problem of the salary system was delay in payment. Treasury registers currently available to researchers indicate the extent of this problem, at least for some years. Register entries for April–May 1853 show salaries for the Sublime Porte being paid pretty much on time, although the references to payment in "cash" leave it unclear whether some of this promptly tendered cash was not printed on paper.[28] Registers postdating the Crimean War, when inflation and foreign debt compounded problems of monetary instability, give a different picture. Entries for March–April 1861 note payments—sometimes only partial ones—due since May of the preceding year.[29] Entries for March 1863 show that the gap was then narrow, most of the payments during the first part of the month being for the previous December and January; but the partial payments continued.[30] Another motif appears in payment, within a short period, for several months, not necessarily consecutive and not necessarily adding up to the total amount of arrears. In November 1863, various Foreign Ministry offices received payments for the preceding June and July more or less simultaneously.[31]

Initially, we might be tempted to blame the payment delays on the slack time in tax collection that the agricultural empire faced yearly from March to September.[32] Some delays, however, were never caught up. By March 1872, we find the staff of the Corresponding Secretary of the Grand Vezir (*Mektubî-'i Sadr-ı Âli*) getting paid for July, May, June, March, and April of 1871—listed in that order—on the same day. A few days later, the Translation Office got paid for seven months, January–July 1871, on a single day.[33] And these were prestigious offices, where influence could have come into play.

[28] BBA, Mal. Müd. 10542, pp. 5–14, entries of April 1269/April–May 1853—the earliest register I could find from the *Tanzimat* that recorded payments, rather than issue of vouchers (*suret*). When I did research in these sources, there were also no available salary registers postdating the mid-1870s. I was told that the financial archives for the later period (i.e., after the government bankruptcy and the establishment of the Public Debt Administration) remained unopened to researchers. Cf. Çetin, *Başbakanlık Arşivi Kılavuzu*, 28–35, 158–60.

[29] BBA, Mal. Müd. 10531, pp. 2–23, entries of March 1277/March–April 1861. By an entry of 1 March 1277/13 March 1861, the officials of the office responsible for issuing the paper money themselves got a half salary payment, due for August 1276/1860. I did not find an entry for payment of the balance.

[30] BBA, Mal. Müd. 10529, pp. 3–28. On p. 11, entries of March–April 1279/1863 show the offices of the *Şeyh ül-İslâm* and the police force (*asker-i zabtiye*)—two large payrolls—receiving their pay for December 1278/1862–1863 in two installments each; those for the offices of the *Şeyh ül-İslâm* still do not sum to the total due, although that may be a clerical error only.

[31] BBA, Mal. Müd. 10529, pp. 207–208, entries of November 1279/1863.

[32] Among sources mentioning this fact: BBA, Yıldız, 36.156.142.XI, on budget of 1296/1880–1881; cf. Biliotti, *La Banque impériale ottomane*, 119.

[33] BBA, Mal. Müd. 11169, pp. 4, 7–8, entries of 8 and 14 March 1288/1872.

Inaccessibility of the sources makes it impossible to trace later salary payments in Treasury registers. The government bankruptcy does not appear, however, to have improved things. In chapter 6, we noted the economic distress of Ottoman diplomats in the 1890s. Similar problems were widespread, one result being the threats and revolts that military and police forces used to secure payment of their overdue entitlements.[34] Despite attempts at reform under the Young Turks, salary problems also continued after 1908. To cite a vivid illustration, Keçecizade İzzet Fuad Paşa, who complained in 1901 of the "*Timurî* and *Cengizî* treatment" he experienced as Ottoman minister in Madrid, later threatened to commit suicide if his back salary as a senator was not paid.[35]

Across the years, it is difficult to assess how much of his nominal salary an average official got. One source of 1884 says that an official of a department without receipts would be lucky to get paid for seven or eight months a year.[36] As good an indication as any, this suggests that a "typical" official eventually got half to two-thirds his salary, minus prescribed deductions.

The overarching problem of Ottoman government finance was the slide into bankruptcy. This made it inevitable that payrolls would come under scrutiny and become the object of economy efforts. One characteristic response was to cut salaries. To judge from the personnel records, all but one or two cuts were selective; and the rates varied.[37] One wit made fun of them in a verse about cutting salaries by one in five, one in four, one in three, one in two, one in one—that's "circumcision from the bottom" (*dibinden sünnet*).[38] Few officials could muster much humor in the face of salary cuts, and a more common response was to condemn them with

[34] Said Paşa, *Hâtırat*, II, i, 115–18.

[35] BBA, Yıldız, 15.74/40b.74.15, letter to the palace, 8 ZA 1318/1901; 15.74/40g.74.15, letter to the sultan, 30 November 1335/1919. I found no response and no indication of his fate.

[36] *Oriental Advertiser, or Le Moniteur oriental*, 3 December 1884, "Les Appointements."

[37] *Journal de Constantinople*, no. 353, 24 January 1852, bottom of p. 1, 2d col. (salary cut on sliding scale, from 5 percent of salaries of 250 kuruş and under, to 20 percent of those at or above 2,500 kuruş); AAE, Turquie 337, Lallemand to Walewski, 1 September 1858, 18b (10 percent cut of salaries over 6,000 kuruş per month); BBA, Buy. 5, entry of 25 B 1284 (cut on sliding scale, March 1283/1867); *Levant Herald*, 1 June 1870, p. 141, "Local" (25 percent cut in salaries over 2,500 kuruş per month); *Levant Herald*, 4 September 1872, p. 7 (attempt to cut highest salaries but raise those below 5,000 kuruş per month); *Levant Herald*, 4 August 1875, p. 276, circular from grand vezir to governors-general, mentioning that all salaries under 3,000 kuruş per month were to be exempt from a cut. Bureaucratic self-protection was at work in these decisions. Salaries of 2,500 or 3,000 kuruş were far above what most officials needed to support a household. Dates of salary cuts mentioned in Foreign Ministry personnel records: ZA 1283–M 1284/1867, 1292/1875, N–Z 1296/1879, R 1297/1880, 9 L 1314/March 1897, R–Ş 1327/1909. Only the cut of 1897 was mentioned in as many as 60 percent of the files of officials then in service. However, the cut of 1909, occurring in connection with the purges following the 1908 revolution, was probably a general one, the incidence of which has been masked by the incompleteness of most records after 1908.

[38] İnal, *Şairler*, 814–15 (Kâzım Paşa).

arguments about how low salaries already were, or about added incentives to corruption.[39] With or without the cuts, irregularity of payment forced officials to sell their past-due salary entitlements at discount to brokers or money changers, or to try to use influence to get their payments; and special idioms entered the language to refer to both these practices (*maaş kırdırmak, maaş buyurtmak*).[40] Past-due salary entitlements might figure as large items in the estates of the deceased.[41] The pressures that led to the tax cuts also forced the government to other expedients. Perhaps the strangest occurred in the case of some consuls appointed with the stipulation that they live off the fees they collected and demand nothing from the Treasury.[42]

Ways for Officials to Cope?

Faced with such problems, Ottoman officials resorted to a number of expedients. It is easy to lump these under the heading of "corruption," but not all of them were so. Some expedients were in a shadow zone of practices that had once been permitted, but had been proscribed with the adoption of the salary system, whose malfunctions nonetheless created pressures to retain them. This kind of corruption—if such it should be termed—represented "not . . . the . . . deviance of behavior from accepted norms," but "the deviance of norms from . . . established patterns of behavior."[43] In a more important sense, as we shall argue below, the problem of corruption cannot be understood on the individual level at all. The experience of the Public Debt Administration, established in 1881 after the state bankruptcy, proved conclusively that Ottoman officials were capable of honest service under the right conditions:

> It is astonishing how with such insignificant salaries men can be found to serve us in responsible positions with absolute integrity, provided always that any irregularity is visited with immediate severity, and that there is a certainty of regular pay with a pension to look forward to.[44]

[39] AAE, Turquie 391, Vogüé to Rémusat, 27 March 1872; *Levant Herald*, 11 September 1872 ("The Financial Condition of Turkey"); *Düstur*[1], VI, 587–88 (budget memorandum, 1306/1890–1891).

[40] Pakalın, *OTD*, II, 373–74 (*maaş buyurtmak, maaş kırdırmak*); id., *Son Sadrâzamlar ve Başvekiller*, IV, 122, Safvet Paşa's accounts, salary entitlements sold at discount.

[41] E.g., Grand Vezir Hayr ül-Din Paşa's estate: İnal, *Sadrıazamlar*, 937.

[42] Har., SA530, Zare Demirian, appointed consul at Gözleve (Yevpatoria) in the Crimea with a stipulation to this effect, January 1287/1870, the earliest example I have found. Under Abd ül-Hamid, appointments of this type became too numerous to list. Ordered by the sultan, such appointments were evidently made to posts formerly held by honorary consuls, who had been required to submit most of the fees they collected to the Treasury. The result of the appointments was thus to create the very drain on the budget that they appeared to avoid; BBA, BEO 64508, documents of 4 L 1314–15 M 1315/1897.

[43] Samuel Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Society*, New Haven, 1968, 60.

[44] Robert G. Landen, *The Emergence of the Modern Middle East*, New York, 1970, 173, quoting Sir A. Block, *Special Report on the Public Debt Followed by the Translation of the*

These, however, were conditions that the Ottoman government seldom met.

Facing that fact, some Ottoman officials would attempt to provide for themselves by retaining incomes from former positions after moving on to new ones,[45] by holding more than one office at a time (not that all the additional duties were salaried),[46] or by combining work in different fields—for example, teaching or journalism together with an official position.[47] Chronic lateness or absenteeism was almost a prerequisite for such combinations; we have noted that they were long-standing problems of official discipline, despite a workday that did not begin until midday. Certain avocations pursued on the job offered other ways to make a profit. For some consuls, it may have been the official position that provided the extra income for men who were basically merchants.[48] In the central offices, many still wrote petitions for private individuals (*kâğıd haffaflığı*). It was a matter of gradation from this to demanding payment for services that one was salaried to perform. Officials with power of decision in loan negotiations or purchasing—as noted in chapter 6—had really large-scale opportunities for rake-offs and kickbacks. The same was true of those with power to obtain awards of medals and decorations, which generally required the recipients to pay official fees for their honors.[49] As in the past, some officials got added income from supervising pious foundations (*evkaf*) or investing in business, real estate, and securities. Some of those who served abroad evidently invested abroad. Those best able to protect themselves by such means were people of substance to start with.[50]

The ultimate problem about the salary system was, however, that officials really could not protect themselves from its malfunctions. The progressive disruption of the Ottoman economy jeopardized investment. In 1875, for example, when the government decided to reduce by half its payments on the foreign debt, enough Ottoman holders of debt securities were hurt that their resentments reportedly became a factor in the overthrow of Sultan Abd ül-Aziz (1861–1876).[51]

More to the point under Abd ül-Hamid, however, was the fact that the malfunctions of the compensation system had become structural compo-

Annual Report of the Council of Administration for the Twenty Fourth Financial Period, Istanbul, 1906.

[45] E.g., BBA, DSA II, 546, entry of 15 R 1278/1861 (Mustafa Vehbî, a "traditionalist" Muslim, retained the salary from his previous post in the Foreign Correspondence Office after assuming a salaried secretaryship at the Saint Petersburg embassy); DSA I, 52, entry of 1273/1856–1857 (Arzuman İstepan, retained salary from Translation Office while serving in a series of missions outside it). During the *Tanzimat*, famous cases included Sadık Rif'at and Âli Paşas, who retained *tımar* incomes assigned to the chancery offices after going on to higher posts; see Uzunçarşılı, *Merkez*, 54 n. 4.

[46] BBA, BEO 252830, reports submitted in response to an order of c. B 1326/August 1908 from the Council of Ministers to furnish lists of all officials receiving multiple salaries (I am indebted to Donald Quataert for this reference); Said Paşa, *Hâtırat*, II, i, 144–46.

[47] Teachers: Ahmed Ata Bey (Har., SA762), multiplied his salary several times over in the 1880s by combining service in the Translation Office with teaching French at the School of Civil Administration and the government Language School; Mahrunîzade Eşref Cafer (Har., SA174), partly educated in Paris, began his career as a teacher (May 1296/1880), before being appointed to a government office (end February 1296/1881). Journalists: Ali Muzaffer (Har., SA623, a modernist Muslim), served at the Public Debt Commission in the 1890s, wrote for two newspapers, and edited a journal, *Marifet*; Dimitraki Teodosiadi (Har., SA313) wrote for the Greek newspaper *Vizantis*; Ohannes Şekib (Har., SA136, identified in Çark, *Ermeniler*, 151, as Ohannes Aprahamyan) served, c. 1875–1877, as a writer for the official newspaper of Edirne province; Edouard Blacque Bey (BBA, DSA I, 1016) says that he was assigned in 1262/1846, with salary paid from the Sublime Porte, to write for the *Courrier de Constantinople*, not an official paper.

[48] The consular regulations of 1881 forbade salaried (*muvazzaf*), as opposed to honorary (*fahrî*), consuls to be in trade; *Düstur*[1], *zeyl* ii, 192, art. 3; printed French text, in Har., Niz. Kav., Âsar-ı Matbua 27/1. The reality was sometimes different. Kevani (?) Mavrogordato (Har., SA67, whose eight-year career record excludes him from the quantitative analysis) was dismissed as chancellor at the consulate general in Trieste on 7 M 1307/September 1889 because he was "local" and in trade. Tade Andonian (Har., SA331) lost his post as consul general in Tiflis on 12 N 1301/July 1884 for some misdeed and spent years in trade before getting another appointment, as consul general at Corfu, 29 M 1323/April 1905. Zare Demirian (Har., SA530) lost his post as consul at Sukhumi on the eastern Black Sea coast because of the Russo-Turkish War (1877). He later requested reappointment on the ground that family reasons and lack of funds had kept him from returning to Istanbul, adding that he had tried to go into trade but been unsuccessful. Ten years passed before he got another appointment, and he obviously lived by some means during the interim. Others made no explicit mention of trade, but lived for periods of time by means other than official service. Dimitri Yovanidi (Har., SA519) spent the first fourteen years of his career as an unsalaried consular translator at Trikkala in Greece. Minas Aram Bağdadlıan (Har., SA45) was dismissed as consul at Patras on 4 CA 1314/October 1896 for negligence, but was reappointed to the same post three years later; his file includes no indication of what he did during the interim, which included the Greco-Turkish War of 1897. Kemal (Har., SA500), who describes himself as a Karaite Jew, was not appointed to his first position, as a secretary and translator at the Gözleve (Yevpatoria) consulate in the Crimea, until he was twenty-nine years old; thereafter, his sixteen-year recorded career passed almost entirely without note of monetary compensation. Commercial careers are hard to find among Muslim Ottoman consuls, although many Muslim officials had unexplained periods out of office. At least some modernist Muslims had business experience: Aziz Harun Bey (Har., SA181) worked for three years in the 1870s at the Coûteaux banking house in Galata, from which he went on to the palace secretariat and Athens embassy staff; Ahmed Kâmî (Har., SA89), after several provincial posts, became translator for the Ottoman Bank in Edirne (1887–1891), following which he resumed his official career as translator for the province of Salonica and later vice consul at Batum; Arslanzade Samî Bey (Har., SA644) resigned from his first position in 1891 and remained out of office for two years for personal reasons; Hasan Tahsin Bey (Har., SA549) was a Bulgarian Turk who had been an apprentice official in the judiciary at Ruscuk before the Russo-Turkish War, later went into trade for several years and was elected to the Bulgarian parliament, before becoming in 1897 the Ottoman commercial agent (*tüccar vekili*) at Vidin (effectively, a consul, but given a different title to avoid Ottoman recognition of Bulgarian independence).

[49] Pâker, *Hariciye Hâtıraları*, 35–36, recounting London ambassador Musurus Paşa's efforts to determine whether a decoration set with brilliants would be worth more than the bribe required to get it. Cf. Ahmet Mumcu, *Osmanlı Devletinde Rüşvet (Özellikle Adlî Rüşvet)*, Ankara, 1969.

[50] İnal, *Sadrıazamlar*, 35–36, 937–38, 1855: real estate of grand vezirs Âli, Hayr ül-Din, and Gazi Ahmed Muhtar Paşas; Pakalın, *Sadrâzamlar*, IV, 115–26, Safvet Paşa's accounts, indicating real estate investment; my thanks to Engin Akarlı for information on real estate.

[51] Enver Ziya Karal, *Osmanlı Tarihi*, Ankara, 1977, VII, 238–39; Davison, *Reform*, 309; Cevdet, *Tezâkir 40*, 146; İnal, *Şairler*, 868, 905, 1171.

nents of it, serving as means for manipulation of the officials, into whose ranks the sultan pressed as many as possible of the politically conscious intelligentsia. The policy was not expressly avowed, but was an important prop for the sultan's neopatrimonial authoritarianism.[52] For example, the vast gap between the highest salaries and those of most officials, on which we shall present evidence below, reinforced patrimonialism by practically requiring junior officials to have behind them the resources of an extended family household, headed by a senior male who had acquired a large income. As in earlier centuries, if the sultan was the patrimonial household head writ large, Ottoman social structure assumed the same pattern, endlessly repeated, at the grass roots level. Neopatrimonialism meant reemphasis on the individual's submergence in dependency relations at the familial level, as well—politically—as at higher levels.[53]

The other accidents and incidents of the salary system—the *havale*s, the irregularity of payments, the manipulation of the value of the coinage—supported the purpose of the sultan's system. As for corruption, the sultan professed not to know of any among high officials, although he would condone a bit of it among the low-paid.[54] To reinforce the loyalty of those he especially valued, Abd ül-Hamid would assign them extra salaries, paid regularly, in gold, from the palace treasury. As a German diplomat summed things up in 1901:

> The State, always in financial difficulty, has gradually learned to derive an advantage [from the situation] and accustomed itself and the officials to the irregularity of the salary payments. As matters now stand, a general salary payment has become a special act of grace on the part of the Ruler, announced in the newspapers and celebrated almost like a national holiday. And not only by the officials and the poor; persons on the payroll of the State, when they are not paid on time, buy on credit from the baker, the butcher, and other suppliers; in this way a system of business has developed under which the merchants receive settlements of their various accounts only when the salaries for the months in which the goods were delivered are paid.[55]

[52] Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform*, 227–39.

[53] As a prominent Turkish scholar put things in a letter to me: "In a proper Istanbul household, the younger men's salaries were pocket money—they lived with their fathers up to marrying age, their fathers-in-law after that, all expenses paid. As to how the patriarch himself coped, my grandfather did by selling one bit of property after another, so that his children inherited only an assortment of debts. Mind you he looked after all of us splendidly until he retired. . . ."

[54] Abdül Hamid, *Siyasî Hatıratım*, Istanbul, 1974, 77–79; Mehmet Hocaoğlu, *Abdülhamit Han'in Muhtıraları (Belgeler)*, Istanbul, n.d., 114–16.

[55] PAAA (Bonn), Türkei 134, Bd. 18, Wangenheim to Bülow (T139, roll 392); Carter Vaughn Findley, "Economic Bases of Revolution and Repression in the Late Ottoman Empire," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, XXVIII (1986), 101 n. 58. Examples of newspaper announcements of salary payments: *Levant Herald*, 5 December 1860, p. 980, "Local News"; *Levant Herald*, 2 February 1876, p. 38, "Local and Provincial News"; *La Turquie*, no. 49, 1 March 1889, p. 1, "Les appointements des fonctionnaires"; *La Turquie*, no. 55, 8 March 1889, p. 1, same title.

Sources like Aşçı Dede's memoirs add to this dispassioned summary vivid accounts of the hardship that overshadowed occasions like the month-long fast of Ramazan, or the outburst of joy that followed a salary payment in time for the feasting and gift-giving at the festival that concludes it.[56] The ultimate problem about compensation was, then, that corruption—at least corrupting pressures—remained structural traits of a system in which even the personally incorruptible were trapped.[57] After 1908, the Young Turks again tried to centralize finances and regularize salary payments. The circumstances of the period prevented any thorough success in these efforts, however.[58]

These characteristics of the compensation system already tell a great deal about Ottoman officials' economic problems. Yet the personnel records add deeper insights, which we shall examine under the rubrics of, first, reward and punishment and, then, living standards.

REWARD AND PUNISHMENT: A LAST LOOK AT EGALITARIANISM

To study problems of reward and punishment in the Foreign Ministry personnel records is to return to the question of egalitarianism as implemented during the *Tanzimat* and altered in application under Abd ül-Hamid. Reward and punishment are key issues in this context, for the two most readily measured indicators of egalitarianism in these sources are equality of access to official employment and equality of reward. In chapter 7, the evidence on differing career ladders has already indicated the limits of egalitarianism in matters of promotion. The evidence on compensation brings these limits into sharper definition. While our documentation focuses the question on Muslim–non-Muslim relations, comparable evidence from the Young Turk years would presumably disclose similar problems among Turkish and non-Turkish Muslims as the breakdown of the Ottoman synthesis continued.

In addition to noting punitive actions, the personnel records document rewards in the form of salaries, ranks, and decorations. The ranks and decorations have a certain interest—the decorations that overflowed the coatfronts of Said Paşa or his colleagues included everything from the Venezuelan Order of Merit to the Ethiopian Seal of Solomon, and the Jap-

[56] Aşçı Dede İbrahim, *Hatıralar*, ed. Koçu, 83–84, 114; id., *Risale*, TY79, 353–55.

[57] Cf. John Waterbury, "Endemic and Planned Corruption in a Monarchical Regime," *World Politics*, XXV (1973), 533–55; id., "Corruption, Political Stability, and Development: Comparative Evidence from Egypt and Morocco," *Government and Opposition*, XI (1976), 426–45; and Susan Rose-Ackerman, *Corruption: A Study in Political Economy*, New York, 1978, 179, 188.

[58] Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform*, 333–34.

anese Order of the Sacred Treasure.[59] Yet the evidence on nonmonetary forms of compensation adds little to the conclusions that emerge from the salary analysis. We shall therefore limit this discussion to salaries and punishments. Moreover, since most of the evidence on punishments and other disadvantageous career incidents is nonquantifiable, and so different in kind from the salary data, we shall present it first, then go on to the salary statistics whose analysis forms the basis for most of the remainder of this chapter.

Punishments, Direct and Indirect

As their careers progressed, Ottoman officials not only received rewards but also faced experiences that were punishing in effect if not always in intent. For quite aside from the machinery of administrative justice that was supposed to grind when an official was charged with abuses, life in government included a number of disadvantages due either to the state's economic weakness or to the still imperfect systematization of service conditions. Such disadvantages included the shift of the officials' apprenticeship to later ages, salary cuts that did not affect all officials, declines in salary simply as a result of changes of position, and periods out of office without unemployment stipends. As reformers of the Young Turk years rightly complained, earlier personnel practice also did not recognize the possibility that an official might need to be removed from office for no fault of his own. If two officials could not be exchanged, one would simply be dismissed. In a practical sense, study of the punitive side of official life must begin with phenomena like these before going on to overtly disciplinary actions.

Efforts to tabulate manifestations of the indirectly punitive aspects of official life do not always yield clear results. Yet all evidence considered, traditionalist Muslims seem to have been at a relative disadvantage, and non-Muslims even more so. One way to assess this disadvantage, shown in table 8.1, is to consider the ages at which members of the different personnel categories first received a salary. Of the three large personnel groups, the traditionalist Muslims received a salary at the earliest age,

[59] Cf. tabulation of ranks in Findley, "Acid Test," 361, Table 16.7. Among exotic orders, Har., SA726, Hüseyin Hüsnî Paşa, received the Bukhara order from the emir of Bukhara in 1314/1896–1897 (?). Har., SA429, Grand Vezir Ahmed Tevfik Paşa received the "Seal of Solomon" from the *necâşî* of Ethiopia in R 1315/1897; he had a score of foreign orders or more. Har., SA435, Artin Dadian Paşa had—among some nineteen foreign decorations—the Japanese Order of the Sacred Treasure and the Venezuelan Order of Merit. Har., SA426, Mehmed Galib Paşa had the Crown of Siam, the Japanese Rising Sun, and the Ethiopian Seal of Solomon. Foreign Ministry officials got decorations from Iran and European states in wholesale lots. Part of the fun of research in these records is making out the names of the decorations—transcribed via French into Arabic script—*Trezor Sakre* (Japan), *Sen Sovör* (Holy Savior, Greece), *Izabel la Katolik* (Spain).

Table 8.1.
IMPACT OF INEQUITABLE SERVICE CONDITIONS AND DISCIPLINARY ACTIONS

	ALL RESPONDENTS (1)	*MUSLIM I* (2)	*MUSLIM II* (3)	*NON-MUSLIM* (4)	*Greek* (5)	*Armenian* (6)	*Other N-M.* (7)
N	*366*	*115*	*144*	*107*	*30*	*52*	*25*
Approx. Age at First Receipt of Salary[a]	19.5	18.0	19.0	20.1	20.1	20.2	19.7
Median Number of Years out of Office without Unemployment Stipend	0	0	0	1.0	1.5	1.5	0
Percentage Experiencing Disciplinary Action	17	10	19	22	23	25	16

NOTE:
[a] These figures are estimates arrived at by adding the median ages at first appointment, shown in Table 3.3, to the median numbers of years spent in the first position (generally an unpaid apprenticeship), as shown in Table 7.5A-C.

while non-Muslims did so at the latest. As is often the case with those of limited education, the traditionalist Muslims' precocity in earning an income was outweighed in the long run by their limited upward mobility. For the non-Muslims, however, the converse was not true, as the salary statistics will show. The fact that non-Muslims had the most education did not give them the greatest prospects of upward mobility. Lateness in receiving an income thus became one of the indirectly punitive facets of official life for them.

The incidence of periods out of office without an unemployment stipend heightens this impression of relative disadvantage. While episodes of this kind are common in the personnel records, the files of most members of the two Muslim personnel groups record no such episodes. Among non-Muslims, however, half spent a year or more out of office without stipend. Examination of the non-Muslim subgroups shows that this problem was confined to Greeks and Armenians; half of each of these groups spent at least a year and a half out of office without stipend. In every category, some spent much longer in such a status.

Problems like those just discussed were punishing in effect but presumably not as a matter of policy. A look beyond such inequities, at disciplinary problems that led to overtly punitive actions, provides telling evi-

dence on the limits of egalitarianism, and on the general ineffectiveness of the compensation system in differentiating reward from punishment.

While the incidents that led to overtly punitive actions were variable, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that non-Muslims had an "accident-proneness" that their Muslim colleagues did not, and that this vulnerability grew with time. The last row of table 8.1 documents this exposure to disciplinary action. In this instance, traditionalist Muslims fared better than modernists, who were almost twice as likely to undergo disciplinary actions. But the vulnerability of non-Muslims was greater still. Essentially a quarter of both Greeks and Armenians experienced such actions. Among the small non-Muslim subgroups (column 7), the Jews, at 33 percent, had the highest exposure to punitive actions of any personnel category (the aggregate rate of 16 percent for "other" non-Muslims results from the fact that both Arab Christians and men of European origin experienced no such incidents). The Jewish officials' high rate implicitly reflects both general non-Muslim disadvantage and—since they were the youngest personnel category—the later fate of *Tanzimat* egalitarianism.

Beyond this point, the heterogeneity of the incidents provoking punitive action blocks the path of quantitative analysis; yet certain points seem clear. Some incidents resulted from the low state of official discipline, a problem linked in part to the inadequacy of the compensation system. Examples include cases of nonattendance, overstaying leave, or refusing assignments.[60] A lot of officials got away with such behavior. Confusing incidents also occurred when, in the confined atmosphere of a consular or diplomatic mission, personal relations degenerated into accusations that the ministry in Istanbul, despite sometimes strenuous efforts, would be hard put to resolve.[61] Where alleged abuses were grave enough to warrant

[60] Two traditionalist Muslim examples: Har., SA244 (Mehmed Aziz Bey, lost a position in N 1311/1894 for nonattendance; remained out of office three years), SA620 (Hüseyin Hüsnî Bey, lost position in R1307/1889 for nonattendance; remained out of office about two years). Three modernist Muslim examples: Har., SA166 (Hüseyin Hasib, dismissed in C1310/1892 for not returning from leave to his post as consul general in Tiflis; remained out of office ten months), SA139 (Veli ül-Din Şemsî Bey, dismissed in RA 1313/1895 from Batavia consulate for overstaying leave by eight months after repeated renewals; remained out of office four months), SA408 (Yusuf Ziya Bey, lost post in Yemen, C 1324/1906, for overstaying leave; no later entries in file). Two non-Muslim examples: Har., SA31 (Ohan Bağdadlıan, career apparently terminated 26 S 1313/August 1895 because of prolonged absence in Europe), SA128 (Moise Hanail, career apparently terminated 17 RA 1317/July 1899 when he refused to accept assignment).

[61] One traditionalist Muslim example: Har., SA395 (Mehmed Hayrî Bey, dismissed from post in Belgrade, ZA 1313/1896, on the minister's report that he had engaged in "disreputable activities that it would not be appropriate to mention" and word had gotten out). One modernist Muslim example: Har., SA641 (Şekib Bey, confusing problems as embassy secretary in Belgrade; dismissed M 1326/February 1908 for inappropriate statements and acts in demanding money; this and other issues investigated by Council of State, which ruled in C 1326/July 1908 that the minister in Belgrade had not been at fault, but neither was there any obstacle to Şekib Bey's further employment). Two non-Muslim examples: Har., SA170 (Sarkiz Balian, incident of 1316–1317/1898–1899 involving conflicting reports on his services in Montenegro); SA513 (Güreî Cemil, who identifies himself as Jewish; he was removed in Ş 1323/1905 from a consular post in Greece because of conflict between himself and the consul general). Examples also turn up in other sources, as on the clash between Samipaşazade Sezaî Bey in Madrid and his secretary of legation, Spiro; Har., Müt. 156, dossier on "Remplacement de Spiro Effendi. . . ."

investigation or prosecution, the creakiness of Ottoman justice, compounded by the difficulty of communicating with remote localities, usually reduced the entries in the personnel records to inarticulate confusion. Articles published in the professional journal *Mülkiye* during the Young Turk period confirm that Ottoman officials were concerned about problems of administrative justice.[62] To judge from the personnel records, at times justice was done and offenders punished.[63] Yet the Porte was slow and inefficient in disposing of such cases.[64] The frequent rehiring of men who had lost positions for disciplinary reasons further muddled things.[65]

[62] Kevâkibîzade Abd ül-Halik Midhat, "Memurin Muhakemesi," *Mülkiye*, no. 2 (1 March 1325/1909), 29–31; Mehmed Âsım, "Memurin Muhakemesi," *Mülkiye*, no. 3 (1 April 1325/1909), 45–50 (by the time a case reached the Council of State [the highest administrative instance], so much time would have elapsed that it would be accounted punishment enough for the accused and he would be ruled innocent); Abd ül-Halik Midhat, "Memurin Muhakemesi," *Mülkiye*, no. 4 (1 May 1325/1909), 26–29. Ottoman officials had never ceased displaying concern about corruption or abuse of office, although they may not always have dealt with these problems efficiently. E.g., Har., İdare 156 and 322: complaints or reports about corrupt consular dealings in Batum (1902), Sofia (1908), and Akmescid/Lympheropol (Russia, 1902).

[63] Three traditionalist Muslim examples: Har., SA716 (Resul Hayrî, dismissed in R 1312/1894 as vice consul at Poti in the Caucasus for embezzlement and negligence), SA193 (İsmail Şevket Bey, convicted of embezzlement in N 1325/1907, sentenced to three months in prison, and ruled unfit for further employment), SA125 (Mehmed Emin Yümnî, at least three incidents—Z 1303/1886, C 1308/1891, and S 1312/1894—of dismissal on account of complaints or charges, followed by investigation or trial). Two non-Muslim examples: Har., SA68 (Krikor Hakimoğlu, accused of misdeeds as consular official in Montenegro, exonerated March–June 1312/1896; reappointed, but not until 1904), SA212 (Tavik [?] Besim, who identifies himself as Jewish, was convicted of embezzlement, c. N 1305/1888, and appealed unsuccessfully).

[64] The most confusing case in these records—rivaled only by the many charges brought against Mehmed Emin Yümnî (Har., SA125), also a traditionalist Muslim—was that of Hüseyin Hamî Bey (Har., SA387). He was dismissed from a consular post in Serbia in B 1321/October 1903 because of debt proceedings in the Serbian courts, which supposedly made it impossible to keep him there, and his demands for assurance of regular salary payments in future. Following his dismissal, charges by the Ottoman legation in Belgrade that he had fled and joined the opposition and committed (or intended to commit) "damnable acts" (*bazı harekât-i mel'anetkârane*) led to his trial in criminal court in Istanbul, where he was acquitted for want of evidence. Thereafter, examination of the records of the Foreign Ministry Accounts Office showed (October 1906) that he had continued to serve at his consular post through February 1904, forwarding fees and accounts, so disproving the allegations of his flight. He was ruled eligible for further employment in April 1907, but his record includes no entry for reappointment.

[65] Three traditionalist Muslim examples: Har., SA716 (Resul Hayrî, reappointed in B 1313/1895, fifteen months after dismissal for embezzlement), SA178 (Ömer Lûtfi, dismissed in 1301/1884 and M 1314/1896 for improper performance of consular duties and—the second time—excessive expenditures; exonerated and reappointed both times, the second time on the ground that sixteen months out of office without stipend was punishment enough), SA125 (Mehmed Emin Yümnî, punitively dismissed at least three times on some thirty charges in all, including bribery and dereliction of duty; but exonerated and reappointed each

Some such rehirings amounted to rewarding unsatisfactory service when there was no consistent reward for the contrary.

From the entries in the personnel records, it is possible to see at times that non-Muslim officials benefited from the efforts of Muslim colleagues at fairness and impartiality.[66] Still, they had a special vulnerability, in that they faced, not only the same problems as all other officials, but also doubts that grew as the Ottoman synthesis of nationalities eroded.

Sometimes the reticence of the officials who kept the personnel records leaves it unclear whether we are observing the effects of this erosion. We read of one Armenian who lost his post as secretary of the embassy in Brussels in 1905 on account of "certain causes and circumstances," and of a Greek dismissed as consul at Antwerp in 1905 because of "some special [or personal] circumstances."[67] In other cases, the records are more explicit. One Greek official serving as foreign affairs director of the province of Baghdad lost his position in 1914 on the ground that "his being in contact with foreigners would entail difficulties in confidential matters."[68] Another Greek lost his place as consul in Liverpool in June 1905 when the Foreign Ministry received orders from the Palace Secretariat to appoint a Muslim instead.[69] Explicit avowal of such a motive is rare in the personnel records. The fact that the order came from the palace implies that the decision was an expression, not of administrative initiative, but rather of palace interference and, implicitly, of the sultan's pan-Islamic policy, whose implications for relations with the British Empire were

time; cf. İnal, *Şairler*, 1955–58). No modernist Muslim examples found in documents. Five Non-Muslim examples: Har., SA722 (Dimitraki Lefteriadi, reappointment of N 1322/1904, seven years after dismissal for negligence and inappropriateness to his post), SA313 (Dimitraki Teodosiadi, reappointments of R 1304/1890 and B 1317/1899 after about three years out of office in each case; first dismissal essentially for incompetence, second for causing difficulties with a foreign government), SA331 (Tade Andonian, reappointment of CA 1321/1903 after nineteen years out of office but in trade; he had been dismissed for a "misdeed"), SA45 (Minas Aram Bağdadlıan, reappointment of S 1317/1899 almost three years after dismissal for negligence), SA164 (Rupen Davud, thrice dismissed for negligence or incompatibility with superiors and twice reappointed after intervals of eight to nine months).

[66] Har., SA68 (Krikor Hakimoğlu; file includes details on his exoneration following dismissal as consul at Podgorica, Montenegro, for negligence and misconduct; but he remained out of office for more than seven years following dismissal). Among officials who mention being recognized for good service, Har., SA725 (Pozik Yusuf Azarian, entry of Ş 1299/1882, mentions being promoted in rank as a reward for reports on certain matters). Artin Dadian's long years as undersecretary of the Foreign Ministry (1875–1901 with two gaps) imply recognition of a non-Muslim for good service (Har., SA435); see also Söylemezoğlu, *Hariciye Hizmetinde Otuz Sene*, I, 54–55.

[67] Har., SA39 (Mihran Kavafian, entry of Ş 1323/1905; *bazı esbab-u-ahval*); SA505 (Alexander Dosios, 20 CA 1326/June 1908; *bazı ahval-i hususiye*). The reticence is probably part of the climate of fear in this period: the subordinate whom one accused of misdoing might have powerful protectors.

[68] Har., SA270 (Nikolaki Faler, entry of May 1330/1914; *ecnebilerle münasebatta bulunması mahremane hususatta müşkülâta tesadüf bahisle . . .*).

[69] Har., SA9 (Pandeli Logaris, R 1323/1905).

manifold. In any event, such a case throws an added light on the transience of the non-Muslim presence in civil official ranks.

The Ottoman government thus proved unable, both to differentiate reward and punishment for officials in general, and to equalize the impact of this problem on officials from different communities. Inequalities in vulnerability to punishments and disadvantageous service conditions thus confirm the indications of "tokenism" and unequal access noted in analysis of employment records. The salary statistics complete the picture of inequality in reward.

Foreign Ministry Salaries

The bulk of the personnel record data on reward and punishment pertains to salaries. The chronological account of each career in fact includes the materials for computing series of salary statistics. To do so reliably requires confronting problems pertaining to the representativeness of the data, variation over the years in the numbers and seniority of documented officials, monetary units of payment, and the relation of the salary figures in the records to the officials' actual receipts. Major technical problems of analysis, these require carrying out statistical adjustments where possible, and otherwise making assumptions, as set forth in appendix A. Since the officials did not actually receive the full amounts stated in the records, perhaps the most important qualification to note here is that the statistics are essentially relative indicators of how different groups of officials fared. The statistics are especially useful for determining how these groups compared with one another, over time, in compensation.

Since our ultimate goal in computing the salary statistics is to compare them with prices so as to study official living standards, and since our price indicator is based on Istanbul prices (see appendix B), we can simplify presentation of salary statistics in this chapter by discussing only those computed for Foreign Ministry officials serving in Istanbul. Separate series computed for all Foreign Ministry officials without regard to place of service appear in appendix A; those series make fuller use of the data, but cannot appropriately be compared with the Istanbul price average. Emphasizing that the appendices are indispensable for a precise understanding of the computations, we may begin presentation of salary statistics here with annually computed means for Foreign Ministry officials serving in the capital, shown in table 8.2.

Of conclusions that could be drawn from table 8.2, two merit comment at this point. First, by its mode of computation—for each year, the sum of the salaries divided by the number of salaries—the mean can be strongly influenced by extreme values. If a few men had either extremely high or low salaries, the means may not provide reliable indicators of how much

Table 8.3.
ADJUSTED FOREIGN MINISTRY SALARY MEDIANS,
OFFICIALS SERVING IN ISTANBUL WITH KNOWN SALARY[a] (gold kuruş per month)

YEAR	ALL RESPONDENTS (1)	MUSLIM I (2)	MUSLIM II (3)	NON-MUSLIM (4)	Greek (5)	Armenian (6)	Other N-M. (7)
1869	1550	750				3550	
1870	3017	800		3050		3800	
1871	3025	800		6013		6250	
1872	1150	800		6250		8375	
1873	1150	775		1425			
1874	1044	1033	1800	317		1750	
1875	1050	1038	3050	188		875	
1876	1339	974	5113	1412			
1877	1035	950	2971	682	731		
1878	1011	942	2386	584	487	633	
1879	1218	1185	2679	1266	1120	998	
1880	1174	1175	2484	1120	1169	317	
1881	1212	1187	2971	1558	1705	1218	
1882	1215	1190	2386	1315		1218	
1883	1216	1196	2971	1218		609	
1884	1201	1175	3458	1120		73	
1885	1231	1187	3701	1510		146	
1886	1242	1193	3653	1705	3653	1266	
1887	1256	1183	3214	1997	3653	1705	
1888	1255	1177	1510	2532	3019	2045	
1889	1231	1023	1327	2532	3019	2045	
1890	1213	925	1266	1972	1997	1948	

medians equal or exceed the corresponding figures in table A.2. Without clear pattern, such instances can probably best be regarded as exceptions confirming the general rule of lower salaries for officials serving in the capital city.

Comparing the medians in table 8.3 and the means in table 8.2 shows, in turn, that for all officials serving in Istanbul (column 1), means exceeded medians in every year when it is possible to compare, except 1870 and 1908. For modernist Muslims (column 3), the means were invariably greater. For traditionalist Muslims (column 2), in contrast, the medians exceeded the means from 1880 through 1894 and again in 1896. For non-Muslims (column 4), higher medians occurred in 1870–1872, 1885, 1887–1892, and 1906–1908. By themselves, the salary data disclose no reason why higher medians for these groups should occur in these years. The non-Muslims' medians of 1870–1872 and 1906–1908 are probably anomalies reflecting the problems of computations based on small numbers of cases. As for the high medians of the 1880s and early 1890s, we

Table 8.3 (contd.)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
1891	1188	769	1242	1899	1997	1899	
1892	1181	804	1234	1964	2532	1266	
1893	1144	844	1201	1266	3068	1242	
1894	1144	877	1201	1510	1169	1534	
1895	1039	760	1169	1510	1218	1558	
1896	1153	950	1412	1485	1948	1510	
1897	1062	860	1412	1291	536	1339	
1898	1193	852	1510	1291	536	1315	
1899	1201	877	1461	1315	536	1339	
1900	1230	804	2045	1071	1412	1364	
1901	1169	1035	1461	925	925	1023	
1902	1242	1047	2094	925	828	1023	
1903	1218	1039	1851	877	828	1023	
1904	1278	1030	1607	1169	828	1412	
1905	1218	1023	1534	877	828	1169	
1906	1315	1047	1558	974	828	1120	
1907	1347	1096	1493	1169	828	1461	
1908	1266	1096	1445	1266	828	1461	
1909	1212	1120	1291		1169		
1910	1169		1218		1120		

NOTE:
[a] The maximum numbers of cases available for calculation of these medians, under the procedure defined in appendix A, are as follows: all respondents, 84 in 1906; Muslim I, 34 in 1903-1904; Muslim II, 39 in 1904; all non-Muslims, 19 in 1892; Greeks, 5 in 1902-1906; Armenians, 15 in 1892; other non-Muslims, 2 in 1884-1885, 1895, 1901, 1906-1908. Again, columns 1-4 include no statistics for years when the number of men in service did not equal one-fourth of these maxima; columns 5-7 include no statistics for years without at least half the maximum number of cases (except that the number of "other non-Muslims" allows no meaningful computation of medians in this table).

shall note evidence below that those years formed an exceptional economic period.

In any case, the fact that salary means for officials serving in the capital generally exceeded the medians signifies a salary distribution in which a minority of exceptionally high salaries pulled the means upward—a distribution "skewed" toward the high values. This indicates an inegalitarian compensation system with a privileged few among the salary recipients. Among categories of Foreign Ministry officials, this economic elitism proves chiefly characteristic of modernist Muslims. Figure 8.1 illustrates the relationships between means and medians for each of the large personnel categories.

Separate comparisons among, first, the means and, then, the medians for all the larger personnel categories (figure 8.2) generally confirm the implications of economic elitism. Based on the analysis of career records in chapter 7, we might expect a rank ordering, with modernist Muslims best paid, non-Muslims next so, and traditionalist Muslims least. The comparison between figures 8.2 and A.2 (in appendix A) shows that the



Fig. 8.1 Comparisons of Salary Means and Medians, Organized by Personnel Groups, for Foreign Ministry Officials Serving in Istanbul with Known Salary

ranking may have been less clear-cut among Foreign Ministry officials serving in Istanbul than among the larger group including their colleagues elsewhere. For example, in Istanbul (figure 8.2), non-Muslims collectively enjoyed higher median salaries than modernist Muslims between 1888 and 1896—a period that begins to appear exceptional in a number of respects; among all officials of the ministry (figure A.2), non-Muslims' median salaries exceeded the modernist Muslims' in fewer of those years and by less of a margin. It is surely no accident that non-Muslims' median salaries fell again at the time of difficulties between Turks and both Greeks and Armenians in the late 1890s. The effect of the Ottoman-Greek War of 1897 on the Greek officials (tables 8.2–8.3, column 5) appears immediate and catastrophic; the Armenians' fall appears more gradual (column 6). In any event, the evidence overall still indicates an economic hierarchy among the three major personnel groups.

The evidence also suggests important long-term trends. In figure 8.2, the means for all officials serving in the capital trend downward over time; the corresponding medians, discounting the erratic values of the first few years, remain more nearly on a level. The apparent narrowing of the mean-median gap implies a narrowing over time for the entire salary distribution, and the fact that the medians changed relatively little has important implications for the discussion of living standards below. Among



Fig. 8.2 Comparisons of Salary Means and Medians, Organized by Statistic, for Foreign Ministry Officials Serving in Istanbul with Known Salary

the major personnel groups, the most important divergence from these general trends occurred among the traditionalist Muslims, whose median and—especially—mean salaries trended upward after about 1890. Since they were on balance the lowest-paid group, these changes in their salaries helped narrow the salary gap among the different personnel groups.

The comparison of means and medians proves suggestive of long-term changes in the total range of salaries; yet, since means and medians are both statistical measures of "central tendency," each marking one kind of midpoint in the total range of salaries for a given year, they cannot define that range or fully measure its changes over time. There is, however, a simple way to study the outer limits of the Foreign Ministry salary distribution. On the one hand, we know that there were always unsalaried apprentices—officials with a salary of zero. On the other hand, while the personnel files used to compute the statistics include a few men who "went beyond" the Foreign Ministry to become grand vezir or hold other extremely high offices, the post of foreign minister was the highest, and the highest-paid, that an official could hold *in* this ministry. Compared to

the apprentice's zero, the foreign ministers' salary and its fluctuations over time thus provide a way to verify the range of Foreign Ministry salaries, and so to gain an added perspective on the economic environment that the means and medians represent.

Supplementing the evidence in the personnel records with other sources makes it possible to begin the survey of foreign ministers' salaries from the beginning of the salary system. Among eight references for 1838–1876, seven ranged between 60,000 and 75,000 kuruş per month.[70] The one anomaly, 50,000 kuruş in 1872, was still over forty times the median for that year shown in table 8.3. Military and fiscal crises of the late 1870s lowered the minister's salary to around 40,000 kuruş.[71] For 1880–1884, it fell again, by half, to an all-time low of 20,000 kuruş.[72] For 1885–1895, the figure was again 30,000 per month.[73] From 1896 through the 1908 revolution, the salary wavered in the range 36,000–46,000. In the purges and salary cuts that followed the revolution, the minister's salary fell to 25,000, still about twenty times the median for that year as shown in table 8.3.[74] World War I brought a cut of 50 percent to all official salaries. By 1916, inflation forced a restoration of the amount cut and even cost-of-living supplements, though they proved inadequate.[75]

Especially because the foreign minister's salary indicates the range and fluctuation of salaries in that ministry, several points emerge from this survey of ministerial salaries. One is the proof that the spread between highest and lowest Foreign Ministry salaries narrowed over time, while the medians remained nearly on a level. No doubt, it was necessity that

[70] Salaries of 1838–1876 (and data sources): 75,000 kuruş per month (HHS, Türkei VI/67, 18 April 1838); 65,000 (BBA, Mal. Müd. 11738, p. 11, entry of 17 S 1256/20 April 1840, salary of Mustafa Reşid Paşa); 75,000 (BBA, DSA II, 218, İbrahim Edhem Paşa, entry of 1273/1856–1857); 61,455 (BBA, Mal. Müd. 10531, p. 20, entry of 27 March 1277/1861, Fuad Paşa); 75,000 (BBA, Mal. Müd. 10529, pp. 11 and 22, entry of 26–27 March and 10 April 1279/1863, Âli Paşa); 50,000 (BBA, DSA II, 416, Safvet Paşa, entry of 2 C 1289/August 1872); 75,000 (BBA, DSA XXII, 37, Ahmed Ârifi Paşa, entry of 1 R 1291/May 1874); 75,000 (BBA, DSA II, 416, Safvet Paşa, entry of 8 Z 1291/January 1875, in office until May 1876).

[71] 39,000 kuruş (BBA, DSA II, 416, Safvet Paşa, entry of 25 CA 1293/June 1876); 40,000 (ibid., 16 S 1295/February 1878); 39,000 (ibid., 9 Ş 1296/July 1879). From 1876 on, consistency with the procedure outlined in the discussion of monetary units in appendix A would require multiplying the ministers' salaries by 0.975 to take account of the depreciation of silver in relation to gold. Since the highest salaries may have been paid in gold (Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform*, 237), I have not done this here.

[72] Entries showing the minister's salary at 20,000: BBA, DSA IV, 114, Mehmed Âsım Paşa, L 1297/September 1880, 14 M 1300/November 1882, and 19 C 1301/April 1884; BBA, DSA I, 576–77, Mehmed Said Paşa, 20 C 1299/May 1882.

[73] BBA, DSA I, 576–77, Mehmed Said Paşa, entry of 15 Z 1302/September 1885, in office through 1895.

[74] Salaries for 1896–1908 (with data sources): 45,000 kuruş (BBA, DSA I, 576–77, Mehmed Said Paşa, entry of 15 B 1313/January 1896); 40,000 (Har., SA429, Ahmed Tevfik Paşa, 18 CA 1313/November 1895); 36,000 (ibid., 9 L 1314/March 1897); 46,000 (ibid., 4 B 1318/October 1900); 25,000 (ibid., 17 Ş 1326/September 1908).

[75] Ahmed Emin [Yalman], *Turkey in the World War*, New Haven, 1930, 151–53; Zafer Toprak, *Türkiye'de "Millî İktisat" (1908–1918)*, Ankara, 1982, 334–35.

forced this ragged retreat from economic elitism among officials. Yet the extent of elitism, once fantastic, remained great. In contrast to the present-day U.S. civil service, where the highest salary exceeds the lowest by a factor of nine,[76] here the highest salary exceeded the median salary—not the lowest—by factors of twenty or forty. Not only that, but most civil officials appear to have been highly paid compared to other segments of society, even allowing that irregularities of payment probably cost officials a third to a half of their nominal salaries. For example, the best available evidence indicates laborers' wages of roughly 250 kuruş per month in the early 1870s or 350 about 1908.[77]

Whatever their salary problems, or the inequities within their ranks, most Ottoman civil officials were relatively privileged economically, and the highest paid were still patrimonial grandees, until World War I turned their lot into that of all people on fixed incomes in a time of rampant inflation. No wonder Ottoman novelists often chose officials as leading characters. Of course, the officials whom the novelists idealized were young, upward-mobile modernist Muslims, who were not all there was to civil officialdom. It also included traditionalist Muslims, who tended to fare least well in salary, but were gaining in the later Hamidian years. And the Foreign Ministry included a sizable non-Muslim contingent, which usually came second in salary, but was losing ground and suffered especially from inequities in reward and punishment.

To recall how favorably their educational levels and professional capabilities compared with modernist Muslims' throws the non-Muslims' problems with the compensation system into high relief. The roots of those problems in the empire's lack of social cohesion and in its demographic shifts have already become familiar from earlier chapters. The general malfunctions of the compensation system, reflecting larger financial and economic issues, merely aggravated those difficulties.

OFFICIAL LIVING STANDARDS AND THEIR POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS

Our discussion of the compensation system has yet to broach its most important question, that of official living standards. The present state of research on incomes and prices in late Ottoman times precludes more than a tentative discussion of living standards, and even that presents difficulties. The effort proves worthwhile, however; for the results not only

[76] Don Mace and Joseph Young, ed., *Federal Employees Almanac*, 34th ed., Falls Church, 1987, 3, salary range from $9,619 for grade GS–1 (step 1) to $86,682 for GS–18.

[77] Korkut Boratav, A. G. Ökçün, and Şevket Pamuk, "Ottoman Wages and the World Economy, 1839–1913," *Review* (published by the Fernand Braudel Center of the State University of New York, Binghamton), VIII (1985), 379–406, appendix (same article published in Turkish as "Osmanlı Ücretleri ve Dünya Ekonomisi, 1839–1913," *Yapıt*, XLIX [1984], 62–76); Issawi, *Economic History of Turkey*, 37–43; Findley, "Economic Bases," 86.

yield an insight into the fluctuations of official living standards across a half-century, but also suggest a meaningful and hitherto little-noticed relationship between these fluctuations and the political-intellectual history of the period.[78]

Estimating a "Living Wage" for Civil Officials

The difficulties of studying official living standards become apparent as soon as we look for evidence on what would have constituted a "living wage" for an official household of this period. Ultimately, two kinds of evidence emerge. The first consists of officials' estimates of how much they needed to support a family; the second, of more systematic calculations. Analyzing the officials' own estimates requires caution. Some estimates range quite high, telling more about the officials' wants than their needs. In addition, the officials rarely tell anything about the size of the family to be supported.[79]

Fortunately, the available estimates include some of the 1890s that give a consistent and seemingly realistic idea of what officials then needed to support a family. About 1902, Aşçı Dede recorded his thoughts on how much he would need to retire. He wrote that since he had a small family, he could get by on 5 liras a month, or about 540 kuruş in silver.[80] Implicitly, such a sum would not have sufficed for a man with full family responsibilities. Further, since Aşçı Dede seems to be speaking of cash in hand, rather than salary or pension, an official would have needed perhaps half again as much in nominal salary to net this amount. As if to support these inferences, a petitioner wrote in 1897 that he could not accept a post at a salary of 600 kuruş per month because he could not support his family on that.[81] For officials with large families or bad habits such as alcoholism, the definition of inadequacy could be much higher.[82]

[78] One scholar who has emphasized the connections between economic and political change, as it relates to the 1908 revolution, is Donald Quataert. In addition to his works on agricultural and labor history, cited below, see his "The 1908 Young Turk Revolution: Old and New Approaches," *Middle East Studies Association Bulletin*, XIII (1979), 22–29; id., "The Economic Climate of the 'Young Turk Revolution' in 1908," *Journal of Modern History*, LI (1979), D1147–D1161 (available from University Microfilms, Ann Arbor, order no. IJ–00049).

[79] In compensation for these problems, however, the difference between nominal salary and what the officials actually collected (a problem discussed in appendix A) ceases to be a concern in analysis of these estimates, for the officials obviously knew that their salaries would not be paid regularly and made allowance for this fact.

[80] Aşçı Dede İbrahim, *Hatıralar*, ed. Koçu, 114–15.

[81] BBA, BEO 6641, Hasan Tahsin to grand vezir, 20 January 1312/1897.

[82] Har., SA531, entry of C 1314/1896 (Mehmed Mazhar Bey, a modernist Muslim, unable to manage on 920 kuruş per month because of the size of his family and alcoholism [*işrete inhimaki*]); Har., SA270, entry of 17 April 1327/1911 (Nikolaki Faler, unable to get by as foreign affairs director of Aleppo province because of the size of his family and the "smallness" of his salary of 2,000 kuruş [*ailesinin kesreti ve maaşının kılleti*]).

Still, it appears that officials of the mid-1890s would have considered a salary of 1,000 kuruş per month adequate to support a family. Saying that she had only a small pension and that her son's salary was only 250 kuruş per month, an official's widow petitioned in 1892 for the son's salary to be raised to 1,000 kuruş.[83] Also referring to the 1890s, when he, too, was an official, Halid Ziya Uşaklıgil discussed the significance that a raise to 1,000 kuruş had for him on account of an "important death" in the family.[84] On this basis, the salary medians shown in table 8.3 for the 1890s appear comfortable, at least for modernist Muslims and non-Muslims. Many officials made less than the median, however, and the comfort of all depended on the actual extent of payment.

By the Young Turk period, the most nearly comparable salary estimates are 50 to 100 percent higher. In a report on a proposed reorganization of 1912, the director of one Foreign Ministry office said that salaries of 1,500–2,000 per month were needed to attract qualified officials. The director general of another department wrote that his staff should be reorganized in classes receiving 800–1,000, 1,000–1,200, 1,200–1,500, and 1,500–2,500 kuruş.[85] It is a matter of judgment to estimate at what age, on average, such individuals would become chief providers for a family, presumably an extended one. Assuming that this occurred about age thirty-five would again probably suggest a required salary of 1,500. The latest medians shown in table 8.3 offer little confidence that most Foreign Ministry officials made that much even nominally in 1912.

Aside from officials' estimates of a "living wage," the second and more valuable kind of evidence consists of systematic calculations of living costs, based on prices of a shopping list of goods, with the prices weighted by likely amounts consumed. However, such estimates are available only for the eve of World War I, and then with wide disparities. One source sets the budget of a "mid-level" official in 1914 as low as 235.25 kuruş.[86] The budget is incomplete, omitting such expenditures as tobacco, transportation, and housing. A more complete budget for 1914 sets the budget for a family of middle standing (*orta halli*), as reckoned by the Istanbul Chamber of Commerce, at 945 kuruş.[87] Of this, 150 is for rent; tobacco and transportation again do not appear.

It is not clear how to explain the discrepancy between these estimates. The lower one comes from the European-controlled Public Debt Admin-

[83] Har., TKE 1406, no. 226, petition of Enise Hanım, 20 August 1308/1892.

[84] Uşaklıgil, *Kırk Yıl*, 358.

[85] Har., Müt. 249, reports by Nikolaki on the Directorate General of Consular, Commercial, and Mixed Legal Affairs, May 1328/1912, and by Suad Bey on the Directorate General of Administrative Affairs, 10 February 1916.

[86] Toprak, "*Millî İktisat*," 332–33.

[87] Vedat Eldem, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunun İktisadî Şartları Hakkında bir Tetkik*, Ankara, 1970, 214–15.

istration, which paid its Ottoman employees regularly and so was able to get good service at modest rates. That fact might have "depressed" the figure stated. Yet a high-placed Public Debt official reported in 1906 that the commission had found it appropriate to raise the salaries of its agents in the provinces to a minimum of 400 kuruş.[88] Public Debt agents in Istanbul would have needed more than that, and prices certainly rose between 1906 and 1914. However the low figure should be explained, the larger Chamber of Commerce budget seems more realistic. An official of 1914 with a nominal salary of 1,500 kuruş might perhaps have taken home 945 a month on average. Because extrapolation from the latest medians in table 8.3 suggests that most officials did not have a salary of 1,500 in 1914—yet did have one several times the Public Debt budget of 235 kuruş—accepting the higher estimate fits a qualified observer's assertion that official salaries before World War I amounted to "scarcely . . . a living wage."[89]

The upshot of our efforts to ascertain a "living wage," then, is that to support a modest household—perhaps consisting of the official, his wife, two to four children, and one or two other dependents—a civil official would have needed a nominal salary of 1,000 kuruş per month in the 1890s or about 1,500 in 1912. At 1914 prices, actual living costs for such a household would have been on the order of 950 to 1,000 kuruş. At any date, living costs for a great household, like Derviş Paşa's as seen in Aşçı Dede's memoirs or Abd ül-Selâm Bey's in Tanpınar's fictional depiction, would have been many times higher, as the immensely broad range of official salaries recognized.

Toward a Comparison of Salaries and Prices

These figures take us as far as it is possible to go with available cost-of-living estimates. The Chamber of Commerce figure, and the officials' own estimates of a "living wage," do, however, provide benchmarks for an analysis that must proceed beyond this point by other means. Our problem at this point is that we have cost-of-living figures for only a few of the roughly fifty years for which we have salary statistics. For a systematic comparison of salaries and prices, we need cost-of-living figures computed from a "market basket" of goods and services, as the Chamber of Commerce figure was, for each year in which we have salary means and medians. Failing that, to advance any argument at all about fluctuations in living standards, we need at least some kind of price series that can stand as a proxy for a more systematic calculation.

As such a proxy, appendix B presents an average of Istanbul market

[88] Landen, *Emergence*, 173, quoting Sir A. Block.

[89] *Most* official salaries, that is; Ahmed Emin [Yalman], *Turkey*, 151.

Table 8.4.
PERCENTAGE RELATIVES, ADJUSTED FOREIGN MINISTRY SALARY MEANS, OFFICIALS SERVING IN ISTANBUL WITH KNOWN SALARY (base period 1880-1882)

YEAR	ALL RESPS. (1)	M.I (2)	M.II (3)	N-M. (4)	GRAIN AVG. (5)	YEAR	ALL RESPS. (1)	M.I (2)	M.II (3)	N-M. (4)	GRAIN AVG. (5)
1863	316			124		1887	115	99	131	121	75
1864	236	148		155	69	1888	108	98	101	113	70
1865	153	190		153	67	1889	99	83	99	109	71
1866	152	160		154	86	1890	95	76	97	104	77
1867	94	143		84	112	1891	91	72	97	94	96
1868	152	158		91	110	1892	87	72	101	84	76
1869	148	137		75	83	1893	86	75	88	109	68
1870	169	158		79	91	1894	91	79	89	100	50
1871	193	156	249	93	96	1895	87	80	92	94	53
1872	190	200	193	139	85	1896	91	91	91	99	57
1873	122	154	103	122	107	1897	98	90	81	109	68
1874	158	117	230	67	104	1898	96	96	75	108	78
1875	153	120	204	51	91	1899	98	99	70	121	75
1876	126	117	171	151	84	1900	104	105	76	120	70
1877	140	119	163	81	91	1901	110	119	78	109	65
1878	109	115	132	76	95	1902	109	126	78	78	65
1879	108	117	89	98	99	1903	111	124	78	89	69
1880	95	99	103	72	111	1904	112	140	79	83	70
1881	100	100	93	115	99	1905	112	160	71	90	73
1882	105	101	105	112	90	1906	84		58	47	75
1883	109	106	117	95	90	1907	87		61	40	90
1884	114	96	131	100	75	1908	55			40	99
1885	118	94	145	91	72	1909	81		46		99
1886	123	99	142	129	80	1910	67		36		86

prices for several grain products; the appendix calls attention, as well, to some of the interpretive problems that may arise from using grain prices as a proxy indicator for general price movements. To compare salary and price statistics using this indicator, it remains only to convert them into common units of measure. This requires converting the salary statistics shown in tables 8.2 and 8.3 into percentage relatives, the form in which the grain price average has been computed.[90] Tables 8.4 and 8.5 present the results of these calculations, with an added column displaying the grain price average (brought forward from table B.2). Since the analysis of egalitarianism is now virtually complete, and since adjusted salary sta-

[90] In converting the salary statistics in this way, we take 1880–1882 as the base period, the same base period also having been used in computing the grain price average. For each series of salary statistics, we then recompute the value for each year as a percentage of the base period value for that series. See appendix A and its note 11 for an explanation of percentage relatives and the procedure for computing them about an arbitrarily selected base period.

Table 8.5.
PERCENTAGE RELATIVES, ADJUSTED FOREIGN MINISTRY SALARY MEDIANS, OFFICIALS SERVING IN ISTANBUL WITH KNOWN SALARY (base period 1880-1882)

Year	ALL RESPS. (1)	M.I (2)	M.II (3)	N-M. (4)	GRAIN AVG. (5)	Year	ALL RESPS. (1)	M.I (2)	M.II (3)	N-M. (4)	GRAIN AVG. (5)
1869	128	63			83	1890	100	78	51	150	77
1870	249	67		232	91	1891	98	65	50	144	96
1871	250	67		457	96	1892	97	68	50	149	76
1872	95	67		475	85	1893	94	71	48	96	68
1873	95	65		108	107	1894	94	74	48	115	50
1874	86	87	72	24	104	1895	86	64	47	115	53
1875	87	87	123	14	91	1896	95	80	57	113	57
1876	110	82	206	107	84	1897	88	72	57	98	68
1877	85	80	120	52	91	1898	98	72	61	98	78
1878	83	79	96	44	95	1899	99	74	59	100	75
1879	100	100	108	96	99	1900	101	68	82	81	70
1880	97	99	100	85	111	1901	96	87	59	70	65
1881	100	100	120	118	99	1902	102	88	84	70	65
1882	100	100	96	100	90	1903	100	88	75	67	69
1883	100	101	120	93	90	1904	105	87	65	89	70
1884	99	99	139	85	75	1905	100	86	62	67	73
1885	102	100	149	115	72	1906	108	88	63	74	75
1886	102	101	147	130	80	1907	111	92	60	89	90
1887	104	100	129	152	75	1908	104	92	58	96	99
1888	104	99	61	193	70	1909	100	94	52		99
1889	102	86	53	193	71	1910	96		49		86

tistics are available for the non-Muslim subgroups in relatively few years, we shall simplify the tables from this point on by showing salary statistics only for the larger personnel categories.

Having already analyzed the fluctuations over time in the means and medians as stated in money terms (tables 8.2–8.3), prior to converting those statistics into the percentages shown here, we need not comment again on that aspect of tables 8.4–8.5. What is noteworthy about tables 8.4–8.5 is the ratio of the salary statistics, shown in columns 1–4, to the grain price average in column 5. To facilitate analysis, it will help to compute these ratios, by dividing the grain average for each year into each of the salary means and medians shown for that year. The results appear in tables 8.6 and 8.7.

The ratios of the salary means and medians to the grain price average provide us with a measure of official living standards and their changes over time. In any year when the percentage relative for the salary statistic is greater than that for the grain average, the value of the ratio is greater than one. When the opposite relationship occurs, the ratio will be less

than one. The lower the value of the ratio, the greater the economic distress it implies, and vice versa. The interpretation of the ratios must be expressed simply in terms of "more" and "less," however. The method for computation of the ratios provides no basis on which to say that any single value marks the threshold between prosperity and hardship. Still, these ratios make it possible to extend assessment of official living standards beyond the few dates for which we have actual estimates of a "living wage" to compare with the salary data.

Political Significance of Shifts in Official Living Standards

The salary-price ratios show that the economic situation of Foreign Ministry officials varied widely over time. The most important thing about these variations is that they parallel important changes in the political and intellectual history of the late nineteenth century closely enough to suggest a causal relationship. It is true that these salary statistics come from a single ministry. But the Foreign Ministry possessed exceptional importance during the *Tanzimat* as the training ground for the modernist elite. After that, Foreign Ministry salaries still had value as indicators of civil officials' fortunes—perhaps all the more value if the ministry lost its earlier preeminence. It is true, too, that statistics like those presented here cannot prove a causal link between economic and intellectual or political change. Coupled with other types of evidence, however, they suggest one.[91] If a matter of inference, this link emerges as one of this study's most important findings. To assess the link, it helps to consider the series of ratios as breaking down into three periods, one running through the 1870s, the next from 1880 through the mid-1890s, and the third from the mid-1890s on. This periodization corresponds to price movements noted in world markets, but also displays the effects of local factors.[92]

In the first period, official living standards underwent an erosion expressed in the irregular but sizable declines that occurred through 1880 in almost all series in tables 8.6 and 8.7. These declines are not surprising in terms of events of the period. Atop a price rise, lasting in world markets from the 1850s into the early 1870s, the late 1860s confronted the Ottomans not only with a short-term peak in international grain prices in

[91] For consideration of the null hypothesis that there was no connection between economic distress and political behavior in this environment, see Findley, "Economic Bases," 101 n. 58.

[92] In the midst of a long-term downward price trend that spanned the nineteenth century, its third quarter witnessed a cyclical price rise into the 1870s, followed by a further decline to depression levels in the 1890s, and then an upturn that lasted, on the world market, until 1920; Brian K. Mitchell, with collaboration of Phyllis Deane, *Abstract of British Historical Statistics*, Cambridge, 1962, 488–89; United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), *Yearbook 1921*, Washington, 1922, 146. See also Şevket Pamuk, "The Ottoman Empire in the 'Great Depression' of 1873–1896," *Journal of Economic History*, XLIV (1984), 107–18.

Table 8.6.
RATIOS OF ADJUSTED SALARY MEANS TO GRAIN PRICE AVERAGE
(computed from percentage relatives, base period 1880-1882)

YEAR	ALL RESPS. (1)	MUSLIM I (2)	MUSLIM II (3)	NON-MUSLIM (4)	YEAR	ALL RESPS. (1)	MUSLIM I (2)	MUSLIM II (3)	NON-MUSLIM (4)
1864	3.4	2.2		2.3	1887	1.5	1.3	1.7	1.6
1865	2.3	2.8		2.3	1888	1.6	1.4	1.5	1.6
1866	1.8	1.9		1.8	1889	1.4	1.2	1.4	1.5
1867	0.8	1.3		0.7	1890	1.2	1.0	1.3	1.4
1868	1.4	1.4		0.8	1891	0.9	0.8	1.0	1.0
1869	1.8	1.6		0.9	1892	1.1	0.9	1.3	1.1
1870	1.9	1.7		0.9	1893	1.3	1.1	1.3	1.6
1871	2.0	1.6	2.6	1.0	1894	1.8	1.6	1.8	2.0
1872	2.2	2.3	2.3	1.6	1895	1.6	1.5	1.7	1.8
1873	1.1	1.4	1.0	1.1	1896	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.7
1874	1.5	1.1	2.2	0.6	1897	1.4	1.3	1.2	1.6
1875	1.7	1.3	2.3	0.6	1898	1.2	1.2	1.0	1.4
1876	1.5	1.4	2.0	1.8	1899	1.3	1.3	0.9	1.6
1877	1.5	1.3	1.8	0.9	1900	1.5	1.5	1.1	1.7
1878	1.1	1.2	1.4	0.8	1901	1.7	1.8	1.2	1.7
1879	1.1	1.2	0.9	1.0	1902	1.7	1.9	1.2	1.2
1880	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.6	1903	1.6	1.8	1.1	1.3
1881	1.0	1.0	0.9	1.2	1904	1.6	2.0	1.1	1.2
1882	1.2	1.1	1.2	1.2	1905	1.5	2.2	1.0	1.2
1883	1.2	1.2	1.3	1.1	1906	1.1		0.8	0.6
1884	1.5	1.3	1.7	1.3	1907	1.0		0.7	0.4
1885	1.6	1.3	2.0	1.3	1908	0.6			0.4
1886	1.5	1.2	1.8	1.6	1909	0.8		0.5	
					1910	0.8		0.4	

1867–1868,[93] but also with the Cretan crisis of 1866–1869. Occurring as the empire slid toward bankruptcy, this crisis worsened the economic strain. In 1868, distress was so great in Istanbul that wives of officials serving in the provinces besieged the Finance Ministry in screaming mobs, demanding their husbands' salaries. The minister had to be assigned a special guard. Public security virtually ceased to exist on the outskirts of the city and declined within it.[94]

[93] Mitchell, *Abstract*, 488–49; USDA, *Yearbook 1921*, 146; Issawi, *Economic History of the Middle East*, 10; Şevket Pamuk, *Osmanlı Ekonomisi ve Dünya Kapitalizmi (1820–1913)*, Ankara, 1984, 131–36; id., *The Ottoman Empire and European Capitalism, 1820–1913: Trade, Investment and Production*, Cambridge, 1987; Quataert, "Ottoman Reform and Agriculture," 1973, 188, 389–90.

[94] Shaw and Shaw, *History*, II, 151–52; Karal, *Osmanlı Tarihi*, VII, 37; Du Velay, *Essai*, 279; specifics about officials' wives and disorder from PAAA (Bonn), Abt. A (856/3), 868, I.A.B.q 95, Brassier von Saint-Simon to Bismarck, 13 February 1868, Uebel to Bismarck, 9 July 1868 (T139, mf. roll 354 in U.S. National Archives).

Table 8.7.
RATIOS OF ADJUSTED SALARY MEDIANS TO GRAIN PRICE AVERAGE
(computed from percentage relatives, base period 1880-1882)

YEAR	ALL RESPS. (1)	MUSLIM I (2)	MUSLIM II (3)	NON-MUSLIM (4)	YEAR	ALL RESPS. (1)	MUSLIM I (2)	MUSLIM II (3)	NON-MUSLIM (4)
1869	1.5	0.8			1890	1.3	1.0	0.7	2.0
1870	2.7	0.7		2.6	1891	1.0	0.7	0.5	1.5
1871	2.6	0.7		4.8	1892	1.3	0.9	0.7	2.0
1872	1.1	0.8		5.6	1893	1.4	1.1	0.7	1.4
1873	0.9	0.6		1.0	1894	1.9	1.5	1.0	2.3
1874	0.8	0.8	0.7	0.2	1895	1.6	1.2	0.9	2.2
1875	1.0	1.0	1.4	0.2	1896	1.7	1.4	1.0	2.0
1876	1.3	1.0	2.4	1.3	1897	1.3	1.1	0.8	1.4
1877	0.9	0.9	1.3	0.2	1898	1.3	0.9	0.8	1.3
1878	0.9	0.8	1.0	0.5	1899	1.3	1.0	0.8	1.3
1879	1.0	1.0	1.1	1.0	1900	1.4	1.0	1.2	1.2
1880	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.8	1901	1.5	1.3	0.9	1.1
1881	1.0	1.0	1.2	1.2	1902	1.6	1.3	1.3	1.1
1882	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.1	1903	1.5	1.3	1.1	1.0
1883	1.1	1.1	1.3	1.0	1904	1.5	1.3	0.9	1.3
1884	1.3	1.3	1.9	1.1	1905	1.4	1.2	0.9	0.9
1885	1.4	1.4	2.1	1.6	1906	1.4	1.2	0.8	1.0
1886	1.3	1.3	1.8	1.6	1907	1.2	1.0	0.7	1.0
1887	1.4	1.3	1.7	2.0	1908	1.1	0.9	0.6	1.0
1888	1.5	1.4	0.9	2.8	1909	1.0	1.0	0.5	
1889	1.4	1.2	0.7	2.7	1910	1.1		0.6	

The years of the Cretan crisis are precisely when the protest movement of the Young Ottomans—pioneer ideologues of the modern Middle East—emerged. In attacking the *Tanzimat* leadership, the Young Ottomans exploited economic issues, among others. Almost all privileged in terms of social background, trained in the prestigious Translation Office of the Foreign Ministry, closely connected to the civil-official elite of the *Tanzimat*, the Young Ottoman leadership apparently fell short of later political activists in economic awareness. Yet they responded to massive long-term economic problems, such as foreigners' commercial privileges or the foreign debt, even if they did not take full advantage of immediate near-term grievances.[95]

[95] Findley, "Economic Bases," 83, 102; id., "Advent of Ideology," Part II, 147–55, 174; Mardin, *Genesis*, 166–68, 321–23, 354, 388; Tarık Zafer Tunaya, *Türkiyede Siyasî Partiler, 1859–1952*, Istanbul, 1952, 91–96. To cite specifics about a leading Young Ottoman, Ziya Paşa's record as a local administrator demonstrates that by the 1860s he had the socio-economic awareness of an official who strove for development through public works and law enforcement, and who struggled to restrict foreigners' exploitation of capitulatory privileges and to limit the local notables' exploitation of the populace. See Kenan Akyüz, *Ziya Paşa'nın Amasya Mutasarrıflığı Sırasındaki Olaylar*, Ankara, 1964, 3 and passim; M. Kaya Bilgegil, *Ziya Paşa Üzerinde bir Araştırma*, Erzurum, 1970, 471–80.

The 1870s brought graver troubles. The Anatolian famine of the early 1870s had limited effect on the Istanbul market because little Anatolian produce could reach the capital as yet. Even so, prices went up, 1873 marking a cyclical high on the world grain market. The first half of the 1870s was also a time of troubles for civil officialdom in the sense that instability of political leadership, following the death of Âli Paşa (1871) and the breakup of the *Tanzimat* political alignment, heightened problems such as uncertainty of tenure in office, nonpayment of salaries, and inefficiency in tax collection.[96] The second half of the 1870s was one of the lowest points of the entire century for the Ottomans, a fact evidenced in the government bankruptcy and the Russo-Turkish War, which brought the Russian army to the outskirts of Istanbul, flooded the city with refugees, and left the government saddled with a huge indemnity. One result was the reissue of paper money from 1876 through 1883—the only time, other than 1863, during the period for which we have salary statistics, when paper money circulated. The paper money soon sank as low as 1,300 kuruş to the gold lira.[97] Major domestic political phenomena of these years included the continued activity of the Young Ottoman opposition movement until Abd ül-Hamid (1876–1909) neutralized its leaders, the broader phenomenon of the first Ottoman constitutional movement, the deposition of two sultans in 1876, and the brief period of constitutional rule (1876–1878).[98]

In the 1880s, while the salary medians remained rather level (figure 8.2), the downward trend in prices, characteristic of the nineteenth century in general, reappeared, opening a new period in the evolution of official living standards. In the Istanbul grain price average, this downward trend lasted through 1894. Examination of the salary statistics has already implied that these years were economically exceptional; now the price decline emerges as a major distinctive trait. The period 1880–1894 includes only one short-term peak in the grain price average, in 1891. This resulted from crop failure in Russia and a consequent surge in exports.[99] For officials, and the state in general, the effects of this price decline appear beneficial. To explain how this could have been so for officials whose incomes came out of the tax receipts of a state with a primarily agricultural economy evidently requires noting a contemporary railroad-related expansion in Ottoman agriculture, large enough to benefit the Ottomans but not to lower prices further on world markets.[100]

[96] Shaw and Shaw, *History*, II, 156; Du Velay, *Essai*, 316–461; Davison, *Reform*, 301–10; AAE, Turquie 390, 24 October 1871, Vogüé to Rémusat; Turquie 391, 9 January 1872, id. to id.; Turquie 391, 17 March 1872, id. to id., Turquie 404, 17 May 1876, from Bourgoing.

[97] Shaw and Shaw, *History*, II, 182ff., 221ff.; Du Velay, *Essai*, 354–57; Issawi, *Economic History of Turkey*, 326–29, 361–65; Karpat, *Ottoman Population*, 28–30, 68, 70–77, 103; Michael R. Milgrim, "An Overlooked Problem in Turkish-Russian Relations: The 1878 War Indemnity," *IJMES*, IX (1978), 519–37.

[98] Davison, *Reform*, 270–408; Mardin, *Genesis*, 62–80; Shaw and Shaw, *History*, II, 152–91.

[99] European and U.S. grain prices showed small rises at the time. Quataert, "Ottoman Reform and Agriculture," 21–23, 211–12; Mitchell, *Abstract*, 489; USDA, *Yearbook 1921*, 146.

But for the temporary price surge in 1891, the ratios in tables 8.6 and 8.7 generally indicate a marked improvement in official living standards during this period. In most series, the ratios based on both the means and the medians doubled from 1880 to 1894.[101] The chief exceptions appear in the ratios based on the median for the modernist Muslims (table 8.7, column 3), which barely increased at all, although the ratio based on the mean doubled, and in both ratios for the non-Muslims, which tripled rather than doubled.

Interpretation of these anomalies is a matter of speculation and requires remembering that the salary relatives, from which the ratios have been computed, obscure differences in the absolute amounts of the different personnel categories' salaries. In money terms, the modernist Muslims generally had the highest salaries, except that the median salaries for non-Muslims serving in Istanbul were consistently higher than theirs from 1888 through 1896. It is not clear why this was so. The exceptional increase in the ratios for the non-Muslims has to be weighed against the fact that this group's official role was in decline. Some of the apparent increase may be attributable to the non-Muslims' having suffered especially, as the evidence in tables 8.2 and 8.3 indicates, from the economic difficulties of the 1870s. Whatever they regained between 1880 and 1894, they more than lost thereafter, as we shall see below.

In any case, what is clear about the ratios for 1880–1894 is the general improvement of living standards. While officials continued during this period to suffer from salary irregularities, documentary sources offer tacit evidence of this improvement through the absence of reports of distress like that of the 1860s or 1870s. Another way to express the significance for officials of the price decline is to return to the grain price average (table 8.5, column 5). Its fluctuations suggest that the official who needed a nominal salary of 1,000 kuruş to support his family in 1894 would have needed one-and-a-half to two times as much in the 1870s or after 1900.

[100] Quataert, "Ottoman Reform and Agriculture," 15–17, 189–91, 352–54; id., "Limited Revolution: The Impact of the Anatolian Railway on Turkish Transportation and the Provisioning of Istanbul, 1890–1908," *Business History Review*, LI (1977), 151, 154–58; id., "Economic Climate," D1157; id., "Agricultural Trends and Government Policy in Ottoman Anatolia, 1800–1914," *Asian and African Studies*, XV (1981), 83; Issawi, *Economic History of Turkey*, 353–55; id., *Economic History of the Middle East*, 105; Pamuk, "The Ottoman Empire in the 'Great Depression,' " 111–16; Findley, "Economic Bases," 99.

[101] One objection to use of a price indicator based on grains is that grain prices fell faster than those of other commodities during the price decline extending into the 1890s; see Boratav et al., "Ottoman Wages," 384. The change in our ratios is, however, great enough to leave room for improved living standards, even if the ratios could be recomputed with a broader-based price indicator showing a smaller price decline.

The median salaries of Foreign Ministry officials serving in Istanbul generally exceeded the needed sum in the 1890s, but fell short during the 1870s or after 1900 (see table 8.3, column 1).

After 1894, prices turned up again. For the remaining years that it covers, the rise in the grain price average reflects a phenomenon common to this and other markets. The price high of the late 1890s coincided with crop failure in Anatolia, the Greco-Turkish War of 1897, and the Armenian crisis of the same period. Thereafter, the high of 1907–1909 signaled an unusual combination of woes—international financial crisis, domestic and international crop failure, exceptionally widespread distress—that provided the economic backdrop for the Young Turk revolution of 1908.[102] Finally, war-induced inflation raised the cost of living by a factor of more than twenty between 1914 and 1920.[103]

While the series of salary-price ratios shown in tables 8.6 and 8.7 do not extend as late as World War I, both types of ratios reflect this worsening of conditions after 1894. In most series, the ratios declined between 1894 and 1908 by something like half or more, with the declines generally accelerating just before the revolution. For the non-Muslims, whose ratios displayed an exceptionally large increase in the period 1880–1894, the ratios based on both means and medians fell between 1894 and 1908 by well over half. The only personnel category to buck the general trend was that of traditionalist Muslims, for whom the ratio based on the means increased, although their ratio based on the medians fell. Comparison of the two ratios for the traditionalist Muslims suggests a growth of economic elitism in this sector of civil officialdom in the later Hamidian years, as noted earlier. The idea that some of the Muslim officials with little or no western education achieved relatively higher salaries in the later Hamidian years implicitly fits the Islamic emphases of this reign and suggests some of the tensions that may have existed between this generally least-favored branch of the Foreign Ministry staff and the other two.

Just as the deterioration of living standards in the 1860s and 1870s coincided with the emergence of the Young Ottoman protest movement, the deterioration of the 1890s and later coincided with the resurgence of political opposition in the Young Turk movement, the beginnings of which

[102] Quataert, "Economic Climate"; id., "The 1908 Young Turk Revolution"; Pamuk, "The Ottoman Empire in the 'Great Depression,' " 115; Findley, "Economic Bases," 98. There I advance the comparative argument that much the same problems, felt in other countries, helped provoke others of the wave of revolutions and disturbances that swept Asia and the colonial world in the years just before World War I. See also Anon., "Türkei. Handelsverkehr in den Jahren 1895 und 1896," *Deutsches Handelsarchiv*, 1897 (II?), 121–22 on economic consequences of Ottoman-Armenian troubles; Biliotti, *La banque impériale ottomane*, 201–203.

[103] Ahmed Emin [Yalman], *Turkey*, 151; Toprak, *"Millî İktisat,"* 331.

date to 1889.[104] While the Young Turks regarded themselves as heirs to the Young Ottomans, this time the movement was broader in scope, and its leadership more sophisticated in ideas and methods. In the economic arena, this sophistication expressed itself in the ability to exploit specific crisis conditions, in addition to attacking general problems. No doubt, the progressive broadening of political mobilization helped shape this capability.[105] The Young Turk leadership, for example, emerged as much or more from the military as from civil officialdom and was more likely to include people of humble social background than the Young Ottomans had been. Irregular salary payments were as great a problem for the military as for civil officials; moreover, the military had learned how to use threats and force to exact their rights.[106] In a broader sense, too, the Young Turks excelled the Young Ottomans in ability to mobilize other sectors of Ottoman society—nongovernmental elites, members of the non-Muslim communities, and workers. The connections between Young Turk activists and these groups are not equally well established. In the case of workers, to cite a less-known example especially significant for political mobilization, Young Turk activists had forged alliances with worker groups before revolution broke out in 1908 and had taken an active role in agitating workers who had suffered from the current economic crisis and the larger underlying problems of tightening integration into the world economy.[107]

Comparing the three periods in the evolution of late nineteenth-century official living standards, we thus find a noteworthy parallelism between living standards and levels of political activism. In the 1860s and 1870s, widespread economic distress coincided with the Young Ottomans' emergence out of the civil official elite. From roughly 1880 through 1894, improvements in living standards for civil officials and—to judge from the evidence on agriculture—some other sectors of society coincided with rel-

[104] Şerif Mardin, "Libertarian Movements," 169–82; id., *Jön Türkler*; Tarık Zafer Tunaya, *Türkiye'de Siyasal Partiler*, I: *İkinci Meşrutiyet Dönemi, 1908–1918*, Istanbul, 1984; Hanioğlu, *Jön Türklük*; E. E. Ramsaur, *The Young Turks: Prelude to the Revolution of 1908*, Princeton, 1957.

[105] Findley, "Advent of Ideology," Part II, 162–65.

[106] Said Paşa, *Hâtırat*, II, 103–105 (on the military's use of force and threats to get their salaries paid, 1901); 113–20 (general salary problems, 1899–1901, mentioning [115] that military and police salaries at Salonica were twenty-five to thirty months behind, and that troops rotating home from the Hicaz had threatened to sack the bazaar at Beirut if their salaries—[116] unpaid for five years—were not settled). By 1908, the sultan faced widespread strikes and mutinies among his troops; Lewis, *Emergence*, 207.

[107] Donald Quataert, "Machine Breaking and the Changing Carpet Industry of Western Anatolia, 1860–1908," *Journal of Social History*, XIX (1985–1986), 473–89; id., "Economic Climate"; id., "The 1908 Young Turk Revolution"; id., *Social Disintegration and Popular Resistance*, chaps. 4, 5; Findley, "Economic Bases," 102 n. 62, and works cited there by Paul Dumont on Ottoman socialists; cf. also Tunaya, *Siyasal Partiler*, I, 247–62. The growth of a positive interest in entrepreneurship among Turks is another important development of the Young Turk years: Toprak, *"Millî İktisat,"* passim.

ative political quiescence. Abd ül-Hamid's success during these years in consolidating his regime must have depended as much on improving economic conditions as on his intelligence or power. But the past was not forgotten. The Society of Union and Progress (1889) formed before economic conditions deteriorated anew. But the Young Turks' triumph came only after economic conditions had again worsened to the point of agricultural and financial crisis.

In sum, the later empire's two great episodes of ideological and, in the later case, revolutionary ferment appear to have had economic bases that scholars have not yet fully recognized. In between, the last great flourish of Ottoman sultanism evidently owed part of its success to a temporary respite, if it was no more than that, in the empire's general economic decline. In the case of the civil official intelligentsia and, at times, other sectors of society, economic conditions thus varied over time in ways that indicate a clearly intelligible relationship to the rise and fall of political activism.

SYSTEMIC CORRUPTION, COMPENSATION INEQUITY, REVOLUTIONARY FERMENT

To return to the point with which this chapter began, if the ability of a government to get good service from its officials depends on its rewarding such service, punishing those who violate its standards, and maintaining a clear difference between reward and punishment, then the compensation system was surely the greatest internal weakness in the Ottoman civil administrative mechanism. To the extent that finance was the greatest weakness of Ottoman government in general, this observation is not a surprising one. Yet its practical meanings go beyond the obvious. They begin with the unexpected range of malfunctions that plagued the compensation system. Particularly as manipulated under Abd ül-Hamid, these again transformed corruption from an individual failing into a systemic disorder of the entire administrative system. The fact that systemic corruption was still a reality of official life after a century of reform marks one of the greatest failures of the reform movement.

Among civil officials, while a few benefited from the inequity of existing conditions, and while officials still formed an economic elite compared to the rest of society, reward and punishment were not effectively differentiated in general; and minorities tended to suffer added difficulty. The non-Muslims, the minorities most visible in the sources analyzed here, experienced not only the pervasive problems of the compensation system, but also salary inequities and a greater vulnerability to directly or indirectly punitive incidents. These problems reflect the limits and the decline of the *Tanzimat* concept of egalitarianism; the simultaneous improvement in traditionalist Muslims' salaries should probably be understood as a concomitant of this decline. Again, as surmised in earlier chapters, fuller documentation from the Young Turk period would probably show that non-Muslims were not the last minority officials to face growing insecurity as feelings about egalitarianism continued to evolve.

All the while, as the relative economic fortunes of groups within civil officialdom shifted, the living standards of officials in general fluctuated in ways that possessed a larger significance. Conclusive proof of a causal link between economic conditions and political action would require further research, different in kind from the primarily statistical argument presented here. Yet changes in the living standards of civil officials, from whom many of the intellectual and political activists emerged, suggest that the Young Ottoman and Young Turk movements, which scholars have so far explained primarily in political and intellectual terms, also had economic roots. So did Abd ül-Hamid's seeming triumph over the opposition during the first half of his reign. Just as problems of reward and punishment critically affected the personal and professional lives of civil officials, the broad economic trends that caused shifts in official living standards thus appear to have had a part in producing one of the most significant changes of the entire reform era—the transformation of the political process, pointedly expressed in the emergence of the empire's ideologues and revolutionaries.

C H A P T E R I X

Conclusion: A Gallery of Portraits in Retrospect

As noted at the beginning of chapter 1, almost the only studies of administration that arouse a popular response are ones that satirize its negative dimensions. The story of Ottoman administration provides much material for such presentation. Yet studying the social history of Ottoman civil officials also inspires empathy with them, as well as appreciation for the efforts that many of them made to improve administration. Perhaps a retrospective look, guided by this spirit of empathy, at some of the groups and individuals portrayed in preceding chapters will provide the best way to arrive at a judicious assessment of the development of civil officialdom during the reform era.

From the overview of the late scribal service, presented in chapter 2, several images come to mind. One is the imaginary apprentice with his dream of a brilliant future. Evidently shared by many young Ottomans, his dream epitomizes many features of scribal careers as then known. Traits of the guild tradition, and of the organizational pattern of the patrimonial household, appear both in the recruitment of future scribes as young boys, whose fathers or guardians presented them in the offices fresh from the Qur'ânic elementary school, and in the boys' training on the job as apprentices to older officials. The idea of learning the scribal craft by watching and serving a master virtually as a servant evokes not only the milieu of the guilds, but also the mystics' concept of knowledge and of the master-disciple relationship. Indeed, the scribal *adab*-tradition—with its many script styles, document genres, stylistic conventions, and artificial language, not to speak of its more advanced literary and scholarly pursuits—had evolved to an intricacy that contrasted strangely

with the rudimentary means available for educating young men in the tradition.

The most prominent motif of the dream account is the *cursus honorum* the apprentice imagined ascending. Other motifs, less prominent in the vision, may have been equally so in real life. One consists of prebendal compensation systems, starting with a tiny share of the office fees. Another is the sense of duty characteristic of such an official milieu. The apprentice's fear of losing his position for any misdeed expresses this sense of duty, as does the account's concluding emphasis on the officials' fidelity to the sultan. One important motif is conspicuous by its absence. This is the factionalism of high office—a danger from which mere clerks were, however, relatively shielded.

The treacherous world of the highest scribal dignitaries appears with archetypal clarity in the last years of Pertev Paşa, a man almost old enough to have been an apprentice when the dream account was written. Pertev's rise and fall epitomize the power and opulence of high office. But they also express its politicization and the actualization of the hazards of official slavery for those who came face to face with the sultan. More a place for scheming than dreaming, the high officials' world was one of intensely personalized loyalties and rivalries. What mattered there was not so much policies or principles. What mattered was to have the largest possible, and best-placed, network of protégés whose loyalty and support could be relied on in an unremitting struggle for the sultan's favor, the source from which all power and honor flowed. With his son-in-law Vassaf a key man in the palace secretariat and his brother Emin in military supply, and with several protégés in the fledgling diplomatic elite, Pertev had been the most successful scribal figure of his day in faction-building. No doubt, his dervish connections had also helped him consolidate his position. At their outer edges, his and Âkif's networks also had ties to Phenariot Greeks and even to European envoys; the shadowy way the Phenariots appear in the background of the story gives a good feel for their marginality to the scribal service, important though their role as translators had become.

There was little Âkif's frantic efforts could avail him against such a combination until he formed links with the most important faction among the military, Husrev Paşa's, and they tricked Pertev, it seems, into expressing views on military questions that antagonized Mahmud II. This turn of events suggests that policy issues and interservice rivalries, always present to some degree, were growing in significance. Another "modern" trait of the Âkif-Pertev rivalry was the impetus it appears to have imparted to the development of civil official personnel policy. What made the Âkif-Pertev rivalry a turning point was, however, its ghastliness as an example of a type of factional intrigue that was all too familiar, especially to

younger officials who had learned how different things were for their counterparts in England, France, Prussia, and Austria.

To illustrate conditions of 1908 or after, we could hold up many images. Perhaps the best way to sum up conditions then is to start with the Foreign Ministry personnel records and synthesize from them portraits of each of the three types of officials compared in the analysis of these records. One of the three portraits must, then, be of a traditionalist Muslim official, perhaps a grandson or great-grandson of the apprentice dreamer of 1790. We may call him İbrahim Efendi.

Our hypothetical İbrahim Efendi was the son of a government clerk and had grown up within walking distance of the Sublime Porte. He had attended the neighborhood Qur'ânic elementary school and the *rüşdiye*, following which he spent a year or so in one of the schools for civil officials, before becoming an apprentice in the Turkish Correspondence Office of the Foreign Ministry. Thereafter, he attended lectures on religious subjects at the Beyazid Mosque in the mornings, following which he would walk through the Covered Bazaar to the Sublime Porte around midday. As a boy, he had spent a good bit of time reading Arabic religious texts and some Persian poetry with his father and grandfather. They had introduced him as an adolescent to the Mevlevî dervish order, where he first met many influential officials. Following apprenticeship, he had some private lessons in French from an official in another office, but never learned enough to use it professionally. His mastery of the Ottoman official style and office procedure advanced swiftly, however, partly because he learned so much about them from his father.

As an apprentice, the young man had thoughts of a brilliant future; but time disclosed that he was headed for a stable career, not unlike his father's. Things might have been different had he moved into local administration. But he was not eager to leave Istanbul or to live among strangers, especially non-Muslims. His father-in-law, a department head in the Ministry of Finance, and a well-known figure in Mevlevî circles of the capital, might also be able to help his career, if he stayed close to home. Perhaps it would be more rewarding to stay where he was, and move up gradually to examining clerk, head clerk, and perhaps director of the office. Time also gave İbrahim Efendi pride in his mastery of the many skills his work required. Much of the work was dull and repetitive; but mystical and literary conversations helped enliven the day, and people were always coming into the office to talk. Occasionally, he could pick up a few kuruş from someone needing help with a petition. With time, his accumulated knowledge of the office's precedents made him increasingly valuable, he could tell, to his superiors, who often called on him to find documents or inform them about events that had occurred before their time in the office.

As the years passed, İbrahim Efendi concluded that he would have to continue working as long as he could, even though it often seemed all he could do just to get to the office. The outlook for a retired pensioner was too uncertain. In reward for fifty year's service, he was raised to the first rank, second class—only three ranks below that of vezir, which only the minister and some of the ambassadors held in this ministry, and he was given the Mecidiye Order third class. His salary was still not regularly paid; but petition-writing, the rent from a small house he owned, and a share from a pious foundation whose trusteeship was in the family all helped. He had been aware of the political activities of the Young Ottomans and later the Young Turks. Among the former, he admired some of the verses of Namık Kemal and still more of Ziya Paşa, his being closer to traditional forms. By the Young Turk period, it was the prominent Islamic activist and intellectual, Mehmed Âkif, who most impressed him. What gave meaning to İbrahim Efendi's life was being a Muslim and a servant of the sultan—a political identity that he feared the Young Turk agitators might shatter. His greatest regret in life had been the deaths of two small sons, but now he had two sons-in-law, who were officials like himself. His greatest remaining ambition was to go on the pilgrimage, preferably in a year when an official he knew was in charge.

Down the hall from İbrahim Efendi's Turkish Correspondence Office was the Foreign Correspondence Office—a very different place. There, the work, and much of the conversation, was in French, and many of the officials were non-Muslims, especially Armenians. Combining the names of two real-life examples, we can imagine a young man named Ohannes Papasian, who began his career in this office. This fictional Ohannes Efendi was the son of a money changer (*sarraf*) and was the first of his family to enter civil officialdom. His father had urged him to do so, thinking that it might serve the family's interests to take advantage of this possibility. Ohannes Efendi had begun his education at Armenian schools in Istanbul, then continued it at others in Paris, where he had an uncle in trade. Having taken the trouble on returning to Istanbul to study Arabic and Persian for a time with private tutors, he was better in Ottoman Turkish than many non-Muslims, especially the Greeks he encountered. But he was better yet in Armenian and French. As during his school days in Paris, he would still try his hand at versification in French, and sometimes submit the results to provincial literary reviews in France. All of this had made him a good fit as an apprentice official and young clerk in the Foreign Correspondence Office. In 1884, he transferred to the Foreign Press Office on the recommendation of the director, a family friend, whose daughter he was about to marry. The work of monitoring the local non-Turkish-language press and following coverage of Ottoman affairs in European publications gave him an ideal chance to keep track of some of his

favorite reviews and papers. From the press office, he went on to a series of minor consular and embassy staff posts. These proved not to be the dead end he feared; for in 1900 he was lucky enough to land a position as secretary of legation at The Hague under Yusuf Misak, one of the ministry's most successful Armenian diplomats and a friend of his relatives in Paris.

Remaining there until Misakian's departure in 1913, Ohannes Efendi pondered from afar the decline of Ottoman-Armenian relations, the dwindling role of non-Muslims in official circles, and the growing influence of Turkish nationalism on government policy. Though deeply pleased by the restoration of the constitution in 1908, he had generally not been much interested in politics himself. If he had, he would not have been able to work for the government as long as he had, especially not as a diplomat. But as time for retirement approached, he was increasingly unsure whether to go back to Istanbul, where most of his relatives lived, or to Paris, scene of many youthful memories, where his son had joined his cousins in business and he himself had acquired a meager income by sending them what he could from his irregularly paid salary to invest.

Not far from either the Turkish or the Foreign Correspondence Office at the Sublime Porte was the Translation Office. It is not hard to imagine a smart young Ottoman named Tevfik Bey, who began his career there in the very years that Mizancı Murad's satirical account refers to. Reading the famous novel, Tevfik Bey would later admit that there was much truth to the picture. What had bothered him more at the time was that the office no longer seemed as sure a launching point for an ambitious man's career as he had been led to expect.

Son of a family that had produced many successful middle- and upper-level officials, Tevfik Bey had studied at the neighborhood Qur'ânic school—an unpleasant memory that colored his opinion of everything to do with the *ulema*—then at *rüşdiye*s in several provinces where his father was serving, and for a time at a French school in Izmir. What he was most proud of, however, was being a graduate of the Galatasaray Lycée. Following his graduation, his father had taken him to see the head of the Civil Officials Commission, an old friend. The latter had promised to help young Tevfik get something in Istanbul until a suitable embassy post would open, and appointment as an apprentice in the Translation Office had followed only a few months later. To his surprise, Tevfik found himself vegetating in the Translation Office for three boring years—a chance, at least, to size up some of his competition. During this time, his family arranged a brilliant marriage for him with the daughter of an ambassador, into whose household he moved. There he met a number of other prominent diplomats. It was no surprise a year later when one of them, about

to leave for a European embassy, got Tevfik assigned as his second secretary.

For Tevfik, it was a long-awaited opportunity to see what he had often dreamed of as the centers of progress and civilization, although he left less eagerly than he would have before he had a wife and newborn daughter to leave behind. He could only hope for a chance to smuggle them out. Meanwhile, his influential father-in-law would watch over both his wife and his career in Istanbul, keeping the wheels turning to see that the appointment board—and the palace—never lost sight of him. The result over a period of years was a series of embassy staff positions, interspersed with family visits in Istanbul. Despite the hardship of getting along with some of his colleagues and stretching every salary payment as if it would be the last, Tevfik greatly enjoyed his years in Europe, attending university classes when he could, especially in useful fields like international and administrative law, and profiting from the intellectual freedom in general. He felt that his years at Galatasaray had given him just the preparation he needed to function on a par with his European colleagues, and he was proud of his savoir faire as a diplomat. Then at the age of forty-five, Tevfik returned to Istanbul to take up a senior position in the Office of Legal Counsel. There was talk of making him undersecretary of the ministry, if the perennial incumbent of that position, Artin Dadian Paşa, would only retire. Glad to be reunited with his family, Tevfik Bey was also not past imagining himself as another of the Tevfik Paşas of the Foreign Ministry.

The Young Turk revolution interrupted these reveries, appearing at first to Tevfik Bey, a modern man well acquainted with the outside world, like the true dawn of a new age. As months passed, his mind was divided between optimistic thoughts—including the feeling that his much-admired superior, İbrahim Hakkî Paşa, might soon become grand vezir, which would not be a bad thing for him—and anxieties about the move to purge the bureaucracy. One could never know where something like that might lead, especially given the dire need to reduce government payrolls. Tevfik Bey took some comfort, however, from the way he had always used his diplomatic skills to maintain distance between himself and the palace. Others in high station had not had the foresight to do this; they had had their rewards while the palace regime lasted. Once some well-known palace agents had been forced into retirement or exile, it was easy to see, in a time of recurrent diplomatic crises, that there would be a real need for well-qualified professionals like Tevfik Bey in the major embassies and even the foreign minister's office. The same factors might help launch the career of his son, who would soon graduate from Galatasaray. The boy's talk of going into business impressed Tevfik Bey as a newfangled idea, though perhaps people were right to argue that more Turks needed to do

this. Anyway, the boy should probably try the new university for a while after Galatasaray, and that would give more time to think things over.

Between 1790, the date more or less of the apprentice's dream, and the hopes for the future that the 1908 revolution kindled, greater changes had occurred than Tevfik, Ohannes, or İbrahim could realize. The possibility of serving with a resident embassy staff in Europe evokes the growth in the formal apparatus of government and in its range of functions. The fact that the worst fates awaiting most of Abd ül-Hamid's minions were retirement or exile, with a certain amount of vilification in the newly freed press, symbolizes the security that the new personnel policy had introduced. Gone with the gowns and turbans of old were the fates that had awaited Vassaf and Pertev, although Abd ül-Hamid had seemed bent at times on turning back the clock. The change in the social fabric of officialdom had been especially great. The numbers of officials had increased many times over. Recruitment had broadened in a variety of senses, one being the egalitarian policy that had been introduced at mid-century and had since gone through several metamorphoses. Educational reform and cultural change had produced dramatic effects. Most of them—such as the growth of literacy, or the improvements in professional training through institutions like the School of Civil Administration—were beneficial, although cultural conflict had also intensified to a disturbing degree. As government acquired new functions, new role concepts, going beyond the old paper-shuffling routines of the scribal service, had begun to emerge. New appointment-making procedures that were supposed to identify the best-qualified person for each position had begun to make their effects felt tentatively. The compensation system, too, had been almost completely transformed, with the old prebendal systems that had formerly deflected much of the officials' time and attention into fee-collection and the like now replaced—in concept—by the salary system and its ancillaries, such as the unemployment stipends and retirement pensions.

Much of what had been done was useful and desirable from any point of view. Still more was useful or desirable in potential. The fact remains, however, that many of the reforms were only partially successful, that the record of reforming sultans and statesmen—though far better than nineteenth-century Europeans were prepared to acknowledge—was no more than moderately good. It is too facile to say—as is often done—that the empire was doomed as a multinational empire, and thus in a sense exempt Ottoman reformers from critical evaluation by implying that their efforts would have succeeded, and the empire would have emerged as a viable modern state, but for its multi-ethnic character. By some indicators, it seems quite clear that the Ottoman governmental system would still have been doomed, or at least inefficient in holding its own in a competitive world environment, even had it not been vulnerable to the divisive force of separatist nationalism.

In part, the problems did result from the impact of European expansionism on the Ottomans, even prior to the nineteenth century. The weakening of the empire through the evolution of the capitulatory system, even before the dawn of the nineteenth-century free trade era, illustrates this point. But even here, the Ottomans were at fault for clinging too long to old economic attitudes and being strangely slow to realize what was happening to them. The Ottomans' problems grew to a large degree out of their past and their slowness in realizing how much effort it would take to hold their own in a rapidly changing world.

This interpretation proves applicable to most of the fields of reform that we have surveyed. In education, for example, we have noted that the result of reform was remarkable growth—between starting and ending levels that were both sadly low, not just by European, but even by some Asian standards. In the simplification of the literary language and the opening up of communications, the record is again mixed, with much of the progress of the century offset by the censorship of the Hamidian era and the simultaneous turn back toward linguistic obscurantism in official communications and some literary schools. The problem of cultural dualism hardly did anything but worsen during the nineteenth century, although this is one case where any different outcome may have been unimaginable in the short run.

Among officials, while conscientious and hard-working men were always to be found in government offices, the panics that necessitated their exertions seem to have grown as much out of the procedural complexities and inefficiencies of the administrative system as out of the crises of approaching imperial dissolution. Other governments have their emergencies, to be sure; but a sudden rush to catch up accounts fifteen years past due, to recall one of Aşçı Dede's experiences, suggests disorder by any standard of comparison. However laudable the new sense of professionalism that appeared during the Young Turk years in the journal *Mülkiye*, the empire still did not have enough such men to set the tone of administration, even after more than a century of efforts to form new civil and military cadres. The self-congratulatory elitism of the *Mülkiye* graduates—while understandable from the convergence of Ottoman tradition and contemporary European ideas—was in any case of doubtful value in the Ottoman situation of the time. Further, while creating the regulations and organizations required to place appointment-making on a basis of impersonal regularity, so that the best-qualified, rather than the best-connected, could be chosen, Abd ül-Hamid unmistakably set the example for manipulating these systems as tools of personal arbitrariness, patrimonialism, and favoritism. The officials, faced with the need to return

to Istanbul and use influence to get the system to process their appointments, obviously understood this example. By turning the administration into a patronage machine of grossly inflated scale, moreover, Abd ül-Hamid undercut his own efforts at rationalization, incidentally creating vast and needless problems for those who later faced the task of purging the ranks.

Finance discloses the folly—or perverted logic—of the patronage policy more than any other field. We have noted that the government failed or was unable to maintain the distinction between reward and punishment for its official servants. Given that fact, for the government to increase the number of civil officials to several times as many as could be usefully employed was a strange proceeding indeed, made intelligible only by the paranoid sultan's zeal for self-preservation and his readiness even to reassert pressures for systemic corruption in an effort to tighten his control. Nothing did more to undercut all efforts at administrative revitalization than reviving, rather than eliminating, systemic corruption, the effects of which in undermining administrative effectiveness and alienating the subject peoples had become quite clear by the eighteenth century. To the extent that the official intelligentsia's economic hardships fostered political radicalization and were of Abd ül-Hamid's making, his financial manipulations backfired on him by helping bring on the 1908 revolution. Thereafter, despite renewed effort, neither time nor opportunity sufficed to right things before the empire fell.

The administrative mechanism and trained personnel that the Ottoman government left for its republican successor were major resources, whose value becomes clear in any comparison between the record of the Turkish republic and those of other states that have had to launch their national lives without comparable assets. Along with these resources, however, came long-standing problems—procedural over-elaboration, fear of responsibility, elitism, lack of a strong public-service orientation, and a history of extreme incapacity in fiscal administration, to name only a few. Future generations would still have to contend with these problems, ironic legacies though some of them were for a new order in which sovereignty officially belonged to the people.

The time for new heroes had come. But individual heroics, of even the grandest kind, would not suffice to resolve all the problems that lurked, amid the achievements, in the Ottoman legacy of governmental reform.

A P P E N D I X A

The Foreign Ministry Personnel Records: Sources, Methods, and Problems of Analysis

SOURCES AND METHODS OF DATA COLLECTION

Created about 1877, the personnel records system had by 1879 acquired a method of operation that assumed "two classes" of officials: a first class of high officials whose appointments required an imperial decree, and a second class whose appointments might or might not require an imperial decree, some of these appointments still being at the discretion of officials such as ministers or provincial governors.[1] The instructions of 1879 that first described these two classes had difficulty defining which officials belonged to the first. Considering how appointments were made later in the reign of Abd ül-Hamid, the real distinction would appear to be that the first-class officials' appointments not only required the sultan's decree but were matters of personal importance to him, often decided on his own initiative, whereas the sultan was willing to leave nomination of candidates for second-class positions to nominating boards or, in the humblest cases, to the discretion of responsible superiors.[2]

This distinction of two classes of officials affected the way the personnel records took shape. The first-class officials' records were to be recorded in the "general register" of the personnel records commission, while the second-class officials' records were to be entered first in the "special register" of the ministry in which they served and only later in the general register.

[1] *Düstur*[1], IV, 63–66, instructions to Civil Personnel Records Commission, 10 RA 1296/1879, art. 2.

[2] Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform*, 267–68.

During 1967 and 1971, I did research in the two collections of personnel records accessible to scholars in the Istanbul archives. One of these is in the Foreign Ministry Archives and consists, not of registers, but of envelopes, each containing the original documents on one official. The index of the collection listed 771 envelopes; in fact, 15 were missing. The other collection, in the Prime Ministers' Archives, was called the Interior Ministry collection but was in fact the "general registers" of the entire system. This collection consists of 196 huge registers, reportedly containing 92,137 biographies. Even the index of the collection fills 17 volumes, with each individual listed alphabetically under his name plus his father's name—a system that makes it difficult to find specific individuals and impossible to locate officials by other criteria, such as the agency in which they served.[3] The neat entries in the "general registers" appear to be transcriptions of the rougher material in the envelopes from the Foreign Ministry (and other ministries as well, presumably). The files in the two collections are thus identical in content and arrangement, although it is seldom possible to locate the same individual in both collections.

Cursory inspection revealed the potential of these records for collective analysis. There was even a thrill of discovery in finding the documentation underlying the individual entries in most of the biographical compendia on the period and realizing that it had never been collectively analyzed. The problem was how to carry out such a project.

For a foreign scholar working alone under existing conditions of access, even the Foreign Ministry collection was a large objective to take on in any limited amount of time. The archival research day did not exceed seven hours. Microfilming and photocopying were too restricted to be of any real help with either collection. Without a team of collaborators and all the problems collaboration would create, a large-scale study of the Interior Ministry records was out of the question, unless a meaningful set of manageable size could be isolated; even to do this would be a cumbersome undertaking, as the registers and indexes had to be called in from a remote repository one or two at a time.

Isolating a meaningful set of cases to work on was a problem with either collection, for the Foreign Ministry set proved to be incomplete: just as might be supposed from the regulations, almost none of the high-ranking officials associated with the ministry turned up in its personnel files.

It took time and experimentation to find some of these things out. I did not even find the regulations explaining the relationship between the two sets of records until after my first research trip. The result was a slowly evolved research strategy aimed at recovering all career officials of the Foreign Ministry. The qualification "career officials" is a critical one; for

[3] Çetin, *Başbakanlık*, 46–47.

a great percentage of the personnel files contain only one or two appointments and so are almost useless for analysis of career patterns. The personnel records contain no explanation of this anomaly, and I could not understand it until I had learned from other sources how Abd ül-Hamid used patronage as a way to force potential political activists into official positions where he thought he could control them, as his ancestors controlled the slave officials of yore.[4]

Confronting the extreme brevity of so many personnel files, I decided to collect all recoverable files on Foreign Ministry officials whose recorded service spanned at least fifteen solar years—a limit arbitrarily chosen to separate careerists from noncareerists. Discovering as my research progressed that many Foreign Ministry officials of high rank were absent from the archives of that ministry but could often be found in the so-called Interior Ministry collection, I decided also to collect all such cases as I could identify. I was aided in this effort by the fact that the first volume of the Interior Ministry collection had "first-class" (*sınıf-ı evvel*) written on the flyleaf. The registers through number 4 conformed to this description, with a qualitative change occurring in the fifth, after which the officials of high rank appeared to be scattered. I was able to find a number of men associated with the Foreign Ministry in the first four volumes. I then tried using the indexes of the collection to locate comparable figures in later volumes, but could locate only a few with distinctive names. Among the high-ranking officials in the Interior Ministry collection, there was the problem, too, that some were ministerial types who held high office in many agencies. It became a matter of judgment whether or not to identify them with the Foreign Ministry. I would cast my net rather widely, although I was concerned not to weigh down my study of Foreign Ministry officials with high-rankers who had little to do with the ministry.

Experts on research design may find this approach inelegant and question why I did not use a systematic sample. In fact, my first approach, in my dissertation research, was to take a random sample from the Foreign Ministry records. But those records were too few, once noncareerists were weeded out, to yield a sample of worthwhile size. There was also no discernible way to define a systematic sampling technique that could draw in the high-ranking Foreign Ministry officials found only in the Interior Ministry collection. And that collection as a whole was too voluminous to make it feasible to identify a population of careerists from which to take a sample.

I accordingly opted for an attempt to collect the entire professional staff of the one most accessible ministry. In the technical language of research design, this means that the statistics in the tables pertain to an entire

[4] Cf. Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform*, 234–39, 270–76.

population (all career officials of the Ottoman Foreign Ministry), not a mere sample of that population. Thus, there is no need to question the significance (in the statistical sense of that term) of those figures. Alert readers will of course still question the "significance," in a nontechnical sense, of any group of a few hundred officials, if they are taken to represent a body that may have included a hundred times that many. We shall return to this point below in discussing the "representativeness" of the Foreign Ministry data.

Examination of the records collected disclosed that most were also incomplete in the sense of containing no dates later than 1908. Since many of the individuals in question can be shown from other sources to have served after 1908, the reason for this incompleteness is obviously the purges and reorganizations (*tensikat*) undertaken after the Young Turk revolution, noted in chapter 1. These interrupted or ended many officials' careers. More than that, the purges overtaxed the offices responsible for keeping the personnel records in such a way that they never seemed to catch up. To deal with this fact, I used a variety of other sources to extend the career records, wherever possible, of the officials whose files I had collected.[5] The practical reasons for proceeding in this way become apparent in chapter 7, when, in analyzing how officials moved through the phases of their careers, we confront the decline in the number of cases documented past the fifteenth year of service.

Proceeding in the way stated, I was able to collect 366 files of career officials in the Foreign Ministry; 29 of these files came from the Interior Ministry collection, the rest from the Foreign Ministry collection. Not all these 366 men could have been in service at one time; thus, their numbers do not directly indicate the size of the professional staff of the ministry. All of them were in service for some part of the period 1877–1908, during which the records-keeping system operated most efficiently. Some individuals' records span sixty years. In the extreme cases, the population's dates in service span about ninety years, down to 1922.

[5] Extending the records meant checking the 366 files against: (1) İnal, *Sadrıazamlar*; (2) İnal, *Şairler*; (3) Çankaya, *Mülkiye Târihi*; (4) *Salname-i Nezaret-i Hariciye*, 4 vols., Istanbul, 1302, 1306, 1318, 1320/1884–1885, 1888–1889, 1900–1901, 1902–1903; (5) the lists of ambassadors in the republican Foreign Ministry "yearbook" for 1964–1965, *Dışişleri Bakanlığı Yıllığı, 1964–65*, Ankara, 1965 (?), 288–372; (6) Har., TKE 1397, 1400, 1406, 1456, petitions to the Foreign Ministry, mostly requesting employment; (7) Har., Müt. 249, "Kadro Haricî Memurların Listesi," and other documents naming individuals, in folder on "Réorganisation du Min. Impl, des Missions et Consulats, Fonctionnaires hors cadre, 1909"; (8) Har., Müt. 249, "İcrası makrun-ı Müsaade-i Seniye olan Tensikat mücebince Teşekkül eden Heyet-i Şehbenderî," list contained in dossier on "Réorganisation du service consulaire," 1908; (9) Karatay, *Türkçe Basmalar Kataloğu*, used as reference on publications; (10) Har., İdare 663, "Etats de service des fonctionnaires ottomans," correspondence on updating personnel files, c. 1914–1918; (11) Çark, *Ermeniler* (on Armenians in Turkish service); (12) a file of biographical notices that I collected from British, French, German, and Austrian diplomatic correspondence.

CONTENTS OF THE FILES

The original document for each file was a printed questionnaire in the form of a large paper divided into boxes. The column of boxes on the right contains the printed questions for the official to answer; the center column contains the spaces for his answers; the left column contains spaces for observations by his superiors. Over the years, reprintings introduced but minor variations of wording into the questionnaire. The items requested were as follows:[6]

1. Personal and any other names of the respondent (*isim ve şöhreti*), name and occupation of his father;
2. Date and place of birth;
3. Schools in which the respondent studied, subjects studied, whether or not he has a diploma, languages that he can speak or in which he can perform the duties of a clerk (*tekellüm ve kitabet*); if he has written works (*te'lifat*), what they pertain to;
4. Age and date at which he entered state service, whether he entered salaried or as an apprentice (*muvazzafen ve yahud mülâzemetle*), what positions he has filled, what ranks and decorations he has obtained, how much salary he obtained in each position, how much time he has spent out of office, whether or not he received an unemployment stipend; if so how much; if he has foreign decorations, how he obtained them, with the dates of the events;
5. The reasons for his leaving (*infisal*) the offices he has held; whether there has been a complaint from any quarter about him; if he has been tried, whether he was found guilty or innocent; whether he has been punished; whether he has documents concerning his acquittal.

Other than the autobiographical questionnaire, usually in the official's own handwriting, the documents found in a given individual's envelope in the Foreign Ministry archives consist chiefly of printed forms on which personnel bureau officials recorded additional events as they occurred. With few exceptions, these simply continue the record of the official's career as it began on the questionnaire, all in a sloppy *divanî* handwriting used for rough drafts. Here we find entries recording appointments, changes of salary, ranks, and decorations. Occasionally, the files contain supplementary documentation, such as diplomas or copies of them. A few officials' envelopes became quite thick. The usual reason was accusations of misdeeds. The effort to ferret out the truth, often from remote places, and to bring malefactors to trial greatly taxed the administrative system—and its self-defensive reflexes (see chapter 8).

As the questionnaire makes clear, the records present a kind of curriculum vitae. This omits some questions that we should want put on such a form today—such as names of wives and mothers. Officials sometimes included interesting information that was not asked. Not appearing for all

[6] Translating from the questionnaire in Sadullah Paşa's file, Har., SA424.

cases, such items cannot be included in quantitative analysis, but may be discussed in the text.

A survey of the records-keeping system creates the impression that it was good at keeping track of the events it was supposed to, with two exceptions. First, complicated events and issues—especially allegations of misdeeds—did not always come through clearly. The same was true of reasons for dismissal, which these records generally pass off with stock phrases about necessity (*hasbe 'l-icab*) or even fate (*hasbe 'l-kader*). Similarly, officials sent to serve outside Istanbul had a way of resigning because they could not get along with the air and water of the locality (*ab-u-havasıyle imtizac edemediğinden*).

Secondly, events not occurring on governmental initiative often remained unnoted. For example, many records simply broke off without indication of how the official's career ended. When this occurred in or near 1908, the reason was most often the impact of the purges that followed the Young Turk revolution on the records-keeping system. At other times, the reason may have been the official's death. The records sometimes mention deaths, even when they follow an official's retirement. But such notices are infrequent enough to imply that the system had difficulty keeping track of an event no longer so closely linked to official personnel policy as in the days of summary executions. As a result, the personnel records are not good sources on the last phases of the official life cycle, which accordingly do not figure in this study.

Another type of information poorly recorded in the questionnaire was publication. The Foreign Ministry records contain some of the most important literary figures of the century, but we might never know this unless we recognized their names from other sources. Even Namık Kemal, who submitted his questionnaire about 1876 or 1877, said only that he had seven or eight printed works on Turkish, history, and literature.[7] Here, the problem stems from the wording of the questionnaire, which asked only the subjects of the respondent's works, if any.

The personnel record data thus have limits—sometimes quaintly drawn—that make us remember the anti-quantifiers' strictures about reductionism. While these limits whet our desire for other sources that will shed a fuller light on the inspirations of the muse, the mysteries of air and water, or the strange workings of fate, the fact remains that the personnel records offer us the chance to throw our analytical net over at least a few hundred officials at once, so creating a comparative perspective for the evaluation of the more richly detailed sources on a few individuals. Working from the archival originals of these records enables us, moreover, to measure many more phenomena than we can from their literary adaptations—works like İnal's and Çankaya's—in which much of the consistency and uniformity of the documents becomes lost.

[7] BBA, DSA I, 210.

TECHNIQUES OF ANALYSIS

Bringing the personnel record data from the archives in Istanbul to the computer centers of U.S. universities took a number of steps, especially since I learned what I was doing as I went along. First, in the archives, I made research notes on the files, developing a format that was highly abbreviated but omitted essentially nothing in the documents. Then I developed codebooks for the data and coded them for analysis. I adopted as my program for the computer analysis the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS).[8]

The tables in the text are all products of SPSS routines that produce cross tabulations and frequency distributions. Throughout the analysis, the Foreign Ministry staff is broken down into various groups and subgroups defined in ethnic and cultural terms. As explained more fully in chapter 3, the three main groups are culturally traditionalist Muslims, modernist Muslims, and non-Muslims (all of the last being western-oriented in culture)[9]; the subgroups are the ethnoreligious ones distinguishable among the non-Muslims. Taking the distinct identities of these groups and subgroups in effect as independent variables and the other quantifiable data from the records as dependent variables, the analysis compares the collective profiles of the various personnel categories. The analysis relies on the simple techniques of quantitative analysis—cross tabulations, calculation of means and medians—that are appropriate for the kind of data contained in these records.[10]

Measurement of change across time being a major goal of this study, the quantitative analysis has pursued this concern in several ways. The simplest has been to divide the entire population of officials under study into "older" and "younger generations" and compare the two. In terms of dates of first appointment, the population breaks most nearly in half at 1876, the older generation including men who began their careers

[8] See Norman H. Nie et al., *SPSS: Statistical Package for the Social Sciences*, 2d ed., New York, 1975, the current manual as of the time I ran my analyses (1976–1981). Over the years, I received much help, for which I am most grateful, from several staff members of the Instructional and Research Computer Center of Ohio State University: Fred Ruland, Jim Wagner, and above all Tom Whitney.

[9] However undesirable it would be to make such an equation otherwise, in terms of nineteenth-century Ottoman attitudes, "modernist," "westernist," and "secularist" generally *were* synonyms.

[10] This statement refers to what statisticians call "level of measurement." This concept, and its implications in determining the statistical techniques and measurements appropriate for a given set of data, are discussed in most statistical manuals; e.g. Blalock, *Social Statistics*, 15–20.

through 1875, and the younger those who began in 1876 or later (see table 3.1). The results of the generational breakdown are not consistently informative, and so are usually not included in the tables but only discussed in the text, when appropriate.

In chapter 7, study of career patterns requires considering change over time in a different sense, that of how officials moved through their career cycle. This analysis identifies change over time with seniority, rather than calendar years, although the generational contrast continues to be discussed in the text. Here, I have defined each individual's career in terms of the total *span* of time from first appointment until the end of his career, as far as it is recorded or can be reconstructed. The career span could include periods out of office, or even out of government service; chapter 7 discusses an example of this phenomenon from the life of Aşçı Dede İbrahim Halil.

To display the officials' experiences at different points in the career span, the tables in chapter 7 require multiple columns for each personnel category and therefore—since they can no longer fit on a single page—are divided into separately presented sections. The columns for each personnel category present figures for the first position, the positions held at the end of the fifth, tenth, fifteenth, twentieth, twenty-fifth, and thirtieth years, and the last recorded position for those who served more than thirty years. Only section A of each of chapter 7's tables, presenting the data for the entire population, includes all possible columns. So that each can fit on one page, sections B, presenting the data on the three large personnel groups, and C, for the non-Muslim subgroups, include only every other one of these columns.

In the analysis of salaries in chapter 8, the best way to analyze change over time is to compute long-term series of annual salary statistics. This required devising a data coding system that assigned specific columns to each year for which salary data was available in any quantity. Foreseeing that I would compare the salary statistics with a price indicator from the Istanbul market (see appendix B), I also included, for each year, a code indicating the official's place of service as of that year. I recorded each official's place of service and salary, coding the latter with a system of brackets, as of 1 June of each year of the official's recorded career, a procedure that required converting dates from the two different calendars used in the records—the lunar religious (*hicrî*) and the solar financial (*rumî*, also known as *malî*)—to the Gregorian calendar. Computing the salary statistics with SPSS required calculating statistics separately for each year for each personnel group, then recompiling the means and medians to produce the tables in chapter 8.

Bringing the salary statistics into a form suitable for comparison with the price series further required recomputing the salary statistics as percentage relatives, that being the form in which the grain price average was computed. The point of recomputing time series as percentage relatives is to convert values expressed in other terms into percentages, with the value for an arbitrarily selected base period set equal to 100. This technique not only facilitates analysis of change over time in a single statistical series, but also—if the base period used for all series is the same—permits the comparison of different series. For computation of percentage relatives on a common base period turns disparate values and measures (salary per month, price per unit) into comparable values expressed on a common scale.[11] To complete the salary-price comparison, I then computed the ratios of salary relatives to price relatives, as shown in tables 8.6 and 8.7.

Other programs could perhaps have produced some of the results I sought more directly than SPSS, with smaller volumes of printout and less need to recompile tables. One of my goals, however, was to be able to account personally for the entire quantitative analysis and how all its results were produced. I produced all but a few of the printouts used as sources for the tables in this book; an assistant under my direction produced the rest.[12]

PROBLEMS IN ANALYSIS OF THE FOREIGN MINISTRY PERSONNEL RECORD DATA

Correct interpretation of the personnel records depends on understanding—and, where possible, eliminating distortions that result from—certain problems of either the documentation or the data collection method. These problems are especially significant for the salary analysis. The problems, and the procedures or assumptions used to cope with them, are as follows.

[11] To convert salaries stated in kuruş into percentage relatives, I used 1880–1882 as the base period. (While the choice of base period is in principle an arbitrary one, I used 1880–1882 as the base period for salaries, and also prices, because it was an intermediate period, in terms of dates and values recorded, for both.) For the means, the divisor used to compute the relatives is the arithmetic mean of the three annual means falling in the base period. Since medians are not mathematically manipulable, I have taken as the divisor the middle value of the three salary medians for the base period. To compute the relatives, the values in kuruş for each year are divided by the appropriate divisor, and the result is expressed as a percentage. By this procedure, as each column of table 8.4 shows, the average of the means for the base period (1880–1882) equals 100. In the case of the medians, the intermediate value—or in some cases the paired value—for the same years equals 100.

[12] Halûk Görgün produced several printouts for me in Istanbul in 1976, using the same SPSS routines that I myself used on many other occasions. Over the years, several other people assisted me with some of the repetitive work of the quantitative analysis, from converting dates between calendars, to recompiling statistics from computer printouts into the forms in which they are presented in the text. Zeynep Catto and Ayhan Aktar helped me in Istanbul in 1976; Dwayne Martin and Mark Kwasny helped me as graduate research associates at Ohio State in 1982–1983.

Representativeness of the Foreign Ministry Data. Chapter 1 comments on whether or not civil officialdom in general should be regarded as "elite" in the context of nineteenth-century Ottoman society. The discussion then focuses the question of elitism more narrowly on the Ottoman Foreign Ministry, arguing that it had a special prominence in relation to the rest of the civil administration during the *Tanzimat*, but no longer thereafter. With specific reference to the quantitative analysis, a different question of representativity arises. Can a group of 366 officials validly be taken to represent a civil bureaucracy of perhaps 35,000 career officials? If not, does that deprive the present study of value?

A "safe" response would be to say that we are studying only the Foreign Ministry. This approach would dictate changing the name of the book and avoiding the question of representativity. At points, such narrowness is indeed indicated. In the career analysis, for example, the jobs Foreign Ministry officials held could not have corresponded closely to those in ministries with other functional specializations.

To present this as solely a study of Foreign Ministry officials would, however, be misleading. Doing so would leave unbroached the question of what conditions were like for civil officialdom more broadly. The data on education in chapter 4, for example, surely tell something about the educational choices open to Ottomans rather generally, not just to future Foreign Ministry officials. An analogous argument applies to the salary data. Even if Foreign Ministry salaries were higher than those in other sectors of administration—and there is no reason to think they were after the *Tanzimat*—they provide an indication of how official salaries fluctuated over time. The personnel record data on the Foreign Ministry is, furthermore, only one kind of documentation on which this study draws. Much of the rest comes from other sectors of civil officialdom and so provides controls on the representativity of the Foreign Ministry officials. In sum, while our quantitative analysis focuses on one ministry, the data analyzed have broader implications; and this study in its entirety is certainly of broader scope.

Variation over Time in the Number of Officials for Whom Data are Available. At points in the analysis where the officials are divided into groups on the basis of when they served—as in the distinction of older and younger "generations" (table 3.1) or in the year-by-year computation of salary statistics in chapter 8—we note that the number of Foreign Ministry officials on whom we have data varies over time. Table 3.2 summarizes the evidence on this point, showing that the number of cases for each year peaked for the population as a whole at 310 in 1891–1892 (and peaked in various years for the other personnel categories that the tables distinguish). The further away from the peak year one moves in either direction, the fewer cases there are. For the earlier years, the problem is that the personnel records were not created until 1877. Since the records covered the individual's life span from birth, some files contain data for years long before 1877 (cf. tables 3.2–3.3). Yet the earlier the date, the fewer the cases. The problem in the later years arises from the purges following the Young Turk revolution—a crisis that not only reduced the number of officials, but also overburdened the records-keeping system, which had lost staff and suddenly faced a greatly increased number of personnel actions to record. As noted, many career records simply break off, with no entries after 1908. Since I had decided to collect records only of officials with at least fifteen years of recorded service, the decline in the number of cases on which I have data begins, not in 1908, but some fifteen years earlier.

Variation over time in the number of cases creates analytical problems whenever it means computing statistics from very small numbers of files, since the statistics become erratic, and it becomes difficult to argue that they represent the findings that might emerge from a larger data base. The only way to eliminate this problem totally is not to present computations based on small groups. In this study, it has been impossible to avoid a certain amount of this. The complexity of Ottoman society meant that official ranks contained men of various social backgrounds; and some of these minorities were almost bound to seem relatively small in any setting—hence the occasional appearance in the tables of separate columns for very small groups of officials. It is possible to minimize displays of this kind, however. Thus the tables normally combine the three smallest subgroups of non-Muslim officials into a single column. For the same reason, the tables almost never include data on the contrast between "older" and "younger" generations of officials, even though it is mentioned in discussion. In the salary tables, finally, I have adopted an arbitrary cutoff point, showing no statistics for years in which there are data for fewer than one-quarter of the maximum number of officials that ever served simultaneously in the large personnel categories, or one-half in the smallest (that is, the ethnoreligious subgroups among the non-Muslims).

Apparent Increase over Time in the Seniority of the Officials for Whom Data are Available. The factors that caused the number of cases to rise and fall also create a misleading appearance of a long-term increase in seniority. If the oldest records date from 1877, data on earlier years reflect a population that is more and more junior, the further back the dates of the statistics. After 1893, the rule excluding officials with fewer than fifteen years of service, and the decline in maintenance of the records in 1908, combine to create the appearance of a population that became more

senior with time. In the intervening period, 1877–1893, the seniority distribution, though heavy with junior officials, was not changing. The apparent long-term increase in seniority thus results from the data collection procedure and the properties of the records, not from attributes of the population studied. Given the likelihood of a positive association between seniority and phenomena such as office, rank, and salary, the apparent seniority increase must be brought under control before the figures in the tables can be accepted as reliable.

In analyses based on cross tabulations (chapters 3, 4, and 7), the problem is minimized in the sense that the generational contrast—the main way of dealing with change over time in those analyses—is generally not shown in the tables. Still, when the comparison is mentioned in text, it makes sense to compare—for example—not the final ranks or positions that members of the two generations held, but rather their ranks or positions after a given number of years of service. The career analysis incorporates this type of control by breaking the career span down into essentially five-year units.

In the time series of salary statistics (chapter 8), the shift over time in seniority becomes a critical issue that would introduce major distortions if not controlled. Doing so requires use of techniques appropriate to the two types of statistics presented, means and medians. For the means, the statistical technique of standardization provides the needed adjustment. I have standardized across time, dividing the salaries quoted for each year into three brackets defined according to the seniority of each official at the time, and recomputing the salary mean for each year as a weighted average of the means for each seniority bracket.[13]

No counterpart of standardization exists for the median. Because the distortions of the seniority distribution lie mostly in the lack of senior officials in the early years, and of junior officials after 1893, the best alternative seems to be to compute medians for only the middle seniority bracket, comprising officials with fifteen to twenty-nine years of service as of each year of computation. To avoid displaying statistics based on very small numbers of cases, for the large personnel groups, the tables again

[13] The three seniority brackets contain officials whose careers spanned 0–14, 15–29, or 30 or more years. I selected the weights to use in recomputing the average by examining the ratios among the average numbers of cases falling into the three seniority brackets during the years 1880–1882, which I selected to serve as the base period for the standardization. This base period falls in the interval 1877–1893, when the seniority distribution apparent in the records was not distorted by the factors discussed above. (For a different reason, as already noted, I used the same base period in computing percentage relatives of salaries and commodity prices.) During the base period, on average 60 percent of the officials in service were in the 0-to-14-year seniority bracket, 30 percent were in the 15-to-29-year bracket, and 10 percent were in the 30-or-more bracket. I therefore used 0.6, 0.3, and 0.1 as weighting factors to recompute the mean for each year as a weighted average of the means for the three brackets. No statistics can validly be shown for years when any seniority bracket contains no cases. On standardization, see R.G.D. Allen, *Statistics for Economists*, London, 1968, 111–14.

display statistics only for years when the number of cases equals at least one-quarter of the largest number found in that seniority bracket in any year; for the non-Muslim subgroups, the cutoff rises to one-half. Given differences in the adjustment techniques for means and medians, the years for which these statistics appear in the tables differ slightly.

Monetary Units. This is one of several problems peculiar to analysis of the salary data. Because the Ottoman monetary system was complex, and the personnel records are not specific as to money of payment, care is needed to convert the salaries stated in the records into units of constant value.

The Ottoman coinage of this period was officially bimetallic. The gold lira, nominally consisting of 100 kuruş, stood throughout the period at essentially 1.11 to the pound sterling. The silver coinage was minted in units nominally worth 20 kuruş (the silver *mecidiye*) and less, the gold-silver ratio having been set in 1844 at 1:15.0909. There were also small coins of base metal. Finally, paper money circulated, usually much depreciated, during the intervals 1840–1863, 1876–1883, and 1914–1922.[14]

Since gold coins were mostly hoarded and paper money circulated for only a few of the years for which statistics appear in the tables in the text, the silver *mecidiye* must have been the primary unit for salary payment. Converting salaries assumed to be stated in silver into units of constant value becomes a problem after the value of silver began to decline in the 1870s. By the early 1880s, it took 108 kuruş in silver to buy a gold lira (100 kuruş in gold). On the world market, silver declined much further thereafter. In Istanbul, however, the Ottoman silver coinage held steady around 108 kuruş to the gold lira through 1914, according to the money rates published in local newspapers.[15]

The Ottoman government responded to the decline in silver by decreeing in 1879 that the silver *mecidiye* was worth 19 kuruş in gold, rather than 20, and proceeding to use this rate in government transactions. The capitalist commercial sector did not accept this rate. In fact, there was an error in it, for if it took 108 kuruş in silver to equal 100 kuruş in gold, 100 kuruş in silver were worth 92.59 in gold. At one-fifth of that, the value of

[14] Charles Issawi, *Economic History of Turkey*, 326–31; id., *Economic History of the Middle East*, 186; Roderic H. Davison, "Ḳā'ime," *EI*², 2d ed., IV, 460–61; Young, *Corps de droit ottoman*, V, 1; Carl Anton Schaefer, "Geldwesen und Staatsbankfrage in der Türkei," in *Das Türkische Reich*, ed. Joseph Hellauer, Berlin, 1918, 33; Biliotti, *La Banque impériale ottomane*, 91–131; I also computed money market statistics from the same newspapers used to compute commodity prices.

[15] See also Biliotti, *La Banque impériale ottomane*, 114. For an explanation of this stabilization, see Salgur Kançal, "La dualisation de l'espace monétaire ottoman," paper presented at the Third International Congress on the Social and Economic History of Turkey, Princeton, 24–26 August, 1983. For the empire as a whole, money rates varied widely according to place and purpose.

the silver *mecidiye* should have been reduced, not to 19 kuruş, but to 18.52. The new official rate for the *mecidiye* represented an error of 2.6 percent of 18.52, or 2.5 percent of 19. The government did not rectify this error until August 1909, when it reset the rate for the gold lira at 102.6 kuruş in silver while holding the *mecidiye* at 19.[16] For the years when governmental policy was based on this error, I have interpreted the personnel-record salary figures to mean payment in *mecidiye*s assumed by the payer to be worth 19 kuruş in gold. To state salaries in gold kuruş, I have compensated for the error of 2.5 percent by multiplying all salaries for the appropriate years by 0.975. Since the adjustment of the official rate was a tardy response to the decline in silver, I have made this adjustment from 1876 on, that being the first year when the money rates in Istanbul newspapers indicate an appreciable decline in silver.

Table A.1.
ADJUSTED FOREIGN MINISTRY SALARY MEANS,
ALL OFFICIALS WITH KNOWN SALARY[a] (gold kuruş per month)

Year	All respondents (1)	Muslim I (2)	Muslim II (3)	Non-Muslim (4)	Greek (5)	Armenian (6)	Other N-M. (7)
1863	5432			5179			
1864	4358	1582		4435			
1865	3995	1923		4495			
1866	3859	1816	8128	3977			
1867	3520	1934	4892	4721			
1868	4027	1796	6462	4831			
1869	3812	1579	6680	4269			
1870	4027	1641	7347	4293			
1871	4318	1619	7580	5250			
1872	3698	2116	5426	4292			
1873	3274	1644	5338	3360		2127	
1874	3359	1279	6389	2430		1454	
1875	3385	1264	6428	2669		1199	
1876	3522	1186	7445	3028		3282	2738
1877	3066	1277	5985	2767		2326	2480
1878	2874	1207	6397	2285	2067	1759	2506
1879	3031	1237	6093	2682	2015	2807	3140
1880	2728	1073	5466	2224	1797	1407	3788
1881	2791	1061	5218	2887	3195	2179	3720
1882	2717	1066	5172	2775	2475	2285	3502
1883	2727	1131	4459	2325	2530	2224	2171
1884	2628	1061	5121	2191	2401	2290	2025
1885	2655	1026	5428	2172	2389	1888	2134
1886	2665	991	5699	2455	2037	2461	3219
1887	2443	1001	5001	2224	1961	2074	3034
1888	2263	1082	3770	2014	1772	1897	2801

[16] Schaefer, "Geldwesen," 30.

Table A.1 (contd.)

Year	All respondents (1)	Muslim I (2)	Muslim II (3)	Non-Muslim (4)	Greek (5)	Armenian (6)	Other N-M. (7)
1889	2101	953	3451	1974	1639	2043	2775
1890	2123	905	3589	2009	1652	2103	2804
1891	2026	823	3569	1925	1623	1999	2570
1892	1872	823	3567	1567	1505	1499	2126
1893	1886	895	3314	1729	1648	1718	2363
1894	1842	939	3124	1589	1539	1590	2234
1895	1769	906	3081	1454	1526	1613	1102
1896	1918	1019	3494	1439	1472	1542	1282
1897	1965	1021	3249	1492	1464	1636	
1898	2001	1112	3302	1519	1306	1540	
1899	2112	1190	2571	1442	943	1566	
1900	2006	1215	3090	1471	992	1656	
1901	2034	1334	3103	1299	721	1555	
1902	1972	1423	2989	1128	602	1343	1038
1903	1977	1427	2817	1288	587	1548	1191
1904	2031	1555	2906	1200	582	1267	1210
1905	1925	1667	2572	1286	627	1254	1359
1906	1625		2234	927	603		
1907	1503		2150	633	540		
1908	1946		2446	1400	542		
1909	2044		2365				

NOTE:

[a] As indicated above in discussing the variation over the years in numbers of men in service, columns 1-4 of Table A.1 include no statistics for years when the number of cases available for computation falls below one-fourth of the maximum number of men ever in service in each personnel category; for columns 5-7, the limit is raised to one-half; the maximum number of men in service in any single year in each personnel category appears at the foot of table 3.2. Here and in the tables of chapter 8, statistics are also not shown for any year in which no cases fell into any one of the three seniority brackets used in standardizing to control for the shift over time in the seniority distribution (see Appendix A, note 13, above). Officials whose salaries were indeterminate in any year of their career span are excluded from the calculations. Apprentices have been included in all salary calculations as officials with a known salary of zero.

Disparity between Nominal Salary Entitlements and Actual Receipts. Ottoman officials did not get paid regularly or fully. The salaries quoted in the personnel records thus signify gross nominal entitlements by way of salary, not net receipts. The difference consisted partly of deductions for things like retirement funds. A larger part of the gross-net difference consisted of delays in payment (see chapter 8). Indeterminably large gross-net differences raise questions about the value of the personnel-record salary data; yet, for various reasons, they remain worthy of study. There are, for example, no known sources from which to verify the actual receipts of substantial numbers of civil officials. Similarly, since the Otto-

mans never produced any comprehensive grading of officials and their salaries,[17] there is no regulatory source from which to verify salaries. Further, while the problems of the salary system are sometimes taken to mean that salaries were unimportant to officials, massive evidence indicates that officials were keenly concerned about their salaries, precisely because they were not regularly paid.

Reflection shows, too, that the salary data in the personnel records do tell several things. They indicate the priorities of those with discretion to assign salaries. They indicate the upper limit of what officials legitimately received by way of salary. If we can assume that the gap between nominal and actual salaries did not vary materially over long periods, the nominal salaries yield good relative indicators of long-term changes in officials' fortunes. It is essentially as relative indicators that the salaries serve in this study.

Table A.2.
ADJUSTED FOREIGN MINISTRY SALARY MEDIANS,
ALL OFFICIALS WITH KNOWN SALARY[a] (gold kuruş per month)

Year	All respondents (1)	Muslim I (2)	Muslim II (3)	Non-Muslim (4)	Greek (5)	Armenian (6)	Other N-M. (7)
1869	2600	800			1650		
1870	3067	1000			1100		
1871	3050	850			1100		
1872	2075	1150			1075		
1873	2550	1138	10375		1800		
1874	1750	1067	8000	1500	3050		
1875	1550	1038	8000	1450	3500		
1876	2484	937	7695	3409	3360		
1877	1491	1023	8035	1997	2484	1705	2192
1878	1396	942	3360	1047	1023	682	1997
1879	1977	1201	6087	2045	1510	3019	2971
1880	1266	1190	5308	2045	1266	682	3117
1881	1558	1185	5016	2143	1997	1315	3068
1882	1899	1200	4042	2938	2143	1997	2971
1883	1607	1207	5113	2910	2192	2906	2938
1884	1485	1187	3701	2045	2094	1266	2906
1885	1948	1205	5357	2532	1607	2021	2922
1886	1985	1193	3653	2036	2045	2013	3117
1887	1948	1183	2983	2029	1997	1997	2971
1888	1970	1193	2873	2727	2094	2484	3044
1889	1911	1193	2021	2037	2021	2009	3044
1890	1851	1193	1997	2011	1997	1985	3044
1891	1546	877	1997	2005	1997	1997	2946

[17] Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform*, 277–78, 331–32.

Table A.2 (contd.)

Year	All respondents (1)	Muslim I (2)	Muslim II (3)	Non-Muslim (4)	Greek (5)	Armenian (6)	Other N-M. (7)
1892	1705	852	2026	1969	2033	1266	1315
1893	1875	950	1972	2004	2029	1997	1315
1894	1529	942	1964	1972	1997	1997	1120
1895	1473	828	1705	1969	1997	1987	1047
1896	1519	1071	2005	1534	584	1753	1047
1897	1339	974	1997	1071	1071	1339	950
1898	1357	1023	1997	1047	1023	1315	974
1899	1429	1035	2045	1023	828	1315	942
1900	1656	1023	2127	1364	1023	1412	950
1901	1350	1120	1997	1023	1023	1388	925
1902	1522	1193	2143	1266	877	1583	1218
1903	1471	1120	2289	1193	779	1656	1120
1904	1429	1064	1817	1218	828	1778	1120
1905	1490	1088	1948	1364	877	1656	1169
1906	1529	1136	2362	1364	877	1607	1218
1907	1503	1242	2338	1315	1120	1558	1071
1908	1489	1218	1948	1364	1120	1558	1218
1909	1239		1485				1120
1910	1315		1510				

NOTE:

[a] The maximum numbers of cases available for calculation of these medians, under the procedure defined above as a control for the apparent shift in the numbers of men in service, are: all respondents, 125 in 1903; Muslim I, 41 in 1901-1903; Muslim II, 60 in 1904-1905; all non-Muslims, 47 in 1889-1891; Greeks, 13 in 1879; Armenians, 31 in 1889-1890; other non-Muslims, 7 in 1891-1897 and 1903-1904. Columns 1-4 again include no statistics for years when the number of men in service did not equal one-fourth of these totals; columns 5-7 include no statistics for years without at least half the total number of cases. Figures in this table differ from the preliminary ones published in Findley, "Acid Test," 358-59, due to recomputation.

Calculation of Salary Statistics Separately, for All Foreign Ministry Officials, and for Officials Serving in Istanbul Only. Chapter 8 presents an analysis of official living standards based on a comparison of salaries and prices. The price indicator is computed entirely from Istanbul commodity market prices (see appendix B), and the only valid comparison is between salaries and prices from the same place. Even though it is implicitly part of the salary analysis to present statistics computed for the entire population, without regard to place of service, for the sake of brevity chapter 8 displays only salary statistics for officials serving in Istanbul. For purposes of record and comparison, analogous figures and tables for the entire Foreign Ministry staff, without regard to place of service, are included here.

The comparison between these statistics and the "Istanbul-only" figures is taken up in chapter 8. Here and in chapter 8, the term "adjusted" in the table headings refers to the controls introduced, in calculation of the statistics, for the problems of seniority and monetary fluctuations discussed above.



Fig. A.1 Comparisons of Salary Means and Medians, Organized by Personnel Groups, for All Foreign Ministry Officials with Known Salary



Fig. A.2 Comparisons of Salary Means and Medians, Organized by Statistic, for All Foreign Ministry Officials with Known Salary

A P P E N D I X B

The Commodity Price Average: Sources and Methods of Analysis

To date, no scholar has computed—or even found the sources for—a time series based on a comprehensive market-basket calculation of Istanbul prices for the late nineteenth century.[1] Except for two contradictory cost-of-living figures from 1914, discussed in chapter 8, determination of living costs for the period therefore depends on some proxy for a systematic calculation. One recent study uses British consumer prices as a "crude indicator" of Ottoman prices.[2] Growing integration of the Ottoman economy into the world market argues for this approach. Yet, a look at the goods used to compute two cost-of-living estimates available from 1914 indicates that 60–75 percent of either budget went for local goods whose prices must have responded to local factors: perishable foodstuffs, from fruit to fish; firewood and charcoal; housing.[3] Persons with discretional income, businesses, or government agencies may have spent more on imports. As a guide to the fortunes of the average Ottoman, however, British prices are not necessarily preferable to even a narrowly based indicator from the local market.

In this study, we shall use a composite average of Istanbul grain prices. It can be objected that grain prices give a better idea about the living

[1] Boratav et al., "Ottoman Wages," 383–84; Issawi, *Economic History of Turkey*, 44–50, 332–36; Donald Quataert, "Ottoman Reform and Agriculture," 21–23, 366–70 (uses the same sources analyzed here); Safi Yorulmaz, "İstanbul Toptan Eşya Fiyatları," *Konjonktür* (1946), 45–55.

[2] Boratav et al., "Ottoman Wages," 384.

[3] Toprak, "*Millî İktisat*," 333; Eldem, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunun İktisadî Şartları*, 214–15. In computing the percentage for the estimate in Toprak, I added 100 kuruş for rent (cf. 150 in the larger Eldem estimate). On integration into the world economy, see Şevket Pamuk, *Osmanlı Ekonomisi ve Dünya Kapitalizmi*, chaps. 2, 7, id., *Ottoman Empire and European Capitalism*.

standards of the poor than about those of relatively affluent officials, that most grains traded in Istanbul were imported, at least until the mid-1890s, or that the price of grain fell faster than that of other items during the price decline extending into the same decade.[4] Nevertheless, movements in grain prices help make it possible to locate times of distress that, as other sources show, did affect officials. The figures show, too, that Istanbul grain prices responded to local forces, as well as to more distant ones; and allowances can be made in discussion for the exceptional extent of the price decline.

SOURCES AND METHODS OF DATA COLLECTION

The prices analyzed here come from commodity quotations of the years 1851–1914. Realizing early in my research that there was nothing approaching an index of prices for the Istanbul market in the late nineteenth century, I began seeking data to create a price indicator to compare with my salary data. Finding tables of money and commodity market quotations in the European-language newspapers published in Istanbul in this period, I began to collect these.

Relying on the collections of the Istanbul Municipal Library (Belediye Kütüphanesi) and the British Museum Newspaper Library (Colindale), I collected newspapers published on, soon after, or otherwise as close as possible to 1 March, 1 June, 1 September, and 1 December of each year for which I could find them. The purpose of collecting quotations at quarterly intervals was to even out seasonal price fluctuations. I could find no quotations for 1850, although they were occasionally published at earlier dates. I was able to gather data for almost every year from 1851 through 1914. Since the format of publication for the quotations varied little, newspapers of a given date seemed virtually interchangeable as sources. The publications, with quarters and years for which they served, are as follows:

Journal de Constantinople	1851–2d qtr. of 1865
Levant Herald (*LH*)	3d qtr. of 1865–2d qtr. of 1875
La Turquie	3d qtr. of 1875–3d qtr. of 1880
Constantinople Messenger (*CM*)	4th qtr. of 1880–2d qtr. of 1881
LH	3d qtr. of 1881–1st qtr. of 1882
Eastern Express (*EE*)	2d qtr. of 1882–4th qtr. of 1884
Journal de la Chambre de Commerce de Constantinople (*JCCC*)	1st–3d qtr. of 1885
EE	4th qtr. of 1885

[4] On the provenance of grains traded in Istanbul, see the listing of varietal series and subseries below. Ottoman-grown grains began to assume an important place in the Istanbul market only in the 1890s (Quataert, "Economic Climate," D1157; id., "Limited Revolution," 151, 154–58). Boratav et al., "Ottoman Wages," 384, emphasize the exceptional decline in grain prices in the early 1890s.

Levant Herald and Eastern Express (LHEE)	1st–2d qtr. of 1886
JCCC	3d qtr. of 1886–4th qtr. of 1887
LHEE	1st. qtr. of 1888–4th qtr. of 1891
JCCC	1st qtr. of 1892–2d qtr. of 1914
Moniteur oriental	1 August 1914

METHODS OF ANALYSIS

The commodity price indicator used in this study takes the form of an unweighted average of prices for several cereal commodities. Unfortunately, a variety of problems made it impossible to compute a broader-based average of consumer prices from the sources used here. Information on likely volumes of consumption was missing. Many consumer goods were not listed at all in the published quotations, which are essentially those of a wholesale commodities market. Many of the items quoted were not consumer goods, or—like raw cotton and wool—not directly so. And varieties and quality grades of some consumer goods, such as tea and sugar, varied so widely as to be unintelligible. The task of overcoming these problems must await some scholar who can take the study of prices as his or her primary objective.

In defense of the method here applied, we may note that grain products were and are extremely important in the Turkish diet. The prime example of this is bread, of which the average Ottoman at the turn of this century reportedly consumed a kilogram or more a day.[5] As a Levantine woman of Istanbul once explained to an Englishman, "vous êtes carnivore, je suis carnipain."[6] The price of bread was officially controlled in Istanbul, so that the effects of shifts in wholesale wheat and flour prices were passed on to the consumer only intermittently. This does not, however, deprive wheat and flour prices of value as indicators of movements in the economy. Furthermore, Ottoman bakers had ways, at times, of "disadjusting" the official bread price, for example, by decreasing loaf size.[7] And Ottomans consumed other baked goods, various types of noodles, cracked wheat (*bulgur*), and other grain products.

To compute a grain price average in a form appropriate for comparison with our salary statistics requires converting the prices quoted in the newspapers into gold kuruş for a standard unit of measure, for which I chose the *okka*, a unit of weight equal to 2.828 pounds or 1.283 kilograms. In converting the prices in the newspapers, I relied as much as possible on notations published with the prices to explain the value of the monetary units and measures in which the quotations were given.[8]

[5] Quataert, "Economic Climate," D1154.
[6] *BMCCFC*, no. 256, 31 July 1908, 156.
[7] Quataert, "Economic Climate," D1155, events of 1908.
[8] Otherwise, the best guidance on weights and measures comes from the series of articles on "Poids et mesures en Turquie," *JCCC*, no. 456, 23 September 1893, 446–47; no. 460, 21 October 1893, 495–96; no. 466, 21 November 1893, 567–69; no. 467, 9 December 1893, 578–79; no. 468, 16 December 1893, 590–91.

Since for every commodity, several varieties or provenances were quoted, I computed commodity averages as averages of varietal subseries. The procedure was to select for each variety all years in which there were quotations for at least three quarters. From each subseries, other years were excluded as offering insufficient control for seasonal fluctuations. Averaging the quotations for the selected years produced varietal price series, which were then averaged to produce the commodity averages in table B.1. To minimize the impact of price differences among commodities on the composite grain price average, it was computed as an average of percentage relatives, the computation of which is explained under "techniques of analysis" in appendix A. The price relatives and the composite grain average appear in table B.2. Again, 1880–1882—an interval intermediate, in terms of both time and price levels, between the highest and lowest grain prices included in our data—served as the base period. The fact that the composite grain price average must—for want of weighting factors—be an unweighted average limits its value from an economic point of view and could be taken to indicate use of a single commodity series for comparison with salaries. I have preferred the unweighted composite average as having fewer gaps.

Designations for varietal subseries of each commodity, with the dates for which each is quoted, follow. Of the four commodities, hard wheat was normally used for making noodles. Soft wheat was chiefly used for making bread. Barley, while the second most widely cultivated grain in Turkey after wheat in the 1920s and the preferred grain for bread making in some provinces then,[9] was not a major constituent of the diet of Istanbul-dwellers. In Istanbul, most barley was consumed by horses, a fact that affected living costs to the extent that people used horses for transportation. Barley was also a raw material for the brewing industry, which dates back to the nineteenth century, at least, and whose products were surely not unknown to officials. The main justification for including barley in the average is that its record is the longest and most nearly uninterrupted of the four series. Including both flour and wheat in the average has the effect, in years with prices for both, of reinforcing the representation of the commodities most directly related to bread making.

HARD WHEAT

Azov-Taganrog, 1850–1890; Ismail-Bessarabia, 1850–1890; Galatz-Danube-Constantza, 1851–1890; Rumelian (Balçık, Burgaz), 1850–1896;

[9] G. Stratil-Sauer, "Cereal Production in Turkey," *Economic Geography*, IX (1933), 324, 327–39; Quataert, "Limited Revolution," 149.

Edirne, Rodosto, 1862–1903; Anatolia-Bandırma, 1896–1906; Anatolian First, 1905–1914; Anatolian Second, 1907–1914

SOFT WHEAT

Rumanian (Galatz, Galatz-Braila, Danube, Braila), 1850–1888, 1893–1896, 1906–1913; Rumelian (Burgaz-Varna-Balçık, Varna-Balçık), 1850–1896; Burgaz-Plovdiv, Plovdiv-Zagora, Zagora, 1880–1896; Konya First, 1904–1915; Konya Second, 1904–1914; Ankara First, 1904–1912; Ankara Second, 1904–1912

BARLEY

Braila, Danubian, 1851–1913; Rumelian, 1858–1908; Black Sea, Odessa, 1888–1900; Mersin, 1899–1914; Anatolian First, 1903–1914; Anatolian Second, 1903–1914

FLOUR

Odessa 2d, 000, 1, and successor grades, 1869–1914; Odessa 3d, 00, and successor grades, 1868–1914; Danube 2d, Braila 3d, and successor middling grades, 1870–1880, 1882–1885, 1888, 1890–1908, 1911–1914; Danube 3d, Braila 00, 4th, and successor lower grades, 1868–1876, 1878–1879, 1890–1897, 1899–1902, 1907–1908, 1911–1914; Local, local Braila, local kırma, 1868–1914.

PRICE TABLES

With this introduction, we may now present the price statistics. Table B.1 presents annual average prices for the four cereal items. The table states the kuruş prices in decimals; in fact, the subdivision of the kuruş was the para, at forty to the kuruş. Gaps appear in the series for either of two reasons. Some signify insufficient numbers of quarterly quotations. Others, especially longer gaps like that of 1896–1903 for soft wheat, or short gaps across all series, signify that no quotations were being published. The reason is never stated, but sometimes (1855, 1915–1918) was obviously war.

The commodity prices, shown in kuruş in table B.1, appear in the form of percentage relatives in table B.2, with an added fifth column of the table presenting the composite grain price average, which has been computed for each year from the relatives appearing in columns 1–4. Figure B.1 then displays the composite grain price average graphically. The salary-price comparison, and its implications concerning official living standards, are taken up in chapter 8 in discussing tables 8.4–8.7.

Table B.1.
ANNUAL AVERAGES OF ISTANBUL GRAIN PRICES
(in gold kuruş per okka)

Year	Hard Wheat (1)	Soft Wheat (2)	Barley (3)	Flour (4)	Year	Hard Wheat (1)	Soft Wheat (2)	Barley (3)	Flour (4)
1851	0.79	0.63	0.45		1883		1.12	0.79	1.72
1852	0.87	0.76	0.49		1884	0.91	0.96	0.70	1.45
1853	1.16	0.95	0.57		1885	0.94	0.95	0.59	1.49
1854	2.05	1.89			1886	1.01	1.04		1.76
					1887	1.01	0.99	0.56	1.63
1856	1.81	1.35	0.84		1888	0.98	0.93	0.53	1.39
1857	1.51	1.05	0.60		1889	0.97	0.89	0.52	1.60
1858	1.20	0.98	0.68		1890	0.96	1.02	0.63	1.60
1859	1.29	1.03	0.66		1891	1.30	1.34	0.74	1.87
1860	1.43	1.19	0.70		1892	0.98	1.01	0.62	1.57
1861	1.33	1.17	0.68		1893	0.89	0.90	0.56	1.32
					1894	0.59	0.69	0.41	1.02
1864	1.00	0.91	0.50		1895	0.61	0.76	0.47	1.04
1865	0.97	0.88	0.49		1896	0.69		0.51	1.13
1866	1.27	1.13	0.63		1897	0.90		0.51	1.50
1867	1.59	1.41	0.89		1898	1.07		0.62	1.59
1868	1.51	1.43	0.93	2.11	1899	0.98		0.67	1.42
1869	1.17	1.03	0.64	1.77	1900	0.87		0.65	1.33
1870	1.27	1.14	0.71	1.87	1901	0.81		0.55	1.33
1871	1.33	1.18	0.75	2.05	1902	0.80		0.60	1.26
1872	1.23	1.09	0.63	1.79	1903	0.88		0.61	1.31
1873	1.54	1.47	0.75		1904	0.90	0.94	0.58	1.36
1874	1.47	1.27	0.84		1905	0.94	0.96	0.63	1.38
1875	1.22	1.15	0.78	1.75	1906	0.98	0.95	0.70	1.37
1876	1.14	1.09	0.63	1.84	1907	1.14	1.10	0.87	1.64
1877	1.27	1.28	0.65	1.83	1908		1.27	0.85	1.82
1878	1.29	1.28	0.77	1.82	1909	1.37	1.26	0.89	1.72
1879	1.46	1.31	0.78	1.86	1910	1.17	1.13	0.78	1.51
1880	1.52	1.47	0.90	2.15	1911	1.13	1.03	0.80	1.54
1881	1.36	1.32	0.74	2.08	1912	1.15	1.19	0.97	1.65
1882	1.26	1.12	0.72	1.84	1913	1.22	1.21	0.93	1.67
					1914	1.14	1.13	0.78	1.60

Table B.2.

PERCENTAGE RELATIVES, ANNUAL AVERAGES OF ISTANBUL GRAIN PRICES

(base period 1880-1882)

Year	Hard Wheat (1)	Soft Wheat (2)	Barley (3)	Flour (4)	Composite Grain Average (5)	Year	Hard Wheat (1)	Soft Wheat (2)	Barley (3)	Flour (4)	Composite Grain Average (5)
1851	57	49	57		54	1883		86	100	85	90
1852	63	59	62		61	1884	66	74	89	72	75
1853	84	73	72		77	1885	68	73	75	74	72
1854	149	145			147	1886	73	80		87	80
						1887	73	76	71	81	75
1856	131	104	106		114	1888	71	72	67	69	70
1857	109	81	76		89	1889	70	69	66	79	71
1858	87	75	86		83	1890	70	79	80	79	77
1859	94	79	84		85	1891	94	103	94	93	96
1860	104	92	89		95	1892	71	78	79	78	76
1861	96	90	86		91	1893	65	69	71	65	68
						1894	43	53	52	51	50
						1895	44	59	60	52	53
1864	73	70	63		69	1896	50		65	56	57
1865	70	68	62		67	1897	65		65	74	68
1866	92	87	80		86	1898	78		79	79	78
1867	115	109	113		112	1899	71		85	70	75
1868	109	110	118	105	110	1900	63		82	66	70
1869	85	79	81	88	83	1901	59		70	66	65
1870	92	88	90	93	91	1902	58		76	62	65
1871	96	91	95	102	96	1903	64		77	65	69
1872	89	84	80	89	85	1904	65	72	73	67	70
1873	112	113	95		107	1905	68	74	80	68	73
1874	107	98	106		104	1906	71	73	89	68	75
1875	88	89	99	87	91	1907	83	85	110	81	90
1876	83	84	80	91	84	1908		98	108	90	99
1877	92	99	82	91	91	1909	99	97	113	85	99
1878	94	99	98	90	95	1910	85	87	99	75	86
1879	106	101	99	92	99	1911	82	79	101	76	85
1880	110	113	114	106	111	1912	83	92	123	82	95
1881	99	102	94	103	99	1913	88	93	118	83	96
1882	91	86	91	91	90	1914	83	87	99	79	87



Fig. B.1 Composite Grain Price Average

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