The City in the Ottoman Empire

Migration and the making of urban modernity

Edited by
Ulrike Freitag, Malte Fuhrmann, Nora Lafi and **Florian Riedler**

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The City in the Ottoman Empire

The nexus of urban governance and human migration was a crucial feature in the modernisation of cities in the Ottoman Empire of the nineteenth century. This book connects these two concepts to examine the Ottoman city as a destination of human migration, throwing new light on the question of conviviality and cosmopolitanism from the perspective of the legal, administrative and political frameworks within which these occur.

Focusing on groups of migrants with various ethnic, regional and professional backgrounds, the book juxtaposes the trajectories of these people with attempts by local administrations and the government to control their movements and settlements. By combining a perspective from below with one that focuses on government action, the authors offer broad insights into the phenomenon of migration and city life as a whole. Chapters explore how increased migration driven by new means of transport, military expulsion and economic factors were countered by the state's attempts to control population movements, as well as the strong internal reforms in the Ottoman world.

Providing a rare comparative perspective on an area often fragmented by area studies boundaries, this book will be of great interest to students of History, Middle Eastern Studies, Balkan Studies, Urban Studies and Migration Studies.

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Porters at the Customs House in Izmir (Smyrna), late nineteenth century.
Source: DAI (German Archaeological Institute Istanbul).

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1 Migration and the making of urban modernity in the Ottoman Empire and beyond

Ulrike Freitag, Malte Fuhrmann, Nora Lafi and Florian Riedler

Migration is as important and acute a topic for historians as it is for contemporaries. Indeed, a historical study of migration into cities and its management by urban institutions might hold some surprising and relevant insights into how people in earlier times dealt with one of the major issues of urban development, namely the movement of people and their diversity. Given the intricate link between urban growth and migration, this can be considered one of the central questions with regard to the historical study of cities. To discuss the topic historically in our case with regard to mostly Mediterranean cities in the late nineteenth century means to deal with a wide variety of questions. How and where did migrants settle in cities? How did migrants become integrated into the local labour market? Did they have access to urban property? How did migration affect the denominational/communal and 'ethnic' balance of certain quarters or even whole cities? How were migrants treated by urban institutions, i.e. what was their legal status, did they become citizens, did they have access to the sphere of government and could they exercise any rights? Finally, how was the identity of marginal migrants shaped by their precarious existence?

This book addresses these questions with regard to the late Ottoman Empire in a period of deep-rooted political and structural reforms and changes, which brought about new definitions of the individual and of society as a whole. The old system of urban governance was transformed; however, many of its features survived in the new model. Individuals from the elites like urban notables, but also simple citizens and newcomers had to position themselves in new ways and on different scales both within their cities and vis-à-vis the empire, which increasingly regulated the life of its subjects. To better understand the issues associated with migration, and notably urban governance and migration, has important ramifications for a more mature understanding of imperial governance in the Ottoman context. In many ways, the management of such a dynamic process as migration sheds an important light on the dynamism of governance or lack thereof in the Ottoman context. Developments linked to migration during the late Ottoman period also provide a key to understanding many post-Ottoman situations.

A rich historiography of migration studies exists for the Ottoman Empire, but it is mostly phenomenologically or regionally fractured. By contrast, this book brings together migration studies featuring cities of all parts of the Ottoman

Empire as well as from regions that were in contact with it, thus achieving an empire-wide perspective without isolating the Ottoman world from a broader context. It analyses a variety of migratory phenomena, such as the large number of Muslim refugees fleeing the loss of the Southeast European provinces of the Ottoman Empire, East Europeans seeking refuge from anti-Semitism, itinerant labourers, urbanisation fed by the influx from rural areas, state-induced transfers of administrative elites and pilgrims turned settlers.

These multi-faceted inquiries follow a common agenda by focusing on the city as thoroughfare and/or destination of all these movements, and by collectively addressing the question of the governance of migratory processes. They try to build a methodological and interpretative link between the social sphere and the institutional one. As the case studies illustrate, central, provincial and urban institutions all played a role in attempting to regulate movements; however, several studies also highlight the agency both of the migrants and of the established population. The overall aim is to read migrations in a dynamic way in which the attention to the condition of migrants is in return an attention to the structure of society.

In her introductory chapter, "The Ottoman urban governance of migrations and the stakes of modernity', Nora Lafi examines both the historiographical stakes linked to the study of Ottoman migrations and the influence the influx of migrants had on urban institutions from the end of the old regime period to the era of reforms, the Tanzimat. It is the main task of this chapter to situate the following chapters in the framework of the different streams of historical migration studies and studies on urban history introducing many of the research questions also at the outset of this volume. Research on Ottoman cities and migration has to enter into a dialogue with these research traditions and work out the comparable aspects, as well as the specificities, of different cities and forms of migration regarding time and place.

In the following chapters by Tetsuya Sahara, Florea Ioncioaia, Wolfgang Kaiser and Nelida Fuccaro, the present volume takes up that challenge by focusing on urban governance in a comparative perspective. These chapters display the full geographical and historical range of the project by putting cities of the Ottoman Empire proper, as well as of neighbouring and connected regions, into a comparative framework. In all of these regions similar questions of urban governance and migration can be observed from the early modern age well into the twentieth century. At the core of these chapters are processes of urbanisation and how they are accelerated or impeded by the integration of different groups of migrants into city structures. Mainly, but not exclusively, the articles foreground administrative and legal structures that define the rights of migrants and decide their incorporation or non-incorporation. This process was played out against the background of changing economic structures that offered different groups of migrants different sources of income.

In his chapter 'The Ottoman City Council and the beginning of the modernisation of urban space in the Balkans', Tetsuya Sahara, with reference to various cities in the Balkans, shows the consequences of the imperial programme of administrative and institutional modernisation in the context of intense migrations. The chapter considers the growth of nineteenth-century Balkan cities and the changes in urban administration that were implemented during this period.[1] It highlights the role of the Ottoman reform policy as the main cause for a new style in urban governance. As a result, migrants were also integrated into these cities in a new way. Much of the population growth in Balkan cities was due to Christian migrants from the countryside, changing the ethnic and religious character of the hitherto predominantly Muslim cities. Christian migrants were not Islamised as had been the case in previous centuries; instead they established their own community structures. Notably, the Slavic-speaking Orthodox communities grew in importance and were supported by the Ottoman government. City growth, transformation of urban space and migration went along with administrative reforms that, since the second half of the nineteenth century, created modern municipalities. The chapter deals with the structure, as well as the rights and duties, of these municipalities. Of special importance were the new municipal councils designed to represent the ethnic and religiously mixed character of the cities. Councils represented modernity in the urban setting of the Balkans as much as improved city infrastructure and new style buildings. They were to enhance the collaboration of the various urban communities according to the reform programme.

Florea Ioncioaia's chapter, 'Foreigners in town: urban immigration and local attitudes in the Romanian Principalities in the mid-nineteenth century' examines the process of urbanisation in the Principality of Moldavia in the first half of the nineteenth century. For this crucial zone, situated between the three largest Empires on the continent (Habsburg, Russian and Ottoman, constituting a semi-autonomous principality of the latter empire, but under strong influence of the first two), a comparative attention to migration issues is a good mirror for the historian in order to discuss facts and categories. As the main particularity of this process of migration and urbanisation, the chapter highlights the overwhelming importance of migration in creating new towns and boroughs and in letting the population numbers of existing cities swell. The largest group of migrants to Moldavian towns came from across the border, consisting of Jews fleeing the economic hardship and pogroms in Galicia and Poland. Like the Jews who remained a culturally distinct group, other migrants acquired a special and privileged status awarded by foreign consulates. Vagrants and refugees made up another large group of migrants to Moldavian towns. A second focus of the chapter is on the reaction of urban government and population towards these different groups of migrants. The Jews who became the foreigners par excellence were the main target of xenophobia. As their expulsion would have caused huge economic problems, the policy of the administration could only control and limit their further influx. Likewise the state created the category of 'vagrant' for all undesired migrants like refugees, deserters, etc., who could not earn a living. These vagrants were subjected to severe control and occasionally were expelled from the cities.

Wolfgang Kaiser's chapter, 'Mobility and governance in early modern Marseilles', is conceived as a comparative excursion, the goal of which is to discuss questionings, categories and chronologies. The chapter examines the integration of migrants into the economy and the political structures of early modern Marseilles. The growth in population and trade the city experienced since the sixteenth century depended very much on migration. Merchants from Italy managed up to one-third of the city's trade, but less prestigious sectors also attracted large groups of mariners, artisans and workers from abroad. Some of these migrants only stayed temporarily in the city, others settled down. The most active and wealthy could be awarded citizenship very quickly; others had to follow the conventional routes of integration, i.e. guild membership or marriage. The political power in the city was concentrated in the hands of a merchant aristocracy that had access to municipal offices. With many examples, the chapter demonstrates the way in which migrants were integrated into Marseilles' traditional structure of government. Although certain groups, such as Italian merchants, had a relatively easy access to political office, others, such as German or Swiss Protestants, were never fully accepted, even if naturalised.

Nelida Fuccaro's chapter, 'Pearl towns and early oil cities: migration and integration in the Arab Coast of the Persian Gulf' concludes the first part of the book. This chapter explores the significance of migration for towns on the Ottoman fringe in the Gulf area, such as Kuwait and Manama, from the late nineteenth century. Both towns were founded on the consensus of different groups of migrants. Several networks of patronage, from tribal leaders of the hinterland to merchants from Southern Iran or India, provided the infrastructure for economic growth and political stability. Ruling families, who were themselves migrants, presided over this situation. At the bottom rung of society, migrants from the tribal areas, manumitted slaves and poor pearl divers as well as workers from India were to be found and were largely excluded from patronage. The result was a society where the designation 'migrant' became a marker of urbanity and civic pride and where connections to other places remained important for generations. At the same time the rulers of the Gulf cities tried to bolster their legitimacy by their claim to autochthony. In this situation only the few European and American missionaries and merchants remained foreigners. After the First World War the character of Gulf cities changed because of the introduction of passport and new nationality laws. This had profound effects on their urban societies of migrants.

The second section of the book with contributions by Christoph Herzog, Pascale Ghazaleh, Florian Riedler and Dilek Akyalçın-Kaya focusing on controlling movement, besides taking up issues from the previous section from the perspective of the migrants. The focus is on the process of surveillance and control, which city and state authorities displayed in many instances in the regimes of urban governance presented above. These could be geared towards a control of the migrants' mobility in a literal sense, but also in the sense of the migrants' social mobility. In many instances these were administrative and police measures, but also choices concerning which groups of migrants received support and which did not.

This part begins with a chapter by Christoph Herzog: 'Migration and the state: on Ottoman regulations concerning migration since the age of Mahmud II'. The chapter gives an account of the development of the internal passport that was the principal administrative instrument of migration control in the nineteenth-century Ottoman Empire. Created in the early nineteenth century in the context of the policy of state centralisation, the internal passport was carried over to the Reform Era, the Tanzimat, specified in its function and standardised in its procedure and appearance. It remained in use until the end of the Ottoman period. One of the main aims of the internal passport was to prevent vagrants, beggars, bandits and other undesired people from moving in the country and especially from coming to the capital Istanbul. In this it was an instrument to control small-scale migration to Ottoman cities. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries the internal passport was seconded by various laws on vagrancy that added a further dimension to it. The new laws shifted from preventing migration of undesired groups to their repression. As part of a new social discourse that came to be complementary to religious ideals, vagrants, defined as people unwilling to work, were to be educated in workhouses. This process is the other face of modernisation.

With Pascale Ghazaleh's chapter, 'Governance in transition: competing immigrant networks in early nineteenth-century Egypt', the question of the relationship between migration, the changing definitions of identity and access to the elite is addressed. This chapter examines the impact of migration on existing social networks in the Egyptian elite during the first half of the nineteenth century. The context is the policy of Muhammad Ali to replace the old ruling class with a new one composed of migrants in order to gain a more independent position from the Ottoman central government. On the one hand, the chapter describes the mechanisms of how this new elite was brought to the country and installed in its powerful position. On the other hand, the reactions of parts of the old elite are analysed through the example of a prominent Cairene merchant family. The chapter presents the changes in the social universe of this family from the late eighteenth to the early nineteenth century.

Florian Riedler, in his chapter 'Armenian labour migration to Istanbul and the migration crisis of the 1890s' deals with the surveillance of Armenian labour migrants in the context of the inter-communal violence that shook the Ottoman capital in 1895 and 1896. Especially in the late nineteenth century, the number of these migrants was increasing because of the economic and political crisis in Eastern Anatolia, home to a large community of Armenian peasants who were forced to leave their land to earn money in cities. These labour migrants were among the ones most affected by the unrest in 1895 and 1896 when the government tried to suppress the Armenian national movement in Anatolia and also in Istanbul. The chapter shows how traditional ways of migration management (keeping migrants away from the capital) became enmeshed with political questions and the authorities' fear of terrorists in the era of competing nationalisms. The Ottoman police started a programme of supervision and expulsion of Armenian workers and enforced regulations that made their return impossible. This situation could only be partly alleviated by the constant intervention of the Armenian Patriarchate in favour of its constituency. In this situation, the governance of migration was not only to manage the passage to industry after the demise of the guilds, but it was also to find a post-imperial equilibrium for the resulting diversity in a context of modern nationalisms.

Such issues were also at stake in Salonica at the same time, a city that Dilek Akyalçın-Kaya studies in her chapter: 'Immigration to the Ottoman territory: the case of Salonica in the late nineteenth Century' The chapter traces immigration to this Ottoman city in the aftermath of the 1878 Ottoman Russian War. The main focus is on the nature of immigration regulations and on their actual implementation in the context of a massive influx of Muslim refugees and Jewish immigrants to the city. The chapter gives an account of who was in charge of settling and taking care of the immigrants and refugees, highlighting the role of the local administration and its different departments, as well as the conflicts between central and local government. The reaction of local people towards settling immigrants illustrates how migration is a challenge to existing social and institutional balances.

The last part of the book, comprised of the chapters by Irena Fatsea, Ulrike Freitag and Malte Fuhrmann, focuses on the theme of status and identity, that is on questions of migrants' status and of how their identity was defined. On the one hand, their identities were defined externally, i.e. by new state regulations on movement and settlement that have been encountered in the preceding sections. On the other hand, identity was a question of status and religion, and to a lesser extent of personal choice. Its investigation demonstrates the methodological difficulties of any history from below. Frequently, the chapters in this section illustrate the complex nature of the attribution and self-attribution of status and identity at the intersection of traditional and modern forms.

In her initial chapter 'Migrant builders and craftsmen in the founding phase of modern Athens', Irene Fatsea examines the role of craftsmen and workers in the building of Athens as the national Greek capital in the decades after independence in 1830. Workers were representatives of the old tradition of itinerant guilds in the building sector that had dominated the Southern Balkans, and they were adapted to the Ottoman labour market. In the era of national states, this situation came to be challenged. What this chapter shows is the link between old regime itinerant migrations and modern routes. It also illustrates the fact that change was incremental, and that between the 1820s and the 1880s old habits and modern ideologies cohabited. Modernity also being, in a way, the passage from itinerant migration to durable settlement, this chapter illustrates the complexity of this process in the context of competing nationalisms.

The urban identity of newcomers is also one of the main questions Ulrike Freitag poses in her chapter 'The city and the stranger: Jeddah in the nineteenth century' She argues that over the course of the nineteenth century, a number of factors profoundly changed notions of who was an 'outsider', and how such people were regarded. In a port city characterised by its international trade and the seasonal influx of hajjis en route to Mecca, the nineteenth century brought about important transformations: a combination of international pressure to liberalise trade and technological change, like steamshipping or the construction of the Suez Canal, diminished Jeddah's role as an international entrepôt of trade. New regulatory measures introduced in the nineteenth century also impacted on the status of longer term residents. Whereas a first move was towards liberalisation (notably towards non-Muslim residents) during the reign of Muhammad Ali of Egypt, regulations regarding citizenship and land-acquisition gained in importance following increased European pressure and Ottoman wariness regarding possible Western attempts to gain control over the Holy Cities. This had an effect, for example, on the right of non-Ottoman Muslims to acquire lands in the Hijaz. Perhaps more prominently, the question of nationality seems to have been the trigger of the 1858 riots against European consuls and their entourage. Finally, there were increasing attempts to regulate the free movement of pilgrims, partly for fear of disease, partly to prevent the spread of Pan-Islam.

In the last chapter of this book, entitled '"I would rather be in the Orient": European lower class immigrants into the Ottoman lands', Malte Fuhrmann explores the identities of lower class migrants who came in small, but not insignificant numbers from Western and Central Europe to try their luck in Ottoman port cities such as Istanbul, Izmir and Salonica in the nineteenth century. Starting around the mid-nineteenth century, they were put under pressure by both their countries of origin and their country of residence. The migrants were supposed to integrate into the imperialist schemes of European states to dominate Ottoman cities. The European consulates could offer material assistance and a protected status to those 'European' migrants who were willing to go along with these claims and support their countries of origin.

The focus of the chapter is on four individuals who serve as examples of different reactions to these pressures. The chapter addresses the difficult questions of the identity and feelings of lower class migrants towards their adopted home country, the Ottoman Empire. These questions are hard to tackle, because due to their low social status these migrants have left few written sources to be interpreted by the historian. The four examples, among them two women and two men, and the confession-like accounts of their lives, are an exception in this regard. A variety of attitudes can be observed from these examples. They range from the instrumental use of the consulates' infrastructure to the proclamation of having found a new home in the Ottoman Empire.

What this whole journey into Ottoman, circum-Ottoman and post-Ottoman migrations intends to propose is not only a revised vision of the identity of the migrant in the mirror of Ottoman urban societies. It is also a revised vision of Ottomanity itself. The fate of migrants tells a lot about the imperial system, about the old regime governance of migration and urban societies, made up of communities, guilds and civic elites, and about the ambiguous ways by which modernity came into this system. Thus, this book offers a glimpse of a transitional period of Ottoman history and the dilemmas faced by the empire and individuals alike in coping with the governance of the phenomenon of migration, which continue to challenge us well into our present time.

Note

1 On the Ottoman municipal reforms during the Tanzimat era: N. Lafi (ed.) *Municipalités méditerranéennes. Les réformes urbaines ottomanes au miroir d'une histoire comparée (Moyen-Orient, Maghreb, Europe méridionale)*, Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag-ZMO Studien 21, 2005, p. 373.

2 The Ottoman urban governance of migrations and the stakes of modernity

Nora Lafi

Historical migration studies: a vast horizon of social expectation

Migration is a crucial topic for historians. Not only do its present echoes give it a specific contemporary relevance but also what scholars of the reader-response literary theory called a wide horizon of expectation in society.[1] The study of the impact of migration on past societies is a way to discuss the very nature of these societies in a dynamic perspective. The vast horizon of social expectation has some consequences on the work of the historian, however, and one has to be aware of the possible distortions in the perception of the hierarchy of values and priorities in past societies as we mirror them in our own society. The fact that we are invited by present times to put migration at the top of social priorities does not automatically imply that it was so in the past. There is no mechanical link between the contemporary importance of the governance of migrations and the importance this topic has had in the past. The nature of this link is precisely part of what the historian has to discuss. Not that migration was not important, just that it was not necessarily such a central topic in governance and social balance as today. And, from a methodological point of view, everything is in the 'not necessarily'. One can also be convinced of the centrality of migration issues in many societies, but it was not central just because we think it is, in the light of what we know of today's societies. Rather, it is because history as a method of investigation relies on the study of archives and material from the past, and this will eventually shed light on just how central migration is. I mention these methodological premises to recall the fact that the work of historians, though always involved in a critical dialogue with their own times, has to try and define an analytical framework that makes a non-anachronistic perception of the past possible. This does not impede reflection on the present in the light of the past. In the specific case of Ottoman migration into cities, the implicit social horizon of expectation pertaining to the present research is even wider: 'how do we deal with populations of rural origins coming from the former Ottoman Empire and settling in European cities?'. From Istanbul to Berlin or from London to Paris, this is a question society poses with great force, and even maybe sometimes with some objective pertinence. The exploration of the specific Ottoman response to such demographic and social challenges might also be a pertinent exploration of the question. What is important is to make implicit expectations explicit, and, in the practice of the historical profession, to be aware of the paradigmatic weight of present interrogations in order not to make improper transfers of anachronistic interrogations. A pertinent historical answer to a legitimate question can also be a complex elaboration of new perspectives and not a mere list of solutions.

Migration studies and the evolution of the historical discipline

Another important aspect of historical migration studies is that they cross most of the methodological choices that history has been confronted with in the last few decades. The history of the history of migrations is a good mirror of the evolution of the discipline and of the debates, methodological but also ideological, it has experienced.

As Göran Rystad states, the historiography of migration might have begun with a perspective of economic history, illustrated, for example, by the work of Harry Jerome, *Migration and Business Cycles*, published in 1926.[2] The main focus of the historiographical trend this work illustrates was the understanding of the determination of the migration impulse, and not directly the description of the social consequences of migration. Logically, this trend leads to the endless debates on push and pull factors. Migration history has also focused at an early stage on the history of the transatlantic migration system, with its great diversity, from slavery and rural settlement to cities and suburbs. Marcus Lee Hansen's *Atlantic Migration* is surely among the most important books in this trend, together with, half a century later, Nicholas Lemann's *Promised Land*.[3]

The history of migrations then followed the progresses of demographic history, with very important questions of method: how to track the migrant in historical records? How to quantify the phenomenon of migration? In the urban case, how to follow the complex individual and familial journeys of migration? This includes a critical approach to the sources: when does the migrant appear in archival sources? In the census? Population records? Tax records? Bureaucratic records of border crossings? Records pertaining to social assistance? But we know how the registration of migrants is itself a complex subject, the study of which implies a critical reflection on the way in which migrants are registered. This also leads to a more social history of migration: migrants may often be tracked in other records that underline the precariousness of their condition, such as poverty, charity, deviance and marginality. This social history of migration, created first for Europe and America, has brought many results, both informative and methodological. Colin Pooley and Ian White gave one of the most stimulating panoramas of this trend.[4] We will see that in the urban case, it has proven an efficient way to build effective categories and concepts. In general, migration studies have been the fertile compost on which urban social sciences have developed since the 1920s. Urban sociology, and also urban history and urban anthropology owe not only some of their most remarkable works, but also their very method and existence as social sciences to subjects linked to migration issues. From William Isaac Thomas and Florian Znaniecki and their work on Polish migrants in America (1918) to Louis Wirth and Robert E. Park, the very core of the so-called Chicago School was characterised by a major focus on migration issues.

But, as the British approach to migration illustrates, the history of migration is also marked by a long affinity with Marxist history. As migrants have often constituted the basis of the proletariat, this is logical. But this poses questions on how to write the history of migrant populations. Marxist history has in this sense evolved from a history of the industrial proletariat and of its living conditions to what is now called subaltern studies. The main question focuses on the sources: how do we write about people who seldom left traces first hand?

The topic of migration has, therefore, logically been at the centre of the focus of historians interested in a renewal of the discipline on the basis of subaltern studies and history from below. Following invitations of Marxist theoreticians such as Antonio Gramsci or Henri Lefebvre, their aim was to bring ordinary people back into history writing. It was also a response to the invitation of the French *Ecole des Annales* to invent a new historical method that is able to bring into the written panorama of history characters other than kings, nobles and notables; not only the history of rulers, but also of the people. Migrants, of course, are the perfect example of generally mute actors of history, and giving them a voice has been one of the stakes of the historical enterprise of subaltern studies. This also follows a suggestion by Gayatri Spivak, who in 1988 published a seminal article, since then quoted many times, in which she posed the question of the voice of the subaltern in a critical way: 'Can the Subaltern Speak?'.[5] Her goal was to discuss the very ideology of postcolonialism.[6] In non-European and non-American contexts, this intellectual framework remains dominant. The question is how to write a history from below of migrant people without carrying the mighty prejudices of the postcolonial legacy?

But not all debates on the treatment of the migration paradigm in the historical discipline are to be reduced to this evolution of the Marxist influence on history writing. There is also a more Kantian perspective, embodied by world history and all its diverse declensions. Migrations are indeed a major justification of the validity of world history as a method: people moving, bringing new characteristics into other systems; all that a world historian likes to deal with. But this also poses many questions to the discipline, regarding the practice of comparison, validity of the categories and quantification of dynamic impulses compared to the inertia of the receptive system. Patrick Manning has recently published a stimulating essay in which he discusses the relationship between migration and world history.[7] From prehistoric population movements to the present, he divided his essay into nine chronologico-thematic sections, the last one being urbanisation in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. With this method, the author is able to embrace the vast complexity of migrations in the last 40,000 years and to draw a rather clear panorama. The crossing of a dominant theme and of a time period, for example, labour in the industrial age up to 1900, is a way to resolve one of the most difficult methodological challenges of world history. But it also masks the perception of other phenomena that a greater attention to the question of scales could have highlighted, like the anthropological dimension of migration, and the fate of the individual in a world that is too big. An attention to the question of scale also permits us to read the impact of migration on societies with other means, such as demography or culture in general. Thus, we analyse the evolution of the institutional framework, adaptation of social rules, modification of the relationship between the individual and society, behavioural components. But world history has other advantages, as it also proposes a specific attention to networks. As Adam McKeown underlines, only looking globally at migrants allows us to perceive the consistence of the social networks they are building.[8] In the field of migration studies, what world history is able to bring is connectivity. For those who focus on Ottoman history, a first major stake is to both include the global dimension of reflection that a vast empire requires and deal with the micro-social dimension of the impact of migration on urban microcosms.

Migration is also an important way to deal with the history of nation-building processes. As nations were often constituted on the solidification of an ideology of identity and belonging, the fate of migrants and the evolution of the way in which they were seen by societies during the course of their nation-building process are a strong indicator of the nature of the process itself. In areas, furthermore, with a diversity of population and a tradition of governance of diversity, like the Ottoman Empire, this point is even more crucial: who is a migrant? Who is the member of a community? How were these elements subject to theoretical constructions during the era of nationalisms? On what base has citizenship been constructed?[9] These are some of the questions that arise from the confrontation of the migration topic with the nation-building issue. But this perspective must be complemented by its reverse: the social construction of diversity and not only the way in which a nation filters diversity in a process of construction of a more or less mythical national cohesion.[10]

The new perspectives on migration history derive from this panorama, with a growing importance of networks, subalterns and social analysis. Some recent works do illustrate this trend.[11] But, as we will see, in the evolution of the historical discipline, the urban framework is also an important indicator of intellectual and ideological evolutions. Cities are also a good terrain for comparative studies, and they allow a crossing of perspectives and methods. This is why they constitute the horizon of a renewal of the perspectives on the history of migrations. They also allow a reading at different scales of the insertion of migrants into the spatial extension of the city, into social networks regulating work and production, and into the institutional panorama. Cities, places of coexistence and diversities, but also of conflict and mediation, were also the places in which the impact between a modernity with strong and contradictory demands and migrant individuals can be read in the light of rich archival resources.

Migration and urban history: the intellectual and methodological framework

Cities have always been a favourite destination for migrants, and the accommodation of newcomers in cities has been, since ancient times, a major issue in urban development. The major areas of focus for study include the following: spatial distribution in the urban territory, demographic contribution to the growth of the urban reality, the relationship to the local labour market, issues of confessional or 'ethnic' balance, treatment by the urban institutions, access to property, access to the sphere of governance, definition of urban citizenship, definition of the local *droit de bourgeoisie* and of local political rights, treatment of marginality and precariousness. With the arrival of migrants in town, not only can the historian read the city's functionality more clearly, but also the very urban system becomes the object of a dynamic interaction with a new element that might modify it, or, in the absence of any modification, reveal its inertia.

Regarding the impact of migration on urban systems, the European and American historiographies have produced a rich, but sometimes divergent literature. Logically, in an American context, the focus has been put on what has historically made the essence of the American city: mass immigration, the constitution of vast cities and suburbs, the urbanisation and Americanisation of populations of foreign and rural origins, the life of urban cultural enclaves in cities and their evolution (with a reflection on the notion of ghetto), and the relationship between industrialisation and urbanisation. The specificity of the American approach allowed for the development of a rich urban historical sociology, the innovative methods of which have been built on the basis of the experience given by the study of migration in an urban context. Many paradigms and concepts useful for the historical study of migrations into Ottoman towns have been elaborated in this context. The European situation also provided the elements for the constitution of a rich literature on the subject. European towns were also closer to the situation of Ottoman towns: the existence of an old regime of urban governance, the existence of a tradition of local forms of self-government anchored in tradition, and the experience of the interaction of this form of government with central powers, the experience of the governance of diversity on the basis of communal regulations, the role of the guilds,[12] role of the notables, definition of the notability, role of religious social regulations, impact of modernity and of state-building processes. This is why, for the historical study of migration into Ottoman towns, a familiarity with the European historiographical legacy is important. Scholars must cover all, from the study of the 'invisible paths' that lead from land to town,[13] to the reading of the living conditions of immigrants or to the contribution of individual life histories, possibly relying on sources produced by the actors, to the whole picture.[14] Attention to the concept of transnational networks is also crucial.[15] But attention to the European situation also proves that not all answers are provided. In such an important book as *Les étrangers dans la ville*, edited by Jacques Bottin and Donatella Calabi, an accurate definition of who is a migrant and when one stops to be such is not to be found and the stranger is sometimes the member of a minority, not a migrant anymore.[16] The historian has to identify migrants from imprecise definitions that are possibly a reflection of discriminations. But this ambiguity might also have positive echoes in the analytical process, as it might reveal an ambiguity in the historical situation. In past societies, there was not necessarily a clear definition of who is from somewhere else, or more precisely, of the scale of extraneousness of the individual in society. From a seasonal migrant from a neighbouring region who comes every year and whom everybody knows in town to the descendant of a family that migrated into town centuries before and is still perceived as alien, the identity of the self in relation to migration was the object of social and cultural interpretations. Thus, the question of the access to urbanity: not just the spatial repartition of the migrant population, and the urban sedimentation that derives from it, but also the integration of migrants, and then their descendants, into the local system of governance.

For research impulses, nothing is as interesting, in a comparative perspective, as Italy.[17] Between the sixteenth and the nineteenth century, according to the place and to the local form of old regime, the regulation of the labour market was in the hands of guilds. Additionally, the degree of openness to migrants, or the specificities of the use of migrant labour forces outside of the guilds in order to avoid their rigidity, can be used as an indicator of the relationship between the urban society and migrants. The same is true for France, as such studies were also made for Paris.[18] What has also been studied with great accuracy for Europe is the integration of families of newcomers into the local nobility or notability, as well as the relationship between urban government and communal regulation. But Europe also provides many examples of studies about the way in which migrants and subalterns were treated in cities. Europe, in its diversity, has also proved a rich terrain for a reading of the changes that came with the end of the various forms of old regime. With modernity, and a new definition of the individual and of political rights, but also of the relationship between local powers and central powers, the situation of the migrant is both the object of new stakes and reveals new tensions in society. This process is not to be read only under the angle of industrialisation. This is why Ottoman studies have to engage in a methodological dialogue with this historiography. Comparison is not juxtaposition. It is rather the practice of an exchange of methods, perspectives and results, with the spirit of crossing heritages and situations. This is the best guarantee against europeocentrism.

The specificities of the Ottoman case

The richness of the Ottoman social urban history invites us to absolutely avoid the position of subordination to other historiographical traditions. If Ottoman studies have to engage in a dialogue with what is made elsewhere, this dialogue has to be conceived in a dynamic way, because the Ottoman urban situation provides a fertile terrain for urban studies and because this terrain has been explored intensively.[19]

For the Ottoman scholar, the first question for the history of migrants is the question of the sources. For more than two decades this question has been the object of an intensive research investment.[20] But migrants present a great specificity, which requires a further reflection on how to write their history. There are, of course, the sources linked to the attempts by authorities, both central and local, to count migrants and to control their influx: censuses, internal passports and deportation.[21] There are also sources linked to the treatment of precariousness in towns: charity, sanitary controls. Of great importance also are sources about the repression of marginality and on the perception of the migrant by society as a danger to public order. And the exploitation of these sources has begun to bring important results. But the stake today is to combine such approaches with the study of documents of another nature: tax registers, property registers, chronicles of urban notables, guild registers, petitions and court records in order to reveal how migration involves society as a whole.

The Ottoman urban history of migration illustrates as great a variety of methods and ideological points of view as does European historiography. From world history to social history or labour history,[22] from Marxist history to history from below, most of the options have been explored. In a recent book, Cem Behar managed to build a methodological synthesis on the scale of a neighbourhood, with a fascinating chapter on the urban integration of migrants through shelters, connections and networks.[23] What Behar tried was also to achieve a junction with the institutional urban history: the study of migrants not only as a social history of a subaltern milieu, but also as an indicator of the functioning of the whole society. Behar tried to anchor the research into the past of urban governance and identified the major poles of notability and moral reference. But his focus was not on institutions. This is precisely one of the stakes of today's research: a crossed perspective that opens to the sphere of governance without leaving the scale of the individual and his experiences. This also explains the main chronological focus of recent studies. New definitions not only of migrants, but also of the role of individuals in society, were brought in during the reform period of the second half of the nineteenth century. When the old system tried to find a way to consolidate its main features into the new one, the main stake for urban notables was to remain such in a time of change. For the Ottoman Empire, the difficulty is in the building of a comparative framework. And even if many efforts have been made for the constitution of a convergent reference system and the writing of synthetic works,[24] migrations and their urban consequences still need to be treated in a way that allows a global outlook at the imperial scale. Such work should also take into account the broader framework of intercontinental population movements, and at the same time, at the scale of the monographic case studies, include an attention to the fate of individuals. The link between demography and urban studies also has to be the object of a special focus.

For the early modern period, it has been shown how demographic changes could modify the equilibrium of a whole region and how towns, but also the nature of the relationship between towns and their rural hinterland, were subject to profound changes.[25] For the time of the reforms, this is also true, and the causal links between migration numbers and new urban equilibriums, or crises, have to be explored. This remains true of course for the post-Ottoman period and even for contemporary Turkey, as Kemal Karpat illustrated with his seminal study on squatter settlements in Northern Istanbul.[26] During the second half of the nineteenth century, reforms were contemporary to great demographic and confessional changes, but not necessarily a response to them. It has been shown for the case of Aleppo in 1850 that anti-Christian urban riots were largely the result of the non-insertion of Muslim newcomers into the governance framework represented by the rule of the *a'yan*.[27] Newcomers had been kept outside of the traditional framework of mediation that the rule of the notables was supposed to embody. They expressed their anger in a way that was violent against a different confessional group, and expressed a distance against a system in which they were not represented and in which they were not invited to participate. The municipal reforms of the next years and decades, promoted throughout the Empire, were at least partially a response to this matter of fact. Indeed, even if they did not seem to propose a valid insertion of newcomers into local civic life, or at least did not propose the immediate horizon of such an insertion, they represented a moment of mediation with the various communal notables. The reforms confirmed the rule of the notables, under a different angle of justification. This is why the study of the access of migrants to urban institutions is so crucial: it is a way to understand the changing face of the local governance system, and the inertia it carries.

The relationship between migrants and urban institutions is also complex. It is not the same thing to benefit from municipal welfare and to sit on the municipal council. Being indirectly represented in the council by a notable of the same confession does not mean that the political rights of migrants have been extended. This demands a closer look at who the migrants are: they themselves transport (part of) their social identity in the process of migration. The migration can either confirm a social status (urban merchant to urban merchant, member of a prestigious guild and member of the local council of notables), upgrade it (poor peasant to urban worker) or downgrade it (peasant to marginal). But there is also the timescale: how many generations are needed to gain a chance to access the urban elite? And which were the initial characteristics that proved more efficient in such a possible social journey: confessional status, spirit of enterprise, family ties, professional belongings?

The question regarding the reforms of the late Ottoman Empire is also to know whether they contributed to open the system or just confirmed previous equilibriums based on a more or less closed notability. For the relationship between migrants and urban institutions in a time of reforms, the question is then: who has access to what and what is new in this process?

One of the answers could come from the new definition of the individual and of its rights brought about by the creation of municipal councils in the towns of the empire. Access to the new urban institutions, though always in the hands of the notability, was defined according to property. And this might have been an open door for some successful migrants, who could have had access in the previous decades to urban property. But of course, only a tiny portion of the mass of migrants and of their descendants took part in this process. This fact invites us to try and define a typology of migrants in Ottoman towns during the reform period of the second half of the nineteenth century, in order to note the difference between the different categories of population, who had different modes of relationship to the local society and its institutions.

How to define a migrant in the Ottoman Empire? A tentative typology

Bruce Masters has illustrated how the influx of migrants in eighteenth-century Aleppo had an influence on city life.[28] Migrants are a challenge to existing (or perceived) equilibriums, and their arrival is an occasion to discuss the long negotiated balance of powers between groups. Even if during the second half of the nineteenth century, the typology of migration evolves, the Ottoman Empire is still to be seen as between two eras. These are the imperial era of wars (with displaced populations and forced migrations, but also with traditional migration routes) and the modern era of labour migrations and rural exodus, itself to be seen in close relation to pre-existing old regime migration routes. These old regime migrations consisted of seasonal work, the consequences of wars and conflicts, imperial policy governance of territories and of the diversity of populations. What is to be stressed is that during the nineteenth century, the nature of such migrations changed deeply under the effect of nationalisms, modern wars, modern labour conditions, industrialisation and urbanisation. What is of interest in the Ottoman case is the very specific relationship it presents with modernity. Each category of migrants is the object of deep redefinitions. The reading of these evolutions is not only a key to a better understanding of migrations, but also of the impact of the whole Ottoman structure and society on modernity.

Nomads

The Ottoman case presents the very interesting specificity of including in its migration feature some migrations linked to the practice of nomadism. This practice experienced deep transformations with the impact of modernity: changing routes, sedentarisation and changing of the social value of nomadic practices. Nomadism was also seen as a potential challenge to the territorial 'rationality' nationalisms were constructing.[29] In a space where nomadism had been a tradition for centuries, and where nomads used to come to town on various occasions and had developed a peculiar relationship to urbanity, with provisional settlements outside of the walls and the practice of some seasonal works, the changes induced by modernity were a big challenge for this habit and for the networks of relationships it used to feed. As Reşat Kasaba's work illustrates, from the eighteenth century on, the Ottoman State has been in a constant double dynamic with nomadic populations. On the one hand, imperial authorities stimulated settlement in stable villages, and, on the other, they used the nomadic populations as a feature of territorial control.[30] For an analysis of the urban aspects of this complex process, a lot remains to be done, and this subject clearly constitutes one of the most promising horizons of Ottoman urban history. With the study of nomadism, not only can the Ottoman urban panorama be refined, but also the method used for its analysis. And through the urban lens, it is the whole imperial structure that is to be read. With the rise of nationalism, the identity of nomads and their urban belonging was indeed questioned. The example of Roma (Gypsies) is a good illustration of the challenge posed to the old regime organisation by an ambiguous modernity. The study of these populations in the Empire has been thoroughly renewed in recent years and today constitutes a new stake.[31] Discussing the relationship between nomadism, ethnicity, the State and local authorities is surely a promising way of challenging common views on modernisation, just as is the examination of the fate of the concept of tribe during the modernisation process. For the urban space, the case of Roma is also very important, as they represent the persistence of old ways to consider the relationship between a town and its hinterland in a time where impulses towards 'normalisation' (that is, reduction to a determined model) were strong.

Marginals

This field is also subject to important renewals, in the wake of present impulses in the whole field of subaltern studies.[32] Marinos Sarigiannis' work on marginals and deviance in Ottoman Istanbul illustrates the importance of new methods and questionings in the urban history of the Empire.[33] It is also an invitation to revisit the research field. With the modernisation process of the second half of the nineteenth century, not only was the social and administrative treatment of marginality evolving, but also the very nature of being marginal. Through marginals, it is a whole society that is to be read. Many questions are indeed linked to the history of marginals: was migration responsible for marginalisation? What was the impact on urban social and behavioural norms? And the impact on urban institutions? What is also crucial with the impact of modernity is the evolution of the social treatment of marginality: assistance, soup kitchens and dispensaries evolve from old regimes to modern bureaucracies or from charities to modern social systems. In this process, the nature of urban governance can also be read, and notably the consequences of the growth of the bureaucratic apparel on social relations. If we know the old regime patterns of assistance quite well, from Istanbul to the Ottoman Maghreb,[34] the very process of evolution to modern structures is less known, and even less the consequences of this evolution on social links. Networks of solidarity, clientelism and religious charity were subject, during the course of the nineteenth century, to strong redefinitions. The scale of this redefinition illustrates and indicates the depth of the changes of nature to which the whole urban society was submitted.

Displaced populations

Within the vast category of forced migrations in the Ottoman Empire (these migrations existed well before the nineteenth century), one can differentiate various cases: displaced Muslims escaping Russian expansion,[35] consequences of Greek independence in its various phases, or of the various Balkan crises and wars,[36] North-African notables fleeing colonisation, displaced nomads sent by the Ottoman government to another part of the Empire in order to ease territorial control over frontier zones, displaced minorities seeking refuge in town and slaves being imported into Ottoman cities.[37] The cities of the Empire in the nineteenth century were crowded with different waves of refugees or displaced people who had to settle in towns and insert themselves into the housing and labour markets. The treatment of this question by the authorities provides many indications on the evolution of the very conception of imperial governance. The time of the Ottoman reforms was also a time of increased need for municipal assistance to these populations. In the very moment in which urban government evolved from old regime structures to modern municipalities, refugees constituted a major challenge to the efficiency of welfare organisations. The fate of refugees in towns is a good occasion for the historian to read the urban charitable system not only through its principles and application, but also through its civic dimension.

Seasonal workers

Seasonal workers represent a rich tradition of old regime migration, which was confronted with modernity during the second half of the nineteenth century.[38] Greek workers from various parts of the Ottoman Empire were very active in seasonal or 'circular' migrations, for example.[39] After 1830, and the establishment of a Greek national state in which only a portion of the Greek population lived, these migrations continued, in and out of the Empire. But there was a notable change in the basis of the relationship between local identity, identity of the migrant and national frameworks. This is precisely the point at which we can begin to analyse the evolution of Ottoman seasonal migrations. What is also interesting with Greek seasonal migrations is that they changed scale and nature, to feed more stable migrations to America or Australia, in a process that is very important to understand in order to determine the nature of Ottoman emigration. The Empire also knew other forms of seasonal migration, from rural regions to towns, creating a whole urban world of professions, the relationship of which with the guild system evolved over the course of the century, challenging old regime balances and illustrating the passage to a modern form of industrial organisation.

Urban proletariat

In the nineteenth century, the Ottoman manufacturing system in general evolved and required new workers.[40] This had a strong impact on the nature of migration. The question is to know whether the specificities of the Ottoman industrialisation produced massive migration toward cities. As Donald Quataert illustrated, one of the specificities of the Ottoman industrial development is the importance of the domestic system, with textile work being distributed into homes. Concerning Aleppo, D. Quataert also illustrated the lasting importance of guilds in the organisation of work. From a traditional migration of populations of rural origin performing subaltern jobs[41] at the service of the urban society, to an industrial proletariat posing the question of the impact of a modernity seen as the influence of the capitalistic organisation of society, the study of the establishment of migrants in towns poses the question of the nature of the late Ottoman society. Beyond this, it raises the question of the nature of the industrialisation process of urban societies in so-called peripheries and that of the transformation of the urban mass into a proletariat.[42]

Merchants

The case of migrant merchants is interesting because it allows us to read migration stories with good possibilities of integration into a dominant social milieu, thanks to previous contacts. Sadok Boubaker evokes the case of a merchant of Ottoman Tunis in the seventeenth century whose enrichment was made step-by-step by temporary migrations to Palermo. This process allowed him to achieve a better social status among the Tunis notability.[43] For the reform period, the question is to know whether this kind of migration continued along the traditional routes of Ottoman trade and whether local notabilities were still open to that kind of newcomer in a time in which the equation between merchant and notable was subject to change.

Emigration from the Empire

The urban aspect of Ottoman migrations between 1870 and 1920 also includes migration by Ottoman citizens to towns outside of the Empire. Not only to Athens, a post-Ottoman town that attracts Greeks from all over the Empire (even if the major wave of migration to Athens only started in 1922), but also to New York or Melbourne. The migration of Ottoman citizens to America has been studied, but not always in its urban echoes.[44] Greeks, Armenians and Syrians, of both rural and urban origin in the Empire, settled in very different urban situations and were confronted with very special adaptation requirements. Does communal life in America reproduce features of communal confessional urban regulation in the Empire? How did they integrate into municipal life in New York or Manchester?[45] An interesting perspective is also to look at the consequences of international migrations from the Ottoman Empire in terms of gender relations.[46]

Immigration of Europeans into the Ottoman Empire

The Ottoman Empire was also the object of migration from European citizens, such as German workers,[47] Italian workers for the Damascus Medina Railway,[48] English manufacturing experts, European Jews in Ottoman Palestine[49] and Europeans in Tunis.[50] We must also take into account European colonial migrations into ex-Ottoman provinces.[51] In a changing geopolitical context with colonial ideas becoming more pressing, as far as the Ottoman Empire is concerned, not only are the living conditions of migrants interesting, but also the way in which they conceived their relationship to Ottoman urban institutions. The evolution of the reformed Tunis municipality is very telling in this sense.[52] For the case of Jerusalem, the history of the reformed Ottoman municipality in a time of strong growth of the population with European background is also a mirror of the main tensions of the time.[53] In general, beyond the specificities of each case, what is at stake is the functioning of the Ottoman modernised urban government apparel in the context of new geopolitical equilibriums.

From rural migrant to urban citizen? Ways and detours of the urban integration in an Ottoman context

In this historiographical context, one of the main issues raised today in Ottoman studies is how urban societies functioned when confronted with newcomers. As migrants were a challenge to the existing system, the study of their fate allows historians to understand the system better, or to trace its possible malfunctions. So what was the system? In the Ottoman urban old regime, cities were generally ruled by an elite of merchants and/or nobles, in conjunction with a representative of the central imperial power. Participation in civic life was opened to certain categories of inhabitants: noble families, notable merchant families, notable families of members of powerful guilds and sometimes religious notables. Charity towards unstable populations, poor populations or migrants was a prerogative of the civic institutions, sometimes in relation to the representative of the Empire when a specific emergency, sanitary or political, required it. So, the challenge of migration is twofold: how does the charitable treatment of migrants reveal the system, and how does the integration, or not, of newcomers also reveal it and its possible inertia.

Assistance was a highly civic prerogative, including communal and religious aspects. In an old regime system, newcomers who needed assistance were never neutral elements. They had a precise identity, and the way they could be assisted depended on it: confession, origin, occupation and family. But modernity brings huge changes into this system, on both sides. The principles of civic assistance changed, and the nature of migrants too.

Assistance was also a way to make the architecture of the system visible. Communal assistance reinforced the cohesion of communities, municipal assistance was a way to make reformed municipalities visible on the institutional scene. A common feature is that in Ottoman towns, assistance, and the coordination of its various forms, was a prerogative of the civic elite. In the case of emergencies, like the influx of refugees from a lost province, which overwhelmed the traditional framework of assistance, civic assemblies organised a special network of assistance in conjunction with imperial authorities. In various cases, imperial authorities also decided to tax urban notabilities in order to organise assistance to refugees. In the context of an Ottoman old regime, assistance was a mirror of the whole system and remained such in the time of reforms.

But charity and assistance are not all. The question of the possibilities of integration into the civic elite for migrants and their descendants is an important indicator of the state of openness or not of the Ottoman society. The migrant carried some important elements of identity: origin, religion, family belonging, profession, membership in labour, civic or religious institutions, experience of former practices of seasonal migration and existence in town of a network of affinity. In an old regime system, these elements were determinants for the positioning of the migrant in urban society. These elements are also clues for the historian towards a comprehension of the ways of integration: assistance first, but then logging, working, marriage. But civic participation remains a question. It is part of the stakes of today's research to determine which elements were likely to open entry for newcomers towards civic institutions. Were Ottoman civic elites a closed social milieu, or, on the contrary, were they open to the integration of newcomers? What were the channels of integrations, or, on the contrary, the obstacles?

Concerning various towns from North Africa to the Levant, some elements tend to show that a migrant had chances to be integrated as an urban notable sooner if:

> he himself was already a notable in his town of origin. For example, this was the case of 'Ali Rida Pasha al Jazayri, who fled the French invasion in Algeria as a child with his father who was a *qadi*. Son of an urban notable, he was granted education and access to notability in Istanbul, and made a great career as Ottoman governor in various cities of the Empire;
> he achieved successful integration into a guild thanks to previous contacts;
> he developed a sphere of moral and/or religious notability;
> he used imperial relays such as holding an imperial office (including military);
> he used a communal relay to become first a communal notable and then an urban notable;
> he set up a successful commercial activity and granted himself access to notability through property.

The initial baggage in all cases appears determinant, but also the comprehension of the mechanisms of the system. Outside of these type cases, the access to notability seemed longer, if not closed.

Do the reforms of the second half of the nineteenth century change this panorama? If they change the definition of the notable, do they also change the grade of openness of the system? What is sure is that the *Tanzimât* reinforced the importance of property in the definition of notability. It also reinforced the role of measurable fiscal capacities. Even if precise studies on the consequences of this shift are still to be done, it appears that the reforms, on the one hand, tended to limit the functioning of old regime regulations, but, on the other hand, included the possibility of integrating newcomers through an access to civic rights granted by property.

But the reforms also changed the nature of civic assistance to migrants. As charity was an essential feature of the previous system, and as it was challenged by the new reality of the nineteenth century, its reform was a crucial point for the whole process of reform. How to make municipal what was the prerogative of the former civic elite and of the communities? And what was really municipalised? It appears, of course, that a lot remained in the hands of the communities. Their role as an accommodation chamber for the integration of migrants into urban societies seemed to survive the reforms well. Municipalities, on their behalf, formally received new tasks, as the one of organising charitable bequests, stated in the new Ottoman municipal code.

As for civic integration, despite the inclusion of articles about property into the most important reformative acts, the impression is that reforms often cemented one's belonging to the civic elite and formalised some aspects of a civic life that relied earlier on a more ductile definition of notability. As municipal reforms introduced a list of civic notables, and as revisions of this list were not made as often and openly as the sole criterion of wealth would have asked, the result was often that access to notability was closed. The first effect of the reforms was to recognise existing notabilities, sometimes integrating previously underrepresented categories; but then inertia often prevailed. The inertia of the fixed list of municipal voters also reinforced this tendency. It was easier to enter the circle of urban notables when the list existed in a pre-bureaucratic order (in the form of a chronicle, for example) than when a list was bureaucratically formalised and not constantly revised. The very process of revision, due to a complex communal equilibrium, was the object of such tensions that it was not done as often as it should have been. For migrants, the result was a more difficult access to civic life. This was clearly the case in Beirut, Jerusalem, Tripoli and Alexandria, for example. And when openness was implemented, it was often in the context of European pressures of a colonial nature.

This matter of facts is also interesting for comprehension of the nature of the *Tanzimât* process itself. The reforms, on the one hand, introduced some elements of a new definition of the individual self in Ottoman society, but not without references to the old regime identity (confession, community). But, on the other hand, it deprived the individual from a certain margin of fuzziness, which the old system had as a constitutive tool. This old regime fuzziness was an element of liberty for negotiation. So the ambiguity of the reforms for migrants is that, on the one hand, they changed the definition of who individuals were, but not enough to let them live in the new system with equal chances. As a migrant in the era of reforms, you were still tagged with your origin, community, profession and belonging or not to various institutions, but had to live in a city where not all doors related to these tags were potentially open anymore. Old regime patronage did not function as well as before, but the new regime was in no way universalist.

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3 The Ottoman City Council and the beginning of the modernisation of urban space in the Balkans

Tetsuya Sahara

During the nineteenth century, urban space in the Balkans underwent a drastic change. The urban population constantly expanded, with Christians especially increasing in number. Owing to energetic activity on the part of non-Muslim merchants and artisans, the urban economy as a whole flourished in many parts of the peninsula; and the very scenery of the cities was changed substantially as well. Alongside centuries-old mosques and hamams (public baths), the city centre was now furnished with European-style buildings, such as city halls, community houses, clock towers, schools and the elegant residences of wealthy merchants.

Traditional Balkan historiography has posited that the basic driving force underlying these changes was the emergence of a national bourgeoisie.[1] Such a view regards the changes in the urban space as a prelude to national independence. The same period, however, was the time when reform-minded Ottoman bureaucrats attempted to introduce a European-style rule to wide-ranging fields of administration, with particular concern for the renovation of the urban space. In this chapter, I try to ascertain the effects of Ottoman municipal reform on the modernisation of Balkan urban space.[2]

Ottoman Balkan cities and a new trend in the nineteenth century

The once prosperous ancient urban civilization of the Balkans had almost died out by the time of the Ottoman conquest.[3] The Ottomans brought with them a new flavour of urban culture from Middle Eastern Islamic civilization. Towns were initially built for the Ottoman administrative authorities and for the army garrisons. Gradually, in many towns, there began to appear Islamic foundations (*vakıf*) that provided the infrastructure for the various economic activities of Muslim merchants and artisans, who quickly took over from local Christian mercantile classes, and dominated the urban space.[4]

As towns developed into the commercial and manufacturing centres of a district, they also provided a link between the local economies and the larger economic zone of the Middle East, serving as locales for the diverse confluence associated with trade. This contributed to the ethnic diversity: Jews, Armenians and other ethnic groups formed their own communities in the cities on the main trade routes across the Balkans.[5] In this way, the multi-religious and multi-ethnic (albeit Muslim-dominated) character of Balkan urban space took shape.

Unlike the rapid growth of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, in the seventeenth century Balkan cities were subject to sudden decline. Lack of investment can be seen in that most of the important public constructions in Balkan cities were built as late as the second half of the sixteenth century. The stagnation of commercial activities, mainly brought about by local unrest, reached its nadir during the last decades of the eighteenth century. The ebb of urban activity, however, was reversed at the beginning of the new century.

According to Michael Palairet, the total population of the Ottoman Balkans was 8.3 million in 1850, in contrast to 5.5 million in 1815. Thus, the average population growth was 1.36 per cent. Owing to population pressure, European Turkey regained its active urban life. The percentage of people who dwelled in localities of more than 2,000 people was about 27 per cent in Macedonia during the 1880s and the 1890s. The urban population in Bulgaria and Bosnia stood at between 12 and 18 per cent in the 1860s. These figures are notable if compared with the case of Serbia, where the proportion of city dwellers never exceeded 8 per cent.[6]

It has been noted that the nineteenth century saw a different trend in urban population expansion. Whereas the earlier urbanisation had been a product of the growth of Muslim city dwellers, in the nineteenth century we find an obviously disproportional increase in Christian citizens. In Bulgaria, there were only four cities where Muslims composed the overwhelming majority among a total of 38, whereas the number of Christian-dominated cites was five.[7] The same trend was observed in Bosnia, Kosovo and southern Serbia. For example, allegedly more than 13,000 Christians lived in Niş [Niš], the administrative centre of Southern Serbia, in 1861, whereas the Muslim population was about 5,000.[8]

Let us examine this topic further by taking the Macedonian case as an example. Although a steady increase in the Christian population of the urban space had been discernible in 1790 1830,[9] the trend became irreversible after the 1850s. Between the 1850s and 1870s, Macedonian cities were roughly classified into four categories according to their pattern of development. The first group, the largest cities, was composed of Selanik [Thessaloniki] (75,000 80,000), Manastır [Bitola] (40,000), Siroz [Serres] (25,000), Üsküb [Skopje] (22,000 25,000), Drama (12,000) and Debre [Debar] (12,000). All of these were either provincial capitals or prefectural centres. The second group was composed of Köprülü [Veles], İştib [Štip] (both 15,000 20,000) and other middle size cities of 7,000 13,000 population (Perlepe [Prilep], Ohrid, Kesriye [Kastria], Vodine [Edessa], Tetovo and Kavala). All of them were county centres. The third group was composed of such cities as Kumanova, Karaferye [Veroia], Yeniçe Vardar [Giannitsa] and Avret Hisar [Kilkis]. The common characteristic of this group was that they had grown in size by a factor of two or three during this period; they had been no more than large villages in the 1850s. The remaining cities such as İstormiçe [Strumica], Navrokop [Goce Delčev] and so on belonged to the last group, the common feature of which was constant population shrinkage.

The cities classified in the first three groups, without exception underwent rapid population growth, at least 30 per cent, but usually more than 50 per cent, within the three-decade period under study. What is noteworthy is that this increase virtually coincided with the growth of the Christian population: in the first group, where the traditional pattern of religious distribution, that is, a Muslim majority (Selanik was the only exception, where the Jewish community was the largest), had been barely maintained, the presence of Christian communities began to be felt more and more strongly. As for the second group, Christians succeeded, though only slightly, in outnumbering Muslims. It was in the third group that the Christian preponderance was undisputable.[10]

It is obvious that the most important factor in population increase in nineteenth-century Balkan cities was immigration, as the growth of urban dwellers outnumbered any natural increase. We have many records that suggest an increase in demographic fluidity during the nineteenth century. In northern Albania, there was a considerable influx of seasonal workers. They usually moved in groups, called *çega,* who came down from the mountainous regions in autumn to the lowland cities, where they were engaged in manual labour as carpenters, bakers and housekeepers, returning to the mountains in spring.[11] The same type of seasonal worker operated on a large scale in Macedonia. At harvest time they came from the mountain villages to find work in the picking and processing of cotton, tobacco and silk cocoons.[12] Macedonia was also famous as a supplier of skilled workers, and in Northern Bulgaria the presence of Macedonian craftsmen was disproportionately large. Whereas the proportion of skilled workers among immigrants from the Balkan mountains and Thrace was between 30 and 32 per cent, it exceeded 60 per cent for Macedonia.[13] In Serbia, Greece and Romania, Macedonian artisans were also welcomed for their expert skills. The most conspicuous example might be those from Kırçova [Kruševo]. They too moved in groups, called *taifs,* and engaged in various types of work as gardeners, butchers, goldsmiths, carpenters and merchants. Their sphere of activity was not limited to the Balkans, however; some went as far as Vienna, Leipzig, Budapest, İstanbul, İzmir, Beirut and Alexandria.[14]

As well as long-distance immigration, mobility over limited distances also increased. For the scale and significance of the composition of the urban population, the latter could be more important. For example, the proportion of new immigrants in urban areas constantly exceeded 6 per cent in northern Bulgaria and Dobruja in 1868 72. Although this conclusion was deduced from partial data, if we look at the case of Küstençe [Constanța] and Hacı Oğlu Pazarcık [Dobrič], where the data have been well preserved, the proportion was much larger, 14.5 per cent and 33 per cent respectively.[15] These cases clearly show that new citizens usually came from areas close by. Although the information is limited, the same conclusion may well be applicable to other regions.

A new trend in the incorporation process of urban immigrants

Whether or not short-range immigration outnumbered long-distance immigration is not crucial for our discussion. More important is how the immigrants adjusted to new circumstances. In this respect, a new trend emerged around the middle of the nineteenth century. As explained above, the primary pressure that led to an increase in the urban population was Christian immigration. However, if we take into account the discussion of urbanisation and Islamisation in the earlier stage of Ottoman rule, the Christianisation of nineteenth-century Balkan cities cannot be fully explained by immigration data only; because, in the earlier stage urbanisation was also a result of the widespread immigration of Christian peasants. So the question is not the scale or place of origin of the immigrants, but the process of their incorporation into the urban space. In other words, why did Christian peasants not accept Islam in the nineteenth century, whereas their predecessors seemed to have been willing to do so?

As late as the beginning of the eighteenth century, conversion (to Islam) was no exceptional phenomenon, but, rather, a common event. However, it occurred less and less frequently after that date, and at the beginning of the nineteenth century to change faith was regarded as one of the most serious violations of communal life. We can use a collection of documents prepared by the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences as circumstantial evidence for this. The book contains 174 archival documents concerning the Islamisation of Balkan Christians, of which 124 date between 1680 and 1734. It seems plausible that conversion occurred frequently before the middle of the eighteenth century but suddenly halted after that.[16]

This suggests that religious intolerance was prevalent in the Balkans at the beginning of the nineteenth century.[17] The tendency increased in the course of the nineteenth century, so that by the middle of the century it had become very difficult to change one's communal affiliation, even among the Orthodox Christians. So-called Grecomans, or Hellenised Orthodox Christians, are one of the focuses of discussion among Bulgarian and Macedonian historians. Usually, Hellenisation has been explained either as the result of malicious intrigue by Greek priests who dominated the Orthodox Church, or as a betrayal by wealthy Slavic merchants of their national cause. However, Hellenisation was deeply connected with Ottoman policy.

After examining the pedigrees of more than 400 families that had lived in the central district of Filibe [Provdiv] in the nineteenth century, the Bulgarian historian Zina Markova reached the conclusion that, whereas there had been a strong tendency towards Hellenisation among Bulgarians in Filibe as late as the 1820s, this suddenly decreased in the 1830s, and ceased completely afterwards. She considers the reason for this change to be that, until the 1820s, Bulgarian immigrants were encouraged by the practical need for economic success to make great efforts to learn the Greek language and customs, and willingly merged into Hellenism. However, after the 1830s, a wealthy Bulgarian stratum began to prevail, and newcomers felt no difficulty about living in the urban space without abandoning their old identities.[18] Although Markova did not explain why wealthy Orthodox merchants and craftsmen could function as Bulgarians after the 1830s, it is no coincidence that this happened just after the Greek war of independence. It is well known that after the outbreak of insurrection in Morea, the Ottoman government changed its policy of marked preference for Greeks, and began to distribute the administrative functions of the Orthodox millet among non-Greek elements.

This change of policy might partly explain the root cause of the increasing authority in the Balkans of non-Greek orthodox communities. From the 1830s on, all over the Slavic regions in the Ottoman Balkans, local community offices appeared. The fact that they had their own seals and register books kept in Slavic dialects suggests that Slavic Christians, instead of Greek priests, began to look after their own communal affairs.[19] These Slavic Orthodox community offices began as lay parochial committees that were to take care of the financial affairs of their local church, but they gradually enlarged their sphere of activity to such fields as education, civil suits, support of orphans and the poor, fire fighting and garbage collection, and eventually functioned as a kind of local government for Orthodox Christians.[20] The establishment and institutionalisation of these offices also contributed to facilitating the accommodation of migrants, as they provided judicial protection as a kind of civil court and offered the basic information necessary for adjustment to urban life by opening elementary schools.

Traditionally, historians have explained the genesis and development of Slavic Orthodox community offices as a somewhat parthenogenetic process, with an emphasis on the independent nature of the institutions, their characteristic voluntary organisation and the self-sufficient mechanisms of their domestic affairs. However, taking into consideration the fact that the rapid development of Orthodox Christian autonomous institutions occurred at the same time as the establishment of the Ottoman Empire's local government reform, the reality does not seem to have been so simple.

Beginning of the municipal reform during the Tanzimat

Starting as military and administrative centres, the pre-modern cities of the Ottoman Balkans lacked a unified authority that took care of the administration of urban space. As they hosted a mix of religious and ethnic communities, most of the public service was entrusted to each community. The latter took responsibility for various tasks, such as sanitation, construction of public roads, street cleaning, sewage disposal and fire fighting.[21] Owing to a diverse system of administration, the cities were vulnerable to disasters such as major fires or epidemics.

As late as the beginning of the nineteenth century, a handful of reform-minded bureaucrats and Western-oriented intellectuals felt there was an urgent need to improve the urban space. After the failure of initial efforts, in 1858 the Ottoman government took decisive steps toward the establishment of a modern urban policy. It was then that a new office of the city administration council (*Belediye Meclisi*) was set up, entrusted with various public works for the urban space.[22]

The beginning of modern municipal administration in the Ottoman Empire was the establishment of the sixth district in Istanbul in 1858. The genesis and failure of this sixth district have been relatively well studied, and many historians have considered it to be the model for the urban policy that was to spread into provincial cities. It may partly explain why numerous researchers are sceptical about how far modern urban policy permeated provincial cities. For example, Osman Nuri Ergin, the pioneer of Ottoman urban studies, considered that even Istanbul did not have a municipal government other than that established in the sixth ward, and there is no doubt that such innovations were not successful in the provinces.[23] However, as Erkan Serçe points out, Istanbul was too large to be the model for the other cities, which were usually far smaller.[24] Thus, it is necessary to look elsewhere for the real origin of provincial municipal reforms.

It is well known that the Ottoman government established the Danube province in 1864 as the model for local administration reforms. In the following year, the governor of the province, Midhat Paşa, petitioned the Supreme Council of the Tanzimat (*Meclis-i Vala*) to set up a city council in Rusçuk [Ruse], the main provincial city. The proposal was approved on 6 October, and the 'rules on the form of organization and the duties of the staff of the city council that was to be established first at Rusçuk, and that was then to be established at other cities and towns in the province' became law.[25] It is noteworthy that this law also ordered that the 'rules' be applied to other provinces as well. Shortly after it was put into effect, a new municipal law was promulgated, on 25 July 1867. Most of the regulations under this law coincide with the 'rules of Rusçuk.' Thus, it is clear that the 'rules of Rusçuk' served as a blueprint for the law; and that the model for provincial municipal government was Rusçuk, and not Istanbul.

Let us now examine more closely what these rules consisted of. All administrative duties within the municipality were entrusted to a council, which was composed of appointed government officials and councillors elected by the local populace. It was to have regular sessions twice a week to discuss matters concerning the municipal administration, and to execute its decisions with the approval of higher authorities. These decisions were to be reached by majority vote.

The council was to have its own budget. Special attention was paid to financial stability, and the municipality was required to be financially self-sufficient. Thus, the government allotted wide-ranging sources of local income to the municipality, which came through various channels. Major items of income were property taxes, registration fees for real estate, various market duties and taxes allotted to the municipality according to local usages. Such income was to cover the expenses related to tasks carried out by the municipality, as well as the salaries of its employees. The municipality was to employ secretaries, treasurers and janitors.

The works entrusted to the municipality were to cover the following fields of public service: infrastructure construction, social welfare, public sanitation, police, medical and fire fighting services.

In regard to the urban infrastructure, road maintenance received the highest priority. The municipality was charged with surveying and registering existing roads, and with the construction and repair of pavements and sidewalks. These expenses were shared by the owners of the shops and houses lining the road, and were distributed according to the width of their frontage. The Provincial Reform Law added the construction and maintenance of water supply and drainage canals, the installation of street lighting and the construction of public parks to the previous task list.

Police duties included supervising the transportation business, issuing permits for and collecting fees from bars and casinos, and cracking down on illegal enterprises. Fire fighters oversaw the safekeeping and maintenance of pumps and other fire fighting tools, and employed special officials. The municipality also offered ambulance services, assisted homeless people, provided vocational education for orphans, supplied medical aid to handicapped persons, managed the garbage collection and street cleaning, handled quality control for food and for measuring instruments, and supervised real estate transactions and the population register.

With all these functions in mind, we can conclude that the city council had authority in two areas. The first included functions previously carried out by traditional urban organisations, such as Islamic judges, city officials, religious communities and guilds. For example, the municipality took over such services as relief work for the poor, fire fighting, street cleaning, and the water service, all of which had been performed by the autonomous religious communities.

The second area of authority extended to those works that became necessary in response to a new, European style of urban life. All were previously unknown, or at least exceptional, in the traditional Ottoman urban space. These included city illumination, the construction of paved roads, parks and other public spaces, the control of traffic, and maintenance of the population register. In this regard, municipal reform was to integrate the various functions, old and new, into the hands of a single administrative body. By so doing, the Ottoman reformers intended to create a unified urban space.

Another important characteristic was that the new system opened the door to administration by the local populace as council members. Councillors were to be elected by local communities. Respect was shown for the religious and ethnic composition of the locality. Consideration was given, not only to parity of Muslims and non-Muslims, but also to a fair distribution of seats among the non-Muslim communities. In this way, the Ottoman government attempted to simultaneously realise popular participation and religious equality.

Bearing in mind the need for financial self-sufficiency, the rulers had to achieve two further goals with municipal reforms reducing the financial burden and improving relations within communities. But how successful were they and to what extent were their intentions realised? We shall examine detailed information concerning the activities of the city council in the Balkans; and our first task is to survey the places where the city councils were set up.

Territorial distribution of the city councils

During the period under discussion, the Ottoman authorities published provincial yearbooks (*Vilayet Salnameleri*) under the aegis of the provincial governments. Although they were expected to appear every year, thus reflecting local conditions, some provinces failed to issue them regularly. Nevertheless, they are an important source of information about the activities of city councils, as they contain lists of the public officials of each county (*Kaza*), including the staff members of the city councils. Based on this information, the place and date of establishment of councils, together with the names of officials and council members, can be determined. The present study makes reference to 37 copies of the total 44 provincial yearbooks (i.e. 84 per cent) published in the Balkans during the Tanzimat period.[26]

In the Danube province, which covered Northern Bulgaria and Southern Serbia, all but four county centres had their own city councils recorded in the first provincial yearbook in 1869. The İvraça [Vraca] city council was established in 1870, and the councils of Plevene [Pleven] and Cümaa-ı Atik [Eskidžumaja] were set up in 1871. Mangalya [Mangelia] was the only city without a council; this eventually was created in 1874. Thus, municipal reform was introduced into most of the cities in the Danube province.

Southern Bulgaria and Thrace were part of the Edirne province during the third quarter of the nineteenth century. The provincial government first published its yearbook in 1871. Only four counties were without city councils at that time. Among them, Kırin Abad [Karnobat] and Missivri [Nesebar] established councils the following year. Municipal reform was thus widely introduced in this province as well.

In Bosnia, one of the earliest municipal governments in the Balkans was established in Sarajevo, but it was very slow in spreading to the other cities. The second city council in Bosnia was founded in Banaluka [Banja Luka] in 1870. An additional four cities (Bihçe [Bihač], Mostar, İzvornik [Zvornik] and Travnik) established their own councils in the following year. In 1872, the city council of Seniçe [Sjenica] was set up. All of the six cities were prefectural centres, and it should be stressed that the regulations of the municipal reform were never fully implemented in Bosnia, and that the municipal system was unknown in more than half of the county capitals until the end of the Ottoman rule there. The same was true for Albania and Kosovo.

In order to ascertain the differences between the provinces, it is useful to compare the situation in 1876 (Table 3.1). In this year, all the six provincial governments (Bosnia, Danube, Edirne, Manastır, Selanik and Yanya) published yearbooks. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, 17 city councils were set up in the total of 44 counties. Thus, municipal reform covered 38.6 per cent of the counties. The rate in Albania was 61.9 per cent, Kosovo 75 per cent and Southern Serbia 85.7 per cent.

Table 3.1 City councils in the Balkans, 1876

	Counties	*City councils*	*%*
Bosnia and Herzegovina	44	17	38.6
Albania	21	13	61.9
Kosovo	8	6	75.0
Southern Serbia	14	12	85.7
Macedonia	17	16	94.1
Northern Greece	42	39	92.8
Bulgaria	55	52	94.5
Dobruja	8	8	100
Eastern Thrace	18	18	100

Source: Sahara/Vilayet Salnameleri.

On the other hand, municipal governments were set up in more than 90 per cent of the cities in the Eastern provinces. There was a sharp contrast between the Eastern and Western Balkans. With Kosovo as the watershed, the municipal reform was well introduced in the Eastern provinces, whereas the Western Balkans were late and slow in accepting it.

It is notable that reform was less advanced in those places where Muslims represented the majority of the population. Considering that the Western provinces experienced strong Muslim opposition to the Tanzimat reform during the first half of the nineteenth century, it may be said that the key impediment to implementing reform lay in the intensity of negative Muslim reaction.

Ethno-religious composition of the city councils

The poor development of city councils in Muslim-dominated regions may have something to do with the pluralistic purpose of the reform. As often mentioned, the Ottoman reformers intended to improve relations within their subject communities, which were divided along religious lines. The introduction of religious equality in the field of administration was the official principle of the Tanzimat, and was clearly articulated both in the Gülhane Decree of 1839 and the Reform Edict of 1856. Municipal reform was one of the best examples of this policy, as it introduced religious parity to the selection of local representatives.

The 'rules of Rusçuk' and the Provincial Reform Law set the term of office for councillors at two years, and upon completion of this first term annual elections were to be held, in which half of the council members were eligible for re-election. The authority could then approve those elected as councillors.

The process for electing councillors was rather complicated. The 'rules of Rusçuk' prescribed that two Muslims, two Bulgarians, one Jew and one Armenian be elected by the council of elders (*ihtiyar meclisi*) of the town, whereas the Municipal Law of 1867 simply directed that the election be determined by the council of elders in 'the same manner as in the other local councils.' The wording 'in the same manner as in the other local councils' meant that the election laws of the Danube province were applicable. According to these, in all localities with a substantial non-Muslim population, half of the councillors were to be elected from non-Muslims, and the other half from the Muslim population. When the non-Muslim population was composed of several different groups, the seats were to be allocated according to the size of the communities.

Table 3.2 shows the proportion of non-Muslim representation of each office. There are 990 chairpersons (including deputy chairs), 814 secretaries, 363 treasurers and 4,519 councillors among the total of 6,543 municipal staff listed in the above-mentioned provincial yearbooks. The number of members of the city councils is 5,509, of which non-Muslim members account for 2,400; thus, the rate of non-Muslim representation is 43.6 per cent.

As the majority of chairpersons and deputy chairs were Muslim, the religious constitution of the city councils generally tended to be Muslim-dominated. Looking at the number of councillors, however, we find parity in the representation of Muslims

Table 3.2 Religious composition of the city councils

	Total	*Muslims*	*Non-Muslims*	*Unknown*	*Proportion of non-Muslims (%)*
Total	6,540	3,920	2,475	145	37.8
Elected councillors	4,519	2,066	2,355	97	52.1
Secretaries	814	796	10	8	1.2
Treasurers	363	293	66	4	18.2
Chairpersons	923	865	20	37	2.2
Deputy chairs	67	42	25	0	37.3
Others	63	—	—	—	—

Source: Sahara/Vilayet Salnameleri.

and non-Muslims. The total number of city councillors is 4,519, and that of non-Muslim delegates is 2,335; so the rate of Muslim representation is 52.1 per cent.

The proportion of non-Muslim representation in each province is given in Table 3.3. There is no great difference in the proportion of non-Muslim representation for each province, as the figures range from 48.1 per cent to 55.5 per cent. Generally speaking, then, most of the cases fairly well typified the principle of representative parity. A comparison of the religious composition of the population and of the non-Muslim degree of representation in the city councils in Bulgarian territory is shown in Table 3.4. This demonstrates that the parity principle was generally well observed, regardless of the religious composition of the population. However, the number of council members for each case is fairly small, usually from three to six men, so there are several deviations from the parity principle. Some municipal governments were religiously uniform, but these tended to be exceptional cases where there was a religiously uniform population, as, for example, in the case of Gabrova [Gabrovo]. Here, the city council was dominated by a non-Muslim element, but this reflected its population's religious structure. A population census of 1880 shows that the non-Muslim population of Gabrova was 99.3 per cent; it was therefore an almost wholly Christian city.

It can thus be concluded that equal participation by non-Muslims was widely guaranteed. This means that during the Tanzimat period, for the first time most of

Table 3.3 Religious composition of the elected councillors

Province	*Total*	*Muslims*	*Non-Muslims*	*Unknown*	*Proportion of non-Muslims (%)*
Edirne	1,345	570	747	28	55.5
Manastır	410	205	197	8	48.1
Danube	1,624	727	836	35	52.3
Bosna	311	149	155	8	49.7
Selanik	384	191	189	4	49.2
Yanya	465	224	231	10	49.7

Source: Sahara/Vilayet Salnameleri.

Table 3.4 Religious composition of the population and the city councils in Bulgaria

	(A) Share of the non-Muslims	*Total population*	*Muslims*	*Orthodox Christians*	*Jews*	*Armenian Christians*	*(B) Share of non-Muslim representatives in the City Council*	*B-A*
Niğbolu	22.2	4,662	3,573	833	205	0	48.3	26.1
Tuturakan	24.4	7,172	2,556	1,726	10	19	45.8	21.4
Osman Pazarı	28.8	3,832	2,448	1,102	2	0	53.3	24.5
Hacı Oğlu Pazarcık	43.5	9,567	4,175	3,724	113	333	45.2	1.7
Hezargrad	44.3	11,625	6,341	4,905	224	31	32.6	−11.7
Pravadi	45.1	4,700	2,447	1,868	249	3	46.8	1.7
Cümaa-ı Atik	47.2	9,197	4,587	4,340	3	2	50	2.8
Balçik	48.6	3,855	1,752	1,868	7	–	47.6	−1.0
Rahova	50.9	3,837	1,233	1,945	11	0	41.4	−9.5
Varna	51.4	24,555	8,904	12,081	541	–	69.2	17.8
Şümnü	54.7	23,093	9,844	10,988	738	927	63.3	8.6
Vidin	54.8	13,714	4,482	6,059	1,427	31	45	−9.8
Rusçuk	55.1	26,163	10,252	11,640	1,943	835	57.6	2.5
Aydos	67.8	3,977	1,122	2,651	43	6	37.0	−30.8
Ziştvi	68.6	11,540	2,833	7,897	29	0	48.7	−19.9
Kırin Abad	72.1	5,039	1,173	3,401	222	11	55.1	−17.0
Belgradçik	73.1	1,110	218	802	10	0	50	−23.1
İzladi	73.1	1,570	411	1,148	0	0	58.8	−14.3
Lom	74.0	7,508	1,389	5,202	361	0	46.1	−27.9
Zağra-ı Cedid	74.0	3,647	745	2,533	152	15	43.5	−30.5
Bırgas	74.6	5,865	1,268	4,076	213	88	41.6	−33.0
Pazarcık	76.7	15,425	2,600	10,406	1,259	171	56.4	−20.3
Filibe	77.0	33,442	7,144	22,546	2,168	1,061	76.1	−9.0
Küstendil	78.1	9,590	1,572	6,537	959	0	47.7	−30.4
İslimye	78.6	20,248	2,877	15,252	401	279	67.7	−10.9
Berkofça	79.0	5,429	866	3,925	364	0	56.2	−22.8
Kazanlık	80.1	9,469	1,589	7,280	309	4	54.0	−26.1
Zağra-ı Atik	80.6	15,258	2,599	11,956	332	21	61.5	−19.1
Servi	80.8	8,373	1,541	6,772	1	0	53.3	−27.5
Plevene	83.0	11,474	1,589	9,327	203	0	61.9	−21.1
İhtiman	84.8	3,321	263	2,777	41	1	50.0	−34.8
Yanbolu	85.3	10,771	1,507	8,410	745	33	61.8	−23.5
Sofya	86.5	20,501	535	13,441	4,146	163	40.0	−46.5
Tırnovi	86.8	11,247	1,362	9,754	19	0	53.6	−33.2
Dübniçe	88.0	7,529	656	5,815	812	0	53.1	−34.9
Lofça	88.5	5,978	640	5,291	5	0	39.0	−49.5
Samako	88.6	9,970	608	8,002	833	0	56.2	−32.4
İvraça	89.0	11,190	1,085	9,768	202	0	60.0	−29.0

(continued on the next page)

Table 3.4 (Continued)

	(A) Share of the non-Muslims	*Total population*	*Muslims*	*Orthodox Christians*	*Jews*	*Armenian Christians*	*(B) Share of non-Muslim representatives in the City Council*	*B-A*
Orhaniye	90.9	2,297	65	2,088	1	0	47.8	−43.1
Radomir	94.0	2,381	106	2,210	29	0	50.0	−44.0
Ahiyolu	94.3	4,922	271	4,635	7	3	57.6	−36.7
Gabrova	99.3	7,646	40	7,596	0	0	96.0	−3.3
Adliye	100.0	2,903	0	2,899	4	0	51.2	−48.8

Source: Sahara/Vilayet Salnameleri.

the Balkan cities experienced a pluralist city administration. At the same time, however, uniform implementation of this rule possibly contributed to an overrepresentation of minorities in certain areas.

Although the religious composition of the city councils was divided equally between Muslims and non-Muslims, the religious composition of other municipal employees reveals that the Muslim element was still strong in municipal government. As both the posts of secretary and treasurer required skills in reading and writing Ottoman-Turkish, these offices were Muslim-dominated. This is further reinforced by the fact that 18.9 per cent of the total number of councillors bore the title of *efendi* (a title given for a cultivated person, usually signifying a person with reading and writing ability in Ottoman-Turkish), whereas 92.0 per cent of the secretaries and 76.0 per cent of the treasurers attained this title. Therefore, a linguistic barrier prevented many non-Muslims from participating in local administration. Although secretaries and treasurers were not members of the city council, they performed an important role in municipal government. The fact that two significant offices were controlled by Muslims perhaps led the non-Muslim population to see the municipal government as a predominantly Muslim institution.

Improvement of the urban space by the municipal governments

Having established that the institution of city councils was now firmly rooted in the Balkans, we now need to assess what changes the reform produced in the urban space.

As often pointed out by Western travellers, Ottoman cities were in a miserable condition until the middle of the nineteenth century. Roads, other than major thoroughfares, were rarely paved, and turned into muddy streams when it rained. To make matters worse, many roads were used either as sewage drains or garbage dumps, and consequently were foul-smelling and extremely unhygienic. Naturally, one of the most important duties of the municipality was to improve street conditions.

In the Danube province, where the city councils set to work as early as 1865, many reports appeared concerning the construction of pavements. For example, in

Ziştvi [Svištov], the council was reported to have brought about radical improvements in enlarging and paving the streets in the first year of its establishment.[27] The Bulgarian historian Jurdan Trifonov also points out:

> In Plevene, the reform of Midhat Paşa produced a strong effect as early as 1865. In the autumn, the main street was enlarged and repaired, and people began to call it a wide street (širok sokak). At the time, the street was enlarged as far as the residence of the bishop. Three years later, when Midhat visited the city again, the enlargement was completed to the Salı Pazar mahalle...The street was all covered with stone.[28]

Another report on the enlargement of the streets in Hacı Oğlu Pazarcık was issued in 1866.[29] There are many reports on road construction in other provinces as well. For example, the main road in the capital city of the Selanik province, Via Egnatia, was paved, enlarged and furnished with underground drainage.[30] In Filibe, the second largest city in Edirne province, the main street of the commercial sector was radically improved, and widened from 5 to 10 metres in 1867.[31]

Together with the enlargement of main streets, the authorities paid attention to the improvement of commercial areas as well. They tried to introduce some kind of order into the narrow and winding lanes, a traditional feature of the Ottoman cities. In Manastır, where the old market place was destroyed by a fire in 1862, the authorities introduced a system of straight streets and two-storey houses made of stone.[32] In other cities, improvement was sometimes carried out forcibly. In Plevene's commercial district, the authorities built a straight road and demolished the adjoining small shops.[33] In Hezargrad [Razgrad], the city council ordered that the commercial district be remodelled according to an integrated city plan. The old winding roads running across the marketplace were straightened. At the same time, all shops and workplaces were forced to change their old doors, windows and shutters. A group of painters was called in from Romania to paint the district in a uniform colour.[34]

According to an article that appeared in *Tuna/Dunav*, the official newspaper of the Danube province, the construction policy was justified as follows:

> Street improvement is the most important duty for the regeneration of the cities and towns. Not only do narrow streets look ugly, but they also impose great difficulties for passengers and carts. They even constitute great danger in case of fire. There is therefore no need to state the merits of wide and well-kept streets. Moreover, they embellish the urban landscape.[35]

It is noteworthy that the authorities tried in this article to emphasise visual values more than practical advantage. Indeed, embellishment of the urban environment was a key element in official propaganda for the urban reform policy. The editor of the *Dunav* drew attention to and praised visual improvements, saying 'a big clock tower was built, and the streets were paved and enlarged. In this way, Hacı Oğlu Pazarcık is a much more beautiful place now.'[36]

Propaganda of this type was popular in journalism at this time. Thus, the Bulgarian newspaper *Turcija* issued the following correspondence in 1866:

> Recently, our native town has been becoming more like a European city. Some of the main streets have been enlarged, and all the other streets have been repaired. Many large hotels have been built in the city center. The city hall has been reconstructed, and several private residences have been newly built. The army barracks have been renovated. Owing to these changes, Şümnü is really much more attractive now.[37]

The so-called European style was at that time a common feature in reconstructing urban space. According to Boris Ćirpan, a Macedonian historian of urban architecture, there was a strong tendency for the Ottoman authorities to imitate European models in Macedonia. The governors' residences were a kind of imitation of European palaces. Schools, local courts, and the other public buildings were all constructed according to European models. Even the most oriental phenomena such as clock towers were constructed in a European style in Manastır and Perlepe.[38] In other cities, the clock towers were reconstructed in what was called a 'European style'. For example, an Italian architect was invited to build a new clock tower in Novi Pazar in 1866.[39] In Vidin, the city council replaced the old wooden clock tower with a stone one.[40] Judging from contemporary writings and memoirs, people tended to see the many public buildings constructed in a European style as a visible reflection of modernisation, and generally welcomed them.

Visual aspects of modernity in the urban space were not restricted to street refurbishment or public building. Probably the most interesting innovation in contemporary city planning was the introduction of street lighting. In Ottoman towns commercial districts were traditionally separated from residential areas. Merchants and artisans would return home after work, and the commercial districts would be locked during the night. Street lighting was usually unknown, or restricted to a handful of big cities. However, in the 1860s many small towns began to furnish themselves with gas lamps.

It was the city council that took the initiative to set up street lighting. Many councils started such schemes soon after their establishment. Although the lighting was usually limited to commercial districts, owing to the high costs, some municipalities enthusiastically announced plans to provide the entire town with street lighting. Thus, the municipality of Cümaa-ı Atik [Eskidžumaja], having just set up gas lamps in the small commercial district in 1868, ordered the installation of more lighting to cover the city.[41] In Selanik, it was claimed in 1870 that 'gas lamps had illuminated all corners of the town'.[42] Indeed, the zeal that the municipalities showed for the installation of street lighting was astonishing. For example, the municipality of Rusçuk set up 50 gas lamps in the commercial district in 1865, 100 more in 1866, then an additional 200 in 1867.[43] In Niş, the municipality managed to set up 84 lamps, including 14 gas lamps in 1867, and in spite of complaints from the populace about their high cost, went on to install a further 100 gas lamps the following year.[44]

Another important task for the municipality was to improve public hygiene. In the 1860s, towns and cities in the Balkans suffered from very poor hygienic conditions, and were constantly subject to epidemics. For example, cholera was widespread in Bulgaria in the periods 1817 23, 1826 37, 1846 62 and 1864 75.[45] The Ottoman authorities tried to control these epidemics by setting up quarantine areas, but bad sanitary conditions meant that these efforts failed. In order to improve the urban environment, the city council undertook the task of enhancing public sanitation, with services such as regular garbage collection, sewage disposal, security of food and water and medical services.

Regular garbage collection seemed to have been unknown until the establishment of city councils in most of the cities. Newly established city councils began to prepare areas outside of the urban space for the disposal of garbage. Many municipalities employed garbage collectors, and regularly cleaned the streets. For example, in Doyran, a small Macedonian town, the council employed a janitor who cleaned the city's marketplace every morning. In summer he sprinkled water in the commercial districts. The authorities also instructed individual households to carry waste to a suburban garbage dump. According to a contemporary Bulgarian resident of the town, these measures were accepted as a drastic innovation by the local populace, and were generally welcomed.[46]

To secure the water supply was another important task. Municipalities began to construct new waterworks and sewer systems in the 1860s. These were usually large-scale construction projects, in which pure water was brought from a long distance. In Rusçuk, the city council constructed a new water supply system composed of two tunnels, one of 1,300 metres and the other 300 metres in length, by which they provided the city with pure water from a spring that was two hours' away.[47] In Tulça [Tulcea], the municipality set up a German steam pump to draw water from the Danube that provided a plentiful supply of water to citizens. They also built a large fountain at the centre of the city.[48] These projects enabled them to demonstrate the benefits of modern technology.

Municipalities operated their own medical services. Many, especially the large ones, had their own hospitals and employed medical doctors. In the Danube province, there were at least seven municipal hospitals operating in the 1870s.[49]

All these activities seem to have contributed to changes in the visual aspects of urban space and the way of life of the people living there. However, information provided by the press and the other writings is fragmentary, and it is difficult to use it to trace the entire activities of the city councils. Moreover, it is often claimed that the Ottoman press was a tool for official propaganda, providing strongly biased information. These matters need to be examined from other perspectives.

Finance of the city councils and their activities

More concrete information concerning municipal activity can be found in archival materials. The Oriental Department of the Historical Archives of Bulgaria possesses a fairly comprehensive collection of documents issued by the city councils in Bulgaria before 1878. The collection is composed of 29 fonts (146 items, total 984 sheets) and contains information about 22 cities. The majority of the documents are receipts for salaries and other expenditures, and it is not rare to encounter archival fonts that contain only a few sheets. However, the very existence of these documents testifies to the activities of the city councils during the 1860s and the 1870s. There are also several documents that illustrate the activities of a municipality in more detail. The best preserved example is the set of documents issued by Silistre city council.

During the nineteenth century, the ethno-religious composition of Silistre was complicated. According to statistical information from 1865, the population was composed of 4,667 Muslims, 2,263 Orthodox Christians, 297 Armenians, 193 Jews and 157 gypsies. This number seems highly trustworthy if we compare it with the official statistical data of 1880 collected by the Bulgarian government (total 10,642: Bulgarians 3,341, Turks 5,303, Greeks 291, Jews 314 and Armenians 349). In the 1870s at least four religious communities existed in Silistre, Muslim, Orthodox Christian, Jewish and Armenian.[50]

The composition of the city council reflected the city's ethno-religious composition. According to data in the official yearbook of the Danube province, the governor (*kaymakam*) of Silistre always presided over the council. There were seven council members in 1872 and 1876, and eight in 1874 and 1877. A secretary and a doctor from the municipal hospital seemed to be permanent members of the council, and the other five/six would be elected members. Of these, the Muslim community always sent two delegates, and the other communities usually sent one each. This means that the city council was an assembly of representatives of religious communities.

An incomplete set of Silistre city council account books, though badly damaged, gives valuable information about the finance of the council in the period 1873 6.

Tables 3.5 and 3.6 show the council balance sheets for two separate periods, from February 1873 to December 1873, and from January 1875 to January 1877. The total revenue of the first period is 70,792 qurushes and 10 paras, whereas the

Table 3.5 Municipality of Silistre: balance sheet 1873

	Income	*Payment*	*Total Balance*	*Monthly balance*
1873				
February	—	—	71,524.26	—
March	10,290.255	3,990.10	77,825.015	6,300.15.5
April	8,129.10	2,793.305	83,160.215	5,335.29.5
May	8,246.05	2,445.20	89,001.025	5,790.25
June	4,217.30	2,767.10	100,807.305	1,450.20
July	2,350.10	1,730.00	101,428.005	620.1
August	12,734.00	61,521.36	52,640.045	−48,778.04
September	3,427.20	3,676.10	52,391.145	−249.10
October	11,527.10	6,907.05	57,011.195	4,626.05
November	9,868.195	7,767.345	59,111.35	2,100.25

Source: NLKM, OD, F.119, a.e.26–36.

Table 3.6 Municipality of Silistre: balance sheet 1875–7

	Income	*Payment*	*Balance*	*Monthly balance*
1875				
January	—	—	119,857.21	—
February	27,339.265	110,444.25	88,979.325	16,895.055
March	7,025.00	7,750.28.5	88,647.04	−724.115
April	2,819.20	3,358.20	87,707.04	−539.00
May	5,460.15	4,916.28	88,250.31	543.17
June	4,393.10	2,896.00	89,748.01	1,497.10
July	1,494.05	2,961.20	88,280.26	−1,467.15
August	6,394.00	9,478.30	85,195.36	−3,084.30
September	6,187.05	2,918.00	77,455.01	3,269.05
October	35,007.10	2,897.00	109,565.11	32,110.10
November	7,149.10	3,189.20	113,525.01	3,959.30
December	4,202.25	318.30	117,409.36	3,883.35
1876				
January	2,554.05	106.20	119,857.21	2,447.25
February	27,383.165	100,489.25	46,751.125	−73,106.085
March	1,050.00	462.20	47,374.32	587.20
April	2,370.20	—	—	—
May	—	7,346.35	39,294.175	—
June	2,718.27	4,429.24	37,578.20	−1,710.37
July	1,816.10	5,792.37	33,597.33	−3,976.27
August	6,062.05	5,592.23	34,067.15	−470.18
September	2,229.20	6,460.30	29,836.05	−4,231.10
October	6,551.00	6,481.30	29,906.05	70.00
November	6,794.30	7,656.39	30,219.05	313.00
December	8,355.10	5053.21	29,917.16	301.29
1877				
January	7987.25	—	—	—

Source: National Library 'Kiril and Methody' Oriental Department (NKLM, OD), F.119, a.e.26–36.

total expenditure is 93,609 qurushes and 36 paras. Thus, the first period is 817 qurushes and 26 paras in the red. The second period marked a deficit of 89,940 qurushes and 5 paras, if we compare the sum left over in January 1876 with the balance at December 1876. However, it is wrong to conclude that the city council constantly suffered from 'red ink' finance. The first balance sheet does not cover the whole fiscal year, and there is also an unusually big payment of 61,521 qurushes and 36 paras in August 1873. The reason for this extraordinary expenditure is unknown. It seems most probable that the sum went to some large construction project. Moreover, the municipality earned 17,447 qurushes and 26 paras from February 1873 to February 1875. It is intriguing to examine the data of 1875. In this year, the city council started with the sum of 119,857 qurushes and 21 paras, and ended with the same amount of money. It is obvious that the council manipulated the finance toward the end of year, as it restricted the expenditure to a very low level, indicating that it wanted to make up for the shortage in order to balance the books. However, there was another extraordinary expenditure of 73,106 qurushes and 8.5 para in February 1876, which indicates that they finally lost control. Indeed, 1876 was the year when financial catastrophe overtook the city council. As there is not a big difference in monthly expenditure in comparison with the previous year, the cause was a deficit in income. If we remember that there was turmoil all over the Balkans at that time, there may be a social factor underlying the sharp revenue shortfall.

Table 3.7 is another example of a city council balance sheet, this time for Osman Pazarı [Omurtag] in the period 1870 2. This municipality recorded a substantial profit in both the 1870 and 1871 fiscal years. However, if we examine this in more detail, this apparently healthy financial condition does not reflect normal municipal

Table 3.7 Municipality of Osman Pazarı: balance sheet 1870–2

	Income	*Payment*	*Balance*
1870			
June	419.3	175	244.3
July	1,199.00	2,437.39	−1,238.39
August	755	1,161.00	−861
September	913	1,107	−194
October	679.1	694	−14.3
November	406	393	13
December	191.2	345	−153.2
1871			
January	428.1	345	83.1
February	7,140.10	385	6,755.10
Total for the fiscal year 1870	15,346.20	11,157.35	4,188.25
March	694.2	348.1	346.1
April	143	363.3	−219.1
May	319.2	345	−25.2
June	439.1	348.2	90.3
July	243.1	345	−102
August	230.1	372	−142.1
September	198.1	345	−147.1
October	110.1	345	−234.3
November	640	245	295
December	513	385	128
January	279	348	−69
February	9256.3	575.2	8,681.10
Total for the fiscal year 1871	13,067.30	4,466.20	8,601.10
March	105.2	1,132	−1,026.10
1870			
June	419.3	175	244.3
July	1,199.00	2,437.39	−1,238.39
August	755	1,161.00	−861
September	913	1,107	−194
October	679.1	694	−14.3
November	406	393	13
December	191.2	345	−153.2
1871			
January	428.1	345	83.1
February	7,140.10	385	6,755.10

(continued on the next page)

Table 3.7 (Continued)

	Income	*Payment*	*Balance*
Total for the fiscal year 1870	15,346.20	11,157.35	4,188.25
March	694.2	348.1	346.1
April	143	363.3	−219.1
May	319.2	345	−25.2
June	439.1	348.2	90.3
July	243.1	345	−102
August	230.1	372	−142.1
September	198.1	345	−147.1
October	110.1	345	−234.3
November	640	245	295
December	513	385	128
January	279	348	−69
February	9256.3	575.2	8,681.10
Total for the fiscal year 1871	13,067.30	4,466.20	8,601.10
March	105.2	1,132	−1,026.10

Source: NLKM, OD, F.182a, a.e.2.

activities. Municipal spending over a period of two years was usually very small, with monthly expenditure amounting to around 345 qurushes. This sum is equivalent to an average monthly salary, and therefore suggests that the municipality employed only a single secretary or treasurers. We can therefore conclude that the municipality of Osman Pazarı usually confined its activities to regular sessions of the city council.

Quite different from the case of Osman Pazarı, the municipality of Silistre was engaged in various kinds of public services. First of all, it employed far more workers than Osman Pazarı, with as many as eleven workers in 1875: a secretary (with a monthly salary of 500 qurushes), a treasurer (200), a doctor (1,000), a tax collector (200), a garbage collector (130), a lamp lighter (200) and five guards (125 each). The salaries of these public employees amounted to one-third of total expenditure.

The municipality had its own hospital, with a doctor and a pharmacist. The hospital and pharmacy brought in a fair amount of money to the municipality 6,493 qurushes and 19 paras in 1869, 5.3 per cent of the total revenue. In 1873, the sum was 6,087 qurushes and 10 para, 18.87 per cent of the total income from May to November. However, this was not enough to cover the salary of the municipal doctor. The municipality also had to pay the fees for patients who could not afford to pay; so the hospital suffered a considerable deficit.

Table 3.8 shows several items of income of the municipality of Silistre. Although the original document is badly damaged, it is obvious that the municipality possessed a notary office, coffee shops, shops, public bakeries, potteries and a casino. They were all leased out and the rent constituted an important part of the municipality's revenue. In 1870, the total rent amounted to 7,870 qurushes. The most important item was the rent from a casino and a public baths, which together contributed 5,000 qurushes annually in 1870 and 1871.

Table 3.8 provides an image of the development of the municipality's activities. The municipality was established in 1866. During the first and the second year, the

Table 3.8 Municipality of Silistre: income items, March–November 1873

	1866	*1867*	*1868*	*1869*	*1870*	*1871*
Casino and public bath charge			260.00	333.16	5,000.00	5,000.00
Shop rents					620.00	2,140.00
House rents				375.00	990.00	1,049.00
Coffee house rent					460.00	1,380.00
Bakery rent					800.00	2,400.00
Stamp duty	9,272.00	1,464.00				
Musical instrument charge	200.00	395.00		933.00	1,394.00	1,038.00
Ship construction charge	6,222.08	4,109.16	4,785.10	8,327.30	3281.00	2,758.10
Street stall charge			811.00	1,396.20	1,849.20	454.20
Gas lamp tax	24,790.15	30,680.10	31,601.05	28,351.05	28,145.35	27,930.20
Cereal measurement charge			285.10	4,940.00	9,303.00	1,942.30
Tile factory charge			9,903.00	7,275.00	7,275.00	7,275.00
Market charge			1,554.00	410.00	410.00	410.00
Butchers' tax	4,307.10	5,424.10	8,785.00	11,280.00	11,280.00	11,280.00
Measurement charge				40,000.00	40,000.00	40,000.00

Note: The original document is badly damaged. The items listed here do not seem to cover the total revenue. For example, no income is indicated from the city pharmacy.
Source: NLKM, OD, F.119, a.e.32.

budget was maintained by four major items: stamp duty, ship construction charge, the gas rate and the butchers' tax (zebhiye rüsümü). However, a change in income structure took place in the third year. In 1868, the income deriving from the casino and public baths first appeared in the list. Later on, various kinds of rent began to constitute an important source of revenue for the municipal budget. Bearing in mind that these items derived from the facilities constructed by the municipality, we can say that it succeeded in enlarging its budget by its own initiative.

Among the other items of revenue, the gas rate was the most important. The municipality first received the sum of 24,790 qurushes and 15 paras as the gas rate in 1866. The sum slightly increased in the following two years. The gas rate was to cover the cost of the construction of street lamps, gas lighting and the wages of the lamp lighters. As Table 3.9 shows, the municipality spent 10,512 qurushes and 35 paras on gas and the glass cases for street lamps, the cost of garbage carts, and others in 1869, and the wage of the gas lamp maintainer amounted to 2,400. This means that street lighting resulted in a considerable surplus, if the cost of construction of street lamps is not taken into account.

There are no data relating to the cost of gas lamp construction, but public building seems to have been the greatest financial outlay for the municipality. For example, in 1869 the construction cost of a public bakery, shops and a coffee house

Table 3.9 Municipality of Silistre: expenditure items, 1869–70

Month	*1*	*2*	*3*	*4*	*5*	*6*	*7*	*8*	*9*	*10*	*11*
III	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	259.35	1,469.20	1,729.15
IV	319.00	0	0	0	0	0	64.00	0	2,224.00	2,960.00	5,567.00
V	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	168.00	2,460.00	2,628.00
VI	3,090.00	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	90.20	2,460.00	5,640.20
VII	0	0	0	0	0	240.00	0	0	163.30	2,470.00	2,873.30
VII	300.00	0	0	0	0	0	0	300.00	1,408.00	2,510.00	4,218.00
IX	7,000.00	467.00	0	0	0	0	0	0	578.00	2,510.00	10,555.00
X	7,147.30	0	0	0	0	0	0	222.00	1592.00	2,510.00	11,471.30
XI	0	0	39,543.20	0	115.00	0	346.30	0	570.10	2,510.00	43,085.20
XII	0	0	0	104.00	295.00	0	0	0	153.30	2,500.00	3,052.30
I	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1,422.20	2,500.00	3,922.20
II	6,588.00	0	0	0	0	0	140.00	0	1,882.10	2,500.00	11,110.35
–	24,144.30	467.00	39,543.20	104.00	410.00	240.00	550.30	522.00	10,512.35	29,359.20	105,855.00
%	22.81	0.44	37.36	0.10	0.39	0.23	0.52	0. 49	9.93	27.74	100.0

Note: 1 About half of the original document is missing. These figures represent various missing items: 2 Casino: 3 construction cost of a public bakery, shops, and a coffee house: 4 Tax, 5 sewerage clearance, together with medical benefit for the poor: 6 Garbage collection: 7 Repair: 8 Construction and maintenance of fountains: 9 Price of gas and glass cases of street lamps, the cost of garbage carts, and others: 10 Salaries: 11 Total.
Source: NLKM, OD, F.119, a.e.31.

amounted to 39,543 qurushes and 20 paras, constituting 37.4 per cent of the total expenditure. The erection of street lamps and laying of pavements might well also have been costly tasks.

Other than the above-mentioned activities, the municipality provided such public services as the fire service, garbage collection, sewer cleaning, water supply and educational activities. The municipality possessed at least one water pump for the fire service and one garbage cart, and paid an annual salary of 1,560 qurushes to its garbage collector. In 1869, it spent 522 qurushes on the construction and maintenance of fountains. In the same year, the cost of sewer cleaning, together with medical support for the poor, amounted to 410 qurushes.

After this brief look at the archival information, we can conclude that the municipality of Silistre engaged in various public services for its citizens. Almost all the services of a modern municipality were provided, however rudimentary they may have been. The municipality provided not only a daily garbage collection service, water supply, medical care and fire fighting, but also actively undertook public building work. Municipal construction work furnished the city with public space, and subsequently became important sources of revenue; these, in turn, enabled the city council to initiate new enterprises and thus to improve the urban space.

Conclusions

During the late 1860s and 1870s, Ottoman municipal reform functioned quite well in the Eastern Balkans. Most of the county centres had their own city councils. The most noteworthy result of reform was that, for the first time, it opened the door to political participation by the local non-Muslim populace. Although this was restricted to the urban space, people began to choose their representatives, who could make their voice heard in the local administration. In other words, it enabled religious minority groups to participate in city administration alongside Muslims. As religious groups, especially Orthodox Christians, had begun to develop their judicial and social autonomous institutions shortly before the inauguration of Tanzimat, it can be said that the new system was expected to coordinate those institutions that had been functioning separately. What kind of evaluation can we give to this aspect?

As far as the data that we have examined here are concerned, the city council successfully fulfilled its role as a coordinator of various religio-communal institutions. Owing to concerted activities under their councils, many cities succeeded in improving their public space. The main streets of the cities were enlarged, and the dusty winding lanes of the market places were transformed into clean and paved avenues. The central parts of the cities were furnished with parks, fountains, and new Western-style public buildings. Urban street lighting at night with gas lamps presented a sharp contrast with the darkness of the countryside. The fact that these changes were brought about mainly by local resources and initiatives reinforces our proposition.

What we have examined in this chapter also urges us to reconsider the traditional view that the rapid growth of the urban population and especially the preponderance of Christian citizens was a result of indigenous processes the dynamics of which were that of the 'Christian bourgeoisie', entirely independent of and often obstructed by the Ottoman policy. The reality, in fact, can be found in a rather more complicated picture, where Ottoman reform policy and the development of various Christian communities were merged. The records of Ottoman municipal reform suggest that the seeds of modernity had already taken root in the Balkans in the middle of the nineteenth century. They were the results of the multi-religious collaboration of the local populace under the guidance of Tanzimat reformists. The process not only improved local governance as a whole, but also reinforced the function of various autonomous institutions, for which the city councils functioned as coordinator.[51]

Notes

1 One of the most important discussions of this type is Traian Stojanovich's 'The conquering Balkan Orthodox merchants', *Journal of Economic History*, 20/2, 1960, pp. 234–313.
2 Works relating to this topic include, for Bosnia and Herzegovina, A. Aličić, *Uredjenije bosanskog ejaleta od 1879. do 1878. Godine*, Sarajevo: Orijentalni institut u Sarajevu, 1983; for Bulgaria, Georgi Pletn'ov, who touches on various topics of the Ottoman provincial reforms and city councils, in 'Administrativno-stopanska politika na turskata vlast u Dunavskija vilaet', *Trudove na Veliko Tûrnovskija universitet*, 7/3, 1976, pp. 105–62, and *Midhat Paša i upravlenieto na Dunavska vilajet*, Veliko Tûrnovo: Vital, 1994; for Macedonia, Risto Kirjazovski, with reference to the city council of Skopje, R. Kirjazovski, 'Osnivanjeto i organizacijata na turskata opština vo Skopje vo 1869 godina', *Glasnik*, 15/2, 1971, pp. 185–210.
3 B. Zlatar, 'Tipologija gradskih naselja na Balkanu u XVI vek', in Balkanološki institut, *Gradska kultura na Balkanu XV-XIX vek, Zbornik radova*, vol. 2, Beograd: Srpska Akademija nauka i umetnosti, 1988, pp. 64–5.
4 H. Krševljaković, 'Gradska privreda i esnafi u Bosnu i Hercegovini od 1463–1851', *Godišnjak Društva istoričara Bosne i Hercegovine*, 11, 1960, pp. 169–70; S. Faroqhi, 'Crisis and Change', in H. Inalcik and D. Quataert (eds) *An Economic History of the Ottoman Empire*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994, p. 603.
5 E. Benbassa and A. Rodrigue, *The Jews of the Balkans, The Judeo-Spanish Community 15th to 20th Centuries*, Oxford: Blackwell, 1995; S.V. Ovnanjan, *Armeno-bûlgarski istoričeski vrûzki i armenskite kolonii v Bûlgarija prez vtorata polovina na XIX vek*, Trans. A.G. Ohapkin, Sofia: Nauka i izkustvo, 1972.
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7 N. Todorov, 'The Balkan town in the second half of the 19th century', *Études balkaniques* 2, 1969, p. 39.
8 *Istorija srpskog naroda*, vol. 5, part 1, Beograd: Srpska književna zadruga, 1981, p. 453.
9 I. Katarživ, *Serska oblast, 1780–1879, Ekonomski, politički i kulturni pregled*, Skopje: Institut za nacionalna istorija, 1961, p. 52.
10 R. Poplazarov, *Osloboditelnite voorženi borbi na makedonskiot narod vo periodot 1850–1878*, Skopje: Institut za nacionalna istorija, 1977, pp. 31–4.
11 J. Baker, *Turkey*, New York: Henry Nolt & Com., 1877, p. 326.
12 Poplazarov, *Osloboditelnite voorženi borbi*, pp. 36–7.
13 N. Todorov, *The Balkan City, 1400–1900*, Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1983, p. 372.

14 K. Bitkovski, *Istorija na Kruševo i Kruševsko od postanakot na gradot do podelbata na Makedonija*, Kruševo: Sobranie na opštinata i opštinski odbor na Sojuzot na borcite od NOV-Kruševo, 1978, pp. 39–40.
15 Todorov, *The Balkan City*, p. 369.
16 M. Kalicin (ed.) *Osmanski izvori za islamizacionnite procesi na Balkanite, XVI-XIX v.*, Sofia: Bûlgarskata akademija na naukite, 1990.
17 As it is not the central point of our discussion, I hope to suggest only the following circumstance. If we try to elucidate the mechanism of the sudden ebb of conversion, we must take into consideration many factors like the pressure of Western missionaries, the decline of the Ottoman economic and military power, purification movement of Orthodox church, and so forth.
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19 This process is well documented and has been studied by many Bulgarian and Macedonian historians. See, for example: for Bulgaria, H. Hristov, *Bûlgarskite obštini prez Vûzraždaneto*, Sofia: Bûlgarskata akademija na naukite, 1973; for Macedonia, A. Trajanovski, *Crkovno-učilištenite opštini vo Makedonija*, Skopje: Institut za nacionalna istorija, 1988.
20 T. Sahara, *An Eastern Orthodox Community during the Tanzimat*, Tokyo: Institute for the Study of Language and Culture of Asia and Africa, 1997, pp. 22–44.
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22 S. Rosenthal, 'Minorities and municipal reform in Istanbul, 1850–1870', in B. Braude and B. Lewis (eds) *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire*, vol. 1, New York: Holmes & Meier Pub., 1982, pp. 369–85.
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24 E. Serçe, *Tanzimat'tan Cumuhuriyet'e İzmir'de Belediye, 1865–1945*, İzmir: Dokuz Eylül Yayınları, 1998, pp. 16–17.
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28 J. Trifonov, *Istorija na grada Pleven do osvoboditelnata vojna*, Sofia: Dûržavna pečatnica, 1933, p. 240.
29 E. Bužaški, *Istorija na grad Tolbuhin*, Sofia: Nauka i izkustvo, 1968, p. 113.
30 *Turcija*, 6/17 (13 June 1870).
31 D. Popov, 'Obštestvenite sgradi v Plovdiv prez Vûzraždaneto', in *Arhitekturata na bûlgarskoto vûzraždane*, Sofia: Izdaletsvo na BAN, 1975, p. 85.
32 D. Grdanov, *Bitola i Heraklea niz hronika na vekovite*, Bitola: Kiro Dandarov, 1969, p. 21.
33 Trifonov, *Istorija na grada*, p. 240.
34 A.I. Javašov, *Razgrad, negovoto arheologičesko i istoričesko minalo*, Sofia: Razvitie, 1930, pp. 148–9.
35 *Dunav*, 288 (19 June 1868).
36 *Dunav*, 267 (14 April 1868).
37 *Turcija*, 3/14 (24 September 1866).
38 B. Čipan, *Makedonskite gradovi vo XIX vek i nivnata urbana perspektiva*, Skopje: Makedonska akademija na nauka i umetnost, 1978, p. 94.
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40 F. Kanic, *Dunavska Bûlgarija i Balkanût*, trans.M. Matilev and P. Gorbanov, Sofia: Borina, 1995, vol.1, p. 49.
41 *Dunav*, 298 (31 July 1868).
42 *Turcija*, 6/17 (13 June 1870).
43 G. Pletn'ov, 'Administrativno-stopanska politika na turskata vlast u Dunavskija vilaet', *Trudove na Valiko Târnovskija universitet*, 13/3, 1976, p. 79.

44 *Dunav*, 268 (14 April 1868).

45 H. Golemanov, *Vûzroždenskata medicinska knižnina*, Sofia: Bûlgarskata akademija na naukite, 1964, p. 69.

46 B. Janišliev, *Grad Dojran (Poljanin, Pulin) i životata ni tam pri tursko vladičestvo do 1912 godina*, Sofia: Sûglasie, 1936, p. 34.

47 *Dunav*, 766 (12 April 1873).

48 *Istočno vreme*, 1/34 (5 October 1874).

49 M. Popov, 'Njakoi Danni otnosno sûštestvuvaneto na bolnici v Bûlgarija prez srednite vekove i prez turskoto robstvo', *Zdravno delo*, 9/4, 1956, pp. 47–49; Bužaški, *Istorija na grad Tolbuhin*, p. 112; V. Pavlova (ed.), *Istorija na medicinata v Bûlgarija*, Sofia: Medicina i fizkultura, 1980, p. 108.

50 The Orthodox community might have been divided into several subunits, Bulgarian Exarchate, Greek Patriarchate and Rumanian church, but this is not quite clear. It is known that the Armenians composed a religious community as they had their own church.

51 The Ottoman Reform and the consolidation of communal identities developed in tandem. This seemingly contradiction is well explained by a work of Yonca Köksal. Köksal studied the reaction of the local religious communities to the government projects of the socioeconomic development in the Edirne province. Although he noticed that local residents actively supported and voluntarily contributed to projects, state reforms never succeeded in forming an Ottoman national identity. On the contrary, religious and ethnic identities were apparently fortified and consolidated. Köksal elucidates the process in the following way. 'Dense relations between and within millet communities provided opportunities for both contention and cooperation. Existence of ties that bridged religious and ethnic boundaries created a sense of a common good for the inhabitants and facilitated coalition building. The local elite were able to form broad coalitions and to contribute to state development projects and administrative centralization in Edirne. At the same time, dense connections within the millets led to the investment of their members in the development of community structures in the areas of education and justice.' (Y. Köksal, 'Rethinking nationalism: State projects and community networks in 19th-Century Ottoman Empire', *American Behavioral Scientist* 51, 2008, p. 1510. His conclusion reinforces and coincides with our findings in this chapter.)

4 Foreigners in town

Urban immigration and local attitudes in the Romanian Principalities in the mid-nineteenth century

Florea Ioncioaia

Introduction

In the first half of the nineteenth century, the Romanian Principalities, especially Moldavia,[1] went through a spectacular and contradictory urban evolution. On the one hand, the demographic and economic growth of the urban world was rapid, with no historical precedent, but rather sudden and syncopated, and it was not upheld by general economic growth, or at least not growth of the same dimensions. On the other hand, the demographic growth of the cities was not accompanied by a corresponding modernisation of urban life or administrative rationalisation. Most of the newly built towns were simply exchange centres, lacking not only industries and autonomous administration, but also, more importantly, any kind of urban conception. This is when the distinction between borough (*târg*) and town (*oraş*)[2] appeared. The former were mainly centres for commercial exchange with a local character, generally owned by a *boyar* (landowner) or a monastery, whereas the towns, few in number, started working as autonomous administrative entities, but more like communities with relatively separate semi-political and economic aspects, where urban policies and the beginnings of urban life were tested. It is not a surprise that some of the boroughs that appeared then would disappear in the second half of the nineteenth century.

To explain this paradox, we must find out what triggered the urban explosion in this period. The first event that attracts our attention is the growth and, even more, the mobility of the population. The arising of new settlements and the growth of old ones is first of all the effect of a flow of population from very different origins. Second, looking at the statistics of the time, the number of internal migrants was low compared to the number of immigrants from across the borders. Thus, due to the impact of immigrants coming especially from Austria, Russia and, although far fewer, the South-Danubian regions of the Ottoman Empire, the urban world in the Principalities underwent a decisive mutation; the town started playing a visible economic and social role, becoming a public space in a modern way.

At the same time, especially in the Principality of Moldavia, more so in the northern or border towns, this phenomenon changed the symbolic geography of the country. The massive arrival of foreign populations brought into discussion their acceptance in a culturally poorly adjusted habitat that was still at the beginnings of modernisation. It was no longer a question of a simple relationship with the generic foreigner or with 'Greco-Levantines', who were seen as Turkey's puppets. The image of a foreigner, as the expression of an undesirable internal other lifted from the Greeks and Muslims to settle on the Jews and the marginalised, sometimes not distinguishing among them. The urban foreigner thus becomes a character in the public discussions about difference, modernisation and the search for identity. The authorities start taking their first steps against immigration. Xenophobia is visible, although the nationalistic speeches, in all their glory at this point in time, do not target these immigrants. It is clear, however, that the tension between immigration and creating a 'modern' political agenda in the Principalities, based on identity, legal order, ethno-cultural homogeneity and a common ethos, is insinuating itself in the public debates in the 1860s. Starting from that moment, immigration becomes perceived as a danger that is increasingly easier to play with politically.

Naturally, the historical reconstruction of the urban migration phenomenon has been linked to the ever-changing political agenda. The topic in itself, therefore, has from the very beginning a highly political flavour. Besides the cult of the nation-state, which fatally involved a different agenda, a discussion about immigration would have seemed like a concession to the immigrationalist theories, which implicitly spoke about the historical right to the national territory and were always powerfully refused by Romanian historiography from the very beginning, in the seventeenth century. Thus, a distinction had to be made between the history of the towns and that of their migrant community. The migrant was a problem for the Parliament, but he seemed to be completely invisible in the academic area.

Furthermore, for a long time, history research on urbanity developed as a meta-project of urban genealogy, which left us many urban monographs, somewhere between a relatively critical positivism and an ethno-graphical tinge. Only recently, starting in the 1950s and 1960s, under the impetus of the new Marxist-influenced social and economic history, is the theme of the town's history clearly linked to the history of migration. It is a fact that the immigration problem appears mostly in the background or at most as internal migration. But it is only now that these ideas have been cleared of old Marxist or nationalist clichés. First of all, the immigrants no longer appear as a threat to the ethnic purity or as the expression of an invasion.[3]

However, besides a certain methodological and conceptual poverty, analytical studies on urban immigration and on general urban demography are lacking. As Ecaterina Negruți, the most important researcher in this field said, we still do not know the total number of the urban population, not only by social class, but also by sex, age, number of families, of houses, the density, the natural fluxes of the urban population (birth and death rate), urban mobility or the familial and biological structures of the towns.[4]

Also lacking are studies about the socio-cultural impact of immigration and about the way immigration contributed to the urban socio-genesis of Moldavia in the first half of the nineteenth century. The historiographic perspective develops a different asymmetrical picture of immigration, in which the advantages are only for the immigrants and the disadvantages for the locals. In an even stronger way, the immigrants continue to be considered 'foreign': an extraneous and exotic part of the 'national body'. Worse, the immigrants are completely set aside from the discussions about the modernisation of the Principalities. Thus, the immigrants seem to just make use of these changes or be the perverse effect of them.[5]

In the following study I will limit myself to studying the problem of the relationship between migration and urban socio-genesis in Moldavia in the first half of the nineteenth century, based on studies of the phenomenon of urban migration in several northern cities of Moldavia and especially in Iaşi, the capital of the Principality. In order to do so, I will briefly speak about the demographic context, dimensions and consequences of the immigration phenomenon, the effects of migration on urban life, the perception of the population and the reactions of the authorities faced with this phenomenon.

Despite the lack of rich narrative sources, the period in question offers the advantage of having relatively complete and trustworthy statistical and administrative sources (fiscal censuses), even if they create methodological problems. Compared to the preceding period, after 1800 especially, we have frequent fiscal censuses: in 1808, 1816, 1820 and 1831. After 1832, they come at regular, seven-year intervals. It is true that of these, only the last census, from 1859 60, is considered scientific. These sources have been associated especially with the reports from commissions specialised in vagrants and most certainly with the documents of the municipal councils. Their nature and value differ.

The main problem with these sources is that they come from the state's administrative machinery and therefore follow the state's vision and interests. Their variables do not coincide with those of daily life, and even less with the perspective of the migrants themselves. Unfortunately we do not have internal sources from the migrating communities, not even those on their civil status, except those of the Catholics and Protestants. The 'non-visibility' of the migrant is a well-known factor, though: he is only spoken about when he becomes a problem.

Migration and urban socio-genesis

Due to the lack of sources, it is almost impossible to know with reasonable precision how much migration there was to Moldavia until the beginning of the nineteenth century. Unfortunately, even after 1800, reconstructing the dimensions of the general demographic evolution of the Principalities is not possible in precise numbers. The statistical sources we have are approximate, either due to their disparate, unscientific methodology or due to their intent, generally fiscal, even if after 1832 their trustworthiness improves.[6] On the other hand, normal statistical sources do not cover the migration phenomenon except in passing.[7] However, the first thing we notice is that, in the half-century we are discussing, the population of Moldavia at least doubled, whereas its territory was almost halved. This must be considered in the historical context, but if we compare it with other historical periods or even with neighbouring countries, we will see that the demographic growth is spectacular and therefore difficult to explain of itself.[8]

According to the fiscal documents of the time, in 1774 there were little more than half a million inhabitants within Moldavia's historical borders. In 1803, the probable head count was 700,000, in 1832, 1.2 million and at the end of the period, in 1859, between 1.7 and 1.8 million.[9] Over the same period in Walachia, the neighbouring Principality, in a territory twice the size, the population grew from 1.2 million to 2 million, in 1832, to reach only 2.5 million inhabitants in 1859.[10]

The demographic density of Moldavia is what is really important; it nearly quadruples in this period: from 7.7 inhabitants/square mile in 1774 to 11.3 in 1803, to reach 35 inhabitants/square mile in 1859.[11] By comparison, Transylvania's population density rose from 24 inhabitants/square mile in 1787 to 34 in 1857; and in Walachia, the highest density, in the region of Oltenia, was 27.9 inhabitants/square mile in 1857.[12] The proportion of urban population also grew from 9.11 per cent in 1803 to 10.86 in 1832 and reached 21.75 in 1859. In Walachia, by comparison, the population of the towns and boroughs reached no more than 20,000 imposable families in 1859, which means *c.* 80,000 inhabitants, for a total population of over 2.5 million.[13]

Only recently has this increase been attributed to the natural growth and 'infiltration' of people from across the border, 'wandering Romanians (especially from Transylvania and Bucovina) and foreigners'.[14] But these groups did not arrive in equal number. The analysis of the evolution of the general structure of the population, which went through the most important change in this period, would reveal at best the total percentage of immigration. Unfortunately, the fiscal statistics we have access to are sometimes disparate, especially when it comes to the Jews. Furthermore, the growth is not equally spread out between the various counties of Moldavia, especially taking into account the rural urban factor. Generally speaking, the north, in the first line of the migration wave, is more populated and more urbanised than the south of the Principality. From the four or five main towns of Moldavia (Iaşi, Botoşani, Roman, Bacău and Galaţi),[15] four are in the north and the fifth, Galaţi, Moldavia's only Danube port, will only start counting after 1838, when it is declared *porto franco*. Between 1831 and 1859, all the towns in Moldavia doubled their population; but the towns in the north grew closer to fourfold.[16]

The most impressive demographic evolution is seen in the capital of the country, Iaşi, which is where we have the most reliable sources. The population of this town rose from 9,000 taxpayers in 1774[17] to almost 16,000 in 1803,[18] to over 62,000 in 1845,[19] and in 1859 reached 65,747.[20] These statistics clearly show that we can speak about neither a steady increase nor a normal one, proportional to the general demographic evolution of Moldavia. A similar evolution, although on a smaller scale, can be seen in the towns of Botoşani, Bacău, Roman (all in the north of Moldavia) and Galaţi.[21]

In fact, the towns spread out, but the urban space did not do so in equal measure. The towns grew numerically, through new boroughs, a phenomenon that reached an average of two per year. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, there were 32 urban settlements in Moldavia, 25 of which were in the territory between the

Carpathians and the Pruth River and the rest between the Pruth and the Dniester, a territory that in 1812 became the Russian province of Bessarabia. In 1859, the count was 90. Most of the new boroughs appeared between 1820 and 1859, and between 1831 and 1838, 22 boroughs were created.[22] Some of these seemed to be simple 'comptoirs': they have a semi-urban character, low population under 500 inhabitants, sometimes even around 100 inhabitants, and they, including county seats, were most often the private property of a boyar or a monastery.[23] In this fashion, the boroughs were more open to start-ups, which is why people at the beginning of their career preferred them.

After 1830, the towns changed their role in the economy of Moldavia: they were no longer local exchange centres or administrative fiefs. It is obvious that, everywhere, the role of the merchants and of commercial activity was crucial in regenerating or expanding old towns, but especially in the creation of new ones. However, the urban economy was diversifying. Merchants were the majority (everywhere the number of merchants doubled), but their percentage was no longer overwhelming except in small boroughs. Thus in 1845, of the 17,087 families established in towns and boroughs, with 85,435 family members, the ratio of merchants to artisans was 60:40 in favour of the merchants.[24] Generally speaking, in larger towns the percentage of merchants was even smaller, on average 34 per cent. In Iaşi, according to the statistics of 1845, the percentage reached 38 per cent; but together with the artisans they made up 64 per cent of the population of these towns,[25] which shows the intensity of the economic activity of the town. It is true that there was not yet extensive industrial production: in the main towns, in the middle of the century, there were barely 300 families of industrial workers.[26]

All the statistics show that in the period under discussion, foreign merchants and artisans had the top social positions in the urban world. Also, very often, the migrants brought an important growth of technical qualifications to Moldavia. Many had intellectual jobs (teachers, doctors, pharmacists, architects, engineers, etc.) or other jobs that required a high level of qualification and specialisation for which there was no local competition: from clockmakers to jewellers or typographers. Some were specialised in luxury goods, but others contributed to basic economic growth. The Jews especially came with an excellent professional experience in bulk trade or in the loan and money-changing fields. Many of these occupations had not existed in the Principalities until then. One example is the birth, after 1830, of a financial 'system' with banks and credit institutes, separate from the usual money-lenders who practice *cambio* (money exchanges). All five important banks in the middle of the nineteenth century in Moldavia were created by foreigners (Jews).

This is why the discourse about a decline of the locals compared with the wave of immigrants ignored the newcomers' role as cultural and economic pioneers. As unsettling as immigration was, it must be judged from the point of view of a society and economy that was changing. It is clear that the general percentage of indigenous people decreased rapidly in towns and boroughs, and some have even spoken about a decline of the social position of local merchants and artisans compared with the Jews. In 1845, the local, Jewish and Sudit (foreign) artisans made up a third of the total town population, and the merchants one-half. In 1860, the proportion of indigenous artisans in the whole artisan population of Moldavia was approximated at 20 per cent, whereas the Jewish artisans accounted for 68 per cent and the Sudits 8.6 per cent. This ratio is somewhat lower for the merchants.[27]

On the other hand, we observe that the number of merchants and artisans in Moldavian towns grew in that period. In Iaşi, their number rose from 691 families in 1835 to 1,580 in 1845 and to over 3,024 in 1859. A similar situation can be observed also in the other towns. In Galaţi, a highly cosmopolitan town, their number rose from 716 families in 1854 to 3,632 in 1859. In Bacău, from 85 in 1838 to 219 in 1845 and 468 in 1859; in Roman, from 466 in 1845 to 1,200 in 1859; and in Botoşani, from 866 in 1845 to 1,390 in 1850.

In fact, external immigration brought with it an internal migration. The expansion of towns and of the capitalist economy created by the newcomers created the need for a workforce, and its success created models of professional and social promotion. In all the towns it can be observed that the number of Orthodox families grew. Towns also started to become magnets for the rural population who lived in semi-serfdom. Their migration, even if historians have overestimated its volume, is clearer in the fiscal statistics and the police documents, especially after 1850.

Urban migration in Moldavia: determinants, dynamics, types

General aspects

The Romanian Principalities were a goal for immigration starting in the Middle Ages due partly to the demographic deficit, but more to the lack of skilled population. From very early on, the ratio of foreigners in the towns was instantly visible. These foreigners were granted privileges by the rulers, although, if they were not Orthodox, they always had the status of being merely tolerated. Until the eighteenth century, there were no important waves of migration, however. The influx of Greek-speakers from south of the Danube in the seventeenth century, which provoked the first xenophobic reactions in the Principalities, was not very significant. It was only towards the end of the eighteenth century and in the first few decades of the nineteenth century that a wave of immigrants arrived in Northern Moldavia. If up till then immigration had been almost entirely towards the east but without a clear destination or visible rhythm chaotic and creating new towns from then on, immigration was towards the south and gravitated around a few towns, most importantly Iaşi and Galaţi. There was a clear discrepancy between the transit and the destination towns.

The dimensions of these waves are hard to calculate. For the time being, due to the lack of more precise relevant statistics, we cannot know the speed of entry of these new populations; in the same way, we cannot recreate the dynamics or exact dimensions. The information we have is always indirect: either indicating the intensity of restrictive measures, administrative documents, the speed of borough growth or the mobility of the population, especially where the immigrants (Jews, foreigners, people from the south of the Danube) played a larger part. According to these documents, the moments of maximum intensity of cross-border immigration seem to be 1804 6, 1822 4 and 1828 32. Between 1838 and 1845, things seem to have slowed down; then, after 1850, especially between the years 1853 and 1856, the wave grew again.

What caused this migration? It is obvious that it is generally a migration with economic reasons. We do not, however, have serious studies on this subject; narrative testimonies are missing. Moreover, it is always hard to explain why an individual or a group leaves its hometown in favour of a different one, which is generally unfamiliar. Individual motivations are inextricably joined with favourable historical circumstances. In this case, they varied from period to period but especially from one type of experience to another. The situation in the immigrants' homeland must be compared with the picture they had of the host country. It was, however, a period of intense mobility in the whole of Europe. Most migrations to Moldavia are considered to be due to the situations in Austria, Russia and the Ottoman Empire (the persecution of the Jews in Russia and the Austrian fiscal pressures in Galicia, etc.),[28] or due to the regional wars of that period (especially at the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the next century), which made the borders inviting to cross.[29] This perspective considers migration a phenomenon of semi-aggression, or, at the least, an intrusion.

In fact, immigration was not only a unilateral action by the migrant, but often was the result of an implicit or explicit offer from the host country. In our case, there were many situations in which migrants were called by the authorities or by landowners and were offered a series of privileges and facilities, albeit temporary ones.[30] At the same time, we must not forget that, after the Treaty of Adrianople/Edirne (1829), the Principalities could liberalise external commerce, and they had great need of technical assistance and labour. The potential of internal migration was very limited due to the restrictive rural laws, which only rarely allowed a farmer who was in semi-serfdom (as was most of the rural population) to leave his hometown.[31] In the end, the corruption of the Moldavian civil servants probably played an important role in making Jewish migration easier, although some historical analyses probably exaggerate this.

The favourable period for these migrations was of course the summer season.[32] It seems that the beginners and those without sufficient resources preferred the smaller boroughs in the north and the richer people moved towards the larger towns. But many of those with no income or qualifications also preferred the larger towns. Thus, Iaşi, Botoşani and Galaţi attracted the largest migration and the most diversified in terms of origins.

Neither the migration experience nor the make-up of the migrating population was regular or homogenous. In this case, we can distinguish four principle forms of immigration:

1. bulk immigration, in waves. This is typical for the Jews and sometimes the people from south of the Danube and is linked in many cases to economic,

military and demographic circumstances in the region. It is visible and spontaneous;
2. immigration through colonisation: when the initiative belongs equally to the host authorities and the migrating community. It happens rarely as an urban migration, it is limited in time and includes the migration of relatively grouped communities: Germans and especially people from south of the Danube, and partially Jews;
3. individual infiltration. This is the hardest to reconstruct. It happens with two main categories, which find themselves somewhat in opposite situations: the Sudits, a term that will be explained later, and the 'vagrants';
4. temporary migration, with a seasonal character or for cross-border activities. This does not necessarily involve a change of residence and does not have important cultural effects. This is of little interest to us in this study.

At least three main categories of migrants can be clearly identified: Jews, Sudits and vagrants. These categories do not represent all of the migrants, and not all the people in these groups are migrants. Nevertheless, although being linked to migration, the locals spontaneously see their presence as a different and illegitimate one. In fact, among these, only the Jews have a structured different culture. Each of these groups seeks the attention of the host country in one way or another. We will go on to present their number, dynamics and structure.

The 'progressive invasion'

The Jews represent without a doubt the principle migrating category in Moldavia in the first half of the nineteenth century, numerically speaking, proportionally speaking and especially in terms of the reaction they provoked. This is probably where the term 'progressive invasion' came from, in the words of a contemporary French diplomat, Bois le Comte, in 1834.[33] Unfortunately, although the Jews were visible in that period, they had no social representation. The fiscal censuses did not record them systematically and rarely placed them together with the 'Christians', and the local Jewish communities did not keep archives in that period. Furthermore, the powerful community culture of the group made newcomers join the local communities swiftly, and so they could never be recorded as 'newcomers' as such.

We have seen that their number grew from several thousand in 1775 to almost 125,000 in 1859, among which more than 100,000 were urban population. In percentages, this increase was even more amazing: from 3.5 per cent of the total population in 1803 to almost 9 per cent in 1859, and if we relate this to the total urban population, the increase was from 5 per cent in 1774 to over 30 per cent in 1859, the year a liberal regime was adopted in the Principalities.[34] Their ratio is higher in the towns and boroughs of north Moldavia, which are known as the prime zone for their immigration.

The phenomenon, however, did not have a homogenous timeline or a unique model. The infiltrations coincided with a quasi-colonising phenomenon and took place in compact groups and also individually. Their faith was what finally united these experiences, playing the role of a screen between them and the rest of society but also creating a community refuge.

The reasons for the Jews' migration to Moldavia are known: from fiscal and cultural pressures, especially the measures taken by Joseph II to 'modernise' the Jewish world, to the offences of the Russian administration, etc. It is obvious that they were also attracted by the fiscal situation of the Principalities, partly as a consequence of the introduction of a legal status for the Sudits (at the end of the eighteenth century), but also due to the lack of indigenous competition, especially after the Greek merchants left in the context of the Etheria insurrection defeat in 1821.[35] Nor should we forget the privileges the authorities and landowners offered, even if these progressively diminished.

The origin of the Jews was mostly Galician, but after 1806, Jews from Russian occupied Poland made their appearance also. Thus the migration came from north to south, in groups or individually (as Sudits or vagrants). This timeline is underscored by the reactions they provoked and their weight in the total population. It would seem that the first waves of Jewish immigrants appeared in Moldavia at the end of the eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth century, due to the Austro Turco Russian conflicts from the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the following century. The growth of their numbers was constant and visible, judging by the authorities' reaction. The peak period seems to be between 1828 and 1834. In 1838, the total number of Jews reached 55,280.[36] Then a few years of stagnation followed. In 1845, there were 17,087 stable families in the towns and boroughs, that is to say 85,435 individuals. In 1859, Jewish people in the towns and boroughs of Moldavia reached a third of the population, but in the smaller boroughs and the northern towns, it rose to over 42 percent.[37]

The newcomers searched for towns or boroughs. In fact, several boroughs in the north of Moldavia owe their existence almost entirely to these Jews.[38] The main towns also saw an important surge of Jews, first of all Iaşi, the administrative capital of the Principality, and then Botoşani, Bacău, Roman and in smaller measure Galaţi. In Iaşi, the Jewish population was no more than a few thousand people at the beginning of the nineteenth century, but in 1859 this number reached 30,440 Jews, almost half of the population.[39]

They came in groups and remained in their communities, benefiting from fiscal autonomy and partially under their own administration. They were generally Hassidic, conservative and not very open to inter-cultural exchange.[40] They did not inter-marry, although they did not form urban ghettos. Their economic status was varied; some became very rich, whereas many lived on the edge of poverty, as can been seen from the high number who were exempt from taxes in their communities, which was 10 per cent of the total. Most of the merchants or artisans belong to the third class. When cholera appeared in the towns of Moldavia, Jews in densely populated neighbourhoods were among the most exposed. Many of them brought with them great experience in bulk commerce or in loans and money exchange. A new series of occupations appeared: tailoring, silverware, glass-working and coffee shops.

Otherness and privilege

There is a category of people that voluntarily chose the status of foreigner: those named the Sudits, or the submitted foreigners, who were under the consular protection of the European states.[41] Initially this was just a fiscal category, small in number and importance and only of interest for the authorities. In time, however, their number grew and they became the symbol of foreign domination in the Principalities, enjoying many privileges the locals did not have, including (partial) juridical and fiscal extraterritoriality. Thus, their problem became an intensely political one in the following decades because their status was in the fiscal interests of the state but also raised a symbolic question about the sovereignty of the Principalities in relationship to the Ottoman Empire. In fact, the Sudit system represented rather a counterweight to the system of feudal privileges and remained a scandal in the eyes of their contemporaries for as long as this system continued.

Thus, the Sudits were only partially the product of a migration wave. This is why, although we can reconstruct their number precisely, we cannot really know what the real proportion of migrants was, nor their ethno-cultural origins. We know also that many rich Jews and even locals put themselves under the protection of the foreign consulates in the Principalities, to benefit from their fiscal and juridical advantages. Their number was relatively important in the first decades of the nineteenth century. A general statistic on the Sudits from 1824 5 shows 2,282 heads of families, which means between 11,000 and 12,000 individuals. Among these, only a third were the first generation to be in Moldavia. Most had come in their youth (between 15 and 30 years old) and were qualified, meaning that they had an occupation to live off; some were teachers and doctors, but most were merchants and artisans.[42] By 1859, their number had increased to 16,482 individuals. This growth is not spectacular, but it is important in the given context.

Most Sudits settled in large towns, especially Iaşi and Galaţi. In Iaşi, they increased from 705 families in 1820 to 993 families in 1845 and to 1,092 in 1859, that is to say by 3,300 people. The majority of Sudits were in the port of Galaţi, under the regime of *porto franco*, numbering 1,430 in 1845 and 5,294 in 1859. In Iaşi, we must mention the 26 types of trade and 65 crafts that the foreigners practiced.[43]

However, the Sudits cannot be considered a socio-cultural group. Their problem will remain a political one, as they are seen less as immigrants and more as the expression of a privileged status imposed by an abusive external authority.

Refugees, vagrants, marginals

Like the Sudits, the refugees, vagrants and 'homeless' did not have a specific cultural identity, thus in the eyes of the administration, they embodied the problems of immigration. As ethno-culturally heterogeneous as they were, that is how homogenous they were from the social and legal point of view of the state; this category was a single entity only in the eyes of the administration. Unlike the Sudits or partially the Jews, they were a potential danger, but they mainly were not regarded as useful in the economic order. For a corporative society, based on fiscal solidarity and still threatened by food shortages and epidemics, the presence of these foreigners was a threat in itself. They did not have capital or qualifications, and more importantly they lacked documents and were often a hazard for public law and order.

There were certainly important differences among them, obvious mainly in their relationship with the fiscal order. Their identity was generally vague and their number variable. Their mobility was irregular, which made it impossible to draw a common conclusion. At the beginning, in the Middle Ages, the refugees (*bǎjenari*) were either peasants who had escaped from landowners, or foreigners with no qualifications or capital but of Orthodox religion.[44] Their provenience was either rural (most of them, after 1832) or from across the border. Therefore, although they did not belong to a fiscal corporation, unlike other categories, they did however pay a tax, according to certain data that gave them a certain status of public legitimacy. From a fiscal point of view, they are most often included among the taxpayers. Their status was constantly changing and was negotiated according to context. Their evolution was contradictory, as were the statistics that record them. In 1826, we find around 2,850 urban taxpayers[45] in all of Moldavia. In 1838, in Iaşi alone there are 1,750 Christian taxpayers, among whom almost 27 per cent came from over the border; a similar percentage can be found in all the towns in Moldavia, excepting the port of Galaţi, where there were over 32 per cent.[46] In the 1845 statistics, the 'newly arrived' counted for around 27 per cent of all taxpayers, which meant around 7,000 individuals. In opposition to the trend up till then, their proportion was now higher in the main towns, where they represented around 13.4 per cent of the local urban inhabitants. It is interesting to note that the census in 1859 did not mention them.

Few of them managed to become licensed apprentices (*patentari*), artisans or merchants. Of the 400 refugees recorded in Iaşi in the 1845 statistics who had come to town in the last seven years, only 33 had become apprentices, four merchants and 19 artisans. Also in Bacău, between 1838 and 1845, more than 100 had arrived, of whom only 18 became artisans.[47] Most of the taxpayers became *căpătăieri* (homeless), outside of any corporation. These are mostly town dwellers, who came to the town in the first generation and who were not yet integrated into the corporative system, meaning that they did not have a licence (*patenta*), an authorisation to freely practice an occupation. It was a fluctuating population, made up of temporary workmen who were at the bottom of the urban social pyramid; sometimes they were also called 'tramps' or 'swindlers'; they generally paid a tax per capita, individually because they had no one to guarantee for them. In time, the meaning of the term *căpătăieri* became pejorative, describing a category of people without class who lived precariously, often by illegal means, who were almost completely ignored by society. Except for the judiciary annals, none of the archives mention them.

The number of *căpătăieri* was variable, possibly because their status was continually changing, but it increased as the towns developed. Besides domestic staff, these people were already around 23 per cent of the urban population in 1832; they were the third most numerous group after the merchants and artisans.[48] For 1838, there are no data except for two border towns, Galați and Focşani; in both, the newcomers (*haimanale*) made up half of the total population; the difference between the two cities lay in their origins: in Focşani, most of them came from the countryside, in Galați, most of them came from across the border. In 1845, in Iaşi, there were around 1,000 newcomers. From then on, they disappear from the fiscal archives and are replaced by a new category: the vagrants.

The vagrants appeared as a distinct conceptual category beginning in the 1840s.[49] The phenomenon must be linked to the rise of immigration in that period and to the expansion and liberalisation of the urban space. At that time, the vagrants were individuals with no papers who were added to those with no source of income and to the homeless. It seems not to be enough, however, because many vagrants were put into the homeless category at the beginning of the 1840s. In this way, from 1843 on, the law considers as vagrants only the homeless and occupationless who did not pay taxes or disturb public order. A difference was made, however, between the local vagrants and the foreign ones, probably for administrative reasons. Thus, the local vagrants could be hired by landowners, if the latter were willing to offer a 'pledge' for their behaviour, whereas the vagrants who were considered foreign were to be 'exiled over the border'.[50] A few years later, in the laws passed on 5 May 1851, given by the Interior Ministry to the Special Commission of Research of the Vagrant's Situation, the category of the vagrants who had no 'pledges' but who were trustworthy was added to the list of criteria, as was that of those who, although they had an occupation, were not part of a corporation but mainly came from across the border with no capital, no occupation and no passport.[51]

Their number is hard to decide and was probably a lower proportion. It seems, though, that their number continued to increase, either because of the change of class of the homeless, or as a consequence of the growth of migration. In May 1850, a commission specially created for this purpose stated that there were 402 'vagrants' in Iaşi; a similar situation was also seen in Galați.[52] The measures taken on this occasion were not of much use. It seems that, after 1853, the wave grew fast. The commission, that researched the situation of the vagrants for three months from March to May 1858, found 402 vagrants in Iaşi alone,[53] so public speeches started taking them into account. In a report to the Interior Minister, one of the members of the research commission, Toma Vartic, drew up a panicky picture: 'numberless vagrants from every nation and especially Jews, which can be found in the capital and in the country in a number that no one can imagine'.[54] The fact is that these were the principle actors of the judiciary cases for theft, crime, scandals, swindling, etc. The population's complaints about these vagrants increased in number in the 1850s, especially in Iaşi and Galați.[55] Their identity thus took on very negative connotations and was associated with the status of being foreigners, but also socially marginalised.

The town faced with migration

We have seen the role immigration had in building towns in Moldavia, especially after 1830. Starting in the fourth decade of the nineteenth century, the town became a part of the collective imagery and the end of political action, either about the town or on the town. The politicising of the town must be linked especially to the difficult problem of cultural heteronomy: the presence inside the political community of different ethno-cultural communities. The foreigner was now in the town. The town became more and more a cosmopolitan territory and at the same time strongly distinct from the rest of the 'national community'.

At the same time, the large number of newcomers created unrest in the urban world. Progressively there was a change that can be seen in the way foreigners were seen: the foreigner was no longer a Greek, but a Jew and a marginal, referred to as the immigrant per se. The authorities had to deal with double pressure: the problems created by mass and irregular migration, and then the pressure of society, still dominated by patriarchal and religious values. One cannot say that their answer was articulate and efficient. It was more instinctive, in the traditional, utilitarian-guild way. There were no public policies towards the migrants or even the conceptual methods of counting them in a census. A series of measures and discussions appeared, however, that tended to institutionalise these reactions. Their goal was to control migration as part of the control of urban life in general.

In turn, the town was then born as a political space: a place of public life and complex interaction. The corporative system continued to be powerful (it only disappeared after 1858). Many towns still remained the property of important landowners. The break from the rural lifestyle and structure of economic activity was not decisive. However, after 1832, the towns progressively started to organise themselves as self-governed communities. Municipal efforts appeared in the main towns as the expression of a primary form of autonomy.[56] The voting system was restricted and the efficiency of the counsels limited. Their goal, however, was to start urban policies, to organise urban activities and to take care of current problems.[57] Economic competition, public hygiene and crime were linked to migrants, and the towns started trying to respond to these challenges. Foreigners did not have the right to vote or to be elected; but as members of a guild, they were allowed to take part in choosing the guild's representative on the municipal counsel.

These regulations, expressing perceptions, justified or not, were backed by the Orthodox Church, which was generally cautious about foreign non-Orthodox migrants, but especially Jews. At the same time, these initiatives clashed with the fiscal needs of the state and the interests of market owners, who made use of the flow of migrants to increase their income. This is why anti-immigration policies often seemed to contradict each other, were incoherent and aimed generally at criminal immigration.

Xenophobia and restrictions

Regardless of time and space, immigration produces xenophobia, intolerance, segregation and unrest. The status of foreigner meant not only the lack of civil rights and economic privileges, but also a special relationship with the host nation, generally a precarious one, characterised by anxiety, suspicion and exclusion. It is easy to see that there is not a single kind of 'foreigner', just as the real consequences of immigration are not necessarily the ones seen by the host population.

Anxiety due to migration and foreigners grew in some periods, especially in moments of crisis, military conflict or political instability. The lack of an articulate society and a visible public opinion, makes it difficult to separate the reactions of the majority of the people from those of the state. Most often we can see in the attitudes of the people two main types of behaviour:

1. a latent xenophobia, diffused, motivated by religion and culture, as is typical of rural and autarchic societies;
2. spontaneous actions either against the competition brought by the newcomers, especially the Sudits, with their privileged regime, and the Jews, or against the marginalised criminals.

It cannot be said, however, that there was a systematic discrimination, at least at the level of the popular class, towards the newcomers. There were no ghettos of migrants, although the confessional barriers were powerful. Unfortunately, we still know very little about the inter-cultural relationships and reciprocal images between the locals and the newcomers to town. In most cases, these had denominational, ethno-linguistic and social foundations. The most frequent tensions were mostly about the competition between the Jewish and Christian merchants, especially in the small towns.[58] Generally speaking, these were based on the locals' suspicion that the foreigners had fiscal advantages. These advantages, however, were not very significant. It was above all a diffuse kind of intolerance that seemed to be activated in certain periods, in times of crisis. In 1848, during a huge cholera epidemic, the people asked for the Jews to be evacuated from the areas surrounding the town where the epidemic had claimed the most victims; their request was granted.[59]

Not even the birth of a civil society could radically change the situation over the short term. As in the programmes of the1848 movement, during the discussions in 1856 7 about the new statute of the Principalities, the people asked that citizenship be granted only to the Christian locals and said that rules were required to control Jewish immigration, letting in only those who had a useful occupation.[60]

Whether it was an echo of the reactions of the people or not, the measures of the authorities was clearer and more articulate. Continuity long remained the main criterion. Its logic, a double one (utilitarian and confessional), carried on until the end of the period under discussion. According to these laws, whoever paid taxes was useful to the state; and the non-Christians had the status of being tolerated. The logic was contradictory, which can also be seen in the way the state solved the problems of the migrant's identity and the clarification of his status. At the same time, it is known that in the Ottoman Empire as a poorly institutionalised state legislation was not as important as custom: juridical and social practices were in line with the laws.

As we have seen, the statistical sources given by the public authorities only accidentally touch on this phenomenon. The classifications that the state works with seem to be implicit and calculated in terms of cultural visibility and the risk the people in question posed to public order and hygiene, and also in terms of the utility of the newcomers. Thus, we can distinguish four main categories of migrants from the state's point of view:

1. Jews;
2. Sudits;
3. vagrants;
4. indigenous rural people.

Different, numerous and visible: the Jew

The Jews were, as we have seen, the main category of immigrants. Furthermore, they had the disadvantage of being visible, religiously distinct from the majority of the people and living in a tight-knit community. This is why it is hard to separate measures against their immigration, which were part of a general effort against immigration, and the measures taken simply against the Jews qua Jews. It is obvious that their immigration progressively changed the relationships between the locals and the (indigenous) Jewish world.

The state's reaction to the immigration of the Jews pointed in two directions: restricting and controlling it, eventually integrating it as a cultural difference. These measures were a dilemma for the administrative authorities of Moldavia; the Jews seemed to be a danger, but their expulsion would be an economic loss.

According to most Romanian historians, in the Principalities, the Jews had 'rights and privileges they found nowhere else',[61] at least in the period that interests us. The discussion is a long one and is not the point of this chapter. The fact is that, from the Middle Ages, the Jews were put into a separate corporation from the Christians and had the advantage of fiscal, juridical and ethno-denominational autonomy. In this way, the Jews were given freedom to practice their religion with certain restrictions, to administer themselves and their community, including juridical autonomy, but not extraterritoriality, as applies for the Sudits.[62]

At the same time, the Jews were denied the right to own agricultural property, to freely build synagogues, to hire Christian apprentices, to make candles and bread, etc. These laws were generally not respected and that is why they were periodically reinstituted, including during the period under discussion, up until 1859. Their denominational motivation was clear.

The first reactions against the immigration of the Jews followed this pattern. They dated from the end of the eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth century and, besides reiterating what had already been promulgated, some of the newcomers' advantages were eliminated and the Jews were banned from entering the villages and especially from owning or working the land.[63] These rules were reinstituted several times. However, at least until 1830, none of these laws were directly related to immigration, instead they were linked to the status of the newcomers. The Jew, however, started to be associated with the migrants.[64]

Generally speaking, the restrictions against Jews were motivated by the commercial and fiscal interests of the reigning party; they did not have an important ideological or confessional connotation.

The new semi-constitutional regime instated by the Organic Statute (*Regulamentul Organic*) in 1832 did not bring with it an immediate change of juridical condition for the Jews; but in the basic rules of the state, the 94th article of the Organic Statute adopted in 1832 clearly identified migration with the Jew. This picture will be found, similarly, in all the administrative reports, some of which gave the impression that they were dealing with a secret invasion that threatened 'public welfare'.[65] Therefore, article 94 stipulated measures for controlling clandestine immigration by those without documents, without occupations and without homes. Based on this article, a series of laws were formed between 1834 and 1843 related to the control of the border and entry into the country, passport control, supervising vagrants, etc. Apparently these rules did not speak exclusively about Jews, but Jews nevertheless remained the most targeted category.[66]

In these rules we can see the first serious attempt to make a difference between desired and undesired migration. Thus, in a law from 1834, the vagrants were divided into four categories, the last of which was 'Jews coming from other places with no job or capital, those without passport or guarantee or proof of legality of their stay in the country and those who do bad deeds'.[67] At the same time, these provisions aimed at 'reducing the number of Jews', as part of measures 'of utmost necessity to stop the Jews from flowing over our borders and to evacuate the vagrants from the land'.

Also, in a discussion about the completion of a law against vagrants, which took place in a meeting of the Extraordinary Administrative Council (the Government) on 1 July 1843, besides the measure for the vagrants, there also appeared articles that banned 'the Jews of the capital from living on certain streets' (art. 2), banned 'them from buying places on those streets' (art. 3) and banned them from 'having Christian servants' (art. 6).[68] These 'norms' were not put into practice, because, although the project was submitted for discussion in the *Obsteasca Adunare* (Political Assembly, the Parliament) in January 1844, it was refused.[69]

Moreover, a tendency appeared to distinguish between Jews and vagrants. In December 1850, the Prince of Moldavia, Grigore Ghica, asked for the law on vagrants not to be applied to the Jews born in Moldavia who had guarantees of good behaviour.[70] A few months later, however, he changed his mind, reinstating the old commissions to check the Jews' situation.[71] The position of the authorities towards the Jews started radicalising, as can be seen from a series of repeated complaints by the authorities in Moldavia about the lack of cooperation by the Russian and Austrian authorities in giving the Jews passports.[72]

Migration and public order

The authorities' reaction against immigrants was faint. It was reduced to a series of policies against vagrants: censuses and trying to keep them under control, either by deporting them or by integrating them into the fiscal order. This type of attitude was motivated on the one hand by fiscal logic, public hygiene, but also by the small possibilities of absorption into the urban economy, due to the lack of important industrial capacities. In any case, the conceptual construction of the vagrant as a migrant and marginal showed a refining of the administration's point of view, but also the fact that the corporative society of the *ancien régime* type, in which the 'non-fiscal' categories were included in the united community system, could no longer cope.

It is true, for example, that not only vagrants were thrown out of towns, but also anyone who disobeyed the legal order, including workers who disobeyed the agreement with the landowner or those who rebelled or who incited others to rebel.[73] The first year in which the authorities explicitly considered a category of immigrants to be an immediate public threat, for no denominational or ideological reason was 1856. In this case, the authorities' favourite answer was imprisonment. Prior to this year, more and more people were brought before the penal tribunals, whether the cases were about genuine criminals, homeless people missing documents or deserters. In 1848, a year with major political protests, there were only 25 people arrested; in 1853, 122 were arrested; and in 1854, the criminal courts judged 276 individuals, most of whom were vagrants or deserters, five of them Austrians.[74]

The problem became more complicated from the moment when, after 1856, the Ottoman Empire and other neighbouring states refused to receive the deported people. Thus the decision of the government was that they would be enrolled in the police forces, which could be a 'way to correct their morality and safeguard their existence', whereas others were to be used for different jobs in community service, for example looking after the public gardens.[75]

Was this the beginning of a new attitude, maybe a bit more differentiated, toward dealing with immigrants? For the moment, there were no actual urban policies, but rather policies concerning the urban space were seen almost exclusively as a threat to legal order. The authorities were generally very careful about public order in town, from the crime rate to the price of cereal and meat or public hygiene.

It is obvious that the massive urban migration phenomenon changed social relationships and more so cultural ones, and raised problems that Moldavia was not prepared to deal with, especially the conceptual assimilation of the newcomers, controlling public order and negotiating inter-cultural relations. Integration of the migrants was based on the medieval guild model: an economic and administrative integration with no social, cultural or political integration. This model then started to crumble at the end of fifth decade of the nineteenth century. After a short while, towards the end of the period under discussion, the idea of a radical difference appeared and was discussed as the assimilation problem.

Conclusions

The present study had two goals: to present the dimensions of urban migration alongside its socio-economic effects on Moldavia's society in the first half of the nineteenth century, and to analyse the reactions of the communities to which the immigrants came. Thus, my first hypothesis was that migration was a phenomenon of socio-genesis, maybe one of the most important in the history of the Principalities in the nineteenth century. Apart from the economic impact of immigration, which is hard to define, it is well known that the extraordinary expansion of towns in that period was mainly due to immigration.

I mostly used fiscal and administrative sources, due to the lack of internal archives of the immigrant communities. The advantages of studying this period from an urban demographical point of view are linked to the existence of some statistical and administrative sources (censuses) that are relatively numerous and homogenous. The fiscal sources, even if they do have serious interpretation problems, are a priceless documentary base.

I organised this chapter in three parts. In the first part, I attempted to recreate the link between migration and urbanisation and to review the demographic, economic and cultural wealth the migrants brought to the urban world of Moldavia. The population, especially the urban population, of Moldavia grew at a much faster pace than that of the neighbouring countries. Not only did new towns appear (at one point at the speed of two per year), but we also see a growth in occupations and economic activities. Urban migration was a part of the general urban dynamics. The most important fact is the birth of a new urban society, a multi-cultural and relatively open one. This new world economically depends on immigrants. The role they play explains the absence, at least for the moment, of any discussions about radical exclusion and functional discrimination of the newcomers. There were no ghettos or systematic policies to exclude foreigners in Moldavia.

It is known that early modern European cities depended on migration tides in the same way as the fluctuating processes of urbanisation and de-urbanisation. At the same time, it is difficult to compare the evolution of urban communities from Eastern Europe with what happened in the West. In Central and Western Europe, the spread of urbanisation was based on industrialisation and internal mobility. In Moldavia, at least in the period under discussion, urbanisation depended on migrational tides whereas immigration was foreign, civilly but also culturally. Many of the new towns from this period that appeared under the influence of a new wave of migrants were just transit towns. There were four or five destination towns that can be considered the centres of a gravitational migration: Iaşi, Galaţi, Bacău, Botoşani and Roman.

This fact, along with the persistence of the medieval guilds, probably stopped the birth of what could be called urban 'middle classes'. The urban nobility came either from the old aristocrats or from the newcomers. This impeded the creation of an individual urban ethos. Thus, the town could not become an autonomous political place. The town grew chaotically, lacking adequate public policies and discussions.

In the second part of the chapter, I took a closer look at the phenomenon in itself, especially how urban migration took place: its rhythm, types and structure. I looked at this phenomenon generally, but also more specifically, by category of migrants: Jews, people from south of the Danube and Sudits, vagrants and deserters. The phenomenon is irregular and not ethnically or economically homogenous, but it is historically visible. Its beginnings must be traced back to the end of the eighteenth century, to a few moments of high tension in the middle of the second decade, in the fourth decade and then in the fifth decade of the nineteenth century. The immigrants from across the border were attracted to the labour market and the dynamics of society in the Principalities, and also by their integration into the free market system. These immigrants met the need for a highly skilled workforce, even experts in such areas as urban architecture, various engineering positions and finance. They were not attracted to the prosperity of the land, but to her promising future.

At the same time, the presence of a population so heterogeneous with an ambiguous civil status raised some serious questions about the administration of all urban problems, from public law and order and sanitary protection to local government. In the third part of the chapter, I tried to present the way the town related to this process.

I found it hard to differentiate the 'town' and urban world as an autonomous actor. The urban world is still dependent on the state when it needs to create a community to administer itself. But I separated the spontaneous reactions of the people from the attitudes of the state. These are not always separate. In that period, however, they did not fully coincide. The state did not wish to foster the cultural assimilation of the newcomers, but just to collect as much tax as possible.

The phenomenon of mass urban migration changed social and especially cultural relationships. The migrants fractured the 'social body' and their dynamics were a source of inequality, but above all they seemed to threaten public order, moral values and the system of sanitary protection. To understand the reaction towards the migrants, these three fears must be taken into account. Additionally, at that time there was also the difficulty of conceiving migration as a complex demographic, social and cultural phenomenon and of offering an answer to this challenge.

Thus, the integration of the migrants was based on the model of the medieval guilds, which meant economic and administrative integration without a social, cultural or political one. This is a form of fiscal integration without any cultural assimilation and also without citizenship. Cultures mixed only around the ethnic borders or, maybe more so, the religious borders.

This model would collapse after a short while, when assimilating the newcomers became an issue. At that moment we see the birth of what we could call the urban socially marginalised: the poor of the town (especially the vagrants) were unable to integrate into the community's solidarity system. They threatened not only public, but also social order.

At the same time, this model made the concentration of the newcomers in cultural communities easier. These communities were relatively closed, normally formed on a denominational or linguistic basis (Jews, Protestants, Lippovans,[76] Bulgarians, Germans, etc.). But, generally speaking, there were no ghettos or fractured urban entities. This was due on the one hand to the professions of the immigrants tradesmen or housekeepers which are clearly categories that mediate culturally, and on the other hand to the lack of a local powerful cultural identity.

Notes

1 I am speaking here about historical Moldavia, with its medieval borders, between the Dniester River and the Carpathians.

2 The word *târg* is the oldest, but it refers to any place designed for exchanging goods; progressively, a set of larger towns like Iaşi, Botoşani, Galaţi, Roman and Bacău start being called in administrative language towns rather than boroughs; cf. a discussion on the subject in: V. Tufescu, *Târguşoarele din Moldova şi importanţa lor economică*, Bucharest: Imprimeria Nationala, 1942, p. 92; L. Boicu, 'Despre structura socială a oraşului moldovenesc la mijlocul sec. XIX', *Studii, Revistă de istorie* 2, 1963, pp. 281–5; E. Negruţi, *Structura demografică a oraşelor şi târgurilor din Moldova, 1800–1859, Contribuţii*, Iaşi: Editura Fundaţiei Academice 'A.D. Xenopol', 1997, pp. 5–16.

3 Especially Negruţi, op. cit.; Vasile Docea, *Străinii de-alături. Explorări în istoria minorităţilor şi a comunicării interculturale*, Timişoara: Editura Universităţii de Vest, 2006, p. 234.

4 Negruţi, p. 2.

5 Among the most recent contributions in this field: G. Platon, 'Problema evreiască în Moldova secolului XIX. Privire generală', in G. Platon (ed.) *De la constituirea naţiunii la Marea Unire*, VI, Iaşi: Editura Universităţii 'A.I. Cuza', 2006, p. 326, pp. 192–4.

6 A discussion about them is found in: L. Boicu, pp. 281–304; G.G. Platon, 'Populaţia evreiască din târgurile şi oraşele Moldovei, la mijlocul secolului XIX, Raport numeric-pondere economică', in *De la constituirea naţiunii la Marea Unire.*, op. cit., pp. 181–191; Negruţi: *Structura demografică a oraşelor şi târgurilor din Moldova*, pp. 2–5, and passim. The main documents of this kind can be found at the Arhivele Naţionale Iaşi (National Archives of Iaşi, from here on referred to as: ANI): *Catagrafia din 1820*, tr. 166, op. cit. 184.; *Catagrafia din 1838*, tr. 1 316, op. cit. 1 488; *Catagrafia din 1845*, tr. 1 423, op. cit. 1 619.

7 The first document of this type, which mentions the 'newcomers' dates back to 1851: 'Ecstract pentru neguţitorii şi meşterii patentari cu calfele lor şi pentru bejenarii greco-sârbo-bulgari veniţi de peste Dunărea precum şi pentru jâdovii de prin târgurile Prinţipatului 1851'; ANI, tr. 1423, op. cit. 1619, File No. 1054.

8 It seems that, before 1774, from when we have the first general statistics of the Principalities, they had an average rhythm of growth of less than 1 per cent per year. Cf. Ş. Ştefănescu, 'Aspects de la révolution démographique dans le Pays Roumains à la fin du XVIIIe siècle', *Nouvelles Etudes d'Histoire* VI-1, 1980, p. 309.

9 These calculations are based on the information found in the aforementioned statistics, and the information given by Ecaterina Negruţi, Corneliu Istrati, Leonid Boicu and Gheorghe Platon (see above). We do not have a serious and comprehensive study of this subject yet. On the one hand, Romanian historians tend to exaggerate dates, and on the other hand, the statistics mentioned talk more about families and less about individuals. Anyway, normally Jews and non-fiscal categories were excluded from the normal censuses.

10 Ştefănescu, pp. 309–311; G. Platon, *Istoria modernă a României*, Bucharest: Editura Didactică şi Pedagogică, 1985, p. 56; G. Zane, 'Probleme de economie financiară în timpul domniei lui Alexandru Ioan Cuza', *Studii*, Bucharest: Editura Eminescu, 1980, p. 212.

11 P. Dimitriev, *Narodonaselenie Moldavii*, Kishinew: MLD, 1973, p. 112.

12 Platon, p. 57.

13 Zane, p. 212.

14 Negruţi, p. 8.

15 These are not English terms for these towns. Nevertheless, some authors use for Iaşi the French or German historical term: Jassy. The terms Galatz (Galaţi), Botoshani (Botoşani), Bacau (Bacău), etc., are not used very frequently. In this approach, I will affect the Romanian terms with a view to simplify the exposure.

16 See the cases of the Fălticeni or Dorohoi boroughs, for example; Boicu, pp. 286–8.
17 Dmitriev, pp. 398–9.
18 *Uricariul* VIII, pp. 363–8.
19 ANI, tr. 1423, op. cit. 1619, No. 1015, 1019, 1033; G. Platon, 'Populaţia oraşului Iaşi de la jumătatea secolului al XVIII-lea pînă la 1859', in Ş. Pascu (ed.) *Populaţie şi societate, Studii de demografie istorică* I, Cluj: Editura Dacia, 1972, annex XV; Boicu, passim.
20 C. Negruzzi (ed.) *Din lucrările statistice ale Moldovei. Lucrări statistice făcute în anii 1859–1860*, Iaşi: Direcţia centrală de statistică din Ministerul de interne a Moldovei, 1860, pp. 114–15.
21 Cf. Platon, 'Populaţia oraşului moldovenesc la jumătatea secolului *XIX*', *Carpica*, t. III, 1970, annex II.
22 *Documentele privitoare la istoria economică a României, 1766–1861*, A. *Moldova*, II, Bucharest: Editura Academiei, 1960, p. VII; Boicu, 285; Negruţi, pp. 7–12.
23 Tufescu, 91; C. Cihodaru, 'Dezvoltarea economică', in C. Cihodaru and G. Platon (eds) *Istoria oraşului Iaşului*, Iaşi: Editura Junimea, 1980, p. 388.
24 Cf. Platon: *Populaţia evreiască din târgurile şi oraşele Moldovei*, p. 182.
25 Boicu, p. 293.
26 Ibid. 284.
27 ANI, *Catagrafia din 1845*, tr. 1 423, op. cit. 1 619, File No. 926; Negruzzi, op. cit., p. 108.
28 This perspective seems to be a cliché of the historiography of the problem; cf. Negruţi, pp. 8–9, and passim.
29 Tufescu, pp. 102–5.
30 A.T. Obreja, 'Târgurile din Moldova în veacul XIX', *Arhivele Basarabiei* 4, 1936, p. 321; Negruţi, pp. 9, 82.
31 It was only after 1832, once the Organic Statute was accepted, that these conditions relaxed partially; cf. D. Vitcu and G. Bădărău (eds) *Regulamentul Organic al Moldovei*, Iaşi: Junimea, 2004, pp. 127, 202.
32 We observe, for example, that between 1832 and 1865, in August, the mortality rate was highest among the locals but also among the foreigners, which could suggest that the towns were experiencing at that moment the highest incoming wave of population; Negruţi, p. 125.
33 Hurmuzaki, *Documente* XVII, Bucharest, 1913, pp. 362–3. Report from 14 May 1834.
34 I have used here the sources already mentioned; cf. also R. Rosetti (Verax), *La Roumanie et les juifs*, Bucharest: I.V. Socec, 1904, p. 42; Tufescu, p. 102; Negruţi, p. 112.
35 The decline of Greeks from Moldavia in this epoch, even relatively, is related to their terrible massacre by the Ottomans after the defeat of the insurrections from 1821. See, a source about it to: I. Ghica, 'Din vremea zaverei', in *Scrisori către Vasile Alecsandri*, Bucharest: Editura Minerva, 1986, pp. 58–85. Equally, for a historical picture of the context, see: I. C. Filitti, *Frământări politice şi sociale în Principatele române de la 1821 la 1828*, Bucharest: Editura Cartea Românească, 1932, passim; S. Mărieş, 'La statistique de 1834–1825 de sujets étrangers en Moldavie et son importance démographique', *O Eranistis* 15, 1978–9, pp. 131–53.
36 N. Şuţu, *Opere economice*. Edited by Ion Veverca, Bucharest: Editura Academiei, 1957, pp. 147–8.
37 'Populaţiunea pe 1859–1860', pp. 108–15.
38 Tufescu, p. 131.
39 In 1808, there were 2,869 Jews in Iaşi; cf. *Condica scrierii sufletelor şi a familiilor stării de jos din târgul Iaşii*, Arhivele Naţionale Istorice Centrale (The Historical National Archives of Bucharest: from here: ANIC), Mss. No. 804; the same document in: ANI, Mss. No. 1 634; cf also C. Istrati, 'Statistici administrative şi fiscale privind populaţia Moldovei între anii 1808–1812', *Anuarul Institutului de Istorie şi Arheologie Iaşi* XXIV-2, 1987, p. 379.
40 M.H. Halevy, *Comunităţile evreilor din Iaşi şi Bucureşti, I (pînă la 1841)*, Bucharest: 1941, pp. 74–8, quoted in Negruţi, p. 92.
41 The *Sudiţii* (plural of Romanian term *Sudit*, from Italian *suddito* meaning 'subject' or 'citizen') were the inhabitants of the Romanian Principalities, foreigners or native, who,

for the latter stage of the eighteenth and a large part of the nineteenth century, enjoyed foreign consular protection, as stipulated by the terms of the treaties signed by the Western powers and the Turkish Empire and imposed to the Principalities after the treaty of Kucuk Kaynarca (1774). This legal status will be annulated by the Treaty of Berlin (1878). For a complete presentation of this case, cf. S. Mărieş, *Supuşii străini din Moldova în perioada 1781–1862*, Iaşi: Editura Academiei, 1985, pp. 41–106, passim.

42 ANI, *Fond Vistieria Moldovei*, Tr. 166, op. cit. 184, File No. 23: p. 1.

43 Platon, 'Populaţia oraşului moldovenesc la jumătatea secolului XIX', Annex II, III, XVI, XVII.

44 Concerning the translation of several terms and the change of meaning that took place, we have here a problem of semantic modernisation. For instance, the word *băjenari* translated as refugees or homecomers and the word *căpătîieri* as homeless. The plural noun *băjenari* comes from *bejenie*, which is a Slavonic word that actually means to find refuge, to be forced to leave your hometown; here though, it means people who were fiscally indeterminate: they were not attached to a corporation or a fiscal category. The meaning of the noun *căpătăieri* is close enough, but although the refugees meant groups of population, here we are speaking about isolated individuals; they very probably had no shelter or home, but this is not what their name primarily refers to. We have here, in fact, some social marks with a powerful moral meaning: the terms mentioned label those people who left their native communities through this fiscal evasion. These were the categories that were frowned upon not only by the authorities, but especially by the people, because in a society based on fiscal solidarity, the community paid taxes on their behalf.

45 Negruţi, p. 74.

46 Ibid. pp. 148–9; ANI, *Catagrafia din 1838*, tr. 1 316, op. cit. 1 488, 2–78, File No. 1 293: pp. 1–318.

47 ANI, tr. 1316, op. cit. 1488, File No. 1293; Boicu, pp. 289–99.

48 Negruţi, p. 200.

49 The first special commissions created by the authorities for the census and surveillance of the vagrants appear in Moldavia in the middle of the 1830s; cf. ANI, *Fond Eforia Municipiului Iaşi*, File No. 80/1836.

50 *Manualul administrativ al Moldovei*, No. 354: pp. 491–2.

51 ANI, *Secretariatul de Stat*, File No. 1.114: 413–44; *Manualul administrativ*, I, No. 387: pp. 523–4.

52 ANI, tr. 1772, op. cit. 2020, No. 35 605; Boicu, pp. 298–99.

53 ANI, tr. 1772, op. cit. 2020, No. 42 896: pp. 68–72; No. 41 337: p. 253; Negruţi, pp. 78–9.

54 ANI, tr. 1772, op. cit. 2020, No. 41 337: p. 87.

55 ANI, tr. 1772, op. cit. 2020, No. 45 368: pp. 7–9; No. 41 520: pp. 4–5.

56 Cf. N.A. Bogdan, 'Cea dintâi legiuire comunală în oraşul Iaşi şi în principalele târguri din Moldova', *Ioan Neculce, Buletinul Muzeului Municipal din Iaşi* I-2, 1921, pp. 240–1; D. Agache, 'Înfiinţarea eforiilor orăşeneşti în Moldova', *Cercetări istorice* (Excerpt), Iaşi, 1973, pp. 196–9.

57 In Iaşi, for example, the Municipal Council (*Eforia*) was made up of members chosen for a year from among the indigenous apprentices. This council was intended to look after the administration of current affairs, cleanliness, town activity and the budget: about the council's activity: D. Rusu, 'Oraşul Iaşi în perioada regulamentară' in Cihodaru and Platon, pp. 477–80.

58 Cf. E. Schwarzfeld, *Din istoria evreilor. Împopularea, reîmpopularea şi întemeierea târgurilor şi târguşoarelor în Moldova*, Bucharest: Editura Uniunii evreilor, 1914, pp. 61–2; Iorga, *Breasla blănarilor din Botoşani*, Bucharest: Socec, 1911, pp. 31–5; Negruţi, 'Tulburările antievreieşti din 1859 în Moldova', *Anuarul Institutului de Istorie din Iaşi* XXXII, 1995, pp. 177–83.

59 ANI, *Fond Comitetul sănătăţii*, tr. 1 757, op. cit. 2005, File No. 651: pp. 885, 1026; Negruţi, p. 88.

60 Cf. *Acte şi documente relative la Istoria Renaşterii României*, III, Bucharest: Tipografia Carol Gobl, 1889, pp. 98–110.

61 Platon, '*Problema evreiască* în Moldova secolului XIX', p. 195; the author gives a shade to his idea, saying that it was only valid for the first half of the nineteenth century; this idea, however, is very common in Romanian historiography; see also D. Vitcu: 'Chestiunea evreiască în relaţiile româno-americane timpurii', *Studia et Acta Historiae Judaeorum Romaniae*, 1, 1996, pp. 167–207.
62 M. Spielmann and L. Benjamin, 'Studiu introductiv', *Izvoare şi mărturii cu privire la evreii din România* II-2, Bucharest: Editura Hasefer, 1986, XLII–XLIII.
63 *Uricariul*, V, pp. 32, 169; E. Pavlescu, *Economia breslelor în Moldova*, Bucharest: 1939, pp. 415, 431.
64 See *Uricariul*, I: pp. 111–13.
65 ANI, *Fond Ispră̆vnicia Bacău*, tr. 345, op. cit. 370, File No. 31: p. 184; ANI, *Fond Isprăvnicia Iaşi*, tr. 1 759, op. cit. 2008, File No. 362: p. 6; *Manualul administrativ al Moldovei*, I, No. 379: pp. 511–14; quoted by Negruţi, p. 88.
66 *Manualul administrativ*, I, No. 382: pp. 511–17, quoted by Negruţi, p. 88.
67 *Manualul administrativ*, I, No. 379: p. 511.
68 ANI, *Secretariatul de Stat*, File No. 1 114: p. 166.
69 Ibid.
70 *Manualul administrativ*, I, No. 385: pp. 521–3.
71 ANIC, *Fond Ministerul de Interne Moldova*, File No. 2/1851: p. 11.
72 ANI, tr. 1772, op. cit. 2020, File No. 41 776: p. 25; Negruţi, p. 169.
73 *Documente privitoare la istoria economică a României. Oraşe şi târguri*, II: pp. 236–7, 286–7.
74 ANI, tr. 1772, op. cit. 2020, File No. 13 889: pp. 2–377; File No. 15 530: p. 5; ANI, tr. 1772, op. cit. 2020, File No. 30 795: p. 154.
75 ANI, tr. 1772, op. cit. 2020, No. 42 896: p. 223; ANI, tr. 1772, op. cit. 2020, No. 41 337: 36; 42 896: p. 146.
76 The Lippovans were fugitives from Russia, who fled religious persecutions and settled in Moldavia.

5 Mobility and governance in early modern Marseilles

Wolfgang Kaiser

Like other port-cities in the early modern period, in the Mediterranean and elsewhere, Marseilles was a place of transit. The port and the city, proud of their past and Phoenician origins, rich in ancient relics, attracted visitors and pilgrims, passers-by and people of note who came in style. In the sixteenth century Provence and Marseilles were a crossroads, a melting-pot of all nations. This is how the royal authorities explained the periodic outbreaks of violence and revolts. The Governor of Provence, the Duke of Épernon, wrote in 1593 to King Henry IV: 'There is no province in your whole kingdom, where men are more marked by inconstancy and instability than men of this country.'[1] He then denounced their 'extreme opinions'.[2] For the queen mother, Catherine of Medici, who visited the region in 1578 9, the innumerable quarrels and enmities among the people of Provence could be explained by the fact that this was a mixed population: 'thus all the people here are descended from diverse nations and the strain still shows through in many of them'.[3] The Spanish Ambassador to France, Álava, who accompanied King Charles IX and Catherine of Medici, went even further. During his visit to Marseilles (1563) he complained about the taste for things Turkish of the galley commander Cornelio Fregoso, a naturalised Genoese,[4] and also condemned those of the King's entourage who enjoyed the Moorish-style ballet put on by the Knights of Malta and dressed up à la Turque for their amusement in the city.[5] For Álava, this taste for things Turkish is not only visible proof of the alliance with the Ottoman Empire in the Mediterranean, but also brings to light the false difference between what they profess and what they practice, with its deeper taint.[6]

Various migrant groups and commercial networks inter-mingled in this city crossroads: men from the interior of the region and neighbouring Mediterranean countries; from the commercial networks that linked Lyons, Strasbourg and Geneva, via Marseilles, with the Mediterranean and the trade routes both in and beyond the Mediterranean Sea. An awareness of the history of Marseilles's long economic development is essential if one is to understand the city's relatively open attitude towards demographic growth. In the early modern era Marseilles witnessed a demographic afflux (from 15,000 to almost 435,000 inhabitants in the sixteenth century), though it was not continuous (there were plagues in 1580, 1586 and 1720). Its economic prosperity made the Marseilles of the eighteenth century the most important grain port in the Mediterranean, a port henceforth of international importance: this was reflected in its rapid growth (to 120,000 inhabitants in 1790).

In 1489, there were so many foreigners in the city that the town council opposed the expulsion of the Genoese and Milanese, fearing that this would leave the city depopulated: 600 men and their families had come to live in Marseilles in the previous ten years, owning houses and disposing of their fortunes.[7] Even if this report is somewhat exaggerated, it gives an idea of the domination of large-scale trade in Marseilles by the Italians, that is, by resident merchants and those from Lyons. On the financial level, but also in relation to shipping and chartering, Marseilles' Mediterranean commerce was controlled largely by the Florentine and Lucchese merchant-bankers of Lyons. In 1555, some 80 per cent of exports happened through foreign firms; of the 153 expeditions, only one concerned Alexandria, two went to Tripoli in Syria and one to Malta.[8] This can be explained by the fact that the Levant trade consisted principally of imports; furthermore, Marseilles' foreign merchants were no doubt tempted to use local merchants to avoid payment of the *foraine* (a tax on foreign merchants). The tax-farmer of the customs on silks and drugs, Louis Diadjaceto, claimed that in the 1570s all trade in Marseilles was conducted on commission.[9] Even if there is in his claim an element of contempt, of tending to play down the role of foreigners, one should note, with Michel Morineau, that in the sixteenth century one-third of trade was controlled by foreign merchants who did not have citizenship, and still a quarter in the seventeenth century.[10]

Besides the Italian 'noble merchants', like Joseph de la Seta from Pisa or the Lucchese Betin Dati, there was a constant stream of immigration linked to maritime trade in which, in the sixteenth century, the Corsicans featured prominently because of their close-knit family groups. In the 1540s and 1550s, the Corsican War precipitated a mass influx of Corsican soldiers, captains, sailors and merchants, all of whom found themselves in a privileged position across the French kingdom. The often-quoted rapid rise of Thomas Lenche 'Tommaso Corso' in Marseilles is typical;[11] this is but one example of the continuous stream of Corsican and Ligurian sailors who were concentrated in the parish of St Laurent.

From Liguria and Piedmont came another migratory wave, gardeners, artisans and also lawyers, who created a niche for themselves in legal institutions such as the Parlement of Aix-en-Provence. The continuous immigration from the provençal hinterland and from the countryside surrounding the city is equally important but less visible. According to the town council, in 1571 some 2,000 seasonal workers came to prune the vines in the Marseilles region.[12]

We can identify the visitors, travellers and temporary migrants by means of official residency controls. The authorities of any port-city are preoccupied with controlling commercial lodging places. The many different types of transit and entry, categorised by purpose, nature and route, were matched by the varied infrastructures of admittance, arranged according to the social status of the visitor and the services offered, which also determined their location in the urban space and within the municipal territory. For visitors and travellers, the city of Marseilles offered a variety of accommodation options.[13] In the early modern period private and religious hospitality coexisted, in a generally expanding economy of hospitality. Important visitors King Charles IX were accommodated, with their households, outside the walls: in taverns with stables, on the *Plaine* and in the *bastide* (rural estate) of the nobleman Nicolas de Bausset (Charles IX); or they stayed on their ships (as did Mary of Austria in 1583, on her way to Spain). Royal ambassadors like Nicolas de Nicolay could make use of the *Logis du roi*, that is, the King's residence that looked out on the port. Private hospitality continued to play a role in the early modern era: in the sixteenth century, one finds Jews from Avignon (forbidden to stay, expelled in 1501) in the house of the Governor of Marseilles, outside the walls; the Algerian Ambassadors who came for the signing of the peace treaty in 1620 were accommodated in private houses by merchants of the Compagnie du Corail where, in 1620, they were spotted, besieged and massacred;[14] during his stay in Marseilles in April 1676 John Locke was welcomed by Tobias Sollicoffre, head of the Reformed community of Marseilles, which practised at Velaux (a landed estate of Solicoffre), and consul (that is representative) for merchants from Hamburg and Flemish merchants in Marseilles.[15] For important or official visitors, this practice changed progressively: at the end of the eighteenth century, the French Ambassador to the Sublime Porte, was housed, like other members of the high aristocracy, at the Hôtel du Prince, in 'five-star' accommodation (à *la meilleure enseigne*).

For this frontier town and military port, the afflux of travellers and the important accommodation infrastructures meant for the authorities a major institutional investment to control visitors and people passing through the town and also the innkeepers, hoteliers and others who lodged them. For the sixteenth century, there is virtually no record of checking safe-conducts or health clearances (*bollettes de santé*) at the town gates or of any records made by those offering accommodation. Such records can be found only in the accounts of the travellers themselves in their accounts, journals, letters, and so forth. A particularly obscure point is the arrival and presence of Muslims in Marseilles. Although there were lodging places for Germans or hotels accommodating the Swiss and the Dutch (in the seventeenth century the basis of a Reformed spy network),[16] no similar places were found for the Muslims, who were apparently welcomed privately and so were less visible in the urban environment. It was only the development in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries of sanitary control in the Mediterranean (in Marseilles the Bureau de santé), the structuring of maritime society (the strict control through registration of sailors, the *système des classes*) as well as European politico-military arrangements (a headcount of 'foreigners' in times of crisis, of the Genoese and the English, for example) that produced a more consistent documentation. The controls imposed in the eighteenth century give us a glimpse of the patterns and composition of these travellers and migrants, from the single women who gained employment as domestic servants to the figurine-makers from Lucca, or hat-makers. Less notable than the Italian businessmen and the migrants who aimed to settle in the city, these newcomers are hard to distinguish from seasonal workers.

This fluidity combined with other migrations. The city was not only a place that welcomed visitors and seasonal workers; its own, so-called sedentary or stable population was itself a population on the move. The fortified city boundary could not have deceived any observer as to its porosity or openness in this respect: many inhabitants divided their time between the city proper and the surrounding *bastides* (rural estate or manor), between city and ship, and many merchants and residents, had significant resources elsewhere and so left the city for extended periods. Compared with Venice, Genoa or Naples, Marseilles was a small city, spread out over three hills on the northern shore of the port. Despite the limited space, which seemed to prevent actual spatial separations, contemporary writers distinguished between the various reception areas for different types of migrants. The Marseillaise notary (*notaire*) Robert Ruffi, author of a manuscript history of the city, described the differences between these urban areas by a mixture of social, cultural and linguistic criteria:

> Since in the quarter *Corps de ville*, where the King's residence may be found along with the town hall and the dwellings of most of the noblemen and rich city merchants, the provençal language used is more refined; in the Blancarie area, where most of the *mesnagers* [wealthy land owners] are situated and some gentlemen, it is less so; still less in the Cavaillon neighbourhood, where *laboureurs* [landholders] have their lodgings, or in the St Jehan quarter where all the fishermen and seamen and some merchants dwell; and also in this quarter most conversation is between foreigners from across the seas, and similarly those who travel to the Levant and other places. The language is more mixed than in the other quarters, and I remember that in the year 1559 there was a carnival at the above-mentioned Marseilles where among other things they mimicked the language of these quarters, [so that while] in the Corps de ville they said 'ouy ben', in the Blanquerie [they said] 'ouy' and in Cavaillon 'ol hoc' and in St Jehan 'Olé'.[17]

This text first sketches out a social topography of the town according to the professions and degrees of 'refinement' (*civilité*). Then it describes the reception areas: Cavaillon for labourers and gardeners, Saint-Jean for seamen and fishermen, as if these were spatially arranged to receive successive waves of immigrants from different countries, as William Sewell noted for the nineteenth century.[18]

The notary Robert Ruffi mapped the route of social mobility that led to the heart of the city: to the Corps de Ville with the King's residence and the town hall accessible only to citizens.[19] It was not an oversight that he omitted the merchants' *Loggia*, which was open to the city's wealthiest merchants whether from Marseilles or foreigners to deal with important *affaires*. Ruffi focused on city politics, deliberated on by the 'Corps de Ville', the political body formed by the citizens who alone had access to municipal office and enjoyed political and financial privileges.

In Marseilles, the granting of bourgeois status the Marseilles sources of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries use the Italian term *citadinage* (citizen status) was, in principle, subject to strict conditions. *Citadinage* was not to be granted by the municipal council unless the asker had resided in the city for at least 10 12 years, had married a local woman, owned a house (and kept 'open house') and had invested a third of his assets in property either in the city or the surrounding territory. A commitment to accept municipal office and to practise the Catholic faith was also required. These restricting conditions appeared to limit access to citizenship to a small group of well-to-do foreigners, merchants keen to enjoy the fiscal privileges of Marseilles' bourgeoisie as soon as possible. In the sixteenth century the control of citizenship passed from the city to the King, by grant of letters of naturalisation in both cases registration was called for not only to insure one's goods and secure inheritance (Marseilles being exempt from the *droit d'aubaine* (that is 'the King's right to seize the estates and property of aliens who died in the kingdom unless they had native heirs or had been exempted individually or collectively'[20]) but especially to allow enjoyment of the fiscal privileges of citizenship.[21] But, in practice, these costly letters account for only a minority of cases; assimilation into the city generally took place by other, traditional ways, such as practising a trade, entrance into a guild and especially by marriage, an alliance with an honourable Marseillaise family. Provided these conditions were met, the town council sometimes relaxed the criteria of citizenship.[22]

Another way of reducing the time constraint or bypassing official procedure was to invoke loyalty and service to the community. This applied especially to foreigners from outside with a certain public image: for example, the Genoese merchants who suddenly rose at the turn of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries to become consuls in the city. We can see the case of Niccolò Pesciolini of San Gimignano, sent after a turbulent youth to his cousin, the merchant Ottavio Pesciolini, established in the mercantile place of Marseilles.[23] He travelled and traded on behalf of the firm in Spain and Portugal, and the services rendered to Grand Duke of Tuscany led to his becoming a Knight of the Military Order of Santo Stefano. In 1582, he hosted in his house the first secretary of the Grand Duke, on his way to Spain.[24] At the time of the Ligue, Pesciolini became the consuls' preferred agent for negotiating loans and deliveries of grain to the Grand Duke while also being the Duke's secret agent.[25] While on a mission for the Marseillaise *ligueurs*, seeking grain in Tuscany, he was captured at sea by North African corsairs. The Marseilles consuls, in their letters to the authorities in Tunis demanding his release, refer to him simply as 'citizen': 'Le Sieur Pescioliny qui combien il ne soit natif de Marseille, il y est habité despuis son ieune aaige et tenu pour notre citoyen' ['Sir Pescioliny who though not a native of Marseilles has lived in the city since a young age and is regarded by us as a citizen']; 'le Sieur Pescioliny, citoyen & habitant de ceste ville' ['Sir Pescioliny, citizen and inhabitant of this town'].[26]

The different methods of becoming established in urban society appear to correspond to the different ways of being inscribed into the city's physical space. The visible sign of successful assimilation and gaining an honourable reputation is for the complex of buildings (*l'îlot*) in which one lives to take on the family name. This becomes a landmark both in urban topography and in the social fabric. The commissioners charged with evaluating assets, who in 1595 and 1599 made their way through the streets of Marseilles noting all the owners, tenants and houses, designated topographical positions by the names of the families or well-known individuals who had given their names to buildings or groups of buildings: thus, in the Saint-Jean quarter there was the île de Roncaglio in the rue des Masses (Ascanio Roncaglio came originally from Lucca), that of Claude de la Sousso (originally from Corsica) and of Antoine Gratian, also from Lucca, in the Grande Rue.[27] Families of fishermen or caulkers like the Bompar, Napollon or Reboul families were also grouped together in *îlots*. These complexes, however, did not signify a wish to stake out a territorial claim, but were rather centres of trade or a family strategy for the transmission of goods to ensure inheritance. Some families were memorialised in this way in the urban topography: the Reboul, caulkers, gave their name to the Reboul neighbourhood in the port; Thomas Lenche, following his meteoric rise, to the place Saint-Sauveur in the Saint-Jean quarter.

The urban elite of Marseilles was happy to resuscitate at regular intervals the political myth that Marseilles 'se serait maintenue en République soubz ses propres loix et forme de gouvernement aristocratique par le cours de dix huit cens septante ans' ['would have remained a Republic under its own laws and form of aristocratic government for eighteen hundred and seventy years'],[28] or, more realistically, to emphasise that the citizens of Marseilles had built the city 'en République après qu'ils eurent achetée des vicomtes [de Provence] la Seigneurie de leur ville' ['as a Republic after they had purchased the lordship of their town from the viscounts (of Provence)'].[29] The peace declarations of 1257 and other various rulings certainly point to a wide municipal autonomy. The town's privileged status was proudly recalled in 1593:

> The arms, justice and liberties that the town holds by express agreement which agreements the said town has always held and enjoyed, and still with (the right to bear) arms to hand, (responsible for) the defence of the town, (in possession of) the keys of the city gates and the harbour; the consuls give the orders and are in command in times of war; for the judiciary the king set up two judges and the town two also.[30]

This period of autonomy under the benevolent eye of the count's authority and subsequently that of the king ended after the Fronde with the entrance of Louis XIV into the rebel town on 2 March 1660. The statutes decreed by the king excluded the nobility from municipal office and town council membership and installed two municipal magistrates from trade and merchant backgrounds as managers of economic affairs.[31]

But the domination of the city by a merchant aristocracy did not change. For the period before 1660 this domination was expressed in the exemption obtained in 1566 by the 'noble merchants' of Marseilles from article 109 of the ordinance of Orleans (1561) that forbade the nobility to engage in trade;[32] this was fixed in the municipal law of 1585 that stipulated that the first consul must be a gentleman with a fortune of 10,000 écus, the second consul a 'squire' (*écuyer*) with 6,000, and the third consul a '*bourgeois*' worth 4,000 écus; even a council member had to be worth 2,000 écus.[33] This unique moment, when the social features of urban government were fixed, offers the historian a valuable insight though the ruling was abolished three years later in favour of a late fifteenth-century ruling that left much implicit, suiting the merchant aristocracy by reinforcing the openness of the social body.

In their request to the King, the city's 'gentilshommes issus de noble et ancienne lignée' ['gentlemen from noble and ancient lineage'] quoted the situation of Italian towns 'où les gentilshommes et grands seigneurs font profession de l'art de marchandise' ['where gentlemen and great lords engage in the art of commerce'].[34] This reference was used not only in Marseilles, but also in other commercial towns such as Lyons. The argument ran on several levels. First, the Italian position was taken as a model to justify a practical parallel with the aristocracy of Marseilles. Then economic factors were brought to bear: the nobility was forced into commerce on account of the 'sterility of the land' and the absence of other sources of wealth. Commerce, especially the Levant trade, was essential for the city of Marseilles, built on 'sterile rocks'; only by commerce could the city survive:

> The said city, one of the principal cities of the kingdom, is sustained and maintained only by the traffic of commerce which is the soul and spirit that enriches it and without which it would lose the lustre, title and reputation that it bears and would be no more than a village.[35]

But whereas the Italian reference appears to be explained simply by geographical proximity and similar situation, the argument of economic constraint has nothing Italian about it. The same argument can be found, for example, in the Norman nobility's register of complaints (*cahier des doléances*) to the Estates General in 1614.[36] In Provence itself the argument became a *topos* that was found also in requests for letters of rehabilitation or relief for the nobility: it was stated, for example, that their predecessors, because the family assets had been committed, had been obliged to 'engage as a lawyer in the Courts [*pratique du palais*] of our towns of Aix and Marseilles'.[37] This temporary practice appears, in the sixteenth century, so natural that one could omit registering these 'letters of rehabilitation' with the Cour des Comptes. In 1568 the Marseillais squire Lazarin George called Olières, whose family was from the hinterland of Provence, acquired the lordship of Gréasque.[38] As his father Esparron had been a notary in Marseilles, Lazarin asked, to avoid payment of the *franc-fief*, (a levy to be paid by non nobles who acquired land of noble status), for 'letters of rehabilitation' and was released from the levy in 1585.[39] It was only when under pressure to establish the authenticity of noble titles (in 1667 8) that the George d'Olières family registered these 'letters' that Lazarin de George 'de' Olières had obtained in 1574.[40] In the middle of the seventeenth century it appeared easier to recognise having been a lawyer at the Courts (*la pratique du palais*) than mercantile activities (*la pratique marchande*). Thus, the 'Letters patents for the relief of the nobility' for 'Nicolas d'Hermitte, lord of Belcodène', note that Jean-François Hermite, a lawyer in the legal district of Marseilles, was 'obligé de faire aussi conjointement la fonction de procureur attandu qu'audit temps il n'y en avoit aucun de créé et estably en ladite ville' ['obliged to practise simultaneously as a barrister (*procureur*) since at that time there was no one qualified and established in the said town'].[41] Legal employment is represented as useful for the community and a recognised service, as in 1542 and 1562 François Hermite was elected assessor of the city.[42] But neither the plea nor the dossier prepared by the Hermittes during the investigations of nobility mentioned the trading business of the grandson d'Elzéas, Antoine Hermite, or of his brother, Gilles, who at the end of the sixteenth century were very active in the Levant trade.[43]

One can see in this silence about the family past a reflection of the hostility to trade, a recent phenomenon in the Marseilles context, which was to develop in the seventeenth century. But this would perhaps be an overinterpretation of the facts, as at the same time other families of 'noble merchants', such as the Florentine André d'Altovitis, simply added to their dossiers a copy of the 1566 letters patent of Charles IX.[44] One finds an elaborate echo of the seventeenth-century arguments against the nobles' practice of commerce in Abbé François Marchetti's *Discours sur le négoce des gentilshommes de la ville de Marseille et sur la qualité de nobles marchands qu'ils prenoient il y cent ans.*[45] This writer defended the practice of the provençal nobility, which saw trade as a major career path and source of wealth and enrichment.

> The gentlemen of Aix & Provence send [to the people of Marseilles] their children to be instructed in commerce If custom had not allowed our Nobility to Trade openly, & if it is true that trade had been for them a degrading occupation; it is certain that they would have taken care not to practise this profession openly and publicly, committing themselves to public contracts, instructing other gentlemen, & making in their own homes a sort of School & Academy.[46]

Commercial education in this context of an urban aristocracy cultivating the ideal of Christian chivalry, the crusade, the civilities and entertainments that are hallmarks of refinement, consists not only of technical skills (double book-keeping, languages) but also 'refinements' such as dance and fencing at least if one gives credence to a proposal for an academy drawn up at the beginning of the seventeenth century and put to Marseilles' town council, and which seems to have been in existence for at least a few years.[47]

In the sixteenth century apprenticeship in the Levant trade was not unusual for the Marseillaise aristocracy, which saw the Levant as its 'Indies': thus, the young Pierre Vento, from a Genoese family, learnt Arab in Aleppo, guided by his uncle Gilles Hermite, and familiarised himself with the country's customs.[48] Such knowledge of the Levant could leave the way open to the post of consul in France, to ennoblement[49] or other honours.[50] In 1735, Jean-Baptiste Labat gave, in his introduction to the 'Mémoires' of chevalier Laurent d'Arvieux (1635 1702), a typical account of such a career:

> The Chevalier d'Arvieux dwelt in the country, & applied himself to Mathematics, he had an overwhelming desire to learn foreign languages and to travel . . . He thought that wholesale commerce with the Levant was the only means open to poor gentlemen to establish their families on a good footing; that the most impressive buildings in Marseilles and Provence had been

> established in this way, without detriment to the owners' nobility granted by the king as a special privilege and often retracted, to allow wholesale trade and to allow their money to be valid in the exchanges of the Levant, as the nobles do in Venice, Genoa, Florence, Leghorn and other Italian towns and as they do even in England and many other places besides.
>
> Provence, as all the world knows, is not a fertile land; it is mountainous, dry, much of it sterile. It has to produce enough to maintain its people, but only commerce is able to sustain it. Its people regard the Levant, that is to say, the empire of the Grand Seigneur, as their Indies; it is there they send almost all their children to train them to deal on the exchanges of this vast country, and so long as they are wise and lucky, they amass enough money to establish their houses and to spend the rest of their days in opulence.[51]

Thus the young Laurent d'Arvieux enters a commercial house to train in commerce and is sent as a factor to the Levant. A polyglot traveller and connoisseur of the Levant, he became French consul in Aleppo.

In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, a presence in maritime commerce gave access to judicial and financial office, offered a path to a military career and alliance with the provençal nobility, that is, to an urban aristocracy that did not carry with it municipal offices like that of consul (royal officers were excluded) but did imply a quality and reputation that went beyond the urban framework and allowed the exercise of an intermediary role between the city, the province and royal authority (as later with the Valbelle family, admiralty lieutenants).[52]

The success of the Félix family offers a significant example: of Avignon extraction, Claude Félix set up in Marseilles in the fifteenth century; his son, Philippe, a draper, was granted citizenship in 1541. A branch of the family from Aix established itself in the legal world, whereas the Marseilles branch grew wealthy thanks to maritime trade and to the office of controller general of the Levant marine. In the 1580s, Louis Félix, controller general of the marine, was a personality of 'great authority' and was naturally considered a '*gentiluomo*' by the Italian Capucins who, in their ransoming mission (*mission de rachat*) in Algiers, passed through Marseilles.[53] It was Félix who provided the contact for financial operations with the political authorities and with the Italian bankers in Lyons.[54] His nephew, Philippe, inherited from his mother, Louise Huc, the lordship of La Reynarde and embarked on a military career: he attracted attention as galley captain in the 1622 battle against the Catalans, before being elected first consul of his native town in 1628.[55] War and maritime trade accounted for the subsequent success of the Félix family, who were linked by marriage to the powerful Valbelle clan.[56]

This marriage of war and trade was not unusual, however, in a port-city and could give rise to schemes and comings and goings that did not correspond to noble principles of military virtue. In the first half of the sixteenth century, privateering in Marseilles was practised by noble galley captains and rich merchants associated in a veritable business that used force to make profit.[57] But the 'little war' could lead to rapid social ascendancy like that of the draper Gaspard Fabre: in 1552 he built a brigantine and in the same year received letters patent as captain from the

Governor of Provence and Admiral of the Levant.[58] His first exploit earned him operational letters patent as captain from King Charles IX, as well as entrance into the Royal Order of Saint-Michel.[59] During the Corsican War, in the 1550s, the *condottieri* and Corsican merchants who acted as intermediaries in the troubled waters of the relationships with the 'Turk', met some spectacular successes.[60] The first decades of the seventeenth century were also times of opportunity for 'buccaneers'. Employed in 1614 for six months by the city of Marseilles to engage in counter-privateering against the 'Barbaresques', Théodore of Mantin preferred to capture English or Italian merchant ships and sell them to Livorno.[61] Another active privateer, the Knight of Malta Jacques de Vincheguerre, had come to know the Mediterranean as owner of a ship in the Levant trade. He was accused of having avoided combat with the Barbaresques; on his ship were found 'personnes notoirement suspectes et d'intelligence avec les corsaires' ['suspect persons and persons in touch with the corsairs'].[62] In an urban culture shot-through with violent confrontation and tacit compromise with the 'Infidel', the shift from counting-house to the sword, from the merchant ship to the brigantine or privateer, if not the rule was certainly an option.

How can one distinguish between an adventurer and the success of a *parvenu*? And how can one clear the aristocracy of the suspicion that it was in part composed of impostors of doubtful origin? In 1671, François Marchetti suggested a whole catalogue of distinctions that counter the reproaches of the seventeenth century with answers and justifications that go back and belong to the previous century.[63] His arguments appear to have been born of the experiences of Marseillaise families faced by the royal commissioners' criticism; in part, the examples he gives come directly from such family accounts. But there are some significant blanks. For example, Marchetti sets a parallel with the Venetian situation, as studied by Nicolò Machiavelli:

> The gentlemen of this Republic (i.e. Venice) do not bring great possessions, since their wealth is founded in trade and mobile chattels, and none of them any longer own castles or have jurisdiction over men.[64]

But, significantly, Marchetti suppressed two sentences in this quotation: for Machiavelli, 'i gentiluomini in questa republica sono più in nome che in fatto' ('the gentlemen in this Republic are more so in name than in fact'); the title of *gentiluomo* was according to Machiavelli more 'nome di degnità e di riputazione' ('a name conferring dignity and reputation') than founded on what gentlemen do in other Italian cities.[65]

But it is exactly this notion of 'reputation' on which membership of Marseilles' urban aristocracy hangs. The acquisition of a 'noble' reputation is not made without knocks and hostility, but has to be reinforced by the practice of 'living nobly' and defended, with peer support, against enemies. There are even situations where the 'bad blood mixing' (*mauvais meslange*) between nobles and commoners, noted by writers of the second half of the sixteenth century,[66] was deliberately upheld and defended. In 1561, the Marseilles consuls asked that the city should be exempt from the general prohibition on carrying arms. To wear a sword was not only necessary to defend the frontier town, but 'telle prohibition pourrait engendrer plusieurs disputations, querelles et procès entre lesdits citoyens, manans et habitants de ladite cité, parce que chacun se voudrait soutenir et maintenir gentilhomme l'un contre l'autre' ['such a prohibition would give rise to disputes, quarrels and lawsuits between the said citizens, residents and inhabitants of the said city, because each one wanted to uphold and maintain themselves as gentleman against the other'].[67] In other words, the definition of who was and who was not a gentleman came to trigger civil strife in Marseilles.

It is this variety of access to noble status and noble reputation, and the multiple facets of this urban aristocracy, that one has to keep in mind when thinking about the political structure and governance of Marseilles, especially in the sixteenth to seventeenth centuries.

The town council is one of the prisms through which one can observe the social fluidity of families in the political and social life of Marseilles. One-third of its body of 72 members was changed each year by cooption. A smaller council of 24 each year elected the consuls and appointed the assessor (*assesseur*). Each councillor formed part of this body of electors just once, leaving two years of his three-year mandate to have the chance of becoming consul. Despite the impression this gives of a compact urban aristocracy, research into the presence of families (in the wider sense, into the patronymic) in the most important posts (consuls, assessors, treasurer) between 1492/3 and 1659/60 indicates that 342 presented themselves for office. More than half (172, or 52%) appeared only once; 23 families (6.7%) appeared throughout the whole period; 11 families (3.2%) occupied these offices between 1492 and 1558 (the beginning of the wars of religion), disappearing during the central period of the wars and reappearing on the town council in the seventeenth century. Almost a quarter (83 families, or 24.3%) were present only between 1492 and 1558; 26 families (7.6%) remained in power until the end of the wars of religion. In the same way, almost a quarter was made up of new families (77, or 22.5%) who sat for the first time on the council at the beginning of the wars of religion; among them, 43 families (12.9%) were present only from 1559 to 1596, 34 (9.9%) again after the troubles. The end of the wars of religion certainly marked a turning-point: more than a third of the families who belonged to the town council from 1597 to 1660 were new families (122, or 35.7%); 31 of them held only that first step on the official ladder, the post of treasurer.[68]

A more comprehensive survey has led to the identification of 771 people belonging to 466 families, who stood as councillors during the wars of religion (1559 97), two-thirds for, at most, two periods of office. The most important posts were mostly occupied by families who sat for more than ten years on the council (19.3%). This was partly due to the vagaries of demography: the eight male members of the Cabre family, who came from Aubagne (near Marseilles), provided a second and first consul and an assessor, and sat on the council for 33 years (38 years with the *suppléants des conseillers*, that is those who substitute the councillor in case of absence).

Councillors were elected by quarter, and so they reflected the social characteristics of that quarter: representatives of the marine and of the fishing industries were found among the councillors of the Saint-Jean quarter (32.5%), whereas in the Cavaillon area the *ménagers* made up a large part of the councillors (33.2%).[69] The topographical distribution according to quarter was in effect a socio-professional distribution. This was also reflected in the way the hundred or so offices, more or less significant, that served to involve the different trades in the running of the town were divided up, as, for example, the control of drugs by the apothecaries and so on. If one takes into account only the 23 most important offices of the city's economic and political life, for the 38 years of disturbance (1558/9 to1596/7) the figure reached is 4,241 offices, which were held by just less than 800 people. This gives an idea of the 'availability' and presence (the *Abkömmlichkeit* of Max Weber) necessary for the everyday running of the city, even when municipal controls were organised in a hierarchical manner and relied on the community infrastructure (parish, guild, etc.). The example of the fishermen's community illustrates this horizontal and above all vertical integration by sector. The fishermen from the parish of Saint-Laurent and the Saint-Jean quarter were in a privileged position; their representatives (*prudhommes*) elected by the community of fishermen exercised an oral jurisdiction and a key position in factional confrontation as they 'controlled' their quarter.

At the level of the minor offices and councillors in the quarters, newcomers were assimilated by marriage and gradual integration into social and neighbourhood networks. It is at this level that one can see the almost surreptitious entry into the governance of the city   to appear in consular office is obviously more visible. If the route of Genoese, Piedmontese and Tuscan merchants to the council and consulship was rapid at the dawn of the sixteenth century, even brilliant (like that of the Genoese Betin Dati), the route that led to the consulship was slower in the long run, but remained within the realms of possibility, at least for Spanish and Italian merchants and businessmen. There is a difference here from the welcome afforded to German, Flemish and Swiss merchants, who were not fully integrated into the city on an institutional level.

The tax-farming of the *gabelle* (a levy) constituted a place of meeting and 'participative governance' between merchants with access to political office in the city and those who remained outside the political scene. The major stake in urban governance was the control of finances and access to the city's resources and markets. In Marseilles, from the first half of the sixteenth century the office of treasurer (*trésorier des deniers commun*) was no longer conferred on members of the urban aristocracy but on well-to-do merchants, as they were expected to advance considerable personal sums. It was an office that brought considerable risk, yet one that also offered access to valuable information and opportunities and could also be a stepping stone to qualifying for the post of third consul. But this applied only to a minority; in practice, the treasurers were above all active in administering the *gabelle*, as tax-farmers or co-farmers or as guarantors.

However, the urban aristocracy retained control of financial affairs through the function of auditors (chosen from former consuls or often the *sanior pars*). The municipal finances constituted a sector protected by a 'social secret' (Georg Simmel) shared by those in power who, not by chance, became one of the first targets in times of civil unrest. The demand for access to any municipal titles or agreements was a demand commonly made in urban revolts throughout Western Europe, and it was no doubt the high stakes at play that set a high price on the management of the archives and the creation of the post of community archivist (significantly, Marseilles witnessed a strong move in this direction during the time of the *Ligue* in the 1590s). The management of and access to information on municipal finances was, therefore, an essential element in the art of 'city governance'. In Marseilles, as in other provençal towns, the argument about the repayment of debts contracted during the wars of religion (and especially in the last years of the Ligue) gave rise to social rifts from the 1580s (after the great plague of 1580), when an attempt was made to share out the debt across various sectors and urban groups (trade, landowners, the 'people'). But unusually, the heated discussions were above all about what normally remains in the domain of unspoken informality: to distinguish between 'good debts' and fraudulent debts, the law tell us about different ways of farming out the town's *gabelles* (levies) and *octrois* (dues), as well as the frauds associated with 'loans' requested of well-off bourgeoisie (to provide supplies of grain, for the defence of the city, and so on).

Following the annual consular election, in Marseilles as in other provençal towns, not only minor offices and functions of control were distributed; but also the different rights and *gabelles* and certain categories of provisioning (flour and meat especially) were auctioned off. But this farming out of the various urban levies was only one part of this lucrative process, even a minority sector. The merchant aristocracy also looked after the farming of certain royal rights, farmed out in part by the town (alum, spices, silks and, in a lesser measure, the salt tax), though less obvious than the market for the *gabelles urbaines*.[70] This was all the more reason why with the multiplication of new levies imposed in the 1580s and 1590s (and also at the beginning of the seventeenth century), the minor farms were taken up by merchants of second rank.[71] But generally these markets were controlled by very active merchants who did not appear on the town council or in municipal office (for example, the merchant Reynaud Turrel). Where necessary they served other merchants, foreign businessmen in the city (the rich merchant from Augsburg, Melchior Manlich, for the levies on commodities entering or leaving the port) or royal officers.

As the farming of these levies was in principle incompatible with the exercise of municipal office, the reality of access to these significant economic resources was generally hidden by auction procedures and in the municipal accounting, the competitors being hardly identifiable; those who were not successful in getting the farms reappear later, as 'pledges', giving guarantees regarding the financial involvement of the farmer, or entering directly into partnership with them. It could be a question of family guarantees, or brothers taking turns, one after the other.[72] But such associations could also involve other merchants.[73] One can detect schemes devised after the event, tactics to limit the price of the farm, behind the reappearance of these former rivals for the farm as guarantors or partners.[74]

The role of these 'front men' became transparent if the scribe at the auction hesitated for a moment or expressed astonishment. Thus, on 23 November 1567, in the sale of the *gabelle du vin*, an offer was made by someone 'called Jehan Simon', as if he were an unknown person (the farm was eventually taken by the 'bourgeois' Raynaud Turrel). The person 'called Jehan Simon' was a baker who on 23 November 1561 took on the *gabelle des pestres* (levy on bread) insured by the guarantee of the merchant Jehan Moranede, his brother-in-law,[75] who had tried, in the same year, to get the farm of the *gabelle du vin*, and who would do so again in 1568. There was therefore some astonishment at someone appearing 'out of turn'.[76]

The existence of financial consortiums (behind the front men) and of a system of 'transfers' and 'subcontracting' was sometimes recorded in the municipal records. In November 1569, the lawyer Balthasar Garnier took on the farming of the *gabelle du vin* with 'several others', and three people, two of whom were squires (*écuyers*), stood as guarantors.[77] The following year, the tax-farmer of the *gabelle du vin*, Thomas Seguier (who paid 13,000 fl.) transferred it to four merchants (Jean d'Aisac, lord of Venelles, and the merchants Michel Picard, Jehan Doudon, Reynaud Turrel). The guarantor sometimes declared himself as the 'principal payer'. Transfer and guarantee could cross over (the goldsmith Raphael Jacob, farmer of the *gabelle des pestres*, transferred the *gabelle* in 1570 to captain François Bouquier, each giving each other reciprocal guarantees), or the farming could be by simple commission (the *gabelle des pestres* in 1582, held by the doctor-in-law Bertrand Vias, 'by commission and for the profit of Raphael Jacob, goldsmith').[78]

The *gabelle du port* was particularly valued by merchant groups.[79] The process of acquisition by commission became apparent in November 1573: François Franc took the *gabelle* for a very high price (19,000 l.t.) and immediately gave it up to 'Melchion Manlich le Vieulx and Company, merchant of the town of Augsburg in Germany', represented by their procurator and factor Gaspard Fleckheimer, who had leased the commission to François Franc.[80] Sometimes the process only becomes obvious thanks to other sources (lawsuits, etc.).

Looking closer at who takes on the farms and how they try to limit the risks, one finds family networks and collaborations that demonstrate a strong presence for a certain time on the markets, sometimes over two generations (Pierre Crozil, his sons Jean et Paul). To control a town through its finances meant first of all to adopt a tactic of assimilation into the local context, and that, in turn, meant reaping the benefits of the town. If one considers only the most important levies (*la Gabelle du Port*; *la gabelle du vin*; *la gabelle des pestres*; *le droit de rompre navires*; *l'once sur la chair/boucheries*; *la vente des boucheries*; *le droit des estravagans*), one is talking about (for the same period) more than 369 farmers, concessionnaires, pledges and front men. From the available information over 36 years, a study of the *gabelle du vin* that also includes the bidders shows 238 names, representing 133 actual people. Some of these, closely involved in the sale of farms and linked with political office, devised ways and means of dealing with the rulings that forbade the simultaneous holding of office and tax farm (one was a tax-farmer before being appointed to a given office, like that of treasurer we will come back to this later). This group of merchants, very much to the fore in making the cross-over with political life, shows us how malleable was involvement in administrating the city.

Nevertheless, while Flemish, Swiss and German merchants continued to play an important role in commercial exchange with northern and Central Europe, they remained residents pure and simple or later became consular representatives for their communities of origin. In the incomplete picture given by the *traite foraine* in 1555, there are four Swiss merchants who send wool, figs, cotton and saffron to Geneva.[81] Marseilles merchants for their part had contacts in Geneva (sending soap, oranges, woad).[82] In effect, Geneva and Marseilles enjoyed a close and privileged relationship; Marseilles was in a sense the port of Geneva, a role it shared with Genoa.[83] In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, these two cities played an essential role in the provision of grain to the city.[84] Imports into Geneva were organised by merchants, agents and factors from Marseilles, but did not necessarily go through the port of Marseilles; to avoid goods being seized in times of scarcity or the duties being levied on foreigners (1659), the merchandise was alternatively transported through the secondary ports of La Ciotat and Port-de-Bouc, before moving up the Rhône valley.[85]

Who are the actors in this commerce in the sixteenth century? One example is Nicolas Ferrat, a Genevan wool merchant whose family settled in Geneva before the Reformation, where Nicolas Ferrat became councillor (1569) then mayor (*syndic*) (1569). His agent and associate was first Nicolas Populus, also mentioned in the *foraine* records of 1555. Then we have a spice merchant of Piemontese origin, Anselme Caille, who in 1565 was his employee and agent at Marseilles. Finally we see him trading with his brother-in-law, François de Brumont, who had previously been agent of the company of Israël Minckel and Georges Obrecht from Strasbourg and Lyons.[86]

Here one finds contacts with the German merchant bankers at Lyons, people like Jean Kléberger under Francis I and Georges Obrecht and Israël Minckel under Henry II and Charles IX: like the Fuggers, who made use of the profits of their mining monopolies (Saintes-Marie en Vosges), long-distance trade (spices, alum from Civitavecchia) through Marseilles (the factor François de Brumont, in contact with other factors, such as Benoît Montchal and Valentin Holtzheuser), in the loan of enormous sums to the King of France (guaranteed by the *gabelle du sel* or the customs' rights on alum 164,000 livres were advanced in 1555 on the farm of the *gabelle de l'alun*).[87] Georges Obrecht (1500 69) was a resident of Lyons and married a woman from the city; Protestant city magistrate (*échevin*) from 1562 to 1567, he later took refuge in Geneva, where he died of the plague in 1569, aged 70.[88]

The city of Marseilles, a Mediterranean port, was linked via the Rhône to Switzerland and upper Germany, including Alsace, a corridor or 'vertical space' described in a 'Mémoire of the inhabitants of Lyons' at the end of the sixteenth century:

> Item by the said Rosne river comes from Lake Geneva and thus by the said River Rosne Germans and others of such countries who can come from the

> said town of Lyons and from there to Aigue-Mortes, Marseilles or other maritime ports and on the other hand the said harbours and ports in the whole of Languedoc can by the said river go up to the said Lyons and from here access the lands of Savoy, Germany and others or in Burgundy and elsewhere by the Saône and Doulx rivers and others.[89]

Thus Marseilles was linked through Lyons and Geneva to the region between Basle and Strasbourg, a region where the economy was steeped in trade, giving access to the Frankfurt fairs, and on towards Cologne and Amsterdam and the commercial centres of Augsburg, Nuremberg and Ulm. This was an exchange network, a sizeable banking region that conveyed with monetary security fundamentally based on religion the finances of Protestant towns to Geneva. This, by means of the public exchange of Basle, created in 1504, with that of Strasbourg, the first institutions that 'worked appreciably in the same way' as the public banks of Venice (from 1587) and their imitators in Amsterdam, Hamburg and Nuremberg.[90] Active in subscription loans (from the early sixteenth century, well before Lyons), for the Kings of France among others, this public exchange was in the same way 'seated on two buttocks', for which Minckel and Obrecht were criticised, like the Solicoffre of Saint-Gall and others. Among this network of Protestant merchants one must also mention the Darut brothers, originally from Franche-Comté, who were active in Lyons, Basle (where they obtained bourgeois rights) and Marseilles. Georges Obrecht appointed them, as trusted friends, as German representatives in Lyons, in an assembly under the authority of the consulate, soon after the defeat of Saint-Quentin. In 1558, Jean Darut was factor for Minquel and Obrecht at the Consulat; and after Obrecht's death in 1571, Guy Darut looked after the affairs of his successors.[91]

It was especially the import of alum[92] and the spice trade, saffron in particular, that in the second half of the sixteenth century attracted the German merchants of Lyons and Italy to Marseilles.[93] Conversely, from Germany came metals and textiles (fustian). Lyons was a matrix of merchant-factors and commercial agents: François de Brumont, factor for Minckel and Obrecht who dealt in bills of exchange with another factor in Marseilles, Benoît Montchal,[94] who worked for the successors of Georges Wolff, a German merchant from Strasbourg.[95] Ten years later he was working with another 'German merchant living in Marseilles', Valentin Holtzheuser: in 1582 the 'merchandise and profits sent from Lyons and Allemagne' were shared out.[96] But the event that really left its mark on the city in the second half of the sixteenth century was the establishment in the port of the firm of Manlich, from Augsburg (actually in the dwelling let by Barthélemy Dupuy-Servian, near the Augustins): in 1571, Antoine Manlich, son of Melchior, set up there; after his death in 1573, his brother, Melchior the Younger, took his place. There were procurators and factors on site: Gaspard Fleckheimer and, above all, Georg Brunnenmayr (Prunemoyr) who founded the first soap factory in Marseilles. The boom that was brought to the port city (the purchase of the *gabelle du port* in 1573 for a record price of 19,000 livres; chartering and construction of ships, trade especially with Tripoli in Syria 10 to 20 ships) would not last: the firm went bankrupt in Augsburg on 21 June 1574, with a liability of 700,000 florins. The main elements of their commercial fleet were immediately transferred by Gaspard Fleckheimer, their representative, to Jean Paul Herwart; the Dettighofer of Memmingen seized their goods in Avignon. George Prunemoyr dealt with the liquidation, which dragged on until 1584. The brief influence of the Manlichs was indicative of a strong but secondary German presence in Marseilles: in addition to the names already mentioned, the house of Höchstetter from Augsburg (Jérémie Hoestetter), a representative of Herwart (Albert Baldinger), Jean Langnauer et Cie, traders in mercury and cinnabar, and an agent of the Augsburg firm David Haug (Raymond Hermann).[97]

More stable and more important was the presence of the Zollikoffer (Solicoffre) from a powerful Saint-Gall family, also settled since the early sixteenth century in Hamburg, Frankfurt and Amsterdam, as well as in Marseilles: Christian and Thomas Solicoffre settled in Lyons from 1556; the first known member to come to Marseilles, in the last quarter of the century, was Louis Solicoffre, who under the Ligue took part in the Tunis-based *Compagnie de Corail*, acquired la *bastide* or the *château* of Velaux.[98] These German and Swiss merchants Protestants made up a network that served as a valuable safeguard for Protestant travellers: thus, for example, Valentin Holtzheuser helped the protestant Martin Heberer von Bretten who arrived in Marseilles in 1585, theatre of a revolt in favour of the Catholic *Ligue*. The city of Geneva, 'the hinterland' of Marseilles, also became in the sixteenth century a temporary or long-term refuge for Protestants from Marseilles and Provence: the Candolles, for instance, from Aubagne, were active in the drapery trade and silk industry in Geneva and Yverdon.[99]

At the end of the sixteenth century, one can see reflected in Marseilles the changes that had taken place in international trade, the weakness of Italian trade, the growth of trade and towns along the Atlantic coast, the arrival in force of the firms in the Mediterranean the English and Hamburg firms already in the 1570s. In the 1590s the Marseillaise *ligueurs* took wheat from Hamburg ships. In 1593, Louis Solicoffre bought, from 'patron Honoré Stapelmann of Emden', the ship *L'Enfant perdu* (4,000 quintals, for 1,300 écus at 60 sous); his agent at the time was another German, the merchant Sébastien Rehat.[100] In 1588, letters patent were registered at Marseilles for two 'English merchants [who had been] trading in Marseilles' for a long time, which gave them liberty to trade throughout the realm.[101] A regular representative, a consul for the Flemish and German merchants, was appointed in 1615: this was Pierre Luce, a merchant of Amsterdam. Among the signatures of the declaration calling for Luce's appointment, were Joachim, Laurent and David Solicoffre, as well as, for example, Thomas Vandestraten of Frankfurt-am-Main and Jacques Fritz.[102] The Solicoffres always featured as 'merchants of Saint-Gall',[103] whereas Vandestraten was squire (*écuyer*) of Marseilles and Lord of the Grand-Bastide.[104] In 1650 1, David La Fleur became the representative of the Dutch (in Marseilles, Toulon and Hyères);[105] another Solicoffre, Tobias the younger, originally from Switzerland but a Hamburg merchant, was proposed as consul of the Hanseatic towns and accepted by the King (he lodged John Locke in 1676).[106]

With their contacts into Protestant or multi-confessional Northern Europe, and some of their own number Protestant too, these merchants were accepted only with an element of mistrust, which kept them outside the families who held real political power in Marseilles. A similar distrust, if on another level, was also felt towards merchants from the Levant, especially the Armenians, accused of wanting to maintain or practise a monopoly of the trade in raw silk from Turkey and Persia, exported to Europe via Smyrna.[107] These resident foreign merchants remained, even if naturalised, 'long-term guests'. They were accorded resident status yet distrusted on religious and cultural grounds as people with alternative loyalties and who could always leave.[108] They appear to settle in order to take advantage of the privileges and advantages of the city but in practice much of their success comes precisely from their position as newly arrived foreigners whose commercial ties and contacts elsewhere constituted a major resource. This underlying distrust, ever present, is revealed in the phrase 'étranger naturalisé' (naturalised foreigner) that appears in the sources in the reign of Louis XIV. The taxing in 1697 of 'étrangers naturalisés' reveals that naturalisation presented as a change of nature was but a precarious fiction.[109] In Marseilles the royal commissioners combed the physical space of the city to detect traces of these 'foreigners' in the social body and urban space. Here is an example of their reports, regarding Smyrna [Izmir]:

> Catherine Roubin, from Smyrna, daughter of Jean Roubin, from Grignan, et Marie Roze from the said Smyrna. The said Roubin, wife of François Vareze of Mars[ei]lle, Seris Vareze and Marg[ueri]te Vareze, his son and daughters, living in the said Marseilles, naturalized in 1669. The said Roubin is a widow, still living, Ceris Vareze, her son, is still living and the said Marg[ueri]te Vareze also, residing with her mother at the *pavé d'amour* below the lodging of Estrieu. At present they have about six thousand livres.[110]

This example reflects the particular attention, in the social fabric and urban space, given to those who came from elsewhere, or to certain among them who even naturalized still had their *macula*, and also allows one to glimpse the forms of social control enmeshed in society on which rested the city's institution up to the end of the *Ancien Régime* and perhaps even later on.

Notes

1 Bibliothèque nationale de France (BnF), Dupuy 155 fol. 15r (7 December 1593).
2 BnF, ms. fr. 23195 fol. 101v (10 September 1593).
3 *Lettres de Catherine de Médicis*, published by comte Hector de la Ferrière; vol. 7, published by comte Baguenault de Puchesse, Paris, 1899, p. 25 (24 June 1579).
4 'A man of little significance, with unlimited passion for the Turk', P. Champion, *Catherine de Médicis présente à Charles IX son royaume (1564–1566)*, Paris, 1937, p. 170.
5 Ibid., pp. 170–1.
6 'The main concern of the provençal people is not religion but always business, and keeping up relations with their African contacts', ibid, p. 172.
7 Marseilles Municipal Archives (ACM), AA 175; cited in R. Collier and J. Billioud, *Histoire du commerce de Marseille*, vol. 3, Paris, 1951, p.12 n.1.

8 Collier, Billioud, *Histoire du commerce*, p. 235. Estimate based on the register of the *traite foraine* levied on merchants who were not citizens; these tax records were kept for the year 1555, that is, for 225 days (140 days were exempt): 153 sorties between 3 January 1555 and 22 February 1556. *Foraine* of 1543 (records exist for four months only), Archives départementales des Bouches-du-Rhône (ADBdR), IX B 198ter.

9 Collier, Billioud, *Histoire du commerce*.

10 Michel Morineau, 'Flottes de commerce et trafics français en Méditerranée au XVIIe siècle (jusqu'en 1669)', *XVIIe siècle* 86/7, 1970, pp. 135–71, here p. 159.

11 P. Masson, *Histoire des établissements et du commerce français dans l'Afrique barbaresque (1560–1793)*, Paris, 1903; ibid., 'Les compagnies de Corail: Etude sur le commerce de Marseille au XVIe siècle et les origines de la colonisation française en Algérie-Tunisie', *Annales de la Faculté des Lettres d'Aix-en-Provence* 1, 1907, fasc.1–2, 3–4. P. Giraud, 'Les Lenche à Marseille et en Barbarie', *Mémoires de l'Institut historique de Provence* 13, 1936, 10–57, 14, 1937, 107–39, 15, 1938, 53–86. W. Kaiser, *Marseille au temps des troubles. Morphologie sociale et luttes de factions, 1559–1596*, Paris, 1992, passim; ibid., 'Frictions profitables. L'économie de la rançon en Méditerranée occidentale (XVIe-XVIIe siècles)', in S. Cavaciocchi (ed.) *Ricchezza del mare. Ricchezza dal mare, secc. XIII-XVIII*, Florence: Le Monnier, 2006, 2 vols (Istituto Francesco Datini, Prato: Atti delle Settimane di Studie altri Convegni, 37), ii, pp. 689–701.

12 The consuls chased them out of the city: ACM, CC 2189.

13 In the second half of the sixteenth century one finds some 96 lodgings mentioned in the sources (and this is not exhaustive), lodgings that carried a certificate (*enseigne*), with a 'host' who rents or owns the property and who offers lodgings as one of his jobs. In addition to these are people like Caspar Rotemundt who offered lodging to German-speaking students, or the widow who gave lodgings to the German traveller Michael Heberer von Bretten en 1585, on the eve of the first bloody encounter involving the radical catholic *Ligueurs* of Marseilles, M. Heberer von Bretten, *Aegyptiaca Servitus: Warhafte Beschreibung einer Dreyjaehrigen Dienstbarkeit / So zu Alexandrien in Egypten ihren Anfang / und zu Constantinopel ihr End schafft genommen.* Gedruckt zu Heydelberg A. D. 1610, Reprint Graz, 1967, pp. 54–7.

14 W. Kaiser, 'Récits d'espace. Présence et parcours d'étrangers à Marseille au XVIème siècle', in J. Bottin and D. Calabi (eds) *Les étrangers dans la ville. Minorités et espace urbain du bas Moyen Âge à l'époque moderne*, Paris, 1999, pp. 209–312.

15 *Locke's Travels in France, 1675–1679.* As related in his Journals, Correspondence and other papers. Edited with an introduction and notes by John Lough, Cambridge, 1953, p. 73 (April 1676).

16 L. Bély, *Espions et ambassadeurs au temps de Louis XIV*, Paris, 2002, p. 905.

17 'Car au Corps de ville où est le Logis du roy, la maison de ville et la plus part des gentilhommes et riches marchandz de la ville et y a plus de civilté du Langage provenssal; au quartier de la Blancarie où sont la pluspart mesnagers et bourgeois et partie de gentilzhommes, Il y a moings de civilité; Encore moingz au quartier de Cavaillon ou logent la plus part des laboureurs comme aussi au quartier de St. Jehan où sont logez tous les pescheurs, gens de marine et quelques merchans; mesmes en ce quartier, les estranger[s] venants par mer y conversent le plus, et encore ceulx dudit quartier vont voyager au Levant, ponant et autres lieux. Le Langage est plus meslé qu'en aucun des autres quartier[s], et me souvient qu'en l'an 1559, on fit une farce à carnaval audit Marseille où entre autres choses l'on contrefaisoit le langage de ceulx desdits quartiers sur ce qu'au corps de Ville ilz disoient 'ouy ben' / A la Blanquerie 'ouy'/ et en Cavaillon 'ol hoc' / Et à St Jehan 'Olé''. R. Ruffi, 'Mémoires', Musée Arbaud, Aix-en-Provence, MQ 112 fol.169r ('Du Langage ancien'). His grandson gives a shortened version of this passage: L.-A. de Ruffi, *Histoire de la ville de Marseille*, 2nd edn, Marseilles, 1696, vol. 2, pp. 331–2. Cf. W. Kaiser, 'Le passé refaçonné. Mémoire et oubli dans les histoires de Marseille, de Robert Ruffi à Louis-Antoine de Ruffi', *Provence Historique* fasc. 193, July–September 1998, pp. 279–92.

18 W. H. Sewell jr., *Structure and Mobility: The Men and Women of Marseille, 1820–1870*, Cambridge, 1985, p. 377
19 For the social topography of Marseilles, see Kaiser, *Marseille*, pp. 80–93.
20 P. Sahlins, *Unnaturally French. Foreign Citizens in the Old Regime and After*, Ithaca and London, 2004, p.454, 5.
21 Letters of naturalisation were registered with the Cour des Comptes, ADBdR, B 35–75 (1541–96), sometimes added at a later date by the Sénéchaussée, ibid, 2 B 1-3, 5 (1579–1616): a good 30 have been located, a list, which is not exhaustive, focused on those who would play a role in urban society. Letters granting citizenship can be found in ACM, BB 40-57bis (1559–97): 36 letters granting citizenship. *Les Statuts municipaux de Marseille*, éd. par Régine Pernoud, Monaco, 1949. A. Crémieux, *Marseille et la royauté pendant la minorité de Louis XIV (1643–1660)*, Paris, 1917, 2 vols, vol. 1, part 1. M. Zarb, *Les privilèges de Marseille du Xe siècle à la Révolution. Histoire d'une autonomie communale*, Paris, 1961, p. 367.
22 Letter of citizenship for the sailor Jacques Reimonnene de La Roque, ACM, BB 49 ff.7v-10v (8 November 1587): he lived in Marseilles for 40 years and was married there, at the age of 25, to a labourer's daughter. He was given citizenship on condition that he bought a house 'in the next two years'.
23 Ottavio Pesciolini (son of Alexandre) and his cousin Nicolas (son of Michel) were naturalised in 1574, ADBdR, B 64 fol. 239^{r} (letters of naturalisation, Lyons, 3 September 1574). Augustin Pisciolini (son of Nicolas, from San Gimignano) and his brother Léonard, were naturalised in 1582, ibid., B 71 fol. 254^{r} (letters of naturalisation, Paris, February 1582). In 1591 Léonard Picholliny received his letter of citizenship, ACM, BB 53bis fol. 315^{v}
24 Niccolò Veronesi Pesciolini, 'La vita scritte da lui', Biblioteca comunale di San Gimignano, ms. 99, fol. 9^{v} ('stetti più giorni in Marsilia in casa nostra').
25 Kaiser, *Marseille*, ch. 10. A branch of the Pesciolinis was definitively established in Marseilles and in the seventeenth century built a private house, which still exists today. See G. Reynaud, 'L'Hôtel de Pesciolini (1673): Une nouvelle identité pour la "maison au cariatides" du cours Belsunce de Marseille', *Provence historique* 38, fasc. 154, 1988, pp. 377–401.
26 ACM, HH 186 (31 July 1593).
27 ACM, CC 178, conte 952. Bibliothèque municipale de Marseille, ms. 1183 fol.8r ('Levadour des censives et petions des directes de la luminaire N. D. de Puriffication des notaires de la ville de Marseille', 1591); ACM, CC 178, conte 932, 957–59.
28 BnF, coll. Dupuy 155 fol. 35r (Remontrances à Henri IV, 22 April 1596); Kaiser, *Marseille au temps des troubles*, ch. 4.
29 L.-A. de Ruffi, *Histoire de la ville de Marseille*, vol. 2, p. 205.
30 Les armes, la justice et les franchises lesquelles la ville retient par conventions expresses … desquelles conventions ladite ville a toujours esté en possession et jouissances, ayant encore les armes en main, la garde de la ville, les clefs des portes et du hâvre; les consuls d'icelle donnent le mot et commandement au fait de la guerre; en la Justice le Roy institue deux juges et ladite ville deux autres. Lawsuits relating to the deliberations of the nobility, BnF, coll. Dupuy 650 fol. 12v-13r, in *Procès-verbaux des Etats généraux de 1593*, ed. A. Bernard, Paris, 1842, p. 566–7. See also ACM, AA 117.
31 Kaiser, *Marseille*, pp. 352–53; Crémieux, *Marseille et la royauté*, vol. 2, pp. 833–44.
32 Lettres patentes (Moulins, 10 January 1566), ACM, HH 243; ADBdR, B 3330, fol. 199.
33 Règlement d'Angoulême, art. I, IV. ACM, AA 5 fol. 282r–287v.
34 ADBdR, B 3330, fol. 199.
35 'Ladicte Ville …, vne des principales de votre Royaume n'est soustenue et entretenue que par le moyen du traffict et commerce qu'est l'ame et l'esprit qui la vinifie et regist et sans lequel elle avoit perdu le lustre et le tiltre qu'elle porte et ne seroit rien plus qu'un village', ACM, AA 122 (Remonstrances de Marseille, 1606).

36 'Qu'il soit loisible à la noblesse de faire le grand trafic et d'équiper navires pour cet effet, sous les congés et formes accoutumées, sans pour ce être estimés dérogeans. Cela rendra l'Etat plus puissant et les cadets seront employés', cited in G. Richard, *La noblesse d'affaires au XVIIIe siècle*, 2nd ed, Paris, 1997, p. 166, 21.

37 Letter of rehabilitation for the brothers Antoine and Jean-Baptiste Marquesis (Paris, 1642), Musée Arbaud, Aix-en-Provence, MQ 168 (non fol.).

38 ADBdR, B 792, fol. 51 (hommage, 5 June 1568).

39 Baron A. Du Roure, *Les maintenues de noblesse en Provence par Belleguise*, 3 vols *(1667–1669)*, Bergerac, 1923, vol. 3, pp. 199–200.

40 ADBdR, B 106, fol. 503r-v (22 October 1668; lettres patentes de réhabilitation, Avignon, 11 December 1574).

41 ADBdR, B 108, fol. 249 (1675).

42 M. Baulant, 'Introduction', in M. Baulant (ed.) *Lettres de négociants marseillais: Les Frères Hermite, 1570–1612*, Paris, 1953, p. xv.

43 *Lettres de négociants marseillais*, *passim*.

44 ADBdR, B 1357, fol. 1634 infra. Among his antecedents one finds an Angelo Altoviti, a Venetian merchant.

45 F. Marchetti, *Discours sur le négoce des gentilshommes de la ville de Marseille et sur la vasalité de nobles marchands qu'ils prenoient il y cent ans*, Marseilles, 1671.

46 Les Gentilshommes d'Aix & de la Province, leur [aux Marseillais] envoyaient leurs enfans pour les élever au Négoce   Si la coustume n'eust point permis à notre Noblesse de Negotier ouvertement, & s'il est vray que le trafic eust esté vne occupation qui l'eust degradée ; il est certain, qu'elle n'eust eu garde d'en faire vne profession ouverte & publique, jusqu'à s'obliger par des contracts publics, de l'enseigner à d'autres Gentilshommes, & d'en faire dans leurs propres maisons vne espece d'Eschole & d'Academie. Marchetti, *Discours sur le négoce*, pp. 11f.

47 The programme proposed consisted of training for a future merchant and instruction in the qualities necessary for a noble education: 'Sur la requête présenté audict conseilh par Maurice de la Laye tendant   ce qu'il offre dresser une Académye publique dans la ville à laquelle se pourroict mouller [sic] tous les enfans de la ville et les estrangers moyenant la pention de mille livres tous les ans qu'il prie audict conseilh luy octroier pour l'entretien des hommes quy enseigneront. Laquelle Academie sera compozée de six classes sçavoir en la première sera ensseigné à escripre toutes sortes de lettres quy sont à notre uzaige et les principes de pourtraicture. En la seconde s'apprendra l'art de la navigation et cosmographie, la langue latine et espaignolle. En la troysiesme sera monstré l'arithmétique jusques aux mathématiques et à tenir les libvres en parties doubles. En la quatriesme s'apprendra à jouir sur toutes sortes d'instrumantz et à chanter en musique. En la cinquiesme sera enseigné la dance avec toutes sortes de civillités pour l'advancement du corps. En la sixième sera monstré à tirer aulx armes et oultre ce sera permis à ung escuier d'y aller apprendre les escolliers', ACM, BB 59, fol. 165 (Council of 9 November 1608). The project was put to the Council and the consuls and assessors, current and former, as well as to the *députés aux requêtes*. We know the Academy was established because in 1610 the consuls made it pay, by means of a *bullette* addressed to the town's treasurer, the quarterly sum of 75 l.t. for the maintenance of 'its academy composed of writing and other virtues for the instruction of youth in all the civilities', ACM, CC 571, n 772 (31 March 1610).

48 Son of Charles Vento and the Marquise Hermite, sister of the merchants Gilles and Antoine. See Micheline Baulant, Introduction, in *Lettres de négociants marseillais*, p. 16 and *pièce* 70.

49 Féris Hostagier of Toulon, French consul in Egypt, thus received in 1558 letters of nobility, ADBdR, B 48, fol. 5.

50 Christoph[l]e Vento, consul in Alexandria, called by Catherine de Médicis 'one of my serving gentlemen', *Lettres de Catherine de Médicis*, 10 vols, ed. Hector de la Ferrière and the Comte Baguenault de Puchesse, Paris, 1880–1909, vol. 7, p. 160.

51 Le Chevalier d'Arvieux demeura à la campagne, & s'appliqua aux Mathematiques, il sentit outre mesure le désir d'apprendre les Langues Etrangeres & de voyager... Il considera que le commerce en gros qui se fait au Levant, étoit le seul moyen qui fût ouvert aux Gentilshommes pauvres pour retablir leurs familles; que les maisons les plus considerables de Marseille & de la Provence s'etoient rétablies par cet endroit, sans avoir dérogé à leur noblesse par le privilege special que le Roi leur a accordé & souvent réiteré, de pouvoir faire le commerce en gros, & de faire valoir leur argent dans les Echelles du Levant, comme les Nobles le font à Venise, à Gennes, à Florence, à Livourne, & autres Villes d'Italie, & comme ils le font encore en Angleterre, & en bien d'autres endroits.

La Provence, comme tout le monde sçait, n'est pas abondante; elle est montagneuse, sèche, stérile en bien des endroits. Il s'en faut bien qu'elle produise suffisamment pour l'entretien de ses Peuples, ce n'est que le commerce qui les fait subsister. Ils regardent le Levant, c'est-à-dire, l'Empire du Grand Seigneur, comme leurs Indes; c'est-là où ils envoyent presque tous leurs enfans pour les façonner au négoce dans les Echelles de ce vaste Païs, & pour peu qu'ils soyent sages & qu'ils ayent du bonheur, ils y amassent du bien assez considérablement pour retablir leurs maisons, & pour passer le reste de leurs jours dans l'opulence. L. d'Arvieux, *Mémoires du chevalier d'Arvieux*, ed. le père Jean-Baptiste Labat, 5 vols, Paris, 1735, vol. 1, pp. ix–xii.

52 S. Kettering, *Patrons, Brokers, and Clients in Seventeenth-Century France*, New York, 1986.

53 S. Bono, 'La Missione dei Cappuccini ad Algeri per il riscatto degli schiavi cristiani nel 1585', *Collectanea Franciscana* 25, 1955, p. 287.

54 W. Kaiser, 'Missione impossibile? Riscatto e communicazione nel Mediterraneo occidentale, secc. XVI–XVII', *Quaderni storici*, 124/1, April 2007: Informazioni e scelte economiche, pp. 19–41.

55 ADBdR, B 1357, fol. 2352 sqq., 2388–92; A. Du Roure, *Les maintenues de noblesse en Provence*, vol. 3, pp. 510–17.

56 Jean-Baptiste de Félix, first consul in 1653 and 1654, married in 1654 Louise de Valbelle, ADBdR, B 1357, fol. 2352 sqq., 2388–92.

57 In 1512 Jaume Ricaud received a *lettre de course*, ADBdR, 380 E 12, fol. 263. The first voyage gave rise to an exploit noted by the local chroniclers: il réussit à se faufiler dans le port de Porto Ferraio (on the Island of Elba) and to seize richly laden ships', P. Bertas, 'Un exploit de corsaires marseillais (1512)', *Provincia* 9, 1929, pp. 167–86.

58 ADBdR, 373 E 196, fol. 294v; 373 E 197, fol. 139.

59 ADBdR, B 3325, fol. 700v (letters patent, July 1555); B 59, fol. 184 (10 July 1566). P. Bertas, 'Les origines du Capitaine Gaspard Fabre', *Provincia* 12, 1932, pp. 48–67.

60 P. Masson, *Les compagnies de Corail. Etude sur le commerce de Marseille au XVIe siècle et les origines de la colonisation française en Algérie-Tunisie*, Annales de la Faculté des Lettres d'Aix-en-Provence 1, 1907, Paris, 1907. Kaiser, *Marseille*, pp. 157–63.

61 ACM, HH 318.

62 Archives de la Chambre du Commerce de Marseille (ACCM), E 49 (instructions of 2 January 1613); G 43, Mémoyre, fol. 1v und 2v: 'ce contentant de prendre les crestiens'. L.-A. de Ruffi, *Histoire de Marseille*, vol. 1, p. 456. Kaiser, 'Frictions profitables'.

63 'La première, que c'estoit la coustume des Gentilshommes de ce temps-là, de prendre quelquesfois des fermes, & d'ajouter à la qualité de Noble celle du Marchand; & que cette coustume a esté approuvée & autorisée, non seulement par le temps, qui s'est acquis le pouvoir de prescrire sur la Noblesse & sur la condition des familles; mais encore par les Edits de nos Roys, & depuis quelques années par ceux de V. M. La seconde, que ces Nobles Marchands étoient distinguez des simples bourgeois & des autres négotians, par

leurs Habits; par leur séance à la Loge, qui est la place où les Marchands s'assemblèrent; par leur rang dans les Assemblées publiques; par leur ageans ou hommes d'Affaires; par leurs Députations; par leurs Fiefs; par leurs alliances, par leurs contrats & la solennité de leurs mariages; par leurs services; & par leurs emplois. La troisième, que quelque qualité de Marchand que les Nobles ayent pris, ils ont est, toujours reconnus pour vrayment Gentilshommes, par les Conseils & les Assemblées Générales de cette Ville; par les Gentilshommes & Seigneurs de Provence; par les Règlements de Saint-Valier, & d'Angoulesme; par les actes les plus considérables qui ont est, faits à Marseille; par la Religion de Malte; par les Grands Sénéchaux de ce Pays; par les Estats Généraux du royaume; et enfin par nos anciens Comtes; & par nos Roys leurs héritiers et leurs successeurs', Marchetti, *Discours sur le négoce*, pp. 7f.

64 'I Gentilhuomini in quella Republica [di Venezia] non hanno grandi entrate di possessioni, sendo le loro richezze grandi fondate in sulla mercanzia e cose mobili, e di più nessuno di loro tiene castella o ha alcuna iurisdizione sopra gli uomini', Marchetti, *Discours sur le négoce*, p. 27 (Niccolò Machiavelli, *Discorsi sopra la prima Deca di Tito Livio*, I, 55).

65 N. Machiavelli, *Il principe e Discorsi*, Sergio Bertelli (ed.), 8th edn, Milan, 1981, p. 258.

66 E. Schalk, *From Valor to Pedigre: Ideas of Nobility in France in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries*, Princeton, 1986, pp. 87f. Marchetti, *Discours sur le négoce*, p. 27.

67 ACM, BB 40, fol. 157v-158 (25 November 1561). Prohibition on carrying arms by letters patent made at Saint-Germain-en-Laye (18 October 1561).

68 Kaiser, *Marseille*, pp. 142f.

69 Ibid, pp. 143–57.

70 November 1559: 'ferme des drogueries et espiciers: fermier la ville; nomination des officiers: Pierre Bausset, consul, trésorier, gages 60 livres, Nicolas Seguier, consul, receveur, 100 livres; Laurens Reynier, contrerolleur, 300 livres', ACM, BB 40bis.

71 But not always: the farm of the levy on meat (*once des boucheries*) in 1558, by the nobleman Jean Boniface, for 1,700 golden écus at 48 s. pièce, ACM, BB 40bis.

72 François Martin dit Teisseire, merchant, on 23 November 1561 took over the *gabelle du vin*, the guarantee was given by his brother Pierre, ACM, BB 40 fol. 159–63v.

73 In the example cited, other guarantees were given by the brothers Jean and Leynet de la Deffores, goldsmith, as well as the merchant Marin Lambert, ACM, BB 40 fol. 163.

74 Thus, Barthélemy Candolle on 18 November 1560, took the *gabelle de vin* (8910 fl. prç) against Reynaud Turrel, ACM, BB 40 fol. 88r–89v; but this latter, with Michel Picard, very active on the market, appears three days later as the farmer of the *gabelle*, with Barthélemy Candolle, ACM, BB 40 ter.

75 ACM, BB 40 fol. 164r–167r.

76 Another, less obvious example: on 23 November 1577, the *gabelle du vin* was farmed out to Pierre Touzet, to whom the merchants François Citrany and Barthélemy Héraud stood as guarantors; the notarial act was signed by them but not by Touzet who 'did not know how to write', ACM, BB 44 fol. 390v–391v; similarly, in 1582, Pierre Touzet took the *gabelle du port* – 'the said farmer said he was unable to write', the guarantee was given by the merchant Paul Crozil, ACM, BB 45 fol. 188r–189r.

77 ACM, BB 42 fol. 115r–116r.

78 Pour 2700 fl., ACM, BB 45 fol. 194r–195r.

79 1570 by the merchant Pierre Gardiolle, guaranteed by merchants Nicolas du Renel, François Mantellin, Charles Gerenton and Jean d'Aisac, sgr. de Venelles, ACM, BB 43 fol. 175r–176r.

80 ACM, BB 43 fol. 259r-v.

81 Nicolas Ferrat, Nicolas de Populis, Jacomin Cerlan, François de Roche; Collier and Billioud, *Histoire du commerce*, p. 234f.

82 Ibid., the Marseillais Louis Bollet.

83 Zarb, 'Les relations avec Genève'.

84 In 1770/71, 86,000 hectolitres of wheat [from Barbary, Sicily, England]] reached Geneva from Marseilles, either by land or along the Rhône valley. A.-M. Puiz and L. Mottu-Weber, *L'économie genevoise, de la Réforme à la fin de l'Ancien Régime*, Geneva, 1990, pp. 90, 258f, 376f.

85 'A Livourne et à Gênes, les blés étaient embarqués par Port-de-Bouc ou La Ciotat, de préférence à Marseille, où la police locale des grains interdisait, en temps de disette, la sortie des blés ... Parvenus en Arles, les grains étaient transportés jusqu'à Seyssel par les soins d'entrepreneurs, "patrons barquiers" souvent. En octobre 1693, Etienne Fabri et Louis Caillat, marchands de bois à Lyon, sont engagés par Fatio pour transporter 20.000 quintaux de blé d'Arles à Seyssel; de là, un autre entrepreneur, disposant de chariots, prendra la route de Genève.' Puiz and Mottu-Weber, *L'économie genevoise*, p. 377. One quintal = about 55 kilograms.

86 L. Mottu-Weber, *Genève au siècle de la Réforme. Economie et Refuge*, Geneva and Paris, 1987, pp. 57, 136.

87 R. Gascon, *Grand commerce et vie urbaine au XVIe siècle. Lyon et ses marchands*, Paris, 1972, 2 vols, vol. 1, p. 97.

88 He was a friend of Calvin and Bèza who said of him in a letter to Bullinger (Zurich): 'C'était un oiseau rare, qui a su concilier ces deux choses, les richesses et la vraie piété'. L'humaniste strasbourgeois Jean Sturm en revanche les accusait auprès de Calvin, dans une lettre de fin décembre 1560, de duplicité. Ils auraient réussi de tirer leur epingle du jeu (parmi les prêteurs allemand au roi de France) parce qu'ils avaient fait passer leur créance sur l'assignation des gabelles du sel tandis qu'ils renvoyaient leurs propres créanciers aux "grand parti" de Lyon'. In 1569 Thodore Beza noted the zealousness of Georges Obrecht for the good cause (financing the soldiers of Jean Casimir): 'il n'a jamais espargné du sien propre quand il a est, question de s'employer pour la religion'. In 1560 Jean Sturm bluntly described a supreme example of merchant duplicity: 'Ces deux-là ont fleuri sous le règne des Guise; ils étaient assis sur deux chaises, une fesse sur la votre [Calvin], l'autre sur celle des Guise. Maintenant ils projettent de s'asseoir les deux fesses sur la vôtre...', G. Livet and F. Rapp (ed.) *Histoire de Strasbourg des origines à nos jours*, Strasbourg, 1981, vol. 2, p. 315

89 'Item par la dite rivière Rosne vient du lac de Geneve et par icelluy en la dite rivière de Rosne les Allamans et autres quelzconques de celles contrées peuvent venir en la dite ville de Lion et de là, se bon leur semble, jusqu'en Aigue-Morte, Marceille ou autres ports maritimes et par contre ceux des dits havres et ports et de tout le Languedoc peuvent par la dite rivière en montant aller au dit Lion et d'icelle ce bon leur semble esdits pays de Savoye, Allemaigne et autres ou en Bourgogne et ailleurs par les rivières de la dite Saoune, du Doulx et autres en icelle chéans.' Puiz and Mottu-Weber, *L'économie genevoise*, p. 504.

90 M. Körner, *Solidarités financières suisses au XVIe siècles. Contribution à l'histoire monétaire, bancaire et financière des cantons suisses et des états voisins*, Lausanne, 1980, p. 332, which challenged the exclusivity given to Genoa, Barcelona or Valence in the creation of public banks.

91 R. Gascon, *Grand commerce et vie urbaine*, vol. I, p. 326.

92 'Lettres patentes de main levee' [Royal Letters for the restoration of goods] for 180 *balles* of alum found on a ship going from Genoa to Marseilles, for 'Ysrael Micael German merchant from Strasbourg', mentioning the privileges accorded to 'the said suppliant and other merchants and imperial towns', ADBdR, 9 B 1.

93 Conversely, marseillais merchants imported tin: ADBdR, 9 B 1, fol. 226: authorisation given to Louis Monier, purchaser of 1,000 quintaux of tin in Germany and to load this in Marseilles; attestation of the arrival of 600 quintals of tin for François de Corbie, from Marseilles, to Lyons (1571); Beutin, *Der deutsche Seehandel im Mittelmeergebiet bis zu den napoleonischen Kriegen*, Neumünster, 1933, p. 16 n. 62.

94 ADBdR, 362 E (B. Renozi) fol. 1188vo: Bill of exchange for Benoît Montchal, residing at Marseilles (factor Jehan du Bois), from 12 May 1572, to Lyons, montant 499 l.t., raised on François Brémont, at Geneva (31 July 1572).

95. ADBdR, 378 E 181 fol. 235: 'factor, negotiator at Marseilles for the affairs of Sieur Wolff, German merchant from Strasbourg' (5 May 1573).
96. ADBdR, 356 E 32 fol. 930 (27 October 1584).
97. Collier and Billioud, *Histoire du commerce*, vol. 3, p. 248. A.-E. Sayous, 'Le commerce de Melchior Manlich et C ie d'Augsbourg à Marseille et dans toute la Méditerranée entre 1571 et 1574', *Revue historique*, CLXXVI (1935), 3e fasc., pp. 389–411. G. Seibold, *Die Manlich. Geschichte einer Augsburger Kaufmannsfamilie*, Sigmaringen, 1995.
98. L. Malzac, 'Les Zollikoffer de Saint-Gall. Une famille de négociants suisses à Marseille (1550–1770)', *Provincia* 14, 1934, 97.
99. Mottu-Weber, *Economie et refuge*.
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101 ADBdR, 9 B 1 fol. 616r–617r (20 May 1588): Henry Hardresson, Henry Ferenton and colleagues.
102 ADBdR, IX B 1 fol. 413v–414r (4 March 1615).
103 Passport for Jean-Laurent and David Solicoffre, ADBdR, 9 B 2 fol. 400 (4 December 1636).
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107 P. Echinard and E. Temime, *Migrance. Histoire des migrations à Marseille*, vol. 1, Aix-en-Provence, 1989, pp. 45f.
108 G. Simmel, *Exkurs über den Fremden*, in ibid., *Soziologie. Untersuchungen über die Formen der Vergesellschaftung* (1908), Frankfurt/Main, 1992, pp. 764–71. A. Loycke (ed.) *Der Gast, der bleibt. Dimensionen von Georg Simmels Analyse des Fremdseins*, Paris, 1992, p.124.
109 See P. Sahlins, *Unnaturally French*, and J.-F. Dubost and P. Sahlins, *Et si on faisait payer les étrangers? Louis XIV, les immigrés et quelques autres*, Paris, 1999, p.475.
110 Catherine Roubin, orig[inai]re d'Esmirne [= Smyrne], fille de Jean Roubin, orig[inai]re de Grignan, et de Marie Roze de lad[ite] ville d'Esmirne. Lad[ite] Roubin, femme de François Vareze de Mars[ei]lle, Seris Vareze & Marg[ueri]te Vareze, ses filz & filles, habitans aud[it] Marseille, nat[urali]zés en 1669. Lad[ite] Roubin est vefue encore vivante, Ceris Vareze, son filz, est encore en vie et lad[ite] Marg[ueri]te Vareze aussi, demurant avec la maire au pavé d'amour au dessous le logis de l'Estrieu. Ilz peuvent avoir quant à présent six mil livres', ACM, CC 58, non fol. Cf. Wolfgang Kaiser, 'Voisins barbares et des hôtes qui restent. Pratiques d'assimilation et de démarcation à Marseille (XV-XVIIe siècles)', in D. Nourrisson and Y. Perrin (eds) *Le barbare, l'étranger: images de l'autre*, Saint-Etienne, 2005, pp. 185–92.

6 Pearl towns and early oil cities

Migration and integration in the Arab coast of the Persian Gulf*

Nelida Fuccaro

The landscape of migration, urban life and state authority along the Arab coast of the Persian Gulf in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries contrasts that of the late Ottoman Empire. The differences between Gulf ports and the provincial centres of the Arab Ottoman world can be readily explained by contrasting political realities. With the exception of Ottoman Basra, the urban societies of the Arab coast were neither ruled by an imperial administration nor had been shaped by a long established tradition of self government as was the case of some of the ports of the Mediterranean and the Red Sea. Kuwait Town, Manama in Bahrain and Dubai were 'new' towns that had risen to commercial prominence in the second half of the nineteenth century following the boom of the Gulf pearls in the world market. Located on the fringes of imperial administrations, these pearl towns were part of a region that bordered the Ottoman domains and those of the Qajar dynasty, which controlled southern Iran. At the centre of what in the late nineteenth century was an expanding urban frontier, these settlements were veritable 'societies of migrants', mercantile city-states or quasi-city-states ruled by local dynasties of tribal descent.[1] Originally from central Arabia, the Al Sabah, Al Khalifah and Al Maktum families were able to consolidate their position in Kuwait Town, Manama and Dubai as protégées of the Government of India, which after 1820 integrated the Gulf coast into the sphere of British informal empire.[2]

Whereas in the second half of the nineteenth century the provincial centres of the Ottoman Empire were experiencing modernisation under the Tanzimat reforms, in the Gulf urban governance still conformed to desert ideals, which conceived the town and its residents as an integral part of the tribal domains of its ruling dynasty. Although urban modernisation in Manama and Kuwait Town started with the establishment of municipalities in 1919 and 1930 respectively, modern state administrations emerged only with the discovery and exploitation of oil: in the

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1930s in Bahrain, two decades later in Kuwait and in the 1970s in Dubai. The changing position of immigrant populations and the role played by urban institutions in fostering integration before and after the advent of oil brings into a sharp focus the evolution of state power as a determinant in affecting migrant lives. Since the oil boom of the 1970s the history of migrants to the Gulf is a tale of disempowerment and exploitation as disciplined armies of workers from Pakistan, India and the Philippines have toiled as the servants of rentier states and of wealthy populations of nationals.[3] This tale is uncontested evidence of the spectacular growth of the control exercised by the modern state over immigration and labour markets, the result of a generalised commodification of labour power that has affected the Arab Middle East as a whole.[4] In the Arab States of the Persian Gulf both commodification and state hegemony are epitomised by the institution of *al-kafalah*, a system of sponsorship of the labour force strictly regulated by Ministries of Labour.[5]

Although not directly relevant to this chapter, the present condition of the labour force in the Gulf raises a number of crucial issues for urban historians dealing with the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The first is how the immigration systems in place before oil interacted with political orders and how these systems related to the political and social institutions which regulated the life of port settlements. The second is the extent to which at the onset of the oil era, a period marked by both urban modernisation and state centralisation, the presence of old and new immigrants and the growth of the authority of the state influenced civic solidarities and emerging national identities. It is beyond doubt, for instance, that the political, economic and social segregation experienced by 'guest' workers in contemporary Gulf cities forms one of the core tenets that underpin national consensus. An understanding of the transition between old and new regimes seems particularly important in order to bridge what current literature on Gulf migrations more or less explicitly depicts as a historical rupture in the lives of migrants, states and urban institutions brought about by the discovery of oil.

This chapter adopts a fluid definition of institution as a practice of social, political and legal control which regulated both immigration and integration. It concentrates on different forms of patronage as a diagnostic of changing power relations between immigrants and urban milieus. In the nineteenth century the position of migrants and the evolution of migrant identities are analysed through the networks of tribal and communal patronage that sustained the evolution of pearl towns cum city-states. After the First World War and during the first two decades of the oil boom in Bahrain and Kuwait, the focus shifts to the enforcement of provisions of naturalisation and nationality as the key legal instruments deployed by modernising indigenous administrations to establish a monopoly over the movement and integration of immigrant populations.

Migrants in Gulf ports

Although oil modernity has produced powerful narratives of subordination of migrant workers, the histories of immigration of the pre-oil era are part and parcel of processes of urban expansion, economic empowerment and state building. Since the late eighteenth century the port towns of Kuwait, Manama and Dubai developed primarily as immigration units. In the same way as their Ottoman counterparts, they were multi-cultural and multi-ethnic societies. Yet the pace of both migration and urbanisation was very fast, particularly in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. In this period, migrations towards the Arab coast intensified as a result of the boom of the Gulf pearls in the world markets. As centres of pearl production and commercial emporia, these towns attracted a host of immigrants in search for a living: tribes, agricultural communities and mercantile groups from the hinterland and overseas, particularly from Iran, India and East Africa. The age of pearling (*zaman al-ghaws*) transformed small tribal and commercial outposts in fully fledged port settlements. The population of Kuwait Town increased from approximately 6,000 in the 1840s to 35,000 at the turn of the twentieth century. In the same period the population of Dubai grew from 800 in 1834 to 10,000 in 1905. In the last quarter of the nineteenth century the number of residents in Manama, which was surrounded by the richest pearl banks of the Persian Gulf, increased from two to threefold.[6]

A number of interrelated factors contributed to make migrants a mobile economic and political force which rubbed shoulders with each other across the region. The first was the system of supply and demand that regulated trade and the pearling industry, both not subject to state monopoly but controlled by merchants and pearling entrepreneurs.[7] In the nineteenth century, coastal rulers (*shaykhs*) exercised loose control over people and goods entering their towns. Harbours, which were often the only geographical barrier that separated towns from their surroundings, were equipped with rudimentary dock and customs facilities. Dubai, for instance, had no permanent customs administration for much of the nineteenth century and in Manama the collection of customs dues became an established practice only after 1869. Until the reorganisation of the urban administration of Kuwait Town under Mubarak al-Sabah (r. 1896 1915), the imposition of taxes on imports was sporadic, only 2 per cent of value in 1831.[8] In the same way as with the customs, the policing of harbours and of urban precincts was lax, often in the hands of tribal irregulars. Another important factor that prevented the centralisation of the urban administration was the dependency of rulers on merchant capital for their economic and political survival. As leading *shaykhs* competed with each other to attract merchants, they kept customs tariffs to a minimum in order to increase the volume of trade passing through their ports. By the early twentieth century this quasi-free-port regime benefitted from the protectionist policies enforced by the Ottoman and Qajar administrations in Basra, Bushehr and Lingah, which caused the relocation of Ottoman and Iranian merchants to the Arab coast, particularly horse dealers, food suppliers and entrepreneurs involved in the trans-shipment of commodities.[9] In this period, foreign mercantile communities, particularly Indians and Persians, played an increasingly important role in the import trade of essential foodstuffs, which supported growing urban populations. After 1880 the consolidation of British informal empire also favoured the plethora of migrant groups which served expanding port economies, from traders to pearl divers and artisans. As British interests concentrated on the protection of trade and of public order, the political agents based in the Gulf ports generally safeguarded the position of immigrant communities, often acting as intermediaries between them and indigenous rulers.[10] In this age of accelerated imperial expansion, the scarce natural resources offered by the Gulf coast to the industrial economy of Great Britain rescued immigrants and the indigenous workforce from becoming instruments for the production and accumulation of colonial capital, a trend that characterised the making of new coastal and inland economies in some of the British colonies in Asia and Africa.

The definition of 'migrant' in Gulf ports was extremely broad, often including different generations of settlers and individuals of diverse social, ethnic and professional background: from Bedouin tribes and Persian villagers to mercantile groups, mercenary soldiers, slaves and clerics. At the turn of the twentieth century some Sunni and Shi'i clerics and preachers from the Arabian Peninsula and Iraq escaped the puritanical Wahhabi regime established by the Al Sa'ud family in central Arabia and the new Sunni orthodoxy promoted by the Hamidian regime in southern Iraq, then the world centre of Shi'ism.[11] Ruling families were also migrants. They formed status groups across the region as they had established commercial outposts along the coast in the eighteenth century. They were economic migrants and political refugees, often itinerant merchant seafarers who had been forced to relocate along the coast as a result of tribal conflict and of the scarce economic resources of the mainland. This was the case of the Al Khalifah and Al Sabah families who belonged the Bani 'Utub confederation from the Arabian Peninsula and arrived in Kuwait and Bahrain around the 1750s and in 1793 respectively. The early history of the Bani Yas rulers of Dubai is more obscure but according to Omani chronicles they were already in the area in the eighteenth century where they established the settlement of Abu Dhabi.[12] The seafaring tradition of the Gulf is also embodied by the *Hawala* (from the Arabic *tahawwala,* to move around), a group of Sunni tribes originally from the Persian coast which moved across the Gulf waters and made their fortune with the booming trade of the Arab coast. Politically, the most successful group was that of the Al Qawasim, which in the eighteenth century built a maritime empire based in Ras al-Khaymah and Sharjah in Trucial Oman (now the United Arab Emirates) that stretched to the Iranian coast.[13] These groups of merchant warriors combined a strong commercial, tribal and military ethos. Once they became in control of the coast they encouraged the settlement of tribal clients and allied tribes from the hinterland of the Arabian Peninsula.

Although in the nineteenth century tribal migrations continued to swell the rank-and-file of the ruling classes and the workforce, the age of pearling increased the inflow of migrants who were outside the tribal system. Some overseas migrants followed the trail of British expansion in the region after 1820 when the Government of India started to control the Gulf and its ports by imposing maritime truces. The status and position of these migrants was largely defined by their imperial connections, particularly in the case of the Indians. Engaged in trade and money lending, the majority of them belonged to a Hindu caste traditionally devoted to commerce (*Banias*) or to a Shi'i Isma'ili sect (*Khojahs*). Some *Banias* served as British native agents in Manama between 1816 and 1834, whereas after the 1830s the Government of India started to favour the appointment of Muslims, particularly Persians.[14] Wealthy Indian merchants organised themselves in powerful syndicates under British protection and dealt with import export commodities such as foodstuffs and textiles. After 1865 some Indian entrepreneurs also became involved in the pearl trade with Bombay, the principal market for Gulf pearls.[15] The British presence in the Gulf also encouraged the arrival of slaves from East Africa and Baluchistan. Restrictions imposed on the slave trade after 1804 in the colonies and the manumission programme started by British agents in the second half of the century contributed to increase the number of Africans and Baluchis who sought emancipation and work opportunities in the ports of the Gulf.[16] Unless employed in tribal militias, emancipated slaves remained at the bottom of the social scale. They either joined the labour force engaged in the pearling industry or, in the case of many women, sold their sexual favours in the districts and taverns surrounding the busy harbours of the Gulf coast.

Regional and local connections played an equally prominent role in both migration and urbanisation. As it was the case of the urban rulers and their tribal allies, labour, capital and political support could be easily obtained through the tight web of family, commercial and religious networks that intersected the region. The majority of immigration flows were spontaneous, often including few individuals and families over long periods of time. Migrations from southern Iran are a case in point, particularly after the 1860s when entire families, merchant communities, urban quarters and villages relocated to the Arab coast as a result of the prevailing political and economic insecurity under the Qajar regime.[17] Easa Saleh al-Gurg, a prominent Emirati diplomat and businessman whose family settled in Dubai from southern Iran, explains the toils of migration in these terms:

> If you come to know Dubai you will know that this crossing of the Gulf's often tricky and unpredictable waters has been the experience of many families living on this part of the Arabian coast. For a variety of reasons including climate change, economic pressures, environmental decline, the ebb and flow of politics and war people from the mainland of Arabia were often obliged to seek a livelihood or security for their families across the Gulf.[18]

Dubai and Manama were the preferred destinations for Persian and *Hawala* merchants. Here, in the early twentieth century and until the collapse of the pearl industry in the late 1920s, a handful of powerful entrepreneurs were able to tap into British trade and European shipping: the al-Shirawis, 'Arshis, Kanus, al-Gurgs and al-Muwayyads among others. Immigrants from Lingah, for instance, formed a large proportion of the merchant elite of Dubai, particularly after the establishment of a modern customs administration in the Iranian port in 1900 which shattered its quasi-free-trade economy.[19] The rise to power of the Pahlavi dynasty in Iran after the First World War gave further impetus to the relocation of merchants to the Arab coast. In his memoirs, al-Gurg explains why his wealthy family left Lingah for Dubai in this period:

> For some of us … in the years after the First European War … it was the first Reza Shah's [Pahlavi] attempts to reform aspects of Islamic customs which encouraged many of the *Sunni Arab families, living like my own on the [Iranian] coast, to return to Arabia*. Not least among the innovations to which the Arab families objected was the decision that women should go unveiled.[20] [my emphasis]

Al-Gurg's account highlights two important aspects of the identity politics pursued by merchant families from Iran underlining their quest for political and social integration into Arab ports. The first is their claim to an ancient Arab origin, which is substantiated by depicting their settlement on the Arab coast as a 'return' to the ancestral land of Arabia. The second is the emphasis on their Sunni credentials and piety. This emphasis reflected the historic divide between Sunnis and Shi'is, which in political terms was closely identified with that between the Arab and the Persian worlds. Once on Arab lands, being a Sunni was a considerable asset, a ticket to economic, political and social success. Moreover, in the early Pahlavi era the resurgence of sectarian identity and religious fervour was obviously facilitated by the political centralisation and social modernisation undertaken by Reza Shah.

Less evident and often difficult to trace, but not less important, were migrations from the desert and from agricultural areas which were located in the vicinity of coastal towns. The pearl industry and their thriving port economies attracted scores of anonymous tribesmen, villagers and agriculturalists whose histories are largely unrecorded. At the turn of the twentieth century Shi'i cultivators from the agricultural region of Bahrain and al-Ahsa' formed large segments of the popular classes of Manama.[21] Migrants were also 'itinerant' urban dwellers, working in coastal towns but not living there on a permanent basis. Many of the divers, pullers and entertainers of ship crews employed in the pearl banks of the Arab coast were seasonal labourers and travelled from port to port in search for employment. Peddlers also constituted an important segment of the urban labour force. In ports with a large tribal hinterland such as Kuwait Town, Bedouins often pitched their tents on the outskirts in order to sell their merchandise to the population. Lorimer reported in 1904 that the 132 dealers in Bedouin goods who operated from the town represented the largest group of retail merchants after grocers suggesting the importance of these commodities in the local market.[22]

Migrants and patrons: the architecture of the urban community before oil

Migrants brought to port towns a host of tribal, family, religious and imperial connections transforming them into the nodes of regional and transregional networks. These complex layers of migration coupled with the fast evolution of city-states had a profound impact on the infrastructure of the urban polity and on the architecture of community. The patronage of merchants and rulers was the key institution that supported these 'societies of migrants'. In structuring political orders and socio-economic relations it provided a means of integration for newcomers granting them access to the upper echelons of urban society.

Tribal patronage was closely identified with that of state as it dominated the exclusive system of government established by ruling dynasties. The administrative apparatus of Gulf towns was minimal and directly controlled by their rulers who often had to assuage the sensibilities of family members. It centred on the ruler's *majlis*, a personal council that served as the forum for consultation with merchants, tribal leaders and the population, and on *al-fidawiyyah*, militias organised along tribal lines that controlled public security. The political and military supremacy of tribes was sanctioned by tribal customs rather than being legitimised by Islamic law or imperial legislation. Towns were administered as tribal fiefdoms, part of the domains of their ruling families (*al-dirah*). Within these, rulers retained ultimate ownership of properties, people and resources. State patronage usually took the form of trade concessions and the distribution of land, and of rights of exploitation of pearl banks to immigrant tribes and their leaders who were often both merchants and entrepreneurs. Pearl merchants who invested in trade and shipbuilding prospered in close association with urban rulers. Marriage often cemented political alliances and economic partnerships with ruling families. Their ability to build up militias and to convene personal councils measured their political influence and created a network of institutions, which ran in parallel with those controlled by the ruler. On the eve of oil the Kuwait elite included a number of closely knit wealthy trading families such as the al-Ghanims and al-Hamids who claimed descent from the Bani 'Utub. They married each other and members of the Al Sabah, and maintained their prestigious *diwaniyyahs* (the local name for *majlis*) on the seafront while organising military contingents for the defence of the town.[23]

Only a few groups of non-tribal immigrants benefitted from direct state patronage, usually by offering their services to urban administrations. Syndicates of Indian and Persian merchants, for instance, managed the customs and the harbour in Manama and Abu Dhabi, which were under the direct control of the rulers. In Manama, a handful of Persian and Arab entrepreneurs of rural extraction got lucrative contracts for the management of the markets that were owned by members of the Al Khalifah family.[24] The immigrants who featured most conspicuously in the administration were African and Baluchi slaves who reached Gulf ports via Bandar Abbas and Muscat. Renowned for their military skills and prized for their loyalty, both groups formed the rank-and-file of the urban militias (*al-fidawiyyah*) alongside tribesmen. Over time, African slaves in particular became assimilated into the tribal system. Those who were able to gain positions of authority among the *al-fidawiyyah* were often granted lucrative positions as collectors of revenue in the markets where they also controlled public security. In Kuwait, for instance, Mubarak al-Sabah employed almost exclusively slaves of African descent to administer the town. In Bahrain the groups of former slaves, Baluchis and Arabs with no tribal affiliation that controlled the markets of Manama and Muharraq, the second largest town of the islands, were known as the *Bani Khudayr*, the people of the green stock, a derogatory term which denoted their non-tribal descent.[25]

The patronage of prominent merchants with no tribal pedigree was equally influential in moulding the political infrastructure of urban society. Their role in providing assistance and political protection to immigrant populations was particularly pronounced in fast developing cosmopolitan towns such as Manama and Dubai. As explained in the previous section their Arab, Persian, Jewish and Indian merchant families were 'young' urban elites, newcomers who benefitted from the pearl and trade boom under the aegis of the *Pax Britannica*. Still linked to their towns and regions of origin, they built networks of clients among immigrant groups by virtue of family, business and social connections. While offering employment and often housing, they also sponsored institutions independent from the tribal administration: traditional and modern schools, mosques, small synagogues and Hindu temples, and among the Shi'i population *husayniyyahs* for the celebration of '*ashura*'. Besides providing religious and educational services, Arab and Persian merchants offered civic assistance by sponsoring their own *majlis*es, which were used for the distribution of alms to the poor. They also supported public events such as assemblies in *al-barahat*, open spaces often named after the benefactors used for the celebration of religious holidays.[26] The influence and prestige they acquired as the 'natural leaders' of immigrant communities allowed them to play the role of intermediaries between them and the tribal administration much in the same way as the *a'yan* in the provincial centres of the late Ottoman Empire. Unlike the Ottoman *a'yan*, however, their role of patrons was often facilitated by their connections with regional powers: British agencies, the Sa'udi family of central Arabia and the Qajar and Pahlavi governments in the case of Shi'i merchants of Iranian origin.

Tribal affiliation and merchant patronage also measured the degree of spatial integration of immigrant groups into developing port towns. The quarters of their inner cities developed as clusters of client solidarities around the residences of rich merchants and tribal leaders. Not only was spatial proximity a guarantee of security and protection, but also provided easy access to the institutions sponsored by notables, which became the centres of public life. *Majlis*es, mosques and *husayniyyahs* were in fact the principal venues of religious and political socialisation. Many neighbourhoods populated by non-tribal settlers developed as immigration units: the popular quarters of *al-Mukharaqah* and *al-Hammam* in Manama, and the upmarket districts of *al-Bastakiyyah* and *al-Awadhiyyah* in Manama and Dubai respectively. These two districts were built by those Persian merchants from Lingah that relocated to Bahrain and Dubai after 1900. By the 1920s they had become the two most architecturally distinctive urban quarters of the Arab coast with elegant mansions and wind towers.[27] Similar processes underscored the development of neighbourhoods around tribes and their clients, including slaves. The *al-Shandagah* district, which was the oldest quarter of Dubai, housed the Albu Falasah and the Banu Yas tribes, which were closely related to the Al Maktum, the ruling family of the town. The neighbourhoods of the inner city of Muharraq, the seat of Bahrain's tribal rulers, developed around their headquarters (*Farij Al Khalifah*), and were populated by allied tribes such as the Al Ibn 'Ali and Al Jalahima.[28]

The exclusion of immigrants from the tribal and communal systems of patronage that organised urban life resulted in their social isolation, spatial segregation and political marginalisation. Former agriculturalists, tribesmen and slaves who worked as pearl divers are a case in point. They constituted a fluctuating and destitute labour force, which was routinely indebted to the captains and entrepreneurs who controlled the industry. Rather than being clients of the upper echelons of the pearling establishment they were subordinate to them, trapped in a vicious cycle of debt, which often affected their offspring. Their miserable condition often led some European observers to view the pearl industry as a system of 'enslavement' of migrant populations. As suggested by Paul Harrison in 1924 when he visited Bahrain 'The diver is known as a slave for the rest of his life'.[29] These patterns of exclusion became enshrined in the urban development of the pearl era which shadowed the emergence of veritable modern shanty towns outside inner cities. Not only did they house pearl divers but also a multitude of rural and overseas immigrants who worked in the port as porters and water carriers. Ethnic solidarities also played a role in the development of these settlements. In Dubai, *Farij al-Baluch* (the Baluchi quarter) housed a majority of Baluchi slaves and their descendents who were continuously forced to relocate with the expansion of the neighbourhoods of the inner city in the first decades of the twentieth century. Similar developments affected several of the neighbourhoods in the outskirts of Manama, which were populated mainly by Persians: *Sangeki*, *Zulm Abad* and *al-Minawiyyah*.[30]

As towns became organised as immigration units along communal and tribal lines, migrant identities proved to be particularly resilient. They were reinforced by the arrival of new immigrants and by their importance in enlarging the clientele of merchants and rulers, the two groups which were at the head of urban society. In these 'societies of migrants', claiming to be one became a crucial marker of urbanity. These claims expressed a mixture of civic spirit, entrepreneurial pride and appreciation of social orderliness in opposition to the risky and 'unruly' tribal world which surrounded coastal towns. In Manama, for instance, no collective name denoted immigrant. Individual communities continued to define immigrants in their own terms: the urbanised Arab Shi'i population referred to their own newcomers as *al-hala'il* (villagers) as many were flocking to the town from the rural hinterland. Persian settlers called their immigrants *Farsi*, a term that denoted rural origin and reflected the long history of immigration to Bahrain from the rural areas of southern Iran.[31] In Kuwait tribal immigrants continued to be identified by their tribal names and affiliations long after they had taken residence in town. Second or third generation settlers continued to behave as migrants; they maintained and strengthened connections with their places of origin through marriage and business. Politically, the services provided by their patrons reinforced allegiances towards the leaders of their ancestral land: the Shah of Iran in the case of the Persians, Ibn Sa'ud for the majority of the tribal immigrants from Central Arabia who populated Kuwait Town and Manama, whereas Indian mercantile communities looked at the Government of India as their protector.

Thus, provided that newcomers fitted in with community and tribal networks, they were not necessarily considered aliens, unlike the few Europeans and Americans who populated Gulf ports: traders, British officials and missionaries. Being a foreigner was not necessarily politically contentious. In these 'new' towns, claims to be indigenous or native (*asli*) had more far-reaching implications as ruling families used them to legitimise their political, economic and social position. The Al Sabah and those families who settled with them in Kuwait in the eighteenth century promoted their image of *al-asliyyun* as the founding fathers and first settlers of the town. In Bahrain and al-Ahsa', areas of ancient Shi'i settlement, these claims were put forward by the Shi'i agricultural population who refused to recognise the authority of the Al Khalifah and of the Al Sa'ud families. The collective name *Baharna* used for the Arab Shi'is throughout the Gulf carried the connotation of native, denoting their ancestral links with greater Bahrain, a historical region that also included the mainland.[32] These claims of 'authenticity' could be easily disputed as history was transmitted orally and recorded in tribal genealogies, which were prone to manipulation. The forging of tribal identities and Arab ethnic affiliation was quite common. As suggested by the account of Easa Saleh al-Gurg discussed in the previous section, merchants from the Iranian coast emphasised their Arabness in order to boost their social and political prestige, often to gain proximity with local ruling families. In Manama the Kanu family, one of the richest in the Gulf to this day, still claims to have arrived in Bahrain in the eighteenth century from central Arabia via southern Iraq and Iran. In Bahrain, some evidence suggests that an emphasis on tribal ancestry also played a role in the development of a local Shi'i nativist movement which was promoted by the religious classes.[33]

The multiple definitions of migrant, foreign and indigenous and their political nuances reflect the complex architecture of community in Gulf ports. Their 'minimal' apparatus of government was undoubtedly a key factor which shaped the destiny of migrants. In an important sense these urban societies developed almost as 'voluntary' associations, part of a commonwealth of port towns, the success of which depended on their ability to attract newcomers and on the effectiveness of their clientelist systems. As suggested by the cases of Manama and Kuwait Town, only with the establishment of municipal administrations did networks of patronage start to be integrated into modern institutions of governance. The merchant class used these two municipalities, which were created in 1919 and 1930 respectively, as a new institutional platform for the distribution of civic assistance, particularly the provision of services such as jobs, water, food and funds for public events. They did so by monopolising municipal councils as the new bodies in charge of public security, health and building regulations, and the cleaning and repair of roads and markets. Municipalities also started to employ some of the seasonal labour force, particularly in Manama where many pearl divers originally from the Arab coast worked as night guards, tax-collectors and road sweepers while not at sea.

With municipalities, however, old networks of patronage became enmeshed in representative politics. As membership in these councils was decided at the ballot-box, residents started to relate to their patrons as municipal voters. The new electoral politics involved a high degree of reciprocity as successful candidates continued to dispense their favours for the next electoral round. In Manama the most influential merchant patrons cum community leaders of the pearl era and their families dominated the municipal council until 1950.[34] Similar trends can be observed in Kuwait Town where members of the old tribal/mercantile aristocracy acquired permanent seats on the council. Unlike in Manama, however, by the late 1930s the merchants used popular demands for the improvement of health and education in order to gain political leverage against the Al Sabah.[35] Yet in both Manama and Kuwait the new electoral system disqualified the least affluent segments of the urban population and poor immigrants as only property owners were entitled to vote. In this respect, municipal charters started to transform the old 'politics of patronage' drawing new lines of inclusion and exclusion among urban clienteles.

Controlling 'the means' of integration and movement in the early oil era: Manama and Kuwait Town

The beginning of state centralisation had a profound impact on identity politics, opening the way to the dramatic changes experienced by urban populations and migrants in the age of oil. The ways in which tribal administrations appropriated their destinies after the First World War is closely intertwined with the consolidation of British power on the one hand, and with the development of port towns as centres of oil economies and metropolitan states on the other. Provisions of naturalisation and nationality were the powerful legal instruments deployed by the nascent modern bureaucracies to control urban societies and the movement of populations across the Gulf waters. Only Bahrain and Kuwait will be discussed in this section as they pioneered these developments in the inter-war period.

The issue of certificates of nationality, identity cards and passports were not the mere corollaries of the emergence of a new state system around Manama and Kuwait Town. The enforcement of documentary controls constituted the core activity which sustained the modernisation of their tribal administrations and the means through which the emerging modern states of Bahrain and Kuwait started to promote national consensus and integration in their capital cities in the making. While creating new political and legal distinctions between nationals and non-nationals, states also established a monopoly of the 'legitimate means of movement', a practice which has been so brilliantly analysed by John Torpey in his study of the history of the passport and citizenship in the USA and Western Europe.[36] The rise of the state as the supreme arbiter of political identities and of the labour markets was relatively slow by twentieth-century standards. Only in the 1970s, after the oil boom precipitated by the fourth Arab Israeli war, did Interior and Labour Ministries acquire the necessary budgets, personnel and bureaucratic skills to exercise their powers fully. Yet this age of rampant state patronage was inaugurated in Manama in the 1920s with the introduction of documentary controls on movement and identification, which anticipated the issue of laws of naturalisation and nationality. This new age of state surveillance stood in stark contrast with the old urban world dominated by tribes, merchants and British political agents, the primary controllers and regulators of immigration before oil.

In the Gulf modern nationality was an Indian import. It made its first appearance in the nineteenth century with the arrival of merchants and seafarers who carried certificates of British Indian nationality issued by the Bombay Government. After 1861 with the application of British extraterritorial jurisdiction across the Gulf, nationality became an integral part of the legal practice of imperial rule. British agents started to arbitrate commercial disputes involving their protégées in accordance with the law in force in British India, which was codified in 1860. By the end of the century extraterritorial jurisdiction had not only become a successful system of legal protection, but also of surveillance. In fact, British agencies functioned as passport offices *ante-litteram*. They issued visas and identity papers for travel across the region to both residents and visitors in transit. Their services often overlapped with those offered by the local *shaykhs*, who issued traditional safe passages to their subjects on sheets of paper bearing their seal and the name of the holder.[37] After the First World War British extraterritorial jurisdiction was placed on a firmer footing following the issue of Order-in-Councils, decrees that transformed the principalities of the Gulf coast into overseas imperial territories.

In the inter-war period increasing numbers of merchants and seamen obtained certificates of British nationality: not only Indians but also Persians, East Africans, Egyptians and Iraqis following the expansion of British rule in various countries of the Middle East and Africa. Furthermore, British agencies consolidated their position as the providers of travel certificates in order to monitor the movement of both undesirables and the workforce: criminal offenders, pearl divers and poor immigrants from the Iranian coast who were perceived as hostile to the British government. By the 1930s the agencies of Manama and Muscat in Oman, the centres of British influence, issued standard certificates of nationality for the subjects of local rulers, which replaced traditional identity cards and travel papers. After 1923 in Manama British agents started to work in conjunction with the local port authorities following the establishment of a modern customs administration in the town, the first of the Arab coast.[38] As a new system of surveillance the practice of nationality was a mixed blessing for the itinerant populations of the Gulf. Although it generally worked to the advantage of seafarers and commercial classes, it was opposed by Shi'i and Sunni clerics who considered nationality as a shameful and illicit 'innovation' (*bida'*), which fragmented *al-ummah* as a transnational community.

The politics of jurisdiction and nationality pursued by the Government of India had momentous repercussions on Manama. As after 1904 all immigrant settlers and newcomers came under the jurisdiction of the British agency, the inflow of particular communities under British protection became subject to intense scrutiny, particularly pearl divers and labourers from Najd and Iran who were the major cause of urban unrest. Further, in popular parlance the term 'foreigner' (*al-ajanib*) started to become synonymous with British-protected subject rather than indicating, as it had done previously, European and Indian merchants and British officials. In the tumultuous 1920s, when the Government of India started to reform the tribal administration of Bahrain, this term became part of a new language of political mobilisation. As the Al Khalifah and their entourage attempted to rally the allegiance of their subjects against imperial 'intrusion', they championed the interests of the true patriots (*al-wataniyyun*) of Manama against its 'foreigner' population (*al-ajanib*), particularly the Persians who were the main beneficiaries of British protection.[39] The legal and political position of the Persians was complicated further by their links with the Pahlavi regime which competed with the Government of India for influence in the northern Gulf. It is no coincidence that the provisions of naturalisation enforced by the newly established Government of Bahrain after 1929 and the Bahrain Nationality and Property Law of 1937 targeted this community with a view to severing their links with Iran, as will be explained in more detail below.[40]

In Kuwait Town imperial politics did not play so large a role in popularising ideas of nationality. As British influence was limited to the external affairs of the principality, the Al Sabah did not relinquish their jurisdiction over immigrant populations as the Al Khalifah had done in Bahrain after 1904. With the issue of the Kuwait Order-in-Council in 1920 the British agency acquired jurisdiction over foreigners. Yet it was limited to the subjects of 'Christian Powers': British nationals and the few Europeans and Americans settled in town.[41] It was the wall built in 1920 to protect urban residents from the attacks of the tribal militias of Ibn Sa'ud which constituted the landmark of modern identity politics. The wall defined a new line of physical separation between town dwellers (*ahl al-sur*, the people of the wall) and the populations that lived outside. Furthermore, as this new dividing line was key to determine Kuwaiti citizenship, the wall and the Ikhwan attacks of 1920 represented the basis upon which the government in the early oil era drew new political and legal boundaries among the urban population. In fact, according to the provisions of the Kuwaiti Nationality Law of 1959, only descendants of those families who lived inside the perimeter of the wall at the time of the Ikhwan attacks were considered Kuwaitis by origin (*bi-l asl*) and thus entitled to first-class citizenship. A segment of the population who settled in the town after 1920, including many Persian and *Hawala* families, obtained citizenship through naturalisation but were deprived of political rights as second-class citizens.[42] The process of separation between Kuwait Town and its hinterland respected the tradition of the town as a city-state. It also occurred in parallel with the fixation of national borders between the Kuwait principality, Iraq and Najd which initiated in 1922 under the aegis of the British administration of Iraq.

As suggested by the cases of Manama and Kuwait Town, the circumstances that marked the beginnings of a modern 'politics of nationality' differed across the region. British influence, which was rooted in late nineteenth century trajectories of imperial expansion, created new tensions between the Persian and Arab settlers of Manama, and between the British agency and the Al Khalifah. In Kuwait Town the complex regional politics of the early 1920s, which antagonised the Al Sabah, Ibn Sa'ud and the British administration of Iraq, shaped the provisions of the 1959 Nationality Law. In both towns, however, it was the emergence of oil states that provided the platform for the translation of tribal and communal identities into legal citizenship. In Bahrain and Kuwait nationality laws were issued after the discovery of oil, although provisions of naturalisation started to be enforced a decade earlier. Emerging modern states used them to impose their political and economic vision on the multi-cultural and multi-ethnic urban societies of the age of pearling. As explained above, the 1959 legislation initiated a differential system of status and rights among the population of Kuwait Town posing severe constraints on the integration of groups that settled there after 1920. It is worth mentioning that only few of those families who arrived between 1920 and 1959 were granted second-class citizenship. Moreover, tight restrictions on naturalisation also denied their offspring their rights to citizenship. In creating the new profile of national as passport holder, the government effectively legalised the rights traditionally claimed by the ruling family and by their allies as *al-'asliyyun* (original settlers). Inevitably, as suggested by Ann Marie Tétrault, provisions of nationality ultimately worked to the advantage of the Al Sabah and of their former tribal clients. This is also epitomised by the concept of *al-'usrah al-wahidah* (the united family) which since the 1970s was popularised by the government to promote national cohesion while reinforcing allegiances to the rulers.[43]

In Manama the distribution of Bahraini passports in the 1930s and 1940s was somewhat more inclusive. The subjects of the Al Khalifah, including the Arab Shi'i population, were automatically entitled to Bahraini citizenship. In contrast, the acquisition of nationality on the part of those groups that, since 1904, were under British protection was made conditional on residence and property ownership. The centrepiece of the first nationality law issued in 1937 was real estate, as also suggested by its name, 'Bahrain Nationality and Property Law'. In particular, this legislation aimed to transform the wealthy Persian property owners of the town into loyal citizens as the government threatened to confiscate their assets if they refused to apply for Bahraini passports.[44] At least until the Second World War, however, many rich Persians continued to own both properties and Iranian travel documents as evidence of the difficulties faced by the administrations in enforcing the new provisions. As applications for new passports also became conditional on ownership of real estate, after 1937 many immigrants attempted to acquire real estate in order to legalise their position in Bahrain. This policy of 'land and nationality', aimed primarily at boosting foreign investment, penalised heavily poor immigrants at the time when Bahraini passports became the symbol of the benefits of oil modernity throughout the Gulf.[45]

For both residents and newcomers nationality laws redefined traditional ideas of belonging to the town. Besides enforcing closer links between them and the government, they replaced the localised networks of tribal and community patronage that had supported both immigration and integration before the oil era. This process is best exemplified by the consolidation of the profile of 'illegal immigrant' in Manama as a new type of outcast by government decree. Here, the port authorities started to enforce immigration quotas and work permits in the late 1920s. After 1938, large numbers of Persians with no passport, identity papers or visas were routinely rounded up by the police, and then either imprisoned or expelled from Bahrain.[46] That by the mid-1950s the number of these Persian aliens had grown exponentially is testimony to the collapse of traditional community networks precipitated by changes in the urban economy and by the growing coercive power of the state. In transforming early oil cities into the exclusive domain of nationals, the enforcement of provisions of nationality undermined the cosmopolitan tradition of pearl towns. In Kuwait Town and Manama the prominence accorded to residence and property as criteria of citizenship established the principle of *ius loci*, that is the right of membership in the new political community of nationals by virtue of occupancy and control of real estate. In an important sense it was this principle that replaced the traditional solidarities that had structured the architecture of the urban community before oil.

Conclusion

Both before and after the discovery of oil the accommodation of migrants in pearl towns and early oil cities was not merely *one* of the variables that underscored urban development and state formation. Since the late eighteenth century migrants were the *de facto* building blocks of the political, social and institutional infrastructure of urban societies. For this reason processes by which they entered the life of Gulf towns are the most poignant testimony of the functioning of the larger systems of authority that controlled them: the tribe, British informal empire and the early oil state. In this light, the urban scenario of the pre-oil era prompts a critical scrutiny of the very concept of integration as a process of assimilation and adaptation into a host society. Rather than being forced to 'conform', pre-oil migrants were primary actors in the public arena, the makers of political and social consensus. The centralisation of government and the beginning of modern statehood after the 1920s transformed towns into new territorial and membership 'organisations', where boundaries between residents, immigrants and states started to be rooted in the legal category of nationality. Since then nationality has constituted an almost insurmountable barrier to integration, almost a historical necessity for the regulation of access to the entitlements of the spectacular oil wealth of the majority of contemporary Arab Gulf states.

Notes

1 There is no historiography of migrants in the Gulf before oil. The history of immigrant communities features more or less prominently in the literature on port towns, which is limited and uneven in approach. See as main contributions C.M. Davidson, *Dubai: the Vulnerability of Success*, London: Hurst, 2008; W. Floor, *The Persian Gulf: A Political and Economic History of Five Port Cities, 1500–1730*, Washington, DC: Mage, 2006; N. Fuccaro, *Histories of City and State in the Persian Gulf: Manama since 1800*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009; idem, 'Mapping the Transnational Community: Persians and the Space of the City in Bahrain, c.1869–1937', in M. al-Rasheed (ed.) *Transnational*

Connections in the Arab Gulf, London: Routledge, 2005, pp. 39–58; N.M. al-Qasimi, *al-Wujud al-Hindi fi-l Khalij al-'Arabi 1820–1949*, Sharja: Da'irah al-Thaqafah wa-l 'Ilm, 2000.

2 On the tribal and imperial histories of the region see A.M. Abu-Hakima, *History of Eastern Arabia, 1750–1800: The Rise and Development of Bahrain, Kuwait and Wahhabi Saudi Arabia*, Beirut: Khayats, 1965; J. Crystal, *Oil and Politics in the Gulf: Rulers and Merchants in Kuwait and Qatar*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990; J.B. Kelly, *Britain and the Persian Gulf, 1795–1880*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968; F.I. Khuri, *Tribe and State in Bahrain: The Transformation of Social and Political Authority in an Arab State*, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1980; M. Yapp, 'British Policy in the Persian Gulf', in A. Cottrell et al. (eds) *The Persian Gulf States: A General Survey*, Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980, pp. 70–100; R.S. Zahlan, *The Making of the Modern Gulf States*, 2nd edn, Reading: Ithaca Press, 1998. The only study dealing with the influence of the late Ottoman Empire in the region is F. Anscombe, *The Ottoman Gulf: The Creation of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Qatar*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1997.

3 In contrast with the previous century and a half, labour migration after the oil boom of the 1970s has received considerable academic attention, also in relation to processes of urbanisation. M. Bonine, 'Cities of Oil and Migrants: Urbanization and Economic Change in the Arabian Peninsula', in T. Yukawa (ed.) *Urbanism in Islam*, The Proceedings of the International Conference on Urbanism in Islam (ICUIT), Tokyo, 1989, vol. II, pp. 339–54; R.L. Franklin, 'The Indian Community in Bahrain: Labour Immigration in a Plural society', PhD Dissertation, University of Harvard, 1985; I.J. Seccombe, *Work Camps and Company Towns: Settlement Patterns and the Gulf Oil Industry*, Durham: Centre for Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies, University of Durham, 1987; O. Winckler, 'Gulf Monarchies as Rentier States: the Nationalization Policies of the Labour Force', in J. Kostiner (ed.) *Middle East Monarchies: the Challenge of Modernity*, Boulder: Rienner, 2000, pp. 237–56. See also 'New Ethnographic Fieldwork among Migrants, Residents and Citizens in the Arab States of the Persian Gulf', special issue of *City and Society* 20/1, 2008, p. 5–31.

4 J. Chalcraft, Labour in the Levant', *New Left Review* 45, 2007, pp. 40–1.

5 A.N. Longva, 'Keeping Migrant Workers in Check: the *Kafala* System in the Gulf', *Middle East Report* 29/2, 1999, pp. 20–2; M. Nancy, 'Le travail entre deux codes au Koweït: la *kafāla*', in H. Bleuchot (ed.) *Les Institutions Traditionnelles dans le Monde Arabe*, Paris, Karthala and Aix-en-Provence: IREMAM, 1996, pp. 193–210.

6 W.G. Palgrave, *Narrative of a Year's Journey through Central and Eastern Arabia (1862–63)*, 2 vols, London and Cambridge: Macmillan, 1865, vol. II, p. 211; *The Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, Oman and Central Arabia*, 2 vols by John George Lorimer, Calcutta: Office of the Superintendent Government Printing, 1908, republished by Gregg International, Farnbourough, 1970, vol. II, pp. 454–56, 1051, 1159–61; G.B. Brucks, 'Memoir Descriptive of the Navigation of the Gulf of Persia with Brief Notices of the Manners, Customs, Religion, Commerce, and Resources of the People Inhabiting its Shores and Islands', (1829–35), Fiche 1096, pp. 545 and 575–6, V 23/217 India Office Records (hereafter IOR).

7 On the pearl industry see Lorimer, *Gazetteer*, vol. I, pp. 2220–93; P. Lienhardt, *Shaikhdoms of Eastern Arabia*, Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2001, pp. 150–64; R. al-Zayyani, *al-Ghaws wa-l Tawwashah*, Manama: al-Ayyam, 1998.

8 Brucks, 'Memoir Descriptive of the Navigation of the Gulf' (1829–35), p. 576, fiche 1096–7, V 23/217 IOR; Kemball, 'Memoranda on the Resources, Localities, and Relations' (1845), fiche 1090–1, p. 109, V/23/217 IOR; Assistant Political Agent Bahrain to Political Resident Bushehr, 19 December 1903, n. 277 and 26 March 1904, n.76, R/15/2/49 IOR. Lorimer, *Gazetter*, vol. I, p. 928. F. Heard-Bey, From *Trucial States to United Arab Emirates*, London and New York: Longman, 1999, p. 191.

9 H. Fattah, *The Politics of Regional Trade in Iraq, Arabia and the Gulf, 1745–1900*, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997, pp. 171–8; F. al-Sayegh, 'Merchants' Role in a

Changing Society: The Case of Dubai, 1900–90', *Middle Eastern Studies* 34, 1998, 90; Lorimer, *Gazetteer*, vol. I, p. 322.

10 For a general discussion of British interests and imperialism in the Gulf see J. Onley, 'Britain's Informal Empire in the Gulf, 1820–1971', *Journal of Social Affairs* 22.87, 2005, p. 29–47.

11 This was particularly the case with Bahrain which according to oral tradition in this period offered shelter to some Shi'i clerics from Iraq, al-Qatif and al-Ahsa'.

12 On the early history of the 'Utubi states of Kuwait and Bahrain see Abu-Hakima, *History of Eastern Arabia*, pp. 45–124. B.J. Slot, *The Arabs of the Gulf, 1602–1784*, Leidschendam: 1995, pp. 39–40.

13 The *Hawala* descent of the al-Qawasim is confirmed by European observers in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, but it is still the subject of disputes as a result of contrasting genealogical traditions as it is often the case throughout the region. Slot, *The Arabs of the Gulf, 1602–1784*, pp. 40, 42–43; M.G. Khatam, *Tarikh 'Arab al-Huwilah*, Beirut, 2003, pp. 79–85.

14 J. Onley, *The Arabian Frontier of the British Raj. Merchants, Rulers, and the British in the Nineteenth-Century Gulf*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007, pp. 137–143.

15 Al-Sayegh, 'Merchants' Role in a Changing Society', pp. 87–88, 189–90.

16 A.B. Khalifa, 'Slaves and Musical Performances in Dubai: Socio-Cultural Relevance of African Traditions', PhD Dissertation, University of Exeter, 2003, pp. 87–96.

17 Fuccaro, 'Mapping the Transnational Community' pp. 45–51; M.T. Razavian, 'Iranian Communities in the Persian Gulf: a Geographical Analysis', PhD Dissertation, University of London, 1975.

18 E. S. al-Gurg, *The Wells of Memory: An Autobiography*, London: Murray, 1998, p. 2.

19 Khalifa, 'Slaves and Musical Performances in Dubai', p. 31; K. al-Qasimi, *Tarikh Linjah*, 2 vols, Dubai, 1993.

20 Al-Gurg, *The Wells of Memory*, p. 2.

21 Fuccaro, *Histories of City and State in the Persian Gulf*, pp. 68f., 91–93.

22 Lorimer, *Gazetteer*, vol. II, pp. 1050, 1053–4.

23 Crystal, *Oil and Politics in the Gulf*, p. 37. For a discussion of the political economy of Gulf ports see Fuccaro, *Histories of City and State in the Persian Gulf*, pp. 55–57.

24 Heard-Bey, *From Trucial States to United Arab Emirates*, p. 249; Fuccaro, *Histories of City and State in the Persian Gulf*, pp. 77–80, 87f.

25 Lorimer, *Gazetteer*, vol. II, p.1075; Khuri, *Tribe and State in Bahrain*, p. 51.

26 Fuccaro, *Histories of City and State*, pp. 95–110; al-Sayegh, 'Merchants' Role in a Changing Society', pp. 88–93.

27 Fuccaro, *Histories of City and State in the Persian Gulf*, pp. 90–93; A. Coles and P. Jackson, *Windtower*, London: Stacey International, 2007, p. 194.

28 Lorimer, *Gazetteer*, vol. II, p. 455; M. al-Nabhani, *al-Tuhfah al-Nabhaniyyah fi tarikh al-Jazirah al-'Arabiyyah*, Beirut: Dar Ihya' al-'Ulum, 1976, p. 141; T. Wali, *al-Muharraq: 'umran madinah khalijiyyah* 1873–1971, Manama, 1990, p. 71.

29 P.W. Harrison, *The Arab at Home*, London: Hutchinson, 1925, p. 80.

30 Khalifa, 'Slaves and Musical Performances in Dubai', p. 24; Fuccaro, *Histories of City and State in the Persian Gulf*, p. 93.

31 The naming of immigrant communities is preserved in local tradition and it is not documented in written records. Interviews with 'Abdallah Sayf, Tayyebah Hoodi, Khalid al-Bassam and 'Ali Akbar Bushehri, Manama, March and April 2004.

32 Crystal, *Oil and Politics and in the Gulf*, p. 37; I.A. Schumacher, 'Ritual Devotion among Shi'i in Bahrain', PhD Dissertation, University of London, 1987, p. 39.

33 See K.M. Kanoo, *The House of Kanoo: a Century of an Arabian Family Business*, London: The London Centre of Arabian Studies, 1997, p. 1, 323; M.A. al-Tajir, *Language and Linguistic Origins in Bahrain: The Baharna Dialect of Arabic*, London: Keegan Paul International, 1982, pp. 15–23.

34 Membership in the municipal council of Manama for the period 1920–50 has been inferred from electoral lists and the minutes of council meetings for the years 1927–1929 (15/2/1923 and 1218 IOR), 1934–45 (R/15/2/1921 to 1931 IOR), 1946–50 (R/15/2/1932 IOR). 'Abd al-Razzaq Yusuf al-'Awadhi, *Thamanun 'am min 'amr al-baladiyyah fi-l Bahrayn*, State of Bahrain, Ministry of Housing, n.d.

35 Crystal, *Oil and Politics in the Gulf*, pp. 46–55; N. 'Abd al-Qadir, *Baladiyyah al-Kuwayt fi khamsin 'am*, Kuwait: Kuwait Municipality, 1980.

36 J. Torpey, *The Invention of the Passport. Surveillance, Citizenship and the State*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, pp. 1–3.

37 H.M. Al Baharna, *British Extra-Territorial Jurisdiction in the Gulf, 1913–1971*, Slough: Archive Editions, 1998, pp. 1–51; S.A. Al-Arayyed, *Islamic Law as Administered in British India and in Joint British Courts in the Arabian Gulf, 1857–1947*, Manama, 2001.

38 Evidence of these developments is included in files R/15/2/1748 IOR 'Passports and Visa Regulations, 1930–1933'; R/15/2/1748 IOR 'Passport and Visa Regulations, 1933–1937' and R/15/2/1756 'Travel facilities for Gulf subjects, 1932–1941'

39 British Resident Bushehr to Foreign Department, Government of India, 17 December 1904, n.421, L/P&S/1081 IOR; Fuccaro, *Histories of City and State in the Persian Gulf*, pp. 157–60.

40 I'lan Hukumah al-Bahrayn, n.1101/17/1347 and n.50/1351; 'Bahrain Nationality and Property Law', 17 February 1937/King's Regulation n.2 of 1937, September 1937, R/15/2/150 IOR.

41 Memo Political Resident Bushehr to Political Resident Baghdad, 7 April 1919; 'The Kuwait Order in Council, 1920', R/15/5/293 IOR. 'Kuwait Order in Council 1935 and Jurisdiction over Foreigners', R/15/5/294 IOR.

42 Tétrault discusses this episode as part of a repertoire of myths of citizenship that underpin modern Kuwait. M.A. Tétrault, *Stories of Democracy: Politics and Society in Contemporary Kuwait*, New York: Columbia University Press, 2000, pp. 43–46; A.N. Longva, 'Nationalism in Pre-Modern Guise: the Discourse of Badu and Hadhar in Kuwait', *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 38.2, 2006, p. 174.

43 Tétrault, *Stories of Democracy*, pp. 44, 48.

44 I'lan Hukumah al-Bahrayn, 27 Sha'ban 1356/1 November 1937, n. 53 of 1356, R/15/2/151 IOR.

45 *The Bahrain Government Annual Reports, 1924–1970*, 8 vols (Gerrards Cross: Archive Editions, 1986): 'The Annual Report for the Year 1365', vol. III, 56; 'The Annual Report for the Year 1369', vol. IV, 7; 'The Annual Report for the Year 1370', vol. IV, 39; 'The Annual Report for the Year 1371', vol. IV, 38.

46 R/15/2/494 IOR, particularly 'Deportations of Persians from Bahrain, 1938–1944'; Belgrave to Political Agent Bahrain, 17 February 1948, D.O. n. 782, R/15/2/485 IOR.

7 Migration and the state

On Ottoman regulations concerning migration since the age of Mahmud II

Christoph Herzog

In the past there has been a tendency to view migration as an expression of social crisis or as a functional failure of economic structures. Although it is clear by now that migration constitutes a regular phenomenon in most socio-economic structures throughout history,[1] there still seems to be some hesitation in including itinerant groups and itinerancy into the overall picture of migration.[2] However, if we adopt the state's perspective, as is the intention of this chapter, we realise that itinerant groups and homeless people have been the subject of law-making and administrative repression in Europe at least since early modern times. As most of these itinerant people were poor, many of these measures were carried out in the context of the poor law.[3]

John Torpey in his study of the invention of the modern passport-system has stressed the importance of controlling migration for the constitution of the 'state-ness' of states. For him, control of migration is part of a secular trend aiming at the state's monopolisation of the legitimate means of movement that parallels its monopolisation of the means of violence.[4] The ability of the state to actually control or enforce restrictions of movement of its population depends on what Michael Mann has called the 'infrastructural power' of the state. Torpey, in contrast to the widely used metaphor of the ability of the state to penetrate societies, prefers to speak of the ability of the state to embrace society. 'My use of the term "embrace" ', he explains, 'derives from the German word *erfassen,* which means to "grasp" or "lay hold of" in the sense of "register" '.[5] Counting, registering, regulation and identifying its populations were indeed the key activities of modern states that led to their ability to embrace society and to invade even small-scale social life. Also, identity is not sufficiently explained by adherence to imagined communities but must be complemented by 'the ways in which identities are anchored in law and policy'.[6] Modern states, not least with the help of documents, have created a reality of citizenship that control movement by identifying the individual that is not imagined but much more real because it is backed up by a pervasive apparatus of infrastructural power. Thus, the question of controlling movement is closely linked to the question of identifying the individual. The passport, the identity card and so on, and the obligation in everyday life to produce them to the state's authorised security forces on demand, were important or even revolutionary[7] steps on the way to the total electronic control of any individual's movements now in preparation in the opening decade of the twenty-first century.

At first glance, changing concepts of space, of surveillance, of borders and citizenship and of who is defined and perceived as a foreigner may appear to outline a fairly linear development to the modern nation state, where internal borders and differentiations become irrelevant in favour of the external state border and the idea of national citizenship. Things are, however, much more complex. In the introduction to a monumental study on the border and the state in the Hapsburg Empire the editors write a word of warning in this respect:

> The crystallization of citizenship, the national border as the dominant and outstanding symbol of the territorial state, the abandoning by the state of internal passports, all these factors seem to determine as foreigners only he who crosses the national border as an emigrant. And yet, this is not a matter of linear development, since closer scrutiny reveals that in the nineteenth century the national border had no monopoly of establishing the difference between the foreign and the indigenous.[8]

If this is true for the Hapsburg Empire it should also be true for the Ottoman Empire. But it will be obvious, too, that beyond certain parallels emerging from a secular historical trend the Ottoman case will yield a different picture. To forestall temptations of precipitately constructing at that point a dichotomy between the cases of 'the West' and 'the Orient', it will be useful to keep in mind that recently rather different concepts of citizenship within Europe have been discussed in the antagonistic terms of the *ius solis* versus the *ius sanguinis*.[9]

A discussion of Ottoman migration 'bringing the state back in' would ideally have to pay attention to several inter-related fields, namely to the change in the state's ideology, its normative formulation as laws and regulations as well as its practice as reflected in the administrative realities when speaking of the state's dealing with internal migrants, with the poor and homeless, with citizenship, borders and foreigners. In what follows, however, I restrict myself to the discussion of the normative level, that is, a selection of the Ottoman state's laws providing prescriptions and definitions of how to handle internal migrants stigmatised as beggars, vagrants and evil-doers as well as several provisions for external passports, which may give a clearer idea of the construction of the dichotomy between the 'nationally' indigenous and foreign. Consideration of the parliamentary debate for the law on vagrants and suspect people dating from 1909 will provide a closer perspective on the discourse from which this law was emerging without, however, attempting a wholesale reconstruction of the ideological formation underlying the discursive fragments analysed.

The internal passport and its demise

The internal passport was an indispensable tool of absolutist government.[10] In France at the time of Louis XIV, commoners were required to have either an internal passport that was issued by the municipality or the *aveu*, a certificate attesting their good character issued by the local religious authorities.[11] In the Hapsburg empire the so-called *Auswanderungspatent* of 1784 achieved a certain degree of simplification and unification in the countless rules for travel abroad and within the empire. But although in principle the regulation made travel possible for everybody (unless for the purposes of luxury, of subversion against the state and of permanent emigration), it did so to a very different degree for the different estates: whereas members of the aristocracy would travel freely in all of the emperor's land, all commoners intending to leave their home district had to provide themselves with an internal passport. It was only in 1857 that a new passport regulation stated that for domestic travel a passport was 'not generally' needed. However, even then a kind of an identity card valid for the period of one year was obligatory; while the final abolition of all remaining forms of internal passports came only in 1879.[12] Against a general historical background it will be useful to remember that a very considerable percentage of the rural population in central and, even more so, in Eastern Europe was living in a state of serfdom, which tied them to the land and thus (at least legally speaking) prevented them from migrating anywhere. On the other hand the very same agrarian regime also generated an important population of 'masterless men,' of homeless people, beggars and vagrants. It was only at the end of the eighteenth and in the course of the nineteenth century that servile lands were abolished in Europe.[13]

The question of whether the Ottoman agrarian regime may be meaningfully termed as feudal or not has been subject to much debate, especially during the 1970s, and does not need to occupy us here.[14] It will suffice to reiterate that Ottoman peasants were by no means free from restrictions of movement. Those working on Ottoman military fiefs (*timar*) were tied to these lands. When they left and were caught before a period of ten years had elapsed, they would be brought back or had to pay a kind of penal tax, the *çift bozan resmi* or *levend akçesi*.[15] Also, prevention of uncontrolled migration of the rural population to Istanbul formed a recurrent theme in Ottoman administrative measures before the nineteenth century.[16]

After Mahmud II had abolished the Janissaries in 1826 a ministry was founded with the name of a traditional institution in the Islamic Near and Middle East, the *ihtisab nezareti*, to be directed by the so-called *ihtisab ağası*. The functions of the newly founded institution, focusing roughly speaking on the internal security of Istanbul, were laid down in the *ihtisab ağalığı nizamnamesi* of August/September 1826. The regulations included provisions for checking the migration of undesired population groups to the capital. Although it was partly aiming at preventing former Janissaries who had fled or had been expelled from Istanbul from returning, the groups targeted by this law certainly were not limited to ex-Janissiaries.

The *ihtisab ağalığı nizamnamesi* stipulated that people from the provinces who wanted to travel to Istanbul had to provide themselves with an internal passport called *mürur tezkeresi*.[17] Checkpoints at strategic roads and quays with access to Istanbul made sure that only these authorised people entered the city. An internal passport, however, considerably predating the year 1826, was not only needed for

Istanbul. In principle, anyone wanting to travel to another town had to obtain one. For example, official announcements for the requirement of internal passports were sent in 1822 to a province as far away as Baghdad.[18]

In order to obtain permission to travel, a written note was first to be procured from the imam of the future traveller's quarter (or from the *muhtar*, after this office had been introduced) that stated the destination and the purpose of the planned travel. This note had to be presented to the *kadi* of the parish or the provincial town, who, for a fee, issued the *mürur tezkeresi*. After 1831 this process was extended by a third step: this took the competence to issue the *mürur tezkeresi* from the *kadi* and gave it to the *defter nazırı*. After that, the aspiring traveller had to carry the note from the imam to the *kadi*, obtain an additional attestation from him and carry both to the *defter nazırı*, who finally issued the passport. A valid passport was required to state the name of the traveller, the name of his (or her) father, the destination and purpose of travel and a rough description of the traveller's physical appearance. Moreover, the traveller had to name a guarantor for his timely return.[19]

About two years after the promulgation of the Tanzimat decree, on 9 February 1841 a regulation concerning internal passports with the title *men'i mürur nizamnamesi* ('regulation for the prevention of passage') was put in force and subsequently published in the official gazette, *Takvim-i vekayi*. The regulation, originally drafted by the *ihtisab nezareti*, was considerably modified during the process of regulation.[20] It was intended to be a part of the new Tanzimat regulations and was to be put in force only in those regions of the empire where the Tanzimat were already applied, whereas the other regions for the time being remained under the old jurisdiction (Article 1). The *mürur tezkeresi* was no longer to be handwritten but a standardised printed form that had to be filled out correctly (Article 7). It was stipulated that every subject of the 'exalted state' who wanted to travel beyond his parish needed a *mürur tezkeresi*: this could be only obtained after having provided two guarantors that the traveller was not a stranger to his alleged home place and was not someone of bad reputation whose circumstances were unknown (*mechulü'l-ahval*) (Articles 2 4). Although such a document was normally valid for one trip only, a special *mürur tezkeresi* valid for one year could be issued for merchants and other people who for business had to repeatedly travel back and forth between two places (Article 14). The document had to contain its bearer's name, his reputation, his age, his occupation, a personal description, his nationality, his place of residence and the list of places to which he intended to travel (Article 6). There were some specific regulations for travel abroad (Article 5) and some details on the procedure for travellers from and to Istanbul (Article 8). The costs of a *mürur tezkeresi* for the interior was set at five *kuruş* and for abroad at 20 *kuruş* (Article 15) with the possibility of a reduction for the poor (Article 16). The regulation also contained provisions for people who were seized without being in possession of a valid *tezkere*. They were to be sent to a nearby provincial assembly for interrogation. If no one from this place was found to vouch for the illegal traveller the provincial assembly was to order his detention. After three days in prison he was to be sent off by the shortest route to the place he intended to go, but with a special document that indicated his former failure to produce a valid *tezkere*. If after that he was found off the direct route to his destination he would be imprisoned for another month and then sent there under custody (Articles 10 12). Travelling with the *tezkere* of another person was to be considered as forgery of documents and punished accordingly (Article 13).

It seems that the 1841 regulation for the prevention of passage was amended by the *mürur talimatı* ('instructions for passage') of 1844, which remained in force throughout the Tanzimat until superseded by a new regulation issued by Abdülhamid II in 1887.[21] This new regulation extended the requirement for passports for internal to foreign travel (Article 1). But on the whole, rather than introducing any new concepts, it seemed to be aimed at clarifying and specifying numerous issues that had repeatedly been the subject of irritation and intra-administrative debate. Thus, it was explicitly stated that in no case was it admissible to travel beyond a parish (*kaza*) without *tezkere* (Article 2). It was also specified that travellers accompanied by their wives, relatives, attendants and children needed only one *tezkere* listing their names, ages and sexes, provided that the relatives or children were not over 20 years old, in which case they needed their own travel documents (Article 3 4). The period of validity for internal passports was set to one year (Article 5). Moreover, the procedure for obtaining a *mürur tezkeresi* was detailed in a second section. The certificate (*ilmühaber*) that was a necessary precondition for getting a *tezkere* was to be given to civil servants by the director of their department (Article 9). Members of the military received their internal passports directly from the military offices to which they were attached. It was, however, explicitly stipulated that any non-military attendants or persons accompanying a military person had to obtain civil passports (Article 10). Commoners who were neither military nor civil servants had to procure their certificates according to place and religion either from the imam of their quarter or from the *muhtar*, or from the respective non-Muslim religious institutions like the patriarchates. Additionally, medrese-students, monks and people residing in *khans* were listed as special cases (Article 9). The third section of the regulation dealt with punishments for violations of the law. Travellers failing to produce their internal passport to the police (this legal obligation had been explicitly added in Article 16) were liable to a fine without previous warning and had, as before, to procure a guarantor; but the explicit provision for imprisonment was gone (Article 18). Provisions for people having lost their passports were added (Article 19). This regulation remained in force throughout the reign of Abdülhamid II until the requirement for internal passports was cancelled altogether during the Second Constitutional Period in mid-July 1910.[22] By that time, however, vagrants had been subject to special legal provision for almost two decades.

Vagrants, beggars and suspected persons

During the Tanzimat, regulations directed against 'passage' were probably targeted primarily against vagrants, beggars and bandits as the terminology used in many official documents shows. Thus, one of the aims of the *ihtisab ağalığı nizamnamesi* of 1826 was to prevent 'the assembling in Istanbul of all sorts of slackers and vagrants (*başıboş ve serseri makûleleri*)'.[23] Although the *men'i mürur nizamnamesi* of 1841 was less outspoken in this regard, it preserved the essential idea: nobody whose integrity was not testified to by two guarantors would receive permission to travel. Moreover, 'vagrants' clearly continued to pose a challenge to the Ottoman administration. A document of December 1859, for example, stated that civil officials were not paying enough attention to the issue so that 'every day a number of people of unknown circumstances (*mechul ül-ahval eşhas*) of all races and religious groups come to Istanbul' where 'the numbers of the impertinent and vagrant sort (*edebsiz ve serseri makuleleri*)' were increasing daily, causing all sorts of trouble. Many of them, according to this document, after having been expelled, managed to come back to Istanbul under a false identity. It was to be demanded that 'from now on nobody should be given the authorisation and the passport to come to Istanbul without real necessity (*ba'dema hic kimesneye lüzum-i hakikisi olmadıkça Dersaadet'e mürur için ruhsat ve tezkere verilmemesi*)'.[24]

Another and obviously quite common way of dealing with undesired vagrants (and bachelors) in the capital, at least during the 1840s, was to press them into the Ottoman army.[25]

While the regulation of 1887 further standardised and normalised the handling of the internal passport as a regular tool to control (and restrict) internal movement and migration, a separate group of legal provisions emerged shortly afterwards that targeted people stigmatised as vagrants. In 1890 the *serseri mazanne-i su' olan eşhas hakkında nizamname*[26] (regulation concerning suspected persons and vagrants) was drafted and put into force, making vagrancy an issue of criminal law.

Article 1 defined vagrants (*serseri*) and people of unknown circumstances (*mechul-i ahval eşhas*) as follows: 'Persons who do not engage in any work or trade and do not have a permanent and definite place of residence who cannot prove that they earn their livelihood by legal means and who rove about are considered vagrants and persons of unknown circumstances'. Suspect people (*mazanne-i su' eşhas*) were defined in Article 2 as people 'who belonged to the category of vagrants', but in addition had been previously convicted of crimes like theft, robbery or fraud.

Anyone rightly denounced for vagrancy for the first time, before he was handed over to justice, was to be admonished and given a certain time to find himself a job, about which he had to inform the constabulary (Article 4). Whoever missed this chance was to be handed over to a criminal court and convicted to a prison term of between one and three months. After serving his term he was to be put under police surveillance for another two years and could be deported to his place of origin or to any other place deemed suitable (Article 3). A vagrant who was under 14 years of age was to be handed over to the custody of his parents or relatives (Article 7), whereas one not of Ottoman nationality was to be expelled from Ottoman territory after having served his sentence (Article 8).

Nadir Özbek, who has investigated the dealings of the Ottoman state with the poor, has claimed that the Hamidian regime clearly differentiated the legal definitions of beggars and vagrants,[27] and that since the mid-1890s it was the newspapers in the Ottoman capital that showed increasing hostility to public begging.[28] In April 1890 a regulation (*tese'ülün men'ine dair nizamname*) forbidding public begging was drafted. However, as the prohibition of begging was linked to the establishment of a poorhouse (*darülaceze*) in Istanbul, which was opened only six years later in 1896, this regulation was not enforced until the latter date.[29] But only people who were prevented through illness from earning their livelihood and who had no one, according to the Sharia, responsible for their maintenance, were to be accepted into the poorhouse (Article 2); and everybody who was begging despite being capable of work was to be arrested and imprisoned for between one and three months (which, incidentally, was the same punishment that awaited vagrants), then deported to his place of origin (but not to any other place, a possible alternative applied only to vagrants). And so the difference between beggars and vagrants can be said to have been legally blurred. This tendency is confirmed by the fact that the Ottoman police ordinance (*polis nizamnamesi*) of 1907 stipulated in article 108 that any beggar capable of work should be admonished once and, if caught begging after that, treated as a vagrant.

After the revolution of July 1908 and the re-establishment of the parliamentary system in the Ottoman Empire, a new law on vagrants and suspected persons appeared as one of the relatively early items on the agenda of the new parliament. The bill was submitted to parliament on 18 February 1909. The accompanying declaration by the grand vizier, Hüseyin Hilmi Paşa, stated that close to 10,000 persons classified as vagrants had either been released from the prisons of Istanbul on the occasion of the reinstatement of the constitution or had been pouring into the capital from the provinces. The increase of 'incidents' caused by these vagrants and the ensuing security disturbance in the capital were shown as the driving force behind the legislative initiative. In addition, to support the claim of urgency for the matter a police report listing criminal offences committed in Istanbul (including Pera) during 24 hours from 14 to 15 February had been appended and read in parliament. The report listed seven cases of theft, two cases of robbery (one connected with physical assault) and one case of physical assault unconnected to any property offence. Most of these crimes, according to the police report, were committed by provincials (*taşralı*) and vagrants.[30] After two months' work in parliamentary committees and intense debate in parliamentary plenum, the *serseri ve mazanne-i su' eşhas hakkında kanun* finally became law on 10 May of that same year. This legislation has been analysed in the context of late Ottoman class relations[31] and of the state's social policy vis-à-vis the urban poor.[32] It has not been put, however, in the context of migration proper, although the figures of the capital's population growth during the nineteenth century clearly seem to suggest this: In 1844 the population of Istanbul was set at close to 360,000; in 1885 it amounted to *c.* 875,000; and in 1914 reached almost 910,000.[33]

On 24 March 1909, Fuad Hulusi Bey [Demirelli] (1876 1955),[34] representative of Tripoli, who had been a member of the commission of the Ministry of the Interior who had revised the bill, gave a lengthy explanation about the outcome of its work to the parliamentary plenum. This explanation offers an illustration of the reasoning behind the bill and the political and legal discourse on which it was based.[35] For Fuad Hulusi the problem was rooted in the new freedom acquired through the reinstatement of the constitution and the dichotomy between bad and good character:

> Of course, as a result of our fortunate revolution, we are all alike rescued from imprisonment and were quick to enjoy the advantages of the fruits of freedom. But, as is known to you, the people are composed of different classes. There exist very different characters among people. That is, there are men who are of good morals and there are persons who are accustomed to evil morals.[36]

On the other hand, Hulusi Bey notified his colleagues that some legal provisions demanded by the Ministry of Police were incompatible with legal and constitutional principles. He then set out to outline the guidelines of the parliamentary committee on whose work he was reporting: 'First of all one will proceed according to tradition, secondly according to reason and in the third degree according to experience and observation'.[37] Tradition (*nakl*), as explained by Fuad Hulusi, provided the obvious obligation that the law must not contradict any of the principles of Islamic law. Under this primary condition, provisions of foreign laws had been consulted, he said, as well as theories of criminology and justice. Finally, the experience and observations of officials on the spot had been consulted. According to Islamic law, it was a religious duty applicable to all (*farz-i ayn*) to secure one's own livelihood and that of one's family and children. As living meant consuming, financial assets (*servet*) were needed to pay for consumption. If someone neither worked nor produced any benefit for society, this person was simply consuming without compensating for his consumption, which meant damaging the economic and social balance. This practice was therefore forbidden. A further point he made was that criminals recruited themselves from idlers, which, he said, was proved by statistics. Poverty in particular drove people to become criminals, as was shown by the hadith '*kāda 'l-fakru yakūna kufran*', saying that poverty almost meant unbelief.[38] An interesting claim made by Hulusi Bey is that mendicancy (*dilencilik*) was not in principle different from vagrancy. Both were to be classified in the same categories.

The first category of vagrants (and beggars) were those who were unable to work for reasons of temporary physical weakness or illness. They did no work not because they chose to but because they were unable to work, and therefore this did not harm other people. For that reason, these kinds of people merited not coercive measures but charity (*muamelat-i zecriyye değil bilakis muamelat-i şefkatkaraneye müstahaktırlar*). State and society were obliged to offer them help. The second category was similar to the first, the difference being that it comprised people who were not physically ill but had lost their jobs or fortunes by bad luck or economic crisis, for example workers who were fired because the factory in which they were employed was closed down. They too could not be said to have chosen vagrancy deliberately (*bunlara kasden serseriliği ihtiyar etmiş denilemez*) and therefore had to be helped, for instance by the establishment of 'guesthouses' (*misafirhanes*).

It was the third type who formed the true category of vagrants, because it comprised all those who were able to work but were not willing to do so. These people were not only economically useless, but also by their very presence were a negative influence on other members of society. Finally, although vagrancy in itself was not a criminal activity (*cürüm*), vagrants, Hulusi Bey claimed, generally tended to pursue illegal activities and constituted a risk to internal security. Therefore, it was the duty of the state to intervene.

In explaining why and how these vagrants had become what they were, Hulusi Bey blamed both the failure of socialisation and in some cases an innate tendency to vagrancy. Accordingly, more or less forceful education was to be applied to rescue at least those vagrants who were in principle capable of reform. In some 'civilised countries' (*memalik-i mütemeddine*) like Germany or Belgium, he stated, there were special institutions for vagrants where they were sent and employed first with exceedingly hard work in order to make them used to a well-ordered life and to determine whether they were able to adapt themselves to work. All those who passed this test, he claimed, were able to support themselves by regular jobs after that. Hulusi Bey considered this 'educative' practice to have set standards, but he admitted that, because of financial constraints, it was impossible for the foreseeable future to introduce such institutions into the Ottoman Empire. This passage is remarkable because it not only contains the reproduction of the modern belief in the reform of vagrants by the deployment of institutional force (an idea that formed part of the modern civilising disciplinary programme as described by Foucault and others), but also the recognition of an inability to fully implement these (perceived) civilising standards.

Taking the example of Germany, it may be useful at this point to remember that even within that country's contemporary discourse the educative purpose and efficacy of workhouses was sporadically questioned. A German textbook of 1889 dealing with penal justice stated quite frankly that the order enforced in German workhouses was totally arbitrary and 'according to the circumstances fluctuated between almost comical cosiness (*fast komische Gemütlichkeit*) and gross ill-treatment',[39] whereas the director of one of them wrote in 1913 that the educative effect of workhouses was negligible, their usefulness lying rather in keeping the inmates off the road and busy with useful work.[40] However, the discursive mainstream of improvement through forced labour prevailed; workhouses in Germany were finally abolished only in 1969.[41]

It is also noteworthy that the semantic differentiation made by Hulusi Bey did obviously not correspond to a terminological differentiation nor did it result in one. The Ottoman dictionary of Şemseddin Sami published in 1890 defined a vagrant (*serseri*) as 'a species [of men] who roams back and forth wandering about purposelessly and shabbily without occupation, domicile, duty or craft, a prowler (*haylaz*)'.[42] But it did not discuss the question of deliberate choice, only arguably, seemed to imply it. The problem remained that the question of deliberate choice, crucial according to that logic, was not something easily clarified in practice, where the difference between beggars, vagrants and paupers consequently must be expected to have tended to become blurred. Although there is little information about the application of the law on vagrants in the Ottoman Empire and no statistical data is available,[43] this was, in fact, the case for Germany, where the so-called country poor (*Landarme*) were frequently placed into the same workhouses as vagrants. Although their legal status there was different, it is doubtful to what degree this difference reflected the reality of the workhouses as, in the sense of Goffman, total institutions.[44]

The Ottoman law that was finally enacted defined a vagrant as someone who wandered about and, possessing no means of subsistence, was able to work but did not have a job for at least two months and was not able to prove that during that time he had done what was necessary to find employment. Explicitly included in this definition were people who, although able to work, made their living from begging (Article 1). This clearly meant a tightening of the law concerning beggars, who were not formerly included specifically into the definition of vagrants. What aggravated this inclusion even more was the blurred distinction between vagrants and suspected persons (*mazanne-i su' eşhas*), which found expression in the fact that, among other things, Articles 12 22 of the law were applicable for both groups. Also, compared to the regulation of 1890, the criterion of permanent residence was missing: having a domicile was no longer sufficient to disprove the charge of vagrancy. Articles 2 and 3 stipulated that if anyone was arrested for suspicion of vagrancy the state attorney had to decide within 24 hours whether to send this person to trial. If the court found the person guilty of vagrancy the person was to be employed in public work or sent to a workhouse for two to four months. If for some reason such an employment was not feasible, the culprit would be deported either to his home parish or to any other place where he could find work. The sentence was to be enforced immediately; no appeal against the ruling of the court was admitted (Article 4). In case of flight or of recidivism within one year, the vagrant was to be deported for a period of three months to one year (Article 8). A vagrant who was caught by the police in a suspicious place (*zabıtaca şüpheli addolunan mahalllarda*) or else aroused suspicion according to Article 12 (see below) was to be arrested and imprisoned for one week to six months or to be deported for three months to two years (Article 9).

Article 10 defined who was to be considered a suspect person. In contrast to the regulation of 1890, this definition did not make an explicit connection between suspected persons and vagrants. Moreover, a suspected person had to be convicted twice of such crimes as theft, robbery or fraud. However, this narrow defining focus was somewhat loosened again by the second defining clause, which stipulated that a suspected person was someone under police surveillance and found by the police in circumstances causing suspicion (*da'i-i şüphe ahval ve harekat*). As anybody who had received even the minimum punishment stipulated in Articles 9 (for vagrants) and 11 (for suspected persons) was placed under police surveillance (according to article 15), a beggar caught by the police in what the latter declared a 'suspicious place' could be designated immediately a vagrant, and after having been released and caught at the same or any other suspicious place again, a suspected person without having committed any further criminal act.

Article 11 gave a state attorney 48 hours to hand suspected persons over to court and, for anybody found guilty of belonging to this category, stipulated imprisonment for one month to one year or deportation for three months to two years. Anybody who used disguise of any form in order to hide his personality or who carried tools for burglary such as files, hooks or picklocks without being able to prove that he carried them for legal ends would be punished with five to 20 lashes and then treated according to Article 9 or imprisoned for a period for one month to two years if he was a vagrant. If he was a suspected person he was to receive 15 35 lashes and then treated according to Article 11 or to be imprisoned for two months up to two years (Article 12).

Children younger than 15 years could not legally be stigmatised as vagrants but were to be handed over to their parents or relatives. If the latter allowed them to roam about or if they sent the children begging, they had to pay a fine of 20 300 *kuruş* or to serve a term of four hours to 15 days (Articles 16 and 17). Foreigners convicted as vagrants or suspected persons were to be expelled from the Ottoman Empire after having served their terms (Article 18).

All corporal punishments had to be executed in prison (not in public), in presence of a physician and with a standardised whip (Article 19). People not able to take the prescribed number of lashes were to receive up to the amount they were believed to be able to bear, and for each lash not received they were to serve two days in prison (Article 20).

The new law was the outcome of parliamentary debate; but it was much harsher than the absolutist regulation decreed by Sultan Abdülhamid II, in that it introduced corporal punishment and a reversal of the burden of proof at the expense of the person arrested by the state's security forces. It has also been claimed that it gave the police much more discretionary power than the regulation of 1890.[45] There is certainly some substance in this claim. Thus, Article 4, that had stipulated a warning for any person who for the first time was accused of vagrancy, was discarded. Naturally, the police had found it impractical.[46] On the other hand, one should probably not overstate this point. The police ordinance of 1907, in force until 1913, already gave a large amount of discretionary power to the police, making it the task (and thereby the right) of the security forces to control places like hotels, *khans*, pensions, gardens, mills, bakeries and factories, 'which are the whereabouts of workers and bachelors (*bekar*)' (Articles 72 3), as well as bridges, train stations, promenades and theatres (Article 84), and to arrest anybody who seemed to be a vagrant, as a suspected person or else suspicious. The police had also the job of making sure that coffeehouses, bars and pubs were not used as overnight accommodation by anyone not working there (Article 74).

Ferdan Ergut has pointed out that one group given special attention by the police were bachelors, defined as people coming from another region for work, in other words as migrants.

> Two things are noteworthy here. Firstly everybody who did not live in the framework of a family was potentially culpable. Secondly, the places where such people were living even if rented by themselves were not counted as

> 'private houses' and therefore the police were not bound to any rules when controlling such locations. [...] Needless to say that these 'bachelors', if they were unemployed were directly subjected to the treatment laid down in the law for vagrants.[47]

The external passport

During the second half of the nineteenth century most countries liberalised if not their laws then their administrative practices regarding travelling foreigners, so that in practice no external passports were needed, for example, in England, Norway or Sweden (which had never had them). France abolished passports in 1843, Belgium in 1861, Spain in 1863, Germany in 1867 and Italy in 1889.[48] Austria ceased to control external passports in 1865.[49] It was only during the First World War that states implemented the new restrictive policy of international passports, which continued in force during most of the twentieth century. The passport policy of the Ottoman Empire does not seem to have belonged to this trend. The regulation regulating passport requirements for foreigners in the Ottoman Empire, the *pasaport odası nizamnamesi*, was already dated by 1867 when it was included in the official Ottoman collection of laws and regulations.[50] It seems, however, that it was enacted already in 1844.[51] It consisted of 17 articles and stipulated that foreigners needed both a passport and a *mürur tezkeresi* for travel within the Ottoman domains. However, the *mürur tezkeresi* could be replaced by either a *firman* or a *buyruldu*. A tourist guide for the Ottoman Empire printed in 1878 stated:

> A Foreign-Office passport must be taken by British subjects. The traveller who crosses the Continent en route for Turkey should have his passport visé in London by the Turkish ambassador. In Turkey it is not safe to be without such a document. The officials will abstain from asking for it for months, and then all at once demand it. When a long journey in the interior is contemplated, it is always best to be provided with all the documentary helps the Government is willing to furnish, by paying the fee. These are of three classes the *firman*, *bouyurouldi*, and the *teskéréh*. The first can only be granted by the Vizir, and is only given to a traveller who will pay for it on the application of the Ambassador. The two latter can be granted by a Governor; either of them will answer the purpose required, but the *bouyorouldi* is an order to the police to provide horses. It is always useful, in case the traveller should want horses or send a messenger, as he then only pays the postmaster at the rate fixed by law. The traveller provided with a *firman* will rarely find it necessary to use his passport, as it will never be demanded of him; it will only be in case of any difficulty, or of his being forced to apply to the authorities for redress, that he will find occasion to present it. The *teskékéreh* is the usual form of passport. No visa is required.[52]

The passport not only provided regulations for foreigners travelling to the Ottoman Empire, but was also required by anybody intending to cross the border into Ottoman territory. This did not change with the passport regulation that was issued in the end of 1894 (*pasaport nizamnamesi*) at the height of the Hamidian regime. Ottoman subjects who desired to travel abroad had to prove their identities with an identity pass (*nüfus tezkeresi*) and certificate (*ilmühaber*) (Article 6). The cost of the passport was set at 50 *kuruş* (Article 3). Foreigners who wanted to enter Ottoman territory needed not only a passport, but also a visa (Article 11). Thus, the law in general upheld the restrictive regulations of the early 1840s.

In 1910, during the Second Constitutional Period, a draft of a new passport law was submitted to the Ottoman parliament. Several members of parliament pleaded for the complete abolishment of the external passport because it restricted freedom of movement. It was also argued that only Russia, Serbia and Bulgaria were still demanding passports.[53] Even the Minister of the Interior, Talat Bey (later Paşa), claimed that the government needed passports only for some time.[54] The vote of the parliament for Article 1 of the passport law, which stipulated the requirement of the passport ended with a razor-thin majority of passport supporters: of 156 votes 79 were pros and 77 were cons.[55] However, because of formal irregularities and an ensuing heated debate in the chamber, the vote had to be repeated. It was decided to ask whether the passport should be obligatory (*mecburi*) or optional (*ihtiyari*). This time, of 163 votes 76 advocated the obligatory and 87 the optional character of the passport.[56] As will be seen, this vote was to be invalidated during the legislation process. In its final form, Article 1 of the passport law of 4 June 1911 declared that anyone who leaves the Ottoman Empire to go abroad 'may choose to obtain a passport' (*pasaport ahzında muhtardır*), whereas Article 8 of that same law stipulated that 'every person who wishes to enter the Ottoman Empire is required to present a passport (*pasaport ibrazına mecburdur*)'. The resulting problem of the treatment of an Ottoman subject who had chosen to leave the country without a passport was solved in Article 13: his (or her) identity was to be enquired about and verified (ideally by producing an identity card). If the person was proven to be Ottoman but had not obtained a passport before leaving the country he was to pay the fee (of 50 *kuruş*) for a passport, or, if he had a passport but no visa, twice the fee for a visa. If the person in question was unable to prove identity he was to be put under police surveillance. When the chamber finally passed the bill on 3 June 1911, no one among the members of parliament was willing to take up the proposition of Dr Rıza Nur, then representative of Sinop, that the regulations for entry and exit contradicted each other. Mehmed Tevfik Efendi from Malatya closed any further debate on this issue by remarking: 'No man who is leaving the country is obliged to return. He may or he may not, just as he likes. That's all. That is the answer to it'.[57] The option of passports when exiting the country was revised only after the armistice of Mudros, when a new passport law of 20 November 1918 stipulated in Article 1 that anyone passing the border, no matter in which direction, was required to produce a passport.

Conclusion

In Turkish historiography a strong tendency prevails that identifies the history of migration in the late Ottoman Empire with the history of the Muslim refugees who left their former homelands, mainly in the Balkans and in the Caucasus during wartime or as a result of campaigns of ethnic cleansing in other words, with the history of migration into the Ottoman Empire.[58] Recent critical research has started to focus on large-scale 'population engineering' within the Ottoman Empire.[59] This is, however, only the most spectacular part of state activity aiming to control the movement of its population. Drawing on John Torpey's view of the passport as one of the state's crucial instruments of embracing society, we have discussed laws and regulations that targeted the migratory individual rather than administrative measures concerning war refugees or the administrative, often military-backed attempts to settle nomadic tribes. It is true that the passport was only one of several tools.[60] Others were the population census (the first modern one being that of 1831),[61] the identity card (introduced into the Ottoman Empire gradually after the Crimean war)[62] and the administrative enforcement of compulsory military service. However, the passport was the instrument that was primarily directed at controlling the movement of the individual and hence regular small-scale migration. Unlike most European countries (with the notable exception of Tsarist Russia), the internal passport remained in force in the Ottoman Empire throughout the nineteenth century. Likewise, the Ottoman state never subscribed to the liberalisation of international passport regulations in the second half of the nineteenth century. This did not mean, however, that the Ottoman Empire did not participate in the general movement of modernisation and bureaucratic expansion or that it remained detached from the shifts of social and political discourse. The situational, unsystematic and potentially contradictory passport legislation that was typical for the absolutist regime in the Hapsburg Empire[63] may be paralleled in the Ottoman case for the last time with the regulation of the *ihtisab ağalığı nizamnamesi* in 1826. Not only was this *nizamname* specifically designed for Istanbul, it also prescribed temporary solutions for specific ethnic groups: 'The multiplying and the residence in Istanbul of Albanian rabble is, just as in the case of the Kurdish nation, at no time permitted. However, the Albanians who are currently here shall not be summarily evicted'.[64] Later, regulations were published by printing them in the *Takvim-i verkayi* or in the official corpus juris, the *Düstur*, rather than by having them announced only by the public crier;[65] they had a more general scope and were structured by numbered articles, giving them a thoroughly 'modern' appearance.

Although it was probably never very effective, the internal passport aimed at controlling internal migration, and especially at keeping economically and politically undesired people potentially dangerous vagrants and beggars out of the capital and the empire's other cities. In the Ottoman Empire, as elsewhere, the increase of mobility through steamships and trains and the economic and demographic expansion of the late nineteenth century rendered this instrument definitely obsolete.[66]

In this situation the internal passport was supplemented by legislation targeting specifically these economically marginal groups. The priority shifted from prevention to repression. Instead of trying to keep these people out of the cities in the first place they were to be identified by tightening the state's control in the cities. It may be assumed that an increasing demand for an unskilled urban workforce helped to trigger this shift of legislative and administrative focus. Migration to the cities, then, was tolerated as long as the migrants integrated into the economic system. The capitalist work ethic and modern authoritarian state ideology were, as the parliamentary speech of Fuad Hulusi demonstrates, easily complementary to values formulated in an Islamic context. It is significant that the Ottoman parliament, in the matters of vagrancy and begging, seems to have advocated a rather more repressive policy than the autocratic Sultan Abdülhamid II. It is also significant that the Ottoman parliament failed to implement its own decision to abolish the requirement of the passport for travel abroad. It seems that libertarian tendencies still manifest among the parliamentarians in 1909 and 1910 were of only little interest in 1911, before the new age of closed international frontiers in 1918 found its legal reflection in the Ottoman context. As for legislation concerning the individual's freedom of movement, it seems that, whereas the Ottoman Empire sailed close to the winds of change that were blowing in Europe, the cordage of its legal rigging always remained much more tightly tied up. However, the question of to what degree the Ottoman state was able and willing to apply this legislation and to effectively curb the freedom of individual movement constitutes a different issue.

Laws and regulations in chronological order

İhtisab ağalığı nizamnamesi of August/September 1826 (evahir-i M 1242), available in *Tarih-i Encümeni Mecmuası* vol. 2, nos 9 (Ağustos 1327), pp. 572 84 and 10 (Teşrin-i evvel 1327), pp. 640 8; a transcription into the Turkish Latin alphabet in Ergin, *Mecelle*, i, pp. 328 41 [pp. 338 54 in the Ottoman original of the volume].

Men'i mürur nizamnamesi of 9 February 1841 (17 Z 1256), published in Takvim-i vekayi, no. 218 on 27 February 1841. A Latin transcription available in Çardırcı, 'Men'i Mürûr,' pp. 173 8.

Pasaport odası nizamnamesi of 14 February 1867 (9 L 1283), published in *Düstur*, tertib-i evvel, vol. 1, pp. 776 9. Transcription available in Çardırcı, 'Men'i Mürûr,' pp. 178 81. The regulation originally dates from 1844; cf. Grégoire Aristarchi, *Législation ottomane*, vol. 3, p. 95 and Sarkis Karakoç, *Külliyât-ı Kavânîn*, vol. 1, p. 421.

Mer'iyeti ahkamına bil-istizan irade-i seniye-i cenab-i padişah-i şerefmüteallık buyurulan mürur nizamnamesi of 8 August 1887 (18 Za 1304 / 27 Temmuz 1303) published in *Düstur*, tertib-i evvel, vol. 5, pp. 861 5.

Tese'ülün men'ine dair nizamname of 17 April 1890 (26 Ş 1307 / 5 Nisan 1306), published in *Düstur*, tertib-i evvel, vol. 6, pp. 607 9.

Serseri mazanne-i su' olan eşhas hakkında nizamname of 18 September 1890 (3 S 1308 / 6 Eylül 1306), published in *Düstur*, tertib-i evvel, vol. 6, pp. 748 51.

Pasaport nizamnamesi of 6 December 1894 (7 C 1312 / 24 Teşrin-i sani 1310), published in *Düstur*, tertib-i evvel, vol. 6, pp. 1530 4.

Polis nizamnamesi of 18 April 1907 (5 Ra 1325 / 5 Nisan 1323), published in *Düstur*, tertib-i evvel, vol. 8, pp. 666 92.

Serseri ve mazanne-i su' eşhas hakkında kanun of 10 May 1909 (19 R 1227 / 26 Nisan 1325), published in *Düstur*, tertib-i sani, vol. 1, pp. 169 73.

Pasaport kanunnamesi of 4 June 1911 (6 C 1329 / 22 Mayıs 1327), published by the Nezaret-i celile-i dahiliye, sicill-i nüfus idare-i umumiyyesi as an eight-page booklet entitled *Pasaport kanunnamesi*, Istanbul: Matbaa-i Kesnufun, 1327Mal and in *Düstur*, tertib-i sani, vol. 3, pp. 462 7.

Pasaport kanunu of 20 November 1918 (15 Safar 1337 / 20 Teşrin-i sani 1334), published in *Düstur*, tertib-i sani, cild 11, pp. 53 8.

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Başbakanlık Arşivi (Istanbul), A.MKT.UM 382/55 (7 Ca 1276).

Başbakanlık Arşivi (Istanbul), Cevdet - Dahiliyye 2295, (Za 1237).

The National Archives, Public Record Office (London), FO 195/2340, no. 685/32, 8 August 1910, Lorimer to Lowther.

The National Archives, Public Record Office (London): FO 195/272, no. 23, 28 April 1847, Rawlinson to Wellesley.

Notes

1 Cf. the editors' introduction in J. and L. Lucassen (eds) *Migration, Migration History, History: Old Paradigms and New Perspectives*. 3rd edn, Bern: Lang, 2005, pp. 9, 454. See also P.A. Rosental, *Les sentiers invisibles. Espace familles et migrations dans la France du 19e ciècle*, Paris: L'École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales, 1999, p. 255.

2 L. Lucassen, 'Eternal Vagrants? State Formation, Migration, and Travelling Groups in Western-Europe, 1350–1914', in J. and L. Lucassen (eds) *Migration*, p. 225.

3 For the cases of Austria and Germany cf. H. Stekl, *Österreichs Zucht- und Arbeitshäuser 1671–1920*, München: Oldenbourg, 1978, p. 412; W. Ayaß, *Das Arbeitshaus Breitenau*, Kassel: Gesamthochschule Kassel, 1992, p. 401.

4 J. Torpey, *The Invention of the Passport: Surveillance, Citizenship and the State*, Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2000, pp. 4–10.

5 Torpey, *Invention*, p. 11.

6 Ibid., pp. 13–14.

7 This process has been called 'revolution identificatoire' G. Noiriel, *La tyrannie du national: Le droit d'asile en Europe, 1793–1993*, Paris: Calmann-Levy, 1991, p. 355.

8 W. Heindl and E. Saurer (eds) *Grenze und Staat. Paßwesen, Staatsbürgerschaft, Heimatrecht und Fremdengesetzgebung in der österreichischen Monarchie 1750–1867*, Wien: Böhlau, 2000, pp. xxi, 972.

9 Cf. Heindl and Sauer (eds) *Grenze und Staat*, p. xx referring to Jürgen Habermas, 'Staatsbürgerschaft und nationale Identität'

10 H. Burger, 'Paßwesen und Staatsbürgerschaft', in W. Heindl and E. Sauer (eds) *Grenze und Staat*, p. 7 writes 'Paßpolitik [...] war ein wichtiges Steuerungsinstrument des vollendeten Absolutismus — war Ausdruck seines Raffinements.' Cf. also, J. Torpey, 'Revolutions and the Freedom of Movement: An Analysis of Passport Controls in the French, Russian and Chinese Revolutions', *Theory and Society* 26, 1997, p. 843 and for the Russian case D. Moon, 'Peasant Migration, the Abolition of Serfdom, and the Internal Passport System in the Russian Empire, 1800–1914', in D. Eltis (ed.) *Coerced and Free Migration: Global Perspectives*, Stanford, CA: Stanford Univ. Press, 2002, pp. 324–432.

11 Torpey, *Invention*, p. 21.

12 Burger, 'Paßwesen', pp. 11–24.

13 J. Blum, *The End of the Old Order in Rural Europe*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 1978, pp. 189–91.

14 The most viable proposal for a pragmatic solution to this discussions seems to me A. Schölch, 'Was There A Feudal System in Ottoman Lebanon and Palestine?', in D. Kushner (ed.) *Palestine in the Late Ottoman Period. Political, Social and Economic Transformation*, Jerusalem; Leiden: Yad Izhak Ben-Zvi; Brill, 1986, pp. 131–45.
15 Ö.L. Barkan, *Türkiye'de Toprak Meselesi.* Toplu Eserleri 1, Istanbul: Gözlem, 1980, pp. 723–4; Y. Halaçoğlu, *XVIII. Yüzyılda Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun İskân Siyaseti ve Aşiretlerin Yerleştirilmesi*, 3rd edn, Ankara: TTK, 1997, p. 6.
16 M. Çadırcı, 'Tanzimat Döneminde Çıkarılan Men'-i Mürûr ve Pasaport Nizâmnâmeleri', *Belgeler* 15.19, 1993, p. 170; O.N. Ergin, *Mecelle-i Umûr-ı Belediyye*, vol. 1, Istanbul: İstanbul Büyükşehir Belediyesi Kültür İşleri Daire Başkanlığı, 1995, p. 342.
17 Ergin, *Mecelle*, p. 330.
18 Başbakanlık Arşivi (Istanbul), Cevdet – Dahiliyye 2295, dated Za 1237 (July/August 1822).
19 M. Çadırcı, 'Tanzimat'ın İlânı Sırasında Anadolu'da İç Güvenlik', *Ankara Üniversitesi Dil ve Tarih-Coğrafya Fakültesi Tarih Araştırmaları Dergisi* 13.24, 1979–1980, p. 56.
20 Cf. the text of the regulation in Çadırcı, 'Men'-i Mürûr', pp. 173–74.
21 Article 24 of the *mürur nizamnamesi* of 1887 states that after three months it would supersede the *mürur talimatı* of 9 N 1260 (22 September 1844). I was not able to trace this latter *talimatname.* It cannot be identical with the *Pasaport odası nizamnamesi* of the same year. One might alternatively speculate that article 24 of the *nizamnamesi* of 1887 was actually referring to the regulation of 1841 but under a wrong date.
22 The National Archives, Public Record Office (London), FO 195/2340, no. 685/32, 8 August 1910, Lorimer to Lowther.
23 Ergin, *Mecelle*, p. 330.
24 Başbakanlık Arşivi (Istanbul), A.MKT.UM 382/55 (7 Ca 1276).
25 V. Şimşek, 'Ottoman Military Recruitment and the Recruit: 1826–1853', MA Thesis Bilkent University Ankara, 2005, pp. 46–7.
26 *Düstur*, tertib-i evvel, vol. 6, pp. 748–51.
27 N. Özbek, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Sosyal Devlet: Siyaset, İktidar ve Meşruiyet*, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2002, p. 92.
28 Özbek, *Sosyal Devlet*, pp. 79–86. I don't see, however, how this attitude of the newspapers could be equated with the attitude of the Ottoman elite as Özbek seems to claim, as the journalists were not, in general, members of the elite. Cf. e.g. Emin, *Development*, pp. 47–8.
29 Özbek, *Sosyal Devlet*, pp. 90–2.
30 *Meclis-i Mebusan Zabıt Ceridesi* (henceforth MMZC), Ankara 1987ff, vol. 1, devre 1, ictima senesi 1, inikat 31, 1. celse, 5 Şubat 1324, pp. 684–5.
31 F. Ergut, *Modern Devlet ve Polis. Osmanlı'dan Cumhuriyet'e Toplumsal Denetimin Diyalektiği*, Istanbul: İletişim, 2004, pp. 243–63.
32 Özbek, *Sosyal Devlet*, pp. 92–104.
33 Ibid., pp. 78–9.
34 For him cf. S. Prätor: *Der arabische Faktor in der jungtürkischen Politik. Eine Studie zum osmanischen Parlament der II. Konstitution (1908–1918)*, Berlin: Klaus Schwarz, 1993, p. 260.
35 *MMZC* ii, devre 1, ictima senesi 1, inikat 45, 11 Mart 1325, pp. 424–34.
36 *MMZC* ii, devre 1, ictima senesi 1, inikat 45, celse 1, 11 Mart 1325, p. 424.
37 *MMZC* ii, devre 1, ictima senesi 1, inikat 45, celse 1, 11 Mart 1325, p. 426. The following is a summary of ibid., pp. 424–8.
38 This is part of a weak hadith occurring in *Mīzān al-i'tidāl fi naqd ar-rijāl* by Shamsaddīn Muḥammad adh-Dhahabī. (d. 748H). I owe this information to Prof. Manfred Kropp. For adh-Dhahabī cf. *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, new edn, vol. Ii, Leiden: Brill, 1965, pp. 214–16.
39 W. Ayaß, *Arbeitshaus*, p. 41.
40 Ibid., pp. 41–2.
41 Ibid., p. 32.

42 Ş[emsüddin] Sami: *Kamus-i türki. Kaffe-i lugat-i türkiyye ile lisan-i türkide müsta'mel kelimat ve ıstilahat-i ara biyye ve farisiyye ve ecnebiyyeyi cami olarak lisanımızın mükemmel lugat kitabıdır* ([Reprint] Beirut: Maktabat Lubnān, 1989; originally published in 1890), p. 717.
43 Cf. Özbek, *Sosyal Devlet*, pp. 104–12.
44 Ayaß, *Arbeitshaus*, p. 42–3.
45 Ergut, *Modern Devlet*, pp. 253.
46 *MMZC* ii, devre 1, ictima senesi 1, inikat 45, celse 1, 11 Mart 1325, p. 425.
47 Ergut, *Modern Devlet*, p. 263.
48 S. Kern, *The Culture of Time and Space 1880–1918*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press, 1983, pp. 194–5.
49 Burger, 'Paßwesen', p. 23.
50 Cf. *Düstur*, tertib-i evvel, vol. 1, pp. 776–9 and Çadırcı, 'Men'-i Mürûr', pp. 178–81.
51 Cf.G. Aristarchi, *Législation ottomane*, vol. 3, Constantinople: Bureau du Journal Thraky, 1873, pp. 95–8 and S. Karakoç, *Külliyât-ı Kavânîn*, vol. 1, Ankara: TTK, 2006, p. 421. As early as in 1847 this regulation seems to have been applied in a province as remote as Baghdad; cf. TNA: FO 195/272, no. 23, 28 April 1847, Rawlinson to Wellesley. This document contains a translation of the passport regulation, which is largely identical with the Ottoman text given in *Düstur* in 1867. The first introduction of passports for Ottoman subjects travelling abroad seems to date from 1838; cf. A. Lütfi, *Tarih-i Lütfi*, vol. 5, Istanbul: Mahmud Bey Matbaası, 1302, pp.116–17.
52 *Handbook for Travellers in Turkey in Asia Including Constantinople, the Bosphorus, Plain of Troy, Isles of Cyprus, Rhodes, &c., Smyrna, Ephesus, and the Routes to Persia, Bagdad, Moosool, &c.* 4th edn, revised, London: John Murray, 1878, pp. 15–16.
53 Cf. e.g. the statements of the representative of Karesi, İbrahim Vasfi Efendi, in *MMZC* ii, devre 1, ictima senesi 3, inikat 2, 2 Teşrin-i sani 1326, p. 37, Ankara, TBMM Basımevi, 1986.
54 *MMZC* ii, devre 1, ictima senesi 3, inikat 4, 6 Teşrin-i sani 1326, p. 53.
55 *MMZC* ii, devre 1, ictima senesi 3, inikat 4, 6 Teşrin-i sani 1326, pp. 75–6.
56 *MMZC* ii, devre 1, ictima senesi 3, inikat 5, 8 Teşrin-i sani 1326, pp. 105–6.
57 *MMZC* ii, devre 1, ictima senesi 4, inikat 114, 21 Mayıs 1327, pp. 494–5.
58 Cf. e.g. A.C. Eren: *Türkiye'de Göç ve Göçmen Meselerleri*, Istanbul: Nurgök Matbaası, 1966.
59 Cf. e.g. F. Dündar, *İttihat ve Terakki'nin Müslümanları İskân Politikası (1913–1918)*, Istanbul: İletişim, 2001, p. 284.
60 For an application of Bruno Latour's theorising of the use of objects as actants and their effectiveness in the historical process cf. H. Kalthoff, 'Die Implementierung bankwirtschaftlicher Instrumente: Zur Formatierung des Automarktes in Polen', *F.I.T. Discussion Papers* 1/01, 2001.
61 Cf. E.Z. Karal: *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda İlk Nüfus Sayımı 1831*, Ankara: T.C. Başvekalet İstatistik Umum Müdürlüğü, 1943.
62 Cf.S. J. Shaw, 'The Ottoman Census System and Population, 1831–1914', *IJMES* 9, 1978, p. 327.
63 Burger, ,Paßwesen', p. 11.
64 Ergin, *Mecelle*, p. 334. '*Arnavud taifesinden ahad-i esafil makuleleri Kürt milleti gibi hiç bir vakitte İstanbul'da tekessür ve tavattunu mücaz değil ise de şimdiki halde mevcud olan Arnavudlar külliyen tard ve def' olunmayıb.*'
65 It seems that these two systems coexisted side by side. Still in 1911, the public crier in Baghdad announced official regulations and communications. *Luġat al-'Arab* 1.4 (L 1329, Tašrīn I 1911), p. 278.
66 Burger, 'Paßwesen', p. 18.

8 Governance in transition

Competing immigrant networks in early nineteenth-century Egypt

Pascale Ghazaleh

Between 1805 and 1848, Egypt was governed by Muhammad 'Ali, a vice-roy who, although he was careful to obtain Ottoman approval of his rule in the form of regularly renewed firmans, implemented transformations that obtained for this province of the sultanate a considerable measure of autonomy from Istanbul. The wholesale replacement of the ruling class was both a vector and a result of these changes.[1]

In the first part of this chapter, I will examine local structures and networks that existed in Egypt prior to the arrival of Muhammad 'Ali. I will look at the ways in which key figures created and maintained their influence by diversifying their contacts with a variety of social groups. Then, I will seek to trace the ways in which a new ruling class of immigrants was encouraged to immigrate to Egypt, and I will analyse the impact of selective migrations on existing social networks, which Muhammad 'Ali mobilised and then dismantled. It is not my intention, here, to undertake a quantitative or statistical investigation of migration patterns to or out of Egypt during the first half of the nineteenth century an exercise, which, however worthy, is beyond the scope of my current research. Rather, I am interested in the process of state institutionalisation at a micro-social level, and the ways in which the vice-roy became able to dispense with power brokers who had their own interests especially ulema, merchants and customs administrators. These groups had provided successive Ottoman governors, as well as the beys who ruled Egypt directly, with legitimacy and material resources throughout the eighteenth century, thereby ensuring local continuity despite changes in the political and military power structure.

I will therefore attempt to detect the specific loci of shifts in social networks, from those maintained by an entrenched commercial-administrative elite to those implanted by a newly arrived governor. In particular, I will focus on the social universe of Muhammad al-Mahruqi, who was head of the merchants' guild from 1804 to 1827, and who functioned probably unbeknownst to him as a pivot in the transition from eighteenth-century to nineteenth-century patterns and modes of rule. Mahruqi's grandfather seems to have moved to Cairo from Upper Egypt (Qina); his father, Ahmad, forged alliances with the powerful North African merchant community, and rapidly obtained influence and wealth thanks to his networks of allies. Using Muhammad al-Mahruqi as a nodal point, and comparing his partnerships and relations to those forged by his father, I will try to demonstrate that a radical shift in the social networks of government took place during the first third of the nineteenth century, engendered both by the guided immigration of a new ruling class, and by the unwillingness or inability of the old elite to integrate itself into these new structures.

The shift in the ruling class's identity and affiliations entailed especial reliance on certain ethnic groups, of which perhaps the best studied are the Armenians. Also included, however, were Ottomans of Anatolian and Balkan provenance, as well as non-Ottomans, particularly from Western Europe. Selected on the basis of individual skills or contemporary perceptions of ethnic specialisation in certain administrative, productive, or financial activities, the members of these groups played a dual role in directing the state-building process. On one hand, they shared a primary loyalty toward Muhammad 'Ali, their employer and sponsor, and a corresponding lack of local affiliations. On the other, they identified consciously with family members and other relations belonging to their group, and used their new access to government posts to facilitate further immigration and group consolidation. It is often difficult to identify ethnic or geographical origin with accuracy in the sources, suggesting that such origin did not have equal importance for all members of the ruling class, as will be further demonstrated in what follows; it is clear, however, that such criteria of classification and identification acquired increased importance in the early nineteenth century as means of network building and instruments for the creation of new solidarities. Most importantly, perhaps, these criteria provided a basis for the development of ruling-class solidarities and forms of sociability that excluded the former elite.

The first question to ask, however, concerns the members of the old elite   those who had provided the nascent military and political order with the raw materials for the manufactories, and then sold the finished goods produced in these establishments. Who were the people who coveted, obtained and managed urban tax-farms until the early years of the nineteenth century? Were they   like the immigrants who came after them, attracted by the opportunities Muhammad 'Ali provided   civil servants entirely created by the bureaucratic apparatus, and subject to its exigencies, or military men indebted to the *nizami* army for their successes? Or were they more or less independent actors, with their own networks of social relations and influence? Did they undertake transactions on equal footing, choosing certain alliances (the ones they deemed most profitable) and forgoing others? In the latter case, one suspects, they must not have taken kindly to being supplanted or supplemented by the vice-roy's clients.

For the local notables, a strategy of endogamy, which might have ensured flexibility and dynamism in business matters, did not allow for upward social mobility once the avenues leading to key posts had been closed by the new ruling class's exclusivism. In the early nineteenth century, the vice-roy and his allies followed their predecessors' example in practicing intensive endogamy, which aimed at staffing the administration with allies, selected precisely because they lacked local roots (which incidentally made of shared origin a main criterion in creating a pool of potential supporters). One of the principal effects of this strategy was to close off important political posts to local notables, as they were monopolised by Muhammad 'Ali's relatives, sons-in-law and clients.

Efforts to understand the replacement of one ruling class by another encounter several difficulties, the most complex of which is the fact that, by definition, the old notables were replaced almost entirely by the new administrators, in branches of the bureaucracy that were created between 1805 and the 1830s. It is difficult to compare the staff of the new offices and departments with their predecessors, as the latter, *stricto sensu,* did not exist unless one accepts the (very debatable) hypothesis that a purely functionalist analysis is useful. Instead of attempting a comparative exercise, therefore, I will seek to unravel the Mahruqis' social networks, in order to detect, at the individual level, the points of contact between 'old' and 'new' orders. To this end, I will discuss the neighbourhood in which they lived, and analyse the ethnic/religious composition of their business circles, as revealed by their estate inventories.[2] Such documents, although masterfully analysed (for example, by André Raymond and Nelly Hanna[3]) in the context of studies in social history, where series of inventories are investigated for large-scale patterns, have very rarely been used in a micro-historical perspective, aiming to detect individual traces of consumption habits, social ties or investment behaviour. This latter use is precisely what I have attempted, as will be shown below.

Urban networks

It has often been suggested that eighteenth-century Cairo, like other Ottoman cities during the same period, was characterised by the ethnic, religious and professional organisation of space: communities of North Africans, Anatolians, Jews or Syrians (among many other possible groups) are thus said to have lived in more or less isolated neighbourhoods, working in specialised trades. In the nineteenth century, according to this frame of analysis, ethnic segmentation gave way to a larger division between 'traditional' and 'modern' cities (the latter resulting from innovations in urban planning, introduced under European influence) or rich and poor neighbourhoods. In relation to immigration, however, it seems justified to ask whether ties actually existed across ethnic and religious communities during the eighteenth century, especially as the Ottoman Empire in general, and Egypt in particular, was the site of vast population movements well before the reforms of the nineteenth century caused provincial governors like Muhammad 'Ali to import administrators and experts in bulk. Any effort to retrace the shift in trade routes notably, the emphasis on trade with Europe, monopolised by minority merchants enjoying strong ties of protection with various European powers that took place during the nineteenth century, or the creation of new neighbourhoods where the wealthiest members of various communities moved, away from their former quarters in Harat al-Yahud or Harat al-Rum[4] will be transformed by such an exercise. In fact, the very concept of Egypt's 'integration into the world economy' (a process that took place, according to many historians, during the nineteenth century at a far accelerated rate) must be tested at the micro-social level of the neighbourhood, and nowhere more significantly than in the heart of Cairo's traditional commercial district. By examining one neighbourhood in particular, it becomes possible to test concretely the long assumed correspondence between 'spatial segregation and social segmentation'.[5]

In the centre of Cairo, the concentration of communities in distinct spaces seems to give way to professional ties, all ethnic groups combined. In other words, during the eighteenth century, it is possible to observe a primacy of profession over the ethnic identity of the inhabitants. Many of the individuals who served as *shahbandar* or head of the merchants during the second half of the eighteenth century, no matter what their ethnic origin, took up residence or owned warehouses and shops in his area, and specifically in the neighbourhood of Jawdariyya and Fahhamin, near al-Azhar Mosque the centre for the redistribution of goods from North Africa and India. Ahmad al-Mahruqi owned several properties there; his son, Muhammad, took them over when Ahmad died, and expanded them to form the focal point of his large household of dependents and clients. The Fahhamin neighbourhood was strongly marked by North African commerce: the traces of this trade, perhaps astonishingly, may be followed from the sixteenth century to the mid-nineteenth, showing great continuity. Even in the 1870s, the shops abutting the *qaysariyya* of Baybars al-Jashankir, at the top of Harat al-Jawdariyya, were specialised in the sale of slippers and other North African footwear.[6] In 1846 8, 73 of the 434 economically active men counted in this neighbourhood were Maghribis (against only seven Turks).

Jawdariyya owed its homogeneity more to the nature of activities exercised there than to its residents' ethnic identity. Here, trade brought together distinct groups (North Africans, Anatolians and Syrians) that geographical origin and religious affiliation might otherwise have separated.[7] Commerce and religious professions were predominant: among the Maghribis just mentioned, 18 were described as traders; two others were shoe sellers; one repaired Cashmir shawls; 33 (among them the Maliki mufti) were affiliated with al-Azhar, pilgrims, *kuttab* pupils or servants at the mosque; finally, 17 had 'no profession.' Among the residents of local origin (described in the census as *taht al-hukuma*, or under the aegis of the government), the three majority professions were those of trader (16 individuals), maker of *rumi* trimmings (14 individuals) and spice seller (10 people).

These professions cohabited with a constellation of trades that owed their existence primarily to the proximity of traditional commercial centres, such as long-established street markets: sale of textiles, spices and rosewater; brokerage in real estate or other goods. In this neighbourhood, only three people were employed in the new manufactories established under Muhammad 'Ali, although the textile manufactory of Khurunfish was nearby. Professions related to the food industry were also underrepresented: only five coffee-shop owners, three sugar sellers, one seller of sesame oil and one seller of lupin seeds.[8] And yet at the end of the nineteenth century, the area surrounding Jawdariyya was a centre for the spice trade. Several specialised warehouses (*wikala*) were found there. Sellers of orange-blossom water (*mawardiyya*), spices, perfumes and textiles (especially silk) also lived nearby in Tarbi'a.[9]

Groups from various areas of the sultanate were present in the same quarter: Syrians, concentrated around Khan al-Hamzawi, to the north-east of Jawdariyya;

Turks[10] in Khan al-Khalili; and Greeks in Harat al-Rum, toward Bab Zuwayla, lived side by side with the North African population. Once again, it is the requirements of commerce (rather than the ethnic affiliations one might accept unquestioningly as a factor of group solidarity or settlement in certain neighbourhoods) that seem to have dictated the concentration of textile merchants around Khan al-Khalili and Hamzawi. When Syrian Catholics settled there, especially after 1760,[11] they were therefore moving in next door to Turks and Maghribis who devoted themselves to this sector of trade.

Subsequent developments confirm the specifically commercial character of these urban quarters, which the Muslim commercial elite favoured until the end of the nineteenth century. The residence of Muhammad Pasha al-Suyufi, *shahbandar* of merchants in Egypt around 1887, was located south-east of al-Ghuri Mosque, in Fahhamin street. Ali Mubarak described it as 'grand': *bayt kabir fi ghayat al-'azm*. It had been his father's house, and Suyufi added annexes mainly shops, which he obtained through exchanges with the pious foundations that held the plots in this part of the city, before integrating them into his residential complex. Many spice sellers and druggists, as well as Maghribi merchants, lived opposite, in Harat al-Tawuqjiyya (Bonnet-Sellers' Alley), during the same period.[12]

Also in the neighbourhood chosen by Ahmad al-Mahruqi for his residential and commercial headquarters, in the alleyways that extended until the mausoleum of Baybars al-Khayyat to the east, was the home of al-Habbani al-Maghribi, a renowned North African merchant, and other new buildings built or bought by 'reputable Maghribi merchants'.[13] The fact that members of the commercial elite continued to settle in this neighbourhood until the end of the nineteenth century indicates a degree of continuity: the city's commercial centre remained strongly associated with activities that had made the fortune of so many merchants during the preceding centuries.

North Africans

To suggest that various communities interacted and lived side by side, however, is not to negate the strategies of solidarity that some of their members deployed. In particular, the North African community, whose importance in Cairo on the eve of Muhammad 'Ali's accession to power has been suggested above, seems to have been organised quite formally more so, perhaps, than its Anatolian or Syrian counterparts.

The North African presence in the Fahhamin neighbourhood, however, was expressed primarily through the influence of the Maliki school of jurisprudence, and the renowned Maghribi shaykhs who taught its precepts. Their influence was maintained, on the ground, through stipends that explicitly encouraged adhesion to this school, rather than a specific geographical origin: stipends allocated to the Maghribi College, 'one of the most powerful at al-Azhar',[14] were thus exclusively attributed to scholars of the Maliki school. In contrast, stipends allocated to the Turkish college were attributed on the basis of geographical origin rather than doctrinal affiliation. In the 1870s, the Maliki shaykh received 862 loaves of bread every two days; this was considerable. The rations distributed to the Turkish college during the same period amounted to only 256 loaves every two days, although the shaykh was one of the vice-roy's manumitted slaves, and also held the (probably equally lucrative) office of second delegate to the Grand Tribunal.[15]

Between the two poles constituted by al-Azhar and the Citadel, Maghribis acted as a group whenever a disturbance took place in the city. Whatever the actual geographical origin of the individual soldiers who made up the troops, North African contingents which an eye-witness identified as such in his chronicle played a visible role during revolts against the French occupation. It was also a *sharif* of Maghribi origin, Shaykh Muhammad al-Jilani, who departed for Qusayr 'at the head of a group of Maghribis, Meccans, and sharifs from Yanbu'', leading a private expedition aimed at dislodging the French from Egypt.[16] Maghribis, then, were recognised and singled out among the crowds that regularly rose up against the Armée d'Orient.

Even after Muhammad 'Ali's accession to power, the Maghribis continued to display a deeply rooted, locally manifested solidarity, which was integrated into the state's strategies. In 1811, the vice-roy sent 14,000 Turks and Maghribis among the first units of fighters to the Hijaz to combat the Wahabis.[17] These militias were directly targeted by the creation of a *nizami* army, and it is certainly no coincidence that Muhammad al-Mahruqi appeared before Muhammad 'Ali accompanied by a large escort of Maghribi troops when the vice-roy summoned him in August 1815, after Cairo's central markets had been pillaged because of rumours concerning the new army.[18]

Mahruqi also seems to have maintained special relations with the rulers of Morocco: in 1817, when the pilgrimage caravan from Fez arrived in Cairo, he welcomed Sultan Sulayman's two sons, settled them in a house near the sanctuary of al-Husayn, and assigned 'appropriate payments' to them. In return, they presented him with mules, silks, burnouses and other gifts.[19] Furthermore, the Mahruqis' professional ascent seems to have taken place in close symbiosis with Maghribi trading houses, which were pre-eminent in the Indian Ocean and Red Sea trade. Before making a trip to the Hijaz, John Lewis Burckhardt, the Swiss traveller and Orientalist, obtained a letter addressed by Muhammad al-Mahruqi, 'the first merchant in Cairo', to 'Araby Djeylany, the richest merchant of Djedda'.[20] Several members of the Jilani household were mentioned in the estate inventory of Ahmad Ibn Abd al-Salam,[21] who had served as *shahbandar* before Ahmad al-Mahruqi and sponsored Ahmad's career. Ibn Abd al-Salam was himself originally from Mashish.[22] An individual named Saqqat is also mentioned in this document, as a creditor (the estate owed him the price of coffee he had sold on Ibn Abd al-Salam's behalf); and members of these commercial houses continued to invest in the Red Sea trade until the 1830s at least, as the two principal Maghribi merchants in Jeddah at that time, named Jilani and Saqqat, seem to have served as agents for their compatriots in Cairo.[23]

In addition, 'Moroccans,' *lato sensu*, had managed commercial activities in the centre of al-Qahira since the late eighteenth century. Members of the Jallun household were active in the Indian textile trade during the last quarter of the eighteenth century: upon his death, Tahir Ibn Jallun left textiles worth almost 80,000 paras in a shop in Jamlun Market. His nephew who died in 1776, owned stock worth a little less than 100,000 paras, and had sold textiles worth 283,000 paras on credit, for which he was awaiting reimbursement when he died.[24] In the late 1820s, another member of this group was among 'the notable merchants' (*min 'a'yan al-tujjar*) in the same neighbourhood.[25] In al-Ghuriyya, their influence 'was so great,' according to André Raymond, 'that all the shaykhs of the guild of merchants in Ghuriyya known to us were originally from North Africa' starting in the 1780s.[26] Documentary evidence abounds: among the individuals who held this office are 'Abd al-Rahman b. 'Abd al-Khaliq al-Qabbaj (shaykh starting in 1784 or 1785);[27] and Muhammad Ibn Muhammad Ibn 'Ali Jallun,[28] whose son, 'Abd al-Rahman, was *naqib* of al-Ghuriyya.[29] The names of later shaykhs also identify them as members of the Maghribi community.[30]

Besides commercial and political-military ties, the Mahruqis established marriage alliances with North African families: Muhammad's wife, Nafisa, was the daughter of Qasim Jassus,[31] and was allied by marriage to the Qabbaj household (her great-grandfather's widow had gone on to marry Abu Jida al-Qabbaj). The Mahruqis' close professional ties and friendship with Ahmad Ibn 'Abd al-Salam, their commercial activities, and their control of a sanctuary devoted to a North African holy man, served to reinforce these family ties.[32] In fact, documentary evidence suggests that the Mahruqis were able to take control of the office of *shahbandar* thanks to their Maghribi connections, in a shift of economic functions from one ethnic group to another. The North Africans, in turn, had taken this office over from Anatolians: starting in 1750, the head of the merchants had been a Masabni, an Alayli or a Malatyalli, tobacco merchants who traded between Cairo, Istanbul and Izmir.[33] Anatolian control over strategic commercial sectors seems to have been broken thanks to the efforts of Ahmad Ibn 'Abd al-Salam; after him, Mahmud Muharram, and then Ahmad al-Mahruqi, both natives of Egypt, took over this office. They appear to have achieved their monopoly by inserting themselves into the Maghribis' social networks.

The Mahruqis' relations with the Maghribi soldiers, merchants, and ulema who expressed the community's collective identity, however, only lasted for two generations; on a larger scale of analysis, they would have been completely invisible. In this perspective, such social ties did not constitute a family trajectory crowned with success thanks to integration into an already established community; rather, they must be seen as part of a strategy of 'collective promotion through the sliding of one network onto another' [34]

Syrian Christians

Although the Maghribis dominated certain sectors of commerce during the last years of the eighteenth century, Syrian Christians were more active in the administration of trade. Using Muhammad al-Mahruqi's estate inventory to recreate his microcosm of relations, it is evident that there was far less contact between him and the Syrian Christians than there had been between him and the North

Africans. In the late eighteenth century, Syrian Christians had established a degree of control over the Red Sea trade by settling in Suez, where they took over the customs house.[35] They owed their increased influence, at least for a brief period, to the support of the political and military authorities.[36] Given that many of the most influential Muslim large import-export merchants (*tujjar*)[37] had made their fortunes in the Red Sea trade, one might expect to find evidence of partnerships or at least financial dealings between them and the customs house officials. And yet, despite the multiplicity of possible connections between spheres of activity, points of geographical embeddedness and fields of influence, however, personal relations between Levantine customs officials and Muslim merchants are rarely evident in the early years of the nineteenth century.

Still, certain links did exist between the Red Sea *tujjar* and some members of the Syrian Catholic community at the very beginning of the period under study here. Among the five individuals to whom Ahmad Ibn 'Abd al-Salam, Ahmad al-Mahruqi's patron, owed money for trade in Bengali textiles when he died were two whose names indicate that they belonged to this community: Antun Zughayb and Yusuf Dibbana. The first, a Syrian Catholic merchant who had settled in Damietta, accompanied General Beauvoisins on his mission to Acre; there, he was assassinated by Ahmad Pasha al-Jazzar.[38] The second was the scion of a family of large landowners and merchants, established in Egypt since the mid-eighteenth century, and which preserved its influence until the mid-twentieth century.[39] Among Ahmad al-Mahruqi's debtors, the individual who owed him the largest sum of money 653,087 paras was Basili Fakhr, 'consul in Damietta'.[40] Although the estate inventory does not tell us when this debt was contracted, it is highly likely that Ahmad al-Mahruqi extended credit to Fakhr before the French occupation, as between 1798 and 1801 Mahruqi played an important role in mobilising popular revolts where a great many Syrian Catholics, among other Christians, were massacred.[41]

Perhaps these hostilities are the reason why ties between indigenous Muslim *tujjar* and Syrian Christians unlike other links were not cultivated beyond the first years of nineteenth century. Muhammad al-Mahruqi, in contrast with his father, had barely any with the community, judging from the records of debt and credit preserved in his estate inventory. Could this be due to the relative decline of the Syrian Catholics, who lost control of the customs houses after the 1780s? Perhaps the community no longer offered opportunities for advancement or networking to a prominent merchant like Mahruqi. Still, some Syrian Christian families managed to preserve their social position and prosperity during the Muhammad 'Ali period, and perhaps beyond: in 1837, 10 of the 55 largest trading houses in Cairo were Syrian Catholic.[42]

There is, furthermore, one exception to what may have been a policy of mutual exclusion on the part of the indigenous *tujjar* and the Syrian Christians during the first third of the nineteenth century. That exception was Dimitri Kahil, who constituted the only point of continuity in contacts between the Mahruqis' social and business universe and that of the Syrian Christians. Dimitri's father, Mikha'il, was appointed chief customs officer of Egypt after Yusuf Qassab was killed in 1790, and held this position until 1798. Along with Ahmad al-Mahruqi, he served on an advisory council created by the French, in his capacity as 'head of the Damascus merchants in Cairo' and 'head of the nation of Damascenes'.[43] Mikha'il Kahil was certainly more generous than Ahmad al-Mahruqi in welcoming the French troops, as he opened his house to their officers when they arrived in Cairo. Like other large-scale merchants Ibn 'Abd al-Salam and the Mahruqis among them he engaged in trade via the Red Sea;[44] unlike them, however, he did not make this activity the keystone of his economic endeavours.

Dimitri's name, at any rate, is associated with the Mahruqis' circle only twice in the documents consulted. He appeared in court on one occasion,[45] along with other individuals described as *nasrani halabi* (Christian Aleppine) merchants: Niqula, son of Shukri, and Yusuf, son of Lutfi Bitar. Dimitri, however, appeared only to testify that Rahma, Yusuf Bitar's daughter, had granted him power of attorney in a transaction to which she and Muhammad al-Mahruqi's mother were parties; this single document, therefore, does not suffice to prove that there were direct links between Mahruqi and Kahil. Further evidence exists, however: Dimitri was also among Muhammad's debtors, and purchased marble and wheat from his estate when Muhammad died.[46] During the same period, he was also linked to members of the regime: he borrowed large sums from Hasan Efendi, lieutenant to the governor of Mecca, who had taken an advance sum on his master's budget; as a result, the governor found himself deeply in debt to the state treasury.[47] Other members of the Kahil household later turned to the European powers for consular protection, which was being extended to Christian merchants as part of a growing polarisation within the merchant class. Some members of this class allied with the vice-roy or attempted to maintain their old connections, whereas others took advantage of the tax breaks and legal protection offered by Europe. Thus, Saba Kahil was a Sardinian protégé in 1836 7.[48]

As for Yusuf Bitar, mentioned above, he does not appear in any of the documents related to the Mahruqis and members of their entourage, although a relative of his, Ibrahim Bitar, had been in debt to Muhammad 'Ali al-'Arayshi, Ahmad Ibn 'Abd al-Salam's half-brother, who died in 1788.[49] A deed of sale identified Yusuf as former '*mu'allim al-dawawin*' or customs officer: he replaced Mikha'il Fakhr[50] in this office when Fakhr was exiled to Rosetta in 1771. When he died in 1774, Antun Fara'un took his place; although he had served as chief customs officer longer than his predecessors, was the 'uncontested head of the community' of Syrian Christians in Egypt and engaged in Red Sea trade on a far larger scale than his compatriots,[51] no trace of him, or of his descendants, appears in estate inventories or transactions concerning Muslim *tujjar* in the first half of the nineteenth century. In brief, it remains surprising that prominent members of two communities of wealthy, influential merchants both engaged in trade and the administration of trade, both with headquarters in Cairo, both focusing their investments on the Red Sea, and both connected with the inner circles of political and military power seem to have had little or no contact during the last quarter of the eighteenth and the first quarter of the nineteenth centuries, judging from the evidence provided by the Mahruqis' estate inventories.

Copts

This gap between two communities is mirrored by another, between the Mahruqis and prominent members of the Coptic community. The separation is especially clear in the case of the Tawils Hanna and then 'Iryan who took up many urban and rural tax farms between 1816 and 1830.[52] Hanna al-Tawil held the concessions on salt mines and vegetables in Bulaq and Fustat in 1816, and in the northern cities and provinces of Egypt (*al-aqalim al-bahariyya*), as well as the right to tax taverns; the coffee customs house and its adjunct departments; and, finally, Syrian merchandise passing through the customs house at Bab al-Nasr.[53] As for 'Iryan, he held the concession on government-controlled trade in 1825; the following year, he farmed all the taxes for Upper Egypt.[54] He also controlled the tax-farms on leather[55] and the sale of fruit,[56] and held (at least theoretically) exclusive rights to the salt from the marshes of Mahalla and Nabarruh.[57] He was director of the copper manufactory;[58] finally, he obtained the concession on plaster, lime and tiles for a period of three years starting in 1826,[59] a privilege for which he spent 80 million paras a year.[60] Despite this intense involvement in economic activities, most of them directed by the state, and despite Mahruqi's status as head of the merchants, which presumably should have led these individuals to engage in many transactions together, only one dispute (concerning land and trees in Jiza) indicates that Hanna al-Tawil and Muhammad al-Mahruqi ever even met. Hanna, then supervisor of the villages of Gharbiyya, was the defendant, and Muhammad one of the witnesses.[61] This almost coincidental encounter seems to have been the only instance of contact between the two men, and indeed of the two worlds that they inhabited.[62]

Anatolians

We have seen so far that, although the neighbourhood where the Mahruqis lived was not one marked by ethnic or religious segregation, they, and other prominent merchants like them, tended to focus their social networks particularly on one ethnic group the North Africans in the present case. Their social investments allowed the Mahruqis to advance quite rapidly, consolidating their hold on leadership of the merchant community from the end of the eighteenth century to the first third of the nineteenth. A somewhat endogamous strategy of upward social mobility, however, meant that there were gaps in the social universe of the Mahruqis, father and son. As noted above, the most surprising such gaps occur in the case of the Syrian Christians, who were prominent in the Red Sea trade during the last part of the eighteenth century, and in the case of Coptic Christians, who were actively engaged in state administration of the Egyptian economy during the first quarter of the nineteenth century.

There are, however, other 'gaps' in the Mahruqis' constellation of social relations, indicating that religious affiliation, which they had in common with the North African merchants, was not the factor dictating their choice of certain alliances over others. Most notably, the Mahruqis do not seem to have developed contacts with members of the Anatolian or Rumelian communities who had settled in Cairo. Rather, the Mahruqis' contact with Anatolians and Rumelians seems to have been limited to members of the ruling class. Here again, it would seem, it was profession, rather than ethnic or religious identity, that encouraged the formation of certain ties of acquaintanceship, clientelism, or solidarity. In the documents that concern the Mahruqis, there are only a few mentions of persons whose patronymics indicate that they were of Turkish origin. Ahmad al-Mahruqi, who did business in the central lands of the sultanate, had among his debtors two Kharputlis: Yahya, who worked in the customs house at Bulaq, and Hasan. There was one Turk among his creditors. Debts he had guaranteed for the grand vizir, Yusuf Pasha, were reimbursed to another Kharputli (Sulayman) and an Islambulli. In other words, these individuals, who were part of the chief merchant's social universe, were mainly state officials or administrators, and were not numerous by any means. Furthermore, the amounts of money involved in their transactions were insignificant: barely over 150,000 paras, including both debt and credit. In the case of Muhammad al-Mahruqi, who had many relations with state officials of Turkish origin, only three of his creditors who were not explicitly affiliated with government offices could be identified clearly as originating from the sultanate's central lands: Muhammad Agha Urfa Amin, Musa Urfalli and Waliyy Arna'ut.

The links between eminent representatives of the Muslim merchant class, who had reached the peak of their power in the late eighteenth century, and 'ethnic' Anatolian or Balkan natives, were therefore restricted, in this case study, to transactions the merchants undertook with the state apparatus.

To understand the significance of this vacuum in the social universe of Ahmad and Muhammad al-Mahruqi, it is necessary to remember that the neighbourhoods in which they lived and worked al-Ghuri and al-Husayn, the centre of Cairo's religious and commercial districts were immediately adjacent to Khan al-Khalili, where Anatolian merchants were concentrated. Contiguity, then, was not sufficient in creating social ties, and the Mahruqi household seems to have foregone the opportunity to work with these neighbours, restricting its financial relations with Turks almost entirely to those that passed through the state. It is probably in this context that Muhammad learned Turkish well enough, at least, to use it in his diplomatic activities, as he served as interpreter when Ghalib, *sharif* of Mecca, was taken captive after Egyptian troops occupied the holy cities, and was brought before the vice-roy's lieutenant. The *katkhuda* wished to reassure Ghalib that no harm would befall him and to win his trust and cooperation. On that occasion, Mahruqi sat between the two men to translate from Turkish into Arabic and vice versa.[63]

Perhaps it is their failure to create more significant ties with influential individuals from the heart of the Ottoman Empire that ultimately led to the Mahruqis' marginalisation. Such a failure, in turn, may have been due to short-sightedness on Muhammad al-Mahruqi's part, or on the insular and endogamous nature of the immigrants who were brought to Egypt between 1805 and 1820 to create and run a new military, financial and bureaucratic state apparatus. More surprising, however, is the virtual absence of any substantive connection between Muhammad (or other members of the late eighteenth-century local elite), on one hand, and the circle of immigrants who were closest to the vice-roy, on the other. Boghos Yusufian,[64] the vice-roy's right-hand man and secretary of foreign trade, was particularly symptomatic of this rupture: he had lent money to Ahmad al-Mahruqi and must have associated with Muhammad, as both men were the vice-roy's agents in Red Sea trade; yet no financial ties of any sort seem to have existed between him and Muhammad. Furthermore, the names of the two men are never mentioned together in the documents I had the opportunity to examine.

Importing the ruling class

As Ghislaine Alleaume has pointed out, Muhammad 'Ali arrived in Egypt at the head of a contingent of Albanian troops sent by the Ottoman sultan; because he had no social roots in the province, he had no locally available pool from which to draw political personnel that belonged to him alone. As vice-roy, one of his earliest concerns was to establish local links with provincial notables especially *ulama* like Umar Makram, the head of the *ashraf* or descendants of the Prophet Muhammad, and *tujjar* like Muhammad al-Mahruqi who could provide him with much needed legitimacy and resources as he battled to secure the imperial centre's acquiescence to his assertion of power in Egypt. During a second phase, as he consolidated his authority, he sought to emancipate himself from these local elites, and imported his own personnel. He relied on this group until the graduates of the new schools he had established, who were Egyptian Muslims of rural origin, could take over (as indeed occurred starting in the late 1820s). Significantly, this 'second generation' shared characteristics with the earlier immigrants, especially the quality of rootlessness that Muhammad 'Ali valued in those who staffed the state apparatus. Whereas the first generation of immigrants had been brought from Anatolia or the Balkans, the second was brought from the countryside, and its members were often separated from their families so that they might devote themselves to serving the state. In both cases, 'cut off from their roots at a very early age, and owing the state most of their education and all their social success, these new men were to be the best servants of the new political order that Muhammad 'Ali's reforms established'.[65]

From the perspective of group solidarity *'asabiyya* in the Khaldunian sense Muhammad 'Ali, a newcomer from Kavalla (Thrace), stood out from his predecessors, the Mamluk beys who had governed Egypt (ostensibly on behalf of the Ottomans, but in reality almost independently during the last quarter of the eighteenth century), in the sense that he was not a product of one of their powerful households. In establishing his authority, he was therefore capable of creating a military force free from the loyalties and rivalries that permeated the 'Mamluk organisation'.[66] Some of his most eminent clients emerged from the group that had accompanied him to Egypt: this was the case of Muhammad Bey Topoz Ughli, for example. He was made director of the Treasury in 1806, and became the first governor of Alexandria after Muhammad 'Ali's troops took control of the port city in 1807. He joined the Egyptian military campaign to fight the Wahabis in the Hijaz in 1814. He and others like him were therefore introduced quite abruptly into Egyptian society by the Ottomans, who were keen to re-establish their control over

Egypt after quarter of a century of virtually autonomous rule by the beys, and three years of occupation by the French (1798 1801). Later, the presence of this class of immigrant administrators was enhanced and modified by an ambitious vice-roy, whose ambivalent relation to Ottoman authority and to provincial society caused him to select 'outsiders' who simultaneously did not enjoy great influence in Istanbul as his key advisers and high-ranking officials.

Apart from Muhammad 'Ali's sons, who took over the highest ranks in the military, a certain number of individuals responsible for key administrative posts were compatriots or relatives, chiefly, although not exclusively, by marriage. The secretary of the Treasury gave his daughter in marriage to Sharif Agha, one of the vice-roy's 'favourite relatives'.[67] A nephew of the vice-roy was commander of the Egyptian troops in the Hijaz, and headed the army in 1832. His brother became governor of the Hijaz in 1827, and commander of the army in Yemen in 1831. The following year, after the Egyptian troops had occupied Damascus, he became governor of that city.[68] One of Muhammad 'Ali's sons-in-law was governor of Sudan until 1826. Other high-ranking state officials had distinguished themselves in the expansionist military campaigns organised by Muhammad 'Ali in Syria and Sudan.[69]

Some of these officials, starting with the members of the vice-roy's immediate household, were of Albanian, Anatolian or Macedonian origin. Their immigration to Egypt was of recent date: the first of them had accompanied the Ottoman campaign of 1801. Still, ethnic identity was not as important a factor in this group's formation as was its members' personal attachment to the vice-roy, and their ability to stay afloat in the turbulent first years of the nineteenth century, manoeuvring through the complex rivalries between Muhammad 'Ali and his many rivals. By 1815, many of the individuals occupying key posts in the administration were simply those who had survived the multiple hostilities among Mamluk beys, Ottomans, and French and British troops. In some cases, survival meant nothing more than an ability to emerge relatively unscathed from the perilous settlement of Ottoman Egyptian affairs and to negotiate the treacherous waters of alliances concluded and soon betrayed. Sulayman Agha al-Silahdar had been promoted to the rank of arms-bearer thanks to the grand vizir, Yusuf Pasha, who had sent him on a mission to Istanbul. As a deputy of the Sublime-Porte, he played a pivotal role in the negotiations of 1806 7, when the Ottomans, attempting to unseat Muhammad 'Ali, vainly sought to reach an agreement with the beys.[70] Ahmad Agha al-Khazindar 'Bonaparte' had fought the British in Rosetta in 1807; then, in 1813, he joined the *katkhuda bey*'s camp against Latif Pasha, Muhammad 'Ali's favourite Mamluk, in a dispute that developed out of the 1811 massacre, and marked the definitive victory of the 'Ottoman' party. He became the vice-roy's treasurer in 1816, but died barely six months later. The *katkhuda* became the Sublime Porte's representative during the summer of 1813, but simultaneously preserved his position as the vice-roy's lieutenant.

During the nineteenth century, the Egyptian state developed in a way similar to that described by Robert Descimon with respect to eighteenth-century France 'in conjunction with the dominant social forces', and through 'the continual conclusion of compromises intended to ensure the transfers necessary to policy implementation'.[71] The time period under observation here the first half of the nineteenth century witnessed precisely such a transfer. In an initial phase, the 'dominant social forces' had not been created by the state; in consequence, they were capable of turning the privileges the sultan granted his subjects throughout the empire to their own advantage, through such mechanisms as the administration of pious foundations or the supervision of the pilgrimage.[72] By the latter part of this period, the very concept of the state had been transformed and expanded. New state organisms had come into existence, taking over wider spheres of the economy and gaining access to fields of activity like education and healthcare, which for the most part had been privately run until that point. The individuals whom Muhammad 'Ali imported or attracted to Egypt, in contrast with those who ensured his accession to power, lacked long-standing networks or deep roots in the urban economy. Whereas the local elites who had managed economic, political and religious life in Egypt during the eighteenth century had derived their income and status from the empire and its local manifestations of power (which they often used for purposes other than those for which they were intended), the new class, made up of the vice-roy's men, obtained similar privileges directly from a new Egyptian administration that produced wealth and supervised its distribution locally, with little or no recourse to Istanbul.

The officials and entrepreneurs who immigrated to Egypt because they had been recruited by the vice-roy and were affiliated to him by links of common origin, marriage, manumission or blood, were the supervisors of this newly minted legal, financial and cadastral administration. Their formal attachment to Muhammad 'Ali was reinforced by the very short periods of time they spent in each office, even though they might have devoted their lives to serving the vice-roy and the state. Ottoman norms had limited the terms of judges and governors to a year or two (frequently shortened during the eighteenth century by the beys, who sent back emissaries who did not please them).[73] After they had climbed the echelons of the *kalemiye* (later the *mulkiye*), the *ilmiye* or the *seyfiye*, thereby entering the administrative, religious, legal or military apparatus, they were nominated to a position;[74] once the duration of their service had ended, they waited for a new promotion to be available. Egyptian provincial practice under Muhammad 'Ali was very similar the crucial difference being that the vice-roy, not the sultan, appointed, rotated and dismissed these officials. A former head of the Silk Department thus became responsible for gunpowder manufactories and saltpeter production; the governor of Rosetta was subsequently appointed head of the Arsenals in Bulaq, Rosetta, Alexandria and Damietta; the cannon foundry, furnaces and saddle manufactories were placed under the direction of the head of Public Works.[75] This rapid rotation, controlled by the vice-roy, is the main factor distinguishing the careers of these bureaucrats from offices related to finance or tax collection, which were awarded on a lifetime basis.[76]

The career of Boghos Yusufian, secretary of foreign trade, most poignantly illustrates the transition from one mode of recruitment and type of relationship to the state to another. Boghos himself was, to a large extent, typical of the first-generation immigrants who were personally loyal to the vice-roy. Among the civil servants, he alone had no salary; for his needs and those of his household, he drew on the Treasury. The creation of an institutionalised bureaucracy, however, left little place for individuals of this sort. In 1843, 'Abbas Pasha 'fixed a salary for Boghos, who was so offended by this act that he allegedly wasted away, would not eat and died in January 1844'.[77]

As an Armenian, Boghos was also emblematic of the process whereby individuals were recruited and encouraged to immigrate to Egypt for their particular skills or apparent business acumen, and made responsible for sectors of the administration. Artin Bey Cherakian, of Armenian origin, had become head of commercial affairs and sales in 1844.[78] Tossizza, a Greek merchant who had come to Egypt to serve the vice-roy, became Muhammad 'Ali's agent; he was subsequently appointed head of a glass manufactory, and finally became Greek consul in Egypt.[79]

The vice-roy, then, did not govern alone. Nor, however, did he come to power with a ready-made, imported group of subordinates who might have helped him defeat domestic and external contenders for authority over the province. Rather, the alliances he concluded with certain *ulama*, *tujjar*, suppliers of goods and services to the state, and Mamluk beys whose loyalty he had secured indicate that the first years of his reign constituted an extension of the preceding period if only because the reforms he initiated were planned and implemented by individuals who were accustomed to serving his predecessors. It is plausible, therefore, that the process of ruling-class replacement took place through a transfer of wealth, office and status from settled to immigrant communities. This is not to say, of course, that the beys who had ruled Egypt before Muhammad 'Ali's arrival were somehow indigenous the structure and identity of the ruling class at the end of the eighteenth century has been studied in detail by Jane Hathaway, among others, and its reproduction through fresh supplies of mercenaries and slave soldiers is established. On the other hand, those who provided continuity in the form of trade, administration and finance, who ensured relatively smooth transitions during political power struggles, and who can be said to have formed a local class of notables either belonged to the second or third generation of migrant descent (from North Africa, Anatolia, Arabia or the Levant) or were natives of Egypt. At any rate, the decisive element in their identity was not so much a question of origin as it was one of rootedness in local society something the newcomers brought in by Muhammad 'Ali lacked almost entirely.

How is one to explain the gap that existed between the older local elites, on whom Muhammad 'Ali depended in his rise to power, and the new immigrant elites, whom he imported once he had consolidated his authority? One possible reason for the lack of ties one observes at the micro-historical level of estate inventories ties that might have taken the form of reciprocal financial obligations is the fact that the implantation of a new ruling class is typically accompanied by the elaboration of myths concerning its specificity. These myths organise certain differences of identity between this group and the former elite, on one hand, and this group and the population it governs, on the other, in exclusionary terms. This is the case, for example, of the Mamluks (1250 1517), who developed an identity as 'professional Turks',[80] and also of the officers in the *nizami* army created by the vice-roy in the nineteenth century, who were separated from the soldiers they commanded by language and an institutionalised ethnic superiority.[81] In order to assert their identity as a new class, devoid of ties to local society, the new officials may have made a conscious effort to avoid fraternising with their predecessors.

Another possible explanation resides in the fact that the state apparatus was thoroughly overhauled when the vice-roy's first collaborators disappeared, in the 1820s, and especially after 1825, when the first study missions were sent to Europe. This reorganisation entailed imposing an administrative separation between fields of activity that had been important before Muhammad 'Ali's rise to power, and those he emphasised as vice-roy. Thus, trade of cash crops with Europe, which the vice-roy sought to monopolise through the state apparatus, was separated from the Eastern trade, which remained in private hands for the remainder of the nineteenth century. Artin, whose father was an agent for 'Abbas, Muhammad 'Ali's grandson, was sent to Paris in 1826 and, upon his return in 1830, was assigned to 'the ruler's direct service'. In 1844, he became supervisor of the bureau of commerce and sales an institution that managed trade with Europe, had offices in Alexandria, and engaged in 'agricultural export operations directed toward European markets'.[82] The Red Sea and Indian Ocean trade, on the other hand, was subjected to the requirements of rail transport: 'Abd al-Rahman Rushdi, who was given the task of organising the transit service in 1839, became head of railways under Isma'il; this service oversaw the transit of the India post from Alexandria to Suez.[83] Both Artin and Boghos might have done business with Mahruqi, as all of them were engaged in long-distance trade; and yet Artin, even more than Boghos, is absent from the social universe of Mahruqi and his associates.

This process of replacement, however, did not merely entail one ethnic group (North African or Egyptian) being supplanted by another, which was more exclusively Anatolian or Armenian, less rooted in local society and more closely affiliated with a more powerful sovereign. Although the new group's ethnic identity, isolation and dependence on the ruler all played a part in its ascent, and the concomitant disappearance of the old elites, it is also necessary to take into account the strategies adopted by the actors who were part of these processes, including those who left few traces in the configuration that was created after they had disappeared. Muhammad al-Mahruqi, in particular, might have been able to survive longer, or to pass on his social and economic capital to an heir or client, had he diversified his investments and placed clients in spheres other than trade and the administration. In the midst of centralisation, however, he banked on one sphere alone, which the vice-roy controlled quite closely; this made Mahruqi's position more precarious than his father's had been. Paradoxically, Ahmad's success and longevity had depended largely on the very instability of the political and military ruling institution, which needed *tujjar* and *ulama* to ensure continuity in Egypt's affairs. Links between Muhammad al-Mahruqi and various state departments seem far more numerous and intense, and less egalitarian, than those his predecessors had maintained with either the beys or the Ottoman state. In addition, Muhammad lost out in this process of intensification: on his death, most of his estate was seized to pay off debts he had contracted to the state.

The urban topography, too, shows traces of Muhammad's strategies. In the urban context, his position took the shape of a defensive retrenchment: most of his real estate investments were focused on al-Qahira, the old business centre. Those of the new elite, on the other hand, were located on the periphery of the quarters along the Qasaba. Indeed, Cairo's evolution, during the early nineteenth century, seems to have been determined by three main trends: a shift in the identity of the ruling class, and a concomitant transfer of investment and residential patterns toward the city's periphery; the creation of monopolies on construction materials; and the formation of administrative bodies whose jurisdiction gradually extended to the city as a whole. The 'invasion' of the new ruling class, then, was neither as sudden nor as aggressive as a military takeover; nonetheless, it expressed a decisive transfer of power, in the financial, political, commercial, administrative and even architectural spheres.

Conclusion

One of the least comprehensible aspects of the nineteenth century, to my mind, is the seemingly impermeable character of the different universes that came to coexist in the city during that period. In commerce (Red Sea trade/Mediterranean trade), production (craft guilds/state-run manufactories), the administration of trade (*shahbandar*/secretary of foreign trade), affairs of state (Mamluk households/ government diwans; tax farms/central administration), military matters (*ojaqs*/*nizam jadid* army) and the judiciary (courts/'councils' or *majalis*), the 'Ottoman' and 'modern' spheres appear as mutually exclusive: the institutions developed during the former period find no echo in the latter, whereas the staff of the new organisations seem to have been transplanted into a social vacuum. Here, I have tried to test this impression in more concrete ways, by examining personal links among individuals who seemed emblematic of the various fields under investigation.

The renewal of the administrative personnel concerned not only individuals but also an entire structure, which was created through their collaboration. The origin of state officials, their relation to the vice-roy and the extent of their skills were all transformed as a result of this process. Between these individuals, on one hand, and the relatively solid circle of relations surrounding Muhammad al-Mahruqi, on the other, there was very little communication.[84] Muhammad, who represented a pivot in this respect, served as a conduit whose financial investments channelled resources towards the state: on his death, among many other debts, he owed the Treasury (*Khazina 'Amira*) a sum that, alone, equalled his entire estate almost 110 million paras. During his lifetime, he had reimbursed only insignificant fractions of this debt, distributed among several state departments.[85] The shift from one phase to another from the first, in which Muslim *tujjar* dealt on equal footing with a few representatives of the Ottoman state, to the second, in which they had very few personal transactions with members of the new elite, but very concentrated (and highly unequal) relations with the state apparatus itself seemed irreversible, starting around 1828; the two periods were separate in terms of relations between state officials 'before' and 'after'.

Archival sources tend to confirm this impression, of course, as many series concerning the nineteenth century emanate, precisely, from state institutions created during this period, and which have no counterparts in the eighteenth century. One need only compare the list of offices provided by Jabarti, a chronicler and eyewitness of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, to that presented by the historian Amin Sami to understand the radical character of the alteration: in 1829, the members of the Consultative Council, selected among the highest officials of the state apparatus in Egypt, all occupied positions that had not existed 15 years earlier. With the exception of the ulema *shaykhs* al-Bakri, head of the *ashraf*; al-Sadat; al-Amir, Maliki *mufti*; and al-Mahdi, Hanafi *mufti* they were administrators responsible for Egypt's provinces (Jiza, Buhayra and Munufiyya; Upper Egypt), sections of the army (equipment; saltpeter processing; artillery; manufactories) or production (rice and cereals; cattle; tanneries; textiles).[86]

The aura of absolutism that emanates from historiography concerning the 'Muhammad 'Ali period' is largely due to the creation of a group of state officials who, like the Ottoman governors dispatched to Egypt by the Sublime Porte, had no personal roots in the country. In contrast to these imperial envoys, however, the new ruling class was attached to a governor who may be compared to the beys of the late eighteenth century in regard to his autonomous initiatives. The originality of the group that immigrated to Egypt at the vice-roy's instigation may lie in this combination: for a brief time, after they had replaced local networks, and until they were replaced by natives of Egypt, these individuals and institutions were 'provincialised' and anchored in a local context by a ruler who, at the same time, actively sought to prevent their integration into local society. The same modes of group formation (recruitment and manumission of slaves; slave-oriented endogamy) that had allowed the beys to constitute households capable of resisting the Porte's financial demands, despite the civil conflicts that had weakened them, presided over the establishment of a pre-eminent household, which exercised more continuous control over resources than its predecessors, and was therefore able to send more surplus to Istanbul, even while devoting larger amounts of money to Egypt's internal requirements.

High-ranking officials during Muhammad 'Ali's time were allegedly selected on the basis of ethnic or religious criteria, which their contemporaries associated with specific skills.[87] Historians have thus tended to present ethnic identity or religious affiliation as decisive factors in this ruler's policies and choice of administrators.[88] By mobilising ties of clientelism, officials subsequently created personal cliques, based on 'ethnic and religious solidarity'.[89] I would suggest, rather, that the recruitment of confidants and trustworthy allies should be seen within a framework of 'class egotism', which characterised the creation of the first modern state institutions in Egypt.[90] The local actors, networks and institutions that had preceded the arrival of the vice-roy and his administrators initially sought to serve Muhammad 'Ali as they had his predecessors. Almost imperceptibly, however, they were supplanted by the creation of new state bodies, the reorientation of state-directed trade, the reorganisation of production and a class of personnel qualified primarily by their dependence on the ruler. Those who were able to invest in the state, like Muhammad al-Mahruqi, found themselves overwhelmed. The pre-eminence of the new ruling class was brief: by mid-century, indigenous administrators were coming to the fore. These, however, tended to be salaried servants of the state, rather than notables with their own power base. Muhammad al-Mahruqi and his network may therefore be seen, through the historical microscope, as a fulcrum in the shift from one state formation to another.

Chapter sources

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BD 48, from the vice-roy to Ibrahim Agha, supervisor of the administrative sector of Minya, Ma'iyya turki, reg 25, doc 528, 17 Jumad II 1242/16 January 1817.

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BD 48, letter given to the delegate sent to Upper Egypt on the tax-farmer's behalf, Ma'iyya turki, reg 25, doc 106, 23 Dhul-Hijja 1241/29 July 1826.

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BD 140, from the financial department to Habib Efendi, Ma'iyya turki 745, p. 64, doc 116.

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Dasht 333 doc 565

Dasht 333, 5 Sha'ban 1205 15 Safar 1206/9 April 14 October 1791.

Diwan 'Ali 6, doc 8, 1st of Safar 1234/30 November 1818.

Qisma 'Askariyya (QASK) 213, doc 319, 21 Dhul-Hijja 1201/4 October 1787.

QASK 214, doc 285, 29 Dhul-Qi'da 1202/31 August 1788.

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QASK 290 doc 1135, 29 Rabi' II 1244/8 November 1828.

QASK 213 doc 319, 21 Dhul-Hijja 1201/4 October 1787.

QASK 282, doc 761. BA 370, doc 429, 24 Rabi' II 1237/18 January 1822: Zubayda purchased from Rahma Bint Yusuf Bitar, a house in Khatt al-Muski and an adjacent shop.

Notes

1 This chapter is based on parts of my dissertation: P. Ghazaleh, *Fortunes urbaines et stratégies sociales: Généalogies patrimoniales au Caire 1780–1830*, Cairo: Ifao, 2010.

2 A typical estate inventory is structured according to a well-known and fairly formulaic model, as André Raymond has ably pointed out: identity of the deceased and the heirs; guardians and/or legal executor(s); list of assets (including credit owed to the deceased); items to deduct (including debts and expenses); net total; possibly, division among the heirs. A. Raymond, *Artisans et commerçants au Caire au XVIII^e siècle*, Damascus: IFEAD, 1973–4 (2nd edition Cairo, IFAO, 2000), p. xxii–xxiii; G. Veinstein, 'Note sur les inventaires après décès ottomans', in M. Nicolas and R. Dor (eds) *Quand le crible était dans la paille. Hommage à P.N. Boratav*, Paris, 1978, pp. 384–95; 387–89, 398.

3 See especially N. Hanna, *Making Big Money in 1600: The Life and Times of Isma'il Abu Taqiyya, Egyptian Merchant*, Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 1998, p. 219.

4 The Jewish quarter and the Rumelian quarter respectively.

5 G. Alleaume and P. Fargues, 'Voisinage et frontière: Résider au Caire en 1846', in J. Dakhlia (ed.) *Urbanité arabe: Hommage à Bernard Lepetit*, Paris: Sindbad, 1998, p. 78.

6 *Al-bulagh al-baladi wa nahwaha min marakib al-maghariba*: 'A. Mubarak, *Al-Khitat al-Tawfiqiyya al-Jadida li Misr al-Qahira wa Muduniha wa Biladiha al-Qadima wal-Shahira*, Cairo: Al-Hay'a al-Misriyya al-'Amma lil-Kitab, 1994, vol. III, p. 181. The Fahhamin area 'was more or less specialised in the sale of textiles from North Africa (woolens)'; it was 'one of the Maghribis' favourite neighbourhoods' A. Raymond, *Artisans et commerçants au Caire au XVIII^e siècle*, Damascus: IFEAD, 1973–4 (2nd edition Cairo, IFAO, 2000), pp. 295–6, 320. In this neighbourhood, and the eponymous marketplace, was a craft guild specialised in making 'Moroccan' shoes. Raymond, *Artisans*, p. 329.

7 In this regard, see also Alleaume and Fargues, 'Voisinage et frontière', pp. 96–7, as well as P. Verley, 'Note critique. A propos de la 'prosopographie' des élites économiques: un retour à l'anecdotique, une sociologie du patronat et/ou une nouvelle entrée dans le champ de l'histoire économique?', *Revue d'histoire du XIX^e siècle* 23, 2001, s.p., online at http://rh19.revues.org/document.html?id=318. In nineteenth-century France, the 'limits of urban regional centers' territorial sphere of economic influence, which cause various networks of influence to exercise their activity, are lines that do not materialize through the administrative geography reigning over the production of statistics; rather, one perceives them through networks of alliances and relations among individuals, networks of capital'.

8 Census of the population of Egypt, carried out in 1846–8 and classified in the series of the Cairo governorate (*Muhafazat Misr*), Al-Darb al-Ahmar, vol. II, pp. 212–13.

9 Mubarak, *Khitat*, vol. III, pp. 169, 172.

10 Raymond, *Artisans*, p. 469.

11 A. Bittar, 'La dynamique commerciale des grecs-catholiques en Egypte au XVIIIè siècle', *Annales Islamologiques* XXVI, 1992, p. 191. Concerning the 'Syrian Christian mark' on Khan al-Hamzawi, observed in the 1840s, see Raymond, *Artisans*, p. 495.

12 Mubarak, *Khitat*, vol. III, p. 173.

13 Mubarak, *Khitat*, vol. III, p. 189.

14 Raymond, *Artisans*, p. 475.

15 Mubarak, *Khitat*, vol. IV, p. 53.

16 M. Abir, 'The 'Arab Rebellion' of Amir Ghalib of Mecca (1788–1813)', *Middle Eastern Studies*, 7/2, May 1971, p. 192.

17 T. Bayyumi, *Siyasat Misr fil-Bahr al-Ahmar fil Nisf al-Awwal min al-Qarn al-Tasi' 'Ashr, 1226–1265 H / 1811–1848*, Cairo: Al-Hay'a al-Misriyya al-'Amma lil-Kitab, 1999, p. 76.; A.L. al-Sayyid Marsot, *Egypt in the Reign of Muhammad Ali*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 125–6.

18 A.R. Al-Jabarti, *'Abd al-Rahman al-Jabarti's History of Egypt. 'Aja'ib al-Athar fi'l-Tarajim wa'l-Akhbar*, translated and annotated under the supervision of T. Philipp and M. Perlmann, Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1994, 4 vols, vol. IV, p. 314 (29 Sha'ban 1230/6 August 1815). These may have been mercenaries from Morocco; many were employed in Greater Syria, especially in the provinces of Damascus and Saida; they were infantry or cavalry, sometimes in the governors' service. See B. Marino, *Le faubourg du Midan à Damas à l'époque ottomane. Espace urbain, société et habitat (1742–1830)*, Damascus: Institut français de Damas, 1997, p. 310.

19 Jabarti, vol. IV, p. 395.

20 As this was not a letter of credit, he did not present it but addressed the vice-roy directly. J.L. Burckhardt, *Travels in Arabia, Comprehending an Account of Those Territories in Hedjaz Which the Mohammedans Regard as Sacred*, London: Henry Colburn, 1829, online at http://etext.library.edu.au/b/burckhardt_jl/arabia/ (Chapter 1: Djidda).

21 An individual named Jilani was among the creditors of Ahmad Ibn 'Abd al-Salam's manumitted slave: Qisma 'Askariyya (QASK) 213, doc 319, 21 Dhul-Hijja 1201/4 October 1787. Ibrahim al-Jilani, represented by the son of the *tajir* Mahmud Muharram, exchanged goods against a residence in Jiddah, belonging to the *waqf* of Ahmad Ibn 'Abd al-Salam: Bab 'Ali (BA) 313, doc 614, 9 Jumad II 1207/22 January 1793. This same Ibrahim, as well as one 'Arabi al-Jilani, were associates of Ibn 'Abd al-Salam's in a partnership for the sale of coffee; Ibrahim al-Jilani, 'who is in the holy sites', claimed 224,797 paras for gum (*luban*) sold on his behalf, merchandise in his name at the Diwan al-Bihar (spice customs), and a tax (*'adat al-faqar*) owed in Mecca and Jiddah. Finally, Ibn 'Abd al-Salam owed a sum to the heirs of Qasim al-'Arayshi (related to Ibn 'Abd al-Salam's uterine half-brother) 'for *hajj* Jilani' (Dasht 333, 5 Sha'ban 1205–15 Safar 1206/9 April–14 October 1791).

22 Jabarti notes that 'Ahmad ibn 'Abd al Salam était un "Fasi"; mais son information est plus tardive, et de toute manière elle ne contredit pas l'origine méridionale des ancêtres de Ahmad ibn 'Abd al Salam, car le mot "Fasi" était souvent employé dans les documents égyptiens de cette époque pour désigner des "Marocains" quelle que fût leur origine réelle'. A. Raymond, 'Ahmad ibn 'Abd al Salam un shah bandar des tujjar au Caire', *Annales Islamologiques* VII, 1967, p. 92.

23 P. Gran, *Islamic Roots of Capitalism. Egypt, 1760–1840*, Austin: University of Texas Press, 1979 (2nd edition, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1998 and Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press, 1999), p. 116.

24 'Abd al-Mu'ti, *Al-'Ilaqat al-Misriyya al-Hijaziyya fil-Qarn al-Thamin 'Ashr*, Cairo: Al-Hay'a al-Misriyya al-'Amma lil-Kitab, 1999, pp. 122–3.

25 QASK 290 doc 1135, 29 Rabi' II 1244/8 November 1828.

26 Raymond, *Artisans*, p. 474.

27 He was among the witnesses to Ahmad Ibn 'Abd al-Salam's estate inventory (Dasht 333 doc 565), recorded in 1791; at this time, he was still *shaykh* of the merchants in Suq al-Ghuriyya.

28 'Abd al-Mu'ti, 'Al-Buyut al-Tujariyya al-Maghribiyya fil-'Asr al-'Uthmani (1517–1798)', doctoral dissertation, Cairo University, Faculty of Letters, under the supervision of N. Ahmad and R. al-Rifa'i, 2002, gives two different dates (1202/1787–8 and 1203/1788–9 to 1204/1789–90) on p. 209 and 210.

29 QASK 213 doc 319, 21 Dhul-Hijja 1201/4 October 1787.

30 Husam 'Abd al-Mu'ti, who studied the Maghribis in Egypt during the Ottoman period, mentions 'Abd Rabb al-Nabi Ibn al-Tayyib al-Bannani (circa 1792); Muhammad Ibn Muhammad Ibn 'Ali al-'Ushubi (1793–1801); and 'Abd Allah al-Tawdi (1801–2). See

'Abd al-Mu'ti, Al-Buyut al-Tujariyya', p. 209. I have modified the dates he suggests according to the information provided in the documents to which I referred. Several ulema who emerged from these Maghribi households formed ties of apprenticeship as early as the 1760s: *shaykh* Abu 'Abdallah al-Tawdi, born in Fez in 1715 or 1716, studied with Abu 'Abdallah Ibn Qasim Jussus, and with Abu 'Abdallah Muhammad Jallun. Jabarti (P/P), vol. II, p. 403 (necrologies of the year 1207/1792–3).

31 Jabarti mentions his relative, Abu 'Abdallah Muhammad ibn Qasim Jassus ('the humble jurist, voluminous author'), the master of *shaykh* al-Tawdi. Jabarti (P/P), vol. II, p. 403. Raymond also notes the case of one *hajj* Jassus, a North African *tajir* in textiles and spices: Raymond, *Artisans*, p. 776.

32 'La mosquée al 'Arabi où furent enterrés successivement 'Abd al Salam, son fils Ahmad puis Ahmad al Mahruqi, était primitivement une *zawiya* où reposait un saint homme maghrébin ... [Elle] fut plus tard restaurée par le sayyid Ahmad ibn 'Abd al Salam qui [...] habitait dans le même quartier. En honorant un compatriote il manifestait son attachement à sa communauté d'origine, sentiment qui restait très vif chez les Maghrébins installés au Caire et qui se traduisait souvent par des legs, parfois considérables, faits au *riwaq* des Maghrébins à la mosquée al Azhar' Raymond, 'Ahmad ibn 'Abd al Salam' p. 94.

33 'Abd al-Mu'ti, *Al-Buyut al-Tujariyya*, p. 203.

34 P. Lachaier, 'Le capitalisme lignager assigné aujourd'hui: les marchands Kutchi Lohana du Maharashtra (Inde)', *Annales ESC* 4–5, July–October 1992, 885.

35 Also known as Melchites: Bittar, 'La dynamique commerciale', p. 181.

36 '[C]'est surtout vers 1780 que les Chrétiens 'natifs de Syrie', et en particulier Antun Qassis, 'chef des marchands syriens et receveur des douanes, acquièrent de solides positions dans le commerce de la mer Rouge.' Raymond, *Artisans*, pp. 154–5.

37 See P. Gran, 'Late 18th-Century – Early 19th-Century Egypt: Merchant Capitalism or Modern Capitalism?', in *L'Égypte au XIXe Siècle*, pp. 267–81; and G. Gilbar, 'The Muslim Big Merchant-Entrepreneurs of the Middle East, 1860–1914', *Die Welt des Islams* 43/1, 2001, p. 1–36.

38 T. Philipp, *The Syrians in Egypt 1725–1975*, Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1985, p. 45.

39 In Egypt, an eponymous church is located in Alexandria. Max Debbane, a descendant, also bequeathed a collection of rare books to the library of the American University in Cairo.

40 QASK 282, doc 761. He was French, then Russian, consul in Damietta, where his house was still prospering in 1826, and he enjoyed widespread respect; but his son, Yusuf, had nothing of his father: Philipp, *Syrians in Egypt*, pp. 60, 69.

41 In the months of confusion that followed the signing of the al-Arish convention between the French and the Ottomans, on 24 January 1800, the population of Cairo began to rise up while Ottoman and French troops were engaging in violent altercations. The French, fearing an Ottoman attack, left the city on 19 March to consolidate their defences and expel the troops mustered under the grand vizir's command. The inhabitants heard the fire being exchanged by the two armies and rebelled, under the leadership of Sayyid 'Umar, *naqib al-ashraf* (representative of the Prophet's descendants), Ahmad al-mahruqi, and Husayn Agha Shanan. They were joined by 'the Turks of Khan al-Khalili and the Maghribis of Cairo'. The crowd camped on the hills above Bab al-Nasr, and, the next morning, entered the city once again, with several of the amirs and their mamluks. There, they pillaged the Christian quarters and massacred all the Christians they could find. Jabarti (P/P), vol. III, pp. 141–3.

42 Bowring's report, in A. Hourani, *The Emergence of the Modern Middle East*, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1981, p. 111.

43 Jabarti (P/P), vol. III, p. 58.

44 Philipp, *Syrians in Egypt*, pp. 40, 42, 45.

45 BA 370, doc 429, 24 Rabi' II 1237/18 January 1822: Zubayda purchased from Rahma Bint Yusuf Bitar a house in Khatt al-Muski and an adjacent shop.

46 QASK 289, doc 510.
47 Bitaqat al-Dar (BD) 174, from the Diwan khidiwi to the vice-roy, Diwan khidiwi turki 729, folio 75, doc 940, 29 Safar 1242 / 2 October 1826.
48 A. Sami, *Tawqim al-Nil*, Cairo: Dar al-Kutub al-Misriyya, 1928 and 1931, vol. II, p. 476.
49 He owed the deceased the price of incense (*'ud*) evaluated at 9,000 paras: QASK 214, doc 285, 29 Dhul-Qi'da 1202 / 31 August 1788.
50 Cf. Bittar, 'La dynamique commerciale', p. 184.
51 Philipp, *Syrians in Egypt*, pp. 33, 40. Fara'un did not hesitate to open Red Sea trade to British merchants, who had long been excluded from this lucrative sphere: ibid., p. 41.
52 In 1815, Jirjis and Hanna al-Tawil accused *mu'allim* Ghali of having hidden money he owed the government, and took his place at the head of the secretaries' corporation: Jabarti (P/P), vol. IV, p. 340.
53 See BD 48, from the vice-roy to the tenants (*arbab*) of these fiscal units, Dhawat turki, file 5, doc 72, 19 Shawwal 1232/1 September 1817.
54 BD 48, from the vice-roy to Ibrahim Agha, supervisor of the administrative sector of Minya, Ma'iyya turki, reg 25, doc 528, 17 Jumad II 1242/16 January 1817.
55 BD 48, from the vice-roy to the arms-bearer, head of the division of Abu Tij and Asyut, Ma'iyya turki, reg 25, doc 96, 22 Dhul-Hijja 1241/28 July 1826.
56 BD 48, letter given to the delegate sent to Upper Egypt on the tax-farmer's behalf, Ma'iyya turki, reg 25, doc 106, 23 Dhul-Hijja 1241/29 July 1826.
57 BD 48, from the vice-roy to Ibrahim Agha, head of the sector of Mahalla and Nabarruh, Ma'iyya turki, reg 25, doc 224, 25 Muharram 1242/29 August 1826.
58 BD 48, from the vice-roy to the arms-bearer à l'agha porteur d'armes, head of the division of Abu Tij and Asyut, Ma'iyya turki, reg 25, doc 250, 7 Safar 1242/10 September 1826.
59 BD 48, Diwan khidiwi turki, reg 736, p. 35, doc 150, 29 Shawwal 1242/26 May 1827.
60 BD 48, from the head of the Diwan khidiwi to the efendi in charge of public works, Diwan khidiwi turki, reg 733, p. 67, doc 329, 1st of Dhul-Qi'da 1242/27 May 1827. This was an order to the director (*ma'mur*) des travaux publics to transfer the concession immediately to *mu'allim* 'Iryan, in order to avoid further losses for which he might hold the government responsible.
61 Diwan 'Ali 6, doc 8, 1st of Safar 1234/30 November 1818.
62 *Mu'allim* Ya'qub, the British agent at Jiddah, was an exception in this regard, but nothing suggests that he engaged personally in transactions with the *tujjar*.
63 Jabarti (P/P), vol. IV, pp. 283–4.
64 For his complete biography, see Sona Zeitlian, *Armenians in Egypt. Contribution of Armenians to Medieval and Modern Egypt*, Los Angeles, CA: Hraztan Sarkis Zeitlian Publications, 2006, pp. 98–108.
65 G. Alleaume, 'Muhammad 'Alî, pacha d'Égypte (1771–1849)', in P. Coste (ed.) *Toutes les Égypte*, Marseilles: Éditions Parenthèse / Bibliothèque municipale, 1998, pp. 54, 58.
66 The expression is P.M. Holt's: *Egypt and the Fertile Crescent 1516–1922: A Political History*, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1966; see pp. 98–100 for a summary of this period. For important clarifications regarding the differences between the military rulers of the late eighteenth century and their predecessors of the pre-Ottoman period, see J. Hathaway, *The Politics of Households in Ottoman Egypt: The Rise of the Qazdaglis*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997, p. 15ff., 198.
67 Jabarti (P/P), vol. IV, p. 403.
68 Husam al-Din Isma'il, *Madinat al-Qahira min Wilayat Muhammad 'Ali ila Isma'il, 1805–1879*, Cairo: Dar al-Afaq al-'Arabiyya, 1997, pp. 155f. 180.
69 A. Sami, *Tawqim*, vol. II, pp. 389, 536; A. al-R. al-Raf'i, *'Asr Muhammad 'Ali*, Cairo: Dar al-Ma'arif, 1989, p. 175.
70 Jabarti (P/P), vol. IV, pp. 50–1, 80.

71 R. Descimon, 'Les élites du pouvoir et le prince: l'État comme entreprise', in W. Reinhard (ed.) *Les élites du pouvoir et la construction de l'État en Europe*, Paris: PUF, 1996, p. 133.
72 Cf. A. Hourani, 'Ottoman Reform and the Politics of Notables', in ibid., P.S. Khoury, and M.C. Wilson (eds) *The Modern Middle East*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993, pp. 83–109.
73 The chief qadi, sent from Istanbul, still spent a year in Cairo by the mid-1830s, before accompanying the annual pilgrimage caravan to the holy sites of the Hijaz, where he performed the pilgrimage and served for a year in each of the two cities. E.W. Lane, *An Account of the Manners and Customs of the Modern Egyptians: The Definitive 1860 Edition*, introduced by Jason Thompson, Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press, 2002 (herein *Manners and Customs* (AUC)), p. 112.
74 See C. Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform in the Ottoman Empire: The Sublime Porte, 1789–1922*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980, p. 15; C. Fleischer, *Bureaucrat and Intellectual in the Ottoman Empire: The Historian Mustafa Âli (1541–1600)*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986, pp. 192–7.
75 Sami, *Taqwim*, vol. II, p. 309.
76 H. Shalabi, *Al-Muwazzafun fi Misr fi 'Asr Muhammad 'Ali*, Cairo: Al-Hay'a al-Misriyya al-'Amma lil-Kitab, 1989, p. 29.
77 Marsot, *Egypt*, p. 76; N. Nubarian, *Mémoires de Nubar Pacha*, introduction and notes by Mirrit Boutros Ghali, Beirut: Librairie du Liban, 1983, pp. 7f.; G. Alleaume, 'Les sources de l'histoire économique de l'Égypte moderne aux Archives nationales du Caire', *Annales Islamologiques* XXVII, 1993, pp. 269–94.
78 Hunter places the apogee of his career during the same period (*Egypt Under the Khedives*, p. 111). See Zeitlian, *Armenians in Egypt*, p. 146: the family originally came from Sebast, and settled in Egypt in 1914. Artin's father, Sukias Efendi, had been 'the agent of Muhammad Ali's son Tusun in Constantinople'. The specific nature of his capabilities (and, incidentally, the conflation that occurred before the mid-1840s, if not earlier, between trade with Europe and trade in general) is revealed by a tendency in the sources to identify him occasionally as secretary for foreign affairs (*umur ifrinjiyya*). For examples of his activities, see A.M. Damasi, *Al-Iqtisad al-misri fil-qarn al-tasi' 'ashr*, vol. I (1800–1840), Cairo: Al-Hay'a al-Misriyya al-'Amma lil-Kitab, 1994, pp. 246, 294 and 305.
79 Marsot, *Egypt*, pp. 78, 165, 167.
80 J.-Cl. Garcin and M.A. Taher, 'Identité du dédicataire, appartenances et propriétés urbaines dans un waqf du XVᵉ siècle', in Ch. Décobert (ed.) *Valeur et distance: Identités et sociétés en Egypte*, Paris: Maisonneuve et Larose, 2000, p. 189.
81 For example, 'although according to an initial plan it was possible to promote *evlad-ı* Arab (lit. sons of Arabs, i.e. Arabic-speaking Egyptians) to the rank of *Binbashı Mülazimi*, Mehmed Ali insisted that no fellahin should be promoted beyond the rank of *bölükbashı* 'commanding twenty-five soldiers'. K. Fahmy, *All the Pasha's Men: Mehmed Ali, His Army and the Making of Modern Egypt*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997, p. 91.
82 Alleaume, 'Les sources', pp. 273, 283.
83 Alleaume, 'Les sources', p. 274; R.F. Hunter, *Egypt Under the Khedives, 1805–1879: From Household Government to Modern Bureaucracy*, Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1984 (2nd edition, The American University in Cairo Press, 1999), pp. 73, 77.
84 It may seem surprising, in this regard, that the documents concerning the Mahruqi family bear no trace of the Abu Manna' tribe, who served as *multazims* of Qina and then, toward the mid-nineteenth century, as *shaykhs* al-'Arab: G. Alleaume, 'La naissance du fonctionnaire', *Égypte - Recompositions* numéro spécial de *Peuples méditerranéens* 41–42, Oct. 1987–March 1988, p. 72. There are, of course, some continuities between the two 'eras' discussed here, which, at least initially, concerned individuals as well as institutions. Before 1819, for example, trade with Europe was managed by the governors of Damietta and Rosetta, or by the chief customs officer; and I have discovered financial ties between

Yusuf Shakur 'Kan'an', who was chief customs officer at least until 1829, and Muhammad al-Mahruqi as well as his closest business associate, 'Umar al-Husayni. See Damasi, *Al-Iqtisad*, p. 241 note 228. In particular, Kan'an held the Bulaq customs in 1828: BD 140, from the financial department to Habib Efendi, Ma'iyya turki 745, p. 64, doc 116. He was also supervisor of the department of leather production, to which Mahruqi owed approximately 70,000 paras. 'Umar al-Husayni owed another 50,000 to Kan'an personally.

85 Specifically, 11,278 paras to the department of livestock, 5,000 to the textile bureau, 6,000 to the department of supplies and 50,843 to the manufactory at Bulaq – i.e. barely over 73,000 paras in total, 0.06% of his debt to the state. QASK 289 doc 510, p. 231.

86 Sami, *Taqwim*, vol. II, p. 350.

87 As Hourani puts it, '[T]he tendency for ethnic difference and economic specialisation to go closely together in the traditional society of the Muslim Middle East': *Emergence*, p. 103. See also R. Tignor, 'The Economic Activities of Foreigners in Egypt, 1920–1952: From Millet to Haute Bourgeoisie', *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 22, 1980, pp. 416–49.

88 See Shalabi, *Al-Muwazzafun*, p. 42 (according to this writer, Muhammad 'Ali reserved the highest offices in the state administration to Turco-Circassians, Copts and 'foreigners' – i.e. Europeans).

89 See, for example, the analysis provided by A. Bittar of Greek-Catholic merchants' careers under the pashalik of Zahir al-'Umar ('La dynamique commerciale', pp. 182–3): 'Mû par une profonde solidarité ethnique et religieuse, [Ibrahim al-Sabbagh] fit appel à d'autres membres de sa communauté pour remplir les postes importants de l'administration'. The same mechanism is in evidence in Boghos's trajectory, and the immigration of Armenians to Egypt in Muhammad 'Ali's time: see, for example, Philipp, *Syrians in Egypt*, p. 64 ('The Armenians, who had played no particular role under the old regime, suddenly came into the limelight through Boghos Pasha Yusuf, who was probably the person closest to Muhammad 'Ali and enjoyed his absolute trust Under his patronage other Armenians became especially powerful in the administration').

90 'Rousseau avait déjà remarqué que les détenteurs du pouvoir étatique n'entretiennent pas seulement leurs propres intérêts, mais aussi une conscience de classe particulière fondée sur ces intérêts communs'. W. Reinhard, 'Élites du pouvoir, serviteurs de l'État, classes dirigeantes et croissance du pouvoir d'État', in ibid. (ed.) *Les élites du pouvoir*, pp. 1–24.

9 Armenian labour migration to Istanbul and the migration crisis of the 1890s

Florian Riedler

Introduction

The importance of the migration experience for the Armenian community in the past and present is widely acknowledged. This is more so because of a central event in modern Armenian history, the extermination of the Ottoman Armenians in 1915 with its deplacements of populations, streams of refugees and new diasporas, that can be integrated into the narrative of migration. Yet, here a very specific form of migration is brought to the foreground, namely unfree or forced migration.

The distinction between unfree and free migration has been identified as one of the most fundamental and enduring distinctions in migration studies. Although research on the former category tends to view migrants as victims of outside forces, in the latter category the motivation of migrants and the general economic circumstances of migration are more open to consideration. The archetypical figures of these two categories are, on the one hand, the refugee and, on the other hand, the labour migrant. Only exceptionally have studies on the social reality of migration come to appreciate the fact that, in many situations, different forms of migration can blend into each other very easily. This happens at the level of the individual migrant and his or her motives to migrate; it also happens at an institutional level, with the authorities' reactions and policies towards different groups of migrants.[1]

Recently, studies on migration to the Ottoman Empire also have adopted such a revisionist approach. Notably the history of Muslim refugees that were expelled from Russia to the Ottoman realm during the nineteenth century has been read against the grain to discover experiences and practices that do not seem to fit the received categorisation.[2]

In this chapter I examine the history of Armenian labour migration to Istanbul in a similar fashion. Particularly for the last quarter of the nineteenth century, when Ottoman Armenians were subjected to violent persecutions by the Ottoman state, migration has been told as a pre-history of later extermination through forced migration. In this light the more mundane aspects of migration have often been overlooked. In the following I will argue that for the Armenian case there is good reason to merge the two perspectives of unfree and free migration, especially regarding the late nineteenth century. Not only was the migration of Armenian peasants to Ottoman cities stimulated and accelerated by economic and political developments, but also, during the persecutions of the 1890s, migrant workers could suddenly become refugees before short-term motives of personal security would switch back to long-term economic considerations.

Besides offering new avenues to examine the development of the Ottoman Armenian community, this merger of perspectives on migration also sheds light on the attitudes, ideologies and policies that the Ottoman state adopted towards migration. Set against the background of a traditional way of dealing with migration, new political concerns began to play an increasing role in the time under consideration. Control and surveillance of migration, which before had been elements of the official policy, began to gain in importance, not least in the light of new administrative techniques at the government's disposal to steer migration. The relative abundance of sources make this state-centred focus an especially viable avenue of investigation. Managing migration has a long history in the Ottoman context, particularly with regard to the Ottoman capital. To begin with, I wish to demonstrate the entanglement of the Armenian community in the general picture of migration in the Ottoman Empire before turning to the specific context of Armenian labour migration in the last quarter of the nineteenth century.

Sürgün, refugees and labour migrants

The history of Istanbul offers a good case to illustrate the importance of migration for the Armenian community, as well as the principal attitudes of the Ottoman state towards migration. Migration could become part of 'population management' in the framework of *sürgün*, the policy of deportation and resettlement of populations the Ottoman state used throughout its history for economic and political purposes. After its conquest by the Ottomans, Istanbul was almost an empty city, and it had to be systematically repopulated by transplanting groups from other cities in the empire to the new capital. Apart from the necessity to literally fill the city with people, these resettlement measures also served a political aim to keep certain elements of the population under the scrutiny of the state. In waves of resettlements that concerned all the major communities of the empire, the Armenian community was also re-established in Istanbul.[3]

At first, groups of Armenians from other cities like Bursa and Edirne were called to Istanbul. In the following decades rather small groups of Armenians from places as far away as Kaffa, Bayburt, Trabzon, Kayseri, Amasya, Karaman, Ankara and Konya were settled in the new capital. They formed the original nucleus of the urban community that, from the seventeenth century onwards, became one of the most important centres of Armenian life.[4]

In these early transplantations of populations, political and economic motives were balanced, the latter factor gaining in importance in times of stability. Under premodern conditions of labour scarcity the recruitment and control of this valuable resource by the state became a typical feature of the Ottoman economy. In many instances this practice resulted in forced temporary or permanent migration to the capital of considerable groups of workers and craftsmen. Particularly highly specialised, but also unskilled workers, were drafted into government projects and were forced to work for little or no money. Places like the Imperial Arsenal, as well as big civilian projects like the construction sites of the imperial mosques, benefited from the forced recruitment of craftsmen such as carpenters, stone-cutters, etc. Another sector that involved the relocation of workers was the production of luxury goods such as miniatures or carpets for the palace. Especially during the expansion phase of the Empire, considerable groups of highly trained artists and craftsmen were forced to move to Istanbul from places newly conquered, such as Cairo and Tabriz.[5]

The Armenian community in Istanbul also grew because of these forced recruitments. Artisans from Van, Yerevan and Nakhichevan were moved to the Ottoman capital after the campaigns in the east in the beginning of the sixteenth century. Additionally, there was a regular forceful recruitment of Armenian youth in Anatolia from the late fifteenth to the early seventeenth centuries. Although very similar in style to the devşirme on the Balkans, these recruits probably did not serve in the Janissary corps, but in other functions.[6] Mobilising labour in this form went on until the nineteenth century. Adolphus Slade, a traveller to Istanbul in the 1830s, relates that in winter 1835 up to 2,000 Armenians from Anatolia were pressed to come to the capital to work as plasterers and carpenters on soldiers' rations and pay.[7]

Although this kind of migration was initiated and controlled by the government, it is likely that the majority of migrants to Istanbul were received less favourably by the authorities. One group adding to the growing population of the Ottoman capital was refugees during the frequent periods of lawlessness and internal warfare that Ottoman Anatolia witnessed from the late sixteenth century onwards. On such occasions, large groups of people fled the insecurity of the countryside to find shelter in the cities of the region as well as in the capital. Among the refugees who came to Istanbul were many Armenians, the most famous of them being the later patriarch Krikor of Kemah on the Euphrates. In general, the Ottoman government tried to stop such uncontrolled migration, fearing loss of the migrants as taxpayers in the provinces for good. Additionally, the capital was considered as overcrowded so that it would be hard to provision any further inhabitants. After the period of repopulation of Istanbul, population management mainly began to consist of averting unwanted migration to the city.[8]

In contrast to the periodic arrival of refugees, the constant trickle of migrants from the countryside looking for employment opportunities was even more important for Istanbul's growth. This form of migration, although disliked by the authorities for the same reasons, was absolutely necessary to keep up the city's level of population in times of bad sanitary conditions and recurring epidemics. Because migrants of this sort left little trace in the official sources, an effort is needed to study this phenomenon.[9]

Side by side with this unspecified form of migration and blending into it, there was also a more organised and steady system of labour migration bringing men from the provinces without their families to work in Istanbul for a certain period of time. This system rested on the economic imbalance of the empire that channelled the excessive workforce of the countryside to the areas of labour scarcity, i.e. the cities and most notably the capital. The resulting circles or systems of migration became stabilised by tradition and they functioned, in principle, without interference from the government. Under the conditions of an urban economy, work seasons were not very well pronounced as was the case for short-term circular migration in the agrarian sector. For this reason individual workers could, and most probably often did, become permanent citizens of the capital after a time and circular migration tended to blend into the unwanted flow of migrants to the city described above. However, for a large number of labour migrants, working alone in the city while the family remained in the countryside became a lifestyle for a considerable time, if not for all of their lives.

Because some of the most vital branches of the city like the transport and supply business were dependent on outside labour, the government could not interdict this form of migration that invited large groups of unattached men called *bekar* in Ottoman and *pandukht* in Armenian into the city; some then stayed. However, the authorities tried to integrate this form of migration into their system of ordering and policing the capital. The guilds were to control labour migrants and their apartments, the so-called *bekar odaları*, during their stay in the city. As soon as such workers were not employed any more or vanished from that control in any other way, they were treated like other unwanted migrants and expelled from the city.

Labour migration in the nineteenth century

We have no systematic knowledge before the nineteenth century about the volume of this type of migration, the shape of its systems and their alterations. From sources taking an interest in the economy and social life of the Ottoman capital, we can learn some of the particularities of such circles of labour migration organised in the framework of the guilds. Such sources also hint to the fame of *bekar*s in the lore of Istanbul. Among them, Armenians from Anatolia also had an important place. In Eremya Çelebi Kömürcian's description of seventeenth-century Istanbul, Armenian bakers are mentioned, but their origin is not specified. In his description of the guilds of the capital in the same century, Evliya Çelebi mentions Armenian canal workers or cesspool cleaners (*lağımcı*), who in a large number originate from Kayseri.[10]

With the reintroduction of empire-wide censuses, the quantitative aspects of labour migration becomes visible. Two censuses, 1844 and 1857, offer the first statistics of labour migrants to Istanbul.[11] In total, 76,000 and 90,000, respectively, were employed in the capital a number that amounted to 35 and 39 per cent of the male population of the city. The breakdown of these numbers to the five recognised religious communities (*millet*) (Muslim, Greek-Orthodox, Armenian-Gregorian, Armenian-Catholic and Jewish) reveal an overrepresentation of the Christian communities among the seasonal migrants that is especially stark regarding the Greeks. In 1857, over half of the male Greek community of Istanbul consisted of migrant workers who took a share of 35 per cent of all workers from the provinces, although the Greek community only amounted to approximately 25 per cent of the city's population. In contrast to this, the numbers in the Armenian community were lower and went down slightly in between the two censuses. In 1857, 21 per cent of all temporary workers had an Armenian background, which was approximately the same share that the Armenian community held among the population of Istanbul.

Some particularities of Armenian labour migration at the time between the two censuses can be determined from a population register (*yoklama defteri*) giving an overview of Armenian migration in the month of Receb 1265 (May/June 1849).[12] As is the case with similar documents concerning Muslim labour migrants, these take note of comings and goings of workers in various quarters of Istanbul and the suburbs, as well as in Istanbul khans. Regarding the urban geography of migration, one of the centres of Armenian migrants in Istanbul was the old city. According to these documents, many of the migrants came to the old centres of Armenian settlement like Gedikpaşa, a popular quarter that was a traditional entry point of many labour migrants. According to Evliya in the seventeenth century, it had a large khan reserved especially for provincial workers.[13] Also, other established Armenian quarters in Istanbul like Samatya, Langa and Balat were entry points to the city. Additionally, a new and most vibrant centre of Armenian migrants formed north of the Golden Horn in Kasımpaşa and Galata. These were the quarters where, half a century later, the persecution of Armenian workers, which is the focus of the second part of this chapter, was strongest. Most of the seasonal migrants from the Armenian community registered in the 1849/50 census, however, lived in khans scattered all over the city.

Typical employment for Armenian seasonal migrants was that of a porter (*hamal*). Charles White's account of the urban economy of Istanbul in the mid-nineteenth century claims that of the 8,500 registered porters in Istanbul, two-thirds were Armenians originating from Van and its neighbouring provinces. Like other seasonal migrants they worked and lived together in teams under an experienced headman. As we know from the inquiry into the urban economy that the British consul undertook later in the century, the members of these teams usually originated from the same village or town, to where they returned afterwards. Their stay in the city could last up to several years 10 or 12 according to White thus totally losing its seasonal character. This account also hints at the self-perpetuating nature of seasonal work migration: as it occurs in other realms, jobs as porters were passed on in the family.[14]

Although the porters could claim an established position in the urban economy of the capital, census documents concerning the quarter of Kasımpaşa offer an alternative picture of Armenian labour migration. With almost no exception, migrants arriving in the summer of 1849 in that quarter worked as day-labourers (*rençber*), probably in the nearby arsenals and arsenal workshops. In a large part they came from the vilayet of Bitlis, more specifically from the environments of the towns of Bitlis, Hizan and Şirvan to the west and southwest of Lake Van. There were smaller groups from the Van region to the east of lake Van and from Kiğı in the vilayet of Erzerum, a hundred kilometres to the northwest of Bitlis.[15]

It is interesting to note that this structure of Armenian labour migration to Kasımpaşa is very similar to that of Muslim (i.e. Kurdish) migration at the same time. As the registers of 1849/50 show, Muslim migrants to the quarter also came predominantly from the Bitlis region (43 per cent) and from Kiğı (13 per cent) to work as day-labourers in Istanbul.[16] This seems to suggest that we are confronted with a single system of migration that was organised regionally, rather than along ethnic or religious lines. Regarding this aspect, the lower end of the work market seems to have been organised in a similar fashion to the more formalised structures of the Istanbul urban economy, where Muslim and non-Muslim workers were occupied in the same branches and organised in the same guilds.[17] In the case of Kasımpaşa, the jobs in question were of a more humble nature. Overall, we are confronted here with a particular kind of migration of poor workers to a quarter of the city that has been classified as a 'gecekondu' zone *avant la lettre*.[18]

Of the succeeding Ottoman censuses, only the data of the one undertaken in 1882 has been made accessible as yet and allows similar calculations on the impact of migration to Istanbul.[19] In this census the inhabitants of the capital were registered according to their type of habitation. Seasonal migrants can be expected among the men registered as living in shops and inns. With approximately 61,000 individuals, their ratio of 28 per cent of the total male population was slightly less than at the middle of the century. If this decrease is not due to purely technical problems in the process of counting, it probably has to do with the economic depression the Ottoman Empire was witnessing after the state bankruptcy and the war with Russia for much of the 1870s and 1880s. Istanbul was hit especially hard, because it was dependent on foreign capital and also lost much of its function as an entrepôt of foreign goods to other cities.[20]

At the same time, this crisis made the economic situation in Eastern Anatolia deteriorate to a degree that seasonal migration was one of the few options for people to get by. The Ottoman government was aware of the situation; however, it tried to discourage such migration. A decree (*irade*) of autumn 1894 dealt with the stream of villagers trying to reach the capital via Trabzon, the port serving the interior of Eastern Anatolia, to secure their livelihood by looking for jobs as day-labourers and porters. Because of security concerns the government decided to prevent passage of these migrants, who, for the greatest part, had no orderly papers that allowed them to travel. They were sent home even before they had reached their destination, because it was suspected that among them might be criminals and deserters. However, acknowledging the bad economic conditions, the government promised to establish an agricultural charity fund (*ziraat sandıkları*) from the private property of the sultan to support destitute villagers.[21]

Apart from its decrease, the structure of labour migration did not seem to have changed substantially according to the 1882 census. Greek workers, especially, were still overrepresented, although not as highly as in the boom-years after the Crimean War. According to the figures of 1882 there were around 12,000 Armenian workers in the capital, approximately 20 per cent of all temporary workers, who made up *c.* 30 per cent of the Armenian community. As earlier in the century, there were two big centres of Armenian labour migrants in the Ottoman capital. One was located in Beyazıt, i.e. the traditional commercial centre on the Historical Peninsula that also included the area of Gedikpaşa. Here, seasonal migrants were in their majority registered as living in khans. The other centre of migration was Beyoğlu, including the area of Kasımpaşa, where seasonal workers preferably inhabited the shops they worked in.

The origin of this stream of migration and the jobs of the migrants mainly as porters and in the building trade did not change very much. For the villagers from Eastern Anatolia this was the only way to earn money and return after a few years to buy some land, marry and pay their taxes.[22]

Kasımpaşa remained a centre for Armenian labour migrants to Istanbul in the following decade. Still in the 1890s, Protestant American missionaries took to the quarter to evangelise among them. According to these missionary sources, at the beginning of the 1890s there were around 35,000 Armenian labour migrants from Anatolia in Istanbul.[23]

The massacres of 1895 and 1896 in Istanbul

The foregoing discussion showed that Armenian migration to Istanbul operated in the framework that shaped migration to the capital in general. However, towards the end of the nineteenth century it became increasingly politicised in the context of the so-called Armenian Question, i.e. the issue of Armenian cultural and/or political self-determination in Eastern Anatolia.[24] The origin of this issue lay in the complex set of political, economic, social and cultural problems that the eastern part of the Ottoman Empire and its populations were facing since the central government had re-established control over the area from the 1830s onwards. This had severe consequences, some of which directly touched on the issue of migration. The central government started to collect taxes in the area forcing many peasants to take up work in the city as the only means to earn cash to meet their obligations. Of a more indirect nature was the economic restructuring of the whole empire that also affected its eastern parts and put subsistence farming in the area under pressure. An additional problem was the issue of land reform and instances of massive land grabbing by powerful landlords.[25]

This entangled set of problems and also its connection to migration became increasingly urgent in the aftermath of the Ottoman Russian war of 1877 8. Like previous wars in the area it brought additional unrest to an already lawless region, worsened the economic outlook and, as in the Balkans, the other and more prominent theatre of such displacements, set populations in motion. According to estimates of the Armenian Patriarchate during and after the war, up to 87,000 Armenian peasants left the region for Russia. Until 1912 it is said that a total number of 150,000 Armenians emigrated to Russia, to other Ottoman cities as well as to the Middle East and the Americas. All these figures remain highly contested today.[26]

At the same time, to answer the question of who would rule Eastern Anatolia and in what manner, new competitors apart from the Ottoman state and the local Kurdish notables appeared on the scene. These were, first, the Powers and European public opinion who succeeded in inserting a reform programme in favour of the Armenian community into the peace treaty of Berlin that concluded the war. Second, these years saw the formation of the Armenian revolutionary movement. Although by far the weakest of the contenders, it was mainly as a reaction to the groups, organisations and individuals forming this movement that the issue of migration of Armenians to Istanbul slowly moved to the top of the political agenda in the 1890s.

Decisive in this process were a series of pogroms and massacres against the rural and urban Armenian communities in the empire. These started in summer 1894 when the Ottoman authorities violently quelled unrest in the Sasun region in the north of Bitlis, where Armenian peasants aided by two nationalist agitators refused to pay taxes to the central government. This local issue was pushed to a higher stage by international protests and particularly by a demonstration of the Armenian community at the Sublime Porte in Istanbul, which ended in a shoot-out between the police and Armenian revolutionary groups (the so-called *Bab-ı Ali hadisesi*) on 30 September 1895. Protests by the Powers were pro forma acknowledged by the Ottoman government, which adopted a reform scheme for five of its eastern provinces similar to the one proposed in 1878. However, at the same time, to nip Armenian political demands in the bud, in the first weeks of October 1895, a series of pogroms were initiated, or at least not prevented, by the central government with the help of local forces. They started in the capital itself, covering many cities and villages in the east and southeast of the empire. A third wave of massacres swept the country after the violent takeover of the Ottoman Bank in Galata by Armenian terrorists in the summer of the following year. This time mainly Istanbul, but also cities in the east like Van, were affected.[27]

Armenian migrant workers in Istanbul were deeply involved in these events. First of all they brought the situation in their home regions to the knowledge of the Armenian community in the capital. It is relayed that many of the participants in the demonstration at the Sublime Porte on 30 September 1895, which had been organised by the revolutionary Hunchak group, had been workers from Eastern Anatolia. It remains an open question as to what degree those participants were politicised by the propaganda of the group. There is at least some indication that the group had a certain following in the capital, also among the poorer classes to which the labour migrants belonged.[28] Hunchak had been founded in Geneva in 1886 by Armenian students from Russia with the aim to liberate Ottoman Armenia by way of revolutionary struggle and to erect a just and equal society and economy. Apart from the clearly nationalist agenda, because of its socialist orientation, workers always had been in the focus of the group. Hunchakist propaganda not only highlighted the suppression by the central state and local government that forced the Armenian peasants of Eastern Anatolia to migrate, but also hinted at the exploitation by Armenian middlemen and traders in the cities that aggravated the plight of the workers.[29]

More immediately apparent is the role of labour migrants as victims of the pogroms in Istanbul during the two days following the demonstration. Immediately after the events there were some random killings of Armenians in various quarters of the city. The night witnessed attacks on two khans, the Çukurçeşme Hanı at Laleli, and another khan at Kasımpaşa, where several hundred Armenian workers were massacred.[30] Workers were also attacked immediately at their workplaces, such as the brick factory at Hasköy and the gas works at Galata, and they were, in some instances, killed by their Muslim colleagues.[31] Afterwards many Armenian workers were discharged, for example those employed at the ministry of the navy (probably working at the arsenal), and were sent home to their provinces by the police.[32]

Much worse was the repression of Istanbul Armenians that started after a group of Armenian terrorists occupied the Ottoman Bank in Galata and two other buildings in the city on 26 August 1896; they had killed several Ottoman policemen and passers-by. This provocative act of violence did not involve any popular participation as had been the case at the demonstration at the Sublime Porte a year earlier. But it had been secretly planned and executed by another Armenian revolutionary group, the Dashnak (Federation of Armenian Revolutionaries), in revenge for the massacres of the preceding year. The four leaders of the plot were Armenian students from Europe; however, the other participants apparently had been recruited from among the Istanbul porters.[33] The Dashnak, founded in Tiflis in 1890, advocated guerrilla tactics and terrorist action in their programme that, up to then, had been implemented mainly in Anatolia. It is said that the raid on the Ottoman Bank was to provoke an Ottoman overreaction in the capital and thus draw the European Powers further into the affair. The urban unrest that followed the Dashnak's action lasted for three days and cost the lives of up to 6,000 Armenians. Once again it seems that these killings were tolerated and probably, to a degree, were secretly steered by parts of the Ottoman authorities.

As differentiated as the landscape of the city itself, the killing and plundering, too, presented itself in a differentiated fashion a hint to the fact that beyond the confrontation between nationalists and the state there were also other conflicts present. Similar to the incidents of the previous year the mass of the victims were again to be found among the Anatolian workers. Quarters like Galata or Samatya, where the terrorists had staged their provocations, were immediately put under siege by armed bands. At Kasımpaşa and Hasköy, where many of the poorer labour migrants lived, most of the Armenian inhabitants were killed. Their houses and shops were looted by their Muslim and Jewish neighbours. In contrast, in other parts of the city, for example at Kumkapı, at the seat of the Armenian Patriarchate, it remained relatively calm.[34] Also in the outlying districts, the Ottoman authorities tried to prevent the outbreak of any violence. On the Princes' Islands in the Sea of Marmara and in Kadıköy on the Asiatic side of the Bosphorus to where many Armenians had fled, the police were reinforced to keep order and prevent clashes between Armenians and Kurdish workers.[35] Likewise in the district of Kartal, where Kurdish and Albanian workers were besieging shops and a church where Armenians were hiding.[36]

Although on the whole the killings were clearly a political reaction to the provocations of Armenian nationalists, in many cases there was also an economic connection between the perpetrators of the killings and their victims. Immediately after the capture of the Ottoman Bank, men armed with sticks (hence their name *sopacı*) randomly formed groups and killed any Armenian they met in the streets. There have been some accusations that these 'mobs' had been actively formed by the police and equipped with their weapon of choice in the days before the events.[37] Many eyewitnesses described that they were often led by imams and medrese students and were composed of 'Kurds, Lazes, Gipsies and refugees from European Turkey', i.e. the economically marginal population of the city.[38] The political motives of the instigators and economic motives of the perpetrators matched, and the one instrumentalised the other. As in the incidents after the demonstration at the Sublime Porte of half a year before, in some very drastic cases, colleagues that worked together killed each other. Thus, the Kurdish railway porters at the central train station of Sirkeci and those at the customs houses murdered their Armenian colleagues to take over their jobs.[39]

The embassies of the Powers that protested against the killings in a collective note even hinted at the possibility that the authorities directly made use of some Istanbul guilds to organise the repression of the Armenian community.[40] If guilds could be used as 'shock troops' against suspected political enemies, the solidarity inside the respective guilds that also had many Armenians as members must have been rather weak. It is impossible to prove such an allegation. However, how important the guilds were in keeping up order becomes clear regarding an incident a year after the massacres of 1896. In a similar fashion to a year before, Armenian terrorists tried to create disorder via bomb attacks, on the seat of the grand vizier as well as other prominent buildings in the city, in which several people were killed or hurt. Unlike in 1896, the culprits were arrested speedily and the police dispersed the crowds that formed after the events. An instruction from the grand vizier's office to the Istanbul municipality and the ministry of police ordered all Muslim porters, day-labourers and workers who lived in the khans, bachelor rooms and hamams of the town to be put under the special supervision of the wardens of their lodgings (*odabaşı*) and the principals of their respective guilds (*esnaf kethüdaları*) to prevent any outrage.[41]

This episode offers proof for the continuing importance of guilds regarding questions of urban governance even at times when their economic influence was waning.

Flight, emigration and deportation

The events just described seriously affected the Armenian presence in Istanbul and particularly that of Armenian workers. During, and immediately after, the massacres of August 1896, many thousand Armenians, poor workers, small shopkeepers and other professionals, spontaneously fled the city in panic. An account of stocktaking undertaken by the city administration three years later, which lists about 1,000 individuals that did leave the country and later returned, reveals the range and magnitude of this wave of escape. Favourite destinations of the refugees had been nearby Bulgaria and Greece, but also Alexandria, Western Europe and America. The more affluent the refugee, the freer he was in the choice of his place of asylum. Most of the poorer labourers such as porters (*hamal*), workers (*amele*), innkeepers (*odabaşı*) and servants (*uşak*) residing in Galata could only go back to their places of origin in Anatolia.[42]

Emigration continued after this first spontaneous wave. It seems that in the beginning the authorities facilitated the departure of Armenians from Istanbul by granting passports in a liberal and uncomplicated fashion to workers who were afraid to return to their jobs and to businessmen who wanted to try their luck elsewhere. Later, due to the negative economic effects of this exodus, this measure was partly taken back. It was not only the absence of shopkeepers and traders that disrupted business life in the capital, but also the enforced switch from Armenian to Kurdish porters in many areas, for example in the Istanbul custom house, did not run smoothly, as a complaint by the chamber of commerce suggests.[43] Emigration papers were only to be granted to those Armenians who officially renounced their Ottoman nationality and stated that they would never return to the empire. Armenians who had spontaneously fled the country and now wanted to return could apply within a certain period of time. Behind these strict measures stood the fear of the authorities that freedom of movement of a transnationally connected group such as the Armenians could also enable Armenian terrorists to enter the country.[44]

Besides the Armenians who left Istanbul out of fear in the aftermath of the killings in autumn 1896, many more were forcefully deported by the government. Already, after the demonstration at the Porte in 1895, the Ottoman cabinet had issued a decree (*irade*) with the objective of expelling all Armenians without a job from Istanbul, sending them back to their home regions and taking care that vagabonds (*serseri*) would not enter the city again.[45] In autumn 1896 many Armenian workers were randomly arrested and the authorities began to banish labour migrants from the city, accusing them of having been the main perpetrators of the unrest. It was particularly the governor (*mutasarrıf*) of the district of Beyoğlu (Pera) who pressed for getting rid of the Armenian servants, porters, workers and doorkeepers who were altogether suspicious of being in company with terrorists. Anyone who still employed such persons was asked to deliver them to the police in case they had been involved in the events. Anyone who wanted to employ them in future was to be held responsible in case they would take part in any revolutionary activities.[46] Additionally these porters and innkeepers were accused by the government of using shops and khans in possession of foreigners (and thus under restricted control of the Ottoman police) as headquarters for revolutionary committees from where attacks on the soldiers and the people had been planned and executed. Such places, too, should be searched and the inhabitants arrested.[47]

The possibility that Armenian revolutionaries could hide among Armenian labour migrants from Anatolia had already been discussed by the Ottoman government in the above mentioned decree of 1894 restricting immigration from Trabzon. Here strong security concerns were voiced that besides deserters and criminals among the many day-labourers and porters there could also be Armenian revolutionaries (*bir takım bedhah Ermeniler*) preparing terrorist acts in the capital.[48]

Following the events of 1895/6, as a rule, every shop in Galata was to be searched. Any excessive personnel were to be interned by the police and then, because of their high number and suspicious character, transported back to their home regions. To avoid any rumours, this procedure was to be supervised by the police as well as by a trusted official from the Patriarchate who would check that they arrived safe at their destinations.[49]

The British consuls in various towns of Asia Minor sent accounts of the deported workers arriving in destitute conditions in their hometowns in October and November 1896. Most of them were shipped to Trabzon, but there also arrived a sizeable number in Samsun and other smaller Black Sea ports, altogether around 3,000 individuals.[50] This number is consistent with the estimates of the Ottoman minister of police who claimed that there were 3,000 4,000 Armenian workers from Anatolia staying in Istanbul.[51] The head of the American Missionary Society ABCFM in Istanbul, H.G.O. Dwight, put the number of exiled Armenians even higher. According to him, the number of workers removed in the manner described above amounted to up to 5,000, while 3,000 Armenians did flee the city voluntarily. In his eyes these measures constituted 'a general war upon the Armenians engaged in business'.[52]

Renegotiations

In the following years there was much concern over the Ottoman policy preventing travel and migration of Armenians to Istanbul. In the Armenian relief campaigns in Europe and America, the issue became an additional point of critique vis-à-vis Sultan Abdülhamid. In the reasoning of the campaigners, the regime first massacred its subjects and then aggravated their economic condition by prohibiting them to seek employment in the capital.

An initiative from within the Ottoman administration, a visit and a petition to the Porte by the Armenian Patriarch as early as December 1897, was a more promising attempt to alter this situation. Among the 16 demands Patriarch Ormanian presented to the Porte were for traders to be granted permission to travel from one province to the other, as well as the admission back to Istanbul of anyone exiled to the provinces.[53]

This was just the first of a series of petitions and demands from the side of the Armenian Patriarchate with which it tried to help the community and renegotiate its position. Repeated interventions did not seem to have changed the situation in any way, so that at one point the patriarch as well as the Armenian Assembly, a secular body representing the Armenian *millet*, threatened to resign collectively.[54] Thus, the topic of migration and freedom of movement remained virulent throughout the last two decades before the First World War, highlighting the mixed political and economic imperatives that ruled the reaction of the authorities.

An exchange of letters between the Patriarchate and the Porte in November 1899 may serve as an example. Here the patriarch stated that because of the prohibition to look for employment as workers, day-labourers and other jobs, the livelihood of many Armenians had been destroyed and their misery and poverty were severe.[55] Outwardly this petition was treated favourably by the Ottoman authorities; however, in the regulations concerning its implementation that the Porte directed at the provincial administration most of the severe restrictions prevailed. With the very classical argument not to damage agriculture in the provinces, those people occupied in the rural economy were to be prevented from coming to the capital. Because the whole issue was deemed very sensitive, the Porte advised keeping the communication secret.[56]

In this formulation the restriction of seasonal migration relied more on economic than on political arguments. This is underlined by the fact that these regulations seemed to have also been enforced with regards to Muslim workers and day-labourers who were found unfit to work.[57] Therefore, certain exceptions from the ban on travel for Armenians were possible. One such exception concerned traders and shopkeepers who wanted to go to Istanbul for a limited time, no more than three to five days, to look after their business and their shops. Likewise, Armenians in government positions, as well as church officials, were exempted from the restrictions. The matter was further complicated by the fact that some Armenians tried to travel with documents issued by foreign consulates.[58]

Further petitions by the Patriarchate followed, the general thrust of which were that the Ottoman policy vis-à-vis Armenians was unjust, because it destroyed the livelihood of so many people and that it was implemented with excessive severity.[59] This last reproach was particularly directed at the police. They were accused by the patriarch of habitually putting under arrest any Armenian wanting to go to Istanbul, disregarding his standing and reputation. Even ill people looking for medical treatment in the capital and women looking for work as wet-nurses and servants, as well as children being sent to Istanbul for schooling were subjected to this kind of treatment. All of these groups were prevented from coming to the capital by special agents supervising the train stations and quays, under the legal pretext not to let vagabonds into the city.

The patriarch's petition called for an end to this practice not only regarding merchants, brokers and craftsmen (*tüccar, komisyoncu, esnaf*), but also for poor workers, male and female. The lobbying for the latter group was supported by humanitarian reasons: the poor of Anatolia had no other chance to earn money to pay their taxes, but to come to the capital. Half of the men in each household were obliged to work abroad to sustain their families.[60]

In a more general vein, the patriarch accused the authorities of deliberately discriminating against the Armenians in comparison to other Ottoman subjects, and especially in comparison to Armenians of the Catholic and Protestant communities. He feared that, out of hardship, his flock would go over to the latter two and he therefore insisted on equal treatment for all and an end to any exceptions.

The reply of the ministry of police to these accusations offers a good illustration of the political issues behind the policy of migration. First of all the police ministry rejected all claims of discriminating treatment against Armenians. Those with a clear background would be handed passports to travel inside the empire and to foreign countries immediately. If some people had been arrested, it had been only those who were either vagabonds coming under various pretexts to Istanbul or terrorists who hid among those Armenians returning home from Alexandria, Bulgaria and America. Anyone without a valid passport and a guarantor could be detained for a couple of days to determine his identity, and, in case of doubts regarding his intention and reputation, he would be returned to his place of origin. Overall, the measures would prevent thousands of Armenians streaming to Istanbul with their families and the negative effects this would have.[61]

This mix of severe restrictions and pragmatic exceptions to Armenian migration remained political practice up to the Young Turk revolution, as a decree issued in summer 1906 demonstrates. To prevent any repetition of terrorist acts, a set of conventional measures was reiterated including banishment from the city of all jobless Armenian workers, labelled vagabonds (*serseri*). Additionally, all remaining Armenian workers, journeymen and masters were to be registered by the police and the municipality and the whole work process was to be controlled. The main fear of the authorities was that Armenian-owned workshops and factories would secretly produce arms and bombs. To prevent this, not only such obvious professions as blacksmiths or foundry workers, but also engravers and etchers, were to be checked regularly by the police, because they worked with chemicals that, in the eyes of the government, could be used to fabricate explosives.[62]

In the process of drafting the decree the police as well as the Istanbul municipality gave an account of the situation. In the previous year, 120 suspicious Armenians from Anatolia had been deported to their home regions by the police authorities, some of whom had been living for many years in the city earning their living as inn and coffeehouse keepers, grocers or tinkers. Thus, apart from the Istanbul community proper, the Anatolian merchants and businessmen then currently present in the capital were only those who were temporarily there to buy and sell goods.[63]

The deportations of poor and jobless migrants that continued in the following years seem to have been partly conducted with the help of the Armenian Patriarchate. In a letter to the police ministry the Patriarchate claimed back the money it spent on boat fares for 57 poor and destitute migrants that had been transported home. The destination for the majority of them was Trabzon from where they had to reach their homes in Eastern Anatolia.[64]

Conclusion

Apart from the connection to the formation of the Ottoman Armenian community proper, a topic that has not been in the centre of this chapter, Armenian labour migration in the late nineteenth century offers an example for the changing attitudes and policies of the Ottoman state towards migration. On the one hand, there was a living tradition of migration management that prescribed these policies. The basic attitudes of the Ottoman authorities regarding the dangers of uncontrolled migration did not seem to have changed very much over the centuries. Here economic, but also security concerns were used as justifications to put migrants under state surveillance.

On the other hand, in the late nineteenth century very special political circumstances, such as the emergence of an Armenian nationalist movement, imbued the subject with new fears that led to harsher reactions. From some evidence it seems that surveillance and expulsion of certain groups of migrants was seen as an alternative and long-term strategy as compared to their persecution. In the context of the 1890s, both were options that were tried, but which still could be negotiated and adapted to the economic needs of the day. Whereas poor migrants and temporary workers were to a certain degree dispensable, there could be exceptions granted for traders and established businessmen. It was the task of the Armenian elite in the capital to negotiate these arrangements with the Ottoman authorities to alleviate the fate of their co-religionists.

Armenian labour migration is not the only case that illustrates the importance of migration for general changes in Ottoman governance. Migration from Mount Lebanon to America, immigration of Zionist settlers to Palestine as well as the migration of Russian Muslims to the Empire; research on all of these cases has revealed similar dynamics.[65] In each instance, that simultaneously occupied the Ottoman administration during the 1890s, the state experimented with new methods of surveillance trying to achieve results with reference to new ideals of the management of populations. To fully grasp the entanglement of the subject of migration with the pertinent questions of late Ottoman history, a comparative study of these and similar cases would be desirable.

Notes

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59 A.MKT.MHM 634–9, 9, Patrikhane to Adliye (8 M 1320); ibid., 14, Patrikhane to Sadaret (4 Z 1320).
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10 Immigration into the Ottoman territory

The case of Salonica in the late nineteenth century

Dilek Akyalçın-Kaya

The aim of this chapter is to trace immigration into Ottoman territory using the case of Salonica in the aftermath of the 1878 Ottoman Russian War. What was the nature of immigration regulations? What happened in practice? Who was in charge of settling and taking care of the immigrants? How did the local administration and its different departments deal with this issue? How did local people contribute and react to settling the immigrants? What kinds of problems arose with regard to this issue between central and local government? Where and how were the immigrants settled?

The Ottoman Empire underwent drastic changes as a result of mass immigration, especially after the wars of the second half of the nineteenth century. The Ottoman state had to undertake the difficult task of organising transportation for the immigrants, dealing with their health problems, redistribution and settlement. Although some previous studies have dealt with the general schemes of immigration in the Ottoman Empire,[1] with regulations,[2] and, finally, with the central commissions that were established to deal with the immigrants,[3] the local administration of immigration has not yet been studied comprehensively.[4] One needs therefore to concentrate on the local level and especially on the local administration of the immigration process.

Furthermore, the current immigration historiography for the Ottoman Empire has concentrated almost exclusively on the immigration of people of Muslim origin; and so one of the most important characteristics of these studies is a lack of interest in non-Muslim immigrants. Such studies generally focus on the arrival and problems of Muslim immigrants and ignore the settlement, for example, of Russian and Romanian Jews in the Ottoman Empire. An exception to this trend is the work of Kemal Karpat, who focuses on Jewish migration and on how the Ottoman government dealt with the situation.[5] His main interest is the migration of Jews from the Balkans to Anatolia and Syria after 1877 8 and the Ottoman settlement policies. Another exception is the work of Meropi Anastassiadou, who, in her study of the immigration of Muslims and non-Muslims, devotes a section to the city of Salonica in the context of the population boom in this city in the second half of the nineteenth century.[6]

To grasp better the scope of immigration into Salonica, I first provide some figures concerning the number of immigrants in the province. Second, I focus on the regulation regarding the local organisation of immigration and try to understand its application in the case of Salonica. Finally, I concentrate on Jewish settlement within the city.

Some figures on the immigrants in Salonica

During the 1877 78 Ottoman Russian war and its aftermath, the province of Salonica became a centre or *carrefour* for gathering and transferring immigrants. Some of these immigrants into Salonica were transferred to Anatolia and Syria, whereas others were settled within the province.[7] Nedim İpek mentions that before 10 September 1879, some 387,804 immigrants came to Istanbul from Rumeli only and that 274,875 of these were transferred to the provinces. We can deduce from the table he provides that 4.9 per cent of this population was sent to the province of Salonica.[8]

Another table of the distribution of immigrants transferred from Istanbul to other provinces between 1877 and 1891 shows that 4 per cent of the immigrants (18,878 out of 474,638 people) were transferred to Salonica.[9] Unfortunately, the origins of the immigrants settled here are not mentioned. However, these data reveal that Salonica was not one of the main places of settlement compared with provinces such as Hüdavendigar or Aydın, of which the percentages of immigrant settlement were 34 and 12, respectively, for this period.

The registers of immigrants kept in the empire's central administration[10] reveal only a partial picture of the immigration process. Through these documents and tables, we can keep track only of the immigrants who came to, and were distributed from, Istanbul. In other words, the immigrants who arrived at places in the Ottoman Empire other than the capital were not represented.

I have been able to find 51 registers that contain 80 tables of migration. Some were maintained daily, others monthly and others still annually. The registers contain two types of tables. One was kept for arrivals in the capital and the other for the distribution of immigrants from Istanbul to the provinces. Some of the arrival tables contain only the place of departure and the total number of immigrants arrived at a certain date; whereas most contain also migration routes and distribution of the immigrants according to their sex and age. The same is also true for the distribution tables, that is to say, some contain only the total number of immigrants and the province where they were going to be settled, but most mention also their distribution according to the categories mentioned above.

According to my findings in these tables, Salonica was first used as a place of transit, mostly by Bosnian immigrants, and then as a place of settlement largely for immigrants from Bulgaria. Salonica was used exclusively by Bosnian immigrants as a transit place en route for another transit place, namely the capital, by boat. From the registers we see that Bosnians started to use this route from the year 1892 onwards, until 1908. At the turn of the century, 4,488 Bosnian immigrants used Salonica as a place of transit for Istanbul. Some of the immigrants were placed in *khans* until they were able to find a passage to the capital. For example, in the year 1901, the Bosnian immigrants were placed in a *khan* whose owner was a certain

İsmail Ağa. The central administration was asked to transfer the cost of accommodation of the Bosnian immigrants in that *khan* to pay this person.[11] The local government was held responsible for finding accommodation and food. Although the immigrants sent from the capital to the province of Salonica were mainly from Bulgaria, some came from Western Rumeli. In March 1888, for example, immigrants who came to settle in Salonica stayed in mosques until their transfer to places within the province. The governor of Salonica therefore demanded 400 *lira* from the central administration as their settlement cost.[12] It should also be emphasised that the tables do not provide information regarding the exact place of settlement within the province of Salonica.

The regulation of 1888 and its application in Salonica

In this section, the main focus is on the 1888 regulation and its application in Salonica. First, I examine the establishment of local commissions, then the local urban and rural populations and their duties with regard to the immigrants. Next, I analyse the financial resources allocated to the immigrants and the problems related to the use of these resources. Finally, I concentrate on settlement and its repercussions in the villages and in the city.

The regulation of 1888,[13] published in Istanbul, is composed of five chapters, a total of 34 articles. The first deals with the officers responsible for immigrants and the commission to be established in the provincial centres; the second part is entitled 'on various matters'; the third is about the transfer of immigrants to their places of settlement; the fourth is about the rations (*ta'yinat*) to be distributed to the immigrants; and the fifth deals with the land and equipment to be given to the immigrants.

Local commissions

First, I focus on the establishment of the local commissions, their members and their duties. The related articles state the following:[14] an immigration officer and one secretary are appointed to the provincial centres to which the immigrants are transferred and settled. A commission of immigrant administration is to be established under the presidency of these immigrant officers with the approval and assistance of governors. The members of these commissions are composed of one salaried officer, one member from the municipal council, local officials, and three or four notables and public-spirited people from the provincial centre. The composition of the commission indeed affirms the statement made in the introductory paragraph: the immigrant issue is, in fact, a local matter. The central government is represented only by the immigrant officer controlling and maintaining the progress of affairs. However, it is the local officials and people who are supposed to know the capacity and the resources in the province to be allocated to the immigrants.

Another article mentions the establishment of branches of these commissions in the provincial centre. However, the main branches are to be established at the ports where the immigrants are transferred. According to need and necessity, the available officers and members are present at the ports when the immigrants arrive. Branches in the districts (*kaza*) and sub-provinces (*liva*), which are dependent on the commissions at the province's centre, are to be established. The distribution of rations to the immigrants and all the other matters are to be realised according to the decisions of these commissions. During the meetings, a majority of members are to be present, to sign and seal the decisions. The rations are to be distributed under the supervision of local government and by means of the commissions. The immigrant officers work under the supervision and assistance of the governors, and the commissions in the districts and sub-provinces (*sancak*) are to be under the supervision and assistance of *mutasarrıf* and *kaymakam* respectively. These officers are charged with settling the immigrants and seeing to their ease and comfort. The governors, *mutasarrıf*, *kaymakam*, local councils and commissions of immigrant administration are to do their best for the stability of settlement matters.[15]

The hierarchical structure of these commissions can be seen from the responsibilities and duties of each. The district commissions are meant to keep a register concerning the price and amount of the rations distributed, to be approved by the district council. Then they are sent to the sub-province commissions. They, in turn, together with their own registers prepared in the same manner, send all the registers to the provincial commission. After having been approved by the provincial commission, they are examined in the administrative council of the province (*meclis-i idare-i vilayet*) and a copy is sent to the administrative commission in Istanbul.

In order to check if this theoretical structure for the administration of immigration in the provinces works in practice, I chose three yearbooks from Salonica province, for years 1892, 1893 and 1894.[16] During these three years, although an immigrant officer was appointed to the province of Salonica, no provincial commission was established in the province centre. The districts of Köprülü, Sarı Şaban, Cuma-ı Bala and Razlık, and the sub-provinces of Drama and Siroz had their immigration commissions in these years. The regulation of 1888 mentions that commissions are established according to need, that is to say, when there are immigrants assigned to a certain district or sub-province. Therefore, it is natural that not all districts in the province of Salonica have a commission.

Unfortunately, the occupations of the commissions' members were not regularly mentioned in the yearbooks in question. As for the district, although it is not obligatory, the president can be a *müfti* or *kaymakam*. Among the members of the district commissions there is an administrative council, a secretary of title deed and a money changer (*sarraf*). For the sub-province commissions, soldiers can also be part of the commissions; for example, the president of one sub-province commission was a commandant of a brigade (*mirliva kumandanı*). Notables (*eşraf*) also took part in these commissions. It is interesting to note that in the commissions were officers of imperial crown lands (*defter-i hakani*) and population administration. Although they are not mentioned in the 1888 regulation, it is clear that they became part of the commissions. Immigration is a matter directly related to both these administrative bodies, one of which is responsible for keeping track of the population and the other of state lands. That is why they were in fact mentioned in the regulations as obligatory members, starting with the regulation of 1910.[17]

Together with the commissions, the local people, not only the notables but also the villagers, were also held responsible for the settlement of immigrants. Their assistance was called for in several ways. First, public-spirited individuals were asked to be part of the commissions. Their other responsibilities consisted of financially assisting the immigrants, and/or appointing them as servants until they find a job and so on. In return, they could be honoured with a decoration, according to the service undertaken during the transfer and settlement matters.[18] The villagers were asked to help build necessary housing for the immigrants and to cultivate the land apportioned to the immigrants for the first year. We do not know to what extent these kinds of duties were undertaken by the villagers and if they were ready, physically and mentally, to receive the newcomers. It seems that this sort of activity depended on the goodwill of these people, as they were asked to help voluntarily. We do not know what the sanctions were if villagers did not comply; or the incentives they could gain if they did. Although the regulations mention the duties of the villagers, there is no mention at all of either sanctions or incentives. How their capacity to assist physically and financially can be 'measured' is another question, unanswered by an examination of the registers.

Financial resources

One of the most important problems concerning immigrant arrival and settlement is the financial resources to be used for this. As the immigrants started to come en masse, the problem of creating financial resources for their use was felt more seriously. The central government, on the one hand, tried to group the financial resources to be used in the centre as most of the immigrants initially arrived in Istanbul and were thence distributed to the provinces. The local governments, on the other hand, tried to create their own financial resources for the immigrants. The allocation of financial resources was, therefore, a field open to conflict of interest. However, it should be mentioned that neither the regulations in general nor the one in question contain any articles on the allocation of financial resources.

Facing such a difficult situation, the local government tried to create its own financial resources by using any means, such as selling lottery tickets, organising fundraising dances and so on.[19] The procedure followed for this was for local government to get official permission from the centre to allocate any resources for the use of immigration expenses. For example, the governor of Salonica sent a telegraph to the grand vizier for permission to use the revenues from immigrant stamps. The governor of Salonica explained that the local treasury (*emval*) was insufficient to defray the expenses of the Bosnian immigrants who had started to come en masse to the province of Salonica. The grand vizier decided that stamp revenues should be kept separate and not allocated to the treasury. He also stated that the money needed for the immigrants was going to be transferred to the account of the stamp revenue and that this amount was to be spent, as it was needed in the locality. However, the Ministry of Finance was not willing to lose one of its own resources for immigrants' expenses to local government, and opposed this decision. Given the number of immigrants in the capital and the difficulty of finding resources for their needs, the Minister of Finance insisted that the stamp revenue was to be sent directly to the treasury and that immigrant costs were to be funded by the general financial resources of the local government.[20]

Another conflict between local and central government about resources for the immigrants arose in connection with the revenue from the hide of sacrificed animals. The 1888 regulation stated that registers should be kept for each item of expenditure for the immigrants and be sent to the central commission in Istanbul. The province of Salonica sent a telegraph explaining the resources spent and the expenses for immigrants in 1888.[21] The governor explained that 6,950 *guruş* were spent on rations, 40,000 *guruş* for housing and 1,500 *guruş* for the immigrants sent from Istanbul to the province of Kosova (transfer costs). The financial resources included selling tickets (92,410 *guruş*), 5 per cent of municipal revenues (66,290 *guruş*) and the revenue from the hides of sacrificed animals (1,500 *guruş*). After the usual inspection of the official permissions given to use these resources for immigrants, the centre concluded that there was no permission given from the centre regarding the use of hide revenue. On 23 September 1888 it demanded that the governor explain where they had gained permission to use this revenue for the expenses of immigrants. In fact the very same demand was reiterated on 10 December 1888, explaining that they had not received any response to the former demand. As Nedim İpek mentions in his book on migration, the hide revenue was assigned to the expenses of the immigrants. However, he provides examples that show this revenue in each province was sent directly to the capital.[22] In other words, this was one of the financial resources that the central government did not want to leave to local government.

Settlement in the province of Salonica

Having examined the provisions made, in the widest sense, for immigration matters and the allocation of financial resources, a more vivid picture can be provided by describing the articles on the settlement process and its actual application in the villages and cities. Some specific cases from Salonica help us to understand how the settlement locality was decided; who was in charge of finding such places; and how the immigrants were distributed among the villages and cities.

For the villages, Article 28 of the 1888 regulation mentions that the past and present situation of the village is to be examined by the administrative commissions of immigration, its branches and the administrative councils of the province, sub-province and district. As a result of this examination, empty lands and lands without owners are to be given over to the immigrants. Between 20 and 50 *dönüm*[23] of land will be distributed, according to the size of immigrant families. The finding of 'empty land' is analysed in detail in Yücel Terzibaşoğlu's dissertation: Terzibaşoğlu concludes that in fact the 'empty land' was not always as 'empty' as was thought.[24] The regulation also mentioned that in cases of trial or litigation about the land allocated to the immigrants or about the areas on which the immigrants are settled, the officers and members of the commissions are to examine and inspect the conditions, the rations and the land in question and are to act in accordance with the rules. Therefore, one of the most important matters in the villages was the allocation of land to immigrants.

In the village of Yüncüler in Salonica, a piece of land belonging to the treasury was thought to be suitable for the settlement of immigrants. The members of the immigrant commission probably did not go to the place directly to undertake an examination but instead looked at the registers kept in the province and stated that the land was empty. The matter got more complicated when they understood that 40 *dönüm* of the land was inhabited by the villagers without an official permission [*ruhsat*]. They had built houses and gardens. The two solutions possible either to evict these people or to leave the land to them without any cost seemed unacceptable. However, it is interesting to note that those responsible were not the inhabitants themselves, but the officers in charge of preventing such occupation. A middle way was therefore found: the 40 *dönüm* of land was to be left to the inhabitants who were to be given title deeds, in return for its value. With this solution, the problem of settling the immigrants became less important; there is no mention in the document as to what happened to the immigrants who were to be settled on this land.[25] It seems that once this issue of official permission was solved, the immigrants were settled, because a year after this event the names of the villages and immigrant quarters in this village are mentioned in some documents.[26]

There seems to be a relative lack of interest in the settlement of immigrants in cities. As Yücel Terzibaşoğlu mentions, the 'withdrawing Ottoman armies were often accompanied by long lines of refugee columns, *mostly peasants* [my italics] who had lost their lands and were displaced either because of direct military action, political design, civil strife, or some combination of these'.[27] This might be the reason why the regulation does not contain detailed rules about the settlement of immigrants in cities: the 1888 regulation has only two articles on this matter, Articles 31 and 32. One of these mentions that there is no obligation to settle the immigrants in villages; they can also be settled on the borders and environs of cities if there were empty lands. The second article related directly to settlement in cities. It explains that all the immigrants will not necessarily be farmers, and among them there will be teachers and artisans. If these people wish to settle in cities in order to perform their handicraft and profession, the necessary help and assistance should be provided to them. This is also true for those who volunteer to be apprenticed to artisans or to hire or buy *khans*, and, finally, wealthy immigrants who wish to settle in the cities.

As for the immigrants in the city of Salonica, P. Risal explains that, after the Ottoman Russian war and the treaty of Berlin, many Muslim families from Bulgaria and Bosnia began to settle in Salonica, on the hill of Çavuş monastery. This was a place of sparsely scattered habitation at the foot of the Acropolis. In 1880, Circassian immigrants from Dobrudja came to settle in Salonica.[28] Unfortunately, Risal does not mention their place of settlement within the city. Given the fact that there were limited spaces within the city, some of the immigrants were probably scattered across already existing quarters, whereas others were settled in big empty places; and the documents concerning the newly established quarters reveal procedures for establishing quarters.

In 1883, for example, there are three localities within Salonica where newcomers were settled: 67 houses were built on the empty land next to the garden of a certain Mehmed Çavuş and 81 others in Kala-ı Bala and 62 in Gölcük. These places had no connection with the other quarters nearby; so each of them became a quarter in itself. After having built the necessary houses for the immigrants, the second step was to integrate them into the administrative body of the province. First came the naming of these quarters. The immigrant officer in Salonica decided to call them Hamidiye, Selimiye and Mecidiye. Although it was the officer appointed by the centre who decided on the names, the administrative provincial council (*meclis-i idare-i vilayet*) also approved. The second step was the appointment of a headman for the quarter (*muhtar*) and a council of elders (*ihtiyar meclisi*). Finally, the governor of Salonica demanded official permission from the grand vizier for the realisation of these steps. This was granted on 26 June 1883.[29]

I mentioned above that there is no clear-cut regulation concerning settlement within cities. However, analysing a specific case related to this issue can provide us with complementary knowledge about the actual practices of immigrant settlement. There is, for example, the case of building a house for a certain Hadice, an immigrant from Crete. Some clues from this case can broaden our understanding of how things worked out. On 28 9 January 1903, the grand vizier decided to grant the cost of building a house for Hadice and her two daughters. The house was located on empty state land next to some other immigrant houses in the lower part of Yedikule. At this point some unanswerable questions arise: who was in charge at the local level of demanding from the centre the cost of the house? Was it the immigrant officer, the governor, or the municipality? Or is it possible that the immigrant herself might have sent a petition demanding the cost of building a house from central government? Again, who, among the local institutions mentioned undertook the task of choosing the place of the house?

At the demand of the grand vizier, the Ministry of Finance transferred the amount, 5,208 *guruş*, to the province of Salonica on 22 April 1903. Two years after the transfer, the house was not yet built and Hadice herself sent a petition directly to the grand vizier to inform him of the situation and demanded the house be built immediately. The only local actor in this case seems to be the governor: the grand vizier exchanged correspondences only with him to solve this issue. It was finally understood that the financial situation of the province was not strong and it was impossible to build the house immediately; the governor asked for the cost of the house to be transferred to next year's budget.[30]

With all these immigrants, their settlement within the city and the establishment of new quarters, it is hard to imagine that the city's physical appearance remained the same. With the establishment of the municipality in Salonica, reforms had already started there.[31] The yearbook of 1893 mentions, for example, that the tearing down of the city walls on the seashore, which had already started in 1869 70, progressed very slowly until 1878 when numerous immigrants arrived at Salonica. The need to enlarge the city then became urgent and establishing new quarters beyond the city walls began. It is also mentioned that in the last 10 15 years (from 1878 to 1893 4) the city doubled in size.[32]

Jewish immigrants in Salonica

Although we do not have regular lists or tables of Jewish immigrants who arrived in the empire during the last quarter of the nineteenth century, Kemal Karpat tries to deduce this number by analysing the figures of two population censuses, the first being undertaken in 1882 93 and the second in 1906 7. In the first census, the Jewish population in Salonica numbered 37,237 people,[33] whereas in the second, this number rose to 52,395. This increase, according to Karpat, 'can be attributed to migration from those areas in the Balkans that had been detached from the empire'.[34]

From the scarcity of lists and tables, it seems that Jewish immigrants from Russia and Romania and their settlement were not the responsibility either of the immigrant officer or the immigration commissions. As the regulations in general and that of 1888 do not differentiate between Muslim and non-Muslim immigrants, this means that the articles are supposed to be applied to all immigrants regardless of their faith. However, my impression is that matters concerning the Jewish immigrants in Salonica were dealt with by the local Jewish community and their institutions, mainly by the Alliance Israélite Universelle. Meropi Anastassiadou mentions that the local authorities in Salonica were incapable of taking care of the massive Muslim arrivals because of the municipality's financial situation;[35] in other words, the local government did not have the means to deal with the problems of Jewish immigrants, which left this issue to their co-religionists already in Salonica.

In the decade between 1882 and 1892, Jewish immigrants started to settle in Salonica; they were welcomed by the local Jewish community. The community readily provided the immigrants with medicine, food and procured all the facilities, such as the professional equipment and financial aid necessary for those who had a profession.[36] The Alliance assumed responsibility not only for professional matters but also for education. They began to give professional training courses for young immigrant boys (between 16 and 18 years old) to professions in their schools.[37] They also appointed the teachers.[38]

As Anastassiadou states, with massive Jewish arrivals starting from the middle of 1892, the situation became worrisome for the local Jewish community. Using the correspondence of the Alliance teachers in 1892, she provides an approximate list of the Jewish arrivals in that year: in July 83 families came to Salonica,[39] in August 1,000 immigrants arrived in the city[40] and finally 1,500 immigrants came in the middle of the same month.[41] Although not all were settled in Salonica and sent to other provinces,[42] it turned out to be extremely difficult for the local Jewish community to deal with the problems of the new arrivals. However, the Alliance was able to construct houses for the Jewish immigrants.[43] In times when their financial situation proved to be insufficient, they tried to find the necessary funding from other institutions in Istanbul. On 30 October 1892, for example, they made a demand to the Commission de Secours in Istanbul for financial aid for the use of Russian immigrants and received 2,750 francs for this purpose.[44]

It seems from this picture that the people who took responsibility for Jewish immigrants were the local Jews. Although this might be true for local government, this does not mean, however, that the Ottoman government played no role. Indeed, it was central government that gave official permission for settling within the empire, and, second, it was central government again, with the central immigration commission, that decided on the place of settlement. Finally, immigrants' rations and travel costs were provided by Treasury. In order to illustrate the participation of the central government in Jewish immigration matters, I will focus on a case of Russian and Romanian Jews who came to Istanbul, demanding settlement in Ottoman territory.

The document for this case dated from the years 1891 2.[45] Because of the constant flow of Jewish immigrants in these years from Romania and Russia, the Ottoman government faced a very difficult situation. It decided that the prefect (*şehremini*) should prepare a register of Jewish immigrants, separating Ottoman subjects from foreigners: the latter were not to be accepted into the Ottoman state but to be sent to their own countries or places of their choice, with the help of the respective consulates. As for Ottoman subjects, the government decided that half be sent to Salonica and the other half to Izmir. The matter seemed to be solved in this way; but in fact the real problem started at this moment. Those responsible for preparing the register were the prefect and the *tabiyet müdiri*. The only possible way to separate the Ottoman subjects from foreigners was to check their passports, but these immigrants had fake passports. So the authorities prepared a register in which the number of Jewish immigrants who were Ottoman subjects amounted to 278. But over the 20 days after the preparation of this register the number of immigrants who claimed to be Ottoman subjects amounted to 633 an impossibility according to the authorities, as the new arrivals within these 20 days could be 100 at most. In February 1892 the prefect asked for a new register, in which the total of Jewish immigrants was given as 963, of which 826 were Ottoman subjects.[46] After this issue was settled, another institution, the immigration commission, was asked to decide on a suitable place for their settlement and examine the cost. Izmir was chosen because the previous Jewish immigrants from Dobrudja were settled there. But the grand vizier stated that the number of immigrants was too high to settle in one place and therefore only half should be settled in Izmir, the other half in Salonica. It took around six months to settle this issue in Istanbul. Because there was a constant flow of immigrants, it was hard to establish a fixed number of arrivals, their countries of origin and other details. This might be the reason why, six months later, in August 1892, the Ottoman government decided to send the Jewish immigrants who arrived at Istanbul by boat directly to Salonica and Izmir, without letting them set foot in Istanbul. Recent experience showed that to deal with their separation proved time-consuming; central government therefore decided that local government and, to some extent, local community networks should deal with this issue.[47]

Conclusion

Policies introduced by the central administration and the central apparatus to overcome the problems do help us in understanding immigration and the transformation of Ottoman society from the second half of the nineteenth century.

However, immigration has always been a local issue in which two factors play major roles: first the capacity of local government to negotiate with central government over such matters as the number of immigrants to be settled within their province, the amount of money to be spent on their expenses and so on. Local financial resources were already limited and local government faced the difficulty of allocating existing local revenues and creating new resources for the newcomers. Therefore, as we have seen in the case of Salonica, the local government had to negotiate each issue with the central government in order to receive the immigrants without disturbing the equilibrium of local politics. Here the second factor comes into play: the capacity of local people to receive the newcomers. Although some local public-spirited people and some local community organisations (such as Alliance Israélite Universelle of Salonica in the case of Jewish settlement) searched for solutions to taking care of the immigrants, sharing material resources and land could result in conflicts between the local people and the immigrants. In this context, local administration had to balance the interests of each party while searching for negotiation with central government.

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10 These registers are: Y.PRK.KOM 3–37 [January 1882], Y.PRK.KOM 3–40 [15 January 1882], Y.PRK.BSK 5–58 [February–March 1882], Y.PRK.BSK 5–59 [21 March 1882], Y.PRK.KOM 4–65 [June 1885], Y.PRK.KOM 4–69 [June–July 1885], Y.PRK.KOM 4–71 [7 September 1885], Y.PRK.KOM 4–77 [December 1885–January 1886], Y.PRK.KOM 4–78 [28 January 1886], Y.PRK.KOM 4–79 [9 February 1886], Y.PRK.KOM 4–81 [March 1886], Y.PRK.KOM 4–85 [July 1886], Y.PRK. KOM 4–86 [2 August 1886], Y.PRK.KOM 4–93 [November 1886], Y.PRK.KOM 4–98 [November 1886], Y.PRK.KOM 4–103 [20 January 1887], Y.PRK.KOM 4–104 [2 February 1887], Y.PRK.KOM 4–107 [7 March 1887], Y.A.HUS 201–61 [1886–7], Y.PRK.KOM 4–107 [March 1887], Y.PRK.KOM 4–108 [26 March 1887], Y.PRK. KOM 4–110 [30 April 1887], Y.PRK.KOM 5–178 [10 December 1887], Y.PRK. KOM 6–147 [July 1888], Y.PRK.KOM 7–12 [8 October 1888], Y.PRK.KOM 7–17 [10 November 1888], Y.PRK.KOM 7–70 [19 September 1890], Y.PRK.KOM 7–53 [28 March 1891], Y.PRK.KOM 7–68 [August–September 1891], Y.PRK.KOM 8–12 [5 December 1891], Y.PRK.KOM 8–49 [2 April 1894], Y.PRK.DH 8–11 [15 July 1894], Y.PRK.DH 8–41 [29 December 1894], Y.MTV 191–68 [March–June 1899], Y.MTV 201–14 [1890–9], Y.MTV 204–5 [May–June 1900], Y.PRK. KOM 10–95 [June–September 1901], Y.MTV 225–110 [September–December 1901], Y.PRK.KOM 11–54 [June–July 1903].Y.MTV 252–138 [September–October 1903], Y.MTV 253–87 [October–November 1903], Y.PRK.KOM 12–115 [January–February 1904], Y.PRK.DH 12–70 [February–March 1904], Y.MTV 290–8 [August–September 1906], Y.MTV 291–143 [November–December 1906], Y.MTV 296–33 [1906–7], Y.MTV 300–44 [June–July 1907], Y.MTV 304–157 [November–December 1907], Y.MTV 310–3 [April–May 1908], Y.MTV 311–96 [May–June 1908], Y.PRK.KOM 16–41 [June–July 1908].
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14 The articles in question are listed from the first to the twelfth.
15 The travel allowance of the members of the branches and the commissions and the officers are to be given according to the regulation of the Treasury from the cash box [*emval*] of the local government: for the provincial centre commissions up to 250, for the *liva* branches 150 and for the *kaza* branches 100 *guruş* as various monthly expenses.
16 *1310 sene-i hicriyesine mahsus Selanik vilayeti salnamesi*, onbirinci defa olarak (Salonica, 1310); *1311 sene-i hicriyesine mahsus Selanik vilayeti salnamesi*, onikinci defa olarak (Salonica, 1311); *1312 sene-i hicriyesine mahsus Selanik vilayeti salnamesi*, onüçüncü olarak (Salonica, 1312).
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18 DH.MKT 1577–36; DH.MKT 1578–110; DH.MKT 1589–57.
19 İ.TNF 15–1310B-28; Y.PRK.ASK 84–90.
20 A.MKT.MHM 512–5 1901.
21 DH.MKT 1546–2 and DH.MKT.1573–12.
22 İpek, *Rumeli'den Anadolu'ya Türk Göçleri*, p. 82.
23 A land measure approximately of 1000 square metres.
24 He mentions that 'the local officials and notables in many districts had been "in the habit of usurping empty lands through legal or illegal means"', and that 'local land officials were issuing title deeds for the empty lands in the name of the local inhabitants, and thus distributing such lands to the local people'. Terzibaşoğlu, *Landlords, Nomads and Refugees*, pp. 117–57.

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33 Karpat, 'Jewish population movements in the Ottoman Empire, 1862–1914', p. 157.
34 Karpat, 'Jewish population movements in the Ottoman Empire, 1862–1914', p. 158.
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43 A.I.U. Greece III B 17–20, 16 August 1893; 18 September 1893.
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11 Migrant builders and craftsmen in the founding phase of modern Athens*

Irene Fatsea

Introduction

The formation of the Hellenic state in the third decade of the nineteenth century is widely known for having marked the offset of the grand historical project of national integration for all Greek people. However, it is less known for the multitude of practices that it fostered in the small scale of life, culture and administrative policy in view of a balanced form of government and a manageable transition from a premodern to a modern cultural state.[1] A major concern on the part of the Greek authorities was to ensure loyalties, social cohesion and a sense of community for their subjects. To that end, they invested with nationalist and ideological rhetoric any act aiming at the creation of institutional infrastructure or the repairing of the ravages left by the recent war. Among the instrumental tools that the agents of change used in order to reinforce emotional attachment to selected parts of the country's history was their appeal to myths of origin and the language of symbols, while casting in shadow some of the people's living traditions. Some authors regard such a self-conscious political programme of historical coercion as a sufficient and necessary condition for nation building. 'It is the state which makes the nation and not the nation the state', writes Hobsbawm.[2] Others take a more moderate stand by advocating that the nation, in its modern institutional form of nation-state, is not a deliberate construction or 'an imagined community' but 'the successful end result of a dialectical process'[3] in which all the pre-existent bonds of identity, culture and tradition among its members play a role by feeding into the new socio-cultural framework. If we believe then that the latter was the case with the Greek nation-state in the nineteenth century, we should seek to define the particulars that formed a transitional condition rather than a historic break. As a matter of fact, people's divorcement from a decentralised and multi-nuclear system of government, like the one to which they had been long accustomed as subjects of Ottoman rule, in order to conform to the homogenising directives of a new sovereign authority, was neither radical nor uniform as one would be led to believe under the spell of state rhetoric. It was subjected to the complexities of a centralised bureaucracy, which employed rational forms of control, organisation and self-management, whereas at the same time it subsumed in many of its functions residual cultural patterns of communal subsistence, such as domestic economy, cooperative and skill-based labour, and fluctuating migration.

This chapter undertakes to illuminate part of post-independence Greek history, which bears vivid the signs of this transition, that is, the world of building practice as related to its paramount agents, the builders and craftsmen. Most of them, having flowed from various peripheral areas to Greece in search of new work opportunities, had a significant, yet often understated, share in the country's restoration and modernisation process. The chapter probes into the conditions of life and work of those people, both before and after Independence, with a special eye on the institutional framework within which they operated at a time when the building profession was redefining its nature vis-à-vis a rising architectural culture. In doing that, it aims to fill a gap in the literature of architectural history, the grand narrative of which is customarily monopolised by a state-centric perspective including descriptive accounts of public monuments, interpretations of ideologically driven architectural symbolism and architects' biographies. Being only part of a larger project, this study intimates an alternative to this conventional approach to architectural history as it proposes to contextualise its subject-matter.

The case in point is Athens, the leading city in Greece at that time, which within a few years was promoted from a small agrarian town to a modern capital of a Western appeal. Its architectural makeup, heavily drawing upon its classical antecedents and gaining power through its symbolism, became a strong component of the government's aforementioned programme of political cohesion. Building construction created a robust labour market for several decades, which occupied builders and craftsmen of all specialties, many of whom belonged to those migrant groups from the broader region. It is in this context of heterogeneous influences that the new city of Athens emerged as a metropolis, aiming at, yet never attaining, the crystallised image of a neoclassical city.

Given that the primary documentary source available is the building contract for a consistent period of 15 years (i.e. 1835 50),[4] the inquiry profits from the textual validity and statistical recurrence of various data related to construction activity in order to configure the identities of the building agents, some of their labour conditions, work procedures, technologies and materials, building prefigurations, and most importantly patterns of development and change. At the same time, it is subject to the limitations of the textual source (i.e. the work deed), which bears witness of intentions, terms and conditions, but not of the actual outcome of the work. In fact, the 'building-referent' of each document more often than not is either absent (i.e. demolished) or unidentifiable. As there was still no street naming or lot numbering, the individual property was specified through its landowner's name, the district and the nearest points of reference. Unfortunately, none of these data are sufficient to identify structures dating 150 years back and more. This, however, does not diminish the value of the evidence, which in all cases helps recreate the contextual framework of building history, with the human agents forming an indispensable part. It is to this part that the present chapter is turning its attention.

Here again, it is the text of the notary archives that draws the line of the inquiry. Concerning people's names, for example, the vast majority are highly unlikely to be cross-checked against documents of other kinds. Apart from the few noted architects, homeowners and patrons, known through history, all the rest fall under the general category of 'anonymous' from today's point of view. Particularly interesting, though, is the case of some craftsmen whose career path can be easily unravelled through the notary archives alone, in which their names recur in a notable frequency. In this sense, these 'anonymous' agents gain a small place in history. Other than that, research into the micro-histories of this field is extremely difficult due to the fact that Greek archival materials pose unsurpassable constraints on cross-correlating inquiries. Official registers, such as municipal rolls, consulate records and port authority books, which are generally considered plausible repositories of historic information, here are proven secondary in significance for several reasons. First, for most of the nineteenth century massive registration, although required, was not faithfully applied in Greek offices;[5] therefore, itinerant workers continued to move to and from certain places freely as they had been doing long before the establishment of legal borders. Second, formal registration to whichever extent it applied is not always trustworthy for its data as reported; an overgrown bureaucratic mechanism, largely dysfunctional in the early days of the state, fell short in its various control practices. This becomes evident in the case of the newly introduced passport policy, which will be further discussed toward the end of this chapter.[6] The third, and probably most important reason that proves such an inquiry into official registers inefficient relates to the fact that masses of routine documents from that time period have been largely disposed of over the years. Therefore, any finds of interest are rather dependent upon chance or mere coincidence. Nevertheless, and despite all the limitations of the approach, the value of inquiring into notary archives is self-evident.

Who were the builders: origins, specialisations, roles through the notarial evidence

> Construction workers here during the Turkish domination were slaves, then became *klefts* [bandits] in the mountains, and never learnt a craft. Thus anyone who could buy a hammer and a plane became a carpenter. In a similar manner, anyone who managed to get a beater, became a builder. Very few were those who could read numbers, no one though could read a plan. It was then fully natural not to have good work done. [Technical] classes for craftsmen then were organised which brought about significant progress over the past two years.[7]

This is how the Westerner i.e. the eminent Danish architect Christian Hansen[8] saw the local builder at the dawn of the Greek state: an illiterate dabbler who stepped into the realm of architecture through the back door. Having been exposed himself to the works of famous architects, such as Leo von Klenze and Friedrich

Schinkel during his trip to Germany in 1831, Hansen came to Greece with a well-formed outlook on what a modern approach to architecture should be. At a time of construction frenzy and confusion in a city still convalescing from the menace of the recent war, the young architect judged architecture in practice mainly performed by self-taught local builders unacceptable. Is it that Hansen was more concerned about education rather than skill, about method rather than practical experience? Most likely, he would have favoured a combination of both, provided that he could be in command of the project and the nature of craftsmanship. In fact, two years later he returned to this matter only to find some progress been achieved. For that he credited the newly arrived *foreign* craftsmen and the technical classes set up by the state under his guidance and teaching service:[9] 'This building [the Mint] has caused difficulties; these have now lessened since the Greek craftsmen have improved considerably, and besides several German and Italian craftsmen have arrived in the country'.[10]

Actual evidence is too scant to either prove or disprove Hansen's claim. However, there is hardly any reason to doubt the transformation that the building profession was undergoing during those years and the new work hierarchies that were set under the authority of the academically trained architect. Construction work, whether better or worse than before, certainly belonged to a different philosophy, as the building plan and mathematical precision were now the regulators of its architectural qualities. As for the necessary manpower, this had to be recruited mainly from the ranks of the available workers, who, according to the notarial documents and contrary to Hansen's statement were neither always local, nor lacking in skills. The extent to which those people had to either compromise or completely give up their own 'know-how' in order to adhere through training to the modern way is impossible to be detected through the documents. It stands to reason though that, regardless of the end result each time, the construction site itself served as a polyphonic field of forces and influences in which knowledge of all sorts (i.e. tacit, by apprenticeship, or by formal education) was submitted to negotiation and contestation. The nature and the dynamics of this field, although impossible to figure out in detail, can be hinted at through a closer look into the identity of the construction agents, their socio-legal status and occupational framework in the city. The notary archives yield substantial information on these issues, which this chapter addresses, yet not all with equal emphasis due to its size limitations.

First, the habit of workmen contracted for a job to report their names adjoined either to their work title, or their place of origin or both, raises them from the state of complete anonymity. At the same time, it leads to interesting deductions about the much debated issue of identity. Despite the few gaps and inconsistencies in the related information, for example, different spellings for the same name, different professional titles for the same person, and most importantly, no place of origin for a significant number of persons, a (rough) mapping of general trends and distributions can still be formed bearing a good statistical value. The figures are meaningful only for their relative value. It is utterly impossible, based on the available resources, to approximate the actual figures of migrant workmen in Athens at the time. The first profession-based official census of the Athenian population was published only as late as 1879, in which the craftsmen (of all specialties) amount to 5,552, outnumbering all the other professions.[11] These deductions may be summed up as follows:

1. With regard to place of origin, builders and craftsmen form distinct groups by geographic area. These areas are for the most part remote from the city of Athens and widely spread in the Balkan region and the islands. Macedonia, Epirus, the Peloponnese (Morea), the Cyclades and the island of Karpathos are the most frequently quoted provenances. Italy follows. It is noteworthy that *ad hoc* (single) cases of workmen have not been reported. A good number of artisans of various specialties report no place of origin. This can be interpreted in one of two ways: they were either locals (i.e. from Athens and its vicinity), or well-known individuals needing no further identification. Usually this happens with contractors of big projects who also appear frequently in the contracts.
2. With regard to reported craft, certain areas figure as homelands of artisans specialising in specific trades, one or two at the most. The majority of builders and masons originated in the hinterland and the island of Karpathos, much fewer in the islands of Andros, Samos and Zakynthos (Zante). The marble-carvers came mainly from Tinos, whereas the plasterers from the islands of Chios and Hydra, and the broader area of the Eastern Peloponnese (Argolis). The majority of the wall painters were Italians. Although wall painters habitually did not report their place of origin, through their names and signatures alone their Italian origin is self-evident. However, it remains unclear whether these craftsmen were migrants from Italy or natives of Greek islands, formerly under Venetian or Genovese domination (e.g. Syros, Tinos, Chios, etc.).

A series of secondary observations follow, which expand upon the factual information of the contracts as summarised above:

1. An artisan's declared craft is aptly related to his homeland's tradition in the same craft, which in turn and in most cases was intimately tied to the availability of the related material. Thus builders and masons reported as their places of origin particularly mountainous regions with a long-standing tradition of working and building with stone. By the same token, areas that produced carpenters and joiners, such as the Northeastern Peloponnese (Argolis), the Central Peloponnese (Arcadia) and Zakynthos (Zante) have always been known for their woods and fine wood crafting. The island of Tinos, which supplied the broader Mediterranean region with fine quality marble, was also the homeland of the most skilful stone-cutters and marble-carvers. Probably, the only categories of artisans not 'materially' related to their respective homelands were the plasterers and painters who had come either from Italy or from islands strongly bearing the Venetian influence and the tradition of these crafts.
2. Taken together, builders, stone-cutters and carpenters outnumbered by far all the rest (i.e. 165 cases) and originated in the hinterland, mainly in such areas as

Epirus and Western Macedonia. Karpathos, being an island, is a striking exception as a homeland of many stone workers (24 cases). Artisans of other trades, namely plastering and wall-painting, were sparse (i.e. only 20 cases have been reported) and mainly islanders or Italians. The ratio between the two categories of specialisations is noteworthy (i.e. 8/1) and gives base to the theory that plasterers and painters formed a rather elite class of artisans within the Athenian building crew.

3. The largest flow of builders (i.e. stone workers) originated in Ottoman-held regions, namely Western Macedonia (18), Epirus (43), and the island of Karpathos (24) (totalling 85). The rest were comparably spread in the central Peloponnese (c. 30) and the Cyclades (34).
4. Regarding ethnicity, the vast majority of signatures and reported names betray a Greek origin. Non-Greek names are very few, either Italian or German, and belonging mainly to the classes of painters and plasterers. From the latter, except for those who reported Italy as their place of origin, the rest could have easily originated in the Catholic populations of the islands (Aegean and Ionian).
5. Among all the craftsmen, the workers of stone declared a place of origin almost always, whereas the carpenters and plasterers only occasionally. Very rarely so did the wall-painters. Lastly, the master builders hardly ever reported a place of origin. The architects, in particular, presented themselves with their title only (i.e. 'arhitekton'), never stating either their name or their place of origin. From an official point of view, the architects remained the most 'obscure' agents in the entire building crew, albeit very renowned in the city's social milieu.
6. Many of the travel routes to the capital of migratory artisans coincide with those of pre-Independence itinerant companies (so-called *isnafs*), particularly in reference to their points of departure (e.g. Zagori, Ioannina, Kastoria), not to their actual topographical definition, which, due to the lack of evidence, remains unknown.[12] Besides, new routes show on the map (e.g., from Karpathos, the Cyclades, the Northwestern and Central Peloponnese, and Zakynthos). Neither the nature (i.e. whether temporary, seasonal, or permanent) nor the causes/ motivations of these movements (i.e. refugee or migratory) are discernible from the available material alone.
7. There are no reports of artisan-members of a corporation, whereas cases of temporary business-partnerships between two or more parties for a specified timeframe (normally six months to one year) or a project are frequent.[13] Commonly these cases involve members of the same family.

In summing up, we see the notary archives serving as the unfailing witnesses to the rich anthropological context of the building industry in the early days of modern Greece. From the long list of deductions they allow, it becomes evident that no major changes have occurred in this context during the timeframe of the study, that is, a period generally viewed as a turning point in the country's history. The primary resource of manpower and skilled labour remained the broader Balkan

Routes to Athens in the 19th Century.
Geographic Origin of Craftsmen & Builders by Area of Specialization.



region both before and after Independence. Local traditions fed into the biggest construction site of the time, that is, the city-capital, thus providing diversity to the leading neoclassical vocabulary, along with a grounding in time-honoured craftsmanship. However, the degree of competence and the level of skill invested in new construction could not be uniformly of the first rate. Time-pressure, expediency of work and lack of expertise on the part of many workmen just emerging in the field, must have naturally compromised many of its products, to the disappointment of the Western educated architect.

In the meantime, any changes under way were happening subtly and with progressing effects on the building profession. The opening of new routes of imported labour enriched the field with even more diverse influences where a good share now belonged to the crafts of plastering and painting, even though stone craftsmanship continued to have the lead as far as workforce is concerned. At the same time, the ethnic spectrum of in-migrants was narrowed to the Greek almost exclusively, as the reported names indicate. This point may be reasonably counterargued on the claim that the names could have been made up as had commonly been the case with migrants travelling across countries and that the artisans who reported themselves as Greeks could have belonged to other ethnic groups, e.g. Albanian, Serbian, etc. In other words, as opposed to a self-evident Greek nationality, here a Greek name could as easily betray one's intention of subjecting his identity to negotiation in exchange for an easier assimilation in the new country, whether short, long or permanent.[14] Far from being legal or illegal, this has always been an act of survival for itinerant workers, i.e. a way of accessing the local labour market. This may explain the generic name form by which many builders and craftsmen presented themselves, e.g. Yiannis Demetriou (that is, Yiannis, son of Demetrios). Also, their usual declaring themselves functionally illiterate, i.e. incapable of signing the contract, obscures things even further. However, in considering the fact that traditionally the majority of builders and craftsmen working in the Southern Balkans had been Greek ethnics,[15] naturally they continued to be so after the establishment of the Greek state. The specific programme of nation building was mainly realised on the basis of national or formerly hellenised populations. Ethnic purification was effectively deployed to this end. By organising the productive mechanism of the country around the new and flourishing urban centres, the new state authorities managed to attract a steadily increasing portion of the widespread masses of Greek population into these centres in the promise of security and an open job market for several generations ahead. Craftsmen and builders were most surely included in these masses due to the aforementioned growth of building industry in the cities.[16] The devastating effects of this policy on the life, economy and demographics of the countryside go beyond doubt, and became more strongly felt through the course of the twentieth century.[17] The disruption of earlier socio-cultural traditions, however, were to have a more significant impact on people's moral and psychological makeup. According to social historian Kostis Moskof, the transformation of cities into the controllers of total production brought about a new 'état d' esprit' to the urban dweller who was now compelled to develop strong emotional ties with the city and its population, and consequently to construct his identity around this new condition.[18] As this form of urban consciousness developed into an ideology, the rift between city and countryside became more vast and permanent. People's rooting in the city, combined with a claim to a definitive ethno-religious identity, played a decisive role in this process of psycho-social transformation. Whereas before independence the ethnic identity of Balkan people was highly negotiable and fluid as it was dependent upon social mobility and the division of labour, in the new state it has been assigned political significance linked to the condition of being place-bound. Therefore, the Greek names in the contracts may not be as fake and misleading as one might think in the first place. It is only the legal and political implications of this transformation process that still escape us. In the case of crafts-men and traders, such implications naturally lay with their professional status, which, in premodern times, was known to be formed through the tradition of the guild system. Scrutinising the history and development of this system during these critical years of change both for Greece and Turkey, seems a reasonable step to take in the context of this endeavour, even if the outcome is to yield more questions than answers.

The tradition of the building guild: some open questions

> Before the crack of the dawn the group of *Koudarei* [craftsmen of Epirus and Western Macedonia] set off speechless, silent, the *protomastoras* [master builder], the *mastóroi* [master-craftsmen], the animals, the adolescents. All their relatives and small children followed them up to the turning of the road to see them off. From time to time the *mastóroi* lingered to pass a word to their wives. As soon as the heavily-loaded horses were lost to view down into the wooded ravine the escort group took the road back to the village and the women secretly let water run on the pathway to leave a trail for the *afentis* [master] to find his way back; that is, an old custom. The return of the *isnaf*, on the contrary, was full of joy.[19]

Lyrical accounts like this are common in Greek folk literature. The perilous life of itinerant groups of Balkan workmen (Albanians, Greeks, Vlachs, Rom, Epirotes) travelling from place to place for procuring a living has always been met with enormous interest on the part of chroniclers and historians for many reasons, one of them being its long legacy, which dates back to the legendary times of Byzantium at least. Travelling companies came to be seen as a condition *sine qua non* for the development of all vernacular architecture of the region. The rocky villages of Epirus and Macedonia, the central Peloponnese, and some islands, physically isolated from the centres of urban economy, have been historically ideal refuge places, yet always poverty-stricken due to the lack of arable land.[20] Stone crafts-manship has been proven both a suitable and a honourable occupation for the locals whose reputation as skilful builders was widely spread to the entire Mediterranean area. In the aforementioned quote, Nikos Moutsopoulos refers to the *Koudarei* builders as 'isnaf', that is, an arabic term widely used in the Ottoman world to designate the class of a specific trade or corporation, which closely corresponds to the notion of 'guild' in medieval and early modern Europe. *Esnaf* (or *isnaf*) members, similarly to *guild* members, are commonly known for having been socially, politically, and economically tied to one another through a certain normative framework. However, as it appears, 'esnaf' as a term was also more freely used to describe work partnerships with no formal structure or organisation.[21] This is why the organising framework of the itinerant builders' 'esnafs' deserves closer consideration in the context of this study. Were these groups customarily having no permanent place of work but moving constantly through long distances liable to a certain authority, either central, local or internal? Did they abide by any standard protocol? Did they maintain a fixed composition or not? Unless we are clear about their nature, we will not obtain a factual understanding either of the mechanics of transition of the building profession from a premodern to a modern state, or of its labour market, especially in the first Greek urban centres. All of the above questions may not be answerable in the lack of concrete evidence. It is, however, worth opening a way to some answers by placing this tradition of itinerant groups in the broader context of labour market at that time, and for some parallels to be drawn that would render the related questions more meaningful.

Guilds in the Ottoman Empire were formed as oath-bound associations of persons of the same trade or pursuits, aiming to protect mutual interests and regulate the profession. They presented a two- or three-tiered hierarchical structure comprising the masters, the senior apprentices and the regular apprentices or journeymen, and upheld normative and institutional power to the extent that they were backed by superior political sanction. It was to the benefit of local governments to support these institutions because, in their role as regulators of the city's economic life, they created the framework of administrative and fiscal control over large portions of the extensive states at that time. Ottoman guilds in general were representatives of stability and hereditary vocation.[22] Being a largely urban phenomenon they had to accommodate to the Ottoman state's understanding of stability between city and countryside, which did not foster exchange between the two. However, the degree of an *esnaf*'s attachment to state authority differed from region to region, or from one *esnaf* to another, and was aptly related to the status of the headman, i.e. by whom he was appointed and how dependent from the government he appeared.[23]

In the multi-cultural Ottoman state guilds, instead of being compliant servants to the state, commonly acted as righteous instruments against administrative injustice and as guards of their members' labour rights. This explains why at large, despite regional variations, *esnafs* fulfilled a primarily social function in addition to safeguarding the moral level and standards of craftsmanship. This social functioning made them resistant to state interference, and often led them to direct confrontation with the authorities.[24] More specifically, Greek *esnafs* were known for electing their own headman, instead of having him appointed by the government, as it was normally the case.[25]

The prominence of the working classes in the scene of Ottoman state economy must not be identified with technological stagnancy and scarcity of innovation. On the contrary, changes and improvements did take place in all areas of production, including building construction, during the long history of the Empire.[26]

Regarding the guilds' roles and functions in Ottoman society, the itinerant groups of builders and craftsmen of the Balkans emerge as an interesting broadening of our understanding of what Ottoman guilds were and what they represented. Being primarily inhabitants of rural areas on the one hand, they were occupied with farming and stockbreeding when they were not travelling, which made them firmly bound to the land. Travelling long distances on a seasonal basis on the other hand, in seeking out newer and newer markets for work, made them bold entrepreneurs. Their travel routes and destinations in the multi-ethnic Ottoman empire knew no limits or symbolic barriers, such as ethnicity, religion or language. Similarly, the shared space of the construction site in every new place they moved to, was not only a field of societal exchange and solidarity between co-workers, but also an opportunity for the circulation of practical knowledge and, possibly, for the production of new technological advances. Building construction during Ottoman times was admittedly one of the few domains characterised by a high level of scientific expertise, including stereotomy, geometry, inventive techniques of measurement and the skilful application of proportions.[27] It was the domain in which science and technology fused into the so-called practical knowledge most useful in architecture. These must be some of the reasons why construction work has been seen 'as one of the essential professions for the progress of civlilization' and the builders' groups as 'among the most prestigious and progressive professional corporations'.[28] What is most important though is that, as a rule, travelling builders and craftsmen were villagers and peasants, not city dwellers. Being so, they were not covered by any institutional framework, namely a guild, and therefore also were labelled incomplete guilds.[29] Itinerant groups could be no more than companies or fraternities of craftsmen, with an informal, open-ended and rather not time-bound constitution. It was probably in this sense that Moutsopoulos used the term 'isnaf' in the above-quoted passage, thus opening the ground for various misinterpretations.[30]

Historically the cases of city-based builder *esnafs* have been few,[31] and continued to be so until very late. This becomes evident also through the reported craftsmen's places of origin in the contracts, the large majority of which are small villages with an established tradition in the respective crafts (*mastorochoria*). Hence, justly Cerasi underscores the paradox that whereas 'the Ottoman civilization was centered in towns and dominated by towns [...] its architectural culture should have been almost entirely produced by villagers',[32] which leads to a whole chain of questions: what was the actual relationship of the so-called travelling companies (*bouloukia*) to the builders' corporations in towns? 'How independent from urban traditions or state bureaucracy were these village-based groups?'[33] Should we assume that after having gained basic training and craft skills as apprentices to city-based experts, i.e. architects or master builders, new craftsmen went off to their home towns or villages and headed their own workshops? In other words, that, in reference to the building profession, the city related to the village through a line of educative and periodic labouring activity, not through a permanent corporative one? And again, have guild and non-guild workers ever coexisted in the same building site? And if yes under whose command? In other words, did they share a common ethos of work? Unfortunately none of these questions can be answered with certainty because itinerant groups in the empire easily escaped all sorts of registers. This is the main reason why their history is enveloped with so much mystery.[34]

The absence of any official mechanism to encompass all sedentary and itinerant builder companies most likely furnished the latter with unlimited freedom in managing their internal affairs through privately and orally set up agreements. Loyalty and obedience in this case was owed only to the headman, whereas custom law regulated all other activities through time-honoured patterns of behaviour, not through any written statute or institutional law. For a building company to be established, no special licence from a central or local authority was required. Itinerant companies or individuals did not form taxable units either.[35] In other words, by contrast to what had been the case with city guilds, there was no legal framework to regulate the business of these groups, nor state intervention in their constitution.[36] Their mode of operation was clearly set up from below. Although one would expect for such companies to have had a rather short-term existence, history attests to the contrary. Kin ties among their members on the one hand and a land policy on the other, which precluded any detachment of land tenants from their shares, were factors conducive to the life-long stability of these groups. A company's members often belonged to the same family, town or village.[37] Therefore, the sense of comradeship and brotherhood among company members, which characterised work partnerships in the Islamic world, here appears self-evident. As in the case of city guilds, the rigid three-tier hierarchical structure of the group preset their mutual commitments and responsibilities around the person of the master builder (*protomastoras*), thus ensuring its internal coherence. Secrecy, preserved through coded dialects internal to each group, strengthened their class consciousness, plus a sense of belonging to a common field of shared interests and expertise.[38] All the members were considered equal, with the exception of the master builder and headman of the company who was seen as primus inter pares by holding the role of the general manager, contractor of the projects and partner of the rest. There have been cases reported where the master builder appeared to exceed this role by acting as the employer of all, or some, of the members, giving rise to complaints on the part of his partners for arbitrariness, favouritism and arrogation.[39] It is no surprise that, with the lack of a legal framework to restrain the power and authority of the headman of itinerant companies, this privileged individual was left free to take the easy way to profit and glory by pursuing and executing commissions on his own.[40] Such instances must have occurred more frequently toward the latest period of the Empire when the middle-class clientele increased. As far as bigger projects were concerned, the master builder continued to resort to the collective workforce of his habitual companions.

Under the guidance and the managerial ingenuity of the master builder, itinerant companies from the Balkans were led as far as Asia Minor, Rumania and the Middle East following routes along which the most prosperous and highly populated towns or villages were to be found.[41] In the lack of any official accounts of those people's lives, the architectural imprints of their labouring activity in many of these station points serve as living witnesses of their history. Besides, as Moutsopoulos notes, the itineraries of these groups have a great importance for the study of vernacular architecture in the Ottoman Empire because they enable a clear mapping of diffusion and dissemination patterns of different architectural languages and technical knowledge. This temporary stationing in various sites resulted in an interesting exchange: on the one hand, the travelling group inculcated new building forms and construction technologies to the local traditions, whereas, on the other hand, their work with unfamiliar materials and new topographies enhanced their own skills and technical expertise, thus imparting a distinct identity to their way of building, i.e. what enables the unravelling of their life history.[42] And the other way around: once having formed a complete mapping of the route network of one or more travelling companies through a certain area, researchers can develop a better understanding of the architecture of that area. The post-1830 routes to Athens, as surfaced through the mappings of this research project on the basis of notarial evidence, is a good case in point, although the documentation concerns mainly individual workmen crossing paths in the capital rather than organised itinerant builder companies. Comparing, for example, the traditional routes of travelling groups (as traced by Moutsopoulos) with the new, post-1830 routes to Athens, we notice the island of Karpathos on the one hand being a station point of major builders' routes originating in the area of Thessaloniki and heading toward the Middle East through the Aegean, and on the other hand the same island creating a significant influx of builders to the new capital. Hence, the origin of a certain line of influence upon Athenian building may be sought in northern Greece. Also, three successive waves of migration of Epirotes between the thirteenth and the sixteenth century through the entire Greek peninsula, the islands of the Aegean and the Ionian sea leaves no doubts that their building expertise was transmitted to the locals thus creating new work enclaves (i.e. local workshops). Most notable among them were to be found in Arcadia, Argolis, Hydra, Spetses and Zakynthos in which many artisans working in Athens originated according to the contracts.[43] There is hardly any doubt that it was through these workmen, whether in-migrant or itinerant, that Athens received an amalgam of various influences and technological traditions in its new constructions. This fact alone invalidates any arguments for the paucity of skilled labour in the early days of the new state.

As already mentioned, the labouring traditions of the builders and craftsmen of post-Independence Athens are traceable principally in the northern mainland and, more generally, in Ottoman-held areas, whereas to a lesser extent in Southern Greece and the islands. The issues that arose from the establishment of national borders and the ethno-centric policies of the new state introduced new parameters to the age-old migration patterns of the semi-nomadic craftsmen of the region; these will be discussed in the next chapter. In the context of the present discussion one can convincingly argue that former itinerant workers, who for some reason decided to migrate to the new country, were more likely to succeed as opposed to others who were used to a more settled way of life. In other words, they were better prepared to adjust to the socio-cultural milieu of modernity and to the demands of the free market economy that Otto's government promoted as part of its modernisation programme. The analysis revealed that in terms of life and work patterns these groups were remarkably similar to Western European builder guilds, whereas they significantly differed from their city-based counterparts in the same region. More specifically, due to their mobile lifestyle and involvement with new construction techniques, they greatly contributed to technical progress, which in the given context was synonymous with nothing but small-scale anonymous innovations. The master builder, in particular, closely approximated the Western guild headman in his entrepreneurial spirit and potential to move freely and independently to new sites, thus expanding his building skills through participation in big construction projects together with state architects and fellow master builders. His loose ties with the authorities, either state or civil, allowed him to dispose himself at will by launching various entrepreneurial activities, now within Greek territory, even if he had to alter his seasonal migration pattern to a permanent or semi-permanent one. In the challenge of a growing free market the traditional master builder had to abandon his authorial role of the teacher and life-long mentor of his group and stick only to the one of the employer and subcontractor, i.e. a role anyway to which he was not completely alien from earlier times. However, the fact that in several building documents certain master builders appear to contract repeatedly with the same crew of craftsmen and builders in various Athenian sites indicates that the traditional schema of the fathered company was not totally extinct. The only difference is that now, in the context of a capitalist economy, any phenomena of systematic partnership or knowledge transmission by apprenticeship were rather circumstantial than regulated by custom.[44] 'Capitalist', however, as a term to characterise the economy of the first few decades of the new Greek state sounds like an overstatement. As long as industrialism had not yet invaded the country, formal education had not yet been developed on the basis of a full-scale programme, and the dominant forms of capital accumulation was mostly in the private and joint ventures, not in state-initiated ones, the term 'proto-capitalist' instead of 'capitalist' is more suitable to the situation.

During those crucial decades of transition, the successive governments resorted to a political language, which lingered between two extremes, boldness and indecisiveness. It is, therefore, unclear which aspects of Greek culture at the time should be attributed to the state's purposeful action or mere tolerance. Most prominent among them were inherited patterns of life and work, which persisted alongside new ones in a kind of a symbiotic coexistence. The results of this state tactics are difficult to either analyse or assess, which explains why many of the questions that this chapter raises have no definitive answers.

The modern metropolis as a catalyst for change

The war and its aftermath uprooted the peasantry of the countryside and caused a dramatic upheaval to the demographic map of the Greek peninsula. A good portion of the population resorted again to the mountains seeking protection in familiar homelands. Some classes of people, however, were attracted to the reborn cities, which now appeared promising for quick recovery, particularly to those who had experienced serious losses and suffering from the war. To this influx of population the government responded with a restitution plan and a legislative policy, which offered to effectively resolve immigration matters, yet without having well considered their various complexities.

One of the government's objectives was:

> to settle uprooted peasants, *itinerant workers*, indigent veterans, and refugees from abroad and to attract mountaineers to a more sedentary and productive way of life in the plains, thus arresting the turbulence and insecurity which independence had spawned by giving even the most volatile elements of the population a stake in the new order.[45]

According to McGrew, 'itinerant workers' belonged to the destitute classes, therefore, deserving state welfare. However, there is hardly any information about the measures taken to alleviate those people whose labour was set from the start in the service of the reconstruction of the country as a whole, and Athens in particular, a city with limited resources of its own in the building crafts.[46] Refugees from various places, e.g. the Aegean islands, Asia Minor or Epirus and Macedonia, on the contrary, received first priority in the provision of material comfort. They formed distinct sub-groups, organised in associations, which pursued their claims. The state responded promptly by granting them collective settlement in designated colonies normally outside urban areas and near arable lands on favourable terms (i.e. long-term mortgage plans) and in the promise of their occupation with agriculture.[47] This should by no means give one grounds to believe that the refugees' way to reparation was easy, timely or free of monetary cost. Building one's own house or settling in a job fit to his skills and disposition could often take many years of strife.

Given the particular circumstances, refugees came to become conspicuous classes of citizens in the new state, as opposed to migrant workers who were more scattered and for whom no special measures are known to have been applied.[48] Therefore, many questions are open about their state of being, now in the service of the modern Greek market, as they do about their long history as subjects of the Ottoman state: how easy or difficult was their travelling path to Athens, especially if they originated in foreign territories and had to cross borders? Were they in the habit of travelling in more or less organised groups, or in families? Did they come to stay, pass through or return to their homelands, or were they on a periodic/seasonal pattern of travel and work carrying on their old itinerant tradition? Did they seek lands for permanent settling and where? How many of them have finally settled? These questions have occasionally received different and contradictory answers, based on sporadic evidence, insofar as no systematic sources exist to clarify the matter.

Certainly the state relied on all the various classes of incoming Greek nationals, including migrant workers, for the country's repopulation, revitalisation and national integration. However, no matter how appealing the various administrations wished to present to all the 'Greeks by descent' (*Ellenes to genos*) the prospect of settling in a tiny country still lacking basic infrastructural facilities in exchange of a brand new nationality, the majority of them must have placed this option under close scrutiny, probably with the exception of the aforementioned classes of refugees. In fact, many Greeks especially, the most well-off members of the Diaspora were unwilling to give up an established way of living in order to enter the adventure of a relocation for an uncertain outcome.[49] To itinerant workers though, who had been prone by nature to follow the most promising route to labour availability, Greece must have appeared like a vast worksite, like another station point in their job-hunting enterprises. How willing they have been to commit themselves for life to the new country is questionable. Unless they fell under the category of refugee or had the assurance of a master builder-contractor for long-term employment, these workers had no special reason to consider seriously the probability of a permanent settling in Greece. On the other hand, keeping up with their most familiar lifestyle of seasonal mobility in this new political milieu must not have been easy either for reasons that will be explained below.

In fact, the government seemed unwilling to put up with unstable populations, as well as with any other setup that would either evade its immediate control or interfere with the laws of the free market. It was not only the phenomena of anarchy, inherited by the country from the independence years, that caused the authorities' unease, but also brigandage, which kept on undermining all attempts at bringing law and order to the frontier areas. For this reason local townships or *demes* were made responsible for civil order, in other words, the state established a local network, yet centrally controlled and fully integrated in state administration.[50] The similarities with the Ottoman administrative system are notable. However, the Greek communes (*demes*) were way different in function from the self-governing units of the Empire, the purpose of which was to exercise institutional power and authority over all local matters. Registration with the township was required by all the newcomers and citizens-to-be in the specific *deme*, from which point on they became taxable. This was a measure with political implications because, other than keeping track of the local population, it was the first in a two-step process toward the naturalisation of a new Greek national-citizen. The second step was the naturalisation (nationality) proper, which entitled a citizen to vote in the national elections and bear all the obligations of a national-citizen. Of the two stages, the first, as opposed to the second, was the most advantageous and pursued according to a census of 1840. The second stage became more meaningful after 1843, when the political system changed to constitutional monarchy by which all male citizens were granted the right to vote.[51] Registration was confirmed by taking the oath of allegiance to the king and by the issue of a legal document, i.e. a passport, which was required for travel between eparchies and for the issue of an international passport by the prefect's office.[52] A similar document, the *tezkere*, was in effect in the Ottoman Empire, too. Yet for early modern Greece this document served as a twofold commitment, to the *deme* and to the state. For the latter, it also ensured the stability of its subjects and controlled movement. Because of that beggars and wandering adventurers were not issued passports.[53] In other words, the Greek State was unwilling to officially encourage the peripatetic lifestyle of builders and craftsmen, no matter how essential these were to its physical reconstruction. There is no doubt though that several of them did stay and work along with the rest even if this had to happen under the nose of the authorities or, in the best of cases, under the legal protection of a temporary employer.

An inventory composed on the basis of Greek official sources in 1840 shows that of a total population of 854,470 inhabitants in the country, the 'Greeks not belonging to any commune' were estimated to reach 6,057, of whom 1,809 resided in or near Athens.[54] According to the author and commentator of this inventory, Frederick Strong, these individuals were:

> for the most part foreign Greeks who have emigrated to Greece partly to settle, and partly to reside temporarily. They are principally natives of Scio, Samos, Smyrna, and other parts of Turkey, who being Rayahs of the Porte, have not taken the oath of allegiance to the king of Greece, nor become naturalized in the country, and cannot consequently be admitted to the rights and privileges of citizens.[55]

Based on the named places of origin, these people must have been to the greatest part vagabonds, that is, workmen, and possibly former warriors or brigants, and only to a lesser extent refugees in a transitional stage. It should be borne in mind that it was to the refugees' advantage to be included in the classes of the registered population of the communes, thus enjoying full state privileges, as opposed to all the rest who kept moving from place to place drawn by work opportunities, unwilling to commit themselves to one country for life.[56] It is no surprise that 3,233 of the non-registered individuals of a total of 6,057 in the country (i.e. a percentage of over half) resided in Athens, Piraeus, Nauplia, Syra and Patras, that is, port cities and areas with the highest labour demand. Refugees, by contrast, were provided lands for colonial settlement mainly in rural areas, away from the urban centres. It is likely that the above figures are far below reality as 'independent' individuals were naturally inclined to evade official registration or inventory reports. The fact though that these people no matter how small their number was formed a distinct category, 11 years after the end of the war and in a law-bound system of communes, is noteworthy.

Already in the early 1830s philhellene historian George Finlay expressed concerns that many of the migrant builders, craftsmen and still landholders in the Ottoman state, discouraged either by the living conditions or by the government's inadequate citizenship policy, would be likely to return to their home towns.[57] Taking into consideration the biographical ties with the native land on the other, it becomes evident how strong and hard to break the connection of those groups to their places of origin was; also how much they would have benefitted from a dual-citizenship status with a special providence for reduced taxation which naturally the two governments, each for different reasons, were unwilling to cede.

To this major adversity that these people had to overcome as prospective Greek citizens two more, no less important, must be added: first, the enmity of locals against newcomers, which as a problem acquired huge political dimensions in the fractional jealousy of *autochthons* (natives) versus *heterochthons* (non-natives).[58] Although lower class migrants were not seriously implicated in this jealousy that turned around public office from which lower class migrants were excluded anyway, they could not be left unaffected by the widespread phenomenon of localism and xenophobia, which in those early years caused serious distress to all the outlanders and, according to McGrew, urged 'large numbers of disheartened immigrants [to] return to their places of origin'.[59] Unfortunately, no sources are available to substantiate this hypothesis. Given though that there have been reports of Greek migrants from Turkey who, after having received the Greek nationality, resigned from it in order to return to their former lands,[60] the above hypothesis is not completely unfounded.

The second adversity for itinerant, or formerly itinerant workmen, had to do with the government's opposition to any guild-like establishment likely to look after labour rights and exercise control over the Greek market. Drawing on the example of other nations that had entered the free economy system earlier, the Greek government pressed for this change by narrowing down the workers' power of intervening in the political scene. Concerns on the part of administrators were raised from an early date. In 1830 the general commander of Nauplion, Nikolaos Gerakaris, reporting to the then-Governor of Greece, Joannes Kapodistrias, interpreted the union among the city's builders as a 'clandestine guild-like plot', by which they controlled wages and labour matters while they undermined building quality in exchange of profit. It is worth noting that Gerakaris in his letter characterised the builders devious, untrustworthy and backward, thus setting forth a moral criterion on which the country's progress was measured; that is, the traditional bonding that has always served equally all trade companies either institutional (i.e. *esnafs*) or independent (i.e. itinerants) as a protecting device against any sort of ill-treatment, now, under the free State had to be compromised in favour of the common good.[61]

To this and other similar reports, the governor responded by prompting immediate action and restraining measures checking the monopolistic power of these groups and breaking up their guild-like character: 'yet without dispensing with the quality of the job' as Kapodistrias ordered in one of his letters.[62] This was certainly a paradoxical claim, which, however, every government since defended with passion: that is, to gain all the benefits of workmanship devoid of its generating condition, the communal spirit of the artisans. Specifically, in a ten-page handwritten draft of a statute, commander Gerakaris attempted to set up the legal framework within which trade guilds would be allowed to operate under Kapodistrias's rule. Although this statute was never put in effect, it is worth referring to because it clearly outlines the current state philosophy on the specific issue, and sets the stage for the subsequent Otto's administrative policy.[63] According to the statute, a craft guild's jurisdiction was limited to the administering of its internal affairs only, its interference (e.g. representational, fiscal, etc.) with the central administration was inhibited, whereas its involvement with city life and public welfare was mandatory; so was its subjugation to the superior guardianship of the city commander. In other words, the trade corporation was completely deprived of its earlier autonomy, thereafter functioning as a state-serving regulatory device ensuring the lawful status of each of its members. According to law historian Elias Arnaoutaoglou, there was an obvious Western influence on this document's philosophy, which marked a pronounced shift from the long-established guild tradition to a more European mentality whereby trade corporations have been always subservient to the state.[64] The Penal Law of 1834 under Otto's rule completed in a sense Kapodistrias's unfinished project on this matter. Although guilds were never placed openly at the target of the law, state legislation prohibited the establishment of associations with political, religious, or other public (e.g. professional) objective without state permission and supervision.[65] Also, under threat of imprisonment, it forbade any syndicalist action (e.g. strike, public protest, etc.).[66] Thus surely, yet indirectly, guilds were abolished in the modern Greek state, and along with them the spirit of collective action in defence of the members' rights, something that affected all the organised workers' groups extending even to the itinerant ones.[67] Through these measures the state managed to reduce the influence of these groups and to confine their role to mere free associations with no unionisation power. Thenceforth craftsmen and builders were urged to settle and register in one place where they would dispose themselves at will, being no longer loyal and bound to the same group, the same set of rules and the same coded behaviour for life.

However, it is highly uncertain whether such measures were sufficient to so drastically alter those people's life patterns. Custom law, as opposed to formal law, continued to regulate public matters, just as it had been doing for centuries, working out practical ways through the problems. Law enforcement had little power in a context where formal documents, such as identification cards or passports, did not yet belong to the citizen's civic culture. In the years following Greek Independence borders between countries remained as porous as at any other time before Independence, mainly due to the weak control system. As anyone could embark on a boat and cross the sea to the other coast, anyone could cross the continental border by taking proper action. After Independence, in particular, the aforementioned brigandage of outlaw rebels, which was widely spread in mountainous areas, came to impose its own rules along the frontier line depending upon the anticipated returns in every case.[68] Itinerants must have taken this situation to their advantage and through private settlements with the brigands sneaked from one country to the other. This happened because, no matter how much building workers were pressed by the state to be rooted in one place, naturally their early years in the new country were rather exploratory; hence their visits back home more frequent. Massive and permanent migrations from rural areas of the periphery are expected to have taken place only after 1858, that is, the year when a new land code liberated the rules of land transfer in the Ottoman state.[69] Until then the Greek citizen's status had no vital meaning for those people, not only due to its multiple restrictions, but because of their own need to keep all their possibilities wide open. Such possibilities could have easily arisen in countries other than

Greece in a constantly growing international market, in which both itinerants and permanent residents of Greece could be now considered equivalent candidates for new jobs. A consulate register of craftsmen's *esnafs* established in the Turkish city of Smyrna, dated in 1835, is very revealing in this respect as it contains 13 lists of Greek *esnafs* of various professions numbering close to 500 members in total. Worthy of note is the carpenters' *esnaf* with 73 members originated in the Cycladic islands of Tinos, Andros, Naxos and Ios, that is, islands belonging to the free Greek state. The commentator of this document, Panagiotis Kamilakis, underlines the increasing wave of out-migration from the Aegean islands to Smyrna and other Ottoman cities throughout the nineteenth century, especially after 1840.[70] That craftsmen were included in these long lists shows that permanence in one place, invested with the symbolic charm of a national-citizen's status, counted second in priority for people who were long accustomed to be primarily driven by opportunities that would enable them to make best use of their craft as a way to a better livelihood.

Conclusions

The aim of this chapter has been to explore the nature of changes that the traditional profession of the builders and craftsmen has undergone with the formation of the national Greek state and the consequent rise of a modern culture in the southern Balkans characterised by the establishment of national borders, a centralised system of administration and a paper-bound bureaucracy. As those people constituted the technological capital of the broader Balkan region, naturally such an exploration builds upon an important epistemological presupposition: that the geographical dispersion of the builders and craftsmen in pursuit of better work opportunities in the given period coincides with the dissemination paths of technical knowledge per se, which eventually constitutes the history of the building profession. More specifically, this dispersion has the potential to reveal whether Balkan builders and craftsmen preferred to encounter early modernity in the form of a nationalistically based culture with direct consequences on their trade (i.e. professionalisation), or follow their familiar way to their craft practice in more supportive settings of their choice. The fact that the basic archival resource and springboard for this exploration has been a bulk of notarial building documents from one single place, i.e. Athens no matter how important narrows the scope of the inquiry and, if its findings were generalised, they would tend to misconstrue the broad picture, thus leading to false conclusions about the dynamics of this field. As Liliane Hilaire-Pérez and Catherine Verna wrote,

> An important issue when studying technical dissemination is the choice of scale. The balance between macro- and microhistories can be critical. For instance, [...] early modern historians have increasingly recognized that the nation-state was not the proper scale by which to study the Industrial Revolution. They suggest instead that there was a pan-European pool of skills and resources that fostered different technological paths.[71]

It is, however, unlikely that this broad picture revealing the 'different technological paths' will be ever rounded off in the case of the Balkan region owing to the scarcity (or unequal distribution) of the resources for the given historic period, that is, a period when the written document was still a rarity. Therefore, the value of the specific project, centred on the city of Athens, lies in its potential to open up this vaster field of research by outlining basic trends and posing questions for further reflection.

Based on the factual evidence of the notary documents, which brought to light a significant concentration of builders and craftsmen in the rising city-capital, with origins in neighbouring countries, this chapter undertook to investigate the range of possibilities available to them in the Greek land, along with the determinants of their either positive or negative decision for permanent migration. These can be summed up in the following three categories (i.e. possibilities), which might have existed as concurrent scenarios:

1. The possibility of continuing their traditional itinerant pattern of work travelling across countries on a passport of their own country,[72] including now Greek centres on their routes, either as temporary station or destination points. In this case the workmen would have had an easy transition to a modern market system, not having to compromise much of their living situation. However, several problems would have come on their way suppressing their volatile lifestyle, such as the official policy requiring registration and incorporation in the communal system. Besides, state policy would have prohibited them from taking up jobs in the traditional form of organised, guild-like companies. As a result, travelling workers would have to set up work deeds individually with local employers every new time they entered the country, often for unusually long-term projects, causing another death-blow to their customary seasonal mobility. To these difficulties one should add the complications related to the frequent border-crossing and the xenophobic attitude of the locals. For all these reasons, prospective workers in Greece were forced to gradually abandon their habitual pattern of seasonal migration, spend big chunks of time in the new country, and suffice themselves with short visits to their native lands; in other words, to enter the category of semi-permanent residents, yet lacking all the conveniences of a resident.
2. The possibility of a permanent moving and settling in Greece alone or with families and the acquisition of the Greek citizenship (possibly also of the Greek nationality) with a parallel cutting off of all their actual ties with their places of origin. In this case, the workman would have been induced to adopt a whole new lifestyle, work attitude and mentality conforming to the status of a national-citizen. As opposed to refugee colonies, which accommodated massive migration from the periphery, there are no data regarding collective resettlement of workers, except for two well-known cases of Athenian neighbourhoods the so-called Proastion (Neapolis) and Anafiotika both planned and developed by builder-migrants from Aegean islands mostly under Greek rule on illicitly appropriated grounds on the city's outskirts in the period 1840 70.[73]

3. The possibility, after having settled in Greece as permanent residents (with or without the Greek nationality), of perpetuating their itinerant work pattern by travelling in organised companies and on a Greek passport, now beyond Greek territory, where their craft would have had better reception.

Of these three scenarios, each seems probable for different reasons. Considering as one's basic motivation for migration either circular or permanent the pursuit of a basic living condition, all scenarios would have worked equally well, each under its given constraints. If, however, the potential of using one's trade skill to its best were introduced as a criterion to differentiate between a basic and a better living condition, then the first scenario would have worked better despite its numerous odds. Unless a skilled craftsman belonged to the classes of refugees, or had found a good fit in a certain job and/or a suitable partnership opportunity in the context of the modernising country, he would not have given up easily his traditional occupation for the conveniences of modern living. Because, no matter how vast a building site Greece was at the time, it seems highly unlikely that the given conditions of work (e.g., building urgency, Westernised methods, architect's authority, etc.) would have allowed a skilled worker to make the best use of his craft. The third scenario, on the other hand, would have only compensated a skilled person who has already been a resident in the new country, i.e. either a Greek native, or a refugee, or even a migrant on his own volition.

Nevertheless, the matter of fact is that builders and craftsmen did migrate from the periphery to Greece feeding into centres with a blooming building industry at the time, such as Athens. The building contracts are the best 'living witnesses' of that. Based on their places of origin, these people did not belong to the masses of refugees. Also the fact that they formed groupings based on distinct places of origin with established traditions in the building crafts indicates a far from random distribution of energies. Some names in repetition over the years attest to phenomena of permanent residency, probably having eventually complied to state rules in reference to full citizenship status. The adjustment of those people to a more Western-like work situation, involving new technologies, task roles, and group hierarchies, although not effortless, was not impossible either, owing to their long exposure to novelty and the adventurous lifestyle of the itinerant worker. Lastly, the overwhelming rate of Greek names in these lists of workmen stands as indirect evidence of the appeal that the new country had to its widespread nationals, not so much for the symbolic value imbedded in the title 'Greek citizen' as for the promise of a more stable labour market while sharing in a common project of growth and improvement. How this attitude was measured against the skilled person's ambition for self-actualisation through the customary practicing of his craft in a more open-ended field remains to be answered by future research. There is, however, strong evidence that the tradition of itinerant workmanship persisted through the turn of the century, particularly in areas sharing borders with the former Ottoman Empire. A more familiar setup, lesser state control and a wider range of opportunities were enough to keep many skilled craftsmen and builders away from the paper-bound world of modernity even at the cost of never having become themselves subjects of history.

Notes

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1 The two terms 'premodern' and 'modern' distinguish an earlier traditional socio-cultural state giving primacy to family and community values from a later one, marked by advancing capitalism, industrialism, and administrative rationalism with consequences on the social level. In Greek history there is no distinct borderline between the two.

2 E. Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992, pp. 44–5.

3 L.M. Danforth, *The Macedonian Conflict: Ethnic Nationalism in a Transnational World*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995, p. 17.

4 The contracts belong to three Athenian notary archives – today in the possession of the General State Archives of Greece (*G.A.K.*) – under the names of Kosmas Kokides, Konstantinos Daskalopoulos and Konstantinos Philalethes. Of these the first is the most extensive counting approximately 42,000 documents and covering the period of 1835–66. The other two have a much narrower time-span, i.e. 1838–44. Of this volume of documents, only a minor portion of approximately 2 per cent pertains to building construction and contains information regarding builders' and technicians' activities.

5 The case was, however, different in its neighbouring countries. The Ionian Islands, for example, which since 1815 were placed under British protection, had to comply early with British policies and regulations, such as the passport system. See A.D. Nikiforou, *Ta Diavateria tou 19ou Aiona ton Arheion tes Kerkyras (1800–1870)*, Kerkyra: Genika Archeia tou Kratous. Archeia Nomou Kerkyras, 2003. On the other hand, post-Independence Greek consulates in the Ottoman Empire prove good recordkeepers of in-migration flows, evidently carrying on a well-established Ottoman tradition of meticulous recordkeeping. A case in point is the Greek consulate of Smyrna, which by order of the Greek embassy in Constantinople, kept full and detailed lists of incoming workmen originating in the Greek state. It is then probable that similar records may have survived in other post-1830 consulate offices either in Turkey or in other places formerly under Ottoman government.

6 Cf. E.K. Vogli, *'Hellenes to genos': He Ithageneia kai he Tautotita sto Ethniko Kratos ton Hellenon (1821–1844)*, Herakleion: Panepistemiakes Ekdoseis Kretes, 2007, pp. 285–6 and elsewhere.

7 From a letter of Christian Hansen to Danish Journal *Dansk Kunstblad*, I, 7 January 1837, no. 20, pp. 144–5. The date on the letter is 11 December 1835 (sent from Athens). Greek translation from the Danish by A. Papanikolaou-Christensen in *Christianos Hansen: Epistoles kai Shedia apo ten Hellada*, Athens: Okeanida, 1993, pp. 72–3.

8 Hans Christian Hansen (1803–83) arrived in Athens on a scholarship from the State Academy of Denmark in February 1833. He became involved in important commissions both private and public, including the *Metaxourgeion* (silk factory), a school complex for the American missionary John H. Hill, the Mint and the University, in addition to his archaeological restoration studies on the Acropolis and (possibly) his consultation to Kleanthes and Schaubert on the first plan of Athens.

9 K. Biris, *Historia tou Ethnikou Metsoviou Polytechneiou*, Athens: Ethnikon Metsovion Polytechneion, 1957.

10 Letter by Christian Hansen to *Dansk Kunstblad*, II, 10 June 1837, no. 10, pp. 74–5 (sent from Athens). Greek translation from the Danish by Papanikolaou-Christensen, *Christianos Hansen*, p. 76. No date on the letter, probably of 1837.

11 Cf. N. Todorov, *The Balkan City, 1400–1900,* Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1983, pp. 327–330.

12 Cf. N. Moutsopoulos, 'Oi prodromoi ton proton Hellenon tehnikon epistemonon. Koudareoi Makedones kai Epirotes Maistores', in P. Kyriazes (ed.) *Protoi Hellenes Tehnikoi Epistemones Periodou Apeleutheroses,* Athens: Greek Chamber of Engineers (T.E.E.), 1976. To my knowledge, the author has never furnished any thorough documentation of these routes, which for this reason remain rather schematic.

13 As for example in the case of contractors Stavros Leonidas, Panagiotis Athanasios (Samios), Apostolos Stergiou, Anastasios Miserlis, and Demetrios Theodorou, contractors (Kosmas Kokides Notary Archives *(G.A.K.),* F23/#6652/10-1-1838).

14 Here I take into account Prof. Ulrike Freitag's comment on my paper presentation at ZMO on 10 May 2007. In fact, there are a few cases in the contracts that allude to her point. They concern only Italian and German names disguised into Greek. For example, the *tekton* Simone Muscot from Malta signs his full name in Italian, whereas the notary registers him as 'Symeon Moshatos' (Kosmas Kokides Notary Archives *(G.A.K.),* F43/# 14038/7-2-1841). For a contemporary example of such a practice cf. G. Parati, *Migration Italy: The Art of Talking Back in a Destination Culture,* Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005, p. 97.

15 R.B. Walkey, 'Life-Making in the Balkans: the Legacy of the Builders Guild', *Culture-Space-History* (Proceedings 11th International Conference of the IAPS), vol. 4, July 1990, pp. 113–4. By the same token, other crafts traditionally belonged to other national or religious, groups, e.g. metalworking and skilful leatherwork to Muslim craftsmen. Ch. Jelavich and B. Jelavich, *The Establishment of the Balkan National States, 1804–1920,* Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1986, p. 8.

16 W. McGrew, *Land and Revolution in Modern Greece, 1800–1881,* Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1985, p.161.

17 The related literature is extensive including G. Tsougiopoulos, *To Helleniko Astiko Kentro,* Athens: National Centre of Social Studies, 1984; P. Loukakis, *Athena 1830–1940. Historikes Faseis Pagioses tou Hypersygkentrotismou tes,* Athens: Hetairia Meletes Neou Hellenismou, 1984; B. Kayser, P.-Y. Pechoux, M. Sivignon (eds) *Exode rural et attraction urbaine en Grèce: matériaux pour une étude géeographique des mouvements de population dans la Grèce contemporaine,* Athens: Centre National de Recherches Sociales, 1971, p. 362; G. Burgel, *Croissance urbaine et développement capitaliste le 'Miracle' Athénien,* Paris: Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, 1981, p. 271.

18 K. Moskof, *Eisagogika sten Historia tou Kinematos tes Ergatikes Takses: He Diamorfose tes Ethnikes kai Koinonikes Syneideses sten Hellada,* Thessaloniki: Papageorgiou Typography, 1979, pp. 132–3. See also K. Moskof, *He Ethnike kai Koinonike Syneidese sten Hellada (1830–1909). Ideologia tou Metapratikou Horou,* Thessaloniki, 1972.

19 Moutsopoulos, 'Oi prodromoi', p. 358. The translation is mine.

20 The literature related to the structure, operation and practice of building guilds in the Greek peninsula during the Ottoman period is very limited. Besides Moutsopoulos's bibliography, other related titles are: A. Hadjimihali, 'Oi syntehnies – Ta isnafia', *Epeteris Anotates Sholes Viomechanikon Spoudon* 2, 1949–1950, pp. 186–206; D. Salamangas, 'Ta isnafia kai ta epaggelmata epi Tourkokratias sta Giannina. Meros A: Genikotites', *Epirotike Hestia,* Giannina 8–82, Feb. 1959; T. Hadjigeorgiou, *He Apodemia ton Epeiroton,* Athens, 1958; M. Kalinderis, *Ai Syntehniai tes Kozanes epi Tourkokratias,* Thessaloniki, 1958; E. Vourazeli–Marinakou, *Ai en Thrake Syntehniai ton Hellenon kata ten Tourkokratian,* Thessaloniki, 1950; L. Zois, *Ae en Zakyntho Syntehniae,* Zakynthos, 1893; N. Konomos, *Epirotes sten Zakyntho,* Ioannina, 1964; V.A. Mystakides, 'Ta esnafia etoi Roufetia Thessalonikes', *Emerologion Thessalonikes,* 1932.

21 On the coexistence of the two notions in the Ottoman Empire, see D. Quataert, 'Labor History and the Ottoman Empire, c. 1700–1922', *International Labor and Working Class History* 60, 2001. Still early, in the seventeenth century, the pioneer 'surveyor' of the guild

tradition in the East, Evliya Çelebi, used the term 'esnaf' in its looser sense to mean a group or a kind, which stands closer to its original Arabic definition. Eunjeong Yi, 'Guild Membership in Seventeenth Century Istanbul: Fluidity in Organization', in S. Faroqhi and R. Degilhem (eds) *Crafts and Craftsmen of the Middle East: Fashioning the Individual in the Eastern Mediterranean*, London: I.B. Tauris, 2005, p. 73, fn. 12. On the application of the term 'esnaf' to trade corporations in Istanbul, see C. Kirli, 'A Profile of the Labor Force in Early Nineteenth-Century Istanbul', *International Labor and Working Class History* 60, 2001, where, however, the author opens the definition to include all workers characterised by tax-paying status.

22 O. Yildirim, 'Ottoman Guilds as a Setting for Ethno-Religious Conflict: The Case of the Silk-thread Spinners' Guild in Istanbul', *International Review of Social History* 47/3, 2002, p. 407.

23 Cf. G. Baer, 'Guilds in Middle Eastern History', in M.A. Cook (ed.) *Studies in the Economic History of the Middle East*, London: Oxford University Press, 1970, p. 30. Also cf. Donald Quataert's objections in his 'Workers and the State during the Late Ottoman Empire', in T. Atabaki (ed.) *State and the Subaltern: Modernization, Society and the State in Turkey and Iran*, London: I.B. Tauris, 2007, p. 21.

24 Incidents of rebellion and upheaval of Ottoman guilds against state authorities are common in literature. See for example, B. Jelavich, *History of the Balkans, vol. 1: Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983, p. 115 and G. Denoeux, *Urban Unrest in the Middle East: A Comparative Study of Informal Networks in Egypt, Iran, and Lebanon*, Buffalo, NY: State University of New York, 1993, pp. 48–9.

25 E. Vourazeli-Marinakou, *Ae en Thraki*, p. 29.

26 The literature of this subject is still limited. See, for example, A.Y. al-Hassan and D. Hill, *Islamic Technology, an Illustrated History*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press and UNESCO, 1986, p. 304; E. Ihsanoglu, *Science, Technology, and Learning in the Ottoman Empire*, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004; W. Gervase Clarence-Smith, 'Science and technology in early modern Islam, c.1450–c.1850' (unpublished paper available online – www.lse.ac.uk/collections/economicHistory/GEHN/GEHNPDF/ScienceandTechnology-WGCS.pdf). Some hints at the complex attitude of seventeenth-century Istanbul guilds toward both tradition and progress exist in E. Yi, *Guild Dynamics in Seventeenth-Century Istanbul: Fluidity and Leverage*, Leiden; Boston, MA: Brill, 2004, esp. pp. 124–5.

27 See M. Cerasi, 'Late-Ottoman Architects and Master Builders', *Muqarnas* 5, 1988, esp. pp. 91–4.

28 R. Deguilhem, 'Shared Space or Contested Space: Religious Mixity, Infrastructural Hierarchy and the Builders' Guild in Mid-Nineteenth Century Damascus', in S. Faroqhi and R. Degilhem (eds) *Crafts and Craftsmen of the Middle East: Fashioning the Individual in the Eastern Mediterranean*, London: IB Tauris, 2005, p. 261.

29 See, for example, C.G. Konstantinopoulos, *Oi Paradosiakoi Htistes tes Peloponnesou: Historike kai Laografike Melete*, Athens: Melissa, 1983, p. 48: the author invents the term 'incomplete guilds' for the travelling builders' groups. The legal and economic framework that distinguishes an urban guild from a travelling company of builders is analysed by Ch. Gkoutos in his *Ergasiakes Sheseis ton Oikodomon sti Hersaia Hellada meta to 1800: Symvole sten Historia tou Hellenikou Ergatikou Dikaiou*, Doctoral Dissertation. Athens, 1985.

30 Gkoutos (in *Ergasiakes Sheseis*, pp. 171–2, fn. 2) attributes this chain of misinterpretations to N. Pantazopoulos's failure to discern the differences pertaining to legal status between a guild, a company, an association, etc. See Pantazopoulos, 'Hellenon syssomatoseis kata ten Tourkokratian', *Gnoseis*, Athens, 1958, p. 18.

31 The best known of them are Philippoupolis, Andrianoupolis, Thessaloniki, Cairo, Damascus, Smyrna and Istanbul. See Gkoutos, *Ergasiakes Sxeseis*, pp. 200–1 and footnotes 13–25.

32 Cerasi, 'Late-Ottoman Architects', p. 90.

33 Ibid.

34 Cf. D. Quataert, 'Labor and Working Class History During the Late Ottoman Period, c. 1800–1914', in *Workers, Peasants and Economic Change in the Ottoman Empire*, Istanbul: Isis Press, 1993, p. 187. On the other hand, oral testimonies from those years that could support these hypotheses are practically non-existent.
35 Ibid. Here Quataert mentions the *temetii vergisi*, i.e. a certain kind of tax that all workers were liable to, the records of which may be still extant in government archives.
36 Gkoutos, *Ergasiakes Sheseis*, p. 172.
37 Despite the anonymity that characterises the world of premodern building practice, a few names of builders' families have surfaced due to the widespread reputation of their work. Cerasi, for example, makes reference to the Damianov family in Macedonia and the Ficev family in Bulgaria. Cerasi, 'Late-Ottoman Architects', p. 89. However, in pragmatic terms, the constitution of an itinerant company lasted for as long as one trip, i.e. usually a season. See Gkoutos, *Ergasiakes Sheseis*, p. 67.
38 In the case of Greek *esnafs* these dialects were intentionally corrupted variations of the Greek language with many foreign infusions. They were particular to the group of a certain region, not to the trade in general. Thus, the coded idiom of the *Koudarei* in Epirus and Western Macedonia was different from any other spoken by builders in other regions; the goldsmiths of Stemnitsa had their own, and so forth. Cf. Moutsopoulos, 'Oi prodromoi', p. 360 and Cerasi, 'Late-Ottoman Architects', p. 89. These coded 'languages' should not be confused with the technical glossaries, specific to each trade, which had a much wider usage.
39 Cerasi, 'Late-Ottoman Architects', p. 173.
40 Yet law required that any builder (*mastoras/usta*), therefore any master builder, become member of a city-based building guild in order to practice his profession. Gkoutos, *Ergasiakes Sheseis*, p. 78.
41 C. Bouras, 'The Approach to Vernacular Architecture: General Introduction', in D. Philippides (ed.) *Greek Traditional Architecture*, vol. 1, Athens: Melissa, 1983, p. 26.
42 Cerasi, 'Late-Ottoman Architects', p. 90.
43 On the impact of Epirot builders in the Peloponnese the earliest written testimony dates to 1691. Cf. Konstantinopoulos, *Oi Paradosiakoi*, p. 17. Regarding the migrations of Epirot and Macedonian craftsmen to Zakynthos see Konomos, *Epirotes sten Zakyntho*. The historical formation of a local builders' workshop in the Aegean island of Kassos and its neighbouring Karpathos has not been studied yet.
44 There exist contracts in Kokides's archive from the period 1835–60, which confirm apprenticeship deeds, as 1) Efstathios Flambouras, a plasterer from Zakynthos, takes Nikolaos Matthaiou as an apprentice for one year (F24/#6762/25–1–1838); 2) Mihalis Kranios, painter, takes Joannes A. Tzinis as an apprentice for 18 months (F39/#12007/10-4-1840). Both in Kosmas Kokides Notary Archives (*G.A.K.*).
45 McGrew, *Land and Revolution*, p. 161. Actually the term 'refugee' is not applicable yet in the given historical context. The Greek state did not differentiate 'refugees' from 'migrants' until late in the nineteenth century. However, for the purposes of this research I find McGrew's distinction convenient and I am using it throughout.
46 The leading trade guilds of Ottoman Athens were those of the soap-makers, tanners, and honey and oil producers. D.G. Kambouroglou, *Athenaikon Arhontologion*, Athens: J.N. Sidelis bookstores, 1921, pp. 24–5, and D.G. Kambouroglou, *Ai Paleai Athenai* (Old Athens), Athens: G.J. Vasileiou bookstore, 1922, pp. 443–6.
47 Cf. A.E. Vakalopoulos, *Prosfyges kai Prosfygiko Zetema kata ten Epanastase tou 1821* (Refugees and the Refugee Issue during the Revolution of 1821), Athens: Herodotos, 2001, pp. 112–13.
48 To the extent that the government was supportive of internal migration, that is, mountaineers resettling in the plains to form communes or join the existing ones, it must have done the same for migrants from the Ottoman state who were not classified as refugees. However 'there could be no question of a free distribution of farm land because the

government relied heavily upon usufruct taxation receipts from the national lands.' McGrew, *Land and Revolution*, p. 191. The author does not expand on the latter, as opposed to the former, category of migrants.

49 For a more detailed analysis of this issue see Vogli, *'Hellenes to genos'*, esp. pp. 262ff.

50 McGrew, *Land and Revolution*, p. 99.

51 Vogli, *'Hellenes to genos'*.

52 See Royal Decree 'On Internal Passports' (28 March/9 April 1835), esp. Article 14, in T.P. Delegiannes, G.K. Zenopoulos (eds) *Hellenike Nomothesia apo tou 1833 mehri tou 1862*, Athens: 'Hermou' print, 1862, fn. 2.

53 McGrew, *Land and Revolution*, p. 103.

54 F. Strong. *Greece as a Kingdom; or a Statistical Description of that Country, from the Arrival of King Otho, in 1833, down to the Present Time*, London: Longman, Brown, Green, and Longmans, 1842, pp. 45–50 (table on p. 50). Later assessments of this inventory characterise its numerical estimates too low.

55 Ibid., p. 45.

56 This formulation draws upon Governor Kapodistrias' early definition of the term 'refugee', i.e. the person who finds refuge in the free state and states a clear intention to permanently settle in it. See Vogli, *'Hellenes to genos'*, p. 113, fn. 154.

57 G. Finlay, *The Hellenic Kingdom and the Greek Nation*, London: J. Murray, 1836, pp. 2, 83–4, and 87–8. As quoted in Vogli, *'Hellenes to genos'*, p. 212.

58 For an extensive discussion of this issue see Vogli, *'Hellenes to genos'*, esp. pp. 89–113. Also J. Dimakis, *He Politeiake Metavole tou 1843 kai to Zetema ton Autochthonon kai Heterochthonon*, Athens: Themelio, 1991.

59 McGrew, *Land and Revolution*, p. 188. Also Vogli, *'Hellenes to genos'*, p. 220.

60 Vogli, *'Hellenes to genos'*, p. 236. The reasons have not been specified.

61 General Secretariat (*G.A.K.)*, F233/ms.195/ 3–3–1830. In the same folder there is an undated draft of Kapodistrias's response to Gerakaris's letter expressing concern about the situation and pressing for a resolution (entry #176).

62 Kapodistrias to Gerakaris as published in Gkoutos, *Ergasiakes Sheseis*, Appendix no. 3, p. 225.

63 The full statute (68 articles) has been published and analysed by E. N. Arnaoutoglou, as "He idea tes apokatastaseos ton synafion…'. Enas diorganismos synafion tou 1831' ('The idea on the guilds' restitution'. A guild statute of 1831), *Epeteris tou Kentrou Ereunes tes Historias tou Hellenikou Dikeou* 36, Academy of Athens, Athens, 2002 (reprint).

64 Ibid., p. 137. The author seeks the roots of this influence in the legislation effecting the guild system in the British protectorate of the Ionian Islands. On the 1831 statute as compared with the firman see pp. 218–9 and footnotes #19–26.

65 Penal Code of 1834, articles 212–224. See Gkoutos, *Ergasiakes Sheseis*, p. 210.

66 Penal Code of 1834, article 167. See Gkoutos, *Ergasiakes Sheseis*, p. 211.

67 All these restrictions were relaxed with the constitutional reform of 1864. Gkoutos, *Ergasiakes Sheseis*, p. 211.

68 According to Petropoulos there seems to have been a secret alliance between the klefts and the lower strata of the population. J. Petropoulos, *Politics and Statecraft in the Kingdom of Greece, 1833–1843*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1968, p. 31.

69 A. Minkov, 'Ottoman tapu title deeds in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries', *Islamic Law and Society*, 7/1 2000, p. 74.

70 P.I. Kamilakis, 'Syntehnies kai Epaggelmata ste Smyrne prin apo ta Mesa tou 19ou Aiona, me Vase Arhiakes Kirios Piges' (Esnafs and Trades in Smyrna Before the Middle of the 19th Century, based mainly on archival sources), *Mikrasiatika Hronika*, vol. 20, 1998. In these lists, the artisans are stated by name, craft/profession or title, and place of origin. The lists were composed by order of the Greek Embassy in Istanbul.

71 L. Hilaire-Pérez, C. Verna, 'Dissemination of Technical Knowledge in the Middle Ages and the Early Modern Era: New Approaches and Methodological Issues', *Technology and Culture* 47, 2006, p. 538.

72 This must have been the case if they were inhabitants of the Ionian Commonwealth. The requirement of a passport has not been confirmed for itinerants originating in the Ottoman state.

73 Of the two, Proastion was soon integrated in the city plan. See K. Biris, 'To Proastion', *Nea Hestia* 33, 1943; K. Biris, *Ai Athinai apo tou 19ou eis ton 20on Aiona* (Athens from the 19th to the 20th Century), Athens: Found of the History and Town Building of Athens, 1966, p. 80. The Anafiotika, on the northern cliffs of the Acropolis, has not been much altered over the years. Cf.R. Kaftanzoglou (with Ph. Kamoutsi), *Ste Skia tou Hierou Vrahou: Topos kai Mneme sta Anafiotika* (In the Shadow of the Sacred Rock: Place and Memory in Anafiotika), Athens: Ethniko Kentro Koinonikon Erevnon/Hellenika Grammata, 2001.

12 The city and the stranger:

Jeddah in the nineteenth century[1]

Ulrike Freitag

Introduction

This chapter considers the question of migration in the case of Jeddah in the nineteenth century. Its thesis is that there was considerable change, both with regard to who actually lived and worked in the city, and with regard to the notions about and the status of 'outsiders'. These were mostly affected, it will be argued, by Ottoman administrative modernisation and European expansion. These intertwined developments have to be considered in the framework of socio-economic changes. After a brief description of Jeddah in the early nineteenth century, the chapter will discuss major changes in the city's history in the course of the nineteenth century, and discuss the impact of these changes on three distinct groups, namely resident Muslims, Muslim pilgrims and Christians.

In the early nineteenth century, Jeddah had two main and distinct, albeit intertwined functions: it was the main port for pilgrims en route to the holy city of Mecca, who arrived mainly (albeit not exclusively) during the annual pilgrimage season, and it served as the main Red Sea entrepôt in the trade between the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean.[2] The Wahhabi incursions into the Hijaz between 1802 and 1811 affected Jeddah, although it was not conquered by Wahhabi troops owing to its fortifications. Merchant families left for Suakin and other destinations and the number of pilgrims diminished dramatically, so that the town's population sank temporarily to 5,000, only to recover to its earlier volume of 15,000 20,000 by the early 1830s.[3] Temporarily under Egyptian control, the Ottoman status of the region was unambiguously restored by 1840.

Politically, this meant a return to the rivalry between the Meccan-based *sharīfs* and the governors, whose seat shifted between Jeddah, Mecca and the summer residence of Ta'if. More relevant for our topic are various measures of the Tanzimat that were launched by the Ottoman sultan in 1839, as will be shown in the following. Economically, the liberalisation forced by the application of the Convention of Balta Liman of 1838 between the Ottoman and British Empires deprived Jeddah of its status as the legitimate entry point into the Ottoman Empire for all trade arriving from the southern Red Sea and Indian Ocean. Its use as a coaling station seems to have compensated for losses thus incurred. In the long run, however, this, combined with the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 led to a serious decrease in its role as an entrepôt, while the number of pilgrims increased as travel became quicker and, eventually, cheaper.[4] Even if estimates of pilgrims varied greatly and depended on a good number of variables, their numbers increased after 1869. Similarly, the number of pilgrims arriving by sea, although varying dramatically, shows a fairly sustained overall increase.[5]

The political and economic changes impacted not only on the composition of the population of Jeddah, but also on the legal status of various groups, as will be sketched out in the following sections of this chapter.

Changing legal categories of the 'stranger'

'The inhabitants of Djidda, like those of Mekka and Medina, are almost exclusively foreigners', wrote Burckhardt after visiting Jeddah in 1805.[6] Their presence reflected the links of the city through pilgrimage and trade: Yemenis, Hadhramis and (some) Omanis from the Peninsula and more than 100 Indian families from Surat and Bombay, as well as some Malays. In addition, Burckhardt describes settlers from Egypt, Syria, North Africa and the European and the Anatolian provinces of the Ottoman Empire. At his time, non-Muslims were not resident in the city: The Jews had been driven out and left for Yemen in the late eighteenth century, Banyan merchants arrived periodically during the shipping season but never settled, and some Greek Christian merchants lived on islands off the shore of Jeddah. It is difficult to ascertain whether this was a formal ban on non-Muslims, and, if so, how long it might have lasted, as we have to rely on the somewhat patchy and not necessarily fully informed reports by European travellers for this matter. Thus, Ulrich Jasper Seetzen, who explored Arabia in 1809, mentions a meeting with an English trade representative, presumably of Italian origin, who seemed to reside in Jeddah at least temporarily. It is not known, however, whether Mr. Benzoni, who had a long history of trading in the Red Sea, had converted to Islam.[7]

This exclusion of non-Muslims from Jeddah confirms André Raymond's observation that religion rather than origin was the main marker of difference in premodern Ottoman cities, followed by language. Nevertheless, it was exceptional for non-Muslims to be excluded from Ottoman cities, and even in the case of Jeddah it seems to have been a temporary measure at most, which was grounded in an understanding that not only Mecca and Medina, but also, by extension, other cities in the Hijaz were part of the holy land of Islam. By contrast, non-Sunni Muslims, i.e. Shi'ites, but also less orthodox groups such as the Ismailis were tolerated, even if they had to pay special taxes.[8] As shall be seen, the changes of the nineteenth century greatly modified this type of order, although, unfortunately, I am only able to comment, as yet, on change at the macro-level, rather than on the transformation at the urban level as such. The following discussion will focus on how the position of various groups changed and shifted, starting with the one most clearly distinct, namely the non-Muslims.

Christians in Jeddah

When reflecting on his passage through Jeddah in 1762, Carsten Niebuhr recalled how he had been worried about the attitude of its inhabitants towards Christians, not least in the light of the contemptuous and hostile attitudes he had encountered in Egypt and Yanbu' However, he was pleasantly surprised. Apart from a warning against approaching the gate leading towards Mecca, he and his companions enjoyed complete freedom of movement.[9] His map of Jeddah also shows a Christian cemetery firmly established on the mainland (and not on a sandbank or island), which seems to run counter to claims that the first Christian cemetery was established in 1820. Although it is, from Niebuhr's description, not clear whether he actually visited the location, separated from the old town by a creek, and although the accuracy of his map is difficult to ascertain, it would seem that it might still be in the same place today.[10] An attempt to expand the graveyard in the late nineteenth century failed due to resistance by Sharīf ʿAbd al-Muṭṭalib.[11]

It seems that the restrictions on Christian settlement in the city were lifted during the period of Egyptian control. This might have been in line with the Egyptian policy of equality between Muslims and Christians in Syria, basically aiming at an appeasement of European powers, but also at using the economic and administrative know-how of the minorities. The first Christians to make use of this new liberty and to probe the economic opportunities of the major port of the Hijaz came from the realms of the Ottoman Empire, they are reported to have been Greeks (possibly meaning Greek orthodox), Egyptians and Iraqi Christians, mostly arriving from Egypt.[12] During the same period, the first formal Western consulates were established in Jeddah, taking the place of representatives of the Western trading companies who had periodically resided there. It took a while, however, until foreign consuls actually took up residence in the city.[13] For example, Fulgence Fresnel, the first French consul whose post was created in 1839, could only take up residence in the city in early 1843. However, France had created the post already in 1839, and had been represented by an Armenian who had come to Jeddah with Muḥammad ʿAlī Pasha of Egypt.[14]

The Ottomans continued to tolerate the presence of non-Muslims, which encouraged the immigration of Ottoman as well as Western traders and companies. There might even have been a number of Ottoman Jews who settled in Jeddah. Although Ottoman non-Muslims seem to have integrated well into local society, the status of Westerners became precarious as the century progressed and Western influence began to weigh harder on the Empire.

Locally, residents grew nervous about the growing number of tourist-explorers who regarded a visit to Mecca as an ultimate challenge.[15] Perhaps more importantly, Western pressure on the Ottoman Empire to abolish slavery caused increasing resentment, as did Western competition in two of Jeddah's major professions, shipping and trade. Pressure to introduce quarantine and improve the sanitary conditions in Jeddah and the holy cities further heated the situation, which erupted on a number of occasions, although, in each case, different factors combined.

Western consuls were attacked in 1841, 1851 and 1856, and Western consuls or vice-consuls killed during the revolt of 1858 and in a targeted attack in 1895.

The most instructive incident is the revolt of 1858, in which 22 people were murdered, among them 21 Christians and residents under foreign protection.[16] Among those later trying to reclaim the value of their plundered and lost properties were an Austrian merchant resident in Alexandria as well as a number of Greeks.[17]

The course of events leading up to the revolt points to another important issue: an Indian merchant, Ṣāliḥ Jawhar, exchanged the British flag that his steamer was flying for the Ottoman one when it became obvious that the British consulate in Jeddah was enquiring into his family's business transactions. According to British law, such a change of flag warranted the confiscation of the ship. However, the merchant was not only Indian, and as such a British protected person, he also was resident merchant at Jeddah. He could, therefore, claim Ottoman nationality and, according to Ottoman law, had every right to fly the Ottoman flag.[18] As we shall see, the question of nationality became important in more than one respect.

After the revolt of 1858, trust between consuls and the Ottoman authorities did not increase. In 1881, the commander of the Ottoman troops in the Hijaz demanded the replacement of the governor (*qāʾimmaqām*) of Jeddah in order to restore a firmer Ottoman administration, as the foreign consulates had begun to violate Ottoman law.[19] However, although letters by the *qāʾimmaqām* ʿĀrifī Bey of 1305/1888 and 1306/1889 confirm this suspicion, they also show that Ottoman rules forbidding direct contact between consuls and *qāʾimmaqām* might not have contributed to effective communication concerning different interpretations of the law.[20]

The changing landscape of Muslim Jeddah

Although I mentioned earlier that religion was a major marker in Ottoman Jeddah, I now have to complicate the picture slightly. The city's quarters were not obviously divided by ethnicity, nor was the social structure. This notwithstanding, social and ethnic origins did influence the place of residence and professional choices, which again were transmitted in families. The northern quarter became the area of choice not only for European consuls but also for the Ottoman administrative institutions as the quarter benefited from the fresh sea breeze. By contrast, Ḥārat al-Baḥr was where fishermen and carpenters working in the shipyards would be found. The southeastern suburb of Nakutu, in turn, was mostly populated by Sudanese and other African immigrants, who worked as carriers, servants and prostitutes.

Neither were social relations entirely without complications. Travellers report reservations against 'Turks', presumably thereby referring to representatives of the Ottoman state, irrespective of how their rule compared to that of the sharīfs. This might be due less to their interest in Christian innovations such as forks, chairs and alcohol than to the fact that they were the tax collectors or unpaid soldiers and thus representatives of a power that could not easily be challenged. It remains somewhat open whether or not this categorisation as 'Turks' was limited to obvious state employees, such as members of the administration or military, or whether it was extended to other people coming from Anatolia, be it for trade or as artisans.

Interestingly enough, it seems that Ottomans at least occasionally brought Istanbuli artisans to the Hijaz when embarking on large construction projects.[21]

Other people coming from the Ottoman Empire, as well as from outside, like Yemen or Hadhramaut, could, quite irrespective of their ethnicity, fairly easily become members of Jiddawi society. Many, however, remained clearly identifiable outsiders, the Indian dress noted by Burckhardt seems only the tip of an iceberg in that respect. Indicators of integration seem to have been mainly language, dress and inter-marriage, although much work remains to be done on how integration actually worked.

Although internal travel had for long required a special permit, this does not seem to have hindered the circulation of merchants within the Ottoman Empire significantly, travel into and out of the Ottoman Empire became more complicated in the course of the nineteenth century. Probably since 1847, foreigners required a passport and visa when intending a visit to the Ottoman Empire, whereas the passport regulation of 1894 also demanded passports for leaving the Empire.[22] Although much research still needs to be done to assess the practices associated with such legal stipulations, documents from ʿĀrifī Bey, a qāʾimmaqām who represented the Ottomans from 1883 to 1885 in Jeddah attest to the detailed supervision of travellers by the authorities.[23] As European rule over Muslim territories in Africa and Asia expanded and protection was afforded to certain groups of Ottoman subjects, Ottoman attempts to control their subjects and foreigners became more complicated. Again, ʿĀrifī Bey's documents point to attempts by European consuls to actively intervene in favour of particular foreigners who headed for Jeddah, and the Ottoman authorities adamantly refusing to accept foreign intervention.[24]

The conflict of 1858 already highlighted the complicated questions related to people claiming dual nationality, and thus attempting to find legal loopholes in case of need. Another problem associated with nationality became more pressing, namely that of land acquisition. Whereas this had been legalised for foreigners in 1867, the Hijaz was exempt from this law by virtue of the presence of the two Holy cities.[25] What, however, about Muslim foreigners aiming at buying land or a house in the Hijaz? After all, this had been a time-honoured practice, partly associated with the desire to reside near the holy shrines, partly resulting from business interests in cities such as Jeddah. In 1878, a decree outlawing the ownership of properties by foreigners in the Hijaz was issued by the Sultan, about which the foreign consulates were informed.[26]

Although I have yet to find evidence of concrete cases, the discussions about this matter became quite intense in the early 1880s. In December 1881, Sharīf ʿAbd al-Muṭṭalib and the *wālī* of the Hijaz maintained jointly in a letter to the Sultan that Indians and Javanese had in the past bought land, but that this practice had ceased due to the decree outlawing the practice.[27] Nevertheless, by April 1882, the administrative council of the province was asked to investigate the matter, a task that was then delegated to the sharia court.

It seems that the background of the matter was a complaint by the provincial council about people from Daghestan and Java acquiring land in spite of such stipulations, the accusation being that a certain *qāḍī* had maintained the practice in order to maintain his share of transaction charges. The council's main concern was that such a transaction might actually provide European imperial powers an eventual pretext to intervene in the most holy land of the Muslims.[28] The possibility of becoming Ottoman following a five-year residence did not make this matter less pressing, and rules were introduced whereby such a 'new' Ottoman had to sell his property upon leaving the Empire.

An anecdote related to the traveller Julius Euting by an ironsmith in Ha'il, and referring to events in 1883 possibly reflects how the matter of foreigners and their presence in Mecca was, under such circumstances, retold and reinterpreted at the popular level: According to the ironsmith, a Christian had bribed the Sharīf of Mecca and thus managed to buy a house in the holy city. Only upon public pressure did the Sharīf recommend that the Christian leave Mecca for Jeddah. En route, he was murdered by Bedouins.[29] In this story the two narratives of repulsive and threatening practices, namely of Christian visitors to Mecca and of the illegal acquisition of houses by those prohibited from buying them, merge into one. Thus, European expansion in the Middle East and physical presence in the most holy city of Islam was not only considered a real fear, but also, more indirectly, infringed on the status of Muslims living under European rule once they came to Jeddah, and contributed to their categorisation as 'foreign'.

At the same time, however, the Ottoman Empire at times also successfully resisted European expansionism. Thus, in a dispute concerning Tunisians in the Hijaz, the authority of the French consulate to represent these Tunisians was disputed and it was claimed that they were Ottoman subjects.[30]

Pilgrims

Finally, even travellers on the annual pilgrimage to Mecca were affected by the changing international landscape. Pilgrims constituted the economic lifeline of a large service industry based on the ḥajj, and complaints by pilgrims about extortion by Ottoman authorities and those involved in the ḥajj services are abundant. At the same time, many pilgrims combined the ḥajj with small-scale business to finance their ways, or even remained in the Hijaz for varying periods to pay for their passage back, or possibly find themselves new livelihoods.

Although the Ottomans afforded wealthy and prominent pilgrims wide-ranging hospitality and eased any formal restrictions on their movement, they grew increasingly concerned about poor and destitute pilgrims. Passport laws and laws against vagrants were put to use in the 1880s when trying to prevent their entry, or deport them. Incidentally, the British consuls were concerned about poor Indian pilgrims, fearing that they in turn might have to drum up the expenses.

Finally, the quarantine measures need to be mentioned as another hurdle to the free movement of pilgrims in and out of the Hijaz. Once again, it was difficult to fine-tune such measures, so that Jiddawi merchants started to complain about restrictions of movement and delays in their trade operations.[31]

Legal separation – economic integration?

The above sketch of an increasing legal differentiation between Muslims of various origins, as well as the growing importance of the question of nationality and foreign protection emphasises the official Ottoman or foreign classification of the population. It is far less telling if one wants to understand the day-to-day interactions between different sections of the Jiddawi population. The one aspect that becomes tangible from the documents inspected so far concerns the economic interactions. Here, an image of close interactions between different sectors of the legally divided society emerges. Two examples may serve to illustrate this point.

The Italian keeper of a 'locanta', a tavern selling alcohol and thus in theory at least limited to Christian customers, in 1860 made his will. It shows that, at the time, he was debtor not just to other Italians living in Jeddah, but also to one of the most respected Muslim notables of the town, who himself represented the business interests of the Sharīf of Mecca in Jeddah.[32] Another creditor of his was a Daghestani resident of Mecca.[33] Given the low reputation of alcohol selling, which caused repeated social and legal problems in Jeddah, such financial support by well-respected Muslims is quite remarkable. It points to the fact that credit relations between businessmen were extremely widespread and common, and may have served to cement social ties, which are less well documented.

In the 1870s, the Alexandrian-born Richard Jorelle, agent of the Austro Hungarian Lloyd and of a variety of other European and Indian-based firms and private traders, exported, among other goods, coffee. This was bought from his agent in Hodeida, a Hadhrami by the name of Bā 'Ashan, himself from a family with branches in Jeddah, Hadhramaut, India and Java, and trading with Bengal and Singapore.[34] Richard Jorelle also was creditor of the Indian merchant Faraj Yusr, long regarded as one of the major merchants of Jeddah, he was in partnership with a Meccan (not identified by the documents) and linked to the Dutch consul van der Chys.[35]

Finally, it should be noted that it was not only merchants, shopowners and tavernkeepers who were linked by business and credit relations. Rather, the Ottoman government regularly asked for and was granted credit by local businessmen, due to regular shortfalls in cash, and the difficulties of money transfer from Istanbul.[36]

Did inter-communal integration surpass joint economic ventures and mutual credit relations? In contrast to other Middle Eastern cities, Jeddah has no quarters with ethnic designations (even if these were usually not ethnically exclusive), rather, the quarters were linked to socio-economic functions and status. In itself, this does not yet tell much about the degree of actual interaction among the different segments of the population. It seems that language and dress were considered among the major yardsticks for integration, and that, by this very yardstick, many Indians continued to be considered strangers.[37] However, does this mean that inter-marriage between Egyptians and Yemenis, between Indians and ethnic Turks was possible or even commonplace? Would Sunnis and Shi'ites celebrate religious holidays together? In the poorer quarters, who would share living space with whom? We know that due to the accommodation of pilgrims in people's houses, interactions did take place but was this limited to interactions between inhabitants and transient pilgrims, or did people of different origins share houses permanently? In the absence of court records, these questions have to remain largely unanswered.

The only rather significant exception, which is already clear, is that of the female household slaves, who seem to have lived within the quarters of families and, if they had children, to have become very much integrated into the families. Given that they were usually of Abyssinian (Christian) origin and only converted to Islam upon arrival in Jeddah, a closer scrutiny of their particular role would also merit further attention.

Conclusion

In conclusion, it can be confirmed that the residents of Jeddah, temporary or permanent, were of many different ethnic and religious origins, due to the city's role as an important entrepôt in the Red Sea as well as its function as the main port of entry for Muslim pilgrims en route to Mecca. In addition, the city accommodated a large number of foreign pilgrims each year. Not only the varying political and economic developments, but also new rules and laws regarding the equality of non-Muslims, movement within and without the Empire, as well as concerns about the health of the pilgrims and the spread of infectious diseases all contributed to significant changes in the modes of movement and settlement in Jeddah. Thus, the transition from archaic to modern globalisation, as well as the intersecting of different modes thereof, can be seen to have intersected in the city.[38] There was a marked increase in the number of people passing through Jeddah with the introduction of steam shipping, albeit its effects took some time to become significant. Surely, there was also a shift in population groups in congruence with changing patterns and agents of trade, reflected, for example, in the increase of the British protected Indian merchant population. In terms of the widening scope of international exchange, however, the expansion under Western dominance went hand in glove with the establishment of new divisions and frontiers, which impacted directly on the city. These could be physical (quarantine), legal (nationality legislation) or ideological (the emergence of nationalism). Some of these restrictions were imposed by those dominating the globalisation process, some might be characterised as defensive moves aimed at preventing Western expansion, and some could be attributed to the global spread of new concepts.

Hopkins has remarked in passing that although 'the cosmopolitan ideal made its way into and through the nineteenth century, it had to be reformulated en route to take account of technological innovation and industrialization'.[39] The case of Jeddah can be used to exemplify this through the changing notions of who was considered to be a stranger, and how the classification of different groups of people changed. It is far less clear how the changing legal categories impacted on the daily lives of the city's inhabitants or whether they affected it at all. The uprising of 1858 seems to suggest that Christians and foreign protégés were exposed to such changes, but whether this was a mere eruption instigated by specific powerbrokers or whether social and economic relations really changed, remains to be investigated.

It is also interesting to note, however, that in spite of these and many later changes, Jeddah remains a multi-ethnic city to this day. This is mainly due to its continued function as a main entry point for pilgrims, but, perhaps more so, to its function as one of Saudi Arabia's main economic hubs as a port and trading centre in spite of the dramatically changed nature of the modes of transport and trade.

Notes

1. I am grateful to Abdel Karim Rafeq, Nora Lafi, Florian Riedler, Malte Fuhrmann and Leyla von Mende for their comments on earlier drafts of this chapter.
2. W. Ochsenwald, *Religion, Society and the State in Arabia: The Hijaz under Ottoman Control, 1840–1908*, Columbus: The Ohio State University Press, 1984, p. 241 and the contributions by M. Tuscherer, 'Trade and Port Cities in the Red Sea – Gulf of Aden Region in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Century', pp. 28–45; A. Raymond, 'A Divided Sea: The Cairo Coffee Trade in the Red Sea Area during the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries', pp. 46–57 and C. Dubois, 'The Red Sea Ports During the Revolution in Transportation, 1800–1914', pp. 58–74, all in L. Fawaz and C. Bayly (eds) *Modernity and Culture*, New York: Columbia University Press, 2002. For the political history of the early nineteenth century, see A. Vassiliev, *The History of Saudi Arabia*, 2nd edn, London: Saqi Books, 2000, pp. 91–105, 144–50.
3. Ali Bey, *Travels of Ali Bey in Morocco, Tripoli, Cyprus, Egypt, Arabia, Syria, and Turkey, Between the Years 1803 and 1807*, London: Longmans, 1816, vol. 2, p. 43, J. L. Burckhardt, *Travels in Arabia*, London: Colburn, 1829 [http://etext.library.edu.au/b/burchkhardt/john-lewis//arabia/arabia.html], chapter 1, E. Rüppell, *Reise in Abyssinien*, Frankfurt: Schmerber, 1838, vol. I, p. 159, Vassiliev, *The History of Saudi Arabia*, p. 138.
4. W. Ochsenwald, 'The Commercial History of the Hijaz Vilayet, 1840–1908', *Arabian Studies* VI, 1982, pp. 57–76, Public Record Office, FO No. 1451, Turkey, Report for the Year 1893, p. 2.
5. For figures see Ochsenwald, *Religion, Society, and the State*, p. 61 and K. Ezzerelli, 'Le pèlerinage à La Mecque au temps du chemin de fer du Hedjaz (1908–1914)', in S. Chiffoleau and A. Madoeuf (eds) *Les Pèlerinages au Maghreb et au Moyen Orient: Espaces publics, espaces du public*, Beirut: IFPO, 2005, p. 170.
6. Burckhardt, *Travels in Arabia*, chapter 1.
7. 'Aus einem Schreiben des Dr. Seetzen', in *Monatl. Correspondenz* 27 (1813), pp. 160–82, here p. 161.
8. Burckhardt, *Travels in Arabia*, chapter 12, A. Raymond, *Grandes villes arabes à l'époque ottomane*, Paris: Sindbad, 1999, p. 101.
9. C. Niebuhr, *Reisebeschreibung nach Arabien und andern umliegenden Ländern*, Copenhagen: Nicolaus Möller, 1774, pp. 271f.
10. Ibid., Tab. LV, after p. 278; *Jeddah 68/69*, Nairobi, Tavistock, 1968, p. 62.
11. BBA Y.EE 88/67, 21. Tishrīn al-thānī 1297/3.12.1881.
12. R. Burton, *Personal Narrative of a Pilgrimage to al-Madinah & Meccah* (ed. I. Burton), London: Longman, Brown, Green, and Longmans, 1855, vol. 2, p. 272.
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16. Ochsenwald, *Religion, Society and the State*, p. 143.
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18. Details of the affair in Ochsenwald, *Religion, Society and the State*, pp. 143–151.
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20. Ṣ. M. Ismā'īl, Jidda khilal al-fatra 1286–1326h./1869–1908, Riyadh: Darāt al-Malik 'Abd al-'Azīz, 1418/1997–98, pp. 35–9, 184–7.
21. BBA, Y.EE. 42/130, 19. Ramaḍān 1295/24.4.1878, concerning a number of state employees (and presumably their families), and A.DVN 90/77, 5. ZA 1269/10.8.1853. This document pertains to Medina, not Jeddah.
22. See Ch. Herzog's article in this book.
23. Ismā'īl, S. Ṣabbān *1286–1326h./1869–1908*, pp. 35–39, 183–190.
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38. A.G. Hopkins, 'The History of Globalization – and the Globalization of History?', in A.G. Hopkins (ed.) *Globalization in World History*, London: Pimlico, 2002, pp. 12–44 and C.A. Bayly, '"Archaic" and "Modern" Globalization in the Euroasian and African Arena, ca. 1750–1850', ibid., pp. 45–72, for a thoughtful discussion of the conundrums of periodisation, c.f.A. Komlosy, 'Weltzeit – Ortszeit. Zur Periodisierung von Globalgeschichte', in M. Grandner, D. Rothermund, W. Schwentker (eds), *Globalisierung und Globalgeschichte*, Wien: Mandelbaum Verlag, 2005, pp. 83–114.
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13 'I would rather be in the Orient'

European lower class immigrants into the Ottoman lands

Malte Fuhrmann

The Eastern Mediterranean was in the nineteenth century strongly inter-connected with Western, Central and Southern Europe. In recent years, a number of case studies have highlighted that the influx from 'Europe' into the regions de facto or de jure pertaining to the Ottoman state was not limited to factory-produced commodities, academic or technical knowledge, and a limited number of upper-class merchants, trade agents and consuls.[1] Thanks to a growing number of mostly recent case studies, we now know that workers and providers of low-key services originating from Italy, France, Germany and the Habsburg lands migrated to the South and to the East of the Mediterranean throughout the long nineteenth century.[2] Work opportunities in or around the large infrastructure projects, the desire of upper-class families in the Levant to educate their children and run the household in Western manners and languages, the economic stagnation of some rural areas in the European states and a desire to see more of the world than the West, as well as many other disparate factors, all combined to create a 'European' migrant population in the Ottoman lands of presumably several tens of thousands. Although this cannot compete with other mass migratory phenomena of the period, such as the countless movements to the Americas, these Europeans were numerous enough to make an impact in the towns and cities where they concentrated and occasionally were the subject of diplomatic, political and social debate. What created a particular anxiety for the states concerned was the matter of these expatriates' or new Ottomans' place in international relations, specifically concerning the 'Eastern Question': did they support their home countries' attempts to expand their influence into the Ottoman domains, or did they feel more attached to their place of residence?

The loyalties of temporary residents and immigrants are, of course, often a point of particular concern for states and societies. Their respective positioning of 'home' can be deciphered in three different ways. First, it can be defined as the locality where a certain person stays the de facto largest amount of his or her time (the spatial dimension); second, it depicts a locality that recognises the individual as a legitimate user of a particular space (the legal dimension); third, it is the locality to which the individual attaches a predominant degree of his sense of belonging (the subjective dimension). Ideally, all three localities coincide, but in the case of migrants, this is rarely the case. Within the respective dimensions, the locality designated as 'home' is, of course, not in itself stable, but is contested and the contestation becomes more powerful if the aspiring locality dominates one of the other dimensions. The potential conflict, for the migrant who seeks to locate him- or herself in these localities and their respective communities, between the migrant and the states involved, and between the states concerned, is considerable. It is the third definition of 'home', the subjective dimension, that this chapter intends to explore in more detail. Can we reconstruct how the lower-class 'Europeans' settling or travelling in Rumelia and Anatolia (mostly concentrated in the big cities on the Aegean and Marmara Seas) in the Hamidian period related to the country they had left and the one in which they now found themselves?

The feasibility of such an endeavour naturally hinges on its sources. Lower class actors are less likely to have recorded their views in memoirs or travelogues, nor are their personal letters likely to have survived in an accessible form. However, in the case of the large Ottoman cities, this is more than compensated for by the rich documentation in consular and church archives. But can such documents lend insight into the subjective views of the people about whom they were written? It seems that such insights are rare but not impossible to find. But before I discuss the four examples I have chosen in detail, I must first sketch the identities that 'Europeans' in the Levant were offered.

The Ottoman state was not truly hospitable to its new residents. It was traditionally suspicious of people moving of their own accord and upheld a system of internal passports long after other European states, believing in the capitalist benefits of freedom of movement, had abandoned them.[3] The state institutions registered with unease that the number of de facto inhabitants with foreign passports was growing (although predominantly due to the common practice of Ottoman subjects adopting foreign nationality) and stipulated that any foreigner arriving with the intent of settling down in Ottoman lands should take on Ottoman nationality.[4] Also, any foreigner on Ottoman soil who had forfeited his homeland's nationality (which mostly occurred if they had neglected to reregister with their consulate over a longer period of time) was considered a naturalised subject by default. However, the state's possibilities to implement these stipulations were limited due to the strong role of the Great Powers and internal problems of the administration.

The so-called Great Powers on the other hand, to further their position with regard to the 'Eastern Question', made ample use of the so-called capitulations. These treaties with the Porte, originally negotiated to facilitate trade between the Ottoman Empire and its neighbours, had been successively developed to exempt European foreigners from many taxes and in several cases provided indemnity from Ottoman executive measures and judicial prosecution, assigning this task to the respective consulates instead. In their struggle to gain influence in the East, the capitulatory powers put great emphasis on their subjects' rights on Ottoman soil and additionally tried to harness their loyalties and shape them into 'storm troops' for their imperial interests.[5] While such attempts to rally one's expatriate citizens or subjects around the motherland concentrated primarily on the 'respectable' members of society, they did not ignore the sometimes considerable concentrations of working class or sub-proletarian 'Europeans' in the Ottoman Empire, especially in the major ports or working in large-scale infrastructure projects, such as railway or port construction or operation. Moreover, to promote the standing of the respective foreign state, it was necessary that all its subjects on Ottoman soil were respected by the local authorities, so the Great Powers in some cases did not shy away from protecting subjects who in their mother countries might have been the object of pressure or prosecution. On the other hand, creating an aura of respectability also meant that individuals or groups who cast a bad light on the mother country were urged by the consulates to leave the Levant or at least its major cities or in rare cases were forcibly extradited to the motherland.[6]

This competition for control of the 'European' immigrants was reflected on the local level. In the port cities, where their numbers were relatively large, two models existed to integrate them. The first was the 'colony'. This term was widely used to denote a rather hierarchic institution of people originating from and identifying with the same country. They accepted the authority of the consul as their representative, as well as the privileged position of certain notables assuming responsibility in community affairs. These 'colonies' were often ruled by rigid notions of respectability, and the patronising attitude towards non-conformists or people of little social capital was often more oppressive than in the respective motherlands. Working-class countrymen could be integrated, but would rarely be considered equal to their middle-class compatriots. Loose moral conduct was considered damaging to the 'colony's' corporate identity and was not tolerated.[7]

The alternative model to integrate into was 'Levantine society', a phenomenon that is hard to reconstruct with any ethno-graphic accuracy. It denotes the society of the major Ottoman ports that could not be neatly subsumed as belonging either to one of the large indigenous communities, such as the Greek-Orthodox, Sephardic Jews or Turkish-speaking Muslims, or to the bona fide foreigners: partially descendants of families that had lived in the Levant for centuries, they had to a certain degree adapted local ways, such as Greek language or religion, but were still noticeably distinct, either by denomination, or language, or dress or at the very least by their name.[8]

Did the late nineteenth century lower-class immigrants of European origin in Ottoman towns choose to identify with the powerful imperialist states or did they give in to the Ottoman state's pressure to naturalise themselves? Did they associate themselves to the expatriate 'colonies' or did the local ties they had established prove more powerful? In assessing the responses of the local 'Europeans' of modest assets to the identities on offer, the different case studies come to a variety of results. Particularly the conclusions drawn by analyses of the foreign members of the Ottoman working class stand in stark contrast to one another. In his older works, Donald Quataert does not differentiate between the foreign capital and foreign workers. He characterises the latter as a labour aristocracy in league with the former.

> In sum, although 90 per cent of all persons employed by the [Anatolian, MF] railroads were Ottoman subjects, Europeans (especially Germans) occupied

> the highest and most lucrative posts. They held the middle-level positions in about equal numbers with the Ottoman Christians. Mostly Muslim Turks held the lowest categories of work. [...] The intrusion of the Europeans was a disruptive, divisive force that fractured the Ottoman polity both horizontally and vertically.[9]

In contrast, Anthony Gorman believes that

> Far from being a labour elite or members of privileged and insular communities more concerned with their own affairs and developments abroad, many foreign workers in Egypt sought to organize on the basis of class affiliation and were committed to the improvement in the conditions of all workers, both foreign and Egyptian.[10]

Individual articulations found in consular archives are no less contradictory than the conclusions for the field of labour history. Focusing on community and municipal participation and individual strategies, Marie-Carmen Smyrnelis and Oliver Schmitt have claimed that the loyalties by many foreign passport holders (of both high and low social rank) to their respective consulates were given as part of a rational choice, a calculated means to an end, in exchange for a foreign passport or protection, or for economic and social standing, and could be reversed if the benefits of having a certain nationality faded.[11]

> Au sein de l'Empire ottoman, les individus et les familles n'essaient donc pas d'avoir plusieurs identités par leurs rattachements à des groupes institutionnels différents. Leur identité est construite précisément par leur appartenance à des systèmes de relations différentes, qui impliquent tous des obligations et des contraints propres, qu'ils ne perçoivent pourtant jamais comme des absolus; le rattachement, sans réserve ni réticence, à un groupe institutionnel précis, ne leur apparaît jamais comme une donnée allant de soi.[12]

Schmitt adds that although Levantines on an individual or family basis pledged such limited allegiance to foreign states, this was somewhat of an outer skin to them. In essence, their group identity was local and Catholic. However, in the age of nationalism and imperialism, the pressure to choose a strong state-based national identity, either Ottoman or foreign, increased.[13]

However, both Schmitt's and Smyrnelis's conclusions, as well as Quataert's and Gorman's ideas about allegiances and identities, are mainly grounded on actions and their documentation in official sources. Although reading the actions of historical agents as texts is a necessary method for any historian engaged in non-elitist history, i.e. history of people who were not primarily engaged in creating texts, the complete absence of explicit articulations on matters of subjectivity by the historical agents leaves a sense of uneasiness. Is the historian simply injecting his or her own sentiments into a particular material? To tackle this problem, I have selected a sample of sources that are more explicit than usual on the subjective positioning of the nineteenth-century lower class European immigrants into the Ottoman Empire. The purpose of this endeavour is, of course, not to represent the feelings of belonging of this immigrant class as a whole, but to make visible what kind of different subjective positionings could arise in this milieu.

In order to assess these documents correctly it is of great importance to take into account the communicative nature of the documents involved. Whether filing an appeal to the consulate, attracting the authorities' attention by non-conformist behaviour, or writing a travelogue, the agents are driven by particular needs, which can be of a material kind, but can also include the necessity to inform others of the particularities of their life situation, a necessity that presents itself most articulately in the following more explicitly subjective sources.

Amalia Ruggiero

On 8 July 1900 Amalia Ruggiero née Travniček wrote to the Salonica consulate, 'As is known to the most honorable Consulate General from the previous inspection of my documents, I was born in Moravia, am thus an Austrian national and as such I request to take into account the following appeal'. As background information, she narrates the part of her life she has led in the Levant. She had come to the Aegean region as an educator for the children of the Kavalla tobacco merchant Foskioglu in 1888. She got to know the Italian consul's cook Nikola Vutzia, and the two of them quit their positions and left first for Salonica and then for Vodena (Edessa) where they opened a temporary shop for railway construction workers. They repeated this successful business scheme on the Salonica Dedeağaç (now: Alexandroupoli) line and then between Alaşehir and Afyon-Karahisar. Her initial savings of 50 Turkish Pounds having been depleted in the initial months, the couple possessed 100 Pounds when leaving Vodena. By the time they were living in West Anatolia, they had two children but remained unmarried. Supposedly because of his refusal to marry her or hand out her share of their savings and because of abuse, she chose to marry the foreman Alexander Ruggiero, but he left her after just two months. She moved to Constantinople with her daughter, and later found employment in Salonica as a cook. When Vutzia demanded the return of their daughter, she turned to the consul, claiming Austrian nationality and protection for herself and her children, something she apparently had so far neglected to do.[14]

This appeal is framed as a testimony, a favourite among the historians' objectives for peaking into non-elitist life-worlds. It takes on a narrative character and it seeks to explain an assumed reality, thus combining the reconstruction of a historical scenario with background information. In testimony, we find a dialogue between 'master' and 'servant': there is an element of transgression against the norms set by the 'master', who may be framed as God and the Church, the rightful ruler and his loyal servants, society and the common good, the class and the party, etc. The 'servants', those involved in or having witnessed the transgression, are compelled in the dialogue to frame the transgression, explain how it came about. The narrative is chosen to convince the master, and as such, will vary according to what is considered a successful discursive strategy in a given place and time; for nineteenth-century Europe, they often follow a thread of bourgeois morality (that is not yet, as in our times, intimately intertwined with psychology).

At first sight, it seems the obvious choice to read Travniček's plea within the parameters established by Smyrnelis and Schmitt. The very first sentence of her appeal creates the link between nationality and using the consular authority for one's own interests. The native Moravian, by her social interactions, is an established member of Levantine society. Her lover, her husband, her employers and customers belong to the mixed society of the major Macedonian towns and the workforce on the railway construction sites. Her interactions with her country of origin apparently lie in the past. Having lived on Ottoman soil for the past twelve years, she had not bothered to renew her ties with her mother country for years, forfeiting her passport and now having to remind the consular agents that her place of birth still qualified her for Austrian nationality despite her lack of a valid passport. Now when under pressure, she resorted to the consular power as a resource. For years, she had disrespected both Austria's claim to a superior culture vis-à-vis the Balkans and her home country's predominant Catholic morale by diving into an adventurous life, working 'on the frontier' among railway workers, having relationships with a Greek and then an Italian, living together and having children out of wedlock, leaving the father of her children for another man. In order to mobilise the consul, she clumsily reinterprets her life, so he might see in her not a sinner and a Levantine, but an Austrian damsel in distress: Vutzia had promised her marriage from the start; in the end he had started to abuse her, so in desperation she turned to her future husband; the two men had conspired behind her back to thus cheat her of her fortunes. On the other hand, an a priori assumption of a purely instrumentalist approach by Travniček to her petition, which in fact resembles a confession, ignores the dynamics of testimony as an act, which, depending on circumstances, can be experienced as a painful invasion into one's life-world or as liberation from an environment and from a self-consciousness ignorant of the transgression.[15] It is highly likely that the act of putting her life in the Levant to paper, of trying to shape a coherent teleological narrative from the day of writing by itself transformed Travniček's perspective, that she began to believe in this view of her life: she had 'gone native' for a while and having been seriously disappointed, learned the error of her ways and returned to her mother country's flock.

It cannot be clearly established which of the two interpretations of the plea has more validity. Does the problem stem from the partisan nature of information that we find in consular personal records? If we disregarded them and turned to other information that was not given in order to induce particular actions, would the picture become clearer? Would we know more about the lower class Central Europeans on the shores of the Aegean if more of them had written down their views on Ottoman society to communicate them to others, as so many of their bourgeois compatriots had done? The answer is most likely no, as the following example will show.

Anna Forneris

Anna Forneris née Hafner, born 1789 in rural Carinthia (Kärnten), set out at adolescence to live and travel in the Levant and Persia. Having returned to her native village in 1847, she wrote her memoirs two years later. She left her home according to her narrative, because of the lure of the wide world and found initial fulfilment in the nightlife of Trieste, before setting out for the Levant and marrying the owner of a hotel in Smyrna. Forneris soon realised that her husband of Venetian origin was an alcoholic and enjoyed brawling, but following her son's birth stayed on until her husband died of a wound inflicted by a customer. As a widow at the age of 30, she tried to resettle on the Habsburg coast but following a series of disappointments set out once more four years later for the Ottoman shore. She opened an inn in the Constantinople suburb Pera (now: Beyoğlu), catering mainly to Germans and Italians. The successful business ended when the fire of 1829 destroyed the inn and Forneris resettled to Persia as a trader. Several years later, she returned to Constantinople with her new Sardinian husband to open a bar with self-brewed beer. Following a series of arbitrary evictions by the police and the court, as well as several cases of European foreigners disappearing overseas despite unsettled bills, they resettled once more in Persia.[16]

Forneris begins her account stating that her partial intention in publishing her memoirs is 'to restrain the one or other female compatriot with wanderlust from embarking on similar follies and self-inflicted misfortunes'.[17] Distancing herself from her former lifestyle and surroundings serves a communicative strategy and takes on once more a character similar to confession. She frames the path she has chosen as a zigzag caused by a dilemma. Since her youth, she had experienced 'two souls within her breast': on the one hand, she was attracted by pious Catholicism and the desire to live a simple life in her region of origin; on the other, she was driven by the need to see the world at large, take pleasure in her youth, her attractiveness to men and her ability to dance. As her experiences with religion took place at an early age, she missed the opportunity to become a nun; by the time she had reached a mature enough age, the world at large and party life had taken control of her. In her later years, she once again opts for religiosity, undertaking the pilgrimage to Jerusalem and Rome. This interpretation of her life, although sincere, is clearly motivated by the attempt to re-establish her respectability in the bourgeois and Catholic public of her home region, where zest of life, independence, resourcefulness and adventurousness were not characteristics that were in high esteem for women. She writes after having returned from the Orient to her native Carinthia and expected her readership to be from the local Catholic conservatives that frowned on lower class female agency. Like her Moravian compatriot Amalia Travniček who 50 years later set out on a similar 'folly', Forneris presents herself as weak and gullible, as giving in to temptation, although her ability to compensate for ever-changing circumstances in a variety of environments, starting all kinds of jobs and businesses, surviving several life-threatening situations, tell a different story. She writes at the age of 60 with a sense of bitterness about the countless employments, businesses, friendships and loves in her life that at some point became a disappointment. Accordingly she does not dwell long on her original intentions or attitudes attached to her life in the East, but more on the disappointments that forced her to move on and finally return.

Additionally, the genre she chose to follow, the travelogue, was shaped by upper-class men who claimed to portray the objective reality of the strange ways and strange people they had seen, not to describe how they themselves had been affected by what they had observed. Forneris struggles to follow this objective approach, although it becomes obvious that this cold detachment does not suit the narration she is trying to create. She also repeats many of the derogatory characterisations of the people of the Ottoman Empire, which are common tropes of the nineteenth-century travelogue and wastes much space on detailed graphic descriptions of the holy sites of Jerusalem and Rome. Repetition serves to win credibility with the reader: she does not challenge bourgeois assumptions on the East; instead by reiterating the dominant paradigms of her time, she intends to symbolically take part in the domination and thus to gain esteem in the eyes of her contemporaries back home.[18] As a woman of low social status, being very original in her points of view or choice of subjects could lead to assumptions that she did not understand what she saw or that she had simply made up her experiences. By reiterating common narratives on the Orient, she fulfils the reader's expectations and in the process avoids such possible assumptions. Appropriately, her statements on the Ottoman state and Levantine society are not very flattering and she highlights her personal negative experiences with them: women are of low social esteem, the Europeans settled in the Levant do not treat marriages with proper seriousness and there is no possibility of securing one's rights in court.

Although this negative narration of the Orient and a laudation of the simple life in Carinthia pervade the entire narrative, in a postscript she surprisingly adds a negative reflection about her life in Austria since her return.

> I had acquired a different guise, lifestyle, and habits through all those years. [...] and as these discrepancies in themselves are completely harmless, I did not see a reason why I should force myself in my old days. But I was therefore observed with ambiguous eyes even in my father's house and was by tendency judged to be a useless adventurer and my narrations to be crude lies or at least gross exaggerations.[19]

Her Oriental dress and customs seem not only habit, but also a form of resistance against the intolerance she feels by the villagers. Instead of making an effort to reintegrate into the modest life she had lauded throughout the book, she increases this resistance further by decorating her room in Oriental style and buying a horse carriage to, as she claims, compensate for her restlessness. On the final page of her memoirs, she seems to have given up the hope of reintegration completely and instead expresses the wish to return to Persia, 'Honestly said, I would rather be in the Orient once more'.[20] The remark leaves the reader puzzled after reading chapters of derision on the immoral Levant and laudation for rural Austria. Although her failed reintegration is made explicit, there is no articulation as to what in the Orient makes her want to return. This hope seems such a gross violation of the common sense of the Orientalist travelogues that the author does not find the words to explain it. Whatever positive emotions Forneris entertained for the Orient, her memoirs written in the narrative of a confession fail to give us clear insights into them.

This example shows the limits in trying to recreate lower class orientations and identities from travelogues, memoirs or other explicitly narrative texts. Although the text obviously demonstrates a tension between the hegemonic norms of the place of origin and the writer's emotional attachments, they are hinted at but not made explicit. This is not really surprising, as we cannot expect the marginalised themselves to have mastered a media that was not created for and by them, and to thus have created their own counter-epistemology about the world around them. If we are to find their statements, we will have to delve into what they have to say about themselves. This turns our attention back to archival material and to two characters that transgress against social norms in a very different way. In contrast to Travniček and Forneris, who appear as women who are too independent, mobile and self-sufficient for the female ideals of their times, Robert Weiss and Wilfried Blumberg fail to fulfil the male role because of their lacking psychic integrity and independence.

Robert Weiss

It would be a wrong assumption to believe that ethno-centrism and imperialist arrogance was a mentality that the new arrivals from West or North of the Mediterranean brought to the Ottoman port cities and that long exposure to the heterogeneous Levantine society tempered such attitudes or reduced them to mere lip service in order to gain the favour of the consular authorities. As the following example will show, such identity patterns were sometimes adapted by individuals who had little actual contact to their motherlands.

In the winter of 1887 8 the Salonica resident Robert Weiss, a minor, became psychotic. He repeatedly said to his mother, 'Jew, the Jews, the Jews, I do not want to become Jewish, I was born a Protestant and I will die as a Protestant [...] Someone in the house must die, either you or a Jew'.

Several witnesses confirmed that the young German was obsessed by the idea that he was in danger of forceful conversion to Judaism. This obsession was augmented by the fear of the accompanying circumcision, a practice, which in his confused state, he envisioned as a castration. The widowed mother and her son were living as the only non-Jews in an apartment house owned by a Jew in Salonica. The other residents of the house kept a fearful distance from Robert, except for Salomon Salem, the grandson of the houseowner. Salem confirmed that Robert was obsessed by Christian Jewish relations and also reported outbreaks of enthusiasm for the German Emperor and nation such as 'May our Kaiser live a thousand years'.[21]

Robert Weiss's need to differentiate himself from his surroundings and identify with Germany and Protestantism comes as a surprise, as his relationship to them was very limited. His mother, Augustina Lukat née Bagatella, had been born in Udine, Venetia, in 1838 and had settled in the Ottoman lands at an early age. His father's family was cited by the German consul of Salonica as a prime example of Germans who had been almost completely assimilated to local conditions

> [T]he Weiss family. Its progenitor, a Protestant from Baden, emigrated to Smyrna around the middle of the century, both his sons moved on to Salonica and married indigenous women there. The children from both of these marriages have been baptized, some as Protestants, some as Catholics, some as Orthodox, but the children of the third generation only as Catholics. One member of this family speaks only Greek and has obtained naturalization as a Hellene on Corfu; they all though pertain to the German colony simply because they have guarded their nationality more carefully than their religion.[22]

Robert Weiss had never experienced much of the Protestantism and the glory of the German nation that he turned to in his moment of crisis. He was from the second generation of Germans being born on Ottoman soil. He did not even share his denomination with all his cousins. The preponderance of Jews in his surroundings and in Salonician public life cannot have been a new phenomenon for him, as he had grown up in the city where Sephardim were the largest ethnic group by far. And yet, at the moment of his psychic illness, he experienced this preponderance as threatening, despite the fact that there was no tangible threat against him. Apparently, he had been exposed to anti-Semitic agitation, whether of local Ottoman, German or other origin is impossible to say. This propaganda marked the Jews' social position as disproportionately high and gave Robert a focus to address his own feelings of inadequacy. After his father's death in 1881, his mother had married Gottfried Lukat, a machinist on the railways, but he had died only four years later in an accident. The widow made ends meet by washing and ironing.[23] In these dismal circumstances, anti-Semitism and German imperialism combined to promise to Robert something of a better life than he was leading: a world, where he, due to his descent, would not be living at the bottom end of the social scales, whereas people of a supposedly inferior race were his landlord or more well-off neighbours.

Although obviously in a state of psychosis, Robert Weiss managed to convince the German consular authorities that the threat he perceived to be under was genuine, and that he was in need of solidarity from his overseas countrymen. The examining doctor wrote

> The aforementioned individual is of morally good predisposition and is full of a vibrant sentiment for his Protestant belief from his father's side. The intentional or accidental injury to these religious feelings was the cause that Mr. Weiss was seized by various delusions.[24]

He concluded that the most important thing was to remove Robert from his malicious Jewish surroundings where the insults had been inflicted. As a result, Weiss was sent to psychiatric institutions in the Reich.[25] The example shows in what roundabout ways imperialist chauvinism could manifest itself, far from the simple diffusion by consular agents or colonial activists. Robert Weiss had, through some indiscernible channels, been touched by their propaganda and had made use of it for his deluded personal revolt against his living circumstances. By adapting this aggressive worldview, he managed to procure the imperial solidarity that he had not received as a non-descript sane man.

Wilfried Blumberg

Did any of the lower class European immigrants refuse to take sides in the confrontation between the Levant and the metropolis? Was there a voice that reclaimed the right to combine both worlds, Orient and Occident, which together shaped the lives of the expatriates on the shores of the Eastern Mediterranean? Renouncing both the dominant trope of imperial supremacy and the powerful ideologies that favoured local integration such as socialism, Ottoman constitutionalism or local patriotism and instead carving out a third path such a feat at first glance appears to be beyond the intellectual capacities of people with a limited degree of educational and social capital. One would expect such feats from exceptional intellectuals such as the Austromarxist Otto Bauer, but not from the shopkeepers, railway workers or sex workers of Constantinople's Galata district or the Frank Quarter of Smyrna or Salonica. And yet one document has survived in which a German resident of Constantinople outlines such a worldview. As in the case of Robert Weiss, however, it is once again a figure on the margins who makes these bold statements.

Wilfried Blumberg visited the German consulate of Salonica on 4 October 1905. As he did not succeed in seeing the acting consul Dr. Hesse, he wrote a letter to him. Blumberg, a resident of the Ottoman Empire of German nationality, had been sent to Germany in the summer of 1903 to cure his addiction to alcohol. He had first been in an institution near Halle, then near Fürstenwalde in Brandenburg. In the end, homesickness had caused him to end the therapy and set out for the southeast once more. Whereas the trip to Germany had been arranged with the help and possibly the finances of the German consulate, Blumberg claims that his return trip (also apparently undertaken by railway) was financed mostly by 'my consulates', meaning the Ottoman consulates in Germany. This means that he must have proven to them, or at least led them to believe, that he was an Ottoman subject. Blumberg felt attached to Germany mainly through his worldview: he considered himself a member of the free or liberal religious (freireligiös) movement, a loose association based on humanist concepts and opposition to dogmas and ecclesiastical hierarchies. Surprisingly, he considered Wilhelm II the patron of the movement, despite the emperor's tendency towards a somewhat crude and medieval Protestantism.[26] Otherwise, Blumberg thanked for 'all kindness, but also for some lessons' the authorities had taught him (a hint that some of his time in Germany was apparently spent outside of the institutions and in conflict with the law) and included in his letter a 'long live the Emperor, the Empress, and all good

Germans'. However, he made it clear that he did not consider himself part of the nation, instead taking his 'leave from the good German people in Germany'. Whether such detachment from his place of origin resulted from his stay in Central Europe, or whether he had felt equally distant to it prior to leaving the Orient is not clear. However, his identity is clearly inspired by his place of residence: his homesickness results from the fact that 'I am a Constantinopolitan'; his plans for the future, besides staying sober, were 'to become a useful human being in the ranks of my Turkish nation, be they of what confession whatsoever (as I am of free religion)'. He immediately added that this was not meant as chauvinism against non-Ottomans, but included good wishes to 'those who have done good to me and protected me outside of the Turkish Empire'.[27]

Blumberg stated that he would continue to Smyrna where he had family to take care of. Unfortunately, the documents make no further mention of him, so it is not possible to see whether he managed to pursue his good intentions and pan-Ottomanist ideals, or whether he reverted to alcoholism and complacency. However, his statements stand out as the most explicit identification with local society by any nominal foreigner that has come to light in the consular archives.

These four documents show some possible positions of the lower class foreigners residing in the Ottoman Empire. A merely instrumental attitude towards their original nationality as a means to pursue one's rights, or a back-and-forth motion between going native and confessing for the sins against the norms of the motherland and asking to return to the flock; identifying the motherland with piety and stability versus the adventurousness and instability of the Orient and feeling torn between the two; feeling rejected because the motherland does not accept divergent lifestyles, whereas the diversity of the Levant absorbs such difference more easily; using the imperial claims to superiority to rebel against one's imbeddedness in Ottoman society at a socially low position; or, upon having experienced the motherland and its correctional institutions, politely severing the ties to the motherland in order to commit oneself to making the dream of a truly multi-cultural society in the framework of the Ottoman Empire come true these are the reactions we can gather from the heterogeneous sources on four individuals. Although their stories mark them as extraordinary, their ways of mediating between the different identities on offer reflect common themes that possibly were employed under less spectacular life circumstances as well. Although they all exhibit the desire to guard their particular interests, their communicative strategies are no mere means to an end, but portray a sincere desire to explain the circumstances and the choices they took in their lives. It is this multi-layered nature of the migrant identities and their manifestations that we should take into account when dealing with the difficult task of portraying the life-worlds of the European migrants on Ottoman soil.

Notes

1 The concentration on these upper-class representatives of Europe in the Ottoman sphere resulted from the preoccupation in the history of European–Ottoman relations with trade; see, for example, R. Kasaba *et al.*, 'Eastern Mediterranean Port Cities and their Bourgeoisies: Merchants, Political Projects and Nation-States', *Review* 10, Summer

1986/1: *Special Anniversary issue: The Work of the Fernand Braudel Center*, pp. 121–35; A. Kössler, *Aktionsfeld Osmanisches Reich. Die Wirtschaftsinteressen des Deutschen Kaiserreiches in der Türkei 1871–1908*, New York: Arno Pr., 1981; M. Anastassiadou, 'Les Occidentaux de la place', in G. Veinstein (ed.) *Salonique, 1850–1918. La ville des juifs et le réveil des Balkans*, Paris: Éd. Autrement, 1993, pp. 143–52.

2 For Istanbul and Anatolia, see D. Quataert, *Social Disintegration and Popular Resistance in the Ottoman Empire, 1881–1908*, New York: New York University Press, 1983; for Rumelia, see M. Fuhrmann, 'North-to-South Migration in the Imperial Era: Workers and Vagabonds between Vienna and Constantinople', in U. Freitag and N. Lafi (eds) *Roots of Ottoman Urban Government Principles: Heritages, Hisba, Construction of the State and the Reforms* (forthcoming); for Algeria, see A. L. Smith, *Colonial Memory and Postcolonial Europe: Maltese Settlers in Algeria and France*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006; for Tunis, see J. Clancy-Smith, ''Making It' in Pre-Colonial Tunis: Migration, Work, and Poverty in a Mediterranean Port City, c. 1815–1870', in St. Cronin (ed.) *Subalterns and Social Protest: History from Below in the Middle East and North Africa*, London: Routledge, 2008, pp. 237–60; for Cairo and Alexandria, see A. Gorman, 'Foreign Workers in Egypt 1882–1914: Subaltern or Labour Elite?', in Cronin (ed.) *Subalterns and Social Protest*, pp. 213–36; for Port Said, see V. Huber, 'Cosmopolitanism on the Move: Port Said as Imperial Relay Station' (paper presented at Zentrum Moderner Orient Berlin, December 10, 2007; publication in preparation).

3 See Chapter 7 by Christoph Herzog in this book.

4 Ottoman Archives of the Prime Minister's Office, Istanbul (BOA): İrade Meclis-i Mahsus 9/373, 1273 (my thanks to Dr. Malek Sharif for drawing my attention to this document).

5 O. Schmitt, *Levantiner – Lebenswelten und Identitäten einer ethnokonfessionellen Gruppe im osmanischen Reich im 'langen 19. Jahrhundert'*, Munich: Oldenbourg, 2005, pp. 337–8; M. Fuhrmann, *Der Traum vom deutschen Orient: Zwei deutsche Kolonien im Osmanischen Reich 1851–1918*, Frankfurt/M.: Campus-Verl., 2006, pp. 270–80.

6 M. Fuhrmann, 'Vagrants, Prostitutes, and Bosnians: Making and Unmaking European Supremacy in Ottoman Southeast Europe', in N. Clayer *et al.* (eds) *Conflicting Loyalties in the Balkans: The Great Powers, the Ottoman Empire and Nation Building*, London: I.B. Tauris (forthcoming 2010).

7 M.-C. Smyrnelis, *Une société hors de soi: Identités et relations sociales à Smyrne aux XVIIIe et XIXe siècles*, Paris: Peeters, 2005, pp. 57–69; Fuhrmann, *Der Traum vom deutschen Orient*, pp. 356–66.

8 Alternatively, 'Levantine' was used to describe only the indigenous or indigenised Catholic population; see Schmitt, *Levantiner*, pp. 53–61. Because of this terminological inconsistency and its exonymous and partially derogative character, Edhem Eldem pleads against the use of 'Levantine' in the academic field; see E. Eldem, ''Levanten' Kelimesi Üzerine', in A. Yumul and F. Dikkaya (eds) *Avrupalı mı Levanten mi?*, Istanbul: Bağlam, 2006, pp. 11–22.

9 Quataert, *Social Disintegration*, pp. 71–93, p. 148.

10 Gorman, 'Foreign Workers in Egypt', p. 255.

11 Schmitt, *Levantiner*, especially pp. 340–400; Smyrnelis, *Une société hors de soi*; Fuhrmann, *Der Traum vom deutschen Orient*, pp. 270–80.

12 Smyrnelis, *Une société hors de soi*, p. 122.

13 Schmitt, *Levantiner*, pp. 305–69.

14 Austrian Archives of the House, Court and State (HHStA), Consulate General (GK) Salonica 443, Helene u. Dimitri Travniček – Vormundschaft: Amalie Ruggiero to Consulate General, Salonica 8 June 1900. The petition led to one of the classic legal impasses due to the black holes of capitulation legislature. Could the children of an Austrian woman and an Ottoman man born out of wedlock on Ottoman soil be considered Austrian subjects? Moreover, in Konya, in inland Anatolia, where Vutzia was now living, the Austrian diplomats could not hope to execute the boy's extraction

against his father's resistance. Four years later when Travniček was working in an Anglo–German butcher shop in Cairo, the matter had still not been resolved.

15 M. Foucault, *The History of Sexuality*, vol. I, New York: Pantheon, 1978, p. 59; V. Crapanzano, 'Life Histories', *American Anthropologist* 86, 1984/4, pp. 953–60; S. Felman and D. Laub, *Testimony: Crises of Witnessing in Literature, Psychoanalysis, and History*, New York: Routledge, 1992, p. 46.

16 A. Forneris, *Schicksale und Erlebnisse einer Kärntnerin während ihrer Reisen in verschiedenen Ländern und fast 30jährigen Aufenthaltes im Oriente, als: in Malta, Corfu, Constantinopel, Smyrna, Tiflis, Tauris, Jerusalem, Rom /beschrieben von ihr selbst*, Klagenfurt: Heyn, 1985 (reprint: 1st ed. Ljubljana 1849). My thanks to Dr. Ulrike Stamm, Berlin, for drawing my attention to this source.

17 Forneris, introduction to *Schicksale*.

18 M.L. Pratt, *Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and Transculturation*, London: Routledge, 1992, p. 259. This tendency is more explicit in another travelogue by a lower-class Habsburg subject; see H.-P. Laqueur, 'Das Osmanische Reich und seine Bewohner aus der Sicht eines Südtiroler Bäckermeisters (1851/1852)', in M. Kurz (ed.) *Das Osmanische Reich und die Habsburgermonarchie: Akten des Internationalen Kongresses zum 150-jährigen Bestehen des Instituts für Österreichische Geschichtsforschung*, Vienna: Oldenbourg, 2005, pp. 461–70.

19 Forneris, *Schicksale*, p. 133.

20 Forneris, *Schicksale*, p. 134.

21 Political Archives of the Foreign Office, Berlin (PA-AA), GK Salonica box 32 (Robert Weiss).

22 Evangelical Central Archives Berlin (ezab) 5/1948, pp. 134–7: Mordtmann to Hohenlohe-Schillingsfürst, Salonica 24 July 1897.

23 PA-AA GK Salonica box 14 (Pass und Polizei), p. 27.

24 PA-AA GK Salonica box 32 (Robert Weiss).

25 PA-AA GK Salonica box 14 (Pass und Polizei), p. 27. Upon release he remained unemployed.

26 T.H. Benner, *Die Strahlen der Krone: Die religiöse Dimension des Kaisertums unter Wilhelm II. vor dem Hindergrund der Orientreise 1898*, Marburg: Tectum-Verl., 2001, p. 392.

27 PA-AA GK Salonica, box 14 (Auskunftsgesuche), p. 168: I. Wilfried Blumberg to Hesse, Salonica 5 October 1905.

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