

DAVID PATTERSON

A GENEALOGY OF EVIL

ANTI-SEMITISM

from NAZISM

to ISLAMIC JIHAD

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A Genealogy of Evil

On the basis of extensive scrutiny of primary sources from Nazi and Jihadist ideologues, David Patterson argues that Jihadist anti-Semitism stems from Nazi ideology. This book challenges the idea that Jihadist anti-Semitism has medieval roots, identifying its distinctively modern characteristics and tracing interconnections that link the Nazis to the Muslim Brotherhood, to the Palestinian Liberation Organization, Fatah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, Hezbollah, al-Qaeda, the Sudan, the Iranian Islamic Republic, and other groups with an anti-Semitic worldview. Through close readings of numerous Jihadist texts, Patterson critiques their anti-Semitic teachings and affirms the importance of Jewish teaching, concluding that humanity needs the very Jewish teaching and testimony that the Jihadists advocate destroying.

David Patterson is Hillel Feinberg Chair in Holocaust Studies at the University of Texas at Dallas. He also has taught at the University of Memphis, Oklahoma State University, and the University of Oregon. He is the author of numerous books, including, most recently, *Sounding the Depths of the Soul* (2009), *Jewish-Christian Dialogue: Drawing Honey from the Rock* (with Alan L. Berger, 2008), and *Overcoming Alienation: A Kabbalistic Reflection on the Five Levels of the Soul* (2008). His writings have also appeared in many journals and anthologies on philosophy, literature, Judaism, the Holocaust, and education.

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A Genealogy of Evil

Anti-Semitism from Nazism to Islamic Jihad

DAVID PATTERSON

University of Texas at Dallas



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*For Elliot Chodoff,
whose brilliant mind and incisive inquiries provided
the inspiration for this book.*

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Preface

This volume is intended to bring some clarity to a crisis that confronts the entire world. It is more than a social, political, or economic crisis. It is a metaphysical crisis in which humanity is confronted with a pervasive and relentless evil. And it is an *evil*. In the postmodern intellectual world – where truth, meaning, and value have been so relativized as to become meaningless – there is a reluctance to use terms such as *evil* that may imply some higher absolute at work in our lives. A historian once told me, for example, that when speaking of the Holocaust, we must not use the word *evil* because of its “religious baggage.” If we refrain from using the term, however, we shall become blind to it and, in the end, overwhelmed by it.

Hasan al-Banna (1906–49), founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, stated that “our mission is one described most comprehensively by the term ‘Islamic,’”¹ and that the “call to [Islam] cannot survive without Jihad.”² Thus, we have the term *Islamic Jihadism* to name this evil. I use the expression to distinguish this insidious “-ism” from other outlooks in Islam, such as that espoused by two former heads of the Al-Azhar University in Cairo: Shaykh Mahmud Shaltut (1893–1963) and Shaykh Jad al-Haqq Ali Jad al-Haqq (d. 1996). Citing the Quran,

¹ Hasan al-Banna, “Our Message”: http://www.youngmuslims.ca/online_library/books/our_message.

² Hasan al-Banna, “The Message and the Teachings”: http://www.youngmuslims.ca/online_library/books/tmott.

Mahmud Shaltut argued that Islam cannot be spread by force: “Had Allah wanted, all people of earth would have believed in Him, would you then dare force faith upon them?” (10:99). Jad al-Haqq Ali Jad al-Haqq took a similar position.³ Still, both insist on the spread of Islam, and such an insistence has the potential of playing into the hands of the Jihadists. Indeed, like Christianity, Islam is a supersessionist religion and is inclined toward a theological hostility toward the Judaism (and Christianity) it supposedly supersedes. Nevertheless, the refusal to use force in the expansion of Islam is a significant difference between the Jihadists and other Muslims.

Although, as we shall see, certain elements of traditional Islamic teaching may be selectively cited to justify Jihadist murder, such a selective exploitation of isolated teachings amounts to a betrayal of the very tradition that Islamic Jihadists invoke. From my work in the Jewish-Christian-Muslim dialogue, I can attest to the fact that there are courageous Muslims whose voices run counter to the fanatic cry for jihad against the unbelievers, particularly against Christians and Jews – above all, against Jews. My use of the term *Islamic Jihadism*, then, is intended to distinguish the modern Jihadist evil from other currents of Islam; we shall find, in fact, that Islamic Jihadism is a kind of reform movement significantly influenced by National Socialism and pitted against Islam itself – or so one may hope. I also use the term to distinguish Islamic Jihadism from terrorism. Islamic Jihadism is not merely terrorism – it is ideologically sanctified murder. Unlike terrorism in most of its historical manifestations, the aims of Islamic Jihadism are as much metaphysical as they are political. That is the key to the genealogy of this evil: the merging of the metaphysical with the political, of Allah’s word with the Jihadist agenda.

In the academic and political world, there reigns a certain complicity of silence surrounding the genealogy of the evil that confronts us and that betrays those brave Muslims who would confront it. In his foreword to Andrew Bostom’s *The Legacy of Jihad: Islamic Holy War and the Fate of Non-Muslims*, Ibn Warraq lists some reasons for this

³ See Bassam Tibi, “War and Peace in Islam,” in Andrew G. Bostom, ed., *The Legacy of Jihad: Islamic Holy War and the Fate of Non-Muslims* (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2005), 333–34.

intellectual evasion that typifies the current engagement with Islam and Islamic Jihadism:

- political correctness leading to Islamic correctness,
- the fear of playing into the hands of racists or reactionaries to the detriment of the West's Muslim minorities,
- commercial or economic motives,
- feelings of postcolonial guilt (wherein the entire planet's problems are attributed to the West's wicked ways and intentions),
- plain physical fear, and
- the intellectual terrorism of writers such as Edward Said.⁴

In this book, I make an effort not to succumb to these feelings and fears. Striving to recognize the danger for what it is, this book is intended not only for the intellectual audience that shies away from such a confrontation but also for a general public that is concerned with the real threat we face. And face it we must: it is a matter of life and death, of how we understand the dearness and the meaning of life and death. If at times the urgency of my language seems extreme, it is because the situation we confront could not be more extreme.

The aim of this volume, then, is to introduce to its readers a greater awareness of the Jihadist evil that now besets the world, exploring where it comes from and where it is going and explaining exactly what the Jihadists set out to exterminate in their determination to exterminate the Jews. The stake in our understanding of this evil is not merely Western civilization or the state of Israel. Far more than that, our sense of the sanctity of human life, our sense of meaning in life, and the presence of something holy in this world hang in the balance.

⁴ *Ibid.*, Ibn Warraq, Foreword, 22.

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Introduction

The Essence of the Jihadist Evil

I will assault and kill, assault and kill, assault and kill.

Hamas “Charter of Allah,” Article Fifteen

In his analysis of modern Islamic Jihadism, Laurent Murawiec writes, “Jihadis of all stripes in the modern age share the same highly toxic mix of messianism, revolution, and the cult of blood and violence. Modern jihad is the tapestry resulting from the weaving together of different warps and woofs: Pan-Islamism and Bolshevism, Nazi and fascist ideology and practices, and Gnostic-Manichean beliefs within Islam.”¹ Commenting on Pan-Islamism, he rightly underscores the universal scope of the fanatic call to jihad. Like the Bolsheviks, the Jihadists believe that any means can be justified to achieve their aim – namely, the Islamization of the world. As for Nazi and fascist ideology, Murawiec notes a similar glorification of force and power in the Jihadist movements. What he has in mind by “Gnostic-Manichean beliefs” is their view of the human condition as a war between absolute good (the Muslims) and absolute evil (the rest of humanity). As in the case of the Nazis, however, the reverse may be the case: although the rest of humanity may not fall into the category of absolute good, Islamic Jihadism certainly falls into the category of absolute evil.

¹ Laurent Murawiec, *The Mind of Jihad* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 269.

One thing Murawiec all but leaves out of his otherwise insightful analysis is Jew hatred. “Jihad and Jew-hatred belong together,” Matthias Küntzel correctly observes. “Approval of antisemitism strengthens jihadist barbarism. Any variety of anti-capitalism that wittingly or unwittingly has recourse to antisemitic forms of thought strengthens jihadism as well. The struggle against jihadism therefore requires zero tolerance for antisemitism. Were Jew-hatred to be ostracized, isolated, prosecuted and punished on a global scale, then jihadism would be a thing of the past.”² The “evil” that the Jihadists oppose through murder is the Jewish presence in the world. “Just like National Socialism was propelled by a utopia which advocated salvation through destruction,” explains Küntzel, “Islamism is propelled forward by a similar utopia. In both cases, it is the distorted image of a perceived enemy which provides the perpetrator with his own identity. In both cases, the annihilation of evil is considered to be the precondition for the realization of an idealized dream of homogeneity. In both cases this evil is projected onto ‘the Jew. . . .’ Fighting Islamism demands zero-tolerance of antisemitism.”³ The resemblance to National Socialism that Küntzel notes is not accidental; among the most prominent contributors to this Jihadist thinking are the Nazis.

Serge Trifkovic argues convincingly that “the most potent heirs to the Nazi worldview in our own time as regards the Jews are not skinheads and Aryan Nation survivalists. They are schools, religious leaders, and mainstream intellectuals in the Muslim, meaning primarily Arab, world.”⁴ There can be no doubt that Jihadist movements have had a huge impact on mainstream Muslim culture. Anyone who has followed the developments in the tensions between the Jewish state and Islamic terrorists is familiar with scenes of Palestinian toddlers dressed as suicide bombers ready for martyrdom. There are the photographs of kindergarten kids, hands raised and painted blood red, imitating the gesture of the blood-covered Muslims who butchered

² Matthias Küntzel, *Jihad and Jew-Hatred: Islamism, Nazism and the Roots of 9/11*, trans. Colin Meade (New York: Telos Press, 2007), 149.

³ Matthias Küntzel, “National Socialism and Anti-Semitism in the Arab World,” *Jewish Political Studies Review* (17, Spring 2005): <http://www.jcpa.org/phas/phas-kuntzel-so5.htm>.

⁴ Serge Trifkovic, *The Sword of the Prophet: Islam: History, Theology, Impact on the World*, (Boston: Regina Orthodox Press, 2002), 188.

Yossi Avrahami and Vadim Norjitz in Ramallah on 13 October 2000. In the Behesht Zahra (Paradise of Flowers) in Tehran, there is a fourteen-foot Fountain of Blood, “symbolizing the essence of Islam’s message.”⁵ (In what other capital of the world can one imagine the creation of a glorified Fountain of Blood?) Furthermore, there are the music videos with lyrics calculated to incite acts of murder and hatred, such as the one broadcasted from Hezbollah’s Al-Manar (“The Beacon”) Television Station: “We will wear coffins until every inch of our world is liberated.” Of course, “our world” means *the* world, the world inhabited by all humanity. Liberated from what? The lyrics explain: from the international Jewish conspiracy to take over the world,⁶ liberated by the Jihadist Islam that is determined to rule the world.

The Jew hatred that characterizes Islamic Jihadism is not about Zionism or the Jewish presence in the Middle East; it is about the Jewish presence in the world. As Salafist Sheikh Muhammad Hussein Yaqoub (b. 1956) declared in a broadcast aired on Egypt’s Al-Rahma TV, 17 January 2009,

If the Jews left Palestine to us, would we start loving them? Of course not. We will never love them. Absolutely not. The Jews are infidels – not because I say so, and not because they are killing Muslims, but because . . . it is Allah who said that they are infidels. . . . Your belief regarding the Jews should be, first, that they are infidels, and second, that they are enemies. They are enemies not because they occupied Palestine. They would have been enemies even if they did not occupy a thing. . . . Our fighting with the Jews is eternal, and it will not end until the final battle. . . ., until not a single Jew remains on the face of the Earth. . . . As for you Jews, the Curse of Allah upon you, you pigs of the earth!⁷

Islamic scholar Ziad Abu-Amr has correctly pointed out that in keeping with – and informed by – Nazi thinking, “the Islamic Jihad theoreticians believe that the danger of Israel lies . . . in the spread of Jewish

⁵ Amir Taheri, *Holy Terror: Inside the World of Islamic Terrorism* (Bethesda, MD: Adler & Adler, 1987), 125.

⁶ See Avi Jorisch, *Beacon of Hatred: Inside Hizballah’s Al-Manar Television* (Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2004), 75. The name of the Hezbollah station is taken from the Salafist journal published by Rashid Rida (1865–1935), which promoted murder as a means of “purifying” and spreading Islam; see Murawiec, 30–31.

⁷ Muhammad Hussein Yaqoub, “We Will Fight, Defeat, and Annihilate Them,” Al-Rahma TV (17 January 2009): <http://memri.org/bin/latestnews.cgi?ID=SD227809>.

corruption.” Because of “Israel’s evil,” Israel “was born to be annihilated.” All Muslims must “eliminate the element of corruption, Israel.” They must fight the “Torah adherents to the bone.”⁸ For Torah, in the minds of the Jihadists as well as the Nazis, is the source of the “corruption” of all humanity.

As far as “Palestine” is concerned, even a faithful Muslim could argue that the Muslims should support a Jewish presence in Israel because the Quran designates the Land of Israel as a dwelling place for the Jews, to which the Jews in exile will be returned when the last days approach (17:104). The fact that this verse is seldom mentioned by the Jihadists underscores their rebellion against God and what they view as “the Holy Quran,” against the spirit and the meaning of Islam itself, which they do not follow but rather exploit to suit their own ends. (Nevertheless, as Chapter 2 shows, it is not for nothing that this exterminationist Jew hatred has sprung up within Islam.) With their accent on killing, moreover, Islamic Jihadists transgress the Quran’s prohibition against killing Muslims (4:93) by placing the “virtue” of killing Jews above the prohibition. Al-Qaeda operative and spokesman Abu Musab al-Zarqawi (1966–2006), for example, declared, “The shedding of Muslim blood . . . is allowed in order to avoid the greater evil of disrupting jihad.”⁹ Once again, the exterminationist agenda of Islamic Jihadism eclipses what other Muslims deem the holy word of Allah.

The Jihadists’ transgression and exploitation of the Quran is a form of the appropriation and usurpation of God used not only to justify but to sanctify the murder of Jews. They engage in a similar exploitation of holy days to serve their ideological agenda, as when Ramadan, a holy month of fasting, is transformed into “a month of jihad and sacrifice.”¹⁰ This means that Islamic Jihadism entails far more than terrorism. It is no more reducible to terrorism than the Nazis’ extermination of the Jews is reducible to genocide. Beyond committing genocide, the Nazis set out to commit deicide.¹¹ Similarly, the radical

⁸ Ziad Abu-Amr, *Islamic Fundamentalism in the West Bank and Gaza: Muslim Brotherhood and Islamic Jihad* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994), 101–2.

⁹ Quoted in David Aaron, *In Their Own Words: Voices of Jihad* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2008), 103.

¹⁰ See Meir Hatina, *Islam and Salvation in Palestine: The Islamic Jihad Movement* (Tel Aviv: The Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, 2001), 126.

¹¹ Recall passages such as the one from Judith Dribben’s memoir in which a Nazi beholds a synagogue in flames and declares, “The Jewish God is burnt to ashes!” See Judith Dribben, *And Some Shall Live* (Jerusalem: Keter Books, 1969), 24.

anti-Semitism that defines Islamic Jihadism far exceeds the parameters of mere terrorism: it is a usurpation of God that assumes other forms more horrific than those dreamt of by any terrorists that history has ever seen.

Some people are horrified by the sounds and the images of Muslim children whose upbringing is so steeped in Jew hatred that they declare their adamant desire to murder themselves in the process of murdering Jews, duped into the belief that by doing so, they become martyrs and thus have purchased their ticket to paradise. This Islamic Jihadist morphing of murder into martyrdom is a new turn in the history of evil.¹² In most other sacred traditions, the martyrs among the faithful do not take themselves to have purchased anything; for them, martyrdom is not a commodity for which they expect due compensation – it is a summons from on high, to which they respond. True martyrs offer all to God, without expectation of reward. They choose martyrdom not by committing murder but *instead of* committing murder. The Jihadist evil, to the contrary, represents a radical perversion of the most ancient, most fundamental evil – murder – into the highest good. Whereas in Jewish tradition, as in other traditions, martyrdom means dying in a refusal to commit murder and thus to sanctify life, in the Jihadist teaching it means dying precisely to commit murder for the glorification of God. But the Jihadist martyrs neither glorify God nor sanctify life. Rather, they glorify an ego made into Allah and thereby sanctify murder made into martyrdom – including the murder of their own children.

In the Torah decried by the Islamic Jihadists, who insist on choosing death over life, it is written, “I set before you this day life and death, blessing and curse; therefore, choose life” (Deuteronomy 30:19). To choose life is to choose holiness, to choose the good, to choose loving kindness toward the other human being, including the stranger in our midst. It means making one’s own life a blessing to the lives of others. It means choosing *not* to murder. In a stark contrast to this Jewish teaching, Islamic Jihadism not only chooses death but venerates it,

¹² It should be noted, however, that Jihadists have ancient precedents to justify this innovation. An official Chinese source from the tenth century reads, “Every seventh day the king [of the Arabs] sits on high and speaks to those below, saying, “Those who are killed by the enemy will be borne in heaven above; those who slay the enemy will receive happiness.” Quoted by Michael Bonner, *Jihad in Islamic History: Doctrine and Practices* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006), 72.

in a show of an idolatry with an appetite for human sacrifice that is insatiable. Murawiec explains: “The constant repetition of the same stock phrases that prescribe and exalt killing and the veneration of death means that Allah wants blood, needs blood, that blood pleases Allah, whether the blood is that of His martyrs or that of His enemies. Allah demands blood as evidence of worship. In turn, society must be organized according to what Allah demands. A society that needs blood in so fundamental a way is a society whose mind is set on human sacrifice.”¹³ Such a mind-set is a defining characteristic of Islamic Jihadist society. And it is characteristic of evil.

In his seminal study of the Muslim Brotherhood, Richard P. Mitchell writes of Hasan al-Banna saying, “Death, as an important end of *jihad*, was extolled by Banna as a phrase which came to be a famous part of his legacy: ‘the art of death’ (*fann al-mawt*).”¹⁴ Indeed, al-Banna declared that “the Muslim Community . . . excels in the art of death.”¹⁵ Article Eight of the Charter of Hamas, a branch of al-Banna’s Muslim Brotherhood, sets forth the Hamas slogan: “Allah is its target, the Prophet is its model, the Quran is its constitution: Jihad is its path and death for the sake of Allah is the loftiest of its wishes.”¹⁶ Hassan Nasrallah (b. 1960), head of Hezbollah, boasts that Islamic Jihadists choose death over life.¹⁷ Said Osama bin Laden (b. 1957) to CNN reporter Peter Arnett in March 1997, “We love . . . death . . . as much as you love life.”¹⁸ In a sermon delivered on 25 May 2001, the Palestinian Liberation Organization’s mufti of Palestine from 1994 to 2006, Ikrima Sabri (b. 1939), declared, “We tell them [the Jews]: in as much as you love life – the Muslim loves death.”¹⁹ Thus, not only is the Torah’s

¹³ Murawiec, 59–60.

¹⁴ Richard P. Mitchell, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 207.

¹⁵ Quoted in Ronald L. Nettler, *Past Trials and Present Tribulations: A Muslim Fundamentalist’s View of the Jews* (Oxford: Pergamon, 1987), 18.

¹⁶ Dimitry Kapustyan and Matt Nelson, *The Soul of Terror: The Worldwide Conflict between Islamic Terrorism and the Modern World* (Washington, DC: International Affairs Press, 2007), 128.

¹⁷ Quoted in Jorisch, 80–81.

¹⁸ Quoted in Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, revised and expanded edition (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 135.

¹⁹ Quoted in Efraim Karsh, *Arafat’s War: The Man and His Battle for Israeli Conquest* (New York: Grove Press, 2003), 104–5.

summons to choose life abrogated, but so is its prohibition against murder.

The evil that surrounds the Jihadist love for death lies in a love for the death of *the other human being* – specifically, the death of the Jew. That is what they love – not the death of oneself for the sake of another, not the death that affirms life in an affirmation of the One who commands us to choose life and forbids us to murder. No, the Jihadists love inflicting death: witness the mass celebrations that occurred throughout the Muslim world over the murders committed on 9/11. The Jihadists love inflicting death so much that they are literally dying to kill – or rather, they are bent on indoctrinating their *children* in the desperate longing to kill, as stipulated in Article Eighteen of the Hamas “Charter of Allah.”²⁰ Here and elsewhere their discourse makes it clear that they have no love for the One who forbids both self-murder and the murder of others. Simply stated, the Islamic Jihadists’ love for death is a love for murder, a love for making their children into murderers. Murder is as much a defining feature of Islamic Jihadism as, in the words of Emil Fackenheim, it was the “pure essence” of “the Nazi empire.”²¹ There lies the essence of the Jihadist evil.

Inasmuch as Hamas’s referring to its charter as the “Charter of Allah” implies an equivalence between itself and Allah, it becomes clear that the declared love of death, which is a love of murder, on the part of Islamic Jihadists amounts to a rebellion against God, against Allah. Here, too, lies the evil: crying out “*Allahu Akbar!* – God is great!” in the process of murdering the children of God amounts to a radical eclipse of God. If Islamic Jihadists are religious fanatics, they are the fanatics of a false religion, fanatics of a self-styled idolatry, who bow to the false god of their own ego. When God gave the world the Ten Commandments, He divided them into two categories, two tablets – not because He could not write small enough to get them onto one but so that He could reveal to humanity the sanctity of two realms of relation. The first five pertain to the relation between God and

²⁰ See Yonah Alexander, *Palestinian Religious Terrorism: Hamas and Islamic Jihad* (Ardslley, NY: Transnational Publishers, 2002), 58.

²¹ Emil L. Fackenheim, *The Jewish Return into History* (New York: Schocken Books, 1978), 246.

the human being, beginning with the utterance of “I am the Lord your God.” The second five pertain to the relation between human and human, beginning with “Do not murder.” The two parallel one another, as the sages have taught: to transgress the most basic of the human-to-human commandments, “Do not murder,” is to deny the divine affirmation “I am God.”²² To which the Jihadist replies, “No, I am God. And I command the faithful to murder.” In reply to the God who chose the Jewish people to be a light unto the nations – a light that forbids murder – the Jihadists choose the Jewish people for extermination, thus extinguishing such a light for the sake of their own dark aim of dominating humanity and usurping divinity.

Usurping God, the Jihadist murderer undertakes an assault on God. His is an evil as old as Cain. Feeling rejected by God, Cain set out to murder God by murdering his brother: he took the place of God by making his brother a sacrifice unto himself. Further, as in the case of Abel, the murdered victim is always our sibling: homicide is fratricide – another teaching jettisoned by the Jihadist. The one form of rebellion against God that is more radical than murder is suicide, the murder of oneself. To be sure, the seeds of suicide lie in the act of murder: killing my brother, I kill my own soul. The Jihadist evil takes up this radical rebellion against God by merging these two forms of unseating God – murder and suicide – into one. Like all evil, it preys on what is highest within us, on the selfless desire for meaning and purpose, on the readiness to serve something holy, for the sake of humanity. Like all evil, its first victims, its designated targets, are children, both from within and from without. Like all evil, its lure is deadly to all.

What exactly is *Jihadist* about this evil, other than the fact that the perpetrators invoke the word *jihad*? It is said that *jihad* pertains to an inner spiritual struggle to purify the soul. In the discourse of Islamic “purist” movements, however, *jihad* is an outward, violent endeavor aimed primarily at Jews and those who have been “Jewified.”²³ If the true meaning of *jihad* lies in an inward struggle, then this movement of turning it outward is a perversion of the concept from a struggle to

²² See, for example, the *Mekilta de-Rabbi Ishmael*, Vol. 2, trans. Jacob Z. Lauterbach (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1961), 262–64.

²³ Nonie Darwish, who grew up as a Muslim in Egypt and Gaza, has told me that in all of her experience, the word *jihad* never pertained to an inner struggle but only to the violent struggle of Islam against the world.

serve God into a struggle to kill God. The Islamic Jihadists' invocation of God to justify their actions echoes the inscription on the Nazi SS belt buckles: *Gott Mit Uns* – “God [is] with us.” In both cases we have a struggle – a *Kampf* – to oppose God by becoming as God, even as the murderer invokes the name of God. To be sure, the assault on God is nearly always undertaken in the name of God. It is the most ancient temptation to the most ancient evil. The Nazi influence on Islamic Jihadist ideology is not accidental: the Jihadist program of the modern Jihadist ideologues is, as we shall see, very much informed by National Socialism. Chapter 1, then, begins by examining the numerous echoes of National Socialism in Islamic Jihadism, both as parallels and as points of influence.

Forging murder and suicide into a single action of “martyrdom,” the Islamic Jihadist evil exceeds the Nazi evil. For the Nazi assault on God took the form only of mass murder, with no mutation into martyrdom; in their deadly assault on Jews and Judaism, they were bent on destroying the teachings of Judaism in the process of destroying not only the body but also the soul of Israel. Whereas the Nazis made the Führer into God, the Jihadists make God into the Führer, *and not the Father*, a god whose commandment is not merely to choose death but to love death, as the Jihadists themselves boast. Once the “divine” injunction is to pursue death over life – death through murder – we face an evil even more radical than the Nazi evil. Hannah Arendt once declared that “we cannot conceive of a ‘radical evil.’” Unable to accommodate the Nazi evil, writes Arendt, all we can say is that “radical evil has emerged in connection with a system in which all men have become equally superfluous.”²⁴ With the Jihadist evil, not only are all men equally superfluous – all men must be enlisted into the project of making all men equally superfluous. Facing *this* radical evil, we are compelled to address its genealogy, so that, understanding where it comes from, we may see where it is going – and respond to it.

“Our world seems not unlike a pit of snakes,” writes Abraham Joshua Heschel. “We did not sink into the pit in 1939, or even in 1933. We had descended into it generations ago, and the snakes

²⁴ Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (New York: Harcourt Brace & Company, 1979), 459.

have sent their venom into the bloodstream of humanity.”²⁵ Referring to the years 1933 and 1939, Heschel has in mind, of course, the evil of National Socialism: on 30 January 1933, Adolf Hitler (1889–1945) became chancellor of Germany, and on 1 September 1939, the Germans invaded Poland. But National Socialism, with the Jew hatred that defined it, was not just a *cause* of the evil that plagues the world today – it was the *outcome* of a long philosophical process of thinking God out of the picture and situating man at the center.

Commenting on the rise of modern thought, Fackenheim has rightly said that “the denial of the living God was an essential aspect of man’s scientific and moral self-emancipation. If man was to be fully free in his world, God had to be expelled from it.”²⁶ Further, “The moment the living God became questionable, Jewish existence became questionable.”²⁷ The same egocentric thinking that helped to pave the way to Auschwitz now plays into the hands of the Islamic Jihadists. Like the Nazis, the Jihadists introduce their own absolutes, determined by the ostensible obedience not to the divine commandment but to the murderous, ego-centered will to dominate. “Now that Marx has failed,” writes Serge Trifkovic, “Islam offers a helping hand to those who want to subvert the tradition of the West.”²⁸ Yet the tradition slated for annihilation is far older than the West. It is the tradition of Judaism and of the Christianity that stemmed from Judaism, both of which Islam believes it has superseded. The supersessionism that fueled centuries of Christian Jew hatred has added to the fire of Jihadist Jew hatred, which deems anything that falls outside of *Dar al-Islam*, the “realm of Islam,” to be either illegitimate or evil.

In the post-Holocaust era, the world has become filled not so much with the venomous Nazi Jew hatred as with the anti-Semitism that defines Islamic Jihadism. Chapter 2 shows that the world did not descend into this pit in 1928, with the founding of the Muslim Brotherhood, or in 1979, with the Islamic Revolution in Iran. Rather, the teachings and texts that feed the Jihadists’ Jew hatred are centuries old.

²⁵ Abraham Joshua Heschel, *I Asked for Wonder* (New York: Crossroad, 2008), 126.

²⁶ Emil L. Fackenheim, “Jewish Existence and the Living God: The Religious Duty of Survival,” in Arthur A. Cohen, ed., *Arguments and Doctrines: A Reader of Jewish Thinking in the Aftermath of the Holocaust* (New York: Harper & Row, 1970), 260.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 261.

²⁸ Trifkovic, 281–82.

They draw not only on Christian Jew hatred, as the Nazis did, but, even more so, on the Jew hatred of the Nazis themselves, as well as elements of Muslim tradition. “To understand the reality of Islam’s record with its non-adherents,” writes Trifkovic, “one should . . . match it against modern totalitarian ideologies, notably . . . National Socialism. Each explicitly denied the legitimacy of any form of social, political, or cultural organization other than itself. In the name of Allah and Islam, more people were killed in one year of Khomeini than during the preceding quarter-century of the Shah. It is easy to eliminate enemies who have been dehumanized. When Khomeini announced, ‘In Persia no people have been killed so far, only beasts,’ he was following in the footsteps of the architects of the Holocaust,”²⁹ and the architects of the Holocaust were first and foremost anti-Semites.

Islamic Jihadism has certain things in common with all manifestations of anti-Semitism. Its adherents are not the servants of God; rather, they make God into their own servant, using Him to justify their murderous agenda and position themselves outside the scope of divine judgment. Thus, the era of evil that “began with the rise of Hitler,” Bernard Lewis writes, “did not end with his fall.”³⁰ As with the National Socialists, that project is rooted in Jew hatred, and Chapter 3 discusses how the seeds of Nazi Jew hatred sprout from the Islamic soil. Unlike Christians who set out to convert the Jews, Islamic Jihadists, like the Nazis they learned from, now set out to exterminate them. It was an easy lesson for them, because the early rise of Islam has its moments of Jew hatred, as when Muhammad expelled the Jewish tribes of Banu Nadir and Banu Qainuqah from Medina and then slaughtered 900 men of the Jewish Banu Qurayzah tribe in 627. Jews from the Banu Qurayzah tribe were punished with crucifixion, amputation, and other forms of torture, as prescribed in the Quran (69:30–37, 5:33–34, 76:4). The disappearance of the Jewish communities from Arabia, Trifkovic correctly concludes, “was not a spontaneous phenomenon, but the result of what would be known in our time as ethnic cleansing and genocide. The first stage consisted of individual murders of Jews; the second entailed the expulsion of

²⁹ Ibid., 205–6.

³⁰ Bernard Lewis, *Semites and Anti-Semites: An Inquiry into Conflict and Prejudice* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1999), 13.

two tribes from Medina; the third was completed with the slaughter of one remaining tribe.”³¹ Thus, Arabia was made *Judenrein*, cleansed of its Jews.

It is easy to understand, therefore, why Küntzel insists that “whoever does not want to combat antisemitism . . . hasn’t the slightest chance of beating Islamism,”³² and “Jihadism did not merely spur this anti-semitism; it was constituted by it.”³³ Above all else, the Islamic Jihadist evil is about Jew hatred, which is a hatred of Judaism and its commandments concerning the love and responsibility for one’s neighbor – not the Jewish neighbor but any child of Adam, any *ben adam*, which in Hebrew means “human being.”

What, then, do the Nazis and the Islamic Jihadists hate when they hate the Jews? Whereas the Jews pose a theological threat to the Christians, they pose an existential, ontological threat to both the Nazis and the Jihadists. Both the Nazis and the Islamic Jihadists hate the Jews because the very presence of them robs them of their salvation. It robs them of their salvation because it signifies the infinite responsibility that makes the wait for salvation infinite and that makes us infinitely responsible for the life and well-being of the stranger. In a word, it robs them of their salvation because it disturbs the sleep that would settle the matter of redemption in a Final Solution, whether by a utopian ideology or by an exterminationist agenda. The presence of the Jews forces both into an “awakening,” as Emmanuel Lévinas puts it, that is “a demand that no obedience equals”³⁴ – the obedience to neither the Führer nor Allah. The presence of the Jews is a constant reminder that we are forever in debt and that our ultimate reward – whether it is the Thousand Year Reich or the Seventy-Two Virgins of Paradise – is always in question. There is no settling the accounts: no payment will do, because payment is always due. Thus, among the anti-Semites it is a truism that the Jews control the banks and ledgers of the world.

Both Nazi and Jihadist versions of Jew hatred are manifest in the claim to the last line in the syllogism, to a truth that is resolved and guaranteed. As Haj Amin al-Husseini (1893–1974), the Palestinian

³¹ Trifkovic, 42.

³² Küntzel, 146.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Emmanuel Lévinas, *Of God Who Comes to Mind*, trans. Bettina Bergo (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998), 59.

leader and infamous ally of the Nazis, pointed out, both National Socialism and Islamic Jihadism include a *Führerprinzip* among their defining elements, both insist on unswerving obedience, and both strive to control every aspect of every person's life.³⁵ Absolute security is attained through absolute control. However, the Jews, by their very presence, announce that those who would wield absolute control over the truth are not in control. For the truth is always in control of us, not the other way around, despite our ideological machinations.

In ideologies and traditions that preach personal salvation through a specific belief in a specific doctrine, and not a never-ending responsibility to and for the other human being, anti-Semitism necessarily ensues. Why? Because the Jews insist that the fixed formulas and ready answers of the creed are not enough. For this reason, what Franz Rosenzweig says of Christianity may also be said of Islam: "The existence of the Jew constantly subjects Christianity to the idea that it is not attaining the goal, the truth."³⁶ The hatred of the Jews is both the oldest hatred and the most current, because the challenge from the Jews is the oldest challenge to the personal autonomy that would curl up in comfortable sleep of looking out for Number One: for National Socialism, as for Islamic Jihadism, salvation is about *me* and *mine*. Thus both National Socialists and Islamic Jihadists insist that everyone be like *me* in his or her belief.

Resting on a final solution, both the religious and the ideological forms of Jew hatred would have the last word, settle the matter of redemption, and slip into the egocentric complacency of personal salvation – all for the sake of the egocentric self, the ethnocentric *Volk*, or the religiocentric *umma* (Muslim people). Both the religious and the ideological anti-Semites *have to* annihilate the Jew, whose *very existence* disturbs their sleep with the insistence that the wait for salvation lies in an interminable service to the other person, to the one created in

³⁵ Of course, al-Husseini made the comparison to Islam, not to Islamic Jihadism, a term I have chosen to distinguish the perversions of Jihadism from more legitimate forms of Islam. See Klaus Gensicke, *Der Mufti von Jerusalem, Amin el-Husseini, und die Nationalsozialisten* (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 1988), 207. For Hitler's pronouncements on the *Führerprinzip*, see Adolf Hitler, *Mein Kampf* (Munich: Zentralverlag der NSADP, 1927), 378–79.

³⁶ Franz Rosenzweig, *The Star of Redemption*, trans. William W. Hallo (Boston: Beacon Press, 1972), 413.

the image of the Holy One for the sake of the Holy One and His creation. The genealogy of evil is the unfolding of the abrogation of this infinite responsibility to and for the other human being, in a radical usurpation of the Infinite One.

This book explores that unfolding, as it has progressed from National Socialism to Islamic Jihadism, in terms of influence, confluence, and parallel. What we discover is not so much a chain of causal connections between the ideologies as a web of combinations and intersections that shape the modern Jihadist evil. After laying the foundations for the investigation in the first three chapters, Chapter 4 examines the emergence of the most widespread of the Jihadist movements: the Muslim Brotherhood. Chapters 5 and 6 proceed from this Jihadist root to the “religious” branches in the genealogical tree of Jihadism, with the “religious” focus on several movements, from the offshoots of the Brotherhood in the Sudanese National Islamic Front and Hamas, to its influences on the Islamic Revolution in Iran and on al-Qaeda. The “secular” manifestations of the evil, examined in Chapter 7, are found in the Baath Party and the Palestinian Liberation Organization. (I place the words *religious* and *secular* in quotes because the religious movements are political, and the secular movements are religious.) In these chapters, we see how the poison tree spreads from master to disciple to bear its deadly fruit, and the tree is known by its fruit.

That the Jihadist evil is alive and well is evidenced by the fact that when, on 23 September 2008 at the United Nations, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad spewed forth an anti-Semitic diatribe that could have been delivered from the balconies of Berlin in the 1930s, the nations of the world – with the admirable exception of the United States and Israel – applauded. Therefore the book concludes with a reflection on humanity’s need for the state of Israel as a Jewish State that symbolizes, in principle if not always in practice, an ancient testimony to the holiness of every human life.

Nazi Ideology and Jihadist Echoes

To what extent the whole existence of this people [the Jews] is based on a continuous lie is shown incomparably by the *Protocols of the Elders of Zion*.

Adolf Hitler, *Mein Kampf*

[The intentions of the Jew] have been laid out in the *Protocols of the Elders of Zion*, and their present conduct is the best proof of what is said there.

The Hamas “Charter of Allah,” Article Thirty-Two

The central tenets of National Socialist ideology include the superiority of the Aryan people, the drive to rule over other peoples, and the opposition to both Western democracy and Marxist communism. Contrary to popular misconception, the Nazi view of the superiority of the Aryan people is not reducible to mere racism. More than a biological or anthropological category, “race” in this instance is a *metaphysical* category. In Nazi ideology, the notion of race is rooted not only in color or physiognomy or even in the genes but in a concept of human essence: it is an ideological category in which body and soul, biology and being, are fused into one. The category has a name: it is *Rasenseele*. Explaining the Nazi concept of *Rasenseele* or “race-soul,” chief Nazi ideologue Alfred Rosenberg (1893–1946) wrote, “Soul means race viewed from within. And, vice versa, race is the externalization of soul.”¹ If race may be viewed from within, then it is not reducible to

¹ Alfred Rosenberg, *Race and Race History and Other Essays*, ed. Robert Pais (New York: Harper & Row, 1974), 34.

any outward manifestation such as skin tones or hair texture; rather it is *conceptual* and therefore an abstraction.

“This heroic attitude [of National Socialism],” said Rosenberg, “departs from the *single* but *completely* decisive avowal, *namely from the avowal that blood and character, race and soul are merely different designations for the same entity.*”² If character and soul are in the blood, then so is the creed, or at least the inclination toward the creed. Hence, the Jewish threat to humanity “would not be altered,” Rosenberg explained, “if the Jew denied the Talmud, because the national character, which remains the same, would continue to represent an equally inflexible, dogmatic viewpoint in other areas.”³ With the character in the blood and the blood in the soul, the Jew is an *essential* threat to the Aryan *essence*. The Jew is, as the Nazis declared, the disease that threatens the body of humanity from within, which makes the Jew a *pathological* threat. In 1935, the journal of the Association of German Physicians stated, “Almost all people harbor TB [tuberculosis] bacilli, almost all nations on earth harbor the Jews – a chronic infection, which it is difficult to cure. Just as the human body does not absorb the TB germs into its general organism, so a natural, homogeneous society cannot absorb the Jews into its organic association.”⁴ Like the TB bacilli, the Jews must be completely eradicated. Thus, we have the concrete necessity imposed by the abstract concept.

The metaphysical nature of the Nazi notion of race-soul makes the category of *Rasenseele* much less alien and even palatable to Islam. Although Islam rejects racism based on color, it preaches a certain segregation based on creed, that is, an ideological segregation: under Sharia or Islamic law, non-Muslims on every level are refused the consideration allowed for Muslims, because “God does not love the unbelievers” (Quran 3:32). Of course, contrary to the Nazi view that a non-Aryan cannot become an Aryan, Islam teaches that in principle any non-Muslim can become a Muslim. When it comes to the Jews, however, modern Islamic Jihadism has more in common with Nazi ideology than with traditional Muslim teaching.

² Quoted in Max Weinreich, *Hitler's Professors: The Part of Scholarship in Germany's Crimes against the Jewish People* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999), 26; emphasis added.

³ Rosenberg, 183.

⁴ Quoted in H. H. Ben-Sasson, ed., *A History of the Jewish People* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976), 1019.

“Just as the Young Egypt movement borrowed from the *Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei* (NSDAP),” Laurent Murawiec notes, “so did the radical Islamist movement as a whole [borrow] its racism and anti-Semitism. This included support for Nazi philosophy, viciously anti-Jewish propaganda in the party press. [Thus] Islamic extremists acquired the perverse modern form of racism, biological racism and racial theory.”⁵ In the matter of a specifically racist form of Jew hatred in which race is not just a biological but also a metaphysical category, the Jihadists not only parallel the Nazis, they imitate them.

According to Rosenberg, the Nazis fought the Jews because the Aryan race “has been poisoned by Judaism,” and not merely by Jewish blood, for the “-ism” is *in* the blood.⁶ Therefore, he insisted, all Jews are prone to think talmudically, “whether they are atheistic Bourse-speculators, religious fanatics, or Talmudic Jews of the cloth.”⁷ Similarly, Sayyid Qutb (to be discussed at length in Chapter 2), one of the most influential ideologues of the Muslim Brotherhood and Islamic Jihadism, maintained that “Jews as Jews were *by nature* determined to fight Allah’s Truth and sow corruption and confusion,”⁸ that the Jews’ “passion to control others” was a “driving force in their *national character*,”⁹ and that “the deeper cause of the Jewish hatred of Islam was the *malevolent Jewish nature*.”¹⁰ A Jew cannot change his nature any more than a tiger can change its stripes. Like the Nazis, who understood the Jewish evil to lie in the Jewish essence, the Jihadists’ aim “is not simply to morally delegitimize Israel as a Jewish State and a national entity in the Middle East, but to dehumanize Judaism and the Jewish people as such.”¹¹ Once dehumanized, the Jew is easily deemed evil. Once deemed evil, Jews cannot be accorded the same possibility of conversion that is open to the rest of humanity.

⁵ Laurent Murawiec, *The Mind of Jihad* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 255.

⁶ Rosenberg, 131–32.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 181.

⁸ Quoted in Ronald L. Nettler, *Past Trials and Present Tribulations: A Muslim Fundamentalist’s View of the Jews* (Oxford: Pergamon, 1987), 35; emphasis added.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 37–38; emphasis added.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 44; emphasis added.

¹¹ Quoted in Kenneth R. Timmerman, *Preachers of Hate: Islam and the War on America* (New York: Three Rivers Press, 2004), 63.

Rosenberg's call for the "universality of an all-embracing spirit, a *universal* striving,"¹² is another foundational element of National Socialist ideology. The ideology is not merely for the Aryan Volk; rather, it submits all of humanity to the Aryan Volk and the Nazi *Weltanschauung* or "worldview." It is a *Weltanschauung*, which is to say it accounts for *everything*. As Emil Fackenheim explains it, "a *Weltanschauung* requires: cosmic scope, internal coherence or *Geschlossenheit*, and a sincere commitment on the part of its devotees."¹³ Inasmuch as universal rule is a tenet of the Nazi *Weltanschauung*, Nazism, like Islamic Jihadism, *has* to be both totalitarian and expansionist. The Nazi drive for *Lebensraum* or "living space" is a drive for the conquest not just of German lands but of all lands; such conquest is an ideological necessity of their defining *Weltanschauung*. For the Nazi *Weltanschauung*, there can be no internal coherence without total external control, and no external control without the absolute devotion of its followers.

Echoing Rosenberg, but perhaps without having read him, the first of the major modern Jihadist ideologues and founder of the Indian Jihadist group Jamaat-e-Islami, Sayyid Abdul Al'a Maududi (to be discussed at length in Chapter 2), writes, "The Message of Islam is meant for the whole of mankind and whatever relates to human life necessarily concerns Islam as well. Hence the Islamic movement is universal in nature."¹⁴ Taking his cue from Maududi, Hasan al-Banna writes, "Islam is a comprehensive system which deals with all spheres of life,"¹⁵ a position likely influenced by the Nazi worldview but one that certainly parallels it. To be sure, sharing with Nazism a contempt for Western democratic systems of government, Islamic Jihadism necessarily shares with Nazism this insistence on the universality of a totalitarian hold on the lives of all.

This insistence on the universal domination of the ideology, whether it is National Socialism or Islamic Jihadism, leads to a division of world and humanity into Manichean opposites, a division already

¹² Rosenberg, 134.

¹³ Emil L. Fackenheim, "Holocaust and *Weltanschauung*: Philosophical Reflections on Why They Did It," *Holocaust and Genocide Studies*, 3 (1988): 204.

¹⁴ Sayyid Abdul Al'a Maududi, *Selected Speeches and Writings*, Vol. 1, trans. S. Zakir Ajjaz (Karachi: International Islamic Publishers, 1981), 5.

¹⁵ Hasan al-Banna, "The Message and the Teachings," http://www.youngmuslims.ca/online_library/books/tmott.

inherent in Islam. From the very beginning, as Majid Khadduri has pointed out, Islam has divided the world into two opposing realms: the *dar al-Islam* or “world of Islam” and *dar al-harb* or “world of war.” The *dar al-harb*, explains Khadduri, is “permanently under jihad obligation until the *dar al-harb* is reduced to non-existence. . . . The universality of Islam, in its all embracing creed, is imposed on the believers as a continuous process of warfare.”¹⁶ What defines *dar al-Islam*? Sayyid Qutb explains: “There is only one place on earth which can be called the home of Islam [*dar al-Islam*], and it is that place where the Islamic state is established and the *Shari’ah* [Islamic law] is the authority.”¹⁷ Parallel to the *dar al-Islam* and the *dar al-harb* opposition, says Qutb, is the distinction between *hizb Allah* or “Party of Allah” and the *hizb al-shaytan* or “Party of Satan.”¹⁸ The universal threat to the universal house of Islam and the Party of Allah is the satanic evil of the Jew and Judaism. It should be noted that the opposing view is not merely that of an opposition party; instead, it is a transcendent evil opposed to the absolute good as Jihadists define the “good.”

Hence, the justification of Jihadist Jew hatred, as seen in Qutb’s comment on Muhammad’s expulsion and massacre of the three Jewish tribes from the area surrounding Medina: the Jews, he says, “have continued to scheme against Islam and the Muslim community ever since [that time]. . . . In modern history, the Jews have been behind every calamity that has befallen the Muslim communities everywhere.”¹⁹ Just as the realm of Islamic control is universal, so is the Jewish threat to that control. The threat has far more to do with Jewish teaching and testimony than with Jewish power. Indeed, in the time of the Holocaust, almost half of the world’s Jews were too powerless to save themselves.

Not only drawing on but enlarging Nazi Jew hatred, the Jihadists’ sense of the inherent, essential evil of the Jew is an essential part

¹⁶ Majid Khadduri, *War and Peace in the Law of Islam* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1955), 63–64.

¹⁷ Sayyid Qutb, *Maalim fi al-Tariq [Milestones]* (Damascus: Dar Al-Ilm, 2006), 118.

¹⁸ See Ahmad S. Moussalli, *Radical Islamic Fundamentalism: The Ideological and Political Discourse of Sayyid Qutb* (Beirut: American University of Beirut, 1992), 168.

¹⁹ Andrew G. Bostom, “Jihad in the Quran and the Hadith,” in Andrew G. Bostom, ed., *The Legacy of Jihad: Islamic Holy War and the Fate of Non-Muslims* (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2005), 130–31.

of their *piety*. Haj Amin al-Husseini, a devotee of the Nazis, issued this summons to the Muslims in a radio broadcast from Berlin on 26 November 1942, after Rommel's defeat at El Alamein on 4 November: "Arise, O sons of Arabia! Fight for your sacred rights! Slaughter Jews wherever you find them! Their spilled blood pleases Allah!"²⁰ In Jerusalem the Muslims' call to kill the Jews dates back to the riots of 4–5 April 1920, when posters in the Muslim Quarter read, "Kill the Jews. There is no punishment for killing Jews."²¹ Just before the Arab riots against the Jews in August 1929, when 133 Jews were killed and 339 wounded, al-Husseini and his fellow Muslim preachers declared that "he who kills a Jew is assured a place in the next world."²² Al-Husseini repeated the exhortation to "kill Jews wherever you find them" in a speech from Berlin on 4 May 1944 to Muslim Handschar SS killing units, responsible for the murder of 90 percent of the Yugoslavian Jews, along with the insistence that *it pleases Allah*.²³ If it pleases Allah, then killing Jews is not about "freeing Palestine" or driving out an "oppressor" or even revenge. It is about serving God. This makes it an absolute duty. Just as a Nazi cannot be a true Nazi without murdering Jews, so an Islamic Jihadist cannot be a true Muslim without murdering Jews. The Jihadist's ticket into paradise is a dead Jew. For a dead Jew pleases Allah.

Al-Husseini's words continue to be repeated from the pulpits of mosques throughout the Muslim world. Recall the sermon by Dr. Ahmad Abu Halabiya, the former director of Gaza's Islamic University, delivered on 13 October 2000: "Have no mercy on the Jews, no matter where they are in any country. Fight them, wherever you are. Wherever you meet them, kill them."²⁴ The phrase fouls the mouths not only of the Muslim clerics but of Jihadist intellectuals as well – and, like National Socialism, Islamic Jihadism is driven by intellectuals. In the next chapter, we discover that the Jihadists' hatred of the Jews is as

²⁰ Tom Knowlton, "Nazi Roots of Modern Radical Islam," <http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/news/816232/posts>.

²¹ David G. Dalin and John F. Rothman, *Icon of Evil: Hitler's Mufti and the Rise of Radical Islam* (New York: Random House, 2008), 13.

²² *Ibid.*, 30.

²³ Knowlton.

²⁴ Quoted in Joseph Farah, "How Islam Plays the Press," in David Bukay, ed., *Muhammad's Monsters: A Comprehensive Guide to Radical Islam for Western Audiences* (Green Forest, AR: Balfour Books, 2004), 92–93.

old as it is deep. In modern times, however, this murderous attitude toward the Jews – the view that killing Jews is an absolute, ideological necessity – has its roots in National Socialism. The Jihadists have proven to be among the Nazis' most avid students.

Sowing the Dragon's Teeth

What has been said so far with regard to Nazi ideology and its Jihadist echoes is by way of introduction to the most infamous manifesto of Nazi ideology: Adolf Hitler's *Mein Kampf* (volume one published in 1925, volume two in 1926). "Written in white-hot hatred," as Konrad Heiden describes it in his introduction to the English edition, this book presents "a program of blood and terror in a self-revelation of such overwhelming frankness that few among its readers had the courage to believe it."²⁵ In his history of World War II, Winston Churchill described *Mein Kampf* as "the new Koran of faith and war: turgid, verbose, shapeless, but pregnant with its message."²⁶ It is no accident that Churchill compares the Führer's tractate with that of Muhammed: both chart a path not only toward war but also toward an exterminationist Jew hatred that is an ideological key to world domination: there is no ruling the world without the extermination of the Jews.

One of the most terrifying assertions of Hitler comes early on, when he declares that the Nazis' struggle is "a struggle for the soul of the child, and to the child its first appeal is addressed."²⁷ Islamic Jihadism shares Hitler's views on the struggle for the soul of the child; indeed, the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) modeled its children's camps after the Hitler Youth camps.²⁸ "Like other modern dictators, from Adolf Hitler and Nicolae Ceaușescu to Saddam Hussein," notes scholar Efraim Karsh, PLO leader Yasser Arafat (1929–2004) was "keenly aware that the road to absolute power has to begin with

²⁵ Konrad Heiden, Introduction to Adolf Hitler, *Mein Kampf*, trans. Ralph Manheim (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1971), xv.

²⁶ Winston S. Churchill, *The Second World War, Volume One: The Gathering Storm* (Boston: Mariner Books, 1986), 50.

²⁷ Adolf Hitler, *Mein Kampf*, trans. Ralph Manheim (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1971), 12.

²⁸ Efraim Karsh, *Arafat's War: The Man and His Battle for Israeli Conquest* (New York: Grove Press, 2003), 101.

the education of the young. . . . From their first days at kindergarten, Palestinian children are inculcated with virulent hatred toward Jews and Israelis.”²⁹ So, too, are children throughout the Jihadist world.

Of course, the Jihadists’ borrowing from the Nazis in the indoctrination of their children predates the PLO, as Islamic scholar Ziad Abu-Amr has shown.³⁰ Ardent admirers of the Nazis, such as Hasan al-Banna and Haj Amin al-Husseini, promoted the organization of youth groups, training camps, and Islamic scouts in the 1930s, not only in Egypt and Palestine but also throughout the Middle East. Al-Husseini’s Arab Revolt of 1936, notes Matthias Küntzel, “took place against the background of the swastika: Arab leaflets and signs on walls were prominently marked with this Nazi symbol; the youth organization of [al-Husseini’s] political party paraded as ‘Nazi-scouts,’ and Arab children greeted each other with the Nazi salute. Those who had to pass through the rebellious quarters of Palestine attached a flag bearing the swastika to their vehicles so as to insure protection against assaults by the Mufti’s volunteers.”³¹ Says Lukasz Hirszowicz, “It was no accident that in 1937 the Führer of the German youth, Baldur von Schirach, went to the Near East with fifteen co-workers, visiting Damascus, Baghdad and Tehran. . . . German propaganda, especially von Schirach’s visit, found a strong echo in Arab countries, where the German pattern of para-military and youth organizations, some Nazi slogans and particularly the *Führer Prinzip* were very popular.”³² Poisoning children with a deep-rooted Jew hatred and thus drawing their souls into the service of the ideology is a crucial part of Nazi and Jihadist strategy.

In our own time, the Jihadists’ struggle for the soul of the child can be seen, for example, in the Nazi-like situation that exists in the Islamic Republic of Iran, where “child moralists tell grown-ups how they ought to dress as well as how to behave at home or at work. They

²⁹ Ibid., 100.

³⁰ See Ziad Abu-Amr, *Islamic Fundamentalism in the West Bank and Gaza: Muslim Brotherhood and Islamic Jihad* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994), 2.

³¹ Matthias Küntzel, “National Socialism and Anti-Semitism in the Arab World,” *Jewish Political Studies Review* (17, Spring 2005): <http://www.jcpa.org/phas/phas-kuntzel-so5.htm>.

³² Lukasz Hirszowicz, *The Third Reich and the Arab East* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1966), 18.

are the eyes and ears of the Imam.”³³ Just so, in Nazi Germany, decent German parents grew afraid of their own children, whose souls had been captured by the Nazi Party.³⁴ If the Nazis captured the souls of their children, however, the Jihadists destroy them by training them not just for sacrifice but for murder. Like the ancient idolaters against whom God warned the Israelites (see, e.g., Deuteronomy 18:10), they pass their children through fire and worse: making their children into sacrificial offerings consumed by the flames of their bombs, they transform them into murderers. As Ahmed Yousef, chief political advisor to Hamas prime minister Ismail Haniyeh, declared in an interview with *Der Spiegel* (2 February 2008), “If the Israelis want our blood, I’m willing to sacrifice my children.”³⁵ In this difference between the Nazis and the Jihadists, we have another glimpse of the Jihadist evil.

Just a few examples serve to make this point. After the murder of Americans on 9/11, Palestinian Sheikh Ibrahim Mahdi cried out, “We bless all those who educate their children to jihad and to martyrdom.”³⁶ That is, do not teach them merely to hate and to fight—teach them to die a death that combines suicide with homicide. Although the Quran forbids suicide (2:195; 4:29), contemporary Muslim authorities legitimize it through their self-styled revision of the Quran’s teachings. In “The Islamic Ruling on the Permissibility of Martyrdom Operations,” for example, the Council of Scholars from the Arabian Peninsula states that the term *suicide operations*, when used in connection with terrorist attacks, “was chosen by Jews to discourage people from such endeavors.”³⁷ From the standpoint of Islamic Jihadism, sending their children to kill Jews by killing themselves is

³³ Amir Taheri, *Holy Terror: Inside the World of Islamic Terrorism* (Bethesda, MD: Adler & Adler, 1987), 93.

³⁴ See Simon Wiesenthal, *The Sunflower: On the Possibilities and Limits of Forgiveness*, trans. H. A. Piehler (New York: Schocken Books, 1998), 31–32.

³⁵ Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “The Hamas Terror War against Israel,” <http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Terrorism+Obstacle+to+Peace/Terror+Groups/Missile%20fire%20from%20Gaza%20on%20Israeli%20civilian%20targets%20Aug%202007>.

³⁶ Quoted by Robert S. Wistrich, “Islamic Judeophobia: An Existential Threat,” in David Bukay, ed., *Muhammad’s Monsters*, 197.

³⁷ David Cook, *Understanding Jihad* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2005), 144.

not suicide. Although killing oneself is contrary to Islamic law, dying in the act of killing Jews is righteous. Why? Because if those who are murdered are Jews – that is, if those who are murdered are the embodiment of evil and therefore a threat to all humanity – it is not a suicidal act but an act of martyrdom and is therefore in keeping with the Quran; if anyone should think otherwise, it is the fault of the Jews themselves.

In a similar desecration of the teachings of the Muslim tradition, the Iranian-funded organization Hezbollah formed a group called Children's Power, with twelve year olds being issued Kalashnikovs; Jihadist terrorist training starts at an early age, particularly for those selected for "martyrdom." Their oath is: "In the name of Allah the Avenger and in the name of Imam Khomeini I swear on the Holy Book to perform my sacred duty as a Child of the Imam and a Soldier of Islam in our Holy War to restore to this world the Light of Divine Justice. May Allah be my Guide on the Path of Jihad and of *qital* [killing]." ³⁸ It must be noted that here "Divine Justice" means the murder of the Jews, according to "Allah the Avenger." One cannot help but recall, with a chill, the Nazi German primary reader for third- and fourth-grade children that included the prayer, "May we become strong and pure . . . German children of our Führer." ³⁹ Once again, we hear the Jihadist echo of the Nazi evil.

Glorifying the Jihadists who offer up their children on the altar of Jew hatred, Ruhullah Khomeini (1902–1989) boasted that "primary school children of seven or eight stand ready to sacrifice themselves and shed their blood for the sake of Islam." He asks, "When has anything like this been seen?" When, indeed, we may ask, has such evil been seen? Says Khomeini, "Our lion-hearted women snatch up their infants and go to confront the machine guns and tanks of the regime," as if it were a wonderful and wondrous thing for mothers to no sooner bear life into the world than to transform it into death. ⁴⁰ Although the Jihadist evil may exceed the Nazi evil in this respect, we can see that the Jihadists have taken Hitler's assertion in *Mein Kampf*

³⁸ Taheri, 91.

³⁹ See Lisa Pine, *Nazi Family Policy, 1933–1945* (Oxford: Berg Publishers, 1999), 60.

⁴⁰ Ruhullah Khomeini, *Islam and Revolution: Writings and Declarations of Imam Khomeini*, trans. Hamid Algar (Berkeley: Mizan Press, 1981), 240.

to heart: “Only the greatness of the sacrifices will win new fighters for the cause.”⁴¹ What sacrifice is greater than child sacrifice at the hands of the mothers who brought them into the world? As the Palestinian Mufti Ikrima Sabri declared when asked about suicide bombers killing Israeli citizens in October 2000, “The younger the martyr, the greater and the more I respect him.”⁴² The younger the “martyr,” the greater his sacrifice. Thus the Jihadist Slaughter of the Innocents.

The Sanctification of Violence

Other pronouncements in *Mein Kampf* have their echoes in Islamic Jihadism. Like the spread of Jihadism, for instance, the spread of National Socialism could be accomplished only through the ruthless and relentless use of force, to the point of extermination. Thus, said the Führer, the “complete annihilation” of a doctrine “can be carried out only through a process of extermination. . . . Only in the steady and constant application of force lies the very first prerequisite for success.”⁴³ The doctrine he would exterminate, of course, was Judaism, which is as undermining to Islamic Jihadism as it is to National Socialism, for the prime directive in Judaism is just what the Nazis and the Jihadists set out to usurp: thou shalt not murder. Hitler went on to assert, “The fight against a spiritual power with methods of violence remains defensive, however, until the sword becomes the support, the herald and disseminator, of a new spiritual doctrine.”⁴⁴ All those who refused to fall under the rule of the ideology would fall under the sword.

So it is with Islamic Jihadism. Comparing Hitler’s proclamation concerning the sword to the insignia of Jihadist regimes, which emulates the Quran’s Verses of the Sword (see 9:5–29), we note that it is not for nothing that the one nation whose flag has a weapon emblazoned on it is the Wahhabi nation of Saudi Arabia. The *shahadah* – the Islamic declaration of “Ashadu an la ilahah illa-lah, wa ashadu

⁴¹ Hitler, 103.

⁴² Reported by David Kupelian, “Jerusalem Cleric Praises Child ‘Sacrifices,’” *WorldNetDaily*, 10 November 2000, http://www.worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=18773.

⁴³ Hitler, 170–71.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 172.

anna Muhammadan rasulu-lah” (“There is no God but Allah, and Muhammad is the messenger of Allah”) – is written across the Saudi flag, with a sword underneath the inscription: the sword is for those who refuse the shahadah. Similarly, the emblems of the Muslim Brotherhood, Islamic Jihad, Hamas, Hezbollah, and every other Jihadist group display weapons.

Hasan al-Banna, who enthusiastically professed his admiration of Hitler,⁴⁵ understood this principle of murderous violence from *Mein Kampf* only too well, as he described force as “the motto of Islam” – force “of doctrine” and force “of arms.”⁴⁶ Elsewhere al-Banna writes, “How wise was the man who said: ‘Force is the surest way of implementing the right, how beautiful it is that force and right should march side by side.’”⁴⁷ Given his reverence for the Führer, al-Banna may well have been thinking of Hitler in his reference to the “wise man.” It is a reference echoed in a musical refrain that ran throughout the Arab Muslim world during the reign of the Third Reich: “Bala Misou, bala Mister, bissama Allah, oria alard Hitler (No more monsieur, No more Mister, in heaven Allah, on earth Hitler).”⁴⁸ One can see that the idolatrous adulation of history’s most notorious broker of Jew hatred extended well beyond the borders of Germany, even beyond the borders of Europe.

The Power of Propaganda

Slogans extolling the Nazis were part of an effective propaganda campaign that the Muslim Brotherhood launched throughout the region during the Palestinian Arab Revolt of 1936.⁴⁹ Hasan al-Banna, in fact, indicated that he had learned a great deal from the Nazis about the importance of propaganda,⁵⁰ and, as Christina Phelps Harris has

⁴⁵ See, for example, Hasan al-Banna, *Five Tracts of Hasan al-Banna: A Selection from the Majmuat Rasail al-Imam al-Shahid Hasan al-Banna*, trans. Charles Wendell (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), 97.

⁴⁶ See Abu-Amr, 120.

⁴⁷ Al-Banna, 80.

⁴⁸ Raoul Aglion, *The Fighting French* (New York: Holt, 1943), 217.

⁴⁹ See Abu-Amr, 1.

⁵⁰ Al-Banna, 45–46.

pointed out, al-Banna “gave careful thought to all the details of a far-flung propaganda campaign.”⁵¹ In 1935, he organized the Muslim Brotherhood’s first propaganda committee,⁵² and in 1943, the Brotherhood published its first edition of *Da’watuna* (*Our Propaganda Aims*). “If propaganda is to be effective for the movement,” Hitler explained, “it must be addressed to only one quarter [of the people]. . . . If propaganda renounces primitiveness of expression, it does not find its way to the feeling of the broad masses.”⁵³ Thus an intellectual elite molds the minds of the young and underprivileged into sacrificing themselves for the cause, body and soul. In its National Socialist manifestation, this molding of minds entails making as many people as possible dependent on the regime for their basic needs. Thus, like the Nazis, the Islamic Jihadists – from the Muslim Brotherhood, to Hamas, to Hezbollah – provide a variety of social services for the people whose children they will pass through fire. Like the Godfather, they say to those whom they help, “I am doing you a favor, but one day I may come to you and ask you a favor.”

Both for the Nazis and for the Islamic Jihadists, the aim of propaganda is not merely to convince members of a population to adopt a certain ideological viewpoint and thus offer up their most precious possessions to the cause; rather, in Hitler’s words, it is to “reimplant the spirit of proud self-reliance, manly defiance, and wrathful hatred.”⁵⁴ Yes, *wrathful hatred, zornigen Hasses*⁵⁵: one must *wrathfully hate* the Jew, which means: extermination. Any means can be justified to attain this ideological end, including and above all falsehood and deception. Just so, Hitler understood deception to be an important part of the strategy of any propaganda campaign, because “something of the most insolent lie will always remain and stick.”⁵⁶ That is how you breed “wrathful hatred.” The Nazis were masters of “the most insolent lie,”

⁵¹ Christina Phelps Harris, *Nationalism and Revolution in Egypt: The Role of the Muslim Brotherhood* (The Hague: Mouton & Co., 1964), 152.

⁵² Richard P. Mitchell, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 55.

⁵³ Hitler, 341–42.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 632.

⁵⁵ Adolf Hitler, *Mein Kampf* (Munich: Zentralverlag der NSADP, 1927), 714.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 232.

accusing the Jews of everything from the age-old Blood Libel to secretly plotting to take over the world. The Jihadists echo the Nazi lies. At a United Nations seminar on religious tolerance, Saudi representative Dr. Maruf al-Dawalibi averred, "If a Jew does not drink every year the blood of a non-Jewish man, then he will be damned for all eternity."⁵⁷ Syria's defense minister Mustafa Tlas wrote a book titled *The Matza of Zion* in which he maintained the truth of the age-old Christian claim that Jews murder children to obtain blood for Passover matzo.⁵⁸ Only such calumny can justify the spilling of the blood of Jewish children.

Bernard Lewis notes several examples of other fantastic lies spread by Islamic propaganda in which the Jews "are accused of infecting girls with AIDS and syphilis and sending them to Egypt to spread these diseases. They are also accused of supplying Egyptian women with hyper-aphrodisiac chewing gum which drives them into a frenzy of sexual desire," as well as "of deliberately spreading cancer among the Egyptians and other Arabs by devising and disseminating carcinogenic cucumbers and shampoos; of promoting drug-taking and devil-worship, and organizing a campaign to legalize homosexuality in order to undermine Egyptian society."⁵⁹ In other words, Jews are behind every evil that might threaten a society. "In Islamist eyes," as in the eyes of the Nazis, Küntzel states it, "not only is everything Jewish evil, all evil is Jewish."⁶⁰ That is why the Jews *must* be hated, and hated wrathfully.

Another good example of the Jihadists' slanderous propaganda against the Jews is the typical programming broadcast from Hezbollah's television station Al-Manar, one of the top five stations viewed in the Arab Muslim world. With the launching of its broadcasts in 1991, Ali Dahir, Al-Manar's first station manager, said their aim was to "focus on our hostility and hatred toward Israel."⁶¹ Another stated

⁵⁷ See Bernard Lewis, *Semites and Anti-Semites: An Inquiry into Conflict and Prejudice* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1999), 194.

⁵⁸ See Barry Rubin, *Revolution until Victory?: The Politics and History of the PLO* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994), 125.

⁵⁹ Lewis, 265–66.

⁶⁰ Matthias Küntzel, *Jihad and Jew-Hatred: Islamism, Nazism and the Roots of 9/11*, trans. Colin Meade (New York: Telos Press, 2007), 5.

⁶¹ Avi Jorisch, *Beacon of Hatred: Inside Hizballah's Al-Manar Television* (Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2004), 20.

aim is “to promote suicide missions.”⁶² On 17 September 2001, Al-Manar propagated the insolent lie that the Jews were behind 9/11⁶³ and that the Israelis are developing weapons of mass destruction to carry out “a Torah-based plan to finish all of Islam.”⁶⁴ Similarly, notes Robert Wistrich, in Egypt “comparisons of Israel with the Nazis, denial of the Holocaust, and medieval blood libels regularly appear in the government-backed press, . . . as they do in the leftist, Nasserist, and fundamentalist opposition newspapers. Worse still, the cartoons consistently deform Jews. They are almost always dirty, hook-nosed, money-grabbing, vindictive, scheming, and cruel.”⁶⁵ In other words, the images of the Jew spread throughout the Islamic world could have been lifted from *Der Stürmer*. The images to which Wistrich refers underscore Hitler’s statement that “no one need be surprised if among our people the personification of the devil as the symbol of all evil assumes the living shape of the Jew.”⁶⁶ Form the Jew as evil, and evil assumes the form of the Jew. Once again, we encounter the “most insolent lie” that permeates Nazi and Jihadist propaganda: the Jew is the incarnation and source of all evil.

The insolent Nazi lies that reverberate throughout Islamic Jihadist propaganda are not confined to the media or to popular culture; they also echo in the halls of Islamic academia and flow from the printing presses of academic publishers. A standard text in Egyptian schools, for example, is written by Sheikh Muhammad Sayed Tantawi (b. 28 October 1928), the noted scholar who on 27 March 1996 was appointed Grand Sheikh of Al-Azhar University, the most prestigious university in the Muslim world. Based on his doctoral thesis, Tantawi’s textbook is called *The People of Israel in the Quran and Sunna*. In it he maintains that the Jews were behind the French and Russian revolutions and both World Wars, they control the world’s media and the world’s economy, they endeavor to destroy morality, and they set up brothels throughout the world. He echoes Hitler’s claim in *Mein Kampf* that “in resisting the Jews, I am doing the work of the Lord,” and he praises the *Protocols of the Elders of Zion* as a profound exposure and irrefutable evidence of

⁶² Ibid., 35.

⁶³ Ibid., 39.

⁶⁴ Ibid., 59.

⁶⁵ Wistrich, 202.

⁶⁶ Hitler, 324.

the world Jewish conspiracy.⁶⁷ Similarly, political and economic expert Dr. Amira al-Sinwani published in the 26 October 2001 edition of the Egyptian newspaper *Al-Akhbar* an article affirming the authenticity of *The Protocols*, using *A Handbook on the Jewish Question* published by the Nazis in 1935⁶⁸ – still more evidence that the Jihadists studied the Nazis.

“The same ideas,” Küntzel reminds us, “appear in non-religious guise in Muhammad Qutb’s *Muslims and Globalization*, which appeared in 2000.”⁶⁹ Muhammad Qutb (born ca. 1907) was the brother of Muslim Brotherhood ideologue Sayyid Qutb. He taught at King Abd al-Aziz University in Jeddah in Saudi Arabia, where he was one of Osama bin Laden’s teachers from 1974 to 1978. Learning from a man who in turn learned from the Nazis, bin Laden (b. 10 March 1957) espouses the distinctively Nazi-like propaganda that the Jew is a threat to all humanity and the corrupter of everything decent. The “Jewish enemy,” he declares in a letter to Saudi mufti Bin Baz dated 29 December 1994, “is not an enemy in his own original country fighting in its defense until he gains a peace agreement, but an attacking enemy and a corrupter of religion and the world.”⁷⁰ In these words, we see the branching out of a genealogical tree from Adolf Hitler to Hasan al-Banna to Muhammad Qutb to Osama bin Laden. Indeed, at the Hamburg trial of Al-Qaeda operative Mounir el-Motassadeq in October 2002, Shahid Nickels testified that 9/11 terrorist Mohammed “Atta’s *Weltanschauung* was based on a National Socialist way of thinking.”⁷¹ We shall find that there are many other branches that grow from the Nazi root.

Fueling Fanaticism

The claim that the Jew corrupts all things pure is among the views shared by Nazism and Islamic Jihadism. It fuels the fanaticism of Nazi ideology, and fanaticism is essential to the spread of the ideology,

⁶⁷ See Küntzel, *Jihad and Jew-Hatred*, 94.

⁶⁸ Serge Trifkovic, *The Sword of the Prophet: Islam: History, Theology, Impact on the World* (Boston: Regina Orthodox Press, 2002), 190.

⁶⁹ Küntzel, *Jihad and Jew-Hatred*, 95.

⁷⁰ Osama bin Laden, *Messages to the World: The Statements of Osama bin Laden*, ed. Bruce Lawrence, trans. James Howarth (London: Verso, 2005), 9.

⁷¹ Küntzel, *Jihad and Jew-Hatred*, 129.

as Hitler realized. “The future of a movement,” he insists, “is conditioned by the fanaticism [*Fanatismus*], yes, the intolerance, with which its adherents uphold it as the sole correct movement.”⁷² That’s it: fanaticism is radical intolerance of anyone who does not actively share the party’s ideology. Such thinking is echoed in Sayyid Qutb’s *Hadha al-Din (This Religion, 1962)*, where he contends that Islam must become an all-embracing totality and that it alone can free man because it alone is the correct all false ideology. Therefore, everyone must obediently fall lockstep into line.⁷³ Such a totality can be achieved only by the sword, as both the Nazis and the Jihadists understand. Hitler’s call for a peace “based on the victorious sword of a master people, putting the world into the service of a higher culture”⁷⁴ characterizes the call of Islamic Jihadists and their peculiar understanding of Islam as a “religion of peace.” The sword on the Saudi flag once again comes to mind; it is a Wahhabi flag raised over a land where no religion other than Islam is tolerated, just as no party other than the Nazi Party was tolerated under the Third Reich.

Like Islamic Jihadism, Hitler’s National Socialism requires fanatics who “must not fear the hostility of their enemies, but must feel that it is the presupposition for their own right to exist. They must not shun the hatred of the enemies of our nationality and our philosophy and its manifestations; they must long for them.”⁷⁵ Once again, we see the turning of one’s own hatred back on the other, ascribing to the other our own evil. Engendering not only hatred for the others, particularly the Jews, but seeking to be hated, fanatics feed their fanaticism by casting themselves in the role of victims who alone can oppose the absolute evil embodied in the Jew. Sayyid Qutb explained, for instance, that the Jews could not see the truth of Muhammad because of their hatred of the Angel Gabriel, the revealer of Islam.⁷⁶ That is why the Jews should be the object of the hatred of all humankind: they hate good and love evil. In that unrelenting, fanatical hatred of the Jew lies what the Jihadists perceive to be the greatness both of Nazism and of Jihadism.

⁷² Hitler, 349–50. See also the German edition, Hitler, *Mein Kampf*, 385.

⁷³ Moussalli, 49.

⁷⁴ Hitler, 396.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 351.

⁷⁶ See Nettler, 43.

“The greatness of every mighty organization embodying an idea in this world,” wrote Hitler, “lies in the religious fanaticism and intolerance with which, fanatically convinced of its own right, it intolerantly imposes its will against all others.”⁷⁷ The fanatical imposition of one’s own will on all others is the mark both of Nazi and of Jihadist totalitarianism. The Nazis understood that they shared this ideological position with Islam, and so they were careful to note that their own anti-Semitism was specifically *Jew* hatred and did not include Arabs. In November 1942, for example, the *New York Times* reported that a Berlin foreign ministry spokesman took “great pains” to assure the Arabs that Nazi anti-Semitic policies were directed toward Jews exclusively. “We have never said the Arabs were an inferior race. On the contrary, we have always pointed out the glorious historic past of the Arab people.”⁷⁸ This statement was made just a few months after the massive transports to the murder camps had begun. What made the Arabs’ past glorious, in the eyes of the Nazis, was the Jew hatred that manifested itself in the Arabs’ present.

Other, more infamous and more scholarly Nazis sang the praises of Islam. In the 15 December 1942 issue of *Die Judenfrage*, Dr. Johann von Leers (1902–1965) published an essay titled “Judaism and Islam as Opposites,” in which he cited Haj Amin al-Husseini with great admiration⁷⁹ and underscored the fact that “the Quran is full of warnings about the Jews, who are bluntly called ‘Satans’ [see 4:55, 4:60, 58:14–19, and 98:6].”⁸⁰ If the Jews had been successful in Judaizing the Arabs, von Leers claimed, they would have spread the Talmud with the sword, and “this would have resulted in a cruel catastrophe for the whole of cultured humanity.” Therefore, he concluded, the world owes a great debt to the Muslims.⁸¹ Indeed, according to von Leers, if the rest of the world had adopted the policy toward the Jews

⁷⁷ Hitler, 351.

⁷⁸ “Nazi Reassure Arabs – Antisemitism Confined to Jews, Spokesman Explains,” *New York Times*, November 5, 1942. Quoted in Andrew G. Bostom, “Islamic Antisemitism – Jew Hatred in Islam,” in Andrew G. Bostom, ed., *The Legacy of Islamic Antisemitism: From Sacred Texts to Solemn History* (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2008), 31.

⁷⁹ Johann von Leers, “Judaism and Islam as Opposites,” trans. Steven Rendall, in Andrew G. Bostom, ed., *The Legacy of Islamic Antisemitism: From Sacred Texts to Solemn History* (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2008), 621.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, 620.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*

that the Muslims of Arabia did, “today we would have no Jewish question. . . . As a religion Islam has performed the immortal service of preventing the Jews from carrying out their threatened conquest of Arabia and of defeating the dreadful doctrine of Jehovah through a pure faith that opened the way to higher culture for many peoples and gave them an education and humane training, so that still today a Muslim who takes his religion seriously is one of the most worthy phenomena in this world in turmoil.”⁸² Defeating the “doctrine of Jehovah” – defeating the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob – entails eliminating the absolute prohibition against murder. “Pure faith” is pure, fanatic commitment to the Jihadist creed, at all costs. For example, the Muslim who today takes her “religion seriously,” as prescribed in Article Eighteen of the Hamas Charter, is the mother who lays her child on the sacrificial altar of homicide.⁸³ Thus, both the Nazi and the jihadist are amazed at this “most worthy” phenomenon. Thus, we see that for murder to be raised to the level of martyrdom, hatred must be raised to the level of nobility: that is the meaning of fanaticism, both Nazi and Jihadist.

Here we must make a distinction among the terms *fanaticism*, *extremism*, and *fundamentalism*. Whereas fanaticism is central to the genealogy of evil, extremism and fundamentalism may be central to overcoming evil. “The question is not whether we will be extremists,” Martin Luther King, Jr., put it, “but what kind of extremists will we be. Will we be extremists for hate or will we be extremists for love?”⁸⁴ Mahatma Gandhi was an extremist. Mother Teresa of Calcutta was an extremist. Both were fundamentalists, inasmuch as they invoked the fundamental teachings of their traditions to guide their actions. But neither was a fanatic. Whereas an extremist or fundamentalist is often on the fringes of a society, a fanatic is not necessarily marginal or consigned to a minority. Indeed, a fanatic can be the ruler of a country. In the Muslim world, Islamic Jihadists are no more marginal than the National Socialists were in Germany. In both cases, as in all cases,

⁸² Ibid., 622.

⁸³ See Yonah Alexander, *Palestinian Religious Terrorism: Hamas and Islamic Jihad* (Ardsey, NY: Transnational Publishers, 2002), 58.

⁸⁴ Martin Luther King, Jr., *A Testament of Hope: The Essential Writings and Speeches of Martin Luther King, Jr.*, ed. James M. Washington (New York: HarperOne, 1990), 298.

fanaticism lies not in marginality but in idolatry, an idolatry rooted in the transformation of one's ideology into an absolute and of one's ego into a god. It lies in succumbing to the most ancient of temptations—namely, to be as god, not just knowing but determining good and evil.

However, the god that the fanatic would become is not the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, the God who is “compassionate and gracious, slow to anger, abundant in loving kindness and truth,” and so on (Exodus 34:5–7). No, it is the false, idolatrous god, for whom power is the only reality and weakness is the only sin. It is the god of National Socialism and of Islamic Jihadism. If a Muslim is to believe the teaching from the Quran that says, “Do not be driven by hatred of any people” (5:11), then the fanatical hatred that leads to the idolatry of Islamic Jihadism is a rebellion against Allah. In the case of National Socialism, the fanaticism that characterizes Nazi idolatry can be seen in statements from Hitler, such as “Today I believe that I am acting in accordance with the will of the Almighty Creator: *by defending myself against the Jew, I am fighting for the work of the Lord.*”⁸⁵ Further, it can be seen in Jihadist pronouncements such as Khomeini's *Kashf al-Asrar* (*Key to the Secrets*, 1942): “Islam says: Kill all the unbelievers. . . . Islam says: Kill in the service of Allah.”⁸⁶ Haj Amin al-Husseini's expression of the Jihadists' defining principle again springs to mind: “Slaughter Jews wherever you find them! Their spilled blood pleases Allah!” Once more we see that, in the discourse of the Jihadists, murder equals righteousness.

The Demonization of the Jew

In 1936, Julius Streicher, the notorious Nazi publisher of *Der Stürmer*, declared that whoever fights the Jew fights the devil, and whoever masters the devil conquers heaven: to get rid of the Jews, in other words, is to assail heaven and thus get rid of the Holy One, which was the Nazis' ultimate aim.⁸⁷ Indeed, the usurpation of God is the

⁸⁵ Hitler, 65.

⁸⁶ Quoted by Taheri, 242.

⁸⁷ Cited in Emil L. Fackenheim, *Jewish Philosophers and Jewish Philosophy*, ed. Michael L. Morgan (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996), 122.

aim of every fanatic. As the fanatic makes himself into a god, so he makes his enemy into the devil and therefore the most heinous of all threats to humanity, as Hitler did: if “the Jew is victorious over the other peoples of the world,” he wrote, “his crown will be the funeral wreath of humanity.”⁸⁸ Likewise, Khomeini declared that the Jews and Zionism are the enemies not just of Islam but of all humanity.⁸⁹ His ideological predecessor Maududi referred to world Jewry as “the devil” that threatens all humanity,⁹⁰ and for Sayyid Qutb, the Jews were “the blackest devil and source of the worst anti-Islamic machinations.”⁹¹ When it comes to the Islamic fight against the devil, no weapon is over the line: there is no “line,” nuclear or otherwise.

Fighting the devil, Hitler argued, requires “*firm belief in the right to apply even the most brutal weapons,*” and such a belief “*is always bound up with the existence of a fanatical faith in the necessity of the victory of a revolutionary new order on this earth.*”⁹² In keeping with the fanatical faith that Hitler summoned is Osama bin Laden’s reply to a question in an interview aired on the Qatari television network Al-Jazeera in December 1998. When asked if he is seeking nuclear weapons, he answered, “There is a Muslim duty to acquire them,”⁹³ a position shared by Jihadist ideologue Muhammad Khayr Hayhal, as he stated in 1993.⁹⁴ Both for a Nazi and for a Jihadist, the reaction to Ahmadinejad’s assertion that once Iran has a nuclear weapon, it will wipe the “Zionist regime” off the map is not horror – it is delight.⁹⁵ In that delight lies the evil that shapes and links the two ideologies. It is a delight that leads people to dance in the streets and pass out candy to children whenever Jews and “Crusaders” are murdered, as has often happened in capitals throughout the Muslim world.⁹⁶

⁸⁸ Hitler, 65.

⁸⁹ Khomeini, 195.

⁹⁰ Maududi, Vol. 2, 62–63.

⁹¹ Quoted in Nettler, 28.

⁹² Hitler, 533.

⁹³ Bin Laden, 72.

⁹⁴ Cook, 126.

⁹⁵ See BBC News, “Iran Leader’s Comments Attacked,” 27 October 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4378948.stm.

⁹⁶ See, for example, “Fanatical Muslims Celebrate the Death of Jews and Christians” at http://www.standingwithisrael.org/synapse/homepage/view.cfm?Edit_id=36&website=standingwithisrael.org.

“The Zionist Entity”

The attack on Zionists and Zionism is also part of the discourse of National Socialist ideology that fueled Islamic Jihadism from the early days of the Nazi Party. As in the case of Nazi views on propaganda, here we have an influence rather than an echo. In 1921, Alfred Rosenberg published his diatribe *Der staatsfeindliche Zionismus (Zionism: Enemy of the State)*, in which he argued that Zionism is a Jewish strategy for world domination. Even prior to the formation of the Nazi Party in 1920, said Hitler, during his years in Vienna (1907–1913), he discovered the “national character of the Jews” – that is, their true evil – “in the Zionists.”⁹⁷ As though writing the script for Islamic Jihadists, he asserted, “While the Zionists try to make the rest of the world believe that the national consciousness of the Jew finds its satisfaction in the creation of a Palestinian state, the Jews again slyly dupe the dumb *Goyim*. It doesn’t even enter their heads to build up a Jewish state in Palestine for the purpose of living there; all they want is a central organization for their international world swindle.”⁹⁸ Therefore, “the Jewish state,” according to the Führer, “is completely unlimited as to territory.”⁹⁹ Thus, the measures taken to oppose the Jewish state must be equally unlimited.

Repeating the Nazis’ representation of the Zionist movement, which he must surely have gathered from Berlin’s Arabic-language broadcasts, Sayyid Qutb viewed the Jewish state as just a small part of a “universal Zionist conspiracy; indeed, like Hitler, he took Marxism and Zionism to be part of a single conspiracy.”¹⁰⁰ A familiar image employed by Nazi propagandists to illustrate the Zionist threat shows an octopus with its deadly tentacles wrapped around the entire globe and a Star of David inscribed on its head. The same image can be found among many of the Jihadist illustrations of “nefarious world Zionism.”¹⁰¹

⁹⁷ Hitler, 56.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, 325.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, 301.

¹⁰⁰ See Nettler, 49, 55.

¹⁰¹ For examples of these images, see the article “New Antisemitism,” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/New_antisemitism.

It is important to keep in mind that by the term *Zionism*, Nazis and Jihadists both have in mind much more than the establishment of a Jewish state in the ancient Jewish homeland. They take the Zionist discourse of haven and homeland to be nothing more than a ploy in the Jewish plot to take over the world. It would seem, in fact, that the Jews have already taken over the world, for they are behind every evil in the world. When in December 1948, for example, the Muslim Brotherhood was banned in Egypt, their leader Hasan al-Banna blamed International Zionism.¹⁰² In 1950, Islamic scholar Abd al-Rahman Sami Ismat wrote, “The Jews and Zionism are like an evil tree. Its root is in New York, its branches all over the world, its leaves the Jews – all of them, old and young, male and female, without exception, are its thorny leaves and poisoned thorns, and the poison is swift and deadly.”¹⁰³ Years later, Hezbollah’s Al-Manar broadcast system repeatedly “depicts the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a key part of a larger effort to halt the ‘cancer’ of Zionism,” a view espoused by Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh.¹⁰⁴ Article Thirty-Two of the Hamas Charter – or the “Charter of Allah,” as they call it – states, “After Palestine, the Zionists aspire to expand from the Nile to the Euphrates.” And: “Their plan is embodied in the ‘Protocols of the Elders of Zion.’” And: “The Islamic Resistance Movement considers itself to be the spearhead of the struggle with world Zionism.”¹⁰⁵ Once again, what is actually a Jihadist struggle to control the world is cast in terms of saving the world.

The Fight against World Jewry for the Sake of All Humanity

In these and similar statements from Islamic Jihadists, one finds echoes of another important aspect of Nazi ideology: the conviction that we are all threatened by a takeover on the part of a secret, conspiratorial, international organization of world Jewry and that only the Nazis

¹⁰² Küntzel, *Jihad and Jew-Hatred*, 54–55.

¹⁰³ Quoted in Lewis, 15.

¹⁰⁴ Jorisch, 68.

¹⁰⁵ Quoted in Dimitry Kapustyan and Matt Nelson, *The Soul of Terror: The Worldwide Conflict between Islamic Terrorism and the Modern World* (Washington, DC: International Affairs Press, 2007), 147–48.

(or the Jihadists) can save humanity. One of the central motifs in this ideological incitement of fear lies in the invisibility of the enemy who manipulates the affairs of the world. The Jew, said Hitler, is an “invisible wirepuller,”¹⁰⁶ a term that he used repeatedly.¹⁰⁷ Casting the Jew in the metaphysical terms discussed at the beginning of this chapter, the Nazi renders the Jew as invisible – and as threatening – as the devil. Rendering the Jew invisible, the Nazi transforms the Jew into a ubiquitous threat, and the effort to eradicate the evil must be equally ubiquitous. Finally, given the invisibility of the evil, one cannot be certain of its defeat until the Nazi has become the ruler of all humanity.

This hiddenness of the ominous, manipulative, Jewish evil that runs throughout National Socialist ideology is reflected in Haj Amin al-Husseini’s letter to Hitler dated 20 January 1941 in which he lamented how Palestine had been corrupted by a secret world Jewish conspiracy.¹⁰⁸ Article Twenty-Two of the Hamas Charter states that the Jews are the founders of secret societies, such as Freemasons, Rotary Clubs, Lions, and others. “They were behind World War I.” They “formed the League of Nations, through which they could rule the world.” And they replaced the League of Nations with the United Nations, “through which they could rule the world.”¹⁰⁹ Sayyid Qutb even accused Jews of secretly installing Zionists in Muslim regimes,¹¹⁰ so heinous and nefarious was this invisible menace. Echoing numerous declarations from Hitler, Sayyid Qutb averred that the aim of the invisible international world Jewry is to “eliminate all limitations, especially the limitations imposed by faith and religion, so that the Jews may penetrate into the body politic of the whole world and then may be free to perpetuate their evil designs. Among these activities is usury, the aim of which is that all the wealth of mankind end up in the hands of the Jewish financial institutions which run on interest.”¹¹¹ The one

¹⁰⁶ Hitler, 493.

¹⁰⁷ See, for example, *ibid.*, 523, 526.

¹⁰⁸ See Zvi Elpeleg, *The Grand Mufti: Haj Amin al-Hussaini, Founder of the Palestinian National Movement*, trans. David Harvey, ed. Shmuel Himelstein (London: Frank Cass, 1993), 59.

¹⁰⁹ Quoted in Kapustyan and Nelson, 139–40.

¹¹⁰ See Nettler, 50.

¹¹¹ Qutb, *Maalim fi al-Tariq [Milestones]*, 111.

solution to such a threat to the world? Islamic domination of all the world.

Both National Socialist and Islamic Jihadist ideologues make reference to the “world Jewish hydra”¹¹² that poisons humanity. It is not just a conspiracy: it is a *hydra*, something evil and monstrous, something that cannot be stopped, as two heads grow wherever you chop off one. Only something *holy*, only a holy war, only jihad, can oppose such evil. Further, it must be opposed with “extreme prejudice.” The name for the evil in Nazi and Jihadist ideology is not just the *Jew* – it is *Judaism*. For Jew hatred is always and everywhere a hatred of Judaism, which is precisely what defines the Jew as a Jew. When, for example, Hitler referred to “the inner grounds which cause the disease in question,”¹¹³ he is referring to Judaism – which, the Nazis maintained, is in the blood. One realizes that when Hitler referred to “blood sin,” he had in mind much more than sexual relations: “Blood sin and desecration of the race are the original sin in this world and the end of a humanity which surrenders to it.”¹¹⁴ Simply stated, the hydra-like Jew is the serpent in the garden, the original source of evil. The savior who does the work of the Lord, waging a holy war against Satan for the sake of redemption, battles the Jew. That battle is Hitler’s *Kampf*. It is, as the translator of *Mein Kampf* into Arabic describes Hitler’s “struggle,” a jihad,¹¹⁵ which is *holy*.

Holy War

Bassam Tibi correctly explains that “the Western distinction between just and unjust wars linked to specific grounds is unknown in Islam. Any war against unbelievers, whatever its immediate ground, is morally justified.”¹¹⁶ Simply stated, the distinction between just war and holy

¹¹² Hitler, 637. This image is used in an editorial cartoon in the Palestinian Authority’s newspaper *Al-Hayaat Al-Jadidah*, 2 August 2004; see <http://somebodyhelpme.info/cartoons/anti-Semitic/anti-Semitic.html>.

¹¹³ Hitler, 233.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 249.

¹¹⁵ Luis al-Haj, Introduction to Adolf Hitler, *Kafaahi*, trans. Luis Al-Haj (Beirut: Dar Baysan, 1963), 6.

¹¹⁶ Bassam Tibi, “War and Peace in Islam,” in Andrew G. Bostom, ed., *The Legacy of Jihad: Islamic Holy War and the Fate of Non-Muslims* (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2005), 329.

war is this: a just war is fought by humans who strive to adhere to divine law, whereas a holy war is fought by humans obeying a divine command. In the case of the Islamic Jihadists, part of the usurpation of the divine lies in the human presumption that the war against the Jews is a divine commandment, for in the case of the Jihadists, there is a presumption that the Jihadist ideologues' commandment *is* the divine commandment. Theirs is a holy war as determined by a human authority – which makes it most unholy. Thus we see the horror and the parallel with Nazi ideology.

As a war against evil, in which there can be neither compromise nor negotiation, the National Socialist and the Islamic Jihadist war against the Jews is a holy war. And a holy war, unlike a just war, is waged against an enemy who is other than human and who requires extermination. In other wars, one may have a certain respect for the enemy's strength, courage, and resourcefulness. Not so with the Jew. The Jew is "an ape," said Hitler,¹¹⁷ echoing the teaching from the Quran (5:60) on which the Jihadists base similar statements.¹¹⁸ Indeed, commenting on the Quran's statement that Allah changed Jews into pigs and apes (see 7:163–166), the Hamas monthly magazine *Falastin Al-Muslima* said, "The transformation was actual."¹¹⁹ Like the Father of All Lies, says Hitler, "the whole existence of this people [the Jews] . . . is based on a continuous lie."¹²⁰ Therefore, to wage holy war against the Jews is to wage war for the sake of truth. Because, in Khomeini's words, "Islam is the religion of militant individuals who are committed to truth,"¹²¹ Islamic Jihadists *must* wage war against the Jews, who by definition are committed to lies – it cannot be otherwise. For Jews, Sayyid Qutb declares, are "falsifiers of Divine Truth."¹²² If one is to love the truth and hate the lie, then Jew hatred is a mark of righteousness, "the driving impulse of a great people's movement," as Hitler put

¹¹⁷ Hitler, 302.

¹¹⁸ See, for example, the speech given by Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah on 7 May 1998, in Hassan Nasrallah, *Voice of Hezbollah: The Statements of Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah*, ed. Nicholas Noe, trans. Ellen Khouri (London: Verso, 2007), 188; see also Karsh, 103.

¹¹⁹ See Küntzel, *Jihad and Jew-Hatred*, 77.

¹²⁰ Hitler, 307.

¹²¹ Khomeini, 28.

¹²² Quoted in Nettler, 2, 7.

it.¹²³ When al-Husseini met with Hitler on 28 November 1941, he stressed that, due to their mutual hatred of Jews and their lies, the Nazis and Muslims were “natural friends.”¹²⁴ Yes, both were bent on ruling the world. But their Jew hatred was enough to overcome any fear of competition.

Here, too, the Jihadist hatred of the Jew has its roots in a metaphysical category that deems the Jew the enemy of truth and all things holy. It has nothing to do with political or territorial issues surrounding the Jewish state; least of all does it have to do with check points or the security fence. As David Dalin and John Rothman have shown, the Mufti of Jerusalem sought to “lead a holy war of Islam in alliance with Germany, a jihad that would result in the extermination of the Jews.”¹²⁵ Al-Husseini himself wrote in his memoirs, “Our fundamental condition for cooperating with Germany was a free hand to eradicate every last Jew from Palestine and the Arab world. I asked Hitler for an explicit undertaking to allow us to solve the Jewish problem in a manner befitting our national and racial aspirations and according to the scientific methods innovated by Germany in the handling of its Jews. The answer I got was: ‘The Jews are yours.’”¹²⁶ Here we have more than an echo of Nazi Ideology in Islamic Jihadism – we have an amplification of the exterminationist agenda vis-à-vis the Jews of Palestine as part of the Nazis’ Final Solution of the Jewish problem. To be sure, the Jews of Palestine may not have belonged entirely to the Mufti and the Muslims: “Since summer 1942,” according to Küntzel, “an SS special unit had been on standby in Athens, ready to implement the Shoah in Palestine in alliance with the Nazis’ Arab allies.”¹²⁷

Contrary to Samuel Huntington’s well-known thesis,¹²⁸ “a clash of civilizations” is not what primarily characterizes Islamic Jihadism in its determination to wage a holy war, any more than it is a feature

¹²³ Hitler, 561.

¹²⁴ Hirszowicz, 218.

¹²⁵ Dalin and Rothman, 5.

¹²⁶ Quoted in *ibid.*, 5–6.

¹²⁷ Küntzel, *Jihad and Jew-Hatred*, 36

¹²⁸ See Samuel Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1998).

of National Socialism. No, the defining impetus behind both is Jew hatred transformed into a sacred obligation. Both for Nazis and for Jihadists, the hatred of Western democratic forms of government lies in the association of such political systems with the Jews: if the Jihadists take themselves to be at war with a corrupt civilization, the Jew is the source of the corruption. Hitler decried representative democratic government because “only the Jew can praise an institution which is as dirty and false as he himself.”¹²⁹ Similarly, in June 1940, an Iraqi delegation went to Ankara to consult with the Turks about the situation in Europe and the Middle East. Justice Minister Naji Shawkat Bey took a personal letter of introduction dated 21 June 1940 from Haj Amin al-Husseini to Franz von Pappen, the German minister to Turkey. In it al-Husseini offered all of his aid to the Germans, saying that in Palestine he had long been “fighting the democracies and international Jewry.”¹³⁰ As a man of God, it was his duty.

Summing Up

In the foregoing discussion of National Socialist ideology and its echoes in the discourse of Islamic Jihadism, one can see a classic case of projecting the evil within oneself onto another. The Nazis’ claims about the Jews’ desire to plunge the world into war, their plotting to take over the world, and so on are all too familiar.¹³¹ In the Jihadist discourse, this projection of evil onto the Jew comes out in the allegations that the Jews have an exterminationist agenda toward the Arabs, that they are behind the 9/11 attacks, that they seek to conquer the world, that “whoever denies their religion deserves to be killed,”¹³² and even that the Jews are consumers of blood. How is this last accusation a projection of the Jihadist evil onto the Jews? On 28 November 1971, Jordan’s Prime Minister Wasfi al-Tal was assassinated by the Palestinian group Black September in front of Cairo’s Sheraton Hotel. One of the

¹²⁹ Hitler, 91.

¹³⁰ Joseph B. Schechtman, *The Mufti and the Fuehrer: The Rise and Fall of Haj Amin el-Husseini* (New York: Thomas Yoseloff, 1965), 104.

¹³¹ See, for example, Hitler, 623.

¹³² Bin Laden, 190.

assassins went over, bent down, and licked his victim's blood.¹³³ In February 2006, Hamas produced a video of a homicide bomber's final testimony to the world, in which he declared, "My message to the loathed Jews is that there is no god but Allah [and] we will chase you everywhere! We are a nation that drinks blood, and we know that there is no blood better than the blood of Jews. We will not leave you alone until we have quenched our thirst with your blood, and our children's thirst with your blood."¹³⁴ This most radical appropriation of the soul of the other person – the soul that is in the blood – is characteristic of the Jihadists' radical appropriation of God. Indeed, it is done in the name of god, albeit a false god.

Episodes such as these bring to mind a rabbinic interpretation of the meaning of *Amalek*, the name of the tribe who attacked the children and the elders among the Israelites immediately upon the exodus from Egypt, a name that personifies the evil that threatens the Jews and the rest of humanity. *Amalek*, it is said, means "Am Lak," a "people" who "lick" blood.¹³⁵ Whether they lick blood or dip their hands into it, as displayed in numerous Palestinian media images, the Jihadists thrive on the blood of Jews. Recall the words of al-Husseini: "Their spilled blood pleases Allah." Jihadism not only *legitimizes* spilling Jewish blood – it *sanctifies* it in an undermining of the divine, absolute prohibition against murder (Exodus 20:13). Indeed, a defining feature of evil is that it undermines this prohibition. It was true of the Nazis, and it is true of the Jihadists, who are the ideological stepchildren of the Nazis, which means: Islam Jihadism is not a throwback to a medieval mind-set. It is as modern as National Socialism – but even more deadly.

In this chapter, we have seen both Nazi influences on Jihadism and Jihadist parallels to Nazis. In both instances, it is clear that each shares with the other the evil of exterminationist Jew hatred. Although he

¹³³ See Rubin, 37–38. Black September was formed in 1970 to avenge the Jordanian killing of several thousand Palestinians in September 1970.

¹³⁴ Itamar Marcus and Barbara Crook, "Hamas Video: 'We will drink the blood of the Jews,'" *Palestine Media Watch*, 14 February 2006, <http://www.pmw.org.il/latest%20bulletins%20new.htm#b140206>.

¹³⁵ See Moshe Weissman, ed., *The Midrash Says*, Vol. 2 (Brooklyn: Bnay Yakov Publications, 1980), 158.

uses the term *fundamentalist* in ways that I would not, Robert Wistrich sums up very well what we have demonstrated in this chapter on National Socialist ideology and its echoes in Islamic Jihadism:

Their Bible may be the *Quran* and not *Mein Kampf*, but the mental structures and world view behind their actions have striking analogies with German National Socialism. The Muslim fundamentalists – like the Nazis before and during the *Shoah* – rant against the “anonymous powers” of globalization and the plutocratic West. . . . Like their totalitarian predecessors, they (falsely) claim to speak for frustrated, underprivileged, and impoverished masses betrayed by more traditional Arab and Muslim ruling elites and ruthlessly exploited by international capitalism. . . . Anti-Semitic conspiracy theories lie at the very heart of the Muslim fundamentalist and Arab nationalist world view today – linking together plutocratic finance, international freemasonry, secularism, Zionism, and communism as dark occult forces led by the giant octopus of international Jewry – whose alleged aim is to destroy Islam and to subvert the cultural identity of Muslim believers. This mythical structure of thought is in many ways virtually identical with Nazi anti-Semitism. . . . Fundamentalist Islam has the same totalitarian, pseudo-messianic aspiration to world hegemony as German Nazism.¹³⁶

If the Jihadist Bible is the *Quran*, and not *Mein Kampf*, then the Jihadist evil transcends the Nazi evil, inasmuch as the *Quran* is *Scripture*, a revelation from God, and not just the pronouncements of the Führer, no matter how godlike he may be. Establishing a scriptural foundation for their actions, the Jihadists can justify any action. Eclipsing God, the Nazis eclipsed the absolute obligation imposed from beyond, so that the will from within posed the only limits to their actions. Appropriating God, the Jihadists appropriate the authority to impose from beyond what they have determined to be the will of Allah, which is not a matter of human will but an absolute obligation. There is, then, a difference in how this evil unfolds. That difference will become clear as we consider the ideological foundations of modern Jihadism.

¹³⁶ Wistrich, 196.

Modern Jihadist Ideological Foundations

God gave the *umma* that is skilled in the practice of death.

Hasan al-Banna, "On Jihad"

Almost always implicitly or explicitly used with the phrase *fi sabil Allah* or "in the path of Allah,"¹ the word *jihad* means "to strive in the path of Allah."² Citing the *Encyclopedia of Islam*, David Cook explains that "*jihad* consists of military action with the object of the expansion of Islam"; the explanation common among American Muslims that "jihad is entirely peaceable and represents the exertion of spiritual warfare," he adds, "is not the word's primary meaning."³ Michael Bonner notes that "several other Arabic words are closely related to *jihad* in meaning and usage. These include *ribat*, which denotes pious activity, often related to warfare. . . . *Ghazw*, *ghazwa*, and *ghaza* have to do with raiding."⁴ Then there is *qital*, which means "fighting" or "killing," as well as *harb*, the word for "war"; "*qital* in the path of

¹ Michael Bonner, *Jihad in Islamic History: Doctrine and Practices* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006), 2.

² Andrew G. Bostom, "Jihad Conquests and the Imposition of *Dhimmitude*—A Survey," in Andrew G. Bostom, ed., *The Legacy of Jihad: Islamic Holy War and the Fate of Non-Muslims* (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2005), 26–27.

³ David Cook, *Understanding Jihad* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), 2.

⁴ Bonner, 2.

God,” notes Reuven Firestone, “is virtually synonymous with *jihad*.”⁵ A Jihadist, by sacred Islamic definition, *must fight and kill in order to be righteous*.

Although the Quran has never been the only source of inspiration for jihad, it has always been the most important source. Majid Khadduri elaborates: “The term *jihad* is derived from the verb *jahada* (abstract noun, *juhd*) which means ‘exerted’; its juridical-theological meaning is exertion of one’s power in Allah’s path, that is, the spread of the belief in Allah and in making His word supreme over this world. The individual’s recompense would be the achievement of salvation, since jihad is Allah’s direct way to paradise. This definition is based on a Quranic injunction which runs as follows: ‘ . . . Believe in Allah and His Apostle and carry on warfare (*jihad*) in the path of Allah with your possessions and your persons” [61:11].⁶ Because the Quran contains numerous imperatives of this kind,⁷ a warring, killing, raiding Jihadism has been part of Islamic thinking since the advent of Islam itself.

“Muslims believe that expansion through war is not aggression but a fulfillment of the Quranic command to spread Islam as a way to peace,” explains Muslim scholar Bassam Tibi. “The resort to force to disseminate Islam is not war (*harb*), a word that is used only to describe the use of force by non-Muslims. Islamic wars are not *hurub* (the plural of *harb*) but rather *futuhats*, acts of ‘opening’ the world to Islam and expressing Islamic jihad.”⁸ Here we see a ploy that Islamic proponents of jihad share with Nazis – namely, the perversion of the meaning of a word, or the tearing of meaning from a word, to justify evil. In fact, the justification of evil always entails the tearing of meaning from the word – that is a defining feature of evil: an assault on the word

⁵ Reuven Firestone, *Jihad: The Origin of Holy War in Islam* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 18.

⁶ Majid Khadduri, “The Law of War: The Jihad,” in Andrew G. Bostom, ed., *The Legacy of Jihad: Islamic Holy War and the Fate of Non-Muslims* (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2005), 307.

⁷ Other verses in the Quran urging the believers to jihad include 2:191, 2:216, 2:217, 2:218, 4:74, 4:76, 4:95, 8:15–16, 8:39, 8:41, 8:65, 9:5, 9:29, 9:73, 9:111, 9:123, and 48:20. The Sura of Combat (47) and the Sura of Victory (48) also have extensive verses on fighting in the path of Allah. See Firestone, 60–65, 84–91.

⁸ Quoted in Bostom, “Jihad Conquests and the Imposition of *Dhimmitude* – A Survey,” 98.

as part of an assault on the sanctity of the human being. In this line of Islamic thought, if war is a means to peace, it is the peace that comes when everyone thinks alike, in keeping with the word of Allah. That notion of peace is what makes Islam the “religion of peace.” It has characterized a dominant line of Islamic teaching from the start.

Precedents for Modern Islamic Jihadism in the History of Islam

The first comprehensive treatises on the law of jihad were written by al-Awaza'i (d. 774) and Muhammad al-Shaybani (d. 804).⁹ “At the very outset,” Khadduri points out, “the law of war, the jihad, became the chief preoccupation of jurists.”¹⁰ If jihad is a “chief preoccupation of jurists,” then its justification occupies jurists who would not only legalize but sanctify the slaughter of anyone who is not a Muslim, as the Nazis did vis-à-vis the Jews. From the beginning, writes Rudolph Peters, “expansionist jihad, is a collective duty (*fard 'ala al-kifaya*). . . . The most important function of the doctrine of jihad is that it mobilizes and motivates Muslims to take part in wars against unbelievers, and it is considered to be a fulfillment of a religious duty.”¹¹ Peters points out further that although some verses in the Quran suggest that wars can be fought only in self-defense (for example, 2:190), the verses that held sway in classical Muslim interpretation were the Sword Verses: “Slay the idolaters wherever you find them, and take them, and confine them, and lie in wait for them at every place of ambush” (9:5); and “Fight those who believe not in God and the Last Day and do not forbid what God and His Messenger have forbidden – such men as practice not the religion of truth, being of those who have been given the Book – until they pay the tribute out of hand and have been humbled” (9:29).¹² A jihad that entails “humbling” the nonbeliever

⁹ See Rudolph Peters, “Jihad: An Introduction,” in Andrew G. Bostom, ed., *The Legacy of Jihad: Islamic Holy War and the Fate of Non-Muslims* (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2005), 321.

¹⁰ Majid Khadduri, *War and Peace in the Law of Islam* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1955), 63–64.

¹¹ Rudolph Peters, *Jihad in Classical and Modern Islam: A Reader* (Princeton, NJ: Markus Wiener, 1995), 3.

¹² Peters, “Jihad: An Introduction,” 321.

is a jihad that would not only claim his soul – it would crush his soul. In this attitude we find a predisposition to what would characterize a Nazi assault on the soul.

Nor was this a minority view. As Andrew Bostom has demonstrated, “within several centuries of Muhammad’s death in 632 C.E., based on the ‘proto-jihad’ campaigns he waged in Arabia, Muslim jurists and theologians formulated the uniquely Islamic institution of permanent jihad war against non-Muslims for the submission of the known world to Islam. The historical record demonstrates that this jihad war theory has been put into practice by Muslims, continuously, across the globe, for more than a millennium, through present times.”¹³ The jurists referred to thus far come from four main schools of Islamic thought: the Hanafi, founded by Abu Hanafi (699–765); the Maliki, founded by Imam Malik ibn Anas (714–96); the Shafi’i (founded by Imam Muhammad ibn Idris ash-Shafi’i (767–820); and the Hanbali, founded by Ahmad ibn Hanbal (780–855). Among the leading scholars in these schools are Maliki jurist Ibn Abi Zayd al-Qayrawani (922–96), Shafi’i jurist al-Mawardi (d. 1058), Hanafi jurist Sheikh Burhanuddin Ali of Marghinan (d. 1196), and Hanbali jurist Taqi ad-Din Ahmad ibn Taymiyyah (1263–1328) – all of whom defined and extolled jihad as holy war, despite their other differences. Drawing on their writings, the medieval Muslim sage Ibn Khaldun (1332–406) summarized the consensus opinions on jihad from the four schools of Islamic law: “In the Muslim community, the holy war is a religious duty, because of the universalism of the [Muslim] mission and [the obligation to] convert everybody to Islam either by persuasion or by force. . . . Islam is under obligation to gain power over other nations.”¹⁴ If one should ask why more Muslims do not speak against the murderous agenda of Jihadism, here we may see why: in traditional, orthodox Islam the

¹³ Bostom, “Jihad Conquests and the Imposition of *Dhimmitude* – A Survey,” 104.

¹⁴ Ibn Khaldun, *The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History*, trans. Franz Rosenthal (New York: Pantheon, 1958), 473. Hasan al-Banna invoked this support for Jihadism on the part of all four of the major schools of Islam when he made his case for the Muslim Brotherhood’s pursuit of their murderous program; see Hasan al-Banna, *Five Tracts of Hasan al-Banna: A Selection from the Majmuat Rasail al-Imam al-Shahid Hasan al-Banna*, trans. Charles Wendell (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), 146–51.

promotion of Jihadism is not heresy.¹⁵ On the contrary, it is among the loftiest expressions of piety.

Jihadism is traditionally viewed as the central means to the all-encompassing rule that Islam is destined to attain. This universal hegemony is a key component of the Muslim doctrine of *tawhid*, or the oneness of God, as reflected in the oneness of the outlook of humanity, with no tolerance for anything other than a Muslim worldview. The oneness of God equals the oneness of a strict conformity with Islam, and there lies the Jihadist appropriation and usurpation of God. In the previous chapter, we saw that Islamic Jihadism and National Socialism shared this universalist view, just as they share this eclipse of the Holy One. Wherever there is a universalist view that all humanity should follow a single path, there is a justification of murder, the prohibition of which is what defines the authority of the Holy One. In short, given the Jihadists' merging of religion and politics into one, their insistence on *tawhid* amounts to an abrogation of the prohibition against murder and an appropriation of God Himself. "Islam reckons itself to be a world-wide religion, and a universal system," wrote Sayyid Qutb, and it is incumbent upon Muslims to "establish its universal aims" through war.¹⁶ In an appropriation of the divine authority, both the Nazi and the Jihadist define greatness in terms of conquest rather than kindness, as when Qutb asserted that the "spiritual greatness" of Islam is "shown in the conquest" of various empires,¹⁷ a conquest that is above all ideological.

Just as the major schools of law espouse jihad, so do the major collections of Hadith, those texts containing oral traditions and teachings based on the words and deeds of the Prophet. The earliest known composer of Hadith texts is Abdallah ibn al-Mubarak (d. 797), the author of *Writings on Jihad (Kitab al-jihad)*, which "documents the evolution

¹⁵ Ahmad S. Moussalli claims, however, that "the fundamentalists, especially Qutb and al-Banna, have offered an untraditional, new, comprehensive interpretation of Islam." If it can be said to be new, the newness lies in the accent placed upon the political, and not just the religious, authority of Islam. See Ahmad S. Moussalli, *Radical Islamic Fundamentalism: The Ideological and Political Discourse of Sayyid Qutb* (Beirut: American University of Beirut, 1992), 222.

¹⁶ Sayyid Qutb, *Social Justice in Islam*, trans. John B. Hardie (New York: Octagon Books, 1963), 167–68.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 142.

of the Muslim conception of warfare.”¹⁸ Although there are numerous collections of tales and teachings on the Prophet, the six major collections that comprise the Hadith are Sahih al-Bukhari, compiled by Muhammad ibn Ismail al-Bukhari (810–870); Sahih Muslim, collected by Muslim ibn al-Hajjaj (821–875); Sunan Abu Daud, gathered by Abu Daud al-Sijistani (817–888); Sunan al-Tirmidi, put together by Eesa Muhammad ibn Eesa al-Tirmidi (824–892); Sunan Ibn Majah, collected by Muhammad ibn Yazid ibn Majah (824–887); and Sunan al-Nasai, compiled by Ahmad ibn al-Nasai (829–915). “All six,” writes David Cook, “accord a prominent place to jihad.”¹⁹ In the Hadith of al-Bukhari, for example, it is written, “The Prophet said: No slave [of God] who dies and has goodness with God wants to return to the world, even if he would have the world and all that is in it, except the martyr (*illa al-shahid*), for when he sees the greatness of martyrdom (*faal al-shahada*), he will want to return to the world and be killed again”²⁰ – killed again, that is, in the act of killing for Allah. For “he who dies without fighting or believing in [the merit of] fighting,” says the Hadith of al-Bukhari, “dies as a kind of dissenter.”²¹ These texts are second only to the Quran as authoritative sources on what to believe and how to live.

Bonner points out that “in the hadith, [there] is a central theme of the jihad, namely *the propagation of the Faith through combat*. Islam must be brought to the entire world. . . . This fighting and spreading of the faith will continue until the end of the world as we know it.”²² This teaching has its roots in the Quran, where it is written, “Fight them, till there is no persecution and the religion is God’s entirely” (8:39). Here “persecution” refers to the presence of any form of rule that is not Islamic because only Islamic rule can be a just rule. Muslim scholar Khaleel Mohammed explains further that the Hadith is the primary source of the most anti-Semitic Islamic teachings,²³ so much so that, based on the Hadith alone, Jew hatred would appear to be a

¹⁸ Cook, 14.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 16–17.

²⁰ Quoted in Firestone, 100.

²¹ Quoted in *ibid.*, 101.

²² Bonner, 49.

²³ Khaleel Mohammed, “Antisemitism in Islamic Texts and Traditions,” lecture given at The University of Memphis, 14 March 2007.

fundamental tenet of Islam. In the Hadith, for example, we find the teaching that “the last hour would not come unless the Muslims will fight against the Jews and the Muslims would kill them until the Jews would hide themselves behind a stone or a tree and a stone or a tree would say: Muslim, or the servant of Allah, there is a Jew behind me; come and kill him” (*Sahih Muslim*, Book 41, Number 6985).²⁴

Many other Islamic sources, both classical and modern, demonstrate the justification of Jihadism as an absolute duty and a defining feature of Islam. In his *al-Muwatta* (*The Approved*), for instance, Malik ibn Anas (715–95) wrote, “Someone who does jihad in the way of Allah is like someone who fasts and prays constantly (21.1.1).”²⁵ In *Bidayat al-Mudjtahid* (*The Distinguished Jurist’s Primer*), the great Muslim sage Averroes (1128–1198) said that, on the basis of the Quran (2:216), jihad is compulsory.²⁶ The great scholar Ibn Qudama (1147–1223) wrote that jihad “is an obligatory social duty (*fard-kiefaya*).”²⁷ Especially influential in Jihadist movements – he is quoted, for example, in the al-Qaeda Manual²⁸ – Ibn Taymiyyah cited Muhammad, saying, “The devotional journey of my community is jihad.”²⁹ Jihad, said Ibn Taymiyyah, “is the finest thing in this world and the next, and to neglect it is to lose this world and the next. . . . This means: either victory and triumph or martyrdom and paradise.”³⁰ To be sure, among the manifestos of Islamic Jihadism, Ibn Taymiyyah is the most frequently cited of all the medieval Muslim sages. One point must, however, be kept in mind: Islamic Jihadism in its modern mode is

²⁴ Quoted in David Aaron, *In Their Own Words: Voices of Jihad* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2008), 43–44.

²⁵ Andrew G. Bostom, “Muslim Theologians and Jurists on Jihad: Classical Writings,” in Andrew G. Bostom, ed., *The Legacy of Jihad: Islamic Holy War and the Fate of Non-Muslims* (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2005), 141.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 147.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 162.

²⁸ Al-Qaeda Manual, in Walter Laqueur, ed., *Voices of Terror* (New York: Reed Press, 2004), 405.

²⁹ Bostom, “Muslim Theologians and Jurists on Jihad: Classical Writings,” 168. Ibn Taymiyyah promoted the doctrine of *tawhid*, or God’s Oneness, the purification of Islam through the eradication of all beliefs and customs alien to Islamic scriptures and laws, and a literalist interpretation of the Quran and Sharia. He opposed Sufism (Islamic mysticism), and he cursed Christianity. He preached the importance of the Muslim’s reward in the afterlife. He had a strong influence on Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab al-Tamini, founder of Wahhabism.

³⁰ Quoted in Aaron, 46.

shaped as much by National Socialism as it is by Ibn Taymiyyah. Ibn Taymiyyah did not preach total annihilation of the Jewish people. Still, just as the Nazis could quote Martin Luther, the Jihadists can quote Ibn Taymiyyah without editing.

Of course, he is not the only medieval Muslim whose words lend themselves to the justification of murder under the guise of jihad. In the *Hidayah (Guidance)* Sheikh Burhanuddin Ali of Marghinan (1135–1196) asserted that jihad “is established as a divine ordinance, by the word of God, who said in the Quran, ‘Slay the infidels,’ and also by saying of the Prophet, ‘War is permanently established until the Day of Judgment.’”³¹ Then there is the proclamation of the Persian Muhammad al-Amili (1547–1621) in his manual of Shia law *Jami'-I 'Abbasi: Yakdawrah-I Fiqh-I Farsi* that “jihad against followers of other religions, such as Jews, is required unless they convert to Islam.”³² Further, the “1915 Ottoman Fatwa” reads, “The slaying of one unbeliever in public or private shall be called an additional life of Islamism, and will be well recompensed by God.”³³ Here, too, we may have the seeds of extermination, but the exterminationist Jew hatred that characterizes Jihadism in its modern mode had yet to fully emerge.

On the basis of this history of Islamic teachings, one might conclude that modern Islamic Jihadism is neither a revisionist nor a reformist movement – it is a revivalist movement. Where Jews were concerned, however, the Nazi influence removed the option to convert that al-Amili allows. As Lawrence Wright points out, moreover, “the Quran explicitly states that Muslims shall not kill anyone, except as punishment for murder.”³⁴ And so we may ask: is Islamic Jihadism, after all, a reform movement within Islam, a movement informed by the Nazis’ distinctively modern mode of thought?³⁵ However, if Islamic Jihadism is in fact deeply influenced by National Socialism, as I maintain, it is because traditional Islamic teachings provided fertile ground for that influence. Not a single Muslim cleric has ever declared the Jihadism

³¹ Bostom, “Muslim Theologians and Jurists on Jihad: Classical Writings,” 184.

³² Muhammad al-Amili, *Jami'-I 'Abbasi: Yakdawrah-I Fiqh-I Farsi*, trans. Fatemeh Masjedi (Tehran: Fars, 1980), 153.

³³ Bostom, “Muslim Theologians and Jurists on Jihad: Classical Writings,” 221.

³⁴ Lawrence Wright, *The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2006), 124.

³⁵ I owe these considerations to Israeli terrorism specialist Elliot Chodoff, who views Islamic Jihadism as a reform movement within Islam.

of the Muslim Brotherhood or al-Qaeda, for example, to be heresy. Why? Because there is no firm basis for such a declaration.

Considering these foundations of modern Islamic Jihadism, and having examined Jihadist echoes of Nazi ideology, one may wonder who is echoing whom. It turns out that, to a large extent, in the Jihadist encounter with National Socialism, what occurs is not only an incitement to a new outlook but also a reinforcement of a perennial one. As we shall see, the modern ideologues of Jihadism – chiefly Abdul Al'a Maududi, Hasan al-Banna, and Sayyid Qutb – have no trouble finding more than a millennium of Islamic teachings to justify their contempt for nonbelievers, their urging to holy war to spread Islam over the face of the earth, and their insistence that every human being, body and soul, falls under the social, political, and religious dominion of Islam.

If Islamic Jihadism is as much a political movement as it is a religious doctrine, its seeds, Ronald Nettle argues, were planted with the advent of Islam itself. “Islam’s political theology,” says Nettle, “emerged in the crucible of war against the Meccans and the Jews. On the Jewish question, Islam emerged from all this with shattered expectations and an indelibly fixed notion of the Jews as a great enemy of Muslims and their god, Allah.”³⁶ Further, “all of the various Qur’anic attitudes toward the Jews and their religion shared one central theme; in fact they were all different formulations of that theme: the Jews as arrogant renouncers and falsifiers of God’s Truth.”³⁷ What the Jihadists derive from their exposure to the Nazis is a justifying nod and an edifying behest to pursue new methods and new extremes of expressing an already ancient Jew hatred. The modern Jihadist ideologues were awash in the fuel. Adolf Hitler and Heinrich Himmler (1900–1945) simply provided the match.

Precedents for Modern Jihadist Jew Hatred

One false view on the relationship between Muslims and Jews over the ages is that in the past, the two groups were generally on good terms. Although there may have been times when Jews were allowed to live

³⁶ Ronald L. Nettle, *Past Trials and Present Tribulations: A Muslim Fundamentalist’s View of the Jews* (Oxford: Pergamon, 1987), 5.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 7.

in relative peace as second-class citizens or *dhimmis*, as when the Turks took in Jews expelled from Spain, at other times, Muslims were less than kind toward the Jews. In the Introduction, it was noted that in 627, Muhammad expelled the Jewish tribes of Banu Nadir and Banu Qainuqah from Medina and slaughtered the Banu Qurayzah, thus purging Arabia of its Jews. That hatred has been reinforced in Muslim texts throughout the centuries. Andrew Bostom has demonstrated the prominence of Jew hatred in Islam, exposing as he does the “virulently Antisemitic Qu’ranic verses *whose virulence is only amplified by the greatest classical and modern Muslim Qu’ranic commentaries* (by Tabari, Zamkshari, Baydawi, Ibn Kathir, and Suyuti, to Qutb and Maududi), *the six canonical hadith collections, and the most respected sira* (by Ibn Ishaq/Ibn Hisham, Ibn Sa’d, Waqidi, and Tabari).”³⁸ This Jew hatred found in many of Islam’s sacred writings and teachings was frequently put into practice, from ancient to modern times.

Bat Ye’or points out that during the Muslim campaign in Palestine in the 630s, “according to [the Muslim chronicler] Baladhuri (d. 892 c.e.), 40,000 Jews lived in Caesarea alone at the Arab conquest, after which all trace of them is lost.”³⁹ Yes, lost. . . . Issuing the familiar call to jihad, to take another example, Idris I engineered the massacre of Jewish communities in Morocco during his reign from 789 to 791. Under the Abbasid caliphates of Harun al-Rashid (786–809) and al-Mutawakkil (847–861) Jews and Christians were required to wear yellow patches attached to their garments or hats, setting a precedent for the ruling of Innocent III at the Fourth Lateran Council in 1215 that Jews must identify themselves by wearing a yellow badge, a policy later adopted by the Nazis. After a short period, to differentiate further between Christians and Jews, al-Rashid required the Christians to wear blue. In 850, consistent with Quranic verses associating them with Satan and hell (for example, 16:63), al-Mutawakkil decreed that Jews and Christians must attach woolen images of devils to the doors of their homes.⁴⁰ Once a people is thus demonized, murdering them is not only acceptable – it soon becomes a religious duty.

³⁸ Andrew G. Bostom, “Islamic Antisemitism – Jew Hatred in Islam,” in Andrew G. Bostom, ed., *The Legacy of Islamic Antisemitism: From Sacred Texts to Solemn History* (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2008), 165.

³⁹ Bat Ye’or, *The Decline of Eastern Christianity under Islam: From Jihad to Dhimmitude* (Madison, NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1996), 47.

⁴⁰ Bostom, “Jihad Conquests and the Imposition of *Dhimmitude* – A Survey,” 47–48.

As the Muslims extended their invasions to Spain, more of their leaders wrote more diatribes against the Jews. Ibn Hazm (994–1064), a minister in the Umayyad government under the Caliphate of Cordova, is a good example.⁴¹ Then there is Ibn Tumart (c. 1080–c. 1130), who, according to the medieval sage Abraham ibn Daud, undertook a campaign of extermination against the Jews, when he “decreed apostasy on the Jews, saying, ‘Come, and let us cut them off from being a nation; that the name of Israel may be no more in remembrance.’ Thus he wiped out every last ‘name and remnant’ of them from all his empire, from the city of Silves at the end of the world until the city of al-Mahdiya.”⁴² Other facts showing that the Muslims and Jews have not always enjoyed the best of relations include decrees ordering the destruction of synagogues in Egypt and Syria (1014, 1293, 1301), Iraq (854–9, 1344), and Yemen (1676). Jews were often forced to convert to Islam or face death, for example, in Yemen (1165 and 1678), Morocco (1275, 1465 and 1790–1792), and Baghdad (1333 and 1344).⁴³ There was also the killing of five thousand Jews in Granada in 1066, when, perfectly in keeping with Sharia, Joseph Hanagid of Granada was crucified by a Muslim mob, as well as the Almohads’ slaughter of Jewish and Christian populations in Spain and North Africa (1130–1232).

The fifteenth century brought more Muslim violence against the Jews: in 1465 Arab mobs in Fez killed thousands of Jews, and under Muslim rule of the Byzantine Empire, thousands more suffered heavily during the Ottoman jihad conquests, as well as from policies of colonization and population transfer. With regard to relations between Muslims and Jews in modern times, recall Ali Burzi Pasha’s massacre of hundreds of Jews in 1785 and Tudor Parfitt’s account of the Ottomans’ brutal oppression of the Jews of Palestine in the nineteenth century.⁴⁴ Then there is the infamous Damascus Affair of 1840, when violence against the Jews followed in the wake of the resurfacing of the ancient

⁴¹ See Gerson D. Cohen, Introduction to Abraham ibn Daud, *Sefer Ha-Qabbalah: The Book of Tradition*, trans. Gerson D. Cohen (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1967), xxx.

⁴² Abraham ibn Daud, *Sefer Ha-Qabbalah: The Book of Tradition*, trans. Gerson D. Cohen (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1967), 88.

⁴³ Bat Ye’or, *The Dhimmi* (Teaneck, NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1985), 61.

⁴⁴ Tudor Parfitt, *The Jews of Palestine* (Suffolk: Boydell Press, 1987), 168, 172–73.

blood libel.⁴⁵ There were pogroms against the Jews in Aleppo in 1853, in Damascus in 1848 and 1890, in Cairo in 1844 and 1901–1902, in Alexandria in 1870 and 1881, and in Fez in 1912. Between 1864 and 1880 more than 500 Jews were murdered in Morocco.

This oppression of the Jews would be extended to a jihad against the Christians that came to be known as the Armenian Genocide, which is seldom acknowledged as a jihad and is still denied by the Turkish government. During the reign of Sultan Abdul Hamid II (1842–1918), the Ottoman Turks massacred more than two hundred thousand Armenians between 1894 and 1896. In 1915 alone, the year of the “Ottoman Fatwa” mentioned earlier, an additional six to eight hundred thousand Armenian Christians were slaughtered. “Contemporary accounts from European diplomats make clear that these brutal massacres were perpetrated in the context of a formal jihad against the Armenians who had attempted to throw off the yoke of *dhimmitude* by seeking equal rights,” Bostom notes, adding that a report from the British embassy on the mass murders of 1894–1896 says that the perpetrators “are guided in their action by the prescriptions of the Sheri [Sharia] Law.”⁴⁶ This legalization of murder characterizes the Jihadist project and represents an assault against the absolute, divine prohibition against murder that enters the world through the Jews. One begins to understand Serge Trifkovic’s complaint that “thirteen centuries of religious discrimination, causing suffering and death of countless millions, have been covered by the myth of Islamic ‘tolerance’ that is as hurtful to the descendants of the victims as it is useless as a means of appeasing latter-day jihadists.”⁴⁷

These Jihadist movements against the Jews and other nonbelievers have something in common with modern Jihadism, which in turn has something in common with National Socialism – namely, a drive toward *purification*. Wherever the Nazis went, they were determined to make their conquered territories *Judenrein*, that is, “purified” of

⁴⁵ See Jonathan Frankel, *The Damascus Affair: “Ritual Murder,” Politics, and the Jews in 1840* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

⁴⁶ Andrew G. Bostom, “A Modern Jihad Genocide,” in Andrew G. Bostom, ed., *The Legacy of Jihad: Islamic Holy War and the Fate of Non-Muslims* (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2005), 522.

⁴⁷ Serge Trifkovic, *The Sword of the Prophet: Islam: History, Theology, Impact on the World* (Boston: Regina Orthodox Press, 2002), 127.

the Jews. In a similar manner and under the doctrine of tawhid, the Jihadists sought to purify the planet of anything that did not belong to Islam. In both cases, any other point of view was regarded not only as mistaken but as contaminating: therefore, it had to be eradicated through jihad. In the modern era, the two most notorious purification movements in Islam are Wahhabism and Salafism.

Wahhabism was founded in 1744 by Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab al-Tamini (1703–1792), with the stated objective of purifying Islam of (1) pre-Islamic pagan practices, (2) Muslim scholasticism, and (3) the mystic teachings of the Sufis.⁴⁸ Heavily influenced by the teachings of Ibn Taymiyyah and the Hanbali school, it continues to have a huge impact on purist Jihadist movements of today. Wahhabism is the predominant form of Islam in Saudi Arabia, a country that funds the vast majority of Muslim institutions throughout the Western world. Forming the basis of Wahhabism is Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab's *Book of Unity* (*Kitab at-tawhid*), so that the movement is known among its adherents as a "call to unity," a unity under which all people think alike and all follow a single path: the path of Islam. One important point to keep in mind is that ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab was among the first Jihadists to attach a political significance to his teaching, drawing the movement from the spiritual realm into the realm of power struggle – a natural move for Jihadism. In the spiritual and political interests of Islam, and in keeping with Jihadism, he insisted that all unbelievers be put to death and that Paradise was guaranteed to any Muslim who died in that effort.

Building on the principles of Wahhabism, Salafism emerged in the mid-nineteenth century as a collective movement, rather than at the instigation of a single individual. Among its key figures are Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1839–1897), Muhammad Abduh (1849–1905), and Rashid Rida (1865–1935), all of whom were among the modern intellectuals at the renowned Al-Azhar University in Cairo and all of whom had a powerful impact on the Jihadist movements of the twentieth century. Deriving their name from the word *salaf*, which means "pious ancestor," the Salafists are purists who maintain that only the first three generations of Islamic scholars are authoritative. Like the Wahhabis,

⁴⁸ Christina Phelps Harris, *Nationalism and Revolution in Egypt: The Role of the Muslim Brotherhood* (The Hague: Mouton & Co., 1964), 112–13.

they are literalists in their interpretation of the Quran, Hadith, Sunna, and Sharia. They promote the reestablishment of the Caliphate and are opposed to modern democratic forms of government that allow tolerance of other religions. Thus they prepare the soil for the emergence of the Nazi-like Jihadist ideologues of the twentieth century, for whom “shirking the quest for governmental power (*hukm*) is an ‘Islamic crime’ (*jarima islamiyya*).”⁴⁹ The first of the most significant modern Jihadist ideologues is Abdul Al'a Maududi.

Abdul Al'a Maududi (1903–1979)

Deemed “the founder of modern Islamism,”⁵⁰ Abdul Al'a Maududi was born in Aurangabad, India, on 25 September 1903. By 1918, he was working as a journalist contributing to an Urdu newspaper. In 1920, he moved to New Delhi, where he assumed the editorship of the newspaper *Muslim*. From the first book he published in 1930, he pushed the concept of jihad not just as a religious duty but as a political idea, with all the ramifications of seizing government control and ruling over all aspects of society.⁵¹ Declaring of himself that “on seeing a *hadith*, I can tell whether the Holy Prophet could or could not have said it,” he placed himself at the pinnacle of the Islamic world: he *was* Islam, and his Islam was “a universal ideology,” as he described it.⁵² Jihad, he maintained, was the key to the spread of that ideology. Jihad, therefore, must take the offensive “because the Islamic party opposes and confronts systems founded upon the principles that are contrary to Islam, and desires to destroy their power.”⁵³ On 26 August 1941 in Lahore, India, he founded Jamaat-e-Islami, a politically motivated Jihadist movement against not only the British but also the entire non-Muslim world. On that day he declared to an audience of seventy-five followers, “The Message of Islam is meant for the whole of mankind

⁴⁹ Richard P. Mitchell, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 308.

⁵⁰ Ruthven Malise, *A Fury for God: The Islamist Attack on America* (London: Granta, 2004), 68.

⁵¹ See Jason Burke, *Al-Qaeda: Casting a Shadow of Terror* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2003), 47–48.

⁵² Laurent Murawiec, *The Mind of Jihad* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 263.

⁵³ Abdul Al'a Maududi, *Al-Jihad fi al-Islam* (Damascus, 1984), 54; quoted in Cook, 101.

and whatever relates to human life necessarily concerns Islam as well. Hence the Islamic movement is universal in nature.” He followed this statement with a call for worldwide jihad.⁵⁴

What that call means he explains elsewhere:

Islam is a revolutionary ideology and program which seeks to alter the social order of the whole world and rebuild it in conformity with its own tenets and ideal. . . . Jihad refers to that revolutionary struggle and utmost exertion which the Islamic party brings into play to achieve this objective. . . . Islam wishes to destroy all states and governments on the face of the earth which are opposed to the ideology and program of Islam. . . . The purpose of Islam is to set up a State on the basis of its own ideology and programme, regardless of which Nation assumes the role of the standard bearer of Islam or the rule of which nation is undermined in the process of the establishment of an ideological Islamic State. Islam is not merely a religious creed or compound name for a few forms of worship, but a comprehensive system which envisages to annihilate all tyrannical and evil systems in the world.”⁵⁵

And this is for the sake of all humanity: “What the communist utopia desired . . . , what Nazism wanted . . . , Maududi’s Islam equally called forth. All evils shall disappear, harmony will prevail, all troubles will vanish. God’s kingdom will be realized on earth,”⁵⁶ as a ubiquitous Islamic kingdom.

Similar to the vision for National Socialism promulgated by Hitler, for whom he had immense admiration,⁵⁷ Maududi insisted that “the objective of the Islamic Jihad is to eliminate the rule of a non-Islamic system and establish in its stead an Islamic system of state rule. Islam does not intend to confine this revolution to a single State or a few countries; the aim of Islam is to bring about a universal revolution.”⁵⁸ Further: “Islam wants the whole earth and does not content itself with only a part thereof. It wants and requires the entire inhabited world.”⁵⁹ What does it want from the entire inhabited world? Subservient compliance and lockstep obedience. Until that happens, the religion of

⁵⁴ Abdul Al’a Maududi, *Selected Speeches and Writings*, Vol. 1, trans. S. Zakir Aijaz (Karachi: International Islamic Publishers, 1981), 5.

⁵⁵ Abdul Al’a Maududi, *Jihad in Islam* (Lahore: Islamic Publications, 2001), 8–10.

⁵⁶ Murawiec, 266.

⁵⁷ See Sayyed Abdul Al’a Maududi, *The Process of Islamic Revolution*, 2nd ed. (Lahore: Urdu Type Press, 1955), 25.

⁵⁸ Quoted in Laqueur, 398.

⁵⁹ Quoted in Malise, 71.

peace will brook no peace. To be sure, it is not enough to conquer the non-Islamic world; it must be degraded, just as the Nazis degraded the Jews: "Jihad applies to all those efforts that are made to degrade the word of kufr and to exalt the Word of Allah."⁶⁰ This degradation, of course, includes the use of propaganda to incite what Hitler called "wrathful hatred."

Now a Jihadist political party in Pakistan, Maududi's movement has branches known as Jamaat-e-Islami Hind and Jamaat-e-Islami Bangladesh, as well as in Southern and Southeast Asia. Its spread demonstrates that Islamic Jihadism is not just an Arab Muslim phenomenon but one that extends throughout the Muslim world. Issuing a call to political action with the aim of establishing the Islamic rule of the world, Maududi proclaimed that "Islam arose in Mecca as an ideological movement,"⁶¹ that is, as an all-encompassing Weltanschauung which, by definition, demands world domination. Like National Socialism, Maududi's Jihadism is Manichean. Dividing existence into two distinct realms, he invokes the German Manichean metaphor, saying, "This is an age of storm and stress [cf. German *Sturm und Drang*] in which two ideologies [Muslim and non-Muslim] are at daggers with each other. This conflict has already assumed serious proportions involving the entire world."⁶² His writings carried substantial weight for all the Jihadist ideologues who followed him.

In a tone reminiscent of the Nazi adulation of the State as the ultimate realization of *Geist* or Spirit, Maududi advanced the Islamic state as the embodiment of the Umma [Volk] and of the word of Allah. For Maududi, "the law of the Islamic state is divine law,"⁶³ so that, as in the Nazi state, there can be no unjust law in the Islamic state. To be sure, Maududi conjures up the next best thing to the word of Allah, the Bukhari Hadith, saying, "The State shall have to be heard and shall have to be obeyed, in adversity and in prosperity, whether it is pleasant or unpleasant to do so" (*Bukhari*).⁶⁴ Once again, in a tone

⁶⁰ Quoted in Aaron, 58.

⁶¹ Abdul Al'a Maududi, *First Principles of the Islamic State*, trans. and ed. Khurshid Ahmad (Lahore, Pakistan: Islamic Publications, 1960), 50.

⁶² Abdul Al'a Maududi, *Selected Speeches and Writings*, Vol. 2, trans. S. Zakir Aijaz (Karachi: International Islamic Publishers, 1981), 131.

⁶³ See Moussalli, 151.

⁶⁴ Maududi, *First Principles of the Islamic State*, 71.

reminiscent of the Nazis: “In other words, the order of the State, be it palatable or unpalatable, easy or arduous, shall have to be obeyed under all circumstances.”⁶⁵ Hence Maududi’s idolatrous deification of the state, a move that would be repeated among all the Jihadist ideologues. Thus, the freedom championed by the Jihadist cause: it is the freedom of the state to make it “obligatory on citizens . . . to make sacrifices of life and property,”⁶⁶ so that the ubiquitous reign of Islam, under the doctrine of tawhid, may be attained. “To kill the enemies of Allah and to offer the infidels the choice between converting to Islam or being put to death,” Amir Taheri states it, “is the duty of every individual believer, as well as the supreme – if not the sole – task of the Islamic state.”⁶⁷ That end justifies every means, including the sacrifice not only of one’s own life but also the lives of one’s children who have not yet attained the flower of life.

Under the doctrine of tawhid, the establishment of such a state requires the absolute allegiance – in other words, the absolute enslavement – of its subjects. “A state-system based on belief in the sovereignty of God,” says Maududi, “requires for its successful working a special type of individual mass-character and a peculiar mental attitude.”⁶⁸ Indeed! Hence such a form of Islamic government “can be achieved only when the society has already been developed in accordance with all the revolutionary teachings of Islam,” so that central to the formation of such a society is a massive campaign of propaganda and brainwashing.⁶⁹ As shown in the previous chapter, the purpose of propaganda is to incite “wrathful hatred” through “the most insolent lies.” Given this prerequisite for the governance of the Islamic state, “all persons who have been trained for running the affairs of secular states and whose moral and mental training has been undertaken in the spirit which permeates every activity of the secular state are totally unfit for an Islamic state.”⁷⁰ In fact, “their [non-Jihadists’] existence in such a state is a challenge to the principles on which it claims to

⁶⁵ Ibid., 72.

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ Amir Taheri, *Holy Terror: Inside the World of Islamic Terrorism* (Bethesda, MD: Adler & Adler, 1987), 16–17.

⁶⁸ Maududi, *The Process of Islamic Revolution*, 17.

⁶⁹ Maududi, *First Principles of the Islamic State*, 57.

⁷⁰ Maududi, *The Process of Islamic Revolution*, 18.

rest.”⁷¹ From this premise, we come to the logical conclusion that they should not exist: their very existence is a crime, a status that the Nazis imposed on the Jews. Thus, the Jihadist opposition to the Jews, as articulated by Maududi, had nothing to do with the Zionist movement or the plight of the Palestinians. Rather, he said, “we are of course opposing the Jews to fulfill the demands of our faith and not for the sake of the Arabs.”⁷² It is the Quran, not Zion, that molds to the Jihadists’ exterminationist Jew hatred.

In its Jihadist mode, then, a defining feature of Islam lies in a demand that the Jews cease to exist. Thus we see the pattern as it develops over the course of history (a pattern that emerges not just among the Jihadists). First, the Jews are prohibited *from living among us as Jews*, as when the seventeenth-century Islamic sage Muhammad al-Amili insisted that Jews be forced to convert to Islam.⁷³ Next, Jews are prohibited *from living among us*, as when more than eight hundred thousand Jews were expelled from Muslim lands in the years following the establishment of the State of Israel.⁷⁴ Finally, Jews are prohibited *from living*, as we see from the stated agenda of Hezbollah, Hamas, and every other Islamic Jihadist group inspired by the writings of Maududi.

Maududi admired the Nazi method of addressing the Jewish Question, if not the Nazi ideology per se; still, the ideology breeds the method. Better than most Holocaust scholars even now, he understood that National Socialism sprang from certain strains of German Idealism. “The National Socialism of Germany,” he writes, “could only take root in the moral, psychological and cultural conditions which had been created by the theories of leaders of thought like Hegel, Fichte, Goethe, Nietzsche and many others including Hitler. Exactly in the same way the Islamic revolution can be brought about only when a mass movement is initiated based on the theories and conceptions of the Quran and the example and practice of Muhammad.”⁷⁵

⁷¹ Ibid., 20.

⁷² Maududi, *Selected Speeches and Writings*, Vol. 2, 271.

⁷³ See Bostom, “Muslim Theologians and Jurists on Jihad: Classical Writings,” 213.

⁷⁴ For statistics on the radical removal of Jews from Muslim lands, see “Muftism and Nazism: World War II Collaboration Documents,” EretzYisroel.org, <http://www.eretzyisroel.org/~jkatzt/nazis.html>.

⁷⁵ Maududi, *The Process of Islamic Revolution*, 25. For a detailed examination of the relation between German philosophy and National Socialism, see chapter 1 of David Patterson, *Wrestling with the Angel: Toward a Jewish Understanding of the Nazi Assault on the Name* (St. Paul, MN: Paragon House, 2006).

In keeping with the Nazi methods, Maududi espoused the careful training of the youth⁷⁶ and the establishment of an “internal police” force, much like the Gestapo, one that does not knock before it invades our personal lives.⁷⁷ This is what Maududi proposes when he advises, “There should be an institution in the State which should undertake to adjudicate in strict accordance with the Book of God and the *Sunnah* of the Prophet,”⁷⁸ that is, “adjudicate” not only what happens when you are on the street but what transpires when you are alone in your room.

Here we see as clearly as in any of the speeches of Josef Goebbels the essential, ideological connection between a propaganda machine and a program of coercion. Just as only “true Nazis” could teach in German universities, so only “true Muslims” can teach in Islamic universities.⁷⁹ “As proper education and a sound milieu [read: propaganda] are needed to guide man to the right path,” proclaims Maududi, “so also coercive force is necessary to prevent him from going astray.”⁸⁰ Guiding such an internal police state – indeed, guiding every function of the state – “a Sovereign has the undisputed right to impose his orders on all subjects of the State and the subjects are under an absolute obligation to obey them, be it willingly or unwillingly.”⁸¹ For “Sovereign” read “Führer.”

Maududi believed that “Islam is inconceivable without an organized party and no organized party is conceivable without a Chief or Ameer.”⁸² Here, as among all the Jihadist ideologues, we have the perfect statement of the *Führerprinzip*. Articulating the *Führerprinzip* in 1933, the great Nazi German philosopher Martin Heidegger asserted that “the Führer himself and he alone is the present and future German reality and its law.”⁸³ Similarly, Maududi affirmed that “laws come into existence by dint of the will of the Sovereign and place all subjects of the State under the obligation to obey them; but no law

⁷⁶ Ibid., 22.

⁷⁷ Ibid., 39.

⁷⁸ Abdul Al'a Maududi, *First Principles of the Islamic State*, 28.

⁷⁹ Maududi, *Selected Speeches and Writings*, Vol. 2, 254–55.

⁸⁰ Ibid., 17.

⁸¹ Maududi, *First Principles of the Islamic State*, 16.

⁸² Maududi, *Selected Speeches and Writings*, Vol. 1, 11.

⁸³ From the *Freiburger Studentenzeitung*, 3 November 1933; see Guenther Neske and Emil Kettering, eds., *Martin Heidegger and National Socialism*, trans. Lisa Harries (New York: Paragon, 1990), 45.

binds the Sovereign himself. . . . Whatever he does is just and nobody can question his conduct or his orders and their enforcement.”⁸⁴ Again we discover that, as in Nazi Germany, in the Jihadist Islamic state, there is no concept of an unjust law: man is justified by will alone.

For the word of the Sovereign, like the word of the Führer, is law: because his word is in keeping with the word of Allah, there is no higher law. Thus, in Jihadism we see the radical usurpation of Allah as lawgiver, a move justified, like every Jihadist move, by selectively invoking the Quran itself: “He who obeys the messenger obeys God” (4:80), and “O you who believe, obey Allah and obey his Messenger and those from among yourselves who hold authority” (4:59). Of course, the Messenger is not only Muhammad but also the Jihadist Führer. Thus, “the Head of an Islamic State is, as such, the supreme head of all,” as Maududi affirmed, head of all existence, in this world and beyond.⁸⁵ This is the thinking that would have a huge effect not only on Pakistani Jihadist movements but also on Hezbollah leaders⁸⁶ and, of course, on the leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood, beginning with its founder, Hasan al-Banna.

Hasan al-Banna (1906–1949)

Hasan al-Banna was born on 14 October 1906 in Mahmudiyya, Egypt, the eldest son of watch repairman Ahmad Bin Abdur Rahman al-Banna, who was a Hanbalite Sunni. At the age of thirteen, he participated in demonstrations against British rule and, already enthralled by a purist approach to Islam, founded The Society for the Prevention of the Forbidden. In 1923, he entered the Dar al-Ulum teacher’s college in Cairo, from which he graduated in July 1927. Al-Banna founded the Muslim Brotherhood (*Jam'iyyat al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin*) in March 1928 in the presence of six other men devoted to the cause: Hafiz 'Abd al-Hamid, Ahmad al-Misri, Fu'ad Ibrahim, 'Abd al-Rahman Hasab Allah, Isma'il 'Izz, and Zaki al-Mughrabi. Al-Banna remembers

⁸⁴ Maududi, *First Principles of the Islamic State*, 17. As Ruthven Malise has already noted, Maududi’s ideology “had more than a hint of *Führerprinzip* about it”; see Malise, 69.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 35.

⁸⁶ See Taheri, 132.

the occasion, saying, “We determined in solemn oath that we shall live as brethren, work for the glory of Islam and launch *Jihad* for it.”⁸⁷ Their creed was: “Allah is our goal, the prophet our model, the Koran our constitution, and Jihad our path and death for the sake of Allah the loftiest of our wishes.”⁸⁸ Their emblem was a Quran situated between two scimitars,⁸⁹ with the swords signifying jihad, which is the Brotherhood’s defining category. The meaning? For the believer, it is Islam *through* the sword; for the nonbeliever, it is Islam *or* the sword.

In late 1942 or early 1943, al-Banna created the al-Nizam al-Khass, or “Special Section,” to serve as the military arm of the Brotherhood, which, like the SA (Sturmabteilung), was entrusted with the enforcement of the party line; in 1943 they added the al-Jihaz al-Sirri, or “Secret Apparatus,” which, like the Gestapo, was above all accountability.⁹⁰ Al-Nizam al-Khass carried out numerous acts of terrorism, such as the murder of Egypt’s Prime Minister al-Nuqrashi in 1948 and the 1952 burning of Jewish institutions in Cairo, thus fulfilling their jihad obligation. The killing of al-Nuqrashi provoked the assassination of al-Banna himself on 12 February 1949 in Cairo. The assassins were members of King Farouk’s secret police. Thus, al-Banna earned the title of *Shahid*, or “Martyr,” a word that, like its Greek root *murtus*, means “witness.”

From the beginning, the Muslim Brotherhood has proved to be the most successful, most influential of all the modern Islamic Jihadist groups; indeed, it has deep ties with most of the Jihadist organizations operating in the world today. From the beginning, they emulated the Nazis, as Jeffrey Herf has demonstrated: on 23 February 1945, he points out, the British Political Intelligence Centre Middle East issued a report on the Muslim Brotherhood. It found that Hasan al-Banna had “made a careful study of the Nazi and Fascist organizations. Using them as a model, he has formed organizations of specially trained and trusted men who correspond respectively to the Brown Shirts and Black Shirts.” J. E. Jacobs from the American Embassy in Cairo also

⁸⁷ Hasan al-Banna, *Memoirs of Hasan al Banna Shahid*, trans. M. N. Shaikh (Karachi: International Islamic Publishers, 1981), 142.

⁸⁸ Matthias Küntzel, *Jihad and Jew-Hatred: Islamism, Nazism and the Roots of 9/11*, trans. Colin Meade (New York: Telos Press, 2007), 14.

⁸⁹ Harris, 149–50.

⁹⁰ Mitchell, 32.

had similar findings about the Ikhwan.⁹¹ With regard to the National Socialist influence on al-Banna's nationalism, Yisrael Neeman points out that "in the tract 'Our Mission' under the heading *The Characteristics of Arabdom* he at first tries not to degrade other peoples for not being Arabs but insists that Arab traits should be adopted 'as a means of realizing the foremost task for which every people is responsible – the renaissance of humanity.' To reach perfection the world must be Arab/Moslem."⁹² Thus we see yet another branch in this genealogical tree of evil.

The Brotherhood established relations with Palestine in 1935, when Hasan's brother Abd-al-Rahman al-Banna met with Haj Amin al-Husseini in Jerusalem. Ten years later, after having formed killing units of tens of thousands of Muslims for the Nazi SS, al-Husseini would declare, "I believe in the Muslim Brotherhood as they are the troops of God who shall defeat the troops of Satan."⁹³ During the Palestinian revolt of 1936, the Brotherhood carried out propaganda campaigns for the Arab rebels. From 1936 to 1938, its membership rose from 800 to 200,000. By 1948, they numbered half a million, with at least as many sympathizers in the Arab Muslim world; there were forty thousand in their paramilitary wing alone. Branches of the Brotherhood were set up in Lebanon (1936), Syria (1937), and Transjordan (1946). Said Ramadan opened the Brotherhood's first branch in Jerusalem on 26 October 1945, and by 1947, there were some two dozen offices operating in Palestine. By 1952, they had fifty branches in the Sudan,⁹⁴ the population of which would later be subjected to Omar al-Bashir's genocidal program of Islamization. Al-Bashir, of course, is a follower of the Ikhwan.

Among the Jihadist thinkers who had the most profound influence on al-Banna were the founder of Wahhabism Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab al-Tamini and Salafists Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and Rashid Rida, all of whom embraced Jihadism as the path to the purification of Islam. For al-Banna, this meant, among other things, liberation "from all un-Islamic or foreign control, whether political, economic,

⁹¹ Jeffrey Herf, *Nazi Propaganda for the Arab World* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2009), 225–26.

⁹² Yisrael Neeman, "Jihad in Hasan al-Banna's Worldview," unpublished, 2.

⁹³ Quoted in Küntzel, *Jihad and Jew-Hatred*, 37.

⁹⁴ Harris, 160.

or ideological,”⁹⁵ and a complete return to Sharia as the law of the land and ultimately of the world. In language reminiscent of Hitler’s complaint against the Jews, he said of the West, “The viper’s venom creeps insidiously into their [Muslims’] affairs, poisoning their blood and sullyng the purity of their well being.”⁹⁶ One means of purifying Islam is to subject everyone to Sharia. Thus, al-Banna demanded that certain punishments prescribed by the Sharia be restored, including whipping, stoning, amputation, and other horrific forms of punishment calculated to “deter” crime.⁹⁷ The return to Sharia above all meant “a return to the world-state of the Four Orthodox Caliphs (Al-Khulafa al-Rashidun) and, this once accomplished, an aggressive march forward to conquer the rest of the earth for God and His Sacred Law [Sharia].”⁹⁸ Why this admiration for the totalitarian Caliphate? Because, said al-Banna, beginning with the first Caliphate, the Muslims “warred against guileful Judaism” and “they struggled against Christianity,” the two main sources of the defilement of Islam and the world.⁹⁹ The primal evil, in his view, is Judaism because, he believed, it was the source of the contagion of Christianity. After all, Jesus was a Jew.

Like Maududi, al-Banna had other ideological influences. Having often expressed his admiration for Hitler,¹⁰⁰ he adopted his own version of the *Führerprinzip* and saw to it that members of the Brotherhood swore an oath of loyalty to himself as the Murshid al-'Amm or al-Murshid (“General Guide” or “Supreme Guide”), thus transforming himself into the object of the Jihadists’ idolatry.¹⁰¹ To be sure, Haj Amin al-Husseini once commented on the Führer cult surrounding al-Banna by saying, “His mastery over his followers was complete

⁹⁵ Hasan al-Banna, “The Message and the Teachings,” <http://www.youngmuslims.ca/online.library/books/tmott>.

⁹⁶ Quoted in Aaron, 117.

⁹⁷ Harris, 163.

⁹⁸ Charles Wendell, Introduction to Hasan al-Banna, *Five Tracts of Hasan al-Banna: A Selection from the Majmuat Rasail al-Imam al-Shahid Hasan al-Banna*, trans. Charles Wendell (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), 3.

⁹⁹ Al-Banna, *Five Tracts of Hasan al-Banna*, 17.

¹⁰⁰ See, for example, *ibid.*, 97.

¹⁰¹ Since al-Banna’s death in 1949, there have been six other Führers of the Muslim Brotherhood: Hassan al-Hudaybi (1949–72), Umar al-Tilmisani (1972–86), Muhammad Hamid Abu al-Nasr (1986–96), Mustafa Mashhur (1996–2002), Mamun al-Hudaybi (2002–4), and Mohammad Mahdi Akef (2004–present).

and inclusive, almost approaching sorcery.”¹⁰² As with the Nazis, the sorcery was rooted in the ideology.

As Laurent Murawiec points out, “*al-Murshid* was a notion with an old Sufi pedigree; it merged and blended with the *Duce* leading his *stato totale*, with Hitler’s *Führerprinzip*.”¹⁰³ Such allegiance, wrote al-Banna, meant “full compliance with the commands of the leadership and prompt execution of these commands in hardship and in ease, whether pleasant or unpleasant.”¹⁰⁴ Lest this declaration of the Jihadist *Führerprinzip* seem too harsh, al-Banna went on to say, “In the call of the Brotherhood, the leader has the rights of a father by virtue of his heart-warming relationship. He is like a teacher and guide because he provides the members with education and trains them spiritually. He plays the role of a commander by virtue of his political leadership. Consequently, confidence in the leadership is the cornerstone of our movement’s success.”¹⁰⁵ These words could have been spoken from the balconies of Berlin. It is not surprising that, according to former U.S. Justice Department prosecutor John Loftus, al-Banna was so persistent in his “admiration of the new Nazi Party that in the 1930s al-Banna and the Muslim Brotherhood became a secret arm of Nazi Intelligence.”¹⁰⁶ Through the Jihadist *Führer*, the eyes and ears of the German *Führer* extended well beyond the borders of the Fatherland.

It has already been pointed out that al-Banna learned much from Nazi methods of spreading propaganda against the Jews and that he urged Muslims to go forth and do likewise.¹⁰⁷ “The methods of propaganda today,” he explained, reflecting the lessons he learned from the Nazis, “are not like those of yesterday. The propaganda of yesterday consisted of a verbal message given out at a speech or a meeting, or one written in a letter. Today, it consists of publications, magazines, newspapers, articles, plays, films, and radio broadcasts. All this has made it easy to sway the minds of people, both men and women, in

¹⁰² Quoted in Mitchell, 297.

¹⁰³ Murawiec, 293.

¹⁰⁴ Al-Banna, “The Message and the Teachings.”

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

¹⁰⁶ Quoted by Robert Duncan, “Islamic Terrorism Linked to Nazi Fascists,” *Renew America* (August 15, 2006): <http://www.renewamerica.us>. See also Küntzel, *Jihad and Jew-Hatred*, 27.

¹⁰⁷ See al-Banna, *Five Tracts of Hasan al-Banna*, 45–46.

their homes, places of business, factories and pasture lands. It became necessary for the propagandists to perfect all these means so that their efforts may produce the desired effect.”¹⁰⁸ The desired effect was to incite an exterminationist hatred of the Jews. Indeed, al-Banna saw this as the first stage of the Islamization of society, a process he referred to as *tareef* or “familiarization” with Islamic principles, which “involves spreading the general concepts of Islam amongst the people.”¹⁰⁹ The second stage he calls *takween* or “development” of an Islamic foundation, which lies in “selecting and consolidating those righteous members who can bear the burden of jihad.”¹¹⁰ The third stage, *tanfeedh* or “implementation” of the Islamic program, “consists of an uncompromising Jihad and persistent effort in pursuit of the objective,” which “cannot be attained without total obedience.”¹¹¹ Obedience to whom? To the Supreme Guide and the “Party,” who indoctrinate their followers in the Jihadist demands of Allah and Islam.

Al-Banna incorporated other Nazi principles and strategies in his agenda for the Brotherhood and Jihadism. For example, he called for

- “The surveillance of the personal conduct of all its [the government’s] employees, and an end to the dichotomy between the private and professional spheres.”
- “The employment of graduates of Al-Azhar [Egypt’s renowned Islamic university] in military and administrative positions.”
- “The expurgation of songs, and a rigorous selection and censorship of them.”
- “The confiscation of provocative stories and books that implant skepticism.”
- “A campaign against harmful customs.”
- “Moral censorship.”
- “The annexation of the elementary village schools to the mosques.”
- “The designation of religious [party] instruction as a basic subject in all schools.”
- Giving “journalism a proper orientation.”¹¹²

¹⁰⁸ Hasan al-Banna, “Our Message,” http://www.youngmuslims.ca/online_library/books/our_message.

¹⁰⁹ Al-Banna, “The Message and the Teachings.”

¹¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹¹ Ibid.

¹¹² Al-Banna, *Five Tracts of Hasan al-Banna*, 126–28.

Obviously totalitarian, these statements are indicative of what Richard Mitchell describes as the “fundamental ideas” of the Brotherhood: “The insistence on (1) Islam as a total system, complete unto itself, and the final arbiter of life in all its categories; (2) an Islam formulated from and based on its two primary sources, the revelation in the Qur’an and the wisdom of the Prophet in the Sunna; and (3) an Islam that applies to all times and to all places,”¹¹³ both public and private, domestic and foreign, political and spiritual. This, too, is descriptive of the Jihadist understanding of tawhid.

For al-Banna, absolute control and absolute obedience were indispensable to the achievement of such aims, which are precisely the aims of jihad. Hence, like Hitler, he advocated the dissolution of all other political parties and building a strong military composed of men bent on jihad.¹¹⁴ Such all-encompassing power is essential not only to controlling the population but also to tearing meaning from words, so that jihad may be understood as “martyrdom” and as the key to the elimination of the enemies of Islam – beginning with the Jews, then the “Crusaders,” then the rest of the non-Muslim world. That is what makes al-Banna a central ideologue of modern Islamic Jihadism. “Always intend to go for Jihad and desire martyrdom,” he urged his followers. “Prepare for it as much as you can,” for “this call (to Islam) cannot survive without Jihad.”¹¹⁵ By “jihad,” said al-Banna, he meant “the duty that will last until the Day of Resurrection and is the object of these words from God’s Messenger . . . : ‘He who dies without having fought [*ghaza* = raided] and without having had the intent of going, dies of a *jahiliyya* death.’ Therewith you shall know the meaning of our motto that you must ever retain: *jihad* is our path.”¹¹⁶ Jihad is the Tree of Death standing over against the Jewish Tree of Life.

To underscore this point, in 1938 al-Banna wrote an article that would become one of his most famous pronouncements on the glory of Jihadism. Titled “Industry of Death,” the purpose of the article was to explain to all Muslims his concept of jihad. He wrote, “To a nation that perfects the industry of death and which knows how to

¹¹³ Mitchell, 14.

¹¹⁴ Harris, 170.

¹¹⁵ Al-Banna, “The Message and the Teachings.”

¹¹⁶ Quoted in Murawiec, 37–38.

die nobly, God gives proud life in this world and eternal grace in the life to come.”¹¹⁷ Note in particular the terms *eternal* grace in the *life to come*. This reward for one’s exterminationist Jew hatred is distinctively Jihadist; the Nazis never promised any such compensation for the mass murder of Jews.

Here we realize that the totalitarianism – and the evil – of Islamic Jihadism exceeds even that of National Socialism, extending as it does not only throughout this world but also into the next. “Islam,” says al-Banna, “is an all-embracing concept which regulates every aspect of life.” It regulates “the affairs of men in this world and the next.”¹¹⁸ When al-Banna declared that “the mission of the Muslim Brotherhood is pure and unsullied, unblemished by any stain,”¹¹⁹ he announced the totalitarian tyranny of Jihadism over time and eternity. Further, whereas the Nazi concept of *Rasenseele* reduces the purity of soul to the purity of blood, Islam maintains a sharp distinction between body and soul – a distinction that comes to justify not only the murder of the bodies of others but also the murder of one’s own body. For the Jihadist, this purity of the soul manifest in a deadly disregard for the body is the key that opens the gate for the soul to enter the next world.

At this juncture, we come to an important point with regard to what is distinctively insidious about Islamic Jihadism. Usurping God, the Jihadist ideologue al-Banna presumed to speak for God and thereby to control life, death, and eternal life among his followers. “God,” he piously asserted, “has imposed *jihad* as a religious duty on every Muslim, categorically and rigorously, from which there is neither evasion nor escape. He has rendered it as a supreme object of desire, and has made the reward of martyrs and fighters in His way a splendid one. . . . He has made their pure and guiltless blood the gauge of victory in this world. . . . He has threatened backsliders and slackers with His most frightful punishments. . . . He regards abstention and evasion of *jihad* as one of the major sins, and one of the seven mortal sins that guarantee annihilation.”¹²⁰ Either you take up arms in service to the hatred that drives Jihadism, beginning with Jew hatred, or you are

¹¹⁷ Quoted in Küntzel, *Jihad and Jew-Hatred*, 14.

¹¹⁸ Al-Banna, *Five Tracts of Hasan al-Banna*, 46–47.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 57.

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*, 133.

destined for the Fire. The more mercilessly you kill, however, the more mercy you earn and the greater your reward, as al-Banna pointed out: in the Quran, “Forgiveness” and “Mercy” are “associated with slaying and death.”¹²¹ There you have the god of Islamic Jihadism. Al-Banna lists no less than thirty-one proof texts from the holy books of Islam to make the point that at stake in the death inflicted on the enemy of Islam is the very life of the Muslim’s soul.¹²²

This extension of the Jihadist tyranny over the soul is the key to the transformation of a murderer into a martyr in a manner never conceived by the Nazis, by merging suicide and homicide into a single action for the sake of Allah and the absolute rule of His law – in this world and the next. According to al-Banna, jihad is an “obligation of every Muslim (*farida*).”¹²³ Like his fellow Jihadist ideologues, he based his position on the Quran: “Fighting is obligatory for you, as much as you dislike it” (2:216); “Frighten the enemies of God and your enemies” (8:60); and “Fighting is prescribed for you” (2:216).¹²⁴ For al-Banna, qital – that is, fighting and killing other people even if it means killing oneself in the process – is the true essence of jihad and therefore of Islam. Following the Nazis’ example of indoctrinating the youth, al-Banna understood the importance of engendering jihad in the minds of children early on to enlist them in the cause of qital: “Renascent nations require strength, and need to implant the military spirit in their sons.”¹²⁵ Modeled after the Nazis’ Hitler Youth, the Muslim Brotherhood’s “Tourist Scout Group” followed a program of physical education “based on the concept of *Jihad*.”¹²⁶ Unlike the Nazi ideologues, however, for the Jihadist ideologues, “implanting the military spirit in their sons” means, among other things, urging mothers to raise their children to become suicide bombers, as stated in Article Eighteen of the Hamas “Charter of Allah.”¹²⁷

¹²¹ Ibid., 134.

¹²² Ibid., 138–46.

¹²³ Hasan al-Banna, *Majmu'at rasil al-imam al-Shahid Hasan al-Banna*, new legal ed. (Cairo: Dar al-Da'wa, 1990), 295.

¹²⁴ See al-Banna, *Five Tracts of Hasan al-Banna*, 111.

¹²⁵ Ibid., 110.

¹²⁶ Al-Banna, *Memoirs of Hasan al Banna Shahid*, 189.

¹²⁷ See Yonah Alexander, *Palestinian Religious Terrorism: Hamas and Islamic Jihad*. Ardsley (New York: Transnational Publishers, 2002), 58. Hamas is a branch of the Muslim Brotherhood.

Glorifying death throughout his writings, al-Banna indulged in a rhetoric extolling death and legitimizing suicidal acts of terrorism, declaring that “Allah rewards the *umma* which masters the art of death and which acknowledges the necessity of death in dignity. . . . If you do this for Allah, you will be rewarded.”¹²⁸ Adopting the formulaic phrases *fann al-mawt* (“the art of death”) and *al-mawt fann* (“death is art”), he declared, “The Quran has commanded people to love death more than life. Unless the philosophy of the Quran replaces the love of life which has consumed Muslims, they will reach naught. Victory can only come with the mastery of the art of death.”¹²⁹ Where jihad is concerned, said al-Banna, “I don’t care who is dead and who is killed.”¹³⁰ According to the Islamic Jihadists, to die as a martyr is not a price to be paid but a wage to be earned: “The virtue of *shahadah*,” said al-Banna, is “the wage of *jihad*.”¹³¹ Thus “a good man,” he affirmed, “takes delight in launching *Jihad*,”¹³² that is, takes delight in indiscriminate murder for the sake of Allah and Islam, beginning, again, with the murder of Jews. Yes: a *good* man.

Whereas the Nazis embraced a will to power, the Jihadists embrace a will to death as a means of seizing power under the pretense of exalting “the Word of the Truth.”¹³³ What sanctifies the “Word of the Truth” is not the wisdom of the sages but the “blood of martyrs,”¹³⁴ so that the more blood is spilled, the more truth is justified. Thus, like all evil, the evil of Islamic Jihadism feeds on itself: it cannot exist without a world awash in the blood of nonbelievers, beginning with the Jews. In contrast to Judaism’s prohibition against the consumption of blood because the *nefesh* or “soul” is in the blood (see Genesis 9:4), Islamic Jihadism insists on the consumption of blood for the same reason. Recall the words from the Hamas video: “We are a nation that drinks blood.”¹³⁵ Here nothing like “rational argument” or “scientific

¹²⁸ See al-Banna, *Majmu'at rasil al-imam al-Shahid Hasan al-Banna*, 289 and 291.

¹²⁹ Al-Banna, *Five Tracts of Hasan al-Banna*, 206–7.

¹³⁰ Al-Banna, *Memoirs of Hasan al Banna Shahid*, 113.

¹³¹ Al-Banna, *Five Tracts of Hasan al-Banna*, 112.

¹³² Al-Banna, *Memoirs of Hasan al Banna Shahid*, 117.

¹³³ See al-Banna, *Five Tracts of Hasan al-Banna*, 93.

¹³⁴ *Ibid.*, 115.

¹³⁵ Itamar Marcus and Barbara Crook, “Hamas Video: ‘We will drink the blood of the Jews,’” *Palestine Media Watch* (14 February 2006): <http://www.pmw.org.il/latest%20bulletins%20new.htm#b140206>.

method” comes to bear, as it had with the Nazis. For the Islamic Jihadists, murder not only settles all disputes but it justifies all ideology. If in the modern period Maududi and al-Banna laid the ideological foundations for such thinking, Sayyid Qutb built the edifice.

Sayyid Qutb (1906–1966)

Sayyid Qutb was born on 9 October 1906 in the village of Musha in Upper Egypt, the son of a prosperous farmer named Haj Ibrahim Qutb (d. 1933). Because his mother Fatima Husayn Uthman had dreamt of his attending the renowned Islamic Al-Azhar University, she had him memorize the Quran by the time he was ten. Al-Azhar is the same university whose Rector, Shaikh 'Abd al-Halim Mahmud (d. 1978), stated, “Allah commands Muslims to fight the friends of Satan wherever they may be found. And among Satan’s friends – indeed, his best friends in our age – are the Jews.”¹³⁶ At age thirteen, Qutb enrolled in the Dar al-Ulum secondary school in Cairo; after graduating, he was admitted to the University of Cairo in 1929 and earned his bachelor’s degree in education in 1933. A prolific writer, Qutb became known as a literary talent in the 1930s and 1940s. During most of those years, he was a member of the Egyptian nationalist Wafd Party; in 1942, he joined the Saadist Party, which had formed as a more strongly nationalist break-away party from the Wafd. By the mid-1940s, he had become friendly with members of the Ikhwan. During those years, his thinking became increasingly influenced by the Hanbali jurist Ibn Taymiyyah, who had also been a chief influence on the Wahhabis; he also studied the works of Ibn Taymiyyah’s famous Syrian disciple Ibn Qayyim (1292–1350).

A turning point in Qutb’s ideological outlook came in 1948 when he traveled to the United States to earn a master’s degree from Wilson Teacher’s College (now the University of the District of Columbia). During his stay in the United States, he also studied at the Colorado State College for Education and at Stanford University. His reaction to Western culture was decidedly negative. In the United States, he saw a prime example of the depravity of a society steeped in *jahiliyyah* (from the word for “immoral,” *jahili*). Jahiliyyah, he explained, is an abandonment of Allah, through which human beings claim the right

¹³⁶ Quoted in Nettler, 18–19.

to create values of their own and choose a way of life without strict adherence to the laws of Allah as articulated in Sharia.¹³⁷ By Qutb's definition, "a *jahili* society is any society other than the Muslim society," and therefore it must be eliminated by any and all means necessary, which today would include the use of nuclear weapons.¹³⁸ Identifying such societies as a target for the Jihadist agenda is easy because, according to Qutb, "all Jewish and Christian societies today are also *jahili* societies."¹³⁹ Dominated by Jews and Christians, these jahili societies are generally democratic societies, and, from Qutb's standpoint, "democracy is a form of idol worship."¹⁴⁰ Hence, democracy is the cause of Western decadence; it is the best evidence that the actions of Christians and Jews fall under the category of *shirk*, or the worship of false gods.¹⁴¹

His contact with the Muslim Brotherhood before his travels in the United States no doubt shaped Qutb's reaction to the West. When he returned to Egypt in 1951 – the year that he would later refer to as the year of his birth¹⁴² – he officially joined the Brotherhood, and by 1953, he was appointed editor-in-chief of the weekly *Al-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn* (*The Muslim Brotherhood*). Fearing the Brotherhood's increasing power and popularity, Gamal Abdul Nasser (1918–1970), who had come to power in a military junta in July 1952, banned the organization in January 1954 and imprisoned Qutb. He remained in prison only until March but was arrested again seven months later, after a member of the Ikhwan had made an attempt on Nasser's life on 26 October.

"While behind bars," Ahmad Moussalli relates, Qutb "managed to establish an effective, secret organization for the Brethren and became its chief spokesman."¹⁴³ During the ten years he spent in prison, Qutb

¹³⁷ Sayyid Qutb, *Milestones on the Road: A Translation of Ma'alim fi'l-tariq* (Plainfield, IN: 1990), 15.

¹³⁸ Sayyid Qutb, *Maalim fi al-Tariq [Milestones]* (Damascus: Dar Al-Ilm, 2006), 80. This teaching is the basis for Osama bin Laden's assertion that it is a Muslim's duty to acquire – and use – nuclear weapons; see Osama bin Laden, *Messages to the World: The Statements of Osama bin Laden*, ed. Bruce Lawrence, trans. James Howarth (London: Verso, 2005), 72.

¹³⁹ *Ibid.*, 81.

¹⁴⁰ Dinesh D'Souza, "Osama's Brain: Meet Sayyid Qutb, Intellectual Father of the Anti-Western Jihad," *The Weekly Standard*, Vol. 7 (2002).

¹⁴¹ Qutb, *Maalim fi al-Tariq [Milestones]*, 83.

¹⁴² See Malise, 83.

¹⁴³ Moussalli, 35.

studied the works of Abdul Al'a Maududi, whom he acknowledged as one of his main influences.¹⁴⁴

“Qutb is clearly indebted to Maududi,” David Cook demonstrates, “for seeing jihad as a radical and revolutionary proclamation to mankind, and the terms he uses to describe it are identical to those of Maududi.”¹⁴⁵ In the words of Murawiec, Qutb “made Maududi’s absolute dichotomy between Islam and un-Islam into the cornerstone of his revolutionary Islamist ideology.”¹⁴⁶ While in prison, he wrote several of his most significant Jihadist works. (One cannot help but call to mind the parallel to Hitler’s time in prison, from 1 April to 20 December 1924, when he wrote much of *Mein Kampf*. Of course, Hitler’s time in prison was much easier than Qutb’s time in Egyptian incarceration.) Released from prison in 1964, he was arrested yet again within a year on charges of attempting to overthrow the government; the charges were based on his widely read book *Maalim fi al-Tariq (Milestones)*, a work that advocates jihad against any government or society that does not operate in strict adherence to Islamic law. On 29 August 1966, he was executed.

One of the key ideas that Qutb derives from Maududi is that Islam is as much a political movement as it is a religious doctrine. He even viewed the meaning of the shahadah in political terms because it requires that Muslims live, publicly and privately, in keeping with Islam and that all others be called to Islam. According to Qutb, this political totalitarianism of Islam is the key to “the liberation of man.”¹⁴⁷ The “milestones” referred to in the title of his book are those along the way to Islamic world domination, both in the political and in the religious domain – indeed, in every domain.

“The Muslim war,” he maintained, “aims at converting all humans on the entire earth. Men everywhere must be liberated. . . . Who grasps the nature of the religion also grasps how necessary is the militant principle of Islam in the form of armed struggle. . . . It is an expansionist militancy which aims at liberating the whole of mankind.”¹⁴⁸

¹⁴⁴ Sayyid Qutb, *In the Shade of the Quran*, trans. M. A. Salahi and A. A. Shamis (Alexandria, VA: Al Saadawi Publications, 1997), 91–92.

¹⁴⁵ Cook, 104.

¹⁴⁶ Murawiec, 269.

¹⁴⁷ Moussalli, 120–21.

¹⁴⁸ Quoted in Murawiec, 98.

Therefore, there can be no relation between Islam and the non-Muslim world other than jihad, nor can jihad be construed simply as a war waged in defense of Islam.¹⁴⁹ Citing the Quran, Qutb maintained that peace comes only “when the religion is entirely Allah’s” (Quran 8:39), that “the causes of jihad have their roots within the very temperament of Islam and its true role in the world,” and that jihad “regulates the relation between Muslims and non-Muslims.”¹⁵⁰ Therefore, said Qutb, the claim that jihad is not violent and warlike “degrades the meaning of Islam by not embracing the militancy that is integral to it.”¹⁵¹ Why is militancy inherent in Islam? Because, he asserted in *Milestones*, Islam is “the way of the life of God and a system for the world. Thus it has the right to move to destroy impediments.”¹⁵² More than the right, it has the duty to kill.

The chief impediment to the spread of Islam is the Jews, who, for Qutb, have no option for conversion, as Neeman correctly points out: “Qutb makes it clear when dealing with converts to Islam that they are equal to all Muslims and will be judged on their dedication to Allah and in following His demands. For him, an Arab Muslim was not superior to a non-Arab Muslim as made clear in *Milestones*. The Jews, however, could not be trusted to embrace Islam because in the end, it was their objective to become apostates and weaken Allah’s final, perfectly revealed religion. Jews adopting Islam would destroy it from within.”¹⁵³ Thus we see the Nazi-like principles affirmed in Islamic Jihadism: the ideological abrogation of the prohibition against murder and the exclusion of Jews from the circle of salvation.

Qutb’s *Milestones* divides the world into the realm of God (Islam) and the realm of Satan (everything else): “There is no way to compromise or mediate between the two.”¹⁵⁴ Further, “this struggle is not a temporary phase but a perpetual and permanent war. This war is the natural corollary to this eternal verdict that Truth and falsehood

¹⁴⁹ See Moussalli, 206.

¹⁵⁰ Cited in Cook, 104.

¹⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 105.

¹⁵² Quoted in *ibid.*, 105.

¹⁵³ Neeman, unpublished, 17.

¹⁵⁴ Sayyid Qutb, *Ma'alim 'ala al-Tariq* (Beirut: Dar al-Mashriq, 1986), 21; see Ziad Abu-Amr, *Islamic Fundamentalism in the West Bank and Gaza: Muslim Brotherhood and Islamic Jihad* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994), 98.

cannot coexist on the face of the earth.”¹⁵⁵ Hence Hamas’s position, for instance, stated in Article Thirteen of its charter, that to negotiate with the State of Israel is to betray Islam and Allah.¹⁵⁶ The refrain running throughout *Milestones* is that no man should be a slave to another man or to anything human. The implication is that one need have no respect for anything like the sanctity of the other human being, so that the killing of “innocent” human beings – including Muslims – is of no consequence to the Jihadist. Thus, Qutb’s follower Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri, the ideological spokesman for al-Qaeda, argued that it is legitimate to kill Muslims, women and children, and dhimmis if they should be among the victims of a homicide bombing.¹⁵⁷ This Jihadist killing of the innocent through terrorist actions amounts to the transformation of the worship of Allah into a bloody idolatry.

Moussalli notes that “Qutb identifies three principles: complete liberation of conscience, complete human equality, and mutual social responsibility.”¹⁵⁸ If this is the case, then what Qutb had in mind is conscience rooted only in Islam, human equality only as Muslims, and responsibility to make all others into Muslims. Jihad, said Qutb, is “a movement to wipe out tyranny, and to introduce true freedom to mankind, using whatever resources are practically available in a given human situation. . . . The peace of Islam means that the law of society be purified by Allah, that all people should obey Allah alone, and every system that permits some people to rule over others be abolished.”¹⁵⁹ That is, every system that permits non-Muslims to rule over Muslims should be abolished. Therefore, Qutb elaborated elsewhere, “since the objective of the message of Islam is a decisive declaration of man’s freedom, not merely on the philosophical plane but also in the actual conditions of life, it must employ jihad.”¹⁶⁰ In Qutb’s Islamic Jihadist terms, “freedom” means “the obedience

¹⁵⁵ Sayyid Qutb, *Milestones*, trans. S. Badrul Hasan (Karachi: International Islamic Publishers, 1981), 125.

¹⁵⁶ See Alexander, 54.

¹⁵⁷ See Ayman al-Zawahiri, “Jihad, Martyrdom, and the Killing of Innocents,” in Raymond Ibrahim, ed., *The Al Qaeda Reader*, trans. Raymond Ibrahim (New York: Doubleday, 2007), 137–71.

¹⁵⁸ Moussalli, 170.

¹⁵⁹ Qutb, *Milestones on the Road: A Translation of Ma'alim fi'l-tariq*, 50.

¹⁶⁰ Sayyid Qutb, “Jihad in the Cause of God,” in Laqueur, 395.

of all people . . . for God alone.”¹⁶¹ In other words, from the Jihadist standpoint, freedom lies in the elimination of all other points of view.

Clearly, this freedom is the counterfeit freedom from having to care for one’s fellow human being; the summons to care for another is sacrificed on the altar of caring only for Allah. The peace of Islam, as Qutb presented it, is the peaceful sleep that leaves us undisturbed by the outcry of our neighbor. His repeated insistence that Islam represents true freedom is reminiscent of the Orwellian assertion that slavery is freedom. There is no slavery more deadly to the soul than this complacent sleep of indifference toward the death of others, which is induced by the premise that only when all of humanity bows before Allah will humankind be free. What Western democracies try to pass off as freedom grounded in responsibility, Qutb maintained, is slavery to sensuality and self-interest, both of which are born of corruption from the Jews.¹⁶² In the modern world, jihad is always a jihad either against Jews or against those who are “controlled” by Jews because Jews are deemed the source of every form of contamination – a view shared by the Nazis.¹⁶³

Among the statements in *Milestones* that reflect the Nietzschean/Nazi division of the world into masters and slaves – but without the forthrightness of Nietzsche or the Nazis – is Qutb’s assertion that “one who does not defend himself with weapons will perish. And one who does not oppress will be oppressed.”¹⁶⁴ The aim of Islamic Jihadism, as expressed by its chief ideologue is “to annihilate all those political and material powers which stand between the people and Islam.”¹⁶⁵ Yes: *annihilate*. Thus, we see that Islamic Jihadism is more about power than about truth, more about the control, oppression, and annihilation of our fellow human being than about serving Allah. If he should invoke service to Allah, Qutb invariably has in mind submission to the Jihadist polity party: his invocation of Allah is an appropriation of Allah.

Said Qutb, “The spirit of submission is the first requirement of the faith. Through this spirit of submission the believers learn the

¹⁶¹ Ibid.

¹⁶² See Qutb, *Maalim fi al-Tariq [Milestones]*, 7.

¹⁶³ Two notable exceptions are the Muslims’ slaughter of the Armenians in the Armenian genocide and the genocide perpetrated by the Muslims in the Sudan.

¹⁶⁴ Qutb, *Maalim fi al-Tariq [Milestones]*, 28.

¹⁶⁵ Ibid., 57.

Islamic regulations and laws with eagerness and pleasure. As soon as a command is given [by the leaders of the movement], the heads are bowed, and nothing more is required for its implementation.”¹⁶⁶ The heads are bowed indeed, bowed in worship of the Jihadist idol, in worship of not the God who is loving and long-suffering but of the god who demands human sacrifice. For the command is the command to pursue qital, the command to kill, as given in the Quran: “The recompense of those who make war against Allah and His Messenger, exerting themselves to cause corruption in the earth, is that they be killed or crucified” (5:37).¹⁶⁷ Anyone who is not a Muslim, in the Jihadists’ view, is either actually or potentially at war with Allah. “The basis of the message,” Qutb explained, “is that one should accept the *Shari’ah* without any question and reject all other laws in any shape or form. This is Islam.”¹⁶⁸ No, this is the evil that is Islamic Jihadism.

The Jihadist evil views everything that is not Islamic as evil, not just as “problematic”: among the uppermost aims of jihad, declared Qutb, is “to abolish all the Satanic forces and Satanic systems of life,”¹⁶⁹ which is to say, all forces and systems of life that are not Islamic, beginning with the Jews. Islam, according to Qutb, cannot coexist with any society or system that is not Islamic.¹⁷⁰ What, then, is jihad? It is not the innocuous “inner struggle” that Muslim reformers would make it out to be. No, “*Jihad* in Islam is simply a name for striving to make this system of life dominant in the world,” Qutb proclaimed. “Thus, wherever an Islamic community exists which is a concrete example of the Divinely-ordained system of life, it has a God-given right to step forward and take control of the political authority so that it may establish the Divine system on earth.”¹⁷¹ This invocation of a *God-given* right to take control of a political authority amounts to an abrogation of the divinely commanded prohibition against murder, inasmuch as it leads to the sanctioning of terrorism, which, by definition, is the killing of innocents. It is yet more evidence of the assault on God that characterizes the Islamic Jihadists’ assault on humanity.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid., 32–33.

¹⁶⁷ Quoted in Qutb, *Social Justice in Islam*, 27.

¹⁶⁸ Qutb, *Maalim fi al-Tariq [Milestones]*, 36.

¹⁶⁹ Ibid., 70.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid., 73.

¹⁷¹ Ibid., 76.

Moussalli points out that, like Maududi, Qutb defined “Islam as a program of life according to the rule of nature given by God and as the expression that aims at constructing the superstructure *for the whole of humanity on the hakimiyyah or governance of God.*”¹⁷² Further, “Islam reckons itself to be a worldwide religion and a universal religion; therefore, it could not confine itself to the limits of Arabia but naturally desired to spread over the whole world in every direction.”¹⁷³ Further elaborating on the Nazi-like universalism of Jihadism, Qutb explained that the defense of Muslim lands is “*not* the ultimate objective of the Islamic movement of Jihad but is a means of establishing the Divine authority within it so that it becomes the headquarters for the movement of Islam, which is then to be carried throughout the earth to the whole of mankind, as the object of this religion is all humanity and its sphere of action is the whole earth.”¹⁷⁴ Like al-Banna, Qutb held that in Islam the ruling authority has “wide powers which touch every aspect of life,”¹⁷⁵ because “Islam represents the eternal system for the world throughout the future of the human race.”¹⁷⁶ It “extends into all aspects of life; it discusses all minor or major affairs of mankind; it orders man’s life – not only in this world but *also in the world to come.*”¹⁷⁷ Again, this is where the Jihadist evil exceeds the Nazi evil, in the extension of its totalitarian rule over both the temporal and the eternal, over this world and the next.

We see what sort of “freedom” Jihadism promises: it is the “freedom” of having *every* detail of one’s life *ordered*, from the womb to the tomb *and beyond*. Thus, in keeping with the Ikhwan’s emulation of Nazi cosmology, Qutb viewed Sharia as “a part of that universal law which governs the entire universe.”¹⁷⁸ Such a view makes the enemies of Islam – that is, Jews and Christians – not merely a political, ethnic, social, or religious problem but a *metaphysical* problem of cosmic dimensions: at stake in jihad are the essence and meaning of creation itself. Therefore, he enjoined, “Brother, push ahead, for your path is

¹⁷² Moussalli, 129; emphasis added.

¹⁷³ Quoted in Aaron, 59.

¹⁷⁴ Ibid., 61.

¹⁷⁵ Qutb, *Social Justice in Islam*, 98.

¹⁷⁶ Ibid., 91.

¹⁷⁷ Qutb, *Maalim fi al-Tariq [Milestones]*, 32; emphasis added.

¹⁷⁸ Ibid., 88.

soaked in blood. Do not turn your head right or left but look only up to heaven.”¹⁷⁹ In Islamic Jihad, blood itself thus assumes a metaphysical meaning: it is the key not only to annihilating jahiliyya humanity but to assailing the heavens. The blood that most fundamentally assumes such significance is Jewish blood.

Qutb portrayed the Jews, Nettler explains, as “the blackest devil and source of the worst anti-Islamic machinations.” His “main principle was that of the Jews as First Cause – First Cause of resistance to Islam’s Truth in its early quest for fulfillment.”¹⁸⁰ Here it is clear that, from the standpoint of Islamic Jihadism, the Jewish Question is far more than a Zionist Question – it goes to the question of human sanctity and divine authority: it is a metaphysical question that has profound political implications. And so we see why Qutb insisted, “The dynamic spread of Islam assumes the form of *jihad*, not as a defense movement, as those Muslim defeatists imagine, who subjugate to the offensive pressure of Western orientalisks. . . . Islam is meant for the entire globe.”¹⁸¹ Further, “For human life, there is only one true system, and that is Islam; all other systems are *jahiliyyah*.”¹⁸² For Qutb, Islam is “the Divine Imperative that must assume power in order to regulate all aspects of life.” There are “only two possibilities: Islam or Jahiliyyah.”¹⁸³ Again Qutb laid out his Manichean either–or arrangement of the world, an outlook that might undermine a strictly monotheistic position because it borders on deifying jahiliyyah as the evil force that Islam opposes. I know of no Muslim cleric, however, who has denounced Qutb as a heretic or who has rejected his teaching as *bidah*, that is, “innovation,” which is forbidden.

It is no surprise that, much like the Nazis’ notion of a master race, Qutb drew on his ideology to establish the superiority of the party adherent, or the “believer,” over the rest of humanity – his discourse against racism notwithstanding. Islam provides the believer, he said, with “a sense of superiority” over all who are not Muslims, no matter how much power they may have.¹⁸⁴ “The Believer,” he went on to say,

¹⁷⁹ Quoted in Aaron, 62.

¹⁸⁰ Nettler, 28.

¹⁸¹ Sayyid Qutb, *Maalim fi al-tariq*, 13th legal ed. (Cairo: Dar al-Da’wa, 1989), 72.

¹⁸² Qutb, *Maalim fi al-Tariq [Milestones]*, 117.

¹⁸³ Nettler, 27.

¹⁸⁴ Qutb, *Maalim fi al-Tariq [Milestones]*, 142.

is “superior to all others,”¹⁸⁵ and “the Believer from his height looks at the people drowning in dirt and mud.”¹⁸⁶ Those who drown in the dirt and the mud are Jews and people manipulated by them, starting with Europeans. Because of its debauchery, he said, European civilization “has never reached the same level” as Islam, because “it is a civilization founded on pure materialism, a civilization of murder and war, of conquest and subjugation.”¹⁸⁷ As we have seen, however, murder and war, conquest and subjugation, are exactly what Qutb prescribed for adherents of Islam; to be sure, they are defining features of Islamic history. Why has European civilization not only failed to reach the level of Islam but also harbors a hatred of Islam? Who, according to Qutb, has corrupted that civilization? The Jews.¹⁸⁸

Matthias Küntzel demonstrates that Qutb saw Hitler as a divine instrument, sent by Allah to punish the Jews. “In Qutb’s eyes, the Jews are to blame for everything they have suffered over the centuries, and this applies to Hitler and the Shoah too. Thus, in the modern period, ‘the Jews again returned to evil-doing and consequently Allah . . . brought Hitler to rule over them.’ But even the ‘punishment’ meted out by Hitler was not sufficiently terrible, since ‘once again today the Jews have returned to evil-doing, in the form of ‘Israel’ . . . So let Allah bring down upon the Jewish people . . . the worst kind of punishment.’ Qutb’s message is internally consistent: the Jew is the source of evil in the world, the Shoah is therefore no crime and Israel deserves to be erased from the map.”¹⁸⁹ Not only is the Shoah no crime, according to Qutb, it is something holy ordained by the Holy One. Further, notes Neeman, “as is traditional among the Islamists and their apologists, Zionism and Marxism are thrown together as two strategies in the same Jewish plot for world domination. Qutb lines himself up perfectly with the Czarist *The Protocols of the Elders of Zion* and Hitler’s *Mein Kampf*.”¹⁹⁰ There can be no doubt that Qutb’s view of Hitler as an instrument of God reflects a Nazi influence on his thinking. After all, anyone who has such admiration for another is surely

¹⁸⁵ Ibid., 143.

¹⁸⁶ Ibid., 145.

¹⁸⁷ Qutb, *Social Justice in Islam*, 170–71.

¹⁸⁸ Ibid., 235.

¹⁸⁹ Küntzel, *Jihad and Jew-Hatred*, 84.

¹⁹⁰ Neeman, 19.

influenced by him. This influence shows itself in his other writings as well.

As corruptors of the law and the teachings of Allah, “the Children of Israel, both before and after Moses, tarnished and perverted his message.”¹⁹¹ This tainting by the Jews is what makes non-Muslim humanity inferior to the master believers: unlike the Muslims, they have been infected with the Jewish contagion. The Jews, then, are the evil that plagues humanity: “With their spite and deceit, the Jews are still misleading this nation, and distracting her away from her Koran in order that she may not draw her sharp weapons and her abundant ammunitions from it. . . . [The Jews’] aim is clearly shown by the *Protocols [of the Elders of Zion]*. The Jews are behind materialism, animal sexuality, the destruction of the family and the dissolution of society. Principal among them are Marx, Freud, Durkheim and the Jew Jean-Paul Sartre.”¹⁹² The solution to the eradication of this evil is Islam: “The war that the Jews have launched against Islam has been much longer lasting and wider in spectrum than that launched against it by pagans and unbelievers both in old and modern times. . . . Theirs is a wicked nature which is full of hatred for Islam, its Prophet and its followers. . . . Our modern world will not be saved from this wicked nature except by Islam.”¹⁹³ There can be no rehabilitation of a “wicked nature”: like a disease – which, as noted in Chapter 1, is precisely how the Nazis viewed Jews and Judaism – it must be eradicated.

Qutb’s most infamous diatribe against the Jews is an essay titled *Ma'rakatuna Ma'a al-Yahud* (“Our Struggle with the Jews”); written in 1950 – with a title suggestive of Hitler’s *Mein Kampf* (*My Struggle*) – it was reprinted by the Saudi government in 1970. Hundreds of thousands of copies were distributed throughout the Muslim world in 1967 after the Six Day War. Herf comments on Qutb’s work, comparing it to *Mein Kampf*, noting, “Whereas the Nazis depicted Jewry as obsessed with plans to destroy Germany, Qutb . . . presented the Jews as preoccupied with an effort to destroy Islam. Whereas Nazism attacked the

¹⁹¹ Sayyid Qutb, *Basic Principles of the Islamic Worldview*, trans. Rami David, preface by Hamid Algar (North Haledon, NJ: Islamic Publications International, 2006), 207.

¹⁹² Quoted in Aaron, 159.

¹⁹³ Qutb, *In the Shade of the Quran*, 220–21.

Jews for undermining the values of the nation, . . . Qutb saw Jews as agents of confusion and doubt about religious belief. Where Nazis appealed to the authority of . . . Hitler, . . . Qutb evoked the even more unshakable authority of the Koran and Allah himself.”¹⁹⁴ These parallels between Qutb’s manifesto and Hitler’s hardly seem coincidental; indeed, there can be no doubt that Qutb had been following the Nazis’ propaganda broadcasts to the Arab world all along. “Drawing on this reading of the Koran,” says Herf, “Qutb reached conclusions about the Jews identical to those of Europe’s radical anti-Semites. Although European anti-Semitism was very old, it was the Nazis who first claimed both that the Jews had launched an international full-scale war against their enemies and that therefore all the Jews should be murdered. Qutb, like Husseini and his associates broadcasting from wartime Berlin, claimed that the Jews had been waging war on Islam since its inception.”¹⁹⁵ Hence, the inherent, *essential* evil of the Jews; hence the need to exterminate them.

Ronald Nettler comments on the significance of Qutb’s diatribe, saying that from Qutb’s

judicious use of ancient sources applied imaginatively to contemporary crises, there arose familiar ideas: the Jews as inherently decadent and anti-religious; the Jews as being driven by an obsessive urge to destroy the only true religion, Islam; the Jews as the organizers and agents of the Western political threat to Islam; the Jews as the main purveyors of the cultural Westernization which has so damaged Islam; the Jews as the modern “Hypocrites” continuing the work of their ancient predecessors; and the Jews as the power behind the Westernizing “Muslim” politicians. The monstrous evil exemplifying these specific Jewish evils was the Jewish Satan of Zionism and Israel.¹⁹⁶

Although the Jewish State exemplifies the “Jewish Satan,” the Jihadists’ view of the Jews does not derive from the reestablishment of the Jewish State. It is the other way around: their view of the Jewish State derives from what they have always taught about the Jews. Thus, with a passage from the Quran describing the Jews as “the worst of created beings” (98:6) in mind, Qutb wrote, “There is no other group whose

¹⁹⁴ Herf, 256.

¹⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, 258.

¹⁹⁶ Nettler, 69.

history reveals the sort of mercilessness, (moral) shirking and ungratefulness for Divine Guidance. Everywhere the Jews have been they have committed unprecedented abominations.”¹⁹⁷ For Qutb, “our struggle with the Jews” is a struggle with primordial, satanic evil. With such an enemy, there can be no compromise or negotiation, and every available means must be used to attain victory.

The three themes that run throughout “Our Struggle with the Jews” are as follows: (1) the Jewish goal of Islam’s destruction, (2) the evil essence of the Jews, and (3) the balance of power in this situation. In these last two themes, one can see a clear repetition of some of the themes of *Mein Kampf*. Like Hitler, for example, Qutb associated the Jews with the evils of Communism.¹⁹⁸ Turning to history, as Hitler often did in his manifesto, Qutb invoked the Muslims’ enmity with the Jewish tribe Banu Qurayzah, pointing out that “the Jews have confronted Islam with enmity from the moment that the Islamic state was established in Medina”; therefore, the Jews are “the eternal enemy of Islam.”¹⁹⁹ An eternal enemy must be utterly exterminated. Why? Because, in terms once again reminiscent of *Mein Kampf*, “Jews as Jews were by *nature* determined to fight Allah’s Truth and sow corruption and confusion.”²⁰⁰ If the Jews are the enemy of Islam *by nature* – if they pose a threat to humanity not because of their actions but because of their *essence* – then they fall outside the possibility of conversion and redemption. The only solution to the Jewish problem is a final solution, for, due to their “malevolent nature,” the Jews cannot help but hate Islam.²⁰¹ Hence Qutb’s Jihadist interpretation of the warning from the Quran: “You will surely find the worst enemies of the Muslims to be the Jews” (5:85).

Like anti-Semites throughout modern times and certainly throughout the Muslim world, Qutb promulgated the “world Jewish conspiracy” calumny, citing the Jews’ passion to control others as a “driving force in their national character.”²⁰² Zionism, he argued, was not about the creation of a Jewish haven or homeland but rather was

¹⁹⁷ Qutb, “Our Struggle with the Jews,” 78.

¹⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, 80.

¹⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, 81.

²⁰⁰ Nettler, 35.

²⁰¹ *Ibid.*, 44.

²⁰² *Ibid.*, 37–38.

the first move toward the Jews' conquest of the world.²⁰³ He viewed Zionism and Marxism as part of the same conspiracy,²⁰⁴ and he even accused Jews of installing their own secret agents in Muslim regimes: "The Jews have installed men and regimes (in the Islamic world), in order to conspire against this (Muslim) Community,"²⁰⁵ and a conspiracy against the community, he insisted, is a conspiracy against the creed.²⁰⁶ Like Hitler, Qutb played on the fear of an invisible enemy, one who is as invisible as Satan. Also like Hitler, he provided the key to salvation: an exterminationist program of jihad. From the standpoint of Islamic Jihadism, that is the meaning of justice, as one can see from one of Qutb's most important works, *Social Justice in Islam (Adalah al-ijtimaiyah fi al-Islam)*.

Here Qutb was careful, as ever, to ground his ideology in teachings from the Quran, such as "in retaliation there is life for you" (2: 175).²⁰⁷ Citing Sura 8:42, he argued that one method of gathering wealth that Islam deems legitimate is raiding and plundering, taking "the possession of plunder, which consists of everything possessed by an unbeliever who has been killed by a Muslim."²⁰⁸ A legitimate use of *zakat*, which is charity or almsgiving "in the way of Allah" and one of the Five Pillars of Islam,²⁰⁹ is to finance jihad.²¹⁰ The implication? If you are not contributing to jihad, which in modern times is guided by an exterminationist Jew hatred, you are not a Muslim, for you have thereby undermined one of the Five Pillars.

Muslim societies that are not with the Jihadist program are in need of "purification." "We must cleanse it [Islam] of all accretions, such as alterations and interpretations and ambiguities" by "establishing our Islamic theory in individuals and societies, at the same time as we set up the Islamic legislation to regulate life. . . . We must avoid the ways of Western thought; rather we must choose the ways of native Islamic

²⁰³ Ibid., 49. Qutb's Saudi editor underscores this point with reference to the *Protocols of the Elders of Zion*.

²⁰⁴ Qutb, "Our Struggle with the Jews," 84.

²⁰⁵ Ibid., 75.

²⁰⁶ Ibid., 74.

²⁰⁷ Quoted by Qutb, *Social Justice in Islam*, 66.

²⁰⁸ Ibid., 112.

²⁰⁹ The other four pillars of the creed are (*shahada*), prayer with ablution (*salat*), fasting (*sayam*), and pilgrimage to Mecca (*hajj*).

²¹⁰ Qutb, *Social Justice in Islam*, 137.

thought, in order to ensure pure results, rather than mongrel.”²¹¹ Further, “God has informed the believers that the life of this world is such that checking one group of people [Jews] by another [Muslims] is the law of God, so that the earth may be cleansed of corruption.”²¹² For the Islamic Jihadists, the “Jewish Problem” is a problem of “purification,” which runs far deeper than any biological concern: it is metaphysical.

A Nazi-like discourse of cleansing and purification is immediately noticeable here, where the non-Aryan – like the non-Muslim – is part of a “mongrel” people. When Qutb identified Western thought as the source of defilement, he was referring to a way of thinking that has been shaped by the Jews, as “Judaism, the religion of the Children of Israel, was polluted with pagan concepts as well as racial arrogance.”²¹³ This is why the Jews, Qutb maintained in *Basic Principles of the Islamic Worldview* (*Khasa'is at-Tasawwur al-Islami wa Muqawwimatuhu*, 1961 or 1962), have been rejected by God: on Judgment Day, they shall “taste suffering through fire.”²¹⁴ Because this is what God has ordained for the Jews, it behooves all people to act in accordance with the divine wisdom, that is, in accordance with Jihadist Jew hatred. If humanity is to be cleansed of this defilement, then it must be made *Judenrein*.

Other basic principles of Islamic Jihadism that Qutb outlined in “Our Struggle with the Jews” should by now sound familiar. One basic principle is totalitarianism: “It is the duty of all humanity to receive it [Islamic Jihadist ideology], adapt to it and apply it to real life,” for “there is stability in the fundamentals and essential values of the Islamic concept”²¹⁵ – the stability of totalitarian rule. Because “it is Islam, and Islam alone, that enables man to live both for this world and for the hereafter,” Islam alone is “suitable as a complete way of life, embracing individual belief and social order”²¹⁶ – a position that justifies the use of the swords surrounding the Quran in the emblem of the Muslim Brotherhood. If, as Qutb maintained, “the Islamic concept is based on the belief that there is divinity and servanthood, the former pertaining to God in exclusivity and the latter characterizing

²¹¹ Ibid., 250.

²¹² Qutb, “Jihad in the Cause of God,” 396.

²¹³ Qutb, *Basic Principles of the Islamic Worldview*, 21.

²¹⁴ Ibid., 25.

²¹⁵ Ibid., 73.

²¹⁶ Ibid., 113.

everything and everyone other than Him,”²¹⁷ then there is no notion of covenant or questioning, no room for “striving with God,” which is the meaning of the word *Israel*, but only a bowing to God – no place for marriage or parenthood as a metaphor for God: Muslims do not call God “Father.” This “basic principle” of Islamic Jihadism is just what leads to the attitude of superiority that we have seen in Qutb, an attitude that in the end justifies murder. For unless we can call out, “Father,” to God, we shall never call out, “Brother,” to the stranger. Only where we thus understand the human-to-divine relation in terms of love and not of servanthood, can we understand the human-to-human relation in terms of love and not of domination.

The Legacy of the Ideologues

All three of the Islamic Jihadist ideologues I have discussed have had a huge impact on the genealogy of the Jihadist evil in the modern world. Maududi was the acknowledged godfather of the modern ideologues, but, as we have seen, all of them ground their thinking in the texts and traditions of Islam. Among the champions of this evil in our own time, the Muslim Brotherhood is the most heinous, widespread, and influential. “No other organization,” Kuntzel observes, for example, “has influenced the ideology of the al Qaida cadres more strongly than the Brotherhood and its leading members Hassan al-Banna, Sayyid Qutb and Abdullah Azzam have”²¹⁸ (Azzam is discussed in Chapter 6).

Other notorious figures of the twenty-first century who trace their genealogy directly to the evil of these ideologues include Omar al-Bashir (b. 1944) of the Sudan, Ismail Haniyeh (b. 1963) of Hamas, and Hassan Nasrallah (b. 1960) of Hezbollah. Still others counted among Qutb’s disciples include the blind sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman (b. 1938), now in prison in the United States for conspiracy to commit terrorism in the 1993 World Trade Center bombings, and Muhammad Abd al-Salam Faraj (1954–1982), whose “book *Al-Farida al-Gha’iba* (*The Neglected Duty*) is considered the most important of the *jihad*

²¹⁷ Ibid., 204.

²¹⁸ Matthias Kuntzel, “National Socialism and Anti-Semitism in the Arab World,” *Jewish Political Studies Review* (17, Spring 2005): <http://www.jcpa.org/phas/phas-kuntzel-so5.htm>.

literature,”²¹⁹ as well as lesser known thinkers such as Dr. Muhammad Na'im Yasin (b. 1965)²²⁰ and Jordanian Colonel Ahmad al-Mu'mini (dates unknown).²²¹ According to Malise Ruthven, the first terrorist group inspired by Qutb was Hizb al-Tahrir (Islamic Liberation Party), founded in 1974 by Palestinian Salih Sirriyya (1933–1974); the second group was Jama'at al-Muslimin (Society of Muslims), led by Shukri Mustafa (1942–1977).²²² As Moussalli has said, “whether it is *al-jihad al-Islami*, *al-Takfir wa al-Hijrah*, *al-jihad*, *Tanzim al-Faniyyah al-Askariyyah*, *Jund Allah* – all these are theoretical followers of Sayyid Qutb.”²²³ If, however, the Jihadist genealogical tree sprouts from the soil of these Jihadist ideologues, it grows from a Nazi seed planted in that soil, as discussed in Chapter 3.

²¹⁹ Abu-Amr, 101. Faraj is regarded as a prominent post-1966 Salafist; he was the founder of Jamaat al-Jihad, the group that assassinated Anwar Sadat. The great eras of Islam, he maintained, were characterized not by learning but by great *jihad*. He argued that jihad is not limited by any prohibitions against killing the innocent, including children; see Charles Selengut, “Sacred Visions and Religious Terror: The Case of Islam,” in David Bukay, ed., *Muhammad's Monsters: A Comprehensive Guide to Radical Islam for Western Audiences* (Green Forest, AR: Balfour Books, 2004), 52–53.

²²⁰ See Muhammad N. Yasin, *Al-Jihad: Mayadinahu wa asalibahu* (Algiers: Dar al-Irshad, 1991).

²²¹ See Ahmad al-Mu'mini, *Al-Tabi'a al jihadiyya fi al-Islam* (Constantine, Algeria: Mu'assasat al-Isra', 1991).

²²² Malise, 103, 105–6.

²²³ Moussalli, 244.

The Nazi Seed in Islamic Soil

Al-Husseini affirmed that “the Arabs were Germany’s natural friends because they had the same enemies as had Germany, namely . . . the Jews.”

From the minutes of Haj Amin al-Husseini’s meeting with Hitler,
28 November 1941

According to Matthias Küntzel, several thousand Nazi war criminals found refuge in Egypt, because “in Egypt they could continue their war against the Jews.”¹ “After the war,” Lawrence Wright correctly adds, “Cairo became a sanctuary for Nazis, who advised the military and the government. The rise of the Islamist movement coincided with the decline of fascism, but they overlapped in Egypt, and the germ passed into a new carrier.”² From what we have seen, however, it is evident that the National Socialist germ had passed into the Islamic Jihadist carrier well before the end of the Second World War. As Joseph Schechtman observes, “The Arabs proved to be the only people in the whole world for whom close collaboration with Hitler and Mussolini was not a crime, not even a blemish in the record of a national leader.”³ On the

¹ Matthias Küntzel, *Jihad and Jew-Hatred: Islamism, Nazism and the Roots of 9/11*, trans. Colin Meade (New York: Telos Press, 2007), 47.

² Lawrence Wright, *The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2006), 39.

³ Joseph B. Schechtman, *The Mufti and the Fuehrer: The Rise and Fall of Haj Amin el-Husseini* (New York: Thomas Yoseloff, 1965), 196.

contrary, it was almost always a badge of honor. There is a reason the Nazis knew they would be welcomed in Arab Muslim lands. There they found not only a war criminals' haven but an ideological heaven.

What exactly is the "germ" Wright refers to? It is exterminationist Jew hatred. Wed to Nazi ideology, the perennial Islamic contempt for the Jews grew into a determined Jihadist desire to annihilate them. Kenneth Timmerman makes the important point that, like Nazi Jew hatred, Jihadist Jew hatred has nothing to do with scapegoating, xenophobia, ignorance, underdevelopment, poverty, or oppression; nor is it about checkpoints, security fences, the status of Jerusalem, or even the "occupation." No, the Jew hatred comes first, and the rest of it is invoked to justify the hatred.⁴

Jeffrey Herf is on target when he writes, "Radical anti-Semitism did not enter Arab and Islamic politics because of the cleverness of Nazi propagandists; on the contrary, their cleverness lay partly in understanding that some currents in Arab politics and the religion of Islam offered points of entry for a positive reception of Nazism's message."⁵ What Herf points out is as much a parallel as a cause: "Where Nazi propagandists in Europe informed audiences that the Nazi regime was then in the process of exterminating Europe's Jews, the Arabic-speaking announcers in Berlin and the VFA [Voice of Free Arabism] would on a number of occasions urge listeners to take matters into their own hands, to, as they put it, 'kill the Jews.'⁶ Of note is that both Nazi and Muslim propaganda campaigns are rooted not in the prospect of a Jewish state but in their hatred of the Jewish people. Küntzel correctly states, "Anyone who believes in presenting Israel as the scapegoat for Islamist violence is not only diverting attention from the goals of Islamism and its National Socialist heritage, but is also, by adhering to a new 'the Jew is guilty' model, reconnecting with the ancient forms of European anti-Semitism."⁷ The Islamic Jihadists did

⁴ Kenneth R. Timmerman, *Preachers of Hate: Islam and the War on America* (New York: Three Rivers Press, 2004), 4.

⁵ Jeffrey Herf, *Nazi Propaganda for the Arab World* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2009), 4.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 11.

⁷ Matthias Küntzel, "National Socialism and Anti-Semitism in the Arab World," *Jewish Political Studies Review* (17, Spring 2005): <http://www.jcpa.org/phas/phas-kuntzel-05.htm>.

far more than reconnect, however; infected by the Nazi germ of Jew hatred, they took that hatred to even greater extremes.

Among the foremost sanctuaries that the Nazi murderers found in Muslim lands was Syria (a point that must be kept in mind when we consider the Baath Party in Chapter 7). Among the most notorious of the Nazis granted asylum in Syria was SS Hauptsturmführer Alois Brunner (b. 1912), to whom Adolf Eichmann (1906–1962) referred as his “best man.” Brunner was convicted in France in 1954 for the murder of at least 140,000 Jews. Twenty years later, French Nazi hunters Serge and Beate Klarsfeld tracked him down in Damascus, where he was making a comfortable living as an adviser to the Syrian intelligence services. According to Tom Knowlton, Haj Amin al-Husseini, an associate of the Muslim Brotherhood who “had a strong influence over the founding members of both the Iraqi and Syrian Ba’ath party,” was “instrumental in arranging Brunner’s employment.”⁸ When the legendary Israeli spy Eli Cohen (1924–1965) took up residence in Damascus in 1962, his Syrian acquaintances introduced him to Nazi expert on Jewish Affairs Franz Rademacher (1906–1973), a senior Eichmann aide who had been involved in the mass murder of Jews from Belgium, Holland, Croatia, and elsewhere. After the war, Rademacher fled to Syria, where he became an official in the Syrian Secret Service.

Egypt, the home of the Muslim Brotherhood, proved to be especially hospitable to Nazi murderers. Knowlton notes that al-Husseini “is reported to have been responsible for bringing Otto Skorzeny (1908–1975), the Nazi commander once labeled by the OSS as ‘the most dangerous man in Europe,’ into the employ of the Nasser government.”⁹ Other notorious Nazi war criminals who found safe haven in Egypt were former Goebbels assistants Johann von Leers (1902–1965), Franz Bünsche (dates unknown), and Louis Heiden (d. 1994), the man who converted to Islam, took the name Luis al-Haj, and translated *Mein Kampf* into Arabic. Then there were Luftwaffe ace Hans-Ulrich Rudel (1916–1982) and Himmler staff member SS Colonel Eugen Dollman (1900–ca. 1982), both of whom helped many

⁸ Tom Knowlton, “Nazi Roots of Modern Radical Islam,” <http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/news/816232/post>.

⁹ *Ibid.*; see also Chuck Morse, *The Nazi Connection to Islamic Terrorism* (New York: iUniverse, 2003), 94.

Nazi war criminals to escape, not only to find refuge in Egypt but to secure influential government positions. Other Nazis assisted Arab governments in the spread of anti-Jewish propaganda throughout the Arab Muslim world, and still others helped Nasser set up a security police force.¹⁰

Among the thousands of Nazis to take up a comfortable residence in Egypt, Seán Mac Mathúna identifies the following:

- Joachim Däumling, former Gestapo chief in Düsseldorf, and later engaged in SS operations in Croatia (He was employed to set up the Egyptian secret service modeled after Himmler's Reich Security Office.)
- SS General Oskar Dirlewanger, chief of the SS penal brigade
- SS Major Eugen Eichberger, battalion-commander in the Dirlewanger brigade
- SS Colonel Leopold Gleim, chief of the Gestapo department for Jewish affairs in Poland
- SS Lieutenant Colonel Bernhard Bender, Gestapo official in Poland and the USSR
- SS General Heinrich Selimann, Gestapo chief in Ulm
- SS Major Schmalstich, Gestapo liaison officer to French collaborators and organizer of Jewish transports from Paris to Auschwitz
- SS Major Seipal, Gestapo official in Paris
- SS General Alois Moser, a war criminal who was involved in the extermination of the Soviet Jews in the Ukraine
- SS Major Walter Bollman, involved in crimes against humanity and genocide against the Jews of the Ukraine
- Gestapo officer Franz Bartel
- Walter Birgal, an SS officer from Leipzig
- Erich Bunz, a former SA major and expert in the Jewish Question
- Albert Thielemann, a regional SS chief in Bohemia
- SS Captain Wilhelm Böckler, who participated in the liquidation of the Warsaw Ghetto
- Wehrmacht General Wilhelm Fahrmbacher, who took over the central planning staff in Cairo.¹¹

¹⁰ Elliot A. Green, "Arabs and Nazis – Can It Be True?," http://www.sullivan-county.com/id4/green_nazis.html.

¹¹ Seán Mac Mathúna, "Postwar Arab links to the ODESSA Network," 1999, <http://www.fantompowa.net/Flame/nazis-postwar-egypt.htm>.

In addition, Mathúna points out, there were many Nazis, mostly former Waffen-SS men, who assisted in the training of the Egyptian army. At least two hundred German and Austrian scientists and other personnel were deployed in the new aircraft and missile center at Helwan, where the new staff physician was Dr. Hans Eisele (1912–1967), SS captain and medical torturer in the concentration camps at Dachau and Buchenwald. The presence of hundreds of Nazis in Egypt under the Nasser regime was exposed in the world press in October 1962; it precipitated a crisis in the Israeli government and an embarrassment in West Germany.¹² One wonders, however, whether even the Israelis had yet fathomed the depth of the connection between the Nazis who had just tried to exterminate the Jews and the Jihadists who were now striving to continue their mentors' work. Be that as it may, the Jihadist soil was fertile and ready not only to welcome its murderous Nazi guests but also to cultivate even further their murderous ideology. For that soil had already been thoroughly prepared.

Nazi Influences in the Arab Muslim World

The Nazis were not the first Europeans to plant the seeds of Jew hatred in the Arab Muslim world. The infamous Damascus Blood Libel of 1840 immediately comes to mind. Bernard Lewis notes that the first Arabic versions of anti-Semitic texts from Europe were published in the second half of the nineteenth century; the earliest ones were mostly translations, and most of them were from French.¹³ He points out further that an Arabic translation of *The Protocols of the Elders of Zion* came out on 15 January 1926 in the periodical *Raqib Sahyun*, which was published in Jerusalem.¹⁴ This notorious anti-Semitic forgery would have – and continues to have – long-standing popularity in Muslim lands. In March 1970, a Lebanese newspaper placed the *Protocols* first on its list of nonfiction best sellers. And so it is today.

Nazi anti-Semitism, however, took European Jew hatred to unprecedented levels, and it influenced the Arab Muslim world in unprecedented ways. “European anti-Semitism, in both its theological and

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Bernard Lewis, *Semites and Anti-Semites: An Inquiry into Conflict and Prejudice* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1999), 133.

¹⁴ Ibid., 199.

racist versions,” Lewis correctly observes, “was essentially alien to Islamic traditions, culture and modes of thought. But to an astonishing degree the ideas, literature, even the crudest inventions of the Nazis and their predecessors have, so to speak, been internalized and Islamicized. The major themes – the *Protocols*, the invented Talmud quotations, ritual murder, the hatred of mankind, the Masonic and the rest of the conspiracy theories, poisoning the wells and taking over the world – remain; but they are given an Islamic, even a Quranic twist.”¹⁵ One work from the period that makes evident the Nazis’ early influence on the Islamic Jihadists is Carl Raswan’s *Escape from Baghdad* (1938). A German traveler celebrated in his time, Raswan reported encountering intense pro-Nazi feelings among the Arabs, who declared to him, “We are learning from Mussolini and Hitler.”¹⁶ And so they did. Inspired by the Nazis, Jihadists throughout the region not only imitated the German form of Jew hatred but expanded it.

Lukasz Hirszowicz points out that Arab-Nazi collaboration took place not just on political and military levels but above all on an ideological level: more than a process of imitation, we observe a process of inculcation and elaboration. On a visit to Berlin in 1937, for example, “Dr Said Abdel-Fattah Iman of the Damascus Arab Club proposed, inter alia, to promote National Socialist ideology among the Arabs and Muslims generally.”¹⁷ In May 1937, “on the occasion of the observance of Mohammed’s birth, German and Italian flags were displayed [in Palestine] as well as portraits of Hitler and Mussolini.”¹⁸ Witnessing such a display of Muslim support for the Nazi agenda, on 1 June 1937 Germany’s Minister for Foreign Affairs, Konstantin von Neurath, declared that Germany “has an interest in strengthening the Arab world as a counterweight against such a possible increase in power for world Jewry.”¹⁹ In other words, to be anti-Zionist was to be pro-Nazi. Confirming that Jew hatred constituted the common link between the Germans and the Muslims, the 9 January 1938 edition

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 267.

¹⁶ Carl Raswan, *Escape from Baghdad*, facsimile edition (New York: George Olms, 1978), 137.

¹⁷ Lukasz Hirszowicz, *The Third Reich and the Arab East* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1966), 35–36.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 27.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 30.

of the Arab newspaper *Al-Jamia al-Islamiyya* printed, “Many Arabs consider that Germany is a friend of the Arabs. This friendship is perhaps the result of the German hatred of the Jews.”²⁰ Later that year, on 16 October, the *New York Times* ran an article by Harold Callender, who related that “the Nazi press this week gave vent to an outburst of sympathy for the Arabs in Palestine who were reported to be forming a ‘free corps’ on the Sudeten German model, in order to ‘fight against Judaism.’”²¹ The use of the term *free corps* is an obvious reference to the *Freikorps*, a group of post-World War I disenchanted Germans out of which the Nazi Party emerged in 1920. Here we see the shift from parallel to influence: again, not only were the Muslims imitating the Germans, but they were also learning from them. The more the Muslims learned from the Germans, the more eager they were to learn.

“The close and at times active relationship that developed between Nazi Germany and sections of the Arab leadership, in the years from 1933 to 1945,” writes Lewis, “was due not to a German attempt to win over the Arabs but rather to a series of Arab approaches to the Germans.”²² The promotion of Nazi ideology of course had political and military implications, which manifested themselves in a variety of ways. Jihadist military units adopted the goose-step march, as well as the Nazi salute, and they continue to use them to this day, as evidenced by scenes from Hezbollah rallies and Iranian military parades. The first congratulatory telegrams to Hitler upon his appointment as chancellor on 30 January 1933 came from Arab Muslims. When the Nuremberg Laws passed on 15 September 1935 and the Nazis began confiscating Jewish property, they received more such telegrams from all over the Arab Islamic world. If the Nazis continued to allow and even encourage Jewish emigration to Palestine, it was because they were convinced that the Arabs would exterminate the Jews.²³

In 1932, immediately before Hitler’s ascent to power – and inspired by him – the Syrian Social Nationalist Party or PPS (*Hizb-el-qaumi-el-suri*) was formed, conscientiously modeled after the National Socialist Party. Its leader Antun Saadeh (1904–1949) called himself the Führer of the

²⁰ Ibid., 42.

²¹ Schechtman, 81.

²² Lewis, 140.

²³ See Timmerman, 104.

Syrian nation, among whom Hitler became known as Abu Ali (in Egypt he was called Muhammad Haidar). The banner of the PPS displayed a swastika on a black-and-white background.²⁴ Timmerman notes that this Islamic admiration of the Nazis extended into later years, when Muslims throughout the Middle East were naming their children after Adolf Hitler, the world's most infamous murderer of the Jews: "A whole generation of Egyptians, such as Hitler Tantawi – director of the Administrative Monitoring Authority, which audits government agencies – bears witness to the admiration many people felt for the German Führer."²⁵ Thus, Jihadists give to their children the name that the Jews would erase.

Next to the Muslim Brotherhood, according to Paul Longgear and Raymond McNemar, "the most influential party [in Egypt] that emulated the Nazis was 'Young Egypt,' which was founded in October 1933. They had storm troopers, torch processions, and literal translations of Nazi slogans – like 'One folk, One party, One leader.'"²⁶ Gamal Abdul Nasser and Anwar Sadat were members. Meanwhile, just to draw the Nazis and the Jihadists closer, in 1934, portions of *Mein Kampf* appeared in newspapers in Beirut and Baghdad. Fritz Grobba (1886–1973) of the Nazi Foreign Ministry played a key role in urging the publication of the Führer's notorious manifesto in Arabic. Perusing the translation, he replaced the term *anti-Semitic* with *anti-Jewish* and the term *anti-Semitism* with *anti-Judaism*.²⁷ Indeed, what made the Nazis and the Islamic Jihadists true soul mates was not just their hatred of Jews; it was their determination to eradicate *Judaism* from the world.

In the 1930s, Küntzel reports, "students from Arab countries received German scholarships, firms took on Arab apprentices, and Arab party leaders were invited to the Nuremberg party rallies and military chiefs to Wehrmacht manoeuvres. An 'Arab Club' was established in Berlin as the centre for Palestine-related agitation and Arabic-language broadcasting."²⁸ For example, modeled after the Nazis'

²⁴ Paul Longgear and Raymond McNemar, "The Arab/Muslim Nazi Connection," *Militant Islam Monitor* (4 May 2004): <http://www.militantislammonitor.org/article/id/73>.

²⁵ Timmerman, 66–67.

²⁶ Longgear and McNemar.

²⁷ Herf, 24.

²⁸ Küntzel, *Jihad and Jew-Hatred*, 30.

Brown Shirts, Young Egypt's Green Shirts sent a delegation to the 1935 Nazi Party rally in Nuremberg, their founding leader Ahmad Husain declaring, "We are infinitely closer to Rome and Berlin than to Paris and London."²⁹ That same year, the Iraqi government formed a youth organization called *Futuwwa* ("Courage" or "Manliness") to educate the youth "in the military spirit in the German fashion."³⁰ They sent a delegation to the 1938 Nuremberg rally.

It is not surprising, then, to find that Professor Walter Gross (1904–1945), chief of the SS Department of Racial Policy, wrote in the SS review *Weltkampf*, "We are not against all Semites. The Arabs are a noble race. We are against *the Jews*."³¹ It is the Arabs' Nazi-like hatred of the Jews that, in Gross's eyes, makes the Arabs a "noble race," particularly the *Arab Muslims*. Similarly, on 4 December 1937, the Nazi newspaper *Völkischer Beobachter* rejected the idea that Arabs were pure Semites, underscoring their "partial Aryanization through Armenian and Circassian elements."³² To be sure, Himmler expressed the "ideological closeness" of National Socialism and Islam by "coining the concept of *Muselgermanen*" (Muslim-Germans).³³ One way in which the Muslims earned that honorary title was to distribute Arabic leaflets embossed with the swastika during the 1935–1939 revolts in Palestine.³⁴

In the fall of 1938, the French newspaper *Marianne* reported that British troops in Nablus were greeted with shouts of "Heil, Hitler!" The Arab journals *Falastin* and *Al Difa'a* frequently published large portraits of Nazi leaders.³⁵ At the time, in fact, wrote journalist John Gunther, "The greatest contemporary Arab hero is probably Hitler."³⁶ Nazi broadcasts in Arabic began on 25 April 1939 from Zeesen; by October 1939, they were broadcasting fifteen hours a day, seven days a week.³⁷ From 1941 onward, Haj Amin al-Husseini was broadcasting

²⁹ Quoted in Laurent Murawiec, *The Mind of Jihad* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 240.

³⁰ Küntzel, 26–27.

³¹ Quoted in Timmerman, 111; emphasis added.

³² Lewis, 147.

³³ Klaus Gensicke, *Der Mufti von Jerusalem: Amin el-Husseini und die Nationalsozialisten* (Frankfurt am Main: Verlag Peter Lang, 1988), 171.

³⁴ Küntzel, "National Socialism and Anti-Semitism in the Arab World."

³⁵ Schechtman, 83.

³⁶ John Gunther, *Inside Asia* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1942), 552.

³⁷ Herf, 37.

from that facility. In most parts of the Arab world, people listened to these broadcasts in public places, because most Arabs could not read and relied heavily on the radio for their information. Of course, in keeping with Hitler's injunction,³⁸ the aim of these propaganda broadcasts was to incite "wrathful hatred" of the Jews. In a document dated 8 May 1941, Shirdar Telkatz of the British Colonial Office reported, "There are Arab Nazi organizations which operate from Damascus, Aleppo and Beirut. The Nadi El Arabi is the most dangerous Nazi propaganda machine. Its members are a group of fanatical Arabs turned Nazis at German universities."³⁹ Thus, when "the Germans intensified their Arabic propaganda campaign" that same year,⁴⁰ they had an eagerly receptive audience.

These seeds planted during the Third Reich sprouted and grew from the end of the Reich to this very day. On 18 September 1953, for example, Anwar Sadat, who was tried and convicted by the British as a Nazi spy, wrote a letter to the Egyptian daily *Al-Mussawwar* expressing his admiration for Hitler, saying, "My dear Hitler, I congratulate you from the bottom of my heart. Even if you appear to have been defeated, in reality you are the victor."⁴¹ The activities of Nazi war criminals among the Muslims continued throughout the 1950s and into the 1960s: "In 1969, the PLO recruited two former Nazi instructors, Erich Altern, a leader of the Gestapo's Jewish affairs section, and Willy Berner, who was an SS officer in the Mauthausen extermination camp. Another former Nazi, Johann Schuller, was found supplying arms to Fatah. Belgian Jean Tireault, secretary of the neo-Nazi organization La Nation Européenne, also went on the Fatah payroll. Another Belgian, neo-Nazi Karl van der Put, recruited volunteers for the PLO."⁴² The PLO's connection to the Nazis lay in Yasser Arafat's intimate relations with Haj Amin al-Husseini, something that I address in detail in Chapter 7.

³⁸ Adolf Hitler, *Mein Kampf*, trans. Ralph Manheim (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1971), 632.

³⁹ Schechtman, 85; emphasis added.

⁴⁰ Moshe Perlman, *Mufti of Jerusalem: Haj Amin el Husseini, A Father of Jihad* (Philadelphia: Pavilion, 2006), 45.

⁴¹ Quoted in Kuntzel, *Jihad and Jew-Hatred*, 69–70.

⁴² David G. Dalin and John F. Rothman, *Icon of Evil: Hitler's Mufti and the Rise of Radical Islam* (New York: Random House, 2008), 134–35.

Typifying not only the admiration but also the assimilation of Hitler's ideology among the Muslims is an article by Dr. Yahya al-Rakhawi published on 19 July 1982 in Egypt's Liberal Party newspaper *Al-Ahrrar*. In it Dr. al-Rakhawi invokes "that great man Hitler, may God have mercy on him, who was the wisest of those who confronted this problem . . . and who out of compassion for humanity, tried to exterminate every Jew," as if he were ridding the world of smallpox. He goes on to argue that Ruhullah Khomeini is best suited to carry on this struggle, declaring, "Failure to 'excise the Jewish cancer on the body of humanity,' could lead to the destruction of humanity itself."⁴³ Excise? *Annihilate* is a more accurate term. An Iranian Islamic regime, influenced from the outset by Nazi and Jihadist thinking, would eventually be best suited for the task of annihilation. Thus, the Arab intellectuals – and not just the "oppressed and poverty-stricken" Muslim masses – adopted Sayyid Qutb's ideological line on the "nature" of the Jew. Much more than a matter of race, it was a matter of essence, a principle that was foundational to the ideologies of Islamic Jihadist movements, from Islamic Jihad to Hezbollah, from Hamas to Fatah. It is an issue that defines the Islamic Jihadist imperative to exterminate the Jews: the extermination of the Jews becomes the extermination of the *essence of evil*, and therefore *the Jew cannot be redeemed*. Because the Jew is the embodiment of the essence of evil, the Israeli, as a Jew, also falls into that category: the term *Israeli*, then, becomes a metaphysical, and not a political, designation.

Thus, in another article espousing Hitler's views, on 27 September 1982, Dr. Lutfi Abd al-Azim wrote, "The first thing we have to make clear is that no distinction must be made between the Jew and the Israeli. . . . The Jew is a Jew, through millennia . . . in spurning all moral values, devouring the living and drinking his blood for the sake of a few coins."⁴⁴ The one reservation that the Arab Muslim world seems to have about Hitler was expressed by Egyptian scholar Ahmad Ragab, who on 18 April 2001 wrote, "Our thanks go to the late Hitler, who wrought, in advance, the vengeance of the Palestinians upon the most despicable villains on the face of the earth. However, we rebuke Hitler

⁴³ Lewis, 232.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 195.

for the fact that the vengeance was insufficient.”⁴⁵ Similarly, on 29 April 2002 Egyptian journalist Fatma Abdullah Mahmoud declared in *Al-Akhhbar*, “I, personally, complain to Hitler. . . , ‘If only you had done it, brother, if only it had really happened, so that the world could sigh in relief without their evil and sin.’”⁴⁶ As one can see from these examples, the expression of the Jihadists’ exterminationist anti-Semitism is not confined to their diatribes from the pulpit or to the bravado of their covenants. No, the Jihadist hatred of the Jews is woven into the fabric of Muslim culture, both high and low.

Hitler’s last injunction to the world called for “a merciless resistance to the world poisoners, international Jewry.”⁴⁷ The Arab Muslims heeded his call by rendering their lands as *Judenrein* as possible. Here are some figures that indicate the rate of the expulsion of Jews from Arab Muslim countries, showing the Jewish population of those countries before 1948, compared with 1979–1982:

Country	Pre-1948	1979–1982
Iraq	125,000	200–300
Egypt	75,000	250
Syria	30,000	4,300–4,800
Yemen	55,000	1,200
Morocco	265,000	18,000
Algeria	130,000–140,000	300–400
Tunisia	105,000	2,500–4,000
Lebanon	5,000	200
Libya	38,000	15–20 ⁴⁸

It will be said that this was “merely” a reaction to the establishment of the Jewish state and that the Nazi influence had little to do with it. However, the expulsion served only to add to the Jewish state because, as Herzl had predicted, Israel proved to be the one haven open to most of the eight hundred thousand-plus Jews expelled from their homes throughout the Middle East and North Africa: *if the Muslims*

⁴⁵ Quoted in Serge Trifkovic, *The Sword of the Prophet: Islam: History, Theology, Impact on the World* (Boston: Regina Orthodox Press, 2002), 188.

⁴⁶ Quoted in Küntzel, *Jihad and Jew-Hatred*, 61.

⁴⁷ Adolf Hitler, *Speeches and Proclamations, 1932–1945*, ed. Max Domarus, trans. Mary Fran Gilbert (Wauconda, IL: Bolchazy-Carducci, 1997), 647.

⁴⁸ As reported on www.erezysisroal.org/~jkatz/nazis.html. Saudi Arabia is not on the list because Jews are not allowed to live in Saudi Arabia; Jordan has also been excluded because no Jews lived there before 1948.

had been concerned merely about the Jewish state, they would not have added to its population. Were they attempting to move the Jews into one big ghetto, as the Nazis had done, this time to bring the gas chambers to the Jews rather than the Jews to the gas chambers? No one can say. What is clear is this: the Muslim countries were not reacting to the existence of a Jewish state: rather, in keeping with their Nazi-like Jew hatred, they were reacting to the existence of Jews in their midst, and the ongoing postwar influence of the Nazis on Arab Muslim thinking is reflected in numerous pronouncements from the twenty-first-century Arab Muslim world.

For example, “on May 27, 2001, a cleric from Egypt’s renowned Al-Azhar University named Mahmoud Muhammad Khadhr penned an essay entitled ‘In Defense of Hitler.’”⁴⁹ The Arab Lawyers Union had full-size posters of Hitler on display at their stand in the documentation center for the UN-sponsored World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance in Durban, South Africa, 31 August–7 September 2001. A “documentary” called *Horseman without a Horse*, based on *The Protocols of the Elders of Zion*, was produced in December 2001 by Egyptian actor Muhammad Subhi. In 2002, Dr. Umayma Ahmad al-Jalahma of King Faisal University published an article in the Saudi newspaper *Al-Riyadh* accusing the Jews of the blood libel. When Voice of America issued an editorial calling for a retraction, the editor of the newspaper, Turki al-Sudairi, wrote a reply falsely stating that George Washington and Benjamin Franklin had called for the expulsion of the Jews from America. In it he used quotes lifted directly from the 1935 Nazi publication *A Handbook on the Jewish Question*.⁵⁰ A dramatization of the blood libel was created by Hezbollah as an episode in a twenty-nine-part series produced by their broadcasting facility, Al-Manar, with Syrian government funding; it was first aired during Ramadan 2003. Programs in the series accuse Jews of every atrocity, including the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki; the Al-Manar station has an audience of ten million viewers per day.

Itamar Marcus and Barbara Crook reported a statement from an article by Kan'an Ubayd in the Hamas newspaper *Al-Risalah*, published on 23 April 2007, in which he declares, “The extermination of the Jews is good for the inhabitants of the world,” a statement that

⁴⁹ Timmerman, 91–92.

⁵⁰ See *ibid.*, 74–76.

sounds familiar to anyone who knows Hitler's diatribes against the Jews. Indeed, Marcus and Crook observe, "It should be noted that Hamas's justification for the extermination of Jews, both as God's will and for the benefit of humanity, echoes Hitler's words in *Mein Kampf*: 'If the Jew with the help of his Marxist creed is victorious over the peoples of this world, then his crown will be the funeral wreath of humanity. Thus I believe today that I am acting according to the will of the almighty Creator: when I defend myself against the Jew, I am fighting for the work of the Lord.'"⁵¹ Among the Jihadists we find much more than an echo of Hitler. We find a continuation and a refinement of National Socialist ideology as it blossomed in the words and the deeds of Islamic Jihadism.

A prime example of the spread of Hitlerian Jew hatred in the Arab Muslim world can be found in the introduction to the Luis al-Haj translation of selections from *Mein Kampf* into Arabic. The first Arabic-language edition of portions of *Mein Kampf* was published in Egypt in 1939 by Nassiri Nasser, the brother of Gamal Abdul Nasser who admired Hitler as the strongest man in Europe. Since 1963 (with a later edition published in 1995), however, the al-Haj translation has been the best-selling edition in the Arabic-speaking world. It is currently distributed by Al-Shurouq, a Ramallah-based book distributor, to East Jerusalem and territories controlled by the Palestinian Authority, where in 1999 it was number six on the best-sellers list. The book has maintained its spot on the Palestinian best-sellers list ever since.

In Chapter 1, I cited a passage from the introduction to the English edition of *Mein Kampf*: "Written in white-hot hatred," this book presents "a program of blood and terror in a self-revelation of such overwhelming frankness that few among its readers had the courage to believe it."⁵² The introduction to the Arabic edition describes him as a great jihadist. Here is that introduction in full:

Adolf Hitler was not an ordinary man to be summarily turned over to the fading of time. His example has been both widespread and visible and has deeply influenced the resurgence of the fascist universe. Adolf Hitler is not the possession of the German people alone. Indeed, he is one of the few

⁵¹ Itamar Marcus and Barbara Crook, "Hamas Spokesman: Genocide of Jews Remains Hamas Goal," *Palestinian Media Watch* (12 April 2007): <http://pmw.org.il/bulletins-apr2007.htm#030507>.

⁵² Konrad Heiden, Introduction to Adolf Hitler, *Mein Kampf*, trans. Ralph Manheim (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1971), xv.

great men who all but brought the march of history to a standstill; he altered its course and reshaped the world. Therefore he belongs to history. Hitler was a soldier whose efforts bequeathed [to the world] a true legend stained by nothing less than tragedy, the tragedy of a country whose dreams were shattered, of an order whose reign was crushed, and of a party whose brilliant power came to an end. Hitler was a man of ideological conviction who left behind an ideological legacy that assumes various forms. This ideological legacy pervades politics, society, science, art, and war as science and art.

The National Socialism that Adolf Hitler nobly espoused and expounded upon in his book *My Struggle* – whose principles he elucidated in his speeches before he came to power, as well as during his thirteen years of rule as head of the German nation – this National Socialism will not fade away with the death of its bearer of good tidings. Rather, its seeds are dispersed beneath every star. The National Socialist ideology was the weapon used by national radical followers as they were confronting the Third Communist International⁵³ and the principles of Karl Marx. Even those who were fighting National Socialism and those who turned to progressivism and Communism in order to wipe out Nazism began to realize the importance of Hitler's principles and their validity as a model of an effective factor halting the course of radical left ideology. Through his unflagging determination and perseverance in his pursuit of clarity, Hitler exposed the [Communist] deception in his written work and has empowered others to do likewise. His work has been effective in halting the course of their influence with the utmost ease. This, of course, resulted from the effective rise of the dictatorship of a single, unified party, a party that rules by force, violence, and every Machiavellian means necessary to achieve its ends.

Whoever follows the evolution of the conflict between the Communist camp and democratic camp can see their confusion and embarrassment. In its attempts to block the increasing spread of Karl Marx's principles after the Second World War, the democratic camp is trying to achieve that goal by providing nations with financial, economic and technological support, while developing its political structure as a balance to Communist regimes. What springs to mind is Hitler's jihad as a soldier and his summons to action to achieve the aims of his party and his community. However, we cannot truly understand the man's jihad for truth without examining the principles I have laid down in his book *My Struggle*, which became the Nazis' "Bible of National Socialism."

This translation of *My Struggle* is justified by how well this work has been received; it has never been offered to the Arabic speaking people. It is taken

⁵³ The Third Communist International was established by Lenin on 19 March 1919. It consisted of twelve countries that sent delegates to promote Communism worldwide. The International was dissolved in 1943.

from the original edition of its author Adolf Hitler, an edition prepared without any omissions or modifications at the hand of the censor. We strived to transmit Hitler's views and theories on nationalism, ruling regimes, and inferior races, without any departure [from the text] because in the Arab world we thoroughly deliver blows and blindly strike out in all three areas Luis al-Haj.⁵⁴

Al-Haj's introduction illustrates a point made by Bernard Lewis: "The militant leaders of Arab nationalism, both right and left, saw in Hitler's Germany the model of successful nationalism or national socialism, an inspiring guide and helper in the struggle against their two great enemies, the West and the Jews."⁵⁵ After reading this introduction, one is not surprised to find that on 31 May 1960 the Saudi newspaper *Al-Bilad* ran the headline: "Capture of Eichmann, who had the honor of killing five million Jews."⁵⁶ The "tragedy" al-Haj refers to in the first paragraph is not just that Germany lost the war but that the Nazis failed to accomplish their primary mission – namely, the extermination of the Jews. Nevertheless, as al-Haj proclaims, his legacy lives on, particularly among the Islamic Jihadists: "National Socialism will not fade away with the death of its bearer of good tidings." Taking themselves to be the heirs to Hitler's greatness, the Jihadists "deliver blows and blindly strike out" against other nationalist movements, non-Muslim regimes, and "inferior races," meaning the Jews.

As indicated earlier, the al-Haj edition is not a complete translation of *Mein Kampf*; rather, he has translated selections of Hitler's inspiring manifesto and divided it into categories. Here is the Arabic edition's Table of Contents:

- I. Hitler and the Jews
 - A. My Childhood
 - B. Emerging from My Pastoral Age
 - C. The Social Democrat Party
 - D. The Rise of Socialism
 - E. Remarks of General Encouragement
 - F. The Rise of Organized Labor

⁵⁴ Luis al-Haj, Introduction to Adolf Hitler, *Kafaahi*, trans. Luis Al-Haj (Beirut: Dar Baysan, 1963), 5–6; my translation, with the assistance of Avi Melamed, to whom I am deeply grateful.

⁵⁵ Lewis, 160–61.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 162.

- G. A Universal Vision
- H. The Downtrodden Worker
- I. Munich

- II. Hitler and His Followers
 - A. The Workers' Party
 - B. The Party's Appeal
 - C. Agitation
 - D. Suddenly Energized
 - E. The Rising Success of the Party
 - F. Revilers

- III. Hitler and Race
 - A. Peoples and Race
 - B. The Workers' Party
 - C. In Its Infancy

- IV. Hitler and Nazism
 - A. The International the Period of Its Foundation
 - B. The International and Domestic Rabble
 - C. The Philosophical Concept and the Organization
 - D. A Treatise on Terror
 - E. The Powerful Strength of His Soul
 - F. Useful Weapons

- V. Hitler and His Spiritual Movement
 - A. Summons and Organization
 - B. The Movement and Its Leaders
 - C. Forging Alliances
 - D. Looking to the East
 - E. The True Impetus behind Its Inception⁵⁷

Notice that al-Haj begins with a defining feature both of National Socialism and of Islamic Jihadism: Jew hatred. Next he has a section on the organization of the Party, followed by the ideological foundations of the party's anti-Semitism as reflected in its race theory. The section on "Hitler and Nazism" includes discussions of strategy, including

⁵⁷ Adolf Hitler, *Kafaahi*, trans. Luis Al-Haj (Beirut: Dar Baysan, 1963), 383-84; my translation.

the spread of terror, in achieving the ideology's goals, and the book concludes with a section on the religious dimensions of the movement, imparting to it a sense of absolute, uncompromising duty. Thus, al-Haj presents his Muslim reader with a version of Hitler's diatribe that is especially appealing to the Jihadist outlook steeped in Jew hatred. The Nazi seed had indeed sprouted in Islamic soil. But a seed does not grow without careful cultivation and plenty of fertilizer. That fertilizer has a name: it is Haj Amin al-Husseini. As Timmerman has correctly observed, al-Husseini's "close ties to Hitler, and his total embrace of Hitler's Final Solution, provides the common thread linking the past to the present. If today's Muslim anti-Semitism is like a tree with many branches, its roots feed directly off of Hitler's Third Reich."⁵⁸ Yes, Muslim Jew hatred is like a tree, as Timmerman suggests: it is a genealogical tree of evil. Among its first fruits, its strange fruit, was Haj Amin al-Husseini.

Hitler's Jihadist Stepchild: Haj Amin al-Husseini (1895–1974)

Haj Amin al-Husseini was born in Jerusalem in 1895, the son of Mufti Tahir al-Husseini. The al-Husseini clan was known for its wealthy landowners and their involvement in the political life of the Holy City. Al-Husseini's education included a year at Al-Azhar University in Cairo, where he studied Islamic law under Rashid Rida, the Salafist who had had a profound influence on Hasan al-Banna. In 1913, he made the *haj*, the journey to Mecca required of Muslims, and earned his honorary title. Immediately before World War I, he studied at the School of Administration in Istanbul. When the war broke out in August 1914, he joined the Ottoman Turkish army, an ally of Germany, and was commissioned as an artillery officer. When he returned on leave to Jerusalem in 1916, the British recruited him to serve in their cause, and he became an officer in the Arab Sherifian armies that had allied themselves with the British in a fight for independence against the Turks. With the Balfour Declaration of 2 November 1917, however, al-Husseini's attitude toward the British underwent a complete reversal. For the declaration had assured a British commitment to the establishment of a homeland for the Jews in Palestine, and, like

⁵⁸ Timmerman, 104.

many of his Muslim co-religionists, al-Husseini harbored a deep-seated hatred of the Jews.

Between 1917 and 1919, al-Husseini, who was emerging as a representative of his clan, came into conflict with the Nashashibi clan, a family who was sympathetic to the British position that the Jews should be allowed a homeland in Palestine. He was also enraged at the signing of the Weizmann-Faisal Agreement by Chaim Weizmann of the Zionist movement and His Royal Highness the Emir Faisal on 3 January 1919: Articles III and IV of the agreement assure the Jews a homeland in Palestine. Largely at the incitement of al-Husseini, four days of rioting in protest to the Balfour Declaration and the Weizmann-Faisal Agreement broke out in Jerusalem on 4 April 1920 during the annual *Nabi Musa*⁵⁹ procession; in the aftermath, al-Husseini was sentenced to ten years in prison for his role in instigating the riots, which devastated the Jewish residential areas of the Holy City. One result of the violence was that the mayor of Jerusalem, a member of the al-Husseini clan, was replaced by a member of their rival clan, Raghīb al-Nashashibi.

Upon the death of Grand Mufti Kamil on 21 March 1921, elections were held the following 12 April to select a new Grand Mufti. The top three in the polls were Sheikhs Husam al-Din Jarallah, Mahmoud Aziz al-Khaladi, and Kamel al-Budairi, with Haj Amin al-Husseini coming in fourth. Although the Nashashibi candidate Jarallah received more votes than his opponents, British Mandate Governor Herbert Samuel (1870–1963) saw an opportunity to make peace with Haj Amin, who all the while was orchestrating protests and threats of violence. In an effort to maintain a balance of power between the Husseini and Nashashibi clans, on 8 May 1921, Samuel appointed al-Husseini Grand Mufti of Jerusalem. The appointment was for life: it was an appointment that would cost the lives of thousands, if not tens of thousands, of Jews.

The following year, al-Husseini was elected president of the Supreme Muslim Council, a body that controlled tens of thousands of British pounds annually. They were also in charge of the Islamic courts in Palestine, which had the power to appoint teachers and preachers, all of whom would have to meet al-Husseini's criteria for spreading

⁵⁹ *Nabi Musa* means "the Prophet Moses," an annual Muslim festival that included a pilgrimage to the tomb of Moses, which, according to Islam, is near Jericho.

Jew hatred in the schools. Among the lies al-Husseini foisted on the little ones in the Muslim schools was that the Jews intended to take over the Temple Mount, destroy the al-Aqsa Mosque, and rebuild the temple. Those lies added fuel to the Muslim Jew hatred in 1928, when the British allowed the Jews to gather at the Western Wall for prayer. Following his hate-inciting speech on 23 August 1929, on 24 August, a Sabbath, sixty-seven Jews were slaughtered in Hebron; afterward photos were taken of the Jewish corpses, with the claim that they were actually Arabs murdered by Jews.⁶⁰ David Dalin and John Rothman put the numbers at 133 Jews killed, 339 wounded; they add that the riots of 1929 were preceded by the assertion of the Mufti's preachers that "he who kills a Jew is assured a place in the next world,"⁶¹ a refrain that continues to be repeated from Islamic pulpits throughout the world. The Muslim's ticket to paradise? A murdered Jew.

Norman Bentwich, who served as an attorney for the British mandatory government from 1920 to 1931, described al-Husseini as "a modern Haman plotting the destruction of the Jews."⁶² In 1931, the mufti founded the World Islamic Congress, with himself seated as president. In 1935, he formed an alliance with a militant group led by Sheikh Izz ad-Din al-Qassam (1882–1935), the man known as the father of the modern Jihadist movement and who is identified as its first martyr: he was killed by the British on 20 November 1935. Al-Qassam coined the slogan "God's book in one hand, and the rifle in the other."⁶³ According to Islamic scholar Ziad Abu-Amr, he personified two dimensions of Islamic Jihadism that parallel Nazi ideology: nationalism and socialism.⁶⁴ His enduring legacy is evidenced by the fact that the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigade, the military wing of Hamas formed in 1992, is named for him. On 19 April 1936, after al-Husseini had spread rumors that Jews were killing Arabs and had incited Arabs to kill Jews in retaliation, riots against the Jews in Jaffa broke out. Coincident with the outbreak of the Arab riots against the Jews, al-Husseini

⁶⁰ Morse, 29.

⁶¹ Dalin and Rothman, 30.

⁶² Schechtman, 57.

⁶³ Ziad Abu-Amr, *Islamic Fundamentalism in the West Bank and Gaza: Muslim Brotherhood and Islamic Jihad* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994), 99.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 100.

formed the Arab Higher Committee on 25 April 1936 and made himself head of the new fanatical organization, a position he held until his death in 1974, despite the British order to dissolve the organization on 30 September 1937.

Before and during the Arab riots against the Jews of Palestine in 1935–1939, al-Husseini was busy establishing his Nazi connections; indeed, as Chuck Morse has pointed out, “the election of Hitler as Chancellor of Germany, January 30, 1933, was an event that galvanized the entire Arab world.”⁶⁵ On 31 March 1933 (by which time Dachau was already in operation), al-Husseini made an appointment with German General Consul Heinrich Wolff in Jerusalem. That same day, Wolff sent a telegram to Berlin: “Today the Mufti gave me assurances that Muslims both within and outside of Palestine send greetings to the new regime in Germany and that they hope to see the spread of fascism and anti-democratic leadership in other lands. The current Jewish influence on the economy and politics is harmful everywhere and must be fought.”⁶⁶ Lewis makes the correct observation that the mufti’s “immediate aim was to halt and terminate the Jewish settlement of Palestine. Beyond that, however, he aimed at much vaster purposes, conceived not so much in pan-Arab as in pan-Islamic terms, for a holy war of Islam in alliance with Germany against world Jewry, to accomplish the final solution of the Jewish problem everywhere.”⁶⁷ It seems that the leader of the Islamic Jihadist world at the time was way ahead of the Führer, and he had his allies within that world.

In 1935, Abd-al-Rahman al-Banna, brother of Hasan al-Banna, went to Jerusalem to set up an alliance with al-Husseini, thus establishing a long-term relation between the mufti and the Muslim Brotherhood. Lukasz Hirszowicz argues that the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood “played an important role in the Palestinian uprising of 1936–9,”⁶⁸ which was spurred by the creation of the Peel Commission (the Commission arrived in Palestine on 11 November 1936), whose task was to

⁶⁵ Morse, 31.

⁶⁶ Gensicke, 45–46.

⁶⁷ Lewis, 147.

⁶⁸ Hirszowicz, 13.

explore the feasibility of the establishment of a Jewish state and an Arab state in Palestine. Neither al-Husseini nor the Ikhwan, as the Muslim Brotherhood is known, could tolerate a Jewish presence in Palestine or anywhere else, for that matter. With al-Husseini's help, the Muslim Brotherhood received support from the Nazis in the 1930s and 1940s. Al-Husseini later indicated that without funding from Germany and assistance from the Brotherhood, he could never have engineered the revolt of 1936–1939.⁶⁹ This deep connection between National Socialism and Islamic Jihadism was thus firmly rooted in their mutual hatred of the Jews. The Jew hatred, in fact, transcended even the Nazis' racism: the Nazi-Jihadist bond of Jew hatred ran so deep that on 18 June 1936, Vicco von Bülow-Schwante (1891–1970) of the Foreign Ministry informed the German Embassy in Cairo that “the Nuremberg race laws are aimed only at the Jews.”⁷⁰ For, as we have seen, it was the Jews *and Judaism*, certainly not Islam, that posed a threat to the Nazi Weltanschauung.

By 1937, al-Husseini was in control of a movement inspired by the Hitler Youth called *Al-Jihad Almuquaddas* (The Holy Jihad). On 21 July 1937, he visited Hans Döhle, the German Consul in Jerusalem, to express his support for the Nazis' cause and to enlist the Nazis in his own cause. Weeks later, however, on 13 October, al-Husseini was forced to flee from Palestine to Lebanon because he had become a criminal wanted for inciting insurrection against the British Mandate government. Working from his new base of operations, in 1938 Haj Amin systematically eliminated his Arab Muslim opponents, including members of the Darwash family and especially members of the Nashashibi family, who had supported the Peel Commission's proposal for a two-state solution to the conflict between the Arabs and the Jews. On al-Husseini's orders, Nashashibi Sheikh Abdul Rahman al-Khatib was shot in January 1938, Admon Nashashibi on 4 March 1938, and Sheikh Said al-Khatib on 6 March; on 9 November 1941, Fakhri Bey Nashashibi was assassinated.⁷¹ According to Zvi Elpeleg, the mufti's most important achievement during his tenure in Palestine was the British White Paper of 17 May 1939, which provided for

⁶⁹ Küntzel, *Jihad and Jew-Hatred*, 31.

⁷⁰ Herf, 19.

⁷¹ Schechtman, 74–76.

the cessation of the building of a Jewish homeland and the establishment within ten years of an Arab majority.⁷² The document closed the door on Jews trying to escape from Nazi Europe to Palestine.

With the coming of the war, al-Husseini's ties with the Nazis would run deeper still, but he was not the first or the only Muslim to establish such ties: a representative of the Saudi government, Khalid al-Hud, visited Germany in May 1939, and on 17 June, Hitler granted his new ally an audience. "The Führer regaled him with a long diatribe on his sympathy for the Arabs, which he said began in his childhood, and he declared his readiness to extend to the Saudis 'active assistance.'"⁷³ We have seen the tie that binds the Muslim Brotherhood and the Arab Palestinians to the Nazis. Here we discover that it applies to the Wahhabis as well, one of the most influential Islamic movements in the world today.

Soon after the outbreak of the war, on 13 October 1939, al-Husseini set up his base of operations in Baghdad. In a letter dated 20 January 1940 from Haj Amin to Hitler, the mufti "gave his assurance that the Arabs had deep sympathy for the Axis states and were ready to rise against the common enemy" and "contribute . . . to the well-deserved defeat of the Anglo-Jewish coalition."⁷⁴ On 21 June 1940, he sent an emissary to Istanbul with a letter for the German Minister to Turkey, Franz von Papen (1879–1969), in which he assured von Papen that the Palestinian Muslims were prepared to take an active role in bringing the fight against "international Jewry" to other Arab lands.⁷⁵ A little more than six months later, the Nazis stated their own assurances: in a memorandum dated 5 February 1941, the Wehrmacht High Command "stressed the 'favourable position' of Germany in relation to the Arabs" and affirmed that Germany could promise "everything they [the Arabs] wanted on 'the solution of the Jewish question in Palestine.'"⁷⁶ What the solution to the Jewish question meant was clear to al-Husseini, if not to much of the rest of the world.

⁷² Zvi Elpeleg, *The Grand Mufti: Haj Amin al-Hussaini, Founder of the Palestinian National Movement*, trans. David Harvey, ed. Shmuel Himelstein (London: Frank Cass, 1993), 52.

⁷³ Hirszowicz, 56.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 109.

⁷⁵ Gensicke, 59–60.

⁷⁶ Hirszowicz, 122.

In keeping with this general design aimed at the extermination of the Jews, on 3 April 1941, al-Husseini orchestrated an Iraqi government takeover, with Nazi support and financing, led by Rashid Ali al-Gaylani (1892–1965). He took advantage of the turmoil ignited by the coup to incite the slaughter of 600 Jews in Baghdad; 911 houses were destroyed and 586 businesses ransacked.⁷⁷ Yunis es-Sewabi, who had worked on an Arabic translation of *Mein Kampf*, played a major role in the overthrow of the government.⁷⁸ Among the leaders closest to al-Husseini was Saddam Hussein's uncle and later father-in-law General Khairallah Tulbah (d. 1992), the man who would spoon-feed little Saddam Nazi propaganda throughout the future tyrant's formative years. When the British suppressed the attempted takeover in May, al-Husseini blamed the Jews for the failed Iraqi Nazi takeover. On 9 May in a broadcast over Iraqi and Axis radios, he issued a fatwa announcing a jihad against the British and the Jews.⁷⁹

After the takeover failed, Haj Amin and Rashid Ali fled to Teheran on 22 July 1941, where, according to Schechtman, al-Husseini managed to convince people that Hitler was actually a Muslim.⁸⁰ From there the mufti charted his course to Berlin. Once again, however, other Muslims had already paved the way to friendly relations with the Nazis. The Islamische Zentral-Institut was established in Berlin in 1927 by Mohamed Abdul Nafi Chelebi, Professor Georg Kampffmeyer, and Mohamed H. Hofmann. Throughout the years when the Nazis were legislating the Jews out of political, economic, and social existence, they left the Muslims alone; indeed, they had the Muslims' support. In September 1941, the Arabs living in Berlin were under the leadership of Hafiz Manzurudin Ahmad, Dr. Galal, and Dr. Mohamed Safty, who was the director of the institute. The Jew-hating Jihadist Mufti was their patron.⁸¹ When, after having just met with Mussolini on

⁷⁷ See Lewis, 158.

⁷⁸ Herf, 60.

⁷⁹ Schechtman, 110.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, 117. According to Islamic scholar Amir Taheri, however, "it is quite possible that the Brothers were the origin of rumors that Mussolini was an Egyptian Muslim, that his real name was Musa Nili (Moses of the Nile), and that Hitler too had secretly converted to Islam and bore the name of Hayder or 'the brave one.' Saying special prayers for an Axis victory became a frequent feature of the Brothers' gatherings during World War II." See Amir Taheri, *Holy Terror: Inside the World of Islamic Terrorism* (Bethesda, MD: Adler & Adler, 1987), 50.

⁸¹ Gensicke, 134.

27 October, al-Husseini arrived in Berlin on 6 November, “the Nazi press described him as ‘a great champion of Arab liberation and the most distinguished antagonist of England and of Jewry.’”⁸² The Nazi government provided him “with a luxurious home on Berlin’s fashionable Klopstock Street, a full staff of servants, a chauffeured Mercedes limousine, and a monthly stipend in excess of \$10,000, as well as four other residences and suites in two of Berlin’s most luxurious hotels.”⁸³ Al-Husseini would be headquartered there until May 1945.

After his meeting with Hitler on 28 November 1941, the mufti reported in his diary the Führer’s determination to wage war against the Jews and his insistence that the Nazis and the Arabs are engaged in the same struggle – namely, to exterminate the Jews.⁸⁴ The Final Solution had been under way ever since the Nazis launched their invasion in the East a few months earlier, on 22 June. As the Wehrmacht advanced, the Einsatzgruppen, four killing units positioned from the Baltic to the Black Sea, sought out and murdered every Jew they could find. Conservative estimates put the number of Jews murdered by the Einsatzgruppen at 1.5 to 2 million. Further, since 21 February 1941, “the SS had an Einsatzgruppe Afrika, a paramilitary task force, under the leadership of SS *Obersturmbannführer* Walter Rauff [1906–1984], ready to work behind the lines of Rommel’s Africa Corps to extend the final solution of the Jewish Question in Europe to the Jews of North Africa and the Middle East,”⁸⁵ a fact that pleased the Islamic Jihadists. The first of six *Vernichtungslagern*, or “annihilation camps,” went into operation on 7 December 1941 at Chelmno,⁸⁶ and al-Husseini, or the *Grossmufti*, as Hitler called him, did his part to contribute to the program of extermination.

Since the mid-1930s, al-Husseini had been on intimate terms with Nazi mass murderer Adolf Eichmann. Eichmann’s deputy Dieter Wisliceny (1911–1948) maintained at his war crimes trial on 26 July 1946 “that when the Mufti visited his [Eichmann’s] office at the end

⁸² Schechtman, 121.

⁸³ Dalin and Rothman, 47.

⁸⁴ Schechtman, 306.

⁸⁵ Herf, 7.

⁸⁶ By the end of April 1942, the other five extermination camps were operating, with the first massive deportations from the Warsaw Ghetto taking place on 26 July 1942. The other five camps were Sobibor, Belzec, Majdanek, Treblinka, and Auschwitz-Birkenau.

of 1941 or the beginning of 1942, the Mufti was informed of the plan concerning the ‘Final Solution of the Jewish Question in Europe.’”⁸⁷ Around this time, on 20 January 1942, Reinhard Heydrich (1904–1942) convened the infamous Wannsee Conference; at that meeting, the heads of the Nazi government sat down to work out the logistics of the extermination of the Jewish people. Said Wisliceny, “The Mufti had repeatedly suggested to the various authorities with whom he was maintaining contact, above all to Hitler, Ribbentrop and Himmler, the extermination of European Jewry. He considered this as a comfortable solution of the Palestine problem.”⁸⁸ He even claimed that “the Mufti was one of the initiators of the systematic extermination of European Jewry and had been a collaborator and advisor of Eichmann and Himmler in the execution of this plan.”⁸⁹ Dalin and Rothman have shown that “of the major Nazi leaders, Heinrich Himmler was the one with whom al-Husseini collaborated most actively and consistently. . . . One of the common goals shared by al-Husseini and Himmler, who was the architect of the Nazis’ ‘Final Solution,’ was the extermination of the Jews.”⁹⁰ According to Simon Wiesenthal, al-Husseini was close to other murderers who had a direct involvement in the slaughter of the Jews: he visited Auschwitz and Majdanek and was on intimate terms with Auschwitz commandant Rudolf Hoess (1900–1947), Mauthausen commandant Franz Ziereis (1905–1945), Theresienstadt commandant Siegfried Seidl (1911–1947), and Belsen commandant Josef Kramer (1906–1945), the “Beast of Belsen.”⁹¹

Operating from the *Büro des Grossmufti* in Berlin, al-Husseini organized radio propaganda, espionage in the Middle East, and the establishment of the Arab Legions and the Arab Brigade, Muslim military units that fought for the Nazis. He had at his disposal six “freedom stations” for radio broadcasts (Berlin, Zeissen, Bari, Rome, Tokyo, and Athens) from which he urged Muslims everywhere to kill Jews everywhere. In January 1942, al-Husseini and Rashid Ali were in Germany to discuss the formation of the Deutsch-Arabische Lehrabteilung (German-Arab Training Detachment) as a fighting unit for the Nazis,

⁸⁷ Gensicke, 165.

⁸⁸ Schechtman, 159–60.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, 160.

⁹⁰ Dalin and Rothman, 50.

⁹¹ Schechtman, 160.

but they wanted it designated as an Arab unit, not as a German-Arab unit. On 3 May 1942, they wrote letters to Joachim von Ribbentrop and Count Galeazzo supporting Axis aims and requesting from the German and Italian governments a declaration favoring several things, most important “the liquidation of the Jewish national home in Palestine.”⁹² Dalin and Rothman note that “in consultation with the Mufti, the Nazi leadership had created a special Einsatzgruppe Egypt, a mobile SS squad distinct from Einsatzgruppe Afrika, under the supervision of Adolf Eichmann, which was to carry out the mass murder of Palestinian Jewry. By the summer of 1942, anticipating a German military victory in the Middle East, the Einsatzgruppe Egypt had been standing by in Athens and was ready to disembark for Palestine.”⁹³ SS Obersturmbannführer Walter Rauff led the killing unit.

Among al-Husseini’s notable Arabic-language broadcasts of 1942 was one aired on 2 July, when the Grossmufti addressed “the Egyptian people,” declaring that Rommel’s victories had inspired the Arabs with hope because the Arabs and the Axis have a common enemy: the English and the Jews.⁹⁴ On 7 July 1942, Rashid Ali al-Gaylani aired a broadcast on VFA titled “Kill the Jews before They Kill You.” He shouted, “It is the duty of the Egyptians to annihilate the Jews and to destroy their property. . . . The Jews are planning to violate your women, to kill your children and to destroy you. . . . Your sole hope of salvation lies in annihilating the Jews before they annihilate you.”⁹⁵ On 11 December 1942, al-Husseini aired a broadcast aimed at the Arab Muslims and summoned them to “martyrdom” as allies with Germany in the war against the English and the Jews. “The spilled blood of martyrs,” he cried, echoing the Jihadist dictum, “is the water of life” and “We Arabs should clearly join the Axis powers and their allies in common struggle [i.e. jihad] against the common enemy [i.e. the Jews].” Further, If England and her allies should win the war, “Israel would rule the whole world”; if the Nazis should win, “the Jewish danger” would be defeated.⁹⁶

⁹² Hirszowicz, 227.

⁹³ Dalin and Rothman, 60.

⁹⁴ Jeffrey Herf, *The Jewish Enemy: Nazi Propaganda during World War II and the Holocaust* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006), 159.

⁹⁵ Herf, *Nazi Propaganda for the Arab World*, 125–26.

⁹⁶ Herf, *The Jewish Enemy*, 173.

Among al-Husseini's public speeches delivered in 1942, the year when all six extermination camps were in full swing, was one he gave in December, when he addressed a rally of Nazis, declaring that "the Jews were the bitterest enemies of the Muslims." The Quran, he said, "was full of stories of Jewish lack of character, Jewish lies and deceptions." He also repeated the Nazi truism that "the Jews dominated England and the United States and were the force behind 'godless Communism.'"⁹⁷ At a meeting of the Islamische Zentral-Institut on 18 December 1942, the Mufti proclaimed the glorious cooperation between the Nazis and the Muslims of the world, who fought "a common enemy: the Jews, the Bolsheviks, and the English." He also repeated verses from the Quran teaching that the Jews are the "most implacable enemies of the Muslims."⁹⁸ Yes, implacable: in keeping with the thinking shared by Nazis and Islamic Jihadists, al-Husseini espoused the view that the Jews fall outside the circle of redemption or rehabilitation. The *only* way to handle the Jewish Question is through extermination.

In addition to being a man of hateful words, al-Husseini was a man of murderous deeds. As early as January 1941, he had gone to Bosnia to convince Muslim leaders that a Muslim SS division would bring honor and glory to the followers of Islam. Dalin and Rothman estimate that as many as one hundred thousand Muslims were recruited by al-Husseini and fought for the Nazis.⁹⁹ Each battalion had its imam and each regiment its mullah. The mufti set up a mullah school for them and taught them himself; it was based in Dresden. He successfully recruited Bosnian Muslims to serve in the Waffen SS and in killing units, assuring them that "there are considerable similarities between Islamic principles and those of National Socialism."¹⁰⁰ The largest of the mufti's Bosnian Muslim killing units was the 13th Handschar Division of 21,065 men. He and Himmler's minions began recruiting for the Waffen SS Mountain Division Handschar in February 1943, with imams selected by al-Husseini for special ideological training. In a speech delivered to the SS on 11 January 1944, "Himmler argued

⁹⁷ Ibid., 179–80.

⁹⁸ Gensicke, 135–38.

⁹⁹ Dalin and Rothman, 55.

¹⁰⁰ Quoted in Morse, 77.

that the bond between Nazism and Islam was built on enduring common values as well as shared enemies in the war. He also presented Hitler as a gift sent from God – and Allah.”¹⁰¹ The commander of the Handschar, Karl-Gustav Sauberzweig (1899–1946), “reported that the Muslim recruits gladly adopted Nazi doctrine and even that ‘the Muslims, SS men in the Division, and the civilians are beginning to see in our Führer the mission of a second prophet,’ that is, one following Mohammed.” The division went into action in February 1944.¹⁰²

Another major Muslim SS killing unit was the Skanderberg Division from Albania, with the Arabisches Freiheitskorps operating in Macedonia. The Muslims whom al-Husseini recruited for the SS would play a major role in rendering the Balkans Judenrein in the winter of 1943–1944. As al-Husseini was in the process of organizing the Muslim killing units, “Himmler raved about the ‘bond in the world-views’ between National Socialism and Islam.” He saw “a new era of cooperation” in the formation of Muslim SS divisions in Bosnia.¹⁰³

In 1943, the Grossmufti pursued other measures to see to the extermination of the Jews. According to Dieter Wisliceny and Hungarian Jewish leader Rudolf Kastner (1906–1957), he wrote letters to the governments of Bulgaria (6 May 1943), Italy (10 June 1943), Rumania (28 June 1943), and Hungary (28 June 1943), demanding that their Jews be sent not to Palestine but to Poland to be exterminated.¹⁰⁴ Joseph Schechtman reports that “on May 13, 1943, he personally delivered to Von Ribbentrop a letter of protest against the plan to arrange for the emigration of 4,000 Jewish children.”¹⁰⁵ In addition, according to research done by Benjamin Korn, al-Husseini attempted to implement a chemical weapons assault on Tel Aviv: he arranged for five parachutists to dump enough toxin into the water supply to kill 250,000 people, but they were captured near Jericho before they could complete their mission.¹⁰⁶ He also tried to convince the Nazis to carry out bombing raids on Tel Aviv and Jerusalem.

¹⁰¹ Herf, *Nazi Propaganda for the Arab World*, 200.

¹⁰² *Ibid.*, 201.

¹⁰³ Gensicke, 171.

¹⁰⁴ Hirszowicz, 312.

¹⁰⁵ Schechtman, 157.

¹⁰⁶ Benjamin Korn, “Arab Chemical Warfare against Jews” (21 December 2008): <http://www.wymaninstitute.org/articles/2003-03-chemical.php>.

Although he was unsuccessful in those attempts, on 2 November 1943, Himmler sent him a telegram in Berlin that was read over the radio: "The National Socialist Movement of Greater Germany has, since its beginning, inscribed upon its flag the fight against world Jewry. It has therefore followed with particular sympathy the struggle of the freedom-loving Arabians, especially in Palestine, against the Jewish interlopers."¹⁰⁷ That same day, al-Husseini declared at a rally in the Luftwaffe Hall in Berlin, "The Germans know how to get rid of the Jews. . . . They have definitely solved the Jewish problem. [This makes] our friendship with Germany not a provisional one, dependent on conditions, but a permanent and lasting friendship."¹⁰⁸ Later he would write in his memoirs, "Our fundamental condition for cooperating with Germany was a free hand to eradicate every last Jew from Palestine and the Arab world. I asked Hitler for an explicit undertaking to allow us to solve the Jewish problem in a manner befitting our national and racial aspirations and according to the scientific methods innovated by Germany in the handling of its Jews. The answer I got was: 'The Jews are yours.'¹⁰⁹ Once again we discover the tie that binds National Socialism to Islamic Jihadism, both as influence and as affinity: it is exterminationist Jew hatred.

On 21 January 1944, al-Husseini began his radio broadcasts for that year by declaring, "National Socialist Germany is fighting world Jewry. The Koran says, 'You will find that the Jews are the worst enemies of the Moslems.' There are also considerable similarities between Islamic principles and those of National Socialism."¹¹⁰ In a broadcast aired on 1 March 1944, he enjoined the Arabs to "rise as one man and fight for your sacred rights. Kill the Jews wherever you find them. This pleases God, history and religion. This saves your honor. God is with you."¹¹¹ Reading these last words, one cannot help but recall the words inscribed on the SS belt buckles: *Gott Mit Uns*. Concerned with the turn in the tide of the war, he wrote to Himmler on 5 June

¹⁰⁷ Schechtman, 146.

¹⁰⁸ Quoted in Morse, 60.

¹⁰⁹ Quoted in Ami Isseroff and Peter Fitzgerald-Morris, "The Iraq Coup Attempt of 1941, the Mufti, and the Farhud," Mideast Web, <http://www.mideastweb.org/Iraqaxiscoup.htm>.

¹¹⁰ Quoted in Morse, 82; see also Schechtman, 139.

¹¹¹ Quoted in Morse, 62.

1944 and again on 27 July 1944, asking the SS Reichsführer to do all he could to complete the extermination of the Jews.¹¹² That such a sentiment was not peculiar to the Muslim al-Husseini is confirmed by an entry in the diary of Joseph Goebbels dated 26 April 1944: “The four hundred million of the Mohammedan-Arabic population are absolutely there for us.”¹¹³ In a speech delivered on 4 October 1944, the mufti asserted that “as far as fighting against Jewry, Islam and National Socialism have moved very close to one another.” He also noted specific commonalities between Nazis and Arabs: “monotheism, defined as obedience to one spiritual, political, and military authority; an emphasis on obedience and discipline; and the celebration of battle and of labor.”¹¹⁴

Although when the war came to an end Britain, France, and the United States refused to prosecute al-Husseini as a war criminal, Yugoslavia officially placed him on their list of war criminals in July 1945, accusing him of organizing SS Muslim divisions in the Balkans. Now a fugitive, the Grossmufti found a safe haven in Paris on 17 May 1945. Contrary to the rest of the world’s reaction to Nazi war criminals, notes Schechtman, al-Husseini’s status as a fugitive “and his association with the Axis had enhanced rather than shattered his halo” in the Muslim world.¹¹⁵ He disappeared from Paris on 28 May 1946 and turned up in Egypt on 20 June, where King Farouk provided him with sanctuary and showered him with honors.

The Muslim Brotherhood also gave him a hero’s welcome. The newspaper *Al Ahrām* wrote, “God preserved the Mufti for the Arab world.” On 12 June 1946, the paper *Al Kutla* welcomed Husseini “in the field of Jihad.” On 30 June 1946, the Muslim Brotherhood paper *Al Ikhwan Al Muslimin* said of Husseini, “The Arab hero and symbol of Al Jihad and patience and struggle is here in Egypt.”¹¹⁶ Within a week of his arrival in Cairo, he met with Hasan al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb, thus demonstrating once again his intimate ties with the Ikhwan, a point that is crucial to an understanding of the genealogy of this evil. Said al-Banna, “The Mufti is worth the people of a whole nation put

¹¹² Trifkovic, 187.

¹¹³ Quoted in Herf, *The Jewish Enemy*, 244.

¹¹⁴ Ibid.

¹¹⁵ Schechtman, 182.

¹¹⁶ Herf, *Nazi Propaganda for the Arab World*, 242.

together. The Mufti is Palestine and Palestine is the Mufti.” Herf’s interpretation: “Husseini was continuing *the same* struggle that Hitler and Germany – and Husseini himself – had been waging during the war.”¹¹⁷ In 1946, the mufti took in Yasser Arafat, whose mother was the daughter of al-Husseini’s first cousin, as his protégé and brought in a former Nazi commando officer to teach Arafat “the fine points of guerilla warfare.”¹¹⁸ To be sure, Chuck Morse presents a convincing argument that “al-Husseini was himself most likely the true founder of the al-Fatah, . . . Arafat’s terror cell, . . . the nucleus of the PLO.”¹¹⁹ Thus we see how the intricate web linking the Nazis to the Muslim Brotherhood and to the Palestinian Liberation Organization finds its nexus in Haj Amin al-Husseini.

In 1948, the Mufti played an active role in the Arabs’ attempt to destroy the Jewish state. In May, he “called for Arabs throughout the Islamic Middle East to wage a holy war against the newly established Jewish State. The goal of this jihad, he emphasized, was the extermination of the Jews,”¹²⁰ thus affirming what had always been and continues to be the aim of the Nazi-influenced Jihadist movement. Earlier that year, the Muslim Brotherhood had already stationed a unit in Gaza “under the command of Tariq el Afriki, a Sudanese close to the Mufti.”¹²¹ With the Islamic Jihadists positioned to complete the extermination of the Jews that both the Nazis and al-Husseini had longed for, the mufti attended a meeting in Damascus on 5 February 1948 to organize Palestinian field commands, as well as the commanders of the Holy War Army, among whom were Hasan Salama and his nephew Abd al-Qadir al-Husseini. When the Arab League met in Cairo on 9 February, however, they did not support al-Husseini’s drive for Palestinian self-determination; it was clear that the Arab League was more interested in using the Palestinians to suit their own political ends than in “liberating” them. One wonders, in fact, how important the lives of the Palestinians were to him, given that, as Zvi Elpeleg points out, “on 8 March 1948, Haj Amin sent a memorandum to the

¹¹⁷ Quoted in *ibid.*, 244.

¹¹⁸ David N. Bossie, “Yasser Arafat: Nazi Trained,” *Washington Times*, 9 August 2002.

¹¹⁹ Morse, 90.

¹²⁰ Dalin and Rothman, 133.

¹²¹ Schechtman, 223.

Arab heads of government requesting that they refuse to allow Palestinian Arabs to enter their countries.”¹²² He knew that keeping the Palestinians in the miserable condition of “refugees” was essential to the Jihadists’ exterminationist agenda.

On 22 September 1948, al-Husseini’s Arab Higher Committee announced the formation of a Palestinian Government, with its seat in Gaza. On 30 September 1948, he took his place as the head of the “government.” The Arab nations generally supported him, but Transjordan did not, and Transjordan was in military control of Palestine. Significantly, Hasan al-Banna “threw his support behind the establishment of a Palestine Arab government based on the Mufti’s Arab Higher Committee.”¹²³ The gesture, however, was largely symbolic. By this time, al-Husseini’s efforts to attain his desired extermination of the Jews of Palestine had been foiled. One thing, however, is certain: had the Muslims won the War of Independence, the Jews of Palestine would surely have been annihilated.

Al-Husseini remained in exile at Heliopolis in Egypt throughout much of the 1950s. In the first part of the decade, Israel claimed al-Husseini was behind many of the border raids from Jordanian and Egyptian-held territory. After the attempt on Nasser’s life on 26 October 1954, for which the outlawed Muslim Brotherhood was blamed, Nasser grew very cold toward the Mufti, as he had been very close to the Brotherhood. Indeed, the Brotherhood’s intimate ties with al-Husseini strengthened the ideological bridge between them and the Nazis. By 1959, the notorious Muslim Nazi’s position in Egypt had become so tenuous that in August of that year, he moved his Arab Higher Committee headquarters from Cairo to Beirut. He issued one of his last public pronouncements from Baghdad, where he presided over the World Islamic Conference on 29 May 1962. Asserting that “world Judaism plans to take over most of the Arab countries,” he once again sounded the alarm for the Muslims of the world not only to destroy the Jewish state but to annihilate the Jews of the world.¹²⁴ Al-Husseini died in Beirut on 4 July 1974. He had wanted to be buried in Jerusalem, but the Israeli government refused the request.

¹²² Elpeleg, 91.

¹²³ Schechtman, 232.

¹²⁴ Quoted by *ibid.*, 276.

Pulitzer Prize–winning Foreign correspondent Edgar Ansel Mowrer said of al-Husseini, “As a murderer, this man ranks with the great killers of history. As an enemy of the United Nations, he was surpassed only by Hitler. In the evil of his intentions, Haj Amin equaled Hitler.”¹²⁵ It must be emphasized that throughout his Jihadist career, al-Husseini was acting not as a renegade but rather as the generally acknowledged leader of the Muslim world. To be sure, Hitler took him to be “the decisive voice in Arab affairs as the most authoritative spokesman for, and as *the* leader [*Führer*] of, the Arabs.”¹²⁶ Although there are Christians who in the post-Holocaust era have had the decency to be embarrassed by centuries of Christian anti-Semitism and have tried to come to terms with the silence of Pope Pius XII, the complicity of Monsignor Jozef Tiso, and the collusion of the German Protestant Churches during the Holocaust, almost every Muslim scholar I know of has expressed admiration for the mass murderer Haj Amin al-Husseini. At best, the vast majority of Muslim scholars remain silent on the matter. His vicious words and his murderous actions have had a huge influence on Jihadist movements throughout the Islamic world. Perhaps his most far-reaching influence was on the Muslim Brotherhood, the Jihadist organization that would establish connections with every quarter of the Jihadist movement.

¹²⁵ Quoted in Dalin and Rothman, 106.

¹²⁶ Hirszowicz, 219.

The Evil Spreads

The Muslim Brotherhood

God has imposed jihad as a religious duty on every Muslim, categorically and rigorously, from which there is neither evasion nor escape. He has rendered it as a supreme object of desire, and has made the reward of martyrs and fighters in His way a splendid one.

Hasan al-Banna, "On Jihad"

In the previous chapter, we saw the extent of Haj Amin al-Husseini's connections with the Nazis and his vast influence throughout the Muslim world. Among the Jihadist organizations on whom he had the most profound influence is the Muslim Brotherhood. Al-Husseini made his escape to Egypt as a war criminal on 20 June 1946 with the assistance of the Brotherhood; upon his arrival, Hasan al-Banna, the founder and Führer of the Brotherhood, appointed al-Husseini his "official representative and personal supervisor of the Brotherhood's activities in Palestine."¹ In al-Husseini the Muslim Brotherhood saw one of their most powerful allies in the spread of Islamic Jihadism in the postwar era. In al-Husseini's bent toward a Nazi-like exterminationist Jew hatred, they found their common denominator, just as al-Husseini had found with the Nazis.

The Brotherhood, as we have seen, had already had its ideological contacts with the Nazis. Therefore, its members were quite

¹ Matthias Küntzel, "National Socialism and Anti-Semitism in the Arab World," *Jewish Political Studies Review* (17, Spring 2005): <http://www.jcpa.org/phas/phas-kuntzel-so5.htm>.

receptive to an even deeper Nazi influence via al-Husseini. As Matthias Küntzel points out, “The powerful collaboration of the Muslim Brothers and the Mufti and the pogroms against the Jews [of Egypt] a few months after the world learned about Auschwitz clearly showed that the Brotherhood either ignored or even justified Hitler’s extermination of European Jews.”² Küntzel adds, “It was not until May 8, 1945, however, that the ideological approach between the Mufti, the Muslim Brothers and the Nazis reached its peak. This became obvious as early as November 1945. The core of antisemitism had thus begun to shift from Germany to the Arab world. On the anniversary of the Balfour Declaration, demonstrators rampaged the Jewish quarters of Cairo. They plundered houses and shops, attacked non-Muslims, devastated the synagogues and then set them on fire.”³ Therefore, writes Küntzel, “the Muslim Brothers were inspired not by the Nasserism of the 1960s [which was strictly political], but by the European Fascism of the 1930s [which was ontological]. Their pre-1951 campaigns were not anti-colonialist, but anti-Jewish. The anti-Jewish passages in the Koran were fused with the antisemitic methods of the struggle of the Third Reich and hatred of the Jews acted out as jihad.”⁴ Here the Ikhwan becomes a hybrid of Nazism and Islam to form Islamic Jihadism, making the ultimate extermination of the Jews not just a political or territorial aim but a fundamental, defining element of their worldview: one cannot be part of the Brotherhood, just as one cannot be a Nazi, without espousing the extermination of the Jews.

Today “the Muslim Brotherhood is the largest of the Islamic groups, both in numbers and in influence,” writes Islamist scholar Ziad Abu-Amr. “These groups make no distinction between religion and state and consider the Koran and the *sunna* as the basis for all aspects of life.”⁵ The collapse of distinctions between religion and state reflects the collapse of distinctions between God and man in the Jihadists’ appropriation of God. As was the case in the Nazis’ eclipse of God, so the Jihadists’ appropriation of God demands the elimination of

² Ibid.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Matthias Küntzel, *Jihad and Jew-Hatred: Islamism, Nazism and the Roots of 9/11*, trans. Colin Meade (New York: Telos Press, 2007), 3.

⁵ Ziad Abu-Amr, *Islamic Fundamentalism in the West Bank and Gaza: Muslim Brotherhood and Islamic Jihad* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994), xiv.

the chosen of God, that is, of those first chosen to bring to the world God's message that every human being is chosen. One key to the Muslim Brotherhood's assault on the Holy One, then, is their assault on the Jews, a move that they had learned well from the Nazis.

Similar to the Nazis, in the Brotherhood's ideology a key component of this usurpation of God is the *Führerprinzip*, as Richard Mitchell, the author of a seminal work on the Muslim Brotherhood, has pointed out: the Brotherhood's leader, he writes, "was in fact the center of all power."⁶ Küntzel explains further: "Tightly organized around the leadership principle [*Führerprinzip*]," the Ikhwan "demanded the dissolution of all parties and the abolition of parliamentary democracy in favor of an 'organic' state based on *sharia* law."⁷ They were also opposed to the Communist Party, which they, like Nazis, viewed as a Jewish party. Mitchell identifies three fundamental elements of the Brotherhood's ideology that resonate with the Nazis' eclipse of the absolute: "the insistence on (1) Islam as a total system, complete unto itself, and the final arbiter of life in all its categories; (2) an Islam formulated from and based on its two primary sources, the revelation in the Qur'an and the wisdom of the Prophet in the Sunna; and (3) an Islamic application to all times and to all places."⁸ In these fundamental elements we have the ingredients of a totalitarianism diametrically opposed to the Judaism that resists fixed formulas and ready answers but rather encourages questioning, even questioning of God, for God or *el* abides in the *shelah*, in the "question." Over against these elements of Islamic Jihadism we have a Judaism that (1) not only tolerates other religions (at least those that do not engage in child sacrifice) but preaches love for the stranger; (2) turns to many sources among the holy books, including sources that contradict each other; and (3) attempts to adjust to the various times and places in which it finds itself, honoring the government as long as it does not contravene Torah. The Jihadist imperative – and this is why the Egyptian government fears the Ikhwan – is to overthrow any government that is not Islamic.

⁶ Richard P. Mitchell, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 295.

⁷ Küntzel, *Jihad and Jew-Hatred*, 10.

⁸ Mitchell, 14.

For these and other reasons, Küntzel has demonstrated that “the history of the Muslim Brothers shows that revolutionary antisemitism is no mere supplementary feature of modern jihadism; it is its core.”⁹ Here, too, we have not just an echo but a calculated repetition of the Nazi Weltanschauung. In this statement the term *modern* is crucial: what makes modern Jihadism “modern” is its exterminationist ideological stance toward the Jews. Among the modern Jihadist organizations, the impact of the Muslim Brotherhood has been most widespread and most profound. Indeed, it is not for nothing that of the three most influential Jihadist ideologues – Abdul Al’a Maududi, Hasan al-Banna, and Sayyid Qutb – the latter two belonged to the Muslim Brotherhood. Roughly following the emergence of the Brotherhood’s ideologues, Abu-Amr identifies three periods in the genealogy of the evil embodied by the Ikhwan: the rise of the movement and its years under the rule of Hasan al-Banna are known as “the stage of insurrection” (1928–1949), the emergence of Sayyid Qutb in the midst of the Egyptian government’s persecution of the Brotherhood is called “the stage of ordeal” (1949–1967), and the phenomenal spread of the Brotherhood throughout the world, is referred to as “the stage of differentiation” (1967–present).¹⁰ Let us consider these stages in the genealogy of the Jihadist evil known as the Muslim Brotherhood.

The Stage of Insurrection

The tension between the modern Western world and the traditional Islamic world in Egypt goes back to at least 1882, when the British occupied the region to control the Suez Canal. When massive demonstrations against the British broke out in 1919 and 1921, the young Hasan al-Banna was among the active participants. A key instigating factor in those demonstrations was the Balfour Declaration of 2 November 1917, in which the British endorsed the creation of a Jewish homeland in Palestine. Although an independent Kingdom of Egypt was declared in 1922, with Sarwat Pasha (1878–1928) ruling as prime minister, the British influence remained strong, as they continued to rule the Canal Zone. They also installed King Fuad (1868–1936) as

⁹ Küntzel, *Jihad and Jew-Hatred*, 59.

¹⁰ Abu-Amr, 90–91.

king of Egypt. Upon his death in 1936, the king was succeeded by his son Farouk (1920–1965), who was sympathetic toward the Jihadist movement, as well as toward the Nazis, for whom he declared his official support in 1941.¹¹ The Egyptian nationalist opposition to the British resulted in the formation of the Wafd Party; its founder was Saad Zaghlul (1859–1927), who was elected prime minister in 1924. As the political opposition to the British became more organized, so did the religious opposition; after all, it is a tenet of Islam that Muslims should not be ruled by non-Muslims.

The Islamic political and religious movements merged most dramatically with the founding of the Muslim Brotherhood one night in March 1928, as indicated in the previous chapter. Their credo was “God is our goal. The Prophet is our leader. The Qur’an is our constitution. Struggle is our way. Death in the service of God is the loftiest of our wishes. God is great, God is great.”¹² Their goal was to reestablish a worldwide caliphate ruled by Sharia, with one people, under one leader. Once again we hear echoes of the cry of “Ein Volk, ein Reich, ein Führer!” Here the *Volk* consists of the umma, that is, the Muslims of the world; the *Reich* is caliphate, under which Sharia rules over every aspect of life; and the leader is none other than the *Murshid al-'Amm* or *al-Murshid* or the “Supreme Guide” of the Muslim Brotherhood.

If this is the beginning of the Brotherhood’s “stage of insurrection,” it is an insurrection against more than the existing Egyptian regime and the British influence. Christina Phelps Harris makes a good case for her claim that “the Muslim Brotherhood in its motivation and religious objectives was an ideological throwback to the 18th and 19th centuries – to militant Arabian Wahhabism and to the later Pan-Islamic ideal of Jamal al-Din al-Afghani [1838–1897].”¹³ She goes on to describe the Brotherhood as “a militant reactionary reform group which began life as a religious revivalist movement.”¹⁴ If the Brotherhood is a “reform group,” however, the reform lies not in its totalitarianism but in its adoption of key elements of Nazi ideology.

¹¹ Lukasz Hirszowicz, *The Third Reich and the Arab East* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1966), 232.

¹² Mitchell, 193–94.

¹³ Christina Phelps Harris, *Nationalism and Revolution in Egypt: The Role of the Muslim Brotherhood* (The Hague: Mouton & Co., 1964), 15.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 137.

Although the founders of the Brotherhood were clearly influenced both by Wahhabism and by Salafism, the new Islamic Jihadist movement was not a “throwback” but an innovation in the evil of Jew hatred. As Küntzel has correctly observed, “The jihad movement of the Brotherhood was almost exclusively focused on Zionism and Jews.”¹⁵ Furthermore, because Zionism is about the creation of a haven for the preservation of Jewish lives, the Brotherhood is about the destruction of that haven and the extermination of those lives.

But a point of clarification may be called for here. Upon close examination, the evidence shows that, contrary to Mitchell’s claim,¹⁶ the founding of the Muslim Brotherhood was neither a reform nor a revivalist movement, but, as Abu-Amr suggests, it was an insurrectionist movement. The Jihadist insurrection, however, runs much deeper than Abu-Amr perhaps realizes. It has a metaphysical dimension that most analysts ignore: the creation of the Muslim Brotherhood was an insurrection, the aim of which was to unseat the Holy One Himself as the Lawgiver, whose most fundamental commandments are to love God, one’s neighbor, and the stranger – not one’s Muslim or Jewish neighbor, but any human being, any *ben adam* or “child of Adam.” This evil’s appropriation of God lies in the presumption of being the voice of Allah, the executor of the will of Allah, and the enforcer of the unforgiving law of Allah. Herein lies the Brotherhood’s affinity with the Nazis, but with the difference that they would control the fate of the soul not only in this world but also in the next, as stated by their Supreme Guide Hasan al-Banna.¹⁷ Like Hitler, whom he venerated, al-Banna was known to have possessed three distinctive qualities: personal charm, eloquence as a speaker, and a good command of his native tongue.¹⁸ He used all of his talents to incite a murderous hatred of the Jews.

Recall that in 1935, al-Banna organized the Brotherhood’s first committee devoted to Jihadist propaganda, which, modeled after the

¹⁵ Küntzel, “National Socialism and Anti-Semitism in the Arab World.”

¹⁶ Mitchell, 238.

¹⁷ Hasan al-Banna, *Five Tracts of Hasan al-Banna: A Selection from the Majmuat Rasail al-Imam al-Shahid Hasan al-Banna*, trans. Charles Wendell (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), 46–47.

¹⁸ Harris, 152.

formulas of the Führer he admired, was dedicated to inciting a “wrathful hatred” of the Jews. When the British killed Izz al-Din al-Qassam in Palestine on 19 November 1935, the Brotherhood was quick to make a martyr out of him; in fact, he is regarded as the first martyr in the Jihadist war against the Jews and the West. Thus, the Brotherhood’s offshoot Hamas named their version of the SS, the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, after him. A resident of Haifa, al-Qassam was a close associate of Haj Amin al-Husseini and played a major role in the provocation of the Muslims’ massacre of the Jews of Hebron in 1929. Like al-Banna, one of his most important teachers was Salafist Rashid Rida. Earlier in 1929, as noted in Chapter 2, Hasan’s brother ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Banna had met with al-Husseini to establish official relations between the Brotherhood and the mufti, who by then was one of the most politically powerful Muslims in the world. After all, the effective spread of propaganda requires political power: the whole interest of propaganda, indeed, is an interest in power. Not righteousness but power. Not justice but power. Not loving kindness but power. For the insurrectionist, power is always the power to destroy.

One of the reasons that ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Banna met with al-Husseini was to open the way for members of the Ikhwan to enter Palestine, where they joined the insurrection and took part in attacks on Jewish settlements in Palestine in 1936. That same year, they set up a branch in Lebanon; they opened an office in Syria the following year. Between 1936 and 1938, its membership grew from eight hundred to two thousand.¹⁹ The primary reason for this dramatic growth in the Brotherhood’s numbers was the Arab revolt against the Jews of Palestine. “This conflict in Palestine gave Hasan al-Banna an unexpected opportunity for action and expansion,” Harris correctly observes. “His loyalty helped earned him the warm commendation of the powerful mufti of Jerusalem, Hajj Amin al-Husseini,”²⁰ who relied heavily on Nazi funding to finance the revolt of 1936. It is also worth noting that in 1937 Ruhullah Khomeini hooked up with the Brotherhood and studied the writings of Hasan al-Banna; thus the seed of the Brotherhood’s evil was planted in the thinking of the future Ayatollah of Islamic Jihadist Iran. By that time the Nazis had begun their broadcasts

¹⁹ Küntzel, “National Socialism and Anti-Semitism in the Arab World.”

²⁰ Harris, 177–78.

from Zeesen in Farsi, and, according to Küntzel's research, Khomeini was an avid listener.²¹

In April and May 1938, the Brotherhood expanded its actions against the Jews of Egypt by leading violent demonstrations against Egyptian Jewish communities. Nazi journalist Giselher Wirsing applauded the attacks on the Jews in Egypt and the "return to the religious traditions of Islam" in Egypt,²² a tradition that included Jew hatred. From the Nazi and Jihadist standpoint, Jew hatred is a defining part of Islamic tradition. In 1939, bombs were placed in a Cairo synagogue and in Jewish homes, making it clear that the Islamic Jihadists targeted not just the "Zionists" but Jews everywhere – everywhere that the Jihadists could find them. In October 1938, a month before the infamous, nationwide pogroms of Kristallnacht in Germany, the Brotherhood organized the Parliamentary Conference for Arab and Muslim Countries in Cairo. At that conference, precisely as it occurred more than sixty years later at the UN's Durban Conference against Racism on 8 September 2001, the Brotherhood distributed Arabic translations of *Mein Kampf* and the *Protocols of the Elders of Zion*. In the previous chapter, it was pointed out that in 1938 Haj Amin al-Husseini began the systematic elimination of his enemies, particularly in the Nashashibi clan, which was sympathetic toward the Peel Commission's proposals to find a two-state solution to the tension between Arabs and Jews. What must be added here, according to the findings of Küntzel, is that the murder of the Nashashibis was largely incited by the Muslim Brotherhood, who "called on the Palestinians to kill the Nashashibis in the name of God and who mobilized the masses in support of the Mufti against Jews."²³ Here, too, we see the Brotherhood's efforts toward inciting "wrathful hatred" of the Jews through their propaganda campaigns. We also see their calculated involvement in promoting the agenda of Haj Amin al-Husseini.

Once the war had broken out in Europe, the Brotherhood became even more supportive of the Nazis' aims, not only in Europe but also in the Middle East. In 1940, al-Banna arranged a meeting between Anwar Sadat and General Aziz al-Misri, both of whom were among

²¹ Küntzel, *Jihad and Jew-Hatred*, 56.

²² *Ibid.*, 24.

²³ Küntzel, "National Socialism and Anti-Semitism in the Arab World."

the Nazis' most ardent supporters in Egypt. In 1941, Sadat joined the Brotherhood's military organization; in 1943, Nasser and his cohorts followed suit, thus demonstrating the huge influence that the Brotherhood exercised over Egyptian Muslim leaders at that time. Sadat, of course, was arrested by the British for his activities as a spy for the Nazis. Nevertheless, by 1943, the Brotherhood's "Secret Apparatus" (*al-Jihaz al-Siri*), the functions of which were similar to those of the Nazi Gestapo, was operational. Like the Nazis, they considered the communists "to be one of their principal enemies"; also like the Nazis, they identified the communists with the Jews.²⁴ Finally, like the Nazis, the Ikhwan would morph the Jew into any image associated with the evil of the hour: the capitalist, the communist, the racist, the colonialist, the violator of human rights, the war criminal, the perpetrator of apartheid, and so on to this day.

On 26 October 1945, the Brotherhood officially opened its first office in Jerusalem. Within two years, they had more than two dozen branches in Palestine, as well as in Jordan (with incursions as early as 1942) and the Sudan, where by 1952 they had established more than fifty bases of operation; from those bases a Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood state would eventually emerge. When King Farouk granted al-Husseini asylum in Egypt on 20 June 1946, the Brotherhood's Supreme Guide Hasan al-Banna applauded the decision, declaring that "in Berlin he [al-Husseini] had been purely and simply carrying out jihad [just as the Nazis had done]. Thus, the Muslim Brothers cleared the way for the second career of the Mufti, whose pro-Nazi past they considered a source of pride."²⁵ More than a source of pride, the Nazis were a source of inspiration, demonstrating as they did that the extermination of the Jews is possible.

Once the war in Europe had come to an end and al-Banna was no longer engaged with the Nazis' war effort, he renewed his contacts with the Arab League, especially with its Secretary-General Azzam Pasha (1893–1976). When the UN passed Resolution 181 on 29 November 1947, calling for the partition of Palestine into a Jewish and a Palestinian state, al-Banna and the Brotherhood joined with other Jihadists, such as Salih Harb Pasha of the Young Men's Muslim Association and

²⁴ Mitchell, 32.

²⁵ Küntzel, *Jihad and Jew-Hatred*, 46.

Muhammad Alube Pasha to form the Committee of the Nile Valley; Mustafa Mumin represented the Brotherhood on the Committee. The purpose of the Committee was to raise funds and gather weapons for members of the Jihadists “to save Palestine” by ridding the region of any and all Jewish presence. For the Ikhwan, however, this move to wage war against the Jews of Palestine was *not* instigated by the vote in the UN. In early October 1947, al-Banna gave the order for all branches of the Brotherhood to begin preparing for a jihad against the Jews. By 27 October, the first battalion of fighters had been organized; it consisted largely of men from the Brother’s “secret apparatus,”²⁶ a move that may call to mind the SS’s organization not only into a secret police force but also into elite fighting units known as the Waffen SS. Here, too, the Brotherhood was learning from the Nazis.

In the early months of 1948, the Ikhwan organized a military wing called the Katibat al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin (Phalanx of the Muslim Brotherhood), the purpose of which was to recruit and train men for the imminent war against the Jewish state. “On 25 April 1948, weeks before the official war began,” writes Mitchell, “the first battalion of volunteers set out for al-'Arish, on the frontier, and was joined by its commander, an officer on leave from the army, Ahmad 'Abd al-'Aziz. . . . Even before the arrival of the ‘official volunteers’ of the Arab League, Brothers were engaging Zionists in the Negev.”²⁷ Once again, we see that the actions taken against the Jews were not reactions to Jewish instigation; rather, they were initiatives taken to destroy the Jewish state before it could be born – not because the Jews had no rightful claim to the land but because, according to the Jihadists, they intended to use it as a base of operations for International Jewry’s rule of the world, as outlined in the *Protocols of the Elders of Zion*, a work that the Brotherhood regarded as Gospel; Article Thirty-Two of the Hamas “Charter of Allah” confirms this lie that in the Jihadist world is axiomatic truth.²⁸ When on 15 May 1948, Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, and Iraq declared war on the newly declared Jewish state, al-Banna’s intimate friend and Secretary-General of the Arab

²⁶ Mitchell, 56.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 57.

²⁸ See Dimitry Kapustyan and Matt Nelson, *The Soul of Terror: The Worldwide Conflict between Islamic Terrorism and the Modern World* (Washington, DC: International Affairs Press, 2007), 147–48.

League Azzam Pasha affirmed, "This will be a war of extermination and momentous disaster which will be spoken of like the Mongolian massacres and the Crusades."²⁹ Thus, exterminationist Jew hatred became an official part of the Arab Muslims' political discourse; thus, the political fused with the metaphysical, a move that always legitimizes mass murder.

As the Muslim Brotherhood became more popular and acquired more power, it became an ever-increasing threat to the political structure of Egypt. As noted earlier, the Brotherhood called for the establishment of Sharia as the law of the land, with an Islamic cleric as the Supreme Guide of the Islamic state. They viewed the existing government as tainted by Western ways and mores from exposure to the British. For these reasons, as noted in Chapter 2, the Brotherhood murdered Prime Minister al-Nuqrashi in 1948, and by the end of the year, Egyptian Prime Minister Mahmud Fahmi Nokrashi (1888–1948) declared them to be an illegal organization, a move that resulted in his assassination on 28 December 1948. When King Farouk's secret agents assassinated Hasan al-Banna on 12 February 1949, the Brotherhood's stage of insurrection came to an end. Now the object of persecution, the Brotherhood entered into the stage of ordeal.

The Stage of Ordeal

It would be mistaken to assume that during the stage of ordeal, the spread of the Brotherhood suffered major setbacks. As this section of the chapter indicates, its tentacles continued to extend during this period from Morocco to Somalia, from Somalia to Syria, and beyond. The ordeal endured through this stage was an ordeal visited upon the Ikhwan in its home, in Egypt.

If Hasan al-Banna was the key thinker in the Brotherhood's stage of insurrection, in its stage of ordeal Sayyid Qutb was at the ideological center. Recall that Qutb joined the Brotherhood upon his return from the United States in 1951 and that within a year, he had become the movement's ideological spokesman. In the early 1950s, he wrote *Marakatuna Maa al-Yahud* (*Our Struggle with the Jews*), in which he

²⁹ Quoted by Mitchell G. Bard, "Myths and Facts: Arab/Muslim Attitudes toward Israel," <http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/myths/mf25.html>.

argued that from the beginning the Jews have *by nature* been the enemies of Islam and that the spread of Islam throughout the world requires the elimination – that is, the extermination – of world Jewry. Qutb does not deny the Holocaust; instead, he says Allah sent Hitler to give the Jews the punishment they deserve, as Matthias Küntzel correctly observes: according to Qutb, “the Shoah is therefore no crime and Israel deserves to be erased from the map. Demonization of the Jews, legitimization of the Holocaust, and liquidation of Israel: three sides of an ideological triangle that cannot exist if any one of the sides is missing.”³⁰ The implications of this position are chilling. Instead of denying the Holocaust and therefore maintaining that the Jews do not need a Jewish State as a haven from a hostile world, Qutb argued that the annihilation of European Jewry was not only real but also *desirable*. The Jews, he maintained in Nazi-like fashion, are the embodiment of evil.

As the embodiment of evil, the Jews are behind every evil, including atheistic Communism and all other forms of jahiliyya. In his Manichean division of the world into Islamic and jahili societies,³¹ Qutb imitated the Nazis’ Manicheanism that associates the Jews with all things evil. Not only did he associate Jews with the evils of Communism,³² as Hitler did, but, also like Hitler, he assigned to the Jews a metaphysical significance, deeming them to be an irremissible evil that plagues all of creation, outside the fold of correction, conversion, or redemption. “There is no other group whose history reveals the sort of mercilessness, (moral) shirking and ungratefulness for Divine Guidance,” he wrote. “Everywhere the Jews have been they have committed unprecedented abominations.”³³ For such an evil there is no solution but a final solution.

After Israel’s victory in their War of Independence and the poor performance of the Egyptian army in that war, the Egyptian people became increasingly disenchanted with the Farouk government. Egyptian nationalism was on the rise, and on 23 July 1952, Lieutenant Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser led a group of nationalist army officers

³⁰ Küntzel, *Jihad and Jew-Hatred*, 84.

³¹ See Sayyid Qutb, *Maalim fi al-Tariq [Milestones]* (Damascus: Dar Al-Ilm, 2006), 93.

³² Sayyid Qutb, *Our Struggle with the Jews*, in Ronald L. Nettler, *Past Trials and Present Tribulations: A Muslim Fundamentalist’s View of the Jews* (Oxford: Pergamon, 1987), 80.

³³ *Ibid.*, 78.

in a coup to overthrow King Farouk. After nearly a year of internal turmoil, Nasser and his cohorts established the Republic of Egypt on 18 June 1953, a turn of events that marked the beginning of what was known as “Arab socialism.” During this revolutionary period, the Brotherhood, with which Nasser had once been associated, was allowed to operate legally. To appear less threatening to the new government, in 1952, Brotherhood leader Hasan Ismail al-Hudaybi (d. 1973) proposed that the Ikhwan’s “secret apparatus” be dismantled. His chief opponent, Abd al-Rahman al-Sanadi, however, insisted that to dissolve the secret apparatus would be to “violate the concept of *jihad* in Islam.”³⁴ In other words, totalitarian jihad requires a unit that may operate beyond the parameters of the law or any other scrutiny, so that it may secretly oversee the most private aspects of each person’s life. Al-Sanadi won that argument.

In part as a result of al-Sanadi’s prevailing position, the standing of the Brotherhood in the eyes of the Nasser government had deteriorated by 1954. In that same year, wrote Abu-Amr, “The League of Palestinian Students was formed in Cairo and was controlled by students who belonged to or sympathized with the Muslim Brotherhood. One of the most prominent of these sympathizers was Yasir Arafat (who was even thought of as a member of the society). A few members of the society later became founders of the Fatah movement. Those included Salim al-Zanun, Salah Khalaf, and 'Abd-al-Fattah al-Hamound.”³⁵ This development in its history demonstrates once again that even in the time of their “ordeal” the Brotherhood’s influence was expanding. Conscious of this growing influence, the Nasser government carried out a major roundup of members of the Brotherhood in 1954. By the end of 1954, as Küntzel points out, the Brotherhood was targeted for severe oppression; that oppression ushers in the period they call *al-mihna* (catastrophe).³⁶ With this escalation in the oppression of the Ikhwan in Egypt, Syria became a place of asylum for its leaders, just as in later years it would provide asylum for Jihadists of every ilk. Also by 1954, the Brotherhood’s reach extended west as far as Algeria, where Sheikh Ahmad Sahnoun (1907–2003) founded its first branch in that

³⁴ Mitchell, 119.

³⁵ Abu-Amr, 8.

³⁶ Küntzel, *Jihad and Jew-Hatred*, 69.

area; the branch is now known as the Movement for the Society of Peace (MSP). It, too, provided refuge for the Brothers.

Sayyid Qutb, however, was not among those who found refuge. In 1955, he was arrested and sentenced to twenty-five years of hard labor, only to be pardoned in 1964, thanks to the intervention of Iraqi president Abdul Salam Arif (1921–1966). Much like Hitler, but enduring much harsher conditions, Qutb wrote one of his key works while he was in prison: *Maalim fi al-Tariq* (*Milestones*, discussed at length in Chapter 2), in which he argues that setting up an Islamic state to oppose jahiliyyah, or the pre-Islamic state of barbarity, is the religious duty of Muslims throughout the world.³⁷ In this defining work of modern Islamic Jihadism, Qutb cited the Quran (5:64) to maintain that at the core of jahiliyyah's corruption of the world is the Jew.³⁸ The Egyptian regime deemed the work dangerous enough to have him arrested again in August 1965, along with Brotherhood members Sadiq al-Muzeini, Abd-al-Rahman Barud, Riyad al-Zanun, and Shakir Shubair. Found guilty of inciting the overthrow of the Egyptian government, he was hanged on 29 August 1966.

Meanwhile the Muslim Brotherhood's presence outside of Egypt continued to grow. The Palestinian leader Sheikh Ahmed Yassin (1937–2004) joined the Brotherhood in 1957 while studying at Al-Azhar University in Cairo and later worked to promote its activities in Israel and the Palestinian territories. He would go on to establish Hamas, the Brotherhood's Palestinian branch, an organization that I examine at length in the next chapter. In 1960, Abdullah Azzam (1941–1989), a man who would have an immense influence on Osama bin Laden and a major hand in authoring the Hamas charter, was appointed spokesman for the Brotherhood at Damascus University. That same year, the Iraqi Islamic Party was formed as a branch of the Brotherhood. It was repressed, however, under the reign of Saddam Hussein and the Baath Party, until the fall of Hussein's regime in 2003. Similarly, in the 1960s, the Brotherhood was operating in Libya under the leadership of Dr. Ezzudine Ibrahim but faced repression under Muammar Gaddafi's (b. 1942). Leaders of the Brotherhood throughout the region viewed the humiliating defeat of Egypt and

³⁷ Qutb, *Maalim fi al-Tariq* [*Milestones*], 131.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 82.

other Arab countries at the hands of the Israelis in the 1967 Six Day War as a “divine revenge.”³⁹ As much as the execution of their ideological spokesman Sayyid Qutb, that war would lead into the Brotherhood’s stage of differentiation.

The Stage of Differentiation

The Brotherhood’s stage of differentiation was marked by the dramatic dissemination of its ideology throughout the Muslim world. During this time, various Islamic Jihadist movements adopted the Ikhwan’s basic principles, including the defining principle of exterminationist Jew hatred, with their own variations on that theme. As the chapters that follow will show, the Brotherhood’s influence spread from al-Qaeda to Islamic Jihad, from Hamas to Hezbollah. Soon after Qutb’s execution in 1966, the Ikhwan went to great lengths to have his manifesto *Our Struggle with the Jews* widely distributed. From 1967 onward, for instance, the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), whose origins are traceable to the Muslim Brotherhood, declared that its aim was no longer to “impose our will on the enemy [i.e. the Jews]” but “to destroy him in order to take his place.”⁴⁰ This shift in its stated mission is indicative of the Brotherhood’s continuing influence on its thinking. Like Nazis, the PLO could not conceive of negotiations, its signing of Oslo Accords notwithstanding. In the Six Day War, the Jews demonstrated a strength unimagined by their enemies; with this show of a Jewish determination to live in their ancestral homeland, the Jihadists’ ideology became more exterminationist than ever. By 1968, Jihadist ideology was defined largely by the Muslim Brotherhood.

Andrew Bostom notes, for example, that in 1968 the Al-Azhar Academy of Islamic Research held a meeting of the leading Muslim thinkers; it was a meeting in which the Muslim Brotherhood’s widespread impact was apparent. “This assembly of learned Muslim speakers,” says Bostom, “called for an annihilationist jihad against the Jews of Palestine. Repeated declarations expounded the classical jihad doctrine of jihad war, focusing its bellicose energy on the destruction

³⁹ Abu-Amr, 11.

⁴⁰ Barry Rubin, *Revolution until Victory?: The Politics and History of the PLO* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994), 27.

of Israel.”⁴¹ This call for the extermination of “the Jews of Palestine” had nothing to do with checkpoints or security fences, no connection to settlements or the status of Jerusalem. As in the time of the Third Reich, it had to do with the existence of the Jews – period. Bernard Lewis points out that by March 1970, *The Protocols of the Elders of Zion* was number one on the list of “nonfiction” best sellers in the Muslim world.⁴² The spread of Qutb’s *Our Struggle with the Jews* and the increasing popularity of the *Protocols* were hardly coincidental. As we have seen, there is a clear parallel, if not a causal connection, between the introduction of the *Protocols* to the Arabic-speaking peoples and the rise of their sympathies with National Socialism.

During the 1970s, the stage of differentiation and expansion took off. In 1971, Anwar Sadat welcomed the Muslim Brotherhood back into Egyptian society; in 1973–1975, members of the Brotherhood were released from Egyptian jails. In 1973, they established a front organization in Gaza called the Islamic Center (*al-Mujamma' al-Islami*); with it came the establishment of the Islamic University of Gaza. The leaders of the Islamic Center were Ahmed Yassin, the future founder of Hamas, and Abdel Aziz al-Rantisi, who served as the center’s executive director. Just three years later, in 1976, Osama bin Laden began his studies at the King Abd al-Aziz University in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, where he met Mohammed Jamal Khalifa (d. 2007), a member of the Brotherhood who soon became his closest friend (Khalifa, in fact, married one of bin Laden’s sisters). During these years, bin Laden’s formative years, he studied under Sayyid’s Qutb’s brother Muhammad, who indoctrinated him in Qutb’s writings. Those writings became part of the educational program in all the training camps that, with the assistance of Khalifa, bin Laden would establish.⁴³ Beginning in 1977, Hasan al-Turabi (b. 1932), the Brotherhood’s chief advocate in the Sudan, “transformed the Muslim Brotherhood from a pressure group

⁴¹ Andrew G. Bostom, “Jihad Conquests and the Imposition of *Dhimmitude*—A Survey,” in Andrew G. Bostom, ed., *The Legacy of Jihad: Islamic Holy War and the Fate of Non-Muslims* (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2005), 100.

⁴² Bernard Lewis, *Semites and Anti-Semites: An Inquiry into Conflict and Prejudice* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1999), 210.

⁴³ Lawrence Wright, *The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2006), 79.

to a formidable political force in the Sudan.”⁴⁴ Thus, the differentiation, with its thematic variations, spread.

As early as the 1960s, groups inspired by the Ikhwan, such as the Waxda al-Shabaab al-Islaami and the Jama'at al-Ahl al-Islaami (also known as the al-Ahli group), made their first appearance in Somalia.⁴⁵ Both groups, however, soon dissolved after Said Barre's (1919–1995) rise to power in 1969. In 1978, the Somali variation of the Brotherhood known as the *Harakat al-Islah* (the Reform Movement) was founded by Mohamed Ahmed Nur, Dr. Ali Sheikh Ahmed, Dr. Mohammed Yusuf Abdi, Ahmed Rashid Hanafi, and Abdullah Ahmed Abdullah. As it happened with the formation of Brotherhood branches in Iraq and Libya, in Somalia the members of the Islamic Jihadist organization were initially operating underground, out of fear of oppression under the Barre regime; they came out of hiding with the collapse of the regime in 1991. Ever since then, the Reform Movement has played a prominent role in the Somali government and has had an especially strong presence in Mogadishu University. In fact, Dr. Ali Sheikh, president of the University, is also the leader of the Reform Movement.

One of the places where the impact of the Brotherhood's principles runs deepest is Iran. Islamic scholar Said Amir Arjomand correctly observes that the clerics led by Ruhullah Khomeini in the Islamic Revolution of 1979 were avid readers of Sayyid Qutb, as well as Abdul Al'a Maududi, who, as we have seen, was among the thinkers who significantly shaped Qutb's thinking.⁴⁶ Similarly, Laurent Murawiec demonstrates not only the link between the Brotherhood and the leaders of Iran's Islamic Revolution but also the link between Maududi and the Ikhwan.⁴⁷ In 1979, moreover, the Iranian clerics “created an equivalent to the SS, the Corps of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution

⁴⁴ Mohamed Elhachmi Hamdi, *The Making of an Islamic Political Leader: Conversations with Hasan al-Turabi*, trans. Ashur A. Shamis (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998), 4.

⁴⁵ See Roland Marchal, “Islamic Political Dynamics in the Somali Civil War,” in Alex de Waal, ed., *Islamism and Its Enemies in the Horn of Africa* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004), 119.

⁴⁶ Said Amir Arjomand, *The Turban for the Crown: The Islamic Revolution in Iran* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), 97.

⁴⁷ See Laurent Murawiec, *The Mind of Jihad* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 270.

(Sepah-e Pasdaran-e Enqelab-e Eslami),”⁴⁸ notes Murawiec, elucidating not only the influence of the Brotherhood but also of their allies, the Nazis. The spread of its influence from Maududi to Khomeini corresponded to the Brotherhood’s continued dissemination of its Jew hatred: in 1979, the Muslim Brotherhood newspaper in Cairo, *al-Dawa (The Call)*, warned its readers, including in the paper’s children’s section, against their enemy “the Jew”; not the Zionist or Israeli, but “the Jew.”⁴⁹ Indeed, the Brotherhood had never drawn any distinction among Israeli, Zionist, or Jew.

In 1980, yet another offshoot formed in the “differentiation stage,” the rabidly anti-Semitic group known as Islamic Jihad. The founding of Islamic Jihad was influenced by the revolution in Iran, and, to some extent, it represented a break from the Muslim Brotherhood, who, they believed, had not been radical enough in their diatribes and actions against the Jewish state.⁵⁰ There lies the “differentiation.” Among the organization’s founders were Fathi Shaqaqi (1951–1995, succeeded by Dr. Ramadan Abdallah Shalah), Abd al-Aziz Odeh (b. 1950), and Bashir Musa (b. 1953).

Similarly frustrated with the “moderation” of the Brotherhood, another offshoot called the Tanzim al-Jihad was founded by engineer Muhammad Abd al-Salam Faraj, whose father was in the Muslim Brotherhood; led by Khalid al-Islambuli, they assassinated Anwar Sadat on 6 October 1981. The assassins left behind a document titled *Al-Farida al-Ghaiba (The Neglected Duty)* by Faraj. An extremely influential thinker inspired both by Maududi and by Qutb, Faraj maintained that “there is no doubt that the idols of this world can only be made to disappear through the power of the sword.”⁵¹ Thus, “we should refute those who say that jihad in Islam is defensive, and that Islam was not spread by the sword. To fight is, in Islam, to make supreme the Word of God in this world.”⁵² Even more than Qutb (if it is possible), Faraj incorporated into his

⁴⁸ Ibid., 288.

⁴⁹ Lewis, 192.

⁵⁰ Yonah Alexander, *Palestinian Religious Terrorism: Hamas and Islamic Jihad* (Ardsley, NY: Transnational Publishers, 2002), 30.

⁵¹ Quoted in David Aaron, *In Their Own Words: Voices of Jihad* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2008), 63.

⁵² Ibid., 64.

writings the Jew hatred found in the Hadith.⁵³ Sadat's assassins insisted that "peace with Israel was . . . incompatible with Koranic precepts."⁵⁴ In other words, the very existence of Israel – and the Jews – is an offense against Allah. In June 1980, the Brotherhood attempted to assassinate Syrian president Hafez al-Assad, whereupon the Syrians massacred one thousand members of the Brotherhood; the following month, the Baathist regime passed a law making membership in the Brotherhood punishable by death. Meanwhile, the Ikhwan's ideological presence spread to Tunisia, where Rashid al-Gannushi (b. 1941) founded the Jihadist Renaissance Party (Al-Nahda) in 1981; in the 1989 elections to the Tunisian parliament they took 14% of the votes.

Given the rise of the Brotherhood's presence throughout the Jihadist world after 1982, it should not be surprising that Fatah's discourse took a religious turn, especially from the mouth of Yasser Arafat,⁵⁵ a development welcomed by the Brotherhood. To be sure, the Brotherhood had initially opposed the PLO charter not because it called for the destruction of "the Zionist entity" but "because it did not call for the establishment of an Islamic state in place of that entity."⁵⁶ When they decided to take part in the PLO's intifada of 1987, the Brotherhood established the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas), the charter of which states that Hamas "considers the PLO to be the closest to the Islamic Resistance Movement and regards it as a father, brother, relative or friend."⁵⁷ The shift in Arafat's discourse in 1982 also corresponded with Israel's movement into Lebanon to rout out PLO terrorist cells and training camps. Taking on a more pronounced Jihadist stance, Arafat believed that he might renew the resolve among his followers and draw more support from the Ikhwan in the PLO's opposition to the Israelis.

With the regional rise of the Brotherhood in the early 1980s came a rise in the trepidation of regional governments over the Ikhwan's increasing influence on the affairs of those governments. The bloodiest action of Syria against the Brotherhood, for example, occurred in

⁵³ David Cook, *Understanding Jihad* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2005), 107.

⁵⁴ Küntzel, *Jihad and Jew-Hatred*, 86.

⁵⁵ Abu-Amr, 47.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 71.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 51.

February 1982, when, according to scholar Zaki Chehab, the Syrians responded to an attempted insurrection on the part of the Brotherhood by killing between 10,000 and 25,000 members. When Bashar al-Assad became president on 17 July 2000, however, he released many members of the Brotherhood from Syria's prisons, perhaps in an attempt to mitigate an anticipated response to his ascendancy from the Brotherhood and its sympathizers.⁵⁸

As the Muslim community began to expand into Europe, the Brotherhood became increasingly aware of new opportunities there. To be sure, Sayyid Qutb had maintained that Islam could be established in the West only when the Muslims assumed "control of the Western world."⁵⁹ On 1 December 1982, they drafted a document known as "The Project," outlining "a global vision of a worldwide strategy for Islamic policy," with the immediate aim of gaining a foothold in Europe and the ultimate aim of establishing "an Islamic State" on that continent. In this document, the Brotherhood proposes to make alliances with other Islamic movements to support "jihad across the Muslim world" and "to adopt the Palestinian cause as part of a worldwide Islamic plan, with the policy and by means of jihad, since it acts as the keystone of the renaissance of the Arab world today." "Preaching against the Jewish state" is a theme that runs throughout "The Project." It warns against "international [Jewish] conspiracies that threaten Muslims everywhere" and insists that "conciliation with the Jews will undermine our Movement and its history." A chief aim of "The Project," therefore, is "to nourish a sentiment of rancor with respect to the Jews and refuse all coexistence."⁶⁰ Yet again, the traces of the Nazi discourse persist in the discourse of the Ikhwan.

On 22 May 1991, the Brotherhood published a similar document titled "An Explanatory Memorandum: On the General Strategic Goal for the Group in North America," in which it states, "The Ikhwan

⁵⁸ Zaki Chehab, *Inside Hamas: The Untold Story of the Militant Islamic Movement* (New York: Nation Books, 2007), 146.

⁵⁹ Sayyid Qutb, *Social Justice in Islam*, trans. John B. Hardie (New York: Octagon Books, 1963), 242.

⁶⁰ See Sylvain Besson, *Le conquête de l'Occident: Le Project secret des Islamistes* (Paris: Le Seuil, 2005), 193–205. Passages quoted are translated by Scott Burgess. See also Patrick Poole, "The Muslim Brotherhood 'Project,'" *FrontPageMagazine.com* (11 May 2006): <http://www.frontpagemag.com/Articles/Printable.aspx?GUID={67736123-6864-4205-B51E-BCBDEF45FCDE}>.

must understand that their work in America is a kind of grand Jihad in eliminating and destroying the Western civilization from within and ‘sabotaging’ its miserable house by their hands and the hands of the believers so that it is eliminated and God’s religion is made victorious over all other religions. Without this level of understanding, we are not up to this challenge and have not prepared ourselves for Jihad yet. It is a Muslim’s destiny to perform Jihad.” Invoking the name of the Brotherhood’s founder and ardent disciple of Hitler, Hasan al-Banna, the document calls for the promotion of Islamic Dawa, thus spreading “true” Islam, that is, Jihadist Islam, by establishing Islamic centers throughout North America. The “Explanatory Memorandum” was entered into evidence as Government Exhibit 003–0085 in the trial of the United States versus the Holy Land Foundation; the initial indictment was filed on 27 July 2004.⁶¹

Meanwhile, although it had been officially banned in Egypt, the Ikhwan continued to make inroads deep into Egyptian society. In 1985, television programs “incompatible with Islamic values” were banned in Egypt, with 1,400 hours per year (about four hours per day) reserved for religious broadcasting.⁶² In his forward to Mitchell’s book, John O. Voll notes that by 1990, “the Muslim Brotherhood had become the dominant force in the major professional organizations, controlling the syndicates of doctors, engineers, pharmacists, dentists, and lawyers” in Egypt.⁶³ One realizes that Jihadism is driven not by the poor, the downtrodden, and the disenfranchised but by the most privileged members of Muslim society. This professional profile also fits many other branches of the Brotherhood, including its Islamic Action Front (Jabhat al-Amal al-Islami), created in Jordan as a distinct political party in 1992, which has the largest number of seats in the Jordanian parliament. Similarly, in the 19 July 2002 edition of Germany’s *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, Hamas leader Mahmoud al-Zahar is

⁶¹ Muslim Brotherhood. “An Explanatory Memorandum: One the General Strategic Goal for the Group in North America,” 1991, <http://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/misc/20.pdf>.

⁶² Küntzel, *Jihad and Jew-Hatred*, 93.

⁶³ John O. Voll, Forward, Richard P. Mitchell, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), xiv.

quoted as saying, “We are doctors, engineers. The best-educated people are in Hamas. We don’t live with myths. We have the highest academic level in this society.”⁶⁴ One cannot help but recall that eight of the fourteen men who on 20 January 1942 gathered for the Wannsee Conference to work out the logistics for the extermination of the Jews had doctorate degrees, as did three of the four commanders of the Einsatzgruppen killing units.

Since the 1990s, the stage of differentiation has increasingly assumed the features of a worldwide takeover, which is precisely the crime of which the Jihadists accuse the Jews. Once again, we discover in Islamic Jihadism “the important role played in the antisemitic mentality by the projection mechanism.”⁶⁵ The Ikhwan’s program of cooperation with the Jihadist groups that spring up throughout the world will be examined in more detail in the chapters that follow; what must be kept in mind is that this program of cooperation is calculated to achieve a worldwide Islamic state ruled by Islamic law, as envisioned by Hasan al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb, instituting a totalitarianism informed by Nazi ideology, the primary piece of which is exterminationist Jew hatred: for the Islamic Jihadists, the key to the domination of the world is the extermination of the Jews. Hence the prominence of the exterminationist elements of their discourse vis-à-vis the Jews. The most immediate manifestation of that discourse, as it fuels the Islamization of all humanity, lies in the influence of the Brotherhood on the emerging religious movements in the Muslim world. The next two chapters examine first those movements that are direct offshoots of the Ikhwan and then those religious movements less directly influenced by them.

⁶⁴ Küntzel, *Jihad and Jew-Hatred*, 105.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 97.

Jihadist Brothers

The Sudanese National Islamic Front, Islamic Jihad, and Hamas

Our conflict with the Jews is central. It was never a conflict just of three hundred kilometers of land, or over water rights. Every Muslim in the world is with Hamas.

Abdullah al-Akailah, Muslim Brotherhood spokesman, 1994
interview with Kenneth Timmerman

Matthias Küntzel points out that after 8 May 1945, the Nazi evil “found its most fruitful exile in the Arab world, where the Muslim Brothers now disposed of a million followers.”¹ Perhaps more to the point, the Nazi evil found its most fruitful exile in the Arab world precisely *because* the Brotherhood by then had a million followers. We have glimpsed the vast influence that the Muslim Brotherhood has had on Jihadist movements throughout the world. To be sure, Islamic Jihadism might never have taken on its defining elements, such as exterminationist Jew hatred and a rabid disdain for the West, had it not been for the Muslim Brotherhood. According to Bassam Tibi, “militant fundamentalists are far more familiar with Sayyid Qutb’s main writings than with the text of the Koran.”² As a religious movement, the Ikhwan’s broadest appeal is found among Muslims who are passionate about their religion. What makes the Brotherhood and its Jihadism a religious

¹ Matthias Küntzel, *Jihad and Jew-Hatred: Islamism, Nazism and the Roots of 9/11*, trans. Colin Meade (New York: Telos Press, 2007), 60.

² Quoted in *ibid.*, 80.

movement, however, lies not in a devotion to God but in an appropriation of God. Such a move can be made only in the name of God, the false totalitarian god of tyrannical control over every aspect of life, of brainwashing children so as to pass them through fire, of transforming murderers into martyrs. Just as Hamas equates itself with Allah by calling its charter the Charter of Allah, so the Brotherhood equates its murderous agenda with the will of God.

This chapter examines three of the most insidious movements to emerge directly from the Muslim Brotherhood: the Sudanese Islamic Front, Islamic Jihad, and Hamas. In an interview conducted on 29 March 1998, Hassan Nasrallah, head of Hezbollah, affirmed the intricate interrelationships that join these three offspring of the Ikhwan.³ Wherever possible each organization has pursued an agenda of Islamizing any area that comes under its control and of calling for the destruction of Jews and Judaism. Further, as the case of the Sudan demonstrates, for Islamic Jihadists, Islamization always means mass murder: the more extensive the Islamization, the more massive the murder. To be sure, the elimination of the Jews always brings with it the elimination of the absolute, divine prohibition against murder. Just as the Nazis prove this important point, so does the Sudanese National Islamic Front (al-Jabhah al-Islamiyah al-Qawmiyah).

The Sudanese National Islamic Front: First Muslim Brotherhood State

In the previous chapter, it was noted that by 1952, the Muslim Brotherhood had established more than fifty enclaves in the Sudan. Among those Muslims who spread the Brotherhood into the Sudan were Jamal al-Din al-Sanhuri, Sadiq Abdullah Abd al-Majidhi, and Saim Muhammad Ibrahim, who had founded the Islamic Liberation Movement (Hakarāt al-Tahrir al-Islami) at Gordon College (later known as the University College of Khartoum) in 1947.⁴ The Sudanese Brotherhood was officially established at a conference held on

³ Hassan Nasrallah, *Voice of Hezbollah: The Statements of Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah*, ed. Nicholas Noe, trans. Ellen Khouri (London: Verso, 2007), 184.

⁴ For more information on the Islamic Liberation Movement, see Abdel Salam Sidahmed, "Sudan: Ideology and Pragmatism," in Abdel Salam Sidahmed and Anoushiravan Ehteshami, eds., *Islamic Fundamentalism* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996), 180–81.

21 August 1954 under the leadership of Rashid al-Tahir. By 1956, the Brotherhood had drafted an Islamic Constitution, which called for the establishment of an Islamic republic ruled by a Muslim leader and governed in accordance with Sharia. Their proposal, however, did not get very far. Undertaking a strategy of infiltrating other political movements, in the 1957 elections, al-Tahir made an unsuccessful attempt to become a candidate for the popular Ummah Party. In 1958, General Ibrahim Abbud (1900–1983) led a military coup against the Sudanese government. The Brotherhood was allowed to operate freely under the new order, until 9 November 1959, when al-Tahir attempted to overthrow Abbud's regime.⁵ For the next several years, the Brotherhood was forced to operate underground.

In 1964, the future of the Ikhwan in the Sudan began to wax much brighter with the return of a highly charismatic figure from his studies abroad, a man whose story lies at the core of the story of the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood: Hasan al-Turabi (b. 1932), the son of an Islamic jurist from the eastern Sudanese town of Kassala. Al-Turabi had been a member of the Brotherhood since 1954, when he joined the group a year before his graduation from Khartoum University. From there he went to London and then to Paris, where he earned a Ph.D. in constitutional law. Upon his return to the Sudan, he was appointed to a position in the School of Law at Khartoum University, where he was known to be a strong proponent of making Sharia the law of the land. Like many other Jihadists, he was very much influenced by the medieval theologian and Islamic jurist Ibn Taymiyyah. He maintained that Sharia was “so all-encompassing” that there was no need for legislation.⁶ A year later, al-Turabi left academia to go into politics.

Because the Brotherhood lacked any real support from the Sudanese intelligentsia, in October 1965, it created the Islamic Charter Front (ICF) to broaden its base, with al-Turabi as secretary general. He described the ICF as “the political arm of the Ikhwan,”⁷ thus demonstrating once again the modern merging of religion and

⁵ For more on al-Tahir's opposition to the Abbud regime, see John L. Esposito and John L. Voll, *Islam and Democracy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 89–90.

⁶ See J. Millard Burr and Robert Collins, *Revolutionary Sudan: Hasan al-Turabi and the Islamist State, 1989–2000* (Boston: Brill, 2003), 21.

⁷ Mohamed Elhachmi Hamdi, *The Making of an Islamic Political Leader: Conversations with Hasan al-Turabi*, trans. Ashur A. Shamis (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998), 15.

politics, which is a merging of religious fervor with political power, a phenomenon witnessed in Nazi Germany that had informed the thinking of foundational Jihadists such as Abdul Al'a Maududi and Hasan al-Banna. The formation of the ICF reflected al-Turabi's pragmatic approach to the Islamization of the Sudan. Learning from the historical example of National Socialism, the ICF took gradual steps toward achieving its ultimate aim.⁸ They declared, for example, that Sudanese non-Muslims should enjoy religious freedom, even though the country must be ruled not by parliament but by a Muslim leader, in keeping with Sharia and the Brotherhood's version of the *Führerprinzip*. Slowly but surely extending its influence, the ICF worked with other political parties that promoted the Islamization of the Sudan, including Sadiq al-Mahdi's (b. 1936) wing of the Ummah Party, as well as the Ansar⁹ and Khatmiyyah¹⁰ parties. This cooperation among the Islamic parties resulted in having the Communist Party of the Sudan outlawed. (Recall that the Nazi Party had the Communist Party outlawed after the Reichstag burned down on 27 February 1933.) It is from the ICF that the National Islamic Front (NIF) would emerge in 1986.

May 1969 brought a critical development for the Sudanese Brotherhood, when Colonel Jafar Numeiri (b. 1930) led a coup against the Abbud government.¹¹ Because Numeiri viewed al-Turabi and the Muslim Brothers as a threat to his power, some of its leaders, including al-Turabi, were placed under house arrest, and others went into exile. After the outlawed Communists failed in their attempt to take over the government in July 1971, al-Turabi met with Numeiri, who had come to view the ICF leader as an ally against Communism. In that meeting, al-Turabi obtained permission for the ICF to resume its activities, so that by 1972, it had gained control over Khartoum University's Student

⁸ It is said that when Hitler emerged from prison in 1924, he vowed never again to take a step forward only to have to take two steps back.

⁹ Dating back to the 1880s, the Ansar Party had its roots in a fundamentalist Mahdist movement that promoted preparing for the coming of the Mahdi, the awaited messenger of Allah and representative of the Prophet Muhammad, who would prepare the way for the second coming of the Prophet Isa (Jesus) and the Last Judgment.

¹⁰ The Khatmiyyah movement was an offshoot of Sufism established in the early nineteenth century by Muhammad Uthman al-Mirghani in eastern Sudan. Although the Khatmiyyah opposed the Ansar when the latter made its first appearance in the Sudan, the modern Ummah Party brought the two together.

¹¹ See Hamdi, 2–3.

Union. Operating under the ICF sobriquet, the Ikhwan was further encouraged when in 1973 Numeiri took the first steps toward implementing Sharia law in the Sudan. Possibly influenced by Anwar Sadat's accommodation of the Brotherhood in Egypt,¹² Numeiri adopted a similar policy of accommodation in the Sudan in the mid-1970s. When National Reconciliation became an official policy of state in 1977, members of the Brotherhood seized every position of the power that the government had to offer. Members of the Ikhwan were now in charge of instruction in Islamic ideology for senior officers in the army, among whom was Omar al-Bashir (discussed subsequently). With the creation of the Faysal Islamic Bank in 1978 the Brotherhood assumed control of major sectors of the Sudanese banking system. Then in 1979, al-Turabi was appointed minister of justice.

Throughout the 1970s and into the early 1980s, the policy of reconciliation enabled al-Turabi to successfully transform the Muslim Brotherhood into a formidable political power in the Sudan. They were influential in Numeiri's implementation in September 1983 of Hudud,¹³ a category of Sharia that prescribes forms of punishment for various transgressions, including the consumption of alcohol and illicit sexual relations, as well for blasphemy. Among the punishments for these and other offenses are flogging, amputation, stoning, beheading, and crucifixion. For women, committing adultery and the "crime" of being raped were punishable by death. In 1984, al-Turabi had his first meeting with his fellow Jihadist-in-arms, Osama bin Laden, who later made al-Turabi's niece his third wife.¹⁴ Following al-Turabi's example, Bin Laden deepened his connections with the Muslim Brotherhood, which dated back to 1974 with his studies at King Abd al-Aziz University in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, under the tutelage of Mohammad Qutb, the brother of Sayyid Qutb (Bin Laden is discussed further in the next chapter).

Meanwhile, Numeiri's measures to further the process of the Islamization of the Sudan resulted in a deterioration of his popularity

¹² See Gabriel R. Warburg, "The Muslim Brotherhood in Sudan: From Reform to Radicalism," August 2006, <http://www.e-prism.org/images/Muslim.BROTHERS.PRISM.pdf>.

¹³ See *ibid.*

¹⁴ For more on this first meeting between the two renowned Jihadists, see Burr and Collins, 69–70.

among many of the Sudanese people, particularly in the south. Soon civil war was fomenting. In 1983, Numeiri declared a jihad against Christian leader Colonel John Garang de Mabior (1945–2005) and his Sudanese People’s Liberation Army (SPLA). Early on the SPLA gained some strategic ground, so that by 1985, Numeiri’s position had become untenable, and on 6 April of that year, while he was in Washington, D.C., seeking financial assistance from the United States, he was deposed in a bloodless coup led by his chief of staff Lieutenant General Suwar al-Dhahab (b. 1930), a member of the Muslim Brotherhood. In May 1985, al-Turabi formed the National Islamic Front to replace the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood/Islamic Charter Front. The change, however, was in name only: the Jihadist ideology of the Ikhwan was rapidly emerging as the state policy of the Sudan.¹⁵

Although the NIF did not do as well in the 1986 elections as its membership had hoped, its influence with the military continued to grow. In January 1987, the NIF drafted a National Charter that affirmed its program of Islamizing the South through genocidal jihad and of bringing the country under the rule of Sharia. “Once we put political power within our sight,” al-Turabi reflected on this period, “we discovered the wider borders of the Sudan and realized how far behind we had been. Thus, we embarked on a more serious programme of action,”¹⁶ a program that would include mass murder. “You have the right to take the initiative,” he insisted, “and confront your enemy economically, politically, and territorially *by all means* until God grants you victory.”¹⁷ Thus we see that, as with the Nazis, there is no limiting principle at work in Islamic Jihadism, nothing but the imagination to curb the violence perpetrated in the name of their false god. For like any false god, the god of Islamic Jihadism is unlimited in what can be justified in the name of god.

The NIF’s growing presence in the military led to the overthrow of the democratic government of Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi on 30 June 1989. In the ensuing internal power struggle, General Omar al-Bashir emerged as president, and al-Turabi was again imprisoned in the Kobar Prison, where he not only enjoyed special treatment but

¹⁵ See Sidahmed, 184.

¹⁶ Quoted in Hamdi, 24.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 39; emphasis added.

also continued to have a major impact on the NIF regime. It appears that he had a hand in al-Bashir's appointment of Jalal Ali Lutfi as the head of the Sudanese Bar Association; like al-Turabi, Lutfi was an Islamist who believed that the country's legal system must be in line with Sharia. He also supported the appointment of Dr. Ibrahim Ahmad Umar, an NIF member, as minister of higher education; Umar immediately set about Islamizing the entire system of higher education in the Sudan. Abd al-Rahim Hamid, also a prominent NIF member, was appointed minister of finance and economy, thus enabling the NIF to take control of all the state's leading financial institutions.

In March 1990, al-Bashir's friend and now minister of the interior, Colonel Faisal Ali Abu Salih, took control of the Omdurman Islamic University, which was known as "the school of choice among radical Muslims looking for a career in terrorism."¹⁸ Al-Bashir had al-Turabi's support when on 31 December 1990, his Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) announced Sharia laws much more stringent than Numeiri's 1983 September Laws, which made non-Muslims into something less than second-class citizens. The new laws, for example, mandated the death penalty for any Muslim who left Islam. The Popular Police Force Act passed in December 1991 was strict on women's dress and behavior in public, with flogging as the preferred form of punishment.¹⁹ By the early 1990s, the first and only Muslim Brotherhood state was fully established in the Sudan.

Al-Turabi's work as a Jihadist leader was not confined to the Sudan. In 1989, the year of the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, he met several times with Osama bin Laden, who was allowed to set up an al-Qaeda training base in the Sudan. In return, Bin Laden donated \$2.5 million for Port Sudan's new airport, which was used to transport arms to Jihadist movements in Yemen and Somalia. He set up other training camps for various Jihadist groups in the region, including two major offshoots of the Muslim Brotherhood: Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Hamas. In addition to aiding al-Qaeda, al-Turabi assisted the PLO and Hamas, both of which were provided with offices in Khartoum, and acted as mediator between them and the Islamic regime

¹⁸ Burr and Collins, 15.

¹⁹ Robert O. Collins, *A History of Modern Sudan* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 191.

in Iran (to be sure, he spoke of Khomeini with great admiration²⁰). “My relations with Hamas are, of course, very good,” said al-Turabi, “and my relations with brother Yasser Arafat and his colleagues in the Palestinian leadership are equally good and go back a long way.”²¹

Once again, we see al-Turabi bringing rivals together for the cause of Jihadism. In this case, he affirmed “the legitimate goal of the Palestinians,” as defined by Hamas, that is, the annihilation of the Jewish state. Always the pragmatist, al-Turabi recognized that Arafat’s overtures for peace may be a necessary means of achieving that “legitimate goal.”²² Al-Turabi’s stated position was that if the Sudan were to consider acknowledging the Jewish state, “it would be betraying its Islamic conviction and would be appeasing the West while incurring the wrath of God.”²³ Thus, in accordance with Islamic Jihadist doctrine, the destruction of Israel and the Jews was a holy mission pleasing to God.

As always, one tie that al-Turabi used to bind together the Jihadist movements was the same tie that binds all of them to National Socialism: exterminationist Jew hatred. Although by the end of the 1960s, the few Jews who were still in the Sudan had left,²⁴ the Sudanese Islamic government maintained a policy of killing Jews at every opportunity, particularly the Ethiopian Jews who attempted to cross the Sudan in an effort to get to Israel. Typical of the Sudanese Jihadists’ attitude toward the Jews is the claim of Sudanese Defense Minister Abdel Rahim Mohamed Hussein that the Jews are behind the crimes of the Sudanese Jihadists themselves – namely, the slaughter in Darfur. Similarly, al-Turabi declared that “Jewish and Zionist groups” control American foreign policy, which, according to the genocidal Sudanese Brothers, also promotes genocide.²⁵ “The majority of Arabs know,” he maintained, “that the Gulf War was not precipitated by any political conflict but was the result of intrigue by international powers [that is, the world Jewish conspiracy] to divide the Arabs”²⁶ – another example

²⁰ Quoted in Hamdi, 87.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 55.

²² *Ibid.*, 56.

²³ *Ibid.*, 79.

²⁴ For an excellent study of the Jews in the Sudan, see Eli S. Malka, *Jacob’s Children in the Land of the Mahdi: Jews of the Sudan* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1997).

²⁵ Quoted in Hamdi, 65–66.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 52.

of Hitler's "most insolent lie" strategy adopted by Islamic Jihadists and calculated to incite "wrathful hatred."²⁷

Al-Turabi's efforts to bring together various Jihadist organizations and to promote their international agenda, including the extermination of the Jews, did not end here. His growing prominence both within the NIF and among international Jihadist organizations soon earned him his release from prison. In December 1990, he traveled to the United States to solicit funds for the Islamic Committee for Palestine, which is known to have supported Jihadist terrorist activity, including the operations of Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ).²⁸ At this time, tapes of his speeches promoting jihad began to circulate throughout the Muslim world. When Osama bin Laden was expelled from Saudi Arabia in 1991, al-Turabi invited him to set up his base of operations for al-Qaeda in the Sudan.

On 25–28 April of that same year, al-Turabi organized the first meeting of the Popular Arab and Islamic Congress (PAIC) in Khartoum; the purpose of the Congress was to coordinate Jihadists' efforts to bring about the worldwide Islamic revolution. As al-Turabi stated it in his essay "Priorities for Islamic Movements until 2020" (1991), "under Islam as a religion of *tawheed*, Muslim activists must strike a balance between short-termism and the eternity of their mission; between the local and the universal; and between the absolute and the relative in terms of time and place."²⁹ A prime example of the application of this principle is the "phased strategy" that the PLO implemented with the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993 (see Chapter 7). It is a policy of taking what you can, when you can, on the path toward the ultimate aim of annihilating the Jews and Islamizing a world controlled by the "Zionist conspiracy." Here, too, a major part of the ideological common ground of groups that had at times been at odds with each other was Jew hatred.

The NIF hailed the gathering as the most significant event in the Islamic world since the collapse of the caliphate. "We are prepared to stand side by side with our fellow human beings and work with

²⁷ See Yaakov Lappin, "Sudan: Jews behind Darfur Conflict" (29 July 2007): <http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/1,7340,L-3431281,00.html>.

²⁸ On 28 February 2006, Sami al-Arian (b. 1954), formerly a professor at the University of South Florida, pleaded guilty to charges of conspiracy to provide aid to the Palestinian Islamic Jihad.

²⁹ Hasan al-Turabi, "Priorities for Islamic Movements until 2020," in Hamdi, 107.

anyone under a *leadership of our choice*" (emphasis added), al-Turabi once declared, asserting the totalitarian essence of Islamic Jihadism. Because Islam, in his words, encompasses "personal as well as collective life,"³⁰ he could not accept "the Western concept of rule by majority,"³¹ a concept that allows for personal privacy, which is as inimical as it is alien to Sharia. Sharing that position were two hundred Jihadists from forty-five countries, including representatives of Egyptian Islamic Jihad, Algerian Islamic Jihad, Hezbollah, al-Qaeda, and Hamas, as well as the PLO, featuring Yasser Arafat. With the encouragement of Hamas leaders, Arafat convinced the participants in the Congress to declare Khartoum "the springboard for the liberation of Jerusalem,"³² which could come about only through the destruction of the Jewish state. Working extensively with these and other Jihadist groups, al-Turabi once boasted, "I am close to, I know, every Islamic movement in the world, secret or public."³³ Thus, through al-Turabi the ideological influence of the Muslim Brotherhood and Islamic Jihadism spread even further to include the non-Arab Muslim world.

During this time, the bonds between the NIF and non-Arab Iran, between Sunni Jihadists and Shiite Jihadists, deepened further, cemented by their shared hatred of the Jewish people. The evidence? "In December 1990 an Islamic conference on Palestine was convened at Tehran where for the first time Shiite Iran made a determined effort to reach out to the Sunni Palestinians involved in the Arab rebellion (*intifada*) against Israel. Iran would provide military assistance to Hamas and signed a secret agreement for cooperation between the Sudanese and Iranian intelligence services. By 1992 Iran had become the most dependable political partner of the Sudan that symbolized the success of Turabi to bridge the theological differences between Shia and Sunni."³⁴ When Tehran hosted the Second International Congress on the Struggle for Palestine in October 1991, the NIF, Hamas, and Islamic Jihad were among the comrades in attendance.

³⁰ Quoted in Hamdi, 115.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 45-46; emphasis added.

³² Burr and Collins, 60.

³³ *Ibid.*, 74.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 79.

On 16 October 1993, Omar al-Bashir declared himself president of the Sudan and dissolved the RCC. Al-Turabi enjoyed his favor for a time; in fact, al-Turabi once asserted, “Omar al-Bashir is me.”³⁵ Under al-Bashir’s authority al-Turabi served as speaker of the National Assembly, where he worked with the president to promote the NIF agenda to Islamize the Sudan, an agenda that would mean the murder and displacement of more than two million people, many of whom were Christians, many of whom followed native African religions. Christianity may not be a “dead religion,” as al-Turabi claimed,³⁶ but before long, with the implementation of the Brotherhood’s Jihadist agenda, most of the Christians of the Sudan would be either dead or displaced. When it came to the distribution of food, and in keeping with Islamic Jihadist ideology, notes Serge Trifkovic, “if one does not bear an Islamic name, one is denied food. Without any means of alternative support the choice is, as ever, Islam or death.”³⁷ As the slaughter reached its height, al-Turabi convened the Third Popular Arab and Islamic Congress on 30 March–2 April 1995, with Hezbollah, Hamas, PIJ, and al-Qaeda, as well as the Algerian Armed Islamic Group (GIA) and its rival, the Egyptian Islamic Group of Omar Abdel Rahman, in attendance.³⁸ Al-Turabi had a way of bringing together rival groups such as these, as well as Hamas and the PLO, the Sunnis and the Shiites, with no comment from the rest of the world, even as they were eyeball deep in the blood of the victims of the Sudanese Ikhwan’s genocidal jihad.

By the mid-1990s, the Bashir/Turabi-led NIF had become so powerful that Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak feared a resurgence of the Muslim Brotherhood and other fanatic Islamist groups in Egypt. In January 1995, he ordered scores of arrests, which resulted in the indictment of thirty members of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood on charges of inciting terrorism. It turned out that Mubarak had good reason to fear the Jihadists’ connections with the NIF: on 26 June 1995, with the assistance of the NIF and al-Jamaat al-Islamiyyah, an

³⁵ Quoted in Hamdi, 61.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 68.

³⁷ Serge Trifkovic, *The Sword of the Prophet: Islam: History, Theology, Impact on the World* (Boston: Regina Orthodox Press, 2002), 179.

³⁸ For more details on the Third Popular Arab and Islamic Congress, see Collins, 213–14.

affiliate of Egyptian Islamic Jihad, attempted to assassinate Mubarak in Addis Ababa. Later that year, in another declaration of the NIF's support for Islamic Jihadists worldwide, al-Turabi put his signature to a "Statement of Solidarity and Support" for Hamas in its efforts to destroy Israel, a move that was not surprising, given that by then, five hundred members of Hamas were stationed in the Sudan.

Evidence of the Sudanese Jihadist government's involvement in the attempt on Mubarak's life led to UN sanctions against the Sudan, which came in April 1996 and soon led to an internal decline in the prominence of al-Turabi. On 18 May of that year, his niece's husband, Osama bin Laden, was invited to leave the Sudan. "In May 2000," write J. Millard Burr and Robert Collins, "Hasan al-Turabi made his last public statement at the popular Arabic Al-Jazeera television station in Qatar on his seventy-third and last appearance. He predicted that the Sudanese authorities would soon place him under arrest."³⁹ His prediction came true: after the Al-Jazeera broadcast al-Bashir had al-Turabi imprisoned on charges of conspiracy to take over the government. He was released in October 2003, then sent back to Kobar in March 2004, then released again on 28 June 2008. His relations with al-Bashir became more strained than ever when on 12 January 2009, al-Turabi urged the Sudan's leader to turn himself over to the International Criminal Court in The Hague to face charges of genocide, which had been filed on 14 July 2008. Two days after calling for al-Bashir's surrender to the Court – a call likely rooted far more in political than in humanitarian motives – al-Turabi found himself back in prison.

Throughout these years the NIF, under the totalitarian rule of al-Bashir, continued its program of the Islamization of the Sudan. According to Bullen Dolli, an Episcopal bishop from the Sudan, the death toll there exceeds Bosnia, Kosovo, Chechnya, Afghanistan, Somalia, and Algeria combined. Twice as many Sudanese have perished since the late 1990s as Americans in the past two hundred years.⁴⁰ The slaughter in the south continued until the signing of the tenuous Nairobi Comprehensive Peace Agreement on 9 January 2005, under which Southern Sudan would enjoy a certain amount of

³⁹ Burr and Collins, 277.

⁴⁰ Trifkovic, 255.

autonomy for the next six years. As the conflict in the South decreased, however, the devastation in the West, around Darfur, increased; mass murder perpetrated by the *janjawiid* Muslim militias in the region began around October 2002. “The Fur,” Robert Collins explains, “whom Salah Ali Alghali, the governor of southern Darfur, had openly vowed to exterminate, were the primary targets for the mounted *janjawiid* commandoes, usually comprised of 100 raiders who would sweep down on a village just before dawn.”⁴¹ These pogroms perpetrated with the approval of the Jihadist Sudanese state continued unabated and unpunished under the gaze of an indifferent world, confirming once again that what befalls humanity befalls the Jews first. Also confirmed is the evil of Islamic Jihadism, an evil defined not only by a hatred of the Jews but also by a hatred of the Jewish testimony concerning the holiness of *every* human life. Only by eliminating such a testimony – a testimony that insists on the *divine* prohibition against murder – can the Jihadists implement such a program of murder.

This brings us to another branch in the genealogical tree of Islamic Jihadist evil stemming from the Muslim Brotherhood: Islamic Jihad.

Islamic Jihad and Islamic Jihadism

After Nasser’s suppression of the Ikhwan in the 1960s, in 1971, Anwar Sadat welcomed the Muslim Brotherhood back into Egyptian society; by 1974, he had released all Brotherhood members from Egypt’s prisons. Most of them were understandably cautious about a quick return to militant activity. Those who were less patient – particularly after Sadat signed a peace treaty with Israel on 26 March 1979 – formed a group known as Islamic Jihad (al-Jihad al-Islami). Islamic Jihad understood itself to be restoring to the Brotherhood “the organic unity between religion and politics, faith and power,”⁴² which had been espoused by Jihadist ideologues Abdul Al’a Maududi, Hasan al-Banna, and Sayyid Qutb. Although groups identifying themselves as part of Islamic Jihad have appeared throughout the Muslim world, our focus

⁴¹ For details on Janjawiid operations, see Collins, 289ff.

⁴² Meir Hatina, *Islam and Salvation in Palestine: The Islamic Jihad Movement* (Tel Aviv: The Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, 2001), 31.

here is on the movement that emerged almost immediately from the Egyptian movement – namely, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (Harakat al-Jihad al-Islami al-Filastini). First, however, a few words must be said about Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ), the organization that spawned the PIJ.

Ziad Abu-Amr notes that for Islamic Jihad and its factions, “the Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979 came to offer an Islamic model that could be emulated.”⁴³ Following that model – and demonstrating an influence that ran in both directions – the EIJ branched out from the Muslim Brotherhood with the aim of overthrowing the Egyptian government and establishing an Islamic state ruled by Islamic law. Chief among its leaders was Muhammad Abd al-Salam Faraj, who drew his inspiration from the Salafist ideologues and even more from the writings of Sayyid Qutb. Among al-Faraj’s most notable works, as mentioned in Chapter 2, is *The Neglected Duty*, in which he argues that the establishment of the Islamic state takes precedence over all other concerns facing modern Islam.⁴⁴ Another key figure at the founding of the EIJ is Karam Zuhdi, who, along with al-Faraj and Ayman al-Zawahiri (more about him in the next chapter), was involved in the assassination of Anwar Sadat by Khalid al-Islambuli (1954–1982) on 6 October 1981. Faraj was among those condemned to death in the aftermath of Sadat’s murder; he was executed on 15 April 1982.⁴⁵ His legacy continued, however, as the tentacles of the EIJ spread and they continued to work closely with other movements throughout the Jihadist world, until in 2001, they merged with al-Qaeda.

In the mid-1980s, Egyptian-born Sayyed Imam al-Sharif (b. 1950), also known as Dr. Fadl, assumed leadership of the EIJ. His book *The Essentials of Preparing for Jihad* (1988) was required reading in al-Qaeda’s training camps. He worked closely with al-Zawahiri, who was a pivotal figure in the connection and collaboration between the EIJ and al-Qaeda. Under the guidance of al-Sharif, the EIJ argued

⁴³ Ziad Abu-Amr, *Islamic Fundamentalism in the West Bank and Gaza: Muslim Brotherhood and Islamic Jihad* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994), 91.

⁴⁴ See Mohammad abd al-Salam Faraj, “The Neglected Duty,” in John Calvert, ed., *Islamism: A Documentary and Reference Guide* (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 2007), 148–53.

⁴⁵ For details on Sadat’s assassination, see Caryle Murphy, *Passion for Islam: Shaping the Middle East: The Egyptian Experience* (New York: Scribner’s, 2002), 61–63.

that apostates (those who did not fall in line with Islamic Jihadism) should be executed, including any Muslims who registered to vote. Why? Because, he maintained, democracy is contrary to Islam and undermines Allah's sovereignty over the state.⁴⁶ In 1991, al-Zawahiri succeeded al-Sharif as the head of the EIJ. In that capacity, al-Zawahiri traveled to Iran, where he met with leaders of the Islamic Revolution and Hezbollah. After the EIJ's attempted assassination of Mubarak in 1995, however, the organization soon fell out of favor, particularly with the NIF. Hence their merger with al-Qaeda in June 2001, under the guidance of al-Zawahiri. As with all Islamic Jihadist movements, exterminationist anti-Semitism is among the defining features of the EIJ; it is also a defining feature of the PIJ.

The PIJ emerged from the EIJ in 1979 in Gaza. Just as the Egyptian faction believed that the Brotherhood was not moving rapidly or violently enough, the PIJ's founders – Fathi Shaqaqi, Abd al-Aziz Odeh, and Bashir Musa – held that the Ikhwan was not doing enough to achieve the destruction of the Jewish state, with Shaqaqi soon assuming the leadership of the PIJ. Their position was that the Brotherhood had deviated from Hasan al-Banna's founding Jihadist principle by taking a gradualist approach to the Islamization first of the region and then of the world, particularly in Palestine. They also maintained that the Brotherhood had failed to understand the implications of the revolutionary events that had transpired in Iran. Soon after the Iranian Revolution of 1979, Shaqaqi authored a book titled *Khomeini: The Islamic Solution* in which he praised the example set by the teachings and the actions of the Ayatollah. Indeed, Shaqaqi saw the Iranian Revolution as an important bridge between Sunni and Shiite Muslims.⁴⁷ He was an equal admirer of Sayyid Qutb's *Milestones*, which he hailed as "one of the most important works in modern Islamic literature."⁴⁸ Once again, we see the paths of influence in the genealogy of evil going in both directions.

⁴⁶ It should be noted, however, that al-Sharif questioned the wisdom of the 9/11 attacks and argued against the indiscriminate killing of non-Muslims; see "Major Jihadi Cleric and Author of al-Qaeda's Sharia Guide to Jihad: 9/11 Was a Sin," MEMRI (14 December 2007): <http://www.memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=archives&Area=sd&ID=SP178507>.

⁴⁷ See Hatina, 47.

⁴⁸ Quoted in *ibid.*, 23.

Born in Gaza in 1951 and trained as a physician in Egypt, Shaqaqi maintained, much like the Nazi ideologues, that the very existence of the Jews and the “Zionist entity” was the contagion that contaminated the world, beginning with the Muslim world. “Palestine is part of the faith,” the PIJ’s Internal Charter declares. “To relinquish any part of it is to abandon Islam.”⁴⁹ Further, “A solution of peace based on the recognition of the Jews’ right to Palestine, or part of it, contradicts the Quran.”⁵⁰ Where the charter leaves the status of “peace negotiations” is obvious: any and all such negotiations are out of the question. Embracing Shaqaqi’s vision, the PIJ views Israel as “the main enemy of [all] Muslims”; hence, the PIJ is dedicated to “the destruction of the State of Israel [and the extermination of the Jews],” as well as the “overthrow of Arab governments that do not uphold Islamic law [which forbids making peace of any kind with the Jews].”⁵¹ The Jihadists’ war against the Jews, therefore, transcends geography and politics; it is an ideological, metaphysical war that can be resolved only through jihad. The movement’s slogans, as stated in its charter, include “Jihad is the way of liberation,” “Jihad is the way to unity, and unity is the way to strength and power,” and “Victory or martyrdom is the way of jihad.”⁵² Unless death can be dealt to the Jew, death is the only option remaining to the Jihadist. Thus, the Jihadist loves death more than life.

The annihilation of the Jews, Judaism, and the Jewish state, then, is the defining ideological principle of Islamic Jihadism, and this is what defines the PIJ: its ultimate aim is the liberation not merely of Palestine but of the entire world from the “Jewish cancer” that plagues humanity, and, in the words of the PIJ Charter, the cancer is “embodied in the Zionist presence in Palestine.”⁵³ Following the lead of Maududi, al-Banna, and Qutb – and in keeping with a lesson learned from the Nazis – Shaqaqi insisted that “to divest Islam of its political content would mean leaving Muslims without identity and power.”⁵⁴ It is worth

⁴⁹ Quoted in *ibid.*, 162.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 165.

⁵¹ Yonah Alexander, *Palestinian Religious Terrorism: Hamas and Islamic Jihad* (Ardsey, NY: Transnational Publishers, 2002), 29.

⁵² Hatina, 163.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 165.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 90.

noting that the *political* content, and not just the religious content of the Muslim's life, is essential to Muslim identity. If, therefore, one cannot be a Muslim and tolerate the existence of the Jews, then one cannot be a Muslim without waging an exterminationist jihad against the Jews.

"According to Islamic Jihad," as scholar Meir Hatina correctly notes, "a proper reading of the Qur'an and an understanding of history would lead to the unequivocal conclusion that Palestine is at the focus of the religio-historic confrontation between the Muslims and their *eternal enemies*, the Jews."⁵⁵ In addition to a variation on Qutb's conviction that "history must confirm faith,"⁵⁶ one hears echoes of the Nazis' theme of the *ewige Jude*, the "eternal Jew," here designated as the eternal enemy of Islam. It should be noted that the invocation of history as proof of the eternal enmity of the Jew is distinctively modern and characteristic of Hitler's approach to the Jewish Question in *Mein Kampf*.⁵⁷ Also in keeping with National Socialism and Islamic Jihadism – both of which sought to create a world that is *Judenrein*, "purified of Jews" – the PIJ sees itself as a purist movement, following in the ways of "the first generation of righteous Muslims and the pure companions of the Prophet," as its Internal Charter states.⁵⁸ This theme of purity, it will be recalled, is characteristic of Qutb's "central theme," as Amir Taheri correctly describes it: "Islam could not accept any compromise with other religions or political doctrines. . . . Islam had to remain pure, and be applied as a total system of life."⁵⁹ In the end, this totality, like the Nazi totalitarianism, requires the total annihilation of the Jews.

Taking steps toward the more immediate goal of destroying the "Zionist entity," the PIJ launched its first attacks on the Jewish state in 1984. Shafaqi was apprehended in March 1986; in 1988, he and Odeh were deported to Lebanon. Once in Lebanon, Shafaqi strengthened his connections with Hezbollah and Iran; soon Hezbollah was training

⁵⁵ Ibid, 48; emphasis added.

⁵⁶ See Ronald L. Nettler, *Past Trials and Present Tribulations: A Muslim Fundamentalist's View of the Jews* (Oxford: Pergamon, 1987), 5.

⁵⁷ See, for example, Adolf Hitler, *Mein Kampf*, trans. Ralph Manheim (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1971), 154–56, 488–90, 678–83, and many other sections of this volume.

⁵⁸ See Hatina, 161.

⁵⁹ Amir Taheri, *Holy Terror: Inside the World of Islamic Terrorism* (Bethesda, MD: Adler & Adler, 1987), 57.

PIJ terrorists, and Iran was providing them with funds. Shaqaqi made the first of several trips to Tehran in December 1988; subsequently, according to a report published in the Beirut newspaper *Al-Hayat*, Iran donated \$20 million to the PIJ.⁶⁰ That same year, Shaqaqi published a booklet outlining the conditions and strategies for sending adolescents on suicide missions to kill Jews.⁶¹ He also set up an office in Damascus under the protection of the Syrian Baathist regime.

After the Oslo Accords of 13 September 1993, Shaqaqi led the way in the Jihadists' opposition to any peace with Israel. In the view of the PIJ, "the Oslo Accords were a device designed to extract the PLO from its financial mire and satisfy Arafat's lust for power."⁶² Subsequent to the Accords, the PIJ joined with Hamas to form the Alliance for Palestine Forces (APF) in Damascus. By then they had also established offices in Beirut, Tehran, and Khartoum. Although the Palestinian Authority expressed some official "concern" over the actions of the PIJ and even arrested some of its low-level operatives, it did not place any obstacles in the path that the PIJ was determined to pursue. What that path entailed Shaqaqi made clear in a statement broadcast on Iranian television on 3 November 1994: "We shall raise arms against the criminal Israelis [that is, Jews] wherever they may be in the autonomous territory *and outside it*."⁶³ Why outside the territory? Because the Jewish contagion extends far beyond Palestine: it is, according to the Jihadists, a pathogen threatening all humanity.

The Mossad tracked down Shaqaqi and shot him on 26 October 1995 in front of the Diplomat Hotel in Sliema, Malta; Shaqaqi had been in transit to Libya, where he was to have met with Muammar Gaddafi to discuss finances for suicide bombing operations against the Israelis. Forty thousand people attended his funeral in Damascus on 1 November, including dignitaries from Hamas, the PLO, and Hezbollah. "Iran's leaders," Hatina observes, "claimed Shaqaqi as their own martyr, declared a public day of mourning, and named a street

⁶⁰ *Al-Hayat*, 17 December 1994, quoted in "Zionism and Israel – Encyclopedic Dictionary," http://www.zionism-israel.com/dic/Islamic_Jihad.htm.

⁶¹ See David Brooks, "The Culture of Martyrdom," *The Atlantic Monthly Online* (June 2002): <http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200206/brooks>.

⁶² Hatina, 86.

⁶³ Quoted in Anthony H. Cordesman, *The Israeli-Palestinian War: Escalating to Nowhere* (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger Security International, 2005), 210; emphasis added.

after him. Their protégé, Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah, stated that ‘we are all soldiers of the Islamic Jihad.’⁶⁴ Hamas leader Ahmed Yassin visited Shaqaqi’s grave in October 1997 after his release from an Israeli prison; he praised the Jihadist murderer as “a symbol for the Muslim believer and a true fighter.”⁶⁵

Shaqaqi’s successor as head of the PIJ was Gaza-born Sheikh Ramadan Abdullah Shallah (b. 1958), a Ph.D. in economics and former professor at the University of South Florida. As a result of his activities in the United States, he earned the honor of being listed as a “Specially Designated Terrorist” under U.S. law on 27 November 1995. Shallah made efforts to improve relations between Fatah, Hamas, and the PIJ, so as to achieve their common goal of destroying the Jewish state. The Al-Aqsa Intifada of September 2000 helped to solidify the cooperative efforts of the PIJ, Hamas, and Fatah in their terrorist attacks on the Jews. During the Intifada, the PIJ carried out numerous homicide bombings against the Israelis, recruiting adolescent girls as well as boys to serve as “martyrs” in the cause of jihad.⁶⁶ Many of the attacks were coordinated from Jenin by Mahmoud Tawallbe, Ali Sefoori, and Tabeth Mardawi. Since that time, however, and in contrast to Fatah, the PIJ has maintained its ideological “purity” by refusing to consider more expedient political measures that would involve negotiations of any kind with Israel. As stated in its charter, any negotiation with Israel is contrary to Islam.

In 2001 and 2002, the relationship between the Palestinian Authority and the PIJ grew more strained when the PA arrested members of the PIJ, despite the protests of thousands of Palestinians. This action on the part of the PA cemented ties between the PIJ and Hamas, both of whom were experiencing increasing tensions with the PA.⁶⁷ To be sure, in January 1990, Odeh affirmed the view that the PIJ complements Hamas in a mutual striving toward a mutual end – namely, the elimination of the Jewish state.⁶⁸ Hamas and the PIJ cooperated, for example, in the bombardment of Israel with mortars and Qassam

⁶⁴ Hatina, 113.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 106.

⁶⁶ For a comprehensive list of attacks by the PIJ against Israel during the Al-Aqsa Intifada, see *ibid.*, 211–13.

⁶⁷ See *ibid.*, 214–15.

⁶⁸ See *ibid.*, 80.

rockets launched from Gaza, even though the two have had their issues with regard to control of the area since the Hamas takeover in 2007. As Hatina has pointed out, “the ideological convergence between the Islamic Jihad and Hamas . . . did not cancel out their political rivalry.”⁶⁹ In that power struggle, Hamas proved to be the victor.

Hamas: Islamic Jihadism in the Midst of the Jewish State

The Islamic Resistance Movement (Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiya), more widely known by its acronym Hamas, emerged as a militant Palestinian wing of the Muslim Brotherhood on 9 December 1987, immediately after the outbreak of the Palestinians’ First Intifada against Israel. This avowedly terrorist arm of the Ikhwan was founded by Sheikh Ahmed Yassin (1937–2004) and his comrades Dr. Abdel Aziz al-Rantisi (1947–2004) and Mahmoud al-Zahar (b. 1945),⁷⁰ who wrote, “If the Quran attacks the Jews in some of its verses, the people must read it.”⁷¹ Also present at the founding meeting were Ibrahim al-Yazuri (a pharmacist), Sheikh Salah Shehada (of the Islamic University of Gaza), 'Issa al-Nashshar (an engineer), Muhammad Sham'a (a teacher), and 'Abd-al-Fattah Dukhan (a principal).⁷² As in the case of the Nazis, these champions of an ideology that espouses Jew hatred are not from the uneducated, disenfranchised dregs of society – it is just the opposite: they come from the highest social and cultural echelons of the Arab Muslim world, as Mahmoud al-Zahar himself has boasted.⁷³

Ahmed Yassin is to Hamas what al-Turabi and Shaqqaqi are to the NIF and the PIJ. Born in Ashkelon in 1938, Yassin grew up in admiration and awe of Haj Amin al-Husseini.⁷⁴ In 1957, during his years at the prestigious Al-Azhar University in Cairo, he joined the Muslim Brotherhood and embraced the Brotherhood’s ideology of Islamic rule

⁶⁹ Ibid., 90.

⁷⁰ See Zaki Chehab, *Inside Hamas: The Untold Story of the Militant Islamic Movement* (New York: Nation Books, 2007), 25.

⁷¹ Quoted in David Aaron, *In Their Own Words: Voices of Jihad* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2008), 78.

⁷² Abu-Amr, 63.

⁷³ See Küntzel, 105.

⁷⁴ David G. Dalin and John F. Rothman, *Icon of Evil: Hitler’s Mufti and the Rise of Radical Islam* (New York: Random House, 2008), 139.

over all humanity. In 1973, Yassin established the Islamic Congress (Mujama al-Islami) in Gaza as part of his efforts to expand the influence of the Brotherhood, and in 1978, his organization founded the Islamic University of Gaza, whose Rector Dr. Ahmad Abu Halabiya is known for publicly calling for the massacre of Jews everywhere. In a Palestinian television broadcast from 2000, for example, he ranted, “None of the Jews refrain from committing any possible evil. . . . They are all liars. They all want to distort truth, but we are in possession of the truth. . . . They are the ones who must be butchered and killed, as Allah the Almighty said: ‘Fight them: Allah will torture them at your hands, and will humiliate them and will help you to overcome them, and will relieve the minds of the believers.’”⁷⁵ In a word, one cannot be a pious Muslim without torturing, humiliating, and murdering Jews.

Articulating an *essential* evil within the Jew reminiscent of Nazi diatribes, Sheikh Ibrahim Mudeiras of Hamas declared, “The Jews will not live in peace and comfort under our rule. Treachery will keep being their nature throughout history. The day will come when the whole world will rid itself of the Jews.”⁷⁶ Thus, as Abu-Amr has explained, Yassin and his cohorts embraced the Ikhwan’s fundamental position that the Jews are “the dirtiest and meanest of all races, defiling the most sanctified and honored spot on earth,” making “no distinctions between Jews, Zionists, and Israelis.”⁷⁷ Esther Webman’s study of Hamas propaganda confirms Abu-Amr’s findings: “The anti-Semitic rhetoric in Hamas leaflets is frequent and intense. . . . Generally no differentiation is made in the leaflets between Jew and Zionist, inasmuch as Judaism was perceived as embracing Zionism.”⁷⁸ As in all ideology driven by Jew hatred, from National Socialism to Islamic Jihadism, where the Jew is the enemy, Judaism is the enemy.

Noting quite correctly that Hamas represents a distinctively modern form of animosity toward Jews and Judaism, Beverley Milton-Edwards

⁷⁵ “PA TV Broadcasts Call for Killing Jews and Americans,” MEMRI (13 October 2000): <http://www.memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Area=sd&ID=SP13800>.

⁷⁶ Quoted in Aaron, 113. For more on Mudeiras and other sheikhs inciting the extermination of the Jews, see Matthew Levitt, *Hamas: Politics, Charity, and Terrorism in the Service of Jihad* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2006), 134ff.

⁷⁷ Abu-Amr, 26.

⁷⁸ Esther Webman, *Anti-Semitic Motifs in the Ideology of Hizballah and Hamas* (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University, 1994), 22

writes, “The Hamas view of the Jewish people is not drawn solely from the pages of the Qur’an and Hadith. Its myopia is also the product of Western anti-Semitic [primarily Nazi] influences. While Hamas, like other modern-day Islamic Jihadists, has developed its argument on the Jewish question by relying on Qur’anic and other Islamic sources, it also . . . [borrows] from such classical Western anti-Semitic sources as *The Protocols of the Elders of Zion*. Such opinions are influenced by the most bizarre form of Gentile [that is, Nazi, among others] paranoid conspiracy theory.”⁷⁹ Once again, the point to bear in mind is that, like other Islamic Jihadist movements, Hamas represents not a throwback to a “medieval mind-set” but a distinctively modern, *exterminationist* mutation of Jew hatred, fomented largely by Nazi ideology. What Islamic Jihadism has in common with National Socialism is not merely the desire to exterminate the Jews, a desire that many others have expressed. No, it is this: exterminationist Jew hatred forms a *definitive, foundational* basis for their entire worldview. Both for Nazis and for Islamic Jihadists, exterminationist Jew hatred is a *metaphysical* category, a first principle, defining the very essence of their thinking.

Such thinking defined Yassin’s position when in 1979 he expanded his political influence with the creation of the Islamic Organization. In 1983, Yassin set up the organization’s military wing, which he called the Palestinian Mujahadeen (al-Mujahadioun al-Falastinioun), a unit that functioned much like the SS or Gestapo, headed by Salah Shehada (1953–2002). The Palestinian Mujahadeen served as a model for the creation of the military wing of Hamas in 1992, the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam; much like the process for the selection of the SS, their members are recruited according to criteria demanding “that they should have a strong religious commitment and demonstrate fiery determination towards the cause.”⁸⁰ This group of elite Jihadists bore the name of the man who fought the British in Palestine and was killed in 1935. Their slogan, taken from a diatribe delivered by Iman Ibrahim Aqel (d. 1993), is “Killing Israelis is *ibada* [an act of devotion].”⁸¹ The formation of the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam led to Yassin’s arrest by the Israelis

⁷⁹ Beverley Milton-Edwards, *Islamic Politics in Palestine* (London: I. B. Tauris, 1999), 188.

⁸⁰ Chehab, 52.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 50.

in 1984 for the possession of arms and for operating an organization dedicated to the destruction of the Jewish state; he was released in May 1985 in one of Israel's prisoner exchanges with Jihadists.

In 1989, Yassin adopted a tactic expressive of the murderous nature of the no-limit ideology of Hamas: he ordered the kidnapping and murder of Israeli soldiers, who would be buried in a way that would enable Hamas to negotiate an exchange of the soldiers' dead bodies for the live bodies of jailed Hamas Jihadists. In this move, we see yet another aspect of the meaning of the Jihadists' claim that they love death – the death of Jews – more than they love life. Yassin was arrested after just such a kidnapping of Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) soldier Ilan Saadon on 3 May 1989; Saadon's body was not recovered until 29 July 1996. Yassin was tried, convicted, and held from May 1989 until October 1997, when, he was released in another prisoner exchange. During his stay in prison, his followers continued to be true to the cause, launching the first of numerous homicide bombings against the Israelis on 16 April 1993.⁸² This was also a time when Hamas stepped up its propaganda efforts, using methods borrowed from the Nazis since the time of Hasan al-Banna. In September 1996, for example, the Hamas monthly magazine *Falastin Al-Muslima* published in an article by Ibrahim al-Ali on the transformation of Jews into "apes, pigs, mice, and lizards," maintaining that "the transformation was actual" and that it "left its mark in the souls of the Jews who came after them."⁸³ As in the case of the Nazis, those souls, and not just the body of Israel, are the object of Hamas's exterminationist agenda.

After his release from prison in 1997, Yassin continued to preach that it is a *religious duty* to refuse any negotiation for peace with the Israelis and the Jews. On 27 March 2002, Hamas adopted another tactic employed by the Nazis: following the holy Hebrew calendar to plan their actions against the Jews, Hamas sent twenty-five-year-old Abdel-Basset Odeh of Tulkarem on a homicide bombing mission to the Park Hotel in Netanya to murder Jews in the middle of their Passover Seder. Subsequent to the attack and responding to numerous other attacks, Human Rights Watch (HRW) urged that Hamas leaders, including Yassin, "be held accountable for war crimes and

⁸² For more information on the first homicide bombings by Hamas, see Küntzel, 119.

⁸³ See *ibid.*, 77.

crimes against humanity.”⁸⁴ On 30 June 2007, HRW issued a similar condemnation of Hamas’s eight thousand-plus rocket and mortar attacks on Israeli civilians, which began in April 2001 under Yassin and continued into 2009.

Meanwhile Dr. Rantisi, Yassin’s right-hand man, carried on the propaganda campaign, publishing an article in 2003 in the Hamas weekly *Al-Risala*, arguing that the Holocaust was “the greatest of lies” perpetrated by the Jews and, if there was a Holocaust, the Zionists were behind it.⁸⁵ Said Rantisi, “It is no longer a secret that the Zionists were behind the Nazis’ murder of many Jews, and agreed to it, with the aim of intimidating them [the Jews] and forcing them to immigrate to Palestine. Every time they failed to persuade a group of Jews to immigrate [to Palestine], they unhesitatingly sentenced [them] to death. Afterwards, they would organize great propaganda campaigns, to cash in on their blood.”⁸⁶ Yassin remained in power until 22 March 2004, when the Israelis assassinated him. Rantisi succeeded him, only to meet the same fate on 18 April 2004.

After Rantisi came former physics teacher Khalid Mashal (b. 1956). Born in Silwad, a village outside of Ramallah, Mashal attended Kuwait University. He joined the Brotherhood in 1971 and led the Hamas faction in Kuwait until 1991; with the onset of the Gulf War, he moved to Jordan. When the Jordanian government expelled Hamas in August 1999, the Syrian Baath government, under the leadership of Hafez al-Assad (1930–2000), provided refuge for him, thus demonstrating a close ideological tie between Hamas and the Baath Party (see Chapter 7), their religious and secular differences notwithstanding. Once again, the tie that binds the two – the ideological bond that overcomes all differences – is exterminationist Jew hatred.

In keeping with the Nazi-like discourse that labels Jews as a threat to all humanity, Mashal wrote, “The Zionist blueprint constitutes a danger to the entire [Muslim] Nation and not just the people of

⁸⁴ See Human Rights Watch, “Structures and Strategies of the Perpetrator Organizations,” in *Erased in a Moment: Suicide Attacks against Israeli Civilians* (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2002).

⁸⁵ “Hamas Leader Rantisi: The False Holocaust,” MEMRI (27 August 2003): <http://www.memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=subjects&Area=antisemitism&ID=SP55803>.

⁸⁶ Quoted in Aaron, 137.

Palestine. Iraq was occupied because of a Zionist agenda that was placed on top of the American agenda. If Iran is hit this will happen as part of a Zionist agenda that has become an American agenda. Do not take the Zionist danger lightly because it does not menace only Palestine, Lebanon or the Ring States [surrounding Israel]. It is threatening all of you.”⁸⁷ Ruling from his office in Damascus after Rantisi’s demise, Mashal announced on 13 February 2006 that Hamas would cease all terrorist actions against Israel, if Israel would withdraw to its pre-1967 borders and allow the return of all Palestinians and their descendents who had left Israel in 1948. Not only did he know that Israel could not accept such terms, he viewed such terms as an intermediate step toward the destruction of the Jewish state and the extermination of all Jews within the scope of his power.

On 27 May 2008, Mashal met with Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei in Tehran to shore up the alliance between Hamas and Hezbollah, once again demonstrating the ideological tie between the Brotherhood and the Islamic Revolution in Iran, a tie that began with the bond between Hasan al-Banna and Ruhullah Khomeini (a point to be elaborated on in the next chapter). Hamas had been on friendly diplomatic terms with the Iranian Islamic regime, in fact, ever since its delegates attended the Islamic congress that met in Tehran on 14–22 October 1991. That same year, Hamas leader Imad al-Alami established an information bureau in the Iranian capital.⁸⁸ Because, after what happened to Yassin and Rantisi, Mashal was afraid to return to Hamas’s base of operations in Gaza, he appointed the cofounder of Hamas, Mahmoud al-Zahar, as his foreign minister on 20 March 2006. A graduate of Cairo University’s Faculty of Medicine, Dr. al-Zahar declared on 6 January 2009, with the Israeli action in Gaza, that “Jewish children everywhere” are “legitimate targets” of Hamas terrorist operations.⁸⁹

In Gaza, however, Ismail Haniyeh (b. 1963) was voted the leader of Hamas in 2006. Born in Gaza and a graduate of the Islamic University of Gaza, Haniyeh was sworn in as prime minister on 29 March 2006

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 118.

⁸⁸ See Chehab, 130.

⁸⁹ Maajid Naawaz, “Mahmoud Zahar Has Betrayed His People,” *The Guardian Online* (7 January 2009): <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/jan/07/gaza-mahmoud-zahar-hamas>.

after elections held the previous December, when Hamas took 76 of the 132 seats in the Palestinian parliament, with Fatah taking only 43. His appointment as prime minister resulted in a power dispute between Hamas and Fatah. On 8 February 2007, the two groups agreed to put an end to the fighting between them and to form a unity government, but they made little progress, and tensions between them remain high. One point of contention lies in the strategy to be used for the ultimate destruction of the Jewish state.

In November 2008, during a tenuous cease-fire that lasted from 19 June until 19 December, Haniyeh repeated Mashal's earlier offer of a *hudna* or truce if Israel should withdraw to the pre-1967 borders, which, of course, would mean not only abandoning settlements in the West Bank but giving up all of East Jerusalem, including the Old City. Haniyeh also called for the recognition of the Palestinians' "right of return" to Israel. He made it clear that the *hudna* applied only to Hamas, and not to other Jihadist groups.⁹⁰ A *hudna*, however, is no more than a cessation of hostilities to allow time for the Jihadists to regroup to once again take up the task of destroying the Jewish state. As stated by Sheikh Nizar Rayyan (1959–2009), the professor of Islamic law regarded as Hamas's chief clerical authority since the death of Yassin, "The only reason to have a *hudna* is to prepare yourself for the final battle. . . . There is no chance that true Islam would ever allow a Jewish state to survive in the Muslim Middle East. Israel is an impossibility. It is an offense against God."⁹¹ Once again, we see that, whereas the Nazis viewed Jewish existence as a crime against nature, Islamic Jihadists view it as a crime against Allah; in both cases, the punishment for the crime is extermination.

Like his predecessors, Haniyeh applied lessons learned from the Nazis on the use of propaganda to incite what Hitler called a "wrathful hatred" of the Jews. In broadcasts from the Hamas television station Al-Aqsa, modeled after Hezbollah's Al-Manar, Jews are commonly referred to as "the brothers of apes and pigs." On 13 March 2008, Hamas legislator Sheik Yunus al-Astal wrote in the Hamas weekly

⁹⁰ See Amira Hass, "Haniyeh: Hamas Willing to Accept Palestinian State with 1967 Borders," *Haaretz Online* (11 November 2008): <http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1035414.html>.

⁹¹ Quoted by Jeffrey Goldberg, "Nizar Rayyan of Hamas," *The Atlantic Online* (2 January 2009): http://jeffreyygoldberg.theatlantic.com/archives/2009/01/nizar-rayyan_of_hamas.on.gods.php.

Al-Risalah that “suffering by fire is the Jews’ destiny in this world and the next. . . . But the urgent question is, is it possible that they will have the punishment of burning in this world, before the great punishment” of hell? Many religious leaders believe so, he said, adding, “Therefore we are sure that the holocaust is still to come upon the Jews.”⁹² Al-Astal was, of course, referring to the nuclear holocaust that the Jihadists are preparing for the Jews. Realizing, with Hitler,⁹³ the importance of poisoning the minds of the young with Jew hatred, Hamas takes its propaganda campaign to children’s television programs. Steven Erlanger of the *New York Times* reports in this connection that the Mickey-Mouse-like character “Farfour was murdered by an Israeli interrogator and replaced by Nahoul, the bee, who died ‘a martyr’s death’ from lack of health care because of Gaza’s closed borders. He has been supplanted by Assud, the rabbit, who vows ‘to get rid of the Jews, God willing, and I will eat them up, God willing.’”⁹⁴ In this we see the Hamas version of *Sesame Street* and *Barney the Dinosaur*.

The reference to martyrdom and the invocation of God’s will underscore the religious sanction and the religious obligation of Jew hatred. Hamas receives funding for such propaganda efforts, terrorist operations, and the general cause of jihad from several other Arab nations, all in the name of *zakat* or charity, which is one of the Five Pillars of Islam, again transforming the murder of Jews into a duty that defines Muslim piety. Among their most generous supporters are Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Iran,⁹⁵ and for good reason. Saudi Arabia and Iran are states ruled by Sharia, and one of the aims of Hamas, if it should ever succeed in forming a state of its own, is to rule by Sharia. As for Syria, it is ruled by the Baath Party, which, as Chapter 7 will show, was conscientiously modeled after the National Socialist Party of Germany and shares an antisemitic ideological cornerstone with Hamas, Hezbollah, and other Jihadists.

I have argued that an important distinction between National Socialism and Islamic Jihadism is that, whereas the Nazis eclipse God, the Jihadists appropriate God. Stated differently, whereas the Nazis

⁹² Quoted in Steven Erlanger, “In Gaza, Hamas’s Insults to Jews Complicate Peace,” *New York Times Online* (1 April 2008): http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/01/world/middleeast/01hamas.html?pagewanted=1&_r=2&sq=hamas&st=cse&scp=g.

⁹³ Hitler, 12.

⁹⁴ Erlanger.

⁹⁵ See Chehab, 134.

make themselves into God, the Jihadists make God into themselves. The difference? Whereas for the Nazis the word of the Führer is law, for the Jihadists the word of Allah, as they define it, is law. In both cases, it is a murderous word and a malicious law. Nowhere is this move more evident than in the Hamas charter, through which, Küntzel correctly argues, “Hamas follows faithfully in the footsteps of Amin el-Husseini.”⁹⁶ That they follow in the footsteps of Adolf Hitler is made clear in a deft analysis by Yisrael Neeman: the Hamas Charter, he points out, “is dependent on the famous and vicious anti-semitic Czarist forgery *The Protocols of the Elders of Zion* and its most nefarious inspired text, Chapter XI in Hitler’s *Mein Kampf* entitled ‘Nation and Race.’”⁹⁷ The branches in the poison tree of this genealogy, then, are clear. Islamist scholar Zaki Chehab notes that the man behind the drafting of the charter was Sheikh Abdullah Azzam, spiritual leader of Osama bin Laden and numerous other Jihadists (more about Azzam in the next chapter).⁹⁸ Drafted on 18 August 1988, this document that defines the essence of Hamas is deemed “The Charter of Allah,” with the clear implication that the word of Allah is the word of Hamas. What, then, is the word of Allah when it is appropriated by Islamic Jihadism?⁹⁹

In language reminiscent of master race discourse, the charter opens by declaring Muslims to be “the best nation that hath been raised up unto mankind,” whereas other nations are “smitten with vileness wheresoever they are found.” Quoting Hasan al-Banna, the founder of the Ikhwan, the preamble goes on to declare the exterminationist aims of Hamas: “Israel will exist and will continue to exist until Islam will obliterate it,” where Israel is a reference to the Jewish people, not to the Jewish state. This point becomes clear if we recall a simple fact: *when al-Banna made his assertion, the Jewish state did not yet exist.* Hamas’s war, therefore, as Neeman rightly concludes, “is not confined to Israel

⁹⁶ Küntzel, 111.

⁹⁷ Yisrael Neeman, “Hamas: World Jihad and Antisemitism in the Cloak of Palestinian Nationalism,” unpublished, 1.

⁹⁸ Chehab, 193.

⁹⁹ See “The Covenant of the Islamic Resistance Movement (HAMAS),” *Jewish Virtual Library*, http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Terrorism/Hamas_covenant_complete.html; see also Kapustyan and Matt Nelson, *The Soul of Terror: The Worldwide Conflict between Islamic Terrorism and the Modern World* (Washington, DC: International Affairs Press, 2007), 122–51; Alexander, 47–69.

as secular Palestinians claim, but rather it is a universal struggle for the defeat of the Jews. Here is the all encompassing common denominator with the *Protocols of the Elders of Zion* (mentioned in Article 32) and Hitler's *Mein Kampf*.¹⁰⁰ Although the introduction to the charter affirms the movement's bond with "all the fighters for the liberation of Palestine," the Hamas covenant truly "reveals its identity," as the introduction goes on to affirm. The Movement's Jihadist essence, for example, is declared in Article Eight: "Jihad is its path," once again repeating the ideological stance of al-Banna.¹⁰¹

The charter's aim of explaining an Islamic Jihadist Weltanschauung and articulating "ways of thinking and understanding of the universe, life, and man," is stated in Article One and reiterated in Article Thirty-Three, which states that Hamas is "based on the common coordinated and interdependent conceptions of the laws of the universe" and that it flows "in the stream of destiny." Thus, according to *the laws of the universe* and the order of *destiny*, which is the will of Allah, the Jews must be exterminated – if only the Jihadists can muster the will to see it through.¹⁰² In keeping with this worldview, Article Two indicates that Hamas is a branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, the totalitarian goal of which is to encompass "all aspects of life, culture, creed, politics, economics, education, society, justice and judgment." In accordance with the ideological position stated by al-Banna,¹⁰³ Hamas would encompass both this world and the upper worlds, because it "extends to the depth of the earth and reaches out to the heavens" (Article Five). Here, too, we find that the totalitarianism of Islamic Jihadism, in contrast to National Socialism, extends beyond this realm and into the upper realms. Whereas for Nazis, the blood must be dominated, for the Jihadists the soul must be appropriated. If "the Movement is a universal one . . . well-equipped . . . because of the clarity of its ideology" (Article Seven), it is because the universal nature of the movement extends to the soul of every human being.

¹⁰⁰ Neeman, 6.

¹⁰¹ See Hasan al-Banna, *Five Tracts of Hasan al-Banna: A Selection from the Majmuat Rasail al-Imam al-Shahid Hasan al-Banna*, trans. Charles Wendell (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), 133–61.

¹⁰² *Triumph of the Will* is, of course, the title of the most famous of the Nazi propaganda films.

¹⁰³ See Kuntzel, 14.

A key to the universal rule of Islam is the universal extermination of the Jews, a position justified by Article Seven's invocation of a teaching of the Prophet himself found in the al-Bukhari Hadith, no. 3,593: "The Prophet, Allah bless him and grant him salvation, has said: 'The Day of Judgment will not come about until Moslems fight the Jews (killing the Jews), when the Jew will hide behind stones and trees. The stones and trees will say, 'O Moslems, O Abdulla, there is a Jew behind me, come and kill him.'" Nature itself rebels against the existence of the Jews: natural law, therefore, requires the eradication of the Jews. Thus, "if there were doubts as to whether the Jews had any right to exist," as Neeman observes, "they are now removed, and the process becomes the same as it was in Nazi Germany. The war against the Jews is absolute; there is no compromise: the Jews must be destroyed forever."¹⁰⁴ This "forever" underscores the metaphysical common ground between National Socialism and Islamic Jihadism: for both, the Jew is not just an ontological enemy but a metaphysical threat.

Reading Article Eleven, one realizes that the Islamic Jihadist ideology of Hamas can allow no compromise on the status of Palestine, for the presence of the Jews is not only unnatural – it is unholy: "Palestine is an Islamic Waqf land consecrated for Moslem generations until Judgment Day. This being so, who could claim to have the right to represent Moslem generations till Judgment Day? This is the law governing the land of Palestine in the Islamic Sharia." As an "Islamic Waqf land," Palestine is consecrated ground reserved for Muslims alone, like Mecca, a city which, unlike Jerusalem, *only* Muslims can enter. The issue of Palestine, then, is not about politics or economics – it is about holiness and truth, something that no government or ruler can negotiate. To ask a Muslim to negotiate peace with the Jews is to ask him to renounce Islam.

Therefore "initiatives, and so-called peaceful solutions and international conferences, are in contradiction to the principles of the Islamic Resistance Movement. Abusing any part of Palestine is abuse directed against part of religion. Nationalism of the Islamic Resistance Movement is part of its religion. . . . These conferences are only ways of

¹⁰⁴ Neeman, 11.

setting the infidels in the land of the Moslems as arbitrators. . . . There is no solution for the Palestinian question except through Jihad” (Article Thirteen). Furthermore, the “Palestinian question” is above all the Jewish question, the *Judenfrage*. For Islamic Jihadism, jihad is ultimately jihad against the Jews. (Yes, jihad, is also directed against the Christians or “Crusaders,” but, according to Sayyid Qutb, they were corrupted by the Jews.¹⁰⁵) Note, too, the association between ideological essence and national identity, which as “part of its religion” places Hamas’s nationalist character in a metaphysical – and not a cultural or ethnic – category. This is another distinctively modern move reminiscent of National Socialism, and not a reversion to a medieval mentality.

Affirming the lesson that al-Banna learned from the Nazis about the importance of propaganda, Article Fifteen states, “It is necessary that scientists, educators and teachers, information and media people, as well as the educated masses, especially the youth and sheikhs of the Islamic movements, should take part in the operation of awakening.” Awakening to what? To a “wrathful hatred” of the Jews. Thus, Article Fifteen ends with the refrain from the al-Bukhari Hadith: “I will assault and kill, assault and kill, assault and kill”¹⁰⁶ – assault and kill the Jews. Here one cannot help but recall Hitler’s assertion that “the fight against a spiritual power with methods of violence remains defensive, however, until the sword becomes the support, the herald and disseminator, of a new spiritual doctrine.”¹⁰⁷ It is not for nothing that the emblems of the Muslim Brotherhood and its offspring Hamas display weapons. Just as the Nazis carefully shaped the minds of the young, so Article Sixteen underscores the importance of “forming the thoughts and faith of the Moslem student”; just as the Nazis used a thorough knowledge of the Jews in their assault on the soul of Israel, so Article Sixteen calls for “a comprehensive study of the enemy [the Jew].” Because jihad is not just a tactical war but a holy war, this call to know the Jew is for the purpose not only of winning battles against the body of Israel but of destroying the teaching, tradition, and testimony that the Jews represent by their very presence in the world.

¹⁰⁵ See Sayyid Qutb, *Basic Principles of the Islamic Worldview*, trans. Rami David (North Haledon, NJ: Islamic Publications International, 2006), 27.

¹⁰⁶ See Alexander, 57.

¹⁰⁷ Hitler, 172.

Reading further in the “Charter of Allah,” one sees that the Jihadists have taken Hitler’s assertion in *Mein Kampf* to heart: “Only the greatness of the sacrifices will win new fighters for the cause.”¹⁰⁸ To be sure, understanding their struggle as a holy war, they take this idea to a level that even the Nazis failed to attain. What sacrifice is greater than child sacrifice, made at the hands of the mothers who brought them into the world? If the Nazis captured the souls of their children, the Jihadists destroy them by training them not just for sacrifice but for murder. For the duty of a good Muslim mother toward her children is “to teach them to perform the religious duties in preparation for the role of fighting awaiting them” (Article Eighteen). Therefore, as Chehab points out, “it is imperative for the family of a Hamas fighter to be seen in front of the world’s media as proud of their beloved son rather than bitter or tragic and they should extol Hamas’s belief in the battle and the glorious afterlife their son is destined to experience.”¹⁰⁹ So what is the role of the child raised by his mother and extolled by his family? To offer up his life for the sake of murdering Jews in suicide attacks. Like the ancient idolaters against whom God warned the Israelites (see, for instance, Deuteronomy 18:10), they pass their children through fire and worse: making their children in sacrificial offerings consumed by the flames of their bombs, they transform them into murderers. In this difference between the Nazis and the Jihadists, we have another glimpse of the distinctively modern Jihadist evil.

Article Twenty’s description of the Jews as Nazis is nothing more than a ploy to veil the Nazi-like nature of Hamas’s ideology and to further incite hatred of the Jews. As Küntzel correctly points out, the projection of “Nazi” on the Jew is “a specific form of Holocaust denial, one which legitimates the pursuit of an anti-Jewish extermination policy, while projecting these murderous intentions onto the chosen victim.”¹¹⁰ When Article Twenty-One states that “members of the Islamic Resistance Movement should consider the interests of the masses as their own personal interests” and that “the masses are part of them and they are part of the masses,” for example, one could easily insert *Volk* for *masses* and convey the same ideological principle.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., 103.

¹⁰⁹ Chehab, 97.

¹¹⁰ Küntzel, 118.

Echoing Hitler's insistence that the Jew is an "invisible wirepuller" who by stealth conspires to rule the world,¹¹¹ Article Twenty-Two states:

With their money, they [the Jews] took control of the world media, news agencies, the press, publishing houses, broadcasting stations, and others. With their money they stirred revolutions in various parts of the world. . . . They were behind the French Revolution, the Communist revolution and most of the revolutions we heard and hear about, here and there. With their money they formed secret societies, such as Freemasons, Rotary Clubs, the Lions and others in different parts of the world for the purpose of sabotaging societies and achieving Zionist interests. With their money they were able to control imperialistic countries and instigate them to colonize many countries in order to enable them to exploit their resources and spread corruption there. . . . They were behind World War I, when they were able to destroy the Islamic Caliphate. . . . They obtained the Balfour Declaration, formed the League of Nations through which they could rule the world. They were behind World War II, through which they made huge financial gains by trading in armaments, and paved the way for the establishment of their state. It was they who instigated the replacement of the League of Nations with the United Nations and the Security Council to enable them to rule the world through them. There is no war going on anywhere, without having their finger in it.

In a word, the Jew is the hidden source of every evil, and Hamas is the salvation of humanity. To assure its adherents that these lies are truth, Article Twenty-Four opens by saying, "The Islamic Resistance Movement does not allow slandering or speaking ill of individuals or groups." Or could it be that for Hamas, as for the Nazis, the Jews do not fall into any of the categories of humanity? After all, Article Twenty-Five states that Hamas "desires only the good of *people*" (emphasis added). Yet they desire the extermination of the Jews.

As already noted several times, the Jihadists learned well from Hitler's understanding that deception is an important part of any propaganda campaign, because "something of the most insolent lie will always remain and stick."¹¹² In this regard, Article Twenty-Eight of the Charter of Allah à la Hitler is also worth quoting at some length:

The Zionist invasion [of the world] is a vicious invasion. It does not refrain from resorting to all methods, using *all evil* and contemptible ways to achieve

¹¹¹ Hitler, 493.

¹¹² Ibid., 232.

its end. . . . They aim at undermining societies, *destroying values*, corrupting consciences, *deteriorating character* and annihilating Islam. It is behind the drug trade and alcoholism in all its kinds so as to facilitate its control and expansion. . . . We should not forget to remind every Moslem that when the Jews conquered the Holy City in 1967, they stood on the threshold of the Aqsa Mosque and proclaimed that ‘Mohammed is dead, and his descendants are all women.’ *Israel, Judaism and Jews* challenge Islam and the Moslem people. (Emphasis added)

Here, too, we see the metaphysical dimensions of Hamas’s assault on the Jews *and Judaism*, both of which they associate with evil *as such*: hence, in keeping with the position of the Ikhwan’s chief ideologue Sayyid Qutb¹¹³ – and in keeping with National Socialist ideology – the Jews, unlike the rest of humanity, *cannot be rehabilitated*; they fall outside the circle of redemption through conversion. We realize this notwithstanding Article Thirty-One’s claim that Jews and Christians can live in peace under the rule of Islam, which is but another ruse employed in the Charter for propaganda purposes.

In Article Thirty-Two of the Charter of Allah, we have yet another borrowing from National Socialism and *modern* Jew hatred: “Today it is Palestine, tomorrow it will be one country or another. The Zionist plan is limitless. After Palestine, the Zionists aspire to expand from the Nile to the Euphrates. When they will have digested the region they overtook, they will aspire to further expansion, and so on. Their plan is embodied in the *Protocols of the Elders of Zion*, and their present conduct is the best proof of what we are saying. Leaving the circle of struggle with Zionism is high treason, and cursed be he who does that” – “high treason” meaning a betrayal of Allah, because Islamic Jihadism fuses the religious, nationalist, and political realms into one. Thus, “let every person know that he is responsible before Allah” and that Islamic Jihadist groups throughout “the Arab world” (again the master race, nationalist superiority) “are the best-equipped for the future role in the fight with the warmongering Jews.” Continuing this theme of the betrayal of Allah, Article Thirty-Four invokes the words of Allah: “Say unto those who believe not, Ye shall be overcome, and thrown together into hell” (Quran 3:12), adding, “This is the only way to liberate Palestine.” Indeed, according to Islamic Jihadism,

¹¹³ See quotes of Qutb in Nettler, 35–44.

casting the Jews into hell, where they belong, is the only way to liberate humanity.

Part of casting the Jews into hell, however, entails casting humanity into hell, through the use of torture¹¹⁴ and human shields,¹¹⁵ practices for which Hamas is notorious. For the elimination of Jews from the world is the key to the elimination of the prohibitions against such practices from the world. As in the enmity between the Nazis and the Jews, the enmity between the Jihadists and the Jews concerns a fundamental view of the absolute sanctity of the other human being.

Thus, we see how three branches in the genealogical tree of evil extend directly from the Muslim Brotherhood and its ideologues Hasan al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb. They in turn, as we have shown, have their links to Abdul Al'a Maududi and Haj Amin al-Husseini, the man most intimately connected to the Nazis. The next chapter describes how this web of influence branches out further to have its impact on other Islamic Jihadist groups: the Islamic Revolution, Hezbollah, and al-Qaeda. In this chapter, we have already seen certain ties between these movements and the ones described here. Let us now examine them in more detail.

¹¹⁴ Associated Press, *The Jerusalem Post Online* (28 June 2008): <http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull&cid=1215331122903>.

¹¹⁵ See Canaan Lipshiz, "IDF Soldiers Give Testimonies to Counter Gaza War Crimes Claims," *Haaretz Online* (17 July 2009): <http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1100740.html>.

“Religious” Offshoots

The Islamic Revolution, Hezbollah, and Al-Qaeda

The Almighty Himself taught us how to kill. . . . So shall we not kill when it is necessary for the triumph of the Faith? Killing is tantamount to saying a prayer.

Iranian Jihadist Muhammed Navab-Safavi,
an inspiration for Ruhullah Khomeini

So far we have seen the Nazi connection to the Muslim Brotherhood not only in the admiration and cooperation of Brotherhood founder Hasan al-Banna but also in the activities of the notorious Haj Amin al-Husseini, whose ties with the Ikhwan date back to 1935. We have examined direct extensions of the Brotherhood into the National Islamic Front (NIF), Islamic Jihad, and Hamas. Here we shall see how much further the genealogical tree branches out in the overt fanaticism of Islamic Jihadism. One important key to this branching out was the NIF’s Hasan al-Turabi, a direct descendent of the Ikhwan who provided support, conference sites, and bases of operation for many Jihadist organizations, including those considered in this chapter: the Islamic Revolution in Iran, their offspring Hezbollah, and their ideological comrades in al-Qaeda. Islamic Jihad leader Fathi Shaqaqi, as noted in the previous chapter, had deep ties to Ruhullah Khomeini, and Hamas is extensively connected both to Hezbollah and to the Iranian Islamic Revolution. There are other, older connections linking these groups. A key figure in establishing those connections was Muhammed Navab-Safavi (1924–1955).

Laurent Murawiec describes Navab-Safavi as the “founding hero of the modern Shiite murder cult, whose biography exemplified the cooperation of Shia and Sunni radicals. In 1936, an Iranian radical in exile in Cairo, he frequented Muslim Brotherhood mosques and attended their secret meetings; he met Hasan al-Banna in 1937.”¹ In that same year, notes Matthias Küntzel, Khomeini himself, already an avid reader of al-Banna’s writings, met the Brotherhood’s leader; he was an equally avid listener of the Nazis’ Farsi-language broadcasts from Zeesen.² Navab-Safavi did not meet Khomeini, however, until the outbreak of the Second World War, when he became Khomeini’s tutor.³ The influence of Navab-Safavi and the Brotherhood on Khomeini was so extensive that the future Ayatollah would translate several tomes of Sayyid Qutb’s eight-volume work, *In the Shade of the Quran (Fi Zilal al-Quran, 1952)* into Persian.⁴ It is not for nothing that the Qutbists are often referred to as “Egyptian Khomeinists.”⁵ Qutbists are above all Islamic Jihadists. The Islamic Revolution in Iran was a Jihadist revolution that resulted in the establishment of the first Jihadist state and has its genealogical origins in the marriage of the Muslim Brotherhood and Nazi ideology. The revolution was fueled by Hasan al-Banna and Muhammed Navab-Safavi, spurred by Amin al-Husseini and Sayyid Qutb, and brought to fruition by Ruhullah Khomeini. Let us now examine this offshoot of the Jihadist evil.

The Islamic Revolution: The First Jihadist State

Just as Hitler was the central figure in National Socialism, Jihadist movements have their own key figures. We have already seen this phenomenon illustrative of the *Führerprinzip* in leaders such as Hasan al-Banna, Haj Amin al-Husseini, Hasan al-Turabi, Fathi Shaqaqi, and

¹ Laurent Murawiec, *The Mind of Jihad* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 40.

² Matthias Küntzel, *Jihad and Jew-Hatred: Islamism, Nazism and the Roots of 9/11*, trans. Colin Meade (New York: Telos Press, 2007), 56.

³ Murawiec, 41.

⁴ Ahmad S. Moussalli, *Radical Islamic Fundamentalism: The Ideological and Political Discourse of Sayyid Qutb* (Beirut: American University of Beirut, 1992), 48.

⁵ Amir Taheri, *Holy Terror: Inside the World of Islamic Terrorism* (Bethesda, MD: Adler & Adler, 1987), 187–88.

Ahmed Yassin. Thus, Ruhullah Khomeini is the Führer behind the Islamic Revolution. His life embodies the life of the revolution itself.

Born on 24 September 1902 in the town of Khjumayn south of Tehran, Khomeini was the son of Mustapha Musavi, the town's chief cleric. With the murder of his father within five months of his birth, the child Ruhullah was reared by his mother Hajar and his Aunt Sahebeh; they died when the boy was no more than fifteen. Having begun his study of the Quran when he was six years old, at the age of nineteen Khomeini went to Qom to pursue his Islamic studies under Ayatollah Abd al-Karim Haeri Yazdi (1859–1937), the man who transformed Qom into Iran's modern center of Islamic studies. Khomeini went on to become a lecturer in the Qom seminary. In 1925, soon after Reza Shah Pahlavi (1878–1944) came into power, there developed a tension between the Iranian rulers and the Shiite clerics, even though Haeri Yazdi preferred to avoid political involvement. Khomeini, however, like Abdul Al'a Maududi and Sayyid Qutb, saw no distinction between politics and religion: because Islam is all-encompassing, it naturally encompasses political ideology.

After Haeri Yazdi's death in 1937, Khomeini became a student and supporter of Ayatollah Muhammad Hussein Burujirdi,⁶ the man who urged him to write *Kashf al-Asrar* (*The Revelation of Secrets*, 1941) to counter the anti-religious stance of the shah. In this, his first political work, Khomeini defined jihad as "the conquest of [other] countries,"⁷ a statement that brings to mind the Nazis' conquest of other countries that was taking place at the same time. Even as Khomeini authored his work, the Nazis were entertaining the question of whether they could pass off Hitler to the Iranian Shiites as the Twelfth Imam, that is, the Mahdi or Twelfth Imam and last of Muhammad's true successors, also known as the Expected One (*al-Muntazar*), who would usher in the Shiite messianic era. Failing that, the Nazis believed they might cast the Führer as the Muslim Jesus, who had returned to kill all the Jews, as the Hadith predicts he will do. In their Farsi-language propaganda, they juxtaposed "You will meet no greater enemy of the believers than the Jews" (Quran 5:82) and Hitler's statement in *Mein Kampf*: "I believe

⁶ For more on Burujirdi's role as Ayatollah in this period, see Ira M. Lapidus, *A History of Islamic Societies*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 482–83.

⁷ Quoted in *ibid.*, 241.

that today, I am acting in accord with God’s creation. By resisting the Jews everywhere, I am fighting for the Lord’s work.”⁸ Although the extent to which Khomeini might have taken such propaganda seriously is unknown, there can be no doubt that he was aware of it.

What is clear is that during these years, Khomeini’s thinking was influenced by Seyyed Abolqassem Kashani (1882–1962), who was a close collaborator of al-Banna, al-Banna’s successor Ramadan, and other leaders in the Ikhwan. In 1943, Kashani founded an Iranian Shiite branch of the Muslim Brotherhood called the Devotees of Islam. “Like the Muslim Brotherhood, the Devotees had their own assassination squads. They failed, in 1949, to assassinate the Shah.”⁹ Upon Burujirdi’s death on 30 March 1961, Khomeini became the leading Shiite voice in Qom. He brought with him the Brotherhood’s Jihadist ideology. In January 1963, when the shah announced a series of reforms with his “White Revolution” – reforms that, among other things, would enfranchise women and allow non-Muslim men to hold political office – Khomeini launched his first political campaign against the Pahlavi monarchy, a regime that he regarded as totally corrupted by what Sayyid Qutb called the jahiliyyah of the West.¹⁰ In speech after speech, he summoned the Islamic clerics and their students to rebellion as “soldiers of the Hidden Imam.”¹¹ On 22 January, Khomeini issued a condemnation of the shah. His outcry led to the bloody rebellion of 23 March 1963.

On 5 June, two days after delivering yet another public diatribe against the shah, Khomeini was arrested, only to become a national hero. In his speech, he declared that the poisoning of Islam came not merely from the West but primarily from Israel: “Israel does not wish the Qur’an to exist in this country,” he cried. “Israel does not

⁸ Jeffrey Herf, *Nazi Propaganda for the Arab World* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2009), 155.

⁹ K. Gajendra Singh, “West – Stirred Up Muslims Terrorise Mumbai,” *Vijayvanni*, 17 December 2008, <http://www.vijayvaani.com/FrmPublicDisplayArticle.aspx?id=291>; see also Mohammad Mohaddessin, *Islamic Fundamentalism* (New Delhi: Anmol Publications, 2003), 11.

¹⁰ Hamid Algar, Introduction to Ruhullah Khomeini, *Islam and Revolution: Writings and Declarations of Imam Khomeini (1941–1980)*, trans. Hamid Algar (Berkeley: Mizan Press, 1981), 16.

¹¹ See, for example, Baqer Moin, *Khomeini: Life of the Ayatollah* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999), 98.

wish the *ulama* to exist in this country.”¹² On 7 April 1964, he was released from prison, whereupon he resumed his incitement against the shah. On 27 October of that year, in a speech delivered on the birthday of the Prophet’s daughter Fatima, Khomeini declared the United States and Israel to be the source of “all of our troubles,” because, he insisted, both are controlled by Jews.¹³ On 4 November, he was arrested again and held for six months. At the end of those six months, he was sent to Bursa, Turkey, where he spent less than a year as the guest of the Persian-speaking Colonel Ali Cetiner of the Turkish Military Intelligence. On 8 October 1965, he left Turkey and, after various stops, arrived on 14 November in the holy Shiite city of Najaf, Iraq, the site of the famous shrine of Imam Ali (598–661), the first of the Twelve Imams to succeed the Prophet. Najaf would be his residence for nearly thirteen years.

Khomeini lost no time in once again blaming the Jews for the “secular” takeover of his homeland in Iran. In a letter to Iranian prime minister Hoveyda dated 16 April 1967, he accused Israel and the Jews of “the domination of the country’s economy” and of “interference in [Iran’s] educational system.”¹⁴ Both accusations were tied to the age-old anti-Semitic propaganda concerning a world Jewish conspiracy. Between 21 January and 8 February 1970, Khomeini gave a series of lectures that would comprise his notorious work *Islamic Government*. One theme that ran through these lectures was that the Jews were the source of the corruption that pervaded Islam.¹⁵ In words that bring to mind Hitler’s condemnation of the Jews’ “international world swindle,”¹⁶ Khomeini cried out, “How can we stay silent and idle today when we see that a band of traitors and usurpers, the agents of foreign powers [that is, Jews], have appropriated the wealth and the fruits of labor of hundreds of millions of Muslim?”¹⁷ If, as Khomeini insists in this work, the aim of the totalitarian Islamic government is

¹² Ruhullah Khomeini, *Islam and Revolution: Writings and Declarations of Imam Khomeini (1941–1980)*, trans. Hamid Algar (Berkeley: Mizan Press, 1981), 177. See also Ervand Abrahamian, *Khomeinism: Essays on the Islamic Republic* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 48.

¹³ Quoted in Moin, 126.

¹⁴ Khomeini, *Islam and Revolution*, 190.

¹⁵ Moin, 154.

¹⁶ See Adolf Hitler, *Mein Kampf*, trans. Ralph Manheim (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1971), 325.

¹⁷ Khomeini, *Islam and Revolution*, 50.

to create “conditions conducive to the production of morally upright and virtuous human beings,”¹⁸ then “it is our duty to remove from the life of Muslim society all traces of *kufr* [those who do not subscribe to the party line] and destroy them.”¹⁹ Chief among the *kufr* and the source of corruption that spreads disbelief are the Jews.

Like the Nazis, Khomeini and his cohorts viewed the Jews as a pathological threat, and they used the pathogen metaphor to describe them. Murawiec points out that Khomeini’s friend and commentator Abdul-Karim Biazar-Shirazi, “in echo of the Nazi obsession with alien contaminations of the *Volk*’s purity,” wrote with regard to the Jews, “Could a responsible doctor [of medicine] see the microbes in a body through a microscope and do nothing about what he sees? The answer is clearly no. The same can be said of true believers, who cannot see agents of corruption acting within the body of the community without seeking to destroy them.”²⁰ Compare this to what appeared in 1935 in the journal of the Association of German Physicians: “Almost all people harbor TB bacilli, almost all nations on earth harbor the Jews – a chronic infection, which it is difficult to cure. Just as the human body does not absorb the TB germs into its general organism, so a natural, homogeneous society cannot absorb the Jews into its organic association.”²¹ In the case of the Islamic Jihadists, as in the case of the Nazis, the Jew is both the disease and the carrier of the disease. And the Jew is everywhere.

In keeping with the Nazi-like impetus toward ubiquitous rule over every aspect of life, Khomeini declares in his *Islamic Government*, “Islam contains everything. Islam includes everything. Islam is everything.”²² This “everything” includes every limb of every human being’s body, as prescribed by the punishments of Sharia: a key to Islamic government, said Khomeini, is “implementing the penal law of Islam and the sanctions it provides [as prescribed in the Quran].” For example: one hundred lashes for adulterer and adulteress (24:2–3); for *Muharabah* [waging war against Allah and for Spreading Disorder], it is “execution is an exemplary way,” that is, by crucifixion (5:33–34);

¹⁸ Ibid., 44.

¹⁹ Ibid., 48.

²⁰ Quoted in Murawiec, 49.

²¹ Quoted in H. H. Ben-Sasson, ed., *A History of the Jewish People* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1976), 1019.

²² Ruhullah Khomeini, *Islamic Government* (New York: Manor Books, 1979), 2.

amputation of hands for theft (5:38–39); other violations require amputation of hands and feet on the opposite sides of the body and stoning.²³ These forms of punishment and execution by torture are in keeping with the Jihadist totalitarian appropriation of the other human being, body and soul.

Islamic government, Khomeini maintained, should be rooted in the Hadith,²⁴ Islam's body of oral teachings notorious for its Jew hatred. Especially worth noting is this: "*There is no place for doubting*" the Hadith.²⁵ He further argued that in Islamic government the power of legislation is confined to God and that no one may rule who has not been given that power by God.²⁶ Therefore, the ruler who enacts the law through his reading of Sharia *appropriates the authority* of God. Just as in Islamic Jihadism there is no concept of an unjust war (as discussed in Chapter 1), in the Islamic Jihadist state, there is no concept of an unjust law, as was the case in Nazi Germany. The difference? Whereas the Nazis viewed what was lawful as whatever the party and the Führer willed to be lawful, the Jihadists view what is lawful as whatever they deem to be God's will. Needless to say, in a move that appropriates the divine, they understand the divine will to be anything that suits their totalitarian agenda: first they determine the agenda, and then they decide on the divine will that justifies the agenda – not the other way around.

Also imitating Nazi Germany and other totalitarian regimes – and perfectly in keeping with the appropriation of the divine that characterizes Islamic Jihadism – the Islamic Revolution, said Khomeini, regards legislative bodies as superfluous, if not dangerous, because Islamic "jurisprudents are representatives of prophets,"²⁷ and, by Jihadist definition, they cannot be wrong. In keeping with the *Führerprinzip*, Khomeini formulated the principle of *wilayat al-faqih*, or the Jurisdiction of the Jurist-Theologian.²⁸ He insisted that "God's

²³ Khomeini, *Islam and Revolution*, 74.

²⁴ Khomeini, *Islamic Government*, 28.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 47, emphasis added.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 31.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 52.

²⁸ Nicholas Blanford, Introduction to Hassan Nasrallah, *Voice of Hezbollah: The Statements of Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah*, ed. Nicholas Noe, trans. Ellen Khouri (London: Verso, 2007), 4.

authority means that the imam is the reference to the people in all issues and that God has appointed him and entrusted him to take every action capable of doing the people good and making them happy.”²⁹ The Imam, of course, is a better judge of what will make the people happy than the people themselves ever could be.

Any Muslim devoted to the spread of Islam, moreover, is required to stoop to any lie in any negotiation with those designated as the enemies of Islam, because all “truth” is the “truth” that serves the conquest of the non-Islamic world: “If someone wishes to speak about Islamic government and the establishment of Islamic government, he must observe the principle of *taqiya* [dissimulation, that is, lying].”³⁰ This point is especially crucial to the present-day (in fact, nonexistent) negotiations with Iran. Keep in mind Khomeini’s interpretation of the verse in the Quran “Prepare against them whatever you can muster” (8:60): it means that the Islamic state must, as a religious imperative, gather “as much armed defensive force as possible.”³¹ In brief: the Islamic Jihadist Revolution as exemplified by Iran *demands as a religious duty the acquisition and use of nuclear weapons against the Jews and all other “enemies” of Islam*. Thus, when asked about the acquisition and use of nuclear weapons, Osama bin Laden replied, “There is a Muslim duty to acquire them.”³² This basic tenet in the ideology underlying the Islamic Revolution in Iran escapes anyone who believes that negotiations can curtail the development, acquisition, and use of nuclear weapons against any non-Muslim regime, starting with Israel and including Arab states such as Egypt. A Jihadist regime can no more abandon its attempts to acquire nuclear weapons than it can renounce Allah.

What is of particular interest to our concern with the Jihadists’ exterminationist Jew hatred is Khomeini’s argument in *Islamic Government* justifying the extermination of the Jews by any means necessary, at the center of which lies this statement: “The prophet, may God’s peace and prayers be upon him, annihilated the Bani Qurayzah Jews to the last man because of the harm he realized they were causing

²⁹ Khomeini, *Islamic Government*, 62.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 34.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 46.

³² Osama bin Laden, *Messages to the World: The Statements of Osama bin Laden*, ed. Bruce Lawrence, trans. James Howarth (London: Verso, 2005), 72.

the Moslem society, his government and all the people.”³³ Further, whenever “the Most Noble Messenger . . . gave orders for the conquest of a certain area, the burning of a certain place, or the destruction of a certain group whose existence was harmful for Islam, Muslims, and mankind in general, his orders were just. . . . Since the Jews of Bani Qurayzah were a troublesome group, causing corruption in Muslim society and damaging Islam and the Islamic state, the Most Noble Messenger . . . eliminated them.”³⁴ Furthermore, the actions of the Noble Messenger carry the weight of divine commandment. Thus, Khomeini issued the call to follow the example of Mohammad, who beheaded seven hundred “Bani Qureizah . . . on a single day, beheaded [them] for constant plotting against Islam,”³⁵ and called for the extermination of Jews everywhere.

Quoting Hussein ibn Ali, the grandson of Muhammad killed in 680 at Karbala, Khomeini asserted that God rebuked the rabbis, for “what the Jews have done is evil” (Quran 5:63). Further, “Cursed by the tongue of David and Jesus, son of Mary, are those among the Children of Israel who have failed to believe!” (Quran 5:78).³⁶ Echoing the diatribes of Sayyid Qutb, he added, “From the very beginning, the historical movement of Islam has had to contend with the Jews, for it was they who first established anti-Islamic propaganda and engaged in various stratagems.”³⁷ What is to be concluded from the threat of the Jews and the world Jewish conspiracy? This: “Our responsibilities of propagation [i.e. spread of propaganda] and instruction [i.e. indoctrination] are greater than ever before. We see today that the Jews (may God curse them) have meddled with the text of the Quran and have made certain changes in the Quran they have had printed in the occupied territories. . . . We must . . . make people aware that the Jews and their foreign backers are opposed to the very foundations of Islam and wish to establish Jewish domination throughout the world.”³⁸ Once again, projected on the Jews is the evil of the Islamic Jihadist drive for “domination throughout the world,” which, in fact, is the Jihadists’ stated aim.

³³ Khomeini, *Islamic Government*, 66.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 89.

³⁵ Quoted in Moin, 280.

³⁶ Khomeini, *Islam and Revolution*, 109.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 27.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 127.

All of this is in keeping with Khomeini’s assertion in a “Message to the Pilgrims to Mecca for the Haj” (6 February 1971) that Zionism is “the enemy not only of Islam but of all humanity.”³⁹ In other words, Israel – both the people and the country – is an absolute evil that must be annihilated. For Israel, as he declared on 31 October 1971, is at war with all Muslims and “plans to occupy all the lands of Islam,”⁴⁰ where “all the lands of Islam” sooner or later includes all lands. In Khomeini’s propagandistic rants against the Jews one finds an application of the Nazi propaganda strategy, which, once more, is calculated to incite “wrathful hatred” through the spread of “insolent lies.” In Jew hatred Khomeini saw the key to Muslim unity, pleading in his signature work *Islamic Government* that it is of the utmost importance for Muslim countries to overcome “their petty differences,” so that they can fight the Jews.⁴¹ In fact, both the Islamic Revolution and its offspring Hezbollah have extensive ties to the Sunni Jihadists of the PLO and the Muslim Brotherhood.⁴² The means to reconciliation between Sunni and Shiite differences? Jew hatred.

In October 1978, Iraqi Vice President Saddam Hussein forced Khomeini out of Iraq for political reasons. From there he traveled to Paris and settled in nearby Neauphle-le-Château. In a declaration issued on 11 October of that year, Khomeini cried out with joy that “primary school children of seven or eight stand ready to sacrifice themselves and shed their blood for the sake of Islam.” He asked, “When has anything like this been seen?” (Indeed!) He continued: “Our lion-hearted women snatch up their infants and go to confront the machine guns and tanks of the regime,” as if it were a wonderful and wondrous thing.⁴³ So it is not just seven- and eight-year-olds that the Jihadists lay on their altar of hatred; it is infants sacrificed at the hands of their mothers, passing their children through fire. In that image we have an image of the evil that is Islamic Jihadism.

Khomeini’s stay in France was not to be for long. On 16 January 1979, the Shah Muhammad Reza (1919–1980) fled Iran, and on 1 February, Khomeini returned to his homeland, where the events of

³⁹ Ibid., 195.

⁴⁰ Ibid., 201.

⁴¹ Ibid., 47.

⁴² See Augustus Richard Norton, *Hezbollah: A Short History* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007), 93 and 148.

⁴³ Khomeini, *Islam and Revolution*, 240.

the Islamic Revolution were rapidly unfolding.⁴⁴ Greeted with chants of “Khomeini, O Imam,” he incited a bloody campaign to purge Iran of everyone associated with the Shah’s regime, crying out, “Criminals should not be tried. . . . We should have killed them in the first place.”⁴⁵ As it had happened in Nazi Germany, writes Khomeini’s biographer Baqer Moin, “a personality cult was in the making; overnight Khomeini had been transformed into a semi-divine figure. . . . He was no longer a grand ayatollah and deputy of the Imam, one who represents the Hidden Imam, but simply ‘The Imam.’ In Arabic the term ‘Imam’ is used to describe a leader or prayer leader, but in Shi’i Iran, where the title was reserved for the twelve infallible leaders of the early Shi’a, among ordinary people it carried awe-inspiring connotations.”⁴⁶ By 31 March, the Islamic Republic was a reality, with Khomeini as its undisputed Supreme Leader. Upon his instructions, organizations such as the Islamic Republican Party, with Hezbollah as its military wing, and the Gestapo-like Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps were soon in place.⁴⁷

Islamic scholar Amir Taheri observes that “the overthrow of the Shah in Iran, besides symbolizing the first modern victory of Islam over the West, proved to Muslims that change was not only possible, but also preordained.”⁴⁸ Among the Jihadists, then, there was a very powerful sense that not only history but *sacred* history was in the making. To objections voiced against the appointment of his chosen representatives to positions of power, Khomeini answered that any resistance against him was “a revolt against God.”⁴⁹ In a speech he gave in Bihisht-i Zahra on 2 February 1979, he declared, “The government I intend to appoint is a government based on divine ordinance, and to oppose it is to deny God.”⁵⁰ Thus, in Khomeini we see the same appropriation of God that we have seen in all the Islamic Jihadist ideologues, as well as in the charters that define their movements. On 24 September of that year in his “Message to the Pilgrims to Mecca

⁴⁴ See Moin, 207–8.

⁴⁵ Quoted in *ibid.*, 208.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 200–1.

⁴⁷ See *ibid.*, 210–12.

⁴⁸ Taheri, 53.

⁴⁹ Moin, 204.

⁵⁰ Khomeini, *Islam and Revolution*, 259.

for the Haj,” he asserted that Islam is “the religion of man’s essential nature,”⁵¹ so that to oppose Islam is to oppose humanity’s true essence. As it always happens, those who appropriate God presume to define the essence of the human being. Indeed, “Divine governments,” said Khomeini, “set themselves the task of making man into what he should be.”⁵² Because the Jews corrupt what man should be, said Khomeini, “every Muslim has a duty to prepare himself for battle against Israel.”⁵³ As ever, those who appropriate God incite their followers to annihilate the Chosen of God: there can be neither a Nazi eclipse of God nor a Jihadist appropriation of God without the extermination of the Jews.

Adopting familiar totalitarian tactics whenever voting was allowed, the Jihadists engaged in “vote-rigging, violence against undesirable candidates and the dissemination of false information were all used to produce an Assembly overwhelmingly dominated by clergy loyal to Khomeini.”⁵⁴ As in every totalitarian regime, Khomeini saw to it that opposing political parties, such as the National Democratic Front and the Muslim People’s Republican Party, were quickly banned, just as on 14 July 1933, the Nazis criminalized all political parties but the Nazi Party. On 22 August, newspapers deemed a danger to the Revolution were shut down, just as on 4 October 1933, the Nazis made it illegal for any Jew to work as a journalist. In November, the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran was drafted and ratified by a national referendum.⁵⁵

The Constitution’s Preamble states that “Islamic Government is designed on a basis of ‘religious guardianship’ as put forward by Imam Khomeini,” who “opened up the true path for the religious fight of Islam, pressing forward the struggle of the committed Muslim combatants, inside and *outside the country*” (emphasis added). Echoing the evil of the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khomeini, it glorifies the image of “a mother with a child in her bosom hastening to the

⁵¹ Ibid., 275.

⁵² Ibid., 330.

⁵³ Ibid., 276.

⁵⁴ Moin, 218–19.

⁵⁵ For a draft of the constitution, see Iran Chamber Society, “The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran,” <http://www.iran-chamber.com/government/laws/constitution.php>.

battlefield” and declares that the foundation of all legislation shall be “Quran and tradition.” Declaring the Jihadist principle of universal rule, the preamble states that “the Mission of the Constitution is to identify itself with the basic beliefs of the movement and to bring about the conditions under which the lofty and *worldwide values* of Islam will flourish” (emphasis added); in keeping with this stated mission, the Republic strives to build relations with other Islamic movements “so as to prepare the way for *a united single world community*” (emphasis added), which, of course, is the political upshot of the Islamic notion of *tawhid* or “oneness” (discussed in Chapter 2). In Khomeini’s words, the Islamic state “must make sure that the same word is on every lip.”⁵⁶ The aim of the Revolution’s “religious army,” says the preamble, is not only to defend the nation but *to spread jihad throughout the world* and thus “*extend the supremacy of God’s law in the world*” (emphasis added). Where such a position leaves negotiations with the Islamic Republic of Iran is self-evident.

The imperative to make “God’s law” supreme throughout the world led the Iranian Jihadists to reach out to all Muslims. This move toward cooperation on the part of the Islamic Revolution, as Meir Hatina has shown, “elicited praise from highly placed Islamic figures in the Sunni world, such as Shaykh al-Azhar ‘Abd al-Halim Mahmud [1910–1978], Abu al’A’la Mawdudi and various Brothers leaders.”⁵⁷ Further, Hatina adds, “Sheikh Asad Bayyud al-Tamimi [b. 1924] issued a fatwa in 1985 saying that the Shiites did not preach division in Islam and that it was important for Sunnis to work with the Islamic Revolution.”⁵⁸ Therefore, the Sunnis – or rather the Sunni Jihadists – should have nothing to fear from the Islamic Revolution’s acquisition of nuclear weapons. Indeed, whatever misgivings the Arab nations may have about the Persian acquisition of such weapons, those misgivings have not been voiced by the Muslim Brotherhood, the National Islamic Front, Islamic Jihad, Hamas, al-Qaeda, or any other Islamic Jihadist organization.

This avowed Jihadist ideological position must be kept in mind when reading Article 176 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic, which calls for the “exploitation of materialistic and intellectual

⁵⁶ Quoted in Taheri, 30.

⁵⁷ Meir Hatina, *Islam and Salvation in Palestine: The Islamic Jihad Movement* (Tel Aviv: The Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, 2001), 55.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

resources of the country for facing the internal and external threats.” The implication is obvious: the pursuit of a nuclear arms program and the use of nuclear weapons against the non-Islamic world is an ideological *and religious* imperative – beginning with the destruction of the biggest threat to Islamic Jihadist ideology – namely, the Jews and the Jewish State. The man in charge of carrying out this ideological imperative, according to Article 176, is the Supreme Leader: parallel to the National Socialist *Führerprinzip*, the preamble states that this effort to make the rule of Islam absolute and ubiquitous shall be under the “Guardianship and Leadership” of a single leader, the Supreme Leader.

In the Iranian Islamic Republic, then, the president has little real authority. The Consultative Assembly, a legislative body of elected individuals, falls under the oversight of the Guardian Council, who sees to it that all the actions of the Assembly are in keeping with Sharia and Islam (Articles 91 and 94). The Supreme Leader is chosen from a Counsel of Experts selected by the Guardian Council (Article 107). Like the members of the Guardian Council, but to an even greater degree, the Supreme Leader must be preeminent in scholarship, piety, and the correct view of society, politics, and so on (Article 109). The Guardian Council, of course, has the sole authority to interpret the Constitution (Article 98). As for rights of individuals, those rights are enumerated in Articles 19–42, but always with the stipulation that “rights” must be understood to conform to the parameters of Islamic law. To see to the Islamization of every aspect of life, the government must see to the universal establishment of moral virtue through their absolute control of the media, education, and all other aspects of society (Article 3). Likewise, the government has authority over “the sanctity and stability of family relations on the basis of the law and the ethics of Islam” (Article 10). To avoid contamination of the utopian Islamic society from the outside, “the employment of foreign experts is forbidden” (Article 82).

After a perusal of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic, one realizes that the 444 days of the Iran hostage crisis, which began on 4 November 1979, have much deeper ideological implications than most may have surmised. Far more than a humiliation of the Great Satan, the event served as a rallying point for Islamic Jihadist opposition to the Jewish-controlled West. Indeed, it fueled the impetus to ratify the Constitution and may have been orchestrated to achieve

that end and thus shore up the absolute power of the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khomeini and his Jihadist agenda. Adding to the resolve of the Iranian regime at that time was the Iraqi invasion of Iran in September 1980, which ignited a war that would last until August 1988. The convenient outbreak of the war came at the instigation of the Ayatollah. In a radio broadcast on 8 April 1980, Khomeini called upon the “pious of Iraq” to overthrow Saddam Hussein and his Western-supported regime.⁵⁹ The Iranian Islamic Revolution portrayed the war as a war against the decadent West, not against the Muslims of Iraq. Part of Khomeini’s strategy was to appeal to the Muslims of Iraq who were opposed to the Western-Zionist contamination of their land.

Meanwhile, to secure his power base and to mold the government into a strictly Islamist state, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khomeini removed “moderate” President Abul Hassan Bani-Sadr (b. 1933) from office on 21 June 1981. Khomeini appointed his longtime associate, Hojjat al-Islam Ali Khamenei (b. 1939), president of the Islamic Republic on 20 October 1981. Like Khomeini, Khamenei was heavily influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood; also like Khomeini, he translated several works by Sayyid Qutb into Persian.⁶⁰ The removal of Bani-Sadr was consistent with other moves that the leaders of the Islamic Revolution made during these years. In 1979, Murawiec points out, the Iranian clerics “created an equivalent to the SS, the Corps of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution (*Sepah-e Pasdaran-e Enqelab-e Eslami*). In 1984, they established the Vigilante Patrols for Combating the Forbidden (*Gashta-ya Mobarazeh ba Moukarat*), a modern variation on the traditional moral police – the *mutawwa*, under the Central Bureau of the Revolutionary Committee. A ministry of intelligence – a KGB or SS Sicherheitsdienst, or better, the Nazi Reichssicherheitshauptamt (RSHA) – was established in 1983, along with a supreme command of Islamic propaganda.”⁶¹ These parallels to the Nazis are hardly coincidental; they underscore, once again, the modern nature of Islamic Jihadism and the Jew hatred that defines it.

⁵⁹ See Sandra Mackey, *The Iranians: Persia, Islam and the Soul of a Nation* (New York: Penguin, 1996), 317.

⁶⁰ Moin, 246.

⁶¹ Murawiec, 288–89.

In the “New Year’s Message” he delivered on 21 March 1980, for example, Khomeini shouted that Israel and its puppet-state America are “global plunderers”⁶² interested in ruling far more than the Middle East – a position that brings to mind Goebbels’s assertion in April 1943 that “one can really describe the USA as a Jewish State.”⁶³ There can be no doubt that Khomeini was also aware of Haj Amin al-Husseini’s declaration a year prior to the Nazi’s statement that the Americans were the willing slaves of the Jews and were therefore the enemies of Islam,⁶⁴ demonstrating that the Islamic Jihadist hatred of the American “puppet” of the Jews goes back to the Nazi hatred of the Americans – it has nothing to do with Iraq, Afghanistan, or the American support of Israel. In the speech he delivered to the pilgrims setting out for Mecca on 12 September 1980, Khomeini referred to the United States as “the number-one enemy in the world” precisely because their actions “are coordinated” by “international Zionism.”⁶⁵ Thus, the recurring Jihadist motif drawn from National Socialism.

A case in point: Islamic Jihadists identify the Jewish world conspiracy as the first of the “monster with four heads.” Khomeini’s man in charge of assassination squads, Ayatollah Fazlallah Mahalati, said in his pamphlet *Tariqat va Shariat (The Path and the Law, 1983)*, “The first and principal head and ‘the most dangerous’ is that of the Jew, the eternal schemer against God. . . . The second head is symbolized by the Cross. . . . The third head of the monster belongs to atheism. . . . The monster’s fourth head represents secularism.”⁶⁶ Each head of the monster stems from the first head, the Jew. There can be no negotiations with the Jew, any more than there can be negotiations with Satan. Hence, Ayatollah Sadeq Khalkhali (1927–2003), a member of Khomeini’s inner circle, once declared, “Those who are against killing have no place in Islam,”⁶⁷ beginning with killing the Jews. If, according to the Jihadists, having a place in Islam requires killing, then having a place in paradise requires killing. In this precept, which undermines the prohibition against murder, we see a fundamental

⁶² Khomeini, *Islam and Revolution*, 286.

⁶³ Quoted in Küntzel, *Jihad and Jew-Hatred*, xx.

⁶⁴ See *ibid.*, 35.

⁶⁵ Khomeini, *Islam and Revolution*, 305.

⁶⁶ Quoted in Taheri, 204–5.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 44.

expression of the Jihadist evil. To be sure, among Khomeini's most infamous statements is this: "Islam says: Whatever good there is exists thanks to the sword and in the shadow of the sword! People cannot be made obedient except with the sword! The sword is the key to paradise, which can be opened only for holy warriors!"⁶⁸ The primary target on the other end of the sword is the Jew: kill a Jew and go to heaven.

As long as he was the Führer of the Islamic Revolution, Khomeini supported this thinking; in fact, he transformed killing "infidels" from a necessary evil into an act of kindness. In a speech delivered on 12 December 1984, he orated, "If we kill the infidels in order to put a stop to their [corrupting] influence, we have indeed done them a service. . . . Those who follow the rules of the Qur'an are aware that we have to apply the laws of Qissas [retribution] and that we have to kill. . . . War is a blessing for the world and for every nation. It is Allah himself who commands men to wage war and to kill."⁶⁹ Note the repetition of what he learned from his teacher Muhammed Navab-Safavi, the Iranian cleric drawn into the fold of the Muslim Brotherhood: "Killing is tantamount to saying a prayer."⁷⁰ As soon as Khomeini declared in December 1985 that "the very fact of being born Jewish makes one an 'enemy of Islam,'" ⁷¹ he sealed the link between Islamic Jihadism and National Socialism, abrogating all possibility of redemption for the Jew: if the Jew is the enemy of Islam *from birth*, as Khomeini proclaimed, then for the Jew birth itself is a capital crime. This linkage between birth and crime is another important point of convergence between National Socialism and Islamic Jihadism.

As already noted, the war with Iraq ended in August 1988. The following summer, on 3 June 1989, Khomeini died; two million Iranian Islamic Jihadists attended his funeral. The next day the Council of Experts chose Ali Khamenei, the man whom Khomeini had just designated as his successor,⁷² to be the next Supreme Leader.

⁶⁸ Quoted in Lawrence Wright, *The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2006), 47.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 123–24.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 32.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 150–51.

⁷² Before choosing Khamenei as his successor, Khomeini had, in November 1985, selected Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri, one of the most radical of the Jihadists in the Islamic Revolution. However, political struggles soon made that choice untenable; see Moin, 262–64.

"Khomeini's historic role," as correctly described by Moin, "was to legitimize the notion of the temporal state of the Shi'ia clergy who traditionally rejected it until the reappearance of the Hidden Imam."⁷³ The implication is that Khomeini had succeeded in usurping the place of God, as I have argued, in his Jihadist move to assume control of Islam and then control of a world dominated by the illusory "world Jewish conspiracy."

The years following Khomeini's death saw the occasional human rights protests in Tehran (in 1999, 2003, 2006, and 2009), but those protests were swiftly and effectively crushed by the iron fist of the Iranian Jihadist regime. Although there has been no essential ideological change in Iran since the Islamic Revolution, there has perhaps been a shift in style. That shift has included brazen denials of the Holocaust as a Zionist hoax and even more brazen threats to carry out the nuclear annihilation of Israel at the earliest opportunity. To be sure, we have already seen that the development and use of weapons of mass destruction for the sake of the Islamization of the world – beginning with the destruction of the "Zionist entity" – is a Jihadist ideological and theological imperative. Among the Jihadist presidents who have carried the torch of exterminationist Jew hatred under Khamenei are Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani (b. 1934), Mohammad Khatami (b. 1943), and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (b. 1956), a man who has been identified as one of the torturers of the hostages during the Iran hostage crisis of 1979–1981 and who has been honored with various appearances on the United Nations' platform to the world. For our concerns, however, perhaps the most insidious Islamic Jihadist legacy born of the Islamic Revolution was the emergence of Hezbollah, the Party of Allah.

Hezbollah: The Political Appropriation of God

Contrary to media reports claiming that Hezbollah is a "Lebanese Islamist Shi'ite group set up in 1982 to resist Israeli occupation of Lebanon,"⁷⁴ this Islamic Jihadist organization has its roots in Khomeini's Jihadist movement in Iran. Its creation has no connection to

⁷³ Moin, 294.

⁷⁴ See Dahr Jamail, "Hezbollah's Transformation," *Asia Times Online* (20 July 2006): http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/HG20Ak02.html; see also BBC News Online, "Who Are Hezbollah?" (21 May 2008): http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4314423.stm.

the “Israeli occupation of Lebanon.” The view made popular by the media is in keeping with a general anti-Semitic stance that would blame the Jews for being hated and attacked. It has already been noted that Hezbollah was operating as a military wing of the Islamic Republican Party in 1979. According to Naim Qassem, Deputy Secretary General of Hezbollah, the Party of Allah traces its origins to the early 1960s – before the Six Day War, “Jewish Settlements,” or the reunification of Jerusalem. Hezbollah, he explains, emerged from the activities of three clerics: Imam Mussa al-Sadr (1929–1978), Ayatollah Muhammad Mahdi Shamseddine (1936–2001), and Ayatollah al-Sayyed Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah (b. 1935).⁷⁵ All three were instrumental in the Jihadist movements in Lebanon well before the Israelis entered the country to seek out PLO terrorists in 1982.

Born in Iran, Mussa al-Sadr was the author of the infamous Hezbollah slogan “Israel is an utter evil,” reminiscent of the German *Die Juden sind unsere Unglück* (“The Jews are our misfortune”).⁷⁶ He moved to Tyre in 1960 to lead the city’s Shiite community and from there went to Beirut at the end of 1961. During his stay in Lebanon, he established alliances with the Syrian Alawites, most of whom were Baathists, a connection that further demonstrates the genealogy of evil argued here. In 1972, he became a vocal advocate for Khomeini’s Islamic Revolution, and in 1975, he formed Amal as a militant branch of the *Harakat al-Mahrumim*, the “Movement of the Deprived.” Members of al-Sadr’s Amal group were trained by Fatah, the terrorist branch of the Palestinian Liberation Organization,⁷⁷ a fact that reveals the interconnections among this precursor of Hezbollah, the PLO, and the Iranian Revolution. Indeed, members of Amal and Hezbollah participated in the Iranian Islamic Revolution of 1979.⁷⁸ On 31 August 1978, al-Sadr was kidnapped during his visit to Libya, where he had gone to seek support for his Jihadist activities.⁷⁹ He was never heard from again.

⁷⁵ See Naim Qassem, *Hizbollah: The Story from Within*, trans. Dalia Khalil (London: SAQI, 200), 14–16.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 15.

⁷⁷ See Norton, 17.

⁷⁸ Taheri, 114.

⁷⁹ For an excellent study of Mussa al-Sadr, see Fouad Ajami, *The Vanished Imam: Musa Al Sadr and the Shia of Lebanon* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992).

Al-Sadr’s successor was Muhammad Mahdi Shamseddine, who was born in Najaf. In 1969, he joined al-Sadr in Lebanon to assist him in the creation of the Supreme Islamic Shiite Council, which laid the foundations for Hezbollah to work its way into Lebanese politics. Like al-Sadr, he was a vocal inciter of hatred for Israel and the Jews.⁸⁰ Also born in Najaf, Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah, the third cleric whom Qassem identifies as a true founder of Hezbollah, moved to Lebanon in 1952. Heavily influenced by the writings of Abdul Al’a Maududi,⁸¹ Fadlallah was an active supporter of Khomeini’s Islamic Revolution and fomented a similar movement in Lebanon, all the while using his sermons to promote Palestinian terrorist assaults against the Jews.⁸² It is no accident that Khomeini, Shamseddine, and Fadlallah all studied and worked in Najaf, the city where Khomeini penned the lectures that went into his manifesto *Islamic Government*. There can be no doubt that the two clerics who would be instrumental in the founding of Hezbollah knew very well the work of the great Jihadist Ayatollah. “It is essential to understand,” Magnus Ranstorp correctly writes, the importance of “the Najaf-background of most members of Hizb’allah’s command leadership.”⁸³ If Hezbollah was born of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, it was conceived in Najaf.

Amir Taheri dates the founding of Hezbollah in 1973, when Ayatollah Mahmoud Ghaffari was tortured to death in Qom. According to Taheri, Ghaffari founded the party with his famous dying words: “There is only one party, the Party of Allah!”⁸⁴ Based on a verse from the Quran (“Whoever takes Allah and His apostle and those who believe for a guardian, then surely the Party of Allah are they that shall be triumphant” [5:56; see also 58:22]), this outcry of a dying man became the slogan for his followers, the first members of Hezbollah. Ever since his death, his blood-stained white cotton turban has served as a powerful symbol for Hezbollah. His son Hadi Ghaffari took

⁸⁰ For more details on Shamseddine, see Roschanack Shaery-Eisenlohr, *Shi’ite Lebanon: Transnational Religions and the Making of Identities* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), 34–37.

⁸¹ See Taheri, 132.

⁸² For more on Fadlallah, see Magnus Ranstorp, *Hizb’allah in Lebanon: The Politics of the Western Hostage Crisis* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1997), 27–28.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, 27.

⁸⁴ Taheri, 86.

over the leadership of the party, which soon became a Brown Shirt–like group of enforcers of Islamic law. With the coming of the Islamic Revolution, Moin states that the Islamic Republican Party wielded power through “organized gangs of strong-arm thugs known as the Hezbollah,” the Party of God; they were supervised “by a young protégée of Khomeini, Hojjat al-Islam Hadi Ghaffari.”⁸⁵ Khomeini saw a great deal of promise in ruthlessness of the young Ghaffari and bestowed on him the honor of keeping order in the new order. And so he did. Ruthlessly.

In 1981, Ghaffari boasted that Hezbollah ruled the streets of Iran. Taking his talents abroad, the following year, he began to organize the Party in Lebanon. By then their slogan had become “Only one party, the Party of Allah! Only one leader, Ruhullah!”⁸⁶ Although it may not have been directly influenced by the Nazis, the slogan certainly reflects the ideological view voiced in “Ein Volk, ein Reich, ein Führer!” (“One people, one empire, one Führer!”), as well as the importance of the *Führerprinzip* in Jihadist thinking. Indicative of the Jihadist appropriation of God is Hezbollah’s “theoretical booklet” *Rah e Ma* (Our Party), published in Tehran in 1982, which declares that the Party of God “is a way of life, an ‘army of civilians,’ a semi-secret fraternity, and, last but not least, a ‘clearinghouse for mankind,’ where those who will be admitted into paradise are separated from those destined for hell.”⁸⁷ Whereas Allah had once been the one to decide who would be redeemed and who would be damned, that prerogative now falls to the Party of Allah, to Hezbollah, thus rendering Allah superfluous: Allah and Hezbollah are one and the same.

On 6 June 1982, when Israel entered Lebanon to rout out PLO terrorists, Hezbollah was poised to enter the scene. Taking advantage of Israel’s move against the PLO to recruit more members, Hezbollah supported the PLO and sowed division within the ranks of Amal. They embraced jihad as their guiding principle and adopted a symbol that has the first letter in the name *Allah* holding a weapon, in keeping with Sadeq Khalkhali’s assertion that “those who are against killing have no place in Islam.” The implication? The name of Allah is manifest in the

⁸⁵ Moin, 211.

⁸⁶ Taheri, 88.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 87.

murder of nonbelievers, starting with Jews. Thus, we come to a crucial point in the demonstration of our thesis. Here, as much as anywhere, lies the heresy of Islamic Jihadism: it is not the name of Allah that wields a weapon, but the name of Allah appropriated by Islamic Jihadists, as evidenced by all their insignias. The leader of Hezbollah at this writing, Hassan Nasrallah, embodies the view inscribed in his insignia, insisting as he does that “the most honorable death is death by killing”⁸⁸ – not by dying in a moment when one refuses to commit murder but precisely by dying in the process of murdering Jews. It is not surprising, therefore, that Hezbollah enjoys the distinction of being among the first to employ the tactic of suicide bombings against the Jews.⁸⁹

On 16 February 1985, “Sheik Ibrahim al-Amin publicly declared the group’s manifesto, which included three goals: the eradication of Western imperialism in Lebanon, the transformation of Lebanon’s multi-confessional state into an Islamic state, and the complete destruction of the state of Israel.”⁹⁰ To be sure, the first of the twelve priorities outlined in Hezbollah’s ideological handbook *Yom Eddin* (*The Day of Faith*) is the elimination of Israel and “liberation” of Jerusalem.⁹¹ Hezbollah’s Deputy Secretary General Qassem identifies the annihilation of the Jews as one of the three pillars of the Party of God (the other two are Islam and the principle of one-man rule of the Party).⁹² The program of extermination aimed at the Jews is the defining feature of jihad, he maintains, and jihad “is a pivotal pillar of Islam, bearing an imperative for sacrifice of soul.”⁹³ Of note here is that, more than viewing jihad as a war against the infidels, the Hezbollah’s Islamic Jihadists view jihad chiefly as a war against the Jews. In that war, they do indeed sacrifice their souls.

In “The Hezbollah Program,” these Jihadists declare, “We obey the orders of one leader, wise and just, that of our tutor and faqih (jurist) who fulfills all the necessary conditions [for bearing the Shiite title of

⁸⁸ Quoted in Murawiec, 55.

⁸⁹ See Dimitry Kapustyan and Matt Nelson, *The Soul of Terror: The Worldwide Conflict between Islamic Terrorism and the Modern World* (Washington, DC: International Affairs Press, 2007), 90.

⁹⁰ Kapustyan and Nelson, 89.

⁹¹ Taheri, 276.

⁹² Qassem, 19.

⁹³ *Ibid.*, 42.

Imam]: Ruhollah Musawi Khomeini.”⁹⁴ In keeping with the universal scope of the Jihadist ideology, they understand themselves to be “an umma linked to the Muslims of the whole world.” Although they claim that they “do not want to impose Islam upon anybody,” they push for a world governed by “the Law (the Shari’a) as laid down by Muhammad, the Seal of the Prophets,” and they call on the Christians “to embrace Islam so that you can be happy in this world and the next.”⁹⁵ Indeed, Hezbollah maintains that if the Lebanese “choose freely, they will only choose Islam.”⁹⁶ Yes, Hezbollah’s intention is to set non-Muslims free, so that they may “freely” choose; what they would have them choose, however, is not Islam – it is Islamic Jihadism.

In a section titled “The Necessity of the Destruction of Israel” the Program deems Israel “the greatest danger to our future generations,” for the Jewish state “glorifies the ideas of settlement and expansion, initiated in Palestine, and yearning outward to the extension of the Great Israel, from the Euphrates to the Nile. . . . Therefore our struggle will end only when this entity is obliterated. We recognize no treaty with it, no cease fire, and no peace agreements, whether separate or consolidated. We vigorously condemn all plans for negotiation with Israel, and regard all negotiators as enemies.”⁹⁷ Like all other Islamic Jihadist groups, Hezbollah regards any negotiation of peace with Israel as a betrayal of Allah. Asserting that “Israel’s final departure from Lebanon is a prelude to its final obliteration from existence,”⁹⁸ Hezbollah’s defining document demonstrates that its Jew hatred is an exterminationist Jew hated. Like all other Islamic Jihadists.

With the signing of the Taif Accord on 22 October 1989, the civil war in Lebanon came to an end. All the warring parties complied with the accord by laying down their arms and disbanding – except Hezbollah, which had a much larger agenda in the works. On 11 November of that year, Sheikh Subhi al-Tufaili was elected to serve as Hezbollah’s first secretary general; like many other leaders in the organization, he had studied the teachings of Khomeini in Najaf. In

⁹⁴ “The Hizballah Program,” *The Jerusalem Quarterly*, No. 48 (Fall 1988): <http://peacebuffs.com/index.php?page=hezbollah-charter>.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*

⁹⁶ Norton, 39.

⁹⁷ “The Hizballah Program.”

⁹⁸ Norton, 39.

May 1991 he was followed by Secretary General al-Sayyed Abbas al-Moussawi. Shortly thereafter, on 3 June, the Party of Allah began its propagandistic broadcasts calculated to incite “wrathful hatred” from its new television station Al-Manar, “The Beacon.”

As noted in Chapter 1, Ali Dahir, al-Manar’s first station manager, said the station’s aim was to “focus on our hostility and hatred toward Israel.”⁹⁹ Its program *The Spider’s House* is dedicated to uncovering the weakness of the “Zionist entity” and explores how to use violent resistance, including suicide bombing, to destroy Israel. *My Blood and the Rifle* promotes Hezbollah and its murderous aims. *Terrorists* is a weekly show on the “terrorist acts” of Israel. *In Spite of the Wounds* commemorates the martyr-murderers who fight against Israel.¹⁰⁰ Among the lyrics in the station’s music videos are “Write in running blood: Death! Death! Death to Israel! And cause with the exploding body death! death! death to Israel!”¹⁰¹ Glorifying murder in the guise of martyrdom, “Al-Manar depicts resistance – including suicide bombing – as a family affair.”¹⁰² In this summons to families to bring up their children as murderers so bent on killing Jews that they are willing to die for it, we see yet again the extent of the Jihadist evil. Recall the lyrics to another Al-Manar video, aimed at adolescents who have not even had time to live: “We will wear coffins until every inch of our world is liberated.”¹⁰³ Liberated from what? Not from the oppression but from the *presence* of the Jews in the world.

Secretary General al-Moussawi was killed by Israeli forces on 16 February 1992; the following May, Hassan Nasrallah became al-Moussawi’s successor. Since that time, Nasrallah has been Hezbollah’s chief voice and ideologue. Nasrallah was born on 31 August 1960 in East Beirut. At the age of sixteen, he traveled to Najaf, the center for Jihadist indoctrination at the hands of Khomeini; two years later, he was forced to return to Lebanon, when Saddam Hussein expelled Shiite clerics, including Khomeini, from Najaf. Soon after the Israelis moved into Lebanon on 6 June 1982, Nasrallah became a member

⁹⁹ Avi Jorisch, *Beacon of Hatred: Inside Hizballah’s Al-Manar Television* (Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2004), 20.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, xiv–xv.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, 63.

¹⁰² *Ibid.*, 85.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, 75.

of Hezbollah and commanded a number of guerilla operations for them. In 1987, he went to Qom to continue his religious studies and returned to Lebanon in 1989. The two Jihadists who had the greatest impact on his thinking were Abbas al-Moussawi and Ruhullah Khomeini. Nasrallah describes Khomeini as “the greatest, most dignified, and undisputed personality of the twentieth century.”¹⁰⁴ These influences led him to affirm in an interview on 27 February 1992 that Hezbollah’s aim is to annihilate Israel altogether: “We are engaged in an existentialist battle with Israel.”¹⁰⁵ Even before he became the head of Hezbollah, Nasrallah was casting his war against the Jews not only in survivalist terms but also in metaphysical terms, projecting onto Israel his own evil.

In a speech delivered on 13 September 1997, Nasrallah made it clear that the Jihadist enemy is not Israel but the Jew: “If we search the entire globe for a more cowardly, lowly, weak, and frail individual in his spirit, mind, ideology, and religion, we will never find anyone like the Jew – and I am not saying the Israeli.”¹⁰⁶ Choosing the Jew as the designated target, Hezbollah makes no distinction between military and civilian targets, both in Israel and elsewhere. According to Qassem, in fact, targeting civilians is a “prime directive” for Hezbollah.¹⁰⁷ On 7 May 1998, in a speech commemorating the Day of Ashura – a day of mourning the martyrdom of Hussein ibn Ali in 680, when many Shiites cut themselves, as well as their infants with knives¹⁰⁸ – Nasrallah invoked the Quran (7:163–166) and echoed Hamas¹⁰⁹ to declare the “Zionist Jews” to be the descendants of “apes and pigs” and condemned them as the “murderers of prophets.”¹¹⁰ In an interview on 29 March that year, he affirmed not only the close ties between Hezbollah and Hamas but also the close cooperation between Hezbollah and Islamic Jihad, as well as between Hezbollah and the National Islamic Front in the Sudan, thus demonstrating once again that there is indeed a genealogy to this evil.¹¹¹

¹⁰⁴ Blanford, 4.

¹⁰⁵ Jorisch, 63.

¹⁰⁶ Hassan Nasrallah, *Voice of Hezbollah: The Statements of Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah*, ed. Nicholas Noe, trans. Ellen Khouri (London: Verso, 2007), 171.

¹⁰⁷ Qassem, 74.

¹⁰⁸ Norton, 58.

¹⁰⁹ Küntzel, 77.

¹¹⁰ Nasrallah, *Voice of Hezbollah*, 188.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, 184.

That this genealogy is traceable to the Nazis can be seen in the Day of Ashura speech, when Nasrallah borrowed Hitler’s metaphor of Jews and Judaism as a disease,¹¹² to assert that Jews are a “cancerous growth and harmful microbe, this entity without borders.”¹¹³ Elsewhere the Jihadist leader asserts that the battle against the Jewish cancer is commanded from on high, making it a duty for every Muslim who wants to enter the Paradise of the Virgins to obliterate every trace of every Jewish presence on the face of the earth: “Anyone who reads [the Quran] cannot think of co-existence with them [the Jews], of peace with them, or about accepting their presence. . . . They are a cancer which is liable to spread again at any moment.”¹¹⁴ Nasrallah’s ally Osama bin Laden repeats this appeal to the murderer-martyrs’ interest in enjoying the company of the Virgins.¹¹⁵ It is incumbent on every Muslim to ask himself: Can this be a true reading of the Quran? If it is not a true reading, then every Muslim must declare the Islamic Revolution, Hezbollah, and al-Qaeda to be heretical and an offense against Allah.

Again we see the Islamic Jihadist directive drawn from National Socialism to eradicate not just the Jewish state but every Jew, just as one would eradicate every case of AIDS. Indeed, Nasrallah accused the Jews of deliberately spreading AIDS among the Muslims.¹¹⁶ Such an accusation is calculated to label the Jews as an evil disease that threatens all humanity, so that those who die in the effort to kill Jews die for the sake of all humanity. Hence, like all other Jihadist ideologues, he argued that Muslims are obligated “to use *any means at their disposal*” to kill Jews.¹¹⁷ For the Jews are far more than the source of a mortal contagion – they are “satanic,” as Nasrallah insisted in an interview on 21 June 1999.¹¹⁸ They are “behind all evil,” he would later reiterate.¹¹⁹ This means that the Jews are a mortal threat not only

¹¹² Hitler, 233.

¹¹³ Nasrallah, *Voice of Hezbollah*, 189.

¹¹⁴ Quoted in Andrew G. Bostom, ed. *The Legacy of Islamic Antisemitism: From Sacred Texts to Solemn History*. Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2008, 682.

¹¹⁵ Bin Laden, 29.

¹¹⁶ Elaine Sciolino, “French Court Delays Decision on Hezbollah-Run TV Channel,” *New York Times Online* (12 December 2004): http://www.nytimes.com/2004/12/12/international/europe/12france.html?_r=1.

¹¹⁷ Nasrallah, *Voice of Hezbollah*, 231; emphasis added.

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 196.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 295.

to the body *but also to the soul* of humanity. Hence, the metaphysical nature of the Jewish contagion.

Even as he draws on the Nazis for his demonizing of the Jews, however, Nasrallah denies that the Nazis ever launched a program of extermination against them. In a speech given during an Ashura flagellation ceremony on 9 April 2000, he cried out that “the Jews invented the legend of the Nazi atrocities,” adding that “when a cancer is discovered, it must be dealt with fearlessly.”¹²⁰ Later, in a speech aired on Al-Jazeera Television on 3 February 2006, he invoked the infamous Holocaust denier Roger Garaudy, describing him as “a great French philosopher” who “proved that this Holocaust is a myth.”¹²¹ With Nasrallah, as with the Islamic Revolution that spawned him, Holocaust denial has nothing to do with history and everything to do with Islamic Jihadist Jew hatred. If the Jihadists can maintain that the Holocaust is a fiction, then they can maintain that the Jews have no need of a haven: like sheep among the wolves, say the Jihadists, they shall be perfectly safe among the nations.

Gathering the pack of wolves to devour the Jewish sheep, as we saw in the previous chapter, was Hasan al-Turabi and the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood; the National Islamic Front in the Sudan forged alliances not only with Hezbollah’s parent, the Islamic Revolution, but more intimately with Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda. According to Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, the NIF assisted in arranging meetings between Hezbollah and Al-Qaeda representatives, who visited Hezbollah training camps in Lebanon.¹²² According to Lawrence Wright, bin Laden “sent some of his top people to Lebanon to train with the Iranian-backed group Hezbollah.”¹²³ In addition, Bilal Saab and Bruce Riedal of the Saban Center for Middle East Policy report that in 2000, “Imad Mugnyiah, an international terrorist who is widely

¹²⁰ Hassan Nasrallah, “Excerpts from Speech by Hizbullah Secretary-General Nasrallah, 9 April 2000,” Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/MFArchive/2000_2009/2000/4/Excerpts%20from%20Speech%20by%20Hizbullah%20Secretary-Genera.

¹²¹ Hassan Nasrallah, “Hizbullah Leader Nasrallah: Great French Philosopher Garaudy Proved Holocaust a Myth,” MEMRI (7 February 2006): <http://www.memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=archives&Area=sd&ID=SP108806>.

¹²² Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, *The Age of Sacred Terror* (New York: Random House, 2002), 127–28.

¹²³ Wright, 173.

believed to be associated with Hezbollah, met with Osama bin Laden in Sudan to plan the bombings of the U.S. embassies in Africa.”¹²⁴ Saab and Riedal’s report goes on to explain that Hezbollah and al-Qaeda may have their differences, but one thing that enables them to overcome those differences is their unrelenting, unabashed determination to wipe the Jews and everyone under their “influence” off the face of the earth. Thus al-Qaeda began to spin its web.

Al-Qaeda: A Multiplying Genealogical Hybrid

Rohan Gunaratna describes al-Qaeda as “the natural offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood.”¹²⁵ More than that, al-Qaeda is “guided by an antisemitic ideology that was transferred to the Islamic world in the Nazi period,”¹²⁶ as Küntzel has shown. In the aftermath of the Islamic Revolution in Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, numerous Jihadist groups joined forces to form a network called al-Qaeda al-Sulbah. With this spread of Jihadism well under way, the Palestinian-Jordanian ideologue Abdullah Azzam, the man whom the Muslim Brotherhood appointed as its spokesman at the University of Damascus in 1960, conceptualized al-Qaeda as a movement in 1987.¹²⁷ Wright pinpoints its official founding on 20 August 1988 at a meeting convened by Ayman al-Zawahiri, Abdullah Azzam, and Osama bin Laden.¹²⁸ Al-Qaeda is much better described, however, as a Jihadist network than as a Jihadist group. Bridging the Shiite-Sunni gap, it is an association spawned by the seed of Nazi Jew hatred and cultivated in the soil of Islamic Jihadism. Their stated goals are “(1) establishing the rule of God on earth, (2) attaining martyrdom in the cause of God, and (3) purification of the ranks of Islam from the elements of depravity,” where the Jews are the primary source of depravity; the earth must be made Judenrein.¹²⁹ “The enmity between us and the

¹²⁴ Bilal Saab and Bruce Riedal, “Vanguards at War: Hezbollah and Al Qaeda,” Brookings Online (9 April 2007): http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2007/0409terrorism_saab.aspx.

¹²⁵ Rohan Gunaratna, *Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), 96.

¹²⁶ Küntzel, *Jihad and Jew-Hatred*, xxiii.

¹²⁷ Gunaratna, 3.

¹²⁸ Wright, 133.

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*, 302.

Jews,” bin Laden stated in 1998, “goes back far in time and is deeply rooted. There is no question that war between us is inevitable. . . . The Hour of Resurrection shall not come before the Muslims fight the Jews.” He adds that he is convinced that the Jews control America.¹³⁰ As Jason Burke has correctly observed, then, al-Qaeda “is not about being part of a group. It is a way of thinking about the world, a way of understanding events, of interpreting and behaving.”¹³¹ Further, like the categories of thought that define Nazi thinking, the categories defining this “way of thinking” cannot abide in the same universe with Jewish thinking.

Here are a few among the many Jihadist organizations with whom al-Qaeda has connections and whom they support in their actions against the Jews and the United States:

- Egyptian Islamic Jihad
- The Algeria-based Armed Islamic Group (GIA), founded in July 1992 by Mansour Meliani
- The Pakistani Jamaat-e-Islami, founded by Abdul Al'a Maududi on 26 August 1941
- The Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, founded in 1995 by Libyan veterans of the war in Afghanistan
- Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), founded in 1990 by Pakistanis Hafiz Muhammad Saeed and Zafar Iqbal, notorious for their terrorist attacks in India
- Harkat ul-Ansar, founded in 1993 by former GIA member Abdel-Kader Mokhtari
- Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), formed in Pakistan on 31 January 2001 by Maulana Masood Azhar after his release from an Indian prison
- The Moro Islamic Liberation Front, established in 1981 in the Philippines
- The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), created in 1998 by former Soviet paratrooper Juma Namangani and Jihadist ideologue Tahir Yuldashev

¹³⁰ Küntzel, *Jihad and Jew Hatred*, xxi.

¹³¹ Jason Burke, *Al-Qaeda: Casting a Shadow of Terror* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2003), 17.

- The Islamic Army of Aden (IAA), formed in the early 1990s and famous for its role in the bombing of the USS *Cole* on 12 October 2000¹³²

The genealogical ties that bind these Islamic Jihadist organizations are ideologically rooted in the Muslim Brotherhood, which in turn had definitive ties to Nazism and whose teachings are embodied in the diatribes of Abdullah Azzam. Much more than Osama bin Laden, he is the figure who forged the ideological ground on which al-Qaeda is built.

Born in the British Mandate of Palestine in 1941, Azzam obtained a degree in Sharia Law from the University of Damascus in 1966; in 1973, Egypt’s Al-Azhar University awarded him a Ph.D. in Islamic Jurisprudence. Azzam had long been part of the Muslim Brotherhood and an avid admirer of Sayyid Qutb; during his studies at Al-Azhar, he became close to other major followers of Qutb, such as Omar Abdel Rahman and future al-Qaeda leader Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri.¹³³ From the Muslim Brotherhood and its embrace of the Nazi concept of *Kampf* or “battle” as a fundamental feature of the movement, Azzam realized that “those who believe that Islam can flourish [and] be victorious without Jihad, fighting, and blood indeed are illusioned and do not understand the nature of this religion.” Further, “The word Jihad, when mentioned on its own, only means combat with weapons.”¹³⁴ Therefore, he asserts, “every Muslim who passes away without a gun in his hand faces Allah with the sin of abandoning fighting.”¹³⁵ Justifying his position by invoking the Quran, Azzam insists, “The Sword verses abrogate about 140 verses on jihad . . . revealed previously. . . . They

¹³² See “Al-Qaida/Al-Qaeda (the Base),” Global Security, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/al-qaida.htm>.

¹³³ David Aaron, *In Their Own Words: Voices of Jihad* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2008), 66–67; see also Ruthven Malise, *A Fury for God: The Islamist Attack on America* (London: Granta, 2004), 202.

¹³⁴ *Ibid.*, 68.

¹³⁵ Quoted in David Cook, *Understanding Jihad* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), 130; cf. Abdulla Azzam, *Join the Caravan*, <http://www.worldofislam.info/ebooks/joincaravan.pdf>, 11; cf. Abdullah Azzam, *Defense of the Muslim Lands: First Obligation after Iman*, trans. Brothers in Ribat, <http://www.ayyaz.com.pk/Books/Shaykh.Abdullah.Azzam/Defence.of.the.Muslim.Lands.-.the.First.Obligation.After.Iman.pdf>, 32.

give a definite answer to anyone who questions [the Quran's] clear definition [of jihad]."¹³⁶ With this ideological move, Azzam, like the Nazis, eliminates the prohibition against murder, a move that is central both to the eclipse and to the appropriation of God.

Soon after obtaining his Ph.D., Azzam accepted a position at King Abd al-Aziz University in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, where he took Osama bin Laden under his ideological wing. After the Jihadist fanatics' revolt that took place in Mecca on 20 November 1979, however, Azzam was expelled from the Saudi kingdom and took up residence in Pakistan. He brought with him the totalitarian ideology and Jihadist Jew hatred that he had inherited from the Ikhwan. Immediately after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan on 25 December 1979, Azzam issued a fatwa linking the struggle against the Soviets with the struggle against the Jews (recall the Nazi identification of Jews with Bolsheviks) and declared a jihad on both. Bin Laden joined him in Peshawar in 1981, and the two of them set about the task of aiding and abetting Islamic Jihadists, primarily but not exclusively, in Afghanistan. His slogan was "Jihad and the rifle alone: no negotiations, no conferences, and no dialogues,"¹³⁷ a principle that, with the help of bin Laden and al-Zawahiri, transformed the Islamic Jihadist movement from a regional into a global phenomenon.

As Malise Reuthven has noted, to encourage adolescent boys to offer themselves up on his Jihadist altar, Azzam preached, "The martyr has seven special favors from Allah: all his sins are forgiven at the first spurt of his blood, he sees his place in Paradise as his blood is shed (before his soul leaves his body), he tastes the sweetness of *iman* (faith), he is married to 72 of the Beautiful Maidens of Paradise, he is protected from the Punishment of the Grave, he is saved from the Great Terror (on the Day of Judgment), there is placed upon his head a crown of honor, a jewel of which is better than the whole world and everything in it, and he is granted permission to intercede for 70 members of his household to bring them into Paradise and save them from Hell Fire." With these words, Malise added, "Azzam presents himself as an orthodox *'alim* in the Hanbali tradition."¹³⁸

¹³⁶ Quoted in Burke, 31–32.

¹³⁷ Wright, 95–96.

¹³⁸ Malise, 206.

In this exploitation of “mythical modes of thought to mobilize unconscious or psychic forces,” Malise correctly sees a strategy that Azzam, like Hasan al-Banna, borrowed from the Nazis: “In the same line of thinking [as Azzam] Alfred Rosenberg, the Nazi ideologue, stressed the other-worldly, spiritual aspect of Hitler’s racial theories: ‘The life of a race does not represent a logically-developed philosophy, not even the unfolding of a pattern according to natural law, but rather the development of a mystical synthesis, an activity of soul, which cannot be explained rationally.’”¹³⁹ The extent of Azzam’s familiarity with the Nazi ideologues is uncertain, but it is clear that he was quite familiar with figures such as Hasan al-Banna, who knew the Nazis well.

In one of his best known works, *Ilhaq bil-qawafilah* (*Join the Caravan*, 1987), Azzam wrote, “Anybody who looks into the state of the Muslims today will find that their greatest misfortune is their abandonment of Jihad (due to love of this world and abhorrence of death). Because of that, the tyrants have gained dominance over the Muslims in every aspect in every land.”¹⁴⁰ Further, “A religion which does not have Jihad cannot be established in any land. The steadfast Jihad, which is one of the innermost constituents of this religion [Islam] and which as its weight in the scales of the Lord of the Worlds, is not a contingent phenomenon peculiar to the period in which the Quran was revealed; it is in fact a necessity accompanying the caravan which this religion guides.”¹⁴¹ He justified this position by quoting a similar statement from Sayyid Qutb.¹⁴² Thus confirming that the elimination of the divine prohibition against murder is a defining feature of Islamic Jihadism, the thinker behind al-Qaeda situated murder in the realm of the eternal and in so doing usurps the throne of the Eternal One. For Abdullah Azzam, as for all Islamic Jihadists, the “religion” has more to do with shedding blood than with bleeding, more to do with tyrannical rule than with pious humility, more to do with appropriating God than with serving God. Here Jason Burke is accurate in his assessment that “Azzam was clearly building on the legacy of al-Banna, Maududi,

¹³⁹ Ibid., 207.

¹⁴⁰ Azzam, *Join the Caravan*, 5.

¹⁴¹ Ibid., 9.

¹⁴² Ibid.

Qutb and Khomeini,”¹⁴³ all of whom were either directly or indirectly influenced by Nazism’s exterminationist Jew hatred.

Azzam’s most famous work is *Al-Defaa aan Ardh al-Muslimeen aham furood al-ayaan* (*Defense of the Muslim Lands*, 1987), in which, like his Jihadist predecessors, he quoted Hanbali jurist Taqi ad-Din Ahmad ibn Taymiyyah extensively, as well as the Hadith and other Islamic sources, including, of course, the Quran. There he explains that “this rule of fighting,” or the jihad that Islam insists upon, is for “the salvation of humanity.”¹⁴⁴ Even fellow Muslims can be killed, if it promotes the killing of the “unbelievers.”¹⁴⁵ In keeping with the imperative for conquest and expansion, he declares, “Any Islamic territory is not large enough for one thousandth of all the thousands of Muslims.”¹⁴⁶ Not surprisingly, this work includes a call to rid Palestine of all Jews: “If only the Muslims would apply their Lord’s command and implement the laws of their *Shariah* concerning the General March for just one week in Palestine, Palestine would be completely purified of Jews.”¹⁴⁷ The language of purification is clearly reminiscent of the modern exterminationist anti-Semitism that portrays the Jews as a contagion. This is why – like Hamas, Islamic Jihad, Hezbollah, and all other Islamic Jihadist movements – Azzam insisted that Islam permits no negotiation with the Jews.¹⁴⁸ You cannot negotiate peace with the Jews any more than you can negotiate peace with a disease.

Killed in Peshawar on 24 November 1989 by assassins who remain unknown, Azzam did not live to witness how far his influence would extend. Still his words have a dark prophetic ring: “This small band of Arabs [in Afghanistan] changed the tide of the battle from an Islamic battle of one country to an Islamic world Jihad movement,” so that “Jihad must not be abandoned until Allah alone is worshipped.”¹⁴⁹ The axiom of this ideology of evil? In the words of Azzam, words that bring to mind the Sturmabteilung combat song *Blut muss fließen!* (“Blood Must Flow!”), it is this: “History does not write its lines except

¹⁴³ Burke, 72.

¹⁴⁴ Azzam, *Defense of the Muslim Lands*, 12.

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 20.

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 36.

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 45–46.

¹⁴⁹ Aaron, 69.

with blood. Glory does not build its lofty edifice except with skulls. Honor and respect cannot be established except on a foundation of cripples and corpses. [Islamic Jihadist] Empires, noble persons, states and societies cannot be established except with [such] examples.”¹⁵⁰ One Islamic Jihadist who lives by these words is Azzam’s younger cohort Ayman al-Zawahiri, the other ideological architect of al-Qaeda’s Islamic Jihadism.¹⁵¹ Since the death of Azzam, he has been “widely considered Osama bin Laden’s top aide and al-Qaeda’s principal ideologist.”¹⁵²

Al-Zawahiri was born to a wealthy family on 19 June 1951 in the Cairo suburb of Maadi. At an early age al-Zawahiri came under the influence of his uncle Mahfouz Azzam (no relation to Abdullah), who was Sayyid Qutb’s lawyer.¹⁵³ At the age of fourteen, he joined the Muslim Brotherhood; a year later, his idol Qutb was executed, whereupon al-Zawahiri vowed “to put Qutb’s vision into action.”¹⁵⁴ Completing his studies in medicine in 1978, he soon became one of the leaders of Egyptian Islamic Jihad, as noted in the previous chapter. He was among the fanatics arrested in the aftermath of Anwar Sadat’s assassination in 1981 and was sentenced to three years in prison. After serving his time, he spent a year in Jeddah, and in 1986, he traveled to Peshawar to practice medicine and to reconstitute the Islamic Jihad group. There he met Abdullah Azzam and Osama bin Laden.¹⁵⁵ By that time, he had thoroughly studied the works of Ruhullah Khomeini and the strategies of the Islamic Revolution in Iran. In 1990, al-Zawahiri returned to Egypt, where he led the Egyptian Islamic Jihad in a series of terrorist actions. He rejoined bin Laden in 1998, at which time he merged the Egyptian Islamic Jihad with al-Qaeda.¹⁵⁶

On 23 February 1998, he and bin Laden put their names to a fatwa that in all likelihood al-Zawahiri had written himself; it was called “Al-Jabhah al-Islamiyya ak-’Alamiyya li-Qital al-Yahud wal-Salibiyyin” (“World Islamic Front against Jews and Crusaders”). The other

¹⁵⁰ Ibid.; see also Malise, 204.

¹⁵¹ See Gunaratna, 25.

¹⁵² Aaron, 70.

¹⁵³ Wright, 36.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid., 37.

¹⁵⁵ See Gunaratna, 25–26.

¹⁵⁶ Aaron, 70.

signatories were Abu Yasir Rifai Ahmad Taha of the Egyptian Islamic Group, Sheikh Mir Hamzah of the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Pakistan, and Maulana Fazlur Rahman of the Jihad Movement in Bangladesh. The document illustrates al-Zawahiri's view that jihad is not part of Islam – it is its defining essence.¹⁵⁷ Proceeding from the injunction in the Quran to “kill the polytheists, seize them, besiege them, ambush them, wherever you find them” (9:5),¹⁵⁸ the authors once again transform murder into a holy act pleasing to God, insisting that “to kill the Americans and their allies – civilians and military – is an individual duty incumbent on every Muslim in all countries.”¹⁵⁹ America's chief ally, of course, is Israel; in fact, as noted earlier, Islamic Jihadists view America as Israel's puppet. Therefore “peace with Israel and acceptance of its usurpation of Palestine,” says al-Zawahiri, “is a rejection of *jihad*.”¹⁶⁰ As shown in Chapter 1, just as a Nazi cannot be a true Nazi without murdering Jews, so an Islamic Jihadist cannot be a true Muslim without murdering Jews.

Al-Zawahiri's most famous manifesto is *Fursan Taht Rayah al-Nabi* (*Knights under the Prophet's Banner*), published in December 2001, a work that Laura Mansfield compares to Hitler's *Mein Kampf*¹⁶¹ and the title of which is “a deliberate reference to the ‘knights of the holy tomb,’ as those who fought against the Crusaders in the Middle Ages were called.”¹⁶² The comparison to *Mein Kampf* is rooted not only in the work's significance to al-Zawahiri's ideology but also in its content. Like Hitler, for example, he embraces the *Führerprinzip*, declaring that “the loyalty to the leadership and the acknowledgment of its precedence and merit represent a duty that must be emphasized and a

¹⁵⁷ Ayman al-Zawahiri, *His Own Words: Translation and Analysis of the Writings of Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri*, trans. and analysis by Laura Mansfield (Irvine, CA: TLG Publications, 2006), 342.

¹⁵⁸ Bin Laden, 59.

¹⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 61.

¹⁶⁰ Ayman al-Zawahiri, “Loyalty and Enmity: An Inherited Doctrine and a Lost Reality,” in Raymond Ibrahim, ed., *The Al Qaeda Reader*, trans. Raymond Ibrahim (New York: Doubleday, 2007), 102.

¹⁶¹ Laura Mansfield, Introduction to Ayman al-Zawahiri, *His Own Words: Translation and Analysis of the Writings of Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri*, trans. and analysis by Laura Mansfield (Irvine, CA: TLG Publications, 2006), 14.

¹⁶² Abdel Bari Atwan, *The Secret History of al Qaeda* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008), 82.

value that must be consolidated.”¹⁶³ Also like Hitler, he recognizes that “the masses need three things: leadership, a clear enemy, and fearlessness.”¹⁶⁴ The clear enemy, of course, is the Jews.

Demonstrating the influence of Sayyid Qutb in this regard, al-Zawahiri points out that Qutb “greatly helped the Islamic movement to know and define its enemies,”¹⁶⁵ as, for example, in “Our Struggle with the Jews.” Echoing the accent on the youth that the Muslim Brotherhood learned from Hitler, he notes that “Professor Sayyid Qutb played a key role in directing the Muslim youth to this road” of Islamic Jihadism.¹⁶⁶ Invoking the holy name of Qutb, al-Zawahiri justifies laying Muslim youth upon the altar of Jihadism: “Sayyid Qutb, the most prominent theoretician of the fundamentalist movements, said: ‘Brother, push ahead, for your path is soaked in blood. Do not turn your head right or left but look only up to heaven.’”¹⁶⁷ Al-Zawahiri’s altar of Jihadism is the altar of Jew hatred, which shapes the sum of Jihadist understanding, as he indicates: “The one slogan that has been well understood by the nation . . . is the call for the jihad against Israel.”¹⁶⁸ In keeping with the anti-Semitism that defines Islamic Jihadism, al-Zawahiri asserts that the hatred of Israel and its puppet regime the United States “in the hearts of Islamists is genuine and indivisible.”¹⁶⁹ Not only does “the global Jewish government” control the United States,¹⁷⁰ the Jews manipulate the media and “propaganda tools” throughout the West.¹⁷¹ Because the Jews, he argues, control the West, they corrupt the West, so that “the West, led by the United States, . . . does not know the language of ethics, morality, and legitimate rights.”¹⁷² Finally, al-Zawahiri is no exception to the universal Jihadist denial of the Holocaust, which is a stereotypical expression of Jew hatred.¹⁷³ Just as Holocaust denial is not about history, the

¹⁶³ Al-Zawahiri, 207.

¹⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 224.

¹⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 47.

¹⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 49.

¹⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 137.

¹⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 210.

¹⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 72.

¹⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 125.

¹⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 77.

¹⁷² *Ibid.*, 199.

¹⁷³ *Ibid.*, 311.

Jews are not a political enemy – they are a cosmological, metaphysical enemy. That is why it is a *religious* duty to murder them. That is why al-Zawahiri can insist that in the war against the Jews “the rule against the slaughter of innocents must be relaxed.”¹⁷⁴ In the words of bin Laden, “Yes, we kill their innocents, and this is legal religiously and logically. There are two types of terror, good and bad. What we are practicing is good terror. We will not stop killing them.”¹⁷⁵ *Good terror*: a distinctively Jihadist combination of words.

Needless to say, the high-profile financial supporter and public relations man in al-Qaeda’s network of this evil is Osama bin Laden, who is more a source of money than a source of ideology to al-Qaeda. Bin Laden was born on 10 March 1957 in Riyadh, the only son of Saudi multi-millionaire Muhammed Awad bin Laden’s tenth wife, a Syrian named Hamida al-Attas. Brought up in a home devoted to Wahhabism, he is a fanatic supporter of forcing all of humanity to submit to the rule of Sharia. “They say our *sharia* does not impose our particular beliefs upon others,” he once said. “This is a false assertion.”¹⁷⁶ In keeping with this position – a position reminiscent of the Nazis’ drive for world domination – al-Qaeda spokesman Suleiman Abu Gheith (b. 1965) has averred that “the Muslim nation was created to stand at the center of hegemony and rule,” for it is “the divine rule that the entire earth must be subject to the religion of Allah.”¹⁷⁷ The determination that this totalitarian rule of Islam is a “divine rule” is characteristic of the Jihadist appropriation of God.

Bin Laden spent his childhood years in Jeddah, where, while still a teenager, he joined the Muslim Brotherhood.¹⁷⁸ His father died in 1968, leaving \$11 billion to his fifty-four children (including bin Laden) from more than twenty wives. Bin Laden, then, had no trouble paying for college: he entered King Abdul University in Jeddah in 1976, where he met Mohammed Jamal Khalifa, a member of the Brotherhood who would become his closest friend. Together they

¹⁷⁴ Quoted in Wright, 218.

¹⁷⁵ Quoted in Murawiec, 56.

¹⁷⁶ Quoted in Ibrahim, 51; see also bin Laden, 167.

¹⁷⁷ Matthias Kuntzel, “National Socialism and Anti-Semitism in the Arab World,” *Jewish Political Studies Review* (17, Spring 2005), <http://www.jcpa.org/phas/phas-kuntzel-so5.htm>.

¹⁷⁸ Wright, 78.

studied the writings of Sayyid Qutb who, according to Khalifa, had the greatest impact on their generation. They attended lectures by Muhammad Qutb, the brother of Sayyid Qutb; they also studied under Abdullah Azzam, as already noted.¹⁷⁹ Küntzel correctly observes that bin Laden “was not politicized by ‘specific US policies,’ but by the jihadist lectures of Muhammad Qutb and Abdullah Azzam.”¹⁸⁰ After completing his university studies, in 1980 bin Laden traveled to Peshawar to recruit Arabs for jihad against the Russians in Afghanistan.

By 1984, under the tutelage of his mentor Abdullah Azzam, he was directing money and arms to Muslim fighters in Afghanistan in the war against the Soviets. After the Russians pulled out of Afghanistan in 1989, bin Laden returned to Saudi Arabia; due to his opposition to the Saudis’ cooperation with the United States during the Gulf War of 1991, he was forced to flee his homeland. From there he went to the Sudan, where he would spend the next five years and would establish a close working relationship with Hasan al-Turabi and the National Islamic Front. Upon his expulsion from the Sudan on 18 May 1996, he returned to Afghanistan, where he allied himself with the Taliban and entered the world scene. With that entry, writes Robert Wistrich, “the Egyptian-based journal of the Muslim Brotherhood rapturously greeted Osama bin Laden as ‘a hero in the full sense of the word.’”¹⁸¹ Throughout the 1990s, bin Laden pushed for a globalization of Islamic Jihadism, as his organization extended its reach into Bosnia, Somalia, Yemen, and other realms to eventually form the global Jihadist web known as al-Qaeda.

As always, the best way to assess bin Laden is to listen to what he says and to take his words seriously. One of his axioms, for example, is that every “iniquity and injustice” suffered by the Muslims throughout history has been “imposed on them by the Zionist-Crusaders alliance”¹⁸² (never mind the fact that the Crusaders slaughtered an estimated quarter of a million Jews in the course of their nine major campaigns from 1096 to 1271). In a statement made on Al-Jazeera television

¹⁷⁹ Ibid., 79; see also Burke, 45.

¹⁸⁰ Küntzel, *Jihad and Jew Hatred*, 158.

¹⁸¹ Robert Wistrich, “Islamic Judeophobia: An Existential Threat,” in David Bukay, ed., *Muhammad’s Monsters: A Comprehensive Guide to Radical Islam for Western Audiences* (Green Forest, AR: Balfour Books, 2004), 198.

¹⁸² Quoted in Aaron, 119.

on 15 April 2004, he declared that “the Zionist lobby” is “a mortal danger to the entire world,”¹⁸³ reflecting a discourse borrowed from *Mein Kampf*.¹⁸⁴ Also imitating the Nazis’ projection of their own evil onto the Jew, bin Laden maintains that “the Jews believe as part of their religion that people are their slaves, and whoever denies their religion deserves to be killed.”¹⁸⁵ Bin Laden thus casts the Jew in the mold of the eternal enemy of all humanity. Thus, the war against the Jews – and here one readily recognizes the Nazis influence – assumes apocalyptic dimensions. That the Nazi connection to al-Qaeda is not just a parallel but is indeed a relation of influence can be seen in the testimony of Shahid Nickels, a follower of 9/11 terrorist Mohammed Atta between 1998 and 2000; the testimony was given at the trial of al-Qaeda operatives held in Hamburg in October 2002. Said Nickels, “Atta’s weltanschauung was based on a National Socialist way of thinking. He was convinced that ‘the Jews’ are determined to achieve world domination. He considered New York City to be the center of world Jewry which was, in his opinion, Enemy Number One.”¹⁸⁶ Enemy of whom? Of humanity.

Bin Laden reinforced such an outlook in an interview with Al-Jazeera on 21 October 2001, when he repeated the refrain found in Article Seven of the Hamas “Charter of Allah,” citing the Hadith collection of al-Bukhari, no. 3,593: “The Hour will not come until the Muslims fight the Jews and kill them. When a Jew hides behind a rock or a tree, it will say: ‘O Muslim, O Servant of God! There is a Jew behind me, come and kill him!’”¹⁸⁷ Any peace with “the Jews,” he insisted, “is a disaster for Muslims.”¹⁸⁸ Thus “our current battle is against the Jews. Our faith tells us we shall defeat them,”¹⁸⁹ a position confirmed by al-Qaeda’s “Manchester Document,” discovered by the Manchester Metropolitan Police in 2000, which designates Jews – not Israelis but Jews – as the organization’s primary targets:

¹⁸³ Bin Laden, 235.

¹⁸⁴ See Hitler, 325.

¹⁸⁵ Bin Laden, 190.

¹⁸⁶ Küntzel, “National Socialism and Anti-Semitism in the Arab World.”

¹⁸⁷ Bin Laden, 125.

¹⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, 9.

¹⁸⁹ Quoted in Aaron, 168.

“Human targets sorted by level of importance: 1. The Jews: They are divided in grades with respect to importance: American and Israeli Jews are first targeted, then British Jews, then French Jews, and so on.”¹⁹⁰ As designated targets, the Jews are marked for murder: once again we see the nature of the Jew hatred that defines Islamic Jihadism. In another interview with Al-Jazeera, aired in December 1998, bin Laden identified Jew hatred as “part of our belief and our religion.”¹⁹¹ It is as if this murderous anti-Semitism were as much a part of Islamic doctrine as the Five Pillars of Faith.

Bin Laden’s diatribes against the Jews extend much further. Like other Sunni Jihadists, he extended the hand of cooperation to the Shiite Jihadists in their common effort to exterminate the Jews,¹⁹² a move illustrated by al-Qaeda’s contacts with Hezbollah. His efforts to seek cooperation went beyond the Muslim world, into the gullet of the Great Satan himself: in a letter to Americans reminiscent of the Nazi song *Deutschland Erwache!* (“Germany Awake!”), bin Laden pleads with them to awaken to the fact that “the Jews have taken control of your economy, through which they have then taken control of your media, and they now control all aspects of your life.” The means of this Jewish control, says bin Laden in a distinct repetition of Nazi propaganda, are “the immoral acts of fornication, homosexuality, intoxicants, gambling, and trading with interest.”¹⁹³ Thus, in a missive titled “Modern Islam Is a Prostration to the West,” he quotes the Quran, saying, “The most implacable men in their enmity to the believers are the Jews” (5:82); then he attacks the Christians, who have been corrupted by the Jews.¹⁹⁴ Here bin Laden further perverts the Quran (8:60) in a Jihadist appropriation of Allah by averring that “whoever refuses the principle of terror against the enemy also refuses the commandment of Allah,”¹⁹⁵ which, of course, is the commandment of al-Qaeda.

¹⁹⁰ Ibid., 211.

¹⁹¹ Bin Laden, 87.

¹⁹² See Aaron, 243.

¹⁹³ Küntzel, “National Socialism and Anti-Semitism in the Arab World”; bin Laden’s letter was published in *The Observer* on 24 November 2002. Al-Zawahiri wrote a similar letter dated 10 January 2006; see al-Zawahiri, 297.

¹⁹⁴ Quoted in Ibrahim, 34.

¹⁹⁵ Ibid., 54.

Osama bin Laden is not enough of a thinker to be deemed an ideologue. But he is an effective mouthpiece and promoter of a virulent ideology of exterminationist Jew hatred. Since the time he has gone into hiding, like Hitler in his bunker, he has become a powerful symbol of Islamic Jihadism. From the darkness of his cave, there extends over the world an even greater darkness. Whether the world will realize the extent of the Jihadist genealogy of evil before it is too late remains to be seen.

“Secular” Offshoots

The Baath Party and the PLO

We were racists, admiring Nazism, reading its books and the source of its thought, particularly Nietzsche, . . . Fichte, and H. S. Chamberlain’s *Foundations of the Nineteenth Century*, which revolves on race. We were the first to think of translating *Mein Kampf*. . . . Nazism was the power which could serve as [the Arab people’s] champion.

From the memoirs of Sami al-Jundi, Syrian leader of the Baath Party

Turning to the “secular” branches of the genealogical tree of evil, I place the word *secular* in quotation marks because, as this chapter shows, the two groups under consideration – the Baath Party and the Palestinian Liberation Organization – do not, in fact, situate themselves outside of any religious affiliation: both strongly identify themselves as Muslims. The usual labeling of the two as secular, then, can be misleading. What distinguishes them from “religious” Islamic Jihadists is the absence of a firm insistence that Sharia be the law of the land, not a rejection of Islam. In the words of Michel Aflaq, the Baath Party’s foundational ideologue, “religion, as it appears to us when reviewing the history of mankind from the most ancient times to the present day, is fundamental in the life of humanity.”¹ The religion fundamental to the Baath, he affirmed, is Islam.² There we have the secularism of the

¹ Michel Aflaq, “Our View of Religion” (March 1956): http://albaath.online.fr/English/Aflaq-01-arab_unity.htm.

² See Amatzia Baram, *Culture, History and Ideology in the Formation of Baathist Iraq, 1968–1989* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1991), 115; see also Kamel S. Abu Jaber, *The*

Baath Party. Indeed, it is not for nothing that before his death in 1989, Aflaq converted from his Greek Orthodox upbringing to Islam and received a Muslim's burial in Baghdad.³

As for the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), after a homicide bombing it perpetrated in Tel Aviv in June 2001, Yasser Arafat declared, "The heroic martyrdom operation [of the man] who turned his body into a bomb [is] the model of manhood and sacrifice for the sake of Allah and the homeland."⁴ There we have the secularism of the PLO. Although from its inception the PLO has had deep connections to the Muslim Brotherhood, the Baath Party is more directly influenced by the Nazis. Adopting a discourse similar to the Nazis, the Baath Party has always insisted that its national socialism is "indigenously Arab, as are their values and approaches," as if the "-ism" were in the Arab blood.⁵ As this chapter will show, this racist tenet of Baathist ideology, influenced by a similar Nazi racism, would be a key to the Arab Iraqis' animosity toward the Iranian Persians. Nevertheless, even the Baath Party has certain Jihadist connections to the Persian Jihadists, despite their "racial" differences. For they have one important, overriding point in common: an exterminationist anti-Semitism.

Further underscoring the Islamic Jihadist aspects of both the Baath and the PLO, in its Syrian form, the Baath Party has established close ties with the Iranian Islamic Republic through its ties to Hezbollah; it should also be pointed out that Arafat enjoyed an "extraordinarily enthusiastic reception" in Tehran in February 1979.⁶ In an interview given on 16 February 2000, Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah affirmed his "affinity with Syria, not only in the political domain, but also on many other levels, including psychologically and emotionally,

Arab Ba'ath Socialist Party: History, Ideology, and Organization (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1966), 129.

³ See Amatzia Baram, "Re-Inventing Nationalism in Baathi Iraq 1968–1994: Supra-Territorial and Territorial Identities and What Lies Below," in Yesim Arat, ed., *Challenges to Democracy in the Middle East* (Princeton, NJ: Marcus Wiener Publishers, 1997), 39.

⁴ Quoted by Walter Laqueur, *No End to War: Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century* (London: Continuum, 2004), 213.

⁵ Jaber, 8.

⁶ Augustus Richard Norton, *Hezbollah: A Short History* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007), 32.

thanks to our shared interests” – namely, their shared interest in the extermination of the Jews.⁷ This hatred is what makes Hezbollah’s alliance with Baathist Syria a “natural” one, as Hezbollah’s Deputy Secretary General Naim Qassem describes it.⁸ Through such links between Hezbollah and the Islamic Revolution in Iran, the Baath, particularly in its Syrian form, has an indirect line of influence traceable to the Ikhwan; we shall find that the PLO’s connection to the Brotherhood is quite direct. Like the Nazis and the Jihadist offspring of the Muslim Brotherhood, both the Baath and the PLO advocate the annihilation of the Jews. Both subscribe to “the Arab response to the Israeli War of Independence promoted by Islamist jihadists, led by al-Husseini, the young Yasser Arafat, and their allies in the Muslim Brotherhood, whose express purpose was genocidal. . . . Their objective had been, as the mufti candidly put it and reiterated throughout his political career, to ‘murder the Jews,’ to ‘murder them all.’”⁹ There lies the thread that runs throughout this genealogy of evil in its “secular” manifestations.

The Baath Party: Arab National Socialism

Michel Aflaq (1910–1989) was the ideological father of the Baath or “Resurrection” Party. Although he was born into a Greek Orthodox family, Aflaq had a largely nonreligious upbringing. In 1928, he enrolled at the Sorbonne with his friend Salah al-Din al-Bitar (1912–1980), a Sunni Muslim from Damascus who would later become his cofounder of the party. During his stay in Paris, Aflaq became an ardent admirer of German National Socialism and saw many political implications of such a movement for the Arab world. Upon their return to Syria in 1932, Aflaq and al-Bitar took positions as teachers in the French government schools and became active in political circles bent on eliminating the French domination of Syria. A defining element of their agenda was the establishment of an Arab national

⁷ Hassan Nasrallah, *Voice of Hezbollah: The Statements of Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah*, ed. Nicholas Noe, trans. Ellen Khouri (London: Verso, 2007), 227.

⁸ Naim Qassem, *Hizbollah: The Story from Within*, trans. Dalia Khalil (London: SAQI, 200), 134.

⁹ David G. Dalin and John F. Rothman, *Icon of Evil: Hitler’s Mufti and the Rise of Radical Islam* (New York: Random House, 2008), 136.

socialist movement inspired by and modeled after the Nazis. Indeed, as we have seen, this was a time when the Arab world was developing significant ties with Nazi Germany.

When, with the help of the Nazis, Rashid Ali al-Gaylani overthrew the Iraqi government on 3 April 1941, Aflaq and al-Bitar took it as a cue to form the Syrian Committee to Aid Iraq; this move to align themselves with the Nazis spurred the Arab national socialists to create a national socialist party in Syria.¹⁰ Within days, twelve men who had been part of the Syrian Committee to Aid al-Gaylani's Iraq founded the Baath Party: Aflaq, al-Bitar, his cousin Dr. Madhat al-Bitar, Dr. Munif Razzaz, Dr. Ali Jabir of Beirut, Dr. Abdullah Abdul Daim, Dr. Wahib al-Ghanim, Dr. Jamal al-Atasi, Dr. Musa Rizik, Badi al-Kasm, Sami al-Droubi, and Abdul Birr Iyun al-Sud.¹¹ Seizing the historical moment, Aflaq declared, "A day will come when the nationalists will find themselves the only defenders of Islam. They will have to give a special meaning to it if they want the Arab nation to have a good reason for survival."¹² Thus, from the outset the chief spokesman of the Baath Party introduced an Islamic dimension to the Baathist ideology that was perfectly in keeping with Islamic Jihadism.

The "special meaning" given to Arab nationalists as "defenders of Islam" is to transform the defense of Islam into a will to rid the world of the Jews – that was their "good reason" for survival. The transformation of Arab thinking into anti-Semitic national socialist thinking is part of the *inqilab*, the "psychological revolution," that, according to Aflaq, defines the Baathist movement; people's minds and personality, he declared, must be transformed and controlled.¹³ Here it is important to note that what Aflaq sought was not a return to Islamic tradition but a new step forward, toward the formation of a "new Muslim humanity" that would rise above the rest of humanity. The key to that ascent is the elimination of the teachings on humanity embodied by the presence of the Jews in the world. Thus, in 1946, the newly created Baath Party

¹⁰ John F. Devlin, *The Baath Party: A History from Its Origins to 1966* (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1976), 5.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 28.

¹² Michel Aflaq, "In Memory of the Arab Prophet" (1 April 1943): <http://albaath.online.fr/English/Aflaq-01-arab-unity.htm>.

¹³ See Jaber, 131.

undertook a propaganda campaign against the Jews,¹⁴ using methods borrowed from the Nazis. What motivated Aflaq's hatred can be seen in a statement that he made at the time, well before there was a Jewish state, West Bank settlements, or a security fence: "The Zionist menace is not merely an economic invasion motivated by material greed, but it is first and foremost a religious invasion [of Islam], which has no parallel in history except the crusades! Nothing but the awakening of faith in the Arabs, and the incarnation of that faith in a practical and efficacious form can ward off this menace."¹⁵ Here we have yet another assertion that belies the notion that the Baath Party is a secular entity.

Another important figure at the birth of the Baath was Zaki Arsuzi (1900–1968), an Alawi Muslim from Alexandretta. Arsuzi had initiated a similar movement in 1940 called the al-Baath al-Arabi (The Arab Resurrection Party), which was distinct from but very similar to Aflaq's Baath Party; among the founding members of Arsuzi's group were Sami al-Jundi and Abd al-Halim Qaddur. The two like-minded groups merged on 4 April 1947, when the Baath Party held its First National Convention in Damascus, with 247 members in attendance.¹⁶ In addition to drafting a constitution, the delegates determined that Aflaq would serve as party secretary, a position he held until 1965. His coleader al-Bitar lost no time in demonstrating the Baathists' hatred of the Jews and the "world Jewish conspiracy": on 7 May 1947, al-Bitar declared the Baath's opposition to *any* Jewish presence in the region and underscored the party's conviction that the United Nations was a Zionist puppet organization.¹⁷ Their slogan, as stated in the Third Principle of their constitution, was "One Arab Nation with an Eternal Mission."¹⁸ The "Eternal Mission" is a reference to the distinctively Islamic mission of the party.

Among the other "fundamental principles" outlined in the Baath Party Constitution of April 1947 are the following: "The Arab fatherland constitutes an indivisible political and economic unity," which echoes the Nazi principle that the Aryan people form such a unity,

¹⁴ Devlin, 25.

¹⁵ Michel Aflaq, "The Arabs Should Not Wait for a Miracle," *Al-Baath* (6 August 1946): http://albaath.online.fr/English/Aflaq-01-arab_unity.htm.

¹⁶ Devlin, 14.

¹⁷ See Jaber, 135.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 115.

regardless of borders; further, “the Arab nation is characterized by virtue,” with the implication that the Arabs are superior to other “races.”¹⁹ Article One proclaims the universalist, totalitarian nature of the movement, declaring that “the Party of the Arab Baath is a Universal Arab Party,” with Articles Three and Four attesting to nationalism and socialism as defining features of Baathist thinking.²⁰ The Fourth Article also insists on the need for “transformation and struggle” for the party to achieve its aims.²¹ Indeed, struggle or *kafaah* is a recurring theme in the Baath constitution, a word that in the Arab Muslim world immediately calls to mind a book whose Arabic title is *Kafaahi – Mein Kampf*. The constitution claims to “value freedom,” but, as stated in Article Forty-One, all freedom must be defined “within the limits of the Arab national idea.”²² As Shibli al-Aisami, former minister of guidance, stated it, “liberty will be extended to those individuals and associations that are in agreement with the aims of the Arab nation, i.e., the Party.”²³ Understanding, as Hitler did, that the party’s “struggle” is “a struggle for the soul of the child,”²⁴ the Baath constitution states its “Policy on Education”: “The educational policy of the Party aims at creating a new Arab generation which believes in the unity of the nation and in the eternity of the mission.”²⁵ Yes, the *eternity* of the mission, reaffirming the party’s slogan and the metaphysical dimension of its worldview. What is at stake in the struggle for the soul of the child is not just the welfare of the child; much more than that, it is humanity as such.

The Baath welcomed the coup of 30 March 1949, when Husni al-Zaim (1897–1949) seized power of the Syrian government, but the party did not enjoy his favor for long. Within a few months al-Zaim was assassinated, and on 14 August 1949, Colonel Sami Hinnawi (1898–1950) took over. He was replaced the following 19 December by Colonel Adib Shishakli (1909–1964); in 1952, Shishakli exiled

¹⁹ Devlin, 345–46.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 346.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 347.

²² *Ibid.*, 351.

²³ Jaber, 126.

²⁴ Adolf Hitler, *Mein Kampf*, trans. Ralph Manheim (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1971), 12.

²⁵ Devlin, 351.

Aflaq, al-Bitar, and Arab Socialist Party leader Akram al-Hawrani (1912–1996) to Beirut.²⁶ In the aftermath of Israel's War of Independence, the Baath's "definitive project," as scholar Kamel S. Abu Jaber describes it, was "getting rid of Israel"²⁷ and, of course, the Jews. Indeed, Jaber notes, the Baath Party was bent on the elimination of a Jewish presence in the region well before 1948; the party "actively participated in the Palestine War. It sent volunteers, collected money and weapons, and Bitar, Aflaq, Wahib al-Ghanim, and others were in the front lines."²⁸ By 1953 the party was engaged in subversive activities in Iraq under the leadership of Fuad al-Rikabi (1931–1971) and Feisal Khaizuran,²⁹ a development that would later prove to be quite significant. By October 1953, more and more Syrians had become disillusioned with Shishakli, and Aflaq and al-Bitar returned to Damascus; the following February, Shishakli was overthrown by members of the Syrian Baath Party, as well as members of the Communist Party, even though the Baathists had serious issues with the Communists. In June 1954, the parties involved in the coup convened, and the Baath Party Constitution was adopted unchanged; Aflaq and al-Bitar were elected to the new National Command.

Shukri al-Quwatli (1891–1967), a man sympathetic toward the Baath and the Arab Nationalists, was elected president of Syria in August 1955,³⁰ by which time the Baath had offices in almost every Arab country.³¹ Upon al-Bitar's appointment as minister of foreign affairs in 1956 and keeping with their Arab nationalist ideology, the Baathists immediately began pushing for unification with other Arab states, most notably with Nasser's Egypt. On 1 November 1957, Aflaq went to Cairo to discuss the merging of Syria and Egypt into a single Arab nationalist entity. Al-Bitar went to Egypt on 16 January 1958 for unity talks, and ten days later, on 26 January, the United Arab Republic (UAR) came into being.³² One of Nasser's first orders of business was to rid Syria of the Communist Party, which had long been a threat

²⁶ See *ibid.*, 52–56.

²⁷ Jaber, 36.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 28.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 52.

³⁰ Devlin, 70.

³¹ Jaber, 29.

³² *Ibid.*, 45.

to the power of the Baath Party, just as they had been a threat to the National Socialists in Germany. The campaign against the Communists lasted until 28 September 1961, when a military coup in Damascus brought the UAR to an end.³³ Al-Bitar signed a document supporting the dissolution of the UAR, a move that outraged his fellow Baathists.

Meanwhile, Israel and the Jews continued to be the designated evil threatening the Arab people, an enemy of cosmic proportions, as Aflaq suggests in an essay from 1 October 1956: "We have not been wrong when we always considered imperialism as the first enemy and 'Israel' as the consequence of imperialism, its ally and offshoot. . . . But there is no need to be reminded that this should not be taken literally, so that you think that 'Israel' follows the orders of imperialism. . . . It has its own structure and designs as well as interests. It has its own power, intelligence and policy. *It depends on the strength and influence of world Zionism.* Therefore it sometimes entangles imperialist countries while at other times it is imperialism, which instigates 'Israel.'" ³⁴ Less than a year later, on 27 July 1957, he wrote:

The danger to the Arab nation is the existence of "Israel. . . ." The acceleration of the liberating and unitary struggle . . . will put an end to the designs of imperialism to use "Israel" and the *designs of world Zionism* to use imperialism for the protection of "Israel" and enhance its expansionism. Expediting the Arab Socialist Struggle will remove the fears of the Jewish minority of the impossibility of living peacefully and justly with the Arabs. It will also obliterate or weaken the weapon of world Zionism of appealing to the sympathy of the free peoples and popular classes for "Israel" as a haven for an oppressed and advanced people.³⁵

Once again, we see what the Baathists, like the Jihadists, have inherited from the Nazis: it is the notion of a world Jewish conspiracy hatched by the elders of Zion, a deadly, invisible threat to all of humanity. Borrowed from the Nazis, this cornerstone of Baathist and Jihadist Jew hatred is distinctively modern and is central to the Jihadist perversion of Islam. As for Aflaq's assurance to the Jewish minority, it is a

³³ Ibid., 48.

³⁴ Michel Aflaq, "The Arab Struggle Facing Imperialism and 'Israel,'" 1 October 1956, http://albaath.online.fr/English/Aflaq-01-arab_unity.htm; emphasis added.

³⁵ Michel Aflaq, "The Combat of the Arabs with Imperialism and Zionism" (27 July 1957): http://albaath.online.fr/English/Aflaq-01-arab_unity.htm (emphasis added).

prime example of the application of the principle of *taqiya*, that is, the "legitimate" use of deception to gain one's end. Like the wolf trying to seduce the lamb, Aflaq promises Jews that they can find a safe haven among the Arabs, even as hundreds of thousands of them are being expelled from Arab lands.³⁶

On 8 March 1963, Alawi Baathist Salah Jadid (1926–1993) and Amin al-Hafiz (b. 1911) led a coup to establish the Baath Party as the single ruling party in Syria.³⁷ With the formation of the National Revolutionary Command Council (NRCC), however, Aflaq's influence waned considerably. Contributing to the March 1963 revolution was the Syrian Cabinet's dismissal of thirty government teachers in February 1963, many of whom were members of the Muslim Brotherhood; it was a move that met with the Baathists' vocal denunciation of the government as a "criminal regime."³⁸ Meanwhile on 8 February 1963, the Iraqi Baath Party won a short-lived victory, when Baathist Colonel Abdul Salam Arif (1921–1966) ousted Iraqi leader Abd al-Karim Qasim (1914–1963), only to fall from power the following November.³⁹ Ten days after the Iraqi coup, the Syrians sent Aflaq and a ten-man Baath delegation to Baghdad.⁴⁰ Once the left-wing factions of the Syrian and Iraqi Baathists had united to seize control over the party at its Sixth Congress in October 1963, Aflaq was no more than a party figurehead.

In 1964, the Baathist government of Syria adopted a Provisional Constitution.⁴¹ The constitution guarantees numerous freedoms to the Syrian people, all of which sound good, until you come to Article Twenty-Two: "Citizens shall exercise their right and enjoy their liberties guaranteed by law, *provided they do not infringe on the safety of the fatherland, national unity, the bases of the Republic, and the popular socialist aims of the revolution*" (emphasis added). In this statement, which mimics the Nazis' invocation of the fatherland, we see the overt totalitarian

³⁶ See, for example, Norman A. Stillman, *The Jews of Arab Lands in Modern Times* (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1991), 155–76.

³⁷ For a detailed discussion of this period, see Itamar Rabinovich, *Syria under the Ba'ath: 1963–1966: The Army Party Symbiosis* (Piscataway, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1972), 26–48.

³⁸ See Jaber, 68.

³⁹ See Baram, 7–12; see also Jaber, 55–56.

⁴⁰ Devlin, 236.

⁴¹ See Jaber, 175–83.

ideology of the Baath Party. In keeping with its totalitarian agenda, the Constitution goes on to state that “private property shall be expropriated . . . in the public interest” (Article Twenty-Six) and that “the state may nationalize, by law, any firm or establishment which is connected to the public interest” (Article Twenty-Nine). Imitating the Nazi drive to appropriate the souls of the youth, Article Seventeen stipulates that all education shall be in keeping with the Arab “national character” and that the state shall “define the duties” of the universities and “consolidate, abolish, or change their titles” (Article Thirty-Two). Further, “the president of the Executive Council and its members” shall take an oath to Allah to be “faithful to the Constitution” (Article Forty-Nine). There we have, once again, the “secularism” of the Baath Party: members of the Executive Council must “take an oath to Allah.” It is not surprising that the party is so profoundly sympathetic and supportive of Islamic Jihadist movements.

As the Syrians drafted their constitution, Aflaq became an increasingly passionate supporter of Saddam Hussein (1937–2006); in fact, it was Aflaq who brought Saddam into the Regional Command of Iraq’s Baath Party in 1963.⁴² His support of Saddam contributed to the split in the Baath Party that occurred in 1966, when on 23 February the Baathists’ right-wing faction seized control of the Syrian government.⁴³ Power struggles ensued over the next several months, involving Salah Jadid, President Nureddin al-Atassi (1930–1992), Salim Hatum, and Hafez al-Assad.⁴⁴ Tensions within the party significantly increased in the aftermath – and in the embarrassment – of the June 1967 Six Day War, when Syria and other Arab states suffered a humiliating defeat by Israel. With the Corrective Movement (Al-Thawra al-Tashihyya) of November 1970, al-Assad assumed absolute power and had Jadid and al-Atassi imprisoned.⁴⁵

Al-Assad remained in power until his death in 2000, when he was succeeded by his son Bashar al-Assad (b. 1965). Bashar is the man who

⁴² Efraim Karsh and Inari Rautsi, *Saddam Hussein: A Political Biography* (New York: Grove Press, 2002), 19.

⁴³ Devlin, 302.

⁴⁴ See Nikolaos van Dam, *The Struggle for Power in Syria: Politics and Society under Asad and the Baath Party* (London: I. B. Tauris, 1996), 41–47; 71–75.

⁴⁵ See Patrick Seale, *Asad of Syria: The Struggle for the Middle East* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), 163–65.

greeted Pope John Paul II in Damascus on 5 May 2001 by declaring that the Jews are out to kill the principles of religion "with the same mentality with which they betrayed Jesus Christ" and murdered him. The pope said nothing.⁴⁶ Bashar is not the only Muslim to incite Christian hatred toward the Jews by invoking the deicide charge; Bassam Abu Sharif (b. 1946), former advisor to Yasser Arafat, often uses the same ploy, even though the Quran denies that the crucifixion ever took place (see 4:157), demonstrating that the Jihadists' hatred of the Jews runs deeper than their love of the Quran.

The lines of Nazi influence on the Baathist movement extended equally into Iraq, where the Baathists came to power in July 1968 in a coup led by General Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr (1914–1982). Indeed, Iraq was the one Arab country where a Nazi-backed government takeover had enjoyed a short-lived success in 1941. Al-Bakr had the enthusiastic support not only of Aflaq but also of Saddam Hussein, who shared with al-Bakr a rabid hatred of the Jews.⁴⁷ Saddam was born on 28 April 1937 in the town of Al-Awja, near the Iraqi city of Tikrit. Having never known his father, who disappeared before his son was born, Saddam spent most of his childhood years with his maternal uncle General Khairallah Tulfah, the man who played a leading role in the pro-Nazi uprising of April 1941 and who was close to Haj Amin al-Husseini and Rashid Ali al-Gaylani (see Chapter 3). Of all the men in his life, Khairallah "had the most influence on molding Saddam's character"; it was he who introduced Saddam to al-Bakr.⁴⁸ Khairallah was the author of *Three Whom God Should Not Have Created: Persians, Jews, and Flies*, a work that significantly molded young Saddam's mind.⁴⁹ "To judge from Saddam's diatribes against Israel and Iran throughout his career," Efraim Karsh and Inari Rautsi observe, "Khairallah's ideas about Persians and Jews had fallen on fertile soil."⁵⁰ At Khairallah's encouragement, Saddam joined the national socialist Baath Party in 1957.

After rising in the ranks and becoming known for his brutality, Saddam was at al-Bakr's side for the coup of July 1968. Reflecting his

⁴⁶ See Eric J. Greenberg, "Open Season on Jews," *The Jewish Week*, May 11, 2001.

⁴⁷ See Karsh and Rautsi, 43.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 14.

⁴⁹ See Shiva Balaghi, *Saddam Hussein: A Biography* (Santa Barbara, CA: Greenwood Press, 2008), 5–7.

⁵⁰ Karsh and Rautsi, 15.

anti-Semitic upbringing, Saddam conducted a purge of Jews in Iraq in 1969, publicly executing fourteen of their leaders; “some half a million men, women and children,” write Karsh and Rautsi, “danced past the scaffolds and throughout Baghdad chanting ‘death to Israel.’”⁵¹ Imitating the Nazis, Iraqi premier Nuri al-Said “convened parliament and passed laws allowing the government to confiscate property of any Jews who emigrated.”⁵² Karsh and Rautsi note that “the Iraqi state radio lauded the public hangings of the Jews in January 1969 as ‘a courageous first step toward the liberation of Palestine’ and called on the public to come in great numbers and ‘enjoy the feast.’”⁵³ Note the logic of hatred here: you initiate the liberation of Palestine by murdering the Jews of Baghdad. The “Jewish Question” has nothing to do with the Jewish “occupation” of Palestine; the problem is the Jewish presence in the world. Like the Nazis, the Baathists of Iraq view their war against the Jews in existential terms: at stake was “nothing less than the Arab national existence.”⁵⁴ Just as the Nazis had expelled their “foreigners” in 1938, so in September 1971, the Iraqi Baathists expelled thousands of Shiite Kurds to Iran; in 1972, tens of thousands more were forced to leave the country.⁵⁵ Just as the Nazis blamed the world Jewry for plunging Germany into war, so Saddam blamed “the Zionist entity” for continually plunging Iraq into war.⁵⁶ This accusation would extend into the war with Iran in the 1980s.

By the time Saddam had risen to the rank of general in the Iraqi army in 1976, al-Bakr’s health was failing, and Saddam was largely in control of the country. He became its official head on 16 July 1979, whereupon he appointed Aflaq to a top position in the party. “It is Michel Aflaq who created the party and not I,” Saddam told an interviewer in 1980. “How can I forget what Michel Aflaq has done for me? Had it not been for him, I would not be in this position.”⁵⁷ He often cited the writings of Aflaq to insist that the Baath Party is no ordinary

⁵¹ Ibid., 42; see also Balaghi, 41.

⁵² Balaghi, 43.

⁵³ Karsh and Rautsi, 57.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ Ibid., 73.

⁵⁶ Ibid., 162.

⁵⁷ David Brooks, “Saddam’s Brain,” *The Weekly Standard Online* (11 November 2002): <http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/001/837uvzrs.asp>.

political party; rather, it is more akin to a religious creed, “similar in faith and purpose to early Islam.”⁵⁸ Insisting that the Baath Party “derived its spirit from heaven,”⁵⁹ Saddam saw himself as the successor to Sennacherib and Nebuchadnezzar in humanity’s eternal battle against the Jews; Arab Iraq, he maintained, was the Mesopotamian cradle of civilization, and the Jews were in their essence the enemies of civilization.⁶⁰ Like Hitler, Saddam became the focal point of a new idolatry, portrayed as the god Tammuz reborn. For the Baath Party came to power in the month of Tammuz, and just as the god Tammuz had the power to restore life, so the Baath Party, the “Resurrection” Party, restored new life to the Arabs.⁶¹ Thus mythologized, Saddam was no ordinary dictator – he was the Führer.

Saddam immediately set about consolidating his power and eliminating his enemies within the party, much as Hitler had done on the Night of the Long Knives on 30 June 1934. Within a month of assuming power, he had executed hundreds of Baath Party members whom he regarded as a potential treat to his power. He also set about controlling minority religious and ethnic populations, such as the Kurds and Shiites, through the establishment of the Gestapo-like Department of General Intelligence (Mukhabarat) under the command of his younger half-brother Barzan Ibrahim al-Tikriti (1951–2007).⁶² Also similar to Hitler, who convened his first war council in 1935, Saddam soon drafted plans for a nationalistic war against the Islamic Republic of Iran as “the defender of the Arab world” and “an agent of the civilized world.”⁶³ Just as Hitler took the Sudetenland, a Germanic-populated region of Czechoslovakia, in 1938, on 22 September 1980, Saddam entered the Iranian region of Khuzestan, an oil-rich area that had a substantial Arab population. Just as Hitler would justify his aggression by invoking “Blood and Soil” (*Blut und Boden*) at the core of Aryan nationalism, Saddam declared, “Sniff the

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ Karsh and Rautsi, 151.

⁶⁰ Ibid., 123.

⁶¹ Baram, 98.

⁶² For more information on the Mukhabarat, see Kanan Makiya, *Republic of Fear: The Politics of Modern Iraq*, 3rd ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), 36–37.

⁶³ See John Esposito, *Political Islam: Revolution, Radicalism, or Reform?* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1997), 56–58.

soil of this land, . . . and then you will become familiar with the principles of Baath.”⁶⁴ Baathist history specialist Amatzia Baram points out, “In 1985, at a crucial juncture in the war with Iran, Iraqi territorial nationalism was rammed home in unprecedented fashion when the Citizenship Law was amended by the addition of an oath of allegiance that echoed of Blood and Soil and Iraq Above All.”⁶⁵ What immediately jumps to mind, of course, is the Nazi anthem *Deutschland Über Alles*. The important difference is that Iran fought back in a bloody war that lasted until 20 August 1988 and that claimed millions of lives.

Why was there such a bitter war between nations that have in common the Jihadist agenda to exterminate the Jews, beginning with the state of Israel, especially when the Baathists of Syria have been so friendly with the Iranian Islamic Jihadists? The answer lies in a combination of things. First, Saddam’s hatred of Khomeini dated back to the days of Khomeini’s exile in Najaf, when the future ayatollah advocated the overthrow of the Iraqi government and the establishment of an Islamic Republic of Iraq. Second, there is the centuries-old sectarian tension between the Iraqi Sunnis and the Iranian Shiites. In addition, and just as significantly for Saddam’s mythological propensities, there is an ancient hatred of the Arabs for the Persians dating back to the Persian conquest of Babylon under Cyrus the Great in 539 BCE. Despite Saddam’s ideological hatred of the West – something he held in common with Islamic Jihadism in all of its forms – he accepted many billions of dollars from Western powers, including the United States, to fight the Persians. That relation with the West shifted with his invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990 and the onset of the Gulf War on 16 January 1991.

Chief among Saddam’s named enemies in the Gulf War were the Jews; indeed, one of his stated reasons for the invasion of Kuwait was that country’s collusion with the world Zionist conspiracy, which, according to Saddam, was responsible for the war.⁶⁶ Saddam therefore made the plight of the Palestinians a major part of the Gulf War,

⁶⁴ Quoted in Baram, 32.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 67.

⁶⁶ Karsh and Rautsi, 212.

launching forty scud missiles against the "Zionist entity" and declaring that the aim of the war was the liberation of Palestine from the Jews.⁶⁷ His missile attacks against Israel were not just an attempt to irritate the United States and others by hitting one of their allies; in Saddam's mind those attacks were against the instigator and the power behind the whole affair. Even before the outbreak of the war, in a speech delivered on 10 August 1990, he cried out, "Arabs, Muslims, believers in God! This is your day to rise and spread quickly in order to defend Mecca, which is captive to the spears of the Americans and the Zionists!"⁶⁸ Not surprisingly, these words won the avid support of the PLO. In another move that demonstrated his ideological ties to his Nazi predecessors, immediately before the outbreak of hostilities, when he was holding hundreds of foreigners hostage, Saddam welcomed former Nazi Kurt Waldheim and released all Austrian hostages.⁶⁹

When the war came to an end on 6 March 1991, Saddam proclaimed victory for having averted capture and, in Jihadist fashion, identified himself more profoundly than ever with Islam, against the Jewish-controlled West. He introduced portions of Sharia law into the Iraqi legal code and added the phrase "God is great" (Allahu Akbar) to the Iraqi flag, embossed in his own handwriting.⁷⁰ With this affirmation added to its national emblem, Iraq morphed into a Baathist Islamic Jihadist state and became a haven for numerous Jihadist operatives, including those with ties to al-Qaeda, the network behind the attacks of 11 September 2001. For Saddam and the Iraqi Baath Party, those attacks would have devastating results. The United States led a multinational operation against Iraq on 20 March 2003; Saddam blamed Iraq's inability to oppose the operation on the "world Zionist conspiracy,"⁷¹ demonstrating yet again his embrace of the Nazi slogan *Die Juden sind unser Unglück!* (The Jews are our misfortune!). Baghdad fell on 9 April, and on the following 14 December, the United States announced the capture of Saddam Hussein. On 30 December

⁶⁷ Karsh and Rautsi, 245-46.

⁶⁸ Quoted in Balaghi, 88.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 234.

⁷⁰ Balaghi, 88-89.

⁷¹ Karsh and Rautsi, 290.

2006, he was hanged. Among the last words of the most notorious of the “secular” Baathists were: “Long live Palestine. . . Long live jihad and the mujahideen,”⁷² words that bring to mind another man’s last words: “Above all, I charge the leadership of the nation and their subjects with the meticulous observance of the race-laws and the merciless resistance to the universal poisoner of all peoples, international Jewry.”⁷³ For among Islamic Jihadists, jihad is always jihad against the Jews.

It will be said, quite correctly, that many of the features of the Syrian and Iraqi Baathist regimes also apply to other repressive regimes throughout the world. But the combination of the points made about both – their nationalism, their socialism, their exterminationist Jew hatred, their racism, the mythological and metaphysical aspects of their discourse, their invocations of blood and soil, their embrace of the *Führerprinzip*, their state secret police apparatus, their one-party system, and, most important, their clear connections to Nazi influences – places on them the stamp of a Nazi-like National Socialism. The Palestinian Liberation Organization bears a similar stamp.

The Palestinian Liberation Organization

Of all the groups stemming from Islamic Jihadism, the PLO and its military wing Fatah exist for the sole purpose of destroying the Jewish state, as stated in Article Fifteen of the PLO Charter; Article Twenty-Two states that Israel is a constant threat to “peace in the Middle East and *the whole world*,” labeling the Jews as a threat not only to the Palestinians but to all humanity.⁷⁴ One ancestor that the PLO shares with the Baath Party in this genealogy of evil is Haj Amin al-Husseini. Just as Saddam Hussein traces his core ideological elements to al-Husseini, so does the man whose name is synonymous with the PLO: Yasser Arafat (1929–2004). From the time of their first meeting in Cairo in 1946,

⁷² “Saddam’s Final Words,” *Daily Telegraph Online* (30 December 2006): <http://www.dailytelegraph.com.au/news/saddams-final-words/story-e6freuy9-1111112757497>.

⁷³ The last line of Adolf Hitler’s last political testament, quoted in Ian Kershaw, *Hitler: A Biography* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2010), 950.

⁷⁴ Matthias Küntzel, *Jihad and Jew-Hatred: Islamism, Nazism and the Roots of 9/11*, trans. Colin Meade (New York: Telos Press, 2007), 113; emphasis added.

Arafat “came to adore and emulate” Haj Amin.⁷⁵ Like his Nazi-Mufti mentor, in the words of Efraim Karsh, Arafat was a “bigoted megalomaniac . . . blinded by Jew hatred.”⁷⁶ It will be recalled, in fact, that Arafat’s mother Zahwa Abdul Saud was the daughter of al-Husseini’s first cousin.⁷⁷

Arafat was born Mohammed Abdul Rahman Abdul Rauf Arafat al-Qudwa al-Husseini in Cairo on 24 August 1929. His father was a textile merchant from Gaza; his mother was from Jerusalem. Within a year of his mother’s death in 1933, Arafat’s father sent him to live with her family in Jerusalem; four years later, his father brought him back to Cairo, where his older sister Inam became his primary caregiver.⁷⁸ Under the tutelage of Nazi war criminal Haj Amin al-Husseini, Arafat joined the Muslim Brotherhood and received military training from other Nazis who had found a haven in Egypt.⁷⁹ In 1948, Arafat fought in a Muslim Brotherhood unit against the Israelis in the War of Independence, a war that ended in a humiliating defeat for the Arabs, beginning with the Armistice Agreement signed by Egypt on 24 February 1949.

Once the war had ended, al-Husseini attempted to reestablish his authority in Gaza in 1949 and 1950, at which time Arafat served as one of his mentor’s “thugs whose task was to intimidate supporters of the less militant Nashashibi clan.”⁸⁰ During those years, Arafat published a magazine called *The Voice of Palestine* that was “full of polemics and promises to fight ‘the Zionist entity, the cancer in our midst, the agent of imperialism.’”⁸¹ Soon thereafter, he returned to the University of Cairo, where in 1952 he was elected chairman of the Federation of Palestinian Students; in 1953, he became chairman of the General Union of Palestinian Students, a position he held until completing his degree in civil engineering in 1956.⁸² Following the Suez Crisis of that year, when on 26 July Egypt attempted to nationalize the Suez Canal,

⁷⁵ Said K. Aburish, *Arafat: From Defender to Dictator* (London: Bloomsbury, 1999), 15.

⁷⁶ Efraim Karsh, *Arafat’s War: The Man and His Battle for Israeli Conquest* (New York: Grove Press, 2003), 253.

⁷⁷ Dalin and Rothman, 82.

⁷⁸ See Aburish, 11–13.

⁷⁹ Küntzel, 114.

⁸⁰ Karsh, 23–34.

⁸¹ Aburish, 23.

⁸² *Ibid.*, 23–24.

Arafat obtained a visa to travel to Kuwait in 1957. It was not a voluntary departure: the United Nations had stepped in to force the expulsion of the fedayeen fighters, including Arafat, from Egypt. In Kuwait, he reconnected with two Palestinian Jihadists: Salah Khalaf (1933–1991, also known as Abu Iyad) and Khalil al-Wazir (1935–1988, also known as Abu Jihad), both of whom were devoted members of the Muslim Brotherhood.⁸³ Arafat took the name Abu Ammar, demonstrating, as Barry Rubin has shown, that he and his friends were “pious Muslims,” with a decided “Islamic orientation”⁸⁴ – still more evidence to call into question the designation of the PLO as a secular organization.

Anat Kurz reports that in 1957 Arafat, his two chief cohorts Khalaf and al-Wazir, and Jihadists from Syria “formulated their political credo, which was promulgated in two papers: ‘The Structure of Revolutionary Construction’ and ‘The Movement’s manifesto.’” The dominant theme in both documents was the destruction of the Jewish state.⁸⁵ The next step came in October 1959, with the creation of the terrorist organization Fatah, a word that means “conquest” and is a reverse acronym for Hakarat al-Tahirir al-Watani al-Filastini, “The Palestinian National Liberation Movement,”⁸⁶ where the “liberation” of Palestine meant the obliteration of Israel. Chief among its founders were Arafat, Khalaf, al-Wazir, Farouq Qaddoumi (b. 1931), and Khaled al-Hassan (1928–1994, also known as Abu Said).⁸⁷ Two years later, Arafat made his first contact with Mahmoud Abbas (b. 1935, also known as Abu Mazen) in Qatar. He is the author of *The Other Side: The Secret Relationship between Nazism and the Zionist Movement* (1983), which was based on his doctoral dissertation completed in 1975 at Moscow Oriental College. This Holocaust denier, whom the world deems a “moderate,” would succeed Arafat as the head of the PLO on 29 October 2004.⁸⁸

In 1962, Arafat relocated to Syria, where Fatah had established connections and where he believed he could recruit many more members.

⁸³ Aburish, 29.

⁸⁴ Rubin, 6.

⁸⁵ Anat N. Kurz, *Fatah and the Politics of Violence: The Institutionalization of a Popular Struggle* (East Sussex, United Kingdom: Sussex Academic Press, 2006), 29–30.

⁸⁶ See *ibid.*, 30–33.

⁸⁷ Karsh, 23.

⁸⁸ See Dalin and Rothman, 118.

Echoing the sentiments we have seen among other Jihadist organizations, one of the Fatah “hymns” goes like this:

Farewell, tears and sorrow.
Farewell, sighs and grief,
Our people has come to loathe you,
Welcome, blood and heroic death. . . .
With our lives and with our blood we will redeem Palestine.⁸⁹

With Fatah “the desire to kill is sown early and often, and with it the love of killing,” as Laurent Murawiec argues, pointing out a poem recited at Fatah’s summer camp for boys:

We are your boys, O Palestine
We will flood you with our blood.⁹⁰

The purpose of flooding the soil with Palestinian blood? It is to flood the land with far more Jewish blood. This defining characteristic of Fatah also defines the character of the PLO; indeed, Fatah is the essence of the PLO.

On 29 May 1964, 422 members of the Palestinian National Council convened in Jerusalem at the behest of the Arab League; by 2 June, they had prepared a constitution and a draft of the Palestinian National Covenant to officially become the Palestinian Liberation Organization.⁹¹ The PLO’s first chairman was Ahmad Shukeiri (1908–1980), who served until 24 December 1967; he was followed by Yahya Hammuda (b. 1908), who held the position until 2 February 1969. On that date, Yasser Arafat became Chairman Arafat, a title he would retain until his death in 2004. Although the Six Day War weakened the Arab states surrounding Israel, it strengthened the PLO’s resolve to annihilate the Jewish state: after 1967, as Rubin points out, the PLO’s stated goal was no longer to “impose our will on the enemy” but “to destroy him in order to take his place.”⁹² As with the Nazis, there was no room in PLO’s Jihadist thinking for negotiations with the

⁸⁹ Laurent Murawiec, *The Mind of Jihad* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 51.

⁹⁰ See *ibid.*, 51–52.

⁹¹ See Karsh, 36; see also Murawiec, 313.

⁹² Barry Rubin, *Revolution Until Victory?: The Politics and History of the PLO* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994), 27.

Jews; unlike the Nazis, however, they were willing to give the appearance of negotiating, with the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993, in order to achieve the higher aim of annihilation.

Arafat came to the forefront of the world's new media when his face appeared on the cover of the 13 December 1968 issue of *Time* magazine. The cover story chronicled his rise to power as the leader of Fatah and his determination to fight against the Jewish state, as evidenced by the Battle of Karameh that had taken place the previous March. On the night of 21 March, the Israeli Defense Forces attacked the Jordanian village of Karameh, where Fatah had set up its headquarters. Days before the battle other Palestinian groups, such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine⁹³ and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine,⁹⁴ had fled in fear. Only Fatah stayed to fight. When the Jordanian army entered the fray, the Israelis withdrew, and Arafat declared a victory, despite suffering some 150 casualties.⁹⁵ One result of Arafat's perceived heroism was his elevation to the office of Chairman of the PLO the following February. Under Arafat, who was now the undisputed Führer of the PLO, the Palestinian National Charter took on its definitive form in July 1968.⁹⁶ The ultimate end defining the existence of Fatah and the PLO, as revealed in their charter, is "the annihilation of the Zionist entity in all of its economic, political, military, and cultural manifestations."⁹⁷

Declaring the Palestinians to be an integral part of the Arab nation, Article One of the PLO Charter lays a nationalist foundation for the movement; it promotes a nationalism that allows no room for a Jewish state, because "Palestine" is "an indivisible part of the Arab homeland." Article Four then sets a racist tone, stating that "the Palestinian identity is a genuine, essential, and inherent characteristic; it is transmitted from parents to children." Although Article Six appears to allow some

⁹³ For detailed information on the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, see Aaron Mannes, *Profiles in Terror: The Guide to Middle East Terrorist Organizations* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2004), 323–36.

⁹⁴ Although the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine did not officially come into existence until 22 February 1969, it was formed from PLO factions that had fled Karameh; for detailed information, see *ibid.*, 215–22.

⁹⁵ See Aburish, 79–85.

⁹⁶ See Leila S. Kadi, ed., *Basic Political Documents of the Armed Palestinian Resistance Movement* (Beirut: Palestine Research Centre, 1969), 137–41.

⁹⁷ Rubin, 22.

room for Jews who lived in Palestine before the "Zionist invasion," if that "invasion" is dated from the First Aliyah, which began in 1881, then in 1968, there were almost no Jews still alive from the time of the "Zionist invasion." The national identity of Palestinians as Arabs, moreover, is "material, spiritual, and historical" and demands that Palestinian children be brought up in such a way as to prepare them to sacrifice their lives, for the sake of the "homeland" (Article Seven). Translation: Palestinian children must be indoctrinated to hate Jews to the point of longing to murder them, even – or especially – if it means their own death. Like the Hamas Charter, the PLO Charter allows no room either for negotiations or for a peaceful means of attaining their ends (Articles Nine, Ten, and Twenty-One).

The PLO's "three mottoes," as stated in Article Eleven, are "national (*wataniyya*) unity, national (*qawmiyya*) mobilization, and liberation." The national unity is racially defined. The national mobilization draws every Palestinian Arab into the war against the Jews. Liberation means liberating the land from all Jewish presence, because "Arab unity and the liberation of Palestine are two complementary objectives, the attainment of either of which facilitates the attainment of the other" (Article Thirteen). Because "the destiny of the Arab nation and, indeed, Arab existence itself depend upon the destiny of the Palestine cause" (Article Fourteen), the elimination of the Jews is not merely a political or cultural or even a religious issue but, most fundamentally, an existential issue: just as the Jews threatened the existence and the essence of the Aryan nation, so they threaten, by their very presence, the existence and the essence of the Arab nation. Therefore, while Article Sixteen appears to promise religious freedom in the liberated Palestine, that freedom does not extend to the Jews: states Article Twenty, "Claims of historical or religious ties of Jews with Palestine are incompatible with the facts of history." The Jews simply have no place in Palestine. There lies the Palestinian objection to Jewish settlements in the West Bank; it has nothing to do with "Israeli occupation."

In keeping with the anti-Semitism that characterizes Islamic Jihadism, the PLO Charter buys into the "world Jewish conspiracy" libel, stating that "Israel is the instrument of the Zionist movement, and geographical base for world imperialism placed strategically in the midst of the Arab homeland to combat the hopes of the Arab

nation for liberation, unity, and progress. Israel is a constant source of threat vis-à-vis peace in the Middle East and the whole world” (Article Twenty-Two). Again *the whole world*: the PLO, with Arafat at its helm, is the champion and defender of humanity in the eternal struggle against the eternal Jew. Part of the PLO’s deception in signing the Oslo Accords in 1993 was to assure all parties that these and other portions of the charter calling for the destruction of the Jews and the Jewish state would be “amended.” On 26 April 1996, the Palestinian National Council met with the ostensible purpose of amending the charter, but, of course, no action was taken: the charter, with its discourse steeped in exterminationist Jew hatred, remains unchanged.

Regarding its progress in the war against the Jews, a major setback for the PLO came when it was expelled from Jordan in September 1970, the infamous Black September. The Palestinians sustained more than four thousand casualties in the action undertaken by King Hussein, who viewed the PLO as an increasing threat to his sovereignty. From Jordan the PLO moved to Lebanon, where it set up bases for training new fighters against the “Zionist entity.” Arafat’s association with Ruhullah Khomeini dates from that time; in fact, Khomeini sent his own son to train in the PLO camps in Lebanon.⁹⁸ The emergence of the Black September terrorists, a murderous but short-lived PLO offshoot, from these events is worth noting because they exemplify the evil of the PLO and Islamic Jihadism.⁹⁹ The proof? On 28 November 1971, members of Black September assassinated Jordan’s Prime Minister Wasfi al-Tal in front of Cairo’s Sheraton Hotel. One of the assassins went over to his body and licked his blood from the ground,¹⁰⁰ a grisly gesture that brings to mind a rabbinic teaching on the evil of Amalek: *Amalek*, it is said, means “Am Lak,” a “people” who “lick” blood.¹⁰¹ “The blood-lapping ‘Black September’ assassin,” Laurent Murawiec points out, “was a standard-issue PLO killer.”¹⁰² Arafat claimed responsibility for the murder.

⁹⁸ See Murawiec, 317.

⁹⁹ See Christopher Dobson, *Black September: Its Short, Violent History* (London: Robert Hale, 1975).

¹⁰⁰ See Rubin, 37–38.

¹⁰¹ See Moshe Weissman, ed., *The Midrash Says*, Vol. 2 (Brooklyn: Bnay Yakov Publications, 1980), 158.

¹⁰² Murawiec, 51.

The Black September terrorists are best known for their kidnapping and murder of eleven Israeli athletes at the Olympic Games held in Munich in 1972, after which the Israelis eliminated the leaders of their organization. Every Jew, said Arafat at the time, is a target because, “civilian or military, they’re all equally guilty of wanting to destroy our people.”¹⁰³ *Every Jew*. Hence, he went on to proclaim, “the end of Israel is the goal of our struggle, and it allows neither compromise nor mediation. . . . We don’t want peace. We want war, victory. Peace for us means the destruction of Israel and nothing else.”¹⁰⁴ An indication of the Arab Muslim world’s attitude toward the evil of the PLO came at the Rabat Summit on 26 October 1974, when the Arab League declared Arafat’s organization to be “the sole legitimate representation of the Palestinian people.”¹⁰⁵ The following 22 November, Arafat addressed the United Nations General Assembly in his new capacity; subsequently the UN formally recognized the PLO as the representative of the Palestinians (Resolution 3236) and granted the terrorist organization observer status (Resolution 3237). “A year later,” notes Rubin, “the UN General Assembly passed a resolution [Resolution 3379] equating Zionism with racism, one of the goals set by the PLO Charter.”¹⁰⁶ On 12 January 1976, the UN Security Council granted the PLO the right to participate in Security Council debates, but without giving them the right to vote.

The PLO was now in a perfect position to implement what they referred to as their “phased strategy,” a process whereby they planned to take what they could when they could, until they could take it all.¹⁰⁷ Articulating the essence of the “phased strategy,” in 1977, PLO chief Abu Iyad asserted, in language calculated to echo the Nazi discourse, “An independent state on the West Bank and Gaza is the beginning of the final solution.”¹⁰⁸ Based in Lebanon, the PLO found itself in the middle of the Lebanese Civil War, which broke out in April 1975 and would last until 1990. Numerous factions – including Christians and Muslims, Lebanese and Syrians, and various terrorist groups – were

¹⁰³ Quoted in *ibid.*, 34.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, 41.

¹⁰⁵ Aburish, 142.

¹⁰⁶ Rubin, 47.

¹⁰⁷ See Karsh, 4.

¹⁰⁸ Quoted in Rubin, 47.

shoring up their positions. The civil war in Lebanon, however, did not distract the PLO from their war against the Jews. They continued to cross the Lebanese-Israeli border in terrorist actions that culminated in the Coastal Road Massacre on 11 March 1978, when Fatah murdered thirty-seven Jews on a bus traveling from Haifa to Tel-Aviv. Three days later the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) went into southern Lebanon, and Fatah withdrew to Beirut.¹⁰⁹ When the PLO continued its incursions into Israel, the IDF went into Lebanon once again on 6 June 1982. In 1983, Arafat fled from Lebanon and reestablished his headquarters in Tunis, which remained his base of operations until 1991.

Meanwhile the PLO continued its terrorist attacks, as well as its association with Islamic Jihadists and Neo-Nazis. In February 1979, just days after the Islamic Revolution in Iran, Arafat was the first foreign “diplomat” to be welcomed in Tehran.¹¹⁰ When he landed in the Jihadist capital, he said, “I felt as if I was landing in Jerusalem.” His entourage carried a portrait of Khomeini and chanted, “Today Iran, tomorrow Palestine.”¹¹¹ Embracing the Ayatollah Khomeini, he declared, “The path we have chosen is identical,”¹¹² a path that has as its ultimate aim the extermination of the Jews. Just as Hezbollah saw a natural alliance with the Syrian Baath Party, so it sees a natural alliance with the PLO. The Palestinian people, says Naim Qassem, have “found in Hezbollah’s political and mobilization rallying, tactics and approach to domain activity an inspiration and new hope for liberation. . . . What is required is the consecration of the Palestinian struggle as a central cause for the entire nation of Islam.”¹¹³ Arafat’s ties with Neo-Nazis became evident on 25 September 1985, when Fatah’s Force-17 attacked a group of Israeli tourists in Cyprus; the killers included British Neo-Nazis.¹¹⁴ Needless to say, he continued to express his admiration for his mentor Haj Amin al-Husseini, a Nazi war criminal, until the end of his days. In an interview published in

¹⁰⁹ See Aburish, 161–62.

¹¹⁰ See *ibid.*, 164.

¹¹¹ Rubin, 54.

¹¹² Murawiec, 318.

¹¹³ Qassem, 183–84.

¹¹⁴ Rubin, 76.

the Palestinian newspaper *Al-Quds* on 2 August 2002, Arafat described the mufti as his "model and hero."¹¹⁵

This ongoing interweaving of Islamic Jihadism and National Socialism in Arafat's thinking can be seen not only in his admiration for the Iranian Islamic Republic and Hezbollah but also in his affiliation with Muslim Brotherhood offshoots Hamas and Islamic Jihad, demonstrating further that the PLO is not as strictly secular as some may suppose. To be sure, as Rubin makes clear, a major teaching from Islam – namely that "non-Muslims in historically Islamic lands must bow to Muslim rule, that Muslims cannot be rightfully governed by others, and that each Muslim has a duty to wage holy war – helped gain the PLO popular support for its goals and tactics."¹¹⁶ In 1987, to impart to the PLO a deeper Islamic Jihadist dimension, the PLO appointed Sheikh Abd al-Hamid al-Saih (1908–2001) chairman of the Palestinian National Council (PNC),¹¹⁷ with Arafat insisting that "the religious trend is an integral part of the PLO."¹¹⁸ True to their slogan "Jihad for Allah," in November 1987 PLO leader Salah Khalaf affirmed the PLO's participation in the Palestinian Islamic Jihad movement, as well as its nationalistic stance, insisting, "The beginning of the Islamic awakening lay in sanctified jihad, which was started by Fatah. . . . We must not differentiate between Muslim or nationalist, for there is no difference between them."¹¹⁹ This pronouncement came immediately after the East Jerusalem newspaper *Al-Fajr* had quoted Islamic Jihad leader Abd al-Aziz Odeh as saying, "Our politico-ideological differences with the PLO do not justify the use of violence against nationalist forces. We respect the outlook of all nationalist forces, for we believe in dialogue as the sole means of attaining understanding,"¹²⁰ excluding, of course, dialogue with Jews. The tension between the PLO and the Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ) came in November 1988, when at the Nineteenth

¹¹⁵ See Shlomo Ben-Ami, *Scars of War, Wounds of Peace: The Israeli-Arab Tragedy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 214.

¹¹⁶ Rubin, 147.

¹¹⁷ Meir Hatina, *Islam and Salvation in Palestine: The Islamic Jihad Movement* (Tel Aviv: The Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, 2001), 63.

¹¹⁸ Quoted in *ibid.*, 66.

¹¹⁹ Quoted in *ibid.*, 66.

¹²⁰ Quoted in *ibid.*, 64.

Congress of the PNC Fatah showed an openness toward a political solution to the Israeli occupation that would imply an acceptance of the Jewish state. Like Hamas, the PIJ has little patience for the “phased strategy.”

With the outbreak of the First Intifada in December 1987, Hamas seized the opportunity to enter the scene; Arafat declared to their leaders, “My brother Sheik Yassin, my holy brother Hadi Hunam, I cherish your participation in the struggle for the liberation of Palestine.”¹²¹ It will also be recalled that Article Twenty-Seven of the Hamas Charter affirms a deep kinship with the PLO, their differences notwithstanding:

The Palestinian Liberation Organization is the closest to the heart of the Islamic Resistance Movement. It contains the father and the brother, the next of kin and the friend. The Moslem does not estrange himself from his father, brother, next of kin or friend. Our homeland is one, our situation is one, our fate is one and the enemy is a joint enemy to all of us. . . . The day The Palestinian Liberation Organization adopts Islam as its way of life, we will become its soldiers, and fuel for its fire that will burn the enemies. Until such a day, and we pray to Allah that it will be soon, the Islamic Resistance Movement’s stand towards the PLO is that of the son towards his father, the brother towards his brother, and the relative to relative, suffers his pain and supports him in confronting the enemies, wishing him to be wise and well-guided.¹²²

Thus, PLO political chief Farouq Qaddoumi declared, “We were never different from Hamas. Hamas is a national movement. Strategically, there is no difference between us.”¹²³ In February 1996, the Palestinian Authority named a square in Jericho after Hamas arch-terrorist Yahya Ayyash (alias “the Engineer”), after the Israelis killed him the previous month. Arafat himself would eulogize the Jihadist murderer.¹²⁴

In keeping with its “phased strategy,” on 15 November 1988, the PLO declared the existence of an independent Palestinian State in a text written by poet Mahmoud Darwish (1941–2008) but without

¹²¹ Quoted in Karsh, 116.

¹²² Yonah Alexander, *Palestinian Religious Terrorism: Hamas and Islamic Jihad* (Ardley, NY: Transnational Publishers, 2002), 64.

¹²³ Quoted in Karsh, 120.

¹²⁴ *Ibid.*, 121.

identifying any specific boundaries, except the boundary indicated in their slogan "From the river to the sea," which stipulated the obliteration of the Jewish state. With its declaration came a claim of readiness to accept a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, but with conditions that would be impossible for the Israelis to meet, such as the establishment of East Jerusalem as the capital of the Palestinian state, the full "right of return" of all Palestinians to Israel, and the right of Palestinians to continue their armed struggle until the end of the "Zionist entity."¹²⁵ On 13 December of that year, Arafat addressed the UN General Assembly in Geneva and spoke about "peace based on justice," but, as Benny Morris points out, he neglected to say anything about the right of Israel and the Jews to exist.¹²⁶ To be sure, from a Jihadist standpoint, the very existence of Jews in the world is "unjust." On 2 April 1989, the PNC elected Arafat president of its self-proclaimed state.

The 13th of September 1993 marked a major turning point in the PLO's "phased strategy": it is the date of the official signing of the Oslo Accords, which were designed as a "declaration of principles" for a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This development came just over a year after Arafat had publicly commented on the Jews, saying, "Damn their [the Jews'] fathers. The dogs. Filth and dirt. . . . Treachery flows in their blood, as the Quran testifies."¹²⁷ Arafat knew well that the "Islamic view of Jews as inherently evil also struck a powerful chord among Palestinians,"¹²⁸ and he exploited that view. Engendering and spreading this extreme hatred of the Jews – not the Israelis but the *Jews* – Arafat and the PLO entered into the Oslo Agreement. The agreement provided for Palestinian control over most of the West Bank and Gaza, in cooperation with Israeli members of the police force. The Palestinians would retain control over the curriculum in their schools, so that they could see to the indoctrination of their children to hate the Jews,¹²⁹ a move reminiscent, once again,

¹²⁵ See Benny Morris, *One State, Two States: Resolving the Israel/Palestine Conflict* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2009), 124–25.

¹²⁶ *Ibid.*, 126.

¹²⁷ Quoted in Rubin, 180.

¹²⁸ *Ibid.*, 148.

¹²⁹ See Nathan J. Brown, *Palestinian Politics after the Oslo Accords: Resuming Arab Palestine* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), 239–40.

of Hitler's assertion that the struggle is "a struggle for the soul of the child, and to the child its first appeal is addressed."¹³⁰ Indeed, Karsh argues that "Arafat's indoctrination of hatred among Palestinian children was unparalleled since Nazi Germany."¹³¹ Both signatories of the accords agreed to cooperate on matters of utilities, economics, industry, and communications. Before signing the accords Arafat put his signature to documents renouncing all violence.¹³²

Arafat described the Oslo Accords as the next step in the implementation of the "phased strategy" for the annihilation of the Jewish state and boasted that "the Israelis were willing to allow a Trojan Horse into their midst."¹³³ With the signing of the Oslo Accords, as Karsh correctly observes, Arafat emulated Hitler's signing of the Munich agreement, using it as a Trojan Horse for the destruction of Czechoslovakia.¹³⁴ Addressing the Palestinian people, Arafat compared this strategy to one used by the Prophet Muhammed, who signed the Treaty of Hudaibiya with the people of Mecca in 628, only to break it when the situation shifted to his advantage.¹³⁵ This comparison once again belies the "secularist" orientation of the PLO. Indeed Arafat's signing of the agreement is yet another illustration of the principle of *taqiya* at work, that is, the teaching that a Muslim may tell any lie to a non-believer for the sake of the promotion of Islam. He was so good at it that in 1994, the notorious terrorist was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize.

Sakhr Habash (b. 1939), a member of Fatah's central committee and a chief PLO ideologue, commented on the Oslo agreement by saying that once the Palestinians had control of Gaza and the West Bank, they would proceed to the "final solution,"¹³⁶ once again employing a distinctively Nazi shibboleth in their discourse. Thus, Habash described the PLO's position by saying, "There can be no coexistence between Zionism and the Palestinian national movement."¹³⁷

¹³⁰ Hitler, 12.

¹³¹ Karsh, 247.

¹³² For the text of the Oslo Accords, see Geoffrey R. Watson, *The Oslo Accords: International Law and the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Agreements* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 313ff.

¹³³ Karsh, 4.

¹³⁴ *Ibid.*, 127.

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*, 5.

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*, 62.

¹³⁷ Quoted in *ibid.*, 199.

Demonstrating further what he had learned from the Nazis and Haj Amin, on 13 May 1994, Arafat set up the Gestapo-like Preventive Security Service, headed by Mohammed Dahlan (b. 1961), a founder of the Fatah Youth in Gaza and leader of the First Intifada, and Jibril Rajoub (b. 1953).¹³⁸ Arafat spent November and December of 1995 going from town to Palestinian town – including Jenin, Ramallah, Nablus, and Tulkarm – to declare them as “liberated.” How well the accords worked for the Jews is indicated by this fact pointed out by Karsh: “In the entire two decades of Israeli occupation preceding the Oslo accords, some four hundred Israelis were murdered by the PLO and associated terrorist groups; since the conclusion of that peace agreement [a period of 10 years], three times as many have lost their lives in terrorist attacks.”¹³⁹ It is a fact that demonstrates the cunning of the PLO’s “phased strategy.”

Continuing to shore up the Islamic Jihadist basis of Fatah and the PLO, in October 1994, Arafat appointed Sheikh Ikrima Sabri (b. 1939), a known Holocaust denier, as mufti of Jerusalem, a position that he held until 2006. Under Sabri’s direction, the Palestinian religious leaders preached a rabid hatred of the Jews, denouncing them as “descendants of pigs and apes,” accusing of them of every sort of “world Zionist conspiracy,” and blaming them for every ill that has befallen humanity.¹⁴⁰ The PLO engaged in other obvious violations of the Oslo Accords almost immediately. Just months prior to Arafat’s tour of “liberated” Palestine in 1995, the PLO sent two Palestinian women on suicide missions to kill Israelis. The chairman’s comment? “This is the Palestinian woman in all respects. This is the model woman in which we take pride and share their glory.”¹⁴¹ This is the Palestinian Jihadist *Eshet Chayil*, the “Woman of Valor”: she murders herself in the process of murdering Jews. Thus, Arafat takes the Hamas image of the ideal woman – one who raises sons to murder themselves in the process of murdering Jews (Article Eighteen of the “Charter of Allah”) – a step further.

Arafat continued his unabashed demonstration of the PLO’s exterminationist intentions toward the Jews when on 30 January 1996 he

¹³⁸ See Aburish, 281–82.

¹³⁹ Karsh, 8.

¹⁴⁰ See *ibid.*, 103–4.

¹⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 118.

told a group of Arabs diplomats in the Spiegel Salon at the Grand Hotel in Stockholm, “We plan to eliminate the State of Israel and establish a purely Palestinian state.”¹⁴² They would do this by taking advantage of what Arafat identified in 1996 as the “Israelis’ weakness”: their sensitivity toward human life.¹⁴³ Thus, in the Friday sermons that issued from the PLO-controlled territory, we recall the cry of Dr. Ahmad Abu Halabiya, from 13 October 2000: “Have no mercy on the Jews, no matter where they are, in any country,”¹⁴⁴ a statement that makes evident the ideological foundation of Islamic Jihadism that stems from National Socialism: the evil to be overcome is not the Jewish state but the Jews and Judaism, no matter where they are, in any country.

With the outbreak of the Second Intifada in late September 2000, the Palestinian media, in keeping with the age-old incitement of “wrathful hatred” against the Jews, invoked the Christian charge of deicide to incite Jew hatred among the Christians.¹⁴⁵ It is a libel that, as we have seen, runs contrary to the teachings of the Quran. This turn in the propaganda of Islamic Jihadists, from the Ikhwan to the PLO, demonstrates my thesis laid out from the start – namely, that Islamic Jihadism, whether in its “religious” or in its “secular” guise, is in essence a rebellion against Islam itself, inasmuch as Islam is grounded in the Quran. The official PLO position on the cause of the Second Intifada is that it was Ariel Sharon’s visit to the Temple Mount, as if a Jew should not be permitted to set foot there. Arafat’s advisor Mamduh Nawfal, however, confirmed that the Second Intifada “was a premeditated and meticulously prepared ‘War of Independence and Return.’”¹⁴⁶ Karsh shows that during the Second Intifada, Hamas and Islamic Jihad were “integral parts of Arafat’s terror coalition.”¹⁴⁷ At least some of the terrorist actions against Israel involved cooperation between the PLO and Hamas, such as the attack on a bus going from Bnei Brak (near Tel Aviv) to Emmanuel on 12 December 2001.¹⁴⁸

¹⁴² *Ibid.*, 57.

¹⁴³ *Ibid.*, 126.

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 104–5.

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 197.

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 194.

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 221.

¹⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 229.

As international pressure mounted to bring the Second Intifada to an end, on 13 March 2003, Arafat appointed the "moderate" Holocaust denier and avowed anti-Semite Mahmoud Abbas the new Palestinian prime minister. No doubt Arafat relinquished that much control because his own health was failing: he died in Paris on 11 November 2004, whereupon the Palestinian people observed all of the Islamic ceremonies of mourning. According to reports from BBC News, French president Jacques Chirac eulogized the man who described the Jews as "dogs, filth, and dirt" and who was guided by an exterminationist Jew hatred as a "man of courage," "saying he wished to bow before Mr. Arafat and send a message of friendship and solidarity to the Palestinian people and their representatives."¹⁴⁹ One wonders what the former French head of state venerates in this gesture.

The PLO has since entered into a power struggle with Hamas over the control of the future of what both deem Palestine. After a twenty-year hiatus, Fatah convened its Sixth General Assembly in Bethlehem on 4 August 2009; more than two thousand delegates attended the three-day meeting. In keeping with their perennial position and their fundamental, anti-Semitic principles, the delegates set impossible conditions for anything resembling peace negotiations, including the release of all Palestinians from Israeli jails, the halt to any Jewish presence in the West Bank, the complete opening up of Gaza, the establishment of East Jerusalem as the capital of "Palestine," and the ongoing imperative for an armed struggle against the Jews. They also declared that Israel was responsible for the "assassination" of Arafat.¹⁵⁰ The Sixth General Assembly met amid an ongoing power struggle between Hamas and Fatah, where the issue is not about the fate of the Jews but about who will be in control of the process of their ultimate extermination. As of this writing, the outcome of that struggle is yet to be decided.

¹⁴⁹ "Veteran Leader Yasser Arafat Dies," *BBC News Online*, 11 November 2004, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/3984841.stm>.

¹⁵⁰ "Sixth Fatah Assembly Goes Back to Basics," 7 August 2009, *People's Daily Online*, <http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90777/90854/6722295.html>.

Concluding Thoughts

Humanity's Need for Israel

Do we not smell here . . . the odor of the camps? Violence is no longer a political phenomenon of war and peace. . . . It is the abyss of Auschwitz or the world at war. A world which has lost its "very worldliness. . . ." One must go back inside, even if there is terror inside. Is the fact of Israel unique? Does it not have its full meaning because it applies to all humanity? All men are on the verge of being in the situation of the State of Israel. The State of Israel is a category.

Emmanuel Lévinas, *Nine Talmudic Readings*

We have traced a genealogy of exterminationist Jew hatred from National Socialism to Islamic Jihadism. The branches of the tree, the web of interrelations, are intricate and complex, yet the influences and the parallels are clear. Abdul Al'a Maududi, Hasan al-Banna, and Michel Aflaq were admirers and students of Adolf Hitler, Alfred Rosenberg, and Johannes von Leers. Haj Amin al-Husseini was connected, both ideologically and politically, to al-Banna and the Brotherhood, as well as to Adolf Hitler, Adolf Eichmann, and Heinrich Himmler; among his most notorious protégées was Yasser Arafat. Al-Husseini also had ties to Iraqi Baathist Kairallah Tulfah, the guardian and mentor of Saddam Hussein. The Brotherhood branched out to establish itself in the Sudan, first under Hasan al-Turabi and then under Omar al-Bashir. Al-Turabi transformed the Sudan into a base of operations for Osama bin Laden, Hezbollah, Hamas, the PLO, and other Jihadist organizations. Stemming further along the Brotherhood line, we have

perhaps the most influential of all: Sayyid Qutb, whose work shaped the thinking of Mohammad Abd al-Salam Faraj of Islamic Jihad, al-Qaeda's Abdullah Azzam and Ayman al-Zawahiri, and Hamas founder Ahmed Yassin. Others who came under this influence were Ruhullah Khomeini and, through Khomeini, Hassan Nasrallah. Although it is true that there have been feuds among the various Jihadist groups, their issues have far more to do with political power than with ideological differences. In their essence, they are the same, for they are defined by the same murderous hatred of the Jews.

Of course, both National Socialism and Islamic Jihadism grow out of deeper historical roots, each distinct from the other. The Nazis owe elements of their Jew hatred to centuries of displacement theology and ontological philosophy that developed throughout Christendom and in the thinking of the modern German philosophers. Islamic Jew hatred has its roots in the Hadith and Hanbalism, in Wahhabism and Salafism. Although they have significant differences, these roots have at least one thing in common: the anti-Semitism that defines both National Socialism and Islamic Jihadism is spawned from ways of thinking that insist on a totalitarian ubiquity. They are ways of thinking characterized by the embrace of a creed that demands the appropriation of the other human being through the control of every aspect of every life: all must be subsumed under the ideology, whether theological or philosophical, public or private, physical or spiritual. Thus, this evil lies in ways of thinking that insist on a humanly determined power structure that sees to the submission of all. Such a structure is fundamentally threatened by Judaism and therefore by the very presence of Jews in the world.

Jean-François Lyotard sheds some light on this point. He argues that the Jews were murdered in Auschwitz not because of their "race" but because of their constant reminder to Western religious and political thought of its failure in the effort to deny human dependence on the Holy One. "The Jews," as he puts it, are "the irremissible in the West's movement of remission and pardon. They are what cannot be domesticated in the obsession to dominate."¹ If they cannot be domesticated, they must be annihilated. Thus, Lyotard outlines the history

¹ Jean-François Lyotard, *Heidegger and "the Jews,"* trans. Andreas Michel and Mark S. Roberts (Minneapolis: University of Minneapolis Press, 1990), 22.

of anti-Semitism in the West: “One converts the Jews in the Middle Ages, they resist by mental restriction. One expels them during the classical age, they return. One integrates them in the modern era, they persist in their difference. One exterminates them in the twentieth century.”² In the twenty-first century, the Jews have become the “irremissible” in the Middle East, “what cannot be domesticated” in the Islamic “obsession to dominate.” Hence exists the modern Islamic obsession to exterminate the Jews as expressed by Egyptian journalist Fatma Abdullah Mahmoud in *Al-Akhbar* on 29 April 2002: after denying that the Holocaust took place, he declares, “I, personally, complain to Hitler . . . , ‘if only you had done it, brother, if only it had really happened, so that the world could sigh in relief without their evil and sin.’”³ Yes, he calls Hitler his *brother*: here we have an expression of the Jihadists’ deepest, most definitive desire, as well as their essential tie to the Nazis.

Yet the Jews cannot be dominated. They cannot be dominated because Judaism insists not on an ironclad creed but on an ethical accountability. It is rooted not in a universal principle but in a testimonial particularity: the Jewish people are singled out as witnesses to the nations, witnesses to an absolute, revealed truth that implicates every human being in his or her unique relation to the other human being. The sum of this testimony is stated quite simply in Leviticus 19:18: *V’ahavta l’reekha kamokha*, “and you shall love your neighbor as yourself,” where *kamokha*, “as yourself,” means “you are like that” or “that is who you are.” A better translation, then, would be: “you shall love your neighbor, for that loving *is* your self,” the soul and substance of who you are. Who you are, then, is always in question. It is rooted in a capacity not for appropriation but for the embrace of the other human being.

The opposite of appropriation, the relation that Judaism demands lies in being there for the sake of the other, which requires a certain relinquishing of power. Judaism is rooted in a truth whose authority is grounded in a divinely revealed good, and not in a humanly determined might. Both in Christianity and in Islam, the relation to the

² Ibid., 23.

³ Quoted in Matthias Küntzel, *Jihad and Jew-Hatred: Islamism, Nazism and the Roots of 9/11*, trans. Colin Meade (New York: Telos Press, 2007), 61.

other entails an appropriation of the other, inasmuch as the other human being must be converted if he is to be counted among the “saved.” Therefore, in contrast to the Covenant of the Land, which forbids expansion beyond its borders, both Christianity and Islam are expansionist to the core. In the Greek ontological tradition that influenced both Christianity and Islam, there is a further insistence on conquest and control, which is the aim of knowledge rooted in a universal reason that grasps all things, and not in a divine revelation that sanctifies all things. Here, too, expansionism is the order of the day: it is not for nothing that Alexander the Great learned at the feet of Aristotle, and, of course, it was the Muslims who reintroduced the Greek philosophers to the West. Whatever difficulties the Jews have had with Hellenists and Christians, however, the Nazis and Jihadists have taken it to an entirely new level: the Jews and Judaism cannot abide in the same universe as their totalitarian ideology.

To be sure, anti-Semitism has almost always been a feature of totalitarianism. The difference between one regime and another lies in the extent of the exterminationist element at work in their Jew hatred. What do Nazis and Islamic Jihadists want to exterminate in their desire to exterminate the Jews? As explained in Chapter 1, it is the divine, absolute prohibition against murder, for the murder that is prohibited is the radical opposite of the love that is commanded. To love another is to affirm the covenantal relation to the One who commands us to love; to murder another is to usurp Him. The assault on the prohibition against murder, moreover, is an assault both on the Holy One who commands it and on the Jewish people through whom He transmits the commandment to the world. The presence of the Jewish people is the key to the transmission of the testimony, and Land of the Covenant is the key to the presence of the Jewish people. Thus, we have the teaching that the Jewish people, the Holy Land, and the commandments of Torah are of a piece; because each derives its meaning from the Holy One, the assault on the Holy One entails an assault on all three.

As we have seen, in their drive to possess the Holy Land, the Jihadists must usurp the Holy One. Whether it is the extermination of the people, the domination of the land, or the elimination of the Torah, each endeavor demands the other. Thus, the Jihadist determination to “liberate” the land is a determination to exterminate the people,

without making any distinctions between Israelis and Jews. The extermination of the people aims at the elimination of Torah, which, in their appropriation of God, the Jihadists *have to* regard as a Jewish forgery. If, as it is written in the Quran (see 2:59; 3:78), the Jews falsified Scripture, then the Torah of the Jews must be eradicated, along with all their other lies. Furthermore, the God of the Jews – a false God, by the Jihadist definition – must also be obliterated. That obliteration, however, has a devastating consequence: as soon as we refuse the Torah’s revelation of “I am Hashem” (Exodus 20:2), we refuse the divine commandment of “Thou shalt not murder” (Exodus 20:13). According to the Midrash, “Thou shalt not murder” derives from “I am Hashem” (*Mekilta de-Rabbi Ishmael, Bachodesh* 5). The former is the first commandment in the relation between the human being and God, and the latter is the first commandment in the relation between human and human: each is an expression of the other.

In the Tosefta, the Jewish sages teach that “whoever sheds blood renounces the image and likeness of the Holy One” (*Yevamot* 8:4). Compare this to the “truth” that the Islamic Jihadist “sage” Haj Amin al-Husseini proclaimed to the world in a radio broadcast from Berlin on 26 November 1942: “Arise, O sons of Arabia! Fight for your sacred rights! Slaughter Jews wherever you find them! Their spilled blood pleases Allah!”⁴ Compare it to the images of Palestinian kindergarten children, hands raised and painted blood red, imitating the gesture of the blood-covered Muslims who butchered Yossi Avrahami and Vadim Notjitz in Ramallah on 13 October 2000. Compare it to Tehran’s fourteen-foot Fountain of Blood, “symbolizing the essence of Islam’s message.”⁵ Such comparisons demonstrate that the evil we have explored in this genealogy is manifest in the erasure of the absolute, divine commandment: “Thou shalt not murder.” Nazism undermines the commandment through a usurpation of God, Jihadism through an appropriation of God. The former is a nihilism in the mold of racist nationalism; the latter is a nihilism in the guise of totalitarian theism. There has never been a nihilist who did not hate the Jews.

⁴ Tom Knowlton, “Nazi Roots of Modern Radical Islam,” <http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/news/816232/posts>.

⁵ Amir Taheri, *Holy Terror: Inside the World of Islamic Terrorism* (Bethesda, MD: Adler & Adler, 1987), 125.

Israel is known for its innumerable innovations in science, technology, medicine, agriculture, and other areas that are indispensable to human well-being. When we place the Jewish prohibition against spilling blood next to the Jihadist glorification of it, however, we see that humanity's need for Israel far exceeds the need for these innovations. It is a need that runs even deeper than the need for the example that Israel sets by being among the first on the scene wherever disaster strikes, from Cambodia to Bosnia, from Haiti to Rwanda, from the Sudan to Sri Lanka; the Israelis, in fact, have provided more than 140 countries with help in time of need (compare that to, say, Iran, Syria, or Saudi Arabia).⁶ Beyond Israel's lifesaving contributions and examples of aiding others, however, humanity's need for Israel is a need for an alternative to nihilism, an alternative to the dictum that nothing is true and everything is permitted, an alternative to the fountains of blood that both please and appease the false god of Islamic Jihadism. Humanity's need for Israel is a need for the revealed, absolute commandment that forbids murder. For without that commandment, the human being has no sanctity. When the human being has no sanctity, evil is sanctified.

After 1,900 years of exile, persecution, and slaughter in other lands, Jews have returned to the Holy Land in the realization that, as long as they are guests in someone else's house, their lives are in peril. The Nazis' extermination of European Jewry and the expulsion of almost a million Jews from Arab Muslim lands in the years following the Holocaust make this truth self-evident. Now the Jews living in the land of Israel face a worldwide, systematic effort to remove them not just from the land but from existence. "All that is necessary for the triumph of evil is that good men do nothing," as the famous line from Edmund Burke goes, because when good men do nothing, at least in modern times, Jews get murdered. If Iran should fail in its determination to launch a nuclear attack against Israel, it will be thanks not to the actions of the world's "good men" but to the actions of Israel. Here, too, we see humanity's need for Israel.

Because the Jewish people, the covenantal land, and the revealed Torah are interwoven into a single category, the Jewish presence in the

⁶ "Israelis Save the World One Life at a Time," <http://www.standwithus.com/pdfs/flyers/israeldisaster.pdf>.

land is not just a political matter, in which power can justify anything; rather, it has a metaphysical significance, from which we derive certain first principles regarding the sanctity of human life and the confrontation with evil. That the world is aware of this is demonstrated in the perennial double standard applied to Israel in areas that concern the sanctity of human life, to the point where Palestinian inconvenience is more precious than Jewish blood. That the Jihadists are aware of this is demonstrated in their repeated assertions that the Jews love life more than death, whereas the Jihadists love death more than life. What the Jews love is the holiness of life. What the Jihadists love is inflicting death: they love not death but murder. Hence, the Jihadist conflation of murder and martyrdom, which is a conflation of politics and religion. Here lies one key to what makes Islamic Jihadism distinctively modern, and not a throwback to a medieval mind-set, as some have maintained: Islamic Jihadism perverts Islamic religion by twisting the imperative to bear witness to humanity into a demand to rule over humanity, which is also a demand for political power. Political power is the power to destroy.

André Neher understood the metaphysical scope of the Jihadist drive to destroy the Jewish state when he wrote, "Is not the State of Israel, in its very existence, a meta-state? And surely the war launched against Israel on Yom Kippur, October 6, 1973, was not only horizontal. . . . Zion, which is only a fragment of Jerusalem and the Land of Israel, is a word one can neither play around with, nor play tricks with, nor beat around the bush with. It is the key word of the 'meta' of Jewish history. Through Zion, Zionism becomes bi-dimensional. The vertical is interlocked with the horizontal."⁷ Islamic Jihadism's war against Israel is not merely horizontal, even if – or precisely because – the Jihadist ideologues collapse the horizontal and the vertical into a single dimension in their conflation of politics and religion, of murder and martyrdom. This collapse characterizes the Jihadists' assault on God, the aim of which is to make themselves into God, as when Hamas deems its charter the "Charter of Allah" or when the Khomeinists declare that to oppose the Islamic state is to oppose Allah. Because the Jihadists' assault *is* an assault on God, the vertical is interlocked with the horizontal: you cannot attack God without attacking Zion,

⁷ André Neher, *They Made Their Souls Anew*, trans. David Maisel (Albany: SUNY Press, 1990), 58.

which requires an assault on Jews, the Jewish state, and Torah. The tie that binds the Nazis to the Jihadists is just such an assault. The Jihadists' aim of eradicating a Jewish presence in the *Holy Land* is to eradicate the vertical dimension of the *Holy One*, who confers *holiness* upon every human being.

The holiness of the Holy Land derives neither from its history nor from its shrines but from the same source that sanctifies humanity: the divine commandments of Torah – from the *mitzvot*, in Hebrew, a word that means not just “commandments” but also “connections.” This divine connection to the Land of the Covenant, and not the momentous events of history, is what makes the land the Holy Land. In other words, Israel is the Holy Land not because of what has transpired there; rather, certain events – events that are part of sacred history – have transpired there because Israel is the Holy Land. The commandments that bind together God and humanity, as well as human and human, also join together Torah and the land, the people and Torah, the land and the people. The One who commands us to care for the land – stating, for example, when we can plant and when we can harvest – also commands us to care for our neighbor. Because the holiness of the land is central to the notion of human sanctity, without that holiness, power is the only reality and weakness is the only sin. The holiness of the land, then, does not mean I can justify any action to maintain possession of the land but just the opposite: it means that I must justify *every* action toward my neighbor according to the commandments of Torah.

Among those commandments is the commandment to treat the stranger – the non-Jew – as part of the Jewish family, a commandment alien and contrary to Islamic Jihadism, indeed, to Islam in general. Whereas Islam confers a second-class status on the non-Muslim (see Quran 9:29), the Torah commands us to love the stranger as we love the neighbor: *kamokha*, “as yourself” (Leviticus 19:34). Humanity needs that commandment, and not the conferment of a dhimmi status on one group at the hands of another. Both the Holocaust that the Nazis perpetrated and the Holocaust that the Jihadists desire are about the obliteration not just of the Jews but of the stranger, whom the Muslims would vilify and the Jews would sanctify.

It is not evident that another Holocaust is impossible; in fact, what is evident is that another Holocaust is in the making, and the evidence, as we have seen, goes well beyond the Iranian promises to vaporize

Israel. A Jewish State – a Jewish *haven* – is essential to maintaining both the Jewish presence and the Jewish testimony in the world, for the sake of humanity. Because the holiness of Zion is central to that testimony, a Jewish presence in Zion is central to the witnesses' affirmation of human sanctity. Like the presence of the Jews in the world, the presence of the Jewish state signifies a teaching and a commandment concerning our absolute responsibility to and for our fellow human being. After the Nazis' attempt to eradicate that divine commandment from the world, and in the light of the Islamic Jihadists' stated aim of annihilation, the Jews must abide in the Holy Land because the Jews and the land *together* signify the truth of the Torah that commands love and forbids murder. The Torah and its commandments are what make Israel the *Eretz Hakodesh*, the "Holy Land." If the land of the Jewish people is no longer viable as something holy, then the truth of the Torah is no longer viable. Which means: neither the commandment to love nor to refrain from murder is viable. To obliterate the viability of Torah is precisely the goal of Islamic Jihadism.

Perhaps this is why Emmanuel Lévinas insists that the state of Israel, "in accordance with its pure essence, is possible only if penetrated by the divine word,"⁸ which always speaks in the imperative. It is the imperative "Thou shalt not murder," with its corollary commandment "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself." The radical evil that opposes these imperatives, which are central to every notion of the sanctity of the human being, is the Jihadist imperative that would transform the murderer into a martyr – this, among other things, is what makes the Islamic Jihadist evil *radical*. From the Land of Israel a voice emanates into the world precisely because the Jews once again dwell in the Land. It is a voice that stirs in the silent ashes of Auschwitz. It is a voice that declares precisely what the Nazis and the Jihadists set out to silence. Because the state of Israel is thus penetrated by the divine word, it has an inescapable, metaphysical significance. Therefore, Lévinas states it, "the State of Israel will be religious . . . or it will not be at all."⁹ For the Jews, being "religious" means bearing witness, in their particularity as

⁸ Emmanuel Lévinas, "Zionisms," trans. Roland Lack, in Sean Hand, ed., *The Levinas Reader* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989), 271.

⁹ Emmanuel Lévinas, *Difficult Freedom: Essays on Judaism*, trans. Sean Hand (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990), 219.

Jews, to the sanctity of every human life, beginning with the observance of the commandment “Thou shalt not murder.” Being religious means helping others, both near and far.

This is what it means to posit humanity’s need for Israel, both as a people and as a state: it is the need for a witness to this absolute. “Zion is absolute in the world,” says the Chasidic master the Maggid of Mezeritch. “It is the life of all countries.”¹⁰ The action that establishes Israel as a Jewish state is the action that preserves this universal blessing, as well as a universal responsibility to and for the other person. Because Islamic Jihadists of every ilk continue to harbor their exterminationist designs on the Jews, the holiness of the Land can endure only through a Jewish rule over the Land. Furthermore, just as the Land is the center of Jewish life, so is Jerusalem the center of the Land. Any other capital of the Jewish State would reduce it to just another political entity engaged in the power struggles of the world. To suggest that Jews should not live in Jerusalem – whether north, south, east, or west – is to suggest that Jews and their testimony should not live. Jerusalem remains a volatile focal point for the world, precisely because it is the center from which the very holiness of humanity is decided. It is not an “occupied territory” – there are no “settlements” in Jerusalem. Rather, it is a holy sanctuary. Thus, facing Jerusalem, we face a fundamental question. Which shall we love more: life or death?

Between the Islamic Jihadists and the Jews, the conflicting claims to Jerusalem parallel conflicting views of the human being. The key to the conflicting claims is this: whereas the Jihadists lay claim both to God and to Jerusalem, the Jewish understanding is that both God and Jerusalem lay claim to *them*. Just as the Jewish state signifies the holiness of every human being, so the Holy City demands an openness to every human being. That openness has been attained only since Jerusalem was reunified as Israel’s capital in 1967: since that time, everyone who comes in peace has been free to pray in the Holy City. By contrast, one need only look to Mecca to see what the notion of “holy city” means in the Muslim world: it is closed to all except Muslims, closed to the “stranger.” More than that, it is closed to all Muslim women, except those who are accompanied by a husband, brother, or father. Whereas

¹⁰ Quoted in Louis I. Newman, ed., *The Hasidic Anthology* (New York: Schocken Books, 1963), 301.

Mecca signifies the truth of Islam, Jerusalem signifies the holiness of humanity – that is what makes it God’s dwelling place. That is what makes Jerusalem the Holy City. Jews do not claim Jerusalem as their own; rather, in their prayers, it is *irkha*, “Your city,” that is, God’s city. This means that Jerusalem lays claim to the Jews.

The Talmud teaches that the people of Israel, the land of Israel, Torah, and Jerusalem are among the ten things that are distinguished by the word *living* (see *Avot d’Rabbi Nathan* 34:11).¹¹ Why? Because these are among the things necessary for *life* – that is, for the meaning and holiness of life. The world, and not just the Jews, can no more do without the people of Israel, the land of Israel, and Jerusalem than it can do without the prohibition against murder and the commandment to love the stranger. That is why Jerusalem is not only the capital of Israel, it is the center of the world. Understood as God’s dwelling place, Jerusalem signifies God’s presence in the world, a presence that endures only as long as these two commandments endure. Far more than a political capital belonging to the Jews, Jerusalem embodies the divine authority and the divine commandment to affirm the sanctity of our neighbor and thereby sanctify the Name signified by Jerusalem, as it is written: “There are seventy names of God, Israel, Torah, and Jerusalem” (*Yalkut Shimoni, Naso*). Each of these terms is a synonym for the other. Each summons humanity to a human community that, as Martin Buber has argued, requires two things: every member of the community must live in a relation to a transcendent center, and each must live in a relation to the other that is expressive of the higher relation.¹² The Holy City is that center. Hence humanity’s need for Israel.

A text from Jewish tradition articulates this significance of the Holy City by saying, “This world is likened to a person’s eyeball: the white of the eye [corresponds to] the ocean which surrounds the whole world; the iris to the [inhabited] world; the pupil of the eye to Jerusalem; the face in the pupil to the Temple” (*Derekh Eretz Rabbah* 9:13). In other words, Jerusalem is the lens through which God looks

¹¹ The other six things distinguished by the word *living* are God, the righteous, the Garden of Eden, loving kindness, the wise, and water.

¹² Martin Buber, *I and Thou*, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1970), 94.

upon the world and puts to every human being the question He put to the first human being: Where are you? As we peer through the gates of Jerusalem, the face in the pupil reveals to us the face reflected in our own pupil, the face of the other human being. Indeed, through Jerusalem each of us is tied to Adam, and, through Adam, to one another. "In the place whence Adam's dust was taken," it is written in the *Tanna debe Eliyahu*, "there the altar was built."¹³ As the Holy City's Holy of Holies, the altar signifies the link between God and humanity; as the place from which Adam's dust was taken, it signifies the bond between human and human, the bond that demands acts of loving kindness toward the other. Jerusalem, then, represents precisely what the Nazis attempted to destroy at Auschwitz: the Commanding Voice of the Divine Presence. And that is what the Islamic Jihadists would destroy, with this difference: instead of bringing the Jews to the ovens of Auschwitz, the Jihadists have vowed to bring the oven of a nuclear holocaust to the Jews.

Just as Auschwitz symbolizes the Nazi assault both on the Holy One and on the holiness of humanity, so, too, says Adin Steinsaltz, does "harm done to Jerusalem" and to those who dwell there strike "at the light of the world."¹⁴ And striking at the light of the world – at the Jewish people, who are a "light unto the nations" (Isaiah 42:6) – is harm done not only to Jerusalem but to all the nations. For there is, as the Talmud says, a Jerusalem above and a Jerusalem below (*Bava Batra* 75a–75b). There is no "Heavenly Paris," no "Heavenly Tokyo," nor even a "Heavenly Tehran." But who has not heard of the Heavenly Jerusalem? That is the meaning of the holy in the Holy City. Signifying the light of God and Torah, Jerusalem signifies the *height* that transforms the state of Israel into a *category*. From that height issues the holiness of every human. Humanity cannot do without this teaching, which is everywhere present in Judaism and utterly absent from Jihadism. Like National Socialism, Islamic Jihadism undermines the very notion of the holiness of a human being. Thus, we realize that an Islamic control of Jerusalem is essential to the Islamic appropriation of God that defines the essence of Islamic Jihadism. There lies the

¹³ *Tanna debe Eliyahu: The Lore of the School of Elijah*, trans. William G. Braude and Israel J. Kapstein (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1981), 411.

¹⁴ Adin Steinsaltz, *The Strife of the Spirit* (Northvale, NJ: Jason Aronson, 1988), 214–15.

sense of urgency that the Jihadists have about claiming Jerusalem as their capital: it is to make it *their* city, just as they have made *their* word into the word of Allah.

The Torah contains a warning and a prophecy, along these lines: “The sword shall bereave you of children without, as shall the terror from within” (Deuteronomy 32:25). In a commentary on this passage, the Talmud urges us to move to the inside, even if there, too, terror threatens to bereave us of our children (see *Bava Kama* 60b). To the inside of what? To the inside of the land, to the heart of human relation, and to the depths of the Torah’s commandments. Lévinas elaborates: here we “see the entire problem of present-day Israel appear, with all the difficulties of the return. One must withdraw into one’s home. . . . And even if ‘at home’ – in the refuge or in the interiority – there is ‘terror,’ it is better to have a country, a house, or an ‘inwardness’ with terror than to be outside.”¹⁵ The point in having a house is not mere survival – it means having a community, an *edah*, in Hebrew, which also means “testimony.” It means bearing witness to the holiness of the human being from within the center that commands such a testimony. It means a Jewish presence in Jerusalem and in the land of Israel.

If Israel has “its full meaning because it applies to all humanity,” if “all men are on the verge of being in the situation of the State of Israel,” and if “the State of Israel is a category,” as Lévinas maintains,¹⁶ it is because Israel embodies an ethical imperative that applies to all, and not just to the Jews – and that imperative sanctifies all: to be thus commanded is to be blessed. The Americans have suffered 9/11 and other Jihadist attacks, as have many others throughout the world, not because of their policies toward Israel but because they strive on some level to engage in the testimony to the ethical imperative that Israel represents. Any nation that would attest to this transcendent truth, a truth that is beyond context and contingency, is subject to the terrorist attacks of Islamic Jihadists, who insist that only the life of the “believer” has value, just as the Nazis insisted that only the life of the Aryan matters. What must be kept in mind is this difference:

¹⁵ Emmanuel Lévinas, *Nine Talmudic Readings*, trans. Annette Aronowicz (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990), 190.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 190–91.

for the Nazi, a non-Aryan could never become an Aryan, whereas for the Muslim any non-Muslim can become a believer – except the Jew.

There lies the common ground. On the part of both the Nazis and the Jihadists, anti-Semitism is not about ethnicity or geography, nor is it about culture or economics or even politics or religion. It is about the testimony to the divine, absolute imperative that devolves on all humanity and that undermines the absolute authority of every human institution, including religious and political institutions. The opposite of the holiness that binds together Torah, people, and the land is the Jihadists' exterminationist hatred that justifies every means of murdering Jews. The justification to murder the Jews justifies the murder of anyone who shares in the Jewish testimony.

It will be said that this argument for humanity's need for Israel is based on a distinctively Jewish point of view and that Islamic Jihadists make the same argument from their point of view. After all, as Ahmad S. Moussalli correctly points out, "al-Mawdudi and Qutb define Islam as a program of life according to the rule of nature given by God and as the expression that aims at constructing the superstructure for *the whole of humanity* on the *hakimiyyah* or governance of God."¹⁷ Thus, Qutb argues that "it is the duty of *all humanity* to receive it [Islamic Jihadist ideology], adapt to it and apply it to real life."¹⁸ According to Qutb, peace comes to humanity "when the religion is entirely Allah's" (Quran 8:39), adding that "the causes of jihad have their roots within the very temperament of Islam and its true role in the world," for the sake of all humanity.¹⁹ In *This Religion (Hadha al-Din)*, 1962), Qutb maintained that Islam alone can free humanity,²⁰ and in his most widely read book, *Milestones*, he explained that "*Jihad* in Islam is simply a name for striving to make this system of life dominant in the world [for the sake of the world],"²¹ explaining that, "for human life,

¹⁷ Ahmad S. Moussalli, *Radical Islamic Fundamentalism: The Ideological and Political Discourse of Sayyid Qutb* (Beirut: American University of Beirut, 1992), 129; emphasis added.

¹⁸ Sayyid Qutb, *Basic Principles of the Islamic Worldview*, trans. Rami David, preface by Hamid Algar (North Haledon, NJ: Islamic Publications International, 2006), 73; emphasis added.

¹⁹ Quoted in David Cook, *Understanding Jihad* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), 104.

²⁰ See Moussalli, 49.

²¹ Sayyid Qutb, *Maalim fi al-Tariq [Milestones]* (Damascus: Dar Al-Ilm, 2006), 76.

there is only one true system, and that is Islam; all other systems are *jahiliyyah*.”²² Having learned at the ideological feet of Qutb, Hasan al-Turabi asserted that one of the primary principles of Islamic Jihadism is to “unite humanity” and thus bring peace to the world.²³ Similarly, just as in 1943 the Nazis declared that the extermination of the Jews was necessary to an enduring peace, so Mahmud Ahmadinejad declared, “The Zionist regime will be wiped out and humanity will be liberated.”²⁴ Here we have Islamic Jihadism’s division of the world into two realms: *dar al-harb* (the abode of war) and *dar al-Islam* (the abode of Islam) – for the sake of all humanity.

Uniting humanity, “liberating” humanity, for the sake of peace and harmony throughout humanity: these are the aims of Islam, as described by the Islamic Jihadists. But it is the unity of totalitarianism, the “freedom” from the burden of decision, and the peace that comes with the death of the soul – all of which are purchased with blood. Omar al-Bashir’s Sudan, Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, and Ruhullah Khomeini’s Iran are perfect examples of what Jihadist rule is like. For the Islamic Jihadists, all of humanity must bend to the rule of Sharia, all must become Muslims, for the sake of all. This notion of all bending to the same law, of all following the same path, is alien to Jewish teaching. Indeed, the Midrash teaches that the Torah has seventy faces, each corresponding to one of the seventy nations; for the world to behold all of Torah, each nation must pursue its own path of righteousness, not the path of the Jews (see *Bamidbar Rabbah* 13:15–16). From the standpoint of Judaism, every nation has a perspective on God that is essential to all other nations, including the Jews; from the standpoint of the Jihadists, only Islam has a true perspective on God, and all other perspectives must be eliminated – *by any means necessary*. Thus, we see the fundamental distinction between Judaism and Islamic Jihadism: in Judaism every human being is both indispensable and irreplaceable, whereas in Islamic Jihadism, all are both disposable and expendable, *as a matter of first principle*.

²² Ibid., 117.

²³ Quoted in Mohamed Elhachmi Hamdi, *The Making of an Islamic Political Leader: Conversations with Hasan al-Turabi*, trans. Ashur A. Shamis (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998), 43.

²⁴ Quoted in Küntzel, 153.

As for what action must be taken in response to this horrific, murderous situation, that shall have to be determined by the leaders and policy makers of the world. However, there are a few things that should be called to their attention. Above all, the evil must be named; otherwise it remains invisible. One example of cloaking the evil is the media's refusal to refer to the perpetrators of Islamic Jihadist attacks as either Islamic or as Jihadist, and rarely are they called terrorists; they are most commonly designated as "militants," a term that could apply to anyone who takes up any arms. Another is the announcement from the Obama administration on 8 April 2010 that the United States would no longer use terms such as *Islamic Jihadism* in its discussion of Islamic Jihadism; such an avoidance of the term amounts to becoming an accomplice to this evil that threatens humanity.

Which brings us to another crucial point regarding both world leaders and the public: their abysmal ignorance of the history, religion, culture, languages, traditions, teachings, and everything else that goes into the emergence of Islamic Jihadism. This book is an attempt to fill some of that gap. If there were a greater awareness along these lines, then there would be a deeper realization that it is impossible to negotiate with Islamic Jihadists – not because they are stubborn or politically inept or even because they have no identifiable spokesperson. It is because the core of their ideology explicitly excludes negotiation as an option – except, in some cases, as the application of *taqiya* or calculated deceit to achieve the higher aim of conquest in the dar al-harb. To expect Hamas or Fatah or the Islamic Republic of Iran to enter into any peace negotiations that would allow for the existence of the Jewish state would amount to expecting them to renounce Islam and Allah.

The most critical, most urgent recommendation I have is this: a world threatened by the evil of Islamic Jihadism must not turn its back on the Jews, as it did in the time of the Shoah, not for the sake of the Jews but for the sake of humanity. Here, too, however, there is much for the world to atone for, starting with the countless UN resolutions against the Jewish state, while passing not a single resolution against Jihadist states and other totalitarian regimes. To be sure, instead of denouncing Jihadist murderers for who and what they are, the representatives of the world provide them with an open

forum before the United Nations General Assembly. Moves such as these imperil not only the Jews and the testimony they emanate into the world but all of humanity. For such moves render us deaf and blind not only to the evil but also to the victims of the perpetrators of evil. If we are to heed the outcry of the victims, we must heed the Commanding Voice that goes forth from Zion and emanates from Jerusalem, as it is written: *ki mi-Zion tetze Torah udevar Ha-Shem mi-Yerushalayim* (Isaiah 2:3).

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