

Nazis Sought Peace In 1940

Davies Reveals Plan Was Proposed To 'Retire' Hitler Then

Glasgow's Mayor Says Hess Came With Peace Offer

Stressed Fears of a Long War

Promised Hitler Wouldn't Make 'Oppressive Demands,' Report Says

MILWAUKEE SENTINEL, TUESDAY, JULY 15, 1941

Nation Warned Of 'Nazi Peace'

La Guardia Blasts at Movement by Germany

MONDAY, NOVEMBER 25, 1940

Peace Feelers— ENGLAND OPPOSES IMMEDIATE TRUCE

Germany Moved in Self-Defence, Nazis Allege with Usual 'Proof'

SPOKANE, WASH., SATURDAY, JULY 5, 1941.

BRITAIN TO SAY "NO" TO HITLER PEACE PROPOSAL

British Spurned 1940 Hitler Ouster Deal

London, England —AP— The British government ignored a peace offer made by top German generals who wanted to oust Hitler in 1940, hitherto secret government papers revealed Friday.

Sweden Reports— NAZIS PUT OUT PEACE FEELERS

Nazis' Proposal for Parley Rebuffed, Says Marshall

MILWAUKEE SENTINEL, TUESDAY, DECEMBER 31, 1940

Fuehrer Tells Neutral Nations Concessions He'll Make To End War With Allies

MONDAY, FEBRUARY 26 1940

HITLER SUGGESTS PLAN TO END WAR

Is Hitler's Peace Proposal Just a Trick?

CANBERRA MONDAY, OCTOBER 9, 1939.

BRITAIN REJECTS HITLER'S PEACE PROPOSALS

OCTOBER 9, 1939.

WHO STARTED WORLD WAR II?

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Everything I undertake is directed at Russia. If the West is too stupid and too blind to comprehend that, I will be forced to come to an understanding with the Russians, to smash the West, and then, after its defeat, to turn against the Soviet Union.

- Hitler's words to the League of Nations commissioner for Danzig, Carl Burckhardt, in August 1939.



In September 1944, when I was commander of the guard unit at Hitler's headquarters, I spoke with Hitler during a walk together outside. I asked him: "My Fuhrer, may I speak frankly with you for a moment?" "Of course," he replied. I then asked him: "Why did you really attack Poland? Couldn't you have been more patient?"

Hitler had only asked for an extra-territorial highway and rail line across Polish territory, and he wanted the return of Danzig to the Reich. These were really very modest demands. With a bit more patience, couldn't he have obtained these, in much the same way that Austria and the Sudetenland had been united with the Reich?

And Hitler replied: "You are mistaken. I knew as early as March 1939 that Roosevelt had determined to bring about a world war, and I knew that the British were cooperating in this, and that Churchill was involved. God knows that I certainly did not want a world war. That's why I sought to solve the Polish problem in my own way with a kind of punishment expedition, without a declaration of war. After all, there had been thousands of murders of ethnic Germans and 1.2 million ethnic German refugees. What should I have done? I had to act. And for that reason, four weeks after this campaign, I made the most generous offer of peace that any victorious leader could ever have made. Unfortunately, it wasn't successful." And then he said: "If I had not acted as I did with regard to the Polish question, to prevent a second world war, by the end

of 1942 at the latest we would have experienced what we are now experiencing in 1944.” That’s what he said.

- General Otto Ernst Remer, 1990 interview



I really think that this trial, if it should get into an argument over the political and economic causes of this war, could do infinite harm, both in Europe, which I don’t know well, and in America, which I know fairly well. If we should have a prolonged controversy over whether Germany invaded Norway a few jumps ahead of a British invasion of Norway, or whether France in declaring war was the real aggressor, this trial can do infinite harm for those countries with the people of the United States. And the same is true of our Russian relationships. The Germans will certainly accuse all three of our European allies of adopting policies which forced them to war. The reason I say that is that captured documents which we have always made that claim – that Germany would be forced into war. They admit they were planning war, but the captured documents of the Foreign Office that I have examined all come down to the claim, “We have no way out; we must fight; we are encircled; we are being strangled to death.”

- Justice Jackson, Nuremberg trial record,
<http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/jack37.asp>



If another war comes and the history of it is ever written, the dispassionate historian a hundred years hence, will not say that Germany alone was responsible for it, even if she strikes first, but that those who mismanaged the world between 1918 and 1937 had a large share of responsibility in it.

- Lord Lothian, British Ambassador to the U.S., March, 1938



There can be no doubt that he [Hitler] broadened the war in 1941 only on preventive grounds.

- A. J. P Taylor, British historian.



The nature of the concessions that the German Fuhrer was prepared to make in order to obtain peace with Britain must have astounded the men at the head of SO1.

This was not even a deal worked out through a process of hard negotiation. It was Hitler's opening gambit ... an offer so generous and pragmatic that it would be very tempting to anyone who genuinely wanted peace.

- Martin Allen describing Hitler's January 1940 peace offer (via the Vatican ambassador) in *Himmler's Secret War*.



...Take the summer of 1940, when Britain came to its other fateful crossroads, after France, Poland, the Low Countries, Norway and Denmark were all in German hands: at this point in Britain's tragic history, our "deadly foe" Adolf Hitler came to us with an offer so generous that you can only scratch your head now and ask, Well, what went wrong? I've seen it in the German, the Swedish, the Swiss and the American archives; but there are only vague traces of it in the British archives, because it has all been blanketed out – pasted over, like certain paragraphs in the Cabinet minutes of May, June, and July 1940, which you are not allowed to read even now, fifty years later.

The peace offer was this: Hitler declared that he was prepared to pull his armies out of France, Holland, Belgium, Norway, Denmark, Poland and Czechoslovakia -- out of all these territories except of course for the regions which had been German before and which he had fought the war over. Now that he had the

territories like Alsace and Lorraine back, he was not going to let them go. Hitler told us, through emissaries. In Sweden, he informed Victor Mallet, the British ambassador; Hitler sent a lawyer called Ludwig Weissauer to him in August 1940. In America, it was Hans Thomsen, the German ambassador, approached by the British ambassador, Lord Lothian, a very upright Christian gentleman. Every attempt that the Germans made to bring the details of their historic Peace Offer to the attention of the British people was killed by Winston Churchill.

- David Irving, speech to the Clarendon Club, 1990



Played golf today with Joe Kennedy. I asked him about his conversations with Roosevelt and Neville Chamberlain from 1938 on. He said Chamberlain's position in 1938 was that England had nothing with which to fight and that she could not risk going to war with Hitler. Kennedy's view: That Hitler would have fought Russia without any later conflict with England if it had not been for Bullitt's urging on Roosevelt in the summer of 1939 that the Germans must be faced down about Poland; neither the French nor the British would have made Poland a cause of war if it had not been for the constant needling from Washington. Bullitt, he said, kept telling Roosevelt that the Germans wouldn't fight, Kennedy that they would, and that they would overrun Europe. Chamberlain, he says, stated that America and the world Jews had forced England into the war. In his telephone conversation with Roosevelt in the summer of 1939 the President kept telling him to put some iron up Chamberlain's backside.

- James Forrestal's diary, entry dated 27 December 1945



[Polish foreign minister] Beck assured [American] Ambassador Biddle shortly before midnight on August 25, 1939 that war between Germany and Poland was inevitable. He claimed that Poland had an adequate legal basis for a

declaration of war against Germany, in case the Germans failed to take the initiative against Poland within the next few days. Beck denied that there was any truth in the Bielitz massacre, which had been confirmed by neutral sources.

- David Hoggan, *The Forced War*, p.515



Few historians now accept that Hitler had any plan or blueprint for world conquest, in which Poland was a stepping stone to some distant German world empire. Indeed, recent research has suggested that there were almost no plans for what to do with a conquered Poland and that the vision of a new German empire in central and eastern Europe had to be improvised almost from scratch.

- Richard Overy, *1939: Countdown to War*, p.124



‘French Invade Reich’

- New York Times front page, September 7, 1939

‘Goering Makes Bid to Paris’

- New York Times front page, September 10, 1939

The French invasion occurs some 8 months before the German invasion of France. On October 16 and 17, a German counter-offensive re-takes areas of the Saar occupied by the French, sustaining casualties of 196 dead, 114 missing, and 356 wounded.



Hitler... would have preferred to keep Norway neutral and did not plan to invade her until he was provoked to do so by palpable signs that the Allies were planning a hostile move in that quarter.

- Captain B.H. Liddell Hart, *History of the Second World War*.



In this hour I feel it to be my duty before my own conscience to appeal once more to reason and common sense in Great Britain as much as elsewhere. I consider myself in a position to make this appeal, since I am not the vanquished, begging favors, but the victor speaking in the name of reason. I can see no reason why this war must go on. I am grieved to think of the sacrifices it will claim.

- Hitler's speech before the Reichstag, 19 July, 1940. Dropped as a leaflet over England.



Hitler only undertook the bombing of British civilian targets reluctantly three months after the RAF had commenced bombing German civilian targets. Hitler would have been willing at any time to stop the slaughter. Hitler was genuinely anxious to reach with Britain an agreement confining the action of aircraft to battle zones.

- J.M. Spaight, CB, CBE, Principal Secretary to the Air Ministry, *Bombing Vindicated*, 1944.



The primary purpose of these raids was to goad the Germans into undertaking reprisal raids of a similar character on Britain. Such raids would arouse intense indignation in Britain against Germany and so create a war psychosis without which it would be impossible to carry on a modern war.

- Dennis Richards, Royal Air Force 1939-45, *The Fight at Odds*, 1953



... The Netherlands coastal territory constituted an equally open and unsecured gate for British aircraft. The Reich government in repeated communications had drawn the Royal Netherlands Government's attention to a violation of Netherlands' neutrality by English planes. Since the outbreak of the war British fliers practically daily have been coming from the Netherlands and have appeared over German territory.

There were 127 cases of such flying over Holland by England which have been confirmed definitively and in all details, and the Royal Netherlands Government has been notified of them. In reality, however, their number is much greater, amounting to many times, than cases in which the Netherlands has been notified.

... [the] massing of Belgian and Netherlands troops on the German frontier occurred at a time when Germany had concentrated no troops at all on its frontiers facing Belgium and the Netherlands and while England and France on the contrary had gathered strong motorized offensive armies on the Belgian-French frontier.

- German Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop's statement on the Invasion of the Low Countries, May 10, 1940



...as long as Germany and Italy are under their present governments, they will not touch foreign loans, and Germany by her method of internal economy and trading has eliminated the international financier, and those who make profits by playing with foreign exchanges. That is doubtless why the government is being forced by the "City" to start a trade war with Germany. If the economic methods devised by Germany are successful, and spread to other nations, and if Hitler succeeds in his policy of establishing permanent peace in Europe, the high financier will cease to be able to exist. It is therefore their main interest today to plunge the four powers into war, in order to destroy Germany

and Italy.

- Arthur Laurie, British chemist, *The Case for Germany*, 1939, p.9



“There are 20,000 German Jews in England – in the professions, pursuing research. They all work against an accommodation with Germany.”

“The Jews have got a big position in the press here... At last I am shaken. The Jews may drive us into war.”

- Lord Beaverbrook (owner of UK’s biggest paper), quoted in *Beaverbrook: A Shattered Legacy*.



Appearing before a Senate Committee investigating propaganda in films, he [Senator Bennett Champ Clark] said the industry was turning out dozens of pictures to infect the minds of their audiences with hatred and to arouse their emotions. America's 17,000 cinemas virtually constitute daily and nightly mass meetings for war.

- Daily Express, September 11th, 1941



For months now the struggle against Germany is waged by each Jewish community, at each conference, in all our syndicates, and by each Jew all over the world. There is reason to believe that our part in this struggle has general value. We will trigger a spiritual and material war of all the world against Germany's ambitions to become once again a great nation, to recover lost territories and colonies

- Zionist leader, Vladimir Jabotinsky in *Mascha Rjetsch*, January, 1934 (also quoted in *Histoire de l'Armée Allemande* by Jacques Benoist-Mechin, Vol. IV, p. 303).



The Focus was financed by a slush fund set up by some of London's wealthiest businessmen. Principally, businessmen organized by the Board of Jewish Deputies in England, whose chairman was a man called Sir Bernard Waley Cohen. Sir Bernard Waley Cohen held a private dinner party at his apartment on July 29, 1936. This is in Waley Cohen's memoirs... The 29th of July, 1936, Waley Cohen set up a slush fund of 50,000 pounds for The Focus, the Churchill pressure group. Now, 50,000 pounds in 1936, multiply that by ten, at least, to get today's figures. By another three or four to multiply that into Canadian dollars. So, 40 times 50,000 pounds... about \$2 million in Canadian terms was given by Bernard Waley Cohen to this secret pressure group of Churchill in July, 1936. The purpose was, the tune that Churchill had to play was, fight Germany. Start warning the world about Germany, about Nazi Germany. Churchill, of course, one of our most brilliant orators, a magnificent writer, did precisely that.

- David Irving, 1983 speech



Joining with Samuel Untermyer in calling for a war against Germany, Bernard Baruch, at the same time, was promoting preparations for war against Germany. 'I emphasized that the defeat of Germany and Japan and their elimination from world trade would give Britain a tremendous opportunity to swell her foreign commerce in both volume and profit.'

- *Baruch, The Public Years*, p.347.



I wish to confirm, in the most explicit manner, the declarations which I and my colleagues have made during the last month, and especially in the last week, that the Jews stand by Great Britain and will fight on the side of the democracies. Our urgent desire is to give effect to these declarations [against

Germany].

We wish to do so in a way entirely consonant with the general scheme of British action, and therefore would place ourselves, in matters big and small, under the coordinating direction of His Majesty's Government. The Jewish Agency is ready to enter into immediate arrangements for utilizing Jewish manpower, technical ability, resources, etc.

- Letter from Chaim Weizmann president of both the international "Jewish Agency" and of the World Zionist Organization (and later Israel's first president) to British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain – published in *The London Times* on September 6, 1939.



... in 1946, the following statement appears in the annual report of the Rockefeller Foundation, quote:

“The Committee on Studies of the Council on Foreign Relations is concerned that the debunking journalistic campaign following World War I should not be repeated and believes that the American public deserves a clear, competent statement of our basic aims and activities during the Second World War.”

The Rockefeller Foundation made a grant of \$139,000 to promote a book — actually, as it turned out, a pair of books — to defend our entry into that war. In today's money, call it \$1.7 million ... These were standard works when I was in graduate school almost two decades later, and they are still standard works.

Who did they select? ... Langer, immediately upon the outbreak of the war, was hired by the Office of Strategic Services, the OSS, which under Truman morphed into the CIA ... Gleason was the intelligence chief of the Office of

Strategic Services until 1946.

- Gary North, 2012 address:
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ByWW9Va8UIo>



Nazis tried to create super-soldiers, using steroids ... they sought to reanimate the dead – coffins of famous Germanic warriors were found hidden in a mine, with plans to bring them back to life at the war's end.

- Professor Noah Charney, Salon.com, 22 August 2015

Did Hitler Want War?

Patrick J. Buchanan, 2009

On Sept. 1, 1939, 70 years ago, the German Army crossed the Polish frontier. On Sept. 3, Britain declared war.

Six years later, 50 million Christians and Jews had perished. Britain was broken and bankrupt, Germany a smoldering ruin. Europe had served as the site of the most murderous combat known to man, and civilians had suffered worse horrors than the soldiers.

By May 1945, Red Army hordes occupied all the great capitals of Central Europe: Vienna, Prague, Budapest, Berlin. A hundred million Christians were under the heel of the most barbarous tyranny in history: the Bolshevik regime of the greatest terrorist of them all, Joseph Stalin.

What cause could justify such sacrifices?

The German-Polish war had come out of a quarrel over a town the size of Ocean City, Md., in summer. Danzig, 95 percent German, had been severed from Germany at Versailles in violation of Woodrow Wilson's principle of self-determination. Even British leaders thought Danzig should be returned.

Why did Warsaw not negotiate with Berlin, which was hinting at an offer of compensatory territory in Slovakia? Because the Poles had a war guarantee from Britain that, should Germany attack, Britain and her empire would come to Poland's rescue.

But why would Britain hand an unsolicited war guarantee to a junta of Polish colonels, giving them the power to drag Britain into a second war with the most powerful nation in Europe?

Was Danzig worth a war? Unlike the 7 million Hong Kongese whom the British surrendered to Beijing, who didn't want to go, the Danzigers were clamoring to return to Germany.

Comes the response: The war guarantee was not about Danzig, or even about Poland. It was about the moral and strategic imperative “to stop Hitler” after he showed, by tearing up the Munich pact and Czechoslovakia with it, that he was out to conquer the world. And this Nazi beast could not be allowed to do that.

If true, a fair point. Americans, after all, were prepared to use atom bombs to keep the Red Army from the Channel. But where is the evidence that Adolf Hitler, whose victims as of March 1939 were a fraction of Gen. Pinochet’s, or Fidel Castro’s, was out to conquer the world?

After Munich in 1938, Czechoslovakia did indeed crumble and come apart. Yet consider what became of its parts.

The Sudeten Germans were returned to German rule, as they wished. Poland had annexed the tiny disputed region of Teschen, where thousands of Poles lived. Hungary’s ancestral lands in the south of Slovakia had been returned to her. The Slovaks had their full independence guaranteed by Germany. As for the Czechs, they came to Berlin for the same deal as the Slovaks, but Hitler insisted they accept a protectorate.

Now one may despise what was done, but how did this partition of Czechoslovakia manifest a Hitlerian drive for world conquest?

Comes the reply: If Britain had not given the war guarantee and gone to war, after Czechoslovakia would have come Poland’s turn, then Russia’s, then France’s, then Britain’s, then the United States.

We would all be speaking German now.

But if Hitler was out to conquer the world — Britain, Africa, the Middle East, the United States, Canada, South America, India, Asia, Australia — why did he spend three years building that hugely expensive Siegfried Line to protect Germany from France? Why did he start the war with no surface fleet, no troop transports and only 29 oceangoing submarines? How do you conquer the world with a navy that can’t get out of the Baltic Sea?

If Hitler wanted the world, why did he not build strategic bombers, instead of two-engine Dorniers and Heinkels that could not even reach Britain from

Germany?

Why did he let the British army go at Dunkirk?

Why did he offer the British peace, twice, after Poland fell, and again after France fell?

Why, when Paris fell, did Hitler not demand the French fleet, as the Allies demanded and got the Kaiser's fleet? Why did he not demand bases in French-controlled Syria to attack Suez? Why did he beg Benito Mussolini not to attack Greece?

Because Hitler wanted to end the war in 1940, almost two years before the trains began to roll to the camps.

Hitler had never wanted war with Poland, but an alliance with Poland such as he had with Francisco Franco's Spain, Mussolini's Italy, Miklos Horthy's Hungary and Father Jozef Tiso's Slovakia.

Indeed, why would he want war when, by 1939, he was surrounded by allied, friendly or neutral neighbors, save France. And he had written off Alsace, because reconquering Alsace meant war with France, and that meant war with Britain, whose empire he admired and whom he had always sought as an ally.

As of March 1939, Hitler did not even have a border with Russia. How then could he invade Russia?

Winston Churchill was right when he called it "[The Unnecessary War](#)" — the war that may yet prove the mortal blow to our civilization.

The Views of Four Diplomats Close to Events

Jason Collett, 2009

- **Joseph P. Kennedy**, U.S. Ambassador to Britain during the years immediately preceding WW2 was the father of the famous American Kennedy dynasty. James Forrestal the first US Secretary of Defense (1947-1949) quotes him as saying “Chamberlain (the British Prime Minister) stated that America and the world Jews had forced England into the war”. (The Forrestal Diaries ed. Millis, Cassell 1952 p129).
- **Count Jerzy Potocki**, the Polish Ambassador in Washington, in a report to the Polish Foreign Office in January 1939, is quoted approvingly by the highly respected British military historian Major-General JFC Fuller. Concerning public opinion in America he says “Above all, propaganda here is entirely in Jewish hands...when bearing public ignorance in mind, their propaganda is so effective that people have no real knowledge of the true state of affairs in Europe... It is interesting to observe that in this carefully thought-out campaign... no reference at all is made to Soviet Russia. If that country is mentioned, it is referred to in a friendly manner and people are given the impression that Soviet Russia is part of the democratic group of countries... Jewry was able not only to establish a dangerous centre in the New World for the dissemination of hatred and enmity, but it also succeeded in dividing the world into two warlike camps... President Roosevelt has been given the power... to create huge reserves in armaments for a future war which the Jews are deliberately heading for.” (Fuller, *JFC: The Decisive Battles of the Western World vol 3*, pp 372-374.)
- **Hugh Wilson**, the American Ambassador in Berlin until 1938, the year before the war broke out, found anti-Semitism in Germany

“understandable”. This was because before the advent of the Nazis, “the stage, the press, medicine and law [were] crowded with Jews... among the few with money to splurge, a high proportion [were] Jews...the leaders of the Bolshevist movement in Russia, a movement desperately feared in Germany, were Jews. One could feel the spreading resentment and hatred.” (*Hugh Wilson: Diplomat between the Wars*, Longmans 1941, quoted in Leonard Mosley, Lindbergh, Hodder 1976).

- **Sir Neville Henderson**, British Ambassador in Berlin ‘said further that the hostile attitude in Great Britain was the work of Jews and enemies of the Nazis, which was what Hitler thought himself’ (Taylor, AJP: *The Origins of the Second World War*, Penguin 1965, 1987 etc p 324).

Is all of this merely attributable to antisemitism?

The economic background to the war is necessary for a fuller understanding, before casting judgement on the originators of these viewpoints.

At the end of the First World War, Germany was essentially tricked [see Paul Johnson, *A History of the Modern World*, (1983) p24 and H Nicholson *Peacemaking 1919* (1933) pp13-16] into paying massive reparations to France and other economic competitors and former belligerent countries in terms of the so-called Treaty of Versailles, thanks to the liberal American President Woodrow Wilson. Germany was declared to be solely responsible for the war, in spite of the fact that “Germany did not plot a European war, did not want one, and made genuine efforts, though too belated, to avert one.” (Professor Sydney B Fay, *The Origins of the World War* (vol. 2 p 552)).

As a result of these massive enforced financial reparations, by 1923 the situation in Germany became desperate and inflation on an astronomical scale became the only way out for the government. Printing presses were engaged to print money around the clock. In 1921 the exchange rate was 75 marks to the dollar. By 1924 this had become about 5 trillion marks to the dollar. This virtually destroyed the German middle class (Koestler, *The God that Failed*, p 28), reducing any bank

savings to a virtual zero.

According to Sir Arthur Bryant the British historian (Unfinished Victory (1940 pp. 136-144):

“It was the Jews with their international affiliations and their hereditary flair for finance who were best able to seize such opportunities... They did so with such effect that, even in November 1938, after five years of anti-Semitic legislation and persecution, they still owned, according to the Times correspondent in Berlin, something like a third of the real property in the Reich. Most of it came into their hands during the inflation... But to those who had lost their all this bewildering transfer seemed a monstrous injustice. After prolonged sufferings they had now been deprived of their last possessions. They saw them pass into the hands of strangers, many of whom had not shared their sacrifices and who cared little or nothing for their national standards and traditions... The Jews obtained a wonderful ascendancy in politics, business and the learned professions (in spite of constituting) less than one percent of the population... The banks, including the Reichsbank and the big private banks, were practically controlled by them. So were the publishing trade, the cinema, the theatres and a large part of the press – all the normal means, in fact, by which public opinion in a civilized country is formed... The largest newspaper combine in the country with a daily circulation of four millions was a Jewish monopoly... Every year it became harder and harder for a gentile to gain or keep a foothold in any privileged occupation... At this time it was not the ‘Aryans’ who exercised racial discrimination. It was a discrimination that operated without violence. It was exercised by a minority against a majority. There was no persecution, only elimination... It was the contrast between the wealth enjoyed – and lavishly displayed – by aliens of cosmopolitan tastes, and the poverty and misery of native Germans, that has made anti-Semitism so dangerous and ugly a force in the new Europe. Beggars on horseback are seldom popular, least of all with those whom they have just thrown out of the saddle.”

Goodness gracious, Sir Arthur! What made you get out of the wrong side of the bed?

Strangely enough, a book unexpectedly published by Princeton University Press in 1984, Sarah Gordon (*Hitler, Germans and the "Jewish Question"*) essentially confirms what Bryant says. According to her, "Jews were never a large percentage of the total German population; at no time did they exceed 1% of the population during the years 1871-1933." But she adds "Jews were over-represented in business, commerce, and public and private service... They were especially visible in private banking in Berlin, which in 1923 had 150 private Jewish banks, as opposed to only 11 private non-Jewish banks... They owned 41% of iron and scrap iron firms and 57% of other metal businesses... Jews were very active in the stock market, particularly in Berlin, where in 1928 they comprised 80% of the leading members of the stock exchange. By 1933, when the Nazis began eliminating Jews from prominent positions, 85% of the brokers on the Berlin Stock exchange were dismissed because of their "race"... At least a quarter of full professors and instructors (at German universities) had Jewish origins... In 1905-6 Jewish students comprised 25% of the law and medical students... In 1931, 50% of the 234 theatre directors in Germany were Jewish, and in Berlin the number was 80%... In 1929 it was estimated that the per capita income of Jews in Berlin was twice that of other Berlin residents..." etc etc.

Arthur Koestler confirms the Jewish over-involvement in German publishing. "Ullstein's was a kind of super-trust; the largest organization of its kind in Europe, and probably in the world. They published four daily papers in Berlin alone, among these the venerable Vossische Zeitung, founded in the eighteenth century, and the B.Z. am Mittag, an evening paper... Apart from these, Ullstein's published more than a dozen weekly and monthly periodicals, ran their own news service, their own travel agency, etc., and were one of the leading book publishers. The firm was owned by the brothers Ullstein - they were five, like the original Rothschild brothers, and like them also, they were Jews." (*The God that Failed* (1950) ed. RHS Crossman, p 31).

Edgar Mowrer, Berlin correspondent for the Chicago Daily News, wrote an anti-German tract called *Germany Puts the Clock Back* (published as a Penguin Special and reprinted five times between December 1937 and April 1938). He nevertheless notes, "In the all-important administration of Prussia, any number of strategic positions came into the hands of Hebrews... A telephone conversation between three Jews in Ministerial offices could result in the

suspension of any periodical or newspaper in the state... The Jews came in Germany to play in politics and administration that same considerable part that they had previously won by open competition in business, trade, banking, the Press, the arts, the sciences and the intellectual and cultural life of the country. And thereby the impression was strengthened that Germany, a country with a mission of its own, had fallen into the hands of foreigners.”

Mowrer says, “No one who lived through the period from 1919 to 1926 is likely to forget the sexual promiscuity that prevailed... Throughout a town like Berlin, hotels and pensions made vast fortunes by letting rooms by the hour or day to baggageless, unregistered guests. Hundreds of cabarets, pleasure resorts and the like served for purposes of getting acquainted and acquiring the proper mood...” (pp. 153-4). Bryant describes throngs of child prostitutes outside the doors of the great Berlin hotels and restaurants. He adds “Most of them (the night clubs and vice-resorts) were owned and managed by Jews. And it was the Jews... among the promoters of this trade who were remembered in after years.” (pp. 144-5).

Douglas Reed, Chief Central European correspondent before WWII for the London Times, was profoundly anti-German and anti-Hitler. But nevertheless he reported: “I watched the Brown Shirts going from shop to shop with paint pots and daubing on the window panes the word "Jew", in dripping red letters. The Kurfürstendamm was to me a revelation. I knew that Jews were prominent in business life, but I did not know that they almost monopolized important branches of it. Germany had one Jew to one hundred gentiles, said the statistics; but the fashionable Kurfürstendamm, according to the dripping red legends, had about one gentile shop to ninety-nine Jewish ones.” (Reed, *Insanity Fair*, (1938) p. 152-3). In Reed’s book *Disgrace Abounding* of the following year he notes, “In the Berlin (of pre-Hitler years) most of the theatres were Jewish-owned or Jewish-leased, most of the leading film and stage actors were Jews, the plays performed were often by German, Austrian or Hungarian Jews and were staged by Jewish film producers, applauded by Jewish dramatic critics in Jewish newspapers... The Jews are not cleverer than the Gentiles, if by clever you mean good at their jobs. They ruthlessly exploit the common feeling of Jews, first to get a foothold in a particular trade or calling, then to squeeze the non-Jews out of it... It is not true that Jews are better journalists than Gentiles. They held all the posts on those Berlin papers because the proprietors and editors were Jewish.”

(pp.238-9).

The Jewish writer Edwin Black notes, “For example, in Berlin alone, about 75% of the attorneys and nearly as many of the doctors were Jewish.” (Black, *The Transfer Agreement* (1984) p58.

To cap it all, Jews were perceived as dangerous enemies of Germany after Samuel Untermyer, the leader of the World Jewish Economic Federation, declared war on Germany on August 6 1933. (Edwin Black, *The Transfer Agreement: The Untold Story of the Secret Pact between the Third Reich and Palestine* (1984) pp.272-277) According to Black, ‘The one man who most embodied the potential death blow to Germany was Samuel Untermyer.’ (p.369). This was the culmination of a worldwide boycott of German goods led by international Jewish organizations. The London Daily Express on March 24, 1933 carried the headline *Judea Declares War on Germany*. The boycott was particularly motivated by the German imposition of the Nuremberg Laws, which ironically were similar in intent and content to the Jewish cultural exclusivism practiced so visibly in present-day Israel (Hannah Arendt, *Eichmann in Jerusalem*, p.7).

Since 1919 Hitler had seen the tremendous danger posed to Germany by Communism. In that year there were two attempted Bolshevik-style revolutions in Germany, led by Jews - Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg in Berlin and Kurt Eisner in Bavaria. After the bloody and brutal Russian experience, Hitler appreciated the desperate need to eliminate this threat, a fact that earned him the immense hatred and animosity of the Jewish organisations and the media and politicians of the west which they could influence. After all, according to the Jewish writer Chaim Bermant, although Jews formed less than five percent of Russia's population, they formed more than fifty percent of its revolutionaries. According Bermant in his book *The Jews* (1977, chapter 8):

“It must be added that most of the leading revolutionaries who convulsed Europe in the final decades of the last century and the first decades of this one, stemmed from prosperous Jewish families... They were perhaps typified by the father of revolution, Karl Marx... Thus when, after the chaos of World War I, revolutions broke out all over Europe, Jews were everywhere at the helm; Trotsky, Sverdlov, Kamenev and Zinoviev in

Russia, Bela Kun in Hungary, Kurt Eisner in Bavaria, and, most improbable of all, Rosa Luxemburg in Berlin.”

“To many outside observers, the Russian revolution looked like a Jewish conspiracy, especially when it was followed by Jewish-led revolutionary outbreaks in much of central Europe. The leadership of the Bolshevik Party had a preponderance of Jews... Of the seven members of the Politburo, the inner cabinet of the country, four, Trotsky (Bronstein), Zinoviev (Radomsky), Kamenev (Rosenfeld) and Sverdlov, were Jews.”

Other authors agree with this:

“There has been a tendency to circumvent or simply ignore the significant role of Jewish intellectuals in the German Communist Party, and thereby seriously neglect one of the genuine and objective reasons for increased anti-Semitism during and after World War 1... The prominence of Jews in the revolution and early Weimar Republic is indisputable, and this was a very serious contributing cause for increased anti-Semitism in post-war years... It is clear then that the stereotype of Jews as socialists and communists... led many Germans to distrust the Jewish minority as a whole and to brand Jews as enemies of the German nation.” (Sarah Gordon Hitler, *Germans and the 'Jewish Question'*, Princeton University Press (1984) p 23).

“The second paroxysm of strong anti-Semitism came after the critical role of Jews in International Communism and the Russian Revolution and during the economic crises of the 1920s and 30s... Anti-Semitism intensified throughout Europe and North America following the perceived and actual centrality of Jews in the Russian Revolution... Such feelings were not restricted to Germany, or to vulgar extremists like the Nazis. All over Northern Europe and North America, anti-Semitism became the norm in 'nice society', and 'nice society' included the universities.” (Martin Bernal, *Black Athena vol. 1*, pp. 367, 387).

“The major role Jewish leaders played in the November (Russian) revolution was probably more important than any other factor in confirming (Hitler's) anti-Semitic beliefs.” (J&S Pool, *Who Financed*

Hitler, p.164).

Hitler came to power in Germany with two main aims, the rectification of the unjust provisions of the Versailles Treaty, and the destruction of the Soviet/ Communist threat to Germany. Strangely enough, contrary to the mythology created by those who had an opposing ethnic agenda, he had no plans or desire for a larger war of conquest. Professor AJP Taylor showed this in his book, *The Origins of the Second World War*, to the disappointment of the professional western political establishment. Taylor says, “The state of German armament in 1939 gives the decisive proof that Hitler was not contemplating general war, and probably not intending war at all” (p.267), and “Even in 1939 the German army was not equipped for a prolonged war; and in 1940 the German land forces were inferior to the French in everything except leadership” (p104-5).

What occurred in Europe in 1939-41 was the result of unforeseen weaknesses and a tipping of the balance of power, and Hitler was an opportunist “who took advantages whenever they offered themselves” (Taylor). Britain and France declared war on Germany, not the other way around. Hitler wanted peace with Britain, as the German generals admitted (Basil Liddell Hart, *The Other Side of the Hill* 1948, Pan Books 1983) with regard to the so-called Halt Order at Dunkirk, where Hitler had the opportunity to capture the entire British Army, but chose not to. Liddell Hart, one of Britain’s most respected military historians, quotes the German General von Blumentritt with regard to this Halt Order:

“He (Hitler) then astonished us by speaking with admiration of the British Empire, of the necessity for its existence, and of the civilisation that Britain had brought into the world. He remarked, with a shrug of the shoulders, that the creation of its Empire had been achieved by means that were often harsh, but ‘where there is planning, there are shavings flying’. He compared the British Empire with the catholic Church – saying they were both essential elements of stability in the world. He said that all he wanted from Britain was that she should acknowledge Germany’s position on the Continent. The return of Germany’s colonies would be desirable but not essential, and he would even offer to support Britain with troops if she should be involved in difficulties anywhere...” (p 200).

According to Liddell Hart, “At the time we believed that the repulse of the Luftwaffe in the ‘Battle over Britain’ had saved her. That is only part of the explanation, the last part of it. The original cause, which goes much deeper, is that Hitler did not want to conquer England. He took little interest in the invasion preparations, and for weeks did nothing to spur them on; then, after a brief impulse to invade, he veered around again and suspended the preparations. He was preparing, instead, to invade Russia” (p140).

David Irving in the foreword to his book *The Warpath* (1978) refers to “the discovery... that at no time did this man (Hitler) pose or intend a real threat to Britain or the Empire.”

This gives a completely different complexion, not only to the war, but to the successful suppression of this information during the war and afterwards. Historians today know only too well where the boundaries lie within which they can paint their pictures of the war and its aftermath, and the consequences of venturing beyond those boundaries, irrespective of the evidence. Unfortunately, only too few of them have been prepared to have the courage to break out of this dreadful straitjacket of official and unofficial censorship.

Hundred Years of War against Germany

Steffen Werner, 2013

In August 1895, a series of articles began in the British weekly *The Saturday Review*, which called for the annihilation of Germany and whose disastrous greed for German plunder still reverberates to the present day.

With the Second Reich, a German state came into being which was rapidly creating a modern economy which imperiled the economic predominance of Great Britain. Coal and steel were the two indicators by which national economies were measured prior to the First World War. The production of raw materials in Germany grew by 334% in the quarter-century before the First World War, from 4 million to 17.8 million tons, while the figures for Great Britain rose from 7.7 to 9 million, therefore an increase of 17%. During the same period the mining of coal in Germany increased from 76.2 to 255.8 million tons (240%) but in Britain only 60%, to 240 million tons. Germany's foreign trade was reaching proportions alarming to Great Britain. An investigation by the English Parliament in 1885 noted that the Germans produced more cheaply and their products were geared to the preferences of their buyers. Knowledge of languages, tirelessness and flexibility were considered to be the merits of the German commercial travelers. A trademark law was passed in England as a counter-measure, which prescribed that German products be marked "Made in Germany," yet the British middlemen and consumers nevertheless still often preferred the German goods, on which account the obligatory mark was modified to "Foreign made."[\[1\]](#)

That this new development was no accident was discovered by Paul Valéry in a British commissioned work from the year 1896, in which the reasons for this new development would be raised to a dogma:[\[2\]](#)

"One learns that the military victories through which this [German] nation established itself are small when compared with the economic triumphs

which it has already wrested; already their many markets in the world are more tightly held than the territories which it owes to its army [...] one grasps that Germany has turned to industry and trade as it once did to its military: with level-headedness and resolve. One senses that it is omitting no means. If one wishes to explain this new [...] greatness, then one should call to mind: constant hard work, most precise investigation of the sources of wealth and unrelenting manufacturing of the means for producing it; exact topography of the favorable sites and most convenient connecting routes; and above all, perfect obedience, a subordination of all motives under a sort of simple, exclusive, powerful thought - which is strategic in form, economic in purpose, scientific in its profound design and its realm of authority. Thus does the totality of the German enterprises have its impact upon us."

The European upper classes saw their indolent life imperiled by this upswing of the German economy. They were living, according to Max Scheler, in a Paradise:[\[3\]](#)

"For our Eastern neighbors there was more dreaming, plotting, feeling, praying, and quiet submission to the yoke of fate, but also the drinking of schnapps, strolling romantically through life, careless and illicit coarse enjoyment [...] For the English, it was easy to buy and sell, according to the old way, accustomed to winning, and in the manner of old grand merchants, proud of the old proven types of goods, without adapting to the needs of customers in the world market [...] it was also, however, to enjoy life in sports, wagering, gaming, country life, traveling, to end the week's work on Friday evening and to go to the sports stadium [...] - but to do all this with a matter-of-fact feeling, grounded in the situation and geography of the island, of having been divinely chosen to be Lord of the Sea [...] not as a member of Europe, but as a power equal to all of Europe, indeed, a power which was a match for the entire world, equal to guiding the nations outside of Europe, of leading them and of being their political arbiter. And the same paradise meant for France: increasing financial wealth with few children, pensions after 20-30 years of work, great colonial empire, time and idle leisure for luxury, intellect, outward appearances, adventures full of sensuality with beautiful women."

The terror which the German power of achievement set loose in these European upper classes, was captured by Max Scheler in the parable:

"There [...] appeared on their every horizon [...] the image of a new, strange archangel, the face [...] as severe and iron-like as the old one of the myth, but otherwise quite different [...] He bore the stamp of a plain workman, with good, tough fists, he was a man who labored and kept working, on and on, according to the inner testimonial of his own convictions, not in order to outdo or for the sake of some sort of renown, and not for enjoyment apart from or after the work, nor in order to contemplate and admire the beauty of the world in that spare time following work, but quietly and slowly, immersed in his labor, yet with a terror-exciting steadiness, exactitude and punctuality when seen from the outside, and wholly lost within himself and his task, he worked, worked on and kept working - and this the world was least able to grasp - out of pure joy in boundless work in itself - without goal, without purpose, without end. What will become of us, what shall happen to us - felt the nations [...] How shall we exist, faced by these new masses? Shall we change ourselves, seeking to emulate him? No and again no! We cannot obey this new demand! But we do not want it and shall not do it!"

In 1895 these upper classes, beginning with Great Britain, formed a War Party against Germany which is still at work today and which will be documented by citations from the years 1895 to 1994.

Delendam, Delendam, Delendam!

The Saturday Review of 24 August 1895:[\[4\]](#)

"OUR TRUE FOREIGN POLICY.

[...] As we have before pointed out, the dominant fact of the situation with regard to our foreign policy is the steadfast enmity of France. We can call this enmity unreasonable or untimely, but its existence is not to be doubted. Some papers, therefore, recommend that England should at once join the Triple Alliance; that Lord Salisbury should promise the German Emperor assistance and support in case of any attack made upon the estates or interests of the Allies in Europe, on condition that the Allies should support England in case of any aggression upon her territories in other parts of the world. For various reasons this policy, although eminently safe, does not altogether please us. First of all, we English have always made war hitherto upon our rivals in trade and commerce; and our chief rival in trade and commerce to-day is not France but Germany. In case of a war with Germany, we should stand to win much and lose nothing; whereas, in case of a war with France, no matter what the issue might be, we stand to lose heavily."

The Saturday Review of 1 February 1896:[\[5\]](#)

"A BIOLOGICAL VIEW OF OUR FOREIGN POLICY BY A BIOLOGIST.

The record of the past history of life upon the catch has made us familiar with one phase in the drama of evolution. For countless generations a number of species may have been struggling on tolerably equal terms, now one, now the other, securing some little advantage, when suddenly a turn in the kaleidoscope of the world gives one of them an advantage of real moment. The lucky species multiplies rapidly; it spreads over the land and the seas, its rivals perishing before it or being driven into the most inhospitable corners; [...]

The great nations of the earth are local varieties, species in the making. It is not necessary that there should be anatomical distinctions among them;

although, indeed, the English, Germans, French, Russians and Americans, Chinese and Japanese, have each their distinct groups of average characters. [...]

The world is rapidly approaching the epoch of these last wars, of wars which cannot end in peace with honour, of wars whose spectre cannot be laid by the pale ghost of arbitration. The facts are patent. Feeble races are being wiped of the earth, and the few great, incipient species arm themselves against each other. England, as the greatest of these - greatest in geographical distribution, greatest to expansive force, greatest in race-
pride - has avoided for centuries the only dangerous kind of war. Now, with the whole earth occupied and the movements of expansion continuing, she will have to fight to the death against successive rivals. [...]

Of European nations, [Germany is](#) most alike to England. In racial characters, in religious and scientific thought, in sentiments and aptitudes, the Germans, by their resemblances to the English, are marked out as our natural rivals. In all parts of the earth, in every pursuit, in commerce, in manufacturing, in exploiting other races, the English and the Germans jostle each other. Germany is a growing nation; expanding far beyond her territorial limit, she is bound to secure new foothold or to perish in the attempt. [...] Were every German to be wiped out to-morrow, there is no English trade, no English pursuit that would not immediately expand. Were every Englishman to be wiped out tomorrow, the Germans would gain in proportion. Here is the first great racial struggle of the future: here are two growing nations pressing against each other, man to man all over the world. One or the other has to go; one or the other will go. [...]

The biological view of foreign policy is plain. First, federate our colonies and prevent geographical isolation turning the Anglo-Saxon race against itself. Second, be ready to fight Germany, as *Germania est delenda* [Germany must be destroyed]; third, be ready to fight America when the time comes. Lastly, engage in no wasting tears against peoples from whom we have nothing; to fear."

The Saturday Review of 11 September 1897:[\[6\]](#)

"ENGLAND AND GERMANY

Prince Bismarck has long recognised what at length the people of England are beginning to understand - that in Europe there are two great, irreconcilable, opposing forces, two great nations who would make the whole world their province, and who would levy from it the tribute of commerce. England, with her long history of successful aggression, with her marvellous conviction that in pursuing her own interests she is spreading light among nations dwelling in darkness, and Germany, bone of the same bone, blood of the same blood, with a lesser will-force, but, perhaps, with a keener intelligence, compete in every corner of the globe. In the Transvaal, at the Cape, in Central Africa, in India and the East, in the islands of the Southern sea, and in the fair North-West, wherever - and where has it not ? - the flag has followed the Bible and trade has followed the flag, there the German bagman is struggling with the English pedlar. Is there a mine, to exploit, a railway to build, a native to convert from breadfruit to tinned meat, from temperance to trade gin, the German and the Englishman are struggling to be first. A million petty disputes build up the greatest cause of war the world has ever seen. If Germany were extinguished to-morrow, the day after to-morrow there is not an Englishman in the world who would not be the richer. Nations have fought for years over a city or a right of succession; must they not fight for two hundred million pounds of commerce?

[...] Our work over, we need not even be at the pains to alter Bismarck's words to France, and to say to France and Russia 'Seek some compensation. Take inside Germany whatever you like: you can have it.' [...] 'Germania esse delendam.' [Germany must be destroyed^[7]]"

Secret speech of Winston S. Churchill in March 1936 in the Lower House:^[8]

"For four hundred years the foreign policy of England has been to oppose the strongest, most aggressive, most dominating Power on the Continent [...]. Faced by Philip II of Spain, against Louis XIV under William III and Marlborough, against Napoleon, against William II of Germany, it would have been easy and must have been very tempting to join with the stronger and share the fruits of his conquest. However, we always took the harder

course, joined with the less strong Powers, made a combination among them, and thus defeated and frustrated the Continental military tyrant whoever he was, whatever nation he led. Thus we preserved the liberties of Europe [...].

Observe that the policy of England takes no account of which nation it is that seeks the overlordship of Europe. The question is not whether it is Spain, or the French Monarchy, or the French Empire, or the German Empire, or the Hitler régime. It has nothing to do with rulers or nations; it is concerned solely with whoever is the strongest or the potentially dominating tyrant. Therefore, we should not be afraid of being accused of being pro-French or anti-German. If the circumstances were reversed, we could equally be pro-German and anti-French. It is a law of public policy which we are following, and not a mere expedient dictated by accidental circumstances, or likes and dislikes, or any other sentiment.

The question, therefore, arises which is today the Power in Europe which is the strongest, and which seeks in a dangerous and oppressive sense to dominate. Today, for this year, probably for part of 1937, the French Army is the strongest in Europe. But no one is afraid of France. Everyone knows that France wants to be let alone, and that with her it is only a case of self-preservation. Everyone knows that the French are peaceful and overhung by fear. [...]

Germany, on the other hand, fears no one. She is arming in a manner which has never been seen in German history. She is led by a handful of triumphant desperadoes. The money is running short, discontents are arising beneath these despotic rulers. Very soon they will have to choose, on the one hand, between economic and financial collapse or internal upheaval, and on the other, a war which could have no other object, and which, if successful, can have no other result, than a Germanised Europe under Nazi control. Therefore, it seems to me that all the old conditions present themselves again, and that our national salvation depends upon our gathering once again all the forces of Europe to contain, to restrain, and if necessary to frustrate, German domination. For, believe me, if any of those other Powers, Spain, Louis XIV, Napoleon, Kaiser Wilhelm II, had with our aid become the absolute masters of Europe, they could have despoiled

us, reduced us to insignificance and penury on the morrow of their victory."

Report of Carl J. Burkhardt of a conversation on 15 August 1938 with the Polish foreign minister Beck:[\[9\]](#)

"The Poles are waiting in apparent calm. Beck, during our nocturnal journey, made me privy to his plans to some extent. Furthermore, he is playing his double-game. It is no German game, as many French and the Polish opposition believe. It is a game in which the greatest profit is hoped for Poland, a profit which is supposed to come out of a final and unavoidable German catastrophe. For this reason, the Germans are being encouraged in their wrong actions, and in Danzig they are enjoying letting the extremists triumph while at the same time they repeatedly stress adherence to the outer form of the treaties. One day there will be a reckoning, interest and compound interest will be demanded. Already now, by collaborating in this way with the National Socialists, they have succeeded in creating a solidarity of aversion toward any revision of the treaties in the whole West, in France, England and America. [...] That was entirely different in 1932. At that time Western opinion in the great democracies for the most part supported the German minorities. People got excited over badly drawn borders, over isolated provinces. Thanks to the excessive methods of Nazism, all of that has ended, and now in Warsaw they are hoping not only for the unconditional integration of Danzig into the Polish state territory, but for much more, for all of East Prussia, for Silesia, even for Pomerania. In the year 1933 they still spoke in Warsaw of Polish Pomerania, but now they say 'our Pomerania.' Beck makes a purely Polish policy, ultimately an anti-German policy, a policy of only a seeming Polish-German détente, since the occupation of the Rhineland and the French passivity at the occasion of this event. But they are making efforts to encourage the Germans quite methodically in their errors."

Note of Eduard Benesch of August 23/24, 1939, in London:[\[10\]](#)

"It was a properly tough tactic, to drive Hitler to war."

Report of Friedrich Grimm concerning a visit in May 1945:[\[11\]](#)

"In May 1945, a few days after the collapse, I had a memorable discussion with an important representative of the opposing side. He introduced himself to me as a university professor of his nation who wished to talk with me about the historical foundations of the war. It was a conversation on an elevated level that we were having. Suddenly, he broke off and pointed to the leaflets which were lying on the table in front of me, with which we were flooded in the first days after the surrender and which were mainly concerned with the concentration camp atrocities. 'What do you say to that?' he asked me. I replied: 'Oradour and Buchenwald? You're beating a dead horse with me. I am an attorney and condemn injustice wherever I meet it, but most of all when it occurs on our side. Nonetheless, I know how to make a distinction between facts and the political usage made of them. I know what atrocity propaganda is. After the First World War, I read all publications of your experts concerning these questions, the writings of the Northcliff bureau, the book 'From War to Peace' of the French finance minister Klotz, in which he describes how the fairy tales about the hacked-off children's hands were invented, and what use was made of them, the enlightening writings of the magazine Crapouillot, which compares the atrocity propaganda of 1870 with that of 1914/1918, and finally the classic book by Ponsonby: 'Falsehood in Wartime.' In it, it is revealed that in the previous war they already had magazines in which artificial mountains of corpses were arranged by means of a photo montage with dolls. These pictures were distributed. In doing so, the captions were left blank. They were later inserted telephonically by propaganda headquarters according to need.' My visitor exploded: 'I see I've come across an expert. Now I also want to say who I am. I am no university professor. I am from the headquarters of which you have spoken. For months I have been conducting what you have correctly described: atrocity propaganda - and with it we have won the total victory.' I replied: 'I know and now you must stop!' He responded: 'No, now we are just properly beginning! We will continue this atrocity propaganda, we will increase it until no one will have a good word to say about the Germans any longer, until any of the sympathy you have had in other countries will have been destroyed, and until the Germans themselves will have fallen into such confusion that they no longer know what they are doing!' I ended the conversation: 'Then you will be taking a great

responsibility upon yourself!"

The British magazine Sunday Correspondent on September 17, 1989, for the fiftieth anniversary of the start of the Second World War and of the reunification marking it:[\[12\]](#)

"We must now be honest about the German question, as uncomfortable as it may be for the Germans, for our international partners and even ourselves [...] The question remains, in essence, the same. Not how do we prevent German tanks from rolling over the Oder or the Marne, but how Europe will deal with a people whose number, talent, and efficiency is allowing it to become our regional super-power. We did not enter the war in 1939 in order to save Germany from Hitler or the Jews from Auschwitz or the Continent from Fascism. As in 1914, we entered the war for the no less noble reason that we were not able to accept a German predominance in Europe."

Lech Walesa in an interview with the Dutch newspaper Elsevier of April 7, 1990:[\[13\]](#)

"I do not shrink even from making a declaration which makes me unpopular in Germany. If the Germans destabilize Europe anew in one way or another, one should no longer resort to a division, but rather simply eradicate the nation from the map. The East and the West possess the necessary advanced technologies to carry out this sentence."

Henry Kissinger in the Welt am Sonntag of November 13, 1994:

"President Clinton's idea of the USA and Germany as Partners in Leadership was not exactly very wise [...] Actually, this notion drives everyone to the barricades, for in the final analysis two world wars were waged in order to prevent just that, a dominant role of Germany."

The citations imply that all the wars, revolutions, persecutions and expulsions of the 20th century were matter-of-factly initiated by rationally planning nations or were tolerated, for the sake of power and money. In view of the apocalyptic terror and horror resulting from these undertakings, a clear analysis appears more practical than moral accusations.

For the British upper class - and their international partners - war is an entirely normal activity. The British pragmatically ask: How did our forebears hold it? What was their advantage? Did they not, for four hundred years, wage war against their main rival or the strongest continental power? One weighs, like a merchant: is it advantageous to wage war against France, can Austria hurt us? What will war against Germany bring us? 250 million pounds = 5 million marks per year? The security of our predominance? Must we fight against the USA later?

The thought of whether a war is morally defensible does not even occur! For it is, in any case, "tough" to drive someone to war. For war becomes a game, a double-game. For one places snares by quite methodically encouraging the opponent in his errors. In this 'game,' the 'greatest profit' entices. "Take inside Germany whatever you like": that's how one buys allies; for oneself, one takes money. Is it not better that the other, the enemy, totally disappears? Does he not destabilize the situation, imperil the loot, if he has recovered? Is it not better to exterminate the Germans at once? Is it not smarter to eradicate Germany from the map? *Germania esse delendam!* One has the advanced technologies - by which the neutron bomb is probably meant: the Germans would be dead and the loot intact.

For there is no honorable peace permitted. For the atrocity propaganda is to be continued and increased until no one will any longer have a good word to say about the enemy. The enemy becomes Evil in himself. The objection of Friedrich Grimm, which generally applies to such actions: "Then they will take a great responsibility upon themselves" - fails here. Responsibility toward the enemy does not exist and guilt not at all. Guilt, in this system, is merely a question of power. God isn't needed here, there is no God permitted! "Thou shalt not kill" devolved into meaningless chatter. Man puts himself in God's place.

The sponsors embracing such ideas are: a high British politician, Navy Minister of the First World War and Prime Minister of the Second World War; a former Czech state President; a Polish foreign minister of the year 1938; a Polish President of 1990; and a former American Secretary of State.

The continuity with which these ideas are pursued from 1895 to 1994 is alarming, and the matter-of-fact attitude with which not only the ideas, but also

their acceptance, are still presumed in 1989 by a probably broad public of a British weekly paper. Baffled, with Kissinger, that here it is no longer preventing a German predominance, which is discussed, since even the thought of a Germany as partner of the USA is pronounced dangerous.

Winston Churchill and Thomas More

What is the intellectual-historical background of the continuity of British policy? The model can be found in Utopia by Thomas More. Utopia, misread as social design, is a state with an aristocracy of priests, in which the priests are subject to no public court but only to god and their conscience. The system of government of the Utopians encompasses, in addition to the much-cited social model, a model for world rulership as well. Through the over-valuation of the "utopian" social model, the significance of More's ideas for the British power policy has been misapprehended - and, at least in this century, forgotten.[\[14\]](#)

Machiavelli had the Prince rule over his people and maintain himself against his neighbors. The Utopians, however, have mastery over the world. They decide worldwide over what is just and unjust, so, if "their friend's merchants in any part of the world have been unjustly accused under some pretext of justice, either by using unjust laws speciously or by interpreting good laws perversely." The Utopians are the ruling economic power of their world.[\[15\]](#) They hoard and pile up money, for money is the source of their power, the breaking off of trade relations one of their preferred weapons. In case of war, they buy soldiers and traitors with money, or sow discord between their foes, without any kind of moral restriction: "So easy it is to get someone to commit any crime whatsoever by means of bribe." Thanks to their wealth, most nations are in debt to them.[\[16\]](#) Along with Churchill, one can find in Utopia the foundations for a credo of Liberalism.[\[17\]](#)

Utopia, which appeared exactly 379 years before the first Saturday Review article, seems to have served British policy as a handbook. Even when it was published it was understood to be a political roman à clef: "In truth, the utopian flag marks British goods."[\[18\]](#) Set pieces from Utopia, which seem very familiar to the Germans, have left their imprint upon classical British policy: "[...] they stir up neighboring people and set them against their enemy by digging up ancient claims such as is never lacking to kings."[\[19\]](#) The mercilessness in conduct of war can also be found there. "Certainly, whether the cause was just or unjust, it was avenged by a hideous war, in which the surrounding nations also added their energy and resources to the hostile forces of the major opponents so that some prosperous peoples were ravaged, others were badly shaken."[\[20\]](#)

Also from More came the advice of having others fight for one, for in addition to mercenaries "they use the forces of those for whom they have taken up arms, and after that the auxiliary troops of their friendly nations. As a last resort do they add their own citizens."[\[21\]](#) (There are still numerous other references here to British policy, to deal with which would lead us too far afield.)

When Winston Churchill, in his secret speech of 1936 - 420 years after More had written the first part of his Utopia - adduced, as a four-hundred-year British policy, the struggle against the ruling tyrant, and then went on to claim: "thus we preserved the liberty of Europe," he was arguing in the tradition of the Utopians: [\[22\]](#)

"Therefore, [...] they are reluctant to go to war and also only [...] out of compassion and humanity, they use their force to liberate oppressed people from tyranny and servitude."

Charles VIII of France was viewed as an actual tyrant by More. In Utopia, More discusses his concrete situation in a fictional discussion between Charles VIII and his counselors.[\[23\]](#) With the pretense of disgust, the utopian techniques are illustrated here of inflaming others toward the actual enemy by means of money and plunder. In 1511 England entered the Holy League, by which the beginning of this four-hundred-year-old British war policy invoked by Churchill was probably made.

Common Sense...

The Saturday Review articles appeared anonymously between 1895 and 1897. But what sort of magazine was this? The German Brockhaus encyclopedia of 1908 mentions it as "imperialist 'magazine' published since 1855 with witty reviews of Engl., Fr. and German literature"[\[24\]](#) In accordance with its importance, it is found in many German libraries, and the annual series from 1855 are partially extant. There is not much that can be said about the readers, but they must surely have come from the educated upper class. A judgment concerning the contributors, among whom can be found many illustrious British names, is more easily made. Many of them published several times, a portion of them on a regular basis.

Many of the articles appear anonymously, which gives an even greater weight to the list of names, since it seems to have been customary in England for high-ranking and wealthy persons to have others write for them.[\[25\]](#) But in the period between 24 August 1895 and 11 September 1897, in which this series of articles appeared, there are renowned British names: G. Bernard Shaw,[\[26\]](#) H. G. Wells,[\[27\]](#) Winston S. Churchill,[\[28\]](#) W. B. Yeats,[\[29\]](#) Conan Doyle,[\[30\]](#) Henry M. Stanley,[\[31\]](#) Rudyard Kipling,[\[32\]](#) and Algernon Charles Swinburne.[\[33\]](#) Four of those named received Nobel prizes and one was very influential in the First World War and was the key figure in British politics in the Second World War.

The reputation of many other contributors is so significant that they are still named even 70 years later in one other German encyclopedia,[\[34\]](#) from which also the information about the authors was taken: Sir Max Beerbohm,[\[35\]](#) English writer and caricaturist from the circle around Wilde and Beardsley; John Bagnell Bury,[\[36\]](#) classical philologist and historian, professor at Cambridge and one of the most important scholars in the field of late ancient and Byzantine history, editor of E. Gibbons' History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire; Stephen Crane,[\[37\]](#) American writer, a friend of J. Conrad, H. James and H. G. Wells; John Davidson,[\[38\]](#) Scottish poet and dramatist; Charles Wentworth Dilke,[\[39\]](#) editor of the periodical Athenaeum as well as Member of the Lower House 1868-86 and 1892-1911, in the Foreign Office under Gladstone 1880-82 (Bit.-Fr. Trade Agreement of 1882), publicist and representative of a liberal imperialism; Edward Dowden,[\[40\]](#) British historian of literature,

professor in Dublin; Richard Garnett,[\[41\]](#) English writer and Librarian at the British Museum; Frank Harris,[\[42\]](#) American writer of Anglo-American descent and owner of The Saturday Review, who appointed G. B. Shaw as theater critic; William Henry Hudson,[\[43\]](#) English writer, whose books are distinguished by the exactitude of their descriptions of Nature; Sir Oliver Lodge,[\[44\]](#) British physicist, professor at Liverpool and first President of the University in Birmingham; Margaret Macdonald,[\[45\]](#) British proponent of arts and crafts, formed the Glasgow School in Birmingham with her sister and her husband, Ch. R. Mackintosh; Frederic William Henry Myers,[\[46\]](#) English writer, co-founder of the Society of Psychological Research; Coventry Patmore,[\[47\]](#) English poet; Sir Will(iam) Rothenstein,[\[48\]](#) British painter and graphic artist, influenced by Degas and Whistler, official painter of the war for the British and Canadian army in the First and Second World War; Arthur Symons,[\[49\]](#) English lyric poet and critic, most zealous advocate of Symbolism in England; Silvanus Phillips Thompson,[\[50\]](#) British physicist, Professor at Finsbury, made contributions to the history of Natural Science; Alfred Russel Wallace,[\[51\]](#) British zoologist and explorer; the impressions obtained from his journeys suggested to him the idea of natural selection by means of selection in the struggle for existence. Darwin intentionally beat him to publication and created with Bates the theory of mimicry; Sir William Watson,[\[52\]](#) English lyric poet, honored several times, yet not named "Poet Laureate," because he was an opponent of the policy of empire, from which an opposition to the above ideas may be deduced. The contributors were for the most part recruited from the wealthy educated middle class. I have scarcely found any well-known military figures, apart from two names: General Neville Chamberlain,[\[53\]](#) an old veteran of 70 from India, who does not appear in the above lexicon; in any case, he is probably distantly related to the political Chamberlain family, and Admiral Colomb,[\[54\]](#) the inventor of the Colomb signal apparatus.

Not one of these authors and not any of the readers objected to the proposals in The Saturday Review for the destruction of Germany or dismissed them as insane ideas, not even after these ideas were repeatedly put forward. The global lay-out of the idea of destruction with the biological and historical recourse to Darwin's Theory of Evolution, the analogy of Rome = Great Britain and Carthage = Germany, and the reference to Cato with his inflammatory speech for war: "Ceterum censeo Carthiginem esse delendam" reveals the wire-pullers.

Thus it was only consistent when further articles and letters to the editor were anchored upon the notion of destruction. The comparison of the British and the Roman Empire surfaced in a clear allusion to an appeal to destroy Germany in other texts in *The Saturday Review* in 1896. J.B. Bury^[55] analyzed the causes of the fall of Rome through the invasion of the Germans, in which he ascertained that Rome fell, not because of a moral decline, but rather because it did not possess at least a small class with a pronounced will to power. But Great Britain - according to Bury - possessed this class! In an anonymous letter to the editor of a "GREATER ENGLANDER"^[56] responding to the article by Bury, a superior fleet was promoted as the basis for the British world empire.

The growth of Germany's economic power was suspiciously observed. Above all, the increase in the German iron and steel exports was followed objectively in editorial articles^[57] or excitedly in an anonymous letter to the editor from a "Perplexed."^[58] But beyond this, a monster-image of Germany was also constructed. In order to prepare the path for replacing France with Germany as the arch-enemy, the English reader learned how unpopular the German and how well-liked the Frenchman was in England of those days, a fact that an Englishman who lived in England would not, however, have needed to learn from the newspapers. As another example, the war between Denmark and the German confederation in 1864 was falsified into an attack of Prussia against Denmark.^[59] As one of the few strategically placed exculpatory articles, one can possibly name an essay on Martin Luther, which refers to the fact that Luther makes the individual obligated to God before anything else.^[60]

...and its Antipode

Only George Bernard Shaw vehemently objected in the most manifold ways by word and deed to these ideas from 1898, although at first in a veiled manner, to the extent that he has become the chief witness for the prosecution against Great Britain. But in Germany the connection between Shaw's protests and the battle cry "Germania esse delendam" was not recognized.

Shaw's historical drama *Caesar and Cleopatra*, which appeared in 1898, is a unique answer to the insane ideas of the British middle class of *The Saturday Review*. The argument runs through the prologue, the drama and notes. In the play, Rome - analogous to Great Britain - stands at a crossroads. Shaw juxtaposes to the image of the old, power-hungry Rome which, like Pompey, claimed to "being himself a god",^[61] the other, new Rome of Caesar. By breaking with the old Rome, Caesar leads it to greatness and endurance.

Shaw glorifies Caesar as a duty-bound, kind and wise statesman. Thus, as if Shaw had had a presentiment of the Moscow show-trials, he has Caesar throw into the sea incriminating letters which his secretary Britannus (!), a repugnant character, proudly presented him because by using them Caesar would have power over his enemies. Caesar to Britannus:^[62]

"Would you have me to waste the next three years of my life in proscribing and condemning men who will be my friends when I proved that my friendship is worth more than Pompey's - than Cato's. [who at this time had been dead for 100 years and whose slogan "Cathago esse delendam" was annulled by Caesar] O incorrigible British Islander: am I a bull dog, to seek squarrels merely to shew show how stubborn my jaws are?"

In another scene, in desperate straits, in the spirit of old Rome inevitably at the start of a chain of murders, Caesar opposes this path and prophetically warns:^[63]

"And so, to the end of history, murder shall breed murder, always in the name of right and honor and peace, until the gods are tired of blood and create a race than can understand."

Instead of the statesman for Great Britain whom Shaw portrayed in his writing, Shaw found only Sir Edward Grey, "an unscrupulous imposter and fool, and worse [...] than Caesar Borgia",[\[64\]](#) and so twenty years later, he was no longer thinking of the welfare of Great Britain and the world, but only of that of his own soul. In *Heartbreak House*, which was written between the years 1913 and 1919, in imitation of Chekhov, he creates a portrait of the idle European society to which Scheler also makes reference. For Shaw, the attitude toward life of this class is typical for all nations of Europe:[\[65\]](#)

"The same nice people, the same extreme superficiality [...] they hated politics, they did not want the land of Utopia realized for the common man. They wanted their pet fantasies and favorite verses realized in their own lives, and if they were able to manage it, they lived lightheartedly from an income which they did nothing to earn!"

In *Heartbreak House*, an old seaman and a young girl - who, it seems to me, embody the young and the aging Shaw - encounter each other. The old man, paraphrasing Matthew 16:26, warns the young girl that she should be careful:[\[66\]](#)

"It is clever to win the whole world and thereby lose your soul. But do not forget that your soul does not abandon you if you hold it firmly; only the world has its way of melting away in your hands."

So much for the writer and his work. We will be returning yet to the politician and his words.

The Tough Kernel

The authors of the three anonymous articles quoted in the beginning are partly known. Concerning the author of the first article of August 24, 1895: "The Proper Foreign Policy for Us English," Hans Grimm, who in 1895 was in Great Britain as a young businessman, learned this about his host:[\[67\]](#)

"And it happened by chance that my boss, who himself belonged to the English Conservative Party, had been unexpectedly informed that that essay of August 24, 1895, on English foreign policy had originated from a quite definite faction in the English Foreign Office, directed by the half-German, Sir Eyre Crowe."

Behind the biologist, the author of the article of February 1, 1896: "A Biological Perspective on our English Foreign Policy by a Biologist," is concealed Sir P. Chalmers Mitchell, Professor of Astronomy and Biology at Oxford, as Hans Grimm likewise discovered.[\[68\]](#) According to Grimm, Mitchell was a Captain in the British General Staff from 1916 to 1919 and had connections to Crowe.

Information about the group around Crowe is given in a diary note of October 12, 1918, of First Lieutenant C. Repinton, in which he writes that Crowe, Mallet, and Tyrell will be going as negotiators from the Foreign Office to the planned peace conference. Moreover, he maintains:[\[69\]](#)

"They joined the F.O. between 1885 and 1893, and, with Carnock and Bertie, were the head and front of the anti-German party all along, vexed at our surrenders to Germany and persuaded that Germany planned our ruin. Between them they made the German peril the central feature of our foreign policy."

There is still one more to be counted as belonging to this circle of the F.O., whose significance for the outbreak of the First World War can hardly be overestimated: Sir Edward Grey.

In 1892, Edward Grey became parliamentary Under-Secretary under Lord Rosebery, who took over the Foreign Office. In 1895 Rosebery is voted out and Grey loses his office. Grey writes that these years were "very important" for his life.[\[70\]](#)

To these experiences clearly belongs also the world-view that England must oppose Germany and turn to France. In his memoirs, couched in a very vague diplomatic language, we read:[\[71\]](#)

"In light of after-events, the whole policy of these years from 1896 to 1904 may be criticized as having played into the hands of Germany."

Concrete criticism is expressed by Grey in this manner:[\[72\]](#)

"We relied on German support and we received it; but we never could be sure when some price for that support might not be extracted."

The England of Grey wanted to remain the sole master of the world and not share the power with anyone, most certainly not Germany. This is the basic thought, which runs through Grey's memoirs, and his joy when the British policy of 1904 draws closer to France expresses itself effusively in comparison with his otherwise dry text:[\[73\]](#)

"The real cause for satisfaction was that the exasperating friction with France was to end, and that the menace of war with France had disappeared. The gloomy clouds were gone, the sky was clear, and the sun shone warmly. Ill-will, dislike, hate, whether the object of them be a person or a nation, are a perpetual discomfort; they come between us and all that is beautiful and happy; they put out the sun. If the object be a nation with whom our interests are in contact, they poison the atmosphere of international affairs. This had been so between Great Britain and France. [...] That was all to be changed; it was to become positively pleasant, where we had seen before only what was repellant; to understand and to be understood where before there had been misrepresentation and misconstruction; to have friends instead of enemies - this, when it happens, is one of the great pleasures of life."

Of course, the price for this was "perpetual discomfort," "poison," "misrepresentation," and "misconstruction" in the relationship to Germany, but that did apparently not let anything come between Grey and "all that is beautiful and happy." In Grey's eyes, France was no longer a match for England, whereas Germany was about to outperform England economically. In 1905, Grey took over the Foreign Office and subsequently surrounded himself with the gentlemen

from the anti-German circle of the Foreign Office. Crowe, Mallet, Tyrell, and Bertie all reached key positions and collaborated closely with Grey. Carnock is the only one about whom I did not find anything. Bertie had already previously been ambassador in Paris and in future formed one of the pillars of the new British policy.[\[74\]](#) According to Margaret Bovari, the ambassadors of the most important European nations were exchanged under Grey, but the Parisian embassy, with Sir F. Bertie, remained unchanged, and "it emerges from the private letters between him and Grey that close relations and an excellent accord must have prevailed between the two men." From 1905 to 1906, Louis Mallet was Private Secretary to Grey, and from 1906 to 1907, he was Senior Clerk in the Foreign Office. From 1907-1913, he was Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and diplomat in Constantinople between 1913 and 1914. Margaret Boveri sees the influence of Mallet upon Grey as having been "considerable" and numbers him "amongst the most zealous advocates of English-Russian friendship. Still more pronounced with him than this tendency is the anti-German attitude." William Tyrell was Senior Clerk in the Foreign Office from 1907 to 1918 and from 1907 to 1915 he was Private Secretary to Edward Grey.[\[75\]](#)

In his memoirs, Grey especially emphasized Tyrell and writes in reference to him:[\[76\]](#)

"The public little or no means of knowing how much it owes in public service to special gifts and qualities in individual civil servants in high positions in the Department of State. In each case, where such qualities exist, a man renders service peculiarly his own, besides taking an able part in the conduct of business in the Department. [...] I had the occasion, in office to know the great value of Tyrell's public service; but the thing that is prize is our friendship, that began in the Foreign Office, and has continued uninterrupted and intimate after official ties ceased."

Eyre Crowe finally became Senior Clerk in the Foreign Office in 1906 and was Assistant Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs from 1912 to 1920.[\[77\]](#) His role in the British policy toward Germany cannot be overestimated. For Hermann Lutz, expert in the investigatory committee of the Reichstag for the war-guilt question, Eyre Crowe is "the Evil Spirit of the Foreign Office.",[\[78\]](#) and Margaret Boveri confirms this:[\[79\]](#)

"Although we [...] must assess his direct influence upon the daily decisions in the Foreign Office as small [because of his relatively low position; due to his German mother he presumably climbed only slowly], his fixed stance was however surely of enormous effect upon the shaping of the atmosphere which prevailed in the Western Department and from which policy was made."

It should be briefly remarked - this will be developed later - that from a subordinate position, as expert on Germany, Crowe decisively influenced official policy several times. Edward Grey himself gives Crowe prominent mention in his memoirs:

"It has been a great satisfaction since I left office to see great knowledge, ability and unsurpassed devotion to the public service recognized in the promotion of Sir Eyre Crowe to be head of the Foreign Office."

And he added as a footnote:

"Since these words were written the public service of the country has suffered an irreparable loss in the death of Sir Eyre Crowe."

Under Grey, the anti-German circles which were behind the Saturday Review article of 1895, thereby ascended to key positions.

Grey knew portions of the pattern of thinking there and approved indirectly. Thus, Grey recorded a conversation of 28 April 1908 with Clemenceau and considered it to be so important that he included it as one of the few documents in his memoirs. There we read:[\[81\]](#)

"M. Clemenceau had some conversation with me at the Foreign Office this morning.

He dwelt with great emphasis upon the certainty that we should have to intervene on the continent of Europe against any power which attained a position of domination there, just as we had had to do in the time of Napoleon.

He said we ought to be prepared for this. [...] He felt this to be most important. The fate of Napoleon had been decided not at Trafalgar but at

Waterloo. And so it would have to be again, in the case of any Power which attempted to dominate the continent."

Clemenceau is consciously making use of those modes of thought from the Saturday Review articles in order to drive England into war against Germany, and Grey responds in such a way that not only are these modes of thought familiar to him, but he is also influenced by them. This is also shown by a quotation from Grey, which is found in Margaret Boveri:[\[82\]](#)

"The Germans are not clear about the fact that England always has gotten into opposition to or has intentionally proceeded against any power which establishes a hegemony in Europe."

By his conduct, Grey deceived many Germans about his anti-German attitude, and not only diplomats but also scientists, to the extent that caused Hans Rothfels to derisively refer to the remark of a Prussian artillery lieutenant concerning Napoleon:[\[83\]](#)

"A kindhearted fellow, but stupid, stupid."

As a contributor to The Saturday Review in the years from 1895 to 1897, G.B. Shaw was of course familiar with the anti-German development and surely knew the authors of the articles agitating against Germany. He tried to warn the German ambassador Lichnowsky in London about Grey and his policy. He laid out a proposal to Lichnowsky. Shaw:[\[84\]](#)

"He rejected it without reflecting for a moment. It was inappropriate [he said], because Sir Edward Grey was one of the greatest living statesmen, moreover the most sincere friend of Germany. I could [...] not raise my hands to heaven and, with Huss, cry out: Sancta simplicitas [holy simpleton]! Besides, it was of course Lichnowsky, not I, who was going to the stake. [...] It was not my task to enlighten the Duke about the fact that he was walking straight into a trap."

A trap so thorough in construction that Shaw writes concerning the British wirepullers on the occasion of the outbreak of the First World War:[\[85\]](#)

"They felt in this important hour, as though England was lost if but a

single traitor in their midst let out into the world a tiny kernel of truth about anything."

From 1905 onward, the Foreign Office begins systematically to construct a front with Russia and France against Germany. This development is proven on the basis of the public documents from the German side after the lost war. Crowe, but not only he, worked systematically against Germany through numerous papers, but above all through his memorandum of January 1, 1907,[\[86\]](#) in which he claimed that Germany was striving for world rule and wanted to secretly attack England. In a counter-expert opinion, Sanderson, Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs from 1894 to 1906, dismissed the worst distortions in Crowe's memorandum. Grey passed the paper on only to his like-minded comrades; otherwise it went nowhere.[\[87\]](#)

It would lead us too far afield to present all the lies, distortions, misrepresentations and ploys with which Grey, Crowe, and Company prepared the way for a war against Germany. They have been thoroughly explored to the last detail in many investigations in Germany.[\[88\]](#)

G.B. Shaw has reduced the First World War to this nullity:

"The present destruction of the German military power is [...] a completely regular operation of British foreign policy, which was executed according to plan with all the resolve, patience, cunning and power which we in England are accustomed to use, and with overwhelming success. But likewise also, however, with the amazing English talent of veiling from oneself what one is doing. The Englishman never knows what the 'Foreign Office' is up to; [...] An instinct tells him that it is better for him [...] not to know."

The whole text is rife with such quotations and others, which describe the techniques and partly the motive of British imperialism. Concerning the key role of Grey and his methods, one more citation:

"Grey was not ruined over his mistakes; rather, for him the fact became fatal that the necessity of feeding the British public a children's fairy-tale about the nature and causes of the war made it impossible for him to highlight his triumph; for this was of a kind which he himself had

described as machiavellian."

There is also a solid fact, which proves that Shaw knew exactly what he was talking about, that he knew the fundamental ideas of Grey. In 1912, he made a public proposal for how the peace could be kept; that is what he had also laid out to Lichnowsky:[\[89\]](#)

"In order to avoid war, England would have to strengthen its army as guardian over the balance of powers and officially and unambiguously declare that in the event of a German attack on France, it will throw its sword onto the scales in favor of the latter. But on the other hand, it would have to give its assurance that it will defend Germany in the event the latter is attacked by Russia or France or by both."

According to all that is known today, the First World War of 1914 would not have happened. Germany would have been able to calmly put up with the parade from Russia toward its borders!

The Enemy as Criminal

War as Armageddon, where the opponent is no longer only the opponent and, ultimately, the defeated party, but is, rather, absolute Evil, had already been prognosticated by the Saturday Review on February 1, 1896. After the Second World War this path was then consistently trodden by means of war crimes trials and more. That these trials were directed against Germany as such is shown by the Charter of the United Nations, which withholds human rights and the right to self-determination from Germany. Since the Charter is also directed against Japan, which is, however, not charged with 'unique' crimes, the true background becomes obvious: it was directed against the two great non-Western economic powers and therefore was about safeguarding the most sacred treasure of the West: the key to power and material wealth.

War crimes trials were already demanded by the victors at the end of the First World War. The behavior of Eyre Crowe allows us to presume that he was the political initiator of this demand, unusual in modern European history. Lutz writes:[\[90\]](#)

"It is typical that the statements of the German delegation in Paris regarding the extradition of the German 'war criminals' made a certain impression upon all, apart from the representative of England, Sir Eyre Crowe, who conducted himself in a completely negative way and was almost offensive."

Winston S. Churchill, who was connected to these circles and their activities not only through his collaboration at The Saturday Review, subsequently promote the continuation of this British policy; he also had an affectionate relationship with Grey, about which Wilfrid Scrawen Blunt reports in his diaries:

"Winston nevertheless wants nothing to be said about Grey other than that he is a shining example of an Englishman, the best of his type, and they are obviously good friends; in fact, Grey is the godfather of Winston's son."

His role as Navy minister is well-known, in which he brought about an assemblage of the British Mediterranean fleet by an order of July 30, 1914, that

is, before the outbreak of the war, which, in case of in a war between Germany and France, would have pulled England into the war under any circumstances, even without a marching through Belgium of German troops.[\[91\]](#)

"Quite a few things seem to have been handed down here due to the brisk-and-lively manner in which Churchill wanted to see foreign policy conducted," according to Margaret Boveri, who also cites a letter from Mallet to Grey, which warns against indiscretions which "will slip out of Churchill during maneuvers."[\[92\]](#) To this character weakness of Churchill we presumably owe knowledge of the secret speech of March 1936, which was cited above. The text of the speech was passed on in April 1936 to the German embassy in London.[\[93\]](#) After the Second World War, Churchill published the speech in *The Second World War - The Gathering Storm* in the Boston edition of 1948. Presumably there was some intervention, since in the London edition of 1948 and naturally, of course, in the German edition, it is missing!

Here Churchill declares:

"For, believe me, if any of these other powers, like Spain, Louis XIV, Kaiser Wilhelm, had become absolute ruler of Europe through our assistance, then they would have robbed us and on the morning after their victory have condemned us to insignificance and poverty."

Here it is once again, the void which is the gist of it all: power and money - the rest is window-dressing! Neither the victory over Spain, nor that over Louis XIV or Napoleon, which of course also belongs in this roll call, led to the triumph of democracy in these nations! How things went for the people in these systems was a matter of total indifference to the powerful in Great Britain - and democracy, which was allegedly so important according to Western propaganda, was not only withheld from the French and the Spanish, but also from their own subjects.[\[3\]](#)

For had the struggle really been waged against the tyrant and for democracy, then British policy would have had to vehemently and energetically oppose the Soviet Union, be it only by means of continuous massive support of the Whites against the Reds. In the 20th century, morality was discovered as a weapon and directed against Germany. By labeling the enemy a criminal, one justifies any

crime against him! By raising his crimes to the status of 'uniqueness,' one relativizes and trivializes any other crime into insignificance!

False Parallels

As is well known, Rome and Carthage fought three wars, Great Britain and Germany, so far, only two! Since Germany has been reunified and Communism has collapsed, as a result of which German assistance against the Soviet Union is no longer needed, this Carthage Syndrome surfaced again. Kissinger and Walesa, whose greed for loot is immeasurable, were cited. But there are still other texts without aggressive background, which give reason for hope.

On March 12, 1948, a few days after the downfall in the CSR and the subsequent suicide of Jan Masaryk, the Chief Prosecutor for Great Britain at the Nuremberg war crime trials, Sir Hartley Shawcross, stated according to the London Times: [\[94\]](#)

"Step by step I have been forced more and more to the conclusion that the aims of Communism in Europe are sinister and deadly aims. I prosecuted the Nazis in Nuremberg. With my Russian colleagues I condemned Nazi aggression and Nazi terror.[\[95\]](#) I feel shame and humiliation now to see under a different name the same aims pursued, the same technique followed, without check."

The international edition of the U.S. magazine Newsweek wrote on May 8, 1995, the 50th anniversary of the unconditional surrender of the German Armed Forces:[\[96\]](#)

"The chiefs of state who are assembling this week for the solemn remembrance of the end of the Second World War, will formally dedicate themselves to the theme of reconciliation. The winners of the year 1945 showed toward the losers an unusual degree of generosity, as they had not done after the First World War - with disastrous consequences. However, the state which first brought about this reconciliation will not be taking part in the gathering. It is the Soviet Union, whose ideological menace caused the victorious Western powers to put Germany and Japan on their feet again in the framework of a free-market economy and political democracy. More closely considered, this war did not end even in 1945. Those who were waging war merely found themselves in new systems of alliances, and with modified tactics. The end did not come until 1990-91,

when Germany was reunified and the Soviet Union imploded. According to this general view of the chronology, it can be said that the war lasted seventy-five years. The Kaiser and Hitler lost and Germany has won."

And the German government? A small episode proves that those who govern there know much better than the governed what is going on globally. When then British Prime Minister John Major, in his address in Berlin for the 50th anniversary of the war's end, spoke of the second Thirty Years War from 1914-1945:

"Fifty years ago Europe saw the end of the 30 Years War, 1914 to 1945. The slaughter in the trenches, the destruction of cities and the oppression of citizens: all these left a Europe in ruins just as the other 30 Years War did three centuries before."

The Bulletin of the German government (No. 38, May 12, 1995) falsified the text of the speech into:

"Vor fünfzig Jahren erlebte Europa das Ende der dreißig Jahre, die nicht einen, sondern zwei Weltkriege beinhaltet hatten. Das Gemetzel in den Schützengräben, die Zerstörung der Städte und die Unterdrückung der Bürger hinterließen ein Europa in Trümmern, gerade, wie es einige Jahrhunderte zuvor der Dreißigjährige Krieg getan hatten."

In English:

"Fifty years ago, Europe experienced the end of the thirty years which encompassed not one, but two world wars. The slaughter in the trenches, the destruction of cities and the oppression of citizens left behind a Europe in ruins, just as the Thirty Years War had done some centuries before."

But still weeks after the speech, the British embassy sent the upper text with the clear formulation "the other 30 Years War"! By the will of the German Federal Government, the fact that Major sees the First and Second World War as parts of a single event, was not allowed to become publicly known in Germany.

Berthold Brecht once wrote warningly, with an eye on Germany:[\[97\]](#)

"Great Carthage waged three wars. It was still powerful after the first, still

inhabitable after the second. After the third, it could no longer be found."

After the First World War, a foreign diplomat expressed to Churchill:[\[98\]](#)

"In the twenty years of my residency there, I was witness to a profound and total revolution in England, even as the French Revolution was. The ruling classes in your country have been almost completely robbed of their political power and, to a large extent, their prosperity and property as well; and all this [...] without the loss of a single human life."

The European upper classes, the idle ones of Scheler and Shaw, who wanted to be "clever" as they went out of their way to start a war, they have paid! Anastasia, the wife of the Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolayevitch - who, in 1914 after a murder in Sarajevo, is supposed to have called out triumphantly to Poincaré: "War will break out. Nothing more will remain of Austria [...] Germany will be destroyed!"[\[99\]](#) - lost everything!

In 1947, after the Second World War, India, the Crown of the British Empire, became independent. Egypt freed itself from Great Britain and subsequently Great Britain had to cede the Suez Canal. In 1957 the Gold Coast became the first independent state of Black Africa, after which a large number of colonies followed. Churchill had yet to learn what Shaw knew: that the world for which one exchanged one's soul, had its own way of melting in one's hands. Not even the First, and most certainly not the Second World War, Great Britain was able to win by its own resources! From a position as master of the world, Great Britain was relegated to insignificance, and the descent seems not to have come to an end yet. New powers are arising. Their influence, by means of the modern terrorist techniques of war and the unhesitating way with which they are used, can easily grow to extreme proportions. They are staking claims and creating new centers of conflict. They threaten to unite the Islamic powers and Fundamentalism. A new war against Germany would propel their power into the stratosphere. It is to be feared that powerful groups will continue not to see that the world of today is much larger than the White man's world.

In any case, the analogy of Rome = Great Britain and Carthage = Germany is false. For Carthage was the commercial and sea power and Rome the land power of antiquity! Brecht was a master of language, but had no head for politics. His

history would tell a different story today: Great Britain won two wars. It was still powerful after the first, still inhabitable after the second. Does anyone seriously believe that Great Britain could dare to wage yet a third war against Germany?

Who Broke the Disarmament Treaty of Versailles?

*Declaration of the Government of the German Reich
March 16, 1935*

In November of 1918, when the German people - trusting in the assurances given in Wilson's Fourteen Points - surrendered after 4½ years of heroic resistance in a war whose outbreak they had never desired, they believed that in doing so they had done a service not only to tormented humanity but also to a great Idea *per se*. While they themselves were suffering the most under the consequences of this insane struggle, the millions of Germans trustingly reached out to the idea of a reconfiguration of international relations which was to be ennobled by the elimination of secret diplomacy as well as of the terrible means of war.

Perhaps no other nation has welcomed the idea of a League of Nations as eagerly as the German one, deserted by all earthly happiness. Only in this context is it understandable that the at times downright senseless conditions of destruction of each and every means of defense was not only accepted but also carried out by the German people. The German people and particularly their government at that time were convinced that meeting the disarmament stipulations set out by the Treaty of Versailles would initiate and guarantee the beginning of international, general disarmament, as promised by the Treaty. For only such a bilateral fulfillment of this obligation imposed by the Treaty could justify a demand which, if imposed and carried out one-sidedly, could not but have turned into an eternal disparagement and thus a declaration of inferiority of a great nation. In light of this, however, such a peace treaty could never be the prerequisite for a true inner reconciliation of nations and thus a herald of global peace; it could only be the prerequisite for an eternally festering hatred.

According to the assessment of the inter-Allied Control Commission, Germany has met the disarmament obligations imposed on her.

The following are the works of destruction of the German defense forces and their means, as confirmed by this Commission:

A. Army weapons that were destroyed:

59,897	artillery guns and barrels,
130,558	machine guns,
31,470	mortars and barrels,
6,007,000	rifles and carbines,
243,937	machine gun barrels,
28,001	gun carriages,
4,390	mortar carriages,
38,750,000	larger caliber shells,
16,550,000	hand and rifle grenades,
60,400,000	live fuses,
491,000,000	hand weapon munitions,
335,000	tons of cartridges,
23,515	tons of cartridge cases,
37,600	tons of gunpowder,
79,500	ammunitions dismantlers,
212,000	telephones,
1,072	flame throwers,
31	armored trains,

59	tanks,
1,762	surveillance vehicles,
8,982	wireless stations,
1,240	field bakeries,
2,199	pontoons,
981.7	tons of equipment for soldiers,
8,230,350	sets of equipment for soldiers,
7,300	pistols and revolvers,
180	machine gun sleds,
21	mobile workshops,
12	anti-aircraft gun carriers,
11	heavy-duty gun carriers,
64,000	steel helmets,
174,000	gas masks,
2,500	machines of the former war industry,
8,000	rifle barrels.

**B. Air force weapons that were
destroyed:**

fighter and bomber

15,714 planes,
27,757 airplane engines.

C. Naval weapons that were destroyed:

26 capital ships,
4 armored coastal patrol
boats,
4 armored cruisers,
19 small cruisers,
21 training and special
ships,
83 torpedo boats,
315 submarines.

Further, the following had to be destroyed:

Vehicles of all kinds, means for gas warfare and some for protection from gas, propellants and explosives, floodlights, sighting devices, distance and sound range finders, optical instruments of all kinds, horse harnesses, narrow gauge railway equipment, field printing presses, field kitchens, workshops, cutting and stabbing weapons, steel helmets, materials for the transport of ammunition, standard and special machines of the war industry, as well as jigs, blueprints of the same, ship and airplane hangars, etc.

After this historically unparalleled fulfillment of a contract, the German people were entitled to expect the discharge of the obligations agreed upon by the other side as well. For:

1. Germany had disarmed.
2. The peace treaty had expressly demanded that Germany was to be disarmed as a prerequisite for a general disarmament, that is, it was thereby claimed that Germany being armed was the sole reason why the other nations were also armed.
3. In their governments as well as in their political parties, the German people were at that time of a mind-set which completely lived up to the pacifist-democratic ideals of the League of Nations.

But while Germany had fulfilled her obligations, the other parties to the contract neglected to fulfil their own.

That is, the high contracting officials of the former victor nations unilaterally broke away from the obligations of the Treaty of Versailles.

It was not enough, however, that any disarmament comparable in any way to the German destruction of arms was dispensed with; no: the arming process was not even halted. Quite the contrary, further escalation became evident in a whole number of nations.

In terms of new machinery of destruction, what had been invented during wartime was now being perfected with methodical, scientific work during peacetime. Continual improvements were being made in the creation of powerful land tanks as well as new fighting and bombing machines. New and gigantic artillery was being built, new explosive, incendiary and gas bombs were being manufactured.

Since then, the world has resounded with war-cries just as though there had never been a world war and as though a Treaty of Versailles had never been signed.

In the midst of these nations heavily armed for war and availing themselves increasingly of the newest motorized forces, Germany was a defenseless power void and at the mercy of any threat. The German people remember the misfortune and tragedy of 15 years of economic impoverishment and political humiliation.

It was thus understandable that Germany began to urge that the other nations should keep their own promise of disarmament. For this much is clear:

A hundred years' peace would have to be an immeasurable blessing for the world. A hundred years' split into victors and vanquished, however, is something the world cannot bear.

The urging of the people resulted in attempts to achieve, through conferences, a general decrease in the level of armament.

In this way, the first proposals for international armament agreements developed, of which the Macdonald Plan was most significant.

Germany was prepared to accept this plan and to make it the foundation for agreements.

The Macdonald Plan failed because it was rejected by other nations. Since the equality that had been solemnly guaranteed the German people in the declaration of December 1932 did not come about under these circumstances, the new German government, in its role as the guardian of the German people's honor and natural rights, saw itself no longer able to participate in such conferences or to remain in the League of Nations.

But even after leaving Geneva, the German government was still willing to not only consider proposals by other nations, but also to advance suggestions of its own. In doing so, it espoused the view coined by the other nations themselves, that the creation of short-term armies is unsuitable for attack purposes and is thus to be recommended for peaceful defense.

Therefore the German government was prepared to change the long-term *Reichswehr* into a short-term army in accordance with the other nations' wishes. Its proposals of winter 1933/34 were feasible. However, their rejection, and the rejection of similar Italian and British outlines, showed that there was no longer any inclination among the other parties to the Treaty of Versailles towards even a belated fulfilment of the spirit of the disarmament stipulations of Versailles.

Under these circumstances, the German government saw itself compelled to take the initiative towards those necessary measures that could ensure an end to the no less degrading than dangerous condition of a great people's and nation's

impotent defenselessness.

It based this action on the same consideration that Minister Baldwin had expressed so aptly:

"A nation that is not willing to take the necessary precautionary measures for its own defense will never have any power in the world, neither of the moral nor of the material kind."

But the government of today's German Reich desires only one moral and material power, namely to be able to safeguard the peace for the Reich and thereby probably also for all of Europe.

Thus, the German government has continued to do whatever was in its power and could serve to promote peace.

1. A long time ago already, the German government offered to conclude non-aggression pacts with its neighboring countries.
2. With its eastern neighbor, Poland, the German government has sought and reached a contractual settlement which, thanks to great accommodation and understanding, will hopefully have defused the menacing situation which the government was faced with at the time it took power, and which it hopes will lead to a lasting understanding and friendship between the two peoples.
3. Finally, the German government has given France the solemn assurance that after the question of the Saarland has been settled, it will make no further territorial demands or requests of France. The government believes that through this great political and material sacrifice of a historically uncommon kind, it has created the prerequisite for ending a centuries-old quarrel between two great nations.

To its regret, however, the German government has seen that a continued escalation of the arms process is taking place in the rest of the world. In the creation of a Soviet-Russian army of 101 divisions, i.e. an admitted peacetime strength of 960,000 men, it discerns a danger that could not be anticipated at the time the Treaty of Versailles was drawn up.

In the heightening of similar measures by the other nations, the German

government sees further proof that these nations have rejected the once solemnly proclaimed disarmament contract. The German government does not wish to bring accusations against any one nation; but it must point out that by deciding to introduce a two-year period of military service, France has given up on the principle of *short-term* armies in favor of a long-term army.

This principle, however, was one of the reasons for the earlier demand that Germany should relinquish her army.

Under these circumstances, the German government feels that it is impossible to continue to suspend the measures necessary for the security of the Reich, much less to keep the rest of the world from knowing of these measures.

If, therefore, it complies with the British Minister Baldwin's wish and clarifies German intentions, this is done

1. in order to give the German people the conviction, and the other nations the understanding, that the preservation of the German Reich's honor and security is now again entrusted to the German nation's own power;
2. in order to refute, by declaring the extent of these measures, those assertions with which the German people are accused of striving for military supremacy in Europe.

The German government as guardian of the honor and interests of the German nation desires to secure the necessary extent of those instruments of power that are required to preserve the intactness of the German Reich and to ensure the international regard for and consideration of Germany as fellow guarantor of general peace.

At this time the German government reaffirms, both to the German people and to the world, its determination that its rearming shall not be for military aggression, but a pledge for its defense and thus for the preservation of peace.

The German government hereby expresses the confident hope that as the German people find their way back to their honor, they will - in the spirit of independent equality - be granted the chance to make their contribution to the pacification of the world in free and open co-operation with the other nations and their governments.

What the World Rejected

Mark Weber, 2013

A foreword to 'Hitler's Peace Offers 1933-1939'

Even many people who consider themselves well-informed about Adolf Hitler and the Third Reich are ignorant of the German leader's numerous efforts for peace in Europe, including serious proposals for armaments reductions, and limits on weapons deployment, which were spurned by the leaders of France, Britain and other powers.

Hitler's first major speech on foreign policy after taking office as Chancellor, delivered to the Reichstag on May 17, 1933, was a plea for peace, equal rights and mutual understanding among nations. So reasonable and persuasively argued was his appeal that it was endorsed even by representatives of the opposition Social Democratic Party. Two years later, in his Reichstag address of May 21, 1935, the German leader again stressed the need for peace on the basis of mutual respect and equal rights. Even the London Times regarded this speech as "reasonable, straightforward and comprehensive."

Such appeals were not mere rhetoric. On March 31, 1936, for example, Hitler's government announced a comprehensive plan for strengthening peace in Europe. The detailed paper included numerous specific proposals, including demilitarization of the entire Rhineland region, a western Europe security agreement, and categorical prohibition of incendiary bombs, poison gas, heavy tanks and heavy artillery.

Although this wide-ranging offer, and others like it, were rejected by leaders in London, Paris, Warsaw and Prague, Hitler's initiatives were not entirely fruitless. In January 1934, for example, his government concluded a ten-year non-aggression pact with Poland. (Unfortunately, the spirit of this treaty was later broken by the men who took power in Warsaw after the death of Poland's Marshal Pilsudski in 1935.) One of Hitler's most important foreign policy successes was a comprehensive naval agreement with Britain, signed in June

1935. (This agreement, incidentally, abrogated the Treaty of Versailles, thereby showing that neither London nor Berlin still regarded it as valid.)

For years Hitler sought an alliance with Britain, or least a cordial relationship based on mutual respect. In that effort, he took care not to offend British pride or sensibilities, or to make any proposal that might impair or threaten British interests. Hitler also worked for cordial relations with France, likewise taking care not to say or do anything that might offend French pride or infringe on French national interests. The sincerity of Hitler's proposals to France, and the validity of his fear of possible French military aggression against Germany is underscored by the immense manpower and funding resources he devoted to construction of the vast Westwall ("Siegfried Line") defensive fortifications on his nation's western border.

Over the years, historians have tended either to ignore Hitler's initiatives for reducing tensions and promoting peace, or to dismiss them as deceitful posturing. But if the responsible leaders in Britain and France during the 1930s had really regarded these proposals as bluff or insincere pretense, they could easily have exposed them as such by giving them serious consideration. Their unresponsive attitude suggests that they understood that Hitler's proposals were sincere, but rejected them anyway because to accept them might jeopardize British-French political- military predominance in Europe.

In the following essay, a German scholar reviews proposals by Hitler and his government -- especially in the years before the outbreak of war in 1939 -- to promote peace and equal rights in Europe, reduce tensions, and greatly limit production and deployment of armaments.

The author, Friedrich Stieve (1884-1966), was a German historian and diplomat. During the First World War he served as press attaché with the German embassy in Stockholm. He represented Germany's democratic government as his nation's ambassador in Latvia, 1928- 1932. He then moved to Berlin where he headed the cultural- political affairs bureau of the German Foreign Office, 1932- 1939. He held a doctorate from the University of Heidelberg, and was a member of the Prussian Academy of Sciences. Books by Stieve include *Geschichte des deutschen Volkes* (1939), *Wendepunkte europäischer Geschichte vom Dreißigjährigen Krieg bis zur Gegenwart* (1941), and a collection of poems.

Here, below, is a translation of the lengthy essay by Dr. Stieve, *Was die Welt nicht wollte: Hitlers Friedensangebote 1933-1939*, issued by the “German Information Center” and published as a 16-page booklet in Berlin in 1940. Along with editions that were soon issued in French and Spanish, an English-language edition was published as a booklet, apparently in 1940, by the Washington Journal of Washington, DC.

Hitler did not want war in 1939 – and certainly not a general or global conflict. He earnestly sought a peaceful resolution of the dispute with Poland over the status of the ethnically German city-state of Danzig and the “Corridor” region, which was the immediate cause of conflict. The sincerity of his desire for peace in 1939, and his fear of another world war, has been affirmed by a number of scholars, including the eminent British historian A. J. P. Taylor. It was, of course, the declarations of war against Germany by Britain and France on Sept. 3, 1939, made with secret encouragement by US President Roosevelt, that transformed the limited German-Polish clash into a larger, continent-wide war.

To justify its declaration of war, Britain protested that Germany had violated Polish sovereignty, and threatened Poland’s independence. The emptiness and insincerity of these stated reasons is shown by the fact that the British leaders did not declare war against Soviet Russia two weeks later when Soviet forces attacked the Polish Republic from the East. Britain’s betrayal of Poland, and the hypocrisy of its claimed reasons for going to war against Germany in 1939, became even more obvious in 1944-45 when Britain’s leaders permitted the complete Soviet takeover and subjugation of Poland.

Germany’s six-week military campaign of May-June 1940 ended with a stunning victory over numerically superior French and British forces, and the rout of British troops from the European mainland. In the aftermath of this historic triumph, Hitler and his government made yet another important effort to end the war. (Because it was made in 1940, after Dr. Stieve’s essay was written and published, it is not included in the text, below.)

In a speech delivered to the Reichstag on July 19, 1940, which was broadcast on radio stations around the world, the German leader said:

“... From London I now hear a cry – it’s not the cry of the mass of people,

but rather of politicians – that the war must now, all the more, be continued ... Believe me, my deputies, I feel an inner disgust at this kind of unscrupulous parliamentary destroyers of peoples and countries ... It never has been my intention to wage wars, but rather to build a new social state of the highest cultural level. Every year of this war keeps me from this work ... Mr. Churchill has now once again declared that he wants war ... I am fully aware that with our response, which one day will come, will also come nameless suffering and misfortune for many people ...

“... In this hour I feel compelled, standing before my conscience, to direct yet another appeal to reason in England. I believe I can do this as I am not pleading for something as the vanquished, but rather, as the victor speaking in the name of reason. I see no compelling reason for this war to continue. I am grieved to think of the sacrifices it will claim ... Possibly Mr. Churchill again will brush aside this statement of mine by saying that it is merely an expression of fear and of doubt in our final victory. In that case I shall have relieved my conscience in regard to the things to come.”

Following up on this appeal, German officials reached out to Britain through diplomatic channels. But Winston Churchill and his government rejected this initiative, and instead insisted on continuing the war. – with, of course, horrific consequences for Europe and the world.

Hitler's Peace Offers, 1933- 1939

By Friedrich Stieve

Germany's enemies maintain today that Adolf Hitler is the greatest disturber of peace known to history, that he threatens every nation with sudden attack and oppression, that he has created a terrible war machine in order to bring misery and devastation everywhere. At the same time they intentionally conceal an all-important fact: they themselves drove the leader of the German people finally to draw the sword. They themselves compelled him to seek to obtain at last by the use of force that which he had been striving to gain by persuasion from the beginning: the security of his country. They did this not only by declaring war on him on September 3, 1939, but also by blocking step by step for seven years the path to any peaceful discussion.

The attempts repeatedly made by Adolf Hitler to induce the governments of other states to join with him in a collaborative restoration of Europe are part of an ever-recurring pattern in his conduct since the commencement of his labors for the German Reich. But these attempts were wrecked every time due to the fact that nowhere was there any willingness to give them due consideration, because the evil spirit of the [first] World War still prevailed everywhere, because in London and Paris and in the capitals of the western powers' vassal states there was only one fixed intention: to perpetuate the power of [the imposed] Versailles [settlement of 1919].

A quick look at the most important events provides incontrovertible proof of this.

When Adolf Hitler came to the fore, Germany was as gagged and as helpless as the victors of 1918 intended her to be. Completely disarmed, with an army of only 100,000 men meant solely for police duties within the country, she found herself within a tightly closed ring of neighbors all armed to the teeth and allied together. To the old enemies in the West -- Britain, Belgium and France -- new ones were artificially created and added in the East and the South: above all Poland and Czechoslovakia. A quarter of the population of Germany was

forcibly torn away from their mother country and handed over to foreign powers. The German Reich, mutilated on all sides and robbed of every means of defense, at any moment could become the helpless victim of a rapacious neighbor.

It was then that Adolf Hitler for the first time made his appeal to the common sense of the other powers. On May 17, 1933, a few months after his appointment to the post of Reich Chancellor, he delivered a speech in the German Reichstag that included the following passages:

“Germany will be perfectly ready to disband her entire military establishment and destroy the small amount of arms remaining to her, if the neighboring countries will do the same thing with equal thoroughness.

“... Germany is also entirely ready to renounce aggressive weapons of every sort if the armed nations, on their part, will destroy their aggressive weapons within a specified period, and if their use is forbidden by an international convention.

“... Germany is ready at any time to renounce aggressive weapons if the rest of the world does the same. Germany is prepared to agree to any solemn pact of non-aggression because she does not think of attacking anybody, but only of acquiring security.”

No answer was received.

The other powers heedlessly continued to fill their arsenals with weapons, to pile up their stores of explosives, to increase the numbers of their troops. At the same time the League of Nations, the instrument of the victorious powers, declared that Germany must first undergo a period of "probation" before it would be possible to discuss with her the question of the disarmament of the other countries. On October 14, 1933, Hitler withdrew from the League of Nations, with which it was impossible to reach an understanding. Shortly afterwards, however, on December 18, 1933, he came forward with a new proposal for the improvement of international relations. This proposal included the following six points:

“1. Germany receives full equality of rights.

2. The fully armed states undertake among themselves not to increase their armaments beyond their present level.
3. Germany adheres to this agreement, freely undertaking to make only so much actual moderate use of the equality of rights granted to her as will not represent a threat to the security of any other European power.
4. All states recognize certain obligations in regard to conducting war on humane principles, or not to use certain weapons against the civilian population.
5. All states accept a uniform general supervision that will monitor and ensure the observance of these obligations.
6. The European nations guarantee one another the unconditional maintenance of peace by the conclusion of non- aggression pacts, to be renewed after ten years.”

Following up on this, a proposal was made to increase the strength of the German army to 300,000 men, corresponding to the strength “required by Germany taking into account the length of her frontiers and the size of the armies of her neighbors,” in order to protect her threatened territory against attacks. The defender of the principle of peaceable agreement was thus trying to accommodate himself to the unwillingness of the others to disarm by expressing a desire for a limited increase of armaments for his own country. An exchange of notes, which began with this and continued for years, finally came to a sudden end with an unequivocal “no” from France. This “no” was moreover accompanied by tremendous increases in the armed forces of France, Britain, and Russia.

In this way Germany's position became even worse than before. The danger to the Reich was so great that Adolf Hitler felt himself compelled to act. On March 16, 1935, he reintroduced conscription. But in direct connection with this measure he once more announced an offer of wide-ranging agreements, the purpose of which as to ensure that any future war would be conducted on humane principles, in fact to make any such war practically impossible by eliminating destructive armaments. In his speech of May 21, 1935, he declared:

“The German government is ready to take an active part in all efforts which may lead to a practical limitation of armaments. It regards a return to the principles of the Geneva Red Cross Convention as the only possible way to achieve this. It believes that at first there will be only the possibility of a step-by-step abolition and outlawing of weapons and methods of warfare that are essentially contrary to the still-valid Geneva Red Cross Convention.

“Just as the use of dum-dum [expanding] bullets was once forbidden and, on the whole, thereby prevented in practice, so the use of other specific weapons can be forbidden and their use, in practice, can be eliminated. Here the German government has in mind all those armaments that bring death and destruction not so much to the fighting soldiers as to non-combatant women and children.

“The German government considers as erroneous and ineffective the idea of doing away with airplanes while leaving open the question of bombing. But it believes it possible to ban the use of certain weapons as contrary to international law, and to ostracize those nations which still use them from the community of humankind, and from its rights and laws.

“It also believes that gradual progress is the best way to success. For example, there might be prohibition of the use of gas, incendiary and explosive bombs outside the actual battle zone. This limitation could then be extended to complete international outlawing of all bombing. But so long as bombing as such is permitted, any limitation of the number of aerial bombers is dubious in view of the possibility of rapid replacement.

“Should bombing as such be branded as barbaric and contrary to international law, the construction of aerial bombing planes will soon be abandoned as superfluous and pointless. If, through the Geneva Red Cross Convention, it proved possible to prevent the killing of defenseless wounded men or of prisoners, it ought to be equally possible, through an analogous convention, to forbid and ultimately to bring to an end the bombing of similarly defenseless civilian populations.

“In such a fundamental way of dealing with the problem, Germany sees a

greater reassurance and security for the nations than in all the pacts of assistance and military agreements.

“The German government is ready to agree to any limitation that leads to abolition of the heaviest arms, especially suited for aggression. Such weapons are, first, the heaviest artillery, and secondly, the heaviest tanks. In view of the enormous fortifications on the French frontier, such an international abolition of the heaviest weapons of attack would automatically give France nearly one hundred percent security.

“Germany declares herself ready to agree to any limitation whatsoever of the caliber-size of artillery, as well as battleships, cruisers, and torpedo boats. In like manner the German government is ready to accept any international limitation of the size of warships. And finally it is ready to agree to limitation of tonnage for submarines, or to their complete abolition through an international agreement.

“And it gives further assurance that it will agree to any international limitations or abolition of arms whatsoever for a uniform period of time.”

Once again Hitler's declarations did not receive the slightest response.

On the contrary, France made an alliance with Russia in order to further increase her predominance on the continent, and to enormously increase the pressure on Germany from the East.

In view of the evident destructive intentions of his adversaries, Adolf Hitler was therefore obliged to take new measures for the security of the German Reich. On March 3, 1936, he occupied the Rhineland, which had been without military protection since [the] Versailles [settlement of 1919], and thus shut the wide gate through which the Western neighbor could carry out an invasion. Once again he followed the defensive step which he had been obliged to take with a generous appeal for general reconciliation and for the settlement of all differences. On March 31, 1936, he formulated the following peace plan:

- 1 . In order to give to future agreements securing the peace of Europe the character of inviolable treaties, those nations participating in the negotiations do so only on an entirely equal footing and as equally

esteemed members. The sole compelling reason for signing these treaties can only lie in the generally recognized and obvious usefulness of these agreements for the peace of Europe, and thus for the social happiness and economic prosperity of the nations.

2. In order to shorten, in the economic interest of the European nations, the period of uncertainty, the German government proposes a limit of four months for the first period up to the signing of the pacts of non-aggression guaranteeing the peace of Europe.

3. The German government gives the assurance not to add any reinforcements whatsoever to the troops in the Rhineland during this period, always provided that the Belgian and French governments act in the same way.

4. The German government gives the assurance not to move during this period closer to the Belgian and French frontiers the troops at present stationed in the Rhineland.

5. The German government proposes the setting up of a commission composed of the two guarantor Powers, Britain and Italy, and a disinterested third neutral power, to guarantee this assurance to be given by both parties.

6. Germany, Belgium, and France are each entitled to send a representative to this Commission. If Germany, France, or Belgium think that for any particular reason they can point to a change in the military situation having taken place within this period of four months, they have the right to inform the Guarantee Commission of their observations.

7. Germany, Belgium, and France declare their willingness in such a case to permit this Commission to make the necessary investigations through the British and Italian military attaches, and to report thereon to the participating powers.

8. Germany, Belgium and France give the assurance that they will give the fullest consideration to the objections arising therefrom.

9. Moreover the German government is willing on a basis of complete reciprocity with Germany's two western neighbors to agree to any military limitations on the German western frontier.

10. Germany, Belgium, and France and the two guarantor powers agree to enter into negotiations under the leadership of the British government at once or, at the latest, after the French elections, for the conclusion of a 25-year non-aggression or security pact between France and Belgium on the one hand, and Germany on the other.

11 . Germany agrees that Britain and Italy shall sign this security pact as guarantor powers once more.

12. Should special engagements to render military assistance arise as a result of these security agreements, Germany on her part declares her willingness to enter into such engagements.

13. The German government hereby repeats its proposal for the conclusion of an air- pact to supplement and strengthen these security agreements.

14. The German government repeats that should the Netherlands so desire, it is willing to also include that country in this West European security agreement.

15. In order to give this peace-pact, voluntarily entered into between Germany and France, the character of a conciliatory agreement ending a centuries-old quarrel, Germany and France pledge themselves to take steps to see that in the education of the young, as well as in the press and publications of both nations, everything shall be avoided that might be calculated to poison relations between the two peoples, whether it be a derogatory or contemptuous attitude, or improper interference in the internal affairs of the other country. They agree to set up at the headquarters of the League of Nations at Geneva, a joint commission whose function it shall be to lay before the two governments all complaints received, for information and investigation.

16. In keeping with their intention to give this agreement the character of a sacred pledge, Germany and France undertake to ratify it through a

plebiscite of the two nations.

17. Germany expresses her willingness, on her part, to contact the states on her south-eastern and north-eastern frontiers, to invite them directly to the final formal signing of the proposed non-aggression pacts.

18. Germany expresses her willingness to re-enter the League of Nations, either at once, or after the conclusion of these agreements. At the same time, the German government once again expresses as its expectation that, after a reasonable time and through friendly negotiations, the issue of colonial equality of rights, as well as the issue of the separation of the Covenant of the League of Nations from its foundation in the Versailles Treaty, will be cleared up.

19. Germany proposes the setting up of an International Court of Arbitration, which shall be responsible for the observance of the various agreements and whose decisions shall be binding on all parties.

After the conclusion of this great work of securing European peace, the German government considers it urgently necessary to endeavor by practical measures to put a stop to the unlimited competition in armaments. In her opinion this would mean not merely an improvement in the financial and economic conditions of the nations, but above all a lessening of psychological tension.

The German government, however, has no faith in the attempt to bring about universal settlements, as this would be doomed to failure from the outset, and can therefore be proposed only by those who have no interest in achieving practical results. On the other hand it is of the opinion that the negotiations held and the results achieved in limiting naval armaments should have an instructive and stimulating effect.

The German government therefore recommends future conferences, each of which shall have a single, clearly defined objective.

For the present, it believes the most important task is to bring aerial warfare into the moral and humane atmosphere of the protection afforded to non-combatants or the wounded by the Geneva Convention. Just as the killing of defenseless wounded, or of prisoners, or the use of dum-dum bullets, or the waging of

submarine warfare without warning, have been either forbidden or regulated by international conventions, so it must be possible for civilized humanity to prevent the senseless abuse of any new type of weapon, without running counter to the object of warfare.

The German government therefore proposes that the practical tasks of these conferences shall be:

1. Prohibition of the use of gas, poison, or incendiary bombs.
2. Prohibition of the use of bombs of any kind whatsoever on towns or places outside the range of the medium-heavy artillery of the fighting fronts.
3. Prohibition of the bombardment with long-range guns of towns or places more than 20 kilometers distant from the battle zone.
4. Abolition and prohibition of the construction of tanks of the heaviest type.
5. Abolition and prohibition of artillery of the heaviest caliber.

As soon as possibilities for further limitation of armaments emerge from such discussions and agreements, they should be utilized. The German government hereby declares itself prepared to join in every such settlement, in so far as it is valid internationally.

The German government believes that if even a first step is made on the road to disarmament, this will be of enormous importance in relations between the nations, and thereby in reestablishing confidence, which is a precondition for the development of trade and prosperity.

In accordance with the general desire for the restoration of favorable economic conditions, the German government is prepared immediately after the conclusion of the political treaties to enter into an exchange of opinions on economic issues with the other nations concerned, in the spirit of the proposals made, and to do all that lies in its power to improve the economic situation in Europe, and of the world economic situation which is closely bound up with it.

The German government believes that with the peace plan proposed above it has made its contribution to the building of a new Europe on the basis of reciprocal respect and confidence between sovereign states. Various opportunities for such a pacification of Europe, for which Germany has so often in the last few years made proposals, have been neglected. May this attempt to achieve European understanding succeed at last. The German government confidently believes that it has opened the way in this direction by submitting the above peace plan."

Anyone who today reads this comprehensive peace plan will realize in what direction the development of Europe, according to the wishes of Adolf Hitler, should really have proceeded. Here was the possibility of truly constructive work. This could have been a real turning-point for the benefit of all nations. But once more he who alone called for peace was not heard. Only Britain replied with a rather scornful questionnaire that avoided any serious consideration of the essential points involved.

Incidentally, however, Britain revealed her actual intentions by setting herself up as the protector of France and by instituting and commencing regular general staff military consultations with the French Republic just as in the period before the [first] World War.

There could no longer be any doubt now that the western powers were following the old path toward an armed conflict, and were steadily preparing a new blow against Germany, even though Adolf Hitler's thoughts and endeavors were entirely directed towards proving to them that he wanted to remain on the best possible terms with them. Over the years he had undertaken numerous steps in this direction, of which a few more will be mentioned here. With Britain he negotiated the Naval Agreement of June 18, 1935, which provided that the German Navy could have a strength of 35 percent of that of the British Navy. By this he wanted to demonstrate that the German Reich, to use his own words, had "neither the intention, the means, nor the necessity" to enter into any rivalry as regards naval power, which, as is well known, had had such a fateful impact on its relations with Britain in the years before the [first] World War.

On every appropriate occasion he assured France of his desire to live at peace with her. He repeatedly renounced in plain terms any claim to [the region of] Alsace-Lorraine. On the occasion of the return to the German Reich of the Saar

territory as a result of plebiscite by its people, he declared on March 1, 1935:

“It is our hope that through this act of just compensation, in which we see a return to natural reason, relations between Germany and France have permanently improved. Therefore, just as we desire peace, we must hope that our great neighbor is ready and willing to seek peace with us. It must be possible for two great peoples to join together and collaborate in opposing the difficulties that threaten to overwhelm Europe.”

He even endeavored to arrive at a better understanding with Poland, the eastern ally of the western powers, although that country in 1919 had unlawfully incorporated millions of Germans, and had ever since subjected them to the worst oppression. On January 26, 1934, he concluded a non-aggression pact with her in which the two governments agreed “to settle directly all questions of whatever sort that concern their mutual relations.”

Thus on all sides he countered the enemy plans with his determination to preserve peace, and in this way strove to protect Germany. When however he saw that London and Paris were arming for an attack, he was once more obliged to undertake fresh measures of defense. The enemy camp, as we have seen above, had been enormously extended through the alliance between France and Russia. In addition to this the two powers had secured an alliance line to the south of the German Reich through Czechoslovakia, which, already allied with France, then concluded a treaty with Russia, thereby making her a bridge between east and west.

Moreover, Czechoslovakia controlled the high-lying region of Bohemia and Moravia, which Bismarck had called the citadel of Europe, and this citadel projected far into German territory. The threat to Germany thus assumed truly overwhelming form.

Adolf Hitler found an ingenious way of countering this danger. The conditions in German Austria, which under the terror of the Schuschnigg government were tending towards civil war, offered him the opportunity of stepping in to save the situation, and to lead back into the Reich the sister nation to the south-east that had been sentenced by the victorious powers to lead the life of a hopelessly decaying "Free State." After he had thus established himself near the line of

connection between France and Russia mentioned above, a process of dissolution began in the ethnically mixed state of Czechoslovakia, which had been artificially put together from the most diverse national elements. Then, after the liberation of the [ethnically German] Sudetenland [region] and the secession of Slovakia, the Czechs themselves asked for the protection of the German Reich. With this the enemy's "bridge" came into Hitler's hand, while at the same time direct land connection was made established with Italy, whose friendship had been secured some time previously.

While he was gaining this strategic success for the security of his country, Adolf Hitler was again endeavoring with great eagerness to reach a peaceable understanding with the western powers. In Munich immediately after liberation of the Sudeten Germans, which was approved by Britain, France, and Italy, he made an agreement with the British Prime Minister, Neville Chamberlain, the text of which was as follows:

"We have had a further meeting today and are agreed in recognizing that the question of Anglo-German relations is of the first importance for the two countries and for Europe.

We regard the agreement signed last night and the Anglo-German Naval Agreement [of 1935] as symbolic of the desire of our two peoples never to go to war with one another again.

We are resolved that the method of consultation shall be the method adopted to deal with any other questions that may concern our two countries, and we are determined to continue our efforts to remove possible sources of difference and thus to contribute to assure the peace of Europe.

September 30, 1938.

Adolf Hitler, Neville Chamberlain."

Two months later, on Hitler's instructions, the German Foreign Minister, von Ribbentrop, made the following agreement with France:

"Herr Joachim von Ribbentrop, Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs, and M.

Georges Bonnet, French Minister of Foreign Affairs, acting in the name and by order of their governments, have at their meeting in Paris, on December 6, 1938, agreed as follows:

1. The German government and the French government fully share the conviction that peaceful and good-neighborly relations between Germany and France constitute one of the most essential elements for the consolidation of the situation in Europe and the maintenance of general peace. The two governments will in consequence use all their efforts to ensure the development in this direction of the relations between their countries.
2. The two governments recognize that between the two countries there is no territorial question outstanding, and they solemnly recognize as final the frontiers between their countries as they now exist.
3. The two governments are resolved, while leaving unaffected their particular relations with other powers, to remain in contact with regard to all questions concerning their two countries, and mutually to consult should the later evolution of those questions lead to international difficulties.

In token whereof the representatives of the two governments have signed the present Declaration, which comes into immediate effect.

Done in duplicate in the French and German languages at Paris, December 6, 1938.

Joachim von Ribbentrop,
Foreign Minister

Georges Bonnet,
Foreign Minister”

It should have been entirely reasonable to expect that the way was clear for collaborative reconstruction in which all leading powers would participate, and that the Fuehrer's endeavors to secure peace would at last meet with success. But the contrary was true. Scarcely had Chamberlain reached home when he called

for rearmament on a considerable scale and laid plans for a new and tremendous encirclement of Germany. Britain now took over from France the leadership of this further encirclement of the Reich, to more than make up for the loss of Czechoslovakia. She opened negotiations with Russia, and concluded guarantee treaties with Poland, Romania, Greece and Turkey. These were alarm signals of the greatest urgency.

Just at this time Adolf Hitler was occupied with the task of finally eliminating sources of friction with Poland. For this purpose he made an uncommonly generous proposal by which the purely German Free City of Danzig would return to the Reich, and a narrow passage through the Polish Corridor, which since 1919 had torn asunder the north-eastern part of Germany to an unbearable extent, would be connected with the separated area. This proposal, which moreover afforded Poland the prospect of a 25-year non-aggression pact and other advantages, was nevertheless rejected in Warsaw, because there it was believed, conscious as the authorities were of forming one of the principal members of the common front set up by London against Germany, that any concession, however minor, could be refused. And that wasn't all. With this same attitude, Poland took an aggressive stance, threatened Danzig, and prepared to take up arms against Germany.

Thus the moment was close at hand for an attack against Germany by the countries that had aligned together for that purpose. Adolf Hitler, making a final extreme effort in the interests of peace, saved what he could. On August 23rd, Ribbentrop succeeded in reaching an agreement in Moscow for a non-aggression pact with Russia. Two days later the German Fuehrer himself made a final and truly remarkable offer to Britain, declaring himself ready "to enter into agreements with Britain that ... would not only, on the German side, safeguard the existence of the British Empire come what may, but if necessary would pledge German assistance for the British realm, regardless of where such assistance might be required." At the same time he was prepared to accept a reasonable limitation of armaments, "in accordance with the new political situation and which are economically sustainable." And finally he assured once again that he had no interest in the issues in the west, and that "a revision of the borders in the west are out of any consideration."

The reply to this was a pact of mutual assistance signed that same day between

Britain and Poland, which made the outbreak of war inevitable. Then a decision was made in Warsaw to mobilize at once against Germany, and the Poles began with violent attacks not only against Germans in Poland, who for some time had been the victims of frightful massacres, but against Reich German territory.

But even after Britain and France declared war, as they had intended, and Germany had overcome the Polish danger in the east by a glorious campaign without a parallel, even then Adolf Hitler raised his voice once more in the name of peace. He did this even though his hands were now free to act against the enemy in the west. He also did this even though in London and Paris the fight had been proclaimed against him personally, in boundless hate, as a crusade. At this moment he possessed the supreme self-control to present, in his speech of October 6, 1939, to public opinion throughout the world, a new plan for the pacification of Europe. This plan was as follows:

“By far the most important task, in my opinion, is the creation of not only a belief in, but also a feeling for European security.

1. For this it is necessary that the aims of the foreign policy of each European state should be made perfectly clear. As far as Germany is concerned, the Reich government is ready to give a thorough and exhaustive exposition of the aims of its foreign policy. In so doing, it begins by stating, first of all, that it regards the Treaty of Versailles as no longer valid – in other words, that the German Reich government, and with it the entire German nation, no longer see cause or reason for any further revision of the Treaty, apart from the demand for adequate colonial possessions justly due to the Reich, involving in the first place a return of the German colonies.

This demand for colonies is based not only on Germany's historical claim to her colonies, but above all on her elementary right to a share of the world's raw material resources. This demand does not take the form of an ultimatum, nor is it a demand that is backed by force, but rather a demand based on political justice and common sense economic principles.

2. The demand for a real revival of international economic life coupled with an extension of trade and commerce presupposes a reorganization of

the international economic system, in other words, of production in the individual states. In order to facilitate the exchange of the goods thus produced, however, a new system of markets must be found, and a conclusive settlement of relations of the world currencies must be reached, so that the obstacles in the way of unrestricted trade can be gradually removed.

3. The most important condition, however, for a real revival of economic life in and outside of Europe is the establishment of an unconditionally guaranteed peace, and of a sense of security on the part of the various nations. This security will not only be rendered possible by the final sanctioning of the European status, but above all by the reduction of armaments to a reasonable and economically tolerable level. An essential part of this necessary sense of security, however, is a clear definition of the legitimate use and application of certain modern armaments which could, at any given moment, strike straight at the heart of every nation, which therefore create a permanent sense of insecurity. In my previous speeches in the Reichstag I made proposals with this end in view. At that time they were rejected -- presumably for the simple reason that they were made by me.

I believe that a sense of national security will not return to Europe until clear and binding international agreements have provided a comprehensive definition of the extent to which the use of certain weapons is permitted or forbidden.

The Geneva Convention once succeeded in prohibiting, in civilized countries at least, the killing of wounded, the mistreatment of prisoners, war against non-combatants, and so forth. Just as it was possible gradually to achieve the universal observance of this prohibition, a way ought surely to be found to regulate aerial warfare, the use of poison gas, of submarines, and so forth, and likewise clearly to define contraband, so that war will lose its terrible character of a conflict waged against women and children and against non-combatants in general. The growing horror of certain methods of modern warfare will of its own accord lead to their abolition, and thus they will become obsolete.

In the war with Poland, I endeavored to restrict aerial warfare to objectives of military importance, or only to employ it to deal with resistance at a given point. But it must surely be possible to emulate the Red Cross in drawing up some universally valid international regulation. It is only when this is achieved that peace can reign, particularly on our densely populated continent a peace which, free of suspicion and fear, will provide the conditions for real growth and economic prosperity. I do not believe that there is any responsible statesman in Europe who does not in his heart desire prosperity for his people. But such a desire can only be realized if all the nations inhabiting this continent work together. To help bring about this collaboration must be the goal of everyone who is sincerely striving for the future of his own people.

To achieve this great goal, the leading nations on this continent will one day have to come together in order to draw up, accept and guarantee a statute on a comprehensive basis that will ensure for them a feeling of security and calm -- in short, of peace.

Such a conference could not possibly be held without the most thorough preparation, that is, without clearly specifying every point at issue. It is equally impossible that such a conference, which would determine the fate of this continent for many years to come, could carry on its deliberations while cannons are thundering, or when mobilized armies are bringing pressure to bear upon it. Since, however, these problems must be solved sooner or later, it would surely be more sensible to tackle the solution before millions of men are first pointlessly sent to their death, and billions of dollars' worth of property are destroyed.

The continuation of the present state of affairs in the west is unthinkable. Each day will soon demand increasing sacrifices. Perhaps the day will come when France will begin to bombard and demolish [the city of] Saarbrücken. The German artillery will in turn lay [the French city of] Mulhouse in ruins. France will retaliate by bombarding Karlsruhe, and Germany in her turn shell Strasbourg. Then the French artillery will fire at Freiburg, and the Germans at Colmar or Sélestat. Long-range artillery will then be set up, and from both sides destruction will strike deeper and deeper, and whatever cannot be reached by the long-range artillery will be

destroyed from the air. And while all that will be very interesting for certain international journalists, and very profitable for airplane, weapons and munitions manufacturers, and so forth, it will be appalling for the victims. And this battle of destruction will not be confined to the land. No, it will reach far out over the sea. Today there are no longer any islands.

And the national wealth of Europe will be shattered by shells, and the vigor of every nation will be sapped on the battlefields. And one day there will again be a frontier between Germany and France, but instead of flourishing towns there will be ruins and endless graveyards.”

The fate of this appeal was the same as that of all the previous ones made by Adolf Hitler in the name of reason, in the interests of a true renaissance of Europe. His enemies paid him no heed. On this occasion as well no response was forthcoming from them. They rigidly adhered to the attitude they had taken up in the beginning.

In the face of this series of historical facts is there any need for further details as to the question of why they did so? They had created the Versailles system, and when it threatened to collapse they wanted war, in order to follow it with an even worse Versailles.

The reproaches they make today against Adolf Hitler and Germany, recoil one and all on those who make them, and characterize their actions.

They are the disturbers of peace. They are the ones who contemplate the forcible oppression of other peoples, and who seek to plunge Europe into devastation and disaster. If that were not so, they would long ago have taken the hand that was stretched out to them, or at least they would have made a gesture of honestly wishing to cooperate in making a new order, and thus spare the nations an excess of "blood, tears and sweat.”

World history is the world court; and in this case as always when it reaches its decision it will pronounce a just verdict.

Czechoslovakia in Context

an excerpt from 'Hitlers Revolution', by Richard Tedor, 2013

A few months after the Anschluss [with Austria], Germany annexed the Sudetenland, the ethnic German territory lining the periphery of western Czechoslovakia. The transfer of the region to German control provoked a serious war scare. The controversy traced its origin to the 1919 Versailles system.

During World War I, Czechs served in the Austro-Hungarian army. Immigrants in London and Paris established the Czech Committee on November 14, 1915. Two Czechs in exile, Tomas Masaryk and Eduard Benes, won the Entente's endorsement for a future Czechoslovak state to be carved from portions of the Hapsburg realm. On October 18, 1918, Czechs in Paris and in the USA claimed Czechoslovakian independence.

The new country had three components. Furthest east was Ruthenia, the population of which voluntarily joined Czechoslovakia. In the center was Slovakia, and many Slovaks wanted independence or at least considerable autonomy. The western part consisted of Bohemia and Moravia, where three million German Austrians dwelled with the Czechs. These Germans wished to remain with Austria.

Masaryk and Benes enjoyed prevailing influence in fashioning the post-war structure of Czechoslovakia. Masaryk persuaded Wilson to alter his 14 points, which promised each nationality of Austria-Hungary the opportunity for autonomous development, to exclude Germans. Benes consciously underestimated the number of Sudeten Germans by nearly a million. He falsely claimed that they were not a unified minority, but lived in settlements integrated with Czechs. "The Germans in Bohemia are only colonists," he asserted.⁷⁴

Rich in raw materials and industry, the border territory offered Czechoslovakia a topographical defensive barrier against Germany. Benes based his deliberations more on economic and strategic advantages than on the natural rights of the population. The 1910 census offered a comparison of the number of German "colonists" wishing to remain with Austria in the affected areas to Czechs

residing there. In Bohemia lived 2,070,438 Germans to 116,275 Czechs; in the Sudetenland 643,804 Germans to 25,028 Czechs; in the Bohemian Forest 176,237 Germans to 6,131 Czechs; in southern Moravia 180,449 Germans compared to 12,477 Czechs.⁷⁵

Since the Paris peace conference continued until mid-1919, the German provinces were technically still part of Austria when the Austrian republic held its first democratic election that February 16. The Sudeten Germans prepared ballots to participate. The Czech army forcibly disrupted the arrangements. On March 4, thousands of Sudeten Germans organized peaceful demonstrations in their towns and villages to protest. Czech soldiers fired into the unarmed crowds, killing 54 Germans, 20 of them women.⁷⁶

The Allies finalized a compact with Czechoslovakia formally recognizing her statehood. The preamble to the document endorsed the arrangement, “in consideration that the peoples of Bohemia, Moravia, and part of Silesia, as well as the people of Slovakia have decided of their own free will to join into a lasting union.” Benes promised the Allies “to give the Germans all rights they are entitled to. . . . It will all in all be a very liberal regime.”⁷⁷

Denigrating the ethnic German population to “immigrant” status, the Czech government instituted a policy of “rapid de-Germanizing” in Bohemia and in the Sudetenland. Prague transferred military garrisons, railroad personnel, civil servants, prison populations and even hospital patients in large numbers there to manipulate the census figures. Czech officials tallied Czech transients as residents, even though “residency” seldom extended beyond two days. In Trautenau in northern Bohemia, a 600-man Czech infantry battalion spent one winter day in an unfinished barracks to be counted in the survey. The resulting statistics deprived German districts of adequate representation in parliament. Prague occasionally employed less subtle means to maintain its minorities' political impotence. At an election rally of the Sudeten German Party in Teplitz-Schönau in 1937, the key speaker, Karl Frank, criticized Benes. Czech police scattered the assembly. Fifty-three Germans died in the melee and hundreds suffered injuries.⁷⁸

Prague authorities closed smaller German schools throughout the Sudetenland. They replaced them with Czech language institutions, often requiring German youngsters to attend. The government closed nine of Bohemia's 19 German

universities. Only 4.7 percent of state financial assistance went to German college students, although ethnic Germans comprised nearly a fourth of Czechoslovakia's population. The government issued all public forms and applications in Czech language, even in the Sudetenland. Half the German municipal and rural officials lost their jobs, 41 percent of German postmen and 48.5 percent of railroad personnel.⁷⁹

The Czechoslovakian government's Land Reform Act redistributed real estate so that every rural family would receive sufficient acreage to subsist from the soil. The head of the program, Karel Viskovsky, defined the results as follows: "The soil is passing from the hands of the foreigners into the hands of the Czech people."⁸⁰ Most went to Czech legionnaires and their families. Viskovsky auctioned off the balance to affluent Czechs and Slovaks. They purchased the properties below market value, allowing the former owners to return as tenant farmers. The Germans in Bohemia and Moravia lost 25 percent of their land to Czechs through the state-sponsored land reform.

Approximately one third of the Sudetenland consisted of woodlands, of which the state took over administration. The authorities dismissed some 40,000 German forestry workers, replacing them with Czechs. By 1931, the number of ethnic German tradesmen out of work was three times that of Czechs. Relief efforts concentrated on areas with predominantly Czech populations. A study by the British Foreign Office in 1936 estimated that Czechoslovakia's German colony - approximately 22 percent of the population - comprised 60 percent of the unemployed.⁸¹ Among the most economically distressed areas was Reichenberg, once home to a thriving glass and textile industry. Between 1922 and 1936, 153 factories there closed. Prague awarded contracts for construction and other public works projects for Reichenberg to foreign companies who brought in their own labor.⁸²

Benes described his people as "mortal enemies of the Germans."⁸³ In May 1919, during the inauguration ceremony in Piisen for President Tomas Masaryk, Czechs broke into an apartment not displaying a flag in the window for the occasion. The resident, a German widow and mother of four, was bedridden from illness. The intruders dragged her down the staircase feet first and into the street, her head bouncing off the steps during the descent. She died from her injuries.⁸⁴

In 1921, Masaryk deployed Czech troops in German settlements without provocation. In Grasslitz, four miles from the frontier with Germany, protestors clashed with entering Czech military personnel. The soldiers shot 15 Bohemian Germans dead. Under the “Law to Protect the Republic,” Czech authorities arrested Sudeten Germans demanding self-determination as traitors or spies. They jailed for espionage tourists from Germany visiting Czechoslovakia for sports competitions or for ethnic festivals. Between 1923 and 1932, the state conducted 8,972 legal proceedings against dissident members of ethnic minorities. Defendants in sedition trials often included Sudeten Germans belonging to sports leagues, youth groups, singing societies, or backpacking clubs.⁸⁵

Prague established an immense “border zone” in which lived 85 percent of all Sudeten Germans, the entire Polish and Ruthenian populations, and 95 percent of the Hungarian colony. It came under permanent martial law. The army supervised the administration of factories, major construction projects, public works, the telephone service and forestry. Military authorities limited the civil liberties of citizens in the “border zone,” which comprised 56 percent of the entire country. This did not prevent Benes from lauding Czechoslovakia as a “lighthouse of democracy.”⁸⁶

Although during the first years of Hitler’s chancellorship, few among the German public were concerned with Czechoslovakia, for Hitler himself, the fate of the Sudetenland symbolized the tragedy of Germans under foreign rule. The Sudeten people waged a dogged, solitary struggle to maintain their German identity. Hitler made it his personal mission to recover the Sudetenland. He introduced the topic during the Reichstag speech on February 20, 1938: “As long as Germany was herself weak and defenseless, she had to simply accept the continuous persecution of German people along our borders. . . . The interests of the German Reich also include the protection of those fellow Germans who are unable on their own, on our very frontier, to insure their right to basic human, political and ideological freedoms.”⁸⁷

Another circumstance turned Hitler’s attention to Czechoslovakia. Geographically, the country resembled a spear point penetrating deeply into Reich’s territory. This constituted a potential national security threat no responsible leader could ignore. In January 1924, Paris and Prague concluded a “friendship pact” containing a military clause. This envisioned mutual general

staff talks to prepare a joint defensive strategy in case of attack by a common enemy. The signatories followed with a formal military treaty in October 1925.

Benes replaced the 85-year old Masaryk as president of the republic in December 1935. Only months before becoming president, Benes as foreign minister had concluded a military alliance with the Soviet Union. The pact provided for significant Czech-Russian cooperation. By the beginning of 1936, the Czechs had completed 32 air fields sited near the German frontier as bases for the rapidly expanding Red Air Force.⁸⁸ They established depots to stockpile aviation fuel, aerial bombs and other war materiel.

The Red Army stationed troops in Bohemia and Moravia to undergo parachute training for a possible airborne assault against Germany.⁸⁹ It transferred officers to the Czechoslovakian War Ministry in Prague and to local command centers. On February 12, 1937, the London *Daily Mail* reported that immediately after ratification of the Prague-Moscow pact, Russian flight officers inspected Czech air bases and fuel dumps for their air force.⁹⁰

Prague was a converging point for Communist immigrants who had fled Germany in 1933 and Austria after the Anschluss. Sir Orme Sargent of the British Foreign Office called Czechoslovakia a “distribution center” for Stalin’s Comintern propaganda against Germany.⁹¹ With France, Czechoslovakia and the USSR connected by military alliances since 1936, the Führer felt boxed in. When he re-garrisoned the Rhineland on March 7 of that year, Benes offered France the support of the Czechoslovakian army for a joint invasion of Germany. During the months to follow, it swelled to a force of 1,453,000 men.⁹²

The Germans were undecided on how to recover the Sudetenland. In 1938, the British ambassador in Prague, Sir Basil Newton, advised the Foreign Office, “How precisely they will proceed it is impossible to prophesy, but the indications are that they will at first seek to achieve their aims by friendly diplomacy rather than by physical or economic terrorism.”⁹³ On May 6, British newspaper magnate Lord Harold Rothermere praised the Germans as “very patient people” in an editorial in the *Daily Mail*⁹⁴

The Austrian Anschluss encouraged the Sudeten German Party, the SdP. Under the leadership of its founder, Konrad Henlein, it had already won 44 seats in the Czechoslovakian chamber of deputies and 23 in the senate in the May 1935

elections. At an SdP assembly in Carlsbad on April 25, 1938, Heinlein demanded autonomy for the ethnic German region. With 90 percent of Sudeten voters behind him, he had sufficient influence to compel the Czechs to enter negotiations.

Henlein and Karl Frank had met with Hitler on March 28, but were unable to persuade the Führer to pressure the Czechs. Ribbentrop told the two guests that it was not Germany's task "to offer individual suggestions as to what demands should be made of the Czechoslovakian government." Berlin instructed the German embassy in Prague to limit support of the SdP to private talks with Czechoslovakian statesmen, "if the occasion presents itself."⁹⁵ The allegation of post-war historians that at the meeting, Hitler ordered Henlein to impose impossible terms in order to provoke the Czechs, is without substance.

The British government monitored the escalating controversy. "The plain fact is that the Sudetendeutsche are being oppressed by the Czechs," noted Vansittart.⁹⁶ Newton sent London a detailed analysis from Prague on March 15. He predicted that as long as they can reckon with Anglo-French support in the event of an armed clash with Germany, the Czechs will pursue their present policy. The Germans cannot be deterred from aggression if they consider it necessary. If Paris and London encourage Prague to resist compromise, war is inevitable.

England and France, Newton continued, cannot prevent Czechoslovakia from being overrun. At most they can wage war to restore a status quo that is already proving unworkable. He concluded that no German government will accept "a hostile Czechoslovakia in their flank." Having read Newton's report, the British ambassador in Berlin, Henderson, cabled his ministry on May 17, "I share unreservedly and in all respects views expressed by Mr. Newton in his telegram."⁹⁷

The Cabinet Committee on Foreign Policy discussed Newton's analysis the following day. As its minutes record, "The Minister for Co-ordination of Defence said that he had been struck by Mr. Newton's view that Czechoslovakia's present political position was not permanently tenable and that she was in fact an unstable unit in Central Europe. If, as he believed, this truly represented the position he could see no reason why we should take any steps to maintain such a unit in being."⁹⁸

On March 21, the chiefs of staff submitted a report to the committee explaining that the British and French armies were too weak to go to war against Germany, Italy, and Japan in an expanding conflict over Czechoslovakia. Chamberlain and Halifax considered the military assessment “an extremely melancholy document.” Halifax summarized on April 27, “Neither we nor France were equipped for a war with Germany.”⁹⁹

France’s new prime minister, Eduard Daladier, visited London on April 28 to persuade Chamberlain to publicly guarantee English protection for Czechoslovakia. His British colleague retorted that Benes has never treated the German minority in the territories he annexed in a liberal manner as promised. Chamberlain declared that the people of England would never begin a war to prevent the nationalities of central Europe from expressing their will in a plebiscite.

That month, Hitler ordered General Wilhelm Keitel, chief of the Armed Forces Supreme Command (OKW), to prepare a study on the possible invasion of Czechoslovakia. He told Keitel that he did not at present intend to invade.¹⁰⁰ Guidelines Hitler furnished the OKW emphasized that he would reject any scenario proposing a “strategic surprise attack out of the clear sky without grounds or possibility of justification.” The Führer described “an untenable situation for us should the major confrontation in the East. . . with Bolshevism ever come.... Czechoslovakia would then be the springboard for the Red Army and a landing place for its air force.”¹⁰¹

On May 20, Benes called up over 150,000 military reservists to active duty, claiming that the measure was necessary because of a secret mobilization of the German armed forces. The Czech war office charged that eight to ten German divisions were marching toward the common frontier. The French military attaché in Berlin cabled his government that he saw no evidence of larger troop movements. Henderson sent two British army officers on his Berlin embassy staff on an extensive reconnaissance through the German border provinces of Saxony and Silesia. He wrote later, “They could discover no sign of unusual or significant Germany military activity, nor indeed could any of the military attachés of other foreign missions in Berlin, who were similarly engaged in scouring the country.”¹⁰²

Hitler more or less ignored Benes' provocation and took no action, military or

otherwise. Journalists in Paris, Prague, London, and New York accepted Benes' spurious allegations about German troop deployments. They published stories about how the Führer had massed his divisions to bluff the Czechs into submitting to his demands. When Benes defiantly countered with his own partial mobilization, Hitler supposedly “backed down” and recalled his formations, a profound humiliation for a dictator who was “incapable of acting on his own threats.”¹⁰³ His declarations regarding the Sudetenland were “nothing but hot air.”

Halifax warned Herbert von Dirksen, the German ambassador in London, that a Czech-German war would bring France and Britain into the conflict against the Reich. The foreign secretary then composed a personal letter to Ribbentrop admonishing him of the hazards any “rash actions” would lead to for European civilization.¹⁰⁴ Henderson recorded, “What Hitler could not stomach was the exultation of the press. . . . Every newspaper in Europe and America joined in the chorus. 'No' had been said, and Hitler had been forced to yield. The democratic powers had brought the totalitarian states to heel, etc.”¹⁰⁵ The British conducted partial mobilization of their fleet and the French garrisoned their fortifications along the German border, even though both knew that their Czech ally had instigated the crisis. For Hitler, threats and accusations of cowardice were his reward for the forbearance he had exercised.

The May crisis impressed Hitler with how hostile the western democracies and Czechoslovakia were toward Germany. Even the USSR had publicly reaffirmed its military obligation to the Czechs. He concluded that a peaceful settlement of the Sudeten issue was unlikely. On May 30, he revised the earlier armed forces directive addressing potential war with the Czechs to begin with the sentence, “It is my unalterable resolve to smash Czechoslovakia through a military action in the foreseeable future.” The document stressed that “preparations are to be implemented without delay.”¹⁰⁶

Historians present this statement as proof of Hitler's warlike intentions. Yet just 18 days later, he revised the classified directive, deleting the sentence about the resolve to smash the Czechs. He stated instead that the “solution of the Czech question” was “the near-term objective.” There is little evidence here of a clear intent to wage war. Henderson wrote Halifax, “It stands to reason that Hitler himself must equally be prepared for all eventualities. But from there to say that he has already decided on aggressive action against Czechoslovakia this autumn

is, I think, untrue."¹⁰⁷ The British ambassador wrote again in August, "But I do not believe he wants war." In his own memoirs, Henderson later reflected on the May crisis: "When we were thinking only that Germany was on the point of attacking the Czechs, the Germans were apprehensive lest the latter meant to provoke a European war before they themselves were ready for it."¹⁰⁸

Hitler still possessed a *diplomatic* trump; democracy's own arguments about human rights. The Führer publicly stated, "What the Germans insist on is the right to self-determination that every other nation also possesses. ... I demand that the oppression of the three-and-a-half million Germans in Czechoslovakia stop, and that in its place the free right to self-determination step in."¹⁰⁹ This was the Achilles heel of his adversaries. Henderson confessed, "On the broadest moral grounds it was thus difficult to justify offhand the refusal of the right to self-determination to the 2,750,000 Sudetens living in solid blocks just across Germany's border. Its flat denial would have been contrary to a principle on which the British Empire itself was founded, and would consequently never have rallied to us the wholehearted support either of the British People or of that Empire."¹¹⁰ The permanent undersecretary for the Foreign Office, Alexander Cadogan, concluded that the Sudeten problem "was not an issue on which we should be on very strong ground for plunging Europe into war."¹¹¹

Chamberlain assessed England's position: His country had not yet sufficiently rearmed to honor the commitment to support France in the event of war. To allow Hitler a free hand to settle accounts with Benes would have marred British esteem abroad; "We shall be despised forever," ventured Halifax's secretary, Sir Oliver Harvey.¹¹² A plebiscite for the Sudetenland also had pitfalls. Prague opposed the idea because the precedent would encourage the Slovaks, Hungarians, Poles, and Ruthenians to demand one as well. Since these minorities suffered under-representation in government and from oppression, the result would likely dissolve Czechoslovakia.

Daladier proposed a compromise: Czechoslovakia would cede the Sudetenland to Germany without conducting a plebiscite. In this way, the Czech state would remain reasonably intact. Its importance to France, as Daladier explained to Chamberlain, was that "in any military operation there are wonderful possibilities for attacking Germany from Czechoslovak territory."¹¹³ French Aviation Minister Pierre Cot echoed this attitude with a remark quoted in London's *News Chronicle* of July 1, 1938. Cot stated that France and England

needed Czechoslovakia, “because from this state the German economy and the German industry are most easily to be destroyed with bombs. . . . Joint attacks of the French and Czech air forces can very quickly destroy all German production facilities.”¹¹⁴

In August, Chamberlain proposed travelling to Germany to meet with Hitler to settle the Sudeten question together. He elicited a promise from his host that Germany would take no military action during the negotiations. Czech Foreign Minister Kamil Krofta told the British and French governments that his country refused to cede the Sudetenland to Germany. London countered bluntly, “The Franco-British plan is the only means of preventing the threat of a German attack,” and that if Prague rejects it, England and France will not intervene if Germany invades Czechoslovakia. ¹¹⁵ On September 21, Benes unconditionally acquiesced to the proposal.

During September, Chamberlain visited Germany three times. The first meeting with Hitler took place in Berchtesgaden on September 15. The session was cordial and constructive. Chamberlain approved Hitler’s proposals for the Sudeten areas to be annexed. Halifax wrote his ambassadors, “In fact it corresponded very closely to the line we have been examining.”¹¹⁶ Chamberlain spent the following week in meetings with Daladier and the Czechs to obtain their consent. In Berlin, the German monitoring station in the Reich’s Ministry of Aviation eavesdropped on a telephone conversation between Benes and French Colonial Minister Georges Mandel. Undermining Daladier, Mandel told Benes, “Paris and London have no right to dictate your attitude to you. If your territory is violated, you should not wait a second to issue orders to your army to defend the homeland. . . . If you fire the first shot in self-defense... the cannons of France, Great Britain and also Soviet Russia will begin firing on their own.”¹¹⁷ The Germans also intercepted communications between Prague and its London and Paris embassies. The Benes government had instructed them to stall for time until the “war parties” in England and in France topple Chamberlain and Daladier.

On September 22, Hitler conferred with Chamberlain at the Hotel Dreesen in Bad Godesberg. Reports of mounting unrest in the Sudetenland clouded the atmosphere. Henlein had formed an ethnic German militia, numbering nearly 40,000 men, which skirmished with Czech soldiers and police.¹¹⁸ The Czech government correspondingly implemented more repressive measures. In 14 days,

120,000 Sudeten Germans crossed into the Reich to escape the violence. Henlein appealed to Hitler to send in the German army, “to put an end to any more murders resulting from Czech fanaticism.”¹¹⁹

At Bad Godesberg, the Führer demanded the right to militarily occupy the territory to be annexed in four days. He cited mounting turmoil there as justification. Chamberlain was taken aback. Bitter haggling followed. The tension pervaded the next night’s conference, until an orderly interrupted with news that Benes had just declared general mobilization. Another 1.2 million Czech reservists were returning to active duty. Hitler thereupon reassured his English guest that he would keep his promise to withhold any military response, “despite this unheard-of provocation.”¹²⁰ This relaxed the atmosphere and the discussion assumed a friendlier tone.

In the days following the conference, Chamberlain negotiated with the Czechs. British and French diplomats ultimately prevailed upon Hitler to relax his additional demands. Göring showed Henderson transcripts of the telephone dialogs between Benes and Jan Masaryk illuminating the Czech intrigues. Neither the British nor the French doubted their authenticity.¹²¹ At Munich on September 28, Chamberlain, Hitler, Daladier, and Mussolini finalized details of the annexation of the Sudetenland which Prague had agreed to on the 21st.

Angry with Chamberlain, Jan Masaryk could only bluster, “What bad luck that this stupid, badly informed person is the English prime minister.”¹²² French Foreign Minister Georges Bonnet praised Hitler for softening his Godesberg terms. The Führer also reaped an accolade in the London *Times* on October 2 for his concessions and for reducing military measures to “solely a symbolic partial occupation.”¹²³ Choosing exile in London, Benes later told an associate, “We needed a war and I did everything to bring the war on.”¹²⁴

Once Benes was gone, Germany attempted to improve relations with Prague. There remained 378,000 ethnic Germans in portions of Bohemia-Moravia not annexed by the Reich. Hitler ordered on October 3 that this minority, while nurturing its cultural heritage, was to relinquish political activity toward autonomy or returning its lands to German sovereignty. He met with the new Czech foreign minister, Frantisek Chvalkovsky, on the 14th. Hitler urged him to help “normalize relations in a friendly way.”¹²⁵

In November, the legal department of the German Foreign Office submitted a draft for a Czech-German friendship treaty. Though Hitler postponed the matter until January 1939, the initiative indicates his interest in working with Prague. His first gesture to the new regime was a generous policy toward Czech residents of the annexed Sudetenland. There were 743,000 of them who initially came under German dominion. 260,000 Czech soldiers, civil servants and their families returned to Czech territory under orders from their government. Another 160,000 not wishing to live under German jurisdiction migrated voluntarily.

A treaty the two states ratified on November 20 permitted Czechs and Slovaks remaining in the Sudetenland to choose their citizenship. Men at least 28 years of age, together with their wives and children, received German citizenship upon request. The Reich's Government allowed people opting to remain Czechoslovak nationals to stay on as guest residents. People leaving the Sudeten territory retained ownership of private property there with the option to sell or rent it. Under the treaty's provisions, the German and Czech governments respectively could expel foreigners considered a political risk. Out of the more than 300,000 Czechs choosing to continue to live in the Sudetenland, the Germans deported just 140 "undesirable persons." Hitler exempted Czechs and Slovaks absorbed into the Reich from service in its armed forces.¹²⁶

The ethnic German minority residing in Prague-controlled sections of Bohemia-Moravia experienced the resentment of the Czechs after their defeat at Munich. Thousands of Germans lost their jobs. Many were unnecessarily watched by the police. The government denied them and their families unemployment benefits. Czech health insurance companies refused claims for the German university clinic in Prague. Hitler confronted Chvalkovsky on January 21, 1939, with a list of grievances resulting from what he called a lingering "Benes mentality" throughout the republic. Citing the hostile tone of the Czech press, the Führer warned that no Great Power can tolerate a smaller neighboring country representing a perpetual threat in its flank. He stressed once more the necessity of improving relations.¹²⁷

Ribbentrop read Chvalkovsky passages from prominent Czech newspapers. One predicted, "Four months after Munich it is already clear that a war is unavoidable." Another read, "The momentary political situation will not be regarded as unchangeable and a permanent circumstance."¹²⁸ Henderson advised Voytech Mastny, the Czech ambassador in Berlin, to urge his government to

avoid abuse of its ethnic German residents. In exile in London, Benes sought to maintain political influence through his contacts in Prague. His followers there conducted a press campaign criticizing the present regime for compliance toward Berlin.¹²⁹

None of the rivalries in this political constellation would matter long. The Munich Accord, engineered by the western democracies to save Czechoslovakia, was ironically her death sentence. Its precedent for self-determination encouraged the country's other captive minorities to follow the example of the Sudeten Germans. Most prominent among them were the Slovaks. The Czech army and militia had occupied their land in 1919. Tomas Masaryk failed to deliver on his promise of regional autonomy. Nor were Slovaks equally represented in public administration; of 8,000 civil servants in Prague's government offices, just 200 were Slovak.¹³⁰

Hitler wished to remain neutral in the friction dividing Czechs and Slovaks. On November 19, the Reich's Foreign Office directed its mission in Prague to watch events with reserve. The German press received instructions to maintain a non-partisan attitude in reporting on tensions in Slovakia. Hitler ordered, "For the time being, no political talks with the Slovaks are opportune."¹³¹

Prague lost its grip on the disaffected minorities. In October, the Slovaks and Ruthenians established regional parliaments; a right finally conceded by the central government as a step toward autonomy. Delegates used their influence and authority to steer the regions more toward independence. The new Czech president, Dr. Emil Hacha, resorted to the usual hammer methods. On March 6, he deployed troops in the Carpatho-Ukraine and appointed General Lev Prchala, their commander, minister of the interior and finance. In Slovakia, Hacha dissolved the regional parliament. He placed the capital, Pressburg, under martial law and jailed 60 Slovakian politicians. Czech soldiers and police transferred to Pressburg. Hacha faced mounting chaos and the threat of open rebellion. He appealed to Dr. Joseph Tiso, whom the Slovaks had elected their prime minister, to help restore order.

On March 13, Tiso visited Berlin to ask Hitler how he would react to a Slovakian declaration of independence. The Führer replied only that he has no interest in occupying Slovakia, since the land had never belonged to the German Reich. Tiso returned to Pressburg. He proclaimed national independence in

parliament the next day. Fearing that the Hungarian army would invade and annex Slovakia, Tiso asked for German protection. Hitler replied, "I acknowledge the receipt of your telegram and hereby assume the security of the Slovakian state." On this day, Czechoslovakia ceased to exist as a republic. The German chancellor pacified the Hungarians by allowing them to occupy the Carpatho-Ukraine.

Hacha requested an audience with Hitler. He and Chvalkovsky arrived in Berlin by train the night of the 14th. Since taking office, both men had worked to improve relations with Germany. The machinations of Benes's remaining associates, the anti-German press, and a public attitude tainted by nearly 20 years of Czech chauvinism promoted by Benes had sabotaged their efforts. Prior to meeting Hitler, Hacha told Ribbentrop that he had come to "place the fate of the Czech state in the hands of the Führer."¹³²

During their subsequent conversation, Hitler told Hacha that he was sending the German army across the frontier the following day. He had ordered the OKW to prepare the operation three days earlier. The Führer advised his guests to order the Czech army not to resist: "In this case your people still have good prospects for the future. I will guarantee them autonomy far beyond what they could ever have dreamed of in the time of Austria."¹³³ Hacha duly relayed instructions to his army chief, General Jan Syrový, to stand down. The German troops who entered Czech territory at 6:00 a.m. on March 15 had orders forbidding them to fire their weapons.

Advanced elements of the German army occupied the Morava-Ostrava industrial complex near the Polish frontier. Warsaw was about to exploit the momentary turmoil in Czechoslovakia to militarily seize the center and hold it for Poland. Local Czech residents understood the German initiative and offered no resistance.¹³⁴ The Polish government was angry with Hitler for this rebuff of its ambitions.

The Germans mollified the initial hostility of the Czech people, largely thanks to the efforts of the *Nationalsozialistische Volkswohlfahrt* (NSV), Germany's national social welfare organization. In the first ten days of the occupation, it distributed RM 7,000,000 worth of food to the distressed population. The NSV freely handed out RM 5,000,000 worth of clothing. The organization concentrated on cities and industrial regions, where shortages were more likely

to occur than in rural areas. The German military authorities also arranged for the prompt restocking of grocery and department stores. Relief efforts favored the Czech populace and not the remaining ethnic German colony. The army also guarded against spontaneous attempts by members of the local *Volksdeutsche Partei* (Ethnic German Party) to gain control of the economy or of public administration.¹³⁵

The Germans entered a land with 148,000 unemployed. Demobilization of the Czech army substantially increased the number. The Reich's Ministry of Labor established offices in the Czech Protectorate - as it now became known - to recruit out-of-work persons for German industry. During the first month of the occupation, 15,000 people took advantage of the opportunity and found jobs. Over the next few months, unemployment continued to decline, and in June, the Czech government negotiated trade agreements with Norway, Holland, and several other nations to boost commerce.¹³⁶

Hitler ordered the Czech's peacetime standing army of 150,000 men reduced to 7,000 including 280 officers. Only citizens of Czech nationality could serve. In consideration of the mortification suffered by officers dismissed by the reduction in force, he arranged for them to receive a full military pension regardless of their length of service.¹³⁷ The German military administration lasted just one month. The German army commander, Walther von Brauchitsch, dispersed the permanent garrisons to ethnic German communities to reduce offense to the Czechs. At no time during the 1939-1945 war did the Germans induct Czech nationals into their armed forces. Their country remained virtually unscathed throughout the devastating world conflict.

Hacha and his new cabinet resumed control of the government on April 27, 1939. Czech remained the official language. Administrative responsibilities included the interior, education, agriculture, justice, transportation, culture, social services, and public works. Germany managed foreign policy and finance. Hitler appointed Konstantin von Neurath to discharge these duties. In his long diplomatic career, Neurath had often demonstrated sympathy and admiration for the Czechs.

German Army Group Command 3 estimated there were roughly 140,000 German refugees and immigrants in the Sudetenland and Bohemia-Moravia who had settled there to escape National Socialist rule. The German police arrested

2,500 Communists. The assistance of the Czech police facilitated the round-up. On June 7, Hitler declared general amnesty for all Czech political prisoners in the Sudetenland and in their own country.¹³⁸ The Germans maintained a permanent force of 5,000 police officers throughout the Protectorate to combat sabotage and Communist subversion. The Czech population experienced more autonomy, civil liberty and absence of discrimination under German hegemony than Tomas Masaryk and Benes had accorded the Sudeten German, Slovak, and Hungarian minorities during the earlier years of the republic.

The Germans confiscated most Czech army ordnance and integrated it into their own armed forces. German troops briefly entered Slovakian territory to empty Czech military depots near the frontier. The vast quantity of war materiel substantiated Hitler's protest that Czechoslovakia in a coalition with other European powers represented a threat to Germany. During the first week of the occupation, the Germans shipped 24 freight trains filled with military hardware into the Reich. They estimated 500 trains would be necessary to complete the transfer.

Quartermaster General Eduard Wagner wrote his wife on March 30 that the quantity of combat ordnance discovered in this small country was "downright frightening."¹³⁹ The inventory included 1,582 aircraft, 2,175 field guns, 468 tanks, 501 anti-aircraft guns, 785 mortars, 43,856 machine guns, over a million rifles, three million artillery rounds, a considerable array of military specialty items such as bridge building equipment and searchlights, plus over a billion rifle rounds for the infantry. It consisted of up-to-date, well-designed weaponry. Modern production facilities such as the Skoda plant were expansive enough to simultaneously fill defense contracts for the USSR.

Ribbentrop sent Dr. Friedrich Berber to Prague with a special research staff to peruse documents in the Czech diplomatic archives dating from March 1938 to March 1939. The team examined records "related to the English and French approach to the Czech question." Based on an abundance of documentary evidence assessed both in Prague and a few months earlier in Vienna, Berber's analysis concluded that London had systematically intervened "in the politics of these countries" in order to "maintain their independence and weaken Germany." The records also revealed that the British "have acted in the same manner regarding Poland," the report deduced. Hitler concluded from the findings that "England wants war."¹⁴⁰

Winston Churchill Discreetly Veiled, Part 1

Ralph Raico

Embroiding America in War — Again

In September 1939, Britain went to war with Germany, pursuant to the guarantee which Chamberlain had been panicked into extending to Poland in March. Lloyd George had termed the guarantee "hare-brained," while Churchill had supported it. Nonetheless, in his history of the war Churchill wrote: "Here was decision at last, taken at the worst possible moment and on the least satisfactory ground which must surely lead to the slaughter of tens of millions of people."¹ With the war on, Winston was recalled to his old job as First Lord of the Admiralty. Then, in the first month of the war, an astonishing thing happened: the president of the United States initiated a personal correspondence not with the Prime Minister, but with the head of the British Admiralty, by-passing all the ordinary diplomatic channels.²

The messages that passed between the president and the First Lord were surrounded by a frantic secrecy, culminating in the affair of Tyler Kent, the American cipher clerk at the US London embassy who was tried and imprisoned by the British authorities. The problem was that some of the messages contained allusions to Roosevelt's agreement — even before the war began — to a blatantly unneutral cooperation with a belligerent Britain.³

On June 10, 1939, George VI and his wife, Queen Mary, visited the Roosevelts at Hyde Park. In private conversations with the King, Roosevelt promised full support for Britain in case of war. He intended to set up a zone in the Atlantic to be patrolled by the US Navy, and, according to the King's notes, the president stated that "if he saw a U boat he would sink her at once & wait for the consequences." The biographer of George VI, Wheeler-Bennett, considered that these conversations "contained the germ of the future Bases-for-Destroyers deal, and also of the Lend-Lease Agreement itself."⁴ In communicating with the First Lord of the Admiralty, Roosevelt was aware that he was in touch with the one member of Chamberlain's cabinet whose belligerence matched his own.

In 1940, Churchill at last became Prime Minister, ironically enough when the Chamberlain government resigned because of the Norwegian fiasco — which Churchill, more than anyone else, had helped to bring about.⁵ As he had fought against a negotiated peace after the fall of Poland, so he continued to resist any suggestion of negotiations with Hitler. Many of the relevant documents are still

sealed — after all these years⁶ — but it is clear that a strong peace party existed in the country and the government. It included Lloyd George in the House of Commons, and Halifax, the Foreign Secretary, in the Cabinet. Even after the fall of France, Churchill rejected Hitler's renewed peace overtures. This, more than anything else, is supposed to be the foundation of his greatness. The British historian John Charmley raised a storm of outraged protest when he suggested that a negotiated peace in 1940 might have been to the advantage of Britain and Europe.⁷ A Yale historian, writing in the New York Times Book Review, referred to Charmley's thesis as "morally sickening."⁸ Yet Charmley's scholarly and detailed work makes the crucial point that Churchill's adamant refusal even to listen to peace terms in 1940 doomed what he claimed was dearest to him — the Empire and a Britain that was non-socialist and independent in world affairs. One may add that it probably also doomed European Jewry.⁹ It is amazing that seventy-five years after the fact, there are critical theses concerning World War II that are off-limits to historical debate.

Lloyd George, Halifax, and the others were open to a compromise peace because they understood that Britain and the Dominions alone could not defeat Germany.¹⁰ After the fall of France, Churchill's aim of total victory could be realized only under one condition: that the United States become embroiled in another world war. No wonder that Churchill put his heart and soul into ensuring precisely that.

After a talk with Churchill, Joseph Kennedy, American ambassador to Britain, noted: "Every hour will be spent by the British in trying to figure out how we can be gotten in." When he left from Lisbon on a ship to New York, Kennedy pleaded with the State Department to announce that if the ship should happen to blow up mysteriously in the mid-Atlantic, the United States would not consider it a cause for war with Germany. In his unpublished memoirs, Kennedy wrote: "I thought that would give me some protection against Churchill's placing a bomb on the ship."¹¹

Kennedy's fears were perhaps not exaggerated. For, while it had been important for British policy in World War I, involving America was the sine qua non of Churchill's policy in World War II. In Franklin Roosevelt, he found a ready accomplice.

That Roosevelt, through his actions and private words, evinced a clear design for war before December 7, 1941, has never really been in dispute. Arguments have raged over such questions as his possible foreknowledge of the Pearl Harbor attack. In 1948, Thomas A. Bailey, diplomatic historian at Stanford, already put the real pro-Roosevelt case:

Franklin Roosevelt repeatedly deceived the American people during the period before Pearl Harbor.... He was like a physician who must tell the patient lies for the patient's own good.... The country was overwhelmingly noninterventionist to the very day of Pearl Harbor, and an overt attempt to lead the people into war would have resulted in certain failure and an almost certain ousting of Roosevelt in 1940, with a complete defeat of his ultimate aims.[12](#)

Churchill himself never bothered to conceal Roosevelt's role as co-conspirator. In January, 1941, Harry Hopkins visited London. Churchill described him as "the most faithful and perfect channel of communication between the President and me ... the main prop and animator of Roosevelt himself":

I soon comprehended [Hopkins's] personal dynamism and the outstanding importance of his mission ... here was an envoy from the President of supreme importance to our life. With gleaming eye and quiet, constrained passion he said: "The President is determined that we shall win the war together. Make no mistake about it. He has sent me here to tell you that at all costs and by all means he will carry you through, no matter what happens to him — there is nothing that he will not do so far as he has human power." There he sat, slim, frail, ill, but absolutely glowing with refined comprehension of the Cause. It was to be the defeat, ruin, and slaughter of Hitler, to the exclusion of all other purposes, loyalties and aims.[13](#)

In 1976, the public finally learned the story of William Stephenson, the British agent code named "Intrepid," sent by Churchill to the United States in 1940.[14](#) Stephenson set up headquarters in Rockefeller Center, with orders to use any means necessary to help bring the United States into the war. With the full knowledge and cooperation of Roosevelt and the collaboration of federal agencies, Stephenson and his 300 or so agents "intercepted mail, tapped wires,

cracked safes, kidnapped, ... rumor mongered" and incessantly smeared their favorite targets, the "isolationists." Through Stephenson, Churchill was virtually in control of William Donovan's organization, the embryonic US intelligence service.[15](#)

Churchill even had a hand in the barrage of pro-British, anti-German propaganda that issued from Hollywood in the years before the United States entered the war. Gore Vidal, in *Screening History*, perceptively notes that starting around 1937, Americans were subjected to one film after another glorifying England and the warrior heroes who built the Empire. As spectators of these productions, Vidal says: "We served neither Lincoln nor Jefferson Davis; we served the Crown."[16](#) A key Hollywood figure in generating the movies that "were making us all weirdly English" was the Hungarian émigré and friend of Churchill, Alexander Korda.[17](#) Vidal very aptly writes:

For those who find disagreeable today's Zionist propaganda, I can only say that gallant little Israel of today must have learned a great deal from the gallant little Englanders of the 1930s. The English kept up a propaganda barrage that was to permeate our entire culture ... Hollywood was subtly and not so subtly infiltrated by British propagandists.[18](#)

While the Americans were being worked on, the two confederates consulted on how to arrange for direct hostilities between the United States and Germany. In August 1941, Roosevelt and Churchill met at the Atlantic conference. Here they produced the Atlantic Charter, with its "four freedoms," including "the freedom from want" — a blank-check to spread Anglo-American Sozialpolitik around the globe. When Churchill returned to London, he informed the Cabinet of what had been agreed to. Thirty years later, the British documents were released. Here is how the New York Times reported the revelations:

Formerly top secret British Government papers made public today said that President Franklin D. Roosevelt told Prime Minister Winston Churchill in August, 1941, that he was looking for an incident to justify opening hostilities against Nazi Germany.... On August 19 Churchill reported to the War Cabinet in London on other aspects of the Newfoundland [Atlantic Charter] meeting that were not made public. ... "He [Roosevelt] obviously was determined that they should come in. If he

were to put the issue of peace and war to Congress, they would debate it for months," the Cabinet minutes added. "The President had said he would wage war but not declare it and that he would become more and more provocative. If the Germans did not like it, they could attack American forces.... Everything was to be done to force an incident."[19](#)

On July 15, 1941, Admiral Little, of the British naval delegation in Washington, wrote to Admiral Pound, the First Sea Lord: "the brightest hope for getting America into the war lies in the escorting arrangements to Iceland, and let us hope the Germans will not be slow in attacking them." Little added, perhaps jokingly: "Otherwise I think it would be best for us to organize an attack by our own submarines and preferably on the escort!" A few weeks earlier, Churchill, looking for a chance to bring America into the war, wrote to Pound regarding the German warship Prinz Eugen: "It would be better for instance that she should be located by a US ship as this might tempt her to fire on that ship, thus providing the incident for which the US government would be so grateful."[20](#) Incidents in the North Atlantic did occur, increasingly, as the United States approached war with Germany.[21](#)

But Churchill did not neglect the "back door to war" — embroiling the United States with Japan — as a way of bringing America into the conflict with Hitler. Sir Robert Craigie, the British ambassador to Tokyo, like the American ambassador Joseph Grew, was working feverishly to avoid war. Churchill directed his foreign secretary, Anthony Eden, to whip Craigie into line:

He should surely be told forthwith that the entry of the United States into war either with Germany and Italy or with Japan, is fully conformable with British interests. Nothing in the munitions sphere can compare with the importance of the British Empire and the United States being co-belligerent.[22](#)

Churchill threw his influence into the balance to harden American policy towards Japan, especially in the last days before the Pearl Harbor attack.[23](#) A sympathetic critic of Churchill, Richard Lamb, has recently written:

Was [Churchill] justified in trying to provoke Japan to attack the United States? ... in 1941 Britain had no prospect of defeating Germany without

the aid of the USA as an active ally. Churchill believed Congress would never authorize Roosevelt to declare war on Germany In war, decisions by national leaders must be made according to their effect on the war effort. There is truth in the old adage: "All's fair in love and war."[24](#)

No wonder that, in the House of Commons, on February 15, 1942, Churchill declared, of America's entry into the war: "This is what I have dreamed of, aimed at, worked for, and now it has come to pass."[25](#)

Churchill's devotees by no means hold his role in bringing America into World War II against him. On the contrary, they count it in his favor. Harry Jaffa, in his uninformed and frantic apology, seems to be the last person alive who refuses to believe that the Man of Many Centuries was responsible to any degree for America's entry into the war: after all, wasn't it the Japanese who bombed Pearl Harbor?[26](#)

But what of the American Republic? What does it mean for us that a president collaborated with a foreign head of government to entangle us in a world war? The question would have mattered little to Churchill. He had no concern with the United States as a sovereign, independent nation, with its own character and place in the scheme of things. For him, Americans were one of "the English-speaking peoples." He looked forward to a common citizenship for Britons and Americans, a "mixing together," on the road to Anglo-American world hegemony.[27](#)

But the Churchill-Roosevelt intrigue should, one might think, matter to Americans. Here, however, criticism is halted before it starts. A moral postulate of our time is that in pursuit of the destruction of Hitler, all things were permissible. Yet why is it self-evident that morality required a crusade against Hitler in 1939 and 1940, and not against Stalin? At that point, Hitler had slain his thousands, but Stalin had already slain his millions. In fact, up to June, 1941, the Soviets behaved far more murderously toward the Poles in their zone of occupation than the Nazis did in theirs. Around 1,500,000 Poles were deported to the Gulag, with about half of them dying within the first two years. As Norman Davies writes: "Stalin was outpacing Hitler in his desire to reduce the Poles to the condition of a slave nation."[28](#) Of course, there were balance-of-power considerations that created distinctions between the two dictators. But it

has yet to be explained why there should exist a double standard ordaining that compromise with one dictator would have been "morally sickening," while collaboration with the other was morally irreproachable.[29](#)

"First Catch Your Hare"

Early in the war, Churchill, declared: "I have only one aim in life, the defeat of Hitler, and this makes things very simple for me."³⁰ "Victory — victory at all costs," understood literally, was his policy practically to the end. This points to Churchill's fundamental and fatal mistake in World War II: his separation of operational from political strategy. To the first — the planning and direction of military campaigns — he devoted all of his time and energy; after all, he did so enjoy it. To the second, the fitting of military operations to the larger and much more significant political aims they were supposed to serve, he devoted no effort at all.

Stalin, on the other hand, understood perfectly that the entire purpose of war is to enforce certain political claims. This is the meaning of Clausewitz's famous dictum that war is the continuation of policy by other means. On Eden's visit to Moscow in December 1941, with the Wehrmacht in the Moscow suburbs, Stalin was ready with his demands: British recognition of Soviet rule over the Baltic states and the territories he had just seized from Finland, Poland, and Romania. (They were eventually granted.) Throughout the war he never lost sight of these and other crucial political goals. But Churchill, despite frequent prodding from Eden, never gave a thought to his, whatever they might be.³¹ His approach, he explained, was that of Mrs. Glass's recipe for Jugged Hare: "First catch your hare."³² First beat Hitler, then start thinking of the future of Britain and Europe. Churchill put in so many words: "the defeat, ruin, and slaughter of Hitler, to the exclusion of all other purposes, loyalties and aims."

Tuvia Ben-Moshe has shrewdly pinpointed one of the sources of this grotesque indifference:

Thirty years earlier, Churchill had told Asquith that ... his life's ambition was "to command great victorious armies in battle." During World War II he was determined to take nothing less than full advantage of the opportunity given him — the almost unhampered military management of the great conflict. He was prone to ignore or postpone the treatment of matters likely to detract from that pleasure In so doing, he deferred, or even shelved altogether, treatment of the issues that he should have dealt with in his capacity as Prime Minister.³³

Churchill's policy of all-out support of Stalin foreclosed other, potentially more favorable approaches. The military expert Hanson Baldwin, for instance, stated:

There is no doubt whatsoever that it would have been in the interest of Britain, the United States, and the world to have allowed — and indeed, to have encouraged — the world's two great dictatorships to fight each other to a frazzle. Such a struggle, with its resultant weakening of both Communism and Nazism, could not but have aided in the establishment of a more stable peace.[34](#)

Instead of adopting this approach, or, for example, promoting the overthrow of Hitler by anti-Nazi Germans — instead of even considering such alternatives — Churchill from the start threw all of his support to Soviet Russia.

Franklin Roosevelt's fatuousness towards Joseph Stalin is well-known. He looked on Stalin as a fellow "progressive" and an invaluable collaborator in creating the future New World Order.[35](#) But the neo-conservatives and others who counterpose to Roosevelt's inanity in this matter Churchill's Old World cunning and sagacity are sadly in error. Roosevelt's nauseating flattery of Stalin is easily matched by Churchill's. Just like Roosevelt, Churchill heaped fulsome praise on the Communist murderer, and was anxious for Stalin's personal friendship. Moreover, his adulation of Stalin and his version of Communism — so different from the repellent "Trotskyite" kind — was no different in private than in public. In January 1944, he was still speaking to Eden of the "deep-seated changes which have taken place in the character of the Russian state and government, the new confidence which has grown in our hearts towards Stalin."[36](#) In a letter to his wife, Clementine, Churchill wrote, following the October 1944 conference in Moscow: "I have had very nice talks with the old Bear. I like him the more I see him. Now they respect us & I am sure they wish to work with us."[37](#) Writers like Isaiah Berlin, who try to give the impression that Churchill hated or despised all dictators, including Stalin, are either ignorant or dishonest.[38](#)

Churchill's supporters often claim that, unlike the Americans, the seasoned and crafty British statesman foresaw the danger from the Soviet Union and worked doggedly to thwart it. Churchill's famous "Mediterranean" strategy — to attack Europe through its "soft underbelly," rather than concentrating on an invasion of

northern France — is supposed to be the proof of this.³⁹ But this was an ex post facto defense, concocted by Churchill once the Cold War had started: there is little, if any, contemporary evidence that the desire to beat the Russians to Vienna and Budapest formed any part of Churchill's motivation in advocating the "soft underbelly" strategy. At the time, Churchill gave purely military reasons for it.⁴⁰ As Ben-Moshe states: "The official British historians have ascertained that not until the second half of 1944 and after the Channel crossing did Churchill first begin to consider preempting the Russians in southeastern Europe by military means."⁴¹ By then, such a move would have been impossible for several reasons. It was another of Churchill's bizarre military notions, like invading Fortress Europe through Norway, or putting off the invasion of northern France until 1945 — by which time the Russians would have reached the Rhine.⁴²

Moreover, the American opposition to Churchill's southern strategy did not stem from blindness to the Communist danger. As General Albert C. Wedemeyer, one of the firmest anti-Communists in the American military, wrote:

if we had invaded the Balkans through the Ljubljana Gap, we might theoretically have beaten the Russians to Vienna and Budapest. But logistics would have been against us there: it would have been next to impossible to supply more than two divisions through the Adriatic ports. ... The proposal to save the Balkans from communism could never have been made good by a "soft underbelly" invasion, for Churchill himself had already cleared the way for the success of Tito . . . [who] had been firmly ensconced in Yugoslavia with British aid long before Italy itself was conquered.⁴³

Wedemeyer's remarks about Yugoslavia were on the mark. On this issue, Churchill rejected the advice of his own Foreign Office, depending instead on information provided especially by the head of the Cairo office of the SOE — the Special Operations branch — headed by a Communist agent named James Klugman. Churchill withdrew British support from the Loyalist guerrilla army of General Mihailovic and threw it to the Communist Partisan leader Tito.⁴⁴ What a victory for Tito would mean was no secret to Churchill.⁴⁵ When Fitzroy Maclean was interviewed by Churchill before being sent as liaison to Tito, Maclean observed that, under Communist leadership, the Partisans' ultimate aim

would undoubtedly be to establish in Yugoslavia a Communist regime closely linked to Moscow. How did His Majesty's Government view such an eventuality? ... Mr. Churchill's reply left me in no doubt as to the answer to my problem. So long, he said, as the whole of Western civilization was threatened by the Nazi menace, we could not afford to let our attention be diverted from the immediate issue by considerations of long-term policy Politics must be a secondary consideration.[46](#)

It would be difficult to think of a more frivolous attitude to waging war than considering "politics" to be a "secondary consideration." As for the "human costs" of Churchill's policy, when an aide pointed out that Tito intended to transform Yugoslavia into a Communist dictatorship on the Soviet model, Churchill retorted: "Do you intend to live there?"[47](#)

Churchill's benign view of Stalin and Russia contrasts sharply with his view of Germany. Behind Hitler, Churchill discerned the old specter of Prussianism, which had caused, allegedly, not only the two world wars, but the Franco Prussian War as well. What he was battling now was "Nazi tyranny and Prussian militarism," the "two main elements in German life which must be absolutely destroyed."[48](#) In October 1944, Churchill was still explaining to Stalin that: "The problem was how to prevent Germany getting on her feet in the lifetime of our grandchildren."[49](#) Churchill harbored a "confusion of mind on the subject of the Prussian aristocracy, Nazism, and the sources of German militarist expansionism ... [his view] was remarkably similar to that entertained by Sir Robert Vansittart and Sir Warren Fisher; that is to say, it arose from a combination of almost racist antipathy and balance of power calculations."[50](#) Churchill's aim was not simply to save world civilization from the Nazis, but, in his words, the "indefinite prevention of their [the Germans'] rising again as an Armed Power."[51](#)

Little wonder, then, that Churchill refused even to listen to the pleas of the anti-Hitler German opposition, which tried repeatedly to establish liaison with the British government. Instead of making every effort to encourage and assist an anti-Nazi coup in Germany, Churchill responded to the feelers sent out by the German resistance with cold silence.[52](#) Reiterated warnings from Adam von Trott and other resistance leaders of the impending "bolshevization" of Europe made no impression at all on Churchill.[53](#) A recent historian has written, "by his

intransigence and refusal to countenance talks with dissident Germans, Churchill threw away an opportunity to end the war in July 1944."[54](#) To add infamy to stupidity, Churchill and his crowd had only words of scorn for the valiant German officers even as they were being slaughtered by the Gestapo.[55](#)

In place of help, all Churchill offered Germans looking for a way to end the war before the Red Army flooded into central Europe was the slogan of unconditional surrender. Afterwards, Churchill lied in the House of Commons about his role at Casablanca in connection with Roosevelt's announcement of the policy of unconditional surrender, and was forced to retract his statements.[56](#)

Eisenhower, among others, strenuously and persistently objected to the unconditional surrender formula as hampering the war effort by raising the morale of the Wehrmacht.[57](#) In fact, the slogan was seized on by Goebbels, and contributed to the Germans' holding out to the bitter end.

The pernicious effect of the policy was immeasurably bolstered by the Morgenthau Plan, which gave the Germans a terrifying picture of what "unconditional surrender" would mean.[58](#) This plan, initialed by Roosevelt and Churchill at Quebec, called for turning Germany into an agricultural and pastoral country; even the coal mines of the Ruhr were to be wrecked. The fact that it would have led to the deaths of tens of millions of Germans made it a perfect analog to Hitler's schemes for dealing with Russia and the Ukraine.

Churchill was initially averse to the plan. However, he was won over by Professor Lindemann, as maniacal a German-hater as Morgenthau himself. Lindemann stated to Lord Moran, Churchill's personal physician: "I explained to Winston that the plan would save Britain from bankruptcy by eliminating a dangerous competitor.... Winston had not thought of it in that way, and he said no more about a cruel threat to the German people."[59](#) According to Morgenthau, the wording of the scheme was drafted entirely by Churchill. When Roosevelt returned to Washington, Hull and Stimson expressed their horror, and quickly disabused the president. Churchill, on the other hand, was unrepentant. When it came time to mention the Morgenthau Plan in his history of the war, he distorted its provisions and, by implication, lied about his role in supporting it.[60](#)

Beyond the issue of the plan itself, Lord Moran wondered how it had been

possible for Churchill to appear at the Quebec conference "without any thought out views on the future of Germany, although she seemed to be on the point of surrender." The answer was that "he had become so engrossed in the conduct of the war that little time was left to plan for the future":

Military detail had long fascinated him, while he was frankly bored by the kind of problem which might take up the time of the Peace Conference.... The P. M. was frittering away his waning strength on matters which rightly belonged to soldiers. My diary in the autumn of 1942 tells how I talked to Sir Stafford Cripps and found that he shared my cares. He wanted the P. M. to concentrate on the broad strategy of the war and on high policy.... No one could make [Churchill] see his errors.[61](#)

War Crimes Discreetly Veiled

There are a number of episodes during the war revealing of Churchill's character that deserve to be mentioned. A relatively minor incident was the British attack on the French fleet, at Mers-el-Kebir (Oran), off the coast of Algeria. After the fall of France, Churchill demanded that the French surrender their fleet to Britain. The French declined, promising that they would scuttle the ships before allowing them to fall into German hands. Against the advice of his naval officers, Churchill ordered British ships off the Algerian coast to open fire. About 1500 French sailors were killed. This was obviously a war crime, by anyone's definition: an unprovoked attack on the forces of an ally without a declaration of war. At Nuremberg, German officers were sentenced to prison for less. Realizing this, Churchill lied about Mers-el-Kebir in his history, and suppressed evidence concerning it in the official British histories of the war.[62](#) With the attack on the French fleet, Churchill confirmed his position as the prime subverter through two world wars of the system of rules of warfare that had evolved in the West over centuries.

But the great war crime which will be forever linked to Churchill's name is the terror-bombing of the cities of Germany that in the end cost the lives of around 600,000 civilians and left some 800,000 seriously injured.[63](#) (Compare this to the roughly 70,000 British lives lost to German air attacks. In fact, there were nearly as many Frenchmen killed by Allied air attacks as there were Englishmen killed by Germans.[64](#)) The plan was conceived mainly by Churchill's friend and scientific advisor, Professor Lindemann, and carried out by the head of Bomber Command, Arthur Harris ("Bomber Harris"). Harris stated: "In Bomber Command we have always worked on the assumption that bombing anything in Germany is better than bombing nothing."[65](#) Harris and other British airforce leaders boasted that Britain had been the pioneer in the massive use of strategic bombing. J.M. Spaight, former Principal Assistant Secretary of the Air Ministry, noted that while the Germans (and the French) looked on air power as largely an extension of artillery, a support to the armies in the field, the British understood its capacity to destroy the enemy's home-base. They built their bombers and established Bomber Command accordingly.[66](#)

Churchill among the ruins

Brazenly lying to the House of Commons and the public, Churchill claimed that only military and industrial installations were targeted. In fact, the aim was to kill as many civilians as possible — thus, "area" bombing, or "carpet" bombing — and in this way to break the morale of the Germans and terrorize them into surrendering.[67](#)

Harris at least had the courage of his convictions. He urged that the government openly announce that:

the aim of the Combined Bomber Offensive ... should be unambiguously stated [as] the destruction of German cities, the killing of German workers, and the disruption of civilized life throughout Germany.[68](#)

The campaign of murder from the air leveled Germany. A thousand-year-old urban culture was annihilated, as great cities, famed in the annals of science and art, were reduced to heaps of smoldering ruins. There were high points: the bombing of Lübeck, when that ancient Hanseatic town "burned like kindling"; the 1000-bomber raid over Cologne, and the following raids that somehow, miraculously, mostly spared the great Cathedral but destroyed the rest of the city, including thirteen Romanesque churches; the firestorm that consumed Hamburg and killed some 42,000 people. No wonder that, learning of this, a civilized European man like Joseph Schumpeter, at Harvard, was driven to telling "anyone who would listen" that Churchill and Roosevelt were destroying more than Genghis Khan.[69](#)

The most infamous act was the destruction of Dresden, in February 1945. According to the official history of the Royal Air Force: "The destruction of Germany was by then on a scale which might have appalled Attila or Genghis Khan."[70](#) Dresden, which was the capital of the old kingdom of Saxony, was an indispensable stop on the Grand Tour, the baroque gem of Europe. The war was practically over, the city filled with masses of helpless refugees escaping the advancing Red Army. Still, for three days and nights, from February 13 to 15, Dresden was pounded with bombs. At least 30,000 people were killed, perhaps as many as 135,000 or more. The Zwinger Palace; Our Lady's Church (die Frauenkirche); the Bruhl Terrace, overlooking the Elbe where, in Turgenev's

Fathers and Sons, Uncle Pavel went to spend his last years; the Semper Opera House, where Richard Strauss conducted the premiere of Rosenkavalier; and practically everything else was incinerated. Churchill had fomented it. But he was shaken by the outcry that followed. While in Georgetown and Hollywood, few had ever heard of Dresden, the city meant something in Stockholm, Zurich, and the Vatican, and even in London. What did our hero do? He sent a memorandum to the Chiefs of Staff:

It seems to me that the moment has come when the question of bombing of German cities simply for the sake of increasing the terror, though under other pretexts, should be reviewed. Otherwise, we shall come into control of an utterly ruined land.... The destruction of Dresden remains a serious query against the conduct of Allied bombing.... I feel the need for more precise concentration upon military objectives ... rather than on mere acts of terror and wanton destruction, however impressive.[71](#)

The military chiefs saw through Churchill's contemptible ploy: realizing that they were being set up, they refused to accept the memorandum. After the war, Churchill casually disclaimed any knowledge of the Dresden bombing, saying: "I thought the Americans did it."[72](#)

And still the bombing continued. On March 16, in a period of 20 minutes, Würzburg was razed to the ground. As late as the middle of April, Berlin and Potsdam were bombed yet again, killing another 5,000 civilians. Finally, it stopped; as Bomber Harris noted, there were essentially no more targets to be bombed in Germany.[73](#) It need hardly be recorded that Churchill supported the atom-bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, which resulted in the deaths of another 100,000 or more civilians. When Truman fabricated the myth of the "500,000 U.S. lives saved" by avoiding an invasion of the Home Islands — the highest military estimate had been 46,000 — Churchill topped his lie: the atom-bombings had saved 1,200,000 lives, including 1,000,000 Americans, he fantasized.[74](#)

The eagerness with which Churchill directed or applauded the destruction of cities from the air should raise questions for those who still consider him the great "conservative" of his — or perhaps of all — time. They would do well to consider the judgment of an authentic conservative like Erik von Kuehnelt-

Leddihn, who wrote: "Non-Britishers did not matter to Mr. Churchill, who sacrificed human beings — their lives, their welfare, their liberty — with the same elegant disdain as his colleague in the White House."[75](#)

1945: The Dark Side

And so we come to 1945 and the ever-radiant triumph of Absolute Good over Absolute Evil. So potent is the mystique of that year that the insipid welfare states of today's Europe clutch at it at every opportunity, in search of a few much-needed shreds of glory.

The dark side of that triumph, however, has been all but suppressed. It is the story of the crimes and atrocities of the victors and their protégés. Since Winston Churchill played a central role in the Allied victory, it is the story also of the crimes and atrocities in which Churchill was implicated. These include the forced repatriation of some two million Soviet subjects to the Soviet Union. Among these were tens of thousands who had fought with the Germans against Stalin, under the sponsorship of General Vlasov and his "Russian Army of Liberation." This is what Alexander Solzhenitsyn wrote in *The Gulag Archipelago*:

In their own country, Roosevelt and Churchill are honored as embodiments of statesmanlike wisdom. To us, in our Russian prison conversations, their consistent shortsightedness and stupidity stood out as astonishingly obvious ... what was the military or political sense in their surrendering to destruction at Stalin's hands hundreds of thousands of armed Soviet citizens determined not to surrender?[76](#)

Most shameful of all was the handing over of the Cossacks. They had never been Soviet citizens, since they had fought against the Red Army in the Civil War and then emigrated. Stalin, understandably, was particularly keen to get hold of them, and the British obliged. Solzhenitsyn wrote of Winston Churchill:

He turned over to the Soviet command the Cossack corps of 90,000 men. Along with them he also handed over many wagonloads of old people, women, and children.... This great hero, monuments to whom will in time cover all England, ordered that they, too, be surrendered to their deaths.[77](#)

The "purge" of alleged collaborators in France was a blood-bath that claimed more victims than the Reign of Terror in the Great Revolution — and not just among those who in one way or other had aided the Germans: included were any

right-wingers the Communist resistance groups wished to liquidate.[78](#)

The massacres carried out by Churchill's protégé Tito must be added to this list: tens of thousands of Croats, not simply the Ustasha, but any "class-enemies," in classical Communist style. There was also the murder of some 20,000 Slovene anti-Communist fighters by Tito and his killing squads. When Tito's Partisans rampaged in Trieste, which he was attempting to grab in 1945, additional thousands of Italian anti-Communists were massacred.[79](#)

As the troops of Churchill's Soviet ally swept through central Europe and the Balkans, the mass deportations began. Some in the British government had qualms, feeling a certain responsibility. Churchill would have none of it. In January 1945, for instance, he noted to the Foreign Office: "Why are we making a fuss about the Russian deportations in Rumania of Saxons [Germans] and others? ... I cannot see the Russians are wrong in making 100 or 150 thousand of these people work their passage.... I cannot myself consider that it is wrong of the Russians to take Rumanians of any origin they like to work in the Russian coal-fields."[80](#) About 500,000 German civilians were deported to work in Soviet Russia, in accordance with Churchill and Roosevelt's agreement at Yalta that such slave labor constituted a proper form of "reparations."[81](#)

Worst of all was the expulsion of some 15 million Germans from their ancestral homelands in East and West Prussia, Silesia, Pomerania, and the Sudetenland. This was done pursuant to the agreements at Tehran, where Churchill proposed that Poland be "moved west," and to Churchill's acquiescence in the Czech leader Eduard Benes's plan for the "ethnic cleansing" of Bohemia and Moravia. Around one-and-a-half to two million German civilians died in this process.[82](#) As the Hungarian liberal Gaspar Tamas wrote, in driving out the Germans of east-central Europe, "whose ancestors built our cathedrals, monasteries, universities, and railroad stations," a whole ancient culture was effaced.[83](#) But why should that mean anything to the Churchill devotees who call themselves "conservatives" in America today?

Then, to top it all, came the Nuremberg Trials, a travesty of justice condemned by the great Senator Robert Taft, where Stalin's judges and prosecutors — seasoned veterans of the purges of the 30s — participated in another great show-trial.[84](#)

By 1946, Churchill was complaining in a voice of outrage of the happenings in eastern Europe: "From Stettin on the Baltic to Trieste on the Adriatic, an iron curtain has descended over Europe." Goebbels had popularized the phrase "iron curtain," but it was accurate enough.

The European continent now contained a single, hegemonic power. "As the blinkers of war were removed," John Charmley writes, "Churchill began to perceive the magnitude of the mistake which had been made."[85](#) In fact, Churchill's own expressions of profound self-doubt comport oddly with his admirers' retrospective triumphalism. After the war, he told Robert Boothby: "Historians are apt to judge war ministers less by the victories achieved under their direction than by the political results which flowed from them. Judged by that standard, I am not sure that I shall be held to have done very well."[86](#) In the preface to the first volume of his history of World War II, Churchill explained why he was so troubled:

The human tragedy reaches its climax in the fact that after all the exertions and sacrifices of hundreds of millions of people and of the victories of the Righteous Cause, we have still not found Peace or Security, and that we lie in the grip of even worse perils than those we have surmounted.[87](#)

On V-E Day, he had announced the victory of "the cause of freedom in every land." But to his private secretary, he mused: "What will lie between the white snows of Russia and the white cliffs of Dover?"[88](#) It was a bit late to raise the question. Really, what are we to make of a statesman who for years ignored the fact that the extinction of Germany as a power in Europe entailed ... certain consequences? Is this another Bismarck or Metternich we are dealing with here? Or is it a case of a Woodrow Wilson redivivus — of another Prince of Fools?

With the balance of power in Europe wrecked by his own policy, there was only one recourse open to Churchill: to bring America into Europe permanently. Thus, his anxious expostulations to the Americans, including his Fulton, Missouri "Iron Curtain" speech. Having destroyed Germany as the natural balance to Russia on the continent, he was now forced to try to embroil the United States in yet another war — this time a Cold War, that would last 45 years, and change America fundamentally, and perhaps irrevocably.[89](#)

The Triumph of the Welfare State

In 1945, general elections were held in Britain, and the Labor Party won a landslide victory. Clement Attlee and his colleagues took power and created the socialist welfare state. But the socializing of Britain was probably inevitable, given the war. It was a natural outgrowth of the wartime sense of solidarity and collectivist emotion, of the feeling that the experience of war had somehow rendered class structure and hierarchy — normal features of any advanced society — obsolete and indecent. And there was a second factor — British society had already been to a large extent socialized in the war years, under Churchill himself. As Ludwig von Mises wrote:

Marching ever further on the way of interventionism, first Germany, then Great Britain and many other European countries have adopted central planning, the Hindenburg pattern of socialism. It is noteworthy that in Germany the deciding measures were not resorted to by the Nazis, but some time before Hitler seized power by Brüning ... and in Great Britain not by the Labour Party but by the Tory Prime Minister, Mr. Churchill.[90](#)

While Churchill waged war, he allowed Attlee to head various Cabinet committees on domestic policy and devise proposals on health, unemployment, education, etc.[91](#) Churchill himself had already accepted the master-blueprint for the welfare state, the Beveridge Report. As he put it in a radio speech:

You must rank me and my colleagues as strong partisans of national compulsory insurance for all classes for all purposes from the cradle to the grave.[92](#)

That Mises was correct in his judgment on Churchill's role is indicated by the conclusion of W. H. Greenleaf, in his monumental study of individualism and collectivism in modern Britain. Greenleaf states that it was Churchill who

during the war years, instructed R. A. Butler to improve the education of the people and who accepted and sponsored the idea of a four-year plan for national development and the commitment to sustain full employment in the post-war period. As well he approved proposals to establish a national insurance scheme, services for housing and health, and was prepared to

accept a broadening field of state enterprises. It was because of this coalition policy that Enoch Powell referred to the veritable social revolution which occurred in the years 1942–44. Aims of this kind were embodied in the Conservative declaration of policy issued by the Premier before the 1945 election.[93](#)

When the Tories returned to power in 1951, "Churchill chose a Government which was the least recognizably Conservative in history."[94](#) There was no attempt to roll back the welfare state, and the only industry that was really reprivatized was road haulage.[95](#) Churchill "left the core of its [the Labor government's] work inviolate."[96](#) The "Conservative" victory functioned like Republican victories in the United States, from Eisenhower on — to consolidate socialism. Churchill even undertook to make up for "deficiencies" in the welfare programs of the previous Labor government, in housing and public works.[97](#) Most insidiously of all, he directed his leftist Labor Minister, Walter Monckton, to appease the unions at all costs. Churchill's surrender to the unions, "dictated by sheer political expediency," set the stage for the quagmire in labor relations that prevailed in Britain for the next two decades.[98](#)

Yet, in truth, Churchill never cared a great deal about domestic affairs, even welfarism, except as a means of attaining and keeping office. What he loved was power, and the opportunities power provided to live a life of drama and struggle and endless war.

There is a way of looking at Winston Churchill that is very tempting: that he was a deeply flawed creature, who was summoned at a critical moment to do battle with a uniquely appalling evil, and whose very flaws contributed to a glorious victory — in a way, like Merlin in C.S. Lewis's great Christian novel, *That Hideous Strength*.[99](#) Such a judgment would, I believe, be superficial. A candid examination of his career, I suggest, yields a different conclusion: that, when all is said and done, Winston Churchill was a Man of Blood and a politico without principle, whose apotheosis serves to corrupt every standard of honesty and morality in politics and history.

President Roosevelt's Campaign To Incite War in Europe: The Secret Polish Documents

Mark Weber

Major ceremonies were held in 1982 to mark the one hundredth anniversary of the birth of Franklin Delano Roosevelt. With the exceptions of Washington and Lincoln, he was glorified and eulogized as no other president in American history. Even conservative President Ronald Reagan joined the chorus of applause. In early 1983, newspapers and television networks remembered the fiftieth anniversary of Roosevelt's inauguration with numerous laudatory tributes.

And yet, with each passing year more and more new evidence comes to light which contradicts the glowing image of Roosevelt portrayed by the mass media and politicians.

Much has already been written about Roosevelt's campaign of deception and outright lies in getting the United States to intervene in the Second World War prior to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941. Roosevelt's aid to Britain and the Soviet Union in violation of American neutrality and international law, his acts of war against Germany in the Atlantic in an effort to provoke a German declaration of war against the United States, his authorization of a vast "dirty tricks" campaign against U.S. citizens by British intelligence agents in violation of the Constitution, and his provocations and ultimatums against Japan which brought on the attack against Pearl Harbor -- all this is extensively documented and reasonably well known.[1]

Not so well known is the story of Roosevelt's enormous responsibility for the outbreak of the Second World War itself. This essay focuses on Roosevelt's secret campaign to provoke war in Europe prior to the outbreak of hostilities in September 1939. It deals particularly with his efforts to pressure Britain, France

and Poland into war against Germany in 1938 and 1939.

Franklin Roosevelt not only criminally involved America in a war which had already engulfed Europe. He bears a grave responsibility before history for the outbreak of the most destructive war of all time.

This paper relies heavily on a little-known collection of secret Polish documents which fell into German hands when Warsaw was captured in September 1939. These documents clearly establish Roosevelt's crucial role in bringing on the Second World War. They also reveal the forces behind the President which pushed for war.

While a few historians have quoted sentences and even paragraphs from these documents, their importance has not been fully appreciated. There are three reasons for this, I believe. First, for many years their authenticity was not indisputably established. Second, a complete collection of the documents has not been available in English. And third, the translation of those documents which has been available in English until now is deficient and unacceptably bad.

When the Germans took Warsaw in late September 1939, they seized a mass of documents from the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In a letter of 8 April 1983, Dr. Karl Otto Braun of Munich informed me that the documents were captured by an SS brigade led by Freiherr von Kuensberg, whom Braun knew personally. In a surprise attack, the brigade captured the center of Warsaw ahead of the regular German army. Von Kuensberg told Braun that his men took control of the Polish Foreign Ministry just as Ministry officials were in the process of burning incriminating documents. Dr. Braun was an official of the German Foreign Office between 1938 and 1945.

The German Foreign Office chose Hans Adolf von Moltke, formerly the Reich's Ambassador in Warsaw, to head a special Archive Commission to examine the collection and sort out those documents which might be suitable for publication. At the end of March 1940, 16 of these were published in book form under the title *Polnische Dokumente zur Vorgeschichte des Krieges* ["Polish Documents on the Pre-History of the War"]. The Foreign Office edition was subtitled "German White Book No. 3." The book was immediately published in various foreign language editions in Berlin and some other European capitals. An American edition was published in New York by Howell, Soskin and Company

as *The German White Paper*. Historian C. Hartley Grattan contributed a remarkably cautious and reserved foreword.[2]

The translation of the documents for the U.S. *White Paper* edition was inexcusably bad. Whole sentences and parts of sentences were missing and portions were grossly mistranslated. H. Keith Thompson explained to me why this was so during a conversation on 22 March 1983 and in a letter of 13 May 1983. A poor first draft English-language translation had been prepared in Berlin and sent to America. It was given to George Sylvester Viereck, a prominent pro-German American publicist and literary advisor to the German Library of Information in New York City. Thompson knew Viereck intimately and served as his chief aide and re-writer. Viereck had hurriedly redrafted the translation from Berlin into more readable prose but without any opportunity of comparing it to the original Polish text (which he could not read in any case) or even the official German-language version. In making stylistic changes for the sake of readability, the meaning of the original documents was thereby inadvertently distorted.

The matter was also discussed at a small dinner for Lawrence Dennis hosted by Thompson at Viereck's apartment in the Hotel Belleclaire in New York City in 1956. Viereck explained that he had been a highly paid literary consultant to the German government, responsible for the propaganda effect of publications, and could not be concerned with the translation groundwork normally done by clerks. Even the most careful translation of complicated documents is apt to distort the original meaning, and literary editing is certain to do so, Viereck said. Thompson agreed with that view.

In preparing the English-language text for this essay, I have carefully examined the official German translation and various other translations, and compared them with facsimiles of the original Polish documents.

Media Sensation

The German government considered the captured Polish documents to be of tremendous importance. On Friday, 29 March, the Reich Ministry of Propaganda confidentially informed the daily press of the reason for releasing the documents:

These extraordinary documents, which may be published beginning with the first edition on Saturday, will create a first-class political sensation, since they in fact prove the degree of America's responsibility for the outbreak of the present war. America's responsibility must not, of course, be stressed in commentaries; the documents must be left to speak for themselves, and they speak clearly enough.

The Ministry of Propaganda specifically asks that sufficient space be reserved for the publication of these documents, which is of supreme importance to the Reich and the German people.

We inform you in confidence that the purpose of publishing these documents is to strengthen the American isolationists and to place Roosevelt in an untenable position, especially in view of the fact that he is standing for re-election. It is however not at all necessary for us to point Roosevelt's responsibility; his enemies in America will take care of that.[3]

The German Foreign Office made the documents public on Friday, 29 March 1940. In Berlin, journalists from around the world, including the United States, were given facsimile copies of the original Polish documents and translations in German. Journalists were permitted to examine the original documents themselves, along with an enormous pile of other documents from the Polish Foreign Ministry.

The release of the documents was an international media sensation. American newspapers gave the story large front page headline coverage and published lengthy excerpts from the documents. But the impact was much less than the German government had hoped for.

Leading U.S. government officials wasted no time in vehemently denouncing the documents as not authentic. Secretary of State Cordell Hull stated: "I may say most emphatically that neither I nor any of my associates in the Department of State have ever heard of any such conversations as those alleged, nor do we give them the slightest credence. The statements alleged have not represented in any way at any time the thought or the policy of the American government." William Bullitt, the U.S. Ambassador to Paris who was particularly incriminated by the documents, announced: "I have never made to anyone the statements attributed to me." And Count Jerzy Potocki, the Polish Ambassador in Washington whose confidential reports to Warsaw were the most revealing, declared: "I deny the allegations attributed to my reports. I never had any conversations with Ambassador Bullitt on America's participation in war." [4]

These categorical public denials by the highest officials had the effect of almost completely undercutting the anticipated impact of the documents. It must be remembered that this was several decades before the experiences of the Vietnam war and Watergate had taught another generation of Americans to be highly skeptical of such official denials. In 1940, the vast majority of the American people trusted their political leaders to tell them the truth.

After all, *if* the documents made public to the world by the German government were in fact authentic and genuine, it would mean that the great leader of the American democracy was a man who lied to his own people and broke his own country's laws, while the German government told the truth. To accept that would be quite a lot to expect of any nation, but especially of the trusting American public.

Comment from Capitol Hill generally echoed the official government view. Senator Key Pittman, the Democratic Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, called the documents "unmitigated falsehood designed to create dissension in the United States." Senator Claude Peper, Democrat of Florida, declared: "It's German propaganda and shouldn't affect our policies in the least." Only a few were not impressed with the official denials. Representative Hamilton Fish of New York, the ranking Republican member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, called for a Congressional investigation and declared in a radio address: "If these charges were true, it would constitute a treasonable act. If President Roosevelt has entered into secret understandings or

commitments with foreign governments to involve us in war, he should be impeached."[5]

American newspapers stressed the high-level denials in reporting the release of the documents. *The New York Times* headline read: U.S. BRANDS AS FALSE NAZI DOCUMENTS CHARGING WE FOSTERED WAR IN EUROPE AND PROMISED TO JOIN ALLIES IF NEEDED. The *Baltimore Sun* headlined: NAZI DOCUMENTS LAYING WAR BLAME ON U.S. ARE ASSAILED IN WASHINGTON.[6]

Although the book of Polish documents was labeled "first series," no further volumes ever appeared. From time to time the German government would make public additional documents from the Polish archives. These were published in book form in 1943 along with numerous other documents captured by the Germans from the French Foreign Ministry and other European archives, under the title *Roosevelts Weg in den Krieg: Geheimdokumente zur Kriegspolitik des Praesidenten der Vereinigten Staaten* ["Roosevelt's Way Into War: Secret Documents on the War Policy of the President of the United States"].[7]

An important unanswered question is: Where are the original Polish documents today? Unless they were destroyed in the conflagration of the war, they presumably fell into either American or Soviet hands in 1945. In view of recent U.S. government policy on secret archival material, it is very unlikely that they would still be secret today if they had been acquired by the United States. My guess is that if they were not destroyed, they are now either in Moscow or at the East German Central State Archives in Potsdam.

It is particularly important to keep in mind that these secret reports were written by top level Polish ambassadors, that is, by men who though not at all friendly to Germany nonetheless understood the realities of European Politics far better than those who made policy in the United States.

For example, the Polish ambassadors realized that behind all their rhetoric about democracy and human rights, and expressions of love for the United States, the Jews who agitated for war against Germany were actually doing nothing other than ruthlessly furthering their own purely sectarian interests. Many centuries of experience in living closely with the Jews had made the Poles far more aware than most nationalities of the special character of this people.

The Poles viewed the Munich Settlement of 1938 very differently than did Roosevelt and his circle. The President bitterly attacked the Munich agreement, which gave self-determination to the three and a half million Germans of Czechoslovakia and settled a major European crisis, as a shameful and humiliating capitulation to German blackmail. Although wary of German might, the Polish government supported the Munich agreement, in part because a small Polish territory which had been a part of Czechoslovakia against the wishes of its inhabitants was united with Poland as a result of the Settlement.

The Polish envoys held the makers of American foreign policy in something approaching contempt. President Roosevelt was considered a master political artist who knew how to mold American public opinion, but very little about the true state of affairs in Europe. As Poland's Ambassador to Washington emphasized in his reports to Warsaw, Roosevelt pushed America into war in order to distract attention from his failures as President in domestic policy.

It is beyond the scope of this paper to go into the complexities of German-Polish relations between 1933 and 1939 and the reasons for the German attack against Poland at dawn on the first day of September 1939. However, it should be noted that Poland had refused to even negotiate over self-determination for the German city of Danzig and the ethnic German minority in the so-called Polish Corridor. Hitler felt compelled to resort to arms when he did in response to a growing Polish campaign of terror and dispossession against the one and a half million ethnic Germans under Polish rule. In my view, if ever a military action was justified, it was the German campaign against Poland in 1939.

Poland's headstrong refusal to negotiate was made possible because of a fateful blank check guarantee of military backing from Britain -- a pledge that ultimately proved completely worthless to the hapless Poles. Considering the lightning swiftness of the victorious German campaign, it is difficult to realize today that the Polish government did not fear war with Germany. Poland's leaders foolishly believed that German might was only an illusion. They were convinced that their troops would occupy Berlin itself within a few weeks and add further German territories to an enlarged Polish state. It is also important to keep in mind that the purely localized conflict between Germany and Poland was only transformed into a Europe-wide conflagration by the British and French declarations of war against Germany.

After the war the Allied-appointed judges at the International Military Tribunal staged at Nuremberg refused to admit the Polish documents as evidence for the German defense. Had these pieces of evidence been admitted, the Nuremberg undertaking might have been less a victors' show trial and more a genuinely impartial court of international justice.

Authenticity Beyond Doubt

There is now absolutely no question that the documents from the Polish Foreign Ministry in Warsaw made public by the German government are genuine and authentic.

Charles C. Tansill, professor of American diplomatic history at Georgetown University, considered them genuine. "... I had a long conversation with M. Lipsky, the Polish ambassador in Berlin in the prewar years, and he assured me that the documents in the *German White Paper* are authentic," he wrote.[8] Historian and sociologist Harry Elmer Barnes confirmed this assessment: "Both Professor Tansill and myself have independently established the thorough authenticity of these documents." [9] In *America's Second Crusade*, William H. Chamberlin reported: "I have been privately informed by an extremely reliable source that Potocki, now residing in South America, confirmed the accuracy of the documents, so far as he was concerned." [10]

More importantly, Edward Raczynski, the Polish Ambassador in London from 1934 to 1945, confirmed the authenticity of the documents in his diary, which was published in 1963 under the title *In Allied London*. In his entry for 20 June 1940, he wrote:

The Germans published in April a White Book containing documents from the archives of our Ministry of Foreign Affairs, consisting of reports from Potocki in Washington, Lukasiewicz in Paris and myself. I do not know where they found them, since we were told that the archives had been destroyed. The documents are certainly genuine, and the facsimiles show that for the most part the Germans got hold of originals and not merely copies.

In this 'First Series' of documents I found three reports from this Embassy, two by myself and the third signed by me but written by Balinski. I read them with some apprehension, but they contained nothing liable to compromise myself or the Embassy or to impair relations with our British hosts. [11]

In 1970 their authenticity was reconfirmed with the publication of *Diplomat in Paris 1936-1939*. This important work consists of the official papers and

memoirs of Juliusz Lukasiewicz, the former Polish Ambassador to Paris who authored several of the secret diplomatic reports made public by the German government. The collection was edited by Waclaw Jedrzejewicz, a former Polish diplomat and cabinet member, and later Professor Emeritus of Wellesley and Ripon colleges. Professor Jedrzejewicz considered the documents made public by the Germans absolutely genuine. He quoted extensively from several of them.

Mr. Tyler G. Kent has also vouched for the authenticity of the documents. He states that while working at the U.S. embassy in London in 1939 and 1940, he saw copies of U.S. diplomatic messages in the files which corresponded to the Polish documents and which confirmed their accuracy.

Two Key Diplomats

Two American diplomats who played especially crucial roles in the European crisis of 1938-1939 are mentioned often in the Polish documents. The first of these was William C. Bullitt. Although his official position was U.S. Ambassador to France, he was in reality much more than that. He was Roosevelt's "super envoy" and personal deputy in Europe.

Like Roosevelt, Bullitt "rose from the rich." He was born into an important Philadelphia banking family, one of the city's wealthiest. His mother's grandfather, Jonathan Horwitz, was a German Jew who had come to the United States from Berlin.[12] In 1919 Bullitt was an assistant to President Wilson at the Versailles peace conference. That same year, Wilson and British Prime Minister Lloyd George sent him to Russia to meet with Lenin and determine if the new Bolshevik government deserved recognition by the Allies. Bullitt met with Lenin and other top Soviet leaders and upon his return urged recognition of the new regime. But he had a falling-out with Wilson and left diplomatic service. In 1923 he married Louise Bryant Reed, the widow of American Communist leader John Reed. In Europe Bullitt collaborated with Sigmund Freud on a psychoanalytical biography of Wilson. When Roosevelt became President in 1933, he brought Bullitt back into diplomatic life.[13]

In November 1933, Roosevelt sent Bullitt to Moscow as the first U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union. His initial enthusiasm for the Soviet system gave way to a deep distrust of Stalin and Communism. In 1936 the President transferred him to Paris. He served there as Roosevelt's key European diplomat until 1940 when Churchill's assumption of leadership in Britain and the defeat of France made his special role superfluous.

In the Spring of 1938, all U.S. envoys in Europe were subordinated to Bullitt by an internal directive of the State Department.[14] As the European situation worsened in 1939, Roosevelt often spoke with his man in Paris by telephone, sometimes daily, frequently giving him precisely detailed and ultra-confidential instructions on how to conduct America's foreign policy. Not even Secretary of State Cordell Hull was privy to many of the letters and communications between Bullitt and Roosevelt.

In France, the *New York Times* noted, Bullitt "was acclaimed there as 'the Champagne Ambassador' on account of the lavishness of his parties, but he was far more than the envoy to Paris: He was President Roosevelt's intimate adviser on European affairs, with telephone access to the President at any hour." [15]

Bullitt and Roosevelt were fond of each other and saw eye to eye on foreign policy issues. Both were aristocrats and thorough internationalists who shared definite views on how to remake the world and a conviction that they were destined to bring about that grand reorganization.

"Between these teammates," the *Saturday Evening Post* reported in March 1939,

there is a close, hearty friendship and a strong temperamental affinity. The President is known to rely upon Bullitt's judgment so heavily that the ambassador's mailed and cabled reports from abroad are supplemented several times a week by a chat by transatlantic telephone. In addition, Bullitt returns to the United States several times each year to take part in White House councils, to the displeasure of the State Department, which considers him a prima donna.

In the whole roster of the State Department the President could not have found an adviser who would have been so responsive to his own champagne personality as Bullitt. Both men, born patricians, have the same basic enthusiasm for remolding society ... [16]

In Europe, Bullitt spoke with the voice and the authority of President Roosevelt himself.

The second most important American diplomat in Europe was Joseph P. Kennedy, Roosevelt's Ambassador at the Court of St. James. Like Bullitt he was a wealthy banker. But this Boston Catholic of Irish ancestry was otherwise a very different sort of man. Roosevelt sent Kennedy, an important Democratic party figure and father of a future President, to Britain for purely political reasons. Roosevelt disliked and distrusted Kennedy, and this sentiment grew as Kennedy opposed the President's war policies more and more vehemently. Moreover, Kennedy despised his counterpart in Paris. In a letter to his wife, he wrote: "I talk to Bullitt occasionally. He is more rattlebrained than ever. His judgment is pathetic and I am afraid of his influence on F.D.R. because they think alike on many things." [17]

The Documents

Here now are extensive excerpts from the Polish documents themselves. They are given in chronological order. They are remarkably lucid for diplomatic reports and speak eloquently for themselves.

* * * * *

On 9 February 1938, the Polish Ambassador in Washington, Count Jerzy Potocki, reported to the Foreign Minister in Warsaw on the Jewish role in making American foreign policy:

The pressure of the Jews on President Roosevelt and on the State Department is becoming ever more powerful ...

... The Jews are right now the leaders in creating a war psychosis which would plunge the entire world into war and bring about general catastrophe. This mood is becoming more and more apparent.

in their definition of democratic states, the Jews have also created real chaos: they have mixed together the idea of democracy and communism and have above all raised the banner of burning hatred against Nazism.

This hatred has become a frenzy. It is propagated everywhere and by every means: in theaters, in the cinema, and in the press. The Germans are portrayed as a nation living under the arrogance of Hitler which wants to conquer the whole world and drown all of humanity in an ocean of blood.

In conversations with Jewish press representatives I have repeatedly come up against the inexorable and convinced view that war is inevitable. This international Jewry exploits every means of propaganda to oppose any tendency towards any kind of consolidation and understanding between nations. In this way, the conviction is growing steadily but surely in public opinion here that the Germans and their satellites, in the form of fascism, are enemies who must be subdued by the 'democratic world.'

On 21 November 1938, Ambassador Potocki sent a report to Warsaw which discussed in some detail a conversation between himself and Bullitt, who happened to be back in Washington:

The day before yesterday I had a long conversation with Ambassador Bullitt, who is here on vacation. He began by remarking that friendly relations existed between himself and [Polish] Ambassador Lukasiewicz in Paris, whose company he greatly enjoyed.

Since Bullitt regularly informs President Roosevelt about the international situation in Europe, and particularly about Russia, great attention is given to his reports by President Roosevelt and the State Department. Bullitt speaks energetically and interestingly. Nonetheless, his reaction to events in Europe resembles the view of a journalist more than that of a politician ...

About Germany and Chancellor Hitler he spoke with great vehemence and strong hatred. He said that only force, and ultimately a war would put an end to the insane future German expansionism.

To my question asking how he visualized this coming war, he replied that above all the United States, France and England must rearm tremendously in order to be in a position to oppose German power.

Only then, when the moment is ripe, declared Bullitt further, will one be ready for the final decision. I asked him in what way a conflict could arise, since Germany would probably not attack England and France first. I simply could not see the connecting point in this whole combination.

Bullitt replied that the democratic countries absolutely needed another two years until they were fully armed. In the meantime, Germany would probably have advanced with its expansion in an easterly direction. It would be the wish of the democratic countries that armed conflict would break out there, in the East between the German Reich and Russia. As the Soviet Union's potential strength is not yet known, it might happen that Germany would have moved too far away from its base, and would be condemned to wage a long and weakening war.

Only then would the democratic countries attack Germany, Bullitt declared, and force her to capitulate.

In reply to my question whether the United States would take part in such a war, he said, 'Undoubtedly yes, but only after Great Britain and France had let loose first!' Feeling in the United States was no intense against Nazism and Hitlerism, that a psychosis already prevails today among Americans similar to that before America's declaration of war against Germany in 1917.

Bullitt did not give the impression of being very well informed about the situation in Eastern Europe, and he conversed in a rather superficial way.

Ambassador Potocki's report from Washington of 9 January 1939 dealt in large part with President Roosevelt's annual address to Congress:

President Roosevelt acts on the assumption that the dictatorial governments, above all Germany and Japan, only understand a policy of force. Therefore he has decided to react to any future blows by matching them. This has been demonstrated by the most recent measures of the United States.

The American public is subject to an ever more alarming propaganda which is under Jewish influence and continuously conjures up the specter of the danger of war. Because of this the Americans have strongly altered their views on foreign policy problems, in comparison with last year.

Of all the documents in this collection, the most revealing is probably the secret report by Ambassador Potocki of 12 January 1939 which dealt with the domestic situation in the United States. This report is given here in full:

The feeling now prevailing in the United States is marked by a growing hatred of Fascism and, above all, of Chancellor Hitler and everything connected with Nazism. Propaganda is mostly in the hands of the Jews who control almost 100 percent radio, film, daily and periodical press. Although this propaganda is extremely coarse and presents Germany as

black as possible -- above all religious persecution and concentration camps are exploited -- this propaganda is nevertheless extremely effective since the public here is completely ignorant and knows nothing of the situation in Europe.

Right now most Americans regard Chancellor Hitler and Nazism as the greatest evil and greatest danger threatening the world. The situation here provides an excellent platform for public speakers of all kinds, for emigrants from Germany and Czechoslovakia who don't spare any words to incite the public here with every kind of slander. They praise American liberty which they contrast with the totalitarian states.

It is interesting to note that in this extremely well-planned campaign which is conducted above all against National Socialism, Soviet Russia is almost completely excluded. If mentioned at all, it is only in a friendly manner and things are presented in such a way as if Soviet Russia were working with the bloc of democratic states. Thanks to the clever propaganda the sympathy of the American public is completely on the side of Red Spain.

Besides this propaganda, a war psychosis is being artificially created. The American people are told that peace in Europe is hanging only by a thread and that war is unavoidable. At the same time the American people are unequivocally told that in case of a world war, America must also take an active part in order to defend the slogans of freedom and democracy in the world.

President Roosevelt was the first to express hatred against Fascism. In doing so he was serving a double purpose: First, he wanted to divert the attention of the American people from domestic political problems, especially the problem of the struggle between capital and labor. Second, by creating a war psychosis and by spreading rumors about danger threatening Europe, he wanted to get the American people to accept an enormous armament program which exceeds the defense requirements of the United States.

Regarding the first point, it must be said that the internal situation on

the labor market is steadily growing worse. The unemployed today already number twelve million. Federal and state expenditures are increasing daily. Only the huge sums, running into billions, which the treasury expends for emergency labor projects, are keeping a certain amount of peace in the country. Thus far there have only been the usual strikes and local unrest. But how long this kind of government aid can be kept up cannot be predicted. The excitement and indignation of public opinion, and the serious conflict between private enterprises and enormous trusts on the one hand, and with labor on the other, have made many enemies for Roosevelt and are causing him many sleepless nights.

As to point two, I can only say that President Roosevelt, as a clever political player and an expert of the American mentality, speedily steered public attention away from the domestic situation to fasten it on foreign policy. The way to achieve this was simple. One needed, on the one hand, to conjure up a war menace hanging over the world because of Chancellor Hitler, and, on the other hand, to create a specter by babbling about an attack of the totalitarian states against the United States. The Munich pact came to President Roosevelt as a godsend. He portrayed it as a capitulation of France and England to bellicose German militarism. As people say here: Hitler compelled Chamberlain at pistol-point. Hence, France and England had no choice and had to conclude a shameful peace.

The prevalent hatred against everything which is in any way connected with German Nazism is further kindled by the brutal policy against the Jews in Germany and by the émigré problem. In this action, various Jewish intellectuals participated: for instance, Bernard Baruch; the Governor of New York State, Lehman; the newly appointed judge of the Supreme Court, Felix Frankfurter; Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau; and others who are personal friends of President Roosevelt. They want the President to become the champion of human rights, freedom of religion and speech, and the man who in the future will punish trouble-makers. These groups of people who occupy the highest positions in the American government and want to pose as

representatives of 'true Americanism' and 'defenders of democracy' are, in the last analysis, connected by unbreakable ties with international Jewry.

For this Jewish international, which above all is concerned with the interests of its race, to portray the President of the United States as the 'idealist' champion on human rights was a very clever move. In this manner they have created a dangerous hotbed for hatred and hostility in this hemisphere and divided the world into two hostile camps. The entire issue is worked out in a masterly manner. Roosevelt has been given the foundation for activating American foreign policy, and simultaneously has been procuring enormous military stocks for the coming war, for which the Jews are striving very consciously. With regard to domestic policy, it is very convenient to divert public attention from anti-Semitism, which is constantly growing in the United States, by talking about the necessity of defending religion and individual liberty against the onslaught of Fascism.

On 16 January 1939, Polish Ambassador Potocki reported to the Warsaw Foreign Ministry on another lengthy conversation he had with Roosevelt's personal envoy, William Bullitt:

The day before yesterday, I had a longer discussion with Ambassador Bullitt in the Embassy where he called on me. Bullitt leaves on the 21st of this month for Paris, from where he has been absent for almost three months. He is sailing with a whole 'trunk' full of instructions, conversations, and directives from President Roosevelt, the State Department and Senators who belong to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

In talking with Bullitt I had the impression that he had received from President Roosevelt a very precise definition of the attitude taken by the United States towards the present European crisis. He will present this material at the Quai d'Orsay [the French Foreign Ministry] and will make use of it in discussions with European statesmen. The contents of these directives, as Bullitt explained them to me in the course of a conversation lasting half an hour, were:

1. The vitalizing of foreign policy under the leadership of President Roosevelt, who severely and unambiguously condemns totalitarian countries.
2. United States preparations for war on sea, land and air will be carried out at an accelerated pace and will consume the colossal sum of 1.25 billion dollars.
3. It is the decided opinion of the President that France and Britain must put an end to any sort of compromise with the totalitarian countries. They must not get into any discussions aiming at any kind of territorial changes.
4. They have the moral assurance that the United States will abandon the policy of isolation and be prepared to intervene actively on the side of Britain and France in case of war. America is ready to place its whole wealth of money and raw materials at their disposal.

The Polish Ambassador to Paris, Juliusz (Jules) Lukasiewicz, sent a top secret report to the Foreign Ministry in Warsaw at the beginning of February 1939 which outlined U.S. policy towards Europe as explained to him by William Bullitt:

A week ago, the Ambassador of the United States, William Bullitt returned to Paris after a three months' leave in America. Meanwhile, I have had two conversations with him which enable me to inform you of his views regarding the European situation and to give a survey of Washington's policy.

The international situation is regarded by official circles as extremely serious and in constant danger of armed conflict. Those in authority are of the opinion that if war should break out between Britain and France on the one hand, and Germany and Italy on the other, and should Britain and France be defeated, the Germans would endanger the real interests of the United States on the American continent. For this reason, one can foresee right from the beginning the participation of the United States in the war on the side of France and Britain, naturally some time after the outbreak of the war. As Ambassador Bullitt

expressed it: 'Should war break out we shall certainly not take part in it at the beginning, but we shall finish it.'

On 7 March 1939, Ambassador Potocki sent a remarkably lucid and perceptive report on Roosevelt's foreign policy to his government in Warsaw. This document was first made public when leading German newspapers published it in German translation, along with a facsimile reproduction of the first page of the Polish original, in their editions of 28 October 1940. The main National Socialist party newspaper, the *Voelkischer Beobachter*, published the Ambassador's report with this observation:

The document itself needs no commentary. We do not know, and it does not concern us, whether the internal American situation as reported by the Polish diplomat is correct in every detail. That must be decided by the American people alone. But in the interest of historical truth it is important for us to show that the warmongering activities of American diplomacy, especially in Europe, are once again revealed and proven by this document. It still remains a secret just who, and for what motives, have driven American diplomacy to this course. In any case, the results have been disastrous for both Europe and America. Europe was plunged into war and America has brought upon itself the hostility of great nations which normally have no differences with the American people and, indeed, have not been in conflict but have lived for generations as friends and want to remain so.

This report was not one of the Polish documents which was released in March 1940 and published as part of the "German White Book No. 3" (or the *German White Paper*). However, it was published in 1943 as part of the collection entitled "Roosevelt's Way Into War." As far as I can determine, this English translation is the first that has ever appeared. Ambassador Potocki's secret report of 7 March 1939 is here given in full:

The foreign policy of the United States right now concerns not only the government, but the entire American public as well. The most important elements are the public statements of President Roosevelt. In almost every public speech he refers more or less explicitly to the necessity of activating foreign policy against the chaos of views and

ideologies in Europe. These statements are picked up by the press and then cleverly filtered into the minds of average Americans in such a way as to strengthen their already formed opinions. The same theme is constantly repeated, namely, the danger of war in Europe and saving the democracies from inundation by enemy fascism. In all of these public statements there is normally only a single theme, that is, the danger from Nazism and Nazi Germany to world peace.

As a result of these speeches, the public is called upon to support rearmament and the spending of enormous sums for the navy and the air force. The unmistakable idea behind this is that in case of an armed conflict the United States cannot stay out but must take an active part in the maneuvers. As a result of the effective speeches of President Roosevelt, which are supported by the press, the American public is today being conscientiously manipulated to hate everything that smacks of totalitarianism and fascism. But it is interesting that the USSR is not included in all this. The American public considers Russia more in the camp of the democratic states. This was also the case during the Spanish civil war when the so-called Loyalists were regarded as defenders of the democratic idea.

The State Department operates without attracting a great deal of attention, although it is known that Secretary of State [Cordell] Hull and President Roosevelt swear allegiance to the same ideas. However, Hull shows more reserve than Roosevelt, and he loves to make a distinction between Nazism and Chancellor Hitler on the one hand, and the German people on the other. He considers this form of dictatorial government a temporary "necessary evil." In contrast, the State Department is unbelievably interested in the USSR and its internal situation and openly worries itself over its weaknesses and decline. The main reason for United States interest in the Russians is the situation in the Far East. The current government would be glad to see the Red Army emerge as the victor in a conflict with Japan. That's why the sympathies of the government are clearly on the side of China, which recently received considerable financial aid amounting to 25 million dollars.

Eager attention is given to all information from the diplomatic posts as well as to the special emissaries of the President who serve as Ambassadors of the United States. The President frequently calls his representatives from abroad to Washington for personal exchanges of views and to give them special information and instructions. The arrival of the envoys and ambassadors is always shrouded in secrecy and very little surfaces in the press about the results of their visits. The State Department also takes care to avoid giving out any kind of information about the course of these interviews. The practical way in which the President makes foreign policy is most effective. He gives personal instructions to his representatives abroad, most of whom are his personal friends. In this way the United States is led down a dangerous path in world politics with the explicit intention of abandoning the comfortable policy of isolation. The President regards the foreign policy of his country as a means of satisfying his own personal ambition. He listens carefully and happily to his echo in the other capitals of the world. In domestic as well as in foreign policy, the Congress of the United States is the only object that stands in the way of the President and his government in carrying out his decisions quickly and ambitiously. One hundred and fifty years ago, the Constitution of the United States gave the highest prerogatives to the American parliament which may criticize or reject the law of the White House.

The foreign policy of President Roosevelt has recently been the subject of intense discussion in the lower house and in the Senate, and this has caused excitement. The so-called Isolationists, of whom there are many in both houses, have come out strongly against the President. The representatives and senators were especially upset over the remarks by the President, which were published in the press, in which he said that the borders of the United States lie on the Rhine. But President Roosevelt is a superb political player and understands completely the power of the American parliament. He has his own people there, and he knows how to withdraw from an uncomfortable situation at the right moment.

Very intelligently and cleverly he ties together the question of foreign policy with the issues of American rearmament. He particularly stresses the necessity of spending enormous sums in order to maintain a defensive peace. He says specifically that the United States is not arming in order to intervene or to go to the aid of England or France in case of war, but rather because of the need to show strength and military preparedness in case of an armed conflict in Europe. In his view this conflict is becoming ever more acute and is completely unavoidable.

Since the issue is presented this way, the houses of Congress have no cause to object. To the contrary, the houses accepted an armament program of more than one billion dollars. (The normal budget is 550 million, the emergency 552 million dollars.) However, under the cloak of a rearmament policy, President Roosevelt continues to push forward his foreign policy, which unofficially shows the world that in case of war the United States will come out on the side of the democratic states with all military and financial power.

In conclusion it can be said that the technical and moral preparation of the American people for participation in a war-if one should break out in Europe-is preceding rapidly. It appears that the United States will come to the aid of France and Great Britain with all its resources right from the beginning. However, I know the American public and the representatives and senators who all have the final word, and I am of the opinion that the possibility that America will enter war as in 1917 is not great. That's because the majority of states in the mid-West and West, where the rural element predominates, want to avoid involvement in European disputes at all costs. They remember the declaration of the Versailles Treaty and the well-known phrase that the war was to save the world for democracy. Neither the Versailles Treaty nor that slogan have reconciled the United States to that war. For millions there remains only a bitter aftertaste because of unpaid billions which the European states still owe America.

Juliusz Lukasiewicz, Poland's Ambassador to France, reported to Warsaw on 29 March 1939 about further conversations with U.S. envoy Bullitt in Paris.

Lukasiewicz discussed Roosevelt's efforts to get both Poland and Britain to adopt a totally uncompromising policy towards Germany, even in the face of strong sentiment for peace. The report concludes with these words:

... I consider it my duty to inform you of all the aforesaid because I believe that collaboration with Ambassador Bullitt in such difficult and complicated times may prove useful to us. In any case it is absolutely certain that he agrees entirely with our point of view and is prepared for the most extensive friendly collaboration possible.

In order to strengthen the efforts of the American Ambassador in London [Joseph Kennedy], I called the attention of Ambassador Bullitt to the fact that it is not impossible that the British may treat the efforts of the United States with well-concealed contempt. He answered that I am probably right, but that nevertheless the United States has at its disposal the means to really bring pressure on England. He would be giving serious consideration to mobilizing these means.

The Polish Ambassador in London, Count Edward Raczyński, reported to Warsaw on 29 March 1939 on the continuing European crisis and on a conversation he had with Ambassador Joseph Kennedy, his American counterpart. Kennedy's remarks to Raczyński confirmed Bullitt's reputation in diplomatic circles as an indiscreet big mouth:

I asked Mr. Kennedy point blank about the conference which he is supposed to have had recently with [British Prime Minister] Mr. Chamberlain concerning Poland. Kennedy was surprised and declared categorically that a conversation of such special significance never took place. At the same time, and thereby contradicting his own assertion to a certain extent, Kennedy expressed displeasure and surprise that his colleagues in Paris and Warsaw [William Bullitt and Anthony Biddle] 'who are not, as himself, in a position to get a clear picture of conditions in England' should talk so openly about this conversation.

Mr. Kennedy-who made me understand that his views were based on a series of conversations with the most important authorities here-

declared that he was convinced that should Poland decide in favor of armed resistance against Germany, especially with regard to Danzig, it would draw England in its wake.

This concludes the excerpts from the Polish reports.

* * * * *

The Path To War

While the Polish documents alone are conclusive proof of Roosevelt's treacherous campaign to bring about world war, it is fortunate for posterity that a substantial body of irrefutable complementary evidence exists which confirms the conspiracy recorded in the dispatches to Warsaw.

The secret policy was confirmed after the war with the release of a confidential diplomatic report by the British Ambassador to Washington, Sir Ronald Lindsay. During his three years of service in Washington, the veteran diplomat had developed little regard for America's leaders. He considered Roosevelt an amiable and impressionable lightweight, and warned the British Foreign Office that it should not tell William Bullitt anything beyond what it wouldn't mind reading later in an American newspaper.[18]

On 19 September 1938 -- that is, a year before the outbreak of war in Europe -- Roosevelt called Lindsay to a very secret meeting at the White House. At the beginning of their long conversation, according to Lindsay's confidential dispatch to London, Roosevelt "emphasized the necessity of absolute secrecy. Nobody must know I had seen him and he himself would tell nobody of the interview. I gathered not even the State Department." The two discussed some secondary matters before Roosevelt got to the main point of the conference. "This is the very secret part of his communication and it must not be known to anyone that he has even breathed a suggestion." The President told the Ambassador that if news of the conversation was ever made public, it could mean his impeachment. And no wonder. What Roosevelt proposed was a cynically brazen but harebrained scheme to violate the U.S. Constitution and dupe the American people.

The President said that if Britain and France "would find themselves forced to war" against Germany, the United States would ultimately also join. But this would require some clever maneuvering. Britain and France should impose a total blockade against Germany without actually declaring war and force other states (including neutrals) to abide by it. This would certainly provoke some kind of German military response, but it would also free Britain and France from having to actually declare war. For propaganda purposes, the "blockade must be based on loftiest humanitarian grounds and on the desire to wage hostilities with

minimum of suffering and the least possible loss of life and property, and yet bring the enemy to his knees." Roosevelt conceded that this would involve aerial bombardment, but "bombing from the air was not the method of hostilities which caused really great loss of life."

The important point was to "call it defensive measures or anything plausible but avoid actual declaration of war." That way, Roosevelt believed he could talk the American people into supporting war against Germany, including shipments of weapons to Britain and France, by insisting that the United States was still technically neutral in a non-declared conflict. "This method of conducting war by blockade would in his [Roosevelt's] opinion meet with approval of the United States if its humanitarian purpose were strongly emphasized," Lindsay reported. [19]

The American Ambassador to Italy, William Phillips, admitted in his postwar memoirs that the Roosevelt administration was already committed to going to war on the side of Britain and France in late 1938. "On this and many other occasions," Phillips wrote, "I would like to have told him [Count Ciano, the Italian Foreign Minister] frankly that in the event of a European war, the United States would undoubtedly be involved on the side of the Allies. But in view of my official position, I could not properly make such a statement without instructions from Washington, and these I never received." [20]

Carl J. Burckhardt, the League of Nations High Commissioner to Danzig, reported in his postwar memoirs on a remarkable conversation held at the end of 1938 with Anthony Drexel Biddle, the American Ambassador to Poland. Biddle was a rich banker with close ties to the Morgan financial empire. A thoroughgoing internationalist, he was an ideological colleague of President Roosevelt and a good friend of William Bullitt. Burckhardt, a Swiss professor, served as High Commissioner between 1937 and 1939.

Nine months before the outbreak of armed conflict, on 2 December 1938, Biddle told Burckhardt

with remarkable satisfaction that the Poles were ready to wage war over Danzig. They would counter the motorized strength of the German army with agile maneuverability. 'In April,' he [Biddle]

declared, 'a new crisis would break out. Not since the torpedoing of the Lusitania [in 1915] had such a religious hatred against Germany reigned in America as today! Chamberlain and Daladier [the moderate British and French leaders] would be blown away by public opinion. This was a holy war!',[21]

The fateful British pledge to Poland of 31 March 1939 to go to war against Germany in case of a Polish-German conflict would not have been made without strong pressure from the White House.

On 14 March 1939, Slovakia declared itself an independent republic, thereby dissolving the state known as Czechoslovakia. That same day, Czechoslovak President Emil Hacha signed a formal agreement with Hitler establishing a German protectorate over Bohemia and Moravia, the Czech portion of the federation. The British government initially accepted the new situation, but then Roosevelt intervened.

In their nationally syndicated column of 14 April 1939, the usually very well informed Washington journalists Drew Pearson and Robert S. Allen reported that on 16 March 1939 Roosevelt had "sent a virtual ultimatum to Chamberlain" demanding that henceforth the British government strongly oppose Germany. According to Pearson and Allen, who completely supported Roosevelt's move, "the President warned that Britain could expect no more support, moral or material through the sale of airplanes, if the Munich policy continued." [22] Chamberlain gave in and the next day, 17 March, ended Britain's policy of cooperation with Germany in a speech at Birmingham bitterly denouncing Hitler. Two weeks later the British government formally pledged itself to war in case of German-Polish hostilities.

Bullitt's response to the creation of the German protectorate over Bohemia and Moravia was to telephone Roosevelt and, in an "almost hysterical" voice, urge him to make a dramatic denunciation of Germany and immediately ask Congress to repeal the Neutrality Act. [23]

In a confidential telegram to Washington dated 9 April 1939, Bullitt reported from Paris on another conversation with Ambassador Lukasiewicz. He had told the Polish envoy that although U.S. law prohibited direct financial aid to Poland,

it might be possible to circumvent its provisions. The Roosevelt administration might be able to supply war planes to Poland indirectly through Britain. "The Polish Ambassador asked me if it might not be possible for Poland to obtain financial help and aeroplanes from the United States. I replied that I believed the Johnson Act would forbid any loans from the United States to Poland but added that it might be possible for England to purchase planes for cash in the United States and turn them over to Poland." [24]

On 25 April 1939, four months before the outbreak of war, Bullitt called American newspaper columnist Karl von Wiegand, chief European correspondent of the International News Service, to the U.S. embassy in Paris and told him: "War in Europe has been decided upon. Poland has the assurance of the support of Britain and France, and will yield to no demands from Germany. America will be in the war soon after Britain and France enter it." [25]

In a lengthy secret conversation at Hyde Park on 28 May 1939, Roosevelt assured the former President of Czechoslovakia, Dr. Edvard Benes, that America would actively intervene on the side of Britain and France in the anticipated European war. [26]

In June 1939, Roosevelt secretly proposed to the British that the United States should establish "a patrol over the waters of the Western Atlantic with a view to denying them to the German Navy in the event of war." The British Foreign Office record of this offer noted that "although the proposal was vague and woolly and open to certain objections, we assented informally as the patrol was to be operated in our interests." [27]

Many years after the war, Georges Bonnet, the French Foreign Minister in 1939, confirmed Bullitt's role as Roosevelt's deputy in pushing his country into war. In a letter to Hamilton Fish dated 26 March 1971, Bonnet wrote: "One thing is certain is that Bullitt in 1939 did everything he could to make France enter the war." [28] An important confirmation of the crucial role of Roosevelt and the Jews in pushing Britain into war comes from the diary of James V. Forrestal, the first U.S. Secretary of Defense. In his entry for 27 December 1945, he wrote:

Played golf today with [former Ambassador] Joe Kennedy. I asked him about his conversations with Roosevelt and [British Prime Minister]

Neville Chamberlain from 1938 on. He said Chamberlain's position in 1938 was that England had nothing with which to fight and that she could not risk going to war with Hitler. Kennedy's view: That Hitler would have fought Russia without any later conflict with England if it had not been for [William] Bullitt's urging on Roosevelt in the summer of 1939 that the Germans must be faced down about Poland; neither the French nor the British would have made Poland a cause of war if it had not been for the constant needling from Washington. Bullitt, he said, kept telling Roosevelt that the Germans wouldn't fight; Kennedy that they would, and that they would overrun Europe. Chamberlain, he says, stated that America and the world Jews had forced England into the war. In his telephone conversations with Roosevelt in the summer of 1939, the President kept telling him to put some iron up Chamberlain's backside.[29]

When Ambassador Potocki was back in Warsaw on leave from his post in Washington, he spoke with Count Jan Szembek, the Polish Foreign Ministry Under-Secretary, about the growing danger of war. In his diary entry of 6 July 1939, Szembek recorded Potocki's astonishment at the calm mood in Poland. In comparison with the war psychosis that had gripped the West, Poland seemed like a rest home.

"In the West," the Ambassador told Szembek, "there are all kinds of elements openly pushing for war: the Jews, the super-capitalists, the arms dealers. Today they are all ready for a great business, because they have found a place which can be set on fire: Danzig; and a nation that is ready to fight: Poland. They want to do business on our backs. They are indifferent to the destruction of our country. Indeed, since everything will have to be rebuilt later on, they can profit from that as well." [30]

On 24 August 1939, just a week before the outbreak of hostilities, Chamberlain's closest advisor, Sir Horace Wilson, went to Ambassador Kennedy with an urgent appeal from the British Prime Minister for President Roosevelt. Regretting that Britain had unequivocally obligated itself in March to Poland in case of war, Chamberlain now turned in despair to Roosevelt as a last hope for peace. He wanted the American President to "put pressure on the Poles" to change course at this late hour and open negotiations with Germany. By telephone Kennedy

told the State Department that the British "felt that they could not, given their obligations, do anything of this sort but that we could." Presented with this extraordinary opportunity to possibly save the peace of Europe, Roosevelt rejected Chamberlain's desperate plea out of hand. At that, Kennedy reported, the Prime Minister lost all hope. "The futility of it all," Chamberlain had told Kennedy, "is the thing that is frightful. After all, we cannot save the Poles. We can merely carry on a war of revenge that will mean the destruction of all Europe." [31]

Roosevelt liked to present himself to the American people and the world as a man of peace. To a considerable degree, that is still his image today. But Roosevelt cynically rejected genuine opportunities to act for peace when they were presented.

In 1938 he refused even to answer requests by French Foreign Minister Bonnet on 8 and 12 September to consider arbitrating the Czech-German dispute. [32] And a year later, after the outbreak of war, a melancholy Ambassador Kennedy beseeched Roosevelt to act boldly for peace. "It seems to me that this situation may crystallize to a point where the President can be the savior of the world," Kennedy cabled on 11 September from London. "The British government as such certainly cannot accept any agreement with Hitler, but there may be a point when the President himself may work out plans for world peace. Now this opportunity may never arise, but as a fairly practical fellow all my life, I believe that it is entirely conceivable that the President can get himself in a spot where he can save the world ..."

But Roosevelt rejected out of hand this chance to save the peace of Europe. To a close political crony, he called Kennedy's plea "the silliest message to me that I have ever received." He complained to Henry Morgenthau that his London Ambassador was nothing but a pain in the neck: "Joe has been an appeaser and will always be an appeaser ... If Germany and Italy made a good peace offer tomorrow, Joe would start working on the King and his friend the Queen and from there on down to get everybody to accept it." [33]

Infuriated at Kennedy's stubborn efforts to restore peace in Europe or at least limit the conflict that had broken out, Roosevelt instructed his Ambassador with a "personal" and "strictly confidential" telegram on 11 September 1939 that any

American peace effort was totally out of the question. The Roosevelt government, it declared, "sees no opportunity nor occasion for any peace move to be initiated by the President of the United States. The people [sic] of the United States would not support any move for peace initiated by this Government that would consolidate or make possible a survival of a regime of force and aggression." [34]

Hamilton Fish Warns The Nation

In the months before armed conflict broke out in Europe, perhaps the most vigorous and prophetic American voice of warning against President Roosevelt's campaign to incite war was that of Hamilton Fish, a leading Republican congressman from New York. In a series of hard-hitting radio speeches, Fish rallied considerable public opinion against Roosevelt's deceptive war policy. Here are only a few excerpts from some of those addresses.[35]

On 6 January 1939, Fish told a nationwide radio audience:

The inflammatory and provocative message of the President to Congress and the world [given two days before] has unnecessarily alarmed the American people and created, together with a barrage of propaganda emanating from high New Deal officials, a war hysteria, dangerous to the peace of America and the world. The only logical conclusion to such speeches is another war fought overseas by American soldiers.

All the totalitarian nations referred to by President Roosevelt ... haven't the faintest thought of making war on us or invading Latin America.

I do not propose to mince words on such an issue, affecting the life, liberty and happiness of our people. The time has come to call a halt to the warmongers of the New Deal, backed by war profiteers, Communists, and hysterical internationalists, who want us to quarantine the world with American blood and money.

He [Roosevelt] evidently desires to whip up a frenzy of hate and war psychosis as a red herring to take the minds of our people off their own unsolved domestic problems. He visualizes hobgoblins and creates in the public mind a fear of foreign invasions that exists only in his own imagination.

On 5 March, Fish spoke to the country over the Columbia radio network:

The people of France and Great Britain want peace but our warmongers are constantly inciting them to disregard the Munich Pact

and resort to the arbitrament of arms. If only we would stop meddling in foreign lands the old nations of Europe would compose their own quarrels by arbitration and the processes of peace, but apparently we won't let them.

Fish addressed the listeners of the National Broadcasting Company network on 5 April with these words:

The youth of America are again being prepared for another blood bath in Europe in order to make the world safe for democracy.

If Hitler and the Nazi government regain Memel or Danzig, taken away from Germany by the Versailles Treaty, and where the population is 90 percent German, why is it necessary to issue threats and denunciations and incite our people to war? I would not sacrifice the life of one American soldier for a half dozen Memels or Danzigs. We repudiated the Versailles Treaty because it was based on greed and hatred, and as long as its inequalities and injustices exist there are bound to be wars of liberation.

The sooner certain provisions of the Versailles Treaty are scrapped the better for the peace of the world.

I believe that if the areas that are distinctly German in population are restored to Germany, except Alsace-Lorraine and the Tyrol, there will be no war in western Europe. There may be a war between the Nazis and the Communists, but if there is that is not our war or that of Great Britain or France or any of the democracies.

New Deal spokesmen have stirred up war hysteria into a veritable frenzy. The New Deal propaganda machine is working overtime to prepare the minds of our people for war, who are already suffering from a bad case of war jitters.

President Roosevelt is the number one warmonger in America, and is largely responsible for the fear that pervades the Nation which has given the stock market and the American people a bad case of the jitters.

I accuse the administration of instigating war propaganda and hysteria to cover up the failure and collapse of the New Deal policies, with 12 million unemployed and business confidence destroyed.

I believe we have far more to fear from our enemies from within than we have from without. All the Communists are united in urging us to go to war against Germany and Japan for the benefit of Soviet Russia.

Great Britain still expects every American to do her duty, by preserving the British Empire and her colonies. The war profiteers, munitions makers and international bankers are all set up for our participation in a new world war.

On 21 April, Fish again spoke to the country over nationwide radio:

It is the duty of all those Americans who desire to keep out of foreign entanglements and the rotten mess and war madness of Europe and Asia to openly expose the war hysteria and propaganda that is impelling us to armed conflict.

What we need in America is a stop war crusade, before we are forced into a foreign war by internationalists and interventionists at Washington, who seem to be more interested in solving world problems rather than our own.

In his radio address of 26 May, Fish stated:

He [Roosevelt] should remember that the Congress has the sole power to declare war and formulate the foreign policies of the United States. The President has no such constitutional power. He is merely the official organ to carry out the policies determined by the Congress.

Without knowing even who the combatants will be, we are informed almost daily by the internationalists and interventionists in America that we must participate in the next world war.

On 8 July 1939, Fish declared over the National Broadcasting Company radio network:

If we must go to war, let it be in defense of America, but not in defense of the munitions makers, war profiteers, Communists, to cover up the failures of the New Deal, or to provide an alibi for a third term.

It is well for all nations to know that we do not propose to go to war over Danzig, power politics, foreign colonies, or the imperialistic wars of Europe or anywhere in the world.

Powers Behind The President

President Roosevelt could have done little to incite war in Europe without help from powerful allies. Behind him stood the self-serving international financial and Jewish interests bent on the destruction of Germany. The principal organization which drummed up public support for U.S. involvement in the European war prior to the Pearl Harbor attack was the cleverly named "Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies." President Roosevelt himself initiated its founding, and top administration officials consulted frequently with Committee leaders.[36]

Although headed for a time by an elderly small-town Kansas newspaper publisher, William Allen White, the Committee was actually organized by powerful financial interests which stood to profit tremendously from loans to embattled Britain and from shrewd investments in giant war industries in the United States.

At the end of 1940, West Virginia Senator Rush D. Holt issued a detailed examination of the Committee which exposed the base interests behind the idealistic-sounding slogans:

The Committee has powerful connections with banks, insurance companies, financial investing firms, and industrial concerns. These in turn exert influence on college presidents and professors, as well as on newspapers, radio and other means of communication. One of the powerful influences used by the group is the '400' and social set. The story is a sordid picture of betrayal of public interest.

The powerful J.P. Morgan interest with its holdings in the British Empire helped plan the organization and donated its first expense money.

Some of the important figures active in the Committee were revealed by Holt: Frederic R. Coudert, a paid war propagandist for the British government in the U.S. during the First World War; Robert S. Allen of the Pearson and Allen syndicated column; Henry R. Luce, the influential publisher of *Time*, *Life*, and *Fortune* magazines; Fiorella LaGuardia, the fiery half-Jewish Mayor of New York City; Herbert Lehman, the Jewish Governor of New York with important

financial holdings in war industries; and Frank Altschul, an officer in the Jewish investment firm of Lazard Freres with extensive holdings in munitions and military supply companies.

If the Committee succeeded in getting the U.S. into war, Holt warned, "American boys will spill their blood for profiteers, politicians and 'paytriots.' If war comes, on the hands of the sponsors of the White Committee will be blood-the blood of Americans killed in a needless war." [37]

In March 1941 a list of most of the Committee's financial backers was made public. It revealed the nature of the forces eager to bring America into the European war. Powerful international banking interests were well represented. J.P. Morgan, John W. Morgan, Thomas W. Lamont and others of the great Morgan banking house were listed. Other important names from the New York financial world included Mr. and Mrs. Paul Mellon, Felix M. and James F. Warburg, and J. Malcolm Forbes. Chicago department store owner and publisher Marshall Field was a contributor, as was William Averill Harriman, the railroad and investment millionaire who later served as Roosevelt's ambassador in Moscow.

Of course, Jewish names made up a substantial portion of the long list. Hollywood film czar Samuel Goldwyn of Goldwyn Studios was there, along with David Dubinsky, the head of the International Ladies Garment Workers Union. The William S. Paley Foundation, which had been set up by the head of the giant Columbia Broadcasting System, contributed to the Committee. The name of Mrs. Herbert H. Lehman, wife of the New York Governor, was also on the list. [38]

Without an understanding of his intimate ties to organized Jewry, Roosevelt's policies make little sense. As Jewish historian Lucy Dawidowicz noted: "Roosevelt himself brought into his immediate circle more Jews than any other President before or after him. Felix Frankfurter, Bernard M. Baruch and Henry Morgenthau were his close advisers. Benjamin V. Cohen, Samuel Rosenman and David K. Niles were his friends and trusted aides." [39] This is perhaps not so remarkable in light of Roosevelt's reportedly one-eighth Jewish ancestry. [40]

In his diary entry of 1 May 1941, Charles A. Lindbergh, the American aviator

hero and peace leader, nailed the coalition that was pushing the United States into war:

The pressure for war is high and mounting. The people are opposed to it, but the Administration seems to have 'the bit in its teeth' and [is] hell-bent on its way to war. Most of the Jewish interests in the country are behind war, and they control a huge part of our press and radio and most of our motion pictures. There are also the 'intellectuals,' and the 'Anglophiles,' and the British agents who are allowed free rein, the international financial interests, and many others.[41]

Joseph Kennedy shared Lindbergh's apprehensions about Jewish power. Before the outbreak of war he privately expressed concerns about "the Jews who dominate our press" and world Jewry in general, which he considered a threat to peace and prosperity. Shortly after the beginning of hostilities, Kennedy lamented "the growing Jewish influence in the press and in Washington demanding continuance of the war." [42]

Betrayal, Failure, Delusion

Roosevelt's efforts to get Poland, Britain and France into war against Germany succeeded all too well. The result was untold death and misery and destruction. When the fighting began, as Roosevelt had intended and planned, the Polish and French leaders expected the American president to at least make good on his assurances of backing in case of war. But Roosevelt had not reckoned on the depth of peace sentiment of the vast majority of Americans. So, in addition to deceiving his own people, Roosevelt also let down those in Europe to whom he had promised support.

Seldom in American history were the people as united in their views as they were in late 1939 about staying out of war in Europe. When hostilities began in September 1939, the Gallup poll showed 94 percent of the American people against involvement in war. That figure rose to 96.5 percent in December before it began to decline slowly to about 80 percent in the Fall of 1941. (Today, there is hardly an issue that even 60 or 70 percent of the people agree upon.)[43]

Roosevelt was, of course, quite aware of the intensity of popular feeling on this issue. That is why he lied repeatedly to the American people about his love of peace and his determination to keep the U.S. out of war, while simultaneously doing everything in his power to plunge Europe and America into war.

In a major 1940 re-election campaign speech, Roosevelt responded to the growing fears of millions of Americans who suspected that their President had secretly pledged United States support to Britain in its war against Germany. These well-founded suspicions were based in part on the publication in March of the captured Polish documents. The speech of 23 October 1940 was broadcast from Philadelphia to the nation on network radio. In the most emphatic language possible, Roosevelt categorically denied that he had

ledged in some way the participation of the United States in some foreign war. I give to you and to the people of this country this most solemn assurance: There is no secret Treaty, no secret understanding in any shape or form, direct or indirect, with any Government or any other nation in any part of the world, to involve this nation in any war or for any other purpose.[44]

We now know, of course, that this pious declaration was just another one of Roosevelt's many brazen, bald-faced lies to the American people.

Roosevelt's policies were more than just dishonest—they were criminal. The Constitution of the United States grants authority only to the Congress to make war and peace. And Congress had passed several major laws to specifically insure U.S. neutrality in case of war in Europe. Roosevelt continually violated his oath as President to uphold the Constitution. If his secret policies had been known, the public demand for his impeachment would very probably have been unstoppable.

The Watergate episode has made many Americans deeply conscious of the fact that their presidents can act criminally. That affair forced Richard Nixon to resign his presidency, and he is still widely regarded as a criminal. No schools are named after him and his name will never receive the respect that normally goes to every American president. But Nixon's crimes pale into insignificance when compared to those of Franklin Roosevelt. What were Nixon's lies compared to those of Roosevelt? What is a burglary cover-up compared to an illegal and secret campaign to bring about a major war?

Those who defend Roosevelt's record argue that he lied to the American people for their own good -- that he broke the law for lofty principles. His deceit is considered permissible because the cause was noble, while similar deception by presidents Johnson and Nixon, to name two, is not. This is, of course, a hypocritical double standard. And the argument doesn't speak very well for the democratic system. It implies that the people are too dumb to understand their own best interests. It further suggests that the best form of government is a kind of benevolent liberal-democratic dictatorship.

Roosevelt's hatred for Hitler was deep, vehement, passionate -- almost personal. This was due in no small part to an abiding envy and jealousy rooted in the great contrast between the two men, not only in their personal characters but also in their records as national leaders.

Superficially, the public faces of Roosevelt and Hitler were astonishingly similar. Both assumed the leadership of their respective countries at the beginning of 1933. They both faced the enormous challenge of mass unemployment during a

catastrophic worldwide economic depression. Each became a powerful leader in a vast military alliance during the most destructive war in history. Both men died while still in office within a few weeks of each other in April 1945, just before the end of the Second World War in Europe. But the enormous contrasts in the lives of these two men are even more remarkable.

Roosevelt was born into one of the wealthiest families in America. His was a life utterly free of material worry. He took part in the First World War from an office in Washington as UnderSecretary of the Navy. Hitler, on the other hand, was born into a modest provincial family. As a young man he worked as an impoverished manual laborer. He served in the First World War as a front line soldier in the hell of the Western battleground. He was wounded many times and decorated for bravery.

In spite of his charming manner and soothing rhetoric, Roosevelt proved unable to master the great challenges facing America. Even after four years of his presidency, millions remained unemployed, undernourished and poorly housed in a vast land richly endowed with all the resources for incomparable prosperity. The New Deal was plagued with bitter strikes and bloody clashes between labor and capital. Roosevelt did nothing to solve the country's deep, festering racial problems which erupted repeatedly in riots and armed conflict. The story was very different in Germany. Hitler rallied his people behind a radical program that transformed Germany within a few years from an economically ruined land on the edge of civil war into Europe's powerhouse. Germany underwent a social, cultural and economic rebirth without parallel in history. The contrast between the personalities of Roosevelt and Hitler was simultaneously a contrast between two diametrically different social-political systems and ideologies.

And yet, it would be incorrect to characterize Roosevelt as merely a cynical politician and front man for powerful alien interests. Certainly he did not regard himself as an evil man. He sincerely believed that he was doing the right and noble thing in pressuring Britain and France into war against Germany. Like Wilson before him, and others since, Roosevelt felt himself uniquely qualified and called upon by destiny to reshape the world according to his vision of an egalitarian, universalist democracy. He was convinced, as so many American leaders have been, that the world could be saved from itself by remodeling it after the United States.

Presidents like Wilson and Roosevelt view the world not as a complex of different nations, races and cultures which must mutually respect each others' separate collective identities in order to live together in peace, but rather according to a selfrighteous missionary perspective that divides the globe into morally good and evil countries. In that scheme of things, America is the providentially permanent leader of the forces of righteousness. Luckily, this view just happens to correspond to the economic and political interests of those who wield power in the United States.

President Roosevelt's War

In April 1941, Senator Gerald Nye of North Dakota prophetically predicted that one day the Second World War would be remembered as Roosevelt's war. "If we are ever involved in this war, it will be called by future historians by only one title, 'the President's War,' because every step of his since his Chicago quarantine speech [of 5 October 1937] has been toward war.[45]

The great American historian, Harry Elmer Barnes, believed that war could probably have been prevented in 1939 if it had not been for Roosevelt's meddling. "Indeed, there is fairly conclusive evidence that, but for Mr. Roosevelt's pressure on Britain, France and Poland, and his commitments to them before September 1939, especially to Britain, and the irresponsible antics of his agent provocateur, William C. Bullitt, there would probably have been no world war in 1939, or, perhaps, for many years thereafter." [46] In *Revisionism: A Key to Peace*, Barnes wrote:

President Roosevelt had a major responsibility, both direct and indirect, for the outbreak of war in Europe. He began to exert pressure on France to stand up to Hitler as early as the German reoccupation of the Rhineland in March 1936, months before he was making his strongly isolationist speeches in the campaign of 1936. This pressure on France, and also England, continued right down to the coming of the war in September 1939. It gained volume and momentum after the quarantine speech of October 1937. As the crisis approached between Munich and the outbreak of war, Roosevelt pressed the Poles to stand firm against any demands by Germany, and urged the English and French to back up the Poles unflinchingly.

There is grave doubt that England would have gone to war in September 1939 had it not been for Roosevelt's encouragement and his assurances that, in the event of war, the United States would enter on the side of Britain just as soon as he could swing American public opinion around to support intervention.

Roosevelt had abandoned all semblance of neutrality, even before war broke out in 1939, and moved as speedily as was safe and feasible in

the face of anti-interventionist American public opinion to involve this country in the European conflict.[47]

One of the most perceptive verdicts on Franklin Roosevelt's place in history came from the pen of the great Swedish explorer and author, Sven Hedin. During the war he wrote:

The question of the way it came to a new world war is not only to be explained because of the foundation laid by the peace treaties of 1919, or in the suppression of Germany and her allies after the First World War, or in the continuation of the ancient policies of Great Britain and France. The decisive push came from the other side of the Atlantic Ocean.

Roosevelt speaks of democracy and destroys it incessantly. He slanders as undemocratic and un-American those who admonish him in the name of peace and the preservation of the American way of life. He has made democracy into a caricature rather than a model. He talks about freedom of speech and silences those who don't hold his opinion.

He talks about freedom of religion and makes an alliance with Bolshevism.

He talks about freedom from want, but cannot provide ten million of his own people with work, bread or shelter. He talks about freedom from the fear of war while working for war, not only for his own people but for the world, by inciting his country against the Axis powers when it might have united with them, and he thereby drove millions to their deaths.

This war will go down in history as the war of President Roosevelt.[48]

Officially orchestrated praise for Roosevelt as a great man of peace cannot conceal forever his crucial role in pushing Europe into war in 1939.

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It is now more than forty years since the events described here took place. For many they are an irrelevant part of a best-forgotten past. But the story of how

Franklin Roosevelt engineered war in Europe is very pertinent -- particularly for Americans today. The lessons of the past have never been more important than in this nuclear age. For unless at least an aware minority understands how and why wars are made, we will remain powerless to restrain the warmongers of our own era.

German-Polish Relations 1918-1939

an excerpt from 'Hitlers Revolution', by Richard Tedor, 2013

Poland declared independence upon the collapse of Russia, and the defeat of the Central Powers in 1918. France supported Polish claims for additional territory in order to strengthen the emerging state. Wilson remarked, "The only real interest of France in Poland is in weakening Germany by giving Poland territory to which she has no right."¹⁴¹ The French historian and political analyst Jacques Bainville observed, "The liberated peoples of the East have been entrusted with the task of serving as a counterweight to the German multitude."¹⁴²

At this time, the Bolsheviks under Lenin were consolidating their control of Russia. The Red Army invaded Lithuania, which had declared independence in January 1919. The Polish army drove the Bolshevik forces back. Poland's popular military leader, Marshal Joseph Pilsudski, became head of state. An aggressive field commander, he invaded the Ukraine in April 1920 to destroy a Soviet troop concentration on the frontier. Believing that Poland must become "a power equal to the great powers of the world," Pilsudski conquered territories where less than five percent of the population was Polish.¹⁴³ The Treaty of Riga ended the see-saw war against the Red Army on March 18, 1921, with Poland gaining Galicia.

On Poland's western frontier in December 1918, the Polish secret military organization, *Polska Organizacya Wojskowa* (POW), seized Posen, where Polish and German residents lived in harmony. German *Freikorps* militia launched a successful counterthrust. France's Field Marshal Ferdinand Foch demanded that the Reich's Government withdraw these troops from Posen. Too weak to resist the French ultimatum, German Prime Minister Friedrich Ebert complied. Polish insurgents continued attacking German villages in the region.¹⁴⁴

President Wilson proposed a plebiscite for Upper Silesia to allow the inhabitants to choose their country. 22,000 POW men staged an insurrection in August 1919 to take the region by force.¹⁴⁵ The *Freikorps* broke the revolt in less than a week.

In February 1920, the Inter-Allied Control Commission assumed the administration of Upper Silesia. Over 11,000 French soldiers, supported by small contingents from the Italian and British armies, arrived to supervise the plebiscite. In the spring 1921 poll, 706,820 Silesians cast for union with Germany and 479,414 for Poland. Many Polish residents voted for Germany.¹⁴⁶

While the Allied commission fumbled with determining the ultimate boundaries, the POW staged another uprising in May 1921. Supplied with French weapons, the insurgents organized an army of 30,000 men. The Polish government officially denied supporting Wojciech Korfanty, the instigator of the revolts. The correspondent for the London *Times* observed ammunition trains passing regularly from Poland into Upper Silesia. The frontier was as “freely traversed as our London Bridge” he wrote on May 10.¹⁴⁷

Though outnumbered, 25,000 *Freikorps* volunteers counterattacked on May 21, and forced the Poles onto the defensive. Once the Germans began to advance, the French and British stepped in to restore order. In October, the League of Nations awarded nearly a third of the contested territory to Poland. Based on the plebiscite, the entire region should have fallen to Germany. In the portion granted Poland dwelled 40 percent of the Upper Silesian population. It contained six-sevenths of the zinc and lead production, all the iron, and 91 percent of the coal.¹⁴⁸

Among the lands Germany lost was a 6,300 square-mile vertical strip of West Prussia extending from the Baltic coast down to Upper Silesia. Poland required this corridor, the Allies reasoned, to permit her to have unrestricted access to the sea. Within the corridor was the German port of Danzig. Just 15,000 of the city’s 400,000 inhabitants were Polish. The people of Danzig overwhelmingly demonstrated for union with Germany, but the Peace Commission favored Poland. Lloyd George’s tenacious resistance forced a compromise: the town became a “Free City” under League of Nations jurisdiction, subject to Polish customs administration.

During the Weimar Republic, every German administration and most influential political parties had advocated Poland’s destruction. This attitude prevailed in the Reich’s Foreign Office and in the *Reichswehr* as well. In September 1922,

General Hans von Seeckt wrote to Chancellor Joseph Wirth, "Poland's existence is intolerable and incompatible with Germany's vital interests. It must disappear, and will do so through its own weakness and through Russia with our aid."¹⁴⁹

The Polish government's oppressive minority policy provoked the ire of other European states. Poland's Jewish, Ukrainian, and German populations suffered legal persecution to disenfranchise them, strip them of political influence, or force their migration out. The regime dismissed German officials and employees from civil service. It confiscated German farms, closed ethnic schools and forced the pupils to enroll in Polish educational institutions. These measures compelled many Prussian and Silesian Germans to move into Germany. A quarter of the ethnic German population had left Poland by 1926.

Heinrich Brüning, German chancellor from 1930-1932, pursued a trade policy the Poles considered disadvantageous to their commerce. Pilsudski responded by conducting military maneuvers and massing troops near Germany's border. The Polish army concentrated formations in a ring around East Prussia, geographically separated by the corridor from the Reich. In 1930, *Mocarstwowiec (The League of Great Powers)*, a newspaper mirroring Pilsudski's views, published this editorial: "We know that war between Poland and Germany cannot be avoided. We must prepare for this war systematically and energetically. ... In this war there will be no prisoners taken. There will be no place for humanitarian feelings."¹⁵⁰ The Polish general staff had been weighing options for invading the Reich since 1921.¹⁵¹ German diplomats considered the appointment to Polish foreign minister of Joseph Beck, an army colonel and confidant of Pilsudski's, in November 1932 as indicative of a more militant policy.¹⁵²

Polish saber-rattling provoked resentment in Germany. The Reich's Foreign Office refused to renew even minor compacts with Poland about to expire. When Hitler became chancellor in January 1933, relations with his eastern neighbor were strained to the utmost. The Polish press launched a campaign of vilification against the new chancellor. Pilsudski deployed combat divisions near Danzig and reinforced the 82-man garrison guarding the *Westerplatte*. This was an army depot situated on an islet bordering metropolitan Danzig. A Pilsudski subordinate wrote in the quasi-official *Gazeta Polska*, "for the western

territories, Poland can and will speak only with the voice of her cannons."¹⁵³

In April 1933, Pilsudski asked Paris for the second time in less than two months to join in a “preventative war” to invade the Reich. The French showed no interest. The German representative in Warsaw, Hans von Moltke, discovered the plan and duly warned Hitler.¹⁵⁴ The Führer sidestepped a confrontation. During his first meeting with the Polish envoy on May 2, 1933, he proved gracious and reassuring. Hitler agreed to a public declaration that his government would observe all Polish-German treaties currently in force. In his foreign policy speech to the Reichstag on May 17, the German chancellor spoke of “finding a solution to satisfy the understandable demands of Poland just as much as Germany’s natural rights.”¹⁵⁵

In November, Hitler offered Pilsudski a friendship and non-aggression pact. Only after another discreet, unsuccessful bid to enlist France for his “preventative war” hobbyhorse did the marshal agree. The two governments ratified a ten-year treaty the following January. New trade agreements provided a fresh market for Poland’s depressed economy. Hitler banned newspaper editorials addressing German claims in the East. Warsaw relaxed the anti-German tendency of its own press. The Führer directed Danzig’s National Socialist senate to cease complaining to the League of Nations about Polish violations of legal compacts there.

The German public disapproved of Hitler’s rapprochement toward Poland. U.S. Ambassador William Dodd reported that even convinced National Socialists were disillusioned that the Führer had concluded a pact with Warsaw.¹⁵⁶ Prussian nobles in the general staff and foreign office harbored anti-Polish sentiments and likewise rejected the change of policy. In October 1935, Moltke cabled from Warsaw, “Today the German minority in Poland feels left in the lurch by the German Reich.”¹⁵⁷ Hitler stayed on course. Warsaw’s new emissary in Berlin, Joseph Lipski, experienced a warmth and popularity among his hosts previously unimaginable for a Polish diplomat.

After Pilsudski’s death in May 1935, two government officials assumed virtual autonomy in their respective ministries, much to the detriment of Polish-German relations. These were Foreign Minister Beck and the army commander-in-chief,

Marshal Edward Rydz-Smigly. Both were disciples of an expansionist foreign policy.

The friendship treaty with Germany evoked little sense of obligation on Poland's part. From Warsaw, Moltke informed his superiors, "The Poles think that they no longer need to restrict their steps against the German minority. They must be gaining the impression from the lack of any reaction in the German press, that all infringements will be accepted by German public opinion without objection."¹⁵⁸ In February 1936, the German consul general in Thorn, Kiichler, wrote Berlin about the disproportionate transfer of German farms into Polish hands through government-implemented land reform: "As much German property as possible is supposed to be broken up before expiration of the ten-year agreement."¹⁵⁹ Consul Nöldeke in Katowice described how on March 15, "In Königshiitte, an assembly of the German Farmers Union was dispersed by a mob armed with sticks and clubs, during which German performers of the Upper Silesian country theater who were uninvolved bystanders were physically abused."¹⁶⁰

Diplomatic relations between Poland and the Reich further deteriorated due to a simultaneous tariff dispute. Dissatisfied with Germany's compensation for coal trains crossing the corridor from the Reich to supply East Prussia's energy needs, Warsaw announced in January 1936 that it would curtail 50 to 80 percent of German rail traffic there. The Polish Ministry of Transportation threatened to block it completely during negotiations.¹⁶¹ In March, Beck informed the French that Poland was ready to join France in a war against Germany.¹⁶² Marshal Rydz-Smigly visited Paris in September. He persuaded the French to loan Poland \$500 million in cash and war materiel to upgrade the Polish army. Warsaw already devoted over a third of the budget to armaments, even though the country suffered one of the highest illiteracy rates in Europe and much of the population lived in poverty.¹⁶³ Rydz-Smigly ordered General Tadeusz Kutrzeba to draft a war plan against Germany. Completed in January 1938, the study envisioned a war with the Reich for 1939. To date, Hitler had never made a threatening gesture to Poland.

Of all territories robbed from the Reich after World War I, the German people

felt most keenly the loss of Danzig and the lands taken by Poland. To placate his own public and remove one more obstacle to improving relations with Warsaw, Hitler required at least a nominal correction of the Versailles arrangement. He limited his proposal to two revisions. First, he asked to construct an Autobahn and railroad line across the corridor to connect Germany with East Prussia. The German diplomat Julius Schnurre had already suggested this to Beck in 1935 without receiving an answer.¹⁶⁴ Secondly, Hitler wanted Danzig to come under German sovereignty. In return, he was prepared to acknowledge Germany's eastern border fixed by the Allied Peace Commission as final, something no Weimar administration had hitherto done, and offer Poland a 25-year non-aggression pact.

The Autobahn plan meant that Hitler was willing to renounce an entire province in exchange for a strip of real estate wide enough to accommodate a highway. Financed by the Reich, the project would utilize Polish labor and construction materials to help relieve unemployment in Poland. The recovery of Danzig required even less of Warsaw. The Danzig territory, encompassing 730 square miles, was under League of Nations, not Polish, jurisdiction. Regarding the city's value as a harbor, the Poles no longer needed it for nautical export; further up the coast they had constructed the port city of Gdynia, which opened in 1926. Offering economic incentives to shippers, they had taken more than half of Danzig's commerce by 1930.

Hitler's package called for the Reich's forfeiture of Upper Silesia with its valuable industry, Posen and West Prussia. These provinces had been German for centuries and had belonged to Germany less than 20 years before. Nevertheless, it would abandon nearly a million ethnic Germans residing there to foreign rule, despite the fact that since March 1933, the Reich's Foreign Office had documented 15,000 cases of abuse against Poland's ethnic German colony.¹⁶⁵ The Führer was willing to publicly announce that no more territorial issues exist with Poland. No Weimar administration could have survived such an offer.

Meeting in Berchtesgaden with Polish Ambassador Lipski on October 24, 1938, Ribbentrop brought the German revisions to the table. His guest disputed the Reich's perception of Danzig's status as a "product of Versailles." Only

Poland's rise, Lipski contended, had lifted the city from "insignificance." He told Ribbentrop that public opinion would never accept the city's transfer to Germany.¹⁶⁶ Warsaw reaffirmed Lipski's position in writing on October 31. The letter conceded that Poland was prepared to guarantee the right of "Danzig's German minority" to preserve its national and cultural identity.¹⁶⁷ Describing the population of a city that was 96 percent German as a minority was a studied provocation which Hitler decided to overlook. The Polish press campaign against Germany resumed.

On January 5, 1939, Beck visited Germany to negotiate with Hitler. The Führer insisted that Danzig's return to Germany must be a part of any final settlement with Poland. He reassured Beck that the Reich would never simply declare that the city has returned to Germany and present Warsaw with a *fait accompli*. He pledged that no final arrangement would deprive Poland of her access to the sea. Beck asked for time to weigh the situation carefully.

In mid-January, Beck told Rydz-Smigly of his decision to reject the German proposals, though two weeks later he mendaciously reassured Ribbentrop that he was still contemplating the matter. A wave of fresh persecution swept over the ethnic German minority. On February 25, the British ambassador there, Sir Howard Kennard, reported to Halifax on a dialog with Moltke concerning farmhands and industrial workers in Poland who "were being dismissed because they happened to be Germans." In addition to the forced closing of German schools, it was becoming practically impossible for a German living in Poland to earn enough to exist. Kennard concluded that there was "little likelihood of the Polish authorities doing anything to improve matters."¹⁶⁸

An unrelated episode aggravated tensions. On March 22, the Germans recovered Memel from Lithuania. This was a narrow, 700-square mile strip of northeastern Prussia which the Lithuanians seized by force in 1923. The League of Nations demanded that the territory be governed according to democratic principles. In the 1925 elections, 94 percent of the voters – including many Lithuanian residents – cast for German parties. The Lithuanian government in Kaunas refused to recognize the results. The entire country fell under a dictatorship the following year. The authorities began jailing Prussian residents found guilty of "preserving German heritage."¹⁶⁹

After the Austrian Anschluss, Memel-Germans organized public demonstrations. In November 1938, Kaunas offered to negotiate with Berlin over the region's future. In an internationally supervised plebiscite in December, 87 percent of voters decided for union with Germany. Ribbentrop promised Lithuanian Foreign Minister Juozas Urbys economic incentives for his country. Upon the transfer of Memel back to Germany, the Lithuanians employed their own dock workers and administrative personnel at the harbor there. They also operated a railroad across the now-German strip of Memel territory directly connecting the port to Lithuania. This was the same solution that Hitler had proposed to Warsaw regarding Danzig and the corridor.

During the weeks before the final settlement with Kaunas, Berlin deployed the three army divisions garrisoned in East Prussia on the border with Memel. Rydz-Smigly declared this to be evidence that Germany was about to annex Danzig.¹⁷⁰ On March 23, 1939, he accordingly mobilized a large part of Poland's army reserve. Since Memel was at the opposite end of the province from Danzig, the three divisions were actually moving *away* from the city that Rydz-Smigly claimed they were about to seize. The Memel affair coincided with Germany's occupation of the Czech rump-state on March 15. Beck exploited the occasion to negotiate with London to form an alliance against Germany. On March 24, Beck told Lipski and senior members of his staff that Hitler was losing the faculty to think and act rationally. Poland's "determined resistance" might bring him to his senses. Otherwise, Beck proclaimed, "We will fight!"¹⁷¹

Hitler maintained a conciliatory posture. His army commander-in-chief, General Brauchitsch, noted, "Führer does not want to settle the Danzig question by force." Hitler cancelled a March 24 directive that the diplomat Ernst von Weizsäcker had prepared for Moltke as a guideline for resuming negotiations. The Führer considered it "somewhat harshly formulated" and objected to its tenor "confronting the Poles with a sort of friend-or-foe option."¹⁷²

Returning to Berlin, Lipski delivered a letter to Ribbentrop on March 26 formally rejecting the Danzig-Autobahn proposal. Lipski bluntly told his host, "Any further pursuit of these German plans, especially as far as the return of Danzig to the Reich is concerned, will mean war with Poland."¹⁷³ This threat, together with Rydz-Smigly's partial mobilization against Germany, violated the

1934 non-aggression and friendship treaty: The pact stated word for word, "Under no circumstances will (the signatories) resort to the use of force for the purpose of settling issues in controversy."¹⁷⁴

The British responded favorably to an alliance with Poland. The western democracies had just lost Czechoslovakia as an ally flanking the Reich. Her military-industrial resources were now at German disposal. The British army chief of staff warned Chamberlain that in the event of war against Germany, it would be better to have Poland on the Allies' side. On March 30, Kennard received instructions from London to present the British offer to guarantee Poland. Beck accepted immediately. The next day, Chamberlain explained the details in the House of Commons: "In the event of any action which clearly threatens Polish independence and which the Polish government accordingly considered it vital to resist with their national forces, His Majesty's Government would feel themselves bound at once to lend the Polish government all support in their power."¹⁷⁵

Beck visited London to conclude details for the alliance on April 3. On the 23rd, Warsaw mobilized another 334,000 army reservists, again in the absence of threats from Germany.¹⁷⁶

Hitler addressed the Reichstag on April 28. He explained how the Anglo-Polish agreement obligated the Poles to take a military position against the Reich, should it enter into an armed conflict with any state guaranteed by England. Hitler continued, "This obligation contradicts the agreement I previously made with Marshal Pilsudski; since the (1934) agreement only takes into account obligations already in existence at that time, namely Poland's commitments regarding France. To belatedly expand these commitments is contrary to the German-Polish non-aggression pact. Under these circumstances, I would never have concluded this pact back then; for what sense does it make to have a non-aggression pact, if it leaves a number of exceptions for one partner practically wide open?"¹⁷⁷ Hitler voided the compact. He added in his speech that he would welcome a Polish initiative to negotiate a new treaty governing Polish-German relations.

Warsaw's agreement with London opened a floodgate of war scares and hostile

editorials in the Polish press. The German consul general in Posen reported to Berlin on March 31, “Scarcely a day goes by in which Posen newspapers don't publish more or less aggressive articles or insulting observations about Germans.”¹⁷⁸ Although Hitler had personally instructed his foreign office that there must be “no talk of war” in the negotiations, the French ambassador in Warsaw, Leon Noel, reported to Paris, “Patriotic sentiment among the Poles has reached a zenith in all parties and classes, thanks to the German threats.”¹⁷⁹

Poland’s ethnic German community suffered the backlash of media-generated Polish chauvinism. On April 13, the German consul in Danzig cabled to Berlin that rural Germans in the corridor “are so cowed that they have already buried their most valuable possessions. They no longer risk traversing roads and fields by daylight. They spend their nights in hiding places beyond the farms, for fear of being attacked.”¹⁸⁰

The May 11 edition of the Polish newspaper *Dziennik Bydgoski* (*Bromberg Daily News*) published an editorial asserting that the Germans in Poland “know that in case of war, no indigenous enemy will escape alive. The Führer is far away but the Polish soldier close by, and in the woods there’s no shortage of limbs.” The previous month, the Polish mayor of Bromberg, a town with a comparatively large German population, told journalists that if Hitler invaded there, he'd be stepping over the corpses of Bromberg’s Germans.¹⁸¹

Beck explained his policy to the Polish parliament on May 5. He claimed that Danzig was not German, but has belonged to Poland for centuries. He attributed the city’s prosperity to commerce conducted by Poland ferrying export wares into Danzig via the Vistula River, omitting the fact that the waterway was no longer navigable, thanks to 19 years of improper maintenance under Polish administration. Beck disparaged Hitler’s offer to recognize Polish sovereignty over the corridor, Posen, and Upper Silesia in exchange for Danzig. Since the provinces were already incorporated into Poland, he argued, Hitler was giving nothing in return. “A nation with self-respect makes no one-sided concessions,” he crowed.¹⁸²

Historians praise Beck for defiantly defending his country from becoming a German satellite. Since Hitler’s proposal included an offer for Poland to join the

Anti-Comintern Pact, reaching a Danzig settlement with the Reich would have supposedly drawn the Poles into an alliance with Germany against the USSR. Warsaw would then have eventually become embroiled in Hitler's planned military crusade against Russia. Beyond the fact that no German documents exist to support this theory, it overlooks the essence of the Anti-Comintern Pact. Its purpose was to promote cooperation among civilized nations to prevent internal Communist subversion. Governments would share intelligence, much in the same way that Interpol affiliates do to combat global terrorism today. Also, Hitler had expressed his often-quoted ideas about invading Russia when he wrote *Mein Kampf* during the previous decade. After the Bolsheviks consolidated power in the former Czarist empire, the Führer no longer advocated such an option.

Through personal observation and discussions with diplomats in Berlin, Henderson was able to convey to London a realistic picture of German opinion. He wrote Halifax in May, "It must be borne in mind that Danzig and the corridor was *the* big question prior to 1933. One of the most unpopular actions which Hitler ever did was his 1934 treaty with Pilsudski. He had the whole of his party against him. Today the most moderate Germans, who are opposed to a world war, are behind him in his present offer to Poland." Henderson added that foreign emissaries in Berlin also consider Hitler's proposals justifiable: "According to my Belgian colleague, practically all the diplomatic representatives here regard the German offer in itself as a surprisingly favorable one."¹⁸³

Henderson grasped that Hitler's package was not a demand for Polish territory but accepted a significant *loss* of formerly German lands to Poland. In a May 17 dispatch to Halifax, Henderson wrote, "The fact that what was regarded here as a generous offer of a 25-year German guarantee of the existing Polish frontier in exchange for a satisfactory settlement of the Danzig and Corridor problem had been rejected out of hand by Poland has not only incensed Herr Hitler personally, but has made a deep impression on the country as a whole."¹⁸⁴

The ambassador also referred to "the traditional German feeling of hatred for Poland, particularly in the army, and Polish ingratitude for Germany's past services." On May 16, Henderson summarized a conversation with Weizsäcker

in a letter to Sir Miles Cadogan, the undersecretary in the Foreign Office: “He like all Germans feels bitterly about the Poles. They grabbed what they could after Vienna and Munich and then bit the hand that fed them on these occasions. That is the German view nor is there a single German who does not regard Hitler’s offer to Poland as excessively generous and broadminded.”¹⁸⁵

Hitler understood that he could never normalize relations with Poland without a Danzig settlement. The British guarantee for Poland had robbed Hitler of the opportunity to withdraw his demands without losing face. On April 3, 1939, he ordered the OKW to draft a study for combat operations against Poland. He stipulated that the military solution would only be exercised “if Warsaw revises its policy toward Germany and assumes a posture threatening to the Reich.”¹⁸⁶

Berlin continued to receive reports from its consulates in Poland regarding harsh treatment of the German colony there. On May 8, on instructions from Hitler, press chief Otto Dietrich directed newspaper editors to “practice a certain restraint in reporting such incidents” and not publish them on the front page.¹⁸⁷ Regarding the Polish media, Henderson observed, “The fantastic claims of irresponsible Polish elements for domination over East Prussia and other German territory afford cheap fuel to the flames.”¹⁸⁸

In June, Hubert Gladwyn Jebb and Sir William Strang of the British Foreign Office visited Warsaw. Jebb sent back a report on the 9th that summarized the discussions with Polish government ministers and army officers. He quoted a Polish economist in Warsaw’s foreign ministry as describing how Polish farmers anticipated generous grants of German land after the war with Germany.¹⁸⁹ Jebb opined that the Polish general staff was “overly optimistic” and that officials in Warsaw had become “amazingly arrogant” since the British guarantee.¹⁹⁰ The following month, British General Sir Edmund Ironside visited Poland. Rydz-Smigly told him that war with Germany is unavoidable.¹⁹¹ None of the British emissaries said anything to the Poles to mollify this bellicose attitude.

Since June, as reported by Moltke, 70 percent of the Germans in Upper Silesia were out of work, compared to Poland’s national unemployment rate of 16 percent. The Reich’s Government registered 70,000 ethnic German refugees

who had recently fled Polish sovereign territory. Another 15,000 had taken refuge in Danzig. Among the acts of brutality inflicted on those still in Poland were five

documented cases of castration. Kennard protested to the Polish government about the abuse of the German minority. The complaint “did not appear to have had any definite results,” he notified his superiors.¹⁹²

The crisis also focused on Danzig, still administered by League of Nations Commissioner Carl Burckhardt but under Poland’s customs union. The city’s senate was embroiled in a perpetual controversy over the conduct of the Polish tariff inspectors. Originally numbering six, in 1939 the roster had climbed to well over 100. Polish officials performing these duties roamed areas beyond their jurisdiction, primarily interested in potential military details.¹⁹³ They rendezvoused at Danzig’s rail terminal, which was under Polish administration. A transmitter there relayed intelligence to Warsaw. In the event of war, the inspectors were to lead irregular troops, supplied from arms caches concealed in the city, to hold positions in Danzig until the Polish army arrived.¹⁹⁴

Danzig’s senate president, Arthur Greiser, protested to the Polish commissioner in Danzig, Marjan Chodaki, on June 3, 1939, about the customs inspectors. Chodaki replied that the number of his customs agents was still insufficient, because German inspectors were not doing their job. He threatened economic sanctions against Danzig. In another note on August 4, Chodaki stated that Polish customs officials would henceforth be armed. Interference with their activity would result in an immediate reprisal against Danzig; the Poles threatened to block the import of foodstuffs. Beck informed Kennard that Poland would intervene militarily if the Danzig senate failed to comply with Polish terms.¹⁹⁵

On August 9, Weizsäcker met with the Polish chargé de affaires in Berlin, Michael Lubomirski. He protested the Polish ultimatum to Danzig of August 4. Sanctions against the “Free City”, Weizsäcker warned, may result in Danzig seeking stronger economic ties with Germany herself. The next day, an undersecretary in Warsaw’s foreign ministry told the German chargé de affaires that any involvement by the Reich’s Government in the Danzig issue would be

regarded by Poland as an act of war.¹⁹⁶ Rydz-Smigly contributed to tensions with remarks made in a public speech: “Soon we'll be marching against the hereditary German enemy to finally knock out his poison fangs. The first step on this march will be Danzig. . . . Keep ready for the day of reckoning with this arrogant Germanic race!”¹⁹⁷ Burckhardt described Poland’s intentions as “excessively belligerent.”¹⁹⁸

Warsaw issued an official press release detailing how Greiser had withdrawn his demands after the note exchange with Chodaki. According to the Polish press, a single, mildly harsh note had “forced Hitler to his knees.”¹⁹⁹ The Anglo-French media triumphantly reported that the Führer had had to “climb down.” Hitler told Burckhardt on August 11, “The press said I lost my nerve, that threats are the only way to deal with me. That we backed down when the Poles stood firm, that I had only been bluffing last year, and my bluff flopped thanks to Poland’s courage that the Czechs didn't have. I've read idiotic remarks in the French press that I lost my nerve while the Poles kept theirs.”²⁰⁰

Hitler asked Burckhardt, “Could you go yourself to London? If we want to avoid catastrophes, the matter is rather urgent.”²⁰¹ Halifax, certainly no friend of Germany, cabled Kennard on August 15, “I have the impression that Hitler is still undecided and anxious to avoid war.”²⁰² The day before, Roger Makins in the British Foreign Office wrote England’s delegate in Geneva, Frank Walter, that the Führer wanted to open negotiations to prevent an armed clash.

Historians assert that Hitler was determined to invade Poland. However, had this been his intention, he could have instructed the Danzig senate to pass a resolution abolishing League of Nations jurisdiction and returning the city to the Reich’s sovereignty. This would have provoked the Polish military response Beck warned of, and Germany could then intervene with her own army in order to defend the Danzig population’s right to self-determination. Given the sensitive issue of democratic principles, and the fact that Poland was striking the first blow, it would then have been difficult for Britain to justify support for Poland under the provisions of the guarantee.

The Polish government rounded up “disloyal” ethnic Germans and transported

them to concentration camps.²⁰³ Authorities closed daily traffic between Upper Silesia and Germany, preventing thousands of ethnic Germans from commuting to their jobs in the Reich. Polish coastal anti-aircraft batteries fired on Lufthansa passenger planes flying over the Baltic Sea to East Prussia.²⁰⁴ The Luftwaffe provided fighter escorts for the airliners. In Danzig, the police chief formed his law enforcement personnel into two rifle regiments. In defiance of the League of Nations charter, the city re-militarized. The Germans transferred a battalion from SS Death's Head Regiment 4 to Danzig. The 1,500-man "SS Home Guard Danzig" paraded publicly on Danzig's May Field on August 18. The Poles evacuated the families of their civil servants, fortified public buildings and installations with armor plate or barbed wire and posted machine gun nests at bridges.²⁰⁵

In his directive to the armed forces the previous April, Hitler had cited isolating Poland as a prerequisite for the military option. On August 23, Germany concluded a non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union. The pact, signed in Moscow, contained a secret clause defining mutual spheres of interest. It stated, "The question of whether or not maintaining an independent Polish state will appear desirable for both parties' interests, and how this state should be divided, can be clarified in the course of further political developments." In return for roughly half of Poland, the Soviet dictator gave Germany a free hand to invade. The Germans hoped that news of Soviet-German rapprochement would demonstrate to Beck that his country's position had become precarious, compelling him to return to the conference table.²⁰⁶ Beck however, dismissed the alliance as untenable, because Russia and Germany harbored a serious ideological rivalry. A Warsaw communiqué stated, "The conclusion of the non-aggression pact has no influence on Poland's situation or policy."²⁰⁷

On August 23, Hitler told his armed forces adjutant that the military must be ready to invade Poland by the morning of the 26th. The Führer then postponed the attack, explaining to General Keitel that he needed to "gain time for further negotiations," still seeking a "solution without bloodshed."²⁰⁸ The Poles, without provocation from Germany, closed Danzig's borders. Since the metropolis imported much of its foodstuffs, this created a critical situation for the population.

Hitler and Göring requested British mediation to help persuade Warsaw to resume talks. From Warsaw, Kennard cabled London on August 25 that, were Beck or Lipski to seek an audience with Hitler, the Führer would consider this a “sign of weakness” and respond with an ultimatum.²⁰⁹ Chamberlain concluded the alliance with Poland the same day.

Along the German-Polish frontier, Polish border guards fired on ethnic German refugees attempting to flee into Germany. German infantry patrols crossed into Poland and fought to free them. On the 26th, a Polish cavalry unit rode boldly through German villages near Neidenburg in East Prussia. The German army’s Artillery Regiment 57 engaged the horsemen on sovereign Reich territory. The Poles withdrew, leaving 47 dead on the battlefield.²¹⁰ Hitler told Ribbentrop, “I would like to think that Beck and Lipski have good intentions. But they are no longer in control of the situation. They are captives of a public attitude that has become white-hot through the excesses of their own propaganda and the bragging of the military. Even if they wanted to negotiate, they aren't in a position to do so. This is the real root of the tragedy.” Ribbentrop handed Hitler a telegram describing three further incidents of Polish gunners firing on German commercial aircraft. The Führer responded, “This is pure anarchy. What are we supposed to do?”²¹¹

On August 29, Hitler received a half-hearted pledge from London to urge the Poles to enter negotiations, without, however, stating when. Tired of these dilatory tactics, Hitler wrote back that he expected a Polish diplomat empowered to negotiate by the following day. Examining the note in front of Hitler that evening, Henderson protested that it “has the ring of an ultimatum.” The Führer retorted, “This sentence only emphasizes the urgency of the moment. Consider that at any time it could come to a serious incident, when two mobilized armies are confronting one another.” Henderson insisted that the deadline was too short. Hitler responded, “We've been repeating the same thing for a week. . . . This senseless game can't go on forever.... My people are bleeding day after day.”²¹² In Warsaw, Beck, Rydz-Smigly and the defense minister, Tadeusz Kasprzycki, conferred. They decided to declare general mobilization the next morning.

German diplomats and lawyers spent the morning of August 30 preparing the 16-point Marienwerder proposal as a basis for discussions with the Poles. The

salient points were Danzig's immediate return to the Reich, a German transit route linking East Prussia to Germany, Gdynia remaining under Polish sovereignty, a minority protection treaty, and a plebiscite for the population of the northern corridor region. Göring emphasized that the Führer is trying to avoid infringement of Poland's vital interests.²¹³ Henderson confessed to London that Hitler is considering how generous he can be.

Chamberlain's cabinet concluded that the proposal does not harm Poland's interests nor threaten her independence. Even the suggested corridor plebiscite should not have concerned Warsaw, since it claimed that the population there was 90 percent Polish.²¹⁴ The French government recommended to the Poles that they negotiate. London telegraphed Kennard, instructing him to formally protest Poland's recent practice of shooting at German refugees.

The Polish Foreign Office assumed that Hitler would interpret any willingness on its part to negotiate as a sign of weakness. In reality, simply receiving the German 16-point plan represented no threat to Poland. It would have opened a dialog, and at the very least postponed the outbreak of war. The Poles could have broken off the discussions if Berlin imposed an ultimatum. They could then have fully relied on the support of the Western powers. Beck however, wanted no negotiations. On August 31, he cabled Lipski with instructions to inform Ribbentrop that Warsaw will "weigh the recommendation of the British government (to negotiate) in a favorable light and give a formal answer to this question in a few hours."²¹⁵

In the same message, Beck instructed his ambassador not to discuss anything with the Germans, and that he is not authorized to receive their proposals. That morning, Sir George Ogilvie-Forbes tried to give a copy of Hitler's 16-point program to Lipski at the Polish embassy in Berlin. The Pole refused, replying that "in the event of war, civil strife will break out in this country and Polish troops will march successfully to Berlin."²¹⁶

The radio monitoring station in the Reich's Air Ministry intercepted Beck's transmission ordering Lipski not to accept a copy of Germany's Marienwerder proposals. Hitler now knew that Poland would not compromise over Danzig and the corridor. He nonetheless postponed the military operation once more, upon

Göring's request for a last-minute conference with Henderson and the Swedish mediator Birger Dahlerus.²¹⁷ Later that day, Göring's conference took place. He showed Henderson a transcript of Beck's instructions sent to Lipski. Henderson wrote Halifax, "The highly efficient German intelligence system proved its worth that afternoon in Berlin. Beck's telephone call, including the secret message, was instantly decoded. Here was proof to the German Government of Poland's delaying tactics and refusal to negotiate seriously."²¹⁸

The meeting between Henderson and Göring was cordial, but failed to reach a solution. A session between Lipski and Ribbentrop the same evening was also fruitless. Hitler summoned Keitel at 9:00p.m. The directive he gave the general began, "Now that all political possibilities for relieving the intolerable conditions for Germany on her eastern border by peaceful means are exhausted, I have decided for a solution by force."²¹⁹ Less than eight hours later, the German armed forces invaded Poland.

Historical documents reveal that the attack on Poland was not a step in a long-planned, systematic program to expand Germany's living space. Hitler ordered the offensive upon the failure to achieve a negotiated settlement. Among the most important issues was the welfare of the ethnic German colony beyond the Reich's borders, though to wage war for the sake of people related by blood, but no longer by nationality, may today seem unjustified. The present-day "global community" concept rejects the notion that a nation can be defined more by its race than by geographical boundaries. During the 1930's, however, pride of ethnic heritage was a powerful force in the consciousness of the European peoples.

The 1938 Munich Accord, by which Germany regained the Sudeten territory populated by ethnic Germans under foreign rule, was regarded by the Reich's Foreign Office as a legal precedent: "The right of protection from the mother state was fundamentally acknowledged once and for all, through an international act in which the four Great Powers and three other states took part."²²⁰ In August 1939, Hitler confronted a serious situation regarding Danzig and the German minority in Poland. Blockaded by the Poles since August 24, the Free City's German population faced economic ruin and potential starvation. During the month's final days, Polish radicals murdered over 200 ethnic German residents

of western Poland.²²¹ “German intervention was completely legitimate in accordance with on one hand, the right of the mother state to protect its ethnic families living under foreign rule, and on the other hand, with respect to their right to self-determination,” as a German diplomat asserted.²²² Hitler wrote Daladier on August 27, “I would despair of an honorable future for my people, if under such circumstances we were not resolved to settle the matter no matter what.”²²³

Beyond the moral and legal issues was that of national security. As mentioned, the Germans had discovered documents in Vienna and Prague revealing a covert policy of the British Foreign Office to weaken Germany. Chamberlain’s arbitration of the 1938 Sudetenland crisis had satisfied Hitler’s demands but also had rescued Czechoslovakia; at that time, Britain and France had not been equipped to wage war to defend this small but useful ally. Once Czechoslovakia collapsed in March 1939, the Anglo-French lost an integral component of their “collective security” alliance system. London’s public guarantee of Poland followed immediately. Hitler surmised that Chamberlain’s purpose for this declaration was to turn Poland against Germany, to replace one hostile state on the Reich’s eastern frontier with another. The Führer told his architect, Hermann Giesler, that he believed that the coalition forming against Germany wanted war: “I must strive to prevent the encirclement of Germany or punch through it, regardless of what direction.”²²⁴

On August 9, 1939, Henderson had written Undersecretary Cadogan in London that both the Germans and the Italians believed that Poland would attempt to settle the dispute with the Reich by force that year, before British support becomes lukewarm.²²⁵ In Warsaw, army commanders and certain Polish politicians recommended challenging Germany soon, since the cost of indefinitely maintaining so many soldiers on active duty was too great a strain on the national budget.²²⁶ The general mobilization Poland announced on August 30 was another ominous sign for Hitler. Feeling threatened both to the east and to the west, he opted to strike first. One could perhaps judge his decision in the spirit of a maxim of Prussia’s 18th Century monarch Friedrich the Great. He declared that in war, the real aggressor is he who forces the enemy to fire the first shot.

Peace Overtures Following the German-Polish Conflict

An excerpt from Hitler's War, by David Irving, 1977

Hitler's train idled on a siding in outer Pomerania until 9:30 A.M. on September 26 and then began the eight-hour haul back to Berlin. The journey passed in heavy silence. Hitler went into the command coach, but Keitel was in Berlin and Jodl must have been in his private compartment, for only Colonel von Vormann was there, seated at his customary place next to the telephones, writing and sorting the heaps of papers that had accumulated. For the next few hours Hitler spoke no word but restlessly paced the length of the swaying carriage while the train drew closer to Berlin. There were no messages, no calls, no visitors. Just after 5 P.M. the train reached Berlin's Stettin station, unheralded by any crowds or scenes of jubilation. The motor pool had sent cars to pick them up ; Hitler and his entourage drove almost stealthily to the Reich Chancellery, where dinner was served at the large round table in his residence. The atmosphere was funereal. After a while Hitler abruptly rose, bid the others good night, and retired to his rooms.

Without doubt his thoughts now revolved around the next step he must take : could the western powers be made to see reason, or must he defeat them as he had defeated Poland ? In January 1944 he was secretly to address his skeptical generals with words that he might well have been thinking now. "If I am now taken to task about what concrete prospects there are of ending the war, then I should just like to ask you to look at the history of wars and tell me when in the major campaigns any concrete idea emerged as to how each would end. For the most part there was not even a concrete idea as to how the campaign should be conducted. Moltke himself wrote that it is erroneous to expect that any plan of war can be drawn up that will hold good after the first battles." In the same speech he was to explain : "In my position one can have no other master than one's own judgment, one's conscience, and one's sense of duty. Those are the only masters to whose commands I bow."

The army had already taken matters into its own hands, issuing in mid-September 1939 an order for the withdrawal of most of the combat divisions from Poland and their partial demobilization. Keitel warned General Halder that such an order was unthinkable without Hitler's consent ; and when Hitler heard of it he sat sharply upright and ejaculated, "We are going to attack the west, and we are going to do it this October !"

There are small indications that Hitler had known all along that he was on the threshold of a long and bitter war with Britain—that Britain would not withdraw even now that Poland no longer existed. As early as September 5 the Führer instructed Walther Hewel—Ribbentrop's liaison officer on Hitler's staff, who as a student had spent several months with him in Landsberg prison in 1923—to use every possible diplomatic channel to rescue his disconsolate friend "Putzi" Hanfstaengl from the consequences of his own stubbornness in London and arrange his escape to Germany.⁽¹⁾ A few days later, the British Cabinet announced that Britain was preparing for a war that was expected to last at least three years ; this blunt statement evidently jolted Hitler, for he was still referring to it three weeks later. Britain was clearly going to play for time until her rearmament was complete—and this was the one development Hitler feared most. On the evening of September 12 he confidentially disclosed to Colonel Schmudt that as soon as Poland had been defeated he would swing around and attack in the west ; he must exploit the western weakness while he could. But he deliberately kept General von Brauchitsch uninformed of his thinking.

A few days later, on the fourteenth, he discussed with his chief engineer, Fritz Todt, architect of the West Wall fortifications, the need for a proper permanent headquarters site in the west, as his special train would be too vulnerable to air attack. One site was debated and discarded, and another near Munstereifel was eventually selected. To his adjutants, Hitler explained that his Great War experience in Flanders had taught him that until January the weather would hold good for an offensive, after which it would be imprudent to launch a large-scale campaign before May. He admitted that he did not expect the victorious campaign in Poland to influence the western powers ; he proposed to make one more peace offer to Britain, but he had small hopes for it. He did not seriously expect Britain to come to terms until the Wehrmacht was arrayed on the English Channel, he said. On the twentieth, General Keitel, chief of the OKW (Wehrmacht High Command), warned a member of his staff that Hitler was

planning to launch an offensive in the west as soon as it became clear there was no chance of reaching an understanding with the western powers.

In a long speech, Hitler revealed this intention to his startled supreme commanders on September 27, the day after his return to the Chancellery : what disturbed the army was Hitler's insistence that since German superiority of arms and men was only temporary, the offensive against France must therefore begin before the end of 1939, and, as in 1914, it would have to be carried through Belgium and at least the southern tip of a Holland he hoped would bow before the inevitability of such action. Hitler explained that he was unconvinced of Belgium's honest neutrality, for she was clearly fortified only along her frontier with Germany, and there were indications that she would permit a rapid invasion by the French and British forces massing on her western frontier—perhaps a secret military convention already existed between Belgium and the western powers to that end. (In this belief he was mistaken.) Thus the Ruhr, seat of Germany's armaments industries, would be lost and so would the war. He ordered General von Brauchitsch to establish the earliest date by which the German buildup could be complete. Aware that Brauchitsch inwardly rebelled against this new campaign, Hitler tolerated no discussion of his decision or of the prospects. He terminated the conference by shredding his brief notes and tossing them into the fire burning in the study grate.

As he privately informed Reichsleiter Alfred Rosenberg on September 29, he intended to propose a grand peace conference to arrange an armistice, demobilization, and the general settlement of outstanding problems, but if need be he would launch an offensive in the west. He was not afraid of the Maginot line. If the British would not accept the peace he offered, then he would destroy them. And Baron Ernst von Weizsäcker recorded Hitler as saying in his presence that day that the new offensive might cost Germany a million men—but it would cost the enemy the same number, and the enemy could ill afford the loss. Hitler repeated his arguments to his army and army group commanders when he assembled them in the Chancellery the next day to receive his thanks for the Polish triumph.

Warsaw had just fallen. It had been at the mercy of German ground and air bombardment since September 10. Elsewhere in Poland the towns had largely escaped damage. In Cracow, only the railroad station and the airfield had been

bombed. But this was not to be the fate of Warsaw, whose commandant Hitler suspected of stalling for time in which to fortify the city against the encircling German armies. By the twenty-first it was clear that Warsaw would have to be taken by storm. The two hundred foreign diplomats were allowed to escape through the German lines, and the artillery bombardment of the city's vital gas, power, and water installations was stepped up. On the twenty-fifth Hitler had visited the Tenth and Eighth armies ; the latter had a hundred and fifty batteries of artillery drawn up for the final bombardment due to begin next day. From the roof of a sports stadium Hitler and a handful of his followers watched with binoculars as the artillery pounded Warsaw. Blaskowitz's final report states :

On September 25 the Führer and Commander in Chief of the Wehrmacht visited the Warsaw front with the Commander in Chief of the army and his Chief of Staff. He was briefed on the Eighth Army's plan of attack : according to this the main artillery assault on the fortress will commence early on September 26. Until then only identified military objectives, enemy batteries, and vital installations such as gas, water, and power stations are being bombarded by ground and air forces. Thirteenth Army Corps' attack is to begin at 0800 hrs on September 26, followed by Ninth Army Corps one day later ; opportunities of improving on the opening positions before then will be exploited....

After the plan of attack has been outlined broadly to him and been given the detailed approval of the Commander in Chief of the army, the Führer, who is deeply troubled by the suffering that lies in store for the population of the fortress [Warsaw], suggests that one more last attempt should be made to persuade the military command of Warsaw to abandon its lunatic course. He guarantees that the officers of the fortress will be granted honorable captivity and may retain their daggers if they surrender forthwith, and orders that the NCOs and troops are to be assured of their early release after the necessary formalities.

Millions of new leaflets publishing these terms were dropped over Warsaw that evening. The Polish commandant made no response. Early on the twenty-sixth, therefore, the target of the artillery bombardment was changed to the city itself, and the infantry assault began. The next day it was all over ; the Poles had capitulated with virtually no further military resistance. For a week there had been no water in the city ; the railroads were in ruins ; there was no food or

electric power. Unburied in the ruins lay some twenty-six thousand civilian dead, over twice the total German military casualties of the entire Polish campaign. On October 2, General Rommel and Colonel Schmudt visited Warsaw and afterward reported to Hitler on the terrible scenes of destruction. Rommel wrote to his wife the next day : “All went according to plan yesterday. Flight to Berlin, flight to Warsaw, talks and inspection there, flight back to Berlin, report in the Reich Chancellery, and dinner at the Führer’s table. Warsaw is in bad shape. There is hardly a building not in some way damaged or with its windows intact. ... The people must have suffered terribly. For seven days there has been no water, no power, no gas, and no food... The mayor estimates there are forty thousand dead and injured... Apart from that everything is quiet. The people are probably relieved that we have come, and that their ordeal is over. The NSV⁽²⁾ and the ‘Bavaria’ rescue convoy and the field kitchens are besieged by starving, exhausted people. It’s raining here in Berlin, and there are low-lying clouds. In Warsaw the weather was fine but cloudy.”

A pall of death still hung over Warsaw as Hitler flew in for his big victory parade there on October 5. The stench of rotting bodies soured the Polish air. Handpicked regiments of the finest infantry divisions stomped past in a parade-march that could not have been improved upon, but according to his closest staff the Führer was unnerved by the spectacle of the death and destruction all about. Outwardly he remained hard and callous. To the foreign journalists swarming around him as he returned to the airfield he said menacingly, “Take a good look around Warsaw. That is how I can deal with any European city. I’ve got enough ammunition.” But when he saw the banquet that the army had prepared at the airfield, either his stomach rebelled or his instinct for bad publicity warned him not to sit at a vast, horseshoe-shaped table with spotless white linen and sumptuous food at a time when hundreds of thousands of Warsaw’s inhabitants were starving. He turned on his heel and instructed Keitel and his staff to follow him immediately to the aircraft. He had wanted to eat at a field kitchen with his troops, he said.

The frontiers of eastern Europe had now been agreed upon between Germany and the Soviet Union. Hitler had insisted that his foreign minister personally fly to Moscow to settle the details. Since Ribbentrop was unenthusiastic about the mission, Hitler told him with some feeling : “Laying down the definitive frontiers between Asia and Europe for the next thousand years is after all a task

worthy of the foreign minister of the *Grossdeutsches Reich* !” The partition of Poland had caused some anguish in Germany. Göring, a fanatical huntsman—a member of what Hitler called “that green freemasonry of men”—turned greedy eyes on the forests of Bialystok, rich with game, and he persuaded General Hans Jeschonnek to telephone Hitler’s train to point up the importance of the Bialystok wood supply to the German economy ; Hitler had bellowed with laughter. “He talks of wood and he means stags !” and he instructed that Bialystok should nevertheless be assigned to the Russian side of the demarcation line.

Ribbentrop settled the line on a small-scale map of Europe in Stalin’s Kremlin office on September 28. Whereas the line provisionally agreed upon in mid-September had run along the Vistula River, it now followed the Bug River far to the east, since Stalin had also assigned to Germany the districts of Warsaw and Lublin in exchange for the Baltic state of Lithuania, which the August pact had placed within Germany’s sphere of influence. So now the German troops who had advanced to the Bug, only to be ordered to withdraw to the Vistula, had to march eastward once again, spanning the difficult terrain for the third time in as many weeks. Stalin offset the only other dissatisfaction with the partition—the fact that the oil-producing region at Lvov (Lemberg) was on his side of the line—by a promise to supply Germany with three hundred thousand tons of the oil annually. All in all, as Ribbentrop remarked to Hitler on his return to Berlin, talking with Stalin and the other Kremlin potentates he had felt he was among comrades barely distinguishable from his National Socialist acquaintances.

Rosenberg almost choked when he heard of Ribbentrop’s flattery of Stalin. He saw the strategic weakness in the new eastern frontiers almost at once. The new demarcation line would give Germany no common frontier with Romania, thus Germany’s sole railway link with the Romanian oil fields and the Black Sea would run through Soviet-controlled territory. As another minister commented to Rosenberg, “If the Russians now march into the Baltic states, we shall have lost the Baltic as well, strategically speaking ; Moscow will be more powerful than ever and they will be able to act against us in concert with the West any time they choose.” Rosenberg probably put this view to Hitler with some emphasis when he saw him on the twenty-ninth. In fact the indecent haste with which Stalin moved to take up the options extended to him gravely embarrassed Ribbentrop’s ministry ; it can only be explained by the Soviet leader’s alarm at

the speed with which Hitler's Wehrmacht had polished off Poland and by his fear that peace might break out. Under pressure from him Estonia conceded air and naval bases to Russia on September 29, and Latvia and Lithuania followed suit a few days later. Finland, however, made it clear from the outset she would offer the most determined resistance to similar Russian demands.

For the first two weeks of October 1939, Hitler unquestionably wavered between continuing the fight—which meant launching an almost immediate offensive in the west—and making peace with the remaining belligerents on the best terms he could get. The fact that he had ordered the Wehrmacht to get ready for “Operation Yellow” (*Fall Gelb*, the attack on France and the Low Countries) in no way detracts from the reality of his peace offensive. Whatever his final decision, there was no time to be lost.

Hitler saw powerful arguments against stopping the fighting while the Reich's military advantage was at its height. Nevertheless, he would probably have settled for what he had already conquered—if only to be able to return to his grandiose architectural dreams. Besides, Germany would have needed at least fifty years to digest the new territories and carry out the enforced settlement programs planned by Heinrich Himmler to fortify the German blood in the east. Thus Hitler's peace feelers toward London were sincere—not just a ploy to drive a wedge between Britain and France. Weizsäcker wrote early in October : “The attempt to wind up the war now is for real. I myself put the chances at 20 percent, [Hitler] at 50 percent ; his desire is 100 percent. If he obtained peace, the thesis that Britain would sacrifice Poland would be proven quasi right. And besides, it would eliminate the awkward decision as to how to reduce Britain by military means.” Early in September Göring had hinted to the British through Birger Dahlerus, the Swedish businessman whom Hitler had already accepted as an unofficial intermediary to London during August, that Germany would be willing to restore sovereignty to a Poland shorn of the old German provinces excised from the Fatherland at the end of the Great War ; there would also be an end to the persecution of the Jews and a reduction in German armaments. The British response had been a cautious readiness to listen to the detailed German proposals.

But since these proposals had been made, the Russians, as per their agreement with the Nazis, had seized eastern Poland. Hitler told Göring and Dahlerus in

Berlin late on September 26 that if the British still wanted to salvage anything of Poland, they would have to make haste. They would have to send a negotiator who would take him seriously, and now he could do nothing without consulting his Russian friends. As for the Jewish question, the Germans proposed that it be solved by using the new Poland as a sink into which Europe's Jews should be emptied. Hitler approved the proposal that a secret meeting take place between German and British emissaries—perhaps Göring himself and General Sir Edmund Ironside—in Holland. Dahlerus left for London at once.⁽³⁾

The German army had good reason to keep anxious track of Hitler's peace offensive. Late in September, Halder's deputy had gloomily—and wholly inaccurately—warned that the German army could not launch a frontal assault on the French before 1942. Hitler was aware of the army's reluctance to apply its mind to "Yellow"; this was one reason for his speech of September 27. But even in that speech he had referred to a western assault only as a necessary evil if the French and British failed to see reason. If that happened, then "we must resolve to batter the enemy until he gives in."

The army marshaled what arguments it could against executing "Yellow" now : the tactics which had proved so successful in Poland would not suffice against the well-organized French army ; the foggy weather and short hours of autumn daylight would set the Luftwaffe at a disadvantage ; the army lacked ammunition, stores, and equipment. Brauchitsch enumerated these arguments to Hitler on October 7, and Hitler—already angered by the reluctance of his soldiers to follow him—asked the Commander in Chief to leave his notes behind, an ominous sign that he was not satisfied. Over the next two days he dictated a fifty-eight-page memorandum for the eyes of Keitel and the three commanders in chief alone ; in it he explained just why they must launch "Yellow" at the very earliest opportunity and just why time was working against Germany.

The Führer read this formidable document to his uncomfortable generals on the tenth. We shall return to it at greater length shortly. In it, he insisted that Britain's long-range goal remained unchanged : the disintegration of the powerful German bloc, and the annihilation and dissolution of this new Reich with its eighty million people. The long-range German war aim must therefore be the absolute military defeat of the West (in which the destruction of the

enemy's forces was more important than the gaining of enemy territory). This was the struggle which the German people must now assume. Despite all this, he added, a rapidly achieved peace agreement would still serve German interests—provided that Germany was required to relinquish nothing of her gains.

Hitler ignored none of the various unofficial channels for negotiation with the West now that Poland had been laid low. Over the next few days, however, it became clear that while some circles in Britain—notably in the air ministry—wanted an armistice, there was in the British Cabinet a hard core of opposition to whom all talk of making a deal with Hitler was anathema. Hitler was probably right in identifying the main source of this stubborn anti-German line as Churchill, now First Lord of the Admiralty, and the clique around him. On September 29, Alfred Rosenberg secured Hitler's permission to take up feelers put out through an intermediary in Switzerland by officials of the British air ministry ; but this glimmer of hope was shortly extinguished when the intermediary reported that the forces for peace in that ministry had been pushed to the wall by the more militant forces at Churchill's beck and call. Little more was heard of these diffident approaches from London.

At this stage in Hitler's thought processes there came an ostensible intervention by President Roosevelt that was as abrupt in its approach as it was enigmatic in denouement. At the beginning of October an influential American oil tycoon arrived in Berlin on a peace mission for which he had apparently received a ninety-minute personal briefing from Roosevelt. He was William Rhodes Davis, whose own personal interest lay in preventing any disruption of his oil business with Germany. He had been brought into contact with Roosevelt by John L. Lewis, leader of the CIO, the United States labor federation whose fourteen million members represented a political force no president could afford to ignore. Lewis was originally both anti-Fascist and anti-Communist, but he had, said Davis, been impressed by the significant rise in the living standards of the German worker under National Socialism. Anxious about the effects of a long war on American export markets, Lewis had obliged Roosevelt to entrust this unofficial peace mission to Davis.

In Berlin the oilman met Göring, and a seven-page summary of the discussion of the alleged Roosevelt proposals survives.⁽⁴⁾ It was evidently given wide confidential circulation in Berlin, for sardonic references to Roosevelt's sudden

emergence as an “angel of peace” bent on securing a third term figure in several diaries of the day.

President Roosevelt is prepared to put pressure on the western powers to start peace talks if Germany will provide the stimulus. President Roosevelt asks to be advised of the various points Germany wants to settle, for example, Poland and the colonies. In this connection President Roosevelt also mentioned the question of the purely Czech areas, on which however a settlement need not come into effect until later. This point was touched on by President Roosevelt with regard to public opinion in the United States, as he must placate the Czech voters and the circles sympathizing with them if he is to exercise pressure on Britain to end the war.

Davis assured Göring that Roosevelt’s main strategic concern was to exploit the present situation to destroy Britain’s monopoly of the world markets. “In his conversation with Davis, Roosevelt explained that he was flatly opposed to the British declaration of war. He was not consulted by Britain in advance.” Roosevelt suspected that Britain’s motives were far more dangerous and that they had nothing to do with Poland ; he himself recognized that the real reason for the war lay in the one-sided *Diktat* of Versailles which made it impossible for the German people to acquire a living standard comparable with that of their neighbors in Europe. Roosevelt’s proposal, according to the unpublished summary, was that Hitler be allowed to keep Danzig and all the now Polish provinces taken from Germany by the treaty of Versailles, that all Germany’s former African colonies be restored to her forthwith, and that the rest of the world give Germany financial assistance in establishing a high standard of living.

This was not all. If Daladier and Chamberlain refused to comply, then President Roosevelt would support Germany—Davis reported—in her search for a just, tolerable, and lasting peace : he would supply Germany with goods and war supplies “convoyed to Germany under the protection of the American armed forces” if need be. John L. Lewis had privately promised Davis that if some such agreement could be reached between Germany and the United States his unions would prevent the manufacture of war supplies for Britain and France.

Göring outlined Davis’s message in detail to the Führer immediately after the meeting, and on October 3 the field marshal announced to the American that in

his important speech to the Reichstag on the sixth Hitler would make a number of peace proposals closely embodying the points Davis had brought from Washington. (Hitler's more detailed proposals as described by Göring indeed went so far that their sincerity is open to question.) Göring told Davis : "If in his [Roosevelt's] opinion the suggestions afford a reasonable basis for a peace conference, he will then have the opportunity to bring about this settlement.... You may assure Mr. Roosevelt that if he will undertake this mediation, Germany will agree to an adjustment whereby a new Polish state and an independent Czechoslovak government would come into being. However this information is for him [Roosevelt] alone and to be used only if necessary to bring about a peace conference." Göring was willing to attend such a conference in Washington.

When Davis went back to the United States with the five detailed points Hitler proposed, he was accompanied by a German official, a "special ambassador" appointed to settle any details. Hitler hoped for an interim reply from Roosevelt by the fifth. (As Rosenberg wrote : "It would be a cruel blow for London to be urgently "advised" by Washington to sue for peace!") But something had gone wrong with the mission : when Davis reached Washington he was not readmitted to the President, and they did not meet again.

A different aspect of Roosevelt's policy was revealed by the Polish documents ransacked by the Nazis from the archives of the ruined foreign ministry building in Warsaw. The dispatches of the Polish ambassadors in Washington and Paris laid bare Roosevelt's efforts to goad France and Britain into war with Germany while he rearmed the United States and psychologically prepared the American public for war. In November 1938, William C. Bullitt, his personal friend and ambassador in Paris, had indicated to the Poles that the President's desire was that "Germany and Russia should come to blows," whereupon the democratic nations would attack Germany and force her into submission ; in the spring of 1939, Bullitt quoted Roosevelt as being determined "not to participate in the war from the start, but to be in at the finish"—the United States without doubt would fight, but "only if France and Britain kick off first." Bullitt was said by the Poles to have carried with him to Paris a "suitcase full of instructions" outlining the pressure he was to put on the Quai d'Orsay not to compromise with the totalitarian powers ; at the same time Washington was applying "various exceptionally significant screws" to the British. Washington, Bullitt had told the

Polish diplomats, was being guided not by ideological considerations but solely by the material interests of the United States. The Warsaw documents left little doubt as to what had stiffened Polish resistance to German demands during the August 1939 crisis.

On Friday October 6, Hitler spoke to the Reichstag. His “appeal for peace” was addressed to the British in more truculent and recriminatory language than many of his more moderate followers would have wished. He singled out Churchill—who was then First Lord of the Admiralty—as a representative of the Jewish capitalist and journalistic circles whose sole interest in life lay in the furtherance of arson on an international scale.

On the ninth, he issued to his commanders in chief a formal directive to prepare for “Yellow” with all haste, in the event that “Britain and, under her command, France as well” were not disposed to end the war. His soldiers were, however, full of optimism. General Rommel wrote from Berlin on the seventh : “The reaction of the neutrals [to the Führer’s speech] seems very good. The others will be able to think it over during the weekend. There is not much going on here otherwise. If the war ends soon, I hope I will soon be able to go home. . . .”

Hitler had sent Dahlerus to London for talks with Chamberlain. Late on October 9 the Swede reported to him the conditions Britain was attaching to peace negotiations : in addition to insisting on a new Polish state, Britain wanted all weapons of aggression destroyed forthwith ; and there must be a plebiscite in Germany on certain aspects of her foreign policy. These were hard terms to swallow, for in public Hitler was still claiming that the future of Poland was a matter for Germany and Russia alone to decide, and Britain was blithely ignoring the growing armed strength of the Soviet Union and her expansionist policies. Nevertheless, on the tenth, Dahlerus was instructed to advise London that Hitler would accept these terms on principle. The Swedish negotiator saw Hitler twice that day before he departed for a promised rendezvous with a British emissary at The Hague. He took with him a formal letter from Göring and a list of Hitler’s proposals—which included a new Polish state ; the right for Germany to fortify her new frontier with Russia ; guarantees backed by national plebiscite ; nonaggression pacts between Germany, France, Britain, Italy, and the Soviet Union ; disarmament ; and the return of Germany’s former colonies or suitable substitute territories.⁽⁵⁾ Dahlerus noted to one German officer after

meeting Hitler that “Germany for her part was able to swallow even tough conditions, provided they were put in a palatable form.” He said he was taking with him to Holland more than enough to dispel Britain’s smoldering mistrust of Hitler.

In Holland, however, Dahlerus waited in vain for the promised British emissary. The British foreign office asked him to describe Hitler’s proposals to their local envoy and to remain at The Hague until he heard from London. Berlin optimistically viewed this request as a positive token of British interest and agreed that he should wait there. But Chamberlain’s eagerly awaited speech to the House of Commons the next day, October 12, exploded Hitler’s confident expectation that peace was about to descend on Europe after five weeks of war. Chamberlain dismissed Hitler’s public offer (of the sixth) as “vague and uncertain”—he had made no suggestion for righting the wrongs done to Czechoslovakia and Poland. If Hitler wanted peace, said Chamberlain, “acts—not words alone—must be forthcoming.” That same evening Hitler sent for Göring, Milch, and Udet of the Luftwaffe and instructed them to resume bomb production at the earliest possible moment. “The war will go on !” Dahlerus was asked to return from The Hague to Berlin forthwith. Edouard Daladier’s reply to Hitler was no less abrupt. “Before these answers came,” Weizsäcker wrote two days later, “the Führer himself had indulged in great hopes of seeing his dream of working with Britain fulfilled. He had set his heart on peace. Herr von Ribbentrop seemed less predisposed toward it. He sent the Führer his own word picture of a future Europe like the empire of Charlemagne.”

To the Swedish explorer Sven Hedin a few days later Hitler voiced his puzzlement at Britain’s intransigence. He felt he had repeatedly extended the hand of peace and friendship to the British, and each time they had blacked his eye in reply. “The survival of the British Empire is in Germany’s interests too,” Hitler noted, “because if Britain loses India, we gain nothing thereby.” *Of course* he was going to restore a Polish state—he did not want to gorge himself with Poles ; as for the rest of Chamberlain’s outbursts, he, Hitler, might as well demand that Britain “right the wrongs” done to India, Egypt, and Palestine. Britain could have peace any time she wanted, but they—and that included that “brilliantined moron” Eden and the equally incompetent Churchill—must learn to keep their noses out of Europe.

And in a fit of anger Hitler complained to Dahlerus about “the unbelievable behavior of Mr. Chamberlain”; from now on Germany would fight Britain tooth and nail—he did not propose to bargain with her any longer. Dahlerus left the Chancellery in a huff at the failure of his peace effort, but was later soothed by Göring, who sent an important German decoration around to him that same evening.

To Hitler it was clear there was no alternative but to proceed with the war. The *urgency* of resuming the offensive was what he had most impressed on his supreme commanders in his memorandum of October 9. While German military advantage was now at its very zenith, every month that passed in idleness would see a relative weakening vis-à-vis the enemy ; in Italy, moreover, Mussolini was not getting any younger ; the West might succeed in blackmailing Holland or Belgium into abandoning their neutrality, or in bribing the venal Balkan countries to the same effect ; Russia’s attitude could easily change. And there were other reasons why Germany must strike swiftly and avoid a protracted war : as Britain patched up her military resources and injected fresh units into France, the psychological boost this gave to the French could not be ignored ; conversely it would become progressively more difficult to sustain the German public’s enthusiasm for war or to feed the German war effort with foodstuffs and raw materials as each month passed. Germany’s air superiority was only temporary—the moment the enemy believed *he* had achieved air superiority he would exploit it regardless of any reprisals Hitler might announce. Above all the British and French knew of the vulnerability of the Ruhr industries, and the moment the enemy could base aircraft or even long-range artillery on Belgian and Dutch territory, Germany would have to write off the Ruhr from the war effort ; enemy bombers would have to fly barely a sixth of the distance that German bombers would have to cover to reach important British targets from the small strip of Germany’s North Sea coast. This was why Hitler was convinced that the occupation of Belgium and Holland must be on the western powers’ agenda already, and this was how he justified ordering his army to prepare to attack France through Belgium.

If the coast of western Europe were in Hitler’s hands, the advantages to Germany would be decisive if the war against Britain was to continue : for sound strategic reasons the German navy needed submarine bases west of the English Channel. (On the tenth, Raeder also proposed that Germany obtain

naval bases in Norway for the same reasons.) Similarly the Luftwaffe would have a disproportionate advantage in striking power if its flying distance to British targets involved only the short shuttle route from Holland, Belgium, or even the Pas de Calais in France.

How Britain Pioneered City Bombing

Nicholas Kollerstrom, 2009

The Blitz on London in 1940 came in response to the initiation of city bombing by Britain some months earlier. Few now accept this rudimentary fact, central to Britain's role in initiating World War II. Britons nowadays – or, all of them that I ever talk to – just see the Blitz as proof of Hitler's wickedness and do not acknowledge the cause-and-effect connection. Winston Churchill and the War Department set up a situation where London would be blitzed, without telling the people that Britain had started the process several months earlier. This had the effect of getting Britons into a mood for total war, without the traditional restraints of civilised 'laws' or conventions, restraints which had hitherto established that civilians would not as such be targeted:

‘The exclusion of non-combatants from the scope of hostilities is the fundamental distinction between civilised and barbarous warfare.’ [\[1\]](#)

Britons should take a more responsible attitude, and understand that it was their country and no other which pioneered the bombing of cities in a way that was not mere 'collateral damage' but was the deliberate targeting of working-class homes. Lies are always created by those who wish to wage war and the worst one here ought surely to have become clear to the British people sixty years after the event. But no! One finds today as historian A.J.P. Taylor remarked,

‘ ... the almost universal belief that Hitler started the indiscriminate bombing of civilians, whereas it was started by the directors of British strategy, as some of the more honest among them have boasted.’ [\[2\]](#)

One thing the British people do really, really enjoy is their hate-and-fear enemy image. Britain is one of the most militaristic nations which has ever existed and for its 'moral' well-being it always has to demonise whoever it is making war upon.

I here wish to argue that, if civilised life existed on earth, then the Nuremberg

trials from 1946 onwards would have focussed primarily upon Britain's role in initiating city bombing – town-and-village eradication with over one million tons of bombs dropped on Germany[3] – as well of course as the US nuclear incineration of two Japanese towns, which were a kind of logical development of what Britain had pioneered. Mortality of those two A-bombs was of a far smaller magnitude than what Britain had inflicted upon German cities.

1936: 'Bomber Command' comes into existence, and long-range bomber planes start to be constructed. Its purpose was candidly described by J.M.Spaight of the Air Ministry: 'The whole raison d'être of Bomber Command was to bomb Germany should she be our enemy.' [4] So, those who wanted war started planning for it[5]. Germany and France had nothing resembling these bomber-planes.[6] In 1918, the highly punitive Treaty of Versailles had forbidden war-shattered Germany from ever developing an 'active defence,' alluding to such things as searchlights, flak guns etc.

Hitler repeatedly sought to secure a truce in city bombing, and that in any future conflicts bombing should be confined to the narrow zone of military operation[7]. Existing conventions and laws of war did not specifically allude to air bombardment, and therefore he repeatedly made offers to restrict the conduct of war by 'confining the action of war to the battle zones.'

The war of 1939 was 'less wanted by nearly everybody than almost any other war in history,' wrote A.J.P. Taylor. In September 1939 a state of war had been declared, but not much was happening, because Germany in no way desired war against Britain[8]. On 15th February, 1940, PM Neville Chamberlain in the House of commons affirmed, 'Whatever the length to which others may go, H.M.Government will never resort to deliberate attack on women and children, and other civilians, for the purpose of mere terrorism,' in a reply to Captain Ramsey[9] This reaffirmed his position given on 14th September[10]. City bombing, he emphasised, 'was absolutely contrary to international law'[11]

1940: Churchill ousts Chamberlain as Prime Minister on May 10th, and on May 11th city-bombing begins[12]. On that night, the day after Churchill's election, Bomber Command was first permitted to fulfil the purpose for which it was built. Newspapers merely reported that, that night, 'eighteen Whitley bombers attacked railway installations in Western Germany.' Winston Churchill and his

advisors extended the definition of ‘military objectives’, which had been accepted for two and a half centuries to include factories, oil plants and public buildings – as, would include any town or village. They rendered the definition meaningless.

‘This raid on the night of May 11th, 1940, although in itself trivial, was an epoch-marking event since it was the first deliberate breach of the fundamental rule of civilised warfare that hostilities must only be waged against enemy combatant forces.’[\[13\]](#)

For 12th May, the War Cabinet minutes noted on ‘Bombing Policy,’ that the Prime Minister was ‘no longer bound by our previously-held scruples as to initiating “unrestricted” air warfare’[\[14\]](#).’

On 25 August, 81 bombers made their night raids over Berlin, then on 6th September the Luftwaffe replied. Only after six surprise attacks upon Berlin in the previous fortnight did the Blitz begin, and thus Germany justifiably called it a reprisal. ‘The British people were not permitted to find out that the Government could have stopped the German raids at any time merely by stopping the raids on Germany,’[\[15\]](#) to quote professor Arthur Butz. They still have not found this out. Winston Churchill never gets the credit he deserves for establishing The Blitz. . The German bombs took some one-tenth of the lives of civilians as compared to the British offensive, and Britons do not seem very aware of this ten-to-one ratio[\[16\]](#).

The testimony of J.M. Spaight, who was principal Assistant Secretary to the Ministry of Air during the war, is here crucial. His 1944 book *Bombing Vindicated* proudly defended city-incineration as pioneered by the RAF:

‘Because we were doubtful about the psychological effect of the distortion of the truth that it was we who started the strategic bombing offensive, we have shrunk from giving our great decision of May 11th 1940 the publicity which it deserved. That surely was a mistake. It was a splendid decision.’[\[17\]](#)

He emphasised that Hitler would have been willing at any time to have stopped the slaughter should the Brits agree: ‘Hitler assuredly did not want the mutual bombing to go on. ...Again and again the German official reports applauded the

reprisal element in the actions of the Luftwaffe... 'If you stop bombing us, we'll stop bombing you.'[\[18\]](#)

On 16th December 1940 a moonlight raid by 134 planes took out the defenceless city of Mannheim, focussing on its charming town centre. Flying high enough to be safe from the anti-aircraft flak, the night-time bomber pilot releasing his cargo never hears the mother's scream, nor sees the child's burning flesh. That was the real Holocaust, a word meaning, death by fire. RAF pilots would return home announcing the destruction of assigned 'military' targets. This charade continued until August 1941 when a shocked British Cabinet was shown aerial photographs of the undamaged targets[\[19\]](#). 'Of all the aircraft credited with having bombed their targets only one-third had in fact bombed within five miles of them'.[\[20\]](#)

Air Marshall Arthur Harris took over Bomber Command at High Wycombe on 22nd February 1942, a week after its primary focus had been defined as 'the morale of the civilian population, and in particular industrial workers' by an Air Staff directive. Harris was wont to boast, "I kill thousands of people every night." The Blitz 'failed', on his view, due to the 'short-sightedness of the Luftwaffe chiefs in not providing themselves in peacetime with long-distance bomber planes designed for attacks on an enemy civilian population', as had Britain, an omission which, he declared, 'lost Germany the war.' Thus in September 1940 the Germans found themselves with "almost unarmed bombers."[\[21\]](#) Germany lost the war because it had not planned for city bombing!

In March 1942 Churchill's War Cabinet adopted the 'Lindemann plan'[\[22\]](#), whereby civilian targeting became official. Working-class homes were preferred to upper-class because they were closer together, and so a greater flesh-incineration-per-bomb could be achieved[\[23\]](#). The Jewish German émigré Professor Frederick Lindemann[\[24\]](#), Churchill's friend and scientific advisor had by then become Lord Cherwell. He submitted a plan to the War Cabinet on March 30th urging that German working-class houses be targeted in preference to military objectives, the latter being harder to hit. Middle-class homes had too much space around them, he explained. He was not prosecuted for a ghastly new war-crime, hitherto undreamt-of. Thereby all cities and town over 50,000 inhabitants could be destroyed, or at least brought to ruin. The War Cabinet

realised that no inkling of this must reach the public. [\[25\]](#)

The Lindemann plan swung into action on 28th March 1942 when the old port of Lubeck was attacked by 234 aircraft of Bomber Command. It had no military or industrial importance but was chosen because, as Air Marshall 'bomber' Harris remarked, the city was 'built more like a firelighter than a human habitation.' Its old mediaeval houses and narrow streets and its cathedral were erased, by 'a first class success' of the RAF. On 30 May 1942 a thousand aircraft dropped high explosive and incendiaries on the medieval town of Cologne burning it from end to end. The devastation was total.

Other 'first class-successes' followed, culminating in the incinerations of Hamburg and the beautiful, baroque city of Dresden[\[26\]](#). On July 27, 1943, 'that night when the most densely populated parts of Hamburg became a roaring furnace in which thousands of men, women and children were throwing themselves into the canals in order to escape the frightful heat.'[\[27\]](#) Seven hundred Allied bombers arrived over the city at one o'clock in the morning, and dropped ten thousand tons of high explosives and incendiary bombs on several districts of the city. That night in this one raid alone, more than 45,000 men, women, and children were killed. It was bombed round the clock for four days, American planes by day and British by night. A firestorm of an intensity that no one had ever before thought possible arose. More than a million Germans fled into the surrounding countryside. These were people who had never voted for Hitler, nor had any means of removing him.

Spaight writing in 1944 enthused about how 'today great four-engine bombers are tearing the heart out of industrial Germany' and added, 'Germany had nothing approaching them'[\[28\]](#) France and Germany had not prepared for city-bombing as had Britain. After Spaight's perhaps unduly candid book,

'...it was impossible for anyone, however credulous, to accept the repeated and solemn assertions of His Majesty's Ministers in Parliament that the bombing of Germany was being carried out with strict regard to the dictates of humanity in accordance with the rules of civilised warfare[\[29\]](#)'.

Ministers had been lying through their teeth to Parliament, but this was no

ordinary lie. It was the betrayal of the core principal on which civilised life depends – that civilians and civilian buildings shall not be as such subject to attack. Instead, terror was now coming from the sky, terror beside which the deeds of ordinary killers paled into insignificance. A thousand-year-old urban culture was annihilated, as great cities, famed in the annals of science and art, were reduced to heaps of smouldering ruins.

In the year 1940, British bombers ‘only’ unloaded five thousand tons of bombs onto German cities, whereas by 1944 they were sometimes exceeding that total in a single day. In the spring of ’44 German cities were being pounded with over one hundred thousand tons a month. German civilian deaths from British and American bombing of German cities have been estimated to have been around 600,000, and some 61 cities were turned to virtual rubble, while some 60,000 civilians were killed in the UK. Those cities had an estimated population of 25 million’[\[30\]](#) Germany was thereby reduced to a worse state than that produced by the 30 years’ war. In return the centres of London, Coventry and Portsmouth were attacked by German planes.

While this was going on, it was imperative to stifle public discussion, the Secretary for Air explained, lest public outrage undermined the morale of the bomber pilots.[\[31\]](#) But, despite official denials, anti-war protesters were gleaned some idea of what was happening. Vera Brittain declared in a wartime booklet that Britain’s present policy would ‘appear to future civilisation as an extreme form of criminal lunacy.’[\[32\]](#) Thus, one person managed to find adequate words for Britain’s war-policy.

What was the purpose of city-bombing? Its primary purpose was to goad the German people into reprisals – or, so an official HMSO document of 1953 averred:

If the Royal Air Force raided the Ruhr, destroying oil plants with its most accurately placed bombs and urban property with those that went astray, the outcry for retaliation against Britain might prove too strong for the German generals to resist. Indeed, Hitler himself would probably head the clamour. The attack on the Ruhr, in other words, was an informal invitation to the Luftwaffe to bomb London.’[\[33\]](#)

The purpose was get their war on, which neither the German people nor the British wanted. Germany never wanted war against Britain and Hitler always professed his great admiration for Britain and the British Empire[34]. Germany sought and was refused peace-negotiations in July 1940[35]. The British view ‘surviving the Blitz’ as their finest hour, and have imagined that it was part of a plan to invade and occupy Britain[36]. It would be better to say that the cause of the Blitz lay in the British ardour for war, whereby they set out to generate the conditions that produced it.

After the war, terror-bombing was not a recognised term, it had officially never happened, still less had anyone heard of the Lindemann plan. The truth was suppressed for two decades, even though there was no legal machinery of censorship, and only emerged when it was mere ‘past history,’ in 1961. This posed a serious problem for the ‘trials’ held at Nuremberg: If the most obvious of Hitler’s crimes was his initiation of indiscriminate bombing in the Blitz, why was there no mention of this at Nuremberg? The truth, that this was a mere tiny fraction of what had been visited on Germany[37], and only came months later as a legitimate ‘reprisal,’ clearly could not be told to the British people[38].

Not until 1961 did C.P.Snow[39] reveal in his Harvard Lectures on Science and Government the existence of the Lindemann plan, and that it was ‘put into action with every effort the country could make:’ C.P.Snow’s explanation, about a diabolical plan which concentrated on working-class homes, ‘caused a sensation throughout the civilised world’[40], becoming immediately translated into every language on earth. Later that year, the official account of how the UK had developed terror-bombing in accord with the Lindemann plan[41] revealed the shocking death total of 60,000 RAF lives so lost. These disclosures induced widespread horror.[42]

In 1961 Labour MP Richard Crossman remarked upon the ‘screen of lies’ behind which the ‘terror bombing was carried out’ such that the War cabinet ‘felt it necessary to repudiate publicly’ the policy of their order to bomb[43]. Ministers had proclaimed with absolute mendacity ‘We were not bombing women and children wantonly for the sake of so doing’ (Under-Secretary of Air), when that is precisely what they were doing – hundreds of thousands of women and children.

Blitzkrieg

‘The stock apology then put forward was that it [British policy] was only a reprisal for the German bombing of Warsaw and Rotterdam. Mr Spaight dismisses this argument with the contempt it reserves. “When Warsaw and Rotterdam were bombed,” he points out, “German armies were at the gates. The air bombardment was an operation of the tactical offensive.”^[44] Captain Liddell Hart accepts the same view. “Bombing did not take place, he writes, until the German troops were fighting their way into these cities and thus conformed to the old rules of siege bombardment.”^[45] ‘Bombardment’ was not illegal under the terms of Article 25 of the 1907 Hague convention. Nine hundred died with the tragically mistaken air raid on Rotterdam^[46]. Citizens of Warsaw were given time to evacuate their city before any general bombardment^[47]. To quote Dr Wesserle, who was in Prague when the US and UK bombed it,

“There can be no comparison between the brutality of the Anglo-American bomber offensive, on one hand, and the minimality of the German-Italian efforts, on the other.”^[48]

Law

The Hague Convention of 1923 (Articles 22, 23) proposed to outlaw indiscriminate urban bombing ('aerial bombardment for the purpose of terrorising the civilian population') but alas, the five organising powers (Britain, France, Italy, Japan and the US) never signed it^[49]. Britain's Prime Minister affirmed to the House of Commons in 1938 that any such bombing would be an "undoubted violation of international law," then a resolution passed by the League of Nations in September 1938, 'The intentional bombing of civilian populations is illegal' had been proposed by the British government and passed without dissent – who could object to such a self-evident truth? '...we have no intention of attacking the civil population as such' said the British representative during an Anglo-French staff conversation on August 14, 1939, just before war broke out. Shortly after, the League of Nations unanimously passed a resolution affirming that such bombing was illegal. And yet, by 1943 Britain with America signed the Treaty of Casablanca, which encouraged the stepping up of city bombing – 'morale bombing' as it was called.

The dilemma, the schizophrenia, the failure of Nuremberg is summarised by three dates, dates engraved rather unforgettably in the memory of mankind: August 6th, August 8th and the 9th, 1945. The Nuremberg Charter, defining norms of international law relevant to warfare ('planning and preparing a war of aggression'), was signed as the London Agreement on August 8th, 1945. They blow up one city, they blow up another city, and in between they sign the Nuremberg Charter!

American Century?

In a radio broadcast of 1st September 1939, two days before war broke out, Roosevelt called upon the European powers to make a promise, that 'armed forces shall in no event, and under no circumstances, undertake the bombardment from the air of civilian populations or of undefended cities'[\[50\]](#). Alas the Americans were unable to take their own advice: the fire-bombing of Japan of March 9-10, 1944 killed near 100,000 Japanese civilians, more than died the next year at Hiroshima. In the war overall, the bombing of Japanese cities might have killed about 337,000.[\[51\]](#)

When, after the war, Churchill suggested to Stalin that they find 'some unshattered town in Germany' at which to meet, for the Potsdam conference in July 1945, that was not easy. Then, rather swiftly in March, 1946, Churchill discerned a newly-looming threat, at his Iron Curtain speech at Fulton, Missouri, and this he affirmed warranted the stockpiling of America's newly-developed nuclear weapons[\[52\]](#).

One might have thought that the British War Ministry would have felt some shame over initiating the most frightful crime in the annals of recorded history, but apparently not: in 1946 a report on 'Future Developments in weapons and Methods of Warfare' was handed to the British Chiefs of Staff. 'The most profitable objects of attack by the new weapons will normally be concentrations of population' it recommended, including a blueprint of 58 large Soviet cities having populations of over 100,000. Henceforth it was to be a normal, bureaucratic activity to discuss and refine methods of city-extermination. In the next year, 1947, the first US Strategic Air Command forces came to Britain. Thus Britain contributed to the encirclement of Russia with nuclear bombers when the latter was still a smouldering wreck from WWII, having suffered a mortality of somewhere around twenty million, years before Russia was in a position to threaten anyone in return.

Of the Korean war 1950-53, the former U.S. Air Force Chief of Staff Curtis LeMay recalled that he asked if the Pentagon would let him 'burn down' five of the biggest cities in North Korea, claiming that it could be done in a few days. 'Its too horrible,' he was told. 'Yet over a period of three years or so...we burned down every town in North Korea.' [\[53\]](#) Three million Koreans died, to protect

the world against an alleged 'Yellow peril.'[\[54\]](#) Thus did the legacy of British city-bombing pass over to America.

Postscript

In 1919-1920, the British developed the technique of bombing towns and villages, bombing Kabul, Afghanistan, and rebellious tribal groups along the border areas of India. And in the 1920s, the British intentionally bombed rebel villages in Somalia and Yemen and undertook an extended bombardment campaign against civilian populations in rebel areas in British-controlled Iraq for several years. The death toll from Germans bombing Guernica in 1937 was, according to David Irving, around ninety-eight.[\[55\]](#)

Examining Stalin's 1941 Plan to Attack Germany

A book review by [Daniel W. Michaels](#), 2001

Unternehmen Barbarossa und der russische Historikerstreit (“Operation Barbarossa and the Russian Historians’ Dispute”), by Wolfgang Strauss. Munich: Herbig, 1998. Hardcover. 199 pages. Illustrations. Source references. Bibliography. Index.

No two peoples suffered more during the Second World War than the Russians and the Germans. In the carnage of that great global conflict, nothing matched the massive destruction of life and property wrought on the Eastern front by Russian and German forces fanatically driven by irreconcilable ideologies.

Now, more than 50 years after the end of the “clash of the titans,” free Russian and German historians are collaborating to ascertain the historical decisions and actions that led to that bloodiest of all conflicts. Wolfgang Strauss, a respected German Slavist and political analyst, explains this clarifying historical process in “Operation Barbarossa and the Russian Historians’ Dispute,” his most recent work.[\[1\]](#) He examines here the research of revisionist scholars in Russia and Germany on Stalin’s role in igniting the German-Russian conflict and his efforts to expand the Soviet empire across Europe. Perhaps most importantly, he also shows how a shared understanding of the war is contributing to reconciliation between these two great European peoples.

Strauss affirms the view of German historian Ernst Nolte that Hitler’s militant anti-Communism was an understandable reaction to the looming Soviet threat to Europe and humanity. Put another way, the militancy of the “fascist” movements that arose in Germany, Spain, Italy and other European countries in the 1920s and 1930s was, in essence, a response to the undisguised Bolshevik goal of dominating Europe.[\[2\]](#) This view, Strauss contends, has now largely been embraced by Russian revisionists and the French historian François Furet.[\[3\]](#) It

is basically irrelevant whether one regards the war that broke out in June 1941 between Germany and Soviet Russia as a war of aggression, a preventive war or a counterattack. For each side, Nolte and others contend, this was a life or death struggle to decide which world view and way of life would prevail in Europe – atheistic, internationalist Communism or the bourgeois Christian civilization of the West.

The Black Book

In no way does Strauss dismiss or whitewash Hitler's brutal excesses. He also holds that Hitler's racist concept of the inferiority of the Slavic peoples and his attempt to colonize their lands was not only wrong but doomed his military campaign, and ultimately the Third Reich, to failure. At the same time, Strauss stresses the monumental brutality of Soviet and international Communism. In this regard he cites *The Black Book of Communism: Crimes, Terror and Repression*, a recent 860-page work by French scholar Stéphane Courtois and others.[\[4\]](#)

As Courtois stresses, many American and European scholars have upheld a morally peculiar view of history that fervently condemns National Socialist Germany while maintaining a meretriciously non-judgmental "objectivity" toward Soviet Russia. But there is no hierarchy of death and suffering. As Courtois writes: "The death of a Ukrainian peasant child, deliberately exposed to starvation by the Stalinist regime, is just as important as the starvation of a child in the Warsaw Ghetto."

As Strauss relates, Courtois finds that 1) some 100 million human beings lost their lives as a result of Communist policies in the Soviet Union, Red China and other Communist states 2) The Communists made mass criminality an integral part of their governmental system; 3) Terror was part of the Soviet regime from the outset, beginning with Lenin; 4) Class and ethnic genocide, begun by Lenin and systematized by Stalin, preceded Hitler's dictatorship by years; 5) Stalin was unquestionably a greater criminal than Hitler; and 6) Stalin's joint, if not primary, responsibility for the outbreak of Russo-German War is undeniable.[\[5\]](#)

It is often forgotten that the Russian people were the first victims of Communism. Citing evidence from British, Russian and other sources, Strauss shows that those who imposed Communist despotism on the Russians were primarily non-Russian and non-Christian aliens – above all, Jews.[\[6\]](#) Their goal was nothing short of eradicating Christianity and European civilization, at whatever the human cost. Many Russians place the primary responsibility for the crimes of Communism, particularly in the first ten years of Soviet rule, on the Bolshevik party's non-Russian elements. For example, Strauss notes, the Russian press has referred to the execution of Tsar Nicholas II and his entire family as a "Jewish ritualistic murder."[\[7\]](#) In a similar context, Strauss cites from

Solzhenitsyn the names of the ruthless Soviet secret police (NKVD) chiefs – all of them Jews – who put tens of thousands of slave laborers to death under appallingly inhumane conditions in building the White Sea Canal.[\[8\]](#)

One should not, however, get the impression that Slavs were the exclusive victims of Stalin's terror, or that the murderers were all non-Russians.[\[9\]](#) During the Great Purge of 1937-39, Strauss points out, Stalin executed many Jews who had played a prominent role in the early Soviet regime. In 1940 Stalin succeeded in killing his greatest rival, Lev Trotsky (Bronstein), who had once been the second most powerful figure in the Soviet state. And when Stalin installed the Russian Nikolai Yezhov as head of the NKVD, replacing the Jewish Genrikh Yagoda, thousands of Yagoda's followers and their families, mostly Jews, were murdered or committed suicide.

Pioneering Russian Revisionists

One of the earliest Russian revisionists of World War II history was Pyotr Grigorenko, a Soviet Army Major General and highly decorated war veteran who taught at the Frunze Military Academy. Already in the early 1960s, during the Khrushchev era, he was a “dissident,” publicly supporting civil rights for oppressed ethnic minorities. (Authorities committed him to a mental asylum.) In 1967, Strauss relates, he was the first leading Soviet figure to advance the revisionist arguments, which became well known during the 1980s and 1990s, on Stalin’s preparations for aggressive war against Germany. In an article submitted to a major Soviet journal (but rejected, and later published abroad), Grigorenko pointed out that Soviet military forces vastly outnumbered German forces in 1941. Just prior to the German attack on June 22, 1941, more than half of the Soviet forces were in the area near and west of Bialystok, that is, in an area deep in Polish occupied territory. “This deployment could only be justified” wrote Grigorenko, “if these troops were deploying for a surprise offensive. In the event of an enemy attack these troops would soon be encircled.”[\[10\]](#)

The best known Russian historian to advance revisionist arguments on Stalin’s preparations for a first-strike against Germany has been Viktor Suvorov (pen name of Vladimir Rezun). Strauss recapitulates his main arguments (which have been treated in detail in the pages of this *Journal*).[\[11\]](#)

Strauss examines three significant speeches by Stalin (which have also been dealt with by Suvorov, as well as in the pages of this *Journal*):[\[12\]](#) 1. In his address of August 19, 1939, shortly before the outbreak of war, Stalin explained why a temporary alliance with Germany was more beneficial to Soviet interests than an alliance with Britain and France. 2. In his speech of May 5, 1941, Stalin explained to graduate officers of military academies that the impending war would be fought offensively by Soviet forces, and that it would nonetheless be a just war because it would advance world socialism. 3. In the speech of November 6, 1941, some four months after the outbreak of the “Barbarossa” campaign, Stalin stressed the importance of killing Germans. (This speech helped to “inspire” the Soviet Jewish writer Ilya Ehrenburg to make his notorious contribution to the war effort in the form of murderously anti-German propaganda.)

Recent Russian Revisionist Historiography

A radical revision of World War II history, Strauss contends, became possible only after the collapse of the multinational Soviet Union (1991), when some 14 million previously classified documents dealing with all aspects of Soviet rule were finally open to free examination. This book's greatest contribution may well be to highlight for non-Russians the research of Russian revisionists. Strauss is very familiar with this important work, which has been all but entirely ignored in the United States. The most important publications cited by Strauss in this regard are two Russian anthologies, both issued in 1995: "Did Stalin Make Preparations for an Offensive War Against Hitler?" and "September 1, 1939-May 9, 1945: 50th Anniversary of the Defeat of Fascist Germany."[\[13\]](#) The first of these contains articles by revisionist scholars as well as by critics of revisionism. (The "Russian historians' dispute" referred to in the subtitle of Strauss' book echoes the "German historians' dispute" of the 1980s, in which Ernst Nolte played a major role.)

As Strauss notes, the most prominent critic of the revisionist view of Suvorov and others has been Israeli historian Gabriel Gorodetsky, who teaches at Tel Aviv University. (Strauss suggests that he is a long-time apologist for Stalin.) Gorodetsky is the author of a 1995 Russian-language anti-Suvorov work, "The 'Icebreaker' Myth," and a detailed 1999 study, *Grand Illusion: Stalin and the German Invasion of Russia*.

In his discussion of "Did Stalin Make Preparations for an Offensive War Against Hitler," Strauss writes (pages 42-44):

Even though revisionists as well as the critics of revisionism have their say in this book, the end result is the same. The anti-Fascist attempts to justify and legitimize Stalin's war policy from 1939 do not hold up. The view that the Second World War was "a crime attributable solely to National Socialist Germany" can no longer be sustained. The historical truth as seen by Russian revisionists is documented in this collection of articles published by Bordyugov and Nevezhin as well as by the renowned war historian Mikhail Melitiukhov, academic associate of the All-Russian Research Institute for Documentation and Archives.

This most recent compendium of Russian revisionist writings deepens our

understanding of Stalin's preparations for a military first-strike against Germany in the summer of 1941. The strategic deployment plan, approved by Stalin at a conference on May 15, 1941, with General Staff chief Georgi Zhukov and Defense Commissar Semen Timoshenko, called for a Blitzkrieg:

Tank divisions and mechanized corps were to launch their attack from the Brest and Lviv [Lemberg] tier accompanied by destructive air strikes. The objective was to conquer East Prussia, Poland, Silesia and the [Czech] Protectorate, and thereby cut Germany off from the Balkans and the Romanian oil fields. Lublin, Warsaw, Kattowice, Cracow, Breslau [Wroclaw] and Prague were targets to be attacked.

A second attack thrust was to be directed at Romania, with the capture of Bucharest. The successful accomplishment of the immediate aims, namely, to destroy the mass of the German Army east of the Vistula, Narev and Oder rivers, was the necessary prerequisite for the fulfillment of the main objective, which was to defeat Germany in a quick campaign. The main contingents of the German armed forces were to be encircled and destroyed by tank armies in bold rapid advances.

Three recurrent terms in the mobilization plan of May 15 confirm the aggressive character of Stalin's plan. "A sudden strike" (vnyyzapni udar), "forward deployment" (razvertyvaniye), and "offensive war" (nastupatel'naya voyna). Of the 303 [Soviet] divisions assembled on the western front, 172 were assigned to the first wave of attack. One month was allotted for the total deployment – the period from June 15 to July 15. Mikhail Melitiukhov: "On this basis it appears that the war against Germany would have to have begun in July."

This anthology also devotes much attention to analyzing Stalin's speech of May 5, 1941, delivered to graduates of Soviet military academies. In this speech Stalin justified his change of foreign policy in connection with the now decided-upon attack against Germany. From the Communist point of view even a Soviet war of aggression is a "just war" because it serves to expand the "territory of the socialist world" and "to destroy the capitalist world." Most important in this May 5 speech was Stalin's efforts to dispel the "myth of the invincible Wehrmacht." The Red Army was strong enough to smash any enemy, even the

“seemingly invincible Wehrmacht.”

Strauss lists (pages 102-105) the major findings and conclusions of Russian revisionists, derived mostly from the two major works cited above:

- Stalin wanted a general European war of exhaustion in which the USSR would intervene at the politically and militarily most expedient moment. Stalin’s main intention is seen in his speech to the Politburo of August 19, 1939.
- To ignite this, Stalin used the [August 1939] Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact, which: a) provoked Hitler’s attack against Poland, and b) evoked the declarations of war [against Germany] by Britain and France.
- In the event Germany was defeated quickly [by Britain and France], Stalin planned to “Sovietize” Germany and establish a “Communist government” there, but with the danger that the victorious capitalist powers would never permit a Communist Germany.
- In the event France was defeated quickly [by Germany], Stalin planned the “Sovietization” of France. “A Communist revolution would seem inevitable, and we could take advantage of this for our own purposes by rushing to aid France and making her our ally. As a result of this, all the nations under the ‘protection’ of a victorious Germany would become our allies.”
- From the outset Stalin reckoned on a war with Germany, and the [Soviet] conquest of Germany. To this end, Stalin concentrated on the western border of the USSR operational offensive forces, which were five- to six-times stronger than the Wehrmacht with respect to tanks, aircraft and artillery.
- With respect to a war of aggression, on May 15, 1941, the Red Army’s Main Political Directorate instructed troop commanders that every war the USSR engaged in, whether defensive or offensive, would have the character of a “just war.”
- Troop contingents were to be brought up to full strength in all the western

military districts; airfields and supply bases to support a forward-strategy were to be built directly behind the border; an attack force of 60 divisions was to be set up in the Ukraine and mountain divisions and a parachute corps were to be established for attack operations.

- The 16th, 19th, 21st, 22nd and 25th Soviet Armies were transferred from the interior to the western border, and deployed at take-off points for the planned offensive.
- In his speech of May 5, 1941, to graduate officers of the academies, Stalin said that war with Germany was inevitable, and characterized it as a war not only of a defensive nature but rather of an offensive nature.
- Stalin intended to attack in July 1941, although Russian historians disagree about the precise date. Suvorov cites July 6, [Valeri] Danilov [a retired Soviet Colonel] gives July 2, while Melitiukhov writes: “The Red Army could not have carried out an attack before July 15.”

Hitler's Proclamation

In an appendix of documents, Strauss includes portions of Hitler's "Operation Barbarossa" directive of December 18, 1940. Also here, in facsimile, is a German press announcement of June 22, 1941, that gives Hitler's reasons for Germany's attack against the Soviet Union:

This morning the Führer, through Reich Minister Dr. Goebbels, issued a proclamation to the German people in which he explains that after months-long silence he can finally speak openly to the German people about the dangerous machinations of the Jewish-Bolshevik rulers in Soviet Russia. After the German-Russian Friendship Treaty in the Autumn of 1939, he hoped for an easing of tensions with Russia. This hope, however, was crushed by Soviet Russia's extortionist demands against both Finland and the Baltic states as well as against Romania.

After the victory in Poland the Western powers rejected the Führer's proposal for an understanding because they were hoping that Soviet Russia would attack Germany. Since the Spring of 1940 Soviet troops have been deploying in ever increasing numbers along the German border, so that since August 1940 strong German forces have been tied down in the East, making any major German effort in the West impossible.

During his [November 1940] visit to Berlin, [Soviet foreign minister] Molotov posed questions regarding Romania, Finland, Bulgaria and the Dardanelles that clearly revealed that Soviet Russia intended to create trouble in eastern Europe. To be sure, the Bolshevik coup attempt against the [Romanian] government of Antonescu failed, but, with the help of the Anglo-Saxon powers [Britain and the United States], their putsch in Yugoslavia succeeded. Serbian air force officers flew to Russia and were immediately incorporated in the Army there.

With these machinations Moscow has not just broken the so-called German-Russian Friendship Treaty, it has betrayed it. In his proclamation the Führer stressed that further silence on his part would be a crime not only against Germany, but against Europe as well. On the border now stand 160 Russian divisions,[\[14\]](#) which have repeatedly violated that

frontier. On June 17-18 Soviet patrols were forced back across the border only after a lengthy exchange of fire. Meanwhile, to protect Europe and defend against further Russian provocations, the greatest build-up of forces ever has been assembled against Soviet Russia. German troops stand from the Arctic Ocean to the Black Sea, allied in the north with Finnish troops and along the Bessarabian border with Romanian forces.

The Führer concluded his proclamation with the following sentences: “I have therefore decided to once again lay the fate and the future of the German Reich and of our people in the hands of our soldiers. May the Lord God help us especially in this struggle!”

Coming to Terms With the Past

Even though more and more independent Russian, German and other European historians support the revisionist arguments of Suvorov (and others), it still seems impossible, especially in Germany, to reapportion historical responsibility from Hitler to Stalin. In this regard, Strauss recalls (pages 45-46) a discussion in May 1993 at the Military History Research Office in Freiburg involving German historian Dr. Joachim Hoffmann, decades-long associate of the Research Office, and Russian historian Viktor Suvorov. Hoffman told of conversations on the “preventive war” issue he has had with prominent Germans, including President Richard von Weizsäcker, the influential journalist Marion Gräfin Dönhoff, and political figures Egon Bahr and Heinrich Graf von Einsiedel. In every case he was told that even if Suvorov is correct, and Hitler’s attack indeed preceded Stalin’s by weeks, this must not be acknowledged publicly because it would exonerate Hitler. This is typical, says Hoffmann, of the immoral attitude that prevails in Germany. In their egotism, he adds, these Germans do not realize that they are, in effect, demanding that Russians accept the propaganda lies of the Stalin era.

Strauss contrasts the very different attitudes of Germans and Russians toward 20th century history, and the role of historical revisionism. Whereas Germans are imbued with a national masochistic guilt complex about their collectively “evil” past, which was instilled during the postwar occupation as part of Allied “reeducation” campaign, and reinforced ever since in their media and by “their” political leaders, Russians are much more free and open about their Communist past, largely because they have not been occupied by foreign conquerors, and their media and educational system has not come under the control of outsiders. [15] Although die-hard Communists try to uphold the historiography of the Soviet era, most Russians want to know the truth about their past. After all, Strauss points out, one out of every two Russian families suffered under the Stalinist tyranny. For the time being, anyway, nothing is taboo in Russia, including the role of Jews in the Communist movement. (By contrast, Germans are forbidden by law to say anything derogatory about the political activities of Jews in the first half of the 20th century.)

The term “genocide” is used to refer particularly to the World War II treatment of Europe’s Jews. Without in any way minimizing the sufferings of innocent

Jews caught up in that maelstrom, one should not forget that Stalin's Soviet regime inflicted a much more ruthless and widespread genocide against the Russian and Ukrainian peoples. It is estimated that in the Soviet Union about 20 million people, the vast majority of them Slavs, lost their lives as a result of Soviet policies, either executed or otherwise perished in the Gulag prison network or as victims of imposed famine, and so forth. Millions of Germans were also victims of genocide. It is estimated that some four million Germans were killed or otherwise perished during the 1944-1948 period, victims of Allied-imposed "ethnic cleansing," starvation, slave labor in the USSR, and in inhumane POW camps administered by the victorious Allies.[\[16\]](#)

In promoting greater understanding of the calamitous German-Russian clash of 1941-1945, German and Russian revisionist scholars foster reconciliation between these two peoples. Strauss cites recent developments that attest to this process. In Volgograd, victors and vanquished have joined to erect a monument dedicated to all the victims of the Battle of Stalingrad. Its inscription, written in Russian and German, reads: "This monument commemorates the suffering of the soldiers and civilians who fell here. We ask that those who died here and in captivity will rest in eternal peace in Russian soil." On the outskirts of St. Petersburg a German soldiers' cemetery and memorial was recently dedicated. Across Russia today, it is not unusual for Russian women to tend the graves of German soldiers. (Because the Soviet government did very little to help identify and provide decent burials for their war dead, few Russian women have had any idea where their own sons, brothers, and husbands fell.)

In the book's epilogue, Strauss describes the fervent indignation and rage of Russians over the criminal capitalism that has taken hold in their country. The inequities between the nouveau riches and the mass of Russian working class people are now greater than under Soviet rule. Many Russian revisionists see an intrinsic resemblance and affinity between capitalism and Communism. Given that many former Soviet officials still hold office or otherwise wield power in the "new Russia," everyone readily sees how easy it has been for members of the old Soviet elite – the Nomenklatura – to reemerge in Russia's predatory capitalism as racketeers, gangsters, money speculators, bank frauders, extortionists and mafiosi. On the ruins of the Soviet system, writes Strauss, has emerged a new dictatorship of pitilessness, corruption, criminality, social division, poverty and despair. Resentment against the "reformist" policies

advocated by the United States is widespread.

In this regard Strauss cites the views of Spanish writer Juan Goytisolo, who asserts that if this social pathology endures in Russia, then Karl Marx's analysis will be proven correct, at least in part. While Marx was wrong about the promised virtues of Communism, writes Goytisolo, events seem to confirm his critique of capitalism, especially of unrestrained monetarism that knows only one value, namely, maximum profits regardless of human cost.[\[17\]](#)

‘Strong and Free’

Whether they call themselves “Reformers” (Westernizers), Communists or nationalists (“Eurasians”), Russians today, writes Strauss, overwhelmingly reject all forms of internationalism, whether Communist or capitalist. They want a Russia that is strong and free.

Toward this goal, many look to geopolitics, an outlook built on the Eurasian “heartland” theory expounded by 20th-century British geographer Halford Mackinder and promoted in Third Reich Germany by Karl Haushofer. (According to this theory, Russia has the potential for great power and prosperity because it is the core of the vast, resource-rich Eurasian heartland.) The leading exponent in Russia today of this view is Alexander Dugin, whose book, “The Basics of Geopolitics: Russia’s Geopolitical Future,” has been influential with both old Communists and new nationalists in a grouping sometimes referred to as the “national Bolshevik alliance,” and whose adherents are known as “Eurasianists.” Dugin is a close associate of Gennady Zyuganov, head of the country’s largest political party, the Russian Communist Party (which, in spite of its name, is much more nationalist than Marxist). Zyuganov himself is the author of a recent book, “The Geography of Victory: The Bases of Russian Geopolitics.”

Russia’s parliament, the Duma, has established a Committee of Geopolitical Affairs, chaired by Alexey Mitrofanov, a member of Vladimir Zhirinovksy’s Liberal Democratic Party. (Zhirinovksy proposes the formation of a Berlin-Moscow-Tokyo axis, and has been quoted as saying: “Today, the United States of America is the major enemy of our country. All our actions and dealings with America from now on should be undertaken with this in mind.”)

Revising the Twentieth Century's 'Perfect Storm': Russian and German Historians Debate Barbarossa and Its Aftermath

Book reviews by Daniel Michaels, 2001

- *Grand Delusion: Stalin and the German Invasion of Russia*, by Gabriel Gorodetsky. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999. 408 pages.
- *Samoubiystvo (Suicide)*, by Viktor Suvorov. Moscow: AST, 2000. 380 pages. Illustrations.
- *Upushchenny shans Stalina (Stalin's Lost Opportunity)*, by Mikhail Meltiukhov. Moscow: Veche, 2000. 605 pages. Illustrations, maps.
- *Stalin's War of Extermination, 1941-45: Planning, Realization, and Documentation*, by Joachim Hoffmann. Capshaw, Ala.: Theses and Dissertations Press, 2001. 415 pages. Illustrations.

Revising the history of the Second World War's crucial Russo-German campaign is very much a work in progress, nowhere more so than in Russia and Germany. Ever since Viktor Suvorov (Vladimir Rezun) broke the ice a decade ago with his sensational *Ledokol* (published in English as *Icebreaker* [reviewed in the *Journal of Historical Review*, (Nov.-Dec. 1997)]), Russian historians have been reexamining the many myths, legends, and fantasies associated with the outbreak of the death duel between Communism and National Socialism. The role of Joseph Stalin, in particular, has aroused the most heated controversy.

In Russia, the debate has involved two major groups. The first asserts that the Soviet Union had no aggressive designs against Germany or Europe and was

unprepared for war, while the second maintains that Stalin and the Red Army indeed had plans for a surprise attack against Germany and Europe, but were beaten to the punch by Hitler.

Contending Factions

To the first group have belonged such notables as the late Marshal Georgi Zhukov, journalist Lev Bezymenski (also professor at the Academy of Military Sciences), General M. A. Gareyev, V. A. Anfilov, and Yu. A. Gorkov. This group, in general, also contends that Stalin had decapitated the Red Army by purging many high-ranking officers just before the war; that he was too trusting of Hitler, wrongly believing that the Führer would never deliberately initiate a two-front war; and that Stalin was the cause of Communism's failure. These views are shared by many, regardless of political leanings.

An Israeli, Gabriel Gorodetsky, much ballyhooed in the English-speaking world, also fits in this company. Gorodetsky is a colleague of Lev Bezymenski, as he was of the late General Dmitri Volkogonov. Gorodetsky, Suvorov contends, has been granted unparalleled access to selected archives of the Russian Foreign Ministry, the General Staff, the NKVD, the GRU, and other records usually closed to researchers, above all revisionists, who might probe too deeply. For this reason Suvorov suspects Gorodetsky of being a conduit for information that the Russian government chooses to have disseminated.

To the second group belong military historians such as Viktor Suvorov, Mikhail Meltiukhov, V. A. Nevezhin, V. D. Danilov, and Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, as well as several Germans (Joachim Hoffmann, Wolfgang Strauss, Fritz Becker) and Austrians (Heinz Magenheimer, Ernst Topitsch). (See review of Topitsch's *Stalin's War* in JHR, [Summer 1988]). They argue that Stalin trusted no one, least of all Hitler; that Stalin had, together with Marshal Zhukov, devised his own plan for a surprise offensive against Germany, with the ultimate goal of establishing Communism in Europe; and that it was the USSR, not Germany, which was better prepared for war. Suvorov has also argued that Stalin's purges actually improved the Red Army, by ridding it of the heavy-handed political commissars, most of whom were Trotskyite thugs despised by the people. As is well known, many of Trotsky's followers were his fellow Jews, often foreign born rather than native to Russia.

The American historians Richard Raack and R. H. S. Stolfi (see review in JHR [Nov.-Dec. 1995]) have joined the debate, lending it a worldwide dimension. Professor Raack in particular has reinforced the arguments of the Suvorov group,

writing that "in fact the discussion is now international ... the genie of truth is out of the bottle."

The first group has been taxed with harboring Stalinist apologists for the old Soviet Establishment, the second of seeking to justify Hitler's German invasion. Polemics aside, the historiographical roots of the division are manifest in the reliance of the first group on the Soviet political literature to substantiate its arguments, as opposed to the second group's reliance on historical analysis based on military science, studying and comparing troop deployments, weapons systems, and so on.

In the past few years, several major books have appeared from representatives of both sides of the dispute. Gorodetsky, supported in his research by many former Soviet Jews now residing in Israel, has recently published *Grand Delusion*. Widely circulated in the West, it has won the acclaim of most of its Anglo-American reviewers. The irrepressible Suvorov, who resides in England, has published his fourth major book on the war, entitled *Samoubiystvo* ("Suicide"), dealing with events immediately preceding the outbreak of hostilities, while Meltiukhov, currently associated with the All-Russian Scientific Research Institute of Documentation and Archival Science, has just published *Upushchenny shans Stalina* ("Stalin's Lost Opportunity"). Regrettably, with the exception of *Icebreaker*, none of Suvorov's and Meltiukhov's works are currently available in English, and they have only rarely been reviewed or evaluated in the English-speaking world. Finally, an excellent translation of *Stalin's War of Extermination*, by Joachim Hoffmann, historian at Germany's Military History Research Office (MGFA), has now been made available to English speakers. This book has gone through several editions in Germany, and is widely read there.

Suvorov's works enjoy the greatest sales and circulation of serious Russian literature on the war. At first his opponents (almost all professional historians) tried to ignore him. Later, when compelled to recognize his work, they attempted to dismiss his theses as the product of a fantasist who had had no access to official documents whatsoever. Yet, working solely from Soviet open source literature on the war, Suvorov deduced the Soviet plan to invade Germany, predicting that in time official documents would be found to substantiate his conclusions. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, such documents have surfaced with increasing

frequency, and in recent years Suvorov has found a perfect partner in Meltiukhov, who, with his experience in documentation and archival science and his easier access to Soviet-era records, has provided documentation for Suvorov's theses.

Plan of Attack

The Zhukov Plan of May 15, 1941, discussed briefly in these pages last year (see JHR [Nov.-Dec. 2000]), continues to be the focus of analysis and discussion. Recently, on the fifty-ninth anniversary of the German attack, Vladimir Sergeyev described and published excerpts from the Zhukov document, which was discovered in the Archives of the President of the Russian Federation some years ago. For ultimate security, the original twelve-page text had been handwritten by then Major General, later Marshal, A. M. Vasilevski, and addressed to the chairman of the USSR Council of Peoples Commissars, Joseph Stalin. The document, marked "Top Secret! Of Great Importance! Stalin's Eyes Only! One Copy Only!," was authorized and approved by People's Defense Minister S. K. Timoshenko and Zhukov, then chief of the Red Army general staff.

A key passage in the war plan not previously cited in these pages reads:

In order to prevent a surprise German attack and to destroy the German Army, I consider it essential that under no circumstances should the initiative for freedom of action be given to the German High Command[. I consider it essential] to preempt enemy deployment, to attack the German Army when it is still in the stage of deployment and has not yet had time to organize his front and the interaction between his service arms.[The word for "preempt" was underlined twice in the original document. -- D. M.]

Thus did Zhukov propose to Stalin precisely what the German Army would do to his forces a month later.

The Suvorov school and certain German military analysts speculate that Stalin's failure to attack before the German onslaught of June 22, 1941, was probably because his own forces had not yet fully deployed for the offensive. Sergeyev, on the other hand, suggests that the attack plan prepared by Zhukov was faulty.

Upon his return from the successful blitzkrieg operation he had orchestrated in the battle of Khalkin-Gol in Mongolia (August 1939), Marshal Zhukov was put in charge of the Kiev Special Military District, where he commanded the Soviet Southwestern and Western fronts. His plan of May 15, 1941, assigned these

fronts the task of destroying the Wehrmacht units before them, then advancing southwest across Poland to the German border. This operation was intended to cut German forces off from the Balkan theater of operations and from their Romanian and Hungarian allies, including their vital oil fields.

Zhukov was unaware that the main deployment of German forces was not on the Soviet left flank, but in Army Group Center, further to the north. Thus, had Soviet forces attacked toward Cracow-Lublin, as Zhukov's plan called for, Army Group Center could easily have cut through the exposed right (northern) flank of the Soviet thrust, upset the Soviet offensive, and then advanced along the Minsk-Smolensk line toward Moscow. In that event, the Red Army would have found itself in an even worse situation than after the outbreak of the actual German offensive on June 22. Zhukov admitted as much later to military historian V. A. Anfilov: "In retrospect it is good that he [Stalin] did not agree with us. Otherwise, our forces might have suffered a catastrophe."

Stalin's Aims

In a more detailed study of the May 15 document, L. A. Bezymenski notes that the plan had even more ambitious goals. After completion of the first stage of the offensive, Soviet forces were to turn north and northwest to destroy the northern wing of the German front, thereby occupying East Prussia and all of Poland. Meanwhile, to the north, the Red Army would once again invade Finland. According to Bezymenski, Zhukov's bold offensive plan had very probably been influenced by Stalin's speech of May 5 to Soviet military academy graduates, in which the Soviet leader emphasized the superiority of offensive over defensive military planning.

Soviet mobilization and deployment in the period January-June 1941 took place in three stages:

- first stage, January-March, the call-up of about a million reservists, industry ordered to step up production of T-34 and KV tanks, first echelon troops brought up to strength;
- second stage, April-June, second echelon forces moved up to the western border, Far Eastern troops moved west;
- third stage, June 1-June 22, Stalin agrees to open mobilization and to advancing second echelon armies to the front. All these operations were to be carried out in secrecy, without the enemy taking note. Once mobilized and in position, the Soviet forces were to launch a sudden, decisive offensive against Germany and her allies.

According to Meltiukhov, the correlation of forces along the front from Ostroleka (Poland) to the Carpathians at the time of the planned Zhukov offensive was as shown in the table below.

	<u>Red Army</u>	<u>Wehrmacht</u>	<u>Ratio</u>
Divisions	128	55	2.3:1

Troop strength	3,400,000	1,400,000	2.1:1
Field guns	38,500	16,300	2.4:1
Tanks	7,500	900	8.7:1
Aircraft	6,200	1,400	4.4:1

The attack was to begin in typical blitzkrieg fashion -- without warning, with air raids on enemy airfields, and with heavy artillery bombardment of front-line enemy forces. The USSR would thus have had the clear advantage of superior forces and the benefits of the first strike. Why Stalin did not give the order to attack is unknown.

In "Stalin's Lost Opportunity," Meltiukhov establishes, with meticulous documentation, that in the years 1938-40 the Soviet Union had carried out a massive build-up of military muscle that made it the superpower of the day, far exceeding the might of any enemy. Meltiukhov presents the comparative strength of the major belligerents for August 1939, on the eve of Germany's invasion of Poland, as shown in the table above.

Accounting for Stalin's Delay

Meltiukhov minces no words on Stalin's intent: "The content of the Soviet operational plans, the ideological guidelines and the military propaganda, combined with information on the immediate military preparations of the Red Army for an offensive, attest unambiguously to the intention of the Soviet government to attack Germany in the summer of 1941." He concludes that at first the opening strike against Germany (Operation Groza [Thunderstorm]) was scheduled for June 12, 1941, but that the Kremlin later fatefully shifted the date to July 15. According to Meltiukhov: "Unfortunately, what we now know today was a secret in 1941. The Soviet leadership made a fateful miscalculation by not striking first."

Meltiukhov speculates that Stalin delayed the date for the attack when he learned, on May 12, of Rudolf Hess' flight to Scotland. Stalin feared that if the Hess peace mission succeeded, and the British withdrew from the war, the Red Army would be left to stand alone against the Germans. When it became clear that the Hess mission had failed, Stalin set July 15 as the date for Operation Thunderstorm -- 23 days after Hitler launched Operation Barbarossa. Had the Red Army attacked on the originally scheduled date, Meltiukhov believes, it would have succeeded.

Although Soviet intelligence had been informed of the precise date of the German attack by its agent Richard Sorge in Japan, and by its "Korsikanets" and "Starshina" sources in Berlin, Stalin refused to be convinced. Moreover, Prime Minister Churchill and President Roosevelt had also warned Stalin, to no avail: Stalin knew that Britain desperately needed the USSR in the war against Germany for its own sake. By failing to strike first, as planned, the USSR lost 800,000 men (Germany, 80,000), 4,000 aircraft (Germany, 850), 21,500 field guns and 11,800 tanks (Germany, 400) during the first two and a half weeks of the war. By the end of 1941 the Soviet Union had lost three million Red Army troops.

Meltiukhov rejects the term "preventive war." For a true preventive war, it is necessary for the attacker to know definitely that his adversary is about to invade. Meltiukhov maintains that, while the each side was aware of the other's build-up and deployment of forces, neither the Germans nor the Russians knew

with certainty that the other was about to attack. Stalin believed, with some logic, that Hitler would never open a second front while the Britain was still in the war, but the German leader chose not to wait until the Red Army launched its attack: he unleashed his own blitzkrieg.

The situation best resembles two cats sitting on a fence waiting to see which will jump off first. On the day before the attack, Hitler signaled his frame of mind in a letter to Mussolini: "Even if I were forced to lose 60-70 divisions in Russia by the end of the year, this would still only be a small fraction of the forces I would have to maintain constantly on the eastern border under the present conditions." In the end Germany failed, Meltiukhov states, simply because it had neither the resources nor the reserves necessary to bring a long war to a successful conclusion.

A Suicidal Invasion?

The ever controversial, iconoclastic Suvorov dedicates his new book to his adversaries. He writes, "You can't dedicate a book with this title [Ledokol, or "Suicide"] to friends, so I dedicate it to my enemies." An enemy of the Soviet regime who defected to England, Suvorov was tried in absentia and sentenced to death. Although his opponents are legion, including many in the post-Soviet as well as the Anglo-American establishments, in today's Russia he is the most popular writer on the history of the Second World War.

Suvorov joins Melitukhov in the belief that if any side was unprepared for the war that ensued, it was the Germans. On June 22, 1941 when Germany launched its desperate attack, Stalin had some 13,000 aircraft to Hitler's 2,500. Moreover, the Red Army had an even greater advantage in numbers and quality of tanks (24,000:3,700).

In "Suicide" Suvorov analyzes secondary sources in German, just as he did in his books on Russian war plans, and concludes that Hitler had lost the war even before the first shot was fired. It is Suvorov's contention that Hitler and the Nazi leadership were irresponsible in launching a war against the much larger, better prepared, and better armed Soviet Union in the absurd belief that the USSR could be defeated in 90 days -- July-August-September. Hitler and the German high command unpardonably underestimated the strength of the Soviet armed forces, which Stalin had been building up since the mid-1920s. Germany, of course, did not begin rearming until the mid-1930s, and would delay mobilizing for total war until around 1943.

Stalin and his advisors knew that the Wehrmacht lacked all the essentials for a protracted war under conditions of extreme cold. Through their intelligence services and agents, the Soviets had learned that: German tanks were inferior to their own in both quantity and quality; Germany was critically short of oil; Germany did not manufacture cold-resistant lubricants; the German forces had not been issued winter clothing; Germany was dependent for its war effort on the import of many raw materials; and much more.

Exasperated by the short-sighted, superficial German plan for victory in three months, Suvorov asks a few rhetorical questions: Did Hitler think that May

followed October in Russia? Had he learned nothing from Napoleon's campaign? Did he not know that, even if he reached Moscow, Russia would have continued the war from the Urals in the interior, far beyond the reach of German long-range bombers?

By the end of the fourth month of Barbarossa, the German economy was already groaning. Fritz Todt, chief of arms production, advised Hitler to arrange for an armistice. Large-scale German tank operations had to be curtailed for lack of fuel. The German panzer units, with their limited number of tanks, were often forced to cover long distances to quell unforeseen exigencies, thereby further exhausting fuel supplies. (Large-scale blitzkrieg operations, ensuring the greatest possible encirclement and bag of prisoners, require that the tanks moving out from one pincer proceed with minimum diversion in order to meet those jumping off from the other pincer, thereby closing the encirclement.)

Beyond the Propaganda

Suvorov's list of villains is long indeed. Hitler, Goebbels, and the subservient German generals are castigated for their recklessness. But Suvorov's venom is mostly directed at the Communist and post-Communist establishment, whose spokesmen continue to mouth the Party line. He ridicules and mocks what he considers the falsehoods, misconceptions, myths, and errors about the German-Russian war invented and circulated by the various Soviet and post-Soviet "scientific institutes," including the Institute of Marxism-Leninism and the Institute of Military History, whose researchers have tried to dismiss Suvorov's findings as "unscientific."

Suvorov dismisses typical official Soviet sources for the war as specious propaganda devoid of hard facts or figures. The main message of the original six-volume History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union, 1941-45, Suvorov contends, is that Nikita Khrushchev (under whose administration the work was compiled) won the war single-handedly. Suvorov goes on to observe that when the twelve-volume revised edition of this official history was written under Leonid Brezhnev, it was revised to show that it was actually Brezhnev who had won the Great Patriotic War.

Suvorov singles out the memoirs of Marshal Zhukov for special criticism. He hazards that these were probably written by Glavpur (the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army). Thus "Zhukov" writes that on June 22, 1941, the Germans enjoyed a 5-6:1 advantage over Soviet forces in field pieces, tanks and aircraft, when in fact the ratio was to Russia's advantage.

Suvorov considers Stalin to have been Hitler's superior in cleverness, rationality, emotional stability, international politics, cruelty, and blood-letting. Stalin was much better informed about German capabilities than Hitler was of Russian. Suvorov introduces a Russian adage to demean Hitler's attempt to outwit Stalin: "Never try to trick a trickster." The only reason for Hitler's initial success, for Suvorov, was that Barbarossa was an entirely irrational decision, which the thoroughly logical Stalin could not possibly have anticipated. In the opinion of this reviewer, that was precisely why Hitler took the gamble. Suvorov's Russian nativism shines forth when he writes: "Only a fool would consider defeating Russia! Only a complete idiot would ever think of defeating it in a three-month

campaign!"

As brilliant as Suvorov has been in exposing the historical lies of the corrupt Communist and post-Communist regimes, even sympathetic readers must take issue with him on certain points. As with Heinrich Schliemann's discovery of Troy, Suvorov's findings may not satisfy the more professional historians in every detail -- and some of them will be subject to revision.

Overrating Stalin

Occasionally Suvorov contradicts himself. For example, he argues that when Hitler turned his troops southward to Kiev before Moscow was taken, he all but lost the war. But elsewhere Suvorov recognizes that in war the best strategy is to defeat the enemy's armed forces, not to take prestige cities. In fact the German forces turned south not so much to take Kiev as to destroy another Soviet army. The German generals, who after all had some experience in the conduct of war, were of course perfectly aware of the pointlessness of capturing large cities merely for trophy value. When the enemy's armed forces are destroyed, his cities will fall on their own.

Only in the case of Stalingrad did the German invaders commit all their forces and energies to take a city -- with disastrous results. The previous winter, after the failure to take Moscow, reason had prevailed and the Germans retreated to a more defensible line, where they were able to regroup and reinforce their armies. Without the help of the Finns, German forces were inadequate to take Leningrad, so they bypassed the city. But Hitler forbade any retreat from Stalingrad. Its capture had been aimed, among other things, at blocking oil shipments up the Volga north to the Soviets. The Wehrmacht was no less concerned to fuel its own war machine: it had secured the Crimea in order to protect its chief sources of petroleum, in Romania and Hungary, from Soviet air attack from that peninsula.

Suvorov's excessive regard for Stalin's leadership and his equally overdone criticism of Hitler's ignores the fact that Germany nearly did defeat the Red Army. Had the United States, Great Britain, France, and other allies not supported Stalin with arms, trucks, provisions, and other necessities of war, the outcome might have been quite different. It must also be recalled that, throughout much of the long Russian-German conflict, Germany was compelled to divert 20-30 percent of its war effort to the Western front.

Suvorov's main contention, that Stalin groomed Hitler to do his dirty work in Europe, is untenable. It gives far too much credit to the Soviet dictator. Germany never wanted a war in the west, let alone one against Britain. True, the Germans suspected France -- especially under the government of Léon Blum's popular front -- of further mischief.

It must be recalled that Germany's ill-fated attack on the Soviet Union followed several successive attempts at its encirclement by its enemies. In the 1930s British and French diplomacy had succeeded in surrounding her with hostile nations. Then came the attempted Scandinavian and Balkan encirclement, and finally that of the U.S.,UK, and USSR. With both Soviet and Western forces increasing in strength, Germany took a desperate gamble to break the ring, rather than wait until the Red Army seized the most opportune time to pounce. True, the gamble failed. Today's Germany, however, is a prosperous country, much smaller than it might have wished, but the remnant of Stalin's USSR, stripped of the Tsar's empire, is not much more than an overgrown economic basket case.

Suvorov exaggerates Stalin's "genius." While it is true that he created a police state and built up the Red Army to superpower status, his armed forces failed miserably at the time they were most needed, June 1941. It is also true that Stalin dominated Churchill and Roosevelt, above all in the several conferences that determined postwar arrangements among the "Big Three," but the Western leaders had cast themselves in the role of supplicants who needed the Red Army to contain and destroy Germany.

For all that, Suvorov has made a great contribution to correcting the history of the Second World War by dispelling, once and for all, the myth of a peace-loving Soviet Union invented by Communist propagandists and circulated in the West by their dupes and sympathizers.

Trusting Stalin

According to Gorodetsky's version of the Soviet Union, the USSR planned only counter-attacks in defense of the homeland, and its leader, Stalin, was too trusting of Adolf Hitler. Gorodetsky completely ignores the Soviet Union's military build-up from the 1930s until the outbreak of hostilities in 1941. The tens of thousands of advanced tanks and aircraft; the training of hundreds of thousands of paratroopers; the forward deployment of airfields, depots, and attack units on the eve of the attack in June 1941 are all hard evidence of Stalin's real intentions.

The Israeli researcher has limited himself almost entirely to examining statements from official Soviet sources. For the most part, he ignores military analysts (whether Russian, German, or American), who are better equipped than he to evaluate military capabilities and designs. These researchers tend increasingly to agree with Suvorov.

Gorodetsky retains the stale support of the old Soviet establishment, while Suvorov has gained many post-Soviet adherents in recent years. While Gorodetsky is read mostly in England and the United States, erstwhile allies of Stalinist Russia, Suvorov is read widely in Russia and Germany, whose peoples experienced Stalin's and Hitler's war first hand.

No Room for Chivalry

In Stalin's War of Extermination Joachim Hoffmann examines both the underlying causes and the ruthless execution of the war by Russians and Germans alike, in a thoroughly engrossing, systematic approach that is unsurpassed with respect to comprehensiveness, objectivity, and documentation. Hoffmann has made extensive use of interrogations of Soviet prisoners of war, ranging in rank from general to private, conducted by their German captors during the war. These interviews, combined with the traditional exploitation of open-source, unclassified literature and recently declassified materials, irrefutably dispel the myth of a peace-loving Soviet Union led by a trusting, pacific Joseph Stalin. Hoffmann's research confirms conclusively that the Soviet Union was making final preparations for its own preemptive attack when the Wehrmacht struck.

Besides the POW interrogations, Hoffmann cites such military authorities as Dmitri Volkogonov, to the effect that Stalin needed only a few more weeks to bring his forces into complete battle readiness; Soviet military analyst Colonel Danilov, who agrees that the "vozhd" (commander) only needed a bit more time; and Colonel Karpov, who has written:

"In the early grayness of a May or June morning, thousands of our aircraft and tens of thousands of our guns would have dealt the blow against the densely concentrated German force, whose positions were known down to battalion level -- a surprise even more inconceivable than the German attack on us."

Hoffmann contends that war between these two mutually hostile, ideologically driven nations was inevitable: it was merely a question of which side would initiate hostilities. He reminds us that the First World War had brought Communism to power over the one sixth of the Earth's surface that had been the Russian empire. A second world war, Lenin preached, would advance Communism throughout Europe. Stalin, Lenin's faithful disciple in propagating Communism, acted from the outset of his rule to increase the USSR's military might to that end. By 1941, the Red Army's aircraft, tanks, and field artillery exceeded Germany's by a factor of at least six to one in each category. In that year, the USSR's paratroops and submarines, exclusively offensive forces,

exceeded those of the rest of the world combined.

The main principles of Soviet military doctrine in the spring of 1941 were: 1) the Red Army is an offensive army; 2) war must always be fought on enemy territory, with minimum friendly losses and the total destruction of the enemy; 3) the working class in the enemy's country is a potential ally and should be encouraged to rebel against its masters; and 4) war preparations must serve to ensure offensive capabilities.

So confident was Stalin of Soviet military superiority, Hoffmann asserts, that he doubted Germany would ever be foolish enough to attack, especially as long as Britain remained in the war. Dumbfounded at the German successes at the outset of Barbarossa, the Soviet dictator realized that he had underestimated Germany's chances of defeating the Red Army. Suvorov has described Stalin's probable state of mind as comparable to that of the designer of the Titanic after learning it had sunk. Nevertheless, vowing vengeance, still confident of ultimate victory, Stalin demanded the total extermination of the German invaders. On November 6, 1941, he declared:

"Well now, if the Germans want a war of extermination, they will get it. From now on it will be our task, the task of the peoples of the Soviet Union, the task of our fighters, commanders, and the political officials of our Army and Navy, to exterminate to the last man all Germans who have invaded the Homeland as occupiers. No mercy to the German occupiers! Death to the German occupiers!"

Hitler, for his part, by underestimating the military strength of the Soviet Union, led his country to a catastrophic defeat. Goebbels, in his diary, suggested that had Hitler known the actual strength of the Red Army, he might have at least paused before taking his fateful gamble. Yet, however disastrous the Axis attack finally proved for the German nation in the end, Hoffmann believes that all Europe would have suffered as grim a fate had the Red Army succeeded in striking first.

This clash to the death between two ideologically driven states, Hoffmann observes, left no room for chivalry, or for the strict observance of international conventions on land warfare. Stalin insisted that Soviet soldiers not surrender,

and used maximal terror to prevent them from doing so. Soviet POWs were deemed deserters, and any Soviet soldier who surrendered was to be killed on falling into Soviet hands. (Near the end of the war German soldiers who refused to fight were shot and hanged from lamp posts for all to see.) Throughout the Great Patriotic War, as the Soviets dubbed it, "Soviet patriotism" and "mass heroism" were heavily dependent on terrorism. As Hoffmann writes, the head of Red Army Political Propaganda, Commissar Lev Sakharovich Mekhlis, was empowered by Stalin to use every device of terror to keep the Red Army fighting. This Mekhlis did with relish. In consequence of the activity of this and other commissars, Stalin's terror against his own people (soldiers and civilians) during the war accounted for a substantial percentage of the estimated twenty-five million Soviet war dead. (See also Walter Sanning's essay on Soviet losses, "Soviet Scorched-Earth Warfare," in JHR [spring 1985]). Even so, more than five million Soviet soldiers managed to surrender to the invaders by the end of the war. Of those who survived the war, many had cause to wish they hadn't following their repatriation to the USSR.

Unpunished Crimes, Aggressive Plans

From the onset of the war, German soldiers unfortunate enough to be taken prisoner were often mutilated and murdered. When the Soviet forces entered Germany, men and boys were murdered or drafted for forced labor; the women were often raped, sometimes murdered, and, if strong enough, dragooned for forced labor.

Although by about 1950 Stalin decided to lessen the influence of Jews in the Communist Party, Jews were very much involved in murderous assignments during the war. In addition to Mekhlis, there was Lazar Kaganovich, responsible for the deaths of millions; General Abakumov, who headed the NKVD/MVD (Ministry of Internal Affairs, or secret police), and Generals Reichman and Chernyakhovski, who were especially ruthless. Hoffmann hastens to add that the criminal actions of individual Jews should no more reflect on the Jewish people as a whole than the criminal actions of individual Nazis on the German people. Yet Nazis charged with war crimes have been, and continue to be, tried and punished, while, curiously, no courts appear to be interested in bringing Communist criminals to justice.

The thoroughness and reliability of Hoffmann's work (which helpfully includes an appendix containing key original documents in Polish, Russian, English, and German) is nicely exemplified in his treatment of Zhukov's plan of May 15, 1941. While Sergeev and Bezymenski seem to suggest that the plan was only recently discovered, Hoffmann makes manifestly clear that the plan has long been known and analyzed. Colonel Valeri Danilov and Dr. Heinz Magenheimer examined this plan and other documents that indicate Soviet preparations for attack almost ten years ago in an Austrian military journal (*Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift*, nos. 5 and 6, 1991; no. 1, 1993; and no. 1, 1994). Both researchers concluded that the Zhukov plan of May 15, 1941, reflected Stalin's May 5, 1941 speech (see above) heralding the birth of the new offensive Red Army. Hoffmann reproduces an original document, referred to as "Short Notation of Comrade Stalin's Speech to the Red Army Academy on May 5, 1941," which concludes with the words:

"But now that we have reconstructed our army and abundantly saturated it with the technology to wage modern warfare, now that we have become

strong -- now we are obliged to go from defense to attack. In defending our country we are obliged to act in an offensive manner. To switch over from defense to a military policy of offensive action. We must reconstruct our training, our propaganda, our agitation, and our press in the spirit of attack. The Red Army is now a modern army, and a modern army is an army of attack."

The Zhukov plan of May 15, 1941, indicates clearly that the Red Army planned a preemptive strike against the German forces across the border. Hoffmann further notes that a few days later, on May 20, 1941, Mikhail Kalinin, then chairman of the presidium of the Supreme Soviet and nominally head of state, gave a speech in which he said:

"War is a very dangerous business, laden with sorrows, but when a time comes when it is possible to expand the realm of Communism, war should not be discounted ... and the zone of Communism must be expanded. The capitalist world can only be destroyed by the red hot glowing steel of a holy revolutionary war."

Kalinin thus strongly implied that the war the USSR was about to wage was not a preventive war forced upon it by Germany, but a war of conquest to expand the Communist empire.

The Perfect Storm

The preponderance of documents uncovered in the past decade, including further analyses of the Zhukov plan of May 15, 1941, by members of the Suvorov school, should convince the impartial reader that: Germany was woefully unprepared for a long war; that the Soviet Union was not only armed to the teeth, but poised to spring in July 1941; that Stalin was Lenin's disciple in striving to advance Communism to the rest of Europe, especially to Germany; and that the governments of Britain and France were totally oblivious of the greater danger Communism posed to them when they declared war on Germany over its border dispute with Poland. The failure of the British, French, and American leaderships to perceive that the Soviet Union was by far the deadlier threat, even in 1939, was a mistake that has taken half a century to rectify, at the cost of countless millions of lives.

Hoffmann concludes that the war between the two irreconcilable ideologies was inevitable and unavoidable. Stalin's fanatical adherence to Communism (class hatred) and Hitler's equally fanatical adherence to racial theories (Hoffmann cites Disraeli: "The race question is the key to world history") led their peoples to a catastrophe unmatched since the Thirty Years' War. Hoffmann blames the horrible excesses the Red Army inflicted on German civilians on hate-obsessed war propagandists such as Ilya Ehrenburg in Russia who deliberately exaggerated German crimes. Thus, Hoffman notes, Ehrenburg announced a death toll of four million for Auschwitz on January 4, 1945, weeks before the capture of the camp. Likewise, months before the war's end, Ehrenburg reported that six million Jews had been murdered by the Germans. Moreover, in many instances, including the infamous Katyn forest massacre of Polish prisoners, Red propagandists shamelessly tried to blame the German army for crimes committed by the Soviets.

Like his colleague Wolfgang Strauss, Hoffmann advocates reconciliation between the peoples of Germany and Russia. The policies of both Stalin's Communist regime and Hitler's National Socialist state were aberrations far removed from the traditional friendship between the two peoples as prevailed under Bismarck and before him. In that spirit Hoffmann makes special mention of Drs. Heinz Magenheimer, Werner Maser, Ernst Topitsch, Günther Gillessen,

Alfred M. de Zayas, Viktor Suvorov, and also Aleksandr Moiseevich Nekrich and Lev Kopelev, two former Soviet wartime commissars of Jewish extraction, for their courageous contributions to revisionist history. (Nor has Hoffmann been less than courageous: he testified in a German court to the scholarly quality of Gernar Rudolf 's Holocaust revisionist anthology, Grundlagen zur Zeitgeschichte, later published in English as Dissecting the Holocaust.)

The extreme economic and political conditions that afflicted much of the first half of the twentieth century devastated Germany and Russia. The slaughter of the First World War, the triumph of Communism in Russia, the treaty of Versailles, and the Great Depression combined to culminate in the political storm of the century, the Second World War, much as unique and unforeseen meteorological conditions in October 1991 -- three merging hurricanes -- combined to create what writer Sebastian Junger called "the perfect storm," a devastating "nor'easter" in the North Atlantic. In historians such as Suvorov and Hoffmann, the historical tempest of the twentieth century is, increasingly, finding able and objective chroniclers.

The Jewish Hand in the World Wars, Part 1

Thomas Dalton

In 2006, an inebriated Mel Gibson allegedly said this: “The Jews are responsible for all the wars in the world.” There followed the predictable storm of anti-Semitism, ad hominem attacks, and various other slanders against Gibson’s character. But virtually no one asked the question: Is he right? Or rather this: To what degree could he be right?

Clearly Jews can’t be responsible for *all* the world’s wars, but might they have had a hand in many wars—at least amongst those countries in which they lived or interacted? Given their undeniable influence in those nations where they exceed even a fraction of a percent of the population, Jews must be responsible, to some degree, for at least some of what government does, both good and bad. Jews are often praised as brilliant managers, economists, and strategists, and have been granted seemingly endless awards and honors. But those given credit for their successes must also receive blame for their failures. And there are few greater failures in the lives of nations than war.

To begin to evaluate Gibson’s charge, I will look at the role Jews played in the two major wars of world history, World Wars I and II. But first I need to recap some relevant history in order to better understand the context of Jewish policy and actions during those calamitous events.

Historical Context

Have Jews played a disproportionate role in war and social conflict—a role typically not of peacemakers and reconcilers, but of instigators and profiteers? Let us very briefly review some historical evidence to answer this charge; it provides relevant insight into Jewish influences during both world wars.

As far back as the Book of Genesis, we find stories such as that of Joseph, son of Jacob, sold into slavery in Egypt. Joseph earns the favor of the Pharaoh and is elevated to a position of power. When a famine strikes, Joseph develops and implements a brutal policy of exploitation, leading Egyptian farmers to sell their land, animals, and ultimately themselves in exchange for food. Joseph himself survives unscathed, living out his days in “the land of Goshen,” with a life of luxury and ease—evidently as repayment for a job well done.¹

Over time, Jews continued to build a reputation as rabble-rousers and exploiters. In 41 AD, Roman Emperor Claudius issued his Third Edict, condemning the Jews of Alexandria for abuse of privilege and sowing discord; he charged them with “fomenting a general plague which infests the whole world.” Eight years later he expelled them from Rome. As a result, the Jews revolted in Jerusalem in the years 66-70, and again in 115 and 132. Of that final uprising, Cassius Dio made the following observation—the first clear indication of Jews causing a major war:

Jews everywhere were showing signs of hostility to the Romans, partly by secret and partly overt acts... [M]any other nations, too, were joining them through eagerness for gain, and the whole earth, one might almost say, was being stirred up over the matter.²

Thus it was not without reason that notable Romans denounced the Jews—among these Seneca (“an accursed race”), Quintilian (“a race which is a curse to others”), and Tacitus (a “disease,” a “pernicious superstition,” and “the basest of peoples”).³ Prominent German historian Theodor Mommsen reaffirmed this view, noting that the Jews of Rome were indeed agents of social disruption and decay: “Also in the ancient world, Judaism was an effective ferment of cosmopolitanism and of national decomposition.”⁴

Throughout the Middle Ages and into the Renaissance, their negative reputation persisted. John Chrysostom, Thomas Aquinas, and Martin Luther all condemned Jewish usury—a lending practice often trading on distress, and a frequent cause of social unrest. In the 1770s, Baron d’Holbach declared that “the Jewish people distinguished themselves only by massacres, unjust wars, cruelties, usurpations, and infamies.” He added that they “lived continually in the midst of calamities, and were, more than all other nations, the sport of frightful revolutions.”⁵ Voltaire was struck by the danger posed to humanity by the Hebrew tribe; “I would not be in the least bit surprised if these people would not some day become deadly to the human race.”⁶ Kant called them a “nation of deceivers,” and Hegel remarked that “the only act Moses reserved for the Israelites was...to borrow with deceit and repay confidence with theft.”⁷

Thus both empirical evidence and learned opinion suggest that Jews have, for centuries, had a hand in war, social strife, and economic distress, and have managed to profit thereby.⁸ Being a small and formally disempowered minority everywhere, it is striking that they should merit even a mention in such events—or if they did, it should have been as the exploited, and not the exploiters. And yet they seem to have demonstrated a consistent ability to turn social unrest to their advantage. Thus it is not an unreasonable claim that they might even instigate such unrest, anticipating that they could achieve desired ends.

Jewish Advance in America and Elsewhere

The long history of Jewish involvement in social conflict has a direct bearing on both world wars. Consider their progressive influence in American government. Beginning in the mid-1800s, we find a number of important milestones. In 1845, the first Jews were elected to both houses of Congress: Lewis Levin (Pa.) to the House and David Yulee (Fla.) to the Senate. By 1887 they had their first elected governor, Washington Bartlett in California. And in 1889, Solomon Hirsch became the first Jewish minister, nominated by President Harrison as ambassador to the Ottoman Empire—which at that time controlled Palestine.

Overseas, trouble was brewing for the Jews in Russia. A gang of anarchists, one or two of whom were Jewish, succeeded in killing Czar Alexander II in 1881. This unleashed a multi-decade series of periodic pogroms, most minor but some killing multiple hundreds of Jews. Further difficulties for them came with the so-called May Laws of 1882, which placed restrictions on Jewish business practice and areas of residency within the “Pale of Settlement” in the western portion of the Russian empire.⁹ Many Jews fled the Pale; of those heading west, Germany was their first stop.¹⁰

Even prior to the 1880s, Jewish influence in Germany was considerable. In the 1840s, both Bruno Bauer and Karl Marx wrote influential essays on *Die Judenfrage (The Jewish Question)*. In 1850, composer Richard Wagner complained that Germans found themselves “in the position of fighting for emancipation from the Jews. The Jew is, in fact...more than emancipated. He rules...”¹¹ By 1878, Wagner declared that Jewish control of German newspapers was nearly total. A year later Wilhelm Marr decried “the victory of Jewry over Germandom”; he believed it self-evident that “without striking a blow...Jewry today has become the socio-political dictator of Germany.”¹²

The facts support these views. And with the influx of Russian and Polish Jews in the late 1800s and early 1900s, the situation got demonstrably worse. Sarah Gordon (1984: 10-14) cites the following impressive statistics:

Before the First World War, for example, Jews occupied 13 percent of the directorships of joint-stock corporations and 24 percent of the supervisory

positions within these corporations. ... [D]uring 1904 they comprised 27 percent of all lawyers, 10 percent of all apprenticed lawyers, 5 percent of court clerks, 4 percent of magistrates, and up to 30 percent of all higher ranks of the judiciary. ... Jews were [also] overrepresented among university professors and students between 1870 and 1933. For example, in 1909-1910...almost 12 percent of instructors at German universities were Jewish... [I]n 1905-1906 Jewish students comprised 25 percent of the law and medical students... The percentage of Jewish doctors was also quite high, especially in large cities, where they sometimes were a majority. ... [I]n Berlin around 1890, 25 percent of all children attending grammar school were Jewish...

For all this, Jews never exceeded 2% of the German population. The public accepted the foreigners with a remarkable degree of tolerance, and more or less allowed them to dominate certain sectors of German society. There were no legal constraints, and violent attacks were rare. But the Germans would come to regret such liberal policies.

The other important factor at that time was the emergence of Zionism. Formally established by Theodor Herzl in 1897, its basic principles were laid out in his book *Der Judenstaat (The Jewish State)*. He argued that the Jews would never be free from persecution as long as they were foreigners everywhere, and thus they needed their own state. A number of locations were discussed, but by the time of the first meeting of the World Zionist Organization in 1897, the movement had settled on Palestine. This, however, was problematic because the region at that time was under control of the Ottoman Empire, and was populated primarily by Muslim and Christian Arabs. Somehow, the Zionist Jews would have to wrest control of Palestine away from the Ottoman Turks and then drive out the Arabs. It was a seemingly impossible task.

They immediately understood that this could only be done by force. It would take a condition of global distress—something approaching a world war—in order for the Zionists to manipulate things to their advantage. Their guiding principle of ‘profit through distress’ could work here, but it would require both internal and external pressure. In states where the Jews had significant population but little official power, they would foment unrest from within. In states where they had influence, they would use the power of their accumulated

wealth to dictate national policy. And in states where they had neither population nor influence, they would apply external pressure to secure support for their purposes.

That the Zionists seriously contemplated this two-pronged, internal/external strategy is no mere speculation; we have the word of Herzl himself. He wrote:

When we sink, we become a revolutionary proletariat, the subordinate officers of the revolutionary party; when we rise, there rises also our terrible power of the purse. (1896/1967: 26)

In fact, Herzl apparently *predicted* the outbreak of global war. One of the original Zionists, Litman Rosenthal, wrote in his diary of 15 December 1914 his recollection of a conversation with Herzl from 1897. Herzl allegedly said,

It may be that Turkey will refuse or be unable to understand us. This will not discourage us. We will seek other means to accomplish our end. The Orient question is now the question of the day. Sooner or later it will bring about a conflict among the nations. A European war is imminent... The great European war must come. With my watch in hand do I await this terrible moment. After the great European war is ended the Peace Conference will assemble. We must be ready for that time. We will assuredly be called to this great conference of the nations and we must prove to them the urgent importance of a Zionist solution to the Jewish Question.

This was Herzl's so-called "great war prophecy." Now, he does not say that the Zionists will *cause* this war, only that they will "be ready" when it comes, and "will seek other means" than diplomacy to accomplish their end. A striking prediction, if true.[13](#)

In any case, there was clearly a larger plan at work here. The Jews would pursue a policy of revolution in states like Russia in order to bring down hated governments. To the degree possible, they would seek to undermine the Ottoman Turks as well. And in Germany, the UK, and America, they would use "the terrible power of the purse" to dictate an aggressive war-policy in order to realign the global power structure to their favor. This would have a triple benefit: curtailing rampant anti-Semitism; enhancing Jewish wealth; and

ultimately establishing a Jewish state in Palestine, one that could serve as the global center of world Jewry. Revolution and war thus became a top priority.¹⁴

Turkey was in fact an early success for the movement. The Sultan's system of autocratic rule generated some dissatisfaction, and a group of Turkish Jews exploited this to their advantage—resulting in the Turkish Revolution of 1908. As Stein explains,

the revolution had been organized from Salonica [present-day Thessaloniki], where the Jews, together with the crypto-Jews known as Dönme, formed a majority of the population. Salonica Jews and the Dönme had taken an important part in the events associated with the revolution and had provided the Committee of Union and Progress with several of its ablest members. (1961: 35)¹⁵

This group of revolutionaries, today known as the Young Turks, was able to overthrow the Sultan and exert substantial influence on the succeeding ruler. But in the end they were unable to steer the declining empire in a pro-Zionist direction.

Back in the USA, Jewish population was rising even faster than in Germany. In 1880 it had roughly 250,000 Jews (0.5%), but by 1900—just 20 years later—the figure was around 1.5 million (1.9%). A census of 1918 showed this number increasing to an astonishing figure of 3 million (2.9%). Their political influence grew commensurately.

For present purposes, significant American influence began with the assassination of President William McKinley in 1901. He was shot by a Polish radical named Leon Czolgosz, who had been heavily influenced by two Jewish anarchists, Emma Goldman and Alexander Berkman. The presidency immediately fell to the vice president, Theodore Roosevelt—who, at age 42, was (and remains) the youngest president in history. His role as an army colonel in the 1898 victory in Cuba over the Spaniards had led to widespread publicity, and with the backing of the Jewish community, he won the New York governorship later that same year. Thus he was well situated to earn the vice presidential nomination in 1900.

A question of interest: Was Roosevelt Jewish? I will examine this issue in detail

later with respect to FDR (as to whom there is more to say), but in brief, there is considerable circumstantial evidence that all of the Roosevelts were, at least in part, Jewish. In Theodore's case, the only explicit indication is a claim by former Michigan governor Chase Osborn. In a letter dated 21 March 1935, Osborn said, "President [Franklin] Roosevelt knows well enough that his ancestors were Jewish. I heard Theodore Roosevelt state twice that his ancestors were Jewish."¹⁶ But Osborn offers no specifics, and I am not aware of any further claims regarding Theodore himself.

However, there are two other relevant items regarding his Jewish connections. Having acceded to the office in 1901, he subsequently won the 1904 election. In late 1906 he appointed the first Jew to the presidential cabinet: Oscar Straus, a wealthy New York lawyer and former ambassador to the Ottoman Empire. As Secretary of Labor and Commerce, Straus was in charge of the Bureau of Immigration—at the critical time of accelerating Jewish immigration. We can be sure that his office was particularly amenable to incoming Jews.

The second event occurred in 1912. Roosevelt had declined to run again in 1908, preferring to nominate his Secretary of War, William Taft—who proceeded to win handily. Taft, however, disappointed many Republicans, and there was a call to bring Roosevelt back. But the party would not oust a sitting president, and so Roosevelt decided to run on a third-party ticket. Hence the peculiar status of the 1912 election: it featured Taft running for reelection, Roosevelt running as a third-party candidate, and Woodrow Wilson running as a first-term Democrat. As the history books like to say, we had a former president and a sitting president running against a future president. Wilson, as we know, would win this race, and go on to serve two consecutive terms—covering the lead-up, duration, and aftermath of World War I.

But less well known is this fact: For perhaps the first time in US history, all three major candidates had substantial Jewish financial backing. Henry Ford's *Dearborn Independent* reported on a 1914 Congressional testimony by Paul Warburg, best known as the Jewish "father of the Federal Reserve." Warburg was the prototypical Jewish banker, long-time partner at Kuhn, Loeb, and Co., and later head of Wells Fargo in New York. At some point during Taft's presidency, Warburg decided to get financially involved in politics. By the time of the 1912 election, he and his partners at Kuhn, Loeb were funding all three

candidates. Warburg's testimony, before Senator Joseph Bristow (R-Kan.), is revealing:

JB: "It has been variously reported in the newspapers that you and your partners directly and indirectly contributed very largely to Mr. Wilson's campaign funds." PW: "Well, my partners—there is a very peculiar condition—no; I do not think any one of them contributed largely at all; there may have been moderate contributions. My brother, for instance, contributed to Mr. Taft's campaign." ...

JB: "I understood you to say that you contributed to Mr. Wilson's campaign." PW: "No; my letter says that I offered to contribute; but it was too late. I came back to this country only a few days before the campaign closed." JB: "So that you did not make any contribution?" PW: "I did not make any contribution; no." JB: "Did any members of your firm make contributions to Mr. Wilson's campaign?" PW: "I think that is a matter of record. Mr. [Jacob] Schiff contributed. I would not otherwise discuss the contributions of my partners, if it was not a matter of record. I think Mr. Schiff was the only one who contributed in our firm." JB: "And you stated that your brother had contributed to Mr. Taft's campaign, as I understand it?" PW: "I did. But again, I do not want to go into a discussion of my partners' affairs, and I shall stick to that pretty strictly, or we will never get through." JB: "I understood you also to say that no members of your firm contributed to Mr. Roosevelt's campaign." PW: "I did not say that." JB: "Oh! Did any members of the firm do that?" PW: "My answer would please you probably; but I shall not answer that, but will repeat that I will not discuss my partners' affairs." JB: "Yes. I understood you to say Saturday that you were a Republican, but when Mr. Roosevelt became a candidate, you then became a sympathizer with Mr. Wilson and supported him?" PW: "Yes." JB: "While your brother was supporting Mr. Taft?" PW: "Yes." JB: "And I was interested to know whether any member of your firm supported Mr. Roosevelt." PW: "It is a matter of record that there are." JB: "That there are some of them who did?" PW: "Oh, yes."[17](#)

In sum: some unknown members of Kuhn, Loeb donated to Roosevelt; Paul's brother (Felix) gave to Taft; and Schiff donated to Wilson. Cleverly, Paul Warburg himself admitted to no funding, but we can hardly take him at his word

here. In any case, there was a Jewish hand in all three contestants, and the Jews were guaranteed influence with the winner, no matter the outcome. We don't know the extent of this influence, nor how long it had gone on. To date I have not uncovered evidence of Jewish involvement with Roosevelt's 1904 election, although his appointment of Straus to the cabinet is typical of the kind of political patronage that follows financial support. And the same with Taft: We don't know the degree of Jewish support for his initial run in 1908, but support in 1912 suggests that they were reasonably satisfied with his performance.

But Taft turned out to be a mixed bag for the Jews. On the one hand, Jewish immigration continued apace. And he did appoint Oscar Straus to the ambassadorship to the Ottoman Empire. However, he was less inclined to act on the international stage than the Jews had wished. Of particular concern was the growing problem in Russia, and steady reports of Jewish pogroms. For example, there was the "Kishinev massacre" of April 1903; the *New York Times* reported that "Jews were slaughtered like sheep. The dead number 120... The scenes of horror attending this massacre are beyond description. Babes were literally torn to pieces by the frenzied and blood-thirsty mob" (April 28; p. 6). A slight exaggeration—the actual death toll was 47. A second attack in Kishinev in 1905 left 19 dead; regrettable, but hardly a catastrophe. In early 1910 the *NYT* ran an article, "Russian Jews in Sad Plight." Their source said, "The condition of Russian [Jews] is worse today than at any time since the barbarous massacres and pogroms of 1905 and 1906."¹⁸ Then on 18 September 1911, the Russian Prime Minister, Pyotr Stolypin, was shot and killed—by a Jewish assassin, Mordekhai Gershelevich, aka Dmitri Bogrov. (The reader will recall Herzl's demand for revolutionary action.) This of course brought even harsher recriminations.

But the last straw, for the American Zionists, was the restriction on American Jews from entering into Russia. There had been obstacles in place since the turn of the century, but they became much more stringent during Taft's presidency. The Zionists wanted the US government to take action, but this was forestalled by a long-standing treaty of 1832, one that guaranteed "reciprocal liberty of commerce and navigation" and allowed mutual freedom of entry of citizens on both sides. The Zionists thus took it upon themselves to initiate the abrogation of this treaty as a means of putting external pressure on the Czarist regime. And,

despite the wishes of President Taft and the best interests of America at large, they succeeded. This whole incident, thoroughly documented by Cohen (1963), is an astounding and watershed event in Jewish influence. As she says,

Credit for this act belongs to a small group which had campaigned publicly during 1911 for the abrogation of the treaty. How a mere handful of men succeeded in arousing American public opinion on a relatively obscure issue to a near “wave of hysteria,” how they forced the hand of an antagonistic administration, and what principal aim lay behind their fight for abrogation constitute an absorbing story of pressure politics. (p. 3)

The “mere handful of men” consisted primarily of Jewish lawyer Louis Marshall, the banker Jacob Schiff, and their colleagues at the American Jewish Committee—the ‘AIPAC’ of its day, and still a potent force a century later. They had raised the topic of abrogation as early as 1908, but it did not become a top priority until early 1910. They then approached Taft, knowing that he was preparing to run for reelection the following year. As Cohen (p. 9) says, “The quid pro quo was obvious; the Jewish leaders would try to deliver the Jewish vote to Taft.” But he was unsympathetic. Taft knew that, for several reasons, it was not in America’s favor: Our commercial interests, our Far East foreign policy, Russian good will, and our international integrity would all be harmed by abrogation. But the Jews were pressing; in February 1910 they met with Taft, to “give him one last chance” to support their cause. When he again declined, they decided to go around the president, to Congress and to the American people. They knew how to work Congress. As Cohen (p. 13) explains, “the pattern of Jewish petitions to the government...was generally that of secret diplomacy. Wealthy or politically prominent individuals asked favors...but always in the form of discreet pressure and behind-the-scenes bargaining.” But mounting a public campaign was something new.

In January 1911, Marshall “officially opened the public campaign for abrogation.” He immediately appealed not to Jewish interest—though that was the sole motive—but rather to allegedly American interests. “It is not the Jew who is insulted; it is the American people,” he said. As Shogan (2010: 22) puts it, “a key to the [Jewish] strategy was to frame its demand as a plea to protect American interests in general, not just the rights of Jews.” The AJC then embarked on a massive propaganda effort. They enlisted Jewish support in the

media; Samuel Strauss and Adolph Ochs (of the *New York Times*) helped coordinate a series of articles and op-eds in several major cities. They made the case “in popular emotional terms,” organized petitions and letter-writing programs, and held dedicated, pro-abrogation rallies—one of which included such luminaries as William Hearst and future president Woodrow Wilson.¹⁹ Everything was designed to put maximum pressure on Congress to act.

All the while, Taft remained firm in his opposition. In a private letter he wrote, “I am the President of the whole United States, and the vote of the Jews, important as it is, cannot frighten me in this matter” (Cohen, p. 21). Secretary of State Philander Knox, and Ambassador to Russia William Rockhill, both strongly supported him. Rockhill was particularly galled; expressing his thoughts, Cohen asks, “were national interests to be subservient to a small group of individuals?” After all, the actual harm was near microscopic: “Only 28 American Jews resided in Russia, and the State Dept knew of only four cases in five years where American Jews were denied admission” (p. 16). And yet this “small group of men” was turning the tide in their favor.

By November of 1911, just 11 months after launching their public campaign, the AJC was confident of victory. Schiff was able to predict easy passage for the resolution. That same month an “unofficial delegation” of Jews met with Taft regarding his pending annual message, and they convinced him that Congressional action was inevitable, and veto-proof. Taft relented, agreeing to sign the resolution when it reached his desk. Wanting no further delay, the AJC pressed for a vote before the end of year. On December 13 the House approved the measure—by the astounding tally of 301 to 1. A slightly modified version came up for Senate vote on December 19, which was passed *unanimously*. A reconciled bill was approved the next day, and Taft signed it. So it came to be that, on 20 December 1911, the US government sold its soul to the Jewish Lobby.

The importance of this event can scarcely be overestimated. The interests of “a mere handful of men,” acting on behalf of a small American minority, were able to dictate governmental foreign policy, against the express wishes of the president and his staff, and contrary to the larger interests of the nation.

The Russians, incidentally, were stunned at this decision. They knew of the

Jewish hand behind it, but could hardly believe that it had the power to carry through on its threat. The *NYT* again gives a useful report:

In parliamentary circles here [in Russia] the prevailing comment is characterized by astonishment that the American government has responded so readily to the Jewish outcry. The opinion is expressed by members of the Duma that in all probability the Jews will now attempt to force matters further. (20 Dec 1911; p. 2)

Indeed—the Jewish-led Bolshevik revolution was just six years away.

Such was the state of things in America and globally at that time. International Jewry had sufficient wealth and influence to steer events at the highest levels, and American Jews (Zionist and otherwise) had come to permeate the government—and American culture generally. The situation so impressed German economist Werner Sombart that in 1911 he made this observation: “For what we call Americanism is nothing else than the Jewish spirit distilled.”²⁰ From the perspective of a century later, this would seem truer than ever.

Wilson and the “Great War”

All this, then, serves as the context and backdrop for the emergence of Woodrow Wilson, beginning with the election of 1912. If Franklin Roosevelt was “the first great hero of American Jews,”²¹ then Wilson was the first great understudy. As Henry Ford saw it, “Mr. Wilson, while President, was very close to the Jews. His administration, as everyone knows, was predominantly Jewish.”²² Wilson seems to have been the first president to have the full backing of the Jewish Lobby, including multiple major financial donors. And he was the first to fully reward their support.

It’s worthwhile summarizing the main figures in the Jewish power structure, as of 1912. Herzl died young in 1904, so he was out of the picture. But a “mere handful” of others came to dominate the movement, and the American scene:

- *Oscar Straus* (age 62), German-born, first Jewish cabinet member under T. Roosevelt, and later ambassador to the Ottoman Empire under Taft.
- *Jacob Schiff* (65), head of the Kuhn, Loeb banking firm.
- *Louis Marshall* (56), borderline Zionist, founder of the AJC.
- The *Warburg brothers: Paul* (44) and *Felix* (41), German-born bankers. A third brother, Max, stayed in Germany (until 1938).
- *Henry Morgenthau, Sr.* (56), German-born lawyer, father of the even more influential Henry, Jr.
- *Louis Brandeis* (56), lawyer, strongly Zionist.
- *Samuel Untermyer* (54), lawyer.
- *Bernard Baruch* (42), Wall Street financier.
- *Stephen Wise* (40), Austrian-born rabbi and fervent Zionist.
- *Richard Gottheil* (50), British-born rabbi and Zionist.

These, to emphasize, were all Americans. On the European side there was a different structure, one centered on such figures as Chaim Weizmann and

Herbert Samuel in Britain, and Max Nordau in France.

Let me begin with financial backing—which of course has long been the trump card of Jewry. Many of the above individuals were prime supporters of Wilson. Cooper (2009: 172) remarks that his “big contributors” included the likes of “Henry Morgenthau, Jacob Schiff, and Samuel Untermyer, as well as a newcomer to their ranks, Bernard Baruch.” Such assistance continued throughout Wilson’s tenure; for his 1916 reelection bid, “financiers such as Henry Morgenthau and Bernard Baruch gave generously” (ibid: 350). As we saw, Schiff’s support was admitted by Warburg in his congressional testimony.

Warburg himself was very evasive, allowing only that his “sympathies went with Mr. Wilson.” Yet we can hardly believe that no money followed. Warburg’s most profound impact was his leading role in the creation of the Federal Reserve in 1913, the year Wilson took office. Seligman (1914: 387) remarks that “it may be stated without fear of contradiction that in its fundamental features the Federal Reserve is the work of Mr. Warburg more than of any other man in the country.” Its basic principles, he said, “were the creation of Mr. Warburg and of Mr. Warburg alone.” In due recognition, Wilson appointed him to the Fed’s first Board of Governors in August 1914.

Morgenthau’s influence began in 1911, when Wilson was still governor of New Jersey. Balakian (2003: 220) notes that it was at this time that the two “bonded,” and that “Morgenthau offered Wilson his ‘unreserved moral and financial support’.” In the run-up to the 1912 Democratic convention, “Morgenthau was giving \$5,000 a month to the campaign, and continued to give generously throughout the fall” (ibid.: 221). In fact, says Balakian, only a few of his wealthy Princeton classmates gave more. Ward (1989: 252) confirms this, noting that Morgenthau “had been an important backer of Woodrow Wilson in 1912.” Morgenthau duly received his reward: ambassadorship to Ottoman Turkey, again overseeing Palestine.

Of special importance was Wilson’s association with Louis Brandeis. The two first met back in 1910; Shogan (2010: 64) describes Brandeis’s “friendship with Woodrow Wilson,” noting that he had “worked mightily” for him in the 1912 campaign. In a telling statement, Wilson wrote to his friend after the election, “You were yourself a great part of the victory.”²³ Brandeis would be rewarded

by a successful nomination to the Supreme Court in June 1916—the first Jew on the court. He would serve a full 23 years, well beyond Wilson’s lifetime, and, despite his formal ‘neutrality’ as a justice, would play a vital role in both world wars.

But perhaps the most significant of all was Bernard Baruch. A millionaire before he was 30, Baruch catapulted out of nowhere, under obscure conditions, to become a leading influence in the Wilson administration. Already in 1915, in the early years of the European war, he was convinced that America would be involved. In Congressional testimony of February 1920, Baruch stated that, in 1915, he “had been very much disturbed by the unprepared condition of this country.” “I had been thinking about it very seriously, and I thought we would be drawn into the war. ... I thought a war was coming long before it did.” Through some still-mysterious process, Baruch was named to the Council of National Defense in early 1916. He then came to control a particular subcommittee, the War Industries Board (WIB), which had extraordinary wartime powers. Baruch single-handedly ran it throughout the war years. His testimony before Sen. Albert Jefferis (R-Neb.) summarizes his role:

AJ: “In what lines did this board of 10 have the powers that you mention?

BB: “We had the power of priority, which was the greatest power in the war.” AJ: “In other words, you determined what everybody could have?”

BB: “Exactly; there is no question about that. I assumed that responsibility, sir, and that final determination rested within me.” AJ:

“What?” BB: “That final determination, as the President said, rested within me; the determination of whether the Army or Navy should have it rested with me; the determination of whether the Railroad Administration could have it, or the Allies, or whether General Allenby should have locomotives, or whether they should be used in Russia, or used in France.” AJ: “You had considerable power?” BB: “Indeed I did, sir.” ...

AJ: “And all those different lines, really, ultimately, centered in you, so far as power was concerned?” BB: “Yes, sir, it did. I probably had more power than perhaps any other man did in the war; doubtless that is true.”[24](#)

An astonishing fact: a young, unelected Jew with no political experience

becomes, in time of crisis, the most powerful man in the US government, after the president himself. And yet all this was just a rehearsal. Baruch would play a similar role in the Second World War under FDR, in his Office of War Mobilization. He was also a friend and confidant of Winston Churchill. No doubt “Barney” Baruch had lots of advice for all parties involved.

World War I began in earnest in August of 1914, when the German army crossed into officially neutral Belgium on its way to France. A series of alliances and treaties triggered a chain reaction in which 10 nations entered the war by the end of that year. Ultimately another 18 would be engaged—though in the case of the US, it would be nearly two and half years later. It’s difficult today, with our present eagerness to engage in warfare around the world, to understand the degree to which Americans then were so strongly anti-interventionist. Neither the public nor the government had any real inclination to get involved in a European war. Publicly, at least, Wilson himself was a pacifist and an isolationist. In a speech of 19 August 1914, just after the outbreak of war, he proclaimed that “every man who really loves America will act and speak in the true spirit of neutrality, which is the spirit of impartiality and fairness and friendliness to all concerned.” We have a duty to be “the one great nation at peace,” and thus “we must be impartial in thought as well as in action.”²⁵

And yet, American governmental policy did not fully adhere to these lofty words. Under international law, the United States, as a neutral party, had the right to conduct commerce with all sides. But of course both Britain and Germany sought to restrict trade with the other. A British naval blockade interrupted or seized a substantial portion of our intended shipments to Germany, reducing trade by more than 90%. And yet Wilson hardly objected. On the other hand, when German submarines attacked or threatened our shipments to England, he reacted in the strongest manner. The end result was a near quadrupling of trade with the Allies between 1914 and 1916. In practical terms, we were supporting the Allied war effort, even as we remained officially neutral. Wilson’s government—if not he himself—was decidedly biased against the Germans. Not coincidentally, Wilson’s Jewish advisors were, to a man, anti-German.

By the time of the 1916 election, war was churning throughout Europe. Still,

Wilson promised to remain unengaged; he ran and won on the slogan, “He kept us out of war.” The American people too had little appetite for armed conflict; as Cooper (2009: 381) writes, “Clearly, the president was not feeling a push for war from Congress or the public.” But like so many campaign promises, this one would be discarded soon afterward—in fact, barely one month after his second inauguration.

So: Why did he do it? Why did Wilson change his mind and, on 2 April 1917, issue his famous call to Congress to declare war on Germany? His official answer: German submarines were relentlessly targeting US military, passenger, and cargo ships, and thus we simply had no choice. But this explanation does not withstand scrutiny. Early in the war the Germans were sinking a number of ships that were trafficking with the Allies, but in September 1915, after urgent demands from Wilson, they suspended submarine attacks. This suspension held for an exceptionally long time—through February 1917. And all throughout that time, we, and other “neutral” nations, were trading with Germany’s enemies, supplying them with material goods, and assisting in a naval blockade. Thus it is unsurprising that the Germans eventually resumed their attacks, on all ships in the war zone.

In his famous speech to Congress, Wilson said of the lifting of the suspension, “the Imperial German Government...put aside all restraints of law or of humanity, and uses its submarines to sink every vessel [in the war zone].” Sparing no hyperbole, he added, “The present German submarine warfare against commerce is a warfare against mankind. It is a war against all nations.”

But what are the facts? Specifically, how big a threat did Germany pose to the US? In reality, it was not much of a threat at all. From the time of the outbreak of war (August 1914) until Wilson’s declaration in April 1917, a total of three small military ships were lost—one submarine in 1915, one armored cruiser in 1916, and one protected cruiser in early 1917. Additionally, a total of 12 American merchant steamers (freight ships) were sunk in the same period, but with the loss of only 38 individual lives.²⁶ So the US had lost a grand total of 15 ships to that point. Putting this in perspective: Over the course of the entire war, German U-boats sank roughly 6,600 ships in total. Hence the threat to the US was all but inconsequential. Clearly Wilson was thinking in internationalist terms, and someone or something convinced him that realigning the global order

was more important than American public opinion; thus his famous and much-derided phrase: “The world must be made safe for democracy.” Yes—but whose democracy?

A few powerful voices opposed Wilson, including Senators Robert La Follette (R-Wisc.) and George Norris (R-Neb.). Both spoke on April 4, just two days after Wilson’s plea for war. La Follette was outraged at the unilateral action taken by the Wilson administration. In a scathing speech, he said:

I am speaking of a profession of democracy that is linked in action with the most brutal and domineering use of autocratic power. Are the people of this country being so well-represented in this war movement that we need to go abroad to give other people control of their governments? Will the President and the supporters of this war bill submit it to a vote of the people before the declaration of war goes into effect? ... Who has registered the knowledge or approval of the American people of the course this Congress is called upon to take in declaring war upon Germany? Submit the question to the people, you who support it. You who support it dare not do it, for you know that by a vote of more than ten to one the American people as a body would register their declaration against it.²⁷

Norris had some ideas about the driving forces behind the call to war. He believed that many Americans had been “misled as to the real history and the true facts, by the almost unanimous demand of the great combination of wealth that has a direct financial interest in our participation in the war.”²⁸ Wall Street bankers loaned millions to the Allies, and naturally wanted it repaid. And then there were the profits to be made from military hardware and ammunition. These same forces also held sway in the media:

[A] large number of the great newspapers and news agencies of the country have been controlled and enlisted in the greatest propaganda that the world has ever known, to manufacture sentiment in favor of war. ... [And now] Congress, urged by the President and backed by the artificial sentiment, is about to declare war and engulf our country in the greatest holocaust that the world has ever known...

Indeed—every war is a ‘holocaust.’ Norris then encapsulated his view with a

most striking line: “We are going into war upon the command of gold.” And everyone knew who held the gold.

Norris and La Follette both realized they had no chance to change the outcome. Any force that could compel abrogation of the Russian treaty and monopolize a presidential election could manufacture Congressional consent for war. Later that same day, the Senate confirmed it, by a vote of 82 to 6. Two days thereafter, the House concurred, 373 to 50. And so we were at war. American troops would be on the ground in Europe within three months.

Balfour

Political power is a strange thing; it is one of those rare cases where *appearance is reality*. If you say you have power, and *others* say you have power, and if all parties *act as if* you have power—*then you have power*. Such is the case with the Jewish Lobby. Simply because, at that time, they had no army, had internal disagreements, and in no country exceeded one or two percent of the population, we cannot conclude that they were mere helpless pawns, manipulated at will by the great powers. And yet today, modern commentators continue to refer to the ‘illusory’ or ‘misperceived’ power of the Jews at that time.²⁹ This can now be exposed as a weak attempt to whitewash the Jewish power play. When a small minority can dictate foreign policy, promote global war, and steer the outcome in their favor, then they have substantial power—no matter what anyone says. It was true in 1911; it was true in the 1912 election; and it would be clearly demonstrated once again in the case of the Balfour Declaration of 1917.

To recap: During Wilson’s first term, Jewish Americans achieved major political gains. Paul Warburg’s Federal Reserve Act was passed, and he was named to the Board. Henry Morgenthau, Sr. was nominated ambassador to Turkey, watching over Palestine. Brandeis was named to the Supreme Court. And Baruch became the second most powerful man in the land.

Jews also made important strides elsewhere in America during those four years. Two more Jewish governors were elected—Alexander in Idaho, and Bamburger in Utah. The motion-picture business witnessed the beginning of Jewish domination, with Universal Pictures (Carl Laemmle), Paramount (Zukor, Lasky, Frohmans, and Goldwyn), Fox Films (William Fox), and the early formation of “Warner” Bros. Pictures—in reality, the four Wonskolaser brothers: Hirsz, Aaron, Szmul, and Itzhak.³⁰ This development would prove useful for wartime propaganda. And the Jewish population grew by some 500,000 people.

1917 was the first year of Wilson’s second term. The European war was into its third year, and looking increasingly like a stalemate. With the German resumption of U-boat attacks on shipping to the UK and the American declaration, a true world war was in hand. And it was also a time of revolution in Russia. In fact, *two* revolutions: the worker’s uprising in February that overthrew Czar Nicholas II, and the Bolshevik revolution in October that put the

Jewish revolutionaries in power.

The role of Jews in the Russian revolution(s) is a complicated and interesting story. There isn't space here to elaborate, but in brief, the communist movement had a heavy Jewish hand from its inception. Marx, of course, was a German Jew, and his writings inspired an 18-year-old Vladimir Lenin in 1888. Lenin was himself one-quarter Jewish (maternal grandfather: Alexandr Blank). In 1898, Lenin formed a revolutionary group, the Russian Social Democratic Worker's Party (RSDWP), which was the early precursor to the Soviet Communist Party. Four years later, Lenin was joined by a full-blooded Jew, Leon Trotsky—born Lev Bronstein. Internal dissension led to a schism in 1903, at which time the RSDWP split into Bolshevik ('majority') and Menshevik ('minority') factions. Both factions were disproportionately Jewish. In addition to Lenin and Trotsky, leading Bolshevik Jews included Grigory Zinoviev, Yakov Sverdlov, Lev Kamenev (aka Rozenfeld), Karl Radek, Leonid Krassin, Alexander Litvinov, and Lazar Kaganovich. Ben-Sasson (1976: 943) observes that these men, and "others of Jewish origin...were prominent among the leaders of the Russian Bolshevik revolution." This was public knowledge, even at the time. As the *London Times* reported in 1919,

One of the most curious features of the Bolshevik movement is the high percentage of non-Russian elements amongst its leaders. Of the 20 or 30 leaders who provide the central machinery of the Bolshevik movement, not less than 75 percent are Jews. ... [T]he Jews provide the executive officers. (March 29, p. 10)

The article proceeds to list Trotsky and some 17 other individuals by name. Levin (1988: 13) notes that, at the 1907 RSDWP Congress, there were nearly 100 Jewish delegates, comprising about one third of the total. About 20% of the Mensheviks were Jews, but by 1917 they comprised eight of 17 (47%) of its Central Committee members.[31](#)

Thus it was that, in the years leading up to the 1917 revolutions, Jews were working internally and externally to overthrow the Czar. Stein (1961: 98) quotes a Zionist memo of 1914, promoting "relations with the Jews in Eastern Europe and in America, so as to contribute to the overthrow of Czarist Russia and to secure the national autonomy of the Jews." Temperley (1924: 173) noted that,

“by 1917, [Russian Jews] had done much in preparation for that general disintegration of Russian national life, later recognized as the revolution.” Ziff (1938: 56) stated the common view of the time that “Jewish influence in Russia was supposed to be considerable. Jews were playing a prominent part in the revolution...”

Surprisingly, even Winston Churchill acknowledged this fact. In 1920 he wrote an infamous essay explaining the difference between the “good” (Zionist) Jews and the “bad” Bolsheviks. This dichotomy, which was nothing less than a “struggle for the soul of the Jewish people,” made it appear almost “as if the gospel of Christ and the gospel of Antichrist were destined to originate among the same people” (1920/2002: 24). The Zionists were “national” Jews who sought only a homeland for their beleaguered people. The evil “international Jews,” the Bolsheviks, sought revolution, chaos, and even world domination. It was, said Churchill, a “sinister conspiracy.” He continued:

This movement among the Jews is not new. From the days of Spartacus-Weishaupt to those of Karl Marx, and down to Trotsky (Russia), Bela Kun (Hungary), Rosa Luxemburg (Germany), and Emma Goldman (United States), this world-wide conspiracy for the overthrow of civilization and for the reconstitution of society on the basis of arrested development, of envious malevolence, and impossible equality, has been steadily growing. ... It has been the mainspring of every subversive movement during the Nineteenth Century; and now at last this band of extraordinary personalities from the underworld of the great cities of Europe and America have gripped the Russian people by the hair of their heads and have become practically the undisputed masters of that enormous empire. (p. 25)

“There is no need to exaggerate” the Jewish role in the Russian revolution; “It is certainly a very great one. ... [T]he majority of the leading figures are Jews.” In the Soviet institutions, “the predominance of Jews is even more astonishing.” But perhaps the worst aspect was the dominant role of Judeo-terrorism. Churchill was clear and explicit:

[T]he prominent, if not indeed the principal, part in the system of terrorism applied by the Extraordinary Commissions for Combating Counter-

Revolution has been taken by Jews, and in some notable cases by Jewesses. The same evil prominence was obtained by Jews in the brief period of terror during which Bela Kun ruled in Hungary. The same phenomenon has been presented in Germany (especially in Bavaria), so far as this madness has been allowed to prey upon the temporary prostration of the German people. ... [T]he part played by the [Jews] in proportion to their numbers in the population is astonishing. (p. 26)

By this time, Churchill had been working on behalf of Zionist Jews for some 15 years. He had long counted on Jewish political support, and was rumored to be in the pay of wealthy Zionists.[32](#)

The Russian revolutions were significant, but the premier event of 1917 was surely the Balfour Declaration of November 2. This short letter from the United Kingdom's Foreign Secretary Arthur James Balfour to Baron Rothschild was remarkable: it promised to a "mere handful" of British subjects (and indirectly their coreligionists worldwide) a land that the United Kingdom did not possess, and that was part of some other empire. It is enlightening to examine the orthodox account of this event. According to the standard view, it was at this time that Britain was not only mired in the war on the Continent, but also that "British forces were fighting to win Palestine from the Ottoman Empire."[33](#) The Brits wanted it "because of its location near the Suez Canal." (In fact, of course, Palestine is more than 200 km from the Canal, separated by the whole of the Sinai Peninsula.) "The British believed the Balfour Declaration would help gain support of this goal from Jewish leaders in the UK, the United States, and other countries."

So, here are a few relevant questions: Was control of the Canal really the primary objective? Or did the British think that the Jews would help them in their broader war aims? *The Jews?*—a beleaguered minority everywhere, with no nation, no army, no "real power"? Could they really help *the British Empire*? And did they in fact help them? And if so, how?

Nothing in the documentation of the time suggests that the canal was anything more than an incidental concern. But there was clearly a larger goal—to enlist the aid of Jews everywhere, in order to help Britain win the war. Schneer (2010: 152) notes that, beginning in early 1916, the British sought to "explore seriously

some kind of arrangement with ‘world Jewry’ or ‘Great Jewry’.” A diplomatic communiqué of March 13 is explicit:

[T]he most influential part of Jewry in all the countries would very much appreciate an offer of agreement concerning Palestine... [I]t is clear that by utilizing the Zionist idea, important political results can be achieved. Among them will be the conversion, in favour of the Allies, of Jewish elements in the Orient, in the United States, and in other places... The only purpose of [His Majesty’s] Government is to find some arrangement... which might facilitate the conclusion of an agreement ensuring the Jewish support. (in Ziff 1938: 56)

Later that year, an advisor to the British government, James Malcolm, pressed this very point: that, by promising Palestine to the Zionists, they would use their influence around the world—and especially in America—to help bring about overall victory. On the face of it, this was a preposterous suggestion: that the downtrodden Jewish minority, and in particular the even smaller minority of *Zionist Jews*, could do anything to alter events in a world war.

And yet that quickly became the official view of the British government—particularly so when David Lloyd George became prime minister in December 1916. Lloyd George was, from the Zionist perspective, a nearly ideal leader. He had been working with them since 1903.³⁴ He strongly believed in their near-mythic influence. And he was a devout Christian Zionist, making him an ideological compatriot. Immediately upon assuming office, Lloyd George directed his staff—in particular, Mark Sykes and Lord Arthur Balfour—to negotiate Jewish support. MacMillan explains:

From [early] 1917, with Lloyd George’s encouragement, Sykes met privately with Weizmann and other Zionists. The final, and perhaps most important, factor in swinging British support behind the Zionists was to make propaganda among Jews, particularly in the United States, which had *not yet come into the war*, and in Russia... (2003: 416; my italics)

And as if the stalled war wasn’t motivation enough, rumors were soon flying that the Zionists were also soliciting *German* support; the Jews, it seems, were willing to sell their services to the highest bidder.³⁵ When these rumors reached

London, “the British government moved with speed” (ibid). And with speed they did. With Brandeis’s input, a first draft of the brief statement was completed in July. A second draft appeared in mid-October, and by the end of that month Balfour was ready to make public his Government’s stance: “from a purely diplomatic and political point of view, it was desirable that some declaration favourable to the aspirations of the Jewish nationalists should now be made. ... If we could make a declaration favourable to such an ideal, we should be able to carry on extremely useful propaganda both in Russia and America.”³⁶ Three days later, they did.

But most striking was the implication that the “mere handful” of Zionist Jews in England could actually be a decisive factor in bringing a reluctant US into the global war. If successful, this would dramatically swing the military balance of power. And via Wilson’s Jewish advisors—most notably Baruch and Brandeis—they had the ear of the president. But could they do it?

Unquestionably, the Brits thought they could—and that they *did*. This is such an astonishing manifestation of Jewish power that it is worth reviewing the opinions of several commentators. Speaking after the war, on 4 July 1922, Churchill argued for full implementation of the famous Declaration:

Pledges and promises were made during the War... They were made because it was considered they would be of value to us in our struggle to win the War. It was considered that the support which the Jews could give us all over the world, and particularly in the United States, and also in Russia, would be a definite palpable advantage. (in Gilbert 2007: 78-79)

In his monumental six-volume study of the 1919 Paris Peace Conference, British historian Howard Temperley (1924) made this observation:

It was believed that if Great Britain declared for the fulfillment of Zionist aspirations in Palestine under her own pledge, one effect would be to bring Russian Jewry to the cause of the Entente [Allies]. It was believed, also, that such a declaration would have a potent influence upon world Jewry in the same way, and secure for the Entente the aid of Jewish financial interests. It was believed, further, that it would greatly influence American opinion in favour of the Allies. Such were the chief considerations which,

during the later part of 1916 and the next ten months of 1917, impelled the British Government towards making a contract with Jewry. (1924, vol. 6: 173)

We must bear in mind that the Declaration was issued *seven months after* US entry into the war. But Temperley is unequivocal: the deal was concluded “during the later part of 1916,” well *before* Wilson’s decision to go to war. Apparently the deal was this: bring the US into the war, and we will promise you your Jewish homeland. Such was the “contract with Jewry.”

Sensing the importance, Temperley reiterates the point, to drive it home: “That it is in purpose a definite contract with Jewry is beyond question. ... In spirit it is a pledge that, in return for services to be rendered by Jewry, the British Government would ‘use their best endeavours’ to secure... Palestine.” And in fact, it was a good deal all around. “The Declaration certainly rallied world Jewry, as a whole, to the side of the Entente... [T]he services of Jewry were not expected in vain, and were...well worth the price which had to be paid” (p. 174). Britain’s price was low: a spit of land far from the home country. True, there would be Arab resistance, but the Brits were used to that. A much higher price would be paid by Germany and the Central Powers, and by America—who would expend hundreds of millions of dollars, and suffer 116,000 war dead.

A Zionist insider, Samuel Landman, wrote a detailed and explicit account of these events in 1936. After noting some preliminary attempts in 1916, he remarks on the significance of Malcolm’s involvement. Malcolm knew that Wilson “always attached the greatest possible importance to the advice of a very prominent Zionist, Mr. Justice Brandeis...” (p. 4). Malcolm was able to convince Sykes and French ambassador Georges Picot that

the best and perhaps the only way...to induce the American President to come into the war was to secure the cooperation of Zionist Jews by promising them Palestine, and thus enlist and mobilize the hitherto unsuspectedly powerful forces of the Zionist Jews in America and elsewhere in favour of the Allies on a *quid pro quo* basis.

Granted, Landman was not an unbiased observer, and had good reason to exaggerate Zionist influence. But that was not the case with the British Royal

Palestine Commission, which issued a report in 1937. At the critical stage of the war, “it was believed that Jewish sympathy or the reverse would make a substantial difference one way or the other to the Allied cause. In particular, Jewish sympathy would confirm the support of American Jewry...” (p. 23). The report then quotes Lloyd George:

The Zionist leaders gave us a definite promise that, if the Allies committed themselves to...a national home for the Jews in Palestine, they would do their best to rally Jewish sentiment and support throughout the world to the Allied cause. They kept their word.

Two years after this report, in 1939, the British contemplated starting a war with Germany. Churchill wrote a memo for his War Cabinet, reminding them that

it was not for light or sentimental reasons that Lord Balfour and the Government of 1917 made the promises to the Zionists which have been the cause of so much subsequent discussion. The influence of American Jewry was rated then as a factor of the highest importance, and we did not feel ourselves in such a strong position as to be able to treat it with indifference. (in Gilbert 2007: 165)

The implication, of course, was that the British might once again need Jewish help to defeat the Germans. Having been goaded into war in 1939 by Roosevelt and his Jewish advisors,³⁷ the British were becoming desperate once again to draw in the Americans. As David Irving reports, it was in late 1941 that Weizmann and his fellow British Zionists began “promising to use their influence in Washington to bring the United States into the war” (2001: 73). Irving quotes from an amazingly blunt letter from Weizmann to Churchill, promising to do again in this war what they did in the last:

There is only one big ethnic group [in America] which is willing to stand, to a man, for Great Britain, and a policy of ‘all-out aid’ for her: the five million Jews. From [Treasury] Secretary Morgenthau [Henry, Jr.], Governor [Herbert] Lehman, Justice Frankfurter, down to the simplest Jewish workman or trader... It has been repeatedly acknowledged by British Statesmen that it was the Jews who, in the last war, effectively helped to tip the scales in America in favour of Great Britain. They are

keen to do it—and may do it—again. (p. 77)

So here we have Weizmann explicitly naming the influential Jews with the power to bring Roosevelt and the United States into a war in which it, once again, had no compelling interest. The letter was dated September 10, 1941. Churchill did not have to wait long. Within 90 days, America would be at war.

The Jewish Hand in the World Wars, Part 2

Thomas Dalton

In [Part 1 of this article](#), I provided an account of the Jewish role in the events leading up to World War One, with an emphasis on their influence in the UK and United States. Woodrow Wilson was shown to be the first American president elected with the full backing of the Jewish lobby, and he responded by granting them leading roles in his administration. They were also seen as having decisive influence at the time of Wilson's declaration of war in April 1917. On the British side, Prime Minister David Lloyd George was a Christian Zionist and ideological compatriot of the Jews, and equally eager to support their aims. Britain leveraged Jewish support through the Balfour Declaration of November 1917, which promised the Zionists a homeland in Palestine; it was their reward for their having brought the US into the conflict some seven months earlier.

Such actions were shown to be part of a long-standing historical trend: one of Jewish activists and agitators inciting turmoil and war whenever they stood to benefit. This tendency, which reaches back to the days of the Roman Empire, suggests a callous disregard for the lives and well-being of non-Jewish populations.

Wars, of course, are not only events of great death and destruction; they provide tremendous opportunity for financial profit, and for dramatic shifts in global power structures. For those in the right position, warfare can yield extreme gains in wealth and influence. Specifically, the events surrounding the First World War brought substantial gains to Jews worldwide—in several ways. First, with highly-placed individuals in the Taft and Wilson administrations, the US was very amenable to Jewish immigration; in fact their numbers increased dramatically, from 1.5 million to over 3 million between 1905 and 1920—on the way to 4 million by the mid-1920s. Second was the Balfour Declaration, which promised them Palestine. Granted, nothing was immediately delivered as to Palestine, but even so, it was a major concession by a world power. Third, the world order was changed in their favor: the hated and “anti-Semitic” Czarist rule

in Russia was replaced by the Jewish-led Bolshevik movement, the hated and “anti-Semitic” Kaiser Wilhelm II of Germany was replaced by the Jewish-friendly Weimar regime, and the Jewish-influenced governments of the US and Great Britain reestablished their global dominance.

Finally, and as always, there was money to be made. Running the War Industries Board for Wilson, Jewish Financier Bernard Baruch had extraordinary power to direct military spending; we can be sure that his preferred clients benefitted.¹ But perhaps Nebraska Senator George Norris said it best. Speaking in opposition to Wilson’s call for a war declaration, Norris exclaimed that Americans were being deceived “by the almost unanimous demand of the great combination of wealth that has a direct financial interest in our participation in the war.” Furthermore, “a large number of great newspapers and news agencies of the country have been controlled and enlisted in the greatest propaganda that the world has ever known, to manufacture sentiment in favor of war.” Summarizing his case, Norris said this: “We are going into war upon the command of gold.”² Finance, media, ‘gold’—Jewish interests prospered on many fronts.

But Wilson was evidently unaffected by such matters, or by his pledge to his fellow Americans to “keep us out of war.” His team of Jewish backers and advisors—Baruch, but also Henry Morgenthau Sr., Jacob Schiff, Samuel Untermyer, Paul Warburg, Stephen Wise, and Louis Brandeis—wanted war, and war they got. The fact that it would cost America \$250 billion (current equivalent), and some 116,000 war dead, did not seem to figure into their calculations.

The main topic of the present essay is World War Two, but its roots lie in the outcome of the First World War. I therefore continue the story from that time.

Some Context

Before proceeding, we must bear something in mind. The striving of Jews for greater influence and political power is to be found on both of the sides of World War I. Russian imperial leaders had long been suspicious of the Jews, and largely banished them to the so-called Pale of Settlement that was established in western Russia in the 1790s. Beginning in the 1880s, western media issued exaggerated reports of slaughters, pogroms, and assorted massacres among the Russian Jews there, whose numbers were nearly always recorded—astonishingly—as “6 million.”³

This naturally generated deep hostility toward the House of Romanov, and the Jews sought its demise. Special animosity was reserved for Czar Nicholas II, who assumed power in 1894. In Part 1, I explained the stunningly successful effort of the American Jewish lobby to abrogate the long-standing US-Russia treaty in 1911; this was a small punishment aimed at the Czar. The ultimate goal, though, was his overthrow, and thus we can imagine the joy of the global Jewish community at his fall in March 1917. As we recall, the Czar and his family were then murdered by Jewish Bolsheviks in July of the following year.

It was a somewhat similar story with the German ruler Wilhelm II, who rose to power in 1888. There, however, Jews were prosperous and enjoyed a relatively high degree of freedom—despite the Kaiser’s evident personal dislike of them.⁴ Previously I cited some impressive statistics by Sarah Gordon regarding their numbers in law, media, business, and academia, all prior to World War I. In the banking sector, they utterly flourished; prominent German-Jewish banking families included the well-known Rothschilds and Warburgs, but also the Mendelssohns, Bleichroeders, Speyers, Oppenheims, Bambergers, Gutmanns, Goldschmidts, and Wassermanns. But despite their wealth and success, Jews had no access to political power, owing to the hereditary monarchy. This, for them, was unacceptable. Thus they had to introduce “democracy”—with all due high-minded values, of course. Only through a democratic system could they exert direct influence on political leadership.

Consequently, as soon as the Czar fell in Russia, calls came out to repeat the success in Germany. On 19 March 1917, four days after the Czar’s ouster, the *New York Times* reported on Louis Marshall lauding the event, and adding that “the revolt against autocracy might be expected to spread to Germany.” Two

days later, Jewish speakers at Madison Square Garden “predict[ed] an uprising in Germany.” As the article explains, “[some] predicted that the revolution of the working classes of Russia was the forerunner of similar revolutions the world over. That the next revolution would be in Germany was predicted by a number of the speakers” (March 21). On March 24, Jacob Schiff took credit for helping to finance the Russian revolution. At the same time, Rabbi Stephen Wise put the blame for the pending American entry into WWI on “German militarism,” adding “I would to God it were possible for us to fight side by side with the German people for the overthrow of Hohenzollernism [i.e., Kaiser Wilhelm].”

Strangely enough, Wise got his wish. Within two weeks, America was in the war. And about 18 months later, Wilhelm would suffer defeat and be compelled to abdicate.

The Paris Peace Conference

Having won the war, Wilson's Jewish team was anxious to dictate the peace. "As it turned out," remarks Robert Shogan (2010: 25), "the war would bring benefits to the Zionist cause, in part because of Brandeis' role as a trusted advisor [to Wilson]." The victorious nations convened in Paris in January 1919, and the American Jewish Congress was there as its own delegation. Shogan adds that "[Stephen] Wise was in Paris, on assignment from President Wilson to head the Zionist delegation to the peace talks." (One might reasonably ask: Why do Zionists get their own delegation at all?) Louis Marshall was also prominent there among the American Jews.

The Jewish aim was neither a just implementation of peace, nor fair treatment of Germany, but rather to maximize benefit to the various Jewish communities of Europe and the US. "At the beginning of 1919," says Ben-Sasson (1976: 940), "diplomatic activity in Paris became the main focus of the various attempts to fulfill Jewish aspirations." Fink (1998: 259) concurs: "In March 1919, pro-Zionist and nationalist Jewish delegations arrived in Paris." Nearly every victorious nation, it seems, had its own Jewish representatives. Some sought formal and explicit Jewish rights in their own nations, and others worked for recognition of a Jewish national state. Polish Jews were notable beneficiaries; they succeeded in achieving explicit mention in the Polish Treaty for Minority Rights.

Writing shortly after the event, Irish philosopher and journalist Emile Dillon saw it this way:

Of all the collectivities whose interests were furthered at the Conference, the Jews had perhaps the most resourceful and certainly the most influential exponents. There were Jews from Palestine, from Poland, Russia, the Ukraine, Rumania, Greece, Britain, Holland, and Belgium; but the largest and most brilliant contingent was sent by the United States. (1920: 12)

Describing the American side, Fink explains that "the fervent Zionist Julius Mack and the more moderate Louis Marshall quickly overshadowed the leading American anti-nationalists, Henry Morgenthau, Oscar Straus, and Cyrus Adler."

Though he was predisposed to be sympathetic to the Jewish plight, Dillon nonetheless noted that a “religious” or “racial” bias “lay at the root of Mr. Wilson’s policy” (496). It is a fact, he said, “that a considerable number of delegates believed that the real influences behind the Anglo-Saxon peoples were Semitic.” Summarizing prospects for the future, he remarked on the general conclusion by many at Paris: “Henceforth the world will be governed by the Anglo-Saxon peoples, who, in turn, are swayed by their Jewish elements.”

Among non-Jewish Americans there was a young Herbert Hoover, then-Secretary of the US Food Administration, and of course, future president. He was accompanied by a Jewish assistant, the financier Lewis Strauss, who remarked on his boss’s notable inclination to “champion Jewish rights,” especially in Poland.⁵ Strauss would later become instrumental in funding early development of the atomic bomb.

Treatment of the Germans at the conference, as is well known, was brutally harsh. They expected, and were promised, that the conference would be a fair settlement of the legitimate war claims of all belligerents—particularly given the complex and convoluted nature of the outbreak of hostilities. (We recall: the Archduke was assassinated by a Serb in June 1914; the Russian army mobilized and massed on the German border in July; a threatened Germany declared war on Russia in August; a Franco-Russian Pact required a simultaneous declaration against France; and Britain declared war on Germany as soon as its army crossed into Belgium.) By the time of the Peace Conference, Wilson and his team had decided that Germany alone was responsible for the war, and thus had to bear the full burden of reparations.⁶ The impossible conditions forced upon them set the stage for the rise of National Socialism and the next great war.

All in all, what emerges from the first war and the subsequent peace conference is a picture of British and American supplication to Jewish interests. Indeed, the prime beneficiaries of the war were Jews, both in America and in Europe generally. For Germany, it was obviously a disastrous event; it suffered some 2 million military deaths along with thousands of indirect civilian losses, crushing financial debts, and witnessed the end of the 900-year reign of the House of Hohenzollern. This was a tragedy for a nation that, according to Fay (1928: 552), “did not plot a European war, did not want one, and made genuine...efforts to avert one.”

America, which had no legitimate interest in the battles in Europe, was drawn in by Wilson's compliance with Jewish demands. For his part, Wilson comes across as something of an amoral political schemer. MacMillan (2010: 7) describes his close, "possibly romantic," relationships with several other women during his first marriage. Theodore Roosevelt viewed him "as insincere and cold-blooded an opportunist as we have ever had in the presidency" (ibid: 6). To Lloyd-George, he was "tactless, obstinate, and vain." Granted, we all have our faults; but for most of us, they do not lead to national catastrophe.

The Jewish Revolutions

With the fall of Czar Nicholas in March 1917, and upon the Bolshevik revolution of October that same year, Jewish revolutionaries became particularly active in East and Central Europe. Flush with success in Russia, they hoped to duplicate events in other countries. Ben-Sasson provides a typically understated account:

The new forces that emerged in many countries...opened up new horizons of activity for Jewish statesmen of liberal-democratic propensities, particularly those with radical-revolutionary views. ... Jews were also extremely active in the socialist parties that came to power or attained political importance in many European countries. They were even more prominent in the communist parties that split from the socialists... In short, never before in European history had so many Jews played such an active part in political life and filled such influential roles... (1976: 943)

In other words, Jewish anarchists and militant communists (“new forces”) conducted violent insurrection (“new horizons of activity”) aimed at overthrowing the ruling governments, and installing Jewish-led regimes. Bermant (1977: 160) confirms this point: “most of the leading revolutionaries who convulsed Europe in the final decades of the last [19th] century and the first decades of [the 20th], stemmed from prosperous Jewish families.” This again is in keeping with the longstanding trend of Jewish rebellion.

Not that any of this was news; major politicians of the time knew it well. Lord Balfour, for example, once remarked to Wilson’s aide Edward House that “nearly all Bolshevism and disturbances of a like nature, are directly traceable to the Jews of the world. They seem determined either to have what they want or to upset present civilization”⁷—a concise and accurate summary.

Consider Hungary, for example. There, a Hungarian Jew named Bela Kun (Kohn) founded and led the local wing of the Russian Communist Party in early 1918—which later became an independent entity. Along with Jewish colleagues Matyas Rakosi (Roth/Rosenfeld) and Otto Korvin (Klein), Kun’s party organized numerous strikes, and conducted violent and subversive attacks against President Karolyi and the ruling Social Democrats. In March 1919

Karolyi resigned, and the SD Party made an alliance of necessity with Kun's communists, in the hope of leveraging his connections to the Russian Bolsheviks. Kun agreed, on the condition that the government reestablish itself as the "Hungarian Soviet Republic"—which it did.

Kun dominated the new government, filling many top seats with Jews; as Muller (2010: 153) explains, "Of the government's 49 commissars, 31 were of Jewish origin."⁸ He fended off a coup attempt in June, and then conducted what came to be known as the "Red Terror"; this was a paramilitary group, led by Jewish ideologues Georg Lukacs and Tibor Szamuely, that hunted down and killed members of the local opposition. Unfortunately for Kun, ongoing conflicts with neighboring Romania led to an invasion of Hungary, and the promised Russian aid never materialized. Kun and his fellow Jews were driven out in August, just 133 days after taking power.

It was not only Russia and Hungary that had problems. "Jews had a prominent role in Communist parties elsewhere," explains Bermant (172). In Poland, for example, "about a quarter of party members and about a third of delegates to party congresses were Jews." The Polish Communists were unable, however, to generate sufficient force to oust the newly-established government of Jozef Pilsudski.

It was in Germany, though, that the most significant actions occurred, ones that would have a lasting effect. We need to recall events at the end of World War I. Long a stalemate, the war had essentially become a battle of attrition. American forces on the ground in mid to late 1917 threatened to change things, but for the Germans, the western front generally held up—even to the very end. At no point in time did it ever retreat into German territory. But even though the Germans were able to hold out, their allies could not. Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire surrendered by the end of October 1918. Austria-Hungary yielded in early November. For the Germans, though, the last straw was their problems at home—with the Jews.

Trouble began with a minor naval mutiny in late October and early November 1918, at the ports of Kiel and Wilhelmshaven. A number of sailors, workers, and Jews from the Independent Social Democratic Party (USPD) joined forces to conduct a nonviolent rebellion against the Kaiser. The German rebels simply

wanted the war to end, whereas the Jewish rebels sought power; in this sense it was a natural alliance. The “rebellion”—primarily in the form of a general strike—quickly spread, reaching Munich within a matter of days. In an attempt to cut short this action, the majority Social Democrats (SPD) called on the Kaiser to abdicate, at which time they would form a republican government. On November 9, they prevailed; Wilhelm stepped down and a new “German Republic” was proclaimed. It was this new leadership that signed the armistice agreement on November 11, ending the war.

The USPD rebels, however, had their own plans. On the very same day that the German Republic was created, they declared the formation of a “Free Socialist Republic.” This group had an almost entirely Jewish leadership: Rosa Luxemburg, Hugo Haase, Karl Liebknecht (half-Jewish), Leo Jogiches, Karl Radek (Sobelsohn), and Alexander Parvus (Gelfand/Helphand) were the dominant figures. And these were just the activists centered in Berlin. In Munich, other Jewish rebels were conducting a separate, simultaneous revolution, aimed at creating a Bavarian communist state. The leading USPD revolutionary there was a Jewish journalist, Kurt Eisner. On November 7, he demanded the abdication of the local monarch, King Ludwig III. The king fled on the following day, and Eisner declared himself “Minister-President” of a free Bavarian state.

Soon enough, though, Eisner’s luck ran out. On 21 February 1919, he was assassinated by a fellow Jew, Anton Arco-Valley. Within a few weeks, other USPD Jews regained power and established a Bavarian Soviet Republic—the third in Europe, behind Russia and Hungary. Its leader was the Jewish playwright Ernst Toller. Among his group were the noted Jewish anarchists Gustav Landauer and Erich Muehsam. Through sheer incompetency, Toller’s government managed to get usurped by yet another Jewish faction, one led by Eugen Levine and the half-Jew Otto Neurath. Levine attempted to institute a true communist system, including its own “Red Army” modeled on the Russians’. But once again, his success was short-lived. Remnants of the old German army quickly intervened, deposing the communists in early May.

Things did not end well for the Jewish rebels. Levine was captured and executed, as was Landauer. Toller, Muehsam, Radek, Parvus, and Neurath managed to escape. Luxemburg and Liebknecht were shot by German soldiers in

January, and Jogiches died under mysterious circumstances in March. Haase was killed by a deranged worker in November of that same year.

But that was far from the end of their influence in Germany. The USPD was reconstituted as the German Communist Party (KPD), under the leadership of Paul Levi. The ruling SPD had meanwhile joined forces with the moderate German Democratic Party (DDP), convening in January 1919 in the city of Weimar to create a constitutional form of government. Jews were front and center in both of these parties: Otto Landesberg, Eduard Bernstein, and Rudolf Hilferding in the SPD, and Walter Rathenau in the DDP; Rathenau was eventually named as German Foreign Minister.⁹ His Jewish colleague, Hugo Preuss, wrote the Weimar constitution. This Jewish influence was well described by a philo-Semitic and Pulitzer Prize winning American journalist, Edgar Mowrer. Writing in 1933, he noted that

a large number of Jews entered the Social Democratic Party [SPD] which inherited power as a result of the [November] Revolution. Other Jews flocked to the Democratic Party [DDP], a group which certainly overlooked no chance to favor the interests of trade, banking and the stock exchange... (1933: 227)

It is interesting that then, as now, they seem to have covered all the bases: liberal, left-wing Jews dominated the SPD, and capitalist, right-wing Jews dominated the DDP. Thus, no matter which party emerged with control, Jews retained influence. Confirming my earlier statements, Mowrer added that “a number of outspoken revolutionary leaders, Rosa Luxemburg in Berlin, Erich Muehsam and Ernst Toller in Munich, were Jews.” He continued:

In post-war politics any number of Jews rose to leadership. Both in the Reich and in the Federal States, Jews, particularly Social Democrats, became Cabinet Ministers. In the bureaucracy, the Jews rose rapidly to leading positions, and until about 1930 their number seemed on the increase.

Summing up the situation, he observed that, “in short, after the Revolution, the Jews came in Germany to play in politics and administration that same considerable part that they had previously won by open competition in business, trade, banking, the Press, the arts, the sciences, and the intellectual and cultural

life of the country” (228).

The new Weimar Republic was duly signed into law in August 1919. Unsurprisingly, it was notably friendly to German Jews, removing all remnants of legal obstructions, and granting them full access to business, academia, and government—the very process that Mowrer described. As Lavsky (1996: 41) says, “All remaining discrimination was abolished and there were no restrictions on participation in German public life.” The vital role played by Weimar Jews is concisely explained by Walter Laqueur:

Without the Jews there would have been no ‘Weimar culture’—to this extent the claims of the antisemites, who detested that culture, were justified. They were in the forefront of every new daring, revolutionary movement. They were prominent among Expressionist poets, among the novelists of the 1920s, among the theatrical producers and, for a while, among the leading figures of the cinema. They owned the leading liberal newspapers such as the *Berliner Tageblatt*, the *Vossische Zeitung* and the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, and many editors were Jews too. Many leading liberal and avant-garde publishing houses were in Jewish hands (S. Fischer, Kurt Wolff, the Cassirers, Georg Bondi, Erich Reiss, the Malik Verlag). Many leading theatre critics were Jews, and they dominated light entertainment. (1974: 73)

Laqueur, however, does not explain that the celebrated “Weimar culture” was perhaps best known for its licentiousness, promiscuity, and general moral depravity.¹⁰ “They established themselves in the universities, civil service, law, business, banking, and the free professions,” adds Lavsky. “Certain spheres were virtually monopolized by the Jews, and their contribution to journalism, literature, theater, music, the plastic arts, and entertainment was considerable.”

It was this very centrality of Jews to social upheaval, the November Revolution, and the new Weimar Republic that led three German activists and intellectuals—Anton Drexler, Gottfried Feder, and Dietrich Eckart—to found the *Deutsche Arbeiterpartei* (DAP) in January 1919. This would be the forerunner to the National Socialist DAP (NSDAP), or Nazi Party. One of their first recruits was a distraught 30-year-old former soldier, Adolf Hitler.

In *Mein Kampf*, Hitler describes in painful, personal detail how the young

German men went to fight and die on the front lines, even as the Jewish activists and rebels undermined the imperial government back home. Calling them “hoary criminals,” he adds that, all the while, “these perjured criminals were making preparations for a revolution” (I.5).¹¹ Upon a medical leave from the front in October 1916, he describes the situation in Munich:

Anger, discontent, complaints met one’s ears wherever one went. ... The administrative offices were staffed by Jews. Almost every clerk was a Jew and every Jew was a clerk. ... In the business world the situation was even worse. Here the Jews had actually become ‘indispensable.’ Like leeches, they were slowly sucking the blood from the pores of the national body. ... Hence as early as 1916-1917 practically all production was under the control of Jewish finance. (I.7)

Hitler returned to the front in March 1917, and was struck by a mustard gas attack in October of the following year. The gas severely burned his eyes, sending him to a military hospital for recovery. It was there that he first heard about the revolution. The Jewish-Marxist “gang of despicable and depraved criminals” had led the overthrow of the Emperor and were attempting to take direct power themselves. Their revolts would be transitory, but the Jewish-influenced Weimar regime would soon take control of the nation, and this was scarcely any better. It was these events that led Hitler to become politically active.

The Interwar Period and Emergence of FDR

1920 was a year of some importance. The Hitler-led NSDAP was formally established in February. That same month, a 46-year-old Winston Churchill penned his infamous article “Zionism versus Bolshevism,” in which he decried the pernicious role of Jewish Marxists such as Trotsky, Kun, Luxemburg, and the American Emma Goldman.¹² And in the US, Henry Ford had just begun his two-year series on the “International Jew.”

The following year, in late 1921, Ford recalled his past efforts to bring a peaceful end to WWI.¹³ During that earlier time, he says, “it was the Jews themselves that convinced me of the direct relation between the international Jew and war.”

[They explained to me] the means by which the Jew controlled the war, how they had the money, how they had cornered all the basic materials needed to fight the war... They said...that the Jews had started the war; that they would continue it as long as they wished, and that until the Jew stopped the war, it could not be stopped. (*New York Times*, 5 December 1921, p. 33)

This was a recurrent theme in Ford’s “International Jew” series.

Meanwhile across the ocean, Lenin (a quarter-Jew) and his Jewish Bolshevik colleagues established the Soviet Union in December of 1922. The next year, Hitler and others within the NSDAP launched a failed coup attempt in Bavaria, leading to his 12-month imprisonment and consequent writing of *Mein Kampf*. In early 1924, both Lenin and Woodrow Wilson died within a month of each other.

Little of note occurred during the mid- to late-1920s. Jewish immigration into the US continued to expand, with their numbers surpassing 4.3 million by 1927. Jews made further inroads into Hollywood; Marcus Loew acquired MGM studios, the Cohn brothers took over at Columbia Broadcasting System, and David Sarnoff founded RKO Pictures. In the political sphere, the Republican and Christian Zionist Herbert Hoover won the presidential election of 1928, and a relatively unknown Democrat, Franklin D. Roosevelt, won the governorship of New York.

From the start, FDR had close and persistent ties to American Jews—ties that would prove decisive to his actions in the Second World War. His running mate in New York was Herbert Lehman, the son of German Jews. (His Republican opponent, Jewish Attorney General Albert Ottinger, failed to draw the Jewish vote that FDR did; this says something about the strength of FDR’s connection to that group.) Upon assuming the governorship, Roosevelt “filled a number of key positions from the state’s large Jewish population,” according to Shogan (2010: 5). One of his first major appointments was his longtime friend Henry Morgenthau Jr. to the New York State Agriculture Committee. He also named a former speechwriter, Samuel Rosenman, as “counsel to the governor.” Both would play important roles in his presidency.

Other Jews, though, also had an interest in FDR—notably, Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis and his protégé, Harvard lawyer Felix Frankfurter. Even prior to his gubernatorial win in New York, “Brandeis alerted Frankfurter to his eagerness to connect with the man he believed would someday be the nation’s president” (ibid: 72). And indeed, “for the next four years Brandeis was content to rely on Frankfurter to be his conduit to the governor’s chambers in Albany.”

The same election that put Roosevelt in the governor’s seat placed Hoover in the presidency. As I noted earlier, he had long championed Jewish interests. As president, Hoover did his part for the Hebrews, naming Eugene Meyer Fed Chairman in 1930, and appointing the second Jewish justice, Benjamin Cardozo, to the Supreme Court in March 1932. But by then the Great Depression was well underway, dooming any chance for reelection.

FDR's Jewish Ancestry?

Before turning to FDR's long and historic stint as president, I want to recall a question I raised in Part 1 of the present series: Was Roosevelt Jewish? Previously I noted that his fifth cousin Theodore claimed to be Jewish, according to former Michigan governor Chase Osborn. I have yet to find any independent confirmation of this assertion, though there seems to be no reason why Osborn would lie about such a thing. Both were good Republicans, after all. But more to the point, Osborn would have much to say about FDR, as I will explain momentarily.

Regarding Franklin, he left many clues to a possible Jewish heritage, beginning as far back as 1914. In a letter to a friend upon the birth of his son Franklin Jr., he wrote that he had considered naming him Isaac—a classic Jewish name, and one shared by both his grandfather and great-great-grandfather. But the family resisted: “this name is not met with enthusiasm, especially as the baby's nose is slightly Hebraic and the family have visions of Ikey Rosenvelt, though I insist it is very good New Amsterdam Dutch.”¹⁴ For Shogan this is a sign of latent anti-Semitism, but I find that an unlikely excuse. What true anti-Semite would admit that his newborn son looked Jewish? Or would contemplate a Jewish name? More likely it was an inside joke, of the kind that people might say to family or close friends about a particular ethnic heritage within one's own background.

Twenty years later, another clue. In 1934, now-president FDR gave a photo of himself and Henry Morgenthau to Henry's wife. It bore this inscription: “For Elinor from one of two of a kind.”¹⁵ Yes, but two of *what* kind? Democrats? Americans? Jews? An oddly suggestive remark.

That same year saw the publication of an enlightening interview with Osborn, one that would initiate a prolonged discussion on FDR's heritage. The 8 February 1934 edition of the *St. Petersburg (Fla.) Times* carried an interview in which Osborn claimed that the Roosevelts were descended from the Rossacampos, a Jewish family expelled from Spain in 1620. That family spread out into Europe and altered their spelling according to the various places where they took root: Rosenberg, Rosenblum, Rosenthal, and in Holland, Rosenvelt. “The Rosenvelts in north Holland finally became Roosevelt,” claimed Osborn—which in fact seems to be true: the family patriarch, Claes van Rosenvelt, immigrated to the US in 1649. His son Nicholas apparently dropped the ‘van’

and changed the spelling to the standard form.

A small Michigan publication, *Civic Echo*, picked up and repeated the story soon thereafter. A year later, Jewish journalist and publisher Philip Slomovitz came across the *Echo* story, and decided to write directly to FDR to get his opinion. On 7 March 1935 the president responded:

I am grateful to you for your interesting letter of March fourth. I have no idea as to the source of the story which you say came from my old friend, Chase Osborn. ... In the dim distant past they [the Roosevelts] may have been Jews or Catholics or Protestants—what I am more interested in is whether they were good citizens and believers in God—I hope they were both. (cited in Slomovitz 1981: 5)

Once again this is a suspiciously circumspect reply by FDR. For him to say that his relatives “may have been Jews” sounds very much as if he knows this truth, does not want to openly acknowledge it, but cannot quite bring himself to lie about it.

Slomovitz planned to publish the reply in his *Detroit Jewish Chronicle*. Before he could do so, the *New York Times* got wind of it and carried the text in their issue of March 15—on page 1.

Slomovitz passed this reply on to Osborn, who repeated his original assertion in a return letter of March 21: “President Roosevelt knows well enough that his ancestors were Jewish. I heard Theodore Roosevelt state twice that his ancestors were Jewish. Once was to me when I asked him about it after he had made a pleasing euphemistic statement in a speech to a Jewish gathering” (ibid: 6-7). Osborn is adamant. And it is important to note that he does *not* take this Jewish heritage as a slur; in fact, quite the opposite. He is evidently a Christian Zionist (and Republican), and thus views it as a redeeming quality. As such, he would likely not cast the Democrat Franklin in this positive light unless he actually believed it to be true. It seems that he was talking from a factual, if unconfirmed, basis.

If Slomovitz was inclined to doubt Osborn’s claim, another letter would soon fortify his belief. On March 27 he received a note from none other than Rabbi Stephen Wise of New York City. Wise had evidently seen the *New York Times* story, and wrote to confirm it. In his letter he recounts an “almost literal

transcript” given to him by his wife, who had previously attended a luncheon with Roosevelt’s wife Eleanor—who said the following: “Often cousin Alice and I say that all the brains in the Roosevelt family comes [sic] from our Jewish great-grandmother” (ibid: 9). She then allegedly added a name, ‘Esther Levy.’ The Alice in question was the oldest child of Theodore; Eleanor’s father Elliot was his brother. Their common great-grandmother would have been either Margaret Barnhill or Martha Stewart—neither of whom appears to be Jewish, unfortunately. And we have no record of any Esther Levy in the Roosevelt lineage. A bit of a mystery.

The letter then takes a little twist. Eleanor continued: “Whenever mention is made of our Jewish great-grandmother by cousin Alice or myself, Franklin’s mother [Sara Delano] gets very angry and says, ‘You know that is not so. Why do you say it?’” Another puzzling remark, and one that Wise leaves unexplained.

Wise closes the letter with his own assessment: that Roosevelt “knows what I [Wise] have just written to be true, but deems it wiser and more expedient not to make any public mention of it at this time.” The letter, after all, was marked “Strictly private and confidential.” Wise adds that “you [Slomovitz] must not, however, make use of this. I think it is just as well to let the matter die down now.” A strange series of comments, to be sure.

Many years later, a final small clue appeared. From the mid-1920s to mid-1930s, Franklin’s daughter Anna was married to a stockbroker named Curtis Dall. After having two children, they divorced in 1934. Three decades later Dall published a book, *FDR: My Exploited Father-in-Law* (1968). In it we read this sentence: “As I gathered it, the background of the Franklin Roosevelt family was a composite of English, Dutch, Jewish, and French stock” (98). There is no further elaboration.

In the end, many questions remain, but it seems very likely that the Roosevelts were at least in part Jewish.¹⁶ Perhaps the larger question is this: Does it matter? I believe it does, on two counts. First is the basic matter of historical accuracy; if we did in fact have a partially Jewish president, or rather two such presidents, the history books ought to reflect this reality. Likely other relevant evidence exists in the vast presidential archives, and an open admission might bring this to light.

Second and more important is the possible effect this may have had on FDR's actions prior to and during World War II. With even a partial Jewish heritage, he would likely have been more sympathetic to the Jewish cause, more amenable to Jews within his administration, and more likely to sacrifice on behalf of Jewish interests. The evidence shows that all these things actually happened—which is precisely why “Franklin Roosevelt was the first great hero of American Jews” (Shogan 2010: xi). The ‘family connection’ would certainly help to explain such things.

Alternatively, and as is often the case today, it could have been strictly a matter of money—of rewarding those who paved one's way to the top. But perhaps the strongest case is this: that it was a combination of both. If FDR was predisposed by his heritage to be sympathetic to the Jews, and they also stepped forward to fund his campaigns and support him in the media, these would then be powerful incentives to reward them within his administration, and to be swayed by their concerns when it came time to deploy American military power. I examine that case now.

“All the President’s Jews”

The case for a possible Jewish hand in World War II could be made, if we could show the following:

1. an extensive and influential Jewish presence in FDR’s administration,
2. that the US public did not want war,
3. that influential American Jews did want war,
4. that FDR acted surreptitiously on behalf of war,
5. that Jewish-run US media supported war, and
6. that the US entered the war under false pretenses.

I will provide specific data on the first two points, and then address the remaining ones collectively.

Earlier I showed Roosevelt’s dependence on Jewish supporters during his gubernatorial term. When it came time to mount a presidential campaign, his old buddies were there to help. As Scholnick (1990: 193) explains, “A number of wealthy Jewish friends contributed to Roosevelt’s prenomination campaign fund: Henry Morgenthau Jr., Lt. Gov. Lehman, Jessie Straus, [and] Laurence Steinhardt.” Once the primaries were out of the way, “Roosevelt’s campaign was heavily underwritten by Bernard Baruch.”

The first rule in politics is to reward those who finance your path to success. Thus it is unsurprising that “[FDR’s] administration contained a higher proportion of Jews than any other” (Michael 2005: 178). In the words of Herzstein (1989: 40), “Jews were indeed more prominent than ever before in American history.” So who were these leading figures that were so dominant during the Roosevelt years? At the top of the list were the Big 5, the “President’s Jews” as Shogan says, who had the largest hand in swaying events within the presidency: Louis Brandeis, Felix Frankfurter, Henry Morgenthau Jr., Sam Rosenman, and Ben Cohen.

Brandeis was of course a sitting Supreme Court justice long before Roosevelt

ran for office, having been placed there by his friend Woodrow Wilson in 1916. Even prior to his initial election in 1932, FDR arranged a meeting with Brandeis to discuss policy. According to Shogan (2010), the Justice soon sent Roosevelt “a broad blueprint for the New Deal” (72). Some years later, in 1938, “Brandeis made his first call on FDR on behalf of the Jews” (83). Such involvement in government administration by a Supreme Court justice is unusual, to say the least. Others would call it flagrantly unethical. Justices are supposed to rule on constitutional matters, not make policy. He obviously knew this, and thus generally worked through Jewish intermediaries, like Frankfurter and Cohen, to get his message to the president.

On a day-to-day basis, Frankfurter was particularly important. Even by 1933 he had become “probably FDR’s most influential advisor” (ibid: 105). Incensed at the extent of his power, American general Hugh Johnson called him “the most influential single individual in the United States” (86).¹⁷ Frankfurter, he said, “had insinuated his boys into obscure but key positions in every vital department” related to the New Deal. Later, when Europe was on the brink of war, Frankfurter was apparently instrumental in initiating a series of secret correspondences between FDR and Churchill at a very sensitive time—neutral presidents are not supposed to be conducting secret negotiations with leaders of belligerent nations.¹⁸ Frankfurter, as we know, would be well rewarded by Roosevelt for his efforts, with the nomination to the Supreme Court in January 1939.

Moving down the list: Roosevelt “was as close to Henry Morgenthau...as to any man” (ibid: 32). So close, in fact, that Franklin would make him the second Jew ever to join a presidential cabinet; he was named Secretary of the Treasury in early 1934, serving right through the end of the war.¹⁹ Henry would later author the notorious “Morgenthau Plan”—a policy for the virtual destruction of postwar Germany. This again was an outrageously out-of-line effort by a treasury secretary, who formally has no business conducting foreign policy. But this evidently did not stop him from trying.

The two youngest members of the Big 5 were Rosenman and Cohen. Though serving as a New York state judge, Rosenman also functioned as “FDR’s chief speechwriter and a leading general advisor” (ibid: 9). Ward (1989: 254) notes that he was “a close aide from 1928 onwards”—that is, even before FDR’s

governorship. The lawyer Benjamin Cohen became one of the key drafters of Roosevelt's vital New Deal legislation, which was his lasting economic legacy. He clearly had the president's ear; Nasaw (2012: 358) calls him the "unofficial emissary of Justice Brandeis and Felix Frankfurter."

But more importantly, Cohen was the lead architect and executor of the infamous 'bases for destroyers' plan of mid- to late-1940. At that time Britain was well into the war and badly needed military assistance from the US. But as a neutral nation, and by law, it was unable to help. Cohen then concocted a plan by which America would "loan" 50 warships to the UK in exchange for the use of certain global bases that they held. "Employing hairsplitting technicalities and unprovable assertions about national defense, [Cohen's] memorandum stretched the law, creating a loophole wide enough for fifty warships to steam through on their way to join the Royal Navy," says Shogan (152). Seeking legal approval for this blatantly illegal action, Roosevelt turned to...Justice Frankfurter. And to no one's surprise, the Justice conferred his blessing. The Brits, of course, were elated. For the Germans, this was a veritable act of war by the nominally neutral Americans. Most fatefully, it seems to have been decisive in causing Hitler to sign a mutual-defense pact with Japan in October 1940; it was this agreement that would trigger Germany's declaration of war on the United States following the attack on Pearl Harbor.

Beyond the Big 5, several other Jews played influential roles. Bernard Baruch, another Wilsonian holdover, was a part-time financial advisor and "prominent confidant" of both FDR and Churchill.²⁰ Jerome Frank was a close aide, as was David Niles. James Warburg, son of Paul, was an early financial advisor. In May of 1934, Eugene Black was named Fed Chairman, and Jesse Straus was appointed ambassador to France—even as his nephew, Nathan Straus Jr., came to head the US Housing Authority. William Bullitt, a quarter-Jew, was given two critical ambassadorships: first to the Soviet Union, and then, during the war, to France.²¹ Laurence Steinhardt, who had helped so much with campaign funding, was awarded a string of ambassadorships throughout FDR's tenure. Franklin's old friend Herbert Lehman was appointed head of the new Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation in 1943. Herbert Feis was an influential economics advisor for the State Department. Abe Fortas served as Undersecretary of the Interior. Charles Wyzanski was solicitor general in the Labor Department. Mordecai Ezekiel was economics advisor to the Agriculture

Secretary. David Lilienthal became chairman of the TVA. Other Jews, like Sidney Hillman and Rose Schneiderman, emerged as important advisors on labor matters.

Even some of FDR's non-Jewish team members had Semitic connections. Long-time Secretary of State Cordell Hull's wife, Frances Witz, was Jewish. So too was the spouse of New Deal architect and close confidant Harry Hopkins (Ethel Gross). We can be sure that they were sympathetic to the Jewish cause. All in all, one can well understand the motivation of Roosevelt's critics, who called his administration the "Jew Deal."²²

On the second point, it is uncontroversial that Americans overwhelmingly wanted to avoid the war. In a radio address of 23 April 1941, the leading anti-war advocate, Charles Lindbergh, condemned the course of action "to which more than 80 percent of our citizens are opposed." In an address the month before, Congressman Hamilton Fish stated that "somewhere between 83 and 90 percent of the people, according to the various Gallop polls, are opposed to our entrance into war unless attacked."²³ The data supported such claims. According to surveys conducted in June and July 1940, between 81 and 86% of respondents preferred to "stay out" of a war, if it were to come up for a vote.²⁴ Another poll in July 1941 registered a 79% figure.²⁵ The highest recorded number came somewhat earlier, in a report published in mid-1938; when asked "If another war like the World War [I] develops in Europe, should America take part again?," fully 95% of the respondents replied "No".²⁶ Such figures generally held up right until the attack on Pearl Harbor.

The Path to War

The remaining points become clear, I think, simply by stepping through some key events and observations as they happened chronologically.

As is well known, Jews worldwide confronted Hitler as soon as he assumed power in 1933—witness the infamous “Judea Declares War on Germany” headline in the UK’s *Daily Express* of 24 March 1933. In a sense, this was understandable. Putting an end to a post-World War I Weimar Republic dominated by Jews, Hitler quickly banished them from positions of power, and placed immediate restrictions on their movement and business practices. In fact, one may speculate that this was not unrelated to Germany’s amazing economic renaissance.

But the Western media did not see it this way. As early as April 1933, the *New York Times* was reporting on the “economic extermination of Jews in Germany” (April 6). Two months later we read, simply, that “Hitler’s program is one of extermination” (June 29). In August, we are shocked to learn that “600,000 Jews are facing certain extinction” (August 16). Here we can graphically see how the ‘extermination’ myth rapidly evolved, from a simple plan of economic exclusion.[27](#)

For the Germans, Western—particularly American—media meant *Jewish* media. As early as 1934, they viewed it as a potential threat. A communiqué by the German ambassador to the US, Hans Luther, observed that America possessed “the strongest Jewish propaganda machine in the world.”[28](#) This comment was made in light of Jewish dominance in Hollywood, and the fact that Jews owned two of the major American newspapers, the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post*.[29](#) Luther’s impression was held by German leadership throughout the war. Goebbels, for example, wrote the following in his diary entry of 24 April 1942: “Some statistics are given to me on the proportion of Jews in American radio, film, and press. The percentage is truly frightening. Jewry controls 100% of the film business, and between 90 and 95% of press and radio.”[30](#)

By the mid-1930s, Germany was in the midst of their astounding economic recovery, one that was particularly striking given their ruination after World War I, and that it occurred during the Great Depression. Within just his first four years, Hitler had reduced unemployment from 6 million to 1 million; the jobless

rate fell from 43.8% when he took office, to effectively *zero* by the end of 1938. In just four years, he increased GNP by 37%, and oversaw a 400% increase in auto production. In effect, he single-handedly ended the Depression in Germany. Two more years, and the nation would be a world power of the first rank.

Germany thus emerged as a viable competitor to the traditional global powers. Churchill felt particularly threatened. In a congressional testimony, US General Robert Wood recalled a statement by the British politician from 1936: “Germany is getting too strong. We must smash her.”³¹ This suggests a belligerence on Churchill’s part long before any aggressions by Hitler. As we know: it was the UK that declared war on Germany, not vice versa.

In October 1937, Roosevelt gave his famous ‘quarantine’ speech. Here we find one of the first indications, albeit indirect, that he anticipates a time when the US would come into direct conflict with Germany, and he subtly propagandizes the public in favor of war. The danger of Hitler is exaggerated; neutrality and isolation are disparaged; baseless assertions and cautiously conditional statements are thrown out—and all in the language of peace. Should Hitler prevail, “let no one imagine that America will escape, ... that this Western Hemisphere will not be attacked.” “There is no escape through mere isolation or neutrality,” he said; “international anarchy destroys every foundation for peace.” “We are determined to keep out of war,” said FDR, “yet we cannot insure ourselves against the disastrous effects of war and the dangers of involvement.” Sparing no hyperbole, he added that, if Germany initiates a war, “the storm will rage till every flower of culture is trampled and all human beings are leveled in a vast chaos.” This is difficult to read except as an indication that the path of violent confrontation had already been decided upon, and that the long process had begun to persuade a reluctant public that they must support it.

By this time, Jewish lobbies around the world, but especially in the UK and US, began to press hard for military action, to intervene on behalf of their beleaguered coreligionists in Nazi Germany, and to once again overthrow a hated regime—never mind that the Germans may have had some right to self-determination. One of the first clear pieces of evidence of this came in early 1938, from the Polish ambassador to the US, Jerzy Potocki. He reported back to Warsaw on his observations of the American political scene:

The pressure of the Jews on President Roosevelt and on the State Department is becoming ever more powerful... The Jews are right now the leaders in creating a war psychosis which would plunge the entire world into war and bring about general catastrophe. This mood is becoming more and more apparent. In their definition of democratic states, the Jews have also created real chaos; they have mixed together the idea of democracy and communism, and have above all raised the banner of burning hatred against Nazism.

This hatred has become a frenzy. It is propagated everywhere and by every means: in theaters, in the cinema, and in the press. The Germans are portrayed as a nation living under the arrogance of Hitler which wants to conquer the whole world and drown all of humanity in an ocean of blood. In conversations with Jewish press representatives, I have repeatedly come up against the inexorable and convinced view that war is inevitable. This international Jewry exploits every means of propaganda to oppose any tendency towards any kind of consolidation and understanding between nations. In this way, the conviction is growing steadily but surely in public opinion here that the Germans and their satellites, in the form of fascism, are enemies who must be subdued by the 'democratic world.' (February 9)³²

Such a view is confirmed in a letter by Senator Hiram Johnson (R-Cal.), written to his son that same year. The pro- and anti-war camps were clear: "all the Jews [are] on one side, wildly enthusiastic for the President, and willing to fight to the last American." Though sympathetic, Johnson had no interest in fighting a war on their behalf. He and other like-minded politicians wanted to speak out, "but everybody is afraid—I confess *I* shrink from it—of offending the Jews."³³ The situation has hardly changed in 75 years.

For his part, Bernie Baruch was certainly itching for a fight. Speaking to General George Marshall, he said "We are going to lick that fellow Hitler. He isn't going to get away with it."³⁴ One wonders how he would know this, in 1938. Actually, it's not much of a mystery: Churchill apparently told him so. As Sherwood (1948: 111) recounts, Churchill—then still First Lord of the Admiralty—said this to Baruch: "War is coming very soon. We will be in it and you (the United States) will be in it. You (Baruch) will be running the show over there, but I will be on the sidelines over here." This is an astonishing claim; how would

Churchill know such a thing, in 1938? The *Anschluss* with Austria had been completed in March that year, and Germany annexed the Sudetenland in October, but the Munich Accord was signed in September, nominally preserving a kind of tenuous peace. So what could have convinced Churchill that war was inevitable, and that the Americans would be running the show? *Kristallnacht*, perhaps? Was that the last straw, for the global Jewish lobby?[35](#)

Apparently Lord Beaverbrook thought so. Writing to Frank Gannett in December 1938, he made this striking statement:

The Jews are after [Prime Minister] Chamberlain. He is being terribly harassed by them... All the Jews are against him... They have got a big position in the press here [in the UK]... I am shaken. The Jews may drive us into war [and] their political influence is moving us in that direction. (cited in Nasaw 2012: 357-358)

Beaverbrook was a prominent and influential media executive and politician, rather like the Rupert Murdoch of his day. He was well positioned to make such a claim.

The year 1939 opened with FDR's State of the Union speech—and more veiled threats. “We have learned that God-fearing democracies of the world...cannot safely be indifferent to international lawlessness anywhere. They cannot forever let pass, without effective protest, acts of aggression against sister nations.” He consequently called for an unprecedented peacetime allocation of \$2 billion for national defense. A message to Hitler—and to all those Americans who might oppose intervention in European affairs.

Hitler, incidentally, was giving his own speeches, most infamously to the Reichstag on January 30. It included this memorable warning:

If the international Jewish financiers in and outside Europe should succeed in plunging the nations once more into a world war, then the result will not be the Bolshevization of the earth, and thus the victory of Jewry, but the annihilation [*Vernichtung*] of the Jewish race in Europe!

Two quick comments: The German word ‘*Vernichtung*’ has multiple meanings, and in no way requires the killing of the persons in question. The literal meaning is “to bring to nothing.” More broadly it means to completely remove or

eliminate the presence, role, or influence of something. And there are many ways to do this short of murder. But more to the point, Hitler's alleged program of physical extermination was supposedly a great secret. He cannot possibly have told the world, in the most public of venues, of his 'secret' plan to kill all the Jews—in early 1939. Clearly he was referring to their displacement from Europe, and to an elimination of their previously dominant role there. But this was no secret at all—he had been doing that in Germany for some six years already.

Back in Washington, Ambassador Potocki sent two more revealing reports to Warsaw. A short statement on January 9 included this: “The American public is subject to an ever more alarming propaganda, which is under Jewish influence and continuously conjures up the specter of the danger of war. Because of this, the Americans have strongly altered their views on foreign policy problems, in comparison with last year.” Three days later came the longest and perhaps most insightful report:

The feeling now prevailing in the United States is marked by a growing hatred of Fascism and, above all, of Chancellor Hitler and everything connected with Nazism. Propaganda is mostly in the hands of the Jews, who control almost 100 percent radio, film, daily and periodical press. Although this propaganda is extremely coarse and presents Germany as black as possible—above all religious persecution and concentration camps are exploited—this propaganda is nevertheless extremely effective, since the public here is completely ignorant and knows nothing of the situation in Europe. ...

The prevalent hatred against everything which is in any way connected with German Nazism is further kindled by the brutal policy against the Jews in Germany and by the émigré problem. In this action, various Jewish intellectuals participated: for instance, Bernard Baruch; the Governor of New York State, Lehman; the newly appointed judge of the Supreme Court, Felix Frankfurter; Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau; and others who are personal friends of President Roosevelt. They want the President to become the champion of human rights, freedom of religion and speech, and the man who in the future will punish trouble-makers. These groups of people, who occupy the highest positions in the American government and

want to pose as representatives of ‘true Americanism’ and ‘defenders of democracy,’ are, in the last analysis, connected by unbreakable ties with international Jewry.

For this Jewish international, which above all is concerned with the interests of its race, to portray the President of the United States as the ‘idealist’ champion on human rights was a very clever move. In this manner they have created a dangerous hotbed for hatred and hostility in this hemisphere, and divided the world into two hostile camps. The entire issue is worked out in a masterly manner. Roosevelt has been given the foundation for activating American foreign policy, and simultaneously has been procuring enormous military stocks for the coming war, for which the Jews are striving very consciously.³⁶

If Potocki were correct, it would mean that war had effectively been decided upon by the Allied powers. And in fact, that’s exactly what Bullitt said to American journalist Karl von Wiegand: “War in Europe has been decided upon. Poland had an assurance of the support of Britain and France, and would yield to no demands from Germany. America would be in the war after Britain and France entered it.”³⁷ Bullitt obviously had inside access to a well-developed plan, one that was proceeding apace.

In July, Potocki was back in Warsaw, speaking with a foreign ministry undersecretary named Jan Szembek. In his diary, Szembek recorded Potocki as stating the following: “In the West, there are all kinds of elements openly pushing for war: Jews, big capitalists, arms dealers. Now they are all ready for some excellent business... They want to do business at our expense. They are indifferent to the destruction of our country.”³⁸ This is notable, if only as confirmation of the legitimacy of the earlier reports.

Around that same time, the American ambassador to Great Britain began to cause a stir. He was a member of the Boston-area Irish Catholic set, a successful businessman...and father of a future president. Joseph Kennedy contributed to Roosevelt’s 1932 presidential campaign, and was rewarded with the chairmanship of the SEC. He left that office in 1935, and was appointed ambassador to the UK in January 1938.

By mid-1939, Kennedy evidently began to have concerns about the Jewish role

in the push toward war—and he began to speak openly to his colleagues in London. Somehow word of this got out to a local periodical, *The Week*, which found its way over the ocean to Washington D.C. and into the hands of the Secretary of the Interior, Harold Ickes. Convening with the president in early July, Ickes raised his concern: “This [story] was to the effect that Kennedy was privately telling his English friends in the Cliveden set that the Jews were running the United States and that the President would fall in 1940. It also charged that ‘[Kennedy believes] that the democratic policy of the United States is a Jewish production’.”³⁹

Amazingly, the president was unfazed. “It is true,” he said. Ickes provides no further information on the incident, and thus it is hard to know how to take this blunt response. Was FDR joking? A half-joke? An outright, straight-faced admission? We simply do not know. What was undoubtedly true, though, was that Kennedy had deep concerns about Jewish influence.

He was not the only diplomat with such worries. A month later, reports Taylor (1961: 267), British ambassador to Germany Nevile Henderson told Hitler that “the hostile attitude in Great Britain was the work of Jews and enemies of the Nazis.” Here again we see a parallel action on both sides of the Atlantic, and possibly coordinated. This would be consistent with Baruch’s role as a “prominent confidant” of both Roosevelt and Churchill.

A few weeks later, on September 2, the German army crossed into Poland. What began as part of a long-standing border conflict between two neighboring countries became, two days later, a European war, when England and France declared war on Germany.⁴⁰

England Stands Alone

On September 3, Roosevelt broadcast another of his many fireside chats to the American public. It contained the usual combination of exaggeration, propaganda, and misrepresentation. “When peace has been broken anywhere,” he said, “the peace of all countries everywhere is in danger.” Even one who strives for neutrality “cannot be asked to close his mind or his conscience.” His ending was again cloaked in the hypocritical language of peace:

I hate war. I say that again and again. I hope the United States will keep out of this war. I believe that it will. And I give you assurance and reassurance that every effort of your government will be directed toward that end. As long as it remains within my power to prevent, there will be no black-out of peace in the United States.

Here Roosevelt clearly reveals himself as a dissembler and a liar. Qualifications, conditionals, half-truths—all evidently designed to manipulate public opinion in favor of war. Jews inside and outside his administration had been pressing for intervention for years; now with actual combat underway, the pressure would rapidly escalate. Roosevelt knew this, but said nothing. After all, he was facing another election the following year, and had to publicly maintain an anti-war stance, or risk losing to the Republicans. But he also had to keep his Jewish financiers happy. The fact that the vast majority of the American people were still strongly against the war apparently had no effect upon him—so much for democracy.

Kennedy could see what was happening. He strongly opposed American entry into the war, both on principle and because he had three sons who would likely be drawn in—and indeed, his eldest son, Joe Jr., would be killed during a bombing run in 1944. Speaking to his colleague Jay Moffat, Kennedy said, “Churchill...wants us there as soon as he can get us there. He is ruthless and scheming”⁴¹—unsurprising, given that the Brits found themselves in a war that they were ill-prepared to fight. But Churchill knew whom to go to: “He is also in touch with groups in America which have the same idea, notably, certain strong Jewish leaders.”

Not that this was a secret. In a December 1939 memo to the British cabinet,

Churchill recalled the vital role played by the Jews back in World War One—to draw in the Americans, against their wishes, against their desires, and against their national interests. “It was not for light or sentimental reasons,” wrote Churchill, that Balfour issued his famous promise of Palestine to the Zionists. “The influence of American Jewry was rated then as a factor of the highest importance...” “Now,” he added, “I should have thought it was more necessary, even than in November 1917, to conciliate American Jewry and enlist their aid in combating isolationist and indeed anti-British tendencies in the United States.”[42](#)

Here we have an amazingly bald-faced admission. Churchill has utter contempt for the “tendencies” (read: democratic principles) of the Americans. His sole concern is to leverage Jewish power to draw a neutral nation into yet another major war, to save his skin and to aid his Zionist friends.[43](#) Kennedy was naturally appalled—both that Churchill would do such a thing, and that it seemed to be working. “I don’t trust him,” he wrote in his diary; “He always impressed me that he was willing to blow up the American Embassy and say it was the Germans if it would get the United States in.”[44](#) No doubt that was true—just as FDR would be willing to sacrifice some 2,400 American lives at Pearl Harbor, for precisely that end.

Into 1940, Hitler ran off an impressive string of victories, culminating in the capture of Paris in June. Chamberlain resigned as prime minister, to be replaced by Churchill, who immediately initiated the ‘bases for destroyers’ plan with the US (see above).

As the year wore on, Roosevelt continued to lie to the American public. His campaign address in Boston on October 30 contained the same deceptive falsehoods of his earlier speeches. “Your government has acquired new naval and air bases in British territory in the Atlantic Ocean”—but no mention of the extralegal 50 destroyers that he gave them in return. He boasted of doubling the size of the army within the past year, and of letting out \$8 billion in defense contracts. But not worry, fellow Americans—“I give you one more assurance. I have said this before, but I shall say it again and again and again: Your boys are not going to be sent into any foreign wars.” An utter lie, and he knew it.

One is perhaps tempted to make excuses for FDR: that he was morally torn, that he could see a larger danger that the public could not see, that he had to lie to us

‘for our own good.’ None of these withstands scrutiny. The ethics of warfare are fairly well established, at least for nominal democracies. They would include, at a minimum: proportionality, mutuality, direct threat, and public support. That is, (a) any aggressions should be responded to only with equivalent force, (b) rules for one party hold for all, (c) force is justified only in the face of a direct and imminent threat, and (d) the public must be given an honest appraisal of the situation, and its wishes respected. Suffice it to say that none of these conditions would hold. One wonders: If the public had known of the ultimate cost—some 420,000 American deaths, and roughly \$4.2 trillion (present-day equivalent)—would they have embraced war, even after Pearl Harbor? Or would they perhaps have put FDR and his Jewish supporters on trial, for fraud, treason, and war crimes?

By October, Joe Kennedy had enough; he resigned his post. But he continued to comment on the role of the Jews, both to friends and in his private writings. On December 15, for example, he made this diary entry:

[Justice Frankfurter] is supposed directly and indirectly to influence Roosevelt on foreign policy over [Secretary of State] Hull’s and [Undersecretary of State] Welles’s heads, [and] whose cohort of young lawyers are in practically every government department, all aiding the cause of Jewish refugees getting into America... It looks to me as if the English sympathizers were tying their cause in with the Jews because they figure they’ve got all the influence in US. (cited in Nasaw 2012: 507)

Jewish population in the US, incidentally, was soon to reach 5 million. Frankfurter’s boys were doing a good job.

As before, Kennedy was not alone in his concern. Another Supreme Court Justice, Frank Murphy, confided to him that “it was Frankfurter and Ben Cohen who wrote the Attorney General’s opinion on destroyers and bases.” Kennedy added: “Murphy regards the Jewish influence as most dangerous. He said that after all, [Harry] Hopkins’s wife was a Jew; Hull’s wife is a Jew; and Frankfurter and Cohen and that group are all Jews.”⁴⁵ For his part, Welles privately referred to Frankfurter as “dangerous” and “a Jew chiseler.”

One of the most revealing remarks by Kennedy comes from the diary of James Forrestal, who at the time was Secretary of the Navy. In the entry from 27

December 1945, we read this:

Played golf today with Joe Kennedy.... He said Chamberlain's position in 1938 was that England had nothing with which to fight, and that she could not risk going to war with Hitler. Kennedy's view: That Hitler would have fought Russia without any later conflict with England, if it had not been for Bullitt's urging on Roosevelt in the summer of 1939 that the Germans must be faced down about Poland; neither the French nor the British would have made Poland a cause of war, if it had not been for the constant needling from Washington.... Chamberlain, he says, stated that America and the world Jews had forced England into the war. (Forrestal 1951: 121-122)

So, we must ask: Why was the partly Jewish Bullitt—a mere diplomat—“urging” the president of the United States to face down Hitler? And why were Bullitt and Roosevelt “constantly needling” England and France to fight a war that *they themselves* did not see as necessary or winnable? And why did these nations succumb to American pressure? And why did Chamberlain ultimately link together America and “the world Jews” as the driving force for war? We need not look very hard to see a Jewish hand at work.

Media Blitz

Jewish-run media was becoming very active by this time. The newspapers, for example, had found much disagreement with Washington on domestic issues, but “Roosevelt’s standing with the press on foreign policy matters was much stronger,” according to Cole (1983: 478). Apart from the *Chicago Tribune* and the Hearst papers, most dailies backed intervention. Unsurprisingly, “the more prestigious and influential news publications strongly supported the president.” These included the *New York Times*, the *New York Herald Tribune*, the *Chicago Daily News*, and *Time Magazine*.

The motion picture industry certainly did its part to get America into war. Given that it took at least a year to get a motion picture from conception to theater, and that efforts to produce pro-war films did not start in earnest until 1937, it was well into 1939 before they began to appear. Early efforts like *Confessions of a Nazi Spy* and *Beasts of Berlin* came out that year, and set the stage for a flood of films over the next three years. In 1940, Hollywood released graphic and high-impact films like *Escape* and *Mortal Storm*; Hitchcock’s *Foreign Correspondent* came out that year, as did Chaplin’s *The Great Dictator*. In May, two major studio heads, Jack and Harry Warner—more accurately known as Itzhak and Hirsz Wonskolaser—wrote to Roosevelt, assuring him that they would “do all in our power within the motion picture industry...to show the American people the worthiness of the cause for which the free peoples of Europe are making such tremendous sacrifices.”⁴⁶ It’s nice to see such unselfish, high-minded public service amongst corporate executives.

By early 1941, Jewish filmmakers and producers were working subtle, pro-war themes into many of their films. The anti-war group America First argued that belligerent propaganda was becoming widespread; “films that have nothing to do with the European war are now loaded with lies and ideas which bring about an interventionist reaction” (in Cole: 474). In August of that year, Senator Gerald Nye (R-N. Dak.) delivered a stinging radio address, arguing that the Hollywood studios “had become the most gigantic engines of propaganda in existence, to rouse the war fever in America and plunge this nation to her destruction” (in *ibid*: 475). By that time, nearly three dozen major pro-war films had been released.⁴⁷

In the end, more than 60 explicitly ‘patriotic,’ pro-war films were produced,

along with dozens of ordinary films that incorporated subtle pro-war messages. There were a few classics—*Casablanca*, *Sergeant York*, *To Be or Not to Be*—and many duds. *Hitler's Children* and *Nazi Agent*, for example, won't be making any Top 10 lists.

In March of 1941, under pressure from the Jewish lobby, Congress passed the Lend-Lease Act; this allowed shipment of armaments and military supplies to Britain and the other Allied nations. The vote was 260-165 in the House, and 59-30 in the Senate. Public opinion was narrowly in favor of the Act, but only as a defensive measure; a strong majority still wished to stay out of the war. FDR could arm the Allies but not join the fighting.

Roosevelt made a major radio address in May, declaring an “unlimited national emergency.” It was filled with more war hyperbole, most notably regarding the Germans’ alleged striving toward “world domination.” Over and over came the words: “Nazi book of world conquest”; “Hitler’s plan of world domination”; “a Hitler-dominated world.” Suffice to say that no evidence of such a plan has ever come forth.⁴⁸ Deploying the most facile, us-or-them language, FDR struggled to persuade reluctant Americans that they should fight and die: “Today the whole world is divided between human slavery and human freedom—between pagan brutality and Christian ideal.” He even hinted at the essentials of his strategy, namely, to provoke an ‘incident’ that would allow him to declare war: “We are placing our armed forces in strategic military position. We will not hesitate to use our armed forces to repel attack.”

In June, convinced of the Bolshevist threat posed by Stalin, Hitler invaded the Soviet Union. In August, the US placed military forces in Iceland, effectively occupying that country. And on 11 September 1941—60 years to the day before that other 9/11—Charles Lindbergh gave his most famous speech, at Des Moines, Iowa. There he called out, for the first time, the three main groups that were driving the US toward war: the British, the Roosevelt administration, and the Jews. Of this latter group, Lindbergh acknowledged their plight under the Nazis, and their hatred of Hitler. But instead of inciting America to war, they should be working to halt it; “for they will be among the first to feel its consequences”—presumably meaning both in Germany and in the US, where anti-Semitism would surely be inflamed. In one of the more notable lines of the speech, he said that “[The Jews’] greatest danger in this country lies in their

large ownership and influence in our motion pictures, our press, our radio, and our government.” Lindbergh thus ran afoul of the first rule of wartime: Thou shalt never speak the truth.

Indeed: If Jewish influence in “our government” was part of the danger, then naming the “Roosevelt administration” was redundant. The true danger was Jews in media, Jews in Hollywood, and Jews in the government—along with those non-Jews who worked on their behalf. And even to name the British—Churchill and his Zionist backers—was, in effect, to name yet more Jews. On all fronts, it was powerful and influential Jews driving peaceful people toward war, simply to destroy the hated Nazi regime.

There is no doubt that Lindbergh was right—that British Jews were pushing the US toward war, and that they were succeeding. In a strange coincidence, just one day before Lindbergh’s Des Moines speech, leading British Zionist Chaim Weizmann delivered this notorious letter to Churchill:

There is only one big ethnic group [in America] which is willing to stand, to a man, for Great Britain, and a policy of “all-out aid” for her: the five million Jews. From Secretary Morgenthau, Governor Lehman, Justice Frankfurter, down to the simplest Jewish workman or trader, they are conscious of all that this struggle against Hitler implies.

It has been repeatedly acknowledged by British Statesmen that it was the Jews who, in the last war, effectively helped to tip the scales in America in favour of Great Britain. They are keen to do it—and may do it—again. (cited in Irving 2001: 77)

A most explicit admission: American Jews, working in conjunction with British Jews, hold the key to war. They are “keen to do it.” Virtually upon command, they can “tip the scales”—again—and drive the Americans into another war that they desperately want to avoid.

The Pearl Harbor “Incident”

With American opposition to war still hovering near 80%, FDR and his Jewish team were evidently becoming desperate. Dramatic action was increasingly necessary. At that point, only a direct attack on American soil could alter public opinion. For a good two years, Roosevelt had been harassing the Germans. But they refused to bite. What to do?

History is full of ‘false flag’ operations in which governments or other actors conduct a fake attack, blame the enemy, and then use the event as a pretext for military action. By some accounts, the earliest was in 47 BC, when Julius Caesar arranged and paid for insurgent ‘rebel’ actions in Rome prior to his taking of the city. A more recent instance occurred in 1846, when President James Polk sent an army detachment into a disputed area along the Texas-Mexico border. When the Mexicans responded, he declared it an attack on “American soil,” and promptly began the US-Mexico War. For centuries, military commanders have understood the benefits of false flags; Roosevelt’s team was no different.

Though I cannot elaborate here, there is ample evidence that the Pearl Harbor attack was effectively a false flag event. While obviously not directly conducting the attack, Roosevelt did everything possible to encourage and allow the Japanese to strike—and then to feign shock when it actually happened. Below are the key elements of that story.[49](#)

The earliest explicit indication that some such plan was in the works comes from October 1940, in the so-called McCollum Memorandum. Lt. Commander Arthur McCollum was director of the Office of Naval Intelligence’s Far East Asia section, when he issued a five-page letter to two of his superiors. The memo describes a situation in which a neutral US is surrounded by hostile nations across two oceans, and notes that “Germany and Italy have lately concluded a military alliance with Japan directed against the United States.” This was a mutual-defense pact, such that an attack against Japan would be considered by Germany to be an act of war. This gave FDR two paths to war: attack by Germany, or attack by Japan. Germany was scrupulously eschewing conflict, but perhaps Japan could be engaged.

This was evidently well understood within the military establishment. As

McCollum explained, “It is not believed that in the present state of political opinion, the US government is capable of declaring war against Japan without more ado; and it is barely possible that vigorous action on our part might lead the Japanese to modify their attitude”—clever language that essentially means: Japan does not really want war either, but perhaps we could provoke them enough (“more ado”) that they would launch a first strike (“modify their attitude”). McCollum then suggested an eight-point action plan, anticipating conflict with Japan. Item Six includes this: “Keep the main strength of the US fleet now in the Pacific in the vicinity of the Hawaiian Islands.” The memo concludes with this striking sentence: “If by these means Japan could be led to commit an overt act of war, so much the better.” The plan could hardly be clearer.

On 19 August 1941, Churchill told his war cabinet that FDR was doing all he could to provoke an attack by the Axis powers—information which came to light only in 1972. Churchill said:

[Roosevelt] was obviously determined that they [the US] should come in. ... The president said to me that he would wage war but not declare it, and that he would become more and more provocative. If the Germans did not like it, they could attack American forces. ... Everything was being done to force an ‘incident.’ The president has made it clear that he would look for an ‘incident’ which could justify him in opening hostilities.[50](#)

Further comment is unnecessary.

Lindbergh essentially understood what was going on. In his September 1941 speech, he laid out FDR’s three-part plan: (1) prepare for war in the guise of defense, (2) incrementally involve the US in conflict situations, and (3) “create a series of incidents which would force us into actual conflict.” Near the end of his speech he added that “The war groups have succeeded in the first two of their three major steps into war. ... Only the creation of sufficient ‘incidents’ yet remains.” An amazing prognosis, given that the Pearl Harbor attack was just three months away.

On 25 November 1941, 12 days before the attack, Roosevelt held a War Cabinet meeting at the White House. Secretary of War Henry Stimson wrote the following in his diary of that day:

[Roosevelt] brought up the event that we were likely to be attacked perhaps next Monday [December 1], for the Japanese are notorious for making an attack without warning, and the question was how we should maneuver them into the position of firing the first shot without allowing too much danger to ourselves. It was a difficult proposition.[51](#)

This is Stimson's infamous "maneuver" remark; once again, it is clear and explicit.

The following day, November 26, Secretary of State Hull presented a letter to the Japanese ambassador, demanding that they withdraw from China and French Indochina (section II, point #3). Though couched in the language of peace, it was effectively an ultimatum, and it was thusly perceived by the Japanese prime minister.

On December 4, the anti-war paper *Chicago Daily Tribune* ran a huge headline: "FDR's War Plans!" It detailed a plan for a 10-million-man military force, half of whom would be dedicated to fighting Germany. It even mentioned a specific date—1 July 1943—as the day for the "final supreme effort by American land forces to defeat the mighty German army in Europe." This was incredibly accurate; the Allied invasion of Sicily, the first direct assault on European territory, occurred on 9 July 1943. Clearly FDR's secrets were quickly unraveling.

At 4:00 pm on Saturday, December 6, a decoded Japanese communiqué was delivered to Roosevelt. It indicated that Japan was not going to accept any portion of America's ultimatum, and that they were compelled to respond to its on-going belligerence. "This means war," said the president. If war was inevitable, said Harry Hopkins, it was too bad that we couldn't strike first. "No, we can't do that," said Roosevelt, hypocritically; "We are a democracy of a peaceful people. We have a good record. We must stand on it."[52](#) Pearl Harbor was not explicitly mentioned, but the president took no action to forewarn any of his commanders in the Pacific theater, thus rendering them defenseless before the oncoming assault.

Eight years after the attack, the president's administrative assistant, Jonathan Daniels, recalled events of that time. "There was a mass of warning before Pearl Harbor," he wrote (1949: 490). "As a matter of fact, warning had been clear for

many months before Pearl Harbor. The increasing menace had been understood and accepted. Of course, even Senators can now read to precise clarity—to the place and the hour—the warnings we possessed.” At the time, though, Roosevelt was surprised: “Of course, he was surprised. But he had deliberately taken the chance of surprise, as he had won the strategy of successful militant delay. The blow was heavier than he had hoped it would necessarily be.” Indeed—2,400 Americans killed in one day.

Or perhaps it was no “surprise” at all. In 1989, a 90-year-old British naval intelligence officer named Eric Nave came forth with a stunning assertion: that the Brits had detailed foreknowledge of the attack, days before the event. As reported in the *Times of London* (June 1), Nave’s decoding of Japanese battle commands made “clear their intention to attack several days before the raid took place.” “His revelations challenge the view that the Americans were taken by surprise, and support evidence that Churchill, and probably Roosevelt, allowed the attack to go ahead unchallenged as means to bring America into the Second World War.” Nave added this: “We never had any doubt about Pearl Harbor itself. It should never have happened. We knew days, even a week before.” His account is detailed in his book *Betrayal at Pearl Harbor* (1991). Nave died in 1993.

Some Concluding Thoughts

This essay has been a study in history. But we must never forget: History is suffused with lessons for the present. What, then, can we conclude from this long and tragic story?

First: Wars are complex events, and all complex events have multiple causes. They are generally the result of an accumulation of tensions and conflicts over several years. It would be all but impossible for any one group, no matter how influential, to precipitate war if the conditions were not already favorable. But a small group can certainly heighten existing tensions, or serve as a trigger, or exacerbate an ongoing conflict.

It would be misleading to say that Jews ‘caused’ World War I, or the Russian Revolution, or World War II—though they certainly had a *significant* influence in all these events, and arguably a *decisive* influence. Clearly they are not the sole cause of the wars under review. It is not as if, were there no Jews at all, fighting in Europe would never have occurred. There were, for example, many non-Jewish belligerents on all sides during World War II, including Lord Halifax in England, and Stimson among the Americans. Military men always have an inclination to fight; after all, their very positions and prestige depend upon it. But we can say, with confidence, that the war was longer, more intense, and more deadly due to Jewish intervention.

Counterfactuals are notoriously difficult to apply to historical events: What if Jewish rebels and Weimar reconstructionists had not dominated post-World War I Germany? What if Roosevelt had not been partly Jewish? What if he had not relied upon Jewish money to finance his campaigns? What if Churchill had not been a Zionist? What if Ben Cohen’s ‘bases-for-destroyers’ plan had failed? We obviously can never know these things; but it is clear that Jews were active and instrumental at several critical junctures on the path to war. And indeed, this is one of the most striking facts: that Jews were so active, at so many points along the way, that we can scarcely avoid attributing to them a large portion of blame for the world wars and accompanying revolutions.

Second: FDR comes off, rather like Wilson, as an amoral, opportunistic, war-mongering dupe. His own Secretary of War, Henry Stimson, wrote that “his

mind does not follow easily a consecutive chain of thought, but he is full of stories and incidents, and hops about in his discussions from suggestion to suggestion, and it is very much like chasing a vagrant beam of sunshine around a vacant room.”⁵³ Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes famously declared him “a second-class intellect” in 1933. His close advisor Frankfurter once wrote, “I know his limitations. Most of them derive, I believe, from a lack of incisive intellect...”⁵⁴ British ambassador to the US Sir Ronald Lindsay considered FDR “an amiable and impressionable lightweight,” one who could not keep a secret from the American press.⁵⁵ Even his wife Eleanor did not know “whether FDR had a hidden center to his personality or only shifting peripheries.”⁵⁶

His lies were persistent, malicious, and criminal. His more knowledgeable opponents could see through them, even if the public could not. Lindbergh certainly knew the truth, and was appalled at the ability of our executive-in-chief to baldly lie to the people. In late 1944, with hostilities nearing an end, Congresswoman Clare Boothe Luce (R-Con.) loudly and publicly declared that Roosevelt “lied us into war.”⁵⁷ “The shame of Pearl Harbor,” she added, “was Mr. Roosevelt’s shame.”

Thus we see something of a long-term trend: Unethical, unprincipled, deceptive American presidents, who are “swayed by their Jewish elements” (Dillon), to lead an unwilling nation into battle against sovereign countries that are deemed to be enemies of the Jews. The parallels to the past 25 years are striking.

Recommended Reading

- The War That Had Many Fathers – Gerd Schultze-Rhonhof, 2011
- Hitler's Revolution – Richard Tedor, 2013
- Hitler's War & The War Path – David Irving, 2001 edition
- The Unnecessary War – Patrick Buchanan, 2008
- The Chief Culprit – Viktor Suvorov, 2008
- Truth For Germany – Udo Walendy, 1965
- The Forced War – David Hoggan, 1961
- Back Door To War – Charles Tansill, 1952

Notes

Hundred Years of War Against Germany

[1] Heinrich Fried Jung, Das Zeitalter des Imperialismus 1884-1914, Vol. 1, Berlin 1919, p. 230, 80.

[2] Paul Valéry, Eine methodische Eroberung, Zürich, New York 1946. p. 9; Cf. also: Hans-Dietrich Sander, Der nationale Imperativ, Krefeld 1980. p. 116ff.

Max Scheler, Die Ursachen des Deutschenhasses, Leipzig 1917. p. 61ff. Concerning Great Britain, cf. also Winston S. Churchill, Meine frühen Jahre. Weltabenteuer im Dienst, Munich 1965, 4th ed., p. 79. There it says: "In those days English society still had kept its old form and tradition, a shining and impressive Whole, of a highly elevated standard of behavior and conduct, and with sure methods of establishing their general acceptance, as today they are completely forgotten. Thus each man quite knew each man, and knew who he was. The few hundred Great Families who ruled England for many generations and had experienced the ascent of the country to the zenith of its glory, were [3] related by marriage to the utmost degree.

Everywhere one went, one met friends or relatives. The leading personalities of Society were often at the same time the leading statesmen in Parliament and likewise the leading sportsmen on the turf. Lord Salisbury always carefully avoided summoning the cabinet when there was racing at Newmarket; and the lower House basically held no sessions during the Derby."

This testimony of the British upper class reveals the talk of British democracy to be pure hypocrisy.

Editor's note: In the English edition of this book, *My Early Years. A Roving Commission*, Butterworth, London 1930, I did not find the passages Werner quotes here and in note [\[98\]](#).

[\[4\]](#) Quoted by Hans Grimm, *Warum-Woher-Aber wohin*, Lippoldsberg 1954. p. 33. For the original see "Our True Foreign Policy," *The Saturday Review*, August 24, 1895, p. 228.

[\[5\]](#) *Ibid.*, p. 46ff. For the original see "A Biological View of our Foreign Policy," "by a Biologist," *The Saturday Review*, 01 February 1896, p. 118ff.

[\[6\]](#) Up to the headline, H. Grimm, *op. cit.* (note [\[4\]](#)), p. 58f. For the original see "England and Germany," *The Saturday Review*, 11 September 1897, p. 278f.

Editor's note: These last three words of this article, meaning "Germany must be destroyed" do not

meaning "Germany must be destroyed" do not appear in the microfilmed version in the Public Library of Chicago as well as in other libraries, as Mr. Werner was told by readers of his original

[7] German article. However, Mr. Werner sent me a copy of this article which does include these words. It seems that there are two different versions of this article, one of which had these words omitted/deleted (most likely those which were later microfilmed).

[8] Winston S. Churchill, *The Second World War*, Vol. I. "The Gathering Storm", Boston 1948, p. 207ff.

[9] Carl J. Burckhardt, *Meine Danziger Mission 1937-1939*, 3. rev. ed., Munich 1980, p. 156f.

[10] Igor Lukes, "Benesch, Stalin und die Komintern 1938/39," *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte*, 41(3) (1993), p. 325.

[11] Friedrich Grimm, *Politische Justiz, die Krankheit unserer Zeit*, Bonn 1953, p. 146ff.

Retranslated from *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, September 18, 1989, p. 2. Since the 18th of [12] September 1989 was a Monday, the day of appearance of the article is taken to be the 17th of September 1989.

Quoted by a letter to the editor from Ferdinand Otto

[13] Mischke, Officier de la Legion d'Honneur, Paris, Frankfurter Allgemeine, April 27, 1990, p. 14. For the original text see Elsevier, April 7, 1990, p. 45.

Thomas More, *Utopia*, Yale Univ. Press, 2001, p. 133. Also, in *Utopia* divorce is only a formality (cf. p. 98f). It can be assumed that *Utopia* inspired Henry VIII in several respects. In 1529 More became Lord Chancellor. In 1534 Henry VIII made himself Supreme Head of the Church and thereby to a certain extent its Chief Priest and - since he was also King - he, like the priests of the Utopians, was subject only to God and his conscience. In a letter Henry VIII describes himself as King and Sovereign, who recognizes above himself no one on earth save God alone and who is not subject to the laws of earthly creatures. Quoted by Winston S. Churchill, *A History of the English Speaking Peoples*, vol II: "The New World," Dodd, Mead & Co., New York 1956, p. 61. In fairness to More it should be mentioned that he vehemently opposed this self-elevation of Henry VIII and for that reason was executed in 1535.

[15] T. More, *ibid.*, p. 105. One should recall here the trade war between the USA and Japan which was beginning to develop in 1995 where the thinking was similar on the American side.

[16] Ibid., p. 74, pp. 106-109, esp. 108.

In Churchill one finds this sentence concerning the time after Henry VIII: "Thomas More's definition of government as a conspiracy of rich men

[17] procuring their own commodities under the name and title of a commonwealth fitted England very accurately during these years," op. cit. (note [8]), vol. II, p. 93.

[18] Hermann Oncken, in: Thomas Morus, Utopia, Darmstadt 1979, p. 32 (introduction). Oncken has also made detailed reference to the connection between More and British colonial policy, p. 33.

[19] T. More, op. cit. (note [14]), p 109.

[20] Ibid., p. 106.

[21] Ibid., p. 111.

Ibid., p. 105. The contradictory absurdity is that the Utopians in their country know slavery quite well (p. 95f). When More introduced slavery into his [22] ideal state, it had disappeared in the West. But of all things, such a model is chosen by the intellectuals of Modernism as namesake for their future plans!

Ibid., p. 39-50, cf. also footnotes. That the discussion is fictitious is naturally an assumption

discussion is tedious is naturally an assumption
[23] for which, however, inspection speaks, since from
where could More have be able to get his
information?

[24] Brockhaus Konversations-Lexikon, Leipzig 1908,
Vol. 8, p. 374.

In an bitter comment on the death of Juarez, Shaw
wrote, obviously out of knowledge of the practices
of the English press: "I once proposed a press law
[...] each article printed in a newspaper should not
only give the name and address of the author, but
also give the sum which was paid for the
contribution. If the miserable fool who murdered
[25] Juarez had known that the worthless articles [...] were
not the voice of imperiled France, but instead
the ignorant scrawling of some poor devil who no
longer knew how to earn three francs for himself,
he would hardly have thrown away his own life."
Bernard Shaw, *Der gesunde Menschenverstand im
Krieg* (Commons Sense in War), vol. II. Zürich
1919, p. 75. Editor's remark: I did not find an
English version of this German book.

[26] G. B. Shaw had taken over the theater paper
between 1895 and 1898; cf. Hermann Stresau,
George Bernard Shaw, Rowohlt, Reinbek 1962, p.
56.

For H. G. Wells, as with the names following, only one publication may be named: "The Well at the World's End," The Saturday Review, October 17, 1896, p. 413ff.

Winston S. Churchill published three articles, all about the war in Cuba. With his first article of February 15, 1896, his name is erroneously given as Winston L. Churchill, but Churchill repaired this in his next essay "American Intervention in Cuba", The Saturday Review, March 7, 1896, p. 244f.

W.B. Yeats, "The Twilight of Forgiveness," The Saturday Review, November 2, 1895, p. 573.

Conan Doyle wrote two reader letters: The Saturday Review, January 2, 1897, p. 15f.; January 9, 1897 p. 40f.

Henry M. Stanley, "The Recent Attacks on the Congo Administration," The Saturday Review, September 19, 1896, p. 307.

Rudyard Kipling, "The Vampire," The Saturday Review, April 24, 1897, p. 443.

Algernon Charles Swinburne, "A February Roundel," The Saturday Review, February 22, 1896, p. 194

Meyers enzyklopädisches Lexikon. 25 volumes.

- they are only in parentheses. Common, 20 volumes,
[34] Mannheim 1971. Information about these persons
also comes from this encyclopedia.
- [35] Max Beerbohm, "Madame Tussaud's," *The
Saturday Review*, February 13, 1897, p. 165f.
- [36] J. B. Bury, "The British and the Roman Empire,"
The Saturday Review, June 27, 1896, p. 645.
- [37] Stephen Crane, "London Impressions," *The
Saturday Review*, July 31, 1897, p. 105f.
- [38] John Davidson, "The Hymn of Abdul Hamid,"
Saturday Review, May 22, 1897, p. 570.
- Charles Wentworth Dilke, "Lord Roberts, Lord
[39] Salisbury, and Russia," *The Saturday Review*,
January 23, 1897, p. 83ff.
- [40] Edward Dowden, "Matthew Arnold's Letters," *The
Saturday Review*, December 12, 1895, p. 757f.
- Richard Garnett, "Recollections of Coventry
[41] Patmore," *The Saturday Review*, December 5,
1896, p. 582f.
- [42] For the latter information cf. Hermann Stresau op.
cit. (note [26]), p. 56.
- [43] W. H. Hudson, "London Birds in Winter," *The
Saturday Review*, March 13, 1897, p. 264f.

- [44] Oliver Lodge, "Roentgen Radiography and its Uses," *The Saturday Review*, April 25, 1896, p. 422f.
- [45] Margaret Macdonald, Reader letter "Salvagia," *The Saturday Review*, October 24, 1896, p. 445f.
- [46] Frederic William Henry Myers, "A Cosmic Outlook," *The Saturday Review*, December 7, 1895, p. 758.
- [47] Coventry Patmore, "Mrs. Meynell's New Essays," *The Saturday Review*, June 13, 1896, p. 593f.
- [48] Will(iam) Rothenstein, "Goya II," *The Saturday Review*, September 19, 1896, p. 307.
- [49] Arthur Symons, "A Visit to Dumas fils," *The Saturday Review*, November 30, 1895, p. 724f.
- [50] Silvanus P. Thompson, "The Progress of Electric Traction," *The Saturday Review*, June 29, 1897, p. 600.
- [51] Alfred Russel Wallace, "Our Native Birds," *The Saturday Review*, September 14, 1895, p. 342f.
- [52] William Watson, "Estrangement," *The Saturday Review*, May 2, 1896, p. 451.
- Gen Neville Chamberlain "Our Treatment of the

SMITH REVUE CHAMBERLAIN, "Our Treatment of the
[53] Kafirs," *The Saturday Review*, May 16, 1896, p.
494ff. For personal data: *Mayers Konversations-*
Lexikon, 5th rev. ed., Leipzig and Vienna 1897.

Admiral P. H. Colomb, "The Naval Programme,"
[54] *The Saturday Review*, March 14, 1896, p. 268f. For
personal data see previous note.

[55] J. B. Bury, op. cit. (note [36]), p. 64.

GREATER-ENGLANDER, "The British and
[56] Roman Empire," letter to the editor, *The Saturday*
Review, July 11, 1896, p. 39.

"German Competition," *The Saturday Review*,
[57] January 25, 1896, p. 91, or "The German
Menace," *The Saturday Review*, August 29, 1896,
p. 208.

Perplexed. "The Spectator and Political Economy,"
[58] letter to the editor, *The Saturday Review*, August 8,
1896, p. 137.

[59] "The Failure of Germany," *The Saturday Review*,
October 24, 1896, p. 434.

[60] "Luther: Liberalism: Individualism", *The Saturday*
Review, January 2, 1897, p. 6.

[61] Bernard Shaw, "Caesar and Cleopatra," *Appleton-*
Century-Crofts New York 1965 n 5

Century Series, New York, 1909, p. 9.

Ibid., p. 78. In his character of Britannus, Shaw expressly maintains continuity of character between the inhabitants of the Great Britain in Caesar's time and that of today (cf. p. 123f). In his argument, he [62] personifies the mind-set which is found in the essay by "a Biologist" (cf. footnote [5]), as when he stresses the importance of the climate and of the forest for the character of Britannus and of present-day Britons.

[63] Ibid., p. 113.

[64] Bernard Shaw, op. cit. (note [25]), vol. I., p. 35.

[65] Hermann Stresau, op. cit. (note [26]), p. 126; retranslated.

[66] Ibid., p. 127; retranslated.

[67] Hans Grimm, op. cit. (note [4]), p. 33f.

[68] Ibid., p. 52.

Charles à Court Repington, The First World War [69] 1914-1918, Personal Experiences, vol. II., London 1920, p. 463; cf. p. 478.

Edward Grey, Twenty Five Years, 1892-1916, [70] Fredrick A. Sokes Company, New York 1925, p. 2; cf. p. 25.

[71] Ibid., p. 32.

Ibid. Editor's note: On pp. 9-11, Gray reports how Germany pressured competing England in the 1890s to withdraw its offer to build a railway through Minor Asia (Turkey) or Germany would stop supporting England in Egypt. England complied, but was mischievous ever since.

[72] Ibid., p. 50.

Cf. the detailed exchange of letters which Grey reproduces in his memoirs, [ibid.](#), p. 70-74, 76-79, 102-107, 110, 139ff.

Margret Boveri, *Sir Edward Grey und das Foreign Office*, Berlin-Grunewald 1993, p. 134; 198; 105; 198.

[75] Edward Grey, *op. cit.* (note [\[70\]](#)), p. xviii.

[76] Margret Boveri, *op. cit.* (note [\[75\]](#)), p. 197.

[77] Hermann Lutz, *Eyre Crowe, der böse Geist des Foreign Office*, Stuttgart and Berlin 1931.

[78] Margret Boveri, *op. cit.* (note [\[75\]](#)), p. 112.

[79] Edward Grey, *op. cit.* (note [\[70\]](#)), p. xviif.

Ibid., Vol. 2, p. 302.

[\[81\]](#)

[\[82\]](#) Margret Boveri, op. cit. (note [\[75\]](#)), p. 183.

Hans Rothfels, "Zur Beurteilung Greys," in: "Die
[\[83\]](#) Kriegsschuldfrage," Berliner Monatshefte für internationale Aufklärung, April 1927, p. 351f.

[\[84\]](#) Bernard Shaw, Winke zur Friedenskonferenz, Berlin 1919, p. 22.

[\[85\]](#) Bernard Shaw, op. cit. (note [\[25\]](#)), p. 5.

Friedrich Thimme, "Das Memorandum E. A. Crowes vom 1. Januar 1907. Seine Bedeutung für
[\[86\]](#) die Kriegsschuldfrage," Berliner Monatshefte für internationale Aufklärung, August 1929, p. 735.

[\[87\]](#) Hermann Lutz, op. cit. (note [\[78\]](#)), p. 9.

Cf. e.g. Friedrich Thimme, op. cit. (note [\[86\]](#)), pp. 732ff.; Hermann Lutz, Deutschfeindliche Kräfte im Foreign Office der Vorkriegszeit, Berlin 1932, p. 13ff.; Werner Frauendienst, "Crowe, der
[\[88\]](#) Deutschland-Referent des Foreign Office," Berliner Monatshefte für internationale Aufklärung, August 1931, p. 776ff.; Hermann Lutz, op. cit. (note [\[78\]](#)), p. 10-55; Margret Boveri, op. cit. (note [\[75\]](#)), p. 114ff.

[89] Bernard Shaw, op. cit. (note [84]), p. 8; 9; 20

[90] Hermann Lutz, *Deutschfeindliche Kräfte...*, op. cit. (note [88]), p. 18, footnote 35.

[91] Hermann Lutz, *Lord Grey und der Weltkrieg*, Berlin 1927, p. 48; 299 footnote 82a.

[92] Margret Boveri, op. cit. (note [75]), p. 53.

[93] Fritz Hesse, *Das Spiel um Deutschland*, Munich 1953, p. 66.

[94] *The Times*, March 13, 1948, p. 4.

Editor's note: Between these two sentences, one often finds quoted other sentences, the entire text allegedly stemming from an AP press release of that time (the date often quoted, March 16, 1984, is obviously wrong): "Hitler and the German people did not want war. According to the principles of the balance of powers, we, goaded on by the 'Americans' around Roosevelt, declared war against Germany in order to destroy it. We did not respond to the various appeals for peace of Hitler. Now we must discover that Hitler was right. In place of a conservative Germany which he had offered us, stands the enormous imperialistic power of the Soviets."

[95] These sentences are, however, not part of the

London Times article, which does not claim to be based on an AP release. Associated Press informed me that they have no record of such a press release, which may or may not be result of AP archiving exclusively national U.S. news releases on microfilm at that time. I also did not find Shawcross' speech quoted in the New York Times or the then German-friendly/IMT critical Chicago Tribune. Since Shawcross always indicated his full and uncritical support for the IMT show trial and its judgment (cf. his memoirs *Life Sentence*, Constable & Co., London 1995), it is more than unlikely that these sentences were added by a third person.

Kenneth Auchincloss, "The Long Shadow," *Newsweek International Edition*, May 8, 1995, p. [96] 11. [Although order via inter-library loan, I had to retranslate this quotation from German to keep the deadline. Editor.]

Bertolt Brecht, "Offener Brief an die Künstler und Schriftsteller vom 26. September 1951," in: Bertolt Brecht, *Gesammelte Werke*, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt/Main 1967, p. 496. [97]

[98] Churchill, op. cit. (note [3]), p. 80.

[99] Dieter Friede, *Das russische Perpetuum Mobile*, 2nd ed., Würzburg 1959, p. 181.

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Czechoslovakia in Context

- [74.](#) Schultze-Rhonhof, Gerd, Das tschechisch-deutsche Drama, p. 61
- [75.](#) Kunert, Dirk, Hitlers kalter Krieg, p. 285
- [76.](#) Schultze-Rhonhof, Gerd, Das tschechisch-deutsche Drama, p. 52
- [77.](#) Ibid, p. 61
- [78.](#) Ibid, pp. 140, 186
- [79.](#) Ibid, pp. 108, 123
- [80.](#) Ibid, p. 124
- [81.](#) Klüver, Max, War es Hitlers Krieg?, p. 80
- [82.](#) Schultze-Rhonhof, Gerd, Das tschechisch-deutsche Drama, p. 169
- [83.](#) Ibid, p. 60
- [84.](#) Ibid, p. 89
- [85.](#) Ibid, pp. 115, 119, 120, 147
- [86.](#) Ibid, pp. 166, 154
- [87.](#) Domaras, Max, Hitler Reden und Proklamationen, p. 802
- [88.](#) Kunert, Dirk, Hitlers kalter Krieg, p. 280
- [89.](#) Kunert, Dirk, Ein Weltkrieg wird vorprogrammiert, p. 126
- [90.](#) Schultze-Rhonhof, Gerd, Das tschechisch-deutsche Drama, p. 154
- [91.](#) Kunert, Dirk, Hitlers kalter Krieg, p. 289
- [92.](#) Schultze-Rhonhof, Gerd, Das tschechisch-deutsche Drama, p. 190
- [93.](#) BD I, Third Series, 86
- [94.](#) Schultze-Rhonhof, Gerd, Das tschechisch-deutsche Drama, p. 206

- [95.](#) Klüver, Max, War es Hitlers Krieg?, p. 76
- [96.](#) PRO FO 371/20375 C 5216
- [97.](#) BD I, Third Series, 86
- [98.](#) PRO CAB 27/623
- [99.](#) PRO CAB 23/93 cab 21138
- [100.](#) Schultze-Rhonhof, Gerd, Das tschechisch-deutsche Drama, p. 227
- [101.](#) Schultze-Rhonhof, Gerd, Der Krieg, der viele Väter hatte, p. 159
- [102.](#) Henderson, Nevile, Failure of a Mission, p. 137
- [103.](#) Post, Walter, Die Ursachen des Zweiten Weltkrieges, p. 237
- [104.](#) Klüver, Max, War es Hitlers Krieg?, p. 93
- [105.](#) Henderson, Nevile, Failure of a Mission, p. 142
- [106.](#) Klüver, Max, War es Hitlers Krieg?, pp. 96-97
- [107.](#) BD II, Third Series, 665
- [108.](#) Henderson, Nevile, Failure of a Mission, p. 142
- [109.](#) Hitler, Adolf, Reden des Führers am Parteitag Grossdeutschland, pp. 77-78
- [110.](#) Henderson, Nevile, Failure of a Mission, p. 131
- [111.](#) BD II, Third Series, 8
- [112.](#) Klüver, Max, War es Hitlers Krieg?, p. 107
- [113.](#) Schultze-Rhonhof, Gerd, Das tschechisch-deutsche Drama, p. 260
- [114.](#) Meiser, Hans, Das Ringen um Frankreich, p. 171
- [115.](#) Schultze-Rhonhof, Gerd, Der Krieg, der viele Väter hatte, p. 173
- [116.](#) BD II, Third Series, 1038

- [117.](#) Meiser, Hans, Das Ringen um Frankreich, p. 166
- [118.](#) Post, Walter, Die Ursachen des Zweiten Weltkrieges, p. 262
- [119.](#) Klüver, Max, War es Hitlers Krieg?, p. 119
- [120.](#) Schultze-Rhonhof, Gerd, Das tschechisch-deutsche Drama, p. 275
- [121.](#) Klüver, Max, War es Hitlers Krieg?, p. 122
- [122.](#) Schultze-Rhonhof, Gerd, Das tschechisch-deutsche Drama, p. 280
- [123.](#) Ibid, p. 297
- [124.](#) Meiser, Hans, Das Ringen um Frankreich, p. 184
- [125.](#) Klüver, Max, War es Hitlers Krieg?, p. 160
- [126.](#) Schultze-Rhonhof, Gerd, Das tschechisch-deutsche Drama, pp. 313-315, 304
- [127.](#) Ibid, p. 334
- [128.](#) Klüver, Max, War es Hitlers Krieg?, p. 163
- [129.](#) Post, Walter, Die Ursachen des Zweiten Weltkrieges, p. 304
- [130.](#) Schultze-Rhonhof, Gerd, Das tschechisch-deutsche Drama, p. 129
- [131.](#) Klüver, Max, War es Hitlers Krieg?, p. 161
- [132.](#) Schultze-Rhonhof, Gerd, Das tschechisch-deutsche Drama, p. 340
- [133.](#) Ibid, p. 342
- [134.](#) Hoggan, David, The Forced War, p. 248
- [135.](#) Umbreit, Hans, Deutsche Militärverwaltungen 1938-1939, pp. 59, 56, 54
- [136.](#) Hoggan, David, The Forced War, p. 251
- [137.](#) Schultze-Rhonhof, Gerd, Das tschechisch-deutsche Drama, p. 344
- [138.](#) Ibid, p. 344

[139.](#) Umbreit, Hans, Deutsche Militärverwaltungen 1938-1939, p. 55

[140.](#) Kunert, Dirk, Ein Weltkrieg wird vorprogrammiert, p. 242

Winston Churchill Discreetly Veiled, Part 1

[1](#) Winston Churchill, *The Gathering Storm*, vol. 1, *The Second World War* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1948), p. 347. Churchill commented that the guarantee was extended to a Poland "which with hyena appetite had only six months before joined in the pillage and destruction of the Czechoslovak State." He was referring to the annexation of the Teschen district, by which Poland had reclaimed the ethnically Polish areas of that bizarre concoction Churchill was pleased to dignify as "the Czechoslovak State."

[2](#) David Irving, *Churchill's War*, vol. 1, *The Struggle for Power* (Bullsbrook, Western Australia: Veritas, 1987), pp. 193–96.

[3](#) James Leutze, "The Secret of the Churchill-Roosevelt Correspondence: September 1939 — May 1940," *Journal of Contemporary History* 10, no. 3 (July 1975): 465–91; Leutze concludes that this was the real reason the two governments colluded to silence Tyler Kent.

[4](#) John W. Wheeler-Bennett, *King George VI: His Life and Reign* (New York: St. Martin's, 1958), pp. 390–92. Wheeler-Bennett added: "On his return to London the King communicated the essence of his talks with the President to the proper quarters, and so greatly did he esteem their importance that he carried the original manuscript of his notes about him in his dispatch case throughout the war."

[5](#) Hart, "The Military Strategist," p. 208.

[6](#) John Charmley, *Churchill: The End of Glory* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1993), p 423.

[7](#) See also Charmley's review of Clive Ponting's work, in the *Times Literary Supplement*, May 13, 1994, p. 8.

[8](#) Gaddis Smith, "Whose Finest Hour?" *New York Times Book Review*, August

29, 1993, p. 3.

[9](#) On March 27, 1942, Goebbels commented in his diary on the destruction of the European Jews, which was then underway: "Here, too, the Führer is the undismayed champion of a radical solution necessitated by conditions and therefore inexorable. Fortunately, a whole series of possibilities presents itself for us in wartime that would be denied us in peacetime. We shall have to profit by this." He added: "the fact that Jewry's representatives in England and America are today organizing and sponsoring the war against Germany must be paid for dearly by its representatives in Europe — and that's only right." *The Goebbels Diaries, 1942–1943*, Louis P. Lochner ed. and trans. (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1948), p. 148.

[10](#) Paul Addison, "Lloyd George and Compromise Peace in the Second World War," in *Lloyd George: Twelve Essays*, A.J.P. Taylor, ed. (New York: Atheneum, 1971), pp. 359–84. Churchill himself told Stalin in 1944: "We never thought of making a separate peace even the year when we were all alone and could easily have made one without serious loss to the British Empire and largely at your expense." *Ibid*, p. 383.

[11](#) Irving, *Churchill's War*, pp. 193, 207.

[12](#) Thomas A. Bailey, *The Man in the Street: The Impact of American Public Opinion on Foreign Policy* (New York: Macmillan, 1948), p. 13. A recent writer has commented on Bailey's position: "In reality, when Roosevelt and other presidents lied, they did it for their own good, or what they believed to be their own good. But they were often mistaken because they have tended to be at least as shortsighted as the masses ... Roosevelt's destroyer deal marked a watershed in the use and abuse of presidential power, foreshadowing a series of dangerous and often disastrous adventures abroad." Robert Shogan, *Hard Bargain* (New York: Scribner's, 1995), pp.271, 278. The classical revisionist case on Roosevelt's war policy was presented in Charles A. Beard, *President Roosevelt and the Coming of War 1941* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1949); and *Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace*, Harry Elmer Barnes, ed. (Caldwell, Idaho: Caxton, 1953), among other works.

[13](#) Winston S. Churchill, *The Grand Alliance*, vol. 3, *The Second World War* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1950), pp. 23–24.

[14](#) William Stevenson, *A Man Called Intrepid* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1976).

[15](#) Irving, *Churchill's War*, pp. 524–27.

[16](#) Gore Vidal, *Screening History* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992), p.40.

[17](#) *Ibid.*, p. 47.

[18](#) *Ibid.*, p. 33.

[19](#) "War-Entry Plans Laid to Roosevelt," *New York Times*, January 2, 1972.

[20](#) Beesly, *Room 40*, p. 121 n. 1.

[21](#) See, for instance, William Henry Chamberlin, *America's Second Crusade* (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1950), pp. 124–47.

[22](#) Richard Lamb, *Churchill as War Leader* (New York: Carroll and Graf, 1991), p. 149.

[23](#) *Ibid.*, pp. 147–62.

[24](#) *Ibid.*, p. 162.

[25](#) Chamberlin, *America's Second Crusade*, p. 177. On Churchill's use of the "backdoor to war" for the United States, see John Costello, *Days of Infamy. MacArthur, Roosevelt, Churchill — The Shocking Truth Revealed* (New York: Pocket Books, 1994). On the question of Pearl Harbor, it is interesting to note that even as "mainstream" a historian as Warren F. Kimball, editor of the Churchill-Roosevelt correspondence, writes: "Doubts have not yet been laid to rest concerning still-closed British intelligence files about the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor: information that Churchill may have chosen not to pass on to the Americans in the hope that such an attack would draw the United States into war." See also Warren F. Kimball, "Wheel within a Wheel: Churchill, Roosevelt, and the Special Relationship," in Churchill, Blake and Louis, eds., p. 298, where Kimball cites James Rusbridger and Eric Nave, *Betrayal at Pearl Harbor: How Churchill Lured Roosevelt into World War II* (New York: Summit, 1991). Kimball complains that, despite written requests from him and other historians, British government files on relations with Japan in late 1941 remain

closed. Churchill, p. 546 n. 29. Robert Smith Thompson, in *A Time for War: Franklin Delano Roosevelt and the Path to Pearl Harbor* (New York: Prentice Hall, 1991), presents a useful recent account of the coming of the war with Japan.

[26](#) Jaffa, "In Defense of Churchill," p. 277.

[27](#) Charmley, *Churchill: The End of Glory*, p. 538.

[28](#) Norman Davies, *God's Playground: A History of Poland*, vol. 2, 1795 to the Present (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), pp. 447–53.

[29](#) For a critique of the view that Hitler's aim was to "conquer the world," see Geoffrey Stoakes, *Hitler and the Quest for World Domination* (Leamington Spa, England: Berg, 1986).

[30](#) Taylor, "The Statesman," p. 43.

[31](#) For instance, in May 1944, Eden protested to Churchill, regarding the prospect of the "Communization of the Balkans": "We must think of the after-effect of these developments, instead of confining ourselves as hitherto to the short-term view of what will give the best dividends during the war and for the war." Charmley, *Churchill: The End of Glory*, p. 538.

[32](#) Ben-Moshe, *Churchill: Strategy and History*, pp. 236–37.

[33](#) *Ibid.*, 241.

[34](#) Hanson W. Baldwin, *Great Mistakes of the War* (New York: Harper, 1949), p. 10.

[35](#) Roosevelt's attitude is epitomized in his statement: "If I give him [Stalin] everything I possibly can, and ask nothing of him in return, [then] noblesse oblige, he won't try to annex anything and will work with me for a world of peace and democracy." Robert Nisbet, *Roosevelt and Stalin: The Failed Courtship* (Washington, D.C.: Regnery, 1988), p. 6. Joseph Sobran's remarks in his brief essay, "Pal Joey," *Sobran's* 2, no. 8 (August 1995): pp. 5–6, are characteristically insightful.

[36](#) Ben-Moshe, *Churchill: Strategy and History*, pp. 287–88, 305–6.

[37](#) Ponting, Churchill, p. 665.

[38](#) Isaiah Berlin, "Winston Churchill," in idem, *Personal Impressions*, Henry Hardy, ed. (New York: Viking, 1980), p. 16., where Churchill is quoted as saying of Stalin that he is "at once a callous, a crafty, and an ill-informed giant." Note, however, that even this quotation shows that Churchill placed Stalin in an entirely different category from the unspeakably evil Hitler. In fact, as the works by Charmley, Ponting, and Ben-Moshe amply demonstrate, until the end of the war Churchill's typical attitude toward Stalin was friendly and admiring. Berlin's essay, with its mawkish infatuation with "the largest human being of our time," has to be read to be believed. An indication of one source of Berlin's passion is his reference to Churchill's sympathy for "the struggle of the Jews for self-determination in Palestine."

[39](#) Cf. Charmley, *Churchill: The End of Glory*, pp. 572–73, on "Operation Armpit," the extension of the Italian campaign and a thrust towards Vienna; Charmley concludes that, contrary to Churchill's Cold War defenders: "there is little evidence to show that Churchill's support for 'Armpit' was based upon political motives ... [He supported it] for the reason which any student of his career will be familiar with — it fired his imagination."

[40](#) Cf. Taylor, "The Statesman," pp. 56–57: "According to one version, Churchill was alarmed at the growth of Soviet power and tried to take precautions against it, if not in 1942 at least well before the end of the war.... It is hard to sustain this view from contemporary records. Churchill never wavered from his determination that Nazi Germany must be utterly defeated.... Churchill had no European policy in any wider sense. His outlook was purely negative: the defeat of Germany.... With Churchill it was always one thing at a time." See also Ben-Moshe, *Churchill: Strategy and History*, pp. 292–99, on the southern strategy not being aimed at forestalling Soviet gains.

[41](#) *Ibid.*, p. 287.

[42](#) An instance of the lengths to which Churchill's apologists will go is provided by John Keegan, in "Churchill's Strategy," in Churchill, Blake and Louis, eds., p. 328, where he states of Churchill: "Yet he never espoused any truly unwise strategic course, nor did he contemplate one. His commitment to a campaign in the Balkans was unsound, but such a campaign would not have risked losing the war." Risking losing the war would appear to be an excessively stringent

criterion for a truly unwise strategic course.

[43](#) Albert C. Wedemeyer, *Wedemeyer Reports!* (New York: Holt, 1958), p. 230. Everyone else was against Churchill's plan, including his own military advisors. Brooke pointed out to his chief that, if they followed through with his idea, "we should embark on a campaign through the Alps in winter." Ponting, *Churchill*, p. 625.

[44](#) Lamb, *Churchill as War Leader*, pp. 250–75.

[45](#) Churchill's own Foreign Office informed him that: "we would land ourselves with a Communist state closely linked to the USSR after the war who would employ the usual terrorist methods to overcome opposition." *Ibid.*, p. 256. Anthony Eden told the Cabinet in June 1944: "If anyone is to blame for the present situation in which Communist-led movements are the most powerful elements in Yugoslavia and Greece, it is we ourselves." British agents, according to Eden, had done the work of the Russians for them. Charmley, *Churchill: The End of Glory*, p. 580.

[46](#) Fitzroy Maclean *Eastern Approaches* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1949), p. 281.

[47](#) Lamb, *Churchill as War Leader*, p. 259. Churchill believed Tito's promises of a free election and a plebiscite on the monarchy; above all, he concentrated on a single issue: killing Germans. See also Charmley, *Churchill: The End of Glory*, p. 558.

[48](#) On September 21, 1943, for instance, Churchill stated: "The twin roots of all our evils, Nazi tyranny and Prussian militarism, must be extirpated. Until this is achieved, there are no sacrifices we will not make and no lengths in violence to which we will not go." Russell Grenfell, *Unconditional Hatred* (New York: Devin-Adair, 1953), p. 92.

[49](#) Ponting, *Churchill*, p. 675.

[50](#) Watt, "Churchill and Appeasement," p. 210.

[51](#) In a memorandum to Alexander Cadogan, of the Foreign Office; Richard Lamb, *The Ghosts of Peace, 1935–1945* (Salisbury, England: Michael Russell, 1987), p. 133.

[52](#) Peter Hoffmann, *German Resistance to Hitler* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1988), pp. 95–105; idem, *The History of the German Resistance*, Richard Barry, trans. (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1977), pp. 205–48; and idem, "The Question of Western Allied Co-Operation with the German Anti-Nazi Conspiracy, 1938–1944," *The Historical Journal* 34, no. 2 (1991): 437–64.

[53](#) Giles MacDonogh, *A Good German: Adam von Trott zu Solz* (Woodstock, N.Y.: Overlook Press, 1992), pp. 236–37.

[54](#) Lamb, *Churchill as War Leader*, p. 292. Lamb argues this thesis at length and persuasively in his *The Ghosts of Peace, 1935–1945*, pp. 248–320. A less conclusive judgment is reached by Klemens von Klemperer, *German Resistance against Hitler: The Search for Allies Abroad 1938–1945* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1992), esp. pp. 432–41, who emphasizes the difficulties in the way of any agreement between the British government and the German resistance. These included, in particular, the loyalty of the former to its Soviet ally and the insistence of the latter on post-war Germany's keeping ethnically German areas, such as Danzig and the Sudetenland.

[55](#) Marie Vassiltchikov, who was close to the conspirators, in her *Berlin Diaries, 1940–1945* (New York: Knopf, 1987), p. 218, expressed her bafflement at the line taken by the British: "The Allied radio makes no sense to us: they keep naming people who, they claim, took part in the plot. And yet some of these have not yet been officially implicated. I remember warning Adam Trott that this would happen. He kept hoping for Allied support of a 'decent' Germany and I kept saying that at this point they were out to destroy Germany, any Germany, and would not stop at eliminating the 'good' Germans with the 'bad.'"

[56](#) Ben-Moshe, *Churchill: Strategy and History*, pp. 307–16. See also Anne Armstrong, *Unconditional Surrender* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, [1961] 1974); and Lamb, *The Ghosts of Peace, 1935–1945*, pp. 215–35. Among the strongest wartime critics of the unconditional surrender policy, as well as of the bombing of civilians, was the military expert, Liddell Hart; see Brian Bond, *Liddell Hart: A Study of his Military Thought* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1977), pp. 119–63.

[57](#) Lamb, *The Ghosts of Peace, 1935–1945*, p. 232.

[58](#) Ibid., pp. 236–45.

[59](#) Lord Moran, *Churchill: The Struggle for Survival, 1940–1965* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1966), pp. 190–91. Churchill's ready acceptance of this specious argument casts considerable doubt on the claim of Paul Addison, *Churchill on the Home Front*, p. 437, that Churchill was "schooled" in free-trade doctrines, which were "ingrained" in him. More consistent with the evidence, including his outright rejection of free trade beginning in 1930, is that Churchill used or cast aside the economic theory of the market economy as it suited his political purposes.

[60](#) Moran, *Churchill: The Struggle for Survival, 1940–1965*, pp. 195–96.

[61](#) Ibid., p. 193. That the spirit at least of the Morgenthau Plan continued to guide Allied policy in post-war Germany is shown in Freda Utley's *The High Cost of Vengeance* (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1949).

[62](#) Lamb, *Churchill as War Leader*, pp. 63–73. See also Ponting, *Churchill*, pp. 450–54; and Hart, "The Military Strategist," pp. 210–21.

[63](#) The "British obsession with heavy bombers" had consequences for the war effort as well; it led, for instance, to the lack of fighter planes at Singapore. Taylor, "The Statesman," p. 54. On the whole issue, see Stephen A. Garrett, *Ethics and Airpower in World War II: The British Bombing of German Cities* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993). See also Max Hastings, *Bomber Command* (New York: Dial Press, 1979); David Irving, *The Destruction of Dresden* (New York: Ballantine, 1963); and Benjamin Colby, 'Twas a Famous Victory (New Rochelle, N.Y.: Arlington House, 1974), pp. 173–202. On the British use of airpower to "pacify" colonial populations, see Charles Townshend, "Civilization and 'Frightfulness': Air Control in the Middle East between the Wars," in *Warfare, Diplomacy, and Politics: Essays in Honor of A.J.P. Taylor*, Chris Wrigley, ed. (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1986), pp. 142–62.

[64](#) Ponting, *Churchill*, p. 620.

[65](#) Hastings, *Bomber Command*, p. 339. In 1945, Harris wrote: "I would not regard the whole of the remaining cities of Germany as worth the bones of one British grenadier." Ibid., p. 344. Harris later wrote "The Germans had allowed their soldiers to dictate the whole policy of the Luftwaffe, which was designed

expressly to assist the army in rapid advances.... Much too late in the day they saw the advantage of a strategic bombing force." Hughes, Winston Churchill: British Bulldog, p 189.

[66](#) J.M. Spaight, *Bombing Vindicated* (London: Geoffrey Bles, 1944), p. 70–71. Spaight declared that Britons should be proud of the fact that "we began to bomb objectives on the German mainland before the Germans began to bomb objectives on the British mainland." Hitler, while ready enough to use strategic bombing on occasion, "did not want [it] to become the practice. He had done his best to have it banned by international agreement." *Ibid.*, pp. 68, 60. Writing during the war, Spaight, of course, lied to his readers in asserting that German civilians were being killed only incidentally by the British bombing.

[67](#) On February 14, 1942, Directive No. 22 was issued to Bomber Command, stipulating that efforts were now to be "focused on the morale of the enemy civil population and in particular of the industrial workers." The next day, the chief of the Air Staff added: "Ref the new bombing directive: I suppose it is dear that the aiming points are to be the built-up areas, not, for instance, the dockyards or aircraft factories." Garrett, *Ethics and Air Power in World War II*, p. 11. By lying about the goal of the bombing and attempting a cover-up after the war, Churchill implicitly conceded that Britain had committed breaches of the rules of warfare. *Ibid.*, pp. 36–37.

[68](#) *Ibid.*, pp. 32–33.

[69](#) Richard Swedberg, *Schumpeter: A Biography* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1991), p. 141.

[70](#) Garrett, *Ethics and Air Power in World War II*, p. 202.

[71](#) Hastings, *Bomber Command*, pp. 343–44. In November, 1942, Churchill had proposed that in the Italian campaign: "All the industrial centers should be attacked in an intense fashion, every effort being made to render them uninhabitable and to terrorise and paralyse the population." Ponting, *Churchill*, p. 614.

[72](#) To a historian who wished to verify some details, Churchill replied: "I cannot recall anything about it. I thought the Americans did it. Air Chief Marshal Harris would be the person to contact." Rose, *Churchill: The Unruly Giant*, p. 338.

[73](#) Garrett, *Ethics and Air Power in World War II*, p. 21.

[74](#) See Barton J. Bernstein, "A postwar myth: 500,000 U.S. lives saved," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 42, no. 6 (June/July 1986): 38–40; and, idem, "Wrong Numbers," *The Independent Monthly* (July 1995): 41–44. See also, idem, "Seizing the Contested Terrain of Early Nuclear History: Stimson, Conant, and Their Allies Explain the Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb," *Diplomatic History* 17, no. 1 (Winter 1993): 35–72, where the point is made that a major motive in the political elite's early propaganda campaign justifying the use of the atomic bombs was to forestall a feared retreat into "isolationism" by the American people. It is interesting to note that Richard Nixon, sometimes known as the "Mad Bomber" of Indo-China, justified "deliberate attacks on civilians" by citing the atomic bombings of the Japanese cities, as well as the attacks on Hamburg and Dresden. Richard M. Nixon, "Letters to the Editor," *New York Times*, May 15, 1983.

[75](#) Erik von Kuehnelt-Leddihn, *Leftism Revisited: From de Sade and Marx to Hitler and Pol Pot* (Washington, D.C.: Regnery, 1990), p. 281. This work contains numerous perceptive passages on Churchill, e.g., pp. 261–65, 273, and 280–81, as well as on Roosevelt.

[76](#) Aleksandr I. Solzhenitsyn, *The Gulag Archipelago, 1918–1956: An Experiment in Literary Investigation*, Thomas P. Whitney, trans. (New York: Harper and Row, 1973), 1–2, p. 259n.

[77](#) *Ibid.*, pp. 259–60.

[78](#) Sisley Huddleston, *France: The Tragic Years, 1939–1947* (New York: Devin-Adair, 1955), pp. 285–324.

[79](#) See, for instance, Richard West, *Tito and the Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia* (New York: Carroll and Graf, 1995), pp. 192–93.

[80](#) Ponting, *Churchill*, p. 665.

[81](#) Herbert Mitzka, *Zur Geschichte der Massendeportationen von Ostdeutschen in die Sowjetunion im Jahre 1945* (Einhausen: Atelier Hübner, 1986). On other crimes against German civilians in the aftermath of the war, see, among other works, Heinz Nawratil, *Die deutschen Nachkriegsverluste unter Vertriebenen, Gefangenen, und Verschleppten* (Munich/Berlin: Herbig, 1986); John Sack, *An*

Eye for an Eye (New York: Basic Books, 1993); and James Bacque, *Verschwiegene Schuld: Die alliierte Besatzungspolitik in Deutschland nach 1945*, Hans-Ulrich Seebohm, trans. (Berlin/Frankfurt a. M.: Ullstein, 1995).

[82](#) Alfred de Zayas, *Nemesis at Potsdam: The Anglo-Americans and the Expulsion of the Germans. Background, Execution, Consequences* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1977).

[83](#) Gaspar M. Tamas, "The Vanishing Germans," *The Spectator*, May 6, 1989, p. 15.

[84](#) Critiques of the Nuremberg Trials are included in Lord Hankey, *Politics, Trials, and Errors* (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1950), and F.J.P. Veale, *Advance to Barbarism: The Development of Total Warfare from Sarajevo to Hiroshima* (New York: Devin-Adair, 1968).

[85](#) Charmley, *Churchill: The End of Glory*, p. 622.

[86](#) Robert Boothy, *Recollections of a Rebel* (London: Hutchison, 1978), pp. 183–84.

[87](#) Churchill, *The Gathering Storm*, pp. iv — v.

[88](#) Nisbet, *Roosevelt and Stalin: The Failed Courtship*, p. 106.

[89](#) Cf. Robert Higgs, "The Cold War Economy: Opportunity Costs, Ideology, and the Politics of Crisis," *Explorations in Economic History* 31 (1994): 283–312.

[90](#) Ludwig von Mises, *Human Action* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1949), p. 855.

[91](#) Charmley, *Churchill: The End of Glory*, p. 610, 618. Cf. Peter Clarke, *Liberals and Social Democrats* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), p. 281: "When the Churchill Coalition was formed in May 1940 it gave progressivism a central political role which it had lacked since 1914.... The people's war brought a people's government in which ordinary Labour and good Liberals were the ascendant elements.... Anti-appeasement was the dominant myth; it helped displace the Guilty Men of Munich; and it prepared the ground

for the overthrow of the Chamberlain consensus in domestic policy too. Keynes suddenly moved to a pivotal position inside the Treasury. Labour's patriotic response to the common cause was symbolised by the massive presence of Ernest Bevan as Minister of Labour."

[92](#) Addison, "Churchill and Social Reform," p. 73. Addison states: "By the spring of 1945 the Coalition government had prepared draft bills for comprehensive social insurance, family allowances, and a national health service." As Leader of the Opposition for the next six years, "in social policy [Churchill] invariably contested the Labour Party's claim to a monopoly of social concern, and insisted that the credit for devising the post-war welfare state should be given to the wartime Coalition, and not to the Attlee government." For a contrasting view, see Kevin Jeffreys, *The Churchill Coalition and Wartime Politics, 1940–1945* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1991).

[93](#) Greenleaf, *The British Political Tradition*, pp. 254–55.

[94](#) Roberts, *Eminent Churchillians*, p. 258.

[95](#) *Ibid.*, p. 254. Roberts points out that "when the iron and steel industries were denationalized in 1953, they effectively continued to be run via the Iron and Steel Board."

[96](#) Roy Jenkins, "Churchill: The Government of 1951–1955," in Churchill, Blake and Louis, eds., p. 499.

[97](#) Addison, "Churchill and Social Reform," p. 76.

[98](#) Roberts, *Eminent Churchillians*, pp. 243–85.

[99](#) C.S. Lewis, *That Hideous Strength: A Modern Fairy-Tale for Grown-Ups* (New York: Collier, [1946] 1965), p. 291.

President Roosevelt's Campaign To Incite War in Europe: The Secret Polish Documents

1. See, for example: Charles A. Beard, *President Roosevelt and the Coming of the War 1941* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1948); William Henry Chamberlin, *America's Second Crusade* (Chicago: Regnery, 1952, 1962); Benjamin Colby, *'Twas a Famous Victory* (New Rochelle, N.Y.: Arlington House, 1979); Frederic R. Sanborn, *Design for War* (New York: Devin-Adair, 1951); William Stevenson, *A Man Called Intrepid* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1980); Charles C. Tansill, *Back Door to War* (Chicago: Regnery, 1952); John Toland, *Infamy: Pearl Harbor and Its Aftermath* (New York: Doubleday, 1982).
2. Saul Friedlander, *Prelude to Downfall: Hitler and the United States 1939-1941* (New York: Knopf, 1967), pp. 73-77; U.S., Congress, House, *Special Committee on Investigation of Un-American Activities in the United States, 1940*, Appendix, Part II, pp. 1054-1059.
3. Friedlander, pp. 75-76.
4. *New York Times*, 30 March 1940, p. 1.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 4, and 31 March 1940, p. 1.
6. *New York Times*, 30 March 1940, p. 1. *Baltimore Sun*, 30 March 1940, p. 1.
7. A French-language edition was published in 1944 under the title *Comment Roosevelt est Entre en Guerre*.
8. Tansill, "The United States and the Road to War in Europe," in Harry Elmer Barnes (ed.), *Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace* (Caldwell, Idaho: Caxton, 1953; reprint eds., New York: Greenwood, 1969 and Torrance, Calif.: Institute for Historical Review [supplemented], 1982), p. 184 (note 292). Tansill also quoted from several of the documents in his *Back Door to War*, pp. 450-51.
9. Harry Elmer Barnes, *The Court Historians Versus Revisionism* (N.p.: privately printed, 1952), p. 10. This booklet is reprinted in Barnes, *Selected Revisionist Pamphlets* (New York: Arno Press & The New York Times, 1972), and in Barnes, *The Barnes Trilogy* (Torrance, Calif.: Institute for Historical Review, 1979).
10. Chamberlin, p. 60.
11. Edward Raczynski, *In Allied London* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1963), p. 51.
12. Orville H. Bullitt (ad.), *For the President: Personal and Secret* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1972), p. x1v [biographical foreword]. See also *Time*, 26 October 1936, p. 24.
13. *Current Biography 1940*, ed. Maxine Block (New York: H.W. Wilson, 1940), p. 122 ff.
14. Gisleher Wirsing, *Der masslose Kontinent: Roosevelts Kampf um die Weltherrschaft* (Jena: E. Diederichs, 1942), p. 224.

15. Bullitt obituary in *New York Times*, 16 February 1967, p. 44.
16. Jack Alexander, "He Rose From the Rich," *Saturday Evening Post*, 11 March 1939, p. 6. (Also see continuation in issue of 18 March 1939.) Bullitt's public views on the European scene and what should be America's attitude toward it can be found in his Report to the American People (Boston: Houghton Mifflin [Cambridge: Riverside Press], 1940), the text of a speech he delivered, with the President's blessing, under the auspices of the American Philosophical Society in Independence Hall in Philadelphia shortly after the fall of France. For sheer, hyperventilated stridency and emotionalist hysterics, this anti-German polemic could hardly be topped, even given the similar propensities of many other interventionists in government and the press in those days.
17. Michael R. Beschloss, *Kennedy and Roosevelt* (New York: Norton, 1980), pp. 203-04.
18. Robert Dallek, *Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy 1932-1945* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), p. 31. See also pp. 164-65.
19. Dispatch No. 349 of 20 September 1938 by Sir. R. Lindsay, *Documents on British Foreign Policy* (ed. Ernest L. Woodward), Third series, Vol. VII (London, 1954), pp. 627-29. See also: Joseph P. Lash, *Roosevelt and Churchill 1939-1941* (New York: Norton, 1976), pp. 25-27; Dallek, pp. 164-65; Arnold A. Offner, *America and the Origins of World War II* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1971), p. 61.
20. William Phillips, *Ventures in Diplomacy* (North Beverly, Mass.: privately published, 1952), pp. 220-21.
21. Carl Burckhardt, *Meine Danziger Mission 1937-1939* (Munich: Callwey, 1960), p. 225.
22. Drew Pearson and Robert S. Allen, "Washington Daily Merry-Go-Round," *Washington Times-Herald*, 14 April 1939, p. 16. A facsimile reprint of this column appears in Conrad Grieb (ed.), *American Manifest Destiny and The Holocausts* (New York: Examiner Books, 1979), pp. 132-33. See also: Wirsing, pp. 238-41.
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25. "Von Wiegand Says-," *Chicago Herald-American*, 8 October 1944, p. 2.
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27. Lash, p. 64.
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29. James V. Forrestal (eds. Walter Millis and E.S. Duffield), *The Forrestal Diaries* (New York: Viking, 1951), pp. 121-22. I have been privately informed by a colleague who has examined the original manuscript of the Forrestal diaries that many very critical references to Jews were deleted from the published version.

30. Jan Szembek, *Journal 1933-1939* (Paris: Plan, 1952), pp. 475-76.
31. David E. Koskoff, *Joseph P. Kennedy: A Life and Times* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1974), p. 207; Moffat, p. 253; A.J.P. Taylor, *The Origins of the Second World War* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1961; 2nd ed. Greenwich, Conn.: Fawcett Premier [paperback], 1965), p. 262; U.S., Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1939, General, Vol. I* (Washington: 1956), p. 355.
32. Dallek, p. 164.
33. Beschloss, pp. 190-91; Lash, p. 75; Koskoff, pp. 212-13.
34. Hull to Kennedy (No. 905), U.S., Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1939, General, Vol. I* (Washington: 1956), p. 424.
35. The radio addresses of Hamilton Fish quoted here were published in the *Congressional Record Appendix* (Washington) as follows: (6 January 1939) Vol. 84, Part 11, pp. 52-53; (5 March 1939) same, pp. 846-47; (5 April 1939) Vol. 84, Part 12, pp. 1342-43; (21 April 1939) same, pp. 1642-43; (26 May 1939) Vol. 84, Part 13, pp. 2288-89; (8 July 1939) same, pp. 3127-28.
36. Wayne S. Cole, *Charles A. Lindbergh and the Battle Against American Intervention in World War II* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1974), pp. 128, 136-39.
37. *Congressional Record Appendix* (Washington: 1941), (30 December 1940) Vol. 86, Part 18, pp. 7019-25. See also: *Appendix*, Vol. 86, Part 17, pp. 5808-14.
38. *New York Times*, 11 March 1941, p. 10.
39. Lucy Dawidowicz, "American Jews and the Holocaust," *The New York Times Magazine*, 18 April 1982, p. 102.
40. "FDR 'had a Jewish great-grandmother'" *Jewish Chronicle* (London), 5 February 1982, p. 3.
41. Charles A. Lindbergh, *The Wartime Journals of Charles A. Lindbergh* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1970), p. 481.
42. Koskoff, pp. 282, 212. The role of the American press in fomenting hatred against Germany between 1933 and 1939 is a subject that deserves much more detailed treatment. Charles Tansill provides some useful information on this in *Back Door to War*. The essay by Professor Hans A. Muenster, "Die Kriegsschuld der Presse der USA" in *Kriegsschuld und Presse*, published in 1944 by the German Reichsdozentenfuhrung, is worth consulting.
43. An excellent essay relating and contrasting American public opinion measurements to Roosevelt's foreign policy moves in 1939-41 is Harry Elmer Barnes, *Was Roosevelt Pushed Into War By Popular Demand in 1941?* (N.p.: privately printed, 1951). It is reprinted in Barnes, *Selected Revisionist Pamphlets*.
44. Lash, p. 240.
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47. Harry Elmer Barnes, "Revisionism: A Key to Peace," *Rampart Journal of Individualist Thought* Vol. II, No. 1 (Spring 1966), pp. 29-30. This article was republished in Barnes, *Revisionism: A Key to Peace and Other Essays* (San Francisco: Cato Institute [Cato Paper No. 12], 1980).
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1. [*Editor's note*: William C. Bullitt, the U.S. ambassador to France (1936–1940).]
2. [*Editor's note*: The presidential election campaign of 1940.]

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- [141.](#) Ruhnau, Rudiger, *Die freie Stadt Danzig*, p. 9
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- [143.](#) Watt, Richard, *Bitter Glory*, pp. 93, 99
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- [147.](#) Venner, Dominique, *Söldner ohne Sold*, p. 222
- [148.](#) *Der Tod sprach polnisch*, p. 9
- [149.](#) Karski, Jan, *The Great Powers and Poland*, p. 84
- [150.](#) Schultze-Rhonhof, Gerd, *Der Krieg, der viele Väter hatte*, p. 401
- [151.](#) Elble, Rolf, *Die Schlacht an der Bzura*, p. 41
- [152.](#) Preradovich, Nikolaus, *Deutschland und Polen*, p. 20

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- [162.](#) Klüver, Max, Die Kriegstreiber, p. 115
- [163.](#) Schultze-Rhonhof, Gerd, Der Krieg, der viele Väter hatte, p. 399
- [164.](#) Klüver, Max, Es war nicht Hitlers Krieg, p. 8
- [165.](#) Klüver, Max, Die Kriegstreiber, p. 246
- [166.](#) Klüver, Max, War es Hitlers Krieg?, p. 176
- [167.](#) Klüver, Max, Die Kriegstreiber, p. 131
- [168.](#) Ibid, p. 397
- [169.](#) Schultze-Rhonhof, Gerd, Der Krieg, der viele Väter hatte, p. 221
- [170.](#) Ibid, p. 420
- [171.](#) Karski, Jan, The Great Powers and Poland, p. 247
- [172.](#) Klüver, Max, Es war nicht Hitlers Krieg, p. 11
- [173.](#) Schultze-Rhonhof, Gerd, Der Krieg, der viele Väter hatte, p. 423
- [174.](#) Ibid, p. 422

- [175.](#) Karski, Jan, The Great Powers and Poland, p. 268
- [176.](#) Ruhnau, Rudiger, Die freie Stadt Danzig, p. 163
- [177.](#) Hitler, Adolf, Rede des Führers und Reichskanzlers am 28. April 1939, pp. 36-37
- [178.](#) Preradovich, Nikolaus, Deutschland und Polen, p. 44
- [179.](#) Wellems, Hugo, Das Jahrhundert der Lüge, p. 117
- [180.](#) Preradovich, Nikolaus, Deutschland und Polen, p. 45
- [181.](#) Der Tod sprach polnisch, pp. 18, 23
- [182.](#) Schultze-Rhonhof, Gerd, Der Krieg, der viele Väter hatte, p. 426
- [183.](#) Klüver, Max, Es war nicht Hitlers Krieg, pp. 53-54
- [184.](#) Klüver, Max, Die Kriegstreiber, p. 193
- [185.](#) Ibid, p. 404
- [186.](#) Kern, Erich, Adolf Hitler und das Dritte Reich, p. 365
- [187.](#) Piekalkiewicz, Janusz, Polenfeldzug, p. 44
- [188.](#) Klüver, Max, Die Kriegstreiber, p. 194
- [189.](#) Wellems, Hugo, Das Jahrhundert der Lüge, p. 119
- [190.](#) Ibid, pp. 122, 119
- [191.](#) Klüver, Max, War es Hitlers Krieg?, p. 251
- [192.](#) Ibid, p. 271, 273
- [193.](#) Ruhnau, Rudiger, Die freie Stadt Danzig, p. 76
- [194.](#) Ibid, p. 318
- [195.](#) Hoggan, David, The Forced War, p. 413
- [196.](#) Klüver, Max, Die Kriegstreiber, p. 324

- [197.](#) Preradovich, Nikolaus, Deutschland und Polen, p. 210
- [198.](#) Klüver, Max, War es Hitlers Krieg?, p. 277
- [199.](#) Schultze-Rhonhof, Gerd, Der Krieg, der viele Väter hatte, p. 476
- [200.](#) Klüver, Max, War es Hitlers Krieg?, p. 258
- [201.](#) Klüver, Max, Die Kriegstreiber, p. 333
- [202.](#) BD VII, Third Series, 4
- [203.](#) Preradovich, Nikolaus, Deutschland und Polen, p. 211
- [204.](#) Schultze-Rhonhof, Gerd, Der Krieg, der viele Väter hatte, p. 442
- [205.](#) Sudholt, Gerd, So war der Zweite Weltkrieg 1939, p. 57
- [206.](#) Klüver, Max, War es Hitlers Krieg?, p. 319
- [207.](#) Preradovich, Nikolaus, Deutschland und Polen, p. 212
- [208.](#) Klüver, Max, War es Hitlers Krieg?, p. 320
- [209.](#) Schultze-Rhonhof, Gerd, Der Krieg, der viele Väter hatte, p. 500
- [210.](#) Sturm, Gero, Mit Goldener Nahkampfspange Werner Kindler, p. 20
- [211.](#) Schultze-Rhonhof, Gerd, Der Krieg, der viele Väter hatte, pp. 505, 506
- [212.](#) Ibid, pp. 513-514
- [213.](#) Meiser, Hans, Gescheiterte Friedens-Initiativen 1939-1945, p. 32
- [214.](#) Klüver, Max, War es Hitlers Krieg?, pp. 361-362, 305
- [215.](#) Meiser, Hans, Gescheiterte Friedens-Initiativen 1939-1945, p. 33
- [216.](#) Ibid.
- [217.](#) Schultze-Rhonhof, Gerd, Der Krieg, der viele Väter hatte, p. 527
- [218.](#) PRO FO 371/22979 C 12480

- [219.](#) Post, Walter, Die Ursachen des Zweiten Weltkrieges, p. 423
- [220.](#) Freytagh-Loringhoven, Freiherrn von, Deutschlands Aussenpolitik, p. 234
- [221.](#) Danco, Walter, Der Weltveränderer, p. 200
- [222.](#) Freytagh-Loringhoven, Freiherrn von, Deutschlands Aussenpolitik, p. 233
- [223.](#) Domaras, Max, Hitler Reden und Proklamationen, p. 1275
- [224.](#) Giesler, Hermann, Ein anderer Hitler, p. 366
- [225.](#) Klüver, Max, War es Hitlers Krieg?, p. 345
- [226.](#) Klüver, Max, Die Kriegstreiber, p. 414

Peace Overtures Following the German-Polish Conflict

1 After a ham-handed joke by Hitler and Göring in February 1937 had misfired, Hanfstaengl had fled to England, believing his life to be in danger.

2 *National-Sozialistische Volkswohlfahrt*, the Party's civilian welfare organization.

3 From the papers released to the Public Record Office in London it is clear that neither Chamberlain nor Halifax rejected Hitler's terms out of hand when Dahlerus described them. Even Churchill talked approvingly of an armistice. However, the file that evidently contains notes of Chamberlain's talk with Dahlerus on September 29, 1939, is closed until 1990, and forty-five pages of the foreign office file on Germany and future policy (F.O.371/22,985) covering the crucial period of October 3-4, 1939, are unavailable until the year 2015. A two-volume history of Anglo-German peace negotiations by Dr. Bernd Martin, of the University of Freiburg, is to appear shortly.

4 Signed by Ministerialdirektor Wohlthat, this remarkable document was not published in the postwar volumes of captured German documents ; nor were the German reports on the Dahlerus missions that followed.

5 The brief treatment of this episode in Sir Llewellyn Woodward's *British Foreign Policy in the Second World War*, Vol. II (H.M.S.O., 1971), page 186, includes an inadequate summary of the proposals.

How Britain Pioneered City Bombing

[1] F.Veale, Advance to Barbarism, The Development of Total War from Serajevo to Hiroshima, IHR 1979, 176. www.heretical.com/miscella/veale.html

[2] A.J.P. Taylor, *The Origins of the Second World War*, 1972, 16.

[3] W.G. Sebald, *A Natural history of Destruction*, 2003 (an odd translation of the German title, *Luftkreig und Literatur* 1999), 3.

[4] J.M. Spaight, *Bombing Vindicated*, 1944, 60.

[5] In 1936 Churchill remarked 'Germany is getting too strong, we must smash her' to the American military advisor General Wood: H. Barnes, *Blasting the Historical Blackout*, 1961, 24 www.ihr.org/jhr/v01/v01p163_Barnes.html

[6] Max Hastings, *Bomber Command* 1979, 50: the Lancasters were 'heavy bombers which no other country in the world could match.' Germany and France had lighter bombers 'primarily for air support,' or 'tactical air power'.

[7] Sir Basil Liddell Hart, *The Revolution in Warfare*, 1946, 86.

[8] Hitler declared, 'I want to live in peace with England and to conclude a definite pact; to guarantee all the English possessions in the world and to collaborate,' on 14 Aug 1939: Taylor (ref 2), 308. For his re-advocacy of this position at Dunkirk, see B. Liddell Hart, *The Other Side of the Hill*, Germany's generals, their rise and fall, with their own accounts of events 1939-45, 1948, 1970, 186.

[9] A. Ramsey, *The Nameless War* 1952, 64.

[10] The words were nearly identical: A.C. Grayling, *Among the Dead Cities*, was the Allied Bombing of Cities in World War II a Necessity or a Crime? 2006, 149.

[11] *For Those who Cannot Speak* M. McLaughlin, Historical Review Press 1979 monograph, 24.

[12] David Irving, *The Destruction of Dresden*, 1963, 1974, 19.

[13] Veale (ref 1), 170

[14] *The Churchill War Papers*, 1993 Ed M. Gilbert, Vol. I, 18.

[15] Butz, *The Hoax of the 20th Century*, 1976, 70.

[16] Of the 131 German towns hit by heavy strategic raids, 46 cities had half of

their built-up area destroyed. Berlin had 6427 acres, Hamburg 620 acres, Duesseldorf 2003 acres and Cologne, 1994 acres destroyed. Whereas London had 600, Plymouth 400 and Coventry 100 acres destroyed.[16] A. Wesserle, The Journal of Historical Review, 1981, vol. 2, 381-384.
www.vho.org/GB/Journals/JHR/2/4/Wesserle381-384.html

[17] Spaight (ref 4), 74.

[18] Spaight, 43.

[19] Irving (ref 12), 32; Hastings (ref 6), 99.

[20] Veale (ref 1), 180: the Bensusan-Butt Report..

[21] A.T. Harris, Bomber Offensive, 1947, 42; summarised by Veale (ref 1), 174.

[22] CP Snow Science and Government, OUP, 1961, 47-51.

[23] www.lewrockwell.com/orig/raico-churchill5.html

[24] www.ety.com/HRP/rev/terrorbombing.htm

[25] Irving (ref 12), 220.

[26] “Many of the most beautiful cities of Europe and the world were systematically pounded into nothingness, often during the last weeks of the war, among them: Wuerzburg, Hildesheim, Darmstadt, Kassel, Nürnberg, Braunschweig:” Dr Wesserle, ref. 16. www.exulanten.com/kep3.html

[27] Veale (ref 1), 171.

[28] Spaight (ref 4), 38.

[29] Veale, 177

[30] R. Harwood, Nuremberg, 1975, Historical Review Press, 61

[31] Veale, 28. Archibald Sinclair was then the Air Secretary.

[32] V.Brittain, Seed of Chaos, what Mass Bombing Really Means, 1944, 116; Gaylor (ref.10), 183, 281. With this in the British Library is a fine collection

(made by George Orwell) of anti-war pamphlets.

[33] The Royal Air Force 1939-1945, Vol. 1 'The Fight at Odds,' HMSO 1953, p.122.; Veale, 184.

[34] For Hitler's admiration of Britain and its empire, see:
www.ihr.org/jhr/v01/v01p163_Barnes.html

During and after the war, it was hard to obtain an English translation of Hitler's Mein Kampf, a central theme of which was Hitler's 'admiration for and longing for friendship with Great Britain:' Ramsey (Ref 9), 49. Captain Arthur Ramsey, Conservative MP, found himself jailed for the duration of the war, accused (quite rightly) of undermining the war effort.

[35] The two German peace offers to Britain came in October 1939, after defeating Poland, and in July 1940, after defeating France, both spurned: Captain R. Grenfell, Unconditional Hatred, German War guilt and the Future of Europe, NY 1954, 201.

[36] For the but faintly-imagined and conditional German plan to invade Britain in the summer of 1940, see Hart (ref 7), pp.212-222; and his History of the 2nd World War 1970, pp.93-6.

[37] Anglo-American strategic bombers dropped 2690 kilotons of bombs on Europe (1,350kt on Germany, 590kt France, 370 kt Italy, etc), while Germany dropped 74 kt of bombs including V-1 and V-2 rockets on Britain in WWII: a mere 5%, or one-twentieth as much: Dr Wesserle, Ref. 26.

[38] Veale, 29, 32.

[39] Snow, ref. 22.

[40] Veale, 197.

[41] C.Wester & N.Frankland, The Strategic Air Offensive HMSO, 1961, Volume I.

[42] Veale, 201, 197.

[43] Sunday Telegraph, 1.10.61, Veale, 198.

[44] Spaight, 43.

[45] Hart (ref 7), 72; Veale, 171.

[46] This was a mistake as Holland had surrendered: Gaylor (ref 9), p.34; Irving (ref 12), 21.

[47] David Irving: 'In fact the bombardment of Warsaw did not begin until September 26, 1939, after all the military niceties had been observed: warning leaflets dropped on to the civilian population, open routes provided for the Polish civilians to leave before the timed hour of bombardment, a formal ultimatum to the commandant of the fortress Warsaw to capitulate before the bombardment began, which was rejected". Hitler's War, 1977, 2001, 239
www.fpp.co.uk/books/Hitler/

[48] Wesserle, ref 16.

[49] Grayling (ref 10), 143.

[50] Gaylor (ref 9), p.149.

[51] www.hawaii.edu/powerkills/COMM.10.5.03.HTM

[52] D.F.Fleming, The Cold War and its Origins, 1961, Vol. I, 349

[53] www.brianwillson.com/awolkorea.html; R.Howe, Weapons, London 1981, 500.

[54] Fleming (ref 52), 656.

[55]

www.stormfront.org/solargeneral/library/www.fpp.co.uk/History/General/Guerni

Examining Stalin's 1941 Plan to Attack Germany

Strauss, born in 1931, was arrested for anti-Communist activities as an *Oberschüler* (secondary school student) in East Germany (DDR) and

[1] imprisoned, 1950-1956. He is the author of several other notable books on Russia, including *Russland wird leben: vom roten Stern zur Zarenfahne* (1992), *Drei Tage, die die Welt erschütterten* (1992), *Bürgerrechtler in der UdSSR* (1979), and *Von der Wiedergeburt slawophiler Ideen in Rußland* (1977). He is also a frequent contributor to scholarly journals. He currently lives in Bavaria, where he works as a Slavic affairs specialist.

See: Ernst Nolte, *Der Europäische Bürgerkrieg 1917-1945: Nationalsozialismus und Bolschewismus* (Munich: 1997 [5th ed.]). Nolte has strongly suggested that Hitler's wartime treatment of the Jews might legitimately be regarded as a defensive response by Hitler to the threat of Bolshevik mass murder of the Germans. In a 1980 lecture he said: "It is hard to deny that Hitler had good reason to be convinced of his enemies' determination to annihilate long before the first information about the events in Auschwitz became public." See also the interview with Nolte in the Jan.-Feb. 1994 *Journal* (Vol. 14, No. 1), pp. 15-22, and "Changing Perspectives on History in Germany: A Prestigious Award for Nolte: Portent of Greater Historical Objectivity?," July-August 2000 *Journal*, pp. 29-32.

François Furet and Ernst Nolte, *Feindliche Nähe:*

[3] *Kommunismus und Faschismus im 20. Jahrhundert: Ein Briefwechsel* (Munich: 1998).

The Black Book of Communism: Crimes, Terror, Repression, by Stéphane Courtois and others (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999).

Original edition: *Le livre noir du communisme: Crimes, terreur, répression* (Paris: 1997). Earlier works by Courtois include *Histoire du parti communiste français* (1995), *L'état du monde en 1945* (1994), *Rigueur et passion* (1994), *50 ans d'une passion française* (1991), and *Qui savait quoi?* (1987).

Courtois has also written: “I am fighting for a reevaluation of Stalin. He was to be sure the greatest criminal of the century. But at the same time he was the greatest politician – the most competent, the most professional. He was the one who understood most perfectly how to put his resources at the service of his goals.”

Russian nationalists are fully aware, just as were the anti-Bolshevik “White Russians,” that the leaders of Russia’s Marxist movement – Mensheviks and Bolsheviks alike – were predominantly not Russian at all. As evidence of the alien character of the Bolshevik revolution and of the early Soviet regime, Russian nationalists (along with many others) often

[6] cite *The Last Days of the Romanovs*, a work by British writer Robert Wilton (and now translated into Russian). In an appendix to the 1993 IHR edition of this work (pp. 184-190), Wilton also notes: “According to data furnished by the Soviet press, out of important functionaries of the Bolshevik state... in 1918-1919 there were: 17 Russians, two Ukrainians, eleven Armenians, 35 Letts [Latvians], 15 Germans, one Hungarian, ten Georgians, three Poles, three Finns, one Czech, one Karaim, and 457 Jews.” See also: M. Weber, “The Jewish Role in the Bolshevik Revolution and the Early Soviet Regime,” Jan.-Feb. 1994 *Journal*, pp. 4-14.

[7] A special 1996 edition of the Moscow newspaper *Russkiy Vestnik* lists the names of the executioners: Yankel Yurovsky, Anselm Fischer, Istvan Kolman, A. Chorwat, Isidor Edelstein, Imre Magy [?], Victor Grinfeld, Andreas Wergasi and S. Farkash. The article concludes: “All of this attests to the non-Russian origin of the murderers.”

According to Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, the six directors were Semyon Firin, Matvei Berman, Naftali Frenkel, Lazar Kogan, Yakov Rappoport, Sergei Zhuk. The Head of the Military Guards was Brodsky, the Canal Curator of the Central Executive Committee was Solts, the GPU and NKVD heads

[8] were Yagoda, Pauker, Spiegelglas, Kaznelson, Sakovskiy, Sorensen, Messing and Arshakuni. As the names indicate, all were non-Russians. Stalin awarded most of these murderers the honorary title “Hero of Labor.” See: Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, *The Gulag Archipelago*, III-IV, Book Two (New York: Harper & Row, 1975), pp. 79, 81, 82, 84, 94, etc.

This generalization is mostly valid for the first 20 years of Soviet rule. However, following the Great Purge (1937-1939), and except for several years [9] after World War II in East Europe where Stalin used Jewish Communists to instal puppet regimes, the dictator until his death actively opposed elements he referred to as cosmopolitans, parasites, and so forth.

Grigorenko originally submitted his article to the Soviet journal *Voprosy istorii KPSS*, which (of [10] course) rejected it. It was published in 1969 by Possev, a Russian emigré publishing house in Frankfurt am Main.

Suvorov’s first three books on World War II have been reviewed in *The Journal of Historical Review*. The first two, *Icebreaker* and “M Day,” were [11] reviewed in Nov.-Dec. 1997 *Journal* (Vol. 16, No. 6), pp. 22-34. His third book, “The Last Republic,” was reviewed in the July-August 1998 *Journal* (Vol. 17, No. 4), pp. 30-37.

See the review of *Stalins Falle* (“Stalin’s Trap”), by [12] Adolf von Thadden, in the May-June 1999 *Journal*, pp. 40-45.

Gotovil li Stalin nastupatel’nyuyu voynu protiv Gitlera (“Did Stalin Make Preparations for an Offensive War Against Hitler?,” by Grigoriy Bordyugov and Vladimir Nevezhin (Moscow: AIRO XX, 1995), and, *1 sentyabrya 1939-9 maya 1945: Pyatidesyatiletie razgroma fashistkoy Germanii v Kontekste Nachala Vtoroy Mirovoy Voyny* (“September 1, 1939-May 9, 1945: the 50th Anniversary of the Defeat of Fascist Germany in the Context of the Beginning of the War”), edited by I.V. Pavlova and V. L. Doroshenko (Novosibirsk Memorial, 1995). The latter work was briefly cited in the Nov.-Dec. 1997 *Journal*, pp. 32-34.

The German High Command greatly underestimated the number of Soviet divisions, as well as the quality and quantity of Soviet tanks. Hitler and the Wehrmacht were to find not 160 divisions on their doorstep, but more than 300. See: [14] David Irving, *Hitler’s War* (New York: Viking, 1977), pp. 205-206, 297. On the correlation of forces in June 1941, see also Joachim Hoffmann, *Stalins Vernichtungskrieg 1941-1945* (Munich, 1995), Chapter 1, and esp. pp. 31, 66.

Ominously, however, the “oligarchs,” most of them Jewish, exercise considerable control over the Russian media. See: Daniel W. Michaels, [15] “Capitalism in the New Russia,” May-June 1997 *Journal*, pp. 21-27, and, “A Jewish Appeal to Russia’s Elite,” Nov.-Dec. 1998 *Journal*, pp. 13-18.

See: Alfred-Maurice de Zayas, *The German Expellees: Victims in War and Peace* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993), Alfred-M. de Zayas, *Nemesis at Potsdam: The Expulsion of the Germans From the East* (Lincoln: Univ. of Nebraska, 1989 [16] [3rd rev. ed.]), James Bacque, *Other Losses* (Prima, 1991), J. Bacque, *Crimes and Mercies* (Little, Brown, 1997), Ralph Keeling, *Gruesome Harvest: The Allies’ Postwar War Against the German People* (IHR, 1992).

Juan Goytisolo, *La Saga de los Marx* (Barcelona: Mondadori, 1993). Although Goytisolo was [17] undoubtedly one of Spain’s foremost 20th century novelists, both his political views and private life were highly controversial. Expelled from Spain by Franco, he lived most of his life in France.

The Jewish Hand in the World Wars, Part 1

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Notes:

[1](#) It is clear that Joseph was Jewish: His father, Jacob, was renamed by God as “Israel” (Gen 35:10), and Joseph himself is repeatedly referred to as a “Hebrew” (e.g. Gen 39:14, 41:12).

[2](#) *Roman History*, 69.13.

[3](#) For Seneca's and Quintilian's comments, see Stern (1974), pages 431 and 513. For Tacitus, see his *Annals* (XV, 44), and *Histories* (5.8).

[4](#) *History of Rome*, vol. 4, p. 643.

[5](#) *Ecce Homo!* (1770/1813: 26, 28)

[6](#) Cited in Hertzberg (1968: 300).

[7](#) For Kant, see his *Conflict of the Faculties* (1798/1979: 101). Hegel's quotation is from his *Early Theological Writings* (1975: 190).

[8](#) This is just a fraction of the negative observations of Jews over the centuries. For a more complete study, see my series Dalton (2011a, 2011b, 2011c, and 2012).

[9](#) A large area, comprising much of present-day Poland, Lithuania, Ukraine, and Belarus.

[10](#) In 1891 the *New York Times* ran the headline: “Russia’s Fierce Assault: Europe amazed at her treatment of Jews.” As the article explained, “Berlin...is overwhelmed by the advance wave of the flying Jews, driven on a day’s notice from their homes and swarming westward...” (May 31; p. 1).

[11](#) Cited in Rather (1990: 163).

[12](#) Cited in Levy (1991: 83-84).

[13](#) There are a few problems, however. First, the diary is dated some five months after the war actually started; it’s easy to recall a prediction after the fact. Second, Rosenthal’s book *My Siberian Diary* is nowhere to be found. The entry is recounted in an obscure periodical, *The Jewish Era*, dated January 1919 (p. 128); this was not only after the war was over, but after the Peace Conference had already begun.

[14](#) This was true of both Zionist and non-Zionist Jews. It’s worth noting that Zionism was a minority view among American Jews, at least for the first two decades of its existence. Many Jews, being ‘internationalists,’ did not feel the need for a Jewish homeland. And many realized that, should this come to pass, they would be charged with dual loyalty. But with the Zionists’ relentless pressure and record of success, they became the dominant view.

[15](#) For a contemporaneous account, see the *London Times*, 11 July 1911, p. 5.

[16](#) Cited in Slomovitz (1981: 6-7).

[17](#) Cited in *Dearborn Independent* (25 June 1921).

[18](#) April 11, p. 18. The same article goes on to decry “the systematic, relentless quiet grinding down of a people of more than 6,000,000 souls.” This figure surely strikes a chord—but that’s another story.

[19](#) Indeed—a “special effort” was made to get the support of Wilson, “whose influence was rising within the Democratic ranks” (p. 32).

[20](#) *The Jews and Modern Capitalism* (1911/1982), p. 44.

[21](#) Shogan (2010: xi).

[22](#) *Dearborn Independent*, 11 June 1921. The entire ‘international Jew’ series

ran without a byline, and so for the sake of convenience I attribute them to Ford—even though it is virtually certain that he did not write the pieces himself.

[23](#) Cooper (1983: 194).

[24](#) *War Expenditures: Parts 1 to 13*. US Government Printing Office (1921: 1814, 1816).

[25](#) Cited in Chalberg (1995: 46-47).

[26](#) Other Americans died on foreign-flagged ships—most notoriously, 128 on the *Lusitania*. But this still pales in comparison to the thousands who would die in a war.

[27](#) Online at: www.historymatters.gmu.edu. I am not aware of any polling data supporting his claim that 90% of Americans were opposed to entering the war, but it seems to have been a reasonable estimate.

[28](#) Cited in Chalberg (1995: 71-73).

[29](#) Schneer (2010: 153) is typical: there was “no such thing” as a powerful Jewish force in world affairs. Any thoughts to the contrary are “based upon a misconception.” Hodgson (2006: 154-155) is another example: “the influence of Zionism [was] considerably exaggerated” by the British government, who believed the international Jews to be “more influential and more Zionist than in fact they were.”

[30](#) Jews had nearly a total monopoly on the film business. The only significant non-Jewish movie mogul was Darryl Zanuck, who was a studio head at 20th Century Fox for many years.

[31](#) Among the leading figures, Ben-Sasson (p. 944) mentions Julius Martov, Fyodor Dan, and Raphael Abramowitz.

[32](#) Churchill’s close connection to British Jews dated back at least to 1904. Gilbert (2007: 9) explains that “this was the first but not the last time that Churchill was to be accused by his political opponents...of being in the pocket, and even in the pay, of wealthy Jews.” Makovsky (2007) describes Churchill’s father’s longtime association with “Jewish financial titans,” and notes that Churchill himself “came to count many of [his father’s] wealthy Jewish friends

as his own” (p. 46).

[33](#) Encyclopedias are usually good sources for conventional views. Quotations here come from the *World Book*, 2003 edition, entry on ‘Balfour Declaration.’

[34](#) See Stein (1961: 28).

[35](#) See Lloyd George (1939: 725), Ziff (1938: 55), Stein (1961: 528), and Liebreich (2005: 12).

[36](#) Minutes of the War Cabinet for October 31; see Ingrams (1972: 16).

[37](#) As I will explain in Part II, there is ample evidence that this was true. For a review of some of the relevant sources, see Weber (1983). In brief, it seems that Roosevelt wanted England and France to do the early ‘dirty work’ of the war, and then the US would intervene as needed to conclude the issue.

The Jewish Hand in the World Wars, Part 2

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Notes:

[1](#) As Baruch stated to Congress, "I probably had more power than perhaps any other man did in the war; doubtless that is true." See Part 1 for his full testimony.

[2](#) Cited in Chalberg (1995: 71-73).

[3](#) The *New York Times* carried periodic such reports. See, for example: 26 January 1891 ("Rabbi Gottheil says a word on the persecution of the Jews... about six millions persecuted and miserable wretches"), 21 September 1891 ("An indictment of Russia...a total of 6,000,000 is more nearly correct."), 11 June 1900 ("[In Russia and central Europe] there are 6,000,000 living, bleeding, suffering arguments in favor of Zionism."), 23 March 1905 ("We Jews in America [sympathize with] our 6,000,000 cringing brothers in Russia"), 25 March 1906 ("Startling reports of the condition and future of Russia's 6,000,000

Jews...”). The situation led a former president of B’nai B’rith to a prophetic exclamation: “Simon Wolf asks how long the Russian Holocaust is to continue” (10 November 1905). History does indeed repeat itself.

[4](#) It seems that he had good reason for this enmity. According to Cecil (1996: 57), Wilhelm “believed that Jews were perversely responsible...for encouraging opposition to his rule.” In a letter to a friend, the Kaiser wrote: “The Hebrew race are my most inveterate enemies at home and abroad; they remain what they are and always were: the forgers of lies and the masterminds governing unrest, revolution, upheaval by spreading infamy with the help of their poisoned, caustic, satyric spirit” (in Rohl 1994: 210). Townley (1922: 45) relates this comment of his: “The Jews are the curse of my country. They keep my people poor and in their clutches. In every small village in Germany sits a dirty Jew, like a spider drawing the people into the web of usury. He lends money to the small farmers on the security of their land, and so gradually acquires control of everything. The Jews are the parasites of my Empire.” He adds that the Jewish question is one of his “great problems,” but one in which “nothing can be done to cope with it.” In 1940, with Hitler moving to clean up Europe, he said this: “The Jews are being thrust out of the nefarious positions in all countries, whom they have driven to hostility for centuries” (in Rohl: 211).

[5](#) Wentling (2012: 6).

[6](#) A good, brief account is given in MacMillan (2003: 463-466).

[7](#) Cited in MacMillan (2003: 414-415).

[8](#) Muller adds, “The prominence of Jews in the Hungarian Soviet Republic is all the more striking when one considers that the Jews of Hungary were richer than their coreligionists in Eastern Europe... Though only 5% of the population, on the eve of WWI, Jews made up almost half the doctors, lawyers, and journalists in Hungary.” But this is precisely as I have said: no amount of wealth or social status is sufficient, if Jews lack political power.

[9](#) Until his assassination in June 1922.

[10](#) For one account, see Darkmoon (2013). Also see Bryant (1940: 142-145).

[11](#) In my notation, (I.5) refers to Volume I, chapter 5. I use the Murphy translation.

[12](#) See Part I for an elaboration.

[13](#) Ford's so-called "Peace Ship" sailed to Norway in December of 1915, in a failed attempt to negotiate an end to the war.

[14](#) Cited in Shogan (2010: 51).

[15](#) Cited in Ward (1989: 253). See also Morgenthau (1991: 169 facer).

[16](#) Various other extremist writings have also claimed that the Delano family (Franklin's mother's side) were Jews. They construct a parallel account to the Rossacampo story, and of dispersion from Spain or Italy. But I find no evidence to verify this claim.

[17](#) This recalls the similar characterization of Baruch during World WarI.

[18](#) See Leutze (1975: 469-470).

[19](#) The first Jewish cabinet member, as we recall, was Oscar Straus, selected by Franklin's cousin Theodore back in 1906.

[20](#) See Makovsky (2007: 216).

[21](#) Bullitt's heritage is somewhat cryptic. His mother, Louisa Horowitz, was apparently at least half-Jewish. Her father, Orville Horowitz, descended from the Salomon family, who were distinctly Jewish. Her mother, Maria Gross, likely had a mixed Jewish heritage. But there is no doubt where his sympathies lay; "Bullitt [is] a friend of ours," wrote Weizmann in 1938 (cited in Nasaw 2012: 358).

[22](#) Though scandalous at the time, such level of Jewish influence is commonplace today—with three of nine Supreme Court Justices being Jewish (Kagan, Breyer, Ginsburg), numerous Cabinet-level appointments, and countless subordinate positions. Over just the past three presidential administrations, Jewish and part-Jewish Cabinet-level office holders include, at a minimum, the following: M. Albright, L. Aspin, C. Barshefsky, S. Bodman, J. Bolten, A. Card, M. Chertoff, W. Cohen, R. Emanuel, M. Froman, J. Furman, T. Geithner, D. Glickman, M. Kantor, J. Kerry, A. Krueger, J. Lew, M. Markowitz, M. Mukasey, P. Orszag, P. Pritzker, R. Portman, R. Reich, R. Rubin, S. Schwab, M. Spellings, J. Stiglitz, L. Summers, J. Yellen, and R. Zoellick. This list does not

include others, such as Samantha Power, who have a Jewish spouse (Cass Sunstein). Nor does it include Chairmen of the Federal Reserve—a very powerful office, held by Ben Bernanke and Alan Greenspan during the past several years, and currently by Janet Yellen.

[23](#) Both citations from Chalberg (1995: 192-193).

[24](#) *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 4(4), December 1940: 714.

[25](#) *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 5(4), Winter 1941: 680.

[26](#) *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 2(3), July 1938: 388.

[27](#) By late 1936, the “600,000” had evolved into “6 million.” In the *New York Times* (Nov. 26) we read this: “Dr. Weizmann dwelt first on the tragedy of at least 6,000,000 ‘superfluous’ Jews in Poland, Germany, and Austria...” It was even more explicit by early 1938: “Persecuted Jews Seen on Increase... 6,000,000 Victims Noted” (Jan. 9)—this, a full four years before the alleged “death camps” even began operation.

[28](#) Cited in Herzstein (1989: 33).

[29](#) The *New York Times* had long been under Jewish control. The *Post* was purchased by Eugene Meyer in 1933.

[30](#) See Dalton (2010) for an elaboration of Goebbels’s views.

[31](#) Testimony of February 1941. Cited in Doenecke (2000: 440). See also Fuller (1957, vol. 3: 369).

[32](#) Cited in Weber (1983). This and other reports by Potocki were acquired by the Germans upon capture of Warsaw, and thus there is some skepticism about their authenticity. Weber makes a good case that they are genuine. David Irving reports that he saw copies of the original in the Hoover Library (<http://www.fpp.co.uk/History/General/Potocki/papers.html>).

[33](#) Cited in Cole (1983: 308).

[34](#) Cited in Fuller (1957: 370).

[35](#) Traditional references to *Kristallnacht* often overlook the fact that the event

was triggered by a Jewish youth, Herschel Grynszpan, who murdered German Diplomat Ernst vom Rath in Paris on November 9. *Kristallnacht* followed the next day.

[36](#) See Weber (1983) and Fuller (1957: 372-374).

[37](#) Cited in Fuller (1957: 375).

[38](#) See Szembek (1952: 476), published in French. The first sentence reads as follows: “*En Occident, il y a toutes sortes d’elements qui poussent nettement a la guerre: les Juifs, les grands capitalists, les marchands de canons.*”

[39](#) As recorded by Ickes in his personal diary, for July 2. See Ickes (1954: 676).

[40](#) Obviously there is more detail to the outbreak of war than I can provide here. In brief, once Poland received a guarantee of military support from England in March of 1939, they became increasingly belligerent toward German minorities on Polish soil, particularly in Danzig. It seems bizarre in hindsight, but many of the Poles (Potocki excepted), with the Brits at their back, were virtually spoiling for a fight with Germany. They believed that a victory would solidify their national standing, and help to ward off the Soviet threat to the east. Instead, they succumbed to the German assault in just four weeks.

[41](#) Cited in Nasaw (2012: 429).

[42](#) Cited in Cohen (2003: 195).

[43](#) Churchill himself was a Zionist—a fact that he openly admitted. In a letter of 1942 to Roosevelt, Churchill said, “I am strongly wedded to the Zionist policy [in the UK], of which I was one of the authors” (in Loewenheim 1975: 234). Speaking in 1950 on behalf of the creation of Israel, he said that it was “a great event in the history of mankind,” and that he was “proud of his own contribution towards it.” He added that “he had been a Zionist all his life” (in Cohen 2003: 322).

[44](#) Cited in Doenecke (2000: 198).

[45](#) Cited in *ibid.*

[46](#) Cited in Dunn (2013: 48).

[47](#) Including *Beasts of Berlin*, *Espionage Agent*, *Arise My Love*, *British Intelligence*, *Escape to Glory*, *Murder in the Air*, *Waterloo Bridge*, *All Through the Night*, *Confirm or Deny*, *International Squadron*, *Joan of Paris*, *Man at Large*, *Man Hunt*, *One Night in Lisbon*, *Paris Calling*, *So Ends Our Night*, *Sundown*, *Underground*, and *World Premiere*.

[48](#) Buchanan (2008: 334-340) gives a succinct argument that Hitler had a hard enough time taking even Great Britain, let alone America or “the world.”

[49](#) For a full account, see Stinnett’s book *Day of Deceit* (2001).

[50](#) *Chicago Tribune* (2 January 1972; p. A22). See also *New York Times* (1 January 1972; p. 7).

[51](#) Cited in Jackson (2003: 247). See also Morgenstern (1947: 292).

[52](#) See *New York Times* (16 February 1946; p. 1).

[53](#) Cited in Shogan (2010: 33).

[54](#) In *ibid*: 96.

[55](#) In the words of Dallek (1979: 31).

[56](#) According to Breitman and Lichtman (2013: 6).

[57](#) Quoted in the *New York Times* (14 October 1944, p. 9)