Perpetual War/Perpetual Peace: Kant, Hegel and the End of History

Kimberly Hutchings, Wolverhampton Polytechnic

Introduction

Recently our particular end of history has been characterized as the coming of age of a post-communist, liberal nation-state system and global political economy. On this interpretation of history and international relations, the philosophy of world history is no longer needed, since the meaning of history, its goal and end, are already known. In essence, we have arrived at the Kantian regulative ideal of perpetual peace, not in the form of a world state, but of an international order in which commerce can take over the role of war and deterrence in ensuring progress. In this paper, I will be arguing for a different understanding of the end of history, one which recalls the philosopher's attention to world history as the realm of the self-relation of spirit most in need of philosophical comprehension. In order to do this, I will be examining the differences between Kant's treatment of history and war in the critical philosophy, and Hegel's speculative transformation of that treatment in his own work. It will be argued that in Kant's work a posited end of history serves to undermine the philosophical comprehension of history, by removing that comprehension from history. Whereas in Hegel's work the experienced end of history opens up the understanding of history by acknowledging the philosopher's identity with his time. The paper falls into three sections. In the first part I will present a reading of Kant's philosophy of history and war, and try to illustrate its consequences for attempts to theorise and moralise about world history in the present. In the second part I will demonstrate how Hegel's philosophy of history and war differs from Kant's, giving us an alternative starting point for our contemporary comprehension of the end of history. Finally, I will comment on a recent Hegelian reading of world history by Hayo Krombach, *Hegelian Reflections on the Idea of Nuclear War.*[1]

I

Kant

Kant's philosophy of history has not generally been seen as a significant part of his critical or post-critical project; though the work of people like Yirmiyahou Yovel (*Kant and the Philosophy of History*, 1980)[2] has done something to draw the attention of English language scholarship to this part of Kant's work. While not wishing to overstate the centrality of history in Kant's thought, it seems to me that it does form a significant moment in his politics. A moment that reveals some of the central tensions of Kant's theoretical and practical philosophy.[3] Kant's political thought in all of its aspects is structured by a rigid rational/actual distinction which pure practical reason demands must be overcome, yet which cannot be overcome. The realm of legality is sunk in contingency, yet is somehow

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0263523200002688

supposed to make the rational actual, something that pure practical reason cannot accomplish for itself. The impossible project of actualising the rational ideal is attempted within the sphere of right, the domestic state, but it fails and becomes the reconciliation of rational and actual only in the idea of a legitimating common will and its as-if identification with the actuality of the Emperor's rule. Even as this becomes apparent towards the end of Kant's philosophy of right (*Metaphysics of Morals Part 1, Rechtslehre*), we are directed towards another sphere in which the actualisation of the rational may be achieved, the sphere of history or nature.[4]

Kant's writings on history are fragmentary, written at different times and for different purposes; however, from such texts as "Perpetual Peace", "Idea for a Universal History" and the "Contest of the Faculties" a philosophy of history can be identified.[5] The assumption underlying this philosophy is the same as that which underlies Kant's philosophy of right. The realm of history, unlike the realm of morality and like the realm of legality, is one in which natural motivation holds sway. Within the juridical sphere, the juridical ideal can never be actual, because individuals are externally coerced, rather than autonomously choosing dutiful behaviour. Nevertheless, Kant argues that this externally coerced obedience to law brings us closer to the goals of pure practical reason than we could be in a state of nature. This provides a prima facie justification for any state which ensures the rule of law regardless of its character and helps to support Kant's as-if identification between the ideal legitimation of legislation in the common will and its actual ground in the sovereign's power.[6] At this point in his political philosophy Kant comes across the problem that this political solution to the impossible task of achieving the goals of reason works only within the domestic state. In the case of inter-state relations, which is the realm of world history, there is no overarching law. Yet practical reason demands that there must be one, or something that does the work of one, ensuring the possibility of stable inter-state relations or perpetual peace, coercing an approximation to the moral ideal. It is from this demand that Kant's philosophy of history takes its starting point.

In his essay on perpetual peace, Kant distinguishes between the concept of Fate and the concept of Providence within history.[7] Both concepts involve the assertion that there is a necessity involved in the workings of nature in history. Fate implies a causal necessity, pushing us in a direction unknown. Providence is a teleological concept, involving the idea that there is purpose in history, "the underlying wisdom of a higher cause", so that history is explicable in terms of its end. It is the latter concept which is crucial to Kant's own philosophy of history. Providence in the international realm stands in for law within the domestic state, it ensures an approximation to the ideals of reason. But it does so, as Kant quite clearly states, only by virtue of the philosopher's judgment, which chooses to interpret history as progress. In the essay on "Idea of Universal History", the Ninth thesis, Kant concludes his survey of the development of empirical history thus:

> It is admittedly a strange and at first sight absurd proposition to write a history according to an idea of how world events must develop if they are to conform to certain rational ends; it would seem that only a novel could result from such premises. Yet if it may be assumed that nature does not work without a plan and purposeful end, even amidst the arbitrary play of human freedom, this idea might nevertheless prove useful. And although we are too shortsighted to perceive the hidden mechanism of nature's scheme, this idea may yet serve as a guide to us in representing an otherwise planless aggregate of human actions as conforming, at least when considered as a whole, to a system.[8]

The argument of the Ninth Thesis is that there is value in prescribing a rational end to history, as giving hope for the future of mankind in accordance with the goals of pure practical reason. However, Kant is in no doubt that this is the contribution of the philosopher to history as opposed to the work of the empirical historian. What the empirical historian sees is the "disjointed product of unregulated freedom". The distance between the empirical historian and the philosopher is parallel to the distance between the historical/political actor and the philosopher in Kant's response to the French Revolution. The philosopher's judgment is privileged because it is that of a non-participant with a world historical overview, which enables him to read a meaning beyond nature into the work of nature.[9] Kant is not suggesting that pure practical reason is at work within historical actors, far from it. He sees historical events in terms of the "unsocial sociability" of man, the conflict of passions and needs, which serve rational ends in spite of themselves. This is displayed in Kant's comments on war, which along with commerce, provides a crucial example of the way in which the philosopher's judgment establishes an identity of rational and actual in history.

The international sphere, according to Kant, is close to the situation of a Hobbesian state of nature. Each state relates to other states as an individual, with no overarching law to regulate that relation. Inevitably, given unregulated human desires for power, wealth, security, the interests of states will clash and there will be war.[10] Kant is quite unequivocal that war is ultimate moral wrong; totally opposed to the moral law, war represents the triumph of nature over reason. Reason demands that there be an end to war, that there must be perpetual peace. This demand of reason is akin to the demand that legislation within the state must be founded on a Common Will, and like that demand it is in itself impotent. Pure practical reason cannot bring about its own ends. Within the domestic sphere the contradiction between reason and reality is resolved via the as-if identification of the Common Will with the will of the actual ruler. Within the international sphere the triumph of nature over reason is ironically reversed by nature herself. Kant's argument follows the

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0263523200002688

logic of a classical deterrence theorist. As wars go on more and more sophisticated weapons are developed, until the mutual fear between states is so great that they are afraid to go to war. At the same time, human greed requires wider and wider markets, and as war is bad for trade (arguable), this provides another motive not to go to war.[11] In these circumstances, perpetual peace, the demand of reason, does become a possibility, in the form of a league of nations, a system of treaties, some kind of an international law. It is not clear in Kant's work exactly what perpetual peace entails. At times it seems little more than the uneasy coexistence of sovereign powers, which is always liable to break down if technological or commercial advantage is held by one power. At other times, something like a world state seems to be envisaged.[12] The difference between these two seems to me to be explicable in terms of a slippage in Kant's thought between the moral and legal realms he insists are forever divided yet wants to bring together in history. The philosopher's hope is manifested both in his judgment that the ends of reason will work through the self-interest of the former model of perpetual peace to the latter, and in his faith in the influence of his own judgment over historical actors - the relation between philosophers and kings.[13]

Let us reflect back on the kind of understanding of war and history that Kant gives us, and the kind of theory and philosophy of international relations and history that is implicit within it. As we have seen, it is a fundamentally dualistic vision. From the standpoint of morality, unmediated by the philosopher's judgment, the workings of history and war are utterly condemned as in contradiction to the moral law. Mediated by the philosopher's judgment, they receive an unconditional sanction as serving the ends of reason. From the standpoint of legality, unmediated by the philosopher's judgment, the workings of war and history represent an eternal truth about human relations, this is how human and inter-state relations will always be. Mediated by the philosopher's judgment, they represent an approximation to, though never an achievement of, the ends of reason. I would argue that Kant's views on history and war, and the role of the philosopher in making sense of those workings are reflected in the dominant strands of thinking within contemporary theory of international relations. At our end of history, the Kantian end of history continues to dominate how history in the sense of world history is to be comprehended. This is something that I have argued in detail elsewhere and can only characterize briefly here.[14]

The dominant trend in the contemporary theory of international relations corresponds closely to the standpoint of legality mediated by the philosopher as outlined above. States are akin to Hobbesian individuals engaged in a constant struggle for power. All explanation is structured by what Richard Ashley has called the anarchy problematique.[15] This realist perspective dehistoricizes the international realm and presupposes an absolute distinction between the moral and the political. International

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0263523200002688

relations are always the same and always driven by nature as opposed to reason. Complementary to the dominant theoretical approach to international relations is a dominant practical approach which abstracts the moral judgment of inter-state relations from history, and condemns or applauds the actions of states according to principles derived from the possible worlds of ethical theory.[16] Attempts to rethink the divisions between history, politics and morality that underlie the above theoretical and practical approaches have tended to correspond to the standpoints of legality and morality mediated by the philosopher's judgment rather than offering a genuine undermining of the Kantian dichotomies.[17] Most current thinking on international relations presents us with a positivistic social science, in which detailed empirical work continually confirms the already presupposed truth of international life; and abstract moralising, which counterposes an ideal ought to history, which is already presupposed to be ineffectual. Very recently, this state of affairs has begun to be challenged within the discipline of international relations itself, and there is now a very rich debate in progress on the future of that science.[18] I wish to go on to argue now that for those seeking to restructure our understanding of world history what is required is a turn from Kant to Hegel.

II

Hegel

Clearly philosophical history is essential to Hegel's philosophy as a whole in a way very different from Kant's. So that where the consideration of history is tagged on to Kant's political thought in an unsystematic way, it is at the heart of the Hegelian system in its theoretical as well as its practical dimensions. The *Phenomenology of Spirit*, the *Science of Logic*, the *Encyclopaedia*, the *Philosophy of Right* are all histories in the sense of being bound up with and articulating the historical development of spirit. The lectures on art, religion, philosophy and history itself present a comprehension of the past culminating in Hegel's own end of history. As always with Hegel, however, the significance of his philosophy of history can be interpreted in different ways. The concepts of world spirit, of world historical individuals, of the nation as the instantiation of the rational idea, of the "cunning of reason" and of the end of history itself, have been read to mean opposing things. Hegel's end of history has been identified as the Prussian state (both authoritarian and liberal versions), as the actualisation of a transhistorical reason, as his own speculative system and, most recently, as "the triumph of bourgeois civil society".[19] Hegel has been held to take a realistic view of the eternally contingent nature of world historical development, and to impose an idealistic pattern on history, reconciling and legitimating the contingencies of history in the higher purposes of the world spirit. It is impossible to deal here with all the readings of Hegel's philosophy of world history that have been put forward and the arguments surrounding them. Instead, what I wish to do is to look at one

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0263523200002688

specific aspect of Hegel's thought on world history, his concept of international relations. I believe this will be helpful in illuminating some of the significance of Hegel's philosophy of world history for an idea of the end of history that takes us beyond Kant.

Hegel does not write extensively on the philosophy of international relations, and what he does write was, in the past, frequently held against him by commentators. The charge that Hegel glorifies war was once a commonplace. However, few contemporary commentators accept this charge, and recent discussions of Hegel's writings on war tend to be divided amongst those that argue that Hegel does acknowledge the necessity of war (without wishing to glorify it),[20] and those that argue that Hegel, whether he realised it or not, gives us grounds to hope for the historical overcoming of war in a new kind of international order.[21] Those that argue for the former position point to Hegel's arguments about the relation between war and the "ethical health" of nations, about international relations in which he stresses the unregulated nature of the international realm and about the peculiar nature and virtues of the military class. Those that argue for the latter position point to Hegel's linking of international relations to the nature of the domestic state as providing a possible ground, whether it is the economic logic of civil society or customary ethical life, for abolishing the necessity of war.[22] What is interesting in all of these readings is that Hegel is always subsumed under either the unmediated Kantian position, in which war is eternally necessary and morally abhorrent; or the mediated Kantian position in which progress is read into the workings of history. Hegel is explicitly critical of Kant's notion of perpetual peace, yet his writings on international relations seem simply to reproduce the Kantian dichotomies. We need to look more closely at what Hegel is saying in order to understand why this is so.

The most sustained examination of international relations in Hegel's work comes at the end of the *Philosophy of Right*. Hegel moves from the exploration of the philosophical idea of the state to the world of inter-state relations and world history. It is extremely important to understand the nature and logic of this move, if we are to make sense of Hegel's remarks about war and peace. If the *Philosophy of Right* as a whole is understood as Hegel's prescription for political life, then the comments on war and peace will be interpreted as a rather confused account of the specific problems posed by international relations, and how those relations ought to be regulated. If the *Philosophy of Right* is understood as essentially a description of the political life of Hegel's time, then the comments on war and peace will be interpreted as a reflection of the inter-state relations of early 19th century Europe, which may be more or less applicable to the present day. I would want to argue that neither of these readings captures adequately what the *Philosophy of Right* is about, though both are in a sense involved in the alternative of reading the *Philosophy of Right* as an exploration of the philosophical self-understanding of Hegel's

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0263523200002688

time which is found in the critical philosophy. It is this alternative reading that seems to me to be the most productive for making a non-Kantian sense of Hegel's political thought.

Throughout the *Philosophy of Right*, Hegel follows through the logic of a Kantian philosophy of right, premised on the split between finite and infinite will, and bedevilled by the problem of grounding right in the realms of law and history. In moving from the domestic to the international sphere at the end of the *Philosophy of Right*, Hegel is still following the logic of a political philosophy which gives primary validity to domestic legislation as the ground for the legitimacy of the state. If right operates within states, then states gain an absolute status which has to be recognised by other states, states must be sovereign and independent. In the sections on International Law and World History in the *Philosophy of Right*, Hegel is acknowledging the necessity of Kant's reading of international affairs as an extension of the logic of his political thought. At the same time Hegel suggests that there are alternative implications of Kant's view of the logic of international relations, which raise important questions about the adequacy of Kant's political and historical thought for his own or any other time. Hegel is quite clear that as long as states are conceptualised as individual autonomous entities, motivated by their own interest and with an absolute right to determine their own affairs, perpetual peace, as anything other than a staving off of war, will remain philosophical wishful thinking. Hegel also points out, however, that even in the relation of war, the mutual recognition of states points beyond their absolute difference and begs the question of their absolute right.

> The fact that states reciprocally recognise each other as states remains, even in war - the state of affairs when rights disappear and force and chance hold sway - a bond wherein each counts to the rest as absolute. Hence in war, war itself is characterized as something which ought to pass away.[23]

As we have seen, in Kant's argument war is both necessary and ought not to be. The former is identified as a natural, the latter as a rational necessity. In Hegel's discussion we are pushed into re-thinking these two kinds of necessity as necessarily related, identified both in the logic of critical thought which attempts to deny the relation, and in history.

One way of interpreting Hegel's bringing together of the rational and actual poles of the Kantian dichotomies in history, is to see him as exercising a philosophical sleight of hand to resolve real contradictions. On this reading Hegel solves the problem of both domestic and international right by injecting world history with an inner purpose which both justifies and explains the role of force and chance in historical development. This bringing together of *is* and *ought* in the philosopher's judgment is, however, something much more characteristic of Kant's philosophy of history. In Kant's reading of history, the essential meaninglessness of history is given meaning through the philosopher's

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0263523200002688

identification of an end of history, and his interpretation of history as progress. We have a choice between contingency, force and chance on the one hand, and philosophical rationalisation on the other. The exposition of the *Philosophy of Right* is intended to demonstrate that these are not alternatives, but equally products of the same philosophical presuppositions that keep rational and actual apart. Following through the logic of these philosophical presuppositions in the context of world history inevitably brings them into question. Either the finite and contingent is infinitized into the eternal truth of history, or the infinite is posited as the end of history. The gap between finite and infinite is not sustained by the thought that thinks it. Yet however much we may appreciate the truth of Hegel's criticism of Kant, it is still very difficult to understand Hegel's own claim that there is reason in history except along Kantian lines. In order to do so, it is necessary to consider carefully the meaning of the identity of the rational and the actual in history in Hegel's work.

> The realm of fact has discarded its barbarity and unrighteous caprice, while the realm of truth has abandoned the world of beyond and its arbitrary force, so that the true reconciliation which discloses the state as the image and actuality of reason has become objective.[24]

The "true reconciliation which discloses the state as the image and actuality of reason" may sound like the identifying of the modern state with a Kantian kingdom of ends, but this is to ignore the point that reason is in history and not beyond it. Reason is historically mediated in both theory and practice, just as historical actuality is always mediated by reason. Our understanding of ourselves must always be an identity of rational and actual, even in so far as the rational is radically distinguished from the actual. Philosophical presuppositions are aspects of the historical self-understanding of spirit, even if they do not recognise themselves as such. There is no trans-historical ideal, no ought-to-be, which gives an overall meaning to history. Thus, we are always at the end of history, and the recognition of this changes the nature of the philosophy of history. With Hegel there is no escape either into the abstract moralism which condemns the world without engaging with it; or into the equally abstract legalism which transforms contingency into an eternal truth. Neither is it possible to impose a meaning on history from without, since reason is within history. Now we need the philosophy of world history, not to provide an alien meaning to existence, but to make explicit what we already grasp in the different mediations of rationality and actuality which we inhabit and construct.

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0263523200002688

III

Krombach

A recent example of an attempt to use a Hegelian approach to the philosophy of history in the context of international relations can be found in Hayo Krombach's book *Hegelian Reflections on the Idea of Nuclear War*. In this book, Krombach uses Hegel's philosophical logic to try and comprehend the present end of history. Krombach's reading of the logic enables a reading of history that resists subsumption under either the realist or idealist side of the Kantian dichotomies.

> Hegel's reason is not a hoped-for, future-oriented reason, but one that is historically always fulfilled in its present. The present is: it is the result that has developed out of its past. Reason is not an *ought* that still awaits completion. For Hegel it relates only to the task of present being to comprehend itself fully in and through the multiple ought of its past.[25]

Krombach argues that historical dialectical logic is the only way of thinking adequate to the task of understanding the current end of history. An end of history peculiarly structured by the menace of nuclear war. The bulk of the book is a very detailed and dense analysis of dialectical logic, with Hegel's historical dialectic being argued to be superior to any other kind. In the final chapters Krombach explicitly addresses the subject of international relations, and analyses it in what he sees as Hegelian terms. According to Krombach the logic of history necessarily develops via the dialectical relation of a system of states. Inherent in the dialectical possibilities of inter-state relations is the possibility of both war and peace, these are necessary consequences of the way states are and the way in which they relate to one another. In turn, war and peace, in different ways, reinforce and structure the particular states that make up the state system. The invention of nuclear weapons is likewise a necessary consequence of the dialectic of inter-state relations. However, with nuclear weapons a radically different possibility is introduced into the system of states, ie. the possibility of the complete annihilation of the historical dialectic itself. Previously the negative power of war had been recuperable in a new set of inter-state relations, there was always a future, now this is no longer the case. Krombach argues that the only proper philosophical response to the nuclear age is to redouble efforts to comprehend the present in relation to the past, and thus to acknowledge our global responsibility for that present in all its potential. His analysis seems to offer very little hope.

Krombach's argument is a genuine attempt to avoid, in particular, the Kantian trap of philosophical wishful thinking. He is careful not to posit any ahistorical goals of reason and locates the end of history firmly in the present. In so far as he does this, he is clearly in

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0263523200002688

tune with the kind of Hegelian reading of history I have already discussed. Nevertheless, it seems to me that Krombach's analysis is fundamentally problematic from a Hegelian point of view, because in avoiding Kantian idealism, Krombach fails to avoid the other side of that coin, an uncritical realism in which war and peace are seen as the product of an international realm structured purely in terms of the interaction of self-interested sovereign nation states. When it comes to the nature of inter-state relations, Krombach slips into the Kantian realm of perpetual peace, where relations between states are never as they ought to be and hope for the future is necessarily hollow. This system of states is given the sanction of reason and the status of an end of history by being presented as the identity of the rational and the actual in the contemporary world, rather than being seen as an abstract conceptualization of global actuality that holds a partial, one-sided and certainly not eternal truth.

Krombach bases the Hegelian credentials for his account of the logic of inter-state relations on Hegel's remarks in the *Philosophy of Right*. And it is certainly the case that Hegel does expound the logic of a system of states, each endowed with absolute right, interacting in the context of a global state of nature. However, he also points out that this logic is to some extent self-subverting, the battle for mutual recognition begging the question of the absolute right of any particular state. And he also points to the importance of factors other than anarchy and Hobbesian self-assertion in the international realm. That realm will be structured differently depending on the nature of the states in question and what they have in common. Krombach's Hegel identifies the state with right, regardless of its nature, and builds a model of the international realm on this basis. I would argue that this is the logic of Kant's position and not of Hegel's. What it leaves us with is philosophical wishful thinking as our only source of hope. Hegel, on the other hand, rejects the reification of abstract conceptualizations into the eternal truth of history. He recognizes the historically mediated nature of Kant's concept of the workings of history and its timeliness, but also its limitations for the comprehension of his end of history. Its limitations both theoretically as an account of global actuality, and practically in its banishing of hope to the possible worlds of the philosopher.

For our end of history the theoretical and practical limitations of the Kantian model of international relations are more acute than ever. The model of a system of states, operating within the anarchy problematique underlies most attempts to understand world history and is hopelessly inadequate for dealing with the complexity of the international sphere. The moral endorsement given to the absolute right of states in the philosopher's judgment has given the goal of national self-determination an overriding validity with frightening results. By looking back at Hegel's critique of the Kantian presuppositions which structure contemporary philosophy and theory in international relations, I believe we can trace the nature of a Hegelian philosophy of world history. A philosophy which does

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0263523200002688

not dictate to history but recognises its own mediation in history, and therefore remains open to all the complexities of global actuality.

---

1 H Krombach *Hegelian Reflections on the Idea of Nuclear War* (London, 1991).

2 Y Yovel *Kant and the Philosophy of History* (Princeton, 1980).

3 This is nicely illustrated in Leon Pompa's essay "Philosophical History in Kant and Hegel" in *Hegel's Critique of Kant* edited by S Priest (Oxford, 1987).

4 Kant, *Metaphysics of Morals Part 1* translated as *The Metaphysical Elements of Justice* by J Ladd (Indianapolis, 1965), pp 127-9.

5 All these texts are to be found in *Kant: Political Writings* edited by H Reiss (Cambridge, 1991).

6 See Kant *The Metaphysical Elements of Justice,* pp 138-41.

7 *Kant: Political Writings,* p 108.

8 Ibid, pp 51-2.

9 Ibid, p 115.

10 Ibid, pp 112-3.

11 Ibid, p 114.

12 The ambiguities of Kant's position are usefully highlighted in Andrew Hurrell's article, "Kant and the Kantian Paradigm in International Relations", *Review of International Studies* Vol 16, No 3, 1990.

13 *Kant: Political Writings,* p 115.

14 K Hutchings "The Possibility of Judgment: Moralising and Theorising in International Relations", *Review of International Studies* Vol 18, No 1, 1992 (forthcoming).

15 R K Ashley "Untying the Sovereign State: A Double Reading of the Anarchy Problematique", *Millenium* Vol 17, No 2, 1988.

16 The rigid politics/morality divide is nicely illustrated by a collection of essays arising from a conference of strategists and philosophers: *Nuclear Deterrence: Ethics and Strategy* edited by R Hardin, J J Mearsheimer, G Dworkin and R E Goodin (Chicago and London, 1985).

17 Examples of this can be found in the work of Charles Beitz and Andrew Linklater, who attempt to bridge the traditional dichotomies by drawing on the work of Rawls and Habermas respectively. See Charles Beitz *Political Theory and International Relations* (Princeton, 1979); Andrew Linklater *Men and Citizens in the Theory of International Relations* (London, 1982) and *Beyond Realism and Marxism: Critical Theory and International Relations* (London, 1990).

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0263523200002688

18 In the course of this debate international relations theorists have turned to Marx, Gramsci, Habermas, Derrida, Foucault and Feminism (judging by editions of journals such as *Millenium* since the mid 1980s). However, Hegel has not generally been identified as a source of possible renewal within the discipline.

19 S B Smith *Hegel's Critique of Liberalism* (Chicago and London, 1989), p 164.

20 E E Harris and H Paolucci in *Hegel's Social and Political Thought*, papers from the Biennial Meeting of the Hegel Society of America (Humanities Press, 1980); S Watt "Hegel On War Another Look", *History of Political Thought* Vol 10, No 1, 1989; D P Verene "Hegel's Account of War", *Hegel's Political Philosophy: Problems and Perspectives* edited by Z A Pelczynski (Cambridge, 1971).

21 Eg J C Flay's response to Harris and Paolucci in *Hegel's Social and Political Thought*; S B Smith *Hegel's Critique of Liberalism*, pp 156-64; A Vincent "The Hegelian State and International Politics" *Review of International Studies*, Vol 9, 1983.

22 Grounds for all of these different interpretations can be found in the closing sections of the *Philosophy of Right* trans T M Knox (Oxford, 1967), pp 208-15, 321-340.

23 Hegel *Philosophy of Right*, p 215, 338.

24 Ibid, p 222.

25 Krombach *Hegelian Reflections*, p 82.

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0263523200002688