THE EARLY RECEPTION OF BERKELEY'S IMMATERIALISM

1710–1733

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REVISED EDITION

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To A. A. LUCE and T. E. JESSOP

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION

By the time of Immanuel Kant, Berkeley had been called, among other things, a sceptic, an atheist, a solipsist, and an idealist. In our own day, however, the suggestion has been advanced that Berkeley is better understood if interpreted as a realist and man of common sense. Regardless of whether in the end one decides to treat him as a subjective idealist or as a realist, I think it has become appropriate to inquire how Berkeley's own contemporaries viewed his philosophy. Heretofore the generally accepted account has been that they ignored him, roughly from the time he published the *Principles of Human Knowledge* until 1733 when Andrew Baxter's criticism appeared. The aim of the present study is to correct that account as well as to give some indication not only of the extent, but more importantly, the role and character of several of the earliest discussions. Secondarily, I have tried to give some clues as to the influence this early material may have had in forming the image of the "good" Bishop that emerged in the second half of the eighteenth century. For it is my hope that such clues may prove helpful in freeing us from the more severe strictures of the traditional interpretive dogmas. To these ends, the first two chapters survey such material as I have been able to uncover from the two supposedly "doldrum decades," while the final three chapters deal in detail with discussions which seemed to warrant specific attention. The text of several of the early criticisms have, because of their relative inaccessibility, been reproduced in the Appendices.

I wish to take this opportunity to acknowledge some of the help I have received while preparing this book. First of all, my thanks to my colleagues in the Department of Philosophy at the State University of Iowa for frequent assistance and constant encouragement. I am especially indebted to Professor Richard H. Popkin, whose willingness to discuss issues both in and around the material of this study has been

most sincerely appreciated. Mrs. Margaret J. Corcoran, Mr. Richard A. Watson, and Professor Henry G. Van Leeuwen, now of Hanover College, have also helped me in preparing the text.

My debt to the State University of Iowa Library is considerable. Thanks are especially due Mrs. Julia Bartling, Head of Reference Services, Miss Lillie Cilley, Miss Ada Stoflet, Mrs. Mary Lee Tsuffis, as well as to Mrs. Moira Buhse and Mrs. Carol Frey. Other librarians who have made my task easier include Miss Margaret Hackett of the Library of the Boston Athenaeum, Mr. Henry J. Dubester of the Library of Congress, M. P. Josserand of the Bibliothèque Nationale, Dr. W. Douglas Simpson of the University of Aberdeen, and the staffs at both the University of Chicago and the Newberry Libraries.

Part of the material in Chapters Four and Five has appeared as articles in the *Journal of the History of Ideas* in 1956 and 1957 and is reprinted here with the kind permission of the Editors.

I am especially grateful to the Graduate College of the State University of Iowa and to the Publications Committee of the American Philosophical Association for the financial assistance that has made publication of this book possible.

Finally, my thanks to Nancy Hunt Ryden and to my wife for preparing the original typescript, to my wife for helping with the burdensome task of reading proofs, and to Christopher for letting her.

H.M.B.

Iowa City

July 27, 1958

PREFACE TO THE REVISED EDITION

The first edition of this study having been out of print for several years, I am grateful for the opportunity to present this new edition. A large number of small changes have been made in the text and a substantial number of references added. These are primarily references to secondary sources since I have come upon little in the way of new material for the 1710–1733 period. This is in spite of the fact that during the summer of 1964 I examined a quantity of English tract literature of the early eighteenth century as well as many of the more philosophical books of that era. Accordingly, I believe that my account of the early reception of Berkeley's immaterialism and its influence on Berkeley's subsequent reputation as a philosopher remains sound.

I have, however, included in the present edition my paper, "Berkeley's Realisms." The text is substantially that which appeared in the *Philosophical Quarterly* in 1958 and is reprinted in Appendix A with the kind permission of the Editor. My reasons for including this paper are twofold. *First*, because it contains a statement of those philosophical difficulties in Berkeley which, at the time that I prepared the first edition of this study, seemed to me the most serious. I called attention to them from time to time in my text and I referred on occasion to the article. *Second*, because in an article in *Hermathena* in 1960, Professor Luce made both the first edition and the article the joint object of a critical discussion.

My opinion now, as then, is that the broad strokes of the Luce-Jessop interpretation of Berkeley are correct. I remain uneasy with their accounts of Berkeley's ideas of sense. And I am much more inclined to believe that Berkeley would himself have accepted what I suggested at the end of "Berkeley's Realisms" as an unsought and undesired consequence for the Luce-Jessop interpretation, i.e. that all our knowledge might be notional. But however that may be, it was

Luce and Jessop who alerted me to a "realist" reading of Berkeley, and thereby made me share their concern with the extent of Berkeley's interest in a realist ontology and philosophy of mind. It was, after all, precisely to the realism in Malebranche's theory of Ideas that Luce first called attention. And it is my own belief that eventually the theory of notions will also be seen to be an appropriate part of Berkeley's involvement with the realist tradition.

The contemporary student of Berkeley can certainly take pleasure in the fact that thirty years after the appearance of Luce's *Berkeley and Malebranche*, not only is a new edition of Berkeley available, but the half-way mark has been reached in producing a new edition of Malebranche. Thirty years ago Luce spoke of Locke, Malebranche, and Bayle as the major influences on Berkeley. Now, for the first time, a wealth of material is also becoming available on Bayle. Elisabeth Labrousse has made three major contributions to our appreciation of Bayle: a labor of love, an *Inventaire Critique* of his correspondence; plus one volume dedicated to his intellectual biography and another (both in the *International Archives of the History of Ideas*) to a study of his ideas – philosophical, religious, historical. Paul Dibon has edited a collection of essays, *Pierre Bayle: Le Philosophe de Rotterdam.* A selection of *Dictionnaire* articles, edited and translated by Richard H. Popkin is about to appear. There has of course been a great deal of new material on the Cartesian background including Henri Gouhier's *La pensée métaphysique de Descartes*, Popkin's *History of Scepticism from Erasmus to Descartes*, as well as R. A. Watson's *The Downfall of Cartesianism 1673–1712*, and the extremely helpful *Bibliographia Cartesiana* by Gregor Sebba (these last two items are also in the *International Archives*).

The only disappointing feature of all this is that histories of philosophy, and hence, all too often, courses in philosophy, continue to reflect nineteenth century attitudes. Despite the surprisingly large number of history texts that have appeared in the last two decades, I know of only two: one by George Boas, the other by James Collins, in which sustained efforts are made to rethink the history of philosophy in the light of the scholarly research of the past half-century. "Higher criticism," whether practiced by a Bayle, a Lovejoy, or a Gouhier, has often received such a cool reception in philosophy that one is tempted to think that it is the philosophers who are the true defenders of revelation!

In conclusion, I wish to acknowledge the help that I have received from a wide variety of sources. During the summer of 1964 I was the

recipient of a research grant from the American Philosophical Society which enabled me to use the libraries of the Los Angeles area. While my research project was not directly concerned with the material in this text, it did concern a Berkeleian theme and it required my use of the literature of the period. As a result I was able to examine some new material relevant to the present study. I am indeed grateful to the Society for this unanticipated by-product of its support.

I am also grateful to several librarians for the assistance, encouragement, and thoughtfulness that they accorded me. I wish to thank Miss Mary Isabel Fry, Miss Constance Lodge, and the staff of the Henry E. Huntington Library; Mr. Wallace Nethery of the Hoose (Philosophy) Library, University of Southern California; Mr. Leo Linder and the other members of the staff of the Special Collections Library at the University of California, Los Angeles; and Mr. William E. Conway, Mrs. Edna C. Davis, and the staff at the William Andrews Clark Memorial Library.

The task of revising the text has been made much easier by the help of friends who have made many valuable suggestions. I wish especially to thank Dr. T. E. Jessop, former Professor of Philosophy at the University of Hull, and Professor Richard A. Watson of the Department of Philosophy, Washington University. Their wise counsel on textual questions, their assistance on research problems, and the generous contributions of time and effort that these entailed, have been greatly appreciated. Mr. David Norton, Department of Philosophy, University of California, San Diego, has helped me considerably, both by examining the text and by responding to my urgent and all-too-frequent pleas for reference data when I no longer had ready access to good library facilities. Professor Phillip Cummins, Department of Philosophy, University of Iowa, has also helped provide me with reference material.

I wish also to thank the directors of the *International Archives of the History of Ideas*, Paul Dibon, Professor of Philosophy at Nijmegen, and Richard H. Popkin, Professor of Philosophy at the University of California, San Diego, for including my text in their series. I am pleased to have this revised edition appear under their auspices not only because of the intrinsic merits of the series, but also because much of the material which went into the first edition had been assembled earlier in a dissertation at the University of Iowa under Professor Popkin's direction. Both Professors Dibon and Popkin have helped me in many ways in preparing this edition for the press.

Finally, I wish to thank my wife for assuming the difficult, and at times seemingly endless, task of reading proof. Christopher, in consultation with Timothy, assisted in the preparation of the index. Mrs. Ruth A. Bardrick helped prepare copy for the printer.

H.M.B.

Tempe, Arizona

September 30, 1964

CHAPTER I

THE EARLY RECEPTION OF BERKELEY'S IMMATERIALISM

'Tis incredible what prejudices can work on the best geniuses, nay and even on the lovers of novelty, for I did but name the subject matter of your book to some ingenious friends of mine and they immediately treated it with ridicule, at the same time refusing to read it ... A physician ... undertook to describe your person, and argued you must needs be mad, and that you ought to take remedies. A Bishop pitied you that a desire and vanity of starting something new should put you on such an undertaking, and when I justified you in that part of your character, and added the other deserving qualities you have, he said he could not tell what to think of you.[1]

So did Sir John Percival report in 1710 to Berkeley on the London reception of the *Principles of Human Knowledge*. Ridicule rather than argument was the response of the London wits, and Percival found it necessary to defend Berkeley on the grounds of his character. Wishing to clarify his position and elicit something more than laughter from his readers, Berkeley published his *Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous* three years later. As an attempt to stem the tide, the work failed: for there are numerous references to Berkeley during the two decades that followed publication that do little more than find in him a source of low-class intellectual comedy. Even at the end of an extract (in Latin) of the 1725 edition of the *Three Dialogues* in the staid *Acta Eruditorum* (Leipzig)[2] one finds a trace of bitter humor:

Thus Berkeley gives a fairly plausible defense of his paradox of the non-existence of matter. Whether it is true or not I leave others to judge; but as for its origin this *Lycian Beast* seems to me, despite the author's dissembling, to have sprung from a mingling of the philosophies of *Descartes*, *Malebranche*, and *Spinoza*.[3]

[1] Letter, Percival to Berkeley, 26 August 1710, in Benjamin Rand, *Berkeley and Percival* (Cambridge: 1914), p. 80.

[2] *Acta Eruditorum* (Leipzig) 1727, pp. 379–383.

[3] Reading "Lukion" for "Lubikon" on the suggestion of Professor Gerald F. Else,

This is possibly a reference to the Chimera, a composite beast of three parts, just as Berkeley's philosophy is a composite. And perhaps there is also a play on Chimera as illusory.

A lengthy review of the Italian translation of Berkeley's *New Theory of Vision* (it included the Introduction to the *Principles*) in *Bibliothèque Italique* (Geneva) in 1732,[1] concludes by saying: "I think moreover, that one has never seen a philosopher fall all at once into such exceedingly fantastic ideas." The reviewer sees Berkeley's initial deviations from the common path leading to some successes which inflate his ego, with the result that "he scorns thinking like others," and soars up and away from view. "At last a ridiculous fall from the rank of a rare and sublime spirit to which he aspired, degrades him below those who have only a modicum of common sense." [2]

Another allusion to the ridiculousness of Berkeley occurs in Jean Pierre de Crousaz' *Examen du Pyrrhonisme* (1733):

> A modern author [presumably Berkeley] pretends to overthrow Pyrrhonism by denying the Existence of bodies and admitting only that of spirits. If he intends to impose that way on the rest of men, and if he hopes to succeed in it, he has a very wrong opinion; and if he thinks as he speaks, he does not give a lofty notion of his good sense, and it is necessary that he suppose the brains of other men to be as upside down as his certainly is . . .[3]

For according to this "refutation" (i.e. Berkeley's) of Pyrrhonism, its author is only a spirit who wrote an idea of a book, printed in the idea of a print shop, etc.

And it is worth noting that Percival's last line of defense against nastiness and ridicule directed at Berkeley, is not an argument but a character reference. Indeed, at least two others took a similar line: (1) Thémiseul de Saint-Hyacinthe, writing in 1743, defends Berkeley from published charges of atheism by suggesting that Berkeley's efforts on behalf of "religious institutions" in the Bermudas attest to his religious sincerity.[4]

Department of Classics, University of Michigan. The text is reprinted in Jessop's Editor's Introduction to the *Three Dialogues* in *The Works of George Berkeley, Bishop of Cloyne*, ed. by A. A. Luce and T. E. Jessop, (London: 1948–57), II, 153n. That edition of Berkeley's writings, complete in nine volumes, is referred to hereafter as "*Works*" and is frequently abbreviated in my text as "*W*" and Berkeley's *Principles* will often be abbreviated as "*Pr.*" See also A. A. Luce, *Berkeley and Malebranche* (London: 1934), p. 9.

[1] *Bibliothèque Italique* (Geneva), XIII (1732), 182–227. The translation of the New Theory is noted in T. E. Jessop, *A Bibliography of George Berkeley* (London: 1934), entry 81.

[2] *Bibliothèque Italique*, pp. 226–7.

[3] Jean Pierre de Crousaz, *Examen du Pyrrhonisme* (La Haye: 1733), p. 97. The substance of these remarks reportedly also appeared in Crousaz' *A New Treatise of the Art of Thinking* (London: 1724). See Richard H. Popkin, "Berkeley and Pyrrhonism," *Review of Metaphysics*, V (1951), 245n.

[4] Saint-Hyacinthe, *Recherches Philosophiques* (La Haye: 1743), p. 95, cf. pp. 94–6.

(2) Commenting on Berkeley's *Alciphron* in the journal *Observations sur les Écrits Modernes* (1736),[1] the one-time Jesuit, l'abbé Pierre Desfontaines claims that it is "a tissue of libertine sophisms, gratuitously contrived in order to destroy the most sure and lofty principles of Morality, Politics and even of Religion." Of Berkeley himself: "How could one be won over by a writer who oversteps all sorts of bounds, and who admits with a cavalier air, that he has studied only in Clubs, Cafés and Taverns?" Desfontaines reveals his contempt not only for these "frivolous spirits who spend their lives dogmatizing in the Cafés of England," but also for England itself and its vaunted political freedom. "This obscure author preaches liberty for all, which according to him, consists in defiance of the authority of laws and of the people charged with their execution ..." And he concludes: "I have perhaps said too much in order to make you scorn a book which degrades equally the spirit and the probity of the Author." [2]

Voltaire, at war with Desfontaines, came to Berkeley's defense twice in 1738 – first by stating that Berkeley was formerly a missionary in America and then concluding: "He who drew this infamous picture of that saintly book makes it evident thereby that he has read none of the books of which he has the audacity to speak." [3] Apparently the aversion to reading Berkeley that Percival bewailed, died hard.

The standard view on Berkeley's early reception has by and large been oblivious of much of this "humor" and vindictiveness that Berkeley aroused, but more important, oblivious also of the philosophical discussion and critical comment which was contemporaneous (and sometimes coextensive!) with it. In his address at the Berkeley Bicentenary Commemoration in 1953, Professor Jessop remarked: "His two philosophical works, the *Principles* and the *Three Dialogues*, do not seem to have been much read, and contemporary comment on them, so far as it is known to us, was rare and unimportant." [4]

[1] *Observations sur les Écrits Modernes* (Paris), I (1736), 178–180.

[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 179–180.

[3] Voltaire, Le Préservatif No. XXVI, in *Oeuvres complètes de Voltaire*, Garnier Frères edition, (Paris: 1875 ff), XXII, 385. See also in his *Éclaircissements sur les éléments de la philosophie de Newton*, in *Oeuvres* XXII, 271. See Jessop, *Bibliography*, entries 16a, 383 and 388 for further references. Voltaire speaks of conversation with Berkeley in his *Dictionnaire Philosophique* art. "corps," cf. *Oeuvres*, XVIII, 271. Jessop (entry 388) notes Voltaire was in England 1726–29.

[4] Jessop, "George Berkeley, 1685–1753," *Hermathena*, LXXXII (1953), 7. See also his Editor's Introduction to Berkeley's *Principles*, in *Works* II, 4. "Berkeley's philosophy did not become a subject of written attention and controversy until he published *Alciphron* (1732)." In his Editor's Introduction to Berkeley's *Three Dialogues* he notes: "Our scanty records suggest that the *Dialogues* attracted almost as little attention as the *Principles* had

Broadly speaking, the accepted opinion has been that after tickling Percival's London friends, Berkeley the philosopher was ignored; that as a philosopher, Berkeley only emerged from the doldrums in the 1730's; that his role in the history of philosophy does not begin until Hume concludes the Locke/Berkeley dialectic. Berkeley is then cast as a precursor of the great Scottish sceptic, he is attacked by Reid, vilified by Beattie, and incorporated into the idealist synthesis by Kant.

For some years past, however, A. A. Luce and T. E. Jessop have combined research and argument to claim that the traditional picture of Berkeley has many major flaws. Berkeley is no longer the "good Bishop" playing with, and being burned by, dialectical fire – he is now a stout common-sense realist who is indebted not only to Locke, but to Malebranche and Bayle [1] as well. And as R. H. Popkin [2] has shown, he was not insensitive to scepticism – but understood it thoroughly and was proposing his philosophy as a serious answer to what was then an extremely serious challenge.

Giving us a new picture of Berkeley – and such a different one – does not, however, explain away the picture that has frequently and influentially figured in the history of philosophy since, let us say, Reid's time. I wish, in the course of this study, to make a beginning at explaining what may have given rise to that view of the "good" Bishop which saw him as the Father of Modern Idealism, and as an unwitting sceptic, joined in partnership with Locke and Hume. I shall present and examine some unknown and/or little noticed material relating to Berkeley's philosophical reputation in the period through 1733. Specifically I shall show that Berkeley's reputation as a philosopher was in the making far sooner than has been realized. As a consequence, I suggest that certain features of his later reputation are made more comprehensible.

Far from Berkeley's reputation *beginning* in 1733 with Baxter's *Enquiry into the Nature of the Human Soul*, we shall find Baxter explicitly referring to some of this material. Furthermore, he, and for that matter Reid and Beattie and Kant, were the cultural heirs to these suggestive

done." (*Works* II, 149). However, see Jessop's comments in *Works* IX, 154f. See also A. A. Luce, *Berkeley and Malebranche*, p. 47; A. C. Fraser's edition of the *Works of George Berkeley* (Oxford: 1901) Vol. III, Appendix D.

[1] See esp. chap. iv of Luce's recent study, *The Dialectic of Immaterialism: An Account of The Making of Berkeley's Principles* (London: 1963).

[2] Richard H. Popkin "Berkeley and Pyrrhonism," *Review of Metaphysics*, V (1951), 223–246.

reviews and discussions which appeared during the supposedly "doldrum decades" after publication of the *Principles*. I can hardly hope to demonstrate that simply as a result of this Berkeley's reputation grew as it did, but I do hope that it will afford some reasons for thinking that the disparity between the earlier and the more recent interpretations is based on something more than the perversity of the commentators. Finally, the year 1733 is not arbitrarily chosen, for it dates Baxter's *Enquiry*, the work which is taken by Luce, Jessop and Fraser to be the first extended criticism of Berkeley in English; criticism which contains many of the objections that Baxter's fellow Scots were later to make.

The material discussed will show that Baxter's barrage does not constitute a beginning out of nothing, but rather that for two decades Berkeley's philosophy had been under attack. Berkeley had been accused of scepticism, egoism, idealism and atheism *long before* 1733. Before 1733 he had been charged with denying the reality of our sense experience, with failing to distinguish sensations from objects of sensations, with denying the substance/attribute distinction, with propounding an argument against the reality of matter which could be applied to the Self, with committing what we now call the fallacy of initial predication, and in his attack on abstract ideas, he was charged with making a proposal which "may well set our philosophy on a new footing."

When we finally get down to Andrew Baxter and discover in some detail the difficulties a half-way earnest critic has in seeing past his own metaphysical commitments and presuppositions, we begin to appreciate the philosophical problems Berkeley faced in getting a hearing. From the philosophical standpoint of a metaphysician like Baxter, there were good grounds for charging Berkeley with all sorts of sins. But while Berkeley's arguments are certainly not impervious to attack, the most striking feature of the criticism that preceded Baxter, is the dearth of argument – his views clearly could have been disputed on technical grounds, but generally they were not. For example, the Jesuits, at whose hands Berkeley suffered the worst treatment, seem hardly to have read him at all. Baxter not only has difficulties in reading Berkeley that are honestly engendered by his own position, he is the inheritor of a two-decade tradition of vilification, ridicule, and at best distortion – some of which he explicitly admits being heir to.

The question now arises, why did Berkeley's two works, directed as

they were against Scepticism and Atheism, (see the title pages) provoke such violent reactions, and shortly lead to his being charged with the very things he was attacking. A major factor in the answer is that Berkeley published his views when tensions in philosophy and religion were extremely high. Berkeley strode bravely forth onto an intellectual no-man's land and was promptly cut down from almost every side. Apparently no one felt courtesy could be risked – rather than grant him a hearing, he was labelled one of the enemy. Percival's London acquaintances merely chuckled, but Berkeley could never find out what they thought wrong with his arguments. The Newtonians were probably not pleased by the attacks on the mathematicians (cf. *Pr* § 101 ff). His stated intent to attack scepticism could hardly be expected to win him friends among Baylean Pyrrhonists. On the other hand, those who were fighting Bayle and his camp, found Berkeley's resolution of scepticism so incredible that they feared Trojan Horse tactics. Worst of all, the Jesuits found in him the *reductio ad absurdum* of Malebranchianism – or rather, they so made him out, and used him repeatedly as a weapon in their bitter struggles with Malebranche and his followers. As I think most of the material drawn from the "doldrum decades" indicates, Berkeley was maligned and his views distorted not in philosophical refutation, but in exceptionally partisan intellectual warfare. Aligned with no side, he was attacked by all sides.

Turning now to that early criticism, so far as I have been able to discover, the first published discussion [1] of Berkeley's *Principles* appeared in the literary news section of the *Journal des Sçavans* in 1711.[2] Thus far, no material seems to have come to light revealing Berkeley's reaction, but surely he was happy to receive attention in so important and long-lived a publication, and probably quite unhappy with the review itself.[3] Unhappy in the first place because the review is patterned

[1] Leibniz seems to have taken early notice of Berkeley, although not in print. For his comments, see Willy Kabitz, "Leibniz und Berkeley," *Sitzungsberichte der Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften* (Philosophisch-Historische Klasse), 1932. pp. 623–636.

[2] *Journal des Sçavans* (Amsterdam edition), Tome L, September 1711, pp. 321–330. My quotations from this review include parenthetical references to *Journal* pages. The complete text is reprinted in Appendix B. The existence of this review is mentioned by Maxime Chastaing, "Berkeley, défenseur du sens commun et théoricien de la connaissance d'autrui," *Revue Philosophique*, CXLIII (1953), 219. His reference is to the Paris edition, which carried the review of the *Principles* in July, 1711. I wish to thank Miss Margaret Hackett of the Reference Department, Library of the Boston Athenaeum, for comparing the Amsterdam edition (in the Athenaeum) with the Paris edition (in Boston Public). She advises me that the texts are substantially the same.

[3] Berkeley did express the desire to have the *Principles* reviewed (as the *New Theory of Vision* had been) in Jean Leclerc's *Bibliothèque Choisie*, for Leclerc had introduced several

along the lines of an "extract" and thus does not include serious criticism of his views – unhappy in the second place because both the choice of selections and their paraphrases give a distorted impression of his position.

The very first paragraph in the review reads:

> The author asserts in the Preface that after a long and serious examination, he has found that the principles which he has made use of in his work are evidently true, and capable of undeceiving those who have been given to Pyrrhonism, or who want a demonstration stronger than that of the existence of God and of the immortality of the soul. (322).

The reviewer is correct in reporting Berkeley's concern with Pyrrhonism.[1] In the early eighteenth century, in the era of Pierre Bayle's *Dictionnaire*, it would be difficult not to be concerned – although Berkeley's role in the attack on scepticism has largely been ignored. But the second point in Berkeley's program should read: "... or want a demonstration of the existence and immateriality of God ..." [*W* II, 23; *Pr* Preface]. Whereas the first paragraph of the review might make a reader suspect that the young Fellow of Trinity College, Dublin was a bit muddleheaded, the second paragraph would convince him.

For the second tells us that the principle Berkeley seeks to prove is "that neither body nor matter exists, and that there is no other being or substance than *Spirits*." (322). "Spirit" is then defined by way of a garbled paraphrase of Section 27. It is there that Berkeley explains that spirits being active, and ideas passive, ideas cannot be framed of spirits themselves – only their effects.[2] Missing this distinction, just as he missed all the Introduction and most of the first sections, the reviewer writes:

> These Spirits are endowed with intelligence and will, that which renders them capable of *power:* because it is absurd, according to him, to imagine *power* where there is no will to direct and apply it. Everything else that we suppose exists outside of us, is nothing else, he says, than ideas of an entirely

English philosophers to the learned world, including Locke. See below, Chapter III. Drafts of Berkeley's two letters to Leclerc are printed in Theodor Lorenz' "Weitere Beiträge zur Lebensgeschichte George Berkeleys," *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* (1904), pp. 159–170. See also *Works* VIII, 48–9.

[1] See Popkin, "Berkeley and Pyrrhonism,"; Pierre Courtines, "Bayle, Hume and Berkeley," *Revue de littérature comparée*, XXI (1947), 416–28; A. A. Luce, *Berkeley and Malebranche*, p. 53 ff as well as his *Dialectic of Immaterialism* (London: 1963), chap. iv; Richard A. Watson, "Berkeley in a Cartesian Context," *Revue Internationale de Philosophie*, XVII (1963), 381–94.

[2] Section 27 culminates his argument. Note also *Philosophical Commentaries*, entry 625: " Matter once allow'd. I defy any man to prove that God is not matter."

passive nature. These ideas come to us by the senses, he adds. They depend no more on us than those that we form by the imagination or memory. It is another spirit which makes us perceive them. They have no other existence than that of being perceived, and they cease to be or exist, as soon as our spirit, or another ceases to perceive them. (322–3).

First off, the reviewer misattributes the absurdity – for he has missed Berkeley's distinction between spirits and ideas. Ideas are purely passive, they reveal to us, says Berkeley, neither power nor activity. What Berkeley wants to be clear on, is that given the passivity of ideas, no idea of extension, etc. could be a *cause* of sensations. What then is the cause of our ideas? "... an incorporeal active substance or spirit." [*Pr* § 26] But spirits being active, they cannot be captured by a passive image or idea. And the absurdity Berkeley is concerned with is not that of *power* apart from will, but any representation via passive idea of that which acts. Secondly, he states that for Berkeley, ideas of sense, imagination and memory are all alike in not depending upon us. Quite apart from whether Berkeley can ultimately keep them separate [1] – his intent as stated in Sections 27–30 is clear – as indeed is the identification of the "other spirit" as God. A reader of the *Journal des Sçavans* might not be tempted to take seriously an author who first claimed that *all* our ideas are aroused in us by another spirit and *not* by our own, and then went on to say that those very same ideas ceased to exist when not perceived by that other spirit *or* our own: i.e. first no ideas depend on us, then some do.

The third paragraph is simply the sentence from Section 1 defining a physical object in terms of sensations.[2] The fourth paragraph begins: " In order to prove a hypothesis which seems so strange, here is how M. Berkeley argues," and certainly *this* version of Berkeley's hypothesis is strange. In all fairness, however, this and the next three expository paragraphs suffer more from being compounded of snippets than from containing outright errors. The first expository paragraph (i.e. his No. 4) traces Berkeley's argument from bare sensations which carry no information about matter or external substance, onto secondary (i.e. sensory) qualities, then his reduction of primary qualities (e.g. extension, movement) to secondary, and finally the learned, rather than innate coordination of the reports of the different

[1] Anita Fritz has argued that he cannot. See her "Berkeley's Self – Its Origin in Malebranche," *Journal of the History of the Ideas*, XV (1954), 554–72.

[2] Cf. *Works* II, 41, lines 13–17.

senses.[1] The second expository paragraph [2] (i.e. No. 5) continues by giving part of Berkeley's argument that neither by sense nor by reason can we know that bodies exist outside of us. Roughly, Berkeley's point is that the senses only yield knowledge of sensations, so that any knowledge we may have of matter is by reason, but since there is no "necessary connexion betwixt [bodies] and our ideas," [*Pr* § 18] as is indicated by dreams and illusions, reason offers us no guarantee. While not sensitive to the sense/reason logical dichotomy here postulated the reviewer does manage to get this argument against matter fairly intelligibly stated.

The third expository paragraph (i.e. No 7) gives Berkeley's rejection of occasionalism [3] – a point which could be expected to arouse interest, for both Malebranche and his philosophy were then alive. The reviewer adds some charm to his account of this rejection by his apparent misreading of a personal "I" for a Roman numeral "I" [*W II*, 71, line 2]. The final expository paragraph [4] takes up the advantages Berkeley claims for his position: "an infinity of difficulties vanish," e.g. "*If matter can think: If it is extended and divisible to infinity: If it can affect spirit: how it can be created from nothing, etc.*" (326) plus a few lines from Berkeley's detailed analysis of scepticism,

> Insofar as men have believed that the objects of their researches exist outside of themselves, it has been impossible for them to be certain what they are. As all their science consisted only in the conformity of their ideas with the nature of things, and as this conformity could be known to them only by means of their sensations, they could have no fixed and assured principle, because they could never be certain of perfect agreement with the exterior objects, the sensations varying incessantly, as when one looks at an object close up or from a distance or through a microscope (326).

However, by giving extracts from the beginning and not the conclusion of Berkeley's analysis [5] – and by omitting his solution, an eighteenth century reader might well agree with Baxter (who saw Berkeley beginning with sceptical arguments and never surpassing them):

[1] This paragraph seems to be very freely drawn from § 18 (*Works* II, 48, lines 16–19), § 9 (p. 44 lines 24–29), plus a long sentence perhaps based on § 8 (p. 44, lines 12–20), and concludes with a line from § 43 (p. 58, lines 30–32).

[2] Drawn very freely from § 18 (*Works* II, 48, lines 26–31); § 19 (p. 49, lines 9–19), and § 20 (p. 49, lines 20–26).

[3] Drawn from § 68, with 69 in mind. (*Works* II, 70, line 31; p. 71, lines 1–7).

[4] Drawn from § 85–7. (*Works* II, 77, lines 27–34; p. 78, lines 18–23; p. 78, line 32–p. 79, line 3). Drawn very freely from § 98 (*Works* II, 83, lines 28–33), § 116 (p. 93, lines 9–23), § 124 (p. 98, lines 29–35), and § 127 (p. 100, lines 12–19).

[5] Berkeley's own analysis runs through § 92.

This is, I think, as if one should advance, that the best way for a woman to silence those, who may attack her reputation, is to turn a common prostitute. [Berkeley] puts us into a way of denying all things, that we may get rid of the absurdity of those who deny some things.[1]

In the omitted portion of his own analysis, Berkeley says: "All this sceptical cant follows, from our supposing a difference between *things* and *ideas*, and that the former have a subsistence without the mind, or unperceived" [*Pr* § 87]. His solution: identify things and ideas – *esse est percipi*. But the paragraph in the review simply ends with Berkeley on time and especially space – including the claim that space is not a separate idea from bodies in motion, and his denial of infinite divisibility.

Having presented four paragraphs of exposition, the review is concluded with a selection from Berkeley's own self-criticisms and replies. They are (1) the problem of intermittency of existence due to intermittency of perception [*Pr* § 45–6]. (2) If extension is in the soul, the soul is extended [*Pr* § 49]. (3) " How is it possible that all men are deceived?" (328) [cf. *Pr* § 54, 56]. (4) "Many mathematical truths would subsist no longer, as of the movement of the earth, which one does not perceive." (329) [cf. *Pr* § 58]. (5) "For what purpose is all this apparent mechanism of planets, this changing of seasons? &c." (329) [cf. *Pr* § 60, 65]. The sixth, inasmuch as it constitutes the end of the review, I quote in full:

Objection. Will the miracles therefore be no more than a changing of ideas? *Response.* The wine of Cana would be no less wine, since it would produce the same effect, and would indicate the same power, infinite and above that of man, *as if it had been real and effective wine.* [my italics]. The miraculous works, although they are only ideal on this hypothesis, have the same effect on our spirit, as if one supposed that they existed outside us. (330) [cf. *Pr* § 84].

A Continental reader interested in discovering the state of philosophy in a world he could not enter – the English-speaking world, would certainly get a distorted picture of Berkeley from this review, although he might not expect distortion in what appears to be a literal extract. Taking the wine of Cana instance: Berkeley was not saying that his *ideal* wine was just as good as *real* wine – rather, the entire *Principles* is a defense of the thesis that the perceived wine *is* the real wine.

The *Journal des Sçavans* reviewer seems to have been impressed

[1] Andrew Baxter, *An Enquiry into the Nature of the Human Soul* (2nd ed.; London: 1737), II, 284. First edition appeared in 1733.

primarily by the negative side of the *Principles*. Ignoring completely the Introduction and the positive arguments of the crucial opening sections of the *Principles*, the statement of the New Principle and the role of God, he is primarily concerned to recount the denial of matter. "Newswise" this is understandable; a straightforward denial of matter might not be expected from the land of Hobbes. But unfortunately, by missing the positive side, the reviewer persists in the assumption, as is clear in the wine of Cana case, that Berkeley is still operating with the standard distinction between appearance and reality.

The Berkeley of this review is holding to the old version of that distinction, namely between ideas and reality, and is opting for ideas because they can be known as against the reality which cannot. Thus a reader of the review might very well brand Berkeley a sceptic or an idealist (or egomist) according to whether he was more impressed with the denial of reality or the affirmation of (subjective) ideas.

The popular work which was to "clarify" the philosophy of the *Principles* appeared in 1713. While it was hardly a best-seller, the *Three Dialogues* did give rise to one excellent piece of criticism – a review which appeared in the opening issue of the *Journal Litéraire*, May-June, 1713.[1] Unlike the vast majority of criticisms published during Berkeley's life, this took him seriously, raised philosophical questions, and avoided ridicule.

While the *JL* reviewer concerned himself with the whole range of the *Three Dialogues*, a brief statement of Berkeley's arguments in the *First Dialogue* might help recall their pattern. It is first agreed between Hylas and Philonous that "sensible things are those only which are immediately perceived by sense" [*W II*, 175]. And Hylas, Berkeley's advocate of matter, begins by assuming that sensible qualities are perceived by us and also exist in objects, e.g. "whatever degree of heat we perceive by sense, we may be sure the same exists in the object that occasions it" [*W II*, 175]. Philonous points out that heat is, however, also a pleasure or pain and so cannot inhere in a senseless substance, but only in a percipient mind – furthermore, variations in perceptions of heat lead us to think it is in the mind and not in an external object in order that we may avoid saying the same thing is both hot and cold. This line of argument is applied against all sensible qualities. For

[1] It is referred to by Jessop in *Works* II, 150 and in his *Bibliography of George Berkeley* (London: 1934), entry 14a. Also by Luce, in his *Life of George Berkeley* (1949), p. 55. The May-June issue of the *Journal Litéraire* was reviewed in the *Journal des Sçavans* (Amsterdam ed.) in December 1713, and its text is reproduced in Appendix C.

example, against the assertion that sensed colors relate to real colors in objects, it is claimed that analogously to heat, perceptual variations due to distance, illusion, magnification, etc., argue for colors not being inherent in external objects.

And so Hylas retreats from saying that sensible qualities have an existence apart from being perceived by a mind, to the (Lockean) position that qualities can be divided into primary and secondary and that the latter have no existence without the mind, whereas the former (i.e., extension, figure, etc.) do. Berkeley now brings his arguments to bear against the privileged status of the primary qualities: extension, for example, being a real property of objects ought not to change without a change in that object – but visible extension does vary, as when we perceive an object with one eye before a magnifying glass and the other unaided, and find one eye reporting the object "great, uneven, and angular," and the other "little, smooth, and round" [*W* II, 189]. Rather than conclude that the object is *really* both of these, had we not better admit that the primary, like the secondary qualities, depend for their existence on a perceiving mind – for indeed in what else could the idea of extension inhere but a mind – certainly not in a material substratum that does not perceive it. And similarly against the other qualities – with a general argument that in any event, we cannot speak (except erroneously in terms of abstract ideas) of primary qualities without an appeal to secondary qualities, and the ideas of the latter being in the mind, so must the former be.

Finally, there are the familiar passages in which the above arguments are extended to "any mixture or combination of qualities, or any sensible object whatever," that is said to exist without the mind, with Philonous triumphant: "You acknowledge then that you cannot possibly conceive, how any one corporeal sensible thing should exist otherwise than in a mind" [*W* II, 200]. The *Dialogue* concludes with Hylas' views having been shown to lead to scepticism – that is, to the denial of the reality of sensible things.

The *JL* reviewer himself begins with a short summary of these arguments. He appreciates, moreover, the critical role played in the argument over the "existence of bodies" by the reduction of primary to secondary qualities, and objects that Berkeley's evidence drawn from sense variations is not sufficient to make out that reduction. The *JL* reviewer objects also to the reduction of extension to idea: Berkeley's argument is held to amount to saying that the idea of extension is an idea, and thus begs the question. He suggests that Berkeley's

argument against matter could be made applicable to his Self. He expresses some concern as to whether, in the strict sense, the non-existence of matter can be demonstrated, inasmuch as knowledge of God's will would seem to be required. The denial of Berkeley's thesis being conceivable, the reviewer's point seems to be that it lacks the absolute necessity of a demonstration. Or put another way, that Berkeley has attempted a demonstration where the appropriate necessity is not to be found, i.e. in the realm of contingent matters of fact, of God's will, rather than in the realm of essences. Finally, he draws some paradoxical conclusions both from the *Third Dialogue* analysis of identity, and the role Berkeley attributes to God in perception, and concludes that Berkeley does not fulfill his claim to restore man to common sense.

Had all Berkeley criticism been as careful and as serious as the *Journal Litéraire* review, the course of Berkeley's star might well have been different. Different in that he might have answered arguments of this order – but unfortunately the bulk of the criticism was better ignored than honored with replies, and as a result the history of philosophy has been deprived of further clarifications. It is not possible, however, to do justice in these survey chapters to the rich variety of material in this review. Accordingly, the third chapter is specifically concerned with a detailed examination of the *Journal Litéraire* material.

This was not, however, the last of the early criticisms of Berkeley, and the balance of this chapter is concerned with a variety of early comments: (I) with a review, of negligible philosophical interest, of the *Three Dialogues* which appeared in *Memoirs of Literature* in 1713 and (II) with a pair of reviews, one of the *Principles* and one of the *Three Dialogues*, which appeared – again in 1713 – in the Jesuit journal, *Mémoires de Trévoux*. This pair was part of a Jesuit attack on Berkeley which linked him with a philosophical label: "Egoism." Accordingly, I have tried to give some indication of the significance for Berkeley's philosophical reputation of this part of the attack by presenting several references to egomism or egoism that appeared during the eighteenth century. For while by themselves this pair of reviews could hardly be considered incisive philosophical criticism, they did influence philosophers and as a result, contributed far beyond their critical merit to Berkeley's reputation as a philosopher.

The review of the *Three Dialogues* in Michael de la Roche's [1]

[1] Michael de la Roche (d. 1731), a French Protestant refugee, edited a series of journals, including *Bibliothèque Angloise*, first 5 vols., (Amsterdam: 1717–), and in London, *Memoirs of Literature* (1710–14; 17), *New Memoirs of Literature* (1725–7), and *A Literary Journal* (1730–1).

Memoirs of Literature appeared in June, 1713.[1] This review, which apparently has gone unnoticed, was also reprinted in the second edition of the *Memoirs*.[2] Expressing, as I shall try to indicate, a combination of incredulity and ridicule, it was hardly calculated to enhance Berkeley's reputation. It begins:

That there is no such Thing, as what Philosophers call Material Substance, *I am seriously persuaded*, says the Author of these Dialogues. Mr. *Berkeley* undertakes to prove this uncommon Opinion, and to shew, as it appears from the Title of his Book, the great Advantages that will arise from it, especially to confute *Scepticks* and *Atheists*. Perhaps the following Passage will be sufficient to give the Readers a general Notion of the Author's Doctrine: It will at least raise their Curiosity, and make them desirous to know, by what Arguments he came to believe that there is no *Material Substance*.

But what passage from the *Three Dialogues* does the editor pick to give a "general Notion" of Berkeley's "Doctrine?" The account of the Mosaic creation in the *Third Dialogue*.[3] Berkeley apparently included his analysis of Chapter I of Genesis partly to answer Lady Percival's query on reading the *Principles:* "If there be nothing but spirit and ideas, what you make of that part of the six days' creation which preceded man." [4] In this section of the *Dialogue*, Berkeley notes that Moses does not speak of a creation of matter in the philosophical sense, but of various things, and as Philonous says:

In common Talk, the Objects of our Senses are not called *Ideas*, but *Things*. Call them so still: provided you do not attribute to them any Absolute, External Existence, and I shall never quarrel with you for a Word.[5]

There are, then, parts of the *Third Dialogue* account of creation which reflect Berkeley's position. Indeed, it is a passage which comes as no surprise to someone who has followed Berkeley's argument through the first two dialogues. But the reader of the review, already suspicious from the introductory paragraph that another propounder of paradox has set pen to paper, would, or so it seems to me, find his suspicions confirmed when the passage intended to give him a "general Notion" concerns itself with whether Moses spoke of the Creation of Ideas or Things. And the air of paradox is made yet more

[1] *Memoirs of Literature* (London) 1713, pp. 157–8.
[2] *Memoirs of Literature* (London) 2nd ed. 1722, Vol. VI, pp. 426–9.
[3] The extract runs from *Works* II, p. 250, line 26 to p. 251, line 14; from p. 251, line 16 to line 22; from p. 251, line 25 to p. 252, line 17; plus p. 256, lines 20–33.
[4] Letter, Percival to Berkeley, 26 Aug. 1710, in Benjamin Rand, *Berkeley and Percival*, p. 81.
[5] From the extract in *Memoirs of Literature* (1713), p. 157. See *Works* II, 251, lines 8–11.

poignant by the very form of the review: the initial paragraph quoted above – then the extract – and not one other comment!

This is not to say Berkeley should have omitted the passage. We are in a position to give several reasons for its inclusion: first, Lady Percival's question; second, a direct consequence of those principles which Berkeley as a Christian and a priest would wish to add; third, Malebranche [1] held that the existence of the material world was known to us only through the revelation of Scripture (i.e. Genesis), and by stating that Moses' account of creation says nothing of external existences, etc., Berkeley may have had Malebranche in mind. But these are reasons which de la Roche's audience, perhaps more literary than philosophical, could hardly have extrapolated from this extract.

Berkeley may or may not have had Malebranche in mind at that point, but certainly one of his most important critics had *both* Berkeley and Malebranche in mind, and in associating these two, had a profound influence on Berkeley's philosophical reputation. I am speaking of Father Tournemine and the other Jesuits who edited the *Mémoires de Trévoux*.[2]

The Jesuits had been engaged in bitter warfare with the Cartesians, particularly with the Malebranchists, over an extended period.[3] While the overall battle lines were themselves clear, it is nevertheless difficult for us to understand either the alliances or the intensity of the hostilities. Cartesianism had early encountered difficulty at Rome, although many of the most distinguished Cartesians were dedicated priests. Furthermore, the efforts to extirpate Jansenism frequently caught up Cartesians. This is hardly surprising since Antoine Arnauld, the brilliant leader of the Jansenist faction, was philosophically close to Cartesianism.

Malebranche was of course also in the Cartesian tradition,[4] but was no Jansenist and tried to show that his philosophy did not support Jansenism. He engaged in a lengthy controversy with Arnauld which,

[1] Cf. Malebranche, *Dialogues on Metaphysics and on Religion.* transl. Morris Ginsberg, (London: 1923), p. 75.

[2] *Mémoires pour l'histoire des sciences & des beaux arts*, (Paris), better known as *Mémoires de Trévoux.*

[3] Cf. Emmy Allard, *Die Angriffe Gegen Descartes Und Malebranche Im Journal De Trévoux: 1701–1715.* (Halle: 1914), in *Abhandlungen Zur Philosophie Und Ihrer Geschichte.* (XLIII). See also Gaston Sortais, "Le Cartésianisme chez les Jésuites Français au XVIIe et au XVIIIe Siècle," *Archives de Philosophie*, VI (1929); Alfred R. Desautels, *Les Mémoires de Trévoux et le mouvement des idées au XVIIIe siècle: 1701–1734* (Rome: 1956); and Gustave Dumas, *Histoire du Journal de Trévoux depuis 1701 jusqu'en 1762* (Paris: 1936).

[4] For a philosophically perceptive account of this period, see Richard A. Watson, *The Downfall of Cartesianism 1673–1712* (The Hague: 1965).

however, did not produce the desired result. Malebranche's theory of Intelligible Extension and the ontological status of this realm of eternal Ideas [1] in relation to God, became the foci of Arnauld's attacks. Without formally accusing Malebranche, Arnauld nevertheless suggested that Malebranche's account was close to Spinoza's.[2] From the 1680's onward Malebranche was forced to devote a great deal of his energy to showing that his position was not Spinozistic.[3] But as we have had occasion to remember in the twentieth century, ideological disclaimers, even when coupled with sound arguments, are not necessarily productive of political victories. And at least in the first quarter of the eighteenth century, the philosophies of Descartes, Arnauld, Malebranche, and Spinoza were thrown together on the losing side.

As a result of this protracted struggle, with its roots in a complex variety of philosophical, theological, religious, political and personal disagreements, the lines were sharply drawn by 1710. Unwittingly, Berkeley stepped, or rather was pushed onto the battlefield – for Tournemine seized upon Berkeley as the *reductio ad absurdum* of those very Malebranchian principles the Jesuits had been fighting. The resultant attack came in three brief encounters, two in 1713, a third in 1718, and the results proved of tremendous consequence for Berkeley's subsequent reputation. The full range of their extensive influences is far beyond the scope of this study, although a few of the post-1733 effects will be noted below.

The first two prongs of the attack came in the form of announcements of Berkeley's *Principles* [4] and *Three Dialogues* [5] in the Nouvelles Littéraires section of the Jesuit journal, *Mémoires de Trévoux*. In May, 1713 two paragraphs were devoted to the *Principles*, both of which contain exceedingly important items. In the first, Berkeley is dubbed the "Malbranchiste de bonne foi" (921) and his *Principles* characterized as follows:

Berkley (sic) ... has pushed without discretion *the principles of his sect* (my italics) greatly beyond common sense, and has concluded that there are

[1] See my "Berkeley and Malebranche on Ideas," *The Modern Schoolman*, XLI (1963), 1–15.

[2] Cf. Henri Gouhier, *La philosophie de Malebranche et son expérience religieuse* (2nd ed.; Paris: 1948), pp. 368f. Martial Gueroult, *Malebranche* (Paris: 1955), I, 159f. Geneviève Rodis-Lewis, *Nicolas Malebranche* (Paris: 1963), esp. pp. 96f.

[3] Malebranche eventually produced a brilliant analysis of Spinoza's "errors." While it has the rare virtue of making Spinoza's metaphysical position intelligible, it is doubtful that Spinoza would have accepted it. See *Correspondance de Malebranche avec J.-J. Dortous de Mairan*, ed. Joseph Moreau (Paris: 1947).

[4] *Mémoires de Trévoux* (1713) pp. 921–2; (May). It is reprinted in Appendix D.

[5] *ibid.*, pp. 2198–9; (December). Reprinted in Appendix E.

neither bodies nor matter, and that spirits alone exist. These spirits are possessed of selves which have the faculty of receiving ideas, of willing and acting, conformably to their ideas and their will. All that we imagine corporeal are only some ideas that another spirit imprints upon us, and which have no existence outside of us, and cease to be when one ceases to perceive them (921–2).

Before turning to the second item in the May announcement, I wish to include the December discussion, inasmuch as it continues the characterization of Berkeley's philosophy.

Mr. Berkley (sic) continues to sustain obstinately *that there are no bodies and that the material world is only an intelligible world;* he crushes the new philosophers through their own principles. I. Extension, he says, has no more existence than the sensible qualities, it is only an idea in our spirit. II. One sees bodies only in God, it is therefore useless for them to exist outside of God. You ask undoubtedly, what then of the creation of which Moses has left us the history? The creation, according to Mr. Berkley, is only the decision that God has taken to imprint upon spirits the ideas of bodies. Has not Mr. Berkley made good use of his meditations, and of his attention to universal reason? (2198–9)

An answer was called for, and as we shall see, several significant voices responded – and given this distorted account, it is understandable that they responded in the negative.

What the Jesuits had in mind in making Berkeley a "leftwing" Malebranchist was that on the question of the "existence of bodies," Berkeley had gone a step beyond the Oratorian by an outright denial of matter, rather than an appeal to the revealed truth contained in Genesis as the sole evidence that matter exists. The Jesuits had a genuine worry here – for to deny matter flies in the face of common sense on the one hand, and on the other, cuts one off from a solid starting point for proofs of God's existence (e.g. cosmological and design arguments). What they seem singularly to have failed to appreciate is that Berkeley was not, as was Malebranche, disdainful of sense experience; one can only imagine Malebranche's reaction on reading, e.g. "Ask the gardener, why he thinks yonder cherry-tree exists in the garden, and he shall tell you, because he sees and feels it ..." [*W* II, 234] or Berkeley's on reading e.g. "Gently, Aristes. Do not consult your senses, and do not judge on the strength of their testimony ..." [1]

In other words, the Jesuits failed to see that Berkeley wants to say that sensible things are the real and the only things and that the

[1] Malebranche, *Dialogues* (Transl. by M. Ginsberg) p. 106.

philosophical notion of matter, far from being "imaginable" turns out to be inconceivable. Nor does Berkeley say that objects cease to exist when not perceived by us – this is an objection explicitly discussed at, e.g. *Principles* 45 ff.

The December review again links Berkeley with Malebranche but not by name. For the reference to "intelligible world" in the first sentence, as well as to the "new philosophers," and finally the question of "good use of his meditations" and "of his attention to universal reason," are all allusions to the Malebranchists.[1] Two points are given as instances of the extremity of Berkeley's position. The first, the denial of "real" extension in favor of sensible, is correct and a contemporary reader might more readily have associated it with Bayle than with Malebranche. The second, – "seeing all things in God" is Malebranchian enough, but is specifically denied by Berkeley in Malebranche's sense in the *Second Dialogue* [*W* II, 213 ff]. The question of Berkeley on the Mosaic creation, and the part Malebranche may have played in its inclusion in the *Third Dialogue* has already been mentioned in discussing the *Memoirs of Literature* review.

Actually, the May announcement was to become far and away the more important of the two. For not only did its first paragraph call Berkeley the "Malbranchiste de bonne foi," speak of his "sect," and do violence to his philosophy, but the second paragraph precipitated a discussion which continues down to the present.[2]

> One of us knew in Paris a Malbranchist who goes further than Mr. Berkley, he has maintained, very seriously, in a long dispute, that it is very probable that he may be the only created being who exists, and that not only are there no bodies, but there is no other created spirit besides his own; it is for those who believe that *we see only an intelligible world* [i.e. the Malebranchists] to prove that their principles are being carried too far (922).

The discussion revolves around the identity (and even the existence) of this solipsist – or as he was soon to be known, *egomist* or *egoist* of Paris. Unfortunately, the fact that the Jesuits coupled Berkeley with their report of the presence in Paris of this character, led to Berkeley

[1] Cf. *ibid.*, p. 140.

[2] See, for example, Lewis Robinson, "Un solipsiste au XVIIIe siècle," *L'Année philosophique*, XXIV (1913), 15–30; Emmy Allard, *op. cit.*; Robinson, "Le 'cógito' cartésien et l'origine de l'idéalisme moderne," *Revue Philosophique*, CXXIII (1937), 315 ff.; Anita Fritz, "Malebranche and the Immaterialism of Berkeley," *Review of Metaphysics*, III (1949), 74–5; Chastaing, "L'abbé de Lanion et le problème cartésien de la connaissance d'autrui," *Revue Philosophique*, CXLI (1951), 232; J. Larguier des Bancels, "Sur un malebranchiste peu connu," *Revue Philosophique*, CXLI (1951), 566; Chastaing, "Berkeley, défenseur du sens commun ..." *Revue Philosophique*, CXLIII (1953), esp. 230 ff.

being associated with this extremist position. There are a good many references in the eighteenth century to *egomism* and to a sect of *egoists* in Paris, all of which derive [1] from this brief announcement of Berkeley's *Principles* in the *Mémoires de Trévoux* for May, 1713.

One early reference is to be found in Christian Wolff, a follower of Leibniz and studied by Kant, who speaks (1720) of there being a "Sect of Egoists" in Paris who "deny the existence of all things but admit the Ego (das Ich)" [2] and he classifies them as "idealists." [3] In the Preface (dated 1721) to the second edition he adds this schema: philosophers are classed as Sceptics/Dogmatists, then the latter into Dualists/Monists, and the latter into Materialists/Idealists, and finally, the Idealists into Pluralists and Egoists. But while the *Mémoires de Trévoux* announcement of Berkeley's *Principles* probably gave rise to the *Egoist* subclassification, Wolff seems not actually to have labelled Berkeley until his *Psychologia Rationalis*, 1734, when he wrote: "Idealists are those who allow only an ideal existence of bodies in our minds, and thus deny the real existence of the world and of bodies. Among the idealists George Berkeley ... has fairly recently declared himself in Three Dialogues ... 1713" [§36, p. 25].[4] According to Chastaing,[5] Wolff thereby became the first to call Berkeley an idealist.

Christoph Matthaeus Pfaff, whose *De Egoismo* Leroy [6] takes as summing up early continental reaction to Berkeley, may be more deserving of the dubious honor of first calling Berkeley an idealist than Wolff. For by admittedly taking over Wolff's classifications,[7] it was a simple task to place Berkeley, along with Arthur Collier,[8]

[1] At least so Lewis Robinson has claimed. The point of his contention is that no later discussion contains any more factual content than is in this brief piece, or its systematic treatment by Wolff and Pfaff. See Robinson, "Un solopsiste ..." *L'Année philosophique*, XXIV (1913), 15–16, See also his "Le 'cógito' cartésien ..." *Revue Philosophique*, CXXIII (1937), 318.

[2] Wolff, *Vernünftige Gedanken von Gott, der Welt und der Seele des Menschen* (Halle: 1720), § 2. (The Preface is dated Dec. 23, 1719).

[3] *ibid.*, § 944.

[4] I am indebted to Professor Jessop for providing me with this passage.

[5] Chastaing, "Berkeley, défenseur du sens commun ..." *Revue Philosophique*, CXLIII (1953), 221n. See also André Leroy, "Influence de la philosophie Berkeleyenne sur la pensée continentale." *Hermathena*, LXXXII (1953), 29n. Berkeley is also called *idealist* in the *Bibliothèque Italique*, XIII (1732), (review of the Italian translation of the *New Theory of Vision*), cf. p. 184.

[6] Leroy, *op. cit.*, p. 28. Pfaff's short Latin work, *Oratio de Egoismo, nova philosophica haeresi* (Tübingen: 1722), was an academic address.

[7] The Wolffian classification schema is quoted, and Pfaff's *De Egoismo* is cited, by J. A. Fabricius in his *Delectus argumentorum et syllabus scriptorum qui veritatem religionis christianae* ... (Hamburg: 1725), p. 482. J. F. Reimmann also discusses the Paris Egoists on the basis of Wolff's comments in his *Historia universalis atheismi et atheorum* ... (Hildesiae: 1725), p. 427.

[8] Arthur Collier, author of *Clavis Universalis: or, a New Inquiry after Truth. Being a Demonstration of the Non-Existence, or Impossibility, of an External World* (London: 1713). An extract

among the idealists. Further harm was done Berkeley by making him a prime target in an attack on the "new philosophical heresy," *Egoism*, and by linking the arguments of these "idealists," these disciples of Malebranche – the "Prince of fanatic philosophers of our time" – with the arguments of the sceptics, particularly with the arguments (against the reality of extension) in Pierre Bayle's *Dictionaire Historique et Critique*, article *Zeno d'Elée*. In so doing, Pfaff may possibly earn a second "first," that of attributing scepticism to Berkeley. Pfaff's final blow, a thumb-nail sketch of Berkeley's philosophy, is thus almost anti-climactical:

> And in Ireland, George Berkeley published at Dublin, in the tenth year of this century, a treatise in the English language on the *Principles of Human Knowledge*, and three years later at London, *Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous*, where he concerned himself almost entirely to prove that bodies [corpora] neither are nor can be given; that only spirits exist; and that what we call bodies are nothing but ideas which can have no existence apart from the spirits which have them. These are the very words of the author, and he adds that this is the only principle whose affirmation can silence atheists and sceptics and bring men back to common sense. The one who defends this paradox of *Idealism* in England is Arthur Collier . . .[1]

How are we to account for this distorted picture? One answer is supplied by Pfaff himself, for his footnotes refer neither to the *Principles* nor *Three Dialogues*, but to four articles – which turn out to be the two previously discussed, i.e. in the *Journal des Sçavans* (1711), and in the *Journal Litéraire* (1713), plus two from *Mémoires de Trévoux* for 1713!

In the light of the trouble Pfaff takes to refer to these four reviews,

of *Clavis* in *Acta Eruditorum* (Leipzig) 1717, had already linked Collier with Berkeley. "These are the paradoxes of our Author [i.e. Collier], which doubtless will be received with no more approbation than those, which to the same import, though with different arguments, a contemporary of his, George Berkeley, attempted to defend in 'Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous,' " cited in Introduction to *Clavis Universalis*, ed. by Ethel Bowman, (Chicago: 1909) p. xi. Collier makes a brief reference to Berkeley's *Three Dialogues* in his *Specimen of true philosophy* . . . (1730).

Pfaff was not the last to associate Berkeley and Collier. In 1756, Joh. Christ. Eschenbach published his *Samlung der vornehmsten Schriftsteller die die Würklichkeit ihres eignen Körpers und der ganzen Körperwelt läugnen* . . . (Rostock: 1756), a translation and attack on *Clavis* and *Three Dialogues*. He continually calls Berkeley an idealist and speaks frequently in terms of Wolff's classifications (including Egoists). The question of this work's influence on Kant has been taken up by Ethel Bowman, in the Introduction to *Clavis*, as well as by A. O. Lovejoy, "Kant and the English Platonists," in *Essays Philosophical and Psychological in Honor of William James* (New York: 1908) esp. pp. 281ff.; by Lewis Robinson, "Contributions à l'histoire de l'evolution philosophique de Kant," *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*, XXXI (1924), 309 ff; and more recently by Colin M. Turbayne, "Kant's Refutation of Dogmatic Idealism," *Philosophical Quarterly*, V (1955), 225–244.

[1] Pfaff, *Oratio* . . ., pp. 17–18. I wish to thank the Bibliothèque Nationale for making available a microfilm of the text in their possession.

and his omission of all quotations from the original texts, one is tempted to think that he never read a line of Berkeley. For example, there is no mention of God's role in Berkeley's philosophy. But Pfaff could well have concluded on reading the discussions in the *Journal des Sçavans* and *Mémoires de Trévoux* (May) that Berkeley held that bodies were only ideas incapable of existing independently of the spirits which have them. Furthermore, given his acquaintance with the *JL* reviewer's criticism that Berkeley's attack on matter is applicable to the Self – Pfaff might be said to be justified in placing Berkeley in Wolff's category of Egoist.

The Jesuits were using Berkeley as ammunition material in their war with the Malebranchists, but by portraying him as an example of the incredible consequences which ultimately flow from Malebranchian principles, and by linking him and his "sect" with someone who goes "even further," they made possible Wolff's talk of a "sect of egoists" in Paris – and thus his new sub-class of Idealists: Egoists. Whereupon Pfaff, taking the reports at face value, is aghast at the frightful results Malebranche seems to be producing – and takes up arms against this new "sect," now including Berkeley. The Jesuit tactics were obviously a success: they brought new troops into the fight against Malebranche, and helped immobilize Berkeley philosophically for several decades.

To digress for a moment, the *idealist* label carried through the century and was eternally attached to Berkeley by Kant. The charge of *sceptic* was frequently repeated, e.g. by Baxter, Hume, Reid and Beattie. The egomist tag had an interesting history. When the great *Encyclopédie* of Diderot, D'Alembert, *et al.* appeared in the 1750's, the seeds sown in 1713 and nurtured by Pfaff, had born fruit – for under article *Egoïsme* one reads "... Pyrrhonism pushed as far as it can go. Berkley (sic) among the moderns has tried his best to establish it. *Voyez Corps.*" [1] Under article *Egoïsme* in the (Jesuit) *Dictionnaire de Trévoux* one is referred to *Egomet:* "... Berkeley has tried his best to establish an opinion as extravagant." [2] But one need not go that far into the century – Père Claude Buffier, S. J., notes (1725):

a Scotch [!] writer has published, it is said, a work to prove that he has no evidence for the existence of any other being than of himself and only of

[1] *Encyclopédie* (Paris: 1755), V, 431b. With reference to Berkeley and art. 'Corps,' see Chapter IV. Other connections between Berkeley and the Encyclopedists are discussed by Leroy, *op. cit.*, p. 30 ff.

[2] *Dictionnaire de Trévoux*, new ed., (Paris: 1771), III, 599b.

himself as *spirit*, but not of himself as *body*, not having any genuine demonstration of the existence of any body. Do you believe, said Téandre, that the Scotch writer has found any sectaries *de bonne foi?* (my italics) [1]

The Chevalier Andrew Michael Ramsay, Scottish-born secretary to Archbishop Fénelon, gave a definition of *egomism* in 1727: "a species of insane Pyrrhonism ... where each believes himself the only existent being ..." [2] About this Andrew Baxter commented (1733): "Dean *Berkeley*, I think, is not far from owning this." [3] Baxter's fellow countryman, Thomas Reid, also suggests that in Berkeley's system one is "left alone ... in that forlorn state of egoism." [4] His editor, Sir William Hamilton, has doubts, however, about the existence of the sect of Egoists and refers to Ramsay, Buffier and to the *Mémoires de Trévoux* announcement of 1713.

In this chapter we have examined several early reviews of Berkeley which recount, with varying degrees of accuracy, his philosophy. But we have also pointed out, in the opening paragraphs, that Berkeley was plagued extensively by ridicule, and that at least three of his defenders, i.e. Percival, Voltaire and Saint-Hyacinthe, made *non-philosophical* defenses. The difficulty, Percival reported, was that people simply would not examine the arguments, and he himself admits speaking out on Berkeley's behalf without having read the texts.

The *Journal des Sçavans* and the *Journal Litéraire* reviewers obviously read Berkeley. It is considerably less evident in the case of the two Jesuit articles of 1713. The Jesuits were motivated, I have suggested, by something more than mere academic interest in the text of the *Principles* when they attacked Berkeley; they characterized Berkeley with an eye on their fight with Malebranche rather than on the Berkeleian writings.

But by the time of Pfaff (1722), Berkeley is an *Egoist* and a *Sceptic* – yet none of the five reviews that had appeared by 1713 contains any such accusations. If these early reviews make no such explicit charges,

[1] Buffier, *Oeuvres Philosophiques* (Paris: 1853), p. 292. This passage is from his *Eléments de Métaphysique*, which the Catalogue of the Bibliothèque Nationale indicates was first published in 1725. For a detailed discussion of Buffier's philosophy and its considerable influence, see Juan A. Ventosa Aguilar. *El Sentido Común En Las Obras Filosóficas Del P. Claude Buffier, S. I.* (Barcelona: 1957). The cited passage is discussed at p. 57 f.

[2] Andrew Michael Ramsay. *Les Voyages de Cyrus, avec un Discours sur la Mythologie* (Paris: 1727), II, 90, in the *Discours* section. An English translation appeared the same year.

[3] Baxter, *Enquiry*, II, 280 and 280n.

[4] *The Works of Thomas Reid, D.D.* 8th ed., ed. by Sir Wm. Hamilton (Edinburgh: 1895), I, 285 (Essay on Int. Powers II, chap. x). See also p. 269 (Essay II, chap. viii) where Reid mentions the Egoists as disciples of Descartes and Hamilton adds a lengthy footnote. See also p. 293 (Essay II, chap. xii) and Vol. II, note Y.

if for example both the *Journal des Sçavans* and *Journal Litéraire* reviews could present their extracts without calling Berkeley a sceptic or solipsist – what gave rise to the labels? The answer, I suggest lies more with these reviews than with Berkeley himself. I do not mean that a serious reader could never call Berkeley, for example, a sceptic – but again it is worth noting that there are five early reviews in which he is *not* called one.

A clue is that there are features of these reviews which might very well lead *their* readers to make charges which a reader of the original text might be less tempted to make. Thus a reader of the *JL* reviewer's concern over what he takes to be Berkeley's denial of the substance/attribute distinction or the reduction of the primary to secondary qualities might take Berkeley as a sceptic – but the reviewer did not!

Take Pfaff for example: he calls Berkeley an *Egoist* in a carefully documented piece which, as we noted, refers to four of these reviews but never to the original texts. As a reader of the *Journal des Sçavans* extract, he would have found Berkeley denying matter and reducing all external reality to mere ideas in a mind (no references to God). In the May *Mémoires de Trévoux* item, he again would not have been enlightened on the place of God in Berkeley's philosophy and again would have found the material world reduced to ideas "which have no existence outside of us, and cease to be when one ceases to perceive them." And since the Jesuits link Berkeley with the Paris solipsist (but carefully avoid actually so labelling him), it is understandable that Pfaff – already equipped with the Wolffian *egoist* classification, so categorizes Berkeley.

In calling Berkeley a *sceptic*, he again may have had in mind the *Journal des Sçavans* extract, with its (understandable) concern over the denial of matter, and the unfortunate misstatement of the wine of Cana discussion which makes Berkeley sound as though his *ideal* wine was as good as *real*. More important, he saw the attack on real extension, which also appeared in the December *Mémoires de Trévoux* review and the *Journal Litéraire* and he found it patterned on Pierre Bayle's *Dictionary* article "Zeno" (which it very likely was) and so concluded it was thoroughly sceptical (which it was not intended to be). Pfaff could hardly have known that, however, for Berkeley's resolution of scepticism hardly finds its way into these reviews.

Percival reported from London in 1710, as we have already seen, that the London wits were *talking* about Berkeley's arguments – but

few apparently troubled to *read* them – and the correspondence of this period reveals Berkeley repeatedly trying to find out what was so "obviously" wrong with his arguments. "'Tis incredible what prejudices can work on the best geniuses . . ." was Percival's wise appraisal of Berkeley's problem in microcosm. There were serious philosophical questions to be raised about the philosophy of the *Principles*, but the one attempt to raise them (the *Journal Litéraire*) clearly did not set the style. Rather, what seems to have happened is that the thumb-nail sketches in the *Journal des Sçavans* and the Jesuit journal, served the world at large as sources of Berkeley's views, just as a few wise sayings sufficed in the London drawing rooms frequented by Percival – for by 1722 we find these reviews blandly accepted as genuine characterizations of the philosophy of the *Principles* by a man of considerable stature in his day. In this and similar ways, their influence helped shape Berkeley's philosophical reputation for decades to come among that large segment of the interested public who refused to read the primary sources.

In the next chapter I wish to resume this survey of early discussions of Berkeley: first, I shall take up the third of the Jesuit attacks plus some of its consequences; second, Berkeley's early reception in Scotland and America; third, discussion of his views in Ephraim Chambers' *Cyclopaedia;* and fourth, Andrew Baxter's full-dress criticism of 1733.

CHAPTER II

A CONTINUATION

The third phase of the Jesuit attack on Berkeley came in 1718 in a Preface by Father Tournemine to Fénelon's *Traité de l'existence et des attributs de Dieu.*[1] Fénelon, Archbishop of Cambrai, was a major figure in French literary, philosophical, political, and religious life, whose influence throughout the eighteenth century was considerable. Despite rather heterodox theological opinions and mystical proclivities (Quietism) [2] that, along with the case of his friend, Mme. Guyon, led to Papal condemnation at the turn of the century, the Jesuits remained his allies. Of the connection between Fénelon and the Jesuits, Père André, a disciple of Malebranche noted: "the prelate had need of them in order to reinstate himself, the Jesuits had no less need of the prelate to maintain themselves." [3]

Whatever the background of the connection, it was as a result of it that the 1712 publication of Fénelon's *Démonstration de l'existence de Dieu* [4] aroused Tournemine to action. From the second edition (1713) onward, Tournemine's *Réflexions sur L'Atheisme* appeared as a Preface, "correcting," as Cherel put it, "and attenuating the Malebranchianism of Fénelon." [5] It was not easy. Fénelon ran his proofs for God along

[1] François de Salignac de La Mothe Fénelon, *Oeuvres Philosophiques* (Paris: 1718).

[2] Curiously enough, this aspect of Fénelon later interested Berkeley's wife. See Luce, *Life of George Berkeley* (London: 1949), p. 111. Furthermore, the translation of some of Fénelon's essays has been attributed to a Bp. Barclay. See Jessop, *Bibliography*, entry 59 *bis*.

[3] André is cited by Albert Cherel, *Fénelon au XVIIIe Siècle* (Paris: 1917), p. 21n from Blampignon, *Vie de Malebranche*, p. 356–362. André, himself a member of the Society of Jesus, was the author of a *Vie du R. P. Malebranche*. His devoted attachment to Malebranche and his cause cost André a term in the Bastille. The persecution he suffered at the hands of his fellow-Jesuits was truly extraordinary. See the Introduction by Victor Cousin to *Oeuvres philosophiques du Père André*, ed. Victor Cousin (Paris: 1843). For further references to André see Gregor Sebba, *Nicolas Malebranche: A Preliminary Bibliography* (Athens, Georgia: 1959).

[4] Following the publication of the English translation of the *Démonstration* (1713) an article appeared in the *Guardian* which has been attributed to Berkeley, see e.g. Fraser, *Works of George Berkeley*, (Oxford: 1901), IV, 166 ff. Luce rejects Berkeley's authorship, see *Works* VII, 174.

[5] Cherel, *Fénelon*, p. 29.

two lines: for the mediocre thinkers, proofs from God's works; for the wise, metaphysical proofs. These all turned out to be not only Cartesian but Malebranchian in content. Tournemine grasped the nettle: Fénelon was simply using their principles so as to refute them![1] This, however, amounted to imputing atheism to Malebranche, and the Oratorian reacted immediately – but to no serious avail:[2] the Preface was not retracted. In 1718 Ramsay published Fénelon's *Oeuvres Philosophiques* which presented the *Démonstration* as the first of a two part *Traité de l'existence et des attributs de Dieu.* The second part, appearing then for the first time, was designed to expound the metaphysical proofs of God's existence, and so there were more passages displeasing to the Jesuits. Fénelon's "Refutation of Spinoza" was included in the second part, however, and afforded Tournemine an opportunity to attack Spinozism. The justification for Fénelon's Malebranchianism in the first part, applied as well to the second, but nevertheless Tournemine saw fit to append a new section to his *Réflexions:*[3] "The Atheism of the Immaterialists Refuted."

Thus the third phase of the Jesuit attack accuses the Immaterialists of Atheism – and the *only* one named in the section is Berkeley![4] There is no question but that Malebranche is the real target – as he had been in the other two cases (i.e. in *Mémoires de Trévoux*, 1713), but once again, the visible one is Berkeley. Although the criticism runs several pages, I shall give enough of it to make clear both its intent and flavor:[5]

> ... A philosophy directly opposite to this system [Spinoza's], has been taking its place for some years past. The English book of one Berkey [sic], has published these new attempts at incredulity. The blasphemous of this sect say not that all is matter; they say all is spirit.

[1] See Part IV of Tournemine's *Réflexions.* While there are metaphysical similarities between Fénelon and Malebranche, there were also major disagreements on matters of theology, etc.

[2] See Cherel, *Fénelon*, p. 21 and 21n. Fénelon, he notes, apparently never received his formal complaint. Negotiations were handled by Cardinal de Polignac through whom Fénelon disavowed the Preface. Tournemine then wrote Malebranche "a letter of apology" but was far from repentant in remarks addressed to Malebranche on this subject in *Mémoires de Trévoux*, November, 1713.

[3] My thanks to M. P. Josserand, Conservateur en Chef du Départment des Imprimés, Bibliothèque Nationale, for examining the texts and informing me that this section appeared in the 1718 edition for the first time.

[4] The existence of this section has been noted by Cherel, *Fénelon*, p. 81, and by Lewis Robinson, "Le 'cógito' cartésien et l'origine de l'idéalisme moderne," *Revue Philosophique*, CXXIII (1937), 319, although Robinson gives its date as 1713.

[5] This is largely drawn from the translation, *A Demonstration of the Existence and Attributes of God* ... (Harrisburg: 1811), pp. 260–263, as corrected against the text in Fénelon, *Oeuvres Philosophiques* (Amsterdam: 1731), pp. 364–8. The section appears in Appendix F.

Everything we perceive in and of the world; our houses, bodies, food, etc., are without reality, they are but

phantoms that our own mind has framed, or rather, which spring up in us by the natural necessity that has caused us to be born ... We are as much a machine as when we were supposed to be nothing but matter. Wickedness flatters itself with being delivered by this new system, from all duty and remorse: to have stripped the true philosophers of all the means of proving the existence of God, and lastly, to have settled themselves in a repose that nothing can disturb ...

One of these philosophers maintained to me very seriously that it might be the case that there was no one in the world but himself, and that he was the only being. Thus the more relations there are, the more duties. In this system our knowledge has no solidity, we deal only with feigned spectres, fantastic pictures without truth, without objects ...

After all, this system, however pernicious it may appear to be, will not do any great harm. The love of novelty, the corruption of the heart, will make these philosophers be listened to, perhaps with some pleasure: but they will persuade no one, they will not even persuade themselves. There is no reason to fear for the truth of God's existence, if one cannot destroy it until he shall have convinced people that what they see, what they touch, does not exist; that they have no bodies, and that they are continually dreaming. They will certainly look upon the Immaterialists as upon the man, who imagining himself to be made of glass,[1] was every moment afraid of being broken; and truly the folly of the Immaterialists differs not from this man's except in that it is more extravagant, although voluntary. No, let no one fear that these wild speculations will prevail against common sense. Formally, to confute these visions would be to show too great a distrust of human reason; we will only make a few reflections which will fully expose the ridiculousness of this new philosophy.

Let us inquire at the outset, what is its foundation? Is it built upon any certain principle, upon any inward sentiment, upon any experience? No. It is founded purely upon conjectures against common sense, upon chimerical suppositions, upon possibilities, at least doubtful. Are these solid foundations? ...

Indeed the unbelievers would make us believe things more incredible than all mysteries.

Poor Berkeley! He is accused of denying reality to the world around us, of making each spirit discrete – and hence virtually solipsistic. He

[1] [The "man of glass" was apparently a "stock character" of the age. Prof. Henry Van Leeuwen has found one in Joseph Glanvill's *Vanity of Dogmatizing* (1661), chap. xi, and also in Henry More, *Enthusiasmus Triumphatus*, (London: 1656), § 14; Descartes, *Méditations* I; Thomas Reid, *Inquiry*, chap. v, § 7, Hamilton ed. of *Philosophical Works*, Vol. I, p. 127. Jean P. de Crousaz, *Examen du Pyrrhonisme* (La Haye: 1733), p. 13a: "A theologian believes himself a bottle, and in spite of this brain derangement, continues to instruct his disciples, and instruct them well: only he warns them, when they approach too near him, to be careful not to break him."]

thus breaks all bonds of men with their fellows and their God, thereby shattering all ties of moral obligation. Furthermore, the attempt to deny reality to ourselves and the world is part of his attempt to deny the reality of the grounds for the proof of God's existence. Fortunately, there is no danger from this most ridiculous of all possibilities – Tournemine points out. For not only is Berkeleian atheism grounded on absurdities but also, Tournemine indicates elsewhere in Section VII, even granted the Immaterialistic Atheistic thesis, Berkeley *et al.* still cannot "avoid the proof of the existence of God, drawn from the excellency of His works ... these demonstrative arguments for His existence, I find them in my thoughts."

Surely this final attack was the most intemperate of the three – so much so that it is hard to believe Tournemine ever read a line of Berkeley. His criticism that for Immaterialists one is a machine, albeit spiritual, is directed at Malebranchists. Yet this was one of the points on which Berkeley strove to distinguish his position from the Oratorian's.[1] *If* he did not read Berkeley, and *if* he relied on the *Journal des Sçavans* (1711) "abstract" from the *Principles*, Tournemine might have concluded on reading there that all ideas of imagination, sense and memory were alike forced upon us by another spirit, that this was as mechanistic as any materialistic theory. And of course that review also took Berkeley to be denying the reality of things in preference to their ideality, as we have noted.

Tournemine's attack on Immaterialism received two paragraphs in a review of Fénelon in *L'Europe Savante* for April, 1719.[2]

> According to [Berkey (sic)] all is spirit; the world is only a compound of thinking beings; all that we think we see and feel as corporeal is only a phantom that is fabricated by our spirit, or rather, which arises in us by the natural necessity that has caused us to be born.
>
> Father Tournemine replies that this system is based only on pure suppositions; that it is not contrary to the existence of God; the ideas that we have of the world can not have their origin in a spirit such as ours, and besides our soul bears indelible marks of its Author. Finally, if these thinking

[1] See for example *Philosophical Commentaries* entry 548, also the *Second Dialogue*, *Works* II, 213 ff. For a careful discussion of several points on which Berkeley differed from Malebranche, see Anita D. Fritz, "Berkeley's Self-Its Origin in Malebranche," *Journal of the History of Ideas*, XV (1954), 554–572, as well as A. A. Luce, *Berkeley and Malebranche* (London: 1934).

[2] *Europe Savante* (La Haye), 1719. Review ran from p. 163–190; Berkeley reference on p. 189–190. A highly respected but shortlived journal, it numbered several Anglophiles on its staff, including Juste Van Effen and Thémiseul de Saint-Hyacinthe (Pseud. of Hyacinthe Cordonnier) who had both been on the *Journal Litéraire*, co-translators of several English works by Swift and Defoe, and both members of the Royal Society of London.

beings are not eternal, it is necessary to seek a first cause: if they are, how is it they have been for an eternity in a sort of Death? "Indeed, the unbelievers would make us believe things more incredible than the mysteries."

How extensively these criticisms damaged Berkeley I do not know,[1] but since Fénelon's *Oeuvres Philosophiques* were reprinted almost annually,[2] it is hard to imagine it did him much good!

It is interesting to note parenthetically that even in later years (even when they read the texts in question!) the Jesuits displayed considerable animosity towards Berkeley. The review in the *Mémoires de Trévoux* [3] of the French translation of *Alciphron* objects that Berkeley introduces many new atheistic arguments under the pretext of refuting them. Insofar as they are refuted at all, the answers are weak – but then, what else could one expect from a Protestant. The French translation [4] of the *Three Dialogues* received a full-length review in the *Mémoires de Trévoux*.[5] Berkeley's seriousness and subtlety are praised and his paradoxical conclusions condemned. The review follows the course of the *Dialogues*, notes in particular the comments on Malebranche (Second Dialogue), and offers a proof for the existence of "bodies in general" drawn from God's not deceiving us, for those who may have been seduced by the dialectics. However, the second paragraph of the review begins:

From the first reading of this work, it seemed to us that M. Berkeley had another plan from the one announced; what was only a suspicion became a certitude as a result of a literary anecdote that we know with certainty. M. Coste, translator of Locke's *Essay concerning Human Understanding*, said one time to a man well known to the Republic of Letters, that he had it from M. Berkeley himself, that he had only written this work in order to expose the absurd and ridiculous consequences which follow from the doctrine of Malebranche.[6]

[1] Robert Clayton, Bishop of Clogher, could write: "The Opinion of *Spinosa* was, that there is no other *Substance* in Nature but God: That Modes cannot subsist, or be conceived, without a Substance: That there is nothing in Nature but Modes and Substances: And that therefore every Thing must be conceived as subsisting in God.

"Which Opinion, with some few Alterations, hath been embraced and cultivated, by *P. Malbranche* and *Bishop Berkeley*." in *An Essay on Spirit* (London: 1751), p. 1–2. Clayton and Berkeley had been associated on the Bermuda project. See *Works* IX, 73 and *Philosophical Commentaries* p. 459.

[2] Cf. Cherel, *Fénelon*, p. 258.

[3] *Mémoires de Trévoux* (1745), pp. 760–64.

[4] Cf. *Works* II, 149, or Jessop. *Bibliography*, entry 62.

[5] *Mémoires de Trévoux* (1750), pp. 675–690.

[6] *ibid.*, pp. 676–7.

There is one final *possible* influence of the Jesuit attack on Berkeley to which I wish to allude because of its importance. The question arises – was the Jesuit attack an influence on David Hume? The broader question of Berkeley's influence on Hume is always a bit haunting, because on the one hand Hume is traditionally the Third Man of British Empiricism, and on the other, three footnotes [1] constitute his total acknowledgements to his traditional precursor: an amusing reference to *Alciphron* (no quotation), a passing reference to the attack on abstract ideas (no quotation), and most famous, an accusation of scepticism (no quotation). This broader question is, however, greatly beyond the scope of this study, and I mention it here simply because it is the background against which we may see our immediate problem.[2]

First of all, one may speculate on what Hume talked about with the Jesuits during his stay at La Flèche (1735–37)[3] and suggest that he talked over their war with Malebranche and his Irish disciple. A little less far-fetched speculation might concern the Chevalier Ramsay. For Ramsay received the young Scot on his arrival in Paris. And, or so the speculation might run, during the days Hume accepted the Chevalier's hospitality, they may have talked of Fénelon's philosophical works – of which Ramsay was editor. Hume and Ramsay may even have talked of Fénelon's proofs for the existence of God and the *Réflexions* of Tournemine, perhaps even insofar as they concerned an English-speaking writer, "un certain Berkey." Ramsay, after all, had been editor of the first edition of Fénelon's *Oeuvres Philosophiques* (1718), the edition which first carried Tournemine's attack – and his common interest with Tournemine in maintaining Fénelon's reputation, put them on close terms.

What makes this line of speculation a *little less* farfetched is the fact

[1] (a) Hume, "Of National Characters" Essay 21 in *Essays, Moral, Political and Literary* (1748); (b) *Treatise of Human Nature* (1739), Bk. I, Pt. I, chap. vii; (c) *Enquiry concerning Human Understanding* (1748), § XII, Pt. I.

[2] However, see Philip P. Wiener, "Did Hume Ever Read Berkeley?" *Journal of Philosophy*, LVI (1959), 533–5; LVIII (1961), 207–9; LVIII (1961), 327–8. R. H. Popkin, "Did Hume Ever Read Berkeley?" *Journal of Philosophy*, LVI (1959), 535–45; Bracken, "Locke-Berkeley-Hume: The End of a Triumvirate," *Indian Journal of Philosophy*, III (1961), 1–8. On the philosophical disparity between Berkeley and Hume see Antony Flew, "Did Hume Ever Read Berkeley?" *Journal of Philosophy*, LVIII (1961), 50–1. For further elaboration of the historical question, see Popkin, "So, Hume Did Read Berkeley," *Journal of Philosophy*, LXI (1964), 773–8. Popkin cites a letter from Hume to Michael Ramsay (Chevalier Ramsay's cousin) recently discovered in Cracow and published by Tadeusz Kozanecki in *Archiwum Historii Filozofii i Myśli Spolecznej*, IX (1963). (*Religie Racjonalne. Studia z filozofii religii xv-xvii w*), 127–141.

[3] For Hume's trip to France and his relationships with Ramsay, cf. Ernest C. Mossner, *The Life of David Hume* (Austin: 1954), esp. chap. viii.

that Hume read Fénelon. Mossner, in his *Life of David Hume* quotes three memoranda which he attributes to Fénelon's "*Traité de l'existence et des attributs de Dieu* (1713)." [1] The third of the memoranda which Hume himself attributes to Fénelon, reads:

> Three Proofs for the Existence of a God. 1. something necessarily existent, & what is so is infinitely perfect. 2. The Idea of Infinite must come from an infinite Being. 3. The Idea of Infinite Perfection implys that of actual Existence. [Fénelon]

These arguments did not, however, appear in the 1713 edition of the *Démonstration;* these metaphysical proofs for the existence of God did not appear until the complete *Traité* appeared, and that was in 1718, in Ramsay's edition of *Oeuvres Philosophiques*, along with Tournemine's *Réflexions*. It is extremely probable that Hume drew these memoranda from an edition of Fénelon which contained Tournemine's "Refutation of the Atheism of the Immaterialists."

And so we not only have another possible influence of the Jesuit attack – we may also have a clue to Hume's somewhat mysterious relation to Berkeley, which we shall leave at that – for "Hume and Berkeley" is not our topic. In the first chapter, however, the two Jesuit attacks of 1713 were presented and it was suggested that they served as a source for Berkeley's views and that as a result the distortions they contained became identified with Berkeley himself. This suggestion already puts us in a somewhat better position to appreciate why the picture drawn of Berkeley in the eighteenth century seems different from that which he drew of himself. This third attack, like the others in being distorted, had the advantage of gaining especially wide currency – thanks to Fénelon – and so must be considered as still another important building-block in Berkeley's reputation, regardless of whether it influenced Hume.

Berkeley's early reception was not wholly dependent on the Jesuits, though their contribution was significant. For he got hearings in Scotland and America during the "doldrum decades" which were apparently a good deal more sincere than those in France. Accordingly, the balance of this chapter is concerned with: (I) early discussions in both Scotland and America; (II) articles in Ephraim Chambers' *Cyclopaedia;* (III) Andrew Baxter's criticism of 1733.

(I) So far as I have been able to discover, Berkeley did not receive

[1] Mossner, *Life*, p. 79.

the attention in England that he did on the Continent. Scotland, however, was a different story. As Luce has put it:

> But for Scotland Berkeley might have died the second death. During his lifetime and for the greater part of the first century after his death Scottish philosophers took charge of him, and placed and kept him on the map.[1]

Luce, however, begins his list of eminent Scotsmen with Baxter – whereas we intend to stop with him. For there is a clue that Scots were interested in Berkeley prior to 1733. Mossner speaks [2] of the influential cultural group, the Rankenian Club, being organized in Edinburgh in 1716 or 1717 and carrying on a correspondence with Dean Berkeley. In the "Memoirs of Dr. Wallace of Edinburgh" to which Mossner refers, one reads:

> Among others the abstruse principles vented by Dr. Berkeley, Bishop of Cloyne, were accurately canvassed in it [the Rankenian Club]; and the society amused themselves by maintaining with that eminent and pious prelate ... a literary correspondence, in which they pushed his singular tenets all the amazing length to which they have been carried in later publications. To their letters his Lordship transmitted polite and regular returns, endeavouring to avoid the consequences drawn from his doctrines: He was greatly pleased, too, with the extraordinary acuteness and peculiar ingenuity displayed in them, and has been heard to say, that no persons understood his system better than this set of young gentlemen in North Britain. Hence he offered to adopt them into his famous design of erecting a college at Bermudas for the benefit of the new world. But the club, thinking the project aerial, and having other agreeable prospects, mostly declined to accept his Lordship's invitation.[3]

"Mostly" may refer to John Smibert, for Mossner reports [4] that he was a member of the Club and also that he accompanied Berkeley to Rhode Island. But as Mossner also notes (p. 618), the history of the Rankenian Club has yet to be written, and this account appeared a half-century after the events. So far as I know, no Berkeley correspondence has turned up to confirm the reported agenda. If, on the other hand, the Rankenians did discuss Berkeley, their words may reasonably be assumed to have carried considerable weight, for Colin Maclaurin (possibly a teacher of Hume) and George Turnbull (a teacher of Reid) were among the early members.[5]

[1] A. A. Luce, "The Berkeleian Idea of Sense," *Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume*, XXVII (1953), 7.

[2] Ernest C. Mossner, *Life*, pp. 48–9. See also G. E. Davie, "Hume and the Origins of the Common Sense School," *Revue Internationale de Philosophie*, VI (1952), 213–221.

[3] *The Scots Magazine* (Edinburgh), 1771, p. 341.

[4] Mossner, *Life*, p. 49.

[5] *ibid.*, pp. 43, 48, 113.

Berkeley arrived in Rhode Island in 1729, with a party that included John Smibert of the Rankenians, to help bring into reality his "Bermuda project" – his plan to bring a religious educational institution to the New World. His philosophy preceded him, however, for Dr. Samuel Johnson (1696–1772) had read "the *Principles* in 1727–28, and again in 1729, along with the Essay on Vision and the *Three Dialogues*." [1] Johnson, a teacher of Jonathan Edwards, went on to become (1754) the first President of King's College (Columbia University) and did his best to propagate what he took to be Berkeley's views.

Already interested in Berkeley's philosophy, Johnson took advantage of the presence of the then Dean of Derry to press for further explanations of the New Immaterialism. Two letters and replies from their philosophical correspondence (1729–30) survive and Luce and Jessop have included them in *Works* II.[2] Apparently Johnson was not alone in his interest, for he writes in his second letter:

> Indeed I had not had opportunity sufficiently to digest your books; for no sooner had I just read them over, but they were greedily demanded by my friends, who live much scattered up and down, and who expected I would bring them home with me, because I had told them before that if the books were to be had in Boston, I intended to purchase a set of them; and indeed they have not yet quite finished their tour. The *Theory of Vision* is still at New York and the *Dialogues* just gone to Long Island. But I am the better content to want them because I know they are doing good.[3]

In the correspondence Johnson reveals himself concerned with such issues as the Berkeleian archetype, i.e. whether "there is a two-fold existence of things or ideas, one in the divine mind, and the other in created minds; the one archetypal, and the other ectypal ..."; [4] or whether Newtonian absolute space and time could not be treated as properties of God; whether there is not a mental *substratum* to give some continuity other than *percipere* to spirits.

And so, in the light of Berkeley's reception in England and on the Continent, it comes as something of a surprise to find him getting a serious and earnest hearing in the American colonies.[5] As a result, Berkeley played an important part in what early American philosophy

[1] Luce, *Life of George Berkeley* (London: 1949), p. 129n.

[2] See also *Samuel Johnson: His career and writings*, 4 vols. ed. Herbert and Carol Schneider, (New York: 1929).

[3] Letter, Johnson to Berkeley, Feb. 5, 1730, in *Works* II, 284.

[4] Letter, Johnson to Berkeley, Sept. 10, 1729, in *Works* II, 274.

[5] In this connection, see Popkin, "Berkeley's Influence on American Philosophy," *Hermathena*, LXXXII (1953), 128–146.

there was, first by Johnson spreading his views, then in the course of disputes in the Scottish Common-Sense tradition during the remainder of the century.

(II) Besides Berkeley's influence in Scotland and America, one item which made considerable impact on Berkeley's subsequent reputation remains to be considered prior to Baxter and that is the discussion of the *Principles* in Ephraim Chambers' *Cyclopaedia, or an Universal Dictionary of the Arts and Sciences*. It appeared for the first time in 1728, was followed by many new editions, and the great French *Encyclopédie* was originally planned as simply a translation of it. At least four articles in the 1728 edition contain selections, not always graced with quotation marks, from Berkeley's *Principles*.[1] As the material is discussed in detail in another chapter, only a few points are relevant to present purposes.

First of all, Chambers took a good deal of material from the Introduction to the *Principles* – the attack on abstract ideas. Sensing its importance, he remarks that the argument would go "a good way towards setting our philosophy on a new footing" (art. "Abstraction"). Second, by careful selection and altering of texts, Chambers all but eliminated God's role in Berkeley's philosophy and so distorted other passages that one might think that Berkeley accepted ideas *and* things and merely denied our ability to know the latter – rather than identifying ideas *with* things. Third, Chambers' views had a great influence. D'Alembert's article "Corps" in the *Encyclopédie* [2] is in part just a translation of Chambers' *Cyclopaedia* article *Body*. Finally, a good number of the references to Berkeley in Andrew Baxter's *Enquiry into the Nature of the Human Soul*,[3] are to quotations in Chambers rather than to the text of the *Principles*.

(III) Andrew Baxter (1686–1750), a Scottish metaphysician, antagonist of Colin Maclaurin, correspondent of Henry Home, Lord Kames, apparently included a refutation of Berkeley in the *Enquiry* because he was himself stating a metaphysical position which would have been threatened by a successful denial of matter. He sought to argue that God is the continuing source of all action and cohesion in

[1] Chambers, *Cyclopaedia*, articles "Abstraction," "Body," "External," and "Matter," for a total of almost 5 folio columns, although with some duplication. See below, Appendix G.

[2] *Encyclopédie* (Paris: 1754), Vol. IV, 261a & b, 262a.

[3] Andrew Baxter, *Enquiry into the Nature of the Human Soul*, (London: 1733). The relevant section is entitled "Dean Berkeley's scheme against the existence of matter, and a material world examined, and shewn inconclusive." My citations are to the text in the second (1737) edition. A third edition appeared in 1745.

the universe, and that the evidence for His existence comes from the material world. But his astigmatic view of Berkeley, in which he saw Berkeley as a sceptic, is a good deal more explicable when it is realized that he was relying on (a) the distorted selections that appeared in Chambers and (b) the text of the *Principles* (1710 ed.) only. Although he knew Berkeley published other works, these were neither refuted, cited, nor named.

Baxter is frequently unfair, with a preference for pejoration rather than argumentation, but in spite of this, he succeeds in raising some serious objections. At the most general level, he sees Berkeley as using Pyrrhonism to refute Pyrrhonism, as being unable to demonstrate the existence of matter, and hence denying it. Baxter proceeds to raise a battery of objections, several of which deserve comment. He criticises Berkeley for attempting to demonstrate the indemonstrable, i.e. for trying to prove impossibles necessary by his denial of the existence of matter. For Baxter, demonstrations pertain to relations between essences and not to contingent existential statements – and thus it is clear (to him) that statements about the existence of matter, being always contingent on God's will, can never be demonstrated. Berkeley, having mistaken the nature of demonstration, is led to demand impossible evidence for the existence of the material world, instead of accepting the only sort of evidence we have for existential truths – sense experience.[1] Baxter sees his task not as demonstrating the existence of matter, but of showing that no such demonstration could be given. Briefly, it should be noted in Berkeley's defense the role played (in the denial of matter) by his attack on abstract ideas; a role Baxter failed to appreciate.

Baxter's metaphysical sensibilities were also offended by Berkeley's (apparent) denial of the substance/attribute distinction. How can Berkeley, he asks, deny us the inference from our perceptions and ideas of men to their (material) substance, while himself inferring from those same perceptions to men's (spiritual) substance, inasmuch as the properties "figure and motion" are no more material substance than "activity and perceptivity" are spiritual substance. The proper conclusion of Berkeley's attack on substance and matter, which denies

[1] Baxter quotes with approval the Chevalier Ramsay's contention that Pyrrhonism arises from failure to distinguish between a demonstration, a proof, and a probability. The importance of this distinction and its possible influence on David Hume is discussed by Popkin in "David Hume and the Pyrrhonian Controversy," *Review of Metaphysics*, VI (1952), 67 ff. cf. Baxter, *Enquiry*, II, 317n for his citation of Ramsay. See also Ramsay, *Les Voyages de Cyrus* (Paris: 1727), II, 41 ff, i.e. Bk. 6.

us equally the grounds for our inferences to men's souls as their bodies, is *Egomism.*[1]

Initially, Baxter is led to question whether Berkeley is discussing sensations or objects of sensation. And Baxter misses no opportunity to indicate the ridiculous conclusions which he thinks must follow for Berkeley. He offers a detailed examination of Berkeley's reduction of things to sensations in Section 4 of the *Principles*, and concludes from his analysis, as the *Journal Litéraire* reviewer did before him and as, e.g., Ralph Barton Perry did after – that Berkeley was only able to set his dialectical trap by begging the precise question at issue, that is whether in perception we perceive nothing but ideas, or whether the ideas can have some independent status as well.

Baxter also suggests that *esse est percipi* ought to be (for Berkeley) the criterion of spiritual as well as of material existence – had Berkeley realized this, and that it would rule out God as well as matter, he would never have propounded his "scheme." Furthermore, he finds Berkeley guilty of violating ordinary language and finally, he suggests that on Berkeley's analysis, science becomes impossible and even the Pythagorean theorem becomes false – it ceases to be true when one substitutes "idea of square" for "square" etc.[2]

This latter sort of "criticism" is clearly intended as ridicule, but it helps us appreciate the sort of difficulty a traditional metaphysician of the period had in understanding Berkeley. Translated into essence/existence, substance/attribute language, Berkeley's position appeared largely ridiculous. This misunderstanding can be rendered intelligible to us, but it was unfortunate with respect to Berkeley's reputation. Especially since this genuine misunderstanding was coupled with the distortions inherited from the misinterpretations fabricated by the Jesuits, *et al.*

Another factor clearly played a part in Baxter's case: i.e. the desire to cling to traditional metaphysical distinctions at all costs. In the tense intellectual milieu of the period, one gave no quarter to the enemy. Under attack from Baylean Pyrrhonism, one had to maintain one's position secure. Baxter knew perfectly well the devastating effects of the sceptical dialectic on these distinctions. He knew the enemy delighted in capitalizing on, for example, the real-thing/appearance-of-thing dichotomy. But the way to deal with sceptics

[1] Cf. Baxter, *Enquiry*, II, 279–80. As noted in Chapter I, Baxter employs Ramsay's definition of *Egomism*.

[2] Cf. Baxter, *Enquiry*, II, 336n.

was to hold one's own ground, maintain that of course one knew whether he was asleep or awake, and attack Pyrrhonism at every opportunity.

Baxter only saw Berkeley attempting to beat Pyrrhonism by joining it; he saw Berkeley giving up critical ground, and ending up unable to protect himself from egoism, scepticism and atheism. Baxter was sounding the alarm: beware of these arguments – Berkeley may be a Churchman, but see where he leads us. Berkeley himself felt keenly the force of the sceptical arguments, and even in his *Philosophical Commentaries* (e.g. entries 358, 424) reveals that he is acquainted with Pierre Bayle's arguments. And he *did* think he could defeat the sceptics at their own game. They had attacked the Cartesians, whose placing of secondary qualities in the mind was itself partially prompted by sceptical arguments from illusions, by asking how one knew when one got to the *real* qualities. So long as appearance and reality were separated, Berkeley realized that the Pyrrhonists could ask when one got to the reality. And then what criterion one used in determining that reality. And what criterion one used in determining the first criterion, *ad infinitum*. The solution was incredibly simple: identify the *esse* of things with their *percipi!*

Baxter failed to see the point. All he saw were the horrendous consequences of giving up substance/attribute, etc. He failed singulary to see the point of the attack on abstract ideas, and indeed Chambers is alone among the early critics in seeing the power in that argument. Along with missing out on the resolution of scepticism and the various facets of Berkeley's empirical meaning requirement, Baxter also – perhaps thanks to Chambers distorted selections from the *Principles* – failed to appreciate the positive role God played in Berkeley's "empirical immaterialism." Nevertheless, among the dozens of charges Baxter hurled at Berkeley, a few hit the mark. Beneath the surface antagonisms and the ridicule, a few serious objections occurred. And, after all, they should not surprise us: Baxter at least read some Berkeley.

Intellectual blindness afflicted only those who went to the trouble of reading Berkeley. Against this he could and did fight, for the *Three Dialogues* was published in an attempt to work a cure. But against the self-imposed blindness of those who attacked his philosophy without studying it, there was only the negative defense of silence. One might struggle against misunderstanding, but against the campaign of false charges unleashed in particular by the Jesuits, there was no protection.

And so when we examine Baxter's criticism, published twenty-three years after the *Principles*, it is essential that we bear in mind (a) that his presuppositions would make the understanding of Berkeley difficult at best, and (b) that he was writing at the close of two decades *not* of silence with respect to Berkeley, but of repeated and concerted attacks against him.

The burden of this survey has been to indicate not only that those first two decades after the *Principles* were extremely hard on Berkeley, but also that the patterns of insult, ridicule and distortion were well established in the Republic of Letters by the time Baxter took up the cudgels and produced what has been acknowledged as the first extended criticism in English. This survey has not tried to disprove that characterization of Baxter's work, but rather to show that Berkeley received a great deal more attention during the "doldrum decades" than has hitherto been appreciated – and that it was attention that mattered.

Baxter did not write in a vacuum: neither did Reid and Beattie and Kant when they discussed Berkeley. For these latter philosophers not only derived their attitudes toward Berkeley from Baxter and the French Encyclopedists, but also in part from the critics of the "doldrum decades": from the strange reviews, the attacks by Tournemine and Pfaff, the categories of Wolff, the account in Chambers, material which made Berkeley an egomist, a Pyrrhonist, an idealist, an atheist, a denier of the reality of our sense experience, and a dabbler in paradox, so that Reid felt obliged to call him "good" – and Beattie didn't!

This is but one part in a long story – the fortunes of Berkeley in the eighteenth century. A story which, as I said at the start, became necessary when the picture of Berkeley, presented especially by Luce and Jessop, could no longer be reconciled with that which made Berkeley a co-conspirator with Locke and Hume and a father of modern idealism. That he was often so described from mid-century onward is a great deal more explicable when both the *nature* and *extent* of the early criticism is appraised.

CHAPTER III

THE *JOURNAL LITÉRAIRE* REVIEW OF BERKELEY'S *THREE DIALOGUES*

While the previous two chapters have surveyed the discussions of the philosophy of Berkeley's *Principles* that appeared between 1710 and 1733, this, as well as the next two chapters, are concerned with specific criticisms which appeared during that period and which merit detailed philosophical treatment. Thus in this chapter, the excellent review of the *Three Dialogues* that appeared in the *Journal Litéraire* [1] (1713) is examined; in the next, the hitherto unnoticed remarks on the *Principles* contained in Ephraim Chambers' *Cyclopaedia* (1728); and in the final chapter, Andrew Baxter's criticisms (1733) are studied.

The *Journal Litéraire* review is anonymous and I have been unable to discover its author. Among the publication's editors (s'Gravesande; Prosper Marchand; A. H. Sallengre; Alexandre; Justus van Effen; Thémiseul de Saint-Hyacinthe, pseud. of Hyacinthe Cordonnier),[2] s'Gravesande is perhaps best known, but his *Oeuvres philosophiques et mathématiques* [3] reveals no interest in either the philosophy or the author of the *Principles*. I have, however, found two editors with slight connections with Berkeley, although there is obviously no guarantee that all contributions, even to the first issue of a journal, must be by its editors. In 1743 Saint-Hyacinthe defended Berkeley (as we noted in the first chapter) against Tournemine's charges of atheism,[4] but

[1] *Journal Litéraire* de Mai et Juin 1713, A La Haye, chez T. Johnson. The first issue was reviewed in *Journal des Sçavans* (Amsterdam) for December, 1713, p. 679.

[2] Listing is from the Catalogue of the British Museum. The list is the same as that appearing in *L'Europe Savante* (La Haye), I (1718), of which Saint-Hyacinthe and Van Effen were also editors.

[3] Willem J. van s'Gravesande, (1688–1742), *Oeuvres philosophiques et mathématiques* (Amsterdam: 1774).

[4] I first noted a reference to this discussion in an anonymous review of Berkeley's *Siris* (French translation) in *Bibliothèque Raisonnée* (Amsterdam), 1745, pp. 36–77, cf. 76–7. Tournemine's criticisms appeared in the Preface to Fénelon's *Oeuvres*. This material has been discussed in Chapter II.

in 1737 he requested Pierre Desmaizeaux to secure "Les 2 livres de métaphisique de Doct. Barclay ..." [1] a request which somewhat militates against his candidacy as author of this astute review, for even if the reviewer could no longer remember any of Berkeley's arguments, he might be expected to remember the spelling of the name (a point which is correct in 1743).

Justus van Effen seems a bit more likely. He was early a follower of Addison and Steele, a translator of the *Guardian* (1723)[2] as well as of Shaftesbury (1710), Swift (1721), and Mandeville (1722). A recent biographer of his, Pienaar, speaking of No. XCII of his journal *La Bagatelle* (1718–19) says: "The subject is an allegory built up on Berkeley's *Theory of Vision* and applied in the sense of Addison's exposition in the Pleasures of the Imagination essays in the *Spectator*, of which again Locke was the starting-point."[3] And finally, Trinius, in his *Freydenker-Lexicon* [4] of 1765, attributes the French translation of *Alciphron* to him. But in the light of the fact that all the editors were interested in English cultural affairs and four [5] were members of the Royal Society, the information above is far short of being conclusive.

As for the review itself, it begins by echoing the statement of purpose given by Berkeley in the Preface to the *Dialogues:* that before publishing the second part of the *Principles*, certain clarifications were in order which the new work was to provide. In mentioning Berkeley's earlier works, the reviewer reveals his familiarity with the *New Theory of Vision* by speaking of it as having been "published for the second time in Dublin in 1709." (148)[6]

The reviewer then proceeds to set forth what he takes to be Berkeley's demonstration "*that there are no bodies, that only spirits exist ... that all that we call bodies are only ideas which can not have an existence separate from the spirits which have these ideas,*" (149) views which he notes Berkeley

[1] Letter, Saint-Hyacinthe to Desmaizeaux, 23 Oct. 1737, among Desmaizeaux correspondence in British Museum: B.M. MSS. Add. 4284 (161).

[2] For Berkeley's contributions to the *Guardian*, see *Works* VII, 173 ff.

[3] W. J. B. Pienaar, *English Influences in Dutch Literature and Justus Van Effen as Intermediary* (Cambridge: 1929), p. 186.

[4] Johann Anton Trinius, *Freydenker-Lexicon* (Leipzig: 1759–), p. 725. I am indebted to Henry J. Dubester of the Library of Congress for assistance in attempting to verify this claim with respect to *Alciphron*. Cf. Jessop, *Bibliography of George Berkeley*, entry 60, "Trans. attributed to B. de Joncourt ..."

[5] Alexandre, secretary of the *JL* editorial board, and Marchand, excepted.

[6] However, he gives London as the place of publication for the *Principles*. Jessop gives Dublin. Cf. *Works* II, 3. *Note:* the parenthetical references which follow my quotations are to page numbers in the original review. The review, which was Article XIV, and ran from p. 147 to 160 in the first issue of the *JL*, is reproduced in Appendix C.

thinks will silence Atheists and Sceptics [1] and return man from paradox to common sense. He suggests that "one will no doubt be surprised by the oddness of this opinion, but the reading of the book will keep one from that which the author has embraced," (149) although he also admits that the ordinary opinion defended by Hylas, seems even less tenable.

> The dispute of our spokesmen is not sufficiently ordered to permit one to follow them in an abstract. We shall content ourselves with expounding M. Berkeley's views as clearly as we can, making the abstract long enough in proportion to the length of the volume, being sure that the reader will be curious to see in some particulars what can be adduced in favor of a view so peculiar as that of M. Berkeley. (149)

Launching into his exposition, the reviewer takes up briefly Berkeley's reduction of sensible things to sensible qualities [*W* II, 174 ff]. It may be recalled that in the *First Dialogue*, Philonous gains admissions from Hylas that there is nothing more to heat than its sensation, nor to sweetness, sound or color, and that none of these can exist in an unperceived thing, culminating in Hylas' admission that "colours, sounds, tastes, in a word, all those termed *secondary qualities*, have certainly no existence without the mind" [*W* II, 187]. Then Philonous proceeds to reduce the primary to the secondary qualities. The reviewer objects, however, that when one speaks of a body having qualities, one does not mean "that this body feels something similar to what it makes us feel," (151) rather that bodies have the property of giving rise, via nerves and the brain, "to those ideas we call sensations" (151). Similarly in the case of sounds – Berkeley should not say "that it is contradictory that *sound* is a *movement*, a *movement* being perceivable only by sight and touch," (151) but should have noticed "that one does not say only the *sound is* a *movement*, but that it is the effect of a movement, which means that the movement, by the organ of the ear, gives rise in our soul to the idea we call sound. What he says about color is pretty nearly of the same force" (151) [cf. *W* II, 181–3]. The reviewer, like Hylas, wants to distinguish bodies from their sensible qualities, perceived sounds from the motions which give rise to them, perceived colors from real colors, but his objection is as open to attack as was Hylas': namely that either all these are sensations, i.e. both real *and* sensible, or the real are unperceived and thus unknown.

The question of the "non-existence of body" is, however, not so much over these secondary qualities, but rather, according to the

[1] Cf. title pages of both *Principles* and *Three Dialogues*.

reviewer, over whether the primary ones (i.e. extension, figure, etc.) "are only sensations of the soul, and can exist only as idea" (152). He sees Berkeley as adducing three proofs that the primary qualities do not exist in bodies: (1) a thing cannot have different dimensions at the same time, yet "a small body which seems to us barely visible, ought to appear extremely large to an animal which is even smaller than this body" (152). (Berkeley's example is the mite.) [1] (2) Inherent qualities of objects cannot change without the objects themselves changing, yet, as in the case of extension, "according as we approach or remove ourselves [from a body, it] appears to us larger or smaller" (152) [cf. *W* II, 189].

(3) When in putting both hands in water it seems hot to the one and cold to the other, we correctly conclude that the heat is not in the water: ought we not likewise to conclude that extension and figure are not in an object when it seems small, highly polished and round to one of my eyes, while to the other it seems large, rough and angular – which is the case when one looks with one eye through a microscope and looks naturally with the other. (152)

The reviewer notes: "In order to make a single comment on all these arguments, we shall be content to say that the author does not take heed of the different relations that objects can have with us ..." (152–3), for objects can remain the same in themselves while changing in regard to us. Furthermore, the hot and cold hands example [2] proves nothing: "It would be wrong to say that the heat is not in the water, if, in order to prove it, we had only the reason of which our author has just spoken" (153). According to the reviewer, objects may stand in different relations to us without ceasing to be objects –therefore all the information on sense variations, shows nothing about what properties objects actually have. One could extend this further, as Ralph Barton Perry [3] did, by saying that even though every object is related to us in sensation, it may also be an independent object as well.

Moving to the attack, the reviewer asks whether we could, from Berkeley's remembering one thing and forgetting another, readily

[1] *Works* II, 188–9. Professor R. A. Watson has called my attention to Malebranche's similar use of a mite. Cf. *De la recherche de la vérité*, I, vi, § 1, in *Oeuvres complètes de Malebranche*, ed. G. Rodis-Lewis (Paris: 1962), I, 83. A fly is used in a similar discussion in Bayle's *Dictionnaire*, art. *Zeno*, rem. G.

[2] Cf. *Works* II, 178–9, The example also occurs in John Locke, *An Essay concerning Human Understanding*, ed. A. C. Fraser (Oxford: 1894), Vol. I, p. 177 (Bk. II, chap. viii, § 21). For a discussion of Malebranche's use of a similar example, see Martial Gueroult, *Malebranche* (Paris: 1955), I, 92.

[3] Cf. Ralph Barton Perry, *Present Philosophical Tendencies* (New York: 1912), pp. 124–134.

conclude that memory is not a faculty of his soul? "Would it not be unjust, in destroying in this way the other faculties, to maintain that he has no soul at all? Having himself already annihilated his body, what would become of him?" (153) The reviewer's argument is this: he accepts Berkeley's parallel between heat not being in water and extension not in body – in both cases denials that the attributes are in the substances being based on variations in the attributes. He then moves Berkeley's own parallel a step further: just as Berkeley concludes that heat is not in body because of the one-hand-hot/one-hand-cold instance, why not conclude from one-thing-remembered/one-thing-forgotten that memory is not a real attribute of soul? And if Berkeley denies the existence of bodies because their supposed attributes turn out not to be in them, so the existence of the soul can be denied because its supposed attributes are not in it. Thus Berkeley's dialectic becomes quite literally self-refuting – in a broad sense, the objection that is usually credited to David Hume.

The reviewer then notes that the same sort of argument is used against the traditional attributes of matter, movement and solidity. In connection with the latter, he remarks that Berkeley should have noticed that it is a property of bodies, "by which they prevent all other bodies from occupying the same space with them; and that solidity is not relative to our senses; water, however fluid it may be, if it cannot escape, resists a bit of iron, as much as the hardest body would be able to do" (153–4). However, this sort of objection is to no avail, for Berkeley, "in order wholly to terminate the dispute and prevent all the objections that one could make against his argument," (154) argues that the primary qualities cannot be conceived apart from the secondary ones, the latter exist only in our spirit, hence the former do also. "If this argument confuses anyone, he can put it in other terms, and he will find that M. Berkeley proves very well that the impression which extension, insofar as it is sensible, makes on our spirit, is an idea; or what is the same thing, that the idea of extension is an idea"(154).

That is enough to settle what our author says of sensible qualities; we pass to a more metaphysical argument, to which he returns frequently, and which he regards as alone capable of entirely deciding the question. There is nothing sensible but what one perceives immediately: what one perceives immediately is an idea, which cannot exist in an insensible being, such as we call body. Ideas vary with all the different situations of objects, and so they can not be the representations of those objects which always remain the same. Besides, an idea can only resemble another idea; and as

a result, what our ideas represent to us can only exist in another spirit. What does not think can not be the cause of thought. Furthermore, a being incapable of action can be the cause of no effect, and one cannot say that movement may be an action of matter: it is only an idea, as our author claims to have proven by the argument that we have set down above. (154–5)

Having described the core of Berkeley's metaphysics, the reviewer sets out to indicate "what is specious in this argument." It is that Berkeley supposes that "there is only one spirit itself capable of having ideas, which can create them in another spirit" (156). The fundamental issue concerns our *knowledge* of the means taken by God to give us ideas, i.e. whether He created "inanimate Beings," which "by means unknown to us," give rise to ideas in spirits, whether He chose any other instrument, or whether He is the "immediate Author," of our ideas, as Berkeley would have it. "One does not deny that God, as our author says, is able to do everything himself without availing himself of any instrument: the question is to know if God did not will to employ it . . ." (156) and he suggests the reader decide which of equally possible (to God) methods are employed. The reviewer admits somewhat grudgingly, that Berkeley takes up the question of whether God deceives us into thinking there are bodies, in the *Third Dialogue*, [cf. *W* II, 243] and there credits the belief to prejudice.

What is "specious" in this "more metaphysical argument," is that it requires *knowledge* about that which we cannot know – namely the activity of God's will. It is perfectly "conceivable" that God chose other means – we can "imagine" it. This is the sort of objection one might expect in the late seventeenth or early eighteenth century from one with metaphysical proclivities.

Andrew Baxter was later to expand into a major criticism what is here only hinted at by the *JL* reviewer. A serious-minded metaphysician (he had doubts about Berkeley) ought to realize, Baxter maintained, that demonstrations apply to essences, but that matters of fact and existence are mere contingencies dependent for their truth not on eternal essences but God's will – thus, not being necessary they are not demonstrable. The *JL* reviewer seems, like Baxter, to have been aroused by Berkeley's "demonstration" of something which cannot be demonstrated. For if Berkeley's argument for the non-existence of matter could be characterized as necessary, i.e. if his argument were a genuine demonstration, then its denial would be inconceivable – but as the reviewer points out, other alternatives to

this "demonstration" are conceivable. Indeed, Malebranche,[1] and Leibniz as well, would have wanted to make distinctions between the sorts of things we can demonstrate, and the contingent decrees of God's will, and further, to hold that the opposite of that which is demonstrated is inconceivable.[2]

Continuing his account, the reviewer notes that Berkeley devotes considerable space to the beauty and order of the universe and further, that Berkeley claims not to be denying the existence of all things, but rather to be asserting that their existence is dependent on spirits "to which they are sensible," that their existence consists "*in being perceived*" (157). But as the objects we perceive are not creatures of our will, they must exist in some other spirit, i.e. God, "*Who contains, and supports them*" (157). Nor are objects destroyed by making them ideas, for, says the reviewer, Berkeley distinguishes these ideas from those – as of imagination – which depend on *our* will and, moreover, claims that all of this is not to make God the author of evil, for "physical action is always indifferent, what is criminal comes from what occurs in the soul of the doer" (158). So much for "his argument against the Atheists."

Before making his concluding criticisms, the reviewer notes Berkeley's reference to Malebranche [*W* II, 213 ff] as well as his account of the Mosaic creation [*W* II, 250 ff]. This latter item, as we noted earlier, was included by Berkeley apparently to satisfy Lady Percival's objection that his immaterialism did not square with *Genesis*. But the reviewer's joining of the Malebranche item from the *Second Dialogue* with the Mosaic creation item from the *Third*, might be expected if one were familiar with the Oratorian. Malebranche [3] held that our knowledge of the existence of bodies was not demonstrable but only assured by the Biblical revelation that God created a physical world.

Berkeley's claim to return man to common sense leaves the reviewer nonplussed. Berkeley may be correct in his claim that unlike those who admit the existence of bodies, he can speak of knowing the nature of things (there being nothing more than the secondary qualities), but his agreement with common sense is purely a verbal affair. "Would [Berkeley] be well received by a peasant if he came to him maintaining

[1] Cf. N. Malebranche, *Dialogues on Metaphysics and on Religion* (London: 1923), trans. Morris Ginsberg, p. 167 (Sixth Dialogue).

[2] Berkeley was aware of the distinction, as is clear from *Principles* 107. Like most early critics, the reviewer failed to appreciate that the "inconceivability" Berkeley talked of was tied up with the revolutionary attack on abstract ideas and the doctrine of empirical meaning discussed especially in the Introduction to the *Principles*.

[3] Malebranche, *Dialogues*, p. 172 (Sixth Dialogue).

that [the horse they see] exists only in the heads of those who look at it?" (159).

There are further difficulties, according to the reviewer – some are paradoxes admitted by Berkeley – and some can be drawn from his stated position. In the first category is the identity problem:

> When I approach an object, with each step I take it is another object that I see. When I note an object through a microscope, I do not see the same one that I perceive without this aid. The object I touch is not the same one I see. It is only in order to avoid confusion in language, that in these cases the same name is given to different objects, and that these are spoken of as if they were the same. (159–160)

And in the second category are some consequences the reviewer draws in the closing lines of the review:

> The hand which strikes a blow cannot be seen. The stick I use in order to strike with, is not that which I hold in my hand. The man who insulted me is not the same one I call to Justice, and he who is seen hanged on the gallows is not the one who committed the theft. I am not able to speak to anyone without an infinite spirit intervening in order to arouse in the spirit with whom I speak, the ideas that I wish to excite. By the same token, even for what I write here, God is obliged to make visible these characters to all those who cast their eyes upon this paper. (160)

These conclusions indicate how far Berkeley has moved from common sense, yet it is precisely accord with common sense that Berkeley claimed as a prime merit of his system. These conclusions reflect the reviewer's sensitivity to two problems in the philosophy of the *Principles* and *Three Dialogues:* first the problem of identity which comes home with a vengeance when Berkeley tries to solve the problem of error, and secondly, the extent of God's role in perception. He has already raised a host of issues: he has claimed that Berkeley's evidence is inadequate for his conclusions; he has argued that Berkeley's attack on matter could be turned against him and applied to spirit – the traditional Humean objection of objections; he has accused Berkeley of begging the question in the case of the reduction of extension to an idea; he has maintained that the very notion of a demonstration of the non-existence of the material world rests on what is unobtainable – knowledge of God's will – and indeed, since the opposite is conceivable, the demonstration fails. These concluding two categories of objections are particularly interesting and I wish now to examine them in some detail.

The drastically revised interpretation of Berkeley's immaterialism

which has been the result of the excellent scholarship of Luce and Jessop, gives heavy weight to the early *Philosophical Commentaries* as a clue to the metaphysical intentions of the *Principles* and *Three Dialogues*. As we have already had occasion to note, Berkeley turns out in the light of their analyses to be a common sense realist,[1] identifying things with perceptions. Luce has added further plausibility to this interpretation by his study of Berkeley's relationship with Malebranche. And it is worth recalling that Berkeley's debt to that great Oratorian was noted by those editors of the *Mémoires de Trévoux* who called Berkeley the "Malebranchiste de bonne foi." A further contribution to the Luce interpretation has come from Popkin, who has examined a portion of Berkeley's debt to Bayle and the sceptics and who has suggested that Berkeley is a common sense realist, if his claims to having solved the sceptical problem are taken seriously. For Berkeley saw that so long as the *esse* and *percipi* of things were distinguished, the sceptical wedge could always be driven between them – hence he identified them in his revolutionary stroke, *esse* EST *percipi* [cf. *Phil. Comm.* 279].

But the identification proved not to be without its disadvantages. Nowhere is this clearer than in the *Third Dialogue* where for the first time, so far as I have discovered, Berkeley takes up the problem of error as it occurs in his own system. The results to which the *JL* reviewer calls attention are hard to fit in with Berkeley's initially stated position, for Berkeley "solves" the problem of perceptual error by phenomenalism [cf. *W* II, 238, 245–8]. An adequate explanation can be given along these lines as Berkeley shows – and indeed, Berkeley's error and identity discussions have proven to be philosophically stimulating,[2] but they do not fit well with the rest of the *Dialogues*, and the *JL* reviewer took them as symptomatic of Berkeley's failure to bring his theory into accord with common sense. Insofar as Berkeley wished his views to restore man to common sense, the *JL* reviewer urged that the attempt failed – and nowhere worse than on the question of identity. What he did not realize apparently, was that for Berkeley, to have his principles accord with common sense was not

[1] For an earlier interpretation along somewhat similar lines, see Frederick J. E. Woodbridge, "Berkeley's Realism," in *Studies in the History of Ideas*, Vol. I ed. by Columbia Univ. Philosophy Dept., (New York: 1918), pp. 188–215. For some difficulties that seem to follow when on the one hand Berkeley is interpreted as a realist, and on the other, his ideas of sense are taken to be sense-data or sensa, see my "Berkeley's Realisms," *Philosophical Quarterly*, VIII (1958), 41–53. (Reprinted in Appendix A.)

[2] For a recent analysis of the identity problem, cf. Denis Grey, "The Solipsism of Bishop Berkeley," *Philosophical Quarterly*, II (1952), 338–349.

simply a pious wish, it was a philosophical necessity.[1] To admit a distinction between "the reality and sensible appearance of things," is to open the way for a "most deplorable scepticism." "I am," continues Philonous, "of a vulgar cast, simple enough to believe my senses, and leave things as I find them. To be plain, it is my opinion, that the real things are those very things I see and feel, and perceive by my senses" [*W* II, 229]. But the phenomenalism of the identity and error questions involves Berkeley in the awkward position of telling the man of "vulgar cast" that something is not *really* what it seems to be. Percepts are always correct (and independent one of another) although inferences about them may be proven wrong. Thus the oar in water appears bent, i.e. it is so perceived, but if one says it is *really* straight, what he then means is, that if one were to take it out of the water, it would appear straight. Likewise a complex phenomenalist translation of the gardener's cherry tree must be presented. But this amounts to telling the gardener, for example, that what he sees then and there may *look* like a cherry tree, but he will have to wait – and see – what it *is*. And so Berkeley, concerned with the problem of error, makes these breaks with his common sense realism – only to slip back into the sceptical dialectic which flourishes on the very appearance/reality distinction his ingenious *esse est percipi* was intended to destroy. Parenthetically, one wonders how well Berkeley has overcome the problem of error itself – for just as the *JL* reviewer points out the paradoxes which will follow from the identity issue (hanging a different man from the criminal, etc.) so one may be troubled that the cherry tree about which I make my original judgment is not the one I make confirming tests on, and thus in what sense my original judgment can be proved or disproved. If, however, Berkeley says our judgment is about our expectations, then indeed, he has left the gardener far behind.

The question of error and identity was only one of the objections which the *JL* reviewer felt impaired the usefulness of Berkeley's appeal to common sense: the second arose from the role Berkeley attributes to God in perception. The broad sweep of the reviewer's criticism has been sharply refined in the intervening years, however. Mrs. Fritz has recently, in a careful examination of certain phases of Berkeley's debt to Malebranche, also commented on this problem:

[1] See also, Popkin, "The New Realism of Bishop Berkeley," *University of California Publications in Philosophy*, XXIX (1957), 1–19.

Berkeley often seems hesitant about committing himself concerning the nature of the archetype in God's mind. He wanted to maintain that the perceived world exists whether or not it is beheld by finite minds, and turned to God for a solution to the problem. However, since each finite spirit's perceived world differs at least slightly from that of every other finite spirit, there is a problem as to what world is continuously beheld by God.[1]

And the problem of course immediately opens up a question as to which world is the *real* one, thereby again exposing Berkeley to sceptical attack. If on the other hand, he tries to extricate himself by means of the logical equipment Grey suggests is at his disposal, the *JL* reviewer stands ready to object on common sense grounds; an objection which, as suggested above, also leads to scepticism.

The *JL* reviewer did not concern himself with these sophistications of the criticism of God's role in perception. He simply called attention to what struck him as a singularly uncommon-sensical conclusion to be drawn from Berkeley's account: that God must intervene in oral communication by exciting ideas in the auditor, and in verbal communication by making the reader see both print and page. What the reviewer could not know was that Berkeley had tried to distinguish his God-dependent world from Malebranche's by giving finite spirits something to do. In his *Philosophical Commentaries* (entry 548) he noted, "We move our Legs our selves. 'tis we that will their movement. Herein I differ from Malbranch." The reviewer is sensitive to a difficulty here. Mrs. Fritz has pursued the matter further by arguing that Berkeley's theory of perception precludes finite spirits from doing the sorts of things Berkeley wanted them to. A leg is perceived and God stands as the cause of the ideas I have of it: when "I move it" God must excite in me both the ideas of its motion and of its new position. Berkeley tried to make his God-dependent perceptual theory acceptable to common sense, as Malebranche's had never been – indeed, because of his coupled attack on scepticism, he was obliged to – but the *JL* reviewer suggests that further explanation is necessary for Berkeley to make good his claim.

One wishes that other critics had dealt as fairly and seriously with the philosophy of the *Principles* and that Berkeley had taken up the challenge. But this review, early as it was, turned out to be, so far as I know, the most philosophically mature discussion that was published

[1] Anita D. Fritz, "Berkeley's Self – Its Origin in Malebranche," *Journal of the History of Ideas*, XV (1954), 561–2.

during Berkeley's life. The review not only was the most intelligent early criticism, it also raised many of the issues which have become standard in contemporary discussions of Berkeley. The reviewer may not have seen all that could be said in defense of Berkeley, but he saw a good deal of what could be said against him.

CHAPTER IV

BERKELEY AND CHAMBERS

This chapter is concerned with a hitherto unnoticed discussion of the philosophy of the *Principles* that appeared in the midst of the "doldrum decades." For in London in 1728 Ephraim Chambers' *Cyclopaedia, or an Universal Dictionary of the Arts and Sciences* was published, containing large selections from and brief comments on, Berkeley's *Principles*. The items employed by Chambers, as we shall see, constitute an alteration in Berkeley's message and may account in part for the later eighteenth century interpretation of his immaterialism. Therefore, these selections which helped spread Berkeley's views, and helped determine the understanding of his theory, deserve some detailed examination.

The reader of Andrew Baxter's *Enquiry into the Nature of the Human Soul* is struck by the fact that references to Berkeley are often made indirectly through references to Chambers' work, [1] and an examination of the *Cyclopaedia* discloses at least four articles which quote from the *Principles*, specifically, *Abstraction*, *Body*, *External*, and *Matter*, a total of almost five folio columns,[2] although there is some duplication of material. Portions of *External* and *Matter* appear in *Body*, the longest of all.[3] Obviously certain of Berkeley's arguments impressed Chambers.

[1] Professor Jessop has informed me that there is a review of Baxter's *Enquiry*, third (1745) edition, in S. J. Baumgarten's *Nachrichten von merkwürdigen Büchern*, V (1754), 310–317. The reviewer (p. 316) says that Baxter examines Berkeley's system as presented in the article *Existence* in the "Universal Dictionary or Cyclopoedia."

[2] Two columns per page. Printed area $13\frac{1}{2} \times 7\frac{1}{4}$ in.

[3] By the time of the fifth edition (1743), a copy of which is in the State University of Iowa Library, Chambers had transferred the selections under *Body* to *Existence* and duplicated those under *External* in *Body*. The total of material selected from the *Principles* remained, however, the same, apart from minor orthographic changes. Introductory comments were altered slightly and a short discussion was added under *Substance*. In this paper all Chambers quotations are from photostats of the articles in the Harvard University Library copy of the first (1728) edition. Thanks are due Miss Carolyn E. Jakeman for information as well as assistance in obtaining photostats. Selections from Chambers' *Cyclopaedia* are reprinted in Appendix G.

Furthermore, his general practice in the *Cyclopaedia* of making references to articles on related terms applied to these; hence it seems likely that the interested reader would, like Baxter, have turned to one or more of the others. Finally, there is some discussion of Berkeley in two other articles: *Existence* and *Fallacy*.

Inasmuch as the *Cyclopaedia* earned Chambers membership in the Royal Society in 1729,[1] a year after publication, it is clear that it made its mark on the Republic of Letters. Its contemporary importance is further attested to by the facts that it was in its fifth edition by 1743 and that the original intention of the editors of the famous French *Encyclopédie* was simply to publish a translation of Chambers. In the text, Chambers defines terms and recounts various theories about them, in a dry, rather whimsical way. Scientific words receive particularly careful attention, with selections from Newton, for example, much in evidence. But a 1751 contributor to *Gentleman's Magazine* [2] complained that in the discussions of the particular terms I mentioned in the preceding paragraph, a disproportionate amount of space had been devoted to the theories of the Bishop of Cloyne. It is to the Berkeley of these articles that I wish to turn.

The first article I have found containing selections from the *Principles* is *Abstraction*. Roughly two and one-half columns long, at a quick glance it might appear that Chambers had given some general definitions, next Locke's views, then a Berkeley selection a bare quarter-column long, and finally a few comments of his own. After mentioning that Locke notes that it is the having of general ideas that differentiates man from brutes,[3] Chambers says: "Yet has a late eminent and ingenious Author, Dean *Berkeley*, contested the Reality of any such Ideas; and gone a good way towards overturning the whole System, and consequently towards setting our Philosophy on a new footing." But the short paragraph concerning Locke, and the three-fourths of a column that follows this quotation, are in fact culled from the Introduction to the *Principles*. Parts of Sections 11 and 6 [4] are presented, together with most of 7, 8, and 9,[5] which is where Berkeley states the doctrine of abstract ideas he proposes to attack. Chambers

[1] *Dictionary of National Biography*, article "Ephraim Chambers." Vol. X, p. 17.

[2] *Gentleman's Magazine*, XXI (1751), 56. An interesting reply appears on p. 111.

[3] Chambers refers at this point to "*Essay on Human Understanding L.* III c. 3." Berkeley gives it correctly in Intro. § 11 as "B.2. C.11. Sect. 10 and 11." Cf. *Works* II, 30, ll. 39–40.

[4] Intro. § 11, *Works* II, 30, ll. 19–21; 31–37. Intro. § 6, *Works* II, 27, ll. 10–17.

[5] Variations from Berkeley's text are frequent. Intro. § 7, *in toto*. Intro. § 8, *in toto*, except phrase in last sentence, "that may be perceived by sense." Intro. § 9, *Works* II, 28, ll. 25–34; ll. 37–40. II, 29, ll. 1–20.

then admittedly quotes with minor variation, the first 17 lines of Section 10 and two lines from Section 11.[1] Dropping quotation marks again, he reproduces parts of Sections 11, 12, and 13.[2] This includes Berkeley's definition of a general term as being the sign "not of an *abstract* general Idea, but of several particular ones; any one of which it indifferently suggests to the Mind." [3] Finally, within quotation marks, he gives the attack on Locke's general idea of triangle. At this point Chambers remarks:

From the Notion of *Abstract Ideas*, Dr. *Berkeley* endeavours to shew, it was, that Bodies first came to be supposed to have an Existence of their own, out and independent of the Mind perceiving 'em. – Can there be a greater Strain of *Abstraction*, says he, than to distinguish the Existence of sensible Objects from their being perceiv'd, so as to conceive them existing unperceiv'd. See *Body*, and *External World.*[4]

The article concludes with a paragraph – about a third of a column – which does not seem to be of Berkeleian origin. Out of a total of two and one-half columns in the entire article, one and two-thirds are from the Introduction. In these selections, Chambers has not only given the heart of the argument against abstract ideas; he has tied the argument up with that of the *Principles* proper. And by suggesting that this argument would go "a good way towards setting our philosophy on a new footing," he became the first to realise its importance, thus antedating Hume by a decade.[5]

Under the article *Body*, the sub-section, "The Existence of Bodies," relates to Berkeley. It begins:

The Existence of Bodies, or of external *Objects*, is a Thing not to be demonstrated in any Manner whatever. The Order in which we arrive at the Knowledge of the Existence of *Bodies*, seems to be this; We first find we have *Sensations:* then observe we have not those Sensations when we please; and thence conclude, we are not the absolute Cause thereof, but that there is requir'd some other Cause for their Production. Thus we begin to know, that we don't exist alone, but that there are several other *Things* in the World together with us. But even this Dr. *Clark* owns to fail of a Demonstration of the Existence of a *corporeal World:* He adds, that all the Proof we have of it is this; That God would not create us such, as that all the Judgments we make about *Things* existing without us, must necessarily

[1] Intro. § 11, *Works* II, 31. ll. 12–14.
[2] Intro. § 11, *Works* II, 31, ll. 15–21; ll. 23–25. Intro. § 12, *Works* II, 32, ll. 3–16. Intro. § 13, *Works* II, 32 ll. 28–32. II, 33. ll. 7–9.
[3] Cf. Intro. § 11, *Works* II, 31, ll. 16–8.
[4] Second sentence is from *Principles* § 5, *Works* II, 42, ll. 38–40.
[5] Cf. David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, Pt. I, Sec. VII, ed. by T. H. Green and T. H. Grose (London: 1898), I, 325.

be false. If there be no External *Bodies*, it follows, that 'tis God who represents the Appearances of *Bodies* to us; and that he does it in such a manner as to deceive us. Some think this has the Force of a Demonstration: 'Tis evident God can't deceive us; 'tis evident he does deceive and delude us every Moment, if there be no *Bodies;* 'tis evident therefore, there must be *Bodies*.

Against the *Existence of Bodies*, or any External *World*, Mr. *Berkley* (sic) argues very strenuously . . .

The remainder of the sub-section, two full columns, is from the *Principles*. But despite the use of quotation marks, variations are so common as to make it little more than a paraphrase. These variations, plus the fact that there are few paragraph breaks, make the task of collation more difficult. It also indicates that Chambers did some work, for his passages are drawn from Sections between 3 and 69; thus it seems fair to infer that he wanted to present certain of Berkeley's points and suppress others.

The selections begin with a badly mutilated version of Section 3, which includes the famous example of "the table I write on," and the statement of the Principle, as it reads in the *Cyclopaedia*, that "'the *Existence* of unthinking *Beings*, without any Relation to their being perceiv'd, is unintelligible; their *Esse* is *Percipi:* Nor is it possible they should have any Existence out of the *Mind* that perceives them.' The Notion of *Bodies*, he [Berkeley] endeavours to shew founded on the Doctrine of *Abstract Ideas*." Berkeley's text, however, reads: "minds or thinking things," rather than "Mind." [1] The selections continue with a sentence from Section 5 [2] and an abridged version of 6 that omits the line about the "choir of heaven" [3] and concludes, "'. . . as long as they are not perceiv'd by Me, nor any other thinking Being, they have no shadow of Existence at all.'" But the *Principles* reads: ". . . so long as they are not actually perceived by me, or do not exist in my mind or that of any other created spirit, they must either have no existence at all, or else subsist in the mind of some eternal spirit." [4]

Only the opening of Section 7, "From what has been said, 'tis evident, there is not any other substance than *spirit*, or that which perceives," [5] is omitted, but a line in the excerpt from this section reads: "'The *Things* we perceive, are Colour, Figure, Motion, &c.

[1] *Works* II, p. 42, ll. 20–23. Chambers also omits the phrase, ". . . or that some other spirit actually does perceive it." *Works* II, 42, ll. 15–6.
[2] *Works* II, 42, ll. 50. II, 43, ll. 1–4.
[3] *Works* II, 43, ll. 21. Only ll. 22–7 appear.
[4] *Works* II, 43, ll. 25–8.
[5] *Works* II, 43, ll. 33–4.

that is, the Ideas of those *Things* . . .'" In the original it reads: "... the sensible qualities are colour [etc.] ... that is, the ideas perceived by sense." [1]

Fairly substantial, although again somewhat mutilated selections appear from Sections 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 18, 19 and 20.[2] Chambers then jumps to a badly cut Section 25,[3] where Berkeley states that our ideas are visibly inactive and (in 26) [4] that an active cause, to wit, spirit, is required to excite our ideas. No selection is taken from Section 27, which defines spirit and explains that a passive idea of active spirit is impossible, while Section 29 is paraphrased to read: "'For that I am not the Cause of my own Ideas, is plain from this, that when I open my Eyes in broad Day-light, I can't help seeing various Objects.'" [5] But the line in the *Principles*, "There is therefore some other will or spirit that produces them," [6] is omitted and Chambers' next line begins: "'Now the fix'd Rules or Methods wherein the *Mind* we depend on excites in us the Ideas of Sense, are call'd *Laws of Nature*...'" [7] Berkeley's argument [8] that this "mind we depend on" is God has thus been completely ignored. The article then skips to Sections 64 and 65 and the discussion of causation and closes with a paraphrase of Section 69, matter as "occasion." [9] Chambers concludes:

> How far the great Argument of the Maintainers of a material World, *from the Impossibility of God's deceiving us, and from the Evidence that he does so, if there be no such thing*, will go against this Reasoning, we leave to the Reader. See *External World.*

Under *Existence*, the *Cyclopaedia* contains a full column of unquoted material taken directly from Book IV, Chapters 9 and 11, of Locke's

[1] *Works* II, 43 ll. 35. II, 44, ll. 1–2.

[2] § 8, *Works* II, 44, ll. 7–12; ll. 14–20. § 9, *Works* II, 44, ll. 21–7. §10, *Works* II, 45, ll. 13–4; ll. 16–29, § 11, *Works* II, 45, ll. 30–5. § 12, *Works* II, 46, ll. 11–7.

Where we might expect a selection from sec. 13, article *Body* reads: "'Nay, many of the modern Geometricians hold, that a finite Line may be divided into an infinite Number of Parts, and each of those Infinitesimals into an infinity of others; and so on, *in Infinitum:* So that the same Thing is either Unity or Infinity; either no Number or all Number.'"

§ 14, *Works* II, 46, ll. 31–40. II, 47, ll. 1–2; ll. 4–10. § 18, *Works* II, 48, ll. 14–8; ll. 20–33. § 19, *Works* II, 49, ll. 7; 10–1; ll. 17–9. § 20, *Works* II, 49, ll. 20–8.

[3] *Works* II, 51, ll. 17–9. II, 52, ll. 1–4.

[4] § 26 appears in paraphrase.

[5] Cf. *Works* II, 53, ll. 18–20.

[6] *Works* II, 53, ll. 22–3.

[7] § 30 *Works* II, 53, ll. 29–32. II, 54, ll. 1–2.

[8] Cf. *Works* II, 53, ll. 22–9. (i.e. last sentence of § 29 and first of 30).

[9] § 64, *Works* II, 68, ll. 37–41. For Berkeley's phrase, "... which seem like so many instruments in the hand of Nature ..." and balance of sentence, Chambers reads: "'... which we call *Bodies:* and the System of those, *the World.*'" § 65, *Works* II, 69, ll. 14–20. § 69, *Works* II, 71, ll. 8–16.

Essay Concerning Human Understanding. "Such," notes Chambers, "is Mr. *Lock's* Demonstration of the *Existence* of External Bodies."

> The ingenious Mr. *Berkeley* has a quite different System. External Bodies, he contends, have no *Existence* but in a Mind perceiving them; that is, they only *exist*, quatenus they are perceiv'd; there *Existere* is *percipi*. They have no *Existence*, nor Shadow of *Existence* out of our Minds. And of this he has given us what he and some others account a Demonstration. See *Body*, *External World*, &c.

Article *External* runs about three-fourths of a column and remains unaltered in the fifth edition, although the selections it contains were also placed under *Body* and the latter's selections placed under *Existence*, an indication of the importance Chambers attached to them. The first selection is roughly the whole of Section 18,[1] where Berkeley argues that neither sense nor reason requires that we suppose the existence of substances external to the mind for the production of ideas. The senses tell us nothing of the unperceived, and reason, reminded of our experience in dreams, finds no cause to infer existence without the mind. The second selection consists of the second third of Section 19 plus the opening sentence of 20.[2] The materialists' supposition of external bodies, argues Berkeley, does not help explain how body acts on spirit or imprints ideas on the mind. Indeed, "'' ... tho' there were *External* Bodies, 'tis impossible we should ever come to know it ...'" But there is one interesting omission, the last sentence in Section 19,[3] and this is the only sentence in any of the sections from which this article is made up that contains the word "God."

The third selection, from Section 22,[4] includes the well-known challenge: "'I am content to put the whole upon this Issue: If you can but conceive it possible for one extended, moveable Substance, or, in general, for any one Idea to exist otherwise than in a Mind perceiving it; I shall readily give up the Cause.'" The fourth and final selection contains, with few variations, all of Section 73 except the last sentence. Here Berkeley suggests some reasons why men may have supposed that material substance existed. When they thought secondary qualities existed outside the mind, some unthinking substratum seemed in order, and even when men came to believe that the

[1] *Works* II, 48, ll. 14–8; ll. 20–33.
[2] § 19, *Works* II, 49, ll. 7–15. § 20, *Works* II, 49, ll. 20–2.
[3] *Works* II, 49, ll. 15–9.
[4] *Works* II, 50, ll. 7–15.

existence of these qualities was mind-dependent, they continued to believe that a material substratum was required to support primary qualities. The end of Chambers' quotation reads: "'But having shewn above, that none, even of these, can possibly exist otherwise than in a Spirit, or Mind, which perceives them, it follows, that we have no longer any Reason to suppose the Being of Matter.'" [1]

The fourth article in which I have found Berkeley directly quoted is *Matter*. After a column and a half of Newton's views on matter we read: "Mr. *Berkeley*, on the contrary, argues against the Existence of *Matter;* and endeavours to prove, that it is a mere *Ens Rationis*; and has no Existence out of the Mind." The half-column that follows, credited to *Inquiry into Principles of Human Knowledge*, contains Section 3, although with many variations, plus a sentence each from Sections 4, 5, 6, and 7.[2]

So much for the texts. What sort of impression could these selections be expected to produce, especially on a reader not directly acquainted with Berkeley's writings? Could the *Cyclopaedia* have contributed to Berkeley's sceptical reputation or to the view that God was an afterthought in his philosophy? I think so. Most of the arguments from *External* and *Matter* also appear in the most important article, *Body;* arguments which are the core of Berkeley's attack on matter conceived as existence without the mind. But as I have already pointed out in discussing *Body*, Chambers cut the passages crucial to what Luce calls the "argument *from* God," [3] and even avoids the term "created spirits." The importance of God to the positive philosophy of the *Principles* does not come up in the sections from which *External* is drawn, yet the one sentence in the original that even *mentions* God is omitted.

Chambers presents us with one more published discussion of the Berkeleian philosophy during the supposedly barren years prior to *Alciphron*, for we now see that from 1728 onwards a very special version of the *Principles* was being spread abroad in Britain. Moreover it was a version calculated to give the impression that the *Principles* was simply an attack, though an important and ingenious one, on abstract ideas and the material world, and thus in the sceptical tradition.

Chambers' version initiated a pattern which has persisted in English

[1] Cf. *Works* II, 73, ll. 6–9.

[2] § 4, *Works* II, 42, ll. 32–5. § 5, *Works* II, 42, ll. 40. II, 43, ll. 1–4. § 6, *Works* II, 43, ll. 19–28. The line noted as omitted, (note 4, p. 54) is included in this article but reads: "'. . . unless *perhaps* in the Mind of some Eternal Spirit.'" (My italics) § 7, *Works* II, 43, ll. 33–4.

[3] A. A. Luce, *Berkeley's Immaterialism* (London: 1945), p. 102.

philosophy of emasculating the *Principles*. Even in the twentieth century, Luce and Jessop have had to argue that there is a positive side to Berkeley, namely his immaterialism, yet during the same period, so distinguished a philosopher as Russell [1] has been content (as have others) to take the Berkeley of the limerick as the true Berkeley. And for the Berkeley of the *Cyclopaedia*, God is as much a *deus ex machina* as he is for the Berkeley of the limerick.

It should be noted that Chambers' study was in a position to contribute to Berkeley's philosophical reputation not simply as one-more-among-many reference works might. Rather, it was among the very first of its kind and its influence was immediate and widespread. It was a ready source for the new science and learning in a period anxious for enlightenment, so that its two volumes counted for a great deal more than would a two volume reference work in our day. As I have noted, it was originally the model of the French Encyclopedists in their grand venture: it remained their model long enough for their article *Corps* [2] to be in part a direct translation of Chambers' *Body*. So that the Berkeley of the *Cyclopaedia*, the negative Berkeley, was not only disseminated through frequent printings, but also, to some measure, through the well-read *Encyclopédie*.[3] And it is possible that Chambers' version of Berkeley created an image of the philosophy of the *Principles* for Hume, Reid, and others. By making this philosophy almost exclusively epistemology, Chambers also made easier the placing of Berkeley in the Locke-Hume triumvirate. And of course, Andrew Baxter saw Berkeley, in good part, through Chambers' eyes.

[1] Cf. Bertrand Russell, *A History of Western Philosophy* (New York: 1945), Ch. XVI, pp. 647–659. Russell notes pp. 647–8; "A limerick by Ronald Knox, with a reply, sets forth Berkeley's theory of material objects:

There was a young man who said, 'God
Must think it exceedingly odd
If he finds that this tree
Continues to be
When there's no one about in the Quad.'

REPLY

Dear Sir:
Your astonishment's odd:
I am always about in the Quad.
And that's why the tree
Will continue to be,
Since observed by
Yours faithfully,
God."

[2] *Encyclopédie*, (Paris, 1754). Article *Corps* (by D'Alembert). Vol. IV, 261 a & b, 262 a.

[3] Some discussion of Berkeley and the Encyclopedists may be found in André Leroy, "Influence de la Philosophie Berkeleyenne sur la Pensée Continentale," *Hermathena*, LXXXII (1953), 30 ff.

CHAPTER V

ANDREW BAXTER: CRITIC OF BERKELEY

Andrew Baxter, as we have had occasion in the last chapter to note, has been regarded as the author of the first extended criticism in English of Berkeley's philosophy,[1] yet that criticism itself has received little attention.[2] This chapter is devoted to an examination of the material contained in a section of Baxter's *Enquiry*[3] entitled "Dean Berkeley's scheme against the existence of matter and a material world examined, and shewn inconclusive." The section is interesting in that it reveals to us the sort of impact Berkeley's *Principles* had on a metaphysician of some ability and influence living in a world, so far as he could see, dominated on the one hand by a Malebranchian type of rationalism, on the other by Baylean Pyrrhonism, with Locke seen as leaning towards the latter. In his either/or intellectual milieu, the revolution advanced in the *Principles* would find no place.

Baxter might well have let the "refutations" Berkeley received during the 'teens and 'twenties be sufficient, or have written the *Principles* off as the effusions of a crank were it not for the fear that it constituted, through its shocking and complete philosophical misunderstanding, a threat to Baxter's own theories. Secondly, he was convinced that wittingly or no, Berkeley was playing directly into the

[1] T. E. Jessop, *A Bibliography of George Berkeley* (London: 1934), entry 241. *The Works of George Berkeley*, ed. A. C. Fraser (Oxford: 1901), III, 399. John Wild, *George Berkeley* (Cambridge: 1936), p. 533.

[2] Some brief discussion of Baxter's views will be found in the following fairly recent works: G. D. Henderson, *Chevalier Ramsay* (London: 1952), esp. pp. 122–3. Joseph Hone and M. M. Rossi, *Bishop Berkeley* (New York: 1931), p. 178. John Laird, *Hume's Philosophy of Human Nature* (London: 1932), esp. p. 90n and 169n. A. A. Luce, *The Life of George Berkeley* (London: 1949), pp. 162–3. Ernest C. Mossner, *The Life of David Hume* (Austin: 1954), esp. pp. 57 ff. Richard H. Popkin, "Berkeley and Pyrrhonism," *Review of Metaphysics*, V (1951), 223–246. Sydney C. Rome, "The Scottish Refutation of Berkeley's Immaterialism," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, III (1943), 313–325.

[3] Andrew Baxter, *An Enquiry into the Nature of the Human Soul* (London: 1733), Published anon. All references will be to the text of the second (1737) ed. Apart from minor orthographic changes, the texts of the 1733, 1737, and 1745 editions appear to be the same.

hands of the sceptics. Baxter's own work was primarily devoted to an attack on irreligious materialism and mechanism, i.e. against any view, such as that of Democritus, Epicurus, or Lucretius, that tries to account for all aspects of life and the world in terms of atoms and their motions. Maintaining the position that God is the continuing source of all action and cohesion in the universe and that the evidence for His existence takes its rise from the material world, Baxter sees that if Berkeley's denial of matter is granted, the very foundation of his own argument for the existence of God is destroyed. And so it falls to Baxter to point out the facts of metaphysical life to Berkeley lest the *Principles* either be taken as challenging his own arguments or win new converts to Pyrrhonism.

Baxter's prominence among his contemporaries is indicated by the fact that whereas it was twenty-four years before the *Principles* appeared in a second edition, Baxter's *Enquiry* made that step in only four years, and within two years of its first printing became the subject of published controversy.[1] A. C. Fraser, in his edition of *The Works of George Berkeley*, quotes a comparison of the two philosophers by Bishop Warburton which he notes "history has thus far failed to justify." [2] Part of it reads:

> [Berkeley's] pretended demonstration on this capital question [existence of matter] is the poorest, lowest, and most miserable of all sophisms: that is a sophism that begs the question. As the late Mr. Baxter has clearly shewn; a few pages of whose reasoning have not only more sense and substance than all the elegant discourses of Dr. Berkeley, but infinitely better entitle him to the character of a great genius. He was truly such; and time will come, if learning ever revive among us, when the present inattention to his admirable Metaphysics, established on the Physics of Newton, will be deemed as great a dishonour to the wisdom of this age, as the neglect of Milton's poetry was to the wit of the past.[3]

If, however, Baxter's fame as well as Baxter have long since been forgotten, it is nevertheless worth remembering that the *Enquiry* seems to have influenced those later Aberdeen Berkeley critics,

[1] Cf. John Jackson, *A dissertation on Matter and Spirit ... with some remarks on a book entitled, An Enquiry into the Nature of the Human Soul* (London: 1735). Jackson, author of numerous books and tracts, was involved in controversy with, e.g., Edmund Law and Daniel Waterland. In an answer to an earlier book by Jackson, Law discusses Baxter at length, i.e., *An Enquiry into the ideas of space, time, immensity, and eternity* ... (Cambridge: 1734), p. 140 ff. Vincent Perronet, *A Second Vindication of Mr. Locke* ... (London: 1738), p. 35, simply names (but does not discuss) Berkeley in the course of an extended treatment of Baxter. Thomas Branch, *Thoughts on dreaming ... occasioned by an Essay ... in ... An Enquiry into the Nature of the Human Soul* ... (London: 1738). Joseph Wimpey, *Remarks on a Book intitled: An Enquiry into the nature of the Human Soul* ... (London: 1741).

[2] *The Works of George Berkeley*, ed A. C. Fraser, Vol. III, p. 400.

[3] *ibid.*, p. 400. My brackets.

Thomas Reid and James Beattie.[1] And their attribution of scepticism to Berkeley owes more to Baxter than to Hume,[2] for unlike the latter, they attacked the arguments of the *Principles* along lines similar to Baxter's. Furthermore, Fraser himself notes: "Baxter, moreover was a Scot; and his criticism is interesting as a foretaste of the protracted discussion of the 'ideal theory' by Reid and his friends, and later on by Hamilton." [3]

In appraising Baxter's own philosophical attitude, the question arises as to what extent he was influenced by the early criticisms to which this study has been calling attention. To what extent did Baxter either read them or move in circles that discussed them: He apparently was not a Rankenian, [4] but his chief antagonist, Colin Maclaurin, was. There is, however, one concrete link between Baxter and the critics we have commented on: Chambers' *Cyclopaedia* [5] is a frequent source of Berkeleian references in the text of the *Enquiry*. While Baxter obviously had access to a copy of the first edition of the *Principles*,[6] his task of labelling Berkeley a sceptic was made a good deal easier by his acquaintance with the negative Berkeley of Chambers' distorted version. Baxter also refers to the Chevalier Ramsay (and uses his definition of Egoism) but whether his interest extended to reading his one-time countryman's edition of Fénelon's *Oeuvres Philosophiques* (with Tournemine's attack on Berkeley)[7] is not revealed.

Whatever other influences there were upon Baxter (and we know now that there could have been others), when he set about his examination of the *Principles* he proceeded to label Berkeley "sceptic" on several counts: Berkeley has been guilty of misunderstanding the nature of metaphysical demonstration and so has, like the Pyrrhonians, been led to demand an impossible sort of evidence for existential

[1] Thomas Reid, *An Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense* (Edinburgh: 1764); James Beattie, *An Essay on the Nature and Immutability of Truth in Opposition to Sophistry and Scepticism* (Edinburgh: 1770).

[2] Hume's only references to Berkeley are as we observed in Chapter II, three footnotes, hardly sufficient to warrant the full-scale interpretation of Hume's contribution on this matter.

[3] *The Works of George Berkeley* ed. A. C. Fraser, Vol. I, p. lxxi.

[4] The Rankenian Club and the contribution it may have made to Berkeley's philosophical reputation are discussed in Chapter II.

[5] Ephraim Chambers' *Cyclopaedia, or an Universal Dictionary of the Arts and Sciences* (London: 1728), has been discussed in the preceding chapter.

[6] Baxter quotes (*op. cit.* II, 280) a passage from *Principles* sec. 138 which was dropped by Berkeley from the second edition (in 1710 he had said "there can be no idea or notion of spirit," but omitted "or notion" in 1734 ed. Cf. *Works* II, 104, lines 29–30) No part of this section was reproduced by Chambers.

[7] See Chapter II.

statements. He has been guilty of behavioral inconsistency in arguing with men after having denied the existence of their bodies, and is thus left in a lonesome Pyrrhonism by having denied the only medium through which we know men's souls. He has been guilty of logical inconsistency in first supposing the existence of that which he later doubts – a traditional Pyrrhonian gambit. He has been guilty of a variety of epistemological errors stemming from a failure to distinguish objects from ideas of objects, one implication of which may involve him in religious scepticism by denying the existence of God. Finally, so far as Baxter can see, if Berkeley did any "thinking with the learned and speaking with the vulgar," the thinking was with learned Sceptics and the language was employed in anything but the way of the vulgar.

For Baxter the proper philosophical task is the elucidation of the eternal ideas in the Divine Mind. He sees Berkeley attempting to demonstrate truths in the realm of existence – the impossibility of which he is at pains to indicate. He sees that attempt as part of a pattern to muddle the distinctions between the kinds of evidence required for various propositions, in order that Berkeley can make a sceptical claim about the status of all sorts of statements. Content to raise objections to Berkeley's empirical meaning criterion, he never quite realizes that the criterion involves the total and complete denial of the very subject matter of early eighteenth century metaphysics. In the attack on matter and on the substance/quality distinction, Baxter sees an attack on the basic explanatory principles of philosophy and physics. Deprived of matter, we are deprived of our ground for a proof of God's existence, we are deprived of the subject matter of natural science, and as a result of these deprivations we are confined in sceptical subjectivism to our "fancy."

There was nothing new to the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries in this. Pierre Bayle (1647–1706) had been saying the same thing in his widely influential *Dictionnaire Historique et Critique*.[1] He had reduced Cartesian primary and secondary qualities to subjective appearances and denied the reality of the objects of sense.[2] Baxter,

[1] Cf. art. *Pyrrhon*, rem. B; *Zenon*, rem. G and H. Berkeley specifically refers to Bayle, *Philosophical Commentaries*, entries 358 and 424. See also entries 79 and 606; *Works* II, 78–80 (*Princ.* 86–92); *Works* II, 227–9, 244, 246, 258 (*Third Dial.*) and esp. Berkeley's statement of purpose, Preface to the *Three Dialogues*, *Works* II, 167–8. See also Richard H. Popkin, "Berkeley and Pyrrhonism," *Review of Metaphysics*, V (1951), 223–46; A. A. Luce, *The Dialectic of Immaterialism* (London: 1963), chap. iv.

[2] See Richard H. Popkin, "L'Abbé Foucher et le problème des qualités premières," *Bulletin de la Société d'Étude du XVII^e Siècle*. No. 33 (1956), 633–647. Phillip Cummins, "Perceptual Relativity and Ideas in the Mind," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, XXIV (1963), 202–14; Richard A. Watson, "The Breakdown of Cartesian Metaphysics," *Journal of the History of Philosophy*, I (1963), 177–97.

aware of the devastatingly successful wedge that Bayle [1] and others had driven between these primary and secondary qualities, sees Berkeley not as setting up a situation in which Bayle's sceptical conclusions about the existence of an external world must follow – he sees Berkeley actually recommending the Baylean dialectic. That Berkeley had boldly deprived the Pyrrhonians of their favorite target, the *esse/percipi* distinction, by removing the target with his revolutionary New Principle – *esse est percipi* – never struck home with Baxter. He sees only difficulties with *esse est percipi* and never that this was the keystone to Berkeley's refutation of Pyrrhonism – because he sees only the all too familiar pattern of the Pyrrhonians with which that refutation begins.[2]

Turning now to the detail of the arguments, "Dean Berkeley's scheme examined ..." opens:

> Some men deny all *immaterial*, and others all *material* substance; so that between them they leave *nothing at all* existing in nature. These two opposite *parties* help to expose each other; and it is hard to say, every thing considered, whose share is greatest in the absurdity of *expunging all Being out of existence*. Yet thus much we may observe, that the existence of *both substances* must be very plain, since each side maintains that the existence of the substance which they themselves assert must be self-evident: for it would be absurd in either of the parties to suppose arguments *necessary* to prove that any thing at all exists [*Enq.* II, 256].

Before examining Baxter's contentions in support of this last point, it should be noted that he believes that Berkeley took his cue, in demonstrating the non-existence of matter and the material world from the ancient Sceptics who based their doubts on the deceptiveness of dream experience. This sort of thing might be an interesting game, suggests Baxter,

> ... but when a person of great capacity and learning seems serious, and writes pieces, one after another to support this kind of Scepticism, and continues in these sentiments for such a number of years; if it be not carrying an ungenteel sort of a *banter* a great deal too far, one cannot tell what to think of it. For it seems impossible that a man should be seriously persuaded that he has neither *country* nor parents, nor any *material body*, nor *eats*, nor *drinks*, nor lies in a *house;* but that all these things are mere *illusions*, and have no existence but in the fancy [*Enq.* II. 259–60].

[1] On Bayle, see Paul Dibon (ed.), *Pierre Bayle: Le Philosophe de Rotterdam* (Amsterdam: 1959); Elisabeth Labrousse, *Pierre Bayle. Tome I: Du Pays de Foix à la Cité d'Erasme* (La Haye: 1963) and *Pierre Bayle. Tome II: Hétérodoxie et Rigorisme* (La Haye: 1964). Also, Phillip Cummins, *Pierre Bayle's Critique of Matter and Its Impact on Modern Philosophy*, University of Iowa Dissertation, 1961. Abstract in *Dissertation Abstracts*, XXII (1962), 2829–30.

[2] See Richard A. Watson, *The Downfall of Cartesianism 1673–1712* (La Haye: 1965).

Baxter's first argument starts by stating his own metaphysical position and then within that context, attacking Berkeley. This argument is intended to show that the Bishop's attempt to *demonstrate* the non-existence of matter is based on a mistaken notion of what constitutes a demonstration. For on Baxter's account, the essences or natures of things are sharply distinguished from existences, the former being the eternally consistent ideas in the Divine Intellect, but actualized as existences only at His will. Secondly, demonstration applies only to necessary truths: a demonstration must show that the denial of the conclusion entails some contradiction. In the case of matter, we can, from its essential nature (i.e. solidity and extension), demonstrate certain necessary truths, the denial of which would be contradictions. Furthermore, all the essential properties of matter can be delineated without reference to existence, i.e. solely in terms of extension. That the existence of matter is indemonstrable is clear from the fact that to deny its existence involves no contradiction of its essential properties, since the truths of extension would still be the same whether matter existed or not. Thus the existence or nonexistence of matter is *equally* indemonstrable, as indeed is *any* existential statement, the denial never being impossible. Finally, like Malebranche, Baxter holds that existential propositions cannot be derived from, nor have any necessary connection with, essential propositions because while the latter are true by necessity, the former owe their truth to the will of God.

Berkeley, in asking that necessary demonstration be applied to existential propositions is in effect saying that "... all Being should be equally necessary, and nothing that exists could ever have not existed." It is, Baxter charges, "a wilful determined kind of Scepticism," that infects men who ask that a contradiction, "*that a contingent Being exists necessarily*," be proven true.[1] According to Baxter, however, Berkeley's error is a common one, for in a later section, Baxter quotes with approval the Chevalier Ramsay's point that Pyrrhonism arises from failure to distinguish between a demonstration, a proof, and a probability.[2] For Baxter, the reports of our senses are not only adequate evidence for the existence of things, they are the only conceivable

[1] Baxter, *Enquiry*, II, 267–9.

[2] Baxter twice refers to the Chevalier Andrew Michael Ramsay's *Voyages de Cyrus* (Paris: 1727). See *Enquiry*, II, 280n, 317n. Ramsay has been discussed in Chapter II. The importance of Ramsay's and Baxter's threefold distinction between a demonstration, a proof and a probability, its role in the intellectual history of the time, and its possible influence on Hume is discussed by Richard H. Popkin in "David Hume and the Pyrrhonian Controversy," *Review of Metaphysics*, VI (1952), 65–81.

evidence, demonstration having been ruled out: "... the knowledge of the existence of external objects, by sense, is *certain knowledge*, and the evidence as great ... as the reasonable soul (as such) can desire" [*Enq.* II, 317]. For Baxter as well as for Ramsay, to ask for demonstration when this sort of evidence is available, and when demonstration can be shown inapplicable, is a form of insanity.

Baxter calls his second criticism the "argument from the *inconsistency of the method.*" [*Enq.*II, 276]. This time the inconsistency is seen between Berkeley's words and his actions. For it is inconsistent to believe that the world, matter, men, books, etc. are but dream and idea in the mind and still try to communicate these dreams to other beings, even granting that they exist.

> In short, his whole enterprise proceeds upon the supposition of the reality of what he is going to confute ... This is the fate of the generality of Sceptics ... A man of this belief, not to contradict himself, should never open his mouth, (the *idea of his mouth*, perhaps I should say) but lament in *silence* the misery of his condition, his lonely state, and the mist and darkness he is inextricably bewildered in [*Enq.* II, 271–6].

Even though Berkeley's actions belie his words, Baxter hits upon a conclusion that he thinks must be drawn from those words, and which when drawn, will prove disastrous to the philosophy of the *Principles*. Berkeley, he suggests, can hardly deny us the inference from our perceptions and ideas of men to their (material) substance, while himself trying to infer from those same perceptions and ideas to men's (spiritual) substance. As he spells out the criticism, we see Baxter's fundamental concern with the substance/attribute distinction:

> *Activity* and *perceptivity*, the only properties whereby we infer the existence of spiritual substance, are not that substance, but qualities belonging to it, any more than *figure*, *motion*, &c. are corporeal substance. If then this argument is good for any thing in the first case, it is as good in the second; and if it demonstrate matter out of existence, it equally demonstrates all substance out of existence, save the mind thus percipient, without excepting the Deity himself [*Enq.* II, 279–80].

This line of Berkeley's pushed to its proper conclusion, must end in "Egoism," which Baxter notes the Chevalier Ramsay describes as "... a species of insane Pyrrhonism"[1] in which one believes that only one's self exists. And so we find Baxter suggesting that Berkeley's argument is equally applicable to spiritual substance, a conclusion

[1] Baxter, *Enquiry*, II, 280n. Baxter quotes "Mr. Ramsay's Discourse upon Mythology, Part I near the end."

that Hume is traditionally credited with having drawn,[1] although one which we have seen hinted at in the *Journal Litéraire* review.

Should Berkeley attempt to avoid the inconsistency of trying to convince human beings of anything, (after having denied the possibility of knowing whether they exist), by saying that God excites the ideas of men's souls in us, Baxter is prepared for him. This, he claims, would really be to base the existence of men's souls on God's not deceiving us. That is, God – being no deceiver – would not excite ideas in us which make us believe in the existence of their referents, unless such referents did really exist. "And this would be founding his belief of immaterial substance, precisely upon *the reason* which Dr. *Clarke* hath brought, to shew that we cannot possibly be deceived, in concluding that material substance really exists without the mind" [*Enq.* II, 283].

Not content with pointing out a trap he thinks Berkeley is about to topple into, he claims: a) that Berkeley teaches men to distrust their senses, and b) that he may evade this, but only at the price of making God a deceiver.[2] There is another difficulty Baxter thinks Berkeley must face in saying that God, rather than external objects and beings, excites ideas in us: "When we think we are tempted by other men, to commit an *unjust* or *immoral* action, God immediately tempts us" [*Enq.* II, 313]. This is so, according to Baxter, because on Berkeley's scheme, the existence of men's bodies having been denied, we no longer have grounds for believing in the existence of men's souls and thus we cannot attribute temptation to the abuse of man's freedom. It would not be so bad if God merely aroused the ideas of the actions and words of the tempter in us, but as Berkeley is seen as having denied

[1] A further implication of Berkeley's "idea" requirement is this: "It is true [Baxter acknowledges] *thinking, willing, &c.* cannot be painted in the imagination, as objects having figure and magnitude may: but might not this *Author* thus prove, that we can have no idea or notion of *virtue, justice, truth.* And if this consequence be fair, as it seems to be; this scheme is a complication of *all the species of Scepticism* that have ever yet been broached." Baxter, *Enquiry*, II, 281.

[2] Cf. *ibid.*, II, 285–6. "... the man who endeavours to overturn *the evidence of sense universally*, endeavours to introduce the *wildest* and most *unbounded Scepticism*, let his pretences be what they will. And Dean *Berkeley*, by teaching men to distrust their senses, teaches men to distrust his *Book* in the first place; it is but an idea like other things, every word and line in it: all his actions and great undertakings are but *mere dream and chimaera;* and his designs disappoint themselves in every respect. If once we refuse that reason which Dr. *Clarke* has assigned for believing the existence of *external objects*, and a *material world;* there is in truth no stopping till a man has denied every thing that exists without his own mind, except it be perhaps the existence of some *delusory Being* who constantly cheats and imposes upon him. How this can be such an *antidote* against *Scepticism* and *Atheism* is not easy to be imagined. We might with equal reason affirm, I think, that putting out the eyes is *the best cure* for dimness of sight."

our grounds for belief in souls, he has given us no alternative but to suppose that the agent intending evil is also God. Baxter is particularly sensitive to this difficulty because he must exonerate God from crime in his own system, where God is the "*first* and *universal Cause*," [*Enq.* I, 162] and in which "*matter cannot be moved without an immaterial Being*" [*Enq.* I, 198]. He wants to argue that while it is the case that God sustains our bodies and the world and is the immediate source of all motion in matter, "the *bare materiality* of the action, that is, *in so far as it is performed by the motion of matter*, is in itself neither morally good nor evil," [1] good or evil residing in the will of man. But, he suggests, no such solution is open to a man who has disallowed grounds for belief in the existence of men's souls.

Baxter's next argument is the application to Berkeley of another criticism which has traditionally been directed against Pyrrhonists, i.e. that they first accept the reality of that which they later doubt. Baxter is convinced that one of the fundamental errors in modern philosophy was the acceptance, by Descartes and others, including Berkeley, of the arguments of the ancient sceptics against the validity of sensory knowledge on the grounds of dreams and illusions. The denial of the evidence of our senses not only introduces scepticism, but it can be shown to involve an inconsistency. Pyrrho, he argues, was inconsistent in raising doubts about the material world from mirror experiences inasmuch as he must have known the difference between reflection and reality in order to make the initial distinction – and if he knew it, he had no grounds for doubting [cf. *Enq.* II, 326]. Descartes is similarly guilty in raising doubts as to whether he is dreaming or not.[2]

Baxter sees that Berkeley is willing to accept the resultant view that secondary qualities are in the mind, a view which Descartes and other seventeenth century philosophers adopted under fire of the sceptics. He sees the denial of matter, however, and so is totally non-

[1] *ibid.*, I, 205. Berkeley himself offers a similar solution in the third of the *Three Dialogues*. Cf. *Works* II, 236–7.

[2] Cf. Baxter, *Enquiry*, II, 319, 320, 325n. "*That we have no certain mark to know whether we are awake or asleep*. This is what a man of plain, common sense would laugh at ... The inconsistency of this *doubt*, or this question, is plain, I think, in that no man has a right to make it, but he who hath experience of both the different states. If he has only been in one of them, he can know *no difference*, and therefore be in *no doubt:* and if he has been in both, and remembers a difference, he must know it; and therefore is obliged to answer himself, as having a conscious experience of the thing he desires to be informed in ... From all this, it appears still more plain, I think, that *Scepticism*, in any shape that may be given it, is inconsistent with itself, in supposing the thing concerning which it pretends to doubt; and therefore it defeats its own design every way."

plussed by Berkeley's title page statement of Purpose [1] or such lines as "We are not for having any man turn *sceptic*, and disbelieve his senses ..." [2] For Baxter, the way to prevent the infinite regresses of the criteria problem as they apply to veridical sensation (i.e. asking for the criterion by which a proffered criterion for the truth of sensible knowledge is determined, and then for a criterion of that, *ad infinitum*) from producing scepticism is by understanding the nature of sensory evidence and thus by never taking seriously the very first doubt. Like Reid, Baxter was convinced that to accept the doctrine of ideas was bound to lead one to seek the wrong sort of evidence, and one need only look at Descartes, as well as Berkeley, to see this. The way to defeat scepticism was not to yield in the fight over a criterion for sensory evidence, but rather to distinguish the sort of evidence to be sought and to point out the inconsistencies that arose from applying the criteria of one level of evidence to another.

Thus far then, Baxter's criticisms can be clustered under three sorts of arguments. First it is claimed that by being mistaken about the nature of a demonstration, Berkeley has been led to demand an impossible kind of evidence for the existence of an external world. That kind of evidence not being forthcoming, he has denied the existence of the world. Whereas in the first criticism Baxter mounts a metaphysical attack, the second criticism is pragmatic: Berkeley may well deny the existence of the external world in theory, but he affirms it in practice. The third criticism is logical: Baxter finds Berkeley assuming distinctions in his argument which he later denies. In each case Baxter is amazed to think that anyone could intend the *Principles* as an attack on scepticism, for if it is not nonsense, it is pure Pyrrhonism. Once one has given in at a single point to the sceptics, all is lost. Berkeley having, according to Baxter, given in at several crucial points, must pay the consequences. So it is we find Berkeley's arguments taken as Pyrrhonian and then attacked with several anti-Pyrrhonian weapons from the Dogmatists' arsenal.

However, a new line of attack, primarily epistemological, comes by way of a textual examination of Section 4 of Berkeley's *Principles*,

[1] Cf. title page of the *Principles:* "Wherein the chief causes of error and difficulty in the Sciences, with the grounds of Scepticism, Atheism, and Irreligion, are inquired into." (*Works*, II, 1.) The title page of the *Three Dialogues* is more explicit, although Baxter may not have seen it: "The design of which is plainly to demonstrate the reality and perfection of human knowledge, the incorporeal nature of the soul, and the immediate providence of a Deity: in opposition to Sceptics and Atheists. Also to open a method for rendering the Sciences more easy, useful, and compendious." (*Works* II, 147).

[2] *Works* II, 57, lines 27–8. (*Principles*, § 40, 1st & 2nd eds.).

and this particular text is chosen because Baxter thinks it comes as near to being the "demonstration" referred to in *Principles* Section 7 [1] as he can find. This marks a change in Baxter's approach: confident that the metaphysical, pragmatic and logical arguments have been decisive on their levels, he is turning to Berkeley's own text and his purported demonstration. He wants especially to show that Berkeley has failed to produce a demonstration, that is, that it is perfectly possible to assert the existence of matter without a "contradiction in terms." And for the purposes of this argument, whether Berkeley misunderstands the nature of demonstration is of less importance, for Berkeley himself several times uses such terms as "inconceivable," [2] and "downright contradiction," [3] in connection with the existence of matter, thus giving every indication, as Baxter sees it, that he is proposing the argument as a demonstration. Furthermore – Baxter need only answer the well-known challenge at the conclusion of Section 22 in order to counter Berkeley on his own terms.

"'For what,'" Baxter quotes *Principles* Section 4,[4] "'are the foremention'd objects [houses, mountains, rivers] but the things we perceive by sense? And what, I pray you, do we perceive besides our own ideas or sensations? And is it not plainly repugnant, that any of these, or any combination of them, should exist unperceived?'" [5]

In response to the first of these three queries from Section 4, Baxter argues that inasmuch as Berkeley admits that he perceives objects by sense, he cannot, without proof, equate the objects of sensations with the sensations. We can, he suggests, reflect upon a sensation and thus consider it as an object to the mind, but this is not to make a sensation an object to itself. So, then, Baxter takes the first query itself to imply that "*we perceive things* by sense," but –

> ... in the next it is taken for granted, that we *perceive nothing* but our own sensations; that is, nothing by means of the senses. This is what one may call sleight-of-hand reasoning. Let us join both questions in one. *What are the objects of our sensations, but those very sensations themselves?* This question proposed somewhat less juglingly, implies or supposes the truth of this proposition. *Our sensations have no objects existing without the mind*: which is really the whole point in controversy. And to take this for granted, is to

[1] *Works* II, 43, line 35. "Demonstration" replaced by "proof" in the 2nd ed., a suggestive alteration in the light of Ramsay's threefold distinction.
[2] *Works* II, 48, line 13. (*Principles*, § 17, 1st and 2nd ed.).
[3] *Works* II, 50, lines 10–11. (*Principles*, § 22, 1st and 2nd eds.).
[4] Baxter, *Enquiry*, II, 287. His brackets.
[5] Luce and Jessop put the "I pray you" phrase in the first of the sentences here quoted by Baxter, he puts it in the second. Cf. *Works* II, 42, line 32.

beg the thing to be proved; or to suppose the debate at an end [*Enq.* II, 287–8].

Berkeley's first query can be answered, it is claimed, without getting involved in a contradiction, if one keeps in mind that Berkeley has only been able to set his trap by begging the question.

Ralph Barton Perry has described this "specious argument" of Berkeley's as "definition by initial predication," [1] and Thomas Reid's criticism of the "ideal system" [2] requires, like Baxter's, that the sensation/object distinction be kept clear.

To the second query, Baxter replies that we perceive not only sensations, but the objects which give rise to them. The cause which excites the sensation "we call matter: D.*B.* [i.e. Dean Berkeley] says it is *God Almighty*" [*Enq.* II, 290]. Berkeley's trouble is that because he does not perceive the cause of his perceptions he denies the cause. But this sort of inference is equally applicable to Berkeley's own explanation that God is the immediate cause of our perceptions. "... if his not perceiving the *cause* of his perception, is a sufficient ground of *denying* such cause, or of making it the same thing with the very perceptions themselves; then, God, not being perceived, either is not; or is but a very perception in the mind of man: *Absit blasphemia!*" [*Enq.* II, 292–3].

In response to the third question, Baxter replies:

> Our *ideas* surely cannot exist without the mind: but their *objects* may: and do. And they are still sensible objects, though they fall not under the senses, at all times and in all places: i.e. though they are not *objected to the sense*, in places where they are not; and at times when our senses are not directed to the places where they are. With respect to this it is observable, that he hath another very short way of demonstrating his main point. He *supposes* that the term [to *exist*] hath the same import, when applied to corporeal things, as to be *perceived:* asserting (strongly indeed) that it is otherwise unintelligible. Whence it clearly follows; Matter which is *not perceived*, doth *not exist!* [3]

The exclamation mark occurs because Baxter is not content to accept *esse est percipi* as an axiom, for it does not fulfill the requirement of self-evidency. Nor does he find any occasion on which Berkeley shows that there is a necessary connection between the *terms esse* and *percipi*. While it is true, Baxter notes, that we speak of God's *esse* being

[1] Ralph Barton Perry, *Present Philosophical Tendencies* (New York: 1912), pp. 126ff.
[2] Thomas Reid, *op. cit.*, Cf. chap. v, § 6.
[3] Baxter, *Enquiry*, II, 294–5. His brackets.

existere, this is because His nature includes necessary existence, but no one takes the nature of matter to include being perceived.

He argues from the meaning of the word [*exist*] that, when spoken of material things, it is the same as *to be perceived;* but who besides the *Author* himself, hath affixed this meaning to that *term?* Is it the common acceptation of the word, when applied to material things? Hath he the *Philosophers*, or even the *vulgar* on his side in this, as he seems to insinuate elsewhere? [1]

"Moreover, what reason," asks Baxter, "can be assigned why the existence of matter should be confined *to the being perceived*, more than the existence of other substance?" [*Enq.* II, 296n]. If Berkeley should reply that what is not perceived does not exist,

... then any other substance (*the human soul*, e.g.) if it doth not always perceive itself, must have *intervals* of non-existence, as it ceases to perceive itself ... It is true, it must always think, upon his scheme, having no restraint or interruption from matter; but then he will have a difficulty to explain, how it could be so affected without matter, as to make this appear doubtful. [*Enq.* II, 296n].

Once more we find Baxter attempting to apply a traditional metaphysical distinction, in this instance, that between material and spiritual substance. If we are to use *esse est percipi* as our criterion of existence, then we ought to apply it to spiritual substance as well. Without pressing the difficulties he sees obviously will ensue for all existents, once the perceivers, on whom Berkeley makes existents depend, can themselves have interrupted existences, he suggests another difficulty. He will allow Berkeley's spiritual substances uninterrupted existence, but only because they are never affected by matter. But, he then asks, how can one raise doubts about the existence of matter after one has denied the possibility of matter affecting spiritual substances?

Pushing the question of interrupted existence further, Baxter notes: "The *Table* I write on, when I do not perceive it, *doth not* exist, but when I sit down to write on it, it *comes again into* existence" [*Enq.* II, 296n]. Then Baxter asks whether, if *esse est percipi* is taken seriously, it will not result in a thing having more existence as the number of perceivers increases. Berkeley's own struggles with an anticipated variant of this question are to be found in the *Three Dialogues*,[2] but

[1] *ibid.*, II, 295n. His brackets.

[2] The objection stated by Baxter is of course partially dealt with in *Principles* § 45 ff., but the matter gets complex when it comes to the problem of error in the *Third Dialogue* (*Works* II, 238) and also as to whether two people see the same thing (*Works* II, 247) especially in the light of the opening discussion of that Dialogue (*Works* II, 227–30).

Baxter merely touches the issue and then suggests that the continued existence of matter can be accounted for, even on Berkeley's scheme, by letting God perceive it! [1] It may be recalled, however, that the *Journal Litéraire* reviewer balked at the "solution" proffered in the *Three Dialogues*. (See Chapter III.)

Just before concluding his textual analysis, Baxter observes:

All this then ends in the following *childish sophism:* sensible things are but the *objects of sense*. Whenever they are not the objects of sense, *they are no longer sensible things*. Therefore, when they are not the objects of sense, or not perceived, they *are not*. But would not D. *B*. allow his house to be a *combustible thing*, unless it were actually on fire? He might, with equal force of reason prove, that unless it were in flame, it were *no house* at all [*Enq*. II, 297].

How, Baxter wants to know, can Berkeley talk about dispositional properties if he denies the substance in which, as any sound-minded metaphysician knows, the properties inhere?

Baxter has gone to some length in this analysis of Berkeley's three queries, however, because he believes he has satisfied the requirements of the challenge stated in *Principles* Section 22, most of which he quotes,[2] but after "'. . . I am content to put the whole upon this issue; if you can but conceive it possible for any one extended, moveable substance, or in general for any one *idea*,'" Baxter adds parenthetically, "here *extended moveable substance*, and idea, are supposed *species* and *genus;* in which case he is very safe," while the passage continues in part, "'to exist any other ways, than in a mind perceiving it, I shall readily give up the cause . . . I say the *bare possibility* of your opinion's being true, shall pass for an argument that it is so'" [*Enq*. II, 299–300]. The safety Baxter refers to derives from his general contention that Berkeley has begged rather than proven the question of whether sensations and their objects are identical.

But we take him at his word. Having shewn that his demonstration doth not conclude; and conceiving it very possible that the whole *compages* of external bodies may exist without the mind, and no ways in it; the argument is at

[1] Cf. Baxter, *Enquiry*, II, 296n–7n. "If another person perceives it along with me, must it have a *double existence?* And if three of us sit at it, must its existence be three times greater, than if I looked at it alone? And, lastly, if it were true that *being perceived* constituted the existence of matter, and *all created substance*, the *Infinite Mind* perceives them without intermission; and this will constitute the continued existence of matter upon his own principles, I think; unless he would say that matter *exists continually* as the Deity perceives it, and *doth not exist continually*, as other Beings do not perceive it."

[2] He omits only the first two sentences of the section, (i.e. *Works* II, 50, lines 3–6) and reproduces the remainder with some slight variations from the text of the first ed.

end with him. No man can ever be seriously persuaded, that this Author's scheme is true in fact, let him use the utmost violence possible to his reason. The thing itself is of such a nature, that it will not admit of belief: so far is the contrary from being a *downright contradiction*, as he says.[1]

Baxter thinks he has set up a case which fulfills the requirements of the challenge, not by *demonstrating* the existence of matter, but simply by arguing that its possibility is not inconsistent. Of course he also thinks that having cleared up Berkeley's metaphysical muddle by showing that demonstrable evidence cannot be adduced for existential statements, he can go on to claim that sensory evidence is perfectly satisfactory evidence. Although Baxter has argued at length over the epistemological issues, and expresses, as above, considerable self-confidence at this point, he continues to worry this side of his criticism. He notes that given the principle *esse est percipi*, and granted that whatever part of an idea is not perceived is no part of it, it follows that a part less than the minimum sensible "is no part of it, or nothing." Therefore, if "*in the idea* of a solid inch of matter," there is no trillionth part because such a part would be smaller than the minimum sensible ("we may make the [denominator] greater, for those who have very good eyes"), but if there is no such part, then "the whole idea is made up of a million of million of *no ideas:* or the whole idea is no idea" [*Enq.* II, 302].

This divisibility problem [2] is best avoided by noting not only that our perceptions of substance are indivisible but also that among the attributes of substance itself are divisibility and extension. Baxter argues that our perceptions of (divisible and extended) substance are themselves indivisible, for if perceptions were divisible we would perceive their parts, but as is clear in the case of the trillionth part of a perception an inch long, we do not. Further, it follows that the "percipient Being in us *is not matter*," [*Enq.* II, 304n] for if perceptions of length, etc., were in a material substance, they would themselves have

[1] Baxter, *Enquiry*, II, 300, 301. Baxter's footnote to the second sentence reads: "It is to no purpose to insist longer on any thing contained in his Book. It will all be found to be a repetition of this supposed demonstration. He carps very much in his Introduction at abstract ideas; but the usefulness and necessity of them is never a whit the less; a remarkable enough instance of which will appear immediately."

[2] Divisibility was one problem that Berkeley considered insoluble on any account other than his own. Concern with this problem dominates Berkeley's remarks on the minimum sensible from the *Philosophical Commentaries* (and *NTV*) onward (cf. *Works* IV). His concern was itself prompted by Bayle's application (cf. *Dictionnaire*, art. *Zenon*) of Zeno's paradoxes to seventeenth century philosophers, especially Cartesians. The present day failure to appreciate Bayle's remarkable influence as a philosopher is largely responsible for the lack of sensitivity to this concern of Berkeley's.

dimensions, etc. Perceptions of extension would then be modifications of matter, something like, Baxter seems to think, internal material models of external matter. So not only does the divisibility argument indicate that perceptions are indivisible, but also that the perceiving soul is indivisible and immaterial. Aware that mental imagery nevertheless seems to have extension, he adds:

If the faculty of imagination requires a *picture extended in length and breadth*, but no idea or perception, *as it is in the mind*, is extended, Does not the power of imagination as much infer a material sensory or organ, as a pure or simple perception requires an unextended or immaterial percipient? In imagination, or in sensation of visible objects, the perception *is not itself a picture;* but undoubtedly *it is the perception* of a picture somewhere lodged. And if this be so; imagination, as it is the perception of a picture, shews not only that the soul is immaterial, *but that it is united to a material sensory*, where the picture is impressed, and to which it applies for the perception of it; or that matter exists. How far this argument is applicable to overturn D.*B.*'s scheme the Intelligent will determine ... [*Enq.* II, 305n].

He draws this argument out by suggesting that solidity, figure, divisibility, etc., are properties of substance, and if they are properties of our ideas, then our ideas are substances.[1] This impossible conclusion is avoided, Baxter argues, by the realization that there must be a substance of which ideas are properties. Granted we have our ideas, we can thus infer not only the possibility but the existence of matter as well.[2] But Berkeley, having even confounded the substance/attribute distinction along with his other errors, is forced to say:

The *ideas* of the spaces *run over* by an *idea*, falling by the *idea* of its own gravity, are as the *ideas* of the squares of the *ideas* of the times: for here all must be expressed by *idea*, their objects being impossible. These are shocking to the last degree. It is no wonder that the men who broach this

[1] Berkeley does discuss this point in *Principles* sec. 49: "... it no more follows the soul or mind is extended because extension exists in it alone, than it does that it is red or blue, because those colours are on all hands acknowledged to exist in it, and no where else." (1st ed., Cf. *Works* II, 61). The balance of the defense on this point is an application of the attack on abstract ideas to the language of modes and attributes. Berkeley may have done himself a practical disfavor by his candid self criticism, for Baxter was not the last to draw part of his critical arguments directly from Berkeley's own text. See also, *Three Dialogues*, *Works* II, 249–50.

[2] Baxter, *Enquiry*, II, 306. A variation of this theme appears in the long footnote at the end of Baxter's "Examination." "If our ideas have no parts, and yet if we *perceive parts*, it is plain *we perceive something* more than *our own perceptions*. But both these are certain; we are *conscious* that we perceive parts, when we look upon a *house*, a *tree*, a *river*, the *dialplate* of a clock or watch. This is a short and easy way of being certain that something exists without the mind." (*ibid.*, II, 337n). Dugald Stewart takes these lines to contain the premises of Reid's argument, cf. *The Collected Works of Dugald Stewart*, ed. Sir W. Hamilton, (Edinburgh: 1854), V, 421.

scheme, should bear a grudge to Mathematicks. They are diametrically opposite to each other: and if there be any truth in that science, this must fall [*Enq.* II, 309].

In his concluding remarks, Baxter defends himself against the suggestion that by interpretations of this sort he has only ridiculed Berkeley's "Scheme." In the process, he returns to the problem of the divisibility of ideas and in so doing throws some light on his line about "Mathematicks." If one takes the Pythagorean theorem, he argues, [*Enq.* II, 336n] and substitutes "idea of square" for "square" and so on throughout, the theorem becomes false, not simply ridiculous (and the "Scheme" with it), because ideas, having no parts, can have no magnitude and thus one cannot be larger than another nor be in dimensional ratios, one to another.

Finally, Baxter's closing paragraph suggests that certainly at one level he anticipated the common-sense school, and perhaps might be labelled a precursor of contemporary ordinary language analysis!

To apply common language to a quite different sense, and then to suppose this *arbitrary application* an argument to overturn common sense, or to contend for the propriety of such application, is as inconsistent as any thing in the scheme. It is plain *figure*, *distance*, *magnitude*, *motion*, are no language on this hypothesis. These are supposed real in the *language*, and it is thence concluded there are no such things. This is an open fallacy [*Enq.* II, 344n].

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It is, I think, not unfitting that the final figure in this extended discussion of the early reception of Berkeley's philosophy should be Baxter – not only because of Baxter's role as author of the first extended criticism in English, but also because he raises some genuine philosophical issues. And inasmuch as Baxter's comments anticipate some of the traditional ones, a brief evaluation of them is in order.

First, Baxter never grasps the significance of the attack on abstract ideas and as a result, fails to realize that on Berkeley's "empirical meaning criterion" the very definition of matter is inconsistent as it requires a conception of the unconceived. Thus Baxter's analysis of demonstration, and the claim that Berkeley has tried to make an (existential) possibility an (essential) necessity is beside the point. But while Berkeley was familiar with this technical use of demonstration, [Cf. *Pr* § 107] Baxter never saw that Berkeley was attacking the idea of matter *as itself* being contradictory. Thus Baxter persisted

in offering a "real" definition in terms of extension, etc. The failure to understand Berkeley's denial of the very *meaning* of matter plagues the section devoted to textual analysis of Berkeley's challenge and is also reflected in his claim that even in Berkeley's terms, the existence of matter is assured by God's perceiving it.

But if Baxter missed the place of Berkeley's analysis of meaning in the total argument for the New Principle, he did call attention to some difficulties which still seem to be there after due account is made for these authors' widely divergent viewpoints. He wonders, given the denial (as he sees it) of the substance/attribute distinction, how Berkeley will be able to treat the question of dispositional properties. At another place, he suggests that if *esse est percipi* implies there are as many existences as there are perceivers, then the Bishop is supporting a very uncommonsensical opinion, to say the least. Had Baxter pushed further his queries on the status of the ideas of justice, virtue, etc. and studied *Principles*, Introduction, Section 20, with its hints of an emotive analysis of ethical terms,[1] he might well have redoubled his charges of scepticism.

Baxter, with his notion of elucidating eternal ideas in the Divine Mind, was bound to have difficulty over the meaning issue. To have been convinced would have required a complete metaphysical conversion; to have understood it would have required a more drastic break with tradition than either he or most of his contemporaries were capable of. Whoever fathered the apocryphal story that a talk with Berkeley precipitated Malebranche's death may well have realized that Malebranche would have been thoroughly bewildered by anyone who thought the sense-world was what one saw in "seeing all things in God," or who thought it a proper subject for philosophical speculations. Malebranche too, had he understood the anti-metaphysical implications of the empirical meaning criterion of the "Malbranchiste de bonne foi," would have had grounds for questioning the "good faith" as well as the sobriquet. More likely, he would have suggested that Berkeley simply did not understand what philosophers meant by "idea," "idea of extension," "matter," etc.

Second, Baxter raises what has become a traditional issue: that Berkeley failed to distinguish sensations from objects of sensations. British philosophers from Reid to Moore progressively expanded this

[1] This claim has been made. For a discussion of Berkeley as anticipating the emotive theory doctrines of A. J. Ayer and C. L. Stevenson, see Avrum Stroll, *The Emotive Theory of Ethics* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: 1954), chap. iii.

into a full scale epistemological analysis. The seeds of that criticism can be found here. Baxter raises it initially as simply another instance of his major complaint, that Berkeley's metaphysical obtuseness has led him to muddle the substance/attribute distinction.

Berkeley was sensitive to the contrast between a sensation and an object of a sensation. Given his use of "idea" and the distinctions between sense and imagination, particularly in *Principles* 28-33 and 37, the contrast was clearly intended to be a feature of his immaterialism. Any criticism must take these passages into account and not only those from the *First Dialogue* [*W* II, 195]. Although the latter do effectively dispose of Russell's criticism that Berkeley simply failed to notice the contrast. Nor was Berkeley abandoning the substance/attribute distinction: what he was denying was the notion of "real and unperceived" substance or matter. Baxter, however, takes the denial of (metaphysical) substance to be a denial of all variants of the distinction. He returns again and again to the sceptical consequences which follow (by preventing all sorts of inferences) when one is deprived of this basic explanatory principle.

While I think it is perfectly clear that Berkeley *wanted* to be able to keep the contrast, he was by no means clear how to do it. Berkeley sometimes follows a very rigorous view, driven by the logic of the attack on abstract ideas, to treat identity as an abstract idea. At other times he makes God perceive continuously what we perceive intermittently – a position which does not square well with his earlier rigor. The conflict may stem from the ruthlessly empirical mood – with nature as Divine Language versus the more Malebranchian mood – with God the cause of nature and source of permanence as well as of uniformity.[1] Put another way, we might say that Berkeley is struggling to keep the (explanatory) benefits of the substance/attribute distinction without the liabilities of (metaphysical) unperceived matter: he wants to throw out "fine-spun" metaphysics, but he wants Christian doctrine to remain intelligible. The tension is readily apparent between passages where Berkeley is "one with common sense" and, for example, the sophisticated phenomenalism of the *Third Dialogue*. There are plenty of problems which follow from Berkeley's handling of the substance/attribute issue, problems which several of Baxter's own

[1] This conflict has been carefully examined by Denis Grey, "The Solipsism of Bishop Berkeley," *Philosophical Quarterly*, II (1952), 338–349; "Berkeley on Other Selves: A study in Fugue," *Philosophical Quarterly*, IV (1954), 28–44. See also Appendix A.

objections against the absolute denial of the distinction nevertheless manage to cut across.

Third, a sizeable portion of Baxter's criticism, like the vast majority of Berkeley criticism, stands only by ignoring the doctrine of notions. Baxter fails to follow Berkeley's claim that because spirits are active, we can have no idea of them – ideas being passive. Matter is ruled out because we have no idea of it, and matter being defined as inactive, could have no *notion* [1] of it. He suggests that Berkeley's denial of material substance, on the ground that only its qualities are perceived, could also be applied to "activity and perceptivity" (qualities) and thus to spiritual substance as well. But Baxter's metaphysical presuppositions allow him to make a more subtle criticism here than merely applying Berkeley's own attack on abstract ideas to his own theories; Baxter is suggesting that in substance/quality language, consistency obliges Berkeley to deny substance either in none or in both instances. Berkeley, however, does not say that he infers spirit from activity and perceptivity, but rather "... that which I denote by the term I, is the same with what is meant by *soul* or *spiritual substance*," [2] that is, that which perceives; and of this we have a notion but not an idea.

Unfortunately, Baxter never quotes or specifically refers to the sections in which spirits are discussed (except Section 138) and so never comments on Berkeley's own account. This is unfortunate, for Berkeley's account of spiritual entities was no accidental afterthought. He was concerned, as was many another post-Lockean (e.g. Edward Stillingfleet), with the question of a "thing" which could be a candidate for immortality.[3] Berkeley's religious interests contribute not only to the place he accords God in his philosophy, but also, I think – and hope on another occasion to be able to show, directly to his account of spirits and the ideas they have.

Furthermore, throughout the entire section on Berkeley, Baxter tries to endow matter with at least enough activity to cause perceptions, etc., although when stating his own positive views he says: "... to

[1] Hylas asks whether we can have a *notion* of matter in the third *Dialogue*, but withdraws the question when finally convinced that either an idea or a notion of matter would involve a contradiction. Cf. *Works* II, 232.

[2] *Works* II, 104–5. (*Principles*, § 139, both eds.).

[3] See, for example, John W. Yolton, *John Locke and the Way of Ideas* (London: 1956), esp. chap. iv, § 3. William Carroll in his *Dissertation upon the tenth chapter of the fourth Book of Mr. Locke's Essay* ... (London: 1706), p. 24, charges that it was Locke's "Design ... to establish Spinoza's Hypothesis in his Essay ..." Pierre Bayle also found suggestions of Spinozism in Locke. In this latter connection see my "Berkeley on the Immortality of the Soul," *The Modern Schoolman*, XXXVII (1960), (i) 77–94; (ii) 197–212.

begin with examining the nature of matter, and shewing its *inactivity*, makes the shortest work with Atheists of all denominations" [*Enq.* I, 82]. And again: "... in short *all* the *motions* we observe in the heavens, or on the earth, except the spontaneous motions of animals, and the immediate consequences of these (of which exception yet more hereafter) are the *immediate work of the first Cause* ..." [1] And so in discussing Berkeley, he not only refuses to use the terms as Berkeley does, he violates his own usage to the extent of saying that matter, not God is the cause of our perceptions.[2]

Fourth, Baxter seems also to have joined those who have missed seeing the central position God fulfills in the *Principles*. God is not merely a metaphysical entity required by the logic of the case, but He is that "*in whom we live, and move, and have our being.*" [3] The careful delineation of His role unfolded from Sections 3 through 30 is crucial to the positive philosophy of the *Principles*. These include, however, the passive-idea/active-spirit distinctions noted above, and so it is comprehensible that these too should have been misunderstood – especially so, given the influence Chambers' *Cyclopaedia* could have exercised on Baxter. Misunderstanding these distinctions between perception by ideas and by notions, Baxter attempts to apply *esse est percipi* to God; to argue that if not perceiving (via idea) a cause is grounds for denying it, then God's existence, not being perceived must be denied. Berkeley, however, notes:

> *Spirits* and *ideas* are things so wholly different, that when we say, *they exist, they are known*, or the like, these words must not be thought to signify any thing common to both natures. There is nothing alike or common in them: and to expect that by any multiplication or enlargement of our faculties, we may be enabled to know a spirit as we do a triangle, seems as absurd as if we should hope to *see a sound.*[4]

These lines should have suggested to Baxter that something had gone awry in his own criticisms of Berkeley, but he seems not to have noticed them – and like so many Berkeley critics, proceeded to try to see sounds.

In his analysis of *esse est percipi*, and specifically, in asking whether

[1] Baxter, *Enquiry*, I, 95, and also, "For all these, without exception, are but the *effects* of the *natural powers* of matter (as they are called) and those powers are no other than the forces *immediately impressed by him* ..."

[2] In his *Philosophical Commentaries*, Berkeley had said (entry 625): "Matter once allow'd. I defy any man to prove that God is not matter."

[3] *Works* II, 109. (*Principles* § 149, 1st and 2nd eds.).

[4] *Works* II, 106. (*Principles* § 142, 1st and 2nd eds.).

a thing seen by two people has double existence, Baxter is raising, as I have suggested, a difficult problem for Berkeley. It is first offered as another dreadful consequence of throwing substance and attribute into the same category. Then Baxter suggests that Berkeley should have seen that even on his own terms, the existence of matter is guaranteed by God. The latter objection fails, as pointed out above, because Baxter ignores the role of the attack on abstract ideas in the denial of matter. Nevertheless, Baxter is, I think, partially correct in raising the objection in the first instance. *Principles* Section 48, for example, in avoiding the problem of existence-intermittency, leads one to wonder which tree (idea) is the *real* one – mine, yours or God's? Or is there but one tree? Generally, in his concern for permanence, his answer is that of naive realism, but Berkeley does not really face up to the problem until the third of the *Three Dialogues*. It begins realistically enough: scepticism arises from our distinguishing between appearances and realities, and then being forever in doubt about the inner natures of the latter; "the real tree existing without [the] mind is truly known and comprehended by (that is, *exists in*) the infinite mind of God" [*W* II, 235], which resolves the intermittency problem; and finally, the idea/thing usage is said to be purely verbal and hence the source of no trouble. But then Hylas asks, how about pains? And Berkeley replies: "that God, though He knows and sometimes causes painful sensations in us, can Himself suffer pain, I positively deny" [*W* II, 240]. Thus we in our imperfection have different ideas from God – and given this dualism, the old troubles about truth and reality arise.

The worst difficulties as we have already seen in discussing the *Journal Litéraire* review, turn up at the end of the *Third Dialogue*, when Berkeley breaks with the common-sense position of the early part of the *Dialogue*, ("I am of a vulgar cast, simple enough to believe my senses, and leave things as I find them" [*W* II, 229]). Faced with the problems of error and illusion, he expounds an intricate phenomenalistic solution. While in itself it has proven a fruitful philosophical gambit, it is disastrous for Berkeley's own position. The scepticism Berkeley is out to destroy takes its rise, he repeatedly explains, from variations on the appearance/reality theme. Berkeley wants to argue that this dualism is to be avoided by saying – with common sense – that things are simply as they are perceived. But with his phenomenalism, Berkeley is forced to say that things are not *really* what they *appear* to common sense to be. Thus he is forced back into the very

dualism, so open to sceptical attack, he was at such pains to refute.

Fifth, Baxter has argued throughout that Berkeley has violated common sense, again a traditional claim, and again one which Berkeley tried to forestall – but nevertheless the one which seems to arouse the most virulence, presumably because the criterion is so easily come by. "I endeavour to vindicate common sense," [*W* II, 244] said Berkeley, but it was twenty-three years after the publication of the *Principles* before anyone bothered to argue at length in English that he had not.[1]

In conclusion, Baxter's significance as an early critic is not lost because we now know that he wrote *after* the patterns of insult and distortion of Berkeley had become well established. Rather, we are now in a position better to appreciate the rancorous tone of his writing when we are aware of the many factors then present in the intellectual atmosphere which could have colored Baxter's reading of the *Principles*. Baxter's criticism apparently still stands as the first extended attack on Berkeley in English. But it does so as the fulfillment not of a generation of silence with respect to Berkeley, but, as we have seen, a generation of attack and misrepresentation.

[1] Baxter was apparently no more successful in arousing Berkeley than the earlier critics: "In April, 1734, he tells his friend Samuel Johnson of Connecticut, that 'as to the Bishop of Cork's (Browne) book, and the other book you allude to, the author whereof is one Baxter, they are both very little read and considered here; for which reason I have taken no public notice of them. To answer objections already answered, and repeat the same things, is a needless as well as disagreeable task . . .'" cited in *Works of George Berkeley*, ed. A. C. Fraser, III, 3. For the entire letter, see *Works* VIII, 236; see also the Editors' Note, *Works* IX, 95–6. Baxter, on the other hand, seems to have been satisfied with his work, for in an *Appendix* (London: 1750) to the third edition of his *Enquiry* (London: 1745) he apparently only found it necessary to defend himself against criticism which had been directed against Book I, but *NOT* II, of the *Enquiry*.

CONCLUSION

At the outset of this study, I suggested that a re-appraisal of early Berkeley criticism had become necessary when scholarly labors in the twentieth century uncovered a positive Berkeleian philosophy that seemed, at least on the surface, virtually to have been ignored by earlier commentators. It proved a difficult task, in the face of the limerick tradition, to suggest that Berkeleianism is not Christian Science, nor pantheism, nor panpsychism – nor *idealism*. Over a long period of years Luce and Jessop have been encouraging us to re-examine our interpretations of Berkeley and to re-read his texts. To the first end they have suggested that Berkeleianism is Immaterialism – that Berkeley rejected matter as metaphysical poppycock in favor of a common sense view which makes the real world the sensed world and which sees the role accorded God as both central and fundamental. To the second end, they have jointly prepared an excellent edition of the *Works* – and among other things, have tried to defend the *Philosophical Commentaries* (Luce's edition corrects Fraser's misordering of the note-books) as an aid in interpreting the *Principles*.

However, even if it is granted that Luce and Jessop have carefully documented cases in favor of a Realist or Common Sense Berkeley, a Berkeley for whom "the world of sense is not a ghost of the corporeal but the corporeal itself, and that, as it appears to be, so it really is, independent of the mind of all finite perceivers ..." [*W* II, 10], a Berkeley who distinguishes radically between passive ideas and active spirits – one may nevertheless be hesitant to accept their conclusions as against a tradition that extends, through the great nineteenth century German historians, back to Berkeley's contemporaries. If one is not hesitant, one at least may still wonder why eighteenth century critics from Baxter onwards were often only concerned with the negative Berkeley – the Berkeley who, as Kant put it, "degrad[ed]

bodies to mere illusion." [1] Luce, arguing for the Immaterialism of Berkeley, has been properly concerned with the discordance between his and many eighteenth century views and has had to suggest that Berkeley's times were just not ripe for immaterialism. In the light of my study, however, I believe we have some positive reasons for this discordance, for I have tried to show not only that Berkeley's philosophical reputation got started several decades earlier than has been realized, but also that thanks to philosophical and religious controversies peculiar to the period, his reputation got off to a bad start.

Thus Thomas Reid, who appears to be the first philosopher to find a grand dialectical progression (or regression) in the writings of Locke, Berkeley, and Hume, writes that Hume's *Treatise* "wantonly sapped the foundation" of the "impregnable partition" whereby Berkeley hoped "to secure the world of spirits." [2] But as we have seen, Berkeley's argument against material substance had been turned against spiritual substance as early as 1713 in the *Journal Litéraire*. Baxter had offered a similar but much expanded argument in 1733 and it seems not unlikely that Reid was acquainted with his work. So that Berkeley's "foundations" had been "wantonly sapped" in 1713, and again in 1733 in a much more explicit fashion than Hume ever offered – for, as I have urged, Hume's three footnote references to Berkeley would scarcely seem to justify the picture painted by Reid, and for that matter by many subsequent philosophers. Furthermore, Reid, like Baxter, finds Berkeley tending towards egoism (or as we might say, solipsism) which suggests that he was acquainted either directly with the Jesuit attacks of the 'teens or indirectly, perhaps through Wolff, Pfaff or Buffier, all of whom helped to give the label currency.

Kant, like Reid, was also an important custodian of Berkeley's philosophical reputation and one wonders how extensively he may have been influenced by Pfaff's charge of solipsism. Pfaff apparently based his charge solely on the Jesuit attacks and the *Journal Litéraire* and *Journal des Sçavans* reviews rather than on Berkeley's texts. If Kant read Berkeley in Eschenbach's translation (the question does not seem to have been completely resolved) then he was treated to an ample dose of the Wolff-Pfaff egoist/idealist classification, which would have made his own use of the subjective idealist label all the more plausible. And inasmuch as Wolff, who was so important an

[1] Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, transl. N. Kemp Smith, (London: 1950), p. 89.
[2] Reid, *Inquiry into the Human Mind*, (chap. i, § 7).

influence on Kant, himself placed Berkeley in the idealist camp within a decade of Pfaff, and called attention to the Paris egoists, presumably in accordance with the Jesuits' suggestion in *Mémoires de Trévoux*, a link between Kant and the critics who gave Berkeley his "early reception" is by no means tenuous.

However, I have not in this study tried to prove that Reid, or Kant, for example, were led to treat Berkeley as they did solely as a result of attitudes which had been expressed during the "doldrum decades," nor do I wish to suggest that all eighteenth and nineteenth century criticisms followed Reid or Kant. But I have tried to show that Berkeley's philosophical reputation began sooner than has been realized. Thus, at the very least, Reid and Kant, to take two philosophers who had much to do with Berkeley's subsequent reputation, philosophized in a milieu which was conditioned by twenty years of what I hope will now be admitted as distorted criticism. And I have tried to show that these criticisms had some impact outside their own time by way of justifying the suggestion that such conditioning occurred. Thus, for example, I have indicated the popularity of Chambers' *Cyclopaedia* and the carry-over of some Berkeley material to the great French *Encyclopédie;* I have noted the wide diffusion of Fénelon's *Oeuvres Philosophiques* and Fr. Tournemine's attack on Berkeley; I have cited four early reviews as sources for Pfaff's piece on *Egomism* – a piece which, quite apart from linking Berkeley with subjective idealism, served to fill out the categories in Wolff's system of philosophical classification – a point not lost on the German translator of the *Three Dialogues.*

I have not re-appraised all of the eighteenth century criticism, but by focussing attention on a series of hitherto unknown or unappreciated accounts of the Berkeleian philosophy, I have tried to give one clue to the question of why the limerick Berkeley seems, from our vantage point, to have emerged from the eighteenth century as the dominant interpretation. Accordingly, I have sought to show in what ways, and occasionally for what reasons, those early accounts were distorted and to suggest that they may have served the "doldrum decades" as primary sources for the philosophy of the *Principles.* Thus by 1733 we find that Berkeley already has a reputation– he has already been called a sceptic, atheist, idealist, egomist and fool. We no longer need suppose that the limerick Berkeley was the simple product of a straightforward reading of the *Principles*, – it was also the product of a bias engendered by the early critics.

Appendix A

BERKELEY'S REALISMS

I

"To-day they even call [Berkeley] 'the father of modern idealism.' What a remarkable accident of birth this is! Berkeley is the putative father of modern idealism, and the child does not take after its father in the slightest degree." [1] So charges Luce in his attempt to replace the idealistic reading of Berkeley's philosophy with one that makes the *Principles* (and *Three Dialogues*) a defense of common sense. I think that Luce and Jessop have succeeded in showing that a careful examination of the texts reveals that the eighteenth century interpretations were hardly more than a caricature of Berkeleianism. A caricature which was created in no small part by the simple fact that early critics either failed to read Berkeley or distorted him for their own purposes.

Luce and Jessop have, in their several publications, been concerned to show that there is "but one Berkeleian system," [2] that it can be labelled "Immaterialism," and that it was first explicitly and consistently stated in the *Principles* and remained the Berkeleian philosophy thereafter. Furthermore, they claim that on their interpretation Berkeley stands revealed as a Defender of Common Sense whose philosophy is in some technical senses realistic. In the course of this paper, I shall argue that Luce and Jessop cannot hold to a Common Sense or Realist interpretation of Berkeley and also hold, as a part of that same interpretation, that Berkeley's "ideas of sense" are to be read as "sensa" or "sense-data" (i.e. colours, sounds, etc.) rather than as "physical objects" (i.e. trees, tables, chairs). My method of argument will be to present three instances where Berkeley *himself* takes the alternative of interpreting ideas of sense as sensa and to argue that the resulting positions are far indeed from either the Common Sense or the Realism which Luce and Jessop take to be fundamental. If this can be shown, then Luce and Jessop cannot hold, as they now do, that there is one Berkeleian philosophy, that it is Common-Sensical and/or Realistic, and that by ideas of sense Berkeley is to be understood as meaning sensa.

[1] A. A. Luce, *Berkeley's Immaterialism* (London: 1950), p. 26.

[2] Jessop, ed. *Berkeley: Philosophical Writings* (Austin: 1953), xx, referred to hereafter as *BPW*. See also Luce, "The Unity of the Berkeleian Philosophy," *Mind*, XLVI (1937), pp. 44 ff.; pp. 180 ff.

Finally, I shall suggest that the price of a consistent interpretation of Berkeley's Immaterialism is either the recognition that (unfortunately for *his* consistency) Berkeley himself takes ideas of sense both ways, or, a restriction of one's interpretation to passages where but one view dominates.

It may be unfair to speak of a "Luce-Jessop" interpretation, but it seems clear that they agree on the following points which have some relevance to present purposes. They have, in their various separate publications, been concerned to show, among other things: (1) that there is a positive Berkeleian philosophy and not just a series of dialectical variations on themes by Locke; (2) that God plays the central role in this Immaterialism; (3) that this Immaterialism is sharply dualistic, thanks to Berkeley's radical distinctions between spirits (active) and ideas (passive) and between ideas of sense and ideas of the imagination, and is thus not mentalism; (4) that this Immaterialism is not subjectivism inasmuch as corporeal objects, i.e. sensible things, are simply collections of ideas of sense, and that these constitute the objective order and are not dependent on the human mind for their existence.

Luce seems somewhat less concerned to attribute realism to Berkeley than to vindicate Berkeley's appeal to common sense. He sees Berkeley seriously urging a return to common sense - a return to the view that the sensible world is the real world, with no unknowable metaphysical remainder to give rise to scepticism. Jessop, like Luce, underscores Berkeley's defense of common sense, but where Luce is content to say "In his general attitude to the problem of knowing [Berkeley] is far closer to modern realism than to modern idealism," [1] Jessop speaks of Berkeley's "realism" [2] outright. Against the background of the spirit/idea dichotomy, both Luce and Jessop say that Berkeley's ideas of sense are to be interpreted as sensa (or sense-data) [3] and furthermore, that these sensa have at least the following characteristics: (*a*) sensa *are* just what they appear to be; (*b*) they are *objects to* minds and not mental; (*c*) they are *given* to us in experience; (*d*) they "persist when we are not sensing them." [4] "That is Berkeley's realism," says Jessop, "There is nothing *per quod percipitur* but simply *id quod percipitur*. The sensed is itself the real corporeal world, perception interposing no screen, whether opaque or diaphanous, of mental entities between us and it." [5]

In a general way, this claim to epistemological realism in Berkeley is not new. Woodbridge, for example, noted that Berkeley's "ideas" were the "real components of nature and not components of the mind," [6] and that Berkeley seriously intended his claim to be at one with common sense. The novel *realist* ingredient in the Luce-Jessop interpretation is, according

[1] Luce, *Berkeley's Immaterialism*, p. 28.

[2] Jessop, *BPW*, pp. xiii ff. See also *Works* II, 10.

[3] Jessop apparently prefers "sensa" cf. *BPW*, p. xiii. I shall follow Luce and use "sensa" and "sense-data" interchangeably. Cf. *Berkeley's Immaterialism*, pp. 42 ff. and p. 117. That they use "sensa" as I have characterized it is clear from the passages referred to.

[4] Jessop, *BPW*, p. xiii; Cf. *Works* II, 11. See also Luce, *Berkeley's Immaterialism*, p. 64 and p. 124, and also, "The Berkeleian Idea of Sense," *Arist. Soc. Proc. Supp.*, XXVII (1953), 17.

[5] Jessop, *BPW*, p. xiii.

[6] F. J. E. Woodbridge, "Berkeley's Realism," in *Studies in the History of Ideas*, I (1918), 202.

to Doney,[1] that in emphasizing the activity of spirits (including activity in perception) Berkeleianism qualifies as a realism à la Moore and Russell. The suggestion that Berkeley is a realist is, says Doney,

> unexceptionable if by Berkeley's *realism* is meant his belief that objects continue to exist when not perceived by man or animal, that when we perceive we are directly confronted with the real things and not the representations or effects of the real things, and that the world is as truly coloured as extended, fragrant as figured, and so on. Something else has been meant by Berkeley's *realism*, however. The editors attribute to Berkeley the belief that there are, and that we can apprehend that there are, acts of perceiving distinct from the ideas perceived. This is part of what Prof. Jessop means by Berkeley's *realism* and of what Prof. Luce means by his *adherence to commonsense*. In *this* sense of *realism*, Berkeley's realism can be questioned.[2]

Doney objects that Berkeley explicitly rejects [3] the distinction between the act of apprehending an object and the object apprehended, which Russell and Moore have taken as essential to epistemological realism, although he admits later in his article that on the critical question of the activity of the mind in perception Berkeley is "ambiguous." [4]

Even if we grant that Berkeley can be read as holding that the mind is active in perception and thus that he distinguishes the object apprehended from the apprehension of the object, it is by no means clear that he is also a realist or a defender of common sense in the way Luce and Jessop have more explicitly suggested. [5] For there seems to me to be a critical ambiguity in the Berkeleian position between the Berkeley of Common Sense and Berkeley the Rigorous Empiricist. I think that Luce and Jessop have shown that most of the time Berkeley stands in the former position, but the latter position is also present. The latter position exists in the sense that there are sections of the *Principles* and *Three Dialogues* which do *not* square with the former but which do hang together as a sort of secondary theme. Very crudely, to the Common Sense side (I shall speak of Common Sense Berkeley) belong the sharp distinction between minds (active) and ideas (passive); the identity of ideas of sense and physical objects; and the role given God as the Absolute Percipient. To the Rigorous Berkeley (so referred to hereafter) belong the attack on abstract ideas; the initial formulation of *esse est percipi* (*Principles* §§ 3–6); the denial of identity and analysis of error in the *Third Dialogues*. With different labels (and for different purposes) this dichotomy has been carefully spelled out and analysed by Grey,[6] but for the present purposes I wish only to note that for the Berkeley of Common Sense ideas of sense are not sensa.

[1] Willis Doney, "Two Questions about Berkeley," *Philosophical Review*, LXI (1952), 382–391.

[2] *ibid.*, pp. 382–3. See also Luce, "Berkeleian Action and Passion," *Revue Internationale de Philosophie*, VII (1953), 3–18.

[3] In the *First Dialogue*, Cf. *Works* II, 194–6.

[4] Doney cites *Principles* § 141. See, however, the claim in § 142 that we have *notions* of the mind's "acts about ideas."

[5] For a provocative discussion of Berkeley as an idealist, see Edwin B. Allaire, "Berkeley's Idealism," *Theoria*, XXIX (1963), 229–244.

[6] Denis Grey, "The Solipsism of Bishop Berkeley," *Philosophical Quarterly*, II (1952), 338–349; "Berkeley on Other Selves: A Study in Fugue," *Philosophical Quarterly*, IV (1954), 28–44.

II

My first reason for claiming that Luce's and Jessop's interpretation of ideas of sense as sensa is not compatible with their basic interpretation of Berkeley as a defender of Common Sense, is based on Berkeley's own claim to have refuted scepticism and to have restored man to Common Sense. The refutation of scepticism is an oft-stated purpose of the *Principles* and *Three Dialogues* at a time when Pyrrhonism – especially that found in Pierre Bayle's *Dictionnaire Historique et Critique* – was held by many to pose a serious threat to science and religion. The sceptics stood prepared to attack all claimants to knowledge; in particular those who distinguished ideas from things, appearances from realities, *esse* from *percipi*. What was the criterion whereby one knew which perceptions were veridical, which appearances yielded knowledge of reality, and then, of course, what was the criterion of *that* criterion....?

Popkin [1] has argued that in good part Berkeley's dictum, *esse est percipi*, stems from Berkeley's sensitivity to this sceptical problem and is intended to resolve it by the revolutionary stroke of *identifying* ideas with things. Eliminating the idea/thing dichotomy eliminates a favorite sceptical target. But this frequently enunciated refutation of scepticism has the consequence, awkward for the Luce-Jessop interpretation, that the real world is precisely the world that gardeners, *et al.* hold it to be. Berkeley's epistemology is "naive realism," at least in the sense that Montague used that term.

> [Naive realism] conceives of objects as directly presented to consciousness and being precisely what they appear to be. Nothing intervenes between the knower and the world external to him. Objects are not represented in consciousness by ideas; they are themselves directly presented. This theory makes no distinction between seeming and being; things *are* just what they *seem*. Consciousness is thought of as analogous to a light which shines out through the sense organs, illuminating the world outside the knower. There is in this naive view a complete disregard of the personal equation and of the elaborate mechanism underlying sense perception. In a world in which there was no such thing as error, this theory of the knowledge relation would remain unchallenged; but with the discovery of error and illusion comes perplexity.[2]

The reason Berkeley's refutation of scepticism is bound up with his appeal to common sense is that there must be no instance in which the philosopher tells the gardener that what the latter holds to be the case about the sense world is not really the case. The philosopher must never reopen the appearance/reality dialectic by saying that the world is really anything other than what the gardener takes it to be.

There are numerous passages in the common-sense mood where ideas are just things. For example, *Philosophical Commentaries* entry 427: "We see the Horse it self, the Church it self it being an Idea & nothing more." [3] In

[1] Richard H. Popkin, "Berkeley and Pyrrhonism," *Review of Metaphysics*, V (1951), 223–246. See also his "New Realism of Bishop Berkeley," *University of California Publications in Philosophy*, xxix (1957), 1–19.

[2] W. P. Montague, "The New Realism and the Old," *Journal of Philosophy*, IX (1912), 39.

[3] See also, e.g. Berkeley, *Phil. Comm.* entries 19, 98, 392, 644, 775, 823, in *Works* I, or Luce's edition of 1944.

the *Principles* (§ 23) Berkeley speaks of "framing in your mind certain ideas which you call *books* and *trees*," and again, in § 38, he speaks of *idea* signifying "the several combinations of sensible qualities, which are called things," thus ideas of sense *are* things (i.e. trees, chairs) rather than things being combinations of ideas. Discussing the Mosaic account of creation in the *Third Dialogue*, Berkeley remarks: "In common talk, the objects of our senses are not termed *ideas* but *things*. Call them so still: provided you do not attribute to them any absolute external existence, and I shall never quarrel with you for a word. The Creation therefore I allow to have been a creation of things, of *real* things." [1] Towards the beginning of the *Third Dialogue* Philonous comments: "I am of a vulgar cast, simple enough to believe my senses, and leave things as I find them. To be plain, it is my opinion, that the real things are those very things I see and feel, and perceive by my senses." [2]

But as Montague puts it: "with the discovery of error and illusion comes perplexity." It comes with a vengeance in the *Third Dialogue*. Berkeley's "escape" from perplexity is by way of the view that objects are collections of ideas, the view which takes ideas of sense as items which could plausibly be read as sensa. The result is disastrous to his claim to hold, with the "vulgar," that "those things they immediately perceive are the real things," [3] and hence he falls guilty – as Popkin has argued – of scepticism as he himself defines it. The result is also disastrous to Luce's and Jessop's thesis that Berkeley is a defender of Common Sense, since that can hardly be maintained if it is coupled with an interpretation of Berkeley's ideas of sense which, when it occurs in Berkeley, can be shown to run counter to his *own* appeal to Common Sense.

It is, then, a perplexed and Rigorous Berkeley who has Philonous reply to Hylas' question about the man who sees an oar in water:

> He is not mistaken with regard to the ideas he actually perceives; but in the inferences he makes from his present perceptions. Thus in the case of the oar, what he immediately perceives by sight is certainly crooked; and so far he is in the right. But if he thence conclude, that upon taking the oar out of the water he shall perceive the same crookedness; or that it would affect his touch, as crooked things are wont to do: in that he is mistaken. In like manner, if he shall conclude from what he perceives in one station, that in case he advances toward the moon or tower, he should still be affected with the like ideas, he is mistaken. But his mistake lies not in what he perceives immediately and at present (it being a manifest contradiction to suppose he should err in respect of that) but in the wrong judgment he makes concerning the ideas he apprehends to be connected with those immediately perceived: or concerning the ideas that, from what he perceives at present, he imagines would be perceived in other circumstances.[4]

Are these "ideas he actually perceives" objects? Yes, but of a special sort. The oar is a collection of an indefinite number of ideas, *each* of which is a separate object – and it is our judgment about this that is incorrigible,

[1] *Works* II, p. 251.
[2] *ibid.*, p. 229.
[3] *ibid.*, p. 262.
[4] *ibid.*, p. 238.

i.e. about ideas as sense-data and *not* as physical objects. Berkeley might have clung to the latter alternative by means of locutions such as "appears to be . . ." or "looks like . . ." But as is clear from the opening lines of the *Third Dialogue*, he wishes to avoid these phrases with their sceptical overtones. How then do we find out if certain collections of sensa constitute reality or illusion? We wait.

Thus, when the gardener [1] looks from his window and says, "That is a cherry-tree," his statement turns out *not* to be about what he sees but rather about what he *expects* to see in the future. Hence we can never know with certainty whether it *is* a cherry-tree, without waiting to see. And it is beside the point to object that probabilities in these cases are good enough – had Berkeley intended this, he could hardly have taken his work to be a serious answer to scepticism, for it was certain and not probable knowledge which was at stake. So in spite of his own intentions, Berkeley is driven towards scepticism by urging this argument; an argument that amounts to saying that everything *looks* as it is, but we must wait an indeterminate period to find out what it *really* is, for what it *is*, is what we expect it to be.

It is also in the *Third Dialogue* that Rigorous Berkeley says: "Strictly speaking, Hylas, we do not see the same object that we feel; neither is the same object perceived by the microscope, which was by the naked eye." [2] In passages such as this, or the analysis of the cherry [3] which follows shortly upon it, or the discussion of error and illusion, I think it is clear that Berkeley is talking in language which we might describe as sense-data or sensa language. It is also clear, I think, that if Berkeley takes the gardener as the Man in the Street, then the sense-data language, in not according with the language of the gardener, is non-common-sensical. For in these passages, Berkeley is explicitly rejecting the gardener's statements as candidates for philosophical statements, and offering intricate translations which make him a sceptic by his own definition.

Berkeley refutes scepticism by a dramatic denial of "screens," to use Jessop's apt phrase, interposed in perception between knower and known – that is, by identifying ideas with things. But, as I have tried to show, Berkeley's invocation of sense-data analyses involves his postulating a temporal screen, the interposition of which entails the abandonment of the idea-thing "naive realism" of the appeal to the gardener and the refutation of scepticism dependent upon it. Thus my first reason for rejecting Luce's and Jessop's claim that Berkeley is *both* a defender of Common Sense *and* that his ideas of sense are to be read as sense-data, is simply that when Berkeley himself interprets his ideas as sense-data he fails to accord with Common Sense and lapses into scepticism.

III

A *second* reason for questioning whether treating ideas of sense as sensa is compatible with the aspect of Berkeley that Luce and Jessop wish to

[1] For the discussion of the gardener and the cherry-tree, see *Works* II, 234.
[2] *ibid.*, p. 245.
[3] *ibid.*, p. 249.

emphasize, is the place of sensa in the dichotomy between ideas of sense and ideas of imagination. Both Luce and Jessop have taken this dichotomy to be evidence that Berkeley was not a mentalist but a realist.[1] Berkeley is in his Common Sense mood, talking about physical objects, when he is distinguishing these two sorts of idea. The distinction is sharp and unproblematic. Luce and Jessop are, it seems to me, correct in interpreting this radical distinction as Berkeley's way of separating absolutely the physical and objective from the mental and subjective. It is still clear-cut in the *Third Dialogue* and still concerned simply with physical objects *versus* imaginary ones:

> In short, by whatever method you distinguish *things* from *chimeras* on your own scheme, the same, it is evident, will hold also upon mine. For it must be, I presume, by some perceived difference, and I am not for depriving you of any one thing that you perceive.[2]

Unfortunately, in the light of the discussion of error and illusion, the distinction is no longer obvious. There is nothing false about illusory perceptions – they simply are the bare colours, roughnesses and smells that they are – it is our judgments about our expectations which may turn out false. Does this not extend to all ideas? If illusion can be disposed of this way, why not pink rats, why not mental imagery? The only way we can tell whether a given sense-datum is a constituent in a "collection of ideas" that goes to make up a "real" or an "illusory" object, is by waiting to see. The datum itself does not tell us.

Let me try to come at this difficulty another way: Berkeley himself (*Principles* § 30) gives two radically different sorts of criteria (in the same sentence) for distinguishing ideas of sense from those of the imagination. The first sort consists in criteria that can be *directly* perceived, and this squares with the interpretation of ideas of sense as physical objects. Direct inspection reveals simply and clearly whether, e.g. a chair is real or imaginary. Criteria of the second sort that Berkeley proposes are order, coherence, etc. No longer are the objective/subjective, the physical/mental, the real/imaginary sharply distinguished. We are back with another variant of Berkeley's own attempt to interpret his ideas of sense as sensa. By introducing order, coherence, etc. as criteria, Berkeley introduces a "wait and see" requirement that, as in the similar case of error and illusion, shatters his refutation of scepticism. To invoke order, coherence, etc. is to admit that the physical or mental status of the datum is no longer revealed immediately. Tying these similar strands (error-illusion plus real/imaginary criteria) together, we come to the conclusion, awkward for anyone who wants to hold *both*, that Berkeley's ideas of sense are sensa *and* that the real/imaginary and physical/mental distinctions are fundamental, that for Rigorous Berkeley these distinctions simply cease to be fundamental. Whether a collection of ideas (i.e. of sensa) constitutes e.g. a tree, is *itself* a judgment about our expectations, and whether it is a real or an imaginary tree is a judgment

[1] *Cf.* Luce, *Berkeley's Immaterialism*, esp. chaps. viii and x; and his notes to *Phil. Comm.* (ed. of 1944) entries 472, 473 (also in *Works* I, 126); Jessop, *Works* II, 10.

[2] *Works* II, 235.

about further expectations – and *neither* is decidable on the basis of the "incorrigible" given.

Berkeley's vitiation of his own position (i.e. that ideas of sense are physical objects – trees, chairs, etc.) should come as no surprise. For Common Sense Berkeley there is no problem of confusing the objective with the subjective. Berkeley simply sloughs off questions on the distinguishing features, as we have already seen. But surely an essential element in the seventeenth century subjectivization and mentalization of sensory qualities had been the philosophers' inability to preserve the objectivity of these qualities in the face of questions put by sceptics: how, Descartes had been forced to ask, does one know he is not dreaming, etc.? Common Sense Berkeley takes the objectivity for granted until he faces up to error and illusion – but the sense-data talk that these new problems require, and his suggestion that objects are collections of ideas, will not square with the sharp Common Sense distinction he desires between ideas of sense and ideas of imagination. By interpreting ideas of sense as sensa, Luce and Jessop are thus repeating Berkeley's own ambiguities, and unfortunately undermining their own overall interpretation by weakening a distinction they take to be crucial to his objectivism and realism. Berkeley's sensa do not reveal themselves as physical *or* mental: they are so judged only in the light of subsequent experience, and the distinction belongs only to the Berkeley of Common Sense, the Berkeley who adopts something akin to naive realism as an epistemological thesis.

IV

Doney, as we have already noted, is perfectly willing to agree with Luce and Jessop and a variety of other commentators, that if "by Berkeley's *realism* is meant his belief that objects continue to exist when not perceived by man or animal . . ." then the suggestion is "unexceptionable." I am inclined to think that the question of independent existence is by no means so "unexceptionable" as Doney, Luce and Jessop take it to be, and this leads to my *third* reason for inquiring whether a "realist" solution can be found in Berkeley if his ideas of sense are read as sensa rather than as physical objects.

The question immediately arises: Granted that these sensa are "given," in what sense can they be said to persist, exist, or subsist when not (humanly) perceived? Common Sense Berkeley is willing to talk about such physical objects as trees, *existing* [1] in the mind of God, when otherwise unperceived. But in those portions of the *Third Dialogue* where error, identity and illusion are discussed, Berkeley would be hard-pressed to speak of sensa persisting. For as we have already seen, when Berkeley takes up the question of the bent oar in water, each idea (in this case, each sensum) is a separate entity. Amplifying this line, Berkeley asserts that "strictly speaking" we do not see the same object we feel. He continues:

[1] *ibid.*, p. 235.

But in case every variation was thought sufficient to constitute a new kind or individual, the endless number or confusion of names would render language impracticable. Therefore to avoid this as well as other inconveniences which are obvious upon a little thought, men combine together several ideas, apprehended by divers senses, or by the same sense at different times, or in different circumstances, but observed to have some connexion in Nature, either with respect to co-existence or succession; all which they refer to one name, and consider as one thing.[1]

Even if we grant that for Berkeley it is not logically self-contradictory to conceive of unsensed sensa-data, insofar as he can be read as distinguishing the given, the object of sensation, from the act of sensing the object, the further step of guaranteeing the ontological status of these "sensibles" is less obvious. Are *all* sensa accorded persistence by being ideas for God?

In the *Third Dialogue*, however, no sooner has Philonous "disposed" of the bent oar, than Hylas asks whether God is affected by pain. God knows pain, replies Philonous, but to "feel anything by sense is an imperfection." [2] Not only does this raise knotty questions as to what it means to have God perceive, it suggests further that God has a different set of ideas from ours. One now wonders whether God's ideas are to be more "real," whether they are to be "archetypes," [3] and if so, how they are to be related to their exemplifications, and how all this is to be known in such a way as to avoid a hopeless scepticism. Nevertheless, Hylas' question is a fair one. For Berkeley has just finished an analysis of error and illusion in terms of sensa, and Hylas is perhaps recalling that heat and pain were the *very* qualities with which the dialectical pattern of the *First Dialogue* began.

In the *First Dialogue*, Hylas wished to distinguish the existence of sensible things from their being *perceived*, but when presented with the case of *heat* and *pain* admitted that the reality of *these* sensible things was in their being perceived.[4] Having yielded in the case of heat and pain, Hylas soon found that the same held for tastes (also as coupled with pleasure/pain), for sounds, for colours, in a word, for all secondary qualities, and then even for extension and the primary qualities. At the conclusion, Hylas learns that although a tulip is only a collection of sensa, none of which can exist "exterior to all minds," nevertheless it "may exist independent of your mind or mine." [5]

When Hylas questions whether God perceives pain, he is tugging at a thread which might well unravel the entire argument of the *First Dialogue*. If it now turns out that God does not perceive pain, then perhaps the same holds for tastes, sounds, colours – indeed, for *all* the secondary and primary qualities "in the mind." If the tulip is a collection of sensa *none* of which is perceived by God, then clearly God's perception is no guarantee of the tulip's "independence." If all ideas of sense are ontologically on a par and if one tries to take ideas (physical objects) as mere collections of ideas

[1] *ibid.*, p. 245.
[2] *ibid.*, p. 241.
[3] Samuel Johnson of Connecticut queried Berkeley on the status of "archetypes." See the correspondence, *Works* II, 284 ff.
[4] *Works* II, 178.
[5] *ibid.*, p. 195.

(sensa), as Luce and Jessop do, then one is in an especially difficult position when Berkeley rejects the notion that certain ideas (sensa) are sensed by God. On the other hand, it should be noted that in the *Third Dialogue*, it is a *tree* (physical object) that Berkeley speaks of God perceiving continuously,[1] and that in the *First Dialogue*, it is a tulip (and *not* a collection of sensa) whose independence is assured.

If, however, we hold with Luce and Jessop that ideas of sense are sensa what now becomes of unsensed (e.g. possible) sensa? In the light of the admission that God *knows* but does not *perceive* pain, we are entitled to enquire whether they shift their status when no longer sensed by men and become something other in relation to God. Since it seems clear that they no longer exist as they did when sensed, what becomes of Jessop's claim that these sensa "persist"?

For Common Sense Berkeley, whose ideas of sense are physical objects, these questions are unintelligible. The existence of the unperceived tree in the quad is simply guaranteed by God's perception of it and its existence is independent of anyone's verifying it. Furthermore, we (including God) all perceive the *same* tree, in order to preclude questions as to which tree is the *real* one. For this Berkeley, the "persistence" of ideas of sense, i.e. physical objects, is no problem.

For Rigorous Berkeley, on the other hand, the questions are embarrassing. For this Berkeley, physical objects are *collections* of "ideas" and judgments about the existence of unperceived objects are eliminable. Thus, "There is a tree in the quad," becomes "If I were in the quad, I would see a tree." As we have already seen in discussing error, illusion and identity, Berkeley's rigorous position amounted to saying that assertions about physical objects turn out to be judgments about what we expect to perceive in the future, i.e. what *sensa*.

This, however, helps not at all with respect to the "persistence" of sensa unsensed by man. Furthermore, I think it is clear that straightforward translations of statements about the unperceived into subjunctives, with nothing said about the status of possibilities, lack that "robust sense of reality" needed to fulfil Luce's or Jessop's (or, for that matter, Berkeley's) Common Sense or Realistic requirements. But Berkeley has given us a clue to remedying this deficiency by his claim that God *knows* i.e. presumably *produces*) but does not sense pain. This distinction suggests that while the persistence of sensa can no longer simply be guaranteed by their being *perceptions* in God's mind, it can be by their being *powers* in His mind. Thus a way has been found to accord ontological status to unsensed, to possible sensa (matter, one remembers, has been ruled out) – and a way that is in

[1] *Works* II, 235. Berkeley seems to take ideas of sense as sensa in his arguments (as in the *First Dialogue*) from the perceptual relativity of secondary qualities. These arguments also appear in his *Philosophical Commentaries* and *Principles*. Luce and Jessop reject them as basic to Berkeley's considered opinion and classify them *ad hominem*. See Luce, *Phil. Comm.* (ed. of 1944), note to entry 265 (or *Works* I, 118); *Berkeley's Immaterialism*, p. 82; Jessop, *Works* II, 44n. *Cf.* Doney, *op. cit.*, pp. 390–1. See also W. B. Carter, "Some Problems of the Relation between Berkeley's *New Theory of Vision* and his *Principles*," *Ratio*, III (1961), 174–192.

the spirit of Berkeley's admission that God, cause of all things, knows without sensing.

Unfortunately a paradoxical result follows from this attempt to provide an ontological sub-structure for perceiv*able* items. As we have already seen (Part II) in some detail, for Rigorous Berkeley *all* judgments about physical objects, all judgments of the kind "That is a cherry-tree," turn out to be about what sensa we *expect* to perceive in the future, i.e. our knowledge turns out to be about *possible* sensa. And as Philonous comments in the "strictly speaking" passage on identity:

> ... my aim is only to know what ideas are connected together; and the more a man knows of the connexion of ideas, the more he is said to know of the nature of things. What therefore if our ideas are variable; what if our senses are not in all circumstances affected with the same appearances. ...[1]

While it might be said that all genuine knowledge is about connections, about possibilities, about what sensa we can expect to perceive in the future, our according ontological status to these possible sensa means that what we know when we know these possible sensa are *powers* or *dispositions* (in the mind of God) to produce sensa. For on the one hand, we have seen that in the case of Rigorous Berkeley all our knowledge turns out to be about possible sensa, while on the other, having shored up possible sensa ontologically in an attempt to speak significantly of sensa "persisting," we find that what we know, and all that we know, are Divine powers.

The paradoxical consequence is not simply that when we examine a case where Berkeley *himself* treats his ideas of sense as sensa, and see that knowledge turns out to be about possible sensa, and then, in accordance with Jessop's "persistence" claim, try to support these unsensed but possible sensa, we find that all our knowledge is about powers. The awkward consequence for Luce and Jessop is that Berkeley has precluded our having ideational knowledge of active entities and their attributes. Powers can only be known by *notions*, and all our knowledge, being about powers, is thus *notional*.[2]

This consequence follows from Berkeley's repeatedly stated position that ideas are passive. He contrasts in the sharpest terms spirits (and their activity) from ideas (and their passivity). Precisely because the content of ideas is "frozen," Berkeley claimed they could not yield knowledge of spirits and their attributes (e.g. wills and the acts thereof). In order to account for knowledge of spirits, and spirits are the only causally efficacious ingredients in Berkeley's philosophical system,[3] he introduced *notions*. Thus if all our knowledge is about powers, all our knowledge must be notional.

Let me briefly recapitulate how I have reached this position: I have tried, within the Berkeleian framework, to make sense of Jessop's claim that sensa "persist," and as a result have expanded a clue given us in the *Third Dialogue* that God *knows* but does not sense pain. This led to the

[1] *Works* II, 245.

[2] On notions, see e.g. *Principles* § 135 ff., esp. § 142; and *Third Dialogue*, esp. *Works* II, 231–4.

[3] Cf. *Phil. Comm.* entry 850 (*Works* I, 101).

suggestion that if sensa persist at all, they persist as Divine powers. Coupling this point about powers with the consequence of Rigorous Berkeley's analysis of error, in which all our knowledge is about possible sensa, *all* knowledge turned out to be about Divine powers. Finally, Berkeley's claim was recalled that active entities, i.e. spirits and their attributes, are known only *via* notions, with the result that all our knowledge is notional – it all is quite literally about God's will.

I do not think that this conclusion drawn from the Rigorous Berkeley would have dismayed the Bishop of Cloyne, but I cannot argue now for that opinion.[1] Suffice it to note that there are passages in the *Philosophical Commentaries* in which it is suggested that unperceived objects exist as powers in God's mind.[2] Nor is it far from the mood of entry 24: "Nothing properly but persons i.e. conscious things do exist, all other things are not so much existences as manners of the existence of persons." And perhaps it was Locke's concern with powers in things that led Berkeley to assert the utter passivity of ideas and to admit in entry 625: "Matter once allow'd. I defy any man to prove that God is not matter."

I do think, however, that this conclusion is one more reason for claiming that the features of the Berkeleian philosophy that Luce and Jessop take to be fundamental simply will not appear when they interpret ideas of sense as sensa. Perhaps a realism can be constructed wholly within the realm of spirit, but that would not be the realism or immaterialistic dualism, based on the spirit/idea dichotomy, that Luce and Jessop wish to defend.

In the course of this paper I have tried to adduce three sorts of reasons for rejecting the Luce-Jessop claim that interpreting ideas of sense as sensa accords with their overall interpretation of Berkeley as a defender of Common Sense and as a Realist: (1) that use of sensa convicts Berkeley of scepticism on his own definition: (2) that the idea of sense/idea of imagination distinction ceases to be fundamental: (3) that all knowledge turns out to be notional, to the detriment of the idea/spirit distinction. In sum, I have tried to show that when Berkeley is himself most inclined to treat ideas as sensa, he is furthest from Common Sense as well as from Realism. On the other hand, taking Berkeley's ideas of sense as physical objects would of course mean that Luce's and Jessop's interpretations would account for somewhat less of the texts, and indeed might end in finding one pattern for the major theme and another for the discordant one, but such a revised interpretation would have the advantage of reflecting, and not containing, the discord.

[1] See my "Berkeley on the Immortality of the Soul," *The Modern Schoolman*, XXXVII (1960), (i) 77–94; (ii) 197–212; and "Berkeley and Malebranche on Ideas," *The Modern Schoolman*, XLI (1963), 1–15. See also A. A. Luce, *The Dialectic of Immaterialism* (London: 1963), chap. ix.

[2] See esp. entry 41, entry 52 ("Bodies etc do exist even w^{n} not perceiv'd they being powers in the active Being."), and entry 282. Luce holds that these entries do not represent Berkeley's final position on this matter.

*Appendix B**

JOURNAL DES SÇAVANS

Septembre, 1711

À AMSTERDAM: CHEZ LES JANSSONS À WAESBERGE

D'ANGLETERRE

Mr. Berkeley a publié depuis peu un Livre, intitulé: *A Treatise*, &c. P. 321
C'est-à-dire: *Traité des principes de la connoissance de l'homme:* I. *Partie, où l'on* [322] *recherche les principales causes des erreurs & des difficultez qui se trouvent* P. 322
dans les Sciences, avec les fondemens du Pyrrhonisme, de l'Atheïsme, & de l'Irréligion. A Dublin. 1710, in 8. pagg. 214.

L'Auteur assure dans la Préface qu'après un long & serieux examen, il a trouvé que les principes dont il se sert dans son Ouvrage sont évidemment vrais, & capables de détromper ceux qui ont donné dans le Pyrrhonisme, ou qui demandent une démonstration plus forte que celle de l'existence de Dieu, & de l'immortalité de l'ame.

Il s'attache ensuite à prouver son principe, qui est, qu'il n'existe ni corps ni matiere, & qu'il n'y a point d'autre être ou substance que des *Esprits*. Ces Esprits sont douez d'intelligence & de volonté, ce qui les rend capables de *pouvoir:* car il est absurde, selon lui, d'imaginer du *pouvoir* où il n'y a point de volonté pour le diriger & l'appliquer. Tout le reste que nous supposons exister hors de nous, n'est autre chose, dit-il, qu'idées d'une nature entierement passive. Ces idées nous viennent par les sens, ajoute-t il. Elles ne dépendent pas plus de nous que celles que nous formons par l'imagination ou par la memoire. C'est un autre esprit qui nous les fait appercevoir. Elles n'ont d'autre [323] existence que celles d'être apperçûës, P. 323
& elles cessent d'être ou d'exister, dès que nôtre esprit, ou un autre cesse de les appercevoir.

Lorsque plusieurs de ces idées ou sensations se trouvent constamment ensemble, comme une certaine couleur, une certaine odeur, un certain goût, une certaine figure, &c. elles font une combinaison, à laquelle nous donnons, par exemple, le nom de pomme.

Pour prouver une hypothese qui paroît si étrange, voici comment raisonne M. Berkeley. Nous ne pouvons sçavoir, dit-il, ni par nos sens, ni par nôtre Raison, qu'il existe hors de nous aucune substance, telle que la matiere ou les corps. Les sens ne nous font appercevoir que des sensations

* In printing the texts of these Appendices, every attempt has been made to keep them in close conformity to the cited originals.

qui n'ont rien hors de nous qui leur ressemblent. On en convient à l'égard des qualitez qu'on appelle accidentelles, comme la chaleur, la couleur, &c. Mais on prétend que la figure, l'étenduë, le mouvement, l'arrangement des parties, sont des qualitez inherentes, ou des modifications de la matiere, & que les sensations que nous en avons leur sont conformes, ou leur ressemblent. Si cela étoit, poursuit M. Berkeley, ayant une fois reçû dans mon
P. 324 esprit la sensation ou la perception de la figure d'un corps par [324] un de mes sens, il faudroit que cette même perception se réveillât dans mon ame, dès que ce même corps feroit impression sur un autre de mes sens, parce qu'il faudroit que ce corps causât, par ce dernier sens, une perception de sa figure qui lui ressemblât, & qui fut par conséquent la même que l'autre; or cela se trouve faux, dit-il; un aveugle de naissance qui recouvre la vûë, ne peut appercevoir par ce sens les figures qu'il connoissoit par l'attouchement.

La raison ne peut pas nous convaincre non plus qu'il existe des corps hors de nous: Car si elle pouvoit nous en convaincre, ce seroit par les sensations; c'est le seul moyen que nous ayons pour les considerer. Or les sensations n'en sont point une preuve: car elles peuvent être aussi vives dans le délire que dans un état tranquille. Il est certain cependant que les perceptions qui se forment dans le délire ne ressemblent point aux corps qu'elles représentent, puisqu'il n'y en a point alors hors de nous qui les causent. Tout ce que nous pouvons conclure de ces sensations, continuë M. Berkeley, c'est qu'elles sont causées par quelque chose hors de nous, & que cette chose ou ce principe doit être doué de pouvoir & de volonté, ce qui ne convient
P. 325 point à l'idée que nous avons [325] d'un corps. On ne peut donc point conclure qu'il y ait des corps hors de nous, puisque l'on conçoit la matiere incapable d'agir sur l'esprit, & que toutes les sensations que nous avons nous peuvent venir sans qu'il existe aucun corps hors de nous: car on peut facilement concevoir qu'une intelligence sans corps reçoive toutes nos sensations, ce qui lui donneroit lieu de conclure, comme nous, qu'il y a des corps, & cependant elle se tromperoit.

Si on dit, que bien que la matiere ne puisse par elle-même agir sur l'esprit, & qu'elle semble par là inutile; elle peut néanmoins servir d'instrument & d'occasion aux sensations que nous avons: Je répons, que le nom d'instrument lui est très-mal donné, puisqu'il ne peut y avoir aucune application de l'une à l'autre. Elle ne peut pas non plus être conçûë comme cause occasionnelle, qu'en disant que Dieu s'est prescrit à lui-même une loi de produire en nous telle ou telle sensation, lorsque tel ou tel corps nous seroit present: Mais, I. comment ce corps nous est-il present, si nous ne l'appercevons point, la perception étant le seul moyen de rendre une chose presente à l'esprit? Puisque ce corps ne contribue en rien à la sensation que
P. 326 j'ai, & que je puis l'a-[326]voir de même sans ce corps, quelle raison ai-je de conclure que ce corps existe? Il faudroit prouver premierement qu'il existe, & faire voir ensuite que c'est à son occasion que nous avons cette sensation.

M. Berkeley fait remarquer après cela les avantages qu'on trouve dans son hypothese. Elle fait évanouïr, dit-il, une infinité de difficultez qui ont été jusqu'ici indissolubles: par exemple, *Si la matiere peut penser: Si elle est*

étenduë, & divisible à l'infini: Si elle peut agir sur l'esprit: Comment elle a pû être créée de rien, &c. Tant que les hommes ont crû que les objets de leurs recherches existoient hors d'eux-mêmes, il leur a été impossible de s'assurer de quoi que ce soit. Comme toute leur science ne consistoit que dans la conformité de leurs idées avec la nature des choses, & que cette conformité ne pouvoit leur être connuë que par le moyen de leurs sensations, ils ne pouvoient en avoir aucun principe fixe & assuré, parce qu'ils ne pouvoient jamais être assurez du parfait rapport de ces sensations avec les objets exterieurs, les sensations variant incessamment, comme lorsqu'on regarde un objet de près, ou de loin, ou dans un microscope. De ce principe l'Auteur conclut que le temps n'est que la [327] succession de nos idées; & l'entendre P. 327
autrement, dit-il, c'est employer un mot qui n'a aucune signification. Cela prouve aussi, selon lui, que nôtre ame pense toûjours, & que c'est dans cette pensée continuelle que consiste son essence. L'Espace, ajoute-t il, n'est que la facilité que je trouve à mouvoir ce que je m'imagine être mon corps. On ne peut concevoir l'espace sans concevoir un corps en mouvement; hors de là ce n'est qu'un mot sans signification, qui nous fait pourtant illusion, parce que nous croyons que chaque mot doit exprimer une idée particuliere. S'il n'y avoit de corps au monde que le mien, continuë-t-il, je dirois que tout le reste est espace: ce qui marqueroit seulement que je puis remuer mon corps en tout sens, sans resistance. Ce corps étant annihilé, il n'y a plus de mouvement, ni par conséquent d'espace. Dire que l'étendue est divisible à l'infini, dit-il encore, c'est une contradiction manifeste, si on entend par étendue une simple perception; puisqu'il est impossible qu'un être fini apperçoive un infiniment grand, un infiniment petit, un infiniment en nombre; & lorsque les Géometres disent, par exemple, qu'une ligne d'un poulce contient 10000 parties, c'est parce que cette ligne [328] ne sert qu'à P. 328
en représenter une autre qui les contient en effet, & dans laquelle ces parties se peuvent appercevoir à cause de sa grandeur. Mais ils ne veulent point dire que ces mêmes parties soient dans la petite; ils le supposent seulement, afin que le calcul soit plus juste.

M. Berkeley répond ensuite aux difficultez qu'on peut faire contre son hypothese. Nous en allons rapporter quelques unes, avec les réponses.

Objection. Dès qu'on n'apperçoit plus, il n'existe plus rien. *Réponse.* 1. On fait la même difficulté à l'égard des qualitez accidentelles du corps, comme la couleur, &c. 2. Cette hypothese ne differe point de celle qui établit que la conservation des êtres est une perpetuelle création. 3. Les creatures de Dieu peuvent subsister dans un autre esprit, pendant que je ne les apperçois point.

Objection. Si l'étendue ne subsiste que dans l'ame, alors l'ame sera étendue. *Réponse.* 1. Elle est donc aussi colorée, puisque les couleurs n'existent qu'en nous. 2. L'étendue n'existe dans l'ame que comme une perception, & non pas comme une realité.

Objection. Comment se peut-il faire que tous les hommes se trompent? *Réponse.* Les hommes voyant qu'ils avoient [329] diverses perceptions, dont P. 329
ils n'étoient pas les auteurs, lesquelles venoient du dehors, sans qu'ils pussent les éviter, les ont rapportées à des objets exterieurs, qu'ils ont supposé semblables à ces perceptions, attribuant du pouvoir à des choses

qui ne pouvant en avoir sur elles-mêmes, n'en sçauroient avoir sur nous.

Objection. Plusieurs veritez Mathematiques ne subsistent plus, comme le mouvement de la terre, lequel on n'apperçoit point. *Réponse.* Ce mouvement n'est qu'une conséquence & une suite de ce que nôtre esprit juge que nous verrions, si nous habitions une autre Planete. D'ailleurs l'ordre, l'enchaînement, & la dépendance que Dieu a établi dans les idées qu'il imprime dans nôtre esprit, étant semblables en tout aux loix de la Nature, le fondement des veritez Physiques & Mathematiques subsiste toûjours.

Objection. A quoi bon tout ce méchanisme apparent des Planetes, ce changement de saisons? &c. *Réponse.* C'est pour exercer les facultez de l'homme, lui donner un plan de conduite, & l'appliquer de la même maniere que si les objets de nos perceptions étoient réels. Ces objets ne
P. 330 sont que les signes & les marques de ce qu'on doit atten- [330] dre, comme le feu n'est point la cause de la douleur, mais il nous en avertit par avance.

Objection. Les miracles ne seront donc plus qu'un changement d'idées? *Réponse.* Le vin de Cana n'en étoit pas moins vin, puisqu'il faisoit le même effet, & qu'il marquoit le même pouvoir infini & au-dessus de la Créature, que si c'eût été un vin réel & effectif. Les productions miraculeuses, quoi qu'elles ne soient qu'idéales dans cette hypothese, font le même effet dans nôtre esprit, que si on supposoit qu'elles existent hors de nous.

Appendix C

JOURNAL LITÉRAIRE DE MAY & JUIN MDCCXIII

Tome I

À LA HAYE CHEZ T. JOHNSON

Article XIV. Dialogues of M. Berkley, to prove the non-existence of matter, &c (147–160)

THREE DIALOGUES between *Hylas* and *Philonus;* the design of which P. 147
is plainly to demonstrate the reality and perfection of humane knowledge, the incorporeal nature of the Soul, and the immediate Providence of a DEITY, in opposition to Sceptics and Atheists: also to open a Method for rendering the Sciences more easy, useful, and compendious. By *George Berkely*, M.A. fellow of Trinity-College, Dublin. London printed by G. James, for Henry [148] Clements, at the half-Moon, in S. Paul's Church- P. 148
Yard, 1713. C'est à dire *Trois Dialogues* entre Hilas & Philon, *pour montrer la vérité & la perfection des Connoissances humaines, l'immatérialité de l'Ame, & la Providence immédiate de* DIEU, &c. *Par* George Berkeley. A Londres, 1713. in 8. pag. 176. en tout.

Occasion de cet Ouvrage

L'Auteur de ces Dialogues, publia il y a trois ans, à Londres, la première Partie d'un Traité sur *les principes des Connoissances humaines:* les sentimens qu'il avança dans cet Ouvrage étant entiérement nouveaux, il a cru, avant que d'en publier la seconde Partie, qu'il étoit nécessaire, d'éclaircir davantage certains principes qu'il y a posez, & de les mettre dans un nouveau jour. C'est pour cette raison qu'il vient de publier les Dialogues dont nous parlons, qui sont pourtant écrits de maniére qu'on les peut lire sans avoir vû le premier Ouvrage. Nous avons encore du même Auteur, un Essai sur une nouvelle Théorie de la Vision, écrit aussi en Anglois, & imprimé pour la seconde fois à Dublin en 1709. On voit dans tous ces Ouvrages le caractére d'un Auteur plus attaché à avancer des Paradoxes & des Sentimens entiérement nouveaux, que soigneux d'examiner les sentimens qu'il réfute.

Caractere de l'Auteur

Les Interlocuteurs des Dialogues, dont nous allons donner l'Extrait, sont *Hilas* & [149] *Philon.* Le dernier qui est celui qui triomphe, & qui fait P. 149
tomber l'autre dans son sentiment, soutient *qu'il n'y a point de Corps, & qu'il ne peut exister que des Esprits:* il prétend que *tout ce que nous nommons* Corps *ne sont que des idées qui ne peuvent avoir une existence séparée des Esprits qui ont ces idées.* Notre Auteur croit que son sentiment est démontré, qu'il n'a aucun embaras, & *qu'il donne le moyen le plus aisé pour fermer la bouche, tant aux Athées qu'aux Sceptiques, & pour ramener les hommes des Paradoxes au sens commun.*

Sentiment défendu dans cet Ouvrage

On sera sans doute surpris de la bisarerie de ce sentiment, mais la lecture du livre empêchera qu'on ne le soit de ce que l'Auteur l'a embrassé. Quoi qu'on puisse dire du sentiment de *Philon*, il faut l'avouër, l'opinion ordinaire

Remarque D. J.

défenduë par *Hilas* (qui apparemment attaque [1] toutes les raisons que les raisons que l'Auteur scait pour la défendre) paroît bien moins soutenable. La dispute de nos Interlocuteurs n'est pas assez reglée pour permettre qu'on les suive dans un Extrait; nous nous contenterons d'exposer le sentiment de M. Berkeley le plus clairement qu'il nous sera possible; nous donnerons même à cet Extrait assez d'étenduë par rapport à la grosseur du Volume; ne doutant point que le Lecteur ne soit curieux de voir dans un espece de détail, ce qu'on peut alleguer en faveur d'un sentiment aussi particulier que celui de M. Berkeley.

Il n'existe point de Corps

P. 150

Nous allons commencer avec lui par les raisons sur lesquelles il se fonde, quand il dit qu'il n'existe rien de semblable à ce qu'on nomme *Substance matérielle*, ou pour le dire en [150] d'autres termes, que les choses sensibles n'existent point de la maniere dont on les conçoit ordinairement. Il remarque d'abord qu'on ne doit nommer choses sensibles que celles que l'on apperçoit immédiatement par les Sens; "quand je vois une partie du Ciel "rouge & l'autre bleuë, j'en conclus nécessairement qu'il faut qu'il y ait "une cause de cette diversité de couleurs; mais on ne peut pas dire que "cette cause soit une chose sensible, il n'y a que les couleurs mêmes que "j'apperçois immédiatement." Notre Auteur ajoûte ensuite que nous n'appercevons par les Sens que *la lumiére*, *les couleurs*, *les figures*, *le son*, *l'odeur*, *le goût*, & *ce qu'on peut appercevoir par l'atouchement;* il en conclut que si on fait voir qu'il ne peut exister hors de nous rien de semblable à ces qualitez sensibles, il s'ensuit qu'il n'y a rien hors de nous qu'on puisse appercevoir par les Sens; par conséquent ce que nous appellons *corps*, & que l'on considere comme un sujet auquel se rapportent ces differentes qualitez sensibles, n'est qu'une chimere, & *les choses sensibles* ne sont que de differentes combinaisons de ces *qualitez sensibles*, qui n'ont aucun sujet hors de nous auquel elles se raportent.

Les qualitez sensibles ne peuvent pas existers hors de nous

P. 151

Pour prouver que les qualitez sensibles ne peuvent pas exister hors de nous, M. Berkeley les distingue en deux Classes, il nomme les unes *Premieres* & les autres *Secondes*. Les premieres sont *l'étenduë*, *la figure*, *la solidité*, *la pesanteur*, *le mouvement* & *le repos*. Toutes les autres il les nomme Secondes, comme *la chaleur*, *l'odeur*, *le goût*, *le son* & *les couleurs*. Notre [151] Auteur commence par l'examen de ces derniers, & il fait voir que dans les Corps il n'y a rien de semblable à ces qualitez Secondes, c'est à-dire aux sensations que nous avons de la chaleur, des odeurs, &c.

Remarque D. J.

Personne ne doute de cette verité, On auroit volontiers dispensé M. Berkeley de s'étendre autant qu'il le fait, pour répondre à des objections qu'assûrémént personne ne s'avisera de lui faire. Quand on dit qu'un Corps a quelqu'une de ces dernieres qualitez, on ne veut pas dire que ce Corps ressente quelque chose de semblable à ce qu'il nous fait sentir: on veut simplement dire que ce Corps, par la configuration de ses Parties, où par le mouvement qu'il communique à la matiere qui l'environne, ou qui se refléchit sur ce Corps, a la propriété de mettre nos fibres dans un certain mouvement, qui par le cerveau se communique à l'ame, en y faisant naître quelqu'une de ces idées qu'on nomme Sensations.

[1] *Errata* to Tome I: read "allegue" for "attaque".

Aussi M. Berkeley se fait-il faire cet objection à l'égard des *couleurs* & du *son*, & il se contente sur ce dernier Article, de répondre, qu'il est contradictoire que le *Son* soit *un mouvement*, *un mouvement* ne pouvant être apperçû que par la *vûë* & par *l'atouchement*.

Notre Auteur auroit dû remarquer, qu'on ne dit point que le *son* soit un *mouvement*, mais que c'est l'effet d'un mouvement, ce qui veut dire que le mouvement, par l'organe de l'ouïe, fait naître dans notre ame une idée que nous nommons *son*. Ce qu'il dit des couleurs est à peu près de la même force. *Remarque D. J.*

Mais ce n'est pas sur ces qualitez secondes [152] que roule la question de la non-existence des corps, il s'agit de faire voir que *l'étenduë*, *la figure*, *la solidité*, *la pesanteur*, *le mouvement* & *le repos*, ne sont que des Sensations de l'ame, & qu'ils ne peuvent exister qu'en idée. Voici quelques-uns des principaux raisonnements de notre Auteur. Pour prouver que la figure & la grandeur ne sont point dans les corps, il remarque qu'une chose ne peut pas être en même tems de differentes dimensions; cependant un petit corps qui nous paroît à peine visible, doit paroître extrêmément grand à un Animal qui seroit encore plus petit que ce corps. Une autre raison, c'est qu'une *qualité inherente* d'un objet, ne peut pas être changée, à moins que l'objet même ne le soit; nous voyons pourtant qu'un corps, suivant que nous en approchons ou que nous nous en éloignons, nous paroît plus grand ou plus petit; ainsi on ne peut pas dire que la grandeur soit une qualité inherente. Voici encore un troisieme raisonnement de M. Berkeley; quand en mettant les deux mains dans l'eau, elle paroît chaude à l'une & froide à l'autre, on en conclut avec raison que la chaleur n'est pas dans l'eau: ne doit-on pas de même conclure, que l'étenduë & la figure ne sont pas dans un objet, quand il paroît petit, fort poli, & rond à un de mes yeux, pendant qu'à l'autre il paroît grand, raboteux, & angulaire; c'est pourtant ce qui arrive quand on regarde avec un des yeux par un Microscope & qu'on regarde naturellement de l'autre. P. 152 *La figure & la grandeur ne sont pas dans les objets* 1. *Preuve* 2. *Preuve* 3. *Preuve*

Pour faire une seule remarque sur tous ces raisonnemens, nous nous contenterons de dire, que l'Auteur ne prend pas garde aux dif-[153] férentes relations que les objets peuvent avoir avec nous: quand ces relations changent, quoi qu'un objet reste le même en soi, il ne reste pas le même à notre égard; l'exemple de la chaleur ne prouve rien, on auroit tort de dire que la chaleur n'est pas dans l'eau, si l'on n'avoit pour le prouver, que la raison dont notre Auteur vient de parler. Auroit-on bonne grace, par exemple, quand M. Berkeley retient une chose, pendant qu'il en oublie une autre, d'en conclure, que la mémoire n'est pas une faculté de son ame? Et ne seroit-on pas injuste, en en détruisant de cette maniére les autres facultez, de soûtenir qu'il n'a du tout point d'ame? Lui-même ayant déja annihilé son Corps, que deviendroit-il? *Remarque D. J.* P. 153

Le raisonnement de notre Auteur sur le mouvement est de la même nature. Si le *mouvement* est dans les corps, il ne peut pas être en même tems rapide & lent, "mais le *mouvement* est rapide à proportion du tems qu'il "met à parcourir un espace donné, &c. Le tems est mesuré par la succession "de nos idées dans notre esprit, & ces idées peuvent se succéder plus vîte "dans un esprit que dans un autre. Donc. &c." La *solidité* aussi n'est pas dans les corps, elle est relative à nos Sens; un corps qui paroît dur, & *Le mouvement n'est pas dans les Corps* *La solidité n'est pas dans les Corps*

qui résiste à un Animal, paroîtra mou & ne résistera point à un autre.

Remarque D. J. L'Auteur auroit dû remarquer qu'on appelle d'ordinaire *solidité*, cette propriété des corps, par laquelle ils empêchent tout autre corps d'occuper

P. 154 un même lieu avec eux; & cette [154] solidité n'est pas relative à nos Sens: l'eau quelque fluide qu'elle soit, si elle ne peut échaper, résiste à un morceau de fer, autant que pourroit le faire le Corps le plus dur.

M Berkeley pour terminer entiérement la dispute, & prévenir toutes les objections qu'on pourroit faire contre son raisonnement, ajoûte, que

L'étenduë n'est pas dans les Corps pour cet effet il suffit de faire voir qu'il n'y a point d'étenduë. Si l'étenduë n'est qu'une idée, les Corps ne peuvent pas être autre chose. L'essentiel de la preuve de M. Berkeley consiste, en ce qu'on ne sçauroit concevoir l'*étenduë* séparée de toutes les qualitez sensibles que nous avons nommé Secondes; d'où notre Auteur conclut, que l'étenduë ne peut pas exister sans quelques-unes de ces qualitez; & comme ces qualitez n'existent que dans notre esprit, l'étenduë ne peut pas être quelque chose hors de nous, & par conse-

Remarque D. J. quent elle n'est qu'une idée. Si ce raisonnement embarasse quelqu'un, il pourra le mettre en d'autres termes, & il trouvera que M. Berkeley prouve très bien que l'impression que l'étenduë, entant que sensible, fait sur notre esprit, est une idée; ou ce qui est la même chose, que l'idée de l'étenduë est une idée.

Raisonnement métaphisique C'est assez nous arrêter à ce que notre Auteur dit des qualitez sensibles; Nous passons à un raisonnement plus que métaphisique, auquel il revient souvent, & qu'il regarde comme seul capable de décider toute la question. Il n'y a rien de sensible que ce qu'on apperçoit immédiatement: ce qu'on

P. 155 apperçoit immédiatement est une idée, qui ne [155] peut pas exister dans un Etre insensible, semblable à ce que nous nommons Corps. Les idées varient à toutes les différentes situations des objets, & ainsi elles ne peuvent pas être les representations de ces objets, qui restent toûjours les mêmes. Outre cela, une idée ne peut ressembler qu'à une autre idée; & par conséquent, ce que nos idées nous representent ne peut exister que dans un autre esprit. Ce qui ne pense point ne peut pas être la cause de la pensée. Il y a plus; un Etre incapable d'agir ne peut être la cause d'aucun effet, & on ne peut pas dire que le mouvement soit une action de la matiére: ce n'est qu'une idée, comme notre Auteur prétend l'avoir prouvé par le raisonnement que nous avons raporté ci dessus.

Objection Par de telles preuves, M. Berkeley prétend renverser tout ce qu'on dit d'ordinaire; que les objets extérieurs par les différentes impressions qu'ils font sur les organes des Sens, mettent les nerfs dans un mouvement qui se communique au Cerveau, & qui excite dans notre ame, les idées que nous nommons Sensations. Notre Auteur demande, si on conçoit ce que c'est que

Réponse le Cerveau? Si on le conçoit, dit-il, c'est une idée, & il est absurde que pour expliquer la maniére dont une idée est excitée dans notre ame, il faille recourir à des idées empreintes dans une autre idée. Si on ne conçoit pas ce que c'est que Cerveau, on ne sçait pas ce qu'on dit, bien loin de former une hipothése raisonnable. Il n'y a aucun raport entre le mouvement des

P. 156 nerfs & les Sensations du Son, des Coleurs, &c. [156] Le sentiment de l'existence des Corps étant faux, il oblige à douter de tout.

Remarque D. J. Ce qu'il y a de spécieux dans le raisonnement de M. Berkeley, c'est qu'i

suppose qu'il n'y a qu'un Esprit capable d'avoir lui-même des idées, qui puisse en faire naître dans un autre Esprit. Quoi qu'il dise sur ce sujet, il ne persuadera jamais que Dieu ne soit assez puissant pour avoir créé des Etres inanimez, & pour les avoir rendus capables, par des moyens qui nous sont inconnus, d'agir sur les esprits pour y faire naître des idées. Il s'agit donc de sçavoir, si Dieu s'est servi de ce moyen pour nous faire avoir les idées qui nous viennent à l'occasion des objets que nous nommons sensibles, ou si Dieu lui-même est l'Auteur immédiat de nos idées, comme le croit M. Berkeley. On ne nie point que Dieu, comme le dit notre Auteur, ne puisse faire tout par lui-même, sans se servir d'aucun Instrument: la question est de sçavoir, si Dieu n'a pas voulu en employer; & s'il n'a pas établi certaines Loix par lesquelles plusieurs choses doivent arriver les unes en conséquence des autres. C'est au Lecteur à juger, s'il est concevable que Dieu ayant voulu que le Monde fut tel qu'il est, ait en même tems voulu être l'Auteur immédiat de nos idées. Peut on s'imaginer, que Dieu, ayant deux moyens pour faire avoir aux hommes les idées qu'ils ont des choses sensibles, il ait voulu faire croire aux hommes qu'il s'est servi du moyen qu'il n'employe pas? tous les deux moyen, étant pour un Etre Tout-Puissant, également faciles & également propres [157] à faire connoître son Pouvoir & sa Sagesse. P. 157
Il est vrai que notre Auteur dans son troisiéme Dialogue, nie que Dieu nous fasse croire qu'il y a des Corps, il soûtient que ce n'est qu'un préjugé, dans lequel nous sommes fort mal à propos. Je m'en raporte aux réfléxions que chacun pourra faire là-dessus.

Les Corps ne sont que des idées.

Venons à présent à un détail particulier du sentiment de M. Berkeley. Après s'être étendu sur la beauté de l'Univers, sur l'ordre admirable qui y régne, sur le Méchanisme Divin qui assujettit & fait comme dépendre les uns des autres tant de grands Corps & à un si grand éloignement les uns des autres, il ajoûte, qu'il y auroit de la folie à nier l'existence de toutes ces choses. Il en conclut, que puis qu'elles ne peuvent exister hors de nous, ni avoir une existence séparée des Esprits à qui elles sont sensibles, il faut que leur existence consiste en ce qu'elles sont apperçûës: *in being perceived.*

Preuve de l'Existence de Dieu.

Considérons de plus, qu'il ne dépend pas de nous d'appercevoir ou de ne pas appercevoir les objets que nous voudrions; par conséquent l'existence des objets ne dépend point de la perception que nous en avons; il faut donc qu'ils existent dans quelque autre esprit qui les aperçoive: sur quoi notre Auteur fait ce raisonnement: "puis qu'on ne sçauroit douter que le Monde "sensible n'existe, il doit être tout aussi certain qu'il existe un Esprit "infini, present par tout, qui contienne ce Monde, & qui lui serve de soûtien. "*Who contains, and supports it.*

P. 158

M. B. ne détruit point l'existence des Corps

Il ne fait pas Dieu Auteur du Péché.

On ne doit pas craindre, dit notre Auteur [158] dans un autre endroit, qu'on détruise les choses sensibles, en disant que ce ne sont que des idées; ce sont des idées bien différentes de celles que notre imagination nous fournit, qui ne sont pas distinctes, & qui dépendent entiérement de notre volonté; au contraire, les idées qui nous viennent par les Sens sont plus vives & plus nettes, étant communiquées à l'ame par un Esprit qui en est séparé. Ce sentiment, ajoûte M. Berkeley, ne méne point à faire Dieu Auteur du Péché, quoi qu'on le fasse Auteur de toutes les Actions Phisiques;

l'Action Phisique est toûjours indifférente, ce qu'il y a de criminel vient de ce qui se passe dans l'ame de celui qui agit.

Voilà en peu de mots, le sentiment de notre Auteur, & son argument contre les Athées, qu'il regarde comme une démonstration directe & immédiate, fondée sur des principes incontestables.

Remarque sur la vûe des Corps en Dieu.

M. Berkeley examine ensuite ce que pense un fameux Philosophe de notre tems, sur *la vûë des Corps en Dieu*, & il remarque que suivant ce sentiment il doit être inutile que les Corps existent, puisque notre ame ne les apperçoit que dans *l'idée representative* en Dieu, sans appercevoir les Corps mêmes. Notre Auteur s'étend aussi fort au long sur la maniére dont il faut entendre ce que Moïse a dit de la Création. Quand il est dit, que Dieu a créé quelque chose, cela veut dire, que Dieu a voulu communiquer une certain idée, aux Esprits particuliers qu'il avoit créez auparavant.

Comment il faut entendre la Création.

P. 159

Outre l'argument contre les Athées, M. [159] Berkeley croit trouver dans son sentiment beaucoup d'autres avantages qu'on n'a point quand on admet l'existence des Corps. Les Philosophes sont obligez de dire, qu'ils ne connoissent point la nature des choses; pour lui il les connoît, les choses ne sont que les idées qu'il en a, ainsi le feu est chaud, & les Couleurs sont dans les objets; en quoi il s'accorde, dit-il, avec tous les hommes: M. Berkeley devoit ajoûter *pour les mots*. Quand un Païsan dit, que la blancheur de son Cheval est dans le Cheval même, & quand M. Berkeley le dit aussi, ont-ils la même idée? Et M. Berkeley, qui prétend si fort s'accorder avec ce que le Sens-commun enseigne à tous les hommes, seroit-il bien reçû de ce Païsan s'il venoit lui soûtenir que ce Cheval n'existe que dans la tête de ceux qui le regardent.

Avantages du sentiment de M. B.

Remarque D. J.

L'Auteur prétend faire valoir son Systême à bien d'autres égards par dessus le sentiment de ceux qui croyent l'existence des Corps; sentiment qui, à ce que dit M. Berkeley, méne à un grand nombre de Paradoxes & de conséquences absurdes & insoûtenables. C'est sur quoi nous ne nous arrêtons point: ce que nous avons dit jusques ici fait assez voir ce que M. Berkeley veut dire par ces paradoxes & ces sentimens insoûtenables. Nous nous contenterons, avant que de finir cet Extrait, de marquer quelques suites de l'opinion de notre Auteur. En voici quelques-unes, dont il parle dans ces Dialogues.

Conséquences du sentiment de M. B.

P. 160

Quand j'approche d'un Objet, à chaque pas que je fais, c'est un autre Objet que je vois. [160] Quand je regarde un objet par un Microscope, je ne vois pas le même que celui j'aperçois sans cet aide. L'Objet que je sens n'est pas le même que celui que je vois. Ce n'est que pour éviter la confusion dans le langage, que dans ces cas on donne le même nom à des Objets différens, & qu'on en parle comme s'ils étoient les mêmes.

Remarque D. J.

Autres conséquences qu'on peut tirer du Systême de M. Berkeley.

La main qui donne un soufflet ne peut pas être vûë. Le bâton, dont je me sers pour fraper, n'est pas celui que je tiens à la main. L'homme qui m'a insulté, n'est pas le même que celui que j'appelle en Justice; & celui qu'on voit attaché à la Potence n'est pas celui a fait le vol. Je ne puis pas parler à quelqu'un, sans qu'un Esprit infini n'intervienne pour faire naître dans l'esprit de celui à qui je parle les idées que j'y veux exciter. Par là même que j'écris ceci, Dieu est obligé de faire voir ces Caractéres à tous ceux qui jetteront les yeux sur ce Papier.

Appendix D

MÉMOIRES POUR L'HISTOIRE

DES SCIENCES & DES BEAUX ARTS

(*i.e. Mémoires de Trévoux*)

Mai 1713

De l'Imprimerie de S.A.S. À TRÉVOUX, *Et se vendent à Paris*, Chez ÉTIENNE GANAU Libraire Rue Saint Jacques, vis à vis la Fontaine St. Séverin, aux Armes de Dombes.

Article LXXX NOUVELLES LITÉRAIRES DE DUBLIN

P. 921

Mr. Berkley, Malbranchiste de bonne foi, a poussé sans ménagement les principes de sa secte fort au delà du sens commun, & il en a conclu, qu'il n'y a, ni corps, ni matiere, & que les esprits seuls existent. Ces esprits sont aurant d'individus qui ont la faculté de recevoir des idées, de vouloir & d'agir, conformément à leurs idées & à leur volonté. Tout ce que [922] nous P. 922 imaginons de corporel ne sont que des idées qu'un autre esprit nous imprime, & qui n'ont point d'existence hors de nous, & cessent d'être quand on cesse de les appercevoir.

Traité des principes de la connoissance de l'homme, premiere partie, où l'on recherche les principales causes des erreurs & des difficultez qui se trouvent dans les Sciences, avec les fondemens du Pirrhonisme, de l'Athéisme, & de l'irréligion. L'Auteur promet une seconde partie.

Un de nous connoît dans Paris un Malbranchiste qui va plus loin que Mr. Berkley, il lui a soutenu fort sérieusement dans une longue dispute, qu'il est très-probable qu'il soit le seul être créé qui existe, & que non seulement il n'y ait point de corps, mais qu'il n'y ait point d'autre esprit créé que lui; c'est à ceux qui croyent que *nous ne voyons qu'un monde intelligible*, à prouver qu'on porte trop loin leurs principes.

Nous prions ceux qui ont du zele pour la mémoire de Mr. Bull Evêque de Saint Asaph, du Docteur Thomas Smith & de Mr. Grabe, de nous mettre en état de donner leurs éloges au Public.

Appendix E

MÉMOIRES POUR L'HISTOIRE

DES SCIENCES & DES BEAUX ARTS.

(*i.e. Mémoires de Trévoux*)

Decembre 1713

De l'Imprimerie de S.A.S. À TRÉVOUX, *Et se vendent à Paris*, Chez ÉTIENNE GANEAU Libraire Rue Saint Jacques, vis à vis la Fontaine St. Séverin, aux Armes de Dombes.

P. 2198 Article CLXXXI NOUVELLES LITÉRAIRES D'ANGLETERRE, DE LONDRES

Mr. Berkley continuë de soutenir obstinément *qu'il n'y a point de corps, & que le monde materiel n'est qu'un monde intelligible:* il presse les nouveaux
P. 2199 Philosophes par leurs principes: I. L'étenduë, dit-il, [2199] n'a pas plus d'existence que les qualitez sensibles, ce n'est qu'une idée de nôtre esprit. II. On ne voit les corps qu'en Dieu, il est donc inutile qu'ils existent hors de Dieu. Vous demanderez sans doute ce que c'est donc que la création, dont Moyse nous a laissé l'histoire? La création, selon Mr. Berkley, n'est que la resolution que Dieu a prise d'imprimer aux esprits les idées des corps. Mr. Berkley n'a-t'il pas fait un bon usage de ses meditations, & de son attention à la raison universelle? *Three dialogues between hylas and Philonous. A Londres, chez Clements in* 8. 1713.

Mr. Ditton a mis au jour un livre *sur la resurrection de Jesus-Christ* qui fait du bruit.

La nouvelle édition *des principes de Physique* de *Mr. Neuton* paroîtra incessamment, ce grand Philosophie se flate d'avoir prouvé le Vuide, & l'impossibilité des tourbillons de Descartes.

Appendix F

RÉFLEXIONS DU PÈRE TOURNEMINE SUR L'ATHÉISME, &C.

...VII. IL REFUTE L'ATHÉISME DES IMMATERIALISTES.[1]

L'aveuglement volontaire des impies n'a pû leur cacher les contra- P. 364
dictions énormes du Systême de Spinosa, il commence de n'être plus à la mode; une Philosophie directement opposée à ce Systême prend sa place depuis quelques années. Le livre Anglois d'un certain Berkey a rendu publics ces nouveaux efforts de l'Incrédulité. Les impies de cette Secte ne disent plus que tout est matière, ils disent que tout est esprit; le Monde, selon eux, n'est composé que d'êtres pensans. Tout ce que nous croïons voir, sentir de corporel, l'étenduë, le mouvement, ces villes, ces maisons que nous croïons habiter, ces personnes à qui nous croïons parler, ce corps que nous croïons avoir, ces viandes que nous croïons manger, tout cela n'a rien de réel, ce sont de vaines idées, des fantômes que notre esprit fabrique, ou plutôt qui naissent dans nous par la necessité naturelle qui nous a fait naître; nos affections, nos résolutions sont aussi necessaires que nos pensées; nous ne sommes plus matiére; mais tout immateriels qu'on nous suppose, nous sommes aussi machine que quand on nous supposoit tout materiels: l'impieté se flatte de s'être par ce nouveau Systême delivré de tout devoir & de tout [365] remors; d'avoir ôté aux vrais Philosophes tous les moyens de P. 365
prouver l'existence de Dieu, de s'être mise enfin dans un repos que rien ne peut troubler.

On pressoit les impies par la démonstration tirée de la structure de chaque corps en particulier, & de la construction entiére du Monde sensible, ils l'anéantissent, c'est la plus courte voie pour se débarrasser de la démonstration. Dans leur Systême point de liaison entre les Etres pensans, chacun est un Monde indépendant des autres.

Un de ces Philosophes m'a soutenu fort sérieusement qu'il se pouvoit faire qu'il n'y eût que lui au Monde, & qu'il fût le seul être. Ainsi plus de rapports, plus de devoirs dans ce Systême nos connoissances n'ont rien de solide, nous ne sommes occupés que par des spectres feints, des peintures fantasques sans verité, sans objets: dans ce Systême je saurois seulement que je suis, que je pense ou plutôt que je rêve, que mes idées n'ont aucune réalité, aucune verité; ainsi plus de foi humaine, plus de loix, plus de principes, plus de morale.

[1] This 7th section of the *Réflexions* first appeared in the 1718 edition of Archbishop Fénelon's *Oeuvres Philosophiques*. The text now reproduced is from an edition of 1731; Amsterdam (Zacharie Chatelain).

Après tout, ce Systême tout pernicieux qu'il paroisse, ne fera pas beaucoup de mal: l'amour de la nouveauté, la corruption du coeur, feront
P. 366 écouter ces Philosophes, peut-être avec quelque plai-[366]sir, mais ils ne persuaderont personne, ils ne se persuaderont pas eux-mêmes. On n'a rien à craindre pour la verité de l'existence de Dieu, si on ne peut la détruire qu'après avoir convaincu les hommes que ce qu'ils voyent, ce qu'ils touchent, n'est pas, qu'ils n'ont point de corps, & qu'ils rêvent continuellement. Ils regarderont sûrement les Immatérialistes comme cet homme qui s'imaginant être de verre, craignoit à tout moment d'être cassé: & franchement la folie des Immatérialistes ne différe de la folie de cet homme qu'en ce qu'elle est plus extravagante mais volontaire. Non, ne craignons pas que ces speculations vagues l'emportent sur le sens commun. Refuter en forme ces visions ce seroit se défier trop de la Raison humaine: faisons seulement quelques réflexions qui découvrent tout le ridicule de cette nouvelle Philosophie.

1. Demandons d'abord quel en est le fondement? S'appuye-t-elle sur quelque principe certain, sur quelque sentiment intime, sur quelque expérience? Non: Elle se fonde uniquement sur des conjectures opposées au sens commun, sur des suppositions chimériques, sur des possibilités au moins douteuses: ces fondemens sont-ils solides.

P. 367 2. On n'évite point dans ce Systême [367] la preuve de l'existence de Dieu, tirée de l'excellence de ses ouvrages: cette excellence, cette perfection qui décele l'ouvrier, ces marques de sa sagesse infinie, ces argumens démonstratifs de son existence; je les trouve dans mes pensées. Le projet du Monde, le projet du plus petit corps ne sont point nés dans un esprit tel que le mien; ces idées universelles, les idées des perfections qui me manquent, l'idée de l'infini sont encore moins les productions d'un esprit borné, des jeux de mon imagination: quand leurs objets ne subsisteroient pas, elles n'ont pû se former que dans un esprit infini qui les a communiquées aux esprits bornés. Le Monde & mon corps portent des caractéres ineffaçables du Dieu qui les a faits: mais mon ame les porte aussi ces caractéres, & l'on ne peut s'empêcher de les y reconnoître.

3. Enfin, ces Etres pensants qui composent seuls le Monde, selon les Immatérialistes, ont ils existé de toute éternité? ont-ils commencé d'être? S'ils ont commencé d'être, il faut remonter à une premiere cause: l'impiété ne s'en accommode pas: il faut donc les supposer éternels: il faut supposer qu'une éternité a été necessaire pour les mettre en état de penser: quoiqu'ils
P. 368 soient naturellement [368] faits pour penser, ils ont été pendant une éternité dans une espéce de mort: ils ne vivent que depuis un certain tems. Suppositions bizarres dont on ne voit aucun fondement; en verité les Incrédules voudroient nous faire croire des choses plus incroyables que tous les mystéres.

Appendix G

Selections from articles in the Cyclopaedia,
or an Universal Dictionary of the Arts & Sciences, *by*
Ephraim Chambers. London: J. & J. Knapton, 1728.

Article Abstraction (*Complete*)

ABSTRACTION, an Operation of the Mind, whereby we separate Things naturally conjunct, or existing together; and form and consider Ideas of Things thus separated. See Abstract.

The Faculty of *Abstracting*, stands directly opposite to that of Compounding – By Composition we consider those Things together, which in reality are not join'd together in one Existence. And by *Abstraction*, we consider those Things separately and apart, which in reality do not exist apart. See Composition.

Abstraction is chiefly employ'd these three ways – First, when the Mind considers any one Part of a Thing, in some respects distinct from the Whole; as a Man's Arm, without the Consideration of the rest of his Body.

Secondly, when we consider the Mode of any Substance, omitting the Substance it self; or when we separately consider several Modes which subsist together in one Subject. See Mode.

This *Abstraction* the Geometricians make use of, when they consider the Length of a Body separately, which they call a Line; omitting the Consideration of its Breadth and Depth.

Thirdly, it is by *Abstraction* that the Mind frames general or universal Ideas; omitting the Modes and Relations of the particular Objects whence they are form'd. – Thus, when we would understand a thinking Being in general, we gather from our Self-consciousness what it is to Think; and omitting the Consideration of those Things which have a peculiar Relation to our own Mind, or to the human Mind, we think of a thinking Being in general.

Ideas fram'd thus, which are what we properly call *Abstract Ideas*, become general Representatives of all Objects of the same Kind; and their Names applicable to whatever exists conformable to such Ideas. – Thus, the Colour that we receive from Chalk, Snow, Milk, &c. is a Representative of all of that Kind; and has a Name given it, *Whiteness*, which signifies the same Quality, wherever found or imagin'd. See General.

'Tis this last Faculty, or Power of *Abstracting*, according to Mr. *Locke*, that makes the great Difference between Man and Brutes; even those latter must be allowed to have some share of Reason: That they really reason in some Cases, seems almost as evident as that they have Sense; but 'tis only

in particular Ideas. They are tyed up to those narrow Bounds; and do not seem to have any Faculty of enlarging them by *Abstraction. Essay on Human Understanding*, L. III. c. 3.

Such is the Doctrine of *Abstract Ideas*, under the Improvements of that excellent Author. – In effect, 'tis the standing Opinion, that the Mind has such a Power or Faculty of framing *Abstract Ideas* or *Notions* of Things; and on such very Ideas do a great part of the Writings of Philosophers turn. These are supposed in all their Systems; and without them there would be nothing done. – They are more especially reputed the Object of Logick and Metaphysicks, and all that passes under the Notion of the most *abstracted* and *sublime* Learning.

Yet has a late eminent and ingenious Author, Dean *Berkeley*, contested the Reality of any such Ideas; and gone a good way towards overturning the whole System, and consequently towards setting our Philosophy on a new footing.

The Qualities or Modes of Things, 'tis on all hands agreed, do never really exist apart, and separated from all others; but are constantly mix'd and combin'd together, several in the same Object. – But, say the Philosophers, the Mind being able to consider each Quality singly, or *abstracted* from other Qualities with which it is united, does by that means frame to it self *Abstract Ideas*, of a different Nature and Kind from the sensible ones.

For an Example hereof, The Eye perceiving an Object extended, coloured, and moved, resolves this Compound Idea, into its simple, constituent ones; and viewing each by it self, exclusive of the rest, frames *Abstract Ideas* of *Extension*, *Colour*, and *Motion* themselves, or in their own Nature. – Not that it is possible for such Colour and Motion to exist without Extension; but only that the Mind can frame to it self, by *Abstraction*, the Idea of Colour exclusive of Extension; and of Motion, exclusive both of Colour and Extension.

Again, say the same Philosophers, the Mind having observ'd that in the particular Extensions perceived by Sense, there is something common, and alike in all; and some other things peculiar; as this, or that Figure or Magnitude, which distinguish them one from another; it can consider apart, or single out by it self, what is common; making thereof a general abstract Idea of Extension, which is neither *Line*, *Surface*, nor *Solid*, nor has any *Figure* or *Magnitude*, but is an Idea entirely prescinded from 'em all. – So, likewise, by leaving out of the several Colours perceived by Sense, that which distinguishes them from one another, and only retaining what is common to all, it makes an Idea of Colour in the *Abstract*, which is neither *red*, nor *blue*, nor *white*, &c. – After the same manner, by considering Motion abstractedly, both from the Body moved, and from the Figure it describes, and all particular Directions, and Velocities; an *Abstract* Idea of Motion is framed, which equally corresponds to all Motions whatever.

They add, that as the Mind frames *Abstract* Ideas of Qualities or Modes; so does it, by the same Faculty, attain *Abstract* Ideas of the more compound Beings, which include many coexistent Qualities. – For an Example – Having observ'd that *Peter*, *James*, *John*, &c. resemble each other in Shape, and other Qualities; we can leave out of the Complex Idea we had of

Peter, James, &c. that which is peculiar to each, retaining only what is common to all, and so make an *Abstract* Idea, wherein all the Particulars equally partake. – And thus it is we are supposed to come by the *Abstract* Idea of *Man,* or of *Humanity,* or *Human Nature;* wherein there is indeed included Colour, because no Man but has some Colour, but it is neither *white,* nor *black,* nor *brown;* because there is no one particular Colour wherein all Men partake. So likewise there is included Stature, but then it is neither *tall,* nor *low,* nor yet *middle Stature,* but something *abstracted* from all these: And so of the rest.

Farther yet, there being a general Variety of other Creatures, which partake in some Parts, but not all, of the Complex Idea of Man; the Mind leaving out those Parts which are peculiar to Men, and retaining those only which are common to all living Creatures, frames the Idea of *Animal;* which *abstracts* or participates not only of all Men, but all Birds, Beasts, Fishes, and Insects.

The constituent Parts of such *Abstract Idea* of Animal, are Body, Life, Sense, and spontaneous Motion. – By *Body,* is meant, Body without any particular Shape, or Figure; there being no one common to all Animals; without Covering, either of Hair, of Feathers, or Scales: nor yet naked; Hair, Feathers, Scales, and Nakedness, being the distinguishing Properties of particular Animals, and for that Reason left out of the *Abstract* Idea. Upon the same Account, the spontaneous Motion must be neither walking, nor flying, nor creeping; it is nevertheless a Motion – But what that Motion is, it is not easy to conceive.

'I will not affirm, *says* Dr. Berkeley, that other People have not this won-'derful Faculty of *abstracting* their Ideas; but I am confident I have it not my 'self. – I have, indeed, a Faculty of imagining, or representing to my self 'the Ideas of Things I have perceived, and of variously compounding or 'dividing them: I can imagine a Man with two Heads, or the upper Parts 'of a Man join'd to the Body of a Horse. I can consider the Hand, the 'Eye, the Nose, each by it self, *abstracted* or separated from the rest of the 'Body – But then, whatever Hand or Eye I imagine, it must have some 'particular Shape and Colour. – So, again, the Idea of a Man I frame to 'my self, must be either of a white, or a black, or a tawny, a strait or a 'crooked, a tall, or a low, or a middle-siz'd Man.

'I cannot by any Effort of Thought conceive the *Abstract* Idea above 'described; and it is equally impossible for me to form the *Abstract Idea* of 'Motion, distinct from the Body moving, and which is neither swift nor 'slow, curvilinear, nor rectilinear. – And the like may be said of all other '*abstract* general Ideas whatever.'

Since all things that exist are only Particulars, 'Whence, *says* Mr. Locke, 'is it, that we come by general Words, expressive of a thousand Individuals?' His Answer is 'Terms only become general, by being made the Signs of '*abstract* and general Ideas'; so that the Reality of *Abstract* Ideas, should follow from the Reality of General Words. – But this is a Deception. – A Word becomes General, by being made the Sign, not of an *abstract* general Idea, but of several particular ones; any one of which it indifferently suggests to the Mind. – For an Example, when I say that *Whatever has Extension is*

divisible: the Proposition is to be understood of Extension in general: not that I must conceive any *abstract* general Idea of Extension; which is neither Line, Surface, nor Solid, neither great nor small, &c.

To make this more evident, Suppose a Geometrician to be demonstrating a Method of dividing a Line in two equal Parts: In order hereto, he draws, for instance, a black Line, an Inch long; and this, which in it self is a particular Line, is nevertheless, with respect to its Signification, general; since it represents all Lines whatever: So that what is demonstrated of this one, will hold of all others – And as that particular Line becomes general by being made a Sign; so does the Name *Line:* And as the former owes its Generality, not to its being the Sign of an *abstract* or general Line, but of any or all particular right Lines that may possibly exist; so must the latter derive its Generality from the same Cause. See General *Term.*

Mr. *Locke*, speaking of the Difficulty of forming *Abstract Ideas*, says; 'And does it not require some Pains and Skill to form the general Idea 'of a Triangle, which yet is none of the most *abstract* and comprehensive; 'for it must be neither Oblique, nor Rectangular; neither Equilateral, 'Isosceles, nor Scalenous; but all, and none of these, at once.' – 'Now, let 'any Man look into his Thoughts, and try whether he has, or can attain to 'an Idea of a Triangle, correspondent to this Description.'

From the Notion of *Abstract Ideas*, Dr. *Berkeley* endeavours to shew, it was, that Bodies first came to be supposed to have an Existence of their own, out and independent of the Mind perceiving 'em. – Can there be a greater Strain of *Abstraction*, says he, than to distinguish the Existence of sensible Objects from their being perceiv'd, so as to conceive them existing unperceiv'd. See Body, and External *World.*

We shall only add, that *abstracting*, on the common System, is no more than generalizing: 'tis making one thing stand for an hundred, by omitting the Consideration of the Differences between 'em: It is taking several Differents, i.e. different Combinations, setting aside the Peculiarities in each, and considering only what is found alike in all. – Thus it is that I say, *I love my Friend, love my Mistress, love my self, my Bottle, my Book, my Ease*, &c. – Not that it is possible I should have the same Sensation with respect to so many different sorts of things, things that stand in such different Relations to me; but only that there appearing something in them all that bears a resemblance to the rest, in some Circumstances or other, I chuse to call 'em all by one Name, *Love.* For if I consider the Tendency of the Effects of them all, I shall find they lead me very different ways to very different Actions: and there is not more resemblance between the Causes than between the Effects: All the Analogy there is between them, is a sort of Pleasure or Satisfaction, arising upon the Application of the particular Object to its proper Organ, or Sense. – The *Abstract Idea* of Love, then, will terminate in the Idea of Pleasure: But, 'tis certain, there can be no Idea of Pleasure, without a thing pleasant to excite it. Any other *Abstract Idea* of Pleasure, will amount to no more than a View or Perception of the Circumstances wherewith our Pleasures have been attended: But these are mere Externals, foreign to the pleasurable Sensation it self; which nothing but an Object applied in such and such a manner, can excite. – To suppose an Idea of Pleasure produced

obliquely, by any other than the proper Cause, is as absurd as to suppose an Idea of Sound, produced without a sonorous Object. The Mind has no Power of making any Ideas, call 'em what you will, whether *Abstract*, or Concrete; or General, or Particular: Its Activity goes no farther than to the perceiving of such as are presented to it: So that its Action is really no other than a degree of Passion. See Sense.

Article Body

[*After various definitions of the Peripateticks, Epicureans, Cartesians, and the Newtonians are given – all to the effect that* Body *is a "solid, extended, palpable Substance," the text continues:*]

The Existence of Bodies, or of external *Objects*, is a Thing not to be demonstrated in any Manner whatever. The Order in which we arrive at the Knowledge of the Existence of *Bodies*, seems to be this; We first find we have *Sensations;* then observe we have not those Sensations when we please; and thence conclude, we are not the absolute Cause thereof, but that there is requir'd some other Cause for their Production. Thus we begin to know, that we don't exist alone, but that there are several other *Things* in the World together with us. But even this Dr. *Clark* owns to fail of a Demonstration of the Existence of a *corporeal World:* He adds, that all the Proof we have of it is this; That God would not create us such, as that all the Judgments we make about *Things* existing without us, must necessarily be false. If there be no External *Bodies*, it follows, that 'tis God who represents the Appearances of *Bodies* to us; and that he does it in such a manner as to deceive us. Some think this has the Force of a Demonstration: 'Tis evident God can't deceive us; 'tis evident he does deceive and delude us every Moment, if there be no *Bodies;* 'tis evident therefore, there must be *Bodies*.

Against the *Existence of Bodies*, or any External *World*, Mr. *Berkley* argues very strenuously, "That neither our Thoughts, Passions, nor Ideas form'd "by the Imagination, exist without the *Mind*, he observes is allow'd; and "that the various Sensations impress'd on the *Mind*, whatever *Objects* they "compose, cannot exist otherwise than in a *Mind* perceiving them, is not "less evident: This appears from the meaning of the Term *Exist*, when "apply'd to sensible Things. Thus, the Table I write on exists; i.e. I see "and feel it; and were I out of my Study, I should say it existed; i.e. Were "I in my Study, I should see and feel it as before. There was an Odor; i.e. "I smelt it, &c. But the *Existence* of unthinking *Beings*, without any Relation "to their being perceiv'd, is unintelligible; their *Esse* is *Percipi:* Nor is it "possible they should have any Existence out of the *Mind* that perceives "them." The Notion of *Bodies*, he endeavours to shew founded on the Doctrine of *Abstract Ideas:* "What are Light and Colours, Heat and Cold, "Extension and Figures, in a word, the Things we see and feel, but so "many Sensations, Notions, Ideas, or Impressions on the *Sense*? And is it "possible to separate, even in Thought, any of these from Perception? "The several *Bodies* then, that compose the Frame of the World, have not "any Subsistence without a *Mind;* their *Esse* is to be perceiv'd or known;

"and as long as they are not perceiv'd by Me, nor any other thinking Being, "they have no shadow of Existence at all. – The *Things* we perceive, are "Colour, Figure, Motion, &c. that is, the Ideas of those *Things:* But has an "Idea any Existence out of the Mind? To have an Idea, is the same thing "as to perceive: That therefore wherein Colour, Figure, &c. exist, must "perceive them. 'Tis evident, therefore, there can be no unthinking *Sub-* "*stance*, or *Substratum* of those Ideas. But you will argue, If the Ideas them- "selves don't exist without the *Mind*, there may be Things like 'em, whereof "they are Copies or Resemblances, which exist without the *Mind:* 'Tis "answer'd, an *Idea* can be like nothing but an *Idea;* a *Colour* or *Figure* can be "like nothing else but another *Figure* or *Colour*. It may be farther ask'd, "whether those supposed *Originals*, or *External Things* whereof our Ideas "are the Pictures, be themselves perceiveable or not? If they be, they are "Ideas; if they be not, I appeal to any one whether it be Sense to say, A "*Colour* is like somewhat which is Invisible; hard or soft, like somewhat "Intangible, &c. Some distinguish between Primary and Secondary "Qualities; the former, *viz.* Extension, Solidity, Figure, Motion, Rest and "Number, they maintain have a real Existence out of the *Mind:* For the "latter, under which come all other sensible Qualities, as Colours, Sounds, "Tastes, &c. they allow the Ideas we have of 'em, are not Resemblances of "any *Things* existing without the *Mind*, or unperceiv'd; but depend on the "Size, Texture, Motion, &c. of the minute Particles of Matter: Now 'tis "certain, that those Primary Qualities are inseparably united with the "other Secondary ones, and cannot even in Thought be abstracted from "them; and therefore must only exist in the *Mind.* Can any Man conceive "the Extension and Motion of a *Body*, without all the other sensible Qualitys? "For my part, I find it impossible to frame an Idea of a *Body* extended and "moving, without giving it some Colour, &c. In effect, Extension, Figure "and Motion, abstracted from all other Qualities, are Inconceivable: "Where the others, therefore, are, there these too must be; i.e. in the *Mind*, "and no where else. Again, Great and Small, Swift and Slow, are allow'd to "exist no where without the *Mind;* being merely relative, and changing, "as the Frame or Position of the Organ changes: The Extension therefore "that exists without the *Mind*, is neither great nor small, the Motion neither "swift nor slow; i.e. they are nothing. – That Number is a Creature of the "*Mind*, is plain (even tho the other Qualities were allow'd to exist) from "this; that the same thing bears a different Denomination of Number, as "the *Mind* views it with different Respects: Thus the same Extension is 1, "or 3, or 36, as the *Mind* considers it, with reference to a Yard, a Foot, or "an Inch. Nay, many of the modern Geometricians hold, that a finite Line "may be divided into an infinite Number of Parts, and each of those In- "finitesimals into an infinity of others; and so on, *in Infinitum;* So that the "same Thing is either Unity or Infinity; either no Number or all Number. "In effect, after the same manner as the modern Philosophers prove "Colours, Tastes, &c. to have no Existence in Matter, or without the *Mind;* "the same thing may be proved of all sensible Qualities whatsoever. "Thus, they say, Heat and Cold are only Affections of the *Mind*, not "at all Patterns of *real Beings* existing in *corporeal Substances;* for that the

"same *Body* which seems cold to one hand, seems warm to another. Now "why may we not as well argue, that Figure and Extension are not Patterns "or Resemblances of Qualities existing in Matter; because to the same Eye, "at different Stations, or to Eyes of different Structure at the same Station, "they appear various? Again, Sweetness, 'tis proved, does not exist in the "Thing sapid; because the Thing remaining unalter'd, the Sweetness is "chang'd to Bitterness, as in a Fever, or otherwise vitiated Palate. Is it not "as reasonable to say, that Motion does not exist out of the *Mind*? since if "the Succession of Ideas in the *Mind* become swifter, the Motion, 'tis "acknowledg'd, will appear slower, without any external Alteration. – "Again, were it possible for solid figur'd Bodies to exist out of the *Mind*, "yet it were impossible for us ever to know it: Our Senses, indeed, give us "Sensations or Ideas, but don't tell us that any Thing exists without the "*Mind*, or unperceiv'd, like those which are perceiv'd: This the Material- "ists allow. No other way therefore remains, but that we know 'em by "*Reason's* inferring their Existence from what is immediately perceiv'd by "Sense. But how should Reason do this, when 'tis confess'd there is not any "necessary Connection between our Sensations and these *Bodies*? 'Tis "evident from the *Phenomena* of Dreams, Phrensies, &c. that we may be "affected with the Ideas we now have, tho there were no *Bodies* existing "without them: Nor does the Supposition of external *Bodies* at all forward "us, in conceiving how our Ideas should come to be produc'd. The Ma- "terialists own themselves unable to conceive in what manner *Body* can act "on *Spirit;* or how it should imprint any Idea on the *Mind*. To suppose "therefore *Bodies* existing without the *Mind*, is little else than to suppose, "God has created innumerable *Beings* entirely useless, and serving to no "Purpose at all. On the whole, it appears that the *Existence of Bodies* out "of a *Mind* perceiving 'em, is not only impossible, and a Contradiction in "Terms; but were it possible, nay real, it were impossible we should ever "know it. And again, that supposing there are no such Things, yet we should "have the very same Reason to suppose there were that we now have: "Suppose, v.g. an Intelligence affected with the same Train of Sensations, "impress'd in the same Order, and with the same Vividness; would it not "have all the Reason to believe the Existence of *Bodies* represented by his "Ideas that we have? – All our Ideas and Sensations are visibly Inactive; "nay, the very Being of an Idea implies Passiveness and Inertness: So that "it is impossible for an Idea to do any thing; or, in strictness, be the Cause of "any thing: It cannot therefore be the Resemblance or Pattern of any "active *Being;* unless Opposites can be said to resemble one another.

"Now we find a continual Succession of Ideas in the *Mind;* but these, "it has been proved, don't depend on any External *Body* as their Cause: "It remains therefore, that their Cause is an Incorporeal active *Substance* or "*Spirit*. For that I am not the Cause of my own Ideas, is plain from this, that "when I open my Eyes in broad Daylight, I can't help seeing various "Objects. Now the fix'd Rules or Methods wherein the *Mind* we depend on "excites in us the Ideas of Sense, are call'd *Laws of Nature:* These we learn "by Experience; which teaches us, that such and such Ideas are attended with "such and such other Ideas in the ordinary Course of Things. – Ideas are

"not any how, and at random produced; there is a certain Order and "Connexion establish'd among 'em, like that of Cause and Effect: And "there are several Combinations of 'em made in a very regular artful "Manner, which we call *Bodies;* and the System of those, *the World.* In "strictness, however, the Connexion of Ideas does not imply the Relation "of Cause and Effect; but, only of a Mark or Sign of the Thing signify'd: "The Fire I see is not the Cause of the Pain I feel, but the Mark that fore-"warns me of it. The Noise I hear, is not the Effect of this or that Motion or "Collision of Natural *Bodies*, but the Sign thereof. The *Cartesians* own some-"what like this: The Action of *Bodies* on our Organs, say they, is not the "Efficient Cause of our Ideas and Perceptions, but only the *Occasional Cause*, "which determines God to act on the *Mind*, according to the Laws of the "Union of the *Soul* and *Body*. See Cause. Mr. *Berkeley*, indeed, taking away "*Bodies*, takes away what these Philosophers account the Occasions of "their Ideas: By an *Occasion*, he says, must either be meant the Agent "that produces an Effect, or something observ'd to accompany or go "before it, in the ordinary Course of Things: But Matter is allow'd to be "passive and inert, and can't therefore be an Agent of Efficient Cause; and "this Matter primitively and in it self, is allow'd imperceivable, and devoid "of all particular sensible Qualities; i.e. it has not this or that particular "Colour, this or that particular Figure, &c. but has Colour in the General, "Figure in the Abstract, &c. but an Abstract is no Object of Sense: Matter "therefore can't be the Occasion of our Ideas in the latter Sense."

How far the great Argument of the Maintainers of a material World, *from the Impossibility of God's deceiving us, and from the Evidence that he does so, if there be no such thing*, will go against this Reasoning, we leave to the Reader. See External *World.*

[*The article concludes with other meanings and problems of* Bodies, *e.g. their color, human body, body in law, etc.*]

Article External

[*One of the meanings given for* External *reads (complete) as follows:*]

EXTERNAL, is also used to express any Thing that is without-side a Man, or that is not within him, and particularly in his Mind. In this Sense, we say *External Objects*, &c. See Object.

The Existence of an *External World*, i.e. of Bodies, and Objects, out of the Mind, is a Thing has been greatly call'd in Question of late. See Matter, Body, World, &c.

'Were it possible for Bodies, i.e. solid, figured, &c. Substances to exist 'without the Mind, corresponding to those Ideas we have of *External* 'Objects, yet how were it possible for us to know it? Either we must know 'it by Sense, or Reason: As for our Senses, by them we have only the 'Knowledge of our Sensations or Ideas: They do not inform us that Things 'exist without the Mind, or unperceiv'd, like those which are perceiv'd. 'It remains, therefore, that if we have any Knowledge at all of *External* 'Things, it must be by Reason, inferring their Existence from what is 'immediately perceiv'd by Sense. But how shall Reason induce us to believe

'the Existence of Bodies without the Mind, when the Patrons of Matter 'themselves deny that there is any necessary Connection betwixt them and 'our Ideas. In Effect, 'tis granted on all Hands, and what happens in Dreams, 'Phrenzies, Deliriums, Extasies, &c. puts it beyond Dispute, that we might 'be affected with all the Ideas we have now, tho' there were no Bodies 'existing without, resembling them. Hence, it is evident, the Supposition of '*External* Bodies is not necessary for the Production of our Ideas.' *Berkeley's Princ. of Human Knowledge*, p. 59.

'Granting the Materialists their *External* Bodies, they by their own 'Confession, are never the nearer knowing how our Ideas are produced; 'since they own themselves unable to comprehend in what Manner Body 'can act upon Spirit; or how it is possible it should imprint any Idea 'in the Mind. Hence, the Production of Ideas, or Sensations, in our Minds, 'can be no Reason why we should suppose Matter, or Corporeal Substances; 'since that is equally inexplicable with or without the Supposition. In short, 'tho' there were *External* Bodies, 'tis impossible we should ever come to 'know it; and if there were none, we should have the same Cause to think 'there were that we now have.' *Id. ibid.* p. 60, 61.

'Try, whether you can conceive it possible for a Sound, or Figure, or 'Motion, or Colour, to exist without the Mind, or unperceiv'd. This may 'perhaps convince you, that what you contend for, is a downright Contra- 'diction. – I am content to put the whole upon this Issue: If you can but 'conceive it possible for one extended, moveable Substance, or, in general, for 'any one Idea to exist otherwise than in a Mind perceiving it; I shall readily 'give up the Cause.' *Id. ibid.* p. 63.

'It is worth while to reflect a little on the Motives which induced Men 'to suppose the Existence of material Substance; that so, having observed 'the gradual ceasing and Expiration of those Motives, we may withdraw 'the Assent grounded on them. First, Therefore it was thought that Colour, 'Figure, Motion, and the rest of the sensible Qualities, did really exist 'without the Mind; and for this Reason, it seem'd necessary to suppose 'some unthinking Substratum, or Substance, wherein they did exist, since 'they could not be conceiv'd to subsist by themselves. Afterwards, in Process 'of Time, Men being convinced that Colours, Sounds, and the rest of the 'sensible secondary Qualities had no Existence without the Mind; they 'stripp'd this Substratum of these Qualities, leaving only the primary ones, 'Figure, Motion, &c. which they still conceiv'd to exist without the Mind, 'and consequently to stand in need of a material Support. But having 'shewn above, that none, even of these, can possibly exist otherwise than 'in a Spirit, or Mind, which perceives them, it follows, that we have no 'longer any Reason to suppose the Being of Matter.' *Id. Ibid.* p. 118, 119. See Quality.

This System, Mr. *Lock* endeavours to set aside, and to prove the Existence of *External Bodies*. – His Arguments see under the Article Existence.

Article Matter

[*After stating the different opinions as to the "Essence of Matter" by e.g. the Cartesians, a lengthy statement of the Newtonian view is given. The article then continues as follows:*]

Hobbes, *Spinosa*, &c. maintain all the Beings in the Universe to be *material*, and their Differences to arise from their different Modifications, Motions, &c. Thus *Matter* extremely subtile, and in a brisk Motion, they conceive, may *think;* and so exclude all Spirits out of the World. See Spirit. Mr. *Berkeley*, on the contrary, argues against the Existence of *Matter;* and endeavours to prove, that it is a mere *Ens Rationis;* and has no Existence out of the Mind: 'Thus, says he, that neither our Thoughts, Passions, nor Ideas, form'd 'by the Imagination, exist without the Mind, is evident; nor is it less evident, 'that the various Sensations or Ideas imprinted on the Sense, however 'blended or combined together (that is, whatever Objects they compose) 'cannot exist otherwise, than as in a Mind perceiving them. This no Man 'can doubt of, that attends to what is meant by the Term *exist*, when applied 'to sensible Things. Thus I say, the Table I write on exists, i.e. I see and feel 'it, and if I were out of my Study, I should say it existed; meaning thereby, 'that if I were in my former Situation, I should see and feel it as before. 'Again, I say there was Odour, i.e. I smelt it; a Sound, i.e. it was heard; a 'Colour or Touch, i.e. it was perceived by Sight or Touch. This is the utmost 'than can be meant by such Expressions; for as to the absolute Existence 'of any unthinking Being, distinct from its being perceived, 'tis a Chimera. 'Their *Esse* is *percipi;* nor is it possible they should have any Existence out 'of the Minds that perceive them. Again, what are Hills and Trees, &c. 'but Things perceived by Sense; and what do we perceive, but our own 'Ideas or Sensations: and can any one of these, or any Combination of them 'exist unperceived? What are Light and Colours, Heat and Cold, Extension 'and Figure, but so many Sensations, Ideas, or Impressions on the Sense? 'And is it possible, even in Thought, to separate therefrom Perception? "'Tis next to self-evident, therefore that all the Choir of Heaven, and Furni-'ture of the Earth; in a word, all the Bodies that compose the System of the 'World, have not any Subsistence out of a Mind; their *Esse* is nothing more 'than their being perceived: and therefore as long as they don't exist in me, 'i.e. are not perceived by me, nor any other created Spirit; they have no 'shadow of Existence at all, unless perhaps in the Mind of some Eternal 'Spirit. It appears therefore, with the Light of an Axiom, that there is not 'any other Substance but Spirit, &c.' See *Inquiry into Principles of Human Knowledge*. See External World.

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* Not listed in T. E. Jessop, *A Bibliography of George Berkeley* (London: 1934). Dr. Jessop is currently preparing a new Bibliography of Berkeley.

INDEX